[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-434
Serial 110-37
OVERSIGHT OF THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE NASA INSPECTOR GENERAL
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, AERONAUTICS,
AND RELATED SCIENCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
__________
JUNE 7, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-101 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, AERONAUTICS, AND RELATED SCIENCES
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Ranking
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois Republican Member
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois, Vice FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
Chairman JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
NICK LAMPSON, Texas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JO BONNER, Alabama
JERRY McNERNEY, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
LAURA RICHARDSON, California RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JIM MATHESON, Utah MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,
Chairman Wisconsin, Ranking Republican
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois Member
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Ex Officio
BART GORDON, Tennessee, Ex Officio
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 7, 2007..................................... 1
Statement of Representative Feeney............................... 7
Prepared statement submitted by Representative Feeney for Hon. F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., U.S. Representative from Wisconsin... 7
Statement of Representative Gordon............................... 3
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 6
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 42
Statement of Representative Miller............................... 4
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Witnesses
Brian, Danielle, Executive Director, Project On Government
Oversight (POGO)............................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Carrington, Lance, Deputy Assistant Inspector General
Investigations, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Postal
Service and Former Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, NASA........................................... 21
Carson, Kevin J., Assistant Inspector General for Audits and
Inspections, Office of Inspector General, Government Printing
Office and Former Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Audits, NASA................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Cobb, Hon. Robert W., Inspector General, NASA.................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Herzog, Debra, Senior Attorney, Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Postal Service, and Former Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations, NASA....................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Light, Dr. Paul C., Paulette Goddard Professor of Public Service,
Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service, New York University. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Appendix
Donohue, Hon. Kenneth M., Inspector General, Department of
Housing and Urban Development, prepared statement.............. 79
Excerpts from Record of Investigation of Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
Office of Inspector General dated August 30, 2006.............. 116
Excerpts from Semiannual Report, Office of Inspector General,
NASA, dated April-September 30, 2004........................... 112
Excerpts from transcript of interview of Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
conducted by Office of Inspector General, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, dated June 27, 2006..................... 113
Grassley, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Iowa, prepared statement. 77
Letter, dated August 15, 2003, from Hon. Robert W. Cobb to Hon.
Sean O'Keefe entitled ``Subject: Observations on the
Independence of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board''.... 84
Policy and Procedures for Exercising the Authority of the
Integrity Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency, dated April 24, 1997............................... 89
Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General, dated
October 2003................................................... 94
Report in the form of a letter, dated January 22, 2007, from
James H. Burrus, Jr., Chair, Integrity Committee to Hon. Clay
Johnson III, Chairman, Integrity Committee, President's Council
on Integrity and Efficiency.................................... 136
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Robert W. Cobb............................................ 81
OVERSIGHT OF THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE NASA INSPECTOR GENERAL
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related
Sciences,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Good afternoon.
Welcome to this hearing, on a matter of serious concern to
the respective committees on the misconduct, or alleged
misconduct, of the NASA Inspector General. We want to make a
special welcome to our colleagues from the House Science
Committee and its Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Chairman Bart Gordon, the Chairman of the full committee,
Chairman Miller, the Chairman of the Subcommittee. I want to
welcome our colleague from Florida, Congressman Feeney, who is
sitting in for the Ranking Member, Jim Sensenbrenner; and, of
course, our colleague here, Senator Hutchison, the Ranking
Member on this subcommittee.
In April, we received the results of the Integrity
Committee's investigation of the NASA Inspector General, Robert
Cobb. That independent panel found that Mr. Cobb had abused his
office and failed to maintain the appropriate appearance of
independence from the agency he is charged with monitoring.
Those are the conclusions of the Integrity Committee.
Based on these conclusions of the Integrity Committee, I
joined Chairman Gordon and Chairman Miller in calling on
President Bush to remove Mr. Cobb from office. My position has
not changed. However, some of the conduct described in the
Integrity Committee's report is so disturbing that it warrants
additional investigation. I am particularly concerned with
several specific instances of Mr. Cobb's misconduct:
First, in 2002, foreign computer hackers gained access to
sensitive information on a NASA computer, including NASA's most
advanced rocket engine designs, the worth of this information
is estimated to be worth $1.9 billion. In such situations,
Federal export control laws require notification to the U.S.
State Department, but Mr. Cobb ignored the advice of his staff
and repeatedly blocked attempts to notify the State Department,
for fear that the disclosure would be embarrassing to NASA.
As Exhibit 3 shows, when the Department of Defense was
finally asked about the impact of this incident, they reported
that the information disclosed may allow our adversaries to
develop larger and more accurate ballistic missiles. Who are
those adversaries? Adversaries with regard to rocket design are
almost any country, not the least of which are Russia, China,
North Korea, and now Iran. You get the picture.
The second incident, in December 2004, and again in 2005,
Mr. Cobb delayed execution of search warrants in criminal
investigations after those warrants had been sworn by an
assistant U.S. Attorney and were signed by a Federal judge. The
question of obstruction of justice arises.
The third example, in June 2002, the Space Shuttle Endeavor
was launched with one of the two required range safety systems
inoperative. In order to launch, the launch criteria is that
both must be operative. Despite the critical safety
implications for NASA and the public, Mr. Cobb blocked a NASA
OIG investigation of the incident, deferring, instead, to the
Air Force, even when it became clear that the Air Force was not
thoroughly investigating the matter.
NASA is unique among Federal agencies, its mission is to
expand the boundaries of exploration, push the limits of
technology, and broaden our understanding of our own planet and
the universe. All of these activities carry considerable risk.
In many cases risk that can jeopardize the lives of NASA
employees, and, with regard to the range safety concerns, could
jeopardize the populations of nearby cities on the east coast
of Florida.
We've had too much experience with this, with mistakes in
the past, and we have lost two Shuttles and 14 astronaut lives.
First in 1986 and again in 2003. Investigators from those
tragic events determined that a key contributor to the death of
those 14 astronauts was a culture that discouraged employees
from raising safety concerns.
With this history in mind, it's particularly important for
NASA employees to know about concerns about safety, waste,
fraud, and abuse, to know that all of that can be reported to a
trustworthy inspector general, and have the full confidence
that that watchdog will pursue each case thoroughly,
professionally, and independently.
The investigations of the two Shuttle tragedies found that,
instead of communication being a two-way street, it was from
the top, down; and the top management was not receiving the
information from the bottom, going up.
Under Mr. Cobb's leadership, the Office of Inspector
General at NASA has become dysfunctional. Fear and mistrust
permeate the office. More than half of the experienced
professionals in the office have left since Mr. Cobb's arrival.
The boundaries, or the firewalls, between the IG and the
agency's management have been trampled. The evidence shows us
that these are not isolated instances, but that a pattern of
misconduct continues even today. As recently as April the 10th,
OIG employees raised new concerns about Mr. Cobb's independence
from NASA management, and the NASA general counsel destroyed
government records in a bungled attempt at damage control
related to the Cobb investigation.
Whistleblowers, who rely on the OIG to voice concerns about
agency operations, are unwilling to come forward, knowing that
this IG will not respond favorably, and may even allow
retaliation from management against them.
Congress depends on inspectors general as the first line of
oversight at government agencies. That's the law. Without an
effective inspector general at NASA, we have no choice but to
increase the frequency and intensity of our own oversight
activities.
With each new revelation, I am more convinced that the
current dysfunction in the NASA OIG is unrecoverable under the
current leadership. I am hopeful that the information learned
today will be helpful in reconstituting an effective OIG at
NASA after Mr. Cobb's departure.
Now, under the procedures that we have set up, each of the
respective leaders here will have an opening statement, and I
would turn to Chairman Bart Gordon, of the House Science and
Technology Committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BART GORDON,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Chairman Nelson. You know, it
was 22 years since I was able to call you that, when you were
Chairman of the Space Subcommittee in the House of
Representatives. And so, I'm glad to refer to you as that
again.
And, although this is not unprecedented, it's certainly
unusual to have a joint hearing, which I think demonstrates, to
the public and to NASA, that this a very serious issue, and
that we take it very seriously, and we are very concerned that
NASA is being compromised.
In 2002, Mr. Cobb took on a very difficult job when he
agreed to sign up to be Inspector General. IGs are probably
held to the highest standard of any office in government. The
expectations of integrity are so high because the job we set
for IGs is so challenging.
The purpose of the IGs, as stated in the 1978 Inspector
General Act, is to act as effective watchdogs on agencies from
the inside by creating independent and objective offices. Those
offices are charged with recommending policies to promote
efficiency and effective administration of government, and
preventing--detecting fraud, waste, and abuse. It was expected
that they would leave no stone unturned in searching for
improper behavior.
It's impossible to do that job if there is even a hint of
misconduct on the part of the IG. And the lack of independence
is a sure sign of a lack of objectiveness. If you view yourself
as part of an agency's management team, you can't be an
effective check on that management team. And it's very clear
that, from the very beginning, Mr. Cobb saw himself as a part
of Sean O'Keefe's team.
Senator Grassley was to testify here today, and I would
like to quote, at some length, from his testimony. Senator
Grassley noted this, ``I'm alarmed by the evidence uncovered by
the PCIE investigation. In fact, it appears that Mr. Cobb did
not act in a manner consistent with the spirit and intent of
that statute. According to the evidence, he was used--he has
used this important position to interfere in the activities and
conduct conducted by the investigative and audit divisions
within his office for reasons that appear, at the very least,
improper. In fact, Mr. Cobb repeatedly told employees that one
of his priorities was to avoid embarrassing NASA. Evidence also
indicates that he shied away from bringing investigators
against--investigations against high-level NASA officials.''
Senator Grassley continues. This is Senator Grassley, ``It
is clear to me that our ability to trust Mr. Cobb to
effectively manage the Office of Inspector General and the
vital functions that it seeks to carry out is in question. It
seems that Mr. Cobb may care more about protecting NASA from
embarrassment than he does about performing the critical
functions of his office. An Inspector General must possess
temperance, high ethical standards, and a firm understanding of
the independent nature of that office. From the evidence
presented, Mr. Cobb does not appear to possess those
attributes.''
I want to concur, today, with Senator Grassley's comments.
An IG has to conduct himself or herself in a way--in a fashion
that Congress trusts them, that IG staffs believe in them, and
that the whistleblower community relies on them. The current
NASA IG has failed on every account.
Mr. Cobb, you've--you were chosen Inspector General not for
your management skills or your experience in auditing,
investigations, financial analysis, public administration, or
any of the other skills that IGs, by statute, are supposed to
possess; you were chosen to play ball with Sean O'Keefe.
Because of that and your own actions, you have been highly
unsuccessful as an Inspector General. I hope you will consider
this, and, for the sake of yourself and for NASA, you will do
the right thing, and you will resign.
I yield back.
Senator Nelson. Chairman Miller--and, of course, each of
our statements will be put in, in full, in--your prepared
statement, for the record, it will be a part of the record.
Chairman Miller?
STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD MILLER,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Representative Miller. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Good
afternoon.
In January, the Integrity Committee of the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency completed its investigation
of allegations of misconduct by Robert ``Moose'' Cobb, the
Inspector General of NASA. After a 6-month investigation, the
PCIE found that Mr. Cobb had abused his authority and exhibited
the lack of independence, or had exhibited the appearance of a
lack of independence from NASA management. Those are violations
of the quality standards for Federal Offices of the Inspector
General established under an executive order. The Integrity
Committee said that discipline up to, and including, removal
was appropriate.
After receiving the report, the majority leadership of the
Senate Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related
Sciences, Senator Nelson, as well as the Chairman of the House
Committee on Science and Technology, Mr. Gordon, and I all--
called upon the President to remove Mr. Cobb as Inspector
General of NASA.
Mr. Cobb remains in office. The findings of abuse of
authority by the PCIE involve Mr. Cobb's abusive and degrading
treatment of his staff resulting in massive staff turnover and
affecting productivity. Mr. Cobb referred to his professional
staffs as ``Burons,'' Mr. Cobb's shorthand for ``Bureaucratic
Morons,'' and by other vulgar terms that I will not repeat
here.
Rather than dwell on the abusive atmosphere created by Mr.
Cobb and its effect on productivity, I want to make sure that
the second finding, regarding the appearance of a lack of
independence, receives the attention that it requires.
According to the official standards, inspectors general and
their staff ``have the responsibility to maintain independence
so that opinions, conclusions, and recommendations will be
impartial, and will be viewed as impartial by knowledgeable
third parties.'' Mr. Cobb has utterly failed to do that.
Perception that Mr. Cobb lacked independence was set in
motion during Mr. Cobb's hiring. Shortly after Sean O'Keefe
moved from the Office of Management and Budget to NASA, Mr.
O'Keefe, NASA's former Administrator, decided that he didn't
like the previous NASA Inspector General. He went to the White
House and demanded a new one. How Mr. Cobb was selected is not
entirely clear, but what is clear is that Mr. O'Keefe
personally chose his new Inspector General and established a
regime in which Mr. Cobb was part of Mr. O'Keefe's team, and
not the independent Inspector General required by law. As Mr.
Cobb described it, ``Mr. O'Keefe reached a conclusion that I
would be the perfect person to conduct the independent Office
of Inspector General activities.''
Once at NASA, Mr. Cobb called Mr. O'Keefe his ``boss,'' and
said he was afraid he would be fired if he displeased Mr.
O'Keefe. And why shouldn't he think that, since Mr. O'Keefe had
been able to fire the previous NASA Inspector General and pick
the new one?
According to some interviewed by the HUD IG staff, who
carried out the PCIE investigation, Mr. Cobb was warned, from
the beginning, about lacking an appearance of independence, but
he ignored those warnings, and the Integrity Committee's record
of investigation is full of evidence of his failure to maintain
any shred of an appearance of independence.
Mr. Cobb asked NASA officials how to design the IG
projects. A December 12, 2002, e-mail, for instance, asked NASA
officials to discuss two proposed projects, ``so we can take
your views into account in designing our activities.''
After the Columbia accident, there are questions about the
independence of the O'Keefe-appointed Accident Investigation
Board. Chairman Gordon was one of those asking questions. Mr.
Cobb provided an unsolicited personal letter to Congress--
unsolicited by Congress, at least--saying that, based on his
observations, the Board was independent. But, before sending
the letter to Congress, Mr. Cobb sent a draft to Mr. O'Keefe
for his review and comment. Mr. O'Keefe liked the letter a lot.
I could go on and on with more examples of the ways in
which Mr. Cobb tried to make himself useful to his friends at
the top of the agency, especially Mr. O'Keefe. But what is most
important here is that Mr. Cobb is now totally ineffective in
his job, and trusted by no one.
As he has made clear in his testimony today, his written
testimony submitted in advance, Mr. Cobb has learned nothing
from the PCIE investigation. He admits no wrong, he blames
others for all of his problems. Mr. Cobb said, in this
deposition, that if the current NASA Administrator, Mike
Griffin, invited him to go play golf, he would love to go, ``By
all means, I'm going to go play if he asks. If he wants to
invite me out to dinner, I think it would be perfectly
appropriate for me to do so.'' He wants the same kind of
relationship that he had with Mr. O'Keefe. Dr. Griffin, to his
credit, apparently does not.
Mr. Cobb, you must leave. You have two clients: NASA and
Congress. That is clear from the statute, from the Inspector
General Act of 1978. That is clear from the quality standards
for Federal Offices of Inspector General, which I hope every
Inspector General would keep on their desk. Congress is your
client, one of only two. It is apparent that Congress does not
trust you.
The Committees of the House and the Senate that are
responsible for oversight of NASA are sitting before you. All
of us have called upon the President to fire you.
You have told our staff that you are afraid to talk to your
own staff, because they twist your words. So, you are hiding
from your own staff. As one of our witnesses said in written
testimony, ``Each IG must be willing to accept responsibility
for his or her behavior, and acknowledge when their
independence has been comprised, fairly or unfairly, and exit
office gracefully.''
Mr. Cobb, the work of the NASA IG is important. Mr. Cobb,
you must leave to preserve what is left of the integrity of
your office.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hutchison?
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly am pleased to be here with our House colleagues
for this joint hearing.
I want to say that I have not called for Mr. Cobb's
resignation, because I haven't heard from Mr. Cobb. And I do
think that, regardless of how one feels about the allegations
made against the NASA Inspector General, or the process by
which the allegations were investigated, or the conclusions
reached, the hearing certainly has been brought about because
of a failure somewhere. The only thing that is--that we can say
is that the hearing is part of examination and accountability
that can help us find where the problems exist within our
jurisdictional areas of responsibility, and how they can be
addressed.
I have made no prejudgment. I am, of course, I have to say,
very concerned about the nature of the allegations made against
the Inspector General of NASA. Some of them, if true, represent
conduct that I find objectionable, and should be changed.
However, I also believe it is only fair that the oversight
hearing include Mr. Cobb. I think that it is going to be very
important to hear the allegations, and then to allow him to
respond.
Most of all, I have to say that this subcommittee must
ensure that nothing within the NASA institutional structure,
including the Office of Inspector General, is allowed to have a
negative effect on the ability of NASA to carry out its
programs efficiently and safely.
Those would be the primary concerns that I have. I have to
apologize right now and say that I'm already late for a meeting
that I cannot miss, so I will have to leave. But I will get all
of the testimony of this hearing, and then will certainly be
part of the collaboration about what should be done about it.
I've talked to Senator Nelson about the issue several
times, and I appreciate that he postponed the hearing to try to
make sure that we did have all the sides fairly represented,
including Mr. Cobb.
So, thank you for that. And I will certainly look forward
to our--exercising our responsibility for oversight correctly.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Congressman Feeney, standing in for
Congressman Sensenbrenner.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM FEENEY,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA
Representative Feeney. Well, I'm not sure anybody can stand
in for Congressman Sensenbrenner under any circumstances, but
it's a pleasure to be here with my Senator, Mr. Chairman, and
also Chairman Miller and Chairman Gordon.
I'll be very brief. I want to echo Senator Hutchison's
remarks that I have not prejudged this case. I'm interested in
hearing from the witnesses, including the expert, Dr. Light, as
to the appropriate role of Inspectors General, and look forward
to hearing and reviewing the response from Mr. Cobb.
With that, I would like to ask for permission to enter into
the record an opening statement from Congressman Sensenbrenner.
Senator Nelson. So ordered.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner,
U.S. Representative from Wisconsin
There is a line between good governance and interference, and I
think we may have crossed it. Without commenting on the merits of any
of the investigations, I note that Robert Cobb is one of four
inspectors general (IGs) currently under investigation. These
investigations are in addition to three investigations that recently
forced IGs to resign. All seven of these investigations are in addition
to the countless investigations of Executive Branch officials outside
of the IG community. The current culture in Washington is becoming one
of overzealous oversight.
Inspectors General are our agency watchdogs. Of course, these
watchdogs need to be watched--accountability is a hallmark of good
government--but when holding officials accountable is more about press
releases than it is about fear of wrongdoing, oversight becomes more
interference than benefit.
Endless investigations have consequences, even beyond the
unnecessary expense to taxpayers. Congressional investigators demand
that IGs act independently, but constant investigations undermine that
independence. In drafting the Inspector General Act, Congress gave IGs
substantial freedom to develop audits and conduct investigations.
Congress clearly expected IGs to act independently and rely on their
own judgment to determine an effective agenda. Constant investigations
undermine that independence. It is as if we have placed our IGs in
front of a firing squad and told them to ``speak freely.''
One of today's witnesses, Professor Paul Light from New York
University, recognized this problem and argued that IGs' agendas were
detrimentally influenced by outside powers:
Compliance monitoring not only generates a much greater volume
of findings of failure . . . and thus more opportunities for
credit claiming by the Congress and the Administration, but
also produces recommendations for actions that are less
expensive, more politically palatable, cleaner
jurisdictionally, and faster to implement.
Frederick M. Kaiser, Paul C. Light, Monitoring Government and the
Search for Accountability 23 (1993).
IGs already have the unenviable task of criticizing powerful agency
heads, Congressional leaders, and the President, himself--this
minefield is inherent in the geography of the IG Act--but the
difficulty is compounded if we continue to perpetuate this culture of
overzealous oversight.
Beyond the systemic damage it causes, investigations cripple the
individual offices under investigation. Robert Cobb was under
investigation by the Investigative Committee (IC) of the President
Council for Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) for over a year. As soon as
that investigation was behind him, Congressional investigators began
their own investigation. Throughout this entire period, NASA's Office
of the Inspector General (OIG) has been in a state of uncertainty.
Congress and the public have been unsure of whether the office is
reliable, OIG staff has been unsure of the future of the office, and
Mr. Cobb, himself, has been uncertain of his own future. Some
investigations are, of course, necessary, but there are drawbacks, so
they should not be undertaken lightly, and the conclusions should not
be preordained.
Who would willingly enter this landscape? Endless investigations
will, if they have not already, discourage public service. Congress
demands that only the most highly qualified individuals serve as IGs,
but constant investigations are making the positions ones that
qualified individuals are wise to avoid. The job is simply too
political and too unstable.
The balance between good Congressional oversight and overzealous
investigations should be struck by examining the Executive Branch's
processes for holding IGs accountable. Robert Cobb was not exonerated
by the IC, but neither did the IC recommend his removal from office.
The Subcommittee's Majority has been critical of NASA for discounting
the IC's conclusions and formulating its own course of action, but the
Majority has done the same thing. While the IC stopped short of
recommending Mr. Cobb's removal from office, the Majority has ignored
that recommendation and has been demanding his removal for months.
The Majority's second-guessing of the Administration's
investigation is especially problematic because, while today's hearing
is setting out to prove that Cobb must be removed from office, it is
not examining the process that determined that he should not be. The
Executive Branch should be given some leeway over its personnel. In the
present case, the Administration conducted a costly and thorough
investigation of Robert Cobb, NASA's Inspector General. A hearing that
condemns the results of a decisionmaking process without considering
the process itself, is fundamentally flawed. A hearing that examined
the process by which IGs are investigated would have global benefits to
the IG community and would eliminate many of the detriments caused by
overzealous investigations. Examining the process may not produce bold
headlines, but it does produce good government.
Senator Nelson. Now, as we have said, Senator Grassley had
asked to be the first witness. And, at precisely the time this
committee kicked off, he was called to a meeting with the
minority leader, and, therefore, he cannot be here. His lengthy
statement will be entered into the record.
But I would just read his concluding paragraph. And this is
Senator Grassley, ``So, in conclusion, I have some questions
that I would like to pose to Mr. Cobb. In answering them, I
hope he honestly places the mission of his office ahead of his
self-interest. Mr. Cobb, do you believe that an Inspector
General can continue to serve if he has lost the confidence of
his staff and of Congress? Do you believe an Inspector General
can continue to serve who has been found, by an independent
investigation, to have abused his authority? Do you believe an
Inspector General can continue to serve if he is perceived as
`in the pockets' of the people he is supposed to investigate?
Do you believe an Inspector General can continue to serve if he
has acknowledged verbally abusing staff on numerous occasions?
These would be my questions to Mr. Cobb. The honest answering
of those questions should lead him to make a decision as to
what is best for NASA and the American people.''
Likewise, Mr. Kenneth Donohue, the Inspector General of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, who conducted the
factual investigation into the allegations against Mr. Cobb, is
unable to be with us today. He has submitted his written
testimony, and, without objection, it will be entered into the
record.
Finally, a procedural note for all the witnesses. It is the
custom of the House Subcommittee that is represented here today
to require sworn testimony from witnesses in oversight
hearings. This is not our practice in the Senate Commerce
Committee. However, witnesses are reminded of their
obligations, under 18 U.S.C. 1001, to provide truthful
testimony, and the penalties for failing to do so.
With that, if we could ask the first panel to come up,
please, to the witness table.
The panel consists of Ms. Debra Herzog, Senior Attorney,
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Post Office, former Deputy
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations at NASA; Mr.
Kevin Carson, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of
Inspector General, the Government Printing Office, former
Assistant Inspector General for Audits in NASA; Mr. Lance
Carrington, Deputy Assistant Inspector General of
Investigations, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Postal
Service, former Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
at NASA; Ms. Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on
Government Oversight; Dr. Paul Light, the Paulette Goddard
Professor of Public Service, Robert Wagner School of Public
Service, at New York University.
So, welcome, all.
Mr. Carson, we will start with you. All of your written
statements will be entered into the record. We would like to
have you give us your five-minute statements, and then we can
get into the questions.
Mr. Carson?
STATEMENT OF KEVIN CARSON, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE AND FORMER DEPUTY
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, NASA
Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committees, thank
you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss my
experiences while employed in the NASA Office of Inspector
General.
Since March 2005, I have been employed as the Assistant
Inspector General for Audits and Inspections at the U.S.
Government Printing Office, Office of Inspector General, in
Washington, D.C. Previously, I worked over 15 years, between
August 1989 and March 2005, for the NASA OIG. While with the
NASA OIG, I held a variety of audit positions, including Deputy
Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Director of Audit
Quality, Program Director for Safety and Security Audits.
Including my employment with the NASA OIG, I've spent
approximately 27 years of my career in various Federal audit
organizations.
I've been invited here today to provide testimony related
to my time and experience in the NASA OIG, while working under
the direction of NASA Inspector General Robert Cobb.
I request that my full statement be submitted for the
record, and will answer any questions related to its contents.
In early 1999, the previous NASA Inspector General, Roberta
Gross, upon the NASA Administrator stating that the agency's
number-one priority was safety, appointed me to form a
directorate whose specific mission was to audit safety and
security issues within NASA. While forming the directorate with
a small staff of auditors, the directorate quickly performed a
series of audits and issued reports addressing various safety
issues, primarily at NASA's manned spaceflight centers. Among
the first reports issued by the directorate included safety
concerns with Kennedy Space Center's payload ground operations,
contractor safety requirements at Kennedy Space Center or
Marshall Space Flight Center, Space Shuttle Program management
safety observations, controls over the use of plastic films,
foams, and adhesive tapes used in and around the Space Shuttle
Orbiter vehicles, safety of lifting devices and equipment at
Stennis Space Center.
The report on safety of lifting devices and equipment at
Stennis resulted from a request by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance. The audit
identified significant safety issues related to lifting devices
and equipment, and found that Stennis did not safely perform
critical lifts of high-dollar items, such as space hardware,
one-of-a-kind test articles, major facility components, or
personnel. In addition, we found that operators and riggers
were not properly trained and certified, operators used cranes
with safety deficiencies, and crane maintenance and inspections
were inadequate.
At the request of the House Science Committee, we performed
an audit of safety related to Kennedy Space Center's payload
ground operations, and found various materials used in
processing facilities at the Kennedy Space Center consistently
failed required tests for flammability resistance, and
electrostatic discharge. These potentially hazardous materials
included plastic films, foams, adhesive tapes used by payload
processing personnel under the Center's payload ground
operations contract. These materials have been used without
approval of the Kennedy Safety Office since 1992. We also found
that NASA had not identified, documented, and appropriately
mitigated the risks of using these potentially hazardous
materials, exposing personnel and flight hardware to increased
risks. We also reviewed USA's controls over the plastic films,
foams, and adhesive tapes used in and around Orbiter vehicles
and other segments of the Space Shuttle, such as the solid
rocket boosters, main engines, and found similar problems.
Each of the highlighted reports addressed potentially
serious safety issues within NASA and within the Manned
Spaceflight Program. I believe that the success of the safety
and security directorate was directly attributable to the
outstanding professionalism and work ethic of the managers and
staff, and their collective dedication to the NASA mission. It
also helped that the directorate's work was always supported by
then-Inspector General Roberta Gross. Although we issued some
controversial reports that were not always accepted by the
agency, I always felt the directorate had the complete support
of senior OIG management, including Ms. Gross.
On two occasions, in 1999 and 2001, the directorate
received the OIG Audit Report of the Year Award. One of these
reports, related to contractor safety requirements, was
transmitted by the NASA Administrator to every NASA center
director, who was directed by the Administrator to implement
the recommendations at their respective centers.
In April 2002, Robert Cobb was appointed the NASA Inspector
General. Although the Office of Audits initially continued to
operate as previously, within 3 to 4 months there was a
noticeable change. Specifically, there was considerably more
involvement in writing, rewriting, and revising a lot of
reports by the Inspector General. There was also considerable
questioning of the audit results, with Mr. Cobb frequently not
agreeing with the conclusions and recommendations in audit
reports.
There was also what I would say was a general disrespect
shown by Mr. Cobb, for auditors in particular. Mr. Cobb would
often make comments like, ``Anybody can perform an audit,'' or,
when an auditor would mention something like ``compliance with
government audit standards,'' he would make the statement that,
``The standards were only something for auditors to hide
behind.''
He also, on more than one occasion, mentioned to me that
the safety audit directorate had produced nothing of value to
the agency, that our audits were archeological digs, or that we
were too far in the weeds.
It was also during this time period that Mr. Cobb appeared
to be providing our reports to agency officials for review and
comment, prior to official draft release, in order to determine
whether the agency would agree with our findings and
recommendations. One such occasion--on one such occasion, a
proposed draft audit report on the International Space Station
was provided to the NASA general counsel to review prior to
official release. The NASA general counsel did not agree with a
conclusion in the report related to the potential for NASA
noncompliance with various international agreements on the ISS.
Prior to the release of the report, the audit team was
instructed to remove this section from the report, or the
report would not be issued.
In instances like the previous one, if any of the senior
audit managers were to disagree with Mr. Cobb or try to defend
our conclusions and recommendations, we were subject to severe
berating and profane language by Mr. Cobb.
In 2003--in January 2003, the Office of Audits was advised
by Mr. Cobb that it would be merged with the Office of
Inspections, and that all senior management positions in the
reorganized office would be moved to NASA headquarters so that
there could face-to-face accountability. Mr. Cobb frequently
stated that he wanted these senior managers in Washington so
that he could personally ``choke them.''
In February 2003, the Office of Audits was merged with the
Office of Inspections into a new Office of Audits. As part of
the reorganization, I was transferred to NASA headquarters and
reverted to my former position as director of safety and
security audits. It was made clear to me, by both the new AIGA
and his deputy, that Mr. Cobb never expected any of the senior
managers, like me, who were located at field centers, to accept
the transfer to headquarters. The new AIGA even mentioned that
Mr. Cobb now had me where he could ``choke me.''
After arriving at headquarters in April 2003, I had even
more contact with Mr. Cobb. It was also during this time that
the Columbia accident occurred, and the investigation of its
cause had begun. As the Director of Safety and Security Audits,
my directorate assumed a large role in directing the work of
the OIG related to the recommendations of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, which published its final report in August
2003. In response to the CAIB report, I compiled a plan to
review the agency's implementation of most of the
recommendations. In addition, I was authorized to hire
additional technical staff to assist with the work to be
performed.
It was also during this period that Mr. Cobb began further
interference with the work of the directorate through either
constant rewriting of products or attacking the work of the
staff and technical experts, to the point where findings and
recommendations were either never officially issued to the
agency or were issued unofficially by Mr. Cobb to various
agency officials, and, thus, never posted publicly to the NASA
OIG website.
I have provided examples of such issues in my prepared
statement, including findings developed, but never issued,
related to the organizational safety recommendations of the
CAIB and the failure of the backup Command Destruct System
during a 2002 Space Shuttle launch. In response to these
issues, Mr. Cobb made statements such as, my staff had spent
almost a year reviewing the independent technical authority and
safety organizational recommendations of the CAIB, ``yet had
nothing to show for it,'' or, with respect to the Command
Destruct failure, that it ``was the Air Force's problem.''
There were numerous other----
Senator Nelson. Mr. Carson, I need you----
Mr. Carson. I'm sorry.
Senator Nelson.--to wrap up.
Mr. Carson. In summary, by constantly rewriting and--
writing and rewriting audit reports, not allowing audits of
potentially controversial issues to be performed or reports of
completed audits to be publicly issued, constantly denigrating
the audit staff in public and in private, intimidating auditors
and staff through the use of verbal threats, foul language, and
intimidating gestures, Mr. Cobb showed that he lacked
independence from agency officials and was willing to go to any
length not to issue audit reports that would embarrass the
agency. In my opinion, he clearly created and endorsed a
hostile work environment.
Thank you. And I would be pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin J. Carson, Assistant Inspector General for
Audits and Inspections, U.S. Government Printing Office and Former
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, NASA
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committees:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss my
experiences while employed in the NASA Office of Inspector General
(OIG).
Since March 2005, I have been employed as the Assistant Inspector
General for Audits and Inspections at the U.S. Government Printing
Office, Office of Inspector General in Washington, D.C. Previously, I
worked over 15 years (August 1989 to March 2005) for the NASA OIG.
While with the NASA OIG, I held a variety of audit positions including
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Director of Audit
Quality, and Program Director for Safety and Security Audits. Including
my employment with the NASA OIG, I have spent approximately 27 years of
my career in various Federal audit organizations.
I have been invited here today to provide testimony related to my
time and experience in the NASA OIG while working under the direction
of NASA Inspector General Robert Cobb. In order to talk about this time
period, I must first discuss my experience with the organization prior
to Mr. Cobb's appointment in April 2002.
NASA OIG Prior to 2002
In early 1999, the previous NASA Inspector General Roberta Gross,
upon the NASA Administrator stating that the agency's Number One
Priority was ``Safety,'' appointed me to form a directorate whose
specific mission was to audit safety and security issues within NASA.
While forming the directorate with a small staff of auditors, the
directorate quickly performed a series of audits and issued reports
addressing various safety issues primarily at NASA's manned space
flight centers. Among the first reports issued by the directorate
included:
IG-00-028 Safety Concerns with Kennedy Space Center's
Payload Ground Operations, March 30, 2000;
IG-00-035 Contractor Safety Requirements at Kennedy Space
Center and Marshall Space Flight Center, June 5, 2000;
IG-01-017 Space Shuttle Program Management Safety
Observations, March 23, 2001;
IG-01-034 Controls Over the Use of PFA's In and Around the
Space Shuttle Orbiter Vehicles, August 31, 2001; and
IG-01-042 Safety of Lifting Devices and Equipment at Stennis
Space Center, September 28, 2001.
During the first 2 years the directorate was in existence, we also
issued several other reports related to issues such as controls over
Foreign National Visitors at NASA Centers, Management and
Administration of International Agreements at NASA, and NASA Oversight
of Contractor Exports of Controlled Technologies. The directorate was
also responsible for audits of classified NASA Programs and Projects.
Some of the highlights of the reports issued included the report on
Safety of Lifting Devices and Equipment at Stennis which resulted from
a request by the NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission
Assurance. The audit identified significant safety issues related to
lifting devices and equipment and found that Stennis did not safely
perform critical lifts of high-dollar items such as space hardware,
one-of-a-kind test articles, major facility components, or personnel.
In addition, we found that operators and riggers were not properly
trained and certified, operators used cranes with safety deficiencies,
and crane maintenance and inspections were inadequate.
At the request of the House Science Committee, we performed an
audit of safety related to Kennedy Space Center's Payload Ground
Operations and found that various materials used in processing
facilities at the Kennedy Space Center consistently failed required
tests for flammability resistance and electrostatic discharge. These
potentially hazardous materials included plastic films, foams, and
adhesive (PFAs) tapes used by payload processing personnel under the
center's Payload Ground Operations Contract. These materials had been
used without approval of the Kennedy Safety Office since 1992. We also
found that NASA had not identified, documented, and appropriately
mitigated the risks of using these potentially hazardous materials,
exposing personnel and flight hardware to increased risks.
On the audit of the United Space Alliance's (USA's) safety
procedures under NASA's Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), we
reviewed the oversight of USA's safety procedures for the Space Shuttle
Program at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (Johnson). We found that
the Johnson Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office (Johnson
Safety Office) was not providing the required support to the Space
Shuttle Program Safety Manager, for oversight of USA's safety
activities. We also found that NASA's contractor surveillance plans do
not address all SFOC requirements for safety; and USA's reporting to
NASA of close calls and mishaps needed improvement. We concluded that
NASA did not have adequate management controls in place to ensure (1)
effective oversight of USA's safety operations under the SFOC, (2)
better control over $13 million in annual Space Shuttle Program funds
provided to the Johnson Safety Office, and (3) that adequate corrective
actions are taken on all safety mishaps and close calls. This report
and its results were discussed in the August 2003 Report of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board in Chapter 7, ``The Accident's
Organizational Causes.''
We also reviewed USA's controls over the use of plastic films,
foams, and adhesive tapes (PFA's) used in and around the Orbiter
vehicles and other segments of the Space Shuttle such as the solid
rocket boosters and main engines. We found that USA was routinely using
in and around the Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicles, PFA's that had no
record of being tested to ensure that the PFA's met NASA standards for
flammability resistance, electrostatic discharge (ESD) rate, or
compatibility with rocket fuel. In addition, neither Kennedy Space
Center nor USA safety personnel had approved the use of these
materials, thereby creating a potential safety hazard to personnel, the
Orbiter vehicles, and other flight hardware and equipment.
Each of the highlighted reports addressed potentially serious
safety issues within NASA and within the manned spaceflight program. I
believe that the success of the Safety and Security Directorate was
directly attributable to the outstanding professionalism and work ethic
of the managers and staff and their collective dedication to the NASA
mission. It also helped that the directorate's work was always
supported by then-Inspector General Roberta Gross. Although we issued
some controversial reports that were not always accepted by the agency,
I always felt that the directorate had the complete support of senior
OIG management including Ms. Gross. Further highlights from the initial
years of the directorate included on two occasions, in 1999 and 2001,
the directorate received the OIG Audit Report of the Year Award. One of
these reports related to Contractor Safety Requirements and was
transmitted by the NASA Administrator to every NASA Center Director,
who was directed by the Administrator to implement the recommendations
at their respective centers.
In late 2001, I was selected to be the Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for Audits. In this position, I had four audit directorates
that reported to me including the Safety and Security Directorate. The
directorate continued to produce high-value audit products.
April 2002 to March 2005
In April 2002, Robert Cobb was appointed the NASA Inspector
General. Although the Office of Audits initially continued to operate
as previously, within 3 to 4 months there was a noticeable change.
Specifically, there was considerably more involvement in writing,
rewriting, and revising audit reports by the Inspector General. There
was also considerable questioning of the audit results with Mr. Cobb
frequently not agreeing with the conclusions and recommendations in
audit reports. There was also what I would say was a general disrespect
shown by Mr. Cobb for auditors in particular. Mr. Cobb would often make
comments like ``anybody can perform an audit'' or when an auditor would
mention something like compliance with government audit standards, he
would make the statement that he had read the government audit
standards and that all they were was ``something for auditors to hide
behind.'' He also on more than one occasion mentioned to me that the
safety audit directorate had ``produced nothing of value to the
agency,'' that our audits were ``archaeological digs'' or that we were
``too far in the weeds.''
It was also during this time period that Mr. Cobb appeared to be
providing our reports to agency officials for review and comment prior
to official draft release in order to determine whether the agency
would agree with our findings and recommendations. On one such
occasion, a proposed draft audit report on the International Space
Station (ISS) was provided to the NASA General Counsel to review prior
to official release. The NASA General Counsel did not agree with a
conclusion in the report related to the potential for NASA
noncompliance with various international agreements on the ISS. Prior
to release of the report, the audit team was instructed to remove this
section from the report or the report would not be issued.
In instances like the previous one, if any of the senior audit
managers were to disagree with Mr. Cobb or try to defend our
conclusions and recommendations, we were subject to severe berating and
profane language by Mr. Cobb. During these tirades about audits and
auditors, I never once saw Mr. Cobb's Deputy Inspector General ever
support the audit staff or the rationale for their conclusions even
though they were clearly supported by audit evidence. In fact, Mr.
Cobb's Deputy often made matters worse for the Office of Audits despite
having been an auditor himself for many years.
2003 Audit Reorganization
In January 2003, the Office of Audits was advised by Mr. Cobb that
it would be merged with the Office of Inspections and that all senior
management positions in the reorganized office would be moved to NASA
Headquarters so that there could be ``face-to-face accountability.''
Mr. Cobb frequently stated that he wanted these senior managers in
Washington so that he could personally ``choke them.''
In February 2003, the Office of Audits was merged with the Office
of Inspections into the Office of Audits. The new Assistant Inspector
General for Audits (AIGA) selected to head up the new organization was
the previous Assistant Inspector General for Inspections who had no
experience either performing audits or managing any type of audit
organization. The previous AIGA was placed in the position of Deputy
AIGA.
As part of the reorganization, I was transferred to NASA
Headquarters and reverted to my former position as Director of Safety
and Security Audits. It was made clear to me by both the new AIGA and
his deputy that Mr. Cobb never expected any of the senior managers like
me, who were located at field centers, to accept the transfer to
Headquarters. The new AIGA even mentioned that Mr. Cobb now had me
where he could ``choke me.''
After arriving at Headquarters in April 2003, I had even more
contact with Mr. Cobb. It was also during this time that the Columbia
accident occurred and the investigation of its cause had begun. As the
Director of Safety and Security Audits, my directorate assumed a large
role in directing the work of the OIG related to the recommendations of
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) which published its
final report and recommendations in August 2003. In response to the
CAIB report, I compiled a plan to review the agency's implementation of
most of the recommendations. In addition, I was authorized to hire
additional technical staff to assist with the work to be performed.
It was also during this period, that Mr. Cobb began further
interference with the work of the directorate through either constant
rewriting of products or attacking the work of the staff and technical
experts to the point where findings and recommendations were either
never officially issued to the agency or were issued unofficially by
Mr. Cobb to various agency officials and thus never posted publicly to
the NASA OIG website.
CAIB Organizational Recommendations
There are several instances of the stifling or covering up of audit
results by Mr. Cobb that I can provide. For example, my staff and I
were responsible for reviewing all agency actions and plans related to
the organizational safety recommendations of the CAIB, specifically,
(1) the establishment of an Independent Technical Engineering Authority
(ITEA), and (2) straight line authority and funding for the Space
Shuttle Program safety organization.
On at least three different occasions beginning in December 2003,
my staff prepared audit reports basically concluding that NASA was not
establishing the ITEA or Space Shuttle Program safety organization in
the manner intended by the CAIB. Specifically, we stated that NASA had
not fully achieved the reporting and funding independence for either
function recommended by the CAIB. We concluded that Technical Warrant
Holders--those individuals the NASA Chief Engineer empowered to ensure
compliance with technical standards and requirements, lacked
independence from major program influences. We further stated that
NASA's plans to strengthen safety functions did not provide for a
safety official at the centers to be accountable to the head of safety
at NASA Headquarters. Based on the structure the agency was proposing,
we concluded that the individuals ultimately held accountable for ITEA
and safety would be subject to cost, schedule, and other pressures from
the same program they would be responsible for independently assessing.
Despite drafting three reports with basically this same message
over a period of 15 months, Mr. Cobb refused to release any of them. On
a couple of occasions, these issues were addressed in either a letter
signed by Mr. Cobb or an e-mail sent by Mr. Cobb to selected NASA
officials.
On October 6, 2004, during my monthly Directorate briefing, the
subject of this review was brought up and Mr. Cobb stated that my staff
had spent almost a year reviewing the ITEA and Safety recommendations
of the CAIB yet ``had nothing to show for it.'' When I reminded Mr.
Cobb that my staff had prepared three separate audit reports that he
chose not to issue, he stated that he was not satisfied with the
message of the reports. I defended the work of my staff and stated that
the reports were right on the issue and that they should be issued. I
subsequently have been told that the current NASA Administrator made
several of the organizational changes with safety and the ITEA that we
had recommended in our reports despite the fact that they were never
issued.
Cape Canaveral Air Station Command Destruct
During October 2004, my Directorate also received a referral from
the NASA OIG Office of Investigations concerning a ``potential safety
issue involving command destruct'' at the Eastern Test Range of Cape
Canaveral Air Station. The allegation concerned a possible safety
violation that occurred in conjunction with a launch of the Space
Shuttle in 2002. Specifically, that during the June 5, 2002 launch of
the Space Shuttle, the Commander of the Eastern Range overruled the
``No-Go'' recommendations of the Air Force's Mission Flight Control
Officer (MFCO) and Chief of Safety and proceeded to declare the range
``Go'' for launch of the Space Shuttle. The reason for the ``No-Go''
recommendations of the MFCO and Chief of Safety was that there was a
failure of the backup Command Destruct System which was not certified
as mission capable prior to launch as required. The original allegation
had been referred to the NASA OIG by the U.S. Air Force Inspector
General in August 2003. After reviewing the allegation for any
potential criminal violations, the Office of Investigations referred it
to audits and my directorate because of the potential safety issues
involved with the allegations.
Upon assigning this issue to a member of my staff, who was an Air
Force officer with an extensive safety background, it quickly became
apparent that there was substantial merit to the allegation and that
the sequence of events, where the Range Commander overruled the MFCO
and Chief of Safety and declared the range go for launch despite a less
than fully certified Command Destruct System, was unprecedented. To
verify that this situation did in fact occur, a total of 9 witnesses
were interviewed who were present on console for the launch. We also
reviewed various launch-related records. Since the NASA firing room and
the range control center are not co-located, the NASA Launch Director
and Mission Management Team Chair at the time relied solely on the Go
recommendation of the Eastern Range Commander without any NASA
independent verification. Both of these individuals also stated that
they would not have launched had they known that the Air Force MFCO and
Chief of Safety were ``No-Go'' for launch.
Upon completion of our preliminary work, my staff and I arranged to
brief Mr. Cobb on February 23, 2005 on the results of our review to
include the work remaining to complete the review and what our
preliminary recommendations to NASA would be. The staff and I had
previously met with Safety Officials at Kennedy in January 2005 and had
obtained their agreement with our proposed recommendations. We received
complete concurrence with our primary recommendation that NASA Safety
must positively verify the Eastern Range status and range configuration
prior to every launch. At the briefing on February 23, 2005, I was
promptly told by Mr. Cobb at the completion of the briefing that this
situation ``was the Air Force's problem.'' While reporting of this
situation would have been controversial to the agency, it was not a
surprise to me that Mr. Cobb would not allow any further work on this
assignment to be performed. I am unaware whether this situation
concerning launches has ever been addressed or corrected.
Other Instances
While I have discussed the above two instances where my directorate
was either interfered with by Mr. Cobb, not allowed to complete work,
or not allowed to issue reports, there were numerous other examples of
this type of behavior throughout my directorate or throughout the
Office of Audits. For example, despite allegations of the possible NASA
misuse of funds appropriated by Congress for security at Federal
Agencies subsequent to September 11, I was told by the Assistant
Inspector General for Audits that Mr. Cobb would not allow an audit of
that area because it would only serve as an ``archaeological dig'' and
would be embarrassing to NASA.
In another instance, an audit report was drafted by my Directorate
addressing noncompliance at Kennedy Space Center with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management
(PSM) standard. The draft report discussed the lack of PSM procedures
for the transportation of highly hazardous chemicals via the Kennedy
railroad. Specifically, neither the United Space Alliance (USA) nor
Space Gateway Services (SGS) had developed PSM procedures for the
railroad transportation of Space Shuttle solid rocket motor segments
(which contain ammonium perchlorate) and nitrogen tetroxide (which was
transported on behalf of the U.S. Air Force). Neither contractor
believed that they were responsible for the PSM program of the railroad
and neither believed that the PSM standard applied to Kennedy railroad
operations. The report illustrated the need for PSM procedures related
to the railroad by discussing several railroad mishaps that had
occurred over the previous 3 years. After reviewing the report, Mr.
Cobb stated that the report was ``based on a flawed premise'' and
directed that the report be rewritten to address the need for improved
oversight and safety procedures for the KSC railroad itself, including
inspections and maintenance of the railcars and the track. This
direction required additional work by the audit team despite the fact
that sufficient work related to the PSM issued had already been
performed. Due to the change in direction of the assignment by Mr.
Cobb, the OIG was not involved in any further actions related to PSM as
it applies to the Kennedy railroad.
Conclusion
In summary, by constantly writing and re-writing audit reports, not
allowing audits of potentially controversial issues to be performed or
reports of completed audits to be publicly issued, constantly
denigrating the audit staff in public and in private, intimidating
auditors and staff through the use of verbal threats, foul language and
intimidating gestures, Mr. Cobb showed that he lacked independence from
agency officials and was willing to go to any length not to issue audit
reports that would embarrass the agency. In my opinion, he clearly
created and endorsed a hostile work environment. Thank you, and I would
be pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Herzog?
STATEMENT OF DEBRA HERZOG, SENIOR ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE AND FORMER DEPUTY
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INVESTIGATIONS, NASA
Ms. Herzog. Good afternoon. Messrs. Chairmen and Members of
the Committees, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
to share my experiences on--as former Deputy Assistant
Inspector General for Investigations under Inspector General
Robert Cobb.
I began my Federal career 20 years ago--over 20 years ago,
in 1983, as an assistant U.S. Attorney. I served in U.S.
Attorneys' offices in such positions as chief of the narcotics
section, regional coordinator of the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force, public corruption and white-collar
crime chief, chief of major investigations. I also served on
details with the Department of Justice and with the United
States Customs Service. In the 4 years before joining NASA, I
was Senior Advisor to the Assistant Commissioner in the Office
of Internal Affairs at the United States Customs Service.
In November 2004, I was selected by Inspector General
Robert Cobb as the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations at the NASA OIG. I served in that position until
December of 2005, when I joined the U.S. Postal Service Office
of Inspector General as a senior attorney.
My testimony today summarizes my experiences and
observations during my tenure at the Office of the Inspector
General at NASA.
During my pre-employment interview with Mr. Cobb, he
expressed his unhappiness with management in the Office of
Investigations, stating, ``The investigators needed a grownup
to supervise.'' I accepted the position, with the impression
that Mr. Cobb wished to improve the quality of work at the NASA
OIG, and believed that I would be instrumental in that effort.
One of my early experiences with Mr. Cobb was so disturbing
that I considered leaving the OIG almost immediately
afterwards. At a scheduled weekly meeting, Mr. Cobb, in front
of his deputy and my supervisor, berated me concerning a word
in a letter. In an ensuing monologue, loudly peppered with
profanities, Mr. Cobb insulted and ridiculed me. After the
meeting, I told Mr. Cobb, one-on-one, that I did not expect my
superior to use profanity, that the use of profanity was
unacceptable, and I would not tolerate profanity. Mr. Cobb
listened and gave me no indication if he agreed or disagreed.
In the months to come, however, I regularly observed and heard
of Mr. Cobb using profanity to berate and demean employees.
Mr. Cobb also exhibited a consistent lack of understanding
of Federal law enforcement. In two cases approximately 6 months
apart, Mr. Cobb was notified several hours before NASA OIG
agents and FBI agents were to execute search warrants at NASA
properties. Mr. Cobb said he would not allow the warrants to
proceed before reading the affidavits, despite the fact that
the responsible OIG supervisor had approved the warrants. The
assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case thought
the warrants were fine, and the warrants were signed by a
United States magistrate judge. After reading the warrants, Mr.
Cobb's opinions included: there was no probable cause, the
assistant U.S. Attorney was stupid, and the NASA agents must
have hoodwinked the magistrate. Mr. Cobb was also overly
concerned about the possible reaction of NASA senior
management. Finally, after much discussion, Mr. Cobb
reluctantly allowed the agents to execute the warrants.
During my short tenure at NASA, at least five other
warrants were issued and executed in locations other than NASA
properties. Mr. Cobb did not express any interest in those
affidavits or warrants.
The incident that convinced me that I could no longer be
effective in my job occurred in August 2005. Mr. Cobb directed
a case accepted for civil prosecution by the United States
Attorneys Office in the Central District of California be
withdrawn pending a review of the investigation at OIG
headquarters. In my 17 years as a Federal prosecutor, I had
never seen that done. Mr. Cobb claimed he was not aware that
the case had even been presented to the U.S. Attorneys Office;
however, a biweekly reporting document provided to Mr. Cobb in
June proves otherwise.
Subsequently, Mr. Cobb claimed that the NASA special agent
in charge of the case who wrote the withdrawal letter was
trying to ``set him up.'' The assistant U.S. attorney, however,
had endorsed the work of the case agent, the case preparation,
and the investigative report. Yet, in a subsequent meeting
about the case, Mr. Cobb leaned over his desk, just feet from
my face, his face red, his fists clenched, and screamed, at the
same time slamming his hand down on the desk so hard that I
jumped. ``You know as well as I do that this report is a
blanking piece of blank.''
In closing, Mr. Cobb's arrogance, bullying style, and
questionable independence limit his ability to lead the NASA
OIG, and, in turn, has demoralized the NASA workforce. As an
example, a recently hired employee, after only 2 days at the
NASA OIG, called the agency she left, requesting her old job
back, because most of her staff spent a good portion of the
workday looking for a way out.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Herzog follows:]
Prepared Statement of Debra Herzog, Senior Attorney, Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Postal Service and Former Deputy Assistant
Inspector General for Investigations, NASA
My testimony relates to my experiences and observations while in
the employ of the NASA Office of the Inspector General (NASA OIG). I
was the Deputy Assistant Inspector General (DAIGI) for Investigations
at the NASA OIG from November 29, 2004 through December 11, 2005. For
more than half that period, I was Acting Assistant Inspector General
(DAIGI) for Investigations.
I began my Federal career in 1983 at the U.S. Attorney's Office in
the Eastern District of Missouri. In 1986, the U.S. Attorney appointed
me to the position of Chief of the Narcotics Section and Regional
Coordinator for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force; one of
thirteen regional coordinators nationwide. I held that dual position
until my transfer to the Southern District of Florida in July 1990.
I transferred into the Southern District of Florida as a
Supervisory Assistant U.S. Attorney. During my 8 years there, I held
several supervisory positions in the Ft. Lauderdale Branch Office,
including White Collar Crime/Public Corruption Chief, Chief of Major
Investigations and Acting Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney. I
supervised anywhere from 6 to 12 attorneys as a section chief, and
approximately 40 attorneys and 20 support staff personnel while
Managing Assistant.
In 1998, I accepted a one-year detail to the Department of Justice
Campaign Financing Task Force in Washington, and then another year's
detail to the Office of Internal Affairs at the United States Customs
Service. At the conclusion of that detail, I accepted the position of
Senior Advisor to the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal
Affairs. As such, I assisted in supervising investigative activity of
over 120 Federal agents in up to twenty field offices. The agents
investigated allegations of criminal conduct and serious administrative
misconduct by Customs employees.
I am currently a Senior Attorney at the U.S. Postal Service Office
of Inspector General.
Mr. Cobb selected me as the Deputy Assistant Inspector General
(DAIGI) for Investigations in late 2004. When I began working at the
NASA OIG, Lance Carrington was Assistant Inspector General (AIGI) and
my immediate supervisor. During my pre-employment interview Mr. Cobb,
the Inspector General (IG) expressed his unhappiness with management in
the Office of Investigations (OI), stating, ``They need a grown-up back
there.'' I accepted the position with the impression that Mr. Cobb
wished to improve the quality of the work and believed I would be
instrumental to that effort.
During my first weeks at the NASA OIG, I endured an episode so
disturbing that I considered leaving the OIG. At a regularly scheduled
weekly meeting among Mr. Cobb, his deputy and my supervisor, Mr. Cobb
berated me, reacting to a word in a letter I'd edited. In the ensuing
monologue, which was loudly peppered with profanities, he insulted and
ridiculed me. I advised him after the meeting that I had never been
spoken to like that in the workplace, that it was unacceptable, and
that I did not expect my boss to use profanity, and I would not
tolerate profanity in the workplace. I told him I could not continue to
work there if it persisted. During the following months, I observed or
learned that Mr. Cobb directed profanity at and humiliated and demeaned
other employees. Gradually, I and many other employees as well as
others involved in law enforcement lost all respect for Mr. Cobb.
Mr. Cobb exhibited a consistent lack of understanding concerning
Federal law enforcement. This became most apparent in two cases,
approximately 6 months apart, in which he clearly failed to recognize
the propriety and value of Federal search warrants.
In the first case, Mr. Cobb was notified that search warrants were
to be executed by NASA OIG agents and FBI agents at NASA's Stennis
Space Center. I was not involved in the matter in anyway until I was
called into a meeting regarding the warrant. Mr. Cobb apparently
received the information that a warrant was to be executed at the
Stennis Space Center within hours of the planned execution. Mr. Cobb
said he would not allow the warrants to proceed before he read the
warrant, despite the fact that NASA OIG agents and FBI agents were
poised to execute the warrant, a NASA OIG supervisor approved the
warrant and it was signed by a United States Magistrate Judge. Yet,
after reading the affidavit in support of the warrant, Mr. Cobb opined
that there was no probable cause established and maintained his
position that the NASA agents should not execute the warrant. When
reminded that an Assistant United States Attorney believed the warrant
was sufficient and that a United States Magistrate Judge signed the
warrant--his response was essentially that: (1) the Assistant United
States Attorney involved was stupid, and (2) that the assigned NASA
agents must have ``hoodwinked'' the Magistrate. He actually said, ``Who
knows what our guys (the investigating agents) told the judge.''
After much discussion, Mr. Cobb reluctantly allowed the agents to
execute the warrant. However, his arrogance appeared to have interfered
with any possibility of educating him in the matter. Six months later,
the scenario was repeated.
On Monday, June 27, 2005, while I was Acting Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations, the Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) at
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center e-mailed me. His e-mail informed
that agents in his office were working with an Assistant United States
Attorney on a search warrant for an NASA employee's office at the
Marshall Center. The e-mail noted that the agents wanted to execute the
warrant by Thursday, June 30, as the employee was about to be
reassigned and they were concerned about losing evidence.
On Wednesday, June 29, the RAC called and advised that the
Assistant United States Attorney approved the warrant and wanted to
take it to the Magistrate Judge forthwith. I hadn't finished reading
the affidavit, but as I am intimately familiar with the warrant review
process in U.S. Attorneys offices and the in the courts, I advised the
agents to proceed to the Magistrate as requested by the AUSA. After the
warrant was signed by the U.S. Magistrate Judge, I e-mailed Mr. Cobb
(who was out of town) advising that a warrant would be executed the
following day at Marshall. I advised the Deputy Inspector General by e-
mail and in person and provided a copy of the warrant and affidavit to
him.
Mr. Cobb asked that I call him that evening. I did, and was greeted
by his loudly-voiced accusations that there was no probable cause for
the warrant; an interesting position as he had yet to see the affidavit
in support of the warrant. I had sent it to him in encrypted form as
required by agency policy and he was unable to open it on his
Blackberry. As with the earlier warrant, Mr. Cobb was primarily
concerned with first, why he I did not tell him about it earlier, and
second, with the fact that it was a warrant at a NASA Center. He
directed me to tell the agents they could not to execute the warrant
(despite the fact he had not seen the warrant or affidavit). They in
turn, had to advise the FBI agents working with them that they could
not participate in the warrant execution the following day. The warrant
allows for execution within 10 days of the date the U.S. Magistrate
Judge signs it. I advised the agents not to tell the U.S. Attorney's
Office, of Mr. Cobb's decision as I hoped to persuade Mr. Cobb to
change his mind when I had an opportunity to speak with him in person.
The FBI agents, however, said they would proceed with the warrant alone
if the NASA OIG agents were not permitted to participate.
------Original Message------
From: Herzog, Debra (HQ-WRH10)
To: Cobb, Robert W. (HQ-WAH10)
CC: Howard, Thomas J. (HQ-WAH10)
Sent: Wed Jun 29 19:21:18 2005
Subject: Search warrant
Moose:
If, after reading the affidavit you still believe that the warrant
should not be executed, Jim Haughton is prepared to walk you through
the case in D.C. on Friday. I want to reiterate, however, that I am
fully responsible for authorizing this warrant.
I believe that using criminal processes in a criminal
investigation, particularly this one, is appropriate and acted
accordingly. I also believe that everyone else involved acted with the
same sincere belief.
Jim had the affidavit faxed this evening so it should be at KSC in
the morning.
My Palm is not receiving/sending mail again, so I am working from
my laptop. I have a medical appointment tomorrow afternoon so will be
out of the office after 2. You can reach me on my cell. Feel free to
call me at home if you need to.
Debbie
When Mr. Cobb arrived back in the office on July 1, 2007, I met
with him and the Deputy Inspector General for several hours. The
meeting was lengthy, and at times, Mr. Cobb called in his counsel. Mr.
Cobb's expressed concerns were: (1) the NASA Center Director's reaction
to OIG executing a warrant and what he would say when the Center
Director called asking why the OIG was at his center. (2) that the
Assistant United States Attorney didn't know what he was doing and by
implication, as the warrant was signed by a U.S. Magistrate Judge, that
he did not either, and (3) the agents were only undertaking this
warrant because they were ``out to get him.''
In both of these search warrant matters, it was Mr. Cobb's position
that everyone supporting the warrant--the agents, the prosecutor, me,
the U.S. Magistrate--were either wrong, out to get him, stupid, or all
of the above. Throughout this episode, Mr. Cobb kept referring back to
the first warrant and its issues and accused me and the agents of
pursuing this warrant ``to rub his face in it.''
In my short tenure at NASA, at least 5 other warrants were issued
and executed at locations other than NASA property. Mr. Cobb did not
express any interest in those affidavits or warrants.
The last incident and the one that convinced me I could no longer
be effective in my job, occurred just 2 months later. In June 2005,
agents in the field office presented a case to the Civil Frauds
Division of the U.S. Attorneys Office for the Central District of
California. The case was accepted for civil prosecution. A letter
outlining the case and containing a number of attachments was provided
to the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the matter.
On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, en route to conduct in-service
training for the NASA OIG Western Field Office, I received an e-mail
from Mr. Cobb regarding a case. The e-mail began:
I would like [the Western Field Office Special Agent in Charge]
to send (ASAP) a letter to the U.S. Attorney withdrawing the
August 1 report on the Genesis investigation pending a review
of the investigation at OIG headquarters.
I took the opportunity to consult with the Western Field Office
Special Agent in Charge and Counsel to the Inspector General the next
morning as we were all at the same training. I wanted to see if they
knew of any reason why Mr. Cobb would direct this withdrawal. When I
determined they did not, I e-mailed Mr. Cobb. In my e-mail I asked Mr.
Cobb if there was any urgency to the request as the Western Field
Office Special Agent in Charge and I wished to speak with him or in the
alternative, have him speak with the AUSA before this ``withdrawal''
was undertaken. He directed me to do as previously instructed. The
Western Field Office Special Agent in Charge wrote the letter and
delivered it to the U.S. Attorney's Office.
After reviewing the letter, Mr. Cobb told me he thought the Western
Field Office Special Agent in Charge was trying to ``set him up.'' He
said he only meant to withdraw the document, not the case. That was
simply not true. His e-mails made it quite clear that he thought the
case should be re-evaluated to determine if it should have been
referred to the U.S. Attorneys Office in the first place. He also
claimed he was not advised the case had been presented, but a bi-weekly
case reporting document provided to Mr. Cobb in June unmistakably
contradicts his claim.
The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the matter, a 10-
year veteran of her office and Deputy Chief of the Civil Frauds
Division, wrote a letter applauding the efforts of the agents on the
case, expressed her support for the case and outlined potential legal
theories. At a meeting between the two of us, Mr. Cobb insinuated to me
that we ``had'' the AUSA write the letter. He leaned over his desk,
just feet from my face, his face red, and his fists clenched and
screamed at the same time slamming his hand on his on desk so hard I
jumped. ``. . . you know as well as I do that this report is a fucking
piece of shit'' (or ``crap'').\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ I am unsure which at this time which of these words he used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Cobb's arrogance, his abusive, bullying style, absence of
managerial experience, limited understanding of investigative
processes, egotism and misplaced sense of self-importance make it
impossible for him to successfully manage and lead an organization.
Many employees left, many are trying to. As recently as last week,
a newly-hired employee who took the job because it was a promotion,
called the agency she left requesting her old job back after only 2
days at the NASA OIG. The new hire said that much of the staff spent a
good portion of the workday looking for a way out.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Carrington?
STATEMENT OF LANCE CARRINGTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE; AND FORMER ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS, NASA
Mr. Carrington. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committees,
I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to share my
experience as the former NASA Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations.
Senator Nelson. Pull that microphone a little closer.
Mr. Carrington. Yes, sir.
My professional life is one of public service, starting
with over 6 years of active duty in the United States Army and
12 years in the Army Reserve. I spent 17 years with the NASA
Office of Inspector General, and the last 2 years with the
Postal Service Office of Inspector General. In 25 years of
public service, I have served as a Federal law enforcement
officer, manager, and executive.
When I became the NASA OIG Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, in September 2002, Mr. Cobb told me his
expectations of my performance included being responsible for
everything that happened in the Office of Investigations, and
he further expected me to know every detail on every case at
all times. We had over 400 open cases. It was an impossible
expectation for anyone.
Mr. Cobb complained that agents couldn't write, and he
referred to their work as ``crap,'' regardless of case
successes. He also referred to the agents as ``knuckle-
draggers.'' He would disparage agents in front of the rest of
the office. To help mitigate Mr. Cobb's negative attitude about
the agents, I personally reviewed and edited every
investigative report or document that Mr. Cobb would see.
I repeatedly asked Mr. Cobb what his expectations were and
what we could do better. He always replied that he didn't know,
but, when he saw it, he would tell me.
Other than Mr. Cobb telling me to keep him informed of
anything and everything, he never told me what he wanted, in
the 3 years I was there.
Mr. Cobb became upset because the agents worked criminal
and civil cases under the direction of the U.S. Attorneys
Office. He would tell me, and other senior managers, that
agents don't work for the U.S. Attorney, and for us to make
sure the agents knew their boss was the IG.
Mr. Cobb's personal interaction with the staff consisted of
yelling and demeaning. And the more it affected them, the more
he did it. In one instance, Mr. Cobb had asked an attorney for
a legal opinion, but, after he heard her opinion, he told her
her legal opinion didn't count, that his legal opinion was the
only one that counted. He then proceeded to demean and ridicule
her in front of the group.
Mr. Cobb routinely used profanity when he spoke to me and
other employees, stating, ``F them'' and ``GD them.'' It was a
regular occurrence that offended many people in the office. On
one occasion, Ms. Debra Herzog, my deputy, was trying to make a
legal point with Mr. Cobb from her perspective as a former
Federal prosecutor. Mr. Cobb did not agree with her, so he
leaned forward and yelled and cussed at her. As tears began
welling in her eyes, I changed the subject so we could leave
the room.
At my performance review sessions, Mr. Cobb would say he
wasn't happy. When I asked him for details, he would say that
everything was wrong, and I had better fix it. He never
provided me with any specific examples.
Once, I showed Mr. Cobb a $3.94 million settlement check
payable to NASA, we had just received. Mr. Cobb's response was,
it didn't mean anything to him. I asked him why, and he said,
``Because I had nothing to do with it.'' I explained that it
was representative of our office. He told me it didn't matter,
because he didn't have anything to do with it.
Mr. Cobb appeared to have a lack of independence when NASA
officials were the subjects of investigation or if arrests or
search warrants were obtained for NASA facilities. Mr. Cobb
would question every aspect of these cases, much more than the
non-NASA-subject cases. It gave us the appearance that he
wanted to derail them before the agents were given adequate
time to investigate the allegations. There were cases where
search warrants were obtained for NASA offices and computers,
but Mr. Cobb declared that there was no probable cause, and he
didn't want the NASA agents executing the warrants. I explained
to Mr. Cobb that the cases were joint with the FBI, and the
searches would be executed anyway. He then allowed us to
participate.
Our Houston office was asked by the NASA--the Johnson Space
Center Legal Office to assist the Texas Rangers with their
ongoing investigation into an alleged missing ring, property of
one of the female Columbia astronauts. The Rangers had
exhausted all leads attempting to determine if the ring existed
and whether it was stolen. As a last resort, the Rangers
drafted a Crime Stoppers Alert they planned to distribute to
the media, and, as a courtesy, asked the OIG to review it. I
provided Mr. Cobb a copy of the draft alert. Mr. Cobb became
very upset, lost his temper, and yelled and cussed at me,
saying that if the media got a hold of it, he would have to
resign. I reminded him that it was not our case, and that we
were merely assisting the Rangers, at the request of NASA.
Later that evening, Mr. Cobb called me at home and proceeded to
yell and use profanities at me again. Mr. Cobb was so loud, I
had to go into the garage so my family would not hear him. Mr.
Cobb would not listen or try to understand it was the Rangers
decision. He continued to yell and use profanities, saying that
he would have to resign if the alert was released.
I didn't understand why Mr. Cobb was so upset about the
alert, until weeks later, at an OIG senior staff meeting. Mr.
Cobb mentioned the NASA Administrator had previously ordered
him and all NASA senior staff not to speak or do anything with
the Columbia astronaut families. I then realized that if the
OIG was associated with the Rangers' Crime Stoppers Alert, Mr.
Cobb considered himself to be in direct violation of the order
from the NASA Administrator.
Mr. Cobb told me he didn't like the special agent in charge
at Goddard Space Flight Center, and directed me to get rid of
him. I asked Mr. Cobb why, because he was doing a good job. Mr.
Cobb said he didn't want him around. I told the special agent
in charge if he was offered an opportunity elsewhere, he should
take it, because Mr. Cobb did not want him around. About a
month later, he left to take a job with the Transportation
Security Administration.
A short while after the special agent in charge departed,
Mr. Cobb told me he wasn't happy with me, but this time he
threatened to make me the special agent in charge at Goddard. I
asked Mr. Cobb for specific reasons, and he said he was just
not happy. I told him I had done everything he had asked me to
do.
Mr. Cobb was never happy with anything we did in the Office
of Investigations. I finally asked him if he even wanted us
working cases. He told me, ``No.'' And I said if that was the
situation, then he didn't need me around. He agreed. So, I told
him I would seek employment elsewhere. Two weeks later, I gave
him my 2-weeks notice.
I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Light?
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL C. LIGHT, PAULETTE GODDARD
PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE, ROBERT F. WAGNER SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
SERVICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Dr. Light. It's a pleasure to be here today. I'm not going
to talk about this particular case. What I'd like to do is give
you a little background on the expectations of Congress in
enacting the 1978 Act regarding the kind of person they hoped
would serve as Inspector General.
I should note that Congress, in passing the 1978 Act, had
many options for creating a much closer relationship between
the Inspector General and the head of the establishment, be it
a Secretary or an Administrator. Congress did not accept that
alternative vision of the Inspector General, despite uniform
opposition from the Executive Branch and from the President of
the United States; they eventually worked toward an agreement
to create a quasi-independent Inspector General in order to
assure the kind of safe harbor, if you will, for investigations
and auditing that we see in the statute now.
In terms of expectations from the Inspector General in
behavior and operations, I'm going to highlight five specific
areas.
The first is that Congress expected, and demanded in
statute, that there be expertise in the Inspector General, that
the individual appointed as Inspector General have specific
skills that would allow him or her to effectively discharge
their duties. The primary focus of this list of expertise was
on auditing investigations, a set of skills that would allow
the Inspector General to discharge his or her duties
effectively.
In reading through the legislative record on the history of
the statute, and also the precedent set in the early
appointments, we see that there is also an expectation that the
Inspector General be a strong manager of the office. Congress
understood that the Office of Inspectors General would--Offices
of Inspectors General would be small, that they would have
relatively meager resources in the grand scheme of things, and
that they would have to be well managed to produce the highest
level of productivity possible. Therefore, Congress expected
that the individuals would be of the highest caliber possible,
including expertise in management.
They also expected, for a second characteristic, that the
Inspector General be a leader who was a wise steward of the
resources at his or her disposal. The Offices of Inspectors
General are fragile entities. They are not particularly popular
within their agencies. It's not that individuals run from them,
but it is rare that the Office of Inspector General employees
are greeted with great friendship and glory when they enter to
make their investigation or audit presence known.
Number three, Congress expected that the Inspectors General
be assertive. The mandate in the statute is actually extremely
broad, in terms of what the Inspector General--Inspectors
General are allowed to do. They're to inspect and audit and
examine, for the purpose of improving the economy and
efficiency of government, not just piling up statistics about
small-caliber fraud, waste, and abuse. They're to reach toward
the broadest agenda possible and maximize their impact
through--their activities through the powers that they were
given in the statute, which are significant.
Number four, the Congressional designers expected maximum
independence. This is, in fact, a lonely job. The individual
who serves as Inspector General must, at the--on the one hand,
have a strong relationship with the Administrator, but it must
be independent. Sad to say, there are very few ways in which
the Inspector General can forge the kind of close friendships
that we sometimes see envisioned without compromising the
appearance and/or substance of his or her behavior. And we have
to be careful about that. You might wish to play golf with the
Administrator, but you create the appearance, in doing so, of a
compromised freedom of investigation. And once that compromise
occurs, you can never get it back.
Number five expectation is integrity, that the individual
who serves has an impeccable reputation, that he or she is the
source of strong morale, a sense of esprit de corps within the
office, and a strong commitment to the most effective operation
possible. Through the exercise of independence, through the
assertiveness in using the wide range of responsibilities
embedded in the statute, this integrity becomes the essential
coin of the realm in the IG's performance.
I'd be delighted to talk with you further about these
expectations and how we get them through the appointments
process, or not, and will look forward to receiving your
questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Light follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul C. Light, Paulette Goddard Professor of
Public Service, Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service, New York
University
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this joint hearing
on the controversies surrounding the National Space and Aeronautics
Administration's Inspector General (IG), Robert Cobb. I am not an
expert on his case, but have studied the IG concept for twenty years,
and hope to provide a brief overview of the authorities and
expectations embedded in the 1978 Inspector General Act.
The current controversy surrounding Robert Cobb stems from
authorities and expectations embedded in that act. Passed against
nearly uniform Executive Branch opposition, the bill created Offices of
Inspector General (OIGs) in 12 departments and agencies, adding to the
two statutory OIGs that already existed--one in Health, Education, and
Welfare (about to be divided into the departments of Health and Human
Services and Education) and the other in Energy. By 1988, the concept
had been expanded to include the rest of the Federal Government,
including 33 small-entities. Subsequent expansions have created either
OIGs in 57 Federal establishments, some headed by Senate-confirmed IGs
and others led by Presidentially-appointed IGs.
The basic thrust of the IG Act, under which Mr. Cobb serves as a
Senate-confirmed appointee, was remarkably simple. On one level, it
consolidated what were then dozens of separate, often scattered audit
and investigation units into single operations headed by a Presidential
appointee. On another level, it created new expectations for economy
and efficiency in government through the appointment of IGs with
impeccable integrity and thoughtful leadership. Being an IG was always
to be an exceedingly difficult post, placing the occupant in the
sometimes precarious position of speaking truth to power at both ends
of Pennsylvania Avenue. But given enough resources and integrity, the
OIGs were to help rebuild trust in government through their aggressive
pursuit of accountability in all corners of their establishment.
Authorities
Compared to most of the bills that passed in 1978, the Inspector
General Act was almost invisible. Reorganizing the varied audit and
investigation units into single-headed Offices of Inspector General was
hardly the stuff of which major controversies are made. Nor was the IG
statute particularly complex--it lays out the responsibilities and
authorities of each OIG with clarity.
Yet, whatever its legislative history or complexity, there is no
question Congress gave the IGs unmistakably broad authorities. Under
statute, the IGs to provide direction for conducting audits and
investigations both including and relating to the programs and
operations of their establishments, they had a long list of ancillary
duties: review existing and proposed legislation and regulations for
impacts on economy and efficiency, coordinate relationships between the
department or agency and other Federal agencies, state and local
governments, and non-governmental entities, and, most importantly,
promote the general economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their
establishments.
Broad as this invitation is, what made the IG concept much more
significant was the decision to protect those new units through at
least three devices.
First, even though each IG was to be a Presidential appointee and
removable without cause, each was to be selected ``without regard to
political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law,
management analysis, public administration, or investigations.''
Further, each IG, not the President nor the head of the establishment,
was to appoint an Assistant IG for Audit and an Assistant IG for
Investigations, and each IG was given full authority to undertake
whatever audits and investigations he or she each deemed necessary to
improve economy and efficiency. There was to be no interference from
Congress or the President on the OIG's workplan or agenda.
Second, every IG was to have access to all ``information,
documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data
and documentary evidence'' needed for an audit or investigation, the
right to request assistance from within the agency and information from
across government, the authority to subpoena documents (but not
witnesses or testimony), the right to hire and fire staff, and ``direct
and prompt'' access to the Secretary or Administrator whenever
necessary for any purpose. Moreover, neither the head of the
establishment nor the second in command was to prevent or prohibit the
IG from ``initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or
investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any
audit or investigation.''
Third, every IG was bound by a two-fold, dual-channel reporting
requirement. One was a relatively simple semi-annual report to the head
of the department or agency. Automatically forwarded unchanged to
Congress within 30 days, each report was to include a description of
every significant problem, abuse, and deficiency the IG encountered in
the previous 6 months, as well as lists of recommendations and results.
The other was a so-called ``7 day letter'' report to the head of the
department or agency to be used only in the event of ``particularly
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies.'' This much
shorter report was also to be transmitted unchanged to Congress, but
within 7 days.
Expectations
As one might expect, Congress did not give these substantial
authorities without a strong sense that the IGs would be above reproach
in using them. Members of Congress spoke frequently about the need for
the highest commitment to faithful execution of the IG mandate, and the
hope that Presidents would take that faithful execution seriously in
the appointment of each IG, whether subject to Senate confirmation or
Presidential appointment without confirmation.
Reading through the record accompanying the Act and its twenty-five
years of implementation, one can discern at least five qualities that
Congress expected the IGs to meet:
1. Expertise: Congress clearly expected each IG to have
substantial knowledge of auditing and investigations, and made
that expectation clear in the demand for significant experience
in these areas. Although the list of qualifications allows for
the appointment of individuals who clearly share the
President's philosophical agenda, the focus was to be on
expertise in actually executing the duties of the office.
Simply put, Congress expected the IGs to be experts in their
field. For the most part, it is an expectation well met over
the years, in part due to consultation with leading IGs on
potential replacements. Under no circumstances was the IG post
to be a destination for the hard-to-place or under-qualified.
Although Congress did not expect the IGs to be rocket
scientists, whether literally or figuratively, it did expect
the IGs to be above reproach in their ability to direct the
high-impact work of their offices.
2. Leadership: Despite the substantial authorities for audit
and investigation, Congress understood that the OIGs would not
be the largest units in their establishments. Therefore,
Congress expected that the IG would provide the kind of
managerial leadership to generate the highest productivity and
esprit de corps from what would, and have been, relatively
small units. Under no circumstances would Congress have
embraced the appointment of an IG who would undermine the
productivity of his or her unit through employee abuse or
practices that in any way created a hostile work environment.
Members wanted the IGs to strengthen their offices, create
healthy working conditions, and build units stronger than the
sum of their parts. If the IGs encountered employees who were
under-performing, Congress expected the IGs to take direct
action to remove them from their posts. But above all, the IGs
were to leave their units stronger when they moved on to other
assignments. A hostile work environment was not just anathema
to effectiveness in the search for improved performance, it
would set an example for other units in the establishment. The
IG simply cannot create a situation in which his or her
employees lost faith in their leadership due to managerial
practices that undermine productivity.
3. Assertiveness: Congress clearly wanted the IGs to have
substantial freedom to follow their instincts in developing an
independent audit and investigation agenda. Toward that end,
they expected the OIGs to pursue any and every lead they wish,
allocate personnel where they felt the greatest returns would
be harvested, and be aggressive in tackling problems from the
top to the bottom of the establishment. Hence, they gave the IG
substantial authority to launch any audit or investigation
deemed responsible, and expected the IG to use his or her
judgment, and his or her judgment alone, to determine the OIGs
agenda.
These authorities were to be used to build an agenda that would
improve the economy and efficiency of the establishment.
Although the IGs must make tough choices about how to deploy
their OIG resources, they were to create the broadest impact
possible, including programmatic evaluations if necessary. They
were not to be mere fraud busters, though attacking fraud,
waste, and abuse was to be part of their agenda. They were also
to ask tough questions that others could or would not. Under
all circumstances, the OIGs were to be a safe harbor for
speaking truth to power on the broadest possible agenda. They
were not to be lapdogs, but watchdogs.
4. Independence: The IGs are not just any Presidential
appointees. Although they do serve at the pleasure of the
President, they are given substantial independence in their
work. Congress expected this independence to be guarded
aggressively. Under no circumstances was the IG to compromise
his or her independence by giving others in the establishment,
Congress, or the White House a determining voice in setting the
audit and investigation agenda. Thus, Congress expected the IGs
and their offices to be astutely independent. Although the OIGs
would clearly need the cooperation of the senior leadership of
their establishments to implement their recommendations for
improvement, they were not to create the appearance or reality
that the head of their establishment was somehow altering or
setting the course of the OIGs workplan.
Although this expectation clearly has costs to the IGs, not the
least of which is a degree of isolation from the senior
leadership team, most IGs have been able to handle the
expectation with ease. This has meant that the IGs must
maintain a sense of distance from any hint that the head of the
establishment has a direct say in the OIGs workplan--no golf
games, intimate lunches, even team-building retreats. And, in
the same spirit of independence, the senior leadership team
must maintain its distance from the OIG--no all-staff meetings
to scold the office, no memoranda outlining what the head of
the establishment wants in or out of the workplan, no sense
that the OIG is somehow beholden to the head of the
establishment or that it will be punished through staff and
budget cuts if it adopts a particular audit or investigation
strategy.
In a very real sense, IGs must isolate themselves from the
senior leadership team even as they try to cultivate a working
relationship that will allow them access when needed to assure
that the senior leadership team follows their recommendations
for action. After all, the vast majority of IG recommendations
involve administrative, not legislative action. Hence, the job
has been described as like straddling a barbed wire fence. But
this access cannot be distorted in such a way as to create the
appearance that the head of the establishment is somehow ``the
boss'' of the OIG, especially, but not exclusively, in setting
the OIGs agenda. That responsibility belongs to the IG, whose
ultimate boss is the taxpayer.
Presidents can remove IGs without cause, of course, implying
that Congress expected them to always remove IGs with cause,
including instances when the IG cedes his or her independence
to another actor. IGs are free to listen to all opinions
regarding their agenda perhaps, but not to create the
impression or reality that they are taking direction. To do so
would create an impossible dependence and cooptation that would
undermine their presence as an independent source of
recommendations to Congress and the President. It would also
severely compromise the IG's ability to investigate upward into
the executive suite of the establishment.
5. Integrity: Congress expected the IGs to be men and women of
impeccable integrity and honesty. Along with the exhortation to
maintain full independence, Congress hoped that the President
would make every effort to find individuals for appointment who
could be trusted with the authorities and mandate embedded in
statute. Although Congress did not create a special appointment
mechanism (such as the one used for the appointment of the
Comptroller General) or term of office (such as the fifteen
year term also governing the Comptroller General), it merely
assumed that Presidents would understand that the IGs had to
bring both the reputation and substance of integrity to their
posts. After all, they would be under constant watch by the
establishments they would audit and investigation, and could
not tolerate even the hint that they played favorites or
curried favor in their work. They had to be more than just
experts in auditing and investigation, they had be exemplars in
their behavior. Under no circumstances did Congress expect that
the IGs could be effective under a cloud of suspicion regarding
their integrity.
6. Courage: Finally, Congress expected the IGs and their
offices to be courageous in their work. The IGs and OIGs were
never going to be the most popular employees in their
establishment--Congress knew that many in their establishments
would oppose them, fear them, and work to undermine them. They
also knew that many in their establishments would fashion
arguments against OIG findings using every tool at their
disposal, sometimes stonewalling the OIG, other times using
gossip to undermine the IG as somehow less than effective or
independence.
Thus, the IGs had to show the courage of their convictions in
stating their intention to use their authorities to take any
course in meeting their mandate, even if that course led upward
to the highest levels of the agencies. Toward this end, the IGs
and their offices had to draw a bright line between informing
the head of the establishment of their workplan and letting the
head of the establishment determine their workplan. Under no
circumstances was the IG to create even the slightest
appearance that he or she had somehow delegated their
authorities upward for any reason.
As with so much that occurs in organizations, appearance is often
just as important as reality in affecting these kinds of expectations.
It may be that an IG can be best friends with the head of the
establishment, and still maintain independence, but the appearance is
created that the head of the establishment has a special voice in
setting the workplan. It may also be that the head of the establishment
can have a brass-tacks meeting with the OIG staff to explain what he or
she wants in or out of the workplan, and not intimate the office into a
cowering compliance, but the appearance is created that the head of the
establishment again has a special voice in determining the workplan.
In this regard, Congress clearly understood that the IG's
effectiveness would be determined in part by the head of the
establishment who could bully, intimate, cajole, and otherwise attempt
to influence the IG into following some leads and not others. Congress
also understood that some IGs might be tempted by the opportunity to
socialize with the head of the establishment as part of the normal give
and take of life in a highly stressful environment. But by NOT
insulating the appointments process with a special appointment
mechanism or term of office, Congress seemed to be saying that such
behavior would never occur if the basic qualifications for IG
appointment were meant. After all, what kind of auditor or investigator
would curry favor or socialize with those who might be committing
fraud, waste, and abuse? Not one who would be given the enormous
authorities and independence embedded in a statute such as the 1978
Inspector General Act.
Later Congresses also understood that the IG's effectiveness would
also depend on the protection of the Deputy Director for Management at
the Office of Management and Budget. This individual would act as a
buffer during moments of intense conflict between the IG and his or her
establishment, assure that appointments were the highest quality,
coordinate the IG community, protect budgets and employment, and serve
as a ``court of last resort'' in particularly difficult cases involving
questions regarding the competence and behavior of individual IGs. As
long as the Deputy Director for Management took these assignments
seriously, Congress saw no need for a government-wide inspector general
or new appointment mechanism. But, to the extent that the Deputy
Director of Management might be conflicted in this role--for example,
by playing a significant role in the selection of an IG in a previous
post--or ignore the role altogether, Congress may yet have to revisit
its earlier decisions.
Ultimately, however, the quality of an IG's work depends on his or
her own willingness to stand independent and courageous in the face of
inevitable opposition. Each IG must be willing to accept responsibility
for her or her behavior, and acknowledge when their independence has
been compromised, fairly or unfairly, and exit office gracefully, even
if the President of the United States has expressed support. It is up
to the IG to be a wise steward of the mandate and office he or she
oversees, and a wise steward of the tremendous authority he or she
wields. Absent a sense of personal integrity that might eventually lead
to his or her resignation, an IG cannot provide the leadership needed
to make the IG concept a success. Integrity simply cannot be legislated
or demanded through executive order. It must come from the individual
IG in those quiet moments of self reflection about duty. That is the
ultimate protection of the independence that is so essential for the
faithful execution of the 1978 Act.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Brian?
STATEMENT OF DANIELLE BRIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (POGO)
Ms. Brian. Chairmen Nelson, Gordon, and Miller, thank you
so much for inviting me to testify today.
My name is Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the
Project On Government Oversight, or POGO.
POGO is an independent nonprofit that has, for 25 years,
investigated and exposed corruption and misconduct in order to
achieve a more accountable Federal Government.
The subject of this hearing raises a number of very timely
issues. Inspector General offices play a tremendously important
role in advancing good government practices, but only if
they're led by independent and qualified IGs.
Next year will be the 30th anniversary of the 1978
Inspector General Act. This is the perfect time to
demonstrate--to determine the strengths, and possible
weaknesses, of the IG system, given the current investigations
into several IGs.
It is the independence from the agency the IG is overseeing
that gives the office its credibility. Not only the actual
independence, but also the appearance of independence, allows
the IG's stakeholders, including the Administrator, Congress,
the IGs, auditors and investigators themselves, and potential
whistleblowers, to have faith in the office. In this case, it
appears Inspector General Robert Cobb no longer enjoys that
credibility with any of the constituencies, other than the
Administrator's office.
Mr. Cobb disputes the basic facts in both cases that are
focused on by the PCIE. However, even if one were to discount
the two cases as inconclusive, there remains indisputable
evidence that Mr. Cobb simply does not understand the need to,
or even how to, remain at arm's-length from NASA's
Administrator. For example, he defends himself in his testimony
for today's hearing against these findings by, incredibly,
citing NASA Administrator Michael Griffin's approval of his
work as proof he should remain the NASA IG. That, in itself,
indicates how insensitive Mr. Cobb is to the problem. In fact,
Administrator Griffin should be the very last person he cites
as evidence of his independence.
Much has been made in the press of Mr. Cobb's golfing and
lunches with former NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, which are
disturbing, but are really just atmospherics if they are, by
themselves, the only instances of possible lack of
independence. But what you see, given the testimony you've
heard today and all the other pattern of behavior, is simply
breathtaking. It's untenable that, according to the PCIE
report, that Mr. Cobb has conferred with NASA's Administrator
and General Counsel on the scope and finding of his audits,
that he has, at least twice, delayed the execution of search
warrants, expressing concerns that NASA managers, or the staff
or vendors who were the targets, would be unhappy. He's even
asked, ``Are we going to be apologizing to them?''
In addition, while quantity does not equal quality, a
reduction of nearly 50 percent in the number of reports, audit
reports, means many topics are not receiving the attention they
would have under past NASA IGs. One possible reason for this
drop is the fact that Mr. Cobb disbanded the IG's Safety Audit
Team in the fall of 2005, only 2 years after the Columbia Space
Shuttle tragedy. The PCIE report indicates, and we heard
further testimony today to confirm this, that Mr. Cobb made it
clear to his staff he didn't believe they had the technical
knowhow to challenge NASA's engineers, despite the fact that
engineers were members of his staff. Given that the Columbia
Accident Board concluded that NASA's safety culture has eroded,
there may be no more important task for NASA's IG than safety
audits to prevent future tragedies.
A final example of Mr. Cobb's inability to protect the NASA
IG office from the appearance of a lack of independence is the
now-infamous all-hands meeting of all-IG staff held by
Administrator Griffin. Not only should the head of an agency
play no role in determining the work scope of the IG, but the
fact that the IG himself did nothing to stop him is further
evidence that Mr. Cobb clearly does not understand what it
means to be an IG. I can only imagine the impact on the morale
of the IG staff, and in particular on those whistleblowers who
were sitting in the room.
With this atmosphere, you can imagine the reception NASA
whistleblowers met when they go to the IG for help. Now, as
nearly half of the IG staff have left or were removed from
office, those whistleblowers, as well as staff leaving, have
come forward to Senator Nelson and the PCIE, revealing the
deeply troubled inner workings of their office, and alleging
that Mr. Cobb was turning a blind eye to the concerns of
external whistleblowers, as well as internal staff. Senator
Nelson should be congratulated for stepping in to assist these
insiders.
So, what should be done? The record reflects Mr. Cobb's
overriding sense of loyalty to NASA's image above a sense of
duty to the public and the Congress. POGO agrees with Chairmen
Nelson, Gordon, and Miller, as well as the PCIE, that Inspector
General Cobb has clearly demonstrated an appearance of a lack
of independence from NASA. It is because of this behavior that
I believe Mr. Cobb is unable to fulfill his role as an
Inspector General.
An opportunity will be missed, however, if Congress does
not look at this case in the broader context. During the Reagan
Administration, a small group of IGs from the PCIE recruited
and screened IG nominees. They then supplied lists of
candidates from which the White House could select. This peer
review was an important way to ensure that unqualified or
partisan people were not placed in the role of IG. The Congress
should consider recreating that model. Ultimately, however, it
is essential that Congress play a more active role in
overseeing the IGs the way these two committees are doing
today.
POGO is also beginning an investigation into the IG system
to determine if there are other ways to ensure these important
offices can meet their mission, and we look forward to
providing you with our findings when our investigation is
complete.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brian follows:]
Prepared Statement of Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project On
Government Oversight (POGO)
Chairmen Nelson and Miller, thank you for inviting me to testify
today. My name is Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the Project On
Government Oversight (POGO). POGO is an independent nonprofit that has,
for over 25 years, investigated and exposed corruption and misconduct
in order to achieve a more accountable Federal Government.
The subject of this hearing raises a number of timely issues.
Inspector General (IG) offices play a tremendously important role in
advancing good government practices, but only if they are led by
independent and qualified IGs. Next year will be the 30th anniversary
of the 1978 Inspector General Act. This is the perfect time to
determine the strengths and possible weaknesses of the IG system given
the current investigations into several IGs.
The intent of Congress in creating these watchdogs was to have an
office within agencies that would balance the natural inclinations of
agency or department heads to minimize bad news, and instead give
Congress a more complete picture of agency operations. That intention
is clearly shown by Congress' decision to break with tradition, and
create a dual-reporting structure where IGs would report not only to
the agency head but also directly to Congress itself.
It is this independence from the agency the IG is overseeing that
gives the office its credibility. Not only the actual independence, but
also the appearance of independence allows the IG's stakeholders,
including the Administrator, Congress, the IG's auditors and
investigators, and potential whistleblowers, to have faith in the
office. In this case, it appears Inspector General Robert W. Cobb no
longer enjoys that credibility with any of the constituencies other
than the Administrator's office.
Over the past year, POGO has held monthly bipartisan Congressional
Oversight Training Sessions for Capitol Hill staff. We regularly tell
participants that the IGs at agencies within their jurisdiction can be
important allies and sources of honest assessments. Unfortunately, we
also have to point out that not all IGs are qualified and independent.
In the case of NASA IG Cobb, current and former IG staff allege,
and the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE)
confirms, an abuse of power and the appearance of a lack of
independence. Mr. Cobb disputes the basic facts in both cases cited by
the PCIE.\1\ However, even if one were to discount the two cases as
inconclusive, there remains indisputable evidence that Mr. Cobb simply
does not understand the need to, or even how to, remain at arms length
from NASA's Administrator. For example, he defends himself against
these findings by citing NASA Administrator Michael Griffin's approval
of his work as proof he should remain the NASA IG. That, in itself,
indicates how insensitive Mr. Cobb is to the problem. In fact,
Administrator Griffin should be the last person he cites as evidence of
his independence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ One of the cases Mr. Cobb disputes involves the hacking of
sensitive computer data regarding NASA rocket engines, know as the ITAR
case. It is worth noting that, whether or not he was required to report
to the State Department in the ITAR case, numerous IG staff stated he
aggressively undermined the issuance of a report on it. Their
impression was that Mr. Cobb did not want to embarrass NASA. As a point
of comparison, the Department of Energy's Inspector General has issued
numerous reports about cases similar to the NASA computer hacking case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much has been made in the press of Mr. Cobb's golfing and lunches
with former NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, which are somewhat
disturbing. But those are really just atmospherics. From POGO's
perspective, there are far more troubling problems. It is untenable
that, according to the PCIE report, Mr. Cobb has on occasion conferred
with NASA's Administrator and General Counsel regarding the scope and
findings of his audits. Furthermore, Mr. Cobb at least twice delayed
the execution of search warrants approved by law enforcement,
expressing concerns that the NASA managers whose staff or vendors were
the targets would be unhappy. Mr. Cobb reportedly even asked, ``Are we
going to apologize to them?'' In response to questions from
investigators, Mr. Cobb confirmed that he would give the NASA
Administrator a heads up regarding impending search warrants. There is
no way of knowing what impact the disclosure of secret warrants had on
investigations.
Another problem is that, although IGs are given a wide latitude to
staff their offices, Mr. Cobb's frequent reorganization of the audit
section has made his office anything but more productive. Since he took
office, the number of audit reports has plummeted from an average of 51
reports annually to only 26 annually. While quantity does not equal
quality, a nearly 50 percent reduction in the number of reports means
many topics are not receiving the attention they would have in the
past. One possible reason for this drop is that Mr. Cobb disbanded the
IG's safety audit team in the fall of 2005--only 2 years after the
Columbia Space Shuttle tragedy. The PCIE report indicates that Mr. Cobb
made it clear to his staff that he did not believe they had the
technical know-how to challenge NASA's engineers, despite the fact that
engineers were members of his staff. Given that the Columbia Accident
Board concluded that NASA's safety culture has eroded, there may be no
more important task for NASA's IG than safety audits to prevent future
tragedies.
A final example of Mr. Cobb's inability to protect the NASA IG
Office from the appearance of a lack of independence is the infamous
all-hands meeting held by Administrator Griffin. At this meeting,
Administrator Griffin spoke to IG employees, with Mr. Cobb present, and
allegedly rebutted the findings of the PCIE report--findings based on
the allegations made by numerous IG employees. NASA Assistant IG for
Investigations Evelyn Klemstine testified before the House Science
Committee that Administrator Griffin's inappropriate directions to the
IG staff regarding the types of investigations and audits they should
be performing was in no way protested by Mr. Cobb. Administrator
Griffin allegedly went on to inform the IG staff that they shouldn't
bother with work that involved less than $1 billion in NASA funds--an
extraordinary threshold under any circumstances. Not only should the
head of an agency play no role in determining the work scope of the IG,
but the fact that the IG himself did nothing to stop him is further
evidence that Mr. Cobb clearly does not understand what it means to be
an IG--independence and the appearance of independence are everything.
I can only imagine the impact on the morale on the IG staff, and in
particular on those whistleblowers who were sitting in the room.
With this atmosphere, you can imagine the reception NASA
whistleblowers meet when they go to the IG for help. One whistleblower,
a NASA research pilot, refused to fly what he believed was an unsafe
aircraft, and was then was reassigned and grounded in apparent
retaliation. He reported his experience to the IG, only to be met with
inaction. Others found the same lack of action, or were simply
forwarded without investigation by the IG to the Office of Special
Counsel to be sentenced to a bureaucratic black hole.\2\ As nearly half
of the NASA IG staff left or were removed from the office, some of them
came forward to Senator Nelson and the PCIE revealing the deeply
troubled inner workings of their office, and alleging that Mr. Cobb was
turning a blind eye to their concerns. Senator Nelson should be
congratulated for stepping in to assist these insiders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ While it may be appropriate to refer a whistleblower case to
the Office of Special Counsel to determine whether a prohibited
personnel practice has occurred, it is also necessary for an IG
themselves to investigate whether there is a need for corrective action
regarding the underlying problem at the agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So what should be done? The record reflects Mr. Cobb's overriding
sense of loyalty to NASA's image above a sense of duty to the public
and Congress. POGO agrees with Chairmen Nelson and Miller, as well as
with the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), that
Inspector General Cobb has clearly demonstrated an appearance of a lack
of independence from NASA. It is because of this behavior that I
believe Mr. Cobb is unable to fulfill his role as an Inspector General.
An opportunity will be missed, however, if Congress does not look
at this case in the broader context. During the Reagan Administration,
a small group of IGs from the PCIE recruited and screened IG nominees.
They then supplied lists of candidates from which the White House could
select. This peer review was an important way to ensure that
unqualified or partisan people were not placed in the role of IG. The
Congress should consider recreating that model. Ultimately, however, it
is essential that the Congress play a more active role in overseeing
the IGs.
POGO is beginning an investigation into the IG system to determine
if there are other ways to ensure those important offices can meet
their mission. We look forward to providing you with our findings when
our investigation is completed.
Senator Nelson. Thank all of you for your testimony.
The House has a vote in progress. So, we're going to be
switching out. I want to call on Chairman Gordon, so that he
can ask a couple of questions, and then run to vote.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It'll only be
one.
Ms. Brian and Mr. Light, we appreciate you being here, and
your good testimony. I have but one question for you.
One of the facts that's clear from the sworn testimony
taken during the investigation of Mr. Cobb is that Sean O'Keefe
was allowed to make the decision to get rid of his old
Inspector General and choose his new one. He also had two key
staffers, including his chief of staff, brief Mr. Cobb on the
problems between his office and the Inspector General's office
that he wanted fixed. Mr. Cobb actually testified that he
thought, ``Hey, this was easy. You don't need to convince me.''
Professor Light and Ms. Brian, is that the way a President
should choose an Inspector General?
Ms. Brian. Certainly not. The entire purpose of the
Inspector General is that they are supposed to be there both to
oversee the agency on behalf of the Congress, and to make the
place honest and more accountable. And the fact that they're,
sort of, handpicked, and with those kinds of criteria, is
utterly unacceptable.
Chairman Gordon. It was widely understood, at the time,
that the decision to remove the incumbent Inspector General was
driven by a desire for more compliance among the future
Inspector General. The incumbent, at that time, was removed
summarily from office, which sent a signal that the
Administrator was looking for somebody more compliant. That
signal was well sent. Whether or not that signal was followed
is a subject for this group to examine, this combination of
committees to examine. But the way in which the outgoing IG was
fired, and the new IG was hired, create, in part, a sense that
this was all about getting somebody into the job who was
compliant. And that starts the appearance ball rolling.
Representative Feeney. Mr. Chairman, I'll probably be
leaving in a moment or two, but--I don't have any pressing
questions, but if it pleases the Chairman, I'd be happy to ask
one or two.
Senator Nelson. Please go ahead.
Representative Feeney. Well, thank you very much. And I
appreciate your hospitality, as my senior Senator.
Mr. Carrington, one of the incidents that is referred to is
the Texas Rangers' investigation into a missing ring. In his
testimony--in his written testimony, Mr. Cobb suggests that,
after some investigation, it turns out that there was never a
ring to be missing in the first place. Were you aware that--is
that the case, to your knowledge? Were you aware of this
investigation, about whether or not there was a ring that, in
fact, was missing?
Mr. Carrington. Yes, sir, I'm aware of it. The ring was
never conclusively established to not exist. I mean, there were
medical reports that determined--made a--made an assumption
that the item on the hand was not a ring. However, there were
witnesses that gave sworn statements to the Rangers that
reported that they found the--or they observed a ring on the
hand. How--so, it was never conclusive, either one way or the
other. But, again, it wasn't our investigation. We were
assisting them with coordinating with NASA and assisting them
with other matters. So, I was never--I felt at--based on what I
had seen, I wasn't sure whether or not it--they did or did not
have a ring.
Representative Feeney. You--so, you--to this day, based on
your review of the facts, you don't know whether there was a
ring in the first place, one way or the other.
Dr. Light, both you and Ms. Brian have been very consistent
in describing the appropriate role of the IGs, and how they
should be appointed, and how they should conduct themselves.
One thing that we haven't talked a lot about here is that in
your testimony you indicate that the IG should be independent
of influence--``any influence from above,'' is the way Ms.
Brian talks about, but you also talk about independent of any
pressure from the White House or, for that matter, from
Congress. And I guess the question is, What's the appropriate
role in Congress's oversight? Ms. Brian suggests we need to be
a lot stronger in overseeing all sorts of Inspector General
issues throughout the Government. Is there a danger, in your
opinion, that Congressional oversight of IGs, in and of itself,
if it's overzealous, could put some inappropriate pressures on
IGs in their role, and, in essence, sacrifice their
independence?
Dr. Light. It depends on the nature of the investigation.
An investigation of this nature, where you're examining the
independence of the IG, can only reinforce and strengthen IG
timber in making recommendations to you and the Administration
for action. There's intimidation of all kinds. If Congress were
to bring an IG in front of a subcommittee or a committee to
berate that IG for undertaking an audit or investigation, that
would have a chilling effect on the IG's independence. But I
don't see a history of that having been done.
Representative Feeney. Thank you.
And, with that, I really appreciate the Chairman's
indulgence, and, again, his hospitality. Thank you.
Ms. Brian. Sir, could I also--could I respond to the point
you were making there? I just wanted to make the point----
Senator Nelson. Please.
Ms. Brian.--of course, if there were overzealous oversight,
that would be a problem. I don't know that--I was not
suggesting overzealous oversight at all. And I do think it's
important--as Dr. Light was just suggesting, there's a big
difference between oversight of the quality of the work of an
office, rather than trying to direct a particular finding by an
IG, which, I think, of course, would be totally inappropriate
interference on the part of the Congress.
Senator Nelson. And I recall that one of you testified that
you think that some statutory change with regard to the initial
selection, so that it's a selection based on merit, as opposed
to personal friendship, would be appropriate. That is your
testimony.
Ms. Brian. That's right. That was the informal arrangement
during the Reagan Administration; and sometime, I think, in the
early 1990s, that fell out of practice, and I think that's
something important for the Congress to reconsider.
Dr. Light. There has been a proposal pending, before the
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, for a term
of office for the Inspectors General, which would be mainly
hortatory. I think the 30-year anniversary is an opportunity
for Congress to take a look at this concept and see whether
we've gone too far in the appointments process, politicized it
too much, what can we do to reverse it, so I encourage you to
encourage your colleagues on that committee to engage that
issue.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Herzog, you described two occasions
when Mr. Cobb asked you to delay the service of a search
warrant, once in December 2004, regarding a case at Stennis,
and again in June 2005, in a case at Marshall. Would you
describe those two incidences?
Ms. Herzog. Certainly.
In the instance in December 2004, I had just been at NASA
for a matter of weeks, if not days, and was more of an observer
than a participant until the discussion arose about whether or
not there was probable cause contained in the warrant. I came
into the situation at a time when Mr. Cobb had decided that the
agents should hold off on executing the warrant. He read the
affidavit, and, even after reading the affidavit, said, ``I
don't think there's a crime here.'' At that point, based on my
past experience--I have handled and litigated literally
countless search warrants--I tried to explain to Mr. Cobb that
an assistant U.S. Attorney, who was going to be responsible for
the prosecution of the case and litigating the search warrant,
reviewed the warrant, seemed--clearly was happy with the
warrant, and a magistrate judge signed it. I mean, a magistrate
judge found there was probable cause. And he asked his counsel
whether or not he thought there was probable cause, and his
counsel said, ``No, I don't think so.'' And, with all due
respect to his counsel--he's a very smart and learned man--he
has never litigated a search warrant or prepared a criminal
case in his life. It's kind of like asking an eye doctor to do
heart surgery. I mean, I don't answer questions I don't know
anything about. I believed, at the time, that I was the expert
in the room on criminal process and procedure. I thought that's
why I was hired, to deliver that--those skills to the office.
And, after a lot of conversation, Mr. Cobb finally allowed the
agents to go ahead.
It was embarrassing for the agents, because they were
conducting this investigation in concert with the FBI, and
there they were, you know, standing literally with a foot out
the door, ready to go execute the warrant, and they had to tell
the FBI agents, ``Our boss says we can't do this.''
The second instance was much more troubling. That search
warrant came in several days before Mr. Cobb saw it. At the
time that I finally had an opportunity to review it, he was out
of town. I had not even quite finished reviewing the warrant
when I got a call from the agent assigned to the case, saying
that the Assistant U.S. Attorney wanted to bring it to the
magistrate right then. There was an issue of timeliness in that
warrant, because the fellow's office that was going to be
searched was going to be changing jobs, and the agents wanted
to get into the office before he started packing up boxes and
perhaps destroying documents.
I personally delivered a copy of the warrant and affidavit
to the Deputy Inspector General, who was in town, and e-mailed
a copy to both he and Mr. Cobb. Mr. Cobb was out of town, and
could not open the warrant on his BlackBerry, because it was
sent encrypted. He and his deputy apparently had a rather
lengthy telephone conversation, and I was advised by his deputy
to expect a phone call at home that evening. I did--or,
actually, to call Mr. Cobb, which I did. And we had a rather
contentious telephone conversation about whether or not there
was probable cause for that warrant.
In both cases, one of his concerns was--and it's almost a
direct quote, ``What am I going to tell the center director
when he asks me what our guys are doing down there?'' And my
response is, ``How about, `Our job--we're doing our job,' and
it's really none of their business what we're doing there. It's
an enforcement activity.'' I asked if he was concerned that
these guys--you know, going in, in raid jackets and big guns.
It was clear he didn't know how search warrants were executed
when they were done on business premises in offices. I said,
``These guys are going to be going in plain clothes, maybe even
suits and ties, knocking on a door, `Here we are. We've got a
warrant to execute. Please remain outside while we do that.' ''
I mean, it was--it was, kind of, you know, Search Warrant 101.
The second instance, it appeared, in addition to Mr. Cobb's
concern that, you know, the agency might have trouble with the
warrant, ``Well, what if he's innocent?'' Well, that happens.
That's what happens in the criminal justice system. That's why
we have all of the safety and the controls that we have over
the system. It happens. ``Are we going to apologize to this
man?'' Well, no, we don't do that. Do U.S. Attorneys offices
apologize to people when they're acquitted? I don't think so.
At one point, I said to Mr. Cobb, ``Listen, this search
warrant doesn't say you can do this if you want to, do this if
you feel like it. It says, `You are commanded to execute this
warrant. This is a court order.' ''
Senator Nelson. Signed by a Federal magistrate judge.
Ms. Herzog. Signed by a Federal magistrate judge. At which
point, he said to me, ``You're telling me that there is never
an occasion when a warrant is not executed?'' And I said,
``Absolutely not.'' I mean, there are times--I've been involved
in cases, for example, when an informant has popped up at the
last minute, and the investigators have decided to stay covert,
so they go and explain that to the magistrate, and they say,
``Listen, you know, we've decided to stay covert, we're not
going to execute the warrant.'' Short of a situation like that,
I'm not aware of an agency just, you know, willy nilly yanking
a warrant.
When I described that process, Mr. Cobb said, ``Well, then
I want you to call the assistant U.S. Attorney and have the
assistant U.S. Attorney get that warrant pulled.'' He left the
room to go into his office. I don't know for what. When he came
back, he was off that topic, luckily for me, because that would
have been my last act there.
It was one of the most exhausting and painful conversations
I have had in my professional life. It was just a horrifying
exercise, and----
Senator Nelson. In your experience, as a prosecutor or in
an office of an inspector general, is it a practice that you've
seen before for management to delay action on a search warrant
after the warrant has been signed by a judge?
Ms. Herzog. I have personally never known that to happen,
at--you know, other than the exceptions I've described.
Senator Nelson. Is it common practice for search warrants
to require approval by the IG himself? Is that a common
practice?
Ms. Herzog. It's not a practice at the agency I currently
work at, which is an Inspector General's office, and I don't
know whether it's a practice at other IGs. And, up until these
two instances, it was not a practice at the NASA Inspector
General's office.
Senator Nelson. Putting on your prosecutorial hat, as an
assistant U.S. Attorney do you think that Mr. Cobb's actions
could be construed as obstruction of justice?
Ms. Herzog. I think, particularly with regard to the second
warrant, but for my involvement in the case, the warrant would
not have proceeded, and that would have been an obstruction of
justice.
Senator Nelson. Did the delay in serving those warrants
affect either of the cases being investigated?
Ms. Herzog. It definitely did not affect the first case,
and I do not believe it affected the second case, but I'm not
sure.
Senator Nelson. In one of the incidences, someone was
moving out of their office, that search warrant, if it had been
delivered immediately, would have prevented those records from
being packed up?
Ms. Herzog. Yes. Well, because we don't know what--if
anything else was there 3 days earlier, when the warrant should
have been executed, we really don't know whether we lost
anything. It's a possibility, but I don't think the agents ever
determined whether or not they actually missed anything.
Senator Nelson. Do you have an opinion as to why Mr. Cobb
wanted to block those search warrants?
Ms. Herzog. I think primarily--he was primarily concerned
with the reaction of the center directors at the centers where
those warrant were to be executed. That was an overriding
concern. He also, with the second warrant, believed that
somehow this was an exercise wherein people were out to get
him, ``They're rubbing this in my face,'' he said,
``They're''--you know, ``They're doing this again to rub it in
my face.'' And he thought that I delayed telling him about the
search warrant for the same reason.
Chairman Miller? And then I will go to you, Senator
McCaskill.
Representative Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The House is having two votes, and I believe that they will
be the first two. They're both procedural issues. I think
they'll be the first two that I will have missed, this
Congress, but I wanted to stay here for this. I may need you to
sign a note to my constituents, however.
[Laughter.]
Representative Miller. I do ask unanimous consent to enter
a packet of documents into the record.
Senator Nelson. Without objection.
Representative Miller. OK.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
The following documents are in the Appendix of this Hearing:
1. August 15, 2003, letter from Hon. Robert W. Cobb to Hon. Sean
O'Keefe entitled ``Subject: Observations on the Independence of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board.''
2. Policy and Procedures for Exercising the Authority of the
Integrity Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency, April 24, 1997.
3. Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General,
dated October 2003.
4. Excerpts from Semiannual Report, Office of Inspector General,
NASA, September 30, 2004 (pp. 1-5).
5. Excerpts from transcript of interview of Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
conducted by Office of Inspector General, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, June 27, 2006 (pp. 40, 44, 54, 78, 94, 98, 104, 106,
114, 125).
6. Excerpts from Record of Investigation of Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
Office of Inspector General, NASA, August 30, 2006 (pp. 49-54, 59, 140-
142, 195-197, 206-217, 222-225, 231, 266-271).
7. Report in the form of a letter dated January 22, 2007, from
James H. Burrus, Jr., Chair, Integrity Committee to Hon. Clay Johnson
III, Chairman, Integrity Committee, President's Council on Integrity
and Efficiency.
Representative Miller. They have been reviewed by both the
majority and the minority staff.
First, Ms. Herzog, Mr. Carson, Mr. Carrington, Mr. Cobb has
said in his testimony that the HUD Inspector General invited
anyone to come forward who had anything bad to say about Mr.
Cobb. He complained bitterly about the procedures of the HUD
Inspector General, and the PCIE report, generally. Were you
invited to come forward and make complaints, or did you step
forward on your own?
Mr. Carson. I was contacted by the HUD OIG, and mentioned
that they wanted to interview me as part of--that my name had
come up in several conversations with other people that had
been interviewed, and they wanted to talk to me as part of the
investigation.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Harrington--Carrington? Excuse me.
Mr. Carrington. Yes. No, sir, I was not invited. I was
contacted and asked to speak.
Representative Miller. OK.
How about you, Ms. Herzog?
Ms. Herzog. The HUD investigators contacted me.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Cobb also says that the staff was unhappy with him
because he was insisting upon higher standards for the Office
of the Inspector General. Do you agree with that? Do you agree
that the standards set by Mr. Cobb were higher?
Ms. Herzog?
Ms. Herzog. No. I don't think they were higher at all, and
I'm not sure what the standards were. In fact, whenever reports
or documents were prepared, and Mr. Cobb was unhappy with them,
if any of us tried to get from him what it was he was looking
for--you know, ``What is it you want?''--his response was,
``I'll know it when I see it.''
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Carson and Mr. Carrington, did you think the standards
in the OIG's office were higher under Mr. Cobb, or lower under
Mr. Cobb?
Mr. Carson. Having spent almost 16 years there in a very--
the organization was very professional, very responsive to the
concerns of the Congress when we had special requests--I
believe the standards were lowered.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Carrington. Yes, sir.
Representative Miller. Mr. Carrington?
Mr. Carrington. I think that--I recall that he did have
high standards. I won't doubt him there. He--but the
standards--the bar was set so high, it was impossible to reach,
to the point where things didn't happen. I recall him saying,
``I don't go into a--any type of issue without four aces in my
hand.'' And so, we were never going to reach the standard that
he had set for me.
Representative Miller. OK.
A lot of the testimony from the three of you in particular
has been with--going to the personal abusive relationship that
Mr. Cobb had with his staff. There are people like that in the
world. Some of them become bosses. Many people have worked for
bosses who appear to go through life on full flame, as appears
to be the case with Mr. Cobb, but are still able to get their
work done. Was this different? Were you able to get your work
done, or did his conduct interfere with getting the work done?
And how?
Ms. Herzog, you can start.
Ms. Herzog. I think, at least, I was able to get my work
done eventually. I did find those occurrences disturbing, and,
at times, particularly on the last occasion, when he
practically came across the table at me, I took the next day
off of work. I mean, I was shaking when I walked out of his
office. It was horrible. And I have to say, I've been yelled at
by the best of them. You know, I have appeared in Federal court
before judges who, lawyers like to commonly say, think they're
the closest thing next to God, maybe other than Congresspeople.
[Laughter.]
Representative Miller. We don't hold a candle to judges.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Herzog. And, you know, I've had my life threatened,
I've been in protective custody, I've been stalked by a man
that I prosecuted. I have been under all kinds of stress and in
stressful situations. I have never experienced anything like
what I experienced when Mr. Cobb went on one of his--I hesitate
to call them ``rampages,'' but----
Representative Miller. OK. I know my time is about to
expire, but Mr. Cobb apparently told the staff, and told the
HUD IG, and has told our staff, in looking into this matter,
that he wanted a collaborative relationship with the management
of NASA, that he believed he would get the recommendations of
the IG's office implemented--he'd be more likely to get them
implemented if he had a cooperative, collaborative
relationship, if he were a part of the team. Then that seems to
be very much contrary to what Ms. Brian and Dr. Light have said
is what Congress intended in the Inspector General Act of 1978,
but was it your experience that the recommendations of the IG's
office got implemented more readily because of Mr. Cobb's good
relationship with Mr. O'Keefe or others?
Mr. Carson. In my case, in the safety directorate, our
reports were being rewritten, changed, revised; rewritten,
changed, revised. The process was to the point of being insane.
We couldn't even get recommendations or reports out the door
that we had previously never had an issue with, as I mentioned
in my statement. Two times, Report of the Year, special
requests from the Safety and Mission Assurance Associate
Administrator, from this committee, from the House Science
Committee, and we couldn't even get reports out the door.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Carrington?
Mr. Carrington. The--ours was a little different, and I
used a different process when getting reports out. The IG Act
required us to notify the Department of Justice, the Attorney
General. So, when allegations came in, we immediately started
working with them and in joint cases with the FBI. And so, our
cases took a little different--our reports took a little
different road. So, anything that did come through, you know,
the--it was very difficult to get the report out in any
possible timeframe.
Representative Miller. Ms. Herzog?
Ms. Herzog. I, for most of the time I was there, worked for
Mr. Carrington. And, at the time he left and I was acting, I
tried to implement some procedures that made it a little easier
and may--actually ended up over-complicating things, because
they were not quite accepted at face value. I really don't have
an answer to that question.
Representative Miller. OK.
Just one more--Mr. Carson, in your testimony before the HUD
IG, you described the relationship with Mr. Cobb, Mr. O'Keefe,
and Mr. Pastorek----
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Representative Miller.--as the ``Holy Trinity.'' What was
the origin of that phrase? Was that your phrase?
Mr. Carson. No, it wasn't my phrase. It was a phrase that I
had heard used by various officials and employees in NASA
headquarters that referred to those three as the ``Holy
Trinity.''
Representative Miller. What----
Mr. Carson. No, I did not originate that. That was just
something I had heard numerous times.
Representative Miller. What did it mean?
Mr. Carson. What did it--it meant that basically everything
in the agency went through those three individuals.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Carson. The--you know, that the--it was inferred that
they ran the agency.
Representative Miller. Mr. Herzog, did you hear that
phrase? And what did you understand it to mean?
Ms. Herzog. Well, I never actually knew what the ``Holy
Trinity'' was. I'm Jewish.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Herzog. It wasn't in my repertoire. But I did
understand that it meant--I believed it meant the people in
power, and aligned in power.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Carrington?
Mr. Carrington. Yes. I'm Catholic, so I----
[Laughter.]
Representative Miller. You know very well what it means.
Mr. Carrington.--I know what it means. And it was a--I had
heard the reference before, and it was not by our people at the
IG's office. I heard it from NASA employees. I had a large
source network of NASA employees, and they would refer to the
group, the three, as the ``Holy Trinity,'' because they had
such a close relationship that if you talked--if one said
something, the other one would know immediately.
Representative Miller. OK.
Mr. Carrington, you mentioned frequently working with the
FBI and U.S. Attorneys office as part of your role in the IG's
office. Did the assistant U.S. attorneys that you were working
with come to different conclusions about the same information
in the course of those investigations?
Mr. Carrington. Different conclusions than the Inspector
General--than Mr. Cobb?
Representative Miller. Right.
Mr. Carrington. Yes. Mr. Cobb had--has a lot of experience
in the area of conflict of interest and ethics, from his
background, and so, he knows that pretty well, and probably
better than a lot of prosecutors, because those cases don't
really get prosecuted that often. And I recall one instance in
Norfolk, down there, where Mr. Cobb actually felt that there
was a violation--a technical violation, and the U.S. Attorney's
office didn't agree with him, and--because they were looking at
it from a prosecutor perspective. So, in that instance, there
were disagreements. He--on other areas, where he didn't have
that background or expertise, he didn't see things the same way
as the prosecutors, so there were a lot of differences. And, in
some instances, he would say, ``Get him on the phone, let me
talk to him right now.'' And--which, you know, my experience
with IGs, is not a normal thing that happens.
Representative Miller. Did he ever say he could, or did, go
over their heads?
Mr. Carrington. Yes, sir. He--in particular, the one in
Norfolk, he told the senior prosecutor there, the supervisor,
that he could go over his head, he could go to the U.S.
Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia. And the
prosecutor said, ``Yes, you can. And what's going to happen is,
the U.S. Attorney's going to call me, and I'm going to tell him
the same thing, and that's going to be the end of it.''
Representative Miller. How about to Mr. Gonzales? Did he
ever say he could call Alberto Gonzales?
Mr. Carrington. He would just make references, that I
recall, that, you know, he had worked for Mr. Gonzales, and
then this--Mr. Gonzales was a friend of his, and that he could
call--you know, go all the way to the top in the Department of
Justice.
Senator Nelson. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill is the former elected auditor of the
State of Missouri.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for calling this hearing today.
I just don't know where to start. I've spent all of my
adult life as either a prosecutor or an auditor, and I
understand the difference between the two roles. It doesn't
appear to me that Mr. Cobb understood the difference between
the two roles, and that an auditor's job--I just can't fathom
an auditor second-guessing a court order of a search warrant.
You cooperate with law enforcement. Your job is to provide them
information. Your job is never to try to second-guess
professional law enforcement work.
In the time I have with this panel, there are so many
questions I would like to ask all of you, but I'd like to focus
for a minute on Mr. Carson. You remind me of some of the career
auditors that I was fortunate enough to encounter when I took
the job as State Auditor. You've been--27 years, you've been
doing this, under a variety of different administrations, and
I'm willing to bet, knowing auditors like I know auditors, that
you saw your job as your job, regardless of who is in charge in
Washington, at that given moment in time.
I want to congratulate you on the work you did as it
related to safety. I can imagine no higher calling as an
auditor than to be tasked with the responsibility of safety
audits as it relates to the NASA program. I have such respect
for the Chairman because of the work he's done in this area,
and the heart of this Nation breaks when we lose people in the
NASA program because of safety issues. And so, I congratulate
you on that work.
And I would like to specifically ask you that, in your
testimony--and I'm sorry I missed it; I was on the floor, on
the immigration bill--but you quote, several times, some
things, and I'm curious if these are your recollections or if
you took notes, as it related to some of the things that Mr.
Cobb said to you, relating to his refusal to issue audit
reports that you had done in this important area.
Mr. Carson. Personal notes--I had notes, but when I left
NASA, I basically left everything in my office. I wasn't about
to take anything out of there, except for some copies of
documents that, you know, I thought may come in handy one day.
The workpaper files for these audits, I believe the staff
of--my staff papered the files with reports that weren't
issued, review comments, you know, information like that, that
would support everything I've said, as far as not issuing
reports.
Now, some of the comments, no, they're just things I'll
never forget.
Senator McCaskill. Well, obviously, ``Anybody can perform
an audit'' is one that would stick in my mind.
Mr. Carson. Right. And that was a common--that was a common
statement. And----
Senator McCaskill. ``Something for auditors''--I mean,
calling the Yellow Book ``something that auditors can hide
behind''----
Mr. Carson. Right.
Senator McCaskill.--is jaw-dropping, from an IG.
Mr. Carson. And we were----
Senator McCaskill. That, in and of itself, is absolutely
completely incomprehensible, that an IG in the U.S. Government
would call the Yellow Book something for auditors to hide
behind. Are you confident that that is what he said, Mr.----
Mr. Carson. Oh, absolutely.
Senator McCaskill.--Carson?
Mr. Carson. Absolutely.
Senator McCaskill. And him saying that, ``Your safety
audits had produced nothing of value to the agency''--I look
forward to reviewing those audits in detail. I have not. And,
you know, one of the frustrating things for auditors is when
they do good work, is worrying if anybody ever reads the whole
thing. And I know you all relate to that.
I'm particularly concerned by his unilateral decision to
not issue audit product. That is a huge decision for the head
of an audit agency to make. First of all, it wastes taxpayer
dollars, because when the audit work has been done, the
taxpayers have spent a lot of money. So, if in fact, there is
some reason for an audit report not to be issued, there should
be some documentation of that by the head of that audit agency
as to why that audit was not issued. Were you ever given, or,
to your knowledge, did Mr. Cobb ever prepare, a written
document that laid out why an audit report that had been
completed was not issued by your agency?
Mr. Carson. No. But there is--there would be evidence in
the working-paper files of what--like in my written testimony,
I talked about the audit reports that became e-mails or
unofficial e-mails to NASA officials late at night. We do have
that. But, no, never any written reason why. That's why, in
my--in my testimony, when I talk about, a year into the review
of the organizational recommendations of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, my staff had written three reports
addressing the way NASA was going about implementing straight-
line safety and mission assurance, straight-line funding, and
independent technical engineering authority, and I go to a
monthly directorate update with Mr. Cobb, and he says to me,
``You've worked on this for over a year, and you've got nothing
to show for it.'' And, I'm sorry, but, at that point, I had to
defend the work done by my staff, and I said, ``We've
issued''--or, ``We've written three different reports,
talking--making recommendations about that, and they were never
issued.''
Senator McCaskill. And let me also follow up on that,
because I understand, from your testimony, that you believe, or
you have knowledge, that he was calling the administrators of
your agency prior to a draft of the report? So, this wasn't a
review of a draft, but that he was checking in with the top
management of the----
Mr. Carson. Well, that----
Senator McCaskill.--agency----
Mr. Carson.--was the general counsel, yes.
Senator McCaskill.--with the general counsel.
Mr. Carson. Yes. On----
Senator McCaskill. In your 27 years of working as an
auditor, have you ever known of the head of an audit agency to
call the auditee with feedback prior to a draft of the audit?
Mr. Carson. No. No, absolutely not.
Senator McCaskill. I mean, that is a violation of Yellow
Book government auditing standards, isn't it?
Mr. Carson. Well, it's definitely a violation of the
independence standard, I would say.
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely. Absolutely. Was there ever
any attempt on the part of Mr. Cobb to understand that he was,
should be subjected to the Yellow Book standards part of an
audit organization? Did he understand that, in his role as head
of the audit organization, that he was, in fact, an auditor,
himself?
Mr. Carson. Early on, we did try to--and I know my boss at
the time did try to bring up--you know, in our senior staff
meetings on the audit side, he would talk about expressing
concern about Yellow Book and professional audit standards.
And, you know, it was relayed to all the managers in the
organization, that we ``use that as a crutch to hide behind.''
Senator McCaskill. Dr. Light, is there anything specific
that exempts IGs from Yellow Book? For people who don't know
the Yellow Book is, in fact, like the Code of Professional
Responsibility for government auditors. Is there anything that
exempts IGs from having to respect the provisions of the Yellow
Book standards of government auditing?
Dr. Light. Nothing whatsoever.
Senator McCaskill. And is there anything that specifically
directs them to be subject to the Yellow Book standards of
professional government auditing?
Dr. Light. Highest professionalism possible. It's embedded
in, and applied in, the statement of qualifications in the IG
Act itself. I don't think Congress felt, at the time, that it
had to say ``abide by the Yellow Book.''
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Dr. Light. That's just--you know, beyond required.
Senator McCaskill. Kinda like brushing your teeth.
Dr. Light. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Yes.
Dr. Light. ``The sun will come up in the morning'' kind
of----
Senator McCaskill. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Light, in Exhibit Number 2, which is
the Integrity Committee's finding with respect to the abuse of
authority, what effect does such conduct have on the
effectiveness of an Inspector General?
Dr. Light. You know, I've been thinking about this as we've
been going through the--this conversation today. The most
powerful product of an IG and the OIG is the deterrence effect
of their work. That's where the independence and the integrity
really works its will so that people understand that there is
an independent place to go, a safe harbor for whistleblowers,
and that there is a consequence for malfeasance and
misfeasance. This is where this kind of behavior would have had
its most pernicious impact, in reducing the sense, among NASA
employees and contractors--and if you have to decide what that
exposure is, in terms of risk--their sense that they would be
held accountable for what they did or did not do. I think
that's where the effect is most pronounced.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Carson, I have a series of questions
for you.
On the Space Shuttle, there is a Destruct System that is
redundant, so there are two. And it is the awesome
responsibility of an Air Force officer at the Cape Canaveral
Air Force Station, should that Space Shuttle go off of its
intended trajectory and head toward a populated area, such as
very nearby Cocoa Beach or Titusville, Daytona Beach, that that
safety officer has the responsibility of destructing. The
launch criteria is, both the primary and the backup have to be
working. That's the launch criteria.
Now, you handled an investigation into the status of the
Range Safety Systems during the June 5, 2002, launch of the
Space Shuttle. What did your inquiry determine?
Mr. Carson. Senator, I received the--it was actually a
referral. The Air Force had looked into it, and then had
referred it to the NASA OIG, our Office of Investigations, and
it was a potpourri of issues about the Command Destruct System,
the procurement of the Command Destruct System, but they
referred it over to us after closing it out. They gave it to
our Office of Investigations, who determined there was no
criminal activity. And Lance--Mr. Carrington's group referred
it to me as a safety issue, because of the--the Command
Destruct System was nonoperational.
I had an Air Force officer assigned to my safety group who
had been an investigator on the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, came to work for me after the Board had released its
final report, and spent a 2-year detail. We got the referral in
2004, and the officer who worked for me started doing some
interviews, investigating down at the Cape. He and I went down
in January 2005; we met with NASA, determined that everything
we heard, that the mission flight control officer and the chief
of safety for the Air Force were both no-go for that launch,
and were overruled by the range commander.
Senator Nelson. That was as a result of a 2-year
investigation, and that's what the report stated.
Mr. Carson. No, the 2-year--no. We only had it for a couple
of--we got it 2 years after--NASA OIG got involved with it 2
years after the actual incident itself. But nothing had been
done, apparently, to that point. The Air Force gave it to us
and said, ``You may want to look at the launch safety issues.''
Senator Nelson. OK. So, what happened?
Mr. Carson. We investigated. The Air Force officer working
for me and I went down to Cape in--to the Cape in January 2005.
We met with NASA safety officials, we--everyone we talked to,
it was unprecedented that a chief of safety and a mission
flight control officer would be--were no-go for launch, but
were overruled. So, we talked to the NASA folks. NASA folks had
a representative in the range. The NASA firing room and the
range are two different facilities. NASA had a safety official,
knew something was going on, but never communicated to the
launch control center that there was an issue with the go--the
Command Destruct System on the range. When it--when the final
poll came around, the range commander said they were go for
launch, overruling the two safety officials, and the launch
took place, with an--with a nonoperational backup Command
Destruct System.
We came back. We met with NASA officials. We told them what
the issue was. They agreed. We said we were going to make a
recommendation that NASA put a safety official on the
communication link in the range operations control center. That
was going to be our recommendation. We came back--NASA was in
complete agreement with us, the safety folks down at Kennedy.
We came back in February 2005, we briefed Mr. Cobb, and, at
that meeting, he said, ``Let the Air Force handle it.''
Senator Nelson. So, at the end of the day, did NASA's
Office of the Inspector General release any report on the
findings to NASA management?
Mr. Carson. Senator, I left NASA about 3 weeks later, and,
to my knowledge, I have never seen anything related to that
issue.
Senator Nelson. Did your organization conduct an audit of
NASA's compliance with the recommendations of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board report?
Mr. Carson. Yes, we did. We conducted a number of audits
and inspections related to all the recommendations in the
Columbia accident report.
Senator Nelson. And what was the ultimate disposition of
that case?
Mr. Carson. I've--I left the NASA--I left NASA before the
final report was ever issued, if there was a final report ever
issued.
Senator Nelson. So, we don't know if the findings that NASA
was not--you do not have personal knowledge that NASA was not
implementing the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
recommendations.
Mr. Carson. No, I don't.
Senator Nelson. OK.
Let me flip it to you, Chairman Miller.
Representative Miller. Thank you, Chairman Nelson.
Senator McCaskill asked about Yellow Book standards, which
I'm not sure the average person would know anything about, but
Senator McCaskill, based on her professional background, knows
very well, and is shocked by, the deviation--the flagrant
deviation from those standards, and asked if the standards for
the Inspector General were different from those standards
expected of auditors, generally.
Are any of you familiar with the Quality Standards for
Federal Offices of Inspector General, which I held up before,
in the opening statement?
Ms. Herzog. Yes, sir.
Representative Miller. OK. And these standards are issued,
pursuant to an executive order, to provide professional
standards, standards of conduct, for an Inspector General. Is
that correct? The statute itself has the purpose of
establishing independent and objective units within each
agency, the Inspector General's office. These standards say
that, ``objectivity imposes an obligation to be impartial,
intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.
Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without
independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is
impaired.'' Is that your understanding, all of you, of the
obligations of an Inspector General?
Ms. Brian. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carrington. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Ms. Herzog. Yes, sir.
Representative Miller. OK. Under the provisional
independence, again, it says that, ``the opinions, conclusions,
judgments, and recommendations of an Inspector General should
be impartial, and be viewed as impartial, by knowledgeable
third parties.'' And then it discusses impairments, what may
detract from the independence, both actual and apparent, and it
says that, ``personal impairments--personal impairments of
staff members result from the relationships and beliefs that
cause OIG staff members to limit the extent of an inquiry,
limit disclosure, or weaken the--or slant their work in any
way. OIG staff are responsible for notifying the appropriate
officials within the organization if they have any personal
impairments to independence.''
Now, we've heard testimony from the three of you with
respect to this particular case. We've got a voluminous record
from the IG of HUD. We've had staff interviews. And what we
understand is that Mr. Cobb met or played golf frequently with
the NASA Administrator, Sean O'Keefe, met him in his office for
drinks, went to lunch with him on a regular--on a weekly basis,
frequently in the NASA cafeteria, so other employees saw them
there, the three of them--Mr. O'Keefe, Mr. Pastorek, and Mr.
Cobb--and that he sent audits, reports, to Mr. O'Keefe and
others for their review before issuing them, and changed things
that they didn't like.
Does that meet the requirement of independence? Is that a
personal impairment?
Ms. Brian?
Ms. Brian. Yes, it certainly is an impairment.
Representative Miller. Does it violate these standards, in
your judgment?
Ms. Brian. I don't think there's any question that it does.
Representative Miller. Dr. Light?
Dr. Light. Same. Same answer. It is an impairment, and it
violates those standards.
Representative Miller. The standards of professional
conduct----
Dr. Light. Right.
Representative Miller. And these are issued by the PCIE
which includes all the Inspectors General, themselves. So, this
is the view of Inspectors General of what their professional
obligations are. Is that correct?
Dr. Light. That's correct. I mean, you know, on one level
it seems so small. You know, lunch at the cafeteria, or maybe
the Administrator gives the IG a couple of mulligans on the
golf course, whatever. It seems so small. But the appearance
effect in the agency as a whole, to whistleblowers and others,
that there may be some sort of clear relationship between the
agenda for auditing and investigation and the personal
relationship is enough to destroy the integrity of the office,
in terms of its creating the deterrent effect that it aims to
create.
Representative Miller. Ms. Brian, you're shaking your head.
Ms. Brian. No, and I--and I'm just thinking, that,
certainly in the context of all the other activities, of
checking with them--if the staff were aware that he's checking
with them on the scope of what audits should be even before
they're begun, I mean, those kinds of things are just
unimaginable to professional staff at IGs.
Representative Miller. OK.
To the ordinary person without a professional background,
there probably is a sense of, ``What's the problem with going
to play golf with someone? What's the problem with meeting
someone from work for drinks? What's the problem with going to
dinner with someone, or lunch with someone, from work?'' But
that's not the expectation of the Inspector General.
Ms. Brian. That's correct. And, as I said in my testimony,
those are, sort of, atmospherics. At one level, if that were
the only thing happening, I think the golf may not have
happened all that often--I think, a couple of times--but if
that's all that had happened, that may not merit the kind of
concern that the Congress has, at this point. But, when you put
it in the context of all the other activities, that's when I
think it becomes overwhelming.
Dr. Light. One IG once described this job as being like
straddling a barbed-wire fence, it's extremely difficult to do.
And it does impose on the auditor or the IGs, you know, an
isolation, a posture that is not comfortable at all in one's
day-to-day work, but that requires a courage and perseverance
that goes beyond, sort of, the personal gratifications of
socializing and so forth. You just have to keep that in mind as
you look at these things, as the effect on the professionalism
of the staff.
Representative Miller. OK. And the description that Mr.
Cobb made of wanting to have a good relationship, wanting to
ingratiate himself with Mr. O'Keefe so that he could get his
recommendations accepted and implemented, is that consistent
with these standards and your understanding of what the
professional obligations of an Inspector General are?
Dr. Light. It is the IG's ultimate goal to see the
recommendations of audits and investigations turned into
action. That does not require ingratiation. That requires
respect and integrity among all parties. One of the people
we're not talking about at depth here is the Administrator and
what he sought to accomplish through this relationship. We
haven't talked about the deputy director of OMB for management,
who has a role, governmentwide, to protect the Inspectors
General from undue influence. So, you know, there is a desire
to have your recommendations adopted, and you want to have a
good professional relationship with the leadership team, but,
under no circumstances do you give away your independence. Your
recommendations are adopted because they're the right thing to
do, not because you're friends or pals with the Administrator.
Representative Miller. OK.
Ms. Brian. I would concur. I mean, basically, you get your
recommendations implemented because of the strength, the power
of the information that you have, and the respect you have for
it, not because of your friendship.
Representative Miller. In these standards, there is also a
discussion of external impairments. External impairments to
independence occur when the OIG staff is deterred from acting
objectively and exercising professional skepticism by
pressures, actual or perceived, from management and employees
of the reviewed entity or oversight organizations.
Impairments include external interference or influence that
could improperly or imprudently limit or modify the scope of
OIG work, or threaten to do so, including pressure to reduce,
inappropriately, the extent of work performed in order to
reduce costs or fees.
Again, asking the management what they want to investigate,
running drafts by them before publishing drafts, editing it
based upon their concerns, is that an external impairment?
Ms. Brian. There's no doubt. And the fact that, even after
the Congress has begun its investigation, to allow the
Administrator to come in and speak to the----
Representative Miller. Well----
Ms. Brian.--entire IG staff, and----
Representative Miller. That was my----
Ms. Brian.--during that conversation, minimize the findings
of the PCIE, which is problematic in itself, but then starts--
tells them what he thinks they should do, including only doing
investigations that involve $1 billion of savings, with the IG
sitting there, and allowing it, to me, is absolute evidence
that he simply doesn't really understand the problem at all.
Representative Miller. OK. That was actually my next
question, but that's OK.
Dr. Light, would you agree with Ms. Brian's----
Dr. Light. I think we're in close agreement on pretty much
everything here.
Representative Miller. OK. With respect both to asking in
advance, exchanging e-mails----
Dr. Light. You know----
Representative Miller.--sending e-mails about----
Dr. Light.--you develop your agenda for the office from
conversation and from observation. It's not, you know,
unacceptable to talk to the Administrator about what you intend
to do, and to have the Administrator say to you, ``Well, I'd
sure like you to focus on X or Y.'' But, at no point does the
IG give the control of the agenda to someone other than him- or
herself. That is just not acceptable. It's a bright line. So,
can you have a conversation with the Administrator about what
you're going to do, you know, where things are going. That's
fine. You know, can you use that information to circumscribe or
to somehow curtail your activities? Absolutely not. You have to
follow the statute's direction, which is extremely broad,
broader than many people recognize, in its intent.
Representative Miller. I don't think you've spoken directly
to the mandatory meeting that--as Ms. Brian did--of the staff
of the OIG, the Office of the Inspector General, and NASA with
Dr. Griffin, in which he addressed the PCIE report with respect
to Mr. Cobb and basically said, ``Moose is my boy.''
Dr. Light. That is a meeting that should never have
occurred, in my judgment. It reflects a lack of understanding
somewhere about the nature of the relationship between the
Administrator and the Office of Inspector General. Should never
have happened. Tremendous chilling effect on the independence
of the OIG.
Representative Miller. OK.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. I, unfortunately, am going to have to
preside over the Armed Services hearing at 4:30, so I'm going
to have to leave to do that in just a few minutes, so I will
not be here for the next witness's testimony.
But I do want to speak to the auditors on the panel a
little bit about the nature of audit reports, in terms of how
conservative they are. And I notice that Mr. Cobb, in his
testimony, wants to diminish the fact that this report that was
issued by the HUD IG, by the President's Council on Integrity
and Efficiency. Could you speak briefly about the requirements
for every finding an in audit to be referenced, and how strict
the requirements are in government auditing, in terms of
nothing is put in a report that cannot be documented by direct
reference. And that's when you refer to your ``workpapers,''
obviously, that's the guts of an audit that is used to glean
the information that is reviewed and reviewed and reviewed for
references. You know his testimony about this report, and the
fact that it didn't show any illegality, and you know this is a
bruising report, since this is a peer review, in essence. Am I
correct, that, for Mr. Cobb, the Integrity Committee's report
is his peers passing judgment on his ability to do this job?
And could any of you reference the conservative nature of you
guys? In my experience, it's very hard to ever question an
audit, because of your training and the way you view what you
do, in terms of the documentation.
Mr. Carson. Well, just to speak for audits--not
investigations, but for audits, like you mentioned, I mean, we
have a very thorough--every organization I've ever belonged to,
we have a very thorough--what we call ``referencing process,''
where an audit report is referenced back to supporting work,
supporting documents, interviews, what have you, and then a
third party, not even associated with the audit, will usually
come in and do a--what we call an ``independent referencing,''
checking the facts and figures in every report, someone who
wasn't even involved with the job----
Senator McCaskill. Clean read.
Mr. Carson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. And when he took some of these reports
and wanted to change findings, wanted you to change findings,
did you explain to him about referencing, and that this was not
a matter of him waving a magic wand and the audit report
changing, that every finding has to be referenced? Did he
understand that concept?
Mr. Carson. We--the auditors--we auditors, the management
team, we argued those things constantly, but--towards the end,
I mean--I mean, it shows, by the number of people that have
left, we just refused to go along with it, at some point. Yes,
I mean, we only tried to publish what we could support. I can't
say we published anything that wasn't supportable, but mostly
it was things being taken out of reports.
Senator McCaskill. How many auditors have left NASA OIG
since Mr. Cobb has taken over?
Mr. Carson. I have no idea, but it's quite a few. All I
know is, the entire senior management team that I worked with,
upon his arrival, of probably 15 to 17 senior auditors, there
may be one left.
Senator McCaskill. And what about the number of audits that
have been performed? I realize that in a couple of instances he
took audits and made them e-mails to management, or he took an
audit and changed it into a letter, so there was never any
public document issued----
Mr. Carson. Right.
Senator McCaskill.--that the public would know that he was
doing his job as an independent IG on these operations. How
many times did that occur? And what about the product, in terms
of the number of audits that were issued under his tenure?
Senator Nelson. Senator McCaskill, if you'll look at that
chart, and if you all will put that chart up on the easel,
you'll see the number of audits and the terms of the two
previous IGs----
Senator McCaskill. Yes.
Senator Nelson.--in NASA.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Did you have a severe staff shortage that occurred under
Mr. Cobb that would have accounted for this kind of reduction--
--
Mr. Carson. No, not at----
Senator McCaskill.--in the number of audits?
Mr. Carson.--not at all. I can attribute it to--I think we
were doing just as much work, but the reporting process was
so--the process was: there was no process. We couldn't get
anything out. It was more painful--it was more painful to the
audit teams to try to issue a report than to just look the
other way at issues. That's how bad it got toward the end.
Senator McCaskill. So, it was easier to start another audit
even though I'm sure it took a lot longer, under Mr. Cobb, to
complete audits, it was easier just to not fight it, and go on?
I mean----
Mr. Carson. Well, or not--or not----
Senator McCaskill. Fewer starts?
Mr. Carson. No.
Senator McCaskill. Did he approve the starts? Did he
approve the initial starts?
Mr. Carson. Some, yes. I mean, we--it was talk--we were
talking, earlier, about planning and the influence of the
agency over planning. I mean, there were several--I had
security as a responsibility, also, and, after 9/11, the agency
received quite a large appropriation for security--supplemental
security funding. And that was my number-one security priority
audit, and I was never allowed to start--and I had allegations
from sources throughout the agency that some of that money may
have been misspent, and I was never allowed to start that
audit.
Senator McCaskill. I noticed, also in his testimony, and
I've got to get this in now, because I have to leave, I found a
certain irony, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Cobb, in one instance,
defended himself by saying that he had done something better
than the Department of Justice, which is a little ironic, in
light of the current situation that we have at the Department
of Justice. I thought that was an interesting defense of his
behavior, that he would draw that comparison.
And, I've got to say, before I leave, and thank you, to all
of you, for being here, I don't know why we're here, because
it's obvious to me that this Inspector General doesn't ``get
it.'' And it seems to me that his resignation should have
occurred a long time ago. And the fact that he hasn't resigned
is an insult, I believe, to Inspectors General throughout
government that are doing their jobs with independence and
integrity and courage, and to all the auditors that are out
there working in the Federal Government, doing the best they
can to hold our Government accountable.
Our job--your job is not to make the people you work for
look good. Your job is to reassure the taxpayers that we're
doing our best.
And clearly, this is an Inspector General that doesn't
understand that obligation. And, to me, it is a vaulted and
honorable obligation that one should relish and embrace. And I
want to go on record as saying I believe that if Mr. Cobb does
not resign immediately, that I certainly hope other Senators
will join me in recommending that he be removed from his
position. And I thank all of you for being here today.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
And if your Armed Services meeting concludes, if you would
come back, your expertise is certainly valuable and has lent
great credibility to the questioning today, from the depth of
your experience as a prosecutor and as an auditor.
Dr. Light, I wanted to clear up just a couple of little
loose threads here, and then, if Chairman Miller doesn't have
any more questions, we'll proceed.
Representative Miller. I don't, of this panel. A vote has
just been called in the House that is one I can't explain
missing, back home. In fact, it has to do, particularly, with
North Carolina, and it's a bill that I've cosponsored in three
Congresses now, and it's going to a vote for the first time.
So, I really do need to go vote on that, but I will be right
back.
Senator Nelson. OK.
All right. Dr. Light----
Representative Miller. It hasn't been called yet. It'll be
called shortly.
Senator Nelson. OK.
In this case, the head of the PCIE elected to send the
Integrity Committee's findings to the NASA Administrator, which
we've already discussed, for him to take corrective action. In
a case like this, where, the independence of the IG is at
issue, how much sense does it make that the agency's management
would decide his punishment?
Dr. Light. I think the finding should go to the deputy
director for management of the Office of Management and Budget.
However, in this particular case there is a conflict of
interest, in that the current deputy director for management
was the director of the Office of Presidential Personnel, which
selected the Inspector General for appointment. Therefore, you
would move this up a notch, and the findings would go to the
deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget. And
that's where it should reside, and then be discussed in the
councils of the White House to decide what to do with this
particular appointee; but not to the head of NASA, I'm afraid.
Senator Nelson. At NASA, the ultimate disposition of the
Cobb case was determined after a review by NASA's general
counsel, and the general counsel admits, in some of the
testimony that these committees have received, to a sort of
mentoring relationship with Mr. Cobb, and that he had discussed
the investigation with Mr. Cobb at weekly intervals throughout.
How credible is the NASA general counsel's review and
recommendations in this case?
Dr. Light. Well, I don't think they're particularly
credible, are they? You have the substance of the argument in
the cases, as I understand it through brief exposure, that the
IG has been compromised due to his relationships with the
Administrator and senior leadership team, of which he is a
part, and wants to be a part, wants to ingratiate himself, and
you would not have your general counsel involved in that
conversation.
The instinct of the administrators and general counsels all
across government are, to some extent, not to have a strong
inspector general. It's an uncomfortable thing to have in your
midst. And you would not look to them to make the decision on
whether a friendly inspector general would stay in office or
not.
Senator Nelson. Well, thank you, Ms. Herzog, Mr. Carson,
Mr. Carrington, Ms. Brian, Dr. Light. Thank you for your
testimony.
The first panel, we will dismiss, and we will call up Mr.
Cobb.
Representative Miller. And, Chairman Nelson, I
misunderstood. I will probably have a vote in about half an
hour, but, when I get called, I will have to go to that.
Senator Nelson. OK. All right.
[Pause.]
Senator Nelson. Mr. Cobb, your written statement has been
received. It is a part of the official record. We would like
for you to summarize it for us, and then we will have some
questions. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT W. COBB,
INSPECTOR GENERAL, NASA
Mr. Cobb. Thank you, Chairman.
My name is Robert Cobb. I am the Inspector General at NASA.
Today, I respond to unjustified allegations against me, as
reported by the Integrity Committee. The Integrity Committee
found that I did not break any laws or act illegally.
Senator Nelson. Pull it a little closer.
Mr. Cobb. Turning it on is helpful, also. Thank you.
The Integrity Committee found that I did not break any laws
or act illegally. Moreover, the Integrity Committee did not
suggest that any matter covered in the wide-ranging
investigation was mishandled by the NASA OIG. However, the
Integrity Committee did reach certain other conclusions which
are demonstrably invalid.
Anyone seeking to learn the truth about the Integrity
Committee's finding should examine my written statement, which
makes clear that the findings are a travesty.
Failing to find actual lack of independence, the Integrity
Committee asserts an appearance of lack of independence in,
specifically, two instances, one involving a proposed Crime
Stoppers notice, and the other relating to the investigation by
my office into the illegal copying of International Traffic in
Arms Regulations designated materials. I prove in my written
statement that these assertions are utterly devoid of merit.
As regards independence, the Inspector General Act, its
legislative history, and PCIE guidance mandate a good working
relationship between an Inspector General and the agency head.
The Inspector General Act states that the Inspector General is,
``to report to, and be under the general supervision of, the
agency head.'' The agency head, under the Inspector General
Act, is ``required to render assistance to the Inspector
General in the Inspector General's execution of his
responsibilities.'' And the Inspector General is, among other
things, ``required to keep the agency head currently informed
of problems and to recommend policies to promote the economy
and efficiency of the agency.''
The legislative history of the Inspector General Act--in
particular, the report of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate, Report Number 95-1071, to accompany H.R.
8588, which I request be added to the record, states
emphatically, quote, ``The Committee believes that Inspector
General's efforts will be significantly impaired if he does not
have a smooth working relationship with the Department head.''
The Committee continued, quoting the ATW Inspector General,
``To be truly effective, the Inspector General must have a
close relationship with the Secretary, enjoy his confidence and
respect, and be responsive to his concerns, both as to his
specific assignments and as to the Inspector General's overall
function in the agency.''
The Committee continued, ``The Inspector General can be the
agency head's strong right arm in rooting out fraud, abuse, and
waste, while maintaining the independence needed to honor his
reporting obligations to Congress. The Committee does not--the
Committee does not doubt that some tension can result from this
relationship, but the Committee believes that the potential
advantages far outweigh the potential risks.''
The chair of the PCIE has issued guidance in 2004, and
again in 2006, that encourages productive and respectful
working relationships between agencies and Inspectors General.
I also request that that guidance be submitted for the record.
I gained the confidence of Administrator O'Keefe, and I
have the confidence of Administrator Griffin. This is not
because of lack of independence. In fact, there's been any
number of instances when my view of matters differed from the
Administrator or his senior staff, or when OIG investigations
have related to the most senior officials of the agency. It is
because of my demonstration of independence that these
Administrators express confidence in me, so the relationship
has been exactly as anticipated by Congress when it enacted the
Inspector General Act.
I'm proud of the management initiatives that have been
executed during my tenure as Inspector General which have
ensured that those matters most significant to NASA are well
resourced and managed. Our investigation into improprieties by
the Boeing Corporation which resulted in the recovery to NASA
of over $100 million last summer was an example of a matter
that benefited from substantial OIG management involvement,
including substantial attention from me.
At NASA, I have taken the responsibilities of office under
the Inspector General Act seriously and without compromise to
root out and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, and to promote
the economy and efficiency of the agency. I have worked with
NASA management in the manner contemplated by the Inspector
General Act. I have upheld my oath to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States. My staff and I have worked
very hard to gain respect by building expertise in the areas in
which we conduct our work, by ensuring that our work is
performed in a fair and balanced manner, by making sure that
the work is supported by law and relevant facts, and by making
sure that NASA OIG organization reflects the economy and
efficiency of operations that we demand of the agency we
oversee. As a result of this dedicated effort, I proudly stand
behind the work of the NASA OIG. I believe the NASA OIG to be a
much stronger organization today than when I became the NASA
Inspector General.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cobb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert W. Cobb, Inspector General, NASA
Chairmen, Members of the Subcommittees, my name is Robert W. Cobb.
I am the Inspector General at NASA, having been appointed to that
position by President George W. Bush on April 16, 2002, after
confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Prior to that, from January 2001, to
April 2002, I was an Associate Counsel to the President, with primary
responsibility for handling ethics program matters for the White House
and the financial disclosure process for nominees to Executive Branch
positions requiring Senate confirmation. For 9 years, from 1992 to
2001, I was a staff attorney at the Office of Government Ethics, and,
from 1986 to 1992, I was an attorney in private practice.
Today, for the first time, I am responding publicly to unjustified
allegations against me. Until now, I have deferred to the process of
the Integrity Committee (IC) of the President's Council on Integrity
and Efficiency (PCIE); that process is now concluded.
The IC opened an administrative investigation of my activities as
Inspector General in December 2005, purportedly pursuant to its
authority under Executive Order (EO) 12993, and closed the
investigation in April of 2007. The Inspector General of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD OIG) conducted the investigation
at the request of the IC. The results of the investigation reflect that
I did not break any laws or act illegally. [Exhibit A] The IC did not
suggest that any matter covered in the wide-ranging investigation was
mishandled by the NASA OIG. But the conclusions the IC did reach were
as flawed as the investigation on which they were based, and are
demonstrably invalid. The IC acknowledged the weakness of its own
conclusions by not submitting any recommendation to the PCIE Chair,
even though EO 12993 mandates such a submission. I attach Exhibit B, an
annotated version of the IC's January 22, 2007, letter, detailing the
IC's false and misleading recitation of facts and law and the broken
and dysfunctional process pursuant to which the IC's conclusions were
reached. My concerns about the investigative process are catalogued in
my correspondence with the IC, with relevant correspondence being
attached. [Exhibits C-R] For just one example, while I was notified by
the IC that the investigation concerned safety matters, to my
knowledge, none of the witnesses I identified at the outset of the
investigation were interviewed. [Exhibit D]
The Chair of the PCIE decided that the results of the investigation
did not warrant a referral to the White House for further action.
Instead, the PCIE Chair forwarded the report to Michael Griffin, the
NASA Administrator, to consider ``what actions, if any, you propose to
take.'' [Exhibit S] Upon review of the IC's report, the NASA
Administrator concluded that the Report of Investigation (ROI) ``does
not contain evidence of a lack of integrity on the part of Mr. Cobb,
nor is there support in the ROI for any actual conflict of interest or
actual lack of independence on his part.'' [Exhibit T] The NASA
Administrator has publicly stated that I did not abuse the power of my
office, that there has been no action on my part to compromise safety,
and that my independence is not in question.\1\ Nevertheless,
Administrator Griffin committed to arranging for me, with the
concurrence of the PCIE Chair, management training and coaching to
address management concerns raised by the IC investigation. [Exhibit U]
I have agreed to receive the executive training and coaching, and I
have already begun to implement these measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Michael Griffin C-SPAN Newsmaker interview on April 8, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his review of the IC's report, Administrator Griffin observed:
In the 2-years that I have [been NASA Administrator], I have
seen a high quality work product from the OIG reflective of a
staff and its leadership dedicated to carrying out the mission
entrusted by law to the IG. IG Cobb is technically sound,
highly conscientious, fully engaged in his work, and he brings
rigorous analysis to the OIG work product. [Exhibit V]
That the PCIE Chair determined the matter did not warrant referral
to the White House and that NASA, in contemplating whether any action
should be taken, would challenge conclusions of the IC is not
surprising because the IC's negative conclusions do not withstand
reasonable examination. This is fundamentally because the IC's
criticisms are not based on facts or law and are wrong. They are wrong
as the result of an investigation flawed in design and execution and
without respect for even the most basic notions of due process and
fairness--or compliance with law and procedural requirements. [See
Exhibit B for detail]
Notwithstanding thousands of hours of investigation by the HUD OIG,
including eleven hours of my interview, neither the HUD OIG nor the IC
could find a single instance where some action or non-action on my part
during the previous 5 years evidenced lack of independence. Indeed,
Alan Li, former Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), who was responsible for
handling NASA issues for GAO, stated before a group of Congressional
staff I was briefing that I was the most independent IG he had ever
seen. (Despite being advised of this, the IC and the HUD OIG did not
interview Mr. Li.) Failing to find actual lack of independence, the IC
asserts an appearance of lack of independence in specifically two
instances, one involving a proposed Crime Stoppers notice and the other
relating to the illegal copying of International Traffic in Arms
Regulation (ITAR) designated materials, which I will prove in this
Statement (and Exhibit B in greater detail) are utterly devoid of
merit. In the Crime Stoppers matter, the IC gets the facts wrong, and
any action other than that I took would have been reprehensible. In the
ITAR matter, there was no action I should have taken that I did not,
and the actions I am alleged to have failed to take were not necessary,
not required, and not the subject of any serious recommendation or
discussion. Yet the IC relies on this house of sand to conclude that I
caused a perception of lack of independence.
In connection with the Crime Stoppers notice, the IC first ignores
the reality that by virtue of NASA OIG senior management involvement, a
serious mistake was averted. One year after the Space Shuttle Columbia
accident, members of the NASA OIG staff had proposed that the OIG join
the Texas Rangers in announcing that the public's help was needed in
connection with the alleged theft of a ring from the finger of a
deceased astronaut. After consultation with senior OIG staff, I
directed that additional investigation be conducted to determine
whether a ring actually had been on the astronaut's finger at the time
of the tragedy. It became clear that there was no ring on the finger of
the astronaut, and, therefore, there was no credible evidence of a
theft. Public suggestion that persons involved in the recovery effort
were involved in such a heinous crime would have been most
inappropriate. Again, to be clear, there was no ring on the remains of
the astronaut and, therefore, there could not have been a theft of a
ring from those remains.
In its review, the IC misleadingly omits any reference to the
compelling photographic evidence that belies any notion that issuing a
Crime Stopper notice might be appropriate. Compounding the unfairness
of ignoring critical contrary evidence, the IC overreaches to find an
appearance issue where there was none by relying on nonsensical HUD OIG
reports of witness testimony. So, for example, the IC recounts in its
January 22 letter that:
According to [redacted], IG Cobb said the whole NASA Columbia
investigation was not going well, NASA wanted it finished, and
for the outcome to reveal nothing that would make NASA look bad
or shake the public's trust in NASA.
The relevant discussion from which this account derives took place
in April 2004, 8 months after the NASA Columbia accident investigation
had been concluded (in August 2003). The idea that I would say the
investigation was not going well 8 months after it was finished is
facially incredible. Yet the IC relies on this obviously mistaken
statement to reach its conclusion on appearance of lack of
independence, notwithstanding that the endorsement of the proposed
Crime Stopper notice would have been a dereliction of my duty.
The IC recounts that:
The Texas Ranger involved in the investigation informed [the]
HUD OIG that he believed someone at NASA wanted the
investigation shut down because if it got out that the ring was
stolen, questions would be asked as to the conduct of the whole
NASA investigation into the Columbia accident.
Reliance on this statement reflects the IC's stubborn persistence
to make something out of nothing. As there was no stolen ring, the
premise for the belief stated is nonsense. Moreover, the statement
reflects an overall ignorance of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board's report issued in August 2003, known for its thorough
examination of both the immediate and root causes of the Columbia
accident. Inclusion of the statement and presumptive ratification by
the IC of its relevance to the analysis of an ``appearance'' issue
again reflects the IC's own total lack of understanding of relevant
facts. It also shows that the IC's determination in this matter is
based more on whatever anyone would say rather than whether there was
any justification or credibility to his or her statements. The IC's
methodology for determining an ``appearance'' problem allows it to make
a negative finding when there are no facts to support it other than
what some person, not in a position to know, says.
The IC also recounts that:
Another NASA employee . . . recalls IG Cobb saying, ``Can you
believe how embarrassing that would have looked for the agency
[NASA] if that [Crime Stoppers report] went out?''
Obviously, there would have been embarrassment if the OIG were to
endorse publication of a false allegation that authorities
participating in the recovery process robbed an astronaut's remains of
jewelry. This incident should have resulted in a finding that senior
staff properly avoided the loss of public confidence that would have
resulted from issuing a misguided and false public cry for help.
Instead, the IC relies on this statement in finding lack of
independence. Again, there was no ring on the remains, and therefore no
theft. Interestingly, after the NASA OIG declined to participate in the
Crime Stopper report, the Texas Rangers, who had been investigating the
matter for a year without the help of the NASA OIG, apparently decided
themselves not to issue the Crime Stopper notice.
The IC's conclusion on the ITAR incident is similarly flawed. As a
starting point, the ITAR matter was one the IC had previously
considered and, after seeking and obtaining relevant information on the
allegation, determined that ``IG Cobb's response substantially
demonstrated that IG Cobb had not engaged in any wrongdoing . . . the
IC will take no further action concerning this matter and has placed
this file in a closed status.'' [Exhibit W] EO 12993 specifically
precludes further review by the IC of a closed matter.
The IC got the ITAR complaint right the first time, but in
reopening the matter, the IC exhibits the same illogical approach and
persistence in the face of the evidence that led to its invalid Crime
Stoppers conclusion.
Again, the IC repeats allegations and treats them as true without
any factual or legal analysis. The IC states, for example, ``[t]he
theft of ITAR matter must be reported to the Department of State.'' No
legal support is cited for this statement and, in fact, I believe that
there is none. Once this initial legal pillar is taken away, the rest
of the house of cards falls away.
Moreover, as a factual matter, the theft of ITAR from the Marshall
Space Flight Center was indeed informally discussed with the Department
of State very soon after the illegal downloading of data occurred. The
director of NASA's export control office informed me that the
Department of State told him when he notified it of the intrusion that
it had already seen the press report about the intrusion and that no
voluntary disclosure of the loss was required because NASA had not
violated the ITAR. Department of State reporting requirements relating
to violations of ITAR and those regulations do not address theft of
ITAR information from a Government agency. For voluntary disclosure
provisions, see ITAR at 22 CFR 127.12.
Having overlooked the substantive rules that apply, the IC then
goes on to ignore the vast bulk of the factual evidence relevant to its
conclusion. The IC states that witnesses questioned my decision not to
report the matter to the Department of State. However, all of the
contemporaneous documentation of the investigation and related matters
demonstrate that no recommendation to report was made. Documents in the
investigative file consider the question of whether there may be a
reporting requirement, but then reflect that if there is, NASA will
take care of it. Regarding the Department of State, NASA had already
informed them of the illegal access to NASA's systems at Marshall, even
though no requirement to do so existed.
After the intrusion was identified in the press, as the index to
the case file reflects, the NASA OIG worked in concert, from the very
beginning of the investigation, with the Defense Criminal Investigative
Service. Soon thereafter, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) were aware of the
matter. (Under Presidential Decision Directive 63, the NIPC was an
interagency operation located at the FBI. Created in 1998, the NIPC was
the focal point for the Government's efforts to warn of and respond to
cyber attacks and served as the national critical infrastructure threat
assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation
and response entity.) Appropriate international authorities were
consulted. The Department of Justice was involved. The ITAR
investigation has been ongoing for more than 4 years and has involved a
substantial amount of NASA OIG resources. The idea that the NASA OIG
failed to report anything or mishandled the matter is simply false, yet
the IC restates unsupported allegations and accepts them prima facie in
order to substantiate its notion of ``appearance'' of lack of
independence.
This investigation was not about finding the truth. The
investigators contented themselves with collecting isolated allegations
from disgruntled persons who were invited to offer personal opinions
and speculate about irrelevant matters. No effort was made to discover
the truth of the underlying facts upon which these allegations were
based--with the result that many of the allegations repeated in the IC
letter are based on false premises and should have been (as was in the
ITAR case) dismissed long ago.
The failure of the IC to follow the EO and its procedures in this
case inevitably led to an investigation conducted without any
applicable legal standards. Without specific guidance from the IC, the
investigators simply invited people to make complaints, without regard
to whether the complaints were a proper area of inquiry or had any
basis in fact. The result was that the vast bulk of the investigation
is unusable for any proper purpose, because it concerned matters
outside the scope of the IC's jurisdiction and involved matters that
amounted to nothing more than idle gossip. In the end, because of the
IC's departure from established procedures, a great deal of time and
money was utterly wasted.
In stark contrast to the IC's investigation, which proceeded
without any apparent concern for due process, compliance with the
controlling EO, and other legal requirements, I have worked very hard
to ensure that NASA OIG operations, audits and investigations have been
conducted in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United
States. For this, I have occasionally met resistance from a few staff
members and now have been investigated for these same acts. In one
instance, I asked a question about the validity--the
Constitutionality--of a search warrant and was told by a member of my
staff that my very asking the question amounted to an obstruction of
justice, notwithstanding that counsel to the IG also questioned whether
the facts on which the warrant were based constituted a crime. And it
is interchanges in which I displayed passionate insistence on
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States, in the
face of unjustifiable recalcitrance on the part of a member of my
staff, which was at the heart of the IC conclusion that I created a
hostile work environment as to one employee. Somehow, by taking
appropriate actions pursuant to the available facts and law, I engaged
in what amounts to the legal impossibility of interfering in
investigations for which I am by law and position accountable.
Just one example of my ensuring that our Office's operations are
conducted in strict conformity with the law occurred in March 2004. I
was presented with a letter by my staff to use new Patriot Act
authority to engage in computer monitoring that required my signature
to proceed. After I inquired into the facts, I determined that the
statute did not authorize the OIG to monitor activity in the instance
presented. I therefore refused to sign the letter. No illegal
monitoring occurred as a result. Contrast this with the March 2007
audit report by the Department of Justice IG concerning the FBI's
issuance of National Security Letters. That audit established that
there was a systemic failure at the FBI to provide adequate assurance
that the Patriot Act requirements were being observed in connection
with the letters. Matters involving the use of investigative power
require management, oversight, and strict abidance with legal
requirements, and they have at the NASA OIG under my leadership.
The road to producing disciplined work at the high standard I
demand has resulted in some discord. Some employees have not
appreciated having their work tested inside the office to make sure it
is founded in fact and law rather than personal opinion. Some have
chafed at my direction that when we conduct investigations we have a
clear understanding of possible wrongdoing based on law and regulation
rather than supposition and personal notions of right and wrong. This
imposition of rigor has resulted in the NASA OIG getting the work
right. The exhaustive investigation of the IC notwithstanding, there
has been no credible suggestion of any defect in OIG work product. As a
result of the NASA OIG work product, real attention is being paid at
NASA to perennial challenges in financial management, information
technology security, and in areas relating to critical mission
execution. Our investigative work product in administrative cases
(where the benefit of an Assistant United States Attorney or other
prosecutor is absent) is taken seriously and acted upon by NASA
management. In contrast, when I began serving as the Inspector General
at NASA, the agency's record in taking appropriate disciplinary actions
based on IG investigations was inconsistent, at best. As for audits,
the agency faced an inventory of approximately 400-500 outstanding
audit recommendations that the OIG had made but the agency had not
implemented. [See Exhibit L, specifically attachment 2 to Exhibit a, of
that Exhibit]. While the OIG was making recommendations, they were not
being implemented, in contrast to what has occurred during my tenure as
IG.
In addition to the discomfort associated with the high standards
for NASA OIG work that some employees might have felt, there was
resistance to changes I directed to address what I perceived to be
weaknesses in the organization and operations of the NASA OIG at the
beginning of my tenure. Some of the most important changes were
unpopular, but needed. While I have been subjected to criticisms
relating to management, actually, the management steps taken under my
leadership have been necessary to execute the OIG mission more
effectively and efficiently. Attached as Exhibit X is a list of some of
the management initiatives that have been executed during my tenure as
IG. These initiatives have led to an organization that approaches
issues systemically rather than ad hoc, with mature quality control,
accountability, and focus on the future as well as the present. The
management strategy has focused on ensuring that we have those matters
that are most significant to NASA well resourced and managed. Our
investigation into improprieties by the Boeing Corporation, which
resulted in the recovery to NASA of over $100 million last summer, was
an example of a matter that benefited from substantial OIG management
attention, including from myself. I believe the NASA OIG to be a much
stronger organization today than when I became the Inspector General.
One might ask why the IC would engage in the type of far-flung,
undisciplined, proceeding it has conducted. When investigations are not
conducted with due process and compliance with legal and procedural
requirements, when false and misleading information is leaked from the
investigation to the press to try to create a negative perception about
a public servant's integrity, and when the results of the investigation
are characterized in a manner to support the objective of elected
officials and those making the complaints, an inference may be drawn
that the investigation is not being conducted with independence.
Ironically, the IC investigation is exactly the type of gross misuse of
investigative power that I have taken careful steps to ensure does not
occur at the NASA OIG.
Complainants and persons associated with the investigation have
used the press to impugn my reputation. Because I was not notified
until April 26, 2007, that the IC investigation was closed [Exhibit R],
because the press is not the proper forum for addressing ongoing
investigative matters (and because releasing information about
investigations or complainants may be inappropriate), I have not
publicly offered any rebuttal to the allegations against me. So
naturally, news reports have been inherently one-sided. For example,
The Washington Post, on February 3, 2006, in a front page story
reported a number of allegations about my purported failure to
investigate a number of safety issues. None of these allegations have
been substantiated because no impropriety occurred.\2\ The Post issued
no follow up article to its front page story.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ One of the matters, involving pilots at the Langley Research
Center who claimed they had been retaliated against for raising issues
about safety matters, led to an earlier call for an investigation. [See
Exhibit Y, and my response at Exhibit Z.] Two reviews of the matter,
one conducted by a senior staff member at NASA Headquarters and one
conducted under the auspices of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a
statutory NASA advisory committee, agreed with the report of the NASA
OIG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2006, the Orlando Sentinel published information leaked
from the investigation. (To its credit, the Sentinel subsequently
reported information from NASA's former Administrator and General
Counsel substantially debunking certain aspects of the leaked
information.) Defending oneself during the course of an investigation
invariably leads to the claim of interference with an investigation,
and I have avoided that by giving the investigation my full cooperation
and by saying almost nothing to the press. Now I am told by a lead
Congressional investigator that the truth of matters is irrelevant and
only perception matters: a perception engineered by those with agendas
having nothing to do with truth. However, under the present
circumstances and my steadfast belief that investigations should be
conducted fairly and legally, I am compelled to state my views publicly
in the hope that greater appreciation for the principles of due process
prevail among those who are charged with the responsibility to carry
out investigative activities.
Given the great lengths the HUD OIG went to try to establish a
suggestion of wrongdoing and the extent of the overreaching of the IC
to find, if not wrongdoing, appearance of it, and the absolute failure
of both of them, in light of the truth, to show any wrongdoing or even
appearance of it, the IC letter, with all its foibles and falsities
stands, in contrast to its intent, as a complete and de facto
exoneration of me and the NASA OIG.
At NASA, I have taken the responsibilities of office under the
Inspector General Act seriously and without compromise to root out and
prevent fraud, waste and abuse and to promote the economy and
efficiency of the agency. I have upheld my oath to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States. My staff and I have worked very
hard to gain respect by following the Constitution and laws of the
United States, by ensuring that our work is performed in a fair and
balanced manner, by building expertise in the areas in which we conduct
our work, by making sure the work is supported by law and relevant
facts, and by making sure that NASA OIG organization reflects the
economy and efficiency in operations that we demand of the agency we
oversee. As a result of this dedicated effort, I proudly stand behind
the work of the NASA OIG.
All exhibits are in the Committee files of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and can be downloaded from the
following URL: http://oig.nasa.gov/congressional/Exhibits060707.pdf
List of Exhibits
A. Letter to James H. Burrus, Jr. from Clay Johnson, March 29, 2007
and Letter to Clay Johnson from James H. Burrus, March 29, 2007
B. Annotated letter to Clay Johnson from James H. Burrus, Jr.,
January 22, 2007
C. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from Chris Swecker, January 9,
2006
D. Letter to James Burrus from Robert W. Cobb, February 16, 2006,
with Enclosures
E. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from James H. Burrus, Jr.,
February 22, 2006
F. Letter to James H. Burrus, Jr., from J. Sedwick Sollers, III,
June 28, 2006
G. Letter to Robert Mueller from Hon. Robert W. Cobb, July 17, 2006
H. Letter to James Burrus from Hon. Robert W. Cobb, July 17, 2006,
with Enclosures
I. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from James H. Burrus, Jr., August
8, 2006
J. Letter to James H. Burrus, Jr. from Hon. Robert W. Cobb, August
23, 2006
K. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from James H. Burrus, Jr., August
30, 2006
L. Letter to Integrity Committee from Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
September 7, 2006, with Exhibits
M. Letter to Robert Mueller from Hon. Robert W. Cobb, November 17,
2006
N. Letter to James H. Burrus, Jr. from Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
November 20, 2006
O. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from James H. Burrus, Jr.,
November 21, 2006
P. Letter to James H. Burrus, Jr. from Hon. Robert W. Cobb,
December 18, 2006
Q. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from James H. Burrus, Jr., January
21, 2007
R. Letter to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from James H. Burrus, Jr., April
26, 2007
S. Letter to Michael D. Griffin from Clay Johnson, February 15,
2007
T. Letter to Clay Johnson from Michael D. Griffin, March 14, 2007
U. Memorandum to Hon. Robert W. Cobb from Administrator, March 30,
2007
V. Letter to Clay Johnson, III from Michael D. Griffin, March 29,
2007
W. Letter to Clay Johnson, III from Chris Swecker, October 29,
2004, with Enclosures
X. Examples of Management and Organizational Changes and
Initiatives at the NASA OIG (2002-2007), and Memorandum to the AIG for
Audits and AIG for Inspections and Assessments from the Inspector
General, January 17, 2003
Y. Letter to Michael D. Griffin from Senator Bill Nelson, May 12,
2005
Z. Letter to Senator Bill Nelson from Hon. Robert W. Cobb, May 13,
2005, with Enclosures
AA. Letter to Kenneth M. Donohue from Chris Swecker, January 6,
2006
Senator Nelson. Mr. Cobb, I'm going to ask you the
questions that Senator Chuck Grassley had stated in his
statement that has been made a part of the record since he was
not able to be here.
And I quote, ``Mr. Cobb, do you believe that an Inspector
General can continue to serve if he has lost the confidence of
his staff and of the Congress?''
Mr. Cobb. There are two parts to that question. The first
is the confidence of his staff. I do not believe that I have
lost the confidence of my staff. As to Congress, I believe if
Congress, and those in Congress, review the work of the Office
of Inspector General, and take that work that that--that the
work is credible, and it's excellent work, and I stand behind
all of it.
Senator Nelson. His second question is, ``Do you believe an
Inspector General can continue to serve who has been found by
an independent investigation to have abused his authority?''
Mr. Cobb. My statement--my written statement is clear on my
views on the Integrity Committee's findings. I stand behind my
written statement. And if the findings of the Integrity
Committee are falsely based, then I don't see any problem with
continuing to serve, under those circumstances.
Senator Nelson. Well, now, are you disputing the findings
of the Integrity Commission as an independent investigation,
that you have abused your authority?
Mr. Cobb. Yes.
Senator Nelson. You're disputing that.
Mr. Cobb. Yes.
Senator Nelson. You acknowledge that that's what the
Committee report said.
Mr. Cobb. The Committee report said I abused my authority
insofar as--and I'm not quoting it exactly--that I created a
hostile work environment as to one employee.
Senator Nelson. So, you think you can continue to serve,
even though the independent investigation says that you abused
your authority.
Mr. Cobb. Yes. And I think the Integrity Committee itself
recognized that by not making a recommendation regarding its
findings to the PCIE chair.
Senator Nelson. Senator Grassley's third question is, ``Do
you believe an Inspector General can continue to serve if he is
perceived as in the pockets of the people he is supposed to
investigate?''
Mr. Cobb. I guess it--from my perspective, it depends on
whose perception that is. The reality, to me, is important, and
there is no work in our office that has been compromised in any
way, shape, or form. So--I'd be interested in discussing the
work of our office, which I think has been outstanding during
my tenure.
Senator Nelson. The next question from Senator Grassley is,
``Do you believe an Inspector General can continue to serve if
he has acknowledged verbally abusing staff on numerous
occasions?''
Mr. Cobb. Again, I think that the premise of the question
is--I don't accept the premise of the question. There hasn't
been ``numerous occasions of berating of staff.'' There are a
few instances.
Senator Nelson. So, all of the testimony brought forth in
the Integrity Committee's report, do you dispute that?
Mr. Cobb. I believe, as my statement indicates, that the
HUD Inspector General's recitation of facts reflects a--an
attempt to obtain the opinions of many persons who did not like
the accountability that I brought to the NASA Office of
Inspector General with respect to the work of that office, and
there was no effort by the HUD Office of Inspector General to
produce a balanced report regarding relevant evidence.
Senator Nelson. Well, let's forget then, what the Integrity
Commission report has stated, and let me ask you, Did you use
profanity in front of your employees?
Mr. Cobb. Yes, I have.
Senator Nelson. Did you use profanity in front of women?
Mr. Cobb. Yes, I have.
Senator Nelson. The statements that were made by the
previous witnesses, are those true with regard to the use of
profanity and the gestures that you had made?
Mr. Cobb. There were many statements made. Certainly as
regards to the testimony of Debra Herzog, there was at least
one instance where I used profanity in her presence in an
aggressive way, and I pounded the table. And I regret that.
Senator Nelson. Do you consider that verbally abusing
staff?
Mr. Cobb. I think that the characterization that that was
verbally abusive is a fair characterization with respect to
that one incident.
Senator Nelson. But no other times.
Mr. Cobb. No, I didn't say that. I believe that there were
three or four other times, in the 5 years that I've been the
Inspector General, where, when I believed that either the
activity of a particular person as regards me was disrespectful
or was--and I don't use this in a legal sense--insubordinate,
but, nonetheless, where a disregard for a determination or a
decision that I had made was shown, and that occurred with Ms.
Herzog.
Senator Nelson. I want to remind you of your obligations
under the United States Code, number 18 U.S.C. 1001, to answer,
truthfully, the questions propounded in a Congressional
hearing. And what we're trying to do is to get your perspective
with regard to a series of allegations that are quite serious,
and are extensive.
So, Senator Grassley's concluding statement in his
testimony, ``The honest answering of these questions should
lead you to make a decision as to what is best for NASA and the
American people.'' And so, your conclusion is that you should
stay as the Inspector General?
Mr. Cobb. My conclusion is that I should stand up against
an investigation that disregards the Constitution and due-
process concepts that are built into it. And I believe that
when our Government operates in a way that is abusive, that
people should stand up against it.
Senator Nelson. And, in your opinion, for you to remain as
Inspector General, that's in the best interest of NASA and the
American people?
Mr. Cobb. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Chairman Miller?
Representative Miller. Thank you. My vote has begun, but I
do want to get in a few questions.
Mr. Cobb, the Inspector General Act provides that, or the
purpose of the Act is to provide a means for keeping the head
of the establishment--in this case, NASA--and Congress fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies. And I'm
sure you're familiar with the Quality Standards for Federal
Offices of Inspector General, which says that, ``Inspectors
General report both to the head of the respective agencies and
to the Congress. This dual reporting responsibility is the
framework within which Inspectors General perform their
functions. Unique in government, dual reporting is the
legislative safety net that protects the Inspector General's
independence and objectivity.''
Do you agree with that requirement, that you report both to
the head of the agency and to Congress?
Mr. Cobb. Yes, I do.
Representative Miller. OK. Now, Senator Grassley's question
was, ``Can an Inspector General serve effectively if the
Inspector General has lost the confidence of Congress?'' And
your response, basically, was that you didn't think you had
lost the confidence of Congress. Without regard to your
personal circumstances, can an Inspector General serve
effectively if Congress has concluded that they cannot rely
upon that Inspector General's work?
Mr. Cobb. The Inspector General can continue to do the
work, and there has been--and let me make absolutely clear that
there has been no suggestion that the work of our office----
Representative Miller. Well----
Mr. Cobb.--is anything other than first-class.
Representative Miller. I really thought that----
Mr. Cobb. So----
Representative Miller.--that question could have been
answered ``yes'' or ``no.''
Mr. Cobb. We've--we put out a first-class work product,
and----
Representative Miller. So, your----
Mr. Cobb.--will continue to do so until such time--we will
just continue to do--we have--there is no problem with the
credibility of the work. And whether Congress chooses and
elects to pick it up and read it is really up to Congress. We
will keep Congressional staff informed of our activities, as we
have throughout my tenure----
Representative Miller. But your answer is, if we've lost
confidence in you, it's our fault, not yours.
Mr. Cobb. It's your decision. It's not--that's not anyone's
fault. It may--if it's your decision----
Representative Miller. But----
Mr. Cobb.--there's not much I can do about that.
Representative Miller.--in your----
Mr. Cobb. I can just do my job.
Representative Miller. In your written testimony, you
questioned whether the PCIE report and their recommendations
were within the authority of the PCIE. And, again, the PCIE is
composed of all the Inspectors General, I believe. This
particular report was reviewed by six Inspectors General as
informed--as we've been informed by the Inspector General of
HUD. Is that correct?
Mr. Cobb. It's close. It's not exactly right. There's an
Integrity Committee. It has several members, three of whom are
Inspectors General. There are three other members. One of the
head of the Office of Government Ethics, the head of--the
Office of Special Counsel. There's--the chair is the FBI chief
of the Criminal Division. And there are others, ex officio
members, who sit in it--in on committee meetings.
Representative Miller. Mr. Cobb, 2 weeks ago the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight in the House,
Science and Technology Committee, had a hearing about this,
all-hands--mandatory all-hands meeting of the Inspector
General's Office. Two witnesses from the agency, the chief of
staff and the current counsel, Mr. Wholley. Mr. Wholley
testified that the chief of staff handed him a stack of DVDs
and said, ``These DVDs should never have been made. You decide
what to do with them,'' or some words to that effect. And he
decided that he would destroy them, because, if he did destroy
them, we would probably ask for them.
Now, in ordinary circumstances--and this was the meeting
where Administrator Griffin talked to the OIG staff, to your
staff, about the finding of the PCIE committee with respect to
your conduct and the recommendations of the PCIE Committee, and
why he was not adopting those recommendations, but doing
something much less.
Now, in ordinary circumstances, some kind of conduct like
that, we would turn to the Inspector General, and ask the
Inspector General to look into it. Can we ask you to look into
that?
Mr. Cobb. Well, you certainly can ask.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cobb. And whether we would undertake an investigation,
I have staff reviewing our role and what role we might have in
connection with that particular activity. But, as you say,
under normal circumstances--that was a very unusual meeting.
Part of the problem that we would have, from my perspective in
connection with conducting an investigation in that case, is
all of the witnesses with respect to what occurred during that
session are Office of Inspector General employees. Furthermore,
there were several Office of Inspector General employees who
were in possession of copies of the activity, and volunteered
to give them back, in fact, knowing that they were going to be
destroyed. And so, there are a number of issues associated with
whether or not it would be appropriate for our office to be
involved in an investigation of that activity.
Representative Miller. All right----
Mr. Cobb. But, the matter is under review.
Representative Miller. Mr. Cobb, you heard me read aloud,
to the previous panel, from the Quality Standards for the
Offices of Inspector General, the provisions on personal
impairments and external impairments. You said that you thought
you were supposed to maintain a close relationship with the
Administrator of NASA and the leadership of NASA. This
provides, ``Personal impairments to staff members result from
relationships and beliefs that might cause OIG staff to limit
the extent of an inquiry, limit disclosure, or weaken or slant
their work in any way.''
The testimony, which I think--some of which you have not
disputed, or some of it is written, and is beyond dispute--is
that it was frequently the case that you would ask in advance
what you wanted the management to have you look at; you would
send them findings before you issued them; you would edit,
based upon their recommendations; and that you met Mr. O'Keefe
and Mr. Pastorek weekly for lunch, frequently in the dining
room of NASA, where every employee in the place could see you
there together; you met Mr. O'Keefe for drinks in his office;
you played golf with him, on and on. You heard both Ms. Brian
and Dr. Light say that that was a flagrant violation of the
requirement that an Inspector General avoid personal
impairments to their objectivity and independence. But you
disagree with their conclusion.
Mr. Cobb. I don't disagree with the conclusion or the tenor
of the guidance that's in the Quality Standards. I don't accept
all of the premises of the question that you asked.
And I would like to say that glaringly absent from all of
the testimony that occurred earlier today is the fact that I do
work with my senior staff in an extraordinarily collaborative
way. So, for example, when I was asked whether I could go
play--whether I would be playing golf with Mr. O'Keefe, I ran
that by the 27-year counsel to the Office of--counsel to the
Inspector General, and I discussed it at great length with my
deputy, Tom Howard. Tom Howard's name hasn't been mentioned.
He's been with our office for five years--for four and a half
years, or four and three-quarters years--a 33-year veteran of
the Government--or 24 years at Government Accountability
Office, five years at the DOT IG, intimately familiar with all
the Yellow Book standards. He's been in the auditing business
for, now, 33 years. There wasn't a decision that was discussed
earlier today that I didn't have Tom Howard closely involved
in, in terms of analyzing the issues that were present.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Cobb, doesn't all of this testimony
bother you? Doesn't the Integrity Committee, made up of other
professional IGs, doesn't this bother you? Doesn't it give you
some pause to think that you might not be right all the time?
Mr. Cobb. There are a couple of questions you've asked. I'm
certainly not right all the time. I make mistakes routinely.
And that's why I have a very collaborative method of dealing
with issues in our office involving, as I just mentioned, Tom
Howard, very closely, and other members of the senior staff.
As for pause, as you know, Senator, you have sought
investigation of me for more than 2 years now. And I've been
under investigation, investigation that's been extraordinarily
costly, involving more than a dozen HUD OIG investigators,
looking through all of my e-mail, basically looking for
anything that can be used to stain my reputation. So, yes, I
have had substantial pause in connection with that activity.
Senator Nelson. Since you raise the issue, I want the
record to reflect that one of the roles of an elected official
is, when constituents refer complaints, to have those
complaints referred to the proper authorities. You just made a
statement that I had made an investigation on you. That's not
true. The Integrity Commission, which is a lawfully constituted
body, is the one who made the investigation. The complaints
that this office and other members of this committee have
received have been referred to them, and that's what started
this whole process.
Mr. Cobb. May I address my comment and your response to it?
Senator Nelson. Please.
Mr. Cobb. What I referred to was a May 12, 2005, letter
from you to Administrator Griffin asking for an investigation
of work of the NASA Office of Inspector General in connection
with a pilot matter down at the Langley Research Center.
Senator Nelson. That's correct.
Mr. Cobb. And----
Senator Nelson. And that was----
Mr. Cobb. And that's what I was referring to.
Senator Nelson. OK. Those were the first complaints that we
were getting. And then, as the complaints continued to come in,
then it was clear that there was a legally constituted
authority in order to do the investigation. The investigation
hasn't been done by this committee.
Mr. Cobb. No, I understand that.
Senator Nelson. All right. Let me go over a number of
issues. And, at the end of the day, I think what we're trying
to get here is what's good for NASA. NASA is this little agency
that's on the cutting edge, that's running a high-risk
operation, and they certainly don't need any side distractions,
like what's been going on. So, let's further explore.
On December 8, 2004, a team of your investigators, working
with the FBI and an assistant U.S. Attorney, obtained a search
warrant that was signed by a U.S. magistrate, Federal judge.
The next day, the investigation team assembled at the Stennis
Space Center as they prepared to serve the search warrant in
this criminal investigation. That morning, you ordered your
investigators not to proceed with the search warrant.
Would you share, for the committees, why you did that?
Mr. Cobb. Yes, sir. And from--and, as a background, and
just in terms of philosophy, I think this is an example of how
you'll find that when Allen Li of the Government Accountability
Office said, ``I'm the most independent Inspector General that
he's ever seen,'' this is an instance where I reflect that
independence.
I reviewed an affidavit, I believe, in support of the
search warrant, which had been signed. Upon my review--read
it--it was brought to me, I looked at it--I couldn't understand
what crime had been committed with respect to the facts that
were alleged to have occurred, and I asked whether and what the
crime was that was occurred, and I did not get an answer.
Nobody knew. I did not think that the facts that were alleged
in that affidavit constituted a crime.
I had a discussion with Ms. Herzog about that. She, as she
testified earlier, indicated that that's, in effect, a matter
for the defendant in a criminal case to litigate whether or not
service of the search warrant is appropriate.
I asked for the counsel to the IG to come in and join us in
the conversation that we were having. My recollection of these
circumstances was that the counsel came in, I asked him if he
had seen the search warrant, and he said, ``Yes, I was
wondering what the crime was that underpinned that search
warrant.''
So, what--and I'll go back, because there was something
that I considered offensive. When I asked Ms. Herzog what the
crime was, she asked--or she told me that I couldn't ask that
question, that to ask that question was interfering with an
investigation, or the service of a search warrant, and
intimating what she said today, that it was an obstruction of
justice.
I had a question as to whether or not a search warrant,
which was going to be served on a citizen of the United
States--happened to be at a NASA center--whether it was a legal
and valid search warrant, and I was told that I couldn't ask
the question. I, again, had my counsel give me his opinion. He
also questioned whether or not there had been--whether there
was a suggestion of a crime in connection with that activity.
We had a vigorous debate as to what we should do under
those circumstances. The result of that debate was that my
counsel, counsel to the IG, would personally communicate with
the assistant United States attorney. He did, and was told that
the assistant United States attorney was very comfortable with
the service of the search warrant, and we did not take the
matter any further.
Senator Nelson. How many days was the search warrant
delayed?
Mr. Cobb. I don't believe it was delayed one day.
Senator Nelson. So, in this situation, even though it had
been investigated by the FBI, with the judgment of an assistant
U.S. Attorney, and a Federal judge, you rendered their decision
wrong, and yours right, to delay the process.
Mr. Cobb. I wouldn't say that I--said that my view was
right. I had a question as to what the crime was that was
alleged to have occurred in connection with this activity,
and--and I think that the--my recollection was that the answer
was theft of proprietary information, and the problem was--from
my standpoint, was that the information had been created by a
government employee on government time, and my limited
knowledge of that particular area was that information produced
by a government employee on government time is not proprietary
information, so, if someone took it and used it for another
purpose, that would not be theft of proprietary information.
So, I asked the question of whether or not this constitutes a
crime. And that's the basis for this notion that I was somehow
improperly interfering with an investigation.
But, I must say, this is reflective of my independent
attitude when it comes to asking questions that I think are
appropriate under the circumstances.
Senator Nelson. If that were the only time, that would be
innocent enough. But that is just one of a pattern, because the
situation repeated itself on June 30, 2005, in a criminal
investigation at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Your agents,
along with the agents of the FBI, were preparing to serve a
search warrant that had been sworn by an assistant U.S.
Attorney and signed by a magistrate judge. And, again, you
halted the search warrant, moments before it was to be served.
Why did you do that?
Mr. Cobb. Well, again, I don't necessarily accept the
premise--all the premises of the question that you pose. But I
also admit that my recollection of exactly what occurred with
respect to that particular search warrant, and whether it was
even a search warrant at the time, or was it a contemplated
search warrant--I'm not that familiar. I do remember having a
question, and the fundamental question I was--I think I was
getting into, in connection with that one, was whether we were
better off serving a search warrant or going and gathering the
evidence, which we would have been able to do at night without
a search warrant.
Senator Nelson. Well, Mr. Cobb, see, this is where you get
into trouble, because this was a different assistant U.S.
Attorney than the one in the Stennis case, it was a different
Federal judge than the Stennis case, and, again, you inserted
your opinion instead of an assistant U.S. prosecutor, the FBI,
your agents, and a Federal judge. And that's where you start to
get into trouble. And part of the execution of criminal law is
the timeliness of the search warrants. Delay gives time for
suspects to dispose of evidence.
Now, how much of a delay was there in this particular time?
Mr. Cobb. I don't recall, but I assure you that that's
something that we would have discussed at great length at the
time, and I do not believe that there was any negative impact
associated with ensuring whether or not this was an
appropriate--an appropriate use of NASA OIG resources in
connection with this activity.
Senator Nelson. There's where you get yourself in trouble.
You are interfering with the judgment of the criminal law
system of a series of people who, by law, are charged with the
responsibility of carrying out that law. And if there is a
delay in that search warrant, there is the distinct possibility
of the loss of evidence.
Now, in your testimony just a few minutes ago with regard
to the Stennis case, you said the search warrant wasn't delayed
more than one day. I want to call your attention to page 117 of
the IC report. It says, ``Burnell stated Cobb called Haughton
and allowed them to execute''--this is on the Stennis case ``to
execute the search warrant at about 2 p.m. on December 9, 2004.
After the search, Burnell recalled discussing with Haughton
that the subjects may have been alerted, `the subjects of the
search warrant,' may have been alerted to the impending search,
and possibly removed the evidence being sought. The Radiance
employees were not surprised when the warrant was executed.
Burnell states that he believes the element of surprise was
lost because of the delay.''
People charged, in the criminal justice system, with
carrying out the law. This is where you're getting yourself in
trouble: imposing your judgment for that of the legal
authorities.
Let me ask you about the Command Destruct System. STS-111
launched on June 5, 2002, and one of the two required range
safety systems was malfunctioning. That's the Command Destruct
System which can destroy the solid rocket boosters in case of
going off track. Your office did an investigation into that
incident. Is that correct?
Mr. Cobb. There was consideration of issues by Mr. Carson
and another gentleman on our audit staff.
Senator Nelson. I don't understand your answer.
Mr. Cobb. We have--we're divided, fundamentally, into two
organizational--operational organizational elements:
investigation and audit. This was not an investigation under
our Office of Investigations. It was in our audit shop.
Senator Nelson. Well, let me continue. It was determined
that an Air Force general went through back channels to the
Kennedy Space Center center director, telling him that the
range was green for launch, when the range safety officers were
actually reporting red, which means that both systems were not
go for launch. And that's a launch criteria. Did your office
complete an investigation in this incident?
Mr. Cobb. I don't believe so.
Senator Nelson. And why not?
Mr. Cobb. I was briefed on these issues, I believe, in
February of 2005, along with my deputy and other senior
managers in the NASA Office of Inspector General. You must
realize that Mr. Carson was, during the course of the time he
worked in the NASA Office of Inspector General, three and four
levels below me, down the chain of command. So, all of those
people up the chain of command would have been present for the
briefing.
The fact was that, in this instance, the Air Force Office
of Inspector General had, two and a half years previously,
already considered the allegation that there was some
impropriety associated with the conduct of the Air Force
general, and had concluded, ``that the general''--excuse me--
that the general, ``acted within his authority for range and
public safety when he made the risk assessment and determined
the range was a `go for launch.' '' Since there was no
violation, any further investigation into this incident is not
warranted.'' That was two and a half years prior to the time
that the matter was brought to my attention in a briefing.
This was an Air Force general executing his authorities as
an Air Force general, not on detail or assignment to NASA.
It's interesting, I think, that, when I was asked by the
HUD Office of Inspector General about this same incident, in
the end of June of 2006, that Administrator Griffin had, in
connection with a launch just prior to that interview down at
the Space Center, had overruled and bypassed the recommendation
of his chief safety officer and, I believe, chief engineer, to
proceed with a launch, notwithstanding the fact that they
indicated that there was a no-go.
So, you know, people make command decisions and are
responsible and accountable for them. And, to me, dedication of
resources to find out whether or not this particular general,
who had retired two and three-quarters years earlier, had
exercised proper authority in a matter that was questionably
under the jurisdiction of the NASA Office of Inspector General,
did not, in my opinion, but also that of my senior staff,
warrant additional examination.
Senator Nelson. So, you felt that the Air Force had
investigated this, and it was a matter that was taken care of.
Mr. Cobb. Yes, as regards the actions of the general. There
were other issues that were legitimate issues, that were
relevant to this, that were being considered. And that was the
communication between the range and NASA officials, and to what
extent those communications were acting in a way that kept
people informed of what they needed to be informed of. And
there was a red team that had been--and, quite possibly, as a
result of the inquiries that Mr. Carson and his colleague were
making--there was a red team that had been established by the
Air Force, a joint NASA/Air Force red team, to consider the
issues. They made recommendations, they established new
procedures, and the--the issue that was most concerning about
communication between the Air Force and NASA as concerned the
range, the safety of the range, the safety of the astronauts,
that those issues were addressed. And we examined that, and we
believe that they were addressed.
Senator Nelson. And you did an investigation on that, on
the issue of communication?
Mr. Cobb. We conducted audit activities in connection with
that communication, yes.
Senator Nelson. If that were to occur again, what would you
do?
Mr. Cobb. If what was to occur again?
Senator Nelson. Same thing. That they launch, and both of
them aren't activated.
Mr. Cobb. Well, one thing that I would do, that I don't
know that the HUD Office of Inspector General did--in fact, I
don't believe that they did--is, I would consult with those
people who were intimately familiar with the range safety
issues, and to the Integrity Committee and the HUD Office of
Inspector General. I made--I made a fairly significant list of
people who would be familiar with those issues, and I don't
believe any of them were spoken to in connection with these
activities.
Senator Nelson. Let me tell you what the difference is
between you drawing a parallel with Dr. Griffin making decision
to launch. In the one case here, we have an Air Force general
overriding his Air Force officer who has said that they are red
for launch, and the Air Force general says they are go, or
green for launch, and then using back channels to the KSC
center director. That, by the way, was reminiscent of all of
the misinformation in the loss of Challenger back in 1986.
That's one set of circumstances.
That is not parallel to the set of circumstances with which
you just accused Dr. Griffin, where there is a flight readiness
review with all the people present, all discussing their issues
being on the table in front of everyone, and with the
Administrator making the final decision in front of everybody,
and then going back to the two that said no-go, and getting
their approval to go. It's a totally different situation. One's
secretive and back channels, the other is a recognized
procedure in the launch operations, and is completely out in
the open among all of the flight readiness team. Huge
difference.
Let's put up that chart again on the work product. Why
don't you just give us some comments about that, in how you
compare to your two predecessors. This is the work product of
your shop, the IG's shop.
Mr. Cobb. Well, I can see the graph from here, and, for
purposes of discussion----
Senator Nelson. Give him a copy of that, please.
Mr. Cobb.--for purposes of discussion, let's assume that
it's an accurate reflection of audit productivity.
Thank you.
To me--and maybe I could be criticized for this--the number
of audits our office publishes is, to me, not necessarily the--
is not my indicia of whether or not we're successfully carrying
out our mission. And, in fact, I'd say, when I joined as
Inspector General at NASA, the metric that was utilized for
analyzing whether or not our office was effectively carrying
out its mission was the number of recommendations it was
making.
As a point of fact, I didn't think that that was an
appropriate metric for our activities. And, furthermore, to me,
the quality of the work was much more important. And, in that
respect, there might, especially if you look at the chart, see
that there were a substantial number of audits that were
generated three-quarters of the way through Roberta Gross's
tenure. Interestingly, there was a significant downward slope
toward the end.
But, in any event, the Office of Inspector General was
generating many, many recommendations which were being accepted
by the agency, and then not implemented. And to the--it became
such a problem that the Internal Control Council at NASA
identified it as an internal control weakness of the agency,
that it had approximately 500 outstanding audit recommendations
that it was not implementing. Office of Inspector General was
issuing recommendations. Agency wasn't implementing them. That
was a problem.
And I think that that problem was caused by many things,
and I don't know that you want me to go into great detail on
that. But part of it was the quality of the recommendations and
whether or not they were implementable, from the standpoint of
doing right by NASA.
So, from my perspective, when I became the Inspector
General, first thing that I did was, I wanted--and I recognized
that I did not have a substantial background in audit
activities, so I hired a deputy who had, at that time, 28 years
of audit experience, to help me in managing the audit activity
of the office. And what we worked very hard to do was to make
sure that our audit work was, as Mr. Carson indicated earlier--
well, that our work was top notch.
Senator Nelson. But you would acknowledge that, on the
number of audit reports, that your high of 19 is less than the
average of the previous two IGs.
Mr. Cobb. I acknowledge that the numbers here are less than
what occurred under Bill Colvin and Roberta Gross.
Senator Nelson. Well, let's talk about safety-related
audits. In the past 6 months, the only safety-related audit
product was not a report, but it was a memorandum on stair
access trucks used at the Dryden Research Center. Is that
correct?
Mr. Cobb. I'm not sure exactly which audits that we've
published. We've published some significant audits in safety in
the last--in the last--in the recent period. Space Shuttle
program--problem reporting corrective action process at Kennedy
Center--Space Center--needs improvement. That was one. But----
Senator Nelson. OK. I'm reading from Appendix B of the
Office of the Inspector General's Semi-Annual Report, October
1, 2006, to March 31, 2007. I think this is your report.
``During the period April 1 through September 30, the Office of
Audits issued 19 products.'' And then, in the audit area of
safety, there is a final memorandum on the review of the access
stair trucks located at the Dryden Flight Research Center. And
that's the only thing under audit safety.
Mr. Cobb. We have many ongoing projects that are safety-
related. You know, the idea that--you know, again, I'd say that
the HUD Inspector General's report, as regards any safety-
related issue, is remarkably deficient insofar as I identified
a substantial number of people with safety expertise at NASA as
people who potentially should be considered as witnesses, and
the HUD Office of Inspector General did not interview a single
one of them.
Senator Nelson. Well, it's a high-risk little agency where
safety is absolutely key. This is one of the reasons you've got
to have an independent IG. You've got to have an IG that's
looking for those safety problems, other than access stair
trucks at Dryden.
Mr. Cobb. Senator, under my leadership, the NASA Office of
Inspector General hired technical staff, safety experts. We've
got somebody at the MMT meeting, going on today, regarding
activities, keeping us apprised of issues that relate to
Shuttle launch safety. We've got people now in the NASA Office
of Inspector General who are engineering and technical experts,
aerospace technologists, safety folks, that we didn't have when
I started as NASA Inspector General. And it's because of my
concern that we have competent, independent ability to
ascertain what are real safety issues that we need to address,
that we now have those people. There is no limit on the amount
of attention, dedication of resources that my office has given
to safety.
And on the investigation side, I'd say that, recently--and
I think that you'll see, in that semi-annual report--many of
our criminal prosecutions are parts- and test-fraud related. We
had a case recently involving the falsification of test data
for spacesuit batteries. We had another case where several
people went to jail, on significant prison sentences in
addition to substantial fines, associated with making false
statements relating to--and altered test results of metal
materials received--relating to the Space Shuttle wings. And I
would just say that there's been no lack of dedication to
safety-related issues at NASA under my leadership.
Senator Nelson. Well, I'm only looking at your report, and,
of course, the question is begged, respectfully, audit area,
financial management, you have four; audit area, procurement,
you have two; audit area, space operations and explanation,
one; audit area, other, one; audit area, quality control
reviews, a couple; but under audit area, safety, the access
stair trucks. So, I just simply point out from your own report,
someone like me, in this committee, has got to raise these
things, because safety is absolute. We can't afford the loss of
another Shuttle, because you know what happens if that's the
case.
Let me ask you about another issue that I stated in my
opening comments. This one really concerns me. This is the
theft of a $1.9 billion set of rocket plans. And it was never
reported. And who knows who has that. It's allegation number
28, the theft of the ITAR-sensitive data from a computer at the
Marshall Space Flight Center. The data involved was detailed
design information on the Shuttle main engines, which are the
most technologically advanced in the world, as well as design
information for NASA's new advanced engine. The intellectual-
property value of that is almost $2 billion. And the
investigation into that incident ultimately determined that the
data was downloaded by a hacker in South America or France,
and, for a period of time, posted on the Internet where anybody
could have gotten it. Anyone and everyone could have gotten it.
And Lord knows who got it. And there are some folks, I can tell
you, sitting in my capacity as the chairman of the Strategic
Systems Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, there are
sure folks on Planet Earth that we don't want to have these
kind of rocket designs that are very advanced. Namely, folks
like North Korea and Iran.
Now, 4 years after the incident, the Department of Defense
was finally asked to evaluate the national security implication
of the compromised data. The request didn't come from your
office, but from the HUD investigators who were investigating
your conduct. And the Pentagon's conclusions are shown in
Senate Exhibit 3.
Do you recall, anytime during 2002 or 2003, a member of
your staff recommending that this incident be reported to the
State Department, as is required under law?
Mr. Cobb. Well, first, I don't accept your premise that
this is required under law.
Senator Nelson. The gravity of this situation, you don't
think, requires the reporting of this to the United States
State Department.
Mr. Cobb. I don't--the premise is--of your question was
that there's a requirement under law to report this to the
Department of State.
Senator Nelson. Well, you----
Mr. Cobb. I have----
Senator Nelson.--you may----
Mr. Cobb.--to this day----
Senator Nelson.--dispute it on the law. What is your
opinion? Do you think it should have been reported to another
agency?
Mr. Cobb. Our office, as soon as we were informed of this
activity, we worked in concert with the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service, the FBI; the NIPC, the National
Infrastructure Protection Center, was aware of it; we worked
with international authorities. There was no act that our
office did not take, that it should have, in connection with
this activity. There was no serious discussion in our office,
or presented to me, regarding a reporting requirement to the
State Department. And, in fact, to this day, nobody has brought
any specific indication of agency requirements to report this
information.
But I do understand that, in August 2002, there was a
conversation between the director of the Export Control Office
at NASA with the Department of State, who indicated that
voluntary disclosure under the ITAR was not required.
Senator Nelson. So, that's your position.
Mr. Cobb. That's my position.
Senator Nelson. All right. A senior member of your staff
reports that you worked with NASA to have the data classified
so that its loss wouldn't be publicly disclosed. Is that true?
Mr. Cobb. I don't believe that that is the case. I believe
that there might have been the discussion, back at the time, as
to whether or not, for example, the kind of conversation that
we're having here today is something that should be made
public, when there are national security concerns--Is it
national security information?--and a question about
classification often rises and is dealt with, as every other
issue is, intelligently, and disposed of.
Senator Nelson. So, it's your position that you weren't
required to report this to the State Department. You've stated
that. Can't you see? You're getting into trouble with judgment
here. Something of enormous defense importance to the United
States, and you're not sharing it with another agency whose
responsibility it is to protect the secrets of the United
States. Can't you see where all of this controversy has stirred
up, and the chain of these things?
Mr. Cobb. Again, our office took every action that was
appropriate under the circumstances. The National
Infrastructure Protection Center--under Presidential Decision
Directive 63, the NIPC was the interagency operation located at
the FBI. It was created in 1998. It was the focal point for the
Government's efforts to warn of, and respond to, cyber attacks,
and served as the national critical infrastructure, threat
assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement
investigation, and response entity. To my knowledge, they knew
about it. The FBI knew about it. The DCIS were aware of it.
International authorities--appropriate international
authorities were aware of it. You know, and so, there was no--
no limitation placed on any member of my staff, in terms of
communication to any person about--and these communications
were taking place not at my direction, but as a matter of
normal course in the exercise of duties of staff members in our
office.
Senator Nelson. Chairman Miller?
Representative Miller. Thank you. I just have a few more
questions.
Mr. Cobb, the finding of the PCIE was based predominantly
on testimony and evidence given by employees of your office.
And you have said that you are now reluctant to talk to your
employees, that they twist your words, you think that they said
unfavorable things about you because you came in and found an
office that did not meet your standards, and you whipped them
into shape, and you insisted that they improve, and that was
why they resented you. You know, you do sound somewhat like
Humphrey Bogart in The Caine Mutiny, when you describe your
staff.
But I have not heard an explanation for why you think your
peers--why other Inspectors General have been so critical. In
your testimony, there is a tone of grievance, and--with having
given 11 hours of testimony, although, in hearing your
testimony today, I think it might have been shorter if yes-or-
no answers--questions that contemplated a yes-or-no answer had
gotten a yes-or-no answer. You obviously think you were treated
unfairly. And it was an investigation conducted by the
Inspector General of HUD, your peer. It was reviewed by other
peers, other Inspectors General. Why do you think they treated
you so badly? I cannot figure a motive for their treatment of
you, if it is as bad as you believe is.
Mr. Cobb. I can only say you request speculation on my
part. I think that all I can say is, as regards the
investigation, I've gone to great lengths in my statement and
my attachment, Exhibit B, to reflect the falsities that are
reflected in the Integrity Committee's report. And, you know, I
think that you need to direct that question to them, on why
they would conduct an investigation that would result in such
falsities being published.
I would go further, to say that you will find no work of
the NASA Office of Inspector General that has those types of
false statements included in it, in terms of the important work
that we do, both on the investigation side and on the audit
side, but particularly as regards administrative investigations
of NASA employees or the addressing of whistleblower complaints
of which we've received many. We go to great lengths to get our
work right, and I can't say the same for what is reflected in
the HUD OIG/Integrity Committee report.
There's this notion that the NASA Office of Inspector
General was the land of milk and honey until Inspector General
Robert Cobb arrived. And let me suggest that, in this very
difficult business, that IGs straddle barbed-wire fences that
we heard about earlier, which doesn't sound particularly
comfortable, but may be apropos--Bill Colvin who was an
Inspector General at NASA, was forced out as a result of
allegations made by staff. Roberta Gross--and this is--I'm not
making any statement about Roberta Gross or Bill Colvin and
their competency or ability to do the job, I'm just saying--
giving a little bit of insight into the NASA Office of
Inspector General. Recently, there was a document from an--a
year 2000 EEO case, which was 2 years before I came, and a
footnote in that document--it's important to know that the
complainant sought a class-action alleging that OIG employees
over 40 years of age were being systematically discriminated
against. The EEO counselor's report included statements from
nine OIG employees who complained of discriminatory
nonselections, and identified an additional 13 OIG employees
who were interested in speaking with an EEO counselor regarding
alleged discriminatory nonselections. That's 22 NASA OIG
employees in the year 2000 concerned about discriminatory
nonselections.
And I don't suggest--present that for the truth of the
matter, only that--again, that--and Roberta Gross had Integrity
Committee complaints filed against her, as well. This is part
of the territory with respect to being an Inspector General.
What I stand for, whether you're talking about search
warrants or you're talking about the work of the NASA Office of
Inspector General, is that we get the work right based on the
law and the facts. And there has not been any--and I credit,
not myself, but the NASA OIG staff, for getting the work
right--there has not been any suggestion that any work that
we--that we've worked on, we didn't get right.
Senator Nelson. OK. I want to thank you for your
indulgence. I want to thank you for the time. It's with a heavy
heart that we leave this hearing, after 24 complaints, 79
allegations, a number of career law enforcement officials at
HUD Office of Inspector General, and seven members of the
Integrity Committee, and you have asserted that those people
are all wrong and that you're all right.
And so, I go back to the question that Senator Grassley
asked us to propound, ``What are the honest answers to the
questions that lead us to a decision about what's in the best
interest of NASA, America's space program, and the American
people?'' And that's a judgment that you're going to have to
live with.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chuck Grassley,
U.S. Senator from Iowa
Good afternoon. I would like to begin by thanking Senator Nelson
and Congressman Miller for calling this important joint hearing
concerning the investigation of the NASA Inspector General by the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE). I regret that I
am unable to attend your hearing in person but would appreciate having
this statement placed into the record.
I have been a long-time advocate of government oversight. I am also
not a newcomer to overseeing the overseers. For example, I conducted
inquiries into the operation of the Offices of the Inspector General at
the Department of Health and Human Services and the Postal Service.
As Ranking Member of the Committee on Finance, I consider
government oversight to be a critical role of Congress. This role is
especially crucial when it relates to an office such as the NASA
Inspector General, an office which plays an important role in
protecting lives, guaranteeing the integrity of vital government
assets, and defending a budget of over $13 billion against waste,
fraud, and abuse. The dedicated staff of the NASA Inspector General
office is one of the last lines of defense for the NASA mission, and I
applaud the work of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, as well as House Committee on Science and Technology,
for their oversight work on this important matter.
Over a period of 14 months, the PCIE's Integrity Committee received
eighteen complaints against NASA Inspector General Robert ``Moose''
Cobb. Then, in January 2006, the Integrity Committee referred the
matter to the Office of the Inspector General in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). I also had a member of the HUD
OIG's staff visit the Finance Committee staff to identify a number of
concerns regarding the operation of the NASA OIG office.
The HUD OIG office conducted an extensive, independent
investigation into the complaints lodged against Mr. Cobb, including 79
separate allegations. During the six-month investigation, staff in the
HUD Inspector General office reviewed 26,259 e-mails, conducted 121
interviews, and cataloged 199 exhibits relating to the allegations.
They interviewed 50 NASA employees and former employees. In all, the
HUD investigators prepared a 289-page report substantiating allegations
that Mr. Cobb abused his authority as Inspector General, and that he
had created at least the appearance of a lack of independence between
the Office of Inspector General and NASA management.
Created by the Inspector General Act of 1978, IG offices were
intended to impartially investigate and audit programs and operations
within their respective agencies to promote efficiency, and prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
I'm alarmed by the evidence uncovered by the PCIE investigation. In
fact, it appears that Mr. Cobb did not act in a manner consistent with
the spirit and intent of that statute. According to the evidence, he
has used this important position to interfere in the activities
conducted by the investigative and audit divisions within his office
for reasons that appear, at the very least, improper. In fact, Mr. Cobb
repeatedly told employees that one of his priorities was to avoid
embarrassing NASA. Evidence also indicates that he shied away from
bringing investigations against high-ranking NASA officials.
From the evidence presented to me, Mr. Cobb hasn't simply tried to
micromanage the activities of NASA IG staff; he has used the power of
his office to insulate the agency from critical investigations and
audits.
One such investigation concerned the theft of approximately $1.9
billion-worth of International Traffic in Arms Regulations data. This
information, controlled by NASA, was illegally accessed by hackers and
transmitted to locations in France. According to the PCIE
investigation, Mr. Cobb dismissed worries over the theft of this data
because, in his view, the data wasn't ``stolen,'' since NASA was still
technically in possession of the accessed information. That kind of
thinking doesn't make sense to this Senator. That sort of hair-
splitting suggests that Mr. Cobb would rather walk a mile to avoid
embarrassing NASA than walk across the street to let the American
people know what really happened.
In another instance substantiated by the PCIE report, Cobb
interfered with law enforcement activities initiated by his office.
Specifically, he questioned the sufficiency of a search warrant sought
by the Department of Justice and issued by a Federal magistrate. In
fact, Mr. Cobb went so far as to say that the Federal judge had been
``duped'' into signing the warrant. Although the search eventually took
place, Mr. Cobb's interference caused the search to be delayed by more
than a week in a matter that is characterized as ``very time
sensitive.'' It also may have given the targets of the search a chance
to receive advanced warning, which could create the opportunity to
destroy evidence before it is seized.
Another troubling allegation substantiated by the PCIE
investigation concerned Mr. Cobb's discussion of potential audits and
investigative findings with former NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe and
former NASA General Counsel Paul Pastorek. This included e-mail
warnings on upcoming investigations. Mr. Cobb also sought the advice of
NASA management about the timing and issuance of OIG findings. Those
simply are not the sort of communications an independent inspector
general ought to be having with officials at the agency he oversees.
Time and time again, it appears that Mr. Cobb sought to protect
himself and NASA's management at the expense of maintaining the
integrity of the NASA Office of the Inspector General.
The allegations against Mr. Cobb and the subsequent findings of the
Integrity Committee all point to deep and systemic problems with
Inspector General Cobb and how he managed his office. These problems in
turn call into question his ability to investigate allegations no
matter where they lead, whom they implicate, or what they uncover.
Whether it embarrasses NASA or not, the Inspector General needs to do
his job. Moreover, the deference demonstrated by Mr. Cobb to NASA
management raises questions about how he views his own duties to be
ethical, independent, and to serve with integrity.
To paraphrase a quote attributed to Abraham Lincoln, if you want to
test a man's character, give him power. By this test, Inspector General
Cobb has not fared well.
The evidence against Mr. Cobb goes beyond the appearance of a lack
of independence between the Office of Inspector General and NASA
management. The PCIE investigation also substantiated allegations that
Mr. Cobb abused Inspector General staff members, creating an atmosphere
of hostility and fear. According to the PCIE report, Mr. Cobb abused
his staff with vile and degrading language. As a result of his
management style, the bulk of his experienced audit staff left the
administration. By his own admission he cannot, and will not,
communicate with a significant portion of his staff because he does not
trust them and they do not trust him. Nearly a quarter of the staff was
interviewed in the independent investigation, and all of them had
negative things to say about Mr. Cobb. In fact, his management style
has proven so abrasive that the NASA Administrator hired an ``executive
coach'' to help Mr. Cobb learn how to better manage his staff, and has
had to send him to a management ``charm'' school.
Additional concerns have also come to light regarding the process
followed by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency that I
am compelled to address. NASA management was provided with a completely
unredacted copy of the PCIE report. This copy identified NASA employees
by name. Specifically, it identified to NASA management those employees
who cooperated with the PCIE investigation; who bravely spoke out about
Mr. Cobb and other problems plaguing NASA. This effectively painted a
target on the backs of NASA employees who provided information to PCIE
investigators and to Congress. This is unconscionable. If we don't give
a certain amount of protection to whistleblowers, if we can't ensure
anonymity to those who speak with investigators about government
wrongdoing, how can we expect anyone to cooperate with these
investigations in the future? For this reason, I am requesting the
Government Accountability Office to review the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency and its procedures and operations.
It is clear to me that our ability to trust Mr. Cobb to effectively
manage the Office of Inspector General and the vital functions that it
seeks to carry out is in question. It seems that Mr. Cobb may care more
about protecting NASA from embarrassment than he does about performing
the critical functions of his office. An Inspector General must possess
temperance, high ethical standards, and a firm understanding of the
independent nature of that office. From the evidence presented, Mr.
Cobb does not appear to possess these attributes.
So, in conclusion, I have some questions that I would like to pose
to Mr. Cobb. In answering them, I hope he honestly places the mission
of his office ahead of his self-interest. Mr. Cobb, do you believe that
an Inspector General can continue to serve if he has lost the
confidence of his staff and of Congress? Do you believe an inspector
general can continue to serve who has been found by an independent
investigation to have abused his authority? Do you believe an inspector
general can continue to serve if he is perceived as in the pockets of
the people he is supposed to investigate? Do you believe an inspector
general can continue to serve if he has acknowledged verbally abusing
staff on numerous occasions? These would be my questions to Mr. Cobb.
The honest answering of those questions should lead him to make a
decision as to what is best for NASA and the American people. Thank you
again for this opportunity.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Donohue, Inspector General,
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Mr. Chairmen and Ranking Members, and Members of the Committees, I
am Kenneth Donohue, Inspector General of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD OIG) having been confirmed to this position on
March 25, 2002. Prior to becoming Inspector General, I spent twenty-one
years in the United States Secret Service. After my retirement from
that organization, I spent 7 years at the Resolution Trust Corporation
as Assistant Director for Investigations, uncovering fraud and abuse
among directors of failed savings and loans institutions.
The HUD OIG is one the original twelve Inspectors General
authorized under the Inspector General Act of 1978. We are committed to
our statutory mission of deterring and preventing fraud, waste and
abuse and promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of government
operations. While organizationally located within the Department, the
OIG operates independently with separate budget authority. This
independence allows for clear and objective reporting to the Secretary
and to the Congress.
The HUD OIG conducts oversight on a Department that receives over
$30 billion in annual appropriation for a myriad of programs including
community development block grants, public housing, homeless and lead
abatement, and nursing home and hospital mortgage insurance coverage.
In addition to these areas, HUD also manages the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), a program that is the largest mortgage insurer in
the world, providing coverage to over 34 million home mortgages and
47,000 multifamily projects since 1934. In the last fiscal year, FHA
had an outstanding insurance portfolio of about $395 billion. HUD also
manages securitizations worth billions of dollars in the Ginnie Mae
program as well as maintains oversight of the regulatory agency that
oversees the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac programs. As you can see, we
have a busy portfolio that requires us to maintain a significant pool
of talented Federal criminal investigators and auditors on staff. Our
semi-annual reports reflect our audit and investigative work as well as
impressive criminal statistics and significant taxpayer funds put to
better use.
On March 21, 1996, President William J. Clinton signed Executive
Order 12993 that outlines procedures to be taken regarding
administrative allegations against Inspectors General. This process is
intended to mitigate the concern that Inspectors General, as designated
by the Inspector General Act, are independent but can still be held
accountable in the event that allegations of misconduct are valid. This
process has been in place for years and has proven to be valuable in
terms of maintaining credibility and integrity within the OIG
community. The process is understood and accepted by the Inspectors
General when they consent to their nomination and are confirmed by the
U.S. Senate.
In early 2006, the Integrity Committee (IC) of the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), a council comprised of
Presidentially-appointed Inspectors General, asked the HUD OIG to
investigate allegations of administrative misconduct it had received
regarding the Inspector General of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The Integrity Committee Executive Order charter
states that it shall first determine if there is a substantial
likelihood that the allegations presented to the Committee disclosed a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, or abuse of authority. If the IC makes this
preliminary determination, and further concludes that allegations
cannot be referred to any agency with appropriate jurisdiction, it then
refers the matter to the Chair who is to cause a thorough and timely
investigation of allegations.
The January 6, 2006 letter I received from the IC Chair (the
Federal Bureau of Investigations' Assistant Director, Criminal
Investigative Division) stated, in part, that ``at a December 15, 2005
meeting, this matter was discussed and opined that due to the number of
credible allegations, with a pattern of possible misconduct and/or
wrongdoings by the NASA IG, the IC determined that an administrative
investigation of the allegations is appropriate.'' It further stated,
``It is requested that the investigators you appoint conduct a thorough
investigation to determine whether the alleged misconduct did, in fact,
occur and develop a comprehensive factual report concerning the
allegations and any additional issues which may be uncovered during the
investigation. That report will serve as the basis for further action
to be taken by the IC.''
In a prior meeting, your committee staff asked that I speak to the
process of what we went through regarding the development and
implementation of this investigation. The PCIE IC forwarded 22
complaints that generated approximately 100 separate allegations. A
team of HUD OIG Special Agents and Forensic Auditors conducted the
investigation and completed the report. Each of the complainants was
interviewed and more than 120 interviews were completed. Documents were
obtained and analyzed, over 25,000 electronic mail messages were
reviewed, and 199 exhibits were catalogued. The NASA IG was interviewed
under oath and the interview was reported by a certified court
reporter. The most significant of the allegations were grouped into the
following general categories: lack of independence and impartiality;
obstruction of justice; misconduct; safety issues; audit issues; and
hostile/untenable work environment. The final Report of Investigation
contained three sections; the first consisted of audit issues, the
second of investigation issues, and the third of management issues.
We had previously successfully conducted another investigation at
the request of the IC of an agency of similar size to our organization.
It had involved multiple allegations, some of a complicated nature,
which had also been forwarded by external entities including
Congressional chairman. I was asked to conduct this investigation of
the NASA IG because of our prior experience and of our position as an
objective outsider. I did not seek this task but did not take the
request lightly as I feel the process must be respected if the
community is to maintain respectable credibility with Congress and the
American citizens we serve. Though I intimately knew how cumbersome
such an investigation could be, I accepted it at the urging of the then
IC Chair despite a confluence of events around that time that made it
even more arduous.
Shortly before this assignment, devastating hurricanes hit the Gulf
Coast region and HUD became the primary agency for redevelopment
activities. $17 billion in new HUD funding needed to be immediately
overseen by the HUD OIG despite our having lost our office in New
Orleans. This was in addition to the already underway, and also labor-
intensive, emergency-related task that we had been given regarding
emergency appropriations for HUD redevelopment and revitalization funds
for lower Manhattan following the attack of September 11th.
Unfortunately, we had also lost our office at World Trade Center 7 on
that day.
Despite our previous experience performing IC work, this
investigation, nevertheless, has taken a big toll on parts of my staff
in terms of manpower and resources. At the time the HUD OIG was tasked
in the early part of 2006, a Shuttle launch had been delayed for over
two and a half years due to safety concerns in the aftermath of the
explosion of the Shuttle Columbia and only one previous mission, a
return to flight in the summer of 2005, had taken place. The next
Shuttle launch was set for the summer of 2006. Though not in the
initial IC direction to us, I felt strongly that, because there had
been allegations relating to safety, I needed to complete our
investigation and draft our Report of Investigation in time for this
scheduled launch.
Indeed, we kept the FBI cognizant of developments for this very
reason (the Integrity Committee staff consists of detailees from the
FBI owing to the fact that the IC Chair is the FBI Assistant Director,
Criminal Investigative Division and these agents perform much of the
duties associated with the IC and its process requirements) and I met
with Senator Nelson's staff to let them know if any critical safety
issues emerged. To keep this timetable and to address all of the
numerous, and sometimes lengthy and complex, allegations caused a
hardship on my staff. We have, however, as a result of our dealings
with the Oklahoma City bombings in which we lost staff, the September
11 attack, and the hurricanes become somewhat condition-hardened. On
August 30, 2006, we turned over our Report of Investigation (ROI) to
the Integrity Committee and briefed its members a short time later. Our
time and resource commitment has not ended due to the extended
deliberation of the IC into 2007 and to the continuing interest of
entities such as the Congress and media. Accordingly, we have recently
submitted a new request for a modest reimbursement of our expended
funds.
I am not a member of the Integrity Committee nor was I privy to its
deliberations once we completed our investigation and briefed the IC. I
placed great weight on our having been chosen as outsiders to be
objective and on our designated role as ``finder of the facts.'' The
IC's determinations, and the underlying process of how it arrived at
its findings, were unknown to me. Only recently was I made aware of its
conclusions but I have not had access to its deliberative activities.
When I met with your staff previous to this hearing, I was asked
specific questions relating to various aspects of an Inspector General.
Being an Inspector General is one of the most difficult jobs in the
Federal Government and remaining independent and objective is the
benchmark of success. As Senator Grassley once characterized the
position, ``you're like a skunk at a picnic.'' Or as another IG once
testified, ``it is like straddling a barbed wire fence.'' I know that I
am constantly striving to achieve a balance of what I believe it is to
be a good public servant in this arena. It can be a challenging job to
supervise a staff of disparate disciplines and to interact internally
and externally with groups or individuals who do not always want to
hear your sometimes controversial or painful findings. I do know,
however, that I believe in the words that the Secretary that I work
under has stated to me numerous times. He has said ``I know that we are
going to definitely disagree, many times and on many different things,
but we will always agree to never be disagreeable.''
As I stated to your staff during their questioning, it is crucial
that the department or agency must respect the independence of the OIG,
must understand why this unusual organization needs to be insulated
from political pressures, and will, hopefully, come to realization that
a strong OIG will ultimately benefit the effectiveness of its
operations. Unfortunately, this epiphany does not always manifest. When
it does by those who run America's Federal programs, however, it works
to the betterment of government efficiency and, ultimately, to the
benefit of the American taxpayer and the recipients of the programs it
manages.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Robert W. Cobb
All answers are to the best of my recollection, after review of
pertinent information.
Question 1. Referring to the search warrant issued December 8,
2004, related to an investigation at the Stennis Space Center: Did you
communicate, or cause any other person to communicate, the existence of
the search warrant to any persons associated with the target of the
search warrant?
Answer. No.
Question 2. Related to the same matter as Question 1: Please list
all persons outside the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) with
whom you discussed the search warrant between its issuance and its
execution. Please describe the nature and content of any such
communications.
Answer. On December 9, 2004, I believe I was conferenced into a
conversation with Jay Golden, an Assistant United States Attorney
(AUSA) regarding a question NASA OIG counsel had raised with him about
whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause. In the
context of my being the official ultimately accountable for the
activities of the NASA OIG staff, I had raised a question as to whether
the allegations, if true, were of conduct constituting a crime and,
therefore, whether there was probable cause underpinning a warrant to
be served by NASA OIG criminal investigators; the Counsel to the
Inspector General believed that the affidavit in support of the warrant
did not support a finding of probable cause, thereby inherently raising
a question of legality of the warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The AUSA wished to proceed with the service
of the warrant notwithstanding the question that had been raised. As
the warrant was the AUSA's and the issuing Federal magistrate's
responsibility and I believed the OIG had fulfilled its responsibility
by raising the issue, I did not object to his decision to proceed with
the warrant's execution. The warrant was served on the day planned.
Question 3. Referring to the search warrant issued June 30, 2005,
related to an investigation at the Marshall Space Flight Center: Did
you communicate, or cause any other person to communicate, the
existence of the search warrant to any persons associated with the
target of the search warrant?
Answer. No.
Question 4. Related to the same matter as Question 3: Please list
all persons outside the NASA OIG with whom you discussed the search
warrant between its issuance and its execution. Please describe the
nature and content of any such communications.
Answer. I had no such discussions.
Question 5. Please describe the history and nature of your
relationship with the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, Clay Johnson.
Answer. I would characterize my relationship with Mr. Johnson as
professional.
From January 2001 to April 2002, I was an Associate Counsel and
Special Assistant to the President as a member of the Office of the
Counsel to the President. I reported through the Deputy Counsel to the
Counsel. Mr. Johnson, as head of the Office of Presidential Personnel,
was an Assistant to the President, two levels higher than I on the
organizational chart and at a level equivalent to the Counsel to the
President, who was also an Assistant to the President. I was
responsible for ethics issues and frequently dealt with staff of the
Office of Presidential Personnel in connection with the processing of
Financial Disclosure Reports of persons under consideration for
nomination and appointment to Executive Branch positions requiring
confirmation by the U.S. Senate. The carrying out of this
responsibility brought me into occasional contact with Mr. Johnson.
I also was responsible for the review of Financial Disclosure
Reports of commissioned officers in the White House, including Mr.
Johnson, providing briefings on ethics issues and answering questions
related to compliance with certain laws and regulations, such as the
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.
These responsibilities brought me into contact with most White House
Office employees, including Mr. Johnson. Any contacts with him in
carrying out these responsibilities were of a routine nature.
During the summer of 2002, I had occasion to play in a Saturday
golf game with Mr. Johnson which was arranged by the then NASA
Administrator.
After Mr. Johnson became the Deputy Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, I came into contact with Mr. Johnson in his
capacity as the Chairman of the PCIE. My contact with Mr. Johnson was
generally limited to seeing and speaking to him occasionally at PCIE
meetings.
Question 6. Please describe any communications between you and Clay
Johnson between January 6, 2006, and the present time that related in
any way to the NASA OIG. Please describe the date and nature of the
communication, who initiated it, and the content.
Answer. I do not have records of contacts with Mr. Johnson, other
than as disclosed below. My contacts with him during the period of the
investigation by the Integrity Committee were initiated by me and were
intended to keep Mr. Johnson informed of the actions I was taking in
response to the investigation so that he would not be surprised. I
believe I contacted Mr. Johnson prior to my sending my July 17, 2006,
letters to the Director of the FBI and to the Integrity Committee to
advise him of my plans to send those letters. Likewise, I may have
called him prior to my sending my letters of August 23, 2006, and
September 7, 2006, and I believe I called him in November of 2006 prior
to sending my November 17, 2006, letter to the Director of the FBI
about leaks of confidential information from the investigation to the
Orlando Sentinel. In my communications to Mr. Johnson, I alerted him to
the content of my letters (all of these letters were copied to Mr.
Johnson, and are attached to my June 7 testimony as Exhibits)
emphasizing that I had never received any honest notice of what I was
accused of and that I was under an impression that I would not receive
a copy of any ``findings'' or have an opportunity to respond to them
and that the process defined in the governing Executive Order, 12993,
was not being followed. In two instances, when I copied Mr. Johnson
with my correspondence to the Integrity Committee, I wrote him notes of
transmittal stating as follows:
8/24/06
Dear Clay:
Enclosed are my August 23 letter to Burros and my letter to Mueller
of July 17. I believe the IC process is broken.
Aside from my letters, which are primarily focused on process, the
500 page transcript of my testimony fully demonstrates the offensive
nature of this.
I understand the process, such as it is, will play out and patience
is required.
Sincerely,
Moose
9/13/06
Dear Clay:
This is my submission In response to Burrus's letter of August 30.
Note the first item on Exhibit A. The IC is broken and needs to be
fixed. I will share some ideas on the subject after the wasteful and
abusive investigation I have been subjected to comes to an end.
Sincerely,
Moose
On those occasions I spoke to Mr. Johnson, his consistent response
was that there is a process in place and it would have to play out. I
believe, during a conversation in the fall, presumably in connection
with my contacting him about the reprehensible leak of information from
the investigation and my intent to report it, Mr. Johnson conceded that
there were problems with Integrity Committee processes and that he
expected that there would be some changes to Integrity Committee
procedures made.
In January of 2007, I was informed by the Integrity Committee that
it had forwarded a report to the Chair of the PCIE, Mr. Johnson. I
called Mr. Johnson to see if I could obtain a copy of the Integrity
Committee report. Mr. Johnson called me back and informed me that he
would not be providing the report to me and that I would have to obtain
it from the Integrity Committee. The Integrity Committee refused to
provide me a copy of that report (which I subsequently obtained only
after publication by a Congressional subcommittee on its website). In
my conversation with Mr. Johnson about the Integrity Committee report,
he read me one paragraph from the Integrity Committee's letter which
summarized the conclusion of the Integrity Committee, he told me that
he did not believe it was a White House matter, and he told me that he
intended to send the report to the NASA Administrator for review. Mr.
Johnson did not provide me with additional detail on the content of the
Integrity Committee report. Subsequently, I copied Mr. Johnson on an e-
mail request to Mr. Burrus relating to a commitment Mr. Burrus made to
provide me with the HUD OIG investigative report responsive to a FOIA
request that I had filed several months earlier. (As I was never
provided, during the course of the Integrity Committee process, any
proposed or final findings or conclusions of the HUD OIG or the
Integrity Committee, I was deprived of an opportunity to respond to the
findings and conclusions or the factual and legal basis for them. As
subsequently demonstrated in my testimony on June 7, the conclusions of
the Integrity Committee were without legal and factual basis.)
I sent Mr. Johnson by e-mail a copy of my prepared testimony for
the June 7 hearing, possibly having called him prior to sending it to
see if he wanted a copy of it. I do not recall any subsequent
conversations with Mr. Johnson about the investigation. I did see him
once socially (which was not prearranged) in the summer of 2007 and
recall discussing in most general terms issues relating to IG reform
legislation. I have communicated to him my recommendations for
improvement to the Integrity Committee in the context of commenting on
proposed legislation relating to Inspectors General. The e-mail
exchange relating to this is attached, along with the attachment to the
e-mail.
Question 7. Have you at any time discouraged an employee of the
NASA OIG from pursuing a criminal investigation of former NASA
[employee] (name deleted).
Answer. No.
In the context of my carrying out my supervisory responsibilities
and as the official ultimately accountable for the NASA OIG's work, I
try to keep informed as to the status of major or sensitive
investigative activity and to ensure that investigative activity is
properly resourced and focused. In various conversations with Office of
Investigations personnel, I inquired, as I frequently do with respect
to significant matters pending in the office, as to what we were
finding through investigation and to what extent we believed that
possible criminal activity was involved.
This case was no exception. In 2002, with respect to allegations
concerning (name deleted) I raised a question of whether the
allegations or facts known to the OIG, if true, constituted a crime.
From the written summary provided to me by the Office of
Investigations, the acts allegedly taken by (name deleted) occurred
prior to his being a Federal employee, and it appeared that, as a legal
matter, the theory of conflict of interest that was being investigated
was a legal impossibility. The conclusion of the Office of
Investigations, in coordination with the Department of Justice Public
Integrity Section, was that there was no crime or other issue
appropriate for further investigation and the investigation was closed.
With regard to a subsequent matter, I referred a question about
(name deleted)'s activities to the Office of Investigations. Based on
this and, I believe, other information that was received by the Office
of Investigations, an investigation was opened. As is the case in all
matters of alleged crime, the NASA OIG coordinated the allegations with
a United States Attorney's office and subsequently other components of
the Department of Justice. I cannot comment further given the legal
status of this matter, except to say that I did not take action to stop
or discourage a criminal investigation. Further details can be provided
by our Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.
______
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of the Inspector General
Washington, DC, August 15, 2003
Hon. Sean O'Keefe,
Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Washington, DC.
Subject: Observations on the Independence of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board
Dear Mr. O'Keefe:
Here are some observations I have about the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB), particularly as regards CAIB independence.
These observations result from my role as an observer to CAIB
activities, a role which I sought and you effected by letter dated
February 2, 2003.
Although NASA policy and the CAIB's original charter contained
provisions that could have hindered an independent investigation, based
on my observations, I believe the CAIB, under Admiral Harold Gehman's
leadership, is and has been conducting its investigation independently
and without undue influence from NASA. I say this while recognizing the
reliance that any investigative body would have on obtaining
information and analysis from NASA. I also note the time-sensitive
nature of the Board's challenge in light of the status of the
International Space Station.
The CAIB has been diligently focused on determining the cause(s) of
the accident and the remedies needed to prevent future mishaps. The
CAIB, despite the breadth of its inquiry and expertise, has not been
chartered to conduct a public policy debate on the merits of human
space flight or to examine whether, from a public policy standpoint,
return to flight best serves the public interest. However, to the
extent the Board distinguishes between return-to-flight and long-term
recommendations, it will facilitate NASA's return to flight. Overall,
it is my expectation that CAIB recommendations will help shape any
debate on the public policy issues.
NASA and the public will be best served by the issuance of an
accurate, constructive, and credible report by the CAIB. One possible
impediment to the Board's ability to issue such a report would be a
compromise of the CAIB's independence. Of course, ``independence'' is
subjective. The CAIB has constituencies including NASA, Congress, the
Administration, and the public. These constituencies and the media
provide information, advice, requests, and expectations. The Board has
been in contact with these constituencies and has sought to be
responsive to their needs.
My conclusion that the CAIB is acting independently and without
undue influence is based on my view that the Board can address the
challenging questions associated with the loss of the Space Shuttle
Columbia in good faith and without material impediments from
organizational or personal conflicts of interest. I have primarily
focused on the question of CAIB independence from NASA--the
organization in the best position to interfere in the CAIB's pursuit of
its objectives and with the most at stake in terms of the Board's
report and recommendations.
Appointment of the CAIB
On February 1, 2003, at approximately 9 a.m., mission control at
Johnson Space Center lost communication with Columbia during re-entry
into Earth's atmosphere. At 9:15 a.m., NASA declared a mishap after
determining that Columbia had experienced a critical failure in the
atmosphere over eastern Texas. At 9:16 a.m., the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight initiated the NASA Contingency Action
Plan, a document that delineates the pre-planned contingency response
to a space flight operations mishap. Within 24 hours of the Columbia
accident, NASA had formally activated the CAIB and published its
charter.
Independence of CAIB Questioned
The initial implementation of the CAIB was not without its
difficulties. During the fast few weeks after the Columbia accident,
Members of Congress and the news media expressed concerns that the
Board would operate at the direction of the NASA Administrator and that
NASA's influence would prevent the CAIB from conducting an independent
and objective investigation. CAIB members themselves expressed concerns
about taking direction from the NASA Administrator.
Revisions to the CAIB Charter
In connection with the issues regarding the CAIB's independence, I
recommended that the Chairman consider four modifications to the
Board's charter. These revisions addressed membership and staffing,
direct supervision of the CAIB by the NASA Administrator, access to
records, and review of NASA's management and fiscal environment
relating to Shuttle crew safety. In a separate letter to the CAIB, I
advised the Chairman that he should take steps to ensure its
independence in connection with the participation of certain senior-
level NASA executives on the Board. (See Enclosures 1 and 2 for
February 14, 2003, memoranda to the CAIB.) The CAIB was already
contemplating independence issues, and it sought changes to the charter
and took other actions to address these issues. NASA management was
supportive of changes to the CAIB charter, which was revised several
times.
As a result of one of the charter revisions, the CAIB was no longer
required to follow the NASA mishap policy. This change provided the
Board the ability to alter the organization and composition of its
membership. For example, the change to the charter that permitted the
CAIB to determine its own policies gave it the flexibility to make
changes that would eliminate the perception of conflicts of interest in
Board proceedings. Specifically, the Chairman replaced an ex officio
member of the Board who was a NASA senior official whose NASA duties
would likely fall under the broad scope of the CAIB's review. Another
NASA senior official, while nominally an ex officio member of the CAIB
in an administrative capacity, returned to his NASA duties with very
little association with the Board after mid-March. While the officials
had proven invaluable in helping establish the CAIB, the need for their
services lessened as the Board became fully staffed and supported.
Ultimately, the CAIB Chairman added four new members with expertise
in aeronautics, astronautics, physics, space science, and space policy.
The changes to the charter, composition, and manner of operations were
intended, in part, to address questions about CAIB independence.
Relationships Between NASA and Individual Board Members
In my view, the CAIB has been composed and operated in a manner
that strikes an appropriate balance between those with limited or no
prior dealings with NASA and those with familiarity with the Agency.
The military members of the Board and the FAA employee have had, for
the most part, little or no association with NASA beyond participating
in mishap activities. Their collective expertise lies primarily in
safety and accident investigations. In contrast, other Board members
have had greater prior exposure to NASA operations. For example, based
on publicly available information, seven of the thirteen CAIB members
worked as NASA contractors or received NASA grants in the past. Two of
these seven members have served on the NASA Advisory Council, and two
are former NASA employees (one worked on the Gemini and Apollo programs
in the 1960s, and the other is a former astronaut and member of the
Rogers Commission, which investigated the Challenger accident). Another
CAIB member was a White House Fellow at NASA and worked as the NASA
administrator's executive assistant and White House liaison at the time
of the Challenger accident. Also, one CAIB member is a full-time NASA
employee. The breadth of experience of CAIB members has enabled the
Board to engage in a comprehensive and independent examination of the
Shuttle disaster.
The CAIB was criticized on the basis of independence because those
persons who were added after the original composition of the Board were
placed on the NASA payroll. Critics presumed that anyone receiving a
paycheck from NASA would somehow be compromised. Without any exercise
of supervision by NASA over these persons, there is no merit to a claim
that NASA controls the actions of these persons or that they might be
beholden to NASA because of the salaries' source. In some respect,
making these persons NASA employees reduced the opportunity for
conflicts of interest. In becoming Federal employees, these individuals
became subject to conflict of interest laws that otherwise would not
have applied.
CAIB Disclosure to the Public
To address the public's interest in the proceedings, the CAIB began
holding press conferences and public hearings. However, public
disclosure was complicated because the CAIB was conducting a safety
investigation that extended a limited privilege to certain witnesses.
Limited privilege protects witness statements from public disclosure.
The theory behind a safety investigation is that an accident's cause(s)
can be best determined in an atmosphere where admissions of mistakes
and criticisms of superiors or programs are free from reprisal or
retribution. As the objective of the CAIB is to identify the cause(s)
of the accident rather than to place blame on particular individuals,
the limited privilege procedure seems reasonably designed to assist in
this regard. In my role as observer, I respected the principle of
limited privilege and, therefore, was not privy to the testimonies of
those witnesses to whom limited privilege was extended. It is
noteworthy that the privilege in no way protects information suggesting
criminal activity.
As a result of the limited privilege protection, some information
obtained by the CAIB will be withheld from public release. Pursuant to
an arrangement with oversight committees, the CAIB is permitting
inspection of the privileged testimony of witnesses by Congressional
members and staff, subject to certain limitations. Heightened attention
is warranted for proceedings that have not been entirely transparent.
Congress, the Office of Inspector General, the media, and the public
will generate additional scrutiny.
Office of Inspector General (OIG) Continuing Role in Columbia-Related
Matters
The conclusions presented in this memorandum are based solely on my
observations. (The conclusions are not the product of a formal audit
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.)
Future activities are planned by the OIG to review the CAB's
activities and the Agency's resulting implementation of the Board's
findings and recommendations. We are currently conducting an audit of
CAIB financial and procurement management. The audit is examining
whether the CAIB established controls to ensure that cost expenditures
were reasonable, necessary, and accounted for and whether the Board
established contract agreements in accordance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. We will also monitor the Agency's plans for
implementing the Board's recommendations, including return-to-flight
activities, and consider all referrals the Board makes to the OIG. In
addition, the OIG will review NASA's contingency plans in the event one
or more of the three remaining orbiters is subject to catastrophic loss
or is otherwise out of service.
Because of the importance of its work to NASA, I sought to be an
observer to the Board's activities and to make recommendations
regarding CAIB organization on an ongoing basis rather than waiting
until after a report is issued, when any recommendations I might have
would be too late to be of any value. I also believed that proximity to
CAIB activities would strengthen the ability of my office to follow up
on CAIB-identified issues and to promote the efficiency and
effectiveness of NASA.
I appreciate the opportunity to have served as an observer to the
CAIB, which has permitted me to coordinate OIG activities with those of
the CAIB and to make these observations.
Sincerely,
Robert W. Cobb,
Inspector General.
Enclosures
cc:
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, USN (Ret.)
Chairman
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Hon. Ted Stevens
Chairman
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Hon. Robert C. Byrd
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Hon. Christopher Bond
Chairman
Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
Hon. Barbara Mikulski
Ranking Member
Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
Hon. John McCain
Chairman
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Hon. Ernest Hollings
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Hon. Sam Brownback
Chairman
Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
Hon. John Breaux
Ranking Member
Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
Hon. Susan Collins
Chairwoman
Senate Committee on Government Affairs
Hon. Joseph Lieberman
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Government Affairs
Hon. C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
House Committee on Appropriations
Hon. David R. Obey
Ranking Member
House Committee on Appropriations
Hon. James T. Walsh
Chairman
House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
Hon. Alan Mollohan
Ranking Member
House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
Hon. Tom Davis
Chairman
House Committee on Government Reform
Hon. Henry Waxman
Ranking Member
House Committee on Government Reform
Hon. Todd Russell Platts
Chairman
House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management
Hon. Edolphus Towns
Ranking Member
House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management
Hon. Adam H. Putnam
Chairman
House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental
Relations and the Census
Hon. William L. Clay, Jr.
Ranking Member
House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental
Relations and the Census
Hon. Sherwood Boehlert
Chairman
House Committee on Science
Hon. Ralph Hall
Ranking Member
House Committee on Science
Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
Chairman
House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Hon. Bart Gordon
Ranking Member
House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
______
Enclosure 1
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of the Inspector General
Washington, DC, February 14, 2003
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, USN (Ret.),
Chairman,
Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
Houston, TX.
Dear Admiral Gehman:
At the February 12, 2003, Congressional hearing on the Columbia
accident, members of NASA's oversight committees expressed concern that
the membership of the Board and its charter could limit the Board's
ability to carry out its duties with independence and objectivity. In
response to the concern expressed at the hearing, the NASA
Administrator amended the Board's charter to expand your flexibility
and remove any inference of NASA oversight.
In order to assist you and the Administrator in ensuring that the
Board's activities are independent, here are some general ideas for
your consideration. These could be worked into the guidelines section
of the charter, any further amendment of the responsibilities listed in
the charter, or in a letter summarizing your interpretation of the
Board's responsibilities under the charter.
The Board will add members and use independent technical
expertise as necessary to reach independent conclusions and
recommendations.
The Board will not be subject to supervision by the
Administrator or any, employee of NASA. Neither the
Administrator nor any delegate of the Administrator will
prevent or prohibit the Board from initiating, carrying out or
completing any task regarding the investigation of the Columbia
accident.
The Board shall have access to all records, reports, audits,
reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material
available to NASA programs and operations that are relevant to
the investigation of the Columbia accident.
In considering all causes of the accident, the Board will
review NASA budgeting and management to determine whether an
environment could have existed that did not maximize human
space flight safety.
I am prepared to discuss these suggestions or any other matter as
the Board deliberates how it can effectively accomplish its mission in
a technically sound and independent manner.
Sincerely,
Robert W. Cobb,
Inspector General.
cc: NASA Administrator
______
Enclosure 2
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of the Inspector General
Washington, DC, February 14, 2003
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, USN (Ret.),
Chairman,
Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
Houston, TX.
Re: Involvement in Board Activities by NASA Employees
Dear Admiral Gehman:
The Board will need to be extraordinarily sensitive to the issue of
NASA employees' involvement in Board activities. There is tremendous
value in the information and views that these employees provide. On the
other hand, these persons may appear to some to have loyalties to NASA
and NASA programs that could impair their objectivity.
In particular, the Board's ex officio member (Bryan O'Connor) and
executive secretary (Theron Bradley) are NASA's Associate Administrator
for Safety and Mission Assurance and Chief Engineer, respectively. The
Board will delve into NASA's safety and mission assurance and
engineering programs. The Board should take steps to ensure
independence in its evaluation of program management in these two
areas. More, the Board must strive to prevent even the appearance of
conflict of interest in these areas.
In addition, Scott Hubbard is the Center Director at the Ames
Research Center. While Mr. Hubbard does not appear to have significant
programmatic responsibilities relevant to the investigation, his status
as a senior NASA official establishes the appearance of an
organizational conflict that the other members of the Board need to be
mindful of in the conduct of Board activities.
The Board has already taken some helpful steps:
1. The breaking of the Board into subgroups has taken the
initial consideration of issues out of the boardroom and into
smaller groups that do not include the executive secretary or
the ex officio member.
2. The Board in at least one instance has had certain NASA
employees step out of the room in connection with a briefing to
assure the free flow of information to the Board and to
minimize any appearance of conflicts of interest.
3. The Board has sought and obtained amendments to the charter
to provide it greater independence from NASA.
The Board should consider taking the following steps:
1. When the Board collectively evaluates the program management
of engineering and of safety and mission assurance, it should
request that the program officials in these areas step out of
the boardroom--except where those officials are answering
questions about their programs posed to them by the Board.
2. The Board should treat any information obtained by witnesses
from within the engineering and safety and mission assurance
programs that is critical of program organization or management
as being privileged from release to these program heads so that
there is no organizational disincentive for witnesses from
within those particular programs to provide information.
Witnesses in these areas should be advised of the Board's
policies in this regard and specifically asked if they want the
information they have provided to be shielded from these
program managers. NASA employees who are witnesses should be
told that they might seek protection from reprisal by calling
the Office of Inspector General, which is by statute obligated
to protect whistleblowers.
I also note that since the revised charter indicates that the Board
is subject to its own policies rather than those of NASA, there is no
limit on the Board's ability to reorganize its support in such a way as
to eliminate appearances of conflicts of interest that may arise by
virtue of provisions in NASA's policies concerning mishap
investigation.
I hope this is of assistance to you.
Sincerely,
Robert W. Cobb,
Inspector General.
______
Policy and Procedures for Exercising the Authority of the Integrity
Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
Preface
In January 1995, the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency
(ECIE) established an Integrity Committee (IC), pursuant to authority
granted by Executive Order (EO) 12805.
In EO 12993, signed on March 21, 1996, the IC was formally
recognized and specifically tasked by the President to receive, review,
and refer for investigation, where appropriate, allegations of
wrongdoing against an Inspector General (IG) or, in the limited
circumstances defined in EO 12993, allegations against a staff member
in an IG office (OIG). However, the authority granted to the IC by EO
12993 does not encompass the statutory IGs of the Legislative Branch.
EO 12993 directs the IC to ``establish the policies and procedures
necessary to ensure consistency in conducting investigations and
reporting activities under [the] order.'' This document seeks to
accomplish that goal.
The policy and procedures provide a framework for the investigative
function of the IC. The IC must consider a wide variety of allegations
of wrongdoing and analyze conflicting information during its
deliberations. Such deliberations require discretionary determinations.
The standards and requirements set out in this document provide the
structure in which that discretion can be exercised. However, policy
and procedures cannot be read to dictate determinative outcomes in any
particular matter before the IC.
The IC policy and procedures were developed under the guidance of
its Chairperson and were considered and accepted by the full IC. Drafts
of the policy and procedures were vetted with the membership of the
PCIE and ECIE. The IC policy and procedures also have the concurrence
of the Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons of the PCIE/ECIE.
After conducting itself under these procedures for a period of
time, the IC may determine that amendments are desired. In that event,
the IC shall vote on any proposed amendment, which must be endorsed by
its Chairperson. The IC win notify the PCIE/ECIE Chairperson and Vice
Chairpersons of the proposed change. Any substantive changes will be
vetted with the membership of the PCIE and ECIE. Unless the Chairperson
or Vice Chairpersons voice disagreement within thirty days, the
proposed amendment will become final.
The IC remains dedicated to building and ensuring integrity in the
IG community by fulfilling its responsibilities under EO 12993 and by
leading discussions of, and ongoing education on, integrity issues.
Table of Contents
I. Statement of Policy
II. Receipt and Initial Screening of Allegations
A. Receipt of Complaints
B. Screening of Complaints by the Working Group
C. Determinations by the Public Integrity Section
D. Definitions
III. Integrity Committee Meetings
A. Administrative Details
B. Review of Allegations
C. Notification to Complainants, Subjects, and Subjects' Agency
Heads of Integrity Committee Decisions
D. Review and Transmittal of Investigative Reports
E. Disposition of Agency Head Reports
IV. Policy Review
A. The Integrity Committee Chairperson
B. The Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons of the PCIE/ECIE
V. Maintenance of Integrity Committee Records
A. The Central Records System
B. Disclosure of Information under the Freedom of Information
Act
C. Privacy Act Protection
D. Physical Maintenance of Records
I. Statement of Policy
The IC serves as an independent investigative mechanism for
allegations of administrative misconduct brought against IGs and, under
certain circumstances, members of their staffs, as authorized by EO
12993.
Allegations against an agency OIG staff member, that implicate that
agency's IC are within the jurisdiction of the IG.
Allegations against certain staff members must be referred to the
IC when an IG, unable to refer them to another Executive Branch agency
with investigative jurisdiction over the matter, determines that an
internal investigation would lack objectivity, or would appear to lack
objectivity.
The IC receives allegations, reviews them, and, where necessary,
refers them for investigation either to an agency with jurisdiction
over the matter or to an investigative team composed of selected
investigators supervised and controlled by the IC's Chairperson.
The procedures which follow describe how the IC, in implementing EO
12993, will ensure timeliness, fairness, and consistency in conducting,
and reporting, investigations and other activities.
II. Receipt and Initial Screening of Allegations
A. Receipt of Complaints
The IC receives complaints containing allegations from a variety of
sources, among them private citizens and government officials. The IC
will respond to all named complainants in writing, advising them that
the allegations have been received. In the IC's reply, complainants
will generally be advised that the IC concentrates its efforts on
allegations of serious misconduct by an IG or an OIG staff member under
the circumstances described in EO 12993. Complainants will also be
advised that the IC will refer cases to other investigative bodies,
close cases, or take other actions consistent with its discretionary
powers under EO 12993. Complainants may contact the IC in writing to
learn the status of a pending case; however, details of pending
investigations will not be provided.
B. Screening of Complaints by the Working Group
1. Initial Review. The working group of the IC will conduct a
timely, initial review of the complaint to determine whether the
allegations made are credible and not frivolous, and fall within the
IC's jurisdiction under EO 12993. Based on that review, a course of
action for every allegation will be recommended to the IC for
consideration at the next scheduled IC meeting. The working group may
conduct, or cause to be conducted, administrative inquiries to obtain
additional information.
(a) Not Within Jurisdiction of the IC. If an allegation of
misconduct does not fall within the jurisdiction of the IC and/
or is frivolous or lacks credibility, the working group will
recommend to the IC that a letter be sent to the complainant
advising of that determination and that no further action will
be taken concerning the complaint.
(b) Within Jurisdiction of the IC. If a credible, nonfrivolous
allegation of misconduct falls within the jurisdiction of the
IC, the working group will refer the complaint containing the
allegation to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice for a determination of
potential criminality.
2. Assignment of Case File Number. A document containing
allegations will be assigned a file number as a record of the IC for
indexing purposes in the FBI Central Records System.
C. Determinations by the Public Integrity Section
The Public Integrity Section will review each complaint referred by
the working group of the IC to determine whether it presents
information sufficient to warrant a criminal investigation. The working
group will maintain the case file containing the complaint in a pending
status until the conclusion of the Public Integrity Section's review.
When a criminal investigation has been conducted, the IC Chairperson
may request that the investigative authority provide, for IC review, a
summary report of the results of the investigation as it relates to the
jurisdiction of the IC. If during, or after, IC review of the matter,
the IC Chairperson determines that additional information should be
considered by the Public Integrity Section, the IC Chairperson will
refer such information to the Public Integrity Section and maintain the
allegation in a pending status.
D. Definitions
``Frivolous allegations'' means those allegations that would not
constitute criminal violations or administrative misconduct, even if
they prove to be true.
``Administrative misconduct'' means noncriminal misconduct, or
misconduct that the Public Integrity Section declines to pursue on a
criminal basis, that evidences a violation of any law, rule, or
regulation; or gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of
authority, in the exercise of official duties or while acting under
color of office.
``Working group'' means agency staff associated with the
Chairperson of the IC, who is the FBI's representative to the PCIE. All
IC correspondence is handled by the working group.
``Agency head'' means the head of a department, agency, or Federal
entity; or an IG who has referred allegations against a subordinate to
the IC for investigation.
III. IC Meetings
A. Administrative Details
1. Membership. The IC is composed of the following members: a
Chairperson, who is the FBI official designated by the Director of the
FBI to serve on the PCIE; the Special Counsel of the Office of Special
Counsel; the Director of the Office of Government Ethics; and three, or
more, IGs, representing both the PCIE and the ECIE, appointed by the
PCIE/ECIE Chairperson. The Chief of the Public Integrity Section of the
Department of Justice, or his designee, attends the meetings in an
advisory capacity.
2. Frequency of Meetings. The IC will meet at least once each
quarter to review the status of all pending cases. More frequent
meetings may be called at the discretion of the IC's chairperson. It is
expected that an IC member will miss no more than two meetings a year.
3. Location of Meetings. IC meetings will be held at a location
agreed upon by the members, usually at an IC member's agency.
4. Records of Meetings. A written agenda of each meeting, and
decisions made pursuant to each agenda item, will be made and retained
as a record of the IC.
B. Review of Allegations
1. New Allegations. The working group will provide a report to the
IC describing allegations of administrative misconduct. The report will
also list any new allegations unrelated to the allegations determined
by the Public Integrity Section to warrant criminal investigation. In
handling an allegation of administrative misconduct, the IC must:
(a) determine whether the allegation is within its
jurisdiction;
Allegations that may be outside the IC's review
authority include general, nonspecific complaints about
the effectiveness of a particular IG. Those issues can
be referred to other officials, as appropriate.
(b) determine whether further investigation is necessary;
Some allegations received by the IC may not warrant
further investigation and, therefore, the IC may choose
to take no further investigative action. The IC
Chairperson will notify the complainant in writing of
the IC's decision.
(c) determine whether there is an Executive Branch agency with
appropriate jurisdiction over the matter to conduct an
investigation; and
For example, equal employment opportunity complaints
are referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, while allegations of illegal political
activity, whistleblower retaliation, or prohibited
personnel practices are referred to the Office of
Special Counsel, or another agency as provided by law.
In accord with Section 4(b) of EO 12993, the IC will
request a summary of the findings from the
investigative authority to which complaints have been
referred.
(d) determine how to handle investigations that do not fall
within the investigative jurisdiction of another Executive
Branch agency.
EO 12993 allows the IC to request that the FBI conduct
such investigations, or that such investigations be
conducted by uninvolved OIGs under the control and
supervision of the IC Chairperson. Should an
investigation by such an OIG be required, the IC
Chairperson, with the assistance of the PCIE/ECIE
Chairperson if necessary, will request the assistance
of IGs whose personnel have the requisite expertise.
OIG investigators will be assigned to the IC with
funding for the investigation provided in accord with
EO 12993.
2. Allegations Currently Under Investigation. The IC may review the
status of any investigations currently under way and will request
expeditious and appropriate action, where necessary.
3. Allegations for Which an Investigation Report Has Been Issued.
When the IG receives an investigative report, it must determine whether
the report establishes any misconduct on the part of the subject of the
investigation. If the report does not establish misconduct, the IC will
close the matter and so notify the PCIE/ECIE Chairperson. The IC may
also choose to forward such a report to the PCIE/ECIE Chairperson and
suggest that the Chairperson share the report with the subject's agency
head, and/or the subject, where appropriate (for example, where the
allegation has become generally known and is now disproved or was
initially referred to the IC by the agency head). However, if, in the
IC's opinion, the report does establish misconduct or otherwise
requires action, the IC shall refer the report to the PCIE/ECIE
Chairperson with recommendations for appropriate action.
C. Notification to Complainants, Subjects, and Subjects' Agency Heads
of IC Decisions
Notice of the IC's decisions to close, refer, or initiate
investigations of allegations will be provided to the complainant, the
subject, and the subject's agency head, when, and if, appropriate. Each
may request in writing from the IC a general status update while the
case is open. However, the IC will not provide details on pending
investigations.
D. Review and Transmittal of Investigative Reports
EO 12993 requires that the IC forward to the PCIE/ECIE Chairperson
investigative reports with IC recommendations for further action if the
results of the particular investigation warrant such recommendations.
The PCIE/ECIE Chairperson will then work with appropriate offices based
on the investigative findings and recommendations of the IC. The PCIE/
ECIE Chairperson may, when he or she deems appropriate, forward these
findings and recommendations to the appropriate parties, such as agency
heads of the subjects of the reports.
E. Disposition of Agency Head Reports
1. Receipt From PCIE/ECIE Chairperson. The PCIE/ECIE Chairperson is
responsible for forwarding to the IC the agency heads reports on any
actions taken in response to the investigative findings. In accord with
section 4(d) of EO 12993, an agency head has sixty days to review an
investigative report, take action or decide on a course of action, and
to so notify the PCIE/ECIE chairperson. The PCIE/ECIE chairperson may
choose to extend that time limit for another thirty days, if necessary.
2. IC Review. The IC will review the course of action taken by the
agency head concerning the investigative findings, and if the IC
believes that the action was appropriate, it will close the matter. If
the IC has concerns regarding the action, it may so advise the PCIE/
ECIE Chairperson and suggest an alternative. However, the IC has no
power to compel any particular action.
IV. Policy Review
A. The IC Chairperson
As Chairperson of the IC, the FBI representative to the PCIE/ECIE
is the Federal official with primary responsibility for: (1) the
effective conduct of the IC; and (2) responses to inquiries regarding
allegations received from Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branch
officials, in a manner consistent with applicable law. The IC
Chairperson oversees the working group, the quality of IC investigative
reports, and discretionary determinations. The IC Chairperson is also
responsible for the timeliness of IC actions; and IC (and/or IC-led
FBI) investigations. The IC Chairperson may recommend changes to the IC
procedures as he or she finds necessary. The IC Chairperson will also
issue an annual report to the PCIE/ECIE Chairperson on the status of
complaints received by the IC.
B. The Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons of the PCIE/ECIE
The PCIE/ECIE Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons provide guidance
and support to the Chairperson of the IC. After the completion of IC
action on a matter within its jurisdiction, the PCIE/ECIE Chairperson
and Vice Chairpersons may review with an IG, or with other appropriate
parties, any allegations which appear to constitute a pattern of
misconduct or gross mismanagement in a particular OIG.
V. Maintenance of IC Records
A. The Central Records System
1. Content of Records. All documents received or transmitted by the
IC in fulfilling its responsibilities under EO 12993 (including, but
not limited to, written complaints making allegations against IGs; IC
correspondence; reports of administrative misconduct investigations;
reports of final actions taken with regard to proven allegations; and
memoranda providing the final dispositions of allegations determined to
be frivolous, outside the jurisdiction of the IC, or otherwise closed
without further investigation) will be collected and maintained as IC
records in the FBI's Central Records System. The Central Records System
consists of a numerical sequence of subject matter files and an index.
2. Criminal Investigative Files Not Included as Integrity Committee
Records. The Integrity Committee records will not include any criminal
investigative files with general investigative information arising out
of Public Integrity Section referrals of criminal allegations to the
FBI. However, Integrity Committee records may contain information from
criminal investigative files when such information is the source of the
alleged administrative misconduct. The FBI's criminal investigative
files are maintained in the Central Records System under the subject
matter of the criminal violation, and, therefore, will be separate from
IC records.
B. Disclosure of Information Under the Freedom of Information Act
Third party requests (requests by individuals other than the IG or
OIG staff member, who is the subject of the allegation) for information
will be processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
(Title 5, U.S.C., Section 562), in accord with applicable law;
regulations implementing the FOIA at Title 28, C.F.R. Part 16, Subpart
A; and FBI FOIA policy and procedures.
C. Privacy Act Protection
1. Restrictions on Disclosure. The records of the IC will he
maintained in accord with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Title 5, U.S.C.,
Section 552a), which restricts the disclosure of all records contained
in a system of records maintained by an Executive Branch agency and
retrieved by an individual's name or a personal identifier, such as a
Social Security Number. The records may be disclosed only in response
to the written request of, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual, to whom the record pertains, or under the conditions
specifically set forth in the Act at Section 552a(b).
2. Access by Individuals to Their Own Records. Procedures for
access by individuals to their own records have been established by the
Privacy Act and in regulations implementing the Act at Title 28,
C.F.R., Part 16, Subpart D. All disclosures of information requested
from the IC records will be coordinated with the IC.
D. Physical Maintenance of Records
1. Retention of Records The records of the IC will be maintained by
the working group in a restricted area.
2. Disposal of Records. FBI record disposition programs relevant to
the Central Records System are conducted under the FBI Records
Retention Plan and Disposition schedule approved by the Archivist of
the United States and U.S. District Court, District of Columbia.
Administrative records at Headquarters which meet the destruction
criteria are destroyed after a period of 10 years or when
administrative needs have expired, whichever is later.
Approved: William J. Esposito Date: 4/24/97
Chairman
Integrity Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency
______
Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency; dated
October 2003
Foreword
On the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended, the members of the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive Council on Integrity
and Efficiency (ECIE) have updated the Quality Standards for Federal
Offices of Inspector General. To commemorate the anniversary, we are
issuing this update with a silver cover. The standards in the Silver
Book set forth the overall quality framework for managing, operating,
and conducting the work of Offices of Inspector General and will guide
the Inspector General Community's efforts into the future.
Gaston L. Gianni, Jr.
Vice Chair, PCIE
Barry Snyder
Vice Chair, ECIE
Contents
I. Introduction
A. Purpose
B. OIG Mission
C. Relationship to Federal Legislation and Regulations, and
Federal and Professional Standards
II. Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
A. General Standard
B. Standards for Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch
C. Independence
D. Confidentiality
III. Professional Standards
A. General Standard
IV. Ensuring Internal Control
A. General Standard
B. Efficient and Effective Operations
C. Control Environment
D. Risk Assessment
E. Control Activities
F. Information and Communication
G. Monitoring
V. Maintaining Quality Assurance
A. General Standard
B. Quality Assurance Program
C. Elements of an Internal Quality Assurance Program
D. Elements of an External Quality Assurance Program
VI. Planning and Coordinating
A. General Standard
B. Elements of the Planning Process
C. Coordination Considerations
D. Prevention
VII. Communicating Results of OIG Activities
A. General Standard
B. Keeping the Head of the Agency Informed
C. Keeping the Congress Informed
D. Keeping the Congress and Agency Informed on Performance
E. Keeping Program Managers Informed
F. Keeping Ethics Officials Informed
G. Keeping the Attorney General Informed
H. Elements of Effective Reporting
VIII. Managing Human Capital
A. General Standard
B. Human Capital Processes
C. Core Competencies
D. Skills Assessment
IX. Reviewing Legislation and Regulations
A. General Standard
B. Elements of Legislative and Regulatory Review
X. Receiving and Reviewing Allegations
A. General Standard
B. Elements of a System for Receiving and Reviewing Allegations
C. Feedback
Appendix I
Legislation, Executive Orders, Standards, and OMB and Other
Guidance Impacting the Inspector General Community
Appendix II
Members of the PCIE/ECIE Advisory Committee to Revise the Quality
Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General
______
Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General
I. Introduction
A. Purpose
This document contains quality standards for the management,
operation, and conduct of the Federal Offices of Inspector General
(OIG). Executive Order 12805 gives the President's Council on Integrity
and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (ECIE) \1\ the responsibility for developing professional
standards for OIGs.\2\ The members of the PCIE and ECIE have formulated
and adopted these standards. They are for OIG use to guide the conduct
of official duties in a professional manner. These standards
incorporate by reference the existing professional standards for audit,
investigation, and inspection and evaluation efforts.
Public office carries with it a responsibility to apply and account
for the use of public resources economically, efficiently, and
effectively.\3\ The OIGs have a special need for high standards of
professionalism and integrity in light of the mission of the Inspectors
General under the Act.\4\ Because of this special need, the PCIE and
ECIE have adopted the general quality standards contained in this
document.
B. OIG Mission
OIGs have responsibility to report on current performance and
accountability and to foster good program management to ensure
effective government operations. The Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG
Act), as amended, created the OIGs to: \5\
1. Conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations
relating to the programs and operations of their agencies;
2. Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations to
make recommendations concerning the impact of such legislation
and regulations on economy and efficiency or the prevention and
detection of fraud and abuse;
3. Provide leadership for activities designed to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and to promote efforts
to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and
operations of their agencies;
4. Coordinate relationships between the agency and other
Federal agencies, State and local government agencies, and non-
government agencies to promote economy and efficiency, to
prevent and detect fraud and abuse, or to identify and
prosecute participants engaged in fraud or abuse;
5. Inform their agency heads and Congress of problems in their
agencies' programs and operations and the necessity for and
progress of corrective actions; and
6. Report to the Attorney General whenever the Inspector
General has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a
violation of Federal criminal law.
In addition to audits and investigations referenced in item 1
above, OIGs may conduct, supervise, and coordinate inspections,
evaluations, and other reviews related to the programs and operations
of their agencies.
C. Relationship to Federal Legislation and Regulations, and Federal and
Professional Standards
OIG operations are subject to a variety of Federal legislation and
regulations, and Federal and other professional standards, such as the
IG Act, Single Audit Act, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of
the Executive Branch, the Government Auditing Standards, the PCIE
Quality Standards for Inspections, and the PCIE/ECIE Quality Standards
for Investigations. The standards contained in this document are
derived from these and other requirements. However, these standards are
not intended to contradict or supersede applicable standards or Federal
laws and regulations. See Appendix I for a list of major laws,
regulations, and standards that apply to OIGs.
An OIG may be a component of an entity that is not legally defined
as a ``Federal agency.'' For this reason, or other reasons, certain
laws, regulations, or other guidance cited in this document may not be
directly applicable to certain OIGs. Where a standard contained in this
document is premised on law or other criteria that are not directly
applicable to an OIG, OIGs are encouraged to adopt the underlying
principles and concepts to their operations where appropriate and
feasible.
II. Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
A. General Standard \6\
The Inspector General and OIG staff shall adhere to the highest
ethical principles by conducting their work with integrity.\7\
Integrity is the cornerstone of all ethical conduct, ensuring
adherence to accepted codes of ethics and practice. Objectivity,
independence, professional judgment, and confidentiality are all
elements of integrity.
Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually
honest, and free of conflicts of interest.
Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without
independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is impaired.
Professional judgment requires working with competence and
diligence. Competence is a combination of education and experience and
involves a commitment to learning and professional improvement.
Professional standards for audits, investigations, and inspections and
evaluations require continuing professional education (see the Managing
Human Capital standard). Diligence requires that services be rendered
promptly, carefully, and thoroughly and by observing the applicable
professional and ethical standards.
Confidentiality requires respecting the value and ownership of
privileged, confidential, or classified information received and
protecting that information, and safeguarding the identity of
confidential informants. In some instances, legal or professional
obligations may require an OIG to disclose information it has received.
B. Standards for Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch
The Inspector General and OIG staff shall follow the Standards for
Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch \8\ (Ethical
Standards) and the Federal conflict of interest laws.\9\ These
standards require the Inspector General and the OIG staff to respect
and adhere to the 14 principles of ethical conduct, as well as the
implementing standards contained in the Ethical Standards and in
supplemental agency regulations.\10\ The first principle emphasizes
that public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place
loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above private
gain.
Executive Order 12993 (``Administrative Allegations Against
Inspectors General'') \11\ provides an independent investigative
mechanism to ensure that administrative allegations against IGs and OIG
senior staff are expeditiously investigated and resolved. The Order
establishes a PCIE/ECIE Integrity Committee to receive, review, and
refer such allegations. OIGs should maintain policies and controls to
ensure that allegations are handled consistent with the executive
order. OIGs should also have in place policies and procedures to ensure
that criminal allegations against the IG or senior OIG staff are
appropriately referred to the Attorney General.
Where a situation is not covered by a specific standard set forth
in the Ethical Standards or in supplemental agency regulations, the
Inspector General and OIG staff shall apply the principles underlying
the standards in determining whether their planned or actual conduct is
proper.\12\ OIG staff should also consult with the Designated Agency
Ethics Official or similar official within their agency or organization
regarding application of the Ethical Standards.
C. Independence
The Inspector General and OIG staff must be free both in fact and
appearance from personal, external, and organizational impairments to
independence. The Inspector General and OIG staff have a responsibility
to maintain independence, so that opinions, conclusions, judgments, and
recommendations will be impartial and will be viewed as impartial by
knowledgeable third parties. The Inspector General and OIG staff should
avoid situations that could lead reasonable third parties with
knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances to conclude that the
OIG is not able to maintain independence in conducting its work.
1. Statutory Independence
The IG Act of 1978, as amended, established OIGs to create
organizationally independent and objective units. This statutory
independence is intended to ensure the integrity and objectivity of OIG
activities. The IG Act of 1978, as amended, authorizes Inspectors
General to:
a. Conduct such audits and investigations, and issue such
reports, as they believe appropriate (with limited national
security and law enforcement exceptions).\13\
b. Issue subpoenas for information and documents outside the
agency (with the same limited exceptions).\14\
c. Have direct access to all records and information of the
agency.\15\
d. Have ready access to the agency head.\16\
e. Administer oaths for taking testimony.\17\
f. Hire and control their own staff and contract resources.\18\
g. Request assistance from any Federal, state, or local
governmental agency or unit.\19\
Inspectors General report both to the head of their respective
agencies and to the Congress.\20\ This dual reporting responsibility is
the framework within which Inspectors General perform their functions.
Unique in government, dual reporting is the legislative safety net that
protects the Inspector General's independence and objectivity.
2. Personal Impairments
Personal impairments of staff members result from relationships and
beliefs that might cause OIG staff members to limit the extent of an
inquiry, limit disclosure, or weaken or slant their work in any way.
OIG staff are responsible for notifying the appropriate officials
within their organization if they have any personal impairments to
independence.
3. External Impairments
Factors external to the OIG may restrict the work or interfere with
an OIG's ability to form independent and objective opinions and
conclusions. External impairments to independence occur when the OIG
staff is deterred from acting objectively and exercising professional
skepticism by pressures, actual or perceived, from management and
employees of the reviewed entity or oversight organizations. OIGs
should have policies and procedures in place to resolve or report
external impairments to independence when they exist.
These impairments could include, but are not limited to, the
following: \21\
a. external interference or influence that could improperly or
imprudently limit or modify the scope of OIG work or threaten
to do so, including pressure to reduce inappropriately the
extent of work performed in order to reduce costs or fees;
b. external interference with the selection or application of
OIG procedures, the selection of transactions to be examined,
or access to records or personnel;
c. unreasonable restrictions on the time allowed to complete
OIG work or reports;
d. interference external to the OIG in the assignment,
appointment, promotion, or termination of OIG personnel;
e. restrictions on funds or other resources provided to the OIG
organization that adversely affect the OIG's ability to carry
out its responsibilities;
f. authority to overrule or to inappropriately influence OIG
judgment as to the appropriate content of reports;
g. threat of replacement over a disagreement with the contents
of an OIG report, conclusions, or the application of an
accounting principle or other criteria; and
h. influences that jeopardize the continued employment of the
IG or other OIG staff other than incompetence, misconduct, or
the need for OIG services.
4. Types of Services
Auditors and audit organizations within OIGs have a specific
independence standard \22\ required by Government Auditing Standards.
This standard requires that, while auditors have the capability of
performing a range of services for their clients, in some circumstances
it is not appropriate for them to perform both audit and certain
nonaudit services for the same client. The standard is based on two
overarching principles:
a. Auditors should not perform management functions or make
management decisions; and
b. Auditors should not audit their own work or provide nonaudit
services in situations where the amounts or services involved
are significant/material to the subject matter of the audit.
In addition to its application to OIG audit activities, the first
overarching principle should be applied broadly to all OIG activities.
Specifically, OIG staff, and others under OIG direction, should not
perform management functions or make management decisions for their
agency.
OIG audit organizations should take steps to ensure that auditors
under contract to the OIG do not have independence impairments.
5. Conflicting Financial Interests
An OIG staff member's objectivity and independence may also be
affected by personal financial interests that are held by the staff
member or by certain family members, or by positions the staff member
holds as a trustee, director, officer, or employee of an outside
organization. OIG staff should notify appropriate officials within
their organization if they have a potentially conflicting financial
interest.
D. Confidentiality
Each OIG shall safeguard the identity of confidential sources and
protect privileged, confidential, and national security or classified
information in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and
professional standards.
Congress has provided specific authority for withholding the
identities of agency employees who make complaints to the OIG. Under
Section 7 of the IG Act of 1978, as amended, the OIG may receive and
investigate complaints or information from employees concerning the
possible existence of an activity constituting a violation of law,
rules, or regulations; mismanagement; waste of funds; abuse of
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety. The Inspector General shall not, after receipt of such
complaint or information, disclose the identity of the agency employee
without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General
determines that such disclosure is unavoidable.
The Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, the Civil Service
Reform Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act,\23\ the Trade Secrets Act,\24\ and other Federal statutes and case
law provide certain protections for the identities of sources and for
sensitive information obtained. Additionally, the relevant professional
standards provide guidance on the use, protection, and reporting of
privileged and confidential information. OIGs must follow the guidance
contained in these authorities.
III. Professional Standards
A. General Standard
Each OIG shall conduct, supervise, and coordinate its audits,
investigations, inspections, and evaluations in compliance with the
applicable professional standards listed below.
For audits: Government Auditing Standards, issued by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO).
For investigations: Quality Standards for Investigations, accepted
by the PCIE and ECIE and consistent with appropriate Department of
Justice directives.
For inspections and evaluations: Quality Standards for Inspections,
accepted by the PCIE and ECIE, Government Auditing Standards, or other
appropriate professional standards.
IV. Ensuring Internal Control
A. General Standard
The Inspector General and OIG staff shall direct and control OIG
operations consistent with the Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government \25\ issued by the GAO. These standards require that
internal control be part of an entity's management infrastructure to
provide reasonable assurance that (1) operations are efficient and
effective; (2) financial reporting is reliable; and (3) operations are
in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and professional
standards.
Internal control is a continuous built-in component of operations,
effected by people, that provides reasonable but not absolute
assurance, that the OIG's objectives will be met. Internal control
considerations include the following:
B. Efficient and Effective Operations
OIGs should strive to conduct their operation in the most efficient
and effective manner. Each OIG should manage available resources at the
least cost to produce the greatest results in terms of public benefit,
return on investment, and risk reduction. OIGs derive much of their
credibility to perform their work by demonstrating the ability to
efficiently and effectively use and account for public funds.
C. Control Environment
OIG management and staff should establish and maintain an
environment throughout the organization that fosters a positive and
supportive attitude toward internal control and conscientious
management. Key factors affecting the control environment include the
following:
1. Integrity and ethical values maintained and demonstrated by
OIG management and staff, the organizational structure and
delegations of authority and responsibility, and OIG
management's philosophy and operating style.
2. OIG management's commitment to competence and human capital
policies and practices (see the Managing Human Capital
standard).
3. OIG management's relationship with the Congress, their
agency, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
D. Risk Assessment
The Inspector General should provide for an assessment of the risks
the OIG faces from both external and internal sources. Risk assessment
includes identifying and analyzing relevant risks associated with
achieving the OIG's objectives, such as those defined in strategic and
annual performance plans, and forming a basis for determining how risks
should be managed. Risk assessment methodologies and the formality of
their documentation may vary from OIG to OIG, depending on the OIG's
size, mission, and other factors.
E. Control Activities
The Inspector General should establish and implement internal
control activities that ensure the OIG's directives are carried out.
The control activities should be effective and efficient in
accomplishing the OIG's control objectives.
Control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and
mechanisms that enforce management's directives. Control activities are
an integral part of the planning, implementing, reviewing, and
accountability activities. Control activities include supervisory
reviews at all levels to ensure compliance with applicable professional
standards, controls over information processing, physical control over
vulnerable assets, establishing and reviewing performance measures and
indicators, and segregation of duties.
F. Information and Communication
The Inspector General should ensure that information is recorded
and communicated to internal OIG management and others within the OIG
who need it and in a form and within a time-frame that enables them to
carry out their internal quality control and other responsibilities.
For the OIG to control its operations, it must have relevant,
reliable, and timely communications relating to internal and external
events. Information is needed throughout the OIG to achieve all of its
objectives.
G. Monitoring
The Inspector General should ensure that monitoring assesses the
quality of performance over time and ensures that the findings and
recommendations of quality assurance and other reviews are promptly
resolved.
The monitoring standard discusses three different types of
activities: ongoing monitoring, self-assessment evaluations, and
quality assurance reviews. Ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of
normal operations and is continuous. Self-assessment evaluations and
independent external reviews can be useful in focusing directly on the
controls' effectiveness at a specific time.\26\ The scope and frequency
of these independent reviews should depend primarily on the assessment
of risks and the effectiveness of ongoing control monitoring
procedures.
1. Ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal
operations. It is performed continually and is ingrained in the
agency operations. It includes regular management and
supervisory activities,\27\ comparisons, reconciliations, and
other actions employees take in performing their duties.
Ongoing monitoring should include policies and procedures for
ensuring that the findings of separate quality control
evaluations and quality assurance reviews are promptly
resolved.
2. Self-assessment evaluations, conducted by the unit or
activity itself, include a reassessment of the risks associated
with a particular activity and can include periodic reviews of
control design and direct testing of internal controls,
depending on the risk associated with the activity.
3. Independent external reviews are conducted by sources not
assigned to the unit being reviewed. These reviews are distinct
from ongoing management and supervision, and encompass the
entirety of internal control, including administrative
operations and professional services (audits, investigations,
inspections, and evaluations). Quality assurance is intended to
assess the internal controls of the entire OIG or specific OIG
components. The Quality Assurance Program is a type of
independent review that focuses on complying with professional
standards in conducting professional services (see the
Maintaining Quality Assurance standard).
V. Maintaining Quality Assurance
A. General Standard \28\
Each OIG shall establish and maintain a quality assurance program
to ensure that work performed adheres to established OIG policies and
procedures; meets established standards of performance, including
applicable professional standards; and is carried out economically,
efficiently, and effectively.
External quality assurance reviews provide OIGs with added
assurance regarding their adherence to prescribed standards,
regulations, and legislation through a formal objective assessment of
OIG operations. OIGs are strongly encouraged to have external quality
assurance reviews of audits, investigations, inspections, evaluations,
and other OIG activities. Each OIG shall participate in the external
quality assurance review programs required by the PCIE and ECIE.
B. Quality Assurance Program
Because OIGs evaluate how well agency programs and operations are
functioning, they have a special responsibility to ensure that their
own operations are as effective as possible. The nature and extent of
an OIG's quality assurance program depends on a number of factors, such
as the OIG size, the degree of operating autonomy allowed its personnel
and its offices, the nature of its work, its organizational structure,
and appropriate cost-benefit considerations. Thus, the program
established by individual OIGs could vary, as could the extent of their
documentation. However, each organization should prepare appropriate
documentation to demonstrate compliance with its policies and
procedures for its system of quality assurance.
1. The quality assurance program is an evaluative effort
conducted by reviewers external to the units/personnel being
reviewed to ensure that the overall work of the OIG meets
appropriate standards. The quality assurance program has an
internal and external component.
2. The internal quality assurance program can include reviews
of all aspects of the OIG's operations. The reviews are
conducted by internal OIG staff that are external to the units
being reviewed. The internal quality assurance program is
distinct from regular management and supervisory activities,
comparisons, and other activities by OIG staff performing their
duties. Thus, an audit supervisor ensuring that audit reports
are properly referenced to working papers is an example of
regular supervision whereas an independent reviewer evaluating
the referencing process is an example of internal quality
assurance.
3. External quality assurance reviews are conducted by
independent organizations not affiliated with the OIG being
reviewed.
C. Elements of an Internal Quality Assurance Program
1. An internal quality assurance program must be structured and
implemented to ensure an objective, timely, and comprehensive
appraisal of operations. The internal quality assurance reviews
should be conducted by individuals who are not directly
involved in the activity or unit being reviewed and who do not
report to the immediate supervisor of that activity or unit.
2. The same professional care should be taken with quality
assurance reviews as with other OIG efforts, including
adequately planning the review, documenting findings,
developing supportable recommendations, and soliciting comments
from the supervisor of the activity or unit reviewed.
3. The Inspector General shall implement necessary improvements
on a timely basis.
D. Elements of an External Quality Assurance Program
1. The purpose of the external quality assurance program is to
provide an additional and external level of assurance that the
OIG conducts its audits, investigations, inspections, and
evaluations in compliance with applicable professional
standards.
2. The objective of the external quality assurance review is to
determine whether the internal control system is in place and
operating effectively to provide reasonable assurance that
established policies and procedures and applicable professional
standards are being followed.
3. Organizations and individuals managing and conducting
external quality assurance reviews should be highly qualified
and comply with specific supplemental guidance issued by the
PCIE and ECIE to ensure the highest level of review quality.
Individuals conducting these reviews should have a thorough
knowledge of the applicable professional standards and the
environment relative to the work being performed.
4. The reviewers should be independent of the organization
being reviewed, its staff, and the work selected for review.
5. The reviewers should have knowledge related to performing an
external quality assurance review and use professional judgment
in conducting and reporting on the results of the review.
6. The review should be sufficiently comprehensive to assess
whether the internal quality assurance program meets its
objectives.
7. The external reviewers and the organization under review
should prepare and sign a Memorandum of Understanding regarding
fundamental aspects of the review. Possible topics include
scope; staffing and time-frames; discussion of preliminary
findings; reporting; handling of requests for reports, letters
of comment, and review documentation; and procedures to address
disagreements on findings and recommendations.
8. OIGs should provide copies of final reports resulting from
external quality assurance reviews to the head of the agency or
department and to the Chair and the Vice Chairs of the PCIE or
ECIE, as appropriate. Upon request and subject to applicable
law, the reports and letters of comment should be made
available to the public in a timely manner.
9. OIGs should have procedures in place to address findings and
recommendations contained in external quality assurance
reviews.
10. The external quality assurance program can be extended to
cover other OIG operations.
VI. Planning and Coordinating
A. General Standard
Each OIG shall maintain a planning system assessing the nature,
scope, and inherent risks of agency programs and operations. This
assessment forms the basis for establishing strategic and performance
plans,\29\ including goals, objectives, and performance measures to be
accomplished by the OIG within a specific time period.\30\
The Inspector General and OIG staff shall coordinate their
activities internally and with other components of Government to assure
effective and efficient use of available resources.\31\
B. Elements of the Planning Process
OIGs should develop an appropriate planning process, giving
consideration to the following elements:
1. Use a strategic planning process that carefully considers
current and emerging agency programs, operations, risks, and
management challenges. This analysis will identify the nature
of agency programs and operations, their performance measures
and anticipated outcomes, their scope and dollar magnitude,
their staffing and budgetary trends, their perceived
vulnerabilities, and their inherent risks.
2. Develop a methodology and process for identifying and
prioritizing agency programs and operations as potential
subjects for audit, investigation, inspection, or evaluation.
The methodology should be designed to use the most effective
combination of OIG resources, including previous OIG work and
input from OIG staff. Also, the OIG should consider the plans
of other organizations both internal and external to the
agency.
3. Use an annual performance planning process that identifies
the activities to audit, investigate, inspect, or evaluate and
translates these priorities into outcome-related goals,
objectives, and performance measures. As part of this planning
process, OIGs should consider agency actions to address
recommendations from prior OIG work. Because resources are
rarely sufficient to meet requirements, the OIG must choose
among competing needs.
C. Coordination Considerations
1. In planning work, the OIG should coordinate, where
applicable, with agency management to ensure that OIG
priorities appropriately consider agency needs. The OIG should
take into consideration requests from the Congress, the OMB,
other external stakeholders, the PCIE, the ECIE, complaints
from employees and, as appropriate, private citizens. By using
this information, along with the OIG's knowledge of agency
objectives and operations, the OIG can plan its work based on
the relative costs and benefits.
2. The OIG should minimize duplicative work. The OIG should
coordinate its work internally and with other groups (both
inside and outside the agency) performing independent
evaluations of agency operations and programs. This
coordination should identify the nature and scope of other
reviews, both planned and completed, to avoid duplicating
others' work. Coordinating with the GAO is particularly
important. As part of the planning process, each OIG should
coordinate as needed with GAO representatives to exchange and
discuss tentative plans for the next fiscal year.\32\ If
duplication is identified, every effort should be made to
resolve it.
3. The OIG will closely coordinate, if applicable, with the
Department of Justice with respect to criminal and civil
investigations in compliance with investigative standards and
applicable deputations and accompanying Memoranda of
Understanding.
4. When OIG staff identify problems that might affect other
offices, agencies, or arms of government, the OIG should
coordinate with them and their respective OIGs. Where
appropriate, joint or coordinated audits, investigations,
inspections, or evaluations may be performed to fulfill all the
interested parties' requirements.\33\
5. Because of the close interrelationships among many Federal
programs, situations will arise where audit, investigation,
inspection, or evaluation activity by one OIG will require work
with another agency's program or administrative staff. In such
cases, the OIGs will coordinate in order to facilitate the
efficient accomplishment of the work.
D. Prevention
OIG planning should develop a strategy to identify the causes of
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in high-risk agency programs,
and to help agencies implement a system of management improvements to
overcome these problems.\34\ OIG prevention efforts may include the
following:
1. A routine procedure for OIG staff to identify and report
prevention opportunities as these may come up in their work,
and for OIG managers to refer these to agency management, as
appropriate;
2. Special awareness and training initiatives designed to alert
agency employees to systemic weaknesses in the programs and
operations of their agencies;
3. Review and comment on initial design of new agency programs
and operations;
4. Analyses of audit, investigative, and other OIG reports to
identify trends and patterns;
5. Education and training to ensure that appropriate OIG staff
have requisite abilities in the loss prevention area, as well
as fraud detection and prevention; and
6. An effective means for tracking the implementation of
recommendations.
VII. Communicating Results of OIG Activities
A. General Standard
Each OIG shall keep agency management, program managers, and the
Congress fully and currently informed of appropriate aspects of OIG
operations and findings. OIGs should assess and report to the Congress,
as appropriate, on their own strategic and annual performance and the
performance of the agency or department for which they have cognizance.
Each OIG shall also report expeditiously to the Attorney General
whenever the Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe there
has been a violation of criminal law.
B. Keeping the Head of the Agency Informed \35\
1. Through periodic briefings and reports, the Inspector
General should keep the appropriate department and agency heads
advised of important undertakings of the OIG, its outcomes, and
any problems encountered that warrant the department or agency
head's attention.
2. The Inspector General should timely advise department and
agency heads, consistent with requirements of confidentiality,
of any agency official who attempts to impede or fails to
require a contractor under his or her responsibility to desist
from impeding an audit, investigation, inspection, evaluation,
or any other OIG activity.\36\
3. The Inspector General should timely alert department and
agency heads, consistent with requirements imposed by
confidentiality and the prosecutive system, to examples of
egregious misconduct and waste.
C. Keeping the Congress Informed \37\
1. The Inspector General shall report to the Congress, as
required by the IG Act of 1978, as amended, and other
legislation, regulations, and directives.
2. The Inspector General may also inform the agency head and
Congress through the 7-day letter (IG Act of 1978, as amended,
Section 5(d)), or other appropriate means of particularly
serious programmatic or administrative problems that contribute
to fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement in agency operations
and programs.
3. If the results of an audit, investigation, inspection, or
evaluation indicate that deficiencies in Federal law contribute
to fraud, waste, or abuse, these matters may be brought to the
attention of the Congress, and may include recommendations for
statutory change.\38\
4. The Inspector General shall also report to the Congress and
OMB on management challenges facing the agency or department
and progress in meeting the challenges.\39\
D. Keeping the Congress and Agency Informed on Performance \40\
1. Each OIG should annually assess its own performance by
evaluating actual to planned performance.
2. Each OIG should have sufficient information to conduct
performance evaluations, e.g., a history of past results to
show prior performance, a strategic and annual planning process
to show expected performance, and a management information
system to show actual performance.
3. Each OIG should report annually on its actual performance as
compared to its performance goals, either as a contributing
part of their agency reporting under the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), if appropriate, or
independently to their agency and Congress.
4. Inspectors General may also advise the Congress on the
performance goals, measurement process, and results of the
agencies and departments for which they have cognizance.
E. Keeping Program Managers Informed
The OIG should make a special and continuing effort to keep program
managers and their key staff informed, if appropriate, about the
purpose, nature, and content of OIG activity associated with the
manager's programs. These efforts may include periodic briefings as
well as interim reports and correspondence.
F. Keeping Ethics Officials Informed
The OIG should make a special and continuing effort to keep the
Designated Agency Ethics Official or similar official informed about
OIG activities, including the results of investigations and allegations
of ethical misconduct where appropriate, that related to the ethics
official's responsibilities for the agency's ethics program.
G. Keeping the Attorney General Informed \41\
The OIG shall notify the Department of Justice and seek a
prosecutive opinion whenever the OIG develops evidence of a Federal
crime.
H. Elements of Effective Reporting \42\
1. All products issued should comply with applicable
professional standards and conform to the OIG's established
policies and procedures.
2. Whether written or oral, all OIG reports should be
objective, timely, and useful.
3. All products should be adequately supported.
VIII. Managing Human Capital
A. General Standard \43\
Each OIG should have a process to ensure that the OIG's staff
members collectively possess the core competencies needed to accomplish
the OIG mission.
B. Human Capital Processes
Each OIG's process for ensuring that its staff members possess the
requisite qualifications should encompass processes for recruiting,
hiring, continuously developing, training, and evaluating their staff
members, and succession planning to assist the organization in
maintaining a workforce that has the ability to meet the OIG's mission.
C. Core Competencies
Staff members must collectively possess the professional competence
(i.e., teamwork, leadership, communication, technical knowledge,
critical thinking skills, abilities, and experience) to perform the
work assigned. In addition, staff must individually meet requirements
established by the Office of Personnel Management for their respective
job series and by applicable professional standards.
D. Skills Assessment
To ensure that the OIG staff members collectively possess needed
skills, the Inspector General and key managers should assess the skills
of their staff members and determine the extent to which these skills
match the OIG's requirements. OIG management is responsible for
deciding the methods by which identified needs can be met by hiring
contractors or outside consultants, using staff members who possess the
requisite skills, developing staff members and providing training, or
recruiting new staff. Each OIG must also ensure that staff members meet
the requirements for continuing professional education contained in the
applicable professional standards.\44\
IX. Reviewing Legislation and Regulations
A. General Standard
Each OIG shall establish and maintain a system to review and
comment on existing and proposed legislation, regulations, and those
directives that affect either the programs and operations of the OIG's
agency or the mission and functions of the OIG.\45\ The system should
result in OIG recommendations designed to (1) promote economy and
efficiency in administering agency programs and operations; (2) prevent
and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations; and (3)
protect the integrity and independence of the OIG.
B. Elements of Legislative and Regulatory Review
1. OIGs should assure independent and timely formulation and,
to the extent within their control, transmission of OIG
recommendations so that authorities dealing with the matters
concerned can adequately consider the OIG comments. This
requires early identification of legislative, regulatory, and
those key administrative or directive issues of particular
interest to the OIG.
2. OIGs should seek implementation of agency procedures that
routinely provide for OIG review or comment on legislative and
regulatory proposals of interest to the OIG and on agency-wide
directives.
3. OIGs should have written procedures for and conduct
appropriate reviews, as necessary, of authorizing legislation,
regulations, and directives during investigations, internal
audits, inspections and evaluations, and other OIG activities,
particularly when it appears that a lack of controls or
deficiencies in law have contributed to fraud, waste, abuse,
and mismanagement.
X. Receiving and Reviewing Allegations
A. General Standard \46\
Each OIG shall establish and follow policies and procedures for
receiving and reviewing allegations. This system should ensure that an
appropriate disposition, including appropriate notification, is made
for each allegation.
B. Elements of a System for Receiving and Reviewing Allegations
This system should ensure that:
1. The OIG has a well-publicized vehicle through which agency
employees and other interested persons can submit allegations
of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, preserving anonymity
when possible.
2. Each allegation is retrievable and its receipt, review, and
disposition are documented.
3. Each allegation is initially screened to ensure that urgent
and/or high priority matters receive timely attention and
facilitate early determination of the appropriate courses of
action for those complaints requiring follow-up action.
4. Based on the nature, content, and credibility of the
complaint, allegations are appropriately reviewed.
C. Feedback
The OIG may establish a mechanism for providing feedback to parties
who submit allegations. This feedback can be furnished in summary form
through such vehicles as an employee newsletter, a semiannual report
digest, or other means.
ENDNOTES
\1\ Executive Order 12805, dated May 11, 1992, updated the charter
for the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency and created the
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
\2\ Executive Order 12805, Section 3(c), states that individual
members of the Councils should, to the extent permitted under law,
adhere to professional standards developed by the Councils. This
section gives the Councils the authority to establish standards for
quality.
\3\ The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
published by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) in November 1999,
require that ``Management and employees should establish and maintain
an environment throughout the organization that sets a positive and
supportive attitude toward internal control and conscientious
management.'' The Internal Control Standards define internal control as
an integral component of an organization's management that provides
reasonable assurance that the following objectives are being achieved:
(1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of
financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and
regulations.
\4\ The IG Act (Public Law 95-452), Section 2, established
independent and objective units to review agency activities.
\5\ IG Act, Sections 2 and 4.
\6\ This standard was adapted from the Standards for Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch and the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Code of Professional
Conduct, Section ET 53-56, and the Institute of Internal Auditors' Code
of Ethics.
\7\ IG Act, Section 2, established independent units to review
agency activities. Section 6(a)(2) gives the Inspector General
responsibility for independently determining the nature and extent of
the work necessary.
\8\ Codified in 5 C.F.R. Part 2635 (January 1, 2002 Edition), as
amended at 67 FR 61761-61762 (October 2, 2002).
\9\ 18 U.S.C. Sections 202-209.
\10\ 5 C.F.R. Section 2635.101(a). The 14 general principles
restate the principles of ethical conduct set forth in Executive Order
12674, as modified by Executive Order 12731.
\11\ Executive Order 12993, Section 2, dated March 22, 1996, gives
the PCIE and ECIE Integrity Committee the responsibility for receiving,
reviewing, and referring for investigation allegations of wrongdoing
against Inspectors General and certain OIG staff members.
\12\ 5 C.F.R. Section 2635.101(b).
\13\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(4).
\14\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(4).
\15\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(1).
\16\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(6).
\17\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(5).
\18\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(7), (8), and (9).
\19\ IG Act, Section 6(a)(3).
\20\ IG Act, Sections 2(3), 4(a)(5), and 5(b).
\21\ Government Auditing Standards, Section 3.19.
\22\ Government Auditing Standards, Section 3.11-Section 3.25.
\23\ 42 U.S.C. Section 1320d-2 and implementing regulations cover
the privacy of individually identifiable health information.
\24\ 18 U.S.C. Section 1905 prohibits OIGs from disclosing
confidential proprietary data obtained during the course of conducting
their work unless such disclosure is authorized by law.
\25\ The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 requires
GAO to issue standards for internal control in government. The Office
of Management and Budget issues implementing guidelines and specific
requirements.
\26\ The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
state that: ``Separate evaluations of control can also be useful by
focusing directly on the controls' effectiveness at a specific time.
The scope and frequency of separate evaluations should depend primarily
on the assessment of risks and the effectiveness of ongoing monitoring
procedures. Separate evaluations may take the form of self-assessments
as well as review of control design and direct testing of internal
control.''
\27\ The Government Auditing Standards, the Quality Standards for
Investigations, and the Quality Standards for Inspections all require
that work be adequately supervised through higher level review and
approval.
\28\ This standard is based on the Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government and the quality control and assurance
standard in the Government Auditing Standards (Section 3.49).
\29\ The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Section
3(a), requires each agency to develop a 5-year strategic plan, and, in
Section 4(a) and (b), to prepare annual performance plans and reports.
A January 28, 1998 memorandum from OMB to the PCIE and the National
Science Foundation OIG requires each OIG that has a separate line item
account in the President's Budget Appendix to submit a performance
plan. The OIGs can either include goals, objectives, and measures in
their agency's strategic and performance plans or develop their own
strategic and annual performance plans and performance reports.
\30\ OMB Circular No. A-123, Management Accountability and Control,
Section 2, states that management accountability is the expectation
that managers are responsible for the quality and timeliness of program
performance, increasing productivity, controlling costs and mitigating
adverse aspects of agency operations, and ensuring that programs are
managed with integrity and in compliance with applicable law.
\31\ Throughout the IG Act, the IGs are given responsibility for
coordinating their activities. In Section 4(a)(1), (3), and (4), the
IGs are to coordinate the following: Section 4(a)(1) audits and
investigations relating to the programs and operations of the agency;
Section 4(a)(3) other activities carried out or financed by the agency
for the purpose of promoting economy and efficiency or preventing and
detecting fraud and abuse in its programs and operations; Section
4(a)(4) relationships between the agency and other Federal agencies,
State and local governments, and nongovernmental entities with respect
to (A) all matters relating to promoting economy and efficiency or
preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in programs and operations
administered or financed by the agency; or (B) identifying and
prosecuting participants in such fraud or abuse.
\32\ IG Act, Section 4(c).
\33\ According to Executive Order 12805, Section 3(a), the PCIE and
ECIE shall continually identify, review, and discuss areas of weakness
and vulnerability in Federal programs and operations to fraud, waste,
and abuse, and shall develop plans for coordinated, Government-wide
activities that address these problems and promote economy and
efficiency in Federal programs and operations. These activities will
include interagency and inter-entity audit and investigation programs
and projects to deal efficiently and effectively with those problems
concerning fraud and waste that exceed the capability or jurisdiction
of an individual agency or entity. The Councils shall recognize the
preeminent role of the Department of Justice in law enforcement and
litigation.
\34\ The IG Act of 1978, as amended, Section 2(2)(B), requires OIGs
``to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for
activities designed . . . to prevent and detect fraud and abuse. . .
.'' Section 4(a)(3) reiterates the OIG's mission ``to recommend
policies for, and to conduct, supervise, or coordinate other activities
. . . for the purpose of . . . preventing and detecting fraud and
abuse.''
\35\ IG Act, Section 2(3), requires that OIGs keep the head of the
establishment and the Congress fully and currently informed about
problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs
and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
Section 4(a)(5) and Section 5(b) require semiannual reports.
\36\ IG Act, Section 6(b)(2).
\37\ See footnote 35.
\38\ IG Act, Section 4(a)(2).
\39\ 31 U.S.C., Section 3516(d), requires OIGs to summarize what
the IG considers to be the most serious management and performance
challenges facing the IG's agency and briefly assess the agency's
progress in addressing those challenges. This requirement is triggered
by the agency's consolidation of reports made to the Congress, OMB, or
the President.
\40\ See footnote 29.
\41\ IG Act, Section 4(d).
\42\ OMB Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by
Federal Agencies require agencies to adopt a basic standard of
information quality (including objectivity, utility, and integrity) as
a performance goal and take appropriate steps to incorporate
information quality criteria into agency information dissemination
practices. Quality is to be ensured and established at levels
appropriate to the nature and timeliness of the information to be
disseminated. Agencies shall adopt specific standards of quality that
are appropriate for the various categories of information they
disseminate, and, as a matter of good and effective agency information
resources management, agencies are to develop a process for reviewing
the quality (including the objectivity, utility, and integrity) of
information before it is disseminated. The Government Auditing
Standards, the Quality Standards for Investigations, and the Quality
Standards for Inspections all address reporting standards for
individual audit, investigative, and inspection or evaluation reports.
\43\ The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
identifies one factor affecting the control environment as management's
commitment to competence. All personnel need to possess and maintain a
level of competence that allows them to accomplish their assigned
duties, as well as understand the importance of developing and
implementing good internal control. Management needs to identify what
appropriate knowledge and skills are needed for various jobs and
provide training as well as candid and constructive counseling, and
performance appraisals. The Standards also discuss good human capital
policies and practices as another critical environmental factor. This
includes establishing appropriate practices for hiring, orienting,
training, evaluating, counseling, promoting, compensating, and
disciplining personnel. Executive Order 12805, Section 3(b), states
that the PCIE and ECIE shall develop policies that will aid in the
establishment of a corps of well trained and highly skilled Office of
Inspector General staff members.
\44\ The Government Auditing Standards, the Quality Standards for
Investigations, and the Quality Standards for Inspections each require
that the personnel collectively possess the skills and abilities to
perform the assigned tasks and require continuing professional
education.
\45\ The IG Act, Section 4(a)(2), gives IGs the responsibility to
review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make
recommendations in the semiannual reports on the impact of legislation
or regulations on the economy and efficiency of administering the
agency's programs and operations or in preventing and detecting fraud
and abuse.
\46\ IG Act, Section 7.
Appendix I
Legislation, Executive Orders, Standards, and OMB and Other Guidance
Impacting the Inspector General Community
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document a Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legislation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Inspector General Act of 1978, Establishes independent and
as amended, 5 U.S.C. App. 3. (P.L. objective Offices of Inspector
95-452) General.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accounting and Auditing Act of Requires the head of each executive
1950, 31 U.S.C. 713, 714, 718, agency to certify that the
719, 3326, 3501, 3511-3514, 3521, agency's systems for internal
3523, 3524. (P.L. 97-258). accounting and administrative
control comply with standards
prescribed by the Comptroller
General.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Assigns responsibilities for
31 U.S.C. 501, 502, 521, 522, government accounting, auditing,
701-704, 711, 712, 716, 718, 719, and financial reporting to improve
731, 771-779, 1101, 1104-1108, evaluations of Federal Government
1111, 1113, 3301, 3323, 3324, programs and activities by better
3521, 3522, 3526, 3529, 3531, identifying sources of funding and
3541, 3702. (42 Stat. 20) how the funding was applied.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Financial Management Act of Requires all agencies covered by
1994, 31 U.S.C. 331, 501 note, the Chief Financial Officers Act
3301 note, 3332, 3515, 3521. (P.L. to prepare annual, agency-wide
103-356) financial statements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Financial Management Provides for the establishment of
Improvement Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. uniform Federal Government
App. 5; 10 U.S.C. 113 note, accounting systems, accounting
2315; 15 U.S.C. 278g-3; 28 standards, and reporting systems.
U.S.C. 612; 31 U.S.C. 3512,
3512 note, 3521; 38 U.S.C. 310;
40 U.S.C. 1401 notes, 1441
note; 41 U.S.C. 251 notes. (P.L.
104-208)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Managers Financial Provides for establishment,
Integrity Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. implementation, and evaluation of
1105, 1113, 3512. (P.L. 97-255) accounting and administrative
controls regarding financial
management activities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government Performance and Results Provides for the establishment of
Act of 1993, 5 U.S.C. 306; 31 strategic planning and performance
U.S.C. 1101 note, 1105, 1115, measurement in the Federal
1115 note, 1116-1119, 9703, 9704; Government.
39 U.S.C. 2801-2805. (P.L. 103-
62)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government Management Reform Act of Improves the efficiency of
1994, 2 U.S.C. 31, 31 note; 3 Executive Branch performance by
U.S.C. 104; 5 U.S.C. 5318, enhancing reporting to the
6304, 6304 note; 28 U.S.C. 461; Congress through elimination and
31 U.S.C. 331 note, 501 note, consolidation of duplicative or
1113 note, 3301 note, 3332, 3515, obsolete reporting requirements.
3521. (P.L. 103-356)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief Financial Officers Act of Improves the general and financial
1990, 5 U.S.C. 5313-5315; 31 management of the Federal
U.S.C. 501 notes, 502-506, 901, Government.
901 notes, 902, 903, 1105, 3511
note, 3512, 3515, 3515 note, 3521,
3521 note, 9105, 9106; 38 U.S.C.
201 note; 42 U.S.C. 3533. (P.L.
101-576)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-Government Act of 2002, 5 U.S.C. Provides for the independent review
3111, 3701-3707, 4108, 8432 of Federal agency information
note; 10 U.S.C. 2224, 2332; 13 technology security by Offices of
U.S.C. 402; 15 U.S.C. 176a, Inspector General.
278g-3, 278g-4; 18 U.S.C. 207,
209; 28 U.S.C. 1913 note; 31
U.S.C. 503, 507; 40 U.S.C.
305, 502, 11331, 11332, 11501-
11505, 11521, 11522; 41 U.S.C.
266a, 423; 44 U.S.C. 101 note,
3501, 3504-3506, 3531, 3541-3549,
3601-3606. (P.L. 107-347)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. Provides for OMB oversight of
571 note, 5315; 5 U.S.C. App. 3 information technology development
11, 11 note; 10 U.S.C. 1701 and acquisition, agency management
note, 2220, 2249, 2302, 2304, 2304 of IT investments, and
note, 2304e, 2305, 2305a, 2306a, establishment of standards by
2306 note, 2306b, 2315, 2323, NIST.
2324, 2350b, 2372, 2384, 2397,
2397a-2397c, 2400, 2401 note,
2405, 2409, 2410, 2410b, 2410d,
2410g, 2424, 2431, 2432 note,
2461, 2533, 2539b, 2662, 2702; 15
U.S.C. 278g-3, 637, 644, 789;
16 U.S.C. 799; 18 U.S.C. 281;
22 U.S.C. 2761, 2761 note; 28
U.S.C. 612; 29 U.S.C. 721; 31
U.S.C. 1352, 1558, 3551-3554;
38 U.S.C. 310; see 40 U.S.C.
11101-11103, 11301-11303, 11311-
11318, 11331, 11332, 11501-11505,
11521, 11522, 11701-11704; 41
U.S.C. 10a note, 11, 15, 20a,
20b, 22, 35 note, 43a, 43b, 44,
45, 57, 251 note, 253, 253a, 253b,
253l, 253m, 254b, 254d, 255, 257,
264a, 265, 266, 401-434, 601, 605,
612, 701; 42 U.S.C. 6392. (P.L.
104-156)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, Encourages and authorizes report
31 U.S.C. 3116, 3501 note, consolidation; makes report
3515, 3516, 3521. (P.L. 106-531) formats more useful and
meaningful; improves the quality
of information reported; enhances
the coordination and efficiency of
such reports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single Audit Act Amendments of Requires that the Government
1996, 31 U.S.C. 7501, 7501 Auditing Standards be followed in
notes, 7502-7505. (P.L. 104-156) audits of state and local
governments and nonprofit entities
that receive Federal financial
assistance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. (P.L. Places limitations on how Federal
93-579) agencies collect, use, and
disclose information about
individuals (U.S. citizens and
resident aliens). Gives
individuals the right to have
access to records maintained on
them by agencies and the right to
seek corrections to those records,
subject to various exemptions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Information Act, as Holds the government accountable to
amended, 5 U.S.C. 552. (P.L. 104- the governed; it establishes a
231) statutory right, enforceable in
court, for persons (individuals,
corporations, etc.) to have access
to Federal agency records, subject
to certain exemptions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 Protects the rights of, and
U.S.C. 1201, 1201 notes, 1202- prevents reprisals against,
1206, 1208, 1209, 1211, 1211 note, Federal employees who disclose
1212-1219, 1221, 1222, 2302, 2303, governmental fraud, waste, abuse,
3352, 3393, 5509 notes, 7502, and other types of corruption or
7512, 7521, 7542, 7701, 7703; 22 illegality.
U.S.C. 4139.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Health Insurance Portability and Covers the privacy of individually
Accountability Act. (PL 104-191) identifiable information.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. Prohibits OIGs from disclosing
1905. confidential proprietary data
obtained during the course of
conducting their work unless such
disclosure is authorized by law.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, Establishes criminal prohibitions
18 U.S.C. Sections 202-209. for employees of the Executive
Branch.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Orders
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Establishes the PCIE and ECIE and
Programs, Exec. Order No. 12805, describes their functions and
57 FR 20627 (May 11, 1992). responsibilities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrative Allegations Against The PCIE and ECIE Integrity
Inspectors General, Exec. Order Committee shall receive, review,
No. 12993, 61 FR 13043 (March 21, and refer for investigation
1996). allegations of wrongdoing against
IGs and certain staff members of
OIGs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standards for Internal Control in Establishes overall framework for
the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD- establishing and maintaining
00-21.3.1 (November 1, 1999). internal control and for
identifying and addressing major
performance and management
challenges and areas at greatest
risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government Auditing Standards: 2003 Establishes standards for
Revision, GAO-03-673G (June 2003). government audits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quality Standards for Establishes standards for
Investigations, PCIE/ECIE investigative efforts conducted by
(September 1997). criminal investigators working for
Federal Offices of Inspector
General.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quality Standards for Inspections, Establishes standards for
PCIE (March 1993). inspections and evaluations
conducted by Federal Offices of
Inspector General.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Establishes general principles for
Employees of the Executive Branch, ethical conduct of employees of
5 C.F.R. Part 2635 (2003). the Executive Branch.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statements of Federal Financial Accounting principles for Federal
Accounting Standards, Federal Government reporting entities
Accounting Standards Advisory issued by the Federal Accounting
Board (May 2002). Standards Advisory Board.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Codification of Statements on Auditing standards for financial
Auditing Standards (Including audits.
Statements on Standards for
Attestation Engagements), American
Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (2003).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OMB Circulars, Bulletins, and Guidelines
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Various OMB Circulars, Bulletins, Establish requirements and
and Guidelines guidelines for implementing:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Guidance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guide for Conducting External Provides guidance on conducting
Quality Control Reviews of the external quality control reviews
Audit Operations of the Offices of of OIG Offices of Audit.
Inspector General, PCIE (February
2002).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guide for Conducting Qualitative Provides guidance on conducting
Assessment Reviews for the external qualitative assessment
Investigative Operations of reviews of OIG investigative
Inspectors General, PCIE/ECIE operations.
(2002).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual, Provides guidance on conducting
GAO-01-765G (July 2001). financial statement audits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Some OIGs are not components of an entity legally defined as a
``Federal agency.'' Therefore, some of the cited laws, regulations, or
other guidance may not be directly applicable by law to all OIGs. In
these cases, principles or concepts of the guidance may be adopted by
the OIG entities as a matter of policy.
Appendix II
Members of the PCIE/ECIE Advisory Committee to Revise the Quality
Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General
Robert McGregor, Chair
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Emilie Baebel
Small Business Administration
David Berry
National Labor Relations Board
Patricia Brannin
Department of Defense
Helen Lew
Department of Education
David Long
Department of Health and Human Services
Peter McClintock
Small Business Administration
Jerome Persh
Department of Transportation
______
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Inspector General
April 1-September 30, 2004
Semiannual Report
From the Inspector General
Since April 2002, when I became the NASA Inspector General, the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) has undergone significant changes in
its organizational structure and workforce. These changes are intended
to improve our ability to root out crime, fraud, waste and abuse, and
to promote economy and efficiency at NASA.
Specifically, during this semiannual period the OIG has enhanced
the management of the Office of Investigations by establishing a Deputy
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations position at Headquarters
and adding Resident Agents-In-Charge to our offices at NASA's larger
Centers. In the Office of Audits we continued to implement the
reorganization strategy created in April 2003 to improve and diversify
the skill mix of the audit staff by hiring technical experts and
management analysts. We also established an Office of Management and
Planning to consolidate the management of our information technology
services, strategic planning and development, budget, human resources,
and administrative services.
Throughout the transition, we have conducted meaningful work in
both the Office of Audits and the Office of Investigations. This
semiannual report reflects on some of our activities that resulted in
published audit works, such as our assessment of the quality assurance
process for the redesigned Solid Rocket Booster bolt catchers, and on
results from our investigative work including indictments,
prosecutions, and convictions for crimes relating to NASA.
The semiannual report does not reflect some other work we are doing
or have done to improve the Agency. For example, some of our Office of
Audits activities this period have included monitoring various
financial management, contract, and Return To Flight matters that do
not necessarily fall within the parameters of announced audits and will
not result in published reports. Also, investigative work often is not
published due to privacy concerns and a desire to maintain
confidentiality of sources and investigative techniques. We also
frequently answer Congressional inquiries or provide information to
Congressional oversight committees on matters of interest to the
Legislative Branch, and these activities often do not involve the
generation of public reports.
Although our work may not always result in a published report, we
do not hesitate to present our independent views to the Agency on a
broad range of topics. The use of alternative communication strategies,
such as formal and informal briefings, allows the OIG to inform the
Agency of critical matters in real-time so management can take action
before issues become problematic.
Allegations of Reprisal and Whistleblowing
In this semiannual period, the OIG dedicated a significant amount
of time and resources investigating allegations of reprisal against
NASA and contractor employees for raising safety and other concerns. In
fulfilling the office's overall mandate, the OIG can and does look at
whatever matters it thinks most important to protect the taxpayers'
investment in NASA, which may include examining whether management
fairly addresses concerns raised by employees on myriad topics.
In the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, a perception
arose that NASA culture at times has muted the free flow of
information. The OIG is trying to assist the Agency in ensuring that
the NASA workplace encourages the free flow of information, especially
pertaining to safety, and that those who conscientiously raise issues
are protected from reprisal. While the OIG does not have the authority
to undo personnel actions taken as reprisal, the OIG can be an advocate
to the NASA Administrator to seek redress where appropriate and report
to Congress on Agency activity. (The independent agency vested with the
responsibility to protect civil service whistleblowers is the Office of
Special Counsel [http://www.osc.gov].)
Whistleblower matters are often difficult to untangle because they
involve professional disagreements and personality conflicts. The OIG
often relies on sources, including confidential and anonymous sources,
to conduct its business. Sources may surface fraud, waste and abuse,
violations of law, safety issues, and ways of improving the Agency.
However, sometimes after conducting an investigation or audit, our
office is unable to validate a source's statements. Notwithstanding the
challenges associated with these matters, the OIG believes it plays an
important check and balance to Agency action. To reflect our views, we
published a white paper, Handling Disagreement with Superiors'
Decisions and Whistleblowing, which can be found on our Website at
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/whistleblower.pdf.
Peer Review
During this semiannual report, under the purview of the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), our Office of Audits
completed a time-consuming and expensive review of the Department of
Treasury OIG's Office of Audits, and the Department of Justice OIG
finished its peer review of the NASA OIG Audit program. The peer
reviews conducted were compliance audits that determined whether audit
policies comply with government auditing standards and if audits are
conducted in accordance with those policies, but did not determine
whether the audits were meaningful or timely. The peer-review
compliance audits, while useful for their intended purpose, are not
designed to determine whether the taxpayers' money is being used
economically or even appropriately.
My office has made recommendations to the PCIE Audit Committee and
its workgroup on peer-review standards that they revise the standards
to include steps to assess the economy, efficiency, and timeliness of
OIG audits. We will continue to advocate overall improvements in the
OIG audit peer-review process.
This report fairly summarizes the activities of the NASA Office of
Inspector General during the reporting period.
Robert W. Cobb,
Inspector General.
______
Excerpts From Transcript of Interview of Hon. Robert W. Cobb, Conducted
by Office of Inspector General, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, June 27, 2006 (pages 40, 44, 54, 78, 94, 98, 104, 106,
114, 125)
Page 40
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't recall?
A. Not me.
Q. You don't know?
A. I don't know. If I'm right in saying Jackie Arends was the
person in the Office of Presidential Personnel whom I was dealing with,
whether she or someone else made the arrangements, I do not know.
Q. OK. The interview was with whom?
A. Sean O'Keefe.
Q. When did that interview take place?
A. I have a date in mind. Whether it is right, I don't know.
February 6, 2002.
Q. Where did the interview take place?
A. In his office.
Q. And that would be NASA headquarters?
A. Yes.
Q. Other than--had you met Mr. O'Keefe prior to this interview at
NASA headquarters?
A. I do not believe that I had ever met him before that meeting. My
recollection is that I don't--that I did not meet him before that
meeting.
Q. OK.
A. I may have had a phone conversation with . . .
Page 44
. . . for integrity, my reputation for having done a first class
job in connection with my duties at the Office of Government Ethics for
9 years, that all of my supervisory chain at the Office of. Government
Ethics had found me to be an outstanding employee, and any one of them,
whether it is Marilyn Glenn, Steve Potts, Gary Davis, any of the people
I work for would have given me a complete recommendation that the
counsel to the President, Al Gonzales, that Tim Flanigan, Deputy
Counsel to the President, my colleagues in that office, the people in
the Office of Presidential Personnel, the chief of staff----
Q. I would like him to be allowed to finish his answer.
A. That Mr. O'Keefe being a person who was working in the
Administration when seeking a person who had the highest levels of
integrity in questions with the execution of the job, that when he
asked around, it might have been that many fingers pointed in my
direction. He reached a conclusion based on that that I would be a
perfect person to conduct the independent Office of Inspector General
activities.
Which I note with some frustration we have yet begun to talk about.
Q. If I understand your response correctly, . . .
Page 54
. . . I don't recall, if there was such a conversation, it was not
one that I rated as memorable. In other words, I don't recall it. Am I
saying it didn't happen? No. I'm not saying it didn't happen. I don't
recall it.
Q. You have no knowledge or recollection of Mr. Stadd approaching
you at the behest of Mr. O'Keefe to ask whether or not you would be
interested in the position as Inspector General of NASA?
A. I don't remember that conversation. I'm not denying whether it
ever happened or not.
Q. How about Mr. Saleeba? Did you ever have any such conversation
with Mr. Saleeba?
A. I don't believe so. I mean, I--again, I met with the both of
them. My recollection as to what the content of that meeting was, was
about Roberta Gross, her execution, position, what the legal--the legal
standard was for removal.
Q. Did they state to you why she was being removed or what the
reason for her removal was?
A. They stated they had a number of concerns about her performance
as Inspector General.
Q. Do you recall what those concerns were?
A. Not specifically. Other than the overall . . .
Page 78
. . . than 3 years.
By Ms. Bahr:
Q. OK.
A. From April of 2002 to February of 2005.
Q. I forgot to take into account that you came in after--all right.
My mistake.
A. I took--and with substantial discussion with my--again, I have a
collaborative style of conducting business. I asked for Frank LaRocca's
opinion. I asked for whoever my senior staff's opinions in connection
with activities.
I don't always do what they say. We talk about it. I do what I
think is right and--you know--the--that's the way I conduct business.
In terms of my relationship with Sean O'Keefe, you know, I'd say we had
a very good, professional working relation where if I thought there was
an issue that he had to be concern about, I had no difficulty or
problem communicating to him.
I tried to have as much contact with him as his schedule could
tolerate. It made it so that I could be best informed as to what the
issues of the day were at NASA.
I was not a person who came to senior management meetings
typically. I was not a regular . . .
Page 94
A. If you have specific examples, it would be easier to talk about
it.
Q. I agree with you complete frequently. I think there will be
points later in the interview here we'll be able to do that.
Let's go back to the relationship between you as the Inspector
General and the agency administrator.
You noted that you on approximately two occasions recall golfing
with Mr. O'Keefe?
A. Yes.
Q. That would have been at his home in Virginia, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Leesburg, I believe, Belmont?
A. Yes.
Q. Aside from that, did you have any other contact outside of the
office, outside of NASA headquarters or NASA center a NASA facility
whether you want to characterize it as social or business, were there
other contacts?
A. In what time-frame.
Q. During the period that--how about let's start with prior to you
becoming the Inspector General . . .
Page 98
. . . Understanding, going down, looking at every one of
facilities, going to a launch.
I went to a launch in Bykanor, Russia, and let me tell you I
learned more about NASA and the manner in which it does business by
going to Russia and attending a launch in Bykanor which is the rockets
launched from the same facility that Sputnik went off in 1959 and
looked to me like there hadn't been any improvement since then, you
know----
Q. What other functions outside of NASA do you recall attending
with Mr. O'Keefe or where Mr. O'Keefe was in attendance?
A. During the time that he was----
Q. That he was the administrator, yes.
A. Again, you know, I'd say there are any number of instances. He
never came to my house. I went to his house after we played golf. I
don't know if there were any instances where I went to his house. I
can't recall any.
You know----
Q. Aside from your--I believe you said weekly lunches at NASA
headquarters with Mr. O'Keefe, did you ever have lunch or dinner
outside of NASA together?
A. Alone with Sean O'Keefe, me and him again . . .
Page 104
Ms. Bahr. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but there will be a line of
questioning later where I think it would be more appropriate to address
this. If for the moment we could go back to just what kind of
interactions you had with Mr. O'Keefe, that would be most helpful.
The Witness. Your last question was what prompted that instance
where I can recall having a drink with Mr. O'Keefe. I think--I can
recall one other instance where that happened. It wasn't with just
O'Keefe. It was with other persons on his staff. That was where I had
been told that I was going to be appointed as the Inspector General to
the Coalition Provisional Authority.
I think that--I'm not positive. I think that he might have invited
me to have a drink relating to that at that time.
By Ms. Bahr:
Q. Did he recommend you for that post?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Do you know how you came to be suggested for the post? Or---
A. I believe it was because for all those reasons that I was
appointed to be the NASA Inspector General, that the people that I had
worked with in . . .
Page 106
. . . that you recall having some contact outside of NASA in a
social setting?
A. Well, again, there were many times where there were--there were
meetings that took place. I remember there was a--there was a Shuttle
upgrade conference which I attended. While at the Shuttle upgrade
conference, which was either at Stennis or Michaud, which is the tank
production facility in eastern Louisiana----
Q. How do you spell that?
A. M-i-c-h-a-u-d. But I'm probably misspelling it because I haven't
spelled it before.
Q. Stennis would be S-t-e-n-n-i-s?
A. Right.
Q. OK.
A. I remember running into O'Keefe. We went over to Stennis for an
event over there. It was a crayfish bake that he attended. I remember
going to that on the premises of the Stennis Space Flight Center.
Q. But there were other NASA officials or senior staff members in
attendance; is that correct?
A. Yes. And it might be that when we were attending those types of
events, that there was interaction, social interaction, in effect,
after---- . . .
Page 114
A. Ten. I'm guessing. Five. More than five. Less than 15 would be
my guess.
Q. OK. In reviewing the records primarily your calendar and other
records, I think we came to the determination there were 13 instances
during the period that he was NASA administrator?
Mr. Sollers. Pretty good.
By Ms. Bahr:
Q. Generally what was the purpose of flying aboard the NASA
aircraft, official aircraft, and was it always with Mr. O'Keefe there?
Were there occasions when he wasn't aboard the aircraft?
A. I would say there would be a number of different reasons for why
I might be on the NASA aircraft. But I'd say that fundamentally, I had
an intent and whatever the reason for the intent was to, go to
someplace that the NASA plane was going and took the opportunity either
at my request or O'Keefe's request or whoever as an indication of
availability to travel in that manner for a number of different
reasons.
After substantial discussion with, as I've mentioned before, I have
a collaborative relationship with my direct reports. This would be the
kind of thing I would talk with them about.
Page 125
. . . going.
Q. In every instance?
A. Yes. I never requested that there be a NASA flight to take me
someplace. In other words, never was the originator of a request for a
flight that independent of something else that was going on. I might
have asked whether or not I could go on a flight, which I believed
would already be going to a certain locale.
Is there space available on the plane for me to go?
Yes, there is space available. Great. I'll go get on that plane. No
cost. No additional cost to the government as far as I know. Now maybe
there were instances where somebody was going on the plane but because
I asked whether or not or was invited that they didn't get a seat on
the plane and had to go commercial. That's a possibility.
But my assumption is there can be plenty of instances where--you
know--I occupied a seat and saved the government money by virtue of my
occupying it.
Q. OK.
A. As far as the appearance issue, Steve Spratt, good guy be
dedicated Federal servant, if he . . .
______
Excerpts from Record of Investigation of Hon. Robert W. Cobb, Office of
Inspector General, NASA, August 30, 2006 (pages 49-54, 59, 140-142,195-
197, 206-217, 222-225, 231, 266-271)
Pages 49-54
Allegation 8--Inspector General COBB squelched a finding on the
Audit of Barters on the International Space Station Program after
conferring with Paul Pastorek (Pastorek), former NASA Legal Counsel.
Investigative Findings
Former Audit Director Dennis Coldren submitted a complaint to the
Integrity Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency (Exhibit 8). On February 22, 2006, Coldren was interviewed
(Exhibit 25). During the interview, Coldren provided an e-mail sent
June 7, 2002, from Pastorek, to COBB regarding the Barters on the
International Space Station Program Audit (Barters Audit).
In the e-mail, Pastorek tells COBB that there are two points in the
Barters Audit about which he would discuss when they meet.
Specifically, Pastorek noted in the e-mail that he wanted to discuss
restricting the circulation of the Barters Audit because he had been
advised by John Schumacher (Schumacher), NASA Associate Administrator
for External Relations, that disclosure of the audit report findings,
as was originally contemplated, would lead to showing foreign
governments NASA's hand. Second, Pastorek stated he wanted to discuss
his concern the audit report mentioned the possibility that NASA may
have been in breach of their agreements with foreign countries if they
took certain actions. Relative to that breach, Pastorek stated in his
e-mail to COBB, ``I question the conclusion and I would like to see the
analysis. I am doing my own analysis and so far cannot understand such
a conclusion.''
Coldren stated that ultimately, through their chain of command
[Alan Lamoreaux, former Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Kevin
Carson, former Audit Director] the auditors who worked on the audit,
James Griggs, Auditor-in-Charge and Barbara Moody, Auditor, were
instructed to remove all audit findings from the. Barters audit report,
and include only the audit findings reported under the heading of
``other matters of interest.'' This effectively removed four pages of
audit findings, and left roughly one paragraph detailing the findings
relative to other matters of interest.
A review of the contents of April 2002 draft report's ``Other
Matters of Interest'' section, which consisted of four pages, to the
September 6, 2002 final report's ``Other Matters of Interest'' one
paragraph, which was moved to the Executive Summary, was conducted to
make a determination if there were substantive changes from the draft
to the final report. In addition, work papers were reviewed.
Draft Report
``NASA risks noncompliance with its intergovernmental agreement and
Memorandums of Understanding if the Agency does not deliver the
Habitation Module and the Crew Return Vehicle. The intergovernmental
agreement and Memoranda of Understanding require NASA to supply a
Habitation Module to support four crewmembers and a crew rescue vehicle
to support the rescue and return of a minimum of four crewmembers. NASA
has complied with the International Space Station (ISS) bartering
agreements. However, because of ISS cost overruns and budget
constraints, NASA reduced the ISS crew capability from seven to three.
If NASA retains the reduced crew configuration, the Agency would be in
noncompliance with the international agreements. Therefore, the
agreements may need to be renegotiated, and NASA would likely be forced
to assume a greater share of costs.''
Final Report
``. . . As a result, NASA deferred certain elements considered high
risk, such as the habitation module and the crew return vehicle. If no
alternatives are provided, the absence of the deferred elements will
limit the permanent ISS crew to three. NASA and the international space
agencies negotiated two ISS bartering agreements based on a percentage
of utilization rights contemplated with a seven-person crew
configuration. To the extent that the two bartering agreements may be
affected by a reduction in planned on-orbit resources, NASA should
coordinate with the affected partner.''
Result of Review: The finding in paragraph one of the Draft Report,
``NASA risks noncompliance with intergovernmental agreements'' was not
present in the final report.
On May 31, 2006, Pastorek was interviewed (Exhibit 138). Pastorek
fielded a number of questions regarding the sharing of IG Audit
reports. Specifically, a pre-draft of the NASA OIG Audit report on
International Agreements/Bartering for the Space Station that COBB may
have shared with him. Pastorek stated the IG frequently advised the
Administration about upcoming. audits but that Schumacher or Jason
(Jay) Steptoe, Associate General Counsel, NASA, would have handled any
details. His only concern with this audit was that if too much
information was in the report, NASA might destroy their negotiating
position with foreign countries. Furthermore, Pastorek said the IG used
a hypothetical situation to criticize NASA rather than using facts and
the took issue with that type of audit.
Allegation 9--The substance of the audit report and recommendations
was changed on an audit regarding the Independent Technical Authority
and Safety and Mission Assurance.
Investigative Findings
On March 10, 2006, [redacted] was interviewed (Exhibit 41) based on
information he provided to Senator Bill Nelson [Florida], which was
forwarded to HUD OIG by the Integrity Committee of the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (Exhibit 7). During the interview,
[redacted] stated there are several examples where Inspector General
COBB has directly changed the substance of a report.
On April 18, 2006, a confidential source identified as T-6 was
interviewed (Exhibit 57). Regarding the Independent Technical Authority
(ITA) and Safety Mission Assurance (SMA) audit, assignment number A-04-
004-00, T-6 provided the following information. After the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report was issued, 14 of the 29
recommendations made had to be addressed before NASA could ``fly
again.'' [redacted] several recommendations to audit, and to ensure
that NASA was making the corrective actions. Part of the issue was the
SMA group reported to the Center Director, who reported to the Mission/
Program Director. Therefore, the very people that the SMA group was
supposed to be overseeing were the same people they reported to and
received funding from. T-6 stated that the bottom line was the safety
staff was not independent, and NASA needed to change the organizational
structure. GAO and an independent study found this issue as well. T-6
stated the audit team cited this in their draft audit report, and made
recommendations, however, Inspector General COBB changed the report and
the recommendations. In April 2005, Michael Griffin (Griffin) became
the NASA Administrator. The first thing Griffin did was realign the
Center Directors. Griffin made the change the audit team had
recommended; the same change the audit team had been trying to convince
COBB of over the previous year.
The first attempt to issue the above report was in December 2003.
COBB sent a memo to NASA management, instead of an audit report with
recommendations. Afterwards COBB [redacted] did not receive a response
[redacted] COBB replied, ``Well then the next thing we issue will not
be a willy-nilly memo.''
The second attempt to issue a report was in March 2004. The audit
team drafted a management letter with four recommendations. COBB
reviewed the draft and made changes. Some of the changes the audit team
did not know how to reference. Suddenly, COBB advised they had to issue
something within the next day. On April 5, 2004, instead of issuing a
management letter COBB sent an e-mail to NASA management. What had
initially started as a management letter with four recommendations
ended up as an e-mail with no recommendations.
The third attempt to issue a report ``fizzled, and did not go
anywhere.'' This was around August 2004. [redacted] were still trying
to make the changes COBB wanted. At the same time they wanted to
address the concerns the audit team had. T-6 stated nothing was issued
this time.
The fourth attempt to issue a report was in October 2004. NASA
appointed Walt Cantrell (Cantrell), NASA Deputy Chief Engineer, to come
up with a plan to implement the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
(CAIB) recommendations. On October 15, 2004, COBB sent Cantrell an e-
mail referencing the audit. COBB sent the e-mail without the audit
team's review. This time, T-6 stated the audit team did not have
concerns about the content of COBB's e-mail.
In November 2004, NASA issued a new plan. COBB asked the audit team
to review it. In January 2005, the audit team briefed Evelyn Klemstine
(Klemstine), the new Assistant Inspector General for Audit. The audit
team told Klemstine, ``At this point you might as well shut down the
assignment because COBB is not going to issue anything.'' Klemstine did
not close the assignment The audit team drafted a report in March 2005,
titled ``NASA's Technical Authority and Safety and Mission Assurance
Lack Total Autonomy.'' In May 2005, the discussion draft was issued
with one recommendation. In August 2005, the final report titled
``Risks Associated with NASA's Plan for Technical Authority and Safety
and Mission Assurance'' was issued with no recommendation.
During the interview with [redacted] on March 10, 2006, Carson
specifically mentions this ITA and SMA audit (Exhibit 41). According to
[redacted] COBB told [redacted] ``You guys have been on this for a year
and have nothing to show for it.'' [redacted] was in this meeting and
said nothing. [redacted] said they had written several reports, but
COBB would not issue them. COBB told [redacted] ``was missing the
message.'' One of the recommendations [redacted] draft report was to
eliminate the warrant holders from having to report to the Center
Directors. COBB told [redacted] ``You don't know what you are talking
about in the recommendations.'' [redacted] recommendation was ``right
on'' because when Griffin became the new NASA Administrator, Griffin
made the change to NASA that [redacted] recommended in his audit
report.
On April 19, 2006, [redacted] was interviewed (Exhibit 62).
[redacted] reported an audit was conducted on NASA's SMA and ITA.
[redacted] said the team had an issue with how the ITA reported up the
NASA chain of command. The audit team recommended moving the ITA out of
the SMA Directorate and having ITA personnel report directly to the
NASA respective Center Directors. [redacted] said COBB did not agree
with the audit team's recommendation. [redacted] advised the audit was
conducted prior to Griffin's appointment to the position of NASA
Administrator. [redacted] stated shortly after Griffin became NASA's
Administrator, be independently implemented the audit team's
recommendations.
On June 15, 2006, NASA OIG [redacted] was interviewed. (Exhibit
157). [redacted] mentioned the ITA Audit [redacted] recalled that the
``auditors were very frustrated that COBB was not using the normal
techniques to report the results of the audit'' COBB would converse
with NASA management and sometimes the findings and recommendations
were not tracked. In his past experience with the NASA OIG, the process
was a more ``rigid structure.'' [redacted] stated, ``Perhaps it's a
better way to get quick responses or information to NASA, but if you
don't keep track, how do you know if you are making a difference.''
On June 19, 2006, [redacted] was interviewed (Exhibit 163).
[redacted] stated that the ITA audit report was a good example of a
report that COBB changed. She stated she would not have ``gone down the
same route'' as COBB on this audit. She believes COBB's version of the
report was ``wishy-washy'' and ``watered down.'' [redacted] stated that
there was a clear articulation of the issues in the draft audit report.
By the time the report was finally issued, the findings in the report
were ``overcome by events.'' Meaning in this case, the audit was
ongoing for years, and by the time they were finally ready to issue a
report, Griffin became the NASA Administrator, and made the changes the
audit team was trying to recommend in the audit report.
A review of COBB's e-mails found an e-mail from COBB to Bryan
O'Connor, Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance, NASA, dated March 17, 2004. In the e-mail, Associate
Administrator O'Connor thanks COBB for coming by last night and
restates his thoughts on the draft audit report. The last paragraph in
the e-mail states, ``Moose, in summary, I cannot agree with either of
your two recommendations because I have such a problem with your three
conclusions. Do we need to talk some more?'' The timing of this meeting
corresponds with the second attempt to issue a draft audit report, as
discussed above in the interview with T-6.
On June 29, 2006, COBB was interviewed (Exhibit 182). COBB was
asked about this audit, and his response to the allegation is located
on page 403, line 14 through page 404, line 16 of his interview
transcript. COBB stated:
Q. How about on the independent technical authority audit
report? One of your senior staff members stated that it was a
good example of you changing a report, but they wouldn't have
gone down the same route as you. Subjective, but that your
version of the report was ``wishy washy'' and ``watered down''?
A. I would say in connection with what I recall that staff
presented to me on a number of occasions, that the--their--what
their articulation of what was going on in connection with the
independent technical authority was inconsistent with the facts
and to such a point that that was a circumstance where the
communication by me to the agency in, I believe, it was
December of 2003 was a product generated mostly by myself with
some benefit of--and Tom Howard is not enthusiastic about the
front office generating, but it was an issue with which I had
substantial familiarity by virtue of my participation in the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, my involvement in the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, considerations of issues, my
personal discussions with a number of officials throughout NASA
on independent technical authority issues.
So I had some comfort with what I articulated in that letter. As
compared to the discomfort I had With the product that had been
generated by staff.
Allegation 10--Inspector General COBB stifled the publication of
audit findings for an audit regarding Wind Tunnel Utilization.
Investigative Findings
On March 15, 2006, a confidential source identified as T-3 was
interviewed to obtain information regarding allegations HUD OIG
received from the Integrity Committee of the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (Exhibit 44). During the interview, T-3
stated, ``COBB stifled the publication of audit findings,'' and
provided several examples.
T-3 supervised audit assignment A-03-007-00, Wind Tunnel
Utilization. Work was performed at Ames Research Center (ARC), Glenn
Research Center, and Langley Research Center. The audit disclosed that
ARC violated Office of Management and Budget policy by failing to bill
private users the full cost of using the wind tunnels. Therefore, ARC
was improperly subsidizing private industry, like Boeing. According to
T-3, ``The front office told me to drop the finding from the report.''
There were several other findings included in the draft report,
however, none of them were as important as the full cost/subsidy
finding. T-3 believes a finding like this would have embarrassed the
Bush Administration because subsidies have been an issue between the
U.S. and Europe.
T-3 recalled attending a meeting in which ``COBB became so angry,
he was practically spitting.'' T-3 believed this meeting was in regards
to the wind tunnel issues, and took place in June 2003, in the
conference room at NASA Headquarters. T-3 recalled that he, Deputy
Inspector General Thomas Howard, former Assistant Inspector General for
Audits (AIGA) David Cushing, and COBB were all in attendance. T-3
stated that COBB made unprofessional comments about the audit and the
work that had been completed. COBB said that the audit staff had not
done enough work to support the conclusions they were making in the
audit.
T-3 said that COBB then agreed to look into the subsidy/wind tunnel
issue in a later audit. The audit was subsequently initiated in January
2005 [Audit Assignment A-05-010-00]. T-3 stated this audit is currently
in process, but it looks like COBB will not issue this report either.
For this second wind tunnel assignment, Audit Assignment A-05-010-
00, a memorandum was issued on June 1, 2006, to NASA. The memorandum
stated the OIG was closing the subject assignment because significant
changes in the management of NASA's wind tunnels have invalidated the
OIG's initial work.
On June 19, 2006, AIGA Evelyn Renee Klemstine (Klemstine) was
interviewed (Exhibit 163). Klemstine stated if certain auditors forward
reports to Headquarters ``there is going to be problems.'' It would not
matter whether the audit or the report was the best, it would never be
good enough. For example, if she forwards a report from Supervisory
Auditor David Gandrud (Gandrud), it will not go through. This happened
on the ``Wind Tunnel'' audit report written by Gandrud [Audit
Assignment A-05-010-00]. Klemstine thought the second version of the
report was good, however, COBB kept re-writing it over the next 6
months. By the time COBB was ready to issue the report, the report had
no meaning because the findings were ``overcome by events.'' Klemstine
stated had the second version been issued, the report would have been
timely and relevant.
Allegation 12--The number of audits has decreased and NASA OIG is
not issuing as many reports as they used to.
Investigative Findings
HUD OIG interviewed several current and former NASA OIG employees
to obtain information regarding allegations received from the Integrity
Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
During several of these interviews, the following allegation was
raised: ``The number of audits have decreased and NASA OIG is not
issuing as many reports as they used to.''
A review of the number of audit reports and memorandums in NASA
OIG's Semiannual Reports to Congress and the Office of Audits Central
Information System (OACIS) from FY 2000 to FY 2006 was conducted
(Exhibit 184). The results are indicated below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Audit Reports Memorandums Audits Closed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 62 0 1
2001 40 0 8
2002 30 0 0
2003 29 3 8
2004 26 7 6
2005 29 2 7
2006* 7 9 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* As of 1st semiannual reporting period.
On June 27 and 29, 2006, Inspector General Robert Watson (Moose)
COBB was interviewed (Exhibit 182). COBB addressed the allegation
during his interview, and his response begins at page 346, line 13 of
his interview transcript. COBB stated, in part:
Q. While you were inspector general, to the best of your knowledge,
do you know if the number of audits and audit reports have increased,
decreased, remained the same?
A. I don't know, but I can tell you--
Mr. Sollers. You mean like on an annual basis?
By Mr. Febles:
Q. The semiannuals that you provide? Have they gotten thicker?
Thinner?
A. The thickness of a semiannual is separate from the issue that
you articulate.
Pages 140-142
Allegation 34--Inspector General COBB, in his e-mail correspondence
with former NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe (O'Keefe), might have
inappropriately released law enforcement sensitive information.
Investigative Findings
On January 31, 2006, and April 24, 2006, [redacted] was interviewed
(Exhibits 19 & 75, respectively) regarding [redacted] complaint to the
Integrity Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency, which was forwarded to HUD OIG (Exhibit 1). [redacted] COBB
does not conduct business independently or carry out his duties in an
impartial manner. [redacted] heard that COBB and former NASA
Administrator O'Keefe were close.
A review was conducted of e-mails retrieved from the Microsoft
Exchange government account of COBB (Exhibit 24). In one e-mail, it was
determined COBB notified senior NASA management officials of impending
search warrant executions and the existence of an undercover operation.
The subject e-mail, dated June 16, 2004, was sent from COBB to O'Keefe.
COBB's e-mail, titled ``Re: bad parts case,'' states in part:
``fyi. Working with FBI and Defense Criminal Investigative
Service and the Department of Justice, we have been involved in
an undercover operation targeting suppliers of bad parts to
NASA among others, including bad parts for Station, Shuttle and
NASA aircraft. Search warrants are going to be served on six
companies over the next couple of days. The names of the
suppliers are not household names, and typically involve
subcontractor suppliers. We have been involved in a number of
similar investigations and, unfortunately, suppliers often
represent that parts they are supplying meet specs when they do
not. Sometimes the misrepresentation is made knowingly and
intentionally. Serving of warrants is sometimes noticed by the
media. Please keep close hold. I have sent this message to
[redacted] and Pastorek.''
Special Agent [redacted] reported the investigation mentioned in
the subject e-mail referred to a joint NASA OIG investigation with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), on a government contractor,
``Max's Marketplace'' (NFI) (Exhibit 125).
On May 22, 2006, Special Agent [redacted] FBI, Huntsville Resident
Agency, Alabama, and [redacted] FBI, Huntsville Resident Agency, were
interviewed (Exhibit 125). [redacted] confirmed the subject of the case
is Max's Marketplace and a number of other government contractors,
involved in the production of substandard NASA parts. In June 2004, his
office, together with NASA OIG, executed six simultaneous Federal
search warrants throughout Alabama. [redacted] advised that
approximately one-month prior to the execution of the search warrants,
his office held a massive operations briefing at a hotel in Huntsville.
Approximately 50 law enforcement officers involved in the executions
were present. [redacted] stated neither O'Keefe, Paul Pastorek
(Pastorek), former NASA General Counsel, nor Glen Mahone (Mahone)
Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, NASA, were invited to, or
were present at, the operations briefing.
The search warrants, as per Straub, were obtained in coordination
with David Estes, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), Northern
District of Alabama. Prior to seeking the search warrants, NASA OIG
placed one of their agents undercover to order parts from the various
contractors.
Ponzo stated, ``As I recall O'Keefe was the guy in charge of NASA
at the time we did the search warrants.'' Ponzo felt that notifying
O'Keefe might have been a protocol in the ``NASA chain of command.''
Ponzo went on to state that in his estimation, NASA OIG making a
notification to O'Keefe would be ``no different'' than his office
notifying the FBI Director's Office in Washington, D.C.
Ponzo stated he was not familiar enough with the reporting
requirements between the two agencies to comment as to whether COBB's
actions were inappropriate. However, Ponzo was ``definitely concerned''
with COBB's notification to Mahone, in the NASA Public Affairs office.
According to Ponzo, his office is required to direct any press related
inquiries to the assigned AUSA.
On May 30, 2006, O'Keefe was interviewed (Exhibit 137). O'Keefe
stated typically COBB would not brief him on criminal cases. It would
be ``very unusual'' if COBB were to brief him on criminal matters.
O'Keefe recalled one occasion when COBB briefed him on the status of
criminal charges against a NASA employee who viewed pornographic
material on a government computer. O'Keefe did not recall ever being
briefed by COBB on the status of upcoming NASA OIG search warrants or
undercover operations.
On May 31, 2006, Pastorek was interviewed (Exhibit 138). Pastorek
noted there were rare occasions when he received a telephone call from
COBB advising him of the arrest of a NASA employee. He believes this
was done in an effort to afford NASA the ability to prepare should they
receive a query from the news media. Pastorek was not given details of
the event; merely that it was going to take place later that day.
On June 28, 2006, Deputy Inspector General Thomas Howard (Howard)
was interviewed (Exhibit 185). Howard was asked about NASA OIG
notifying NASA management in advance of search warrant operations.
Howard's testimony is covered on pages 57 through 66 of the interview
transcript, and he stated, in part:
Special Agent Bahr. OK. His relationship, Mr. Cobb's relationship,
with Mr. O'Keefe, did it affect Mr. Cobb's ability to maintain his
independence and impartiality as the NASA OIG?
Mr. Howard. No. None whatsoever.
Special Agent Bahr. You never saw any indication of that? Never had
any reason to question it?
Mr. Howard. No. No.
Special Agent Bahr. OK. Did Mr. Cobb brief Mr. O'Keefe on or NASA
senior management on NASA OIG, ongoing NASA OIG audits or
investigations?
Mr. Howard. As I said, if during these meetings we thought there
was something that warranted his attention, yes.
Special Agent Bahr. OK. How about on the investigation side of the
house, what information, if any, would Mr. Cobb ever share with Mr.
O'Keefe or anyone else on the NASA senior management?
Mr. Howard. If there were a search warrant executed, once we got
word from the--through the investigative staff that the search warrant
had been executed, if it was on NASA property, we would generally give
Mr. O'Keefe a heads up and sometimes the affected----
Special Agent Bahr. Center director or----
Mr. Howard. Center director or mission head. Yes, it's a convoluted
organization at NASA. So that was primarily--generally, in our policy,
which I believe is still in writing was that essentially, the SAC would
be responsible for notifying the Center director and that's a--that was
a particularly sensitive issue because at the NASA Centers--I think at
all, if not most--the guards are armed.
And so the--you know, just from a safety standpoint, we felt that
the need--if we were going to be armed and making arrests that we
needed to have some, coordination so that they would understand what
was happening.
Special Agent Bahr. Between armed personnel and NASA OIG agents?
Mr. Howard. Yes. Yes.
Special Agent Bahr. And the security officers?
Mr. Howard. Yes.
Special Agent Bahr. These advisements of perhaps Mr. O'Keefe or any
of the Center Directors or you referred to another----
Mr. Howard. The mission directors. Essentially, the----
Special Agent Bahr. Mission directors.
Mr. Howard.--heads of the major groups in headquarters.
Special Agent Bahr. So the advisements relative to the execution of
search warrants this always took place after the warrants had been
executed----
Pages 195-197
Allegation 47--Inspector General COBB maintained a close, personal
relationship with former NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe and former
NASA General Counsel Paul Pastorek.
Investigative Findings
This allegation was predicated upon information obtained in eight
interviews of current and former employees of the NASA OIG. These
interviews were conducted to obtain information regarding various
allegations HUD OIG received from the Integrity Committee of the
President Council on Integrity and Efficiency. In those interviews, the
employees alleged that COBB maintained a personal relationship with
former NASA Administrator, Sean O'Keefe (O'Keefe) and former NASA
General Counsel, Paul Pastorek (Pastorek). In addition, it has been
alleged that this relationship has interfered with COBB's independence
and may not have allowed him to remain impartial regarding audit and
investigative findings.
During the investigation, e-mails sent between O'Keefe and COBB
during their tenure at NASA and. NASA OIG respectively were reviewed.
In addition, e-mails sent between COBB and Pastorek were also reviewed.
The following e-mails depict the type of relationship maintained
(Exhibit 118).
1. E-mail Thread
``From: Sean O'Keefe
To: rcobb;
CC:
Subject: my apologies.
Date: Tuesday, June 15, 2004 1:53:04 PM
Attachments:
Moose--my apologies for standing you up for lunch today--I
completely lost track of the time and have been overrun with demands
today. I owe ya one--many thanks for your patience and understanding.
regards, Sean''
2. E-mail Thread
``From: [email protected]
To: Robert Cobb;
CC:
Subject: Apologies
Date: Tuesday, August 03, 2004 12:22:24 PM
Attachments:
Moose--on further reflection, I owe you an apology for today's
behavior. For lots of reasons I was in a foul mood--you didn't deserve
that. Points made, but could have been more effectively conveyed--
thanks for not returning it in kind--''
3. E-mail Thread
``From: [email protected]
To: Robert Cobb;
CC:
Subject: Departure
Date: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:18:45 AM
Attachments:
Moose--Before the rumor mill runs too hot and heavy, I wanted to
advise ypu [sic] of a personal development. LSU has advised that they
are considering me to be Chancellor. The LSU Board plans to vote on the
recommendation on Thurs. If they offer, as I expect they will, I intend
to accept. With tuition bills for the first of three looming, it is
only a question of months on how much longer I could keep up this
public service addiction. Life on the bayou will improve the situation
immeasurably. Since I've pressed you to service, I owed you a heads up.
I'll make it through Feb in the hopes of a successor confirmed by then.
Best regards, Sean''
4. E-mail Thread
``From: Robert Cobb
To: [email protected]
CC:
Subject: talk
Date: Friday, November 14, 2003 1:29:07 PM
Attachments:
Yesterday I received a call from WH personnel about being on the
list of candidates for the position of IG of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. They said if I were the guy, I would be detailed for 6
months, then back to NASA. I told them I would get back to them this
afternoon to tell them if I am interested. I would like to discuss this
with you; I will call you at 2:15 when, I understand, you may be
between meetings.''
5. E-mail Thread.
``From: Cobb, Robert W. (HQ-WAH10)
To: `[email protected]';
CC:
Subject: Re:In DC today and tomorrow. Are you around? Will be at IMAX
tonight too.
Date: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 10:40:18 AM
Attachments:
I am out of the building until after lunch. Family to be at Imax
tonight. Plan to give you a hug!
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld''
``------Original Message------
From: Paul G. Pastorek
To: Robert `Moose' Cobb
Sent: Wed Sep 21 09:02:52 2005
Subject: In DC today and tomorrow. Are you around? Will be at IMAX
tonight too.''
6. E-mail Thread
``From: Paul Pastorek
To: [email protected];
CC:
Subject: Jazzfest
Date: Thursday, April 15, 2004 9:31:31 AM
Attachments:
Status of activities.
I have a friend who is working on reservations at Commanders Palace
for either Thursday or Friday night.
I am also working on reservations at a place called Cuvee's which
is terrific. I ate there for the first time last week. A relatively new
place. If you want I can get you in at Emeril's instead. Let me know.
We can go with you or you can go off by yourself. You call the
shot.
I also recommend you go to http://www.nojazzfest.com/ and determine
whether you want to go to evening activities on Thursday or Friday. In
addition to the official Jazzfest acts, there is music all over town at
any time of the evening so you could still do dinner and skip the big
acts and see the others. If you want to do a big act, we can skip
dinner.
Kathy would like to take your wife around town on Thursday while
you are at the Conference. She can take her antique shopping, site
seeing around town, or even to a Plantation home (or homes) outside the
city.
Let me know what you think. Also let me know your flight arrival
and departure times and that of your wife, if different, so I can make
other recommendations.''
Pages 206-217
Allegation 48--Inspector General COBB. screened potential audit
topics and investigative findings through former NASA Administrator
Sean O'Keefe (O'Keefe) and former NASA General Counsel Paul Pastorek
(Pastorek).
Investigative Findings
[redacted] was interviewed regarding his complaint to the Integrity
Committee of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which
was forwarded to HUD OIG (Exhibit 8). On February 22, 2006, [redacted]
was interviewed and provided the following allegation (Exhibit 25).
[redacted] stated that he learned from [redacted] that COBB would meet
with O'Keefe and/or Pastorek and ``screen'' potential audit topics, and
audit findings. By doing this, COBB could determine O'Keefe's and/or
Pastorek's ``acceptability'' of a potential audit topic, or an audit
finding. [redacted] COBB used this same method to screen potential
investigations, or investigative findings, to ensure they met with
O'Keefe's or Pastorek's approval, and/or determine what audits and
investigations the OIG would conduct.
Based on this information, a review was conducted of e-mails sent
to and from COBB. The following are e-mails where COBB discussed audit
and investigative information with NASA officials (Exhibit 118).
1. E-Mail Thread
``From: Robert COBB [[email protected]]
Sent: 12/20/2002 12:45 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [redacted]
Subject: facilities issues
We are looking into a couple of facilities issues;
1. NASA-wide wind tunnel use and efficiencies associated with that
use;
2. NASA Research park at Ames.
I'd like to discuss with you these projects so we can take your
views into account in designing our activities.''
Followed by:
``From: [email protected]
Sent: Thursday, December 26, 2002 3:11 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: facilities issues
Sounds good--thanks for the heads up--regards, Sean''
2. E-Mail Thread
``------Original Message------
From: Robert Cobb [[email protected]]
Sent: 06/25/2003 01:32 PM
To: R CABANA ;
;
; Bill Readdy
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: astronaut report
My office was close to issuing a report on the astronaut corps at
the time of the Columbia accident. I stopped release of the report
because the message was not appropriate at the time. Given that NASA is
contemplating a new astronaut class, I believe. the circumstances have
changed and the report should surface. My staff is coordinating with
Code M audit liaison officials on this matter.''
Followed by:
``From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]; [email protected];
CC:
Subject: Re: astronaut report
Date: Thursday, June 26, 2003 10:01:36 AM
Attachments:
Thanks for the heads up, Moose. We'll watch it carefully and
respond promptly.''
3. E-mail Thread
``------Original Message------
From: Robert Cobb [[email protected]]
Sent: 06/27/2003 05:44 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Fwd: CAIB Observations Letter and Enclosures
Here is the draft of my observations on CAIB independence, with
attachments. My expectation would be to issue the letter sometime
before the CAIB issues its report. Please review and let me know what
you think. I will be out the week of July 4, but will be receiving e-
mail.''
Followed by:
``From: [email protected]
To: [email protected];
CC:
Subject: Re:Fwd: CAIB Observations Letter and Enclosures
Date: Sunday, June 29, 2003 10:44:16 AM
Attachments:
Thnks Moose--will advise/comment soonest.''
4. E-mail Thread
``From: Sean O'keefe
To: [email protected];
CC:
Subject:
Date: Monday, July 07, 2003 10:27:35 AM
Attachments:
Moose--I've reviewed your paper on the Board independence issue.
This is very timely and will likely be helpful input as the Board
prepares to release its findings. We've tried to be responsive in the
establishment and conduct of this investigation and your observations
verify my impressions on that score thanks for the opportunity to
comment. regards, Sean''
5. E-mail Thread
``At 04:43 PM 7/30/2003--0400, you wrote:
FYI. OIG may look into procedures for issuing bonuses to NASA's
political >appointees. This is an issue Executive Branch wide and has
received press >attention.>''
Followed by:
``From: Sean O'keefe
To: Robert Cobb;
CC:
Subject: Re: bonus issue
Date: Wednesday, July 30, 2003 6:57:24 PM
Attachments:
sure''
6. E-mail Thread
``------Original Message------
From: Robert Cobb [[email protected]]
Sent: 04/26/2004 04:26 PM
To: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: financial management hearing
FYI. I have been asked to testify on financial management at NASA
on May 12 before the House Govt Reform Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency and Financial Management. I plan to comply with the
request.''
Followed by:
``From: [email protected]
To: Robert Cobb; [email protected];
CC: [email protected]; Paul Pastorek; John Schumacher;
Subject: Re: financial management hearing
Date: Monday, April 26, 2004 5:33:12 PM
Attachments:
Of course--that's during your retreat?''
7. E-mail Thread
``------Original Message------
From: Robert Cobb [[email protected]]
Sent: 06/16/2004 02:11 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: bad parts case >fyi.
Working with FBI and Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the
>Department of Justice, we have been involved in an undercover
operation >targeting suppliers of bad parts to NASA among others,
including bad parts >for Station, Shuttle and NASA aircraft. Search
warrants are going to be >served on six companies over the next couple
of days. The names of the >suppliers are not household names, and
typically involve subcontractor >suppliers. We have been involved in a
number of similar investigations >and, unfortunately, suppliers often
represent that parts they are >supplying meet specs when they do not.
Sometimes the misrepresentation is >made knowingly and intentionally.
Serving of warrants is sometimes >noticed by the media. Please keep
close hold. I have sent this message >to Mahone and Pastorek.''
Followed by:
``From: [email protected]
To: Robert Cobb;
CC:
Subject: Re: bad parts case
Date: Thursday, June 17, 2004 10:58:12 AM
Attachments:
OK--keep me posted--more incoming cowpies I suspect''
8. E-mail Thread
``------Original Message------
From: Robert Cobb [[email protected]]
Sent: 01/12/2005 01:42 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Strategic Planning
Sean: After receiving some inquiries from the Hill, we have been
looking at the role of Dr. Elachi in connection with Strategic Planning
activities. Quite obviously, the concern is about conflicts; we have
found nothing illegal about it, and the question is do we have an
opinion about the appearances. In connection with this, I am going to
send an e-mail to Shoe requesting documents that reflect on Dr.
Elachi's role. I wanted to give you a heads up. I have not had a
discussion with Charles about this, although his folks know we are
interested as we have been rummaging around in the contract and talking
to his counsel's office and others. Of course, we are aware of NASA's
counsel's approval of the arrangement and et cetera. I will be sure to
discuss this with you and Charles before we report out.
Regards,
Moose''
Followed by:
``From: [email protected]
To: Robert Cobb;
CC:
Subject: Re: Strategic Planning
Date: Thursday, January 13, 2005 1:13:35 PM
Attachments:
Thanks Moose--I think we touched all the right bases here and did
it by the book in setting this up. As for appearances--Charles brings a
lot to the equation and he is probably the most objective of all the
scientists given that he doesn't represent any one discipline and he
has mgt responsibilities that injects a sense of realism into our
planning. As evidence, just look at how the road map teams have been
assembled (in accord with FACA etc) and are operating vs the endless
circular motion of the JSAC? I rest my case.''
9. E-mail thread
``From: Robert Cobb
To: [email protected];
CC:
Subject: Fwd: KSC Case
Date: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 2:45:53. PM
Attachments:
FYI on Hi-Shear case. If you forward to others, please let them
know that it is sensitive information about an ongoing investigation,
not for general release.
X-Sender: [email protected]
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.0.22
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2003 14:26:30-0500
To: [email protected], thoward @nasa.gov
From: `Lance G. Carrington'
Subject: KSC Case
Moose,
Here's a summary that can be shared with Code G regarding our
ongoing investigation. This case pertains to the letters sent from KSC
to Mr. Pastorek where USA asks KSC for access to the center to prepare
for their civil case against High Shear.
Thanks, Lance
Hi-Shear Technology Corporation
Case Number: O-KE-00-0107-O
This investigation was initiated based on information provided by
United Space Alliance (USA), Cape Canaveral, FL. It was alleged that
Hi-Shear President George Trahan and Vice President Herb Salit were
attempting to extort contracts from USA. USA operates as the Space
Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC) under NASA contract #NAS9-20000.
USA awarded Purchase Order (PO) #300531, valued at $596,539, to Hi-
Shear for the production of 17-Second Delay Cutters, which are
considered Launch Critical Hardware. After numerous delays caused by
both USA and Hi-Shear, a new delivery date was being negotiated. The
Cutters were complete, pending a final quality inspection by USA.
Approximately $395,035 was paid to Hi-Shear under the PO. According to
USA, on at least three occasions between December 28, 1999 and present,
Salit attempted to extort the award of another USA PO that was in the
pre-award phase, in exchange for the delivery of the Cutters. Hi-Shear
also attempted to extort USA by tying the receipt of the bonnet
thruster award to the delivery of forward and aft separation bolts.
The investigation was accepted by the U.S. Attorney's Office
(USAO), Middle District of Florida. Several conversations between
Salit, Trahan and a USA representative regarding the alleged extortion
attempt by Hi-Shear were recorded. USA later terminated its contracts
with Hi-Shear and qualified another firm to manufacture the separation
bolts. As a result, Hi-Shear filed suit against USA.
Subsequently a target letter was issued to Salit. Salit initially
agreed to plead guilty and cooperate in both the civil and criminal
cases; however that agreement has not materialized due to Salit's
demands. The USAO recently released copies of the recordings and
transcripts to USA and Hi-Shear counsel for use in the civil trial,
which was scheduled to begin October 27, 2003, but has been continued
to address discovery issues.
Update: A draft OIG report of investigation is being prepared at
the request of the USAO who intends to seek an indictment of Salit and
Hi-Shear for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Interference with
commerce by threats or violence). A final decision has not been made on
seeking an indictment of Trahan.
Further examples of e-mails between COBB and O'Keefe may be found
in (Exhibit 113).
On May 30, 2006, O'Keefe was interviewed (Exhibit 137). Asked,
``How often did COBB brief you on audits and investigations prior to
drafts being available, or before charges were filed?'' O'Keefe stated
that he would generally meet with COBB once a month (or more) on audit
issues. For example, O'Keefe reported a major NASA OIG audit that
received more of his attention than any other issue was the audit of
``NASA financial statements.'' However, O'Keefe advised COBB had an
``open door'' to visit with him at any time concerning essential
matters. With regard to NASA OIG audits, O'Keefe stated he always told
COBB, ``On anything, come to your judgments and let me know your
recommendations.'' O'Keefe characterized COBB's involvement with the
audit function as ``proactive.'' As an example, O'Keefe stated COBB
hired Deputy Inspector General Thomas Howard (Howard), an experienced
audit manager from the Government Accountability Office, to further
enhance NASA OIG's audit capabilities. O'Keefe advised NASA OIG audits
generally centered on process and procedural issues, not specific NASA
programs or missions. O'Keefe and COBB would regularly ``collaborate''
prior to audit activities, to determine which inquiries could most
benefit the agency [NASA] and ``the American people.''
Mr. O'Keefe stated typically COBB would not brief him on criminal
cases. It would be ``very unusual'' if COBB were to brief him on
criminal matters. O'Keefe recalled one occasion when COBB briefed him
on the status of criminal charges against a NASA employee who viewed
pornographic material on a government computer.
COBB was interviewed on June 27 and 29, 2006. His response to
questions associated with this area start on Page 72, line 19 through
Page 78, line 23, and Page 87, line 17 through Page 94, line 8 of his
interview transcript (Exhibit 182). COBB stated, in part:
Q. Do I understand correctly that Mr. O'Keefe was concerned about
the audit function; and you had conversations about that, and not so
much about the investigations function of NASA OIG; is that correct? He
felt as if there were problems with the audit function?
A. You'd have to talk to him about what his recollection is and all
that. It is difficult for me to characterize what he thought.
Q. Is that what he communicated to you?
A. My recollection of the conversation would be that we didn't get
into specific activities or whatever but that just as a philosophy,
that an Office of Inspector General has an opportunity to add value to
an organization. And it should work hard to do that;
That's essentially it. I don't recall anything specific from the
conversation, but I do remember him thinking--you know--and me being in
full agreement that that is the nature. We might have talked about a
consultative role, that in effect an Office of Inspector General can
provide a consultation in connection.
You know, I'm aware and he is fully aware having been around
government a long time of what the independent element is in connection
with the activities after Office of Inspector General; and I can say
that he and his staff accorded complete respect for that independence.
I never felt a circumstance where he articulated that I should--I
should have some opinion or should--if he wanted us to do some kind of
work, I told him the same thing I told every other senior manager in
the agency.
Hey, we'd be happy to consider whether or not you thought there was
a fertile ground for us to audit in connection with an activity,
whether or not I can tell you not too many takers in that department of
saying bring in your auditors and conduct an audit of our particular
activity, but----
Q. All right. You touched on this in your last response. Your
philosophy and/or understanding in regard to how an agency IG and the
agency head should interact. You have made reference to a consultative
relationship. Can you explain that and then what your philosophy under
Mr. O'Keefe and under Mr. Griffin is as your role and Inspector General
in your interaction with the agency head?
A. This is the kind of conversation we have in the office all the
time. I'm collaborative in terms of my direct reports. When you get to
the independence issue, you can have a group of people that are the
most independent people in the world, and they never talk to anyone,
because once you get out of the box and start talking to people, that's
an incursion on your independence.
I can tell you in connection with audits that we've had. I've
worried about whether or not our auditors at times were independent in
connection with projects because there would be people who would come
and in effect push an issue at auditors that suggest, gee, this
program, my program should get more money than that one over there, it
shouldn't. I can tell you. I've seen audit work where it felt like,
gee, the program could have written the audit work.
We've had those. In terms of the consultative role, I think that
might have been a word that O'Keefe used in that conversation. I don't
recall specifically it would not be inconsistent with my impression of
what he'd have said. Or there is a document that Clay Johnson in
connection with the IG community has circulated with the assistance of
the IG community that talks about in effect supposed to be a suggestive
governance document between IGs and their agencies.
It is those types of things I'm talking about as being, in effect,
at least from the O'Keefe side what they were looking for in connection
with a role of an Inspector General.
Q. What did Mr. O'Keefe say he was looking for in his Inspector
General?
A. My guess that he would have talked , about something, whether he
used the word consultative or, that in effect you can go and obtain an
independent analysis of issues and provide that to the agency, that
that is a valuable--that is a valuable commodity, and that--you know--
again getting it before--getting it early, getting advice early when
the agency can take advantage of that information rather than after
there has been a problem and a--you know, of note.
Q. So getting advice from the Inspector General as to an issue
within the agency before as opposed to after the fact, after the milk
is spilt, so to speak?
A. You go ask him what we talked about. It wouldn't surprise me if
he had a completely different recollection. I'm walking away in that
meeting with one impression. I don't know his impression. I'd say
everything I said here is impressionistic of a conversation that may
have lasted 45 minutes that took place four-and-a-half years ago.
Q. But you spent 4 years as the Inspector General under the O'Keefe
administration, correct?
The Witness. Right. Unless my math is wrong, I think the overlap of
our service was less than 3 years.
By Ms. Bahr.
Q. OK.
A. From April of 2002 to February of 2005.
I took--and with substantial discussion with my--again, I have a
collaborative style of conducting business. I asked for Frank LaRocca's
opinion. I asked for whoever my senior staffs opinions in connection
with activities. I don't always do what they say. We talk about it. I
do what I think is right and--you know--the--that's the way I conduct
business. In terms of my relationship with Sean O'Keefe, you know, I'd
say we had a very good, professional working relation where if I
thought there was an issue that he had to be concern about, I had no
difficulty or problem communicating to him.
I tried to have as much contact with him as his schedule could
tolerate. It made it so that I could be best informed as to what the
issues of the day were at NASA.
Q. If we could go back to the original question. In terms of what
information did you share either with Mr. O'Keefe or with the center
directors or any other senior staff members within NASA related to what
was going on on the investigative side of the House?
A. On that, I was giving security as a coordinating point. I might
ask a question, have we coordinated in security in connection with the
search warrant that's going to be served at a certain center. That
would be something that the staff level.
There might be certain investigations like a safety investigation.
We get--give an example, prior to the launch of STS 114 last summer, we
got an allegation there was a piece on the external tank that's a bad
piece and this is about a month or 3 weeks before launch is supposed to
take place. The fact that we're going to have a criminal investigation
possibly arising out of this allegation, there's a weighing balance on
how to handle it. I would talk with staff on what is our vehicle for
communicating what we need--what limited information we need to
communicate to the agency.
And typically, if we had, for example, a member of senior staff who
was under investigation, I would sit down with my assistant Inspector
General for investigations, my counsel, my deputy, Tom Howard, and we
would sit and talk about what is the best time to communicate to the
agency this sensitive information that we have so that it, for example,
can take, in the instance of safety, a remedial action to make sure we
don't blow up seven astronauts on launch or alternatively, I can give
you an example.
After getting an OK from whoever my IT was in questions with the
administrator Griffin, our office in conjunction with DCIS was going to
serve search warrants on orbital scientists. Griffin used to work
there. I think he'd rather hear it from his Inspector General than see
it on TV or read about it in the newspaper. Roughly simultaneous with
the execution of the search warrants, by prearrangement with my
investigative team, I would communicate to Griffin, hey, here's a heads
up. We're going to be serving a search warrant in 15 minutes or 5
minutes. I don't know the articulation of time. It was close, worked
out with my staff that. Would be my modus operandi on sensitive
investigative matters whether O'Keefe, center directors, general
counsel, anybody else.
I would just go and say, hey, we got an investigation going on such
and such. Thought you ought to know. That would not be my--the manner
in which I would deal.
Q. OK. What about search warrants? You spoke about communicating
with the center directors relative to search warrants. How would that
be communicated and in what time-frame?
A. Well, typically----
Q. Or arrests? Search warrants or arrests?
A. Typically, those types of things would be coordinated by my
staff and would not involve a phone call by me in questions with the
issue. How exactly to execute them. I would want--I would not want our
armed agents going into a facility with other armed agents who were not
under my employ without giving a notice to, for example, security.
There are certain protocols that have been established of communicating
with security, maybe communicating with chief counsel, or whatever,
where we're going to be doing this.
Q. What about the center directors?
A. I typically would not be involved in picking up the phone and
telling them that something was about to happen. There might be
instances where we sent e-mails to some people, but that would not be a
normal thing. Whatever I would do, again my modus operandi is whether
it was Kevin Winters, Lance Carrington, it would be I'm thinking this
person needs to know this certain information for the following reason.
When would be an appropriate time to communicate that information?
And taking the lead from the investigators in terms of obviously
you don't want to do anything that in any way, shape, or form can
negatively impact an investigation.
And so I'm sensitive to that, and that's why I had a protocol that
for myself was in effect. I'm not going to go tell somebody about an
investigation unless people in my office are on board with the
communications.
Let me tell you. We have a number of very serious and sensitive
investigations that have been conducted throughout my tenure but right
now, and this protocol and how we communicate with the agency, the
agency--if you go and talk to--if you conduct an investigation
involving a senior agency official and talk to five people, the
likelihood, it is going to get back to them.
So how can you control that? You do the best you can. And--but you
do it working with an eyes toward the prize in terms of what we're
doing, how we do it, how we communicate the information we need to.
I wouldn't go off by my loan some and wing it in terms of what
types of things we're looking at.
Q. If I understand you generally; it would be your staff that would
make the contacts or communications to either the security personnel on
centers or perhaps the center directors that was not generally
something you did but were there occasions when that occurred
specifically with the center directors when you would communicate
directly with them as to either a search warrant or an arrest that was
eminent?
A. I'm not coming up with examples to give you of where I made
those calls. I cannot say definitively it didn't happen. I would say
typically staff would handle those communications.
Q. What staff members?
A. The special agents in charge, or the resident agent in charge
would, in effect, have the responsibility for making sure that the
people that needed to know--especially, you can have a lot of safety
issues in connection with a search warrant--that the people that needed
to know about it would know.
Q. Was that protocol within the Inspector General's office, NASA
Inspector General's office that one of the people that needed to know
was the center director or the center directors?
A. I don't know what the paper says.
Q. What paper? Are you referring to NASA regulations?
A. Yes. What our internal guidance articulates in connection with
this.
Q. What was the practice?
A. My guess is the practice was not consistently applied. That in
effect it requires a judgment in every case as to what the
sensitivities are in terms of carrying out the particulars. So it may--
you know; it may involve a call to security office might involve a call
to the facility people to get access to a particular portion of the
building that would not otherwise be accessible.
But you wouldn't always call the people in a facility. Whether it
involved a conversation with the chief counsel, I can tell from you my
perspective, and what I would generally have communicated about this
topic is we need to let the people know. We do not do our work in a
vacuum. We need to let the people who need to know about certain
activity know.
Pages 222-225
Allegation 50--Inspector General COBB frequently had lunch with
former Administrator Sean O'Keefe and former General Counsel Paul
Pastorek, which may have caused an appearance of lack of independence
and impartiality.
Investigative Findings
On February 22, 2006, and March 10, 2006, [redacted] (Exhibit 25)
[redacted] (Exhibit 41) were interviewed regarding complaints and
information they submitted to the Integrity Committee of the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which was forwarded to
HUD OIG (Exhibits 8 & 7, respectively). In their interviews, [redacted]
stated that COBB frequently had lunch with former Administrator Sean
O'Keefe (O'Keefe) and former General Counsel Paul Pastorek (Pastorek),
which may have caused an appearance of lack of independence and
impartiality.
Based on these allegations, a review of COBB's e-mails was
conducted. The following are e-mails between COBB, O'Keefe, and
Pastorek that identify instances where they discussed having lunch:
1.
``From: Sean O'Keefe
To: [email protected];
CC:
Subject:
Date: Tuesday, May 06, 2003 3:09:48 PM
Attachments:
Moose--sorry I stiffed ya for lunch today. I spent quality time
waiting for the House Govt Reform Cmte to fire up the hearing on human
capital legislation. But I was in good company with the SEC Chairman--
upon learning who I was holding up, his legis affairs rep advised as
how I should tell our IG to cool his jets and get a life. just
repeating the comment, clearly from someone who believes she knows you
. . . too well, it would appear! t'was a pleasure talking with your
better half. regards and apologies, Sean''
2.
``From: Robert Cobb
To: Paul Pastorek;
CC:
Subject: Re: lunch
Date: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 12:26:27 PM
Attachments:
Thank you, sir.
At 11:03 AM 9/2/2003--0400, you wrote:
Looks like Sean may be around after all, so I had [redacted]
reserved a table at Columbia Cafe.
I think it is just you and me. Do you want to eat upstairs at noon
or so or do something different?
Robert W. Cobb
Inspector General
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
Paul G. Pastorek
General Counsel
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C.''
On April 20, 2006, [redacted] was interviewed (Exhibit 67).
According to [redacted] COBB and O'Keefe, along with other NASA senior
staff, ate together every Tuesday. The lunches took place either in
O'Keefe's office or sometimes in the Columbia Cafe, which is located
next to O'Keefe's office. These lunches are reflected on COBB's
calendar [redacted] provided the interviewing agents with printed
copies of COBB's calendar covering the time period July 2004 through
April 2006. [redacted] The lunch meetings were sometimes referred to by
COBB as being at the ``Administrator's hideaway.'' [redacted] stated
the Administrator's hideaway was either O'Keefe's office or a reserved
corner of the Columbia Cafe. According [redacted] COBB sometimes puts
other lunch dates on the calendar and he sometimes puts down whom he
was meeting for lunch, but sometimes he does not. [redacted] recalled
that O'Keefe and COBB had lunch alone together on one occasion.
[redacted] advised COBB does not have lunch with the current NASA
Administrator, Michael Griffin (Griffin). COBB and Griffin may have had
a total of five meetings since Griffin became Administrator. Lately
COBB has attempted to schedule meetings with Griffin and, Griffin has
continually postponed the meetings to the point where they are
ultimately not rescheduled.
A review was conducted of COBB's OIG official calendar for the
period April 2002 to April 2006. This review showed that COBB met with
O'Keefe for lunch at a minimum of two times per month from April 2002
through February 2005, the time period when COBB and O'Keefe were at
NASA together. The lunches were called ``Tag-Up'' or ``Administrator's
Hideaway.'' Some of those lunches included [redacted] and Paul
Pastorek. In addition, in some months the lunches exceeded two times
per month.
COBB's schedule did not show evidence he continued those lunches
with current Administrator, Michael Griffin.
On May 30, 2006, O'Keefe was interviewed (Exhibit 137). O'Keefe was
asked how often he held ``Director's luncheons'' with COBB. O'Keefe
stated, ``I'm not sure. Once or twice a month I suppose, or more
often.'' O'Keefe stated others often present at the luncheons included:
Fred Gregory, Deputy Administrator, NASA; John Schumacher (Schumacher),
Chief of Staff, NASA; and Courtney Stadd, Chief of Staff prior to
Schumacher. O'Keefe stated the luncheons always had a working
atmosphere.
On June 27 and 29, 2006, Inspector General Robert Watson (Moose)
COBB was interviewed (Exhibit 182). His response to questions
associated with this area start on Page 79 line 5 and Page 98 line 22
of his transcript, and states, in part:
A. But what I was part of was as his schedule would dictate, we--I
tried to have a weekly luncheon with Mr. O'Keefe; and again his
schedule was extraordinarily busy. If he wanted to talk to me at any
time, I was available to talk to him. And to me, as a consequence of
this interaction with Mr. O'Keefe, our office was able to get involved
and make contributions and establish credibility that it formerly did
not have.
Q. What credibility?
A. Well, for example, when we made an audit recommendation, the
agency would implement it. That was something that did not--was not
occurring as far as I can tell at least from a statistical review of
what was going on under my predecessor.
Q. OK. You said that you would have weekly lunches with Mr.
O'Keefe. You would attend staff meetings on not a regular basis, on
average how often would you attend a senior staff meeting?
A. That would be a very exceptional circumstance that I would
attend any kind of senior staff function. There were instances where it
happened.
Q. Aside from your--I believe you said weekly lunches at NASA
headquarters with Mr. O'Keefe, did you ever have lunch or dinner
outside of NASA together?
A. Alone with Sean O'Keefe, me and him again I went to events
attended by senior staff. At least one. I typically was not invited to
those types of things.
Q. Why did you attend that particular one?
A. Because O'Keefe asked me to come to a particular event which was
at the Stennis Space Flight Center in Mississippi there. Was a dinner
afterward and I attended both of those at his request.
Q. Was there a specific reason why he requested you to attend?
A. Yes. There was a presentation that was going to be given by a
contractor who had come in to analyze NASA culture and, in effect, a
consulting firm. It was going to communicate about its finding and
provide a status report. Because of my interest in all of the Columbia
accident investigation activities, including NASA culture, I had been
involved in a lot of different aspects of that. O'Keefe thought it
would be worthwhile for me to attend the presentation that those people
were given and I did so.
Q. OK. Outside of that kind of lunch or dinner that obviously
appears to be directly related to business, were there any lunches or
dinners?
A. There may have been.
Q. Either one-on-one or with others in attendance? I'm generally
talking about more of a social setting, smaller group?
A. I understand. We're. talking about a person where there'd be
events at the Smithsonian. I would attend those for the same reason I
articulated as attending other things so people can see who you are, so
you can get information from people and pass it on to staff.
Q. That's more business related?
A. I understand. I'm seeing O'Keefe a fair amount. Not every week.
But a fair amount. I'm Just trying to articulate. I cannot remember
whether or not I ever went out to dinner. I think I would remember if I
had a personal one-on-one dinner or one on two lunch or dinner with
him. I don't recall it. Not while he was NASA administrator. It may
have happened. I'm just trying to think. Whether there was a time where
he called me up and said, Moose, we ought to go spend time together. I
can't remember that happening. But. I'm not saying it didn't because
I'm just saying I can't remember it.
Page 231
. . . their (yellow book) standards and hide behind their
pencils.'' [redacted] stated that COBB ends his meetings by saying,
``Everyone is in agreement now, right?'' [redacted] said; ``Who is
going to question him or raise issues?'' [redacted] noted that it was
very clear to all the staff that you do not question what COBB states.
[redacted] recalled that in June or July 2005, COBB and [redacted]
appeared at an Audit Liaison Representative (ALR) Conference. Somebody
there asked COBB why so many people have departed NASA OIG. COBB
replied that he, ``wears them leaving like a badge of honor.''
[redacted] stated that over 100 employees have departed NASA OIG since
COBB arrived. [redacted] advised NASA was once voted the best place to
work, and now it is one of the worst.
[redacted] said the statement, ``There are 1,000 people to take
your place,'' was a commonly used saying by COBB. [redacted] recalled
when one of the auditors who departed NASA OIG was staring out of the
office window on his last day at work. When [redacted] asked him what
he was doing, the auditor replied, I'm looking for the 1,000 people who
are lined up waiting to take my place.''
[redacted] stated that COBB is ``a mean, vicious and arrogant man
who needs to go.'' [redacted] believed COBB has ``wrecked many
careers,'' but feels he [redacted] got lucky and found another
employment opportunity. [redacted] thought that he would end his career
at NASA OIG and not be forced to go somewhere else. [redacted]
explained NASA OIG staff went through a lot by saying, ``reorganization
after reorganization, foul language and intimidation, COBB misusing his
investigative powers and having employees forced out and replaced with
unqualified cronies.''
On March 15, 2006, a confidentia1 source identified as T-3 was
interviewed (Exhibit 44). T-3 stated there was a meeting of all staff
at the Marshall Space Flight Center and ``COBB humiliated and insulted
the audit staff by stating that the auditors were incompetent.'' T-3
directly heard COBB say that he wanted the Audit Program Directors to
be relocated to Headquarters so they ``would be within choking
distance.'' T-3 stated, ``I thought this was a stupid thing to say.''
T-3 felt humiliated and insulted by COBB.
On July 23, 2004, COBB sent an e-mail to all OIG staff and referred
to all the GS-15 Audit Program Directors in the field as ``surplus.''
T-3 stated, ``I've always had a good record, and it's how I became a
15; to be referred to as surplus is insulting and humiliating.'' T-3
stated ``the staff here are highly demoralized.'' In discussions T-3
has had with NASA OIG auditors, more staff would have responded
``disagreed,'' however, they feared the responses could be attributed
back to them. T-3 also stated that there has been an ``extremely high
turnover,'' and believes at least 30 employees left last year alone.
In 2005, at a conference held at the Goddard Space Flight Center
(GSFC) with all the NASA audit liaison representatives, someone raised
the question to COBB as to the reason for the high turnover rate within
NASA OIG. T-3 stated that COBB said he was ``proud of the high turnover
rate,'' and referred to the people who had left as ``trash.''
[redacted] who once worked in NASA OIG and now is an audit liaison
representative at the [redacted], told T-3 that he ``was shocked'' to
hear that from COBB.
On March 20, 2006, [redacted] was interviewed (Exhibit 45).
[redacted] described COBB's management style as ``kind of strange,''
and stated that you ``never knew where you stood with him.'' [redacted]
noted that to his knowledge, COBB did not have a background in
management prior to . . .
Pages 266-271
Allegation 67--Inspector General COBB, former NASA Administrator
Sean O'Keefe (O'Keefe), and former NASA General Counsel Paul Pastorek
(Pastorek) would drink alcohol together.
Investigative Findings
[redacted]
Special Agent Bahr. OK. Generally, who was present at these
meetings in Mr. O'Keefe's office at the end of the day?
Mr. Howard. Who--it varied. Whoever happened to have any business
to be tip there at the time.
Special Agent Bahr. You mentioned the chief of staff?
Mr. Howard. Right.
Special Agent Bahr. Who was that at the time?
Mr. Howard. It was--well, there were a couple. First, it was
Courtney Staid, and then later it was John Schumacher.
Special Agent Bahr. OK. How about the General Counsel for NASA?
Mr. Howard. Yes, he would be there on occasion, Paul Pastorek.
Special Agent Bahr. All right. Are you aware of--did--would they
share in drinking within Mr. O'Keefe's office? Was there alcohol
served?
Mr. Howard. On some occasions I believe there was. Yes.
Below is an excerpt from the transcript of COBB's interview
conducted on June 27, 2006, where he addresses the issue of drinking
alcohol with O'Keefe, beginning at Page 102, line 12 (Exhibit 182).
Q. Was there ever an occasion when you had drinks with Mr. O'Keefe
at NASA headquarters within his office or anywhere--perhaps within your
office or anywhere else within NASA headquarters?
A. I can remember one instance where I had--O'Keefe had social
functions that took place up when there was a retiring employee or some
type of event like that. There would be social functions and there
would occasionally be alcohol there. I didn't go pull the GSA permit
for whether or not they had obtained permission in connection with
that.
I can recall an incident--not an incident, an instance where
O'Keefe gave me a drink in his office.
Q. OK. Could you give us some background on what the occasion was,
why were you meeting with him? How did it come about that you were
sharing--were you having a drink as well?
A. I think he said to me that you look like you could use a drink,
and I articulated that, OK. I don't know what he said. But I had a
drink.
The specific instance there was again the Columbia accident in
terms of the impact on the agency, like the Challenger, there were
tremendously sensitive issues associated with--for example, I bet you
no one here at this table even though they're fairly familiar with the
Challenger incident has any understanding of what happened to the seven
astronauts that were on that vessel.
The reason is that NASA is extraordinarily protective of that
information, the well-being of the program, and the families of those
who died. They know what happened. It is not like it's a secret. It is
known. But it is kept secret.
Same thing is true in connection with Columbia. What happened with
respect to each of the dead astronauts is something that is well known.
We had an instance in February of 2004, where our service working with
the Texas Rangers, this is one or----
Ms. Bahr. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but there will be a line of
questioning later where I think it would be more appropriate to address
this. If for the moment we could go back to just what kind of
interactions you had with Mr. O'Keefe, that would be most helpful.
The Witness. Your last question was what prompted that instance
where I can recall having a drink with Mr. O'Keefe. I think--I can
recall one other instance where that happened. It wasn't with just
O'Keefe. It was with other persons on his staff. That was where I had
been told that I was going to be appointed as the Inspector General to
the Coalition Provisional Authority.
I think that--I'm not positive. I think that he might have invited
me to have a drink relating to that at that time.
Allegation 68--Inspector General COBB played golf with former NASA
Administrator Sean O'Keefe (O'Keefe).
Investigative Findings
This allegation was received through interviews of nine individuals
who alleged that COBB and O'Keefe played golf together. Based on those
allegations a review of COBB's e-mails was conducted. The following are
e-mails that identify instances where COBB discussed playing golf with
O'Keefe:
1. E-mail Thread
``From: Robert Cobb
To: Sean O'Keefe;
CC:
Subject: Re:
Date: Tuesday, July 02, 2002 2:45:20 PM
Attachments:
I would love to, although kids and work have wrecked an at one time
not embarrassing game. If the spot is still open, let me know details.
At 10:38 AM 7/2/2002--0400, you wrote:
Moose--don't recall if you are a golfer--I'm pulling together a
foursome for this Friday AM, Clay Johnson and Alphonso Jackson (Deputy
Secy at HUD). if you're interested, I'll send along particulars. best
for the 4th--Sean''
2. E-mail Thread
``From: [email protected]
To: [email protected];
CC:
Subject: Re:
Date: Friday, July 11, 2003 2:13:24 PM
Attachments:
Fabulous--let's plan to meet Sat around 11:30 or so at the pro shop
or around the practice tee/putting green. Do recall how to get there?
------Original Message------
From: Robert Cobb [[email protected]]
Sent: 07/10/2003 05:48 PM
To: ``Sean O'keefe'
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re:
yes--
At 05:10 PM 7/10/2003--0400, you wrote:
>Moose--you up for golf Sat around noon?>''
3. E-mail Thread
``From: Robert Cobb
To: [email protected]
CC:
Subject: golf buddy
Date: Monday, December 15, 2003 9:24:19 AM
Attachments:
What was the name of the guy who worked at the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service that we played golf with at Belmont?''
On May 30, 2006, O'Keefe was interviewed and provided the following
information (Exhibit 137). O'Keefe was asked, ``Did you and COBB ever
meet outside of work for drinks, golf, or other activities?'' O'Keefe
stated, ``We did not socialize.'' However, he and COBB played golf
together once or twice. O'Keefe could not recall when or where they
played golf. Asked, ``Did you golf together here [Belmont Country
Club]?'' O'Keefe stated, ``I don't recall.'' Asked if he and COBB ever
traveled together onboard NASA aircraft, O'Keefe stated he traveled in
such a capacity with COBB once or twice, but could not recall any
specific flight information. Asked if he ever traveled to Bermuda
aboard a NASA aircraft, with COBB for the purpose of golfing, O'Keefe
stated he has never traveled onboard NASA aircraft and engaged in golf
activities following the official trip.
COBB was interviewed on June 27 and 29, 2006 (Exhibit 182). His
response to questions associated with this area start on Page 81, line
20 and Page 94, line 9 of the transcript dated June 27, 2006.
Q. Did you have any social relationship?
A. I don't--I guess these kinds of questions ask for me to expand
on the nature of my relationship with Mr. O'Keefe. I had a business
relationship with him. Did we personally enjoy each other's company? I
don't know let [sic] enjoyed my company. To me it was advantageous to
me and my office that I spend a lot of time as much time, in effect, as
I could with O'Keefe. When he asked me to come out to where he plays
golf, I accepted that invitation. And I did that I think twice, to go
out and play golf with him. Whether that's a social relationship or a
business relationship, I can tell you that--you know--did I tell him I
had kids? Probably. I tell him you know--about my wife? Probably. Where
she worked. But from my standpoint--you know--that relationship was
defined by--you know--my carrying out the job as Inspector General of
the agency and being able to get access to the person who's chiefly
responsible for policy and execution of the agency mission.
Q. I agree with you complete frequently. I think there will be
points later in the interview here we'll be able to do that. Let's go
back to the relationship between you as the Inspector General and the
agency administrator. You noted that you on approximately two occasions
recall golfing with Mr. O'Keefe?
A. Yes.
Q. That would have been at his home in Virginia, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Leesburg, I believe, Belmont?
A. Yes.
______
Integrity Committee
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency
Washington, DC, January 22, 2007
Hon. Clay Johnson III,
Chairman,
President's & Executive Councils on Integrity and Efficiency,
c/o United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Johnson:
The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the determinations
made by the Integrity Committee (IC) at its meeting on December 13,
2006, regarding allegations of misconduct on the part of Inspector
General (IG) Robert Cobb, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). In summary, the IC determined that certain actions on the part
of IG Cobb, described in detail below, amounted to an abuse of
authority. Other actions taken by Cobb were viewed as creating the
appearance of a lack of independence and as not adhering to the Quality
Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General promulgated by the
PCIE and ECIE. I will first outline the procedural history of the case,
follow with a discussion of the particular conduct on the part of IG
Cobb which the IC found troubling, and conclude with comment about some
of the matters raised in the correspondence received from IG Cobb
regarding the process.
Case Initiation and Investigation
Executive Order (EO) 12993 is the IC's charter for review of
allegations of administrative misconduct made against an IG. The EO
provides that on receipt of allegations, the IC shall first determine
if there is a substantial likelihood that the allegations disclose a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, or abuse of authority. If the IC makes this
preliminary determination, and further concludes that allegations
cannot be referred to an agency of the Executive Branch with
appropriate jurisdiction over the matter, it refers the matter to the
IC Chair who is to cause a thorough and timely investigation of
allegations to be conducted.
During its meeting on December 12, 2005, the IC reviewed several
new complaints against IG Cobb and concluded there was a need for an
administrative investigation. The IC also reevaluated other allegations
regarding IG Cobb that it previously reviewed but which had not been
the subject of an investigation. These were reevaluated because the IC
wished to consider the full picture and determine whether the pattern
of activity disclosed violation of law, rule, or regulation, or
amounted to gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, or abuse of
authority. Following the IC decision to initiate the investigation, as
IC Chair, I requested the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Office of
Inspector General (OIG) to conduct the investigation.
The IC forwarded complaints received against IG Cobb to the HUD OIG
and their investigators organized the case into 79 separate
allegations. The HUD OIG conducted a thorough investigation of 69
allegations and submitted its Report of Investigation (ROI) to the IC
on August 30, 2006. The remaining 10 allegations were not investigated
by the HUD OIG based on their conclusion that the information
supporting the allegations was too vague or insufficient to justify
continuing the inquiry. The IC concurred with that assessment. The ROI
prepared by the HUD OIG is enclosed for your review. IG Cobb cooperated
with this investigation and was interviewed, with legal counsel
present, by HUD OIG investigators for more than 10 hours during
sessions on June 27 and 29, 2006. At the conclusion of his interview,
IG Cobb was allowed to both review and supplement his deposition. The
IC also received correspondence from IG Cobb during its review of the
matter that is also enclosed for your review.
Integrity Committee Review of the Report of Investigation
Over the course of three IC meetings, the allegations and the HUD
OIG ROI were reviewed and discussed. Utilizing the ROI, the IC placed
the allegations into four categories, as follows:
1. Abusive work environment.
2. Lack of independence.
3. Audit Division reorganization.
4. Other Matters.
The identifying numbers used below are those assigned by the HUD
OIG. They are referred to in this letter as a matter of convenience but
they have no other significance.
Abusive Work Environment
The IC evaluated nine allegations, appearing as numbers 52, 53, 57,
58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 in the ROI, which fell under the broad
category of abusive work environment. The IC determined that ``abusive
work environment'' fit under the EO for jurisdiction purposes through
the ``abuse of authority'' clause. The term ``abuse of authority'' is
defined in the IC Policies and Procedures as:
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official
or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or
that results in personal gain or advantage to himself or to
preferred other persons. There is no de minimis standard for
abuse of authority.
Allegation 53 was made by: [redacted] allegations are confirmed by
interviews of two witnesses. According to the ROI, IG Cobb berated the
[redacted] using a loud and nasty tone that included profanity in front
of the [redacted] to the point of causing tears and her departure from
the meeting. When the staff member returned to the meeting at which
this occurred, she informed IG Cobb that profanity in the workplace was
not acceptable; IG Cobb did not apologize for his behavior. On other
occasions, he screamed at the same individual over the issuance of a
search warrant and called the staff member's work a ``fucking piece of
shit'' as he slammed his fist on the table next to the staff member. A
witness confirms that IG Cobb's treatment of [redacted] was
condescending, berating, and demeaning. IG Cobb's treatment of
[redacted] was similar in that he routinely yelled and screamed at the
individual as part of disagreements on positions taken by the
individual in investigative matters.
Three other witnesses confirm IG Cobb's habitual use of profanity
in the office while another, [redacted] confirms that IG Cobb referred
to his staff as ``fucksticks.'' According to the witness, under IG Cobb
there were constant threats and intimidations creating in the witness'
view a ``hostile work place.'' Another witness describes IG's Cobb's
lack of respect for NASA OIG employees by his referring to Special
Agents in the field as ``knuckle draggers.'' According to this senior
employee, morale among NASA OIG staff was ``horrible.''
IG Cobb confirmed use of the F-word in his office and indicated he
is ``passionate when people are insubordinate to my face,'' but denies,
``cursing'' at employees.
The IC determined IG Cobb engaged in an abuse of authority as
defined by the EO. IG Cobb's treatment of [redacted] detailed in
allegation 53 was inconsistent with the high standards of conduct
expected of senior executives. The IC viewed this as more than an
aggressive management style or a way of expressing dissatisfaction with
employee performance but as arbitrary or capricious conduct, which
affected the rights of senior employees to a non-hostile and abusive
workplace.
The IC further determined that other conduct on the part of IC
Cobb, as described in allegations 59 and 61 did occur. This conduct
involved regular belittlement of the audit staff and putting his feet
on the desk in the face of those sitting opposite as a sign of
disrespect. The IC further determined the conduct did not rise to a
level of abuse of authority.
Lack of Independence
The IC considered eighteen allegations, appearing as numbers 9, 10,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 66, 67, and 68 in
the ROI, which fell under the broad category of lack of independence.
The starting point for the ICs analysis is EO 12805 which established
the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the
Executive Counsel on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE). Section 3(c) of
the EO provides that ``[t]he individual members of the Councils should,
to the extent permitted under law, adhere to the professional standards
developed by the Councils and participate in the plans, programs, and
projects of the Councils.''
In October 2003, the PCIE and ECIE promulgated the Quality
Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General, which sets out
quality standards for the management, operation, and conduct of the
Federal Offices of Inspector General. Section II.A. of the Quality
Standards establishes general standards for ethics, independence, and
confidentiality, indicating that ``[i]ndependence is a critical element
of objectivity. Without independence, both in fact and in appearance,
objectivity is impaired.'' Section II.C. describes the independence
standard with more detail:
The Inspector General and OIG staff must be free both in fact
and appearance from personal, external, and organizational
impairments to independence. The Inspector General and OIG
staff have a responsibility to maintain independence, so that
opinions, conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be
impartial and will be viewed as impartial by knowledgeable
third parties. The Inspector General and OIG staff should avoid
situations that could lead reasonable third parties with
knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances to conclude
that the OIG is not able to maintain independence in conducting
its work.
Six of the eighteen allegations within the subset labeled as ``lack
of independence'' indicate that IG Cobb sought to develop and maintain
a close relationship with former NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe and
that this effort contributed to an appearance that his independence was
being compromised. The ROI and IG Cobb's interview documents these
efforts:
IG Cobb frequently joined Administrator O'Keefe in lunches
intended for senior staff at NASA Headquarters.
IG Cobb played golf on two occasions with Administrator
O'Keefe.
IG Cobb used the NASA aircraft for official travel on
several occasions when Administrator O'Keefe was also
traveling.
IG Cobb referred to the Administrator as ``his boss.''
IG Cobb sought guidance from Administrator O'Keefe on the
audit design for at least two audits.
IG Cobb sought Administrator O'Keefe's review of a draft OIG
opinion regarding the independence of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board.
IG Cobb advised Administrator O'Keefe about search warrants
to be issued in a significant criminal investigation before
those search warrants were executed.
An IG is required to keep the head of the agency fully and
currently informed about fraud and other serious problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to the programs and operations administered or
financed by the agency. He has a responsibility to communicate with the
Administrator. IG Cobb concedes his activities and responds that he has
a ``collaborative approach'' with senior management and specifically
agrees with the policy laid out by Administrator O'Keefe that an OIG
has an opportunity to add value to an organization. None of these
instances, standing alone, is sufficient to create an ``appearance''
problem, but it is the responsibility of the IG to consider how the
combined affect of his interaction with the Agency head might cloud or
be perceived to cloud his independence. Against this backdrop, the IC
found two specific allegations warranting its detailed comment.
The fact pattern of allegation 28 involved a June 2002 computer
intrusion and theft of International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)
designated files from a NASA server worth about $1.9 billion. The
matter was brought to the attention of NASA by a news reporter. The
theft of ITAR data must be reported to the State Department. The HUD
OIG investigation revealed the primary responsibility to report the
theft/compromise of ITAR data was the responsibility of NASA's Office
of Security and Program Protection, known as ``Code X.'' However, the
investigation revealed that IG Cobb was aware that Code X was not
reporting the theft/compromise and IG Cobb took no action to ensure the
reporting was made to the State Department. The complainant believes
that IG Cobb failed to report the matter to the Department of State and
Congress to avoid embarrassment for NASA management.
Two witnesses, one of whom was [redacted] opined that if the
appropriate NASA entity failed to report the loss, the reporting
requirement would fall onto whoever had oversight over NASA, which
would include the OIG. Under an OIG's oversight role, IG Cobb should
have recognized Code X's misinterpretation of the reporting requirement
and ensured that the proper parties were alerted. This is incumbent
upon the IG by virtue of his position. Both witnesses questioned the
independence of IG Cobb's decision to not report the theft/compromise
or work to ensure Code X reported the theft/compromise. One of the
witnesses opined that IG Cobb prevented the reporting of the matter
because he was attempting to prevent public disclosure that would have
embarrassed NASA. Another witness said IG Cobb viewed Code X as a
``source of grief'' and that the easiest way to handle matters
involving Code X was to ``acquiesce'' to the Code X Director. Another
senior NASA OIG official prepared a Memorandum for Record (MFR), dated
02/23/2006, concerning the ITAR matter. The MFR states in part:
It took over a year for the loss [referring to the Marshall
Space Flight Center case] to be assessed by DOD, who opined the
stolen ITAR had national security implications (no further
information). For whatever reason, NASA senior management [Code
X] failed to report the loss. By definition and purpose the
OIG's oversight role, the IG [Cobb] should have recognized the
Code X's misinterpretation and misplaced emphasis and ensured
the proper parties were alerted. Even after being coached by
experienced OIG staff, the IG failed to act.
IG Cobb said he directed his staff to prepare a report regarding
the compromise that was sent to the Marshall Space Flight Center and a
copy provided to NASA management in April 2003. In his supplemental
letter IG Cobb indicates that any delay in preparing that report was a
result of his insistence that the NASA OIG staff do the grinding work
to produce an accurate and relevant report. IG Cobb maintains that
there was no clear legal requirement for the loss to be reported to the
Department of State by Code X and that the matter was discussed
informally with the Department of State upon learning of the intrusion.
Allegation 35 involves IG Cobb's actions in the investigation of an
alleged theft of jewelry from the remains of a Columbia Space Shuttle
Astronaut. The Columbia Space Shuttle exploded on February 1, 2003,
during re-entry to the Earth's atmosphere. The explosion initiated over
Texas en route to the planned landing at Kennedy Space Center. The
remains of deceased Astronaut Laurel Clark were recovered shortly after
the Columbia accident and a ring was allegedly present on, and then
stolen from, her recovered remains. NASA OIG, in partnership with the
Texas Rangers, pursued a joint investigation into the theft. As part of
the investigative process, the Texas Rangers planned to release a
``Crime Stoppers Report'' to the public to assist in the recovery of
the stolen ring.
[Redacted] the deceased Astronaut, and a NASA employee, supported
the request for public assistance to find his wife's ring. [Redacted]
said he met personally with IG Cobb who told him he would not issue a
report on the investigation of the stolen ring. The meeting was tape
recorded by [redacted]. At one point during the meeting, IG Cobb asked
[redacted] to turn off the tape recorder. According to [redacted] IG
Cobb said the whole NASA Columbia investigation was not going well,
NASA wanted it finished, and for the outcome to reveal nothing that
would make NASA look bad or shake the public's trust in NASA.
Two witnesses interviewed by the HUD OIG suggest that IG Cobb
inserted himself in the investigation with the intent of ensuring NASA
would not be embarrassed. [Redacted] states that when IG Cobb saw the
Crime Stoppers Report, he (IG Cobb) went ``ballistic.'' He recalled
that IG Cobb, when discussing the report, stated, ``how can you even
think of allowing this to go out'' and ``I am going to have to resign
if this report gets out.'' [Redacted] stated that at the time he did
not understand IG Cobb's response, but later learned that NASA
Administrator O'Keefe instructed everyone at NASA not to contact any
Astronaut or their families. He opined that IG Cobb believed O'Keefe
was his ``boss'' and IG Cobb would do whatever O'Keefe wanted.
Another NASA employee who requests confidentiality recalls IG Cobb
saying, ``Can you believe how embarrassing that would have looked for
the agency [NASA] if that [crime stoppers report] went out?'' The Texas
Ranger involved in the investigation informed HUD OIG that he believed
someone at NASA wanted the investigation shut down because if it got
out that the ring was stolen, questions would be asked as to the
conduct of the whole NASA investigation into the Columbia accident.
IG Cobb responds that the decision he made regarding the matter was
that his office needed to conduct additional investigation to see if
what was articulated in the draft crime stopper notice was right or
wrong. He questioned the evidence that was being relied on to conclude
that a ring had been stolen and directed further investigation be
conducted before consenting to NASA OIG involvement in issuance of any
public notice of a criminal act. In IG Cobb's view, publication of the
notice based on the information would have been irresponsible. IG Cobb
evaluated the evidence as not supporting the contention that the ring
was stolen from recovered remains but was lost along with millions of
pieces of Columbia and all other personal effects of the astronauts
over thousands of miles of Texas and Louisiana.
The IC determined that neither allegation 28 or 35 substantiated an
actual lack of independence on the part of IG Cobb that could be
characterized as gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of
authority, or a violation of any law, rule, or regulation under EO
12993. The facts set out in allegations 28 and 35 did substantiate two
specific instances in which IG Cobb's performance caused the appearance
of a lack of independence not in keeping with the Quality Standards for
Federal Offices of Inspector General. IG Cobb's decision not to act to
ensure the ITAR theft/compromise was reported in a timely manner
created the appearance of a lack of independence. This determination
augments the IC's review of the matter in 2004 in which it relied only
on the allegation and a response from IG Cobb. In that review the IC
determined that IG Cobb had not engaged in any wrongdoing. In addition,
IG Cobb's actions associated with allegation 35, including his
statements to [redacted] and a confidential witness, created the
appearance of lack of independence not in keeping with the Quality
Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General. While the Quality
Standards do not have status of law, rule, or regulation, the IC views
these standards as a benchmark for IG performance and applicable to all
IGs through EO 12805, Integrity and Efficiency in Federal Programs.
Audit Division Reorganization
The IC considered six allegations, appearing as numbers 12, 14, 15,
17, 18, and 19 in the ROI, concerning IG Cobb's handling of audits and
staffing for the auditing function of the OIG. The thrust of these
allegations was that IG Cobb reorganized the office several times,
decreased the number of audit reports and changed their format making
it difficult for auditors to know which format to follow, and generally
slowed the audit reporting process to a substantial degree. IG Cobb's
actions were within the discretion of an IG. The IC determined that the
ROI did not substantiate actions by IG Cobb that amounted to gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a violation
of any law, rule or regulation as it relates to his handling of audit
division reorganization matters.
Other Matters
The IC placed all remaining allegations in a general category
referred to as ``Other.'' In its review of theses allegations, the IC
determined that they were not substantiated by information in the ROI,
indicated no wrongdoing by IG Cobb, were outside the purview of the IC,
or did not warrant further investigation. It is important to note that
within this category there were some allegations involving
whistleblower retaliation which is an area outside the purview of the
IC. The whistleblower retaliation allegations were referred to the
Office of Special Counsel, the agency with the appropriate authority to
conduct inquiries on such matters.
Conclusion
The IC concludes that IG Cobb engaged in abuse of authority as an
Inspector General by creating an abusive work environment. In addition,
IG Cobb's actions created an appearance of a lack of independence
outside the quality standards expected of an IG when he did not report
the theft of NASA ITAR files and prevented the dissemination of a Crime
Stoppers Report.
Issues of Due Process
During the course of the IC inquiry, IG Cobb expressed
dissatisfaction with the IC process in multiple letters. He questioned
the methodology by which IC directed an investigation, the degree of
due process for him in that methodology, his inability to review the
report prepared by the HUD OIG before it was presented to the IC, and
what he perceives as a lack of fairness to him during the course of the
investigation and the IC review.
The decision to investigate was made by the IC. IG Cobb received
notice that an outside investigation would ensue. The letter did not
purport to identify all of the matters to be investigated, but as IG
Cobb was later informed, this letter was not intended to limit the
authority of the IC to review other allegations of wrongdoing. IG Cobb
was generally cognizant of the matters under investigation and answered
extensively in the questioning during his interview. He was provided a
copy of his interview transcript and given the opportunity to comment
on the accuracy of the transcription or submit additional matters for
consideration by the IC prior to IC's review of the report. His
interview regarding allegations 28, 35, and 53 was extensive and he
responded with seemingly clear knowledge of the matters about which he
was being questioned.
In subsequent correspondence to the IC, IG Cobb did not question
the accuracy of the transcription and did submit additional matters to
the IC that went to the substance of allegations. IG Cobb's materials
dealt generally with the matter of lack of independence and
specifically with the substance of allegations 28 and 35, the
compromise of ITAR data and Astronaut Clark's missing ring
respectively. The additional information submitted by IG Cobb was
provided to IC members shortly after it was received. While IG Cobb may
not have been sent a letter detailing the specific allegations being
investigated, he was more than able to respond to the allegations which
ultimately form the basis for the IC's determinations in this case. IG
Cobb also offered the names of witnesses to be interviewed by the HUD
OIG and later suggested questions for those interviews. Some of those
individuals had been interviewed by the HUD OIG but others, including
many from outside the agency, were not.
IG Cobb did not receive a copy of the ROI prepared by the HUD OIG
at the conclusion of the investigation under the Policy and Procedures
of the IC. The ROI is available to him under the Privacy Act and
implementing regulations of the Department of Justice. He has already
submitted a request for the ROI which will be provided to him through
that mechanism. The copy he receives will be redacted of personal
information and other information as allowed by the Privacy Act and
implementing regulations.
IG Cobb will be notified that the IC has concluded its review and
is forwarding the matter for your consideration. He has not been
informed about the IC's determinations or provided a copy of this
letter.
Outside Inquiries
The IC has received both media and Congressional inquiries
concerning this investigation. As part of the PCIE/ECIE, the IC
considers its review a component of the overall process which you, as
Chairman, have ultimate authority. Neither the IC, nor its members will
provide any information or briefing on this matter unless it is
specifically approved by your office. Until advised otherwise, as IC
Chair, I will refer all media and Congressional requests on this matter
to your office.
Please contact me if I can be of any further assistance in this
matter.
Sincerely,
James H. Burrus, Jr.
Chair, Integrity Committee.