[Senate Hearing 110-723]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-723
ADDRESSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
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HEARING
before the
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2008
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES,
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
John Kilvington, Staff Director
Katy French, Minority Staff Director
Monisha Smith, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Carper............................................... 1
Senator Coburn............................................... 11
Senator Akaka................................................ 11
Senator Levin................................................ 32
WITNESSES
Thursday June 12, 2008
Hon. Russell D. Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin.......... 2
Donald Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State...... 11
K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service..... 23
Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 25
Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center.......... 27
Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The
Brookings Institution.......................................... 29
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Camp, Donald:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Cohen, Stephen P.:
Testimony.................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 92
Curtis, Lisa:
Testimony.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Feingold, Hon. Russell D.:
Testimony.................................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Krepon, Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Kronstadt, K. Alan:
Testimony.................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 67
APPENDIX
Report of Senator Carl Levin and Senator Bob Casey, ``Travel to
Pakistan and Afghanistan''..................................... 47
Letter to Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, from Senator
Levin, dated June 5, 2008...................................... 51
Questions and Responses for the Record from:
Mr. Camp..................................................... 95
Mr. Kronstadt................................................ 96
Ms. Curtis................................................... 103
Mr. Krepon................................................... 109
Mr. Cohen.................................................... 112
ADDRESSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
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THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, Federal Service,
and International Security,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
Carper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Coburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. The Subcommittee will come to order.
Welcome to Senator Feingold and Senator Akaka. We will be
joined by a number of our colleagues here in a little bit, but
I just want to thank all the witnesses that are here,
especially Senator Feingold who has joined us here today. He is
going to talk for a little bit about his recent visit, he led a
CODEL to a number of places, including to Pakistan.
I understand Senator Feingold serves on three committees.
Among them are the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Foreign
Relations Committee, and the Judiciary Committee. And over the
past recess, he was in both Pakistan and in India?
Senator Feingold. That is right.
Senator Carper. All right. But as I understand, most of
your time was in Pakistan?
Senator Feingold. That is correct.
Senator Carper. My staff, who visited Islamabad, just
missed you there, but they came back with press accounts. They
said a lot of the stories were above the fold, which is not bad
for an American Senator in a foreign country.
And I understand that you traveled there because you view
Pakistan, as do I, as the central front in the fight against
extremism and critical to our national security. And while
there, I am told that Senator Feingold was vocal on the ousting
of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, noting that this and the
reinstatement of other former judges is a simple rule of law
matter that could jump-start institutional reform in Pakistan.
And again, I would concur with that.
He has also expressed some skepticism about the
negotiations surrounding the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas?
Senator Feingold. Correct.
Senator Carper. OK. And Senator Feingold, we thank you for
your willingness to stop by today before we kick off this
hearing, and invite our other witnesses just to share with us
your thoughts about what our country should be doing with
respect to our relationships with Pakistan. Senator, should we
just go right to you? Take as much time as you wish.
TESTIMONY OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,\1\ A U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Akaka.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears in the
Appendix on page 53.
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This is really very kind of you and I am happy to be asked
to talk about this issue that I have been thinking about a
great deal since my trip.
This hearing is particularly timely given the critical
juncture and this partnership with Pakistan. Although we have a
checkered history with Pakistan, the recently elected civilian
government provides an opportunity to develop a sound,
comprehensive, bilateral relationship that serves the needs and
the principles of both of our countries while also ensuring our
national security and theirs over the long term.
As you said, I recently returned from a four-day trip to
Pakistan where I had the chance, as, frankly, other Senators
did who were in the region at the same time, to meet with a
broad range of political officials from numerous parties as
well as with President Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence
officials, the ousted Chief Justice--we actually met with him
in his home where he had been held under house arrest--and
representatives of Pakistan's civil society. I traveled to
Peshawar, which lies near the border with Afghanistan and the
tumultuous Northwest Frontier Province and to Pakistan-
controlled Kashmir.
Senator Carper. How long were you there?
Senator Feingold. A total of 3 days. And then in the
Kashmir area, we were able to visit successful U.S.-funded
earthquake recovery programs, which I think would make
everybody feel very good about the schools and the dairies and
the other things that we were able to help restore fairly
quickly after a disastrous earthquake in an area that, frankly,
has not been known for being a particularly pro-American area.
So this is a real opportunity.
I chose to visit Pakistan because it is out of that
country, and I think obviously the Chairman sees this, as well,
that we face our most serious national security threat. As the
intelligence community has confirmed again and again,
intelligence is the central front in the fight against al
Qaeda. Confronting this threat, which includes addressing the
al Qaeda safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
must be our top national security priority. That means tracking
down Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda operatives and working
with the Pakistan government to neutralize forces before they
plot or carry out attacks against Americans. And yes, as you
alluded to in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, it means
making clear to our Pakistani friends that cutting deals with
the al Qaeda or the Taliban is simply unacceptable.
But these cannot be our only goals. The fight is more than
a manhunt. If we are serious about fighting al Qaeda and
preventing future generations of bin Ladens from emerging, we
also must recognize the needs of the local population and
expand our development assistance throughout a country where
poverty and anti-Western sentiment is pervasive.
A key part of this approach will require Pakistan's newly-
elected government to rein in the military apparatus, which has
historically controlled much of Pakistan's politics and
policies, sometimes overtly by a military dictator running the
country and other times more discretely from behind the screen
of a civilian-led government. And as Pakistan's new government
seeks to establish itself, we have to find a way to defend our
national security interests while recognizing that the
emergence of a democratic civilian government in Pakistan is in
our long-term strategic interests. We need the support of the
Pakistani people and their democratically-elected leaders to
successfully counter al Qaeda and extremism.
There is an opening right now for the United States to
develop a new relationship with Pakistan. This Administration's
reliance on a single unpopular leader who came to power through
a coup was a serious mistake that was inconsistent with our
values and our national security interests. Now we must end
that mistake by expanding our relationships and supporting
basic democratic institutions. A more inclusive policy will
allow our counterterrorism partnership to hopefully withstand
the frequent turbulence of Pakistan's domestic policies and
help mitigate already high levels of anti-American sentiment.
I have never been to a country, Mr. Chairman, where you ask
people all over the country who are being very cordial to you,
we understand there is anti-Americanism here, and they say,
``Yes, that is right.'' They usually try to tone it down a
little bit. It was not hostile in terms of the comment, it was
just, ``That is right,'' and they gave various explanations for
it.
Senator Carper. That is interesting because in Iran, I am
told that the feelings toward our country are actually for the
most part very cordial.
Senator Feingold. That is an interesting contrast. I think
that would--yes, you wouldn't get the same response.
This Administration's policies toward Pakistan have been
highly damaging to our long-term national security. Although
Pakistan's domestic politics remain fragile, we must seize this
occasion by working with those who promote democracy, human
rights development, and the rule of law. We must align
ourselves with the moderate forces critical to the fight
against extremism and commit to supporting economic reform,
legal political party development, and initiatives to integrate
the FATA into the rest of Pakistan. This will not be easy, but
it is long overdue and will help ensure that we are using all
the tools at our disposal to fight al Qaeda and associated
terrorist threats.
Combatting extremism and denying terrorists the safe haven
now found in the FATA requires, among other things, creating
sustainable development strategies that provide both
opportunities for the Pakistani people and, again, tangible
examples of American good will as I saw in Pakistani Kashmir.
This must include not only traditional development projects,
but institution building and political engagement in a region
long deprived of such opportunities. While we target terrorists
and extremists in the FATA, we must also make sure that the
people of the FATA have economic options that can help them
resist terrorism and extremism while reducing anti-American
sentiment.
Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek to strengthen
development initiatives and democratic institutions is not just
an outgrowth of our values, it is in our national security
interests. This is not to say that this process will be free
from challenges. There are already serious hurdles that must be
dealt with, including negotiations in the FATA and Northwest
Frontier Province, both of which I think are cause for serious
concern and skepticism. America's allies must know that there
can be no negotiations with terrorists who have sworn to harm
our country. Those who would plot against American troops in
Afghanistan or Americans here at home must be pursued
relentlessly.
We must however recognize that the new leadership was
elected democratically by the Pakistani people and we must try
to work with them to advance our mutual interests in fostering
security and development in the region, and again, Mr.
Chairman, I am so pleased with your interest and the growing
interest in the Senate that I think will be very valuable,
quite a few Senators and also members of the House who really
want to work on this Pakistan-America relationship over the
long term.
Thank you so much for having me.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much. Sometimes when
Senators testify to lead off a hearing, we don't ask questions.
Would you be willing to take a question or two?
Senator Feingold. Sure.
Senator Carper. Senator Akaka, do you have a question or
two you would like to ask of Senator Feingold, our colleague?
Senator Akaka. I don't have a question but I want to thank
Senator Feingold for his statement before this Subcommittee and
to tell you that I first visited Pakistan 3 months after
Musharraf took over the country after the coup. I visited with
him and felt that he had some great ideas for the country and I
am glad to hear you now say that it is about time that they
move on democratically to a system. I am very interested in
your comments about that.
Senator Feingold. Senator, we can't ignore the fact that
President Musharraf did side with us and provide help, but the
level of resentment toward the United States among Pakistani
leaders and the Pakistani people because we seem to put all our
eggs in that basket, is a significant part of the anti-American
feelings that I have described.
Senator Carper. Senator Biden, my colleague from Delaware,
has said to me from time to time that what we have had in
Pakistan is not a Pakistan policy, we have had a Musharraf
policy, and he suggested what we need is a Pakistan policy.
Had you been there before?
Senator Feingold. I was there briefly with Senator McCain
and Senator Clinton----
Senator Carper. That was an interesting group to go over
with.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. In 2005. Yes. The story I
like to tell is they get off the plane and all the women in the
country would run up to Senator Clinton, all the military men
would run up to Senator McCain, and I would hold the luggage.
[Laughter.]
But actually, it was a fabulous trip and we had a very long
conversation with Musharraf, and the contrast between meeting
with him now with his changed political situation and then was
really striking.
Senator Carper. When you look at our policy and the things
that we are doing as a country in Pakistan now, what makes
sense and what doesn't?
Senator Feingold. In terms of our policy right now?
Senator Carper. Yes.
Senator Feingold. Well, we have to engage these new
political leaders. They are impressive people. They include at
least two major political parties that are a very tenuous
coalition. But these are strong people----
Senator Carper. Is this a coalition sort of like the
coalition governments they put in Israel, or would it be a
coalition more like putting the Democrats and Republicans
together here?
Senator Feingold. A little bit closer to being the
Democrats and Republicans being together, although not exactly,
but these really are political parties that are not terribly
similar. They have represented two very different views of the
future of Pakistan, two different philosophies. But what they
do share is a desire to return Pakistan to a democratic system,
and they are talented and they are interested in our views.
I also want to add that among the upbeat things I felt in
Pakistan was a better attitude about their future relationship
with India, which has been a source of such difficulty. Now, no
one is naive to think that is easy, but that was almost an
upbeat topic and there seemed to be a willingness and an
interest in that, which I think would be good for us and good
for India.
So to me, we need to engage these folks. On the other hand,
we can't say that our relationships with them are more
important than making sure that the FATA region is not used as
either a safe haven for al Qaeda or a launching pad for attacks
on our troops in Afghanistan. That is non-negotiable for us,
and I tried to make that clear, that is the bottom line for us.
They can't have complete internal peace and democracy in
Pakistan at the expense of our national security, that the two
have to work hand in hand.
Senator Carper. Speaking of security, did you get a feel
for the kind of security that is provided for their nuclear
weapons? I am told they have anywhere from 50 to 100 warheads
or more.
Senator Feingold. I did not get a detailed feel for that. I
actually had longer, more extensive conversations on that with
Ambassador Crocker in the previous visit, who at the time was
the Ambassador to Pakistan. But I did get some briefings on it,
and without getting into any details, there are concerns, but
there are also some feelings that there are real efforts being
made to secure that. But that is a matter of great importance.
Senator Carper. All right.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, may I now ask a question here?
When I first went there at that time, I was very impressed with
Musharraf because he told us some things that literally had my
jaws fall open. One was that he wanted to make Pakistan
literate, and so he introduced us to a woman who was going to
be the Minister of Education and she was going to make it
literate.
Second, he introduced us to his financial person and he
said he was going to correct the mistakes that they had
financially there. Secretary of Treasury Rubin at that time
told me that they hired this person through their firm in New
York and that Musharraf was taking him there to work there.
The third was he introduced us to a Minister of Foreign
Affairs who also worked in the United States and had ideas
about relationships. So those were three areas that he said he
wanted to really improve. Did you have any sense as to these
areas and those improvements?
Senator Feingold. Well, in fairness to President Musharraf,
as I understand it, he did pass significant legislation,
working with the government there to improve women's rights,
which were a serious issue in Pakistan, continue to be,
something I pressed him on. But I actually had a chance to meet
with some civil society leaders and a woman who was
particularly known for her leadership in that area and she told
me that things were somewhat improved.
In terms of the economy, President Musharraf spoke at
length about how proud he is of the growth of the Pakistan
economy under his leadership and his greatest concern was that
might be slipping under this new government. Now, of course,
the new leaders of the new government didn't agree with that,
but he cited some of the things that you alluded to, Senator
Akaka, as being important results of his presidency and I, of
course, can't deny that economic development and the future of
Pakistan is a terribly important thing, but it isn't more
important than having a democracy, and so the two must work
hand in hand.
Senator Carper. One last comment and maybe a question. In
the elections that were held 6 months or so ago, as I recall,
the party was tending to be supportive of President Musharraf,
their turnout, their support was greatly diminished.
Senator Feingold. That is right.
Senator Carper. The support of the other two major parties
rose up dramatically. But as I recall, there were religious
parties that were involved, as well, and their support turned
out to be rather small.
Senator Feingold. Well, one particularly interesting
development was in the Northwest Province, where--I want to be
corrected if I get this wrong, but I believe it is right--a
more traditional religious hard-line party was defeated----
Senator Carper. Yes----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. By a more open-minded, at
least in my view, party, and I had a chance to meet with some
of their new officials, and this is out in one of the more
conservative areas where we were near the FATA. And so that was
an exciting development, that instead of a hard-line, sort of
narrower approach, that actually suggested maybe that people in
that region were tired of that and that they wanted some hope
and economic opportunity and a sense of being connected to the
rest of Pakistan and the rest of the world. So I believe that
was one of the encouraging results of the election, and they
are affiliated, as I understand, with the government now.
Senator Carper. Well, there is an irony that is not lost on
me, and probably not lost on the others. I watched a film a
couple of months or two ago with my older boys and with my
wife--``Charlie Wilson's War.'' At that time, we were using our
influence and our resources to help destabilize--undermine the
Soviet position in Afghanistan and using folks that were pretty
much in the Northwestern part of Pakistan to help do that. So
we have actually seen--I am kind of mixing metaphors here, but
we have seen this movie before while we were sitting in a
different seat when we watched it the last time.
Senator Feingold. And the part of the movie that the
Pakistanis don't like is that after we did that, we just took
off----
Senator Carper. Yes.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. And we didn't stay committed
to that region, and so it is not only that we backed Musharraf,
it is this feeling that we are there when it sort of fits our
purposes but then we are not around--we don't have a consistent
policy. And so, I got one question in Pakistan from people
saying, well, why are all these Senators running around
Pakistan meddling, U.S. Senators, meddling in our affairs? And
I said, I take a different view. I said, I think it is a big
mistake for us not to have this kind of exchange. We certainly
shouldn't go over our bounds, but the biggest mistake we could
make is to not be knowledgeable and engaged with the
Pakistanis.
So I thought it was great that there were as many as 10
Members of Congress over there during the May break. I hope it
is a sign in the long run to the Pakistanis that we aren't
going to be fair-weather people in terms of being interested in
our relationship but that it will be maintained, and that is up
to all of us to keep going there and talking about it and doing
exactly what you are doing today, Mr. Chairman, which I think
is really positive. Thanks so much.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, there is one final question
here. We are interested in the military because he was General
Musharraf----
Senator Feingold. Yes.
Senator Akaka [continuing]. And at that time, he had
military people all over the buildings. And so a question to
him was, will this be a military government, and his answer
was, as soon as he could, that he would relieve the place of
any military security, and I just wondered whether that has
happened.
Senator Feingold. Well, he didn't move very quickly on
demilitarizing the tone of his regime. In fact, I specifically
asked him, as many others did, if he would please not be both
president and head of the army at the same time, which he
maintained for a very long time, until recently, which was an
inappropriate combination. So there was an inappropriate
connection there that was bad for Pakistani democracy.
Now that the new government is in place, the military
leaders of the country are making a concerted effort to show
that they are not trying to meddle in political affairs. In
fact, some of them would not meet with some of the Senators,
including me, because they didn't think that was appropriate.
They did meet, as I understand it, with some of our armed
services people, but the message I think they are trying to
send is that civilian leaders will be your contact rather than
military leaders in most cases, which I think, depending on
whether that is really what they are trying to do, is probably
a good sign of a different approach rather than such a heavily
military-laden look to the Pakistani government.
Senator Carper. We don't have time to ask these. I wish we
could get into whether or not the Pakistani leaders with whom
you might have spoken, if they felt any kind of a sensitivity
or understanding with respect to our concern about the safety
of our troops----
Senator Feingold. That was a--excuse me.
Senator Carper [continuing]. And the fact that they are not
doing what they need to do in the Northwestern Region, it puts
our people more at risk.
Senator Feingold. I met with the governor of the Northwest
Frontier Province, a very eloquent man, and he gave a very long
and very precise explanation of what these agreements were, how
they are trying to put language in the agreements to make sure
that it was understood that there should be no border crossings
into Afghanistan, etc., and he was very precise.
But after he finished, I said to him, look, there are two
things you have to understand about the American people. There
are two things we can't tolerate. One is Osama bin Laden is in
your area, not just in Pakistan, he is right here. That is what
most people believe, and the others. Second, this is used as a
launching pad to kill American troops.
Senator Carper. We are trying to protect a democratically-
elected government in Afghanistan.
Senator Feingold. That is right. I just said, those two
things are not acceptable to any people in the world and the
American people can't accept it. So we do want you to be able
to achieve peace within your region, but not if that is the
price that we, as Americans, have to pay. So that is a message
I tried to convey not only in Islamabad, but directly in the
region where we are pretty sure these folks are.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. This is a great opportunity
and I appreciate it.
Senator Carper. We appreciate very much your being our
lead-off hitter, a good one, too. Thank you so much.
I am going to ask our next witness, Donald Camp, to go
ahead and approach the table. I am going to give a statement
while you do that and then yield to Senator Akaka for a
statement. Then if there is no one else who has joined us by
that point in time on our panel, I will ask you, Mr. Camp, to
proceed.
We are going to have a vote starting around 3 p.m. and we
will probably have to be over to the floor to vote by about
3:15 p.m.. There is a chance that we may be able to get through
our opening statements and your testimony before that happens,
so hopefully that is my goal.
But before I start off, I just want to give special thanks
to the over 500 men and women serving in the U.S. Embassy in
Pakistan. Based on a recent visit to Islamabad, my staff tells
me that our Ambassador there, Anne Patterson, runs a tight,
organized ship. I understand she is a woman from Arkansas, as
is Wendy Anderson. We commend our Ambassador for her leadership
and all our personnel there for the capable service to our
country.
Political instability, a growing Islamic insurgency, a
demoralized army, and an intensely anti-American population are
the hallmarks, unfortunately, of today's Pakistan. In fact,
most national security experts agree that Pakistan is the most
dangerous country in the world today. Admiral Mike Mullen, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently called the
border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this is his
quote, ``the site of planning for the next attack,'' his words,
``on the United States.'' The region is also widely thought to
be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden, as pointed out by
Senator Feingold.
It has become clear in recent months that the billions of
U.S. dollars poured into Pakistan have not helped,
unfortunately, to secure its borders with Afghanistan, in large
part because we failed to link assistance to specific policy
goals. We also know our policies toward Pakistan since
September 11, 2001, have failed to stop or even to mitigate
anti-Western militants or religiously-based extremist elements
in Pakistan.
In fact, a study released by the RAND Corporation says that
Pakistani intelligence agents have aided both Afghani and
Pakistani Taliban insurgents and compromised U.S. military
movements. RAND warns that the United States will face, in
their words, ``crippling long-term consequences,'' if insurgent
strongholds in Pakistan are not removed.
In light of the virulent anti-American Islamic insurgency
raging on the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan today,
from Balochistan to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
FATA, and up to the Northwestern Frontier Province, we must
decide how to effectively move forward with this partnership.
I think it goes without saying that the safety and security
of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance. Again, I
said earlier, anywhere from 50 to maybe as many as 200 warheads
are involved here. Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and
technology from falling into the wrong hands should remain a
top priority for all of us. The possibility of al Qaeda or
another terrorist group acquiring a warhead or enough
radioactive material to create a dirty bomb is something that
we simply cannot leave to chance. And while there appears to be
a very small chance that Pakistan's nuclear assets could be
seized by terrorists or other militant groups, the United
States should pursue policies that promote the safety of
Islamabad's nuclear capabilities.
These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. If, in
fact, the mountainous border region between Afghanistan and
Pakistan is the site of planning for the next attack on the
United States, as Admiral Mullen has stated, what, therefore,
will the United States do in the short-term, say between now
and January 2009, vis-a-vis the lawless region between
Afghanistan and Pakistan?
What are the long-term objectives on how to address this
dangerous region?
The Bush Administration, Congress and the 9/11 Commission
have recognized that the United States needs a long-term
comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threats in
Pakistan. Why hasn't the Administration developed such a plan?
In October last year, the U.S. State Department provided
Congress with a report that certified that Pakistan was making
significant and sustained progress toward eliminating the safe
haven for terrorists. However, a recent GAO report noted that
there was broad agreement, including among the Director of
National Intelligence, the U.S. Embassy officials in Islamabad,
the Department of Defense, and others that al Qaeda had
established a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas and reconstituted its ability to attack the United
States. What was the basis for the State Department's finding
that Pakistan was making significant and sustained progress?
The RAND study also reported continued support by Pakistan
government agencies of the Taliban. Is there any recent
evidence of the Pakistani intelligence or military officials
supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon technology?
What do we know about the Pakistani government's
involvement in nuclear missile proliferation activities? How
effective has the U.S. policy been in stopping or reducing
these activities? How credible is the Pakistani's government's
disavowal of any knowledge of former Pakistani nuclear
scientist A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities, especially in
light of his very recent recanting of his confession? How
secure are Pakistani government controls on its nuclear weapons
arsenal and facilities?
Today, with these questions in mind, I want us to try to do
the following: First, to accurately assess to date the efforts
of the Bush Administration, our country's policy toward
Pakistan. I want us to discuss the most effective strategic
policy options regarding Pakistan, particularly with regards to
ensuring the safety and security of its nuclear arsenals and
addressing Islamic extremism. And finally, I would like to see
us solicit some ideas about how Congress, how my colleagues and
I, can play an active and effective role in the path forward.
If our national security is linked to the success,
security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan, I believe the
United States has no choice but to do more. Dr. Stephen Cohen,
one of our witnesses today, summed it up well in his written
testimony. He said, ``Short term measures regarding terrorism
and nuclear technology should not get in the way of long term
strategies to stabilize Pakistan.''
Therefore, we must work with Pakistan and our other allies
to develop a strategy that creates long-term goals for success.
This should include providing much more U.S. non-military
assistance and demanding greater transparency and
accountability in U.S. military aid to Pakistan, as our
colleague, Senator Joe Biden, a strong leader on this issue,
has asserted.
Again, we thank all of our witnesses for taking this
opportunity to talk with us today about the nature of the
challenges before us and how best to address them.
Senator Coburn, welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN
Senator Coburn. Thank you. Given the fact that we have a
vote on, I concur with a lot of the questions you have asked,
and then we will get forward to our testimony.
Senator Carper. Thanks so much.
Senator Akaka, would you like to make an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for
the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
I'd like to thank Senators Carper and Coburn for holding this
hearing. We all recognize the vital importance to American security of
maintaining a strong strategic relationship with Pakistan. I just have
two comments.
First, I am concerned that Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal
Areas remain sanctuaries for our enemies. If history is to guide us,
there is very little hope that this will change. These areas have
always been ungoverned except by tribal law. I am not fully confident
that our strategy to aid Pakistan forces to assert control is going to
be successful. Our main hope may instead be to contain our enemies in
this enclave.
Second, I am concerned that the longer political instability
continues in Pakistan, the greater the risk that Pakistan's nuclear
program will be infiltrated by al Qaeda. To date all indications are
that Pakistan maintains firm control over the security of its program.
But this security could be affected by a breakdown of authority. We
need to do more, much more, to reinforce Pakistan's democracy and the
rule of law.
I would again like to thank Senators Carper and Coburn for
arranging this hearing and add my welcome to our witnesses.
Senator Carper. Thanks so much.
Mr. Camp, just a brief introduction. He is currently a
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asian Affairs. From 2006 to 2007, Foreign Policy
Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations, and now Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. And prior to
that, I understand, among other things, you were Deputy
Assistant Secretary and then Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for South Asia from 2001 to 2006. You have a long
resume and we are grateful that you are here and grateful for
your service.
Please proceed. Your entire statement will be made part of
the record. Feel free to summarize.
TESTIMONY OF DONALD CAMP,\1\ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize it
briefly. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for inviting me here to discuss U.S. strategy with regard to
Pakistan. Like Senator Feingold, I welcome the growing interest
in the Senate in our policy toward Pakistan. More than ever,
our national security is linked to the success, security, and
stability of a democratic Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Camp appears in the Appendix on
page 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We must build a comprehensive, long-term partnership with
the Pakistan government and people. The February 18 elections
provided a new opportunity for us to do so. Our strategic
priorities in Pakistan include strengthening its democratic
civilian institutions, enhancing counterterrorism cooperation,
particularly in the border region, and ensuring its nuclear
weapons remain secure and unused. Economic and social
development is an essential element to achieving each of these
strategic objectives.
Ensuring the success of Pakistan's democratic transition is
a core priority. On February 18, the Pakistani people cast
their votes for moderate leaders, repudiating extremist voices
and demonstrating that a moderate democratic center prevails as
the country's dominant political force. We are engaging with
the new government and all the political parties to strengthen
participatory democracy and to build a broad-based, long-term
relationship between our two countries.
We believe that a moderate government with a democratic
mandate will be a more effective partner in the fight against
terrorism. Pakistan is a significant partner on the front line
in this war. Pakistan has lost over 1,400 members of its
security forces since September 11, 2001.
Recently, we have heard about the negotiation of peace
agreements with certain groups in the Tribal Areas.
Negotiations with tribes in Pakistan are not a new tactic. We
understand that the recent negotiations are part of Pakistan's
hopes for bringing security and stability to the Tribal Areas.
However, outcomes are what matter. Any agreements must advance
the goals of ending al Qaeda and Taliban activity, ending
suicide bombers, ending cross-border attacks. Each agreement
must be weighed case by case based on results.
Our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are intrinsically
linked. In order to achieve stability and security in either
country, we must achieve it on both sides of the border. Our
challenge is to more effectively coordinate and synchronize
operations by both nations and by our coalition partners.
Let me say a couple of words about nuclear security.
Nonproliferation cooperation is another critical aspect of our
long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan has
taken constructive steps to enhance the security of its nuclear
materials and assets and to prevent diversion of sensitive
items and technologies, as occurred with the A.Q. Khan network.
We are encouraged by Pakistan's improvements in export controls
and its participation in the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism. We will continue to work with Pakistan to
help ensure that its nuclear weapons remain secure.
On the development side, a sustained commitment to help
Pakistan develop its economy is essential to achieving our key
strategic objectives. It will strengthen Pakistan as a partner
with the United States and the international community.
I would like to mention Reconstruction Opportunity Zones as
an important piece of our long-term strategy. These zones can
attract domestic and foreign investment and create sustainable
employment opportunities in the FATA. There is a bill before
the Senate to address these now and we support that bill.
There is a comprehensive frontier strategy presented by the
government of Pakistan which emphasizes economic and social
development. The United States has committed $750 million over
5 years in support of this sustainable development plan for
infrastructure development in the territories.
Additionally, we have partnered with the government of
Pakistan in launching the Security Development Plan to enhance
its ability to secure the border. This involves training the
Frontier Corps, improving the capabilities of Pakistan's
special forces, and constructing Border Coordination Centers.
In conclusion, for our commitment to Pakistan to be long-
term, it must also be bipartisan. We appreciate the Congress's
sustained commitment to Pakistan, particularly the interest of
Members of this Subcommittee. I understand that Senator Levin
recently returned from a successful trip and that you, Mr.
Chairman, are interested in visiting soon. I hope you will do
so. We hope that together, Congress and the Administration can
establish a new framework, a long-term framework for economic
and security assistance that can support Pakistan's democracy.
In conclusion, our long-term commitment is of immense
importance to our partnership with the Pakistan people and
their security, as well as to the security of the American
people and the international community. That is why we need to
work together to help the newly-elected Pakistan government
build strong democratic institutions, combat the threat of
terrorism, and ensure the security of its nuclear weapons.
Thank you. I would be happy to take your questions.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much for your statement.
I thought earlier I might just submit questions for the
record, but I would like to ask some questions, but would you
like to lead it off, Senator Coburn?
Senator Coburn. Yes, I will. Thank you, and thanks for your
testimony.
The $1 billion aid package, the FATA development strategy,
why were there no conditions on that aid package on political
reforms in the Tribal Regions, such as rule of law reforms,
integrating the FATA into the Northwest Frontier Province under
the full jurisdiction of both the legislature and the judicial
system? Why were there no strings attached to that that would
certainly further our interests and their stability with that
money?
Mr. Camp. Senator, I think that the question, particularly
of integrating the Tribal Areas with the rest of Pakistan, is
an issue that needs to be addressed. It needs to be addressed
by Pakistan. It is a tough issue. The FATA has been separate
for decades. I don't think it is an issue that we can
necessarily impose our will on Pakistan. There are many voices
that have spoken up in favor of this integration into the
settled areas of Pakistan, as they are called, but again, it is
not so much for us to condition our assistance, it seems to me.
The assistance that we are offering is really in our interest,
as well, because we have a basic national security interest in
helping to develop and stabilize the border areas.
Senator Coburn. The economic package that you have is about
three-quarters of a billion dollars, $750 million, and in your
statement just a minute ago you said outcomes are what matters,
except on that package there are no metrics. There is nothing
with that that says how we are going to measure what the
outcomes are. What are the measurements? How do we know the
three-quarters of a billion dollars we are going to invest in
this economic package will work, since the State Department has
no metrics to say, this is what we conclude is a success?
Mr. Camp. Sir, I think that the metrics are basically
poverty alleviation, economic development, literacy, raising of
literacy rates. Literacy rates in the FATA are abysmally low. I
have heard the figure of 3 percent for female literacy in the
Tribal Areas. Enrollment in schools is going up. There is a
metric that I think is a useful one.
All of these things will demonstrate that we are achieving
success. In the long run, I think we have to look at
intangibles, too, things like the existence of open democratic
elections, which is not something that necessarily is
susceptible to tangible measurements, but certainly is very
important. So I would say that there are performance plans.
When we put together these assistance programs, we make very
clear what the expectations are in terms of raising people out
of poverty and providing new opportunities, particularly
employment opportunities in the FATA.
Senator Coburn. Balance for me, if you will, if there is
not a judicial system, if there is not rule of law, and we are
going to invest in infrastructure, whether it is clinics or
schools or roads, prime targets for violence, prime targets if
there is no other infrastructure--I guess what I am asking is
which comes first and how do we measure them.
And then the second part of the question, in the oversight
of this investment, where U.S. AID failed in Afghanistan was
because there was not the security available to U.S. AID to
oversee what was actually happening. What are you doing in
terms of making sure the security is there for the investment
so that we can see what the contractors are doing and making
sure when we say a school is built, it was built, or a hospital
is built, it was built? What have we learned from the failures
in the investment in Afghanistan?
Mr. Camp. Well, in fact, I asked this question of a
colleague who works for U.S. AID in anticipation of just this
kind of question, and his answer was rather interesting, and
that is to say we have learned from--we have moved into the
FATA in a rather measured way. We understand that there are
problems in working in parts of the FATA for security reasons,
but we do work actually in all seven agencies, as they are
called, of the FATA.
What we are trying to do is develop sort of innovative
oversight techniques. One that he cited, for instance, is
building schools. We have satellite images. We can verify that
schools have been built, where they have been built. That is
just one example.
Senator Coburn. Well, the problem was in Afghanistan, we
built the schools and the first snow, the roofs caved in. So, I
guess do we have a structure in place so that the overseers of
the contractors can actually get there and see that the
investment is what we expected it to be?
Mr. Camp. I would say that, first of all, we are building
up our personnel in Peshawar, which is the center of the
Northwest Frontier Province, in order to be able to do this.
That doesn't mean that Americans will be traveling to
Waziristan or one agency to inspect. We are working through
NGOs. We are working through the government of Pakistan. We are
depending on them to do these verifications, to do this
assessment, basically.
Senator Coburn. I understand the security risk, but----
Senator Carper. I think we have about seven minutes to go.
What do you say we recess here and we come right back?
Senator Coburn. OK. All right.
Senator Carper. We have about 7 minutes left. We will be
back in about 15 minutes or so. We are going to stand in recess
now and we will be back shortly. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Carper. Let us resume our proceedings. Thank you
for your patience. I am going to turn now for further
questioning of our first witness, Mr. Camp by Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing. I want to say that I had
two concerns and one is that concern about Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas that remain sanctuaries for our
enemies. If history is to guide us, there seems to be very
little hope to change this.
Also, my other concern is that the longer political
instability continues in Pakistan, the greater the risk that
Pakistan's nuclear program could be or will be infiltrated by
the al Qaeda, and to date, all indications are that Pakistan
maintains firm control over the security of its programs.
Mr. Camp, Ahmed Rashid's book, ``Descent Into Chaos,''
describes a double game that Pakistan's military intelligence
agencies have been playing. On the one hand, appears to support
the Taliban and other militias as a weapon against India. On
the other, these agencies are working with the United States to
counter hostile militias in the FATA. Is this true?
Mr. Camp. Senator, I would just say that the government of
Pakistan has been very clear, and President Musharraf, in fact,
was very clear after September 11, 2001, and has fully
supported the war on terrorism. The newly-elected civilian
government has not only reiterated this commitment, but made it
very clear that they view the war as their war. In other words,
it is not just the Americans and it is not just about
protecting the homeland, but it is about protecting Pakistan
from people who are their enemies, as well. Therefore, I would
say that I take with a grain of salt the assumption that
Pakistan's official agencies are playing this kind of double
game.
Senator Akaka. In your testimony, you mentioned that
Pakistan's new export control organization has been reaching
out to technology holders and law enforcement officials. Is the
United States providing any assistance to Pakistan's new export
control system?
Mr. Camp. We have been very supportive of their new laws on
export control licensing and their enforcement body. We have
worked with them in things like the Global Initiative, and I
think really it is probably best to leave that discussion right
there. If you would like me to get further information on
specifically what we are doing on export controls, I would be
glad to provide that separately.
Senator Akaka. I would like to have that information, and
to include this one, if you can't answer it now. Can you
identify any instances where enforcement has prevented the
proliferation of sensitive exports?
Mr. Camp. I will find out if we have such evidence. I don't
have it with me right now.
Senator Akaka. Fine. We look forward to that information.
Mr. Camp, the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship cannot
ignore nuclear weapons or India. Recently, India's prime
minister announced that India has no intention of getting rid
of its nuclear weapons unless other major powers also disarm.
In this situation, it appears that Pakistan would also be
unlikely to disarm. Should the United States be encouraging
nuclear disarmament in the region, and if so, what should we be
doing?
Mr. Camp. Senator, I think that, first of all, it is well
established U.S. policy and certainly something we all believe
in that the subcontinent would be far safer, far better without
nuclear weapons. That said, I think what we can do and what we
should do is do everything we can to support those two
countries developing a better relationship, encouraging them to
work independently to develop a more amicable relationship, and
I am pleased to say that the trend is in that direction, that
India and Pakistan both have recognized the importance of
working together, and I think that goes for this newly-elected
government of Pakistan, as well, very much.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Camp, in Dr. Cohen's testimony, he
argues that the United States should also consider a criteria-
based nuclear deal with Pakistan as a way of encouraging them
to limit and secure their existing nuclear weapons. He also
suggests that Pakistan might get support for its civilian
nuclear program in exchange for greater security assurances.
What is your opinion of this suggestion?
Mr. Camp. I think, Senator, that I will reserve judgment on
that because that is a new idea that we really don't have an
established position on and I would just rather not get into
that area, if I may respectfully hold back on that.
Senator Akaka. All right. Well, thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Carper. Mr. Camp, a couple of questions, if I
could. The first is a series of three short questions and I am
going to repeat them maybe twice just to let you think about
them. You have lived in Pakistan, right?
Mr. Camp. I have visited many times. I have never actually
lived there.
Senator Carper. All right.
Mr. Camp. I have lived in other parts of the----
Senator Carper. When most recently were you there?
Mr. Camp. Two months ago.
Senator Carper. All right. What is your broad assessment,
please, of the outcomes of U.S. policy toward Pakistan since
2001, and a couple of follow-ups. One, what aspects of our
policy there do you think have been most successful in serving,
first of all, our national interest, but also the national
interest of Pakistan, and what are some aspects that you might
want to change? So if you will, again, the broad assessment of
the outcomes of our policy toward Pakistan since 2001, what
parts or portions of that policy do you think have been
successful, both for us and for the national interests of the
Pakistanis, and what are some aspects that you would change?
Mr. Camp. I would say that what has been most important is
that we have been there and we have made the commitment to
Pakistan that we are planning to be a long-term partner of
Pakistan. President Bush, in particular, made a commitment to a
5-year assistance program, something that is not something we
normally do. It was a 5-year, $3 billion assistance package,
evenly divided between security assistance and development
assistance. That was from fiscal year 2005 to 2009. It has
been, I think, successful in demonstrating our commitment in
both sides of the equation with Pakistan.
As we complete that package in 2009, this is the
opportunity, I think--and this is along the lines of what we
should be doing--this is an opportunity to renew the long-term
strategic framework with Pakistan to find a way to make very
clear to the Pakistan people that the United States and
Pakistan have a long-term future, because that is something
that is often questioned in Pakistan.
Senator Carper. What aspect of our policies would you
change?
Mr. Camp. I would say, Senator, that we are adapting to a
new situation----
Senator Carper. Yes, we are.
Mr. Camp [continuing]. And very pleased to have a newly
democratically-elected government. What we are doing, and this
is not to say it is a change in policy but it is something that
we always do, that Ambassador Patterson, whom you mentioned in
your opening statement, has been assiduously meeting every
political leader in Pakistan and making sure that Pakistanis
understand that we want to work with all the political parties
in Pakistan, work with the new government, and that includes
across the board, including the religious parties that have
been referred to, as well, and I think that is a very important
signal for our future relationship with Pakistan.
Senator Carper. What is the likelihood that the Chief
Justice, their top judicial leader who was deposed, what is the
policy, or how would he come to be reinstated? How would that
happen?
Mr. Camp. There are all sorts of scenarios out there,
Senator. It is very much tied up in domestic Pakistani
political politics at the moment--domestic politics at the
moment. There are proposals to----
Senator Carper. I wonder if their judicial nominating
process is as convoluted as ours can be here.
Mr. Camp. In fact, there is no sort of confirmation process
in Pakistan that I am aware of.
Senator Carper. I wonder if they have a blue slip policy
that we have here. Probably not.
Mr. Camp. They do have a Pakistan Bar Association, which,
in fact, has been very much involved in the lawyers' movement.
There is legislation pending now before the Pakistani
Parliament and I am confident that the Pakistani parties will
work out a way to handle this, but it is very complicated
because you have a Chief Justice in place at the moment and the
proposal is to replace him with the previous Chief Justice.
Senator Carper. Obviously, there is enormous complexity in
terms of the groups that are operating in a lawless region
northwest of--between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have
different groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas, the Pakistani Taliban, we have the Afghan Taliban, we
have al Qaeda, and we have other sectarian groups, as well. Do
you believe that we, in this country, have a sufficient
understanding of just who we are fighting? And next, which
groups do we work against first and how do we go about
prioritizing that?
Mr. Camp. Sure. I think, first of all, we are dealing with
Pakistani sovereign territory, so, in fact, we work with the
Pakistanis to attempt to address these problems. I think that
you are quite right. The situation in the Tribal Areas is
extremely complicated. I think, in fact, outsiders do not
probably have a great understanding of tribal dynamics in that
region and I think it is----
Senator Carper. Although, again, 20 years ago, or however
long ago it was when we were fighting Charlie Wilson's war, I
wonder if we had a better understanding.
Mr. Camp. And again, during that period, we worked through
the Pakistani government to achieve our aims, and in fact, they
were our main sort of conduit to the tribes in those days. I
think the British had a long history in Pakistan and they also,
I think, did not feel themselves to be experts in the Tribal
Areas, which were even then an unsettled, relatively lawless
area.
But your question basically is who should we be addressing
first.
Senator Carper. Yes.
Mr. Camp. My answer is we have to focus on all of those
groups who pose a threat to our coalition forces across the
board in Afghanistan.
Senator Carper. And among those, who would be first?
Mr. Camp. Well, al Qaeda certainly is target No. 1 in my
book.
Senator Carper. All right. Some analysts argue that the
Pakistani military remains wedded to a conventional war
strategy and we are accused in this country of always fighting
the last war and maybe not the next war. But apparently it
remains focused on figuring out how to fight a conventional war
with India and it has been slow to reorient itself toward
counterinsurgency planning, which we feel is more relevant
today. To what extent might this be a problem in the context of
our Nation's interest in the region? And second, how has U.S.
military assistance sufficiently strengthened its
counterterrorism capabilities?
Mr. Camp. The Pakistani military is a large and
professional institution with a long and storied history. They
have, in fact, traditionally focused most of their effort on
their Eastern border, that is to say their border with India.
They are developing a counterterrorism force. One important way
in which we are helping is our Foreign Military Financing,
which is, in fact, focused on counterterrorism goals and it is
going to items like communications, radios and the like, TOW
missiles and things that are used for counterterrorism. In
fact, the Congress has mandated, in 2008, that FMF should be
used for counterterrorism purposes and that is what is
happening.
Senator Carper. In our negotiations with the new leaders of
Pakistan, the democratically-elected leaders of Pakistan, do
those discussions include what are their military priorities in
terms of funding and how are those consistent with our greater
interest in funding counterterrorism capabilities?
Mr. Camp. Yes. We have very broad discussions on both the
civilian side and the military side about priorities and about
how our assistance can be used, and certainly Pakistan
understands very well what our concerns are and certainly
understands Congressional restrictions on the use of FMF
funding, which is something that is important, as well.
Senator Carper. All right, thanks. Dr. Coburn.
Senator Coburn. Just to follow up, in the self-interest of
Pakistan, if we weren't involved right now, would they be
seeing that the Northwest Territories were a significant
problem for them?
Mr. Camp. I believe that they recognize that the areas of
the frontier are a problem for them, as well, unless that area
can be brought under Federal control, and I will give you one
very good example, and that is that the assassination of
Benazir Bhutto last December is generally acknowledged to have
been carried out by a member of the Masud tribe located in
Waziristan. That in itself is an indication of the threat to
Pakistan itself from the Tribal Areas, and certainly the number
of suicide bombings that Pakistan has seen in its major cities
is another example of the threat that is posed.
Senator Coburn. So they have every indication in their own
self-interest to try to decrease the lawlessness, bring order
to the Northwest Territories?
Mr. Camp. And they have been very clear about that, yes,
sir.
Senator Coburn. Some of the critics of the FATA development
strategy say the timeline for the strategy to work is 10 to 15
years. We talked a minute ago about benchmarks, but how are
they wrong? What do you expect to see 2 or 3 years from now in
an ideal world if everything that you all were doing was
working appropriately? Describe the situation as you believe it
should be if we were 100 percent effective in carrying out our
aims through the State Department with the dollars that are
following.
Mr. Camp. Well, we are asking for something like $200
million per year for training and equipping of the Frontier
Corps. This is a substantial amount of money and this will
train, I would say, several thousand members of the Frontier
Corps every year. That is progress.
Now, we have to acknowledge that, in fact, this is not a
short-term process, and I think, in fact, Chairman Mullen was
quoted just the other day as saying this will not be over
within a couple of years. I think that we have to view this as
a process and every year that we make the Frontier Corps more
capable, we are helping Pakistan and we are helping ourselves.
Senator Coburn. OK. How often are U.S. AID, the State
Department, and the Department of Defense required to report on
the implementation of the FATA development strategy?
Mr. Camp. I am not sure there is any formal reporting
requirement on that strategy for Congress, but certainly we are
prepared to come and brief on it at any time----
Senator Coburn. Well, I am not talking about the Congress.
How about Condoleezza Rice? Does she get a report from U.S. AID
on the progress?
Mr. Camp. Actually, our embassy in Islamabad sends a
report, I think it is virtually every week, on what is
happening in the FATA and our development strategy and our
security strategy there, and that, of course, is available to
the Secretary and we keep her posted, certainly.
Senator Coburn. OK. I am going to have some other questions
to submit for the record. One of the things that we saw in
Afghanistan is that we used external contractors to measure
performance of other contractors, and given the security
problems within Pakistan, especially in Waziristan and the FATA
area, I assume that we are going to be doing the same thing
again. How do we know that the contractors that we hire to
oversee the contractors that we have paid to accomplish things
are reliable if we don't have boots on the ground to check it
ourselves?
Mr. Camp. Well, I would say, first of all, Senator, that
Pakistan has some advantages over Afghanistan in that it is a
much more, how shall I say, developed society. Pakistan itself
carries out rather detailed surveys of the things you
described. We talked about benchmarks before--literacy,
household----
Senator Coburn. In this area?
Mr. Camp. Throughout Pakistan.
Senator Coburn. Including Waziristan and the Northwest
area?
Mr. Camp. I think they probably have the same difficulties
that we would in gathering detailed statistics, but yes, in
principle, they collect on the whole country.
Senator Coburn. The whole point I am getting at, I don't
want us to have a hearing 2 years from now and discover another
$3 billion blown down the tube because we are spending money in
an effort to help a country and we are not doing good follow-up
and oversight to make sure that the money was actually spent on
the people we intended it to help, and I guess that is a
question.
Reassure me that we have some process in place so that we
know if we are going to spend $750 million, it is actually
going to help the people of the area and we are going to be
able to confirm that it did. How are we going to know that?
That is my problem. I don't disagree with the strategy. It is
how do you measure it and how do you know if we are getting
value? How does the American taxpayer know the $750 million
actually bought $750 million worth of stuff?
Mr. Camp. I guess I would come back to the fact that U.S.
AID has very strict procedures and processes that they are
required to carry out.
Senator Coburn. No, they don't. We have had hearings here.
They don't. They did not carry them out in Afghanistan. They
did not.
[Crowd discourse.]
Mr. Camp. Senator, as the FATA becomes more settled, as it
becomes more secure, and that is our goal, we will have greater
access. We as Americans, we as contractors, and as NGOs, will
have greater access to the area to verify on the ground what is
being done. I think if you go to Peshawar and get a briefing
on, for instance, the kinds of things that our Office of
Transition Initiatives is doing, you will see that, in fact, we
are verifying--to give you an example, the placement of mini-
hydroelectric projects in some villages, things like that. We
can verify. We can take pictures. We can come back and say,
this is in such-and-such a village. And that is some of the
verification we can----
Senator Coburn. I plan on going there in the near term and
what I would like for you to do is, after you leave here,
answer in a way that gives us some assurance that we are not
going to see a repeat of some of the failures. That is not a
reflection on the people, it is a reflection on the system. We
didn't do a good job of being good stewards as we invested in
many of the projects. As a matter of fact, we got pictures from
the Afghani government about the schoolhouses that weren't
built that were paid for. We have got a picture of the slabs
that were poured but we didn't ever get the school, but we paid
for the school.
So all I am saying is, please answer back in a formal way
to give me some assurance. We just had staff over there and
visiting with U.S. AID, and I have to tell you, based on my
staff report, I do not have the feeling that we have any
metrics or real way to know whether or not where that money is
going to. It is just a concern and I want you all thinking
about how we address that, if you would.
Mr. Camp. We will get back to you on that, Senator.
Certainly.
Senator Coburn. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Before we release you, I just want to
conclude by saying I have approached this hearing in a belief
that for a number of years, we have been wedded to a Musharraf
policy and that it is important for us to pivot now and to
develop a Pakistan policy, and I am encouraged that we are
beginning to move in that direction and it is evident that we
need to continue to do so and maybe to accelerate that
distance.
We have at least three major concerns for me, and one of
those is the safety and the potential success for our troops
and allied troops in Afghanistan as they attempt to help
stabilize the democratically-elected government and to enable
them to be successful.
A very grave concern I have is with respect to those
nuclear weapons that are in Pakistan and which could fall in
the hands of people who would use one or more of them to do
harm to any number of people, including to us.
And finally, just feeling concern for the Pakistani people
that the potential that they may face for a better day, a
better future, if their latest effort to put in place a
democratically-elected government, to make sure that reaches
its full potential. Those are at least three things that we
have in mind as we go forward.
We appreciate your testimony here today. We would ask that
you respond for any follow-up questions that Dr. Coburn and
myself or others would provide. Dr. Coburn.
Senator Coburn. I just would ask unanimous consent that I
am going to have questions for the other witnesses. I cannot
stay, and if I could have those submitted for the record, I
would appreciate it.
Senator Carper. We spoke to the other witnesses before.
They said they would prefer not to----
Senator Coburn. They would prefer not to answer my
questions? [Laughter.]
Senator Carper. They said, anything to enable us to avoid
answering them in person. We will take whatever he has in
writing. No, we would be happy to do that, without objection.
All right, Mr. Camp.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much for joining us today, and
we will invite our second panel to join us, please.
[Crowd discourse.]
Senator Carper. I would just ask that our guests continue
to be good guests. We appreciate everybody being here, but we
would like for our guests to remain seated and just to behave
with the appropriate decorum, please.
[Crowd discourse.]
Senator Carper. I would again ask our guests to please be
seated and allow us to proceed. Thank you very much.
[Crowd discourse.]
Senator Carper. I would ask our guests please to--thank you
very much.
[Crowd discourse.]
Senator Carper. I am going to go ahead and begin our
introduction of our second panel. We are led off by Alan
Kronstadt.
Mr. Kronstadt. Yes.
Senator Carper. He is a specialist with the Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional
Research Service, where since 2002, he has researched and
written on U.S. relations with India, with Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka for Members of Congress and our staffs. I understand he
was previously a lecturer at the University of Southern
California in Los Angeles and worked for nearly two decades as
an analyst of U.S. foreign policy and international security
and have published a number of journal articles and book
chapters.
We thank you for the time you spent with our staff on this
hearing, and thanks also to Paul Kerr, who I believe is here
with you today, for preparing my staff, in their recent visit
to Pakistan.
Second, Lisa Curtis. Ms. Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow
at the Heritage Foundation, where you focus primarily, I am
told, on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Previously, you have
worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a
professional staff member, handling South Asia for a fellow
named Senator Lugar--a good man. From 2001 to 2003, you served
as Senior Advisor in the State Department's South Asia Bureau,
where you advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistani
relations. We are lucky that you are here and we appreciate
your being here and look forward to your testimony.
Dr. Stephen Cohen joined The Brookings Institution as a
Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies in 1998 after a career
as a professor of political science and history at the
University of Illinois, in Champaign?
Mr. Cohen. Correct.
Senator Carper. All right. In 2004, he was named by the
World Affairs Councils of America as one of America's 500 most
influential people. That is a list I have yet to crack. Dr.
Cohen is the author and co-author and editor of over 12 books,
mostly on South Asian security issues, and you have consulted
for numerous foundations and government agencies and were a
member of the State Department's Policy and Planning Staff from
1985 to 1987. Currently, a member of the National Academy of
Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control
and a founder of several arms control and security-related
institutions in the United States and South Asia.
And finally, Michael Krepon, founder of the Henry L.
Stimson Center, a Washington-based NGO focusing on security
issues. He is also a diplomatic scholar at the University of
Virginia. Your area of expertise, I am told, includes space and
security and nuclear-related issues and regional expertise in
South Asia. Previously, I understand that Mr. Krepon served
under President Jimmy Carter at the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency in the State Department. He has worked at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Capitol Hill
handling Armed Services and Defense appropriations matters and
has authored numerous books. I think you have a new book coming
out, don't you, called Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of
Living With the Bomb.
We really want to thank you all for coming today. We will
start off, if I may, with Alan Kronstadt. Your entire testimony
will be made a part of the record. If you would summarize for
us, that would be fine. Five or so minutes would be good.
Please proceed. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF K. ALAN KRONSTADT,\1\ SPECIALIST IN SOUTH ASIAN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Kronstadt. Thank you for this opportunity to address
the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kronstadt appears in the Appendix
on page 67.
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While not without success, U.S. policies toward Pakistan
since 2001 have largely failed to neutralize anti-Western
militants and reduce religious extremism within Pakistan, in
turn hindering efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan.
However, Pakistan's recent upheavals may offer an opportunity
to alter the nature of this bilateral relationship. The 2008
elections indicate Pakistanis are moderates not driven by
extreme militant religious world views.
Still, anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan,
apparently rooted in a general disapproval of U.S. global
policies and a specific resentment of U.S. policy toward
Pakistan itself. Most observers agree that reducing these
negative perceptions will be necessary to advance U.S.
interests. Many argue that this goal is overshadowed by
shorter-term policies that may fuel the very distrust the
United States seeks to overcome.
The salience of mutual trust and respect, not only between
governments but between peoples, is often understated in
assessments of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. In the
political realm, Pakistanis resent perceived U.S. meddling in
their country's internal politics. In the security realm, many
Pakistanis believe the United States relies too heavily on
military efforts, thereby damaging Pakistan's legitimate
interests in sovereignty.
Given President Musharraf's status as a moderate pro-
Western ally of the United States, his political diminishment
and potentially ignominious exit from power complicates U.S.
policymaking, yet these complications may be seen as
opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Respect of and active
support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and rule of law
are explicit non-controversial U.S. policies. There is,
however, vigorous debate over whether such policies have been
manifest in both words and deeds.
The Pakistani Nation was traumatized by a huge increase in
domestic religiously-motivated violence in 2007, with more
lives lost to Islamist militancy than in the previous 6 years
combined. Concurrently, al Qaeda and affiliated groups have
resurfaced on Pakistani territory and continue to plot anti-
Western terrorist attacks. Senior U.S. officials, including
President Bush, believe possible future attacks on the U.S.
homeland likely would originate from the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border region.
For the first time in many years, the United States must
deal with a political structure in Islamabad that has
fundamentally differing views on how to combat religious
extremism. Pakistan's new civilian leaders reengaging efforts
at negotiation with religious extremists claim that military
confrontation has allowed militants to become stronger. Most
Pakistanis, though not all, appear to welcome this policy
shift.
A key metric for the United States is preventing pro-
Taliban militants from using tribal regions to plan and launch
attacks. So far, the indicators are not encouraging. Cross-
border raids in Afghanistan reportedly are up significantly in
recent months and Pakistani officials show signs of diminished
concern about this issue, perhaps reflecting Pakistani dissent
from the multi-national strategy being pursued in Afghanistan.
Myriad analysts counsel U.S. patience. Many insist that only by
bringing Pakistan's Tribal Areas under the full writ of the
state and facilitating major economic development there can the
FATA region problem be solved.
Decisionmakers in Washington face the difficult task of
supporting a holistic long-term Pakistani approach to its
militancy problem while making clear to Islamabad's leaders
that international jihadis represent a threat that should be
neutralized in the near term. Reported Predator strikes on
Pakistani territory may kill al Qaeda operatives, but often
take civilian lives, as well. Pakistani leaders strongly
condemn such attacks, reflecting a widely-held Pakistani view
that the United States myopically pursues its own national
interests.
Recognition of Pakistan's legitimate security concerns and
interests regarding Afghanistan and active support for warmer
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are also explicit non-
controversial U.S. policies. Yet on this topic, too, vigorous
debate exists on whether the United States is genuinely
committed to a long-term role in the region that will address
Pakistani concerns.
U.S. public diplomacy gains following the 2005 earthquake
were measurable, but have since receded. By one accounting, 86
percent of Pakistanis believe that weakening and dividing the
Muslim world is a U.S. goal. A scant 9 percent thought Pakistan
should cooperate with the United States in its so-called war on
terror.
These findings may give pause to any observer and serve as
a stark reminder that the national interest and the human
interest do not always correspond in the minds of ordinary
citizens. U.S. interlocutors cannot force upon Pakistanis the
notion that the fight against religious militancy is in their
own best interests. Weakening and dividing the Muslim world is
not a goal of U.S. foreign policy, as a huge majority of
Pakistanis appear to believe. To the extent these
misperceptions exist, they are likely to create formidable
obstacles to a genuine mutually-held trust and respect that
could benefit the governments and peoples of both countries.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I stand ready to
answer any questions you may have.
Senator Carper. Great. Mr. Kronstadt, thank you very much.
Ms. Curtis, I understand that you come late to the game
because we invited you late. We are just delighted that you
were willing to make time in your schedule to come and testify.
I didn't have a chance to read your testimony, so this will be
the first time I have heard it, but I very much look forward to
it and thank you so much for joining us.
TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,\1\ SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Ms. Curtis. OK. Well, thank you very much for having me
here, Mr. Chairman. It is very much an honor. I will focus my
remarks on mainly containing the terrorist threat in Pakistan,
which of course is critical to the future of Pakistan as well
as global security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on
page 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite a successful election 4 months ago, Pakistan's
political and security situation remains highly unstable and
demands close attention from U.S. policy makers and
legislators. The power struggle at the center among the three
main political parties, Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, and
President Musharraf--Asif Ali Zardari leads the Pakistan
People's Party, the main leader in the coalition government;
Nawaz Sharif leads the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz faction,
which is the junior coalition partner in the coalition
government. There is a power struggle between these three
leaders that is distracting the new government from coping with
the grave economic and terrorism challenges that are facing the
country.
A revived lawyers' movement to restore judges deposed by
President Musharraf last year is adding to the political
uncertainty, and I understand tens of thousands of people are
en route from Lahore to Islamabad as we speak, so just to give
you a sense for the political uncertainty in Islamabad at the
moment.
But perhaps the most worrisome trend in Pakistan is the
advance of Taliban militants in the Northwest part of the
country and the government's lack of a strategic approach to
roll back the rising extremist threat. The United States and
Pakistan share the same objective of uprooting terrorism from
Pakistan, but they have not yet developed and agreed upon a
comprehensive joint plan to achieve this goal over the long
term.
Tuesday night's air strike that killed 11 Pakistani
security forces along the Afghan border will likely strain
U.S.-Pakistan relations and create opposition within the lower
ranks of the army and the Pashtun paramilitary Frontier Corps
to any further cooperation with the United States. The incident
points to the challenges of fighting an effective campaign
against insurgents who cross freely back and forth along a
porous border and the confusion that prevails when coalition
forces can operate aggressively on one side of the border, but
must rely on their Pakistani counterparts to control the other
side. Mostly, the incident highlights the need to improve
communication between the coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani
forces along the border.
In September 2006, Pakistani President Musharraf pursued a
peace deal with militants in the North Waziristan agency of the
Tribal Areas. The deal failed by all accounts. Within 2 months,
cross-border attacks against coalition forces increased by 200
percent, and by the summer of 2007, senior U.S. intelligence
officials declared that the Pakistani peace deal had allowed
the region to develop into an al Qaeda stronghold. The
extremists also took advantage of the decreased military
pressure and instituted strict Islamic edicts in the region,
such as closing down girls' schools, barber shops, and video
stores, demonstrating that they could challenge the writ of the
government.
The Pakistani government has once again embarked on a new
set of peace deals in the region. The government hopes that
negotiations will separate tribal leaders from the extremists,
but the problem is the tribal leaders do not have the
wherewithal to confront the extremists. The Pakistani
government says that it needs time for the negotiations to bear
fruit. The danger lies in promoting a negotiating process that
legitimizes the extremists and increases their influence.
During a recent trip to Pakistan, I was struck by the level
of concern expressed about the situation in the Northwest
Frontier Province by the people of that region. Pakistanis
understand that the Taliban militants are competing for
political power with the Pakistani State. They do not support
the agenda of the militants, but they were pessimistic that the
government was capable of successfully countering their growing
influence.
The militants almost certainly will use the current law to
strengthen their ability to fight coalition forces in
Afghanistan. The United States must encourage Pakistan to go
back on the offensive with full U.S. support. But military
operations alone will not uproot the terrorists' safe haven in
the Tribal Areas, which could take several years. It will
require a strategic approach that also relies heavily on
economic development and investment in the region.
In addition to implementing a large-scale economic
development program in the FATA, the United States should move
forward with Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), as they
are referred to, legislation that was introduced in the U.S.
Senate on March 13, 2008. The ROZs are meant to encourage
investment near the underdeveloped Tribal Areas by permitting
certain products produced there to enter the U.S. duty-free.
And I just want to add, during my recent visit to Pakistan,
there was a lot of skepticism because this initiative was
introduced several years ago. President Bush announced this in
March 2006, and here we are 2 years later and it is still not
implemented. So I just want to make the point of how important
it is to keep the faith of the Pakistanis that we really are
truly interested in contributing to the development of this
region.
The United States should also speed up its plans to provide
counterinsurgency training to Pakistan's paramilitary troops
stationed in the FATA. The training of Pakistan's Frontier
Corps, who come from the region and are familiar with the
culture, is scheduled to begin this summer, but it really
should have started long ago.
Washington should also increase efforts to encourage peace
building and greater military-to-military cooperation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani initiatives to bring
political reform to the FATA could actually strengthen
Islamabad's claim to the region and help dispel any controversy
between Kabul and Islamabad on the status of their shared
border.
The United States should also make a quiet yet focused
diplomatic effort to prod the India-Pakistan peace process.
Substantive movement on Kashmir is needed to demonstrate that
the two countries are truly putting their past behind them and
moving toward a new era of peace and cooperation in South Asia.
Finally, the United States should fully support the
democratically-elected coalition government. Washington should
avoid being viewed as meddling in Pakistani internal politics,
including working toward the preservation of President
Musharraf, whose role and influence are declining in Pakistan,
which I think many of the witnesses have indicated. A policy of
clinging to Musharraf in the face of Pakistani opposition will
only increase hostility toward the United States from the
broader population and contribute to greater instability within
the system. Maintenance of the current coalition government
offers the best hope for stabilizing Pakistan as it copes with
the economic and terrorism challenges that threaten political
unrest.
That concludes my statement. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much. It was worth waiting
for. Thanks so much.
Mr. Krepon, you are recognized. Please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KREPON,\1\ CO-FOUNDER, THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER
Mr. Krepon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding
this hearing. You have asked me to focus on the nuclear weapons
issue----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon appears in the Appendix on
page 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Carper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Krepon [continuing]. Which I am going to do. The first
question, how safe and secure are Pakistan's nuclear weapons?
Nobody knows for sure how the current system, which is an
improved system, will work under circumstances of great stress.
Senator Carper. Excuse me for interrupting, but when you
say an improved system, improved how recently?
Mr. Krepon. Well, there was a time, regrettably, when A.Q.
Khan, who ran one of the major nuclear laboratories, was in
charge of security at that lab. That was not a good idea.
Senator Carper. No.
Mr. Krepon. But that has changed and now the Pakistan army
has full control over the security system. It has full control
over the nuclear weapons system within the country, from soup
to nuts.
But the improvements that they have made, thankfully, have
not been tested under periods of prolonged great stress. If
there is great turbulence within the country, and there are
possibilities of that because of this triangular competition
between the political big-wig, or big-wigs, the current
president of the country, and the army chief, that triangular
system of control, there is jockeying there all the time. But
it could get a lot worse.
A period of prolonged political turbulence where the
country's problems grow and divisions within the country grow,
that will also be reflected in the Pakistan army. The Pakistan
army is not some foreign culture that has been imposed on
Pakistan. It reflects the country. And so divisions and
grievances, when they grow within the country, are also going
to grow within the army.
And the biggest, or one of the biggest threats to the
safety and security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan is a
breakdown of unity of command within the army. So unity of
command is a hierarchical institution. The chief gives orders.
The orders are followed. With a breakdown of command, orders
don't get followed. So I think that is something to focus on.
We want to prevent a prolonged period of instability in
governing this country and there is just so much we can do. Our
policies aren't determinative, but they do influence outcomes.
So worry about political instability within the country.
I also worry about the crisis with India because whenever
there is a crisis with India, then nuclear weapons which are
usually in repose, and they are most safely guarded in repose,
they move around. Some portion of their nuclear arsenal, the
launchers and the weapons, move when there is a period of
significant crisis. The reasons are simple. People can look
down on this country by means of satellites and get the
geographical coordinates of where the nuclear storage sites
are, where the missile bases are, where the air bases are. So
all of these are targetable, so you have got to put something
in motion. When you put something in motion in a crisis, then
you are more susceptible to insider threats and you are more
susceptible to accidents, and if a crisis turns into a limited
war, then, of course, all of these concerns really grow
exponentially.
So what can the United States do? We can offer assistance
for nuclear security. The Pakistanis, there is this huge trust
deficit with the United States and every time there is an
incident like yesterday, the trust deficit grows. So they are
not going to let us get hands on their crown jewels. They are
going to keep us at a safe distance.
Support that can be provided from a safe distance, like our
best practices, our lessons learned--which, by the way, we have
to relearn about nuclear safety and security. But if we can
offer assistance that is at a safe distance, chances are, and
if it is kept with a low profile, the Pakistan army will say
yes, as long as they can keep us at arm's length. Those are
small things. If we offer big assistance programs for nuclear
security, it may make doing smaller things even harder.
And, of course, the other two things, because of my
worries, we can do crisis management if there is a problem with
India. Even better, we could do peacemaking, help with
peacemaking in a low-profile way. We haven't done much of that,
unfortunately.
I agree that these assistance packages are required to help
reorient the Pakistan army, Frontier Corps, economic
development. You will be sorely tempted to walk away from these
programs because there is going to be so much friction between
us and Pakistan in so many specific cases. But disengagement
doesn't help. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you for an excellent statement and
for responding to the questions that we asked you to respond
to. We are glad you accepted our invitation and thank you for
your testimony.
Dr. Cohen, you are batting cleanup here. Thank you. Please
proceed.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN P. COHEN,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator Carper. I am honored to be
invited to again speak and offer some advice to the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the Appendix on
page 92.
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Let me begin my remarks by making two general observations.
Somebody said earlier these hearings are timely, but they are
timely because Pakistan is in a protracted crisis that is
measured in decades, not just years. So Pakistan is going to be
with us in one form or another for a very long time. It is not
just a sudden event that is taking place.
Second, there is also a great danger of wishful thinking
regarding Pakistan, projecting on Pakistan our desires and our
belief that we have found leadership or a program that actually
works, and, of course, this is sometimes played back to us,
ratifying our own imagination.
When I worked for George Schultz for a couple of years, he
said to us once, hope is not a policy, so I think we have to
bear that in mind with regard to Pakistan. I hope that this and
that will happen in Pakistan, but I think we also have to take
a realistic assessment of what is actually going on.
I will try and summarize some of this because Mr. Krepon
has said a few things already, but I think there are four
nuclear-related dangers we have to worry about in this
Administration and the next and perhaps the one after that. A
small but real possibility that the next India-Pakistan crisis
could lead to escalation to nuclear use.
Second, Pakistan may decide as a matter of state policy--
this is looking ahead a couple of years--to extend a nuclear
umbrella or engage in nuclear sharing with one or more Middle
Eastern States, especially if Iran acquires a nuclear device.
Third, there is a hard-to-quantify risk of nuclear theft in
Pakistan. Mr. Krepon has talked about that. I won't repeat it.
And finally, there is some small chance that should
Pakistan unravel--again, it has once already--that its nuclear
assets will be seized by remnant elements of the army for
political, strategic, or personal purposes.
While nuclear proliferation or nuclear theft should not be
the sole or even the determining element in a relationship with
Pakistan, some of these are frightening scenarios. Our policy
paradox is that we want many things from Pakistan but that we
cannot directly address Pakistan's inability to deliver. We
want Pakistan to cooperate on terrorism. We want it to
normalize with India. We want it to control its nuclear
weapons. We don't want it to proliferate. And we want it to
transform its domestic order by normalizing the FATA.
Even if Pakistanis wanted to do some or all of these
things, it is not certain that they have the capability to do
them. So no matter how much money we pour into Pakistan, we
cannot expect full compliance. We must pick and choose among
our policy goals.
In the case of nuclear security, we should go beyond
encouraging better safeguards. Within the limits of American
law, we are providing technologies to Pakistan and systems to
Pakistan to help secure their systems and it may be that China
has also done so. I certainly hope they are doing that.
Beyond this, we should consider a criteria-based nuclear
deal with Pakistan, somewhat different than the one we offered
to India, which I support, but one in which Pakistan has to
meet certain criteria to get assistance as a way of encouraging
them to limit and secure their existing nuclear weapons. As far
as I can see, Pakistan is simply going to be building nuclear
weapons in large numbers as fast as they can indefinitely,
something that is not in our interest and I don't think it is
in their interest.
Pakistan could receive support for a civilian nuclear
program in exchange for greater assurances regarding the
security of its nuclear assets and technology and transparency
regarding past leakages.
Finally, we should marginally increase our engagement in
the India-Pakistan relationship--our involvement in the India-
Pakistan relationship, as Mr. Krepon has said. The Pakistan
army still regards India as its main threat and nuclear weapons
as its main defense. We need to address their chief incentive
to acquire more and bigger nuclear weapons. The reason Pakistan
is engaged in Afghanistan or allows individuals based in
Pakistan to become involved in Afghanistan is not because they
have ambitions of expansion themselves. They do not want India
to fill the vacuum in Afghanistan. So it is essentially a
continuation of the India-Pakistan rivalry to Afghanistan that
is part of the problem.
Short-term measures regarding----
Senator Carper. Excuse me, Doctor. Just say that last
sentence again.
Mr. Cohen. Pakistani strategists see Afghanistan as a
vulnerable spot because of Indian engagement in Afghanistan,
and historically there has been an Afghan-Indian alliance or
relationship because both regarded Pakistan as their major
threat. So, in a sense, we have to understand this realpolitik
balance of power issue. From a Pakistani military point of
view, they do not want to see India establish themselves in
Afghanistan, so that is why our Pakistan-Afghanistan policy,
our Pakistan and our Afghan policies and our India policy are
linked at some level, at a strategic level, and we must keep
that in mind.
Short-term measures regarding terrorism and nuclear
technology should not get in the way of long-term strategies to
stabilize Pakistan. We should devote as much attention to
shoring up Pakistan's broken institutions and helping
Pakistanis resolve their permanent domestic critical crises as
we devote to terrorism and nuclear issues, and I think I agree
with the rest of the panelists on this point. If we fail to do
the latter--the former, the latter would certainly become more
acute. If we don't address Pakistan's coherence as a state, it
will be a bigger problem regarding terrorism and nuclear
weapons.
Fortunately, there are other states that share this
interest with us, that want to see a stable Pakistan. These
include Saudi Arabia, China, India, Afghanistan, the major
European powers, and Japan. The Chinese and the Indians, in
particular, are concerned about Pakistan becoming a radical
Islamist State. Of course, Saudi, you could look at the Saudi
view on that several ways, but they share with us a concern
that Pakistan not be an export center for radical Islamic
behavior. In a sense, we have some common interest with the
Chinese and the Indians regarding Pakistan's stability and
normalcy.
Our Pakistan policy should, therefore, be framed by a
regional policy that seeks to stabilize relations between
Pakistan and its neighbors, especially India and Afghanistan,
but also Iran. We also need to make our support more effective.
I won't go into the details. I agree with what others have said
about this.
Finally, I think we should be aware that Pakistan may yet
fail comprehensively. The state has failed in bits and pieces
over the last 25 years in civil war, separatism, economic
collapse, and the rise of a truly authoritarian leader are all
possible futures for Pakistan. This is the core argument of the
book I published in 2004 and I think I would stand by
everything I wrote there. It is still a possible future for
Pakistan.
Pakistan should not be written off as a failed state. It is
not a failed state. It has failed in bits and pieces. But if it
cannot take advantage of this second-last chance, then its
future will be grim, and you and other American policymakers
should not be taken by surprise.
That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to respond
to questions.
Senator Carper. Dr. Cohen, thank you. Thank you for your
testimony.
I am reminded as I listened to each of you testify,
reminded of the words of Thomas Edison, who used to say that
sometimes people miss out on opportunity because it comes along
wearing overalls and is disguised and looks a lot like work.
There is a potential for great calamity here, nuclear weapons
falling into the wrong hands, the Taliban, al Qaeda continue to
find refuge and create mischief both in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, danger to our troops in Afghanistan. But there is
also real potential here, maybe for getting it right. It
doesn't say it is going to be easy.
One of the best ways for me to learn, aside from very
informative panels like the ones that are gathered here, is to
actually go to a country to visit that country, to talk to the
folks who are involved, our people as well as the folks who
live in those countries. Senator Levin has just returned, I
believe, from that part of the world. I am delighted that he is
here. As you know, he Chairs the Armed Services Committee and
is a very senior member of this Committee, as well. Senator
Levin, you are recognized for as much time as you wish to
consume.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Carper, so much, and
thanks for holding this hearing. As you mentioned, I just
returned with Senator Casey from a very brief visit but a very
useful visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think I changed my
mind about a number of things just in talking to those leaders
and talking to our military people during those 3 days. I
learned a lot about the border and the problem that border
creates for Afghanistan, for our troops in Afghanistan because
of the flow of Taliban across that border and other terrorist
forces that emanate from Pakistan, where they really have safe
havens in a number of areas of Pakistan.
The fundamental question that we grappled with, Senator
Casey and I, is to what the real intent or attitude of the
Pakistani government is. Do they really want to stop that flow
into Afghanistan or not? Some argue, particularly in
Afghanistan, but some in Pakistan, that if they could buy off
some of the groups that are violent and persuade them to focus
their fire on Afghanistan next door, that maybe they can have
peace at home in Pakistan, and that is a theory which has a lot
of support, including some very explicit support from some of
our diplomats in Afghanistan as well as our generals as well as
the Afghan leadership that has absolutely no confidence in
Pakistan's either intent or capability to stop those cross-
border movements.
Now, from a military perspective, there are a lot of issues
about rules of engagement, what happens when people are being
fired at on the Afghan side from the Pakistan side. What should
be the response? The NATO rules of engagement, surprisingly, do
not even allow a return of fire across a border after they have
been fired at. That, to me, is a stunning restriction on what
is common sense military conduct, which is at least go after
the folks that are firing at you, but NATO has rules of
engagement that says if that attack comes from across the
border, you cannot respond across the border, even with fire,
much less personal activity crossing the border.
Our rules that we follow in the area that the United States
is patrolling and has responsibility for militarily, with
obviously the support of the Afghans, our rules of engagement
are not that. We will fire back at sources of attack from the
Pakistani side of the border. But that is a kind of an
important issue, but a more military technical issue.
The big issue for us is what is the intent of the Pakistani
government? What do they really intend to do, either in the
Tribal Areas or south of the Tribal Areas? These peace
agreements that are being discussed, we heard a lot of promises
from the Pakistani leader that those peace agreements would
have to contain explicit commitments which would be enforceable
to stop the flow of people crossing the border into Afghanistan
who intend to attack our troops. We have those assurances that
come right from the highest sources you can get in Pakistan,
which are the top elected leaders in Pakistan, including the
president and the prime minister and the heads of all major
political parties.
But then you read about a press conference which is held by
the head of a tribe whose first name I am afraid I will
mispronounce, Baitullah Masud. Mr. Masud holds a--he is a very
militant man who says at his press conference he vows that he
will continue the jihad in Afghanistan. He has an open press
conference in Pakistan. Everybody knows where he is. The press
knows where he is. He makes these vows openly and publicly. He
is the man who, by the way, many think is responsible for the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and yet he has an open press
conference in Pakistan.
So I guess I would ask Ms. Curtis and Mr. Kronstadt this
question, since our other witnesses are on a different part of
this subject, but what are, in your judgment, do the Pakistanis
have the will and have the capability--either or both--of
stopping these attacks from these safe havens on the Pakistani
side of the border into Afghanistan where they are creating
huge problems?
It is our greatest problem, I believe, in Afghanistan,
where you have got a national army which is committed to
defeating the Taliban. Their morale is very high in the Afghan
army. The capability, at least in terms of intent and will and
courage and strength of determination, is high in the Afghan
army. They don't have the military capability yet. But in terms
of the willpower, it is there. In terms of the fighting
strength, our military leaders tell us that the Afghan army has
got this kind of a determination, that they are willing to do
everything they can inside of Afghanistan to stop terrorist
attacks relative to the border, going back to that.
Let me start with you, Ms. Curtis. What is the intent, in
your judgment, of the Pakistan government in terms of stopping
these incursions from their soil into Afghanistan?
Ms. Curtis. Well, let me just start by saying I think it is
extremely difficult to judge intent, but what I can say is if
we look at what has happened in Pakistan over the last year,
literally 50, 60 suicide bombings killing over 1,000 Pakistani
civilians and security forces, I think clearly Pakistan wants
to stop the terrorists. It understands the threats to the
Pakistani State.
In my opening remarks, I pointed out I was recently in
Peshawar and it was very clear the people of Peshawar are
extremely concerned about what is happening. They understand
that the Taliban militants are competing with the Pakistani
authorities for political power and they are very alarmed by
this.
So I would say that we really need to think about the issue
of capability, and I understand the recent RAND study that has
come out that was mentioned earlier about whether or not
Pakistani services, intelligence services, were actually
supporting the Taliban. But I would point out, I think some of
this stems from some media reporting that we saw last year
talking about Frontier Corps who were allowing Taliban to
cross, and I would say there is a difference between allowing
or not being able to intercept because of capability and
supporting or helping, and we have to keep this in mind. It is
my understanding that the pickets along the border are often
made of up to 10 to 20 Frontier Corps troops and they may face
a band of militants of 50 or more Taliban.
So I think we need to look at this question, but I
certainly share your concern and I think it is something we
need to bring up in a very forthright manner with our Pakistani
counterparts when we do have these crossings and we do know
that the Pakistani border posts are not doing their job. We
need to figure out why and we need to address that issue.
Senator Levin. We do bring them up forthrightly with the
Pakistani leaders. Believe me, we were very direct with them on
this question and they assure us that, it is their intent. They
are not going to sign any peace agreements which don't have
explicit language prohibiting it with enforcement mechanisms to
carry out those commitments.
But the RAND study that you referred to says something more
than just people on the border allowing, and I agree with you,
there is a difference between, a gradation between allowing and
supporting or assisting. But what the RAND study says is that
there are a number of instances where Pakistani intelligence
agents tipped off Taliban forces about the location and
movement of Afghan and coalition forces, that there was
actually an affirmative step that was taken, not just passivity
but tipping off Taliban forces.
And there is other evidence, by the way. We talked to one
of our generals there who reported an incident, if I can
quickly find this, where there were some people who went over
the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan to assist people
from--and participated in an incursion from Pakistan military
into Afghanistan to help them get back safely. It was Senator
Casey, and I were told by our military commanders of a recent
incident in which Pakistan Frontier Corps forces sent an
ambulance in to evacuate wounded militants back across the
border into Pakistan.
So these are not just passive actions, failure to act,
although that is not acceptable, either. These are affirmative
actions on the part of the intelligence and the part of the
Frontier Corps people to help militants and to help the Taliban
inside of Afghanistan.
And I agree with your distinction, though, Ms. Curtis. I
don't disagree with that. I am just afraid that there has been
much more than just passive acceptance.
Mr. Kronstadt.
Mr. Kronstadt. Senator, I would, I think, first of all,
agree with Ms. Curtis's emphasis on the capability or capacity
question. I think it has become clear to most observers that
Pakistan's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts have
been hampered by a number of problems, including equipment,
training, so forth.
With regard to what you were just saying about the Frontier
Corps, I might offer that even what we saw on the news
yesterday calls attention to the problem of training and
discipline within that organization. Part of the potential
benefits of working with the Frontier Corps, it seems, are the
fact that they are local Pashtun ethnicity, often live in the
very areas that they are deployed. But there is a potential
downside to that in terms of concerns about sympathies that
they may have. It is possible that these concerns could be
ameliorated by more fully engaging the training and discipline
of this force and I think that has been a focus.
With regard to the intent of the government of Pakistan, I
would call attention first to the fact that it is a very
difficult region that is being operated in, and very often when
I converse with Pakistani interlocutors, they will raise the
issue of our border with Mexico and the difficulties we find
with securing that border, and then go on to explain that they
are dealing with a much more difficult terrain and an actual
division, a Durand Line that was purposefully dividing members
of the same ethnicity----
Senator Levin. Yes. The terrain in the north is more
difficult, but down with the Quetta area, that is not
particularly difficult terrain. They openly meet in Quetta.
They have this press conference that I made reference to, Mr.
Masud. It is an open press conference. He is the guy who is
threatening. He says the jihad in Afghanistan will continue.
Now, how do we explain that in terms of intent?
Mr. Kronstadt. I am certainly not in a position to explain
that. I will call attention to the fact that Deputy Secretary
Negroponte himself called for the capture and bringing to
justice of Baitullah Masud, so I think the U.S. Government's
position on so-called irreconcilable elements such as Masud are
clear. I can't explain the apparent public appearance of a
person like Masud in South Waziristan. But again, it is in a
Tribal Area and it is useful to separate, as you have done, the
Balochistan region and the Quetta local region from the Tribal
Areas, which are operating under a different set of--the
Pakistani government is operating under a different set of
constraints there.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take up time
beyond my allotted amount. You were nice enough not to give me
a specific time, but I don't want to abuse your good nature.
I would just say this in conclusion, I guess. We were
notified a couple of weeks ago by the Administration that they
intended to spend $75 million to train and equip the Pakistan
Frontier Corps. During our recent trip, as I mentioned, we,
Senator Casey and I, heard from so many officials, Afghan and
U.S. commanders, about either the failure to prevent activity
crossing the board by the Pakistan military or actively
supporting these cross-border attacks, that we are, frankly,
troubled by whether or not that money is going to be used to
stop the cross-border incursions into Afghanistan or to be
training a force which doesn't have the same interest and goals
that we do.
And so I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that you insert in the
record two things here. One would be a trip report of Senator
Casey and myself on our visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It
is a fairly short report, but it does contain some of the
questions which you and the witnesses and I have raised.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared report of Senator Levin and Senator Casey appears
in the Appendix on page 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But I also have a second request, which would be to insert
a letter which I recently sent to Robert Gates, the Secretary
of Defense, raising a question about that $75 million.\2\ It is
not up to us to approve it. We don't have that power with this
particular expenditure. But I do think we have to make a
decision fundamentally as to whether or not the folks that we
are training, equipping, making stronger, have the same goal
and interest that we do. I don't think we have made that. I
haven't heard a very strong case being made that we have
confidence that Frontier Corps, in fact, will have its mission
and purpose the same one that we do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The letter to Robert Gates from Senator Levin appears in the
Appendix on page 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And I think there are real questions about it and I think
some of Ms. Curtis's earlier testimony about complicated
motives--these are people who are countrymen. These are people
who have a similar--they are part of the same tribe and they
have a--there is no border for them. I don't think they even
acknowledge a border. It is an artificial line. And I just want
to make sure that before American taxpayer dollars are spent to
equip and arm and train folks that they are not going to be
turned on us and not going to be helping forces that have a
different interest. So thank you.
Senator Carper. You bet. Thank you so much for coming and
for sharing with us your insights, not only from your recent
visit, but from your years in the Senate and your chairmanship
of the Armed Services Committee and your role on this
Committee.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Senator Carper. You bet. What happens to Musharraf? What do
you see in his future? I would just ask each of you to share
some thoughts. Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Krepon. If you look at Pakistani history as closely as
Mr. Cohen has, I think it is possible to come to the conclusion
that when a military strongman really messes up in Pakistan, he
is not part of the clean-up crew. The clean-up is enhanced by
his departure and retarded if he sticks around. Would you agree
with that, Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. Yes. I think that a key element in this will be
the army's own views. They will not want to see a former army
chief disgraced or humiliated in any way, and his major outside
supporter seems to be the United States, or elements of the
United States. So I suspect that as our political system
changes, support for him may diminish--it has diminished
already--and they will find a graceful way for him to exit
Pakistan. On the other hand, he may have hopes that some
dramatic reversal will take place where he will again be seen
as indispensable. But that will depend on the army. I think the
army is a critical factor here, and they will not--but above
all, they will not want to see him humiliated or the army
humiliated by his humiliation.
Senator Carper. In some countries, they have a strong chief
executive. This country is an example of that. Israel has quite
a different situation with the president as a largely
ceremonial position. Is that a potential graceful way out of
this, is for the folks in Pakistan to decide that their
president should be a largely ceremonial office----
Mr. Cohen. Well, that is the way the constitution had it,
until he changed the constitution. And again, if he would be
willing to revert to such a ceremonial president, that would be
fine, but he may be waiting around. Certainly the army is
waiting around for the politicians to fail to come to an
agreement. So if the politicians cannot again agree, and we are
talking about the two dominant centrist secular political
parties of Pakistan, if they cannot come to an agreement as to
the management and the stability of Pakistan, he will have a
role, no two ways about it.
Senator Carper. Who selects the leadership of the military?
Mr. Krepon. Well, under the current constitution, the
president chooses, not the prime minister. But this is in play
now because the new political dispensation has offered some
major constitutional amendments. The constitution is not a
settled document in Pakistan.
Mr. Cohen. That is why I said Pakistan is in a permanent
state of crisis because there is no agreement on the
fundamental law of the land, the constitution, and personality
plays a role, outside powers play a role. We do. The Saudis do.
The Chinese do. So there is no political coherence in Pakistan,
or it has lost whatever coherence it did have, and I think we
can expect this to go on forever, indefinitely.
Senator Carper. Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. Sir, there has been a fundamental political
change in Pakistan that I am not sure that the Bush
Administration has fully absorbed. I think the election showed
that the support for President Musharraf's party, the Pakistan
Muslim League, KDS and PMLQ, did not do very well. In fact, it
did a lot worse than people expected. So I think this was one
indicator that people were not happy with some of the things
President Musharraf had pursued in the last year, particularly
the institution of emergency rule, the clamping down on the
press, throwing thousands of political workers, human rights
workers, in jail for a certain period. So I think this really
needs to be absorbed by the U.S. Administration, this
fundamental change.
And one thing that was made clear to me when I was in
Pakistan was that Pakistan has traditionally followed the
British system where the prime minister does have the majority
of the power and that there was a sense that many Pakistanis
wanted to return to that particular mode of government. So I
think there is definitely interest in moving in that direction.
How quickly it will happen because of all the political
instability, because of this three-way power struggle that we
see, I wouldn't want to hazard a guess.
Senator Carper. Do you want to add anything to that, Mr.
Kronstadt?
Mr. Kronstadt. I would just add that I think it is safe to
say the default setting for Pakistan since the 1973
constitution is a parliamentary system of government where the
prime minister would be the sovereign and head of government.
Senator Carper. Thank you. If you look at the level of
popularity or popular support within Pakistan for President
Musharraf and you look at the drop in our own support, one
seems to mirror the other. I wonder if he is bringing us down
or if the converse might be true or something to both of those.
Mr. Cohen. There is a relationship, and one of the reasons
he is unpopular is that he seems to be doing our bidding and
that we have--there have been American incursions in Pakistan
continuously. The recent attack wasn't the first one.
Senator Carper. Yes. I want us to talk about that here, and
this might be a good place to pivot and to talk about that. It
sounds like a tragic incident that occurred in the last 48
hours where, I believe, weapons delivered by maybe one of our
Predators or a Predator-like system may have led to the death
of a dozen or more Pakistani anti-insurgent troops. Any idea
how that happened?
Mr. Krepon. No idea, but I want to lengthen your frame
thinking about this problem of hot pursuit and bombing on
Pakistani soil, because it is not so long ago when it was the
Soviet Union and Soviet fighters and Soviet bombers were
dropping ordinance on Pakistani territory, the same area. So
Pakistanis----
Senator Carper. Bombing folks that we were supporting?
Mr. Krepon. Well, when we were supporting the Mujahideen,
they were using Pakistani territory as safe havens and there
were plenty of instances where the Soviet Union would just
happen to strafe and bomb Pakistani soil. So we have--I am in
no way paralleling what the Soviets did in Afghanistan and what
the United States is doing in Afghanistan. Let me be clear
about that. But the sanctity of Pakistani soil, which doesn't
seem to apply to cross-border incursions by pro-Taliban
elements, does apply to bombing runs.
So every time the United States finds it necessary to carry
out an attack by a drone or by some other mean on Pakistani
soil, there are huge reverberations within the country and it
impacts on the nuclear security issue that we were talking
about. It impacts on U.S. popularity within the country. So we
are on the horns of a dilemma here, and to my way of thinking,
we have to have really good intelligence when we pick out a
target on Pakistani soil, current intelligence, and we have to
have real good communication so that Pakistani forces,
including the Frontier Corps, are not collateral targets.
Now, the two of these imperatives can also conflict with
each other because of problems that Senator Levin was talking
about. If we give a heads-up, we are not sure that the target
will be there, and this is really hard.
Senator Carper. I agree. Dr. Cohen, and then others.
Mr. Cohen. I don't want to sound too cynical, but for a
billion dollars, you can bomb a country occasionally, which is
what we have been doing, in a sense. What is remarkable about
this last bombing is that none of the Pakistani press reports
have linked it to the actual amount of money we are giving
Pakistan, and I think the Administration feels and maybe our
forces in Afghanistan feel that the part of the billion dollar
package includes the necessity or the ability--I won't say the
right, but allowing us to occasionally drop a few weapons into
Pakistan, and Pakistanis haven't protested that since the
governor of the Northwest Frontier said, ``If you do this
again, we will be very unhappy.'' That struck me as a fairly
weak response from a state, but it could be that this is part
of where our money is going, in a sense, to buy goodwill, if
that is the right term, among Pakistani leaders.
But in the long term, I agree that it is hurting us among
Pakistani people. Imagine how we would feel if we were being
bombed occasionally by Canadians or Mexicans or any other
country. And, of course--that was the point I would make.
Senator Carper. Does anyone else want to comment on this
before we move on?
Ms. Curtis. I just think it points to the need for better
cooperation, and there have been efforts to move in this
direction. The establishment of Border Coordinating Centers
along the border, which would be manned by Pakistani, Afghan,
and coalition forces--it is my understanding that the
trilateral meetings that take place between the three have not
been happening as frequently in the last couple months. Perhaps
this is because of some of the political instability in
Pakistan. I am not sure. But I think this just shows how
important these trilateral efforts are and I hope that Pakistan
will participate fully in making them successful.
Senator Carper. All right. Let me just change our focus
just a little bit. In listening to your testimony today and in
reading your testimony and some other materials, it strikes me
that in the Pakistanis' view, India is their major nemesis.
They don't have a very fond regard for Afghanistan. It sounds
like the folks who voted in Pakistan in the last 6 months, they
voted to say that they don't want to become an extremist
country. They want to basically be a modern society and a
democratic society, but not one that is governed by religious
extremists of any quarter.
Pakistani people, as I understand it, are concerned with
the upsurge of violence, suicide bombs and that sort of thing
in their own country, so I don't know if there is a tension
that is going on here, too. You have got the Taliban or
remnants of the Taliban there along the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan creating mischief over in Afghanistan,
which may be to the pleasure of some of the Pakistanis, I am
not sure. But at the same time, to the extent that the Taliban
and al Qaeda elements are in the mountainous region, the remote
regions there, they are also in a position where they can
create mischief for the Pakistanis, too.
Where do the Pakistanis come down as to what is acceptable
and what is not, where they are going to have enough or decide
that it is not--as much as they might like to poke a stick in
the eye of the Afghanis, the idea of knowing that they are at
risk, too, in Pakistan is on their minds.
Also, I look, I think maybe it is not a perfect correlation
here, but I look at what is happening in the Anbar Province in
Iraq, where for a number of years there was just a hotbed of
violence, people killing one another, trying to kill us, the
Iraqi troops, as well, and the Sunni awakening has emerged,
taken root, and you have gotten the folks, the people who
live--the tribal units who live in that province have said,
enough. We are going to turn to work in concert with the U.S.
forces, with the Iraqi forces, and to turn against the al Qaeda
and Iraq elements.
Are there any lessons to be learned from what has happened
in the Anbar province that might apply in some way to Pakistan?
I am not sure if there are, and I acknowledge it is not a
perfect correlation.
Mr. Cohen. I think in Pakistan, what has happened is that,
among Pakistani civilians especially in the Eastern part of the
country where the major cities are----
Senator Carper. Excuse me just for a minute. What we have
tried to do in Iraq, as you know, we tried to take the lessons
from Anbar Province and tried to apply them in other parts of
the country, and I think with some success. I don't know if it
is transferrable from one country to another.
Mr. Cohen. No, I think much of it is, and in the case of
Pakistan, especially the Eastern portions of Pakistan, the
civilian population has been repelled by these suicide attacks
and they do not want to be subject to extremist Islamic rule.
They are generally secular Muslims. They voted for two major
secular political parties. And frankly, I was surprised that
the election took place relatively freely, Musharraf didn't
intervene, but I was not surprised that the Islamist parties
did badly and the secular parties did well. So in a sense,
there is hope for Pakistan, and that is where most of the
people live.
But there is still ambivalence in the military. They still
regard India as a major threat and one of the theaters in which
they combat India is Afghanistan. So I think you asked what are
their intentions in Afghanistan. They want to have it both
ways. They want our assistance, but they also want to make sure
they have a hand in Afghanistan because from their point of
view, Afghanistan is a critically important backyard for them.
It is not that they have expansionist plans, but they don't
want to see other countries fill into Afghanistan. So you can't
separate the two.
Let me make a point which hasn't been made here but I think
is very important. From an American perspective, neo-American
perspective, the Taliban is not important. Taliban are not
going to reach out and hurt us. Al Qaeda can and will and has.
It is Taliban's willingness to host al Qaeda that is the
danger. So if I had a choice of Afghanistan becoming Taliban
without al Qaeda, I might take it rather than an endless war.
So I think you have to bear in mind that from an American point
of view, neo-American point of view, al Qaeda is the real
threat. For most Pakistanis, also, al Qaeda is seen as an un-
Pakistani kind of organization. They are seen as foreigners.
Senator Carper. That is an excellent point. Thank you for
making it. Anyone else on this issue I have raised?
Ms. Curtis. Well, I think I have a different view in that I
see the Taliban and al Qaeda, they have a symbiotic
relationship and I think that you can't get rid of one without
dealing with the other, and I think this has been the
fundamental problem because I do think that most Pakistanis
would not see it that way and they have a hope of separating
the two. And I think if you look at the leadership connections
and support for each other, while they might have short-term
objectives that differ, they certainly support each other, they
cooperate, and I don't see that kind of cooperation ending any
time soon.
So I think that would be a fallacy and I think that would
be a mistake because we know--we have seen what happens when
the Taliban is in power in Afghanistan and we saw Afghanistan
become a sanctuary for al Qaeda, for terrorists, and I think it
would be a mistake if we don't recognize that fundamental
threat.
And I think what Mr. Cohen just articulated is the
Pakistani assumption that the United States is not going to
stay in Afghanistan. It is going to turn its back. It is going
to leave, and that is why Pakistan has to continue to protect
its own interests. And I think this is something that we need
to overcome because this is hurting our ability to achieve the
aims that we want to achieve in Afghanistan. So I think that
the more that we remain committed, demonstrate we are
committed, will commit troops, will commit resources, will keep
the international community focused, as well, I think we will
be able to achieve our objective not only in Afghanistan, but
Pakistan, as well.
Mr. Cohen. Ms. Curtis, I said if we could separate al Qaeda
and Taliban, but Taliban appear to be the sea in which the al
Qaeda are swimming.
Ms. Curtis. Right.
Senator Carper. All right.
Mr. Kronstadt. Mr. Chairman, could i just echo what Ms.
Curtis was talking about? I want to emphasize, I think, the
importance of the long-term commitment. It is easy to sit in
Washington and make conclusions about what is going on there,
but for the people there and in Pakistan, with the history--
experiencing a history of seeing the United States seem to
abandon the region or become disengaged from the region, they
have continued to see a friendly government in Kabul as being
in their very keen interests and that becomes a special focus
with any signs that the United States might not be committed.
So it is not possible to make a long-term commitment by
making a long-term commitment. It, of course, has to be lived
out that way. But I think to the extent that the Pakistanis are
reassured in that regard, it would serve U.S. interests.
Senator Carper. Thank you. A couple of short questions and
then we will call it a day. Thank you for bearing with us.
Is there any recent evidence of Pakistani intelligence or
military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring
or training to use nuclear or chemical or biological weapons
that you might share with us?
Mr. Krepon. Well, the----
Senator Carper. Or technology relating to those.
Mr. Krepon. Right. The public record has plenty of evidence
of technology transfer, no evidence of the transfer of fissile
material, bomb-making material, no evidence of the transfer of
bombs. The available evidence in the public domain may grow. We
are getting little bits and pieces along the way. There is
probably much we will never know about the complete picture.
But A.Q. Khan seems to have drawn the line, at least as far as
we know, with respect to technology transfer.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Others, please. Dr. Cohen,
anything you would like to add? Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. You meant technology transfer to terrorist
groups?
Mr. Krepon. Oh, no. Thank you very much for clarifying.
These are to governments, not to non-state actors.
Senator Carper. All right. But the question I was asking--
maybe I wasn't clear, but we are looking for evidence that
might suggest that Pakistani intelligence or military officials
may be supporting terrorist elements in acquiring nuclear,
chemical, biological weapons or weapons technology.
Mr. Krepon. I know of no such public evidence.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Anyone else? Dr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. I have never heard of anything.
Senator Carper. All right. Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. No, never heard of anything like that, and I
just wanted to add that also in former Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet's memoirs, he points out that A.Q.
Khan rebuffed several approaches by Osama bin Laden for access
to nuclear know-how. So I just wanted to point that out.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Another question,
really for all of you, but particularly for the three that I
directed the last question to. What is the biggest threat to a
secure nuclear arsenal in Pakistan? For example, is it a threat
by terrorists or other militants? Is it a military coup, a
leakage of nuclear materials or expertise? I am not sure if it
was Mr. Krepon or Dr. Cohen who was talking about heightened
threat with India. The movement of nuclear weapons pose a
greater threat.
Mr. Krepon. In my judgment, it is not the take-over of the
government or a coup within the army leadership by radical
Islamic elements. It is not that. Pakistan is not that kind of
a country. My judgment is the biggest threat right now is
prolonged governmental incoherence.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Cohen. Yes. I had four nuclear-related problems or
threats. I didn't assign a probability to any of them. I would
say that--well, and I can't do that now. It would take a more
detailed analysis. But I agree with Mr. Krepon that instability
in the government generally could lead to problems. Another
crisis with India might force the Pakistanis to put their
nuclear weapons on the road again, in a sense, disperse them.
If that took place simultaneous with the domestic political
crisis in Pakistan, then you would have both opportunity and
availability. Again, that is the perfect storm of situations to
create a nuclear crisis. But again, the possibility is low,
probability is low, but the consequences would be very great.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Anyone else? Please.
Ms. Curtis. Well, I think another threat would be retired
nuclear scientists or retired military terrorists gaining
access that way. I agree that it is not the overthrow of the
government. That is highly unlikely to result in such a danger.
But I point to something that happened in 2001 where two
retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission officials were found
to be meeting with terrorists, I think with Osama bin Laden
himself, and this was something that the United States brought
to the attention of the Pakistanis. So I think this points out
the need for personnel reliability programs. It points at the
need for the United States continuing to help Pakistan in
securing its nuclear weapons.
Mr. Cohen. Yes. Senator, you should know that--I am sure
you are aware that A.Q. Khan is, in a sense, on the loose
again. He visited the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission,
visited old friends there----
Senator Carper. Isn't he supposed to be under house arrest?
Mr. Cohen. Oh, no. He has received visitors. He has
traveled around Pakistan. He has visited the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission headquarters which are in Islamabad, not too
far from his house, in fact.
Senator Carper. And I understand he has recanted some of
his earlier----
Mr. Cohen. Well, and he has also recanted--I think this is
an unfolding story. I am not quite sure whether he is telling
the truth now or he told the truth then. I wouldn't draw
conclusions one way or the other. You get into the whole
classified realm at that point.
Senator Carper. All right. OK. The last question I have is
how credible do you find the Pakistani government's disavowal
of any knowledge of Mr. Khan's proliferation activities,
especially in light of his recanting of his confession? Any
thoughts on that?
Mr. Krepon. I don't think these disavowals, blanket
disavowals, are credible. I do think that each of his
activities needs to be looked at separately. I see separate
motivations, separate rationales, and separate possibilities
for collusion with certain governmental officials in each of
these cases. So I wouldn't wrap everything together. The only
general conclusion I would make in answer to your question is
that the non-collusion of others is very implausible.
Senator Carper. All right. When you look at the
relationship between Pakistan and, we will say, North Korea, in
terms of the exchange of technology, does it make sense for the
Pakistanis to want to trade nuclear weapons technology in
exchange for weapons delivery technology? Is that a reasonable
trade or not?
Mr. Krepon. No, not now.
Senator Carper. No, in the past.
Mr. Krepon. In the past, Pakistan was in a bind. Pakistan
was looking at India's missile programs advancing across a
broad front and Pakistan was stuck and it needed missiles and
it went to two countries for help. It went to China for help
with respect to solid fueled missiles and it got help. And it
went to North Korea for help with liquid fueled missiles.
Pakistan didn't put all its eggs in one basket. What we are
trying to get to the bottom of is what the basis of the
transaction was with North Korea.
Senator Carper. Do you think we will ever know?
Mr. Krepon. Well, there is a new piece that has come into
the public domain. It does appear that even though North Korea
doesn't admit it, that they got some help with respect to
centrifuge technology, the technology to enrich uranium.
Pakistan's bomb program was going down a separate route,
plutonium production, and it appears that Pakistan got some
help on centrifuges. Now, whether this was a discrete
transaction, as has recently been reported, we still haven't
gotten to the bottom of it.
Senator Carper. All right. Anyone else on this point?
Mr. Cohen. I would just add that it is my experience that
one of A.Q. Khan's great assets was his Rolodex, which he
apparently has shared with other countries. That is, he knew,
and he talks about this now, he knew a lot of places in Europe
where he could buy this stuff, buy the technology, put the
pieces together, and so presumably he kept it secret by only
telling one country at a time.
Senator Carper. OK. I am going to do something--I don't
often do this, but I am going to ask each of you to take maybe
one minute. In the House of Representatives--I used to be a
House member years ago, but we had the opportunity at the
beginning of business every day when the House opened for
business to give a one-minute speech on any subject of our
choice. I am not going to ask you to speak on any subject of
your choice, but if there is something that you would like to
just reiterate, to underline, or given the conversation we have
had here today you think is especially relevant as a take-away
for me and for my colleagues, or anyone else that might be
following this and interested in this discussion, what might be
your one-minute speech or your one-minute closing comments? Mr.
Kronstadt.
Mr. Kronstadt. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, of course, won't
have any speech for you, but I would just reiterate a couple of
points.
Senator Carper. Please.
Mr. Kronstadt. One is, and I think these have been
illuminated some at the hearing today, just how complex the
situation is in Pakistan----
Senator Carper. Well, if nothing else is clear, that is.
Mr. Kronstadt. Well, the challenge is clear and I am, I
think, encouraged by signs that the U.S. Government is focusing
more clearly on addressing these challenges, and the hearing
you have called today is evidence of that.
And I would again call attention to the role of mutual
respect and trust. Again, long-term commitment is something
that everyone agrees the United States is pursuing with
Pakistan and the proof is in the pudding. As Dr. Cohen
mentioned, there are going to be times when there will be a
reflex to pull back and that can be reevaluated in the context
of the complexity.
So I think a lot of the problems that have been raised here
today can be traced back to a kind of fundamental distrust or
trust deficit between the two countries and between the
governments of the two countries, and to the extent this can be
ameliorated, it would serve us well.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Ms. Curtis.
Ms. Curtis. I guess I would just say from your doing
Congressional oversight, don't forego the good for the perfect.
I have seen this happen too many times. Certainly the oversight
has to be done, but in a case like Pakistan, sometimes you have
to move forward if you don't have all the answers ready before
you, and I say this reflecting on the FATA development plan and
the $750 million in assistance that we are now moving forward
with. We probably should have done it a long time ago. I
understand there were a lot of questions in Congress. How do we
know if the money is going to go to the right people? Sometimes
you just have to move forward and then learn as you go.
I would just say, I received very good briefings when I was
in Pakistan on what we are doing with our assistance that has
begun to flow into the Tribal Areas and I am very encouraged.
The program is being conducted very creatively, very
professionally. My one concern would be that as the plan--the
more money goes in, big aid goes in, that the same structure is
not kept. So I would just urge you, your staffers to get the
briefing, what is happening now, and try to keep that same kind
of structure going for as long as possible.
And also on the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone issue, here
is another issue where something that makes eminent sense, but
I understand because we are trying to use trade or private
investment for really a counterterrorism goal, that is
difficult legislatively to do, but it is so incredibly
important and, I think, will contribute tremendously to
overcoming a lot of the complicated problems that we have been
talking about today. So I would just end on that note.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Krepon. I would like to thank you very much for holding
this hearing.
Senator Carper. No, we are the ones who are indebted to
each of you. Thank you.
Mr. Krepon. I would like to leave you with a thought----
Senator Carper. It wouldn't have been much of a hearing
with just us. Some of these guys are pretty good. Senator Levin
is good and Senator Feingold is good, so is Senator Coburn. But
it wouldn't have been much of a hearing without all of you.
Mr. Krepon. I want to leave with you a message that still
rings in my ear that Richard Armitage talks about. He was the
Deputy Secretary of Defense in the first Administration. It is
awfully hard to see how Afghanistan becomes a success story if
Pakistan fails, and vice-versa. We really--this is doubly hard
because we need two successes.
And so this is taking me back to something that Senator
Levin talked about. The Frontier Corps is a very weak reed and
it is not clear if they can get the job done. What has been
clear so far is that the regular Pakistan army has not been
able to do very well in countering these groups that are
causing so much trouble. It is going to take a while to get the
Pakistan army trained and equipped to deal with this problem.
It will probably take even longer for the Frontier Corps. And
it is not clear whether intent will be properly aligned with
the capability once the capability grows. But I am having a
hard time seeing what other instruments we have got to work
with in tackling this problem.
So what is the right number? What is the right amount of
money? I don't know. How do we monitor what is spent? Tough
problem. But I don't see a dual success story unless we invest
in the current direction. So I would ask you, like Ms. Curtis,
these are very imperfect policy initiatives, but I don't see
something better out there.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Dr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. I agree that these new initiatives are important
and I think they should be pursued, and I think that the real
problem in Pakistan is it is still an unsettled country. But we
do have resources and we have assets and I say the Chinese, we
should be working with the Chinese to some degree, a
considerable degree, with India to a degree, to some degree the
Saudis. The Chinese and the Saudis aren't interested in
promoting democracy anywhere, let alone in Pakistan, but
clearly they have an interest in the outcomes in Pakistan.
So I think that I was pleasantly surprised at the way in
which the election was held, the way in which young people are
revitalizing Pakistani politics. Pakistan is----
Senator Carper. Like America.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, there are some analogies. Pakistan is like
somebody who is caught in a door. It can't go forward to
democracy, but it doesn't want to go backward to dictatorship.
As long as it is stuck between there, we are going to have
problems with Pakistan. So I think we should continue the
present programs we have had. I think we should make a lot of
them conditional.
Sometimes we give foreign aid for not obvious reasons, and
I refer to essentially the bombings in Pakistan and obviously
that is going to take place. But our developmental aid should
be seen by the Pakistani people as aimed towards their
betterment and their improvement. In a way, I think we have
been very negligent in that and I think we have been cynical in
the way in which we supported a military leader who is not a
great Ataturk--who is not a great man--I think he was well
intentioned, but not up to the job--in lieu of broadening our
contacts with the Pakistani people. That has changed quickly,
but I hope the next American Administration changes it even
further.
So I am optimistic about Pakistan in the--I can't say I am
optimistic about Pakistan, but failure would create much
greater problems for us and for all of Pakistan's neighbors.
Senator Carper. All right. Well, I am glad we took that
extra minute or two for each of you.
I mentioned to Wendy Anderson, who works on our Majority
staff here, and to Trey Hicks, who works for Dr. Coburn on the
Republican side, this has just been an extraordinarily good
hearing, starting with Senator Feingold and with Mr. Camp and
then finally with the four of you. I want to thank the members
of our staff for, first of all, helping us--members don't think
of all this by themselves and come up with a witness list by
ourselves by any stretch, as you know.
But you have provided a great deal of illumination in an
area of the world in which our policy needs illumination, and
have certainly for this Member and think for others helped
better inform our path ahead. For that, I am very grateful, and
speaking for my colleagues, we are grateful. They are grateful,
as well.
The hearing record will remain open for two additional
weeks. During that period of time, some additional questions
may be raised. Members can offer statements for the record. And
I would just ask if you do receive a question or two from my
colleagues, if you would take a few minutes and try to respond
promptly to those questions so that your response can be
submitted for the record, too, that would be just terrific.
With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you so much.
[Whereupon, at 5:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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