[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A REVIEW OF THE COAST GUARD'S SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION
=======================================================================
(111-64)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
September 30, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
__________
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52-608 PDF WASHINGTON: 2009
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania SAM GRAVES, Missouri
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York Virginia
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN J. HALL, New York ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee PETE OLSON, Texas
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
VACANCY
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman
CORRINE BROWN, Florida FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin PETE OLSON, Texas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Brice-O'Hara, Rear Admiral Sally, Deputy Commandant For
Operations, United States Coast Guard.......................... 6
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McMahon, Hon. Michael E., of New York............................ 27
Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California............................ 30
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Brice-O'Hara, Rear Admiral Sally................................. 34
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Brice-O'Hara, Rear Admiral Sally, Deputy Commandant For
Operations, United States Coast Guard:
Response to question from Rep. Elijah Cummings, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland.... 11
Response to question from Rep. Laura Richardson, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California.. 21
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A REVIEW OF THE COAST GUARD'S SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION
----------
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elijah E.
Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Cummings. The Committee will come to order.
The Subcommittee convenes today to examine the Coast
Guard's search and rescue mission, in other words known as
"SAR."
The SAR mission is one that the Coast Guard performs on a
daily basis, and it is a mission central to what our Coast
Guard is: a service of guardians willing to risk their own
lives to save those in peril.
The SAR mission is also a mission that the Coast Guard
generally performs with great efficiency and with exceptional
distinction. Every year, the service responds to tens of
thousands of persons in distress and saves thousands of lives.
I often speak of their role in Katrina, when they saved well
over 30,000 people, many of whom would not be with us today if
it were not for their heroic efforts.
In fact, in 2007, I joined the service in celebrating the
one-millionth life saved since the formation of the Revenue
Cutter Service in 1790. This is an astounding milestone and one
of which the Coast Guard and, indeed, the entire Nation are
rightfully proud.
That said, there have been several recent cases in which,
by the Coast Guard's own account, avoidable failures occurred
in the prosecution of SAR cases. And these cases point to
problems that appear to echo problems we have seen in other
mission areas, particularly marine safety.
Having, in particular, the SAR cases involving Buona Madre
and the Patriot in great detail, it appears that, in the most
general terms, the failures associated with these cases
occurred not because policies that clearly direct how a
response should be conducted and that clearly call for a,
quote, "bias toward action," unquote, were not in place, but
because, for a variety of reasons and in the face of cases that
were admittedly complex and ambiguous, these policies were not
implemented.
In the case of the Buona Madre, a 28-foot wooden hull
fishing vessel was essentially run over by the motor vessel,
Eva Danielsen, on July 13, 2007. At the time the incident
occurred, the Eva Danielsen reported to the Vessel Traffic
Service in San Francisco that it may have collided with a
fishing vessel. However, subsequent investigation by the VTS,
which actually should not have been involved in prosecuting
what was even then a potential SAR case, and the Sector San
Francisco's command center concluded on the 13th of July that
no collision had occurred. Therefore, assets that were within
34 minutes of arriving at the scene of the collision were
called off, and no further investigations were conducted until
the morning of July 14th, when the body of the operator who had
been onboard the fishing vessel was discovered dead in the
water.
In the case of the fishing vessel Patriot, the first Coast
Guard district, Sector Boston, and Station Gloucester, spent 2
hours and 23 minutes examining a potential SAR case before
launching assets. The circumstances of this case were, indeed,
very complex. However, even as facts suggesting a possible
distress began to accumulate and even though a launch of assets
was recommended at several different points, Coast Guard
personnel continued to investigate rather than to launch. In
this case, it is likely that both of the individuals on the
Patriot probably died and the vessel had sunk before the Coast
Guard was even alerted to the possible crisis. However, the
subsequent investigation uncovered what the Coast Guard,
itself, calls an "inefficient response" that revealed several
procedural training and judgment shortfalls. Those are the
Coast Guard's words.
While the administrative investigation into this case
highlights these individual shortfalls, the one issue on which
the investigation's final memorandum spends considerable time
and which is probably the most troubling is the lack of
experienced watchstanders on duty at the time of the Patriot
incident.
In plain language, the final action memorandum concluding
the investigation of this case, signed by Vice Admiral Robert
Papp, commander of the Atlantic Area Command, states, and I
quote, "The actions and judgments exhibited by both the First
District and Sector Boston Command Center watchstanders call
into question the qualifications and staffing procedures at
both the sector and district levels for the command center,"
end of quote. That is a very, very troubling statement.
This finding is particularly troubling because it eerily
recalls the findings of the National Transportation Safety
Board in its safety recommendation report concerning the
Morning Dew accident that occurred in December of 1997. In that
recommendation, the safety board wrote, and I quote, "In order
to appropriately assess the situation and respond correctly in
atypical situations, watchstanders must have the ability to
skillfully apply judgment and analytical thinking to the
watchstanding task," end of quote.
The Patriot case was clearly an atypical case, as to some
degree was the Buona Madre case. And the administrative
investigation into the Patriot case makes clear that, when
confronted with an atypical situation, the First District and
Sector Boston's prosecution of the incident exhibited
significant failures at critical portions of the case.
The investigation into the Buona Madre highlighted a number
of failures on the part of the Sector San Francisco command
center but, frankly, didn't examine whether these were due to
the inexperience of command center staffers. This would be
important to know.
The memorandum on the Patriot case also harkens back to the
NTSB report on the Morning Dew on another point. Today, as at
the time of the Morning Dew accident more than a decade ago,
individuals in supervisory capacities often stand 24-hour
watches and can sleep during portions of those watches. In some
cases, supervisory personnel can even consult from home.
In the Morning Dew, the communications watchstander on duty
at the time did not awaken the duty officer who was sleeping
nearby. The watchstander stated that he did not feel, quote,
"negative pressure or reluctance to awaken the duty officer. He
simply did not think it was necessary," end of quote.
In the Patriot incident, there was a long delay in waking
duty officers. According to administrative investigations, the
command duty officer at Sector Boston was not awakened by
watchstander personnel until 1 hour and 44 minutes after the
sector received notification of this case, a case that we now
know as the Patriot case.
The administrative investigation into the matter notes
that, and I quote, "The fact that both the sector and district
command duty officer, CDO, were asleep at the time of the
incident may have played a role in the relatively inefficient
processing and analysis of case information," end of quote. The
investigation notes that failure to notify the CDOs and other
senior members of the SAR chain of command contributed to
launch delays.
The Patriot investigation also notes that requiring CDOs to
stand a 24-hour watch that includes sleep time means that,
potentially, the most experienced watchstander won't be
available when time-critical decisions have to be made.
Responding to this finding, Admiral Papp ordered units in the
Atlantic Area to identify those sectors in which duty officers
were keeping 24-hour watches and to convert 24-hour watches to
12-hour watches where staffing permits.
Finally, according to information provided to the
Subcommittee, this review has found that there is not adequate
staffing to allow all of the 24-hour positions to be converted
to 12-hour positions.
The longer I am Chairman of this Subcommittee, the more I
begin to see similar patterns repeat themselves. And the one
pattern that I see over and over and over again is how
stretched the Coast Guard is and how, at times, despite its
best intentions, gaps inevitably appear. It was just the other
day that Ranking Member LoBiondo talked about this and how it
is so important that we make sure--and I agree with him
totally--that we have the personnel that we need for this
stretched mission.
The issues before us today are very complex and subtle, and
I look forward to a detailed examination of them. I also
commend the Coast Guard for its thorough examination of these
cases, its candor, and for laying bare the problems that it has
found. There is no way that we can be the great Coast Guard
that we are, and are becoming, unless we have honesty,
integrity, and forthrightness.
That said, the question now becomes, are SAR operations
and, frankly, sector command centers organized and staffed in
the best possible manner? If the answer to that question is
"no"--I fear that, at least at some times, in some sectors,
that is the answer--we must then understand what needs to be
done to ensure that SAR operations and command centers are
organized as efficiently as possible.
To put it simply, each SAR case represents a life on the
line. Each SAR case represents a family member--a father, a
sister, a brother, a mother. And we must ensure that the hand
extended to those in distress is as strong as it can possibly
be. And I say that we can do better, and we will.
With that, I am going to yield to our distinguished Ranking
Member, Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for
holding this hearing.
Of the Coast Guard's many missions, search and rescue, I
think, is the one that the public most closely associates with
the service. From the coverage during Hurricane Katrina to the
countless television programs and films that we have seen,
especially in recent years, Americans regularly see images of
Coast Guardsmen responding to urgent calls for help at sea,
often in the most challenging of conditions. These first
responders are true professionals, and I commend the Coast
Guard for this incredible service to the American public.
However, while the vast majority of the Coast Guard's
search and rescue missions are carried out with great success,
the Subcommittee will be looking this morning for a few
instances where the Coast Guard's response was faulted. The
underlying connection between many of these cases seems to be
due to inadequate training or experience among the search and
rescue personnel at Coast Guard command centers and a failure
of those personnel to comply with standard procedures governing
search and rescue missions. While these cases are rare, they do
point to a need for continued efforts to improve mission
performance and capabilities.
The Coast Guard is in the process of acquiring new tools
and assets that will enhance the search and rescue mission. The
Rescue 21 communication system is already in place in 17 Coast
Guard sectors and is providing direction-finding capabilities
to command centers monitoring more than 28,000 miles of U.S.
coastline.
The service is also acquiring new small boats and coastal
patrol boats under the Response Boat-Medium and Deepwater
projects, which will provide servicemen enhanced and more
reliable platforms to respond to calls for help. Both of these
programs have had their setbacks, however. It is of the utmost
importance for these new, more capable assets to be added to
the Coast Guard's fleet as soon as possible and at the best
price to the American taxpayer.
Professional mariners and recreational boaters are aware of
the potential dangers that they face each time they leave port,
but they do this with the knowledge that the Coast Guard is
prepared to respond to any future calls of distress. I hope
this hearing will provide the Subcommittee with the information
and recommendations necessary to further improve mission
performance.
I want to thank Admiral Brice-O'Hara for appearing this
morning and for taking on the new job of coordinating the Coast
Guard planning, policies, and procedures as the new deputy
commandant of operations. I look forward to discussing your
plans to enhance the service's mission execution in this newly
created position.
And, finally, I want to note that Coast Guard crews are
responding to the tsunami in American Samoa as we speak. While
information regarding the situation in the territory is pretty
spotty at the moment, the Coast Guard, in conjunction with
other Federal agencies, has dispatched emergency management,
law enforcement, pollution investigators, and other qualified
personnel to restore basic governmental functions. This, again,
demonstrates the service's capabilities to quickly respond to
emerging situations, and I want to commend them for their rapid
response.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. McMahon?
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Chairman Cummings and Ranking
Member LoBiondo. And a special welcome and a thank you to Rear
Admiral Brice-O'Hara for your testimony this morning.
I represent Staten Island and Brooklyn, New York, which
certainly have a long history with the Coast Guard, having been
an original base of the Light House Service now since 1997 and
hosting the Coast Guard's main facility for New York Harbor.
And through that time, we have had great experiences with
the bravery and expertise of the members of the Coast Guard,
whether it was just recently with the downing of Flight 1549 in
the Hudson River and the way that lives were saved there thanks
to your expertise; and also with the crash of the Staten Island
Ferry, which is near and dear to our hearts, and the work that
you have done in making sure that that fleet of ships now, if
you will, operates in a much more professional manner. And
certainly, with the events of 9/11 and the heightened level of
security that we have in the port, the role that the Coast
Guard takes in doing that is something that we are very
grateful for.
So we are grateful for your work, Rear Admiral, and for all
of that of the men and women of the Coast Guard. And we look
forward to your important testimony today in terms of the
search and rescue procedures that are in place, what needs to
be done in the future, and how it will affect our harbor back
in New York.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time
and will submit more formal remarks for the record. Thank you,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. McMahon.
Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very brief
opening statement.
I want to associate myself with the remarks of the
gentleman from New Jersey. I think, of all of the duties the
Coast Guard performs, search and rescue is the one that
probably most people synonymously associate with the Coast
Guard.
Each of us, Mr. Chairman and Mr. LoBiondo, holds the Coast
Guard and their service to our Nation in the highest regard. I
believe our mutual goal is to provide effective oversight to
assure that the service maintains its high standards.
For this reason, I appreciate the Chairman calling this
hearing, because, despite some of our best efforts, there is
always room for improvement. I hope it will provide an
opportunity for constructive feedback and dialogue to ensure
the safety and security of the hundreds of mariners and of our
Coast Guard men and women.
And, finally, Admiral, good to have you with us today.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble.
Mr. Bishop?
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you.
I am sorry I have arrived a little late, but I represent
New York 1, which is the eastern half of Long Island, so I
represent a great deal of coastline. And I have to say that my
interactions with the Coast Guard since I have come to office
have been uniformly superior. The Coast Guard is an entity that
is one that does great service to our area.
And I look forward to your testimony, and I will have a few
questions for you when you are done. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop.
We now welcome our panelist, Rear Admiral Sally Brice-
O'Hara, who is the deputy commandant for operations with the
United States Coast Guard.
Rear Admiral, thank you very much for being with us, and we
look forward to your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL SALLY BRICE-O'HARA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your
comments, and thank you for the opportunity to provide a
written statement, which you already have. It is certainly an
honor to appear before you to discuss the Coast Guard's search
and rescue program.
As a Coast Guardsman with more than three decades of
service, I have dedicated much of my career to our search and
rescue mission. I have served as a station commanding officer,
as a group commander in a group that was a precursor to the
sectors that we now have deployed across the Nation. More
recently, I have commanded two of our districts: the Fifth
District in the mid-Atlantic coastal region and the 14th
District in the Pacific.
And, certainly, this morning, my heart and prayers are with
those in American Samoa, where we have Coast Guard members
stationed, as well as many friends, associates, and other
citizens there who are at great risk.
I am incredibly proud of the Coast Guard's rich heritage as
a humanitarian service dedicated to rescuing those in peril on
the sea. Our motto, "Semper Paratus," is a constant reminder
that we must retain a bias for action. Our success demands
readiness that is founded on good training and good equipment,
blended with courage, dedication, and vigilance of our men and
women.
Let me start by citing a few figures.
In 2008 alone, the Coast Guard prosecuted more than 24,000
search and rescue cases. We saved 4,910 lives, assisted an
additional 31,628 people in distress, and we protected property
worth in excess of $158 million. I attribute these remarkable
outcomes to our relentless pursuit of search and rescue mission
excellence and to our continual investment in our people, in
our equipment, and in our infrastructure.
In recent years, we have significantly improved our ability
to detect, locate, and respond to mariners in distress. Rescue
21 is replacing our antiquated National Distress and Response
System to enable superior communications and to help us take
the "search" out of search and rescue. The Search and Rescue
Optimal Planning System, better known as SAROPS, has proven to
be one of the most advanced search and rescue planning tools in
the world. The Response Boat-Medium will bring us speed, better
sea-keeping and integrated navigation capabilities that will
enable better response operations. We have introduced
direction-finding equipment on our search aircraft.
These are but a few of many investments that will more
accurately direct our waterborne and aviation assets, which
ultimately will save time, money, and, most importantly, lives.
And I want to thank you, Members of Congress, for your support
of these enhancements.
At the core of our search and rescue mission performance
are the men and women who stand the watch at the command
centers in our nine districts and 35 regional sectors. They are
always ready for the call. It is a combination of highly
trained military and civilian professionals who staff these
command centers around the clock. They manage distress
communications, plan and coordinate searches, and oversee the
operations.
The Coast Guard is wholly committed to building the
competence of this critical cadre. Sound training and
education, a formal qualification process, combined with
standardized policies and procedures, will help maintain their
edge.
Additionally, in 2003, the Coast Guard established the
Operations Specialist Rating. That is the backbone of our
search and rescue command and control workforce. They bring
operational savvy to our command centers, as well as broad
perspectives gained from serving across the Coast Guard. That
diversity of experience hones their judgment and decision-
making.
We have incorporated dedicated civilian employees into
standing the watch with leadership, continuity, and invaluable
expertise. Every segment of our workforce fulfills key roles in
the SAR program.
We continue to augment our watches with additional
positions--218 new positions in fiscal year 2009. Policy and
procedural compliance is essential. To that end, we have a
Command Center Standardization Team which visits our units.
They spend 3 days on-site to conduct a thorough and independent
review of performance and then to report that back to the
sector and district leadership.
Today, I can unequivocally state that we are better
equipped, better organized, and better trained to meet the
public's expectations for world-class SAR performance. But even
with improved systems, enhanced training, and our very best
efforts, mariners will continue to be lost at sea. Despite
sophisticated technology, search and rescue remains a mixture
of art and science. A SAR case is impacted by human factors
that range from the sketchy initial reports that come in from
panicked mariners to our own Coast Guard members making
judgment calls under the most pressing of circumstances. The
sea is a dangerous and unforgiving place.
We will never be satisfied with our efforts until we study
and learn why a life was lost. That is why we aggressively
review our actions for potential systemic improvements. That is
why we continually review the SAR system and individual
performance. That is why we undertake rigorous self-examination
so that we may continuously learn, so that every distressed
mariner has the best chance of rescue.
Before I close, let me also note that we also must take
every forum to educate and encourage boaters, fishermen, and
commercial mariners to also adopt prudent safety/self-help
measures so that they, too, are doing all that they can to be
prepared in the event of an emergency.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I thank you for
supporting the Coast Guard as you do. And I stand ready to
answer your questions. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Rear Admiral.
I want to go back to something that Mr. Coble said a moment
ago, and I want to make it very clear--because he is absolutely
right; there is nothing that he said that I disagree with--but
I want to make it clear that this hearing is about making sure
that we are the best that we can be. This is not one of these
sessions where we are trying to just tear apart. We are just
trying to see where the possible gaps are so that we can do
what we need to do to help you accomplish everything that you
have to accomplish.
And I want to thank you, Mr. Coble, for your statement.
Admiral, you wrote in your testimony, "Our command and
control organization, improved by the creation of Coast Guard
sectors, places officers with demonstrated experience and sound
judgment in critical leadership positions."
In your statement just now, I think you sort of reiterate
this. But, as I discussed in my opening statement, the
administrative investigation into the Patriot case would not
seem to demonstrate that claim.
On duty at the time of the case in the sector command
center was a lieutenant, junior grade, as the command duty
officer, for whom this was the first assignment outside of the
academy, who had attended SAR school but not received a SAR
qualification and who, because of the length of the watch to
which that person was assigned, was asleep at the time the
initial calls on what became the Patriot case came to the
command center.
The operations unit controller did have 23 months of
experience as a SAR-qualified watchstander, but the
communications watchstander and the situation unit watchstander
had a combined total of 4 months of experience in their
positions, and neither of them had the SAR qualification.
In fact, Admiral Papp's memo notes that these two
individuals had limited experience and, thus, limited ability
to assist the sector OUC. Now, those are Admiral Papp's words,
not mine. The memo also notes he at times felt overwhelmed by
the sheer volume of calls he was handling with the district and
other actors during the management of this case.
My question is this: Did the staffing in the Sector Boston
command center during the Patriot case really represent the
placement of officers with demonstrated experience and sound
judgment in critical leadership positions?
Admiral Papp's memorandum would suggest that, at the time
of the Patriot case, Sector Boston was not staffed with the
watchstanders who had the ability to skillfully apply judgment
and analytical thinking to the watchstanding task.
And I was just wondering what--I mean, could you answer
that, in light of what you have said?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Mr. Chairman, as somebody who has
overseen SAR operations at multiple levels within the Coast
Guard, I will tell you, first and foremost, that we have to
instill within our watchstanders a complete sense that any
question, any need for assistance in standing their watch
tautly and properly should never be considered something
embarrassing. They should always have the understanding that
they should call someone else as they become immersed in
situations that may be out of the ordinary, something different
than what they have prosecuted before.
Mr. Cummings. You are saying that that is part of their
training?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. I am saying that that is something
that we need to ensure every district commander and sector
commander discusses forthrightly with all of their
watchstanders.
In my own experiences, I have spent a lot of time talking
with my watch so that I knew what caliber of individual they
were, what their background was, where we might need to shore
up and improve their abilities, and mentor and guide and
appropriately steer them to be able to continually raise their
abilities and capabilities. So I think, first and foremost,
leadership.
But then, in addition to that, sir, I also want to point
out that there are several individuals who can be contacted
during the course of a watch. We have talked a lot about the
command duty officer as a source of reference. We also have a
supervisor of each watch position within the command center. We
have a command center chief. Usually, that command center chief
is at the lieutenant commander level--very, very experienced in
their craft. And then above that person we have the response
department head, another individual who is very experienced.
Both the response department head and the command center chief
must be SAR-qualified to hold those positions.
So we have several other steps in the chain of command that
our watchstanders can turn to for advice and assistance in
prosecuting the watch. I have never been at a unit, sir, where
there was not regular interaction between watchstanders and
their chain of command, particularly the command center chief
and the ops boss in the group days, now the response department
chief under the sector construct.
Mr. Cummings. Well, let me ask you this: How common is it
for such a group of, frankly, relatively inexperienced
individuals to be placed together in a sector command center,
noting that the sectors are where most SAR cases are managed?
And let me just ask you this one, too. I understand all of
what you just said. I guess my question is,you know, when we
look at another parallel between the Morning Dew case and the
Patriot case, in the Morning Dew case the communications
watchstander did not awaken the duty officer, who was sleeping.
He stated that he did not feel--and this is his statement--
"negative pressure or reluctance to awaken the duty officer. He
simply did not think it was necessary," unquote.
Now, it is one thing to have all of these experienced
people in place. I still want to go back to my first question,
too. But is there something that we are missing? I mean, we
were running into problems because somebody just didn't think
it necessary. I mean, is this a perception problem? I mean,
with your experience, I am sure you have seen all kinds of
things.
And when you talk about teaching folks that they should not
feel ashamed, they should just do what they have to do, as a
result of these incidents was there more emphasis placed on
those kinds of things? Or is this something that just boils
down to judgment?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Mr. Chairman, there were a lot of
questions embedded in that.
Mr. Cummings. I know, and I am sorry. I apologize.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Let me go back to the first part, and
your question was about the relative experience of one----
Mr. Cummings. Yes, a group of people being together,
inexperienced, yes.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. And, as a former commanding
officer and commander, I would tell you that there is
leadership responsibility on the part of the sector commander
to assess who they have and look at anticipated rotations and
then to have a frank dialogue with the assignment officers,
both officer assignment officers as well as the enlisted
assignment officers, to ensure that there is a holistic look
each transfer season to then offset, as somebody more
experienced is departing, to make sure that that is replaced
with an experienced person.
So there needs to be that give and take--we call it
"command concerns"--that are articulated from the sector
commander to our personnel command as they prepare for
assignment rotations.
Now, the second piece to that, sir: As you know, we have
embedded civilian positions across the Coast Guard in both the
sector command centers and the district command centers. Those
civilians have provided absolutely central support to
increasing the experience, the local knowledge, the proficiency
of our watches. And those civilian employees do not rotate, so
they are there to provide that thread across the military
moves.
We have invested in training. We brought a new course
online just this past year, 2009. We brought online----
Mr. Cummings. When was that? Do you know what month that
was?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. I would have to get that question
back to you, sir.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2608.030
Mr. Cummings. I just want to know how new it is and how
many people have been trained. I mean, I assume that some
people have completed the training?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And I just would like to know a little bit
more about it when you get a chance.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. How many people? How often? How are they
selected? Things of that nature.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. This is a course that is
approximately 3 weeks in length, sir. It is the Command Center
Watchstander Course, administered at Training Center Yorktown
as part of our Command Center Standardization Team. Those two
programs are married together.
We have had one convening this year in April of 2009, and
32 individuals completed that course. We anticipate a
throughput of upwards of 64 per year. Quite honestly, we have
taken a little bit of a pause. We want to go back and take a
look at that curriculum and fine-tune it, so the next class
will be delivered in December of this year.
Mr. Cummings. And where is it?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yorktown, Virginia, at the training
center, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. I would like to come down and visit,
just to observe, if you don't mind.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. We would welcome that.
I also want to point out that, in addition to the Command
Center Standardization Team, which we would like to have visit
every command center on a biannual basis--currently, they are
on a triennial basis because of some staffing issues--we also
want to complement that very rigorous examination with a
similar program managed by the district command centers with
oversight of their sector command centers.
So, ultimately, as we get our staffing correct and move
forward on our planned visit program, every sector would be
visited one year by the Command Center Standardization Team and
then the next year by a district assessment team at the sector
level. So that will help bring us up to a higher level of
consistency and standardization.
Now, I am not sure that that gets yet to your question
about experience and judgment and analytical thought. Mr.
Chairman, what I would like to point out in that regard is that
both the maritime search and rescue planner course and the
command center watchstander course have extensive scenario-
based exercises and drills embedded into those curricula. We
purposely extended the maritime search and rescue planner
course this last year by several additional days so that we
could run them through scenarios. We have embedded 2 weeks'
worth of scenarios into the 3-week curriculum of the command
center watchstander course.
When our Command Center Standardization Team visits a unit,
much of that visit is scenario-based. And that scenario is
personalized to the sector, to the types of operations and
geographic area and customer base that are within that sector.
So we know that one of the best ways you get better is to
be faced with very hard, difficult cases and work through them.
And we have brought that into our training and our curriculum
and our regular assessment of our sectors and districts, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Just before we go to Mr. LoBiondo, let me ask
you this. One of the things that--and this is sort of an
analogous situation, but when we have the bar exam in Maryland,
normally what they do is they take two or three actual cases
and put them on the bar examination. You never knew what cases
they were, but they used to do that all the time, so everybody
is reading every case that comes up over a year or 2 before the
bar.
And I am just wondering, do you use--you talk about really
bringing it to real life and personal. Do you use cases in
these courses that have actually happened and said, you know,
"This is what happened right here just a year ago," a month
ago, whatever, and not beating up on anybody but actually
showing them exactly what needs to be done so that they know. I
mean, this is not some hypothetical. This is real stuff.
I mean, do we use them? Or is it sort of like everybody
knows about them, and they sort of talk about them under their
breath, but they don't actually put them out there? Do you
follow me?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Oh, no, sir. We approach this with
the greatest honesty and internal examination and do provide
actual cases in our training curricula.
Mr. Cummings. Good.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. I cannot tell you today that the
Patriot case has embedded itself into our training, but it will
be. We are still working through the marine casualty
investigation.
Mr. Cummings. I understand.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. We are still working through the
follow-on from the final action memorandum from Vice Admiral
Papp. So it is probably a bit premature, but I will assure you
the Patriot case is going to go into our study curricula and be
used, discussed, and learned from for future generations.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very, very much.
And, to the panel, we are going to have a second round of
questions.
Mr. LoBiondo?
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, we have talked about the standing duty for not
more than 12 hours in a 24-hour period and how that all comes
together. Do you believe that the Coast Guard has adequate
resources and personnel to transition to the 12-hour watch
system for command duty officers?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. In direct answer to that, sir, I
would tell you that we do not have the resources. As you may
know, sir, we do not have a full-time command duty officer at
every sector yet. That is our desire, but we don't have a full-
time, dedicated command duty officer populating those 35
sectors. And if we were then to require a 12-hour as opposed to
the 24-hour watch, we would need additional resources, sir. And
that is why we have taken the concept of using collateral duty
watchstanders as opposed to the alert watch for that particular
position.
Mr. LoBiondo. This is sort of related. The Coast Guard is
authorized at an end-of-year strength of 45,000 active-duty
personnel. Do you think that this is adequate to develop
service men and women with the specialized skills necessary to
direct search and rescue and other programs? Is that 45,000
number enough?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. As you know, Mr. LoBiondo, we have
many complex missions and demands on the Coast Guard. We will
put to best use every position that comes to the Coast Guard.
And there are more than enough ways that we could gainfully
employ the individuals as new positions come onboard.
I have to be very frank in saying that, as we have brought
more than 200 positions onboard this year just for our sectors,
we have the whole dilemma of juniority. It is going to take us
some while to get those people recruited and hired and in place
and experienced. So, as positions come online, it is not like
we can immediately have someone ready to go in that new job.
So it is a growing process that has many different aspects.
It is very complex to bring people into the Coast Guard.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral, have command centers been instructed
to make use of all available positioning and identification
tools as part of the search and rescue mission?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. And I think you know how
powerful the Rescue 21 system is from some of the very initial
work that was done in New Jersey.
And we continue to move forward with the Rescue 21 program.
We have not built out all of our sector commands. We have made
good progress across the Southeast, in the Gulf region, in the
Northwest. We still have build-outs to do in 2009-2010 in New
England and in California. And then, the following year, we
will focus on the island sectors, the Great Lakes, followed by
the Western rivers, and finally Alaska. The Rescue 21 system
will not be completely built out until 2017.
But we know from all of our use thus far that it is
tremendously capable when it comes to taking the "search" out
of searching because we have that direction-finding capability.
We have much clearer communications. We have the ability to
monitor up to five channels of communications. We have the
ability to communicate with our partners.
For all of those reasons, Rescue 21 has greatly enhanced
our performance, and we look forward to completing that
acquisition program.
Mr. LoBiondo. And my last question for now, Admiral: Do
Coast Guard personnel have the capability to e-mail and
communicate with fishing vessels through the VMS system?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. There have been a lot of
questions about VMS, and let me clarify a couple of things.
It is one tool in our kit bag of tools. It is a system
owned by NOAA Fisheries for a very specific purpose that is not
search and rescue. However, the VMS plot provides a good
snapshot of the vessels that are under way on the fishing
grounds at a particular time, if they are required to be
outfitted with VMS. Nationally, we estimate we have 85,000
fishing vessels between those that are commercially licensed
and State-registered. Only about 7 percent of those vessels are
required to carry VMS.
When it is available to us and we do get a feed from NOAA
and our watchstanders can pull that up at their desktops on the
Common Operational Picture, they can see where a vessel is
tracking at a particular time. And the VMS feature does allow
for an e-mail to go out to the vessel, but there is not
necessarily a mechanism to get a return to know that that e-
mail has been acknowledged.
We have proactively used VMS. As a recent example, in the
First District, in preparing for hurricanes, in an effort to
warn all of those who were out on the high seas as Hurricane
Bill was approaching, one of the ways we communicated with the
fishing fleet was to send messages to them through VMS that
also guided us in our maritime patrol overflights to see where
the fishing fleet was accumulated to make sure we overflew and
warned them of the pending weather.
We have also been very proactive in using VMS to identify
the fishing fleet and then to make sure that we could talk with
them and that their EPIRB was properly registered. We learned
that not every EPIRB on a fishing vessel in our recent sweep
had been properly registered, and we were able to get that
corrected. As you know, EPIRBs are another very important tool
in saving lives in distress at sea.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. Before we get to Mr. Bishop, let me just ask
you one real quick question: Of those 218 people, you said
those are new billets, is that right?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Are these people, most of them, in the
pipeline, or are they already assigned? I mean, right now, you
said they are in different status. What is the situation? I
just want to know where they are, because I think that would
help all of us.
Excuse me, Mr. Bishop. I just want to get that one answer.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Sir, when we get the new billets,
those positions don't come online until the second half of the
fiscal year.
Mr. Cummings. Right.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. So we have just gotten the positions.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. They are in the process of being
filled. It is going to take us a while to fill them because
those who will be enlisted will need to go through the training
system.
Mr. Cummings. Right. When do you expect they will be all
up, though? I guess that is what I am trying to get to. Do you
have any idea?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. We should get back to you with a firm
answer. It is going to take us a couple of years, sir, to hire
everybody and get them trained.
Mr. Cummings. I am not trying to push you. I am just trying
to get an answer. In other words, I am trying to put all the
things that we are talking about in some kind of context. That
is all.
In other words, I am just trying to figure out--you know,
we do things up here, and I want to know, first of all, how
long it takes what we do here to affect what you do there, so
that we can make sure that we are doing all that we are
supposed to do, so that you can be most effective and
efficient.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. And it is a recruiting
process. It is recruit training for 7 1/2 weeks. It is the
Class A school for several more weeks. It is the assignment to
the unit. And then it is building the skills and credentials.
It is going through the training at the unit, a rigorous
performance qualification system. It is the certification. And
then it is maintaining currency in the watch.
All of that is going to take many months, if not a few
years, to get the people whose positions came online this
fiscal year to the point that we would call them ready, able,
and very experienced watchstanders.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bishop?
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, thank you for your testimony.
I want to focus on what might be referred to as, sort of,
natural or environmental impediments to the search and rescue
mission of the Coast Guard. And, as I said before, I represent
a coastal district. And one of the concerns that I have right
now is the ability of the Coast Guard to have access to
navigable channels, which relates to the work of the Army
Corps.
And so I guess my general question revolves around the
issue of the coordination between the Coast Guard and the Army
Corps and other governmental entities that the Coast Guard
would be reliant upon in order to carry out its mission. I
mean, my specific concerns--and I don't expect you to be able
to deal with these specifically. But the Fire Island Inlet,
right now, has sholed over as a result of both natural
processes and some storms. That is impairing the Coast Guard's
ability to conduct its search and rescue mission. But the Army
Corps cannot, given its process, schedule a dredge of that
inlet for several months. At Moriches Bay, we are having a hard
time maintaining a navigable channel there. Shinnecock Bay,
hard time maintaining a navigable channel.
So I guess, as I say, my general question is: A, how would
you characterize the interaction between the Coast Guard and
the Army Corps? B, should there be a line item for funding in
the Coast Guard budget relative to the dredging needs for
navigable channels? Are there other impediments, sort of
structural impediments, that perhaps the Congress can help with
in terms of helping the Coast Guard perform its mission?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Thank you for your question, Mr.
Bishop. I am not familiar with that particular geographic area
you described.
Mr. Bishop. As I said, I wouldn't expect you to be.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. But I have certainly had much
experience on the eastern seaboard and understand the continued
problems with silting and constrictions of our waterways.
The Coast Guard has a normal and natural dialogue with the
Army Corps of Engineers at the port level through our sector
commands, particularly with the area committees that are
focused on environmental response, as well as the Area Maritime
Security Committee that is focused on the safety and security
of the region.
There are ongoing discussions because the Coast Guard
frequently has access to stakeholders, understands the needs of
the waterway's users, and can help translate and be a voice to
the Army Corps of Engineers as they determine where they will
fund projects, where they will place their priorities in
managing the dredging and other channel work that has to be
accomplished. So I would tell you, at the field level, at the
lowest levels, there are regular dialogues that occur with our
Army Corps of Engineer professional partners.
That also occurs here in Washington. From a program and
policy interaction, there is an open dialogue with the Army
Corps of Engineers. As recently as just a couple of weeks ago,
Admiral Allen, our commandant, met with his counterpart, and I
also have worked regularly with my counterparts within the Army
Corps.
You asked a question about funding, sir, and I think that
appropriately belongs with the Army Corps of Engineers.
Mr. Bishop. Well, thank you. I appreciate your response.
But if your rescue mission is compromised, no reasonable
person would argue that it is not. So that issue is not in
dispute. And if the Army Corps says, "I am awful sorry, we
understand the problem, but we have no funds," what is the
answer? I mean, where do we go to solve this problem?
And that is why I am asking the question of whether or not
there ought to be some provision that allows the Coast Guard to
declare, perhaps, some form of exigent circumstance that would
either provide funding or would accelerate the Army Corps
process or would, perhaps, use Coast Guard funding to take the
place of the required local match, whether it is New York State
or whether it is a county or whatever.
So I know I am asking a bunch of different questions here,
but my concern is that we are in the sort of situations in
which the Coast Guard can't do its job because the Army Corps
doesn't have the funding to do their job. And yet we are left
with a problem that isn't resolved, and leaving the problem
unresolved is not acceptable.
So where do we go from here, I guess is my question.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Sir, I think that I would like to go
back and talk with our local commanders to determine whether
our search and rescue mission has been degraded by the
situation you have described.
There are certainly other means of rescuing people in
distress. Helicopter rescue would be one alternative if someone
is in a waterway that we are not able to access. There
routinely might be a situation where duck hunters are in
marshes and our boats can't get there anyway, and a helicopter
rescue would be appropriate. Or we would turn to one of our
many partners. Certainly State and local partners who have
assets, sometimes much smaller boats than the Coast Guard has,
can trailer and get into those locations. Or we have some
smaller, special-purpose craft that might be trailered to
access an area.
So I am not aware of any instance where access to channels
has not permitted us to do our job effectively, sir.
Mr. Bishop. I thank you.
And thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, good to have you with us.
Admiral, much has been said about Rescue 21, and I want to
continue along that line. How many miles of coastline are
currently covered by Rescue 21, A? And, B, what areas lack
coverage, and when do you anticipate full deployment?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Thank you for your question, Mr.
Coble.
We have more than 28,000 miles of coastline that are
currently covered by the Rescue 21 system. Our next priorities
are the New England area, the two sectors in northern and
southern New England. We then will focus on rollout in southern
California, followed by the island sectors--San Juan, Guam, and
Hawaii; the Great Lakes; then the western regions of river
systems off the Mississippi; followed by Alaska.
Mr. Coble. And when do you anticipate full deployment?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Full deployment will not be completed
until 2017, sir.
Mr. Coble. Oh, I think you said that earlier.
You may have touched on this, Admiral, but let me revisit
it. Generally, how is Rescue 21 improving and enhancing the
Coast Guard's search and rescue capabilities? And could the
system be expanded for application in areas other than search
and rescue cases?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Sir, I would point to, first, just
generally much clearer, better communications. The old system
often was spotty; you would have garbled transmissions. We have
great clarity with the tower array and updated, sophisticated
equipment that has been installed.
So we also have then the capability to direction-find, and
often the array of towers allows us to actually plot a
position, so that tells us exactly where the call originates.
We can get to that mariner in distress much more quickly.
There are multiple communications channels, so the
watchstander can be working multiple cases as necessary at any
point in time. We have better interoperability with our
partners because of the channels that are available with the
Rescue 21 array.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. We also have the ability to play
back. A lot of times we need to clear up the transmission, so
the automatic playback feature is much more manipulable than
previously, and allows us to clear out any background noise so
that we better understand what the mariner is telling us.
The Rescue 21 system also has provided us with an ability
to get coverage out to 20 miles. That is its published
coverage, but I will tell you it has proven itself beyond that
20-mile costal range. So we have been very impressed with the
Rescue 21 system. And as I mentioned, over the course of the
next 3 years we are going to focus on completing the
continental United States, the islands, and then the last piece
will be Alaska in 2017.
Mr. Coble. And do you see any other areas other than search
and rescue where this can be utilized?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Well, it would help us with all of
our missions in terms of the communications capabilities, the
playback features, law enforcement cases. Rescue 21 certainly
enhances first and foremost our legacy mission, our most
critical mission of search and rescue, but it will suit our
needs in the coastal regions across all of the mission sets
that are prosecuted by our districts and our sectors.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble.
Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to start off, first of all, with a comment
following up on Mr. Bishop's question, and then my question for
our witness today.
What Mr. Bishop was referring is that the HMT--and I think
you are aware that we brought forward legislation, HMT reform--
the harbor maintenance tax is collected for port dredging and
port maintenance. Currently, we receive from Customs
approximately $1.3 billion, and yet the appropriators only
spend approximately $600,000. And so currently there is a
surplus of over $4.5 billion in that account, HMT, for port
maintenance and port dredging. So I hope and would look forward
to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Bishop, in bringing
that forward if that can assist the Army Corps to address some
of our longstanding needs that we have.
Mr. Cummings. We will do that.
Ms. Richardson. In terms of my question for our witness
here today, I represent the area of the Port of Long Beach and
Los Angeles, which are the largest ports in this Nation. And
before I say that, let me first of all say, and I apologize, to
thank you for all of your work.
In the Los Angeles area, over 415 search and rescue
missions are performed annually, and so, despite all the
challenges and the things we have talked about today, many
lives are being saved, as well as property, and so we thank you
for your work.
My question is, in my particular area, the larger ships are
beginning to come in and out of those particular ports. Some of
them are as high as 10,000 TEU vessels, which means that the
ships are basically longer than the Empire State Building is
tall. And so my question is, what steps have you taken to
prepare for, in the event of a disaster or search and rescue
that needs to be done, to be able to deal with these larger
ships?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Good morning, and thank you for your
question.
The complexity of the waterways users, as we see
increasingly greater sized vessels, as you have cited, has
prompted the Coast Guard to think about how we prepare
ourselves for a mass rescue operation. We plan, we drill and
exercise, but I will tell you it is not going to be only a
Coast Guard response. When we get to something of that
magnitude, it is going to require all of our professional
partners.
And so when we drill and practice, we bring our local,
other Federal, and certainly the State partners into those
exercises so that we know that we have the same protocols in
place, that we will respond accordingly, that we have the
ability to communicate, and that we understand one another's
roles, authorities, and capabilities.
When we have an incident of that nature, we are going to
see that move to a Unified Command. Something that large is
going to require us to stand up our Incident Command system and
have a very well, nuanced, and deeply integrated response to a
situation like that.
Ms. Richardson. Let me be more specific, and I am glad you
referenced what you did. In my particular port area, the Port
of Los Angeles has the larger fire boats, which can shoot large
enough the water over some of these larger vessels. However,
the Port of Long Beach, for example, does not have this fire
boat and many ports across this Nation do not. Are you aware of
which ports do or do not have the larger vessels or the larger
crew ships that are coming into port? Have you evaluated, are
they properly prepared to be able to work with you to respond?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. I am not personally aware, but I can
assure you that the sectors commanders, as part of their
planning and preparedness, are very much aware of the assets
that are available within the port. And one of the things that
we have done with fire departments is share our own vessel
plans with them and bring the firefighters onto our vessels so
that if we were to have a problem, they have walked through,
they understand the layout. But more importantly, getting to
others who might be in distress, we have worked very closely to
improve the maritime proficiency, understanding, knowledge,
awareness of firefighters who may not have that depth of
experience. Certainly, if they are on the fire boats, they
probably do, but a lot of times it is also going to be a
shoreside response.
Ms. Richardson. Ma'am, what I am saying and what I would
like to ask you to do is to evaluate the ports of entry that
you support to determine whether they have sufficient fire boat
capability to address and to assist you, if need be. It is my
understanding it does not exist, it is not in place, and that
many of our ports, if we were to have ships collide, whatever
situations were to occur, you would not have the sufficient
water support to deal with the situation.
So if you could come back to the Committee or supply in
writing for us where those incidents might be the case, and if
fire boats need to be recommended from this Committee from a
funding perspective.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, ma'am.
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Ms. Richardson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Ms. Richardson.
Just a few more questions, Admiral.
What are the specific efficiencies and improvements that
have been made in the conduct of SAR cases that you can
attribute specifically to the creation of sectors? That is one
question. And two, you talked about what we have learned from
the cases that I have mentioned in my opening statement and the
establishment of these--I guess you call it courses? Are there
other things that we have done since these incidents to try to
improve our efficiency and effectiveness?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, having the
experience of being in a group that then became the activities
and very much the model for the sectors, I saw marked
differences in the integration and cohesion of Coast Guard
operations in the region because of the combining of the legacy
Marine Safety Offices with the group offices.
Previously, it was the groups that had the assets, it was
the Marine Safety Offices that had relationships, the
compliance and prevention aspect of the work. And so by
bringing those two together, we have a much better opportunity
to provide consistency to our partners to provide integrated
operations that look holistically across the mission sets and
requirements of our service. So I think that the first thing
that I would point to is better cohesion, better integration
across our mission sets.
Specifically to search and rescue, as we have brought these
communities of experience and background together, we do our
jobs better because of the deeper understanding of both
prevention and the compliance regimes that the Marine Safety
Program has to carry out, and how those can help us raise
levels of preventative activities and to guard against
accidents happening.
It also has helped us learn better how to dialogue with key
stakeholders. We have a number of search and rescue
professionals that we have to work with. Whenever we have a
search and rescue case, we look for the best provider, and it
might not be a Coast Guard asset that is available at that
time. So a response organization plans better because of the
deeper experience, and we communicate and work with our
stakeholders and partners better because of the things we have
learned by melding these two distinct cultures into the one
sector construct.
Specifically, to the watch standing, because of the
consolidation into sector commands, we have had to look very
hard at our staffing of these organizations. And that, combined
with a series of studies as well as the lessons learned from
the Morning Dew case forced us to grapple with how to stand the
watch better. And that is what has led us to a sector command
center that answers to the deputy sector commander, not to
response, not to prevention, recognizing that those two have to
both be served by the command center, but this is an important
enough entity within the sector that it needs to report
directly to that deputy commander.
We then have been able to fine-tune what is expected of the
watch that has led us to the operations unit, the
communications unit, and the situation unit in each of our
sectors. And the billets that have come on in the last year
will help us completely build out those situational units at
the sectors.
You talked earlier about the Morning Dew and the watch
stander being fearful of not needing to wake someone up. Not
only do we have that communications watch stander on the alert
12-hour watch now, we have the operations unit, our SAR-skilled
individual on an alert watch now. In Morning Dew, that is the
person that was sleeping, but we now have that person standing
the alert 12-hour watch at our sectors. Those two are the key
positions. They are facilitated by the information that is
managed, the situation awareness that occurs in the third unit
of 12-hour alert watches at our sectors. So as part of the new
organization, it was a fine-tuning and honing of the watch
structure that we would imbed within these new organizations.
Mr. Cummings. Let me just move on to another subject very
quickly.
I want to look more closely at some of the issues raised by
the Buona Madre case. Our focus today is on SAR, but this case
does raise a number of questions regarding casualty
investigations and other issues that the Subcommittee has
examined in some detail in the past. Again, I understand that
the Coast Guard is a named party in a legal action arising from
the Buona Madre case, but I do want to at least raise some of
these issues, and if I am stepping over the line, you just tell
me.
The casualty report on this Buona Madre incident indicates
that the Eva Danielson "failed to comply with navigational rule
number 5 in its failure to post a lookout, rule number 6, safe
speed, rule 7, risk of collision, and rule 19, conduct of
vessels in restricted visibility, rule 35, sound signals and
restricted visibility."
As a result of the investigation into the Buona Madre
incident, the report indicates that the Coast Guard referred a
civil penalty enforcement action against KS Aries Shipping for
violations of 46 U.S.C. 2302(a), and it goes on. There was
another violation alleged for bridge operation, ship handling,
and another one for collision. Are you familiar with all that?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. What is the status of the civil penalty case
now?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Mr. Chairman, that civil case was
dismissed without penalty, so the sector has the opportunity to
resubmit that. It was returned to Sector San Francisco last
November. They are continuing to process that and intend to
send that civil penalty forward again, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You know, it is interesting, I was kind of
surprised by--I just wondered what happened to the case. I
mean, we have a vessel that has allegedly falsified
information, run over a fishing vessel and killed a fisherman,
allegedly, and yet apparently the civil penalty case pertaining
to this matter wasn't developed to the degree where it could
withstand certain scrutiny. And as a lawyer, I know all kinds
of things happen in cases, but I just want to make sure that we
have the kind of personnel we need putting these cases
together, I guess. That is what I am trying to get at.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it was an
issue of the substance and content of the civil penalty case
that was forwarded recommending that penalty; rather, it was
the question the hearing officer had as to who should be held
accountable as we set that case forward.
Mr. Cummings. Now, I note that this Subcommittee has
examined the Casualty Investigation Program at Sector San
Francisco previously, and during the Cosco Busan incident.
Regarding that incident, the DHS Inspector General found that
five of the six individuals assigned to marine casualty
investigator billets were not qualified for those positions.
All three of the individuals who responded to the Cosco Busan
were unqualified as marine casualty investigators. Likely, as a
result of the inadequate training and experience and the use of
inadequate manuals, the investigators who responded to the
Cosco Busan failed to identify, collect and secure perishable
evidence related to this casualty.
Additionally, the Coast Guard incorrectly classified the
investigation of the Cosco Busan casualty as an informal
investigation rather than a formal investigation. Does the
apparent failure of the effort to prosecute the Eva Danielson
suggest that there are continuing shortfalls with the casualty
investigation program in Sector San Francisco? I know what you
just said, but I am just curious. And has this situation
improved, the one that I just talked about?
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Mr. Chairman, we know that we had
shortcomings in our Marine Safety program, and we specifically
have embarked on a Marine Safety Improvement Plan. The Cosco
Busan case, the Buona Madre case are indicators of, again, that
rigorous self-examination and the knowledge that we must do
better.
With the Marine Safety Improvement Plan, it went into place
in May of 2008, so this was after the Buona Madre case had
already occurred, we have laid out a course, and we are making
progress on that course to return our skills and our
proficiencies to the high standards that they need to be.
This is a very deliberative process that is going to take
us several years. Our plan stretches between fiscal year 2009
and fiscal year 2014, measured progress as we bring billets on,
as we improve skill sets, focusing on all of the marine safety
missions. So it is looking at our licensing and documentation
program, looking at our compliance and oversight, looking at
how we manage investigations and accident follow-on, outreach
and partnerships, recreational boating safety. All of that is
embedded within the Marine Safety Improvement Plan.
One key piece of that are Centers of Expertise that we are
establishing in key locations around the country so that we
have a cadre of senior mentors, if you will, who are able to
help us. We have established a Marine Safety Center of
Expertise in the Miami area that will focus on crew ship
issues. We are in the process of standing up our Marine Safety
Investigations Center of Expertise in New Orleans. We have
picked key locations where there is a lot of that business that
occurs naturally. New Orleans we have a plethora of
investigative activities that occur within that sector already.
We are collocating our Center of Expertise. We are putting in a
staff of six experienced investigators who can help us as we
develop doctrine, as we assess capabilities. If we have an
investigation, they can actually send an investigator to
assist.
So those are some of the things that I would cite that are
already happening through the Marine Safety Improvement Plan.
Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you this, and this will be my last
question; you know, when I listen to all the things that are
happening, I am very pleased that we are going in the direction
that we are going in because it is about making things better.
As you were speaking, I was just wondering to myself, is it
that we had a high standard, and for whatever reason slipped
back? Is it that circumstances have changed that where--I mean,
in the cases that we have talked about today, have
circumstances changed where there is just a different
environment? Has the post-9/11 stretching of the Guard and more
responsibilities had an impact? I guess what I am trying to
figure out--it may be a combination of all of those or none of
those, I don't know, but I am trying to get to what you see as
having gotten us to the point where we have to do all the
things that you talked about, new courses, all the things you
just talked about. And they are all good. But I want to make
sure that we are on a path where if it is a thing of standards,
if it is a thing of personnel, if it is stretched too far--
particularly post-9/11--whatever it is, that if we can get off
the path of what appears to be a slipping back so that we can
fix what we have and stay steady. I want to kind of know what
your assessment is. And I know that is kind of a loaded
question, but I am sure you have thought about this a lot. The
Coast Guard, rightfully so, has earned a phenomenal
reputation--I talk about the Coast Guard all the time. I want
to make sure that that reputation stays intact and that the
Coast Guard has everything it needs.
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. I thank you for your support, Mr.
Chairman. As I was considering the dialogue that we would have
today, one of the things that crossed my mind was--you have
probably seen the recent article, "First-Class Cadet Jacqueline
Fitch: A Regimental Commander of the Coast Guard Academy." I
think of individuals like her----
Mr. Cummings. From my district----
Admiral Brice-O'Hara. Yes, sir. I think of individuals who
are young, promising, eager to serve, they have joined the
Coast Guard because they want to make a difference. We have not
lost that passion. We have not lost that bias for action. But
there were periods before 9/11 where we were chronically
underfunded, we were underresourced. Even before the Morning
Dew case surfaced, we knew that we were stretching our people
with the watches they were standing. Unfortunately, it took
that crisis to enable us to get the resources to shift to the
12-hour watch that people had been telling us. National
Transportation Safety Board studies, our own studies pointed us
to those 12-hour watches.
So we have begun to get resources. We have applied those
resources as they were intended by Congress. But it has taken
us a while to be able to fill all of our positions and to grow
the stature and the experience and the wisdom within our
workforce for the missions that are becoming increasingly more
complex.
I think that the good news here is nobody is diminished in
their desire to do well. The Coast Guard has not stepped back
from the candid, hard examination of how we are performing, and
that we have put interventions in place. And we now must stay
the course and never step back from these very high standards
that we have established and continue to push our people so
that they are trained, guided, mentored, prepared, equipped,
and with the right leadership to do the job that is expected of
them by you, by the public, by the world.
Mr. Cummings. Well, I want to thank you very much for your
testimony.
I was visiting one of the stations, and a fellow told me
that when these hearings come on, that the Coast Guard watches
them. I didn't know that. So everybody watches them. But the
reason why I raise that is because I want it always to be
understood that everybody on this Committee--and particularly
this Subcommittee, I know--want the very best for the Coast
Guard. We have a phenomenal amount of respect. And I don't
think there is one Member of this Committee that does not
understand that we as a Congress can do better by the Coast
Guard. I know Mr. LoBiondo agrees with me because he talks
about it all the time.
We are going to fight with everything we have to try to
make sure that you get the resources that you need to do your
job. I know you didn't come here complaining. I asked you
certain questions, and you just told the truth. But all we want
is the very, very best for your personnel so that they can be
the best. And so I really thank you very much.
Mr. LoBiondo, did you have anything to add?
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to echo your
comments that when we have incidents like this, we are
interested in trying to drill down a little bit deeper; but
just a remarkable record of service for men and women who have
dedicated their lives under incredibly difficult circumstances
on many occasions, doing a great service to our Nation in many
different respects. And our heartfelt thanks goes out to
everyone in the Coast Guard for the tremendous job and the
service they are rendering to our Nation.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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