[Senate Hearing 110-476]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-476
EXPLORING THE U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH
AFRICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 1, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Frazer, Hon. Jendayi E., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of State, Washinton, DC............................. 5
Gration, MG Jonathan S., USAF (Ret.), former Director, Strategy,
Policy, and Assessments, United States European Command........ 39
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Hess, Hon. Michael, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Malan, Mark Peacebuilding Program Officer, Refugees
International, Washington, DC.................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Morrison, Dr. J. Stephen, Executive Director, HIV/AIDS Task Force
and Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Whelan, Theresa, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC.......................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
(iii)
EXPLORING THE U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH
AFRICA
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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Nelson, Webb, and Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Good morning. Welcome. Thank you all for
joining me and my esteemed colleague, the ranking member of the
full committee, Senator Lugar, for this hearing to explore the
U.S. Africa Command and a new strategic relationship with
Africa.
As many of you know, I have supported the idea of a United
States Armed Forces Regional Combatant Command for Africa for a
long time. Last June, I introduced legislation mandating a
Pentagon study on the feasibility and desirability of
establishing an Africa Command, and asked the Defense
Department to report to Congress on the potential pros and cons
of such a command, and to provide an estimate of the resources
it would require.
Plans for the new Africa Command--now commonly called
AFRICOM--have proceeded swiftly since then. I'm glad that the
administration has recognized Africa's increasing strategic
importance and has pledged to adopt a more comprehensive
approach toward the challenges and opportunities presented by
this diverse continent.
While I welcome the President's announcement of the
creation of an AFRICOM, I am aware that the Combatant Command,
which still exists only at the planning stage, has been the
subject of much scrutiny and debate within the policy community
here in Washington as well as by friends abroad and in the
media. In addition, since AFRICOM's inception there have been,
in my opinion, far too few conversations between the planning
team and those of us on Capitol Hill who are focused on Africa.
I hope that today's hearing will address some of the
concerns that have been raised while allowing full discussion
of the decisions that have already been made and those that are
still forthcoming. With the formation of this command, we are
at a significant turning point in our relationship with Africa,
and we must ensure our actions are aligned with our objectives.
Africa presents a number of security-related challenges,
including violent conflicts with far-reaching spillover
effects, significant displaced populations, maritime
insecurity, large-scale corruption, and the misappropriations
and exploitation of natural resources. The question, however,
is not whether the United States needs to work aggressively and
cooperatively to address these concerns, but how we should do
so in order to be as effective as possible.
There is no doubt that our Nation's military expertise is
one of our greatest assets, but meaningful and sustainable
contributions to security and development in Africa must
address the underlying causes of these security challenges
throughout the continent. Many of these challenges are not
military at their core, but instead require significant
improvement in the capacity of local governments, with an
emphasis on the rule of law, economic development,
democratization, and, of course, anticorruption measures.
Furthermore, many threats throughout the African Continent are
not confined by national borders, which poses additional
obstacles and requires extensive collaboration and coordination
between African governments if they are to be effectively
combated. The United States must pursue a seamless and
adaptable policy on the continent that will enhance and expand
national and regional capacity in Africa.
I understand that these objectives are in line with those
espoused by the AFRICOM planning team and I am prepared to
fully support a unified interagency United States approach that
creates a military command with the primary mission of
supporting our policies toward Africa and ensuring continued
diplomatic, development, humanitarian assistance, and regional
initiatives led by the Department of State, USAID, and other
key stakeholders--including national and international NGOs,
other bilateral and multilateral development bodies, and of
course, African political and military leaders. If designed,
deployed, and equipped with these goals in mind, this command
will contribute to broader United States Government efforts
throughout the continent, and will help provide an additional
platform for regional thinking, strategizing, and activity that
will advance the strategic interests of our country throughout
Africa.
It is abundantly clear that the United States national
security, international stability, and the ability of African
countries to achieve their full growth and development
potential depend upon improving and expanding governance and
accountability so that legitimate grievances are addressed and
extremism cannot take root. This will require strengthening
national and regional commitment and capacity to provide
physical security while also protecting human rights and
democratic freedoms.
And now, let me introduce our two distinguished panels. On
our first panel, we have three witnesses from the U.S.
Government. We have the State Department's Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer; the Defense
Department's Ms. Theresa Whelan; and Mr. Michael Hess, the
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for
International Development. We asked each of them to address the
planning and expectations for AFRICOM, key challenges, resource
requirements, and the interagency process, thus far. To the
extent possible, I'd like to avoid generalities, and hope this
can be a frank and detailed conversation. We're very glad that
you are here today. I will introduce the second panel at the
appropriate time.
Now, I'm delighted to turn to our ranking member of the
full committee, who's extremely active in African affairs
throughout his distinguished career here, Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It's great to be a teammate with you again today in this
important hearing.
I want to veer away from AFRICOM, for just a moment, to
commend the United Nations for acting on Darfur yesterday by
authorizing 26,000 peacekeeping troops. And it was a red-letter
day, because the Senate approved Resolution 276, which asks the
Bush administration to urgently request the necessary funding
to cover our portion of the costs of that vital mission. We
state, in the resolution, that failure of the international
community to take all steps necessary to generate, deploy, and
maintain United Nations/African Union hybrid peacekeeping
forces will result in the continued loss of life and further
degradation of humanitarian infrastructure in Darfur. History
has shown that peacekeeping success depends on size, resources,
mandate, mobility, and command structure of the force, and the
mission must be accompanied by a peacekeeping process among the
parties in the conflict. We strongly urge our Government, as
well as others, to act swiftly and robustly.
Let me just say, with the creation of a new Defense
Department Combatant Command for Africa with a State Department
component, it's an issue that interests this committee, from a
number of different perspectives. What might be the advantages
of such a new command? A new command would bring new focus and
attention to a continent that has been roiled by conflict, most
often by internal strife that spills over borders, creating
tragic refugee flows and new conflicts in neighboring states.
We would benefit as a nation if our military can develop a more
sophisticated understanding of a region that is ever changing
and highly complex. A Combatant Command for Africa would not be
distracted by problems in the Balkans, or wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, or problems in other areas of the world, as is the
case now, as three Combatant Commands divide parts of Africa
into regionally mixed portfolios. Instead, an Africa Command
could focus on building regional and subregional African
peacekeeping capability and strengthening the ability of
partner nations to counter terrorists on their own soil.
Concerns that the region could provide havens for
terrorists are justified. The bombings of U.S. Embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 demonstrated the lethal impact that
even small bands of violent extremists in Africa have when they
target U.S. interests. Somalia has been a known haven for
terrorists and a primary preparation and transit area for past
terror attacks.
With the proposed creation of this new command, however, it
is time to come to grips with the appropriate roles of the
Department of State and the Department of Defense in deciding
which countries are best prepared to receive American security
assistance, and how that security assistance would be used.
With greater expertise created within a new regional
command, our hope is that there would be few disagreements
between the two Departments on the appropriateness of security
assistance to specific African nations. But, undoubtedly, some
differences of opinion will occur. It is my view that it is
only the Secretary of State who has the balanced overview of
the full range of U.S. foreign policy interests in a country or
in a region. Determination as to which countries should receive
U.S. military equipment and training, and the extent and type
of such training, are fundamentally foreign policy decisions.
Judgments on whether a potential recipient has the human rights
and due process protections in place to warrant a strengthening
of the security sector should be the Secretary of State's call.
Likewise, whether a stronger military in one country will upset
a balance in the subregion or cause neighbors to feel
threatened is also a foreign policy, and not a military
judgment, and it belongs to the Secretary of State.
It is crucial that ambassadors on the ground provide strong
leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on the component
parts of all counterterrorism activities in their countries of
assignment. This includes the authority to challenge and
override directives from combatant commanders or other DOD
personnel to their resident or temporary staffs in the embassy.
This hearing provides an opportunity to raise a number of
related issues. To what extent are the State Department and
USAID involved in planning for the proposed new command? It is
important to have the civilian agencies weigh in, especially
when making the strategic decision as to whether the value of
creating such a command outweighs the potentially negative
impact. Robust Secretary of State involvement can minimize the
dangers that critics envision. A disproportionally military
emphasis in our African policy, and a message that such a
command presages a disposition for military intervention in
Africa, would be undesirable.
How would the new combatant commander relate to
ambassadors? Are more formal mechanisms needed to lay out roles
and responsibilities? For example, are memoranda of
understanding--MOUs--necessary?
I understand that there is consideration being given to
having a State Department official serve as one of the two
deputies in the command. This is a new configuration. In the
past, combatant commanders have had political advisors from the
State Department. Would the new State Department deputy have
his or her own staff? And would the deputy report to State
Department or the Department of Defense? What would be the
relationship of the deputy to the African Bureau at the
Department? What is the expectation on the part of Department
of Defense as to its role in Africa? Does it intend to go well
beyond working to strengthen counterterrorism and peacekeeping
capacity in the region? Would there be efforts to have our
military also involved in humanitarian economic development and
nation-building activities throughout the continent, as it is
in the Horn of Africa?
I appreciate the opportunity to explore all of these issues
with distinguished witnesses. We look forward to your testimony
and your responses to our questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for your
comments and your excellent questions.
I'm happy to see Senator Webb here. One of the first things
he did when he came to the Senate was come talk to me about his
interest in Africa. I ask if he has any comments at this time.
Senator Webb. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's just a
pleasure to be here. I'm new on this subcommittee, as you know.
I've got a long history of different types of relationships
with the Department of Defense, however, and I'm very curious
to hear exactly how this Africa Command is going to work, which
is the reason I'm here. I'm looking forward to the testimony.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator. We will now begin
with the first panel.
Secretary Frazer.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Frazer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the committee, for inviting me to
testify here today on a topic that will be a true innovation in
our Africa engagement by providing a new vehicle for addressing
security issues in Africa.
I must say, first of all, that we in the State Department,
and especially in the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau
of Political Military Affairs, strongly support the creation of
the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM. We believe AFRICOM will be an
important asset in our overall African policy, and we welcome
the Department of Defense's greater commitment of resources and
participation in African issues. The military has long been
involved in African affairs through the U.S. European, Central,
and Pacific Commands, each of which has had responsibility for
a portion of the continent, but now, with the creation of
AFRICOM, Africa will be addressed in its own right as the
unique and separate part of the world that it really is, with
all areas of the continent, except Egypt, under a single
unified command. And Egypt, despite its vital historical role
in the Middle Eastern affairs, will not be ignored, but will be
considered as a country of special concern for AFRICOM. All of
Africa finally will get the full attention of one of our
highest ranking and most experienced senior military leaders,
supported by a staff uniquely structured to meet the challenges
of this part of the world.
We in the State Department are pleased to see the
nomination of General William Ward as AFRICOM's first
commander. He has the background and experience to lead this
initiative, and we look forward to working closely with him if
he is confirmed by the Senate.
From the inception of AFRICOM, the State Department has
been closely involved in the planning process, beginning last
fall, when the Department of Defense established its AFRICOM
Implementation Planning Team. Both the Bureau of African
Affairs and the Bureau of Political Military Affairs assigned
senior officers to this planning team, working with Department
of Defense officials full time for many weeks. Several other
State Department bureaus also had officers participating,
bringing functional expertise to key portions of the planning
process. This process has largely occurred in an atmosphere of
cooperation and collaboration.
It is important to note that, throughout this process, we
have seen no need to alter the current authorities that govern
State/
Defense collaboration in the field or in Washington. The
Department of State will continue to exercise full foreign
policy primacy and authority in Africa, and I am confident that
no one in the Department of Defense disagrees with this. The
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs will continue to be the
lead policymaker in the U.S. Government on African issues,
including regional security policy. Each chief of mission in
the field in Africa will continue to act as the President's
personal representative in the country to which he or she is
accredited, and to exercise full authority over all of the
United States Government's peacetime activities.
State, therefore, will continue to provide leadership for
the exercise of authority over State's 47 embassies, which can
be considered diplomatic interagency bases on the continent. In
the AFRICOM area of responsibility, State Department will have
its personnel, on assignments of 2 to 3 years, whose
responsibility it is to understand that host-country government
and people, and to influence the implementation of our foreign
policy.
The Department of Defense and the U.S. military will
continue to support the Department of State in the pursuit of
U.S. foreign policy goals, while we at the Department of State
will continue to fully support the military in its efforts to
promote the security and safety of the United States. We will
work together to promote security and stability in Africa. We
all know that Africa cannot fully develop economically,
politically, or socially where there is violence, the threat of
terrorism, or fear about the security of legitimate governments
and the people they represent. The continued violence in
eastern Congo, at present, offers an example of where AFRICOM
can play an important role in building security, perhaps by
providing training and material assistance to the legitimate
military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We are not at war in Africa, nor do we expect to be at war
in Africa. Our embassies and AFRICOM will work in concert to
keep it that way. We expect the largely civil-military
activities of AFRICOM to help states strengthen regional
security policies and their implementation. AFRICOM will draw
upon our embassies in the field for most of the information it
will use to guide its security cooperation programs and its
overall interaction with Africa.
Throughout the process of creating AFRICOM, we have
carefully considered the views and reactions of our regional
friends and those from outside the region who have significant
interest in Africa. A delegation of senior officials from the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development have already completed two
extensive trips to Africa to consult with many African states
on AFRICOM, and have found a generally positive reaction in
sub-Saharan Africa. We expect to conduct additional
consultations with African officials and with our allies who
have strong interests in Africa in the near future.
Consultations are also ongoing with various international
organizations and nongovernmental agencies on AFRICOM. As one
would expect with a subject of this importance and scope, the
reactions have been varied and diverse.
There has been much written and rumored about AFRICOM over
the past several months: Where it will be located; how it will
be structured; degree to which there will be State Department
and interagency participation. I want to make it clear that no
final decisions have been made about the location of AFRICOM's
headquarters in Africa, although it is AFRICOM's plan to
establish an initial headquarters presence on the continent by
October 2008. Until then, it will be located in Stuttgart,
Germany, not far from the European Command.
The current thinking is there will be a subordinate office
in several other places on the African Continent as well. But
this decision has not yet been taken, and those locations have
not yet been determined.
State will also provide officers to work in AFRICOM,
including one of the two deputy commanders working for General
Ward, if he is confirmed. A senior State officer will be the
deputy to the commander in charge of civil-military affairs,
coordinating those activities in AFRICOM with our policymakers
in Washington and our embassies in Africa. The other deputy
commander, a uniformed military officer, will be in charge of
the purely military aspects of AFRICOM. The State Department
will also provide another senior officer, who will serve as the
political advisor to the combatant commander.
So, we will be well represented on the AFRICOM leadership
team. State and other civilian agencies also will provide a
number of other officers to work in leadership, management, and
functional positions as AFRICOM staff, in addition to
traditional advisors.
In addition, we expect to add staff in the Bureau of
African Affairs who will assist in the interface with AFRICOM
and its various elements.
The Department of State views the creation of AFRICOM as a
major advancement in our comprehensive Africa policy and
engagement strategy. It is the beginning of a long and fruitful
collaboration. It is, in many ways, the marriage of State's
expertise and authorities with the military's resources and its
security experience, and we are excited about it.
I would be glad to take any questions that the committee
might have.
Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Secretary.
I'd ask witnesses generally to limit your remarks to 5
minutes; put their full statement in the record. I did want to
hear the full statement, of course, from our Assistant
Secretary.
But, please, Ms. Whelan, proceed.
STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Whelan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the
opportunity to provide DOD's perspective on Africa Command.
Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved, a
continent of failed states, faltering economies, regional
conflicts, and corrupt leadership. This image, though, is a far
cry from the Africa of today. With the support of international
partners, Africans are slowly but surely instituting democracy
and good governance across the continent.
Our security cooperation with Africa is one aspect of our
collaboration with Africa, but it is a small part of our
overall relationship. The United States spends approximately $9
billion a year in Africa, funding programs in such areas as
health, development, trade and trade promotion, and good
governance. In contrast, security-related programs receive only
about $250 million a year. This security assistance includes
such things as peacekeeping training programs, border and
coastal security capacity development programs, logistics and
airlift support to peacekeeping operations, and joint training
exercises with African militaries throughout the continent. A
great deal of our training is focused on improving the level of
professionalization and technical proficiency in African
militaries. We do our best to convey, through this training,
respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper role
of a civilian-controlled military in a democracy.
We are now taking this relationship a step further. In
February 2007, the President announced his decision to create a
unified command for Africa, United States Africa Command, or
AFRICOM. Although the structure is new, the nature of our
military engagement on the African Continent will not change.
It will remain primarily focused on conducting theater security
cooperation to build partnership capacities in areas such as
peacekeeping, maritime security, border security, and
counterterrorism skills, and, as appropriate, supporting U.S.
Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote
regional stability.
For many years, our military relationships on the continent
have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European
Command, U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command.
While these commands executed their missions well, AFRICOM
presents an opportunity to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions
and operational seams created by this organizational structure.
We hope that AFRICOM will allow DOD civilian and military
leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient
approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as
Africa's multilateral institutions, such as the African Union
and the regional economic communities, figure more prominently
in African security affairs. Consolidation under one command
has the potential to better support the development of these
important regional mechanisms and relationships.
In many ways, the creation of this command is a historic
opportunity to catch up to Africa's quickly evolving
continental and regional security structures and their
increasing capacities, to synergize African efforts in both the
governmental and nongovernmental spheres, and to address the
significant security challenges on the continent. AFRICOM
represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand United
States and African relationships in such a way that our
combined efforts can help generate more indigenous, and,
therefore, more sustainable, peace and security on the
continent.
AFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First,
AFRICOM will include a significant number of representatives
from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers
from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. These interagency officers will
contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that
AFRICOM will be more effective as it works to build
peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and disaster response
capacity in Africa. It will also help AFRICOM identify ways
that DOD can support other U.S. Government Departments and
Agencies and their initiatives in Africa.
Second, the commander will have both a military and
civilian deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military
Affairs, or DCMA, will be a senior Foreign Service officer from
the Department of State. This civilian deputy will be
responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of
AFRICOM's security assistance work. In particular, the DCMA
will work with the State Department and the African Union on
developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective
training, advisory, and technical support to the development of
an African standby force. State Department leadership at this
senior level will also enhance AFRICOM's ability to support
such State Department-funded endeavors as the African
contingency operations training and assistance program, a
mainstay of the United States effort to build peace support
operations capacity in Africa.
Third, AFRICOM will depart from the traditional J-code
structure, recognizing that AFRICOM's focus is on war
prevention, rather than warfighting. We are reorganizing the
inner workings of the command to best position it for theater
security cooperation activities and to prevent problems from
becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes or
conflicts.
There are many misconceptions about what AFRICOM will look
like and what it will do. I would like to address a couple of
these misconceptions and concerns here.
First, some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM
solely to fight terrorism or to secure oil resources or to
discourage China. This is not true. Violent extremism is a
cause for concern, and needs to be addressed, but this is not
AFRICOM's singular mission. Natural resources represent
Africa's current and future wealth, but in an open-market
environment, many benefit. Ironically, the United States,
China, and other countries share a common interest, that of a
secure environment in Africa, and that's AFRICOM's objective.
AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to
assure their own security.
Some have also raised the concern that AFRICOM will take
control of security issues on the continent. Our intent is
quite the contrary. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and
support African leadership and initiative, not to compete with
it or to discourage it. United States security is enhanced when
African nations themselves endeavor successfully to address and
resolve emerging security issues before they become so serious
that they require considerable international resources and
intervention to resolve.
Finally, there are fears that AFRICOM represents a
militarization of United States foreign policy in Africa, and
that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government
interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will
support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The
Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor
to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his
chief advisor on defense. The creation of a single United
States DOD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DOD to
better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State
Department leadership, to better build security capacity in
Africa. The intent is not for DOD, generally, or for AFRICOM,
at the operational level, to assume the lead in areas where
State and/or the USAID has clear lines of authority, as well as
the comparative advantages to lead. DOD will seek to provide
support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader
U.S. Government national security goals and objectives to
succeed.
Thank you very much for this opportunity. I'll look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC
introduction
Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved--a continent of
failed states, faltering economies, regional conflicts, and corrupt
leadership. This image is far cry from the Africa of today. This is a
year in which we celebrate the half century of the historic
independence of Ghana, and where the economic growth rate of the
continent has averaged 5 percent for the past 3 years. In November
2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was democratically elected to replace
Charles Taylor, who is now at The Hague to stand trial for the
brutality he unleashed in the region in the early 1990s. She is the
second elected black woman head of state in the world.
The credit for this progress goes to the African people. With the
support of international partners, Africans are slowly but surely
instituting democracy and good governance across the continent,
enabling more and more people to build their lives and pursue their
livelihoods in a context of security and freedom, choice and
opportunity.
Challenges do remain. Poverty, disease, and conflict persist.
Corruption flourishes where the rule of law is weak. Gaps in
infrastructure, technology, and legal protections discourage local and
foreign investment. We in the United States are in a position to help
African nations develop the capacity to address these challenges.
The United States spends approximately $9 billion a year in Africa,
funding programs in support of a wide range of areas. The U.S. is
helping to train health care professionals and provide desperately
needed hospital equipment, train teachers and provide educational
materials, prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS through various awareness
programs, train prosecutors in support of the legal reforms and the
promotion of independent judiciaries, train police forces consistent
with important human rights norms, and to train customs and border
control officers to increase capacities to thwart illicit trafficking
of weapons, narcotics, and even children across national borders.
We are looking for ways to increase capital and trade flows, the
means by which mutual prosperity is built. The African Growth and
Opportunity Act, for example, grants African economies preferential
access to our markets. The Millennium Challenge Account offers
countries that have met standards of responsible and accountable
governance to develop and propose extensive projects that target
development goals that they themselves have identified.
All of these activities are undertaken in partnership with African
governments, African institutions, and African organizations.
strengthening our relationships with africans
Our security cooperation with Africa is one aspect of our
collaboration with Africa--but it is a small part of our overall
relationship.
This security assistance includes joint training exercises with
African militaries throughout the continent. We provide a great deal of
training to improve the level of professionalization and technical
proficiency in African militaries. We do our best to convey through
this training respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper
role of a civilian-controlled military in a democracy. We provide
equipment--in some cases granting the funds to do so--to meet African
defense and security needs. We established the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, to promote a continuous dialogue
between African military and civilian leaders and their U.S.
counterparts on important security issues. In Nairobi, we instituted
the Regional Disaster Management Center of Excellence. We engage on a
daily basis with African military chains of command through our
embassy-based Defense Attaches and Defense Cooperation Chiefs. Every
step of the way, we consult with our African partners and listen to
what they have to say.
We are now taking this relationship a step further. In February
2007, the President announced his decision to create a Unified Command
for Africa--U.S. Africa Command, or ``AFRICOM.''
Although this structure is new, our military engagement on the
African Continent will remain primarily focused on building partnership
capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important
counterterrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government
agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional
stability. For many years our military relationships on the continent
have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European
Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. While these
commands executed their missions well, AFRICOM presents an opportunity
to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions and operational seams created
by this organizational structure. We hope that AFRICOM will allow DOD
civilian and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally
efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead
as Africa's multilateral institutions, such as the African Union and
the Regional Economic Communities, figure more prominently in African
security affairs. Consolidation under one command has the potential to
better support the development of these important regional mechanisms
and relationships.
rationale for africom's creation
Stability and prosperity in Africa are important to the long-term
interests of the United States. A stable, healthy, and more prosperous
Africa will contribute to global security and a stronger world economy.
Many of Africa's security challenges are not limited by country
boundaries but are transnational and regional in nature. African
governments and institutions are using new approaches to address these
challenges, and our engagement with Africa needs to reflect these
African institutional innovations at the regional level.
In many ways, the creation of this command is a historic
opportunity to ``catch up'' to Africa's quickly evolving continental
and regional security structures, and their increasing capacities to
synergize African efforts in both the governmental and nongovernmental
spheres to address the significant security challenges on the
continent. AFRICOM represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand
U.S. and African relationships in such a way that our combined efforts
can help generate a more indigenous and, therefore, more sustainable
peace and security on the continent. AFRICOM also is a manifestation of
how DOD is innovating to transform its ability, institutionally, to
meet the challenges of the new global security environment.
africom's innovations
AFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, unlike a
traditional Unified Command, it will focus on building African regional
security and crisis response capacity. AFRICOM will promote greater
security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new
opportunities to enhance our bilateral military relationships, and
strengthen the capacities of Africa's regional and subregional
organizations.
Second, AFRICOM will include a significant number of
representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including
officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). A variety of agencies have existing
bilateral relationships with African governments--from collaborating to
promote aviation safety to working with local NGOs to develop conflict
mediation programs targeted at youth. These interagency officers will
contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that AFRICOM
will be more effective as it works to build peacekeeping, humanitarian
relief, and disaster response capacity in Africa. They will also help
AFRICOM identify ways that DOD can support other U.S. Government
Departments and Agencies' initiatives in Africa.
Third, the Commander will have both a military and civilian deputy.
The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) will be a
Senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. This
civilian deputy will be responsible for the planning and oversight of
the majority of AFRICOM's security assistance work. In particular, the
DCMA will work with the State Department and the African Union on
developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective training,
advisory and technical support to the development of the African
Standby Force. State Department leadership at this senior level will
also enhance AFRICOM's ability to support such State Department funded
endeavors as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) program, a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace-support
operations capacity in Africa.
Fourth, AFRICOM will depart from the traditional J-code
organization structure. Originating in the Napoleon age, this has
proven to be an extremely effective method of organizing a command for
war-fighting. Recognizing that AFRICOM's focus is on war-prevention
rather than war-fighting, we are reorganizing the inner workings of the
command to best position it for theatre security cooperation activities
and preventing problems before they become crises and preventing crises
before they become catastrophes.
africom myths versus reality
There are many misconceptions about what AFRICOM will look like and
what it will do. I would like to address these misperceptions and
concerns here.
First, some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely
to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China.
This is not true. Violent extremism is cause for concern, and needs to
be addressed, but this is not AFRICOM's singular mission. Natural
resources represent Africa's current and future wealth, but in a fair
market environment, many benefit. Ironically, the U.S., China and other
countries share a common interest--that of a secure environment.
AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure
their own security.
Second, some have raised the concern that AFRICOM will take control
of security issues on the continent. Our intent is quite the contrary.
DOD recognizes and applauds the leadership role that individual African
nations and multilateral African organizations are taking in the
promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent. For
example, AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical
support to the development of the African Standby Force. This is
exactly the type of initiative and leadership needed to address the
diverse and unpredictable global security challenges the world
currently faces. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and support
such African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or to
discourage it. U.S. security is enhanced when African nations
themselves endeavor to successfully address and resolve emergent
security issues before they become so serious that they require
considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.
Finally, there are fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization
of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that AFRICOM will somehow become
the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is
unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the
continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy
advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his
chief advisor on defense and security matters. The creation of a single
U.S. DOD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DOD to better
coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership,
to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DOD
generally, or for AFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead
in areas where State and/or USAID has clear lines of authority as well
as the comparative advantages to lead. DOD will seek to provide
support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S.
Government national security goals and objectives succeed.
standing up africom
We are moving quickly to stand up AFRICOM through a Transition
Team, which includes officers from the Department of State and USAID,
that is located in Stuttgart, Germany. It is coordinating the planning
for the Command, including the location of the headquarters and
organizational structure, with U.S. European Command to ensure an
effective transition. AFRICOM will be stood up as a subunified command
under European Command by October 1, 2007, and is scheduled to be fully
operational no later than October 1, 2008.
The establishment of AFRICOM--and the participation of State,
USAID, and other U.S. agencies--demonstrates the importance the U.S.
Government places on strengthening ties with Africa. With AFRICOM, the
United States will be working in partnership with Africans to foster an
environment of security and peace--an environment that will enable
Africans themselves to further strengthen their democracies,
institutionalize respect for human rights, pursue economic prosperity,
and build effective regional institutions. A more stable Africa serves
the goal of helping to foster a more stable global environment.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.
Mr. Hess.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hess. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member
Lugar, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an
honor to appear before you today to discuss USAID's involvement
in the establishment of the United States Africa Command.
I will briefly review USAID's history in cooperation with
the military, explain our role, both in the initial planning
for AFRICOM and our continued engagement with the command, and
detail the resources we expect to contribute to it.
Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
USAID has been the principal U.S. Government agency providing
assistance to countries recovering from disasters, trying to
escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.
With regard to our disaster assistance and development
portfolios, we have had many occasions to cooperate with the
military over the years. Our most obvious collaborations are in
the area of emergency humanitarian assistance at both natural
disasters and complex emergencies. During Operation Provide
Comfort in 1991, for example, our disaster assistance response
teams worked closely with coalition forces to facilitate the
safe return of Kurdish civilians to northern Iraq. At the time,
I was serving as a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel in civil
affairs, and Operation Provide Comfort was my first operational
experience with USAID's humanitarian assistance work, and where
I met Fred Cuny.
USAID also has experience collaborating with the military
in peacetime civic action projects. For example, USAID's
missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have worked on
educational projects with Combined Joint Task Force Horn of
Africa, in which the military builds or refurbishes schools and
the USAID furnishes schoolbooks and supports teacher training.
This long record of collaboration with the military
suggests that the cooperative relationship that is envisioned
by AFRICOM is not entirely new, yet experience has also taught
us that when we work with the military, maintaining the
essential humanitarian and development character of USAID is
vital. USAID coordination with DOD should not be perceived as
contribution to specific military objectives, but, rather, as
contributing to broad foreign policy goals.
USAID has been involved in the operational planning for
AFRICOM from the beginning. In November 2006, we sent staff to
participate on the implementing planning teams which developed
the initial conceptual framework for AFRICOM. We have also
participated in the AFRICOM Transition Team since February
2007, when it was established at headquarters, U.S. European
Command, in Stuttgart, Germany.
USAID has two full-time staff people there today,
representing both the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance and the Bureau for Africa. They are
intimately involved in all the operational details required to
help AFRICOM achieve initial operating capability on time. In
addition to the collaboration in Stuttgart, here in Washington
we are in close and continual consultations with our colleagues
at the Departments of State and Defense that have
responsibility for AFRICOM.
We envision that USAID will play a constructive role in the
structure and operations of AFRICOM when the command becomes
operational. As a first step, we intend to send a senior
development advisor to AFRICOM to help the commander make
strategic choices with regard to development issues within his
area of responsibility. The SDA will be a senior Foreign
Service officer with extensive experience in USAID development
work. The person will most likely have previously served as a
mission director, and will bring to AFRICOM command group the
invaluable perspective of an experienced development
professional with significant African experience.
There are other opportunities for us to participate in the
structure and the operations of AFRICOM. There are a number of
leadership positions within the proposed organizational
structure which are currently under development. At the moment,
it is premature to say which, if any, would be appropriately
staffed by USAID personnel. However, we will continue to work
on the evolution of AFRICOM's structure to determine which
positions might best be served by the expertise that USAID has
to offer.
The most important resource that USAID will contribute to
AFRICOM will be our people. USAID staff members have hundreds
of years of experience engaging in humanitarian and development
work in Africa. This accumulated wisdom will be of enormous
benefit to the command as it performs its mission of supporting
the interagency efforts of the U.S. Government to assist local
populations and deter extremism on the continent.
We do not envision transferring any funds to the Department
of Defense for the conduct of its civilian assistance
activities. We will work to ensure that USAID's and AFRICOM's
programs are coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and use
our resources effectively.
USAID is a proud partner with our colleagues from the State
Department and the Department of Defense in the creation of
AFRICOM. As AFRICOM develops, we will continue to collaborate
with our colleagues in the Government and work closely with our
NGO partners to ensure that any concerns they may have are
addressed.
Thank you very much for your time today. I look forward to
keeping Congress informed regarding our involvement in AFRICOM,
and would be pleased to answer any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael E. Hess, Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S.
Agency for International Development, Washington, DC
introduction
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor to appear before you today to discuss USAID's involvement in
the establishment of the United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM. We
believe that AFRICOM can significantly advance the ``Three D'' concept,
and facilitate the coordination of defense, diplomacy, and development
to advance American foreign policy interests on the continent of
Africa.
In the course of my testimony today, I will address USAID's role in
the development of AFRICOM by outlining four important issues:
Summary of USAID's cooperation with the U.S. military;
USAID's participation in the initial planning for AFRICOM;
USAID's intended role in AFRICOM after it reaches Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) on October 1, 2007; and
Resources that USAID will continue to contribute to AFRICOM
after it achieves Full Operating Capability (FOC) on October 1,
2008.
usaid and civil-military cooperation
Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, USAID has
been the principal U.S. Government agency providing assistance to
countries recovering from disasters, trying to escape poverty, and
engaging in democratic reforms. With regard to our disaster assistance
and development portfolios, we have had many occasions to cooperate
with the military over the years.
Our most obvious collaborations have been in the area of emergency
humanitarian assistance. When the magnitude of a natural disaster
overwhelms our normal response mechanisms, we have successfully
enlisted the aid of our military partners to meet the needs of
civilians at risk. During the 2004 Asian Tsunami crisis, for example,
USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (known as DARTs) worked
closely with U.S. Navy units from Combined Support Force 536 to deliver
relief supplies and potable water to affected areas. Similarly, DARTs
collaborated with U.S. military units in 2005 in the aftermath of the
Pakistan earthquake to identify isolated populations in stricken areas,
evacuate victims for medical treatment, and set up emergency shelters
to protect survivors against the harsh winter elements. As recently as
December 2006, USAID worked with aviation assets from the Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti to air drop
supplies to the Somali refugee camps in northeastern Kenya which had
been cut off from overland routes by extensive flooding.
USAID also has extensive experience working with the military to
meet the humanitarian and economic needs of civilian populations
affected by armed conflict. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991,
our DARTs worked closely with the U.S. Army to facilitate the safe
return of Kurdish civilians who had fled into the Zargos Mountains to
escape attacks from Saddam Hussein's genocidal forces. I should note
that as a U.S. Army Civil Affairs lieutenant colonel working in
northern Iraq at the time, PROVIDE COMFORT was my first operational
experience with USAID's humanitarian assistance work. The Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan and Iraq offer the
most integrated model of USAID-U.S. military collaboration to date. In
both countries, USAID staff work closely with personnel from the U.S.
military and a variety of other U.S. Government agencies to provide
essential services to local populations in support of our national
security objectives.
Beyond humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and
armed conflicts, USAID also has experience collaborating with the
military in peacetime civic action projects. For example, USAID
missions have worked with U.S. military units performing medical,
dental, and veterinary missions for civilian populations in Latin
America and Africa, most recently in Kenya and Uganda. In addition,
USAID missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have worked on
educational projects with CJTF-HOA in which the military builds or
refurbishes school buildings and USAID furnishes school books and
supports teacher training.
This long record of collaboration with the military across
countries and across contexts suggests that the cooperative
relationship that is envisioned by AFRICOM is not entirely new. USAID
has learned that the military's logistical capabilities can be
invaluable assets in emergency humanitarian assistance. Likewise, we
have demonstrated that USAID's unique skills in addressing a range of
essential human needs for civilian populations in both peace and war is
of substantial strategic benefit to the foreign policy of the United
States. Thus, USAID's coordination with the military's civic action
programs can lead to important synergies of effort, resources and
expertise for the benefit of our beneficiaries and in support of our
interests.
Yet experience has also taught us of the importance of maintaining
the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID when we
work with the military. While we represent the same government as our
military colleagues, the methods by which we work and the sectors in
which we work are quite different. Preserving the development and
humanitarian role of USAID, even as we work closely with the military
in the field, is vital to the successful operation of our programs, to
the preservation of our partnerships with nongovernmental
organizations, and to our credibility in the eyes of our beneficiaries.
In large part this will be ensured by AFRICOM's focus on the security
sector, while supporting USAID in mutually agreed upon activities.
We remain ever mindful of our humanitarian principles and
development principles as we contribute to the development of AFRICOM.
We also remain mindful that the increasing presence and role of the
Department of Defense in Africa provides opportunities and challenges.
DOD can support national security objectives in ways that USAID cannot.
DOD can help professionalize African militaries; strengthen the African
regional security architecture, including African Standby Force;
mitigate HIV/AIDS and other public health threats in the security
sector; and provide disaster response capacity if others cannot. USAID
participation in such efforts seeks to maximize effectiveness in ways
that broadly support development and humanitarian objectives.
Although there has been increasing recognition of development as
part of the national security strategy, growing DOD presence in Africa
has the potential of blurring the lines between diplomacy, defense, and
development. These lines were never perfect. Increasing levels of DOD
programming in Africa puts it in closer proximity to USAID programs.
Some of these DOD activities include wells, schools, clinics, and
veterinarian services. The result can be confusion and misperceptions.
USAID coordination with the DOD should not be perceived as contributing
to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broader
foreign policy goals.
usaid and initial planning for africom
USAID has been involved in the operational planning for AFRICOM
from the beginning. In November 2006 we sent staff to participate in
the Implementation Planning Team which developed the initial conceptual
framework for AFRICOM. We have also participated in the AFRICOM
Transition Team (TT) since February 2007 when it was established at the
headquarters for U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany.
USAID has two full-time staff people there, representing both the
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, which I
lead, and the Bureau for Africa. They are intimately involved in all of
the operational details required to help AFRICOM achieve IOC on time,
including the shape of the command structure, outreach, staffing
patterns, and legal authorities among others issues. In addition to the
collaboration in Stuttgart, here in Washington we are in close and
continual consultations with our colleagues at the Departments of State
and Defense that have responsibility for AFRICOM.
usaid's role in africom post-ioc
We envision that USAID will play a constructive role in the
structure and operations of AFRICOM when the command becomes
operational. USAID currently has over $3 billion of programs across the
continent planned this fiscal year alone, making it a U.S. Government
agency with one of the largest financial commitment to Africa. Given
AFRICOM's mission to support other agencies in implementing U.S.
security policies and strategies on the continent, we expect that there
will be many areas in which we might usefully collaborate.
As a first step, we intend to send a Senior Development Advisor
(SDA) to AFRICOM to help the Commander make strategic choices with
regard to development issues within his AOR. Modeled after Political
Advisors, or POLADs, which the State Department sends to each of the
geographic combatant commands, the SDA will be a senior Foreign Service
officer with extensive experience in USAID development work. The person
will most likely have previously served as a mission director at least
once, and will bring to the command group of AFRICOM the invaluable
perspective of an experienced development professional with significant
Africa experience. I should note that USAID already has SDAs at two
combatant commands, EUCOM and the U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), and we are committed to sending SDAs to each of the geographic
combatant commands.
We believe that there may be other opportunities for us to
participate in the structure and operations of AFRICOM. There are a
number of leadership positions within the proposed organizational
structure which are currently under development. At the moment, it is
premature to say which, if any, would be appropriately staffed by USAID
personnel. However, we will continue to observe the evolution of the
AFRICOM's structure to determine which positions might best be served
by the expertise that USAID has to offer.
usaid resources for africom
The most important resource that USAID will contribute to AFRICOM
will be our people. USAID staff members have hundreds of years of
experience engaging in humanitarian and development work in Africa.
This accumulated wisdom will be of enormous benefit to the command as
it performs its mission of supporting the interagency efforts of the
U.S. Government to assist local populations and deter extremism on the
continent. To this end, USAID is committed to providing staff for the
position I mentioned above. We will also consider providing additional
staff for the AFRICOM headquarters as requested. Finally, we will work
to ensure that AFRICOM's activities are closely coordinated with USAID
programs managed by our missions across the continent.
We do not envision transferring any funds to the Department of
Defense for the conduct of its civilian assistance activities. We will,
however, work to ensure that our programmatic expenditures are
coordinated with those of AFRICOM to avoid needless overlap or mutually
exclusive activities.
conclusion
USAID is a proud partner with our colleagues in the State
Department and the Pentagon in the creation of AFRICOM. It will be a
substantial step in our effort to integrate further the elements of
defense, diplomacy, and development in the execution of our foreign
policy. In my judgment, it will also represent an improvement in the
delivery of services to our beneficiaries by greater synergies in the
distribution of U.S. Government resources across Africa.
As AFRICOM continues to develop, we will continue to collaborate
with our colleagues in the government and will work closely with our
NGO partners to ensure that any concerns they may have are addressed.
Thank you very much for your time today. I look forward to keeping
Congress informed regarding our involvement in AFRICOM, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Feingold. Thank you all.
We'll begin with 7-minute rounds. There is a vote
anticipated at around 10:30, so ideally we'll all get a round
in, and then take a brief recess before we start panel 2.
Let me begin with you, Secretary Frazer. I presume that the
administration is saying the same things about AFRICOM to our
friends in Africa and elsewhere that this subcommittee just
heard from this panel. Could you give me a sense of what
responses you've received from African political and military
leaders?
Ambassador Frazer. I can, but I would also turn to my
colleague from DOD who has been on the tours. But, in my visits
with African officials, they've had questions about ``Why?''
``Why now?'' And we've answered that it's consistent with the
significant engagement of the Bush administration, that it has
been a long time in coming. As an academic over the last
decade, I've called for bringing Africa under a single command,
so it's not a new idea. And we've also responded that there is
a clear need. Many African countries are participating in
peacekeeping across the continent and globally. There is
clearly a threat of extremism across the Sahel, down the
eastern coast of Africa. And the move toward democratization
also involves professionalization of the militaries. We've had
six wars that have ended, so that obviously there is a need for
security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction.
So, we've gotten mainly, ``Why now?'' and ``What will the
mission of this AFRICOM be?'' And, as Ms. Whelan said,
questions about ``Is it to compete with other regional or
global powers, like China?'' Obviously, we've answered that. It
has no intention of trying to compete with anyone else, and
that it is, in fact, to rationalize our engagement with Africa
under one command, rather than under three separate ones.
Senator Feingold. If you characterized the tone of the
responses from the African countries' leaders, would it be
excited, nervous, wary? How would you describe it?
Ambassador Frazer. Largely positive. Some extremely
positive, very interested in having their countries be the area
where headquarters would be located. I would characterize a
minority as not positive. I would say, maybe, one in the not-
positive category. And I would characterize a few as wary.
Senator Feingold. OK.
Secretary, one of the goals of the new command is to
enhance the security services of African nations. In its
relations with foreign militaries, the United States often
faces the dilemma of whether to support a military regime that
may enhance stability in the short term, but, of course,
potentially undermine stability in long run by compromising
democratic institutions and popular support. As the United
States enhances its military-to-military relations on the
African Continent, are you prepared to make short-term
tradeoffs to support long-term security?
Ambassador Frazer. Well, we've had this issue come before
us with Mauritania, which had a coup d'etat, but yet was an
extremely important partner to us in pushing back extremism in
our efforts to counter terrorism. And we, in fact, cut off the
majority of our security cooperation with the Mauritanian
Government until it returned to democracy. And we think that a
democratic government, a legitimate government, is most
important for long-term stability. And so, I think the
interagency has already faced a scenario that you're
describing, and we've made a judgment that is for long-term
stability.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Secretary.
Ms. Whelan, could you outline for me the basic parameters
of when and where the United States can use lethal force in
noncombatant zones? Do such operations require prior
Presidential approval? Do they require the signoff of the
relevant ambassador?
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Senator.
Yes; the United States, prior to use of lethal force, or
actually force of any kind in a noncombatant zone, requires an
execute order that has been authorized by the President, and it
is also coordinated with the ambassador, either, if it is in a
specific country, in that country, or, if it cuts across
regional lines, with the ambassadors in the region.
Senator Feingold. Coordinated or signed off?
Ms. Whelan. In an execute order provided to a combatant
commander, the President signs off on that execute order
through the national command authority chain of command, but
the ambassador is involved in that process, vis-a-vis the State
Department, and also, on the ground, the ambassador is kept
informed.
Senator Feingold. So, no separate signoff from the
ambassador.
Ms. Whelan. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Feingold. On the issue of civil-military balance,
Secretary Whelan, Navy Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, executive
director of the U.S. Africa Command Implementation Planning
Team said, recently in an interview, that AFRICOM will focus
mainly on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and crisis
response missions. How will you ensure that AFRICOM maintains a
balance in its civil-military duties and does not override the
existing structures that are set up for this purpose such as
those in the USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance?
Ms. Whelan. AFRICOM's intent is to be a supporting element
of the United States foreign policy structure in Africa, not a
supported structure. So, AFRICOM will respond to the
requirements identified by the U.S. Government, by the U.S.
State Department, in terms of humanitarian needs or responses
to disaster relief and those sorts of missions. AFRICOM will
not be initiating any missions or any activities that have not
been previously coordinated with, and approved by, the State
Department in a noncombat context. Traditional lines of
authority will not change, nor will the presence of interagency
personnel in AFRICOM dilute or undermine the independence of
their home agencies. None of those command authorities are
going to be changing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Mr. Hess, in your opinion, is there a risk that U.S.
military counterterrorism operations and programs could
conflict with the security and stability operations assistance
components in AFRICOM's mandate? And, if so, how would you
address that risk?
Mr. Hess. There is always the possibility that they could
conflict with it, and that's why it's important to have a good
coordination mechanism, like AFRICOM, to ensure that we have a
unified approach on how we conduct these operations. And I
think we've worked very closely. We have some good examples on
the Trans-Sahel counterterrorism program, where all three
agencies have worked very closely together to ensure that we
don't cross those lines. If we don't know those coordination
mechanisms, and we don't have those conversations, then there
is that potential. But I think the cooperation is there. We're
working very closely on that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on many of the questions the chairman
asked, but just to try to weigh--once again, how the State
Department, USAID, have weighed in, in the discussion of the
Combatant Command. And Ms. Whelan has mentioned specific chain
of command there, with the President signing off, and the
military then proceeding. But let me just raise a very
practical question. We've had testimony before this committee
on Sudan and Darfur. Many very, very able people, some with
experience in the administration now, some in previous
administrations. Now, I was struck by the fact that, by the
time the hearing was over, some of our witnesses were
advocating United States military action in Sudan. They were
discussing, specifically, bombing of airports, the disruption
of aircraft, a good number of aspects, and they gave the
feeling that, after all, nothing short of U.S. military force
was likely to make a difference.
I took the occasion, in my opening statement, to compliment
the United Nations on the African Command that has been
proposed, because I think that's very important. But these are
not hypothetical situations. Even as AFRICOM is being worked
out, we have conflicts on the ground, presently, in which there
are distinguished Americans with very strong points of view.
This is why I get back, fundamentally to the question, Where
does the Secretary of State fit into this? In other words,
before we begin getting into combatant operations or
antiterrorism operations or any other way in which the
Combatant Command is involved, is the Secretary of State the
major influence, or those who are such as yourselves, who are
somehow involved in the chain of command with her? Can you,
Secretary Frazer, enlighten me further about the consideration,
the arguments, the debate, about what is proceeding as this
very important new organization is founded?
Ambassador Frazer. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I think that in any of these areas of conflict and policy
considerations, the Secretary of State has the primary lead as
the President's foreign policy advisor. And most of these
discussions, practically, take place at the PCC, the Policy
Coordination Committee, and the DC and the Principals
Committee, with all of the agencies sitting around the table.
And so, before any significant, major policy decision would be
made on what the military engagement would be in a place like
Sudan, we're sitting there looking at all of our options, and
the Secretary is right at that table, deciding--obviously
looking at the range of foreign policy tools, whether it's
Treasury and whether it would be more effective to pressure the
government using Treasury, how our diplomacy can be
coordinated, and certainly if there are any areas in which the
military can be of benefit, for instance, NATO airlifting in
the African Union forces, rotating them in. I think it is a
coordinated policy process, and I would expect the same in all
areas of conflict, whether it's Somalia or any future conflicts
that we might see in the Sahel--there would be an interagency
process, with the Secretary as the lead.
I haven't felt that there's been any weakening of State
Department's position as the primary foreign policy actor.
Senator Lugar. Would you agree that this planning on our
part, in the formation of this, ought to be made as explicitly
clear as possible to all the African nations so that they have
some idea of what our debate, what our arguments, what our
resolutions have been? I ask this, because you have assured us
that, generally, African countries have expressed opinions
about this development, and have been positive, maybe a
negative here or there. My own, sort of, reading of the
literature on this is somewhat less sanguine. I feel that a
good number of African countries, without having the briefing
we're having today, or maybe the briefings that you and the
ambassador can give them, are less happy about the whole
prospect; although understanding that the United States is a
world superpower, and that we go wherever we want. But in order
for this to be welcomed as a command that really does offer
potential humanitarian resources, cohesion, stability, which is
our intent as you have described, the approach of this really
is very, very important. I know you know all of this, but we
take this hearing to try to emphasize it.
Now, I just wanted to follow through with one more aspect,
because we've also had hearings in this committee with regard
to other continents and the role of our ambassadors in various
countries. These issues are not new to you, but staff members
from this committee have visited several embassies and have
issued a formal published report about their findings, in which
we found that our ambassadors sometimes were, not the last to
know about Department of Defense activities in their countries,
but, at the same time, it was almost an afterthought. Those
involved in the activities felt that the pursuit of terrorists,
or whatever might be involved, was so critical, so timely,
that, in due course, they might inform the embassy and the
ambassador, but, first things first. And sometimes, large
contingents of Americans were in countries without the
knowledge of our ambassadors, or certainly the participation of
those persons in any such ideas.
Now, I think that has been mitigated by the kind of
hearings we've had here, and the report of our staffs and so
forth. But this is a reason to raise it at the outset here,
because, in fact, events do happen, and if there is not a
general policy that our State Department and our ambassadors
are involved, really, from the outset, then I fear we're going
to be back to square one again, sending staff members down to
interview the ambassadors. Do you have any comment about this
issue?
Ambassador Frazer. Yes, Senator. I agree with you. We
absolutely believe that the chief of mission will continue to
have that authority and should exercise that authority as well.
We're hoping that by placing military liaison elements within
the embassies, it will help to assist with the coordination. I
suspect, in those cases, having served as an ambassador, where
someone's in-country without the knowledge of the ambassador,
that somebody at that embassy knew they were in-country, and
didn't inform the ambassador--somebody that was part of their
country team, because I don't think that our military's just
running around the continent without the clearances. And so,
it's a matter of making sure that our coordination is
effective, and that those country teams are communicating with
the ambassador, the chief of mission.
But I take your point. There's a bigger structural point,
which is that State Department doesn't have the resources and
the personnel that our DOD colleagues have. That, I think, is a
more fundamental structural issue. But, in terms of
coordination and collaboration, I think that we have the
authorities necessary.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I just feel compelled to put on the record that the
conversations we've had have indicated a more negative response
from the African countries on AFRICOM. Obviously, you've had
your conversations, others have had theirs, but this is
something that we need to continue to explore and examine.
I want to welcome Senator Nelson, who's been very involved
on this subcommittee. And he's kind enough to defer to Senator
Webb for his questions.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Frazer, I assume this question would be for you,
but, if not, whoever would be most appropriate to answer it.
Could you give us a better idea of the decisional process
through which we're going to figure out where this command is
going to be headquartered?
Ambassador Frazer. Yes; I can. I would also turn to my
colleague, Theresa Whelan, to answer the question as well.
Certainly, there's a planning team, right now, making
recommendations. And I know that the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Defense are in informal
conversations throughout this process with Deputy Secretary
Negroponte and Secretary Rice. And so, I think there's already
been informal discussion between the agencies.
Senator Webb. How about among other countries in Africa?
Ambassador Frazer. There are certain countries that have
made it known that they would like AFRICOM to be based in their
countries.
Senator Webb. Are you free to share that information with
us?
Ambassador Frazer. Well, I could certainly share one
because the President of the country wrote an op-ed in the
newspaper. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has certainly asked
that AFRICOM be headquartered in Liberia. Others, I would be
more discrete about at this point. There is a planning process,
with criteria, looking at it, and that's where I think Theresa
Whelan might be better able to answer the question.
Ms. Whelan. Senator, we have gone through a very deliberate
planning process to narrow down potential sites, and we have
also, of course, included the fact that there are several
countries that have actually issued explicit invitations.
Despite reports in the press, we have not held discussions, or
even raised the issue of location, with any of the countries
that we have talked to bilaterally, or even in any multilateral
fora.
We have a site selection criteria that we developed, in
coordination with the Department of State. The transition team
has used that criteria to narrow down potential sites. And
those potential sites have been briefed to the Department of
State informally, and we've begun an informal dialogue on the
pluses and minuses of those sites, based on the initial cut.
They will be briefed to the Secretary of Defense on the eighth
of August, and we will continue the dialogue with Department of
State to determine how we want to move forward, in terms of
selecting the location or the country that we would wish to
approach first.
Senator Webb. This is going to be among the list that has
already indicated they would be amenable to this, I assume.
It's not like going forward with an offer. This is more like
going forward with an acceptance, should we say?
Ms. Whelan. In some cases. I mean, some of the potential
sites that have been identified are commensurate with countries
that have indicated a specific interest. We are certainly not
interested in going someplace, or even attempting to go
someplace, where we are clearly not wanted. So, any country
that has either publicly or privately indicated that they would
not be interested, able, capable, or whatever, or hosting a
staff element of AFRICOM would not be considered.
Senator Webb. But there may be others that could be
approached that haven't, at this point, said they would be
amenable? Is that----
Ms. Whelan. That's correct.
Senator Webb. All right. Now, does the establishment of
this command, is it anticipated that it is going to affect the
nature, the size, or the operational parameters of the United
States military in Africa?
Ms. Whelan. Yes; it will obviously affect the size of the
United States military presence in Africa. Currently, our
military presence is limited to our forward operating site in
Djibouti, CJTF-HOA, which is roughly 1,500 U.S. military
members.
Senator Webb. So, are we anticipating that we will be in
Africa, in an operational sense, as a result of the
establishment of this command?
Ms. Whelan. No, sir, we are anticipating that we will have
staff elements present on the continent, but we will not have
operational elements. And we have made very clear, to many
African countries who have asked the question, that we have no
intention of basing any troops or military forces on the
continent. The only presence would be headquarters staff
personnel.
Senator Webb. How about in a strengthening of bilateral
military ties that would foresee operational exercises, as, for
instance, we do in Thailand with Cobra Gold?
Ms. Whelan. Well, we currently conduct a number of
exercises on the continent, and have for a number of years,
including our small Joint Combined Exchange Training, JCET,
exercises, using 12-man teams to conduct training in various
nations.
Senator Webb. Right. Well, would you foresee an expansion
of those sorts of activities as a result of the creation of
this command?
Ms. Whelan. I would anticipate that there would probably be
an increase in the amount of exercises we conduct, and other
types of military-to-military cooperation activity, because we
would have a command focused on Africa.
Senator Webb. Are there countries that would be high on the
list in Africa right now, in terms of that sort of potential
cooperation?
Ms. Whelan. I think all of our current mil-to-mil partners
would be potential partners for potentially increased mil-to-
mil cooperation.
Senator Webb. So, is there a country that you would say--or
a couple of countries--that you would say, in the future, would
be our strongest supporters and allies as a result of the
creation of the command?
Ms. Whelan. In terms of the creation of the command, there
are clearly countries out there, as Assistant Secretary Frazer
said, that are very forward-leaning and very supportive, and we
expect them to continue to be in that position.
Senator Webb. Who would be among those?
Ms. Whelan. Well, Secretary Frazer mentioned, of course,
Liberia. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has been very vocal.
Other countries that have been positive are some of our long-
term military partners that we have had military relationships
with for decades now. Countries like Botswana, Senegal have
been very supportive, and Djibouti has been very supportive. We
anticipate those countries to continue to be supportive of our
military-to-military relationships. We have other relationships
throughout the continent that we expect to maintain, and
hopefully have the opportunity to strengthen and deepen, as we
will have a four-star commander focused on the continent, and
not distracted by issues going on in Europe or the Middle East
or Asia.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. By the way, Ms. Frazer, what did the
President of Liberia say in the op-ed, that they wanted it in
Liberia?
Ambassador Frazer. The President has made known that she
feels that there's a special relationship between the United
States and Liberia, that she wants to deepen that relationship.
She acknowledged the role that our diplomats and Marines played
in ending the 14-year civil war in Liberia. And she also sees
the positive benefits, from a development perspective, that
would come to Liberia if AFRICOM was headquartered there.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Whelan, I've been to a lot of the
combatant commanders' headquarters, and I'd like to know: What
is your thinking of how AFRICOM's interagency coordination
process is going to be different from the existing Combatant
Commands?
Ms. Whelan. We think that the interagency coordination
process will be different, partly because Africa Command will
have the benefit of having interagency knowledge and expertise
embedded in the command. It will not have authority, but the
people that we hope will be detailed to the command, on a
reimbursable basis from the interagency, will be provide the
command the expertise to understand the issue areas in which
coordination in advanced planning and cooperation are required.
So, we hope that this will improve the level of coordination in
an operational level with the interagency counterparts in
Africa.
At the strategic level in Washington, the interagency
coordination will continue, as it has, through the interagency
process, through PCCs, DCs, et cetera. But, at the operational
level, we hope that having people with this knowledge embedded
in AFRICOM will facilitate greater interaction and
communication and transparency.
Senator Bill Nelson. Isn't that pretty much what Admiral
Stavridis does in U.S. Southern Command now?
Ms. Whelan. Admiral Stavridis is actually moving in that
direction. In fact, U.S. Southern Command has been involved in
some of the discussions we've had on Africa Command, and on
where we want to go with Africa Command, in terms of
integrating the interagency. Currently, U.S. South Command is
using a J-9 concept to integrate the interagency--essentially a
through component of the command that sits separately from, but
is part of, the SOUTHCOM structure. The difference within
AFRICOM is that, while there will be a component of the command
responsible for managing what we call outreach and interface,
the members of the interagency will not simply be confined to
that part of the command, but they will be working, not as
liaison officers, but as staff personnel within and throughout
all other parts of the command. The depth of integration is
what is different than the current SOUTHCOM plan that Admiral
Stavridis is working. But Admiral Stavridis is very interested
in what we're doing in Africa Command. And if that proves to be
effective, it may be exported to some of the other commands.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you consider doing the two
simultaneously?
Ms. Whelan. I'm sorry, Senator, ``the two simultaneously''?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes. You're setting up Africa Command
with this concept. Stavridis is moving in that direction. So,
you do both commands the same.
Ms. Whelan. Well, sir, I can't quite speak to SOUTHCOM.
It's not my area. It certainly, I suppose, would be possible,
if Admiral Stavridis were so inclined to move that direction. I
think the challenge for Admiral Stavridis is, he has an
existing command organizational architecture that he has to
work within and change. We have a bit of an advantage on the
Africa Command side, because we are starting from zero, and we
are in the process of building--an organizational architecture
that is somewhat new and different than the traditional J-code
structure that Admiral Stavridis has inherited.
Senator Bill Nelson. How do you envision this new African
Command taking on certain subjects that are peculiar to that
particular command, for example, child soldiers or countering
the role of civil militias. What are you going to do about that
in Africa Command?
Ms. Whelan. I think our hope would be that, as Africa
Command allows us to work more closely in a more sustained and
focused manner with our African partners on building up their
capacity to deal with security challenges that they face, that
issues of militia forces popping up in countries, because,
essentially, there is no competent security force to be able to
deal with them, will be mitigated. Child soldiers are usually
recruited by these popup militias, as their instant armies. We
aim to help create capacity for individual countries to manage
their security appropriately and, especially, professionally.
This is one of the problems we've had, certainly, in many
internal conflicts in Africa, the failure of African forces to
behave professionally, and therefore, they exacerbate the
problem, as opposed to helping solve the problem. But if our
capacity-building can lead to more professional security
responses, we believe that the problems of civil militias and/
or recruitment of child soldiers will actually be mitigated
over time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'd like you to respond further,
reflect on that question, and see if you can give me a little
more definitive answer of the peculiarities of the African
Command. How would you, in the setting up of this new command,
identify and then, through this multiagency coordination,
approach problems that are peculiar to that command?
Senator Bill Nelson. I know we have a vote, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Well, thank you, Senator.
We're in the middle of the first of two votes, so we will
briefly recess. I'll get back as fast as I can, and we will
begin the second panel.
[Recess.]
Senator Feingold. I call the committee back to order. We,
as always, apologize for the unpredictability of the Senate
schedule. I'm sorry you had to wait that long.
Our second panel features individuals who are extremely
well qualified to speak on the unique challenges of
establishing an Africa Command, and the potential obstacles and
impact such a command may have both on the continent itself and
within the broader security realm. We are privileged to welcome
back Dr. Steve Morrison, the executive director of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies' Africa Program. We've
asked Dr. Morrison to speak to AFRICOM related developments
within the broader security realm, and we hope he'll articulate
the challenges and requirements that need to be addressed for
effective planning and implementation.
Mr. Mark Malan is the peace-building program officer with
Refugees International where he conducts advocacy regarding
international peacekeeping efforts and provides leadership for
the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. He's one of the
leading experts in the world on peacebuilding in Africa, and
we've asked him specifically to address the humanitarian
aspects of this command as well as the impact on regional and
local capacity.
Finally, we have MG Jonathan Gration, the former director,
strategy, policy, and assessments, at U.S. European Command. In
this capacity, he was responsible for formulation and staff
direction of the execution of basic military and political
policy, as well as planning for command activities involving
relations with other U.S. unified commands, allied military,
and international military organizations, and subordinate
commands. We've asked him to speak on how AFRICOM fits into the
broader security perspective, and, based on his military
experience, how this unique command can be stood up and
deployed.
So, thank you all for being here, and again for your
patience. We'll begin with Dr. Morrison.
STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HIV/
AIDS TASK FORCE AND DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Morrison. Senator Feingold, thank you so much for the
opportunity to be here today to speak on this important
subject, and thank you for your leadership on these matters.
I will offer some brief introductory comments and ask that
my testimony be submitted into the record.
I do know that General Ward's nomination, now, to become
the first commander in chief is an active matter before the
Senate. I think the absence of an empowered senior AFRICOM
leader has been a big constraint in this last period, and I
think--as we look forward in the future, I think, once he is in
place, his leadership and his ability to clarify a mandate for
AFRICOM, and to bring across a better vision and better form of
communication, will bring us forward from where we are today.
I do believe that, as we look at AFRICOM and standing it up
over the next couple of years, it's going to be--it will remain
difficult. It will require a sustained effort over several
years.
There is strong fear and apprehension within Africa, within
the United States, in Europe, and elsewhere, that AFRICOM
signals the militarization of United States engagement in
Africa, at the expense of developmental and diplomatic
interests. The legitimacy and sustainability and credibility of
AFRICOM is something that's going to have to be earned, I
believe, in moving against that skepticism, and that's going to
require a much-improved strategic communications by AFRICOM, a
high-level reaffirmation of what the mandate is, and how the
interagency will work, and how the civil and military relations
will be linked.
The opinion climate within Africa, at this point, about
AFRICOM, is very mixed and very delicate. It's something that's
going to have to be managed very deftly in this next phase.
Part of what is needed, in addition to a better effort at
addressing the fears, the legitimate fears and apprehensions
that exist within Africa, is to answer the question of, What is
the value-added going to be, programmatically and materially,
and in terms of the presence of AFRICOM? We know that the U.S.
Government has slowly and quietly and incrementally put in
place a number of security programs over the last few years
that are quite promising, and that have built up partnerships
in an ad hoc and scattered way around the continent, but these
are partnerships that have not had to be defended in a very
conspicuous and overt fashion against critics or skeptics in
media or among opposition parties or NGOs or the like. We're
now at a point of transition, where they have to begin to
defend that, and they need greater assurance that, in fact, it
will be truly a civilian-driven process, and that there will be
significant payout, significant value-added, programmatically,
in the presence in Africa. And, so far, that has not been
defined.
The other major point that I've tried to bring across here
is that U.S. civilian agencies--State Department, USAID, most
notably--have had, in the last decade, a significant decline, a
hollowing out of their capacities. If you create a unified
command within Africa, inevitably there will be fears and
allegations that AFRICOM will dominate and be able to call the
shots against the civilian leadership. We should not be blaming
AFRICOM for that reality, the asymmetry that exists between our
civilian and our security agencies. We should be--as we look
forward, we should be putting much greater focus on: How are we
going to make the State Department and the USAID policy
leadership and programmatic implementation on Africa stronger,
better-led, better-resourced, and better able to, sort of,
carry forward its mission?
I talked about the fact that there's been a steady
proliferation of worthy U.S. security programs. This has been a
low-key process. It's one that's quiet and incremental, and
involves modest levels of funding, but are achieving very
important results. We're now talking about shifting into very
overt and potentially much higher levels of engagement, and
we're also shifting in a moment in which you have active
terrorist threats, particularly in north Africa and in the
Horn, and you have active U.S. engagement in those areas.
I do believe that the opinion climate in Africa in the last
several months, partly triggered by the visits--the high-level
visits to Africa, led by Deputy Secretary for Policy, Ryan
Henry--that the critics in government and media have made
significant headway in shaping the environment, in a negative
fashion, about AFRICOM, and that this needs to be--this needs
to be acknowledged, and a better strategic communications
approach taken, that better address what the political risks
and fears are of these--of the actors that we're looking for.
The most recent Pew study of worldwide opinion does show
that, in Africa, 8 of the top 10 countries that have held firm
in their support for the United States are in Africa. I do
believe that the investments made--PEPFAR, MCC, security
assistance--that there is a stronger base, a disposition--a
positive disposition. But, for all of the reasons that I've
enumerated up to now, very skeptical media and NGO community,
an ability to call upon the historical legacy of U.S.
engagement, particularly in the cold war, which is seen as
damaging and inconsistent and unsustained, and, now, the threat
that you're going to see the importation of active
counterterrorism operations. All of those factors play in the
opinion climate and require a strong and very sophisticated
support in order to build the partnerships and get the kinds of
state buy-in from Africa that we require.
We do not--we've heard no mention around China's role.
China has--is actively normatively and operationally competing
with us now in Africa. They are making big commitments on
peacekeeping, including in Darfur. We've had no dialog or
coordination effort with them. One thing that the Senate and
others could do would be to try to reduce the constraints on
having a dialog along security lines in Africa with the
Chinese.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, I'd ask you to summarize, at this
point.
Dr. Morrison. My final points are: AFRICOM needs to
reaffirm its core values, clarify its mandate; the senior-level
deputy from the State Department should be a very respected and
known entity; we need to align our approach to those security
threats that Africa leaders find most compelling; we need to
systematically enlarge our programs now in order to make them
marketable. I haven't talked at all about the maritime program;
that's an area where there's considerably promise. And we need
to multilateralize in tying the way that AFRICOM operates to
U.N. peace operations, African Union, and the regional bodies.
And we need to strengthen our civilian agencies, which are very
weak, and which will remain weak unless there's a concentrated
effort.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Executive Director, HIV/
AIDS Task Force and Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC
introduction
Senators Feingold and Sununu, I am grateful to you both for the
opportunity to address the important and timely subject of AFRICOM and
the United States emerging strategic relationship with Africa. I wish
also to thank you for your leadership on these and other Africa policy
matters.
CSIS has taken a strong interest in AFRICOM over the past year, and
had the good fortune to discuss AFRICOM's rationale and implementation
plans with General Craddock in late 2006, as he was heading to
Stuttgart to assume his duties as Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces
Europe and Supreme Commander of NATO. In May of this year, CSIS also
hosted General ``Kip'' Ward, EUCOM's Deputy Commander in Chief and the
current nominee to be the first Commander in Chief of AFRICOM.
Since the Command was first announced by President Bush on February
6, 2007, the absence of an empowered senior AFRICOM leader has been a
serious constraint and accounts in part for the often ineffective
communication of AFRICOM's mandate and vision. Once General Ward is in
place, his leadership will be an invaluable asset in moving AFRICOM
forward.
Achieving a successful launch of AFRICOM will not be easy or
simple, and will take a determined, sustained effort over several
years. Skeptics here in the United States, and in Africa and elsewhere
abroad, will continue to raise tough issues that will have to be
answered more effectively than has been the case up to now.
Most significant will be overcoming the widespread fear that
AFRICOM signals the militarization of U.S. engagement in Africa, at the
expense of developmental and diplomatic interests.
Achieving balance and legitimacy requires improved strategic
communications by AFRICOM: High-level reaffirmation, backed by action,
that AFRICOM is pursuing a genuinely balanced civil-military approach
that is answerable to civilian U.S. policy oversight, that is
responsive to African perceptions of which security threats matter
most, and that cements support within Africa from a range of stable,
well-governed states and their citizenry. At the end of the day, the
test of AFRICOM's sustainability will be whether it establishes durable
and mutually advantageous partnerships with African interests, both
governmental and nongovernmental. Today it is not clear whether that
condition will be met.
Success also requires a detailed action plan that spells out in
concrete terms what the value-added will be from creating a unified
Africa command. Today, it is not clear whether the creation of this new
entity will result in significant gains over existing U.S. security
programs in Africa.
Success, both at home and in Africa, also reaches beyond AFRICOM's
vision, structure, and leadership. No less important, it requires
getting serious about strengthening chronically weak U.S. civilian
agencies, most importantly the State Department's Africa Bureau,
USAID's Africa Bureau, and U.S. missions in Africa.
AFRICOM aspires to be a new type of interagency command, which
presumes a robust and functioning interagency process. For that to
happen, however, requires a systematic effort to reverse the decline of
the U.S. civilian agencies responsible for policies and programs in
Africa: to make them better led, better staffed and resourced, and more
coherently organized. For a very long time, the administration and
Congress have been complacent, as U.S. Africa policy capacities have
been steadily hollowed out.
So long as the State Department and other civilian agencies are
exceptionally weak, an emerging AFRICOM will inevitably be seen as
domineering. AFRICOM should not be blamed for this phenomenon, and its
progress should not be held back on account of weak civilian agencies.
Rather, simultaneous action is needed on two fronts: To correct
structural weaknesses in our civilian agencies, at the same time that
priority is given to strengthening AFRICOM's strategic outreach and
action plan.
I will concentrate my remarks on three key issues: What is at stake
for the United States in the creation of AFRICOM; the difficulties in
selling AFRICOM internally within the U.S. Government and within
Africa; and practical suggestions on the way forward from here.
1. AFRICOM is a potentially valuable instrument for advancing U.S.
global interests
In the last decade, and especially in recent years, U.S. national
interests in Africa have risen significantly.
For a long time, we have recognized the importance to U.S. values
and norms of responding to Africa's humanitarian needs and assisting in
ending Africa's chronic conflicts and overcoming poverty. We have
recognized how vital it is to support the continent's transition to
multiparty democracies, greater respect for human liberties, improved
management of national economies, stronger curbs on corruption, and
greater integration of Africa into global markets.
What is new in recent years is the rise of strategic interests that
are global in nature.
These include energy, where we today rely on West Africa for
approximately 22 percent of U.S. oil imports, and where in the near
future we will cross the 25-percent mark.
They include counterterrorism, concentrated but not confined to the
Horn of Africa and West Africa.
And they include accelerated competition for influence with China
and other Asian countries which have swiftly expanded their engagement
in Africa.
In line with these rising interests, we have seen a steady
proliferation of worthy U.S. security programs in Africa, some
traditional, other nontraditional. In an organic and ad hoc fashion,
the United States has created multiple partnerships with willing
African counterparts that meet new, emerging needs.
The United States has invested in Africa's peacekeeping capacity-
building (ACOTA, the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance Program), in officer training (International Military
Education and Training, MET, and programs at the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies); and in HIV/AIDS programs (in close partnership with
the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, PEPFAR). It has
concluded multiple access agreements, launched an important and
promising effort to bolster maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea,
and introduced key counterterrorism programs. In East Africa, most
notable is the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force/Horn of Africa
(CFJT-HOA) and the related East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative. In
West Africa is the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative.
So why the need for AFRICOM?
We have reached a tipping point. Africa matters increasingly to
U.S. national interests. Security programs that require careful
management have grown in number. U.S. officials responsible for these
programs increasingly need to approach them as a top priority--day-in
and day-out--and not a second- or third-tier concern. That requires a
unity of effort that transcends the present artificial geographic
``seams'' that separate Africa into a U.S. EUCOM zone separate from the
Horn of Africa that is the responsibility of the U.S. Central Command.
(The U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for Africa's Indian Ocean
island nations.) It requires stronger leadership, coherence and
integration of programs, and more effective management. And it requires
confidence that the resources and commitments needed over the long term
will be there, and that Congress and the American people will be
supportive. These are the accumulating concerns that AFRICOM is
intended to address.
No less important, AFRICOM provides the important opportunity to
experiment and do things differently. It is a command that can place
capacity-building in Africa at the center of its mandate, that holds
the promise of creating innovative, integrated civilian-military
approaches, and that can try out new structural arrangements that
feature regional centers.
2. AFRICOM's launch has moved quickly, but has also generated hard
lessons that now need heightened attention.
AFRICOM is less than 1 year in the making. President Bush made the
decision to move ahead with AFRICOM only last November and officially
launched the effort in early February of this year. The startup team
led by ADM Robert Moeller moved rapidly to devise a launch plan. Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry led two U.S. delegations to
Africa and Europe, in April and June, and the White House nominated
General Kip Ward just this month to be AFRICOM's first Commander in
Chief.
Considerable progress has been achieved, in a compressed period of
time, reliant on the intense efforts of many dedicated officials such
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whalen, a gifted
expert on Africa security who has been indefatigable in developing
AFRICOM.
But things have lately not gone well, in Africa and Europe, and
internally within the U.S. Government.
Across Africa, and in Europe as well, critics in governments and
media alike have made headway in casting AFRICOM as the triumph of
militarism, in which U.S. engagement in Africa will now be dominated by
energy security and the global war on terror, along with fending off
China's competition. According to this view, the shift from scattered
U.S. security programs to a single U.S. command is a sharp turn to a
cold-war-type competition. As in that earlier period, the United States
will disregard the long-term negative consequences of its engagement in
places like Somalia, Ethiopia, and West Africa, show no real interest
in an integrated civilian-military approach, and make no long-term
sustained commitments to build African capacities.
To counter this critique, AFRICOM's leadership needs to better
address the political risks and fears felt by African leadership, and
better define what the value-added will be for African partners. These
issues are especially acute for the candidate countries in Africa where
AFRICOM might in the future have a physical presence.
Africa's political leaders have up to now been willing and able to
strike new partnerships with the U.S. military on security cooperation
without confronting much domestic political opposition. The impending
creation of a unified, conspicuous Africa Command fundamentally changes
the context and invites intensified scrutiny. Controversy over the U.S.
invasion of Iraq and its aftermath have fueled skepticism of U.S.
security engagement in Africa and the larger concern with the
Department of Defense's expanding dominance of U.S. foreign policy and
expanded assistance authorities. As a consequence of these factors,
many African leaders face rising pressure from within their own ranks
and from skeptical media and nongovernmental groups to justify security
relationships with the United States.
Selling U.S. capacity-building activities in Africa is made no
easier by live terrorist threats and in some cases active U.S.
counterterror operations. This problem is most pronounced in the Horn
(especially Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan), North Africa, and East Africa's
Swahili Coast (especially Kenya and Tanzania).
Within north African countries, where al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) seeks to
leverage internal radical Islamist sentiments and has had recent
success in carrying out terror bombings in many major urban centers,
there are obvious risks of identifying with AFRICOM.
In Horn of Africa countries, witness to the disturbing events
unfolding in Somalia, the U.S. association with the Ethiopian
intervention there, and the subsequent rendition of prisoners from
Kenya to Ethiopia, there is an understandable wariness of the creation
of a strong, unified U.S. Africa command. Countries such as Sudan and
Eritrea see AFRICOM as a direct threat. Other established security
partners with the United States, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, fear
domestic reactions and violent targeting of a U.S. presence.
To offset apprehension and risk requires spelling out the concrete
benefits that will accrue from the launch of AFRICOM, beyond existing
programs. This has yet to happen. In the meantime, China has
dramatically expanded its military training and provision of equipment,
and tied that enlarged security relationship to a broader south-south
political alliance. Normatively and operationally, China actively vies
with the United States for influence and access.
Within the State Department and USAID, there is widespread
apprehension that AFRICOM will overwhelm civilian-led policy leadership
and the interagency process. Accordingly, commitments from the State
Department and USAID to join AFRICOM ranks have been ambivalent and
desultory.
3. Suggestions for a way forward.
There are a few key steps that can strengthen AFRICOM's approach
and prospects for success.
First, AFRICOM's leadership and its champions in the White House
and elsewhere should overtly reaffirm its core values and clarify its
mandate. That should involve outlining how operationally AFRICOM's work
will be answerable to civilian policymakers in Washington, how the
interagency process will actually operate, how AFRICOM's transparence
will be guaranteed, and how it will advance democratic governance,
respect for human rights, and poverty alleviation. A special effort
should be made to appoint, as the first Deputy Commander of AFRICOM
responsible for civil-military activities, a known and respected senior
State Department official.
Second, AFRICOM's leadership should reaffirm, doctrinally and in
the development of new programs, its commitment to working with African
partners to address the full spectrum of evolving security challenges
in Africa: Terrorist threats in North Africa, the Horn, the Swahili
Coast; internal and cross-border wars; degradation of the environment;
public health; weak and failed states; and crime, including grand scale
oil theft schemes, piracy and plundering of fisheries.
Third, AFRICOM should spell out in detail how its creation will
systematically enlarge the foundation of existing programs and increase
the ability to sustain these programs into the future. It should set
targets for steady incremental progress in the areas where the
Department of Defense has its greatest comparative advantage: e.g. the
expansion of ACOTA, IMET, military-to-military health programs, and
maritime programs in the Gulf of Guinea. Where possible, it should link
AFRICOM to the reconstruction of Liberia (specifically Monrovia harbor)
and the work of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (e.g. renovation
of Benin port).
Fourth, AFRICOM's plan of action should set targets for
strengthening U.N. peace operations, the African Union, and Africa's
regional bodies. It should set similar targets for incorporating
indigenous nongovernmental groups into civil-military initiatives.
Fifth, the administration should devise a multiyear plan for
strengthening U.S. civilian policy and program capacities, especially
at the Department of State and USAID. Its strategy should emphasize the
exceptional needs in these areas, that now warrant special career
incentives, new expertise in areas such as public health, and
accelerated recruitment and training. A robust staff plan should be
devised for the next 5-10 year period.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Malan.
If we could try to stick to 5 minutes, I'd appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF MARK MALAN, PEACEBUILDING PROGRAM OFFICER,
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Malan. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, for the
honor of testifying before this very timely hearing.
I'm totally new to Washington, DC, and the humanitarian
community, having joined Refugees International in May of this
year, but I have 31 years of experience in working in Africa,
20 as a soldier and 11 as a civilian, trying to build African
peacekeeping capacity. So, I have two concerns, or areas of
concern, to raise before you today, and one is the
perspectives, the concerns of the Washington, DC, based NGO
community, and the other is African perspectives, some fears
that have been voiced rather loudly recently.
In your letter of invitation, Senator Feingold, you asked
me if I think there's any chance that AFRICOM could be
perceived as a threat or somehow undermine United States
interests in Africa. If we look at the African press, the
answer would be an unambiguous yes. Recent articles appearing,
with titles like ``African States Oppose U.S. Presence,''
``SACD Shuns Spectre of U.S. AFRICOM's Plans,'' ``Global Cop
USA Seeks More Presence in Africa,'' ``The Americans Have
Landed,'' and, ``The Scramble for Africa's Oil,'' to name but a
few.
When the United States defines or markets a combatant
military command, in terms of development and humanitarianism,
Africans inevitably suspect that the true story is being kept
from them, much what Dr. Steve Morrison was saying, yet, the
DOD and the marketing have persisted with emphasizing the role
that AFRICOM will play in humanitarian and developmental
efforts. This kind of messaging, rather than allying African
concerns that the United States military will, indeed, hunt
terrorist networks--we expect that, we welcome that--but
creating the impression that the Pentagon is taking charge of
United States development policy and humanitarian assistance in
Africa. Africans see much sense in the argument for interagency
cooperation; what they find strange is that this is linked to a
combatant command. According to one of Africa's leading
security analysts--I quote from him--``The much vaunted
interagency staff to be included in AFRICOM should be seen for
what it is, the further cooption and subjugation of U.S.
foreign and development policy to a near-colonial agenda which
is inimical to Africa and, ironically, to the U.S. itself.''
Please don't shoot the messenger on that.
As far as local operational NGOs are concerned, the primary
concern is that AFRICOM will increase the trend toward the
militarization of humanitarian action. This is more than
concerns about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. The
humanitarians are purists. To them, humanitarian action is more
than building schools and digging wells. It should be motivated
by humanitarianism, which is an assertion of the universal
sanctity and dignity of human life, as manifested in the
commitment to provide protection to civilians on all sides of
an armed conflict, the good guys and the bad guys. It's
underpinned by the principles of humanity, impartiality, and
independence. And upholding these three principles demands
constant vigilance on the part of the NGOs against cooption of
the language of humanitarianism by political and military
actors, including those who are marketing AFRICOM.
There can, in my opinion, at best, be good liaison and
perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental, and
military actors, but not integration. Even within United
Nations peace operations, which are reliant on relatively weak
voluntary troop contributions, there has been stiff resistance
from humanitarians to the concept of integrated missions in the
field. Yet, AFRICOM is marketed as an integrated command, time
and time again.
At a practical level, a level the NGOs can note, that it's
evident that neither USAID nor State have the funds or the
personnel to fill the significant number of civilian posts
which are supposedly envisaged for AFRICOM, and they fear that
a military lens will dominate any nonmilitary tasks assigned to
AFRICOM.
Let me turn to, perhaps, a positive role, a support role
for AFRICOM that does not blur civil-military lines and
encroach on humanitarian terrain. I think that, beyond a
legitimate military counterterrorism priority, AFRICOM should
focus on two primary and unashamedly military support roles;
mainly, defense sector reform, including civil-military
relations, and really entrenching the democratic principle of
civilian supremacy over the military, and (b) support to
building African peacekeeping and standby force capacity. These
roles are, indeed, envisaged by the DOD, but they are not writ
large in the marketing pitch at this point.
Get beyond civil-military relations and defense-sector
transformation, which we know is both a preconflict or conflict
prevention, unopposed conflict reconstruction task on the
peacekeeping side--and I'll be quick, I'm aware time is running
out--we see 55,000 uniformed U.N. peacekeepers deployed in
Africa today. Only 17,000 of these are African. Most of the
rest of the contingents come from Asia. The demand in the
immediate future with--Senator Lugar referred to the resolution
on establishing the African Union U.N. mission in Darfur with a
force level of an extra 20,000 troops. If Somalia comes online,
the U.N. contingency planners are talking about a figure of
20,000 for Somalia, and the AU, if stood up by 2010, as the
ideal is, for Africa to have a standby force capable of
intervening to prevent or stop genocide and ethnic cleansing
will require further 20,000 peacekeepers. We're looking at a
shortfall of 60,000.
It's clear that ACRI, ACOTA, and GPOI, over the last
decade, have not produced a viable and credible independent
African peace operations capability, nor has it produced a
sufficient ready reserve of African U.N. peacekeepers. AFRICOM,
indeed, holds the promise of joining up current U.S. military
capacity-building programs, such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET, and
of evaluating and upgrading them to ensure their relevance and
effectiveness in delivering more and better African
peacekeepers.
On the African standby force, it's not just about the
troops. The African Union lacks strategic management capacity,
has no effective mechanisms for operational-level mission
management, it has insufficient logistics support and ability
to manage logistics, it lacks communication capacity,
information systems, and it is totally dependent on external
partners for technical advice and support. There's a huge role
for AFRICOM to play here, but the marketing pitch needs to
emphasize that AFRICOM is aware of the policy framework
document for the African standby force, and the procedure, the
roadmap toward establishing this capability toward 2010.
In conclusion, Senator, the establishment of AFRICOM holds
great promise for a more joined-up approach to U.S. military
engagement with the continent. And I quote from Mr. Ryan Henry
in one of his briefings to the foreign media. He put it this
way, ``Instead of having three commanders that deal with Africa
as a third or fourth priority, we will have a single commander
that deals with it, day in and day out, as his first and only
priority.''
That is the main reason for the standup of AFRICOM, and we
should leave a full stop after that. This is the main reason
why Africans should embrace the new command. Informed,
persistent, and coherent engagement is far better than ad hoc
United States military engagement or retrenchment in Africa.
Better coordination of United States defense, diplomatic, and
development initiatives and improved cooperation in the field
should also be welcomed by Africans and humanitarians, but they
first need to see that 3D works in D.C. Until such time as the
ability to coordinate and cooperate is demonstrated in
Washington, the DOD would do well to expand upon AFRICOM
military role and let State and AID speak to the issues of
diplomacy and development.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Malan, Peacebuilding Program Officer,
Refugees International, Washington, DC
introduction
I want to thank Senator Feingold most sincerely for inviting me to
testify before this important and timely hearing. This is my first
appearance before you, so please allow me a brief introduction. I am
new to Washington, DC, and the USA, having joined Refugees
International as head of their peacekeeping program this May.
I shall do my best to convey to you the concerns about AFRICOM of RI
and the broader humanitarian NGO community. However, as an African (I
am a South African citizen) who has spent 20 years in the military and
the last 11 years as a civilian working on African security and
peacekeeping capacity-building issues, I shall first highlight some of
the real concerns about AFRICOM that have been voiced rather loudly in
Africa.
african concerns
Senator Feingold, you asked, in my letter of invitation, if I think
there is any chance that AFRICOM could be perceived as a threat or
somehow undermine U.S. interests in Africa? The answer (to both parts
of this question) is ``yes.'' A quick glance at the titles of recent
articles on AFRICOM in the African press indicates that the Command is
indeed perceived as a threat: ``African States Oppose U.S. Presence'';
``North Africa Reluctant To Host U.S. Command''; ``SADC Shuns Spectre
of U.S. Africom Plans''; ``Global Cop USA Seeks More Presence in
Africa''; ``AFRICOM Struggles To Improve Image of U.S.''; ``The
Americans Have Landed''; ``The Scramble for Africa's Oil''; ``Africa
Rebukes Bush on African Command''; etc.
In some parts of the world, like Iraq and Afghanistan, the face of
U.S. foreign policy is clearly a military one. In Africa, the DOD
appears to be putting a civilian mask on the face of a combatant
command, with its marketing pitch for AFRICOM. This disingenuous
strategy is not working. The veneer of the mask is simply too thin, and
attempts to patch the holes that have emerged--by telling us ``what
AFRICOM is not about'' and reemphasizing a humanitarian and
developmental role for the U.S. military in Africa--simply make the
face of U.S. foreign policy much shadier.
The notion of a benign U.S. combatant command is an enigma to those
who clearly understand (and accept) the need for the U.S. to secure
access to Africa's natural resources, especially oil; and to establish
bases from which to destroy networks linked to al-Qaeda. When the U.S.
promotes a combatant military command in terms of development and
humanitarianism, Africans will inevitably suspect that the true story
is being kept from them.
According to its draft mission statement: ``U.S. Africa Command
promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working with African
states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and
security in the AOR. U.S. Africa Command leads the in-theater DOD
response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security
policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. Government and
international partners, U.S. Africa Command conducts theater security
cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and
improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command
conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to
crises.''
This is a clear, unambiguous, and legitimate mission; one that
should be understood and accepted by African leaders. Yet DOD officials
continue to emphasize the nonmilitary roles of AFRICOM. At a June 22
briefing, for example, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Ryan Henry, confirmed that AFRICOM's primary missions include
humanitarian assistance, civic action, and response to natural
disasters. This kind of ``messaging'' has amplified African concerns,
creating the impression that the Pentagon is taking charge of U.S.
development policy and humanitarian assistance in Africa.
There is much sense in the argument for interagency cooperation;
what does not make sense is linking this to a combatant command.
According to one of Africa's leading security analysts, AFRICOM should
be orientated to an appropriate and clearly delineated role, with
nonmilitary issues kept outside of its grasp: ``The much-vaunted
interagency staff to be included in AFRICOM should be seen for what it
is--the further cooption and subjugation of U.S. foreign and
development policy to a neocolonial agenda which is inimical to Africa
and ironically, to the U.S. itself.''
ngo concerns
The main concern of operational NGOs is that AFRICOM will increase
the trend toward the militarization of humanitarian action, which
raises fundamental concerns about the purpose of such assistance.
Security objectives envisioned in the short term can run at cross
purposes to the longer term vision of creating stable and sustainable
institutions that are accountable and responsive to the needs and
aspirations of all segments of the population. Such concerns are
amplified by the way AFRICOM is being presented as a tool for
integrating U.S. military, political, and humanitarian objectives under
a unified military command. For example, Ryan Henry has emphasized
that: ``[T]he deputy for the command . . . will be a senior civilian
from the State Department so that we can integrate with the diplomatic
aspects. . . . [we] will also have a large percentage of civilians from
different parts of the U.S. Government integrated into the command,
because our engagement on the continent is one of diplomacy, of
development and where we can be of assistance to Africans. And having
an integrated staff will help us to do a better job in integrating with
those other parts of the U.S. Government's engagement.''
The specter of integration is unnerving for humanitarians; they
cannot be supportive of the new command as long as AFRICOM portends to
be a humanitarian actor and promises to subsume humanitarianism within
the ambit of military strategy. Humanitarian action is more than the
act of restoring basic living standards to individuals and communities
who have been deprived of them by circumstance. It should be motivated
by humanitarianism; a powerful assertion of the universal sanctity and
dignity of human life, and a practical manifestation of the need to
provide protection to civilians in times of crisis and conflict. It is
underpinned by the principles of Humanity, Impartiality, and
Independence--the observance of which is essential to maintaining the
trust of all sides of a given conflict, and to maintaining access to
victims. Strict observance of these ``core principles'' is an essential
guard against the use of humanitarian assistance to induce compliance
with political demands, and upholding the principles demands constant
vigilance against cooptation of the language of humanitarianism by
political and military actors.
On the other hand, in Africa, mass displacement, hunger and disease
is often the humanitarian fallout of political failures. In order to
effectively address these challenges, there may well be a need for
military strength and political direction, as well as humanitarian
action; and few would contest the need for these three elements to
collaborate in the field. Nevertheless, differences in philosophy and
operational priorities mean that these three types of response do not
naturally coexist. There can at best be good liaison and perhaps
coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military actors--
but not integration. Even within United Nations peace operations, which
are reliant on relatively weak voluntary troop contributions, there has
been stiff resistance from humanitarians to the concept of ``integrated
missions'' in the field.
There are military rationales for soldiers to engage in limited
projects that involve humanitarian or development-type activities.
These are generally linked to issues of force protection and
intelligence-gathering, and the general military aim of ``winning
hearts and minds.'' The efficacy of such ``humanitarian'' efforts is
questionable, and should be debated from the standpoints of the
military's own objectives and with respect to concerns of the
development and humanitarian community. There are obvious compelling
practical, as well as moral, reasons for civilian institutions and
civil society to undertake the vast majority of such work. Agencies
such as USAID as well as many large operational NGOs have far more
experience than the military in implementing development and
humanitarian programs. And they can do so at far lower cost than the
military. Where the military is the only agency with the capacity to
provide humanitarian and development assistance, the solution should
lie in allocating adequate resources to USAID, rather than reinforcing
and expanding the military's role in this sphere.
On the other hand, the U.S. military is seen as an active or
indirect belligerent in some contexts in Africa--for example, in the
Horn of Africa. In such cases, militarization of development and
humanitarian assistance can do grave damage by undermining respect for
the impartiality and nonpartisanship of the humanitarian mission.
Moreover, although there has been some discussion, and even some
agreement, about operational guidelines for interaction between
civilian agencies and the U.S. military in contexts such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, there has been little progress in addressing the
underlying policy questions about appropriate division of roles between
U.S. Armed Forces and humanitarian and development agencies.
The proposed integrated relationship between U.S. foreign policy
and U.S. military strategy, emphasized in the AFRICOM briefs and
concretized in the intention to appoint a civilian (State Department)
deputy to General Ward, has raised eyebrows within the Washington-based
NGO community. There is concern about the uncooperative relationship
between State and DOD and the fact that there is little substantive
interagency collaboration. And there is deep suspicion that the $750
million in separate funding that the DOD is seeking under the Building
Global Partnerships Act is motivated partly by a desire for
independence from Title 22 funding controlled by State (e.g. for IMET,
FMF, and ACOTA). As demonstrated by the experiences of the U.K.,
Canada, France, Germany, and Sweden (as well as those of the USA),
there are always tensions inherent in aligning security, diplomatic,
and development efforts. Unlike most of these countries, however--where
resources allocated to the Departments of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and
to International Development Agency are not grossly unequal--the
resources of the U.S. DOD dwarf those of the State Department and
USAID. As with people, where tensions exist between organizations, the
priorities of the stronger entity will overwhelm those of the weaker;
thus the real fear that AFRICOM will marginalize and/or subordinate
long-term development goals to short-term political and security
imperatives.
At a practical level, it is also very evident that neither USAID
nor the Department of State (or any other civilian agency) has the
funds or the personnel to fill the significant number of civilian posts
envisioned for AFRICOM. Moreover, AFRICOM's regional, strategic
structure, is likely to predominate over the country-based, more
tactical and operational structure of the USAID missions. This,
together with the fact that the regional expertise of State resides in
Washington, DC, not in Africa, is seen as a recipe for enabling a
military lens to dominate any nonmilitary tasks assigned to AFRICOM.
In short, the concerns of the humanitarian NGOs overlap with those
of Africans--to the extent that they are both underpinned by the fear
of the militarization of humanitarian and development assistance, as
well as U.S. policy in Africa. An obvious way to overcome such concerns
and enhance the credibility of the new combatant command, is to focus
attention and effort on those noncombatant roles which are relevant,
meaningful, and undeniably appropriate for the U.S. military.
a support role for africom that does not blur civil-military lines and
encroach on humanitarian terrain
Beyond military counterterrorism priorities, AFRICOM should focus
on two primary and unashamedly military support roles, namely (a)
defense sector reform, including civil-military relations; and (b)
support to building African peacekeeping and standby force capacity.
These roles are indeed envisioned by the DOD, but they are not writ
large at this point. The AFRICOM Transition Team Web site simply states
that: ``AFRICOM is a headquarters staff whose mission entails
coordinating the kind of support that will enable African governments
and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force,
to have greater capacity to provide security and respond in times of
need. AFRICOM will build on the many African-U.S. security cooperation
activities already underway, yet be able to better coordinate DOD
support with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to make
those activities even more effective.''
It is silent on the challenges of Security Sector Reform in Africa,
and on the precise role that the U.S. military, through AFRICOM, might
play in building more professional armed forces and entrenching the
democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military. Africa's
principal security challenge is to mobilize sufficient resources to
provide a secure, stable, and well-governed environment characterized
by the rule of law, in which human rights and civil liberties are
protected and promoted--and where business can thrive. All African
countries face a capacity deficit in their institutions of state, and
the state is too often a predator rather than a facilitator. Since the
1960s, African armies have exhibited a tendency toward rapacious
behavior, and the rebellions spawned in response have caused
unimaginable suffering for civilians. African governments and civil
society movements should therefore embrace AFRICOM support for defense
transformation--if it is made clear that the approach will be
collaborative and that assistance will be sustained over a long period
through the mechanism of the new Command.
In the realm of defense sector reform, the importance of sustained
external mentoring and commitment is well recognized and cannot be
overemphasized. The usefulness of a lead-nation rather than
multinational approach has been demonstrated by the U.K. in Sierra
Leone, as has the allocation of sufficient financial resources to do
the job properly. On the other hand, there are many examples of
perverse consequences of short-term U.S. assistance to select African
armies. AFRICOM should therefore demonstrate that it understands the
role of military support within the broader sphere of Security Sector
Reform (which includes the police and intelligence agencies as well as
the judicial sector), that it is willing to provide sustained support
to defense transformation in partner countries, and that it will have a
secure funding mechanism to do so.
On the peacekeeping side, years of U.S. assistance to Africa
through ACRI, ACOTA, and GPOI have not produced a viable and credible
independent African peace operations capability. Rather, these programs
bring home the fact that real capacity-building is not a simple ``train
and equip'' quick fix. Africa needs a demonstrable commitment by
AFRICOM to provide long-term, sustainable support to developing African
peacekeeping capabilities--for participating in U.N. peacekeeping, as
well as African Union and regional operations.
There are 54,924 uniformed U.N. peacekeepers deployed in Africa--
17,393 of them are African. The U.N. is currently looking for an
additional 20,000 peacekeepers to staff the proposed UN/AU hybrid
mission in Darfur (to take over from a force of some 7,000 AU troops
and police). Khartoum is insisting that the additional troops come from
Africa, but Africa's capacity and/or will to provide them is sadly
lacking. In Somalia, 1,500 Ugandan troops have been deployed for
several months in what was supposed to be an 8,000-strong AU mission in
that country. They are still awaiting the arrival of an additional
6,500 troops to bring the mission up to authorized strength, while the
AU is pleading with the U.N. to take over responsibility for the
mission. U.N. officials, busy with contingency planning for a possible
Somalia mission, are talking of a force level of 20,000. So there is an
impending demand for an additional 40,000 peacekeepers in Africa, and
little evidence to suggest that GPOI has created the necessary ready
supply.
AFRICOM holds the promise of joining up current U.S. military
capacity-building programs such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET; and of
evaluating and updating such programs to ensure their relevance,
coherence, and effectiveness in enhancing the quality and quantity of
African troops who are readily available for peace operations. However,
for an initiative that represents ``the culmination of a 10-year
thought process within the Department of Defense,'' there is a
surprising lack of detail on how AFRICOM intends to bridge African
peacekeeping capacity gaps; gaps which are enormous and growing.
Beyond critical shortages in current and planned U.N. and AU
missions, there are great expectations of the African Union being able
to rapidly deploy an all-African standby force for future operations.
In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defense Staff produced a draft
policy framework document on the establishment of an African Standby
Force (ASF), which would be able to rapidly deploy when mandated to do
so by the AU's Peace and Security Council. The ASF is to consist of
five regionally managed brigades, located in Central, North, South,
East, and West Africa. Each brigade is to be composed of police units,
civilian specialists, 300-500 military observers, and 3,000-4,000
troops, bringing the proposed total standup capacity of the force to
between 15,000-20,000 peacekeepers (which approximates, coincidentally,
the number of troops being sought for Darfur, as well as Somalia). The
ASF is supposed to be capable, by 2010, of undertaking a variety of
operations, ranging from simpler observation and monitoring operations
to interventions to halt ethnic cleansing or genocide.
This ideal is unlikely to be realized as long as the AU is bogged
down in current, nonviable missions, and without a much higher level of
concerted support to the ASF from partners such as the European Union
and the USA. It is not simply troop numbers that are lacking; the AU
mission in Darfur has revealed that the AU suffers from a lack of
strategic management capacity; has no effective mechanisms for
operational-level mission management; has insufficient logistic support
and ability to manage logistics; lacks capacity in communication and
information systems; and is totally dependent on external partners for
technical advice and support.
AFRICOM can and should make a concerted effort to assist the AU in
overcoming these critical capacity gaps. If this is indeed to be one of
the major tasks of AFRICOM, then it would make sense for the Transition
Team to exhibit some knowledge of the detail of the ASF Policy
Framework and Implementation Roadmap, and to be actively discussing how
AFRICOM may best lend support to the ASF--rather than hammering on
humanitarian and developmental issues.
Moreover, it has been mentioned in DOD briefs that AFRICOM will
play a ``donor'' coordination role. This should be regarded as a
priority task, and be strongly emphasized in the emergent AFRICOM
mandate. African leaders remain skeptical of donor assistance; at
times, this skepticism has turned to resentment toward uncoordinated
Western initiatives for enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities. In
1997, France, Britain and the USA attempted to address African
sensitivities to the lack of coordination by announcing a ``P3''
initiative, which was supposed to coordinate ongoing and future
capacity-building efforts by the three powers. To date however, there
has been little evidence of effective coordination between the P3; the
initiative resulted in little more than mutual noninterference, rather
than harmonization.
This is a serious shortcoming, among others because the AU and the
subregional organizations in Africa lack the capacity to analyze and
absorb the plethora of assistance initiatives emanating from the P3,
the G8, the EU, the Nordic countries and others. With a four-star
general at the helm and on the continent, AFRICOM would be uniquely
poised to act as a focal point for liaison and coordination between
African countries and organizations and their multiple peacekeeping
capacity-building ``partners.''
conclusion
The establishment of AFRICOM and the transfer of geographical
responsibility for Africa from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM hold great
promise for a more joined-up approach to U.S. military engagement with
the continent. As Mr. Henry has put it, ``. . . instead of having three
commanders that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, we will
have a single commander that deals with it day in and day out as his
first and only priority . . . that is the main reason for the standup
of AFRICOM.'' The new command should be welcomed by Africans on this
ground alone. Informed, consistent and coherent engagement is far
better than ad hoc U.S. military engagement or retrenchment in Africa.
Better coordination of U.S. Defense, Diplomatic, and Development
initiatives, and improved cooperation in the field should also be
welcomed in Africa. Until such time as the real ability to coordinate
and cooperate is demonstrated in Washington, however, the DOD would do
well to expound upon AFRICOM's military role, and let State and AID
speak to issues of diplomacy and development.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Malan, for your useful and
candid testimony.
Major General Gration.
STATEMENT OF MG JONATHAN S. GRATION, USAF (RET.), FORMER
DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, POLICY, AND ASSESSMENTS, UNITED STATES
EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Gration. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. I
appreciate this opportunity to share some of my views about
Africa and how they might relate to the new Africa Command.
As I explained in my written statement, I went to Africa in
1952, learned to walk there, learned to talk there; the fact
is, my first sentence was in Swahili. And during the years that
I spent there, to include flying with the Kenya Air Force, I
became firmly convinced that the continent's security issues
are directly linked to its significant stability challenges.
Extreme poverty, the youth bulge, insufficient job
opportunities, corruption, weak governance continue to fuel the
feelings of helplessness and despair. It's this environment
that is very hostile to effective security programs and limits
Africa's chances of achieving its enormous human and resource
potential. But it's within this context that AFRICOM must
operate, and it won't be easy.
The more I've learned about Africa, the more I've learned
that I need to learn, but there are a few things that I believe
AFRICOM should keep in mind as it becomes operational.
First, it needs to be proactive and preventative in its
programs, using all the elements of national power, because
these are significantly cheaper and more effective than
reactive and corrective measures. Our experiences in countries
like Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan are obvious examples.
Second, I believe AFRICOM should focus on working to help
Africans help Africans. We must deal with the African Union,
and work with them, the five regional economic communities and
individual countries, to ensure that our assistance programs
mesh with their regional and national programs. United States
initiatives must have the approval and support of our African
hosts if they are to work; if they are to last.
Since we are guests, we must listen to our hosts and
understand their views and requirements. The United States must
build relationships that are based on mutual trust and respect.
We must form strong partnerships based on shared understandings
of security requirements and a common vision for the future.
And this might require an attitude adjustment.
Finally, to the maximum extent possible, our assistance
programs must be focused on sustainment, replicability, and
scalability. Train-the-trainer programs should be a critical
component of any initiative. And we need to work ourselves out
of a job. There needs to be a sundown clause in our individual
training programs and assistance projects.
In conclusion, the DOD's theater security cooperation
program must be matched by a similar interagency commitment to
enhance and resource a more robust regional stability
cooperation program. Increased security depends on better
governance and plans for long-term stability that foster a
believable hope among Africans that tomorrow will be better.
This means cleaner water, adequate food, better schools,
available and affordable health care, improved infrastructure,
communications, and more employment opportunities, together
with human rights and total gender equality. But I believe our
ultimate success will stem from our attitude and our approach,
style points. AFRICOM must be perceived by Africans as being a
good and respectful guest, a valued partner. And, toward that
end, AFRICOM truly must be about Africans helping Africans.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Gration follows:]
Prepared Statement of MG Jonathan S. Gration, USAF (Ret.), Former
Director, Strategy, Policy, and Assessments, U.S. European Command
Thank you for this opportunity to share some of my opinions about
Africa and how they might relate to the new Africa Command. As you are
aware, I served as the Director of Strategy, Policy, and Assessments at
the European Command and was deeply involved with U.S. military
activities in Africa. But my interest in Africa goes back to 1952 when
my parents moved to the Belgian Congo when I was a year old. Learning
Swahili along with English, I learned quickly to communicate with
Africans--they were my friends and playmates in those early years.
During the turbulent years after independence, we were forced to
evacuate to Uganda, then to Kenya where we lived until 1967. I returned
to Kenya after college to do 3 months of humanitarian work, then again
to Uganda in 1979 during the last days of Idi Amin. I later flew as an
F-5 instructor pilot for 2 years with the Kenya Air Force, and served
as an Africa Desk Officer in the Pentagon in the mid-80s. Throughout my
entire career, I've continued to have a deep interest in humanitarian
issues in Africa, especially with orphaned and disabled children.
Until recently, I served as the CEO of Millennium Villages, an
organization established to help end extreme poverty in Africa and to
help developing nations achieve the U.N.'s Millennium Development
Goals. During my frequent visits to Africa, I became even more
convinced that the continent's security issues are linked to its
significant stability challenges. Extreme poverty, the youth bulge,
insufficient job opportunities, corruption, and weak governance
continue to fuel feelings of hopelessness and despair. This is an
environment hostile to effective security programs and it limits
Africa's chances of achieving its enormous human and resource
potential.
Despite significant obstacles to sustained development, natural
disasters and poor leadership in some countries, we must continue to
meet our near-term challenges. We should try to collaborate on and
compliment activities of partners with similar objectives in Africa,
particularly in the context of the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD). We must consult and cooperate with African and
international partners to resolve the situations in Darfur, Somalia,
DRC, and the Western Sahara. We must help to coordinate a plan to deal
with countries like Zimbabwe, especially for the post-Mugabe period. We
must determine where the actions of other external players (e.g.,
China, Russia, and Korea) compete or conflict with our interests and
take appropriate action promptly, while placing an emphasis on how we
can cooperate with external powers in Africa. We must confront
terrorist threats where we find them and help African countries
eliminate terrorist and criminal safe havens throughout the continent.
With this as background, let me state up front that I supported
establishing a separate command to deal with Africa when I was in the
military and I'm delighted to see it's becoming a reality. I believe we
need one unified command to coordinate and synchronize our military
activities in Africa. We will get an even greater benefit when this
command is truly integrated with all the other elements of U.S. power
and diplomacy. With U.S. interests on this continent clearly defined
and a united voice in Washington to advocate for requirement and
resources, I believe we'll be able to advance America's interests in
Africa better and build strong partnerships with African Government to
eliminate poverty and accelerate Africa's integration into the global
economy.
Over the years, I've learned a few lessons about dealing with
Africa. It might be useful for the new Africa Command to consider these
lessons as it establishes its capabilities and initiates its programs.
1. Proactive and preventative programs using all the elements of
national power are significantly cheaper and more effective than
reactive and corrective measures. Our experiences in countries like
Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan are obvious examples. We've got the Kofi
Annan Center for Peacekeeping. Maybe it's time for the United States to
help Africans establish the Nelson Mandela Center for Good Governance
and the Julius Nyerere Center for Political Leadership.
2. I believe we should focus on helping Africans help Africans. We
must work with the African Union, the five regional economic
communities, and individual countries to ensure our assistance meshes
with their regional and national programs. U.S. initiatives must have
the approval and support of our African hosts if they are to work, if
they are to last. Since we are the guests, we must listen to our hosts
and understand their views and requirements. The United States must
build relationships based on mutual trust and respect. We must form
strong partnerships based on shared understanding of security
requirements and a common vision for the future.
3. To the maximum extent possible, our assistance programs must be
sustainable, replicable, and scaleable. ``Train the trainer'' programs
should be a critical component of any initiative. We need to be working
ourselves out of a job; there should be a ``sun-down'' clause in our
training and assistance programs.
I believe Africa Command is off to a good start conceptually. I
applaud DOD's efforts to use an interagency model--to include other
U.S. Government departments' and agencies' inputs in its decisionmaking
process. The discussion about including personnel from other agencies
as permanent members of the headquarters staff is also very
interesting. Our goal not only should be to put a stronger hyphen
between ``mil-pol'' or to make it more ``pol-mil.'' It should also be
to create an organization that truly integrates the unique strengths
pol, mil, econ, and development.
Security cooperation at the AU and national level is extremely
important and the U.S. military has made great strides in this area.
This effort must be matched by a similar interagency commitment to
enhance and resource a more robust ``stability cooperation'' program.
Increased security depends on better governance and plans for long-term
stability that foster a believable hope among Africans that tomorrow
will be better. This means cleaner water, adequate food, better
schools, available and affordable health care, improved infrastructure
and communications, more employment opportunities, human rights, and
total gender equality.
I believe our ultimate success will stem from our attitude and
approach as we have a larger presence and footprint in Africa. AFRICOM
must be perceived by Africans as being a good and respectful guest, and
a valued partner. AFRICOM must be about Africans helping Africans.
In my view, AFRICOM is on track to be just that type of
organization--a significant improvement over the older versions of the
Unified Command Plan.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir. Thank you all.
We'll begin with a 7-minute round.
Mr. Morrison, again, thank you for your testimony. What
valuable roles do you see AFRICOM being suited for in promoting
good governance and building stable states? In what situations
would the military be valuable to humanitarian organizations?
Dr. Morrison. DOD's greatest contribution, on humanitarian
programs historically, are in situations of crisis, either
human or natural disasters, where there's an urgent requirement
for significant lift and distribution. We've seen this in many
places. The Mozambique hurricane, in 2001, our military played
a major role in mobilizing the movement of troops, fixed-wing
aircraft and helicopter relief, and made a substantial
contribution.
In terms of the longer range investment in governance and
professionalization, there's a normative contribution, that
Mark and Paul alluded to, which is the respect of human rights
and the respect of civilian control over operations and the
kinds of investments that have been made. I think the normative
contribution that can be made--let's take the Gulf of Guinea
maritime environment there. We derive over 20 percent of our
oil from the Gulf of Guinea. There's very little capacity,
brown or blue water capacity, to patrol those areas. There's
rampant piracy. And the fisheries there are plundered by others
who come in. A multilateral, coordinated, interoperable
maritime coast guard capacity aided by the United States could
be a deterrent against crime, could bring wealth and
development to those states, and could demonstrate the value of
coordination among those parties and our United States naval
forces, Europe, have begun that process, now, for 3 years. It
could be expanded, it could be carried forward and enlarged,
and it would have a dramatic impact on governance, on
development, on regional institutions being integrated.
Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Those are very good examples.
I appreciate them.
Mr. Malan, from your personal experience you're obviously
aware that when regimes do not have strong popular support
based upon representative government, they too often exert
pressure on their militaries to suppress opposition groups,
including peaceful opposition groups. Do you believe that
training in the rule of law and civilian control of the
military is a reliable safeguard against the misuse of the
military in such situations?
Mr. Malan. No, sir. Training is insufficient. And too
often, addressing these problems of civilian oversight--respect
for civilian supremacy over the military, a so-called
apolitical defense force--is reduced to 1-week courses or
seminars presented by the ACSS, African Center for Strategic
Studies, small group of officers. This kind of culture, this
kind of military culture, is established over a generation or
two. It involves long-term engagement. It cannot be addressed
through select officers attending courses as part of IMET
program. It involves working alongside these militaries for 10,
20, 30, 40 years.
So, I don't believe there's a quick fix, that training
equals capacity-building, or training can establish a culture,
or that train-the-trainer courses are going to do this. The
problems are structural. I can think of a couple of countries
where the ruling party has employed beaters in military uniform
and police uniforms and made instant police officers to beat
the political opposition. I don't think this can be fixed by
training, sir.
Senator Feingold. Speaking more broadly, what are the
criteria in your mind for determining when a particular
military force or unit should not be entitled to aid from the
United States?
Mr. Malan. When it is used as a political tool to suppress
opposition; when it is proven and reported by NGOs, such as
Human Rights Watch, that that military is committing human
rights abuses. That should be enough for turning off the tap,
sir.
Senator Feingold. Very good, thank you.
Major General, I completely agree with your comment that
AFRICOM should represent innovative political/military
cooperation. Based on your military experience, what will be
the main bureaucratic or logistical obstacles to the success of
this type of interdisciplinary interagency approach? How do you
suggest we overcome them?
General Gration. Thank you, sir. That's a tough question,
because it really goes to the heart of the way we're organized
here in Washington and the way we're organized in Africa. It's
my belief that the State Department has to have the lead,
because the issues that are the biggest issues in Africa are
stability issues. We're talking about diplomacy, democracy,
human rights. All those kinds of things that were brought up
earlier by my colleagues have to be addressed with the State
Department lead. It is true that the Defense Department has
great planning capability, great logistics capability, but I
believe that the State Department has to have a stronger role
in making things work.
There's a couple of things that hurt us in that approach.
One is the military has a regional perspective, and that a
regional perspective corresponds with the way the AU is being
organized, and it makes us very effective in looking at
problems from a regional effect, because there is spillover,
and those borders--and so many of the issues are regional--
terrorism, bird flu--all that stuff is cross-border kind of
stuff, and it has to be looked at, at a regional response, even
humanitarian disasters.
So, I believe that we need an interagency approach that is
regional. And the ambassadors still have to be empowered, and I
agree, but somehow we need to restructure our State Department
so that the Middle East Africa branch works together with the
sub-Saharan Africa branch and in the State Department--and in
the DOD, Theresa Whelan has to have--it all needs to match the
Africa Union. And right now we have, in Washington, a
coordination mechanism that doesn't reflect Africa, even in our
schools, the ACSS, departments, and that kind of thing. So,
that needs to be sorted out.
The other thing is, there's not a very strong hyphen
between ``pol'' and ``mil,'' and that needs to be put in there.
We need to have a strong-hyphen return to ``pol-mil,'' so that
the two are working together. And the fact is, it needs to be--
all the elements of national power need to have a strong hyphen
between them. Africa is not producing, in accordance with its
wealth, contribution to the global economy, so there needs to
be a ``econ'' hyphen in there, and there needs to be a
``development'' hyphen in there. And we all need to work
together. And it all comes back to figuring out what is
America's interest in Africa, and how do we take all the
elements of power, from the interagency down through AFRICOM
and through our ambassadors, to make sure that's happening, in
close coordination with the governments, with the AU, the
regional economic communities? This is a tough, big problem,
but somehow it needs to be put in one basket and organized. And
right now, it's schizophrenic.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I've listened to the testimony, and tried to think
through various activities or missions, I would just recall a
personal experience, from two summers ago, in which the State
Department and the NSC, having heard from President Bouteflika
that he would like to try to bring about the release of
Moroccan prisoners from the Polisario camp, and somehow I
became involved, as somebody would go down there to the camp,
ostensibly with President Bouteflika. But, after we had a long
conference about this situation, which our State Department
felt was important, in terms of Algerian/Moroccan relations and
our relations with them, President Bouteflika decided he did
not want to go. He felt I needed to go, or it would be a deal-
breaker altogether. And, fortunately, General Jim Jones stepped
forward. I mention this, Major, because you were heavily
involved with General Jones in support of these operations.
The benefit of that was that General Jones, in addition to
being a fine officer and a good friend, could produce two
planes, two aircraft that could carry out 404 people. I could
not have produced anything, going down there. So, we had our
mission, had a good visit with the chieftains. I acquired garb,
that I still have in my office from those negotiations. And the
net effect was, the Moroccans were freed, they went on General
Jones's plane over to Morocco, where things were not as tidy as
we had hoped, in terms of the reception by the Moroccans, but
this works along.
Now, I mention those countries, because, as I read the
press, neither one seems to be particularly enthusiastic about
AFRICOM, and I mention that, simply because this is a
manifestation of how, in the best of circumstances, the
military can work with the NSC, with the State Department, with
President Bouteflika, with the king of Morocco, and the rest.
There is a feeling on the part of--however, of many in both of
those governments, that that's not the way our military works.
And I dwell on this, because the first panel, in
emphasizing that there was general support, a few dissenters,
and so forth, seemed to be at variance with what the chairman
mentioned from his reading, and I've mentioned, and you
certainly affirm. We have a very large diplomatic process, just
explaining, right now, to Africans why we want to do this, what
benefit this will be to them, and to us, and to others. The
necessity of highlighting some of the points that you gentlemen
have made as to why this could have a humanitarian benefit or
support democracy or transparency, or whatever, is tremendously
important, and that it might jibe somehow with the AU, so that
there's coincidence there.
I accept the point made--and I'm not sure how to remedy
it--that the State Department is woefully underfunded. This is
the reason we get into these predicaments of who is doing what,
because, expediently, the Defense Department has money, it has
personnel. And so, as a result, this imbalance within our own
structure will be reflected, I'm afraid, in AFRICOM initially,
hopefully not perpetually. But this really does need to be
addressed; who does what, and who has the money, and,
therefore, who calls the shots, in some instances?
So, I just make these observations. And then, I want to
mention, that the issues of oil arose, and the Chinese. These
are not incidental factors. And the fact is that the United
States and China, and lots of other countries, are in great
competition in African states for whatever resources they have
there. That is apparent in hotels in any of the major capitals,
where you run into a lot of people from China and India, even
some from Europe. And so, once we talk about a military
organization there, some--the Chinese would say that they have
already thought about that, they try to protect whoever their
oil workers are. They realize this is difficult terrain,
whether it's Sudan or wherever else they might be. But it's an
existential problem for them to draw back these resources, come
hell or high water, leaving aside African democracy or
sensitivities and so forth. And yet, in many ways, the Chinese
have been fairly successful, diplomatically, in many states,
because of the nature of the rulers, perhaps, or perpetuating
of that type of power. I just have not heard yet, in the
testimony about AFRICOM, about the realities on the ground in
Africa--with regard to the Chinese, in particular, plus others,
and the needs they see for their country, their foreign
policies, and how these intersect with what we're attempting to
do, I believe, in a very straightforward and constructive way.
So, I'd just ask you--hopefully, all of you are being
consulted in the process, not only by this Committee, being
asked to testify, but by others who are planning policy in the
African situation. And let me just ask, first of all, Are you
being consulted? Are some of the ideas that are being presented
to us--are these evident in the planning, the discussion, the
debate, and what have you, as you see it, in State Department,
Defense Department, or elsewhere?
Dr. Morrison, do you have a view on that subject?
Dr. Morrison. Thank you, Senator.
On the question of consultation, I believe that there's an
expanding receptivity and openness to----
Senator Lugar. Good.
Dr. Morrison [continuing]. To hearing other people's
opinions and soliciting ideas and airing some of these issues,
after a period in which I think, you know, when the President
signed the initial paperwork, in November, and then made the
official announcement, in February, there was a huge amount of
internal work that had to be done within DOD and in the
interagency to move forward to the point where they could then
begin, in April and June, having the consultations. This was a
very inward process that did not have all that much external
outreach. But I think we're in a different phase now, and I
think, as General Ward steps into the leadership position--
soon, presumably--I think that will grow even larger.
And the question around China, I don't think that that has
figured strategically in the preparations or thinking. And that
may just be that it's a sequential thing, and there needs to be
time to reach that point.
The Chinese engagement, the biggest plays are in Nigeria,
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan, as we all know. These are
areas where the United States has huge foreign policy equities,
as well as--not energy stakes in Sudan, but huge stakes on
multiple other levels in Sudan, and huge energy stakes in the
same places that China has drawn. That would argue for closer
coordination, particularly in the shared interest in having a
stable and secure environment through which business can be
transacted, to have stable governance, and accountable and
transparent governance, and working collaboratively to try and
get to that outcome.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Malan, do you have a thought about this?
Mr. Malan. Yes, Senator. The--both State Department and the
Department of Defense have been engaging with the NGO
community. On two occasions, Refugees International has invited
them to speak at fora that we've convened. I'm aware that they
are, through interaction, getting broader viewpoints and
consulting with the NGO community. However, on the two
occasions--and some of the press briefings that I've attended
where DOD has taken the strong lead in the briefing--they've
moved on from the issues you raise, sir. And if you go to the
transition-team Web site, under ``Frequently Asked Questions,''
``Let us explores some myths about AFRICOM. AFRICOM is not
about counterterrorism, it's not about protecting our oil
interests, and it's not about countering Chinese,'' and moving
on, moving on, ``It's all about humanitarianism.'' Well, that
doesn't sell. There's some extremely bright people in the NGO
community, and there are, surprisingly enough, some extremely
bright Africans. It just doesn't wash, sir.
I tried to say, earlier on, that AFRICOM has a legitimate
mission, and it's draft mission statement says that, ``U.S.
Africa Command promotes U.S. national security objectives by
working with African states and regional organizations to help
strengthen stability and security in the area of
responsibility.'' And it goes on. This is a clear, unambiguous,
and legitimate military mission. And no African or humanitarian
should object to that. But don't move off those strategic
questions and gloss them over and move on to some humanitarian
pitch. It just doesn't sell, sir.
Senator Lugar. General, do you have a thought?
General Gration. First of all, I'd say that General Jones
is one of those people that has really crossed the bridge in
the gulf between military and--he's the epitome of a soldier
statesman. And it brings up a point, that we really need to
train those kind of people. You know, people like General Jones
just don't ``happen.'' I mean, he happened to have a
background--they gave him a lot of cross-cultural experiences,
growing up in France. But those are the kind of people that we
need to promote and put in jobs, and it's going to be
especially important in Africa, to be able to attract people
that understand the African context, that understand how
decisions are made, that understand that it may not be a
PowerPoint briefing that wins the day, but it's a handshake,
it's a look in the eye, and it's the trust, and it's treating
people with respect and trust that's going to win.
In terms of consultation, I have not been part of this
since I left the military. Obviously, I was very much for
Africa Command. As you know, back in the cold war, we were
spending, in the European Command, only about 5 percent of our
time in Africa. Now it's increasing. In my job in the J-5, I
was spending probably 60 to 70 percent of my time looking
south.
And so, AFRICOM is a concept that is good, and it needs to
happen, but we really have to deal with these questions that
are being brought up. Is it really a military arm of U.S.
policy? And should it focus on providing the logistics and the
planning and the military strength, and going after those
issues that have been brought up, like protecting our
interests, doing noncombatant operations, holding things stable
and secure while we do some long-term other kind of projects?
Or should we be putting it all in one hat? And, if we put it
all in one box, who's really in charge?
And I agree that, when you start mixing all that stuff
together, the questions that you are asking, you're going to
have to get good answers for, right up front. The command-and-
control piece, you know: What is the relationship with the
State Department? The individual who is in charge of civil-
military affairs, What linkage do they have? And putting the
right people into those jobs is going to be absolutely
critical, people that have credibility in the State Department,
people who can represent the State Department views, people
that can advocate military views back up to other State
Department. It's going to be very, very critical to get the
right people, people like General Jones, that understand both
sides and are able to do, not what's right for the military or
what's right for the State Department and what's Republican or
Democrat, but what's right for America.
And that's why it's so important to get this right,
because, until you get this piece right, you can't figure out
how you should react to Chinese. But if you know your own
interests, and you know where you're going, it's very easy to
know where you should be going the same way, same day with
other people, or when you should confront them, or where you
should be working in cooperation. But it comes down to having a
very clear all-across interagency policy and then handling
these threats as they come up.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for chairing this meeting
and allowing us to raise these questions, which I think are
important for our State Department and our Department of
Defense to consider as we evolve.
Senator Feingold. As we conclude, let me first thank
Senator Lugar for his very insightful remarks, which I enjoyed
and we all benefit from.
And let me just say how pleased I am with this panel. You
know, I've been trying to help make this AFRICOM happen, and I
still believe it can be a very useful thing, with the proper
efforts being made that were suggested. I also think that we're
getting at it at a time before it's too settled in, so this is
a timely hearing, where some of the concerns, I hope, will be
addressed. And I hope what we heard will be taken seriously.
There's no point in pretending, by the State Department or
anyone else, that there are not serious concerns in Africa, or
trying to minimize those concerns. Those concerns have to be
addressed very aggressively. I came on this subcommittee 15
years ago, because I was told that this area of the world was
not taken very seriously, and that I would have to do some time
on the Africa subcommittee before I got the other committees. I
said, ``That sounds to me like a bad policy, and I'm going to
spend as long as I'm in the Senate, on this committee, so we
take this part of the world more seriously.'' That should be
the spirit of AFRICOM, not something that makes Africans think
that we lead with our military. We should indicate a very
balanced approach, and AFRICOM should be part of that.
I hope this has been helpful, and I know that Senator Lugar
and I have benefited from it.
Thank you very much. That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]