[House Hearing, 110 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] PAKISTANI ELECTIONS: WILL THEY BE FREE AND FAIR OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED? ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS of the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ DECEMBER 20, 2007 __________ Serial No. 110-130 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.oversight.house.gov ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 47-998 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman TOM LANTOS, California TOM DAVIS, Virginia EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BILL SALI, Idaho JIM COOPER, Tennessee JIM JORDAN, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland PETER WELCH, Vermont Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff Phil Barnett, Staff Director Earley Green, Chief Clerk David Marin, Minority Staff Director Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DAN BURTON, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania Dave Turk, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on December 20, 2007................................ 1 Statement of: Daschle, Thomas A., former Senate Majority and Minority Leader; Thomas E. Garrett, regional program director, Middle East and North Africa for the International Republican Institute [IRI]; and Mark L. Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group [ICG] and former Peace Corps director................................ 8 Daschle, Thomas A........................................ 8 Garrett, Thomas E........................................ 30 Schneider, Mark L........................................ 38 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Daschle, Thomas A., former Senate Majority and Minority Leader, prepared statement of.............................. 10 Garrett, Thomas E., regional program director, Middle East and North Africa for the International Republican Institute [IRI], prepared statement of............................... 33 Schneider, Mark L., senior vice president of the International Crisis Group [ICG] and former Peace Corps director, prepared statement of............................ 43 Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of.............. 4 PAKISTANI ELECTIONS: WILL THEY BE FREE AND FAIR OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED? ---------- THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2007 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Tierney, Yarmuth, and Van Hollen. Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright, professional staff member; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; Christopher Bright, minority professional staff member; Todd Greenwood, minority legislative assistant; and Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor. Mr. Tierney. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ``Pakistani Elections: Will They Be Free and Fair or Fundamentally Flawed,'' will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Mr. Yarmuth, we're happy to have an opening statement from you as well, when it comes to that, if you'd like. Without objection, so ordered. I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so ordered. I want to thank our witnesses for coming here today and assisting us in this hearing. We're going to continue our sustained oversight of U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Here in the States, we're well into our longest-ever Presidential campaign; and the future course of U.S. national security is at front and center as an issue. On January 8th, as New Hampshire voters brave the cold to vote in the first of the Nation's primary, another election that very same day, a parliamentary election halfway around the world in Pakistan, will also have a profound effect and consequences on U.S. national security. We've noted at previous hearings that Pakistan is at a crossroads. After a year of extremist violence spreading throughout its western regions and ambivalent military response and increasing pressure from pro-democracy groups, President Musharraf declared a state of emergency on November 3rd. Pakistan's emerging civil society appeared to be the main target. President Musharraf sacked judges who refused to surrender their independence. He jailed lawyers, human rights advocates and political opposition leaders. He banned public political gatherings. He muzzled the nation's independent media; and, worst of all, he turned Pakistan's guns on its civil society instead of on the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Bush administration initially made some gestures to pressure President Musharraf to reverse course. Ambassador Ann Patterson, for example, made very important and visible efforts to highlight the detention of lawyers and the crackdown on independent media. However, the administration, especially recently, has appeared to undermine the pro-democracy message. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Richard Boucher continue to refer to Musharraf as an ``indispensable'' ally. President Bush said that President Musharraf ``hadn't crossed any lines'' by imposing the state of emergency. Just 2 weeks ago, Ambassador Boucher referred to the state of emergency as ``a bump in the road.'' I'm concerned that such statements greatly undermine U.S. credibility with the Pakistani people. We should never forget that the Pakistani people are indispensable and our long-term ally, not necessarily one leader, whether it be President Musharraf or anyone else. Over the last several weeks, there have been some positive developments. President Musharraf resigned as Army Chief; the leaders of the two mainstream opposition parties, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, are now back in Pakistan; and President Musharraf revoked the state of emergency just this past weekend. Still, much of the damage remains. Judges have not been reinstated, media outlets now operate under a code of conduct restricting criticism of the government, leading opposition lawyers remain under arrest, the election commission lacks independence, the voter rolls continue to inspire little confidence, and evidence mounts that raises serious concerns about President Musharraf using the power of the state to gain unfair advantage in the elections. For example, this is a photograph--shown on the screen over there--that was taken last week depicting an armed Pakistani security official actually posting signs on behalf of President Musharraf's political party, the PML-Q. There is also evidence that the crackdown against civil society continues, notwithstanding formal revocation of the state of emergency. This picture on the screen is of security forces beating a woman at a peaceful protest taken just a few days ago. We note that this confrontation happened after the state of emergency was purportedly lifted. Taking all of this into account, there are grave concerns and many questions about the prospects for free and fair parliamentary elections less than 3 short weeks from now on January 8th. How will the code of conduct imposed on the media allow the kind of unbiased political expression necessary for a free and fair election? How much of a chilling effect will there be on a robust political opposition when activists continue to fear crackdowns and arrests? How accurate are the voter rolls going into this election and what effect will Nawaz Sharif's ineligibility to stand for election have? How will political parties campaign in the western regions of the country that have been inflamed by Taliban and al Qaeda violence? How will the removal of judges unwilling to go along with President Musharraf and the lack of an independent election commission hamper the ability to ward off and root out corruption and unfair practices at the polls? We also think it merits taking a few minutes now before the heat of the election day itself to discuss the following: First, what standards must be met for an election to be deemed free and fair? What is the dividing line between minor problems and massive election fraud? Second, how should the United States react if the international community and credible election observers deem it to be a fundamentally flawed election? I look forward to engaging with our distinguished panel that is before us today about these particular questions. I want to thank all of you for sharing your expertise with the Congress and with the American people. In particular, I look forward to hearing your experiences, since you have closely monitored the buildup to these Pakistani parliamentary elections with business there in the not-too-distant past. So thank you. And, Mr. Yarmuth, if you have some comments, we'd love to here those as well. [The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don't have too much. I want to thank you for and commend you for holding this hearing. It is a very important topic, and I'm particularly interested in an assessment of just what the risks and the possibilities are from U.S. relationships in Pakistan. Because I've seen in a number of cases throughout many years that there are usually a lot of unintended consequences from our involvement, our relationships within a country in terms of the results of elections and the perception of the United States as a result of that. So I'm very interested in the witnesses' testimony and the discussion that we'll have. Thank you very much. Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Yarmuth. The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses that are here with us today. I want to begin by introducing each of the witnesses on the panel. We have, starting from my left, Senator Thomas A. Daschle, who is a former two-time Senate majority and minority leader in the Senate. Senator Daschle recently co-authored a pre-election assessment report after he had led a team to Pakistan on behalf of the National Democratic Institute. Mr. Thomas E. Garrett is the regional program director for the Middle East and North Africa for the International Republican Institute. The IRI was awarded the election observer grant on behalf of the U.S. Government and released a survey of the Pakistan public opinion just last week. Mr. Mark L. Schneider is a senior vice president of the International Crisis Group and a former U.S. Peace Corps Director. The ICG closely monitors events on the ground in Pakistan and has employees stationed there to assist in that project as well. Welcome to all of you and thank you again. It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear in our witnesses before we take testimony, so I please ask you to stand and raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Tierney. The record will please reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. You have full written statements that you have been kind enough to supply to the committee, and those will be put on the record with unanimous consent. We ask that you keep your oral statements somewhere within the 5-minute range. So we have a small panel here today, so we're more than happy to let you go a little bit beyond that, And we do want to hear a full assessment of your thoughts and your observations. Senator Daschle, we will be pleased to start with you. STATEMENTS OF THOMAS A. DASCHLE, FORMER SENATE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADER; THOMAS E. GARRETT, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE [IRI]; AND MARK L. SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP [ICG] AND FORMER PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. DASCHLE Mr. Daschle. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today. I commend you on your opening statement, Mr. Chairman; and I'm very pleased to be a part of the distinguished panel that is appearing before you today. I come before you on behalf of the National Democratic Institute regarding the prospects for free and fair elections in Pakistan. I'm a member of the Board of Directors of NDI and, as you noted, was pleased to be able to lead a pre-election assessment of Pakistan for NDI from October 17th-21st. NDI has been actively involved in supporting the electoral process in Pakistan now for nearly two decades. The Institute organized the international delegations to observe the national and provincial elections in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997. This year, NDI is implementing a program to train political party representatives to monitor polling stations across the country on election day. The Institute also conducted two pre-election assessment missions to Pakistan, both prior to the imposition of marshal law. The first was held in May, and I led the second held in October. These missions identified a number of critical issues that needed to be addressed by the Pakistani government to improve the inclusiveness and credibility of the polls. The most recent delegation identified the following critical issues affecting these elections: first, the high incidence of election-related violence, second, the killing and abduction of journalists and political party workers; third, the infringement of the rights of women to vote; fourth, the ban on political parties operating in the federally administered tribal areas. Next, the lack of regular consultation by the election commission with the political parties and civil society on election procedures and policies and the inaccuracy of the voters list. President Musharraf's recent retirement from his military post and the lifting of the state of emergency on Saturday have been welcome developments, but much remains to be done before the upcoming polls could be viewed as free and fair by any international standard. In fact, we urge the members of this committee not to be distracted by President Musharraf taking off his uniform. It has not undone the damage of 8 years of military rule to the basic institutions of rule of law and democracy in Pakistan. Similarly, the lifting of the state of emergency is not alone sufficient for ensuring free and fair elections. It is only the first of many steps the government must take to avoid a further deepening of the Pakistan crisis today. Among the serious impacts of the recent state of emergency was the severe erosion of the independence of Pakistan's judiciary. Musharraf's replacement of several Supreme Court justices who threatened to rule his re-election unconstitutional undermines the democratic principle of checks and balances. Without the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and the other deposed judges, public confidence in the ability of the judicial system to act independently and to ensure the transparence of the electoral process will be significantly curtailed. Lingering restrictions on the press and opposition political parties also pose a threat to free and fair elections. Vibrant independent media and political competition are important elements in free society. While many restrictions imposed during the state of emergency have been lifted, one major television station continues to be prohibited from broadcasting, while others face strict limitations on the content of their political coverage. Many opposition supporters remain under arrest while their parties do not have the freedom to campaign openly. In addition, both of NDI's assessments identified a host of very serious and basic issues that, if not addressed, would adversely affect the election. Virtually none has been done since our first report to strengthen the prospects for free and fair elections. While the government has allowed the return of two former prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, after years of exile, Sharif has been barred from standing for a seat in parliament, thus diminishing his party's ability to fully participate in these elections. The other issues identified by the NDI delegations, which remain unaddressed today, are still fundamental to an inclusive, credible and transparent electoral process. Only elections that are viewed as legitimate by the people of Pakistan can resolve the instability that has long plagued their country. Robust institutions, an independent judiciary, free and independent media, vibrant political parties and transparent elections are all fundamental to a stable and democratic future for Pakistan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Senator. [The prepared statement of Mr. Daschle follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Tierney. Mr. Garrett. STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GARRETT Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Yarmuth, for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the upcoming elections in Pakistan. The International Republican Institute is actively engaged in programs to support the democratic process in Pakistan, ranging from public opinion polling to work with nongovernmental organizations to a political party strengthening program. These activities have been funded through the National Endowment for Democracy. As you mentioned, with recent funding from the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development, IRI has also undertaken a comprehensive elections effort that includes a pre-election assessment, deployment of long-term observers across the country and fielding of a 65-person international election day observer team. I mention the polling as a specific activity that IRI conducts in Pakistan. Our public opinion research has revealed that Pakistanis are committed to democracy and concerned about the future direction of their country. In IRI's February 2007, poll, 81 percent were optimistic that democracy would improve their lives. Over the course of the past year, increasing numbers have expressed their desire for the army to remove itself from civilian government and for President Musharraf to resign his post as army chief of staff. Even when President Musharraf was at the peak of his popularity in IRI polling, strong majorities supported the return of exiled leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in order to contest elections. Our most recent poll, conducted just this past month, found that voters overwhelmingly opposed the President's declaration of emergency. Voters were also opposed in large numbers to the various measures that accompanied this state of emergency declaration. For instance, 71 percent opposed the suspension of the constitution, 76 percent of Pakistanis opposed the closure of TV news channels, 76 percent opposed the crackdown on lawyers, and 62 percent supported the demonstrations you saw on the street against the declaration. On the day before President Musharraf declared the state of emergency, IRI had a pre-election assessment team concluding its 8-day visit to the country. While there, we met with 12 political parties, representatives of the election commission, civil society and media as we traveled throughout the country visiting Islamabad, Quetta, Karachi, Lahore. What we found in this pre-election assessment was a strong commitment on the part of civil society and political parties to engage in the democratic process, even among those who identified as early as November/October a lack of a level playing field in the pre- election environment. One of the overriding concerns expressed to our pre- election assessment team was the continued decline of law and order within Pakistan. People who intended to stand for candidate--excuse me--stand for office expressed fears about their personal safety while electioneering. The media told us they were worried about the vulnerability of their reporters and camera people as they tried to carry out their work to bring information to the public. But even these concerns of election period instability did not result in the majority of Pakistanis we spoke to from saying that they agreed with the governmental band to limit rallies or to stop political gatherings. Questions as to the capacity of the election commission of Pakistan to meet electoral needs in a timely fashion were often raised with IRI's delegation. One consistent issue of concern was the accuracy of the official voter list and the possible exclusion of eligible voters on election day. Our election assessment also noted the important role played by Pakistan's nonstate media. If you look back to 1999, the year during which General Musharraf took power in Pakistan, you can see the limited number of private media that existed at the time. During these last several years, media outlet numbers have grown tremendously and today they play a very important role in the roadmap to democracy in Pakistan. In IRI's most recent polling, the media actually outstrips institutions such as the judiciary and the army as the highest- rated institution in the country. That makes it all the more important, we believe, that private television stations that have been removed from the air--some restored but also still have media curbs in place against them--be allowed to report freely and fully on this election campaign period. The declaration of emergency on November 3rd was a very significant obstacle to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Several individuals that IRI met with during that time were under detention or still face the threat of detention today. The government of Pakistan's decision to lift the emergency and proceed with elections offers some hope the process toward democratization may be restored. However, I have to say it is very difficult to envision how elections conducted in a matter of only a few days and weeks under these kinds of rules while many participants are otherwise still detained or face the threat of detention--it is very difficult to envision how these elections can achieve legitimacy in the minds of the Pakistani citizenry. Of course, it is the Pakistani citizens who will judge this election's credibility. Based upon the polling figures that we have seen, we think this will be very difficult to achieve. Within IRI, we've examined whether or not our presence as observers on this election January 8th is necessary or desirable, given the flawed conditions in which we see this election proceeding. As recently as last week while I was in Pakistan, we met in consultation with our Pakistani partners and others as to the viability of an observer mission. But with the decision of the majority of parties to contest the election, IRI determined that its role as an NGO that promotes democracy was to work with our Pakistani partners on this election in the hope that future elections can be improved to democratic standards. So, over the next few weeks, our long-term and short-term observer delegation will be arriving in Pakistan to observe the electoral process. We will attempt to put people, observers in all four provinces of Pakistan, depending upon security at the time. Our preliminary mission findings will be presented shortly after election day at a press briefing, and within 45 days we'll issue a comprehensive report. It is our hope that the recommendations that report contains will strengthen the future elections in Pakistan. We hope that these recommendations will set benchmarks that serve as a guide for Pakistani election officials, political parties and civil society on how future elections may improve the country's democratic standing. Just before I close, let me say that much of my comments were geared toward the role of the government in this election. As a result of our pre-election assessment, I'd also like to point to the role played by political parties in Pakistan, including those in the opposition. We think that a commitment by the parties to run issue-based rather than personality centered election campaigns would break with the disastrous cycle of elections that have taken place in Pakistan since 1970. We think it is an important role for the parties to come forward with political programs or platforms that motivate the people of Pakistan to participate in elections. If you look at our polling, the issues which predominate are not those concerned with foreign policy or the war on terror. But, for Pakistanis, it is bread and butter issues such as inflation. When presented with a number of issues and asked to select what was most important in determining which party they'd vote for, 77 percent of Pakistanis chose economics related issues. Inflation was the top issue by far, having been selected by 53 percent of the respondents. Just finally, in closing, let me say that restoring public as well as international confidence in the electoral process in Pakistan is going to be very, very difficult. But we can see again through 2 years of polling that the urge among Pakistanis for democracy remains strong. Thank you very much. Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Garrett. [The prepared statement of Mr. Garrett follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Tierney. Mr. Schneider. STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me again express our appreciation to you and to the subcommittee for maintaining this focus on U.S. relations with Pakistan and on the Musharraf government's performance on democracy, extremism and terrorism. This hearing asks whether the parliamentary elections now scheduled for January 8th are going to be fair and free or fundamentally flawed, and it is appropriate that the question is asked now because election day is too late. And, unfortunately, the answer today is that Pakistan's parliamentary elections will be fatally flawed unless fundamental, political, electoral and legal conditions are rapidly improved. Today, those conditions do not permit a fair and free election. It is December 20th. Martial law was lifted only 5 days ago. The elections will take place in 18 days. There is a very short time. There is nothing like time for a long-term observation. That was long ago that the observation should have begun, and there should have already been a finding that the conditions that are required do not exist. Election day, remember, is the final act of a democratic drama. The first act is establishment of neutral rules and standards that all of the major players agree will permit a level playing field. That does not exist. Act two is for all of the parties to be able to name their own candidates and then to be able to campaign freely and the press to be able to ask their questions of all parties. That again does not exist. It is only finally when you get to the final act, if you will, when all eligible voters are permitted to vote, when votes are honestly and accurately counted and reported and when the complaints are heard before a neutral body, then one can say that the full drama is complete. At the moment, all of those factors are in high question as to whether or not those conditions will be met, because the emergency government of General Musharraf and now the current post-December 15th government of President Musharraf have violated the country's constitution and undermined the essential conditions for a fair and free election. As you noted, I was in Pakistan the week before the emergency was declared. At the beginning of the week, the assumption was that there would be no emergency because people did not think the court would dare to rule against Musharraf on the two key constitutional challenges to his re-election, wearing the uniform at the same time as being president and attempting to be re-elected within 2 years of holding an office as a military officer. By the end of the week, the views had changed; and that really gives you an indication of the timing for his action to declare an emergency. By the end of the week, in fact, it was viewed that the Supreme Court would disqualify him on one or both of the constitutional grounds; and, in addition, his government faced contempt charges for having refused to abide by the court decision to permit Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia and forcibly deported him. He essentially preempted the court on November 3rd. He imposed an emergency rule, he voided the constitution, he essentially adopted martial law. And there is a key disconnect between his justification of terrorism, the threat of terrorism, and his actions. The first people arrested were not terrorists. They were political party leaders. The first people released from prison were terrorists, in fact, those that had been linked to suicide bombings. They were exchanged for army hostages. Of the dozen or so paragraphs in the proclamation of emergency, 2 were solely linked to terrorism, 10 complained about an independent judiciary. His actions in time revealed his fundamental motive, which was to maintain power. The reason for acting was to retain political power and not to fight terrorism, and martial law was the means. To be frank, everybody in Pakistan I think was surprised by the level of repression that followed that decision. You've already heard some of it: Thousands rounded up and detained, Supreme Court justices, other justices removed. Remember, 13 of the 17 Supreme Court justices essentially were detained and have been fired; and more than 40 of the provincial High Courts, essentially the state Supreme Courts, have also been fired. The independent judiciary has been undermined, fundamentally; and I'm going to get to the point, which is that the linkage between the judiciary and fair and free elections in Pakistan is fundamental. Now, you have to understand that the reason that he did not use the emergency provision of the constitution and apply that as President, which I put into the testimony, is that would not have voided the roles of the other agencies of government. It would have kept the Supreme Court which had the power under the constitution to review his actions. He didn't do that. He voided the constitution. He essentially took the country back to 1999 and worse. Because what he said was that there will be no review of my action by the court or any other institution. In fact, now when he lifted the emergency last Saturday, he acknowledged what he had done. He said--and I'm quoting--have I done anything constitutionally illegal? Yes, I did on November 3rd. His order deprived the courts of the authority to challenge any Executive order for unconstitutionality and gave him the power to amend the constitution. Before they were placed under confinement, 7 members of the Supreme Court, a majority of the panel of 11, ruled that his actions were illegal and unconstitutional. And then you asked the question about the reaction in Pakistan to what has occurred and to U.S. actions. Pakistanis and others found it utterly incomprehensible that President Bush asserted that Musharraf had not crossed any red line in terms of undemocratic actions. This is the second time he crossed the red line. The first time was 1999, and the second time was when he voided the constitution on November 3rd. Now, afterwards, I think the United States, the U.K. and the EU made appropriate statements expressing the view that the emergency rule was unwise and the martial law abuses are unacceptable; and it essentially said that he needed to give up his army post, hold fair and free elections and end the emergency rule. But it is interesting that the U.S. Government at all levels has been utterly silent about the importance of an independent judiciary, it has been utterly silent about the need to restore the court and to restore the judges who have been fired, and that is a tragedy. Now, to the casual observer, it may appear that Musharraf has met those three conditions. He gave up the army post November 28th, he announced the parliamentary elections would be held, and he issued the order Saturday ending the emergency. Unfortunately, he did so with caveats, with restrictions and with limitations which violate fundamental freedoms and which make fair and free elections highly dubious. The day before he lifted the emergency, he imposed six new constitutional amendments, again which challenged the role of the judiciary; and his orders simply said that nothing that had occurred during the emergency period could be reviewed by the courts or by parliament. And, by the way, some of those items--it is important to recognize what they were. First, of course, it said that the 2-year bar would no longer apply to the President. Second, that the dismissal of the Supreme Court judges and High Court judges can't be challenged by or before any court. An amendment to the 1952 Army Act made retroactive from its military courts now to try civilians for a wide range of offenses, including causing public mischief. Another decree threatens freedom of association by giving the new hand-picked High Court the authority to disbar lawyers. And, again, none of these decrees are subject to review under his order. The linkage between the judiciary and elections. The election commission of Pakistan is comprised of a retired Supreme Court justice and a serving High Court judge from each of the four provinces. Two of those remain unfilled. By permanently barring the previous Supreme Court provincial High Court judges who refuse to bow to his edict, he has basically assured that the commission represents only hand-picked judges that he is satisfied with. But it is even more than that. In every province, above the polling station, when the returns are collated, if you will, at a district level--let's say first at a municipal level and here let's say at a county level--there are what are called district returning officers, returning officers and assistant returning officers who run that. They manage it. In Pakistan, they are either district judges, assistant district judges or civil judges; and they all have to respond to the high--to the High Court of that province. And so the judiciary in Pakistan fundamentally is responsible for running the elections. That judiciary has now been totally tarnished by Musharraf's actions. And, in addition, it should be remembered that whenever there are complaints made, those complaints go to an electoral tribunal made up of judges and then from there to the High Court in each province and then to the Supreme Court, again, courts which now are filled with hand-picked Musharraf choices. By stacking the full range of High Courts, including, by the way, now naming a totally new High Court for Islamabad, he has essentially hijacked the electoral process. In terms of ensuring credible elections, could it still be done? Possibly. But you'd have to do a range of actions: One, establish a neutral caretaker government that doesn't exist. He has refused to do so. Establish a neutral and accepted electoral commission. Tomorrow, he could go and ask the parties for recommendations, and there are scores of acceptable individuals if he would restore the judges who could form that commission. The voters' rolls. You've heard just mention of them. But what occurred was that the commission established new voters' rolls for this election. By August, they had come up with 52 million names. There was a protest from the parties, because, in 2002, there were 72 million names, and it was clear that something was wrong. And it went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court said to the electoral commission, fix this. What the electoral commission did was say, OK, here is the 2002 list. Here is the list we came up with. Those who aren't on our list that were in 2002 we'll add. They added about 25 million names. Nobody reviewed who died. Nobody reviewed who wasn't on--shouldn't have been on that list because they perhaps were terrorists and in jail. Nothing. The parties said, put this on a mechanism where we can electronically go through it and try and say these people are dead, these people on our party lists are not on it. And when we were--when I was in Islamabad, I spoke to the electoral commission; and they said, yes, we can do it and we're figuring out how to and we'll do it shortly. That has not yet been done. So you still have voter rolls which are highly suspect. Finally, you've heard mention of the code of conduct, so I won't go into that. But it basically establishes serious curbs on public statements, press statements and what the parties can say. Let me just note as well that as one looks down the road what is needed: full restoration of the constitution, full restoration of independent judiciary, voiding the emergency period of press prohibition, press ordinances--by the way, they provide for criminal penalties, not simply civil penalties. Up to 3 years in jail, in addition to a $200,000 fine and loss of television licenses. And that's for anyone who publicly criticizes Musharraf, the military, the emergency, the emergency rule or foreign affairs. Establish a neutral electoral commission and a neutral caretaker government and consult with the parties on all of the issues relative to the elections and release from house arrest judges and their lawyers and the others detained for engaging in democratic protests. The United States and Western allies must recognize that fair and free elections are the best option for a secular, moderate parliamentary majority, a unified country against extremists, Jihadi organizations, the Taliban and al Qaeda. A rigged election will produce the worst of all possible worlds. The election will not be credible, the parliament will not be credible, and the parliament will be controlled by a Musharraf- linked majority of religious parties who themselves have links to the Taliban, and the country will be fundamentally and sharply divided. Thank you. Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. [The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Tierney. Thank you, all of you. We went a little bit over the 5-minute line, as we thought we would, but I think it was worth listening to what you all had to say, and I appreciate it. The very last thing that Mr. Schneider said--saving the best for last, I think, is really the crux of the matter, isn't it--that the United States, the Western allies have to recognize that free and fair elections are the best option for a secular and moderate parliamentary majority in a unified country against extremist jihadi organizations, the Taliban and al Qaeda. Do all of the panel agree with that statement, that is really the best option here? Mr. Daschle. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly do. I think Mr. Schneider said it very well, and I'm concerned--and I will say that in answer to your questions, I'll speak for myself and not for NDI. But I'm concerned, as he noted, that there has been far too much silence with regard to the U.S. position on many of these fundamental questions in Pakistan today. But your question is appropriate, and I would answer in the affirmative. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Garrett. Mr. Garrett. Yes, sir, I agree. I think that really our future policies should be determined in large part by whether or not these elections are conducted in any type of a rigged or free and fair manner. Mr. Tierney. When I look at your polls, Mr. Garrett, and I see the number of people responding to this declaration and all, I'm hard pressed to think how without legitimacy--I mean, if there aren't free and fair elections and if somebody isn't given a legitimate mandate, how they are going to marshal all of the people in their country to help us in other countries push back against terrorists and al Qaeda? You're going to have a continuation, I would think, of what we see now as sort of the government fighting those secular forces, moderate forces, lawyers, judges and everything, just to stay in power, as opposed to focusing on these external and some internal problems. Am I right? Mr. Garrett. I would agree. Mr. Tierney. So, following that, Mr. Garrett, I have an issue with you. Are you at all concerned that your IRI's mission is going to be seen as some sort of a validation of what might very likely be illegitimate elections? And how are you guarding against being put in that position? Mr. Garrett. It is difficult to say what the final report that we'd produce 45 days after the election is going to say at this time. However our pre-election statement which we have issued publicly--it is on our Web site--does say that we see this as a very troubled election, pre-election environment, flawed. As I mentioned in my statement, I believe if the political parties of Pakistan had decided not to contest--and they are saying that they're contesting this knowing it is going to be highly flawed. If it weren't for them, we wouldn't be there. But we do feel like we need to stand with the political parties of Pakistan as they do make that courageous stand themselves for democracy and elections. Mr. Tierney. I would ask just a series of questions; and, Mr. Garrett, if you feel uncomfortable answering them because you have a report coming out afterwards, then just defer. But I would like the Senator and Mr. Schneider to answer. I want to talk about what are the standards that have to be met for free and fair if the judges aren't reinstated. Have they failed to meet the standard? Mr. Daschle. I don't see how you can meet the standard without a restoration of the rule of law. And the rule of law cannot be reinstated without the restoration of the judges. So I think it is pretty fundamental. Mr. Tierney. Do you agree, Mr. Schneider. Mr. Schneider. Absolutely. Mr. Tierney. Do you want to defer, Mr. Garrett, or make a comment. If you don't reinstate to the media the ability to report on election occurrences, including criticizing the President and other authorities on that, how can you have a free and fair election? Would that failure to reinstate their ability to do that, to not make them subject to a $200,000 fine, loss of a license and possible imprisonment for reporting a critical aspect, if that doesn't occur between now and January 8th, how can we infer that there are free and fair elections? Is that a fair statement? Mr. Daschle. I think that is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Schneider. Mr. Schneider. Absolutely. Mr. Tierney. If we don't release from prison people like Aitzaz Ahsan, the president of the bar association, the senator of the PPP, a known democracy proponent and others that are imprisoned over there, how can we determine if it is a free and fair election? Am I right? Mr. Daschle. That's exactly right. Mr. Tierney. The voter polls, Senator Daschle, you made mention of that in your report and Mr. Schneider mentioned it again. Twenty-five million people all of a sudden mysteriously appear and get thrown on there. If that isn't corrected by allowing the parties to go through and scrutinize and make comments about who perhaps ought not to be on for whatever infirmity or ought to be on because they're missing, how can that be termed a free and fair election? Am I correct? Mr. Daschle. Precisely. Mr. Tierney. The problem that I'm seeing here is we have 3 weeks to go, some very, very serious impediments on that; and it is almost--and I didn't want to put Mr. Garrett in this position because he is going to put a report out. How in the world do you even think that there can possibly be free and fair elections unless President Musharraf has a sudden turn of heart here and within the next couple of days changes all these things? And I think it would be arguably possible to do if you did things today or tomorrow, but anytime beyond that you just run out of time and you don't have it. So I think the next question is, how does the United States react? How are we to react if all of these things don't get changed so that the elections are put on a footpath toward free and fair elections? Mr. Daschle. Mr. Chairman, again speaking for myself, I would say that the United States needs to be far more assertive, far more vocal, far more aggressive in stating our position, as Mr. Schneider noted and we've noted this morning. The silence is a message, and that silence cannot go unnoted. We just passed the omnibus, as no one knows better than the chairman and Mr. Yarmuth. But that conditionality in the omnibus is a beginning, but it is only a beginning. I think it is a very mellow statement with regard to what it is that this government needs to do, but you have to start somewhere. I would hope that we could build on that in the future, and I would hope that we could be a lot more assertive with regard to the conditionality of assistance. But, most importantly, in the next 3 weeks--and we won't be--you won't be in session during the next 3 weeks--I think it is very critical that the State Department step up to the plate and voice these concerns with a lot more vigor than I've seen so far. Mr. Tierney. I have to agree with you. My problem is that, other than ambassador Patterson, who has done, arguably, a good job on at least some of these aspects of being outspoken, I'm really concerned about Mr. Negroponte and Mr. Boucher and their statements. To say that it hasn't crossed any red line to me is absurd. They crossed when they declared the state of emergency and all the other things that followed from it. But then for Richard Boucher to indicate that it is a bump in the road--if it happened in this country, I don't think we'd look at it as a bump in the road. So I don't know what hope we can hold out for this administration really doing that. For the record, I'll make note that the Senator referenced action that was taken on spending bills, appropriation bills last night where the House and the Senate decided to put some constraints on the financial aid that the United States was giving to Pakistan, a significant amount of money. $50 million was held aside until the Secretary of State can make certain representations about corrections of the conditions we mentioned here today, the judges and others being put out of jail, reinstated to the bench, the media being given back the license that it had to report and so on. So, also, money being put more toward development and education and other things, as opposed to just indiscriminate money to the Musharraf regime to do what they want to do. And also directing some money away from money that had been spent militarily for things like F-16s and focusing it more on the battle against terrorism and the Taliban. Although the administration's surprising remark to that was they didn't quite know how that was going to happen because the F-16s were so important to Musharraf and the military. Notwithstanding the fact that F-16s, to my knowledge, haven't been used to fight terrorism and the Taliban and al Qaeda in that region of the world, nor do they need submarines or some of the other things it was being spent on. So those are the things that were referenced there. I'm going to have Mr. Yarmuth ask some questions. I have a number of questions I'd like to get back to, but I do want to let the other panelists--and I welcome Mr. Van Hollen who is joining us as well. Mr. Yarmuth. Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the testimony of the witnesses. I want to give the President the benefit of the doubt for a second, and I don't usually do that, but I'll do it for the time being. Is he in essentially--are we in a no-win situation in that the likelihood we're going to have to deal with President Musharraf in some way in terms of our fight against radical Islam versus our desire to have a pure democracy, an American-style democracy, is he--how much of a thin line is he treading here in terms of the real politic of the situation? Mr. Schneider. I think really that is a fundamental question. I think the mistake is to assume that the Pakistan military is solely made up of President Musharraf. It is not. The Pakistan military has for its own reasons--if it is working with the civilian democrat, the elected government, efforts to try and stop the Islamic Jihadi forces which have been carrying out, as you know, suicide bombings and other attacks--the issue is that, politically, President Musharraf has linked himself to religious parties which are linked to some of the extremists, including Taliban, in order to gain a majority he hopes in the parliament. That is the problem. All the pressure is on him in terms of his own political interests, are to go soft on the terrorists. On the other hand, both Benazir Bhutto, the PPP and the PML and Nawaz Sharif, their instinct and their desire is to have a secular, moderate majority; and they will be even more concerned about putting restrictions on the religious extremists. So, in a sense, it is a win-win for us to press for a fair and free democratic election which would produce, as we've heard from the polling numbers, a moderate majority. And I believe that if worst--if the United States is taking that position, along with its allies, the military will understand that if they take the position of supporting Musharraf against the majority of the Pakistan population again and put at risk their relationship in terms of aid with the United States and others, that is not in their institutional interests. And at some point--and I would suspect it would be sooner rather than later--they'll press President Musharraf to either change significantly or remove himself. And I should say, by the way, that at this point it seems to me there is something that the State Department can do even at this 12th hour and that is to specify what are those conditions that are required to provide an opportunity for a relatively credible election on January 8th. Present those--and I mean this. They are not hidden. As you've heard from all of us, we all generally agree on what they are. Present those privately to President Musharraf and to the leadership in Pakistan. And if within a number of days that they have not begun to move, then publicly say these are the things which are--that publicly that we've asked because we think it is crucial to a fair and free election. Because, relatively speaking, the short time period--if the people of Pakistan see that the United States is complicit with the steps that rule out any possibility of a democratic election, the future relationship with the United States is going to be, unfortunately, far worse than it is today. Mr. Daschle. I would only add that if we learned anything from history it is that personality driven foreign policy will ultimately lead to a disaster within any country where it is practiced. Personality driven policies in Iran, in the Philippines and in many other countries today have complicated, not simplified, our challenges in the years to follow. We ought to learn those lessons here. The people of Pakistan generally are very supportive of the people of the United States. But over and over again when I was there they asked the question, where is your government? Why aren't they speaking out? Why is it that they seem to be supporting Musharraf against us? And I think we have to make it clear we're with the people of Pakistan, not with the Musharraf government. Mr. Yarmuth. That was actually going to be one of my followup questions, is how aware are the Pakistani people of what this government is doing, what our government is doing? Apparently, they're very aware. Mr. Daschle. They are very aware. Mr. Yarmuth. Mr. Chairman, I'm lost without the clock. I don't know when my time is up. In terms of the ramifications for the international situation--again, our war on terror and so forth--are we--is the failure of a free and fair election in a few weeks, that we have the status quo--in other words, do we have a downside from where we are now? Can it make it worse? Or is there only an upside? Mr. Schneider. Let me give you just one example. Already, as you know, President Musharraf's party, the PML- Q, has indicated that it is going to align itself with the JUIF during the election campaign. That is the extreme religious right party that has been seen to be linked with Taliban. In other words, to create their majority, they're going to link themselves in the parliamentary elections and then in the parliament with that party. That means that the pressures to go after the Taliban particularly--remember, the Taliban military and political headquarters, according to U.S. military sources testifying before the Congress, are in and around Quetta and Peshawar. These are cities. These are not mountain--isolated mountain regions. Any effort to go after them is going to be undermined by this process of an unfair election because it is going to result in a majority of the religious right linked to parties which have their own ties to the Taliban. Mr. Yarmuth. I'll yield. Mr. Tierney. I just want to add one thing, and that is we've seen this before. If we don't have free and fair elections now, when the prospects are that if they were held in that manner that people that were secular probably, at least were moderate and certainly and shared interests with others would be not likely to win. You have a fraudulent election or fundamentally flawed election and one or two terms down the road here you could end up with a team in there that you don't even want to see. That's why it is so disturbing to have this administration sitting on the sidelines and not speaking out. Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Tierney; and thank you for holding this series of hearings on Pakistan. I thank all of our panelists, witnesses here today. I just want to start by looking at the context by which we find ourselves in right now in Pakistan. I think we obviously need to look forward and anticipate what is going to happen after these elections, but it is also important to remind ourselves how we got here. And we did get here in large part because the U.S. Government, under the Bush administration, did not take action nearly early enough to put--keep pressure on Pakistan to move in the direction of greater democratization and essentially bought into Musharraf's argument that he was the only guy in Pakistan that was willing to stand up to the Taliban and be able to fight al Qaeda. When in fact, as you pointed out, Mr. Schneider, his ability to stay in power was in part due to the fact that he had at least the tacit support of some of the extreme religious groups within Pakistan and that they provided him his margin, in fact, for the majority. And if you looked at sort of the secular opposition, that they in fact represented a much greater threat, so to speak, to the Taliban and the extremists. So what our policy did was reinforce Musharraf; and we sort of saw this in stark terms when Musharraf recently, instead of keeping his guns trained on al Qaeda and the extremists, actually turned against the lawyers and those fighting for democracy in the streets. So we sort of saw in very vivid form when push came to shove where he saw some of the threats within Pakistan coming from. So I do think we've got a lot of work to do dealing with the Pakistani public in letting people know that we're on the side of democracy, let the chips fall where they may. And clearly his decision to remove the chief judge had everything to do with the fact that they were about to rule that he could no longer serve, he couldn't serve as President because of the constitutional limitations. So given that we're in that situation and we're going forward now with the elections, if the elections are not perceived to be fair and given what you have all said with regard to the current judges and the election, you know, overseers who were all supporters of Musharraf at this point, if it is not perceived to be fair, where does that leave the United States and what should we both be doing right now? You've answered some of that. But looking to the future, what kind of scenarios should we anticipate and what kind of measure should be willing to take if we judge--we, the U.S. Government, judge that the outcome was not fair? Mr. Daschle. I'd say the three things that we ought to do. First, as we've all said this morning, I think the most important thing in the immediate 3 weeks is to put as much pressure as we can verbally and in other ways on the government to do the right thing, to make them as free and fair as they can, given the limited time available to us. Once the election has been held, I think it is important that we work with political leadership within the country, do as much as possible to ensure that, whatever the results of the election, we work with all interested parties to enhance the institutions of government themselves and not look at that election as the last word but only really the beginning of an ongoing effort to try to put Pakistan on the right path. I think that is critical. And then, third, I think it is important for us to involve the international community as well. This shouldn't just be a bilateral experience. It is important for us to involve others as well in the region and around the world and add to that pressure on the Musharraf government and those responsible for making these decisions. But that all has to be done both in the short term and in the longer term in a concerted way, And we can't afford to wait a day. It has to start now. Mr. Schneider. I would just add to that really one thing, I think; and that is that, instead of the conditionality applying softly to 50 out of the 300, I think you should apply it to all 300 million. I think that anything that we provide thereafter should be clearly performance based in relation to going after Taliban fully, not in a half-way manner and that it should be based clearly on evidence that they have, in fact, taken significant steps to go after the Taliban leadership, the core leadership throughout the country and as well as al Qaeda. I think that is a minimum. But, clearly, we should also be looking for ways to strengthen our relationship with the rest of the political--not just the political parties but civil society as well, the human rights groups, many of which have--their leaders have been detained, the women's organizations. All of those that represent civil society, we should be increasing our support for them. This is not going to remain--even if this outcome of these elections is, as we believe, not going to be fair and free, that is not going to be the future of Pakistan. Mr. Garrett. If I could just add to that. We feel very strongly at IRI that we don't need to fear the outcome of any free and fair elections in the country, but we do need to be very concerned in the United States about what is to come if it is seen as an American validation of a rigged election. As my fellow witnesses have said, I think an investment needs to be made, a long-term investment, in Pakistani civil society. We are seeing the students now stepping up for, really, one of the first times in some years--the lawyers and the political parties--but an investment needs to be made in developing those groups. Mr. Van Hollen. Just to followup on that, Mr. Garrett, in terms of the tools that are at your disposal in terms of the election monitoring, what kind of cooperation have you gotten? What resources do you have at your disposal? At what point would you be in a position to give an assessment, again, prior to the election, as to whether or not you thought you had the resources and tools available to actually make a fair judgment? Because it gets to the point you just raised. We do not want to be in a position here of sort of certifying the fairness of an election or in suggesting we think it was fair if, in fact, we are not in a position to do so, and many in the country see it as unfair. So what resources are at your disposal? At what point do you think you would be able to say that the election monitoring that is going to be put in place will be adequate to make a determination on the fairness of the election? Mr. Garrett. Well, the resources to date that we have been operating on were provided by the National Endowment for Democracy, and they have been our only funding source in the country, until very recently, for this election when we did receive USAID money and State Department money to conduct the election observation itself. A 65-person observation delegation is fairly large. However, in a nation of 160 million people and tens of thousands of polling stations, you can see that will not go very far. That is why I think it is important that the work of our sister organization--the National Democratic Institute--trains the political parties to try to get as many of their own observers there. That has been very, very important to this. There are Pakistani groups that are also domestic observers. As I understand it, as of today, they have still not been given credentials by the government, allowing them, although they are a very well-established NGO, to go out and to try to cover some of these polling stations on election day and to record their findings. There is one more thing that could be done, and that is to encourage the Government of Pakistan to allow its own domestic groups to participate in the election as monitors. As for the resources for the future, as I say, I think we need to try to commit more to these very sectors and to try to do that, possibly, through our USAID programs as opposed to simply through the Pakistani Government. Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tierney. Following on that thought, there are a number of areas of that country that are deemed to be not particularly safe by the Pakistani Government itself, and by our own government on that. Are you going to be able to get into those areas with the IRI to monitor the situations there--into Balochistan, Peshawar and up in the FATA areas? Mr. Garrett. During the preelection assessment, we were able to get into Balochistan. We did not go to the frontier. I believe, a few weeks before, NDI was able to visit Peshawar during their preelection assessment. We do not really know as of now what is going to be happening on election day. There are certainly parts of the country that, I think, are just a ``no go'' for us, but for the most part I think we are going to see a fairly good distribution in all four provinces of our international observer team. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Schneider, tell us a little bit about the alleged role of the intelligence services and their impact and intimidation, or at least alleged intimidation. Also, the local mayors and local authorities, what is their role in the election? What are their concerns around that? Mr. Schneider. There are three things it seems to me that are of major concern. You have already had the parties file complaints with the Election Commission about the intelligence services' having threatened and, in some cases, detained their party leaders at the local level. You have had the decision by the newly named high court judges in several of the provinces to move hundreds of local district judges around. Remember, I mentioned that they are going to be, essentially, the electoral voting managers on election day. Well, they have moved them out of their districts and have sent them elsewhere. So you have a real concern about those kinds of administrative actions at the local level. The state governments have the responsibility for the local administration. Again, there has been evidence--and you have some of it on your screen--of the use of government resources and of government security forces campaigning for Musharraf. So all of these things are major concerns that the parties have. Up to this point, the Electoral Commission has not responded to any of these complaints, so it is a major concern. I will also note that with FATA right now, the political parties, the moderate political parties, are not able to operate there. In the past, in fact, the PPP won in FATA in the distant past, but now they cannot operate there, and the area is essentially controlled by the religious parties. Mr. Tierney. It is disturbing on that. I guess, Mr. Garrett--again, not wanting to be unfair to you, but I keep coming back to this--can you conceive at all of an outcome of this where you deem these elections to be free and fair if that judiciary continues to be stacked the way it is? Is that even a prospect? Would you take one of the other criteria, the fact that the media is still restricted and that they suffer the possibility of a prison sentence of up to 3 years under this code of conduct if they criticize the president or the military? If that does not change between now and then, can you even fathom saying that those elections were free and fair? I think we all know it is not about how transparent the boxes are on the election day. You can monitor that all day long, but if none of this in the lead-up changes--the voter polls do not change, the ability of the press to report, the parties to participate, people to get out of jail, the judiciary to not be stacked--is it really even fair to think that you might come up with any kind of a stamp of approval on this or just a report about how bad it went? Mr. Garrett. Let me just say that we had our preelection assessment team in the country the day the emergency was declared. So, as we became aware of the emergency's being declared, it was one by one that the television stations were disappearing. You were watching one, and it was saying, ``There are troops arriving in the capital. The Supreme Court has been surrounded.'' Then it went off the air. You would switch to the next station, and it would be on for a while, reporting, and it would go, so forth and so on. However, during that entire period up to today, there was still print media that was allowed, I think, to operate unfettered. It was the electronic media that was singled out. It was not the nation's substantial print media. If you look at our polling, it says that in a free and fair election, over 50 percent of the seats would very likely go to a coalition of opposition parties. There are places where these political parties have a very solid basis of support. So I see these sorts of things, and I think that once again we cannot really prejudge, because we do not know what might change in the next few weeks. Mr. Tierney. Well, the one thing that has changed is how the print media is subject to the code of conduct as well. Mr. Garrett. That is true. But as recently as this past week when I was there, they were printing their cartoons against the president. They were doing editorials that were very well written, explaining what were the root issues with the emergency. I would just say that it is going to be very difficult--I think I said that in my statement earlier--it is going to be very difficult to imagine how this election is going to emerge with any type of a positive reference given the things that we are already seeing going into it. It will be very difficult. Mr. Tierney. All three of you probably have far more experience on previous elections than the panel up here does. But my understanding of the electioneering process that goes on out there is that parties take to the streets, that they have large rallies, that they motivate tens of thousands of people on that. There are serious constraints on that as I understand it. How does that affect the ability of any one party to really go through with their historically understood to be the way of conducting an election? What impact is that going to have? Senator Daschle. Mr. Daschle. Well, Mr. Chairman, even by Pakistani standards, you are not going to have anything close to that resembling a free and fair election. I mean it starts with the ISI and Mr. Schneider's description of the circumstances involving the pervasiveness of ISI involvement at the local level now with regard to the elections. You have the incompetence and the intransigence of the Election Commission. You have serious problems with regard to the freedom of press. You have the inability on the part of parties to organize themselves and have the public demonstrations of support for candidates that you have just described. You have a Supreme Court that is now completely violated and that is not in standing within the country. So, as I say, even by past standards in Pakistan, the circumstances today are deplorable, and I do not see how you begin to change that. Having said that, I think the parties have come to the conclusion of what is the alternative. What do you do in a situation like this when the alternative, probably, is Musharraf's dictatorship for an indefinite period of time and no opportunity for them to voice themselves and to be participants in the political process even under this corrupted basis? So I think they probably made the right decision, but we all like to know, going in, that this is really a joke in terms of the capacity to produce any real results. Mr. Schneider. Could I, Mr. Chairman? On the question of the press, I have just a couple of things. Mr. Tierney. Sure. Mr. Schneider. In the last couple of days, the Pakistan media regulatory authority has actually sent new letters to the owners of the private television stations, and they have basically told them that they are being watched and that they cannot do live coverage, live programs that deal with political issues in ways which, in their view, violate the code of conduct in terms of ridiculing or in any other way criticizing the president and the military, etc. When we talk about intelligence agencies, they have also made it known to reporters that their actions are as clearly questionable with respect to some of the things they have written as it relates to individuals like President Musharraf. You have to remember that during the emergency period, then- General Musharraf issued ordinances which increased the restrictions on both the electronic media and on the print media. I was just looking at Ordinance No. 14, for example, on the print media. It says that any material, printed or graphic, that defames or ridicules members of the armed forces, etc., are barred, and they are potentially liable for 3 years in jail and for major fines. So the kinds of restrictions that now exist are far greater than anything in the past. Obviously, this has an enormous chilling effect on all of the media. Mr. Tierney. When we look at the unfortunate circumstances--I think, Mr. Garrett, you put it out in your testimony pretty well. We were looking at it, and we were thinking there was a really good system or that there were parties that would have a platform and that would stand for principles and policies. Historically, it has been very personality-driven, and I do not think that is going to change overnight. So, given the fact that it has now prohibited Nawaz Sharif from even participating, what does that do to at least one of those major parties and their prospects in this election? Mr. Daschle. I think it makes it almost impossible for the full participation of the parties of consequence to have the ability to participate openly and freely. I think once you have eliminated one of the major opponents in the political process, I mean, by the very nature of that act, you are not going to get where you need to go, aside from all of the other things we have already talked about. Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Mr. Schneider, you made mention in your testimony that 7 out of the 11 original judges on the highest court voted, before they were displaced, that the action of President Musharraf, or General Musharraf at that time, actually was unconstitutional. Mr. Schneider. Right. Mr. Tierney. What is the effect of that order now? If that were put in place before they were actually removed or whatever, is it still valid? Has it been invalidated by his subsequent actions? Is it lingering out there? Mr. Schneider. It is very difficult to say because, as I say, that action took place before they were removed from their position. So the argument could be made that still stands. There are some legal voices of impact who are going to say that is the case; that this was an unconstitutional act, that it was found unconstitutional by the court and that court ruling still stands. Obviously, President Musharraf subsequently has said that no order by any court can void what he has done during the emergency law period. But the entire order establishing the provisional constitutional order was declared unconstitutional by the court before it left office, before they were thrown out. So I think at some point in time, you are going to go back. I do think that, at some point, you will have a democratic government. I do think at some point they will find that the original orders by General Musharraf were unconstitutional and invalid and that he could not, essentially, bar the court from reviewing his actions. Mr. Tierney. One of the prospects that elections held is that the PPP takes some, that the PML-N takes some, and that, of course, the PML-Q takes some. Are we looking at deadlock? Are we looking at a constitutional crisis? Is there any way that we can estimate at this time? Mr. Schneider. Not at all. Traditionally in parliamentary democracies, you have coalitions that are built after the elections because you rarely have an overwhelming majority. So, in this case, what seems likely is that you both will have the PPP and the PML-N, plus some of the individual regional parties, moderate regional parties, joining in an effective majority. As I say, if the polling that the IRI has done is reflected in the voting and those votes are counted, then I think you will have a coalition that will be put together and that will choose its prime minister. At that point, I suspect that majority in the Parliament will challenge the actions that President Musharraf has taken and, in fact, may well challenge his reelection. Mr. Daschle. I am actually somewhat encouraged for the reasons you have just heard, in the longer term, Mr. Chairman. I think the parties and the people of Pakistan are increasingly determined to deal with these challenges in a very forceful and effective way. It is going to take some time. I do not think they are probably going to be able to do it in the next 3 weeks. After the election and with the continued effort to organize and to form the coalitions that Mr. Schneider just addressed, in the longer term and with the kind of pressure internally and from the external source, if it can be done as well as we have discussed today, especially by the United States, I think we have reason to be optimistic about the prospects in Pakistan, ultimately. Mr. Tierney. I think the unfortunate consequence, however, is that coalition will be mindful of the fact that this U.S. Government did not speak up as strongly as it should have for the people, and it made their work harder for them. I think, also, that all of that focus on resolving those internal problems will probably detract from efforts that could be used to focus on the Taliban and on al Qaeda and on other situations. So it is unfortunate in that regard. Do either of my colleagues have any more questions? Mr. Yarmuth. Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It seems like we have already decided here that in terms of our standards, there is no chance of a fair and free election there. And that the administration does not seem to want to at least set the stage by saying that is the case. I am more concerned in this question as to what measures the Pakistani people themselves will judge this election by. I mean, is it going to be a repudiation of the Musharraf rule? With all due respect, it does not sound like it is going to be whether Mr. Garrett's organization says it was a free and fair election. The process is probably less significant than the outcome, but I would like your answer as to that. How are they going to judge whether it was a fair election or not? Mr. Daschle. I would just say that the IRI poll was really helpful in creating sort of a picture of where the people of Pakistan are. I do not think anyone challenges the results of that poll. In fact, it has been cited all through the country and in the international community. I think the degree to which people, in spite of all these problems, will find some confidence that the elections are at least accurate is whether they conform at all to the polling data that we know to be fairly accurate. I mean, if they do and if the results of the election reflect that degree of support for the political opposition that we know to exist, I think we can salvage a lot in spite of the difficulties. Mr. Schneider. I will just add one other thing. I do believe that the Pakistani press is not cowed by the restrictions that have been placed on them, and I have no doubt at all that they will be monitoring the voting. As to the degree that they also are reporting that voters are not permitted to vote who are on the rolls, and that others cannot find where they can vote, etc., they will be reporting that. If there is a general judgment that there has been an unfair process at that time, along with the view that the outcome does not conform to anything that one would expect given the polling, then you will see a fundamental rejection. I just want to note here that this is not us. This is one of the leading newspapers in Pakistan, the newspaper DAWN. It says that Pakistan is recognized as a genuine democracy and all that goes with it--an independent judiciary, the equality of all before the law and a media that is truly free. The country can ill afford to go through another flawed exercise, which would be catastrophic. The people who are the public opinion leaders in Pakistan, I think, will set the standards. They are not our standards. They are their standards. They do believe in democracy. I think that they will see what has occurred up to this point, and they will see the outcome on election day, and they will make their own judgments. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Van Hollen. Yes. Just briefly, again, as we discussed earlier on, I think that the reason the Bush administration has been so slow to push Musharraf and others in Pakistan more quickly toward democratization has been this assertion made by Musharraf, and that was essentially picked up by the Bush administration, that he is the only guy standing in the way between the radical extremists taking over in Pakistan. As you pointed out, Mr. Schneider, in your testimony, if you look at some of the sort of bases of operation of al Qaeda, we are talking about places like Quetta. We are talking about Peshawar. We have also seen that the deal President Musharraf struck many months ago with the folks in the federally Administered Tribal Areas was, essentially, that they entered into a nonaggression pact, and, according to the publicly announced portions of the National Intelligence Estimate here, which as you know represent the consensus position of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, that led directly to an increase in Taliban strength, and it increased the sort of sanctuary for al Qaeda-type elements. So I think it is very important as we go forward here that people in the United States understand that Musharraf is not the bulwark against extremism in Pakistan. To the extent that you do not allow the political process to be more open, in fact, you strengthen the extremist elements. So I would just like all of you to respond to: If you were to have the sort of secular opposition win this election and if we were to continue to push Musharraf to more openness and to more democratization in the process, how would that affect Pakistan's policy with respect to the Taliban and to the anti- al-Qaeda effort? Would it hurt that effort or would it strengthen it or would it, essentially, represent---- Mr. Schneider. I think it would definitely strengthen it. Simply, as I said earlier, there would be no countervailing political pressures to try and go soft on the Taliban because they are linked to the religious parties in the case of Musharraf, that I support. So it seems to me that you are likely to see a much stronger, unified civilian leadership in the Parliament, pressing for the military to take actions against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Both parties--both the PPP and the PML-N--have stated in a coalition statement that they would go after al Qaeda and the Taliban terrorists. Mr. Garrett. I agree. I think it would strengthen this struggle that their country and our country are in. Mr. Daschle. I think a lot of the government's actions, the repressive actions, have emboldened the extremist elements within the country and have given them all the more empowerment in these regions outside of the larger cities. I cannot think of a better anecdote to that than to empower the opposition and to give them an opportunity to work these areas and to say, ``We are going to take back our government and, in your name and in the name of people across the country, restore the democracy that Pakistan is proud of.'' Mr. Schneider. Could I just add one thing? Mr. Tierney. Sure. Mr. Schneider. Quetta is in Balochistan. One of the changes with a democratic government would be that--both the PPP and the PML-N have stated that they would end the direct confrontation with the Baloch national parties in Balochistan. That would then provide a unified government's aiming at restricting the Taliban and al Qaeda in that province, which you do not have now. Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I would like to give each of you gentlemen an opportunity to make some overarching closing statement if you would care to. Senator Daschle. Mr. Daschle. First of all, I want to reiterate how pleased I am that you are holding this hearing because I think it sends the message that there are people within this government who are very deeply concerned about circumstances in Pakistan, and I think that is exactly the message we need to send to the people there today. I think we need to keep the pressure on, not only from the administration but from the Congress, and you are doing that, in part, with this hearing. I think we ought to go back and look at the conditionality of aid in the future, and we should not wait for a long period of time for us to revisit the question as to how far we should go with regard to conditionality. Third, I think it is important for us to watch this very carefully and to respond as quickly as we can once the elections have been held. Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Mr. Garrett. Mr. Garrett. Let me also thank you for letting me appear before you today. I think the people of Pakistan are watching what is done here, what is done in the United States. I just wanted to take that opportunity to say that it has been our consistency in our work with the people there that they desire democracy. I think they will see this as an important contribution toward being placed back on the road map to democracy. So thank you. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Schneider. Mr. Schneider. I agree with everything said. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing. I hope that you will consider holding a hearing early in January on the same issue, on what did the elections show and on where do we go from here. I would just simply note something. Today, in Islamabad and in Pakistan, the newspapers are giving a great deal of attention to what the Congress did in terms of conditionality. So they are watching what the United States is doing, and it is crucial that the message from the United States--from both parties and from the administration as well as the Congress--be that the United States stands for democracy and that the United States believes that democracy is in the interest of Pakistan and in the interest of the United States. Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you. You will be comforted to know that we do intend to have a hearing on the financial aspect of it, certainly, in January. We can certainly do a recapture of what happened with the elections as well. We think it is important, and we have a good bipartisan group on this panel and elsewhere that believes strongly that Congress has to speak up, given the silence of the administration. We have to try to get the administration to speak up as well. I want to just publicly thank each of the three of you gentlemen. I am not sure the public is aware of the sacrifices you make in your personal lives with traveling, making the observations, and then in coming back and sharing them. It is important for us to have people willing to do that, to make observations on the ground and come back. Mr. Garrett, in particular. I will note that you just got home this past weekend, and right after Christmas you are going back again and are staying through the election. So thank you for your service. Thank you, Senator and Mr. Schneider, as well. Your testimony here today has been incredibly helpful, and it helps us build a record, and it points us in a direction of where we go from here. We thank you for all of your assistance on that and for your public service. We look forward to the hearings in January as well. I thank my colleagues for their input as well. This meeting is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]