[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MANUFACTURERS OF FEMA TRAILERS AND ELEVATED FORMALDEHYDE LEVELS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-132
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
47-995 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York TOM DAVIS, Virginia
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DAN BURTON, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York DARRELL E. ISSA, California
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
Columbia VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SALI, Idaho
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
JACKIE SPEIER, California
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
Lawrence Halloran, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 9, 2008..................................... 1
Statement of:
McGeehin, Michael, Director, Environment Hazards and Health
Effects, National Center for Environmental Health, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention......................... 66
Shea, Jim, chairman, Gulf Stream Coach, Inc.; Steve Bennett,
president, Pilgrim International, Inc.; Ronald J. Fenech,
president, Keystone RV, Inc.; and Peter Liegl, president
and CEO, Forest River, Inc................................. 117
Fenech, Ronald J......................................... 134
Liegl, Peter............................................. 141
Shea, Jim................................................ 117
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana, prepared statement of.......................... 94
Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Virginia, prepared statement of......................... 17
Fenech, Ronald J., president, Keystone RV, Inc., prepared
statement of............................................... 136
Liegl, Peter, president and CEO, Forest River, Inc., prepared
statement of............................................... 143
McGeehin, Michael, Director, Environment Hazards and Health
Effects, National Center for Environmental Health, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, prepared statement of.. 69
Sali, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Idaho, prepared statement of............................ 181
Shea, Jim, chairman, Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., prepared
statement of............................................... 119
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, information concerning formaldehyde...... 82
Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 177
Waxman, Chairman Henry A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of California:
Staff reports............................................ 20
Prepared statement of.................................... 5
MANUFACTURERS OF FEMA TRAILERS AND ELEVATED FORMALDEHYDE LEVELS
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 2008
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Waxman, Cummings, Kucinich, Davis
of Illinois, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Murphy, Sarbanes, Welch,
Davis of Virginia, Burton, Shays, Souder, Issa, Bilbray, Sali,
and Jordan.
Also present: Representatives Donnelly and Lampson.
Staff present: Phil Barnett, staff director and chief
counsel; Kristin Amerling, general counsel; Karen Lightfoot,
communications director and senior policy advisor; Greg Dotson,
chief environment counsel; Erik Jones, counsel; Earley Green,
chief clerk; Jen Berenholz, deputy clerk; Caren Auchman and
Ella Hoffman, press assistants; Zhongrui ``JR'' Deng, chief
information officer; Leneal Scott, information systems manager;
Rob Cobbs and Miriam Edelman, special assistants; Mitch Smiley,
staff assistant; Lawrence Halloran, minority staff director;
Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for oversight and
investigations; Keith Ausbrook, minority general counsel; Ellen
Brown, minority senior policy counsel; Larry Brady and John
Cuaderes, minority senior investigator and policy advisors;
Benjamin Chance, Adam Fromm, and Todd Greenwood, minority
professional staff members; Patrick Lyden, minority
parliamentarian and member services coordinator; Brian
McNicoll, minority communications director; and Molly Boyl.
Chairman Waxman. The committee will please come to order.
Today the committee is holding its second hearing on
formaldehyde in FEMA trailers. A year ago the committee
examined how FEMA responded to reports that the families living
in Government trailers were being exposed to hazardous levels
of formaldehyde. Our hearing revealed that the FEMA staff out
in the field said that they needed to test these trailers so
the dangerous levels of formaldehyde would not adversely affect
the families living in these trailers, but FEMA, itself, in
Washington refused to do that. One FEMA lawyer directed: ``Do
not initiate any testing. Once you get results and should they
indicate some problem, the clock is running on our duty to
respond.''
Well, what we learned at that hearing outraged Americans
all across the country. FEMA had a duty to protect families
living in its trailers and it failed them. I expect today's
hearing will also generate a sense of outrage.
The largest supplier of FEMA trailers by far was a
manufacturer named Gulf Stream. In the weeks after Hurricane
Katrina struck, Gulf Stream received contracts from FEMA worth
more than $500 million to supply over 50,000 trailers for
displaced residents of the Gulf Coast.
FEMA failed by ignoring the dangers of formaldehyde and
resisted testing. Gulf Stream's problem is different. The
company did test trailers after hearing the first reports of
high formaldehyde levels. It found pervasive formaldehyde
contamination in its trailers and it didn't tell anyone.
The committee received thousands of pages of internal
documents from Gulf Stream. The documents show that Gulf Stream
regarded the high levels of formaldehyde in its trailers as a
public relations and legal problem, not a public health threat.
There is a confusing array of formaldehyde standards used
by Federal agencies. Here are some of the key numbers:
Ten to thirty parts per billion is the level of
formaldehyde found in most homes. Exposure at this level does
not cause acute health effects like burning eyes, shortness of
breath, or nausea.
A hundred parts per billion is the level at which acute
health effects begin to appear in healthy adults. The Centers
for Disease Control, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health, and the World Health
Organization all recognize 100 parts per billion as a level
that can cause acute adverse health effects. Of course, if it
is a vulnerable individual like a child or an elderly person,
or somebody who is chronically ill, they can experience effects
even below this level.
Five hundred parts per billion is the level at which OSHA
requires medical monitoring of employees. This is an old
standard adopted during the first Bush administration.
Seven hundred fifty parts per billion is the maximum
workplace exposure level allowed by OSHA. It is also an old
standard.
Nine hundred parts per billion is an EPA standard for
hazardous response teams of industrial workers. EPA says that
no one should be exposed to more than 900 parts per billion for
more than 8 hours in a lifetime.
And here's what Gulf Stream found. Over 2 years ago, it
tested 11 occupied trailers. Every single trailer had levels at
or above 100 parts per billion, the level at which acute health
effects begin to occur. Four of the trailers had levels above
500 parts per billion, the level at which OSHA requires medical
monitoring. Gulf Stream also tested nearly 40 unoccupied
trailers. These were trailers that were sitting in FEMA lots
waiting to be given to displaced families. Over half of these
trailers had formaldehyde levels above 900 parts per billion,
the level that EPA says no one should ever be exposed to more
than once in a lifetime. Several had levels over 2,000 parts
per billion. One had levels over 4,000 parts per billion.
Gulf Stream never told any family living in its trailers
about these test results. The company did spend a month
carefully crafting a letter to FEMA about the test results. The
letter told FEMA there was no problem in Gulf Stream trailers.
It said: ``Our informal testing has indicated that formaldehyde
levels of indoor ambient air of occupied trailers fall below
the OSHA standard of 750 parts per billion.''
Gulf Stream did not tell FEMA that all 11 occupied trailers
had levels above 100 parts per billion. It did not tell FEMA
that 4 of the 11 occupied trailers had levels above 500 parts
per billion, and it did not tell FEMA that over half of the
unoccupied trailers had levels far in excess of 750 parts per
billion.
Gulf Stream did say that it would share its testing results
with FEMA, but, of course, FEMA didn't want to know and
apparently never asked for those results.
The press asked Gulf Stream about its formaldehyde levels.
Gulf Stream retained a Washington public relations firm, Porter
Novelli, and spent days crafting a statement. The statement
read: ``We are not aware of any complaints of illness from our
many customers of travel trailers over the years, including
travel trailers provided under our contracts with FEMA.''
Gulf Stream did not tell the media that in March 2006, a
month before Gulf Stream released its statement, an occupant of
a Gulf Stream trailer in Louisiana told the company, ``There is
an odor in my trailer in Louisiana that will not go away. It
burns my eyes. I am getting headaches every day. I have tried
many things, but nothing seems to work. Please, please, please
help me.''
The FEMA contract was lucrative for Gulf Stream. In fact,
the company's top executives saw their compensation double to
over a million per year in 2005 and 2006. But revenue growth
does not justify the conduct we have found. Gulf Stream had
results that showed its trailers were a public health threat
and the company never told the families living in its trailers.
The company also examined the conduct of three other
trailer manufacturers. One of the companies, Pilgrim,
apparently took the FEMA approach. Despite widely publicized
reports of dangerous formaldehyde levels in FEMA trailers,
Pilgrim never conducted any testing at all. The other two
companies, Forest River and Keystone, did not test any trailer
purchased by FEMA, but they did do some limited testing of
other trailers and found high levels. In one case, a contractor
hired by Forest River reported finding formaldehyde levels of
over 1,500 parts per billion in a trailer. The contractor told
the company it should post signs on the outside of the unit
stating: ``Hazardous, do not enter.'' And, like Gulf Stream,
these manufactures did not tell the public or FEMA about their
test results.
My staff has prepared an analysis of the evidence before
the committee, and at the appropriate time I will ask that the
analysis and the documents it cites be made part of the hearing
record.
What this hearing will show is that no one was looking out
for the interests of the displaced families living in FEMA
trailers. FEMA failed to do its job, and the trailer
manufacturers took advantage of the situation.
Our committee has held many hearings on waste, fraud, and
abuse. In one sense today's hearing can be looked at as another
example of Government procurement gone astray. The taxpayers
paid $2 billion for trailers that now have to be scrapped for
junk. But in this case, the health of thousands of vulnerable
families was jeopardized.
During today's hearing the trailer manufacturers will be
asked hard questions, and I think they understand this. But I
also want them to know that I appreciate their cooperation with
the committee and their willingness to appear voluntarily.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. I would like to ask unanimous consent that
the staff report, ``Trailer Manufacturers and Elevated
Formaldehyde Levels,''----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, we would also ask
unanimous consent that the minority staff analysis be put in
the record, as well.
Chairman Waxman. We have no objection to your unanimous
consent request.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We have none to yours.
Chairman Waxman. And let me further ours that we want the
documents, as well, that the report refers to be made part of
the record.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman, I have a concern about the
documents that were and would object to the documents all being
inserted that were provided to the committee without having a
further discussion about whether all those documents need to be
released. Many of them contain private information.
Chairman Waxman. Well, we will withhold all the unanimous
consent requests and then see if we can offer it at a later
time.
Mr. Davis, I want to recognize you for an opening
statement.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the third anniversary of Hurricane Katrina's landfall
approaches, we have the opportunity to focus oversight
attachment non disaster preparedness and effective response.
Katrina still has important lessons to teach about emergency
shelter and longer-term housing for disaster victims.
The committee's 2-year investigation into formaldehyde in
FEMA travel trailers could yield important information about
the need for clearer purchase requirements, better product
safety standards, effective trailer storage practices, and a
more rapid coordinated response to public health issues. But by
narrowly focusing today on four trailer manufacturers, the
committee risks missing broader causes of variable potentially
toxic air quality in emergency housing units. The problem was
and remains confusion among Federal agencies, not some
conspiracy by trailer makers.
As we learned from testimony and exhibits at our hearing on
these issues a year ago, FEMA lawyers advised against a
proactive response to questions about formaldehyde raised by
the occupants and by the trailer vendors in 2006. To this day,
far more confusion than clarity emerges from any discussion of
relevant formaldehyde exposure standards. Published guidelines
on exposure under various circumstances, durations,
temperatures, and atmospheric conditions range from eight parts
per billion to one thousand parts per billion, with nine
standards in between. This chart here illustrates that.
For the record, Gulf Stream went to FEMA for guidance when
they uncovered problems. They didn't cover it up from their
customer. They went to the customer. It is FEMA--who is not
here, unfortunately, and ought to be answerable for the results
in this case--that didn't want to make an issue of this.
The closest thing to a standard for travel trailers is one
set for larger manufactured housing units by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development at 400 parts per billion. There
isn't even agreement on the appropriately validated testing
methodologies to determine how to measure indoor formaldehyde
levels that might be elevated above whatever standard is being
used.
The Federal agency witnesses who might help explain this
Formaldehyde Tower of Babel aren't here today. FEMA is focusing
all its attention on Midwest flood relief. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and HUD also
have information relevant to our discussion this morning. But
they were only invited to participate late last Thursday, as
Federal offices were closing for the holiday weekend. They
declined to participate without more time to prepare.
We should have actually taken this hearing and moved it so
we could have had everyone involved here and had a discussion
over what these standards should have been and what happened
and hear how the Federal Government, who I think has the
largest culpability in this, messed this up.
That is unfortunate, because those agencies could help us
interpret results from multiple Government-sponsored tests of
occupied and unoccupied FEMA trailers and component materials.
The test data suggests some wood products obtained from new
sources, including China, yielded higher than expected
formaldehyde readings. Under pressure to meet emergency trailer
production demand, some of that wood may have been put into
trailers before the normal off-gassing could occur. Poor
ventilation during storage and use, particularly in hot
climates, then trapped and concentrated gases that might
otherwise leach off harmlessly.
So what happens to a trailer after it is manufactured may
have as much to do with its subsequent safety as the inclusion
of unregulated wood products in the first place. Remember,
formaldehyde is a widely used chemical in consumer products. It
is also the natural byproduct of many natural processes, like
combustion, and a constant element of basic metabolic
functions. It is in our bloodstream. Each of us releases some
formaldehyde in this room when we exhale.
Eliminating formaldehyde isn't the issue. The goal is to
keep sustained formaldehyde exposure below the levels suspected
to cause health effects. According to some groups that may be
100 parts per billion or less for most people.
So where do FEMA trailers score? According to data recently
released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the
average level of formaldehyde in occupied trailers fell between
72 and 91 parts per billion--72 and 91. Our staff did some
random tests around the Capitol with a hand-held meter and we
got a reading of 80 parts per billion right next to this
committee anteroom. But some trailers tested much higher, some
lower.
Since the CDC tests didn't account for any contribution
from background levels like those we found here, it is even
less clear how much formaldehyde came from the wood in the
trailers. That leaves trailer occupants already victimized by
one storm caught in a legal tempest of post-Katrina political
scapegoating, bureaucratic finger-pointing, and litigation.
Once again, the committee risked being used as a discovery
proxy for plaintiffs suing companies called to testify before
us, and that is wrong. Instead, we should be asking FEMA why
contract requirements for habitable mobile units weren't more
specific, why inspection procedures weren't consistent, and why
health concerns couldn't trigger standardized testing and,
where necessary, prompt remediation.
We should be asking Federal science and health agencies how
to establish and measure workable standards for formaldehyde
exposure in realistic settings so that this sad event never
occurs again.
We will have the opportunity today to ask representatives
of the travel trailer industry whether they will be able or
willing to ramp up production to meet emergency demand when
FEMA calls again. I hope their answer doesn't mean we will have
even fewer options to meet critical housing needs after the
next inevitable disaster.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Let me ask unanimous consent that Representatives Donnelly
and Lampson be permitted to join us at today's hearing and to
ask questions after all members of the committee have had that
opportunity.
Without objection, that will be the order.
Mr. Souder, you had some reservations about the documents
being put into the record. Let me just make a unanimous consent
request that the staff minority and majority reports be made
part of the record, and we will continue to talk to you about
the documents.
Mr. Souder. Thank you for your consideration.
Chairman Waxman. Without objection, that unanimous consent
will be agreed to.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. We will, without objection on questions,
proceed with our first witness with a 10-minute round
controlled by the Chair and a 10-minute round controlled by the
ranking member, and then for all other witnesses, including the
second panel, we will go back to the 5-minute rule.
Without objection, that will be agreed to.
Our first witness today is Dr. Michael McGeehin. Dr.
McGeehin is the Director of Environmental Hazards and Health
Effects Division of the National Center for Environmental
Health within CDC. Dr. McGeehin has worked with CDC for nearly
30 years focusing on issues related to environmental health.
Dr. McGeehin, we are pleased to welcome you to our
committee hearing today. It is it practice of this committee
that all witnesses that testify before us do so under oath, so
please rise.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. The record will indicate that the witness
answered in the affirmative.
Your prepared statement will be in the record in its
entirety. We would like to ask you to proceed and stay as close
to 5 minutes as you can. We will run the clock. It will be
green for 4 minutes. It will turn orange for 1 minute, and then
red when the time is up. When we see the red light, we would
like to ask you to see if you can conclude at that point.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCGEEHIN, DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENT HAZARDS
AND HEALTH EFFECTS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
Mr. McGeehin. Good morning Chairman Waxman, Mr. Davis, and
other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
I am Dr. Michael McGeehin, Director of Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention's Division of Environmental Hazards and
Health Effects in the National Center for Environmental Health.
My testimony today will focus on the results of CDC
investigations related to FEMA-supplied temporary housing units
following Hurricane Katrina. It will focus on two particular
studies: the final report of the formaldehyde levels in FEMA-
supplied travel trailers and the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory Interim Volatile Organic Compound Report Final
Occupied Trailer Study.
From December 21, 2007, to January 23, 2008, CDC conducted
testing to establish levels of formaldehyde in occupied FEMA-
supplied travel trailers and mobile homes in Louisiana and
Mississippi. CDC randomly selected 519 trailers and mobile
homes for testing. These units represented a cross-section of
the trailer types and manufacturers most frequently used by
FEMA in the Gulf Coast. Interim results were announced in 2008,
and a final report was released on July 2nd. The final report
included additional analyses of data such as temperature,
humidity, and ventilation, but did not change the conclusions
and recommendations from those in the interim report.
The average levels of formaldehyde in all the travel
trailers and mobile homes tested was 77 parts per billion. CDC
concluded from the study that: one, formaldehyde levels found
in some trailers and mobile homes could affect the health of
residents; travel trailers had significantly higher average
formaldehyde levels than mobile homes; temperature, humidity,
trailer type, and brand, keeping windows open, and the presence
of mold were associated with formaldehyde levels; and the
levels measured likely under-represented the exposure, since
levels were likely higher when the trailers were first issued
and during warmer months.
CDC recommended that FEMA relocate residents before the
weather became hot, with priority based on those experiencing
symptoms, children, the elderly, those with chronic diseases,
and persons living in trailer types that had higher
formaldehyde levels.
The Lawrence Berkeley Report, CDC hired Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratories to study indoor emissions of volatile
organic compounds, including formaldehyde, in four vacant FEMA-
supplied travel trailers. The study looked at air levels for
the whole trailer and gases released from specific component
parts of the trailers such as the walls, floors, ceilings,
tables, and cabinets. After Lawrence Berkeley and CDC took
measurements of air inside the trailers at FEMA's Purvis, MS,
storage yard, CDC staff then took each trailer apart,
collected, packaged, and shipped the parts to the Lawrence
Berkeley National Labs, where laboratory staff tested the parts
and determined the type and extent of VOCs that each part
emitted.
The four trailers tested were Pilgrim, International; Gulf
Stream Coach Cavalier; Four Industries Dutchman; and Coachman's
Spirit of America. Analysis at the LBNL Labs found 33 VOCs,
volatile organic compounds, in the air of the trailers. Of
those, only formaldehyde, phenol, and TMPDDIP, a substance used
to make plastic, were found at higher levels in trailers than
commonly found in site-built or manufactured homes. Neither
phenol nor TMPDDIP were found at levels that are considered to
be health hazards.
LBNL found that the amount of formaldehyde given off by
each of 44 of the 45 component parts that were tested were
usually no higher than that given off by similar materials used
in site-built or manufactured homes; yet, measurements inside
each of the four trailers before they were disassembled
revealed formaldehyde levels that were higher than those
normally found in site-built or manufactured homes. This may be
because the trailers used more composite wood products, have
more composite wood products in a smaller space, or let in
fresh air, or a combination of all these factors than the site-
built or manufactured homes.
While the results of this study cannot be generalized to
the entire fleet of FEMA-supplied travel trailers because of
the small sample size, CDC's study of four travel trailers
provides information to help guide future research to
understand the effectiveness of using materials that emit lower
levels of formaldehyde during construction and increasing the
ventilation rates in the trailers.
That is a summary of the two major studies that we have
done. We have ongoing work and some future work that we will be
doing with Lawrence Berkeley that I will be happy to talk about
during the questions.
I thank you for the opportunity to present this information
to you today. We recognize that more needs to be done to
understand the health and safety issues for all the people
living in trailers and parks and mobile homes, both in FEMA
temporary housing and in other units bought commercially.
CDC has initiated discussions with FEMA and HUD on these
issues. Since some trailer types had relatively low levels, we
believe that construction practices are available that could
ensure safe and healthy conditions. We hope to provide
technical input to help achieve that kind of housing for all
Americans who live, learn, and work in these units.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
I would like to add, Mr. Chairman, that when I flew up here
I flew up with your colleague, Congressman John Lewis in the
seat next to me, and I told him that I was going to be
appearing before this committee, and he said, well, that is
good. And I said, well, perhaps. And he said, I am sure they
will treat you kindly. So I kind of consider that a promise.
[Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGeehin follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. That is our intention to treat you kindly,
because all we want to do is get the facts.
I will start off the questions.
Dr. McGeehin, I want to ask you about these regulatory
standards, because there are a lot of different standards that
are out there that apply to formaldehyde. According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, outside air
typically has formaldehyde levels of two or three parts per
billion; is that right?
Mr. McGeehin. That is what the information shows.
Chairman Waxman. OK. And we have a chart that we are going
to put on the screen that shows the outdoor air, but
conventional homes, most homes have formaldehyde levels that
typically range from 10 to 30 parts per billion; is that
correct?
Mr. McGeehin. In the more recent studies, yes, sir.
Chairman Waxman. And we could add that to the chart. Busy
city streets generally have formaldehyde levels that range from
20 to 40 parts per billion; is that right?
Mr. McGeehin. If you are downtown on a corner and you
basically are at gridlock, you can see those sorts of levels,
yes, sir.
Chairman Waxman. The next level I want to ask you about is
100 parts per billion. At this level, some people can suffer
acute health effects like burning eyes, shortness of breath,
and nausea. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir. There are a number of studies that
have shown that sensitized individuals have those symptoms, can
have those symptoms at levels of 100 parts per billion.
Chairman Waxman. How about people who are not sensitized?
Mr. McGeehin. The studies show that sensitized individuals
can. Non-sensitized individuals can have those symptoms. I
mean, it is possible that they could have symptoms at that
level. That is not what the studies have shown. That would be
at higher levels.
Chairman Waxman. OK. CDC is not the only agency that
regards 100 parts per billion as a potentially dangerous level.
The Environmental Protection Agency and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission have also identified 100 parts per billion as
a level at which negative health effects can occur. And the
World Health Organization has also issued guidelines for
formaldehyde saying that in non-occupational settings people
should not be exposed to formaldehyde at 100 parts per billion
for more than 30 minutes; isn't that correct?
Mr. McGeehin. That is true, sir.
Chairman Waxman. Now, I want to ask you about the test
results that Gulf Stream found over 2 years ago when it tested
nearly 50 FEMA trailers. Gulf Stream was the largest supplier
of FEMA trailers. In fact, they received a contract worth more
than $500 million to provide 50,000 trailers to FEMA. First
Gulf Stream tested 11 occupied trailers and it found that every
occupied trailer had levels above 100 parts per billion. Four
of the trailers, nearly 40 percent of those tested, had levels
above 500 parts per billion. At that level, Federal regulations
required medical monitoring of workers.
Dr. McGeehin, were you aware of these findings?
Mr. McGeehin. No, sir, I was not.
Chairman Waxman. As a public health expert, do these
findings concern you? Should families be living in trailers
with formaldehyde levels above 100 and 500 parts per billion?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, we would recommend that families living
in trailers with above 100 parts per billion, 500 parts per
billion, that they be offered alternative housing.
Chairman Waxman. Gulf Stream conducted this testing in
March 2006, more than 2 years ago, and yet the company never
told the families living in these trailers. Do you think that
families should have been informed about formaldehyde risks?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, I think that people should be aware of
the risks of where they are living, yes. I am a firm believer
that people should be aware of any information that we have
that could affect their health.
Chairman Waxman. If you were living in one of these
trailers for 2 years after the company knew that it might have
been formaldehyde levels of over 100 and maybe 500 parts per
billion, what would your reaction be if they hadn't told you
about it?
Mr. McGeehin. As a scientist or as a resident?
Chairman Waxman. Give me either one.
Mr. McGeehin. Well, sir, I would think that if we have
information that people may be exposed to levels of
formaldehyde that may cause symptoms in sensitized adults and
may have an effect on children who are growing up in the
environment, that we should share that with the residents, and
I think that it should be shared in a way that they understand
what we are talking about and so they can make an informed
decision.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Gulf Stream also tested unoccupied
trailers. The levels it found were even higher. Nearly half of
the trailers had levels over 900 parts per billion. EPA says
that no one should be exposed to that level more than once in a
lifetime. One trailer had levels above 4,000 parts per billion.
Do you believe that these are dangerous levels of formaldehyde?
Mr. McGeehin. I think that some of those levels, sir, just
about every person would have symptoms of upper respiratory
irritation, and those would be levels that we would be
concerned about. Yes.
Chairman Waxman. Well, Gulf Stream never told FEMA that the
unoccupied trailers had such high levels of formaldehyde. The
result was that FEMA continued to put these trailers into
service. Thousands of unoccupied Gulf Stream trailers were
given to families after Gulf Stream knew they contained these
incredibly high levels of formaldehyde. I suppose once they are
occupied they can open the windows and the formaldehyde levels
would be reduced, but, given their findings, would that concern
you that FEMA was never informed, that families weren't
informed, FEMA was never informed?
Mr. McGeehin. Again, sir, I would have to go back to what I
had said earlier. I think that if we have information that may
affect people's health, that we should share that information
with the people. I don't know what the correspondence was that
went back and forth--and you and all the committee knows more
about that than I do--between FEMA and the various trailer
manufacturers. I am not aware of that.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Well, we learned a year ago that FEMA
failed the families in the Gulf Coast. They refused to test the
trailers because they didn't want to know the results and then
have to take action to protect these families. I think that is
a shameful failure of Government. Today we are learning that
the largest maker of travel trailers did some testing and did
know that its trailers had dangerously high levels, but it
didn't warn anyone, and I think that is also a shameful
failure.
I have 3\1/2\ minutes, and I am going to reserve that and
now recognize Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I am going to start
with Mr. Souder, yield him as much time as he may consume.
Mr. Souder. I thank the ranking member.
I would prefer my questions stick with the science and that
we don't speculate. Politicians speculate, lawyers speculate,
but we need to focus on the science.
There were some assumptions in the questions there that
were not science. Gulf Stream did a desiccator test, which is
not an accurate test, more of a snapshot, just like taking a
formaldehyde tester in this room is a snapshot, not science,
and then attempted to raise that question with FEMA. They went
beyond the call of duty to do that, but it is not an accurate,
scientific test, and it was presented to you as though they had
scientific evidence rather than a snapshot, which still should
have been followed up on but, nevertheless, is different than
having a control group or an actual test with that.
Now, I have had some correspondence, both verbal through my
staff and in the two hearings at Homeland Security as well as
the previous one here, with Centers for Disease Control. I want
to ask on the record why there was not a control group at the
time to see how much was related to other things in the area,
as opposed to the trailer. The response we got from CDC was it
was compared to the national rather than what was happening at
Katrina at the time or the region. Is that scientific----
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. To not have a control group?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir. I mean, you wouldn't have a control
group on that, I think. What we were asked to do was to look at
the various types of various temporary housing units that were
being used and see what the formaldehyde level was. The ambient
air has been measured in many parts of the country by a number
of different researchers and has been found to be consistently
at two, three, and four parts per billion.
One other thing about formaldehyde that I think is
important to remember, and that is that no scientists that have
looked at formaldehyde consider ambient air a driver of indoor
formaldehyde levels.
Mr. Souder. Let me ask you this question. Your office this
morning said that you had no reason to question the Tulane
study that studied the ambient formaldehyde air levels within
site-built homes in Louisiana that averaged 370 parts per
billion, more than four times that found in FEMA trailers. That
would suggest, since your office is aware of that, that you
know there are differences in Louisiana than elsewhere, because
I don't believe that site-built homes are testing that high
nationally. And that, furthermore, you are aware that in the
Hancock study by your office in Mississippi that there was no
measurable difference between those people who were in trailers
and were in other. That might suggest that other phenomena were
occurring other than just the trailers.
Mr. McGeehin. Sir----
Mr. Souder. You have two studies----
Mr. McGeehin. Right.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. That suggest that the non-trailers
had higher levels, or at least equivalent levels.
Mr. McGeehin. Can I answer?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. McGeehin. The second study, the Hancock study, did not
look at exposure. It was tremendously handicapped by the
absolute destruction of so many medical records. We did not
have a base on which we could compare rates, so we were able to
do what we could in what is called an EpiAid investigation,
which is led by a trainee and is conducted in a 3-week period
of time. With that in mind, as a secondary objective, it did
look at whether or not we would see a difference in the
children's respiratory symptoms, those having reported living
in trailers and those that did not live in trailers, and we did
not see a difference.
Do I attribute that at all to formaldehyde levels? I do
not.
The first study that you talked about, the Leamer study, I
have reviewed that study and it appears to be a well-done
study. It used the NIOSH sampling method that we used, which is
the gold standard sampling method. It was slightly different
than the one we used, but it was the NIOSH method. Its results
were well reported, I thought. It was a well-written article.
And its conclusions were, again, having nothing to do with
ambient air outside in Louisiana. The conclusions were--and I
am doing this from memory, but the conclusions were along the
lines of, we need to increase the ventilation in these homes,
we need to look at what furniture products and wood products
are being used in these homes. Its conclusions were strikingly
similar to the conclusions that came out of our occupied study.
So when I was asked to review the Leamer study I found that
it was a well-done study and well written and that its
conclusions were justified.
Now, if you were to ask me why did that study find elevated
levels of formaldehyde in those homes when many studies at the
same time around the country did not, I do not have an answer
for that.
As you suggested in your opening statement and as I
responded to Chairman Waxman, I am going to stick to the
science. I did not know what the correspondence was between the
manufacturers and FEMA so I didn't comment on that, and so I
don't know the answer, Congressman, as to why those levels were
higher. But I will tell you that the science will tell you that
ambient air is not a driver of formaldehyde in indoor
environments.
Mr. Souder. Well, let me ask you a couple of other
questions, because in your testimony you suggested that some of
the things here are concentration; in other words, there has
been this mis-notion that somehow, like, these manufacturers
spray formaldehyde on things. The products they put in, it's
not unique to a trailer. It is unique to size and the wood and
the wood quality, which we are debating.
Now, in a site-built house or a manufactured home, you said
that the thing which we learned apparently, at least, from this
one study different in this particular environment, and you
don't know why. It could be heat. It could be the number of
people in it. It could be other patterns that occur in the
house such as cooking, the intensity. Would you not think,
based on your own statement, that, for example, when you put a
new kitchen in, because much of this is cupboards, depending on
whether it has veneer or vinyl, can quadruple the parts coming
off of a particular piece? When you put a new kitchen in a
house, for a brief period until it dissipates, that kitchen
area may have higher levels of formaldehyde?
When you put new carpet in a room, particularly if it is a
smaller bedroom, you are going to go up and down, that this is
not an uncommon thing even everywhere, including in our own
offices, including elsewhere? It is not unique to trailers
other than that they are small, and any alternative housing
that we would use, such as a tent, a small wood shelter, unless
it uses pure, natural wood with no adhesive, with no repellant,
the smaller the area and the newer it is, the greater problem
you are going to have?
Mr. McGeehin. Absolutely. The component parts are what lead
to formaldehyde. In my old house I brought this desk in and I
put it together, and it was this beautiful desk that was
perfect for the room, and I remember smelling the formaldehyde
as I was unpacking it, which means at that time I was dealing
with formaldehyde of at least above 500 parts per billion. So
what you bring into a house can definitely affect the
formaldehyde levels. Absolutely true.
Mr. Souder. I also want to establish for the record you
said NIOSH is the gold standard. Is it true that their plus or
minus is 19 percent?
Mr. McGeehin. I don't know what their numbers are, but
NIOSH is the gold standard. And if you look at the literature
on the measurement of formaldehyde for all of the studies, they
almost invariably use the NIOSH standard.
Mr. Souder. I would like to insert into the record the
formaldehyde on the NIOSH standards. The reason is because when
we start to get down to really fine lines here, those
variations become very significant.
We will reserve the balance of the time. I yield back.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. How much time do we have, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. You have 1:47.
Did you want to put something in the record, Mr. Souder?
Without objection, your request will be granted.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Dr. McGeehin, again thanks for being
here.
What is the Federal standard for indoor ambient air levels
of formaldehyde in trailers?
Mr. McGeehin. In residences?
Mr. Davis of Virginia. In travel trailers?
Mr. McGeehin. There is none.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. There is none. Are there
formaldehyde standards for the manufacturing housing industry?
Mr. McGeehin. There is for manufactured housing. There is
for the component parts.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And I think that there are component
part standards but not an indoor ambient air standard; is that
correct?
Mr. McGeehin. That is true, Congressman.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. The indoor levels of 400 parts per
billion are target levels based on wood emission standards, as
I understand it, and these have been in place for 24 years.
Mr. McGeehin. Are you talking about the HUD language?
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Yes, sir.
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, that is language and is not a standard.
The way you described it seems accurate to me.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And from the CDC that is not an
appropriate standard, is it?
Mr. McGeehin. It is not a standard, right. It is, from what
I understand from HUD--and it is lonely at this table--the
language, when they announced their component part numbers, the
language said 400 parts per billion. I have had many
discussions with HUD, and they do not consider 400 parts per
billion a standard.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. In your discussions have you worked
toward promulgating any standards, any levels, any regulations
that would define these so when the Government contracts out
contractors know what the rules are, people who are utilizing
trailers know what the rules are? Has the CDC been proactive in
that at all?
Mr. McGeehin. The CDC is trying to get Government agencies
together to address the formaldehyde issue. My boss, Dr. Howard
Frumkin, is leading a group to try to do that. I think you
know, Congressman, and I think you would agree with this, that
CDC is not a standard-setting agency.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Right.
Mr. McGeehin. I think it is in the best interest of the
American public and the Congress that CDC never become a
standard-setting agency because we can go in and look at
something solely from the public health perspective.
However, there right now are no standards by which a
manufacturer or anyone can say this is the ambient indoor air
standard for formaldehyde in the United States.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So as far as you know, then, what
was delivered here was not not meeting standards because there
were no standards, unfortunately?
Mr. McGeehin. They are not only are no standards for travel
trailers for indoor ambient air for formaldehyde, but there are
no standards to my knowledge--and I have been immersed in this
for the last 15 months--there are no standards for travel
trailers for component parts because the HUD component part
standards only apply to manufactured homes and not to travel
trailers. They are exempted from that.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Mr. McGeehin. That is my understanding.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One of the things, just following up on what was just
stated, clearly the United States of America should not be
purchasing trailers that are going to bring harm to the
American people. Would you agree with that?
Mr. McGeehin. Of course, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Regardless of standards. We are talking about
things like watery eyes; burning sensations in the eye, nose,
and throat; nausea; coughing; test tightness; wheezing; skin
rashes and allergic reactions. Formaldehyde exposure may also
trigger attacks of those with asthma. Extremely high levels of
exposure to formaldehyde can immediately be dangerous to one's
health and life. No matter what the standard is, the American
people were purchasing trailers that could bring harm to other
American people. That is the face of this.
In Katrina we had people who were victimized at least
twice. Their country failed them, except for the Coast Guard,
and then living in these trailers was failing them also.
I don't know what John Lewis said. I am not here to attack
you. But I want to make sure we keep the focus on this. I have
said too many times over and over again our country is becoming
mired in a culture of mediocrity and failure to be empathetic
to human beings. So we can talk about standards here, there,
and everywhere, but the question still remains: do we get what
we bargain for, or are we getting something that does harm?
No, I understand you are not familiar with all the letters
and the correspondence that went back and forth, but, Dr.
McGeehin, Gulf Stream sent a letter to FEMA that read in part--
and I just need your opinion on this very quickly--this is what
the letter said. It is dated May 11, 2006. It said: ``We wanted
to followup on our recent conversations regarding travel
trailers supplied to FEMA. As we have previously indicated, we
wanted to again let you know that we remain committed to
providing high-quality products. No particular information on
ventilation or standards for indoor air quality, including
formaldehyde, are required by Government regulations relating
to travel trailers; however, even though not required, Gulf
Stream has taken the added step of specifying low-emission
standards.''
Now listen to what they said. ``We would like to reiterate
our willingness to assist you in addressing any concerns about
our products. Our informal testing has indicated that
formaldehyde levels of indoor ambient air of occupied trailers
far below, for instance, the OSHA standard of .75 parts per
million--'' now what that means is 750 parts per billion--``we
are willing to share these informal test results with you and,
as mentioned during our meeting, if FEMA wishes to conduct
formal testing protocols on any designated units, we are
willing to participate in that testing.''
Now, did you hear that?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right. What impression did you get from
the letter? Does it sound like Gulf Stream is aware that its
trailers have high formaldehyde levels? I mean, from what you
just heard?
Mr. McGeehin. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And let me tell you that Gulf Stream did not
disclose it in that May 11, 2006, letter. This is what they
didn't disclose. Gulf Stream did not disclose that, of 11
occupied trailers it tested, every one of them showed
formaldehyde levels at or above 100 parts per billion. It did
not disclose that four of the eleven occupied trailers had
formaldehyde levels over 500 parts per billion, which is OSHA's
regulatory action level. OSHA requires medical monitoring of
employees exposed to levels over 500 parts per billion. Should
Gulf Stream have disclosed that information to FEMA?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, that is very hard for me to talk about,
a correspondence that I had nothing to do with and don't know
anything about.
Mr. Cummings. If you were in their position, would you have
disclosed it, as somebody expecting certain things from folk
who are selling things to the American people with their hard-
paid tax dollars, would you have expected it?
Mr. McGeehin. I would go back, sir, to what I said to the
chairman, that I think that sort of information should be
shared and that is a good thing to share that.
Mr. Cummings. And Gulf Stream also did not disclose that
its testing of unoccupied trailers showed even higher levels of
formaldehyde. A large number of these showed levels well over
750 parts per billion in unoccupied trailers. Should Gulf
Stream have disclosed that information, do you think?
Mr. McGeehin. I think if they had that information on
formaldehyde that was above 750 parts per billion that would
have been a good thing to let FEMA know.
Mr. Cummings. Clearly, Gulf Stream spent over a month
putting together this letter. They carefully crafted it, and
this is what they came up with.
Thank you very much.
Again, this is about people. This is about human beings.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Now to the Republican side. Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doctor, you are going to be the only scientist we have
here. The next panel, as the ranking member said, basically are
people being sued as a result of the hysteria that may or may
not be valid around formaldehyde. Let me ask the first
question. Is there a universal standard, or is there a number
that you would set here today to say we should make sure
trailers never have in them under ordinary conditions?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, I would think that if we are going to
talk about----
Mr. Issa. No, no. Is there a number?
Mr. McGeehin. I am sure there is. It is not one that----
Mr. Issa. OK. You are not prepared to give it.
Mr. McGeehin. That is true.
Mr. Issa. OK. The second one--and I want to keep it short
because I only have the 5-minutes--so today the Government, you
are not prepared to give a number, so 700, 500, 100. But let's
take HUD's number for a moment. HUD said that basically you can
outgas at 300 parts per billion out of plywood. Is that number
too high?
Mr. McGeehin. For travel trailers?
Mr. Issa. No. It is a standard for wood.
Mr. McGeehin. It is a standard for wood? Well, we have
shown in our----
Mr. Issa. No, it is the standard for outgassing of wood,
because once you make the wood, people aren't going to make a
lot of different plywoods. There is only so much MDF and
plywood going to be made. Once you have a standard for home,
travel trailers, they are going to tend to use the same in
these industries. Is the standard of basically the glue used to
bond together either MDF or plywood, is that an unreasonable
standard, or are you prepared to answer is that a good number?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, I will tell you what our study showed. I
am not going to say whether that is an unreasonable number. I
will show you that 44 of the 45 component parts met the HUD
standard, and yet for those four travel trailers the levels
were in the multiple hundreds of parts per billion.
Mr. Issa. OK. So we have a standards problem today, based
on that, in my opinion.
Let me ask another question. You take plywood, carpet,
plastic, you name it, the components that all produce
formaldehyde, you put them in a closed, air-tight oven, you
heat them up to 160 degrees. Are you going to get a
concentration of formaldehyde inside the air chamber?
Mr. McGeehin. You are going to get a lot of different
contaminants, probably. Yes.
Mr. Issa. OK. But, in fact, that is what a closed-up
trailer is in the hot sun, no matter who made it, no matter
what they used. That is what you have. One, the elevated levels
are to be expected in a closed-up, hot trailer, which means we
shouldn't be testing them that way. There has to be a
standardized test. Can the CDC come up with a standardized
test, or should some agency come up with a standardized test so
that we can be comparing apples and apples for levels of
ventilation, etc.? Because it sounds like the Government hasn't
provided that yet, either.
Mr. McGeehin. Well, I think if an agency moves toward
setting a standard they will have to give guidance on how that
standard would be measured.
Mr. Issa. OK. The trailer manufacturers are going to be
here after you, and Gulf Stream is the gold standard by most
people. I know you have a gold standard of testing equipment,
but they are the gold standard for trailers, commercial, off-
the-shelf trailers, been around forever, well regarded. Most
people know that name more than the other three manufacturers.
Did you find anything in your testing of those other trailers
that showed that these trailers were materially different than
what the commercial public buys and happily works with on a
regular basis?
Mr. McGeehin. We weren't able to look at whether or not
these were different from that. I mean, there are the off-the-
lot models that were sold to FEMA and used, and there are the
spec models that were sold to FEMA and used.
Mr. Issa. OK. Now, in your opening statement you said
something that I think was very significant that I hope we can
all focus on here today. You talk about mold creating
formaldehyde, the relationship between the two. I will set up
the question fairly narrowly. Louisiana, Mississippi, there is
a huge flood, stagnant water sitting there, unfortunately in
some cases with sewage and all kinds of other things. It is
wet. It is rainy. It is hot. It is humid. Everything gets wet,
including the people going in and out to try to salvage things.
Mold is pervasive. In fact, is that a major contributor in all
likelihood to the general unhealthy atmosphere that existed in
that area of the south after Katrina?
Mr. McGeehin. I think that mold in an indoor environment is
not a good thing. I think that what we found in our multiple
regression was that mold was associated with formaldehyde
levels, not causative of formaldehyde levels. There is a
difference.
Mr. Issa. So you are saying that plywood causes mold?
Mr. McGeehin. No, sir. I am saying that the indoor air
contamination may be related to both of them at the same time.
Mr. Issa. I see. Now, in your test you tested for
formaldehyde. Because you had a large amount of people in a
terrible situation post-Katrina, did you test for anything
else? I can't find any other testing for the effects of mold,
mildew, all the other chemicals, including sewage that backed
up. What test can you provide us with that shows the other
things that may have caused the same symptoms more or less that
are being reported and blamed on only one chemical,
formaldehyde?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, we went to the field as rapidly as we
could to answer the question that was pervasive at the time,
which was formaldehyde. The study was aimed at formaldehyde. We
controlled for smoking and some other factors with a
questionnaire, but we tested for formaldehyde.
Now, if you wanted to look at other VOCs that may be in the
air of these trailers, we looked for 80 different VOCs in the
Lawrence Berkeley study, found 33 that were measurable, found 3
that might be considered elevated, and the focus ended up being
on formaldehyde.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to talk specifically about unoccupied trailers.
Between March and May 2006 Scott Pullin, one of Gulf Stream's
vice presidents, tested occupied and unoccupied FEMA trailers
for formaldehyde. All totaled, he tested about 50 trailers. He
tested Gulf Stream trailers, and he also tested trailers made
by other manufacturers. Mr. Pullin tested over 35 new travel
trailers that had not yet been deployed for displaced
residents. Of those trailers, over 25 were manufactured by Gulf
Stream and 7 by other companies. The levels of formaldehyde in
these unoccupied trailers were remarkable. Over 10 Gulf Stream
trailers contained formaldehyde levels in excess of 900 parts
per billion.
Dr. McGeehin, is there any question that exposure to
formaldehyde at that level is dangerous?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, most studies show that when you get up
above 800 parts per billion or so that most people will have
symptoms at that level of formaldehyde.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. And so certainly at 900 it would be
dangerous?
Mr. McGeehin. The word dangerous has connotations to it
that I am not really comfortable with. One of the things that
we have tried to do in all our reports is to stay away from
words that cause alarm. I would say that at that level we could
expect a good proportion of the population to have symptoms
that were described earlier.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Then let me just go on. The
Environmental Protection Agency has established 900 parts per
billion as an acute exposure guideline level. This level is
designed to guide emergency responders in understanding the
risks from a once in a lifetime exposure such as might occur
after a chemical spill. According to EPA, a one-time exposure
to formaldehyde at levels exceeding 900 parts per billion could
lead to irreversible harm.
Let me ask you, would it be appropriate to allow families
to move into an unoccupied trailer that had formaldehyde levels
of 900 parts per billion?
Mr. McGeehin. I would say, Congressman, a family should not
reside in a trailer that has 900 parts per billion
formaldehyde.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. One Gulf Stream trailer had
formaldehyde levels of 2,690 parts per billion. Other makes of
travel trailers contained similarly high levels of
formaldehyde, with seventeen trailers having formaldehyde
levels over 900 parts per billion and one trailer having levels
of 4,480 parts per billion.
Is it safe to allow families to move into trailers with
these levels?
Mr. McGeehin. Those levels are starkly higher than what we
measured in our occupied trailers. I don't know how those
samples were taken, but across the board, if you have levels
like that, it would be an environment where many people, if not
all people, would have the types of symptoms that we have
talked about.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Well, Dr. McGeehin, I have been
informed that Gulf Stream did not inform FEMA that it had
tested unoccupied trailers, nor did it disclose the remarkably
high levels of formaldehyde in these trailers. In March 2006
thousands of trailers were yet to be deployed. Gulf Stream knew
that there was a major problem, but they remained silent, and
as a result those unoccupied trailers became occupied trailers.
Families moved in and families lived in those trailers, and
undoubtedly many suffered the consequences.
I believe that somebody should be held accountable. Whether
it is FEMA or whether it is Gulf Stream or both, somebody
should be held accountable for not alerting those families that
they were moving into hazardous situations.
I thank you very much and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, I have questions for the second
panel, so I would be happy to yield my time to Ranking Member
Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you very much.
I would start by yielding to my friend, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Doctor, the 900 parts per billion that was talked
about in a closed-up trailer, with what you would consider in a
normal healthy environment--home, mobile home, travel trailer--
of air exchange, this closed-up amount would drop off to
something between the two parts per billion that should be
ambient and whatever was in that trailer; isn't that true?
Mr. McGeehin. It would drop off when you opened up the
trailer, to some extent.
Mr. Issa. So if you open up a trailer and you have positive
exhaust, either through an air conditioner that ducts in
outside air or an exhaust fan which trailers always come with,
what would you expect 900 parts per billion and outside of 2 to
equalize at when it was properly ventilated?
Mr. McGeehin. I have no idea.
Mr. Issa. OK. But in a nutshell, if you are exchanging the
air once every several minutes, or a couple times an hour,
wouldn't you expect it to drop off to essentially whatever the
constant emission is at the highest, that it would be whatever
is being outgassed, because your ambient of two is coming in.
You would end up down in the less than 100, wouldn't you?
Mr. McGeehin. Eventually you are going to achieve an
equilibrium with the gasses that are coming off the component
parts.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Everyone here is appalled at what happened to some of these
poor victims of Katrina, that they ended up in trailers with
high formaldehyde, people became sick. I don't think anybody up
here is anything but appalled by this. What concerns me today
is we only have a small piece of the puzzle. We very much
appreciate you being here lending your expertise on this. It is
a very important part of it.
But it seemed to me we had a crisis, you had to get a lot
of product online very, very quickly, and the Government went
out to the private sector, and there were really no set
standards. The private sector is able to testify, I think, they
had to go to new sources to try to bring the product online
very quick, some of it from China and the east. There was no
checking. There were no clear standards of what is going on at
points when the issue was raised by some of the companies. FEMA
tended to look the other way.
What is so sad today is we are focusing just on the
manufacturers and not on the Government, which I think has a
lot of culpability here. Not the CDC, I might add, but other
agencies who, through time, have not promulgated standards, who
haven't done the appropriate inspections, who I think were so
concerned about getting product that they didn't look through
appropriate regulation and inspection that should have
occurred.
What concerns me is: are we changing this in the future
when the next Katrina hits and we need to bring a lot of
product online? I dare say a lot of these companies that have
provided this in the past are probably unlikely to respond.
What is being done to put standards up so everybody knows
what they need? Do you have any idea, Doctor? You said that CDC
is having discussions at this point.
Mr. McGeehin. Right. I don't know if that will lead to
standards or not, but I would like to take this opportunity, if
I might, just to talk. The members of this panel look at things
in one way, and maybe the public health agency looks at it in a
slightly different way. I look at it from this standpoint,
being immersed in this since last May: I look at it that I
think we need to find out what the exposures were and what the
effects of these exposures were on the people residing in these
trailers. That is what----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Just stop there. You never found any
900 parts per billion in any of your inspections, correct?
Mr. McGeehin. The highest level that we found, sir, was 590
parts per billion in the occupied trailer study.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK.
Mr. McGeehin. So that is the one thing. And the other thing
that has kind of driven me over the last few months is to try
to figure out a solution for this for the future. We went out
and we met. I am probably going to go over and I am going to
probably mess up everybody's time, but we went out and we met
with the RVIA and the other industry in Indiana and had a very
good 8-hour session to talk about what we are doing and what
they are doing. I think that somehow we have to solve this
problem, and I think it is going to have to be a Government-
industry sort of solution to this problem so that we have some
sort of temporary housing units for the next time--and I hope
this doesn t happen for a very long time--the next time we have
a Katrina-size issue hit.
The idea that we don't solve this and that we are faced
with this in whatever period of time I think is abhorrent to
all of us.
So pretty much what I have been focused on is trying to
assess what happened to the people, and we are going to try to
do that with the children's health study; and, second, how can
we make sure that this doesn't happen any more.
My solution to that--and I am not an enforcement agency and
I am here by myself as a public health agency--my solution to
that, I think it has to be Government and industry working
together to figure this out.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I agree.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, what concerns me is, because
of the slant of this hearing, without having the Government
here--and we have seen this time and time again--I have had
companies, experts, global companies where the Government will
go to them and say, we need your help in Iraq. And they say,
why are we to do business with the Government with the exposure
of coming before a committee, the lawsuits, and everything
else? It is a high risk for some of these companies. We forget
that. If we had appropriate standards and oversight this
wouldn't happen. I hope it doesn't happen again. I think it has
been very constructive. Thank you.
Mr. McGeehin. It is not comfortable for any of us, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Yes. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I take some comfort today in what seems to be a growing
bipartisan consensus around this idea that we need to have
standards, we need to have some level of enforceability, and
that both industry and Government have to be part of that
solution. Because this seems to be, as Mr. Davis said, a very
clear example in which the absence of that regulatory structure
has led to some very damaging situations for families and a
very uncomfortable situation for Government and its affiliated
agencies.
And in a town in which there is a lot of derision thrown
onto Government regulation, this seems to be a perfect example
of an area in which there is a very appropriate role for the
Government to step in, to make sure that we have the safety of
residents, especially in a crisis area such as the Gulf, at the
forefront of our discussions. For all of the aspersions that
get cast on the regulatory structures the Government may
impose, we have examples like this which suggest that there are
still places in which we need to step up to the plate.
Mr. McGeehin, I just wanted to get back to the science for
a moment. We have heard a lot of efforts on behalf of members
of this committee and of some of the companies that produce
these trailers to explain away the levels of formaldehyde.
Understanding, as you have said, that there are lots of
different explanations for why a real world trailer or home
might have elevated levels of formaldehyde, what we do have is
your study. I want to just get at some of these alternative
explanations, to the extent that they were factored in to the
work that you have done.
The chairman of Gulf Stream asserts in his written
testimony that we have before us today that cooking fish, for
instance, is a substantial source of formaldehyde in indoor
air. I want to go through a couple of these potentially
alternative explanations.
In the research that you have done on the trailers, have
you come across any indication that the formaldehyde levels in
these trailers were caused by abnormally high levels of cooked
fish or other cooked products that would have been found in
these trailers?
Mr. McGeehin. No. For a number of reasons, we did ask the
residents who participated in the study whether or not they had
cooked in their trailer for a period of time prior to that, not
only because the product that they are cooking could give off
formaldehyde, but also the type of gas they use for cooking
may, so we controlled for that and did not find that to be a
factor in our analysis.
Mr. Murphy. The president of Keystone RV states in his
testimony that formaldehyde is ``found in household cleaners,
antiseptics, cosmetics, and medicines.'' Again, any indication
in the trailers that you have tested that the high levels of
formaldehyde are caused by cosmetics or household cleaners?
Mr. McGeehin. No. We did ask about use of a number of
different household cleaners and did not find that to be a
factor.
Mr. Murphy. Finally, there is a suggestion here that--
again, I wanted to let you restate this--that mold and
potentially backed-up sewage can also lead to some levels of
toxicity or high levels of formaldehyde. Any indication that in
the trailers you tested that mold or sewage led to the high
levels of formaldehyde?
Mr. McGeehin. We measured mold in two different ways,
through the walk-through with trained personnel, and also we
asked the residents about mold, and mold was a factor in the
multi-varied analysis that we did. I don't believe mold was the
source of the formaldehyde. I think the quality of the air that
leads to high formaldehyde levels also leads to mold.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Doctor. I understand the
nuance conversation here about the different factors that can
contribute to high levels of formaldehyde, but we are dealing
with science. We are dealing with studies that have been done
by a trusted agency that have controlled for these very
factors, and it is a legitimate conversation to have except for
the fact that we have a study in front of us that shows us that
we have unacceptable levels of formaldehyde, even controlling
for many of these factors that have been brought before us.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
If the gentleman would permit me.
Mr. Murphy. I would yield to the chairman.
Chairman Waxman. I do want to point out, because we have
had several complaints that we haven't had Government witnesses
here, we invited other Government witnesses. We invited FEMA.
We have invited all the Government agencies that have been
requested by Mr. Davis and other members of the committee. They
did not agree to come here. But we did have a hearing on this
subject with FEMA.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. My understanding from FEMA and HUD
is they didn't get the invitation until Thursday before the
weekend to come here for this hearing, and that is why they
declined. I still wish they could have been here. I think it
would have added a lot, but I think it would have helped to
have been able to get them all here at the same time.
Chairman Waxman. I don't disagree with you, except I do
want to point out I think you are misinformed. They were
invited at the same time that CDC was asked to come here, and
we have CDC represented here, and FEMA refused to come. But we
did hear from FEMA last time around, and what we heard from
FEMA is they didn't want to know about the problem. They just
didn't want anybody to do any evaluations because they were
afraid they would find high levels.
If I can yield myself another 30 seconds of my own time
that I reserved before, we heard the statement we ought to have
Government and industry working together to protect the
consumers. I think we have a good example here of Government
and industry working together to hurt the consumers. Government
didn't want to know the information. FEMA didn't want to know
what levels of formaldehyde were in these trailers. And then we
have Gulf Stream trailer manufacturers who don't feel any moral
or other responsibility to let FEMA and the families know that
they have done tests on these trailers and they find high
levels of formaldehyde, which they obviously knew were thought
of as excessive and harmful to people's health.
So what we have is Government failure and industry failure.
If we passed laws with standards, I think that is great, but
what we have to make sure is that the representations that are
made to the Government are about what is actually happening,
and the Government asks the questions, and they work together
to make sure the public is protected.
I think what we have seen here is no regulation and no
self-regulation by the industry, as well.
I now want to yield to Mr. Burton 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Would the gentleman yield me just 20
seconds?
Mr. Burton. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me just note again for the
record I ask unanimous consent, this is a chart from our
minority report, 98.8 percent of the temporary housing units
tested by the CDC in Louisiana and Mississippi met the HUD
ambient air targets for formaldehyde. One of the problems here
is that target level is probably too high and it ought to be
changed. But the customer in practically 99 percent of the
cases met it, and there were inspections in some of the other
instances.
So as we take a look at this, I think that we need to focus
on what the Government did as the buyer. There was no direct
selling between the trailer manufacturers and the end users;
they sold to the Government, and the Government had bad
standards in some cases. And in other cases, when the
manufacturers went to the Government and said there was a
problem, the Government said, let's not talk about it.
Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. If the gentleman might permit, that HUD
standard is not an adequate standard. It is not even----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I just made that point, Mr.
Chairman. It is not an adequate standard, but why beat up on
the customer.
Mr. Burton. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Burton, your time.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
I am not going to take very much time. I would like to have
my whole statement presented for the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Burton. I have been familiar with the travel trailer
and trailer industry since I was a kid, and I haven't seen any
evidence that they have violated any rules and haven't done
their job to perfection. There are over 8 million people in
this country that live in mobile homes and RVs and travel
around the country with no problems with the formaldehyde issue
we are talking about today, and so instead of beating on the
manufacturers I think we ought to give them a little vote of
confidence because they have such a good track record in the
past.
With that I yield to my colleague, Mr. Souder from Indiana.
Mr. Souder. I thank my friend from Indiana.
While there may be differences of opinion, I really am
deeply concerned about the use of the word moral to apply to
people who worked overtime to provide units to people who were
in housing crisis. They may have worked their people hard. They
did it under great pressure. We had tremendous hiring
challenges in Indiana, training challenges, but they worked
overtime to try to meet the standards at half the cost of a
normal unit. I believe the chairman was more referring to a
question, and I think that as we try to make sure that people
live in safe homes and that people work in safe plants, this
debate is not about emotional rhetoric, it is, in fact, about
science.
One of the core fundamentals that is being tossed around
here is whether Gulf Stream's test constitutes science. It was
a flash test with a desiccator method, which is not the way
that you test.
Now, should FEMA have responded to then do scientific
tests? We can't pretend and keep asking Dr. McGeehin how he
would have reacted to something that was a flash warning test
like you do with the formaldehyde test or that type of thing.
We are making big judgments here on the morals of people based
on the fact that one company did have concerns with a shipment
of wood, then did a flash test on that, did say a range but
didn't give all of it because the variation is far too great to
be scientific with the method that they used.
Now, I also want to make sure that when Mr. Murphy asked
some questions, that it isn't really scientific to say, when he
asked did you test, to say the individuals were asked, because,
in fact, you didn't test to see whether other things caused the
standards, you asked them whether they did anything.
Mr. McGeehin. I think I stated that we did it with a
questionnaire and that we controlled for it in the analysis. I
think I exactly said those words.
Mr. Souder. It shouldn't be taken here that there was a
test done on other things. That was a self-dependent referral
rather than an actual scientific test to see what else was
there.
We come back to this Tulane study that said the ambient air
study in Baton Rouge was 390 parts per billion. That was the
average, which means they had four times what you were finding
in these trailers average. Would you recommend that 390
average, which means probably some of them were in the 500-600
range, that everybody who lives in that region should move out?
Mr. McGeehin. I would recommend exactly what the authors of
that recommended.
Mr. Souder. Which is?
Mr. McGeehin. People should look to ventilate their houses
more, that they should look at what component parts they are
putting in and what additional work they are having done on
their house.
Mr. Souder. And that is then your recommendation for the
trailers, as well, not panic?
Mr. McGeehin. I am sorry, sir. I didn't hear that.
Mr. Souder. In other words, if they are averaging 390 in
Louisiana in a general site-built house, which is higher than
the average here, would you make the same recommendations for
emergency FEMA trailers that you just made to Baton Rouge? Why
are we having a double standard on this group and not basically
the same level of concern about possibly the entire southern
region there.
Mr. McGeehin. Congressman, we did make that recommendation.
We recommended that FEMA move the people out of these units
before the weather became hot and the levels went back up. In
the meantime, we did recommend that people ventilate their
trailers more, be careful, do not smoke inside their trailers--
--
Mr. Souder. Taking back my time, did you recommend the same
thing to the people in Baton Rouge?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, we didn't do that----
Ms. Souder. It's 390.
Mr. McGeehin [continuing]. Study, sir.
Mr. Souder. OK. You already testified you felt it was an
accurate study. The question is why would you make a
recommendation to one group and not the other?
Mr. McGeehin. Sir, that was a study that was done 9 years
ago that was given to me 2 days ago. I can't go back and
recommend to the citizens who are in those homes that they move
out. I mean, that is not what we do. This is a study that I was
asked what did I think about this study, and I gave you that
assessment.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time is expired.
Now Mr. Sarbanes.
Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You may have covered this. I apologize if you have. But
when you do a test to determine if the standard is being
satisfied whether a trailer is safe or not safe, do you do it
with the windows closed? Do you do it with the windows open? Do
you do it with the fan running?
Mr. McGeehin. For our occupied study what we wanted was for
people to set their trailers up the way they normally have
their trailers when they are sleeping, so we asked them to set
it up, and if they keep their windows open 3 inches, if they
keep their windows wide open, if they keep the air conditioning
running, however they set their trailers up for that period of
time, that is how we asked them to set their trailers up and
that is how we sampled. We wanted it to be the most realistic
exposure that we could.
Mr. Sarbanes. But that would mean you would sort of end up
on a trailer-by-trailer basis coming up with what----
Mr. McGeehin. We were interested in what the human beings
were being exposed to for formaldehyde.
Mr. Sarbanes. OK. The second question I have is in terms of
sustained exposure, so day after day after day. In somebody who
is exposed to, let's say, 250 parts per billion for 50 days in
a row at a higher risk of some kind of harm than somebody who
is exposed to 250 parts per billion for 10 days in a row and
then are not exposed to that subsequent?
Mr. McGeehin. Essentially what you are doing when you look
at human exposure to any contaminant is, in one way or another,
you are basing it on an index, and the index is based on the
intensity of the exposure--in this case, the level of
formaldehyde that you are mentioning--and the duration of
exposure, how long they are exposed. When you are dealing with
contaminants, I think the rule of thumb is to try to decrease
either of those components as much as you can. Either decrease
the intensity by decreasing the amount of exposure that they
have to formaldehyde, and/or decrease the duration of exposure.
You don't want people being exposed to a contaminant that
causes symptoms, and the more you can decrease either one of
those you decrease the exposure index.
Mr. Sarbanes. So there is a cumulative dimension of
potential harm that can come?
Mr. McGeehin. Particularly when you get into the
carcinogenic potential of formaldehyde. Formaldehyde by the
International Agency for Research on Cancer [IARC], is
considered a human carcinogen, and when you have human
carcinogens you really want to try to decrease the person's
exposure as much as possible.
Mr. Sarbanes. All right. So it becomes relevant the use for
which a trailer is being put?
Mr. McGeehin. Well, we absolutely believe that.
Mr. Sarbanes. Yes.
Mr. McGeehin. One of the recommendations when we were
talking to FEMA is that, while you don't want to get into a
specific number when people are living in a unit, one of the
issues is how is that unit being used. If you have a family
with young children and they are in the unit 24 hours a day, as
some of the families in the parks were, that is different than
a person who has a unit parked outside their home who spends 8
hours at work and then comes home and spends 4\1/2\ hours
repairing the roof to try to move back into their home. So the
use of the trailer is an important part of the level of
exposure.
Mr. Sarbanes. You know, people keep referring to the
emergency circumstances as an excuse/explanation for folks
being put in harm's way where there were these high
formaldehyde levels. But, leaving that aside for a minute,
would you agree that if the alarm had been sounded earlier and
more consistently by both the manufacturers and FEMA, that we
would have gotten started much earlier on doing the kind of
thinking you say you have been doing about how we can fix this
problem going forward and think about the kinds of housing that
should be available to people in these disaster recovery
situations?
Mr. McGeehin. I think it is fairly easy to imagine the time
line that we currently have being moved up.
Mr. Sarbanes. Yes.
Mr. McGeehin. And then moving everything up whatever number
of months that may have been.
Mr. Sarbanes. I mean, I am running out of time, but FEMA
has only just recently come up with a national disaster housing
plan. Actually, it is just a preliminary blueprint, I guess,
and Congress called for it 2 years ago. That would have
included and should have recommendations on creating different
kinds of inventory of housing inventories in these disaster
situations. We could have gotten started much earlier on that
if people had come clean earlier with the information on these
kinds of exposures.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Sarbanes.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
I will first yield to my ranking member, and then I will
take the rest of the time.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, we had talked about
notification. I have letters from you to Steve Preston, the
Secretary of HUD; Steve Johnson, the Administrator of EPA; John
Howard from OSHA; Ed Faulk from OSHA; and Nancy Nord from the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission July 3rd--that is last
Thursday--inviting them to come to testify before the
committee.
I understand there was a letter slightly earlier than that
to FEMA, but they told us they didn't get it until Thursday.
The manufacturers have been on the hook here for a month, have
known that they were coming here.
So this isn't trying to get everybody together at one table
to discuss this. This was almost an afterthought, and as a
result of that we have an incomplete hearing.
This was a tragedy what happened here to some of the
families that had these high levels. It shouldn't happen. It
shouldn't have happened. It should never happen again. And we
ought to focus on what we can do. But the Government bears the
prime responsibility here for not appropriate inspections, not
reacting to what some of the manufacturers had told them early
on that there were problems, not going through proper
inspections, even with a moving and very uncertain standard.
So that is the difficulty here. When you have lawsuits
outstanding against some of these companies, we know how this
works. We are all adults. You are going to have lawyers put in
testimony from some of the Members of Congress and some of the
staff reports into the record before juries to try to get high
awards, and so they are trying this. We have seen this happen
before, unfortunately. We understand the politics of that, but
that is so unfortunate here about not having the Government
here and working toward a solution instead of trying to frame a
lawsuit. That is my major concern with this.
What happened was a tragedy. It shouldn't happen again.
Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Happy to yield.
First, Doctor, thank you for coming. Thank you for your
good work. This is a very important issue, and we appreciate
your expertise and talents.
I would like to ask about what happens in the future. FEMA
has specified a new procurement specification of 16 parts per
billion regarding formaldehyde in FEMA trailers. First, do you
think this new procurement number of 16 parts per billion is
reasonable?
Mr. McGeehin. We weren't asked, Congressman, to comment on
that before FEMA came out with that. I know on which that is
based, which is based on a NIOSH standard that was based on
formaldehyde being considered a carcinogen, and at that point
16 parts per billion I believe was the lowest level that could
be detected by the analysis of air sampling at that time. I
think 16 parts per billion across the board for temporary
housing is going to be a difficult mark to make.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Let me ask you, in your interim report figure two depicts
100 parts per billion of formaldehyde as an intermediate range
and 1,000 parts per billion as a higher range. Does CDC still
stand by the figure? In light of the mean result from the CDC
trailer study being 77 parts per billion, wouldn't it be
inappropriate and misleading to classify trailer formaldehyde
levels as high?
Mr. McGeehin. What we tried to do with that was have a
sliding scale so that people understood that it wasn't just a
one-time measurement of formaldehyde that determined whether or
not an environment was safe and healthy or not, that there were
other factors involved. What CDC has done from the beginning of
this is to look at the literature and to go by what the
literature says, that levels of formaldehyde in an indoor
environment may cause symptoms, and at those levels that is how
we basically have approached this problem.
Mr. Shays. Right. But in your interim report it is
basically 100 to 1,000, but 100 being kind of the low range,
which is still higher than the 77 parts per billion. So do you
need to adjust that number down of 100?
Mr. McGeehin. No. I think that was done by the graphics
people because it made some sense to have 100 and 1,000. If you
are looking at the colored version of that you will see a
gradation in that between 100 and 1,000 where various symptoms
occur. I don't think we need to adjust that particular graphic,
because we have been consistent in what we have said from the
very beginning that at 100 parts per billion sensitive
individuals show symptoms. There are a number of studies that
show 300 parts per billion, and at 100 parts per billion there
are a number of agencies--WHO, EPA, ASHRAY--that talk about
that as the level that action should be taken. So I am very
comfortable at the 100. If you are concerned about the 1,000--
--
Mr. Shays. No, I am not concerned; I am just making the
point. I think you have answered it. The 100 to 1,000 is an
illustration, but 1,000 is pretty low, and there are some
symptoms that show at that point.
Mr. McGeehin. You mean 100.
Mr. Shays. It does suggest that it is certainly higher than
16 or 77.
Mr. McGeehin. Right. The 77 was the geometric mean that we
found across the board. I think what you need to do when you
look at that study is that you also have to look that for some
manufacturers 56 percent of theirs were above 100.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
Dr. McGeehin.
I would like to ask you about a CDC study where you worked
with the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. As I understand
it, you actually deconstructed four travel trailers that were
purchased by FEMA, and these trailers were taken apart so you
could test the emission level of volatile organic chemicals
from the component parts of the trailers. These tests showed
that formaldehyde was being emitted inside the travel trailers
from the component parts; is that right?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson. Yes. They also show that formaldehyde was the
only volatile chemical in the travel trailers that was at a
level high enough to negatively impact human health; is that
correct?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson. Yes. Were you aware that the Gulf Stream also
conducted the test of its component parts 2 years ago?
Mr. McGeehin. No, I was not.
Ms. Watson. OK. Based on documents that were obtained by
this committee, it appears that they did, and the company
actually hired another company called Progressive Engineering
to test individual samples of the paneling, and Gulf Stream,
itself, appeared to have tested the fiber board, vinyl, and the
drawers to determine their formaldehyde levels. That sounds
similar to the tests that you conducted; is that so?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, it does, depending on what type of
chamber testing they did, but yes, it does.
Ms. Watson. Yes. Let me tell you what this company found as
a result of its testing. Progressive Engineering found elevated
levels of formaldehyde emitting from the paneling, and if we
were reading Gulf Stream's notes correctly, they found high
levels from the other components, as well.
If you had been informed of this information 2 years ago,
would it have raised concerns for you?
Mr. McGeehin. Well, again, I will go back to what I have
reiterated. Yes, ma'am, any information that shows levels of
formaldehyde at levels that can cause symptoms would have been
of concern to us.
Ms. Watson. I know some of this is redundant, but I am
trying to move forward.
Mr. McGeehin. No, that is fine. That is fine. I understand.
Ms. Watson. Would it have been beneficial for FEMA or CDC
to have this information when it began investigating these
issues? I have heard you say earlier that if we had that
information we could have moved on it, correct?
Mr. McGeehin. I think any information early on would have
been of great benefit.
Ms. Watson. OK. So the problem is that the company did not
tell FEMA about these component tests, and Gulf Stream had a
contract with FEMA that was worth $550 million to manufacture
these travel trailers. When it learned in 2006 that there was a
formaldehyde problem with the trailers it manufactured, the
company chose to remain silent. And so FEMA has been rightly
criticized for its response to Hurricane Katrina and its
response to the formaldehyde problem, but it should not bear
all the blame, so we need to be talking to each other openly,
honestly, in a transparent way. That is the reason why we have
these Oversight Committee hearings, so a tragedy like this and
our response will not have been as flawed as it was.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time, but I wanted to
make that point.
Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. McGeehin. Can I ask a question?
Chairman Waxman. Go ahead.
Mr. McGeehin. If those data are available, we would love to
see them, because one of the things that we want to do in
followup to the work that we just did with Lawrence Berkeley is
to try to get some of the original component parts and see what
they off-gas and see if we can model to see what happened over
the 2-year period.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Chairman, through the Chair if we can ask
staff to provide the Doctor with that information.
Chairman Waxman. We will certainly try to make that
available to you.
Ms. Watson. Great.
Chairman Waxman. I think it is a reasonable request, and I
would assume the manufacturers would agree with that.
Mr. McGeehin. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Watson. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Souder, you have not taken your 5
minutes. Do you want to proceed now?
Mr. Souder. OK. I thank the Chair.
I think it is really important, because I know that you get
questions directed at you, and some of these you weren't
familiar with, that the Gulf Stream test was a desiccator test,
not a chamber test. There was no chamber test done, which your
agency says has to be done multiple times. They hired a firm to
try to do this test, because they suspected that the wood may
have a problem. They tried to alert FEMA. They told them a
general range because it is not scientific.
Mr. McGeehin. Yes.
Mr. Souder. You used the word chamber. Do you agree that
chamber testing is the way to do scientific testing?
Mr. McGeehin. That would be the gold standard for this.
Mr. Souder. And would you agree that the other is probably
not even a bronze, particularly if you just do it once and you
flash test, because number of people, what may be happening
that day? You said yourself 100 to 1,000 because there may be
temporary things occurring.
Mr. McGeehin. Well, sir, I don't know whether or not it has
been compared to the standard, but if there were data that
showed whatever testing they did was compared to the standard,
then we could make that assessment.
Mr. Souder. Right. In other words, we don't have that
assessment?
Mr. McGeehin. I certainly don't.
Mr. Souder. Well, they didn't either, because they didn't
do chamber testing.
Mr. McGeehin. Right.
Mr. Souder. All they were really alerting FEMA to is hey,
there may be some problem. Now, Lawrence Berkeley Labs said
this: as containing high levels of formaldehyde probably
resulted from cheap wood used by the manufacturers under
permissive Government standards. Do you think, from you own
testing, that the variations--because most of them fell here--
were resulting from probably a certain type of wood, or are you
willing to agree with how Lawrence Berkeley is probably the
best we can come up with there?
Mr. McGeehin. I think the Lawrence Berkeley report is the
best data that we have on the component parts used.
Mr. Souder. So, while there may be other variables, to the
degree we had a problem there, it appears to have been
aggravated, at least, by the wood.
Mr. McGeehin. Yes.
Mr. Souder. You used a very understated term. You said it
would probably be pretty hard to achieve a 16 level?
Mr. McGeehin. Right.
Mr. Souder. That is probably true, since the average rooms
that have been tested here, not in chamber tests, are between
30 and 70, which means that we had better not put anybody in
our House office buildings in an emergency, so probably saying
16 is a pretty under-stated statement. I appreciate you
pointing that out.
I want to come back, because the Hancock study and the
Tulane study were not by you. Well, the Mississippi one was.
You explained the difficulties with that, because we have been
going back and forth here today between chamber tests, non-
chamber tests, different agencies, using something from a flash
test that is nowhere near a gold standard that was used in
quoting some high figure, and we go back and forth between
ambient air and testing of the wood. We go back and forth
between ones that people are living in and ones that have been
packaged up with no ventilation, some new, some old. We don't
have the VIN numbers. The agencies don't appear to have those
numbers to be able to match up. It appears that the numbers
didn't even match up right in some of the cases with the
manufacturers, that there are significant problems.
Now, I want to come back because in Hancock, where it
tested ambient air, with the limitations, there wasn't a
difference between the trailers and the housing. And in the
Tulane study, which is NIOSH and what you said was gold
standard, the average was 390, where the average on these
trailers was 77 or 87.
Now, to come back to this, it is not your agency and you
didn't do that study. You only reviewed it 2 days ago. But if
we are panicked about what we keep hearing of 400, 200 could be
exposure, 100 could be, wouldn't that be suggesting that CDC
and others ought to be checking everything in the State of
Louisiana and elsewhere since they are four times the average
standard of these trailers? The average is four times higher.
Why isn't there panic about the whole region if we are
panicking about 100 and 200?
Mr. McGeehin. Well, sir, there must be something unique
about the houses that were tested in that study. Ambient air is
not a driver for formaldehyde in indoor air.
Mr. Souder. Let me ask the question. Do you have any
scientific evidence that there was anything unusual about their
test?
Mr. McGeehin. No. I think the testing process that they
used, according to the article that I read, was fine.
Mr. Souder. Then your answer was not scientific in saying
it must be something else, because, in fact, they were site-
built homes; that, in fact, we could have a problem with all
site-build homes. You don't know the answer to the question.
Mr. McGeehin. Except that I am familiar with formaldehyde,
sir, and outdoor air is not a driver for indoor formaldehyde.
Mr. Souder. Well, their test didn't suggest it was.
Mr. McGeehin. But if you read their conclusion, sir, they
are not suggesting that it is ambient air, either. They are
suggesting that it is some product inside, either a ventilation
issue or the products that are used inside the home.
Mr. Souder. Which is the same question that we have here--
--
Mr. McGeehin. Absolutely.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. With these trailers.
Mr. McGeehin. Absolutely.
Mr. Souder. My point isn't that the ambient air--I am sorry
if I confused the ambient air, because that was questioned a
little more potentially over in Hancock--that the question is
that if they got these results that are four times higher,
which could be the wood, which could be the ventilation, why
aren't we concerned and looking at those houses like we are
concerned about these houses, because it might not just be the
poor people here; it may be the poor people all over that zone,
and it may be the poor people in other types of homes, because
we are, in my opinion, picking on one industry without really
having a balance.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Souder. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Was that a question? Did you have a
response to that?
Mr. McGeehin. I want everybody on the panel to know that
CDC and I are not picking on an industry at all. I mean, we
have had good conversations with the RVIA and other industry.
They have attended our Scientific Oversight Panel meetings
twice. I think that our people have gone out to their factories
to see how they operate.
From our standpoint, there is no industry bashing going on
with CDC in any way, shape, or form. I simply state, as I
stated before, that we are trying to get the answers for this,
we are trying to provide good data.
I, quite frankly, think that the LBNL study that we just
completed and just published should be something that industry
jumps on and looks at very carefully, because I think it gives
a lot of guidance as to what the problems might be and how they
might be solved.
I just want to make that statement.
Chairman Waxman. I think that is an excellent point.
The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. No questions.
Chairman Waxman. Would the gentleman yield me some of his
time?
Mr. Tierney. I certainly yield to the chairman.
Chairman Waxman. I want to point out the situation, because
we have heard complaints about some other witnesses from other
agencies not being here. The manufacturers were invited,
because this is a hearing about the manufacturers, on June 4,
2008. On July 1st, our staffs, bipartisan staffs, heard from
CDC because CDC was doing a study about formaldehyde levels as
a result of our first hearing with FEMA over a year ago. As a
result of our hearing where we questioned why FEMA didn't do
anything about this problem, FEMA said, oh, we are going to ask
CDC to do an evaluation. So CDC was ready to report its
evaluation and to release it on July 2nd.
So when our staffs talked to--I don't know if it was you,
Dr. McGeehin.
Mr. McGeehin. It was.
Chairman Waxman. I guess it was--and heard what the report
was, Republican staff said, Well, let's invite FEMA back, as
well as CDC. So we sent an official invitation to FEMA and to
CDC on July 1st. This was an official invitation to come.
Some time later in the week, the minority then said, well,
wait a second. We ought to have HUD, as well, to come in and
talk about these standards, in order to get all the relevant
witnesses regarding standards. Well, our staff replied, this
isn't a hearing about standards; this is a hearing about
whether the manufacturers had information that they should have
shared with the Government, FEMA, and whether they should have
shared it with the people living in the trailers.
But, nevertheless, we sent an invitation to HUD, NIOSH,
EPA, CPSC, and OSHA on July 3rd. Now, that is awfully late, and
they said they weren't available to come. FEMA said they
couldn't come at all because they were busy with the
emergencies that are going on.
I want to make that point very clearly and yield to Mr.
Davis if he wants to add anything further.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me just note the CDC report was final, I
think, July 2nd, but we had information July 1st, but that was
the final report. The interim report was in February, as I
understand, and there wasn't a substantial change, was there,
between the two?
Mr. McGeehin. No.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So this has been common knowledge.
We have had plenty of time to plan for this.
Second, I mean, the difficulty here is when a contractor
responds to standards from the Government and doesn't meet
those standards they ought to be held accountable, because we
have standards, we know. in this case we didn't have standards.
You had conflicting standards throughout Government over what,
where, and ambient air standards between HUD and EPA and
everybody else.
Chairman Waxman. But if I could reclaim my time, that is an
odd issue to raise. It is confusing, because we have so many
different standards, but when we have different standards we
can look and see. Well, does that make sense to have the
standards we have? But what we are concerned about is the
health and well-being of people living in these trailers, and
the Centers for Disease Control, which has not established
standards, is giving us their professional judgment about when
it is a risk for people living in those trailers.
Even if we took the report from the manufacturers of over
100 parts per billion, CDC, Dr. McGeehin, has testified over
and over again that he thinks that is an awfully high amount of
formaldehyde for people to be living with.
Now, HUD has a different standard, and it is a different
number that people can live with more formaldehyde than what
Dr. McGeehin is pointing out. We have heard complaints that the
manufacturer's study wasn't adequate, it wasn't done
professionally, it as only a flash study. I don't know. We will
go into that with the next panel. But what they knew from their
evaluation, however complete it was, is that there was a
problem going on; that they were getting very high ratings of
formaldehyde in these trailers. Knowing that, they mislead--I
believe actually mislead--FEMA when they said, ``We are not
getting complaints,'' when, in fact, they were, and we have
done some studies, but the impression was it is not a big
problem but we will share our studies with you. So they had
some sense that maybe FEMA wasn't going to ask, and they would
share it, I presume, if they were asked, but FEMA didn't ask,
which is not a good point for FEMA, and the trailer
manufacturer didn't share the information but seemed to say we
have some studies but we haven't had any complaints.
If what they knew is that it was more than 100 parts per
billion, and they knew it was way in excess of that, they
should have had some suspicious--in fact, I believe they had
some suspicions that people were at risk.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, in the next panel the
companies can take care of themselves, and we ought to ask
those questions there, but there is also ample evidence that in
many of these cases they passed on this information to FEMA and
FEMA either ignored it or didn't want to address the situation.
As I noted before, almost 99 percent of the temporary units
that were tested by the CDC in Louisiana and Mississippi met
the HUD ambient air targets for formaldehyde standards. And
these standards I think were bad standards and we ought to
focus on changing these standards.
Chairman Waxman. What kind of an argument is that to make
that the manufacturers knew they met a standard that wasn't a
good standard, and therefore it was OK for them not to share
the information? I don't believe they shared the information
with FEMA. They invited FEMA to ask them further information.
FEMA never asked.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Well, we can settle that with the
next panel, but if you are holding contractors to some moving
standard, I don't think you will ever get anybody to do
business with the Government again. That is the difficulty.
Chairman Waxman. Whether this is a standard or not, I think
a manufacturer of a product has a responsibility not to harm
the people using the product.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We all agree with that. There is no
question about that. But the question here is, if you are
meeting a standard and it is the wrong standard, is that the
Government's fault for setting the wrong standard or is it the
contractors' problem for meeting a standard? I think we can
have that argument, but you seem to want to put ex post facto
standards into account, and I don't think that is appropriate.
Chairman Waxman. There was no standard. We can all agree to
that. There was no standard for them to meet.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Well, there was a HUD standard, and
they met it 99 percent of the time. But we can have this
discussion with the next panel. It is not my intention to
defend anybody.
Chairman Waxman. They have test results over 2,000 and
4,000 parts per billion, which is over and above any of the
standards, all of the standards. It is worse than any of the--
--
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, there was no finding
of any delivered trailer that had anything close to that, as
Dr. McGeehin has testified. The highest standards they had is I
think you had a couple over 500.
Chairman Waxman. I am talking about what the manufacturers
reported.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I am talking about what they
delivered to the Government. That is what we are talking about,
not what they found in reports.
Chairman Waxman. Well, Mr. Tierney's time has expired and
it is now Mr. Clay's opportunity to pursue questions.
Mr. Clay. I am so glad I have some time left, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. Last winter CDC tested levels of formaldehyde in a
group of randomly selected travel trailers and mobile homes.
CDC finalized its report on these testing results just last
week.
Doctor, CDC found that trailers manufactured by Forest
River, Gulf Stream, Keystone, and Pilgrim all had elevated
levels of formaldehyde; is that right?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. The CDC study states that formaldehyde levels
tend to be higher in newly constructed trailers and during
warmer weather; is that correct?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir. That is pretty well accepted.
Mr. Clay. So, in your expert opinion, would the elevated
levels that CDC discovered in the winter of 2007 been even
higher 2 years ago in 2005?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. And, in your expert opinion, would the
formaldehyde levels that CDC discovered in the winter of 2007
have been even higher during the summer?
Mr. McGeehin. Temperature and humidity are direct drivers
of formaldehyde levels, so I would say yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. The CDC study provides us with a spapshot of what
families were exposed to last winter, but when we account for
the passage of time and temperature fluctuations, these
families were likely exposed to even higher levels of
formaldehyde than indicated in your report; is that correct?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir. That is in our report.
Mr. Clay. It is in your report?
Mr. McGeehin. Yes, sir. That exact language is in our
report.
Mr. Clay. You know, what is so troubling about the decision
by Gulf Stream not to inform the residents of its testing more
than 2 years ago is the fact that no one was made aware who
lived in these trailers and mobile homes. Gulf Stream found
that every trailer it tested had formaldehyde levels higher
than 100 parts per billion and found that some had as high as
500 parts per billion. We all know that FEMA failed miserably
in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. But these poor
hurricane victims have now been subjected to a second disaster
and years of unnecessary and harmful exposure to a known
carcinogen.
Do you think they should have been notified a little
sooner?
Mr. McGeehin. Again, sir, I will say what I said in the
beginning, that as much information as could be given to
residents about effects that might be harmful to them is a good
thing. I mean, we believe in disseminating that sort of
information. I am not commenting on any of the results that we
are talking about because I haven't seen the testing
methodology, but your question is that sort of knowledge is a
good thing for people to have, yes.
Mr. Clay. Is there a difference in a family taking a
weekend trip in one of these homes or camping out in the homes
as compared to someone living in the homes for over a year?
Mr. McGeehin. Dramatically different. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. Dramatically different. And have you documented
any of that?
Mr. McGeehin. No, but, again, when we go back to you are
looking at exposure to environmental contaminants, which I have
done for the last 25 years, you are looking at two basic
things: the intensity of exposure and the duration of exposure.
These units weren't designed or built for people to live in for
2\1/2\ years. And somebody going with their fly rods with their
children up to fish for a weekend, obviously your duration of
exposure is much less, and also most of the time those people
are spending outside of the unit. They are outside. They are
hiking. They are camping.
If we are talking about these units being used on large
lots where people who are living with their children 24 hours a
day, both the intensity and duration of exposure is high.
Mr. Clay. Thank you for your response.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Clay. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. Issa. Just for full disclosure, since you said it would
be good for us to know, and I think you are right, I want to
reiterate that in the room we are in right now we are at 80
parts per billion based on measuring with your gold standard
meter, so please be aware that you are breathing at that level,
and if you need to leave let us know if anyone needs to leave
early.
Mr. McGeehin. What sampling methodology was that?
Mr. Issa. I don't know what sampling methodology. That was
a direct read instrument.
Chairman Waxman. What is the sampling methodology that we
are being told----
Mr. Issa. It was the same methodology as Gulf Stream, and
that was the reason that our staff did it and got the 40 to 80,
depending upon what part of the Capitol you are in. I just
wanted everyone to be aware that we could be off plus or minus
19 percent, but we do want people to know that this carpet
apparently, along with anything else that has been put in this
over the years, that it emits. We apparently are well beyond
the 16. I think full disclosure, you are absolutely right.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, people in the anteroom
will be relieved they are not here in the main room.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
All members of the committee have asked questions, and Mr.
Donnelly is with us, and I want to give him any opportunity he
wishes to take at this point.
Mr. Donnelly. I want to thank the chairman for letting me
be present today. I will submit a written statement for the
record. I want to thank the ranking member, as well.
I guess I want to thank the chairman also for inviting
FEMA. I think FEMA's absence here to explain their standards
and their actions, that they really have eliminated a part of
the answer here. I wish that they were, in fact, present.
Dr. McGeehin, what I want to ask you is, when you did your
testing for the trailers, did you do any comparison tests by
taking trailers off the lots from places here in Maryland or
Virginia that were built in regular production?
Mr. McGeehin. It depends on which you are talking about.
The occupied trailer study had parts of trailers in it that
were off the lot, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Labs had
two spec trailers and two off-the-lot trailers.
Mr. Donnelly. Ones that were just being sold at, like,
Maryland Trailer Sales, or nothing special that was built for
FEMA, but, in fact, was regular production?
Mr. McGeehin. Off-the-lot trailers. That is my
understanding.
Mr. Donnelly. Did you test those?
Mr. McGeehin. We did. They were part of both studies.
Mr. Donnelly. Did you find any difference between off-the-
lot trailers and trailers that were designed for FEMA?
Mr. McGeehin. Well, I want to be cautious in this. We did a
study with Lawrence Berkeley that only had four trailers, and
so therefore I don't want to make any generalizations from
this. We did look at the two spec trailers and the two off-the-
lot trailers, and the two spec trailers on the whole unit
levels of formaldehyde were higher, and the two off-the-lot
trailers were lower, but this study was not designed to look at
that difference and I don't want that generalized because that
would be a mistake and it would be taking the science beyond
what it was designed to be.
Mr. Donnelly. Did you know of any different production
standards for----
Mr. McGeehin. I don't know that.
Mr. Donnelly [continuing]. Trailers that were used for
families in Louisiana or Mississippi or trailers that were
simply shipped to dealers who have been dealers for years of
these companies?
Mr. McGeehin. I have no knowledge about any separate
manufacturing process for the spec trailers versus the off-the-
lot. I don't know anything about that.
Mr. Donnelly. Let me ask you this: 44 components were
tested.
Mr. McGeehin. Forty-five.
Mr. Donnelly. Forty-five. Forty-four met all HUD standards?
Mr. McGeehin. Right.
Mr. Donnelly. OK. And did FEMA provide, as far as you know,
any standards to these companies in regards to formaldehyde to
follow?
Mr. McGeehin. It seems that everybody on the committee is
more familiar with the correspondence between FEMA and the
manufacturers than I am, so I really can't answer that. I am
not aware of that, and you are all probably more aware of it
than I.
Mr. Donnelly. So you don't know of any standards that were
violated in any way in regards to formaldehyde?
Mr. McGeehin. I can't really comment on that. I don't know
of anything about that at all.
Mr. Donnelly. Let me ask you this: in regards to the Tulane
study, do you know anything unique that would have been about
site-built homes that were tested in that study?
Mr. McGeehin. I do not know anything unique about the site-
built homes.
Mr. Donnelly. And the results of 370 parts per billion is,
in fact, higher than what some of the trailers were at; isn't
that correct?
Mr. McGeehin. Sure. Yes.
Mr. Donnelly. So I guess one other question is: why didn't
we test site-built homes also?
Mr. McGeehin. Well, there have been a number of very large
studies that tested site-built homes around the country, well-
done studies.
Mr. Donnelly. In regards to the Katrina situation?
Mr. McGeehin. Well, it doesn't have to be in regards to the
Katrina situation. There are site-built homes, and they were
tested with the same methodology that we used, and those
results are comparable.
Mr. Donnelly. Well, what I am asking is, in regards to
homes in the Katrina region at the same time that these
trailers were down there, was there any test done to compare--
--
Mr. McGeehin. No.
Mr. Donnelly [continuing]. The levels of those homes as
opposed to the levels of the trailers?
Mr. McGeehin. No. The report is as it was: 519 occupied
FEMA-supplied trailers.
Mr. Donnelly. OK.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, sir.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly.
Dr. McGeehin, thank you very much for your testimony. We
very much appreciate it. If there are further questions, we may
submit them in writing to you for a response for the record.
Mr. McGeehin. Thank you for the opportunity.
Chairman Waxman. Our next panelists will consist of the
following individuals: Mr. Jim Shea, Jr. Mr. Shea is the
chairman of Gulf Stream Coach and has been with Gulf Stream for
more than three decades and is responsible for the company's
housing division.
Mr. Steve Bennett is the president of Pilgrim
International.
Mr. Ronald Fenech is the president and chief executive
officer of Keystone RV. Keystone RV is a subsidiary of Thor
Industries.
And then Mr. Peter Liegl is president of Forest River. He
founded the company in 1996.
We welcome each of you to our hearing today. Your prepared
statements will be put into the record in their entirety. We
will ask each of you to limit your oral presentation to 5
minutes. There is a little device on the table that will turn
green for 4 minutes, yellow for the last minute, and then turn
red when the time is up. When you see that it is red, you
should realize your time is up and try to make your concluding
comments.
It is the practice of this committee that all witnesses who
testify before us do so under oath, so please rise and raise
your right hands and I will administer an oath to you.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. The record will indicate that each of the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Shea, why don't we start with you.
STATEMENTS OF JIM SHEA, CHAIRMAN, GULF STREAM COACH, INC.;
STEVE BENNETT, PRESIDENT, PILGRIM INTERNATIONAL, INC.; RONALD
J. FENECH, PRESIDENT, KEYSTONE RV, INC.; AND PETER LIEGL,
PRESIDENT AND CEO, FOREST RIVER, INC.
STATEMENT OF JIM SHEA
Mr. Shea. Good morning, Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member
Davis. My name is Jim Shea and I am chairman of Gulf Stream
Coach. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the travel
trailers that our company produced and sold to FEMA. I have
some brief opening remarks, but ask that my full statement be
made part of the hearing record.
Gulf Stream is a small-town American company committed to
manufacturing quality recreational vehicles for its customers.
Our travel trailers are built by hard-working, dedicated
Americans in the heartland of our Nation. Safety is a key
component to our success.
Just 2 days before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast,
Gulf Stream received an urgent call from FEMA to provide 25,000
travel trailers to house possible hurricane victims. Gulf
Stream was prepared to meet FEMA's critical request, because at
the time we were the only manufacturer approved for rail
shipment of travel trailers.
Almost every year since 1992, FEMA has purchased Gulf
Stream Postal products from independent dealers to respond to
natural disasters. In 2005 for the first time FEMA contracted
directly with Gulf Stream to provide a total of 50,000
emergency travel trailers. It is important to note that FEMA's
specifications did not include any requirement with respect to
formaldehyde emission levels.
The FEMA travel trailers we manufactured followed the same
specifications as those we delivered to hurricane victims in
2004. In order to meet FEMA's urgent request, Gulf Stream
ramped up its production capacity and realigned its plant
operations immediately upon receipt of the purchase order. We
took special care to provide safe and quality product for the
hurricane victims who temporarily were going to live in the
travel trailers. Our FEMA units had four emergency egress
windows instead of the required minimum of two. It was Gulf
Stream's practice to do additional life safety systems testing,
including electrical, gas supply, smoke detection, and carbon
monoxide detection beyond what we would do for our regular
production for regular customers.
In addition to what was routinely performed on the units
for the manufactured public, and FEMA inspectors were onsite at
our Indiana plants during the manufacturing process, and FEMA
performed inspections at the hurricane zone staging areas.
Furthermore, Gulf Stream had representatives onsite in
Louisiana to do additional inspections after shipment.
Today, just as when we produced travel trailers for FEMA,
there are no Federal standards governing formaldehyde in the
manufacture of travel trailers. The lack of such a standard
leaves our industry with no clear definitive guidance on the
issue. Although there are still no formaldehyde standards for
covering travel trailers, Gulf Stream in 2007 voluntarily
adopted the stringent product standard for formaldehyde
emissions proposed by the California Air Resources Board. To
our knowledge, Gulf Stream is the first RV company to receive a
third-party certification of our applicable wood materials
documentation, control processes, and related verification
testing.
Even without a Federal standard, Gulf Stream has had a
longstanding policy to purchase wood products that satisfy the
HUD low-formaldehyde emissions level for manufactured housing,
even though HUD standards do not apply to the manufacture of
travel trailers.
Several design aspects of our travel trailers also
increased ventilation beyond what was required by the FEMA
specifications.
Gulf Stream received the first complaint regarding
formaldehyde concerning these FEMA travel trailers in March
2006. Obviously, we were concerned about the complaints and
tried to be as proactive as possible by taking the following
steps: First, we sought information regarding complaints
received by FEMA; second, we addressed the few complaints Gulf
Stream received regarding its travel trailers, but were
instructed by FEMA in May 2006 not to directly contact trailer
occupants; third, we attempted to gather information on ways to
identify and reduce ambient levels of formaldehyde through
better ventilation solutions and processes; fourth, we provided
FEMA representatives with information related to ventilation of
travel trailers and other measures to reduce formaldehyde
levels for sensitive people; fifth, we offered to participate
with FEMA in joint testing of the travel trailers. FEMA did not
accept our offer to do so; and sixth, we offered to share with
FEMA the results of some informal, non-scientific screenings of
FEMA-occupied travel trailers performed in late March and April
2006. FEMA did not accept our offer.
Gulf Stream has demonstrated its commitment to quality and
safety for the residents from the beginning. Our record shows
that we were ready, willing, and able to assist FEMA with any
resident concerns.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of
Gulf Stream and our dedicated employees, that concludes my
opening remarks. I am happy to answer your questions the
members of the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shea follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Shea.
Mr. Bennett.
Mr. Bennett. I have no opening statement.
Chairman Waxman. No opening statement.
Mr. Fenech.
STATEMENT OF RONALD J. FENECH
Mr. Fenech. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my
name is Ron Fenech and I am proud to be here this morning to
represent the 3,000 men and women who work assembling
recreational vehicles for Keystone RV and our thousands of
customers.
After the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005, as with all
Americans, our employees sympathized with the hundreds of
thousands of people who overnight found themselves homeless.
Emergency workers were faced with an incredible challenge as
they scrambled to rescue survivors, account for the missing, to
feed those in need, and there was an immediate critical need
for basic shelter.
We have been invited here today to discuss the CDC finding
with regard to formaldehyde in trailers. When it comes to
assessing safe levels of formaldehyde, there is no consistent
Government standards. And, as the CDC, itself, stated in its
February 2008 formaldehyde report, there is no specific level
of formaldehyde that separates safe from dangerous.
The recreational vehicle industry cannot address the
formaldehyde issue alone. It is much broader. In fact, the
materials that Keystone uses to assemble its trailers are
generally the same types of materials used in home construction
and can be found in local home improvement stores.
We are looking to the Government to evaluate the science
and provide industry with the uniform standard. Once that
standard has been developed, we hope the home construction
industry will join us in adopting that standard. Together,
these actions can lead to a workable national approach to this
issue.
We join with others in applauding the recent announcement
by the EPA that they will conduct a comprehensive review and
will, we hope, announce a clearly articulated standard that our
industry and our suppliers can follow. Until then, we have not
and we will not stand by idly. The Recreational Vehicle
Industry Association has recently announced compulsory
standards that require manufacturers to build all units using
CARB compliant wood by January 1, 2009, and CARB certified wood
by July 1, 2010. And at Keystone we intend to beat those
deadlines. We have informed our suppliers that as quickly as
possible we will only purchase supplies that meet CARB
standards.
Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster in modern
U.S. history. Hundreds of thousands of Americans needed
temporary shelter, and I am proud to say that our industry was
part of the solution. I sincerely hope that there will never
again be another disaster that requires our vehicles to be used
under such extreme conditions for such lengthy periods of time,
but if there is, the lessons learned from this process will
inform both industry and Government to ensure a sound response
to any need that may arise.
With that, I thank the committee for the opportunity to
appear here today and to answer any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fenech follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Fenech.
Mr. Liegl.
STATEMENT OF PETER LIEGL
Mr. Liegl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. My name is Peter Liegl. I am president of Forest
River. On behalf of more than 5,000 employees, thank you for
the chance so we can tell you about what our company does. I am
especially proud to tell you how Forest River workers pitched
in to help the victims of Hurricane Katrina.
We started Forest River in 1996. It began in the part of
Indiana where people of different backgrounds share a strong
work ethic and what we call Hoosier values. We think that
because of what we do lots of American families are able to get
closer to the outdoors and to travel and explore this great
country. Today, 12 years later, we currently have 5,000
employees who work in more than 60 locations. Forest River has
plants in Indiana, California, Michigan, Texas, Georgia, and
Oregon. Last year we built and sold over 100,000 units. We are
still learning and we are still improving. Our folks still work
hard and still care what they do.
They cared in 2004 when hurricanes hit Florida. Forest
River employees built 800 units to FEMA's specifications, and
our folks were proud. We never received a complaint about one
of them.
They cared in 2005 when Hurricane Katrina and Rita
devastated the Gulf Coast. Like other Americans, Forest River
employees wanted to help, and, again, they did. This time we
were asked to build 35,000 RVs. We had to decide what made
sense for our workers, our suppliers, our dealers, and our
customers, so our team at Forest River came up with a
production schedule that would allow us to build 5,000 trailers
to help the victims, and Forest River workers built those
trailers on the same production line using the same materials,
the same components, the same quality standards, the same
inspectors as they do for the product they build every day. The
quality was the same as all the other units we build.
The units we built for the Gulf Coast received the RVIA
seal because they met RVIA standards.
Of course, our folks couldn't build these 5,000 units for
free. Like every business, we have to pay our workers and our
suppliers. We have to earn enough to keep things going, but we
never thought about charging higher prices. We sold the FEMA
trailers at the same modest profit levels as our normal sales.
Our overall profit that year was about the same as it was in
the years before and the years after Katrina.
Today's hearing involves formaldehyde. We all know there is
some formaldehyde in wood products, carpeting, fabrics used in
the RVs. It is also used in building homes, apartments, and
office buildings. We all agree we don't want formaldehyde or,
for that matter, any other substance to reach levels where it
is a serious health threat. Most of us aren't doctors or
scientists, and those people who are doctors and scientists
don't agree on the level of formaldehyde that are safe or not
safe. There isn't an agreement on how to measure formaldehyde
levels.
No one has all these answers yet. Certainly I don't. But
what I can tell you is Forest River's experience.
First, formaldehyde has not historically been an issue.
Over the dozen years we have been in business, we have made and
sold over one million units. Out of those million-plus units, I
think we only had three instances where customer concerns
actually required our testing of the vehicles. In two of the
cases, the formaldehyde level tested quite low. In the third it
was pretty clear at the end of the day that whatever the
problem was coming from, it wasn't on the manufacturer's end.
Given that experience, literally less than a handful of
instances of this sort out of a million units, I think you can
understand why I say that formaldehyde has not historically
been an issue with Forest River products and customers.
The second point is we have not been sitting idly by
waiting for doctors and scientists to figure out the answers.
We may not know the answers, but we know that it can't hurt by
moving closer to the California stricter formaldehyde standard
for wood products even before it was recommended in the
industry, which we have done.
In closing, I want to thank you again for your allowing us
to share Forest River's story. Our employees are proud of the
product we make and the company they have helped build.
I must also tell you candidly that many of our workers are
now confused and hurt about the charges about the quality of
RVs, but they know when it comes to Forest River products
nothing can be further from the truth. But I think they also
have the faith, as I do, that responsible people will be fair
and will make the decisions on fact.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for letting me
tell you my story. I will answer any questions that you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Liegl follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Liegl.
We are now going to recognize Members to ask questions for
5 minutes apiece, and I will start off the questions.
Mr. Shea, I wrote to Gulf Stream on February 14th of this
year and I asked your company's help in understanding why a
Gulf Stream travel trailer sold to FEMA would have high levels
of formaldehyde, and I want to read what Gulf Stream said in
response to my question on March 7th. Here is what they said:
``Gulf Stream respectfully disagrees with the premise of the
committee's question, i.e., that formaldehyde levels in the
trailers it sold to FEMA following the Gulf Coast hurricanes of
2005 were high.''
Given what we know now, I find this response astonishing.
In March 2006 trailer occupants began to complain about
formaldehyde. On March 21, 2006, Steven Miller of FEMA e-mailed
your brother Dan Shea and asked him if Gulf Stream had ``the
capability to put this to bed.'' Were you aware of this e-mail?
Mr. Shea. Yes, sir.
Chairman Waxman. Your brother responded that he would send
a person to Baton Rouge to test units. From the end of March
until May 2006 Gulf Stream vice president Scott Pullin tested
FEMA trailers. He tested approximately 50 trailers, including
11 occupied trailers. Mr. Pullin's test indicated formaldehyde
levels at or above 100 parts per billion within every occupied
travel trailer he tested; 4 of the 11 occupied trailers had
levels above 500 parts per billion.
Mr. Pullin also tested over 25 new Gulf Stream travel
trailers that had not yet been deployed for displaced
residents, and over 10 of these trailers contained formaldehyde
levels in excess of 900 parts per billion. One Gulf Stream
trailer had formaldehyde levels of 2,690 parts per billion.
In 2006, Gulf Stream knew better than anyone that
formaldehyde levels in the travel trailers it made for FEMA
were high, and just last week the Centers for Disease Control
confirmed that even in the winter of 2007 and 2008 56 percent
of Gulf Stream's travel trailers had elevated levels of
formaldehyde.
I have one question for you, Mr. Shea. Do you still
disagree that formaldehyde levels in FEMA's Gulf Stream
trailers were high?
Mr. Shea. Well, Mr. Chairman, when I reviewed the CDC
report, the most recent CDC report on occupied trailers, I see
that our levels of occupied units fell----
Chairman Waxman. We cannot hear you.
Mr. Shea. Yes. I would just like to repeat, sir, that what
we saw in the occupied unit testing that the CDC did was that
our units fell in what they would term the intermediate level.
Chairman Waxman. How about your own testing?
Mr. Shea. We did not do testing, sir. We used an informal
device, a screening device. It is not a scientific device. It
is not accepted by NIOSH. It is not accepted by any
organization. It could have been used by anyone, any company,
any agency. It is not testing, sir. It is a screening device
that picks up many other components, chemical components. It is
not testing.
Chairman Waxman. Whatever the validity was of that test, it
certainly gave you an indication of very high levels of
formaldehyde in your own trailers, didn't it?
Mr. Shea. Let me tell you, we were a proactive company,
sir. One of the first things we did--in fact, Mr. Pullin, a
long-time technical employee, vice president of this company
went into the field, was in the field on other matters, and he
canvassed and talked to other occupants, to varied trailer
residents. They asked them what their experience was, and they
said they were very happy with their trailers. They weren't
having any problems. They were enjoying their trailers. There
were no issues.
Now, at the time that he did quickly take a snapshot
deployment with this tool, it was screening. It was not
testing. It was a quick snapshot that would have reflected
anything that the residents would have done in the unit at the
time.
I remind you that they were not complaining. There were not
symptoms. He also----
Chairman Waxman. Well, you did have some complaints,
because I just read one of the complaints. In fact, one of the
people said please, please, please help me. I have this
formaldehyde, and it is causing problems in my breathing--to
paraphrase it.
Mr. Shea. Yes, sir. I would like to----
Chairman Waxman. And, notwithstanding that, you did the
testing and you told FEMA you didn't get any complaints, and
you told them you got some test results, but you didn't tell
them what they were. They didn't ask. You told them if they
asked, then you would share it. But your own test results
showed high levels of formaldehyde.
Mr. Shea. Yes. I would like to set the record straight
there, sir. We communicated with FEMA. Actually, we asked FEMA,
Do you have any complaints? We wanted to assist. We wanted to
visit people. We wanted to lend whatever we could for
sensitized individuals. We had three complaints come in
directly to ourselves in that March period after the initial
news reports, and we investigated all three of them. Then in
mid-May, after we had asked FEMA for what complaints they had,
which they directed two people to us, two of those people--none
of them had formaldehyde complaints. What they had was one
complained on odor from an improperly hooked-up sewer. The
other was concerned about wanting to buy her unit and she had
security concerns. Those are the two complaints that we
received from FEMA.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Shea, my time is up, but I do want to
tell you that if you have done some kind of testing and you see
the kind of high levels, even over 2,000 parts per billion, in
some of your trailers, the response, I think, of a responsible
businessman should have been to test further, to find out what
is going on, to take some kind of responsible action and not to
come before Congress and say FEMA didn't tell me they had
complaints--of course, they didn't know what you knew--and
therefore you didn't have to do any more testing yourself, even
though you got these alarming results. That is what you didn't
do. You didn't do more tests. You didn't tell FEMA there is a
problem. And you didn't take the action that I would think
would be a responsible action of a responsible business.
Mr. Shea. I would love to respond to that, sir. Sir, there
is a difference here between testing and screening. There is a
difference between unoccupied units and occupied units. We did
unoccupied unit screening to better be able to inform FEMA how
to properly ventilate units. We also were utilizing some
optional devices that we were using in the unoccupied
screenings because we could generally screen for how indoor air
quality changed. I would remind you there are many components,
as Dr. McGeehin said, in indoor air. This unit would have been
sensitive to many of them. So what we were able to do is we
could advise FEMA better. Our counsel asked us to make sure
what we said to FEMA was as accurate as possible. We tested the
performance of the ventilation systems that we provided with
the unit, plus some optional systems to help with sensitive
individuals.
There is a difference between what we did with occupied
units versus the screenings of unoccupied units.
Chairman Waxman. My time is over. I am just going to say it
sounds like you handled it very carefully as a public relations
and as a legal problem, but I think you had more of a
responsibility to the health of the people that were living in
your trailers.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I would yield my 5 minutes to Mr.
Souder.
Mr. Souder. And I would ask the chairman to be generous if
I go over just a little bit, as well.
First I want to welcome all of you as fellow Hoosiers and
having huge facilities in my District and employing lots of
people who are already hundreds losing their jobs because of
the gas prices, the mileage restrictions, the ability to get
vehicles that can tow. Ten percent of Americans of some sort of
vehicle. Most are from northern Indiana and Congressman
Donnelly and my Districts. It is the danger of how we do
something like this is, as our guys try to meet these
standards, try to follow whatever the Government says, you have
inspectors on your sites, you just push these kind of jobs to
China where they don't meet these kind of inspections, where
there is no conscience, and we wonder why we lose American
jobs.
It is incredibly frustrating. We all want to find out what
the truth is.
Mr. Shea, wasn't FEMA at the plants all day?
Mr. Shea. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Souder. Weren't they at your facilities all day?
Mr. Shea. Yes. During the course of our production, as I
understand, because we were a direct manufacturer, they had an
inspector in each Indiana plant every day receiving units as
they came offline and inspecting them.
Mr. Souder. Without getting into confidential information,
and I am not asking you to disclose this, but the type of test
you did on these trailers, how expensive was it to take the
desiccator test that you did that is not the gold standard,
that has a wide variation of accuracy?
Mr. Shea. This is a device that is called a formaldemeter.
It is not a scientific tool. It is not really what they would
call a desiccator test, which is another imprecise type of
testing. This is a quick snatch method, and it is just a
screening tool. If you look in the directions to the piece of
equipment, it is a screening tool. It doesn't claim to be a
testing tool. It tells you that there are other components that
it absorbs.
Our individual wasn't experienced in using it. It did
provide some benefit in terms of seeing how indoor air changes
occurred, but it is certainly not testing, and we didn't employ
that. And certainly at our plant location with FEMA inspectors
there was no issue about that. It was never an issue with FEMA
inspectors. This was during the time that we were producing
these units.
Mr. Souder. Would this have been an expensive test for FEMA
to conduct?
Mr. Shea. Well, anybody could have used one of these
devices, any organization. FEMA did OSHA testing in fall of
2005, so they were familiar with closed-up units, unoccupied
units. They did more OSHA testing, I think the record shows, in
March, late March, after this became an issue. I think those
results are available. So they knew what closed-up, sealed-up
units that had been cycled to 80 to 100 degrees of hot boxes
would do. Any structure that was closed up, even a house that
was closed up and sealed up and cycled to 80 to 100 degrees
would have decreased indoor air quality. There is just no two
ways about it.
Mr. Souder. Well, the scary thing about if we are not
careful in hearings and we aren't trying to look at fundamental
questions with accurate science, one of our challenges here is
that I met with 9 of the 10 companies named in the early
lawsuit total. They had the three complaints that you had
talked about. Then the lawsuits started, and all of the sudden
legal liability starts. Now you are being criticized for doing
a very simple test that could have been done by the Government,
and the question comes: what employer or company in America is
going to expose themselves to voluntary cooperation if this is
the end result, that the proliferation of suits all over
America right now--you know, people say, I heard in Katrina, I
read in the newspaper, I heard on TV, not on any science, as we
are learning. The 390 parts per billion, we keep sliding
between parts per million and parts per billion, don't have any
standards. You are trying to cooperate. Instead, you get your
head beat in.
Do you plan to ever deal with the Government again?
Mr. Shea. Sir, this is an incredible quandary. We have seen
a specification--it is not a standard--put forth by FEMA in
their latest standards. It is 16 parts per billion. Of course,
very recent studies with new technology show that this is
within the range of human breath. This is within the range of
normal human breath, what people normally breathe out from
their normal metabolism, irrespective of what is in the air.
Well, how can a company, why would a company take on that
kind of liability? It would be so easy for something to occur
either naturally or from user sources that would double or
triple this specification. This company would never take that
liability on, sir.
Mr. Souder. Within the broad definitions of 5 minutes I
have one more supplemental question. You have done FEMA before.
It has been a significant part of your business.
Mr. Shea. Yes. We have provided units through dealerships
since 1992. FEMA came directly to us and asked us for a direct
quotation and proposal at the beginning of this hurricane
before the hurricane actually hit New Orleans.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Souder. Your time has
expired.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shea, you know, I know the chairman referenced a letter
from a lady in which she said, ``There is an odor in my trailer
that will not go away.''
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. ``It burns my eyes, and I am getting
headaches every day. I have tried many things, but nothing
seems to work. Please, please help me.'' You are familiar with
that, are you not, Mr. Shea?
Mr. Shea. It would be helpful for me to see the exact
customer that you refer to, sir. That would refresh my memory.
Mr. Cummings. Well, you heard the words. If that was your
wife, would you be concerned about her living in a trailer?
Mr. Shea. I can give you the letter that we responded to,
sir, to FEMA. When we got that report and we communicated with
FEMA, my recollection is it was with regard to a Mr. Reeser.
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Mr. Shea. Here is what we said, if I can quote.
Mr. Cummings. Very briefly, because I have a lot of
questions and a little bit of time.
Mr. Shea. Yes, sir. ``I do want to take the opportunity to
reinforce our position previously communicated to FEMA that
Gulf Stream is ready, willing, and able to work with FEMA with
regard to any complaint, including sending a representative
within 24 hours to work with your contractors to inspect, test
. . .''----
Mr. Cummings. Good.
Mr. Shea [continuing]. ``--or do whatever is reasonably
necessary to . . ''----
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Shea, you are coming right where I want
you to be, because I want to talk about some of your
correspondence, not in addition to what you just read. I would
like to share with you what Gulf Stream disclosed to FEMA--and
I know you are familiar with this--related to formaldehyde in
its travel trailers in May 2006. It has been referenced quite a
bit here. And Gulf Stream sent a letter to FEMA and said, ``We
want to followup on our recent conversations regarding the
travel trailers supplied to FEMA. We would like to reiterate
our willingness to assist you in addressing any concerns about
our products. Our informal testing has indicated formaldehyde
levels of indoor ambient air of occupied trailers far below,
for instance, the OSHA standard of .75 parts per million, 750
parts per billion. We are willing to share these informal test
results with you and, as mentioned during our meeting, if FEMA
wishes to conduct formal testing protocols on any designated
units, we are willing to participate in that testing.''
Now, you spent a lot of time, I am sure, in drafting that
letter. The documents that we received show that you spent over
a month getting the wording right. How do you interpret your
own letter? And are you saying that your testing showed a
formaldehyde problem, or are you saying that your testing did
not show a problem?
Mr. Shea. Well, sir, going back to the framework of the
time, there were two regulatory standards that I was familiar
with. One was the OSHA permissible exposure level for workers
that would be exposed for their working life; the other was the
HUD target regulatory level. Those were the two. Those are the
two now. There was one that came up in the press. That was
referenced as a .1 EPA ``safety level'' by some activist
groups. But when I looked that up it said above this level
sensitive individuals may experience symptoms. It wasn't a
safety level, and I did ask some experts did EPA have a
standard. They told me that EPA didn't have an outdoor standard
for formaldehyde at the time, it didn't have an indoor standard
for formaldehyde at the time.
So in terms of how----
Mr. Cummings. You understand that before you sent that
letter that the CDC had said that they thought that the levels
of 100 were dangerous? You knew that, right? You didn't know
that? I see people shaking their heads behind you.
Mr. Shea. I have no recollection of--the CDC came out with
their interim report and took a position. The original ATSDR
position was that after the EPA testing that was done in the
fall was that .3 parts per million was acceptable. They changed
that later, but that was well after this time, sir. That was in
2007. That was in, like, February 2007 after EPA did testing of
unoccupied units in September 2006.
Mr. Cummings. So this is not the record on April 24, 2006,
Gulf Stream's outside counsel sent both Jim and Dan Shea a 1997
document created by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
entitled, ``An Update on Formaldehyde.'' The document included
the following information: formaldehyde is a colorless, strong-
smelling gas. When present in air at levels above .1 ppm it can
cause watery eyes, burning sensations in the eyes and nose and
throat, nausea, coughing, chest tightening, wheezing, sick skin
rashes, and allergic reactions. You are saying that is not
accurate? Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Shea. That is the language that came off of the EPA
sensitivity recommendation. As I recall, sir, that is for
sensitive individuals. And we have always been concerned to
help with any individuals that had sensitivities. We know that
there are sensitive people, sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Your time has expired.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This home test kit, this formaldemeter, how accurate is
that?
Mr. Shea. Well, sir, it varies. It can be up and down. if
you sprayed an air freshener and then took a screening it would
be eight parts per million sometimes. It is reactive to
ethanol, methanol, phenol, all kinds of things. It is an
indicator of air flows, ventilation, but in terms of absolute
testing, nobody would accept it. NIOSH doesn't accept it. It is
not acceptable in a court of law. Some people may be more
accurate than others. Our individual wasn't well trained in
this or trained in calibrating it.
Mr. Burton. So it is an indicator, but it is not really
scientific?
Mr. Shea. It is an indicator that formaldehyde is likely
present.
Mr. Burton. Now, in these 11 units that were checked with
the formaldemeter, there were four that were above 500, but the
other seven were below the 500 level?
Mr. Shea. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Burton. But that wasn't scientific?
Mr. Shea. No, it wasn't scientific. Of course, we recognize
that if anybody had smoked a cigarette an hour before or cooked
or something, that influences the level, but what our main
thing was, these people were very happy. One person was
described by Mr. Pullin as being ecstatic that he finally had a
place where he could go to, a refuge, something that was air
conditioned, a totally self-contained living unit, and everyone
was happy. There were some people that were older people. There
were some young children, toddler age. They were happy with
their units. They were not complaining about their units. They
were not experiencing symptoms.
We went back in that proximate time--Mr. Pullin did--to
revisit with these people in that late April period before we
asked FEMA to come in and talk to them further about these
canvassing that we did.
Mr. Burton. You know, I don't think you can answer this
question, any of you, but if I took a HUD-produced house or
HUD-funded house--and there are an awful lot of them around
this country right now that are vacant--and you closed it up,
and you left it closed in very hot weather for, say, a couple
of weeks or longer, would the parts per billion be equivalent
to what you saw in a mobile home, manufactured housing?
Mr. Shea. I do know this, sir: any structure, if you close
it up, seal it up, cycle the temperature to 80 to 100 degrees,
you are going to have a reduction of indoor air quality. There
will be higher levels of chemical constituents, especially if
you have attached garage with a car in it. I just went to a
lean building seminar. The presenter said one of the best
things you could do for indoor air quality was to have a
detached garage. So any structure, if you put it under these
kind of conditions, is going to have decreased indoor air
quality.
Mr. Burton. And you used the kind of materials that are
used in just about any kind of construction in these?
Mr. Shea. The highest users of these composite wood
products, like particle board, MDF, hardwood plywoods, if you
look at the reports, most of it goes into the remodeling
industry. If you go into these large remodeling stores, these
products are stacked to the ceiling. So the RV industry and the
manufacturing housing industry only use less than 1 percent of
these kind of products.
Mr. Burton. The point I am trying to make is you are not
using anything out of the ordinary in producing these products;
you are using what is normal in construction?
Mr. Shea. These products are used in furniture making,
cabinetry, home building.
Mr. Burton. Let me just say I am going to yield to my
colleague, Mr. Issa from California, but I just want to say I
have known the Shea family probably for 30 years, and I know
their business, and, Mr. Chairman, I want you to know they have
impeccable credentials as far as conducting their business in
an honorable way in Indiana. I don't represent that area, but I
want you to know that I don't think they would ever do anything
intentionally to harm the health of any individual.
With that I yield to Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bennett, how many people does your company employ
typically?
Mr. Bennett. Right now we employ approximately 100 people.
Mr. Issa. About 100. And, Mr. Shea, how many would you have
had at the peak of production for FEMA? How many people would
you have employed?
Mr. Shea. I would estimate about 2,000 people, sir.
Mr. Issa. About 2,000. So we are looking at companies of
5,000, 3,000, 100, and 2,000, and I noticed that in the
information that I received we only have two people that have
made complaints, both about your company, Mr. Shea, and they
seem to be about only one thing, which is the question about
Norboard being made in China and that being the source of a lot
of these problems. Earlier people talked about imported Chinese
products. Do you know where Norboard is made? And do you know
if it could be the cause of the problem?
Mr. Shea. Norboard is a product that is made in Deposit,
NY. It is an American product. It is made to what they call an
ANSI standard, which is equivalent to the HUD standard for
particle board. But we asked this company to provide testing
documentation on their product, and their product actually
tested well below the standard that they build to. It is
actually about over 30 percent below the standard. And it is
almost what the upcoming CARB standard is for MDF that is
upcoming for 2009. It is very close to that. So this was good
product, good American product, and I don't know what this
individual was referring to relative to----
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired. We will
come back to you, Mr. Issa, in a minute.
Mr. Danny Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shea, let me try and make sure I understand your
testimony. How many Katrina-related trailers did your company
build and supply to FEMA during this process?
Mr. Shea. Sir, we had two contracts. Each was for 25,000
units, sir.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Did you actually build and supply or
sell to FEMA those 25,000 units?
Mr. Shea. Yes, we did, sir.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Did I understand you to suggest or
to say that prior to the CNN new report, that you had only
heard of possibly three expressions of concern, one which
turned out to be a faulty connection of a sewer line?
Mr. Shea. Sir, I am not sure as far as the CNN report. The
timeframe that I was referring to was a report that came out of
Bay St. Louis on an individual that was in one of our units,
and we contacted FEMA on that individual. They told us, because
we wanted to assist or see what we could do, they said that
they couldn't discuss it for privacy reasons with us, but that
they had addressed his concerns by exchanging for a different
trailer.
Now, I am not including that customer, sir, but----
Mr. Davis of Illinois. OK. But you had no information that
would suggest that formaldehyde was a problem in any of these
units?
Mr. Shea. Before the report that came from Bay St. Louis,
this had not been an issue that we had tried to deal with with
agency FEMA units. Our travel trailers had not been this kind
of concern, so this was surprising to us, very surprising to us
when this became an issue in the State of Mississippi at that
time.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you. Let me ask you, Mr.
Liegl, how many trailers did your company supply to FEMA?
Mr. Liegl. We supplied 5,000 to FEMA specs, not directly to
FEMA but through a Government-approved purchaser, and so 5,000
to the FEMA specs, but we also know that FEMA had bought
trailers of Forest River off of dealers' lots.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Let me just ask, did I understand
also that you were actually invited or there was some
discussion that you could supply 35,000?
Mr. Liegl. That is correct.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And you decided not to do the 35?
Mr. Liegl. That is also correct.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Could you tell us why?
Mr. Liegl. Well, No. 1, we couldn't. Doing what we were
told to do by FEMA, they wanted our units to be built in the
same standards that we build our typical RV, and so to do that
we had to use the same plants, the same people, the same
materials, etc. The most we could build was 5,000 in the time
period they needed them.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So you were afraid that you might
have to compromise something if you were to attempt to take on
that contract?
Mr. Liegl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. The 5,000 that you actually built
and sold, did you make any profit different than the profit
that you probably would have made if you sold those to the
Danny Davis Enterprises?
Mr. Liegl. No. The margin of profit would have been about
approximately the same what we made the year before and the
years after.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Let me ask each one of you gentleman
if you would answer directly. Last week the CDC issued a report
about the results of its testing, and ultimately ended up
suggesting that people living in any of these trailers
exceeding 500 parts per billion, that they actually ought to be
moved out and that they ought to move out immediately. Let me
ask if you agree with that statement, and beginning with you,
Mr. Shea.
Mr. Shea. Sir, I don't recall that 500--my understanding on
the CDC was they really didn't define a level of when people
should move out; they just recommended----
Mr. Davis of Illinois. OK. So you couldn't comment on the
statement that I just made because you wouldn't be aware of it.
Let me go to the next gentleman.
Mr. Bennett. I would have to say that until a standard is
agreed upon, that is a difficult question to answer.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. All right. So it is difficult. Let
me go to the next.
Mr. Fenech. Please ask the question again, sir, because I
don't want to----
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Well, let me just ask this: if you
purchased an apple and cannot eat it, do you believe that you
ought to pay for it?
Mr. Fenech. Great question. No, I would probably not want
to pay for that apple.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Well, my point is this: that if
there were trailers that people can't live in now, that FEMA
has purchased, should the taxpayers be paying for those
trailers that cannot be used for the purposes for which they
were purchased.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Davis, I would be interested to know whether or not we
would make more money on your purchase than on FEMA's purchase.
That could be a whole separate hearing.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. But I am selling apples.
Mr. Issa. Well, and we don't know today, unfortunately,
whether or not this is an example of 50,000, 125,000 apples
being bought and we have a couple of bad apples. I have several
questions, but I would want to make sure we understand here
today there is no test going on in every one of these trailers
in the field. There is no standard if there was a test. And CDC
just told us that, in fact, they only looked at one item and
there is no standard for what level we should move people out
of these trailers or how much ventilation would be enough to
reduce it, and they weren't familiar with the high levels
inside fixed homes in these areas of the south, particularly
Louisiana.
So, having said that, I am going to look at you four
business people and I am going to try and--I am not saying
provide you relief. I think you will provide that for yourself
in due course. But lest you be the last victims of Katrina--
let's just put it that way--today do any of you have a standard
in front of you other than the proposed standard that would
cause you to make your trailers different? In other words, has
FEMA come back to you other than this adopting of 16 parts per
billion and given you any new guidance on how to make trailers
if, in fact, a hurricane hits today?
[No response.]
Mr. Issa. I will take no as the answer. I think I saw a no
from everyone.
Mr. Shea, in your case, speaking about trying to hit this
level of parts per billion that is roughly equal to inhaling
and exhaling and dramatically less than if one cat pees on the
carpet, which would be far greater parts per billion just based
on a kitty accident, the only thing you know of is something
that could cause you to say no bid; is that correct? That if,
in fact, 16 parts per billion becomes the standard, you are
going to have to no-bid it because you can't meet that
standard?
Mr. Shea. No, sir, because even if you tested something,
and where we produce in Indiana, the time you moved it to
Louisiana, totally different atmospherics, much more humidity,
much more heat on a constant basis, there is no way. And that
doesn't even include how residents differ and their use.
Mr. Issa. You know, I am an electronics manufacturer, so my
background is one in which we have standards for absolutely
everything, and I was the chairperson of the Standard and Trade
Association, the Consumer Electronics Association, before I
came to Congress. Now, you all four are, I believe, members of
the trade association for travel trailers; is that correct?
Mr. Shea. Yes.
Mr. Bennett. Correct, sir.
Mr. Fenech. Yes.
Mr. Liegl. Yes.
Mr. Issa. OK. And is your association prepared to
participate in standards setting if, in fact, the Government is
willing to set standards?
Mr. Shea. Yes.
Mr. Bennett. Absolutely.
Mr. Fenech. Yes.
Mr. Liegl. Yes.
Mr. Issa. OK. Do you know if your association has reached
out to try to have that engagement? Any one of you that wants
to speak?
Mr. Shea. I think that is very important to the industry,
and they have said so. They are very interested in being able
to have the kind of standard they can conform to. I am sure
they will be leading the parade as attaining that standard.
Mr. Issa. So, again, in the spirit of lest Katrina have one
more set of victims, all of you are saying today that you do
not have new standards on which to make trailers differently
than you made them before and after Katrina, the only
discussion of a new standard of 16 parts per billion is not
achievable, and your association stands ready to work with, on
a uniform basis, meeting these standards both for FEMA and for,
as a matter of fact, the consumer public. Is that all correct?
Mr. Shea. Absolutely.
Mr. Bennett. Yes.
Mr. Fenech. Yes.
Mr. Liegl. Yes.
Mr. Issa. So we have hauled you all in here to talk about a
standard that didn't exist, that you couldn't meet because it
didn't exist, it doesn't exist today, and we are asking you to
defend yourselves because you might have made a profit making
trailers that in many cases were identical or actually were
off-the-shelf trailers, because many of what FEMA bought were
off-the-shelf trailers; is that correct?
Mr. Shea. Correct.
Mr. Bennett. Yes.
Mr. Fenech. Yes.
Mr. Liegl. Yes.
Mr. Issa. OK. And I yield the remainder of my time to Mr.
Burton.
Mr. Burton. I just want to ask, I was wondering if we could
ask the EPA to test closed houses in this area down there to
see what the parts per billion are in those houses compared to
these motor homes that were there since Katrina. I think that
would be a very interesting thing, and I would like to ask you,
Mr. Chairman, if we could request that kind of a study.
Chairman Waxman. Well, I will certainly take it under
submission, but certainly you are free to ask for any
information you wish.
Mr. Burton. I know, but you being chairman I think it would
carry--I will co-request it with you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shea, my question really goes to the duty of the
manufacturer. We have spoken about FEMA here. You don't have to
worry about FEMA. I am Chair of the subcommittee with
jurisdiction over FEMA. This committee has, in addition, had
FEMA before us way before we ever got to you over the past
couple of years. My questions really go to the duty to disclose
in a free democratic free market society when a business wants
to avoid liability, when a business wants to remain in
business, when a business wants to maintain its reputation with
the Federal Government and with customers, generally. I am
perplexed by your approach to the 35 unoccupied trailers.
I have a letter here from March 2006, a letter from Gulf
Stream where Gulf Stream was testing 35 unoccupied trailers.
Leave aside the controversy about now standard, what standard,
these tests showed levels in some of these trailers well over
2,000 to 4,000 parts per billion, and I don't think there is
much controversy about that level. By anyone's standards that
is a dangerous standard, and I don't think that is subject to
dispute or has been subject to dispute even here.
Now, Mr. Shea, you began testing in March, and FEMA, of
course, was still in the process of activating its purchase of
trailers. Indeed, after March 2006 when you were testing FEMA
actually continued to activate trailers, thousands, which, of
course, ended up in the Gulf with the results that are under
scrutiny here today.
Let me ask you: did Gulf Stream provide FEMA with the
vehicle identification numbers of the trailers that it had
tested that had high levels of formaldehyde so that at the very
least FEMA could ensure that those trailers were not
distributed on the Gulf Coast?
Mr. Shea. Well, there is various e-mails. I think if you
look in the record you will see discussions between FEMA and e-
mails between FEMA and Gulf Stream.
Ms. Norton. Well, we have your letter, and your letter
makes no reference to any results from the unoccupied trailers.
Is it your testimony that you, in fact, told FEMA, e-mailed
FEMA, wrote FEMA about the results in the 35 unoccupied
trailers? Did you reveal these 2,000 to 4,000 parts per billion
in the unoccupied trailers? I am simply trying to get whether
you did or not.
Mr. Shea. Well, we----
Ms. Norton. Did you disclose this information or not?
Mr. Shea. We didn't conclude that it was relevant, ma'am.
We thought that it was irrelevant information.
Ms. Norton. In what sense?
Mr. Shea. Well, ma'am, we felt it was irrelevant
information because, first of all, we provided information to
FEMA in that letter relative to what our experience was with
ventilation, what our experience was with looking at
ventilation options for sensitive individuals. That----
Ms. Norton. That is my point. You provided, indeed, in this
letter you provided only the information that, of course, would
reinforce the continuing purchase and activation of these
trailers. I understand what you provided. I am asking you why
you thought it was irrelevant----
Mr. Shea. Yes, I would love to respond to that.
Ms. Norton [continuing]. To disclose any information about
the formaldehyde levels in the unoccupied trailers which you,
yourself, were at that moment testing. Why was that irrelevant?
Mr. Shea. First of all, FEMA had information on unoccupied
units, ma'am. They had done OSHA testing and----
Ms. Norton. I am talking about your tests. You just said
irrelevant.
Mr. Shea. Yes, we----
Ms. Norton. And I want to know why it is irrelevant.
Mr. Shea. It is irrelevant, ma'am, because FEMA knew about
closed-up, tightened-up, heated-up units, what they would have
been testing at, because they had OSHA-certified persons that
went out and did testing well before this.
Ms. Norton. This was unoccupied trailers about to be
distributed to actual human beings on the Gulf Coast. If you
had to do it over again, would you disclose the information on
the 35 unoccupied trailers to FEMA?
Mr. Shea. Anything that would have been helpful to public
health in any kind of retrospect on this, we would have loved
to have been able to shed more light on. We support public
health. But this is looking at it in a retrospective, and our
perspective at the time was----
Ms. Norton. Well, you haven't been able to tell us why it
was irrelevant. Indeed, you testified that in retrospect, if I
could conclude, in retrospect this could have been helpful to
maintain health. And, you know, my main concern here is not so
much with what appears to be a cover-up, at least of this
information, but with whether or not the companies have learned
anything from this experience. I will try to conclude that your
first answer about irrelevant is not your final answer, and
that if you had to do it over again perhaps it should have been
disclosed. That is giving you the best veneer I can on your
answer.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Waxman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
points that I want to make, but I want to followup there.
Mr. Shea, it was not a scientific test; it was a snapshot,
and it was a snapshot of sealed vehicles which could test at
any different range. In retrospect, perhaps it would have been
helpful for CDC to know, but, in fact, they probably wouldn't
have had it be relevant, either, other than potentially to do
more testing, because the test wasn't accurate. Wasn't that
what you were trying to say?
Mr. Shea. Yes. And, if you will remember, the EPA did
testing, certified testing, several months after we would have
done these screenings, in September, and they showed levels
above these levels, equal to these levels that were shown by
the screenings, which, of course, picked up all kinds of other
chemical constituents. But it wasn't treated by Government as
being relevant. They didn't say because we have these closed-
up, heated-up, sealed-up units at these levels. They didn't
come back and say, Well, everybody needs to be evacuated from
units.
Mr. Souder. Because you have certainly said air them out.
Mr. Shea. They said air them out, and the ATSDR did a
report in February 2007. It wasn't until occupied unit testing
was done 18 months after this approximately letter that Ms.
Norton is referring to that there was a move to what the CDC
said, quickly relocate residents. It wasn't after this EPA
testing that was done well before that showed results in these
sealed-up units.
Mr. Souder. I wanted to make a comment, and if any of you
want to add to this, there is kind of a misunderstanding in
applying the type of industry that has developed predominantly
in Elkhart County from other industry associations and why the
industry hasn't been more proactive. It is basically a startup
industry that was a collection of small companies.
Mr. Liegl, when you started what size was your company?
Mr. Liegl. Well, when we began it was in 1996 and I began
with 20, 30 people.
Mr. Souder. And Forest River is now one of the biggest. How
many acquisitions would you say you have made in the last 24
months?
Mr. Liegl. Acquisitions?
Mr. Souder. Yes. In other words, picking up other
facilities.
Mr. Liegl. We primarily grew from being organically grown
and not through acquisition.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Fenech, Keystone came out of other
companies in the area and was one of the most dynamic young
companies. Four now has bought a whole number of companies in
the District, including yours. Mr. Bennett's historically has
been more typical, fairly small company that, as Government
pressure comes in, and as we have more accountability, one of
the byproducts of this is it is getting harder and harder for
somebody to start a company of 90 employees or harder and
harder to do what Keystone did without the capital, meeting all
the different standards, and there are consequences to our
actions. But in the ability of the association to fund their
own R&D, what we have seen is a consolidation of this industry
into larger companies, because, as you have to do this, you
respond differently.
One of the great entrepreneurial counties--Elkhart County
is the highest percent manufacturing in America, one of the
last percent places.
One other thing that has come up, I have seen it in media
reports, are shuttered buildings. I know another company which
is not this, but Utilimaster, when I first visited them,
sometimes operating in two buildings and sometimes they are
operating in nineteen buildings, because buildings get
shuttered because things are cyclical. That would be the wide
range.
Mr. Shea is a little different, because your company
historically has dealt more with FEMA. Has it always been
significant, as opposed to Mr. Liegl is about 5 percent of
yours? Is that what the trailers----
Mr. Liegl. Correct.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Shea, what percent of FEMA would be a
standard and what is your range that the green facilities tend
to be extra cyclical? Could you kind of give an idea of how you
go up and down because of the nature of your business is
somewhat different than some of the others?
Mr. Shea. Well, some years we provided 500 units to FEMA,
some years we provided 7,000 units to FEMA for hurricane
relief. This was the largest number we ever produced.
Obviously, since that time the industry has gone downward in
terms of its overall production. We have had to adjust to that.
This is going to be a very difficult year for the industry. I
have heard five or six companies already go out of business,
long-term companies, and some of the industry segments are down
56 percent. So we do have to make that kind of adjustment, but
our utmost thing is to try to preserve manufacturing jobs and
do everything we can to do that.
Mr. Souder. I have just a quick followup to that. The 2,000
figure was used. What would be the range of your employment?
Mr. Shea. It could range between 1,000 and 2,000.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. I thank the chairman.
I want to thank the panel, too, for coming. I represent the
Fourth District of Ohio. We have Airstream, part of Four
Industries, as well, in our District; Norcold, which I assume
is a supplier for some of you guys. We do appreciate your being
here and your industry.
I thought Mr. Issa did a nice summary when we talked about
the standards. You talk about there is no test, there is no
standard. In fact, in the previous panel Dr. McGeehin even said
that, I think, if I got his quote right, the CDC is not a
standards-setting agency. So it is a tough situation that you
guys are having to deal with here.
I wanted to go to, I think, Mr. Liegl's reference. I didn't
catch all your opening statements, but Mr. Liegl in his opening
statement talked about his assistance to FEMA in past
disasters. I know Mr. Shea, as well, with Gulf Stream has done
that.
Mr. Bennett and Mr. Fenech, have you guys also assisted
FEMA in past hurricanes or past disasters?
Mr. Fenech. We have never had a contract with FEMA, no.
There have been some products that we have supplied, but it has
been through the dealers.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Bennett.
Mr. Bennett. We have never had a contract directly with
FEMA.
Mr. Jordan. OK. So just Gulf Stream and Forest River. In
your past dealings with FEMA, has there ever been problems?
Have you had any complaints? Have things gone fine?
Mr. Fenech. Could I go back? We did not have a direct
contract with FEMA.
Mr. Jordan. You sold off your lots?
Mr. Fenech. No. We sold to American Catastrophe, which was
an approved supplier.
Mr. Jordan. OK.
Mr. Fenech. So it wasn't a direct deal with FEMA.
Mr. Jordan. OK. But in your past dealings where your units
have assisted FEMA in dealing with disaster relief, have there
been any problems with those units?
Mr. Fenech. In the past, absolutely none.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Shea.
Mr. Shea. We have had a very excellent relationship with
FEMA over the years. We have had a laudatory letters relative
to our performance, and we have worked closely with them.
Mr. Jordan. And the units that went out with Katrina and
Hurricane Rita, the units that were sold there, is it accurate
to say they were the exact same units that you would send to
your dealers and your dealers would sell to any citizen or any
family who came to purchase those?
Mr. Fenech. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Liegl.
Mr. Liegl. Definitely.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Shea, same units?
Mr. Shea. We were the only manufacturer that was approved
for rail transport, which was important to FEMA, and I think
they shipped about 25,000 of our units by rail, so our units do
have differences beyond what would be normal for our regular
production. There are some differences, but all the products
use composite wood products like particle board and MDF and
hardwood plywood. I mean, that is very much the same for all of
them.
Mr. Jordan. And then Mr. Bennett and Mr. Fenech, same units
that were part of Katrina, same units you would sell to any
other customer?
Mr. Fenech. Absolutely.
Mr. Jordan. OK. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of
my time.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
That concludes the questioning by the members of the
committee, and I do want to recognize Mr. Donnelly at this
time.
Mr. Donnelly. I want to thank the chairman again for having
the grace to let me be present at this hearing. And I want to
welcome all of the gentlemen here for participating. There are
headquarters located in our District. You have facilities
located in our District. I think the other story that is here
is the story of the number of families of the Gulf Coast region
who were able to receive shelter from your products when they
had nowhere else to put their head at night and who, because of
the workers of your comps, were able to have their family have
a place to stay and be able to shower and to eat and have
somewhere that they could put their family unit back together.
And that the workers of your companies, the other untold
story is the overtime work that was put in on a constant basis,
the weekend work that was done because of the commitment of
your workers and your companies to the people who live, their
fellow Americans, down in the Gulf region.
I travel the highways of our District, as you know, and day
after day almost every 2 or 3 minutes you could see another
unit heading down to the Gulf region for another family.
So the one question I have is for you, Mr. Shea, and that
is that the Government and scientific agencies have not seemed
to be able to successfully come to a consensus as to a
formaldehyde level for your products. In that absence, are you
voluntarily implementing any standards, and what would they be?
Mr. Shea. Yes, Congressman. In spring of 2007 we started
implementing products that were equivalent to the upcoming CARB
standards for product emissions that go into effect in 2009,
and beyond that we have moved now to actually 2011 compliant
products. So what we are producing now is 2\1/2\ years in front
of the marketplace, as far as I know. That is where we like to
be. We like to be ahead of the curve. We have been ahead of the
curve in terms of using LFU products starting in the 1990's.
And we also, to my knowledge, are the only manufacturer who has
a third party organization that ensures our material
acquisition, our supply processes, and does verification
testing on products that we receive from vendors.
Mr. Donnelly. Thank you very much.
I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Donnelly.
Some Members wish a second round, and I see Mr. Welch has
just arrived and he hasn't done his first round, but let me
recognize myself and then we will get to Mr. Welch down the
road.
Last week CDC issued this report and we heard from CDC this
morning in their testimony, and they said to us that levels of
formaldehyde were elevated in these trailers, and some exceeded
500 parts per billion, which is the level that OSHA requires
mandatory medical monitoring. It is that high so that they
require medical monitoring. As a result of its testing, CDC
recommended everyone currently living in these trailers be
evacuated immediately, not just some residents, but all of
them. CDC said that Government should prioritize its evacuation
first to take out the elderly and children, those who are most
sensitive, but then eventually get everybody out.
The witnesses on this panel that is before us right now
representing the companies that sold these trailers, I would
like to ask each of you, Do you agree with this Federal
Government decision to evacuate these residents from your
trailers if they exceed this 500 parts per billion? Mr. Shea,
do you agree with that statement from CDC and recommendation?
Mr. Shea. CDC recommended that these persons be quickly
relocated despite the levels. The levels were as low as three
parts per billion, sir, and they ranged upwards----
Chairman Waxman. No, that is not my question. My question
is we are being told that if people are living in trailers that
exceed 500 parts per billion, that they be put into some other
trailer, that they be relocated. Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Shea. I think that there should be all consideration
for the safety of the persons. There are some statistical
outlookers. There are very few of the units that I know were at
that level. They average----
Chairman Waxman. But if they are at that level, do you
agree with that recommendation? Yes or no?
Mr. Shea. Above that level, with the concerns that are
being registered by the CDC, I would agree for public health.
Chairman Waxman. OK. How about you, Mr. Bennett?
Mr. Bennett. I would agree.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Fenech.
Mr. Fenech. I think that there are really some unusual
circumstances in Louisiana, and absolutely. I mean, if it is
unsafe they should be moved out.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Liegl.
Mr. Liegl. Yes, sir.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Now, since you agree with this
statement, let me ask you this: why should the Federal
Government have to pay you for these trailers? The American
taxpayers spent $2 billion in trailers that can't be used.
Shouldn't we get that money back if those trailers exceed those
very high levels?
I don't see any of you jumping in to say yes.
Mr. Shea. I would answer that question, sir. CDC testing
totally depends on use. Anybody that would have smoked a
cigarette or otherwise used the unit, it wasn't a protocol that
was universal. They were totally dependent on what people did,
whether they cooked fish, whether they smoked a cigarette,
whether they did other things that raised these levels higher.
We are in favor not just of a standard, but we need also a
protocol of testing to follow so that we know what we are
comparing it to.
Chairman Waxman. Let me interrupt you. Two years ago you
tested trailers and found that 40 percent of them exceeded that
level. Mr. Fenech, CDC found that a trailer from your company,
Keystone RV, had formaldehyde exposures of 480 parts per
billion. Do you think that is safe?
Mr. Fenech. Based on the information that we are hearing
today, you would say that no, that doesn't sound like it is a
safe level.
Chairman Waxman. OK.
Mr. Fenech. Please let me complete my thought, if I might.
But the implication then is that it is all the result of the
way the trailer was built, and that I don't agree with, to
answer your question about the buy-back.
Chairman Waxman. But you don't think it is safe.
Mr. Fenech. I am not a scientist.
Chairman Waxman. Let me ask Mr. Bennett the question. CDC
found that a trailer from your company, Pilgrim International,
had 520 parts per billion. Do you think that is safe for people
to live in?
Mr. Bennett. I would have to state that this is long after
the fact and at the time we built these units we had no
standard to go by. We were building them the same way we build
trailers, thousands of trailers. We had no reason to believe
that these trailers were----
Chairman Waxman. But you don't think it is safe now.
Mr. Shea, you are the chairman of Gulf Stream company. You
provided the most trailers to FEMA. Your company was paid over
a half billion dollars. CDC found that one of your trailers had
formaldehyde levels 590, the highest level of any of the
trailers that it examined.
The point that I am getting to is I don't think that a
manufacturer of any product should say, well, if there is no
standard I don't have to meet it. I think you have an
obligation to try to find out if your product is going to harm
people. I think that is just the responsibility of any
manufacturer that sells a product, no matter what it is,
whether it is a toy or a trailer. When we hear from CDC that
everyone living in these trailers at that level should be
evacuated as soon as possible, nobody should live in those
trailers with formaldehyde that high, it sounds like the
companies who sold these trailers are not willing to say that
they have some responsibility because there was no standard. I
just don't accept that argument.
My time has expired. Who wishes to be recognized? Mr.
Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, this whole issue sort of is interesting how it
has come around. As the chairman knows, I served on the Air
Resources Board in California, and we had major concerns about
indoor pollution exposures. In fact, as far as I know right now
in the 1990's we were looking at a different exposure, and that
was the exposure caused by formaldehyde emissions from new
purchased vehicles, new manufactured vehicles. I question, Does
anybody know what the formaldehyde exposure is on a new
automobile in the United States left in the noonday sun for a
few hours?
[No response.]
Mr. Bilbray. And is there a Federal standard of maximum
exposure for new automobiles?
[No response.]
Mr. Bilbray. I would say, as far as I know, no, there
isn't. And it is a concern and has been a concern of the Air
Resources Board since the late 1980's. But do we hold
automobile manufacturers responsible for that exposure and do
we now open up the issue that automobile manufacturers should
be held accountable for any exposure over a certain limit to
new car purchasers, because I haven't bought a new car in a
long time and, frankly, that new car smell is something that
people talk about. But at the Air Resources Board we were
addressing it.
My question is this: the formaldehyde emissions in these
trailers--and in my family I was in Mississippi. I had a family
home damaged in Mississippi. I saw the trailers coming in. The
manufacturing products that were put in these trailers, are
they products that are available in the open market at any Home
Depot, at any lumber yard, or are these unique particle board
and materials that are emitting formaldehyde? Gentlemen?
Mr. Fenech. I would be happy to answer that. It is off-the-
shelf, standard stuff that is used every day in house building
for all intents and purposes. Maybe we might get a different
thickness of that material versus the standard half-inch versus
we might get three-eighths, but it is off-the-shelf material.
Mr. Bilbray. Anyone knows when the testing was done, was
there any mitigation done to new construction exposed to the
southern sun basically caused more aggravated emissions coming
out of these particle board and other products, just like the
new automobile left in the sun? In these records, what kind of
application? How old were the units? And what was the
parameters with which the tests were made that came up with
these high numbers? Do you guys have any idea of what kind of
parameters the Sierra Club used in doing these tests?
Chairman Waxman. You said the Sierra Club.
Mr. Bilbray. Well, the data I had was that the Sierra Club
felt there were evaluations and concerns about the exposure,
Mr. Chairman. Am I wrong on that? The Sierra Club didn't have--
--
Chairman Waxman. I am misinformed, and I am sorry to have
jumped in. I guess the Sierra Club did some very preliminary,
early studies.
Mr. Bilbray. And raised the concerns?
Chairman Waxman. Yes. The gentleman's question is based on
an accurate statement.
Mr. Bilbray. There were tests done by the Sierra Club and
raised these concerns. And the testing done, the big question
that is there is do we now go to all construction material and
start addressing the issue of formaldehyde in all construction
material, and is that the way we could reduce this exposure,
and basically say particle board may be outlawed in the United
States or may not be used in construction where you have the
potential for indoor pollution, which ARB in California has
been talking about for over a decade.
Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Shea. Yes, CARB is implementing, as I mentioned
earlier, in 2009 new product standards which they say are the
most stringent in the world. And yes, there is going to be
standards certainly for our industry in using these common wood
products. They need to be applied to home building, remodeling,
apartments, furniture. Everyone needs to be on the same,
because it is more difficult to ensure what products you are
getting when there is all kinds of different products out
there, so it would be helpful to have a national standard for
these kinds of products.
Mr. Bilbray. OK. And remember, too, that the use of this
particle board has actually been encouraged due to recycling of
waste products from lumber activity so that waste products that
would normally have been burned or thrown away are now recycled
and put into this stream to be able to use it as construction
material rather than using virgin material and going down and
cutting down more trees. Is that fair to say that this is how
we ended up with so much particle board?
Mr. Shea. Yes, sir. There is a product that came into play
well after our products were created. It is called
environmentally preferable product. It has special standards,
and they are low formaldehyde, but to be an environmentally
preferable product it has to be a sustainable product and taken
from the kinds of products you are talking about. In a lot of
ways it is a green product.
Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask that when we
look for a minimum standard here for exposure in a travel
trailer which really does not apply to the mobile home because
the exposure rate was assumed to be different, and I think
there is a legitimate argument there that maybe we need to look
at our own regs. But again, just as we did with medical
implants and stuff, there has really got to be a line drawn
here of what is the exposure or what is the responsibility of
one person as opposed to another and where the source of the
formaldehyde came from, and was it reasonable for somebody to
feel that generally available construction material that is
used universally across the construction industries in many
different fields was somehow not appropriate at this location.
I think that is a debate, but I think there is a degree of
back seat driving here, hindsight 20/20 that it is not a
trailer that was newly constructed that was in Minnesota during
the winter where there might not have been any exposure at all.
It happened to be a brand new trailer that was produced and
then put into the sun in Mississippi and Louisiana in the
middle of August, which really changes the whole dynamics
there. That real-life application is something that we know now
post-script, but to perceive that was going to be a problem
somewhere in the future I think is really second-guessing
people to an extreme, especially with the fact that I still
would say why are new automobiles exempt from the environmental
air pollution exemption except for the fact that they are in
the same clause here.
I say publicly if you own a new car don't jump into it
after it has been sitting in the sun. Roll the windows down and
let it air out, unless you want to get a good dose of
formaldehyde. That is something that I think the consumers need
to talk about back and forth. But we ought to be talking about
that before the incident rather than coming back now and
pointing fingers after the incident.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shea, I want to ask you a little bit about a CNN story.
In April 2006 I understand that Gulf Stream became aware that
CNN was going to be doing as story on formaldehyde in FEMA
trailers. You are familiar with that?
Mr. Shea. Yes, I recollect that, sir.
Mr. Welch. Well, it was a big deal. This was going to go to
the heart of the quality of the trailers and whether people in
your trailers were getting sick, right?
Mr. Shea. Sir, I expressed earlier--I don't know if you
were here--the experiences that we had with several
complainants.
Mr. Welch. Well, let me proceed here. I am saying the
obvious here. As a company, you obviously want to defend the
product that you put out, right? This is going to be a story
raising questions about it, you are going to take that story
seriously and prepare for it, right?
Mr. Shea. As soon as the initial story came out in Bay St.
Louis in mid-March, we were very much concerned with the story
and the issue. Certainly.
Mr. Welch. So Gulf Stream, your company, sent a statement
to CNN in April 2006 about formaldehyde, where it said, and we
will put this up on the board if we can, ``We are not aware of
any complaints of illness from our many customers of Cavalier
travel trailers over the years, including travel trailers
provided under our contracts with FEMA.'' Did your company make
that statement?
Mr. Shea. And we are speaking retrospectively prior to the
March issue when it started in March. We were talking about our
experience with Florida hurricanes, and we had been building
these since 1992, if you recall.
Mr. Welch. Did your company make that statement?
Mr. Shea. We did make that statement, yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. And did you make it in April 2006?
Mr. Shea. It was made in April 2006.
Mr. Welch. All right. So is it fair to conclude that any
listener would hear your statement as asserting that your
company was aware of no complaints prior to the issuance of
that statement?
Mr. Shea. Our intent with the statement was to describe our
history of experience with this prior to this issue coming
about from Bay St. Louis in mid-March. That was our intent,
sir.
Mr. Welch. Let's use English here. You made a statement in
April, and as of that date I assume that you vouch for the
integrity of the statement.
Mr. Shea. Sir, there were allegations. We are not even
familiar with the medical aspects of any of these complaints.
Mr. Welch. So what you meant to say is that you are unaware
of any substantiated medical complaints?
Mr. Shea. We were aware of allegations; we were unaware of
substantiated medical complaints, and we were speaking prior to
the----
Mr. Welch. So why, if----
Mr. Shea. Previous experience in previous years, sir.
Mr. Welch. So why didn't you say you heard of allegations
but not ``substantiated medical complaints?''
Mr. Shea. Sir, we were trying to be as expressive of our
history of dealing with this, and we thought that was what was
important, but we were addressing the few complaints that we
received, sir, and the record shows that in that period we
had----
Mr. Welch. Let me tell you what the record does show. On
March 20 of 2006 on your Gulf Stream interactive Web site, you
received a statement, you, Gulf Stream, and this is before you
issued the no complaint statement, and I think we can get that
up here, as well ``There is an odor in my trailer that will not
go away. It burns my eyes and I am getting headaches every day.
I have tried many things, but nothing seems to work. Please,
please help me.''
Now, were you able to say that you had received no
complaints because this did not come with a medical
certificate?
Mr. Shea. Every complaint that we received, sir, we
investigated, we responded to, we asked persons if we could
assist them.
Mr. Welch. That is not the question I am asking. I mean, I
asked you how you square that statement, your statement to CNN,
``We are not aware of any complaints of illness,'' you made in
April 2006 with a statement from a customer on a Web site that
was a complaint.
Mr. Shea. Sir, we received three complaints during that
period. We addressed all of them. We were proactive on them. We
asked FEMA to assist on any complaints they had. And we were--
--
Mr. Welch. I don't want to be difficult, but----
Mr. Shea. I don't want to be difficult, either, sir.
Mr. Welch. Had you received any complaints before April
2006 when you issued your statement to CNN that you had no
complaints?
Mr. Shea. The complaints related to this matter that we
received were two for that period.
Mr. Welch. So the answer to my question is yes, you had
received complaints prior to April, but you told CNN you had no
complaints, correct?
Mr. Shea. We were speaking of our history with FEMA as a
program, sir.
Mr. Welch. And that is a convenient way of saying that is
the justification for saying something that was untrue.
Mr. Shea. Sir, I believe we have been very truthful in
everything that we have done and what we have presented here
today.
Mr. Welch. I will yield the balance of my time.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Liegl, I think I will switch to you and give Mr. Shea a
bit of a break here. The chairman earlier was talking in terms
of shouldn't people get their money back, shouldn't the
Government not pay, and so on. And I would like to set the
record straight, as having been a manufacturer, myself. All of
your companies--I will ask you to answer for anyone, unless
they want to pipe in, in particular--all of your companies are
subject to various State lemon laws, right?
Mr. Liegl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Issa. Plus, you all have networks of dealer
distributors, right?
Mr. Liegl. Yes. Correct.
Mr. Issa. Now, if a customer is dissatisfied, and
particularly if the customer either litigates or comes in with
multiple valid complaints, if the distributor sees a problem
they are going to call you up and say take this lemon back,
repair or replace it, right?
Mr. Liegl. I'd say that is correct.
Mr. Issa. OK. So the industry you are in, including the
trade association norms for this industry, say if you make a
product which is substantially defective, such as while it was
on the trip to its destination somebody let it get soaked in
water, or anything else that causes it to be materially
different than the 10,000 other ones produced the same year,
you take them back, you repair or replace them, you make them
right; is that correct?
Mr. Liegl. That is correct.
Mr. Issa. And that is true of most of the sort of Elkhart
group, if you will, of travel trailer makers. So when FEMA
started having these problems, was there any doubt in any of
your mind that if any of your trailers had material or
workmanship failures in your design or in the materials you
chose or in the work that your people did, that you would make
it right by repairing or replacing it? Was there any doubt in
your mind that you would do that?
Mr. Liegl. I believe we would have.
Mr. Issa. OK. Has FEMA ever come to you and said, Take back
this trailer, it is defective in work that you did?
Mr. Liegl. No, sir. Never.
Mr. Issa. OK. Now, you have evaluated trailers that had a
myriad of problems that have been used and you were part of
that evaluation of why does it have this level or why did mold
produce, and so on, and so you are familiar with trailers that
had a year or two down the road and have problems, right?
Mr. Liegl. Correct.
Mr. Issa. OK. So you have cooperated with FEMA, the
Government agency that you sold to. You would take back the
products if they were defective in material or workmanship,
and, in fact, you have not been asked to nor have you been
given a failure or any part of your spec or your material
workmanship; is that correct?
Mr. Liegl. If it was our problem, we definitely would stand
behind it.
Mr. Issa. OK. And I would like just a nod. All the rest of
you agree?
[No audible response.]
Mr. Issa. So the norm in the industry, particularly when
you are making something that feeds into State lemon laws and
so on, as these things do, the norm is you make it right, you
use your distributor network, your dealer networks to make it
right if it is in the field without bringing it back. And, in
fact, even though we are having this hearing today and we are
talking about people suffering and so on--which I am not
disputing that people have had health problems while living in
these trailers, but in no way, shape, or form has the
Government come to you and said you did this wrong as of today?
No allegations against any of the four of you other than what
you heard from the dias here today?
Mr. Shea. Correct.
Mr. Bennett. That is correct.
Mr. Fenech. Correct.
Mr. Liegl. Right.
Mr. Shea. OK. I think, Mr. Chairman, that makes the case
that these are not the wrongdoers. Government may very well
have failed the people of Louisiana and Mississippi. They may
be continuing to fail them by not setting standards for the
travel trailers or living accommodations, by not having ongoing
testing. That may all be very true. Certainly, as a
Californian, you and I share the leading edge of air quality
that California is known for. But none of that is here today.
So I am not defending anyone, but I would like to thank all
four of you for coming here today, for testifying honestly,
and, in fact, for the fact that nothing has been said here that
causes you to have done anything wrong. You may have tested and
come up with high or low or different levels, but, again, as we
heard from the CDC, these are all things we would like to do
but Government, as of today, hasn't done it.
So, Mr. Chairman, since we are the Government Oversight and
Reform committee, now that we have, I think, completed most of
our oversight, I would hope that we would join on a bipartisan
basis to do the reform of making sure that the Government
agencies responsible for air quality, whether it is in
manufactured items or in the air, itself, do their job and set
appropriate standards and testing procedures so that we don't
again haul in four CEOs of companies who, as of today, have not
had one product returned as defective or somehow inappropriate
to the design, and rather make sure that we have standards for
the next one so that these four will competitively bid on a
product that would be improved once we decide what improved
means.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, but
I do very strongly hope that on a bipartisan basis we will do
that second leg and ensure that we set standards that people
can manufacture to.
With that I thank you and yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
I want to ask Mr. Burton and Mr. Souder if you wish to have
a second round?
Mr. Burton. Yes, I want one.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. I want to read to you what it says regarding
the parts per billion and what HUD sets as a target. It says,
``HUD set a target of 400 parts per billion for indoor ambient
air in manufactured homes. HUD's indoor ambient air target
guideline of 400 parts per billion is based on component
standards for plywood and particle board.
In the unoccupied units testing revealed baseline
formaldehyde levels were at 1,040 parts per billion, but fell
to an average of 390 when the air conditioner was turned on.
The averages fell even lower to 90 parts per billion when the
windows were opened. The baseline average is probably
attributable to the fact that unoccupied trailers were sealed
up in storage, they were in the sun, and had little or no air
conditioning or exiting. In all occupied units, the average
level was 77 parts per billion and 81 parts per billion for
travel trailers specifically.''
I kind of am disappointed that we have you four here
beating up on you, because I don't think you have done anything
wrong. You have used standard materials off the shelf that is
used in any kind of home construction or remodeling. I have had
it done in my house. The location of the mobile homes in
question was in an area that was extremely hot. They were
sealed up and nobody was in them, and so when somebody went in
them obviously the parts per billion would be much, much higher
and it would take a while for them to cool off. And if they
didn't open the windows, it would probably take even longer for
them to get all the parts per billion down to where they should
be.
Then you have to take into consideration how the occupants
lived, if they had a dog in the house, if they bought
additional furniture or different kinds of other things that
might have formaldehyde in them. Did they smoke? How did they
cook? Did they like higher temperatures in their house or lower
temperatures in their house? There is all kinds of
imponderables that you have to take into consideration when you
are talking about the parts per billion.
You know, in all of our houses we have carpet, we have
furniture, we have construction material that you use in your
products. And I am going to go home and try to find out how
much I have in my house, and when I exercise downstairs where I
have it all closed up I am going to open the doors because I am
concerned about my health.
I just think, you know, there is eight million of these
units in use around the country, very, very few complaints, if
any, and I just think for us to call you in here and pound on
you and infer that you are lying about your products and
everything, I think is just unconscionable, and I want to thank
you for being here, for being so forthright, and for providing
an industry that helps people when they are in need and
suffering like they did in Florida during the hurricanes and
like they have done in places like Katrina in the south on the
Gulf.
Obviously, the chairman has a right to call a hearing on
almost anything, but I am disappointed in much of the
questioning that has gone on today, because it questions your
integrity, and I don't think it should have been done.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Is Mr. Welch going to ask any more questions?
Chairman Waxman. Why don't you just go ahead and take your
second round?
Mr. Souder. I would like to hear what other questions are
before. I know the chairman has a right to summarize, but if
Mr. Welch has additional questions I would like to reserve.
Chairman Waxman. Let me ask you this. If I make a
concluding statement, do you want to make a concluding
statement?
Mr. Souder. You get to make the concluding statement. I
wanted to know if Mr. Welch had another round.
Chairman Waxman. Do you wish to be recognized at this time?
Mr. Welch. No.
Chairman Waxman. OK.
Mr. Souder. OK. I will just make my comments.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. So we will both make concluding
statements?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Chairman Waxman. OK.
Mr. Souder. Do you want me to go first?
Chairman Waxman. Whatever you want.
Mr. Souder. Well, you are the chairman. You have a right to
summarize. I just wanted to see whether you were going first.
Chairman Waxman. Why don't you wait and hear what I have to
say and you will have the last word about the whole thing.
First of all, I want to ask unanimous consent that the
staffs have discussed the release of documents and have reached
a mutual understanding and so I ask unanimous consent that
these documents be part of the record.
Mr. Souder. Reserving the right to object, I merely want to
say that, while I have some concerns, I really appreciate the
majority working with us. I will withdraw my objection.
Chairman Waxman. OK. Thank you.
This is our second hearing on this issue of formaldehyde in
these trailers. I thought it was the second hearing of the
Congress, but it turned out that during the course of today's
hearing we got a phone call, and that phone call was from a
staff person who worked for this committee in 1981, and he told
us there was a hearing at that time on the question of
formaldehyde in trailers, and at that time, at the conclusion
of the hearing the Members of Congress said to the FEMA and to
HUD and to the Consumer Product Safety Commission and OSHA they
ought to set a standard. They ought to set a standard for
formaldehyde levels in trailers. That was 1981.
So I agree with my Republican colleagues when they say this
is a failure of Government. Government should have set
standards. Government should have protected the public from the
dangers from formaldehyde, and the Government failed. But I
also think this is a failure of industry, because some of you
did testing and you found that there was a problem and then
that was the end of it. We didn't hear anything more. Some of
you didn't want to test at all, even though reports were coming
out in the press about high formaldehyde levels in trailers
causing people to be sick.
I do want everyone to understand when we heard about the
fellow who said the smell is too bad, come and help me, I am
wheezing and having all sorts of medical problems or symptoms,
please, please, please help me, that was rare. Most people
don't smell anything. But suddenly they have symptoms. They
don't go to the manufacturer and say, I have symptoms, take
your trailer back. They don't even know what is causing it.
So Government should know what is causing it, because it is
well established that formaldehyde can cause these symptoms,
and I believe industry has a responsibility, as well, to know
that if they are selling this product that it may cause health
problems to those who are buying it.
Testing by Mr. Shea's company showed high levels. Some of
these levels were far above even the highest standard where
there was a regulatory standard. They were in the hundreds and
thousands of parts per billion. I think a manufacturer knowing
this information had an obligation to make the product safer
and to understand that perhaps there was a problem that needed
to be corrected.
I think the rest of you also had an obligation to do some
testing, not to act as if you didn't know, therefore there is
nothing required of you.
Now, I am pleased that the four of you are in business. I
am pleased that you have employees that have jobs with you. I
am pleased that you have Members of Congress from your area
that will vouch for you personally. I think you are entitled to
make your profits, and even doubling of your salary in those 2
years when you had the FEMA contract, Mr. Shea, for you and I
think it was your brother. You are entitled to that. I don't
begrudge any of that. I want you to be in business.
But I think that when we have to abandon trailers, that it
is not just the Government that should pay for it. I think
there is some responsibility for the manufacturers, as well,
because these levels should have been of concern.
I know that some Members have acted like you are victims
because you are simply asked to come here and answer questions.
I think that those that really suffered are the people who are
getting sick from formaldehyde in these trailers. I think they
are victims of FEMA's incompetence. They were victims of
manufacturers who didn't disclose what they knew about the
formaldehyde dangers, as well.
We will see where all of this goes. I am willing to
entertain ideas for legislation. That is the purpose of our
oversight hearings. But also to find out what really happened.
I think that what happened is a disgrace on the part of the
Government particularly, but is not an exoneration for the
manufacturers who know or should have known or, in fact, did
know that the trailers were not safe for those who were
inhabiting them, and now the taxpayers have to be stuck with
the bill.
So those are my concluding comments. I thank you all for
being here voluntarily and cooperating with us. I think that is
to your credit.
Now any comments you want to make to close off the hearing?
Mr. Souder. I thank the chairman for his generosity. I
wasn't trying to have the last views, but I appreciate that,
because this industry is really critical to my defense, as well
as to Mr. Donnelly's. I was at the Goshen Air Show Saturday and
people kept coming up asking, do you think we are going to get
our jobs back? We really want to work. They love working in
this industry. We need to keep this industry going. They have
worked hard to meet the emergency demand.
We clearly today have kind of confused all sorts of things,
but basically nobody wants to defend somebody getting sick. The
challenge here is there is no evidence, even though it is a
carcinogenic, at this point of, beyond basically itching,
coughing, wheezing type things. This may be like peanuts:
different people have allergic reactions. Clearly we need to be
moving toward some sort of a warning standard as we do this
research that different people react differently to this. That
is at very minimal that should be there.
HUD had a standard. They met the standard, as far as they
knew. Questions came up and the company volunteered to try to
test, even though FEMA could have done those tests, even though
FEMA was at the plant from morning until afternoon. The test
was not prohibitively expensive. The company tried to engage
FEMA and FEMA wasn't interested. The incredible justified
negative publicity about the Government's handling of Katrina
and FEMA has now resulted in an over-reaction to make it 16
parts, which is not achievable for emergency housing.
I want to reiterate again that the 390 that was tested
scientifically, not by the type of formaldehyde meter, but
scientifically to the gold standard. In Louisiana, in southern
Louisiana, trying to convert the 6.6 milligrams per meter,
which is their high point, appears to convert to 4,000 parts
per billion for the highest of a site-built house in the
region. This isn't a question just of manufactured housing, of
travel trailers. It is a fundamental question about the
materials, how they interact by region, and we need to have a
scientific approach to this. Given the fact that we do not have
that evidence of how much is even in the particular wood here
versus in other homes in that region, given the ambient air
standard on the Hancock study, which itself was not precisely
the same type of thing, it is my belief unfair to suggest that
the manufacturers bear responsibility when the science is, at
the very least, very conflicted. It is not clear that every
home in the region isn't hitting--certainly if 390 is the mean,
or the average, that means that a significant percentage of
every house in at least, given what we know now, in Louisiana
doesn't meet the standard. And we aren't asking for all our HUD
houses to be backed. Private owners aren't asking to be backed.
That has been my concern with this industry, not that we
shouldn't be trying to learn the danger to individuals.
I look forward to working with the chairman in the future.
Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Souder. Thanks
for all the witnesses' participation.
That concludes our hearing and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Diane E. Watson and Hon.
Bill Sali follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]