[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY:
A MODEL PARTNERSHIP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 14, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs TED POE, Texas
of 3/12/09 deg. BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida, Chairman
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York TED POE, Texas
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California
Jonathan Katz, Subcommittee Staff Director
Joshua Rogin, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Richard Mereu, Republican Professional Staff Member
Mariana Maguire, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Ian Lesser, Ph.D., Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German
Marshall Fund of the United States............................. 7
Mr. David L. Phillips, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the
United States (Visiting Scholar, Center for the Study of Human
Rights, Columbia University)................................... 18
Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Henry A.
Kissinger Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies 28
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe:
Prepared statement............................................. 3
Ian Lesser, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 10
Mr. David L. Phillips: Prepared statement........................ 20
Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 31
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Prepared statement.................... 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
The Honorable Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Submitted questions....................... 56
Ian Lesser, Ph.D.: Response to the Honorable Jim Costa's
questions...................................................... 57
Mr. David L. Phillips: Response to the Honorable Jim Costa's
questions...................................................... 59
The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina: Submitted questions................... 60
Ian Lesser, Ph.D.: Response to the Honorable Joe Wilson's
questions...................................................... 61
Mr. David L. Phillips: Response to the Honorable Joe Wilson's
questions...................................................... 63
THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY: A MODEL PARTNERSHIP
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:19 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert
Wexler (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Wexler. Good morning. The Europe Subcommittee will come
to order. I very much apologize for the distorted schedule.
Democracy, unfortunately, can be inconvenient at times, but I
very much want to express my gratitude to our witnesses for
testifying today.
Today's hearing, ``The United States and Turkey: A Model
Partnership,'' is being held just 1 month after President
Obama's historic visit to Turkey where he addressed the Turkish
people and Parliament and stated clearly that his
administration was prepared to renew the alliance between our
nations and the friendship between our peoples.
President Obama's trip to Turkey laid the foundation for
enhanced American and Turkish cooperation and dramatically
changed the playing field for increased United States-Turkish
collaboration in the economic, military, and political spheres.
This cooperation is essential to both nations as we face a
global financial crisis and are grappling with serious security
challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the Balkans, Black Sea
and the Caucasus regions, and the Middle East.
Turkey is the world's seventeenth largest economy, a geo-
strategic NATO ally, a member of the G-20 and a non-permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council. It is
strategically suited, alongside the United States to meet the
threats of the 21st century, including nuclear proliferation,
countering terrorism, energy security and Middle East peace.
United States-Turkish cooperation and coordination in both
Afghanistan and Iraq continues to grow. Since 2002, Turkey has
played a leading role in providing humanitarian, economic,
military, and security assistance in Afghanistan, has led the
International Security Assistance Forces in Kabul on two
occasions, and recently hosted a trilateral summit meeting with
the Presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkey has also
played a positive role in efforts to stabilize Iraq through its
role in the trilateral Iraq--Turkey--U.S. Commission. Turkey's
air base at Incirlik in the Harbor Border Gate has been
critical to American military operations and logistics in Iraq.
As the Obama administration finalizes its withdrawal plans
for Iraq, it is clear that Turkey can play a central role in
the administration's plans to withdraw American troops safely,
effectively and securely, and will continue to be a leading
partner in Iraq's future political, economic and security
success.
There are few issues that weigh more heavily on the minds
of the Turkish people than the unconscionable death and
destruction caused over the past several decades by PKK
terrorists. I applaud President Obama's effort to maintain
security assistance to the Turkish Government as it combats the
PKK.
Today's hearing also comes on the heels of a much
anticipated April 22 announcement by the Turkish and Armenian
Governments that they have agreed on a comprehensive framework
for the normalization of their bilateral relations. This
diplomatic effort deserves the highest level of support from
the United States and the international community, and I urge
my colleagues in Congress to join all of the parties in
supporting these governments as they seek to establish
diplomatic, political and economic relations. This effort is no
small feat, and both governments deserve our full support as
they take politically charged decisions.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses who will
provide insight into United States-Turkish relations, and offer
their suggestions on how we can create and build a model United
States-Turkish partnership that will benefit both nations for
generations to come.
I would ordinarily turn to the ranking member, Elton
Gallegly, but I think he may be here a little bit later. I
would like to turn to Mr. Scott if he has any opening remarks,
and then Mr. McMahon if he does as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler
follows:]Wexler statement deg.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
congratulate you and thank you for holding this very, very
important hearing. It is a pleasure to join you with you on the
Europe Subcommittee for this Congress and I look forward to
working with you.
I really can't think of a more important and timely hearing
than that of Turkey. There is no more vital relationship that
the United States has in this world, quite honestly, than with
Turkey, and that is important because strategically,
geographically, as well as geo-politically it is indeed at the
crossroads of the world, sitting right at Asia, Europe and the
Middle East, and it is seen as certainly the gateway of the
Islamic world, but certainly is rich in the heritage and
tradition of the foundation of Christianity as well.
Indeed, the United States has engaged Turkey as a strategic
partner in its operations in both regions, in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as elsewhere. However, Turkey's role with
respect to Europe will continue to grow in the near and long
term, especially as Europe looks to address its energy security
issues. There are certainly challenges that remain in the
United States and Turkey relationship. However, I am certain
that these challenges can and will be overcome.
I am interested to hear our panelists' perspective on these
challenges, and I hope that they will also comment where our
future opportunities lie. I have visited Turkey on many
occasions. My last visit took me through Istanbul, Ankara, and
even into Tarsus. It is a fascinating, fascinating and
beautiful, beautiful country with some wonderful, wonderful
people.
During his speech before the Turkish Parliament, President
Obama reiterated the United States' commitment to partnering
with Turkey, and I certainly share his sentiments.
In my participation as a member of the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, and in my repeated visits to Turkey, and I met with
many of our colleagues from this nation, including the
President, Prime Minister and others, and I am certain and
convinced that the leadership of Turkey share the commitment to
building our relationship in a more positive way as well.
So once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this
hearing. I look forward to more closely examining the
cooperation between our two nations, and discussing in detail
how we can continue to build a much stronger relationship.
I yield back, and thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
convening this very important hearing.
Turkey, like the Turkey, contains an incredible fusion of
cultures which inevitably has created many similarities between
our two countries. The shared values of diversity,
distinctiveness in democracy enable the United States and
Turkey to have not only a mutual partnership, but an evolving
relationship that goes stronger through time.
Turkey has served as a mediator in numerous controversial
conflicts throughout the world even when criticized. Through
Turkey's promotion of dialogue on shared concerns about
terrorism, proliferation, and regional stability, the United
States has seen the various facets of numerous countries in the
Middle East and which certainly has added to our national
security here at home.
In recent years, Turkey seems to have opened itself up to
the rest of the world further through its negotiations with
Armenia, as mentioned by the chairman. My hope is that Turkey
will continue on this direction and re-evaluate is current
position in the Republic of Cyprus as well. I encourage such a
move by Turkey as it will clear the way for Turkey's well-
deserved place in the European Union.
Once again I would like to emphasize my respect and
admiration for Turkey and hope that the panel can shed some
light on the situation in Northern Cyprus and Turkey's
prospects of joining the EU as well.
Thank you again, Chairman Wexler. I yield the remainder of
my time.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, gentlemen. As you can see they
started another vote. My understanding is it is this vote and
then one more, and then we will run back here. I do not in any
way want to cut you short, so I think it would be best if we
would stop now, we go vote, and then come back. I thank you
again for your patience. Take care. Thanks.
[Recess.]
Mr. Wexler. I would like to call the Europe Subcommittee
back into session, and would like now to introduce our
witnesses for today's hearing.
Our first witness is Dr. Ian Lesser, senior Transatlantic
fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in
Washington where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey
and international security issues. Prior to joining GMF, Dr.
Lesser led a major study of United States-Turkish relations as
a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. From 2002
to 2005, Dr. Lesser was vice president and director of studies
at the Pacific Council on International Policy. Prior to this
he spent over a decade as a senior analyst with RAND
Corporation, and from 1994 to 1995, he was a member of the
Secretary's policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of
State responsible for Turkey, Southern Europe, North Africa,
and the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.
Dr. Lesser is a prolific writer and commentator on
international security issues, and we are thrilled that he is
joining us.
Our second witness is David Phillips, senior fellow at The
Atlantic Council of the United States, and visiting scholar
with the Center for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia
University, School of International and Public Affairs. He also
holds positions at New York University and the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy.
Prior to assuming these roles, he was also executive
director at the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity; visiting
scholar at Harvard University, Center for Middle East Studies;
scholar-in-residence at American University, Center for Global
Peace; and senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations.
Oh, Lord, another vote?
Prior to these, Mr. Phillips worked for the U.S. Department
of State as a foreign affairs expert with the Bureau for Near
Eastern Affairs in 2003, and as senior advisor for democracy
and regional stability with the Bureau for European and
Canadian Affairs. In 2005, Mr. Phillips authored a book on
Armenian reconciliation and another on Iraq reconstruction, and
in 2008, authored a book on democratization and Islam, and most
importantly, his father is a very prominent constituent of
mine.
Our third witness is Dr. Stephen Flanagan, senior vice
president and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where the
past year he has directed the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Initiative.
Mr. Flanagan is the co-author of a recently released report,
``Turkey's Evolving Dynamics: Strategic Choices for U.S.-Turkey
Relations.''
Before joining CSIS, he served as director of the Institute
for National Strategic Studies and vice president for research
at the National Defense University. Dr. Flanagan has also held
several senior positions in the U.S. Government, including
special assistant to the President and senior director for
Central and Eastern Europe at the National Security Council,
national intelligence officer for Europe, and associate
director and member of the State Department's policy and
planning staff.
We would respectfully request that the witnesses limit
their opening statements to no more than 5 minutes, and now I
will turn to Dr. Lesser for his opening remarks. Please.
STATEMENT OF IAN LESSER, PH.D., SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW,
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Lesser. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to be with you here today to share some thoughts
about the state of United States-Turkish relations, in
particular, after the President's visit and some next steps.
With your permission, I will offer a brief summary of my
testimony. Let me also stress that these are my views and not
those of The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
In my view, Mr. Chairman, we face three parallel challenges
in managing United States-Turkish relations. First, we need to
repair a very badly eroded set of perceptions of the United
States among the Turkish public, and also among Turkish
policymakers. This is important for many reasons, but it is
important not least because public opinion actually counts in
today's Turkey. It is very difficult to do things when public
opinion is opposed. As polling by my organization, The German
Marshall Fund, and others, has suggested the last years have
been very, very difficult in terms of public diplomacy in
Turkey.
I think President Obama's visit made a very, very good
start in repairing this problem. I think it was a success by
almost any measure. It was very well received even though the
President addressed some tough issues, and we went from single
digits in terms of public attitudes toward the United States--
positive attitudes toward the United States--to, recent polling
suggests, maybe 50 percent positive attitudes. That is a big
change.
It also, I think, made a start on repairing our reputation
among the Turkish leadership across the political spectrum,
which was also very, very badly damaged. So the task now, I
would say, is how we build on this opening in public diplomacy
to improve policy coordination, and that is my second point,
the second challenge.
I think in the near-term we face a series of specific
policy challenges with Ankara. These are really problems of
coordination. Turks and Americans would probably produce--do
produce--the same agenda in terms of what we should be talking
about. The problem is we have some different priorities in key
areas, and we need to work on these.
On Iraq, we certainly need to reenforce our cooperation in
fighting the PKK, but we also need to make sure that Turkey is
on board in terms of supporting our disengagement from Iraq,
including predictable access to Incirlik airbase over the
coming years. That has always been a problem. It will continue
to be a problem. We need to work on that.
On Iran, Turkey is very interested in seeing a United
States-Iranian strategic dialogue. They have no interest in
seeing the emergency of a nuclear Iran, but on the other hand
we will have a key stake in making sure Ankara delivers tough
messages to Tehran on that score.
On Turkey and the European Union, I think the President
rightly stressed our support for Turkey's EU candidacy when he
was in Turkey, but we need to rethink how we make the case, Mr.
Chairman, in the face of European ambivalence. This has not
been an easy case to make. You can't just make the same simple
straightforward geo-political arguments that we made some years
ago. We have to go beyond that. I think it is very important
that this visit to Turkey came as part of a European tour
rather than Middle Eastern one.
On NATO, let me mention this. I think we have a looming
challenge in relations with Turkey on NATO. NATO has a
strategic concept debate that is just starting. Turkey will
have some very specific requirements in that regard because
many of the contingencies that NATO will face in the future
will be on Turkey's borders. I think that is another area where
we can have a more explicit policy discussion.
Third, and finally, I think we need to keep our eyes on
some longer term developments that will influence what our
relationship with Turkey can look like in the future. Let me
just mention two.
The first is what happens in Turkey domestically. When we
talk about Turkey as a model partner, I think what is
significant about that is what is not there rather than what
is. What is not there is the idea that we can somehow shape
internal Turkish politics and society, to see Turkey as a model
in terms of its internal evolution. I think we ought to be
focusing rightly, that is where we have put the focus now, on
the strategic relationship with Turkey and how we coordinate
our external policies.
I do not believe we are losing Turkey in any way, but there
is no question that Turkey has some new priorities and Turkish
society has moved in ways in which will make the relationship
different. We need to take advantage of that.
Secondly, and finally, on the global economic crisis--
Turkey is being badly affected by this now. Turkey's
neighborhood, especially in the Balkans and elsewhere, can be
destabilized by the crisis. I think it is also going to
complicate something that we need to keep our eye on finally
which we have had a very security-heavy relationship with
Turkey over the years. That is a given in a sense, but we need
to work on diversifying it--the economic side, the cultural
side. Americans do not know enough about Turkey and we need to
fix that. The economic crisis makes that a more challenging
task, but I think we can get beyond it.
So to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I think we are now on a much
more positive path in relations with Turkey. We need to build
on this public diplomacy success, recalibrate the relationship
and build a broader constituency for relationships on both
sides.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lesser follows:]Ian
Lesser deg.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. Phillips, please.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, SENIOR FELLOW, THE ATLANTIC
COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES (VISITING SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for inviting
me to present before the subcommittee today. I associate myself
fully with all of the remarks earlier that you made about the
strategic importance of Turkey, so let me just turn myself to
the task at hand, which is to address the matter of Turkish-
Armenian relations. I will refer to my work in the past as
chairman of the Turkish Army and Reconciliation Commission, and
focus on the announced agreement of April 22, try to critique
it, and talk about some pitfalls going forward.
United States-Turkey relations are impacted by what happens
between Turkey and Armenia. Reconciliation between Turks and
Armenians is important. It is also extremely difficult and
sensitive. These difficulties are exacerbated by taboos and
deeply divergent historical narratives.
While Turkey is vitally important to the United States, the
United States also has an important relationship with Armenia.
Both Turkey and Armenia are allies of the United States. Both
contribute to efforts countering global extremism. Armenia has
uniquely good relations with both the United States and Russia.
The framework agreement and the roadmap that was announced on
April 22 for normalizing relations is potentially an historic
breakthrough, but we need to measure progress not by words but
by actions.
With the help of United States mediation, a finalized text
was initialed by Turkish and Armenian officials on April 2.
There is a protocol on recognition and one on normalization. It
also creates some subcommissions and provides a timetable for
implementation. The full text has not been released. There has
been a lot of speculation as to the reason for that. Getting
from initials to signatures and then to implementation is going
to be torturous. The longer it takes, the harder it gets.
My question is does anyone believe that the AKP government
will go forward implementing the agreement without progress on
the Nagorno-Karabakh?
Last Friday President Gul said the normalization would
proceed without preconditions. The next day Tayyip Erdogan said
that Turkey ``could open its border of Armenia lifts its
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.''
When President Obama met with Turkish and Armenian
officials in Istanbul on April 7, he was assured that there
were no preconditions to the agreement. As a practical matter,
however, Nagorno-Karabakh is a deal-breaker.
There is a strong Azeri lobby that opposes normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations. President Ilham Aliyev has been
active in criticizing the agreement, though there has been some
progress on core basic idea on NK. The same deal there has been
on the table with the Minsk group since 2007. There has not
been any progress over the past 17 years.
Turkey's national interests cannot be held hostage by
Azerbaijan. The United States should reaffirm President Obama's
understanding that there is no linkage between normalizing
Turkey-Armenian relations and the Minsk Group process.
If the agreement is actually moved from initials to
signatures, what are the chances that the Turkish Parliament
will actually approve it? The AKP has failed to muster votes on
important initiatives in the past, which we need to recall.
And, why did it take so long to announce the agreement that was
initiated on April 2? Critics maintain that announcing it on
the eve of Armenian Remembrance Day Genocide was just a cynical
effort to dissuade President Obama from characterizing the
events as ``genocide.''
The timing raises serious questions about Turkey's resolve
and self-confidence. It has also rallied opposition. The
Dashnaktsutyuns have pulled out of the coalition government.
Former President Ter-Petrossian called it the deal a ``sell-
out.'' Just as there should be no linkage between normalization
and Nagorno-Karabakh, there must be no linkage between
normalization and genocide recognition.
Normalization is forward looking. However, reconciliation
is a process, not an event. There is an abundance of track two
activities involving civil society, many of which were
initiated by TARC. One way to support track two would be to
create a fund so that civil society groups could apply jointly
for financing. This could be done in the memory of Hrant Dink,
the ethnic Armenian editor who was assassinated.
I also want to refer you to the findings of the legal
analysis by TARC which determined that the Genocide Convention
cannot be applied retroactively. Turkey has no risk of
liability under the convention. At the same time it looked at
the definition of genocide, and determined that had the
convention been in force at the time of the events, that those
events would have met the definition of genocide, and therefore
scholars and others would write and would be correct in
referring to those events as genocide.
There needs to be a historical process. However, the
commission that is proposed is likely to polarize rather than
foster consensus. I have some recommendations on this matter
that are elaborated in my full testimony. I hope that we can
get into it during the question period.
I am also happy to talk about Turkey and Iraqi Kurd
relations as I am heading a high-level study group on that
subject as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Phillips
follows:]David Phillips deg.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. Mr. Flanagan,
deg.Dr. Flanagan.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN FLANAGAN, PH.D., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Flanagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be here before you today to discuss the development of
relations between the United States and Turkey during the Obama
administration, and how the Congress can play a role in
building this relationship into the model partnership that the
President envisions.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
summarize my full statement for the record and just offer,
first of all, some perspectives on what the elements of this
partnership might be, and also what some of the key
opportunities and challenges are to its realization. My
comments, as you noted, draw on a report, a year-long effort
that colleagues and I at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies developed. It is a comprehensive
assessment of Turkey's changing internal dynamics and its
relations with all of its neighbors, and we advance some policy
recommendations and ideas for enhancing the bilateral
relationship and multilateral cooperation. While I draw on this
report my views today are my own.
Mr. Chairman, our key conclusion was very much in keeping
with your opening remarks about the idea that United States-
Turkish strategic interests remain largely convergent. However,
mistrust and suspicion in recent years, much of it related to
the war in Iraq and its aftermath, have clouded this
convergence and complicated cooperation.
President Obama's very successful trip to Turkey last month
recognized the importance of the relationship and established
the foundation for restoring the trust and confidence essential
to orchestrating effective cooperation on mutual, regional and
global interests.
That said, differing political and geo-strategic situations
of our two countries will on occasion lead Turkey and the
United States to pursue distinct and sometimes divergent
policies that could cause disruptive disagreements that would
once again undermine the pursuit of these over-arching
interests.
So, realizing President Obama's vision of a model
partnership will require a sustained engagement and careful
management by senior levels of both governments, and I think
Congress can play a very valuable supporting role in this
effort.
President Obama's speech to the Grand National Assembly in
Turkey articulated a positive and realistic agenda for
strategic cooperation with Turkey in the coming years, and it
also encouraged the pursuit of Turkish internal reforms and
foreign policy initiatives that could both enhance bilateral
partnership and advance Turkey's bid for EU membership. This
agenda builds on the shared vision and structured dialogue that
was developed actually at the end of the Bush administration,
in 2006, and reaffirmed by Secretary Clinton during her visit
to Ankara. I think this was a wise move because that process
did yield some valuable benefits.
In my view, this agenda, the partnership, breaks down into
three sets of issues of ascending degree of difficulty, you
could say. The main elements, the leading elements of this
positive agenda, I think, should be our areas where the two
countries have very clearly convergent interests and a general
agreement on the requisite policy approaches. These include:
Long-term stabilization and development of Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan; expansion of bilateral trade and investment;
military-to-military cooperation; and promotion of Turkey's EU
membership.
There is a second set of issues where the two governments
broadly have the same assessment but there are still important
policy differences, and that are sometimes exacerbated by
difficult domestic political considerations in both countries.
These include: Relations with Russia, Armenia, and Greece; the
development of the Southern Corridor Route for Caspian Energy;
fostering Israeli-Palestinian settlement; and dealing with some
of the frozen conflicts both in the Caucasus and Cyprus.
There is a third set of issues where there are really
fundamental or potentially quite significant policy differences
that will have to be carefully managed including dealing with
aspects of Russian assertiveness in the Black Sea and the
Caucasus; energy and trade relationship with Iran; and also
dealing with Iran's nuclear program.
So one of the key points that I would argue, Mr. Chairman,
is that to ensure the advancement of this broad and very
complicated agenda it is important that the Obama
administration work with the Turkish Government to establish a
regular high-level policy dialogue, and an agenda for joint
action with time lines to advance specific initiatives
supported perhaps by bilateral working groups charged with
monitoring the implementation.
This is a structure that has been pursued to advance U.S.
relations with a number of new and long-time allies. I saw this
work in aspects of our work with Southeastern Europe in the
Clinton administration. The United States-Israeli relationship
has had similar kinds of structures to help manage the
cooperation, and there are other examples. But I think this is
the kind of sustained effort that is going to be required.
Cooperation with the economic development of the
relationship I think is another one that could be further
enhanced. The European Union countries and Russia will remain
Turkey's natural and leading trading partners, but I think
there could be some efforts undertaken to expand United States-
Turkish trade and investment, and Turkey could be an important
staging ground for United States investment, including with
firms partnering with Turkish counterparts to move into new
markets in the Caucasus and the Greater Middle East.
Lastly, let me just say a few words about things Congress
could do to play a valuable role. First of all, I think there
is a scope for a robust smart power initiatives deg.
to expand person-to-person cultural and educational exchanges
between the United States and Turkey. Secretary Clinton and
Former Minister Babacan have initiated a youth exchange in
their visit in March, but I think Congress should treat Turkey
as a priority country in some of these areas to expand cultural
exchanges and to help overcome misunderstanding about the
United States and Turkey where public opinion has really
plummeted in recent years.
I think also mutual understanding between our two
legislatures, and here I know that with the busy schedule you
all lead there is reluctance to take on new commitments like
this, but I do think some more formal and regular exchanges
with the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the U.S. Congress
would be helpful to understanding and advancing a depth of
contacts that give substance to this alliance.
Lastly, with all due respect to the many co-sponsors of H.
Res. 252, rather than seek to legislate history, I think
Congress and the administration should continue to provide
encouragement as you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, to the
efforts by the Government of Turkey and Armenia to realize this
framework and roadmap for normalization of their relations, and
to this framework that was agreed last month and which
obviously faces a number of impediments, but I do think that
this process can move forward, and I think also over time the
creation of a joint historical commission could be very helpful
to continue to help Turkey come to grips with this legacy of
its past, and also to promote further understanding of those
tragic events of 1915.
So, in closing, Mr. Chairman, I think we have a great
opportunity here to build on a wider cooperation with Turkey in
a number of different areas, but it will require a process that
is carefully managed by the leadership of the two governments.
So thank you for the opportunity this morning and for your
attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flanagan
follows:]Stephen Flanagan deg.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much. Thank you to all three
witnesses for their excellent statements.
I would like to begin. I have got a number of specific
questions regarding the obvious topics of the EU, Cyprus,
energy, and several others. But what I would like to start
with, if I could, is just to ask you to provide an analysis in
a more general sense, and what I am referring to is in my last
trip to Turkey, which was in February, it was in the middle of
what was inflamed relations between Turkey and Israel, and I
was struck to a degree by the contrast in that when I arrived
and talked with the American personnel at the American Embassy
in Ankara the presentation essentially was that American-
Turkish cooperation was at an all-time high. Whether we were
talking about the PKK, whether we were talking about Iraq,
Afghanistan, energy, the potential for engagement between
Turkey and Armenia, all signs were relatively positive,
particularly compared to where we were.
When you get down to the specifics what I find is--
generally speaking, but also when you apply it to the specific
issues--the objectives and the goals by and large of the
American Government and the Turkish Government essentially
match.
Now in some instances there are tactical differences. The
one area that I think the tactical difference is most
significant, possibly, is with respect to how to engage or not
engage Hamas, how to bolster up the moderate Palestinians, and
what role the Turkish Government believes it ought to play in
that process.
So in that context, I would respectfully ask if maybe you
could frame an analysis of a Turkey that wants to pursue its
regional interests. I know there are some in Washington that
fret that Turkey may wish to do that, but I happen to believe
that it is in Turkey's interest and in America's interest. If
we are going to make any progress in the region, it would seem
to me one of the foundations of that process is that ultimately
it needs to be Turkey that is influencing Syria, Turkey that is
influencing Iran, Turkey that is influencing Iraq.
Now there are some people that fear it is going to be the
other way around, but I guess I would ask if you could comment
in that regard, Dr. Lesser, and just go across.
Mr. Lesser. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think this
really gets to the heart of it. I think there are a couple of
things happening which will be evident when you go there and
you have the kind of conversations that you described. At the
level between government of coordination on things like the
PKK, it is not surprising that you would get very positive
readouts about the state of cooperation because there has been
a lot of very close cooperation on some of those kinds of
issues.
But there are some other things going on. There is public
opinion, as I say, which counts heavily now, and the AKP
government is a populist government. It pays a lot of attention
to this. So on the question of Gaza, for example, or approaches
to the Middle East peace process, or even the sustainability of
relations between Turkey and Israel, you know, I do fear that
there is a certain tension there which you will feel when you
go and you have these kinds of conversations.
I think it is also the case that Turkish policymakers
across the political spectrum are very sovereignty conscious,
pretty nationalistic regardless of where they fall on this
secular-religious debate in Turkey. All very nationalistic, I
think, and therefore all very sensitive to the kind of role
that we play in the region and whether we are willing to let
Turkey play a leadership role.
I think, as you say, there are a lot of advantages to us
for Turkey playing that active role. Mostly it is a soft power
role, mostly it is commercial, but this is a different Turkey
from 10 years ago. It is not necessarily a bad thing for
American interests, but we need to have a different kind of
discourse to take advantage of it.
Iran is a perfect example. This is a Turkish Government
that is much more comfortable than its predecessors in going to
Iran, going to the Gulf, talking to Syria, et cetera. How do we
make sure that Turkey's relations with NATO and the European
Union, and with us, still retain their priority in that kind of
an atmosphere? It is not impossible at all. We are not losing
Turkey in that sense, but I think it requires a different kind
of discourse.
The final point is that this is not a new problem. There is
a tendency to talk in terms of Golden Ages and lost Golden Ages
and are we entering a new Golden Age with Turkey. I think that
is in some ways a risky kind of analogy to use because in fact
even at times when we thought the relation was very, very
positive, in the late nineties, in the latter part of the
Clinton administration, for example, it was still very tough
and very often on some of the same issues. So I think we need
to be a bit realistic about that, and see where we go, but I
don't think it is a question of Turkey having drifted off into
an orientation that we can't work with. I think on Iran and
some other issues Turkey can indeed be very helpful, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Well, I for one was shocked by the events in
Davos. I thought that the conduct of Prime Minister Erdogan was
rather infantile and reprehensible. My bigger concern is
whether or not it reveals his true character and the character
of his government, and I think these are unanswered questions
that can effect the strategic cooperation between the United
States and Turkey in a broad range of areas.
Certainly the Davos incident didn't help Turkey's future
role in the Middle East. Turkey had been playing a very
constructive role mediating between Israel and Syria up to that
point. Questions about Turkey's future role there certainly
have arisen. Will Turkey be able to play a constructive role in
comprehensive Middle East peace issues, particularly given the
new government in Israel? There is real concern amongst the
Israelis about whether Erdogan is a suitable mediator.
I think that we also have to ask ourselves the question is
the AKP actually a Trojan horse for an Islamist agenda in
Turkey. There has been speculation about that throughout. Other
than the March 1, 2003, vote barring the passage of the U.S.
Army's 4th Infantry Division through Turkey to Iraq, Turkey has
been a predictable and steady ally. What kind of ally is Turkey
going to be going forward, especially now that Turkey is
focusing more on a Eurasia strategy that diminishes the
importance of the West?
And I think a litmus test for this will be whether or not
Turkey is sincere about moving its agreement with Armenia
forward. After having raised such high expectations, and
knowing the import of this issue in the United States if that
deal falls through, it will have serious repercussions in
United States-Turkish relations.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, and I will turn to Dr. Flanagan, but
if maybe I can just ask a follow up to you, Dr. Flanagan, in
the context of Mr. Phillips' remarks. In the analysis of any
nation, but applying it to Turkey, why is it that we should
conclude that a view by another nation that isn't traditionally
just westward--a view that is both westward and eastward--why
do we view that as somehow a negative or a loss to America? Why
isn't that, potentially in the case of a NATO ally with
incredibly strong relations, military, strategic and otherwise
for decades, why isn't that viewed here as a positive? Please,
Dr. Flanagan.
Mr. Flanagan. Yes, I have an answer for that, Mr. Chairman,
and Mr. Gallegly, welcome.
I think you are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman. I think it
is not a net negative that Turkey has this position, and now
with the move of Dr. Davutoglu into the foreign ministry, he is
the architect of this strategy, of zero problems, of Turkey's
engagement with all of its neighbors in an effective way and
this approach will continue. I think there is utility to the
fact that Turkey has tried to pursue through both its soft
power influences Dr. Lesser alluded to, and other aspects of
its really remarkable diplomatic engagement in the region. I
think Turkey has been trying to show that it can be a conduit
and be helpful to us, and its ability to talk to some parties,
including Hamas, including Syria, and even Iran, the countries
that we can't and don't want to talk to directly. I accept the
notion that Turkey could be an intermediary in developing U.S.
engagement with these countries. I think it has proven its
value in brokering the Syria-Israel indirect talks. Indeed a
lot of Prime Minister Erdogan's discontent and dismay with
Israel related to the fact that they themselves, the Turkish
Government, and I have talked to a number of senior officials,
felt that they were really on the verge of moving those to
direct talks on the eve of the Gaza war. It was really partly
dismay and disappointment that they felt they were so close
that led to some of Erdogan's behavior which certainly was
disappointing at Davos. But I think it reflected the sense that
Turkey felt that they could be an effective interlocutor and
help advance the process.
Now, I think it is also possible to overstate Turkey's
influence in the region. It has shown its ability to open some
doors to begin a quiet dialogue. We saw, even at the end of the
last administration, Under Secretary Burns was beginning to
look at further discussions with Iran about both the nuclear
question and perhaps establishment of an interest section.
Turkey was engaged, I think, again, Turkey could play a role in
part of this opening to Iran. But I think it is a part of this
effort that will have to be carefully managed to be sure that
we don't have conflicting strategies. I think it is more about
tactics and sequencing, about how can we effectively channel
Turkish engagement and relationships into supporting our
broader interests and to working also, obviously, when we get
to the peace process with the EU Quartet and others working to
advance these interests in the Middle East.
But I think that Turkey's value in its ability to be an
interlocutor is something that we should take and move forward
in utilizing in advancing our own interests.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. At this time I would recognize the
ranking member, Congressman Elton Gallegly of California. I
believe Mr. Gallegly is going to submit his statement for the
record, and I will allow him to do as he chooses.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and with
the interest in time I would ask unanimous consent to submit my
opening statement for the record, and I apologize for being a
little late today. It has been kind of a challenging day with
the floor votes and other committee markups and so on.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Phillips, could you kind of give us an
assessment of how you would describe the current relations
today between Turkey and Iran at this time?
Mr. Phillips. To second Dr. Flanagan's remarks?
Mr. Gallegly. Yes.
Mr. Phillips. Turkey has an important role to play through
its Eurasia strategy when Turkey's national interests and
United States national interests overlap. We should emphasize
cooperation with Turkey, but we have to recognize that that
overlap will not be consistent or occur at all times. So our
own interests and our own dialogue with Iran, either directly
or through intermediaries, have to be based on decisions that
are made in Washington with guidance from allies like Turkey,
but we should not subcontract our rapprochement to other
countries, to Turkey or any other nation.
Mr. Gallegly. Can you give us with any level of specificity
the efforts Turkey is making to encourage Iran to comply with
the IAEA and to abandon their uranium enrichment programs?
Mr. Phillips. I am not privileged to the details of those
discussions, but I think that the strategy that has been
articulated is the right strategy. Iran needs to understand
that there are rewards if it complies with the Security
Council's will on these matters. If it does not comply, it
equally needs to know that there are strong penalties. If
Turkey wants to carry that message to Iran, it certainly would
be a suitable interlocutor. There are other countries that can
do that as well, but I think the important point here is that
we need to stick to an approach that involves carrots and
sticks, and the Iranians need to know very clearly where they
stand, what kinds of penalties will be incurred, and what kinds
of rewards they might benefit from if they comply with the
Security Council's resolutions.
Mr. Gallegly. How does Turkey view the prospect of their
neighbor being a nuclear-armed country?
Mr. Phillips. With deep trepidation and fear. I would say
that across the Sunni Muslim world the concern about an
ascendant Shia crescent is a serious one. The idea that Iran
would cross the nuclear threshold and weaponize its nuclear
program has to be of enormous concern to the United States, to
Israel, and to all of our allies in the Middle East, including
Turkey.
Mr. Gallegly. Dr. Flanagan, on another issue, what has
Turkey's approach been to the renewed talks on Cyprus?
Mr. Flanagan. Well, Mr. Gallegly, we have yet to see truly
a new approach or a fresh approach from Ankara on the Cyprus
issue. I think really the weight of activity is between the two
communities right now, and my general assessment is that the
prospects are as good as they have been really since the 2004
Annan Plan. The relationship between President Christofias and
Mr. Talat in the north are very good. They are kindred spirits
ideologically. They have had a good dynamic personally, but yet
it is disappointing that after several months of discussions
there are important differences that still remain over power
sharing and property rights which is a particularly difficult
issue.
So I do think that we are at an important stage in these
discussions. I think where both the United States and the
European Union could be helpful to the two communities on the
island is working with the U.N. Special Envoy Alexander Downer.
I had the opportunity to participate in a round table with him
in New York 1\1/2\ weeks ago, and I do think that we are at a
critical stage particularly in regard to the EU timetable where
there will be a review of commitments that Turkey has made to
move toward normalization of relations with the Republic of
Cyprus, opening its ports and airports under the so-called
Ankara Protocol, that will come up during the Swedish
Presidency later this year.
So I think it will be an important test case for Turkey and
this government in Turkey which has recently lost some support
in their municipal elections. I think it is going to be a hard
issue for them to take on. However, it will be a test of their
good faith and commitment to the U.S. process to show that they
are willing to move forward on this commitment. But I think
they are in close consultation with Mr. Talat from what I can
see on the outside, that Ankara is working closely with him.
However, Mr. Talat has his own constituency, and the Turkish
Cypriots recently had local elections where the nationalist
party has gained strength. He is still the key interlocutor
with the Greek Cypriots, President Talat of the Northern
Republic of Cyprus. It is still going to be a difficult set of
negotiations, but I do think that it would be helpful if both
the United States and the EU could work with the parties and to
provide some ideas and perspectives that might help them move
forward on some of the issues that have been so vexing over the
years between the two communities.
Mr. Gallegly. Well, I spent several days in Nicosia a
little over a year ago and one of the things that I came away
from--I am not sure I was quite as encouraged although I heard
all of the same things basically that you are saying.
One thing that I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that Nicosia
and Cyprus is not one of the normal codel hotspots for us to
travel to, and I think it is a little off the beaten path--not
too many of our folks travel there, and I would encourage our
folks to do that. I think it sends a message that we have not
forgotten its importance and the strategic aspect. And I hope I
will become more encouraged as time moves on, but I am not yet.
If any of you would like to follow up.
Mr. Flanagan. I did not mean to suggest that I was overly
optimistic, and Dr. Lesser has looked at this very closely as
well, so he may want to comment on this. I think that the
correlation of political forces are generally positive, but
there are still some hard issues. But, I do think that the hope
is perhaps some of this pressure, particularly with the EU
deadline approaching, that could provide some incentives.
I think that external parties could also provide some
additional incentives to both communities on the island to move
forward. One thing that we haven't mentioned is this issue is
really impeding important elements of not only Turkey's
advancement of its engagement and integration into the European
Union, but also, and more importantly from United States
interests, it is really holding up the development of NATO-EU
cooperation. Because Turkey is using this as a lever. The fact
that as NATO tries to develop, and this relates to activities
in Afghanistan and the Balkans, Turkey has held up aspects of
NATO-EU cooperation because it is the one lever that it has to
express its concern that Cyprus shouldn't have sort of a back
door to NATO assets and NATO cooperation until Turkey is
allowed to have a fuller relationship with the EU, and also to
move forward on some of its other engagement with Europe.
So, it is a complicated web of relations, but it has some
real impact on important security interest in the United States
as well.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired but
maybe we could have a response from Dr. Lesser on that and get
his perspective.
Mr. Lesser. Congressman Gallegly, Mr. Chairman, actually I
agree very much with my colleague, Dr. Flanagan, about this. I
think his comments are exactly right. I would just add that
from an American interest point of view we need to keep in mind
the extent to which our stake in the unresolved Cyprus question
has changed in the past years.
Ten years ago, this would have been a discussion about
security and crisis management. Now it is a discussion about an
unresolved political dispute. That is a big difference, but I
think, as Dr. Flanagan rightly says, that unresolved political
dispute has some real strategic meaning for us because it
impedes where Turkey can go with the European Union, not just
in the near-term, but also ultimately. Ultimately Turkey is
going to have to recognize all the members to join the EU. I
mean, at the end of the day that is going to have to happen, so
there has to be some resolution if Turkey's candidacy is going
to be put back on track. It is meaningful to us from the NATO
perspective as well, as has been mentioned.
I very much agree that one of the most encouraging things
is that, on the island itself, between the two communities,
there really is a much better climate today than there was in
past years. You can go back and forth across the green line and
make visits. There have been hundreds of thousands, maybe 1
million visits across the green line, I believe without any
incident, any violent incident. This is a remarkable thing.
So, we need to keep our eye on the fact that this is
something that has gotten better, and it has gotten better in
part because there has been European and off again/on again
American attention to the problem over the years. Thank you.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Just as there are opportunities if there is a
resolution and settlement in Cyprus, there are also costs if
there is no resolution. There will be a year-end review of
Turkey's candidacy. We know that there are countries in Europe
that strongly oppose Turkey's candidacy and have proposed a
special partnership instead. The chapters of the ``alcquis''
that have not been opened will not be opened anytime soon.
However, Turkey's accession prospects can be positively
affected if there is movement on Cyprus. Its movement forward
can also be stalled if in fact there is a breakdown of talks on
Cyprus. The Swedish presidency has an important job ahead of it
in these next 6 months.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. McMahon of New York.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
these great witnesses for sharing their insights on these very
important issues in and around Turkey.
I want to just pick up a little bit with what the ranking
member was talking about, the issue of Cyprus, because as I
said in my opening statement it is so important to me, maybe
because my last name is McMahon and I am an Irishman, but that
we resolve that issue. It is important to the people of Cyprus,
and then also is for Turkey. It is, as you have all noted, a
great hindrance in its accession to the EU.
So what I would like to do is talk a little bit more
specifically about what you think can be done. I mean, we have
a situation now where the troops of Turkey have been there for
many years, since 1974, yet across the border crossing as you
have mentioned, Doctor, have gone very peacefully.
What role should the United States play to focus attention
on this issue? For instance, should we suggest to our friends
in Turkey that they draw down the number of troops that are on
the island? Would that be a first good step? And what specific
steps should we be promoting?
Mr. Lesser. Congressman, shall I----
Mr. McMahon. Please.
Mr. Lesser. Thank you for the question. Well, I think there
are a number of things that we can do, but I think as a basic
principle we ought to bear in mind that whatever we do, on this
we ought to view as a transatlantic strategy. We ought to be
doing it with Europe. We ought to be doing it with EU
leadership, because that is really the key context for
resolution.
If Turkey still believed that its prospects for membership
in the European Union were positive, I think it would be much
easier to do the sort of things you mention, which would be
perhaps to draw down some of the military presence on the
island, to put new confidence-building measures in place, to
have the United States take some actions as the Turks are
always pressing us to do, to end or limit, as they see it, the
economic isolation of Northern Cyprus.
There are some things we could do. They would be very
symbolic because we are not in a position to have heavy trade
with Northern Cyprus. But whatever we do, we ought to do it, I
think, in full coordination with the European Union because
that is really where the leverage is. The action on this is no
longer, I would say, in Washington as it might have been in
previous decades. It is really in Brussels, it is in the U.N.
to an extent, and it is on the island above all.
One thing that I was part of not too long ago, which I
thought was enormously useful, which the U.S. Embassy in
Nicosia put together, they have a series of activities that
they sponsor, inter-communal activities of all kinds. The one I
was part of was actually a journalists meeting that included
Greeks and Turks from their respective countries, and they were
not talking about Cyprus per se. This was the important thing.
They were talking about regional issues in the eastern
Mediterranean, but leaving aside the Cyprus problem.
I think there is something very useful there, not only
because it brings people together, but also because it shifts
the whole debate onto bigger issues where Cypriots on both
sides of the island have a stake. They were, for example, very
heavily affected by the refugee flows after the conflict in
Lebanon not long ago.
There are environmental issues, maritime security issues, a
whole host of things that we could be working on with both
communities on Cyprus that aren't necessarily always about the
resolution of their own problem. Thank you.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you. Do you think the drawing down of
troops would be a significant step in the right direction?
Mr. Lesser. I do. I am not optimist about the mood to do
that in Ankara at the moment, but I do. I would also tell you
that there are sectors inside Turkish society, especially the
business community, who recognize that there are costs to
having the situation unresolved. Thank you.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you. I just want to with my remaining
time just sort of follow up regarding the joining of the EU by
Turkey. Do any of you think there is credibility to the
argument that the EU's hesitancy, other than--and I think
Cyprus is clearly a flash point, but also the hesitancy toward
Turkey membership may be based on an inherent bias of certain
EU countries, and if so, how do we deal with that treatment
toward an ally?
Mr. Phillips. Of course, there is an inherent bias. There
is also a touch of racism that exists in Europe that we have to
acknowledge. The Europeans, particularly the Northern
Europeans, talk about the Christian Club of the EU. They are
averse to letting Turkey, a majority Muslim country, come in. I
think what the Europeans have to recognize is that Europe
already has a significant Muslim minority, and if Turkey is
treated with disrespect, if the goal posts are shifted, Muslims
within those European countries will become increasingly
agitated.
Mr. McMahon, if I could return to just your earlier
question on Cyprus. We have to acknowledge that Turkey has
played such an important role in bridging differences. There
was a big surprise that it was the Greek Cypriots who rejected
the Annan plan in 2005, but they will be blamed if there is no
progress in the next 6 months precisely by those European
countries that are looking to find fault with Turkey.
One way to cushion that criticism is for Turkey to move
ahead and open its ports to Cypriot flag ships just as a
demonstration of goodwill. That will diminish some of the
negative blow-back from European countries who would look to
blame Turkey for a problem which in fact Turkey is playing a
salutatory role in.
Mr. McMahon. But certainly even though the role is so
important, clearly the fact that their troops remain on the
island it makes progress and if I am a Cypriot in an island and
someone--there are troops there from what I consider a
different nation, that makes it hard to agree to any type of
long-term agreement as long as the troops are there.
Mr. Phillips. And that is certainly the case, but as Ian
pointed out there is no appetite in Ankara for pulling those
troops back. If we could rotate NATO forces in, that would be
an option, but NATO is already overstretched. We can agree on
the desirability of reducing the troop presence, but we have to
live within the realities of what Ankara will bear and what is
possible for NATO.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. I am going to follow up if I could
with Mr. Gallegly's indulgence. First, just an observation, and
I don't want to jinx anything, but we have already accomplished
a great deal here today in that we have had a subcommittee
meeting on Turkey, and we have had a sober, thoughtful,
rational, logical discussion, and I am deeply grateful to
everyone for that.
One observation with respect to Turkish-Israeli relations,
and I certainly have at times expressed my disagreement and
dismay, but I think it would be remiss if we allowed the
discussion to end without the observation that despite the
harsh words and despite the tension, particularly at the
beginning of the year, Israeli-Turkish relations remain not
only in tact, but strong, and the fundamentals of the
relationship appear to be as they were before the Gaza
operation. Undoubtedly people are talking and wondering, but
the fundamentals and the efforts to which many people in the
Turkish Foreign Ministry, the President of Turkey, and others
have gone to both secure and maintain that relationship I think
is noteworthy, and it would not be a complete record if we did
not recognize that.
I would like to just start maybe with Dr. Flanagan and go
the other way and ask you to comment on two remaining issues.
The European Union: President Obama made a very strong
statement consistent with President Bush and consistent with
many Members of Congress in terms of support and encouragement
for Turkey's entry into the European Union. What can the United
States do now to further advance that cause?
Two, with respect to energy, what role can the United
States play in terms of Turkey's pivotal situation as a transit
hub for energy resources?
And particularly to you, Dr. Flanagan, if I could just ask
you why in your third set of categories, those set of
categories where you said there are significant policy
differences, why did you list halting Iran's nuclear program in
that category?
Mr. Flanagan. Thank you. It's a long list but I will try to
touch on each of them, and if I could just also make a quick
comment on your comment about Turkish-Israeli relations.
I fully agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that I think that
actually there is no agreement between Turkey and Israel that
has been set aside as a result of the outrage that was being
expressed by both the Turkish public and the Turkish leadership
about the Gaza operation, and in fact even at the height of it
the Turks were quick to point out that the Israeli Air Force
was still training in Konya, and the kind of military to
military and other official cooperation goes on.
That said, I do think there is some concern growing in
Israel and what we found in our investigation in talking with
Israeli officials, there is some concern about how as Turkey
deepens its ties with some countries that Israel still sees as
very hostile to it, will Turkey equivocate on some questions,
and will it be quite as strong a supporter of Israel as some
tough questions come to the fore, and one of them, to get to
your point, is about the whole question of Iranian nuclear
weapons, which obviously is seen in Israel as an existential
threat to Israel's very existence.
I do not think that is quite the Turkish assessment. I do
fully agree with the comments that were made earlier that
Turkey does see development of Iranian nuclear capabilities and
Iranian homogeny in the region as inimical to its long-term
interests. That said, I think the Turkish leadership very much
fears the eruption of a confrontational relationship with Iran.
Again in keeping with the zero problems approach, I think they
very much are hoping that diplomacy and carrots and sticks can
still achieve the goal of giving Iran the perspective that by
giving up nuclear weapons or at least putting its program under
full-scope safeguards that it will achieve some other benefits.
And so I think it will be an important bell-weather this year
as we watch Turkey as a member of the Security Council if the
diplomatic track in Iran slows down a bit, and looks like it is
not moving forward, and of course we will see more after the
Iranian Presidential elections. What is Turkey willing to do on
the stick side of this so-called carrot and sticks approach.
That will be, I think, a bell-weather of Turkey's intent.
Moving back then on the energy bridge, I think that the
U.S. can do a great deal to help both the government and
working with private industry to create the context. Turkey has
a major role to play in energy transit, but it has had mixed
success and experience, frankly, in dealing with this. Some of
this has to do with internal Turkish policies and the way the
Turkish energy industry is structured, these para-statal firms
like BOTAS and others that have some visions of being both not
just a transit route but an accumulator.
So Turkey has to be a bit more transparent and open in the
way it conducts the management of its energy programs and
capabilities, but it is certainly true that Turkey has
committed to advancing a number of these projects that both the
so-called--the Nabucco project but other aspects that are part
of a southern route to bring Caspian energy from both sides of
the Caspian, on the Azari side and on the far side, on the
Turkmen side to Europe and other parts of the international
market.
I think the administration should work closely with the
Turks on energy issues. The appointment of Ambassador
Morningstar back to his old position as coordinator for
Eurasian Energy was a good move. It will help us to be able to
work with some of the European governments and with industry to
find a realistic set of goals, and what we recommended in our
report was to focus on some short-term and maybe less ambitious
projects that can give investors confidence such as moving the
Greek-Turkey interconnector in gas and some other shorter
pipelines. Such incremental steps can give investors confidence
that there is this emerging route, this southern corridor that
could be quite productive and valuable to diversification, and
giving Europe a route of gas that is independent of Russian
transit.
And lastly, on the EU, I think the best thing that the
United States can do is quiet diplomacy, continuing to be firm
and encouraging the European proponents of Turkish membership
to move on, to keep opening, trying to open a couple of
chapters each presidency, and to really engage with the EU, as
Dr. Lesser suggested, on the Cyprus question. I think in many
ways the key to advancing Turkey's membership in the EU is
through further progress on Cyprus, and once there is some
movement there a number of other things will open.
Mr. Phillips. Turkey's EU prospects will largely be defined
by how it deals with the identity of Kurds in Turkey. We should
applaud Turkey for having launched 24/7 Turkish language
broadcasts on TRT-6. The fact that Tayyip Erdogan opened the
station on January 1 with a salutation in Kurdish broke a lot
of taboos. He demonstrated Turkey's commitment toward meeting
the Copenhagen criteria.
If there is anything that the United States can do to
continue to build on this momentum, it is to make the point
very clearly that solving the PKK problem has to be based not
only on military action, but also on Turkey's continued
democratization and development. There are some specific laws
and constitutional measures that Turkey needs to address if it
is going to be able to make a compelling and coherent case to
the EU.
It needs to eliminate the item in the Constitution that
defines citizenship based on Turkishness. It needs to get rid
of Article 301 of the penal code which makes it an insult for--
which makes it an actionable offense to insult Turkishness, and
also Article 8 of the Anti-terror Act which is applied to crack
down on free speech. If Turkey were to take steps to address
those constitutional and statutory problems, its relations with
Europe would be greatly improved. I think we can have the kind
of conversation with the Turks that would be important in
Ankara.
On the subject of energy, there is a link between Eurasia
energy supplies and new energy streams coming online from Iraq.
Europe is held hostage by Russian gas. Nabucco moving forward
is critically important, but if Nabucco is going to be
profitable it needs to be augmented by energy supplies coming
from Iraq. There are considerable natural gas fields east of
Sulaymania, and bringing those online and involving Turkish
enterprises would strengthen Turkey's position. It would
enhance Turkey's energy security as well as Europe's. It also
speaks to the broader question of relations between Turkey and
the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Over the past year there have been direct contacts between
officials from the two. There has been a lot of progress. Heads
of government from both have visited. Turkey has initiated this
contact and deserves commendation for its leadership, but
Northern Iraq still remains very volatile. As we redeploy from
Iraq, the likely bump in the road is going to be around Kirkuk
and implementation of Article 140 in the Iraqi Constitution. If
the Kurds without their protector insists on pushing ahead to
have Kirkuk join the KRG, Turkey may react militarily. The PKK
may adventure around that, and we could see a conflagration
involving Turkish troops coming across the border. There is no
bigger deal-breaker in Europe than Turkey getting militarily
engaged in Northern Iraq, and crossing swords with the Iraqi
Kurds. So United States diplomacy here is especially important,
particularly given our strong relationship with the KRG and
with Turkey.
Mr. Wexler. Dr. Lesser.
Mr. Lesser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On these two issues I
would say first on the EU and U.S. policy. You know, we have
been such staunch supporters of Turkey's candidacy, and it is
absolutely right, and it is right that the President reiterated
that on his trip. I would just stress again that I think we
need to start making this argument in some different ways.
It is very clear that as Turkey's candidacy has progressed,
just making a broad-gauged strategic argument about anchoring
Turkey and why it matters, looking at the map, et cetera, it
doesn't take us far enough and it does meet European
resistance.
Will that resistance be less if transatlantic relations
improve in the next years? Possibly. But if you look at
President Sarkozy's reaction to President Obama's statements in
Ankara, it is not so clear. So I think we need to make the
argument in a different way.
I think part of that is talking not so much about geo-
politics, but about specific issues where Europe, the United
States and Turkey play. It could be energy, it could be
environment, it could be responses to the global economic
crisis. There are a lot of different areas where we could
change the geometry and not just talk about what the EU should
be doing with Turkey, or vice-versa, but actually where we have
common interests, and it builds a constituency. I think it is
valid to approach it that way because this is not something
that is going to play out in a year or 2. This is a 10- or 15-
year project which I think Turks and Europeans often forget,
but it is a 10- or 15-year project, and I think it is as much
about not just what Turkey looks like in 10 or 15 years, the
foreign issues which are also very important, but also what the
EU looks like.
If the EU in 10 or 15 years is a looser place with
different speeds and different circles, et cetera, Turkey is
obviously going to fit in a different way. So there are a lot
of different moving pieces. I think our priority in the
meantime ought to be making a much more detailed argument and
having a much more detailed dialogue with constituencies with a
stake on specific issues, not just the geo-political argument.
On energy, I agree with what has already been said. I would
also just add that there are complex cross-cutting interests in
Turkey. We would like to think of Turkey as an alternative to
over-reliance on Russian routes, and it can be, of course,
looking at the map again. But, of course, Turkey has its own
complicated debate about this, because there are a lot of
commercial interests in Turkey, some in the energy sector, but
some in other sectors, bound up in a close relationship with
Russia. Russia is now Turkey's largest trading partner,
economic partner across the board. So it is complicated when
you go and talk to the Turks about this.
It is worth noting that the Iraqi piece of this is just as
important as the Eurasian piece. The existing capacity of the
pipelines that are longstanding across Turkey to bring Iraqi
oil to the Mediterranean are actually twice the capacity of the
Baku-Tblisi line, roughly. So this is a big, a big issue and a
big contributor to Turkey's own energy security requirements.
To the extent that we are an arbiter in terms of Iraqi security
so they can actually export these supplies through Turkish
pipelines, that is going to be very, very important to Turkey.
I would just finish by saying that for Turks this is very
much bound up with their own thinking about the relationship
with Russia, which has historically been very wary. But also,
this wariness extends to the idea that NATO and the United
States are entering a period of increased confrontation,
competition with Russia, which also would not serve Turkish
interests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you again to the three witnesses for your
exceptionally thoughtful and sober discussion. I want to note
that you have been with us for a little bit more than 2\1/2\
hours, so you have been extremely generous with your time. I
would like to give Mr. Gallegly or Mr. Boozman the opportunity
for the last word if they wish.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the
chairman for calling this hearing. Thank you for all your
testimony this morning. Of course, I join the chairman in
apologizing for the break for an hour plus with voting.
Unfortunately, there are certain things around here we don't
have a tremendous amount of control over, but we do appreciate
and recognize the time that you dedicated while we were off
doing other things. But thank you for being here today, and we
will stay engaged.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you. Mr. Boozman.
Mr. Boozman. Well, I would just like to thank you and the
ranking member for having the hearing. I apologize for not
being here except at the last few minutes. Again, the schedule
circumstances caused that, so thank you very much, and it is a
very, very important subject that we are all very concerned
about.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, and thank you for your attendance.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
Minutes deg.
FTR1--Costa QFRs deg.
Lesser response to Costa deg.
Phillips response to Costa deg.
FTR2--Wilson QFRs deg.
Lesser response to Wilson deg.
Phillips response to Wilson (plus cite) deg.
[Note: The additional information submitted for the record,
``Confidence Building Between Turks and Iraqi Kurds,'' dated June 2009
by Mr. David L. Phillips, is not reprinted here but is available in
committee records.]