[Senate Hearing 110-635]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-635
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN
MEETING BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 8, 9, AND 10, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Situation in Iraq and Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in
Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation
april 8, 2008
Page
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq 7
Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C., United States Ambassador to Iraq.... 21
The Situation in Iraq and Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in
Meeting the Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation
april 9, 2008
Bacevich, Andrew J., Professor of International Relations and
History, Boston University..................................... 95
Keane, GEN John M. USA (Ret.), Senior Managing Director, Keane
Advisors, LLC.................................................. 100
Malley, Robert, Middle East and North Africa Program Director,
International Crisis Group..................................... 105
The Situation in Iraq, Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in
Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation, the Future U.S.
Military Presence in Iraq, and the Situation in Afghanistan
april 10, 2008
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 161
Mullen, Admiral Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 165
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN
MEETING BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh,
Clinton, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez,
and Wicker.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Thomas K.
McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Paul C.
Hutton IV, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Ali Z. Pasha,
and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator
Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson;
Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon
Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C.
Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine,
Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski and Nathan Reese,
assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew
King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Jason
Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant
to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to
Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
First, let us welcome General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker, we thank you for joining us today. We thank you for
your service to our Nation, and please express our deep
gratitude to the men and women serving in Iraq, both in our
Armed Forces, and the civilian agencies of our Government. We
look forward to your report and recommendations as to where we
go from here.
Until recent attacks on the Green Zone, heightened attacks
on our forces, and violent events in Basrah and Baghdad, the
surge, along with other factors, appeared to have achieved some
success in reducing violence in Iraq.
This newly increased violence raises questions about the
military success of the surge, but more significantly, the
purpose of the surge as announced by President Bush last year,
which was to give the Iraqi leaders breathing room to work out
a settlement, has not been achieved. That reality lead many of
us to, once again, challenge President Bush's policy.
During my recent trip to Iraq, just before the latest
outbreak of violence, a senior U.S. military officer told me
that he asked an Iraqi official, why is it that we're using our
U.S. dollars to pay your people to clean up your town, instead
of you using your funds? The Iraqi replied, ``As long as you
are willing to pay for the cleanup, why should we do it?''
This story crystallizes a fundamental problem of our policy
in Iraq. It highlights the need to change our current course in
order to shift responsibility from our troops and our taxpayers
to the Iraqi Government, and force that government to take
responsibility for their own future politically, economically,
and militarily.
Our current open-ended commitment is an invitation to
continuing dependency. An open-ended pause, starting in July,
would be just the next page in a war plan with no exit
strategy.
Another senior U.S. military officer in Iraq put it 2 weeks
ago, it's time to take the training wheels off and it's time to
take our hands off the Iraqi bicycle seat.
The Bush administration's strategy has been built on the
assumption that, so long as we continue to provide the Maliki
Government with plenty of time, military support, and financial
assistance, they will take responsibility for Iraq and its
people.
The major political steps that they need to take have not
yet been taken by the Iraqis, including establishing a
framework for controlling and sharing oil revenues, adapting an
election law so that provincial elections can take place, and
considering amendments to their constitution.
Even the few small political steps that have been taken by
the Iraqis are in jeopardy because of the incompetence and
obsessively sectarian leadership of Mr. Maliki.
Last week, this incompetence was dramatized in a military
operation in Basrah. Far from being the defining moment that
President Bush described, it was a haphazardly planned
operation, carried out apparently without meaningful
consultation with the U.S. military or even key Iraqi leaders,
while Maliki made unrealistic claims, promises, and threats.
In January of last year, when President Bush announced the
surge, he said the Iraqi Government planned to take
responsibility for security across Iraq by the end of 2007. The
President also pledged to hold the Iraqi Government to a number
of other political benchmarks which were supposed to be
achieved by the end of 2007. Instead of forcefully pressing for
political progress, President Bush has failed to hold the
Maliki Government to their promises, showering them instead
with praise that they are bold and strong.
The President has ignored the view of his own military
leaders. A State Department report less than 5 months ago
included the quote, ``the intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-
dominated government is a key threat facing the United States'
efforts in Iraq, rather than al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni
insurgents, or Iranian-backed militia.''
Now violence appears to be on the rise, and President Bush
is once again taking pressure off of Maliki if he announces
that reductions of our troops will be halted in July, and that
the pause is open-ended.
On the economic side, 5 years after the war began,
skyrocketing oil prices have swelled Iraqi oil revenues beyond
all expectation. Iraq now has tens of billions of dollars in
surplus funds in their banks, and in accounts around the world,
including about $30 billion in U.S. banks.
The Iraqi leaders and bureaucrats aren't spending their
funds. The result is, that far from financing its own
reconstruction as the administration promised 5 years ago, the
Iraqi Government has left the U.S. to make most of the capital
expenditures needed to provide essential services and improve
the quality of life of Iraqi citizens.
American taxpayers are spending vast sums on reconstruction
efforts. For example, the U.S. has spent over $27 billion to
date on major infrastructure projects, job training, education
and training, and equipping of Iraqi security forces (ISFs).
On the other hand, according to the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Iraqi Government budgeted
$6.2 billion for its capital budget in 2006, but spent less
than a quarter of that. As of August 31, 2007, the Iraqi
Government has spent somewhere between 4.4 percent, according
to the Government Accountability Office, and 24 percent
according to the White House, of its $10 billion capital budget
for 2007.
As of last Thursday, the United States is paying the
salaries of almost 100,000 Iraqis who are working on the
reconstruction. To add insult to injury, in addition to
spending tens of billions of U.S. dollars on reconstruction,
American taxpayers are also paying $3 to $4 a gallon for gas
here at home, much of which originates in the Middle East,
including Iraq.
The Iraqi Government seems content to sit by, build up
surpluses, and let Americans reconstruct their country and let
Americans foot the bill. But the American people surely aren't
content with that, and the Bush administration shouldn't be
either.
Militarily, 5 years after the war began, the Iraqi Army now
numbers 160,000 soldiers, over 60 percent of whom, according to
our own statistics, are capable of taking the lead in
operations carried out in conjunction with U.S. troops.
However, in 4 key Northern Provinces where the Iraqis have
50,000 trained soldiers, the United States forces number
20,000. We were told on our recent visit that from December 29,
2007 through March 16, 2008, there were 110 combined U.S.-Iraqi
operations of a company size, or greater, and that the Iraqi
Army led in just 10 of those 110 operations.
As the fighting in Basrah and Baghdad demonstrates, we are
being drawn deeper into what General Raymond T. Odierno
described here last week as an intercommunal conflict. That
conflict, which has nothing to do with al Qaeda and everything
to do with a civil war, appears to be brewing.
There is a consensus among the President's supporters and
critics alike that there is no military solution to this
conflict and there will be no end to it unless the Iraqi
political leaders take responsibility for the country's future.
An announcement of an open-ended pause on troop reductions,
starting in July, would simply send the wrong message to the
Iraqi leaders. Rather, we need to put continuous and increasing
pressure on the Iraqis to settle their political differences,
to pay for their own reconstruction effort with their oil
windfalls, and to take the lead in conducting military
operations.
The way to do that is to adopt a reasonable timetable for a
change in mission and redeployment of our troops. Gradually
shifting responsibility to the Iraqis for their own future--
politically, militarily, and economically--is our best hope for
a successful outcome in Iraq and represents, finally, an exit
strategy for most of our troops.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome back
to our two distinguished witnesses.
We've come a long way since early 2007 and quite a
distance, even, since General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
appeared before our committee last September. We owe these two
patriotic Americans a debt of gratitude for their selfless
service to our country.
At the beginning of last year, we were engaged in a great
debate about what to do in Iraq. Four years of mismanaged war
had brought us almost to the point of no return. Sectarian
violence in Iraq was spiraling out of control, life had become
a struggle for survival, and a full-scale civil war seemed
almost unavoidable. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was on the offensive
and entire Iraqi provinces were under the control of
extremists.
Yet, rather than retreat from Iraq and face, thereby, the
terrible consequences that would ensue, we chose to change
strategies to try to turn things around. Instead of abandoning
Iraq to civil war, genocide, and terror, and the Middle East to
the destabilizing effects of these consequences, we changed the
strategy and sent additional troops to carry it out. By the
time our two witnesses testified in September, it had become
clear that these new efforts were succeeding.
Since the middle of last year, sectarian and ethnic
violence, civilian deaths, and deaths of coalition forces have
all fallen dramatically. This improved security environment has
led to a new opportunity; one in which average Iraqis can, in
the future, approach more normal political and economic life.
Reconciliation has moved forward, and over the weekend,
Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish leaders backed the Prime Minister in
a statement supporting his operation in Basrah, and urging the
disbandment of all militias.
Much, much more needs to be done, and Iraqi leaders need to
know that we expect them to show the necessary leadership to
rebuild their country, for only they can. But today, it is
possible to talk with real hope and optimism about the future
of Iraq and the outcome of our efforts there.
While the job of bringing security to Iraq is not finished,
as the recent fighting in Basrah and elsewhere vividly
demonstrated, we're no longer staring into the abyss of defeat
and we can now look ahead to the genuine prospect of success.
Success: the establishment of a peaceful, stable,
prosperous, democratic state that poses no threats to its
neighbors and contributes to the defeat of terrorists, this
success is within reach. With success, Iraqi forces will take
responsibility for enforcing security in their country, and
American troops can return home with the honor of having
secured their country's interests at great personal cost, and
of helping other people achieve peace and self-determination.
That's what I hope every American desires for our country
and for our mission in Iraq. But should the United States,
instead, choose to withdraw from Iraq before Iraq's security is
established we will exchange for this victory a defeat that is
terrible and longlasting.
AQI will claim victory, and increase its efforts to promote
sectarian tensions, pushing for a full-scale civil war. It
could descend into genocide and destabilize the Middle East.
Iraq would become a failed state and it could become a haven
for terrorists to train and plan their operations.
Iranian influence would increase substantially in Iraq, and
Iran would encourage other countries to seek accommodation of
Tehran at the expense of our interests.
An American failure would almost certainly require us to
return to Iraq, or draw us into a wider, far, far costlier war.
On the other hand, when the Iraqis are able to build on the
opportunity provided by recent successes, they will have a
chance to leave in Iraq a force for stability and freedom, not
conflict and chaos. In doing so, we will ensure that the
terrible price we are paying in the war, a price that has made
all of us sick at heart, has not been paid in vain.
Our troops can leave behind a successful mission, and our
Nation can leave behind a country that contributes to the
security of America and the world. To do this, we must continue
to help the Iraqis protect themselves against the terrorists
and the insurgents.
We must press ahead against al Qaeda, the radical Shiite
militias, and the Iranian-backed special groups. We must
continue to support the Sunni volunteers and the Iraqi
Awakening as they stand up to AQI. We must continue to build
the ISFs so they can play an ever-stronger and more neutral
role in suppressing violence.
This means rejecting, as we did in 2007, calls for a
reckless and irresponsible withdrawal of our forces at the
moment when they are succeeding. I do not want to keep our
troops in Iraq a minute longer than necessary to secure our
interests there. Our hope, my hope, is an Iraq that no longer
needs American troops, and I believe we can achieve that goal,
perhaps sooner than many imagine. But I also believe the
promise of withdrawal of our forces, regardless of the
consequences, would constitute a failure of political and moral
leadership.
Achieving our goals in Iraq will require much more than a
military effort. Arab neighbors should increase their
investment and engagement, including an overdue dispatch of
ambassadors to Baghdad. We should encourage greater United
Nations (U.N.) involvement, building on the work that
representatives have done on Kirkuk recently.
Iraqis must continue the reconciliation that has helped
dampen violence over recent months, and they need to move a
portion of their budget surpluses into job creation programs,
move toward an end to their reliance on outside sources of aid,
and look for other ways to take on more of the financial
burdens currently borne by American taxpayers.
This is especially important as the Government of Iraq
continues to take in revenues it finds difficult to disburse
through its own government channels. One way they begin to do
this is by contributing significantly to the Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP) which pays for the employment
of reconstruction projects throughout the country. This is a
start. Other programs of this type can and should be funded by
the Iraqis themselves.
By giving our men and women in uniform the time and support
necessary to succeed in Iraq, we have before us a hard road. It
is a privilege beyond measure to live in a country served so
well by these individuals. The sacrifices made by these
patriots and their families are incredibly great, and the
alternative path is, in the end, a far costlier one.
As we convene this hearing, and as we continue to debate
our future in Iraq, Americans continue to risk everything to
accomplish their mission on our behalf. Given the untold cost
of a failure and the benefits offered by success, Congress must
not choose to lose in Iraq. We should choose instead to
succeed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Again, a warm welcome to you, General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker.
General Petraeus, will you begin?
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
General Petraeus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide an update on the security situation in Iraq, and to
discuss the recommendations that I recently provided to my
chain of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you 7 months
ago, there has been significant, but uneven, security progress
in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian
deaths have been reduced substantially. AQI and other extremist
elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of ISF
elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement
of local Iraqis and local security.
Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still
unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as
events in the last 2 weeks have reminded us, and as I have
repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is
fragile and reversible.
Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when
Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it
is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was
on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy
additional forces to Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that
has been made. First, of course, has been the impact of
increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. We're well
aware of the U.S. surge, let us recognize that Iraqis also
conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers
and police to the ranks of the security forces in 2007 and
slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these
forces.
The second factor has been the employment of coalition and
Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations
across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi
people, to pursue AQI, to combat criminal elements and militia
extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable
political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been an attitudinal shift
among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first
Sunni Awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq
increasingly have rejected AQI's indiscriminate violence and
extremist ideology.
These communities also recognize that they cannot share in
Iraq's bounty if they didn't participate in the political
arena. Over time, awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of
Iraqis, some former insurgents, to contribute to local
security, the so-called Sons of Iraq. With their assistance and
the relentless pursuit of AQI, the threat posed by AQI, while
still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly.
The recent threat in Basrah, southern Iraq, and Baghdad
underscored the importance of a ceasefire declared by Muqtada
al-Sadr last fall, another factor in the overall reduction in
violence.
Recently, some militia elements became active again, but an
al-Sadr stand down did resolve the situation to a degree. The
flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has played
in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called
Special Groups, and generated a renewed concern about Iran in
the minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups
pose the greatest long-term threat to the viability of a
democratic Iraq.
As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi
partners will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal
with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can
do this while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge
forces.
In September, I described the fundamental nature of the
conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian
communities for power and resources. This competition
continues, influenced heavily by outside actors. Resolution
remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq.
Various elements push Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition
toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militias, extremists,
and criminal gangs pose a significant threat. Al Qaeda senior
leaders who still view Iraq as the central front in their
global strategy send funding, direction, and foreign fighters
to Iraq.
Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges.
Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign
fighters from its territory, but not enough to shut down the
key members of AQI. Iran has fueled violence, as I noted, in a
particularly damaging way, through its lethal support for these
Special Groups.
Finally, insufficient Iraqi governmental capacity,
increased sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq's
problems. These challenges and a recent week's violence
notwithstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian competition in many
areas is now taking place more as debate and less through
violence.
In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and
Southern Iraq was dealt with, temporarily at least, by most
parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is through
political dialogue, rather than street fighting.
As I stated at the outset, though Iraq remains a violent
country, we do see progress in the sectarian arena. As this
chart (slide 1) illustrates, for nearly 6 months, security
incidents have been at a level not seen since early to mid-
2005, though the level has spiked in recent weeks as a result
of the fighting in Basrah and Baghdad.
[The chart referred to follows:]
The level of incidents has already begun to turn down
again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one. As our
primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely
monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed through the
violence. As this chart (slide 2) reflects, civilian deaths
have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the
early 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set off a cycle of
sectarianism violence that tore apart the fabric of Iraqi
society in 2006 and early 2007.
This chart (slide 2) also reflects our increasing use of
Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition
and Iraqi data, and the bottom line reflecting coalition return
data only.
[The chart referred to follows:]
No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to
violence have been reduced significantly, but more clearly
needs to be done.
Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq as
it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As
the box at the bottom left of this chart (slide 3) shows, the
number of deaths from ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since
we testified last September. A big factor has been a reduction
of deaths by sectarian violence in Baghdad. Density blocks for
this are shown in the box depicting Iraq's capital over time.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian
hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is
only a partial explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines
and numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and
elsewhere.
In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have off loaded along
the fault line, to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and
Shiite leaders to begin the long process of healing into their
local communities.
As this next chart (slide 4) shows, even though the number
of hard-core violent attacks increased in March as AQI lashed
out, the current level of attacks like this remains far below
its height a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve
security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease
in the effectiveness of such attacks.
[The chart referred to follows:]
The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence, in
particular, remain relatively low, demonstrating the enemy's
inability to reignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.
The emergence of Iraqi volunteers to help secure their
local communities has been an important element. As this chart
(slide 5) depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq,
Shiite as well as Sunni, under contract to help coalition and
Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure
infrastructure and roads.
[The chart referred to follows:]
These volunteers have contributed significantly in the
savings of vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not
to mention the priceless lives saved, that far outweigh the
costs of the Iraqi contracts.
The Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and weapons in explosive
caches. As this next chart (slide 6) shows, we have already
found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we're working
closely with the Iraqi Government to transition the ISFs into
other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have already been
accepted into the police force or other government jobs. This
process has been slow, but it is taking place, and we will
continue to monitor it carefully.
Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of
Iraq, and they rely on this to target it and reveal it.
However, these attacks, in addition to widespread use of women,
children, and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further
alienated AQI from the Iraqi people. The tenacious pursuit of
AQI, together with AQI's loss of global support in many areas,
has substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom
of movement. This chart (slide 7) displays the key military
effect of the effort against AQI, and its insurgent allies. As
you can see, we've reduced considerably the areas in which al
Qaeda enjoys support and sanctuary, but clearly there is more
to be done.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Having noted that progress, al Qaeda is still capable of
lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the
organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and
on the resource flows that sustain it.
This chart (slide 8) lays out a comprehensive strategy that
we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners
are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you can see,
defeating AQI requires not just actions by our elite
counterterrorist forces, but also major operations by coalition
and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence
effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs,
information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the
employment counterinsurgency principles and detainee
operations, and many other actions.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Related to this effort, I applaud Congress's support for
additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets in the upcoming supplemental, as ISR is vital to the
success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only
reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens
an organization that al Qaeda's senior leaders view as a pool
to spread its influence, and forment regional instability.
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently
advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also
seen AQI involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mid-
East Region.
Together with the ISFs, we have also focused on the Special
Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed
by Iran's Quds Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was
these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at
Iraq's seat of government 2 weeks ago, causing loss of innocent
life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition
actions in response.
Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their
desire that Iran live up to the promises made by President
Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their
support for the Special Groups. However, nefarious activities
by the Quds Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly
recognize the threat they pose to Iraq. We should all watch
Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead, as they
will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its
neighbor, and the character of future Iranian involvement in
Iraq.
The ISFs have continued to develop since September, and we
have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their
capabilities and conditions on the ground have permitted.
Currently, as this chart (slide 9) shows, half of Iraq's 18
provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these
provinces, not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional
government area, but also a number of Southern Provinces have
done well.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Challenges have emerged in some other areas, including, of
course, Basrah. Nonetheless, this process will continue, and we
expect Anbar and Qadisiyyah Provinces to transition in the
months ahead.
Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and
over 540,000 individuals now serve in the ISFs. The number of
combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations,
albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100
(slide 10). These units are bearing an increasing share of the
burden, as evidenced by the fact that ISF losses have recently
been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful
after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of
recent operations, as there were units and leaders found
wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be
downgraded as a result.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid,
especially once they got their footing, and gained a degree of
confidence and certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year has been
improvements in Iraq's security institutions. An increasingly
robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the ISFs to grow by over
133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months, and the
still-expanding training base is expected to generate an
additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 Army and Special
Operations Battalions through the rest of 2008, along with
23,000 police and 9 National Police Battalions.
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily
improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart
(slide 11) shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's Security Ministry
spent more on their forces than the United States provided
through the ISF Fund (ISFF). We anticipate that Iraq will spend
over $8 billion on security this year, and $11 billion next
year. This projection enabled us recently to reduce
significantly our ISFF request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1
billion to $2.8 billion.
[The chart referred to follows:]
While improved, ISFs are not yet ready to defend Iraq or
maintain security throughout the country on their own. Recent
operations in Basrah highlighted improvements in the ability of
the ISFs to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and
replacements on very short notice. They certainly could not
have deployed a division's-worth of army and police units on
such short notice a year ago.
On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored
the considerable work still to be done in the area of
logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and
control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) Program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi
Government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and
services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and
with your encouragement of the organizations and the FMS
process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to
support urgent wartime requirements.
On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider
restoring funding for the International Military Education and
Training Program, which supports education for mid- and senior-
level Iraqi military and civilian leaders, and is an important
component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in
the future.
While security has improved in many areas, and the ISFs are
shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains
exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq can face a resurgence
of AQI, or additional Shiite groups could violate Muqtada al-
Sadr's cease-fire order, and return to violence.
External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence within
Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could undermine the
security situation, as well.
Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved
security which has provided opportunities for political and
economic progress, and improved services at the local,
provincial, and national levels.
But the improvements have also created expectations that
progress will continue. In the coming months, Iraq's leaders
must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass
additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out
a census, determine the status of disputed territories, and
resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks
would challenge any government, much less a still-developing
government, tested by war.
The CERP, the State Department's Quick Response Fund, and
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges.
To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us, by
June, the additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental.
These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the
salaries paid to the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the
cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security
in local communities.
Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300
million for us to manage as Iraqi CERP, to perform projects for
their people, while building their own capacity to do so.
The Iraqi Government has also committed $163 million to
gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small
business loans, and $196 million for a joint training,
education, and reintegration program.
The Iraqi Government pledges to provide more as they
execute the budget passed 2 months ago. Nonetheless, it is
hugely important to have our resources continue, even as Iraqi
funding begins to outstrip ours.
Last month, I provided my chain-of-command recommendations
for the way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the
objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security
gains, while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade
combat teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our
Iraqi partners to secure the population, and to transition
responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit,
but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been
made.
As in September, my recommendations are informed by
operational and strategic considerations. The operational
considerations include recognition that the military surge has
achieved progress, but that that progress is reversible. ISFs
have strengthened their capability, but still must grow
further. The provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns,
detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provisional boundary
disputes and Article 140 issues will be very challenging.
The transition of Sons of Iraq into ISFs or other pursuits
will require time and careful monitoring. Withdrawing too many
forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past
year, and performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require
sizable conventional forces, as well as Special Operations
Forces and advisor teams.
The strategic considerations include recognition that the
strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces,
has been considerable. A number of security challenges inside
Iraq are also related to significant regional and global
threats.
A failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for
the greater fight against al Qaeda, for regional stability, for
the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the
efforts to counter-malign Iranian influence.
After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of
command that we continue the drawdown of the surge combat
forces, and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade
combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of
consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, we
will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions
on the ground, and over time, determine when we can make
recommendations for further reductions.
This process will be continuous, with recommendations for
further reductions made as conditions permit. This approach
does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable,
however, it does provide the flexibility those of us on the
ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our
troopers have fought so hard, and sacrificed so much, to
achieve.
With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and
early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment
of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to
the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important
to those in the Gulf Region, to the citizens of the United
States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our
national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of al
Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist
Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed
ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders
and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable
Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.
In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our
Nation in Iraq. We have asked a great deal of them and of their
families, and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen
personal awareness of the strain on them, and on the force as a
whole, has been an important factor in my recommendations.
Congress, the executive branch, and our fellow citizens have
done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved
ones, and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more
to those in harms' way than the knowledge that their country
appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men
and women serving our Nation in Iraq, and in the courage,
determination, resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each
and every day. It remains the greatest of honors to soldier
with them.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Petraeus.
Ambassador Crocker?
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members
of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
provide my assessment on political, economic, and diplomatic
developments in Iraq.
When General Petraeus and I reported to you in September, I
gave my considered judgment on whether our goals in Iraq were
attainable. Can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with
a democratically-elected government operating under the rule of
law?
Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of
political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq was
upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep.
Developments over the last 7 months have strengthened my sense
of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain and progress is
uneven, and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress.
Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S.
resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial,
but it is also reversible.
Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in
Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago, but
as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the
early part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment
and the enormous investment we have made in the lives of our
young men and women and our resources.
Let me describe the developments upon which I base such a
judgment.
The first is at the national level, in the form of
legislation and the development of Iraq's parliament. In
September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet completed
key laws. In the last several months, Iraq's parliament has
formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases, passed
legislation dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and
nation-building.
A pension law extended benefits to individuals who had been
denied them because of service with the previous regime. The
accountability and Justice Law, de-Baathification reform,
passed after lengthy and often contentious debate, reflects a
strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does a far-reaching
amnesty law.
The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in
defining the relationship between the Federal and Provincial
Governments. This involved a debate about the fundamental
nature of the State, similar in its complexity to our own
lengthy and difficult debate over States' rights.
The Provincial Powers Law also called for provincial
elections by October 1, 2008, and an electoral law is now under
discussion that will set the parameter for those elections. All
major parties have announced their support for elections, which
will be a major step forward in Iraq's political development,
and will set the stage for national elections in late 2009.
A vote by the Council of Representatives in January to
change the design of the Iraqi flag, means the flag now flies
in all parts of the country for the first time in years. The
passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for capital
expenditures ensures that the Federal and Provincial
Governments will have the resources for public spending.
All of this has been done since September. These laws are
not perfect and much depends on their implementation, but they
are important steps.
Also important has been the development of Iraq's Council
of Representatives (COR) as a national institution. Last
summer, the parliament suffered from persistent and often
paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedures. Now, it is
successfully grappling with complex issues and producing viable
tradeoffs and compromise packages.
As debates in Iraq's parliament become more about how to
resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have
become more fluid. Those politics still have a sectarian bent
and basis, but coalitions have formed around issues, and
sectarian political groupings, which often were barriers to
progress, have become more flexible.
Let me also talk about the intangibles; attitudes among the
Iraqi people. In 2006 and 2007, many understandably questioned
whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian
backgrounds was so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The
Sunni Awakening Movement in Anbar, which so courageously
confronted al Qaeda, continues to help keep the peace in the
area, and keep al Qaeda out.
Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one
of Iraq's safest cities. The Shiite holy cities of Najaf and
Karbala are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the
wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity. The
Shiite clerical leadership, the Marja'iyyah, based in Najaf,
has played a quiet, but important, role in support of
moderation and reconciliation.
In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against
each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The
security improvements of the past months have diminished the
atmosphere of suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that
transcend sectarian identities.
When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a
city district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Dora.
Surge forces were just moving into neighborhoods still gripped
by al Qaeda. Residents were also terrorized by extremist Shiite
militias.
Less than a year later, at the end of February, tens of
thousands of Shiite pilgrims walked through those same streets
on the way to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam
Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and water as they passed
through, and some joined the pilgrimage.
News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the
situation in Basrah. Taken as a snapshot, the scenes of
increasing violence and masked gunmen in the streets, it is
hard to see how the situation supports a narrative of progress
in Iraq, and there is still very much to be done to bring full
government control to the streets of Basrah and eliminate
entrenched extremist, criminal, and militia groups.
But when viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to
take on these groups in Basrah has major significance. First, a
Shiite majority government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has
demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and
extremists, regardless of identity.
Second, ISFs led these operations in Basrah, and in towns
and cities throughout the south. British and U.S. elements
played important roles, but these were supporting roles, as
they should be.
The operation in Basrah has also shaken up Iraqi politics.
The Prime Minister returned to Baghdad from Basrah shortly
before General Petraeus and I left for Washington, and he,
confident in his decision, was determined to press the fight
against illegal groups. But he is also determined to take a
hard look at lessons learned.
The efforts of the government against extremist militia
elements have broad political support, as a statement April 5
by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders--Sunni,
Shiite, and Kurd--made clear, in support of Prime Minister
Maliki's Government.
A wild card remains the Sadrist Trend, and whether the
Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of
the Trend and Iranian-supported Special Groups. A dangerous
development in the immediate wake of the Basrah operation was
what appeared to be a reunification between Special Groups and
mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). We also saw a potential collapse
of the JAM freeze in military operations.
As the situation unfolded, however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued
a statement that disavowed anyone possessing heavy weapons,
which would include the signature weapons of the Special
Groups. This statement can further sharpen the distinction
between members of the Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a
threat to the Iraqi state, and members of the Special Groups,
who very much do.
One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that
the strategy that began with the surge is working. This does
not mean that U.S. support should be open-ended, or that the
level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over
time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a
bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States.
In August, Iraq's five principal leaders requested a long-
term relationship with the United States, to include economic,
political, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of
this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of
American troops, similar to that which exists in nearly 80
countries around the world.
The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a
strong affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty, placing Iraq on par
with other U.S. allies and removing the stigma of Chapter 7
status under the U.N. charter, pursuant to which coalition
forces presently operate.
Such an agreement is in Iraq's interest and ours. U.S.
Forces will remain in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the
U.N. resolution presently governing their presence expires. Our
troops will need basic authorizations and protections to
continue operations, and this agreement will provide those
authorizations and protections.
The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq,
and we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The
agreement will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie
the hands of the next administration. Our aim is to ensure that
the next President arrives in office with a stable foundation
upon which to base policy decisions, and that is precisely what
this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as
these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A
reinvigorated cabinet is necessary, both for political balance
and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq's people.
Challenges to the rule of law, especially corruption, are
enormous. Disputed internal boundaries, the Article 140
process, must be resolved. The return of refugees and the
internally displaced must be managed. The rights of women and
minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware of the
challenges they face, and are working on them.
Iraq's political progress will not be linear. Developments
which are, on the whole, positive, can still have unanticipated
or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial
elections, vital for Iraq's democratic development and long-
term stability, will also produce new strains. Some of the
violence we have seen recently in Southern Iraq reflects
changing dynamics within the Shiite community as the political
and security context changes. Such inflection points underscore
the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong
to conclude that any eruption of violence marks the beginning
of an inevitable backslide.
In terms of economics and capacity-building, in September,
I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq's
economy and in the country's efforts to build capacity to
translate these gains into more effective governance and
services. Iraqis have built on these gains over the past month,
as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq,
and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses.
According to a Center for International Private Enterprise
poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed
expect the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next 2
years.
With improving security and rising government expenditures,
the International Monetary Fund projects that Iraq's gross
domestic product will grow 7 percent in real terms this year,
and inflation has been tamed. The dinar remains strong, and the
Central Bank has begun to bring down interest rates.
Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for
reconstruction, and a $5 billion supplemental budget this
summer will further invest export revenues in building the
infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly
needs.
This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq
recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial
aircraft from the U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion. As
Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricks
and mortar construction through oil production and export, our
assistance has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis
on local and post-kinetic development through our network of
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ministerial
advisors.
The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is
over. We are seeking to ensure that our assistance, in
partnership with the Iraqis leverages Iraq's own resources. Our
25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve provincial
and local governance capabilities, particularly in budget
design and execution. They are also helping to establish
critical linkages between provincial and Federal Governments.
Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are working to ensure their
continued viability as our forces redeploy. The relatively
small amounts that they disburse through Quick Response Funds
have major impacts on local communities, and congressional
support is important, as it is for other vital programs in the
fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism supplemental request.
Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support
projects and programs that we have developed. It has committed
approximately $200 million in support of a program to provide
vocational training for Concerned Local Citizens who stood up
with us in the Awakening.
Our technical assistance advisors have helped design new
procurement procedures for Iraq's Oil Ministry. We developed
the technical specifications from which Iraq's State-owned oil
company will build new oil export platforms and underwater
pipelines worth over $1 billion.
In Baghdad, in the last 3 months, the municipality has
stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that
we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program
to clean the street.
Like so much else, Iraq's economy is fragile, the gains
reversible, and the challenges ahead, substantial. Iraq will
need to continue to improve governmental capacity past national
level, improve hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical
production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign
and domestic investment, create short- and long-term jobs, and
tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital
agricultural sector. We will be helping the Iraqis as they
tackle this challenging agenda, along with other international
partners including the U.N. and the World Bank.
In terms of regional and international dynamics, Mr.
Chairman, along with the security surge last year, we also
launched a diplomatic surge focused on enhancing U.N.
engagement in Iraq, anchoring the international compact with
Iraq, and establishing an expanded neighbors process which
serves as a contract group in support of Iraq.
The U.N. has taken advantage of an expanded mandate granted
to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to
increase the scope of its activities and the size of its staff.
Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role in
preparing for provincial elections, and in providing technical
assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has returned
international staff to Iraq to assist with the return of
internally displaced persons and refugees. The international
compact with Iraq provides a 5-year framework for Iraq to
reform its economy and achieve economic self-sufficiency in
exchange for long-overdue Saddam-era debt relief. Preparations
are underway for a ministerial-level compact meeting in Sweden
next month; 74 nations were represented at last year's
gathering in Egypt.
Iraq's neighbors also understand they have a major interest
in Iraq's future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting
of Iraq's neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host the third
meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq's
neighbors, these expanded Neighbor's Conferences also include
the permanent five members of the Security Council, the Arab
League, and the G-8.
Support from Arab capitals has not been strong, and must
improve for the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region.
Bahrain's recent announcement that it will return an Ambassador
to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab States should follow
suit. Iraq is a multi-ethnic state, but it is also a founding
member of the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab
world. Last month, Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab
Parliamentary Union, bringing the leaders of Arab parliaments
and consultative councils to Iraq for the first major inter-
Arab gathering since 1990. It was noteworthy that the meeting
was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, under the recently
redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable
prosperity and stability of Iraq's Kurdish region and the
presence of the Iraqi Federal State.
We hope that this event will encourage more active Arab
engagements with Iraq, and we expect Prime Minister Maliki's
effort against extremist Shiite militias in Basrah will receive
Arab support.
The presence of the Kurdistan Workers Party terrorist
organization in the remote mountains of Iraq along the Turkish
border has produced tension between Turkey and Iraq, and led to
a Turkish cross-border operation in February, including
movement of Turkish ground forces into Iraq.
At the same time, both governments are working to
strengthen their ties, and Iraqi President Talabani made a
successful visit to Turkey in March.
Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of
efforts to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit
Syria to Iraq, but others continue to cross the border. Syria
also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqis
insurgency. Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the
Iraqi Government to establish a stable, secure state through
the training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence
against ISFs, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians.
The extent of Iran's malign influence was dramatically
demonstrated when militia elements--armed and trained by Iran--
clashed with Iraqi Government forces in Basrah and Baghdad.
When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek and
destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know
more about those networks, and their Quds Force sponsors than
ever before, and we will continue to aggressively uproot and
destroy them.
At the same time, we support constructive relations between
Iran and Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to
discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to
make.
Looking ahead, Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq
is hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with
the damage and trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian
Baathist rule. But hard does not mean hopeless, and the
political and economic progress of the past few months is
significant.
These gains are fragile, however, and they are reversible.
Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood as well
as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is
worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the
Iraqis fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop
into a stable, secure, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy
under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is
ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will
continue to be critical.
I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in
Iraq. That is still the case, although I think we are closer. I
remain convinced that a major departure from our current
engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear with
ourselves about what failure would mean. Al Qaeda is in retreat
in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al Qaeda's leaders are
looking for every opportunity they can to hang on. Osama bin
Laden has called Iraq ''the perfect base,`` and it reminds us
that a fundamental aim of al Qaeda is to establish itself in
the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq, we cannot allow it
a second chance.
It is not only al Qaeda that would benefit. Iran has said
publicly, it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shiite
militias will re-assert themselves. We saw them try in Basrah
and Baghdad 2 weeks ago. In all of this, the Iraqi people would
suffer on a scale far beyond what we have already seen.
Spiraling conflict could draw in neighbors with devastating
consequences for the region and the world.
Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last 5
years have been in Iraq; Iraqis, Americans, and the world
ultimately will judge us far more on the basis of what will
happen, then what has happened. In the end, how we leave and
what we leave behind will be more important than how we came.
Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is
real, although still fragile, and we need to stay with it.
Mr. Chairman, in the months ahead, we will continue to
assist Iraq as it pursues further steps towards reconciliation
and economic development. Over time, this will become
increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be. Our efforts
will focus on increasing Iraq's integration, regionally and
internationally, assisting Iraqi institutions, locally and
nationally, to strengthen the political process, promote
economic activity, and support the U.N. as Iraq carries out
local elections toward the end of the year.
These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment
and support from Congress and the American people.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all of
those who serve our country in Iraq--military and civilian.
Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned
the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and
it is my honor to be there with them.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. We're going to have a 6-minute round of
questions.
General, after the brigade combat teams added by the surge
are removed in July, leaving somewhat more U.S. troops in Iraq
than before the surge. Nonetheless, you've recommended at that
time to your chain of command that there then be a 45-day
period of evaluation.
After that period, which takes us to September, you
recommend commencing a process of assessment and then, over
time, determine when you can make recommendations for further
reductions. Now, that is a clear, open-ended pause.
Forty-five days, first, to evaluate, and then you'll
commence a process of assessment. I'm not sure what the
difference between evaluation and assessment is, but then
there's some open-ended process of assessment. Over time, there
will be another determination.
Now, it seems to me, what you've given to your chain of
command is a plan which has no end to it. You do not use the
word, which Secretary Gates used twice, which is that it would
be a brief pause, and I assume that's intentional. Do you agree
with Secretary Gates that it will be a brief pause, or not? Do
you use the term brief?
General Petraeus. What Secretary Gates has described, as I
understand it, is a brief period of consolidation and
evaluation.
Chairman Levin. He used the term brief pause. He used the
term brief pause, General. At any rate, without going into
that; specifically, in February, he used the term brief pause.
But, you're not using the term brief, is that correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, I'm not using the word brief nor the
word pause. What I stated was a 45-day period for consolidation
and evaluation as to examine the situation on the ground, do
the battlefield geometry, consult with Ambassador Crocker on
what might be called the political-military calculus, and then
conduct the assessments. When the assessment is at a point that
the conditions are met to recommend reduction of forces, then
that's what we would do.
So, the bottom line, sir, is after this period in which we
do the assessments, and as the conditions are met for further
reductions, then we make those recommendations.
Chairman Levin. Do you have any estimate at all as to how
long that second period is going to take? Are you giving us any
idea as to how long that will take? You say ``over time.''
Could that be a month? Could that be 2 months?
General Petraeus. Sir, it could be less than that.
Chairman Levin. Could it be more than that?
General Petraeus. It could be more than that. Again, it's
when the conditions are met.
Chairman Levin. I understand.
General Petraeus. Then we can make a recommendation for
further reductions.
Chairman Levin. Could it be 3 months?
General Petraeus. Sir, again, at the end of the period of
consolidation and evaluation, it could be right then or it
could be longer. [Audience disturbance.]
Chairman Levin. General, we're going to ask you this
question again; could it be as long as 3 months?
General Petraeus. Sir, it could be.
Chairman Levin. Okay, that's all I'm asking.
General Petraeus. It is when the conditions are met.
Chairman Levin. I understand, but I just asked you a direct
question; could that be as long as 3 months?
General Petraeus. It could be, sir.
Chairman Levin. Could it be as long as 4 months?
General Petraeus. Sir, it is when the conditions are met,
again.
Chairman Levin. Now, next question; if all goes well, what
would be the approximate number of our troops there at the end
of the year? Let's assume conditions permitted things to move
quickly. What, in your estimate, would be the approximate
number of American troops there at the end of the year? Just
say if you can't give us an estimate.
General Petraeus. Right. Sir, I can't give you an estimate.
Chairman Levin. All right. You're not going to give us an
estimate on that.
Next question. General, an April 3 article in the New York
Times said that before the Iraqi Government's assault on the
Mahdi Army in Basrah, you counseled Prime Minister Maliki, ``We
made a lot of gains in the last 6 to 9 months that you'll be
putting at risk.''
The article also states that you advised him not to rush
into a fight without carefully sizing up the situation and
making adequate preparations. Now, did he follow your advice?
General Petraeus. Sir, he laid out a plan that would, in
fact, incorporate that advice.
Chairman Levin. He followed your advice, then?
General Petraeus. Once the forces got into Basrah, they
ended up going into action more quickly than was anticipated.
Chairman Levin. Would you say that Maliki followed your
advice?
General Petraeus. I would not. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. In your professional judgment, was the
Iraqi Government operation in Basrah properly and carefully
planned, and were the preparations adequate?
General Petraeus. Sir, there is no question but that it
could have been better planned, and that the preparations could
have been better. We've already done initial after-action
reviews on that, in fact, there and also in Baghdad.
Chairman Levin. I understand the report that came
afterward. But, I wonder if we could get a direct answer to my
question. Could you give me a direct answer? In your judgment
was the Iraqi Government operation in Basrah properly and
carefully planned, and were the preparations adequate? Could
you give me a direct answer?
General Petraeus. Sir, the answer is, again, it could have
been much better planned. It was not adequately planned or
prepared. Again, it was laid out to us, the objectives were
described, and in fact, the process as it was laid out was
logical, but I've not seen too many combat operations that have
gone as they were planned, and this was not one either.
The forces were deployed very rapidly, and before all
conditions were set, as they might have been, they were in
combat.
Chairman Levin. General, to summarize in terms of where I
think that testimony leads me to conclude--I will base my
statement on your testimony--it was inadequately planned, it
was inadequately prepared, it was followed by the use of
American troops on that kind of planning, and that is totally
unacceptable to me. I think that this open-ended pause that you
have recommended takes the pressure off Iraqi leaders to take
responsibility for their own country.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, again, news reports said that Prime
Minister Maliki only informed you shortly before the operation,
is that correct? In Basrah?
General Petraeus. It is, Senator. We had a heads up in a
Friday night meeting where we, in fact, were planning to
resource operations in Basrah on a longer-term basis. The
following Saturday, we had a meeting during which he laid out
the plan that he had to deploy forces. He laid out the
objectives, the lines of operations that he was going to
operate along, and stated that he was moving there on Monday,
himself.
Senator McCain. It was not something that you had
recommended.
General Petraeus. It was not something I recommended, no,
sir.
Senator McCain. News reports indicate that over 1,000 Iraqi
Army and Police deserted or underperformed during that
operation. This is 4 months after Basrah achieved provincial
Iraqi control, meaning that all provincial security had been
transferred to ISFs. What's the lesson that we're to draw from
that? That 1,000 Iraqi Army and Police deserted or
underperformed?
General Petraeus. What happened was, in one case, a brigade
that literally had just come out of Unit Set Fielding was
pressed into operation. The other lesson is a recurring one,
and that is the difficulty of local police operating in areas
where there is serious intimidation of themselves and of their
families.
Senator McCain. Suffice it to say, it was a disappointment.
General Petraeus. It was, although, it is not over yet,
Senator. In fact, subsequent to the early days, they then took
control of the security at the different ports, they continued
to carry out targeted raids, the operation is still very much
ongoing, and it is, by no means, over.
Senator McCain. The Green Zone has been attacked in ways
that it has not been for a long time, and most of that is
coming from elements that leave Sadr City, or from Sadr City
itself, is that correct?
General Petraeus. That's correct, Senator.
Senator McCain. What are we going to do about that?
General Petraeus. We have already taken control of the area
that was the principle launching point for a number of the 107-
millimeter rockets into Baghdad, and have secured that area.
Beyond that, again, ISFs are going to have to come to grips--
politically as well as militarily--with the issue of the
militia, and more importantly, the Special Groups.
Senator McCain. What do you make of Sadr's declaration of a
cease-fire?
General Petraeus. As with the cease-fire that was
proclaimed in the wake of the militia violence in Karbala in
August of last year, it is both to avoid further damage to the
image of the Sadr Movement which, of course, is supposed to
care for the downtrodden and, obviously, is a religiously-
inspired movement, but which has been hijacked, in some cases,
by militias. In fact, other elements have used it to cloak
their activities, as well.
If I could, Senator, also point out that along with the
operations in Basrah, there were operations in a number of
other provinces in Southern Iraq, all precipitated by this
outbreak in militia violence. In Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah,
Illa, Wasit, Dhi Qar and Muthanna, the ISFs actually did well,
and in some cases did very well and maintained security.
The same is true in Baghdad, although again, even there,
the performance was uneven in some cases.
Senator McCain. There are numerous threats to security in
Iraq. Do you still view AQI as a major threat?
General Petraeus. It is still a major threat, though it is
certainly not as major a threat as it was, say, 15 months ago.
Senator McCain. Certainly not an obscure sect of the
Shiites, overall?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Or Sunnis, or anybody else. Al Qaeda
continues to try to assert themselves in Mosul, is that
correct?
General Petraeus. It is, Senator. As you saw on the chart,
the area of operation of al Qaeda has been greatly reduced in
terms of controlling areas that it controlled as little as a
year and a half ago, but clearly, Mosul and Ninawa Province are
areas that al Qaeda is very much trying to hold on to. All
roads lead through the traditional capital of the north.
Senator McCain. They continue to be a significant threat?
General Petraeus. They do, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Ambassador Crocker, in your statement, you
talked about a long-term relationship with Iraq, such as a
security arrangement, diplomatic, economic, et cetera, that we
have with some 80 countries. You envision this after we succeed
in this conflict, is that correct? Would you talk a little bit
about that? Elaborate a little more?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir. I would actually envision it
as helping us to succeed in the conflict.
The effort will have two elements; one will be a Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA). That will be, as I said, approximately
like what we have with 80 other countries. It will have some
unique aspects to give our forces the authorities to continue
operations after the end of 2008.
There will also be a broader Strategic Framework Agreement,
first called for by the Iraqi leadership last August, and then
reflected in the Declaration of Principles that Prime Minister
Maliki and President Bush signed in November. This will cover,
in addition to security, the political, the economic, the
cultural, and the whole spectrum of our relations.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Finally, General Petraeus, Mosul continues to be a battle,
is that correct?
General Petraeus. It does, Senator.
Senator McCain. Who are the major adversaries in Mosul?
It's a mixed population?
General Petraeus. The major adversaries are AQI, Ansar al-
Suna, Jaish al-Mahdi, and some related Sunni extremist
organizations that all are allies of AQI.
Senator McCain. It was once said that al Qaeda cannot
succeed without control of Baghdad, and they can't survive
without control of Mosul, is that an oversimplification?
General Petraeus. A little bit, but not completely, sir.
Again, it would be a significant blow to al Qaeda and in fact,
the degree to which they're fighting reflects how much they
want to retain the amount of presence that they do have in the
greater Mosul area.
Senator McCain. Finally, I hope in response, because my
time is expired, could we talk a little bit more about the
Iranian threat, particularly their stepped up support of
various elements that are Shiite extremists in Iraq,
particularly the role they've played in Basrah, as well as the
southern part of the country? I've used up my time. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Thank you for your service.
Ambassador Crocker, listening to you talk about this
bilateral agreement with Iraq, I'm reminded that Secretary
Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``the agreement
will not contain a commitment to defend Iraq,'' but as long as
America maintains 10,000 troops there, there's little
distinction between a treaty.
He has indicated that, of course, in 1953, Congress
ratified the SOFA with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) as a treaty. We have 140,000 men and women over there,
so this isn't insignificantly different from those 84 other
countries, and I think the record's very clear. Are you in
agreement with what Secretary Gates has told this committee?
Just quickly, if you would, please?
Ambassador Crocker. I am, sir. It is our intention to
negotiate the SOFA as an executive agreement. We do not intend
to provide any binding commitments that would trigger the
advice and consent process with the Senate.
Senator Kennedy. Well, that's going to be another issue
that we're going to have to come back to.
So, you're not going to follow what has been done
previously by President Eisenhower. Even under President
Reagan, Congress approved agreements for the observer group in
the Sinai Desert. You're not going to follow their precedent?
Ambassador Crocker. We're going to keep Congress fully
informed. I understand there are some briefings scheduled for
the coming few days.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
In listening to the testimony this morning, General
Petraeus, it seems clear that the administration describes one
Iraq, while we see another. The President sees an Iraq in which
Iraqis want to make political accommodations, if only the
security would allow it, but most Americans see an Iraq in
which the premise of the President's policy has been proven
hopelessly wrong, and will continue to be wrong as long as the
commitment of our military remains open-ended.
The President sees an Iraq where progress is being made in
neighborhoods, villages, towns, and cities across Iraq. But
most Americans see an Iraq in which 4 million refugees have
been displaced from their homes, their homes have been
destroyed, neighborhoods ethnically cleansed, and overtaken by
militia.
The President and the Vice President describe an Iraq whose
oil would pay for the needs of its people, but most Americans
see an Iraq that is sitting on billions in oil revenues, while
the American taxpayer spends billions to fund Iraq's
reconstruction.
A year ago, the President argued that we wouldn't begin to
withdraw troops from Iraq because there was too much violence.
Now, the President argues we can't begin to withdraw troops
because violence is down. Whatever the conditions on the
ground, the President's arrows always point in the same
direction, to an open-ended commitment of our troops. American
people deserve to know when the arrows will finally point to an
exit from Iraq, and it's time to put the Iraqis on notice that
our troops will not remain forever, so they will take the
essential steps to resolve their differences.
Just to come back to a question that was asked earlier,
Americans want to know, after we have spent approximately $24
billion in training Iraqi troops in 5 years, when are these
forces going to be ready and willing to stand up and fight on
their own so that the Americans don't have to fight for them,
as we've seen with the 1,000 that effectively deserted or left
their units?
General Petraeus. Senator, they are fighting and, as I
mentioned, dying for their country in substantial numbers.
Their losses, again, are some three times our losses of late,
and I might add that the Sons of Iraq losses are between two
and a half and three times our losses in addition to that. So
they're very much fighting, and they are very much dying for
their country.
They have, indeed, taken on the security tasks in a
substantial number of provinces, and they are shouldering more
of the burden in a number of the others.
In Basrah, there were not just the units that didn't do
well, there were also units that did do well, and there were
also units that did do very well. This is tough, tough combat.
When forces are new and go into it, they do bow at times before
they steady. We saw that in Basrah and we saw that to some
degree in Baghdad.
Senator Kennedy. Well, of course, there's 4,000 Americans
that have died, as well, and 30,000 that have been wounded, as
well.
Now, you mentioned that the battle in Basrah was to take on
the criminals and extremists. Aren't we in there to battle al
Qaeda?
General Petraeus. Basrah, Senator, is a Shiite area, and it
has a small Sunni community.
Senator Kennedy. But we're over in Iraq to take on al
Qaeda, and here we have the Maliki Government moving in here to
battle inter-sectarian violence that's taking place, which many
believe can enhance the possibilities of civil war.
Let me ask you a question; were you at any meetings with
the Vice President, Ambassador Crocker, where the issue of the
Basrah invasion took place?
Ambassador Crocker. It was not discussed.
Senator Kennedy. It wasn't discussed at all during the Vice
President's visit to Baghdad? The possibility of Maliki going
into Basrah was not discussed? You were not at any meetings
where the Vice President was present, or where this was
discussed in his presence?
Ambassador Crocker. It was not discussed in any meeting I
attended, no, sir.
Senator Kennedy. General?
General Petraeus. Same, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, my time's up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I commend you for your public service, and I
mean that in a very sincere way. I've had the opportunity to
meet with you and work with you, in-country, and back here in
the continental limits of the United States.
I also want to say that I felt your statements were very
informative and strong and clear. It reflects your own
compassion for our forces, and you added the civilians who are
abroad, Mr. Ambassador, and their families here at home. I
should also like to add a word for all of those thousands and
thousands of Americans who are trying to care for the wounded,
and to provide compassion for their families.
I want to go back to your statements and frame a simple
question.
General, you said the following, ``With this approach, the
security achievements of 2007 and 2008 can form a foundation
for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq.
This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq,
it is also vitally important to the Gulf Region,'' and then you
added, parenthetically, ``to the citizens of the United
States.''
Mr. Ambassador, you said the following, ``Americans have
invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood, as well as treasure,
and they have the right to ask whether it's worth it.''
I would hope that you could frame a short message at the
moment, both of you, to the American people, in response to the
same question I asked of you last year, General. Is all of this
sacrifice bringing about a more secure America?
General Petraeus. I've thought more than a bit about that,
Senator, since September, and though I continue to think it's a
question perhaps best answered by folks with a broader view,
and ultimately will have to be answered by history, I obviously
have thoughts on it and on the importance of achieving our
objectives in Iraq.
Iraq has entailed a huge cost. Our men and women in uniform
have made enormous sacrifices, over 4,000 of them, the ultimate
sacrifice. The expenditure has been very substantial in
numerous other respects, including the strain on the overall
force and the opportunity costs in terms of not being able to
focus more elsewhere.
Having said that, there is no longer a ruthless dictator in
Iraq who threatened and invaded his neighbors, and who
terrorized his own people. Beyond that, the seeds of a nescient
democracy have been planted in an Arab country that was the
cradle of civilization. Though the germination of those seeds
has been anything but smooth, there has been growth.
All of this, again, has come at great cost. I recognize
that the overall weighing of the scales is more than difficult,
and believe it is best done at this point by someone up the
chain with a broader perspective. Ultimately, it can only be
answered by history once the outcome in Iraq is determined.
Having said all of that, I believe the more important
question at this point is how best to achieve our important
interests in Iraq. Interests that do have enormous
implications, as I mentioned, for the safety and security of
our country, 27 million Iraqis, the Mid-East region, and the
world with respect to al Qaeda, the spread of sectarian
conflict, Iranian influence, regional stability, and the global
economy.
I do believe that we have made important progress in Iraq
over the past year, and I believe the recommendations
Ambassador Crocker and I have provided are the best course to
achieve our important objectives in Iraq.
Senator Warner. My time on the clock is moving very
quickly, it was a fairly simple question. Does that translate
into greater security for those of us at home? I pointed out
this morning indications that up to 80 percent of the Americans
just don't accept the premise at this point in time that it's
worth it. Can you now, just in simple language, tell us, yes,
it is worth it? It is making us safer here at home?
General Petraeus. Senator, I do believe it is worth it, or
I would not have, I guess, accepted it. You do what you're
ordered to do, but you sometimes are asked whether you'd like
to or are willing to take on a task. I took on the task--the
privilege--of command of Multi-National Force-Iraq because I do
believe that it is worth it, and I do believe the interests
there are of enormous importance to our country, not just to
the people of Iraq and the people of that region and the world.
Senator Warner. Mr. Ambassador, how do you answer it? Is it
providing a greater security here at home?
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, I'll try and answer that at two
levels.
First, in the little over a year that I have been in Iraq,
we have seen a significant degradation of al Qaeda's presence
and its abilities. Al Qaeda is our mortal and strategic enemy.
So, to the extent that al Qaeda's capacities have been lessened
in Iraq, and they have been significantly lessened, I do
believe that makes America safer.
The second level at which I would try and answer that is
that Iraq remains a work in progress. I said in my statement
that I believe there has been significant progress. I believe
that it is worth continuing our efforts there, and I believe
very strongly that any alternative course of action to that
which we have laid out deserves the most careful scrutiny by
the American people and their representatives, because the
consequences could be extremely grave.
Senator Warner. Let me quickly ask a second question, if I
may. On the Strategic Framework Agreement, and SOFA, both very
important, you said, and I took this note, ``the strong
interests and benefits that flow to Iraq.'' Are we utilizing
this framework of negotiations to leverage a greater
acceleration, a greater momentum by the Iraqi Government
towards achieving the basic goals, be they legislative or
military?
Ambassador Crocker. I think the negotiations of the
Strategic Framework Agreement, which is the broad agreement
that covers political and economic and other aspects, will be
an opportunity to have that kind of discussion. Those talks are
not yet underway, we're awaiting the Iraqi decision on who
their negotiators will be on that. But I certainly see that as
an opportunity.
Senator Warner. To advance the reconciliation that is
needed, we all recognize that a military solution is not
possible here. It's only through a political one, and I look
upon these as an opportunity to say to the Iraqis, ``this is
your chance, if we want a greater momentum towards political
reconciliation.'' Can you tell us if that will be an element of
the negotiations?
Ambassador Crocker. It certainly would be my intention to
make it so in the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement.
Senator Warner. I thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General and Ambassador, thank you for your extraordinary
service in the cause of freedom in Iraq.
I must say, your testimony is encouraging and yet quite
realistic, and in my opinion, not overstated. You've told us
that the strategy associated with the surge is working,
progress has been made, but it's entirely reversible, you've
been very frank about some of the problems that we still face.
I say what I'm about to say with respect to my colleagues
who have consistently opposed our presence in Iraq. As I hear
the questions and the statements today, it seems to me that
there's a kind of hear no progress in Iraq, see no progress in
Iraq, and most of all, speak of no progress in Iraq. The fact
is there has been progress in Iraq, thanks to extraordinary
efforts by the two of you, and all of those who serve under you
on our behalf.
I wish we could come to a point where we could have an
agreement on the facts that you are presenting to us; the
charts you've shown, the military progress, the extraordinary
drop in ethno-sectarian violence, the drop in civilian deaths,
the drop in American deaths, and the very impressive political
progress in Iraq since last September.
Hey, let's be honest about this, the Iraqi political
leadership has achieved a lot more political reconciliation and
progress since September than the American political leadership
has. So, we have to give some credit for that.
I repeat, I wish we could have an agreement on the facts
which you've presented. You work for us. I don't distrust those
facts, and I wish we could go from an agreement on those facts,
to figure out how we can move to more success so we can bring
more of our troops home. Now, that's apparently not going to
happen in the near future.
I want to ask you a question about Iran, because both of
you have spoken with grave seriousness about the continuing
Iranian threat. Senator Kennedy asked a question about the
Iraqi Government initiative in Southern Iraq, and said there
was no al Qaeda there, as you said, General Petraeus, there is
no al Qaeda there. But there are Iranian-backed Special Forces
that, from what you've told us today, continue to threaten what
is our real goal, in Iraq, which is not just to defeat al
Qaeda, it's to help stand up a self-governing, self-defending
Iraqi Government.
Let me ask you first, are the Iranians still training and
equipping Iraqi extremists who are going back into Iraq and
killing American soldiers?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator. In fact, we
have detained individuals, 4 of the 16 so-called master
trainers, for example, are in our detention facility. You may
recall that last year we detained the head of the Special
Groups, and also the Deputy Commander of the Lebanese Hezbollah
Department 2800, which is working with the Iranian Quds Force
to train, equip, fund, and also direct these Special Groups.
The Special Groups' activities have, in fact, come out in
greater relief during the violence of recent weeks. It is they
who have the expertise to shoot rockets more accurately, shoot
mortars more accurately, and to employ some of the more
advanced material--the explosively-formed projectiles and the
like--that have not just killed our soldiers, and Iraqi
soldiers, but also have been used to assassinate two Southern
Governors in past months.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Petraeus. Two Southern Police Chiefs.
So they are a serious concern. I believe that this was
brought out in greater relief for the Iraqi Government, as
well, because they have conveyed directly to their Iranian
interlocutors their concerns about the activities of the Quds
Force with the Special Groups, and recognize the very clear
threat that they present to security in Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say that the Iranian-
backed Special Groups in Iraq are responsible for the murder of
hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi soldiers
and civilians?
General Petraeus. It certainly is, I do believe that is
correct. Again, some of that also is militia elements who have
then subsequently been trained by these individuals, but
there's no question about the threat that they pose, and again,
about the way that has been revealed more fully in recent
weeks.
Senator Lieberman. Ambassador Crocker, picking up on
something General Petraeus just said, though we all have
questions about the recent Iraqi Government initiative under
Prime Minister Maliki's leadership in the south, in Basrah, is
it not possible that there's something very encouraging about
that initiative, which is that it represents a decision by the
Maliki Government in Baghdad to not tolerate the Iranian-backed
militias, essentially running wild, and trying to control the
south of his country?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, that's an excellent question.
As I look at the Basrah operation, I look at it through a
political lens, obviously, more than I can a military lens.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ambassador Crocker. General Petraeus has described some of
the military's perspectives of that. The political
ramifications, I think, are distinctly more positive because
that is exactly the signal that the operation has sent within
Iraq and, one would hope, in the region, that this Iraqi
Government is prepared to go after extremist militia elements,
criminal elements, of whatever sectarian identity they may be.
I know, for example, that ISFs are simultaneously engaged
now in Basrah against Iranian-backed Shiite extremists, and are
engaged in Mosul against al Qaeda and its Iraqi supporters. I
think that is important.
The reflection of that has been seen in the level of
political unity behind the Prime Minister.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ambassador Crocker. I mean, there was the meeting of the
Political Council of National Security on Saturday, and this
brings together the President, the two Vice Presidents, the
Speaker, the two Deputy Speakers of parliament, the Prime
Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the heads of all major
parliamentary blocks. They unanimously developed a 15-point
statement that included support for the Prime Minister in these
efforts; it called for the disarming and an elimination of all
militia elements, and it had a strong message, warning of
outside interference in Iraq's affairs.
So I think these are all highly positive developments that
the government can continue to build on as it moves ahead with
the other elements of the reconciliation agenda.
Again, I can't predict that this will take us to a new
level in Iraq, but it is, from a political perspective,
distinctly encouraging.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All of us feel so strongly about the valor of our young
troops. I will be attending a funeral at Arlington at 3 o'clock
today for a Staff Sergeant, Christopher Hake, from Enid, OK. I
just gave a tribute to him on the floor. There's so many others
who are truly heroes. I think we need to keep repeating that,
and reminding ourselves of the great service that they're
performing.
Let me just ask a couple of questions on the detainee
issue, I don't think that's come up yet. I know that some on
the far left are going to try to paint a picture that the
United States of America and our troops are somehow brutal and
torturing detainees, and I think this is something that is
going to be coming back, and they're going to try to make
people believe this, yet it's not true. I recognize, initially,
like Abu Ghraib, there's some that did not perform well, but
after that, that act has been cleaned up.
I just got back from, I think my 14th trip in that area,
but I was very careful to go to Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca,
these are the largest detainee facilities that are there.
Lieutenant General Stone, I think, has done an outstanding
job there, General Petraeus, and he was good enough to let me
have a free hand to go through both of these facilities.
In doing so, I had an interpreter, and actually had
interviews with some of these detainees, asking each one of
them the question, ``Have you ever been abused, mistreated?'' I
got nothing but positive answers. In fact, they were very, very
positive toward us.
I'd like to have you make any comments you might make
concerning the progress that's been made in the way that the
detainees are treated.
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, there's been enormous
change for the better in the detainee facilities. One focus, in
fact, was to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the
detainee facilities. In other words, you cannot allow the
irreconcilables to be with the reconcilables. You have to get
the talk fury out of these large compounds, which you saw, of
hundreds of detainees, and not allow them to prosthelitize,
intimidate, and to take out physical abuse of their fellow
detainees who don't willingly go with them and in fact, to
avoid a situation where you have a training ground for the
terrorist camp of 2008 or 2009.
We separated the irreconcilables, we are now providing
education, there's always been good healthcare, good food, and
good conditions. Also, in fact, to the point that there are
over 100 who have actually requested to stay on in detention
after their actual time was up, after their Reintegration
Review Board, because they wanted to complete either job
training or civilian education or some of the religious
training that is offered in these facilities.
Again, this has been an enormous change, and General Stone
and his team have done wonderful work in this regard. It has
resulted, most importantly, in a recidivism rate, a return to
Bucca or Cropper, if you will, that is very, very small
compared with what it used to be. We track that because we have
the biometrics on each of the individuals who have been in our
facilities.
So, it's an enormous shift, it is something we are trying
to capture in our doctrinal manuals so that we can continue to
build on this, and to perform detainee operations in a much
enhanced way over what was done before.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, that was my observation.
Ambassador Crocker, in your opening statement, you referred
to, I believe, Ahmadinejad making the statement that, if
something happens where we leave precipitously that there would
be a vacuum, and he would fill that vacuum. You didn't take
much time after that to say what would happen. Either one of
you want to comment on what would happen if they were to fill
that vacuum?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I think the developments in
Baghdad and Basrah over the last couple of weeks have been very
instructive on a number of levels. I commented on one of them
in response to Senator Lieberman's question. It is also very
important in what it shows us of what Iran is doing. Because
the general level of violence is down, we could see, I think,
much more sharply defined, what Iran's role is in the arming
and equipping of these extremist militia groups.
What it tells me is that Iran is pursuing, as it were, a
Lebanization strategy; using the same techniques they used in
Lebanon to co-opt elements of the local Shiite community, and
use them as basically instruments of Iranian force. That also
tells me, sir, that in the event of a precipitous U.S.
withdrawal, the Iranians would just push that much harder.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, they said they would do that.
Last question here, as you well know, down at Camp Bucca,
that's real close to Basrah where all of this was taking place,
and I was there right after that took place. I'm a little
confused, there's a lot of criticism over the way they
performed. According to our troops over there, they were real
pleased that they came in when they did with their troops and
demonstrated very clearly that they're willing to take on that
responsibility.
The impression I got from the troops that were there is
that the Iraqis did what they should do, and they performed
very well.
General Petraeus. Sir, I don't want to overstate the
performance. However, the Iraqi people down there, by and
large, were grateful for the action by the ISFs, by the
decision that Prime Minister Maliki took to, in fact, confront
militia, criminals, gangs, or whatever it might be.
In fact, as I mentioned, the operation is by no means
complete. It is continuing, it continues to grow on a much more
deliberate basis, instead of the fairly more rapid sudden basis
in which it was started, and where there was some faltering at
the beginning, as I mentioned.
They now control the different ports, for example, they
control some key areas through which smuggling of weapons, as
well as other contraband used to go. So, again, I'm not
surprised to hear that comment.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, okay. My time's expired. But for the
record, I'd like to kind of get your opinion as to where we are
right now in the numbers, the sheer numbers of the ISFs. It's
my understanding we're at about 140,000 now, we want to get up
to around 190,000, but maybe a status, for the record.
General Petraeus. I'd be happy to.
[The information referred to follows:]
The total number of assigned Iraqi security forces as of April 30,
2008, is 561,963. This includes forces in the Ministry of Interior, the
Ministry of Defense, and the Counterterrorism Bureau in the categories
listed in the below table.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, do you believe that the Mahdi Army will
voluntarily disband and disarm at the request of the Prime
Minister?
General Petraeus. Sir, some elements of the Mahdi Army
could be incorporated into legitimate employment and other
legitimate activities.
Now, standing down at the direction of the Prime Minister
is something that would undoubtedly result in violence.
However, as you may have seen recently, Muqtada al-Sadr has
said that he would stand down the force at the request of the
marjiya, the senior Shiite clerics in Najaf. We're just going
to have to see how that plays out in the months ahead.
Senator Reed. But, unless he is instructed by the senior
Shiite clergy, he would likely resist that which would lead, in
your words, to accelerated violence within the Shiite
community.
General Petraeus. It depends, again, how it's done,
Senator. If you can do this gradually over time, with the force
in the background that is capable of taking out action and
providing alternatives.
The key here is actually providing some other means of
livelihood. The same problem that we had in a number of the
different Sunni communities that were in the grip of al Qaeda.
Senator Reed. Well, after the attack in Basrah, where the
Prime Minister committed to destroy these elements, and then he
had to withdraw, I think this is less of an employment problem
than an existential problem of political survival, one or the
other. In those terms, unless there's a voluntary compliance by
the Mahdi Army, the alternatives for violence seem to be quite
significant.
Let's assume that's the case; will you participate with
your military forces in supporting the government?
General Petraeus. First of all, there is some voluntary
standing down already, Senator. A number of the Sadr political
leaders, in fact, have been engaging, and do not want to bring
the violence.
Everyone has looked into the abyss and said, ``This does
not look good, let's step back and let's see if there is some
alternative that can be followed.''
Senator Reed. What's the alternative?
General Petraeus. The alternative is the incorporation in
the political process, and over time, providing some avenue for
these young men to participate in the economy, and so forth.
That has actually worked in a number of neighborhoods.
Senator Reed. Like?
General Petraeus. Like West Rasheed and a variety of
southern communities.
Senator Reed. I think that's the same dilemma, and it's
been a dilemma now for a year or more with respect to the Sons
of Iraq where they're still being paid by us, and they're now
being assumed, at least 60,000 of them, into the apparatus of
the state of Iraq.
General Petraeus. Over, actually, it's well over 20,000
now, Senator.
Senator Reed. Sixty thousand have still not been?
General Petraeus. I believe it's over 90,000 actually that
are on the rolls right now, and that will either be
transitioned between 20 and 30 percent to the ISFs, and the
issue there is often illiteracy and/or physical disability.
Then the Iraqi Government has pledged funds, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, to retraining programs, to education
programs, and to other job employment programs.
Senator Reed. So I can assume you and the Ambassador are
giving advice to Maliki to go slow, to incorporate the Mahdi
Army into the economy and political life of Iraq over many
months. Is that the advice you're giving him? Or are you giving
him any advice at all that seems to contradict what he tried to
do in Basrah?
General Petraeus. Basrah did go much more suddenly than we
expected, Senator. There's no two ways about it.
Senator Reed. Okay.
General Petraeus. In fact, the report is a good account, I
think that it is accurate to say that he thought perhaps it
would be a bit more like when he went to Karbala back last year
and the sheer presence and so forth would be adequate. That was
clearly not the case in Basrah.
Now, in Basrah what has to be done, and they have just
announced, for example, a $100 million program to begin
addressing these kinds of issues and to get some alternatives
to the young men down there to toting a gun on a street corner.
Senator Reed. It seems to me that Basrah illustrated the
ultimate conflict between Sadr and Maliki, and the elected
government. That's a conflict they tried to resolve militarily.
They failed because the military forces failed, and because
people got very nervous that it was spinning out of control.
But that ultimate conflict is still there, it's the existential
conflict with respect to the Shiite community, and the
potential violence in my mind, it's very real, and we'll be
engaged somehow, either on the sidelines watching or swept up
in it.
Let me switch to the Ambassador for a moment.
Mr. Ambassador, is the Mahdi Army the only Shiite
organization that is receiving assistance, cooperation, and has
significant contacts on a routine basis with the Iranians?
Ambassador Crocker. I don't think so, Senator.
Senator Reed. Who else might be having that kind of
contact? If not military training, then a dialogue, money
moving back and forth for other reasons?
Ambassador Crocker. Those are two different aspects, and
I'll address them separately.
There are other militia groups down in Basrah. One militia
organization is called Thar-Allah, The Vengeance of God, whose
leader, incidentally, is now in detention. They almost
certainly get support from Iran, as does something called Iraqi
Hezbollah. That does not necessarily imply a connection to
Lebanese Hezbollah, but again, an extremist militia.
Iran has used the tactic as we've seen in Lebanon.
Senator Reed. Would that include the Isqi elements, Badr
Brigade?
Ambassador Crocker. I'd put that in the second category.
Iran has a dialogue with----
Senator Reed. Everyone?
Ambassador Crocker. Everyone.
Senator Reed. In the Shiite community.
Ambassador Crocker. Right.
Senator Reed. It's a mutual dialogue.
Ambassador Crocker. Not just the Shiite community.
Senator Reed. No.
Ambassador Crocker. What has happened with the Supreme
Council and Badr is that they've basically gotten out of the
overt militia business, it's now the Badr Organization. Many of
its elements did integrate with the ISFs.
Senator Reed. Thank you, my time's expired. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to thank both of you for your service. General
Petraeus, I know this is your third year in Iraq. You've given
your great abilities and commitment to our country because you
were asked to serve, and you've done so excellently and
progress has been made. When, a little over a year ago, you
were confirmed here to go there, I think there was a feeling
that we needed to give General Petraeus a chance one more time.
The numbers show that you have made extraordinary progress, it
seems to me.
I asked you at that time, when things looked rather grim, I
asked you, did you believe that we had a realistic chance to be
successful in Iraq, and you said you did, or you wouldn't take
the job.
After this period of time there, now, a little over a year,
how would you evaluate our prospects for success today?
General Petraeus. As I said, Senator, in my statement,
there are innumerable challenges in Iraq in the way ahead, but
I do believe that we have made progress, and I also believe
that we can make further progress if we are able to move
forward, as I've recommended.
Senator Sessions. I just wanted to thank you for an
extraordinary demonstration of military leadership, and also I
think we would share an affirmation of the American military
who, under difficult circumstances, have performed so
magnificently. To see us move from a time when I think this
country was deeply concerned about our prospects in Iraq, to a
period where we're seeing real progress, and I think we should
listen to you about how to enhance that progress. Because this
is a policy of the United States of America, it's a policy we
voted on by three-fourths of both Houses of Congress, and we're
making progress towards success, and we need to listen to those
who helped get us there, about how we can maintain it.
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, I am curious about
this activity, the action in Basrah and the south, when Prime
Minister Maliki sent troops there. I appreciate your comments
to Senator Lieberman, Ambassador Crocker, about the fact that
there seems to be in that action a demonstration that the
central government is willing to take on Shiite extremists,
even though they are, at base, a Shiite-supported government.
So, they're taking on, in some sense, some of their own base
support, that many on this panel, over the months, have
complained they're not willing to do. It seems to me that they
did do that.
Now, it does appear that they could have been more
effective, perhaps, with better planning. But does this suggest
that a significant event has occurred? Is Prime Minister Maliki
developing some confidence now? Does his government see itself
as a national Government of Iraq and is prepared to use
military force to defend the concept of the country of Iraq? Is
that an important thing that's happened here?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I believe it is. That
certainly is the reaction that we're seeing from Iraq's
political leadership. I was in intensive contact with them
during this period before our departure, as was General
Petraeus, and the change in tone from other leaders toward the
Prime Minister and his government is marked. They do see him as
taking a strong stand against illegal elements without regard
to their sectarian identity, and that has had enormous impact
on the Sunnis, on the Kurds, as well as other Shiites.
So, I'm pretty cautious about labeling defining moments or
watersheds. In fact I'm real cautious, and I certainly won't
call what we've seen there, that. That will be visible only in
retrospect. But, I do think it is important.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, the American military
is just magnificent in after-action reports, analyzing what
went wrong brutally honestly. Are the Iraqis actually
evaluating what they did in Basrah, and do you think there's
any prospects that they've learned from that?
General Petraeus. In fact, we've already run an after-
action review, or they ran an after-action review, actually, in
Baghdad, based on the actions in Baghdad at the same time.
Most of the participants in Basrah are still engaged in
operations, and we will get to an after-action review with
them, although we've done a macro-level one, obviously, with
some pretty basic conclusions about the need for a more
deliberate setting of conditions. That's the kind of approach
that we take to set conditions, if you will, before you conduct
an operation, and those conditions, in this case, were not as
deliberately set as they might have been.
Senator Sessions. Finally, with regard to Iranian
influence, how would you describe the situation in Basrah, in
the south, in the Shiite community? How is that influenced by
Iran, and to what extent has Iran been strengthened or weakened
as a result of this military action?
General Petraeus. The bulk of the weaponry certainly came
from Iran Senator. Again, they're very signature items that you
see in the hands of the Special Groups, and of some of their
militia allies; the explosively-formed projectiles, 107-
millimeter rockets, and a variety of other items. We have seen
those all repeatedly.
As to Iran's strengthening, or not, I think again, this is
still very much ongoing. At the end of the day, Iran clearly
played a role as an arbiter, if you will, for talks among all
of the different parties to that particular action. Whether
that strengthened them, or also made them realize that their
actions have been destructive in helping a country they want to
succeed, presumably the first Shiite-led democracy, whether
that gives them a good sense, or causes them also to draw back,
I think, is very much in question right now.
The Ambassador might have a view on that.
Ambassador Crocker. It's not something I could really give
a definitive response to, but I would point out some things
that are important to watch.
The militia actions, by and large, were very unpopular
among Iraqis, and that is why the Prime Minister has gotten
such broadbased political support. It is universally known or
believed that the Iranians were behind them, so that
unhappiness descends on them a bit, too.
I think one might look for a reconsideration in Tehran, as
to just where they want to go in Iraq, because over the long
term, as General Petraeus suggests, their interests, I think,
are best served by the success of this state and this
government. No country, other than Iraq itself, suffered more
under Saddam Hussein than did Iran with that brutal 8-year war.
So, they should be thinking strategically, and the reaction to
the militias they support, I would hope would lead them to do
that.
I note the statement by the Iranian government today
actually condemning the indirect fire attacks on the
international zone. I'm not sure what to make of it at this
point, but it does underscore that Iranian influence in Iraq,
while malign and destabilizing, is limited. Iraq is, in its
essence, an Arab nation. Iraqi Shiite, Arab Shiite, died by the
hundreds of thousands in the Iran/Iraq war defending their Arab
state of Iraq against an Iranian enemy.
So there are some constraints on Iran, and this would be an
excellent time for them to reassess what is ultimately in their
own long-term interests.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General and Mr. Ambassador, I want to express my deep
gratitude and appreciation for your service to our country, and
also that of our military personnel who have served so well
there.
General, the Army has been operating with a 15-to-12
deployment to home station ratio for some time now, and has
indicated its desire to immediately shift to a 1-to-1 ratio,
and if possible to a 1-to-2 ratio.
Part of the effort to achieve these numbers has been the
increase in Army end strength. But these forces will not be
available for deployment for some time. In the new to medium
term, especially if a decision is made to freeze further troop
withdrawals, the strain on equipment, on our forces, and on
their families, as well, will continue.
My question to you, General, is it your understanding that
most of the soldiers that will return for subsequent
deployments to Iraq are getting about 6 months quality time
with their families over a 3\1/2\ year period?
General Petraeus. My expectation would have been that it
would be more than that, Senator. There's no question that
there are individuals who are in their third tour in Iraq since
it began, but they happen to be individuals that either stayed
in a unit that did just cycle back through, did not go off to
another assignment in the Army somewhere, didn't go off to a
school, or what-have-you.
Again, the Army would be the one best to answer what the
average dwell time is across the force. There's no question
that certain individuals in certain units, if they have stayed
in those units over time, may now be on their third tour in
Iraq. There's no question, as well, that a 15-month tour is
very, very difficult on a soldier and on a family. As I
mentioned, the strain on the force is something that I very
much took into account when I recommended the continuation of
the drawdown of the surge, and the way ahead, as well.
I might note that there is something very special to
soldiers about doing what they are doing, however. The 3rd
Infantry Division in Iraq right now on its third tour. You'll
recall that it spearheaded the advance to Baghdad in the very
beginning, in the liberation of Iraq, and is now back for its
third tour. That division just met its reenlistment goal for
the entire year at about the halfway mark in this fiscal year.
So, despite how much we are asking of our young men and
women in uniform, they do recognize both the importance of what
they're doing, and I guess this very intangible of being part
of the brotherhood of the close fight, if you will, which is
truly unique and special. They have continued to raise their
right hand to volunteer.
We are very concerned about one subset of the population,
and that is the young captains, of whom we've asked a great
deal, as well, and that is one that the Army is looking very
hard at.
I'm personally keenly aware of the stress. I have actually,
with respect, been deployed now for 4\1/2\ years, since 2001,
on operations alone, not to mention training and other
activities. There's no question about the toll that it takes,
and the challenges that it presents, not just to the soldiers,
but to their families.
Senator Akaka. General, given your perception of the
security conditions in Iraq, how long before you feel we will
be able to meet the Army's desired dwell ratio?
General Petraeus. Sir, again, that has to be a question for
the Army. I don't know their force generation plans, what their
projections are for the bringing on of additional brigade
combat teams. I know that their initial goal is to try to get
back to a 12-month deployment. I'd certainly support that, but
they're the ones that are the generators of the force, not me.
Senator Akaka. General, as chairman of the Readiness and
Management Subcommittee, I am especially concerned that
testimony that comes from combatant commanders outside of the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) indicate that operations in Iraq
are affecting the readiness of their forces to be able to both
train for and meet potential crises in their respective areas
of operation.
A recent deterioration of relations between North and South
Korea highlight the increased risks borne by the United States,
should that situation continue to worsen to the point that
military involvement is required.
Additionally, the Commission on the National Guard and
Reserves testified that due to the high operations tempo of our
Reserve Forces there is an ``appalling gap'' in readiness for
Homeland Defense. Clearly there is widespread agreement in the
Defense Department that this level of U.S. troop commitment is
unsustainable.
In your view, General, at what point must the military, in
effect, hand over the majority of security responsibilities to
the Iraqis so that the burden can be more equitably shared
between our two countries, so that we can begin the reset of
our forces, that is so long overdue?
General Petraeus. Senator, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, there are already many multiples of ISFs serving in
the Iraqi Police, Border Police, Army, small Air Force, Navy,
and so forth. In fact, it is ISFs who are the cops on the beat,
who are performing a vast number of tasks.
To be sure, our forces still have the unique capabilities
in certain areas, when going against al Qaeda and other
extremist elements, and obviously we have the enablers; air
support, and some logistical capabilities and others, that the
Iraqis do not yet have, but are working on.
In fact, one item during Basrah was that their C-130 fleet
ferried an awful lot of the supplies and casualties to and from
Baghdad and Basrah. So, again, they are gradually, slowly
expanding.
By the way, they want to buy U.S. C-130s, and have asked to
be able to buy the C-130J more quickly than, I think, the
original response has been that it would be available.
So they are already shouldering an enormous burden. It is
being handed to them, more all the time. But clearly, as we
have seen, they need assistance in a number of different areas,
and that's what we are providing.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General, 4\1/2\ years of deployment truly represents
extraordinary sacrifice, and I want to begin my comments by
thanking you and Ambassador Crocker for your service. It's been
courageous, it's been extraordinary.
General, for years this committee has heard that progress
is being made in the training and equipping of Iraqi forces.
Each year, military commanders come before us, and they tell us
that Iraqi troops are becoming more and more capable. Today,
for example, you testified that the number of combat battalions
capable of taking the lead in operations has grown to well over
100.
Success always seems to be just around the corner when it
comes to training and equipping of Iraqi forces. Yet, when put
to the test, the Iraqi forces have performed very unevenly, and
it's very disturbing to me to read the press reports that more
than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers refused to fight, fled, or abandoned
their positions during the battle in Basrah.
Ultimately, as the Ambassador has said this morning, the
fate of Iraq is up to the Iraqi people. My concern is, as long
as we continue to take the lead in combat operations, rather
than transitioning to more limited missions, the Iraqis are
never going to step up to the plate and fight for their
country.
So my question to you is, why should American troops
continue to take the lead in combat operations at this point,
after years of training and equipping the Iraqi forces? After
spending tens of billions of dollars on training and equipping
of Iraqi forces?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, in Basrah, we did
not take the lead. Basrah is a Province that is under Iraqi
control, the sovereign Iraqi Prime Minister made a decision to
confront a challenge. It was not just a political challenge,
this is a militia gang--criminals who were threatening the
population. He then deployed forces very rapidly, frankly, more
rapidly than we thought they could deploy. Over the course of a
week, the Iraqis deployed the combat elements of a division.
Then they moved very rapidly into combat operations, again,
too rapidly, most likely, without setting all of the proper
conditions and so forth.
But they were in the lead. We did provide some close air
support, attack helicopters. We augmented their C-130 fleet,
their helicopters were also ferrying in and out of Basrah, as
well, but we clearly did provide a number of enablers. They do
not yet have ISR platforms, they don't have counter-fire radar,
they don't have a sufficiently robust expeditionary logistics
structure, they do now provide their own logistics at their own
bases, at their own police academies, and all of the rest of
that. But again, taking the next step is doing it after you've
deployed the better part of a division's worth of combat
forces; two brigades within about 36 hours of notification,
another later in that week.
They are actually taking the lead in Anbar Province in a
number of different places. There's a guiding hand there, but
one of the largest reductions in the reduction of surge forces
will come in Anbar, which you'll recall, of course, in the fall
of 2006 was assessed as lost, and then through the awakening,
through the combat operations, additional forces, and so forth,
Iraqi, as well as coalition, over time, it has become the
province that is actually relatively peaceful, and actually on
the road toward prosperity.
Again, it is a process, rather than a light switch, and
when the going has gotten tough, or where it requires more
sophisticated application of force, we have had to help them
out.
Senator Collins. But 1,000 troops?
General Petraeus. It's 1,000 out of I don't know how many
tens of thousands, actually, were there. Confronted by very,
very tough militia elements, and in fact, because of the
position into the forces where they were able to get
overwhelmed by larger groups of the militia, put them into an
untenable situation. So, I'm not in the least bit apologizing
for them, but I do see the situation they were confronted with,
because of the speed with which they went into action, was
very, very difficult for any troopers.
What I would point to is that in other provinces where we
have virtually no presence, or perhaps a Special Forces A Team,
such as in Karbala Province, in Najaf, in Illa, in Nasiriyah,
and others in the south where, because of the operations in
Basrah, there were also outbreaks of militia violence. In those
areas the Iraqis proved equal to the task, and in fact, were
able to maintain security.
The same with varying levels in certain areas of Baghdad.
Senator Collins. Ambassador, in 2003, several of us
proposed that the reconstruction aid to Iraq be structured as a
loan rather than a grant. You may recall that debate. We didn't
prevail. Now, we look at $100 a barrel oil, an Iraqi budget
that was predicated on $50 a barrel oil, and the Iraqis, sir,
are clearly reaping a windfall from the higher oil prices.
You mentioned that the era of our paying for major
reconstruction is over. But we're continuing to pay the
salaries of the Sons of Iraq, in many cases, we're continuing
to pay for the training and equipping of Iraqi forces. I'm told
that we're even continuing to pay for fuel within Iraq.
Isn't it time for the Iraqis to start bearing more of those
expenses, particularly in light of a windfall of revenues, due
to the high price of oil?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, it is. That is something that
both General Petraeus and I are engaged on.
We've had several discussions with the Prime Minister, for
example, on the importance or the need for the Government of
Iraq to pick up the funding for employment projects, and he
agrees. So, we're working out the ways to do this.
I think what we have to focus on in the period ahead is
transitioning. It will be, like everything else in Iraq, a
complex process. What do they have the capacity to do, how do
they get the capacity to do it? But, I think that's clearly the
direction, not only should we move in, but that we are moving
in.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have a series of questions. If I don't finish
them now, I will have an opportunity to continue this afternoon
in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Please understand my
comments, my questions, it is with a great deal of respect and
deference to the two of you, and appreciation for your service
to our country.
Now, I want to frame my questions within the context of
more than a year ago. Because the whole idea that you all
presented to us was that the military surge would stabilize the
situation so that the environment would be created in order for
us to have political reconciliation over there.
Indeed, January a year ago, in 2007, Secretary Gates said
that he thought that by March 2007, or about 3 months after he
testified, he said that he would know whether or not the surge
was working. Well, of course, that time came and went. Then,
one of those times you were in front of us, General, I don't
remember if it was in your confirmation hearing or if it was
one of the reports that you gave back to us, you testified that
the surge was necessary for political reconciliation.
Now, I heard some disturbing testimony last week in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from two retired generals.
One, retired Lieutenant General Odom, who said, ``Violence has
been temporarily reduced, but today there is credible evidence
that the political situation is thus far more fragmented.''
Then he went on to talk about Basrah, and so forth.
Then retired four-star General McCaffrey; in response to my
question about what's your degree of optimism or pessimism,
this is what he says, ``It's a hell of a mess. I mean, there's
just no way about it. It's a $600 billion war, 34,000 killed
and wounded. We've alienated most of the global population, the
American people don't support the war, and the Iraqi
Government's dysfunctional. The ISFs are inadequate, ill-
equipped, and we have very little time--by the way, I'm not
recommending that we come out of Iraq in a year or 3--but
that's what's going to happen. This thing is over. So, the
question is how do we stage as we come out.'' Continuing, this
is General McCaffrey, ``and you have to, at some point, hit the
civil war in the direction of somebody who's more likely to
govern Iraq effectively than the current, incoherent,
dysfunctional regime that's in power.''
So, I go back to the original predicate with which we
talked about the surge. Has the political reconciliation
happened?
General?
General Petraeus. As the Ambassador laid out, there has
been agreement among the different political parties on a
number of pieces of important reconciliation, if you will, laws
that represent reconciliation. Among them is, in fact, the de-
Baathification reform, there's also the Provincial Powers Law,
there is a Pensions Reform bill that is little noticed, but
actually extends pension rights to tens of thousands of Iraqis
who were shut out because of de-Baathification.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's a step in the right direction.
Now, the question is: have those laws been implemented?
General Petraeus. I believe that the Pensions Law is,
again, in the process of being implemented. Again, de-
Baathification, they're collecting the information for that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Have those laws been implemented to
the point that we can see in Iraq that there is this political
reconciliation which is the goal in the first place, coming
back to over a year ago, of the surge?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, if I might, I noted in my
testimony when I talked about these laws, that obviously how
they are implemented is going to be key. The Amnesty Law, part
of the legislative package passed in the middle of February, is
being implemented 24,000 applications for amnesty received, and
about 17,000 approved. That's actually moved out at pretty
impressive speed.
The Provincial Powers Law comes into effect after the
forthcoming provincial elections. It does not apply to the
current provincial councils. The one important step it did
foreshadow is an electoral law to set the conditions for those
elections, that is actively being pursued within the Council of
Ministers, and it's a process, incidentally, where we're
involved at Iraqi Government request, as well as the U.N., to
help them get it right, particularly with respect to the role
of women in these elections.
So there is a lot to be done, Senator, but they have passed
the laws, and in several cases, particularly the amnesty law,
we see them moving out pretty rapidly.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you think we are moving toward
political reconciliation?
Ambassador Crocker. I think the various elements I
mentioned in my statement--both the national-level legislation,
the way parliament works, because there was a lot of cross-
block horse-trading going on, particularly in that February
package, that gives and takes from all over the political
groups, which of course, in many respects are sectarian
organized--are as encouraging as the results.
So, yes, I think they're moving in the right direction.
But, yes, I also believe they have an awful lot more in front
of them.
Senator Bill Nelson. I look forward to continuing this this
afternoon.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, both of you, well done.
According to some, we should fire you, it sounds like, that
just--really nothing good has happened in the last year, and
this is a hopeless endeavor. Well, I beg to differ. If I could
promote you to five-stars, I would.
I don't know where to send you, you've been in every bad
place there is to go, so I'd send you to a good place,
Ambassador Crocker.
I cannot tell you how proud I am of both of you. Let's
start this with kind of a 30,000-foot assessment.
The surge, General Petraeus, was a corrective action, is
that fair to say?
General Petraeus. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Graham. The reason it was a corrective action is,
between the fall of Baghdad in January 2007, all of the trend
lines were going in the wrong way--economic stagnation,
political stagnation, increased proliferation of violence--
therefore, something had to be done. That something was called
the surge.
Now, I just ask the American people and my colleagues to
evaluate fairly from January 2007 to July 2008 and see what's
happened. The challenges are real, but there are things that
have happened in that period of time that need to be understood
as being beneficial to this country, they came at a heavy
price, and al Qaeda cannot stand the surge. If you put a list
of people that wanted us to leave, the number one group would
be al Qaeda, because you've been kicking them all over Iraq.
Now, the reason they came to Iraq is why, General Petraeus?
General Petraeus. That al Qaeda came to Iraq, sir?
Senator Graham. Yes.
General Petraeus. To establish a base in the heart of the
Arab world, in the heart of the Middle East.
Senator Graham. Are they closer to their goal after the
surge or further away?
General Petraeus. Further away, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay. If you had to pick one thing to tell
the American people that was the biggest success of the surge,
what would it be?
General Petraeus. Probably Anbar Province and/or just the
general progress against al Qaeda.
Senator Graham. Would it be the fact that Muslims tasted al
Qaeda life in Iraq and Iraqi Muslims joined with us to fight al
Qaeda?
General Petraeus. I think the shift in Sunni Arabs against
al Qaeda has been very, very significant. The rejection of the
indiscriminate violence, the extremist ideology, and really,
even the oppressive practices associated with al Qaeda is a
very, very significant change.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that when Muslims will
stand by us and fight against bin Laden, his agents, and
sympathizers, we're safer?
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Ambassador Crocker, what is Iran up to in
Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I described what I believed to
be an effort at Lebanization through the backing of different
militia groups.
Senator Graham. Okay, let's stop there. Lebanon kicked
Syria out a few years ago, and they tried to create some form
of a democracy. Hezbollah, backed by Iran, had a say in that
endeavor. Is that correct?
Ambassador Crocker. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. They launched an attack from Lebanon
against Israel at the time the U.N. was about to sanction Iran
for their nuclear endeavors. Is that correct?
Ambassador Crocker. I believe so, sir.
Senator Graham. So, is it fair to say that from an Iranian
point of view, one of their biggest nightmares would be a
functioning democracy in Lebanon, and a functioning
representative government in Iraq on their borders?
Ambassador Crocker. Certainly their behavior would indicate
that that may be the case.
You make an important point. We look at Iraq as a nation in
its own terms. The region looks at it a little bit differently.
Iran and Syria have been cooperating over Lebanon since the
early 1980s, over a quarter of a century. They have worked
together against the Lebanese and against our interests.
They're using that same partnership in Iraq, in my view,
although the weights are reversed, with Iran having the greater
weight, Syria the lesser. But they are working in tandem
together against us and against a stable Iraqi state.
Senator Graham. If I can walk through what I think these
laws mean to me, and this is just my opinion.
Provincial elections in October are important to me because
it means that the Sunnis understand that participating in
representative government seems to be in their interest,
therefore they're going to vote in October 2008, and they
boycotted in 2005. Is that correct?
Ambassador Crocker. That's one reason they're important,
yes.
Senator Graham. Okay, so the Sunnis are going to come out,
by the millions, we anticipate, to send representatives to
Baghdad or to the Provinces rather than sending bombs. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Crocker. That is what I would expect, yes.
Senator Graham. Okay, now the reason the surge has been
successful to me, General Petraeus, is that the Anbar Province
has been liberated from al Qaeda, but we've had a reduction in
sectarian violence. Is that true?
General Petraeus. That is true.
Senator Graham. Okay, now this breathing space that we've
been urging to have happen by better security, by my opinion
has produced economic results not known before January 2007. Is
that correct? The economy is improving?
General Petraeus. That is correct.
Senator Graham. The Iraqis will be paying more over time to
bear the burden of fighting for their freedom.
General Petraeus. That's correct.
Senator Graham. They will be fighting more to bear the
burden of their freedom. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Graham. Is there any way that Iraq could be a
failed state, and it not affect our national security?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator Graham. What would happen if the United States
began to remove a brigade a month out of Iraq? What would be
the military consequences of such an endeavor, in your opinion,
if we announced, as a nation, we're going to withdraw a brigade
out of Iraq every month?
General Petraeus. Sir, it clearly would depend on the
conditions at that time. If the conditions were good, quite
good, then that might be doable.
Senator Graham. At this point in time, does that seem to be
a responsible position to take, given what you know about Iraq,
to make that announcement now?
General Petraeus. Senator, I have advocated conditions-
based reductions, not a timetable. War is not a linear
phenomenon, it's a calculus, not arithmetic. That is why I have
recommended conditions-based reductions following the
completion of the surge forces drawdown.
Chairman Levin. Senator Graham, thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, first I thank you for
your service, and say how proud I am of the American men and
women who are serving in the military in Iraq and elsewhere
around the world.
I might add that, as a proud Nebraskan, a proud American, I
witnessed on one of the national news channels, an American--
Captain Logan Veath--embedded with the Iraqi Army in Sadr City,
leading forth the challenge and doing a remarkable job. We're
all proud of him and those who he represents, as well.
In 2003, as Senator Collins mentioned, Senator Bayh and I
and others introduced legislation to require that at least part
of the money that was going for reconstruction in that
supplemental be considered a loan forgivable to a grant--part
of a loan, but part of it also a loan to be forgivable to a
grant--if the rest of the countries would forgive the IOUs of
Iraq that they held. The administration blocked it, even though
it passed the Senate, because they said that they were going to
the donor's conference and this would impair their ability to
get the other countries, as part of the coalition, to be
donors.
It turned out to be a lender's conference, in general,
because the others did loan the money. Now we have an
opportunity to go back and look at what Secretary Wolfowitz
said in 2003, ``We really ought to be able to get our money
back from Iraq because through their oil revenues, they're
going to be able to pay for the war themselves, finance it
themselves.'' That was reconstruction, not the war, but the
reconstruction.
We have your comment, Ambassador Crocker, that they're in a
position soon, or something, to be able to take on that
responsibility. Soon, to me, means now. What I think we should
do is in this supplemental, and I'll introduce legislation with
others to make any further reconstruction money a loan. Purely
and simply, to be repaid, not forgiven. Any other money that
has been appropriated, but unspent, to date, a loan, as well.
When Iraq is today on the basis of $111 barrel oil, and
$3.25 and upwards gas at the pump here in the United States, it
just does not seem responsible for us to continue to borrow
from our grandchildren and China and other places around the
world to be able to finance, in effect, what is their future
opportunity. It seems to me that now is the time.
You also, Ambassador Crocker, said that you think they
should be doing this soon. Will there be a change in the
thinking of the administration on this? Will they now support
legislation that could be worked out to make that now, make
soon now, into the future, on these future appropriations and
past appropriations that are unspent?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, there is very much an interest
in moving the financing from us to the Iraqis.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I think you answered my question,
but there was an interest back in 2003 when Secretary Wolfowitz
said that they ought to be able to finance their own
reconstruction. I'm trying to find out when the soon can be
now.
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, with respect to
reconstruction, soon basically is now.
Senator Ben Nelson. In terms of a loan?
Ambassador Crocker. In terms of the United States no longer
being involved in the physical reconstruction business.
Senator Ben Nelson. What about the money that's in the
current supplemental that's there for reconstruction, is that
structured as a loan?
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, that is not, in my definition, it
is not for reconstruction. These are, for example, some USAID
programs that we think are very important to stabilization. In
conjunction with the military's CERP spending, we will move
into immediate post-kinetic situations and get people going
with jobs and things like that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, then let's call it post-kinetic
aid, as well. It seems to me that if we're paying for what is
not, let's say, military hardware, because they're picking up
more of the cost, we ought to be looking at training costs that
we're engaged in. I just think that there's a point in time,
and it's now, when we need to find a way to make sure that Iraq
is financing more of its own present and future, rather than
incurring those costs ourselves. When they're adding $50 to $60
billion to surplus, at a time when we're developing hundreds of
billions of dollars of deficit, it just doesn't make sense for
us to be the financier of first resort.
Ambassador Crocker. Sir, as I said, I'm committed to that.
At the same time, I don't think you have a one-size-fits-all
situation here. A number of our programs, particularly those
that get down to the local level, that our PRTs, for example,
identify and execute, the Iraqi Government is really not going
to be positioned to pick that up, or even identify it.
Senator Ben Nelson. I don't care whether they can do that,
we can pay it. Whether they can get the money out of their
treasury or not is secondary. If we can do it, we should do it,
and then they should repay us.
What about the money that's already been appropriated but
unspent? Will that now not be spent?
Ambassador Crocker. If you're talking about
reconstruction----
Senator Ben Nelson. Reconstruction.
Ambassador Crocker. We're down to like the last 2 or 3
percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects.
These are things that are underway that we're going to be
bringing to completion.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I think there are billions and
billions of dollars that would fall into that category, and for
me, a billion dollars is not pencil dust.
Ambassador Crocker. I understand your point, Senator, but
at the same time, again, these are projects that are underway.
I think we'd have to think very carefully if we want to risk a
halt in ongoing completion while we try and negotiate with the
Iraqis on----
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I think that's all well and good,
but I wish we'd thought more carefully earlier, and got this
set, such as, back in 2003.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Ambassador, thank you very much for your
extraordinary service to our country, and thank you for your
very candid assessment of how things are going. As always,
you've been very forthright in your testimony, and we
appreciate that, because I think it's important that we have a
good understanding of conditions as you understand them to be
on the ground. We make decisions on funding both on the
military level and the other benchmarks that we're trying to
achieve in regard to economic and political progress in the
region.
I'm wondering if you might be able to elaborate a little
bit on the whole issue of the Shiite militias and the Iranian
influence there. It seems to me, at least, that a lot of our
success these past several months has been because of the
cease-fire that the Mahdi Army has observed, and my question, I
guess, gets at the point of whether or not Sadr really is in
control, or whether the Iranians are pulling the strings there.
If we're going to continue to see reduction in violence and a
lessening of American casualties and civilian casualties there,
that's going to be a big factor.
I guess I'd be interested in knowing, General, what your
impressions are about who really is in charge of these Shiite
militias and the Mahdi Army; is it Sadr or is it the Iranians?
General Petraeus. Senator, let's go back to when the
original cease-fire was put in place in August, and that was
directed by Muqtada al-Sadr. It was because of violence that
was precipitated in the Holy City of Karbala by militia
elements that refused to surrender their weapons before going
into the shrine area. That did a great deal of damage to the
reputation of the overall Sadr Movement, which is first and
foremost a political movement, and then also has the associated
militia.
Added to that, over time, were connections between the
militia and/or the Special Groups, which are these elements
that are affiliated with or associated with the Sadr militia,
but have been selected carefully, and then typically are paid
for, trained by, and armed by Iran, by the Quds Force, in
particular, and which do take direction from the Quds Force.
The hand of Iran was very clear in recent weeks. There was
a recognition, we think, in Iran based on people who talked to
some of the leaders there, that in fact what was transpiring
was very damaging not just to Iraq, not just in the violence to
the Iraqi people, and not just to the reputation of the
militia, but also was backfiring on Iran itself.
In fact, I think arguably it did generate a unification in
concern among Iraqi political leaders about Iranian activity in
Iraq that was nowhere near as great--I would argue--just a
month or so ago.
As we mentioned earlier, both of us have said that it sort
of brought out in higher relief, the activities of Iran, of the
Quds Force in particular, and its involvement with these
Special Groups, and with the weapons and training that they
provided to them.
Senator Thune. Let me ask you, General, there have been
some here who have talked about putting restrictions on or
limiting funding for the CERP. Could you describe that program
and it's value to commanders in the field?
General Petraeus. Senator, a number of us at different
times have stated that there's a point in operations where
money becomes your most important ammunition. Typically, it's
small amounts of money at local levels where, when you have all
of a sudden the opportunity because of security improvements,
you can very rapidly commit it again in small amounts.
We have also used it to fund the so-called Sons of Iraq. As
I had on one of the charts, I think about $16 million a month
is the payroll for those individuals, on average, and I can
tell you the savings that we have had in vehicles not lost in
areas where they used to be lost. There's an area south of
Baghdad, southwest, that used to be called the ``Triangle of
Death.'' That area has actually been very, very quiet over the
course of the last 6 months, since our forces and Iraqi forces
cleared it of al Qaeda, and then Sons of Iraq stood up to help
secure a local community.
It's a big reason why we have the enormous numbers of
caches being found. Most of them are being identified by these
local individuals or by local citizens who have benefited from
various projects done by the CERP. They have seen the benefits
of improved security and started to see some economic growth.
Oftentimes, the pump is primed with small amounts of CERP very
early in that process, before the Iraqi Government can
reconnect to these communities, and get the different ministry
activities out there helping them.
By the way, this is the reason Iraq has committed some of
its money--$300 million is its initial amount--to fund
something called Iraqi CERP, which will help enormously and can
greatly expand the impact of the overall program.
We have a capacity out there in a lot of these communities,
particularly the ones that over the course of the last year
were recently cleared of al Qaeda or other extremists. We have
an ability to spend that money, that they do not. They are now
very much our partners in that and very much doing a cost-
sharing approach, and beyond, over time.
Senator Thune. Last week the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee received testimony from the Service Vice
Chiefs on the current readiness of the forces, and they all
testified that military units that are deploying to you in
theater are currently adequately trained, equipped, and ready
to carry out the missions that you've assigned. As the
combatant commander, is that your perception as well?
General Petraeus. Senator, I would say that this is the
best Army that I've ever seen in 34 years of service. Now, it
is an Army that is capable of what we might call full spectrum;
in fact, what our doctrine does call full spectrum operations.
Counterinsurgency operations include not just the stability and
support operations but also offense and defense.
We have, in the last year, for example, done major
operations in places like Ramadi, Baqubah, South Baghdad, and a
variety of other locations that have involved all of our
different capabilities in the military, not just the soft side
of stability and support operations.
I've said on a number of occasions that there were two
enormous changes that I found when I got back to Iraq in
January 2007. The first, in February 2007, was the damage done
by sectarian violence which tore the fabric of society; the
second was how much our leaders ``get it'' about what it is
that we're trying to do over there as a result of all the
changes made by the Services in terms of doctrine, education,
preparation of units, and so forth.
So the units are exceedingly well-trained, and they are the
best equipped. When I look back at the fact that as a division
commander, when we crossed the berm and went into Iraq, we had
one unmanned aerial vehicle that we were all fighting over
within the entire Corps. Now look at the enormous proliferation
of ISR platforms, the enormous tools that the different
intelligence agencies have now provided to us, the fusion of
intelligence, in the way that Special Forces, Special Mission
Elements, and conventional forces all work together, and
literally have fusion cells, the proliferation of real-time
situational awareness tools, just on and on and on, satellite
tracking and communications. We are vastly better than where we
were in 2003 when we went through the berm and especially in
terms of so-called full spectrum operations, which is what most
of us think we'll be involved in in the future. There are not
too many peer competitors, as they say, out there that want to
take us on toe-to-toe out in the desert somewhere in open tank
warfare.
Senator Thune. Thank you all, again, very much for your
service to our country, and please convey to those who serve
under your command our deep appreciation for their service and
sacrifice, as well.
General Petraeus. I will, Senator.
If I could just thank the committee for one thing, in
particular, and that is the mine-resistant, ambush-protected
(MRAP) vehicles. These have been lifesavers. Countless
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have been saved by these
vehicles, and by the additional protection that they provide to
the occupants.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for that, General.
Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Thank you, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, for
your long and distinguished service to our Nation.
Before I ask you any questions, I just wanted to respond to
some of the statements and suggestions that have been made
leading up to this hearing, and even during it, that it is
irresponsible or demonstrates a lack of leadership to advocate
withdrawing troops from Iraq in a responsible and carefully-
planned withdrawal. I fundamentally disagree.
Rather, I think it could be fair to say that it might well
be irresponsible to continue the policy that has not produced
the results that have been promised, time and time again, at
such tremendous cost to our national security and to the men
and women who wear the uniform of the United States military.
Our troops are the best in the world, and they have
performed admirably and heroically in Iraq. However, the
purpose of the surge--let's not forget--as described by the
Bush administration was to create the space for the Iraqis to
engage in reconciliation and make significant political
progress.
However, since General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker last
testified in September, even General Petraeus, as recently as
3\1/2\ weeks ago, has acknowledged that the Iraqi Government
has not made sufficient political progress.
Our current strategy in Iraq has very real costs. We rarely
talk about the opportunity costs, the opportunities lost
because of the continuation of this strategy. The longer we
stay in Iraq, the more we divert resources, not only from
Afghanistan, but other international challenges, as well.
In fact, last week, Admiral Mullen said that the military
would have already assigned forces to missions elsewhere in the
world were it not for, what he called, ``the pressure that's on
our forces right now.'' He admitted that force levels in Iraq
do not allow us to have the force levels we need in
Afghanistan.
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Cody,
testified last week that the current demands for forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan limits our ability to provide ready forces for
other contingencies.
Finally, the cost to our men and women in uniform is
growing. Last week, the New York Times noted the stress on the
mental health of our returning soldiers and marines from
multiple and extended deployments. Among combat troops sent to
Iraq for the third or fourth time, more than one in four shows
signs of anxiety, depression, or acute stress according to an
official Army survey of soldiers' mental health.
The administration and supporters of the administration's
policy often talk about the cost of leaving Iraq, yet ignore
the greater costs of continuing the same failed policy. The
lack of political progress over the last 6 months, and the
recent conflict in Basrah, reflect how tenuous the situation in
Iraq really is, and for the past 5 years, we have continually
heard from the administration that things are getting better,
that we're about to turn a corner, that there is finally a
resolution in sight. Yet, each time, Iraqi leaders fail to
deliver.
I think it's time to begin an orderly process of
withdrawing our troops, start rebuilding our military, and
focus on the challenges posed by Afghanistan, the global
terrorist groups, and other problems that confront America. I
understand the very difficult dilemma that any policy, with
respect to Iraq, poses to decisionmakers. If there were an easy
or very clear way forward, we could all, perhaps, agree on the
facts about how to build toward a resolution that is in the
best interest of the United States, that would stabilize Iraq,
and would meet our other challenges around the world.
With respect to our long-term challenges, Ambassador
Crocker, the administration has announced that it will
negotiate an agreement with the Government of Iraq by the end
of July that would provide the legal authorities for U.S.
troops to continue to conduct operations in Iraq. Let me ask
you, do you anticipate that the Iraqi Government would submit
such an agreement to the Iraqi parliament for ratification?
Ambassador Crocker. The Iraqi Government has indicated it
will bring the agreement to the Council of Representatives. At
this point, it's not clear to me whether that will be for a
formal vote or whether they will repeat the process they used
in November with the Declaration of Principles, in which it was
simply read to the members of the parliament.
Senator Clinton. Does the administration plan to submit
this agreement to our Congress?
Ambassador Crocker. At this point, Senator, we do not
anticipate that the agreements will have within them any
elements that would require the advice and consent procedure.
We intend to negotiate this as an executive agreement.
Senator Clinton. Ambassador Crocker, it seems odd, I think,
to Americans who are being asked to commit for an indefinite
period of time, the lives of our young men and women in
uniform, the civilian employees who you rightly referenced and
thanked, as well as billions of dollars of additional taxpayer
dollars, if the Iraqi parliament may have a chance to consider
this agreement that the United States Congress would not.
I currently have legislation requiring Congress to have an
opportunity to consider such an agreement before it is signed,
and I would urge you to submit such an agreement to Congress
for full consideration.
General Petraeus, I know that in this March 14 interview
with the Washington Post, you stated that no one--and those are
your words--no one in the United States or Iraqi Governments
feels there has been sufficient progress, by any means, in the
area of national reconciliation, or in the provision of basic
public services. Those are exactly the concerns that my
colleagues and I raised when you testified before us in
September.
I remember well your being asked how long would we continue
to commit American lives and treasure if the Iraqis fail to
make political gains. In response, you said that if we reach
that point in a year, you would have to think very hard about
it. It would be difficult to recommend the continuation of this
strategy, and there clearly are limits to the blood and
treasure we can expend in an effort. Well, we're halfway
through the year, and as many of us predicted, and as you
yourself stated, we still do not see sufficient progress.
What conditions would have to exist for you to recommend to
the President that the current strategy is not working? It
seems apparent that you have a conditions-based analysis, as
you set forth in your testimony, but the conditions are
unclear. They certainly lack specificity, and the decision
points, with respect to these conditions, are also vague.
So how are we to judge, General Petraeus, what the
conditions are, or should be, and the actions that you and the
administration would recommend pursuing based on them?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, if I could just
comment on that Washington Post article. What I said was that
no one was satisfied with the progress that had been made,
either Iraqi or American. I then went on and actually ticked
off a number of the different areas in which there had been
progress, and talked about the different laws that Ambassador
Crocker has rightly identified in a number of other areas that
there's been progress, although not satisfactory progress, as I
mentioned, in the eyes of either Iraqis or Americans.
So, that was the thrust of what I was getting at there,
because there has indeed been progress in the political arena,
and there actually has been progress in a variety of the other
arenas, as Ambassador Crocker laid out in his opening
statement.
With respect to the conditions, Senator, what we have is a
number of factors that we will consider, by area, as we look at
where we can make recommendations for further reductions beyond
the reduction of the surge forces that will be complete in
July. These factors are fairly clear. There's obviously an
enemy situation factor. There's a friendly situation factor
with respect to Iraqi forces, local governance, even economic
and political dynamics, all of which are considered as the
factors in making recommendations on further reductions.
Having said that, I have to say, it's not a mathematical
exercise, there's not an equation in which you have
coefficients in front of each of these factors. It's not as
mechanical as that. At the end of the day, it really involves
commanders sitting down, also with their Iraqi counterparts and
leaders in a particular area, and assessing where it is that
you can reduce your forces, so that you can make a
recommendation to make further reductions.
That's the process, there is this issue and in a sense this
term of battlefield geometry. As I mentioned, together with
Ambassador Crocker and Iraqi political leaders, there's even
sort of a political-military calculus that you have to consider
in establishing where the conditions are met and make further
reductions.
Senator Clinton. If I could just ask one follow-on
question, Mr. Chairman?
In response to a question by Senator Levin regarding when
you knew of Prime Minister Maliki's plans to go into Basrah,
you said, and I was struck by it so I wrote it down, that you
learned of it in a meeting where the meeting's purpose was
planning to resource operations in Basrah on a longer-term
basis.
Clearly, until relatively recently, Southern Iraq has not
been within our battlefield geometry. Southern Iraq was
originally the responsibility of the British. They have clearly
pulled back and were not, so far as I can glean from the press
reports, very actively involved in the most recent operations.
What did you mean by the resources you were planning to
deploy, and over what length of time?
General Petraeus. Senator, what we had been working on with
the Iraqi National Security Advisor, Ministers of Defense and
Interior, was a plan that was being developed by the commander
of the Basrah Operational Command, General Mohan, which was a
fairly deliberate process of adding to the resources there on
the military side and other areas. Then there was a phased plan
over the course of a number of months, during which different
actions were going to be pursued.
Prime Minister Maliki assessed that that plan was taking
too long, determined that the threats that had emerged since
provincial Iraqi control, in terms of the criminal elements
connected to the militia and so forth, were such that more
immediate action was taken. As a sovereign country's leader,
commander in chief of his armed forces, he decided to direct
the much more rapid deployment of forces from other locations
to Basrah. That is what he did. He moved up the timetable and
compressed the different activities that we had been planning
to resource over time.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your excellent service
to our country. I also want to remark how dramatic a difference
it is today, and the reports that you bring us, General
Petraeus, from what we had seen when we were last together here
in September.
I think it's undeniable that dramatic, significant progress
has been made, particularly as it relates to al Qaeda. For that
I think you both should be strongly commended, and we thank
you.
Ambassador Crocker, if I may follow up on the SOFA, I would
like to just have you explain to the committee, first of all,
it isn't your prerogative about what course this follows in
terms of whether it comes to Congress or not. Is that not
correct?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, it would depend on the
elements of the agreement.
Senator Martinez. In fact, these are routinely done between
the United States and allied countries where we may have forces
stationed?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir. There are more than 80 of
them, and as the chairman noted, only the NATO SOFA has gone
before the Senate because of the special commitments that we
undertook in that.
Senator Martinez. So other than NATO, these do not
necessarily, or ever, come before the Senate? So, in other
words, it's nothing unusual for this one not to come before the
Senate, because others do not, as well?
Ambassador Crocker. That is correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. Let me ask you, if I may, about the
diplomatic interaction with Iran. I know that I continue to be
concerned, as I know you are, about their involvement. The
December 18 talks have been suspended or postponed; can you
tell us about the status of those potential conversations with
Iran going into the future?
Ambassador Crocker. Several days ago, the Iraqi Foreign
Ministry announced that they were working on arrangements for
another round of talks. We have indicated to the Iraqi
Government previously that we would be prepared to participate
in such talks, at the request of the Iraqi Government, and if,
in the judgment of the Iraqi Government, they might possibly
improve the security situation.
So, as it stands now, the Government of Iraq is making
efforts to see if it can schedule something, and if they can,
we'll be there.
Senator Martinez. But the Government of Iran seems to be a
little reticent to engage in these talks. Is that what I hear
from you?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir. We've been through a number
of efforts since December, as you point out, and each time
something seems to get in the way of the Iranian schedulers.
Senator Martinez. I know for a long time we've talked about
the need for us to engage and talk to Iran. I guess it's
difficult to talk to someone who doesn't want to talk back, or
whose actions may not be in good faith. In that regard, General
Petraeus, you mentioned earlier about 107-millimeter rockets
that were being fired upon the international zone in Baghdad.
Do we have any idea where the insurgent groups in Iraq are
getting these 107-millimeter rockets to fire?
General Petraeus. They come from Iran, Senator. As I
mentioned, we have found large numbers of them in weapons
caches. We recently, in fact, just south of Baghdad found 45
more in a single weapons cache that also had several thousands
of pounds of explosives in it.
They have come from Iran, there's no question about it, and
we have individuals in detention who have explained the entire
process that goes on with the Special Groups--how they are
brought over there, how they are recruited, trained, how they
are funded--and we've captured one of the senior heads of the
Special Groups, and a number of other of their leaders and
financiers, all of whom were supported by the Iranian Quds
Force. We also have members of the Quds Force in detention.
Senator Martinez. So they are participating--the Quds Force
from Iran--in recruitment, training, and financing, all but the
execution, and I suppose even in some instances, maybe, the
execution of attacks upon our forces, as well?
General Petraeus. I can't speak to the execution directly,
there's a clear sense that there has been direction of attacks,
and of dialing up and dialing down at different times.
Senator Martinez. Now, we've heard some discussion recently
in the media that perhaps Iran had a role in the truce, as it
was called, in Basrah in recent days. Can you comment on that?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, there has been speculation I
would have to say, honestly, I simply don't know. I think the
statement by Muqtada al-Sadr can be explained in Iraqi terms,
just as his original cease-fire announcement in August and its
renewal in February were.
I think that he and the other members of the Sadr political
trend are as aware as anyone that the Jaish al-Mahdi Special
Groups activities, politically, did not play to their advantage
at all. What we've maybe seen through this statement, and
through some of his subsequent actions and statements, is an
effort to distance himself from those extremist elements. I
think that would make sense.
The Sadr movement, in its inception, touched a deep vein in
Iraq. It was populist, it was Iraqi nationalists, and it was
Arab nationalists. It's kind of lost its moorings somewhat in
recent years, with this gravitation toward Iran. What we may be
seeing now--if you're explaining this in Iraqi terms--is an
effort to move away from the Iranian-backed, and I would say
controlled, Special Groups and move back into the Iraqi
political forum. I would certainly hope that's the case.
Senator Martinez. My time is up, but I would like to just
close with a comment that some would suggest that we should
withdraw troops from Iraq so that we might send them to
Afghanistan. I would really prefer to see our NATO partners
pick up their share of the load in Afghanistan, rather than
just shift our troops from one country to another.
Thank you both very much. I admire greatly the work that
you're doing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start, if I may, General Petraeus with one of your
charts. We have it on page 10 of our packet, where you show
several bar graphs here. One thing I noticed immediately is the
national police do not have any operational readiness
assessment 1 (ORA-1) units. Also, I noticed that with the
military, really, if you look at it, the green, the Level 1 and
Level 2 areas have not grown much, maybe a little bit. In fact
it looks like the green maybe is a little smaller, and the
yellow is a little larger than it was as little over a year
ago.
I would expect that we would see more progress on the
military front in these categories. Why haven't we seen more
progress?
General Petraeus. There's actually a very simple
explanation for that, Senator. When a unit gets to ORA-1 level,
which means that it meets certain goals in terms of personnel
fill, leader fill, vehicles, maintenance, training, and a
variety of other categories, the Iraqis tend to take leaders
from these organizations and use them to form new
organizations. Mathematically, then, they just fall below the
level that is required to meet the criteria for ORA-1.
That does not mean that unit may not be in the lead. The
fact that a unit may not have entire fill of its leaders is not
at all uncommon in Iraq because there is a shortage of
commissioned and noncommissioned officers, in particular.
That's the toughest part of growing a force as rapidly as they
have, is finding qualified commissioned and noncommissioned
officers.
Senator Pryor. Is that how you would recommend to them that
they do, that they peel their leaders off of their best units?
General Petraeus. I actually think it does make sense,
Senator. They're not trying to mathematically get to ORA-1,
they're trying to get as many units as they can that are
reasonably capable. I think that is a sensible way to do that.
Now, they do have very high-end units that are exceedingly
capable, arguably the best counterterrorist forces in the
region, certainly the most experienced. I'm not sure, by the
way, all of them meet ORA-1. They may not meet all of the
mathematical criteria, but they are certainly extremely good.
They as well will take leaders from that to form other new
elements.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask about another one of your charts.
This is the caches found and cleared, which I think is a great
chart. Generally, I think that's very good news, however, I do
have a question. When you see this big up-tick in the number of
caches found and cleared, it's great that we're finding them,
that's great--but does it also mean that there's just more
weapons flooding into Iraq than we've ever seen before?
General Petraeus. That may be a factor, but I think the
bigger factor, Senator, is that we were in areas where we were
not present before. If you look at that chart, you can see the
progression, as we cleared certain areas, for example,
southeast, southwest of Baghdad, Anbar Province, Diyala
Province, and a number of areas where we had either little
presence or no sustained presence and there was no ISF
presence.
As we have gone into those areas, as we have, in a sense,
reliberated some of these areas from al Qaeda or other
extremist elements, the people have actually told us where
these weapons were, because they don't want them in their
communities.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask you about Iran. Iran's come up in
several contexts here at this hearing, one of those is
providing weapons. We've heard about them providing training,
even training trainers who can go in and be insurgents or be
terrorists inside Iraq. Iran should be a concern to all
Americans, because Iran is not our friend. If Iran continues to
have a great influence in Iraq, we may end up at the end of the
day with an Iraq that is not our friend, as well. So, I think
we need to be very, very careful about Iran.
Let me ask about Muqtada al-Sadr. I understand he has very
close ties inside Iran. I've read somewhere where he's trying
to attain the status of Ayatollah, and he's been doing some
study in Iran. I read recently where, when the Iraqi Government
asked him to disband his militias if they wanted to participate
in the political process there, he said he would have to talk
to clerics. I got the impression those were clerics inside Iraq
and inside Iran.
General Petraeus. In Iraq, sir. In Najaf.
Senator Pryor. My concern with him--and maybe I'm reading
too much into some of these stories I've been reading--but is
he trying to set himself up as the future Ayatollah of Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, virtually the entire year that
I've been in Iraq, he has been in Iran. It's one of the reasons
I spoke earlier about some confusion, it seems to me, within
the Sadr Trend, as to what it actually stands for and where
it's going.
He has clearly a very concrete association with Iran now
through his presence there, and his religious studies in the
city of Qom. Then of course the Iranian connection to the Jaish
al-Mahdi Special Groups is now undeniable.
None of this, as I look at it, contributes at all to the
receptivity within Iraq of the Sadr Trend. So, it would seem to
me that if he is seeking a future in Iraq, given the roots of
this movement, going back to the 1990s, as I said, as a
populist Iraqi and Arab nationalist movement, he certainly
doesn't seem to be going about it in the right way.
Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, one last question. You've
requested that Congress support a supplemental appropriation
for Iraq, and I will do that, by the way. Hasn't Congress given
you everything you've asked, and the military everything you've
asked, for Iraq?
General Petraeus. It certainly has, Senator. As I made a
point, earlier, of specifically thanking you for the MRAP
vehicles, especially, for the ISR and for a number of other
cases. With respect to the CERP, it was merely the urgency of
having that by June, because that is a hugely important enabler
for our commanders and troopers on the battlefield.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
It's been pointed out by previous questioners, the dramatic
difference that has occurred in Iraq since the surge began, and
since you last made your presentation to Congress. There's no
question that the situation is better now. It's better than
when the surge began, and it's better than in September. It
would take a major suspension of disbelief to conclude
otherwise, to conclude that things are not much improved.
Your testimony has been very measured and honest. According
to what we're told, progress is fragile but it is undeniable
and in large part, I would say to the efforts of you two
gentlemen who have testified today.
The question now before this Congress and this country is,
do we proceed with this proven strategy of success? Or, on the
other hand, in the face of this demonstrated progress, do we
leave with our goals still not yet attained and secured?
I think history would view this Congress as very foolish if
we leave now and refuse to embrace the success that we've seen.
I appreciate, General Petraeus, that you emphatically said
that our efforts in Iraq are worth it. I think the American
people need to be told that. As Senator Warner put the question
in a somewhat different nuance; is our effort in Iraq helping
to provide security for Americans where we live today?
I understood your answer to be yes, yes it is. I would
simply point out that depriving al Qaeda of a major victory
indeed does promote the security of Americans here at home.
Protecting American credibility also protects American security
here at home. It is very much in our national security interest
to show that America stands behind its friends and that America
stands behind its word.
So we're unanimous, also, in our appreciation and thanks
for the troops. I appreciate the chairman and the ranking
member starting off in that vein, and I think that's been
echoed by every member of the committee.
I was told that the average age of a combat soldier in Iraq
is about 20 years old. General, is that pretty much correct?
General Petraeus. That sounds about right to me, yes,
Senator.
Senator Wicker. When I was given that fact, it struck me
what that means. That means that basically, most of these 20-
year-olds made the decision to participate in this war around
2006. That was at a time when our prospects in Iraq were at
their lowest. That was at a time when public opinion and public
support for our involvement in this effort were at their
lowest.
So it makes it all the more remarkable that these young
people would step forward and volunteer during that timeframe.
It just makes me consider them actually, in the tradition of
Abraham Lincoln, who persevered with the war effort at a time
when public opinion was against him, or in the tradition of
George Washington, who never really had more support than one-
third of the colonists during our effort for American
independence. It makes me really proud of the sense of history
that these young Americans must have, if they're willing--at a
time when public opinion is really against it--to step forward
and say, ``We believe in this effort.''
So, if you could--and this will be, I think, the only
question I'll have time to ask you in light of the time I've
taken as a preface--please give us a profile of these troops,
General? What motivates them to enlist? After they've been over
there, and they have an opportunity to get out, what motivates
them to reenlist? Are they watching us today? Do some of them
have an opportunity to listen to this telecast? What do they
want to hear from us? What do they want to hear from the
elected representatives of the American people?
General Petraeus. Senator, first I've mentioned on a number
of occasions that I believe Tom Brokaw had it right when he was
with us one day in the early part of Iraq when, after spending
some time out seeing the myriad tasks that our troopers are
performing, he said that, ``This is surely the new greatest
generation.'' I think that subsequent deployments and
deployments and deployments have underscored the validity of
that assessment.
I think the members of this force enlist for the usual
reasons that soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsman have raised their right hand as civilians to become
servicemembers. They enlist to do something that's bigger than
self. It's certainly a sense of patriotism, the desire to
better themselves, to seek opportunities that are possible to
them serving in uniform.
In combat, I think that they serve most of all for the
trooper on their left and right, and feel very privileged that
that individual is a fellow American soldier, coalition
soldier, and in some cases, Iraqi soldier.
But this concept of the brotherhood of the close fight is a
very, very special feeling. It's a very unique fraternity, if
you will, and it is something that all who have experienced, I
think, are changed in a way for it.
It is one of the reasons that they have raised their right
hand again. As I mentioned, the 3rd Infantry Division there
right now on its third tour in Iraq, has already achieved its
reenlistment goal for the entire fiscal year.
So, for all of those reasons, you find the explanation of
why someone originally raises his or her right hand, and why
they do it again. Knowing the sacrifice, knowing the idea that
you enlist the soldier and reenlist the family, the families do
sacrifice very, very much.
It's not just our troopers who are watching, and they do
have an opportunity to watch, and they do, by the way, watch
this, I guess more than I thought they would. Because in an
email world, you'd be amazed at the number of emails that you
get--you probably would not--but I get emails from a number of
members of the Multi-National Force-Iraq of all ranks. There's
feedback, oftentimes, from these kinds of sessions.
You ask, what do they want? They just want the American
people to appreciate what they're doing, to support their
service, and to ensure that they and their families will be
looked after in an adequate fashion.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, the support of the
American public has been absolutely wonderful, and we are all
very grateful to all American citizens, to Congress, to the
executive branch, and others for repeatedly showing how much
they do appreciate the great service of these young men and
women of what I think really is the new greatest generation.
Thank you.
Senator Wicker. Please convey to them our heartfelt
appreciation, and also to their families.
General Petraeus. I will, sir.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, obviously, comment on the sacrifice that both of
you are making and the thousands other men and women like you
that are working on behalf of our country in Iraq. Let me also
mention the 76 Missourians and their families who have paid the
ultimate sacrifice.
I'd like to focus a minute on the financial sacrifice of
our country. It is a burr in the saddle of the American people
that the Iraqi Government has a budget surplus, and we have a
massive budget deficit. Yet we are paying and they are not.
I'd like to focus in on the SOFA for you, Ambassador
Crocker.
For you, General Petraeus, I'd like to focus in on the Sons
of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq is one of your charts today, and the
success that you have had related to employing some 90,000
Sunnis with American tax dollars----
General Petraeus. Shiite and----
Senator McCaskill. Excuse me, Shiite and Sunni, but
primarily Sunni.
General Petraeus. It's about 20 percent Shiite, and about
80 percent, or so, Sunni.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. The 80 percent, they are viewed as
primarily a Sunni group, in regards to the politics in Iraq,
and that's the point I want to make is that we're spending
about $200 million a year, paying these people twice the
average salary you would make in Iraq, and I'm trying to figure
out how we get the Iraqi Government to pay that price, as
opposed to the American taxpayer.
Obviously, there was a quote in the Washington Post not
long ago from one of these Sons of Iraq that said that they
were late in getting their money. They're going to be patient,
but if they don't get their money quickly, they'll suspend and
quit, and then they'll go back to fighting Americans.
So, we have paid these folks and they are not fighting us,
but the question is, how long are we going to be paying them in
order to keep them from fighting us? What chances do we have of
making the Iraqi Government use some of their budget surplus to
fight them?
For you, Ambassador Crocker, in Japan, Korea, and Germany,
which has been referenced in political circles as to our
involvement in Iraq long-term, in our agreements there, they
are offsetting the costs of our bases. Those countries are
paying the American Government to offset some of the costs of
our bases. Are you going to negotiate in the SOFA, that the
Iraqi Government start offsetting some of the costs of our
temporary bases, that is envisioned that are going to become
theirs, if and when we ever get out of there?
General Petraeus. Senator, on the Sons of Iraq, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, we actually fund those with
the CERP, and in fact, the Iraqi Government just allocated $300
million for us to manage as Iraqi CERP. That will offset a
number of our other projects and allow us to focus more on the
Sons of Iraq, for which they have committed now $163 million to
gradually assume their contracts, over $500 million for small
business loans that can be applied to some of these, and nearly
$200 million for training and education and reintegration
programs.
So there are a number of initiatives ongoing with the Iraqi
Government, in addition to the absorption of 20, 30 percent--
we'll have to see how much it is over time--of the Sons of Iraq
into the legitimate ISFs, either into local police, or in some
cases into the Iraqi Army.
This started in Anbar Province and that's where we have
been most advanced in terms of moving them into the roles. It
is much more challenging, I think understandably so, as you
mentioned, primarily a Sunni organization particularly at the
outset because, of course, we needed them in areas where al
Qaeda was originally, which were Sunni areas. When they moved
into locations such as in Baghdad neighborhoods, where we saw
the Awakening take place in some of those neighborhoods, then
you're near Shiite/Sunni fault lines. Then you have much more
concern, I think, legitimately on the part of a Shiite-led
government.
They've worked their way through that, there were recently
several thousand who were picked up on contract and then
transitioned into the ISFs.
So, that process is underway and I think we're seeing more
and more burden-sharing, cost-sharing, if you will, and they
have committed that they would provide more, as their own
supplementals are addressed over the course of the next several
months.
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, the SOFA talks are just
getting underway, and I believe this committee, among others,
will be receiving a briefing in the near future.
It's an interesting point. We'll need to take that aboard
and see what might be possible.
Senator McCaskill. I think it's tremendously important,
Ambassador, that we make a good-faith effort to begin to force
the Iraqi Government to start spending their money to support
the temporary bases that we have in Iraq. There's no excuse
that the people of Japan and Germany and Korea are helping pay,
and the people of Iraq need to be doing the same thing.
If they refuse to, I think that would be a very
illuminating point for the American people. If they're not
willing to pay for that which we have said will be theirs when
we leave, then I think that would be a very interesting moment
of recognition for Americans as to how we are actually viewed
in the country of Iraq.
Let me also, just briefly, get your take on the Basrah
situation. It is my understanding, and I don't think this has
really been distilled down for most Americans, that really,
Sadr won politically, in terms of the confrontation in Basrah,
that their willingness to do reconciliation was being played
from a winning hand, not from a losing hand. This was about the
political power of Maliki versus Sadr, and that he won; not
Maliki. That it was really one of these moments where Maliki
could not deliver any kind of crushing blow to Sadr, and that
they really, the Mahdi Army stood down because they had done
the political damage they needed to do to Maliki. Is that
incorrect?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I would actually give it a
different reading.
What we've seen since the events in Basrah is very broad-
ranging political support in Iraq for Maliki. I had mentioned,
in response to a previous question, that last Saturday a group
called the Political Council for National Security--this is a
body that includes the President, the two Vice Presidents,
Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Speaker and Deputy
Speakers of parliament, and leaders of all of the parliamentary
blocks--met and came out with a strong statement of support for
the government. There were 15 points, but the most important
were: support for the government in its fight against extremist
militia groups; a call for the disbanding of all such groups;
and a strong statement calling on outsiders to cease
interfering in Iraq's affairs, a clear reference to Iran.
So this is still a process in evolution. But, the way I
would read it right now is that it has definitely strengthened
support for Maliki, as he is perceived as prepared to go into
action against extremist Shiite, as well as al Qaeda and
others.
Senator McCaskill. I appreciate that there is some support
for Maliki. Is it completely wrong to say that in terms of the
actual incidents that occurred in Basrah, that Sadr ended up
with a stronger hand than Maliki at the end of the day?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, Senator, it's a complex
situation that still has to play out. My read at this time of
the positions that Muqtada al-Sadr has taken is that he is
trying to put some distance between himself and these Jaish al-
Mahdi Special Groups.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Ambassador Crocker. Because, there has been a pretty sharp
negative--not only political, but popular--reaction against
these militia groups. So I think he's motivated, trying to say,
``it isn't us.''
Senator McCaskill. Okay, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, again we just can't overstate the fact of how
much we appreciate your service to America.
General Petraeus, I've had the privilege of visiting with
you any number of times in theater, and each time, irrespective
of what the challenge that is ahead of you, you've responded in
a very professional way, a way in which makes us all proud to
be an American.
Ambassador Crocker, it's refreshing to know that there are
folks like you who are career diplomats, and you have a number
of them under your leadership, that are performing such a
valuable service in this particular time of crisis.
To both of you and your families, we just thank you for a
great job.
I'm particularly impressed, too, General Petraeus, at your
comments on the 3rd Infantry Division. We're obviously looking
forward to those folks returning to Fort Stewart and to Fort
Benning, and what a great job they've done over there. From the
very first day of the beginning of this conflict, they were
there and they continue to perform magnificently.
I noticed in your statements, compared to what you talked
about when you were here in September, the percentage of time
that you've spent on military operations versus the time that
you spend on what's happening on the governmental side and the
civilian side is remarkably different.
When you were here in September, we were primarily talking
about an update on the military perspective, and what had
happened, and where we're going.
Now, thank goodness, we're here listening to you talk about
the improvements that have been made on the Iraqi civilian
side. If that's not encouraging to every American, then they
just have not been listening to what's been going on in this
conflict.
I want to focus for a minute, General Petraeus, on a
particular project that you have had under your jurisdiction,
and it's the project where the commanders that are underneath
you have had the opportunity to engage with proprietors all
across Iraq, and to make grants to those individuals, or loans,
however you may want to characterize them, of up to, I think,
$2,500 to put those folks back in business.
Would you talk a little bit about how that program has
worked, the success of that program, and what's been the
reaction, which I personally have seen from Iraqi proprietors,
but what's been the overall reaction of Iraqis to the American
military as a result of that program?
General Petraeus. Sir, it has been very positive. The small
business grants--USAID does small business loans--have really
primed the pump in a number of areas. As you can achieve
security in an area, a lot of these are in the Multi-National
Division Center area that the 3rd Infantry Division is the
headquarters of. As they have cleared and then held areas, the
way to start the building again, as quickly as possible,
oftentimes is these very small business grants or loans.
They have been very, very successful. They obviously
engender enormous goodwill, because we are already there well
before the Iraqi Government can get in there and start to prime
the pump with basic services, and this just starts the whole
process, and it does it very, very rapidly. It is, yet again,
another reason why there have been so many weapons caches found
in so many different areas. They are grateful for what our
soldiers are doing, and they show their gratitude in, among
other ways, pointing out where IEDs are, in some cases and
showing them where weapons caches are in others.
Senator Chambliss. There's been some comments here this
morning, and comments in the press of late by some folks,
regarding whether or not this truly has been a success, this
surge or the new strategy, whatever we call it, that began
under your leadership a little over a year ago.
But I would note that AQI certainly is our primary enemy,
they have been the focus of our attention in Iraq. What
percentage of Iraq was AQI located in 2006, compared to where
they are today?
General Petraeus. As I showed in the one slide during the
opening statements, Senator, in late 2006, AQI had substantial
presence, and even control in significant areas of the
Euphrates River Valley through Anbar Province, in a number of
the areas for which 3rd Infantry Division assumed
responsibility in Multi-National Division Center, in the so-
called throat of Baghdad, just south and southeast of Baghdad.
Several different major neighborhoods in Baghdad extended
up the Diyala River Valley to Baqubah, beyond that, and then a
variety of areas in the Tigris River Valley and then on up to
Mosul in Ninawa.
Over time, the grip of AQI in a number of those areas has
been reduced, and in fact, the violence in those provinces then
came down very substantially, with the one exception, and that
exception is Ninawa Province in the far north. That is the
attention of the main effort, if you will, of the effort
against AQI by conventional and Special Operations Forces on
the Iraqi and the coalition side.
Senator Chambliss. Another measuring stick, I think, is the
participation of Iraqi citizens alongside our coalition forces
in defending their country and prosecuting attacks against AQI.
Have we seen an increase in the percentage of Iraqi
citizens participating in the prosecution of the conflict
against AQI versus where we were in 2006?
General Petraeus. We have very much, Senator. Again, a lot
of this started in late 2006, with the first Sheikh and tribe
sort of courageously saying, ``Will you stand with us if we
decide to stand against al Qaeda? We've had enough of the
damage that they have done, we don't believe in the extremist
ideology that they offer.'' The indiscriminate violence wrecked
havoc in the Euphrates River Valley and other locations.
That was the first manifestation of this. Then over time,
that built. It arguably reached critical mass in the Euphrates
River Valley and the Ramadi Region. It rippled up and down
that. In early to mid-2006 or 2007, Ramadi was cleared in a
very substantial operation mid-March to mid-April. That just
kept moving around.
It was a willingness to reject al Qaeda on the part of
Sunni communities because of the damage that they had done, and
a recognition that they could not share in the bounty that is
Iraq. You can't win if you don't play. You can't share in the
enormous resources that Iraq has, if you're not participating.
That, of course, also is why they so keenly want to see
provincial elections in so many of these different communities
where Sunni Arabs boycotted the vote in 2005.
Senator Chambliss. My time is up, Mr. Ambassador, but could
you give me a quick answer as to whether or not the Iranians
are participating in the economy of Iraq, as well as from a
standpoint of participating militarily?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, yes they are. A lot of goods
move from Iran into Iraq, foodstuffs, consumer goods, and
Iranians are also involved in some project development,
particularly in different cities in the south.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
After we complete the first round, we will excuse our
witnesses and not have a second round so that our witnesses
have at least a little break before their afternoon hearing.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, may we thank you, on our
side, for again, their appearance, in a very thorough hearing
this morning.
Chairman Levin. I think we have three or four more
Senators.
First, Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For the record, I would like to point out then when we talk
about the success in al-Anbar being sort of the greatest event
from the surge, for purposes of history, we should remember
that that Awakening began before the surge was announced. I
know that for a fact, because my son was there as a Marine
rifleman through the period of September 2006 through May 2007,
and was following it with some interest as it was moving
forward.
I hope I can get two questions in here during this period,
but gentlemen, I'm on the Foreign Relations Committee, so we'll
see how far we can go and we'll all take a lunch break and come
back.
General, I'd like to thank you for the way that you
characterized the service of our people in the military today.
I think there's been far too much politicizing of what our
people have done. As someone who grew up in the military,
served in it, and has more than one family member in it right
now, I think it's fair to leave politics out of what our people
are doing. There are people in the United States military today
who feel one way, people that feel another way, and people who
have no political views at all. Quite frankly, combat was the
most apolitical environment I've ever been in. People want to
work together and do their job, and I think it was really
refreshing to hear you take that approach today.
I'm very concerned about the strain on the force. It isn't
reflective, so much, of motivation. As you indicated, we have
great people and we have a career force that continues to
reenlist. It goes more to the stewardship of all of us who are
making these policies, in terms of how we're using people, and
how these experiences are going to impact them downstream in
their lives.
On the one hand, we have reenlistment rates that are high.
On the other hand, we have articles such as the one that came
out in the New York Times the other day with 27 percent of the
career noncommissioned officer force, that has had multiple
deployments, having difficulties at some level.
That's one of the reasons that I introduced the dwell-time
amendment last year, to try to put some perspective, just to
put a safety net under this, while the politics of the war were
being discussed. It's another reason I have introduced, and
pushed so hard, this GI Bill. You mentioned, General, Tom
Brokaw visiting and saying this was the next greatest
generation. I think the least we can do is to give these people
the same shot at a true future as we gave the so-called
greatest generation, by giving them the ability to pursue
education of their choice and to really have a future.
When I'm thinking about all of that and I'm looking at the
numbers that we're seeing, where it looks like after this next
increment of troops are allowed to go home, we're going to
probably be having 10,000 more people remain in Iraq than were
there at the beginning of the surge; that's what I'm seeing,
anyway. We're going to have like 141,000 until this next
increment is brought into place.
I start wondering how we're going to do that and still meet
the demands that are outside of Iraq. When I look at the
situation inside Iraq, I know, Ambassador Crocker, you
mentioned that al Qaeda's capabilities in Iraq have been
significantly degraded over the past year. Al Qaeda is a part
of an international terrorist movement that is, by its
definition, mobile. I don't think we can say that the situation
with international terrorism has improved in Pakistan and
Afghanistan and those areas.
You mentioned, quite correctly, that many Iraqi Shiites, in
the hundreds of thousands, as you commented, stood up and
fought against Iran when called upon to do so during the Iran/
Iraq war. We should consider that when we work through Iranian
influence in Iraq, in fact, Iraq seems well ahead of us, in
terms of seeking a fuller relationship with Iran. Part of the
problem from my perspective, quite frankly, has been this
administration, the way that it has approached possible
aggressive diplomatic relationships with Iran.
But when you look at all of that, the concern that I have
is that keeping that level of force in Iraq and looking at the
other situations, particularly Afghanistan; where are we going
to get these people?
I'm curious, General, as to the level of agreement that you
have in this plan from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff?
General Petraeus. Both Admiral Fallon, the then-CENTCOM
commander, and the chairman were fully supportive of the
recommendations that I made, and of course made through them,
to the Secretary and ultimately to the President.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
We'll be having a hearing with Admiral Mullen this week,
and I would like to be able to pursue that with him.
Ambassador Crocker, with respect to the Strategic Framework
Agreement, we've had two different documents that have been
kind of discussed almost in a way in this hearing that people
may think that it's one document, when clearly it is not.
I have a couple of questions on that. One is, I read your
testimony where you say this is clearly no permanent basis, but
I'm not sure, really, what that term means anymore.
Can you tell us what would have been in this document that
would have elevated it to the point, that from the
administration's perspective, it would have required
congressional approval?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I'm not a lawyer or a
constitutional specialist. I am advised by those individuals,
so I can't give you the whole universe of issues that might be
involved, but some of them are obvious.
The kind of provision that is in the NATO SOFA, the formal
security commitment, that raises that particular SOFA to the
level of advice and consent by the Senate. That is not what we
intend in this current exercise.
Senator Webb. We've been trying to look at what the
specific wording in the document is, and to this point, it has
not been shared with us. But it's been my understanding that
there is a security commitment in the agreement.
Ambassador Crocker. No, sir, there isn't. The SOFA
negotiation itself is still in its very early stages. Although
we have briefed the Strategic Framework Agreement to the Iraqi
leadership, we have not yet sat down for a formal discussion.
Senator Webb. Well, that would be the document that we, in
Congress, would be initially concerned with, rather than the
SOFA.
I'll save this for the afternoon, because my time has run
out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, it's good to see
you again. I had the honor of visiting you and many of the
Texas troops and many other men and women in uniform in
January, and good to see you then, and good to see you here
today.
I want to start by asking, General, the purpose of the
counterinsurgency strategy, sometimes now called the surge, was
to give the Iraqis the basic protection--to protect the Iraqi
population and to give the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi
people the chance to develop their own political arrangements,
so that, as in the words of the Iraq Study Group, we would
leave them with the capacity to govern and to defend
themselves.
Would you accept my summary?
General Petraeus. I would, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. Or maybe state it better than I did.
General Petraeus. No, I think that's fine, sir.
Senator Cornyn. That leads me to Ambassador Crocker, to the
benchmarks. I know there's been a lot of debate, and I seem to
recall some of your writing, about whether the benchmarks that
the United States Government laid down in 2007 were really the
appropriate measures, but let's just set that argument aside
for a minute and just talk about what sort of success the Iraqi
Government has had in meeting those 18 benchmarks that we
identified in 2007.
It's my recollection that they have successfully completed
12 of those 18 benchmarks. Can you either correct me, or
clarify and expand upon the developments in that area?
Ambassador Crocker. I think that's about right, Senator.
We're actually just going through a process now, between us out
in Baghdad and folks back here, in reevaluating the status of
the benchmarks. But clearly they have gained some real momentum
after an admittedly slow beginning.
Amnesty is a benchmark, for example, accountability and
justice, de-Baathification reform is a benchmark, provincial
powers in its election dimension is a benchmark. So in the
space of just a little over 1 month, we saw them achieve three
really significant new benchmarks.
Senator Cornyn. General Petraeus, I remember General
Odierno who, of course, has served with you in Iraq, and is
Commander of III Corps in Fort Hood. Pending his nomination as
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, I remember him saying what he
thought the American people wanted to see out of Iraq was
progress. Progress.
Would both of you characterize what we have seen over the
last year in Iraq, both from a military and security
standpoint, as well as from a political reconciliation
standpoint, as progress?
General Petraeus. I would, Senator.
Ambassador Crocker. Yes. Yes, very much, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. I want to just ask a question about the
consequences of failure in Iraq, because of course, we all want
our troops to come home as soon as they can. I think, giving
both sides the benefit of the doubt, I would say the
disagreement is over whether it's based on a political or a
timetable, which I would call political, without regard to
conditions, and those of us who believe that it ought to be
conditions-based reduction in our troops.
You touched on this, I believe a little bit, both of you
did, in your opening statement, but I think it's worth
repeating because I think the connection that, as you pointed
out, General Petraeus, our troops not only want to know that we
appreciate them, but I think their families and they want to
understand how their sacrifice is directly connected with our
safety and security here at home. Sometimes, I think that gets
lost in the debates here on Capitol Hill.
Traveling to Afghanistan, as I did in January before I came
to Iraq, I of course was reminded of what happened in that
failed state after the Soviet Union left, where the Taliban and
al Qaeda basically used that as an opportunity to organize,
train, and launch attacks, most notoriously on September 11,
2001.
So you see the consequences of a failed state in Iraq, were
we to withdraw before conditions would allow it, before Iraqis
could govern and defend themselves, increasing the probability
that Iraq could, in fact, become a similar failed state to
Afghanistan from the standpoint of allowing space, time, and
opportunity for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to
reorganize and plot and potentially export similar attacks
against the United States or our allies?
General Petraeus. Senator, as I mentioned, not achieving
our goals, our interests in Iraq indeed could lead al Qaeda to
regain lost territory, we could see a resumption of the kind of
ethno-sectarian violence that tore the country apart in 2006
and into early 2007.
No telling what can happen in terms of the Iranian
influence piece, and then just general regional stability
challenges, not to mention the connection with the global
economy.
So there are enormous interests at stake, and that was why
I sought to lay those out earlier.
Senator Cornyn. We recently hit 4,000 dead in Iraq as a
result of armed combat, 373 of those have called Texas home, my
home State. I recently went to a memorial service for a young,
24-year-old soldier named Jose Rubio, who lost his life in
Iraq.
At that memorial service, as you would expect, everyone in
the family was sad, and of course we all grieve with them for
their loss.
But, I think his family took considerable comfort in
knowing that Jose Rubio was doing something he believed in,
something important, and something that contributed to the
safety and security of his family back here, at home, as well
as the rest of the American people.
Do you believe that young soldiers like Jose Rubio are
making such a contribution to the safety and security of their
families back home and the American people?
General Petraeus. I do, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your patience and your testimony
here today, and most of all, for your service to our country.
We may have some differences of opinion about the way forward
in Iraq, but none us questioned your service to our country, or
the candor of your testimony today. So, I'm grateful to you for
that.
I have the privilege of serving on the Select Committee on
Intelligence as well as the Senate Armed Services Committee,
and I'm struck, when reading the most recent National
Intelligence Estimate--which we can't discuss here in detail
today, but both reading that and listening to your testimony
here today and listening to some of the dialogue about how all
of this is subject to differing interpretations.
I would just ask you the question; isn't it true that a
fair amount of humility is in order in rendering judgments
about the way forward in Iraq, that no one can speak with great
confidence about what is likely to occur? Is that a fair
observation?
General Petraeus. It's very fair, Senator, and it's why I
have repeatedly noted we haven't turned any corners, we haven't
seen any lights at the end of the tunnel. The champagne bottle
has been pushed to the back of the refrigerator, and the
progress, while real, is fragile and is reversible.
Senator Bayh. In fact, reasonable people can differ about
the most effective way forward. Is that not also a fair
observation?
General Petraeus. I don't know whether I would go that far,
sir. Obviously, I think there is a way forward, I've made a
recommendation on that, and so----
Senator Bayh. General, you would not mean to say that
anyone who would have a different opinion is, by definition, an
unreasonable person?
General Petraeus. Senator, lots of things in life are
arguable, and certainly there are lots of different opinions
out there. But again, I believe that the recommendations that I
have made are correct.
Senator Bayh. Here's the reason for my question, gentlemen.
Just as I acknowledge your honor and patriotism, which I think
is absolutely appropriate, I hope you would acknowledge the
honor and patriotism of those who have a look at this very
complex set of facts, and simply have a different point of
view. As you both are aware, some argue that, to not embrace
the assessment that you're giving us, is, in fact, to embrace
defeat or to embrace failure in Iraq. I simply would disagree
with those characterizations, and that was the reason for my
question to you.
General Petraeus. Senator, we fight for the right of people
to have other opinions.
Senator Bayh. As we should, and so I appreciate your candor
with regard to that.
So, let me ask you about some of the policies that may be
subject to differing interpretations. You've been asked about
all of them, I think, here.
Chairman, I've never seen so many people be glad to see me
before, here, I'm the last one. I guess there's some benefits
to being last.
The question of opportunity costs was raised, and in the
intelligence world, at least for the foreseeable future, they
tell us that we are much more likely to be subject to a
terrorist strike emanating from Afghanistan, or possibly the
tribal regions of Pakistan, than we are Iraq.
Yet, we are currently spending five times as much in Iraq
as we are in Afghanistan on a monthly basis, we have five times
as many troops stationed in Iraq as we do in Afghanistan
currently. How do you square that when the threat, currently,
is greater in terms of terrorist strike from one place, and yet
we're devoting five times the amount of resources and troops to
a different place? Some might look at that and argue that our
resources are being misallocated.
Ambassador Crocker. I'd just make a couple of observations
on that, Senator, and again, as you know because you visited
me, I am former Ambassador to Pakistan. I am not really in a
position to speak authoritatively about conditions there, but
again, the circumstances in Pakistan are such that it's not
going to be a question of U.S. troops in Pakistan. The al Qaeda
threat out of that border area is indeed significant.
Senator Bayh. Afghanistan and Pakistan are subjects for
another day, but since this is all tied up in the global effort
against extremism and terror, things have not been going as
well as we would hope in Afghanistan. We're not going to have
troops in Pakistan. Still, resources are finite, and they do
have an impact. Some might look at this and say, ``Why are we
devoting five times the amount of resources to a place that is
not, at this point, the principal threat?''
Ambassador Crocker. In part, Senator, to be sure that it
doesn't become that.
I noted in my testimony that Osama bin Laden fairly
recently referred to Iraq as the perfect base for al Qaeda. It
is a reminder of that, for al Qaeda, having a safe base on Arab
soil is extremely important. They got close to that in 2006.
Senator Bayh. They apparently have one now in the tribal
areas in Pakistan.
But in any event, Ambassador, I appreciate your responses,
and I would only caution us to not take our marching orders
from Osama bin Laden, and it might occur to some that he says
these things because he wants us to respond to them in a
predictable way, and we should not do that for him. But, that's
another subject.
Just two or three other things, gentlemen. Again, thank
you.
Ambassador, I have high regard for you. On the subject of
political reconciliation, I think it is a fair comment, on my
part, that the balance of the opinion in the intelligence world
would not be quite as optimistic as some of the observations
that have been given to us here today.
My question is; does not that, and I use the word open-
ended commitment and I know that you would say our commitment
is not open-ended, and yet without any sort of estimate of any
kind of endpoint, I don't know how else you define it, in some
ways, enable some of the political dysfunction we have in Iraq,
by basically saying, ``We're there as long as it takes, we're
going to invest as much money as it takes.'' Does that not take
some of the impetus off of them to make the hard compromises
that only they could make?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, I am the first to say, going
back to your initial comments, that Iraq is both hard and it's
complicated. In this particular aspect, it's my judgment based
on the year that I've been there, that we get political
progress when Iraqi political leaders and figures are feeling
more secure, rather than less, that they are more likely to
make the kinds of deals and compromises that we saw in February
with that legislative package, when they and their communities
do not feel threatened.
It would be my concern that, if they were to sense that
we're moving away from a conditions-based approach in our
presence and our actions, that they would then be kind of
looking over our heads to what might possibly happen next
without us there. They'd be moving away from compromise, not
toward it.
Senator Bayh. Chairman, I just have two brief questions if
I could be permitted.
General, my question to you is, I've asked this directly of
some of our leading experts in the intelligence arena, and my
question was, on a global net basis, is our presence in Iraq
creating more extremists and terrorists than we are eliminating
within Iraq?
The answer they have given me is that they believe that we
are actually creating more than we are eliminating. Creating
more on a global basis then we're eliminating in Iraq. What
would your response to that be?
General Petraeus. I'm not sure I would agree to that,
Senator, but my responsibilities are Iraq, not the greater
global responsibilities. Obviously, I'm a four-star general, I
have strategic thoughts, and again, I would just differ with
that particular assessment.
I think at this point that we have rolled back, as I
mentioned, AQI in a number of different areas. The Ambassador
rightly pointed out that Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri have
repeatedly pointed out in various forms of communication, not
just those for the open world, that Iraq is the central front
of their global war of terror. In that regard, I think that is
where we must roll them back.
Senator Bayh. My final question, gentlemen, is this. I
noticed, and Senator McCain is no longer here, it was his
opinion that success, I think, in his words, ``was within
reach.'' Another quote was, ``success would come sooner than
many imagine.''
Now, I don't want to get you sucked into the Presidential
campaign and ask you to respond to that directly, but many
Americans are going to look at your testimony here today and
all of this proceeding in these questions. They're asking
themselves, ``What does all this mean about the way forward? Is
success truly almost at hand, or is this a commitment without
end?''
So, my final question to you would be, is it not possible
to at least offer some rough estimate about when we will be
able to, after this brief pause, recommence extricating
ourselves by withdrawing more troops from Iraq, down to some
longer-term level? Is it just impossible to offer any rough
estimate?
General Petraeus. Senator, if you believe as I do, and the
commanders on the ground believe that the way forward on
reductions should be conditions-based and it is just flat not
responsible to try to put down a stake in the ground, and say,
``this is when it will be or that is when it will be,'' with
respect.
Senator Bayh. I understand that, General. Many Americans
will listen to that and believe this to be an open-ended
commitment because by definition, we won't know until we get
there, and there have been so many ups and downs in this thing.
I think it's a fair estimate to say that when this began, most
did not assume that we'd be sitting here 5 years on with the
conditions that we currently have.
So, again, I'm just trying to give the American people a
fair judgment about where we stand and what the likely way
forward is, and I guess the best answer to that is, we'll know
when we get there and we don't know when we're going to get
there.
General Petraeus. Senator, as I just said, we have, we
believe the appropriate way, based on the military commanders
on the ground, to sustain and build on the progress that has
been achieved over the course of the last 12 or 15 months, is
to make reductions when the conditions allow you to do that,
without unduly risking all that we've fought so hard to
achieve.
Senator Bayh. We don't know when that point will be.
General Petraeus. Senator, when the conditions are met is
when that point is. Again, that's the way that lays out. Unless
you want to risk and jeopardize what our young men and women
have fought so hard to achieve over the last 12 or 15 months,
then we need to go with a conditions-based approach. That's why
I made that recommendation, obviously.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would just conclude by, I understand your
position, I know why you take the position you do. You can
understand the position that leaves the American people in as
they try and assess the way forward.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Gentlemen, it's been a long morning for you. We appreciate
your service and your appearance here today.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
1. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in a letter to the military
personnel in Multi-National Force-Iraq on May 10, 2007, you wrote in
part that ``Some may argue that we would be more effective if we
sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain information
from the enemy. They would be wrong.''
If a soldier in Iraq had reason to believe that a detainee in his
custody had information about an impending attack on the soldier's
unit, and the soldier thought that gaining that information could save
the lives of his fellow soldiers, would military necessity allow him to
use interrogation techniques that would otherwise not be permitted
under the Geneva Conventions?
General Petraeus. Military necessity does not allow a soldier to
use interrogation techniques not authorized by the Geneva Conventions.
Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV requires that Protected Persons/
Civilian Internees ``shall at all times be treated humanely'' by the
Protecting Power. This requirement is an extension of the standards
that must be applied to an Enemy Prisoner of War under Article 13 of
Geneva Convention III.
While the Geneva Conventions does not detail an explicit list of
what constitutes humane or inhumane treatment, the Department of the
Army Field Manual 2-22.3 details approved interrogation approaches that
do not violate the humane treatment standard. Soldiers must follow this
field manual under all circumstances.
AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
2. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, in your statement you mentioned
shortfalls in airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities. Are these capabilities urgently needed?
General Petraeus. ISR platforms are essential to our operations, as
persistent surveillance is required to identify, track, target, and
kill or capture insurgents, and to minimize friendly force and civilian
casualties. Congress and Secretary Gates have been staunch supporters
of our ISR requirements, and the resources we have received have been
critical to the success of our commanders.
Despite this support, however, we still have unmet requirements and
additional capabilities are urgently needed. Shortfalls in ISR decrease
our ability to conduct multiple, simultaneous operations and therefore
may diminish our ability to maintain our hard-won momentum. We also
expect ISR requirements in Iraq to increase rather than decrease in the
near-term as Iraqi forces assume more responsibility for security and a
smaller coalition force continues to transition from leading, to
partnering, to an ISR-intensive overwatch role. Despite the growing
capability of the Iraqi security forces (ISFs), the Iraqis do not yet
have the ISR platforms they would need to be able to conduct fully
independent operations across Iraq. I am working closely on these
issues with Program Analysis and Evaluation Director Brad Berkson who
directs the ISR Task Force for Secretary Gates. Director Berkson's most
recent set of recommendations of actions to increase ISR is very
encouraging. I am also working with another ISR Task Force overseen by
Director Berkson to help identify and prioritize the needs in the ISR
arena to support conventional forces over the longer term.
3. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, the Department of Defense (DOD)
has taken many actions to accelerate and surge all available unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) systems to meet Central Command's (CENTCOM)
requirements for additional surveillance aircraft. Despite this surge,
a substantial shortfall remains, which will not be filled for some
time. From your perspective, is it necessary to wait until the UAV
systems, such as Predator, Warrior, and Shadow, can meet the expanded
requirement or would CENTCOM prefer that the requirement be met as soon
as possible with small manned aircraft?
General Petraeus. Our desire is to meet ISR shortfalls as quickly
as possible. Together with CENTCOM, we are approaching the ISR problem
from a holistic point of view and are concerned less with the air
vehicle itself than with how the air vehicle fits into the larger ISR
system-of-systems to achieve desired effects. Comprehensive solutions
are required, and these must take into account the platform's support
infrastructure; sensor capabilities; communications bandwidth; and
processing, exploitation, and dissemination architectures. It is also
valuable to have a variety of systems which enable the flexibility in
employment our operations require.
Small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector are
already being employed to help fill the ISR platform shortage, and we
will continue to take advantage of such options where they make sense.
They are not, however, the complete answer to our ISR shortfalls, and
we are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense ISR Task
Force to determine which platforms are most effective in meeting our
ISR needs.
4. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, if a large number of small
manned aircraft were acquired to temporarily fill this operational need
until the UAV systems become available, what might be done with the
manned aircraft when CENTCOM no longer needs them?
General Petraeus. Although we currently have a shortfall in ISR
assets in Iraq, should we reach the point when particular assets become
unnecessary, I would advise my chain of command regarding the
availability of those assets. Though I understand that there are also
shortfalls in ISR elsewhere in CENTCOM's area of responsibility,
decisions on the employment of ISR assets outside of Iraq are beyond my
brief as the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander. I would defer to
those who have better visibility on, and the responsibility for, our
worldwide ISR requirements.
5. Senator Levin. General Petraeus, might the manned aircraft be
good candidates to provide to Iraqi forces for intelligence support?
General Petraeus. As we advise and support the development of ISR
capability in the ISFs, we seek to focus on Iraqi requirements rather
than specific platforms. As with our own posture, comprehensive
solutions are required. Given the nascent state of Iraqi ISR
capabilities, issues of particular concern include a given platform's
support infrastructure and training requirements.
Small, manned aircraft may be part of the solution to Iraq's ISR
needs, and, in fact, the ISR platforms currently in use by the Iraqis
are of this type. In decisions about the procurement of additional
capabilities, much will depend on the characteristics of specific
systems and the extent to which these characteristics meet Iraqi needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
MUQTADA AL-SADR
6. Senator Akaka. General Petraeus, the recent violent activity in
Basra under the direction of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, and the
apparent inability of ISFs to confront his militias effectively, are of
great concern to me. Of even greater concern is how quickly the
violence was reduced once al-Sadr ordered them to lay down their arms.
To what degree does al-Sadr control the overall level of violence in
the country, since it would appear to most of us that his word, and not
the presence of increased numbers of U.S. forces on the ground, is what
defines a week of increased bloodshed and insecurity?
General Petraeus. The Sadrist ceasefires have indeed contributed to
a reduction in violence in Iraq, but they came after their militia took
serious losses from combat with the ISFs and coalition forces. Of
greater long-term importance than al-Sadr's decisions themselves,
therefore, are the factors that led him to declare the ceasefires. One
of the primary factors has been the intense pressure on Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) and the Special Groups (SG). Iraqi-led, coalition-enabled forces
have targeted criminal militias and their mafia-like activity, and
Iraqi leaders have demonstrated their willingness to take on militias.
Recent, ongoing operations in Basra and Sadr City have proven
exceedingly lethal to JAM/SG members; over 770 JAM/SG members were
killed in and around Sadr City alone. Iraqi and coalition forces'
activity in large part compelled Sadr's decision to lay down arms.
Another important factor in Sadr's decisions is his need for support
from the base of the Shiite Sadrist movement. Atmospherics in Basra and
Sadr City indicate that most residents were tired of the violence and
of the militia's mafia-like activities and desired a return to
normalcy. Sadr's decisions to lay down arms in both locales were in
part acknowledgments of this trend toward the popular rejection of
violence (a trend that Iran, whose Qods Force funds, trains, and equips
the militia Special Groups, also recognized). Indeed, many leaders of
the Sadrist movement are increasingly leaning toward participation in
the political process as a way to give voice to the legitimate concerns
of the poor, urban, disenfranchised Shiite that they represent.
IRAQI GOVERNMENT
7. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, there has been a lot of
criticism of the Iraqi Government for not doing enough in terms of
taking responsibility for the future of their country. Their
demonstrated inability to effectively allocate their budget resources
to address reconstruction and provide essential services, and their
failed efforts to diplomatically engage the various factions within the
country and bring about reconciliation, are two of the major concerns.
Given what we did not fully understand prior to the 2003 invasion about
the cultural divides within Iraq, would you say that we have expected
too much from the Maliki Government?
Ambassador Crocker. Iraq's leaders have many difficult problems to
tackle, and it will take time to resolve them. We must not
underestimate the ongoing challenges posed by the gravity of the
circumstances and the fragility of the security environment.
Nevertheless, we believe that the Iraqi political leadership is now on
the right track and has the ability to achieve the needed results. They
are making important progress on national reconciliation that will be
essential if Iraq is to become a stable, united, and democratic
country. They can attain this goal with continued support and
encouragement from us and the international community.
In the last few months, there have been significant political and
security accomplishments that greatly advance the prospects for real
national reconciliation. Regular meetings of the recently established
Executive Council (President, Prime Minister, and both Vice Presidents)
have expanded discussions on and improved prospects for consensus on
key issues. There have been active efforts to bring Sunni ministers
from the Tawafuq Party back into the cabinet. Prime Minister al-
Maliki's security campaigns in Basrah and Sadr City garnered widespread
political and popular support in Iraq--and also sent a positive signal
to regional countries concerned about the Maliki Government's
willingness to confront Shia extremists who had operated with relative
impunity. The central government has channeled some $3.5 billion to the
provinces, addressing a key source of sectarian tension--a fair
distribution of Iraq's vast resources, including petroleum revenue--
thereby strengthening provincial-central government ties.
The Iraqi Government is moving ahead on other fiscal decisions
necessary to meet the Iraqi peoples' needs and improve the country's
economic situation. The passing of the budget law in February,
following extensive debate and compromises in the Council of
Representatives, was an important milestone. The government's ability
to provide essential services is improving, and we have seen
improvements in the Government of Iraq's ability to allocate and spend
its own financial resources on Iraq's reconstruction and security. In
2005, for example, Iraq's capital budget was $5 billion. In 2008 it is
$13.1 billion with the possibility of up to $5 billion more in
supplemental funds. Similarly, the Iraqi Government has increased
allocations for security ministries from $2.1 billion in 2005 to
approximately $9 billion in 2008. There have been improvements in
capital and security budget execution at all levels of the government.
Challenges remain and Iraqi political leaders still need to make
some difficult compromises to advance the stability and prosperity
essential for democracy in Iraq. Among the most important of these
compromises is a package of national hydrocarbons legislation that will
establish mechanisms to regulate Iraq's oil and gas sectors, as well as
guidelines by which oil revenue is equitably shared. Agreement on this
legislation would open the way for further reconciliation and economic
development. Other complex problems that the Iraqis must tackle include
resolution of the status of Kirkuk, decisions on Iraq's federal
structure, and the future of refugees and internally-displaced persons.
The Iraqi Government and the people of Iraq have great expectations
for their future. We and Iraq's other international partners will
support them in their endeavors.
8. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Crocker, assuming they are capable of
achieving some sort of real political progress, where is the plan to
put conditions on U.S. and coalition assistance and hold the Iraqis
accountable for failure to reconcile their differences?
Ambassador Crocker. We are pressing Iraqi political leaders across
the board to accelerate actions necessary to promote national
reconciliation--by passing legislation in key areas, completing
constitutional reform, broadening participation by all of Iraq's
communities in the political process, and improving the delivery of
basic services. The United States and Iraq are negotiating a Strategic
Framework, intended to reflect shared United States and Iraqi
political, economic, and security interests going forward.
International agreements like the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)
promote Iraqi progress in key reconciliation-related areas like
economic self-reliance, good governance, rule of law, and civil
society.
Iraqi steps to promote national reconciliation are indeed essential
if Iraq is to become a stable, united and democratic country. The goals
are attainable with continued support and encouragement from us and the
international community.
In fact, we believe that the Iraqi political leadership is now
largely on the right track and that there have been significant
accomplishments that greatly advance the prospects for lasting national
reconciliation; specifically, these include the passage of key
legislation on amnesty, the budget, de-Baathification reform,
provincial powers (including setting a date for provincial elections),
as well as Prime Minister al-Maliki's recent moves against illegal
armed groups in Basrah and Baghdad.
In the end, the Iraqi Government is accountable to the Iraqi
people, not to us. Provincial elections later this year and national
elections to follow will test the government's standing with the Iraqi
people. Iraq's leaders understand the urgent need to show their fellow
citizens that they can govern effectively and that conditions of daily
life will improve. We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis to
build the united, stable, and prosperous country they want while we
recognize that progress toward this end must be made by the Iraqis
themselves.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
TROOP WITHDRAWAL
9. Senator Pryor. General Petraeus, the war in Iraq has resulted in
numerous pieces of legislation calling for the withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Iraq. However, one thing has remained constant in the
language used by both parties: ``except for military personnel needed
for: (1) force protection, (2) counterinsurgency operations, and (3)
training of ISFs.'' As the commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq,
how many troops do you think satisfy this language?
General Petraeus. At the present time, we have achieved the
conditions to enable us to support current policy goals while drawing
down to 15 U.S. Brigade Combat Teams by July 2008. Indeed we have, with
our Iraqi counterparts, helped reduce the number of security incidents
to levels not seen since 2004. If there were a change in policy, such
that the only goals were those listed in the language above, we would
undertake a comprehensive planning effort and make recommendations on
appropriate force levels given the situation at that time. This
planning effort would require dialogue and clarification with regard to
policy objectives and acceptable risk. This planning effort would also
need to take into account operational and strategic considerations.
As I stated in my testimony, operational considerations include
recognition of the following: the military surge has achieved
significant progress, but that progress remains fragile and uneven;
ISFs have strengthened their capabilities, but still must grow further;
provincial elections are expected to occur this fall; refugee returns,
detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundaries
disputes and Article 140 issues will be challenging; the transition of
Sons of Iraq (SOI) into the ISFs or other pursuits will require time
and careful monitoring; and withdrawing too many forces too quickly
could jeopardize the progress of the past year.
A number of strategic considerations would also affect the planning
process. These would include recognition that a number of the security
challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and
global threats, and that a failed state in Iraq would pose serious
consequences for the greater fight against al Qaeda, for regional
stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and
for efforts to counter malign Iranian influence. An additional
strategic consideration is the fact that the strain on the U.S.
military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable in
recent years.
Without dialogue and clarification regarding policy objectives and
acceptable risk, and without an assessment of the relevant operational
and strategic considerations at the time, only a rough estimate of
force levels is possible. Nevertheless, the language above still
suggests a requirement for sizable conventional forces, Special
Operations Forces, and adviser elements.
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
10. Senator Pryor. Ambassador Crocker, in March, Admiral Fallon
provided his written testimony to Congress in advance of his appearance
before the committee. He stated ``the United States is planning to
normalize long-term bilateral relations through a framework agreement
that reflects our shared political, economic, cultural, and security
interests, as well as a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The
documents will allow us maximum flexibility to assist the Government of
Iraq in the fight against al Qaeda, develop its security forces, and
combat harmful influences inside Iraq while, at the same time, protect
our own forces.'' What is the status of those two agreements, the
framework agreement and the SOFA? Do you anticipate that they will be
sent to the Senate for advice and consent?
Ambassador Crocker. We continue to negotiate the terms of our
bilateral strategic and security relationship so as to address both
United States and Iraqi interests. Specific texts remain in flux and
continue to evolve. We intend to share text with the congressional
committee leadership before any agreement is concluded. In the interim,
we will continue to provide briefings to members and staff to update on
the progress of negotiations and the process by which agreements will
be reached.
We expect to conclude the framework agreement and agreement on
status of forces as executive agreements, and do not anticipate that
they will be sent to the Senate for advice and consent.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
OVEREXTENSION OF THE MILITARY
11. Senator Dole. General Petraeus, I think that it is necessary to
step back for a moment and place the war in Iraq within the context of
projected long-term defense spending. I am increasingly concerned that
because long-term defense spending is projected to be profoundly
inadequate, we may lack the funds to complete the planned expansion of
the Army and Marine Corps.
If we are serious about fielding an adequately-sized force, then
let us not simply agree that the current situations in Iraq and
Afghanistan are difficult. Let us speak with a clear voice to the
American people and to this administration and the next that our forces
must be expanded, and let us agree not to pursue these objectives at
the expense of other important areas within future defense budgets. If
we are to actually address this problem, then we must ensure that the
overall defense budget is adequate rather than merely acknowledge the
problems that our troops confront when defense spending is
insufficient. In such cases, rhetoric is a poor substitute for action.
But I want to take this larger point and put it into the context of
Iraq and get to the bottom line of whether or not in your opinion, our
forces are overextended. Specifically, let's focus on what Admiral
Mullen stated last week, that current force levels in Iraq prevent us
from deploying a sufficient number of troops to Afghanistan. In your
opinion, how much longer can the surge be sustained before it does
irreparable harm to the force?
General Petraeus. I am grateful for Secretary Gates' efforts and
Congress' support to ensure we have had the forces and resources we
need for what have been very intensive operations. Clearly, the surge
and multiple overseas deployments have strained the Active and Reserve
components. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been particularly
demanding on our ground forces, and many servicemembers have completed
or are in the midst of second or third deployments. This is obviously
difficult for them and their families. My own family is well acquainted
with this challenge, as I have now been deployed for more than 4\1/2\
years since 2001. Reset of equipment also remains a challenge. Although
it is beyond my brief to assess the overall health of the Services,
this remains a subject about which I am concerned and on which I will
continue to engage in dialogue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Service Chiefs. Despite the challenges, our soldiers
continue to display incredible resilience. The annual Mental Health
Assessment Team survey completed last fall indicated that morale in
Iraq improved this past year, and the 3rd Infantry Division, which is
completing its third tour in Iraq now, has already met its reenlistment
goal for the entire year. We can anticipate that these positive trends
will continue as force levels in Iraq come down to pre-surge levels.
Already we have withdrawn without replacement three Army brigades, two
Marine battalions, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit; a fourth Army
Brigade has transferred responsibility for its sector and is in the
process of redeploying.
TROOP WITHDRAWAL
12. Senator Dole. Ambassador Crocker, many of the major decisions
made concerning our military and political efforts in Iraq, or any war,
are based on best professional assessments. What is your best
assessment of the consequences, both for Iraq and for the region, if we
withdraw before ISFs possess the capability to maintain stability in
the country?
Ambassador Crocker. A premature drawdown of our forces would have
devastating consequences. This could include a rapid deterioration of
local security initiatives and the disintegration of ISFs resulting in
a marked increase in violence, further ethno-sectarian displacement and
refugee flows, and alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with
internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals. Such
a drawdown would exacerbate already challenging regional dynamics,
especially with respect to Iran. Ultimately, a precipitous withdrawal
could increase the probability that coalition forces would have to
return to Iraq to confront an even more dangerous enemy.
ADVISOR PROGRAM IN IRAQ
13. Senator Dole. General Petraeus, we had an extensive advisor
program in Vietnam. After much effort, we've realized that a similar
program in Iraq would yield profound benefits, especially in terms of
maximizing our limited number of personnel and their value in training
Iraqi forces. An experienced group of advisers embedded in an Iraqi
battalion, for example, is a profoundly valuable combat multiplier. In
your professional opinion, why is there opposition to establishing and
sustaining a dedicated training cadre--at least for the duration of the
war?
General Petraeus. There is fairly widespread agreement in our
military today regarding the importance of advisory work in our
counterinsurgency operations, and our Services have made significant
efforts to prepare servicemembers for this role. As an example, our
Military Training and Transition Teams are composed of 10-15 personnel
who undergo significant training prior to their arrival in Iraq. Teams
that are separately sourced by the Army, Navy, and Air Force attend 2
months of training at Fort Riley, KS, and then 10 days of training at
Camp Buehring, Kuwait, while Marine teams train at Twentynine Palms,
CA. Teams that deploy as parts of units conduct training at their home
station, and also participate in training exercises to include Combat
Training Center rotations and Mission Readiness Exercises. All teams,
regardless of how they are resourced, also attend an additional week's
training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq before conducting a 10-
day transition with outgoing teams. The advisory effort is overseen by
the Iraqi Advisory Group, commanded by a brigadier general, which
supports transition teams through their arrival in Iraq, in-theater
training, and redeployment. This extensive training and integration
process augments team members' tactical expertise and relevant
experience and allows them to best pass on that expertise to Iraqi
forces. Significant energy and funds have also been invested in
implementing a robust and rapid lessons learned processes.
As we assist in the development of ISFs, our troopers play a
critical role in teaching, coaching, and mentoring their Iraqi
counterparts. They do this as part of transition teams, but also as
their units partner with Iraqi units in operational, training, and
mentoring relationships.
The advisory efforts currently underway in Iraq are having the
desired effect. Transition teams have significantly assisted Iraqi
units in action, helping in planning and other staff functions while
providing access to key coalition combat enablers. Together with unit
partnerships, advisory teams have helped to move over 100 ISF
battalions into an ``in the lead'' role. As Iraqi forces continue to
develop, coalition forces will continue to transition into more
advisory roles; at some point, as one of my brigade commanders recently
told me, ``We will all be advisors.''
It is not clear that the creation of a dedicated training cadre, or
advisory corps, would produce results better than those being achieved
by our current efforts. In general, the best advisors are those with
recent, relevant experience in units similar to the units they seek to
develop. Instead of creating a separate force, it may be preferable to
incentivize and reward critical advisory work. To that end the Chief of
Staff of the Army recently announced several important personnel
actions that reflect the importance attached to the advisory effort.
PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS
14. Senator Dole. General Petraeus, private security firms have
attracted more than their share of controversy over the past year. The
largest private firm, Blackwater, is located in North Carolina. I agree
entirely that private security personnel must operate under the control
of our military. But my point is to ask for your opinion of the
contributions that these firms and their people make to the overall
effort. How important of a role do these firms play in maintaining
security across Iraq?
General Petraeus. Private Security Contractors (PSCs) and their
employees make critical contributions to the overall effort in Iraq.
These contractors provide static security for coalition facilities, key
infrastructure, and reconstruction projects, and they provide mobile
security for large convoys, work details, and individual high-ranking
officials. The use of PSCs to meet these defensive security needs
enables more of our military forces to focus on active
counterinsurgency and combat operations.
An inability to continue to use PSCs would be enormously disruptive
to our effort to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq. Replacing DOD contractors
with military personnel would require approximately 7,300 additional
military personnel to be trained and deployed to Iraq, plus additional
forces to provide the expanded logistical support required. These
figures do not include the requirements for the dedication and training
of additional military personnel to support rotational requirements,
nor the addition of equipment and vehicles such as MRAPs used by
contractors, which are needed by our combat forces. The loss of PSCs
would delay the drawdown of U.S. forces, could delay the ability of the
Army to reduce combat tours from 15 months to 12 months, and would
require a special training and certification program to be developed
and implemented. The continued use of PSCs can help us sustain the
significant security progress that has been made in Iraq as the level
of security incidents across Iraq for the past month is the lowest it
has been for more than 4 years, and we continue to transition
additional responsibilities to the Iraqi Government and ISFs.
ETHNIC CONFLICT
15. Senator Dole. General Petraeus, we are receiving mixed reports
on the progress of ISFs during recent fighting in Basra, around Sadr
City, and elsewhere. Some number of Iraqi soldiers, and a great number
of Iraqi police, threw down their weapons, refused to fight, or
actually fought alongside militia forces. In some instances, these men
refused to fight against neighbors, as they were from the same
communities. In some instances, ethnic allegiances still hold. In some
cases, soldiers received calls on their cell phones from old colleagues
telling them that if they fought, their families would be murdered. I
appreciate that it takes years to create a national army, and that many
of the recent problems were rooted in planning problems. That said,
what is your response to these recent events, and what would you
recommend to further ensure that soldiers and police think like Iraqis
and less like members of one of the various ethnic groups? Is that even
doable given Iraq's ethnic makeup and the long history of conflict
between Sunnis and Shia?
General Petraeus. Although many Iraqi units performed very well
during operations in Basra and Sadr City, some others performed poorly
in the initial stages, especially in Basra. Some of those who failed to
fight adequately did so as a result of inexperience, while others did
so as a direct result of ethnic/sectarian allegiance or pressure. The
52nd Brigade of the 14th Division, which was a new unit just out of
initial training, had the most widespread difficulties. That unit has
since been provided replacement leaders and troopers and been
retrained, and it is now back in the fight in Basra and doing well. The
strong performance of other, more experienced units suggests that
ethnic/sectarian allegiances can be overcome through the training and
professionalization of security forces. Toward this end, we are
partnering with Iraqi leaders to institutionalize norms of
professionalism, including non-sectarianism. For example, the Iraqi
National Police just instituted a Code of Ethics for its forces, and
the Ministries of Interior and Defense have not hesitated to remove
leaders and troopers who did not measure up in combat operations.
ISF have demonstrated their growing capability and capacity in
recent operations. In Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and other locations in
Iraq, ISF are conducting clearance operations as well as intelligence-
driven raids, successfully extending the Iraqi Government's presence
and control, removing huge amounts of arms, munitions, and explosives
from circulation, and capturing key militant leaders. Iraqi forces
have, for example, found over 170 caches in Sadr City alone in the past
month or so. These operations have demonstrated increased planning
capability, mobility, and tactical competence, as well as an ability to
conduct simultaneous major operations throughout the country. Thanks to
improved security and ISF capability, 8 of 16 Iraqi provinces are under
Provincial Iraqi Control and 2 more provinces are due to transition by
the end of June 2008.
Professionalization of armed forces alone, however, will not
eliminate ethno-sectarian tension and conflict in Iraq. Ultimately, the
Iraqi people must decide to move beyond the use of violence to address
their concerns, including ethnic-sectarian concerns. In large part,
this is already happening. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen
dramatically in Iraq over the last year, signifying that Iraqis have
decided to step back from the brink of civil war. This reduction in
ethno-sectarian violence is attributable not just to the increased
Iraqi and coalition force presence and decreased al Qaeda in Iraq and
militia capabilities, but also to the increasing rejection of violence
by the Iraqi people. This progress has shown us that ethnic conflict in
Iraq is not inevitable and progress is possible.
FUNDING FOR SUNNI SECURITY FORCES
16. Senator Dole. Ambassador Crocker, I cannot stress enough how
important it is that Iraqi political reconciliation must proceed with a
decidedly greater sense of urgency than we have observed to date.
Furthermore, I find it appalling that Prime Minister Maliki refuses to
adequately fund the Sunni security forces recently formed in Anbar
province and elsewhere, while tens of billions of dollars in Iraqi oil
revenue sit in a New York bank. I find it nearly impossible to
understand that Mr. Maliki would subordinate to some other concern the
fact that instability in Anbar and elsewhere jeopardizes the safety of
the Shiite population. His failure in this area jeopardizes all that
has been achieved. Please share your thoughts on the subject.
Ambassador Crocker. We are pressing Iraqi political leaders across
the board to accelerate actions necessary to promote national
reconciliation--by passing legislation in key areas, completing
constitutional reform, broadening participation by all of Iraq's
communities in the political process, improving the delivery of basic
services, and imposing order evenhandedly. International agreements
like the ICI elicit Iraqi progress in key reconciliation-related areas
like economic self-reliance, good governance, rule of law, and civil
society.
Extremists and criminal groups are resisting government control in
several provinces, including Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. As of April
2008, the Government of Iraq was conducting operations to suppress the
extremists and criminal groups in each of those provinces. Such
operations open the door for rapid progress towards national
reconciliation. Iraqi security operations against predominantly Shia
groups encourage former Sunni oppositionists to see the Government of
Iraq as evenhanded in the application of the law. The main Sunni
political coalition, Tawafuq, has boycotted the government for several
months, but Prime Minister Maliki's moves against Shia groups should
facilitate the end of this boycott.
At the same time, the Government of Iraq's ability to eliminate the
Shia criminal groups' sanctuaries can reduce those groups' capacity to
resist government control. Given the close ties between these criminal
groups and Shia political opposition to the Government of Iraq,
suppression of the criminal groups could then lead to submission of
Shia oppositionists.
The Government of Iraq, under Prime Minister Maliki's direction,
has in fact taken many steps to fully fund ISFs in Anbar and elsewhere.
For example, the Ministry of Interior is now fully funding the Anbar
police payroll. Likewise, equipment shortages for the Anbar police are
being resolved. At the grass roots level, the Iraqi Government and the
coalition are working with thousands of members of the ``SOI''--
locally-hired, community-based auxiliaries--who reject extremism and
work with established authorities to stabilize Iraq. The SOI program
enhances the ability of Iraqi and coalition forces to interact with
local residents and obtain information on insurgents and illegal
militia activity, and protect key infrastructure.
The Government of Iraq certainly understands that security in one
province affects the security in other provinces. As noted above, Prime
Minister Maliki's Government is undertaking security operations to
reduce instability and increase the rule of law throughout Iraq, and
the Government of Iraq is performing these operations in a non-
sectarian manner which facilitates national reconciliation.
[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN
MEETING THE BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCain, Warner,
Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Bethany Bassett and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Colleen J.
Shogan, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Richard H.
Fontaine, Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Meghan Simonds and Mark J. Winter, assistants
to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey
Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; and Jason Van Beek, assistant
to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Let us first welcome our panel of witnesses to continue our
committee's series of hearings this week on the situation in
Iraq.
Yesterday, we heard from General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker. Tomorrow afternoon we will hear from Secretary of
Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Today, we're going to hear from three distinguished
witnesses:
Dr. Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations
and history at Boston University, has written extensively on
U.S. national and military strategies and on the situation in
Iraq. He is a retired Army officer and a Vietnam veteran.
General Jack Keane is a former Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army who has visited Iraq several times. He has testified
before the committee previously on this very subject, and is
surely an expert on the subject.
Dr. Robert Malley has also written on the situation in Iraq
from his position as Middle East and North Africa Program
Director at the International Crisis Group. He is a former
member of the staff of the National Security Council (NSC).
It's clear from General Petraeus's testimony yesterday that
the administration's open-ended commitment in Iraq is going to
continue, now reinforced by an open-ended pause. General
Petraeus has recommended to his chain of command that there be
a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation, in his words,
which will then be followed by a ``process of assessment,''
which will determine, over time, when he can make
recommendations for further reductions.
General Petraeus was unwilling to estimate how long this
period of assessment would last, and would not even agree that
it could be concluded in 3 or 4 months and then redeployment
would recommence. This is a far cry from what Secretary Gates
described in February as a projected ``brief pause.'' Moreover,
General Petraeus was unwilling to venture an estimate of U.S.
troop strength in Iraq at the end of the year, even if all goes
well.
It was also clear from General Petraeus's testimony that
Prime Minister Maliki's action in Basrah once again
demonstrated Prime Minister Maliki's incompetence. I asked
General Petraeus about an April 3 article in the New York Times
which said that, before the Iraqi Government's assault on the
Mahdi army in Basrah, that he, General Petraeus, had counseled
Prime Minister Maliki, saying, ``We made a lot of gains in the
past 6 to 9 months that you'll be putting at risk.'' I also
asked General Petraeus about that same article's statement that
he advised Prime Minister Maliki not to rush into a fight
without carefully sizing up the situation and making adequate
preparations. General Petraeus acknowledged that Prime Minister
Maliki did not follow his advice, that the operation was not
adequately planned or prepared. In effect, U.S. troops, with no
control over an Iraqi operation in a province which had already
been turned over to Iraqi control, were drawn into the fight
when that operation went bad.
It is also clear from Ambassador Crocker's testimony that,
after 5 years of training and equipping the Iraqi security
forces (ISFs), and after 5 years of reconstruction, it is still
the American taxpayer who is shouldering the greatest economic
burden in Iraq, while tens of billions of dollars in Iraqi
money sit in bank accounts around the world.
There is a vast agreement--I believe there is a consensus--
that there is no military solution to the situation in Iraq, no
matter how dedicated our troops may be, and no matter how much
military success they achieve. To maximize success in Iraq, the
Iraqi Government must take control--politically, economically,
and militarily. The Iraqis must make the political compromises
to bring all factions into the political system and effect
political reconciliation. They must spend their own oil
revenues to improve the lives of all Iraqi citizens. They must
take the military initiative, using the training and equipment
that we've provided them, to subdue the politically
irreconcilable and criminal elements in Iraqi society. We
cannot do for the Iraqis--what they must do for themselves. The
open-ended commitment that the administration maintains, now
reinforced by a suspension of further U.S. troop reductions
beginning in July, works against getting the Iraqis to take
responsibility for their own country.
We look forward to hearing our witnesses' assessment of the
security situation in Iraq, the political progress in Iraq, and
any recommendations that they may have with respect to a future
U.S. military, political, diplomatic, and economic strategy for
Iraq and the larger region.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming our distinguished panel this
morning, and I want to thank them for their presence here and
their willingness to share their views about U.S. policy and
strategy in Iraq.
Yesterday, we heard from Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus on progress in Iraq and their views of the way
forward. We still have difficulties, as demonstrated by the
recent fighting in Basrah and Baghdad. Yet, the gains outlined
yesterday, in security, political, and economic terms, are
real.
Tomorrow, the President will address the Nation to provide
further information on his decisions about the way ahead in
Iraq, to be followed soon thereafter by the testimony before
this committee by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
With all of these inputs into our policymaking process,
Congress will face, again, the choice it confronted last year.
We can build on the progress we have seen, acknowledging that
there will be setbacks and new difficulties, and give our men
and women in uniform the time and support necessary to carry
out their mission, or we can choose to set a timetable for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, leading to our failure
there, and presenting us with the terrible consequences that I
believe will ensue.
As our witnesses no doubt recall, last year many observers
predicted that the surge would fail. Yet, since the middle of
last year, sectarian and ethnic violence, civilian deaths, and
deaths of coalition forces have all fallen dramatically. This
improved security environment has led to a new opportunity, one
in which average Iraqis can, in the future, approach a more
normal political and economic life. Reconciliation has moved
forward, and over the weekend Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish
leaders backed the Prime Minister in a statement supporting his
operation in Basrah and urging the disbarment of all militias.
Much, much more needs to be done, and Iraq's leaders need to
know that we expect them to show the necessary leadership to
rebuild their country, for only they can. But, today it is
possible to talk with real hope and optimism about the future
of Iraq and the outcome of our efforts there.
Success--the establishment of a peaceful, stable,
prosperous, democratic state that poses no threat to its
neighbors and contributes to the defeat of the terrorists--I
believe is within reach. With success, Iraqi forces can take
responsibility for enforcing security in their country, and
American troops can return home with the honor of having
secured their country's interests, at great personal cost, and
of helping another people achieve peace and self-determination.
I hope our witnesses this morning will address the ways in
which America can best achieve success in Iraq, and articulate,
as well, the likely costs of our failure there.
My view has been clear. Should the United States choose to
withdraw from Iraq before adequate security is established, we
will exchange for victory a defeat that is terrible and
longlasting. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) would proclaim victory and
increase its efforts to provoke sectarian tensions, pushing for
a full-scale civil war that would descend into genocide and
destabilize the Middle East. Iraq would become a failed state
that could become a haven for terrorists to train and plan
their operations. Iranian influence would increase
substantially in Iraq and encourage other countries to seek
accommodation with Tehran at the expense of our interests. An
American failure would almost certainly require us to return to
Iraq or draw us into a wider and far costlier war.
If, on the other hand, we and the Iraqis are able to build
on the opportunity provided by recent successes, we have the
chance to leave in Iraq a force for stability and freedom, not
conflict and chaos. In doing so, we will ensure that the
terrible price we have paid in the war, the price that has made
all of us sick at heart, has not been paid in vain. Our troops
can leave behind a successful mission. Our Nation can leave
behind a country that contributes to the security of America
and the world.
I know the witnesses this morning will have a great deal of
insight to impart on these vitally important issues, and I look
forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Again, let us thank our witnesses for being here, for their
work on this and so many other issues, for their long histories
of good important advice to this Nation in many, many different
fora.
First, we'll call on Dr. Bacevich. I think it would be good
if you could limit your testimony to 10 minutes or less so that
there will be plenty of time for questions. I'm referring to
all three witnesses, not just you, Dr. Bacevich.
Thank you for being here. Dr. Bacevich?
STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BACEVICH, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND HISTORY, BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Bacevich. Thank you for the opportunity to present my
views to this committee.
I'll focus my remarks on two issues: first, near-term
prospects in Iraq; and then, second, the war's larger strategic
implications.
The bottom-line assessment to which I will return is this:
The United States today finds itself with too much war and too
few warriors. We face a large and growing gap between our
military commitments and our military capabilities, and
something has to give.
Let me begin with the current situation in Iraq. Although
violence there has decreased over the past year, attacks on
coalition and ISFs continue to occur at an average rate of 500
per week. This is clearly unacceptable. The likelihood that
further U.S. efforts will reduce the violence to an acceptable
level, however one might define that term, appears remote.
Meanwhile, our military capacity, especially our ability to
keep substantial numbers of boots on the ground, is eroding. If
the surge is working, as some claim, then why not sustain it?
Indeed, why not reinforce that success by sending another
30,000 or 60,000 or 90,000 reinforcements? The answer to that
question is self-evident: because the necessary troops don't
exist. The cupboard is bare.
Furthermore, recent improvements in security are highly
contingent. The Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents, and tribal
leaders who have agreed to refrain from violence in return for
arms, money, and other concessions, have by no means bought
into the American vision for the future of Iraq; their
interests do not coincide with our own, and we should not
delude ourselves by pretending otherwise.
It is as if, in an effort to bring harmony to a fractious,
dysfunctional family, we have forged marriages of convenience
with as many of that family's members as possible. Our
disparate partners will abide by their vows only so long as
they find it convenient to do so.
Unfortunately, partial success in reducing the level of
violence has not translated into any substantial political
gains. Recall that the purpose of the surge was not to win the
war, in a military sense. General Petraeus never promised
victory. He and any number of other senior military officers
have assessed the war as militarily unwinnable.
On this point, the architects of the surge were quite
clear: the object of the exercise was not to impose our will on
the enemy, but to facilitate political reconciliation among
Iraqis.
A year later, signs of genuine reconciliation are few. In
an interview with the Washington Post less than a month ago,
General Petraeus said that, ``No one in the U.S. Government
feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in
the area of national reconciliation.''
While it may be nice that the Kurds have begun to display
the Iraqi flag alongside their own, to depict such grudging
concessions as evidence of an emerging national identity is
surely to grasp at straws.
So, although the violence has subsided somewhat, the war
remains essentially stalemated. Iraq today qualifies only
nominally as a sovereign nation-state. In reality, it has
become a dependency of the United States, unable to manage its
own affairs or to provide for the well-being of its own people.
The costs to the United States of sustaining this
dependency are difficult to calculate with precision, but
figures such as $3 billion per week and 30 to 40 American lives
per month provide a good approximation.
What can we expect to gain in return for this investment?
The Bush administration was counting on the Iraq war to
demonstrate the viability of its freedom agenda and to affirm
the efficacy of the Bush doctrine of preventive war. Measured
in those terms, the war has long since failed. Rather than
showcasing our ability to transform the greater Middle East,
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has demonstrated just the
opposite. Using military power as an instrument for imprinting
liberal values in this part of the world has produced a failed
state while fostering widespread antipathy towards the United
States. Rather than demonstrating our ability to eliminate
emerging threats swiftly, decisively, and economically, the
Iraq war has revealed the limits of American power and called
into question American competence. The Bush doctrine hasn't
worked. Saddam is long gone, but we're stuck. Rather than
delivering decisive victory, preventive war has landed us in a
quagmire.
The abject failure of the freedom agenda and the Bush
doctrine has robbed the Iraq war of any strategic rationale.
The war continues, in large part because of our refusal to
acknowledge and confront this loss of strategic purpose.
Now, there are members of this committee who have written
of their admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr. I happen to share in
that admiration. Perhaps not surprisingly, Niebuhr has much to
say of relevance on this issue. He once observed that, ``Even
the wisest statecraft cannot create social tissue. It can cut,
sew, and redesign social fabric to a limited degree, but the
social fabric upon which it works must be given.''
In Iraq, to the extent that any meaningful social fabric
has ever existed, events have now shredded it beyond repair.
Persisting in our efforts to stitch Iraq back together will
exhaust our Army, divert attention from other urgent problems
at home and abroad, and squander untold billions, most of which
we are borrowing from foreign countries.
Therefore, the best way to close the gap between too much
war and too few warriors is to reduce our commitments. That
means ending the U.S. combat role in Iraq. It means exerting
ourselves primarily through diplomatic means to limit the
adverse consequences caused by our ill-advised crusade in Iraq.
It means devising a new strategy to address the threat posed by
violent Islamic radicalism to replace the failed strategy of
the freedom agenda and the Bush doctrine.
Now, there are people of goodwill, I know, who will
disagree with this assessment. They will insist that we have no
choice but to persevere in Iraq. They will further insist that
restoring the social fabric of Iraq remains an imperative. To
the extent that this counsel carries the day, then the
predictable result will be to exacerbate even further the
problem of having too much war for too few warriors.
Now, war is the realm of uncertainty. There's always the
chance of catching some lucky break. Perhaps next year the
Iraqis will get their act together and settle their internal
differences. Such developments are always possible. They are
also highly unlikely.
When it comes to Iraq, a far more likely prospect is the
following. If the United States insists on continuing its war
there, the United States will get what it wants: the war will
continue indefinitely. According to General Petraeus, a
counterinsurgency is typically a 10- to 12-year proposition.
Given that assessment, and with the surge now giving way to a
pause, U.S. combat operations in Iraq could easily drag on for
another 5 to 10 years. In that event, the conflict that already
ranks as the second longest in our history will claim the title
of longest. Already our second most expensive war, it will
become, in financial terms, the costliest of all. On one point,
at least, Donald Rumsfeld will be able to claim vindication:
Iraq will, indeed, have become a long slog.
Now, for the United States to pursue this course would, in
my judgment, qualify as a misjudgment of epic proportions. Yet,
if our political leaders insist on the necessity of fighting
this open-ended war, then they owe it to those who have already
borne 5 years of combat to provide some relief. Bluntly, if
those in Washington are unable or unwilling to reduce the
number of wars in which U.S. forces are engaged, then surely
they ought to increase the number of warriors available to
fight them.
Today, in a nation that, according to President Bush, is
``at war,'' approximately one-half of 1 percent of the
population is in uniform. Double that figure, and the problem
of too much war for too few warriors goes away. The United
States will then have the troops necessary to sustain Iraq and
also Afghanistan for years to come.
Now, I do not want to minimize the challenges, political as
well as economic, inherent in any such effort to expand our
military, because they would be large. But, I will insist that
continuing on our present course, in which soldiers head back
to Iraq for their third and fourth combat tours while the rest
of the country heads to the mall, will break the Army before it
produces policy success. Worse, our present course, in which a
few give their all while most give nothing, is morally
indefensible.
If the Iraq war is as important as some claim, then
sustaining the war merits a commitment on the part of the
American people both to fight the war and to pay for it. If
neither the American people nor their political leaders are
willing to make such a commitment, then the war clearly does
not qualify as genuinely important, and our loudly proclaimed
determination to support the troops rings hollow. The choice is
one that we can no longer afford to dodge. It's either less war
or more warriors.
I urge the members of this committee to give this matter
the attention it deserves. I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bacevich follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Andrew J. Bacevich
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views to this
committee. I will focus my remarks on two issues: near-term prospects
in Iraq and the war's larger strategic implications.
The bottom line assessment to which I will return is this: the
United States today finds itself with too much war and too few
warriors. We face a large and growing gap between our military
commitments and our military capabilities. Something has to give.
Let me begin with the current situation in Iraq: Although violence
there has decreased over the past year, attacks on coalition and Iraqi
security forces continue to occur at an average rate of 500 per week.
This is clearly unacceptable. The likelihood that further U.S. efforts
will reduce violence to an acceptable level--however one might define
that term--appears remote.
Meanwhile, our military capacity, especially our ability to keep
substantial numbers of boots on the ground, is eroding. If the surge is
working as some claim, then why not sustain it? Indeed, why not
reinforce that success by sending another 30,000 or 60,000 or 90,000
reinforcements?
The answer to that question is self-evident: because the necessary
troops don't exist. The cupboard is bare.
Furthermore, recent improvements in security are highly contingent.
The Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents, and tribal leaders who have
agreed to refrain from violence in return for arms, money, and other
concessions have by no means bought into the American vision for the
future of Iraq. Their interests do not coincide with our own and we
should not delude ourselves by pretending otherwise.
It is as if in an effort to bring harmony to a fractious,
dysfunctional family, we have forged marriages of convenience with as
many of that family's members as possible. Our disparate partners will
abide by their vows only so long as they find it convenient to do so.
Unfortunately, partial success in reducing the level of violence
has not translated into any substantial political gains. Recall that
the purpose of the surge was not to win the war in a military sense.
General Petraeus never promised victory. He and any number of other
senior officers have assessed the war as militarily unwinnable.
On this point, the architects of the surge were quite clear: the
object of the exercise was not to impose our will on the enemy but to
facilitate political reconciliation among Iraqis.
A year later signs of genuine reconciliation are few. In an
interview with the Washington Post less than a month ago, General
Petraeus said that ``no one'' in the U.S. Government ``feels that there
has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national
reconciliation.'' While it may be nice that the Kurds have begun to
display the Iraqi flag alongside their own, to depict such grudging
concessions as evidence of an emerging national identity is surely to
grasp at straws.
So although the level of violence has subsided somewhat, the war
remains essentially stalemated. Iraq today qualifies only nominally as
a sovereign nation-state. In reality it has become a dependency of the
United States, unable to manage its own affairs or to provide for the
well-being of its own people. As recent events in Basra have affirmed,
the Iraqi army, a black hole into which the Pentagon has poured some
$22 billion in aid and assistance, still cannot hold its own against
armed militias.
The costs to the United States of sustaining this dependency are
difficult to calculate with precision, but figures such as $3 billion
per week and 30 to 40 American lives per month provide a good
approximation.
What can we expect to gain in return for this investment? The Bush
administration was counting on the Iraq War to demonstrate the
viability of its Freedom Agenda and to affirm the efficacy of the Bush
Doctrine of preventive war.
Measured in those terms, the war has long since failed. Rather than
showcasing our ability to transform the Greater Middle East, Operation
Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated just the opposite. Using military power
as an instrument for imprinting liberal values in this part of the
world has produced a failed state while fostering widespread antipathy
toward the United States.
Rather than demonstrating our ability to eliminate emerging threats
swiftly, decisively, and economically--Saddam Hussein's removal
providing an object lesson to other tyrants tempted to contest our
presence in the Middle East--the Iraq War has revealed the limits of
American power and called into question American competence. The Bush
Doctrine hasn't worked. Saddam is long gone, but we're stuck. Rather
than delivering decisive victory, preventive war has landed us in a
quagmire.
The abject failure of the Freedom Agenda and the Bush Doctrine has
robbed the Iraq War of any strategic rationale. The war continues in
large part because of our refusal to acknowledge and confront this loss
of strategic purpose.
Now there are members of this committee who have written of their
admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr. I share in that admiration. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the great Protestant theologian has much to say of
relevance to this issue. Niebuhr once observed that ``even the wisest
statecraft cannot create social tissue. It can cut, sew, and redesign
social fabric to a limited degree. But the social fabric upon which it
works must be `given'.''
In Iraq, to the extent that any meaningful social fabric has ever
existed, events have now shredded it beyond repair. Persisting in our
efforts to stitch Iraq back together will exhaust our army, divert
attention from other urgent problems at home and abroad, and squander
untold billions, most of which we are borrowing from foreign countries.
Therefore, the best way to close the gap between too much war and
too few warriors is to reduce our commitments. That means ending the
U.S. combat role in Iraq. It means exerting ourselves, primarily
through diplomatic means, to limit the adverse consequences caused by
our ill-advised crusade in Iraq. It means devising a new strategy to
address the threat posed by the violent Islamic radicalism, to replace
the failed strategy of the Freedom Agenda and the Bush Doctrine.
This reformulation of strategy should begin with an explicit
abrogation of preventive war. It should include a candid recognition
that invading and occupying an Islamic nation in hopes of transforming
it qualifies as a fantasy.
There are people of good will who will disagree with this
assessment. They will insist that we have no choice but to persevere in
Iraq--although to say that the world's sole superpower has ``no
choice'' in the matter suggests a remarkable failure of imagination.
They will insist further that restoring the social fabric of Iraq--
engineering the elusive political reconciliation that will stabilize
the country--remains an imperative.
To the extent that this counsel carries the day, then the
predictable result will be to exacerbate even further the problem of
having too much war and too few warriors.
War is the realm of uncertainty. There's always some chance of
catching a lucky break. Perhaps next year the Iraqis will get their act
together and settle their internal differences. Perhaps next year
Congress will balance the Federal budget. Such developments are always
possible--they are also highly unlikely.
When it comes to Iraq, a far more likely prospect is the following:
if the United States insists on continuing its war there, the United
States will get what it wants: the war will continue indefinitely.
According to General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency is typically a 10-
to 12-year proposition. Given that assessment, and with the ``surge''
now giving way to a ``pause,'' U.S. combat operations in Iraq could
easily drag on for another 5 or 10 years. A large-scale U.S. military
presence might be required for two or three decades.
In that event, the conflict that already ranks as the second
longest in our history will claim the title of longest. Already our
second most expensive war, it will become in financial terms the
costliest of all. On one point at least, Donald Rumsfeld will be able
to claim vindication: Iraq will indeed have become a ``long slog.''
For the United States to pursue this course would in my judgment
qualify as a misjudgment of epic proportions. Yet if our political
leaders insist on the necessity of fighting this open-ended war, then
they owe it to those who have already borne 5 years of combat to
provide some relief.
Bluntly, if those in Washington are unable or unwilling to reduce
the number of wars in which U.S. forces are engaged, then surely they
ought to increase the number of warriors available to fight them.
Today, in a nation that according to President Bush is ``at war,''
approximately one-half of 1 percent of the population is in uniform.
Double that figure and the problem of too much war for too few warriors
goes away. The United States will have the troops necessary to sustain
Iraq (and Afghanistan) for years to come.
I do not want to minimize the challenges, political as well as
economic, inherent in any such effort to expand our military. They
would be large. But I will insist that continuing on our present course
in which soldiers head back to Iraq for their third and fourth combat
tours while the rest of the country heads to the mall will break the
army before it produces policy success. Worse, our present course--in
which a few give their all while most give nothing--is morally
indefensible.
If the war in Iraq is as important as some claim, then sustaining
that war merits a commitment on the part of the American people, both
to fight the war and to pay for it. If neither the American people nor
their political leaders are willing to make such a commitment, then the
war clearly does not qualify as genuinely important. Our loudly
proclaimed determination to ``support the troops'' rings hollow.
The choice is one that we can no longer afford to dodge: it's
either less war or more warriors. I urge the members of this committee
to give this matter the attention it deserves.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. We thank you, Dr. Bacevich, for your
statement.
General Keane?
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.) SENIOR MANAGING
DIRECTOR, KEANE ADVISORS, LLC
General Keane. Senator Levin, Senator McCain, and members
of the committee, thank you for permitting me to provide some
thoughts today on our situation in Iraq.
I just returned from Iraq at the end of March, and visited
three times during 2007. Let me say that the character of my
visits is to spend considerable time with the Iraqi people,
their sheikh and tribal leaders, as well as time with our U.S.
and Iraqi military and civilian leaders, and, of course, our
troops.
It is not my purpose today to repeat the assessment
provided by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker during
their lengthy testimony yesterday. However, I would like to
emphasize some points of my own assessment, albeit similar to
theirs, and draw several conclusions and implications.
First and foremost, we have the most talented and capable
leadership team in Iraq, represented by General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker. Nothing in my 40-plus years in national
security compares to this extraordinary team, who provide the
very best of leadership to their marvelous teammates and
troops.
Let me begin by saying that our strategy in Iraq is
working. Frankly, it is doing so beyond our initial
expectations. The security turnaround in Iraq from the hell of
2006 and 3 years of failed strategy is one of the most stunning
achievements in the annals of counterinsurgency practice. It
was achieved in a matter of months, versus the years I thought
it would take to turn around one of the most formidable
insurgencies the west has ever faced.
Fundamental to that success was the use of proven
counterinsurgency practices to protect the people with
sufficient amount of Iraq and U.S. troops. This was a catalyst
for the widespread Sunni Awakening Movement, which is truly
underappreciated here in the United States. What really
happened is, the sheikhs and tribal leaders decided they could
not achieve their political objectives with al Qaeda in
fighting the United States and the Government of Iraq. As such,
the overwhelming majority of Sunni insurgent leaders made four
strategic decisions: (1) to stop the violence; (2) to leverage
the U.S. leaders to influence the Government of Iraq; (3) to
reconcile with the Government of Iraq; and (4) provide their
``sons,'' to work with us and the Iraqis to help defeat al
Qaeda and protect their own people.
These results are the very best one could expect in
fighting an insurgency. Your opponent not only surrenders, but
comes to your side to assist.
The entire Arab Muslim world is aware of the Sunni
rejection of al Qaeda, the first major occurrence ever where
the people have rejected al Qaeda and their barbaric hold on
them.
Additionally, in a recent poll, over 90 percent of Sunnis
are expected to participate in the political process in the
2008 provincial election and in the general election in 2009.
What does that tell us about reconciliation? Clearly, the
Sunnis are politically reconciling with the Government of Iraq,
and the Government of Iraq is providing some assistance.
The implication of this is that the central region of Iraq
is relatively secure, and now the United States and Iraqi
forces are focusing their efforts on the remaining presence of
al Qaeda in the north. In my view, al Qaeda is already
operationally defeated, and the final campaign against al Qaeda
is underway as we speak. We will complete that defeat of al
Qaeda in the months ahead in 2008.
Make no mistake, this is genuine progress, and it has led
to a significant conclusion. We cannot lose militarily in Iraq,
as we were on the verge of doing in 2006. Al Qaeda and the
remaining hardliner Sunni insurgents cannot mount an offensive
that they could sustain which would threaten the regime.
Are we finished? No. But, we and the Iraqis have the
momentum, we are on the offense, and we can finally see that
winning in Iraq is now a likely outcome.
The remaining major security challenge in Iraq is in the
south, where we must counter the significant Iranian influence.
The Iranians have a comprehensive political, economic,
diplomatic, and military strategy to accomplish two objectives:
(1) to cause the United States to fail in Iraq and withdraw
prematurely, and (2) to support a stable, but weak, Government
of Iraq which is aligned with Iran as a result of their
foothold and leverage in the south of Iraq. As such, the
Iranians have been working their strategy since 2003, and have
made some progress these last 2 years because of our
understandable preoccupation with al Qaeda, to rescue ourselves
from the jaws of defeat in 2007, as well as the British
pullback, which gave the Iranians and their militias a free
hand.
Admittedly, Maliki has taken a much needed first step to
address this problem. As impulsive as he was, and while the
planning and coordination was inadequate, this is the right
course of action. We should not be quick to judge the success
of a campaign by the first few days of action, when we know
this is the beginning of a campaign which will last for months.
My view is, the campaign in the south will not be as difficult
as the fight against al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgents. Indeed,
Maliki's political position has been considerably enhanced,
because all the major political parties are supporting Maliki
against the Sadrists, who are now isolated. In fact, this
weekend Maliki announced that you cannot participate in the
upcoming elections if your political party has a militia. This
has thrown the Sadrists into disarray.
All that said, it is critical to succeed. It is in the
United States national interests to defeat Iran in Iraq. To do
so, we need a U.S. national and regional strategy. General
Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and Mr. Maliki cannot do this by
themselves. The strategy should have a political, diplomatic,
economic, and military component.
In Iraq, there is much potential as we squeeze the militias
militarily and politically. As I said, I believe it'll be much
easier than the al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgents. We can do
much to influence the sheikhs and the tribal leaders to turn
around, as the Sunnis did in the central region. In fact,
Sheikh Muhazem, a leader of the Tamimi tribe in the south,
which is one of the largest tribes in Iraq, stretching from
Basrah to Diyala, is, as we gather here, turning against the
Iranian influence and taking on the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM).
Maliki is encouraging Muhazem, and is providing financial and
military support. This is significant, because we have the
potential to reduce the fighting much more rapidly, as happened
in the central region with the Sunnis.
In any event, the Iraqis and the U.S. forces will bring the
south under security control prior to the provincial elections
in the fall, in my view.
The surge or counteroffensive was always intended to buy
time so that the Iraqis could make political and economic
progress. This is happening. While there is much to be done,
the progress is definable. How can anyone conclude there is no
political progress, when, number one, the Sunnis are
reconciling with a Shiite-dominated government, they stopped
the violence, and are providing 91,000 of their ``sons'' to
assist us? This, after all, was the intent of the much
discussed national legislative benchmarks. Number two, as to
the benchmarks, we, the United States Government, browbeat the
Government of Iraq into submitting to a legislative agenda.
After we have achieved some basic security, the Government of
Iraq has made impressive political progress, passing 12 of the
18 benchmarks and making progress on 5 others. Significantly,
four of the six legislative benchmarks, to include de-
Baathification, amnesty, semi-autonomous regions, and
provincial powers, are passed. Why is it so difficult to
acknowledge that both these points--Sunni reconciliation and
major national legislation--represent significant political
progress?
Much of the discussion and debate surrounds how fast we
should reduce our forces. The fact is, we are reducing our
combat forces some 25 percent in 2008. I believe there will be
further reductions in 2009. We should prepare ourselves that we
may not reduce our forces further in 2008, because of the major
operations in the north and south, and we do not want to
squander the gains in central Iraq.
Our leaders in Iraq want to reduce our forces, as we all
do. But, they simply want it to be measured. Two realities
drive them: the fact that in the past we overestimated Iraqi
capabilities to take over, and the fact that we underestimated
enemy capabilities. They do not want to make those mistakes
again. Erring on the side of caution makes sense, particularly
in view of our hard-earned success.
It is a myth to suggest that by withdrawing rapidly,
somehow that will force the Iraqis to make progress they would
not make by our presence. Anyone who truly knows the situation
in Iraq and the Iraqi leaders realizes it is the American
presence that has aided the Iraqis to make the progress they
have made and will continue to make. Our encouragement, tough-
mindedness, and genuine assistance are major factors in that
success.
To leave and abandon them forces them into isolation, not
reconciliation. It brings out their worst fears, driven by
their paranoia about the past, that the Shiites are on their
own and all their enemies are around them. What is needed is
our continued, but not open-ended, presence to further our
mutual objectives.
One final point about our ground forces. I welcome the
comments of Dr. Bacevich, that we need to expand them. They are
not only magnificent, but are performing to a standard not seen
in any previous conflict. They are not a broken force, or near
broken. Their discipline, morale, competence, behavior, and
courage is extraordinary, and it is so with the knowledge that
many Americans do not support the war, but do support them.
Are they stressed, and their loved ones as well, by the
repeated deployments? Of course they are. This is a proud,
resilient force that has no quit in it. They have a dogged
determination to succeed. We are fighting two wars that are in
our national interests, and I have known, since September 11,
that our force, which I was a part of, was committed to protect
the American people by staying on the offense against our
enemies. They want to win, and they will. They do not want to
be a party to choosing defeat or to be a part of an Army or
Marine Corps that suffers a humiliating defeat.
That stark reality will break the force. Fighting
protracted wars in our history has always stressed our forces.
Doing what we can to reduce the impact is critical. But,
choosing victory is, hands down, the best answer.
I said, earlier, we cannot lose militarily, and that should
be clear; but we can lose politically because we lose our will
here at home, we lose our determination to work through
difficulty and uncertainty. I ask you to find the will and,
yes, the courage our soldiers display routinely to persevere
and to not give in to understandable frustration and to support
the judgments of our gifted commander and ambassador.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN John M. Keane, USA (Ret.)
Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee. Thank
you for permitting me to provide some thoughts today on our situation
in Iraq. I just returned from Iraq at the end of March and visited
three times during 2007 (February, May, and August).
Let me say that the character of my visits is to spend considerable
time with the Iraqi people, their Sheik and Tribal leaders, as well as,
time with our U.S. & Iraqi military and civilian leaders and, our
troops.
It is not my purpose, today, to repeat the assessment provided by
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker provided during their lengthy
testimony yesterday. However, I would like to emphasize some points of
my own assessment, albeit similar to theirs, and draw several
conclusions and implications.
First and foremost, we have the most talented and capable
leadership team in Iraq represented by General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker. Nothing in my 40-plus years in national security compares to
this extraordinary team who provide the very best of leadership to
their marvelous teammates and troops.
The security turnaround in Iraq, from the hell of 2006 and 3 years
of failed strategy, is one of the most stunning achievements in the
annals of counter-insurgency practice. It was achieved in a matter of
months vs. the years it normally takes to turnaround one of the most
formidable insurgencies the west has ever faced. Fundamental to that
success was the use of proven counterinsurgency practice, to protect
the people, with sufficient amount of Iraq and U.S. troops. This was a
catalyst for the widespread Sunni awakening movement, which is truly
under appreciated here in the U.S. What really happened is the Sheiks
and Tribal leaders decided they could not achieve their political
objectives with the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), in fighting the U.S. and
the Government of Iraq (GOI). As such, the overwhelming majority of
Sunni leaders made four strategic decisions to: (1) stop the violence;
(2) leverage the U.S. leaders to influence the GOI; (3) reconcile with
the GOI; and (4) provide their ``sons'' to work with us and the Iraqis
to help defeat the AQI and protect their own people. These results are
the very best one could expect in fighting an insurgency; your opponent
not only surrenders, but comes to your side, to assist. The entire Arab
Muslim world are aware of the Sunni rejection of AQI, the first major
occurrence, ever, where the people have rejected the AQI and their
barbaric hold on the them. Additionally, in a recent poll over 90
percent of Sunnis are expected to participate in the political process
in the 2008 provisional election and in the general election in 2009.
What does that tell us about reconciliation? Clearly the Sunnis are
politically reconciling with the GOI and the GOI is assisting.
The implication of this is that the central region of Iraq is
relatively secure and now the U.S. and Iraqi forces are focusing their
efforts on the remaining presence of AQI in the north. In my view, the
AQI are already operationally defeated and the final campaign against
AQI, is underway as we speak. We will complete the defeat of AQI in the
months ahead in 2008.
Make no mistake this is genuine progress and has led to a
significant conclusion. We cannot lose militarily in Iraq, as we were
on the verge of doing in 2006. The AQI and remaining hardliner Sunni
insurgents cannot mount an offensive, that they could sustain, which
would threaten the regime. Are we finished, no, but we and the Iraqis
have the momentum, we are on the offense and we can finally see that
winning in Iraq is, now, a likely outcome.
The remaining major security challenge in Iraq is in the south
where we must counter the significant Iranian influence. The Iranians
have a comprehensive political, economic, diplomatic and military
strategy to accomplish two objectives: (1) to cause the U.S. to fail in
Iraq and withdraw prematurely; and (2) to support a stable but weak
GOI, which is aligned with Iran as a result of their foothold and
leverage in the south of Iraq. As such, the Iranians have been working
their strategy since 2003 and have made some real progress these last 2
years because of our understandable preoccupation with AQI, to rescue
ourselves from the jaws of defeat in 2007, as well as the British pull-
back, which gave the Iranians and their militias a free hand.
Admittedly, Maliki, has taken a much needed first step to address
this problem. As impulsive as he was and while the planning and
coordination was inadequate this is the right course of action. We
should not be quick to judge the success of a campaign by the first few
days of action when we know this is the beginning of a campaign which
will last for months. My view is, the campaign in the south will not be
as difficult as the fight against AQI and the Sunni insurgents. Indeed
Maliki's political position has been considerably enhanced because all
the major political parties are supporting Mailiki against the
Sadirists, who are now isolated. In fact, this weekend Maliki announced
that you cannot participate in the upcoming elections if your political
party has a militia. This had thrown the Sadirists into disarray.
All that said, it is critical to succeed. It is in the U.S.
national interests to defeat Iran in Iraq. To do so, we need a U.S.
national and regional strategy to defeat Iran in Iraq. General
Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and Mr. Maliki cannot do this by
themselves. This strategy should have a political, diplomatic, economic
and military component. In Iraq there is much potential as we squeeze
the militias militarily and politically, they will fold much easier
than AQI and Sunni insurgents. We can do much to influence the Sheiks
and Tribal leaders to turnaround as the Sunnis did in the central
region. In fact Sheik Muhazem a leader of the Tamimi tribe in the
south, which is one of the largest tribes in Iraq, stretching from
Basra to Dyala, is as we gather here, turning against the Iranian
influence and the JAM. Maliki is encouraging Muhazem and is providing
financial and military support. This is significant, because we have
the potential to reduce the fighting much more rapidly, as happened in
the central region with the Sunnis. In any event, the Iraqis and U.S.
forces will bring the south under security control, prior to election
in the fall.
The surge or counter-offensive was always intended to buy time so
that the Iraqis could make political and economic progress. This is
happening and while there is much to be done, the progress is
definable. How can anyone conclude there is no political progress when:
(1) the Sunnis are reconciling with a Shia dominated government,
stopped the violence, and are providing 91,000 of their sons to assist
us. This after all was the intent of the much discussed national
legislative benchmarks. (2) As to the benchmarks, we the U.S.
Government, ``brow-beated'' the GOI into submitting to a legislative
agenda. After we achieved some basic security, the GOI has made
impressive political progress--passing 12 of 18 benchmarks and making
progress on 5 others. Significantly, four out of six legislative
benchmarks including, debathification, amnesty, semi-autonomous regions
and provincial powers are passed. Why is it so difficult to acknowledge
that both these points, Sunni reconciliation and major national
legislation, represent significant political progress?
Much of the discussion and debate surrounds how fast we should
reduce our forces. The fact is we are reducing our combat forces some
25 percent in 2008. The fact is there will be further reduction for
sure in 2009. We should prepare ourselves that we may not reduce our
forces further in 2008 because of the major operations in the north and
south while not squandering the gains in central Iraq. Our leaders in
Iraq want to reduce our forces, as we all do, but they simply want it
to be measured. Two realities drive them, the fact that in the past we
overestimated Iraqi capabilities to take over and the fact that we
under estimated enemy capabilities. They do not want to make those
mistakes again. Erring on the side of caution makes sense,
particularly, in view of our hard-earned success. It is a myth to
suggest by withdrawing rapidly, somehow, that will force the Iraqis to
make progress they would not make by our presence. Anyone who truly
knows the situation in Iraq and the Iraqi leaders, realizes that it is
the American presence that has aided the Iraqis to make the progress
they have made and will continue to make. Our encouragement, tough-
mindedness and genuine assistance are major factors in that success. To
leave and abandon them, forces them into isolation, not reconciliation.
It brings out their worst fears, driven by their paranoia about the
past, that the Shia's, are on their own and their enemies are all
around. What is needed is our continued, but not open-ended, presence
to further our mutual objectives.
One final point, about our ground forces; not only are they
magnificent but are performing to a standard not seen in any previous
conflict. They are not a broken force or near broken. Their discipline,
morale, competence, behavior and courage is extraordinary and it is so
with the knowledge that many of the American people do not support the
war, but do support them. Are they stressed and their loved ones as
well, by the repeated deployments, of course they are. But this is a
proud, resilient force, that has no quit in it, they have a dogged
determination to succeed. We are fighting two wars that are in our
national interest and I have known since September 11, our force, which
I was a part of it, was committed to protect the American people by
staying on the offense against our enemies. They want to win, and they
will, they do not want to be a party to choosing defeat, or to be a
part of an Army or Marine Corps that suffers a humiliating defeat. That
stark reality will break the force. Fighting protracted wars in our
history has always stressed our forces. Doing what we can do to reduce
the impact is critical but choosing victory is hands-down the best
answer.
I said earlier we cannot lose militarily and that should be clear,
but we can lose politically because we lose our will, here at home,
lose our determination to work through difficulty and uncertainty. I
ask you to find the will, and yes the courage, our soldiers display
routinely, to persevere, to not give in to your understandable
frustration and to support the judgments of our gifted commander and
ambassador.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Keane.
Dr. Malley?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Dr. Malley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the committee.
This hearing comes at yet another important time in our
debate over the future of our strategy in Iraq. Some argue that
the surge has been a success, and therefore, we should
perpetuate our stay. Others argue that it has been a failure,
and therefore, we need to leave promptly.
In my view, it's the wrong question, addressed in the wrong
way, and it inevitably will lead to wrong answers. The question
of troop level and the pace of our withdrawal should be the
dependent variable, not the independent variable.
The real question is how and to what extent our troop
presence is serving coherent, articulable, policy objectives.
I was a surge skeptic. I admit, and I am happy to admit,
that the surge has exceeded, by far, my expectations, in terms
of what it could achieve. Part of it is because of the planning
that was done, partly for reasons that were serendipitous, and
partly coincidental. But, at the core I believe it reflects a
conceptual revolution at the heart of the military. Our
military commanders in Iraq displayed, for the first time, real
and sophisticated understanding of the dynamics in Iraq, which
gave them the ability to carry out new policies and take
advantage of new dynamics. As a result, as General Keane just
described, the violence is down, areas have been pacified, and
the sectarian war that was unfolding in 2005-2006 has virtually
come to a halt. The end result is that the prospect of a
single, devastating civil war has been replaced by the reality
of smaller, more manageable ones.
But, if I'm no longer a surge skeptic, I remain very much a
skeptic of the policy it's purported to serve.
Yesterday, we heard testimony from General Petraeus and my
friend Ambassador Crocker, and the key questions that they were
asked were: What's the objective of our policy? To what end are
we pursuing our military enterprise? Until when? I was left--
and I don't think I'm alone--profoundly frustrated and
dissatisfied by the answers we got.
Therefore, my sense today is that, after 4 years, where the
U.S. administration pursued a lofty strategy about building a
democratic Iraq and transforming the region, but obviously had
no realistic tactics to achieve that goal, today, for the first
time, we have smart, intelligent, subtle tactics, only to find
ourselves bereft of a strategy that they're supposed to serve.
The starting point, for me, needs to be two fundamental
realities, and from there we need to devise a clear policy.
Reality number one is that a U.S. withdrawal at this time
under these conditions--a failed state, a fragmented polity,
with interference from foreign countries, with the fragility of
Iraq and the rise of jihadism--would be a huge setback to U.S.
interests, and I think we cannot deny that fact. It would leave
Iraq as a failing state. It would probably lead to escalating
internecine and sometimes perhaps horrific violence. It would
lead to regional involvement in Iraq at a time of great tension
in the Middle East. Ultimately, it would weaken our posture in
the Middle East. That's reality number one.
But, there is reality number two, which is that our
continued presence every day that we remain in Iraq also comes
with a very heavy price tag. There's a human toll I don't need
to evoke any further. There is the drain on our resources. Our
military is overstretched. Our readiness is being undercut. Our
room to maneuver in other critical issues, such as dealing with
Iran, is automatically limited when we are so taken by the
combat in Iraq, and our standing, our prestige, and our
credibility throughout the region is being eroded.
Both realities are true, and we have to take both of them
into account. That leads me to say that our policy objective
should be to create a local environment in Iraq and a regional
environment in the region that would minimize the damage to our
interests, to the Iraqis' well-being, and to the regional
environment, as a whole, of the inevitable departure of our
troops. That's the task that U.S. policymakers should be
pursuing. How do we minimize the damage to ourselves, to the
Iraqis, and to the region of a departure that's going to have
to take place probably sooner rather than later?
If that's the objective, two things, in my view, need to be
at the core of U.S. policy.
First, we need to press the Iraqi Government, our Iraqi
allies, to take the steps they have not taken up until now.
They're the ones who could change the Iraqi local environment,
not us.
Second of all, we need to devise a more coherent regional
strategy in order to lessen the tensions and make sure that
when we leave Iraq, Iraq doesn't become a magnet for foreign
interference and doesn't become a source of further instability
throughout the region.
Is the U.S. policy currently pursuing either one of those
objectives? I see no evidence that it is. For me, two facts,
two startling facts, put this in stark relief.
The first fact is that our best Iraqi allies in the surge,
those who have allowed the progress that's been made, have not
been the people we brought to power, the people we've provided
with military and financial resources, the people who we
protect. The people who have been our best allies are the
former insurgents, our former enemies. In fact, the ones who we
brought to power, protect, and promote are obstacles and are
threatening the success of the surge, because they are
dithering in putting in place the kind of policies that the
surge was supposed to lead to.
So, what our U.S. troops have been able to achieve through
their military actions, the Iraqi Government is threatening to
undo because of its political dithering. That's a stunning
indictment, to think that those who have helped us are those
who we used to be fighting, and those who are standing in the
way are those who could not survive, who could not be in power
without our support.
So, we have done our part with the surge. Our allies have
not. Our allies are threatening, every day by their actions,
the sustainability of the surge. By not bringing together a
political compact, they risk alienating the Sons of Iraq, the
Awakening Councils, and the concerned local citizens who may
see, in the end, that they don't have a possible partner in
this government. If they don't create neutral, nonpartisan
state institutions, then you'll find the tribes will simply
become another force in a multilayered conflict. If they take
action, as they did in Basrah--and I'll come back to that
later--they risk undoing the benefits of Muqtada al Sadr's
unilateral cease-fire. Time and again, we're seeing, through
their actions, that they are threatening the gains that we
achieved.
Now, the second fact that I think brings into stark relief
the problems that our policy faces is that our allies in Iraq,
those same allies I just was describing, are also the allies of
our arch enemy, Iran. Iran, who we claim is trying to
destabilize Iraq, and Iran who we claim is our number-one enemy
in the region. So, we're fighting Iran while our Iraqi partners
are partnering with Tehran. We're siding in this Iraqi intra-
civil war with Iran's allies.
These two fundamental contradictions, inconsistencies, and
the incoherence at the heart of our policy tells me, as starkly
as it could, that we do not have a coherent policy, that our
troops are performing admirably, but not in pursuit of a policy
that anyone could articulate. Therefore, what it means is that
they are being forced to carry a disproportionate burden--in
many ways, the exclusive burden--in pursuit of unreachable
goals, inconsistent objectives, and an inordinate and rising
cost.
There is an alternative policy, I believe, and it has to be
articulated around three fundamental pillars. The first is to
put more pressure on Maliki's Government, real pressure. The
second is to engage in real regional diplomacy, including and
especially with Iran and Syria. The third is to transition
towards a longer-term nonmilitary commitment investing in
Iraq's resources.
As to the first, as I said, the key is to put pressure on
our allies to do what they have been asked to do, time and
again, and have not done. Despite all the benchmarks that we
could recite, they have not created a national compact, they
have not reached out in the way they need to, they have not
created a nonsectarian, impartial state. They're not even on
the way towards doing it.
To be credible, if we do want to put pressure on this
government, we, the United States, have to be comfortable with
the prospect of withdrawing from Iraq, even under less than
auspicious circumstances. Unless and until we are convinced
that we are prepared to take that step, there's no reason for
the Maliki Government to believe it, and there's no reason for
Maliki and his people to take any risk. Why should they? For
what reason should they alienate their own constituency,
threaten their fragile coalition, when they know that we're
there to stay, they know that we won't ask them any questions,
they know there's no consequences for their inaction, and they
know we will continue to back them up.
This is not a matter of benchmarks or artificial deadlines.
That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that we have to be blunt
with the Maliki Government, that if they don't do what we've
asked them to do for several years, we cannot stay. It's not
necessarily our first choice, but it will be the inevitable
one. We can't tie our success to Maliki's survival. We can't be
hostage to what he does or doesn't do. Given the gap between
what U.S. troops can do and what needs to be done in Iraq, in
fact, paradoxically the greatest leverage our troops have is
the threat that they might withdraw and take away the support
that they're giving to the Government of Maliki. There are
other ways in which we need to turn from unconditional support
to conditional support. We should stop all assistance to units
of their army, to Iraqi commanders in the field who we know to
be partisan, sectarian, and pursuing partisan and sectarian
agendas. We should condition our assistance to any equip-and-
train mission to proper vetting of the security forces.
The second pillar is regional diplomacy. We can't try both
to stabilize Iraq and destabilize Iran. Those two policies are
at war with one another. We have to choose. If we want to
stabilize Iraq, we're going to have to come to terms with
Iran's role in Iraq, which is deep and which will become even
deeper. They have cultural, historical, military, and religious
tools that we simply lack. They are there, and they'll be there
for a very long time. So, if our priority is Iraq, we need to
enter into tough bargaining with Iran. Iraq will be one of the
issues on the table, but not the only one.
The third, as I said, and there's more in my testimony, is
a long-term commitment to Iraq's depleted human resources.
What happened in Basrah, for me, is a microcosm of
everything that's gone astray, everything that went astray. It
was initiated by the Iraqi Government without our agreement,
and it was ended by the Iranian regime without our involvement.
It was an episode of an intra-Shiite civil war in which we were
dragged in as if we had no influence, no leverage, and no say.
To me at least, it was dumbfounding.
So, to conclude, the question is: Is our mission on the
path to minimizing the cost to our strategic interests, to the
Iraqi people's well-being, and to regional stability of a
withdrawal that, sooner or later, must occur, or are we simply
postponing the most likely scenario: Iraq's collapse into a
failed state, protracted violence, and foreign meddling? We
should be clear, either there's a national compact and
reconciliation and steps toward a nonsectarian, nonpartisan
state and state institutions, in which case we will negotiate
the terms of our departure and the pace of our departure, or
those steps are not taken and we have no business continuing
with this war.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Malley follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Robert Malley
Mr. Chairman: Let me begin by expressing my deep appreciation for
the invitation to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
This hearing comes at an important time, when some argue that the
surge's success dictates continuation of the U.S. military presence
while others claim the surge's underlying failure commands a relatively
prompt military withdrawal.
The issue and the stakes involved merit a different deliberation. I
long have believed that the matter of troop levels, which absorbed so
much of the debate 1 year ago and maintains its centrality today, is a
misleading question that has spawned misguided answers. On its own, and
in the absence of significant policy changes, the addition of troops
can have an impact, perhaps even an important one. But, by its very
nature, that impact inevitably will be temporary, reversible and
inadequate.
The surge is a case in point. Its achievements--some planned, some
serendipitous, others purely coincidental--should not to be belittled.
The military campaign calmed areas that had proved particularly violent
and inaccessible, such as Anbar and several Baghdad neighborhoods and
essentially halted sectarian warfare. Sunni leaders, both tribal
elements and former insurgent commanders, turned against al Qaeda in
Iraq and reached deals with U.S. forces. Until recently at least, the
Sadrist movement abided by a unilateral ceasefire and avoided
confronting coalition troops. All in all, U.S. commanders in the field
displayed a degree of sophistication and knowledge of local dynamics
without precedent during the long course of this war. The end result
can be summed up as follows: the prospect of a single, devastating
civil war has given way to the reality of a series of smaller, more
manageable ones.
But the question is: then what? What higher purpose will these
successes serve? Are they putting the United States on a path that will
allow it to minimize the costs to our strategic interests, the Iraqi
people's well-being and regional stability of a withdrawal that, sooner
or later, must occur? Or are they simply postponing what still remains
the most likely scenario: Iraq's collapse into a failed and fragmented
state, protracted and multi-layered violence, as well as increased
foreign meddling that risks metastasizing into a broader proxy war?
As late as yesterday, we still have not received convincing answers
to these fundamental questions. For the first 4 years of this war, the
administration pursued a lofty strategy--the spread of democracy
throughout the Middle East; Iraq as a regional model--detached from any
realistic tactics. The risk today is that, having finally adopted a set
of smart, pragmatic tactics, it finds itself devoid of any overarching
strategy.
The tactical successes associated with the surge offer a fragile
but genuine opportunity to reassess our overall approach and put the
emphasis where it needs to be: steps by the U.S. administration to
credibly pressure the Iraqi Government and alter the regional climate.
This entails ceasing to provide the Iraqi Government with unconditional
military support; using our leverage and the threat of withdrawal to
encourage progress toward a broad national compact and a non-sectarian,
impartial state; designing a long-term program of cooperation to
replenish Iraq's depleted human resources; and, importantly, engaging
in real diplomacy with all of its neighbors, Iran and Syria included.
If, however, this administration or its successor is not prepared
to undertake such a paradigm shift, then our Nation has no business
sending its men and women in harm's way. It has no business squandering
its resources on a multilayered civil war. It will be time to bring
this tragic policy to a close through the orderly withdrawal of
American troops.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset it is important to recognize what has
occurred since the surge was announced and which exceeded many
observers' expectations, mine and my colleagues included. My assessment
is based on the longstanding fieldwork performed by the International
Crisis Group's staff and consultants who have been in Iraq repeatedly,
inside and outside the Green Zone, in contact with officials,
militiamen, insurgents and ordinary citizens, almost without
interruption since the war began.
The surge in some cases benefited from, in others encouraged and in
the remainder produced a series of politico-military shifts affecting
the Sunni and Shiite communities. One of the more remarkable changes
has been the realignment of tribal elements in Anbar, known as the
Awakening Councils or sahwat, and former insurgents, now referred to as
Sons of Iraq. This was largely due to increased friction over al Qaeda
in Iraq's brutal tactics, proclamation of an Islamic State and
escalating assaults on ordinary Iraqis labeled traitors or apostates
(including policemen, civilians, and mere cigarette smokers). Opting to
break with al Qaeda, they chose to cooperate with the U.S.
In both cases, tribal and insurgent decisions were aided by
enhanced military pressure on al Qaeda resulting from augmented U.S.
troops and in both instances U.S. forces displayed far greater subtlety
and sophistication than at any prior point. All parties benefited. U.S.
forces gained access to the tribes' and former insurgents' in-depth
knowledge of local topography and human environment; conversely, groups
collaborating with the coalition typically ended up with greater
control over relevant areas. As a result of cooperation between the
Awakening Councils, the Sons of Iraq and U.S. forces, large areas of
Anbar were pacified and Baghdad neighborhoods regained a measure of
stability.
Among Shiites, the most significant evolution was Muqtada al-Sadr's
August 2007 unilateral ceasefire. The decision was made under heavy
U.S. and Iraqi pressure and as a result of growing discontent from
Muqtada's own Shiite base. The Sadrists were victims of their own
success. Throughout 2006 and early 2007, the movement was on a steady
rise, controlling new territory, attracting new recruits, accumulating
vast resources and infiltrating the police. But there was a flip side.
The vastly increased wealth, membership and range of action led to
greater corruption, weaker internal cohesion and a popular backlash.
Divisions within the movement deepened, splinter groups--often little
more than criminal offshoots--proliferated. As a result, anti-Sadrist
sentiment grew, including among Muqtada's constituency.
The U.S. surge worsened the Sadrists' situation, checking and, in
some instances, reversing the Mahdi Army's territorial expansion. The
August 2007 clashes in Karbala between members of Muqtada's movement
and the rival Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) further
eroded the Sadrists' standing. In reaction, Muqtada announced a 6-month
freeze on all Mahdi army activities which he subsequently prolonged in
February 2008. The decision reflects a pragmatic calculation that a
halt in hostilities would help Muqtada restore his credibility, give
him time to reorganize his forces and wait out the U.S. presence. Sunni
and Shiite ceasefires were mutually reinforcing, as the need to defend
one's community from sectarian attacks receded. Sectarian warfare
largely came to an end.
Other factors account for the reduction in violence. These include
a welcome shift in U.S. military posture toward population protection,
shifting forces from large bases to the frontlines of the unfolding
civil war, establishing neighborhood patrols and in particular filling
the security vacuum in Baghdad. They also include the less welcome fact
that, by the time the surge was in place, sectarian-based armed groups
had divided up the capital into separate fiefdoms in which they held
their increasingly homogenized population hostage. All in all, however,
the surge benefited from a conceptual revolution within the U.S.
military leadership, which gave U.S. forces the ability to both carry
out new policies and take advantage of new dynamics. Had it remained
mired in past conceptions, propitious evolutions on the ground
notwithstanding, we would today be facing a very different and bleaker
situation.
On their own, absent an overarching strategy for Iraq and the
region, these tactical victories cannot turn into genuine successes.
Yet, as far as one can tell, the tasks being performed by U.S. troops
are disconnected from a realistic, articulated political strategy vis-
a-vis Iraq or the region. What objectives are U.S. troops trying to
accomplish? What is an acceptable endstate? What needs to be done and
by whom? None of these questions has an answer, and they expose the
limits of the surge's tactical success.
Without genuine efforts by the Maliki Government to reach a new
political compact, the surge's achievements are insufficient. By
President Bush's own standards, the military surge was useful only to
the extent it led the Iraqi Government to forge a national consensus,
recalibrate power relations and provide Sunnis in particular with a
sense their future is secure. Observers may legitimately differ over
how many of the administration's eighteen benchmarks have been met.
None could reasonably dispute that the government's performance has
been utterly lacking. The government's inadequate capacity cannot
conceal its absence of will: True to its sectarian nature, and loath to
renounce its exclusive hold on power, the Maliki Government has
actively resisted moving toward compromise. Why not? It has no logical
reason to alienate its core constituency and jeopardize its fragile
political makeup when inaction has no consequence and the U.S. will
always back it up.
A small number of agreements have been reached and are regularly
trumpeted by the administration. But they have made virtually no
difference. In the absence of a basic political consensus over the
nature of the state and distribution of power and resources, passage of
legislation is only the first, and often the least meaningful step.
Most of these laws are ambiguous enough to ensure that implementation
will be postponed or the battle over substance converted to a struggle
over interpretation. In the absence of legitimate, representative and
effective state and local institutions, implementation by definition
will be partisan and politicized. To date, such has been the fate of,
inter alia, the constitutional review, the Justice and Accountability
Law, and the Provincial Powers Law--each one giving rise to
controversy, some having done more harm than good, and none being
meaningfully carried out. What matters is not chiefly whether a law is
passed in the Green Zone. It is how the law is carried out in the Red
Zone.
Without establishment of a more inclusive, less partisan and
sectarian Iraqi political and security structure, the surge's
achievements are reversible. Among Sadrist rank and file, impatience
with the ceasefire already is high and growing. They equate it with
loss of power and resources, believe the U.S. and ISCI are conspiring
to weaken the movement and eagerly await Muqtada's permission to resume
the fight. The Sadrist leadership has resisted the pressure, but in
light of recent events in Basra and Sadr City, this may not last. The
answer is not military. The Sadrists are as much a social as they are a
political or military phenomenon. They enjoy wide and deep support,
particularly among young Shiites. Excessive pressure, particularly
without political accommodation by current power-holders, is likely to
trigger both fierce Sadrist resistance in Baghdad and an escalating
intra-Shiite civil war in the south. Again, those trends have been much
in evidence over recent weeks.
Among Sunnis, mood and calculations also could readily alter. The
turn against al Qaeda is not necessarily the end of the story. While
some tribal chiefs, left in the cold after Saddam's fall, found in the
coalition a new patron eager to provide resources, this hardly equates
with a genuine, durable trend toward Sunni Arab acceptance of and
participation in the political process. For them, as for the Sons of
Iraq in general, it is chiefly a tactical alliance--forged to confront
an immediate enemy (al Qaeda) or the central one (Iran). Any
accommodation has been with us, not between them and the government. It
risks coming to an end if the ruling parties do not agree to greater
power sharing and if Sunnis become convinced the U.S. is not prepared
to side with them against Iran or its perceived proxies; at that point,
confronting the greater foe (Shiite militias or the Shiite-dominated
government) once again will take precedence.
Even al Qaeda in Iraq cannot be decisively defeated through U.S.
military means alone. While the organization has been significantly
weakened and its operational capacity severely degraded, its deep
pockets, fluid structure, and ideological appeal to many young Iraqis
mean it will not be irrevocably vanquished. The only genuine and
sustainable solution is a state that extends its intelligence and
coercive apparatus throughout the territory, while offering credible
alternatives and socio-economic opportunities to younger generations.
Without steps to build a more effective, legitimate central state,
the surge's achievements could portend a serious strategic setback. The
U.S. is bolstering a set of actors operating at the local level, beyond
the realm of the state or the rule of law and imposing their authority
by sheer force of arms. The tribal awakening in particular has
generated new fault lines in an already divided society as well as new
potential sources of violence in an already multilayered conflict. Some
tribes have benefited heavily from U.S. assistance, others less so.
This redistribution of power almost certainly will engender instability
and rivalry between competing tribes, which in turn could give rise to
intense feuds--an outcome on which some insurgent groups are counting.
None of this constitutes steps toward consolidation of the central
government or institutions; all could very easily amount to little more
than U.S. boosting specific actors in an increasingly fragmented civil
war. In sum, short-term tactical achievements could pose a threat to
Iraq's long-term stability.
Without cooperation from regional actors, the surge's achievements
are vulnerable. Iraq's neighbors were not at the origin of, or even
played a major part in, Iraq's catastrophe. But the situation is such
that sustainable stability is impossible without their consent. If
dissatisfied, the sahwat or Sons of Iraq could seek help from
neighboring Arab states seeking to promote their influence, counter
Iran, or pursue a sectarian, Sunni agenda. Iran has the greatest
ability to sabotage any U.S. initiative and its help is required to
pressure insurgents and militias to pursue a political path. U.S.
troops can seek to contain this influence, but they are pushing against
the tide. Tehran's role is there to stay and, over time, deepen,
exercised through myriad channels--military, but also religious,
cultural, economic and humanitarian. Tehran enjoys strong ties to
actors across the political system, both within and outside the
government. If the goal is to reduce Iran's destabilizing efforts and
reach some accommodation over Iraq's future, this can only be done
through U.S. diplomatic engagement with Tehran and negotiations over
all issues.
The bottom line is that it cannot be up to U.S. troops to achieve
prerequisite of success: a legitimate, functioning government;
credible, effective institutions; a less hostile regional environment.
Those goals, if they can be accomplished at all, only can be done by
Iraqis and by hard-headed U.S. diplomacy. This is not a military
challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another
defeated. It is a political one in which new local and regional
understandings need to be reached. That is not occurring. Instead, far
from being a partner in an effort to achieve a new compact or stem
violence, our allies in the government are one side in a dirty war over
territory, power, and resources. Likewise, far from engaging Tehran,
the administration has objected to genuine, broadbased negotiations,
placing it in the awkward position of relying on Iranian allies in
Baghdad while at the same time developing a tough anti-Iranian strategy
for the region.
Mr. Chairman, three critical observations derive from this
analysis.
First, the United States's best allies during the surge have not
been the parties we brought to power, protected and supported. They
have instead been former leaders of the insurgency and armed groups
who, for their own reasons, chose to side with us. That in itself
represents a stunning indictment of U.S. policy to date. It means we
have been unable to pressure those over whom we possess the greatest
leverage.
Second, the reason the U.S. lacks this leverage is that it has not
convinced itself--and perforce its Iraqi allies--that it eventually
might have to withdraw even in the absence of strategic success. This
does not mean the U.S. should announce its departure now or espouse a
timetable or rigid benchmarks. It means, however, that the
administration should be prepared to live with the consequences of
withdrawal if the Iraqi political class fails to make rapid,
substantive progress toward political accommodation and establishment
of non-partisan, non-sectarian state institutions. It means the U.S.
must be prepared to bluntly convey that sentiment to its Iraqi
interlocutors. For as long as the U.S. ties its fate to that of its
Iraqi allies, it will remain hostage to their ineptitude or ill-will.
Given the mismatch between what U.S. forces can do and what needs to be
done, their greatest utility paradoxically may lie in the credible
threat of withdrawal.
Third, the United States's allies in Iraq are also allies of Iran
which is our and, we claim, also one of Iraq's greatest foes.
Ironically, we have been siding with Iran's partners in the intra-
Shiite civil war . That points to yet another fundamental contradiction
at the core of our policy: the U.S. cannot simultaneously pursue the
competing and self-defeating goals of stabilising Iraq and
destabilising Iran. It must choose.
Prolonging the military mission makes sense only if part of a
strategy that is coherent, sets achievable goals, puts the onus on the
Iraqi Government and its allies to take long-overdue steps, and accepts
the need for a U.S. regional approach, including engagement with Iran
and Syria and redefinition of our objectives in the Middle East. Absent
such overarching policy objectives, U.S. troops are being asked to
carry a disproportionate burden to attain unreachable and inconsistent
objectives at inordinate and rising cost.
The recent Basra operation is a microcosm of all that is astray in
the current approach. The battle was initiated by the Iraqi Government
without our agreement and halted by the Iranian regime without our
involvement. Maliki informed coalition officials only a few days prior
that he intended to target militias in the south. His protestation to
the contrary notwithstanding, the operation was neither broadly aimed
at all militias nor narrowly focused on so-called special groups.
Militants linked to the Fadhila party were untouched, despite years of
violently flouting the law. Nothing was done to the Badr organisation,
ISCI's militia which, according to some reports, may even have fought
alongside government forces. Without question, the target was the
Sadrists and ISCI's as well as Maliki's purpose was to cut them down to
size in advance of provincial elections scheduled for October. As the
Iraqi Government seeks to replicate the tribal model to the south, and
encourage tribes to take on the Mahdi Army, potential sources of
internecine violence will multiply. The struggle was another episode in
the ongoing intra-Shiite civil war, a harbinger of what awaits much of
the country if current trends continue.
For the U.S., the downsides were legion. The affair reversed timid
U.S. efforts to reach out to the Sadrists. It threatened their tenuous
ceasefire and led to lethal rocket attacks on coalition personnel in
the Green Zone. It wholly contradicted the notion of an impartial, non-
politicised state. It called into question the tentative security and
stability Baghdad and other parts of the country. It ended up boosting
the Sadrists--who showed the strength of their organisation; Muqtada--
whose stature grew among his followers; and Iran--which mediated the
truce. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces performed poorly, unable to dislodge the
Sadrists from their southern strongholds and victims of a high number
of defections.
Yet, throughout the U.S. appeared at best passive, more often
complicit. It allowed its airpower and Special Forces to be dragged
into an intra-Shiite power struggle at the worst possible time, with
the least possible coordination and resulting in the worst possible
outcome. Despite Iraqi reliance on U.S. political and military support,
the administration acted as if it had no leverage, no influence and no
say. The episode was nothing short of dumbfounding.
Mr. Chairman, in seeking to define concrete, achievable goals for
our troops, I believe we must begin with acknowledgment of two basic
realities.
First, a U.S. withdrawal under existing conditions--an Iraq
dominated by armed militias, sectarian forces and a predatory political
class; the collapse of the state apparatus, the lack of any political
accommodation; the rise of jihadism; an extraordinary refugee crisis;
and a regional context more polarized and tense than ever before--would
constitute a stark and perilous setback. It would leave Iraq as a
failing state, set the stage for escalating and perhaps horrific
violence and invite regional involvement and radicalism that will
further damage our posture in the Middle East.
But, second, that a continued U.S. military presence carries a
heavy price tag as well. With each passing day, the human toll mounts.
Precious resources are expended. Our military is overstretched and our
readiness undercut. U.S. margin of maneuver on other critical national
security issues is further limited. Our influence and credibility in
the region and throughout the world continue to erode.
The objective it follows should be to create a local and regional
environment that minimize the damage flowing from the departure of our
troops that, sooner rather than later, must occur, A strategy that
seeks to capitalise on the surge's achievements to promote that goal
would rest on the following three pillars:
1. A new forceful approach that puts real pressure and
exercises real leverage on all Iraqi parties, government
included. The ultimate goal would be overhaul of the sectarian
political system and establishment of a more equitable and
inclusive compact, agreed upon by all relevant actors--e.g.,
government, militias, and insurgent groups--on issues such as
federalism, resource allocation, internal boundaries, de-
Baathification, the scope of the amnesty, the makeup of
security forces, and the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal.
Pressing the Iraqi Government and its allies is key. As
noted, the U.S. must move away from unconditional support and
use the credible threat of military withdrawal if the
government does not compromise, fairly implement new
legislation or take steps toward impartial state institutions.
Our position should be clear: continued U.S. presence depends
on whether there is movement in this direction. If the compact
is not reached or implemented, the U.S. would significantly
accelerate the withdrawal of forces that then will have lost
their main purpose. Conversely, if and when a compact is
reached, a responsible schedule and modalities of coalition
withdrawal should be negotiated and agreed upon.
There are practical, short-term consequences as well. The
U.S. should only support Iraqi military operations consistent
with its own goals and strategy; base training and assistance
on the professionalism and non-partisan behaviour of its Iraqi
recipients; and shun sectarian ministers or army units and
their commanders. Likewise, the U.S. should condition its help
to expand and equip the security apparatus on a strict vetting
process and retraining program.
2. A new multilateral strategy that focuses on the region and
includes engagement with Iran and Syria. The ultimate goal
would be to diminish tensions and polarisation while agreeing
on rules of the game for outside powers to ensure that a U.S.
withdrawal trigger neither a regional scramble for power in
Iraq nor a local scramble for patrons by Iraqis--either of
which would cause greater instability and loss of American
influence. In principle, neighbouring countries and other
regional powers share an interest in containing the conflict
and avoiding its ripple effects. But, divided by opposing
agendas, mistrust and lack of communication, they so far have
been unable to coordinate their policies to that effect. Most
damaging, given Iran's enormous sway in Iraq, has been
competition between the U.S. and Iran and the conviction in
Tehran that Washington is seeking to build a hostile regional
order. Broad reassessment of U.S. regional policy will be
required, as will wide-ranging negotiations with Iran, whose
influence will not be checked militarily but mainly through
tough bargaining.
There are other regional dimensions. The explosive question
of the Kurdistan region's boundary with the rest of Iraq
obliges the U.S. to define a clear and coherent relationship
with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, Turkey, and
its Kurdish friends. It cannot address the question of al Qaeda
in particular and jihadi salafism more generally without
looking at its sources in Arab Gulf States.
3. A long-term commitment to invest in and replenish Iraqi
human resources. Our obligations and responsibility will not
end after our troops have left. Iraq's human resources have
been sapped by years of sanctions, warfare and post-war
mismanagement. Much of the qualified middle class lives in
exile or is stuck in professional stagnation. The educational
system is eviscerated. Universities are dysfunctional, children
barely learn how to read and girls have been particularly
victimised. Blanket de-Baathification removed experienced
managers. Civil war dynamics in urban centres purged them of
less sectarian and more open-minded professionals. Oil-rich,
Iraq today is also humanly bankrupt. It will take decades to
recover and rebuild.
To this end, Iraqis need training of civil servants,
scholarships and agreements with foreign universities. Refugees
also must be tended to. Many belonged to Iraq's middle class
and fled precisely because they were non-sectarian, were
unaffiliated with any given militia, and therefore lacked the
necessary protection. They should not be abandoned, left to
stagnate and languish but rather be prepared for their return.
Exile should be used to hone new skills that will facilitate
their eventual social reintegration. There is every reason to
assist host countries--Syria included--in that endeavor.
This scenario does not constitute a clearcut victory under any
realistic definition. But, in all likelihood, it represents the optimal
outcomes at this late stage. At the very least, it is consistent with
obligations incurred toward those who were sent to wage this war and
toward those on whose soil it has, for their enduring misfortune, been
waged.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Dr. Malley.
Let's try 8 minutes for our first round of questions.
I want to do something a little bit unusual, for me at
least, and that's to spend my time asking our witnesses to
react to each other's testimony. This is very powerful
testimony from all three of you. It's very different.
I want to start with you, Dr. Bacevich. If you would just
take a couple of minutes, if you feel free, to comment on
General Keane and any comment that you have on Dr. Malley's
testimony. I'm going to ask each of you to spend a couple of
minutes commenting on the other witnesses's testimony.
Dr. Bacevich. I understand, Senator.
I guess in response to General Keane I would want to raise
two issues.
The first issue is time. We've already been in Iraq,
engaged in a war for over 5 years. Even to the extent that the
surge has achieved some amount of improvement in the security
situation, we have a long, long, long road ahead of us. The
question of how long that road is, and I mean in terms of
approximations. Nobody can say that it's going to be 18 months
or it's going to be 24 months. But to some degree, the wisdom
of continuing to go down this path has to be related to how
long that road is, because the farther we go, the more it costs
monetarily, the more it costs in terms of American lives. It
seems to me that there's a tendency not to want really to
address that issue directly. How long is it going to take?
The second thing is that there's a real need, I think, to
try to place the Iraq war back in some kind of a larger
strategic context. What I was trying to suggest in my remarks
is that the Iraq war came out of a particular vision of U.S.
strategy that was devised by the Bush administration in the 6
to 12 months following September 11, probably best expressed in
the national security strategy of 2002, and that OIF was
intended to demonstrate the viability of that approach to
dealing with the larger threat of violent Islamic radicalism.
In that context, it seems to me, this war has failed. This
war does not provide us a paradigm or a model that somehow we
are going to employ elsewhere in order to deal with that larger
strategic threat, in order to make sure that another September
11 on a worse scale doesn't happen.
So, it sort of raises the question: What is the U.S. grand
strategy? My own sense is that the perpetuation of the Iraq war
doesn't lead to a strategy, doesn't produce a set of principles
to help us understand how we're going to deal with the threat
posed by Islamism. In many respects, the perpetuation of the
Iraq war actually provides an excuse not to address that
overarching question of, what are our guiding strategic
principles?
That would be my response to General Keane.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Bacevich.
General Keane?
General Keane. Yes. Thank you.
I totally agree that we do not have a national strategy
dealing with the war against radical Islam, given the fact that
we will probably spend most of this century on that issue. I
look back at the Cold War, where we did have a national
strategy, one of containment, which transcended Presidents and
different persuasions from political parties, but, in a general
sense, different administrations supported that national
strategy, that led to successful prosecution of the cold war.
We are lacking that. There's no mistake about it.
In terms of Iraq itself, I disassociate my comments with
Dr. Bacevich that what we need to do is simply begin de-
escalation and withdrawal from Iraq. I would agree with that if
it was measured based on the realities and the situation on the
ground.
In terms of the Army at large, I totally agree that the
Army is too small. We have probably known that since the late
1990s, if we're totally honest with ourselves about this. We
took too deep a cut as a result of the peace dividend from the
end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991. Then we made another major mistake, post-September 11,
that we did not grow our ground forces.
Now, in fairness to all of you, nobody was putting in front
of you a proposal to grow our ground forces post-September 11,
either. That's the reality of it. Even the service that I am
associated with was not fighting to grow the ground forces
inside the Department of Defense (DOD) post-September 11,
either. I just want to put those facts out there.
The reality is, we are too small to counter the threats
that are in front of us. The fact is the form of warfare by
many of our opponents has changed. They know they cannot
contest us directly with military arms and organizations, and
they want to expose our vulnerabilities, which lead, by
definition, to more protracted wars.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Dr. Malley?
Dr. Malley. Just three quick comments on the testimony by
General Keane.
As I said, I think the surge has produced more than I would
have expected, but we shouldn't fool ourselves, the
reconciliation has been with us, not with the Iraqi Government.
That's what this is about, and that's why it's not sustainable
unless there is real reconciliation with the government.
Second point. Yes, a number of benchmarks have been met,
and some legislation has passed, but that really is not the
measure of whether there is actually the building of a state
that's legitimate and functional and recognized by all. These
are pieces of paper that are being signed. Nothing has yet to
be implemented. Most of the time, whatever is signed then gives
rise to postponement of implementation or argument over
implementation, which is simply another way to argue over the
underlying legislation itself.
Finally, on the operation in Basrah, which I continue to
think was a very ill-thought-out enterprise. This was not a
broadbased enterprise against militias. Some militias were
participating in it. Ishmic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
which is allied with Maliki, was participating on the other
side of the battle; nor was it narrowly focused on the so-
called special groups. Let's call it what it was, it was
another step in an internal Shiite civil war. The target was
Muqtada al Sadr. I think that could have real consequences for
us.
Chairman Levin. Some months ago, according to the DOD
document, the State Department, interviewing senior military
commanders, said the following, that ``senior military
commanders now portray the intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-
dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort
in Iraq, rather than al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents, or
Iranian-backed militias.''
Do you agree with that, Dr. Bacevich?
Dr. Bacevich. I probably basically subscribe to that
proposition, but would want to, I guess, expand on it a little
bit. I'm not sure that there's any major group in Iraq that
actually signs up to our vision of what Iraq is supposed to
look like, whether you're talking Sunnis, whether you're
talking Shiites, whether you're talking Kurds, or whether
you're talking tribes. One of the likely fallacies of our
efforts, at this point, is to assume that those who say they
side with us, those who support us, those who take our money in
return for setting down their arms, share our long-term
purposes. In many respects--and, I think, here I agree with Dr.
Malley--what the surge has done is to encourage a revival of
tribalism to endorse the existence of groups that possess arms
and probably have very little intention of surrendering those
arms, and therefore, allowing the central state to ever
exercise a monopoly of violence.
So, I think my bottom-line point here is that we may be
deluding ourselves in thinking that any amount of cajoling or
encouragement or bribery can actually persuade different groups
to buy into our vision of a legitimate, coherent Iraqi nation-
state.
Chairman Levin. Do either of you have any comment on that?
My time is up. If you could make it brief.
General Keane. Yes. In reference to the Maliki Government,
it's a challenge, to be sure. They've been growing in this
position. They're certainly frustrating to work with. Maliki
has probably got about a year and a half left in office. The
Sunnis will be enfranchised in the next government. There'll be
considerably more participation in it from that community. The
coalition will change rather dramatically.
But, the fact of the matter is, at our urging and with our
assistance, Maliki has made some progress here. Pensions are
now being paid, as well as amnesty for those who were fighting
the government. He's permitting them to come back into the
government through the de-Baathification program and to
participate in the social fabric of life. That is the beginning
of a government connecting with those who were disenfranchised.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Dr. Malley, do you just want to----
Dr. Malley. I would, of course, echo that view and say, not
only because of its intransigence, it's part of what's
preventing----
Chairman Levin. Oh, the view that I quoted?
Dr. Malley. Yes, absolutely. But, also because the Iraqi
Government's intransigence is what is threatening to undo the
gains that have been made with Sunnis against al Qaeda and with
the cease-fire with the Mahdi army.
Chairman Levin. I've arranged with Senator Reed to take the
gavel for about 45 minutes.
First, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
General Keane, was Prime Minister Maliki's move into Basrah
ill-advised or ill-timed?
General Keane. That's a great question. I think, from our
perspective, we probably would have waited until the spring to
conduct that operation. But at the end of the day, this is
Maliki's country. He's impulsive. He got a lot of information
just prior to that. I think he finally came to grips with the
scale of the Iranian influence and the fact that it is
threatening his regime, and how Sadr is tied into that
influence. That resulted in the precipitation of that
operation.
Our commanders were working on a campaign for the south for
some time, and had discussions with him, and I think it's
through those discussions that illuminated the scale of the
problem.
So, yes, it would have been better if he waited a little
bit further so we could have set the conditions, but the fact
is, we had to get after this anyway. Now we're after it. It
didn't start out right, but I'm convinced it will finish right.
Senator McCain. In order to understand the adversaries,
these are basically Shiite militias, a lot of which have been
influenced by the Iranian training, supplies, and equipment. Is
that correct?
General Keane. That's absolutely true. They're not the only
militias there, but the Iranians are influencing both sides.
They do it through training, they do it through laundering
money, and they do it through diplomatic influence. They take
some of the sheikh and tribal leaders, and bring them over to
Iran to show them that Iran is a stable country, friendly to
them. Their malign influence has been growing for some time in
the south.
Senator McCain. In Mosul, where we have another battle
raging, my understanding is it's going to go on for a couple or
3 months, it is al Qaeda--Sunni extremists, primarily that
we're struggling against there.
General Keane. Yes, there are two security operations in
front of us. One is in Mosul, which are the remnants of al
Qaeda. This is not the al Qaeda that we were fighting in Anbar
Province or the al Qaeda that was in Baghdad and certainly not
the al Qaeda that was in Baqubah. We will finish that campaign,
in my judgment, in a few months. I think then the command
itself will be able to admit that AQI are operationally
defeated. I believe they already are, but that campaign will
finish it and remove any doubt about it.
Senator McCain. Dr. Bacevich, do you have a differing view
on that tactical situation on the ground?
Dr. Bacevich. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Dr. Malley?
Dr. Malley. Just, again, to come back to the question of
Basrah. I think there are two questions. It appears to be ill-
timed, and your questioning, yesterday, I think, of General
Petraeus brought out that we would have done it differently and
at a different time.
I think it goes deeper. It was not just ill-timed, it was
ill-conceived. This was not an operation, as I said, against
militias. ISCI has a Badr Corps. It was formed by the Iranians,
it's funded by the Iranians. They were not going after
militias, they were going after a particular group. They didn't
go after Fadhila, which also has a militia which has been
flouting the law in Basrah for a long time.
Maliki should not have been involved in it. We should not
have been involved in it and dragged into it with our air
support and special forces, which may cost us in other ways.
Dr. Bacevich. Senator?
Senator McCain. Dr. Bacevich, yes, but could I just say
before you comment on that; I want to express all of our
sympathy for the tragic loss of your son, and thank you for his
service to our Nation.
I would like for you to comment on that. But, also would
you comment on your testimony, where you said we should have
vigorous diplomatic efforts. How would you envision that? Would
that also include face-to-face talks with the Iranians?
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir. Could I go back to the previous
issue just for a second?
Senator McCain. Sure.
Dr. Bacevich. I hate to make one of these horrible Vietnam
comparisons, but when I was reading the news reports about the
Basrah operation, I have to admit the thing that came to mind
was Lam Son 719, which, remember, well into the Vietnamization
project, this was supposed to be the unveiling of the new Army
of the Republic of Vietnam.
Senator McCain. Incursion into Laos.
Dr. Bacevich. Right. It turned out that it didn't go well.
It does seem to me that there's some, at least, echos of that.
I mean, we've been trying hard for 5 years to build up the
ISFs, and all I know is what I read in the newspapers, but it's
hard to see that their performance was especially
distinguished, which again brings us back to the time issue
that it would appear to me that we have a long, long time
before we're going to have that force built up to the level
it's going to be able to handle the security requirements.
Yes, sir, I did refer, in my comments, to diplomatic
effort. I do subscribe, I think, in general terms, to the
proposal made by the Iraq Study Group almost a year and a half
ago, which I take to be based on an assumption that would have
to be tested, but an assumption that there is a common interest
in the region.
Senator McCain. How do you test it?
Dr. Bacevich. You test it by beginning discussions with
other regions in the Nation. A common assumption is that we
have a common interest in stability. We share a common interest
in avoiding having Iraq or the disintegration of Iraq end up
promoting a larger chaos in the region. Yes, sir, I believe
that one would necessarily have to include Iran in that
conversation.
Senator McCain. Just to clarify, again, that the insurgency
in Mosul is al Qaeda. There are other Sunni extremists, as
well, aren't there, that they're battling against in Mosul?
General Keane. Yes, they are aligned with some Sunni
hardliners that are still fighting us. So, they do have some
Sunni support structure, as they had in other provinces, as
well.
Senator McCain. Dr. Malley, I'd be interested in your
comment about direct talks with the Iranians, and also any
comment about the situation in Mosul, as well.
Dr. Malley. On the Iranians, obviously, we have talks with
them already. They're limited in Iraq.
Senator McCain. Yes, but I think you would agree there's a
difference between the kind of encounters that Ambassador
Crocker has had, as opposed to a full-blown face-to-face
discussion.
Dr. Malley. Absolutely.
My view is, it is a fallacy that we tend to view engagement
as a prize that we withhold or nonengagement as a punishment
that we inflict. I think we should be negotiating, with tough,
tough positions, and not sacrificing our principles with Iran
or with Syria.
In the case of Iran, as I said earlier, I don't see how we
could stabilize Iraq at the same time as we're trying to
destabilize Iran. Iran is closer, has more ties, has influence
in the government, in the opposition, in the tribes, and in the
militias. We can't simply pretend that's not the case.
I think we're going to have to talk to them. We're going to
have to negotiate with them on the full range of issues,
whether it's the nuclear issue, whether it's Iraq, or whether
it's the support for militant violent groups in the region.
That's going to have to be done, because, so far, the
alternative, which has been not to talk to them, certainly has
not served their interests.
Senator McCain. Dr. Bacevich, finally, you made reference
to the Vietnam war, and I think we are all in agreement about
how overstressed the military is, and how tough it's been, and
the unwise reductions in the size of the military that took
place in the 1990s, the so-called peace dividend. Would you
argue that a defeated military also has some devastating
effects that take a long time to cure?
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir. But, I'd agree with General Keane
that there's no way we can possibly be defeated, and a strategy
of deliberate, phased withdrawal, to my mind, does not
constitute defeat.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Thank all of you.
I'd like to come back to get your views on this, Iran in
Iraq. We've heard a great deal about it during the testimony of
General Petraeus. We've heard a great deal about the radiant
support of various kinds of units that are out there
threatening the security of American forces. We have allies who
are over there, who are welcoming the Iranians in celebration
of their leadership. We have Iranian diplomatic leadership that
evidently played a role, in terms of establishing a cease-fire,
which we've welcomed. It seems that we, as a country, never
anticipated, in the involvement of the war that we have in
Iraq, the role of Iran. Maybe we did, but maybe we didn't.
Either we ignored it or we didn't anticipate it.
Dr. Malley was talking briefly about this in response to
the other question; but it does seem to me that we ought to
have a better kind of understanding about whose side are they
on and how we ought to be dealing with the process, because it
does seem to me that they are convenient targets. Maybe they
should be. What should we be thinking, and how should we be
dealing with it?
I'll start with Dr. Malley, and then if each of you would
take a couple of minutes on it. I appreciate it.
Dr. Malley. Several comments. First, it's true that
throughout this war we've tended to look to outside causes for
the failures that we've faced. One day it's Iran, one day it's
Syria, then we find another. I think there is that tendency,
whereas so many other problems are homegrown.
That being said, there's little doubt that Iran is pursuing
what can be described as a policy of managed, and sometimes
less managed, chaos in Iraq. They see us tied down. They don't
want us to turn our attention to them. They think we are
bleeding, strategically and militarily. So, it's perfectly
logical for them to be pursuing a policy of investing in as
many actors as they can in Iraq. They've been proficient at
this for a long time, much more proficient than we could ever
be working with the Kurds, the Shiites, or with militias inside
and outside of government, including militias that are fighting
each other. They used to do that in Lebanon, as well. They're
very good at it, and they'll continue to do it.
The question is: What do we do? What is our approach? I
always judge a policy by whether it succeeds or fails. Iran is
continuing its meddling in Iraq, and it's harmful meddling in
Iraq, in terms of our interests. It's continuing to enrich
uranium, it just announced that it's going to expand it. It's
continuing to support Hamas and Hezbollah. None of the criteria
that we would judge to see whether our approach of containment
and isolating and not talking, whether it's succeeded, points
to success. On every single criteria, things are the same or
getting worse. At a minimum, that argues for reassessment, and
I would say it argues for the kind of tough, clear-eyed
negotiations, bargaining with the Iranians, to see whether, in
fact, we can reach agreement on an end state for Iraq which is
not either one of our ideal situations, but with which we both
could live, perhaps even the ways in Iranians and us have
similar interests in Iraq. Neither one of us wants to see it
descend into chaos and spill over into Iran.
So, I think we need to have that discussion. It hasn't
taken place. There's so many reasons, from the nuclear
proliferation to stability in the Middle East, and, most of
all, the security of our troops in Iraq, why that discussion
needs to begin.
Senator Kennedy. General Keane?
General Keane. Yes, Senator. As I indicated before, one of
the problems we had, certainly, with the change in strategy in
Iraq, we were completely preoccupied with al Qaeda and the
threat of the Sunni insurgents and the fact that they were
winning and our policy was failing and Baghdad was a bloodbath.
So, that has preoccupied us for 2 years, to rid ourselves of
that. Obviously that has occurred.
Meanwhile, the British were pulling back from the south,
and we lost a lot of our situational awareness as that has
occurred, and we turned it over to the Iraqis. While they have
some human intelligence, they don't have the enablers that we
do. So, a lot of what was happening in the south, we did not
have the kind of resolution that we should have. Nonetheless,
we know that Iranians' goals are very clear: they want us to
fail in Iraq, and they want a stable government in Iraq that's
friendly and aligned with them; but aligned with them is very
important, and not aligned with the United States.
I think the essential problem--I do agree with Dr. Malley,
here--is that we do not have a national policy, in terms of
defeating Iran in Iraq, or a regional strategy to deal with
that. We should not leave this up to General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker to work this out by themselves. They are a
part of that fabric, and they have some of the tools to apply,
for sure; but, we need a broader path than that to help them
with that strategy. I do think we can. We have to, certainly,
understand what are Iran's interests here. The fact that they
want a stable Iraq, as we do, is a beginning for both of us to
deal with this issue.
Senator Kennedy. Dr. Bacevich?
Dr. Bacevich. Again, I think the place to begin is trying
to ask the larger strategic question. I mean, it seems to me
that, to a very great extent, we tend to still think of Iran as
this seat or source of Islamic revolution that they are intent
on exporting around the world. I mean, after September 11, when
President Bush lumped Iran into the so-called Axis of Evil,
this sort of revived this image of a state with which we can
have nothing to do, and that poses a threat to our vital
interests. I think the basic image is false.
The Islamic revolution in Iran is a failure. They're not
going to export their revolution anywhere. Iran does not pose a
threat to our vital interests. Iran is a mischiefmaker. In that
sense, therefore, it seems to me that we should be more able,
more willing, as I think Dr. Malley was suggesting, to try to
at least understand, not necessarily empathize or agree with,
how they define their security requirements and their security
concerns, which are real, and then use that as a point of
departure for engaging in a dialogue. A dialogue is not simply
waving the white flag. A dialogue is a serious, tough-minded
negotiation that tries to determine whether or not we have some
common interests that can at least alleviate the kind of
hostile relationship that we've had for the last 30 or 40
years.
The Iranians are not going to go away. They're going to be
the neighbor of Iraq for as long as there is Iraq. So, it's
quite understandable, it seems to me, that the Iraqis are going
to have a rather particular view of Iran that may well differ
from our own.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Thank you, panelists, for your testimony.
Dr. Bacevich, I would think about your statement that a
strategy of deliberate, phased withdrawal does not constitute
defeat, I would say that it doesn't necessarily constitute
defeat, but it could precipitate a defeat. It is a withdrawal
policy, as I understand it, at least the one that's being
discussed publicly around here, that's a withdrawal not tied to
the conditions on the ground, and I believe it could put us in
a position of defeat, which Dr. Malley says would be very
detrimental to the United States and the region.
General Petraeus has his Ph.D. at Princeton University and
was number one in the General Staff College class. He has been
3 years in Iraq. He was in Mosul with the 101st. He trained the
Army for a year on another tour. Now, he came back and wrote
the counterinsurgency manual for the United States of America.
He has testified here that, in his view, a withdrawal should be
tied to the conditions on the ground.
General Keane, thank you for your participation in helping
to draft the surge policy. I know that was a philosophy you
thought would work. You did not believe our current policy was
working. General Petraeus and General Odierno and others have
executed that, and it has, as Dr. Malley said, achieved more
than any of us would have thought possible.
So, I have to tell you, when faced with a choice, I'm going
with General Petraeus' recommendation. If he needs a few
months, he says a pause, I think he's entitled to have that. I
believe, despite all the difficulties that we've had, and I
have to tell you, 2 years ago I was worried, I was very
concerned about the status of our situation in Iraq, and I
remain concerned about it. I certainly favor the withdrawal of
our troops as soon as we can possibly do so.
General Keane, you have provided an optimistic view here.
You're a four-star general, 37 years in the military, not a
Pollyanna. You see progress being made, real progress being
made. Senator Collins, yesterday, sort of asked a question I
think Americans are asking, ``Okay, the violence is down, but
what are we looking at, 2, 3, 4 years down the road? Can we see
further troops withdrawn, and can we see a stable Iraq?''
Give us your best judgment, based on your experience and
the number of times you've been over there--I don't know how
many, but quite a few--give us your best judgment of what we
can expect to achieve and what kind of result might occur if we
follow the Petraeus recommendations.
General Keane. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
I understand some frustration. I mean, our leaders coming
before this panel are reluctant to cast too much of a crystal
ball, here, into the future, because they also know that
previous leaders have done that, and have lost credibility in
doing it, because of events that are not controllable sometimes
in Iraq, and so, I understand that.
But, when I look at this situation, we have really turned a
corner here, and the strategy is working. The security
situation that we all wanted to have has enabled the Maliki
Government to make some genuine political progress with
reconciliation. I mean, that is actually happening, and I know
that for a fact, because I talked to the people who are the
beneficiaries of that. So that, I am convinced of.
Now, there's still a check in the mail with some of that,
to be sure, because we have more implementation of the national
legislation to take place. But, the big decision has been made
by the Maliki Government, and that is that the Sunnis and the
Sunni leadership, they know, is going to be a part of the
fabric of their government and the fabric of Iraq, and they
understand that, despite the fact that many of those Sunnis
repressed them for 35 years. This has been a difficult
psychological, emotional hurdle for them to get over. There are
still residue of paranoia and fears there as a result of it, to
be sure.
But, when I look at this situation, we will finish al Qaeda
this year in the north. The situation in the south, despite the
serious Iranian influence, we do have to deal with the Shiite
militias and bring the level of violence down, regardless of
who those militias are. That will happen. It's not as
formidable a task as dealing with al Qaeda and a Sunni
insurgency. That will happen in 2008, as well. I think the
intent is certainly to drive that so that in the fall of this
year, the elections all over Iraq, but particularly in areas
where there's still violence, that the elections in the south
will be a free and open election and people will be able to
express themselves. That, I think, is a very attainable goal.
In my own mind, I don't think we should probably reduce
forces any more in 2008 than the 25 percent we're going to
take, but if General Petraeus thinks that we can do more
because the situation has improved dramatically, so be it. My
judgment tells me that's not going to be the case.
However, in 2009 I do think we'll continue to reduce our
forces, and I believe that probably late 2009 or 2010, the
mission for our forces in Iraq--and this is important--will
change. We will not be protecting the people, which absorbs a
lot of force levels. The ISFs will be doing that. Our mission
will transition to one of assisting and training them, and no
longer protecting the people. That brings the force levels down
rather significantly, and also the casualties are changed; if
there is still violence in Iraq, it will be at a level that the
ISFs can handle.
Now, I don't believe this is an open-ended commitment to
Iraq. I think what should be open-ended to Iraq is our
political alliance with them and the fact that we do want to
have a long-term security relationship with Iraq, but certainly
we don't need to have forces in Iraq at the levels that we're
at now on some open-ended contract. The conditions on the
ground are going to change favorably that will permit us to
continue to reduce our forces.
Now, does that come close to what you were seeking, sir?
Senator Sessions. Well, it certainly does. Would you say
then, that with regard to withdrawal, DOD, General Petraeus,
actually, and certainly Members of Congress, would like to see
our troops withdrawn? The debate is over what rate, perhaps, or
just how fast, and, really, how much of a gap do we have
between the competing visions politically that we're hearing
about on the question of withdrawal, in your opinion?
General Keane. Well, I agree with that. I think much of the
discussion has to do with the pace and the rate of reducing our
forces. It's a given we're going to reduce our forces. General
Petraeus knows that, Ambassador Crocker knows that. But, they
want to do it on a measured basis, they want to do it based on
the Iraqis' capability to take over, and also the enemy
situation on the ground. That's reasonable, in my judgment, and
particularly in view of the mistakes that we have made in the
past in this area. Certainly they are influenced by those
mistakes. I think it's prudent that the command comes before
you and say they want to err on the side of caution here, and
they want to take a measured approach to this, and they want to
take a pause, and consolidate and evaluate where we are.
Nobody in Iraq knows what the impact of the 25-percent
reduction of our combat forces will be. To give you a sense of
it, in Baghdad we will go from 30 U.S. battalions to 20. A
third of the U.S. battalions will be gone. That's happening as
we speak. In Anbar Province, we will go from 15 U.S. battalions
to 6. Now, anybody looking at that knows that's a significant
military reduction. We believe that the Iraqis will mitigate
that, in terms of their own capabilities. We also believe that,
because of the Sons of Iraq program and the Sunni insurgency,
and the leaders who are helping us, that that is another
mitigation. Those things should hold and permit us to make that
reduction without any increase in violence; actually, with the
violence going down. That's the goal. But, nobody knows for
sure if that's going to happen.
So, I think it's prudent for General Petraeus to say,
``Look, I want to see what's going on, here. I want to see if
those assumptions we're making are holding,'' and make certain
of that before we take what could be unacceptable risks and
reduce our forces further. I think that's what this is about.
What they're doing makes sense to me.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, all of you. The
surge was a bitter pill for us. We were hoping we were on a
downward trend at that point, but the success of the surge has
exceeded our expectations to date. I thank you for your
projections of the future, I think sometimes our military
leaders are afraid to give theirs because it looks like they
can't be certain; they don't want to be accused of being a liar
if they turn out to be incorrect. Thank you for your experience
and your advice.
Senator Reed. Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Keane, the transition you're talking about is very
comparable to what Senator Collins and I and others have
proposed with the transition from providing security in Baghdad
at the level we've been providing it, doing it alone, but by
bringing in the al-Maliki Government security forces to provide
more of their own security to transition, so that we can put
more combat troops in the north, and we would have had, if we
had done this previously, more combat troops in the south,
which probably would have avoided what happened. While we
commend Prime Minister al Maliki for standing up to the
militias in the south, we wish that the result had been better
at the beginning, and perhaps it will work out over time.
But, couldn't we be beginning that process of transitioning
now? Aren't we, in effect, doing it? Why don't we admit that we
are, in effect, doing that, and, at the same time, build toward
the residual force, so we know what we can do? Wouldn't that be
a better way of planning what the future in Iraq is? The
conditions on the ground would dictate how fast you can go, and
the commanders on the ground can make the decisions so that we
don't arbitrarily set dates, but can't we at least begin and
ask for a planning process that would start the transition as
soon as possible, in my opinion, now?
General Keane. The transition has begun, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Then we had the resistance to Nelson-
Collins type of legislation, which said that that's what we
should be doing, and we proposed that a year ago?
General Keane. I think that the command does not want to be
tied down by any timetable.
Senator Ben Nelson. We didn't have a timetable.
General Keane. They don't want to be tied down for when
missions have to change.
Senator Ben Nelson. We didn't put that, either.
General Keane. They want maximum flexibility because
they're dealing with an enemy, and the enemy has a vote on what
we're doing.
But, in terms of transition, to be clear here, we have
places in Iraq, a number of them, where the Iraqis are clearly
in the lead now, and we are in a supporting role, and we have
made those transitions. That will be a gradual transition.
Now, they want to be measured about this, because we've
made mistakes about this in the past. It's easy to get
impressed with your own plan and to start seeing results that
may not be there, and that's happened to us. So, these
commanders know that, and they go through a very detailed
evaluation of what the Iraqis military capability is. They are
transitioning them.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's why we've said that the forces
on the ground and conditions on the ground would dictate how
fast this would go without a timetable. But, we've had
resistance to the legislation, which has absolutely surprised
me, because the only timetable that we put in there was that
the transition should begin immediately and have goals to be
achieved over some period of time, but conditions and
commanders on the ground would dictate when and how and under
what circumstances. I guess I was puzzled then, and I'm puzzled
now, as to what the opposition was to our bill.
I'd like to go to questions. Dr. Bacevich, I believe you
said that Iran is a mischiefmaker. But, in terms of Hezbollah
and Hamas and what they've been able to do in the region, at
what point are mischiefmakers very successful in providing
terrorism, at least within the region? Are we understating
their impact when we say mischiefmakers, or do we have to say
that they're full-fledged terrorists supporting state-sponsored
terrorists for the region?
Dr. Bacevich. Senator, I'll stick with mischiefmaker, but I
don't mean to imply they are trivial, or be dismissed or
ignored; I don't mean that at all. I understand the importance
of noting their support for terrorist organizations, but those
organizations don't pose anything remotely like an existential
threat to the United States of America.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well maybe not existential, but in
terms of the turmoil of the Middle East, it does have an impact
on us in many respects. Maybe, perhaps, it's not existential.
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir. Again, I'm not trying to suggest
ignoring that, but it does seem to me that one needs to take a
broader view of Iran than simply to say that this is a country
that supports Hezbollah and Hamas. This is a country that, as I
said earlier, has failed in its effort to sponsor the spread of
revolution. It's a country that does have serious national
security considerations. We cannot ignore the history, Iran
does have reason to view the United States as something other
than a friendly democracy wishing the people of Iran well. So,
I would not want the fact--and it is a fact--of their support
for Hezbollah and Hamas to somehow act as kind of a veto or the
determinant of what U.S. policy toward Iran would be.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Keane, General Shinseki
advocated that a larger force would be necessary to go into
Iraq, and that advice was not followed. If that advice had been
followed and a larger force had been placed in Iraq at the very
beginning, and had been maintained there at higher levels,
would there have been a need for the surge?
General Keane. Yes, because there was much more of a
problem than just force level. Now, to be quite accurate,
General Shinseki's comments about size of force, actually,
before this committee, as you probably know----
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, I was here.
General Keane. --and a result of Senator Levin's
questioning of him, and it had to do with the size of the force
to provide stability and support operations in what was called
phase 4, after the invasion, just to be specific about it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
General Keane. One of the things I think we did, as
military leaders--and I was there at the time--is, I think we
let down the Secretary of Defense and also the administration,
in the sense that when we were dealing with the invasion plans
that General Franks was putting together, none of us, and
particularly the ground leaders, who have a little bit more
sense of this, challenged the possibility that Saddam Hussein
could choose not to surrender and to continue to fight us
through other means. If we had done that, that would have
caused us to think through the assumptions of what that is, the
nature of that war, and then what kind of a force would we need
after the invasion if such a thing occurred. I think it also
would have spun us up on a lot of what we had forgotten about
this kind of war itself. We would not have stopped Saddam from
doing it. We've talked to all of his leaders; we have them in
detention. We know that 6 months prior to the invasion they
were making those plans, now. But, the fact is we would have
been better prepared for it when it did occur, and maybe we
would not have made as many policy mistakes that first year
that we made. I mean, we still suffer from that incredible
sequence of major policy errors that we made in the first year,
and I think possibly we could have been in better shape for all
of that.
I think we bear some responsibility, ourselves. It's a
shared responsibility, civilian and military leaders, certainly
when it comes to war plans and execution of national policy.
But, in the same respect, this is our lane, and we know a lot
about it, and I don't think we did as good a job here as we
could have.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up
on that.
I remember, in a closed session, before the invasion of
Iraq, asking Secretary Feith to give us some indication of what
plans were in place to keep security if, in fact, the decision
has been made to go in, or it hasn't been made and it is
ultimately made to go into Iraq. What is the plan for phase 2?
I received a stack of papers sometime, I think, in August,
after phase 2 was obviously not succeeding because we weren't
prepared to help them keep the peace, we had fired the
military, and things were in shambles.
General Keane. Yes. That doesn't surprise me.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It seems to me that the question that we're all facing is:
Will the pause in the drawdown of troops after July allow for
continued progress, or does it ease the pressure on the Iraqis
to continue to take over more responsibility for their own
security and to continue to meet the political and economic
benchmarks that everyone agrees are essential for the long-term
stability of Iraq? So, I'd like to ask each of you your
judgment on that question. What is the impact of the pause of
not continuing to drawdown in a gradual and responsible way,
but, rather, holding back? There's a lot that's going to occur
during that period if it goes beyond the 45 days that General
Petraeus indicated is likely, yesterday. We run into, for
example, the provincial elections that are going to occur in
October, if they occur as scheduled. So, I'd like to get an
assessment from each of you on what you believe the
consequences of the pause will be.
We'll start with you, Doctor.
Dr. Bacevich. Well, the pause is not a policy. The pause is
really just a way of avoiding, I think, or deferring,
fundamental policy decisions. But, I have to say, I personally
don't think that the pause will matter much, one way or the
other. I say that because this is, I think, one of the areas
where General Keane and I would just radically disagree with
one another--I don't believe that we're really in charge in
Iraq. I don't really believe that the efforts that are being
made by U.S. officials or U.S. commanders to promote
reconciliation really are shaping the course of events. I think
events are much more likely to be shaped by the Iraqis
themselves, and, again, not to repeat myself, that the various
groups in Iraq are responding to their own particular agendas,
so that, in the larger sense, Iraq is going to follow a
trajectory that's going to be determined by Iraqis. The notion
that staying a little bit longer or slightly accelerating the
rate of U.S. withdrawal, or pausing the rate of withdrawal, is
going to make a major difference strikes me as simply a
fundamental misreading of the situation.
If there is one thing that the Iraq war ought to have
taught us, it is that American power is far more limited than
we imagined back in the salad days of the 1990s, when we were
proclaiming that we were the world's only superpower, an
indispensable nation. It ought also have taught us that our
capacity to understand these societies, to understand the
dynamics that sort of shape the way they evolve, is not all
that great.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Keane?
General Keane. Yes. I think it certainly is a temporary
situation. In my own view, its intended purpose will be
accomplished. General Petraeus will be given the opportunity to
assess whether the ISFs are able to mitigate the reduction
that's taking place and, therefore, take over responsibilities
that heretofore we had. Also, the so-called Sons of Iraq
program, in terms of its viability; is that still supporting
our efforts? That will take some time to understand that. I
think it probably takes longer than 45 days.
I also think, Madam Senator, that we should prepare for the
likelihood that we may not resume reductions, in 2008, which,
in my view, may be the case. Why is that? We want to reduce, so
why does that make any sense? Well, the fact of the matter is,
we have three major events that are occurring in 2008 that
we're very much involved in, two military and one political.
One is, we want to finish al Qaeda off, up in Mosul. We
think we will do that in a number of months, and actually we
think it'll probably be completed around the fall timeframe.
But, there are variables there. The enemy has a vote. We will
finish them, but it may take longer. Our judgment is, it will
not.
The operation in the south, which is just beginning, and
let me say that, we can be so super-critical of military
operations. You heard General Petraeus say that the operation
in the south in many of the provinces that the ISFs performed
very well; and in some of them, they did not, and it was
uneven. So, we know enough about this ISF to know that their
improvement has been very steady, and, overall, they're going
to acquit themselves well in what they are doing, in my view.
But, it will take some time. As I said before, this is not al
Qaeda, and this is not mainstream Sunni insurgents we're
dealing with. We have to shut down the level of violence and
the gangs and the thugs down there, and I believe a lot of them
are going to run from the force levels that we will apply. That
should be completed before the fall election, which is what
Maliki's motivation is, here. But, it may not.
Then we have the fall election itself. This is a watershed
political event in Iraq that will change Iraq for years to
come, because this Maliki Government that everyone is kicking
is willing to share power and decentralize some of its
authority with those provinces, which means those provinces
will have real budgets, money will have to be distributed,
there'll be a percentage and a framework to do all of that, and
there will be significant demands being placed on a central
government by those provincial leaders, who are duly elected by
the people in those provinces. We want that watershed political
event to succeed. Our opponents in Iraq will want it to fail,
and we cannot let that happen. We don't even want it to be
delayed. We don't want it to go into 2009. That watershed
experience is important to us. So, that's the third major thing
that we have to do in 2008. During this, General Petraeus and
his commanders are assessing the impact of the 25-percent
combat force reduction.
So, I think, in my own mind, we should not be too
optimistic that: (1) he will be able to do that assessment in a
short period of time; or (2) that, as a result of his
assessment, he's going to come back and say that he's going to
continue to reduce forces in 2008. I think the plate is very
full for us in 2008, and we are taking a fair amount of risk
with the 25-percent reduction that's already ongoing.
That's the most frank answer I can give you. Does that
answer your question, Senator?
Senator Collins. It does. Thank you.
Dr. Malley?
Dr. Malley. Senator, as I said in my testimony, I believe
in pressure. I believe we have to pressure the Maliki
Government, and I also believe that probably the most potent
form of pressure we have is the question of our troops.
That said, I'm not a big believer in subtle signals; I much
prefer blunt language. I'm not sure that whether we pause or
don't pause, as has been said earlier, is really going to
convey the message we want to convey. We don't know how Maliki
would read the pause or a further withdrawal. We don't know how
he would react or how other Iraqis might react. Would they see
it as a signal that we're actually serious about withdrawing,
and therefore, try, perhaps, to find other allies elsewhere?
Would, on the contrary, they see this as a reason to take more
responsibility?
As I said, a signal such as this, I think, is going to get
lost in translation. I think there needs to be blunt language,
a clear message to Maliki, not that we're withdrawing 25
percent or more, but, ``We cannot stay if you don't take
certain steps,'' and we should be clear about what those steps
are: passing and then implementing certain legislation;
cleaning up some of the security sector that has been
infiltrated by sectarian groups; and reaching out to some of
the Sunnis who are looking for jobs; those are the concerned
citizens. We should have clear tests for reaching a broad
national compact. If he doesn't do them, then we should say,
and we should be clear about it, ``Then our troops cannot stay,
because then you're asking us to stay for an enterprise that
has no end and that has no purpose.'' But, I'm not a big
believer in subtle signals, at this point.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
In 5 years of effort and extraordinary sacrifice by our
service men and women, there are some, I think, strategic
consequences that are becoming more palpable. One, ironically,
is that we replaced a despicable government in Baghdad, but an
implacable foe of the Iranians, with a government that is very
friendly to the Iranians personally, politically, culturally,
and religiously. So, General Keane, if our national need is to
define a strategy to defeat Iran in Iraq, how do we do it with
the present Government of Maliki, which is extremely
sympathetic and personally connected to the Iranian Government?
Do we replace them with a Sunni Government? Do we replace them
at all? What do we do?
General Keane. Well, I think it's a good question, and a
reasonable one.
First of all, this government will be replaced through a
general election, in any event, in less than 2 years. I'm
talking about the Maliki coalition.
Second, it's been, I think, very fascinating to watch
Maliki since he took office, and the weakness of his coalition
and the growth of him in that office. Listen, it's been
frustrating for our people who deal with it. Much of it's two
steps forward and one back, and then one forward and two back,
to be sure.
Maliki is a realist, like the other national leaders are.
Iran is a neighbor, they're always going to be there. The fact
is, the United States is not always going to be there. That is
probably a harsh reality.
The point is also, and this sometimes is lost, they are
Iraqi nationalists, and they feel very strongly about that.
They do not want to be in bed with the Iranians. They do not
want the Iranians to have undue influence in their country.
They do not want the Iranians using leverage and the assault
that they've made on the south--politically, diplomatically,
and economically--to have that kind of influence on the central
government.
Now, they also have relations with Iran, and that's to be
sure, and they have ties to it. Some of them lived in Iran
during the terrible periods of Saddam Hussein. But, at the end
of the day, my view is, they are nationalists, they clearly
want to be aligned with the United States of America, they
clearly want a long-term security relationship with the United
States of America. They believe their future is with us in that
region. At the same time, they want to have good relationships
with their neighbors, and Iran is one of them.
Senator Reed. Dr. Malley, your comments? You seem to
suggest that that might be incompatible to some degree.
Dr. Malley. I would certainly agree with your comments. I
think we do have, today, a policy that's at war with itself. I
don't understand how we could be saying, on the one hand, that
Iran is the major threat to Iraq--which it may be; I'm not
going to argue that point, one way or another--but that our
allies in Iraq view themselves as very closely tied to Iran.
You described it very well, that there are so many ways in
which, in particular, Mr. Hakim and his party were born, bred,
and flourished in Iran. So, the notion that we now have a part
of the Shiites turning against the Iranians by turning against
Muqtada al Sadr, I think, is just wrong. You have both sides
that are supported by Iran.
Again, if you look at the case of Lebanon, that's not
unique. Both Hezbollah and Amal were supported by Iran, and at
some point they were at war with one another, and Iran played
one against the other, and sometimes mediated.
But the notion that this is what's happening now, that the
Maliki Government is disentangling itself from Iran, I think,
is wrong. Again, I think that's why, ultimately, we're going to
have to find some accommodation with Iran, or at least we're
going to have to try. I don't want to sound Pollyannaish. It
may be that our interests are too incompatible. But we're going
to have to go to the source, we're going to have to try,
because right now we have a government in Iraq in which we are
investing huge sums and military personnel that is allied with
the party we say is threatening our interests in the region and
our interests in Iraq more than anyone else.
Senator Reed. I want to ask Dr. Bacevich the same question,
but I want to follow up quickly with just another question. If
the Maliki Government is successful in suppressing the Sadr
militias, which they view as their threat from the Shiite side,
would they turn their attention to Sunni militias? Would they
turn their attention to try to reduce these Concerned Local
Citizens (CLC) groups that we're sponsoring, either directly or
overtly? Or would the CLCs see themselves as being under undo
pressure now that a militia group has been successfully
eliminated from the scene?
Dr. Malley. Well, first, I actually don't believe in the
suppression of the Sadrist militia. I think it's a social
phenomenon as much as a military one, and it has far deeper
roots, incidentally, than either Maliki or Hakim has. I think
we're seeing that, just in the reaction to the events in
Basrah.
Senator Reed. Which means, if there was a free and open
election, they'd do pretty well?
Dr. Malley. This brings me to a very important point about
the elections. Part of what's happening now may well be an
effort by Maliki and Hakim to make sure that those elections
either don't take place, because there's too much chaos, or are
postponed, or against someone, because you disenfranchise the
Sadrists, the Sadrists can't compete. I don't know any expert
who doesn't believe that the Sadrists are going to do much
better in this election than ISCI will.
Senator Reed. But the question about going out to the Sunni
community?
Dr. Malley. It's a good question. I don't know the answer
to that. I think what may well happen is, the Sunni community,
if it doesn't see, in the government and Maliki and his allies,
steps that it believes are necessary to reach a compact they
may turn. Right now, they've decided the greater enemy is al
Qaeda, and they could postpone the fight against the
government. Once al Qaeda's out of sight, or once they believe
that the U.S. is not putting enough pressure on the Maliki
Government or on Iran, they may turn their sights to the
government and to the Shiite militias.
Senator Reed. Dr. Bacevich, the same vein. You made the
point, which I must confess I agree with, that the template for
this operation was the transformation of Iraq as a beacon of
freedom and free-market economics that would essentially
propagate almost automatically throughout the region. I think,
at this juncture, that's not the case. What seems to be
emerging is a much more powerful Iran with a long-term, not
only interest, but staying power. In fact, I think comments,
even of General Keane, are correct that their staying power is
probably as strong or stronger than ours, because of their
proximity and their self-interests. Why don't you comment on
that line of questioning.
Dr. Bacevich. I think General Keane's made the key point,
wherein he was referring to the long run. I think in trying to
understand the way the Iraqi/Iranian relationship is likely to
evolve, we should look to the long run. The long run is that an
Arab nation is not going to want to be a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Persians.
It seems to me that, at least on the fringes, one of the
justifications offered by those who want to continue the war is
that for us to change course at this point would give a big win
to the Iranians. I think there's no question that the Iranians
have done well as a consequence of our blunders. But if you
look at the long run, I would expect that Iraq is going to
serve as some kind of a counterweight to Iran, and that's going
to be in the interests of the stability of the region, and
probably will be in the interests of the United States, as
well.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. My time's expired.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this distinguished panel. Very many have profited
by your, I think, very sage and wise comments this morning.
I want to start off with our good friend, General Keane. I
have before me a transcript of the hearings before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee, and General Cody, who was your successor as the
Vice Chief, said as follows, ``The current demand for forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply of
soldiers, of units and equipment, and limits our ability to
provide ready forces for other contingencies.'' Do you agree
with that?
General Keane. I don't want to get into a contest with Dick
Cody, who I have tremendous regard for.
Senator Warner. No, that's the purpose you're here, to get
into these----
General Keane. No, you know me, I'm always going to give
you a straight answer, Senator.
Senator Warner. All right. Well, let's have it.
General Keane. I'm just sort of warming up to it a little
bit, all right? [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Well, I'm cold steel, and I want to get the
answers.
General Keane. I mean, I'm talking about a friend, as well
as a colleague.
Yes, there's an element of truth in that statement,
certainly, but here's my view of it. The United States Army is
certainly stressed by this war. We're fighting two wars, and
it's understandable that it would be, as we have always been in
wars of consequence that take time. That's number one.
Number two is, the Chief of Staff of the Army is on record
saying that he can sustain 13 combat brigades almost
indefinitely, and I agree with that. Now, at what price would
that be remains to be seen. I believe this force is tough and
resilient, and they're going to continue to make the commitment
to volunteer and be a part of it.
In terms of other missions, here's where I come out on
that. First of all, the Air Force and the Navy are largely not
involved. The Army and the Marine Corps are very much involved.
If we had an emergency someplace else, that would require all
non-engaged Army and Marine Corps to respond, regardless of
deployments, because it is an emergency. That would depend, for
the Army, on the availability of equipment as much as it is the
availability of people. Nonetheless, I am convinced they would
be able to respond.
Then you get to this other question that's always been
troubling to me, the implication of that is that we should do
something about our involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan, and
particularly Iraq, because that's really the contentious issue.
What we should do is, out of consideration for what General
Cody is speaking about--and I'm not suggesting he suggested
this--but the implication is that what we need to do is pull
our troops out of Iraq so we'll be ready in the event something
else happens. That makes no sense to me.
Senator Warner. I think we're getting astray, here. It's a
fairly straightforward, clear pronouncement of a man who is in
a position to make those judgments. I draw to your attention,
and I'll ask unanimous consent to place it in the record, here
a statement by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mullen, perhaps you're aware of that statement,
took the same basic conceptual thought. He is concerned about
other contingencies around the globe, which, at this time, in
his professional judgment, require deployment of additional
U.S. forces.
Chairman Levin. It will be placed in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
What immediately comes to mind is additional forces for
Afghanistan. I've said Afghanistan is an economy-of-force campaign and
there are force requirements there that we can't currently meet. So,
having forces in Iraq don't--at the level they're at--don't allow us to
fill the need that we have in Afghanistan.
Equally broadly around the world, there are other places we would
put forces--or capabilities, not so much brigade combat teams as other
kind of enabling capabilities or small training teams, that we just
can't because of the pressure that's on our forces right now in the
Central Command. I think we'll continue to be there until, should
conditions allow, we start to be able to reduce our force levels in
Iraq.
Senator Warner. We'll have the Secretary of Defense and
Admiral Mullen tomorrow, but I just wanted to get your views on
that.
Dr. Bacevich, I listened to you, and I agree 100 percent,
we're not in control in Iraq. When I look back at World War II,
my recollection is, we went into these areas that we conquered,
Germany and so forth, we declared martial law and took charge
and ran it until such time as they manifested the capability to
go out and establish their governments. The transition was
fairly smooth.
Here, we roared in under the concept of democracy, and
planted the democracy tree, and elections were held, and the
rest is history. I think the Maliki Government does pretty much
as it pleases, in my judgment; and that's regrettable. I don't
suggest that our Department of State and DOD aren't trying to
do everything possible to leverage that government to
accelerate political reconciliation.
I happen to have a personal thesis. If suddenly the Iraqi
people and this government awaken to the fact that if we
stopped our internecine fighting, went down and began to
produce the natural resources in this country, and take the
funds from those natural resources and rebuild our cities, you
could create an Iraq which would be the envy of the whole
Middle East, in terms of structure and education and medicine
and care for its people. But, we're in this deadlock of these
centuries-old animosities and hatred between these people,
riddled with corruption, and it's difficult.
I commend our forces, the men and women of the Armed Forces
and their families. They have taken a tremendous sacrifice to
give the Iraqi people this chance. We haven't given up on
trying to make it come through.
General Keane, I was interested, you just referred to the
south, and you called the groups down there a bunch of thugs
and so forth. I agree with you. This is what troubles me about
the way we conduct these hearings and the terms that we use. We
have to remember, they go out of here, and the media, in large
measure, accurately transmits what's said.
I grew up in a generation which I knew what, basically, an
army was. An army is composed of a divisional headquarters, a
series of, in the old days, regiments, now you have your combat
teams and whatever it is, battalions, and on down. We keep
calling this the Mahdi army. General Keane, it's not an army,
by any means of the interpretation and the use of that term
which has been used for decades. Am I correct?
General Keane. Which army, Senator?
Senator Warner. We call Sadr's outfit the Mahdi army. It's
not an army, it's a disparate bunch of people that he's cobbled
together through spiritual inspirations, and they're fighting.
It's not an army. They don't have a divisional headquarters,
they don't have regiments, and they don't have training areas.
I mean, what is it that we're fighting over there?
General Keane. That's one of the factions in the south,
certainly, is the JAM.
Senator Warner. Right. We call it the Mahdi army.
General Keane. Which is the military side of his
Organization of the Martyr Sadr. I've never referred to it as
an army. There's good and bad parts to it. There's real thugs
and killers in that, and some of them have been directly
fighting U.S. forces present in Iraq, and there's others that
are defensive militia, who are there to protect the people on
the streets.
Senator Warner. But, here's my difficulty. We have spent 5
years training the Iraqi army, and this committee has put
untold authorizations out for whatever was needed to do it. We
now have a couple of hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers. There
they are. They have training camps, practice ranges, armaments,
everything. They're fighting this group, call it what you want,
the Mahdi army and these other militias, which don't have any
of that infrastructure. Yet, what they seem to have is a will
to fight and die. Therein is their secret weapon and the thing
that's making it effective, as we're struggling, the coalition
forces, and so forth, against those people.
Now, how do you describe that will to fight?
General Keane. Well, I think that's true in some of the
people that we've been fighting. Certainly, al Qaeda has
reflected that will, some of the Sunni mainstream insurgents
had that kind of determination, and certain members of the
Shiite extremists have it, particularly those in the special
groups that have been trained in Iran and are further
committed. They have a low-tech system, certainly, that's being
used against the most powerful military in the world, and this
is classic insurgency business, here. The fact of the matter is
that they use the people to shield them and to protect them,
and that is why the change in strategy that we brought to Iraq
recently has worked so well. That's how you defeat them,
Senator. You don't defeat them just by killing them, you defeat
them by isolating them from the people, so the people
themselves reject them.
Senator Warner. Then I think we should stop calling them
the Mahdi army.
Dr. Bacevich. May I comment, Senator?
Senator Warner. Yes.
Dr. Bacevich. I think a more accurate term would be
militia.
Senator Warner. That's correct. Militia.
Dr. Bacevich. Which is also frequently used. The term is
apt. A militia really is the people armed.
Senator Warner. That's the concept of this country itself.
In the 1700s, we had militias.
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir. When you think of our history, and
the fact that, in many respects, the forces that collected
around Boston in 1775 in the aftermath of Lexington and
Concord, the people armed were a militia.
Senator Warner. They coalesced into George Washington's
army.
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir, but it's the militia men, a militia
is very difficult to extinguish. One can imagine that, through
the use of conventional military power, you have defeated a
militia, when, in fact, all you've done is disperse it until it
gathers to fight another day. I personally fear that, to some
degree, what we see to be the recent success in Iraq is simply
that the militia has gone to ground or, for its own reasons has
chosen to stop fighting for now, and they'll be back tomorrow.
Senator Warner. But, they do have an unusual will to fight.
They fight with less armaments, less protection, and less
equipment. But they fight, and that's what we're experiencing
down there.
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. It's just tragic that we had 1,000 Iraqi
soldiers--that's what was reported--defect in the heat of
battle down in this Basrah situation the other day. I'm just
wondering, does anybody know about what accountability any of
those officers have been held to, and what Maliki's doing about
it?
General Keane. May I just comment on that, Senator?
Senator Warner. Yes.
General Keane. I mean, there were 15,000 troops involved in
that operation.
Senator Warner. Right.
General Keane. Most of those defections came from the
malign police force. I was down there 2 weeks ago talking to
the police chief, a former army division commander by the name
of Jalil. Very good soldier. I said, ``What's your problem?''
and he said, ``My biggest problem, General, is that 80 percent
of my police force is maligned with some form of militia or
another, and I can't trust them. If we try to do anything down
here that requires police support,'' he said, ``they're going
to roll on me. They will align themselves with their militia.''
Now, that is part of those 1,000 that took place there, and
there was also some problems with some of the army forces that
went into Basrah. But, the overwhelming majority of the forces
did not defect.
Senator Warner. Performed quite well.
General Keane. Some of their performance was uneven. This
is pretty typical of the Iraqi army. Now, when they're with us
and partnering with us, they do very well. A number of them
have been able to perform independent operations, and there's
been a lot of progress there.
So, don't take that little headline and make it something
worse than what it really is because it's not.
Senator Warner. No, I fully recognize it was a relatively
small thing. But, it is significant.
One last point, and I'll give up my time, here.
I grew out of a generation of World War II. I claim no
personal glory myself, but I saw that. Sixteen million men and
women were trained to fight in that 5-year period. We've now
crossed that with Iraq. Those units were trained, and they were
ready to go into battle in 6 or 7 months. We've been training
these Iraqis for 5 years. I just cannot understand how we can
continue to accept, ``Oh, well, they've just begun, and they're
just doing this.'' Five years of investment, giving them, as
far as I know, every possible economic support that they needed
to do that.
Dr. Malley. May I comment on that?
Senator Warner. Yes.
Dr. Malley. I think it brings me back to your former
question. I think what the Mahdi militia has, which the army
doesn't have, or many parts of the army don't have, is loyalty
to a cause, and which is why they're prepared to die for it,
which the army doesn't have, to a large extent. It's not a
matter of military training, it's a political question. Do they
have something they're loyal to? Are they loyal to their sect?
Are they loyal to their profession? Or are they loyal to a
central state that's viewed as legitimate? Until you reach that
threshold, I think you're going to find the same frustration
that you've found, and you're going to compare them unfavorably
to those members of a militia that have a real cause and a real
will to fight for it.
General Keane. I disagree with some of that. The ISFs, and
particularly the army, have made significant progress. They are
extraordinary in battle. They display tremendous courage. We
have not had a refusal of a major unit in Iraq in some time.
The only problem we've had is just recently in Basrah, and a
lot of that had to do with police, as opposed to army forces.
There's tremendous will to fight in that force. In my last
visit to Iraq, I did not find a single battalion or brigade
commander who did not point out to me an Iraqi unit that they
were proud of and thought they could fight on their own. That
was different than visits in 2007. This slope may not be fast
enough for any of us, but the slope is an improving slope, for
sure.
I'm convinced that we're going to be able to transition to
the Iraqis and bring our combat forces out of there, because
they will have the capability to do that. But, we need a little
bit more time to do it.
Senator Warner. Well, everybody says, ``We need a little
bit more time.'' Can you definitize ``need a little bit more
time''?
General Keane. As I said before, I think we'll make further
reductions in 2009, below where we are right now.
Senator Warner. Of U.S. forces?
General Keane. In our forces, and then I think, probably in
2010, we'll transition our mission, which is no longer protect-
the-people counterinsurgency, and we'll start to do more of
training the ISFs, to finish the training that they need, and
that would mean that they begin to take over much of the
responsibilities that we have. This cannot be done overnight,
but the progress is there. If we take the measured course that
General Petraeus has laid out for us, I think it is very likely
we're going to have a favorable outcome in Iraq.
Senator Warner. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to the witnesses.
I want to ask a few questions, General Keane, through this
perspective, which you alluded to, which is, in the midst of
all the controversy about the war, there's no one that really
wants to stay there in a conflict forever. This is really,
ultimately, a question of what pace do we withdraw our forces,
and based on what standards, and, implicitly, what kind of
condition do we leave behind?
So, with that context, I do want to ask you about a few of
the arguments that we hear in this debate for essentially not
following General Petraeus's counsel yesterday, leaving it to
conditions on the ground, in his judgment, during this period
of consolidation and evaluation, but pressing harder for an
earlier withdrawal.
One is what Senator Warner was asking you about, I want to
ask you to go back to it, which is stress on the Army. You have
37 years, yourself, of experience in the U.S. Army leadership,
and you've kept very close to what's happening in Iraq. So, I
want to invite you to go back to what you were saying, because
there are people who say, because of the stress on the Army, we
should be withdrawing more rapidly, almost regardless of
conditions on the ground. As a matter of fact, I think people
would say ``regardless of conditions on the ground.'' I want
you to work that through. How would you balance the stress on
the Army against the mission we have in Iraq?
General Keane. Well, certainly that premise, that because
of the stress on the Army, which one would expect to have, and
which we did have in all the major wars we have fought of
consequence, and particularly those that were lengthy. In some
of those wars, we actually broke the Army, because the purpose
of that event was justified by that expenditure. That's the
harsh reality of it.
In this case, national interests at stake, the security of
the American people, I believe, are directly related to these
two wars that we are fighting. So, it has purpose and meaning
to us, regardless of what the motivation was to go in
initially. Our Army is stressed by that, primarily because it
is not large enough to be able to endure both of these
conflicts.
Senator Lieberman. Agreed.
General Keane. We should realize that is the elephant in
the room here with us, and never let go of that, and help these
two institutions grow.
That said, I don't believe for a minute that what we should
do is take risk in Iraq with our force-reduction program to
relieve the stress on the Army or the Marine Corps. I don't
know how risking a humiliating defeat in Iraq would ever help
those two institutions maintain the viability that they need if
they, in fact, have suffered a humiliating defeat. I was part
of something like that, as a platoon leader and company
commander coming out of the Vietnam war, and then as a major,
watching us lose that war. The psychological and emotional
impact on the officers and noncommissioned officers, the
professional corps of the military, was very significant. We
lost our way for a while, to be frank about it, and you know
that.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Keane. Nobody wants to be a part of a force like
that.
The other thing is, this vague notion that we need the
forces to do something else. What are we really talking about,
here? Are we talking about Pakistan, with ground forces? I
think not. Are we talking about the Pacific Rim, with ground
forces? I think not. Are we talking about more forces for
Afghanistan? Yes. Do we need more forces in Afghanistan? We do.
That's true. I think those forces will be available for
deployment in Afghanistan eventually, but not right now from
the United States. Afghanistan, let's be frank about it, is a
secondary effort compared to Iraq. Iraq has a higher priority.
Senator Lieberman. I want to come to that with you in a
minute. I agree with everything you've said. It seems to me
that to risk a defeat based on the best counsel of our
commanders on the ground, by accelerating the withdrawal of our
forces from Iraq sooner than they advise because we need to
have forces available for some possible potential speculative
conflict somewhere else doesn't make any sense.
The second point is the one that Senator McCain, I think,
was making in his earlier question, which is, yes, the Army is
under stress, you're worried about breaking a force; but you
can break a force, and probably more likely will break a force,
by letting that force be defeated. The morale of our troops in
Iraq today is very high. There is tremendous pride in what is
being accomplished. If you want to break it, pull out the rug
from under them.
I want to ask you to go to Afghanistan, because here is a
second argument made for a congressionally-mandated accelerated
withdrawal from Iraq, and I'll try to state the argument
fairly, that we are essentially fighting the wrong fight, that
we are engaged more deeply in the less consequential of the
battlefields in the global war on terrorism in Iraq, and, as a
result, we have taken our eye off the ball, we have lost our
focus on the key battlefield, which is Afghanistan.
I know that you have visited Afghanistan and Pakistan. So,
I want you to give me your response to the argument that we'd
be better off taking troops out, regardless of conditions on
the ground. I may be overstating the case; but regardless of
the advice of commanders on the ground, to put them into
Afghanistan as soon as possible, because that's the main event,
regardless of what happens in Iraq.
General Keane. Yes. Afghanistan certainly is important to
us, and I would never want to diminish what we're trying to
achieve there. We have problems in Afghanistan, but al Qaeda is
not the central enemy in Afghanistan. What has taken place
there is the Taliban have resurged, and they're trying to come
back, and they've made some inroads in the south, and the
government is very weak in the south. This is not of the crisis
stage in Afghanistan that we were dealing with in Iraq in 2006,
when al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgents created the bloodbath in
Iraq and were threatening regime survival. That is the
important distinction.
There is no threat to regime survival in Afghanistan. There
is a problem in Afghanistan in the south. It is aided and
abetted by the Pakistanis because there is a Taliban safe haven
in Pakistan that we're all familiar with.
Two things can be done in Afghanistan. One is, eliminate
that sanctuary, and two is, provide some additional forces in
the south. I think that was the basis for the President's
discussion at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the week
before last, to get more forces to do that, and also for the
additional marine forces.
Here's the other point I want to make. If we are talking
about pressuring General Petraeus so that he provides another
brigade or two for 2008, that would not be decisive in
Afghanistan, but it could be very decisive in Iraq, in terms of
what the consequences of that reduction could be.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you a final question, just on
that. My time's up, so I'm going to ask you to be as brief as
you can. Take the argument on the other side of this to what I
think is its logical conclusion. If we started to forcibly
withdraw, or mandate a withdrawal of our troops from Iraq,
risking defeat there, and, in fact, are defeated, and we do it
because we want to focus on Afghanistan, what would the effect
on the war in Afghanistan be if, essentially, chaos developed
in Iraq?
General Keane. Well, I mean, certainly suffering a
humiliating defeat is not going to help you prosecute another
war with a similar adversary, nor does it help you with the
relationship of our allies, who count on the United States to
be there when they say they're going to be there. It certainly
encourages our adversaries and the radical Islamists, and al
Qaeda, in particular. But, also, I think one of the enduring
qualities that we have about us is our reliability and our
commitment, and we stick with them, even though there's a
degree of difficulty, uncertainty, and sacrifice that's
associated with it. There's no country in the world that has
ever made the degree of sacrifices that we have made to help
other beleaguered nations in the world. The record's
extraordinary. To back away so that we could help another
friend a number of miles away makes no sense to me, in terms of
taking that kind of risk. It endangers the United States and
puts us further at risk in the world.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. Number one, I thought you did an excellent job
yesterday, as chairman. That was one of the best hearings I've
attended.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Graham. It was thoughtful and full of difficult
issues.
I really enjoy our discussions here, because people in
decisionmaking capacities have to have some framework from
which to work off of. I think one of the fundamental questions
that I have to address, as a Senator, and where I want to go
with this: Is Iraq part of a global struggle now, or a more
isolated event? For us to come to grips with where to go, I
think we have to come to grips with our failures.
General Keane, is it fair to say that the surge is
corrective action being taken because of the past strategy
failing?
General Keane. Yes. Absolutely. We made a decision to
transition to the ISFs, so they, in fact, could defeat the
insurgency.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Keane. We never made the decision to defeat it
ourselves.
Senator Graham. Do the other two witnesses generally agree
with that, that our first 4 years here were going backwards,
not forward?
Dr. Malley. Yes.
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir, I agree. But, beyond that, I think
that the initial decision to invade Iraq was a mistake.
Senator Graham. Well noted. But, I have to make a decision.
I can't go back in time. If I could go back in time, there are
a lot of things I would do differently. The first thing I would
do is, when the Soviets left Afghanistan, I would have done
things differently, because vacuums are going to be filled.
That's the one thing I've learned, Dr. Malley, is that in this
ideological struggle--and that's what it is; it's not a capital
to conquer or a navy to sink or an air force to shoot down,
it's an ideological struggle. We paid a heavy price, I think,
once the Soviets left, people filled in that vacuum. My biggest
fear now, Dr. Bacevich, is that whatever mistake we've made in
the past, the first job I have is not to compound that mistake.
So, my premise is that we can have an honest disagreement about
what we should have done, and I would argue a bit that leaving
Saddam Hussein in power after ignoring 17 United Nations (U.N.)
resolutions, given his history, is not a status quo event, that
you can't go back in time and say, ``We shouldn't have
invaded,'' without some consequence, in terms of this regime
that we replaced living off the Oil-for-Food Program. I don't
think it was a static situation. I think very much that the
U.N. would become a lesser body than it is today if you allow
dictators like Saddam Hussein to constantly ignore them. But,
that's a legitimate debate, and that debate's behind us.
Now, what to do now? The new strategy is a result from
failure. The new strategy bought into the idea, as I understand
it, General Keane, that the missing ingredient in Iraq was not
a lethargic Iraqi people, indifferent to their fate, that was
relying upon us to do everything, but an Iraqi people under
siege that could not develop military capacity as they're being
attacked and fought at the recruiting station, and an Iraqi
Government that was under siege, where sectarian violence
knocked politicians down. The way to break through, in terms of
military capacity and political progress, was to provide better
security. Is that the underpinning theory of the surge?
General Keane. Yes, absolutely. The general election was
held in December 2005, and constitutional referendum in
October-November. Maliki was forming his government from
January through the end of March 2006, when the Samarra Mosque
bombing occurred, in February, with the single purpose and the
intent to provoke the Shiite militias into an overreaction, as
a result of that mosque bombing, to undermine the government.
So, our problem that we had was a security situation, and the
compromise that we had made in the past, of not putting
security first as a necessary precondition to political and
economic progress, had failed. We had to put security first.
Senator Graham. Well, let's look forward. There are two
points in time, from the fall of Baghdad to January 2007. I
think any objective observer would say that strategy failed to
produce results. Reconciliation is a word. If you look at other
conflicts in history, you name the civil strife, whether it be
religious-based or ethnically-based, there has to be a level of
looking forward, versus backward.
Now, what's happened from January 2007 to the present day?
I would argue, and I would like to hear your thoughts on this,
that the amnesty law that's yet to be implemented, but about to
be implemented, is a giant step forward, in this regard. It's
the Shiites and the Kurds saying to the Sunnis that are in jail
that took up arms against the new Iraq, against the Iraq where
Shiites and Kurds would have a bigger say, 17,000 people have
had their applications for amnesty approved, out of 24,000 who
have applied. Is that not an act of sectarian forgiveness that
is a precondition to reconciliation? Isn't that something that
is a positive trend?
General Keane. In my mind, that and other programs like it
that the Iraqis are implementing is all about reconciliation. I
don't believe we're going to have this national compact, as Dr.
Malley is suggesting, of some kind of Kumbaya event.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Keane. That's not the way this is going to take
place. This is a tribal society, and it's not going to work
that way. This is significant, in what you are suggesting, and
so is de-Baathification.
Senator Graham. Now, I'm from South Carolina, so we know
about civil war. It started in my State. So, we can't rewrite
our history. All those struggles they're having in Iraq have
been known to other people.
Now, let's talk about the provincial election law. If it
becomes a reality, and I don't want to keep us here any longer,
Mr. Chairman, but the point that gives me optimism now, versus
before the surge, is that there has been some actions taken in
Baghdad that are positive, in my opinion. The provincial
election law was agreed to by all the major parties, and it's a
chance to vote in October 2008. From what I can understand,
based on my visits to Anbar, the Sunnis are going to take this
opportunity, this time around, to participate in elections. To
me, that is a statement by the Sunnis to the Shiites and the
Kurds that there is a better way to relate to each other,
``We're going to use the ballot box to send elected
representatives to the provinces, and eventually to Baghdad.''
Isn't that a major step forward, a sea change in Sunni
relationship to the central government and to the people at
large?
General Keane. It absolutely is. I had in my statement that
a poll has been taken among the Sunnis, and they indicate that
90 percent of them will vote in the provincial elections, and a
similar amount in the general election in 2009. So, what is
that saying? That is saying that the Sunni people themselves
are reconciling with the Government of Iraq. They want to
participate in the political process. They know this is a
Shiite-dominated government, but they want to enter that
process. Overwhelmingly, the majority of the Sunni insurgent
leaders are part of that process now.
Senator Graham. Let's take the budget. Now, the one thing
that Senator Levin and I have in common is that we understand
the value of money in politics. Senator Levin is a very good
representative for the State of Michigan, because Michigan gets
their fair share, and I try to do the same for South Carolina.
But, the $48-billion budget that was recently passed, to me, is
a major move forward, simply because money, in politics, is
power.
You're having the Sunnis and the Shiites and the Kurds
agreeing to divide up the resources of the Nation. To me, that
is a statement by each group that, ``I am entitled to some of
this money, but so are you.'' That is something that is
encouraging. We're a long way from having this thing resolved
the way we would like, but I would argue, General Keane,
because of you and others, that we've turned it around, and
that we're moving in the right direction.
From a political point of view, I can tell you, as a
politician, when you share money with other people, you see
value in the role they play.
So, I would just like to end this, Mr. Chairman, with the
idea that better security has led to economic, political, and
military progress, but for me to say that the war has been won
and over would be a gross misstatement. I do believe we're
going to leave, as you say, General Keane, here's what drives
my train, gentlemen. I know, from a historical point of view,
Dr. Malley, that I will not be judged by the date the troops
came home. But, the people who follow behind me will judge me
and others during this time in history by what we left behind
in Iraq. I am confident that the only way we're going to win
the war as a whole against radical Islam is defeat it where you
find it. Al Qaeda was not in Iraq before we invaded, you're
right, but they're there now. I do believe that one of the
success stories of the last year and a half is that they have
been punished. The Muslims in Iraq took up arms against al
Qaeda, and anytime that happens, America and the world is
safer. Does anyone disagree with that?
Dr. Bacevich?
Dr. Bacevich. Sir, I hope this is one of these things where
we can have an honest disagreement.
Senator Graham. Absolutely, we can.
Dr. Bacevich. I just don't share the optimism about
reconciliation. What I would say is, if indeed everybody in
Iraq is keen on reconciling, then let's get out of the way,
let's let them reconcile and be able, therefore, to achieve the
success.
Senator Graham. Do you think we're standing in the way of
them reconciling?
Dr. Bacevich. I do think that, to some degree, our presence
becomes an excuse, a crutch, something that different groups
can use to play with.
Senator Graham. I gotcha.
Dr. Bacevich. To my mind, the insistence that we hear from
General Petraeus about taking the pause, the counsel from
General Keane about not being too hasty now and putting at risk
anything that we've gained, all is suggestive of, perhaps, some
doubts on their part that this reconciliation express train is
moving quite that rapidly. That would be my concern.
Senator Graham. Well, I think they have honest doubts. I
don't know the eventual outcome. I see progress. But, my point
was about the Anbar environment changing, where Iraqi Muslims
rejected al Qaeda, apparently, and aligned with us. To me, that
is a positive step in the overall war on terror. Do you agree?
Dr. Bacevich. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Keane? How significant is that?
General Keane. Excuse me, sir?
Senator Graham. How significant is what happened in Anbar
vis-a-vis al Qaeda?
General Keane. Oh, I think it's a stunning achievement, and
very well appreciated in the Arab world, when you talk to
people in other countries. It is the first time that a majority
of people have rejected al Qaeda at the expense of their own
lives. Essentially, that message is carried around the Arab
Muslim world. When you pick up the traffic of al Qaeda
themselves, they talk about it in terms of a defeat,
themselves, by the Sunnis, ``We've been defeated by the Sunnis
in Iraq.'' They're reluctant to admit, ``The Americans are
killing us,'' but, ``We've been defeated by the Sunnis in
Iraq.''
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've been more
than generous with your time. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen, it's been a great discussion. You're
helping our country. Thank you for coming.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
By the way, Dr. Malley, did you want to add anything?
Dr. Malley. Just on this process of reconciliation, I'd
make two points.
I believe, as General Keane said, that reconciliation is
not a moment, it's a process. My doubt is whether this Iraqi
Government and its allies are seriously, genuinely engaged in
that process. There are a number of laws, I would say some may
be more optimistic about whether they're going to be
implemented, and whether the implementation will be
nonpartisan, as opposed to politicized, which happened to de-
Baathification or to the amnesty law. My view is, we have to
keep the government's feet to the fire and provide real
pressure, which I haven't seen so far, to make sure that these
steps are genuinely taken, rather than simply, ``Let's sign a
piece of paper, because that's what Vice President Cheney asked
us to do, but the minute they turn around, we're going to do it
our way.''
Chairman Levin. That's the whole issue here. It's not
whether or not we want to maximize chances of success in Iraq.
Everybody wants to do that. The suggestion that the other side
of the coin from the current policy is a dismal defeat in Iraq
is ignoring the argument, which is made by at least two of our
witnesses here today, I believe, that the way to maximize
success in Iraq is to put pressure on the Iraqis to work out a
political settlement.
Everybody agrees there's no military solution here.
Everyone mouths the words, ``There's no military solution.''
Some people mean it. Some people, I don't think really
understand what they're saying. If there's no military solution
here, then we have to force a political solution. Then the
question is: How do you do it? That's where the big divide is;
more and more troops, or keeping the troops there in the hope
of creating some kind of an atmosphere where the politicians
can work out a solution. That's what the supporters of the
status quo and the current policy is. Those of us who feel that
the only way to get a political solution is to force the
politicians to reach a political solution by ending this open-
ended commitment, which is clearly open-ended, there is no end
that is projected for it; even this so-called pause, which, by
definition, means a brief period. When you look up the term
``pause'' in the dictionary, it means a relatively brief
period.
Yesterday, General Petraeus destroyed that idea, that the
pause is going to be brief. What is it? Forty-five days, it's
going to be examined, I think. That takes you to the middle of
September. Then there is an indeterminate period to assess. No
end in sight.
I even asked General Petraeus, yesterday, ``What if things
go well? Would you then say we will begin to reduce again?'' He
would not even say that. I said, ``What if things go well by
the end of the year? Can you then say we will start our
reductions again then?'' He would not make a commitment. It
doesn't make any difference to this policy whether things go
well or things go terribly; the answer is the same, ``Maintain
your military presence,'' even though the consensus is,
``There's no military solution.''
Now, I think a majority of the American people do not want
a precipitous withdrawal. That is also used by the supporters
of the status quo, that, ``The opponents of this policy want a
precipitous withdrawal.'' No, they don't. They want a planned,
careful, thought-out timetable that gives the Iraqi political
leaders the opportunity to reach a political settlement. That
is what has been proposed. That's what got 53 votes in the U.S.
Senate. That's what has a majority vote in the House of
Representatives. Not something which is precipitous, immediate,
but something which has a plan to it, which ends this open-
endedness which the Iraqi political leaders think they have a
commitment to.
General, you said it shouldn't be open-ended. But, I don't
see how the current policy is anything but open-ended. We had a
statement by Secretary Gates, not too long ago, that it was his
plan to continue these reductions after the surge. That's out
the window. Then he said it would be a brief pause. That
apparently is out the window. We had the President of the
United States say that by the end of 2007 we would turn over
the security of the country to the Iraqis. That's what he said
would happen when he introduced the pause in early 2007. We
have not turned over security in key areas. Obviously, we have,
in peaceful areas. But, in the key areas, we have not.
I visited the north of Iraq, 3 weeks ago. In those 4
provinces up there, we were told that there were 110 combined
operations in the previous 3 months. There were more Iraqi
troops up there than American troops. Seventy percent, or 60
percent of the Iraqi troops were able to take the lead in a
combined operation. That's the statistics which we've been
given. So, there's as many Iraqi troops in those four provinces
capable of taking the lead in combined operations as there are
American troops. Yet in only 10 out of 110 combined operations
did the Iraqis take the lead. That's 9 percent.
Economically, they are building up these huge surpluses.
These incredible surpluses being built up at $100-a-barrel oil;
2 million barrels a day are exported by Iraq, and we're still
paying for most of their reconstruction?
If you want to talk about dependency, that is what is
continuing, here. It is a dependency on our presence and our
money. Militarily, in those four provinces at least, we're
still taking the lead 90 percent of the time, despite the
ability of their troops to do so. Economically, we're still
spending more for their reconstruction. Politically, we can
talk all about these benchmarks having been met. No, they
haven't been met. Most of the ones that have been, where the
legislation has been adopted, depend on implementation. They
have not, in many cases, been implemented yet.
Senator Graham talked about this provincial elections law.
Well, there's a provincial power law, but there is not yet a
provincial elections law. That depends upon the Iraqi
legislative body acting. They have not yet acted to put into
place the machinery that will allow those October 1 elections
to take place.
I think you would all agree it's important that those
elections do take place. I think everybody believes it's
important that they take place. But, there's a real question as
to whether they will take place or not. I'm not saying that
based on just my assessment, that's based on the assessments of
those who have the responsibility to make these kinds of
assessments.
So, all in all, what we come down to is not the question of
whether or not it's important to, ``leave Iraq in better
condition than we found it,'' whether or not it's important
that it be a stable place. I think everybody wants that. The
question is whether or not the current course that we're on,
with all of our eggs in the Maliki basket, and when he fights a
different part of the Shiite community, we're with him.
We are right in the middle of a sectarian conflict. It was
General Odierno, the other day, that called this an
intercommunal struggle. Do you agree with that, General, this
is an intercommunal struggle in Basrah?
General Keane. Certainly, there are 42 different militia
organizations in and around Basrah alone. But, you have to draw
back from that and take a look at what really happened. We had
no control there. The Brits pulled out of there 2 years ago,
and militia groups took over and maligned the police force. So,
what are we doing? We're going down there to provide security
and control so that, yes, the political process can move
forward. That's what it's about.
Chairman Levin. Yes, but we went down there, not because
they followed our advice; despite our advice. General Keane, I
think you used a term, which is a very interesting term I
found, back, I think, a few days ago, when you said that Maliki
is, ``way in front of the military realities on the ground.''
You acknowledge, and I think General Petraeus acknowledged,
yesterday, it took a couple of times to ask him, and we're
dragged in with Maliki.
General Keane. But, Senator, what we're talking about here
is probably a month or 2. That's the only difference. We have a
campaign that's going to last a number of months to gain
control of the southern provinces before the provincial
election. General Petraeus was working on that plan, I believe,
raising in front of the Iraqi leadership all of the issues in
the south, as a result of the many meetings he was having, some
of which he was having while I was there.
Chairman Levin. He lays out a plan which is thoughtful,
which is building up pressure. What happens to the guy we're
supporting? He trashes the plan by a precipitous action. Maliki
undermines the plan which Petraeus had laid out, and we just
simply continue to defend Maliki.
General Keane. So, you don't want to give him any credit.
Chairman Levin. Maliki, for what?
General Keane. We've been beating this guy up for 2 years,
saying, ``This thing is not just about Sunnis and al Qaeda,
this is really about Shiite extremists.''
Chairman Levin. Let's go through the credits----
General Keane. So, he steps up to the plate and starts to
do something about it. Yes, it's a little ill-conceived, and it
wasn't properly planned. In the long run, let's focus on how it
ends and not how it began.
Chairman Levin. I agree with that. But, when you say ``give
him a little credit,'' I don't give him credit for
precipitously going to the plate and swinging wildly. No, I
don't. Because it raises a question as to what his motive is
and whether or not there's a political motive in his mind, in
terms of the power struggle he is in, politically, perhaps,
with the Sadrists. So, it raises a big question as to his
motivation. The wisdom of putting all of the eggs in the basket
of someone who clearly is not someone who is nonsectarian, who
has his own political ax to grind. So, that is where I have a
lot of problems.
General Keane. Well, I'm going to be the last to say that
he's not----
Chairman Levin. It's not a matter of whether or not we want
to succeed. This isn't a question of whether or not you want to
succeed in Iraq. The question is whether or not the Maliki
course of action, which we are totally locked at the hip on, is
the right way to go. That's the specific question. Or whether
not we should end this open-ended commitment and let Maliki and
others know, ``Folks, we've been there 5 years, we're spending
$12 billion a month, we've lost 4,000-plus troops, this is
longer than World War II, we've given you an opportunity.'' Now
we're saying, objectively, the first 3 years were wasted, now
we're saying that? There were some of us that were saying that
was the wrong course, 3 years ago. But, we were then told,
``You're defeatists. You want to surrender.'' That's what we
heard, 4 years ago, 3 years ago, 2 years ago. No, we don't. We
want to succeed as much as anybody else. The question is: Does
this course that we're on lead to a conclusion which is a good
conclusion, or does this lead to greater and greater
intercommunal conflict? That's the issue.
It's an issue where we have different points of view, and
yesterday, by the way, when General Petraeus was asked, ``Could
reasonable people differ on this issue?'' he would not even
concede that reasonable people could reach a different
conclusion than he did, I have to tell you, I was struck by
that. I was so sure that General Petraeus would say, ``Of
course reasonable people can differ.'' All three of you are
reasonable people, sitting at this table, and you differ with
each other. Does that mean you're not reasonable people? You're
all reasonable people. You have very strong opinions that
differ with each other. But, not to concede that somebody who
differs with his approach, which is just a continuation of an
open-ended commitment that those people are reasonable, it
seems to me, showed the lack of a balance on his part to see
the other side of this issue and to at least acknowledge the
possibility, even though he disagrees with it, that the best
course of action here may be to force the Iraqis to use the
only leverage we have, which is our presence and the departure
of most of our troops as a way of forcing them to accept a
consensus position, ``There is no military solution, there is
only a political solution.''
Now, I've talked long enough, and I haven't taken time for
my colleagues, but I want to give all of you a chance to sum
up. Why don't we go in the same order
Dr. Bacevich?
Dr. Bacevich. I guess I would sum up just with two points.
It's a great honor for me just to come and be part of this
event. My frustration stems from the fact that the subject is
Iraq, and the subject ends up being narrowly Iraq, and
therefore, the conversation tends not to get around to the
larger strategic questions.
I'll repeat a point I made earlier, that, in my judgment at
least, the continuation of this war serves to preclude a
discussion over what ought to be our response to violent
Islamic radicalism, given the failure of the Bush strategy,
given the failure of the freedom agenda, and the failure of the
doctrine of preventive war. General Keane himself acknowledged,
earlier on, we don't have a strategy. As important as this war
is, and trying to find a way to get out of it, it is the
absence of a strategy, and really an absence of a clear
understanding of how great or how limited the threat posed by
violent Islamic radicalism that simply has been lost.
I guess I would recommend to you, Senator, that some part
of the conversation, at some point, should get to these larger
strategic issues.
But, thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Bacevich.
General Keane?
General Keane. Thank you. Just briefly.
I share your frustration and the frustration of other
members of the committee, in terms of the time of our
involvement here and the thought that what really goes on is,
we're just kicking the can down the road some more. But, the
fact of the matter is, there really is a new strategy at play,
it has worked to resolve a lot of the major conflict in the
central region. We will finish al Qaeda this year. I'm also
convinced we're going to bring stability in the south. It's not
as tough a problem as what we dealt with in the central region.
Maliki now, for the first time ever, has the backing of all
the political parties behind him in what he's doing in the
south, except for the Sadrist Party. That is something, in and
of itself.
Let's be honest, our government browbeat Maliki into the
national legislative agenda. Then, last time General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker were here, we were beating up on them
because they didn't do any of it. Now they've done 12 of 18,
and 4 of the 6 significant legislative ones that will have
dramatic impact on the people. Now we're beating them up to say
it hasn't been implemented.
To get to where they were took months of compromise and
negotiations, and you know far better than me, in terms of
getting complicated major sovereign-state issues like that
passed, and they did. That deserves some recognition and some
credit. If executed, and I believe it will be, it will change
Iraq, as will the provincial elections, as will amnesty and the
de-Ba'athification laws.
Yes, I am optimistic. This is not an open-ended contract,
Senator. It is not. I mean, our policy is to transition to the
ISFs.
Chairman Levin. That's been true for years.
General Keane. Your frustration is that for 3 years we had
the wrong policy. That's true. We have the right policy now,
and we will transition to the ISFs. But, you're not going to
get General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in here and lay out
a time schedule on when that's going to be. They have too many
variables to cope with. But, at the same time, I can provide
you a framework for that, because I'm not accountable, the way
they are, and I'm convinced it's pretty close. We will
transition, and I think if you put the two schedules out on a
piece of paper, I'm not sure they're all that different, except
for the crowd that wants a precipitous immediate withdrawal.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you, General Keane.
Dr. Malley?
Dr. Malley. Senator, I would start where you left off,
which is that this is not a military struggle in which there
are parties to be defeated and parties that are going to win.
This is a political struggle in which deals are going to have
to be made, for the most part, putting al Qaeda aside. That's
what this is about. That's where we have to decide whether our
mission makes sense or not.
My fear, as I said earlier, is that we may have wise
tactics, but we don't have a strategy. We don't have a strategy
to achieve achievable goals. The real onus has to be on the
Maliki Government, on the Iraqi Government.
This military mission has a point and has a purpose only if
it is set in the context of a strategy, achievable goals, where
we put the onus on the Iraqi Government to do what it needs to
do, and where we have a regional strategy, so that whenever we
leave, we do it in an environment that is less polarized and
less tense. But again, to echo what you said, I think we've
done more than our part. Now it's up to them.
Chairman Levin. Gentlemen, you've been great. This kind of
discussion is exactly what I know our colleagues relish and
welcome, regardless of their own predilections, which the
American people, I think, are really into, in terms of a debate
on Iraq policy again, and that's healthy.
We will stand adjourned, with our gratitude.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
DRAWDOWN OF TROOPS
1. Senator Collins. Dr. Bacevich, General Keane, and Dr. Malley,
will a pause in the drawdown after July ease the pressure on the Iraqis
to make progress in meeting these important political and economic
benchmarks?
Dr. Bacevich. The question assumes that actions on our part--
whether sending more troops to Iraq or pulling some of them out--can
fundamentally affect the behavior of the Iraqi Government. I'm not sure
that I buy that assumption. It's far more likely that Iraqi politics
have a dynamic that derives from domestic Iraqi considerations related
to ethnic, tribal, and sectarian identity. In short, whatever the
trajectory of Iraqi politics, whether toward democracy or
authoritarianism or chaos, they will decide and we will find ourselves
cast largely in the role of spectators.
General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Dr. Malley did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
2. Senator Collins. General Keane, one of the most important
benchmarks is the need to increase the number of Iraqi security force
(ISF) units capable of operating independently. The news reports that
1,000 Iraqis either refused to fight or simply abandoned their posts
during the Basra offensive are troubling to me and indicate that
despite the time and funding we have put into training and equipping
the Iraqi troops, we are not seeing the results we hoped for.
Furthermore, both United States and Iraqi commanders stated in January
that the ISF would not be ready to secure Iraq from internal threats
until 2012, and from external threats until 2018-2020.
It strikes me that the problem may not be one of resources and
training, but of motivation--in other words, that Iraqis may be less
willing to take responsibility for their own security because they know
U.S. forces are there indefinitely to back them up.
Why, in your opinion, has the ISF performed so unevenly?
General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
3. Senator Collins. General Keane, we heard General Petraeus
testify yesterday that the security situation in Iraq has improved
since the implementation of the surge and that the number of combat
battalions capable of taking the lead in operations has grown to well
over 100.
The report issued by the Independent Commission on the ISF, chaired
by retired Marine Corps General and former Commandant of the Marine
Corps, James Jones, suggests that coalition forces could begin to be
adjusted, realigned, and re-tasked as the ISF becomes more and more
capable. General Jones' report stated that U.S. forces could soon be
retasked to better ensure territorial defense of the state by
concentrating on the eastern and western borders and the active defense
of critical infrastructures essential to Iraq.
This is very similar in many ways to the transition of mission
proposed by the Iraq Study Group, and also proposed in legislation by
Senator Ben Nelson and me. We have suggested that our troops transition
their mission and focus on border security, counterterrorism
operations, training and equipment of Iraqi troops, and protecting
Americans and American infrastructure.
Under what conditions should the U.S. military begin a realignment
of the mission in Iraq?
General Keane did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, PROGRESS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ IN
MEETING BENCHMARKS AND ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION, THE FUTURE U.S.
MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ, AND THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh,
Pryor, Webb, Warner, Sessions, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, Thune,
and Wicker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and William K.
Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Dana W.
White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A.
Cronin, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher
Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon
I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant
to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jane
Alonso and Mark J. Winter, assistants to Senator Collins; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas,
assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke and Russell J.
Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant
to Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody.
On behalf of the committee, let me welcome you, Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen. We appreciate your willingness to
appear before the committee this afternoon. We thank you for a
lifetime of service to this country.
The issue before us isn't whether or not we want to succeed
in leaving Iraq stable and secure. We all seek that goal. The
question is how to maximize the chances of success and whether
the course that we're on is the right one.
Since the beginning of this conflict, we've tried
repeatedly to get this administration to change course and to
put responsibility on the Iraqi leaders for their own future,
since just about everybody agrees there is no military
solution, and only a political settlement among the Iraqis can
end the conflict. The administration has repeatedly missed
opportunities to shift that burden to the Iraqis.
In September--excuse me, in January 2007, President Bush
said, in announcing the surge, that, ``The Iraqi Government
plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's
provinces by November 2007.'' Clearly, the Iraqis have not
taken the lead on security in ``all of Iraq's provinces.'' As a
matter of fact, as of March 2008, the Iraqi Government had not
assumed security responsibility for the most populous
provinces. As the fighting in Basrah demonstrated, the Iraqi
security hold in provinces for which it is responsible is
tenuous at best.
In February of this year, Secretary Gates said that there
was within the Department, ``a broad agreement that the
drawdown should continue,'' as the added presurge brigades
left. Secretary Gates, in his written statement to the
committee this afternoon, refers to a period of consolidation
and evaluation as a ``brief pause.'' Now, that stands in
contrast to what General Petraeus said to this committee 2 days
ago. Under questioning, General Petraeus pointedly refused to
use either the word ``brief'' or ``pause'' to describe how long
reductions might be suspended under the approach that he was
recommending to the President.
General Petraeus's recommendation was that there be a ``45-
day period of consolidation and evaluation,'' beginning in
July, which would then be followed by a ``process of
assessment, which would determine, over time''--those are his
words--when he can make recommendations for further reductions.
In September, in other words, according to General
Petraeus's recommendation, a period of assessment would just
begin. General Petraeus repeatedly refused to estimate how long
that assessment period would last or how low U.S. troop levels
in Iraq might be by the end of the year, even if all goes well,
which was the question put to him.
What recommendation did President Bush adopt a few hours
ago? General Petraeus's open-ended approach or Secretary
Gates's brief pause? The answer is, since the President said
that General Petraeus ``will have all the time he needs,'' and
even went so far as to say that ``some have suggested that this
period of evaluation will be a pause'' and that is misleading,
to use the President's words.
In summary, instead of a continuous reduction beyond
presurge levels, or even a brief pause, what the President did
today was to reinforce America's open-ended commitment in Iraq
by suspending troop reductions in July for an unlimited period
of time.
The administration's current policies are perpetuating
Iraq's dependency on the United States--politically,
economically, and militarily; and they take the pressure off
the Iraqis to reach a political solution. The administration
has repeatedly expressed its unconditional support for the
excessively sectarian government of Prime Minister Maliki. Key
legislation for reconciliation, including a hydrocarbon law,
elections law, and amendments to the constitution, have not
been passed. The success of other laws will depend upon their
implementation.
Our continuing funding of Iraq's reconstruction makes
utterly no sense, particularly in light of Iraq's cash surplus
resulting from the export of 2 million barrels of oil a day.
Prior to the start of the Iraq war, the administration told
Congress that Iraq would be able to finance its own
reconstruction through oil revenues, and that they would be
able to do that in fairly short order.
Five years later, U.S. taxpayers have paid at least $27
billion for reconstruction activities, while Iraq has reaped
the benefits of skyrocketing oil prices. Iraq now has tens of
billions of dollars in surplus funds in their banks in accounts
around the world, including about $30 billion in U.S. banks.
Furthermore, according to the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, the Iraqi Government budgeted $6.2 billion
for its capital budget in 2006, but spent less than a quarter
of that. The President said today that ``Iraqis, in their
recent budget, would outspend us on reconstruction by more than
10 to 1.'' However, as of August 31, 2007, according to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Iraqi Government
has, in fact, spent only a fraction of its $10.1-billion
capital budget for 2007.
Senator Warner and I wrote to the GAO on March 6, asking
the Comptroller General to look into why the Iraqi Government
is not spending more of its oil revenue on reconstruction,
economic development, and providing essential services for its
own people.
Ambassador Crocker told this committee, on Tuesday, that
``The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is
over,'' and the U.S. is no longer ``involved in the physical
reconstruction business.''
However, as of last Thursday, the U.S. Government is paying
the salaries of almost 100,000 Iraqis who are working on
reconstruction. Listen to this, at the same time that
Ambassador Crocker was saying what he said, that the U.S. is no
longer involved in the physical reconstruction business, and
the President today adding that ``American funding for large-
scale reconstruction projects is approaching zero,'' just this
week the committee received a notice from the Department of
Defense (DOD) that it intends to increase U.S. funding for
reconstruction for this year by over 50 percent by reallocating
$590 million of Iraqi security force funds previously
designated for training and equipping and sustaining of the
Iraqi security forces. The notice that we received from the
DOD, from the comptroller there, is that the increased funding
would be used, for example, to build 55 new Iraqi police
stations.
I sent a letter to Secretary Gates earlier today, and we
notified his comptroller yesterday, requesting that the DOD's
notice to us of its plan to use these additional U.S. taxpayer
monies to pay for Iraqi reconstruction be withdrawn.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. Supporters and critics of the Iraq war may
disagree over much of the administration's policy, but can't we
at least agree that a country which is awash in cash as the
price of oil tops $110 a barrel, that Iraq should be using the
resources that they have to pay for their own reconstruction?
Again, I welcome our witnesses. I thank them for coming
here. I know just how difficult their schedule is, and our
schedule may be comparable to theirs today, since, as of a few
minutes ago, we had a number of votes scheduled that are going
to be stacked to begin in a few minutes, and I think that we've
requested that that be changed, that they be delayed until
later in the afternoon. But, as of now, there is no change.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you and other members of the committee in giving you
a warm welcome and thanks to both of you.
I've had quite a few years experience. It's been an honor
to work with the Secretaries of Defense and the Chairmen. I
think history will record the two of you one of the finest
teams that ever served the country.
Secretary Gates, I don't see your arm in a sling. You're
back in every way. You're going to swing at us a little bit, I
hope. Don't feel deterred.
I also want to thank the service men and women under your
command, and their families, particularly those families who
have lost loved ones and those families who are loyally trying
to nurse back to health the wounded. This country owes them a
great debt of gratitude.
This week, we had testimony by General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker. I thought it was well prepared. The
hearings explored, I believe, all facets, whether or not the
answers meet the requirements of, individual or collectively,
remains to be seen, but they came forward and did a real strong
effort in that vein.
We had witnesses yesterday before this committee with some
different perspectives on the situation in Iraq.
I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for having a full
hearing schedule on this very important subject.
Lastly--that's Iraq and Afghanistan--lastly, Mr. Secretary,
I wrote a letter to the President, with a copy to you--and I'll
ask unanimous consent that that letter be placed in the record
following my opening remarks----
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Senator Warner.--expressing my grave concern about the
narcotrafficking in Afghanistan. It has increased every year.
Today, it's so full of drugs getting out of that country, it's
meeting, as I understand it, almost 90 percent of the
marketplace. Now, I know you've tried hard, Mr. Secretary, but
the letter asked this matter be raised to the top levels of the
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conference,
because I think it deserves no less. I find it unconscionable
that narcotics trafficking, which money is taken out of as it
proceeds to leave Afghanistan and--goes directly into the hands
of the Taliban, the insurgents, to buy weapons, which are used
against NATO forces, our independent forces, and other allies
struggling to achieve the goals in Afghanistan of enabling that
country to exercise the reins of sovereignty over their people
and their land.
I would hope today that you could tell us what NATO did
about that. I understand, from your able staff, that there was
strong consideration, and I think I and my colleagues are very
anxious to get those reports.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll ask to put in a statement
by Senator McCain and a further statement of my own.
But, let's get to the hearing. We're anxious to hear from
our witnesses.
Chairman Levin. The statement you referred to, of Senator
McCain, will be made part of the record, as will your letter,
as well as my letter to Secretary Gates, requesting the
withdrawal of this shift of $600 million for additional
reconstruction projects in Iraq. They'll all be made part of
the record.
[The prepared statements of Senator McCain and Senator
Warner follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen to the committee. These are challenging times in our Nation's
history and Mr. Chairman, I cannot think of two better men to serve our
country and lead our brave men and women in uniform. I am grateful for
your service and I thank you for testifying before us today on U.S.
strategy and policy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On Tuesday, we heard from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
on progress in Iraq and their thoughts on our way forward. We still
face difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are making progress
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While there has been recent fighting in
Baghdad and Basra, violence overall is down in Iraq. NATO's recent
decision to add troops to Afghanistan is a welcomed and positive
development for our ongoing fight against al Qaeda and a resurgent
Taliban. The security, political, and economic gains outlined this week
by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are real.
Today, the President addressed the Nation about his way ahead in
Iraq, and today, we have two men, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are supremely aware of the
challenges our forces and our policymakers face this year. Congress has
a choice--as it did last year--to choose to build on the progress we
have made or set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Iraq resulting in ultimate defeat.
Last year, many observers predicted that the surge would fail. Yet,
sectarian and ethnic violence, civilian deaths, and deaths of coalition
forces have all fallen dramatically since the middle of last year. This
improved security environment presents an opportunity for an average
Iraqi, in the future, to embrace a more normal political and economic
life. Reconciliation is happening. Over the weekend, Sunni, Shia, and
Kurdish leaders backed the Prime Minister in a statement supporting his
operation in Basra and disbanding all the militias. No doubt, much more
needs to be done and Iraq's leaders need to know that we expect them to
demonstrate the necessary leadership to rebuild their country. But
today, it is possible to talk with real hope and optimism about the
future of Iraq and the results of our efforts there.
Iraq and Afghanistan lie at the heart of the region. A success in
Iraq and Afghanistan means both nations are stable, prosperous,
democratic states that do not threaten their neighbors and assist in
combating terrorists and religious tolerance must triumph over violent
radicalism.
Whether Iraq or Afghanistan become stable democracies, or sink back
into chaos and extremism, the outcome will have long-term implications
for this critical part of the world as well as our Nation.
This is broad strategic perspective on our efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Many people ask how do we succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan?
The critics said we couldn't meet our goals in Iraq--that they were
unachievable. They were wrong a year ago and they are wrong now. Since
June 2007, sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq has been reduced by 90
percent. Overall civilian deaths have been reduced by more than 70
percent. Deaths of coalition forces have fallen by 70 percent. People
are going back to work. Markets are open. Oil revenues are climbing.
Inflation is down. Iraq's economy is expected to grow by roughly 7
percent in 2008. Political reconciliation is occurring across Iraq at
the local and provincial grassroots level. Admittedly, political
progress at the national level has been too slow, but there is
progress.
I know that the witnesses this morning face formidable challenges
and what often seems like insurmountable obstacles, but I am confident
that they will discuss ways in which America can succeed in Iraq and
detail the likely costs of our failure to Iraq and the region. If the
United States chooses to withdraw from Iraq before adequate security is
established, we will exchange for victory a defeat that will have long
lasting and terrible consequences for ourselves, our friends and the
region. If Iraq or Afghanistan becomes a failed state, they could
become a haven for terrorists to train and plan their operations. In
Afghanistan, it would be a case of history repeating itself--a chance
no one is willing to take. Iran's influence would increase in Iraq and
would encourage other countries to seek accommodation with Tehran at
the expense of our national interests.
However, if we and the Iraqis can build on our successes, we have a
chance to make Iraq a force for stability and freedom, not conflict and
chaos, in doing so, our troops can leave with pride and our Nation can
leave behind countries that contribute to the security of America and
the world. I know that our distinguished witnesses possess a lifetime
of experience and insight, and I look forward to their testimony.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Mr. Chairman, I join in welcoming Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen back before this committee. I commend the continued skilled
manner in which both have carried out their duties and responsibilities
during these challenging times.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling the series of hearings this
week. On Tuesday we received the report from Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus. Yesterday, we had a very good discussion with
witnesses from outside government on their evaluation of the situation
in Iraq and policy alternatives for the way forward.
The committee, I believe, is pleased with the decision announced
today by President Bush that he will reduce Army combat tours in Iraq
from 15 months to 12 months. I presume our witnesses opinions on this
issue were taken into consideration before the President made his final
decision.
The hearings held this week, coupled with the President's
announcement, will yield an equally intensive line of questioning. The
remaining issue, that of dwell time, or the time a servicemember will
return from deployment and remain at his or her home station, must also
be addressed.
Speaking for myself, I have further lines of inquiry that I have
formulated from these recent events.
First, the military surge largely produced the intended results as
announced by the President in his address on January 10, 2007 and
provided the Iraq Government, ``the breathing space it needs to make
progress.''
The second part of the surge was the expectation that the Iraqi
Government would make progress on national reconciliation. I
acknowledge that some progress has been made. However, regrettably, the
Maliki Government appears largely unable, or not inclined, to achieve
national reconciliation based upon top-down political accommodation.
From a long-term perspective, the prospect of establishing a secure and
stable Iraq that rests upon a patchwork of local arrangements is not
heartening.
Additionally, the American people, every day, mourn the loss of
life and limb and the hardship imposed on the military families. I
believe many Americans are also growing increasingly impatient with
Iraq's sectarian squabbling; Iraq's dilatory political delays; and
impatient with the vast sums of U.S. funds that are being spent on
Iraq's reconstruction at a time when Iraq's oil revenues and their
surplus funds in banks continues to grow.
I look forward to hearing the evaluation of the witnesses and the
reasonable effort of reconciliation that will take place in the coming
months.
Finally, there is increasing attention towards the negotiations
between the United States and Iraq on a Strategic Framework Agreement
which would include a Status of Forces Agreement. With regards to these
negotiations, I urge the witnesses to advocate for the fullest
consultation between the administration and Congress.
Turning to Afghanistan, I am increasingly concerned that our goals
there, and the gains achieved so far, have been placed in jeopardy by
the continuing growth of the drug trade in Afghanistan. The profits
from that trade are being used to purchase arms for the Taliban and
other insurgent groups which are, in turn, being used against U.S.,
NATO, and other partnered forces. I, myself, find this unconscionable
and believe it has to be addressed immediately at the highest levels.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to place into the record a letter I sent
to the President, prior to the NATO summit, to address this issue at
the highest levels. I look forward to hearing what steps, at the NATO
summit, were taken to address this critical problem.
[The information for the record follows after the prepared
statement of Senator Warner.]
It has been 9 weeks since our witnesses last appeared before the
committee. Since then, the following events have occurred: the NATO
Summit in Bucharest; the resignation of Admiral Fallon; the elections
in Pakistan; and continued accounts of disturbing Iranian activity--all
of which have bearing on our discussions today on Iraq and Afghanistan.
During these 9 weeks, the committee also conducted a number of
hearings which addressed the readiness of our Armed Forces.
Six years of war have placed strain on the Armed Forces. In these
hearings, the most disquieting statement--for me--came from General
Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. At a Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee hearing on April 1, General Cody provided the
following testimony: ``Lengthy and repeated deployments with
insufficient recovery time at home station have placed incredible
stress on our soldiers and on their families, testing the resolve of
the All-Volunteer Force like never before.''
As we approach the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the
All-Volunteer Force, we must be ever mindful that the All-Volunteer
Force is a national treasure we must preserve.
Our witnesses should expect to address these concerns with the
committee.
Before closing, I would like to acknowledge a very significant
event earlier this week. It was the presentation of the Medal of Honor
to the parents of Petty Officer Michael Anthony Monsoor, a Navy SEAL.
In September 2006, Petty Officer Monsoor laid down his life in Iraq for
his fellow team members. America owes him and his family a debt that
can never be repaid.
This is why, everyday, Americans honor the service and sacrifice of
all those who have given life and limb in Iraq and Afghanistan--as well
as the sacrifices of their families.
Chairman Levin, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Gates?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Senator Warner.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here to discuss the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As always, I thank the members of the committee
for your support of the DOD, but, more importantly, for your
support of our men and women in uniform. While there have been,
and will continue to be, debates over our strategy in these
campaigns, I know we are all unified in our admiration for
those who have volunteered to serve.
As you have heard from Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus, violence in Iraq has declined dramatically since this
time last year. In addition to the drop in U.S. casualties, we
have seen a dramatic and encouraging decline in the loss of
Iraqi civilians. Ethnosectarian deaths are down approximately
90 percent; and overall civilian deaths, 70 percent.
At the same time, the Iraqi security forces have provided a
surge of their own to complement U.S. and coalition efforts.
Though the recent operations in Basrah revealed shortcomings of
Iraq's security forces, it is important to remember that, a
year ago, they would not have been capable of launching a
mission of that scale.
At this time, half of Iraq's provinces have attained
provincial Iraqi control. The next province we anticipate
moving into that category is Anbar, a remarkable development,
considering the grim situation--security situation in that
province, 18 months ago. The Iraqi forces will shoulder more of
the burden as we reduce our forces over time.
On the economic front, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) expects real gross domestic product growth in Iraq to
exceed 7 percent this year. Oil exports are above prewar levels
and generated almost $40 billion for Iraq in 2007. These
numbers reflect improvements that are having a tangible impact
on the lives of Iraqis. These economic gains also mean that
Iraqis should shoulder ever-greater responsibility for economic
reconstruction and equipping their forces.
In recent months, we have seen the Government of Iraq make
meaningful progress in the legislative arena, as you heard from
Ambassador Crocker. These legislative measures are not perfect,
and certainly have their shortcomings. Clearly, these laws must
be implemented in a spirit of reconciliation, or at least
accommodation. Still, we ought not ignore or dismiss what has
been achieved.
Just as there is real progress to report, there are also
substantial reasons to be cautious. Al Qaeda in Iraq, though on
the defensive, remains a lethal force. It is trying to
regenerate itself, and will continue to launch gruesome
terrorist attacks. There will be difficult days for Iraqis and
coalition forces alike in coming months.
All of this, both the good and the bad, both progress and
potential regression, was on our minds as we considered our
options, going forward. In order to advise the President, I
again asked for individual assessments and recommendations from
the Commander in Iraq, from the Commander of Central Command
(CENTCOM) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President received
recommendations face-to-face with General Petraeus, Admiral
Fallon, Admiral Mullen, and each of the Service Chiefs. Though
all bring different perspectives, from the institutional
military to the operational military, all concurred with
General Petraeus's recommendations and the course the President
has chosen in Iraq.
Presently, three of the five surge brigades have departed
Iraq. The other two are scheduled to depart by the end of July.
At this point, it is difficult to know what impact, if any,
this reduction will have on the security situation. A brief
pause for consolidation and evaluation following a return to
presurge troop levels will allow us to analyze the process and
its effects in a comprehensive way.
I do not anticipate this period of review to be an extended
one, and I would emphasize that the hope, depending on
conditions on the ground, is to reduce our presence further
this fall.
But, we must be realistic. The security situation in Iraq
remains fragile, and gains can be reversed. I believe our
objectives are achievable. The gains that have been made over
the past year, at no small cost in blood and treasure, should
not be allowed to unravel through precipitous actions.
Whatever you think of how we got to this place, the
consequences of failure, of getting the endgame wrong, are
enormous. Some have lamented what they believe was an
unwillingness to listen to our military professionals at the
beginning of the war. I hope that people will now not dismiss
as irrelevant the unanimous views of the field commander, the
CENTCOM commander, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of the
Nation's most senior military officers endorse this step-by-
step path forward. As I told the President, I also support
these recommendations.
A final observation. I have 8 months left in this position.
We continue to find ourselves divided over the path forward in
Iraq. This is not a surprise. The truth is, perhaps excepting
World War II, all of our country's wars have been divisive and
controversial here at home. That is the glory of our democracy,
and gives the lie to the notion we are a warlike people.
It was my hope, 16 months ago, that I could help forge a
bipartisan path forward in our Iraq policy that would sustain a
steadily lower, but still adequate and necessary, level of
commitment for the years needed to yield an Iraq that is an
ally against extremists and can govern and defend itself. I
continue to harbor this hope for a bipartisan path, and I will
continue to work for it.
But, I do fear that understandable frustration over years
of war and dismay over the sacrifices already made may result
in decisions that are gratifying in the short term, but very
costly to our country and the American people in the long term.
We were attacked from Afghanistan in 2001, and we are at
war in Afghanistan today, in no small measure because of
mistakes this Government made, mistakes I, among others, made
in the endgame of the Cold War there, some 20 years ago. If we
get the endgame wrong in Iraq, I predict the consequences will
be far worse.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I appreciate the
opportunity to be here to discuss the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As always, I thank the members of the committee for your
support of the Department of Defense, but, more importantly, your
support of our men and women in uniform. While there have been--and
will continue to be--debates over our strategy in these campaigns, I
know we are all unified in our admiration for those who have
volunteered to serve.
Let me begin with a few words about Afghanistan.
Last week, I attended the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
summit in Bucharest with the President and the Secretary of State.
Progress was made in some key areas:
First, NATO leaders unanimously reaffirmed the
importance of success in Afghanistan and renewed their
commitment to the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) mission. This alone is a very significant event when one
considers that domestic opposition in Europe has hardened as
operational demands have greatly increased in the 17 months
since NATO leaders met at Riga. Despite the challenges, NATO
partners are standing together and standing firm;
Underlining this point, a strategic vision document
was adopted that lays out the alliance's goals over the next 3
to 5 years;
A senior U.N. representative was appointed to
coordinate development and reconstruction efforts; and
Several allies pledged additional forces, most notably
France, who will deploy a battalion to the volatile eastern
part of the country.
These elements made Bucharest a successful summit with regard to
Afghanistan and demonstrated that members of the alliance take their
obligations seriously. Members of Congress have expressed frustration
to me over NATO's shortcomings in the Afghanistan campaign--from force
levels to caveats. I have had a few sharp things to say on these
subjects myself. We continue to face serious challenges on the ground
in Afghanistan.
But it is important to remember the substantial, indeed heroic,
contributions of many allies--in particular those operating in the
southern part of the country.
Before heading to Bucharest last week, I visited Denmark to meet
with the Danish leadership and offer my thanks and appreciation for
their efforts. Denmark--a country of about 5.5 million people and a
total defense budget of $4 billion--is truly ``punching above its
weight'' in Afghanistan. Their troops are in the fight and taking
casualties--including two in the days that preceded my visit. I had a
chance to meet privately with some Danish soldiers who had served in
Helmand Province--a long-time Taliban stronghold. The soldiers told me
that their efforts made a real difference by pushing back the enemy and
by improving the lives of the local population. Senator Warner, I
appreciated your kind words about Denmark last week.
We are grateful to Denmark and all of our allies--and in particular
the British, the Canadians, the Australians, the Dutch, the Romanians,
and the Estonians--who have stepped up over the past year to take on
some of the most difficult and dangerous missions in Afghanistan. Their
contributions are truly impressive.
Now to the main topic of this hearing--Iraq.
In the past 2 days, you have heard from Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus. Earlier today, the Nation heard from the President. I
welcome the opportunity to contribute my views--as well as answer any
questions you may have.
Last year, when the President announced an increase in troops, an
overhaul of our strategy, and a new leadership team, many were
skeptical whether these changes could fundamentally alter the situation
in Iraq.
I believe the record shows that the fundamentals have changed, and
that the United States is in a very different place in Iraq today--a
better place, but one with significant challenges still ahead.
We have always said that there is no purely military solution to
the many problems facing Iraq. But a basic level of security for the
Iraqi people is a necessary precondition for progress to take place on
other fronts. Since the full surge forces became operational last
June--just 10 months ago--we have seen security gains accompanied by
movement in the political, economic, and governance arenas, both at the
local and national level.
As you heard from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, violence
has declined dramatically since this time last year. In addition to the
drop in U.S. casualties, we have seen a dramatic--and encouraging--
decline in the loss of Iraqi civilians: ethno-sectarian deaths are down
approximately 90 percent, and overall civilian deaths 70 percent.
At the same time, Iraqi security forces have provided a ``surge''
of their own to complement U.S. and coalition efforts. Though the
recent operations in Basra revealed some shortcomings of Iraq's
security forces, it is important to remember that a year ago they would
not have been capable of launching a mission of that scale. At this
time, half of Iraq's provinces have attained Provincial Iraqi Control.
The next province we anticipate moving into that category is Anbar--a
remarkable development considering the grim security situation in that
province 18 months ago.
The Iraqi forces will shoulder more of the burden as we reduce our
forces over time. I would reiterate that the United States has no
desire to keep a large number of troops in Iraq indefinitely or have
permanent bases. The Status of Forces Agreement being negotiated will
put us on a path to a more ``normal'' security relationship with Iraq--
one that more closely resembles the arrangements we have with other
allies and partners.
On the economic front, the IMF expects real GDP growth in Iraq to
exceed 7 percent this year. Oil exports are above pre-war levels and
generated almost $40 billion for Iraq in 2007. These numbers reflect
improvements that are having a tangible impact on the lives of Iraqis.
To cite one example, the Narhwan Brick Factory Complex has quadrupled
its workforce since January to 15,000. Similar efforts to revive
industry are moving forward--aided by increasing foreign investment.
These economic gains also mean that Iraqis should shoulder ever greater
responsibility for reconstruction and equipping their forces.
In recent months, we have seen the Government of Iraq make
meaningful progress in the legislative arena as well. Iraq's political
leaders have passed:
A pension law;
An amnesty law;
A provincial powers law;
A justice and accountability law; and
Their 2008 budget.
These legislative measures are not perfect and certainly have their
shortfalls. Clearly these laws must be implemented in a spirit of
reconciliation, or at least accommodation. Still, we ought not ignore
or dismiss what has been achieved.
Just as there is real progress to report, there are also
substantial reasons to be cautious. Al Qaeda in Iraq, though on the
defensive, remains a lethal force. It is trying to regenerate itself
and will continue to launch gruesome terrorist attacks. There will be
difficult days for Iraqis and coalition forces alike in coming months.
Similarly, the presence of militias and criminal gangs remains
troubling--as does the ongoing influence of Iran. The operation in
Basra and its aftermath also raises a number of legitimate questions.
Even so, there is still a great deal to be said for the Government of
Iraq's decision to confront the problem.
All of this--both the good and the bad, both progress and potential
regression--was on our minds as we considered our options going
forward. In order to advise the President, I again asked for individual
assessments and recommendations from the commander in Iraq, Central
Command, and the Joint Chiefs. The President received recommendations
from General Petraeus, Admiral Fallon, Admiral Mullen, and each of the
Service Chiefs. Though all bring different perspectives--from the
institutional military to the operational military--all concur with the
course the President has chosen in Iraq.
Presently, two of the five surge brigades have left Iraq. The other
three are scheduled to depart by July. At this point it is difficult to
know what impact, if any, this reduction will have on the security
situation. A brief pause for consolidation and evaluation following a
return to pre-surge troop levels will allow us to analyze the process
and its effects in a comprehensive way. I do not anticipate this period
of review to be an extended one, and I would emphasize that the hope is
conditions on the ground will allow us to reduce our presence further
this fall. But we must be realistic. The security situation in Iraq
remains fragile and gains can be reversed.
I believe the President's plan offers the best way to achieve our
strategic goals:
A unified, democratic and Federal Iraq that can
govern, defend, and sustain itself;
An Iraq that is an ally against jihadist terrorism and
a net contributor to security in the Gulf; and
An Iraq that helps bridge the sectarian divides in the
Middle East.
I believe our objectives are achievable. The gains that have been
made over the past year--at no small cost in blood and treasure--should
not be allowed to unravel through precipitous actions. The
repercussions of getting it wrong now likely would haunt us in the
future.
Whatever you think of how we got to this place, the consequences of
failure--of getting the end game wrong--are enormous. Some have
lamented what they believe was an unwillingness to listen to our
military professionals at the beginning of this war. I hope that now
people will not dismiss as irrelevant the unanimous views of the field
commander, Central Command Commander, and Joint Chiefs. All of the
Nation's most senior military officers endorse this step-by-step path
forward. I support these recommendations.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished
members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I thank you also for your continued support of the men and
women of the United States Armed Forces. I've been spending a
lot of time with our troops these last 6 months, as I know many
of you have as well. It's apparent to me that they and their
families know how much you care, and that, regardless of which
side of the aisle you represent, you actually do represent all
of them. We are grateful.
I know you've heard extensive testimony this week by
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus about Iraq, and I know
you're interested in the military challenges we face in other
places, such as Afghanistan. So, let me get right to it.
The Joint Chiefs and I fully supported the recommendations
made by General Petraeus to the chain of command, that he
complete the withdrawal of all surge brigades and that he be
given time to evaluate and assess his situation before making
any further force-structure decisions. That seemed prudent to
me.
It's not a blank check. It's not an open-ended commitment
of troops. It's merely recognition of the fact that war is
unpredictable. That's why we also advised the President and
Secretary Gates that General Petraeus's assessments of
conditions on the ground be continuously made, rather than on a
fixed schedule. More frequent views of exactly how we are
doing, from a security perspective, is, in my view, the only
way to ensure we make the right decisions at the right time. It
is the speed and uncertainty of this war, not just the enemy
itself, that we are battling. Such has always been the case in
counterinsurgencies. Witness the lethal influence of Iran, the
stepped-up attacks in the Green Zone, and the operations
ongoing today in Basrah.
I give a lot of credit to General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker for their brilliant leadership over the past year. They
understand, and have solved, many of the complex challenges of
waging war against terrorists and extremists, while at the same
time helping to build the foundations of a new nation. It's
tough, grueling, messy, and, yes, even lengthy work.
The surge of forces assisted them in that effort. It has,
without question and by any measure, helped to improve
security. But, the surge was never intended to be the remedy
for all things Iraq. It is designed, rather, to give our
military leaders the forces they need to execute more effective
tactics--which it did--and to provide Iraqi leaders the
opportunity to work toward political reconciliation and
economic progress--which it also did.
That such progress has been slower and of mixed success is,
I believe, more a function of the difficulties of a
representative government in Iraq than it is of the level of
security enabled by military operations.
Our troops can open many doors, but they cannot force Iraqi
leaders through them. As the last of the surge brigades come
home, the U.S. military in Iraq will be focused on keeping
those doors open on assisting the development of more and
faster progress and on helping the Iraqi security forces defend
their own country.
I can't be perfectly predictive, but I see no reason why we
cannot accomplish these goals while also keeping open the
option of an informed drawdown of forces throughout the
remainder of the year. Such options are critical, because,
while Iraq is rightly our most pressing priority right now, it
is not the only one. I need the rest of our military focused on
the rest of our challenges, which are, in this dangerous world,
many and formidable.
With the bulk of our ground forces deployed to Iraq, we've
been unable to prepare for, or deploy for, other contingencies
in other places. We are not training to full-spectrum
capabilities. We are not engaging sufficiently with partner
militaries. We cannot now meet extra force requirements in
places like Afghanistan.
Six years of war have certainly sharpened one side of our
sword. We now have in our ranks the expertise of some of the
most combat-experienced troops we've had in our history. But,
the other side of the blade, the major-combat and full-spectrum
side, needs sharpening, and we must turn this around.
A quick word about Afghanistan. I'm deeply concerned. The
Taliban is growing bolder, suicide attacks are on the rise, and
so is the trade in illegal narcotics. In this economy-of-force
operation, we do what we can. But, doing what we can in
Afghanistan is not doing all that we should.
We recently sent 3,500 marines to the south in Afghanistan.
They are there and already making a difference. But they're not
enough. Requirements exist there that we simply cannot fill,
and won't likely be able to fill until conditions improve in
Iraq.
Continued NATO involvement and the commitment of more
American forces, such as those the President has recently
pledged, will remain vital to the long-term security of
Afghanistan and our national interests there.
Let me conclude here, if I may, by echoing the Secretary's
sentiments on the quality of our men and women in uniform. I've
never seen them better. Though I hear and feel the strain they
are bearing in each of my encounters, I cannot deny that they
are driven by a sense of mission and purpose. They believe in
what they're doing, they know they're having an impact, and
they want to serve.
We must, from a leadership perspective, give them not only
the tools to do so, but also the guidance, the counseling, the
medical care, the support, and the time to do so safely and
efficiently.
The President's announcement today that Active-Duty Army
deployments will be cut from 15 to 12 months is a welcomed
first step in preserving the health of our forces, and I am
grateful for his decision, as are the brave soldiers in our
Army.
Again, thank you for the continued support and leadership
of this committee, as well as on behalf of our people and their
families, and for your time today, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
The first vote is on. We have about 4\1/2\ minutes left in
that first vote, plus the 5-minute extra time which we're
provided. I think I'm going to try to get my questions in, and
those who get back in time can pick up from there. If there's
nobody here, we will just stand adjourned for a few moments
until we get back. You both are old pros at this problem, and
we appreciate your understanding.
We'll have a 7-minute round.
Secretary Gates, your testimony, says that a brief pause
for evaluation following the return to a presurge level will
allow some analysis, you don't anticipate this period of review
to be an extended one. Now, it's very different, your words,
from those of General Petraeus. We pressed him very, very hard
on whether or not he would describe his recommendation as a
``brief pause.'' He pointedly refused to do that. He would not
use the word ``brief,'' he would not use the word ``pause.''
You used both.
Then he has, in his recommendation, an ``open-ended,
unlimited period of time.'' The way he phrased it was that
after a 45-day period, which gets him to September, during
which he would do some evaluation, at that point he would
``begin''--now we're in September--he would ``begin a process
of assessment,'' and then, over time, would determine what
recommendations to make.
Now, were you aware of General Petraeus's testimony to that
effect when you prepared your own testimony?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Are you aware of the fact that he refused
to use the term ``brief pause''--as a matter of fact, refused
to put any kind of an estimate of time on his own reviews and
assessments? Were you aware of that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I think, to the average reader, here,
there's a difference. Now, you can say that you support his
recommendations, but there's no way you can paper over that
difference between your saying you--hoping for a brief pause
and his saying we're going to begin a period, open-ended, and
that, over time, starting in September, there may be some
recommendations. Would you agree that there's a difference
here? You may want to describe why there's a difference, but
would you at least acknowledge that there is some difference
here in the way you described this upcoming period?
Secretary Gates. There certainly is a difference in the way
we've described it. When I visited Baghdad in February, I spent
quite a bit of time with General Petraeus, and he went through
the--if you will, the geometry of the battlefield as he
contemplated the five surge brigades coming out and how he
would be spreading the forces out, or pulling back from some
places, or changing who was responsible for security, moving it
to the Iraqis, and so on. He made, I thought, a compelling case
that once the five surge brigades were out, at the end of July,
that there should be a period of--what I referred to in talking
to the press at the time, a period evaluation and consolidation
so we could see what the impact of having withdrawn a quarter
of the brigade combat teams would be.
I continue to believe that that period of consolidation and
evaluation makes sense. My view is that, in the context of a
full year, and the fact that we went through a period, in
December, January, February, or thereabouts, where we went 2\1/
2\ to 3 months or so without any drawdowns, that a period of a
month to 6 weeks or so made sense, in terms of just seeing what
the impact was. Does the security situation hold with the
withdrawal of those brigade combat teams?
My view is that he should be in a position, at the end of
that 40-day--45-day period of evaluation and consolidation, to
make a determination whether a next-further drawdown could take
place of a brigade combat team or some elements thereof. I
think that when he talks about a continuing period of
evaluation, what he is talking about is that he will be making
this kind of an assessment, beginning--in my view--in mid-
September, making a decision, in terms of whether to make a
further drawdown then, or whether to wait 2 or 3 more weeks or
a period of time before making an additional judgment whether a
subsequent drawdown or an initial further drawdown should be
made.
I think, as the Chairman and I have both pointed out, if
the conditions continue to improve in Iraq, as we have seen
them improve over the last 14 or 15 months, then we believe the
circumstances are in place for him to be able to recommend
continuing drawdowns. But while we have used different words, I
think that that certainly is my understanding and my
expectation.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, these are his words, ``At
the end of that period''--that's 45 days--``we will commence a
process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground
and, over time, determine''--that is an unlimited period of
time. There's nothing in there about 30 days or 40 days. I
particularly said, ``Could that be a month?'' He won't answer.
``Could that be 2 months?'' ``I don't know.'' ``Could that be 3
months?'' ``It may be.''
Now, I know you must have been familiar with General
Petraeus's testimony, and it is very different from what you're
saying here and what, apparently, you recommended to the
President. I think we ought to acknowledge it openly. I'll let
you characterize your own testimony in this regard. But, there
clearly is a difference. The question I'm asking you is, are
you aware of the fact that General Petraeus refused to use the
term ``brief'' or ``pause,'' and he refused to use any idea of
a time period for that second period that began in September--
you're aware of the fact of his refusal?
Secretary Gates. One of the benefits of being Secretary of
Defense, I suppose, is that I am more allowed to hope than the
field commander is.
Chairman Levin. I hope you're doing more than hoping. I
hope you're giving a hardheaded assessment of what you are
recommending to the President.
Secretary Gates. What I've just described to you, Mr.
Chairman, is what I have recommended to the President, and I
believe it is consistent with the decisions the President has
made.
Chairman Levin. When the President today, rejected the use
of the word ``pause''--you used the word ``pause'' in your
testimony. The President explicitly, in his statement, refuses
to use the word ``pause.''
Secretary Gates. I think they were in reference to
different things. My statement of ``pause'' was pause in the
drawdowns. The President was very explicit that we were not
going to pause in our operations in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. The other question I wanted to ask you has
to do--talking about ``hope,'' you said, in September 2007, you
hoped that we could get down to 100,000 troops in Iraq by
January 2009. Do you still have that hope?
Secretary Gates. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, on the funds, on the
reconstruction funds--Mr. Secretary, I find this, frankly, to
be extraordinary, to put it mildly, that we have Ambassador
Crocker coming before us, 2 days ago, saying that the United
States is no longer involved in the physical reconstruction
business. The same day, we get a letter from the DOD, asking us
to shift almost $600 million into reconstruction. Today, the
President says that we're just about down to zero, in terms of
reconstruction.
Now, it is unconscionable for a country with tens of
billions of dollars of surplus money sitting in bank accounts--
$30 billion, probably, in ours alone; they sell 2 million
barrels of oil a day at $110-plus a barrel; we're paying $3.50,
on the average for gasoline--they're building up these huge
surpluses, we have this huge national deficit and debt, we're
paying for their reconstruction, and the President is saying
that they're getting down to zero in reconstruction, the same
week his DOD is asking us to pour an additional $600 million
into reconstruction.
I don't know if you've gotten the letter yet--apparently
you didn't--but, we mentioned this to your Comptroller
yesterday, that this is very troubling to me. If I had the
power, as chairman, as I do in some areas, to actually
disapprove a reprogramming request, I would disapprove this. I
don't have that power in this area, because of a particular law
that was passed. But, we do have the power to request that you
withhold this shift of funds, and that you consider, during
this period, whether or not you really want to make that kind
of a shift. I think it's unconscionable. It runs smack into
what the President assured the American people today. It runs
exactly contrary to what the Ambassador said, 2 days ago. It
just rubs everybody that I know of, of both parties, the wrong
way. This is not a partisan issue. This is a commonsense issue
about American dollars.
When you get my letter, would you please promptly get
back--reconsider what the President said today and what
Ambassador Crocker said, and I would hope you would withdraw
that notice of a shift.
Secretary Gates. I will certainly respond to your letter,
Mr. Chairman. I will say, the reprogramming was for the
Commander's Emergency Response Programs (CERP).
Chairman Levin. No, it's not, those are not CERP funds. No,
no, no.
Secretary Gates. And----
Chairman Levin. We're all for the CERP funds. That's not
this issue.
Secretary Gates. But, I believe the reprogramming, Mr.
Chairman, is for the CERP.
Chairman Levin. No, the CERP doesn't build Iraqi police
stations, 55 police stations.
Secretary Gates. Well, I was unaware of the police
stations, but it is certainly--I mean, the CERP is, basically,
in the very short term, to give employment to Iraqis so they'll
put their guns down and stop shooting at our soldiers.
Chairman Levin. We're all for the CERP fund. Everybody, I
think, here has basically supported the CERP fund.
Secretary Gates. It may be the definition of the projects
under the CERP. I don't know if the Chairman knows.
Chairman Levin. No, I just don't think that's what this is,
and we'll give you a copy of this letter so you can take a look
at it, if you want to today. That's not this issue. This is
$600 million for construction of the size of police stations.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments, you talked about
how your desire to have a bipartisan effort during the time as
the Secretary of Defense--I think you should know, as well as
Admiral Mullen, that many of us have differences with regards
to the policy in Iraq, but I think all of us have enormous
respect for your service, Admiral Mullen's and your comments,
both, what you believe is in the best interest for the security
of the country. We have our differences, but I think you should
obviously know that members of this committee owe both of you
the highest possible regard.
Let me, just for a moment, continue what Chairman Levin has
mentioned and why I think there is at least a degree of
confusion. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the ``brief pause,''
and I think you used the word ``for consolidation and
evaluation, and I do not anticipate this period of review to be
an extended one.'' President Bush, today, said in his
statement, ``Petraeus will have all the time he needs for
consolidation and evaluation.'' It is that dichotomy which
brings the frustration, at least to me, and that, I think, is
underlying the point that was being raised by the chairman. I
think you've answered him. Unless there's something else that
you want to say on it, I'll move on. I think it is that
difference between what the President has said and what you
have said. The chairman was talking about the difference
between what General Petraeus himself had said before the
committee. I think it's this difference that brings some
confusion and some frustration, in terms of looking at this.
Secretary Gates. I actually think, Senator Kennedy, that
there's really not a substantive difference here. I think that
the place where we all start is the ``decisions will be made.''
The place where General Petraeus, the President, and I all
start is--and the chairman--is that decision will be made, in
terms of subsequent drawdowns, based on the conditions on the
ground. We intend to continue that process of evaluation. My
view is, clearly the President, I think, was saying that he
will defer to General Petraeus's evaluation of the situation on
the ground, in terms of--and his continuing assessment of
that--in terms of decisions on any further drawdowns. I agree
with that statement, and I certainly support that statement.
My view is that the period of evaluation and consolidation
is a 45-day period that General Petraeus has referred, and then
I think he makes the initial judgment, right then, whether or
not further drawdowns are possible at that point. He will
continue to make that judgment all through the fall.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, listening to your
testimony, you were talking about the doors being opened in
Iraq, you said, ``We can open doors. We can't force Iraqis to
go through the doors. We can keep the doors open.'' It's just
that kind of open-endedness that is of great concern to many of
us, because it looks like what we are saying is that we are
holding American service men and women hostage to the
willingness of Iraqi politicians to make the political
accommodations that are necessary in order to reach some kind
of resolution there.
How long are we going to keep these doors open? Many of us
believe that we have kept them open long enough and that we
should say to the Iraqis it's time for them to assume
responsibility for their security and for their defense. Now
we're just saying we are going to keep the doors open, and it
appears to many of us that we're going to keep the doors open
while American service men and women are fighting and dying,
and while the Department of Treasury is open to pour additional
funds into the sands of Iraq.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, in the other part of my
statement--I certainly wanted to be clear that I don't see this
as a wide-open commitment, an unending commitment. When I've
previously testified here, I've talked about how the military
solution is not going to be the one that solves all this; we
can provide the security so there can be progress. That has
clearly happened with the surge, the effects of the surge. The
security has improved remarkably, and in that timeframe, there
actually has been movement in the political realm. Not too many
people, myself included, would have said, last summer or last
fall, that the Iraqi Government would have passed these four
laws which they have passed. They've made progress. There are
still other ones that they have to pass. That there are clearly
limits, in terms of how long we would provide that kind of
security. One of the messages that I hope to send in this is
the sense of urgency that they continue to move as rapidly as
possible to provide for their own security--and their security
forces have improved dramatically; to pass the laws that need
to be passed, in terms of their own government; and to
politically reconcile--and that's happened, both locally,
provincially, as well as nationally, not like we'd like it to.
So, it's really in that context that I'm talking about when I
talk about having those doors open. They must take advantage of
that.
Senator Kennedy. There seem to be different views on those
matters, Admiral, but let me move on, because we know that we
have had statements that were made today about the President--
which I welcome--who talks about shortening the deployment of
our soldiers from 15 months to 12 months. We had Secretary
Gates, on April 4. You confirmed that the President committed
to our NATO allies the U.S. would send a significant additional
contribution in troops to Afghanistan. I certainly welcome
that.
All of us know, and Admiral Mullen has talked about this--
the stress that is being put on our service men and women. Even
if you're rotating the five brigades out of Iraq, those
individuals have effectively burned up their time, and now
we're talking about shortening the time from 15 months to 12
months, we're talking about the additional kinds of personnel
that are going to be necessary in Afghanistan.
So, let me ask you, either Admiral Mullen or Secretary
Gates--Admiral, you talked about, ``The military must reduce
the stress on the Army and the Marine Corps, or risk crossing
an invisible red line.'' Secretary Gates, haven't we already
crossed that red line and over-strained our troops? If we
haven't crossed the red line, when do you think we will?
Admiral Mullen, I'd like to hear from you, too.
Secretary Gates. I do not think we've crossed that red
line. Clearly, the force is under strain, their families, in
particular, are under strain. Admiral Mullen's been to the
theater more recently than I have, but I was there just a few
weeks ago, and morale is high, they are determined and
committed. We are watching all of the indicators, in terms of
the health of the force, very carefully. I think all of the
Chiefs would tell you that we are not past that red line. But,
particularly with the Army and the Marine Corps, we are
watching very carefully, and that's one of the reasons why we
put such a premium on being in a position to reduce the
deployment time for troop--for units that are deploying after
the first of August to 12 months, so they can have--and that
they will have 12 months at home.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral?
It's difficult to see, with the stress that is on the
military at the present time, the increased demand you're going
to have, reducing the amount of time that they're going to be
in rotation, and also putting additional kind of numbers into
Afghanistan that you don't increase the kinds of pressure.
Secretary Gates. Senator----
Senator Kennedy. Let me just--there is no other member of
the Senate here, so let me just use up----
Secretary Gates. Could I just respond----
Senator Kennedy. Sure, please.
Secretary Gates.--to the comment about Afghanistan?
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
Secretary Gates. I made that comment, Senator, and
encouraged the President to make the commitment he did, after
long discussions with the Joint Chiefs, in full awareness of
General Petraeus's recommendations, but also out of confidence
that American troop levels in Iraq will be lower in the course
of 2009.
Senator Kennedy. I think you responded to the chairman
asking about whether you thought the numbers were going to be
down, and you indicated you didn't think so, in Iraq.
Secretary Gates. No, I did not. I expressed the hope that
they would be.
Senator Kennedy. On another subject, on this long-term
security commitment, in the discussions that we had, Secretary
Gates, on Iraq in a February 6 hearing of the committee, you
said that there ought to be a great deal of openness and
transparency to Congress. You gave the committee your word that
the Senate would have an opportunity to review it before it was
implemented. So, many of us welcomed that commitment--I'd like
to ask you whether you believe Congress should have the
opportunity to approve or disapprove any agreement, regardless
of what it's called, if it affects our troops. With the country
so deeply involved in Iraq and the Nation so deeply divided,
shouldn't we in Congress have a right to be able to vote on the
nature of any long-term security commitment?
Secretary Gates. Senator Kennedy, as we discussed in
February, the agreement that is under negotiation is a standard
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). It will make no commitments.
It commits the new President, in January, to nothing. It will
not involve bases, it will not involve troop levels, and it
will not involve security commitments to the Iraqis. I would
say that if an agreement emerged in some way that impacted
treaty-making authorities of the Senate, then obviously it
would need to be sent up here, but as long as it conforms to
the standard kind of SOFAs, of which we have some 90 or 100 in
place, none of which have been ratified by the Senate, I would
think it is not necessary.
But again, I think the important thing, because of the
involvement and the controversy associated with the war in
Iraq, it's very important for the executive branch to be very
open with Congress as we go forward with the negotiation of
this SOFA.
Senator Kennedy. In 1953 we ratified the SOFA with NATO,
and President Eisenhower didn't bypass Congress. Congress even
approved the Compact on Free Association during the Reagan
administration, where we didn't have the kind of velocity and
the strong feeling with regards to troops. There's precedent,
and given the fact--the enormous power of this issue, the fact
of American troops--I mean, if we have American troops in those
areas, whether we have the agreements or there are not going to
be agreements, they're going to be affected by whatever is
understood by the Iraqi Government. So, it does seem to me that
this is certainly something that ought to be considered by
Congress.
My time has expired. Thank you very much.
Senator Warner [presiding]. I thank my colleague.
I was very taken aback by your testimony, Mr. Secretary.
That testimony reflects your belief of accountability in public
office and your candor about the mistakes made. I want you to
know, having been the chairman of this committee during most of
that period, I accept the same level of responsibility for some
of those mistakes, as do you, even though you came later on. We
have to go forward in a manner that we think is best for the
long-term interests of our national security. I judge in both
you and Admiral Mullen, a willingness to, on a daily basis,
look at all the options and do what we can to achieve the goals
of enabling that country to exercise the reins of sovereignty.
I was thinking about the SOFA that's coming up and the
Strategic Framework Agreement which is going to accompany two
agreements. It sort of states that they're in a category of
other nations of the world where we have SOFAs. It's a point of
pride, as well as a point of resolving things that are needed
by both the United States and Iraq.
It seems to me that, therein might be some leverage to
achieve a greater degree of reconciliation. They've done some
reconciliation. We know what it is. But, it's far short of what
I believe the President and yourself had in mind in January,
when the surge was launched. Clearly the surge provided, as the
President said, the breathing space, but it simply has not
resulted in the measure of reconciliation that we literally
entrusted to Maliki and the rest of his government.
So, are these agreements a means by which to gain some
leverage?
Secretary Gates. Senator Warner, I think we ought to use
anything we can find in the toolbox to try and encourage the
Iraqis to move forward on reconciliation. My own view is that
we may have--things began to come together and to move--after
what seemed like many months of stalemate in Baghdad, they
moved several of these pieces of legislation, all within a
period of a few weeks, earlier this year.
One of the things we're seeing is, all of the different
elements in Iraq congratulating Maliki on taking on the
situation in Basrah--the Kurds, Sunnis, and others. So we may
be seeing a growing belief in Iraq, that the Government of Iraq
is not sectarian, and that it does represent the interests of
all Iraqis. So, this is clearly a work in progress, but I think
it has accelerated in recent weeks, and we will need to
continue doing everything that we can to push that process
along.
I would just say, in addition, I think that the team that
you had in front of this committee, 2 days ago, or 3 days ago,
of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, is unlike anything
I've seen since I joined the government, 42 years ago, in terms
of being on exactly the same page and working with the Iraqi
Government in trying to push them along in exactly the
direction that you're describing.
Senator Warner. Those two extraordinary public servants are
working together as a team, like two strong horses trying to
pull the wagon with the problems in it. That came through, time
and time again, and I've had the privilege of working,
certainly with the Ambassador for many years. He used to come
up here and be part of the briefing team, before we even went
into Iraq. I have a high degree of confidence in his judgment.
I think he, likewise, is very pragmatic, recognizes mistakes
were made--both of them--and that they stand accountable and
with candor, they acknowledge it.
But back to the drug issue I raised with you. You had the
opportunity to see my letter to----
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner.--the President. I sent a copy to you. If
you could enlighten me. Again, my concern was that this issue
is so serious, in the minds of this Senator, that it had to be
elevated--you had the heads of State and government there, and
this was the forum, because we cannot stand by and just not do
positive steps to rachet down, substantially--maybe we can't
all do it in 1 year, but substantially eliminate those funds
that are flowing to the aggressors that are fighting our troops
and the troops of NATO.
Secretary Gates. It is clearly a huge problem. It came up
in two different forums in Bucharest, first in a meeting of the
foreign and defense ministers of the countries that are all in
Regional Command South. The importance of dealing with it, the
importance of an integrated strategy, the importance of
particularly going after the labs, after the large landowners,
and working with the Afghans, and trying to get rid of corrupt
officials. It then came up again in the meeting that the heads
of government had with President Karzai, and a number----
Senator Warner. Actually, really the buck stops on his
desk, in my judgment.
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Warner. It is his responsibility with his police
and his other mechanisms of internal security.
Secretary Gates. As part of the Afghan Compact, in February
2006, primary responsibility for dealing with the narcotics
problem passed to the Afghan Government. Now, they have a
counternarcotics force with an authorized size of about 3,000,
and they have about 2,100 onboard. They have some helicopters--
a dozen or so helicopters. They're working with the Drug
Enforcement Agency, they're working with us. But, also, the
United Kingdom and NATO are trying to figure out how we can
support them to do a better job. Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Powers, Europe is working on a plan, has addressed this issue
on how the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can
do a better job of supporting the Afghan Government. The
results of that assessment are classified, but I'd be happy to
provide it to you and to the committee for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Secretary Gates. There is clearly an understanding on the
part of the NATO governments, from the heads of government on
down, of the importance of this, and I will tell you, they were
very direct with President Karzai in the meeting in Bucharest.
Senator Warner. I will avail myself of that opportunity,
and that pleases me.
Admiral, would you like to comment on that?
Admiral Mullen. Just that it's as critical as you say it
is, Senator Warner. It is a concern that troops in the field
have, and actually some of our troops are very involved in
meeting this challenge, as well, particularly some of the labs
and that kind of work. It is something that is very much on
their minds, and that a long-term comprehensive, effective
strategy be put in place is critical to a successful outcome in
this country.
Senator Warner. The current senior officer in the country--
I know him as a matter of fact, on earlier visits he was
stationed there--he has spoken out very frankly on this. I had
a long talk with his successor, General Kern, who's coming up
for confirmation before this committee shortly, and he,
likewise, is concerned.
Well, we have to do something. I'll come back, but, I mean,
I leave this issue knowing that both of you are doing
everything you can to reduce that threat to our troops from the
drug money.
Joe?
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Warner.
Thanks to you both for being here, and for your testimony
and service.
I appreciate the opening statements both of you made. I
want to read from the close of your statement, Mr. Secretary.
``Some have lamented what they believe was an unwillingness to
listen to our military professionals at the beginning of this
war. I hope that now people will not dismiss as irrelevant the
unanimous views of the field commander, CENTCOM commander, and
Joint Chiefs. All of the Nation's most senior military officers
endorse this step-by-step path forward. I support these
recommendations.''
I appreciate that, both because of the history that you
referred to, but also because there was a lot of media
speculation that there was intense disagreement within the
military about how to go forward. I've been through this enough
now to discount what I see in the media. But, the important
point is that the recommendation General Petraeus brought
before us, and that you and the President and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs have now accepted, is really the unanimous
recommendation of our military leadership. Admiral, I'm----
Admiral Mullen. It is.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. I appreciate that, and I think it's
very important that Members of Congress and the public know
that, that the President has acted on the unanimous
recommendation of our military leadership.
As this is going on--and, look, I have a point of view on
the war, that you know, and I think the report of General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker showed real progress. They
didn't overstate the case. It's reversible. But, militarily,
the numbers that you cited--real progress, politically and
economically, in Iraq. There are now different lines of
questioning being raised by critics of what we're doing in
Iraq, one of which I think has some merit, although it may be
overdone, and that's the one I want to ask you to comment on,
which is the economic side of this, the concern expressed that
the Iraqis are now putting some money in the bank, based on the
improvement in their oil output and, of course, the increase in
the international price of oil.
So, I wanted to ask, Mr. Secretary or Admiral, if you'd
talk about to what extent are we asking the Iraqis, and are the
Iraqis now picking up costs of either the military or economic
part of our involvement in their country? Two, what thoughts
you have about what more we can ask of them in the months and
years ahead.
Secretary Gates. This is one place, Senator Lieberman,
where I think there is true bipartisan agreement----[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. I think you're right.
Secretary Gates.--across the entire political spectrum,
that the time has come for the Iraqis to pick up the bill for
their own economic reconstruction and equipping of their
forces, and so on. I think the figures that the President was
referring to today, when he said a 10-to-1 differential, in
terms of investment, is that the Iraqis have $13 billion in
their budget for reconstruction, and there's nothing in our
budget.
I'm going to come back to the chairman of the committee,
here, in a second, with an apology.
But, my understanding is that in 2007, out of $2 billion in
foreign assistance the State Department (DOS) got for Iraq,
only about $520 million went for reconstruction. They've asked
for a little less than a billion in foreign assistance. If you
had the same proportion, it would be similar to that.
Maybe I'm using a little of Senator Lieberman's time to
offer you an apology, Mr. Chairman, but I've been handed a
note, and, as strange as it may seem, leading the largest and
most complex organization in the world, there are actually
things that go on that I don't know about. The $600-million
reprogramming that you talked about is not for CERP, and I will
take a very close look at it----
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you.
Secretary Gates.--for the reasons that you cite. But, it
gets to the point----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Gates.--that Senator Lieberman has raised. I
think this is an area where there is broad agreement, it is
time for the Iraqis to spend some of their money.
Senator Lieberman. Should they be spending more of their
money, not only on their own military costs, but on some of
ours, which, of course, has happened in previous American
involvements in conflicts, both in the Middle East, but also
post-second World War, for instance?
Secretary Gates. We haven't really discussed that, at this
point. The focus has really been more on their spending money
on their own forces and on their economic reconstruction. They
clearly have a lot of money they need to spend in those areas.
We've now, I think, actually delivered about $2 billion worth
of arms and equipment, under foreign military sales, to them
that they bought with their own money. There are several
billion dollars more on order. Their forces, we will be asking
for a significantly smaller amount for Iraqi train-and-equip in
fiscal year 2009 than we have in the past.
But, the question, in terms of whether there are some of
our costs they ought to pick up, I'm not aware that we've
really begun to consider that yet. It's been more of making--
one of the concerns, again, the chairman raised, is getting
them--they can budget the money, but one of the----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Gates.--problems they've had is getting them to
execute their budget. Part of it's a lack of expertise, part of
it is a lack of trained people, and part of it, in the past,
has probably been politics. We think they're making headway on
all of those.
Senator Lieberman. It's good to hear. I hope you'll start
to think about that, because I'm sure some of that bipartisan
agreement on this question of the Iraqis picking up more of the
costs of the conflict will be expressed, at some point in
Congress, urging you to do that.
I want to ask a second question. There's been a lot of
concern expressed about the negotiations going on for a SOFA
for a longer-term military relationship with Iraq. I'm thinking
here, let's look to that day when it's post-conflict, when our
troops are not involved in actual combat. Obviously, there's
been a lot of controversy in the presidential campaign about
Senator McCain's comment that we may have troops there a longer
time after the war is over, for peacekeeping. Some seem to
suggest that for us to have a longer-term military presence in
Iraq would be somehow dangerous or destabilizing for the
region.
I don't want to coach the witness too much, but it does
strike me that if one takes that position, then you have to
answer the question. ``What about our presence in Qatar,
Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and throughout
the Arab world, throughout the Middle East?''
I wanted to ask you if you would respond to the concerns
about a longer-term, essentially, military-to-military
agreement between a free, sovereign Iraq and the United States
of America.
Secretary Gates. I think that first of all, the states and
their--and I'll invite Admiral Mullen to comment--I think, with
one exception, virtually all of the states in the region would
like to see the United States maintain some kind of a presence
in Iraq, and not just as a stabilizing force, but to continue
the hunt for al Qaeda, to continue going after--helping the
Iraqi Government go after extremists, and so on. So, we are
talking, at least in my opinion, of a force that is a fraction
of the force that we have there now.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral Mullen, do you want to add to
that?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. Senator, most believe we will need a
long-term presence there, that is, as the Secretary said,
obviously much, much smaller than we have had.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Mullen. I'll just use the Basrah operation as an
example. While they moved a division's worth of forces, there
are capabilities they just don't have yet--the intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistics, and there are a
lot of them--what we call enablers, so that they can take care
of their own security. So, there will be some of that. This is
a sovereign country and if they want training assistance, which
is what we do routinely in lots of countries around the world,
that would be part of this. I would expect that would be part
of this, as well.
This is a part of the world that is as unstable as any, and
so, to the degree that our forces have that kind of footprint
that provide the kind of stabilizing influence that we often
do, I would expect us to be there.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary Gates, I assume that the one
country in the region that you would guess doesn't want us to
have a long-term military presence in Iraq is Iran.
Secretary Gates. That would be correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you both.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Thank you, Secretary Gates, for your clarification.
Let me just give you a couple of other numbers. We've
expended, on reconstruction so far, $27.5 billion on just three
funds; $12 billion is unspent that's been appropriated. So,
there's another $12 billion to look at, as to whether or not we
should not tell the Iraqis that rather than our spending that
unspent $12 billion that's previously been appropriated, that
we're going to look to them to pick up that slack. That's in
addition to this ``$600 million'' letter that you'll be
getting.
Let me just give you one incident that I shared with
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. When I was there a
month ago, and I was talking to one of our generals, and he
said, ``Senator, I was asking an Iraqi general, the other day,
this question.'' He said, ``I asked him, `Why is it that we
Americans are cleaning up your cities at our expense?' His
answer was, `As long as you're willing to pay for it, we're
going to let you do it.' ''
That's the dependency. That's what's been created here, and
that's why I think there is a real feeling in the country which
is united on that issue, and I think, a bipartisan feeling,
hopefully, at least on that question. We appreciate your taking
a close look at that request.
There's another number out there which I want to ask you
about. By the way, on the budget, when you said that they have
$13 billion in their budget for capital costs, you very
properly point out that the issue is whether they're going to
spend it. I just want to reinforce that point, because in 2006
they had a budget of $6.2 billion, the Iraqi budget; they spent
less than a quarter of that. In 2007, as of August 31, they had
spent, depending on which figure you use, either 4 percent,
which is what the GAO said, or 24 percent, according to the
White House computations--somewhere between 4 and 24 percent of
their 2007 capital budget, which was $10 billion. So, the issue
isn't a number that they put on the paper, it's what they spend
which is the critical number. They have the money. It's sitting
in our banks. We know that.
Mr. Secretary, these are 2 million barrels of oil a day, at
$110 a barrel. That's $200 million a day. The U.N. is going
around trying to get the world to pick up costs for Iraqi
people who have left their homes, instead of the Iraqis paying
for the Iraqi people who have left their homes. Why is it that
we're paying money, and that the U.N. is paying money, for
Iraqi people who have been either removed forcefully or fled
their homes--there's 2 million in Iraq and 2 million out of
Iraq, approximately. Someone's going to have to pay for them;
we understand that. But, why isn't the Iraqi Government paying
for that? That's less than a billion dollars the U.N. is
seeking. They get that in 5 days' worth of oil sales.
Secretary Gates. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, I think that,
as I suggested to Senator Lieberman, I think a big part of the
problem here has been the Iraqi capacity to execute their
budget, not a lack of willingness to do it. We have, for
example, just sent 12 experts from the Department of the
Treasury to work with the different ministries in Iraq, to try
and help them figure out, ``How do you execute a budget? How do
you get money to the provinces? How do you get contracts?''
This is all new for the Iraqis.
Chairman Levin. I'm sorry, it's just not acceptable.
Cutting a check from an account that they have in New York, Mr.
Secretary, I just think it's totally unacceptable that we say
they don't know how to cut a check. Do you know how much money
they pledged last year to the U.N. for the support of their own
Iraqi people who have been pushed out or fled their homes? Do
you happen to have that article? I think it was something like
$25 million. $25 million. That's a pledge. I don't even know if
they followed through on the pledge. We have a responsibility
to those people, by the way. I happen to feel that very deeply.
But, my gosh, so do the Iraqis have a responsibility to their
own people. We're spending more of our money, by far, on Iraqi
refugees than the Iraqi Government is spending. The only reason
we hear on that is that they don't have the capacity to cut a
check to the U.N.? It doesn't wash. It's another example of a
failure to force the Iraqi Government to take responsibility
for their own country. It's just another example of that.
Here's what I asked Ambassador Crocker about the number of
employees that we have that are working on reconstruction.
These are not your employees, these are not people working at
the bases, these are not the Sons of Iraq, these are U.S.
Agency for International Development and Army Corps
reconstruction people--100,000 people on our payroll. The
President describes this as coming to an end, today? It doesn't
compute.
What we're going to need you to do--and I really believe
that there's a lot of bipartisan support for what I'm saying--I
really need you to take a look at these monies that are in our
budgets, that are unexpended, and--these are the DOD budgets,
these are reconstruction funds. We think there's $12 billion,
at least, unexpended. If you would take a look at that and get
back to this committee with what can and should be covered by
the Iraqis, it would be very helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
I agree that Iraqis should pay for an increasingly greater share of
the costs associated with reconstruction and stabilization. The
Government of Iraq (GOI) has already assumed responsibility for the
bulk of reconstruction costs. The 2008 GOI budget, with Iraq's mid-year
supplemental, includes more than $21 billion for capital expenditures
and $11 billion for the Iraqi security forces (ISF). The U.S. fiscal
year 2008 budget in contrast includes $3 billion for the ISF Fund
(ISFF), $1.7 billion for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program
(CERP), and $50 million for the Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations (TFBSO).
In fact, the GOI has increased its spending for the ISF by about $2
billion every year since 2005. For 2009, the Iraqi security budget is
expected to reach $11 billion. In addition, the GOI is increasingly
using the Foreign Military Sales program to equip and train its forces.
By building Iraqi capacity and transitioning costs to the GOI, we have
reduced our ISFF request for fiscal year 2009 to $2.0 billion. No funds
will be requested for TFBSO.
The GOI began to assume responsibility for payments to the 54,000
Sons of Iraq (SoI) in the Baghdad area beginning October 2008, thereby
covering $15.5 million in monthly payments previously funded through
CERP. The gradual transition has been positive with both GOI and SoI
leaders supporting the process. The GOI launched a $270 million Iraqi
CERP in April 2008 and has provided a total of $550 million for post-
kinetic reconstruction in Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, and other cities. In
the past, these efforts to enhance stability and cement hard-won
security gains could have fallen to U.S. Commanders with CERP funding.
Although recent, tentative security gains and improvements in GOI
capacity have allowed us to hand over programs and associated costs,
DOD programs remain indispensable to the U.S. Government
counterinsurgency strategy. By enabling commanders in the field to
respond quickly to urgent needs. CERP has proven to be one of our most
successful counterinsurgency weapons. ISFF helps safeguard our
investment in Iraq by ensuring a functional and effective 1SF. Any
effort to curtail these programs would provide new openings for
extremists to regain the initiative they lost in 2007, decrease our
ability to build sustainable security conditions with the ISF, and
hamper the further drawdown of U.S. forces.
We will continue to look for activities that can and should be
funded by the Iraqis. Transitioning these costs to an increasingly
capable GOI and redeploying our troops as security improves and Iraqi
forces assume responsibility constitute a return on our successes in
Iraq.
Chairman Levin. I think it would put us on a path, which is
a kind of path you described in your opening statement, about a
desire that this be put on a bipartisan course. You told me
that, the first day that you came in my office, when you were
nominated, and I believed you then, and I believe you now, that
that is your desire, to try to find a path which can get
bipartisan support. This is a element which I believe can get
bipartisan support.
The last question, if no one else is here--I hope that--
we're going to have a few more coming back--I was over there at
the Senate; I can only tell you that there are so many people,
so many colleagues of mine who were there voting, stuck there,
because they obviously wanted to be here. We did make an effort
to get these votes delayed; I want you to know that.
My final question has to do with Afghanistan, and it goes
to you, Admiral, because you, I think, made reference to
Afghanistan in your statement. You indicated, I believe, that
we have inadequate troops, that we may need to have more troops
in Afghanistan. You said that--at least earlier in the month,
and you, perhaps, said something similar today, which I may
have missed--that there are force requirements in Afghanistan
that we cannot currently meet, and that the high level of
forces in Iraq doesn't allow us to fill the need that we have
in Afghanistan. You said in December, ``It's simply a matter of
resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in
Iraq, we do what we must.''
There's going to be a reduction from a 15-month deployment
to a 12-month deployment--very regrettably, starting in August,
which makes it too hollow for many of us. But, nonetheless,
that's what the President has decided. So, this reduction is
not going to help people who are already there. But,
nonetheless, that reduction has been announced today by the
President, to begin 4 or 5 months from now. How does that
affect the Afghanistan picture? If you haven't already answered
it. If you've already answered that, then I'll read it. But, if
you have not answered that question, perhaps you could----
Admiral Mullen. The reduction from 15 to 12 months most
significantly affects what I believe--the health of the force,
because it takes--these deployments, which I have believed for
some time, are just--they're just too long. It really isn't
going to affect availability for troops for Afghanistan. What
will affect that is more troops being available, and the only
relief valve that I see out there that would provide that,
would be levels of forces in Iraq. So, I'd need to come down--
we'd need to come down a certain number of brigades before we
could start to meet the legitimate force requirements that we
have in Afghanistan that we just can't fill.
Chairman Levin. All right. I said that was my last
question, but I do have one more that has to do with the
militias. There's a ban that the Prime Minister has placed on
the Sadrists and on their militia. Does that ban extend to
Hakim's Badr Corps and all other militias, as well as to the
Mahdi Army?
Admiral Mullen. I think it is specific, but I don't know.
Chairman Levin. Specific to what?
Admiral Mullen. I think it's just to Sadr's--to the Jaish
al Mahdi (JAM) and to Sadr's militia, and not to----
Chairman Levin. Because that would be----
Admiral Mullen.--the Badr Corps.
Chairman Levin.--that would be a real problem, if it's only
limited to his opponents, his competitors----
Admiral Mullen. Well, I'd have to----
Chairman Levin.--in which
Admiral Mullen.--I'd have to----
Chairman Levin. You can double check that----
Admiral Mullen.--check and get back----
Chairman Levin.--because----
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I'll do that.
Chairman Levin.--Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution
already prohibits the formation of military militia, outside of
the framework of the armed forces. That's a constitutional
prohibition. I don't know if this recently announced ban,
whether it's narrow or broad, will stick any more than the
already existing constitutional prohibition will. I'm not
particularly optimistic that it will. But, in any event, if it
is not a broad ban for all militias, the way the constitution
provides, then I think the legislation, which is the subject
the benchmark provides, it would really create a problem, in
terms of selectivity. If you could get back to us on that, that
would be helpful, as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. I want to make sure none of my colleagues
are on their way back. [Pause.]
Okay, Senator Reed is on his way back, and there are
others, as well, but he's literally on his way. With your
indulgence--you've made an apology to me today, we're grateful
for that; you are always open in that regard. I'd like to
emulate you. [Laughter.]
I apologize for this interruption.
We will stand in recess until Senator Reed or someone else
comes back to take the gavel. We do know he's on his way back.
So, we stand in recess. [Recess.]
Senator Warner [presiding]. I thank our distinguished
witnesses for their indulgence today. We have had a series of
votes; and, thus far, I've run back and forth and made every
one. I have to leave shortly, but, I'd like to ask a few
questions now.
I would say to our witnesses that a number of Senators I
visited with on the floor are coming over after, hopefully, a
final-passage vote, here shortly. I think the staff will let us
know when that vote begins and ends.
Admiral Mullen, on April 2, 2008, you said, ``Having forces
in Iraq don't, at the level they're at, allow us to fill the
need that we have in Afghanistan. Equally broadly, around the
world there are other places we would put forces or
capabilities, not so much brigade combat teams as other kind of
enabling capabilities of small training teams that we just
can't, because of the pressure that is on our force structure
now in CENTCOM. I think we'll continue to be there until
conditions allow us to start to be able to reduce our force
levels in Iraq.''
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Would you expand on that, sir?
Admiral Mullen. Just available forces, that we have
additional force requirements for--specifically for
Afghanistan, up to three additional brigades----
Senator Warner. Now, this is on top of the----
Admiral Mullen. Yes.
Senator Warner.--marines that are going in now.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. The marines--actually, from a
fighting/combat standpoint, I'm pretty comfortable this year in
Afghanistan. But, there are additional requirements we've had
for a training brigade--so, about 3,000 trainers----
Senator Warner. Training the Afghan----
Admiral Mullen.--training the Afghan army and police.
Senator Warner.--and police.
Admiral Mullen. The marines are sending, basically, two
battalions this year--one of them will be dedicated to
training, and--
Senator Warner. Training.
Admiral Mullen.--the other to combat. But, they leave in
the November timeframe. So they're partially filling those
combat and training requirements right now, but those will
still be there.
We have a requirement for a training brigade and for up to
two additional combat brigades in Afghanistan, down the road,
and we need to--I mean, we have it now, and we're not going to
be able to fill that until we have forces that are released
from other obligations, principally in Iraq, at the brigade
size.
In addition, I have requirements in other theaters around
the world that wouldn't necessarily be brigade combat teams,
but that would be smaller units that do training with various
militaries around the world or do exercises and those kinds of
things, which are mitigating or preventative capabilities for
the long term that we would normally be doing, some of which we
are doing, but we're not doing it to the level that----
Senator Warner. The level that you----
Admiral Mullen.--we would be.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. Most of the pressure is on the brigade
combat teams, specifically, and the enabling--the significant
enabling capabilities that it takes to fight and--in Iraq and
in Afghanistan--the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities, and also the trainers, both in
Iraq, as well as Afghanistan.
Senator Warner. Let's clarify. You would add those
brigades. What percentage would that increase the United States
force structure in there? Now, your force structure is divided
between those American forces that are working with NATO--as a
part of NATO; then we have the independent force structure out
here for the U.S. Would those brigades be going into the NATO
structure or our own structure?
Admiral Mullen. They would notionally be going in--
notionally into the NATO structure, but, essentially--and it
would be three brigades worth 10,000, 11,000, and 12,000 that--
those kinds of numbers, in terms of overall size of the force.
The other place we find ourselves is, we're growing the
Army and the Marine Corps at a time--from the Army to the
active-Duty Army--I think it's at 525,000. So, we're drawing to
547,000 over the next couple of years. So, we find a great
demand on the forces right now, at a time we're growing. In 2
or 3 years, there'll be more capability. That will provide some
relief. Same in the Marine Corps. But that growth isn't going
to provide much relief in the 2009 or 2010 timeframe.
Senator Warner. We'd better be very cautious that someone
doesn't translate your comments to say we may be there 3 or 4
years more in Afghanistan. That may be the case, but I think we
should proceed very carefully before we try and reach a
benchmark of a date when we're there.
So, the augmentation of our forces, given the actions of
Congress and the appropriations to fund to enlarge both the
Army and the Marine Corps, as you say, will not come to full
bear until late 2009, correct?
Admiral Mullen. Well, actually the growth is out to 2010
and 2011. I mean, when we really have----
Senator Warner. Out to 2010 and 2011.
Admiral Mullen.--all that capability.
Senator Warner. So, I was trying to focus on the interim
period.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Do you think that we would contribute three
combat brigades to the current NATO structure?
Admiral Mullen. If Iraqi forces came down far enough, that
would be that----
Senator Warner. I see.
Admiral Mullen.--and it is the judgment of the Chiefs--
that's the next priority.
The third piece of this, though, is to bring some of
those--a brigade home, or two, at some point, because we need
to start building dwell time----
Senator Warner. Correct.
Admiral Mullen.--which gets relief on the stress on the
force.
So, those are the three big pieces right now that have an
extraordinary amount of pressure on our forces.
Senator Warner. Now, the President announced, today--you
also mentioned it, Mr. Secretary--in the President's speech, he
says, we'll also ensure that our Army units will have at least
a year home for every year in the field. Now, with the
anticipated augmentation of three brigades to Afghanistan, are
we going to be able to hold tight on the tour of 12 months and
a minimum of 12 at home?
Secretary Gates. Let me comment, and then invite Admiral
Mullen to comment.
The three-brigade figure comes out of a view of the ISAF
commander that that's what he could use. We were very careful
in Bucharest that the President not make a specific commitment
or a specific period of time when additional U.S. forces might
be available. So, I think it's an open question whether--how
much of that three-brigade request the United States would be
prepared to fill, or could fill. That decision will almost
certainly need to be made by the next President of the United
States. So, what we're really talking about is capabilities
here.
But, I would say that the Chiefs feel very strongly--and
I'll let the Chairman speak to this--but, the Chiefs feel very
strongly about the dwell-time issue. A big part of coming back
to 12-months deployed is making sure they have a year at home.
One of the things that----
Senator Warner. At a minimum.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Our goal actually would be to
move to 1 year deployed, 2 years at home----
Senator Warner. Two years at home.
Secretary Gates.--for the Active-Duty Force, and maybe
even, ultimately, 3 years; and, for the Guard and Reserve, 1
year mobilized, and 5 years at home, would be the goal
ultimately that we're headed to. Your support of our proposals
for growing the Army and the Marine Corps are really critical
to making that happen.
Senator Warner. Well, Congress is foursquare behind you,
Mr. Secretary, and----
Secretary Gates. Did you want----
Senator Warner.--you, Admiral.
Secretary Gates.--to add anything?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir. This is a--we look at these
requirements that we have. This goes back to the discussions
we've had about Afghanistan being an economy-of-force campaign.
We have a requirement for that one training brigade and two
other brigades.
Senator Warner. This will be refined, on the occasions you
have this period of reflection, once you draw down the surge
forces. Is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes.
Senator Warner. Fine.
On Pakistan, gentlemen--I'll ask both of you to comment--
it's been a major ally in this conflict, in Afghanistan. Much
of our logistics comes across the territories of Pakistan.
We've seen quite a turbulence in the political structure, and
it is yet to be resolved. At the same time, we see the threat
growing from the level of insurgents up in Waziristan, on that
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, that there's no
diminution in that threat. How are we going to deal with that,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I think some credit is due
to the Pakistanis, not only for allowing us the logistical
supply routes and so on, but they've had over 100,000 troops
deployed up in the northern and western part of Pakistan. I
think they've suffered 3,000 or so killed in action. They've
killed a lot of terrorists up there. They are a force
principally trained to deal with their long-time adversary to
the east, and so, clearly, we have some opportunities for
training. But, we also have----
Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, I have a problem.
Secretary Gates.--to let the civilian----
Senator Warner. I have 3 minutes to make it to the floor.
Secretary Gates. Okay.
Senator Warner. If you'd finish that, for the record.
Secretary Gates. Okay.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Pakistan is a key partner in the war on terror and plays a major
role in our long-term efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. Materials
for delivery to coalition forces operating in Afghanistan transit
through Pakistan, including approximately 40 percent of fuel and 84
percent of all containerized cargo. The security of the border region
with Afghanistan, therefore, is vital to the war on terror and
Pakistan's internal security. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) border region with Afghanistan is a largely ungoverned space
that the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) identifies as a
place where Taliban and al Qaeda forces recruit, train, and equip
fighters and infiltrate them into Afghanistan. Pakistan recognizes the
threat posed by its rugged 1,500 mile-long border with Afghanistan and
has improved security by stationing approximately 120,000 military and
paramilitary forces there and strengthening border controls.
Since 2001, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces have
conducted 91 major and countless small operations in support of the war
on terror; it has captured or killed more al Qaeda and Taliban than any
other coalition partner. Following the increase in Pakistani military
and security operations in the FATA, the number of retaliatory suicide
bombings and ambushes increased dramatically. In response to these
attacks Pakistan intensified its efforts to combat extremists,
resulting in the death or capture of a number of Taliban leaders in
2007. In the past 5 years, Pakistani soldiers have sustained more than
1,400 combat deaths (700 since July 2007) and more than 2,400 wounded
in action.
Pakistan has recognized, however, that it cannot rid its territory
of violent extremists by military means alone--it must also create an
environment inhospitable to terrorism and extremism. In 2006, Pakistan
requested U.S. support in developing and funding a comprehensive
Sustainable Development Plan to deny terrorists the ability to exploit
the under-governed FATA through economic and social development, and
strengthening effective governance in border areas. This plan is a 9-
year, $2 billion initiative which will provide services, upgrade
infrastructure, promote the sustainable use of natural resources, and
bolster commercial activity. The U.S. is seeking $750 million in
support of infrastructure development, social welfare, and capacity
building elements of the program over the next 5 years. The governance
element aims to help Pakistan extend its writ into the FATA by re-
establishing the pre-eminence in local politics of the Government of
Pakistan including recognized tribal elders and political agents. To
complement and support this effort the U.S. developed the Security
Development Plan (SDP) for Pakistan's Western Border Areas. The
Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking approximately $200 million
annually from a variety of authorities, including DOD counternarcotics
(section 1004 and section 1033), Global Train and Equip (section 1206),
and an authority specifically designed to train and equip the Frontier
Corps. The SDP is the security element of the U.S. Government's 6-year
plan that is designed to enhance the ability of Pakistan's military and
security forces to secure its border with Afghanistan and deny safe
haven for extremists.
It may be several years before Pakistan's comprehensive strategy to
render the remote tribal areas inhospitable to terrorists, insurgents
and other violent extremists can be measured for success. However,
Pakistan is making progress toward that goal. In the fall of 2007,
positive indicators included the actions taken by the government to
evict the extremists occupying the Red Mosque and its increased
pressure on the Taliban leadership in Quetta. These indicators suggest
Pakistan is willing to shoulder significant burdens to target the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and other violent extremists who enjoy safe haven on
Pakistani territory. It remains to be seen, however, if the newly-
elected civilian government maintain pressure on these extremists and
continue work to eliminate the safe havens in the border region. The
United States stands ready to offer continued support and cooperation
as Pakistan undertakes this difficult challenge.
Senator Warner. May I compliment you on going through
Denmark en route to the NATO conference. That country, although
small, made a valuable contribution to this operation in
Afghanistan, and their troops come and fight, just as the U.S.
troops.
Secretary Gates. I met with some of those troops when I was
in Copenhagen.
Senator Warner. I know you did. Thank you.
Excuse me, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for not only
your testimony, but for your service.
Secretary Gates, I was listening to your opening statement,
and it seems now that the parameters for success in Iraq are,
as you describe it, an ally against extremists and a nation
that can govern and defend itself. The first point raises the
curious relationship between the Iranians and the Iraqis. Are
they truly an ally with us against what some people would call
some of the extreme policies of the Iranians?
Secretary Gates. I think one of the things that has
happened over the past year or so, and perhaps one of the most
significant outcomes of the Maliki government initiative in
Basrah, is that they have increasingly become aware and become
educated to the realities of what Iran is doing, in terms of
meddling in Iraq, in supporting groups that are adversaries of
the government, in their influence in the south, and
particularly around Basrah, and their supply of weapons and so
on to people who are opposing the government. I think that this
has been a real eye-opener for them.
I think that there has long been a religious connection
between the two, because of the location of the holy sites. The
Iraqis obviously, under Saddam Hussein, were huge adversaries
of the Iranians. But, I think that the Iraqi Government today
is quite aware and increasingly concerned about Iranian
activities inside their country.
Senator Reed. Well, I think they are, but I don't know if
this is a recent revelation. I think you understand, probably
better than most, that, for example, Hakim spent a great deal
of the Iraq-Iran war in Iraq. The Badr Brigade was organized by
the Iranian forces, presumably still have close contacts with
Iranians, maybe not in a military capacity. But, one of the
problems here is that the Iranians, as Ambassador Crocker
pointed out, have close ties with practically every Shiite
organization and with Kurdish officials, and I would hesitate
to say maybe even Sunni officials.
So, one of the points that was made, I think very
eloquently, yesterday when we had our panel, was the conflict
between attempting to stabilize Iraq, given the huge influence
of the Iranians and suggestions by some in the administration
that we consciously destabilize Iran. It was described as,
basically, contradictory objectives. Would you comment on that?
Secretary Gates. I think our focus has certainly been on
trying to stop the Iranian activities that have involved the
supply of weapons and improvised explosive devices that have
been used against our troops, and we've been pretty aggressive
in that respect.
I think these connections with Iran, as you say, go back
quite a ways with a number of the Shiite leaders and
politicians in Iran. I think what they are coming to understand
is that Iranian influence has a significant malicious side that
is contrary to their interests as Iraqis. I think, in the past
few months we've seen them beginning to take some actions that
indicate, not only an awareness, but a willingness to act on
it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, the President announced, today, that tours
of the Army will begin to phase down to 12 months, which I
think is welcome news for many, many soldiers who are----
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Reed.--serving, and who are yet to serve. Does this
require an increased call-up of National Guard and Reserve
brigades to maintain the force structure in Iraq because we've
shortened the tour of the units that are in the field now?
Admiral Mullen. Not in the planning that I'm aware of right
now, it doesn't.
Senator Reed. Is that----
Admiral Mullen. This commences August 1.
Senator Reed. Why?
Admiral Mullen.--for troops deploying after August 1.
Senator Reed. As you project force levels, going through
until next year or beyond, I presume you're at least working on
a 18-month to 2-year cycle, are you showing a decrease in
forces? Is that one reason why we don't have to call on
additional Reserve and National Guard components?
Admiral Mullen. We're building some capability. I think,
next year we come up two brigades. It's about two brigades a
year. That's part of it. At this level, if we stayed at this
level that we're at right now for a long period of time,
clearly just the math would tell you that it would potentially
impact that. I just haven't seen that, from a planning
standpoint, at this point.
Senator Reed. So, if, in fact, the commitment to 12 months
is irreversible, then eventually, based on force structure
alone, we have two options--either to drop the force structure
in Iraq or to significantly, or at least to increase the number
of National Guard or Reserve brigades that will be called up.
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, if we are going to sustain this
over a long period of time at the number of brigades we have
there right now, that we would have that kind of impact. I
think that would be longer-term, as opposed to immediately in
front of us.
Back to your point, we're planned pretty well out for the
next couple of years.
Senator Reed. At what force level are you planning? The
current force levels for 2 years?
Admiral Mullen. What General Casey has said is, he can
basically sustain 15 brigades in CENTCOM. So, let's say 13 in
Iraq, 2 in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future at----
Senator Reed. Twelve months.
Admiral Mullen.--a high-risk level specifically,
particularly at high risk for the next 2 years. So, sort of,
through the end of 2009 and into 2010, until he builds out more
brigade combat teams with the Army growth.
Senator Reed. Among the consequences of high risk is the
lack of any significant Strategic Reserve.
Admiral Mullen. Certainly front the ground forces----
Senator Reed. Ground forces.
Admiral Mullen.--yes, sir. We wouldn't be put in a much
different position than we are right now.
Senator Reed. There has been a great deal of discussion
about the assumption of financial obligations by the Government
of Iraq. Specifically, have they agreed to begin to fund the
Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs), or the Sons of Iraq, Sunni
components that we have organized in different parts--
principally Anbar, but also south of Baghdad, in mixed areas?
Admiral Mullen. There is a commitment on the part of the
Government of Iraq to provide what we're calling Iraqi CERP to
$300 million, and they made that a few weeks ago. General
Petraeus said recently, they're very close to that money being
made available. He also said--I was made aware, within the last
few days, that they have an additional commitment in the CERP;
I just can't remember what the number is.
Senator Reed. But----
Admiral Mullen. I couldn't tell you, in the CERP category,
whether that's going to salaries.
Senator Reed. But, as I understand CERP--and my time
expired--that is essentially civic-action funds.
Admiral Mullen. It's both. It's both to pay the Sons of
Iraq, as well as to build projects. That's one of the reasons
that we--and General Petraeus, in particular--pushed so hard on
this, is because he calls it his ``ammunition'' right now. It's
had such a positive impact, in terms of employing people, and
providing additional security, and, obviously, providing a
salary for an Iraqi family so that they can survive in a
meaningful way until we're sort of through this whole
transition.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for your leadership, and from my
observations, I think both of you have won the respect of the
American people and the commentators, critics even, of our
effort, and that speaks well of how you've conducted yourselves
and the integrity you've shown.
Secretary Gates, one of the complaints that we had was,
``Well, things may be getting better, militarily--violence is
down, there's no doubt about that, but there has been no
political progress in the country since the last report from
General Petraeus and you.'' But, you note some political
progress in your written statement--a pension law, an amnesty
law, a provincial powers law, a justice and accountability
law--and they passed a 2008 budget. Would you tell us--just
give us a rundown of how significant you think those political
developments are. What are some of the political challenges
that remain?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that those laws represent,
if I'm not mistaken, four of the six benchmark laws that we all
talked about last year. One of the interesting aspects is how
three of the laws were passed as a package deal in a
negotiation within the Council of Representatives. It was
actual politics going on, where, ``I'll support your bill if
you'll support my bill, if you'll support my bill,'' kind of
thing. I think that, again, you've----
Senator Sessions. That's never done in Washington.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Gates. I think that it has been interesting to
watch the reaction of the other politicians, the non-Shiite
politicians in Iraq, responding to Maliki's initiative in
Basrah, for all of its military shortcomings, because they saw
him go after Shiite extremists. He has heard positive things
from Sunni leaders, from Kurdish leaders, and so on, and it's
still a long path to reconciliation, but I think that there has
been real progress, particularly in the last 3 or 4 months, in
terms of the political process in Iraq. It's still a long way
to go. The challenge is still the suspicion of the Shiite, it
is still the feeling of the Shiite--or the Sunnis that--
presumably, some residual hope that they could regain power
someday. There will be the contest over politics--over
elections in the provinces, and those will go well, I think, in
those areas that are largely Shiite, Sunni, or Kurdish--it'll
get more complicated in the provinces where there's a mixed
population this fall. But, I think that they're moving in the
direction--I don't know whether they'll make elections in
October, but I think that the judgment of our folks in the DOS
and the intelligence community is that they'll probably be able
to get them done this year, the provincial elections, and then
a national election next year.
So, I think everyone has learned lessons from the past, and
you heard great caution from General Petraeus and from
Ambassador Crocker. I think you will hear caution from us, as
well, in terms of expecting too much, too quickly. But, I do
think there has been progress.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Mullen, one of the things about a
withdrawal--and I certainly hope that we can--if we do have
this pause--and I'm inclined to take the advice of General
Petraeus; I think his performance and his integrity and
responding to our questions, and the success that we've seen,
that exceeded my expectations, in the last number of months,
makes me feel that we ought to be respectful of his opinion;
so, I'm inclined to be supportive of that--but, I do believe
plans for continuing the drawdown is important so that our
allies and friends in Iraq don't become dependent upon us. But,
explain to us, as has been explained to me, both in some of the
hearings and privately by generals, how difficult it is when
you pull a brigade out of an area. The danger of leaving gaps
in your lines, and who's going to fill those responsibilities.
Would you give us some appreciation for some of the decision
difficulties that our commanders have when they take out a
brigade in an area in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. General Petraeus frequently talks of
``battlefield geometry'' as he looks at where he has forces and
where he needs to move forces. Clearly he's done that, both in
building the surge--now we have three of the surge brigades who
have returned home, and the other two will be coming out
through the end of July. It is that battlefield geometry,
obviously, that he takes into account, in terms of where he's
going to put people. That's clearly based on the security
requirements that are either right in front of him or that he
expects in the future. He's moved forces around very deftly, I
believe, to handle this drawdown in a way where he's very
comfortable handling the drawdown, and that kind of calculus
goes on constantly.
At the same time--and there is, obviously, very focused
discussion today on the pause and the consolidation and
evaluation and assessment. From my perspective, I think it's
also very important to do this continuously, and because it is
really conditions-based assessment that is actually going on,
has been going on since the surge started to decline, as well
as we'll continue, no matter how many troops we have there.
It also takes, depending on whether you're a light brigade
or a heavy brigade, literally--and where you are coming from
and where you might redeploy to--depending on those factors, 45
to 75 days to move you from where you are in Iraq to, let's
say, back home, or vice versa.
So, those are all factors, planning factors that he has to
take into consideration as he makes decisions about where he
puts his forces.
Senator Sessions. Would you tell the American people--what
I hear you to be saying is that this is complex and difficult,
and you are spending considerable time on it, in planning it so
that it goes as effectively as we can make it go.
Admiral Mullen. General Petraeus is the principal architect
of this, as the tactical guy, and he spends, along with his
commanders, an extraordinary amount of time doing exactly that.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, thank you, as everyone has
said here, for your public service.
I want to ask you about Afghanistan. We've recently put
more marines in there. My question is--it's my understanding we
still have such a paucity of troops, not only our troops, but
the entire NATO force, that, once we clear an area, that we
can't hold it. Can you comment to the committee about that?
Secretary Gates. Let me make a brief comment, and then
invite Admiral Mullen.
First of all, it depends on the part of the country. In the
north, where there is less of a Taliban presence, where there
has been less violence, this is not so much of a problem. In
the east, where we have had a very successful
counterinsurgency, where most of our forces are located, and
where we have very effective provincial governors, there we
have been able to hold. The principal area of concern has been
in the south. I would say that your characterization of not
having enough forces to hold areas that we had cleared is an
accurate description. I would also say that, countrywide, one
of the shortages is for people to train the Afghan army and
police.
Admiral Mullen. I would only echo what the Secretary said
in that regard. If you ask the commanders there right now,
their number-one requirement is for trainers--the Afghan army
and the Afghan police. We've generated--and are doing it very
rapidly--an Afghan army. The police are behind that, and that's
probably the most critical part of this.
So, one of these two battalions of marines that are going
in are specifically going in to train. They leave in 7 months.
The fact that the French have now come forward and said they're
going to add additional troops will provide capability that we
need to address the shortfall that we have, although it won't
meet it fully. It is principally in the south right now that we
are most concerned, with respect to, certainly, combat, and
that's where the Taliban is most dense.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask you about Iraq. We had
testimony in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week
from a couple of retired generals--General McCaffrey and
Lieutenant General Odom--and General Odom told about how much
we are paying Sunnis, basically, to be on our side. He
specifically mentioned some kind of council, and that it
basically costs us about $250,000 per month for 100-square-
kilometer area. Do you know anything about this?
Admiral Mullen. I didn't see his testimony in--I think he's
speaking to the salaries we are paying those in what used to be
the CLCs, and now we refer to as the Sons of Iraq, to the tune
of about 90,000 Sons of Iraq, who are providing for their own
security, who have taken back their villages, their towns; and
about 20 percent of them are--we're moving them into the
security forces. So, all of that, from my perspective, is a
winning strategy, because you take them off the street, they're
providing for their own security, they can provide for their
family, and, in fact, they're moving into the Iraq security
forces. If it is different than that, then I'd have to get back
to you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, basically, his cut on it was,
``Well, we don't own them, we merely rent them,'' but what
you're suggesting is that we're not buying their allegiance,
we're buying their assistance.
Admiral Mullen. I would say there's a mix. When I talk to
commanders on the ground out there, there are those that they
trust implicitly--vet them very hard--there are those that they
trust implicitly, and there are others that they keep their
eyes on. So the impact that it's had, in order to local
security, has really been extraordinary.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask you about something General
McCaffrey said, and I'll quote him, ``The U.S. Army is starting
to unravel--equipment broken, National Guard is under-
resourced, terrible retention problems, severe recruiting
problems--the Army is too small.'' You want to comment on that?
Admiral Mullen. We're growing the Army to 547,000. The
recruiting environment is challenging, although we continue to
make the recruiting numbers, and we did so again this month.
There are waivers, there are concerns about the waivers that
are there, but that's watched very carefully, and their--
performance of individuals in the Army who have received
waivers is consistent with the rest of the force, best we can
tell. We watch the indicators very closely. Clearly, the ground
forces in the Army, in particular, are stressed. That's why the
15- to 12-month deployment is so important.
That said, they're resilient, they're performing at an
exceptionally high level, they're succeeding now in Iraq. When
you visit them, they send you that message. They have a skip in
their step, which is very positive, and yet they're looking for
some relief. In addition to shorter deployments, they'd like to
stay home longer. Their families are pressed very hard.
But, I would not describe it as unraveling. General Casey
has talked about this ``invisible red line.'' We're not
standing right in front of that invisible red line. It's out
there. It's a concern that we all have. So, I would not use
that kind of language to describe where we are.
Senator Bill Nelson. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I think what
folks like me grapple with is the political reconciliation, as
to whether or not it, indeed, is possible. You listed a number
of laws that had been passed. I think the true test there is
the question of whether or not those laws are being
implemented, whether they're being executed. What about an oil
law, which is a major one, because that's the divvying up of
the resource? Other than what you've pointed out, that they
have had some politics and produced some laws, you want to give
us any other insight into political reconciliation?
Secretary Gates. My view is that reconciliation in Iraq is
the beginning of a process that will go on for a very long
time. The enmities are ancient, and had been kept in place, as
they were, in many respects, in the old Yugoslavia, by force.
Once that force was removed, all of the monsters of the past
have, sort of, come back.
I think it has taken longer than any of us would have
wanted, but I think we are beginning to see the re-emergence of
a sense of Iraqi nationalism, including in the Government of
Iraq. I think that is progress.
But for these folks to learn to work together and live
together freely and in a democratic society is going to take
some real time, and that is not unusual for countries that have
the kind of history that Iraq has. I think there has been
progress, and I think they are moving in the right direction.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Gates, Chairman Levin raised the issue of the
Iraqis taking over more of the expenses associated with the
war, an issue that I brought up with General Petraeus earlier
this week, and I'm very sympathetic to the points that the
chairman made. I want to bring up one particular expense that
just floors me that the Iraqis are not covering now, and that
is the fuel costs. According to press reports, the Pentagon is
paying the Iraqi Government $153 million a month for the fuel
that's used at a time when the Iraqis are reaping billions of
dollars in unanticipated oil revenues because the price of oil
per barrel has doubled. Isn't that an expense that the Iraqis
should be covering? Shouldn't they just give us the fuel that
we need to operate?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I think the practical
aspects are, they cannot give us the fuel, because they have
their own shortages of the actual fuel. I think the real
question is whether there is the potential for reimbursement or
something along those lines. I would be honest with you, I
think that it's only been in recent weeks that we've been
seeing the kinds of dollars, and projecting out the kinds of
dollars, that the Iraqis may be able to accumulate. A certain
amount of that, they have to keep in Reserves, under IMF
agreements, but the question is--they are making a lot of
money, they have a big budget--I mean, if you want a
fundamental comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that
Iraq, this year, has a budget of $50 billion and the Afghan
Government will have revenues of $675 million.
I think we are all beginning to come to grips with this,
and I know the President feels strongly about this. He has
weighed in with us, in terms of what we would propose to pay
for Iraqi equipment and why we should pay for Iraqi equipment
at this point. I think we're just beginning to address some of
the issues, in terms of what kinds of expenses the Iraqis ought
to start taking over, in addition to their own reconstruction
funding.
I would just tell you we are mindful of this, but we are at
the beginning of the process of looking at it.
Senator Collins. I hope that you'll work with us on this
issue. Senator Nelson and I have had many conversations about
this. I know the chairman and Senator Graham are interested, as
well. I've often thought that if the group of us had succeeded
in 2003 that had wanted the reconstruction money for Iraq to be
in the form of a loan rather than a grant, that we might have
seen far less sabotage of the reconstruction projects if the
Iraqis had had personal money, more of a commitment to it. I
don't know, we'll never know that. I hope that you will work
with us. It's really difficult for Americans, who are
struggling with the high cost of energy, to see us paying for
fuel costs in a country that has the second largest oil
Reserves, and has a budget that was supposed to be $48 billion,
but now looks like it is going to have revenues of $60 billion
because of the soaring price of oil. So, I think this really is
an issue that we need to try to work on and come up with a
solution.
I do want to switch to Afghanistan. Your comments--your
opening comments about the mistakes in American policy 20 years
ago, and that we can't repeat those mistakes in either Iraq or
Afghanistan, brought to mind the first meeting that I had with
President Karzai in 2003. Senator Levin was there, and many of
my other colleagues, and I'll never forget it, because we
landed at Baghram Air Base, we met with him in an Army tent,
and his message to us, even back then, was, ``Don't abandon us.
Don't make the same mistakes that were made decades ago.''
That's always stayed with me, and in subsequent visits to
Afghanistan, President Karzai has repeated that plea.
That's why I'm concerned about the reports from the
Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council that warned
very bluntly that we are underresourcing Afghanistan and that
NATO--the Atlantic Council's report goes so far as to say,
``Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.'' I
apologize if you covered this and I missed it while we were
voting, but could you give us your best assessment of whether
you expect NATO countries, other than ours, to step up to the
plate and provide the troops that there's widespread agreement
it's necessary. I know you've worked very hard and pressed so
hard on that. I know you've gotten grief for that, but I
applaud you for that. We do need more troops. I'm really
worried that having to send more American troops will make it
impossible for us to, in the long-term, sustain the 12-month
deployments that all of us are desperate to see us return to.
Secretary Gates. One of my defense minister colleagues
accused me of megaphone diplomacy. I think that--two things.
First of all, I think that one should not underestimate what
happened at Bucharest last week. In 2006, when NATO took on the
Afghan challenge, I think a lot of countries really didn't know
what they were getting into. I think they thought it was going
to be largely peacekeeping, economic reconstruction, and so on.
I think that's one of the reasons why they've had political
problems at home in trying to justify more forces, or why they
have not been willing to do that.
In 2008 at Bucharest, the leaders, knowing what they know
now, still unanimously reaffirmed the challenge of Afghanistan
as NATO's most important operational activity. So the leaders
of all of the NATO countries, basically said, ``We have to do
this.'' President Sarkozy, at one point, referred to the
importance of winning, and I mention him in particular, because
the French made a substantial additional contribution that will
be going--Regional Command East--that will allow us, then, to
send some additional forces to Regional Command South.
The desire of the commander--it's not a formal requirement
at this point--the desire of the commander in Afghanistan to
have three additional brigades, in my view, is a requirement
that NATO will not meet. I think we will get additional forces
from a number of different countries. I think they will have
real capabilities. But, I think they will not add up to another
10,000 to 12,000 troops that would be represented by 3
brigades. How much they will contribute, I don't know. It will
depend, in part, on election politics.
One of the things that I initiated a year ago was getting
NATO to approve a vision--a strategic vision statement of where
we want to be in 3 to 5 years in Afghanistan, and what we've
accomplished, and why we are there, in terms of the terrorist
threat to Europe, that the European governments could then use
in their domestic politics to try and educate their people
about why the commitment in Afghanistan is important.
I guess the experienced part of me would say they're
probably not going to make significant additional
contributions. My hope would be, taking advantage of the
Bucharest Declaration and perhaps electoral politics changing
in some of the countries, that there could be some significant
additional contributions.
I'll just leave it at that.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much.
Admiral Mullen, I know you've been very concerned about
this, as well, and have pushed very hard for the reduced
deployment. I know my time has expired, but I'll be interested
in talking to you subsequently about that, as well.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service, and, of course, the
men and women in uniform, both at home and abroad, and we
appreciate, so much, their service, as well.
Senator Collins, Senator Graham, Senator Bayh, and a whole
host of us, have raised the question about making loans or
seeking reimbursement for any direct payment for certain
things. We are sort of reminiscing about 2003, and regretting
that we didn't get that in position back at that time, but the
administration balked at it on the basis that it would affect,
negatively, our going to the donors conference with other
countries. In large part, that so-called donors conference
turned out to be a lenders conference, with the exception of
our effort.
Is it possible for us to be able to work together with the
administration to work out a method of reimbursement? Do you
think we could come to an agreement as to the kinds of things
that should be reimbursed or should the bill footed by the
Iraqi Government, before we even approach the Iraqi Government
to obtain their concurrence wherever necessary? If that's the
case, where we could work together, do you have an idea of the
kinds of things that you could identify for us that might be
reimbursable? For example, gasoline, the cost of training.
That--in some parts, money has gone from reconstruction into
training programs for their security purposes. So, I guess I'm
just asking, can you give us some idea of the things you think
might be reimbursable or direct payments by the Iraqis, so that
they don't come at the expense of the American taxpayer and
borrowing from future generations?
Secretary Gates. Senator Nelson, as I indicated to Senator
Collins, we've, I think, just really begun--we have focused--as
we have begun to look at the sums of money that Iraq is earning
from the oil sales, we have, just in recent weeks, been looking
at ensuring that the reconstruction funds and the military
equipment for them are increasingly and dramatically headed in
the direction of them picking up those costs. The subject of
their reimbursing us, and of those kinds of things, or areas
where they would pay for certain services, has not been
broached yet because of this focus on the reconstruction and
military equipment and so on. But, based on this hearing, I'm
more than happy to carry the message back to the administration
and see if we can have a look at this.
Senator Ben Nelson. I suggested it recently. They're a bit
aware of it, because I suggested it to Mr. Hadley, so that it
wouldn't be a surprise that I intended to bring this up.
Wouldn't you think it would be a good idea to do it in a
comprehensive fashion so we don't do it in piecemeal--in other
words, so we could put together a program, certain things that
clearly would be a loan, those things that could be reimbursed
today, those things that would be loaned for repayment in the
future--wouldn't it be a good idea to have it in a
comprehensive fashion?
Secretary Gates. Well, I certainly agree that if we're
going to go down this path, we ought to look at it
comprehensively.
Senator Ben Nelson. With some urgency, because every day
that goes by, people pay more at the pump, and the oil was at
$1.10, now it's $1.12, maybe spiking up yet today. I hope not,
but perhaps. It is a very strong drag, I think, on our economy
to see these things occur, and then it's sort of an injury on
top of the insult, when we're also paying for services for some
other country.
I have another area that I'd like to raise, as well. During
testimony yesterday before our committee, I discussed with
retired General Jack Keane who's one of the authors of the
surge strategy--about language that Senator Collins, I, and
others have wanted to get passed, and that is to transition the
mission in Iraq out of providing security in Baghdad into
providing more combat troops into the north to take out al
Qaeda and the insurgency through counterinsurgent methods in
the north; and, at that time--we've also proposed, for some
time, a stronger emphasis in the south, with the militias and
the Mahdi Army and other groups in the south. We've really not
received any support from the administration. We've not set a
timetable to withdraw. We set a date to start the process, and
that would be to start it. Now, based on what I heard General
Keane say, and what I'm hearing in the discussions with General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker--is that, in fact, that's
what's happening. I guess my question to you is, is that what's
happening? Have we begun the transition of the mission from
providing, essentially, security for the Government of Iraq in
Baghdad to expanding it into these other areas?
Secretary Gates. Let me comment and then invite Admiral
Mullen to comment.
I think we began the transition of mission with the
withdrawal of the first surge brigade, in December. What is
going to happen in Iraq if you're doing this in a color
graphic, the country is not going to turn from one color to
another color for the whole country. It will be more of a
mosaic, with different pieces of it turning at different times.
There are already eight provinces under provincial Iraqi
control. Anbar will probably go to provincial Iraqi control
within a matter of weeks. So, the mission will have
transitioned dramatically in those places, to strategic
overwatch, where there will be relatively few troops,
relatively few coalition troops, and their role will be very
different, say, in Anbar, than it was 7 or 8 months ago. It
will be----
Senator Ben Nelson. If I might ask you, would that also be,
perhaps, the beginning of the establishment of a residual force
or a residual mission there, as well?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I think so. There will be places
in Iraq where the mission has transitioned from our being in
the lead and being in combat to a strategic overwatch, where we
have a residual force, to other places in Iraq where we're
still engaged in combat, such as in Mosul and places like that.
So, I believe we are in the process of a transition of mission,
and it is taking place at different times and different places
in Iraq.
Admiral Mullen. In fact, General Petraeus, when he was here
in September, was given a mission statement that essentially
was directed to generate this kind of transition. That's
obviously tied to building the Iraqi security forces. We're up
about 20 battalions now from where we were a year ago, in
addition I think it's about 107,000 or so that are leading
independently or leading with us throughout the country, all of
which is part of this transition. There will be places where we
can do it and get into an overwatch position very quickly; in
others, it's going to take more time.
Senator Ben Nelson. We have stressed, with this
legislation, that we always felt that, if it started, the
question of ``how fast does it go?'' depended on conditions on
the ground and commanders on the ground and success. So it was
passed, even though it wasn't voted on. That might be an unfair
way to characterize it, but it does seem that, in effect, that
that is now the strategy. I never understood the opposition to
our legislation. But, that probably isn't the first, nor will
it be the last time, that I don't understand opposition.
Thank you very much for your answers. Appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The whole premise of the surge was to provide better
security and hoping that would lead to better performance by
the Iraqi military and a better economy and quicker political
reconciliation. In January 2007, the President announced that
we were going to change strategy. Admiral Mullen, as I
understand the strategy behind the surge, was to add additional
combat power to bring a level of security to Iraq that was
unknown before January 2007. Is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. There's actually two things--not just the--
--
Senator Graham. Okay.
Admiral Mullen. --additional combat power, but also that
provide security for the Iraqi people. Really, it's--
Senator Graham. That's right, to----
Admiral Mullen. --the counterinsurgency----
Senator Graham. --protect the population.
Admiral Mullen. --the counterinsurgency approach, which was
generated at that time, as well.
Senator Graham. My premise has been that, without better
security and better protection and more confidence of the Iraqi
people, nothing is going to happen. You had political and
economic stagnation before January 2007; you had, basically,
Anbar province occupied by elements of al Qaeda; and widespread
sectarian violence. So, the hope would be that, by protecting
the Iraqi people, getting out behind the walls, the joint
security stations, confidence would be built by the Iraqi
people to take more action, to tell us more about the
insurgency.
I think, by any objective measure, it's worked, that the
military situation in the Anbar situation has dramatically
improved, that the biggest success of all, from my point of
view, is that the Anbar Iraqis rose up against al Qaeda,
aligned themselves with coalition forces, and al Qaeda has
taken a very big beating. To me, of all the things that could
happen in the war on terror, having Muslims reject al Qaeda,
particularly Sunni Muslims, would be a huge sea of change in
the war on terror. I just want to compliment you both, and all
under your command, for having brought about success that was
not known before and has come at a heavy price.
So, now, where to go. The SOFA that is of much discussion.
The reason I think we need to deal with that now is, it's my
understanding the legal underpinning for our presence in Iraq
is based on the U.N. resolution that expires in December. Is
that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. So, come December, the legal
authority that we're basing our presence upon in Iraq, dealing
with security threats and the ability to be there, goes back to
the U.N. resolution. The good news, for me, is that the Iraqi
Government is saying, ``We want out from Article VII--Chapter
VII of the U.N. We want to be seen as a legitimate state, not a
chaotic place,'' and that will require a bilateral negotiation
to continue our presence. Is that the game plan, here?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you know of anyplace in the world where
thousands of American troops are stationed in a foreign country
without a SOFA or something like it?
Secretary Gates. No.
Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, it would be very
irresponsible, wouldn't it, to leave our troops in Iraq or any
other country without some law governing their conduct and
providing them protections? Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. Exactly.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Secretary Gates. A SOFA is for the protection of our
troops. It's the ground rules under which they are in another
country.
Senator Graham. Having been a military lawyer for 25 years,
I appreciate how important that is, because when a soldier,
airman, sailor, or marine may be caught by the host nation
police forces, sometimes, we don't want our folks to go into
that legal system, and I would argue that maybe this is an
occasion where we would want to retain jurisdiction over any
offenses committed in Iraq.
So, there is an effort to negotiate a bilateral agreement,
a traditional SOFA, with the Iraqi Government. Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. I would urge you to get that done, sooner
rather than later, because the next President, whoever he or
she may be, is not coming into office until January, and
there's a legal no-man's land beginning in December. So, I hope
we can do that, and certainly not make it a treaty that needs
to be ratified, and standard SOFAs are not.
Now, about Iran--let's think of Iraq a little more
strategically. Iran seems to me to be hell-bent on requiring
nuclear capability, that they are not producing power--nuclear
power for peaceful purposes, or at least I don't believe they
are; I don't trust them when they say they are. What would be
the effect of a nuclear armed Iran to the region, in your
opinion, Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates? How would it
change the balance of power?
Admiral Mullen. I think it would have a dramatic effect on
the region. I worry a great deal about it generating concerns
in other countries, who then would think they'd have to have
the same capability. Clearly, that kind of capability puts
Israel potentially under the envelope, which is----
Senator Graham. Is it your understanding that the Iranian
nuclear desires could eventually lead to a nuclear weapon? Or
what are their motives? What do you think they're up to, when
it comes to a nuclear program?
Admiral Mullen. Oh, I believe they're still trying to
develop a nuclear weapon.
Senator Graham. What about you, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. I think they're determined to get nuclear
weapons.
Senator Graham. How much time do we have before they get
there? Does anybody really know?
Secretary Gates. No. You have estimates, and the estimates
range from, the worst case, sometime maybe late next year, to--
--
Admiral Mullen. 2009.
Secretary Gates. --out several years.
Senator Graham. Israel is a very valuable ally. Is it fair
to say that some of the attacks that are being generated from
the Gaza Strip, in terms of rockets coming into Israel, the
weaponry is coming from Iran? Are you familiar with that?
Admiral Mullen. I would go so far as to say that certainly
Iranian support for Hamas is there.
Senator Graham. So, Iranian support for Hamas is there.
It's clear that the ``special groups'' that are operating in
Iraq have Iranian ties. Is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. General Petraeus's testimony was pretty
stunning to me, in the sense that he said, ``Now it's not al
Qaeda, it's not sectarian violence that's the biggest threat to
a peaceful, stable Iraq, but Iranian influence.'' Is that a
fair statement, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I think it is.
Senator Graham. Secretary Gates, do you agree with that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Some people have said we've taken our
eye off the ball when it comes to al Qaeda by being in Iraq.
What would be the consequence to the war on terror, in general,
if al Qaeda would have been seen to have lost in Iraq because
Sunnis in Iraq turned on them? Would that have a benefit
throughout the world, in terms of our struggle with al Qaeda?
Secretary Gates. My opinion is, given the level of
investment--in fact, as the President said this morning, given
the level of effort and investment that al Qaeda made in Iraq,
and where they were, 15-18 months ago, in Anbar, it would be
seen, I think, throughout the region, as a major setback.
Senator Graham. Has anyone suggested to you that we should
take troops out of Iraq and send them to Waziristan? No?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Final question. What intrigued me about the comment about
the budgets of Afghanistan and Iraq is that it--did you say it
was $675 million for all of Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Has anybody gone to the Iraqis and asked
them, ``there's another nation out there struggling, trying to
regain their freedom. Would you contribute some money to the
Afghan people?'' I mean, if they have $60 billion, and they've
budgeted for $48 billion--I've never thought about that, until
you mentioned it, but if you get a chance to talk to the
Iraqis, this may be a chance to demonstrate to the world that
they're going to be a team player, here.
So, with that thought in mind, thank you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, I'm not going to ask you
about Iraq or Afghanistan. I'd like to stick a little closer to
home and talk about our hemisphere; and specifically, Latin
America. I come from a State with a 1,600-mile common border
with Mexico, a place that, but for the grace of God, may have
been governed by somebody unfriendly to the United States,
Lopez Obrador, if he had won and beat President Calderon.
President Calderon, of course, has been a good ally and worked
with us; and, particularly, we've helped him fight the
narcotraffickers in his own country. But, it's still a lot of
violence, and it's a big challenge.
Going a little farther south, we have another tremendous
ally named Colombia. Recently, I had a chance to visit with
Admiral James Stavridis, head of Southern Command--about
current developments and challenges our Nation faces in his
area of responsibility, which includes Latin America. I've read
that our policy--our official or national policy toward Latin
America has been described as one of benign neglect. I prefer
to think that it was more unintentional, because of our
concentration in other parts of the world. But, the Admiral
made it clear to me that there's a real threat of the spread of
terrorism in Latin America. Of course, President Uribe, in
Colombia, is fighting the Revoluntionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), which has found safe haven and support in
places like Hugo Chavez's Venezuela and elsewhere.
Unfortunately, today we have the news that the House of
Representatives--and this is not your bailiwick, necessarily,
but the House of Representatives has changed its rules and
prevented us from acting on the Colombian-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement. My question is not so much about trade, but about
our national security.
I would just ask both of you, if the United States were to
turn its back on Colombia, how would this impact our national
security?
Secretary Gates. Senator, a week or 10 days ago, I
published an op-ed on the national security implications of our
relationship with Colombia and of the trade agreement, and I'd
be happy to get you a copy of that. It clearly focuses on where
we were in Colombia 10 years ago.
I will tell you, one of the biggest changes in the time
since I retired from the government and came back has been what
has happened in Colombia. What troubles me is that there was
recognition of Colombia's importance to our security, on a
bipartisan basis, beginning in the Clinton administration with
Plan Colombia, that has invested something like $5 billion of
American money in Colombia for their security, for their
police, for counternarcotics, for counterterrorism, and so on.
We have seen a real success in Colombia in all of these ways.
We have seen the kinds of connections that the FARC has with
neighboring countries. So I believe that Colombian security is
very important, and it would be a shame to see the progress
that's been made there put at risk because they face economic
difficulties or because President Uribe suffers political
consequences because his good friend the United States of
America basically turned its back on him.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, I visited Colombia 2 months ago, I
think, and, while I was aware from a distance how much better
their security had gotten, it was really an incredible
experience to go through it with their military and to see
exactly what they had, which has in effect, become a
counterinsurgency force, expanded in size, and taken back their
own country, about 30 percent of which--I'm sure you know
this--the local mayors, in 2002, didn't live anywhere close to
the towns they were mayors at; they are now all living in their
towns. I give the Colombia leadership, President Uribe, as well
as the Colombian military, great credit for doing this.
They are a good friend of ours, and I do worry, and have
historically worried, about how well we look to the south. This
is just my own experience. I'm not sure benign neglect is the
right answer, but clearly Latin America is an important part of
the world for us. They are our neighbors, and clearly there are
growing challenges down there, not just from the narco piece,
but potentially becoming narcoterrorism--and the leadership,
which is clearly not supportive in other countries--is not
supportive of where we're headed.
So, we need Colombia, certainly from a military standpoint,
to be a strong ally. They've made incredible progress, and I
would hate to see the kind of investment that we've made be
jeopardized, based on other issues which are clearly in play.
Senator Cornyn. I think it's not a coincidence that we've
seen countries like China and Iran interested in South America
and Latin America, generally. Of course, if my memory serves
me, I believe there has been some developments about weapons
production down in Venezuela. If I'm not mistaken, involving
Kalashnikov rifles, and sales of military materiel to Venezuela
by other countries.
I would just hope that the memory of President Ahmadinejad,
of Iran, a state sponsor of international terrorism, touring
Latin America, strengthening their ties with the likes of Hugo
Chavez and leaders of the terrorist group FARC, would cause us
to wake up--and I'm not talking about you, I'm talking about
Congress--to wake up and realize the importance, not only of
our economic ties, but the importance of our national security
ties to a country like Colombia.
I would just think that the only person who is celebrating
the killing of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement today, at
least until after November, is probably Castro, Chavez and all
of our enemies in that part of the world. They're, in effect,
telling President Uribe, ``This is what you get for being a
friend and ally of the United States.'' Not a message we want
to send, and one that's not consistent with our national
security interests.
My time's expired. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for being so patient
today.
Admiral Mullen, a recent estimate by the Congressional
Budget Office puts the projected cost of future operations in
the global war on terrorism between $440 billion and $1
trillion over the next 10 years. The lower figure is based on
an assumption of 30,000 troops deployed to both Iraq and
Afghanistan by 2010, a significant reduction from the
approximately 200,000 currently engaged, an increasingly
unlikely goal.
Admiral Mullen, if realized, what impact will these
expenditures have on the ability of the services to transform
and modernize over the next decade so that they can effectively
meet 21st-century challenges, especially with regards to future
combat systems and the Air Force and Navy fleets.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, that obviously is tied very
clearly to what the defense budget is over time. Over that same
period of time, we're challenged in managing the funds that we
have, with buying what we need for the future, operating today
in operations just as you've described, as well as resourcing
the people who really make all this possible. That tension is
clearly there in a timeframe. If our defense budget went down
fairly dramatically, then those operations were still ongoing--
there's only one place to get those kinds of resources, and
that pretty significantly takes it out of future development or
reduce the number of people. Most of us believe, right now,
that probably wouldn't be a prudent move. We're living in a
very dangerous, unpredictable, uncertain world, and having the
right resources to support the men and women who carry out
these missions is absolutely vital. So, it could put a great
deal of pressure on our future accounts, certainly our
acquisition accounts, based on the size of the operation in an
extended period of time.
That said, that kind of projection, in terms of operational
level, long-term, most of the analysis that we've done in the
DOD look at some level of operations out there in a time of
what we call persistent conflict. In the world we're living in,
one of my biggest concerns is that we figure out a way to
resource that correctly.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, the
absence of attacks within Iraq is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for stability. Dr. Stephen Biddle, who
testified only last week, says that much of the reduced level
of violence is due to Iraq's becoming--and I'm quoting--``a
patchwork of self-defending sectarian enclaves that warily
observe each other.'' Even if a situation of reduced attacks is
maintained by these regional cease-fires, the underlying
problems of political and ethnic fracturing would still exist.
These so-called cracks in the foundation of the new Iraq
represent the absence of the political reconciliation that the
surge was supposed to be able to help provide.
My question to you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen,
what are the long-term implications for the U.S. military
presence in Iraq if the Maliki government is unable to achieve
a degree of reconciliation that will convince the warring
factions to lay down their arms?
Secretary Gates. Senator, first of all, I believe there has
been some real political progress in Iraq with the passage of
four of the six pieces of benchmark legislation. They are
distributing the revenues of the oil--even though there isn't a
hydrocarbon law, they are distributing them according to,
basically, the percentages that would be in the law. I think
that, as I mentioned earlier, we have seen Maliki take action
in Basrah against Shiite who were influenced by Iran, probably
supported by Iran in many respects, and try to establish the
authority of the national government down there. He's been
congratulated on this by the Sunni leadership, by the Kurdish
leadership, and so on.
They're not one big happy family, and they won't be for a
long time, but I think there is progress in this respect. In
some regards, I would say that oil will be the glue that holds
Iraq together and provides the motive for everybody, no matter
how hard things get from time to time, to ultimately work out
their problems. I think they've made some headway on that. I
believe that they will--I think it'll be a mixed record, but, I
think, on the whole, it is moving forward--more slowly than we
would like, but moving forward.
Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I'd like to add to that,
Senator, is we oftentimes focus on the national-level political
reconciliation, which is a very important part, but there's
been considerable progress in reconciliation at the provincial
level, as well as at the local level. When I, again, visit our
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), our commanders on the
ground, they speak to a lot of progress, and it varies,
depending on where you are in the country. But, the kind of
movement among the Iraqi people from the local-politics
standpoint, that just wasn't there a year ago. Also, provinces
starting to connect with Baghdad, and Baghdad starting to
connect with them, all of which is part of this, needs to move
more quickly, but, like in many other things, I think, a year
ago I would not have predicted it would have even gone this
far.
Senator Akaka. Admiral, one of the security successes over
the past 6 months has been the Sunni Awakening Movement in
Anbar province, where former Sunni insurgents have turned on
their former al Qaeda allies in order to bring stability back
to their local neighborhoods. This practice has started
spreading to other provinces, and now even includes some Shiite
groups.
However, there is now a growing concern over what may
become the focus for those battle-hardened militia groups in
the years to come, much like the Mujahedin soldiers the U.S.
aided in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviets and
eventually developed into elements of the Taliban. My question
to you, is there a concern that these groups will ultimately
make it even more difficult for the central Iraqi Government to
establish and maintain effective control over the provinces,
especially given the sectarian conflicts which we are
witnessing now?
Admiral Mullen. Certainly I think there is a concern along
those lines, but it is not something that the commanders on the
ground have spoken to as something they see in the immediate
future with respect to those who are now working with us. I
think the long-term outcome here is going to be tied to success
in the country. Can the country come up in a way to provide the
kind of overall economy and security, the big things we've
talked about before, and, in fact, think of Iraq first, as
opposed to the sectarian aspects of this, thinking that way?
We're moving in that direction, but it is painfully slow, and
it's just going to take some time to do that. The CLCs, 90,000
or so, 20 percent of which are Shiite, and about 20 percent of
that overall force is also joining the security forces. So,
this is all moving in the right direction.
Can we sustain it? I think that's the question that's out
there. There's the feeling that there's a willingness to do
this, but it's the entirety of the country that has to come to
bear on this across all aspects of economy and politics, as
well as security, which provide for a better country and a
better outcome for all of the Iraqis.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for
your presence here today and for your service to our country,
and thank you for your patience. I think you're at the end of
the line, here.
Admiral Mullen, last week the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee received testimony from the Service Vice
Chiefs on the current readiness of our forces. During that
readiness hearing, I asked the Vice Chiefs about the impact on
each Service that may occur from the delay on the passage of
the second part of the fiscal year 2008 supplemental
appropriations request. General Magnus, the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps, said that the delays in
funding, ``send a strong, unmistakable signal to our seasoned
warriors who have been willing--and their families have been
willing to sign them up to re-enlist.'' Then he went on to say,
``that whenever we see a significant delay in deliberations
regarding appropriations to support the pay for our armories--
and I'm sure it's the same for the other Services--you have a
very intelligent, very professional force, and they also pause
to be able to see what this means for them and their future.''
Admiral, would you agree with General Magnus's assessment
of the messages that these delays in funding send to our troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. In my opening comments, I talked about the
support that this committee and Congress has had for our men
and women in uniform, and it's been extraordinary, and we
couldn't be the military that we are without that.
That said, this specific issue of the remaining
supplemental for this year starts to be seen--send the kind of
signals that you've described, or that General Magnus describe.
It also impacts the institution in a way that the institution
starts to react earlier than even the time that we figure we're
going to run out of money. So, the discussion now gets centered
on--that we potentially could run out of money to pay the Army
as early as June, and there--the institution starts to get
poised for that, and the people start--certainly the troops
start to worry whether that's going to happen.
So I would ask the committee and Congress to pass this as
rapidly as possible, because it does have those kinds of
effects. Clearly, it then has a rolling effect, if it didn't--
if funding didn't get out there--into our readiness--very
seriously, our readiness for the rest of this year.
Senator Thune. General Cody also--the Army Vice Chief--
testified about the delay of emergency war supplemental funding
and its effects on equipment readiness. He said that these
delays have a ``cascading impact on readiness over time.''
Could you talk a little bit about the impacts of delayed
funding on the equipment readiness in theater?
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, we've brought equipment back from
theater to run through the depots to repair it. The funds that
are spoken to in this bill are those kinds of funds, and that
does have a cascading and cumulative effect that would, in
fact, impact our ability to be ready to go do what we need to
do in theater, and to refurbish it in order to continue to
support what we're doing.
Senator Thune. This would be for Secretary Gates or for
you, Admiral--but, at a committee hearing last week, again,
General Cody, the Army Vice Chief, testified that the Army is
out of balance, and that the current demand for our forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan exceed the sustainable supply and limits
our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.
We've heard similar statements that have been made, expressed
by the Army Chief of Staff, General Casey. At the same time,
Congress has been very supportive of initiatives that have been
proposed by the Department to increase the number of ground
forces, to accelerate the purchase of new equipment, provide
recruiting and enlistment incentives, and to support the
investment required to transform the Army into modular
brigades. In addition, the President announced, this morning,
that the Army plans to reduce deployment times in Iraq from 15
months to 12 months.
All of these fixes are intended to relieve the stress and
the strain of the current operations tempo for the Army's
ground forces. I guess my question is, In your opinion, does
the Army have the remedies in place to improve their readiness
while continuing to meet security requirements in Iraq and
Afghanistan? If not, what more can be done to help the Army get
themselves back in balance?
Admiral Mullen. The ``grow the force'' initiative is
incredibly important, and yet, we're still 2 or 3 years out
from when we complete that.
When General Casey speaks of the Army being out of balance,
he focuses on the training that we're going through now, and
then the missions we're executing, which principally focuses on
counterinsurgency. So, there's a full-spectrum aspect of this
which we're not able to do right now, in the Army or the Marine
Corps, because we're focused here. General Conway would tell
you he is not able to do any expeditionary amphibious
operations, both training--because of where he's focused right
now--and in that regard, out of balance, that the Army--the
ground forces--and we do focus on the Army, and these 15- to
12-month deployments are specifically Active-Duty Army. But, we
shouldn't forget the pressure that the Marine Corps is under.
They've been in a one-to-one dwell, 7 months gone and 7 months
back, for a significant period of time, as well. That pressure
is on those forces, and it's going to take, actually, both a
``build the force'' and a combination of that and reducing the
amount of forces that are deployed, to start to build more
dwell time, which is the next big step, so forces can go out
for a year and come back for up to 2 years; clearly, the
funding to refurbish the equipment and also the time, if I were
back 2 years, to do some of this additional training.
The other thing is, the Army, in particular, has
modularized at an--when you consider what we're doing in war,
they have modularized at an incredibly fast rate--and I really
applaud that--to meet the needs for the future.
So, we're in a very delicate place right now, for all these
things, and it's the force requirements that are generating a
lot of this, and until we get some relief there--that would be
the next big step.
Secretary Gates. Let me add one thing to that, Senator.
I think one of the biggest differences between a
conscription Army and an All-Volunteer Force is the attention
that we need to pay to families. The family has become
incredibly important in the success of the All-Volunteer Army.
We hope to have, up here fairly soon, some initiatives that
address the family needs and send messages--more messages to
the families about their importance. This will include requests
for accelerated construction of daycare centers and longer
hours for daycare centers, and hiring preferences for--in the
whole Federal Government, for the spouses of our men and women
in uniform, and some--potentially, the sharing of unused
benefits and so on. So, we hope that Congress will take a close
look at those. Congress has always been supportive of these
kinds of initiatives, but paying attention to the family needs
is really going to be important and has been, and will continue
to be.
Senator Thune. We would welcome suggestions that you have
about that, and look forward to working with you when you are
prepared to submit those to us.
So, thank you all very much, again, for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Thank you both. It's been a long afternoon, and very
uneven, in terms of schedule and calendar, but that's the U.S.
Senate. You've been very understanding.
Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, just in the hopes that I
could eliminate additional administrative requirements, your
specific question about Maliki's ban really was focused on JAM,
and there actually are other efforts for other militias that
people are trying to--that are--there are significant efforts
to try to make them go away, not successful, as you----
Chairman Levin. Well, if you look at the--I think it's
called the Council of--if you look at the Iraqi--I think it's
called Presidency Council, but I'm not sure----
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Chairman Levin. --their--and it may have been their
security advisor--National Security Council--their statement
was ``all militias.'' There's a huge difference.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Chairman Levin. It's just not going after his own--Maliki's
only going after the Sadr militia, and leaving out his own.
Number one, he's not being consistent with the constitution.
Number two, he's sending exactly the wrong message, I think, in
terms of even enforcement of the effort to stop all militias.
Remember, the benchmark is aimed at a law to prohibit all
militias. Maliki's taken it onto himself a statement that,
unless certain militia is disbanded, apparently leaving out the
others, that they will not have an opportunity to participate
in the October 1 elections. I'm not sure where he got that
from.
Could you do this, Admiral? Would you--this is really a
suggestion for you, Mr. Secretary, not for the Admiral--could
you double check that with our ambassador and see whether or
not that reflects our policy and whether it reflects the Iraqi
constitution? ``That'' being to just single out one militia for
the prohibition. If it is the Maliki position, and if it
doesn't reflect our policy--and I don't think it does--or their
constitution--and I don't think it does--could you then express
your own opinion, whatever it might be, to our ambassador?
Secretary Gates. Sure, and we'll start with making sure of
what Maliki actually said.
[The information referred to follows:]
There is no conflicting policy on Prime Minister Maliki's part
regarding the prohibition of militias in Iraq. The Prime Minister has
indicated on a number of occasions that he is against militias and has
ordered their disbandment as a threat to national sovereignty. Illegal
militias that have refused to disband are being routinely targeted by
Iraqi security forces for destruction. The Prime Minister has taken a
less combative approach with members of the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq (ISCI) than he has taken with the Sadrist Trend, whose members
remain with active ties to Sadrist militias. This circumstance stems
from the Sadrist group's reticence to disarm until confronted, as
during recent security operations in Basrah in April 2008; however, the
former military wing of ISCI, the Badr Brigade militia, disarmed in
2003 following the liberation of Iraq.
Since its founding in 1982, ISCI has been a political
force in Iraq. During its years in exile, ISCI became an
important political voice for the exiled Iraqi community. Since
the liberation of Iraq in 2003, ISCI has been influential
within the Iraqi Government, most notably within the Ministry
of Interior, and to a lesser extent, the other segments of the
Iraqi security forces.
Also in 2003, ISCI and the Badr leadership chose to
recognize Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 91
that requires all illegal militias to disband. The Government
of Iraq supports this disarming and is thus synchronized with
U.S. policy goals to disarm illegal militias. This order not
only requires disbandment of illegal militias but, under
certain circumstances, precludes former militia members from
holding political office for a period of 3 years. CPA Order
Number 91 directs:
``A member of an Illegal Armed Force or
Militia may not hold political office at any level. An
individual determined to have been a member of an
Illegal Armed Force or Militia shall be barred from
holding political office at any level for a period of 3
years from the date such individual ceased to be a
member of an Illegal Armed Force or Militia.''
In a USA Today October 2006 interview, Prime Minister Maliki
stated:
``We started to deal with militias since the first day
I took over as prime minister. I declared from that day one of
my goals was to dissolve the militias. I believe there could be
no true state while armed militias are operating.''
``This conviction has not changed, whether the militia
is Shiite, Sunni, Arabic, or Kurdish. The problem is the same.
The problem that we face in disbanding militias--and the
militias have to be disbanded--is that there are procedures,
steps that need to be taken, which take time. We have taken
some important steps toward that end.''
In April 2008, following Iraqi security force operations in Basrah,
Prime Minister Maliki said:
``The first step will be adding language to a draft
election bill banning parties that operate militias from
fielding candidates in provincial balloting this fall. The
government intends to send the draft to parliament within days
and hopes to win approval within weeks.''
Prime Minister Maliki, in an interview with CNN on April 7, 2008,
also said:
``Solving the problem comes in no other way than
dissolving the Mahdi Army. They no longer have a right to
participate in the political process or take part in the
upcoming elections unless they end the Mahdi Army.''
The United States supports Prime Minister Maliki's approach and
shares the vision for an Iraq that is free of the violence of militia
groups and other violent elements. U.S. policy is clear: the Iraqi
people have a constitutional right to ``participate in public affairs
and to enjoy political rights including the right to vote, elect, and
run for office.'' However, militias and other violent groups cannot be
members of the same democratic institutions that they work to undermine
by using violence to kill and intimidate the people.
In April 2008 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said:
``First of all, I didn't hear anybody say that the
Sadrist trend, which is--you know, was elected, shouldn't try
again to get the votes of the Iraqi people, as long as they're
prepared to do it not armed. That was--that militias need to
break up. Eventually, all armed force has to be under the
state, and that's true for any society, any democratic society.
Also in April 2008 U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker said:
``Iraq is at the point in its development where the
events of Basrah and Baghdad are the state asserting its
authority against an extralegal or illegal militia. That's
certainly how Iraqis broadly are viewing this, and in that
sense, it is a defining event. The politics of Iraq will go on.
The competition between the Supreme Council and Dawa and the
Sadr trend and Fadhila just to name a few on the Shia side,
that's going to be part of the political landscape and that's
what elections are all about.
U.S. policy toward the uniform elimination of militias in Iraq is
synchronized with Iraqi policy regarding the elimination of these same
militias. Prime Minister Maliki's initiative in removing the threat of
all militia activity from Iraq does not appear to show evidence of
favoritism toward any one militia group. We will continue to support
the efforts of the Government of Iraq to quickly and lawfully remove
militias from Iraq.
Chairman Levin. We thank you both. It's been a very
important hearing for us. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
risk assessment
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
General Cody, in testimony before the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 1, stated
``Our readiness, quite frankly, is being consumed as fast as we can
build it'' and ``I've never seen our lack of strategic depth be at
where it is today.''
At the same hearing, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
General Magnus stated ``The short dwell time at home does not allow our
units the time to train on the full spectrum missions needed to be
ready for other contingencies'' and ``the readiness of the nondeploying
units has been at a significantly lower level than the forward deployed
forces.''
How would you assess the risk if another contingency, such as
conflict on the Korean peninsula, arose while U.S. forces remain
engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
SHIITE CLERIC MUQTADA AL-SADR
2. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, I asked Ambassador Crocker if
radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is trying to set himself up as an
Ayatollah in Iraq. An article in the USA Today on April 10, states that
``the recent spike in violence here has shown that the enigmatic Shiite
cleric and his Mahdi Army militia continue to have the muscle to plunge
Iraq into warfare and essentially reverse recent security gains made by
the United States military that the Bush administration cites as a key
sign of progress. Or as he did in August, al-Sadr can stop much for the
bloodshed by ordering a ceasefire--and win some credit from the United
States military for the resulting calm.'' What are we doing to help the
Iraqi Government deal with cleric Muqtada al-Sadr?
Dr. Gates. We continue to work with the Government of Iraq (GOI) to
protect the population, build the capability of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISFs), and support job training programs. We are also
encouraging and assisting the GOI to provide essential services to the
population to diminish the appeal of extremist and militia movements by
promoting confidence in the Iraqi Government. These efforts have
contributed to a reduction in insurgent and militia activity. We
strongly support efforts by the GOI to bring Sadrist elements into the
Iraqi Government and ISFs. At the same time, we continue to target
criminal militia elements and Iranian supported Special Groups. The GOI
has recently taken a more aggressive posture against criminal militia
elements, and we will continue to work closely to support Prime
Minister Maliki's efforts in that regard.
3. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, are we working on developing a
plan or strategy to get him to stand down and disarm his militia?
Dr. Gates. We continue to work with the GOI to protect the
population, build the capability of the ISFs, and support job training
programs. These efforts have contributed to a reduction in insurgent
and militia activity. We strongly support efforts by the GOI to bring
Sadrist elements into the Government and ISFs. At the same time, we
continue to target criminal militia elements and Iranian supported
Special Groups. The GOI has recently taken a more aggressive posture
against criminal militia elements, calling for all political groups to
disband armed militias. We will continue to work closely to support
Prime Minister Maliki's efforts in that regard.
4. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, does the U.S. military have a
strategy if he does not stand down or disarm and re-engages with
American troops on the streets of Iraq?
Dr. Gates. We retain the ability to engage any militia elements
that take up arms against us or the GOI.
5. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, concerning the decreased level
of violence in Iraq, is this a true indication of success in Iraq or is
this simply Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr issuing an order to his
militia to cease fire which he can reverse at any moment?
Dr. Gates. The decrease in violence is an important indicator of
progress in Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr's cease fire order is just one factor
in decreasing violence levels. Other factors include our effort to
focus on protecting the population, sustained counterinsurgency
operations by Iraqi and coalition forces, the increased capability of
the ISFs, and Iraqi citizens such as the Sons of Iraq turning against
al Qaeda and helping secure their own neigborhoods. Continued Iraqi and
coalition pressure on extremists, terrorists, criminals, and other
armed groups, along with numerous blows to al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI)
leadership and networks, have diminished enemy capability to conduct
attacks.
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
6. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, in response to Senator Collins'
questions on April 9, 2008, at a Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing about the progress made by the GOI in meeting benchmarks,
retired Army General John M. Keane testified that ``we may not resume
reductions in 2008'' pending three significant events that need to take
place: (1) fend off al Qaeda in Mosul; (2) stabilize the operation in
the South of Iraq; and (3) fall election in Iraq which will be the
watershed political effort in Iraq. What is your assessment of these
ongoing and upcoming events?
Dr. Gates. Operations in Mosul against al Qaeda are part of the
ongoing effort to destroy its network and deny al Qaeda sanctuary in
Iraq. Coalition forces are partnering with Iraqi Army and police units
in Ninewa province to accomplish this mission. Prime Minister Maliki
directed the establishment of the Ninewa Operations Center and directed
additional reinforcements to Mosul to bolster the existing Iraq
Security Forces presence there. The provinces in southern Iraq are
under Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Therefore, the ISF are leading
efforts against criminal militias, with Coalition enabler support. The
fall provincial elections will be a significant event in Iraq's
transition to a fully sovereign and democratic nation and are likely to
promote increased reconciliation as communities who boycotted previous
elections participate in the political process and gain increased
representation in their government. General Petraeus will factor these
events and others into his recommendation following the 45-day period
of consolidation and evaluation upon the withdrawal the of the last
surge brigades in July 2008.
7. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, do you tie these successes/
failures to the 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation and then
assessment linked to the withdrawal of troops?
Dr. Gates. At this point it is difficult to know what impact, if
any, the reduction in surge forces will have on the security situation.
A brief pause for consolidation and evaluation following a return to
pre-surge troop levels will allow us to analyze the process and its
effects in a comprehensive way. I do not anticipate this period of
review will be an extended one, and I would emphasize that the hope,
depending on conditions on the ground, is to reduce our presence
further this fall. But we must be realistic. Conditions in Iraq remain
the measure on which we will base our troop strength decisions, and
doing that requires sober and realistic assessments of the effects our
return to pre-surge levels have on those conditions. The security
situation in Iraq remains fragile and gains can be reversed.
READINESS TO RESPOND TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ATTACKS
8. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, the Commission on the National
Guard and Reserve issued its final report on January 31 and cited
substantial shortcomings in the Nation's readiness to respond to
weapons of mass destruction attacks. Do you agree with the Commission's
assessment?
Admiral Mullen. The Commission did a very thorough job looking at
the WMD consequence management problem from a view focused on the
National Guard operating under title 32 and the Reserves under title 10
authorities. The Department views our role in a more holistic manner,
covering not only the consequence management aspect but the
nonproliferation and counter proliferation elements of the national
strategy. We consider the Active and Reserve components as integral to
the Department's capacity to respond in accordance with the overall
Federal strategy.
Essential to DOD's role is interdicting WMD prior to arrival in the
homeland. To that end, DOD participates in numerous interagency venues
to identify, track, and interdict movement of WMD and suspect shipments
from state and non-state proliferators. We have already met with
success in several areas, creating obstacles for would be WMD-capable
actors from gaining access to these materials.
To be sure, the most costly and difficult aspect of the national
strategy is how to respond in a post-detonation environment. There is a
three-phased response. The first response phase is executed routinely
at the state and local level with the National Guard WMD Civil Support
Team (CST), which was directed by congress almost 10 years ago. These
teams have progressively grown to number 55, with at least one team
resident in each state. The teams routinely respond to local level
alarms and will likely provide the first confirmation that an attack
has occurred. The second response phase is executed with National Guard
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE)
Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP), also directed and funded by
congress. There are 12 validated CERFPs with 5 more in various states
of sourcing and validation. These units are roughly 150 members strong,
and have response capabilities that compliment the detection and
assessment capabilities resident with the first on-scene elements.
CERFPs provide immediate but limited duration capability in
decontamination, specialized medical, technical extraction, and command
and control. The CERFPs were developed along the model of the Marine
Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which was a
key element during the response to Anthrax attacks on the U.S. Senate.
The size of the crisis will dictate the level of response, therefore to
address our third response phase, I directed the assignment of the
CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) to USNORTHCOM. This
5000-person organization is built around an Army Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) and deploys with self contained and supporting communications,
medical, transportation, decontamination, logistical, rotary-wing
aviation, and unique WMD response units. The Department is working to
incrementally allocate forces to provide additional capabilities in the
event of multiple events.
As I previously stated, our consequence management response
strategy is built on a combined NG, Reserve component, and Active Duty
solution. The initial elements are predominantly NG (CST, CERFP), with
follow-on forces provided from the Active Duty or Federalized Reserves.
Time is a tyrant and the challenge of moving individual units across
the country is exacerbated considering time to muster and traditional
methods and policies for mobilization. As you are well aware the
Department does not have uncommitted brigades for this mission set, so
I have directed the JS, Services, and JFCOM to develop Reserve
component sourcing solutions. This effort is ongoing with steady
progress.
The Department has worked to synchronize our response to support
the Federal lead agency, which in most cases is the Department of
Homeland Security. DOD elements reside with FEMA Regional offices and
are incorporated in their response architecture. This effort has vastly
improved our response coordination as evident in natural disaster
scenarios, most recently the CA Wildfires. We also train along side our
interagency partners. In May we exercised a broad series of responses
in the National Level Exercise, and USNORTHCOM conducts similar
training events twice a year, normally in the spring and the fall.
9. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, what actions do you believe are
needed to improve the Department of Defense's (DOD) capabilities in
this area?
Admiral Mullen. To continue our efforts in improving DOD's
capabilities to respond to WMD attacks, the Department follows a
construct based on deliberate planning, coordination activities,
operations, and capabilities development detailed in the National
Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD).
This military strategy complements the three pillars of
counterpoliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management set
forth in the National Strategy to Combat WMD.
The Department is taking aggressive actions to specifically
address: protecting the force, improving response capabilities to
support homeland defense and civil support consequence management, and
building partnership capacity. The Joint Staff is currently conducting
a CWMD Strategic Global Assessment that will address the combatant
commanders' ability to execute the strategy outlined within the NMS-
CWMD. This assessment will be used to adjust planning and influence
future CWMD capability development.
Protecting the Force:
The Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is
modernizing the joint force by developing and fielding integrated and
interoperable capabilities to the joint force. Modernization of
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense
capabilities will continue to enable the warfighting combatant commands
to accomplish all of the CBRN components of the NMS CWMD. The CBDP
addresses key doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership
and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) modernization needs
described in the capabilities-based assessments conducted for passive
defense, consequence management, WMD interdiction, and WMD elimination.
Success in CWMD operations depends on the effective integration of
equipment, trained personnel, and proven tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP). The CBDP is developing capabilities that can be
employed at home and abroad, on and off installations, with local and
state responders, and to assist allies or other coalition partners
across a range of operations. Another significant focus area the
Department is addressing is the threat of biological warfare. Broad
spectrum medical countermeasures are being developed to defend against
genetically engineered or naturally mutating pathogens for which there
are no current defenses along with capabilities to manage the
consequence of major catastrophic events.
Consequence Management:
The Department remains committed to providing capabilities to
mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at home and abroad. There are 55
WMD CSTs and 17 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs). The
WMD CSTs provide CBRN identification, assessment and technical advice.
The CERFPs provide medical, decontamination, casualty search and
rescue, technical rescue and C4I. The Department has also fielded a
domestic CBRN Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) to assist
the Lead Agency with capabilities ranging from personnel
decontamination and medical triage to air and ground transportation.
Additional CCMRFs will be sourced in the near future to provide
increased capability. The Department is also in the process of
evaluating and assessing mitigation measures to enhance DOD's
capability to respond to CBRN incidents contained on U.S. military
installations abroad and in support of foreign partners in the event of
an overseas WMD attack.
Building Partnership Capacity:
The Department actively engages in International CBRN defense
programs seeking cooperative efforts in advanced development and
procurement, doctrine and requirements, and science and technology.
These efforts seek to expand the Nation's ability to reduce and, where
possible, eliminate or minimize the threats posed by traditional CBRNE
weapons. The Joint Staff assists in the development of international
military standardization and interoperability agreements involving
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense. The
Joint Staff engages in numerous international organizations, including:
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Capability Group on
CBRN Defense; the NATO CBRN Medical Working Group; Australia, Canada,
United Kingdom and United States CBRN Memorandum of Agreement and
Counterproliferation of WMD Bilateral Agreements (South Korea, Japan,
United Kingdom, France, Israel, and Indonesia). These international
organizations are exchanging research, development, test and evaluation
efforts in CBRN detection, identification, sampling, protection,
medical countermeasures, and modeling and simulation. They are also
conducting numerous multi-national Table Top Exercises that have
identified capability gaps and potential DOTMLPF solutions.
OPERATIONAL RESERVE
10. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, what is your opinion of an
Operational Reserve? Do you believe it is necessary?
Admiral Mullen. I believe that having an Operational Reserve is
vital for our national security. There are several factors that have
evolved and are common for an Operational Reserve. One is our continued
demand for timely utilization of select Reserve military capability.
Second, there is an ongoing paradigm shift for assured, predictable and
responsive access to a more ready Reserve component in order to sustain
current and future operations while still maintaining the Citizen-
Warrior ethos of our Reserves. This means we are continuing to invest
more resources in our Reserve components to become better manned,
trained, and equipped to be readily available for mobilization and
employment as cohesive units while providing predictability to families
and employers.
Each of the Military Services over the past decade and since the
First Gulf War have continued to shift their respective Reserve
components from a Strategic Force towards an Operational Reserve Force
construct based on evolving mission capability requirements and
necessity.
The Military Services believe operationalzing their respective
Reserve component is a necessary part of our overall National and
Military Strategy to support Homeland Defense, plus current and future
combat operations. We also are actively involved in reviewing the
recommendations taken from the Commission on the National Guard and
Reserve report that advocates reviewing the laws, policies, and
procedures which further supports operationalzing our Reserve
components.
PREPOSITIONED STOCKS
11. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, our prepositioned stocks have
been drawn down for use in Iraq and Afghanistan and the depletion of
these stocks increases strategic risk in that it hinders our ability to
respond quickly to emerging conflicts. What is the DOD's plan to
reconstitute the forward deployed war stocks?
Admiral Mullen. Our prepositioned capabilities have been and will
continue to be essential to sustaining the global war on terrorism. We
project the current prepositioned capabilities to be fully
reconstituted by fiscal year 2015, contingent on available resources
and emergent operational requirements. Currently, most of the Army
prepositioned equipment has been employed in support of the global war
on terrorism. The remaining prepositioned combat capability is in a
high state of readiness and the Army maintains unit sets afloat to
support port opening operations to receive strategically deployed
capabilities. By fiscal year 2015 the Army projects to have its full
objective of three Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT), two Infantry
Brigade Combat Teams, five Sustainment Brigades, a Fires Brigade, an
Infantry Battalion, and associated wheeled augmentation sets,
watercraft, and sustainment stocks. Of the Marine Corps three Maritime
Preposition Squadrons, two have less than their full complements of
equipment. They will be reconstituted through scheduled maintenance
cycles and provide full capabilities in 2011 and 2012. The third is
currently fully capable to support contingency operations. As DOD's
prepositioned sets are being reconstituted, the Services are updating
them with equipment and supplies that provide balanced and flexible
capabilities. These capabilities will support a range of operations
from major contingency to lower spectrum operations.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
OUR NATION'S STRATEGIC DEPTH
12. Senator Clinton. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, recently,
Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard Cody testified before the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee on the state of readiness of the Army. He testified
that the current demand on our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan ``limits
our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies.'' Both the
Army and the Marine Corps told the committee that they are not sure if
their forces could handle a new conflict if one came along. In
particular, General Cody noted our Nation's ``lack of strategic
depth.''
In light of General Cody's comment regarding our Nation's
``strategic depth,'' what missions are our armed forces not performing
or are incapable of performing because of their commitments in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Dr. Gates. We continually assess the capabilities of our forces to
perform against plans and assigned missions in all regions. These
assessments, which are classified, are delineated in the Quarterly
Readiness Report to Congress. In summary, while significant portions of
our ground forces are currently involved in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there should be no doubt that we have formidable
capabilities to respond around the globe in the event of another
crisis. Our air and naval forces can respond swiftly and effectively to
any armed aggression. We also have significant capabilities in our
noncommitted ground force, particularly the Reserve component, which
can be called upon to fully mobilize, if required, to meet urgent
national needs. We would also call upon all the instruments of national
power, to include diplomatic, informational, and economic, to address
the situation at hand.
Admiral Mullen. Our Armed Forces are performing a wide array of
combat and noncombat missions throughout the world. Although our forces
are strained, we can perform all missions and execute all contingency
plans. With the advent of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
restructured DOD priorities throughout the world. This has affected our
noncombat operations and ability to respond to a second full-spectrum
major combat operation (MCO).
Every year, combatant commanders determine their regional
priorities and request resources to fulfill their demands. Due to our
focus on combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), we curtailed or scaled back some of our theater
security cooperation (TSC) efforts and multi-lateral exercises.
Combatant commanders continue to conduct TSC efforts throughout their
areas of responsibility; however, fiscal year 2009 demands will not be
completely sourced for TSC and other partnership-building activities.
Sourcing deficiencies will not prevent combatant commanders from
implementing mitigation measures to accomplish priority missions. This
is no different than previous years prior to the global war on
terrorism.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
AL QAEDA AND THE SECURITY OF THE AMERICAN HOMELAND
13. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, while
the bulk of the administration's focus in terms of troops, resources,
and taxpayer dollars has been on Iraq, it seems the most pressing
threat to the homeland security of the United States comes from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Admiral Mullen, you and Central
Intelligence Agency Director General Michael Hayden have publicly
stated that a future attack on the United States will most likely come
from the al Qaeda group operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
in the largely ungoverned tribal areas. Despite these statements, our
continued troop commitment in Iraq has affected our effort in
Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen, you have stated, ``in Afghanistan, we do
what we can, in Iraq we do what we must.'' This has led you to
characterize our effort to stabilize Afghanistan as an ``economy-of-
force operation'' because ``our main focus, militarily, in the region
and in the world right now is rightly and firmly in Iraq.''
Can you characterize your assessment, based on all information
available to you, of whether AQI is planning to launch, or is capable
of launching, attacks on the United States Homeland from Iraq?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
14. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is the
core organization and purpose of AQI oriented at attacks within Iraq or
outside of Iraq?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
15. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, did AQI
exist prior to the United States invasion of Iraq and, if so, was it
affiliated with the broader al Qaeda international network at that
time?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
16. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, if we
know that al Qaeda is planning attacks against America from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, why is the effort in Afghanistan not a
higher priority?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. Developing a stable, free, democratic Iraq that is
not a threat to its neighbors and is an ally on the war on terror has
been the U.S. main military focus. An Iraq that cannot govern, defend,
and sustain itself jeopardizes our vital national interests in the
region. Further, risk associated with a drawdown from Iraq that is not
conditions-based outweigh risk emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border region. However, Afghanistan continues to be a top military
priority. Their are a total of 33,000 U.S. and 29,000 coalition troops
currently deployed to Afghanistan, the highest level since the
beginning of combat operations in that AOR. We are also seeing a higher
level of operational effort by Pakistani forces, which has resulted in
lower levels of cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan by al Qaeda
and Taliban forces. The U.S. and our allies in Afghanistan continue to
work closely with Pakistan to address the cross-border movement of
enemy forces as well as their sanctuaries along the border.
It is important to note that both conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan)
compete for many of the same critical resources. As security in Iraq
improves, U.S. force levels will decrease consistent with the
commander's assessment of conditions on the ground, allowing the
military to reset, reconstitute, and shift focus as required by
existing and emerging threats. As indicated by the recent U.S. Marine
Corps deployment to Afghanistan, the U.S. commitment is strong and will
continue to be so. The military will continue to press al Qaeda and its
associated network in Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever else they operate.
17. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, why has
the DOD continually acted consistent with an Iraq first policy, in
terms of priorities, when threats to our Homeland appear most densely
concentrated in Afghanistan, which the DOD is clearly assigning a lower
priority and acknowledges is under-resourced?
Dr. Gates. The defense of the territory of the United States, its
people, and interests requires an active defense-in-depth, which
includes detecting and countering threats at their source. Destroying
the al Qaeda network remains our most immediate and important task to
deter and prevent any further attacks on the homeland. Al Qaeda's
leaders still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy,
sending funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Winning in
Iraq, which includes defeating al Qaeda, is critical to our success in
the long war and protecting our vital national interests throughout the
Middle East and abroad.
The Department is fully committed to success in Afghanistan. There
currently are some 38,000 U.S. troops assigned to Afghanistan. More
than 21,000 of these personnel are assigned to the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while the remaining
17,000 are assigned to OEF missions, which include both
counterterrorism and training and equipping the Afghan National
Security Forces. Some 3,500 U.S. marines recently deployed to
Afghanistan, of which more than 2,400 are deployed to Afghanistan's
volatile southern region. The remaining 1,100 marines are supporting
the mission to train the Afghan National Police. Our allies and
partners also are contributing in important ways to the mission in
Afghanistan. Some 30,000 non-U.S. troops are deployed throughout the
country, and ISAF leads 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Afghanistan--of which 14 are commanded by non-U.S. force contributors.
Nonetheless, more is needed--the ISAF Commander has identified
requirements that remain unfilled. These include maneuver forces, air
assets, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and additional PRTs.
The Department works closely with our allies and partners to encourage
them to help fill these requirements.
Admiral Mullen. The defense of the territory of the United States,
its people, and interests requires an active defense-in-depth, which
includes detecting and countering threats at their source. Destroying
the al Qaeda network remains our most immediate and important task to
deter and prevent any further attacks on the homeland. Al Qaeda's
senior leaders still view Iraq as the central front in their global
strategy, sending funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq.
Winning in Iraq, which includes defeating al Qaeda, is critical to our
success in the long war and protecting our vital national interests
throughout the Middle East and abroad. An Iraq that cannot govern,
defend, and sustain itself jeopardizes our vital national interests in
the region.
18. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how much
of AQI's diminished operating capacity can be attributed to the large
American troop presence in Iraq? Specifically, do you believe that the
Sunni ``awakening'' that pre-dated the surge has significantly damaged
AQI?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
19. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
role has the Shiite Maliki Government had in making sure that al Qaeda
does not have a sanctuary in Iraq?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
20. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would
you agree that even the Iranians do not want AQI to take hold next door
in Iraq? In short, are there not several factors other than American
troop presence in Iraq that have destabilized AQI, and that would
remain in that region even if American troops did not remain at pre-
surge levels?
Dr. Gates. [Deleted.]
Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
21. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
the DOD doing to increase the availability of resources to ongoing
operations in Afghanistan?
Dr. Gates. We recently increased the effort in Afghanistan by
deploying the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit as well as 2nd Battalion,
7th Marines. The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff continue to
look at force availability for Afghanistan.
Admiral Mullen. We recently increased the effort in Afghanistan by
deploying the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit as well as 2nd Battalion,
7th Marines. The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff continue to
look at force availability for Afghanistan with four principal
considerations in mind;
1. Continued support for and success in Iraq. As has been
clearly indicated by General Petraeus and reinforced by
Presidents of the United States, forces that might become
available as a result of a drawdown in Iraq must be well
thought through in order to ensure Iraq gains are not
negatively impacted. Joint Forces Command is continuously
making assessments of this force balance.
2. Health of the force. The services ability to continue to
provide forces, whether for Iraq or Afghanistan, must be
considered in terms of overall stress on our forces. Increasing
the dwell time of our forces is a key component of any decision
about resourcing Afghanistan requirements.
3. Strategic Reserve. The Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff must also consider the
Strategic Reserve for our Nation and the impact that an
increase in resources to Afghanistan might have on
reconstitution of Strategic Reserve to respond to other
contingencies.
4. Success in Afghanistan. The U.S. and our allies are
committed to success in Afghanistan and hard decisions about
resources will need to be made if we are to turn the tide
against the insurgency and support the Afghan Government in
security, reconstruction, and development. Bottom-line: we are
working within DOD and the IA to develop a resourcing plan that
meets the near-term and long-term needs of the operators in
Afghanistan.
funding and support from others for our efforts in afghanistan and iraq
22. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates, at our hearing with General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, I asked Ambassador Crocker whether our
future security agreements with Iraq will require the Iraqis to pay for
the cost of our temporary bases and other related expenditures.
Ambassador Crocker seemed to have not previously considered such an
arrangement, but appeared open to taking the idea to the Iraqis. As you
may be aware, our long-term security agreements with many other
countries require the host country to offset some of the cost of our
bases and related expenditures. This is an area that is important to me
because of the incredible financial burden Iraq has placed on American
taxpayers. I also note, as I did to Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus, that the United States is running a massive budget deficit
while the Iraqis are running a budget surplus. I believe it crucial
that the Iraqis shoulder a greater amount of the burden of securing
their nation, including offsetting, wherever appropriate, American
expenditures made to support operations in Iraq.
I am also interested in how we can get our North American Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies to make a greater financial commitment to
our effort in Afghanistan. While I applaud France and Romania for
recently adding troops to the NATO force in that country, as you have
stated, it appears unlikely that NATO will commit a large number of
troops to Afghanistan. Since our NATO allies are unwilling to commit
troops to Afghanistan, I would like to see them make an increased
financial commitment to the reconstruction of the country and to
training the Afghan Army. President Bush recently announced that he
plans to pledge an additional $4 billion in aid for Afghanistan at the
international donors conference to be held in Paris in June. I would
like to see us leverage the President's commitment and the Paris
conference to achieve a greater financial contribution from our allies.
I am aware that the administration hopes the conference will raise a
total of $12 billion-$15 billion to fund Afghan reconstruction
projects. It is my hope that the conference will raise at least that
much, if not more, from our allies.
What is being done to increase Iraqi budget execution and, more
importantly, to offset or reduce American expenditures in Iraq?
Dr. Gates. The U.S. Treasury Department and Department of State are
in the lead for enhancing the spending capacity of the GOI. There are
13 ministerial capacity development teams consisting of over 400
advisors working with various GOI ministries to improve Iraqi technical
capabilities.
A primary focus is to improve Iraqi budget execution which in turn
helps the GOI spend its own money on reconstruction and security. This
entails, but is not limited to: (1) documenting budget execution
policies and procedures; (2) training Iraqis (central ministries and
provincial governments) on capital budget execution; and (3) training
U.S. personnel deployed to PRTs to improve the PRTs' ability to assist
the provincial governments in executing their budgets.
As a result of these efforts, Iraqi commitments to assume financial
responsibilities and offset U.S. Government expenditures have already
expanded significantly. In addition to passing a capital reconstruction
budget of $13 billion and security budget of $9 billion in 2008, the
GOI recently funded cost-sharing initiatives for sustaining and
equipping the ISF, created a fund for urgently needed reconstruction
projects that will be coordinated with U.S. commanders, and has begun
to transition the costs associated with the maintenance of existing
U.S. Government-funded Iraqi facilities, among others.
Since 2005, the GOI has increased its share of the costs associated
with ISF development from 29 to 75 percent. Furthermore, due to
increased Iraqi spending, the Department has not requested any funds
for capital expenditures in fiscal year 2008. On funding for the ISF,
the Department asked for $3 billion in fiscal year 2008 and $2 billion
in fiscal year 2009. The fiscal year 2009 request is 52 percent less
than the average ISF funding levels between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal
year 2008, and does not include any funds for infrastructure.
23. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates, is it unreasonable that the
United States should request or demand offsets from the Iraqi
Government of some American expenditures in Iraq, especially when it is
running a budget surplus?
Dr. Gates. No, it is not unreasonable for the U.S. to request from
the GOI increased contributions for the costs associated with capital
reconstruction and development of the ISF. This is why U.S. Government
officials are working with GOI to more effectively utilize its
financial resources in support of these needs.
We have worked closely with the Iraqis to gradually transition U.S.
funding for ISF development as the GOI demonstrates the capacity
required to support the transition. As a result of these efforts, the
Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior have assumed responsibility of
various U.S. Government-funded acquisition and life support contracts
and developed a number of cost-sharing agreements to offset U.S.
expenditures in Iraq.
Moreover, the PRTs are working with local governments and tribal
councils to help plan, prioritize, and execute Iraqi capital
expenditure budgets to further offset U.S. spending on ISF
infrastructure and capital reconstruction projects. Therefore, as
ministerial and provincial capacity increases and matures, U.S.
Government officials will continue to work with the GOI to transfer
additional funding responsibilities to the Iraqis.
24. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates, in what areas, such as base
operations and support, as I have suggested, would it be appropriate to
negotiate for Iraqi funding of the American presence in Iraq?
Dr. Gates. It is appropriate for the GOI to assume responsibility
for a greater share of the costs required to sustain and equip the ISF
as well as the costs associated with the development of critical
infrastructure, long-term capital reconstruction projects, delivery of
essential services, establishment of vocational and technical training
centers, and the creation of civil and public works programs throughout
Iraq.
It would not be appropriate for the GOI to fund U.S. base
operations as such funding from the GOI would require Iraqi Council of
Representatives' (CoR) approval. Alongside the political risk of budget
defeat in the CoR, there would be no way of preventing the CoR from
attaching additional provisions that could affect the operational
flexibility of U.S. forces in Iraq (i.e. requiring pre-approval of
expenditures prior to execution).
25. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates, how extensively is the
United States pursuing such financial assistance, in any area, from the
Iraqis?
Dr. Gates. U.S. Government officials regularly engage the Iraqi
leadership on the need to expend a greater portion of surplus revenues
on security, capital reconstruction, and strategic investments that
will stimulate and sustain economic growth.
Furthermore, as a result of the U.S. Government's sustained
engagement with Iraqi leaders, we expect the GOI to pass its first
supplemental budget later this year. This estimated $4 to $5 billion
supplemental will augment existing provincial and ministerial capital
accounts of $13.2 billion, and further demonstrate the willingness of
the Iraqi leadership to use surplus oil revenues to offset U.S.
Government expenditures.
In addition to developing a 2008 supplemental budget, the GOI
recently funded cost-sharing initiatives for sustaining and equipping
the ISF, created a fund for urgently needed reconstruction projects
that will be coordinated with U.S. commanders, established vocational
and technical training centers throughout Iraq and has begun to assume
the costs associated with the maintenance of existing U.S. Government-
funded Iraqi facilities, among others.
We will continue to identify cost-sharing opportunities with the
GOI.
26. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates, what specifically do you
plan on doing in the months leading up to the Paris conference to
encourage our NATO allies to make a greater financial commitment to
Afghanistan's reconstruction?
Dr. Gates. The U.S. Government looks forward to joining the
international community to renew our long-term commitment to
Afghanistan at the June 12 Paris Support Conference. U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice will be leading our delegation. Afghanistan has
made enormous progress since 2001, but stability remains fragile in
many parts of the country and is dependent on the continued investment
of the international community. The Paris Conference is an opportunity
to build on the international community's renewed security commitment
to Afghanistan reached at the NATO Summit in Bucharest with
complementary achievements on the civilian side. The overarching goal
of the conference is to reaffirm our long-term commitment to
Afghanistan and to focus additional resources behind an effective
strategy. To this end, we seek to surpass the pledge total achieved at
the 2006 London Conference ($10.5 billion) and are endeavoring to
ensure that each donor pledges more than it did at the London
Conference. The U.S. Department of State is leading the U.S.
Government's overall effort to increase donor contributions and is
implementing an overall U.S. strategy to reach out to donors. My office
is actively supporting these efforts, along with members of the United
States Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of
Treasury, which include multiple contacts with donor governments at
various official levels.
27. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Gates, do you believe the $12-$15
billion the administration hopes to raise is the most we can expect
NATO to contribute? Why do you believe we cannot get them to contribute
more?
Dr. Gates. The U.S. Government seeks to surpass the pledge total
achieved at the 2006 London Conference ($10.5 billion) at the June 12
Paris Support Conference and is endeavoring to ensure that each donor
pledges more than it did at the London Conference. The U.S. Department
of State is implementing an overall U.S. strategy to reach out to
donors via a number of worldwide demarches, engagements with key
leaders in capitals and at regional meetings such as, for example, the
U.S.-E.U. Summit, and continuous discussions at various levels with
donor countries. We are optimistic that donor pledges will be
substantial and will complement the security commitments reached at the
NATO Summit in Bucharest.
[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the committee adjourned.]