[Senate Hearing 110-852]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-852
KEEPING THE NATION SAFE THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 18, 2008
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware TED STEVENS, Alaska
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN WARNER, Virginia
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Lisa M. Powell, Counsel
Evan W. Cash, Professional Staff Member
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director
Jessica K. Nagasako, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Senator Voinovich............................................ 3
WITNESSES
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Elaine Duke, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
Frank Chellino, Chairman, National Academy of Public
Administration................................................. 7
Patricia McGinnis, President and Chief Executive Officer, Council
for Excellence in Government................................... 10
John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security,
Congressional Research Service................................. 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Chellino, Frank:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Duke, Elaine:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 29
McGinnis, Patricia:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 38
Rollins, John:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 49
APPENDIX
Questions and Responses for the Record from:
Ms. Duke..................................................... 53
Mr. Chellino................................................. 66
Mr. Rollins.................................................. 69
CRS Report for Congress, ``2008-2009 Presidential Transition:
National Security Considerations and Options,'' April 21, 2008,
John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division................... 70
A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration, June 2008, ``Addressing the 2009 Presidential
Transition at the Department of Homeland Security''............ 122
Background....................................................... 248
KEEPING THE NATION SAFE THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia to order.
Today's hearing, ``Keeping the Nation Safe Through the
Presidential Transition,'' will examine planning for homeland
security risks associated with the upcoming Presidential
transition, the first since the attacks of September 11.
Because history suggests that there is an increased risk of
attack in the time shortly before and after governmental
transitions, it is critical that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) function smoothly through the transition. I want
to commend DHS officials for the seriousness with which they
are planning for the upcoming transition. The Department has
invested considerable time and energy in transition planning.
But DHS starts at a disadvantage in transition planning.
Just created in 2003, it is now the third largest cabinet
department. The Department has been on the Government
Accountability Office's high-risk list since it was created. It
has faced many tests in its short history, and it has not
always handled them well. Even without the transition, I
believe that DHS presents the most serious management challenge
in the Federal Government today.
Substantial gaps in DHS leadership will make it difficult
for DHS to ensure leadership through the transition. According
to the National Academy of Public Administration's June 2008
report, 18 percent of executive positions, nearly one out of
every five top positions, are vacant. Half of the executive
positions at the National Protection and Programs Directorate
are vacant. Forty percent of executive positions in the Office
of General Counsel are vacant. And perhaps most troubling, one-
fourth of the executive positions at the Federal Emergency
Management Agency are vacant.
High vacancy rates will compound the burden placed on top
officials when appointees leave. I know that DHS is working to
address this situation, but time is running out.
Many of the career employees called on to juggle multiple
roles during the transition have been in their current
positions only a short time. DHS has had the highest career
executive turnover rate of any cabinet department over the last
several years. More than half of the current career executives
have been in their positions for less than 2 years. Low morale
and high turnover have plagued DHS since its creation. This is
a serious management problem and now a serious transition
concern and it must be given urgent attention.
I am pleased that the Department increasingly has placed
career employees in positions of high authority. Most
components have a career employee in the deputy position who
will be able to fill the shoes of the departing political
appointee during the transition. The Department has identified
the career employees who will take the positions of other
critical appointees until their replacements start, as well.
The Department's core management functions should be
undertaken without respect to politics or ideology. That is why
I joined with my good friend, Senator Voinovich, on a bill, S.
2816, to allow the DHS Human Capital Officer to be a career
civil servant, as well as on the Effective Homeland Security
Management Act, which is S. 547, which would convert the Under
Secretary for Management into a deputy position with a term
appointment. These bills would improve continuity during
Presidential transitions and would promote better management.
Ms. Duke, as I said during your confirmation hearing, I am
pleased that you are willing to continue serving at DHS through
the Presidential transition. I hope that the next President
considers keeping you in your position until your successor is
confirmed. Your extensive management experience would be
valuable during the challenging transition time, and your many
years in the civil service would give you the credibility to
help bridge the gap between the outcoming Administration and
the new one.
Turning now to the new leadership that will come on board
after the inauguration, the new Administration's national and
Homeland Security appointees must be nominated and confirmed
more quickly than has happened in the past. This was a
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, which observed that many
of President Bush's critical appointees were not confirmed
until the summer of 2001 or later. Indeed, no Administration
has had more than 60 percent of its cabinet and sub-cabinet
appointees confirmed by August of its first year. Speeding this
process will require the commitment of the incoming
Administration, the current Administration, and the Senate.
The new President will need to identify, vet, and choose
his nominees very quickly, which will require a clear
understanding of current homeland security problems and the
incoming President's priorities in addressing them. There are
only 11 weeks between the election and inauguration day. Both
candidates' teams should be working hard now to choose their
potential transition team and key nominees.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, implementing a 9/11 Commission recommendation, allows the
Presidential candidates to submit requests for security
clearances for their prospective transition team before the
election and allows the President-elect to submit requests for
other nominees right after the election. I hope the candidates
will take advantage of that change.
Senator Voinovich and I have worked for years to reform and
modernize the security clearance process. Some progress has
been made in speeding the process and reciprocity of
clearances, but it still remains too slow and too paper-
intensive throughout the government.
Finally, the Senate must speed the confirmation process.
The post-election period will be a time of transition for the
Senate as well as the Executive Branch, with new Members
elected and changes in Committee membership. It will take
planning, focus, and dedication to ensure that the confirmation
process is thorough, fair, and fast.
I want to thank Senator Voinovich again for his work on
this issue. We are both firmly committed, whichever party will
occupy the White House next year, to ensuring that the
transition goes smoothly. As I stated last week at this
Subcommittee's hearing on general government transition
planning, even as the Senate legislative session winds up, this
Subcommittee will continue working to see that Congress, the
current Administration, and the next Administration do all that
we can do to keep the Nation safe through the transition.
I know that DHS takes this issue very seriously, as well. I
look forward to hearing more about DHS's challenges and
progress in preparing for the transition. I want to thank our
witnesses for being here today to discuss this critical issue.
I now turn to my friend, Senator Voinovich, for any opening
statement that he would like to make at this time. Senator
Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the joys
of being on this Subcommittee is the wonderful relationship
that I have with our Chairman, Chairman Akaka. It is unusual
that an agenda continues over a 7- or 8-year period. Ms.
McGinnis, you know how long we have worked on this together,
and I think that you should be assured that we are going to
continue this effort, as Senator Akaka says, to stay on top of
these issues and do the oversight that is necessary as we move
along.
I really believe this is one of the most important hearings
that we are going to have in this Congress. Our Subcommittee
met last week to consider the overall challenges the Federal
Government faces as it prepares for the Presidential
transition, and today we are looking at the Department of
Homeland Security it challenges.
I will say, Ms. Duke, that when Secretary Chertoff was in
Cleveland, I did compliment him on the fact that, according to
everybody that I have talked to, the Department's transition
plan is a very good plan. The real issue is do you have the
wherewithal in order to implement that plan?
I think everyone in the country needs to be cognizant of
the fact that there may be a heightened risk of a terrorist
attack for the next several months. I make this statement based
on history. The U.S.S. Cole was bombed 1 month before our 2000
election and the 9/11 attacks occurred 8 months after our 2000
election.
We are not the only country that is at risk during
transition. In 2003, explosives were detonated on a train in
Russia 2 days before their national elections. Similarly, bombs
were set off on trains in Spain 3 days before its 2004
elections. And last year in the United Kingdom, there were
bombing attempts within days of the appointment of the new
Prime Minister.
The 9/11 Commission has noted that this is a very crucial
time in terms of some of the dangers that we are subjected to.
As I said, I believe that we are preparing for the
transition and I complimented Mr. Johnson last week, and said
that I was appreciative of the fact that he and Secretary
Chertoff were both trying to make sure that we don't drop the
baton during this period like our Olympic runners did, which we
were all unhappy about, but they did compensate later on for
that.
We are here today to hear from DHS and the National Academy
of Public Administration about how DHS, with the Council for
Excellence in Government, is preparing for the transition. I
worked with NAPA when I was mayor, so I know the good work that
they do and look forward to hearing from them today.
Today, we also have an opportunity to discuss what more can
be done by DHS, Congress, and the next Administration to
solidify the transition actions DHS has already taken. I am
anxious to discuss several areas where I think we can build on
the good work that has already been done.
First, many transition reports suggest the need to provide
security clearances for new officials in a timely manner, and I
agree. In fact, the Chairman and I have been working to bring a
performance-based approach to how the government manages access
to sensitive national security information since 2004, and we
are waiting for a report before this Administration leaves on
how they are going to really streamline that process.
Second, I am interested in exploring how DHS human capital
challenges could negatively impact the transition, and Senator
Akaka has made reference to those already. The NAPA report
notes that a large number of vacancies is a major gap in the
DHS career leadership structure, and again, I am not going to
go into the details, but 139 of the Department's executive
positions were vacant on March 20, 2008. That is about 20
percent of its leadership positions, and I am concerned about
that. A number of transition studies note that career
executives must provide stability during transitions, so we
must make sure that DHS has the necessary authority to hire the
employees it needs.
Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked to provide agencies the
tools that they need to hire the right people for the right job
at the right time in the right place, and I hope, Ms. Duke,
that these tools have been helpful to DHS, and I would like to
say to you, thank you very much for stepping up as a career
employee to take on management responsibility. Thank you very
much for doing it.
FEMA executives must also have the qualifications necessary
to manage emergencies and disasters, and I do not think that
non-career executives should fill 34 percent of FEMA's
executive positions. That is something that Senator Akaka and I
are going to have to work on.
This afternoon, I also look forward to discussing how this
Administration and the next, as well as Congress, can best
reach out to the public regarding the transition, as NAPA and
others recommend. I think we need to discuss possible risks to
the Nation during the transition period, but also provide
assurances that the government is preparing to address those
risks and will leave no stone unturned in its efforts. We are
going to make sure that everybody understands that. In other
words, we are going to send a message that transitions bring
risks, but we are alert and ready to address those risks.
I also hope we can discuss how the Federal Government's
transition preparations can and should be coordinated with
State and local governments and the Presidential campaigns.
I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today on this
matter of critical importance to our country. I appreciate your
time and look forward to hearing from each of you, and I want
to especially thank Ms. McGinnis for all of the great work that
you have done right from the beginning when we got started on
the human capital challenge. I hope that you take great pride
in the legislation that Senator Akaka and I have worked on over
the years to try and make sure that we can recruit the best,
retain them, and reward them. I must say, Senator Akaka,
without the participation of the private sector, much of the
great progress that I think we have made over the last 10-year
period--would not have been possible. Thank you, thank you for
all the work you and your organization have done to help us.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Voinovich.
Again, I want to welcome our witnesses today to this
Subcommittee: Elaine Duke, who is Under Secretary for
Management at the Department of Homeland Security; Frank
Chellino, who chaired the panel of the National Academy of
Public Administration that produced the report entitled,
``Addressing the 2009 Presidential Transition at the Department
of Homeland Security'' at the request of DHS and Congress;\1\
Patricia McGinnis, who is the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Council for Excellence in Government; and John
Rollins, a specialist in terrorism and national security at the
Congressional Research Service.
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\1\ The report submitted by Mr. Chellino appears in the Appendix on
page 122.
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As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses. I would ask all of you to please stand and
raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the
Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Duke. I do.
Mr. Chellino. I do.
Ms. McGinnis. I do.
Mr. Rollins. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let it be noted in the record
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
I want the witnesses to know that while your oral
statements are limited to 5 minutes, your entire statements
will be included in the record.
Ms. Duke, will you please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF ELAINE DUKE,\1\ UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Duke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Voinovich. It is truly a pleasure to be here before you this
afternoon and I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity
to highlight the actions that the Department of Homeland
Security is taking to ensure we are completely prepared before
the election, through the inauguration, and beyond.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Duke appears in the Appendix on
page 29.
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As was stated by the Members of the Subcommittee,
historically, we know that terrorists perceive government
transitions to be periods of increased vulnerability. Our
employees and military members will continue their vital
efforts to protect our country today, tomorrow, and throughout
the transition without hesitation. However, we are taking this
time to focus on and improve our day-to-day business operations
as well as to maximize our readiness and incident response
capabilities.
The Department's transition efforts have garnered a great
deal of attention and we have been busy ensuring a seamless
transition will occur. We are reviewing and making changes to
our internal processes. We are preparing briefing and
confirmation materials for the incoming Administration. We are
conducting training and exercises to ensure the current
leadership is in place, is prepared for any threat. We are
focused on change management and communicating our plans to
employees, our partners in industry, and government partners on
the International, Federal, State, and local level.
We are also working with stakeholders and partners outside
the Department in respect to security clearances, exercises,
and interagency coordination. We are working with the members
of this panel here to ensure that we keep the right focus both
in planning and execution of our transition activities.
Our transition efforts actually began in the spring of
2007. By this time last year, we had begun identifying critical
positions and senior career civil servants who will assume
responsibility during the time of transition.
In September 2007, Secretary Chertoff asked the Homeland
Security Advisory Council to establish an Administrative
Transition Task Force for recommendations to the Department on
best practices. The Task Force made many good recommendations.
Although some of the recommendations are not within the
Department's authority to implement, we took the Task Force
recommendations to heart and have incorporated them in our
transition efforts. We have a cadre of transition officers who
are working closely with my core transition team to evaluate
internal processes, develop briefing materials, and implement
an exercise plan.
In November 2007, we joined Congress in requesting that the
National Academy of Public Administration prepare an
independent report of our transition planning efforts. The NAPA
report made several important recommendations, most of which we
have either implemented or will implement prior to transition.
The report confirmed what we had suspected. Of our 22 component
agencies and program offices, 14 have career civil servants in
the No. 1 or No. 2 positions, while seven component agencies or
programs have only career civil servants in senior leadership
positions.
We are providing improved processes to equip new appointees
with the tools they will need as well as the information
relationships required to be effective to do their jobs. To
head this effort, we have appointed Coast Guard Rear Admiral
John Acton, who is here with me today, to serve as our full-
time Transition Director.
In December 2007, the Department focused on the efforts at
an interagency level by engaging the Council on Excellence in
Government (CEG). The emphasis is on the Department's homeland
security training and intergovernmental relations and
interactions with other Federal, State, and local governments.
In concert with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Council is supporting our training and exercise program and our
relationships and communication plans with especially our State
and local government and first responders.
Let me emphasize this. Because more than 99 percent of the
Department's 216,000 employees are career civil services or
Coast Guard members and not political appointees, I do believe
the change in Administration will have little effect on our
day-to-day front-line operations. Our employees will continue
to seamlessly do their jobs as they do now, protecting the
country every day.
Having said that, though, we do understand the increased
risk during this transition and have our efforts dedicated to
preparing for it.
I thank you for your leadership and continued support of
the Department and its management programs. I look forward to
working with you in shaping our future and the success of DHS
with energy and enthusiasm. Again, I am honored to be here
today and thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Duke. Mr. Chellino.
TESTIMONY OF FRANK CHELLINO,\1\ CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Chellino. Senator, thank you. First, I would like to
ask that our report be entered into the record.\2\
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Chellino appears in the Appendix
on page 33.
\2\ The report submitted by Mr. Chellino appears in the Appendix on
page 122.
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Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be included in
the record.
Mr. Chellino. And second, regarding my written comments,
yesterday, we met with Admiral Acton and Dr. Tiffany Lightbourn
from DHS. We had a very positive meeting with them about
training and transition. As a result of that, we revised page
four of my testimony. I think we submitted that to you earlier
this morning, so there is a little revision in what we
previously gave you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chellino. Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich, thank you
for inviting the National Academy of Public Administration to
testify at the Department of Homeland Security's preparation
for the 2009 Presidential transition. I served as the panel
chair for the Academy's 2008 report that assessed DHS's
executive profile and its plan for the 2009 Presidential
transition.
The Presidential transition of 2009 is the first major
transition since September 11, 2001, and the first for DHS,
which was created in 2003. DHS not only built a new
organization from the ground up, but has undertaken two major
department-wide reorganizations and absorbed new and expanded
responsibilities that were not part of its original charter.
This continually changing environment, coupled with major
ongoing operational responsibilities, has caused a continuous
whitewater management environment at DHS. With the 2008
Presidential election on the horizon, DHS leadership is about
to turn over responsibility for managing this complex and
challenging organization to a new team.
As we pointed out in our report, recent history
demonstrates that political transitions present an opportunity
for terrorists to take advantage of real or perceived
weaknesses in a Nation's ability to detect, deter, prevent, or
respond to attacks. The final report of the 9/11 Commission
raised concerns about the impact of future transitions on the
government's ability to deal with terrorism.
Due partly to the delayed resolution of the 2000 elections,
the incoming Bush Administration did not have its deputy
cabinet officials in place until Spring 2001, or its sub-
cabinet officials in place until that summer--historically,
getting the Presidential team in position has been a slow
process. The Commission strongly pushed for changes to the
process so that the Nation is not left vulnerable to these
types of delays in a post-September 11, 2001 world. During the
transition, DHS must retain the ability to respond quickly to
both manmade and natural disasters.
In light of these issues, Congress and DHS asked the
Academy to assess DHS's executive profile, study its transition
training, and review its plans for the 2009 Presidential
transition. Our June report was the result of that request.
Regarding DHS's executive profile, the Academy assessed the
appropriateness of the overall number of executives for DHS
given its size and broad mission objectives, assessed the
Department's allocation between career and non-career
executives, compared the Department with similarly structured
agencies' career and non-career executives, and identified gaps
in the Department's career senior leadership, including risks
associated with changing leadership during the Presidential
transition.
Although no entity has provided a formula or guidelines for
the specific optimum number of executives or political
appointees in an agency, the Academy concluded that the total
number of DHS executives and the percentage of political
appointees are well within the norms of other cabinet-level
agencies. However, the Academy did recommend that DHS shift
more executives to field locations in immigration and border
management agencies and change non-career headquarters deputy
officials, FEMA regional administrators, and other officials to
career executives.
In addition, the report identified gaps in DHS executive
staffing, including high turnover, many vacant positions, and a
lack of ethnic and gender diversity.
Regarding transition training, the Academy assessed the
adequacy of executive training programs as they relate to the
transition and compared DHS training programs with those of
similarly structured cabinet-level agencies. The Academy
concluded that DHS's transition training and development
efforts are consistent with the executive development programs
in most Federal agencies and has a balanced set of transition-
specific training programs underway. If implemented, these
should help executives prepare to meet their homeland security
responsibilities during transition. DHS is well along in its
transition training, especially given that it is a young agency
with a critical national mission and going through its first
Presidential transition.
Last, the Academy reviewed DHS's transition planning and
made 22 recommendations spread across a defined time line from
prior to the national conventions in August to following
inauguration day in January 2009. These specific
recommendations are discussed in detail in the report.
DHS has begun to address these 22 recommendations and has
advised the Academy that they have substantially or partially
completed 10 of the first 12 NAPA recommendations which were to
be completed by September 4. Regarding Academy recommendations
13 and 14, which were to be completed by November 4, DHS has
advised the Academy that the White House has the responsibility
for reaching out to Presidential transition teams to solicit
names of potential political appointees. To our knowledge, this
has not yet been implemented. However, DHS has geared up its
internal security processes to meet the demands of the incoming
executive selectees.
DHS's actions are positive, but there remain important
areas that must be addressed if the Department is to be
completely prepared. To the greatest extent possible, incoming
DHS leadership, including the Secretary and key staff, must be
in place on inauguration day or shortly thereafter. This
requires the support and cooperation of other Federal agencies
with background check and clearance responsibilities as well as
the Congress, given its confirmation role and responsibilities.
Finally, the Academy noted that DHS has not fully achieved
its intended mandate of providing an integrated and universal
approach to homeland security. Much has been asked of DHS since
2003. However, the Department's key seven components still
largely operate as stand-alone entities. Important steps are
being taken by DHS headquarters to improve coordination among
the components. If the void in leadership during the transition
results in components continuing to operate independently in
areas that call for a more collaborative approach, DHS's
operational efficiency and effectiveness will suffer and its
stated objectives will remain out of reach.
In addition, and compounding this lack of coordination is
the 86 Congressional committees that oversee DHS. These
multiple committees make it difficult to both align resources
to strategy and pass authorizing legislation, but it also
subjects the Department to policy disarray. These issues will
provide a major challenge for the leadership team appointed by
the next President.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. Thank you for
inviting the Academy and we will be happy to answer questions
at the appropriate time.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chellino. Ms.
McGinnis.
TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA McGINNIS,\1\ PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOVERNMENT
Ms. McGinnis. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka and
Senator Voinovich. I am glad to see the continuity of
leadership in this Subcommittee even as you switch chairs back
and forth, so thank you very much.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. McGinnis with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 38.
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I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this very
timely discussion of keeping our Nation safe through the
transition. The Council for Excellence in Government works to
improve the performance of government and we have played a
significant role in Presidential transitions. Both the Clinton
and Bush Administrations called on us to help orient new
appointees and offer leadership to the top appointed
Presidential team and White House staff.
In addition, we have worked intensely in the area of
homeland security for the last several years, looking at it on
an enterprise basis, not just working with the Department but
working with State and local government, people on the front
lines, the private sector, and even engaging the public, which
is an important part of this enterprise, as well.
We were asked last fall and we began an engagement with the
Department of Homeland Security to play a role in their
transition planning. Our job is to help ensure that the
critical roles, responsibilities, and protocols for emergency
response will be understood, executed, and coordinated
seamlessly by leaders at the Department of Homeland Security in
collaboration with others across the Federal Government with
homeland security responsibilities, State and local government
officials, and the appropriate private sector leaders.
And this transition period is quite extended. It has
already begun, as we are seeing appointees leave, and will
continue through the election, through the inauguration, and
for some weeks and months after that, we hope not too long
before the appointees are in place to take over.
We are focusing both on the acting career officials, or
those who will be stepping up in acting positions based on the
succession plan, and later on incoming appointees that have
operational and staff support functions to the Secretary.
To guide the work, we have established a small bipartisan
panel, which is co-chaired by Admiral Jim Loy, who was the
Deputy Secretary of the Department, Commandant of the Coast
Guard, and New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly. We have
given you a list of the members of the panel. They really do
represent the homeland security enterprise throughout the
country and have been very helpful.
We have two main tasks. One, we are creating an inventory
and visual mapping of the key roles, relationships, and
responsibilities and protocols based on the National Response
framework, the continuity of operations plans, and the other
protocols. This is not easy because it is very complex, but it
is a great way to see how it works, see who relates to whom and
what the responsibilities are. So we want to offer that to the
Department not only for transition, but for later on.
The second task, as Ms. Duke said, is to design and deliver
workshops for the career officials and then the appointed
officials as they come in. There are three goals here.
One is to make sure that they understand their roles and
responsibilities and the protocols.
Two, we want them to practice these roles. We think that
exercises are critically important.
And three, through that effort, we want to see
relationships and camaraderie built among the team and
including Federal, State, and local, and some private sector
participants. As our friends on the front line often say, you
don't want to be exchanging business cards in the middle of an
emergency.
We held the first scenario-based training workshop on
Monday, September 15, for 50 senior career officials. It went
very well and we know that as we go forward, we will be
offering some of the same kinds of workshops, fundamentals and
getting into scenarios. We are connecting these to the National
Exercise Program exercises and we understand that the career
people who are there now have more experience than the
appointees coming in, for the most part, so we will have to
adjust and focus on who our audience is.
I would like to conclude by answering the questions you
posed about the progress of the Department and the risk. We
agree with you that the Department has made great progress. We
commend the leadership of Elaine Duke, Paul Schneider, and
others who are quite committed to assuring this smooth
transition. We are particularly impressed with Admiral John
Acton, who has been named as the coordinator of the transition
and will be there as appointees leave and new appointees come
in.
We think there are two significant risks that we bring to
your attention, and I think you are aware of them. One is in
terms of training and exercising, the Department is doing a
great job, the National Exercise Program, connecting with other
departments, but we do see that the training and exercises
across the Federal Government is not well coordinated. There
are a lot of training and exercise programs that are not
connected. As far as we know, there is no clearinghouse or
repository for such training and exercise programs, and I think
that this is work to be done, not only for the transition, but
on an ongoing basis, to make sure that each department is
taking advantage of what the other offers and working together.
The second risk you mentioned, and that is the potentially
lengthy gap between the inauguration of the next President and
the confirmation of key appointed leaders. We think that the
cabinet should be sworn in on inauguration day and it would be
great to see other top officials, as well, but certainly days,
not weeks and months after that, if possible. I know you
understand the importance of that.
What I would say is that you hit the nail on the head, both
of you, in terms of the security clearance investigations, and
given the state of the reengineering of that process, we would
strongly recommend increasing the capacity, the investigative
capacity, so that you can be moving people through more quickly
by having a larger capacity.
And then second, in terms of the Senate leadership and the
confirmation, we would urge that commitments and changes in the
process take place before the election, if possible,
establishing time frames for considering and voting on
nominees, maybe a different policy toward holds or other
changes. If that can happen before the election and we have a
winner and a loser, I think it will be most constructive.
Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. McGinnis. Mr.
Rollins.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN ROLLINS,\1\ SPECIALIST IN TERRORISM AND
NATIONAL SECURITY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Rollins. Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member Voinovich,
thank you for asking me to appear today to discuss the risks
and challenges associated with the Presidential transition. As
stated, my name is John Rollins. I am a specialist in terrorism
and national security with the Congressional Research Service.
I authored a report in April of this year entitled, ``2008-2009
Presidential Transition National Security Considerations and
Options,'' and I ask that that be placed in the record.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rollins appears in the Appendix
on page 49.
\2\ The report submitted by Mr. Rollins appears in the Appendix on
page 70.
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Senator Akaka. Without objection.
Mr. Rollins. The nice thing about going last is many of the
points I have to offer have been covered, so I will keep my
comments brief.
Before offering suggestions or ideas where Congress may
assist current and future Presidential transition activities, I
would like to offer a bit of context to the risks that we face.
As previously stated, the Presidential transition currently
underway will be the first one since September 11, 2001. In my
report, and I believe this is similar in the NAPA report, I
look at the transition period actually being from the time of
the campaigning by Presidential candidates through the first
year of the new Administration. That allows for time for
confirmation of new appointees and for national and homeland
security policy directives and procedures to be in place, with
the assumption that some of those will change as they are
currently sitting.
As we have all discussed, history is replete with examples
of attacks by terrorist groups to take advantage of the
transfer of power. We have talked about the examples. I would
refer to last July 2007, a national intelligence estimate to
take a look at what they offered regarding possible
Presidential transition risks. The non-classified version of
the estimate offered the following points regarding al-Qaeda's
capability over the next 3 years. So we are 1 year into that 3-
year period that the estimate spoke of.
The estimate stated, al-Qaeda has regenerated key elements
of its homeland security attack capability and the leadership
continues to plan high-impact plots. Al-Qaeda will intensify
its efforts to put operatives here in the United States. And
last, maybe most importantly, al-Qaeda's homeland security
plotting desires are likely to focus on prominent political,
economic, and infrastructure targets. So here, I think we have
the estimate of a year ago stating that this is a window of
vulnerability, I think confirming what we have seen with
history and past attacks.
As with many crimes, an act of terrorism often results from
the confluence of the aggressor's motivations, means, and
opportunity. Many national and homeland security observers
suggest that al-Qaeda and other international and domestic
terrorist groups maintain the desire to attack U.S. interests.
The means or the capabilities of the enemies of our Nation are
subject to a great deal of debate within the government and
outside the government. However, when one looks at the
possibility of an attack occurring during the Presidential
transition period, combined with the suspected need for al-
Qaeda to prove its continuing viability as an organization, the
enemy may see the upcoming transfer of power too enticing to
resist when considering whether to attack U.S. interests in the
homeland or abroad.
A piece that I added as of yesterday--this wasn't in the
original submission that I provided your staff last week--some
national security observers suggest that the attacks that took
place in Yemen yesterday may have been undertaken with the
desire to seize the U.S. embassy, thus creating a protracted
situation that could influence the upcoming election. So there
may have been a cause to that. Whether this act was designed
for that purpose or for some other objective, many national
security observers suggest that al-Qaeda-supported statements
or actions may increase through the transition period.
I will now briefly touch on areas that Congress can provide
assistance to the transition activity. While implementation
activities of the Presidential transition process are primarily
the responsibility of the Executive Branch, as we have
discussed, there are a number of things that Congress may
choose to do to support the current and incoming
Administration.
One, as I believe Ms. Duke discussed, is providing the name
of agency leaders to the Congress of who is going to have
decisionmaking authority during the transition; providing
briefings to the Congress regarding possible risks to the
Presidential transition process; and, of course, providing
information about the current status of transition activities.
One item of interest that I think we are all aware is
pursuant to a provision in the implementation recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Department of Homeland
Security is required to develop a transition and succession
plan to be presented to the incoming Secretary. The deadline
for this plan to be submitted to Congress is December 1.
Next, I will briefly touch on Congressional support for the
incoming Administration. The Congress may wish to prioritize
hearings, so we talked about the need for the incoming
Administration to identify nominees. Congress may wish to
prioritize the nominees based on national security and homeland
security responsibilities. And, of course, Congress would want
to work with the new Administration to understand its national
security priorities, as that may have short-term policy and
budgetary implications.
Other activities that I will briefly touch on, if Congress
could consider holding a special session of Congress after the
election to ascertain what the outgoing and incoming
Administrations have accomplished, and, of course, Congress may
wish to quickly assign new and existing Members of Congress to
committees that focus on national security.
In conclusion, whether the enemies of the United States
choose to undertake action counter to national security
interests or the new President experiences a peaceful period
during the transition, the new Administration's recognition and
response to the Nation's security challenges will depend
heavily on the preparation activities that take place between
now and the inauguration.
Thank you for convening this important hearing and I would
be happy to answer any questions you may have,.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Rollins.
Ms. Duke, the NAPA report highlights troubling problems
with high executive turnover and vacancies at DHS. I am going
to ask a series of questions about those issues. The report
revealed that DHS has had the highest turnover of career
executives of any cabinet agency over the past several years.
This has contributed to high executive vacancy rates. In
particular, the executive vacancy rates at the National
Protection and Programs Directorate in the Office of General
Counsel are extremely high. What do you attribute this problem
to, and what are you doing to address it?
Ms. Duke. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since the NAPA
report--or even before, but there are results since the NAPA
report, I am, with the Deputy Secretary, managing biweekly the
SES vacancies and announcements and filling of the key
positions. We have been able to reduce our vacancy rate from
about 20 percent at the time of the NAPA report to about 13
percent now. We have about another 35 selections pending, so
with that--it should be completed by the end of this month--we
will have our vacancy rate under 10 percent for the first time.
We are going to start tracking the career and the political
separately now because we think as politicals exit, we want to
make sure we are keeping the career because that is a combined
number of all our senior executives.
What we have done is, one, manage it and bring attention to
it. The second thing we have done is NPPD, one of their unique
challenges is they have grown so big so quickly. They had
several hundred positions to fill this year. So we have
separated their staffing off. They were overwhelming the
system, and so all of the DHS hiring was minuscule. It was less
than half of the--it was not even equal to NPPDs. So we are
managing NPPD's hiring separately, and currently, NPPD's
vacancy rate at the senior executive is down to about 34
percent, not what it needs to be certainly, but we are managing
that. So I think that is unique to NPPD and the fact that with
the reorganization of DHS, they just grew and have so many new
positions. So we are going to continue to watch this.
We do have all the key number twos in place other than my
deputy. The Deputy Under Secretary for Management is under
recruitment. But all the other key deputies that we talked
about, having a career deputy for all the under secretaries,
that is in place.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Chellino, NAPA took an in-depth look at DHS's human
capital challenges for your report. Did that work provide
insight into how DHS could address high turnover and vacancies
among career executives?
Mr. Chellino. Yes and no, Senator. The NAPA report
identified the number of vacancies. Oftentimes, they have a 76
percent executive transition turnover in their positions. The
NAPA report looked at why these people left. A lot of them were
at the end of their career when they switched into DHS. DHS had
a major reorganization in 2005, brought together 22 agencies;
highly centralized in 2003. In 2005, they became completely
decentralized and became seven core component elements. So I
think there probably were some frustrations with some career
people that went into DHS, and as a result of that, they
resulted having the highest turnover in executive positions in
the government, including both political and career.
Now, if you look at political, the average political
employee in the Federal Government today is in place for 24
months. While our report said that DHS did very well with
political appointees in terms of their numbers and percentage,
the panel felt that if DHS, as it grows as an agency, can
continue to reduce those political appointments, it is going to
be a lot better for the experience level, the credibility
level. You don't want people coming into a Nuclear Power
Detection Office in DHS and learning a job for 2 years and then
leaving.
These are positions, not unlike the CIA or the FBI or DEA
or Coast Guard or Secret Service, where those agencies have
very few political appointees and the theme is to get people in
these offices where they are going to stay for a full career.
So while DHS does very well with political positions, we would
recommend as they grow as an agency, they continue to reduce
those slots and make them career experienced people.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Duke, according to the NAPA report, FEMA
had an executive vacancy rate of 25 percent, the highest of any
of DHS's operating components. Additionally, more than one-
third of FEMA executives were political appointees. Most of
these were Senior Executive Service positions that could be
filled with career employees. I am concerned that there will be
a tremendous leadership vacuum at FEMA during the transition
that could hinder the response to any emergency. What is DHS
doing to ensure that there are not any gaps in emergency
response during the transition?
Ms. Duke. Well, what we are doing in terms of leadership,
FEMA has brought its vacancy rate down to 15 percent, so it is
making progress, along with the other parts of DHS. What we
have done for FEMA because as you know, Mr. Chairman, both the
Director and Deputy are political at this time, is we have done
a waiver to the succession order and Nancy Ward, who is the
FEMA Region 9 Director, is going to be the Acting Director of
FEMA when the two top politicals resign. So that is going to
prevent kind of a bumping of FEMA people over time.
So what will happen is when the Director and Deputy resign,
since they are both politicals, Ms. Ward will become the Acting
Director of FEMA so that we can keep the continuity of
leadership. To make her ready for that, she is coming to
Washington, DC on October 6 and will be in the training mode
with Chief Paulison and Deputy Johnson to make sure she is
ready.
Additionally, we are working on the FEMA regional
administrators. All 10 were political originally, and through
attrition, three so far are now career filling those rregional
administrator positions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. One of the questions I asked Mr. Johnson
last week was, is there a transition manual that you have in
place that is pretty comprehensive that you could give
representatives of the Presidential campaigns?
Ms. Duke. Yes. We have an outline of a Presidential
briefing book which we are putting together and that will have
a full overview of DHS. And I think that would be the most to
what you are talking about in terms of having something for the
next Administration.
We also have a manual for our outgoing politicals in terms
of their responsibility and another manual for the incoming
political appointees in terms of how to be a good political
appointee in the Federal Government, some of the management
pieces, the ethics and the responsibilities and those types of
things. But our briefing book would be the closest, I think, to
what you are talking about, Senator.
Senator Voinovich. To your knowledge, have both the
campaigns put people in place that are interfacing with you
currently?
Ms. Duke. We have not been contacted by either campaign at
this time.
Senator Voinovich. When would you suggest that they do
that?
Ms. Duke. We are poised and ready. And additionally, I
might point out that Ms. Lovelace, Gail Lovelace, who you met
with last week, and Mr. Johnson, have put together a Federal
panel. We are in contact with her because she is working with
the campaigns right now and she knows that we are available and
ready to appropriately work with the campaigns. But we do think
we have an important mission and we do not want to lose the
mission continuity because of the Presidential transition.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chellino.
Mr. Chellino. Sir, along those lines with this issue--we
spoke to DHS about this yesterday and about wondering why the
transition teams haven't been engaged to date. Our 13th and
14th recommendations were that after the conventions and prior
to the election, that the transition teams be contacted and
that the initial paperwork, which as you know is very lengthy
and very time consuming, be completed and started and at least
submitted either through the White House or through the FBI,
and that the initial clearances, the dates of birth, the Social
Security numbers be given so that preliminary--both campaigns
are already talking about this in our report so that we don't
lose time waiting for the elections to come around. There seems
to be an issue as to who is supposed to be doing the contacting
and when it is going to be done.
Senator Voinovich. How about Senator Akaka and Senator
Voinovich sending a letter to the campaigns saying that we have
had these hearings. To our knowledge, no one has been
appointed----
Mr. Chellino. I would welcome that.
Senator Voinovich. The sooner you do it, the better off we
are going to be, particularly in this area of the Department of
Homeland Security, because of its critical nature.
Mr. Chellino. Particularly in this area, and I would
wholeheartedly support that recommendation immediately.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Rollins.
Mr. Rollins. Sir, I would just offer that according to
press reports, both campaigns have chosen, nominally chosen
transition leaders, so that is one venue that the Department
could reach out to these people. And also, both campaigns have
senior individuals that have been designated Homeland Security
representatives that have been out on the speaking circuit and
meeting with others. So that would be another way that the
Department could possibly get an opening into the----
Senator Voinovich. Ms. McGinnis.
Ms. McGinnis. Yes. I would say that it would be a great
idea for you to reach to them because there is this sort of
funny dance that goes on at this time of year where no one
wants to seem to be presumptuous, measuring the drapes and
getting ready with their names and nominees. So I think that
the transition planning in the campaigns is behind what has
taken place in the past, and given the vulnerabilities now, I
think that is a little troubling because the authority to go
ahead and send these names up literally now should be taken
advantage of and they need to be completely aware of what they
can do. They need to be briefed and encouraged.
When you asked about a transition manual, it would be
wonderful if we could figure out how to create something based
on best practices in the past and challenges in the future.
Senator Voinovich. Senator Akaka knows this. I did that.
That was one of the most important pieces of work I did when I
was going out as Mayor of Cleveland and as governor. I really
felt an obligation to do everything I could to make sure that
there was a smooth transition, that we laid it out for the next
Administration so they knew some of the things they would have
to do and some of the problems that they would be confronted
with almost immediately.
Mr. Chellino.
Mr. Chellino. Senator, yes. Continuing with that
discussion, I was particularly dismayed in the Government
Executive magazine that came out, and I happened to listen to
your interview with Clay Johnson last week. But he went on
record saying the White House Presidential Personnel Office is
developing a road map that the new Administration can follow to
have 100 appointees confirmed by April 1 and 400 by August 1,
and I find that highly unacceptable. We have 5,000 political
appointees that will be coming in. Twenty-two-hundred of them
are going to be executive level, and you are talking almost a
year to get these people confirmed. We are literally wasting
time right now as we speak.
Ms. McGinnis. And that is where the capacity, increasing
the investigative capacity, could make a big difference. But
this has to be a concerted effort.
Senator Akaka. As you recall on that issue, Mr. Chellino,
Mr. Johnson said that up to the present time, past
Administrations have been able to confirm just 25 by April 1.
And so 100 would be three times as many as in the past. But we
need even more than that.
Senator Voinovich. Have they identified the critical
positions? You said 100 critical by April, 400 by August. Ms.
Duke, have you let them know--do you have the list of what are
the critical positions so that you can share them with----
Ms. Duke. We have our list of critical positions.
Additionally, I would like to note that I did learn from Ms.
Lovelace that the campaigns have requested security clearances
for about 100 people and they worked directly with the FBI. I
do not know, though, if any of those are to work on homeland
security issues. But there is apparently some, in the last week
or so, work on getting names for security clearances.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. McGinnis had a suggestion. I
understand that the Office of Personnel Management now is
whipping people through, doing a much better job, with the
security clearance investigations. What do you think of the
idea of maybe increasing the number of folks that you have got
so that when these come in, you can look them over in terms of
your security concerns?
Ms. Duke. I think we are doing that and we are poised. We
have about 200 political appointees in DHS and we will have the
capacity for both the clearances and the suitability for those
potential employees.
Senator Voinovich. I have used my time up, Senator Akaka.
Why don't you go ahead.
Senator Akaka. We will have a second round.
Senator Voinovich. OK.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chellino, you testified that DHS has
partially or fully completed 10 of the first 12 recommendations
in the NAPA report. As you mentioned earlier, you sent updated
testimony today. The earlier version of your testimony that we
received 2 days ago stated that DHS had partially or fully
completed seven of the first 12 recommendations. What new
information did you receive about DHS's progress on the three
recommendations that you have updated?
Mr. Chellino. Yes, Senator. That was as a result of our
meeting yesterday with Admiral Acton. There were four of us
from NAPA that were present at that meeting, and we left,
walked away from that meeting very impressed at the focus, what
they had accomplished, who they had contacted in terms of
transition training, in terms of contacting the National Guard,
in terms of contacting NORTHCOM, FAA, Department of State. They
had a litany of who they are working with and reaching out to
existing ongoing government agencies that already have
significant training that they can joint venture with and
thoroughly impressed us.
The only two areas that were left vacant were the
distribution of the SES's, and they are doing a comprehensive
review of the existing SES's--I think it is going to be
completed in December--to see whether or not they want to
reallocate them more to immigration and the border agencies.
Keep in mind, Border Patrol, I think, increased 5,000 people in
the last couple of years. So those--proportionately, the border
agencies, the three border agencies, have not kept pace with
the degrees of SESes that the other agencies have.
So as a result of that meeting yesterday, those three more
recommendations were updated and we are very pleased. As you
kick into the next cycle, which will end November 4, you get
into these issues of pre-clearing and getting the security
clearances ready for the transition teams, whomever they want
to name, and that is where we suspect there is going to be a
problem.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Duke, as I stated earlier, I am pleased
that DHS increasingly is placing career civil servants in
positions of authority. However, as the end of the
Administration draws closer, critics have voiced concern that
DHS is filling positions that previously were filled by
political appointees with career employees as a way of
extending this Administration's influence into the next
Administration. What are you doing to ensure that career hiring
decisions are made exclusively based on the qualifications of
the candidates throughout the Department?
Ms. Duke. All our senior executive positions, of which a
deputy-type position would likely be a senior executive, are
publicly advertised, posted on the Federal website, USAJobs,
and competitively solicited. Once we get in the applications,
we go through the standard human resources process, and then
every SES selection at headquarters and the majority of
significant ones in the components are reviewed by an Executive
Resources Board chaired by the Deputy Secretary with about six
members, and we review the senior executive selections to
ensure it was truly merit promotion-based.
Also, right now, if any new SES selection would go to the
Office of Management and Budget for review of SES peers on the
Qualification Review Board. If the candidate was a previous
political appointee, it goes through another review to ensure
that merit--by Office of Personnel Management (OPM)--to make
sure that DHS properly followed merit promotion principles. So
there are several steps of review in filling these.
Most of our deputy positions are by long-time career civil
servants that have been in the Federal system and really are
truly there for the stability of that specific functional area
in DHS.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. McGinnis, in past Presidential transitions, lack of
mutual trust between members of the incoming and outgoing
Administrations has hindered sharing of needed information. The
Council for Excellence in Government has worked on new
appointee training. Do you have thoughts on building trust and
encouraging full and open communication among current and
incoming Administration officials?
Ms. McGinnis. That is a very tough question as the
campaigns heat up and become more and more partisan. But I
think that on issues of national security and homeland
security, which should transcend politics, there is an
opportunity to establish some practices and sharing of
information, and this transition could lay the groundwork for
that in terms of being sure that briefings are taking place,
that the security clearances are being handled for both
campaigns, and I think that the tenor in the Congress makes a
lot of difference.
The Congressional leadership can set the right tone, and in
fact, as I suggested before, if some steps could be taken in
the Senate on a bipartisan basis to assure that the
confirmations actually come to a vote within a reasonable and
short period of time, and I think 30 days is reasonable. It was
mentioned in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act. And it would be wonderful to have some sort of resolution
or commitment from the leadership as an example to show that
trust.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Rollins.
Mr. Rollins. Sir, I just offer the obvious. I believe
oftentimes familiarity breeds trust, even among individuals
that don't see policy issues similar. So the sooner that we can
get the incoming national security and homeland security
leaders engaged with the Department and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and others, I think there
will be a personal relationship that forms which would help the
trust and help move some of these issues forward.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. Duke, is DHS taking any steps to ensure that DHS
officials will provide a full and open exchange of information
with the incoming Administration?
Ms. Duke. Yes. We have an outline of both our transition
plan and our briefing book that is comprehensive, and if this
Subcommittee doesn't have it yet, I would be pleased to share
it with you. I think that the fact that my office has the lead
for this, you have my personal and professional commitment, and
I think that having a Coast Guard officer lead it shows--is a
neutral statement on our part.
As a political appointee, I do serve the President, but I
think each one of us in DHS is dedicated to the homeland
security. We work there because we think that is an important
mission. I think that will transcend any issues, and much of
what we are doing in transition really is policy neutral, as I
think Ms. McGinnis said earlier, just building a strong basis
so we are ready to transition. But I give you my personal word
on that.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Under Secretary Duke, as you know, we have been following
the Department's efforts to establish a common set of
performance metrics, and I know you have got your hands full,
but I am hoping that Mr. Schneider is going to deliver the
agreed-upon metrics by October, which is around the corner----
Ms. Duke. Right.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Because we have worked very
hard on it, and as you know, or maybe you don't know, we have
had this battle going back and forth as to how the Department
is to be judged in terms of whether they are continuing on
their transformation. I don't want to see our effort disappear,
and by having those metrics and agreement, next year, 6 months
out, we can sit down with the folks and just say, here is what
the metrics are. How are you doing? So we can continue on this
transformation because I really believe that if we don't do
that, we are never going to get this Department shaped up. This
is a gigantic management challenge and one that many of us look
back on and say, maybe we did it the wrong way, or at least I
thought we did it the wrong way, but that is neither here nor
there. Anyhow, it is done and so we have got to move forward
with it.
The other thing I would be interested in is your ideas on
some suggestions, for example, some legislation dealing with
moving these appointees through committees. There are some
reasons we just don't get it done, sometimes in regard to a
legitimate complaint, but we are going to be sending out a kind
of a directive to all of the committees saying these are the
kinds of things you should be looking for the nominees for
these key positions, a kind of a job description. But there has
got to be other ways that we can, as you suggest, Ms. McGinnis,
to move nominations along so that we aren't the problem. And so
often, we are the problem.
Mr. Rollins. Senator, I think that is a very good question.
I think you answered the issue in the question, is looking at
the job description, if you will, the job responsibility of the
nominees. Look to see who has significant policy and resource
making decision in the national security and homeland security
environment and then possibly prioritizing those individuals
for confirmation prior to others.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. And, probably another good idea
might be to send that kind of criteria off--I think we did, in
the Bush Administration, I think we sent it off to the
campaigns, or after the election, saying that these are the
kind of qualifications that they should be looking at. So you
have got the administrative branch that has it and the
Legislative Branch.
And this concept of getting people on board and thinking
about them in the key positions early is a great idea because
then you start to--I mean, I have to tell you, I ran for
governor in 1990 and I had somebody who was out working on the
campaign but their main responsibility was to look at people
that would be on screening committees for key positions in the
Administration, asking were there folks out there that looked
like they might be good candidates. In other words, we were
already thinking about if we won the election, how we could go
to town as soon as possible on getting some of this stuff done.
So anything that we can do, our job, I mean, you can't
control what other people do, but certainly we can do our
share, our part.
Ms. McGinnis. The Council over the years has produced
something called our Prune Book. I don't know if you are
familiar with it, but you are familiar with the Plum Book,
which is the list of political appointees. We take advantage of
our members who have experience in government and put together
a list of the top critical management positions and then do
profiles and qualifications. So we are working hard on that
now, trying to do it in a priority fashion, and we worked with
GAO last time to produce those management qualifications that
you are talking about.
A couple of other suggestions, the committees all have
different questions and questionnaires for appointees, and, of
course, they may have different substantive questions. But to
the extent that could be standardized or could be done in a way
that complements the questions that have already been answered
in the Executive Branch clearing process, that would streamline
the process.
And then again, you are leaders and you work with your
leaders, but it would be--I mean, could there be--I guess I am
asking you--a way to establish a time frame as suggested by the
9/11 Commission, by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, of getting these people considered and to a
vote within 30 days?
Senator Voinovich. Well, I think certainly Senator Akaka
and I could work on that, to try and influence our respective
parties and our leadership to do that. I will say this, that we
tried to limit or to reduce the number of political
appointees----
Ms. McGinnis. Yes.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. And ran into a storm
because so many of the committees were jealous of having the
jurisdiction. They wanted it to be a political appointee so
they could get themselves into the act. And I know I am going
to take--it is not going to help this Administration--another
stab at leadership to see if we can't get them to fulfill the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
Ms. McGinnis. Right.
Senator Voinovich. The other point is the point that Mr.
Chellino made, and that is we just have to look at some of
these things from a practical point of view about who should be
a political appointee and who shouldn't be.
Ms. Duke. And if I could add, Senator, in that regard, we
do agree with your proposed--this Subcommittee's proposed 2816.
That won't solve the whole problem, but it will help in one
position, we believe.
Senator Voinovich. I think we have that hotlined. You are
talking about the CHCO position?
Ms. Duke. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. That is done, I think.
Ms. Duke. Great.
Mr. Chellino. Senator, along those lines of thinking
outside the box, and we have a little back-channel information
on this, and being so concerned about the confirmation and how
long it is going to take to get--of the 775 executives in DHS,
83 of them are political--we have heard that some of them, if
they were asked to stay through the inauguration, that they
would be willing to do it. I don't know if that helps the
problem or not in terms of leaving those experienced people, or
quite frankly, how DHS feels about it, but that might be a
temporary hold until we can get these new people on board.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I made a note of that. Everybody
submits their resignation----
Mr. Chellino. Right.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. And that is the end of it
and they walk out of this place. Some of them want to get out
of here.
Mr. Chellino. I understand that. But I have heard that
some, if they were asked at DHS, would be willing to stay.
Senator Voinovich. But some of them are in key positions,
and I think as good citizens and patriotic Americans, if asked
to stay for a time being until somebody was there in place, it
might be a good idea.
The other thing is that having someone that has had the
experience--of course, I suspect some of them come back
voluntarily to spend time with a new person to try and help
them out, but that would be wonderful, if we could do that.
Another good idea.
Senator Akaka, I have another meeting that I have to go to.
I would like to suggest that once this new group is in, that
maybe you and I sit down with them, the administrative branch,
and maybe we could get some of the people, Ms. McGinnis----
Ms. McGinnis. Yes.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. That were part of the
original group that got together and talk about what we have
accomplished in terms of flexibilities and human capital and
then identify maybe some other areas where we could be helpful
to this next Administration so they can get the folks on board
that they need to get the job done.
Ms. McGinnis. We would be delighted to help with that.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. Again, I want to thank the
witnesses for being here. I am sorry I have to exit.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. Your
experience as an administrator certainly adds to trying to meet
these challenges that we are talking about.
Mr. Rollins, you have researched the national security
implications of the Presidential transition across the
government. How do challenges at DHS compare to those at other
agencies with national and homeland security responsibilities,
particularly those created since the last Presidential
transition? And how do you compare the relative risks and the
amount of progress made so far?
Mr. Rollins. This is a very good question. I don't know if
I can offer you a definitive answer. My discussions, my
research into this shows, ironically enough, that the
Department of Homeland Security is further ahead in its
transition planning activities than most other departments and
agencies with national security or homeland security
responsibilities.
The way I look at that is the Department is still young
enough that it hasn't developed enough bad practices or is not
complacent in the transition. So this is something new for the
Department and many of the leaders. I would offer that probably
in other departments and agencies that have been around a
while, this is an every 4-year activity, so complacency has set
in and we will approach this as we did prior to September 11,
2001. But I think that the Department is doing well.
My concern is I think the Department is doing extremely
well internally, but as you offered, Senator, my concern is how
is it doing with respect to other Federal departments and
agencies? Are they interacting and working with the Department
to assist transition efforts? How is the Department working
with State and local governments? Is that connection being
made? So I think there is a very good job being done
internally. I am not quite certain that is the case across the
Federal Government and certainly not down to the State and
local level.
Senator Akaka. Let me then move into the area you just
mentioned, and I want to pose this question to Mr. Chellino,
Ms. McGinnis, and Mr. Rollins. Your written testimony, Ms.
McGinnis, states that Federal officials seldom train and
exercise with State and local officials or private sector
leaders. The NAPA report and the Congressional Research Service
that report Mr. Rollins authored also emphasized the importance
of training and coordination with State and local officials and
the private sector.
I would like to hear more about why you highlighted this
issue and what more should be done to improve State, local, and
private sector coordination through the transition. Ms.
McGinnis.
Ms. McGinnis. The reason that we consider it to be a risk
area is because of the nature of the mission, protecting the
homeland. It cannot be accomplished by one department and it is
quite complex because it involves every level of government and
the private sector and the public. So, first of all, it
presents a huge challenge, and also in our observation and
experience, the best preparation for an emergency is practice
or experience.
We have worked closely with people who are on the front
lines, particularly at the local level, and we know from that
experience that while they exercise frequently with State and
other local governments, the Federal Government is usually not
involved. In fact, I think the training and exercising
programs, as they are funded, are really quite separate for
State and local government and then most of the programs in the
Federal Government are designed for Federal employees.
Now, of course, you know that the TOPOFF exercises and the
National Exercise Program are broader and they are scenario-
based and they are bringing together people from across the
Federal Government and to some extent State and local people.
In my view, this needs to be expanded and more emphasis should
be given to joint exercises and coordinating the exercise
programs and capacity across government and especially those
that are federally funded down to the State and local level.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chellino.
Mr. Chellino. Senator, I think in particular with DHS being
a relatively new agency, the seven core component agencies have
been there for hundreds of years, and quite frankly, I believe
FEMA probably does have a good relationship. In the aftermath
of Hurricane Gustav, FEMA obviously worked very well down in
New Orleans this time and they couldn't have done that without
a good working relationship with the State and locals. The
Immigration Department now has the cross-designation to
designate local police officers with Federal authority to
arrest illegal immigrants. The Secret Service, whenever they
are deployed, they are totally engaged with State and local law
enforcement officers to protect the President or those that
they have to protect.
So I think those things will continue, and clearly the
State and locals are always screaming, we want more Federal
involvement, we want more Federal dollars, we want more Federal
help. That will get better over the years. But I think to the
degree that DHS has come along and done what they have already
done, they are making sufficient progress.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Rollins.
Mr. Rollins. Sir, I will just offer one group that we
focused on early in the hearing is the citizenry of the Nation
here. We have just talked about State and local and the private
sector. But I see this period of risk, potential vulnerability,
as a period of opportunity, as well, to engage the citizens of
this Nation, to inform them that we are going into a heightened
threat period, to ask for their assistance. We have got a lot
of activity on the prevention side of homeland security that is
trying to become more formalized and more routine, the Fusion
Centers and outreach to State and local police and the homeland
security advisors. But this is an opportunity to ramp that up,
if you will, a bit and to involve the citizens, to try to
envelop them into the entire homeland security environment
through the vulnerability that this transition period presents
and then that may help us in the future for safeguarding the
Nation.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Duke, what is DHS doing to improve
coordination with State and local partners and the private
sector through the transition? Will future exercises include
these important stakeholders?
Ms. Duke. Yes, two things. One is we used to think of our
transition planning as it had three pillars or facets. We,
about 3 months ago, added a fourth, and that is communications,
not only with State and local, but with citizens, with other
Federal agencies. It is important enough to rank its own
chapter in the transition book.
On the exercise side, what we have done is we started
originally with the FEMA exercise program as the basis and had
some training earlier of DHS employees. So that was the first
step, and that happened this spring. With the CEG training and
exercises we are doing, we have added some of the Federal
agencies. In the first session of it, we had about three other
Federal agencies participating.
What Admiral Acton is working on right now in terms of the
full plan is we have the FEMA exercise program. Northern
Command has an exercise program and then the National Guard has
an exercise program that they regularly exercise with State and
local governments because of their unique mission. So Admiral
Acton is working with NORTHCOM and the National Guard to
overlay the exercise programs and have them have exercises that
have really all three components, the new Northern Command look
at homeland security, the traditional FEMA, which is, of
course, disaster focused, and then the National Guard to add
the State and local government component.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Duke, many State and local governments
will be undergoing their own transitions after elections this
fall. How will DHS ensure that needed connections are made
between State and local leaders and Federal career executives
and incoming appointees with changes happening at so many
different levels?
Ms. Duke. Well, the part we can do is make sure that our
new points of contact are known and communicated to the State
and local governments. So we are working on ensuring that our
transition plans, our change in personnel is known. We are
going to the different conferences that State and local
governments or different emergency response agencies have that
are talking about transitions. So we are really trying to be
out there and visible.
But I think probably one of the most important things we
can do is make sure they know who is going to be at DHS in key
positions during the transition because the actual response
won't change. The exercise and the National Response Framework
will be the same, whether the incident is in a transition or
not. It is just knowing the right people to do the coordination
with, and that is a principal focus.
Senator Akaka. This is my final question to Ms. Duke. The
Federal Government now recognizes security clearances across
departments, but individuals with clearances still need
suitability reviews before starting new positions. Please
explain why that is necessary and what, if anything, can be
done to ensure that the suitability review process does not
slow the process of getting new appointees on board.
Ms. Duke. Mr. Chairman, that is an area of extreme interest
to me. The difference between a clearance, which is a position
needs to know, have access to classified information, and then
making sure that individual is able to--doesn't have enough
risk that they can't have access to the classification. And
within that, there are specific clearance levels, as you know.
Suitability is, is a person suitable for employment in the
Department? It looks at many different facets. It looks at
debt. It looks at drug use. It looks at does the person
represent themselves well in public. Could they be an
appropriate Federal person. So it looks beyond just national
security risk.
What we are doing to help the fact that these are two time-
intensive processes is for new employees of DHS that need both
a suitability and a clearance, we will run those in
concurrence. So we will do the suitability as the clearance is
being processed. We won't do them sequentially.
Also, I just issued a policy that will allow reciprocity
within DHS. So if you are suitable in one of the components of
DHS, you will be deemed suitable at headquarters. That is
something new. It is an initial step, and there is more to go.
Finally, under the new Executive Order--I know you are
expecting a report this December--DHS was just added to the
group that is looking at reciprocity of suitability Federal-
wide. We have been a member for about 2 months and I am
actively engaged in that. You may know that OMB, DOD, and ODNI
were the principal players previously and we were added as a
key stakeholder and we are really looking at how we can, both
for employees and for contractors, make it so that we are
managing the risks but making it a better process.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much.
I would like to thank each of our witnesses again for your
testimony. Preparing the Department of Homeland Security for
the Presidential transition is critically important. We must
ensure there are no gaps in our homeland security capabilities
as current Administration appointees leave and new leaders are
selected and confirmed. I am pleased the Department is taking
the issue very seriously.
However, the same management problems that hindered DHS's
day-to-day operations will make the Presidential transition
much more challenging. In particular, high existing career
executive vacancies will make it more difficult to fill the
shoes of the appointees who leave at the end of this
Administration. DHS must continue to make progress on its poor
morale, high turnover, and high vacancy rates. DHS deserves
credit for its efforts to develop career employees for
leadership positions and to place more career civil servants in
positions of authority. This will have long-term benefits for
the management of the Department and will smooth future
Presidential transitions. But DHS needs to do even more to
promote career employees.
The current Administration, the new President, and the
Senate will need to work together to make sure key appointees
are nominated early, granted security clearances quickly, and
promptly considered and confirmed or rejected by the Senate.
This Subcommittee will continue to focus on the crucial task of
keeping the Nation safe through the Presidential transition,
and Senator Voinovich and I will continue to discuss this
hearing as well as what we need to do during this period.
The hearing record will remain open for one week for
additional statements or questions from other Members.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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