[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AGENT ORANGE: WHAT EFFORTS ARE BEING
MADE TO ADDRESS THE CONTINUING IMPACT
OF DIOXIN IN VIETNAM?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 4, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs TED POE, Texas
of 3/12/09 deg. BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
DIANE E. WATSON, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
Lisa Williams, Subcommittee Staff Director
Daniel Bob, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Nien Su, Republican Professional Staff Member
Vili Lei, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary and
Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 9
Mr. Charles Bailey, Director, Special Initiative on Agent Orange/
Dioxin, Ford Foundation........................................ 20
Mr. Vo Quy, Professor, Centre for Natural Resources and
Environmental Studies (CRES), Vietnam National University,
Hanoi, Vietnam (Member, US-Vietnam Group on Agent Orange/
Dioxin)........................................................ 36
Ms. Mary Dolan-Hogrefe, Vice President and Senior Adviser,
National Organization on Disability (Member, US-Vietnam
Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/Dioxin and also Director of the
World Committee on Disability)................................. 45
Mr. Rick Weidman, Executive Director for Policy & Government
Affairs, Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA)..................... 52
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement......... 4
The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement................... 12
Mr. Charles Bailey: Prepared statement........................... 22
Mr. Vo Quy: Prepared statement................................... 38
Ms. Mary Dolan-Hogrefe: Prepared statement....................... 47
Mr. Rick Weidman: Prepared statement............................. 54
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 76
Hearing minutes.................................................. 78
The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Illinois..................................... 79
His Excellency Ngo Quang Xuan, Vice Chairman, Foreign Relations
Committee, National Assembly of Vietnam (Co-Chair, US-Vietnam
Group on Agent Orange/Dioxin and also former Vietnamese
Ambassador to the United Nations): Statement................... 80
Ms. Mary Dolan-Hogrefe: Additional material...................... 86
Mr. Rick Weidman: Additional material............................ 106
AGENT ORANGE: WHAT EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO ADDRESS THE CONTINUING
IMPACT OF DIOXIN IN VIETNAM?
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific
and the Global Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H.
Faleomavaega (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The subcommittee will now come to order.
This is a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment.
I certainly want to extend my personal welcome to our first
witness, who came all the way from Vietnam. deg.
But, before doing that, deg.I do want to make a
personal invitation to one of my distinguished colleagues and
dear friend, not only as a historical point but certainly
someone that we should all be proud in making America great. I
would like to invite my dear friend and colleague representing
his district in New Orleans in the State of Louisiana,
Congressman Anh Cao, our first Vietnamese-American elected
Member of Congress. I personally welcome him and want him to
join us in this hearing.
My colleague and ranking member from Illinois, Mr.
Manzullo, is not here yet. He has asked me to go ahead and
begin the hearing. I will open the hearing at this time with a
statement.
Last year, the subcommittee held a historic hearing with
the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group and the Aspen Institute regarding
our forgotten responsibility to the victims of Agent Orange. To
my knowledge, this was the first time in the history of the
U.S. Congress that a hearing was held on Agent Orange that
included the views of our Vietnamese counterparts. And so today
I thank the Dialogue Group for agreeing once more to update us
on what efforts have been made to address the continuing impact
of dioxin in Vietnam.
This subject, though uncomfortable for some, is important
to me. Because, in 1966, I joined the U.S. Army and was then
deployed to Vietnam in 1967 where I served in Nha Trang as a
young soldier at the height of the Tet Offensive.
My younger brother, Tom, also served, as did hundreds of
thousands of Americans at that time. None of us knew then what
we know now. We did not know if we would come back in a body
bag or live to return to see our own families. How my brother
and I made it home, I do not know, but we did.
About 2 years ago, for the first time in nearly 40 years, I
returned to Vietnam in honor of those who did not. Although my
brother passed away a couple of years ago, I wore his aloha
shirt so he could return with me to Vietnam.
Some 40 years later, Vietnam is not the same; neither is
the United States. Today, it is the policy of the United States
to normalize relations with Vietnam. In part, normalizing
relations means coming to terms with our past; and I commend
the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange for openly
discussing ways in which the U.S. Congress can be of help.
As I noted in last year's hearing, it is estimated that
from 1961 to 1971, the United States military sprayed more than
11 million gallons of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Agent Orange was
manufactured under Department of Defense contracts by several
companies, including Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Dioxin, a toxic
contaminant known to be one of the deadliest chemicals made by
man, was an unwanted byproduct, and it is thought to be
responsible for most of the medical problems associated with
exposure to Agent Orange.
According to the Congressional Research Service, and I
quote, ``Vietnamese advocacy groups claim that there are over 3
million Vietnamese suffering from serious health problems
caused by exposure to the dioxin in Agent Orange.''
CRS also reports that in 1995 ``a study of over 3,200
Vietnamese nationals found average TEQ blood levels were nearly
six times higher among the people from sprayed areas compared
to people from unsprayed areas. Average breast milk levels were
nearly four times higher, and average fat tissue levels were
over 24 times higher. A separate study of blood dioxin levels
of Danang residents reported TCDD concentrations of more than
100 times globally accepted levels. Elevated TCDD
concentrations were also found in blood samples of Bien Hoa
residents.''
Despite these findings, as CRS notes, and I quote, ``One
area of continued disagreement between the U.S. and Vietnamese
Governments is the attribution of medical conditions to
exposure to Agent Orange-related dioxin. However, a list of
conditions developed by the Vietnamese Red Cross and the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs significantly overlap,
indicating some agreement on the health effects.''
Assessments of the environmental consequences of dioxin in
Vietnam are ongoing, with serious contamination having been
found at so-called hotspots or, more specifically, former
military bases in Bien Hoa, Danang, Phu Cat, Nha Trang and at a
former U.S. military base in the Aluoi Valley. Yet the U.S.
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development, known as USAID, are only providing technical
assistance and financial support for containment and
remediation efforts in and around the Danang airport. And
support is minimal, with less than $6 million appropriated for
environmental remediation and health care assistance.
In contrast, from 2003 to 2006, the United States
appropriated $35.7 billion for Iraq reconstruction.
For Germany, according to the Congressional Research
Service, in constant 2005 dollars, the United States provided a
total of $29.3 billion in assistance from 1946 to 1952, with 60
percent in economic grants and nearly 30 percent in economic
loans and the remainder in military aid.
Total U.S. assistance for Japan from 1946 to 1952 was
roughly $15.2 billion in 2005 dollars, with 77 percent in
grants and 23 percent in loans.
My question is: Why can't we do more for our U.S. veterans
and the people of Vietnam? I believe that we could and we
should, and this is why I am fully committed to doing
everything I can to bring attention to this issue and make it
right. As a Pacific Islander, I have a special affinity for the
people of Vietnam and what it means to have been exposed to a
horrifying poison.
As a nation committed to lending a helping hand, and with
America ready to lead once more, we can and must do better. I
commend the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group for doing its part to
strengthen our bilateral relations in an effort to put our past
behind us and focus on a future of cooperation and promise.
We are also joined this afternoon by one of my
distinguished colleagues, a former Ambassador to the Federated
States of Micronesia, my dear friend Congresswoman Diane Watson
from California. Very, very glad to have you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega
follows:]Faleomavaega statement deg.
Ms. Watson. Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And, also, we are especially pleased to
be joined by my distinguished ranking member from the great
State of Illinois and my good friend, Don Manzullo.
Would you care to have an opening statement, sir?
The gentleman waives his opening statement.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this most important hearing.
I am reminded of the time you went back to the North
Pacific, and we attended a tribunal where they were
interviewing people because of the effects of other kinds of
agents that were used in the Pacific. It was a very, shall I
say, deeply felt experience, a sad experience, because there
were mutations generation later. So thank you for holding this
hearing to address the continuing impact of dioxin or Agent
Orange in Vietnam.
We know that between 1961 and 1971, as part of the
Operation Ranch Hand, 11-12 million gallons of Agent Orange
were sprayed on South Vietnam. As a result of spraying the
agent, between 1.2 million and 4.8 million Vietnamese were
directly exposed to Agent Orange and other herbicides during
the Vietnamese war.
While the damages and effects of any war are devastating to
locals and U.S. troops alike, I believe that now is the time to
accurately assess the damage to the fullest extent possible and
accept our responsibility in dealing with the aftermath of this
act. Although Agent Orange has long been attached to
uncertainty and controversy, I am pleased that we are seeing
progress in our relationship with the Vietnamese Government and
nongovernmental organizations. We refer to them as NGOs.
The selfless effects of NGOs are to be commended. Included
are the Ford Foundation, UNICEF, the United Nations Development
Program, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as
Vietnamese NGOs and the guests on our panel today.
Over the years, in speaking with the many Vietnamese
veterans in my congressional district, exposure to Agent Orange
has caused many health issues such as, but not limited to,
Hodgkin's disease, respiratory cancer in the lungs, bronchus,
Loronix in the trachea, as well as prostate cancer and type 2
diabetes.
Many Vietnam veterans in my district as well as around the
country are still feeling the effects of Agent Orange some 40
years later. So I am so pleased to see the selected panelists
before us today, and I look forward to hearing their testimony.
So I think----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Will the gentlelady yield?
Ms. Watson. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I think both of us have had a similar
experience to the extent that we also visited the Northern
Pacific----
Ms. Watson. Yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega [continuing]. And something else took
place at the time when we conducted our nuclear testing in the
Pacific. So Agent Orange and dioxin occurred in Vietnam, but
there were also the effects of the nuclear testing where some
300 Marshallese people, people of the Marshall Islands, were
exposed to nuclear contamination. And to this day, they are
still feeling the effects of what we did in conducting those
tests. So that is another issue that I am sure the gentlelady
and I would love to explore more and see what we can do to
help.
Ms. Watson. If you would yield--I still had zero, zero,
zero on my time. But I just want to comment that it was an eye
opener.
I had been out in that part of the world in Okinawa many
years earlier. But to go into the area where we tested the
nuclear bomb--and many of you might not know this, but the wind
shifted. And the plan was to test over open water space, not
over land. And because the wind shifted, it took that waste
over land. And those islands that we visited and looked at,
that 18-inch of topsoil is still today nonworkable, not
growable. Many people were returned to areas in those islands,
and there is nothing growing. There is nothing to do. They put
up housing. And we found, if you remember, that girls as young
as 12 and 13 were pregnant, having babies. We went to the
opening of a hospital over there.
So there is a lot of work to be done in that area. I think
this hearing is the beginning of us reviewing what still needs
to be done, and I thank you so much.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentlelady.
I might also note a very similar characteristic of the
hospitals I visited in Vietnam where many of the children, the
young people and even adults had defective birth conditions in
the same way that the Marshallese women gave birth to jelly
babies, deformed babies, as a result of the nuclear
contamination. So the dioxin poison seems to give that same
kind of medical problem. It is just a really terrible thing
that I have seen.
I thank the gentlelady.
Now I would like to ask my good friend, the gentleman from
Louisiana, for his opening statement.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin, I would like to express my deep
appreciation for your and the ranking member's concern for the
welfare of the Vietnamese people.
Being a native Vietnamese myself, I am also very concerned
with the many health issues that are presently facing the
Vietnamese people because of Agent Orange.
According to the CRS reports that I have right in front of
me, approximately 2.1 million to 4.8 million Vietnamese were
directly exposed to Agent Orange; and a Vietnamese advocacy
group claims there are over 3 million Vietnamese suffering from
serious health problems caused by exposure to dioxin in Agent
Orange.
So, as you can see, Mr. Chairman, this is a serious issue
that the Vietnamese people face. I believe that how the
Vietnamese Government addresses this issue in connection with
Agent Orange will show how they deal with the basic rights of
the Vietnamese people in Vietnam and how they view their duty
to the Vietnamese people.
So I look forward to this hearing, and I appreciate your
deep concern for the Vietnamese people and that you are holding
this hearing. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
I think your presence, Congressman, gives a greater emphasis on
my part and the part of my ranking member, Mr. Manzullo, and
the fact that this is not a Democratic or a Republican issue,
this is not a Vietnamese or an American issue--it is a human
issue. I think this is something that we all ought to bear in
mind regarding what happens in war. Things like this happen.
And maybe we could have prevented a lot of these things from
happening. In the course of our hearing today, I hope that we
will get more data and information from some of our expert
witnesses.
[Discussion off record.]**Deleted from here to
"Print on"**
Because of the rules of the House--I have a very
distinguished gentleman who currently chairs as the vice
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Procedurally, we
are not able to question the gentleman, but he certainly--it is
my privilege and high honor to invite the gentleman who
currently serves as the vice chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee of the National Assembly of the Republic of Vietnam,
His Excellency Ngo Quang Xuan.
Ambassador Ngo Quang Xuan has conducted his studies--
undergraduate studies in Vietnam, received postgraduate
degrees--I am sorry, I am not very good in French--but
Lausanne, somewhere in Switzerland, I believe, and the
Diplomatic Academy of, Moscow Russia; formerly served as
Ambassador of Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations;
involved in several international organizations and
memberships; and now is currently the vice chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly of the
Republic of Vietnam.
Sir, we are very, very happy to have you come and visit us
here; and I would welcome your statement now before the
committee.
STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY NGO QUANG XUAN, VICE CHAIRMAN,
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF VIETNAM (CO-
CHAIR, U.S.-VIETNAM GROUP ON AGENT ORANGE/DIOXIN AND ALSO
FORMER VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS)
Mr. Xuan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen.
I have circulated my statement to you. Due to limited time,
I wish to draw your attention to just a few points.
First of all, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to
Chairman Faleomavaega and the subcommittee for the opportunity
to speak before you on our efforts to address the impact of
Agent Orange/dioxin to the people and the environment of
Vietnam, as well as the road ahead to complete this heavy task.
I believe that following the outcomes of the first hearing
of the subcommittee on Agent Orange in May, 2008, this hearing
will provide more in-depth exchanges on ways and means to
complete the task and will eventually lead to legislation and
other official matters that will assist Vietnam to cope with
the continuing impact of Agency Orange/dioxin in the time to
come.
Today, I speak before the subcommittee in the capacity as
co-chair of the U.S.-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/
dioxin.
As you may know, the Dialogue Group was set up in 2007 in
the framework of track two with assistance from Ford
Foundation's Special Initiative on Agent Orange/dioxin.
I am honored to co-chair the Dialogue Group with Mr. Walter
Issacson, former General Director of CNN Communication,
President and CEO of the Aspen Institute.
Now I wish to express my view on Vietnam-U.S. relations and
the issue of Agent Orange/dioxin.
Vietnam-U.S. relations have witnessed dramatic development
since the mid-1990s following political normalization. Since
the end of the war, major strides have been made in bilateral
relations to enable the two countries to move forward on a
range of issues and areas of difference.
U.S. Trade with Vietnam grew rapidly between 2001 and 2007.
Total bilateral trade between the two countries rose from $1.5
billion to $12.5 billion. Vietnam has also increased its
efforts to assist the United States to recover the remains of
U.S. soldiers and civilians who died during the wartime. The
two nations have also expanded their corporation on strategic
and military issues.
However, one major legacy of the war that remains
unresolved is the impact of Agent Orange/dioxin on the people
and the environment of Vietnam. For the last three decades,
this issue has generally been pushed aside from discussion by
other issues considered more important such as the negotiation
on PNTR, WTO trade relations by two sides. Having those issues
resolved, the issue of Agent Orange/dioxin has emerged as a
regular topic in bilateral discussions in recent years. It is
said that the relations between Vietnam and the United States
will not become totally comprehensive unless Agent Orange is in
mainstay of relationship.
The increasing concern from Vietnamese people about the
impact of Agent Orange in recent years has created more
pressure on the Vietnamese Government to remove dioxin from the
environment and to provide better care to people exposed to
Agent Orange/dioxin.
According to various estimates, the U.S. military sprayed
approximately around 20 million gallons of Agent Orange over
nearly 24.67 percent on Southern Vietnam territory between 1961
and 1971. One scientific study estimated that around 4.8
million Vietnamese were directly exposed to Agent Orange. Now I
will--some efforts made in the field of Agent Orange in
Vietnam.
Since the 1990s, several constructions have been built by
Ministry of National Defense of Vietnam to control the spread
of dioxin in and around the military bases, including three
hotspots in Da Nang Bien Hoa and Phu Cat. However, this project
can only deal with a part of the whole dioxin-contaminated
area.
In 2006, the Vietnamese Government estimated the cost for
the detoxification of Da Nang and Bien Hoa air bases in could
reach $10 million.
In 2008, the estimated cost for decontaminating the Da Nang
air base was raised to $14 million.
In 2007, several projects were carried out by Ministry of
National Defense of Vietnam to prevent the spread of dioxin
from heavy contaminated areas in the Da Nang air base with
funds from the Ford Foundation. Similar projects are now being
carried out at Phu Cat Air Base with 1.5 million U.S. dollars
funded by the Czech Republic. Mangrove planting projects have
also been carried out to rehabilitate forests which were
totally or partially destroyed by herbicide dioxin.
Thousands of victims, especially children with birth
defects, have been nurtured and treated in peace villages,
friendship villages, and centers for children with disabilities
all over the country. Yet these supports only meet a small part
of a very large and long-term of demand of Agent Orange/dioxin
victims.
Scientific research on the adverse impacts of Agent Orange
to the environment of Vietnam and its people have been
conducted with collaboration and support of scientists form
Japan, Germany, Canada, Russia, et cetera. Humanitarian
activities and contribution by organizations and individuals
from Japan, Germany, Norway, England, and the United States for
victims of Agent Orange and people with disabilities have also
been carried out in recent years. Cooperation between Vietnam
and the United States in the issue of Agent Orange began in
2000, following the visit to Vietnam by President Bill Clinton.
Vietnam has also received support from several U.S. NGOs to
address the impact of Agent Orange, including the Ford
Foundation, Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, and some
American friends. At the moment, the Ford Foundation is the
largest international contributor of assistance to Vietnam's
effort to clean up Agent Orange/dioxin. Through August, 2008,
the Ford Foundation has made grants of about $8 million to
Agency Orange/dioxin-related projects in Vietnam and has
committed to grant more in the future.
The total $6 million appropriation to Vietnam for
environment remediation of dioxin-contaminated storage sites
and to support health programs in communities near those sites
was made twice, in 2007 and 2009. However, so far, there have
been no further announcements about the utilization of even the
first appropriation of $3 million in 2007. Some words about the
U.S.-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/dioxin.
In February, 2007, the Dialogue Group was established with
funds from the Ford Foundation. The Dialogue Group seeks to
draw attention to the range of human and environment needs
related to Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam and to identify
practical and effective fields in which donors can help to
address those needs.
In the last 2 years, the Dialogue Group has had four
meetings. Its most recent meeting, the fourth meeting, was held
just 2 days ago, on June 2nd, 2009, in Washington, DC, with
participation of around 70 people representing political
communities, think tanks, NGOs, and scientists. The meeting
concluded with suggestions that the issue of Agent Orange/
dioxin should be put into the comprehensive U.S.-Vietnam
bilateral relations and the overall environment issue in
general and that advocacy to raise awareness of the United
States and fully providing information on this issue should be
done in a more practical way.
The Dialogue Group is not a funding agency but seeks to
identify funds and donors in five priority areas: Containing
Dioxin at former air bases to prevent ongoing and future
contamination; second, expanding services to people with
disabilities, with particular attention to people in and around
the affected area; third, establishing an international
standard dioxin laboratory in Vietnam to help measure the
extent of contamination and contribute to international
research on Agent Orange; fourth, restoring landscape and other
aspects of the environment affected by Agent Orange during the
war in Vietnam; and the fifth, mainstreaming the issue of Agent
Orange within the U.S. public and U.S. policy community.
I go to the last point to complete the task: What should we
do to address the impact of Agent Orange in Vietnam?
Since the end of the war, despite difficulties, the
Government and the people of Vietnam have been active in
carrying out a number of researches on the impact of Agent
Orange/dioxin to its environment and people, as well as
provided health care and financial support for a large number
of victims of Agent Orange/dioxin. In the fight with this war
legacy, Vietnam has received valuable support and cooperation
from international communities.
In the last few years, cooperation between Vietnam and the
United States on the issue of Agent Orange has encouraging
progress. Yet this progress and cooperation is only on a very
small scale compared with the very last long-term and costly
demands needed to complete the task. Completing the task is a
long-term process which certainly requires joint effort of both
countries as well as increasingly partnership between public
and private sector. To do this, I would propose some
suggestions as follows:
In the long run, the issue of Agent Orange should be put
into the comprehensive U.S.-Vietnam relations. The bilateral
relations between Vietnam and the United States cannot become
totally comprehensive without a comprehensive and reasonable
solution for the impact of Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam.
A multiyear policy for cooperation should be developed.
There should be a master plan or multiyear policy on Agent
Orange/dioxin in Vietnam, including scientific research,
environmental remediation, public awareness, and health care.
In the immediate, public and private sector partnership
should be further promoted. In the last few years, the private
sector has been very active in the joint effort with the public
sector to address the impact of Agent Orange in Vietnam. In
recent years, nongovernmental organizations have contributed
most of the funds to that effort.
Fourth, speed up the reimbursement pace. It is appreciated
that the U.S. Congress has twice agreed to allocate $6 million
for the work of Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam. However, in
reality, this budget does not yet reach those who need it. The
decision to add $3 million to the budget of 2007, 2009 is a
significant move made by the U.S. Congress. Therefore, to make
this move not just a symbolic one, the speed of reimbursement
should be soon pushed up.
And the last one, promote various forms of regular dialogue
and information exchanges between the two sides.
Allow me to conclude my statement by welcoming the second
hearing of the subcommittee as an important component on the
long way to complete our tasks. Thank you again for inviting me
and for convening this fruitful discussion. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And I do
appreciate your coming all the way from Vietnam to join us in
this hearing this afternoon. Thank you for your statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Xuan follows:]
******** INSERT 1-1 **********Print Back On** deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Our next deg.first witness is
Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel.
Secretary Marciel currently serves as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and
also serves as Ambassador to ASEAN.
Mr. Marciel has been a career member of the Foreign Service
and State Department since 1985. He served previously as
director of the Department's Office of Maritime Southeast Asia,
as director of the Office of Mainland Southeast Asia, and has
had assignments in our Embassies in Vietnam, the Philippines,
Hong Kong, Brazil and Turkey.
A Californian, Mr. Marciel graduated from the University of
California at Davis, and he earned a graduate degree from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
This is again a reunion with our good friend, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Marciel, on this issue.
Please proceed, sir.
Mr. Marciel. I thank you very much, Chairman Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Is your mike on?
Mr. Marciel. Yes, I think it is. Can you hear me?
Mr. Faleomavaega. Pull it a little closer to you. I am hard
of hearing these days. I don't know why.
Mr. Marciel. Is this----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Much better.
Mr. Marciel. Is that okay?
Mr. Faleomavaega. Much better.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Marciel. Chairman Faleomavaega, Ranking Member
Manzullo, and members of the subcommittee, thank you very much
for inviting me to testify today on the topic of United States
engagement with Vietnam on issues related to Agent Orange.
Since I last testified before your subcommittee on this
topic, just over a year ago--I believe it was May of last
year--we have continued to make great strides in the U.S.-
Vietnam bilateral relationship. We are moving forward on a wide
range of issues, and we discuss matters frankly, even those
issues on which we don't agree.
As a result of our closer ties, we have made significant
gains in areas ranging from accounting for the remains of
Americans lost during the Vietnam War, to development of
bilateral trade liberalization, to greater cooperation on
religious freedom measures. Our success in recovering and
accounting for the remains of Americans lost in the Vietnam
conflict, with 642 now repatriated to date, deserves special
mention as an example of joint collaborative efforts.
Recently, we have expanded our cooperation into new areas--
I think it is very important--including education, climate
change, investment protection, and even military-to-military
relations.
We are implementing a foreign assistance program in Vietnam
that is growing in both size and scope; and it is aimed at
supporting economic reform and good governance, building a
vibrant civil society, and improving health and security for
the Vietnamese people.
Our assistance includes programs to address humanitarian
needs, including HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, and support
for those with disabilities, without regard to their cause.
Since 1989, the United States has funded more than $44 million
in programs in Vietnam to support people with disabilities.
This includes significant contributions from the Leahy War
Victims Fund.
Agent Orange has long been a sensitive issue for both
countries, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman; and we have differed
over the lasting impact of the defoliant on Vietnam. I am
pleased to say that now we--meaning the United States and the
Vietnamese Governments--are engaged in practical, constructive
cooperation. Both the United States and Vietnam agree that the
health of the Vietnamese people and the safety of the
Vietnamese environment are vital for Vietnam's future. With the
support of additional funds approved by Congress in Fiscal Year
2007 and again in Fiscal Year 2009, we are moving ahead with
collaborative efforts to help Vietnam address environmental
contamination and related health concerns.
If I could give you a brief update on our activities, the
$3 million included in the Fiscal Year 2007 supplemental
appropriations bill for ``environmental remediation and health
activities'' at ``hotspots'' in Vietnam is central to our
efforts to address environmental and health concerns.
Out of the initial $3 million, $1 million has already been
spent for health projects. We have utilized a total of $550,000
of that $3 million for support costs, staffing to implement the
dioxin/Agent Orange program through Fiscal Year 2010 and
invitational travel to Vietnam for U.S. experts in dioxin
remediation.
The remaining $1.45 million has been budgeted for
environmental containment and remediation activities. We
focused our efforts on the Danang hot spot, and that is because
the Government of Vietnam has asked us to focus our assistance
there.
In September, 2008--so since I last appeared before you--
USAID entered into 3-year cooperative agreements with three
U.S. private voluntary organizations: Save the Children
Foundation, East Meets West Foundation, and Vietnam Assistance
for the Handicapped. Under these agreements, people with
disabilities in the Danang area are provided with health and
rehabilitation services and livelihood development support.
We are pleased to have a Vietnamese government
representative on the panel that selected those projects.
Already, these organizations have provided a valuable service
to the disabled community in Danang.
For example, Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped
sponsored training for 22 medical professionals in Danang by
U.S.-based physicians and provided rehabilitation services to
66 disabled people, including nine corrective surgeries. The
East Meets West Foundation conducted a baseline needs
assessment for the disabled population of the greater Danang
area and provided medical screening for more than 3,000 people.
Save the Children Foundation sponsored the first job fair in
Danang to include people with disabilities, and I am pleased to
note that 20 of the 72 disabled participants received immediate
employment offers. In addition, our partners are working
closely with local authorities to develop an integrated action
plan to support people with disabilities in Danang.
We are also moving forward on environmental projects. Our
Embassy in Hanoi is working closely with the Government of
Vietnam to finalize an environmental remediation program for
dioxin hotspots at the Danang airport. With support from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and building upon
important Ford Foundation initiatives, USAID has worked in
close coordination with the Vietnamese Government and other
donors to design and implement a comprehensive remediation
program.
As a first step, USAID has developed a project focusing on
an environmental assessment and environmentally sound design
and planning for containment of dioxin at the Danang airport. I
am happy to report that the procurement process for these
efforts is under way.
We are very pleased that an additional $3 million in Fiscal
Year 2009 funding is now available for Agent Orange activities
in Vietnam. I can tell you how we plan to use these. We plan to
use approximately $1 million of this funding for further
support for environmental health activities and $2 million for
environmental remediation efforts. We will also continue to
consult closely with our Vietnamese partners as we do this.
In conclusion, the Governments of the United States and
Vietnam have cooperated on the issue of dioxin contamination
since 2001. Our aim has been to strengthen the scientific
capacity and infrastructure of Vietnam's research institutions
and to improve the ability of the Vietnamese authorities to
protect the environment and promote public health for future
generations.
Our collaboration with Vietnam on Agent Orange/dioxin
issues extends well beyond the government-to-government dialog.
This week's meeting of the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent
Orange/Dioxin, and the Fourth Annual U.S.-Vietnam Joint
Advisory Committee meeting, which is planned for September in
Hanoi, are prime examples of the partnerships that are at the
heart of our efforts.
As we move forward, we will work hard to ensure U.S.
Government assistance complements an open and effective
approach to addressing outstanding concerns related to Agent
Orange.
Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to make
opening remarks; and, of course, I am pleased to answer any
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marciel
follows:]Scot Marciel deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would like to invite the gentlelady
from California for questions.
I will start. Okay.
Well, Mr. Secretary, not only is this a reunion but a
collaboration of the time that, yes, we did conduct a hearing--
the first of its kind, I believe, ever in the history of the
Congress--and this was last year in May. I guess that has given
us an opportunity for 1 whole year now since we met last, and I
do appreciate some of the activities and the conduct on the
part of our State Department, our Government in addressing the
issues that we had discussed in May of last year.
As I recall, I think there was a distinct question whether
or not the United States has any liability for the problems
caused by the usage of Agent Orange and dioxin at the time of
the war in Vietnam; and I believe the response from your
lawyers or legal department was you have no legal
responsibility or liability on this issue.
I believe I also then raised the issue, if we did not have
the legal liability, do you think perhaps that we should have a
moral responsibility since we are the ones who used the dioxin
poison during the war?
What I am trying to get at, Mr. Secretary--and I do
appreciate, as you said, all the NGOs in the organization, the
Ford Foundation, the Dialogue, even EPA's involvement. I am
trying to figure if there is some way that we could put a
little more zip into the whole process for 1 whole year. I
appreciate you have done all that you could under the
constraints that you have been under, but I wanted to ask you,
could there be more that we could do as a government for these
people?
I am not an expert on dioxin, but I am curious--maybe this
is something that I will ask our other witnesses--what do you
consider to be a reasonable amount of resources that we should
provide to address this issue of dioxin and the remediation of
the environment?
I am told that we have all the different numbers. I had a
meeting this morning with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
General Eric Shinseki. He admitted to the so-called scientific
method we have applied as to whether or not dioxin also
affected our men and women in the military. And we really
cannot confirm scientifically if our men and women were exposed
to dioxin, especially those who made the distribution, and
carried the gallons around the military bases. I happened to be
stationed in Nha Trang, one of our military air bases in
Vietnam.
Has there been any conduct or any discussion or dialogue
with the new administration since it came into office in
January? Has this issue been discussed by the administration?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to address
your questions.
In terms of State Department and the question of Agent
Orange/dioxin, there have been discussions certainly in the
East Asian Pacific Bureau with our USAID colleagues and on how
best to move forward and continue this program. I don't know,
to be honest, if there have been broader discussions maybe in
other departments in the administration.
In terms of cost and resources involved, one of the reasons
I became a diplomat is because I wasn't smart enough to do the
science in high school and college. I won't try to comment on
the scientific part, because I don't have that expertise.
I would say maybe a couple of things have guided us here.
You mentioned the point about no legal liability. My
understanding is it is very difficult to determine, if people
have health problems in Vietnam or disabilities, what was the
cause--was it caused by Agent Orange or was it caused by
something else? Rather than try to figure that out, what we
have decided to do is let's see if we can help people who need
help. If it wasn't caused by Agent Orange, it was caused by
something else, that is okay. These are people who still need
help.
I think everywhere around the world we try to help people,
and certainly part of our relationship with Vietnam has been to
try to help people. Our assistance to Vietnam total now is a
little over $100 million a year. A very large percentage of
that goes toward health. It is not necessarily because of Agent
Orange, but it is certainly something we are pleased to do.
My understanding is there have been no good estimates of
what the total cost of remediation, environmental remediation
would be or certainly for dealing with all the health problems.
What we have been doing, as I mentioned, is working with NGOs
but also other partners. Certainly the Government of Vietnam,
the U.N., UNDP, and other governments, including, I believe,
the Czech Republic, have all been active. So it is very much a
multilateral effort now that we are pleased to be a part of.
And I think there is more we can do. I can't put a number
on it, both because I don't actually have the expertise but
also given the budget realities. But certainly we are pleased
to continue to do what we are doing. And I think we are in a
position where the program is accelerating. A little bit slow
starting up in some ways, but now we are accelerating.
Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. In fairness to you, Mr. Secretary, and
the State Department, I realize it wasn't the State Department
that administered Agent Orange. It was the Department of
Defense. And I do have every intention of calling the
appropriate officials from the Department of Defense who should
have all the data and information on how the whole process came
into being, not only among the military bases, but the
information that has also been received recently that it wasn't
just the military bases, but all over Vietnam.
And the real sad thing about this situation, Mr. Secretary,
is that it was intended to be used to fight the enemy, the
North Vietnamese. But the people most affected by this were the
South Vietnamese, our own friends. It wasn't just the North
Vietnamese Army that we were trying to expose or in some way to
defeat in our efforts in fighting the war, but a great number
of people were affected by this, not only our soldiers but the
South Vietnamese people, who were supposed to be the ones that
we were to defend and to protect.
As I said, in fairness to you, I have several questions I
wanted to pose in terms of how the Department of Defense went
about doing this in connection with several of our major
chemical corporations or companies that created the Agent
Orange compound, including this dioxin. And I think this is
where things really get a little more sensitive. Knowing if
dioxin was contained in this compound, why did we continue
using it?
It didn't just cause deforestation but also tremendous harm
to human beings. I like to think if there is an herbicide or a
pesticide, it is not supposed to have an impact on human
beings, but just to cause problems to trees and shrubs. How
were we able to justify using this chemical compound? And if--
--
Diane, do you have any questions?
Ms. Watson. I was tracking the information on the--I guess
it was $3 million for the remediation. And I know that without
a scientific background you don't have that information at
hand. But what I would like to know, Mr. Chairman, and from Mr.
Marciel, if you could, when that information is available, let
us know how these funds have been used. And if you could
provide us the detailed information on how they are--to what
extent these grants have achieved their expected results. And
what were the hotspots, and have they gone into those hotspots,
and to analyze the affect of dioxin over these years.
So if we could get that feedback, we would have a clearer
picture as to how we are aiding the Vietnamese and are we
receiving the right results. It has been too long, and I think
we ought to stand up to our responsibility and have this
information. So if you can get back to us in writing once it is
available, we would appreciate it
Mr. Marciel. I certainly would be pleased to do that.
I could, just briefly, maybe note that we have spent $1.5
million of the $3 million from Fiscal Year 2007. And $1 million
of that was for health in the Danang area and $500,000 for some
support costs and staffing and invitational travel. And the
other $1.5 million out of that is for environmental containment
and remediation planning at Danang Airport, and that
procurement process is under way.
In terms of hotspots, we have focused, for environmental
remediation, on Danang as one of three hotspots, meaning areas
where dioxin was stored, where Agent Orange was stored. And
that decision was made in consultation with our Vietnamese
colleagues, who asked us to focus on Danang.
But I will get back to you with a fuller answer in writing.
Ms. Watson. That would be good.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Diane E. Watson
With the support of funds approved by Congress in FY 2007 and FY
2009, we are working collaboratively with the Government of Vietnam to
address the environmental and health issues related to dioxin in
Vietnam. The $3 million included in the FY 2007 supplemental
appropriations bill for ``environmental remediation and health
activities'' at ``hot spots'' in Vietnam is central to our efforts. Out
of the initial $3 million, $1 million was expended for health projects.
In September 2008, after consulting with the Government of Vietnam,
USAID entered into three-year cooperative agreements with Save the
Children, East Meets West Foundation, and Vietnam Assistance for the
Handicapped for health programs for people with disabilities in the
Danang area. Under these agreements, the three organizations provide
health and rehabilitation services and livelihood development support.
We have already seen concrete results as our implementing partners have
already provided valuable services to the disabled community in Danang.
Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped sponsored training for 22
medical professionals in Danang by U.S.-based physicians and provided
rehabilitation services to 66 disabled people, including nine
corrective surgeries. The organization East Meets West Foundation
conducted a baseline needs assessment for the disabled population of
the greater Danang area and provided medical screening for more than
3,000 people. Save the Children sponsored the first job fair in Danang
to include people with disabilities. Of the 72 disabled participants,
20 received immediate offers of employment.
In addition to the health projects, we also utilized a total of
$550,000 for staffing to implement the Dioxin/Agent Orange program
through FY 2010, invitational travel to Vietnam for U.S. experts in
dioxin remediation, and support costs. The remaining $1.45 million has
been budgeted for environmental containment and remediation activities.
Our Embassy in Hanoi is leading a coordinated effort with the
Government of Vietnam to develop an environmental remediation program
for the dioxin hotspot at the Danang Airport. With support from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and building upon important Ford
Foundation initiatives, USAID has worked in close coordination with the
Government of Vietnam and other donors to design and implement a
comprehensive remediation program.
Also, an additional $3 million in FY 2009 funding is available for
Agent Orange/dioxin activities in Vietnam. We plan to use approximately
$1 million of the funding for environmental health activities with the
remaining $2 million devoted to environmental remediation.
Regarding ``hot spots,'' in June 2006 the U.S.-Vietnam Joint
Advisory Committee, a bilateral forum for high-level scientific
dialogue, identified three priority ``hotspots'' or former U.S. bases
where Agent Orange was loaded, stored, and transferred: Danang, Bien
Hoa, and Phu Cat. We have focused our efforts on the Danang
``hotspot,'' as the Government of Vietnam has requested assistance from
the United States there.
On the effects of dioxin, the environmental effects that are well-
established include defoliation and a host of adverse effects on a wide
range of fish, birds, and mammals due to the contaminants. However,
scientific research to date in Vietnam has not been comprehensive
enough to draw accurate conclusions about environmental consequences of
dioxin contamination.
Few independent scientific studies have been conducted in Vietnam
to assess the possible health effects of dioxin on the local
population. The lack of validated scientific data and critical
scientific review make it impossible to estimate accurately the number
of actual or potentially-affected people or the extent of related
health effects.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And, without objection, your statement,
and the statement also of Ambassador Xuan, will be made a part
of the record.
And, again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming here this
afternoon.
Mr. Marciel. Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Our next panel of witnesses, if we could
have our friends here: Mr. Charles Bailey; Mr. Vo Quy; Ms. Mary
Dolan-Hogrefe; and Mr. Rick Weidman.
Mr. Charles Bailey has worked in Africa and Asia as a Ford
Foundation grant-maker for over 30 years. In 1997, he moved to
Hanoi, where he worked as a Ford Foundation representative for
Vietnam and Thailand until 2 years ago. In his 10 years heading
the office in Vietnam, the Ford Foundation approved some $90
million in grants in the fields of economic development, arts
and culture, higher education, and international relations.
In 1998, he began exploring ways to address the Agent
Orange/dioxin legacy of the Vietnam War. Since October 2007,
Mr. Bailey has continued his work as the director of the Ford
Foundation Special Initiative on Agent Orange/Dioxin based in
New York City.
As a graduate of Swarthmore College, he joined the Peace
Corps and went to Nepal. He currently holds a master's degree
in public policy from the Woodrow Wilson School and a doctorate
from Cornell University.
Dr. Vo Quy holds a doctorate degree from the State
University of Moscow and a bachelor's from the University of
Vietnam. He is a teacher at the university level. I have such
an extensive resume of Professor Quy, and I really, really
appreciate, again, his coming all the way from Vietnam to join
us this afternoon.
Professor Quy conducted several research projects involving
the investigations of the fauna and the flora of northern
Vietnam. He conducted research on the long-term effects of
herbicides used during the war on the environment and on living
resources in South Vietnam as well.
Chairman of various organizations and committees dealing
with environmental issues, he has written 16 books and more
than 100 papers on ornithology, sustainable use of natural
resources, conservation of nature and wildlife, conservation of
the environment, biodiversity and sustainable development. This
gentleman comes well-prepared all the way from Vietnam to help
us this afternoon.
Ms. Mary Dolan-Hogrefe joined the National Organization on
Disability in 1995 and served as vice president and senior
advisor to the National Organization on Disability. Since 1995,
she has been in charge of the National Organization of
Disability's highly regarded survey research program executed
by the Harris Poll.
Mary served in various capacities--so many, my gosh. She
also served as a staff member for Congressman Norman Lent. Two
years ago, Mary was named to the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on
Agent Orange/Dioxin convened by the Ford Foundation and has
visited Vietnam several times.
She holds a master's degree in international relations from
the University of Denver and a bachelor's from American
University.
Richard Weidman serves as executive director for policy and
government affairs on the national staff of Vietnam Veterans of
America. As such, he is the primary spokesman for Vietnam
Veterans of America here in Washington, DC. And as a veteran
himself, he was a medical corpsman during the Vietnam War, with
service in Company C, 23rd Medical Group, AMERICAL division, in
I Corps in 1969.
I was in II Corps, Mr. Weidman. Cheers.
Mr. Weidman also served as a consultant on legislative
affairs to the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans. Mr.
Weidman is a graduate of Colgate University and did graduate
study at the University of Vermont.
Lady and gentlemen, thank you so much for being with us.
Mr. Bailey, could you start us off?
STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES BAILEY, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INITIATIVE
ON AGENT ORANGE/DIOXIN, FORD FOUNDATION
Mr. Bailey. Chairman Faleomavaega and members of the
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment,
thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you
today. I am Charles Bailey, director of the Special Initiative
on Agent Orange/Dioxin at the Ford Foundation.
The Ford Foundation is an independent, nonprofit,
nongovernmental organization. And since 2000, the Foundation
has contributed $9.4 million to begin to address the sensitive
international and humanitarian issues of the Agent Orange/
dioxin legacy, the subject of today's hearing. This issue
touches many lives, not only Vietnamese but American Vietnam
veterans and their families, as well.
This is a challenging topic, but there is promising news.
These problems can now be addressed. Diverse initiatives and
efforts have contributed to a new spirit of cooperation between
the United States and Vietnam.
The Ford Foundation has taken a leadership role in the
philanthropic community on the impact of dioxin on post-war
Vietnam. We are seeking to increase awareness and resources
around a humanitarian agenda. Our role as a neutral convener,
broker, and grant-maker has produced several immediate results.
First, Vietnamese agencies and their partners are
delivering enhanced services in health, education, and
employment to children and young adults with disabilities,
particularly disabilities linked to exposure to dioxin.
Second, the threat to public health has been sharply
reduced in neighborhoods near the airport in Danang. And health
authorities in Bien Hoa have educated citizens on simple
measures to ensure food safety.
Third, rural development officials have devised ways to
reforest mountains denuded by Agent Orange, with help from
Vietnam National University-Hanoi.
Fourth, three Vietnamese who completed master's in social
work in the United States are back in Vietnam strengthening the
services local NGOs provide to groups of young adults with
disabilities.
Fifth, on May 18th, the Government of Vietnam launched a 3-
year, $6.75 million project to create Southeast Asia's first
high-resolution dioxin testing laboratory. The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation and the Atlantic Philanthropies are providing
$5.4 million toward the project. The Ford Foundation brokered
the initial discussions.
And six, we have funded or otherwise contributed to the set
of key studies referenced in my written statement.
In 2007, the US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/
Dioxin was established with funds from the Ford Foundation.
This group brings together policy analysts, scientists,
business leaders, and others from both countries to rally
support around five priorities listed in my statement.
The Ford Foundation is also working with both governments
on dioxin remediation at Danang Airport. This began with
measurement of dioxin levels and construction of interim
containment measures. The U.S. EPA and agencies of Vietnam's
Government last week began field-testing a promising
bioremediation technology developed by the Vietnamese.
Foundation support for these measures at the Danang Airport
totals $1.4 million.
A problem that was too sensitive to broach is now the focus
of multiple and diverse donors; nevertheless, much more needs
to be done. Despite progress relative to the pre-2006 period,
donor funding commitments remain short-term and fragile.
Mr. Chairman, environmental remediation has proved to be
the most feasible starting point for the two governments to
work together on the legacy of Agent Orange. I am pleased to
report that by the end of this year we will have enough
information in hand to be able to proceed to destroy the dioxin
at Danang. The cost estimates to remediate Danang and the other
two major hotspots at Bien Hoa and Phu Cat are expected to be
approximately $50 million to $60 million.
On the health side, however, the issue is rather more
complex. The solutions here will require a longer-term vision
and an even stronger partnership between the United States and
Vietnam. We will need to engage larger numbers of Americans to
resolve this issue. And it will require involving younger
generations of Americans and Vietnamese, who will build on
recent successes, to devise and carry out solutions that will
be required.
The funds which the U.S. Government has allocated so far
are an important beginning. We have an opportunity now to
create a path for a longer-term strategy with multiyear funding
to support it. NGOs and a wide variety of donors were able to
create momentum, but now the scale and the scope of the
revealed needs are such that only governments can address them
comprehensively. The main task--reaching every citizen in need
and sustaining programs over time--will require the reach and
the scale of government.
We have the chance now to shorten the long human shadows of
war and address the needs of both American and Vietnamese
families and communities. Thank you for your interest in our
work on this issue.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bailey
follows:]Charles Bailey deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Bailey.
Professor Quy?
STATEMENT OF MR. VO QUY, PROFESSOR, CENTRE FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES (CRES), VIETNAM NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY, HANOI, VIETNAM (MEMBER, US-VIETNAM GROUP ON AGENT
ORANGE/DIOXIN)
Mr. Quy. Mr. Chairman, Congress Members, ladies and
gentlemen, first of all, I would like to express my sincere
thanks to Chairman Faleomavega and the subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify before you on the impact of Agent
Orange/dioxin on the environment in Vietnam.
The military attacks on the environment by using the toxic
chemicals resulted not only in serious health effects, but had
an immediate and long-term impact on the soil, nutrient
balance, hydrological regimes, plants, animals, and perhaps
even the climate of Vietnam and the region.
Nearly four decades later, many of the affected ecosystems
have not recovered. The long-term consequences include loss of
ecosystems and biological diversity, economic stagnation,
severe constraints on human development, poverty, malnutrition,
disease, and other socioeconomic problems.
More than 2 million hectares of forest were destroyed by
herbicides during the war, including 150,000 hectares of
mangroves, 130,000 hectares of Melaleuca Forest in the Mekong
Delta, and many hundreds of thousands of hectares of inland
dense jungle.
The U.S. toxic chemicals have changed the ecological system
on a large area, leading to serious degradation, turning an
abundant ecological system into a degraded and ragged one, and,
finally, seriously affecting human beings.
The destruction of forests by toxic chemicals badly
affected 28 river basins in the center of Vietnam. Over the
past years, floods have destroyed these river basins, leading
to great human and material losses.
Some 366 kilograms of dioxin were sprayed over the
landscape. Even today, the concentration of dioxin is still at
a very high level in the soil of most extensively affected
areas. Studies in some hotspots, such as A So area and the
Danang and Bien Hoa Airbase, show that dioxin contamination
continue to contaminate people living in these areas.
We can say that war does not end when the bombs have
stopped falling and the fighting has finished. Its devastating
aftermath continues long after on the land and in the minds and
bodies of people.
The rehabilitation of forests destroyed by toxic chemicals
is an urgent and difficult task and a costly and resource-
consuming process. By doing so, we hope to re-establish the
ecological balance in Vietnam to preserve its biodiversity, to
do our part in delaying global warming, and, most importantly,
to reduce the hard and miserable life that inhabitants of the
area have been suffering.
To grow one or two trees is very easy, but to plant
thousands of hectares of forests is not simple, especially
given the fact that the soil has become far less fertile.
Nowadays, we have made some effort to re-green Agent Orange/
dioxin-ravaged areas, but much more remains to be done, and our
resources are very limited.
In conclusion, we can say that alteration of the Earth's
ecosphere is part of an ongoing process that is increasingly
influenced by human activities, of which warfare is among the
most destructive. However, the chemical war conducted by the
United States in the south of Vietnam has been the worst yet of
all of its kind. And its impact on the environment and human
beings is unprecedented in the history of humankind. Its tragic
consequences persist even today and will continue for
generations to come. And the poor, who depend most directly on
natural resources, suffer the most from it.
Restoration of the war-ravaged environment is a matter of
particular urgency, and dioxin-contaminated hotspots need to be
cleaned up urgently. The Government and the people of Vietnam
have undertaken a number of activities to overcome the
consequences of Agent Orange. However, the efforts made can
only meet a part of the huge and complicated demands raised by
the toxic chemical dioxin-related consequences in Vietnam.
In recent years, U.S. Government and some NGOs from the
United States have supported Vietnam in research and in
overcoming the consequences of Agent Orange/dioxin. We highly
appreciate this willingness and activities.
I hope that this hearing on the Agent Orange issue convened
by the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Global
Environment will provide the U.S. Congress and the United
States public with a better understanding of the severity of
damage of the toxic chemical used by the U.S. Army during the
war in Vietnam on the environment and the entire Vietnamese
people, and call upon their responsibility and humanity to help
the Vietnamese people to recover the scar of this tragedy in
order to drive away the ``last ghost of war'' within our two
countries, the United States and Vietnam. Some good seeds have
been sown and are growing well, but a huge garden is waiting
for our further work.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before
all of you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Quy follows:]Vo
Quy deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Dr. Quy.
Our next witness, Ms. Mary Dolan-Hogrefe.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARY DOLAN-HOGREFE, VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR
ADVISER, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY (MEMBER, US-
VIETNAM DIALOGUE GROUP ON AGENT ORANGE/DIOXIN AND ALSO DIRECTOR
OF THE WORLD COMMITTEE ON DISABILITY)
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Congresswoman Watson. I am Mary Eileen Dolan-Hogrefe, and I
serve as vice president and senior advisor of the National
Organization on Disability, a nongovernmental disability
organization founded in 1982. I would like to thank you for the
invitation to testify at this important and timely hearing.
And, Mr. Chairman, I ask for my full statement to be
entered in the record.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Without objection, all of your statements
will be made part of the record.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Thank you kindly.
In December 2007, I was named a member of the US-Vietnam
Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/Dioxin. The level of commitment
on environmental and landscape issues has been notable: The
dioxin at Danang Airbase is being contained and other hotspots
identified. Funding is committed for a $15 million science lab
to test soil for toxins. This all bodes well for cleaning up
the environment.
I applaud this focus of resources, yet as the disability
person of the U.S. side of the Dialogue Group, I would like to
see an increase in attention and commitment to disability
issues from funders and the U.S. Government.
There are several worthwhile projects on the ground in
Vietnam that are helping to improve the human condition. I
would like to highlight some areas where improvements are
urgently needed, and to further ensure the sustainability of
these programs that are under development.
Number one, on-the-ground assessment and limits of
community-based rehabilitation. There is no nationwide
application of universal disability assessment standards, and
there is a desperate lack of expertise in early detection and
intervention for infants and toddlers with disabilities. The
efforts now are largely implemented by people with limited to
no specialized training. As for medically assessing disability,
this is usually done by someone without sufficient training.
This risks failure to identify nonapparent disabilities, as
well as increases the chances of miscategorization of
disabilities.
The other concern is the implementation of therapy plans
using the community-based rehabilitation model, CBR. CBR can be
appropriate and, when applied accurately, has many positive
effects. However, for CBR to be effective, sufficient training
must be conducted with sufficient supervision.
Number two, need for capacity building for people with
disabilities and their organizations. The mantra in the
disability community around the world is ``nothing about us
without us.'' This needs to be the case in Vietnam, and I
encourage the direction of resources toward empowering people
with disabilities in growing their own organizations. The U.S.
can contribute much here from our own disability community. We
should also empower the Vietnamese community by providing
technical assistance in disability data collection and survey
research.
Opportunities for economic self-sufficiency need be to
improved and updated, such as vocational training. American
businesses that invest in Vietnam and employ Vietnamese should
follow the Americans with Disabilities Act when it comes to
employment and accommodations.
And finally, number three, there is a great need for
professional knowledge exchange and capacity building for the
medical and rehabilitation communities. Vietnam needs a
comprehensive and coordinated approach for growing expertise in
these fields, and the United States can provide much
assistance.
While it is true that the United States has been and
continues to be a large humanitarian contributor to Vietnam,
contributions from the U.S. need to be framed within the
context of a greater moral responsibility and not just
technical assistance and foreign aid.
The U.S. and Vietnam are forever intertwined as a result of
the war. The fates of American and Vietnamese veterans are also
intertwined as a result of Agent Orange. We cannot and should
not ignore this important historic nexus in which this
disability crisis is playing out in Vietnam, nor should we
ignore the continuing effects from Agent Orange on our U.S.
veterans and their families.
I was a primary contributor to a paper just published by
the National Organization on Disability titled, ``U.S. Vietnam
Veterans and Agent Orange: Understanding the Impact 40 Years
Later.'' And I ask for the NOD paper to be part of the record,
as well.**appendix**
[The information referred to follows:]
******** COMMITTEE INSERT ******** deg.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. deg.This paper calls for the
following action steps in the United States: Provide outreach
to all affected veterans and their families, health
practitioners and disability-related service agencies; make
available medical care for affected children and grandchildren;
have a fresh approach to research, including a scientific
consensus on unanswered questions related to Agent Orange; use
of existing data for further research, particularly from the
Ranch Hand study and the industrial worker data collected by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health;
expansion of the Agent Orange Registry into a complete database
of affected veterans and their offspring; coordination of data
across the whole spectrum of veteran services; and, finally,
provide direct services to veterans and their families in their
communities.
In closing, I wish to thank you again, Mr. Chairman and the
committee, for its attention to this issue. I thank my fellow
members of the Dialogue Group for their partnership and
leadership, and for the Ford Foundation for convening the
Dialogue Group and for its commitment to this issue.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe
follows:]Mary Dolan-Hogrefe deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Chairman, apparently we have a vote on the
floor. What are your intentions in terms of the committee?
Mr. Faleomavaega. I do intend to continue, but we both have
to go vote on the floor.
And I just would apologize for the inconvenience of the
realities. But I believe--Mr. Weidman, can you just reserve
your testimony? Because we are just going to go vote and be
right back. We will just have a little recess for 15 minutes,
and we will be right back.
[Recess.]
Mr. Faleomavaega. I truly apologize to the panel. I wish
there could have been a better way of conducting votes in the
House, but this is how it has been ever since before I showed
up. So thank you very much for your patience.
I think we have saved the last one for the best.
Mr. Weidman, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. RICK WEIDMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR POLICY &
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA (VVA)
Mr. Weidman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am not
sure that I am the best on this panel. This is a very
distinguished panel, and the three predecessors to me on this
panel are extraordinary.
First, I want to, if I may, sir, pay due respect to the
National Organization for Disability for all their great work,
and particularly to Mary Dolan for her extraordinary work on
the report that was released on June 1st, earlier this week, as
being an extraordinary----
Mr. Faleomavaega. And, without objection, I am sure, that
report will be made part of the record.
Mr. Weidman. That is great. It is really a fine piece of
work, sir, and will stand American veterans in good stead.
I want to touch on a couple of things. One is, in terms of
this hearing, you asked, was enough being done on the American
side? And the answer to that is still no, the same as it was 13
months ago.
At that time, there were no studies funded by NIH, by VA,
by Department of Defense, by EPA, or by ARC, or anyone looking
into the long-term health care deleterious effects of Agent
Orange and other toxic substances utilized in Vietnam during
the American war there, and today there are still none.
We have great hope with the new administration. We have
talked with Secretary Shinseki already, as well as to the White
House, about the need for restarting things. And as soon as
Secretary Shinseki is able to put in place new leadership
within the Veterans Health Administration, and particularly
within the research and development section of the Veterans
Health Administration, we believe we will start to get some
movement and start to get some additional research.
Similarly, there has been a great deal of progress within
the past 13 months in talking with the leadership of the House,
particularly with Chairman Bob Filner of the House Veterans'
Affairs Committee, in regard to Agent Orange legislation. We
have some legislation now introduced. And it is just the first
in a series of things that we believe will be able to move
forward.
Most hopefully, Speaker Pelosi publicly committed to the
veterans organizations and military service organizations at a
meeting we had this spring to have substantive, significant
action on Agent Orange during the course of the 111th, not
necessarily this session but before the 111th ends next year.
And she has always kept her promises to America's veterans, and
we trust she will keep this one as well.
At that time, we also talked about the crying need for
additional research and education of veterans. And since that
time, we have issued a new self-help guide on Agent Orange that
is available on the Web. And there are copies provided so that
you can share one with the offices of each of your
distinguished colleagues. But it is also available by going to
the VVA Web site, vva.org.
In addition to that, we have teamed with the private
sector, with medical societies and disease organizations such
as the American Diabetes Association, the National Men's Health
Network, Easter Seals, and others, to form the Veterans Health
Council. This is the little brochure.
And we created a new Web site called
www.veteranshealth.org. And when you go on that, you click on
your service ribbon from your generation. So you and I from
Vietnam would click on the Vietnam Service Medal. The Gulf War
I vets would click on the Gulf War I Service Medal, and
similarly for the global war on terror folks. And it is part of
the effort to educate American clinicians, but it is still very
small and not terribly well-funded.
Last, but by no means least, is you asked the question, is
enough being done in Vietnam? This gets to be complicated for a
veteran service organization because our job is predominantly
to advocate for American veterans, for our members and those
eligible to be our members, and their families.
In regard to birth defects, there is no registry. And that
is one of the reasons why Ms. Dolan's report is going to be so
useful, is it is not just us saying it, it is an
internationally respected institution coming out and saying, we
need this birth defects registry and we need a real registry to
track the health of Vietnam veterans themselves, in addition to
their progeny.
But in regard to Vietnam, I can answer personally. I was
raised to believe in my family that stewardship was a big deal,
that you leave things better than you found it. I was a Boy
Scout all the way up and took a lot of ribbing because even
when I was a senior in high school in New York City I still was
a Boy Scout, mostly because I could get out of the city
cheaply, and that was the only way I could afford it. But I
was. And I was always taught, and took it as something I have
always tried to live to all my life, you always leave the area
better than you found it, at least as good or better than you
found it.
And we did not do that when we went into Vietnam and fought
our war there. It is unfinished business. We need to go back
and police up our campsite. And whatever it takes in order to
restore that, it is--and, once again, I am speaking personally
because my organization does not have a stake in this--we need
to do something about it. It is a moral imperative, as you put
it so eloquently.
We also believe and have evidence--and today is not the
time to bring that forth, but we would be happy to work with
you, as well as with the House Veterans' Affairs Committee
staff, Mr. Faleomavaega, is we believe that the U.S. Government
knew going in about many of the harmful effects of the
herbicides. And whether that will make any difference or not,
what we do know is that that is the case. And it will have
implications both for our counterparts in Vietnam as well as
for American veterans and their children, grandchildren, and
great-grandchildren.
I will be happy to answer any questions, sir. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weidman
follows:]Rick Weidman deg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Weidman, for your eloquent
statement, and thank you for your observations. You are
absolutely correct. Even though the focus is on what we can do
to help Vietnam, just as serious are the implications in terms
of what our country is doing about our own veterans and their
needs and for those who fought during the war.
Mr. Bailey, thank you very much for a most incisive
statement. And I cannot thank enough not only the Ford
Foundation but the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for all of
the assistance they have given.
I noted with interest in your statement that, for the first
time, the Government of Vietnam has set up an analytical
laboratory to detect dioxin. This is what I was trying to
figure out, whether we had the technology or did the Vietnamese
Government have the technology? Which is the better of the two,
anyway? And it so happens that this was developed by the
Vietnamese Government, did you say?
Mr. Bailey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are two things here. The analytical laboratory is
required to be able to test down to one part per quadrillion,
because dioxin can mess up human systems at one part per
trillion, so you need to be able to measure below that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, let me ask you--I don't mean to
interrupt you, but it is just basically, as you said, one part
per quadrillion. I am just curious, was it really necessary to
have the dioxin as part of a compound in Agent Orange to
conduct the operations that we did in Vietnam?
I like to think if it was a pesticide or herbicide, to
destroy the environment, then it would not have a serious
impact on humans. I just wanted to pursue that a little further
with you.
Is it your understanding that this was done purposefully or
was it by accident? Because there is a certain mixture of this
thing that comes out, in and of itself. I was just curious.
Mr. Bailey. Sir, I am not a scientist, and my reading of
the history of this is that these herbicides were commonly used
in American agriculture during the 1950s, but in small amounts,
on individual farms. And I regard it as a kind of scaling-up
problem. When you go from small amounts carefully used by
people whose land it is to a large military force using it at
the landscape level, bad things can happen.
And everything I have read suggests that it was a
manufacturing defect and consequence of running production
processes too fast in order to generate the large volumes that
were being required.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The question I raised about this is the
fact that it was for a 10-year period, that somewhere or
somehow--it seemed to take a while for the Department of
Defense and those chemical companies involved to discover that
there is dioxin in this mix.
Did we really need it to accomplish the mission, which was
basically just to conduct deforestation operations and not any
more than what it--as a result of what we now see, that maybe
the amount was a lot more than what, as you said, was needed to
use as a pesticide or herbicide?
And I was just curious, from your readings and
understanding, why was it that we had to put that much dioxin
in the mix? That is my question.
And to be fair with you, I know you are not a scientist.
Maybe Professor Quy might help us along those lines.
But you say that in the current usage of herbicides and
pesticides throughout our own country, there is a very small
amount of dioxin contained.
Mr. Bailey. No. What I was trying to say, Mr. Chairman, was
that under normal farm conditions in the 1950s, these were
strictly herbicides, for cleaning weeds out of irrigation
ditches, for example. But when they started to be produced in
much larger volumes, the manufacturers got sloppy and produced
this other compound, dioxin, along with the herbicides.
The dioxin, to my knowledge, has no effect as a herbicide
itself. It is not required as part of the herbicide action.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Maybe Professor Quy could help us out on
that.
Mr. Quy. The U.S. Army used the herbicide the same like
using it in the agriculture, but the more potent--the
concentration of this is different from the agriculture. In
Vietnam, they used the concentration of the herbicide Agent
Orange 10 to 25, something more than the level of the
concentration. And that is why they are very toxic.
I can tell you that one kind of compound using normal in
the family like sugar. If you eat every day one part of sugar,
it is normal. But a human cannot eat in 1 day 10 times or 20
times of sugar. If you eat the same sugar with a high level
like this, the sugar will kill the human.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Quy, is there a lifetime for
the dioxin once it is exposed to the air or to the soil or to
the trees? Does it disappear over time? You know, like,
plutonium is 10,000 years. So is dioxin----
Mr. Quy. Yeah. About 366 kilogram of the dioxin in the
Agent Orange that was sprayed in the south of Vietnam. But the
dioxin is very toxic, a very small part, 1 million parts a gram
can affect the health of the human.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And one of the reasons for the dangers of
dioxin is that it becomes part of your genetic makeup; is this
the problem? In other words, if I had consumed, or whatever it
is, into my body, that means my children are genetically
affected by it just simply because of the poison, or the toxin,
if you will.
What I am curious about, in your scientific understanding
of this poison, how long does it last? It sounds like it is
generational. It could go on for three or four generations.
What is your understanding of this?
Mr. Quy. We don't know exactly this will exist in the human
being how long. Now, in Vietnam, this is the third generation
affected by the herbicide, maybe in the gene of the human. But
not all of the human contaminated by dioxin can affect the
gene. If the dioxin affected the gene of all people
contaminated by Agent Orange in Vietnam, there may be millions,
billions of children affected by the herbicide, by the dioxin.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Weidman, to your knowledge--and I
know you have been following this very well for all these
years--have there been incidents or, actually, the same
situation, that our soldiers who were exposed to dioxin, that
it has generated this genetic defects among the soldiers'
children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren? Have there
been cases where it has been verified----
Mr. Weidman. There are cases----
Mr. Faleomavaega [continuing]. That dioxin was the cause of
this defective malady in children, especially for men and women
in the military?
Mr. Weidman. I understand what you are----
Mr. Faleomavaega. See, I keep getting the response from our
friends in the administration that there has been no scientific
evidence sufficient to prove that there is a connection between
dioxin and the health conditions of our soldiers, so,
therefore, it could be anything.
And that just kind of bugs me a little bit when they keep
evading. The question is very simple: Did it or did it not
affect genetically, physically, in every way, those of our
soldiers who were exposed to it?
Mr. Weidman. If I may take a stab at that--I am not a
scientist either, and so I beg off scientific expertise. But we
have learned more than the average bear, as they say, about
this over the years.
First of all, it does diminish over time, but many places
in Vietnam--as an example, the Tibet Special Forces camp,
almost 40 years later, 35 years later, tested at 1,000 parts
per billion. And we know that there is no known lower threshold
of--nobody knows what threshold you need, but people speculate
that it is somewhere around 10 or 12 parts per billion that
causes abnormalities.
We know that dioxin, when it passes through the body, does
its damage by changing the DNA in the cells, but it damages it
in different ways. So it may be different in my DNA than it
would be in your DNA, but there are certain birth defects that
are recognized as being associated with exposure to something
in Vietnam. And that is why we have a list of I think it is 17
things that are associated for women in Vietnam with birth
defects, even though only spina bifida is service-connected for
the children of male Vietnam vets.
Incidentally, the evidence was no stronger for the women
than the men. And that is what causes a lot of people to be
suspect about when the government says there is no proof or no
scientific evidence. Scientific proof and scientific evidence
are two different things. They don't know what causes lung
cancer; otherwise, we would have a cure for lung cancer. But
every single study shows the association of smoking with lung
cancer to the point where nobody doubts it anymore.
But zillions of studies have been done. But if you don't
look for these associations, you ain't going to find them. Dow
Chemical is not going to fund these studies of my grandchildren
or my great-grandchildren. It has to be the U.S. Government,
because ain't nobody else going to do it. And the government
has not been funding these studies. If you don't look, you are
not going to find. It is another variation of ``don't ask,
don't tell'' policy.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And it is also like, if you ask the wrong
questions, you get the wrong answers.
Mr. Weidman. Well, that is absolutely correct. And that is
why we are so upset with the lack of research into the long-
term effects of Agent Orange.
And, you know, it may be the dioxin, it may be something
else in Agent Orange itself, it may be something in the
arsenic, it may be something in the organic phosphates and the
pesticides that we used in Vietnam, and it may be a synergistic
impact of all of those. But what we know is that there are
certain conditions that those of us who served in Vietnam
versus those who served in military elsewhere, we have certain
conditions in a much higher proportion. We believe the same is
true of the individuals who live in Vietnam, the Vietnamese,
who were in the south during the war and have now gone back
north, that it is higher also. But that is why we need the
epidemiological evidence.
But, at some point, the government is being disingenuous
when it tries to say that you have to find causality, Mr.
Chairman. That is baloney. All you have to do is find
association and move forward.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Weidman.
Ms. Dolan, did you wish to comment? You look anxious.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. I am a bad poker player; I look anxious.
Yes, I would, actually, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity.
I wanted to draw to your attention that samples from the
Ranch Hand studies are now with the Institute of Medicine. They
do not have a mandate to do anything with those samples other
than to just keep them safe. And that mandate is for a 2-year
period of time, which I think terminates in just a little bit
over a year.
I have been advised that those samples include information
on 8,100 live births to those who were the Ranch Hand
individuals, to Ranch Hand parents. And they are tremendously
valuable, and they constitute the only body of epidemiological
information gathered consistently over time on a group known to
be of high risk. I would love to have a research entity have
access to those live births data. And it has been advised that
one might find something interesting there.
I would also encourage a few other things to be looked at.
One is a report done out of the Yale School of Nursing which
reviewed some of the analysis on Ranch Hand, looked at it in a
different way than some other researchers had, and found the
group of individuals from Ranch Hand to be a ``vulnerable
group'' in terms of having children with birth defects.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you describe, Ms. Dolan, when you
said ``Ranch Hand,'' for the record?
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Sure.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Because I thought maybe you were working
on a ranch with cowboys and Indians or something. I am not
clear on that.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Absolutely, sure. The Ranch Hand was
the--and, actually, I should have Rick answer; he could do it
even better than I can--but is a term that was used to--the
shorthand term used for the gentlemen who were spraying in
Vietnam.
Mr. Weidman. It was the code name for the mission of
spraying herbicides in the Air Force unit that had that task.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Thank you.
And, if I may, just one more quick reference is that a
study is coming out this year out of I believe it is New
Zealand that is an epidemiological study of their veterans who
served in Vietnam who also were exposed. And the Institute of
Medicine is awaiting those results and is hoping to find great
use from that, as well.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What about the soldiers, some 50,000
soldiers from South Korea who also served in Vietnam? Mr.
Weidman, have you heard of anything from any studies or any
concerns coming out of that?
Mr. Weidman. There have been some studies in Korea but not
nearly as many as have been done in New Zealand and in
Australia.
Incidentally, virtually all the science on dioxin is done
elsewhere other than the United States. There are 97 countries
that are interested in the question of dioxin minimum and the
after-effects of the health care, and virtually none of those
studies are done in the U.S.
Mr. Faleomavaega. By the way, it is my intention for the
subcommittee to work very closely with the Veterans Committee,
the Armed Services Committee, and hopefully we are going to
find something to get into this.
I just want to share with the members of the panel the
official position of the United States pertaining to the
subject matter, and I want to share this with you:
``The consistent position of the United States has
been that the U.S. military use of herbicides in
Vietnam was consistent with international law. In the
view of the United States, any categorical ban on the
use of poisons under international law is limited to
weapons used for the primary and intended effect of
causing injury or defoliating military bases,
transportation corridors, and other crucial territory,
and destroying enemy crops. Therefore, it did not
contravene the ban on poisons.''
There have been a number of U.S. court decisions, including
the recent Second Circuit decision in the case of Vietnam
Association for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical
Company, 517 F.3d. 104. Apparently, the result of this Federal
case that was taken by our veterans association came out in
favor of Dow Chemical.
But I wanted to ask you, when they say here ``international
law,'' and you mentioned that 97 countries know more about
dioxin than our own country, which produced it and used it for
some 10 years in Vietnam, I am a little puzzled by this.
Mr. Weidman. We can't judge the whole United States by
Judge Weinstein's decisions. And because this is on the record,
but privately I will air my thoughts on that. And let's just
say that we think that Judge Weinstein's decisions are neither
lucid in regard to the facts that are existing today in 2009,
that he is operating at least on facts that are 15 years old
about what is known, and in matters of law, it strips the
government of any accountability for exposing anyone, including
our own service members, to things that they knew were harmful
by his decision.
The question of funding of science, though, that would look
into the long-term effects of the herbicides, and particularly
the dioxin, is something that is important not just to
veterans, but there are dioxins all over this country that are
used in industrial byproducts, whether it is from waste
management--all kinds of things.
The fact that there isn't any major studies looking not
only not at Vietnam vets but at the impact of dioxin says
something about the petrochemical industry and what a grip it
has on national policy that we need to move beyond in order to
have--everybody is talking about green industry. Well, let's
concentrate on something that is anti-green, and that is
dioxin, and where it is it deg.within our own
environment in the United States, as well as how does
deg.it impacts U.S. military folks as well as the people of
Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia who were exposed
to this in lugubrious amounts.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am getting the impression, as I shared
with you the position of our Government concerning this, that
our use of Agent Orange was in compliance with international
law.
My question is, given the amount of dioxin that we
purposefully used as part of the Agent Orange compound to
conduct deforestation operations and what we have done, my
question to you is, does that sound like we violated
international law to that extent? This is not just a mere
herbicide or pesticide like we use for agriculture purposes. I
think we have done a lot more.
I wanted to ask Professor Quy, you had shared with us the
amount of acreage, or hectares, for that matter, especially in
South Vietnam and the impact of what has happened due to the
usage of Agent Orange.
And I wanted to ask you, what is the lifecycle? Are there
still areas in the country that are completely barren, without
any growth again of forests or trees? What is the situation now
in the soil itself if dioxin or the Agent Orange came in
contact with that? Where are we with that?
And I know that this is one of the specific areas that you
have studied quite well. Can you respond to that?
Mr. Quy. In our country, there are about 3.3 million
hectares of land affected by herbicides.
Mr. Faleomavaega. One hectare is, what, 540 square acres?
Mr. Quy. 3.3 million hectares of land, natural land, in our
country affected by herbicide. But the effect there is very
different.
First, I would like to tell you about the hotspots. We
found three hotspots: First in Danang Airport, a second in Bien
Hoa, and a third in Phu Cat. The concentration of dioxin in
these sites is very high, not only higher than 100 PPT but
sometimes a hundred times higher. And this area we have to
clean up as soon as possible.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How deep did you have to dig into the
soil to conduct your cleanup operations? Was it just on the
surface of the soil? Did you go down three feet deep? How did
you conduct your cleanup operation?
Mr. Quy. It differed from this place to the other place.
The most deep, about 30-something mega in the surface. But in
many place, the dioxin in the deep sometimes 1.5 mega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So you are saying that, especially in the
wetlands, where you do agricultural cultivation, the dioxin is
underneath the soil?
Mr. Quy. Yeah. And the other place, the place they sprayed
in Vietnam, until now, the residue of dioxin reduces every
year, year to year. But now we found that the contamination of
dioxin in this area lower than 11 can use agriculture and
forestry, but it exists in the land. Lower 1,000 PPT, that
means you can use this land for agriculture and forestry.
And we try to replant this area, but not easy. It takes
time, takes money and labor to do this. And the price to
replant one hectare in this area, 10 times higher as normal.
And that is why many places affected by herbicide and the
forest destroyed completely, but the people of this area, the
most very poor, the most people of this area are very poor. And
that is why in our country, our people, our Government is
trying to help them to replant this area.
But in the south of Vietnam, there are about 1 million
hectares denuded by herbicide. If we try to plant in the near
future half of this area, that means about 500,000 hectares.
Because in this area, the place that there are many people
living, and they are very poor. And we think that in this area,
we can use this area, but very, very--it takes a lot of time
and money to do this. I mean, it is costly.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would like to ask Mr. Bailey and Ms.
Dolan if, to their knowledge, has there ever been any
cooperative effort made between the Ford Foundation and our US-
Vietnam Dialogue Group with the National Institutes of Health?
There is a big reservoir of resources. Has there ever been any
analysis, study, projects or anything done under the auspices
of the National Institutes of Health to address this question
of dioxin?
Mr. Bailey. Mary has volunteered me to answer.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Both of you can answer it.
Mr. Bailey. Right.
That is a very good idea, Mr. Chairman.
There is, in addition to the Dialogue Group, a Joint
Advisory Committee, which is the technical binational committee
between the two governments. And in their meeting last
September, we understand that they decided to set up two task
forces, one for health, one for environment.
The health one has still to formulate its terms of
reference. And I am hopeful that this visit of the Dialogue
Group to the United States may further that goal, so at the
next meeting of the JAC in Hanoi in September there will be a
blueprint or at least a terms of reference, which wouldn't
necessarily reach out to American technical expertise, although
the relevant JAC members are actually in the CDC in Atlanta, in
the National Center for Environmental Health.
Mary?
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. I would just comment that what the
Institute of Medicine has been doing for a number of years now
is, it is a very valued process of reviewing the literature and
the science regarding Agent Orange. They are not doing science,
they are reviewing science. And that, again, is useful, but
what they are not able to do, of course, is to make any policy
changes that will benefit U.S. Vietnam veterans or Vietnam
veterans themselves in Vietnam.
And whenever there have been some movements regarding
adding additional conditions, I know on the U.S. side it has
been out of policies from Congress, not necessarily out of the
reviews of IOM.
So, thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. In times past, in your involvement
concerning Agent Orange/dioxin, have there ever been any
congressional mandates or directives toward the Department of
Defense or any of our agencies to follow up or to conduct any
comprehensive study dealing with Agent Orange and dioxin?
I get the strong impression that every time we try to get
answers, then our friends downtown--and this is not meant to be
negative or anything, but they just seem to evade the issue. It
is something like, ``Well, we don't want to deal with it.'' Or,
as you said, Ms. Dolan, are they doing the science or are they
just kind of casually talking about it but not really going
into the depths of how we really have been using this poison?
Mr. Weidman?
Mr. Weidman. Mr. Chairman, I think Ms. Dolan--correct me if
I am wrong, Mary--was talking about the processes set up under
the 1991 Agent Orange Act. The Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Sciences, their charge under that statute
is to review all science that has been published, is peer-
reviewed, studies within the preceding 2 years. And they have
done that generally very well.
But they can't review what doesn't exist. And because NIH
and the VA and DOD and ARC and Environmental Protection Agency,
on and on and on, don't fund these studies to study the long-
term health care effects of Agent Orange, of dioxin, of other
toxic materials, IOM can't review it. So they can't do their
job properly.
What IOM has said to us is that obviously they could use
more science. And I am talking about the independent scientists
who have served as chairs of those committees when they make
their biannual report. And it changes every 2 years. These are
people who give up their time to come and work on, frankly, a
thankless task. And we always make it a point to thank them,
because it doesn't help their career, necessarily, to deal with
this issue.
But the point is that we have asked them, what are you
lacking? And every one of them has said, we do need more
science in Vietnam, but what we are really missing is robust
epidemiological studies of Vietnam veterans and their families
and, by extension, robust epidemiological studies of others
exposed, such as the current Vietnamese population, including
babies born.
And the fact that that science is not being done once again
gets back to the ``don't ask, don't tell.'' If you don't look,
you don't find.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I appreciate that comment.
At the same time, I don't want to continue to have hearings
until the Second Coming. This is all part of establishing a
record. And I think you hit it right on the nail, Mr. Weidman.
If the Congress has the political will to provide substance, to
establish a comprehensive study, as you said, the science, by
going to Vietnam with a team established or funded by the
Congress with the help of our NGOs and foundations, a 2-year
period or whatever it takes to come up with--but are we
replicating things that have already been done, Ms. Dolan?
Do you think that right now, in and of itself, we have the
right data and information to say, ``Okay, we have it; now what
are you going to do about it?''
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that data
does exist. I do think it would be extremely fruitful to have
funding for studying those Ranch Hand biosamples that are
sitting there, not doing anything. That would be very useful.
But if we look back at the history of those who have been
able to tackle this issue in other ways or in other countries,
there is a great desire to continue that science. But let's
maybe also get past the science and recognize that there are
people suffering and there are people with disabilities, both
here in the United States and in Vietnam, who are suffering
now; and the more time we spend talking about the science and
the debating of science, the more time passes and the more
human potential is lost.
I would draw your attention to some of the challenging
surveys that have been put together in the past here in the
United States.
There was this report that was supposed to come out of the
Centers for Disease Control back in the '80s. There was a large
article about this in Time Magazine and the many obstacles that
were put before that survey and how it was to be a definitive
account for our Vietnam veterans and their families about their
exposure to Agent Orange and the effects. But numerous reports
have discussed manipulations of that survey data and why it
never revealed what it should have revealed.
Similarly, the Ranch Hand study, there has been controversy
about that since the beginning and whether the methodologies
that have been used to study the data were appropriate. Should
they have been changed along the way and why did it not reveal
the data that it should have? Former Senator Daschle was very
influential in getting some of that data released, and that is
what we are still dealing with now.
The final thing, I would just hope that we wouldn't only
worry about funding the science, despite my sincere interest to
find out what the 8,100 live births say in the biosamples, but
also to call on immediate attention to the human suffering and
disabilities. Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am very happy we are joined by our good
friend and my colleague from Louisiana, Mr. Cao, if he has any
questions.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was busy in a
deposition for the last couple of hours, but I would like to
address questions concerning the health care process.
If you know, presently in Vietnam, Professor Quy, what
specifically--what activities have been done in order to
address the many effects of Agent Orange for the people inside
of Vietnam by the Vietnamese Government? Do you know?
Mr. Quy. The human being?
Mr. Cao. I am sorry?
Mr. Quy. You like to talk about the effect of herbicide----
Mr. Cao. No, what has specifically been done by the
Vietnamese Government to help the Vietnamese people, those that
have been affected by Agent Orange inside Vietnam?
Mr. Quy. In our country, the government tried to help the
victim of the Agent Orange in our country. To now, the
government gave first the same, about 200,000 victims of Agent
Orange. And every year about $50 million for this for the
victim of Agent Orange in our country.
I tell you there are about 200,000 people that receive the
government support. There are some--I know exactly--about $50
million or $70 million per year--$50 million per year for
200,000 victims of Agent Orange.
Mr. Cao. Now, this is 15 million Vietnamese dong; is that
correct?
Mr. Quy. In dong. In dong.
Mr. Cao. Is this 50 million per or $50 million that have
been----
Mr. Quy. $50 million.
Mr. Cao. Okay.
Mr. Quy. Per year.
Mr. Weidman. Five zero.
Mr. Quy. Five zero million dollars per year.
Mr. Cao. To assist around 200,000 victims.
Mr. Quy. Yes, but the victims are higher.
Mr. Cao. Yes, because according to the CRS, there are about
3 million. So are there are any programs out there to assist
the other remaining 2.8 million victims of Agent Orange?
Mr. Quy. We tried to do this, but the fund is very limited
in our country now. And that is why we try and would like to
have support from outside.
Mr. Cao. Okay.
Mr. Quy. Including the U.S. Government and NGO
organizations, the United States and other countries as well.
Mr. Cao. Do you have any methods to remediate the soil that
has been contaminated by Agent Orange?
Mr. Quy. Now, in hotspot, we try to cover the hotspot. But
we organized a meeting, discussion with expert from outside,
including the U.S. expert, to discuss the technical help to
eliminate the dioxin in the hotspot.
Mr. Cao. Now, my question goes to the three members--the
other three members of the panel: Mr. Bailey, Ms.--is it
Hogrefe?
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Ms. Dolan is just fine. Thank you.
Mr. Cao [continuing]. And Mr. Weidman.
What do you think--what can the U.S. Government do to
further assist the Vietnamese Government in its problem in
addressing Agent Orange besides an increase in funding?
Mr. Bailey. I will go first, sir.
I think that we are seeing an increasing level of technical
collaboration, particularly in the environmental remediation at
Danang airport. By the end of this year, I think we will know a
great deal more about how much contaminated soil is there, to
what degree it is contaminated, what it will cost, and how it
might best be done. So I regard the environmental part as
coming more clearly into focus.
And in my earlier remarks I suggested that for all three
hotspots it might be on the order of $50-60 million to
remediate them to the standard set by the Government of
Vietnam. This is in cooperation with the Environmental
Protection Agency at a technical level that has been going on
for several years.
I think there are also further opportunities for technical
exchanges and other matters that would--in addition to simply a
transfer funds.
On the much larger issue of health, I would say that
matters are--in addition to what Professor Vo Quy said, the
continuing monthly income supports, that there are a number of
special programs still at the pilot level which are providing
lessons and which could be spread and scaled up toward building
a more modern, comprehensive social services system. And I
think there are many opportunities here for joint
collaboration, to which I think Mary can speak.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. Yes, to echo what Charles just said, I
would agree that in, addition to funding as a complement to it,
as part of it, which should be technical assistance in a
variety of different areas related to people with disabilities,
including advocacy and awareness for people with disabilities,
improving their systems of service delivery and case
management, training medical professionals and rehabilitation
professionals, education for people with disabilities, job
training, respite care, long-term care facilities. Any number
of issues that the United States has tremendous expertise in
that they can share as part of improving the human condition in
Vietnam.
You asked, Mr. Congressman, what can the U.S. Government do
to further assist Vietnam. I have heard, as a member of this
US-Vietnam Dialogue Group, a number of times from my
counterparts on the Vietnamese side the issue that Agent Orange
is an ongoing concern for them as part of the normalization of
relations between the United States and Vietnam. The chairman
read out the continued view of the United States, and I would
mention that this would be an issue of recasting some of our
sentences about what happened during the war, the use of Agent
Orange, in order to further move forward with our relationship
with the good people of Vietnam.
Thank you.
Mr. Weidman. You asked besides money. A lot of it has to do
with organizational capacity, Congressman; and some of that has
to do with money. There has been significant criticism by our
scientists of Vietnamese science, but a lot of that all
revolves around, as an example, whether you have access to a
mass gas spectrometer in order to measure things to the
specificity that you need when you are dealing with something
like dioxin.
So transfer of scientific, organizational, basic
infrastructure like mass gas spectrometers and other kinds of
basic things that we take for granted within the United States
to Vietnam would be of enormous assistance. That is not direct
cash, but that is both expertise and equipment.
And the Vietnamese certainly are, as you well know, sir,
smart industrious folks. If they have the resources and
technical assistance, their science will be every bit as good
as anybody else's in the world and come up to WHO standards.
The original plan that was in the Memorandum of Agreement
signed in March 2002 called for that. It called for that
exchange essentially of and furnishing the Vietnamese in
collaboration with them, not us telling them what they needed
but them telling us what they needed so we would know what to
give them to be able to have that organizational infrastructure
to do an environmental assay across the country and to do an
epidemiological study across the country.
In order to do an Agent Orange/dioxide study, you have to
develop a system of medical health records; and in the
consequence of that you deliver care, almost the same way I did
as a medic when I served in Vietnam doing MEDCAP patrols.
And last but not least, if you did that research, that is
certainly something that my organization can support. Because
once have your organizational capacity, you can do the research
in Vietnam. Because you know precisely who was exposed and who
wasn't, particularly if you look in the north. You know who
went south and who didn't. Those who went south were exposed.
You know exactly who their progeny are. And that science would
be much more precise than anything that we could do in the U.S.
today. Because we have so much sources of dioxin exposure in
the United States, depending on where you live in the country.
If you live near a petrochemical place in southwest Louisiana,
you might be exposed to dioxins there.
Mr. Cao. I just have one more short question. This is
directly to the whole panel----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Bailey had a further comment to your
question.
Mr. Bailey. I just wanted to add, sir, an example to Mary
Dolan's comment.
One of the things I have observed is the importance of
individualized treatment and care plans at each stage of the
life of a person born with physical or mental disabilities. To
do that, to pull down the various resources of health,
education, vocational training, and so forth requires trained
social workers. And the creation of the modern profession of
social work in Vietnam would be an enormous opportunity to
which our country could contribute.
Mr. Cao. This is my last question. Concerning the 200,000
people that have benefited by some of the programs initiated by
the Vietnamese Government, is there a study out there that
follows, for example, the people's religious affiliations,
whether or not they are politically connected? Are those
benefits provided by the government, are they accessible by
everyone, or at this present moment is it only a few specific
groups of people that are allowed to have access to care?
Mr. Quy. About the 2--more than 200,000 victims that I've
seen they receive support from the government. But in Vietnam
at least more than 1 million people are affected by herbicide
there, but the fund from the government and the--not so much,
and we cannot extend this support. I hope in the future, with
the support of the whole people of Vietnam and the fund higher,
we can support more people affected by herbicide in our
country. And outside of the government there are--many NGO
organizations raises the funds and organizes many activities to
support the victim of Agent Orange in Vietnam.
Mr. Cao. I guess my question was--more specifically, my
question is, the 200,000 who got treated, are they friendly to
the party, to the Communist party, or do they represent a wide
range of people or are they representative of everyone in the
country?
Mr. Weidman. Congressman, the only one that I have seen is
in Danang, and it is run in affiliation with the State
University of New York at Binghamton. I visited there in 2006
for 3\1/2\ days. It is actually the School of Social Work, and
students do internships in Vietnam working with children with
birth defects in order to deliver respite care so that the
families can work. And so the families stay together.
We asked that question, whether there was difference or
interference based on religious preferences. And they said, no,
they chose strictly on the criteria of determining who had the
most severe birth defects, that needed constant 24-hour care
and, therefore, respite care was necessary for the family, for
the mother and father to go earn a living so they could keep
the family together. And they said they had encountered none of
that, at least in the province in the area around Danang.
Mr. Cao. Mr. Chairman, that is all the questions I have.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for
his questions and interest in the issue.
I just wanted to note for the record that I had the
personal privilege recently to discuss this matter with Senator
James Webb, who is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Asia Pacific. So I am looking forward to
working together with Senator Webb, and we are going to
continue making the exploration.
But like I said earlier, there comes a time that--I think
someone once said fish or cut bait. I don't think we can
continue doing the research and all of this. Forty years has
gone past.
I am not a very good mathematician, but since 1961, that is
well beyond the time. I am sure my friend from Louisiana knows
something about evidence. And within the 96 hours you have to
make sure that you are there to get the evidence and make sure
that we have it. Forty years later, it is a little too late.
And I am very fearful that we conduct the studies but we may
have lost a lot of the substance that we needed to make sure
that we can make a better judgment based on the data and
information.
And, Ms. Dolan, I appreciate your sense of confidence that
we do have all the data. We don't need another oversight
hearing. I think what remains to be done now is further
collaboration with my good friend from Louisiana about
introducing legislation to address some of these fundamental
issues that all of you so graciously and so eloquently have
brought to the forum. And I hope that in the coming months--
maybe even earlier--that we are going to come up with something
a lot more substantive.
I really think that if it is possible for the Government of
Vietnam to establish an analytical laboratory to detect and
conduct testing on dioxin, I cannot believe that we are not
able to do the same, Ms. Dolan. Do we have the technology, Ms.
Dolan, to do it, if we wanted to?
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. To test soil?
Mr. Faleomavaega. Yes, soil, human beings, whatever is out
there.
Ms. Dolan-Hogrefe. I believe so. And from the Ranch Hand
studies, that is human blood samples and other samples have
been taken. So absolutely in that case, sure.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you think that court decision which
ruled in favor of Dow Chemical Company was because of the
smartness of the lawyers and not necessarily because of the
substance, that perhaps the judges were misled? In any way or
form, something was missing here as far as this decision here.
Because I cannot believe that for a 10-year period, with all
the uses of this terrible poison or whatever you want to call
it, the dioxin, that it just seemed to have just continued for
10 years.
The biggest question in my mind and certainly with all of
you members of the panel is that we caught or discovered this
imbalance, if you will, that we put just a little bit too much
dioxin into the Agent Orange compound. My question is why
wasn't anything done about it? Was it done in conformance or
compliance with international law? This is the claim that our
Government makes. I get the impression that the use of dioxin
was perfectly legal under international law. Is that correct?
Mr. Weidman. No, sir, it is not. In fact, we have always
contended--``we'' meaning the United States Government--have
always contended that it was used for deforestation. When we
were doing FOIAs for another purpose, looking into Project 112
and Shad, the memos that we were able to dig up from a number
of resources--not from the government, by the way, because they
sandbagged us on FOIAs, claiming classification. We found it
elsewhere, documents that had been declassified. They listed
crop destruction and then deforestation subsequently.
Well, crop destruction under the Geneva Accords is
specifically illegal, one. Two is that we have the
documentation--and I know you don't want to do another hearing,
but at some point----
Mr. Faleomavaega. If necessary, we will do another hearing.
But I like what you are saying so far, Mr. Weidman. Continue,
please.
Mr. Weidman. We have some documentation to show that
Project 112, which is what we were looking at in the course of
researching that, we discovered something we never knew, and we
have been at this a long time. When I say ``we,'' I am talking
collectively, not just VVA. The veterans' advocates did not
know it was part of Project 112. And Project 112 was Robert
McNamara, being the way he is, had gathered all the chemical
and biological stuff under one umbrella, and that was Project
112. And that Agent Orange and herbicides was all part of that;
and Fort Detrick had the operational control over the whole
deal, including the weight of the powder mixed with each 100
gallons of water once it went to Vietnam, which turns out that
it was four times as strong as we ever thought it would.
In preparation for the next round of talks on the Geneva
Accords on banned warfare, on chemical warfare, when Henry
Kissinger became Secretary of State, Nixon came in. It was
Kissinger that got him moved out of Project 112 because he did
not want to deal with herbicides when he got to Geneva. And
they began the fiction that we weren't testing biological or
chemical weapons but rather we were only testing defenses
against biological and chemical attack, when in fact we were
testing weapons.
But the point is this. They knew that what we were doing
with the herbicides was against international law, one, and,
two, even went so far as to commission a study by the Rand
Commission to look at the mountaintop rice paddies. If you are
looking at me funny, that is because there are no mountaintop
rice paddies. There is only one set of rice paddies, and that
is for the civilian population, and the Viet Cong and the NVA
would tax the farmers in order to have rice for their troops.
But it is categorically illegal under international law to
destroy civilian food supplies, so, in fact, it was not in
compliance with international law.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Which raises another question to follow
up to what you just said, Mr. Weidman: Did the chemical
companies know what they were mixing at the time? Were they
aware that the dioxin mixed with whatever other chemical
compounds--were they aware of the contents or the percentage of
the dioxin being mixed into the Agent Orange before the
substance was sprayed?
Mr. Weidman. I am not an attorney, nor am I a magistrate. I
don't know legally whether they are responsible.
Do I believe the chemical companies knew? Yes, I----
Mr. Faleomavaega. They are the ones who mixed the Agent
Orange.
Mr. Weidman. Well, the dioxin--the higher rate of dioxin
came when there was pressure on the industrial capacity of the
chemical companies to produce enough Agent Orange fast enough.
Therefore, they created it at much higher temperatures. It is
the high temperatures that generated the dioxin. The same way
incinerators, industrial incinerators in America will generate
dioxin if you don't watch what they are doing. And you have to
guard against that.
Well, there wasn't any guarding against that. Whether or
not the government knew or not is debatable; and, in fact, it
has been debated time and again in a courtroom. The government
said that they didn't know, and the chemical companies say they
were only making it to government specification and therefore
resort to the Federal contractor defense against any liability.
Mr. Faleomavaega. All right. Again, I want to sincerely
offer my apologies. We have gone way beyond the time that I had
for you to come before the committee.
I cannot thank you enough, Mr. Bailey, being the third
party, innocent party, coming in on behalf of the Ford
Foundation to do all it can voluntarily to help us with this
issue.
But I have a little, I guess, in my own ideological bent in
doing something of this nature to the effect that sometimes, as
a matter of policy, it is not the legalities; it is not the
niceties. I think Mr. Weidman just said it is a moral
imperative that we do this right, not just for our own men and
women in uniform who served in that war, but as an institution
and for what this government stands for and, hopefully----
My good friend from Louisiana and I look forward to going
together to Vietnam in the future. This will be his first visit
since leaving.
I would highly recommend members of the panel and our good
friends here in the audience read what this gentleman went
through, such a tremendous sense of pride. And I am just so
happy to have as a fellow American who happens to be of
Vietnamese ancestry to be serving as a member of this great
institution, as a Member of Congress.
With that, Congressman Cao, again, thank you so much for
taking the time from your busy schedule.
He's not even a member of our Foreign Affairs Committee,
but I have asked him to join us because I think it touches some
good nerves in there. I know he has tremendous interest in
wanting to see what can be done and what our Government can do
to give assistance to the good people of Vietnam.
And again, to all of the members of the panel, thank you so
much for being here. Hopefully, we will have another oversight
hearing and maybe by then a bill to discuss and give it a
little more teeth. What do you think, Mr. Weidman? That will
probably even give it a little better sense of purpose.
Thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
Minutes deg.
Manzullo statement deg.
__________
Briefer: Xuan statement deg.
__________
Hogrefe FTR deg.__
Material Submitted for the Record by Ms. Mary Dolan-Hogrefe, Vice
President and Senior Adviser, National Organization on Disability
(Member, US-Vietnam Dialogue Group on Agent Orange/Dioxin and also
Director of the World Committee on Disability)
Weidman FTR deg.__
Material Submitted for the Record by Mr. Rick Weidman, Executive
Director for Policy & Government Affairs, Vietnam Veterans of America
(VVA)