

**THE ROOTS OF VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM
AND EFFORTS TO COUNTER IT**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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SECOND SESSION

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THE ROOTS OF VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM AND EFFORTS TO COUNTER IT

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, Voinovich, and Coburn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and we will convene the hearing. Welcome to the seventh in a series of hearings this Committee has held and is holding to examine the unique threat posed by what we have called “homegrown” violent Islamist extremism and to determine what steps we can and should take to identify, isolate, and ultimately eliminate this threat and the ideology that supports it.

On May 8, the Committee released a bipartisan staff report titled, “Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat.” That report concluded that the use of the Internet by Islamist terrorist organizations has increased the threat of homegrown terrorism in the United States because individuals can essentially self-radicalize over the Internet.

Since then, about a month ago, a college student in Florida plead guilty to a charge of material support for terrorism. According to the plea agreement, the student admitted to producing a video that he uploaded to YouTube which demonstrated and explained in Arabic how a remote-controlled toy car could be disassembled and the components converted into a detonator for an explosive device. The student admitted in the court papers that in producing the video, he intended to help those who wanted to attack American servicemen and servicewomen.

So we are here today to learn more about the ideology behind terrorism, the ideology that inspires people, including young people like the student in Florida, to take such hateful, violent, and anti-American actions.

The 9/11 Commission Report, I think, outlined quite eloquently and succinctly the dual challenges that we face. It is said, and I quote, “Our enemy is two-fold.” They mentioned specifically “al-Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on September 11, 2001,” and second, “a radical ideological movement in

the Islamic world inspired in part by al-Qaeda,” but I would add not only inspired by al-Qaeda, but that al-Qaeda is in effect a result of that radical ideological movement.

Our first witness on the first panel is Maajid Nawaz. He will offer the Committee insights into that ideology and the role it played in driving him to become a member at age 16 and eventually a leader of the Islamist extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, or the Liberation Party, in the United Kingdom. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is called for short HT, claims that it is non-violent, the exposure of its members to a very extreme form of Islamist ideology seems often to have laid the foundation for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. Mr. Nawaz recruited others, including his own family, to join HT and was sent to Pakistan and Denmark to set up additional cells. He was later arrested in Egypt in 2002 for being a member of the organization, and in fact was in prison for 4 years.

Upon release, Mr. Nawaz returned to England, where he eventually denounced the organization and the ideology that was at its foundation. Today, Mr. Nawaz is one of two directors of the Quilliam Foundation in the United Kingdom, a counterextremism think tank committed to discrediting the Islamist ideology that inspires Islamist terrorism around the world.

Mr. Nawaz, it is my understanding that this is your first visit to the United States and I wanted to extend a personal welcome to you, but also a thank you to you for making the effort to travel this distance to testify before our Committee. I believe your testimony is very important to our purpose.

The other three witnesses are equally distinguished and I know will be equally helpful to the Committee. They have extensive experience studying Islamist movements around the world—Dr. Peter Mandaville, Zeyno Baran, and Dr. Fathali Moghaddam. We look forward to your testimony and your collective insight into this ideology and the organizations that espouse it. As the three of you know, we are particularly interested in how the ideology facilitates the radicalization process, the end point of which is, of course, the planning and execution of terrorist attacks, which it is our aim to stop.

Our second panel today will have one witness. That is the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter. This is the Committee that initiated the legislation that created the National Counterterrorism Center, so we are always proud in a somewhat paternalistic and maternalistic way to welcome Mr. Leiter, its Director, to testify.

I close with another quote from the 9/11 Commission Report as follows: “Our strategy,” the Commission said, “must match our means to two ends, dismantling the al-Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.” I agree. The testimony of our witnesses today, I am confident, can help us measurably in our efforts to better understand the roots of Islamist ideology, to distinguish it, of course, from Islam, with the overall purpose of better directing our international, national, and local efforts to counter the spread of this ideology and to stop the terrorism it aims to inspire.

Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I, too, saw Michael Leiter outside in the anteroom and he said that he was looking forward to testifying before the father and the mother of the National Counterterrorism Center, so obviously he is thinking along those same lines that you are. On a more serious note, he did say that he thought the Center was operating very well and was bringing a great deal to our counterterrorism operations.

I am very pleased to be participating in this important hearing this morning. Islam is a major world religion with more than one billion adherents worldwide. Like most other religions, Islam has myriad variations that are adopted or rejected by people from all walks of life who view these different alternatives through the lens of their own experiences.

Obviously, but I believe it bears repeating today, the vast majority of Muslims lead peaceful lives following the tenets of faith, prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage that characterize mainstream Islam. There are also some Muslims who subscribe to an extreme variation of Islamic ideology that is antithetical to our Western culture and our constitutional democracy. Yet they, too, may pose no threat to our way of life nor to the free exercise of other faiths.

But there also exists a subset of violent Islamist extremists who seek to impose their world view, including the creation of a global totalitarian state, through all means, including violence. These terrorists turn to violence to achieve their ideological goals, seducing recruits and supporters with religiously laced rhetoric that legitimizes and in some cases exalts violence.

To better understand the roots of violent Islamist extremism, this Committee is exploring the radical religious ideology that can be used to incite or justify acts of terror. Specifically, we seek the answers to the following questions:

Is a certain ideology a necessary, albeit not sufficient, factor in leading an individual to embrace violence? How do some extremists use the ideology to legitimize terrorist acts and incite others to commit them? What other factors contribute to turning an individual from the non-violent advocacy of an ideology to violent extremism? How can we deter the use of violence in the support of any ideology?

Learning more about Islamist extremist ideology is important, but it is only part of our inquiry. To understand why an individual becomes violent, we must also consider other triggers, including the social, political, and psychological factors that may combine with ideological fervor to lead recruits down the path to terrorism.

This is a complex area of inquiry. It is not susceptible to easy analysis nor quick fixes. I do not believe that we can say that ideology is the root cause of terrorism any more than we can say that racism or perceptions of injustice or oppression are sufficient in and of themselves to explain violent extremism. Indeed, experts have debunked myths that all terrorists are psychotic, poor, uneducated, or otherwise fall within an easily identifiable profile. To actually gain a better understanding of all the factors that might contribute to terrorism, we must also work with the leaders

in the American Muslim community to address these root causes and to delegitimize violence as the means of promoting a system of beliefs.

As the Committee explores these issues, we must be clear that our efforts are designed to prevent terrorism, not to suppress the peaceful expression of ideas, even those beliefs which are repugnant to us. For example, I am alarmed when extremist ideology is used to justify the oppression of women or those of other religious faiths. As a public official, however, my personal abhorrence cannot color my judgment as to the fair treatment of those who may espouse that ideology as long as it is not accompanied by violence.

Let me emphasize the point. I condemn any group or individual of any ideology that supports, condones, finances, or otherwise uses terrorism to advance their goals. But let me say in equally uncertain terms, I also condemn any action by any government that would punish individuals merely for the exercise of their unalienable rights to worship and speak as they choose.

More than 230 years ago, as this country declared its independence from tyranny, it also declared through the protections of the First Amendment of our Bill of Rights that on these shores, the clash of ideas would be waged with words, not with guns and bombs. To that end, our duty as policy makers is to protect the political institutions that give individuals the right to express their views and exercise their rights without resorting to violence. For in a world where terrorists kill innocent men, women, and children to forcefully impose their beliefs on others, the true battle is between those who are violent and those who are not.

The Constitution protects an individual's right to hold any belief he or she may choose. This constitutional principle also underlies some of the unique features of the American way of life that thus far have helped to prevent violent extremism from taking root in this country. Those values, such as the openness of our society, tolerance for different viewpoints, and the assimilation of peoples of different faiths and ethnicities, are incompatible with extremist ideas like the suppression of other religions.

This is the ongoing struggle, and today, we are continuing our efforts to better understand the triggers of violent extremism and the threat that they pose to our way of life.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Thank you very much, and thank you, Senator Coburn, for being here.

Senator COBURN. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to be able to stay, but I would like unanimous consent to enter something into the record, if I may.¹

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered, and we will welcome you as long as your schedule allows you to stay.

Mr. Nawaz, we are going to go to you first. Thank you again for taking the time and making the effort to come from the United Kingdom.

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We welcome your testimony now.

¹“Report on the Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It: The Muslim Brotherhood,” by Steven Emerson, Executive Director, Investigative Project on Terrorism, submitted for the Record by Senator Coburn appears in the Appendix on page 102.

**TESTIMONY OF MAAJID NAWAZ,¹ DIRECTOR, THE QUILLIAM
FOUNDATION, LONDON**

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins. I really don't think I can add anything more to what you have just said, so really, perhaps I should just go on now because what you just said is a very eloquent expression of what I believe. So thank you for that and thank you for having me here. I wish to congratulate the American people on the recent July Fourth celebrations. It is a shame I couldn't be here for those.

But moving to the discussion of the day, I did join Hizb ut-Tahrir when I was 16 years old. I moved to London to recruit for Hizb ut-Tahrir. I joined Newham College, where I was elected as President of the Students' Union, and regrettably and sadly, due to the radicalization that occurred on that campus, myself and Ed Husain were both on the campus of Newham College at the same time—he is the author of the widely acclaimed book, "The Islamist." Sadly, that radicalization eventually led to a situation where another student was murdered on campus by somebody who was a supporter of our activities, and really, that should have acted as a warning for me in those early days because what played out in Newham College ended up being the microcosm of what would play itself out much later on with the attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States of America, and that is that people who were inspired by our ideology, Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology, but merely differed with us in tactics, decided to use that very same ideology to bring about violence and chaos in this world.

Ed Husain, when he saw the murder at Newham College, decided to leave Hizb ut-Tahrir. I very foolishly decided to stay, thinking that perhaps we could carry on with our intellectual mission rather than focusing on encouraging anyone who is violent to support us. But I didn't realize that the problem was not in necessarily the associations we made with people who were naturally inclined to violence, but the problem was in the very ideas themselves.

I went on to, as you have mentioned, export Hizb ut-Tahrir to Pakistan from London and also to Denmark from London. I also know by personal experience that Hizb ut-Tahrir was exported from London to many other countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Europe generally acts as a diplomatic hub, a funding source, and a media platform for Islamist radicals, whether they be of the terrorist type or whether they be of the revolutionary or radical type.

I ended up, as you mentioned, in Egypt where I was convicted to 5 years in prison for being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, after taking a route via their torture dungeons in the headquarters of the state security, where people were electrocuted before my eyes for being associated with us. I was thankfully adopted by Amnesty International as a Prisoner of Conscience, and that was the first step for my heart to open up for the first time in 10 years after having joined Hizb ut-Tahrir. I began to think in a way different to how I had been speaking and thinking about non-Muslims because Amnesty International extended the hand to me, despite the

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz appears in the Appendix on page 49.

fact that I had been propagating that Amnesty International and other such human rights organizations were, in fact, the enemy to Islam and Muslims.

And as you have mentioned, I left prison in 2006, returned to the U.K., and after having joined the Leadership Committee of Hizb ut-Tahrir, finally decided that I could no longer carry on with the hypocrisy that I felt inside me because I no longer believed in the Islamist ideology, and so I resigned.

Now, what I would like to very quickly address is what I believe in the way to differentiate between Islamists and normal ordinary Muslims, and through my experience, the work we are doing in the Quilliam Foundation and also my academic studies, I went on to study for a Master's degree in political theory with modules in terrorism, conflict, and violence, in multiculturalism, and in religion and politics at the London School of Economics. I believe that we are able to identify four core elements that Islamists will share regardless of the tactics that they employ to bring about that ideology.

I wish to discuss briefly about those four core elements, and then the different strands of Islamists who adhere to those four core principles and how they differ in their tactics, and then if there is time—I am very conscious I have to adhere to the 10 minutes—just to mention something about the role that grievances play in radicalization vis-a-vis ideology itself.

So first of all, the four core elements that I think are common to all Islamists regardless of the methodology they employ—and the first one I identify is that Islamists believe that Islam is a political ideology rather than a religion. Now, traditionally, Muslims would believe that their faith is a religion, but Islamists insist, beginning from the 1920s with Hassan al-Banna, that Islam is, in fact, a political ideology. Now, the roots of that perhaps can come out later, but just very quickly, that is traced through the influence of communism in the Arab world, especially through the Arab socialism known as Baathism. A lot of the founding members of Islamists were inspired by Baathists, Arab socialists, including the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir who used to be a Baathist.

So the first point there, the implication of Islam being a political ideology rather than a religion, is that means there must be a perennial conflict between Islam and capitalism just like there was perceived to be a conflict, as well, between communism and capitalism, and that is one of the implications.

Another implication is that because it is an ideology, it encompasses everything; there must be an Islamic solution to everything. There must be an Islamic economic system. There must be an Islamic car, as has recently been invented in Malaysia. Everything must be Islamized because it is an ideology that encompasses everything.

The second core element that Islamists will all share is the notion that the Shariah religious code, which is a personal code of conduct, must become state law, and this is again a modern innovation alien to traditional Islam. Throughout the history of Muslims, the Shariah was never once adopted as a permanent state codified law. In fact, the whole notion of codified law is modern. But the Islamists will insist that the Shariah religious code must

be state law, and if it is not, then the implication is that state is un-Islamic.

The third principle is that Islamists will identify with a global community known as the Ummah, and they will consider the Ummah, or the Muslim global community, as a political identity rather than a religious identity. Again, drawing parallels from communism, this is easily understood when remembering the whole notion of the international proletariat, this global community where workers owe no other allegiance except to fellow workers, regardless of borders and ethnicity and nationality.

Islamists have developed, again inspired by communism, the same notion of a global political community that owes no allegiance except to itself, and that is the political notion of Ummah rather than the prophetic understanding of ummah, which is as a religious community, and the Prophet himself in Medina, when he signed the Document of Medina, the famous document, used the word ummah, or nation, to refer to the Jews, the Christians, and the Muslims all living together in one city. Yet today, Islamists will use it just for Muslims as a global community.

Fourth, and the final shared element for Islamists, is that this ideology with this law and that global political community needs to be represented by a bloc, like the Soviet bloc. It needs to be represented by an expansionist state, and that is the Caliphate, and this state will be expansionist because it represents that global community, and where that state's authority has not extended to look after the affairs of that global community, then it must reach them to liberate them from being enslaved either by the capitalists or the communists. Just like the USSR developed this bloc and the whole Eastern Bloc was expansionist and it had the whole notion of exporting the revolution, the Islamists, again inspired by the same ideals, have developed the same paradigm for Islamism.

So this global expansionist Caliphate is the final shared element that all Islamists believe in, and they have made these four principles fundamental to the creed of Islam. So if a Muslim was to say that I do not believe the Shariah code should become state law, they would consider him a heretic or an apostate. Or if somebody was to say, I do not believe that Islam is a political ideology, they will consider there is something deviant in his creed. They have changed the religion to make the ideology itself the religion.

Now, these shared elements, though common between all Islamists, this doesn't imply that Islamists are all of one shade. Islamists do differ in their tactics and methodologies. I have identified three types of Islamists. They are first either political Islamists, who are those who use entry-level politics and tactics by working within the system through the ballot box to try and bring about this ideology. These are, by and large, people who are non-violent, yet they have an ideological agenda. They are in some way a fifth column. Their agenda is to infiltrate the system and Islamize the system that they are working in.

The second type of Islamist, again, from these four shared elements, are the revolutionary Islamists, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the group that I was with, and their methodology is to infiltrate the militaries, to overthrow the regimes of the Middle East through

military coups, and those in this category do not believe in using the ballot box or working through the system.

And the final category of Islamists are the militant Islamists, or the jihadists, who believe in an armed struggle against the status quo.

Now, the order of these three is deliberate because they developed in this way. In the 1920s, the political Islamists came about, and through the reaction to them, especially in the Middle East, they eventually became more harsh, more severe, and formed into the revolutionary Islamists, or Hizb ut-Tahrir, and from there, again, through reaction, Hizb ut-Tahrir inspired the jihadist elements, and I know this personally because the assassins of Sadat who I served time with in prison, those who weren't executed in the 1981 case, told me that their teacher was a man by the name of Salim al-Rahhal, a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

I have to end there, so forgive me for—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you want to take a minute more and just finish what you wanted to say?

Mr. NAWAZ. Sure. Thank you for that. So Salim al-Rahhal was a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who taught—he was the instructor for the group that ended up assassinating Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He was deported from Egypt and the group known as Talim al-Jihad was then formed by those very same people, but minus their instructor, they decided to then use a different tactic and that was of assassinations.

I know this, as I said, because they spoke to me personally about these experiences, and Islamists developed through the torture in the Arab world from becoming political to revolutionary to jihadists. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who served time in the same prison that I was in, Mazra Tora prison, and Sayyid Qutb, who served time, again, in the same prison I was held, both had exposure to Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideas. Hizb ut-Tahrir is graffitied on the walls of those prisons.

Ayman al-Zawahiri used to adhere to the same military method of recruiting from the army officers to instigate a military coup, which is why he never joined al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah in Egypt, who would go about through the direct action methodology of violence. These ideas came from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Ayman al-Zawahiri speaks about the notion of how we must: One, destroy Israel; two, overthrow every single Middle Eastern regime; and three, establish the Caliphate. In 1953, these exact same three principles were put out there by Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, who was the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir. And when you hear Ayman al-Zawahiri's theory, it is exactly Hizb ut-Tahrir's theory as articulated in 1953.

Finishing off, I just wanted to mention very briefly about how this ideology of Islamism, as has been identified, mixes with grievances to lead to radicalization. There is a common misperception on the left in the U.K. whereby they only speak about grievances as a cause for radicalization. Now, I had my own grievances growing up in Essex. Many of my friends were attacked, violently assaulted by racists. My friends have been stabbed before my eyes, my white English friends, simply for associating with me. I have been falsely arrested on a number of occasions and released with an apology, and I have never been convicted of a criminal offense in any coun-

try in the world. I had my own grievances. What makes somebody, who has localized grievances, turn into somebody who identifies with a global struggle in a country that has nothing to do with him?

And again, I want to give the analogy of communism. If you take a Marxist, when a Marxist analyzes the Northern Ireland conflict, what we refer to in the U.K. as The Troubles, or when a Marxist analyzes the Israel-Palestine conflict, he will analyze that conflict through a meta narrative, through a theory that he has adopted. So a Marxist cannot but see these conflicts in the theory of class conflicts, as class struggle. So a Marxist will speak about the Israel-Palestine conflict as a struggle between classes, the bourgeois versus the proletariat, and the same with the Northern Ireland struggle because the way in which the grievances are interpreted is through the framework or the prism that the ideology provides, and Islamists have the same thing.

So in my case, with the racism I experienced in the U.K., or the nationalist conflict that was playing out in Bosnia, how from seeing these as localized conflicts that required local solutions into perceiving them as a global struggle, and that is because the ideology came and reinterpreted those grievances for me and provided a new framework. And that framework for Islamists, unlike in the case of Marxists where it is workers versus bourgeoisie, for the Islamists, it is what is known as the perennial struggle of the truth versus the falsehood, Muslims versus non-Muslims.

My country's intervention in Iraq is seen by Islamists as being solely inspired by non-Muslims who are attacking the Iraqis because they are Muslims. It is reinterpreting those grievances through that framework, and you can see how that framework will, in fact, end up in the radicalized person, the radicalized Muslim, in discovering grievances even if they weren't there because the framework itself defines those grievances for him.

And what is key for us to understand is the way in which the grievances interact with the ideology to lead to a whole new set of grievances, which for an Islamist can be summarized in one sentence, and that is that God's law does not exist on this earth.

I thank you. I have gone much over my time, so please, thank you very much for taking the time.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nawaz. It was worth the extra time. Your testimony is very helpful, very clear, and I think very powerful.

We now go to Dr. Peter Mandaville, a professor at George Mason University. Dr. Mandaville is the author of "Global Political Islam" and has done empirical research on how Islamist groups recruit in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Thank you for being here and we welcome your testimony now.

**TESTIMONY OF PETER P. MANDAVILLE, PH.D.,¹ ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, GEORGE
MASON UNIVERSITY**

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, in violent Islamist extremism, the United States faces a complex, little understood, and rapidly evolving threat. I am grateful for the opportunity to address this important issue this morning and to provide some background information that I hope will help us to locate violent Islamism within the much broader and diverse universe of contemporary Islamist political thought and activism.

I would also like to address the phenomenon of Islamism in the West, more specifically in the United Kingdom, and the question of what the United States might be able to learn from the U.K.'s experience of dealing with Islamism in recent years.

So as to leave maximum time for the panel to take your questions, I will limit my remarks this morning to a brief summary of several points contained within the longer written statement I have submitted, although Senator Collins effectively delivered my testimony in her opening remarks, so I may be able to shorten that a bit.

Just as Islam cannot be said to be a monolith, the same goes for Islamism as an ideological project. While it is possible to identify certain key figures and groups as being central to the genealogy of modern Islamism, those who have subsequently drawn on their ideas or organized themselves in their mold have often done so in widely varying ways, interpreting and adapting their views to disparate and sometimes even mutually exclusive agendas. Thus, today we can say that the broad ideological current of Islamism manifests itself in activist agendas that span the complete spectrum from democratic politics to violent efforts aimed at imposing Shariah law worldwide.

There is a tendency today among many analysts of Islamism to define this ideology by very narrow reference to the most militant phase of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's history. While activists and agitators holding to those extremist views can still be found today in the Muslim majority world, and also in Europe and in the United States, it would be inaccurate to characterize Islamism exclusively through them.

Furthermore, it is important, I believe, to distinguish between the Muslim Brotherhood as a distinct organization and the Muslim Brotherhood as a broad current of thought. The two are not coterminous and the latter is far more diverse and varied in its ideational and activist manifestations.

In seeking to identify root causes of extremist violence in the name of Islam, I think we also need to question today the extent to which the answer is to be found primarily in ideology. Millions of Muslims have read "Milestones," the famous work of militant Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb, or have at some point come under the influence of Islamist ideology. Only an infinitesimally small number of them, however, have gone on to commit acts of violence.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Mandaville appears in the Appendix on page 57.

While ideas are undoubtedly important, as Mr. Nawaz has mentioned, they will only drive certain individuals to action if articulated in terms that resonate with and seem to provide solutions that address perceived life circumstances and needs. In this regard, I believe the sociological and particularly the psychological contextualization of Islamist ideology holds the key to understanding the conditions under which it potentially poses a violent threat, a topic I believe Dr. Moghaddam will address in some detail.

Based on my own study and direct observation of socialization processes in radical, although not directly violent, Islamist groups in the United Kingdom such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, I have identified the following factors as playing a particularly significant role in leading an individual to reconfigure his world view and aspirations in terms of the goals of the movement. Needless to say, the presence and relative importance of these factors can vary considerably from individual to individual. I hope also that raising these points will go some of the way towards answering the question that Mr. Nawaz ended on, that is, how it is that local grievances come to be articulated in terms of wider global projects.

First, let me point briefly to some important generational differences around religion within Britain's Muslim communities. Younger Muslims often see their parents' sense of religiosity as out of touch and overly tainted by the cultures of the countries from which they emigrated. In contrast to this "village Islam," as they call it, the younger generation looks for a universal approach to religion, untainted by sectarian bias and cultural baggage, and moreover, one that can address the specific problems they face living in the West.

This search for a universal Islam, however, can cut two ways. On the one hand, it can lead them to emphasize those aspects of Islam that resonate with universal values, such as tolerance, openness, pluralism, etc., or they can be led to equate the search for universal Islam with a focus on global Muslim causes, civilizational struggles, and fantasies of a renewed Shariah-based Caliphate.

Most worrying about the violent strains of Islamist ideology in my eyes is the fact that it travels so well. It is portable precisely because it is so decontextualized and unencumbered by local practicalities. It is very easy under the right circumstances for almost any Muslim anywhere to see himself reflected in its story.

Second, radical groups depend and prey upon those whose knowledge of religion is relatively weak. To this end, they will frequently target new converts to Islam or those who were born Muslim but whose sense of religiosity was only awakened later in life. Thus, someone steeped in traditional Islamic learning is actually better equipped with the resources needed to recognize the fraudulent and often decontextualized ideas that radical groups try to circulate as supposedly authentic Islamic knowledge. To this end, we might consider to what extent a scaling up of the right kind of religious education, rather than a wholesale deemphasizing of Islamic education in favor of secular subjects, might be an effective tool in countering violent Islamism.

Third, Islamist radicalism often succeeds in providing a sense of identity, purpose, and a framework through which to participate in confrontational politics. It is often particularly appealing to those

of hybrid or mixed identity who are well educated and newly attuned to global political issues, that is, easily influenced young people trying to find a way for themselves in the world. As we already know, recruitment into radical movements, particularly in the West, does not correlate with socio-economic disenfranchisement or low levels of educational attainment. Quite the opposite.

Those drawn to these ideologies often have a sense of Muslims as an oppressed group, drawing on, in the case of the U.K., a very tangible and real sense of social discrimination, even where they do not have first-hand experience of this discrimination themselves. In other words, there is a displaced political consciousness that convinces itself that it must fight on behalf of those who cannot fight for themselves.

Finally, moving now beyond the more structured environment of known Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and into the less-charted waters of what Marc Sageman recently called “leaderless jihad,” it is in my mind increasingly debatable whether we are dealing with a full and systematic political ideology as our chief nemesis in the realm of ideas or whether an increasing number of young Muslims drawn to violent extremism are doing something more akin to role playing themselves within a grand narrative of inter-civilizational struggle, or aspiring to some kind of superhero status, taking their pointers from larger-than-life figures in video games, movies, and popular culture as much as from religious scholars and systematic political ideologies. Such a trend, I believe, would represent a particularly dangerous development because it would point to the possibility of an individual moving very quickly to a point where he is willing to use violence without having to be systematically staged through various levels of ideological radicalization.

Let me conclude this morning by making three broad points. First, we were asked to address the question of how a more in-depth understanding of the ideology of violent Islamism can improve America’s national security. We need to recognize that violent Islamism is part of a wider ecology of Muslim and Islamist thought and practice. By developing a better understanding of that ecology, we will have a greater capacity to discern who else within that ecosystem has the capacity to work against the growth of the extremist current. I believe that our efforts thus far to address this question have failed to think effectively and creatively about the question of potential Muslim partners and allies.

Moreover, and although it may seem counterintuitive to say so, I would suggest that some of the most valuable contributions to combatting terrorism in the name of Islam have and can come from those who have passed through or who operate on the fringes of Islamist groups and movements. This is, however, very complex territory, riddled with many, and sometimes dangerous, shades of gray.

Second, I would like to highlight what I have consistently emphasized to be the growing importance and concern that I have around groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir in the post-September 11, 2001, and July 7, 2005 environments. HT in the U.K. has responded very effectively to the polarizing political environment around Islam and Muslims. In recent years, the group has also un-

dergone something of a cosmetic makeover so as to render it palatable to a constituency beyond the angry university cohorts that were its mainstay in the 1990s.

While it publicly recants violence and while the number of active HT members may not be swelling, I think it is fair to say that the ranks of the group's passive supporters have increased considerably in recent years. And while HT may not be the direct conveyor belt into terrorism that some have implied, there is no doubt that the world view it espouses is particularly divisive and can render its followers ripe for cultivation by the enablers of militant agendas. Given the particular expertise and experience of two of our other panelists this morning, I am sure we will be hearing more about this group.

Finally, we should consider the question of what the United States might be able to learn from the U.K. experience with radical Islam. In this regard, I think it would be particularly useful to look at some of the pros and cons of various policy responses of the U.S. Government and law enforcement agencies and also the efforts of various Muslim organizations in the U.K., also to mixed result. In the interest of time, I will not be able to provide a full inventorying of what has and hasn't worked in the U.K. in terms of policy and around Muslim organizations, but would be more than happy to answer questions on this issue.

In my written statement, I addressed the crucial differences between Muslim communities in the U.K. and the United States in terms of levels of socio-economic attainment and social integration. On the surface, it would seem that many of the factors that allow violent Islamist ideologies to find a receptive audience in Europe are simply not present in the United States, and yet the number of abortive plots and arrests made in this country over the past few years suggest that the potential for homegrown terrorism exists here, as well.

While thus far these seem to be largely isolated incidents with little evidence of a more systematic trend at work, it is likely that we will continue to see efforts by limited numbers of American Muslims inhabiting the dense mediascapes of YouTube, online social networking, and jihadi websites to try to bring their violent fantasies to fruition. While the theory of leaderless jihad means that this kind of activity will be increasingly difficult for any government or law enforcement agency to detect, it is not all about self-starter, do-it-yourself terrorism. Enablers of militancy and divisive Islamist activists still play a role in priming the environment, and where the individuals, entities, and spaces to which they operate can be discerned, action can be taken.

Thank you for your attention and again for the opportunity to address the Committee this morning.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Mandaville. Excellent statement, and I promise you we will in the question and answer period ask you to talk some about what your studies of the activities of the government in the U.K. have shown and what they tell us about what might work here and what might not. Thank you.

Our next witness is Ms. Zeyno Baran, the Director of the Center on Eurasian Policy and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute,

where she researches strategies aimed at stemming the spread of radical Islamist ideologies, particularly in Europe. Ms. Baran has done a great deal of research also on the Muslim Brotherhood movement around the world, including here in the United States, and in February published an article entitled, "The Muslim Brotherhood's US Network," which I would enter into the record of this hearing in full.¹

Thank you for being here and we welcome your testimony now.

TESTIMONY OF ZEYNO BARAN,² SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR EURASIAN POLICY, HUDSON INSTITUTE

Ms. BARAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, and Senator Voinovich. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would like to submit my written statement, please, and summarize.

I will very briefly discuss what is at the root of violent Islamist extremism, which I believe is Islamist ideology. Mr. Nawaz has explained it in great detail, so I am grateful to him and I will skip certain parts of my presentation. Second, I will talk about the institutionalization of Islamism in America, which is, I think, a very serious problem, a growing problem. And finally, I will highlight some areas in which I think the U.S. Government has adopted self-defeating policies and then suggest some alternatives.

I understand for most Americans, dealing with Islamism is extremely difficult because it is associated with Islam. Very few people dare to question beliefs or actions of Muslims because nobody wants to be called a bigot or an Islamophobe. That is why we need to be very clear. What needs to be countered is Islamism, the political ideology, not Islam, the religion.

The religion itself is compatible with secular liberal democracy and basic civil liberties. The political ideology, however, is diametrically opposed to liberal democracy because it dictates that Islamic law, Shariah, to be the only basis for the legal and political system that governs the world's economic, social, and judicial mechanisms and that Islam must shape all aspects of life. Although various Islamist groups differ over tactics, they all agree on the end game: A world dictated by political Islam. While many do not openly call for violence, they provide an ideological springboard for future violence.

The first modern Islamist movement, as we know, is the Muslim Brotherhood, and numerous splinter groups came out of it, often more radical, and they have in turn given rise to yet more splinter groups. So consequently, there is now an exponential growth of fairly radical Islamist organizations active all over the world, including in cyberspace. Of course, not all Islamists will one day become terrorists, but all Islamist terrorists start with non-violent Islamism.

For example, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of September 11, 2001, was first drawn to violent jihad after attending Brotherhood youth camps. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood's motto says it all: Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The

¹The article appears in the Appendix on page 119.

²The prepared statement of Ms. Baran appears in the Appendix on page 68.

Koran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.

Islamism is ultimately a long-term social engineering project. The eventual Islamization of the world is to be enacted via a bottom-up process. Initially, the individual is Islamized into becoming a true Muslim. The process requires the person to reject Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the secular rule of law. The process continues as the individual's family is transformed, followed by the society, and then the state. Finally, the entire world is expected to live and be governed by Islamist principles. So it is this ideology machinery that works to promote separation, sedition, and hatred, and that is at the core of Islamist violent extremism.

I think it is important to underline that violent Islamists believe they are engaged in what is called a defensive jihad, which has broad acceptance among many Muslims. The logic is that under "just war theory," armed jihad can be waged when Muslims and Islam is under attack. And since the West is waging war against Islam, if not militarily then culturally, Muslims have an obligation to participate in a defensive jihad.

Now, let me very briefly discuss two Brotherhood splinter groups to show how these groups progressively become more radical. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), was founded by a Brotherhood member who over time wanted to use a more radical methodology and started his own organization. HT's key focus has been the creation of a worldwide Islamic community, Ummah, and the reestablishment of the Caliphate. For many decades, these ideas were considered extreme. More recently, they have been adapted as mainstream by most Islamists.

HT members claim to want freedom and justice; but the freedom they want is, I believe, freedom from democracy, and the justice they want can only be found under Islamist rule. Under such rule, Muslims who do not abide by Shariah law will be, in their terms, considered as apostates and liable to punishment according to Islamic law. Or to put it more directly, they will be executed.

The freedom and justice HT seeks by overthrowing democracy can often only be attained through violence. However, HT is not likely to take up terrorism itself. Terrorist acts are simply not part of its mission. HT exists to serve as an ideological and political training ground for Islamists. That is why I have called them a conveyor belt to terrorism. In order to best accomplish this goal, HT will remain non-violent, acting within the legal system of the countries in which it operates. Actually the same can be said about many of the Islamist organizations, including the Brotherhood. These groups do not need to become terrorists because winning the hearts and minds is much more effective in achieving the ultimate goal. But, of course, they do not rule out the use of force if they cannot establish their Caliphate via non-violent means.

HT has led to the formation of even more radical and militant groups than itself, such as al-Muhajiroun. The founder, again, was at first with the Muslim Brotherhood, then became an Hizb ut-Tahrir member, and when he had a falling out with the leadership of HT over tactics, he formed an even more radical organization. Note that the difference in all these splits was not about ideas or ultimate goal. It was about how best to achieve them.

Al-Muhajiroun has direct links to Osama bin Laden, to Hamas and Hezbollah, and blatantly advocates for terrorist acts. Over the years, it has sent hundreds of British men to Afghanistan and Pakistan for jihadi training. Some of those came back and attacked their homeland on July 7, 2005.

Now, as we know, people don't just wake up one day and randomly decide to commit a violent act. There is almost always a process of radicalization and a network of like-minded people who become enablers. In the West, Muslims undergoing an identity crisis are the most vulnerable. There are also those who are perfectly well adjusted and integrated and simply want to learn more about their religion. If these well-meaning citizens end up getting their information from Islamists, they, too, can become radicalized over time, and that is precisely why we need to be concerned that the most prominent Muslim organizations in America were either created by or are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and are, therefore, very heavily influenced by Islamist ideology. In fact, over the course of four decades, Islamists have taken over the leadership in almost all Islam-related areas in America, and today, as a recent New York Police Department (NYPD) report also stated, there is a serious homegrown threat in the United States.

How did this happen? Muslim Brotherhood members from the Middle East and South Asia began coming to the United States in the 1960s as students, and then they received money and other support from the Gulf, mostly from the Saudis, to undertake a whole range of activities to change the perception of Islamism and Wahhabism in America from extremist to mainstream. And I think they have been fairly successful.

Following the bottom-up approach that I mentioned, focusing on education, the first organizations were created in America were the Muslim Student Associations in universities. After they graduated, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) was created in order to expand these radical ideas, and extend the influence of Islamism beyond college campuses. In the 1980s, several other prominent Islamist organizations were created, including the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and after Hamas was created in 1987 in Gaza, the IAP became its leading representative in North America.

There are a whole set of other organizations that can be added to this list. I will just mention the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), which I believe was created by the Brotherhood to influence the U.S. Government, Congress, Non-government organizations (NGOs), along with academic and media groups. Despite being founded by leading Islamists, CAIR has successfully portrayed itself as a mainstream Muslim organization over the past 15 years and has been treated as such by many government officials, including Presidents Clinton and Bush.

What is critically important in all these organizations is their support for one another. The same leaders appear in multiple organizations, tend to have familiar relations, and move within the same closed, trusted circles. Outwardly, they all appear to be different entities, but they are actually part of a carefully planned Islamization effort.

It is also very important to note that despite their outwardly moderate positions, NAIT, ISNA, and CAIR were all named as unindicted co-conspirators in a Federal case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, which was charged with providing millions of dollars to Hamas. This trial provided us with a shocking set of documents. One document outlining the general strategic goal for the group in America explains that Muslims in America should consider their mission as a “civilization jihadist” responsibility, which they describe as a kind of grand jihad in “eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.” Clearly, in this case, jihad is not intended to be an inner personal struggle as it is often claimed by Islamists when they must explain when they are caught in calling for jihad.

Therefore it is not surprising that large sections of the institutionalized Islamic leadership in America do not support U.S. counterterrorism policy. Far from it. They denounce virtually every terrorism indictment or investigation as a religiously motivated attack on Islam instead of considering whether the individual in question actually broke any laws. They instinctively blame legal accusations on McCarthyism or anti-Muslim conspiracies.

So coming back to the title of this hearing, how can the U.S. counter this extremism and who can be the partners in this effort? First and foremost, U.S. Government entities and all those individuals tasked with so-called Muslim outreach need to know who they are dealing with before bestowing legitimacy on them as moderate Muslims. There have already been rather embarrassing cases of top government officials, including Presidents, posing with their moderate Muslim friends, only to find later that the person was providing funding to enemies of the United States.

Many of the American Islamic organizations are established to further a political agenda. They are not civil rights groups. They are not faith groups. They are political entities with a very clear political agenda. Without this understanding, I believe all kinds of mistakes will continue to be made. For example, for months now, FBI agents have been trained by CAIR to be sensitive to Muslims. This is completely self-defeating.

Second, it is an Islamist myth that U.S. support and engagement for truly moderate Muslims would discredit these Muslims in the eyes of the community. This, I believe, is a trick to keep the United States away from non-Islamists while the Islamists continue to enjoy all kinds of access and influence. Islamists thrive on U.S. support and engagement, which effectively legitimizes their self-appointed status as representatives of the Muslim community. This engagement also legitimizes their self-appointed ability to judge the Muslimness of others.

Third, the mantra that only non-violent Islamists can pull radicalized Muslims away from terrorism is completely illogical. The reason that these people were radicalized is Islamist ideology. If the Brotherhood and related groups could keep these people under control, they would have done so already. These people either left Brotherhood organizations or do not want to be affiliated

with them precisely because they have moved on to more radical platforms. So, as long as Islamism is actively spread, its ideas will continue to wreak havoc.

The only true allies in countering an ideology that is fundamentally opposed to America and its ideas are those Muslims who share American ideas, or at the very least do not work to undermine them. This group includes the pious and the practicing, the liberal, the secular, and the cultural ones; the quiet but still the overwhelming majority of American Muslims. The Muslims that need active support are non-Islamist Muslims who understand the inherent incompatibility between Islamism's desired imposition of Shariah law upon society at large and Western society's pluralism and equality. Non-Islamist Muslims are on the American side on the war of ideas. They can be practicing or not. That is irrelevant. After all, the issues the terrorists raise to gain support are often unrelated to Islam as a religion.

I can go on and on, but I am already over my time, so in closing, I would like to underline that to effectively counter the further spread of violent manifestations of Islamism, the United States needs to seriously engage in countering the Islamist ideology and I believe a good start would be to reveal the deception of the Islamists, especially in America, and start working with true allies. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Baran. That was, as somebody else would say, straight talk. I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate your courage, frankly, and we look forward to asking you questions, particularly about the line of your testimony regarding how the government finds organizations of what you have described as non-Islamist Muslim Americans.

The final witness on this quite remarkable panel is Dr. Ali Moghaddam, a professor at Georgetown University and Director of the Conflict Resolution Program, also a Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Education and Research on Terrorism. Dr. Moghaddam, thank you for being here and please proceed with your testimony.

**TESTIMONY OF FATHALI M. MOGHADDAM, PH.D.,¹ PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, AND DIRECTOR, CONFLICT
RESOLUTION PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY**

Mr. MOGHADDAM. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Senator Voinovich, thank you for the invitation. Because ideology is a major focus here, let me begin by clarifying my own biases. Like hundreds of millions of other Muslims, I am hopeful that Islamic societies around the world, including in the Middle East, will move toward more openness in political, economic, and cultural terms. The open democratic Islamic society will be more peaceful, more productive, more affluent, more just for both women and men, and better for the global economy. To a significant degree, the higher oil prices are a result of the dictatorships, monopolies, corruption, and lack of open competition and inefficiency.

But to achieve a more open Islamic society, we need to overcome violent Islamist extremism. That is one of the obstacles. In order

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Moghaddam appears in the Appendix on page 83.

to evaluate this particular obstacle, I find it instructive to review the letter of invitation I received for this panel, which states the purpose of the Senate hearing to be to explore the ideologies as the root source for the radicalization of potential followers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations around the world.

I believe it is useful to critically assess the assumption that an ideology is the root source for the radicalization of potential followers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations around the world. An ideology does not exist in a vacuum, nor does it arise in a vacuum, nor is it static, as religion is not static. Christianity 1,000 years ago was very different from Christianity today and we hope Islam will change in the direction that is more constructive, away from Islamist ideology, obviously.

In the Georgetown University libraries, there are hundreds of books that write about very fanatical ideologies, including fundamentalist Christian ideologies that could be used to launch terrorist attacks. Why is it that Georgetown students do not become terrorists? Well, clearly, because the availability of violent Islamist ideology serves as a necessary but not a sufficient cause for terrorist action.

We must ask, then, what are the factors that combine with a particular ideology to lead to violent Islamist extremism? How does an ideology supportive of violent Islamist extremism come to influence individuals to support and commit terrorist acts? I have addressed this question by adopting a big picture approach, exploring radicalization and terrorism in the context of both cultural evolution and globalization.

In order to clarify my viewpoint, I find it useful to use a staircase metaphor. Think of a building with a staircase at its center. There are many floors and people are on these different floors. There are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims on the ground floor. On each of the floors that lead up to a terrorist act, there are different psychological processes. I have gone into the details in my written statement. For here, what I will do is just summarize.

The millions of Muslims on the ground floor, they are, of course, potentially influenced by violent Islamist ideology, but there are many other factors. Some of the factors that I have explored are perceived injustice, relative deprivation, identity and inadequate identity in the Islamic world. I have argued that Islamic communities around the world are experiencing an identity crisis. Before us as Muslims, there seem to be two viable options at the moment. One option is to copy the West. The other option is to become a Salafist or to return to pure Islam.

Now, why is there not a third alternative option? That is a very important question, particularly in Middle East. Why is there not a secular constructive alternative option? Well, the simple answer is that the regimes of that region in particular do not allow for a separate option. If you are in Egypt and you happen to be a secular politician, particularly during election time, you had better hide because you will either end up dead or in prison or you must escape abroad. So the potential for a third constructive identity, particularly in the near and Middle East, which is at the heart of the matter, is not there at the moment. I am going to come back to this later.

So in the staircase of terrorism, the few people who do go and commit terrorist acts, they are influenced by many factors other than or in addition to the violent Islamist ideology.

Let me now turn to specifically the idea of homegrown terrorism. I discuss this particularly in relation to what I call the distance traveled hypothesis. The distance traveled hypothesis simply states that the distance that an immigrant has to travel to reach an adopted land is very much related to the material resources needed. If you are coming from North Africa or the Middle East to the United States, you need a great deal more resources than to reach Turkey or France or England.

If you look at the Muslim population in the United States, generally, this population is well educated relative to the indigenous population. It is relatively well off. The perception of openness in the United States is very important. Muslims in the United States in major centers such as Detroit and Los Angeles are doing relatively well. They perceive the system to be open in general and that is a very important factor.

Another important factor related to the relative well-being of Muslims in the United States is that Muslims here are at a greater distance from the centers of radical Islamist ideology, such as Pakistan. This is a very different situation from Muslims in Germany, France, or England. And the historic advantage of the United States in assimilating immigrants—this is another factor to keep in mind. I am an immigrant to the United States and I have been an immigrant—I lived in England for a long time. I lived in Canada for 6 years. Relative to those countries, the United States is far better at incorporating and integrating immigrants. And part of the magic here is the American dream, the ideology that anyone can make it.

Let me turn now to the final part of my testimony, and that concerns a huge challenge confronting the United States, particularly in the global context. This challenge has arisen because of globalization.

Back in 1944, the great Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal published a work that we all know, “An American Dilemma.” Myrdal pointed out that there was a contradiction between American ideology in terms of self-help, individual responsibility, equality of opportunity, freedom, etc., on the one hand, and racial discrimination on the other. Myrdal pointed out that this was a huge dilemma that would have to be resolved, and it was resolved. Eventually through legislation, through cultural reform, we have achieved equality in terms of opportunities in the United States.

There is now a new global American dilemma. This dilemma is confronting us because, on the one hand, we have had in the last three decades at least a rhetoric of support for democracy, support for freedom, support for equality, etc., a rhetoric that says that democracy is not unique to the West or a monopoly of the West but should spread everywhere. On the one hand, we have this rhetoric. On the other hand, successive U.S. administrations have continued to support dictatorships in many countries in the Middle East. This dilemma has to be resolved because globalization would not allow it to continue, and I believe that it doesn't matter whether it is a

Democrat or a Republican or an Independent in the White House——

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Mr. MOGHADDAM. What we need is a resolution of this conflict, of this dilemma, because the dilemma is reverberating around the world.

If you go to the streets of Muslim countries in the Middle East, in North Africa, if you go to the Muslim communities in France, the South Asians in England, the Turks in Germany, you will find that in the communities there, they discuss this dilemma, and it needs to be resolved. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Doctor. Very thoughtful testimony. You have been an excellent panel and I thank you all.

We will start with a 7-minute round of questions by the Members. There may be a vote going off around 11, so hopefully we will each get in a round before we have to go over.

Mr. Nawaz, again, thank you for being here. I have many questions so I am going to ask you and the others if you can keep your answers as brief as possible and still respond. I wanted to ask you, just in terms of your own experience, take a brief moment and tell us about how you were radicalized at college. In other words, what was the process? You mentioned in your testimony you had adequate grounds for grievance in your personal experience, but how did the radicalization process by HT occur?

Mr. NAWAZ. I can summarize that in two points, and that is a crisis of identity and a crisis of faith. Being born and raised in the U.K., growing up in Essex in the early 1990s, there were a lot of racist troubles in my home county and there were an organized group of racist thugs who would target us with violence. And so the questions arose in my mind as to exactly who I was. Was I British? Was I English? Was I Pakistani, which is the country of my grandfather? Was I Muslim?

So these combined with the problems in the mosques—the imams of the mosques in those days were, and still are to a large extent today, imported from the Indian subcontinent. The standards of their education were poor relative to standards in the Indian subcontinent, let alone to the standards in the U.K. The tradition over there is that somebody who fails in his education is sent to become a mosque imam, and that is if he fails in his education in Pakistan. And yet this man comes to the U.K. who can't speak English and he is expected to lead a congregation in a mosque with the vast majority of the people that pray in the mosque being second- or third-generation British citizens who only speak English.

So these two elements combined in me to create a crisis of both identity and faith, and Bosnia, as I mentioned earlier, was playing out in Europe, and up until that point, I had identified these problems purely as racial and Bosnia for the first time brought to the fore that there were white European Muslims, blond-haired, blue-eyed, who were being slaughtered despite the fact that they were Europeans.

And it was at the vulnerable stage, being a teenager, being 15, 16 years old, that I happened across a medical student who didn't have any of the obstacles in communication that the mosque imams had. He was a medical student, again, educated in the U.K., who

could relate to my problems and had joined Hizb ut-Tahrir in London when he went to study. And he came across very articulately and provided the answers to the crises I had in my identity and faith and demonstrated that, in fact, my identity wasn't British and it wasn't Pakistani but these are, in fact, identities given to me by colonialists. My identity was something pre-colonial, and that was belonging to the global Caliphate. So he provided an ideology that gave me black-and-white answers to the very real grievances that I faced.

Hizb ut-Tahrir's (HT) process of indoctrination is quite intense. A member is expected to sit for two solid hours minimum every week in what they refer to as a study cell, and discuss and engage in debate in this ideology, and that is a mandatory requirement for members of HT. And then when he becomes a member of the party, he is also expected to teach for a further two hours for his own cell, and that is the minimum and it will obviously be more than that if he is committed.

So this indoctrination phase involves recalibrating those grievances, which are initially localized grievances, and turning them into something which is identified with a global struggle, and I think that we can't miss either of these. We have to consider the role that real grievances play in providing recruits who are not yet ideologues in joining the ranks of Islamist organizations and then the role that the ideology plays in reframing those grievances and turning them into some notion of a global or perennial conflict.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer very much.

Ms. Baran made a statement. Obviously, we are talking here about distinguishing between the religion of Islam and the political ideology of Islamism. She said something I thought quite direct and provocative and important, which is, and I paraphrase, that all Islamist terrorists start with non-violent Islamism. Would you agree with that?

Mr. NAWAZ. One hundred percent.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me now go to your definition of Islamism, the four characteristics you cited. Consistent with what we just said, these are not necessarily all of them violent, but they may be the precursor to violence. I was particularly struck, and I have been through this but I want you to talk about it, that you said that those who adopt the Islamist ideology are committed to making Shariah state law. So do we understand from that that the members of Islamist groups in the U.K., or in the United States, who themselves are not violent nonetheless are committed to making Shariah law the law of the U.K. or the United States as opposed to the existing law?

Mr. NAWAZ. Again, this is an ideational discussion, so in terms of practicalities and tactics, the groups will differ. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not target the Western world to establish the Shariah as state law. Rather, they don't even target the whole Muslim world. What they have decided to do practicality-wise is identify key countries, Turkey being one of them, Egypt being another, Syria being another. Iraq used to be one of them until the intervention there. Pakistan definitely is one of them, which is why I was sent there when they acquired a nuclear bomb.

They target key countries. If you notice with all these countries, they have military strength, and they target those countries with the purpose of gaining power first in those countries, which they call the starting point. The intention after that is to expand and then encompass the surrounding lands and eventually the whole world.

Now, that is HT. The Brotherhood's organization, the Brotherhood has a similar understanding—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The Muslim Brotherhood?

Mr. NAWAZ. The Muslim Brotherhood. They will target the Muslim world first and with a view to establishing side by side a federation of Islamic countries, which will then all eventually become one and then expand from there.

The purpose of these organizations in the West, I again summarize into three points, and that is to recruit, and those recruits can then be sent back to Muslim-majority countries, as I was, to recruit in those Muslim-majority countries and they have the standing in society as being educated in the West, as speaking English, as being relatively more wealthy, and so they command that immediate respect.

The second aim is to raise funds. Now, the Pound Sterling goes a very long way in Pakistan, I can assure you. It goes quite far here in the United States, as well. So it is to raise funds.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Farther than we would like. [Laughter.]

Mr. NAWAZ. That is to my advantage. And the third is act as a political and diplomatic hub. London especially is the center for the international Arab media. Now, even before I left HT, I appeared on the media regularly, and in fact, BBC's "Hard Talk" interviewed me and I was able to use that as a platform to project what was even at the time a relatively moderate version of HT's ideology to my own internal confusions. However, HT and other Islamist organizations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, have been very successful in using the Western countries as a media and diplomatic hub.

So those three general strands are what they are looking to achieve. But the establishment of the Shariah law as state law is focused on, for practical purposes, the Muslim-majority countries with a view to expanding after that.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very helpful. I am really out of time, but I want to give you, Ms. Baran, just a moment to get into this discussion, if you want to add anything to Mr. Nawaz's characteristics of Islamism as opposed to Islam, and if you want to say anything about what you take to be the goals of the Islamist movement within the United States.

Ms. BARAN. I agree with Mr. Nawaz. One thing I would like to add is that I am originally from Turkey, one of the countries where the groups would like to establish Shariah law. When I was growing up there, a very different understanding of Islam was mainstream. And when I first came to this country, I was quite surprised that I saw so much Islamism at university campuses, and I do believe, because I was also very actively involved as a student activist during the Bosnian war, if it wasn't for my background in a different type of an Islamic upbringing, I probably would have joined one of the radical organizations—probably Hizb ut-Tahrir.

In the West, including in the United States, the focus is to enable having the Shariah law for Muslim communities—so having Shariah for American Muslims, having Shariah in certain parts of Britain for British Muslims. We see more and more of these discussions coming up. In Canada several years ago, it came very close.

I think as these groups increase their activity, we will probably hear more demands for Shariah for American Muslims. They will say it will be compatible with the American legal system and probably there will be analogies made with Jewish traditions and others. But, of course, the big difference is what Mr. Nawaz said; that normally, you don't try to impose your belief on the whole society and community. The West, including the United States, is now the best place for Islamists because of the openness, and of the tolerance of many different ways of living. This is where the Islamist communities get organized, funded, provide the structure, but the focus still is to change the Muslim-majority countries.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Ms. Baran, you gave us a very different picture this morning of the efforts of FBI agents to reach out to the Muslim community in our country. In previous hearings, witnesses have generally pointed to the FBI effort as being the model of outreach to the Muslim community. By contrast, in your testimony today, you stated, for months now, FBI agents have been trained by CAIR to be sensitive to Muslims, which you say is completely self-defeating. Could you expand on why you think the FBI's effort is not an appropriate and worthwhile one?

Ms. BARAN. Sure. Thank you. As I mentioned, CAIR was created by Muslim Brotherhood organizations. It has ideological and other connections to groups like Hamas. It does not represent the Muslim community as a faith community; it is mostly focused on political issues. Often, we hear CAIR raising, for example, civil rights issues. But if you look at the cases, it is almost exclusively of those Muslims who are following a particular Islamist way of thinking. Issues about Muslims that are not Islamist or don't follow a particular way of thinking are hardly ever raised.

So I can give many other examples, but ultimately, it is about what CAIR will define as sensitive, being properly respectful and sensitive to Muslims. If, indeed, the Islamist thinking is the way as Mr. Nawaz outlined, then the agents are going to be misinformed and they will be overly sensitive and they will not be able to ask certain questions or go in certain directions. They are going to be told whatever they want to ask or do will be offensive to Muslims: It is in Islam. Don't touch this. Don't go there. So I believe they are not going to be properly prepared for the work they need to be doing. There are other ways to reach Muslim communities. It is not just through CAIR, I believe.

Senator COLLINS. Whom should the FBI be dealing with?

Ms. BARAN. Well, if the issue is to reach to communities—

Senator COLLINS. Right.

Ms. BARAN [continuing]. Then other community organizations. There are women's groups. There are all kinds of groups that are not organized based on an Islamic political issue. There are other forums; a whole set of non-Islamist-based organizations.

Now, going back to Chairman Lieberman's question, where do you find those non-Islamist Muslims, or Muslim organizations? Well, as I said, some of these organizations that are there now and are easy to work with, they have been created over a period of decades with billions of dollars coming from the Gulf. So there is this established network and structure and money already there.

The alternative never has gotten support. This foundation that Mr. Nawaz is involved in was only created in January of this year, after there were homegrown terrorist attacks in Britain and after British citizens had to say, what is going on, and after people like him left these radical organizations. We don't have that in America at this point.

Again, if you look at the NYPD report, there are many cases of homegrown extremism. We have been lucky that some of those terror attempts simply have not been successful. But I think at some point, hopefully soon, there will be people coming out and denouncing the ideology, but then the question is: Will they get money, will they get support? There is no money outside government support. The British government started to understand this and now supports organizations that are trying to help Britain. They have to somehow counter the money coming from the Gulf with other money.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Let me ask the two professors what you think of the FBI's outreach efforts, whether you share the concerns that we have just heard. I will start with you, Dr. Mandaville.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Thank you, Senator Collins. I am not familiar with the specifics of the CAIR training program for the FBI and so the answer to the question, I think, would depend very much on what is going on in those sessions. If they are primarily aimed at providing basic information about Islam, Muslims, the basic beliefs, issues of cultural sensitivity, that is one matter.

I don't share the view that CAIR as an organization is best understood primarily as a front for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose core agenda is about the realization of that ideological project. I do believe that there are individuals associated with that movement who hold those views, but I think we would be wrong to simply characterize the organization in its entirety in relation to that organization.

Senator COLLINS. Professor Moghaddam.

Mr. MOGHADDAM. I agree with Dr. Mandaville. I would also add that we are really looking at short-term issues here. I mean, in the longer term, the key to changing the situation, I believe, is to change the situation of Muslim women, and the way to do that is to make sure they have greater opportunities for equal participation in economic, political, cultural life outside the home, and when you do that, you transform the family, you transform the socialization of the next generation.

The FBI agents that I know, some of whom have been my students, former students, I don't think they would have problems cross-examining Muslims in any way.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Nawaz, I have very little time left, but let me just read an excerpt from a report that I found very intriguing. In December 2007, the Dutch intelligence agency issued

a report warning that the Muslim Brotherhood has a strategy of covertly infiltrating social, political, and educational institutions, and the report went on to state, "rather than confronting the state power with direct violence, this strategy seeks to gradually undermine the state by infiltrating and eventually taking over civil service, the judiciary schools, local administrative units." Do you think that is an accurate reflection of what the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy is today in Western countries?

Mr. NAWAZ. I think definitely it is an accurate description of the strategy the Muslim Brotherhood have been employing since the 1920s in Muslim-majority countries. In Western countries, they are beginning to move along this same track, and the reason why they are beginning to shift in the direction that you have just outlined is because we are now in the third generation of Muslims who are being born and raised in Western countries, such as myself, people who call themselves British Muslims, people who consider that our expression of faith is indigenously British by definition.

Now, you have at the same time Islamists who are in their third generation who express Islamism as a Western expression. They consider it something which is indigenous. So what they have decided to do, there has been a shift that the original tactics of the Brotherhood to gain power, political power in Muslim-majority countries, these guys do not belong to any of those countries. They don't have nationality or citizenship of any of those countries. Their nationality, even their identity, is becoming Western. And so they are thinking, well, we are here to stay. What do we do if we are here to stay? This has become our home.

So a shift is occurring and we saw this in the U.K., that the institutionalization of Islamism is occurring, and what you have just described is within many factions of Islamist-inspired organizations who are not directly Muslim Brotherhood, it is the tactic that they are beginning to use.

I was the other day speaking to somebody who was a detective in our police services and happened to be Muslim. I know I have to keep this brief. And I was speaking to him about the July 7, 2005 bombings that occurred in London. This man, as I said, was serving in the police, a detective, and now he is serving as an immigration inspector at Heathrow Airport. And this man said to me, well, of course, you know it wasn't the Muslims that committed July 7, 2005. It was the U.K. government and there is a conspiracy and these people are the ones who blew the trains up so they could further their aims and demonize the Muslim community. I said to him, my God, you really believe that? He said, of course. These people are against Muslims. And this is a policeman who is now working on the immigration patrol at Heathrow Airport.

His ideas come from somewhere. There is something we have in the U.K. called the Muslim Safety Forum, an organization that purports to advise the police. This forum has been largely influenced by Islamist ideals and these are the sorts of ideas that are coming out into law enforcement officers who happen to be Muslim. There is a concern we have.

So to summarize, I would say, yes, I am very concerned that the tactic is shifting and moving towards infiltrating with a view, because they now consider these countries their homes, with a view

to at least forming what I call Muslim-centric policies, if not to take over—that is still very much focus in the Muslim-majority countries—but to form Muslim-centric policies that only look after the affairs of the Muslim bloc as a bloc, as a fifth column.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.

Senator Voinovich, a vote has just gone off and I want to propose this, that you take over and ask your questions. I think maybe Senator Collins and I will go over and vote, and if we don't get back by the time you finish your questions, please recess the hearing and I will begin again as soon as I come back.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much. Senator Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. Thank you. I want to thank both of you for holding this hearing.

One of the concerns that I have as a Senator, and a citizen of the United States, is that we have such little knowledge about the Muslim religion and the Koran. I am not here to hustle a book, but Dr. Moghaddam, I am promoting your colleague's, John Esposito's book called "What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam." It is a fundamental book that I think lays out what the Muslim religion is about. Do you think this is a pretty good book? It answers lots of questions about Islam and what the Koran says and so forth.

Mr. MOGHADDAM. Yes. It is excellent.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. The other is a gentleman I have met with, Imam Faisal Abdul Rauf, and he has an effort going throughout the United States now to try and prove that there is nothing inconsistent in the Koran with our Declaration of Independence and our principles here, that you can be a good Muslim and you can be a good United States citizen. They are not inconsistent with each other.

And last of all, the book "Mecca and Main Street," by Geneive Abdo, whom I have met with. It is a very interesting book because of the fact that she, for 3 years, traveled around the United States and interviewed various Muslim people and commented on what she found, and what she said, and I would be interested in your reaction to this, is that "the younger generation of Muslims in particular is charting a different way of life. They are following new imams and placing their Muslim identity before their American one. And unlike their parents, they do not define themselves by their ethnic background as Pakistani, Palestinian, or Yemeni. Instead, they see themselves as belonging to a universal faith. Through their new organizations and websites, they exchange ideas about how to create a more Islamic lifestyle.

"Are there strident voices critical of U.S. foreign policies? Without doubt. But these voices, at least for now, have not made the leap as some European Muslims have toward violent radicalism." That was kind of the summary of what she found while going to various communities.

And the other point I want to make is this, and it is one that you have made, Dr. Moghaddam. It is the issue of women's rights.

And I don't know if any of you have read "Infidel." I am finishing that book, as well as the "Nine Desires of Muslim Women." All over the world, Muslim women are being cramped and I believe that the more we can open up opportunities for Muslim women to get out into society, the more impact we will have on moving in the direction that we would like, to see a more open secular society than we see today.

Dr. Mandaville, you said that while there is not yet evidence of a systemic or widespread threat of homegrown terrorism in the United States, it is worth considering the kind of circumstances that might allow such a situation to emerge. The real issue is what can we do to create an environment in the United States where it doesn't happen. By the way, the people that I talk with in CAIR in Ohio, I like them. I think they are good. I don't know what has influenced them, but I think they are pretty responsible citizens, and at least from my observation have been OK. But if these are organizations that we are not supposed to talk to or they are being influenced, who do we talk to?

Does anyone want to comment on that? Dr. Mandaville.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Thank you very much for the question, Senator Voinovich. To the point of what it would take, what circumstances would actually bring about a more pervasive or systemic problem with radicalization, this is where I think the differences between the United States, the Muslim community in this country, and Europe are very important. Muslim immigrants came to this country for the most part with high levels of education, often professional jobs in hand, and indeed, the data we have suggests that the average Muslim household income in the United States is actually at or slightly above the national average for the United States as a whole, compared with Europe, where we actually see the average Muslim family in the lowest 20 percentile of household income.

The structures for addressing grievances when Muslims here have them, I think are better available than in the United Kingdom, which again on the surface of it, as I have said in my testimony, suggests that this kind of homegrown radicalization is likely to be less of a problem here, although we obviously have seen instances of it.

My concern in part is that one thing that would lead to this becoming a more pervasive problem is an increased sense of victimization on the part of the American-Muslim community, if it increasingly feels as if it is being singled out. This is very much a dynamic that has happened in the United Kingdom and one can explain it and put the blame—

Senator VOINOVICH. And by the way, I think people should understand, it is the fastest growing religion in the United States today.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Absolutely. Yes. In the case of the United Kingdom, a number of the Muslim organizations themselves have not been particularly helpful in this regard. Mr. Nawaz mentioned the Muslim Safety Forum, and I believe that the dynamic coming out of that group has been very much as he has characterized it. There are certain self-appointed spokesmen for the Muslim community in Europe and the United Kingdom that have a tendency towards self-victimization. At the same time, however, some of the

funding and some of the outreach coming from law enforcement and government agencies in that country has been exclusively devoted to issues of radicalization and terrorism. Some, particularly the younger generation within the community being primed in this very polarized environment by some of the ideas coming out of groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, increasingly have a sense of themselves as a community being defined in relation to terrorism, being told that its sole contribution to society is to counter radicalization.

Now, this is a concern that the community has. However, the Muslim community has any number of other concerns, and so my fear is of a growing dissonance, a gap between the concerns and issues that the community sees and the priorities of those in the government and local authorities who are reaching out to them.

Senator VOINOVICH. I am going to have to recess this hearing because I have to go vote, and I am sure that Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins will be back. Ms. Baran, you did not have an opportunity to respond to my questions. Do you have real quick responses?

Ms. BARAN. I just want to be clear. I am sure an overwhelming majority of people in CAIR or other organizations I have named are good citizens, decent people, wonderful human beings. That is not the issue. I am talking about the institutions and the leadership. So I am sure the people you met are really good, wonderful people. And also being nice does not mean they don't have a different ideology. We need to be clear about that.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Well, that ideology hasn't bubbled up as far as my relationships with them.

I will be back. This hearing is recessed until Senator Lieberman comes back.

[Recess.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Let us reconvene the hearing. Thank you for your patience. I know Senator Collins will return. We will go now to another 7-minute round of questions.

Dr. Mandaville, I want to bring you into the discussion particularly in regard to what your research tells us about the policies of the government of the United Kingdom in relationship to various Muslim groups or Islamist groups in the U.K. What lessons do we learn from that?

Mr. MANDAVILLE. There are two points in particular, Senator Lieberman, that I would like to make in this regard. First, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and in the wake of the July 7, 2005, bombings in London, the chief interlocutor for the U.K. government in terms of outreach to the Muslim community was an organization called the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), founded in the late 1990s. This is an umbrella organization representing some 500 Muslim organizations, national, regional, local in nature, spanning the gamut from madrassas operating in the Pakistani model essentially up in rural Yorkshire in Northern England, to quite relatively cosmopolitan, progressive, professional Muslim organizations in the southern cities of England. So there is a wide range of views within this entity, meaning that its claims to be able to say anything representative on behalf of something called the British Muslim community were always dubious.

And part of the problem here, I think, and this was a lesson that the U.K. government learned after some years, was the fact that most Muslims in the U.K., and I would argue in the United States, as well, do not understand or pursue their religiosity or their religious identity primarily through groups and organizations.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Furthermore, with the case of the Muslim Council of Britain, the leadership ranks of this organization tended to feature, in my view, a fairly disproportionate number of individuals with strong linkages to some of the Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama'at-i Islami, and they have managed to maintain something of a stranglehold over that organization. This is unfortunate because I believe that there are within the second and third generation of Muslims in the United Kingdom those who are ready to set off on a different course and I think could have a major impact.

Now, what happened is that the Muslim Council of Britain, for any number of reasons that I won't go into, found itself in a number of controversies and the U.K. government began to see that it was not necessarily the most effective point of interlocution with the community. So a couple of years later, the MCB was, I think it is fair to say, deprioritized as that point of contact and any number of organizations were brought into the picture, and I think that move was important simply because they began to realize that there really was no such thing as an organization that represents the Muslim community in the U.K.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So in reaching to other organizations, did the U.K. government attempt to reach out to—you posited a problem here—

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Which is that most Muslims, I suppose like most other people of other religions, don't belong to organizations. So if minority views or extremist views, Islamist views are disproportionately represented, let me put it that way—

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. In the organizations, how do the authorities, how does the government reach out to try to create constructive linkages with the Muslim community? So were any of these other organizations—for instance, I wonder if there are not uniquely religious organizations that don't have a political agenda within the Islamic community.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Yes, absolutely. The shift that we saw 2 years ago went along two different lines, and I think there is utility in looking at that, and also, I think, looking at what the German government has been doing in recent years with its new Islamic Conference. The German government had the benefit of the hindsight of the British experience, I think, and when the Minister of Interior in Germany set up the Islamic Conference, they made sure to include within its membership a number of Muslim members at large who are not actually affiliated with any organizations per se, but who had a following, who were notable voices and figures representing particular constituents and local groups.

What the British government has done is to widen its outreach to include groups that will represent either more sectarian views or groups such as the Sufi Muslim Council, which is not at all political in orientation. Now, part of the problem that they have encountered, I think, is the question of the extent to which some of the groups they have reached out to or some of the groups that have come to them wanting to be reached out to actually represent sizeable constituencies within the community or have any legitimacy.

A more profitable line that I think that they went down is to abandon the idea of trying to find representative groups altogether and focus instead on problems, to get back to this idea that Mr. Nawaz mentioned that we are talking about local grievances that get turned into global problems.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. So let us start not by addressing or trying to find particular organizations to work with but by identifying problems and work this issue via local problems rather than particular groups and associations.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But problems uniquely within the Muslim community?

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Yes, and in some cases these are problems that are unique to a community that is often living a highly ghettoized, insular existence in the peri-urban areas of post-industrial Northern cities in England where levels of employment are very low—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, the problems may not be uniquely Muslim. Obviously, there are non-Muslims who are experiencing high unemployment. But the governmental reaction may be directed at the problems and perhaps focused on the Muslim community.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Absolutely right, and what my research would suggest is that a profitable line of inquiry, or a profitable line of policy in this regard would actually be to encourage Muslims and non-Muslims who share those same kinds of problems to form coalitions focused not on their religious identity, but the fact that they face a similar kind of issue regarding access to education, access to social mobility, so that the focus becomes the shared issue that we face and not the religion.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Mandaville.

Ms. Baran, let me ask you to comment on this idea that Dr. Mandaville has just suggested as one path to find the non-Islamist leadership or membership within the Muslim community. I mean, you have said to us today that most Muslim Americans are not Islamist, and yet if I am hearing you correctly, you are also saying that a lot of the established Muslim organizations are, if not dominated, disproportionately influenced by Islamist groups. I have a quote from your testimony. You have a section, and which will be part of the record of the Committee, and it is quite strong and provocative, but I think very important to listen to.

“The most prominent Muslim organizations in America were either created by or associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Wahhabis, and they have therefore been heavily influenced by Islamist ideology over the course of four decades. Islamists have taken over the leadership in almost all Islam-related areas in

America. This is scary”—these are your words—“yet almost no one in the U.S. Government deals with it.”

So I take it that in speaking about—for instance, as Senator Collins said, we had testimony here saying that—including from Muslim organizations and the FBI that they, surprisingly, do the best outreach to the Muslim-American community. So I take your testimony not to dispute that in terms of the volume or quantity of the outreach, but to say that in that outreach, they may actually be influenced disproportionately by Islamist ideology and Islamist groups.

Ms. BARAN. Yes. Thank you. I think what we just heard from Professor Mandaville in the British case is a very good example, and there are a lot of parallels in terms of what those in the British system end up learning, even though at the beginning they did not want to move away from established partnerships. Moving away from these partnerships brings political cost.

For me, the question is what is the purpose of outreach? You can always have nice conversations with a whole set of people. What is the purpose? Is the purpose, as some people in the law enforcement have told me, to co-opt them? If that is the case, then I think the people who are doing the outreach are being co-opted because they are going into an area where they are not well educated or informed and they are open to learning. They are not critical and they are not criticizing because as I said, they think what is told to them is Islam and they are not qualified to judge or ask questions about a particular religion.

If the goal of outreach is to talk to the Muslim community, fine, but what is the point? The point is that we want these citizens to be happy, loyal, and, of course, also for homeland security concerns, not radicalized, not engaged in terrorist acts. Then the issue is not to reach out to them based on their Islamic identity or based on their religiosity, but based on the problems.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Ms. BARAN. What are some of the problems? Unfortunately, because Islamism thrives on victimization certain issues are exaggerated so that Muslims come together in this “us versus them” mentality. They are basically saying, we Muslims need to be an ummah because Islam is under attack. So you have now all kinds of stories circulating about Muslims being mistreated, this and that. Some of them are true and those need to be addressed; those are basic civil rights, and equal treatment issues. And there is also some bigotry and there are some activities against Muslims and those need to be dealt as law enforcement issues.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Ms. BARAN. And in general, we are lucky that in America, of course, Muslims do not have the same kind of problems that we often find in Europe. So the purpose of outreach, the counterpart you choose, what you want to get out of those interactions needs to be much more clearly defined. I think after September 11, 2001, there was this urge that we have to talk to Muslims and we have to make sure that they don't hate us. But I think now that with enough time, we understand that alone does not really answer the questions and doesn't resolve anything. I think if we look at the

rate of radicalization among American youth and look at all the activities of outreach, we don't see necessarily an impact.

So there is one set of outreach that needs to be done to understand the community issues and resolve them, but there are also issues that deal with the ideology and what is being supplied. I mean, ultimately, if you think about supply and the result, then we have to address both elements.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. I would like to come back to that briefly in a moment. My time is up, though. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just one final question for Mr. Nawaz. Both the Chairman and I are very interested in better understanding the radicalization process and you described witnessing terrible acts of prejudice and violence and unfair law enforcement actions when you were a teenager. What would have been an effective counter message for you to have heard as a teenager?

Mr. NAWAZ. On that point, I think that an effective counter message would have been for localized grievances to have an outlet to be channeled through localized, or local-based solutions and channels, especially when it came to the crisis of faith that I talked about. There needed to be a strong, firmly grounded, traditional theological leader there to be able to deal with some of these questions, who is articulate in English, fluent and able to communicate with the second and third generations. That was, and to a large extent still is, missing in the U.K. We do not have the imams that are trained and raised from within the U.K. They are still going abroad to take their training. In fact, a recent suggestion was made by our government and was very conveniently and correctly forgotten very quickly, and that was the suggestion that we should take imams and send them to Pakistan for training.

I don't think the solution is that. I think the solution is that there needs to be an indigenous British Islam, or more generally Western Islam, that arises. There are some very encouraging movements in that direction. One of our advisors for the Quilliam Foundation is a wonderful man by the name of Usama Hasan who in his youth went to Afghanistan to train with the so-called jihad there, but has abandoned all of that and now takes very courageous theological stances.

To give you one example of his stance—this man is qualified theologically. He is an imam of a mosque and is also a university lecturer, and he says that Muslim women do not have to cover their heads from a theological perspective. One of our advisors. We need to have more people like this.

I think in the U.K., I am very encouraged by signs of the discussions coming from people like Imam Hasan, Usama Hasan, that I see, very non-Islamist messages. Though they are pious or religious in their personal practice, they are very clear not to encourage, and in fact, they critique the Islamist message. So there needs to be an indigenous growth from within the West of Western Islam, and that is something that the Quilliam Foundation has put as one of its objectives to encourage.

If that had been there for me in my crisis of faith, I don't think I would have turned to a political ideological alternative. I was not

able to relate to the village religion of the mosque imams who did not speak my language.

In terms of the crisis of identity, and this is something where if you caught my facial expressions, I was very keen to interject. All I did is I settled for writing “excellent” on Dr. Mandaville’s book here. And that is that the whole discussion—I agree entirely with what he said, and there is something I would like to add and that is the psychological state of somebody approaching this discussion in the first place, is that when we talk about the Muslim community, that is a paradigm which we have adopted from Islamists and the British government has recently shifted in this and now they are talking about Muslim communities, and that is more accurate, because in the U.K., we have very recent immigrants who aren’t settled as the immigrants who originally came from the Indian subcontinent are, but rather we have had Somalis that have immigrated to the U.K. due to the war and the conflict that is there. There are others, North Africans that have immigrated due to the conflicts in Algeria, and others have immigrated from many different regions.

The expression of Islam from each one of these communities is very different. And in some cases, they are at conflict with each other. The default form of religious expression for the majority of Muslims in the U.K. is the Sufi Barelvi tradition coming from the Indian subcontinent, which is historically apolitical and, in fact, is anti-political.

Now, if we can grasp that there is more than one Muslim community but rather there are Muslim communities, we will not adopt the paradigm of the Islamists in dealing with this problem as a Muslim problem but rather looking at it as localized problems and trying to deal with the problems themselves rather than adopt the paradigm that it is one community that requires one solution and one representative.

The U.K. government made a mistake with the MCB. I pray that your government here does not make that same mistake. And now they have learned from that. The British Government has set up a department called the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), that has a 3-year budget of 70 million Sterling, which again is a lot of dollars. Now, that 70 million Sterling is allocated specifically for dealing with this problem. I recently met with the minister responsible for that department, Hazel Blears, and I am very encouraged by her understanding on these issues.

Now, that department is there solely to take this money and to distribute it on a localized basis through local councils, not through a centralized national body, and I think that is the encouraging way forward. If these measures were there in the early 1990s, we would not have had the situation that we had through the mid- to late 1990s of Islamists pretty much becoming institutionalized.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins.

Unfortunately, we are going to have to move on in a moment. I did want to say, Mr. Nawaz, I am so glad you came here, but I really object to your rubbing in the dropping value of the dollar so often. [Laughter.]

All in good spirit.

Let me just see if I can ask this question because a part of what motivates this hearing is that the insight, which I quoted from the 9/11 Commission Report, that this so-called war with terrorism is really an ideological war at its essence, so that while we are fighting it in a military sense, we also have to try to figure out how to counteract the ideology.

This is not easy because it requires non-Muslim governments in countries like the United States and the U.K. to find an effective, thoughtful, and honest way to reach into the Muslim community, and I think this is part of what the outreach is supposed to be about, but it may not be working. You are absolutely right in the experience that you both reflected from the U.K. Your testimony, Ms. Baran, should really be a warning to the U.S. Government about what they are doing and whether it is really achieving the goals.

But some of the goals are pure law enforcement, there is no question about it, trying to develop links to the community, to the mainstream, law-abiding Muslim-American community so that if they hear of the growth of violent Islamist activities, that they will let law enforcement know. Some of it, I think, is also aimed—and this is not easy—at encouraging leadership to emerge from the majority, mainstream Muslim-American community. In other words, the picture that I am getting today is that there is a silent majority within the Muslim-American community and it is an American community. It is a mainstream community.

In addition, I think you have given us a good idea here, which is that we have to be not just reaching out to organizations, maybe we have to do that with open eyes, but also really to the problems within the community. How do we create a situation where when someone like Mr. Nawaz as a teenager develops these grievances—and look, teenagers of any religion and race will find various reasons to develop grievances. Yours happen to have been quite palpable and real and severe. What can we do to create an alternative vehicle for expression other than Islamism? Ms. Baran.

Ms. BARAN. Well, if I can talk about my teenage rebellious years.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You are not under oath now, so—
[Laughter.]

Ms. BARAN. I was also looking for different identities. Now, I wasn't born in America; I was a teenager in a Muslim country and there were many different options. There were the Islamist options. There were different options. I think having the variety of options is very important and also having good role models and trusted sources. Again, I say that if I had learned my religion from the wrong people, I could have become an Islamist because the ideas are extremely attractive, partly because everything becomes so simple and understandable. In a way it empowers you because all of a sudden, from not being able to change your life or bringing meaning to it, you have a meaning and everything easily makes sense.

So there is not a single answer, and like in the British case, in America, too, I think there are multiple communities. Some of them are more religious, some of them are less religious. You can't even say the Arab-American community. Within the Arab community, there are so many different ones.

In, again, my case, in this neighborhood, the Turkish-American community goes to the Turkish mosque, and so we don't even go to the same mosques because there are different cultures and, of course, when it comes to second generation, third generation, the issues are also different.

There are many ways that this issue can be addressed, but I think the starting point has to be that we need to define what we want in reaching out to the communities because ultimately they are citizens and there are certain citizen rights and there are certain needs for their faith, for their education. I am worried about raising my children in this country because I would not know where to send them to teach them Islam. I would have to do that at home at this point. But I would like to be able to send them to a mosque and be comfortable that what they are going to learn there is going to be about the faith and is going to anchor them in a way that they are going to be Muslim and American and will not find a conflict in the two.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a perfect and strong place to end the testimony of this panel. I thank you all very much.

Mr. Nawaz, I want to thank you really for the foundation. It seems to me that is part of the answer, so I wish you well in what you are doing. I hope that the four of you will remain available to the Committee as we continue to consider these really important but difficult questions and try to play a constructive role. Thank you very much.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you.

Mr. MANDAVILLE. Thank you.

Ms. BARAN. Thank you.

Mr. MOGHADDAM. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will now call Michael Leiter to the stand. Michael Leiter is the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, served as Deputy General Counsel and Assistant Director of the Robb-Silberman Commission and then as Deputy Chief of Staff at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, also an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. Mr. Leiter is responsible for administering the National Implementation Plan, the Federal Government's efforts to coordinate the response to terrorism. One component of that is to Counter Violent Islamist Extremism (CVIE).

We welcome you, Mr. Leiter. Thank you for being here and we look forward to your testimony now.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL E. LEITER,¹ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

Mr. LEITER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, and Senator Voinovich. It is a pleasure to be here. I am happy to talk about the intelligence community's efforts to understand this very difficult problem, and most importantly, in many ways, the broader U.S. Government efforts to counter it, as well.

I am going to focus today on the role of ideology, as you asked, and I am also going to talk about the National Counterterrorism

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter appears in the Appendix on page 95.

Center's (NCTC's) effort in that part, and I ask that my more detailed statement be made part of the record.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. LEITER. Thank you. Now, before focusing on the very specific topic today, I do want to make one clear point and that is that although clearly the greatest terrorist threat we see in the United States today is from al-Qaeda and associated ideologies, this violent extremism is not historically, nor is it today, associated only with Islam. A generation ago, the violent extremist threat came primarily from the far left and the Red Brigades, and even today we continue to see a terrorist threat from organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia that are clearly terrorists and violent extremists in their own right. Thus, although I think the focus today is quite appropriate in light of the seriousness of the threat, it is not the only terrorist ideology that we face.

Now, as you have already heard this morning, the extremist ideological leanings that set the precedent for many of today's groups were articulated first by Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. Now, in the most basic sense, he argued that the notion of Islam's primary enemies are Western cultural liberalism and its Middle Eastern ally, Zionism. Al-Qaeda continues in their propaganda to echo those same views today.

The core narratives repeated in al-Qaeda's message to the West and repeated in the United States at times is that the West and its allies are seeking to destroy the Muslim world and Islam and that Muslims must counter this through violence and that just rule under Islamic law is the reward for expelling Western influences.

At the National Counterterrorism Center, we assess the evolution to violent extremism consists—and this is in very general terms, it does not obviously speak to every precise individual—but in general terms, it breaks down to a four-step radicalization process. Now, first, and you heard this again from some of the panelists on the first panel, an individual develops a sense of crisis and it is often brought about, or at least accelerated by, specific precipitants, depending on their environment. Second, the affected individual seeks answers to those perceived or real crises through ideological or a religious framework. Third, the individual develops contact with a violent group and that violent group establishes a sacred authority for the individual. And fourth and clearly most troublesome, the individual internalizes that group's values and its support for violence.

Now, of note, ideology is not necessarily central to the start of this process. Other factors before ideology might be key. And rather, it gains its greatest importance in later stages and it takes on a crucial role of preserving the radical commitment to violent extremist activity.

Now, beginning with the first stage of the process, there is no single underlying catalyst for this initial period of radicalization. Although most individuals clearly reject extremism outright, personal frustration and perceived social injustices and other grievances can prompt individuals to reassess their general world view and be open to more alternative perspectives, some of which can, in fact, espouse violence. Now, the most common catalyst, but

again not the only ones, in Muslim-majority countries tend to include blocked social mobility, political repression, and relative socio-economic deprivation.

Now, the second stage begins when individuals seek answers to their sense of frustration through a politicized version—and I want to stress here a politicized version—of Islam, or in fact, it could be any other religion, and thus they become what we term religious and ideological seekers. And here again, I want to stress that in no way do I mean to suggest that seeking answers to one's problems in life through religion is in and of itself the least bit worrisome, problematic, or negative. Rather, the key component here is not the contact with religion, it is the contact with a violent extremist group or message and is an ideology which clothes itself in some ways in religious viewpoints.

Now, the third stage of the process distinguishes between those individuals who have contact initially with that violent-prone group and those who are drawn fully into violent extremist activity, and specifically it is at this stage that an individual's willingness to accept the sacred authority of the violent extremist, that is the extremist right to interpret Islam or provide an ideological framework for violence that marks the passage to a latter stage of radicalization and ultimately a support for violence.

Now, simply reaching step three in this process doesn't in all explain why some individuals absorb this and adopt it for their own perspective, and some do not, and there are numerous factors that we assess, that will play into whether or not an individual will ultimately accept that violent extremist ideology. Some of those include, first, I would say, a previous knowledge of Islam. Many academic studies, and our views as well, have found, especially in the U.K., that many of the radicals, in fact, have a far lower level of religious knowledge than those who do not accept an extremist violent perspective.

Second, who are they learning from and what is their authority? What are their attributes? Sociological and psychological studies indicate that individuals and communities that emphasize rote memorization and an unwillingness to challenge authority are more likely, just more likely, to lend themselves to radical indoctrination than others.

Third, we have seen this and it is very vividly illustrated in the case studies of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, those with a technical education, that black-and-white ideology of violent extremism, often appeals to individuals with that background.

Fourth, and this is almost self-evident, but whether or not there are countervailing influences. A lack of exposure to a variety of Islamic perspectives and non-Islamic perspectives makes it more likely that individuals will fully internalize the violent extremist message.

Fifth, and again, this is, I think, obvious to anyone who has a teenager, peer pressure. Group dynamics are key, particularly in extremist study circles. Most likely, those will affect the prospects for successful indoctrination. Family members and friends with connections to extremist movements are critical in determining whether or not an individual will adopt this ideology.

And finally, a lack of exposure to extremist atrocities. In this case, studies such as a Pew poll published in July 2007 found that the confidence in Osama bin Laden among Jordanians dropped significantly, by 36 percent, between 2003 and 2007, reflecting at least in part the Jordanian population's widespread revulsion to al-Qaeda's attacks against hotels in Oman in 2005.

Now, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this gives you a very small sense of how we look at it in this basic four-step process, and obviously there is much greater detail and we look at it differently in different places in the world. I just want to note that from my perspective, there is simply no more important issue than NCTC, and in that sense the U.S. Government, faces in the war on terror. In this regard, we have significantly increased both our analytic resources with a variety of expertise and also our planning resources to make sure the U.S. Government is pursuing this effectively, and we hope in the coming year, contingent on Congressional approval, to dedicate even more resources to this issue.

Now, I also want to note, and Chairman Lieberman, you noted this in part in your closing comments, that this is very different from classic intelligence challenges. A very small section of how we will understand this comes from the world of clandestine intelligence reporting that I deal with most of my day. To understand and combat radicalization requires new sources of information, and equally important, new partners, and it is new partners within the U.S. Government, with State and local authorities, and I want to stress with non-government officials and leaders in the Muslim community in America and abroad.

It also requires us to approach this from multiple angles, which we currently do, because we now approach this not only from a religious perspective, which is certainly critical, but from a sociological perspective, from a regional perspective, and from a psychiatric perspective. All four of those are pieces to this puzzle of understanding why an individual chooses to adopt this ideology.

Now, as we improve our analytic understanding of Islamist militancy, we can better shape our policy response to the threat, and through our responsibilities as the strategic operational planner for U.S. Government-wide efforts, what we did was we created what we have termed a Global Engagement Group, and this group's sole function is to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize all elements of U.S. power to engage and combat this ideology.

Now, I want to give you a few specific examples of what this group is doing, and I can do that—I will do that to the best extent I can here in an open session. First, the group coordinates potentially divergent department and agency responses to specific situations that might be used by violent ideological extremists in their own propaganda.

Second, we are also establishing the capability to provide situational awareness to U.S. policy makers and officials about all of the things that the U.S. Government is doing, across departments and agencies, across the world, to combat this, because without that situational awareness, we cannot actually shape what the U.S. Government is doing.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I just have another 30 seconds or so. Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. LEITER. Third, the group is coordinating the long-term effort to combat this, and what we are doing is identifying very specifically through means such as sociological studies, psychiatric studies, religious studies, and the like, identifying who the next generation of recruits most likely is, and that is both domestically and abroad. And then we are shaping over 5 years and beyond, attempting to shape department and agency programs and budgets to address those in the long term.

Fourth, we work extremely closely with our department and agency partners. I want to just mention two, but the Department of Homeland Security, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer Dan Sutherland has been a fabulous partner in this, and overseas, the newly confirmed Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Jim Glassman, two key partners, and also, as we have talked about before, the FBI.

And finally, and this is, I think, especially important, we work very closely with the Office of Management and Budget to identify where these programs are today, how they are coordinated, and whether or not they are actually synchronized and complementing one another for the long term.

Now, I do believe that working with partners at home and abroad that we can develop targeted and refined approaches to undermining the attractiveness of violence to certain susceptible audiences. But I don't want to leave any doubt in this Committee's mind that this is an effort that is going to take many years and many new partnerships, and I also want to note that tangible results in this area are going to be both elusive and at many times very difficult to measure with any sort of reliable metrics. But none of those make the effort any less important.

Now, we are going to require cross-government efforts, as I have already noted. This Committee is a key part of that. And it is not only going to be about words, it is going to be about a diplomacy of deeds, both domestically and overseas. And I very much look forward to working with this Committee and the larger Congress, because so many committees have a hand in this, and getting your guidance on how you believe we should approach this challenge.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Leiter. That was very good testimony. I must say, some of the programs you describe, you have gone beyond at least what I contemplated the NCTC would be doing, which we saw in its creation as the central place to make sure that all the dots were connected of intelligence in a way that was not done before September 11, 2001. But what you are doing also seems to me to be directly related to counterterrorism, which is what your defining mission is, so I appreciate it and I am interested in asking some questions about it.

Let me first talk about the language we use here, because it is significant and has some substance to it. You said at the outset that what we have been calling this morning Islamism is not the only terrorist ideology we've faced, and, of course, I agree with that, nor is it historically the only terrorist ideology we have faced. But it does seem to me that it is the most significant terrorist ideology we face now. In fact, it motivated the attacks of September 11, 2001, which are the very reason that we created the NCTC in the 9/11 Commission legislation. So do you agree with that, that we

are dealing more with Islamist, what we have called this morning Islamist, ideology-inspired terrorism than any other kind?

Mr. LEITER. Undoubtedly and without question, the greatest threat we face today and in the world of terrorism is from Sunni extremist ideology. I will say one thing, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure.

Mr. LEITER. I think part of the challenge here is about words, and I think just from the four panelists you just heard from, there are not insignificant differences in how individuals and professionals would define Islamism. So I think that is a challenge. But undoubtedly, Sunni extremism is the greatest terrorist threat we face today.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. As you know, in March, there was a State Department document released that said, "Words that Work and Words that Don't: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication," and the document recommended that government officials not make references to Islam when talking about terrorism. And, of course, our whole focus today has been to try to distinguish between the religion Islam and this radical political ideology which we have called Islamism.

I think that there was some misunderstanding, I hope, of what that report intended to say, but I just wanted to ask you whether you agree that—because I think if we don't—just listening to the four witnesses on the first panel, three of whom are Muslims themselves, that we are not going to be able to deal with the problem unless we describe it as what it is, which is originating from a radical political version of Islam which we have called today Islamism. So how do you understand that State Department guidance?

Mr. LEITER. Senator, that State Department guidance, I think was a policy choice by the Department as to how they believed individuals should speak about it. I would say that I don't agree with everything that was in that document. I do think that you cannot separate out the fact that the terror fight we are fighting today involves Islam as a religion. But the ideology which motivates these terrorists has very little to do in reality with the religion of Islam. It is the difference between a religion and a violent ideology that has motivated these individuals. But we can't simply ignore the fact that there is a link to the religion.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I thank you for that and I appreciate it personally. Let me go on to something you talked about, really interesting, which is a quote again from your testimony. "Much of NCTC's growth over the past 2 years and much of our planned growth in the coming year is dedicated to government-wide coordination and analysis to counter radicalization," exactly what we are talking about today. I think it is very important. You talked about it some in your opening statement, but I want to ask you to expand on it, if you would, for the Committee.

What kind of people are you hiring? What will improvements of government-wide coordination look like, and a little bit more about what other agencies you are working with and how you are working with them. We know, for instance, that the State Department cannot be involved in domestic counter-radicalization, but still they have international experience that is relevant. So talk to us a little bit more about your counter-radicalization efforts, because it seems

to me that they are really at the heart of what the U.S. Government should be doing now.

Mr. LEITER. I am happy to, Mr. Chairman. First, on our analytic front, the intelligence side, we are significantly increasing our analytic resources, and the people that we are hiring come from a variety of backgrounds. I have an individual with me today who has a Ph.D. in political science who has looked at these issues and lived in the region throughout the Arab world for many years. That is one example. I also actually have an M.D. psychiatrist trained at Harvard who has spent significant amounts of time speaking with individuals who have become radicalized from a psychiatric perspective, and so on down the line. So the stress in hiring has been to get a wide variety of views, people who have an understanding of domestic issues and foreign issues because as you well know, our mandate is transnational, United States and abroad.

Now, on the coordination side, we have also attempted to bring in people from—the lead from our team of the Global Engagement Group is a State Department Foreign Service officer who has spent a significant number of years in Arab countries and Africa. But working alongside him are individuals from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security, so we can take those lessons from places like Africa or the United Kingdom and see the degree to which they do or do not apply to the United States, and they are very different situations and much of our work is trying to understand where the threat has been, how it does or does not apply to the United States.

In terms of concrete efforts, as I said, one of our biggest efforts is to actually understand what everyone in the U.S. Government is doing on counter-radicalization on any given day. Understanding what the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and on down the list are doing globally is important because anything is said anywhere in the world today can also be circulated in the world anywhere today on the Internet. So I like to think of it as we have to think about this globally, to borrow a phrase from another era, think about this globally but act locally. We have to think about the global challenge of violent extremism, but then we have to apply it to individual local circumstances. And by gaining that situational awareness and working with State, FBI, DHS, and others, we can then shape those messages in a way that is consistent and appropriate for the target community.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because you have no doubt that we do have to confront the threat of homegrown terrorism here in the United States.

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would agree with some of the—from the prior panel of comments. We certainly have not seen the same threat of radicalization here in the United States that we have overseas, in particular the United Kingdom and other nations. That being said, we have seen some instances, and I will certainly not rest on our current good situation to assume that will continue into the future.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on your comments that you provide situational awareness and intelligence analysis that helps other government agencies forge a counterterrorism message. This morning, we heard from one of our witnesses, and I believe you were monitoring the hearing, as well—

Mr. LEITER. I prefer not to use the “monitoring” phrase. [Laughter.]

Senator COLLINS. Good point. FISA has been passed now. [Laughter.]

But I know that you were following the hearing and one of our witnesses was quite critical of the FBI’s outreach efforts. The FBI has been on the front lines of trying to develop a liaison to the Muslim communities in this country and it was interesting to hear from this one expert’s opinion that we are reaching out using the wrong groups or the wrong organizations. What was your reaction to that testimony, since you, after all, are the agency that is doing the analysis to provide the situational awareness that groups like the FBI use in their outreach?

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think that outreach by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security to both groups within the United States and individual leaders within the Muslim-American community is critical. I think that understanding that there are certain groups that might have individuals with whom the U.S. Government might not want to associate does not and cannot stop us from doing the outreach that this government needs to do both to understand the communities more effectively, but also, frankly, to provide these communities with a sense that they do have a voice in how their government operates, that they do not feel disenfranchised because it is just that disenfranchisement that we heard from some of the other panelists that has contributed and acted as one of the precipitants to give people a sense of crisis and a lack of connection to their government, and outreach is one way to ensure that does not occur.

Senator COLLINS. So what criteria should the Federal Government use in determining who or which groups are useful allies in developing a counterterrorism message? If you listened to our previous panel, there are some who believe that if a group holds an Islamist ideology, then even if it has renounced violence as a means to achieving the goals of that ideology, that we should not interact with that group. Others are saying that as long as the group is non-violent, it does not matter what its basic ideology is.

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I want to be a bit careful because ultimately this obviously is a decision for Director Mueller, the Attorney General, and Secretary Chertoff about exactly what that line should be. I will say one clear line is if a group espouses violence, it is quite clear that the U.S. Government should not be talking to them.

Senator COLLINS. But that is the—

Mr. LEITER. That is the extreme.

Senator COLLINS. Right.

Mr. LEITER. Exactly. Beyond that, I think that the U.S. Government, as a general matter, has to become more comfortable speaking with more groups who may be opposed to many policies that the U.S. Government has, and it may be slightly uncomfortable,

but we have to think of this as a full-spectrum engagement, and what I mean by that is we have to be willing to engage with most people on most of the spectrum regardless of how they view U.S. policy. You are going to have to talk to some people that make you uncomfortable.

I analogize back to my days as a Federal prosecutor. I would have gotten very few prosecutions successfully—I could have brought a lot. I would have had very few successful prosecutions in the world of drugs or organized crime if I never dealt and spoke to individuals who at one point in their life had or had not been associated with drugs or organized crime.

Senator COLLINS. You talked about the four steps of radicalization. The third step that you outlined was the development of contact with radical groups. It used to be that contact involved a face-to-face meeting or perhaps going to Afghanistan or Pakistan for training. But today, it is far more insidious and far easier to accomplish because one has only to go to the Internet to make contact with a radical group. How much of our effort is directed toward providing a counter message through the Internet?

Mr. LEITER. Senator, before answering that question, I just want to note how well the NYPD has done in some of their work, so well that we actually brought an inspector from the NYPD who is now a full-time analyst at NCTC deployed from the New York Police Department. So this is another example of a new sort of partnership that in 2000 we never would have imagined having.

Senator COLLINS. I am very glad to hear that, because we have pushed to have more involvement with State and local law enforcement.

Mr. LEITER. Absolutely.

Senator COLLINS. I am very happy to hear that.

Mr. LEITER. In terms of the Internet, the Internet certainly is key and I would say that it tends to be key at the earlier stages when the individuals—they are experiencing the precipitants. They have that sense of crisis and they start looking around and the Internet gives them those initial ideas.

Now, we have seen some cases, more overseas than in the United States, where there was kind of a complete transformation in the process of radicalization that occurred almost solely from the Internet. But that still tends to be the exception rather than the rule. Again, it can be key for that initial guide towards this world, but more often than not, we still see the contact with a charismatic leader who adopts it, that face-to-face contact being very important. And I would actually venture that is most people's experience with the Internet, regardless of violent extremism, that once you have that face-to-face contact with a product or people, it becomes slightly greater pull than just from the Internet.

Now, we spend an enormous amount of time both looking at the Internet and then working with various parts of the U.S. Government on countering messages through the Internet. I will say you rather rapidly enter in a very difficult area both in terms of legal policy and the First Amendment. I am certainly no expert anymore on these issues. But you run into many difficult challenges there, most particularly because anything you put on the Internet is by definition a global message.

So what the U.S. Government does and says overseas is often quite different from what it says here in the United States. The Internet doesn't give you the option necessarily to limit your message in the same way. So this is a new challenge with policies and legal challenges that we really do have to address more over the coming years.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thanks very much for being here today. From a management point of view, I am quite pleased with what I have heard in terms of your efforts to coordinate the various agencies and the fact that you have a connection with OMB because I have found that there are many areas where we need coordination to get the job done and my feeling is that you have to have somebody at OMB that you can talk with and talk about the various agencies and how important their budgets are in regard to various aspects of the work that you are doing. We don't have it all in one place.

Mr. LEITER. Right.

Senator VOINOVICH. Second, I was thinking about low-hanging fruit in terms of things that you can do to influence people, and one of the things that you mentioned at the end was the violence and the impact that it has. I was there in Jordan and absolutely, they know who these people are right now. And I think that my two colleagues are aware of the fact that the Sunnis in Iraq found out who these people were and now have turned against them because they don't like them at all. I wonder, could we be doing more in that area to get across how violent these people are and who are the real victims of their activity?

And then the other one, is the issue of women's rights here in the United States and even over in various other countries. There is a woman named Madsen, who is a leader trying to elevate the rights of women within the Muslim community in the United States. I wonder whether or not that is something that we should be more focused on or maybe that is something that we should stay out of.

I guess the last thing would be the issue that Senator Collins brought up, and that is, who do we deal with? One of the things that we have done in my State, we have had a very aggressive effort to reach out to the Muslim community. In Cleveland, for example, we have the Ishmael and Isaac Organization.

But we need some help. Who are the groups that we ought to be talking to in our respective States and you have identified as people that we should be talking to, because I think it is important that we talk to them, too, so that they know that they are a political constituency out there and that we are interested in what they have to say and make sure that we are talking to folks that we ought to be talking to.

Mr. LEITER. Senator, thank you for all three. I will try to take them in order. First of all, I agree with you. I think one of the most critical underlying messages that we have to get out is that this is not—the war on terror is not us versus them, West versus Islam, and there is no point that illustrates that more effectively than

that more than 50 percent of the individuals who are the victims of al-Qaeda's terrorist violence are Muslims. Whether you look at Oman or Iraq or Afghanistan, the individuals being killed tend not to be Westerners. In fact, they are Muslims. Al-Qaeda is killing Muslims and we do have to get that out more effectively.

We work with the State Department on an annual report of terrorist incidents. We post that on our own website and the State Department website and we have to get that out more effectively, and I would say that we have to get it out more effectively through non-traditional means because it isn't just about doing press conferences in embassies. It is about getting it on YouTube and the like so we are hitting the target population that we are actually most concerned with.

Now, as to your second question, I am going to admit that as we were monitoring the hearing in the anteroom, and I listened to your questions about women, I spoke to some of my analysts about that, and frankly, I think we have not focused the same attention on it that we probably should, so we already have it as a do out to go back and think more clearly about how the issue of women's rights does apply to this. We look at the issue of women in the Islamic world in some other contexts, and I think that the idea of empowering individuals to participate in their political system and political life, in this instance women, is again one of those powerful elements which starts to reduce the possible precipitants for people to go down this path in the first instance. Creating that opportunity to express themselves in the political system, whether or not they are women or men, is a key element and it is one that I would like to come back to you in the future and speak to you more about it.

Now, on your last point about with whom should you deal, and I would agree with you, far be it from me to set your agenda and your schedule, but I think it is critically important for elected representatives at all levels of government, from the U.S. Senate down to the city councilman—I should say council person—to go out and engage with their communities and understand the issues and make sure that their concerns are being reflected in the public discourse.

Now, I would be happy both to offer you experts from the National Counterterrorism Center and I am also more than happy to help serve as a conduit with you with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI and other agencies to figure out groups and leaders who you might want to engage with, people who you might want to consider whether or not you should engage with them, and what concerns other people in the U.S. Government should have, recognizing that you engaging with people, you might have a very different set of standards than, say, the Department of Homeland Security, and that is entirely appropriate. But I am happy to both offer our expertise and also help you work with DHS, Secretary Chertoff, and Director Mueller in determining who you and other Members of Congress might wish to engage with.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. Under Secretary of State Glassman now is our public diplomacy lead. Our earlier witness indicated that there is a dilemma today, and that is that we talk about democracy and freedom, and the President articulated that in his

second inaugural address, but it appears that we have backed off substantially from that. Is that having any influence at all on folks here in this country?

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I have to apologize. This may have been one of the moments that I was not monitoring. But I will say that the idea of democracy is certainly a key characteristic of any public diplomacy message that we have, but it is one part of the message, because—

Senator VOINOVICH. When we began the global war on terrorism, the President said that we wanted democracy in Iraq. That is one of the goals that we had. Now, we seem to be talking just stability.

Mr. LEITER. Yes, sir.

Senator VOINOVICH. And there is an appearance out there that we just kind of backed off this effort after we had elections.

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I don't want to dispute people's perceptions because perceptions are reality in this case. Certainly, my experience with the President and senior leadership is that democracy agenda has not changed in the least. Now, I do believe we have to make sure if people perceive that it has, that will be a challenge.

I also want to stress that is one part of a message that will appeal to one section of the community. We have to have many other messages and speak to the entire community, because there are some individuals who could be at risk for the activities we have talked about, for becoming violent extremists, that may not actually be drawn or stopped or countered through a pure democracy message. It is a series of messages that—some of which we may feel a little bit uncomfortable with at times. But if we are serious about countering that radicalization process, we have to be ready to do that.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Voinovich. Thanks for giving time to this hearing.

Director Leiter, thank you for your testimony. I think we are going to have to close the hearing here, but I really appreciate what you are doing, particularly this, I think, pioneering work on counter-radicalization. I think you are really on the front lines of the attempt to get at the ideological underpinnings of Islamist extremism and terrorism, and I hope you will come back at some point and tell us what your conclusions are and how you are trying to transport the product, if you will, the result, down to the field so that if there is a young Muslim American, like Mr. Nawaz in England, growing up with grievances, that he not turn to violent Islamist extremism as the expression of those grievances. But I thank you very much for your work.

We are going to leave the record of the hearing open for 15 days for additional questions from Committee Members or statements that witnesses want to add to the record.

For now, that concludes our business. The hearing is adjourned.

Mr. LEITER. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

**Testimony of Maajid Nawaz
Director of The Quilliam Foundation, London**

The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter it

**Before the US Senate committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

Thursday July 10th 2008

The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter it

Chairman Lieberman, ranking member Collins and esteemed members of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee, please allow me this opportunity to thank you all for inviting me here to testify before you today. I convey to you warm salutations from all our staff at the Quilliam Foundation in London, and in particular from my friend and co-Director Ed Husain who is currently in Egypt on an official FCO delegation on behalf of the British Government. Violent Islamist extremism is truly the bi-partisan issue of the day. This phenomenon affects those on all sides of the political spectrum, and as such it is one of those rare issues concerning which people of differing political persuasions and backgrounds can find common ground, especially through independent voices.

As director of The Quilliam Foundation, Britain's first counter-extremism think tank, I have made it my aim to spare no effort in directly challenging the Islamist ideology wherever I happen upon it. I believe that my staff and I are uniquely placed for this endeavour due to our past involvement, at a senior level, with various Islamist organisations. In fact, my own history involves thirteen years as a committed activist with the extremist Islamist group *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (The Liberation Party). I served on *Hizb ut-Tahrir*'s UK leadership and personally exported the group from London to Pakistan and Denmark. My international activities eventually led to my witnessing torture and a five-year conviction in Egypt as an Amnesty International adopted prisoner of conscience.

The makings of an international Islamist ideologue: my story

Having been born and raised in the boisterous county of Essex, the early nineties exposed me to situations that I never should have had to witness as a teenager. Despite my liberal British upbringing, I was subject to an appalling level of racist violence by a minority of thugs. Many of my white friends were stabbed before my eyes simply for associating with me. Arrests were made but repetitive procedural errors amidst boasts of 'contacts' in the police meant that the perpetrators were never convicted. By the time I reached fifteen I had been falsely arrested at gunpoint by the police because somebody had earlier seen my older brother, himself only sixteen at the time, playing with a plastic pellet gun. We were released the next morning with an apology, and the plastic gun was returned to us broken. The culmination of such incidents eventually led me to a crisis of identity. Not feeling fully accepted in the country of my birth left me wondering whether I was British, English, Pakistani, Muslim or even something else entirely. What I did know was that I could not relate in any way to the Pakistani heritage of my grandfather. The religious mosque *imams* could not speak English and I in turn found it almost impossible to relate to what they preached. Whilst such a crisis of identity initially concerned only racial and ethnic dimensions, the tragic slaughter of white Muslims that was to eventually play out in Bosnia brought to the fore of my mind Europe's Muslim Question. Through this rude awakening, and for the first time in my life, I became critically aware of a Muslim identity. I could not, however, relate to my religion as taught by the poorly educated mosque *imams*. I began instead to relate to a mid-nineties trend whereby American rappers would use radical Islamic messages through Hip-Hop to engender a sense of empowerment and identity into African-Americans. The early Malcolm X, with his radical and uncompromising message, quickly became my inspiration as I became more and more disillusioned with my own society. I somehow conveniently ignored that even Malcolm tempered his views before he was assassinated - and I believe that a great deal can be still be learnt from this man's late change of heart.

At this critical juncture in my life, whilst already feeling quite anti-establishment, I stumbled across an articulate medical student from my hometown who had gone to London and returned as a *Hizb ut-Tahrir* activist. Here was a man who could speak my language, who felt my pain and who most importantly of all could answer my questions concerning identity and faith in radically

different way. Since Malcolm X, I had never heard Islam presented in this way. Islam was not about mere rites and backward rituals. Islam was a revolutionary ideology that came to liberate man from being a slave to other men's colonial laws. Muslims must refuse the artificial identities imposed upon them by colonialism. We were not Pakistani or British, rather we hailed from the pre-colonial Caliphate, an exclusively Muslim political entity for an exclusively Muslim political identity that was wiped from the minds of our fathers through years of colonial education. Muslims must reject calling Islam a religion, rather ours was a comprehensive and divine political ideology surpassing Communism and Capitalism in its detail and potential power. All we needed to do was to re-ignite this forgotten ideology in the hearts and minds of the Muslim *Ummah*, or global community, and this sleeping giant would automatically arise from his slumber to challenge Western hegemony over the world. The fire within me finally found its oxygen and at the tender age of sixteen I joined *Hizb ut-Tahrir* not because I was in any way religious, but because I sought a radical political solution to the various grievances I felt. I wanted to be an ideologue and now I had discovered a divine ideology.

After I joined *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, I immediately decided to leave my hometown for London so as to enrol at the heavily Muslim populated Newham College for the purpose of using this campus as a recruitment ground. On this campus, after joining forces with Ed Husain, I was quickly elected as President of the Students' Union with my union committee all being *Hizb ut-Tahrir* activists too. Now, as this powerful collective and with Students' Union funds at our disposal we embarked upon radicalising the campus and recruiting more activists. My time at Newham College was brought to a sudden end when one of our non-student associates used our rhetoric to justify murdering a non-Muslim student on campus. The entire Students' Union committee were subsequently expelled from this college, but my reputation grew amongst party ranks.

Soon I was to become a national speaker, and then an international recruiter to *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. In 1999 the global leadership of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* requested that I personally travel to Pakistan to set up the group there. Pakistan had just acquired a nuclear bomb and I was told that the Caliphate would benefit immensely from this development. I duly took leave from my UK law degree and moved to Pakistan, moving from city to city leaving party cells in my wake. After my return to the UK in 2000, the group again requested that I travel to Denmark to aid with recruitment there. In between resuming my law degree I would fly out every weekend on the *Hizb ut-Tahrir* expenses until I had set up a sufficient amount of recruits for the Danish branch of the group to take over. My travels eventually led me to Egypt, where in 2002 my house was subjected to a dawn-raid and I was taken blind folded to the Egyptian State Security headquarters in Cairo, a building known as the Apparatus - or *al-Jihaz* - in Arabic. After being subjected to witnessing torture and held incommunicado in extended solitary confinement I was eventually convicted by Egypt's Supreme State Security Emergency court to five-years imprisonment.

My time in Egypt's notorious Mazra Tora gave me the opportunity to finally study Islam myself from its primary Arabic sources. I also had the opportunity of debating with some of Egypt's most well known convicted terrorists, such as the surviving assassins of late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, or such as the founders of *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah* - formerly Egypt's largest terrorist group. I also had access to imprisoned liberals such as runner-up to the Egyptian Presidential elections Ayman Noor, and the then imprisoned Sociology Professor Saad el-Din Ibrahim. My adoption by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience, and in particular the tireless efforts of one Amnesty activist - John Cornwall - served to open my heart to non-Muslims again for the first time in 10 years. My mind, however, would still not follow without rigorous investigation. After four years of daily debate and organised studying with the whole spectrum of reformed political prisoners I gradually came to the realisation, subconsciously at first, that what I had thought was Islam, was in fact a modern political ideology masquerading as the ancient faith of Islam. Islamists had taken modern day political paradigms and superimposed them onto religion. I now refer to this ideology as Islamism, so as to distinguish it from Islam the faith.

Upon returning to the UK in March 2006 I continued in my activities with *Hizb ut-Tahrir* at the leadership level. At this stage I was in psychological denial, after thirteen years of Islamist activism, that I could have been so wrong. The more my status grew on the Islamist circuit, the

more I felt hypocritical for no longer believing that Islam was a divine political ideology. I had become one of the most well recognised figures amongst Islamists generally and in *Hizb ut-Tahrir* ranks specifically, yet I could not face the fact that I no longer believed in the ideology. I eventually learnt that the group was preparing me for leadership of the UK branch, and this news led me to my final tipping point. In May 2007, thirteen years after joining, I unilaterally announced my resignation from *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, and in September 2007 I appeared on national television to declare that I now recanted Islamism itself.

Understanding the ideology of Islamism

In understanding what the ideology of Islamism is, it would help to begin with the name. The suffix 'ism' has been added to Islam so as to draw attention to the political nature of the subject matter. Islam is a faith; Islamism is an ideology that uses Islam the faith as a justification. Some of you may be reluctant in calling this ideology Islamism. There exists an understandable concern of not wanting to alienate Muslims. It is my contention however that only by using Islamism can one popularise the notion that the ideology is indeed distinct from the faith, and that Islam is innocent from the excesses of Islamism. The presence of Islam in the title should be no more troubling for Muslims than the presence of 'social' in Socialism is for sociologists. The presence of the word Islam in Islamism, like social in socialism, indicates the justificatory claim made by the ideologue rather than an admission of the validity of such a claim. I firmly believe that by claiming the word Islamism, and helping shape how it is used, one can direct the debate in the right way with the intention of distinguishing the ideology from the faith. Finally, for all their feign of offence, Islamists use this word in Arabic when differentiating themselves from other Arab political trends, just as Bathism.

When dealing with this question one must remain cognisant of the fact that the majority of Muslims are not Islamists. Generally, non-Islamist Muslims are from the conservative camp, such as traditionalist Sufis or Deobandis, or the literalist Wahhabis. This camp holds to socially conservative views and is historically apolitical. Non-Islamist Muslims could also be of the progressive camp, such as many leading theologians and academics today. Many in this grouping, and some from the conservatives, may even be politically active. These form the nascent post-Islamist movement of morally inspired politically active Muslims, or Muslim Democrats. However, the majority of progressives are simply secular legal positivists, believing that religion and morals cannot be a basis for strictly defining legal and political decisions. Key to the political activism of the above Muslims is that their politics is not driven by ideology.

The natural question then arises: what is the difference between an Islamist and an ordinary Muslim who may be politically active? Here some identifiers will be highlighted, not as hard and fast rules, but general guidance on the fundamental beliefs that the vast majority of Islamists will hold dear to. It is important to note that just as there is no one single definition to Communism, it is likewise for Islamism. This, of course, does not mean that Communism does not exist just as it does not mean that there is no such thing as Islamism. If, as is claimed, Islamism is a modern ideology, it follows that there must be some basic ideational factors that help shape it, ideas that can be clearly traced as being modern. In this endeavour, I aim to identify an Islamists ideology, law, people and state.

The first identifier of Islamism is the Islamists belief that Islam is not a religion, but a divine political ideology surpassing Communism and Capitalism. An implication of this is the Islamist assertion that Islam must have provided a detailed and divinely pre-ordained stance on matters such as political structure or the economy and these must lie, by definition, in contradistinction to structures already available in Capitalism and Communism. If these structures and systems are deemed absent, the Islamists will work to bring them about. Hence the Islamist desires to 'Islamise' all aspects of society and life. This also carries with it the Islamist assertion, subsequently also subscribed to by prominent non-Muslim commentators, that Islam is in perennial conflict with other ideologies, just like Communism in the cold war. In fact, the founder of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* used to be a Bathist or an Arab Socialist, which is where he found much of his

political inspiration. Moreover, Islamists have long suffered due to their lack of theological legitimacy having been founded by political activists rather than theologians. The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, was a school-teacher. The founder of the Indian subcontinent offshoot of the Brotherhood, Jamat-e-Islami, was a journalist by the name of Abul 'Ala Mawdudi. Osama Bin Laden is an engineer and Zawahiri a medical doctor, as was the man who recruited me to *Hizb ut-Tahrir* all those years ago, the current head of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* in the UK. Due to Islamists' emphasis on modern political thought they tend to attract those who have a modern education, those who can grasp discussions on sovereignty, statehood and economy yet whose disciplines are not these social science subjects themselves, thereby explaining their willingness to adopt political ideas that lack nuance. A qualified theologian would rarely claim that Islam is a political ideology, unless he has been reared exclusively by an Islamist party to become a theologian so as to reinterpret the theology in light of the ideology, such as the Brotherhood reared Qardawi.

The second identifier is the Islamist claim that the Muslim religious code, known as the *Shari'ah*, demands implementation on state level as codified law. In other words, the legal and illegal of state law must be synchronised with *halal* (permissible) and *haram* (impermissible) of the religious code. This again is a modern innovation unheard of in traditional Islamic sources. Muslim history is in fact bereft of examples of any type of *Shari'ah* being wholesale adopted as state law. Despite this, Islamists place so much emphasis on synchronising the *Shari'ah* with codified state law that they consider it a matter of apostasy if someone were to claim otherwise. Such a demand gives rise to Islamist claims of un-Islamic, hence illegitimate, laws that subsequently need to be Islamised. On the contrary, normal Muslims are perfectly happy for the *Shari'ah* to remain a personal code of conduct.

The third identifier is the Islamist notion of the *ummah*, or Muslim community, forming a political rather than simply a religious identity. This has parallels to the Communist idea of the international proletariat. The subsequent implication for Islamists is that loyalty and allegiances are owed to this global community above all else. Hence, an Islamist will not consider a non-Muslim as being from 'his people', nor will he accept any national identity. Normal Muslims, on the other hand, consider the *ummah* as a religious community; hence they are free to adopt as their political identity any of a number of things. In fact, the Prophet himself declared – as a civil leader – that Jewish, Christian and Muslim residents of his city-state were all “one *ummah*”, as ‘citizens’.

The final identifier is the Islamist dream of having an ideological entity to represent the above three elements in the form of an expansionist Muslim bloc, the Caliphate. Its Ideology will be Islamism, its law an adoption on *Shari'ah* and its people the global Muslim political bloc. Just as the international proletariat, the global political bloc for Communists, required an expansionist state to proactively ‘liberate’ workers from the tyranny of Capitalism, likewise the Caliphate must proactively intervene in the affairs of other states so as to ‘liberate’ Muslim residents from the yoke of ‘*kufri*’, or disbelief. Normal Muslims have no such expansionist dreams. Muslim theological authorities in each country have time and time again made the point that the days of religiously inspired expansionism went out with the Middle Ages.

It is not strange that a modern-day supremacist ideology with aspirations of a super-state and a higher people emerged in the Middle-East post World War I. The end of the age of empires led to the same phenomenon in Europe. Whereas European Fascist, Communist and Nazi parties emerged from the ashes of defeated European empires, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to Islamist parties emerging in the Middle East. The very same characteristics of expansionist super-states, a higher-people, and political party organisation are to be found in each of these supremacist phenomena. Such a development can be explained in the crisis of identity experienced by collective peoples in the aftermath of the old-world order empires collapsing.

Trends in Islamist movements

The above four elements, in general, form common ground for all types of Islamists. Despite sharing these core ideological goals however, Islamists may differ in both the intensity and candour with which they advocate them. Moreover, they certainly do differ in their strategic methodology of bringing about these four. There are three overarching strands of methodology employed by Islamists, political, revolutionary and militant. There is a great deal of both intra and inter rivalry between the many groups of each strand.

Political Islamists form the original expression of religion as ideology. Founded in 1928 by a school-teacher, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood now employs entry-level tactics to gain power in Muslim majority countries through the ballot-box with a view to gradually “Islamising” the political structure and laws via a fifth column of committed activists. The Muslim Brotherhood – *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* – encompassed a social movement more than an ideology, though the party was very well disciplined. In 1941 a journalist by the name of Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi founded the Indian Jamat-e-Islami. By building on the Brotherhood’s generalised expression Mawdudi articulated a clearer intellectual case for Islamism with slightly more conservatively religious tendencies, but still adhered to entry-level tactics.

Revolutionary Islamists are those, such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (1953), who are fundamentally anti-establishment. This category believes in instigating military coups against regimes with the purpose of coming to power in one clean sweep. They advocate that to use the ballot box legitimises the system of ‘*Kufir*’ - or apostasy- and hence is absolutely forbidden. Founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, a former Arab Socialist - or Bathist, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* crystallised the generalised ideological expression of the Brotherhood by heavily borrowing from Communist ideological paradigms and Bolshevik party political theory. Uniquely, Nabhani was the only qualified Islamic jurist amongst the founders of major Islamist movements and had served as a *Shari’ah* court appeals judge in Jerusalem. His academic background allowed Nabhani to skilfully weave European political thought with *Shari’ah* legalisms, combining them with the Bathist tactic of military coups. Through *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, Islamism had found its polemicists. In 1964 Sayid Qutb, having met and debated Nabhani in Jerusalem, marked a departure from the Brotherhood’s generalised ‘social movement’ by exporting a combination of Nabhani’s revolutionary Islamism and Mawdudi’s conservative Islamism into Egypt through his book, ‘Milestones’. Nabhani’s ideas were also shared by his good Iraqi friend Baqir al-Sadr, a hugely revered Shi’ah theologian, who popularised Islamism to many Shi’ah in Iraq through his book “Our Philosophy”.

Militant Islamists – or Jihadists - built on the solid theoretical grounds provided to them by Nabhani and Qutb but believed in creating their own army – instead of using Nabhani’s theory of recruiting from the existing army – so as to remove the infidel regimes. This category forms the violent Islamists, many of whom legitimise terrorism as a tactic, and eventually lead to what is witnessed today of the loose affiliation known as al-Qaida.

Islamist roots behind the tactic of terrorism

Not all Islamists employ terrorism as a tactic, but Islamist terrorists are by definition a product and offshoot of Islamist groups. This in no way implies that non-violent Islamists should be legally proscribed; rather it highlights the need for civil society to challenge Islamists even if they are to remain legally tolerated. Civil tolerance must be and always has been distinct from legal tolerance. In the UK the BNP are legal, but are shunned in civil society. Such a shift in tolerance attitude is only possible through education about what it is that Islamists actually believe, and how their beliefs act as ideological inspiration to terrorists. The heritage of Islamist terrorists can be traced both via the ideational inspiration behind key terrorist leaders and via the historical evolution of terrorism as a tactic.

Ideational roots:

In 1953 it was Nabhani, and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, who first expressed the three aims most commonly associated with al-Qaida and Ayman al-Zawahiri today. These three aims, stated clearly in Nabhani's early works, are to i) overthrow Muslim majority regimes, ii) establish in their wake an expansionist Caliphate ruling by '*Shari'ah*', and iii) destroy Israel and then conquer the rest of the available world via '*Jihad*'. It was Nabhani who first classified the entire world as *Dar al-Harb* – the abode of war - due to the dominance of '*Kufr*' throughout. It just so happened that Nabhani's methodology in fighting this war was by using pre-existing militaries rather than creating his own army. Only a return to ruling by the '*Shari'ah*' would restore *Dar al-Islam* - the abode of peace to the world. Nabhani also considered that no legitimacy could be granted to the existing rulers, as they were violating God's mandate by ruling with '*Kufr*'. Hence, forcibly removing them was legitimate and no international treaty or law of theirs was to be recognised. It doesn't take a long leap in the imagination to move from *Hizb ut-Tahrir*'s stance of recruiting from an existing army to al-Qaida's stance of recruiting their own.

Historical evolution:

The above ideational history is born out by historical cases where many violent off-shoots have indeed emerged from Islamist groups where ever they have operated. It is important to note that Islamism began as a non-Wahhabi, Salafist reform movement in Egypt. Politically, it grew into a rigid dogma, yet socially it remained relatively liberal, even through the emergence of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. In fact, much to the protestations of non-Islamist conservatives, Islamists dressed in Western dress, listened music and did not oblige women to cover their faces. These modern political ideologues eventually found themselves seeking asylum in the Gulf. Here, the political rigidity of Islamism fused with the social rigidity of conservatives, in this case Wahhabis, and it is through this powder-keg that Islamist terrorism emerged.

The historical evolution from Islamism to Jihadism, after mixing with conservatism, requires proper attention. In the Egypt, Sadat's assassins, known as Tanzim al-Jihad, eventually split into al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and al-Jihad al-Islami. These groups are Wahhabi in creed. The teacher of the parent group, the terrorist Tanzim al-Jihad, was a non-Wahhabi *Hizb ut-Tahrir* Islamist member known as Salim al-Rahhal. To cite another example, the Islamist Mohammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb's brother, was Wahhabi Osama Bin Laden's teacher. Abdullah Azzam, the first leader who so inspired Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan was also a non-Wahhabi Islamist Muslim Brotherhood member. In Great Britain, Omar Bakri, the former leader of Islamist but non-Wahhabi *Hizb ut-Tahrir* UK began glorifying terrorism after becoming a Wahhabi. The same phenomenon – of Islamism merging with conservatism to produce terrorism – occurred in the Indian sub-continent. The very conservative Deobandi denomination was exposed to Islamism via Pakistan and the Afghan Jihad, leading to the emergence of the Taliban.

The above submission has focused till now on the Islamist ideology, or the pull factor behind terrorism. What cannot be ignored also are the grievances that may be exploited by Islamists to further aid their recruitment. It is noted that the aforementioned evolution of political Islamism to the more extreme revolutionary Islamism, ending with militant Islamism, largely occurred through Egyptian prisons. However, what is noteworthy is the way in which ideology interacts with grievances. Ideology serves to reinterpret local grievances as a global ideological struggle, in turn 'discovering' more grievances where the ideological solution is deemed absent. If such local grievances could be minimised, the fodder that ideologues use to plant new pastures would be denied to them. Policy grievances, however, must only be changed if they form bad policy, not merely because terrorists hold a country hostage.

Concluding recommendations

The Quilliam Foundation has been established in London as a counter-extremism think tank aimed at simultaneously providing advice on policy reform where needed, and to provide a thorough counter-narrative to the Islamist ideology for the first time. An alternative of Western Islam, which would be at one with its host society, is encouraged as the long-term option.

In concluding this submission to the Senate, I recommend that the US government does not enter into the 'representative' game with the organised minority who have hijacked, as I once did, the voice of the silent non-Islamist majority. I recommend that work must be done to solve this problem without subconsciously accepting any Islamist premise. Hence, a 'Muslim' based approach by government – seeking to find the 'Muslim political voice' will only serve to aid the Islamist cause of identifying Muslims as a political bloc rather than religious community. Such a mistake falls for the assumption that Muslims must indeed have one political stance on any given matter, as they form one ideological bloc defined by religion. Rather, a problems-based localised and bottom-up approach, treating Muslims as citizens, is advised. This approach has been adopted by the British government and involves networking amongst normal non-Islamist local Muslims who are working in their communities to make better neighbourhoods for all. Governments cannot win arguments in communities; only civil society can achieve this. Governments can, however, empower civil society to make the necessary arguments and some very encouraging efforts towards this already exist. Existing State Department fact-finding missions to Europe should be encouraged and broadened so that networking and support can truly be facilitated for Europe's nascent voices rising against the dominant Islamist discourse. Banning non-terrorist Islamist movements is counter-productive, provides them kudos and would merely drive them underground. However, government cooperation with Islamist groups provides them with much-craved legitimacy and should be avoided. Rather, civil society should be fully equipped in dealing with and challenging Islamist ideas and groups where they emerge.

Senator Leiberan, ranking member Collins, Committee members and staff I thank you all for your time and for presenting me with the opportunity to address you here today. I hope that my contributions serve to distinguish the noble faith of Islam from the scourge that is Islamism, so that adequate policies can be adopted when dealing with this problem without targeting or alienating normal ordinary Muslims, who are as much victims to this scourge than anybody else. The Quilliam Foundation's staff stand ready to be called upon whenever they may be required, and hope to assist in any way possible to liberate Islam from Islamism.

United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

'The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It'
July 10, 2008

Statement of Peter P. Mandaville
Associate Professor of Government & Politics
Co-Director, Center for Global Studies
George Mason University

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Distinguished Members of the Committee:

In violent Islamist extremism, the United States faces a complex, little understood, and rapidly evolving threat. I am therefore particularly grateful for the opportunity to address this important hearing, and to provide some background information that will help us contextualize and locate violent Islamism within the much broader and diverse universe of contemporary Islamic political thought and activism. I would also like to address the phenomenon of Islamism in the West (more specifically in the United Kingdom) and the question of what the United States might be able to learn from the UK's experience of dealing with various manifestations of Islamism—violent and otherwise—in recent years.

Just as Islam cannot be said to be a monolith, the same goes for Islamism as an ideological project. While it is possible to identify certain key figures and groups as being central to the genealogy of modern Islamism, those who have subsequently drawn on their ideas or organized themselves in their mold have often done so in widely varying ways—interpreting and adapting their views to disparate and sometimes even mutually exclusive agendas. If our goal today is to make some definitive determination as to whether Islamism as a political ideology fosters or hinders violent extremism, then we are likely to be disappointed. Having lived the better part of my life in the Muslim world and having spent the last fifteen years researching political Islam across a wide range of geographic, cultural, and political settings (including, since the mid-1990s, close observation of Islamist groups in the UK, both radical and non-radical), I find myself in the following dilemma, analytically: I can point to any number of occasions when I have seen individuals and groups that can be said to represent, or to be influenced by, Islamist ideology engage in behaviors that push fellow Muslims “up the staircase” of terrorism—to invoke a metaphor commonly used by another of our panelists—and, likewise, I can provide an equal range of examples of situations where I have seen Islamists or those influenced in some way by Islamist ideology do things that I am convinced played a vital role in keeping young Muslims from falling under the sway of radical beliefs. In short, in seeking to understand and counter violent Islamist ideology, I do not believe it to be a useful task for us to sit as judge and jury over Islamism more generally.

In seeking to identify root causes for violent Islamic extremism, I think we also need to question today the extent to which the answer is to be found primarily in ideology. While ideas are undoubtedly important, they will only drive an individual to act if articulated in terms that resonate with and seem to provide solutions that can address a person's own life circumstances and needs. In this regard, I believe that the sociological

and psychological contextualization of Islamist ideology holds the key to understanding the conditions under which it potentially poses a violent threat. Let me move on now to provide some background information on modern Islamism and the evolution of its radical and violent variants before going on to address the issue of Islamism in Europe and the experiences of those charged with addressing the various challenges it poses.

In 1928, a schoolteacher in Egypt named Hassan al-Banna established a group known as the Muslim Brotherhood (hereafter ‘MB’). The MB sought to ensure a continued role for religion in society and saw itself as an antidote to the Westernizing and secularizing tendencies of the country’s dominant political actors in the early postcolonial period. Many Islamist leaders at the time also argued that the doctrine of modern nationalism was incompatible with the teachings of Islam and the ideal of the *umma* (the community of believers, potentially global in scope). While not initially established as a political party, the Brotherhood very quickly became implicated in the rapidly evolving political landscape of Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s. Branches of the Brotherhood were established throughout the Arab world, and it also inspired the founding of similar groups in countries such as Pakistan (the Jama’at-i Islami) and Turkey (the Refah Party). With its enormous popularity and rapid inroads into the country’s new educated and middle classes, Nasser began to see the MB as a political threat. Banned and driven underground from the 1950s, the movement became radicalized. This phase of its existence is most commonly associated with its chief ideologue at the time, Sayyid Qutb. Qutb—whose ideas went on to become very influential on successive generations of radical Islamists (including groups such as Al-Qaeda—see below)—had become convinced, like a number of his contemporary Third World activists, that it had become impossible to work within the existing political system to ensure a political role for Islam. Revolutionary politics and armed struggle (*jihad*—from the Arabic word for ‘strive’), in Qutb’s teaching, were the required paths to achieve social change in the Muslim world.

Yet Qutb’s views appealed only to a fringe minority in the Muslim world and, in the successive generation, to only a very small fraction of Islamists. His views on *jihad*, for example, were regarded by most Muslims (and by most Islamic scholars) as a highly unorthodox departure from traditional understandings of that concept as purely defensive in nature. In other Muslim-majority countries during this period, Islamist parties had evolved into opposition movements. While some of them still continued to question the legitimacy of the secular state, they did not embrace violent tactics. In Egypt, under Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood was once again permitted to operate as a charity and social movement (but not as a political party) after its leadership renounced violence. This shift prompted some within the group who were still beholden to Qutb’s views to split off from the MB and form radical splinter groups, some of which in more recent years have become integrated into Al-Qaeda. Banned from formal politics in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood instead began to build a strong base of social support at the neighborhood and municipal levels, establishing vast social service and charity networks, and gaining control of all leading professional associations and syndicates.

While these may seem to be highly localized, domestic developments, it is interesting to note that an important part of what allowed the Islamists to build up this kind of support within Egypt’s civil societal spaces was the set of forces we refer to today as *globalization*. As Sadat opened up Egypt’s economy to world markets and the country undertook neoliberal economic reforms at the behest of institutions such as the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the scale of state welfare and employment provision was scaled back significantly. This created 'gaps' in the provision of basic services that the Islamists were able to fill very skillfully, gaining widespread support and popular legitimacy in the process.

The 1980s saw a significant increase in the global visibility of political Islam as it became increasingly entwined with Cold War geopolitics. Three events from this decade are particularly noteworthy in terms of their importance to understanding the contemporary interface between Islam and global politics. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a number of volunteer fighters from the Arab world traveled to Afghanistan assist in repelling what they interpreted as an atheist incursion into Muslim territories. These 'Arab-Afghans,' as they came to be known, were important insofar as their experience during these years (1980-88) helped to crystallize the ideological and geopolitical vision that would later define Al-Qaeda. Among this cadre from the Middle East was to be found Usama Bin Laden, a member of the wealthiest commercial family in Saudi Arabia who had renounced his family's business in the name of what he saw as a larger struggle against new forms of global, imperial atheism. The eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was interpreted by Bin Laden and his ilk as a victory and as evidence of Islam's ability to triumph over the world's superpowers. From the crucible of this experience was hence born Bin Laden's vision Al-Qaeda: an effort to globalize the Afghan experience.

As we can see from the preceding discussion, Al-Qaeda—for many, the group that most readily springs to mind today when speaking of Islam and violent extremism—needs to be situated within a diverse and multi-faceted ecology of world political Islam. Al-Qaeda was established in Afghanistan by Arab-Afghan fighters following the decision by the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from that country after a failed occupation effort. Emboldened by this seeming victory, Al-Qaeda sought to export the Afghan model to other countries in which Muslims were understood to be fighting foreign invasions or resisting imposed secularism. The move to establish the group also represented a major shift away from the worldview of earlier radical Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb and the groups he inspired. For them, the goal was to successfully attack and supplant the "near enemy," that is the leaders of secular-national regimes in the Middle East and other Muslim majority countries who were perceived as the proxies of Western powers. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's new emphasis on the "far enemy," inspired by the Afghan experience, emphasized instead the idea of directly attacking what they understood to be the source of global imperialism and atheism—namely, the United States. Al-Qaeda's goals are the liberation of Muslim territories from occupying infidel forces and the making of a world that is "safe for Islam"—understood to mean a world in which a social political order based on *shari'ah* (Islamic law) can be realized. Some within this camp understand this to mean the re-establishment of centralized political authority in the Muslim world via new Caliphate, an institution that had existed since the seventh century but had been abolished by Mustapha Kemal at the end of the Ottoman Empire.

Al-Qaeda today is in many ways better thought of as a particular *discourse of resistance* whose material reality is to be found in a transnational coordinating network highly skilled in forging temporary operational ties with local/regional movements or individuals in many global settings in order to engage in violent activism. Far from

representing a crude, kneejerk reaction to globalization, Al-Qaeda actually appropriates the logistical and communicative infrastructures of globalization to pursue the fulfillment of a narrative, a “story,” internalized by its leadership, about the necessity and inevitability of Islam’s triumph over the infidel (unbelieving) forces of world power—particularly the United States and its allies in Europe and elsewhere. Al-Qaeda as a radical Islamist group is in many ways quite unorthodox even within the ranks of the wider *jihadi* movement, many of whose members did not agree with Bin Laden’s decision to carry out the September 2001 attacks on the United States. While Al-Qaeda’s model of global Islamic politics has attracted only a few thousand of the world’s 1.25 billion Muslims in terms of actual members, some in the Muslim world are drawn to Usama Bin Laden as a symbol of anti-Americanism (even while they usually disagree with the methods he employs). In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 (and a number of subsequent bombings in Europe and elsewhere—such as the London bombings of July 2005—attributed to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates), we have seen an increased *politicization of Muslim identity* around the world—particularly among Muslim populations in Europe and North America. This has meant that debates around Islam and Muslims have come to take on wider significance beyond the question of terrorism and violence, reinvigorating discussions of whether ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ are compatible in cultural or civilizational terms—as per Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (see below). We have seen aspects of this in events such as the 2006 Danish cartoon affair and the controversy surrounding the Pope’s speech later that same year.

As Olivier Roy has noted in his book *Globalized Islam*, it is possible today to identify two distinct generations of Al-Qaeda activists. The comparative sociology of these groups is telling in terms of what it allows us to discern about the evolving nature of the jihadi discourse and movement. The first generation of Al-Qaeda operatives, those who constituted the bulk of the organization in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, were generally citizens of Muslim countries and had direct prior experience of political or militant activism either in their home countries, as Arab-Afghans, or—most commonly—both. They generally had very little experience of the West and their axis of movement was generally confined to Afghanistan, Muslim conflicts in neighboring countries, and their countries of origin.¹ The second wave of Al-Qaeda personnel, from the 1990s, by contrast, tended to have strong connections to the West. Many were recruited in Europe (and to some extent North America) or were citizens of Muslim countries who had spent some time living, studying or training in the West as expatriates. Important to note about this second generation, Roy tells us, is the “deterritorialized” nature of its Muslim identity. Where the original Al-Qaeda activists were firmly socialized in a nation-state environment and had developed their Islamist consciousness primarily in terms of its circumstances, this new generation of jihadis often had weak senses of national and religious identity. For many in the first wave, transnationalism was something of a reach, an idea they needed to get their heads around; for the second generation, however, it was a natural way of life—the “jihadi jet set.”²

¹ O. Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 257-58.

² O. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

In order to better understand this new mode of malignant cosmopolitanism, we need to look more closely at how and why radical religious discourse resonated with these deterritorialized identities. We will discuss these processes primarily in the context of the recruitment and socialization of young Muslims in Western contexts since Al-Qaeda and other radical groups seem to have relied heavily on these settings to provide many of the foot soldiers for their second generation operations. In terms of the first wave, the socialization into jihad occurred primarily through existing radical Islamist structures whose activities and leaderships became increasingly transnational from the 1980s. When looking at the second wave, however, we are confronted with a situation in which ideologues and recruiters are often handed a *tabula rasa* Muslim identity (in the form of a new convert or an immigrant Muslim experiencing new-found sense of religiosity) upon which they employ a range of discursive and disciplining techniques to inculcate certain worldviews and activist tendencies. This may sound like we are referring to something akin to brainwashing, but at work here is actually a much more sophisticated process of socialization that leverages existing cognitive, ideational, and identity formations to sculpt a very particular form of global Muslim subjectivity.

Several observers have already noted the “deculturizing” or “universalizing” dimensions of salafi Islam.³ These two terms refer, respectively, to the analytical and normative aspects of a similar phenomenon. Salafism, with its hostility towards religious innovation (*bid'a*) aims to rid Islam of anything that has entered the faith through contact with various local, “cultural” beliefs and practices. There are no schools of jurisprudence to debate between, salafis insist—there is only Islam. In a normative sense this has proven very appealing to many young Muslims living in the West who feel alienated by their parents’ understanding of Islam. To them, their parents seem trapped in an understanding of Islam as it was practiced in, for example, the village in Bangladesh from which they migrated twenty years ago. They seem obsessed with trivial details relating to how one should hold one’s hands while praying, saints days, various festivals—but nothing to do with religion, modern life, or political questions. Rejecting the “village Islam” of their parents they go in search of a form of Islam that speaks to the issues and challenges of living as a Muslim in a global world—and, moreover, a Muslim caught between two senses of identity. The second and third immigrant generations have generally been born and raised in the West and are well versed (and often comfortable with) its cultural patterns and norms. At the same time, they are aware of belonging to a different and at times disparate identity formation, that of Islam. They search for a universal form of religion that will help them to reconcile what they are (Muslims) with where they are (the West), and that will also help to provide them with some sense of meaning and purpose.

This search for a universal idiom of Islam can lead in two general directions. In some cases it prompts young Muslims in the West to emphasize those aspects of their religion that reflect global human rights norms, democracy and political and cultural pluralism: the umma as an integral part of a common global humanity. But this same search for universal Islam can also lead towards a universalism defined, religiously, in

³ O. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 258; P. Mandaville, ‘Sufis and Salafis: The Political Discourse of Transnational Islam’, in R. Hefner (ed), *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 314-15

salafi terms—and, politically, in terms of Muslim struggles the world over: the umma as a righteous community under assault. While there is no sure way of determining which of these two general currents will prevail when it comes to a given individual, it is possible to make observations about how and why the salafi discourse in particular may seem appealing under certain circumstances. It is also important to note that only a very tiny minority of those drawn to salafi Islamist circles in the West ever get anywhere near the battlefield of jihad. For many, political salafism is a “phase” they go through before either slipping into a conservative but non-Islamist mode of religious practice, or, in some cases, becoming so disillusioned with the movement that they begin to question the very basis of salafism or even Islam. We have already referred above to the deculturating nature of salafi Islam. Several other aspects of the radical discourse merit our attention in terms of their interaction with identity and shifting religious norms in Western contexts.

For those Western Muslims who experience their dual identities as confusing and destabilizing, radical Islamic discourses can provide a matrix of meaning that permits them to derive a clearer sense of purpose and worldview. By shifting the focus of their identity away from the apparent tension between being, for example, simultaneously British and South Asian, and orienting it instead towards a resolution of this tension in a universal, salafi Islam and membership in the global umma, radical ideologues help culturally disoriented Muslims (or recent converts, as yet unsure of their way in Islam) to experience their lack of clear identity foothold not as a weakness or an absence, but rather as something empowering that invests them with the ability to be a “real” Muslim—and, moreover, to prove it by becoming politically engaged on behalf of the embattled umma. Describing the appeal of the radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, one former member put it this way:

They had a very profound analysis of why the Islamic world is in such an abysmal state, how it declined and most importantly how we can elevate ourselves from this position, and break free. The group was not allied to any political regime, it was not operating on the basis of personal or financial motivation, it didn't have a sectarian approach. As long as you are a Muslim and are committed to its beliefs and its causes, you are welcome to join the party.⁴

A previously liminal identity thus rediscovers itself as part of the vanguard of a new global movement. Radical salafism accomplishes a gradual “desocietization” whereby adherents withdraw further and further from the ambient mainstream community, associating exclusively with other “real Muslims” and gradually detaching themselves from the national-societal contexts in which they live.

Another dimension of Muslims' attraction to radical movements relates to the personal charisma associated with the scholars and leaders of these movements. Various observers have noted that within Al-Qaeda's second wave, some of those recruited in the West have been living on the margins of society—often coming from broken homes and families, unemployed, involved in petty crime and so forth. The leaders of the radical

⁴ M. Whine, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir in Open Societies’, in Z. Baran, *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology*, Washington DC: The Nixon Center, 2004.

groups, as one analyst has documented, tend to display a genuine sense of care for those who come into their circle.⁵ For many young Muslims living in the margins, frequently subject to racism and discrimination, this will represent the first time someone has ever seemed to take a genuine interest in them and the direction of their lives. The personal charisma of radical ideologues hence seems vitally important in terms of creating an emotional bond with members of the group.⁶

Many drawn to the radical movements are not by any means marginalized members of society. Rather, they often have very high levels of education, are employed, and even have families in some cases (compare with the demographics of mainstream Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood). There is not a lack of social integration, but rather a seemingly successful integration process that has gone awry. Elements of the identity and worldview crises alluded to above begin to enter the picture and they come to the radical circles in search of a clearer sense of meaning. Well aware of the educational background of these potential recruits—many of whom will have graduated from top scientific and engineering schools—the religious scholars and intellectuals will often articulate radical Islamist ideology in a form that fits comfortably with the “cognitive style” and methods of analysis to which their students are accustomed. Salafi Islam is particularly conducive to this approach. The grammar of salafism suits the structure of modern scientific knowledge production. When teaching salafi Islam to such a group, for example, a sheikh will diagram it on a board such that it closely resembles problem-solving methods or engineering flowcharts. Given that much of the salafi discourse can be explained in terms of discrete categories of analysis, it becomes a relatively straightforward matter to communicate its teachings in a way that allows a follow with a techno-scientific education to work methodically through a given situation (framed in terms of religiously-given normative categories) and to eventually achieve—just as science does—a single, correct answer at the end of that process. This answer, it should be noted is not subjective and nor is it open to interpretation. It is the end result, again, just like science, of an “objective” method whose infallibility is beyond reproach. Faith in science as a technical method becomes faith in salafism as a religious method.

Observers and analysts of radical Islam have speculated as to the process that leads an individual to become willing to engage in violence, or other forms of “high risk” activism.⁷ Is it the religion itself that “radicalizes” them? Is it the teachings of a senior religious scholar who eventually convinces them that violence in the name of Islam is not only permitted, but required of them? Limited anecdotal evidence actually suggests that many individuals come into radical circles having already decided that they want to engage in some form of confrontational politics. Some, in fact, may only very recently have become Muslim, or “reactivated” a previously dormant sense of religiosity.⁸ Thus it

⁵ Q. Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

⁶ F. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 34.

⁷ Q. Wiktorowicz, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸ M. Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

is not salafism, Islamist ideology, or the authority of religious scholars that serve as the “radicalizing agents,” but rather prior life experiences and worldviews that have culminated in a decision to actively seek participation in confrontational politics or even violence. The religious authority of salafi sheikhs, in any case, is anything but absolute. While those who engage in jihad do seek religious justification for their actions, they may sometimes do so after having already decided to act. In this regard, given the lack of religious hierarchy in Islam, it becomes easy for them to shop around—via the Internet or personal connections—to find a sheikh who will authorize and, moreover, provide textually grounded (and hence irreproachable) evidence as to why violence is permitted or even required in a given situation. It is also worth recalling here Sayyid Qutb’s teachings about how activist interpretations are privileged above those of religious scholars. For someone strongly molded in the “Qutbist” worldview, there is the potential that they may even untether themselves from formal sources of religious authority altogether. This phenomenon is illustrated in testimony given by the widow of a jihadi accused of planning the 2002 Madrid train bombings: “Sometimes we received texts [by religious scholars] from the Internet, but my husband did not read them, his relationship to jihad was instinctual.”⁹ Thus while activists may operate in frameworks whose general normative parameters are defined by a given religious authority, their willingness to engage in violence is not necessarily a learned behavior accruing exclusively from their participation in this network. Moreover, it seems that under certain circumstances they may disconnect from, or simply ignore, those aspects and teachings emanating from formally trained religious scholars that are dissonant with the activist orientation to which they have committed.

While the responses of the United States and its allies have severely damaged Al-Qaeda in important ways, there are those who believe that Bin Laden’s movement still represents a significant threat to the United States.¹⁰ Quite aside from the important question of Al-Qaeda’s operational capacity, there are other ways in which we can think of Al-Qaeda as harboring important symbolic power today—particularly in the eyes of some young Muslims in the West:

- (1) *Al-Qaeda as ideology*: a worldview or mindset consisting of a general critique of the prevailing world system shared by a wide range of radical Islamist groups (some affiliated with Al-Qaeda, some not), and also a desire to actively strike at the perceived sources of global injustice and enforced secularism—mainly the United States and its allies.
- (2) *Al-Qaeda as mythology*: the worldview described above can also be marketed as a legendary status symbol well after Al-Qaeda’s own active career (or the life of its leader) has come to an end. The Al-Qaeda “brand name” continues to inspire not only radical Islamists, but all manner of popular anti-systemic movements who now have evidence, based on Al-Qaeda’s example, that it is possible to mount successful attacks on the sources of world hegemony.

⁹ F. Gerges, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁰ B. Hoffman, ‘The Myth of Grassroots Terrorism: Why Usama Bin Laden Still Matters,’ *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008.

- (3) *Al-Qaeda as technology*: Bin Laden's movement provides a basic model or template for networked organization and activism, aspects of which can be emulated by various "franchises" across various scales—local, national, regional, and global.

As ideology, mythology, and technology, it seems likely that some aspect of Al-Qaeda will continue to exert influence in radical Islamist circles even if and when its operational capacity is destroyed or disappears. The popular appeal of radical Islam, particularly in its activist variant, will continue to be limited to a very small and highly extreme minority of Muslims. Many of the symbols it champions and aspects of its overall critique, however, will still resonate more widely in the Muslim world.

Some of the more prominent manifestations of "Al-Qaeda 2.0" have appeared in Europe in recent years, with the Madrid bombings of 2004 and the London attacks of 2005 being the most important. These events have prompted European governments to essay a wide range of counter-terrorism strategies, some focused quite specifically on known individuals or institutions, others on general outreach to European Muslim communities and various preventive measures. U.S. partners on the other side of the Atlantic have at times been very creative in their outreach efforts, but have also encountered major challenges. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) played the role of "Muslims-in-chief" for Tony Blair's government until a number of controversies around the group—not least of all the presence within its ranks of a number of mosque councils associated with intolerant views and Council leadership's ties to Islamist "legacy groups"—sent Whitehall in search of alternative interlocutors. In fact, the MCB, in terms of its membership, is undoubtedly the largest and most diverse Muslim body in the country. Its problems, however, lay precisely in the challenges associated with reconciling within the discourse of a single umbrella body the views of over 500 member organizations, ranging from South Asian-style Deobandi *madrasas* in rural Yorkshire to cosmopolitan progressive Muslim groups in southern English cities. One result of this persistent ideological-sectarian divide within the UK's Muslim community has been the formation of the British Muslim Forum (BMF) in 2005, a body established to give voice to the majority (by a slim margin) Barelwi—that is, traditionalist/Sufi—current within British Islam. British government efforts, most recently under the auspices of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), moved away from exclusive reliance on the MCB to focus on highly localized issues and initiatives via, for example, the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) program.

Part of the problem, however, is that the majority of Muslims living in the West, and particularly the younger generation, do not identify with any of the groups in question. This insight was at least partly reflected in the conceptualization of one of the more creative initiatives to come in the wake of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, the Radical Middle Way project. Combining public messaging, multimedia outreach, and traveling roadshow events, the Radical Middle Way—a partnership between several youth-oriented Muslim organizations (including Q-News, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies, and the Young Muslim Organisation—the latter two having some historical ties to Islamist groups) and the British government—showcases the views of

several leading Muslim scholarly and intellectual voices. The figures involved, such as Tariq Ramadan and the American neo-traditional scholar Sheikh Hamza Yusuf, are noteworthy for the size of their following among younger Muslims and for their strong credentials as authentic voices of Islam willing to criticize Western governments and their policies. Sheikh Ali Goma'a, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, is also on the roster. Very few of the speakers connected to the project have strong ties to or could be considered representatives of particular Islamic—or Islamist—groups, reflecting the aforementioned tendency within the younger generation to seek out independent voices. While this initiative is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, it would seem that the impact has been minimal insofar as those attending the events or picking up lectures on CDs already subscribe to the views being presented. Again, one has to question whether this is a meaningful space for engaging young Muslims whose sense of anger, disaffection, confused sense of identity, and desire for confrontational politics may have them looking towards radical—and potentially violent—alternatives. In some sense it would be unfair to place that burden on a program such as the Radical Middle Way whose original purposes were more in line with bolstering the morale and confidence of young, independent and creative Muslims in the West rather than acting as a bulwark to radicalism.

Another relevant example here and one that is particularly useful in illustrating the complexity of the questions at hand relates to the London Metropolitan Police's Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). Under the leadership of Robert Lambert, the MCU was in the frontline of outreach and coordination with Muslims in the British capital around issues of radicalism and terrorist threats. In this capacity, Lambert worked with and cites the contribution of various Islamists, including the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB—the British branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) as central to the successful rehabilitation of the notorious Finsbury Park Mosque, previously the HQ and chief pulpit for salafi-jihadi scholar Abu Hamza al-Masri. Lambert also acknowledges the contributions of salafi leaders at the Brixton Mosque in south London for their role in bringing to his attention and working to counter the sources and influence of hateful preaching. The most prominent Islamist current to be found in the UK comes from South Asia and the various "legacy groups" associated with the Pakistani and Bangladeshi branches of the Jama'at-i Islami movement. These influences are to be found in groups such as the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Forum Europe, Young Muslims UK and the Islamic Society of Britain. But one cannot simply understand the role of these groups today through the ideological positions of their founders. With most of them now at least a generation removed from the South Asian immigrants who first established them and with the younger generation coming into positions of prominence, one begins to detect in certain of these groups—such as the Islamic Society of Britain and the Islamic Foundation (previously the UK publishing wing of the Jama'at-i Islami)—the contours of a new and distinctly British approach to Islam. This is a discourse that emphasizes the compatibility between being British and being Muslim. As operationalized "on the streets," this vision involves the local leaders of these groups serving a role akin to social workers and "big brothers," taking vulnerable and disaffected young Muslim men under their wing. And yet the tendency, in some cases, to encourage socializing in exclusively Muslim circles and, in others, a seemingly exclusive preoccupation with foreign policy and political issues abroad, leads one to wonder to what extent a sense of Muslim identity

as something “separate” from mainstream British society might not be reinforced through the efforts of these groups. In short, is there a trade off between public order/security and social cohesion at work here?

Finally, what might the British experience of Islamism teach about how patterns could evolve within the Muslim population of the United States? We need to first recognize that the two communities are very different. While Muslim immigrants to the United States were mostly highly educated, employed in professional vocations, and generally well integrated, the same cannot be said of the Britain’s immigrant Muslim population. The issues and challenges faced by the two communities have hence been very different. There is a much larger historical “pool of discontent” from which British Muslims have been able to draw inspiration and see themselves reflected (even when relatively successful in terms of education and employment). We would consequently expect the threat from home grown terrorism in the United States to be much lower. Indeed, the comprehensive surveys undertaken as part of the Pew Research Center’s 2007 study of Muslim Americans indicated that the vast majority of Muslims in this country are moderate, mainstream in their social and political values, and well integrated. But one cannot ignore the fact that we have seen in recent years isolated incidents that suggest the presence of another dynamic: the Virginia Jihad Network, the Lackawanna Six, the Fort Dix plot, and others. While there is not yet evidence of a systematic or widespread threat of home-grown terrorism in the United States, it is worth considering the kind of circumstances that might allow such a situation to emerge. The ideological precursors, as we already know, are widely in circulation on the Internet and elsewhere. But as we have already argued, ideology alone is not a sufficient variable to explain radicalization. In the case of the UK, the experience of Muslims in that country as being a community subjected historically to discrimination and, more recently, as singled out and defined in terms of the threat it potentially poses to security, has provided a tangible basis on which to graft violent Islamist ideology. Heretofore, such a “grievance base” has been largely absent among Muslims in the United States. Should Muslims in this country begin to feel more markedly singled out and/or defined in terms of terrorism and threats to national security, the easier it may be for some among them to understand the worldview and vision of Islamic extremism as something that addresses their life circumstances. Finally, given the extremely broad and diverse nature of Islamism as an ideological movement, there is little doubt that among their affiliates and sympathizers are still to be found figures in the United States who act as fundraisers and financiers to groups currently classified as terrorist entities. In other cases, individuals associated with groups in the Middle East and elsewhere have fomented community tensions and divisive attitudes by “channeling” views and agendas from abroad directly into the streets of America.¹¹ Such individuals, however, represent a fringe minority within a movement whose core agenda has been undergoing significant transformation in the younger generation. To define Islamism exclusively or primarily in terms of their activities would therefore be akin to throwing out an enormous baby with very little bathwater.

Thank you again for the opportunity to address the Committee.

¹¹ One thinks here, for example, of the 2006 controversy involving Muslim taxi drivers at the Minneapolis airport.

The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
July 10, 2008

Zeyno Baran, Senior Fellow and Director of Center for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This issue is very important for me personally and professionally and I am honored to have a chance to share my views with you.

Violence is only one of the tools used by extremist Islamists in the broader “war of ideas” against Western liberal democracy. Winning the war against terrorism is not possible unless, as the 9/11 Commission Report correctly stated, the U.S. “prevail[s] in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.” In order to succeed, we must first come to understand the roots of this ideology: namely, Islamism.

This is not to say that all Islamists will one day become terrorists; the vast majority will never engage in violence and in fact are likely to abhor terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the first step on the path to jihadi terrorism is instruction in Islamist ideology. Nearly all individuals involved in terrorism—whether as a foot soldiers executing the attack or as upper-level strategists, financiers, or recruiters—start out as non-violent Islamists. Therefore, the deciding factor in determining which Muslims can be allies in the so-called “long war” cannot be based on tactics—that is, whether or not a group embraces violent methods.¹ The deciding factor must be ideological: Is the group Islamist or not?

Although various Islamist groups quarrel over means (and often bear considerable animosity towards one another), they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. While many do not openly call for violence or terrorism, they provide an ideological springboard for future violence.

The prime example of these groups is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Founded in 1928, MB is the first modern Islamist movement; out of it have come numerous splinter groups, which in turn have given rise to yet more splinter groups. Consequently, there has been an exponential growth of fairly radical Islamist organizations active all over the world, including in cyberspace.

¹ It is important to note that the “long war” concept was first used by the Islamists, and not the Bush administration. For example, in late 1998, Osama bin Laden’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri explicitly wrote that “we have resolved to fight...in a long battle...Generations will pass the torch to the following ones...” Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006, p. 25.

Over the 60 years since its founding in Egypt, MB has spread across the Middle East and expanded into every corner of the world. The tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood may be nonviolent in the West, and less violent than other groups in the Muslim world, but the ideology behind those tactics remains fundamentally opposed to the Western democratic system and its values. The worldview MB promotes can lead those exposed to it become excited to the point of engaging in violence. For example, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the September 11 terrorist attacks, told US interrogators that he was first drawn to violent jihad after attending Brotherhood youth camps.²

Muslim Brotherhood motto says it all: **“Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Qur’an is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”**³

After I briefly discuss the ideology and ideas of Islamism, I will then talk about two key MB splinter groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, before turning to the institutionalization of Islamism in America, which poses serious risks to the safety and stability of the country. Finally, I will highlight some areas in which I think the US government has adopted self-defeating policies and then suggest alternatives.

Islam vs. Islamism

Since 9/11, there have been various policies developed and numerous initiatives undertaken to counter so-called “violent Islamist extremism”. However, the most important first step—education about Islam and Islamism—has never taken place. I simply cannot understand how one can cure a disease without understanding its root cause. So far the US government has simply dealt with the symptoms, while the problem itself is getting worse.

The starting point has to be distinguishing **between Muslims and Islamists, and between Islam (the religion) and Islamism (the political ideology)**. Islam, the religion, deals with piety, ethics, and beliefs, and can be compatible with secular liberal democracy and basic civil liberties. Islamists, however, believe Islam is the *only* basis for the legal and political system that governs the world’s economic, social, and judicial mechanisms. Islamic law, or *sharia*, must shape all aspects of human society, from politics and education to history, science, the arts, and more. It is diametrically opposed to liberal democracy.

The term “Islamism” was coined by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Hassan al-Banna, in an effort to politicize Islam. Broadly, the label Islamist applies to individuals or groups who believe that Islam should be a comprehensive guide to life (for either Sunni or Shiite background). Islamists do not accept that the interpretation of Islam can evolve over the centuries along with human understanding or that the religion could be influenced or

² *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2004.

³ “Muslim Brotherhood Movement,” <http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan>.

modified by the cultures and traditions of various regions. Nor do they recognize that Islam can be limited to the religious realm, or to simply providing its followers with a code of moral and ethical principles. In this view, there is no such thing as religion being a private matter; all aspects of life are about Islam and for Islam.

I understand that for most Americans, dealing with Islamism is extremely difficult because it is associated with Islam. Very few people dare to question the beliefs or actions of Muslims for fear of being called a bigot or an Islamophobe. Since American culture is disposed to accepting all religions and cultures, when someone says, "This is my religion," there is a tendency not to question it. Oftentimes, there are no further inquiries about what being a follower of that religion entails or about how many different sects or interpretations of that religion exist. That is why we need to be clear: what needs to be countered is a political ideology, not a religion.

Today's Islamists adhere first and foremost to the works of the Muslim Brotherhood's most famous ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, and are not necessarily concerned with Islam's spiritual or cultural aspects. Qutb, like his ideological predecessors Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was preoccupied with the relative decline of the Muslim world. All three believed that this deterioration was a result of Muslims straying from the tenants of "pure Islam." Qutb argued that Islam's crisis could be reversed only if "true" Muslims, emulating the ways of the Prophet Muhammad, worked to replace existing governments in the Muslim world with strictly Islamic regimes.⁴ Accordingly, followers of Qutb desire the overthrow of their current governments and declare armed jihad against non-Muslim states.

It is important to underline that this step is often viewed as "**defensive jihad**," an interpretation which has broad acceptance among many Muslims. Traditionally, questions like who can declare jihad and under what conditions has been widely debated and a broad consensus has emerged: armed jihad is a form of "just war" to protect Muslims and the religion of Islam when under attack, but can only be declared by a legitimate authority. Today, as Islamists argue that contemporary political leaders lack the legitimate authority to order armed jihad, various independent actors have taken this responsibility into their own hands. This logic has been used to justify attacks in Western countries that are deemed to be waging war against Islam—not just militarily but also culturally.

It is also very important to understand that Islamism is ultimately a **long-term social engineering project**. The eventual "**Islamization**" of the world is to be enacted via a **bottom-up** process. Initially, the individual is Islamized into a "true" Muslim. This process requires the person to reject Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the secular rule of law. The process continues as the individual's family is transformed, followed by the society, and then the state. Finally, the entire world is expected to live, and be governed, according to Islamic principles. **It is this ideological machinery that works to promote separation, sedition, and hatred, and is at the core of Islamist terrorism.**

⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, 1990.

Islamists have a long-term and well-crafted strategy. They are known to form short-term alliances and make all kinds of exceptions as long as they serve the Islamist goal in the long-term. Hence, even though they would, for example, form an alliance with governments to “prevent terrorism,” this does not mean that they have stopped providing the ideological machinery that creates future terrorists.

While the MB remains the most powerful and best networked “core” organization, over time there have been different offshoots—some of which have openly promoted violence. I will just mention two of the splinter groups because they have significant influence among second- and third-generation immigrant Muslim youth, including those in the US.⁵ One of the most influential is **Hizb ut-Tahrir** (HT). Like the MB, HT as an organization does not engage in terrorist activities, but has become the vanguard of a radical Islamist ideology that encourages its followers to commit terrorist acts. It too has given rise to splinter groups, some of which have been directly involved in Islamist terrorism.

Exponential Radicalization

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islamiyya (the Party of Islamic Liberation) was founded by Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, whose political and religious philosophy was heavily influenced by the MB. He was first a member of the Brotherhood, but he found its ideology too moderate and too accommodating of the West.⁶ As a result, he founded a splinter group in 1953, which developed from the main ideological pillars of the MB, but adopted a more radical stance on what the ultimate goal of Islamism should be and the means in which to achieve it.

Hizb ut-Tahrir effectively combines Marxist-Leninist methodology and Western slogans with reactionary Islamic ideology in order to shape the internal debate within Islam. HT doctrine stipulates that the only way to re-establish the kind of Islamic society promulgated by the Prophet Muhammad is to liberate (hence the name of the party) Muslims from the thoughts, systems, and laws of *kufir* (non-believers) by replacing the Judeo-Christian dominated nation-state system with a borderless *umma*.⁷ In fact, HT’s key contribution to Islamism is its focus on the creation of a worldwide Islamic *umma* (community) and the re-establishment of the Caliphate. For many decades these ideas were considered extreme; more recently, they have been adopted as mainstream by most Islamists.

HT is active in the Muslim world (where it aims to overthrow governments) and in the West (where it aims to unite the Muslims around their Islamic identity and prevent assimilation into mainstream culture). HT members believe that contemporary international politics is dominated by American efforts to wage a “**fourth crusade**” against Muslims.⁸ HT fans the

⁵ Madeleine Gruen, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s Activities in the United States,” *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, Volume V, Issue 16. <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373622>

⁶ For more details on HT and AM, see Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s Political Insurgency* (Washington DC: The Nixon Center, 2000)

⁷ *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change* (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1999),

p. 5. See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/books/pdfs/method_for_revival.pdf.

⁸ “Annihilate the Fourth Crusade”, March 20, 2003, <http://www.khilafah.com.pk/>

flames with publications such as “**The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilization**,” which is riddled with conspiracy theories.⁹

HT members claim to want freedom and justice. But the freedom they want is “freedom from democracy,” and the justice they want can only be found under Islamic rule. Under such rule, Muslims who do not abide by sharia law will be “considered as apostates and liable to punishment according to Islamic law”¹⁰—or, to put it more directly, they will be executed.

The freedom and justice HT seeks by overthrowing democracy can often only be attained through violence. Hence, groups such as HT never denounce acts of terror because it is deemed as a necessary means towards their ultimate goal. Moreover, HT opposes violence only until the Caliphate is created—we don’t even have to wait for an Armageddon to occur—so long as HT believes that a Caliphate has been created, it will take up arms.

However, Hizb ut-Tahrir is not likely to take up terrorism itself. Terrorist acts are simply not part of its mission—HT exists to serve as an ideological and political training ground for Islamists. In order to best accomplish this, HT will remain non-violent, acting within the legal system of the countries in which it operates—the same can be said about many of the Islamist groups, including the MB. It does not even need to become a terrorist group—winning hearts and minds is far more effective in achieving the ultimate goal. Acts of terrorism are only one tool in the radical Islamist toolbox; Islamists will be even stronger if they can turn people and systems around without violence. However, in the event they cannot establish their Caliphate by words, it may turn to using violent force.

In many ways, HT is part of an elegant division of labor. The group itself is active in the ideological preparation of the “true” Muslims, while other organizations handle the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. Despite its objections to this description, HT today serves as a *de facto* conveyor belt for terrorists.¹¹ As HT becomes more appealing to the activist Muslim at-large, they gain a wider reach in the community. When discouraged people try to find answers, there is a greater chance they will turn to this group, which will provide them with the ideological tools that could incite them to commit a terrorist act. Simply put, HT is not the “non-violent” movement that it claims to be.

leaflets/030320iraq.html.

⁹ “The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilizations”, April 20, 2004, <http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:5UCEoh1Owq&J:www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/books/clashofcivilisation/clashofcivilisation.pdf+the+inevitability+of+a+clash&hl=en>.

¹⁰ Igor Rotar, “Central Asia: Hizb-Ut-Tahrir Wants Worldwide Sharia Law”, *Forum 18*, October 29, 2003.

¹¹ In response to an article of mine entitled, “The Road from Tashkent to Taliban”, April 2, 2004 on National Review Online, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/baran200404020933.asp>, describing how HT serves as conveyor belt for terrorists, Dr. Abdullah Robin, a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, posted an open letter to me on HT’s website, <http://www.1924.org>.

HT has led to the formation of even more radical and militant groups than itself, such as the al-Muhajiroun (AM). This organization was founded by Omar Bakri Mohammed. He was born to a wealthy Syrian family in 1958 and recruited at an early age by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. After his participation in a failed coup against President Hafez al-Asad, Bakri was expelled from Syria. He fled to Lebanon and became a member of the local HT branch. Then, during the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1979, Bakri moved to Saudi Arabia, where he established AM as a front for HT. After being exiled by the Saudi government, Bakri then moved to the UK, where he received asylum in 1985.

Bakri was at first a leader of HT in the UK. However, he had a falling out with the HT leadership over tactics—he believed HT should take a populist approach and preach activism, whereas al-Nabhani sought to develop HT as an elitist and clandestine political party. HT leadership believed Bakri’s style was appropriate for “more advanced stages of the party’s strategy” that should be confined to Muslim countries where there was greater potential for revolution.¹² When Bakri formed AM in the UK, those drawn to a more risky and activist Islamism, the “graduates” of HT, joined his new, more radical organization.

Bakri described the September 11 attacks as “a great achievement by the *mujaheddin* against the evil superpower” and his followers annually celebrate that day.¹³ Bakri stated that, “Sheikh Osama bin Laden is not just another warrior for present-day Muslims; he is a hero who stands for divine justice and freedom from oppression. Any action against him is seen as action against the global body of Muslims.”¹⁴ In fact, he has claimed to be “the eyes of Osama bin Laden” and reports indicate that the two have communicated at least as far back as 1998. After 9/11, the *Los Angeles Times* released the text of a 1998 fax from Bin Laden in Afghanistan to Bakri, urging him to “Bring down their airliners. Prevent the safe passage of their ships. Occupy their embassies. Force the closure of their companies and banks.”¹⁵

AM has recruited in schools to send fighters to Afghanistan to join the Taliban.¹⁶ Reports indicate that al-Muhajiroun’s network fed militants into the heart of conflicts around the world. Bakri openly admitted that he “recruited hundreds of Britons to fight for Islamic causes in recent years.”¹⁷ In 2000, Bakri estimated “that between 1,800 and 2,000 go abroad for military training every year. They either go for national service in Pakistan or to ‘private camps’ in South Africa, Nigeria or Afghanistan where they learn of weapons and explosives.”¹⁸ Although Bakri’s numbers may be inflated, it is clear that al-Muhajiroun activists were drawn into conflict.

¹² Suha Taji-Farouki, “Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36, no. 4: (October 2000), p. 31.

¹³ Thair Shaikh, “London to Host Islamic ‘Celebration’ of Sept 11”, *Daily Telegraph* (London), September 9, 2002, <http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/09/08/nextre08.xml>.

¹⁴ Press Release, Al-Muhajiroun, September 16, 2001.

¹⁵ Stephen Braun *et al.*, “Haunted By Years of Missed Warnings”, *Los Angeles Times*, October 14, 2001.

¹⁶ “UK Muslims ‘Killed’ in Afghanistan”, BBC News, October 29, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1625115.stm>.

¹⁷ Liz Sly, “Arrests Signal Crackdown on Extremists”, *Chicago Tribune*, October 5, 2001.

¹⁸ Cahal Milmo, “Five Britons Die Fighting for Taliban in Mazar”, *Independent* (London),

From this brief summary, it is apparent that one central organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, has led to splinters that have become progressively more radical. From the supposedly non-violent Muslim Brotherhood splintered the HT, which advocates for a Muslim world run by *sharia* law without democracy, but does not openly advocate for violence. From the HT, we got AM, which, frustrated with the inability to make serious progress towards the common goal, took steps up to a new radicalism. AM is directly linked to Osama Bin-Laden, Hamas, and Hezbollah, and blatantly advocates for terrorist acts.

*The Jihad-Identity Nexus: The Ziggurat of Zealotry*¹⁹

This week marks the anniversary of the 7/7 London suicide bombings that killed 52 people. Until that day, the British government believed there was an implicit “covenant of security,” meaning that radical Islamist groups could operate out of the UK, spread hateful messages, provide global networking, distribute literature, etc, as long as they did not attack the homeland. But as we see over and over again, once certain ideas are spread widely and persistently, one cannot control how people will use them—especially if these ideas are about the legitimacy of killing people in the name of their religion.

There were warnings before 7/7 and there have been warnings since. We repeatedly hear about cases of individuals not considered to be “potential terrorists” or seen as “normal” by family and friends engage in violent acts. These are not oppressed or poor people; they tend to be well-educated, gamely employed, and with loving families. As terrorism experts often note, if there is one common element among the terrorists is the tendency to appear as regular people—they do not come across as “death loving” or “crazy”; they completely believe what they do is proscribed to them by their religion as the ultimate show of faith.

It is very rare for someone to wake up and randomly decide to commit a violent act; there is almost always a process of radicalization and a network of like-minded people who become enablers. In the West, Muslims undergoing an identity crisis are the most vulnerable. There are also those who are perfectly well-adjusted and integrated and simply want to learn more about their religion; if these well-meaning citizens end up getting their information from Islamists, they too can become radicalized over time.

Radicalization can be seen as a multi-stepped process. At the bottom of the radicalization pyramid are the disenfranchised, who simply want Muslims to live in better conditions. They are typically involved in social work and proselytizing. Some of these people come into contact with an HT or AM recruiter (or a member of another Islamist group) and develop a relationship, and with it, a sense of community. The recruiter gradually introduces elements of ideology, though

November 17, 2001.

¹⁹ This phrase is taken from a Western intelligence source. The ziggurat was a form of temple in a pyramidal structure, built in receding tiers upon a rectangular, oval, or square platform, with a shrine at the summit. Access to the summit shrine was provided by a series of ramps on one side or by a continuous spiral ramp from base to summit.

without mentioning that there is a greater movement behind it. After a certain period, he or she is convinced that social work alone will not make any real difference; the political conditions must change. At that point, the person takes the leap to political involvement.

Once trust is established, and with the encouragement of the recruiter (who is now a “friend”), the seeker is introduced to the organization, its political philosophy, and its objectives. During this process, the organization promotes an identity that is tied to a sense of pride founded in the glory days of Islamic civilization. In study groups and literature, the emphasis is on consciousness raising, or teaching the individual the “right” way to think about Islam. The current state of the Muslim world is blamed on the forces of democracy and capitalism and those Muslims who ally with America and Israel. These groups use theological explanations to create a sense that Islam and Muslims are under attack.

To reinforce the study groups, consciousness-raising activities continue in private meeting places, where self-declared sheikhs instill a combination of radical theology and a sense of mission. After a while, some people become recruiters themselves to help the *umma*’s consciousness-raising, while others lose patience and resort to more drastic measures.

The third level of the radicalist ladder consists of people who have decided to engage in local violence. They may target their own government by bombing an office building, or focus on a local American or Israeli target. Some people remain at this level. Others engage in one-time violence and move back down one level to the political stage. Quite a few moves on to the fourth and the final step: global jihad.

What seems to encourage people to take the final step are the hateful rants delivered by imams and leaders of the Islamist organizations. For example, over the years London’s Finsbury Park mosque became a virtual social club for radicals: Omar Bakri and Abu Hamza al-Masri lectured there, and terrorists such as Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui regularly attended the mosque.

On the journey from increased consciousness to militancy, it is rare for individuals to commit acts of violence for exclusively ideological reasons. Young Muslims who engage in risky activities usually do so for a combination of ideological and social reasons. An individual who is indoctrinated with militant Islamist ideology but is not embedded within a network of like-minded peers ultimately lacks the vehicle through which he can act. In the reverse scenario, someone who feels strongly attached to the “brothers” of a local Islamist cell may become a political militant or gang member, but will not become a “religious fanatic, ready to sacrifice himself for the glory of God without the necessary ideological foundation.”²⁰ In order to ensure that both factors are present, both HT and AM fuse ideological training with social networks. By virtue of the study groups and social activities that assume the base of their organizations, both groups have covered the globe with like-minded Islamists that encourage their peers to step up towards militancy. The internal structure of both organizations not only encourages radicalism, but strengthens inter-Islamist networking.

²⁰ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). p. 115.

Islamist Infrastructure in the US

For the purpose of this hearing, I will not talk about the MB globally; I will just focus on its network in the US. There is a false sense of security in the US that derives from the belief that American Muslims are well-integrated—that the US will not face the same threat Europe is facing from its alienated Muslim youth. However, if we look at the number of attempted homegrown terror plots that were prevented (often by pure luck) we need to be very concerned. The NYPD report, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” is an excellent source in this regard.²¹ It outlines several European and American based Islamist terror cases, and finds that the homegrown threat is indeed serious in the US. Moreover, the radicalization process is accelerating (i.e. the time between being exposed to Islamism and attempting violent acts) and the individuals involved are getting younger.

To understand how and why this is happening, one has to look at where people learn about Islam, who represents Muslims and Islam, what activities are conducted by these groups, and other related infrastructure questions. This is where the MB comes in—the most prominent Muslim organizations in America were either created by or are associated with the Brotherhood and the Wahhabis and are therefore been heavily influenced by Islamist ideology. Over the course of four decades, Islamists have taken over the leadership in almost all Islam related areas in America. **This is worrisome, yet almost no one in the US government deals with it.**

How did it happen? MB members from the Middle East and South Asia began coming to the US in the 1960s as students. Most were escaping persecution—e.g. government crackdown after an attempted Islamists coup of some sort. This is also when Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment began its global Islamization project, partnering with Brotherhood members around the world. In 1962, the Muslim World League (MWL) was established in Mecca, with Brotherhood members in key leadership positions, to propagate Wahhabism worldwide. Over the ensuing decades, the MWL has funded many legitimate charitable endeavors but also a number of Islamist projects. Some of this money has come to support Brotherhood activists in the US, in part to change the perception of Wahhabism in America from “extremist” to “mainstream.” Looking at the situation today, they have achieved their mission to a large degree.

I will not go into a detailed history of Islamist networks established in America since then. I will just highlight some points here. The primary focus of these organizations has been education, or indoctrination, of the youth, which marks the critical first step of the bottom-up approach that these organizations use.

We see the first MB organizations established in America were the Muslim Student Associations (MSA), which are based in universities. When the first set of MB-indoctrinated university students graduated, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) was created in order to

²¹ Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” New York Police Department, August 1, 2007, available at http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

expand these radical ideas and extend their influence beyond college campuses. NAIT established a variety of Muslim professional associations, schools, Islamic centers, and publishing houses so that Islamist literature could be widely circulated. NAIT was established in 1973; today, it owns hundreds of Islamic centers, mosques and schools across the US.

Then, in 1981, several other prominent Islamist organizations were created: the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), a think-tank dedicated to the “Islamization of knowledge”; the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), a self-described umbrella organization for all Muslims in North America to “to advance the cause of Islam and service Muslims in North America so as to *enable them to adopt Islam as a complete way of life*”; and the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) “to communicate the Ikhwan’s [Muslim Brotherhood] point of view” and “to serve the cause of Palestine on the political and the media fronts.”²² After Hamas was created in 1987 in Gaza, the IAP became its leading representative in North America.

There are a whole set of other organizations that can be added to this list; I will just mention two more because they are particularly well-known and influential. The Muslim American Society (MAS), founded in 1993; and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which I believe was created by MB to influence the US government, Congress, and NGOs, along with academic and media groups. The Brotherhood identified the media as “stronger than politics,” highlighted the importance of training activists to present a “view of the IAP” that would be acceptable to Americans. One of CAIR’s founders, Omar Ahmad, explicitly suggested the need for “infiltrating the American media outlets, universities and research centers.”²³ Yet, despite being founded by leading Islamists, CAIR has successfully portrayed itself as a mainstream Muslim organization over the past 15 years—and has been treated as such by many US government officials, including Presidents Clinton and Bush.

What is critically important in all these organizations is their support for one another; the same leaders appear in multiple organizations, tend to have familial relations, and move within the same close trusted circles. Outwardly they all appear to be different entities, but they are actually part of a carefully planned Islamization effort. Thus, **an American wanting to learn about Islam (a Muslim or a potential convert) would start in MSA, end in ISNA, or move to CAIR, all the while ignorant of the fact that he or she has been part of a political movement instead of a faith group.**

It is unnerving to think that American Muslims who are genuinely seeking greater knowledge about their religion are obliged to turn to one or several of these organizations. Once there, Islamism is presented as synonymous with Islam, and the new member has no way of knowing otherwise. New members often fail to realize the groups they joined are not merely religious groups but political ones with a Wahhabi bias. If I was born and raised in the US, the chances are that I would have been an Islamist as well. However, I grew up in Turkey, and when

²² “A Brief History of the Muslim Brotherhood in the US,” internal Muslim Brotherhood document, October 25, 1991, available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/MBUS_History.pdf

²³ Transcript of October 1993 meeting of US Palestine Committee leaders in Philadelphia, available at http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/93Philly_12.pdf.

I came here to attend university and went to my first MSA meeting, I could detect the influence of Islamism. It was the first and last time I attended such a meeting.

It is also very important to note that despite their outwardly moderate positions, **NAIT, ISNA, and CAIR were all named as un-indicted co-conspirators in the federal case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), which was charged with providing millions of dollars to Hamas.** Among other things, court documents and testimony specifically identified CAIR as a member of the Palestine Committee in America, which is tasked with working to “increase the financial and moral support for Hamas,” to “fight surrendering solutions,” and to publicize “the savagery of the Jews.”²⁴

It is extremely worrisome that CAIR Chairman Parvez Ahmed stated, “It is not just the HLF that is under fire, but the entire American Muslim community is under fire.”²⁵ With this, Ahmed is implying to the American Muslim community that groups like CAIR are being persecuted simply because they are Islamic rather than because of links to terrorist organizations—further creating a sense that all Muslims need to unite under the Islamist cause. Such rhetoric is increasingly used to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in America. The only way to stop this is through education—of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

The HLF trial provided us with a shocking set of documents—yet most people, especially Muslims, will never read them and will buy into the story of victimization propagated by the Islamists.

One document outlining the “**general strategic goal for the group in North America**” explains the goal as consisting of six stages:

1. Establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood
2. Adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally
3. Expanding the observant Muslim base
4. Unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts
5. **Presenting Islam as a civilizational [sic] alternative**
6. **Supporting the establishment of the global Islamic state wherever it is**²⁶

Accordingly, Muslims should look upon this mission as a “**Civilization Jihadist responsibility**” which is outlined below:

The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so

²⁴ Internal memo of the Palestine Committee, October 1992, available at <http://www.investigativeproject.org/redirect/InternalMemo.pdf>.

²⁵ Steven Emerson, “Worst Approach to Counterterrorism Yet,” *IPT News Service*, September 18, 2007, available at <http://www.investigativeproject.org/article/474>

²⁶ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” May 22, 1991, available online at http://www.nefahfoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/Akram_GeneralStrategicGoal.pdf.

that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions.²⁷

Clearly, in this case jihad is not intended to be an inner, personal struggle, as is often claimed by American Islamists when they must explain why they were caught inciting for "jihad."

This document makes clear the Muslim Brotherhood's goal is to spread its version of political Islam, making it a "civilization alternative" to a Western way of life. Even though many Brotherhood-linked organizations have dismissed this memo as "outdated," it is fairly consistent with recent statements as well as the generic long war strategy. In 2004, **MB's official supreme leader, Mohammed Akef** called the US a "Satan" and said that he was confident America would collapse. Akef also **stated that he has "complete faith that Islam will invade Europe and America, because Islam has logic and a mission."**²⁸

In the past 17 years, the MB in the US has made serious progress in its six-stage strategy. In fact, if it were not for the 9/11 attacks and the increased scrutiny on American Muslim organizations that came as a result, it might now be farther along in its plan. Terrorist acts inside the US are huge setbacks for American Islamists because their long-term strategy of gradual infiltration was seriously hurt by the 9/11 attacks; they increasingly came under the scrutiny of law enforcement authorities. It is not surprising that most of these organizations offer their cooperation to prevent Islamist terrorism inside the US. This is also the primary reason why some in the US favor engaging the Islamists.

However, as described earlier, this is a misguided policy, as ideological extremism is at the root of the terrorist problem. The NYPD explicitly stated this link in its recent report on homegrown terrorist threats, saying "jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out 'autonomous jihad' via acts of terrorism against their host countries."²⁹ Turning a blind eye to Islamism and its ideological extremism—even if done for the sake of combating violent extremism and terrorism—is, in other words, extremely short-sighted and self-defeating.

Though many American Islamist organizations deny any connection to Hamas, the direct links between Hamas and the Brotherhood are indisputable. When questioned, many American Islamist organizations deny any links to the MB. If and when this deception fails, then they say the association was in the past. If pressed even further, they adopt the role of the victim, accusing their accusers of "McCarthyism" and "Islamophobia." This intimidation, up to and including anti-defamation lawsuits, has silenced many journalists, researchers, and other Muslims.

²⁷ "An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America," May 22, 1991, available online at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/Akram_GeneralStrategicGoal.pdf.

²⁸ "New Muslim Brotherhood Leader: Resistance in Iraq and Palestine is Legitimate; America is Satan; Islam Will Invade America and Europe," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 655, February 4, 2004, available at http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=egypt&ID=SP65504#_edn10.

²⁹ Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," New York Police Department, August 1, 2007, available at http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

Cloaking themselves in civil rights and charity work, the leaders of these organizations have successfully managed to disguise their true agenda: supporting Islamism, and protecting and augmenting the operations of radical groups that support terrorism. It is therefore not unexpected that large sections of the institutional Islamic leadership in America do not support US counter-terrorism policy. Far from it: they denounce virtually every terrorism indictment, detention, deportation, and investigation as a religiously motivated attack on Islam. Instead of considering whether the individual in question actually broke any laws, they instinctively blame the legal accusations on bigotry or anti-Muslim conspiracies.

Yet, **the Islamist threat is real and is the result of decades of networking, infrastructure-building, and intellectual and ideological preparation.** These groups have spent billions of dollars in creating networks of like-minded supporters. In fact, much of their support comes from the “us versus them” mentality they have helped to create. Islamists sometimes even provoke incidents intended to make the American Muslim community feel under siege, presumably in an attempt to compel them to unite. They have worked hard at social engineering (i.e. Islamization) for nearly four decades. Over time the Islamist network expanded its coverage geographically—from local to international, from charities to public relations, and eventually to national politics.

Countless young American Muslims—whether converts, Muslims born into secular families, or those brought up in traditional households—that have entered college since 9/11 are curious about Islam and their identity as both a Muslim and an American. Too often these young men and women end up at the local MSA chapter looking for answers. Perhaps it’s no wonder that a Pew report released in May 2007 found a quarter of American Muslims aged 18 to 29 believe suicide bombings against civilians can sometimes be justified to defend Islam, while only 9 percent of those older than 30 agreed.³⁰

How to counter Islamism?

First and foremost, US government entities and all those individuals tasked with “Muslim outreach” need to know who they are dealing with before bestowing legitimacy on them as “moderate” Muslims. For months now, FBI agents have been trained by CAIR to be “sensitive” to Muslims. This is completely self-defeating. Furthermore, there have been rather embarrassing cases of top government officials, including Presidents, posing with their “moderate” Muslim friend for a photo, only to find later that the person was providing funding to enemies of the United States.

Many of the American Muslim organizations are founded to further a political agenda. They are not civil rights groups or faith groups—they are political entities with a very clear political agenda. When they raise a civil rights issue, it may be to correct a real issue, but most of the time it is brought up to serve an Islamist cause. They hardly ever take up civil rights issues of Muslims who are not linked to Islamism. Moreover, when Islamists engage in

³⁰ “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007, available at <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf>.

interfaith activities, they only do it as an act of *dawa*, whereas Jewish or Christian groups tend to be genuinely interested in building bridges with Muslims.

Second, it is an Islamist myth that US support and engagement for truly moderate Muslims would discredit these Muslims in the eyes of the community. This is a trick to keep the US away from non-Islamists, while the Islamists continue to enjoy all kinds of access and influence. Islamists thrive on US support and engagement, which effectively legitimizes their self-appointed status as representatives of Muslim community. This engagement also legitimizes the Islamists' self-appointed ability to judge the "Muslimness" of others.

Bestowing this status and capability upon Islamists is particularly dangerous in America. Muslims living in the US—particularly converts and those born to immigrants—are more vulnerable to being won over by Islamist ideology because America does not have a strong native tradition of Islam. American Muslims searching for a greater understanding of what it means to be Muslim often find little information available except those provided by Islamists.

For example, the State Department works with various Islamist organizations in conducting "visitor exchange programs" with Muslims, including imams, coming from outside the US to learn about Americans, American culture and American Muslims. However, this program is de-facto helping Islamists to gain further legitimacy and helping them extend their networks of personal contacts.

Third, with so much information already in the public domain, it is simply irresponsible to claim ignorance of some American Muslim groups' agendas. There are a whole set of questions that need to be asked of organizations who offer help in "countering violent extremism". These include:

- Who is the founder and what is the organization's purpose? (Clearly, one would need to confirm that they are indeed telling the truth, since so many of the Islamist groups are based on deception and dual roles.)
- Where does their funding come from? (Not just now, but also at the start; again, one should not just accept what they say at face value.)

Fourth, the mantra that only Islamists can pull radicalized Muslims away from terrorism, and therefore they need to be further empowered in dealing with "countering violent extremism" is completely illogical. The reason these people are radicalized is Islamist ideology; if the MB and related groups could keep radicals under control, they would have done so already. These people either left MB structures or do not want to be affiliated with them precisely because they have moved to more radical platforms. As long as Islamism is actively spread, its ideas will continue to wreak havoc.

The purpose of "engagement" needs to be clear. It means finding allies among Muslims who would help to prevent radicalization. The only true allies in countering an ideology that is fundamentally opposed to America and its ideas are those Muslims who share American ideas—or at the very least, do not want to undermine them. This group includes the pious and practicing, liberal, secular, and cultural ones—the quiet, but still overwhelming majority of American

Muslims. Most of these Muslims are truly moderate, and by definition simply want to live their lives and do not want to take part in organizations to further the global political agenda of the Islamists.

The Muslims that need active support are non-Islamist people who understand the inherent incompatibility between Islamism's desired imposition of *sharia* law upon society at large and Western society's pluralism and equality. They are on the American side of the "war of ideas." Non-Islamist Muslims can be practicing or not—it is irrelevant. After all, the issues the terrorists raise to gain support are often unrelated to Islam as a religion.

In addition to finding allies, in the "war of ideas" the US also has to have a good product. An increasing number of Muslims prefer the competitor's "product" which contains a two-pronged message:

1) The current system only benefits those in the US-led "West" and so must be overthrown. This very seductive message not only appeals to Muslims, but also brings together a diverse assortment of leaders/peoples from Hugo Chavez to Vladimir Putin and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

2) "Democratization" is a euphemism for the replacement of traditional cultural values with those of the West (i.e. cultural assimilation).

This simple "product" casts the West as the aggressor so Islamist Muslims feel justified in waging a *defensive* jihad. The tools the "competitor" include deception and cooptation—they are well aware of the power of strategic communications.

Unlike the threat posed by the Soviet Union, America's new and more fluid enemy demands a multi-faceted, and more importantly, an ideological response. To effectively counter the message of the Islamist organizations, the US needs to pull together its own toolkit and confidently and aggressively make its case. A good start would be to reveal the deception of the Islamists.

For non-Islamist Muslims, especially in the US, Islam is a matter of personal faith. As long as the government continues to grant them freedom to practice their faith as they see fit and their civil rights are respected, they have no reason to organize politically. And there is no doubt America is and remains the best place for Muslims.

United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
“Violent Islamist Extremism in Global Context”

Statement of Fathali M. Moghaddam
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Georgetown University
Senior Fellow, Center on Policy, Education, and Research on Terrorism
July 10, 2008

Chairman Lieberman; Senator Collins. Distinguished Members.

Violent extremism is a major problem in a number of contemporary societies; violent Islamist extremism has become a serious global threat, and could remain so during the next few decades. In order to more effectively thwart this threat, it is necessary to explore and better understand its roots. For this reason, I am grateful to you for inviting me to present my views regarding the ideological roots of violent Islamist extremism.

Because ideology is a major focus in this hearing, let me begin by clarifying my own ideological biases. Like hundreds of millions of other Muslims, my hope and goal is that Islamic societies, including those of the Near and Middle East, will become far more politically, culturally, and economically open in the future. The open, democratic Islamic society will be

more peaceful, more productive, more affluent, more just, and better for the global economy.

To a significant degree, higher oil prices are the result of dictatorships, monopolies, corruption, a lack of open competition, and inefficiency.

But to achieve more open Islamic societies there are major obstacles to overcome, and violent Islamist extremism is one such major obstacle. In order to evaluate this particular obstacle, I find it instructive to review the letter of invitation I received, which states the purpose of the present Senate hearing to be “to explore the ideology that is the root source for the radicalization of potential followers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations around the world”. I believe it is useful to critically assess the assumption that an ideology is “the root source for the radicalization of potential followers of al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations around the world”.

An ideology does not arise in a vacuum, nor does it influence behavior in a vacuum. An ideology can only impact behavior under given conditions, when other necessary factors are present.

In the Georgetown University libraries, there are many books that espouse potentially dangerous ideologies. Why is it that young women and men at Georgetown are not influenced by the many dangerous books available, including works on fascism, anarchism, and various kinds of religious fundamentalism? Why do they not turn to terrorism? Clearly because the availability of a violent extremist ideology serves as a necessary, but is not a sufficient, cause for terrorist action.

We must ask, then, what are the factors that combine with a particular ideology to lead to violent Islamist extremism? How does an ideology supportive of violent Islamist extremism

come to influence individuals to support and commit acts of terrorism? I have addressed this question by adopting a 'big picture' approach¹, exploring radicalization and terrorism in the context of cultural evolution and globalization. In order to clarify my viewpoint, I have found it useful to adopt a staircase metaphor of radicalization and terrorism.

The Staircase To Terrorism

Consider a multi-story building with a winding staircase at its center. People are located on different floors of the building, but everyone begins on the ground floor; where there are about 1.2 billion Muslims. Thought and action on each floor is characterized by particular psychological processes. On the ground floor, the most important psychological processes influencing behavior are subjective interpretations of material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and adequacy of identity. Hundreds of millions of Muslims suffer collective (fraternal) relative deprivation and lack of adequate identity; they feel that they are not being treated fairly and are not receiving adequate material rewards. They feel dissatisfied with the way they are depicted by the international media and, most importantly, they do not want to become second-class copies of Western ideals.

I have argued that the Islamic population on the ground floor of the staircase to terrorism is experiencing a collective identity crisis, and that this crisis is particularly acute in the major dictatorships of the Near and Middle East. Muslims are faced with a choice between two

¹ For example, see:
Moghaddam, F. M. (2008, September). *How globalization spurs terrorism*. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International.
Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the terrorists' point of view*. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International

inadequate identities. The first involves copying the West, and confronts what I have termed 'the good copy problem'. By copying the West, Muslims can only hope to become 'good copies' of borrowed Western ideals, but not to achieve authentic identities. The second path open to Muslims for identity development is represented by various kinds of Islamic fundamentalism, which push for a return to 'pure' Islam in the form it is assumed to have existed 1,400 years ago. Why is there not a third alternative, a constructive secular third path? The reason is that dictatorial, authoritarian forces continue to imprison, banish, or kill the secular opposition. In country after country in the Near and Middle East, as well as in parts of central and North Africa, Islamic fundamentalism is filling the enormous vacuum left open by the despotic repression of democratic movements.

This situation has resulted in a collective crisis of identity among Muslims. This identity crisis is especially acute because about 60% of the global Muslim population is below the age of 25, and because the psychological experiences of the young are characterized by a yearning for adequate identity.

However, on the ground floor, degrees of freedom are large relative to degrees of freedom² on the higher floors of the staircase to terrorism, and individual Muslims on the ground floor have a wider range of behavioral options. Only some individuals move up from the ground floor to the first floor, in search of ways to improve their life conditions. These individuals in no way see themselves as terrorists or even supportive of terrorist causes; they are simply attempting to improve the situation of themselves and their groups. On this floor they are particularly

²For further clarification of 'degrees of freedom' and behavior, see Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). *Great Ideas in Psychology*. Oxford: Oneworld., and the distinction between 'performance capacity' and 'performance style' in Moghaddam, F. M. (2002). *The Individual and Society*. New York: Worth.

influenced by possibilities for individual mobility and voice. Extensive evidence has accumulated to show that when people feel their voice is listened to during the decision making process, they 'buy into' the system. However, when they feel they have no voice, they become more dissatisfied and detached. Some of these dissatisfied individuals climb up to the second floor of the staircase, where they come under the influence of persuasive messages telling them that the root cause of their problems is external enemies, particularly America and Israel. Individuals on the second floor are encouraged to displace aggression onto external targets.

Displacement of aggression is a well documented phenomenon in inter-group dynamics in both non-Western and Western societies. By focusing attention on so-called 'external enemies', those who oppose openness and democracy find it easier to:

- *increase support for aggressive leadership
- *silence internal critics and dissenting voices
- *isolate and pressure minorities
- *gain public support for trampling on civil liberties and human rights

Many of the individuals who climb up to the second floor of the staircase remain there, but some keep climbing up to reach the third floor where they adopt a morality supportive of terrorism. Gradually, those who have reached the third floor become divorced from the mainstream morality of their society, which generally condemns terrorism (this is also true in Islamic communities), and take on a morality supportive of an 'ends justify the means' approach.

Those individuals who continue the climb up to the fourth floor adopt a more rigid style of categorical 'us versus them', 'good against evil' thinking. Their world is now unambiguously divided up into 'black and white', and it is seen as legitimate to attack 'the forces of evil' in any and every way feasible. Some of these individuals move up to the fifth floor, where they take part in and directly support terrorist actions.

Individuals who reach the highest floors of the staircase become specialized in their activities in support of terrorism. Through an analysis of the available evidence, I identified nine different specialties involved in terrorist activities and networks. Both the research literature and the media typically focuses on the suicide bomber, a specialty that belongs to a category I have termed 'fodder'. The eight other specialties are: source of inspiration, strategist, networker, technical expert, cell manager, local agitator and guide, local cell member, and fund raiser. Some of these specialties are more involved with the production and dissemination of ideology, while others tend to be consumers of ideology.

The higher individuals move up the staircase to terrorism, the lower the degrees of freedom. In other words, the power of the context increases, and the behavioral options decrease, on the higher floors. After an individual has become part of a terrorist group or network and has reached the highest floor, the only options left open are to try to kill, or be killed or captured. Personality factors are less influential, and the context is all-powerful, on the highest floor. In contrast, on the lowest floors the degrees of freedom are greater, meaning that individuals have a wider variety of behavioral options, and personality factors play a larger role in determining who climbs up the staircase.

The varying nature of degrees of freedom is evident in all situations where terrorism has

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existed. Consider the context of Northern Ireland. When I visited Belfast to conduct interviews in the 1970s, it was like walking through a war zone. For example, the offices of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) were in a fortress building, surrounded by sandbags and barbed wire. There was tremendous pressure within both Catholic and Protestant groups to conform to ingroup norms, and not only to maintain a distance from the outgroup but to condone acts of terrorism against the outgroup. This was a situation of low degrees of freedom. Northern Ireland in 2008 is a very different place, where the normative system opposes terrorism and degrees of freedom are far greater. In this transformed 21st century context, individual characteristics will be more influential in determining which individuals participate in and support terrorism.

The Distance-Traveled Hypothesis

I now turn my attention to Muslims in the United States and in Europe, to consider specifically the issue of 'home-grown' terrorism. Clearly, the relatively open nature of Western societies and the global reach of electronic technology and the world wide web means that the ideology of violent Islamist extremism is available to Muslims in the United States, as it is available in Europe. However, because of a variety of other factors, Islamic terrorism will be a greater threat in Europe, at least for the next few decades. The most important of these other factors are briefly discussed below.

*The 'distance-traveled hypothesis'³ proposes that the distance immigrants have to travel in order to settle in a host country determines the (material, educational, and other) resources needed to succeed in the migration. Muslims need to have greater resources to move from the

³Discussed in Moghaddam, F. M. (2008, September). *How globalization spurs terrorism*. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International.

Middle East and North Africa to settle in the United States, than they do to settle in Europe. The greater resources of American Muslims in part explains the greater success of Muslims in the United States, particularly in terms of economic and educational attainment, relative to Muslims in Europe.

*Muslims arriving in the United States have had the resources, including in terms of values, needed to integrate into a competitive, open market system. The openness of the American system and the 'American dream, anyone can make it here' belief system has worked well for Muslims in America. The only serious exception I see to this is the potential for violent Islamist extremism taking root in U.S. prisons, among individuals who become convinced they are being unjustly treated because of their group membership, they have no voice, and no hope for a better future.

*The situation of the approximately 20 million Muslims in Europe is more problematic. First, the largest groups of Muslims in Europe (South Asians in the UK, North Africans in France, Turks in Germany) have lower levels of important resources (income, educational attainment, and so on) compared to the local population. Second, these Muslims are geographically closer to major centers of violent Islamist extremist ideology (e.g., Pakistan). Third, the major European countries are confronted by enormous challenges integrating Muslims, who tend to live in collective segregation. Anyone who wants to confirm this only has to walk through South Asian neighborhoods in major cities in England, or North Africa neighborhoods in major cities in France, or Turkish neighborhoods in major cities in Germany. Fourth, European countries are experimenting with a muddled array of integration strategies, from extreme

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assimilation, the washing away of intergroup differences (“Immigrants must become French”) to relativistic *multiculturalism*, the highlighting, strengthening, and celebration of intergroup differences (“Sharia law can be implemented in Muslim homes”).

*In both North America and in Europe, more constructive policies must be developed to manage diversity. There are serious flaws in the current policies, both of the assimilation and multiculturalism varieties.⁴ The ‘third way’ alternative I advocate is *omniculturalism*, which involves using a foundation of psychological universals and human commonalities as a launching pad for valuing distinct identities. The end point of omniculturalism is a society whose members first recognize the importance of their common similarities and bonds, and on the basis of this ‘common’ foundation recognize and uphold the value of distinct local identities. In omniculturalism, the celebration of intergroup commonalities serve as a stepping stone to the celebration and sharing of intergroup differences.

*A policy of omniculturalism focuses particularly on transforming the economic, political, and cultural role of Muslim women, ensuring their equal progress and participation in the public sphere. Through the transformation of the role of Muslim women, relationships, roles, and socialization practices within the Muslim family will be changed to support open, democratic societies. The healthy family is the basis for the healthy society.

In exploring the ideological roots of violent Islamist extremism in the global context, it is vital to consider the active role Western societies should play. In particular, the United States has global responsibilities that must not be neglected. The final part of my statement addresses

⁴Discussed in Moghaddam, F. M. (2008). *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association Press.

this key issue.

The “New Global American Dilemma”⁵

In a study of race-relations in the United States published under the title of *An American Dilemma* (1944),⁶ the brilliant Swedish researcher Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987) accurately identified the first American dilemma. He pointed out that even after the official end of slavery in the United States, there continued to be a contradiction between, on the one hand the American rhetoric of freedom and liberty, and on the other hand the discriminatory mistreatment of African Americans. As we know, this historic dilemma was eventually resolved in favor of freedom and equality of opportunity through legislative and societal reform. There now looms a second historic dilemma confronting America, one that is global and demands a resolution.

The *new global American dilemma* arises out of the contradiction existing between American support for, on the one hand, so-called ‘friendly’ dictatorships in the Near and Middle East and, on the other hand, the right of all Muslims to live in open, democratic societies. The new global American dilemma is not ‘Democratic’ or ‘Republican’ or ‘Independent’ in political affiliation, it confronts all Americans and will have to be resolved through unified effort.

The rhetoric of “freedom, equality of opportunity, and democracy for all” emanating from the White House over the last few decades has had a powerful impact on two groups in the Near and Middle East. First, the vast majority of Muslims, and Muslim intellectuals in particular,

⁵Discussed in Moghaddam, F. M. (2008, September). *How globalization spurs terrorism*. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International.

⁶Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy*. (2 vols). New York: Harper and Brothers.

immediately recognized the basic contradiction between the 'democracy and freedom' rhetoric of the United States, and the actual practice of continued support for certain dictatorships in the region. The vast majority of Muslims recognize that it is through American support that certain dictatorships in the Near and Middle East continue to crush secular opposition groups, and prevent women and other minorities from gaining greater freedom and equality. A second group influenced by the 'democracy and freedom' rhetoric of American political leaders are Islamic Fundamentalists, who are fearful of any change that gives greater freedom to ordinary people, particularly women. Islamic fundamentalists have generally adopted an 'anti-progress, anti-democracy' position.

But why, then, do Islamic fundamentalists manage to gain sympathy and on some issues even some support from many Muslims, in both Western and non-Western societies? Given the moderate positions of most Muslims, why would they sympathize with fundamentalists at least on some issues? The new global American dilemma is at the heart of this puzzle. Four related facts must be kept in mind. First, the U.S. and its allies continue to support certain corrupt dictatorships in the Near and Middle East. Second, dictatorships in the Near and Middle East refuse to allow the growth of secular, democratic opposition groups. Third, the only avenue open for collective activism in the Near and Middle East is the mosque - no dictator has the power to close mosques, although all dictators attempt to control what happens in mosques. Fourth, fundamentalists use the mosque, and religious traditions broadly, to position themselves as the vanguard of opposition to so-called 'pro-American' dictatorships. This is exactly what happened in Iran in the late 1970s, and in Algeria in the 1980s, and in a number of Islamic countries more recently. The threat of fundamentalist groups is real and imminent in Egypt, Pakistan, and some

other major Islamic societies.

Finally, as a psychologist I am aware that the new global American dilemma is increasing cognitive tensions among Americans. The United States should not and will not shrink from its global responsibilities. Increasing globalization means that the American public is becoming more aware of the contradiction between American rhetorical support for freedom, equality of opportunity, and democracy, and American practices in support of dictatorships in certain Muslim countries. The history of American values will force a resolution to this dilemma, inevitably in favor of support for democracy rather than dictatorship.

Just as democracy in America is different from democracy in the United Kingdom, which is different from democracy in France, which is different from democracy in Germany, and so on, democracy in Iraq will evolve to be different from democracy in Pakistan, which will be different from democracy in Saudi Arabia, which will be different from democracy in Egypt, and so on. *Contextualized democracy*⁷ will eventually evolve in all Muslim countries, as it has in the West.

⁷For a discussion of 'contextualized democracy' as a solution in Islamic societies, see Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism. *American Psychologist*, 60, 161-169, and ch. 10 in Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the terrorists' point of view*. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International

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10 July 2008

**Hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee**

Hearing on

**Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and
Efforts to Counter It**



Michael Leiter

Director, NCTC

**Statement for the Record
of
Michael E. Leiter
Director
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Before the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

10 July 2008

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss terrorist efforts to spread their ideology, the Intelligence Community's (IC) efforts to understand it, and the broader U.S. Government's efforts to counter it. I will focus my remarks on the role of ideology in the radicalization process that can lead to violent extremism and the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) initiatives to improve US national security at home and abroad.

Violent extremism is always possible in any ideologically-driven movement, just as we see in al-Qa'ida today. Two decades ago, for example, one of our principal concerns was the violence of left-wing extremists, such as the Red Brigades. Today's hearing is on the radicalization process that has led to violent extremism in Islam, but what I'm about to describe could be applicable in a variety of circumstances.

Ideology gains importance in the latter stages of what we assess to be a four-step radicalization process. It takes on a crucial role in preserving some radicals' commitment to violent extremist activities, which usually requires continuous socialization in a subculture of violence.

The extremist ideological leanings that set the precedent for many of today's radical Islamic movements were articulated by Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, during the 1950s and 1960s. He argued the notion that Islam's primary enemies are Western cultural liberalism and its Middle Eastern ally—Zionists and Jews generally—and condemned practically all contemporary governments of the Middle East for introducing secular ideologies and developing economic ties to the West that subjugate Islam.

- The ideas set forth in his book, Signposts on the Road (1965), became the major themes for the ideology of many of today's violent extremist movements. His stress on the critical importance of militant struggle became a starting point for seminal figures of jihadist thought including Usama Bin Ladin and 'Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since then many other ideological tracts have been written and disseminated that espouse similar views including Abu Musa'b al-Suri's 1600-page book, The Global Islamic Resistance Call; Yusif al-'Iyari's Iraq's Jihad—Hope and Dangers. An Analysis of the Current Situation, Looking to the Future,

and Practical Steps Toward the Blessed Jihad; and Abdallah ‘Azzam’s Defense of Muslim Lands, the First Obligation After Faith.

Al-Qa’ida propaganda echoes the thought of Sayyid Qutb and other ideologues. The core narratives repeated in al-Qa’ida messages are that the West and its allies in the Muslim world seek to destroy Islam, that Muslims must counter this threat through violence, and that just rule under Islamic law is the reward for expelling Western influence.

- Bin Ladin and other al-Qa’ida leaders have consistently claimed the 9/11 attacks were a necessary response to Western efforts to subjugate Muslims. In his public commemoration of the sixth anniversary of 9/11, Bin Ladin charged that America “insisted on erasing Islamic identity and destroying its strength.”
- Ayman al-Zawahiri in a July 2007 video called on HAMAS and other Islamist movements to “cooperate and support each other in order for the word of God to be supreme, and for *shari’ah* to rule and have undisputed authority, and to free all occupied Muslim lands, and to establish the caliphate.”

There is no single underlying catalyst for the initial stages of radicalization. Although most individuals reject extremism outright, personal frustration at perceived social injustice and other grievances can prompt individuals to reassess their accepted worldview and be more open to alternative perspectives—some of which espouse violence. The most common catalysts—particularly in Muslim majority countries—include blocked social mobility, political repression, and relative socioeconomic deprivation.

- Violent extremist groups try to foster and take advantage of this period of reassessment through propaganda and public outreach. For example, extremists use the Internet, videos, and leaflets with graphic images of Muslim casualties to induce moral outrage and a sense of crisis. For Arab audiences in particular, the radicals are likely to exploit engrained historic grievances, such as incidents in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Some individuals seek answers to their sense of frustration through religion – in this case Islam. Obviously, seeking answers through religion is not in and of itself a bad approach. The problem arises when the individual comes in contact with a violent extremist group or message, which is often the pivotal point for an individual and a second step in the radicalization process. Several factors increase the likelihood that a person seeking answers in religion will make contact with a radical movement.

- Individuals are often introduced to the fringes of violent extremist groups by friends, family members, authority figures, and through the Internet when the immediate environment does not provide access. For example, Mohammad Siddique Khan—thought to be responsible for recruiting and radicalizing at least

two men suspected in the London bombings on 7 July 2005—was a teaching assistant and “mentor” at the Hamara Youth Access in Leeds.

- Many violent extremists emphasize that they turned to leaders who were willing to talk politics when mainstream religious figures refused, citing the belief that Muslims should avoid controversial political and social issues and focus on piety.

Being brought into a radical group initially does not mean that an individual will be drawn fully into violent extremist activity because an important factor, and the third stage of this radicalization process, is the individual’s willingness to accept the sacred authority of the violent extremist – that is the violent extremists’ right to interpret Islam or provide an ideological framework.

- The ideological understanding of individuals undergoing radicalization into a subculture of violence is vulnerable because they are typically younger and have a much less thorough and rigorous religious training than their nonviolent counterparts.
- Proponents of violent extremism try to portray themselves as self-sacrificing truth seekers who only want to serve Islam, while they revile nonviolent Muslims as corrupt and deviant.
- Individuals drawn to extremist groups have indicated to academic researchers that the personality and charisma of the group’s spiritual leader also play important roles in perceptions of the leader’s sacred authority. Violent extremists frequently disparage mainstream Islamic scholars, portraying them as cold, arrogant, and part of a generation that is out of touch with the concerns of younger Muslims.

Simply reaching step three in this process does not explain why some individuals absorb this ideology and others do not. The following factors may play a role in determining the final stage where an individual accepts the extremist worldview and ultimately engages in violent, high-risk behavior.

- Previous knowledge of Islam. An academic study of extremist Muslims in the UK found that many radicals had low levels of religious knowledge before their exposure to a radical group.
- Learning/authority attributes. Sociological and psychological studies indicate that individuals and communities that emphasize rote memorization and an unwillingness to challenge authority are more likely to lend themselves to radical indoctrination than others.
- Technical education. The black and white ideology of violent extremism appears to be more appealing to individuals from technical and scientific backgrounds, such as Usama Bin Ladin and ‘Ayman al-Zawahiri.

- Countervailing influences. Lack of exposure to a variety of Islamic perspectives and non-Islamic worldview makes it more likely that individuals will fully internalize the extremist message.
- Peer Pressure. Group dynamics, particularly in extremist study circles, most likely affect the prospects for successful indoctrination. An academic researcher found that strong social ties played a factor in both the radicalization and de-radicalization of Italian left-wing terrorists.
- Lack of exposure to extremist atrocities. A Pew poll study published in July 2007 found that confidence in Bin Ladin among Jordanians dropped by 36 percent between 2003 and 2007, reflecting widespread revulsion toward the bombings of three hotels in Amman in November 2005. The poll indicated declining confidence in Bin Ladin in all seven countries surveyed during this timeframe.

The vast majority of Muslims reject al-Qa'ida's ideology, particularly its extreme interpretation of Islam and justifications for violence. Many of the themes in al-Qa'ida propaganda, however, exploit viewpoints that are widespread in Muslim countries. The fact that many Muslims sympathize with grievances claimed by al-Qa'ida yet the overwhelming majority of Muslims reject al-Qa'ida's actions suggests that political or economic grievances alone are not sufficient to explain terrorist recruitment.

- Polling data suggests many Muslims are predisposed to believe al-Qa'ida's claim that the United States threatens Muslims, but disagree that conflict between the West and Islam is inevitable. A Pew survey published in July 2007 found that between 63 and 93 percent of respondents in 11 predominantly Muslim countries worried that the US could pose a military threat to their country, yet a World Public Opinion poll in April 2007 only found that minorities in four surveyed Muslim countries believed violent conflict between Islam and the West is "inevitable."
- Many Muslims also broadly accept calls for Islamic law, yet not on al-Qa'ida's harsh terms. A Gallup study published in February 2007 found that majorities in all nine surveyed Muslim countries—except Turkey—wanted some form of Islamic law as the basis of governance. However, no less than 82 percent of respondents—in contrast to al-Qa'ida—also would include provisions for free speech in a hypothetical new constitution for their country. These attitudes likely reflect dissatisfaction with the probity of existing governments than a desire for Taliban-like conditions in their own countries.
- Like al-Qa'ida, many Muslims accept that attacks on US soldiers in Muslim countries are legitimate—but few agree with the group's targeting of innocents. The World Public Opinion poll found that 91 percent of urban Egyptians approved of attacks on US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, fewer than 8 percent in any of the four surveyed countries agreed attacks on

civilians for political ends were strongly justified or approved of attacks on US civilians.

NCTC's evolving understanding of Muslim communities and the process by which individuals are indoctrinated into the ideology of violent extremism informs the Center's efforts to produce objective, timely, and accurate intelligence and to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the US Government's counterterrorism activities.

- Our Directorates of Intelligence and Strategic Operational Planning each have teams dedicated to this important mission and collaborate constantly constituting one of the Center's most successful linkage of subject matter expertise with deliberate strategic planning. Much of NCTC's growth over the past two years—and much of our planned growth in the coming year—is dedicated to government-wide coordination and analysis to counter radicalization.
- We are working with the Office of Management and Budget to identify the USG's current capabilities and to develop desired end states and performance metrics to help guide our resource decisions and address impediments to progress. This step is critical because U.S. Government resources to combat violent extremism are dispersed among numerous Departments and Agencies.
- Through our leadership, the various Departments and Agencies of the US Government are becoming more sophisticated in their understanding of the ideological challenges to combating violent extremism and more capable of bringing their respective expertise, capabilities, and authorities to bear against this difficult problem set. Our analysts—who approach this issue from a variety of perspectives, to include religious, socio-economic, regional, and psychological—work extremely closely with senior policy makers, foreign governments, and others to fully inform government actions.
- NCTC's knowledge not only drives its daily operations, but increasingly guides broader US Government efforts and informs the activities of our partners and allies in combating the worldwide threat of violent extremism. In particular, NCTC is closely partnered with the Department of State's Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, James Glassman, the Department of Homeland Security's Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, Dan Sutherland, and many other officials within the U.S. Government who are responsible translating analytic assessments and strategic plans into operational action.
- We are also increasingly supporting more “non-traditional” partners, to include State and Local governments to try to help inform their efforts to counter violent extremism. For example, we seek to author intelligence assessments that use comparative studies to help inform actions within the United States. As with other efforts, we do this principally by supporting the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security.

- Finally, we are seeking to harness more effectively the efforts of “non-traditional” federal partners whose programs might not normally be considered parts of the fight against violent extremism but which can, if properly informed and targeted, reduce some of the drivers to violent extremism that we identify.

As our understanding of violent extremism improves, we are able to fine-tune our approach to the problem. Working with partners at home and abroad, we can develop targeted and refined approaches—using messaging and other tools—to undermine the attractiveness of violence to certain susceptible audiences, eventually denying violent extremists that critical flow of cannon-fodder recruits.

**Report on the Roots of Violent Islamist
Extremism and Efforts to Counter It:
The Muslim Brotherhood**



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Introduction:

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the security apparatuses of United States have dedicated themselves to combating Islamist terrorism and countering its roots. These efforts have been met with varying levels of success. Operationally, the U.S. has been largely successful – thwarting terrorist attacks against the homeland and hardening American targets abroad. However, the primary driver of the violence – ideology – has not been successfully countered or even sufficiently understood. The roots of this ideology are diverse and diffuse, but the primary root of Sunni Islamist violence in the modern era is the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*)¹ was founded as an Islamic revivalist movement in the Egyptian town of Isma'iliyya in March 1928 by school teacher Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949).² The vast majority of Sunni terrorist groups – including al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad – are derived from the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Brotherhood's goal has been to promote the implementation of *Shari'ah* (Islamic law derived from the Quran and the Sunnah).³ Early in its history, the Brotherhood focused on education and charity. It soon became heavily involved in politics and remains a major player on the Egyptian political scene, despite the fact that it is an illegal organization. The movement has grown exponentially, from only 800 members in 1936, to over 2 million in 1948, to its current position as a pervasive international Sunni Islamist movement, with covert and overt branches in over 70 countries.

"I did not want to enter into competition with the other orders," al-Banna once said. "And I did not want it to be confined to one group of Muslims or one aspect of Islamic reform; rather I sought that it be a general message based on learning, education, and *jihad*."⁴ According to al-Banna, "It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet."⁵ That helps explain the Muslim Brotherhood's motto: "*Allah ghayatuna Al-rasul za'imuna. Al-Qur-'an dusturuna. Al-jihad sabiluna. Al-mawt fi sabil Allah asma amanina. Allah akbar, Allah akbar.*" ("God is our goal, the Quran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle [*jihad*] is our way, and death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes. God is great. God is great.")⁶

¹ They are also known as the Muslim Brothers, The Brothers (*al-Ikhwan*), or the Society of Muslim Brothers (*Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*).

² Born in Mahmoudiyya, Egypt, Hassan al-Banna was the son of the prominent Imam Sheikh Ahmad al-Banna. He studied at Al-Ahzar University and joined a Sufi order there. He then moved to Cairo as a school teacher in 1932 establishing the Muslim Brotherhood branch there. Al-Banna was assassinated by the Egyptian government on February 12th, 1949 as part of an Egyptian government crackdown on the Brotherhood.

³ *Sharia'h* is the body of Islamic religious law. It is primarily based on the Quran and the *Sunnah*.

⁴ Hassan al-Banna, quoted in, Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 207.

⁵ Fereydoun Hoveyda, *The Broken Crescent*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 56.

⁶ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 193-4.

The Brotherhood has reached global status, wielding power and influence in almost every state with a Muslim population. Additionally, the Brotherhood maintains political parties in many Middle-Eastern and African countries, including Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and even Israel. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood attempted to overthrow the Syrian government in the 1980s, but the revolt was crushed. Aside from the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel proper, the terrorist organization Hamas was founded as the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, Article II of the Hamas charter states:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment, the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam.⁷

Since its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood has openly sought to reassert Islam through the establishment of Sunni Islamic governments that will rule according to the strict and specific tenets of *Shari'ah*. To the Brotherhood, this is the correct primary endeavor of human civilization, with the ultimate goal being the unification of these regimes under the banner of the Caliphate – or universal Islamic state.

According to al-Banna, the Caliphate must govern all lands that were at one time under the control of Muslims. He stated:

We want the Islamic flag to be hoisted once again on high, fluttering in the wind, in all those lands that have had the good fortune to harbor Islam for a certain period of time and where the muzzein's call sounded in the *takbirs* and the *tahlis*. Then fate decreed that the light of Islam be extinguished in these lands that returned to unbelief. Thus Andalusia, Sicily, the Balkans, the Italian coast, as well as the islands of the Mediterranean, are all of them Muslim Mediterranean colonies and they must return to the Islamic fold. The Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea must once again become Muslim seas, as they once were.⁸

Once that is accomplished, the Caliphate is to be expanded to cover the entire globe, erasing national boundaries under the flag of Islam. This concept was elucidated by the Brotherhood luminary, Sayyid Qutb, who wrote in his seminal work, *Milestones* (1964), that Muslims are not merely obliged to wage *jihād* in defense of Islamic lands, but must

⁷ "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, August 18, 1988, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm> (Accessed June 9, 2008).

⁸ Hassan al-Banna, quoted in: Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (Encounter Books, 2008), p. 19.

wage offensive *jihad* in order to liberate the world from the servitude of man-made law and governance.⁹

Organizational Structure:

The Muslim Brotherhood used activism, mass communication, and sophisticated governance to build a large support base within the lower class and professional elements of Egyptian society. By using existing support networks built around mosques, welfare associations, and neighborhood groups, the Brotherhood was able to educate and indoctrinate people in an Islamic setting. The organization is headed by a Supreme Guide or Secretary General and is assisted by a General Executive Bureau (*Maktab al-Irshad*), and a constituent assembly known as the Shura Council. There have been six Secretaries General of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,¹⁰ which is widely seen as the leading branch of the worldwide organization.

Ideology:

The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to restore the historical Caliphate and then expand its authority over the entire world, dismantling all non-Islamic governments. The Brotherhood aims to accomplish this through a combination of warfare – both violent and political.

The Muslim Brotherhood has provided the ideological model for almost all modern Sunni Islamic terrorist groups. When discussing Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Richard Clarke – the chief counterterrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council under Presidents Clinton and Bush – told a Senate committee in 2003 that “The common link here is the extremist Muslim Brotherhood – all of these organizations are descendants of the membership and ideology of the Muslim Brothers.”¹¹

The leadership of Al Qaeda, from Osama bin Laden to his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed all were influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology.¹² In fact, al-Zawahiri was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a young man, but he broke with them when his terrorist career began. He later wrote a book called *The Bitter Harvest* in which he condemned the Brotherhood for neglecting *jihad* in favor of participating in elections.¹³

The Brotherhood’s ideology was formulated by its two main luminaries: its founder, Hassan al-Banna – who was assassinated by agents of the Egyptian government in 1949 – and Sayyid Qutb, hanged in 1966.

⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*.

¹⁰ The six Secretaries General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are: Hassan al-Banna (1928-1949), Hassan Ismai’l al-Hudaybi (1951-1973), Omar al-Telmesany (1976-1986), Muhammed Hamid Abu al-Nasr (1986-1996), Mustafa Mashour (1996-2002), Ma’amun al-Hodeiby (2002-2004), and current leader Mohammed Mahdi Akef.

¹¹ Statement of Richard A. Clarke before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, October 22, 2003.

¹² Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, “The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?” *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 1, 2007.

¹³ Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader* (Doubleday: New York, 2007), p. 116.

Al-Banna once described the Brotherhood as, “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea.”¹⁴ While studying in Cairo, al-Banna had become immersed in the writings of Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), who formed the backbone of the Salafiyya Movement.¹⁵ Al-Banna agreed with their ideas that Islam provided the solution to the afflictions plaguing Muslim society. Specifically, in accordance with Salafism, he called for a return to what he perceived to be true Islam.

Salafism is an austere form of Islam within the Sunni sect that attempts to return to what its adherents believe to be unadulterated Islam as practiced by Muhammad and his companions. In order to achieve this, Salafists strip out what they see as *bida*, or innovations, from the practice of Islam as it has developed over the centuries. According to Salafists, only pure Islam can solve the political, economic, social, domestic, and external issues of the Muslim nation (*ummah*). As such, Muslim societies should be governed according to *Shari'ah*.

While al-Banna drew almost exclusively on early Islamic doctrine in his works, it is also important to understand the strong anti-colonialism sentiments driving his ideology. Al-Banna was writing and working at a time when European powers had colonized the Middle East.

Jihad, death, and martyrdom have been lauded throughout the history of the Brotherhood, not only as a means to achieve the above goals, but as an end unto itself. In his seminal work, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, Robert P. Mitchell the late University of Michigan Professor of Near Eastern History, quotes and paraphrases al-Banna:

The certainty that *jihad* had this physical connotation is evidenced by the relationship always implied between it and the possibility, even the necessity, of death and martyrdom. Death, as an important end of *jihad*, was extolled by Banna in a phrase which came to be a famous part of his legacy: “the art of death” (*fann al-mawt*). “Death is art” (*al-mawt-fann*). The Qur’an has commanded people to love death more than life. Unless “the philosophy of the Qur’an on death” replaces “the love of life” which has consumed Muslims, then they will reach naught. Victory can only come with the mastery of “the art of death.” In another place, Banna reminds his followers of a Prophetic observation: “He who dies and has not fought [*ghaza*; literally: raided] and was not resolved to fight, has died a *jahiliyya* [ignorance of divine guidance] death.” The movement cannot succeed, Banna insists, without this dedicated and unqualified kind of *jihad*.¹⁶

¹⁴ Hassan al-Banna, quoted in, Mitchell, *Society of Muslim Brothers*, p. 14.

¹⁵ The term *Salafiyyah* comes from the phrase *as-salaf as-saliheen* or “pious predecessors” of early the Muslim community, referring primarily to Muhammad’s companions (*sahaba*).

¹⁶ Mitchell, *Society of Muslim Brothers*, p. 207.

Jihad is a central tenet in the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. In a booklet entitled, “Jihad” and in other works, al-Banna clearly defines *jihad* as violent warfare against non-Muslims to establish Islam as dominant across the entire world. He wrote:

Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to *jihad* and has made the reward of the martyrs and fighters in His way a splendid one. Only those who have acted similarly and who have modeled themselves upon the martyrs in their performance of *jihad* can join them in this reward.¹⁷

To support his assertions about *jihad*, al-Banna quotes extensively from the Quran, the Hadith, and great Islamic scholars. These quotes either define *jihad* as fighting and/or emphasize the obligatory nature of *jihad*. On the specific subject of “fighting with People of the Book [Jews and Christians],”¹⁸ al-Banna quotes Quran 9:29 – the infamous sword verse:

Fight against those who believe not in Allah nor in his Last Day, nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger and those who acknowledge not the Religion of Truth (i.e. Islam), from among the People of the Book, until they pay the *jizya* [poll tax] with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.

Al-Banna quotes a Hanafi scholar:

Jihad linguistically means to exert one’s utmost effort in word and action; in the Sharee’ah it is the fighting of the unbelievers, and involves all possible efforts that are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship and smashing their idols.¹⁹

Al-Banna continues:

Islam allows jihad and permits war until the following Qur’anic verse is fulfilled:

*“We will show them Our signs in the universe, and in their own selves, until it becomes manifest to them that this (the Qur’an) is the truth” (Surat al-Fussilat (41), ayah 53)*²⁰

In conclusion, al-Banna writes:

¹⁷ Hassan al-Banna, “Jihad,” http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/jihad/ (Accessed June 9, 2008).

¹⁸ Al-Banna, “Jihad.”

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

My brothers! The ummah [Islamic community] that knows how to die a noble and honourable death is granted an exalted life in this world and eternal felicity in the next. Degradation and dishonour are the results of the love of this world and the fear of death. Therefore prepare for *jihad* and be the lovers of death.²¹

To ensure that the *Shari'ah* would be the “the basis controlling the affairs of state and society,”²² al-Banna laid out a seven-step hierarchy of goals to be implemented by the Brotherhood for the Islamization of society. The first step is to educate and “form” the Muslim person. From there the Muslim person would spread Islam and help “form” a Muslim family. Muslim families would group together to form a Muslim society that would establish a Muslim government. The government would then transform the state into an Islamic one governed by *Shari'ah*, as voted by the Muslim society. This Islamic state would then work to free “occupied” Muslim lands and unify them together under one banner, from which Islam could be spread all over the world.

As Mitchell explains, quoting original Brotherhood sources, these goals would be carried out in three stages. Starting with “the first stage through which all movements must pass, the stage of ‘propaganda, communication, and information.’”²³ In this stage, the Brotherhood would recruit and indoctrinate core activists. The next stage consists of “formation, selection, and preparation.”²⁴ In this stage, the Brothers would endear themselves to the population by creating charities, clinics, schools, and other services. More importantly, they would prepare for the third and final stage: the stage of “execution.”²⁵ Of this stage, al-Banna stated:

At the time that there will be ready, Oh ye Muslim Brothers, three hundred battalions, each one equipped spiritually with faith and belief, intellectually with science and learning, and physically with training and athletics, at that time you can demand of me to plunge with you through the turbulent oceans and to rend the skies with you and to conquer with you every obstinate tyrant. God willing, I will do it.²⁶

Qutb and Jahiliyya

In addition to al-Banna’s founding philosophy, the works of Sayyid Qutb (1909-1966) also had a major impact on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Beyond that, Qutb’s books sent shockwaves throughout the entire Islamic world. His most influential

²¹ Ibid.

²² “The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website (Cached), http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:2_Lj7AHyW7oJ:www.muslimbrotherhood.co.uk/Home.asp%3FID%3D458+%26Lang%3DE%26Press%3DShow%26System%3DPressR%26zPage%3DSystems+%22the+bas+controlling+the+affairs+of+state+and+society%22+iSLAMIC&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us

²³ Mitchell, *Society of Muslim Brothers*, p. 13.

²⁴ Risalat Al-Mu'tamar al-khamis (Message of the Fifth Congress), quoted in Mitchell, *Society of Muslim Brothers*, p. 14.

²⁵ Ibid, 15.

²⁶ Ibid.

works were *Fi zilal al-Qur'an* ("In the Shade of the Quran")²⁷ and *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* ("Milestones"). *Milestones* has come to be Qutb's most popular work and has influenced Islamic extremists such as Ayman al-Zawahiri,²⁸ Dr. Abdullah Azzam,²⁹ and Osama bin Laden.³⁰

Written while Qutb was in prison in Egypt,³¹ *Milestones'* central thesis was that the world had degraded into a state of ignorance (as existed before the Prophethood of Mohammad) or *jahiliyya*.³² He proposed that the overthrow of apostate rulers and the establishment of Islamic societies worldwide through offensive *jihad* is the only way to solve this state of affairs. In addition to Hassan al-Banna's ideas, Qutb was heavily influenced by the writings of Indian Islamist Sayyid Mawlana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979)³³ and the medieval scholar Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328). However, Qutb expanded on their ideas of *jahiliyyah* and *jihad*.

As the 9/11 Commission Report found, Qutb came to the U.S. to study in the late 1940s:

Qutb returned with an enormous loathing of Western society and history. He dismissed Western achievements as entirely material, arguing that Western society possesses "nothing that will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence." Three basic themes emerge from Qutb's writings. First, he claimed that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition he called *jahiliyya*, the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the revelations given to the Prophet Mohammed). Qutb argued that humans can choose only between Islam and *jahiliyya*. Second, he warned that more people, including Muslims, were attracted to *jahiliyya* and its material comforts than to his view of Islam; *jahiliyya* could therefore triumph over Islam. Third, no middle

²⁷ This work, written while Qutb was languishing in an Egyptian jail cell (1954-1964), is a 30 volume commentary (*tafsir*) on the Quran. A highly popular work, Qutb in his commentary advocates for *shari'ah* to be implemented in all Muslim societies. It also contains significant amounts of vitriol directed primarily at Jews.

²⁸ Zawahiri, also a member of the Brotherhood since the age of fourteen (1965) became familiar with Qutb's writings while he was in Saudi Arabia. There he came under the tutelage of Sayyid's brother Muhammad Qutb, who fled Egypt in 1972 and began teaching his brother's philosophy while a professor at King Abdel-Aziz University in Jeddah and the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. Osama Bin Laden also reportedly attended Muhammad Qutb's lectures there too.

²⁹ Jim Landers, "Muslim Extremists Justify Violence on Way to Restoring Divine Law," *Dallas Morning News*, November 3, 2001.

³⁰ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*

³¹ Qutb spent ten years in prison from 1954 to 1964 after being arrested for being a member of the Brotherhood (he joined in 1953) when Nasser outlawed the organization in 1954. *Milestones* was published when Qutb emerged from prison in 1965, even though Qutb was arrested and jailed again for preaching for an Islamic state in Egypt. He was executed on August 29th, 1966 with excerpts from *Milestones* used against him during his trial. After his execution he became a "Martyr" (*Shaheed*) to his followers.

³² *Jahiliyyah* can be loosely translated as a state of "ignorance of divine guidance" referring to the conditions in pre-Islamic Arabian society before the revelations of the Quran by Allah and the Prophet Muhammad.

³³ Also written as Maududi, Maudoodi, or Mawdudi. He founded the Pakistani Islamic group *Jamaat-e-Islami* in 1941 with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in South Asia. He headed the party until 1973 and was well known for his writings on Islam.

ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan. All Muslims—as he defined them—therefore must take up arms in this fight. Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of destruction.³⁴

While both Maududi and Ibn Taymiyyah used *jahiliyya* to describe some contemporaries, Qutb described the whole of the Muslim community to be in *jahiliyya*, as “the Muslim community has long ago vanished from existence.”³⁵ Since Arab secular leaders did not follow the *Shari’ah*, they were considered to be in apostasy for violating God’s sovereignty (*al-hakimiyya*) on earth. In fact, “any place where the *Shari’ah* is not enforced and where Islam is not dominant becomes the Abode of War (*Dar-ul-Harb*).”³⁶ *Jahiliyyah* now included all states, whether ruled by Muslims or not.

To achieve his vision, Qutb advocated for the creation of a vanguard (*tali’a*), whose members would model themselves after the Prophet Muhammad’s companions. This vanguard would then fight *jahiliyya* and its influences through

methods of preaching (*daw’a*) and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs; and it uses physical power and *Jihad* for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the *jahili* system which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make them serve human lords instead of the Almighty Lord.³⁷

According to his vision, the vanguard would not “compromise with the practices of *jahili* society, nor can we be loyal to it,” Qutb wrote. “*Jahili* society, because of its *jahili* characteristics (described as evil and corrupt), is not worthy to be compromised with.”³⁸

Qutb’s *jihad* against *Dar al-Harb* (Abode of War),³⁹ was not only to protect the *Dar al-Islam* (Abode of Islam) but also to enhance it and spread it “throughout the earth to the whole of mankind.”⁴⁰ Adherence to *Shari’ah* would free mankind from the *jahiliyyah* influences. This war would not be temporary, “but an eternal state, as truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth.”⁴¹

The Brotherhood Today:

While many Muslim Brotherhood branches around the world claim to have embraced democracy, the philosophies developed by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb still carry

³⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 51.

³⁵ Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. (Syria: Damascus, Dar al-Ilm), 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 124.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

³⁹ The *Dar al-Harb* (Abode of War) traditionally is considered to be countries and places where Islam is not predominant or areas not ruled by Muslims.

⁴⁰ *Milestones*, 72.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 66.

great influence within the organization. The Brotherhood continues to be driven by al-Banna's belief that Islam is destined to eventually dominate the world. The Brotherhood's declared principles remain steadfast even today. According to their website, the Brotherhood seeks, "the introduction of the Islamic *Shari'ah* as the basis controlling the affairs of state and society" and "unification among the Islamic countries and states...liberating them from foreign imperialism."⁴² This includes "spreading Islamic concepts that reject submission to humiliation, and incite to fighting it" while "reviving the will of liberation and independence in the people, and sowing the spirit of resistance."⁴³

Some have contended that there is a "moderate" wing to the Muslim Brotherhood that can and should serve as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West,⁴⁴ but this claim has been much disputed in academia and the media. Proponents of this theory claim that beginning with Hassan al-Hudaybi – al-Banna's immediate successor as Supreme Guide – the Brotherhood took a moderate turn.

Detractors⁴⁵ note the proponents' lack of background in the subject matter. They also cite the Brotherhood's persistent support of violence, under the rubric of resistance against occupation, and the greater popularity of decidedly immoderate figures like Sayyid Qutb over al-Hudaybi in the modern Brotherhood (Qutb's books can be found in a variety of languages all around the world. The same cannot be said for al-Hudaybi's). One scholar has questioned whether al-Hudaybi even penned the moderate volume, *Preachers, Not Judges*, that has been credited to him, raising the possibility that the Egyptian intelligence service played a role in its production.⁴⁶

In the fall of 2007, the Brotherhood issued its first official platform in decades. The platform explains, in plain terms, the agenda of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic world. It calls for: "Spreading and deepening the true concepts of Islam as a complete methodology that regulates all aspects of life." Here are some other notable excerpts from the platform:

- "The intentions of the Islamic *Shari'ah* which aim for the realization of the important aspects and needs and good achievements in the realm of religion and spirit and the self and property and intellect and wealth represent the

⁴² "The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood" IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website (Cached),

http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:2_Lj7AHyW7oJ:www.muslimbrotherhood.co.uk/Home.asp%3FID%3D4584%26Lang%3DE%26Press%3DShow%26System%3DPressR%26zPage%3DSystems+%22the+basics+controlling+the+affairs+of+state+and+society%22+iSLAMIC&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=us
(Accessed June 10, 2008).

⁴³ "Reading into The Muslim Brotherhood's Documents," IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website, June 13, 2007, <http://www.ikhwanweb.org/Article.asp?ID=818&LevelID=2&SectionID=116> (Accessed May 29, 2008).

⁴⁴ Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2007.

⁴⁵ Douglas Farah, Youssef Ibrahim, Patrick Poole, and others.

⁴⁶ Barbara Zollner, "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954-1971" (*International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39, 2007), pp. 411-433.

ruling policy in the defining of the priorities of the goals and strategic policies.”

- “Islam has developed an exemplary model for a state.”
- “The Islamic methodology aims to reform the state of limited capabilities to make it into a strong Islamic state...”

Whatever moderating stance the platform takes, in August 2004, the Brotherhood issued a public appeal of support for those fighting coalition forces in Iraq,⁴⁷ and the following month, spiritual guide Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa deeming it a religious duty for Muslims to fight America in Iraq.⁴⁸

The Brotherhood also plays an active role today in promoting terrorism against American interests. The Brotherhood actively supports Hamas to “face the U.S. and Zionist strategy” in the Occupied Territories and supports their “legitimate resistance.”⁴⁹

A November 2007 interview with Brotherhood Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef shows the group remains committed to violence against those it views as occupiers.

Akef, the Supreme Guide, pledged 10,000 fighters for Palestine but said it was up to a government to arm and train them. In the same interview, Akef denied the existence of Al Qaeda:

“All these things are American Zionist tricks,” Akef said. “The Shi’ites attack one another, the Sunnis attack one another, and the Shi’ites attack the Sunnis. But the Muslim Brotherhood has a principle, which I declared from day one: The Shi’ites and Sunnis are brothers.”

[...]

“I’d like to go back to the issue of Al-Qaeda. There is no such thing as Al-Qaeda. This is an American invention, so that they will have something to fight for...”

Interviewer: “What about Osama bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and the Islamic State of Iraq?”

Akef: “When one man, or two or three, fight this tyrannical global superpower – is it worth anything?”⁵⁰

Interviewer: “Thousands have carried out attacks in the Iraq in the name of Al-Qaeda...”

⁴⁷ “The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Support of Fighting Americans Forces in Iraq,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, September 3, 2004.

⁴⁸ “Cleric Says It’s Right to Fight U.S. Civilians in Iraq,” Reuters, September 2, 2004.

⁴⁹ “Reading into The Muslim Brotherhood’s Documents,” IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website, June 13, 2007, <http://www.ikhwanweb.org/Article.asp?ID=818&LevelID=2&SectionID=116> (Accessed May 29, 2008).

⁵⁰ Special Dispatch - Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project, MEMRI TV Project, December 18, 2007.

Akef: "That is a lie. Who says so?"

Interviewer: "They do."

That argument fits with a theory offered by Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, senior researcher of the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He argues that Al Qaeda and the Brotherhood share the same final goal – the establishment of a global Caliphate – but the Brotherhood fears "that an Al-Qaeda attack against the West at this time might hamper the Islamic movement's buildup and focus the West on the threat implicit in Muslim communities."⁵¹

Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood and spiritual guide al-Qaradawi condemned al Qaeda's actions in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

However, in an interview on May 23, 2008 with the online Arabic news service *Elaph*,⁵² Akef seemed to change his approach. He was asked: "Regarding resistance and *jihād*, do you consider Osama Bin Laden a terrorist or an Islamic Mujahid?" In response, Akef said, "In all certainty, a mujahid, and I have no doubt in his sincerity in resisting the occupation, close to Allah on high."⁵³ He was then asked about his previous denial about the existence of al Qaeda, and said, "The name is an American invention, but al Qaeda as a concept and organization comes from tyranny and corruption."

The interviewer followed with this question: "So, do you support the activities of al Qaeda, and to what extent?" Akef said, "Yes, I support its activities against the occupiers, and not against the people."

Two days later, in another interview the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, Akef tried to clarify some of his comments about al Qaeda after receiving criticism from religious and political leaders about his remarks in the May 23 interview. He said:

We (the Brotherhood) have nothing to do with al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden... we are against violence except when fighting the occupier...When he [bin Laden] fights the occupier then he is a mujahid, and when he attacks civilians, then this is rejected. The word al Qaeda is an American illusion...Bin Laden has a thought ...his thought is based on violence, and we do not approve of violence under any circumstances except one and that is fighting an occupier. We have nothing to do with al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden...we condemn any thought that leads to

⁵¹ Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, "The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?" *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 1, 2007.

⁵² Interview with Mohammad Akef, *Elaph*, May 23, 2008, <http://65.17.227.80/ElaphWeb/AkhbarKhasa/2008/5/332823.htm> (Accessed May 28, 2008).

⁵³ *Ibid.*

violence. When bin Laden fights the occupier then he is a mujahid, when he attacks the innocent and citizens then this is rejected.⁵⁴

Al-Qaradawi's condemnation of 9/11 was based on his assertion that the passengers in the plane and the people in the World Trade Center were civilians. However, in an interview on *Al-Jazeera* in 2004, al Qaradawi elaborated on the concept of the civilian:

When I was asked, I said that I forbid the killing of civilians. I said that it is permitted to kill only those who fight. Islam forbids killing women, youth, and so on. I said so openly, but I asked, "Who is a civilian?" When engineers, laborers, and technicians enter [Iraq] with the American army, are they considered civilians? Is a fighter only the one inside the tank or also the one servicing it? I am speaking of the interpretation of the word "civilian".⁵⁵

By this logic, it can be argued that anyone providing support to a military force in a Muslim country – whether it be a tank mechanic, a worker at a defense factory, or even an American taxpayer – is no longer considered a civilian.

In June 2008, Mohammad Habib, the first deputy chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, sat down with an interviewer from *Al Ahrar*, an Egyptian daily. In the long interview, Habib spoke to the international Muslim Brotherhood:

Al-Ahrar: But what about the view that the Muslim Brotherhood will perish in the coming twenty years?

Dr. Habib: On the contrary, I see that the future is ours, and we will reach our aspirations. The group is gaining every day more territories and a depth in the consciousness of the Egyptian people. Add to this, the group is not confined to Egypt, it has offshoots in various countries all over the world, it continuously grows, achieves more successes at all levels.

Al-Ahrar: What about the international Muslim Brotherhood?

Dr. Habib: There are entities that exist in many countries all over the world. These entities have the same ideology, principle and objectives but they work in different circumstances and different contexts. So, it is reasonable to have decentralization in action so that every entity works according to its circumstances and according to the problems it is facing and in their framework. This actually achieves two objectives: First: It adds flexibility to movement. Second: It focuses on action. Every entity in its own country can issue its own decision because it is more aware of the problems, circumstances and context in which they are working. However, there is some centralization in some issues.

⁵⁴ Abd-al-Sattar Ibrahim, "Akif tells Al-Sharq al-Awsat: The Brotherhood is Against Al-Qa'idah Organization Targeting Civilians; Bin Ladin's Thought is Based on Violence" *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, May 25, 2008, FROM: BBC Monitoring International Reports.

⁵⁵ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Al-Jazeera*, November 20, 2004.

These entities can have dialogue when there is a common cause that faces Arabs or Muslims over their central issues like the Palestinian cause. At that time, all of them must cooperate for it. I want to confirm that while some see that Palestine caused rifts among the Arabs, we see that this cause is the one for which all Arabs unite.⁵⁶

The Brotherhood in the West

In the United States, the Brotherhood has had an active presence since the 1960s. They have been represented by various organizations such as the Muslim Students' Association (MSA) founded in 1963, the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) 1971, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 1981, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) 1981, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) 1981, the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR) 1989, the American Muslim Council (AMC) 1990, the Muslim American Society (MAS) 1992, the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 1994, and others. In fact, nearly all prominent Islamic organizations in the United States are rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood.

An internal Brotherhood memorandum, released during the terror-support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) trial in July 2007 shows that the Brotherhood's *jihad* can take more subtle and long range approaches. Dated to May 22, 1991, the memo states:

The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and 'sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions.⁵⁷

That theme was picked up four years later by al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader, while attending a conference in Toledo, Ohio. Al-Qaradawi has been offered the post of General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood twice, but has turned it down in favor of building and managing several Islamist organizations in the West and the Middle East associated with the Brotherhood.⁵⁸ At the Ohio conference, hosted by the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), he said, "Our brothers in Hamas, in Palestine, the Islamic resistance, the Islamic Jihad, after all the rest have given up and despaired, the movement of the Jihad brings us back to our faith."⁵⁹

He later added:

⁵⁶ "Interview with MB Deputy Chairman in Al Ahrar Daily," IkhwanWeb.Org, Official Muslim Brotherhood Website, June 16, 2008, <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=17267&LevelID=1&SectionID=0> (Accessed June 17, 2008).

⁵⁷ U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, 04-CR-240 Government exhibit 3-85.

⁵⁸ Mona El-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 385.

⁵⁹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MAYA Conference, 1995, Toledo, Ohio.

What remains, then, is to conquer Rome. The second part of the omen. "The city of Hiraq [once emperor of Constantinople] will be conquered first," so what remains is to conquer Rome. This means that Islam will come back to Europe for the third time, after it was expelled from it twice... Conquest through Da'wa [proselytizing], that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da'wa.

...

But the balance of power will change, and this is what is told in the Hadith of Ibn-Omar and the Hadith of Abu-Hurairah: "You shall continue to fight the Jews and they will fight you, until the Muslims will kill them. And the Jew will hide behind the stone and the tree, and the stone and the tree will say: 'Oh servant of Allah, Oh Muslim, this is a Jew behind me. Come and kill him!' The resurrection will not come before this happens." This is a text from the good omens in which we believe.⁶⁰

Prominent Brotherhood organizations in Europe include the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, the Muslim Association of Britain, the European Council for Fatwa and Research, the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD), and the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF).

Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the West have successfully, but disingenuously, positioned themselves as gatekeepers to the Muslim-American community. The underlying goal of these groups is to redefine moderate Islam and to oversee a separation between Western Muslim communities and their secular host societies in order to promote Islamism and reinforce loyalty to the global ummah. Inherent in these goals is a strategy to weaken Western resistance to Islamism. Presenting themselves as the moderate voices of Islam, they have created a narrative to their community that the US government's campaign against terrorism is, rather, a generalized "war against Islam" that must be shunned, discouraged, and monitored. This characterization serves to demonize the efforts of the U.S. government and the West, which ultimately serves to radicalize and alienate Western Muslims.

To a large degree, the narrative propagated by these organizations is a corollary of the primary message of radical Islam at large: That there is a conspiracy by the West to subjugate Islam. This self-victimization fuels paranoia that Muslims are being selectively targeted for racist reasons, because of "special interests," or due to anti-Muslim bias in Western foreign policy. This, in turn, inflames self-alienation and degrades any positive connections between Western Muslim communities and their host state. The foundation and histories of these intertwined organizations in America, as well as their actions in the West, should be examined in an effort to shed a light on the radicalizing effect on the local Muslim communities.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Over the last forty years, the movement that began in 1963 with the MSA has transformed itself into a network of like-minded organizations most commonly identified by a wide array of acronyms. ISNA grew directly out of MSA. According to Muslim activist Ihsan Bagby, who has long been involved in ISNA leadership, “ISNA has always sought inspiration and guidance from the intellectual leaders of the modern Islamic movement (Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, etc.)”

NAIT serves as the financial arm of ISNA and holds the deeds to hundreds of ideologically compatible mosques and Islamic institutions. Groups such as ISNA attract Muslims of all backgrounds to their conferences. Yet, the leadership has remained committed to uphold the values of Islamism, which looks to Islamicize society within the confines of a very specific interpretation. These organizations have been supported by funding from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In 1993, there was a meeting of the Palestine Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America on how to advance the cause of Hamas. As a result of those discussions, three officials from the pro-Hamas, Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) founded the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR’s stated mission is “to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.” By observing the Washington, D.C. based leadership of CAIR, and some of CAIR’s local branch leaders throughout the United States for twelve-years, it has become clear that CAIR has branched out beyond their stated mission. CAIR resources have consistently been utilized to block any action against radicalism. Since its inception, CAIR has intimidated and silenced critics – even fellow Muslims – while spreading disinformation about any who attempt to oppose or compete with them. Personal attacks on reporters, government officials and others who address issues of Islamism are dispatched in lieu of responding substantively to allegations. Almost every time there is a terrorist prosecution or an asset forfeiture of an Islamic charity linked to a terrorist group, CAIR condemns it as a fishing expedition meant to demonize Muslims. These cries often are joined by similar groups, including the Muslim American Society (MAS), an organization identified by a top Muslim Brotherhood leader as one of their own.

CAIR does indeed also work to protect the civil liberties of Muslims, an important endeavor, but does so in a way that projects an “us vs. them” mentality to American Muslims, purposefully fomenting isolation from the rest of the country.

Despite the known ties of the above mentioned organizations to the Muslim Brotherhood, the U.S. government insists on engaging in “outreach” and dialogue with them. This has led to an almost comical situation in which one side of the Department of Justice labels CAIR as an unindicted coconspirator in what has been alleged to be the biggest case of terrorist financing in the history of the Republic while the other side of the Department of Justice meets with CAIR officials and attends CAIR conferences in an effort to perform outreach with the Muslim-American community.

While it can be argued that outreach with the Muslim-American community is a necessary component to a successful counterterrorism strategy, there is absolutely no reason that this outreach has to go through organizations that ascribe to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Alternatively, outreach can be performed at the grassroots level and through individuals respected in the Muslim-American community, like doctors and local businessmen, instead of through groups such as CAIR, ISNA, and MAS.

Muslim voices which promote accountability, democracy, human rights and freedoms must be elevated and embraced. Short of that, organizations, individuals and institutions in the West *and* in the Muslim world that are knee-jerk anti-American, and pro-terrorist, or apologists for terrorism, should be denounced and avoided. The U.S. should not seek to embrace or promote the “least worst option” for lack of a better solution. All organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood need to be treated for what they are: fascistic, paternalistic organizations that seek the return of the Caliphate, act as apologists for Islamism and terrorism, and are not prepared to be responsible actors in democratic systems. They will not and cannot support the future pluralistic liberal institutions which much be built throughout the Muslim world in order to strengthen the promotion of democracy.

Rather than countering the ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorist groups that it has spawned, the U.S. has empowered the Muslim Brotherhood and, by extension, its uncompromising message by reaching out to the group itself in a poorly targeted effort to find allies in the Muslim world. Domestically, government agencies, departments, and officials at the federal, state, and local levels have unwittingly empowered the affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood by making them the dominant focus of their outreach to the Muslim community and thus anointing groups with an extremist bent and a documented ulterior agenda as the gatekeepers to the Muslim-American community. This policy, which continues to this day despite the criminal connections of many of these organizations, can only end in disaster for the interest of the United States both domestically and abroad.

Current and future U.S. outreach efforts need to be viewed through this lens, as the promotion and legitimacy of dangerous elements needs to be avoided at all costs, lest we allow short term and short sighted efforts of outreach, that mostly serve our goals only for the sake of appearances, yet do much damage to legitimate and genuine moderates by promoting elements which seek to exclude moderate voices, trump the more important long term needs and goals of the region, and U.S. national security.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement should be considered a strategic enemy of the United States. It should be designated as a foreign power and a threat, from a counterintelligence point-of-view, to the national security of the United States. The Muslim Brotherhood has stated clearly that it considers the United States to be its enemy, despite claims by some commentators that there exists a moderate wing of the movement that somehow does not support the movement’s core goals and ideology.

The Muslim Brotherhood's US Network

by **Zeyno Baran**

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ARTICLES

Washington, D.C. has suddenly become very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood. American policymakers are debating whether to engage non-violent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood network, both inside and outside the United States, in the hope that such engagement will empower these “moderates” against violent Wahhabi and Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, this strategy is based on a false assumption: that “moderate” Islamist groups will confront and weaken their violent co-religionists, robbing them of their support base.

This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, the U.S. alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, however, U.S. support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, the U.S. cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most importantly, the U.S. must consider the *ideology* of any potential partners. Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A “divide and conquer” strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.

Even though the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) does not openly call for violence or terrorism, it still does little to oppose it. In fact, it may provide an ideological springboard for future violence. This is not to say that all Salafis will one day become terrorists; the vast majority will never engage in violence and likely abhor terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the first step on the road to jihadi terrorism is instruction in Islamist ideology. Nearly all individuals involved in terrorism—whether as a foot soldiers executing the attack or an upper level mastermind, financier, or recruiter—start out as non-violent Salafi Islamists, and many were once Brotherhood members. For example, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the September 11 terrorist attacks, told U.S. interrogators that he was first drawn to violent jihad after attending Brotherhood youth camps.¹ It is therefore inexplicable that policymakers should seek to empower Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood as a strategy to combat terrorism.

The deciding factor in determining which Muslims can be allies in the “long war” cannot be based on tactics—that is, whether or not a group eschews violent methods.² The deciding factor must be ideological: Is the group Islamist or not?

On Islamism

What do I mean by “Islamist?” The term was coined by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, in an effort to politicize Islam.³ Broadly, the label Islamist applies to individuals or groups who believe that Islam should be a comprehensive guide to life. Islamists do not accept that the interpretation of Islam could evolve over the centuries along with human

beings' understanding, or that the religion could be influenced or modified by the cultures and traditions of various regions. Nor do they recognize that Islam can be limited to the religious realm, or to simply providing its followers with a code of moral and ethical principles. With this definition in mind, a nonviolent, American-born Islamist should not be considered an ally of the U.S. Yet a devout, conservative Muslim immigrant to Europe—one who does not even speak any Western languages but rejects Islamist ideology—could be.⁴

Islamists are strenuously opposed to secular governance. Instead, they believe that Islamic rules and laws based upon the Quran and the *sharia* code must shape all aspects of human society, from politics and education to history, science, the arts, and more. Islamic jurisprudence developed and codified over the course of the 8th and 9th centuries and has not changed since then. In wholly *sharia*-based countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, there is little distinction between religion and state, leaving no room for liberal democracy. The institution of *elections* might be maintained, but this will inevitably be an illiberal system without dissent, individuation, or critical thinking.

Today's Islamists adhere first and foremost to the works of the Muslim Brotherhood's most famous ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, and are not necessarily concerned with Islam's spiritual or cultural aspects. Qutb, like his ideological predecessors Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was preoccupied with the relative decline of the Muslim world. All three believed this deterioration was a result of Muslims having strayed from pure Islam. Qutb argued that Islam's crisis could be reversed only if "true" Muslims, emulating the ways of the Prophet Muhammad, worked to replace existing governments in the Muslim world with strictly Islamic regimes.⁵ Accordingly, followers of Qutb desire the overthrow of their current governments and declare armed jihad against non-Muslim states. It is important to underline that this step is often viewed as "defensive jihad," an interpretation which has broad acceptance among many Muslims. This logic has been used to justify attacks in Spain (which was ruled by Muslims for several hundred years) and any other Western countries that are deemed to be waging a war against Islam, either militarily or culturally.⁶ The next step is the establishment of the caliphate. Islamists believe that bringing about such changes is an obligation for all Muslims. They are not bound by constraints of time—they have been fighting this war for many decades already and will continue as long as it takes. Nor are they hindered by location—the new caliphate can be established anywhere.

Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood are engaged in a long-term social engineering project. The eventual "Islamization" of the world is to be enacted via a bottom-up process. Initially, the individual is transformed into a "true" Muslim. This Islamization of the individual leads that person to reject Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the secular rule of law. Next, the individual's family is transformed; then the society; then the state; and finally the entire world is expected to live, and be governed, according to Islamic principles. This ideological machinery is at the core of Islamist terrorism and it works to promote separation, sedition, and hatred. The tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood may be nonviolent in the West and less violent than other groups in the Muslim world, but the ideology behind those tactics remains fundamentally opposed to the Western democratic system and its values.

Many critics of the War on Terror complain that it fosters an “us versus them” attitude between Muslims and non-Muslims. In reality this mentality did not begin with the Bush Administration; it has long been part of the Islamists’ rhetoric. For decades, Brotherhood-affiliated organizations have been telling Muslims that they are different—in fact, superior—and must remain separate from non-Muslims. While more recently, some Islamists in the West have begun talking about integration or participation, these concepts are meant to be followed only if they serve the long-term Islamist agenda.

Non-Islamist Muslims understand the inherent incompatibility between Islamism’s desired imposition of *sharia* law upon society at large and Western society’s pluralism and equality. To the Brotherhood and groups like it—whether in the Middle East or the United States—the Quran and Islam are not merely one *possible* source of law; they are the *only* source of law. As the Muslim Brotherhood declares in its motto, “Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Quran is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”⁷

When the U.S. government engages with Islamist organizations in conferences or government outreach programs, it lends legitimacy to an ideology that does not represent—at least not yet—the views of the majority of American Muslims. American policymakers who advocate pursuing such a strategy are actually facilitating Islamism by endorsing it as a mainstream ideology. Both at home and abroad, this policy is leading to disaster. Liberal and non-Islamist Muslims—having already been denounced by Islamists as apostates—are now being told by Western governments that they do not represent “real” Islam.

Through engagement, the U.S. government effectively legitimizes the Islamists’ self-appointed status as representatives of Muslim community. This also legitimizes the Islamists’ self-appointed ability to judge “Muslim-ness” of others. Bestowing this status and capability upon Islamists is particularly dangerous in America. Muslims living in the U.S.—particularly converts and those born to immigrants—are more vulnerable to being won over by Islamist ideology because America does not have a strong native tradition of Islam. American Muslims searching for a greater understanding of what it means to be Muslim often find little information available except the Islamist perspective. This is because most prominent Muslim organizations in America were either created by or are associated with the Brotherhood—and have therefore been heavily influenced by Islamist ideology.

The Brotherhood Infiltrates America

The Muslim Brotherhood began operating in the U.S. in the 1960s upon the arrival of Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia. These individuals sought a university education (mostly at the leading state schools of Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan)⁸ and greater professional opportunity. A number of these Muslims were Brotherhood members escaping the persecution and repression of their native lands. Starting in the 1950s, many Middle Eastern governments began cracking down on the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Egypt.⁹ The Ikhwanis soon recognized that American social and political liberties would enable them to easily spread their Islamist ideology. Still, they cloaked themselves in secrecy from the start, publicly referring to their organization as “The Cultural Society.”¹⁰

The 1960s was also when Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi establishment began its global Islamization project, partnering with Brotherhood members who had left countries where the group was targeted for repression. One former U.S. Treasury official estimated that the Saudi government has spent some \$75 billion supporting Islam and Islamic institutions worldwide.¹¹ In 1962, the Muslim World League (MWL) was established in Mecca, with Brotherhood members in key leadership positions, to propagate Wahhabism worldwide. Over the ensuing decades, the MWL has funded many legitimate charitable endeavors but also a number of Islamist projects. Some of this money has come to support Brotherhood activists in the U.S., in part to change the perception of Wahhabism in America from "extremist" to "mainstream."

A primary focus of the MWL and the Brotherhood has been on education and indoctrination—especially of the youth—as the critical first step of their bottom-up approach.¹² According to the Brotherhood's own documents, "In 1962, the Muslim Students Union was founded by a group of the first Ikhwanis in North American and the meetings of the Ikhwan became conferences and Students Union Camps."¹³ The next year, a more formal organizational structure was created by two Brotherhood members, Ahmed Totonji and Jamal Barzinji, who helped found the Muslim Students Association (MSA) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. In its early years, the MSA distributed at its chapter meetings English translations of the writings of al-Banna, Qutb, and other Islamist ideologues. Arab Muslim members of the MSA who adopted these ideologies would then be recruited into the Brotherhood.¹⁴

With a global mission in mind, Barzinji, Totonji, and a third Brotherhood associate named Hisham Altalib then spearheaded the founding of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) in 1969. The first IIFSO meeting took place that year in Mecca; Totonji was its first Secretary-General and his friend Altalib served as Deputy Secretary.¹⁵ It may be worth noting that Totonji, Barzinji, and Altalib were born in Iraqi Kurdistan, and after completing their studies in the UK, came to the United States for graduate study but also to continue organizing Muslim youth activities. These three men played a critical role in the Brotherhood's original establishment, its vertical and horizontal institutionalization in the US over the decades, and the development of linkages between the American Brotherhood and other international Brotherhood networks.

Three years after the IIFSO was formed, the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) was created in Riyadh. WAMY has described itself as "an independent international organization" yet it has strong ties to the Saudi government. In fact, the Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowment, and Dawa once served as the group's president.¹⁶ Just as with the IIFSO, Totonji and Barzinji were deeply involved in WAMY's creation. Totonji served as deputy to WAMY's first Secretary-General and Barzinji was listed as a WAMY representative in the 1980s.¹⁷

In 1973, seeking to expand its influence beyond school and university campuses, Barzinji and Altalib also helped establish the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). According to its incorporation documents, the purpose of NAIT was to "serve the best interest of Islam and the Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada" by establishing a non-profit, tax exempt corporation (known in Arabic as a *waqf*). NAIT received large sums of money—especially from Saudi Arabia—allowing it to form a variety of Muslim professional associations as well as to build schools, Islamic centers, and publishing houses.

By the late 1970s it became clear that many of the students who had come to the US from the Middle East and South Asia were not returning home. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Saudis/ Wahhabis intensified their focus on American Muslims, as more funds and more literature flowed into the country. During this period, NAIT received funds and was able to take control of American mosques. Today, NAIT's website claims that it owns approximately 300 Islamic centers, mosques, and schools in the U.S.¹⁸ Other NAIT documents indicate that in 2002 it held the deed to 20 percent of America's approximately 1,200 mosques at that time.¹⁹ However, some assess that NAIT's influence is even greater. In 2003, one national security expert claimed that NAIT owns or controls the physical assets of 75 percent of U.S. mosques and that ISNA (a NAIT affiliate—*see below*) controls their ideological content.²⁰

A number of MWL- and WAMY-linked men then founded the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in 1981, a think tank dedicated to the "Islamization of knowledge." This phrase could be a euphemism for the rewriting of history to support Islamist narratives. For example, after such Islamization, Spain is permanently relabeled "Al-Andalus" (as it was called during Muslim rule) and the country becomes the rightful property of Muslims.²¹ That Spain was first conquered *from* Christian peoples before it was re-conquered *by* them does not matter—Islamists still believe that the region "belongs" to Muslims. The IIIT's founders include Barzinji and Totonji, along with Abdulhamid Abusulayman, Taha Jabir al-Alwani (both of whom were leaders of WAMY along with Barzinji), Yaqub Mirza (chief executive of the now-defunct SAAR Foundation, a fundraising operation linked to Hamas), Sayyid Syeed (then-President of the MSA), and Anwar Ibrahim (founder of a Malaysian student movement (ABIM) affiliated with WAMY and later Malaysia's deputy prime minister). Ishaq Ahmad Farhan, a former Jordanian education minister affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in that country, joined later. The IIIT states that it "supports research projects that study the reconstruction of Islamic thought and worldview based on Quranic principles and the Sunnah."²²

The IIIT also convinced the United States government that they should be the official arbiters of Islam in the American military. Indeed, Abdurahman Alamoudi, a close associate of the IIIT leadership, was tasked by the U.S. government in 1991 to select Muslim chaplains for the U.S. military. Alamoudi became a well-known political personality in Washington and was a frequent guest of Presidents Clinton and Bush in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This same Muslim activist—previously praised as a great moderate—was later convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to serve 23 years in prison.²³ Alamoudi was also later identified by the U.S. Treasury department as having funneled more than \$1 million to a UK-based affiliate of al-Qaeda.²⁴

Another major organization founded in 1981 with the involvement of American Muslim Brotherhood related entities NAIT and the MSA was the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), a self-described umbrella organization for all Muslims in North America. ISNA was incorporated in Indiana on July 14, 1981 "to advance the cause of Islam and service Muslims in North America so as to *enable them to adopt Islam as a complete way of life*." For those familiar with Islamism, this is a clear statement.

ISNA represents a continuation of the MSA. According to the Brotherhood's own internal documents, "the Muslim Students Union [i.e. the MSA] was developed into the Islamic Society

in North America (ISNA) to include all the Muslim congregations from immigrants and citizens, and to be a nucleus for the Islamic Movement in North America."²⁵

ISNA's funding sources are not transparent—it is classified as a church for tax purposes and is therefore not required to file Form 990. However, it too received significant support from Saudi Arabia and has many connections to the MWL and WAMY. A former FBI analyst has testified before the Senate about a 1991 ISNA financial statement indicating that Saudi Arabia was the largest source of donations at that time.²⁶ More recently, in November 2005, Canadian media reported that in 2002 Saudi King Fahd gave \$5 million and an annual grant of \$1.5 million to the Islamic Centre in Toronto which also houses ISNA's headquarters there. In 2005, the Saudi Islamic Development Bank announced a \$275,000 grant to ISNA's high school, as well as a scholarship program.²⁷ The website of the Islamic Development Bank confirms both awards.²⁸

It is instructive to look more closely at just three of the men who founded or directed ISNA. Their Salafi background is clear, as is their connection to other Muslim Brotherhood related organizations created inside the U.S.

Sayyid Syeed helped found ISNA. Following his immigration to the United States, he graduated from Indiana University in 1984 and appears to have spent his entire professional life working for organizations related to ISNA. He served as its Secretary General, and is currently National Director of the group's Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances. Syeed has also served as President of the MSA, Secretary General of the IIFSO, and is on the board of advisors at the Washington-based lobby group Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR, *see below*). Interestingly, his official biography omits that from 1984 until 1994, he was the Director of Academic Outreach at the IIIT.²⁹

Jamal Badawi is another important ISNA leader. Badawi was born in Egypt and received his undergraduate degree in communications from Ain Shams University in Cairo, which is now well known to have been a center for Muslim Brotherhood activity during the years Badawi was there. Muslim Brotherhood leaders and Islamic extremists who studied or taught at Ain Shams during that time period include Mohammed Akef, current leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood; Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, the late Hamas leader³⁰; and Shaykh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, then head of Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood.³¹ Badawi came to the U.S. in 1963 to obtain his PhD in Management at the University of Indiana, where he joined the local MSA chapter.³² Badawi has been a member of ISNA's board of advisors since 1988, and served on NAIT's board from 1991 until 1993. He is also on the executive committee of the Fiqh Council of America, which is run as a subordinate group to ISNA and is comprised of a collection of Muslim scholars who answer questions of jurisprudence and issue religious edicts.³³

Taha al-Alwani, also a key figure, was until recently the Chairman of the Fiqh Council. He was born in 1935 in Iraq and received both his primary and secondary education there; then he went to the College of Shari'ah and Laq at al Azhar University (Cairo), receiving his degree in 1959. He continued at the college, receiving a Master's Degree in 1968 and a doctorate in Usul al-Fiqh in 1973. Ten years after the completion of his doctorate, al-Alwani taught Usul al-Fiqh at Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ood University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.³⁴ Muhammad Ibn Sa'ood University is generally described as Saudi

Arabia's premier Islamic educational institution—known for upholding strict, fundamentalist Islamic teachings. *The Washington Post* called the university the “main citadel for Wahhabi instruction.”³⁵ Al-Alwani was also a founding member of the MWL in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He then came to America and began work in his community. Al-Alwani was a founding member of the IIIT, where he served as president and is still a member of the board. He currently serves as president at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences, an institution run under auspices of the IIIT in Virginia. He is also a professor at this institution, occupying the Imam Al Shafi'i Chair in Islamic Legal Theory. Since 1988, al-Alwani has also been a member of OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.³⁶

Supporting Palestine, Promoting Hamas

After seeing dozens of Muslims graduate from the MSA and into the ISNA umbrella, the Islamist community was able to focus on its version of *dawa*, or proselytizing Islam, in a more systematic way.³⁷ This allowed the Ikhwan to continue to build an Islamist support base in the U.S., and also to begin lobbying in favor of the Palestinian cause. Under the direction of senior Muslim Brotherhood activist Khalid Mishal (who would later become secretary-general of Hamas), Brotherhood member Mousa Abu Marzook (who had come to the U.S. to pursue his Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering and in 1991 became Chairman of Hamas's Political Bureau), and Sami al-Arian (who was pursuing his PhD in Computer Engineering at the time and would later be convicted of providing material support to terrorism), the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) was formed in Chicago in 1981. Its stated purpose was “to communicate the Ikhwan's point of view” and “to serve the cause of Palestine on the political and the media fronts.”³⁸

After Hamas was created in 1987 in Gaza, the IAP became its leading representative in North America. The IAP was the first organization to publish the Hamas charter in English and received hundreds of thousands of dollars from Hamas leader Marzook.³⁹ Yet the IAP would not be alone in furthering Hamas' cause. Mousa Abu Marzook soon formed the Palestinian Committee to raise money for Hamas. Then, in 1989—also in Chicago—Marzook founded a think tank called the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). This think tank was established to promote the ideology of Hamas in the United States and also received large infusions of cash from Marzook—all during the time when Marzook was supposedly an unemployed graduate student. The UASR shut down in 2004 as it began receiving increased levels of scrutiny from federal investigators. The UASR's link with Hamas has been confirmed by a captured Hamas operative named Mohammed Salah. He revealed that political command of Hamas in the United States was vested with the UASR and that the terrorist group's American-based leader, Ahmed Yousef, was the UASR's director.⁴⁰ Yousef fled the United States in 2005 to avoid prosecution and has since become the chief political advisor to Hamas' leader Ismail Haniyeh as well as the organization's principal Western media spokesperson.⁴¹

Though many American Islamist organizations deny any connection to Hamas, given its use of violence and terrorism, the direct links between Hamas and the Brotherhood are indisputable. In fact, Article 2 of the Hamas Charter states:

*“The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a world organization, the largest Islamic Movement in the modern era. It is characterized by a profound understanding, by precise notions and by a complete comprehensiveness of all concepts of Islam in all domains of life: views and beliefs, politics and economics, education and society, jurisprudence and rule, indoctrination and teaching, the arts and publications, the hidden and the evident, and all other domains of life.”*⁴²

The roster of American Islamist organizations grew larger when Ikhwanis created the Muslim American Society (MAS) in 1993. Incorporated in Illinois but now operating out of Virginia, MAS was founded by Jamal Badawi, Omar Soubani, Ahmad Elkadi and Mohammed Akef (now head of the Muslim Brotherhood) to serve as the *de facto* public face of the Brotherhood in the United States. Elkadi, according to a profile by *The Chicago Tribune* in 2004, is an Egyptian-born surgeon who was formerly personal physician to Saudi Arabian King Faisal. He and his wife—both Brotherhood members in Egypt, along with his father—moved to Louisiana in 1967, where he continued his medical training. As Elkadi told the *Tribune*, he became treasurer of the U.S. Brotherhood in 1970 and was elected president in 1984. Elkadi explained that he was the leader of the Brotherhood in the U.S. from 1984 to 1994—the final year also serving as director of the newly-created MAS.⁴³ In response to Elkadi’s revelations, MAS has moved to discredit Elkadi, arguing that his memory is failing and unreliable.⁴⁴ In any case, Akef told the *Tribune* that he helped found MAS and Shaker Elsayed, then-Secretary General of MAS, told the *Tribune* that “Ikhwan members founded MAS” and that about 45 percent of the organization’s “active” members belong to the Brotherhood.⁴⁵ Becoming an active member of MAS entails completing five years of Muslim community service and studying the writings of key Brotherhood ideologues like al-Banna and Qutb.⁴⁶

Following a 1993 Philadelphia meeting of Hamas leaders and activists in which the need to engage in propaganda efforts was discussed, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was founded in Washington DC. Its stated mission is to “enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.”⁴⁷ Although these objectives sound innocuous enough, the Muslim Brotherhood (of which many of CAIR’s founders were members) often uses terms like these as euphemisms for more insidious actions. A Brotherhood memo written in 1991 makes reference to a “dictionary” that the Ikhwanis use to decipher the true meaning of their words, which are put in quotation marks in written documents.⁴⁸

The fact is that CAIR was created by Ikhwanis for influencing the U.S. government, Congress, NGOs, and academic and media groups. The Brotherhood identified the media as “stronger than politics,” highlighted the importance of training activists to present a “view of the IAP” that would be acceptable to Americans. One of CAIR’s founders, Omar Ahmad, explicitly suggested the need for “infiltrating the American media outlets, universities and research centers.”⁴⁹

CAIR, whose founders included top leaders of the IAP and the UASR, can be considered as one of the most effectively camouflaged Brotherhood-related groups in the U.S. Over the past 15 years, CAIR has successfully portrayed itself as a mainstream Muslim organization—and has been treated as such by many U.S. government officials, including Presidents Clinton and Bush.

It is also important to note that American Islamist organizations are alleged to have played a vital role in supporting violent groups in other countries. CAIR, ISNA, and NAIT were all named as unindicted co-conspirators in the federal trial against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), which was charged with providing millions of dollars to Hamas. The HLF court case ended in October 2007 with a mistrial and a deadlocked jury, but facts uncovered during the trial revealed numerous disturbing linkages between Hamas and America's most prominent Muslim organizations. Among other things, court documents and testimony specifically identified CAIR as a member of the Palestine Committee in America, which is tasked with working to "increase the financial and moral support for Hamas," to "fight surrendering solutions," and to publicize "the savagery of the Jews."⁵⁰

This brief review of the history of major American Muslim organizations should make it rather obvious that the majority of them have for some time been intertwined with the Muslim Brotherhood. The same leaders appear in multiple organizations, tend to have familial relations, and move within the same close trusted circles. For example, Ghassan Elashi, who incorporated the Holy Land Foundation and served as the organization's Treasurer and later as its Chairman of the Board, was also responsible for the IAP's incorporation and was a founding member of CAIR's Texas Chapter. Marzook is married to Elashi's cousin and Mufid Abdulqader, a "top fundraiser" for the HLF, is the half-brother of Khalid Mishal. Meanwhile, Mohamed El-Mezain, the original Chairman of the HLF Board, is Marzook's cousin and identified by Mishal as "the Hamas leader for the U.S."⁵¹

Many of the initial group of Brotherhood members who came to the U.S. to study and set up the organizations detailed above are still actively involved in the movement. While their tone and presentation may have changed, their Islamist ideology has not. Even when an American-born "next generation" takes over the leadership of these organizations, little will change. Indeed, this is exactly what the Ikhwan intended. The same 1991 strategy memo referenced earlier states that the most important thing is to establish a "foundation" so that "we will be followed by peoples and generations that would finish the march and the road but with a clearly defined guidance."⁵²

Moreover, given that today there nearly 600 MSA chapters actively nurturing Islamist ideas among next-generation American Muslims at universities throughout the United States and Canada,⁵³ one cannot be too optimistic about the future nature of Islam in America. Indeed, it is unnerving to think that American Muslims who are genuinely seeking greater knowledge about their religion are obliged to turn to one or several of these organizations. Once there, Islamism is presented as synonymous with Islam, and the new member has no way to know otherwise. New members often fail to realize that the groups they have joined are not merely religious groups but political ones with a Wahhabi bias.

The case of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali is instructive of the dangers of education and indoctrination. Abu Ali was convicted in late 2005 of plotting to assassinate President George W. Bush. Abu Ali graduated as the valedictorian of his class from the Islamic Saudi Academy in Alexandria, Virginia. This school is run by the Saudi government, the property is under the Saudi government's control, and the Saudi Ambassador is the school board's chairman. In fact, the school is currently the subject of scrutiny and questions have been raised regarding the propriety of its curriculum. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has urged that the

school be shut down until it can ensure that the texts (provided by the Saudi government) do not preach religious intolerance and violence.⁵⁴ Abu Ali also participated in the paintball sessions organized by the “Virginia jihad” group of Ali al-Tamimi, who was convicted to life in prison without parole in April 2005 on charges of conspiracy, attempting to aid the Taliban, soliciting treason, soliciting others to wage war against the United States, and aiding and abetting the use of firearms and explosives.⁵⁵ Along with many other Islamists, including two of the 9/11 hijackers, Abu Ali attended the Dar al-Hijrah mosque (run by none other than Shaker Elsayed, the former Secretary General of MAS). In fact, Abu Ali taught youth Islamic classes there during high school.⁵⁶

Secrecy and Deception

In setting up their various institutions over the past four decades Brotherhood members have remained secretive, working through the organizations mentioned above to exert their influence. When questioned, most of these organizations at first deny any links to the Brotherhood. One undated MAS memo explicitly instructs group leaders to respond negatively if asked whether they are part of the Brotherhood. When this deception failed and connections to the Brotherhood were disclosed, MAS members have downplayed these links as merely an association of the past.⁵⁷ At the same time, they adopt the role of the victim, accusing their accusers of “McCarthyism” and “Islamophobia.” This intimidation, up to and including antidefamation lawsuits, has silenced many journalists, researchers, and other Muslims.

Thanks to the HLF case, however, much previously-classified evidence and many documents have emerged that clearly demonstrate these linkages. One of the key documents unveiled in this trial is a 1991 strategy paper of the Muslim Brotherhood authored by Mohamed Akram, who was a key Ikhwan leader in the U.S. at the time and is now the Secretary General of the International al-Quds Foundation in Lebanon as well as Director of the al-Quds International Institute. The International al-Quds Foundation is headed by none other than the Muslim Brotherhood’s chief ideologue, Yusuf al-Qaradawi.⁵⁸ In Akram’s 18-page “Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” he states that “the general strategic goal of the Group [the Muslim Brotherhood] in America” consists of six stages:

1. Establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood,
2. Adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally,
3. Expanding the observant Muslim base,
4. Unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts,
5. Presenting Islam as a civilizational [sic] alternative,
6. Supporting the establishment of the global Islamic state wherever it is.⁵⁹

Akram then notes that the priority for this strategy is “Settlement.”⁶⁰ This entails becoming “rooted in the spirits and minds of [the] people” and establishing “organizations on which the Islamic structure is built.” Akram states that Muslims should look upon this mission as a “Civilization Jihadist responsibility,” one that “lies on the shoulders of Muslims [but especially on those of] the Muslim Brotherhood in this country.” Akram then clarifies exactly what the “jihad” required by this strategy entails:

The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating

and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.⁶¹

Clearly, in this case jihad is not intended to be an inner, personal struggle, as is often claimed by American Islamists when they must explain why they were caught inciting for “jihad.” Akram also lists the stages of the Ikhwan activism in the U.S.:

1. The stage of searching for self and determining the identity,
2. The stage of inner build-up and tightening the organization,
3. The stage of mosques and the Islamic centers,
4. The stage of building the Islamic organizations—the first phase,
5. The stage of building the Islamic schools—the first phase,
6. The stage of thinking about the overt Islamic movement—the first phase,
7. The stage of openness to the other Islamic movements and attempting to reach a formula for dealing with them—the first phase,
8. The stage of reviving and establishing the Islamic organizations—the second phase.⁶²

The memo further describes the role of the Ikhwan as “the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims’ efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions’, the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” It then underlines that “the success of the Movement in America in establishing an observant Islamic base with power and effectiveness will be the best support and aid to the global Movement project.”⁶³

Akram lists various tactical and strategic methods to “merge” all the various organizations established across the U.S. (*dawa* and education organizations, women’s groups, political organizations, media, economic, scientific, professional, youth, etc) in order to reach their goal. He concludes the memorandum by listing the various Ikhwan organizations and “the organizations of our friends,” adding a final parenthetical phrase: “Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!” ISNA, NAIT, the MSA, and the IIIT are among the 29 organizations he lists. (CAIR had not yet been created.)

This document makes clear that the Brotherhood’s goal is to spread its version of political Islam, making it a “civilization alternative” to the West’s civilization. In the past 17 years, the Ikhwan in the U.S. has made serious progress in its six-stage strategy. In fact, if it were not for the 9/11 attacks and the resulting increased scrutiny on American Muslim organizations, it might now be farther along in its plan.

Even though many Brotherhood-linked organizations have dismissed this memo as “outdated,” it is fairly consistent with numerous more recent statements as well as the generic long war strategy. In a 1995 speech to an Islamic conference in Ohio, the Muslim Brotherhood’s spiritual leader, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, declared that “victory” will come through *dawa*. “Conquest through *dawa*, that is what we hope for,” said the Qatar-based imam who has authored a number of religious edicts justifying Hamas suicide bombings against Israeli civilians and American

soldiers in Iraq. In a chilling note, he confidently stated, “We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through *da'wa*.”⁶⁴

Other prominent American Muslims have made similarly provocative remarks. In the late 1980s, future CAIR board member Ihsan Bagby said that “Ultimately we [Muslims] can never be full citizens of this country, because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country.”⁶⁵ And in 2006, Zaid Shakir, a well-known African-American imam declared “Every Muslim who is honest would say, I would like to see America become a Muslim country.”⁶⁶

A later affirmation of the Brotherhood’s goal is clear in the views of the group’s official supreme leader, Mohammed Akef. In a series of January 2004 interviews, Akef called the U.S. a “Satan” and said that he was confident America would collapse. Akef also stated that he has “complete faith that Islam will invade Europe and America, because Islam has logic and a mission.”⁶⁷

It is actually rather amazing to find such straightforward statements. Since the 1990s (especially after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing), the Brotherhood has been increasingly cautious. At a secret 1993 meeting of Hamas members and sympathizers in Philadelphia, Shukri Abu Baker, the HLF’s former chief executive, stated “war is deception” and urged “caution should be practiced not to reveal our true identity.” Also present at this meeting was CAIR founder Omar Ahmad, who agreed with Abu Baker’s comments that “war is deception” and went on to say, “this is like one who plays basketball; he makes a player believe that he is doing this while he does something else...politics is a completion of war.”⁶⁸

To deceive Americans, Ahmad also suggested that the Ikhwan create some neutral sounding organizations such as a “Palestinian-American Friendship Association -...This will be done in order to...put some honey a little bit at a time with the poison they’re given. But if from the first night you...call it ‘The Islamic Society for Youths’ Welfare,’ they will shut the door in your face.” He also asked his “brothers” not to even mention Hamas by name and instead refer to it as “Samah” Later, in 2002 he claimed to “reject and abhor Hamas, its goals and methods,” in total contradiction to earlier tapes and documents that revealed him praising Hamas.⁶⁹

At this 1993 meeting Abu Baker also stated, “It does not benefit me to show to the American people that...I hate Abu Amar [Yasser Arafat] and hate the [Palestinian Liberation] Organization.” Instead of “attack[ing] the [Palestinian Liberation] Organization in a personal and direct manner,” Abu Baker suggests that U.S. Islamist groups should speak about “democracy and freedom of expression.” Another participant then agrees on the importance of “playing a very important tune to the average American which is the issue of democracy, the issue of representation. When you tell an American individual that, ‘...this person is not elected. He is an oppressor...This is a dictatorial regime...’ bring up Saddam Hussein’s name...”⁷⁰

Deception is a key tactic the Islamists use to proceed with their “settlement” plan. Below are just a few of the recent and well-known examples demonstrating that MAS, ISNA, and CAIR all play dual roles.

Muslim American Society (MAS)

Until the Holy Land Foundation trial, Muslim American Society leaders played word games regarding their connection with the Ikhwan. At the trial, it was revealed that a phone book was found at the home of Ismail Elbarrasse—an unindicted co-conspirator of the HLF and former assistant to Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzook—listing the names and numbers of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in the United States. On the first page of the phone book under the title “Members of the Board of Directors” were fifteen names. Among those names are Ahmad Elkadi, Jamal Badawi, and Omar Soubani—the founders of MAS.⁷¹

In fact, in light of previous documents that became public in other trials, MAS leaders finally have admitted that the group was founded by the Brotherhood.⁷² Yet, they quickly add that it has since evolved beyond the Ikhwan to include greater ideological diversity. They maintain that MAS has no formal connection with the Brotherhood. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood is just as reluctant to acknowledge any ties with MAS. One senior Muslim Brotherhood official explained that he does not want to say MAS is a Brotherhood “entity” because doing so “causes some security inconveniences for them in a post-September 11 world.”⁷³

Esam Omeish, president of MAS, claimed that the documents introduced at the HLF trial were “full of abhorrent statements and are in direct conflict of the very principles of our Islam.” He said, “The Muslim community in America wishes to contribute positively to the continued success and greatness of our civilization... The ethics of tolerance and inclusion are the very tenets that MAS was based on from its inception.” He also firmly stated that “MAS is not the Muslim Brotherhood.” Omeish said that MAS “grew out of a history of Islamic activism in the U.S. when the Muslim Brotherhood once existed but has a different intellectual paradigm and outlook.”⁷⁴

In August 2007, Virginia Governor Timothy Kaine appointed Omeish to a state commission on immigration. Yet Omeish was compelled to resign less than two months later after a December 2000 video was released in which he praised Palestinians for knowing that “the jihad way is the way to liberate your land;” in another video he congratulated Palestinians for giving up their lives for the sake of Allah.⁷⁵

When confronted, Omeish engaged in a rhetorical dance over his intended meaning of “jihad.” But the 1991 Akram memo makes clear just what jihad means to Islamists. Moreover, Omeish’s comments were made at the height of the 2000 Palestinian intifada. In this context, it is clear that the type of jihad that Omeish praised as the way to “liberate” Palestine was the very same process that the Palestinians were engaged in—that is, violent jihad.

What is particularly worrisome in this example, like so many others before, was that Omeish’s accusers were automatically put on the defensive, while many others, including the governor, supported Omeish. It should be a concern to Americans that those who reveal the Islamists’ true nature are tarred as Islamophobes, McCarthyists, or part of some “vast right-wing conspiracy.”

The Omeish incident reveals a clear tactic: MAS officials’ first move is to maintain that they have no formal connection with the Brotherhood. When evidence comes out that proves otherwise, they engage in wordplay, claiming that they have “moved on” from its ideology.⁷⁶ Of course, to become one of the elite, so-called “active,” members of MAS, one still must—among other things—study in detail the writings of al-Banna and Qutb.⁷⁷

Islamic Society in North America (ISNA)

While information has been available for several years now, the HLF trial clearly demonstrated the ISNA-Hamas connection. Marzook, the political leader of Hamas at the time, thanked ISNA for its support while he was in prison.⁷⁸ This is not a surprise given that ISNA was effectively established by the Ikhwanis and almost all of ISNA's founders have since remained active either in ISNA or in one of its affiliated organizations. Several key individuals who have been very active since the beginning—such as Sayyid Syeed—have tellingly omitted their early Islamist backgrounds from their “official” biographies.

ISNA also has deep links to well-known Islamists. One of the most prominent such individuals is Sami al-Arian, who helped establish ISNA in 1981 and founded the Islamic Committee for Palestine (an official ISNA affiliate) shortly thereafter.⁷⁹ Al-Arian is also currently serving the remainder of a 57-month conviction for supporting the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Until he was arrested in 2003, he was considered to be one of the country's leading civil rights activists and was often invited to meet top U.S. government officials, including Presidents Clinton and Bush. This was despite the fact that al-Arian had been the subject of an FBI investigation into his connections with the PIJ since 1996. After videotapes appeared in 2001 of al-Arian speaking at rallies calling for terrorist jihad in Palestine, he was suspended from his professorship at the University of South Florida. Al-Arian and a host of groups—including ISNA—immediately sprang to the defense, loudly proclaiming this to be nothing more than a “smear campaign” and an example of “anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bigotry.” In February 2003, a federal grand jury served a 50-count indictment against al-Arian.

Until the trial, for over a decade, al-Arian denied any connection to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad—in a 1994 interview, he even pretended that he did not know what the initials PIJ stood for.⁸⁰ In the trial, one piece of evidence was a videotape showing him declaring to supporters: “Let us damn America, let us damn Israel, let us damn them and their allies until death” and “Quran is our constitution... jihad our path ... victory to Islam... death to Israel... revolution till victory.”⁸¹ The case eventually ended in a partial acquittal and mistrial but al-Arian pled guilty in 2006 to “conspiracy to make or receive contributions of funds, goods or services to or for the benefit of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a specially designated terrorist organization.”⁸² Moreover, the judge who presided over his trial had few doubts as to al-Arian's true nature. During sentencing, the judge called him a “master manipulator,” saying to al-Arian “you looked your neighbors in the eyes and said you had nothing to do with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This trial exposed that as a lie... The evidence was clear in this case that you were a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”⁸³

Al-Arian was sentenced on May 1, 2006, to 57 months in prison (which included 38 months time served) and agreed to be deported after serving the prison term. Credit for serving his sentence was frozen due to a contempt citation resulting from al-Arian's refusal to testify before a Virginia grand jury investigating the IIT, which financially and ideologically supported his work in Tampa. However, in December 2007, a federal judge overturned this contempt charge

and al-Arian will likely be released and deported in April 2008.⁸⁴

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)

The HLF trial documents also proved that CAIR was part of the Muslim Brotherhood linked network created to help Hamas in the U.S. Even though it has portrayed itself to be a civil rights group, and is often described as such by the mainstream press, its top leadership is made up of the IAP and the UASR principals mentioned earlier. Despite public denials, CAIR leaders have been heard expressing their support for Hamas both in public and on FBI surveillance tapes. CAIR has received support from, and lent support to, Hamas financial conduits in the United States. Several CAIR officers and employees have been indicted on terrorism-related charges.

A brief look at the men who founded CAIR, their objectives, and their deceptive methods make clear that this it is not just a civil rights group. As mentioned earlier, CAIR was created following the 1993 Philadelphia meeting of Hamas leaders and activists where the need to engage in propaganda efforts was discussed. U.S. prosecutors named Nihad Awad, CAIR's executive director, and Omar Ahmad, CAIR's founder and chairman—both ethnic Palestinians—as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land case.

Among the founders of CAIR were three important leaders of the IAP: Omar Ahmad (IAP President, 1991-1994); Nihad Awad (IAP Public Relations Director, 1991-1994); and Rafiq Jabir (IAP President from 1994 to 2005, the year IAP shut down). Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, Awad's CAIR profile neglects to mention his IAP connection.⁸⁵ CAIR's website no longer contains biographies of Ahmad or Jabir, but even when they were posted they did not include their IAP connections. Likewise, the CAIR biographies of both Mohammed Nimr al-Madani (current research director of CAIR and a former board member at the UASR) and Nabeel Sadoun (CAIR board member and co-founder of UASR) do not mention their association with the UASR.

Typically, when the Ikhwanis are confronted with extremist quotes they claim that they have been misinterpreted. Yet in many cases the directness of their rhetoric leaves little room for interpretation. On July 4, 1998, the *San Ramon Valley Herald*, a local California newspaper, published an article about an Islamic school study session entitled "How Should We Live as Muslims in America?" The article stated that at this gathering CAIR Chairman Omar Ahmed urged Muslims not to assimilate into American society but instead to deliver Islam's message. He underlined that Islam is not in America to be equal to any other faiths, but to become dominant, and that the Quran should be the highest authority in America with Islam the only accepted religion on Earth.⁸⁶ When Ahmed's statements were highlighted in 2003, the CAIR founder flatly denied making these statements and said that he had sought and obtained a retraction from the newspapers that printed the article. Interestingly, as of December 2006, neither of the newspapers that ran the article received a retraction request from Ahmed and the reporter who wrote the article has adamantly stood by her account of the events.⁸⁷ Ibrahim Hooper, CAIR's communications director, has also expressed his wish to overturn the U.S. system of government in favor of an "Islamic" state. "I wouldn't want to create the impression that I wouldn't like the government of the United States to be Islamic sometime in

the future,” Hooper said in a 1993 interview with the *Minneapolis Star Tribune*. “But I’m not going to do anything violent to promote that. I’m going to do it through education.”⁸⁸ By “education,” Hooper likely means *dawa*, which would be in line with what the Muslim Brotherhood commands its members to carry out.

As with other aspects of its existence, CAIR’s funding has also been deceptive. In a November 2001 news release, CAIR stated that it does not support, or receive support from, any overseas group or government.⁸⁹ There is evidence however; that this statement was not true even at the time it was issued: In August 1999, the President of the Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank announced a \$250,000 contribution to the purchase of land in Washington DC for CAIR’s headquarters.⁹⁰ WAMY also financed the construction of the headquarters. In December 1999, Arab news reported that the Riyadh-based group was “extending both moral and financial support to CAIR in its effort to construct its own headquarters at a cost of \$3.5 million in Washington DC.”⁹¹ WAMY later provided in excess of \$1.04 million for one of CAIR’s advertising campaigns.⁹²

Given all the facts that are being revealed, especially as the HLF trial unfolded, the posturing of CAIR is very troubling. In August 2007, at a banquet in Dallas, CAIR Chairman Parvez Ahmed stated, “it is not just the HLF that is under fire, but the entire American Muslim community is under fire.”⁹³ With this, Ahmed is implying to the American Muslim community that groups like CAIR are being persecuted simply because they are Islamic rather than because of links to terrorist organizations—further creating a sense that all Muslims need to unite to the Islamist cause. Such rhetoric is increasingly used to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in America, as well as in Europe and elsewhere.

The Muslim Brotherhood in America: Implications

The preceding pages have shown how various Brotherhood-linked Islamist organizations have flourished in the tolerant environment of the U.S. In the process, they have been actively and openly creating a fifth column of activists who work to undermine the very foundations of America by challenging its constitution and religious plurality.

Turning a blind eye to the Brotherhood and its ideological extremism—even if done for the sake of combating violent extremism and terrorism—is a direct threat to the democratic order. Of course, such a threat might be welcomed by the Ikhwan goals, as the group’s long-term strategy paper of 1991 states that it hopes to “destroy America from within.” Moreover, as mentioned earlier, they seem have realized how certain concepts such as “democracy” and “freedom of expression” can be used in America to win over audiences.

The Islamist threat is real and is the result of decades of networking, infrastructure-building, and intellectual and ideological preparation. These groups have spent billions of dollars in creating networks of like-minded supporters (much of their support comes from the “us versus them” mentality they have helped to create) and have worked hard at social engineering (i.e., Islamization) for nearly four decades. As the Brotherhood in America became more “settled” and mature, it added new institutions, expanding its coverage geographically, based on issues and at

various levels—from local to international, from charities to public relations and eventually to national politics.

The Brotherhood's own documents clearly state a need for "a mastery of the art of coalitions, the art of absorption and the principles of cooperation." As a result of this strategy, individuals like Sami al-Arian—who claimed to have delivered the Muslim vote to the Republican Party in 2000—obtained access to the highest levels of the U.S. government. Gaining influence within the United States is especially important for the Ikhwan since, as a superpower, it has a huge impact on how Islamists are treated in other parts of the world. Indeed, one of the goals mentioned at the 1993 Philadelphia meeting was "forming the public opinion or coming up with a policy to influence the...way the Americans deal with the Islamists." Given this information, it may be worth exploring the decision-making process that led the U.S. to haphazardly push for elections in the Palestinian territories as it led to the election and empowerment of Hamas, which—as this paper has detailed—has strong linkages to some of most prominent and influential American Muslim organizations.

Cloaking themselves in civil rights and charity work, the leaders of these organizations have successfully managed to disguise their true agenda: supporting Islamism, and protecting and augmenting the operations of radical groups that support terrorism. So it is not unexpected that large sections of the institutional Islamic leadership in America do not support U.S. counter-terrorism policy. Far from it; they denounce virtually every terrorism indictment, detention, deportation, and investigation as a religiously motivated attack on Islam. Instead of considering whether the individual in question actually broke any laws, they instinctively blame the legal accusations on bigotry or an anti-Muslim conspiracy. For example, after the FBI raided the offices of HLF co-founder Ghassan Elashi in 2001, CAIR's Executive Director Nihad Awad called the government's actions an "anti-Muslim witch hunt."⁹⁴ It should be noted that Elashi was later indicted and convicted of channeling funds to Hamas.

Islamists sometimes even provoke incidents intended to make the American Muslim community feel under siege, presumably in an attempt to compel them to unite. The case of the six imams who were denied access to a U.S. Airways flight in 2006 is instructive. CAIR, which represented these imams, claimed this was a clear case of discrimination against Muslims. Yet the imams were prevented from flying not because they were Muslim or held a prayer session directly outside the gate (and again on the plane, which is peculiar since even devout Muslims do not pray this frequently), but because they were behaving like hijackers. The imams demanded to board at the same time even though only two had first-class tickets and then attempted to reseat themselves on the plane in a suspicious formation (two in the tail, two in the mid-section, and two in first class). They muttered loudly in Arabic about jihad and cursed the United States for its involvement in Iraq. They requested seat belt extensions (which can be used as makeshift weapons) even though none was large enough to need it. Other Muslim passengers on the flight were not harassed. Given their blatantly suspicious behavior it has been suggested by many that the imams were deliberately trying to provoke their removal from the airplane.

Countless young American Muslims—whether converts, Muslims born into secular families, or those brought up in traditional households—that have entered college since 9/11 are curious about Islam and their identity as both a Muslim and an American. Too often these young men

and women end up at the local MSA chapter looking for answers. Sadly, the MSA is still often the only option available for college students who wish to get involved in Muslim affairs. Perhaps it's no wonder that a Pew report released in May 2007 found a quarter of American Muslims aged 18 to 29 believe suicide bombings against civilians can sometimes be justified to defend Islam, while only 9 percent of those older than 30 agreed.⁹⁵ For non-Islamist Muslims Islam is a matter of personal faith. As long as the government continues to grant them freedom to practice their faith as they see fit, they have no reason to organize politically. It is therefore essential to help American Muslims—particularly younger ones—understand the difference between Islam and Islamism, because the various Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, which have presented themselves as representatives of American Muslim community, are not faith groups. They are political entities with a political agenda. If the U.S. government continues to engage with them, it should be done in the context of a “war of ideas” debate, and not in a passive and receptive mode, expressing concern about offending their religious or spiritual sensitivities.

Another important consideration for the United States is that the Islamist revolutionary vanguard is no longer limited to the Arabic-speaking Middle Easterner. The hardline Islamists and even the terrorists of today and tomorrow are smart, tech- and-media-savvy citizens of the West. Terrorist acts inside the U.S. are huge setbacks for American Islamists; their long-term strategy of gradual infiltration was in fact seriously hurt by the 9/11 attacks as they increasingly came under the scrutiny of law enforcement authorities. It is not surprising that most of these organizations offer their cooperation to prevent Islamist terrorism inside the U.S. This is also the primary reason why some in the U.S. favor engaging the Islamists. But as described earlier, this is a misguided policy, as ideological extremism is at the root of the terrorist problem. The New York Police Department explicitly stated this link in its recent report on homegrown terrorist threats, stating that “jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ‘autonomous jihad’ via acts of terrorism against their host countries.”⁹⁶

Within America, the key threat is not an eventual Islamist takeover of the country, but an Islamist takeover of its Muslim citizens. In accordance with the Brotherhood's long-term plan to create an “us and them” mentality, Islamists in Europe are also beginning to push for the creation of self-segregated societies—a process that has been labeled “voluntary apartheid.” This tactic has been enthusiastically supported by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who has repeatedly advised Muslims living in the West to create their own “Muslim ghettos” to avoid cultural assimilation. If American Muslims start forming “parallel societies,” it will be much easier for the Ikhwan to push for the introduction of *sharia* in these societies. While this may seem far-fetched, it cannot be so easily dismissed—especially given how close the Islamists came to introducing *sharia* for Canadian Muslims.⁹⁷ And since most of the American Muslim organizations are in the hands of Islamists who enjoy seemingly unlimited money, media attention, and political influence, few non-Islamists would be able to fight back.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Dr. Peter Mandaville
From Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

**“The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It”
July 10, 2008**

1. In your written testimony you referenced a controversy that arose in 2006 involving Muslim cab drivers in Minneapolis, many of whom refused to accept passengers carrying alcohol. The drivers, primarily of Somali decent, stated that transporting persons with alcohol was against their religion. According to press accounts, the local chapter of the Muslim American Society (MAS) issued a *fatwa*, or religious edict, saying that ‘Islamic jurisprudence’ prohibits taxi drivers from carrying passengers with alcohol, ‘because it involves cooperating in sin according to Islam.’ Could you please provide further detail with respect to the situation in Minneapolis? What is your analysis of the role of the MAS chapter in this controversy? In your opinion, were the events and justifications surrounding the controversy consistent with Islamist activity and/or rhetoric?

RESPONSE: The 2006-7 situation involving cab drivers at the Minneapolis airport illustrates the point that certain individuals and branches of mainstream Muslim organizations in the United States can sometimes advocate positions that are far removed from militant ideologies but which nonetheless serve socially divisive ends and which also emphasize Muslim “separateness.” In this particular case—in which some cab drivers at the Minneapolis airport (the majority of whom are Somali and Muslim) began to refuse to accept passengers carrying alcohol on their person—the local Minnesota chapter of the Muslim American Society (the U.S. Muslim organization most closely affiliated with the tradition and program of the Muslim Brotherhood) seems to have played a dual role. On the one hand, the local branch of the Muslim American Society (MAS) sought to position itself as a mediator between the cab commission and the taxi drivers. In other words, it sought to represent itself as an organization seeking to defuse the situation by finding a position of compromise. Investigative reporting by the Minneapolis-St. Paul *Star Tribune*, however, revealed that the MAS contribution to the situation was somewhat more complex than this. Not only did the organization issue a fatwa, or Islamic legal opinion, stating that under Islamic law it is illegal for a Muslim to transport someone carrying alcohol (a position, by the way, that is not in keeping with the majority view on this issue within Islamic jurisprudence), but it also seems that certain figures associated with MAS played a key role in mobilizing the taxi drivers to refuse carriage in the first place. Interviews conducted within the Somali Muslim community found that many of them were bitter about what they perceived as an attempt to impose “Arab” interpretations of Islam and Middle East agendas on the Somali community. Those behind this agitation had indeed studied in, and continued to maintain close ties to groups in, the Middle East. The cab drivers episode, alongside other isolated incidents of a similar nature, suggest that some within the American Muslim community may seek to use arguments based on civil rights and religious freedom to advocate legal accommodations and special

exceptions for Muslims in this country. Based on what I know of the major Muslim organizations in the United States, such incidents are not representative of their central role and mission as they themselves understand it. These episodes do, however, suggest that some who are affiliated to these organizations see the U.S. legal system—considerably more open and pluralistic than judiciaries in the Middle East—as a vehicle for their agenda of societal Islamization. This is not a project that derives from violent ideology or one that aims at converting Americans en masse to Islam, but rather one that seeks to create various spaces and forms of “Muslim exceptionalism”—some of which will inevitably challenge commonly-held public norms in this country.

2. In your written testimony you discussed the role of the Muslim Council of Britain and other organizations operating within the United Kingdom. Could you please expand upon the British experience in confronting violent Islamist extremism and the lessons that the United States can derive from that experience?

RESPONSE: As the Committee seems interested in evaluating the experience of the United Kingdom in dealing with Islamism and Islamic radicalism with a view to understanding what lessons might be relevant to the U.S. context, two points in particular are worth bearing in mind:

(1) The social circumstances, historical experience, and community demographics of Muslims in the United Kingdom and the United States are so different that we need to question how much of what has happened in the UK is relevant to the U.S. context. Immigrant Muslims in America have not experienced the same bedrock of social disaffection and alienation that form the historical basis of Muslim grievances in the UK, and they also do not—unlike their co-religionists in Britain—deal with endemic problems of unemployment, drugs, gangs, and racial persecution. American Muslims do not have a general sense of living in a country that has alienated them, or in which avenues of social mobility have been closed to them; quite the opposite. In short, the problems of Britain’s Muslim community are not, for the most part, the problems of immigrant Muslims in America. While we have established through our hearing and subsequent discussions that the ideas contained within violent Islamist ideologies do indeed matter, it also became very clear that the process through which these ideas interact with pre-existing grievances is vitally important to determining how they manifest themselves behaviorally. If the grievances of American Muslims are not the same as Muslims in the UK, it is reasonable to assume that the dynamics of Islamist radicalization will work somewhat differently. Looking at the two communities in parallel, the features that seem most relevant to focus on in the American context are:

(a) The appeal of ultraconservative and literalist interpretations of Islam to recent converts or those of Muslim background lacking in religious knowledge and socialization; many of the radical groups specifically prey on this demographic.

(b) The crisis of identity (generally, in my observations, experienced more intensely in the UK) that provides for an “opening” that can allow narratives of global Muslim oppression to gain a foothold; this state of mind constitutes the *tabula rasa* and the “raw material” which certain radical Islamist ideologies cultivate to their advantage.

Appreciating these characteristics as common to radicalization in both the U.S. and UK settings, it is nevertheless vital that in evaluating potential best practices (or less successful ones) from the UK experience, we pay close attention to the question of the extent to which these policy options are tailored to the specific circumstances and needs of the British Muslim community, and whether they are relevant for the United States. Indeed, I believe that certain British initiatives transplanted wholesale to the United States could even serve to make the situation worse in this country.

(2) One clear parallel between the UK and U.S. contexts relates to the role of Muslim organizations. Most Muslims in both countries do not think about or engage their religious identity through mass organizations or movements. Their concerns and sensibilities are usually far more locally oriented; or, where they relate to national or global issues, Muslim organizations are not generally the conduit through which their views are expressed. So while I believe it is not correct to portray Muslim organizations in the United States as wholly detached from the Muslim community and engaged in the pursuit of Islamist agendas devised in the Middle East, one does need to question the extent to which such organizations are, or could possibly be, “representative” of so diverse a community. These groups are important actors and should be involved in outreach efforts by government and law enforcement agencies. It is also important, however, to build relationships with Muslims who by virtue of their geographic/social location or ethno-national background, may be less represented by some of major national Muslim organizations. This is a clear lesson that can be drawn from the UK government’s complex relationship with the Muslim Council of Britain.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record**Hearing Date: 10 July 2008****Committee: SHSGAC****Member: Senator Coburn****Witness: Zeyno Baran**

Question: In December 2007, a grant of nearly \$500,000 was awarded by the U.S. State Department to a University of Delaware project managed by a leader of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS)¹. As you know, the Muslim Brotherhood considers the AMSS a partner organization. The grant is meant to foster dialogue with clerics in Muslim countries. In early 2008, the Islamic Society of North America, also considered a partner organization by the Muslim Brotherhood, received State Department funding for a similar program through a sub-grant to the National Peace Foundation². Are these the kinds of organizations the U.S. government should employ to conduct these types of programs?

Answer: There are two interrelated questions here on which my answer will focus. First, what is the goal the State Department hopes to achieve with these projects? And second, are these groups best suited to deliver the desired outcomes?

The State Department has established a number of exchange programs that include many promising political, business, cultural and social leaders of other countries. These are intended to provide these current and future leaders with a better understanding of US policies and values, as well as of American life in general. The hope is that once these people meet Americans who are in the same professional field or who share similar interests, they will have a much deeper understanding—and thus, it is assumed, a more positive understanding—of America and Americans. Subsequently, they will share their positive experiences and views with others in their communities, furthering a better image of America.

Since 9/11, the State Department has paid special attention to improving the US image in the Muslim world, focusing in particular on clerics. Though trying to stay away from the specifics of religious teachings, the US government does recognize the importance of winning over these clerics so that they are less likely to preach in anti-American or hate-filled ways. Most importantly, the goal is to help them understand that the US is not at war with Islam or Muslims—just the opposite: Muslims in America can practice their religion as they wish, they are not discriminated against or mistreated; and in fact, Muslims in America enjoy more rights and freedoms in the US than do Muslims in almost all other countries (including, especially, Muslim-majority ones).

¹ Grant details are posted on USA Spending.gov:
http://www.usaspending.gov/faads/faads.php?reptype=r&database=faads&record_id=11414195&detail=3&datatype=T&sortby=i

² Grant details are posted on USA Spending.gov:
http://www.usaspending.gov/faads/faads.php?reptype=r&database=faads&record_id=11414134&detail=3&datatype=T&sortby=i

Investing in clerics in Muslim countries so they are likely to preach positively about America and Americans clearly is a worthwhile goal. However, just who is put in charge of these exchange and dialogue programs is as important as what the programs are about—especially given the sensitive nature of this issue in the post-9/11 environment. The people and groups involved in such projects need to be proud Americans who themselves share these goals in order for these programs to have the desired outcome. They certainly do not need to agree with US policies or practices in all realms; in fact, as citizens, they are likely to have complaints and concerns as most Americans do. The key, however, is that they believe in America and in the need to work constructively in all areas for the benefit of the country.

The questions the State Department then needs to ask in evaluating applicants who are interested in running such projects include: What is the outlook of the applicant group—does it seek to further American interests and values? What is the group's track record, especially in terms of which other groups it associates with? If it has done similar projects before (fostering dialogue or exchanges with Muslims outside the US), with whom did it interact, what did it do and what was the outcome? What criteria will it use to select the participant clerics? What messages will it want to impart on the clerics it chooses for the programs?

These and other necessary questions would make clear that the above-mentioned groups—The Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS) and The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)—are not the appropriate ones to conduct such programs. ISNA has been named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the ongoing Holy Land Foundation trial. Both of these groups have direct and indirect ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a political Islamist network that considers Islam a “civilization alternative” to America (and to liberal democracy in general), and is thus fundamentally anti-American. The Muslim Brotherhood’s mission statement is “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope”. Hamas is a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is not possible for groups founded to further the goals and messages of the Muslim Brotherhood to convey instead the kind of messages the State Department would wish to be conveyed. Ultimately, it is likely that these groups would take advantage of such programs to further expand their own international networks. In short, the money of American taxpayers will not benefit American interests in the hands of groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Question: In your testimony, you quoted from the following section of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic plan for its affiliates in the U.S.:

Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America: The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” ... the [Muslim Brotherhood affiliates] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in

eliminating and destroying the Western Civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of unbelievers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.³

This strategic plan lists several Muslim groups such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) as Muslim Brotherhood partners to carry out the “grand jihad.” What tactics are taken by the Muslim Brotherhood leaders and the groups listed as Muslim Brotherhood U.S. affiliates to reach the goals of this strategic plan?

Answer: Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood are engaged in a **long-term social engineering** project. The eventual “Islamization” of the world is to be enacted via a bottom-up process. Initially, the individual is transformed into a “true” Muslim. This Islamization of the individual leads that person to reject Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the secular rule of law. Next, the individual’s family is transformed; then the society; then the state; and finally the entire world is expected to live, and be governed, according to Islamic principles.

To achieve this goal, different tactics are used in different countries. In the US, Islamist groups have taken full advantage of social and political liberties and of an environment tolerant of religious diversity. Hence, over the past four decades they have established various institutions to spread their ideology and exert their influence. A primary focus has been on **indoctrination**—especially of youth—as the critical first step of their bottom-up approach. Spreading political Islam as a “civilization alternative” to the liberal democracies of the West, they have created a **fifth column of activists** who work to undermine the very foundations of America by challenging its constitution and religious plurality.

Given their **sedition goals**, they **maintain secrecy regarding their objectives and employ deceptive methods**. They have created, as one leader suggested some “neutral-sounding” organizations, such as a “Palestinian-American Friendship Association -...This will be done in order to...put some honey a little bit at a time with the poison they’re given. But if from the first night you...call it ‘The Islamic Society for Youths’ Welfare,’ they will shut the door in your face.”⁴

The Brotherhood has identified the media as “stronger than politics,” and highlighted the importance of training activists to **present their view in a way that would be acceptable to Americans**. One leader of a Brotherhood-linked organization explicitly suggested the need for “infiltrating the American media outlets, universities

³ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” Government Exhibit 003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.*

⁴ Transcript of October 1993 meeting of U.S. Palestine Committee leaders in Philadelphia, available at http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/93Philly_12.pdf.

and research centers.”⁵⁴⁹ And according to internal Brotherhood documents, its leaders suggest that they should speak about “democracy and freedom of expression” to influence American public opinion; “When you tell an American individual that, ‘...this person is not elected. He is an oppressor...This is a dictatorial regime...’ bring up Saddam Hussein’s name...”⁶ They seem to have realized how **concepts such as “democracy” and “freedom of expression” can be used in America to win over audiences.**

When questioned, at first these groups deny any links to the Brotherhood. If this deception fails and connections to the Brotherhood are disclosed, they downplay these links as associations they have had only in the past. At the same time, **they adopt the role of the victim, charging their accusers with “McCarthyism” and “Islamophobia.”** This intimidation, sometimes taken all the way to anti-defamation lawsuits, has silenced many journalists and researchers, as well as other Muslims.

They denounce virtually every terrorism indictment, detention, deportation, and investigation as a religiously-motivated attack on Islam. Instead of considering whether the individual in question has actually broken any laws, they instinctively blame the legal accusations on bigotry or anti-Muslim conspiracy.

Islamists may furthermore **provoke incidents** intended to make the American Muslim community feel under siege, presumably in an attempt to compel them to unite. Such tactics are increasingly used to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in America.

In fact, in accordance with the Brotherhood’s long-term plan to **instill an “us vs. them” mentality**, Islamists are beginning to push for the creation of self-segregated societies—a process that has been labeled **“voluntary apartheid.”** The purpose is to **avoid cultural assimilation** and hence to increase the number of Muslims who would consider themselves **Muslims first, and Americans second.**

These groups make **tactical alliances.** For example, some groups claim to be interested in “civil rights,” and partner with leading American civil rights organizations that are eager to assist in any cases of real or perceived religious discrimination. Others engage in interfaith activities, mostly for the purpose of establishing links to Christian and Jewish groups, who would, in case of any problems with law enforcement, vouch for them being “good Muslims”. Often they partner with non-Muslim groups that are critical of US government policies, especially regarding Israel and the Iraq war, and offer them platforms to speak. Through such partnerships, the Islamists portray themselves as victims who are understandably and legitimately angry so that they can win the sympathies of both Muslim and non-Muslim audiences.

⁵ ibid

⁶ ibid

Hearing Date: 10 July 2008
Committee: SHSGAC
Member: Senator Coburn
Witness: Director Michael Leiter

Question: (U) What public information is available regarding the alleged terror-fundraising activities of the Muslim Brotherhood or any of its U.S.-based affiliates (including entities listed in the 1991 Muslim Brotherhood memorandum)? Have there been any convictions of or guilty pleas made by members of the Muslim Brotherhood or any of its U.S.-based affiliates in connection to supporting terrorist entities?

Answer: (U) Public information regarding the alleged terror fundraising activities of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or any of its U.S.-based affiliates can be found in the government exhibits introduced at the 2007 trial of the Dallas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD), et al. The exhibits can be requested from the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, but a readily-available compilation of key MB-related exhibits can be found at the following websites: nefafoundation.org and investigativeproject.org.

(U) Convictions and guilty pleas by alleged members of the MB and U.S.-based affiliates in connection to supporting terrorist entities are as follows:

- a. (U) Mohamed Salah was convicted in 2007 in Chicago of obstruction of justice for failure to disclose in a civil lawsuit his transfer of funds to HAMAS. The transfer of funds occurred prior to the 1995 designation of HAMAS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. According to the list of un-indicted co-conspirators filed by the U.S. Government in *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, Salah was a "member of the U.S. MB's Palestine Committee and/or its organizations."
- b. (U) In 2006, Mohamed Shorbagi pleaded guilty in Atlanta to providing material support to HAMAS. According to the list of un-indicted co-conspirators filed by the U.S. Government in *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, Shorbagi was a "member of the U.S. MB's Palestine Committee and/or its organizations."
- c. (U) Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi, and Infocom Corporation were convicted in 2005 of conspiracy to deal in the property of HAMAS official Mousa Abu Marzook, a Specially Designated Terrorist. According to evidence introduced at the 2007 HLFDR trial, defendant Ghassan Elashi's name appeared on a list of members of the U.S. MB Palestine Committee. According to the list of un-indicted co-conspirators filed by the U.S. Government in *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, Bayan Elashi, Basman Elashi, and Infocom were "members of the U.S. MB's Palestine Committee and/or its organizations."

Hearing Date: 10 July 2008
Committee: SHSGAC
Member: Senator Voinovich
Witness: Director Michael Leiter

Question: (U) In trying to better understand the roots of Islamist extremism, I referenced a number of books which I believe outline the problem particularly well as it pertains to the treatment of Muslim women around the world. I believe that Ayaan Hirsi Ali's book **Infernal** does an equally good job of capturing the problem: "That oppression of women causes Muslim women and Muslim men, too, to lag behind the West. It creates a culture that generates more backwardness with every generation. It would be better for everyone – for Muslims, above all – if this situation could change." What is the National Counterterrorism Center doing to address these challenges and better engage women around the world on these issues?

Answer: (U) The response to this question is classified and has been delivered to the Office of Senate Security.

Question: (U) Similarly, how should the federal government reconcile its support of authoritarian regimes with poor records of women's suffrage, while similarly attempting to convey a message of 'freedom and democracy' to the Muslim world?

Answer: (U) NCTC analysts provide policy makers and operators the information and analysis they need to counter existing and emerging radicalization threats from women and men. We cannot provide an accurate response to this policy-related question. We respectfully recommend the Committee direct this question to the Department of State and/or the National Security Council.