[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BACK ON TRACK: WMATA RED LINE METRORAIL ACCIDENT AND CONTINUAL FUNDING
CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE,
POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
GERRY E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JIM JORDAN, Ohio
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
Columbia JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois ------ ------
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
------ ------
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of
Columbia
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
Columbia JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
William Miles, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 14, 2009.................................... 1
Statement of:
Davis, Hon. Tom, III, a former Representative in Congress
from the State of Virginia; Jackie Jeter, president,
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689; and William Millar,
president, American Public Transportation Association...... 16
Davis, Hon. Tom, III..................................... 16
Jeter, Jackie............................................ 22
Millar, William.......................................... 31
Graham, Councilmember Jim, chairman, Board of Directors,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; John B.
Catoe, general manager, Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority; Deborah A.P. Hersman, member, National
Transportation Safety Board; Peter M. Rogoff,
administrator, Federal Transit Administration; and Eric
Madison, chairman, Tri-State Oversight Committee........... 58
Catoe, John B............................................ 63
Graham, Jim.............................................. 58
Hersman, Deborah A.P..................................... 77
Madison, Eric............................................ 91
Rogoff, Peter M.......................................... 84
Tuite, Patrick, eye witness and Metrorail Train 112 rider.... 47
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Catoe, John B., general manager, Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, prepared statement of................... 65
Chaffetz, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Utah, prepared statement of....................... 119
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 123
Davis, Hon. Tom, III, a former Representative in Congress
from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of.......... 19
Graham, Councilmember Jim, chairman, Board of Directors,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, prepared
statement of............................................... 60
Hersman, Deborah A.P., member, National Transportation Safety
Board, prepared statement of............................... 79
Jeter, Jackie, president, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local
689, prepared statement of................................. 24
Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts:
Letter dated July 14, 2009............................... 14
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Prepared statement of the Washington Metro Area
Transportation Authority Riders' Advisory Council...... 2
Madison, Eric, chairman, Tri-State Oversight Committee,
prepared statement of...................................... 93
Millar, William, president, American Public Transportation
Association, prepared statement of......................... 33
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 121
Rogoff, Peter M., administrator, Federal Transit
Administration, prepared statement of...................... 86
Tuite, Patrick, eye witness and Metrorail Train 112 rider,
prepared statement of...................................... 51
BACK ON TRACK: WMATA RED LINE METRORAIL ACCIDENT AND CONTINUAL FUNDING
CHALLENGES
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service,
and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, Cummings, Kucinich,
Connolly, Chaffetz, Bilbray, and Issa.
Also present: Representatives Van Hollen and Mica.
Staff present: William Miles, staff director; Aisha
Elkheshin, clerk; Jill Crissman, professional staff member;
Margaret McDavid and Jill Henderson, detailees; Daniel Zeidman
and Christina Severin, interns; Lawrence Brady, minority staff
director; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of outreach and
senior advisor; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member
liaison; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; Christopher
Bright, minority senior professional staff member; and Glenn
Sanders, minority Defense fellow.
Mr. Lynch. Good afternoon, everyone. I apologize for the
brief delay in starting this hearing. The Subcommittee on the
Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia
will now come to order.
I welcome our ranking member, Jason Chaffetz, member of the
subcommittee, all hearing witnesses, and all those in
attendance.
The Chair, ranking member, and the subcommittee members
will each have 5 minutes to make opening statements, and all
Members will have 3 days to submit statements for the record.
At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent that
the testimony from the Washington Metro Area Transportation
Authority Riders' Advisory Council be submitted for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.003
Mr. Lynch. I would also like to ask unanimous consent that
Representative Chris Van Hollen be allowed to join us and to
ask questions of witnesses appearing before us today.
Hearing no objections, it is so ordered.
Ladies and gentlemen, again, let me welcome you to the
subcommittee's third District of Columbia-related oversight
hearing, entitled, ``Back on Track: The Washington Metro Area
Transit Authority Red Line Metrorail Accident and Continual
Funding Challenges.''
Before delving into the purpose of this afternoon's
hearing, I would like to express this subcommittee's heartfelt
sympathy, and that of all of our Members in Congress, for the
victims of the Red Line Metrorail accident on Monday, June 22,
2009, and for their families and friends. The tragic loss of
life and the dozens of injuries make today's oversight hearing
all that more important.
As the Nation's capital area's most public transportation
authority, WMATA provides services to a population of over 3\1/
2\ million people within a 1,500-square-mile area through
Metrorail, Metrobus, and MetroAccess. And given the reliance of
Metro not only for the local economy but also nationally, with
an estimated 42 percent of our Federal employees commuting to
work via Metro and millions of tourists depending on the system
to get around, it is critically important that America's
transit system be both dependable and safe.
While, to their credit, the Washington Metro Area Transit
Authority has at times certainly exhibited great qualities over
its 33-year history, last month's accident points to the fact
that there still remains room for improvement in terms of
ensuring that the highest standards of safety exist for Metro
riders and employees.
Additionally, the June Red Line Metrorail accident also
reignited the debate over the state of WMATA's financial
condition and the impact that the authority's funding
challenges has on such issues as deferred maintenance, capital
enhancement projects, and WMATA's ability to upgrade and
replace aging equipment and railcars. Thus, it is the intent of
the subcommittee that today's hearing also be used to reexamine
and discuss WMATA's financial condition and its effect on
safety, reliability, and dependability.
I must also say that I am happy to learn that funds have
been provided in the fiscal year 2010 Transportation-HUD
Appropriations bill marked up yesterday. Although it has only
been a little over 2 months since the subcommittee's last
oversight hearing on WMATA, the events of the past month have
obviously necessitated a need for this panel to reassess and
explore a host of issues relating to WMATA's services and
operations, which are indispensable to the region and to the
Federal Government.
While today's hearing certainly won't bring a final
resolution as to the cause or leading factors of the recent
accident, given the various ongoing investigations, the hearing
is meant to continue the dialog between WMATA and its regional
partners and the various Federal Government oversight entities
on the specific issue of system safety and to learn what is
being done now to prevent, as best as possible, another fatal
accident from occurring in the future.
I would like to thank today's witnesses for joining us as
we discuss this important matter. I look forward to your
testimony.
And I now yield to our ranking member, Jason Chaffetz, the
gentleman from Utah, for 5 minutes.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.005
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Chairman Lynch. I appreciate you
holding this hearing and participation today.
On April 29th, we held an oversight hearing on the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. At that
hearing, we examined Metro's financial condition and internal
controls, along with safety and security issues.
On June 22, 2009, a tragic accident, the most serious in
Metro's history, occurred on the Red Line. One train crashed
into the back of another, killing 9 and injuring 80. In
addition to the dead and injured, damage to the morale of
Metro's riders and its workers and to Metro's reputation as a
whole is ongoing. A recent Washington Post editorial commented
on the crash as having, ``shattered many riders' assumptions
about the safety of the system.''
Today's oversight hearing will examine that accident and
continuing challenges faced by Metro. Metro appears to be in
the throws of an epic crisis. As a Member of Congress and as a
Metro user myself, I am very concerned about the direction.
Even before the catastrophe of June 22nd, a Washington Post
story described comments from the Metro riders as revealing,
``a band of beaten down and frustrated people who, despite
their close kinship with Metro, have had about enough.''
In the wake of the June 22nd crash, a more recent story
reflected growing concerns about extensively cramped
conditions, long commutes, jerky rides, abrupt stops, and
passengers waiting for more than three full trains to pass
before boarding. There is also evidence of nerves rubbed raw
and some reports of yelling and shoving along the way.
While investigations are continuing, there are deeply
disturbing reports of track circuit problems which should have
been anticipated and which have been dealt with in other
systems, notably the Bay Area Rapid Transit system in San
Francisco. Metro apparently never installed a backup system
that is used by BART.
A significant segment of the Federal work force relies on
the Metro, plus millions of visitors each year. We are also
quite aware of the enhanced security issues which apply to the
Metro because it services the Washington region.
The last Congress approved a measure sponsored by the
former chairman of our committee, Tom Davis, who I am pleased
to see is one of our witnesses today. That law authorizes much-
needed funds and mandates management assistance, but follow-
through by the administration and this Congress is required to
make that law a reality.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today. And let
me just say, on a personal note, our heartfelt thoughts and
prayers with those who were injured and killed on the Metro. It
is devastating anytime you see that. I think that is the
importance of the hearing today.
I look forward to the participation here. We want to make
sure that we are implementing the best practices. I think
individually--let's break it up--everybody's heart is in the
right direction. But if the management is not there to
coordinate and move it forward in a cohesive manner, I think
that is where this committee needs to be involved.
I have my Metro card. I like riding it. I enjoy it. But
there are also challenges. There are times and things and
frustrations that I think are appropriate for us to dive into.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. I
look forward to the dialog, from hearing from our witnesses,
and a better understanding of what is happening or what is not
happening with the Metro today.
And, with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
Before we continue with opening statements, I would invite
our first panel to come forward and be seated.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from the District
of Columbia, Ms. Holmes Norton, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to once again thank Chairman Stephen Lynch for his
attention to Metro by responding to my request early in his
tenure as the new Chair of this subcommittee with a hearing on
April 24th, and again today granting my request for this
hearing in light of the June 22nd Metro tragedy.
I had spoken with the appropriate Metro and National
Transportation Safety Board officials concerning this hearing
before the investigation is completed and learned that it is
not unusual to be asked to testify before an investigation is
fully completed. The investigation of this collision may
require well in excess of a year or even more.
Following our hearing in April, we had every reason to
believe that the Metro system was a safe system. And, because
of the consistent oversight of this subcommittee, I continue to
believe that the system that serves this region and millions of
visitors is safe. I would not hesitate to board a Metro train
even after the tragedy of June 22nd.
However, the public is not fully aware of what this
subcommittee has learned during years of consistent oversight
about the overall safety of the system. And, in any case, the
public deserves to know much more about this recent
catastrophe. It is fair for riders to seek reassurance now or
to know whether there is reason to be concerned about the daily
trip on a Metro train. The public has bits and pieces of
information about what may have caused the accident and what is
being done now to assure its safety. Today's hearing, however,
will make public all that is known now, as Congress opens its
own investigation and will allow the public to separate urban
legend from authoritative facts and eyewitness testimony.
Long before the June 22nd accident, the regional
congressional delegation had been working to secure funds for
Metro for capital costs, such as replacement of Metro trains
burdened by increasing numbers of Federal and congressional
employees, among others; actually subsidized by the Federal
Government in order to encourage employees to take Metro, who
form the majority of Metro's weekday employees.
Today, the region is particularly grateful to
Transportation and Housing and Urban Development Appropriations
Chair John Olver for finding the funds in his appropriation for
the first $150 million installment and the $1.5 billion
Congress authorized for a 10-year period.
Regrettably, despite our efforts over several years,
funding was not authorized until 2008, when control changed in
the Congress. But we particularly appreciate the efforts of the
former Chair of the full committee, Tom Davis, who started us
down the road to today's funding. And we are happy to have him
testify today.
The necessary funds also were not included in the
President's budget, despite constant urging from the regional
delegation. But Chairman Olver found the funds to meet this
year's commitment. And I know that millions of public and
private employees and residents are deeply grateful to him and
to the subcommittee.
I have just come, Mr. Chairman, from managing a floor
resolution recognizing those who were injured and remembering
residents we lost in this tragedy: seven from the District of
Columbia, one from Maryland, and another from Virginia.
We do not have a response that can console the losses of
the victims and their families and those who were injured.
However, we can begin with today's hearing and the first
appropriation for Metro under our bill to demonstrate to all
the families, friends, and associates, and to current riders
that this tragedy has already had immediate effects for
assuring the safety of our transportation system.
May I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your consistent
attention to this system.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentlelady.
I would now like to ask unanimous consent to allow Mr. Mica
from Florida, who I am told was a past chairman of this
subcommittee, to allow him to join the panel and in today's
discussion, as well.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
At this time, I would like to recognize Mr. Mica from
Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mica. Well, thank you. And thank you for yielding.
And while I am on the full committee, I am no longer a
member of this subcommittee, and I am pleased to be here to
discuss an important topic. I also am the Republican ranking
member of the full Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
And Ms. Norton and I also serve on that committee today. In
that capacity, I did want to make some remarks.
And, first of all, I want to join others in expressing our
sympathy to those that lost loved ones in the tragedy of the
Metro crash. We don't know all of the details. I know NTSB is
investigating. But, again, our heartfelt sympathy to those who
lost loved ones or had family members injured in that tragedy.
And it is our important responsibility on this
subcommittee, an investigative committee of Congress, and I
applaud you for holding this hearing. I think it is very
important that not just the Transportation Committee but an
investigative committee take action, like you are doing here
today.
It has been reported that the automatic train control
system failed to detect a train waiting on the track. If the
system had been working properly, possibly, again, the crash
could have been avoided. NTSB will really investigate the crash
and let us know.
However, we do know that other transit systems around the
country rely on automatic train control systems, including San
Francisco, Boston, Baltimore, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and, in my
State, Miami.
Last year, Congress and a lot of us worked on it together.
We passed an Amtrak rail passenger, rail safety bill. And in
that legislation, Congress required that within the next 6
years commuter rail trains, inner-city passenger trains, and
freight trains carrying hazardous materials install similar
positive train control systems. We have to learn lessons from
tragedies like the one we have experienced here in the
Washington community for rail safety around the country.
I do want to note for the record that, 3 years ago, the
Highway and Transit Subcommittee held an oversight hearing on
transit safety. And, at that hearing, the Government
Accountability Office made a number of findings and argued for
a more robust safety oversight program.
Unlike aviation, railroads, including commuter railroads,
transit safety oversight is handled at the local level by State
safety oversight agencies. This is because the Federal Transit
Administration is a grantmaking agency; it is not a regulatory
body.
Each rail transit system is different and has unique system
specifications. The transit agency develops a system safety
plan for each transit system. And the State's safety oversight
agency directly oversees the safety of the transit system by
reviewing safety plans, performing audits, and investigating
accidents.
Some of you may not know this, but FTA currently does not
permit expenditure of funds to support those safety offices and
officers who have that responsibility. I am sending and some
Members have already joined me in sending this letter to the
FTA Administer today. And it is as follows. Let me paraphrase
it here.
We understand that the Federal Transit Administration
administrative policy prohibits transit agencies from using
their Federal grant dollars to support expenses of the State
safety offices that directly oversee the safety of transit
systems. Again, according to a GAO report from our committee,
these State safety offices are often inadequately funded and
staffed. I think in Washington Metro, up until about a year
ago, they had about one position; now they have two. And,
again, they are prohibited from taking these Federal dollars.
And it is not by law, it is by policy.
However, given what occurred last year with, I guess, the
Boston Green Line and also with the Washington Metro system
recently, we feel it is important that these safety offices be
strengthened. So we recommend in this letter here that the
Federal Transit Administration work with us to provide those
agencies, again, the flexibility to utilize some of the
dollars, maybe a small percentage, for some of these important
positions.
So I will be asking other Members to sign this and send
this.
And I think that the final concern that I have here,
Members, is that Mr. Oberstar and I have been trying to get a
major highway and transit bill passed. The current one we
operate under expires in just a few months, at the end of
September. The administration has now said, while we are in the
process of drafting this thing, sort of dropped a bomb on us
and said, let's extend this for 18 months.
What will happen is all of these safety projects, all of
our transportation projects, our major transit projects and
major highway and infrastructure projects will be put on hold
for 2 years. And if we wanted to mandate changes by law, we
would have a tough time doing so.
So I urge everyone to work with Mr. Oberstar and myself to
try to move that legislation forward. I urge Members to sign
this letter, because we don't need legislation to get FTA to do
what they should be doing, is allowing more flexibility and the
use of these Federal funds for safety oversight purposes.
Thank you so much for the courtesy extended me, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Would the gentleman like to have the letter
added into the record?
Mr. Mica. I would. And I appreciate it. And I will also ask
other Members to sign. Thank you so much. I ask unanimous
consent.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman's
letter be entered into the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.006
Mr. Lynch. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Issa, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask unanimous
consent that my full opening statement be placed in the record.
Mr. Lynch. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, we are honored today, as
Congresswoman Norton said, to have Mr. Davis here. Mr. Davis,
when he was Chairman Davis, championed the Metro system and
continued to do so until his departure last year. As I will
predict, Congressman Davis would rightfully so say, ``If you
can't get it right in D.C., you can't get it right in public
trains around the country.''
There is a proposal in the stimulus package just passed a
few months ago to put a mag-lift type of train, a high-speed,
200-mile-an-hour train between Orange County and Las Vegas. It
is pretty clear that we have fundamental problems with going 59
miles an hour with absolute safety in Washington, DC.
Here, today, we are going to hear about how the accident
happened, how it won't happen again. But, more importantly, I
think this is an opportunity for us to look at a 30-plus-year-
old system, since 1973 when the whole Metro system began being
rolled together, and say, have we done all that we can do?
I know that Chairman Davis did all he could do on his
watch. But I do believe that Washington, DC, a compact city
with a large ridership that comes in to Federal systems or in
and around the city every day, commuters who, by both their own
choice and by incentives from the Federal Government,
essentially in most cases free passes, want to use this system
and want it to be 100 percent safe and 100 percent reliable.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that we, as a committee, have a
special obligation to look at this system. But I believe that
what we get right in this system, including the full funding of
all the safety requirements, in fact is essential for all
systems around the country.
And I, like many people--everyone has a solution when they
come after a tragedy like this. I might strongly suggest to
this committee that we bear in mind that there are billions of
unspent stimulus dollars that are, in fact, earmarked for train
transportation that will not be spent in the near future and
might very well still be redirectable to meet the needs of
getting the Metro system both safe and reliable at the level
that we believed we were at and believe we should be at.
I look forward to hearing our panel. And I thank the
chairman for holding this important hearing, and yield back.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
Before we swear our witnesses, I want to ask, if Mr. Tuite
is here, come forward.
Mr. Tuite was an eyewitness on the day of the accident. We
will entertain him when he does arrive.
It is the custom in this subcommittee to swear witnesses
who are to testify. May I ask you all to stand and raise your
right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record reflect that all of the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative, with the absence of Mr.
Tuite, who will be sworn when he arrives.
And your entire statement will be included in the record.
Mr. Davis, I am sure you don't need to be instructed in
this matter, but the green light indicates that each witness
has 5 minutes to summarize your statement. The yellow light
means you have 1 minute remaining to complete your statement.
And the red light indicates that your time for speaking has
expired.
Originally, I had offered the courtesy to Mr. Connolly to
introduce Mr. Davis. And here he is. Perfect.
Mr. Issa. Gerry, you are a little late. We were just about
to give your seat away.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman is right on time, as always.
The Chair would now like to recognize the gentleman from
northern Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for the purposes of
introducing Mr. Davis.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, as
ever, for your graciousness.
It is a great privilege for me to sit up here and welcome
back to this committee our distinguished former chairman, Tom
Davis.
Tom Davis and I have followed in each other's footsteps. He
was a longtime member of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County, then became the chairman of Fairfax County, and then
took this congressional seat. I also was a longtime member of
the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, succeeded Tom as
chairman, and then of course succeeded him in this seat.
Tom has been a friend and mentor. He has shown bipartisan
inclinations that are deeply appreciated. And I want to say
personally, in my transition to this job, Tom Davis could not
have been more gracious and more generous, he and his staff.
And I just want to thank him and thank him for his
leadership on Metro. Without Tom's visions, this Congress would
never have come up with the idea of a $150 million matching
grant to the localities putting up capital money for Metro.
As the tragedy of June 22nd underscored, Metro is starved
for capital investment. And the Federal Government bears some
responsibility, as do the localities, in trying to address that
investment shortage. And, again, I salute my predecessor, Tom
Davis, for his understanding of that issue, his vision for what
had to be done, and his willingness to make sure that this
Congress lives up to that obligation.
Welcome back, Tom.
STATEMENTS OF HON. TOM DAVIS III, A FORMER REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA; JACKIE JETER, PRESIDENT,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 689; AND WILLIAM MILLAR,
PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM DAVIS III
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. Thank you, Representative
Connolly, in your continued commitment to public service. We
have fought a lot of battles, usually together, not always, as
local politics go.
Chairman Lynch, thank you for calling this hearing. It is
timely, it is important.
Let me thank Ms. Norton, Mr. Issa, who helped us pass this
legislation first in 2006 and then in 2008, and we finally got
it through the Senate and into law.
And to Ranking Member Chaffetz, it is nice to see you
again, and thank you for your leadership, as well.
We saw early on, with GAO reports, that Metro has a $6
billion shortfall in terms of its capital funding need, and
there was no way that this could have been raised within the
existing system. Fares would not have supported it.
So the legislation simply bit off part of that, $3 billion:
$1.5 billion paid for by the Federal Government over 10 years;
$1.5 billion in matching funds--dedicated matching funds from
localities. Prior to the legislation, there was no dedicated
funding. Metro got what it got on an annual basis. And when
local governments cut their budget, Metro suffered as a result.
This has put, I think, a needed discipline on local
governments to get the match. And I was just thrilled to hear
that Chairman Olver put in the $150 million last night in the
transportation appropriation bill. This is a precedent for the
next 10 years that I think will go a long way toward making the
Metro system safer and stronger.
I also want to offer my condolences to the friends and the
families of the nine Metro passengers who were tragically lost
in last month's crash. And for those that are injured, I wish
them a speedy recovery.
You know, as policymakers, like it or not, we bear some
responsibility in funding and some of the shortfalls the system
has had over time. And I think, if anything else, we want to
learn from this. We don't want this to happen again.
So let me go briefly over what the legislation called for
and what remains to be done and how we can continue to make
this a safer and a better system here in the Nation's subway
system.
First of all, the Congress, last night, put in $150 million
for the fiscal year. The localities have already come up with
their match. An independent IG was established under the
legislation so that Metro--it wouldn't be looking at itself.
You would have an independent inspector general, which we think
helps their operations and keeps them on their toes, something
that I think was overdue. Metro actually--we introduced the
legislation. Metro actually acted on their own to establish
this, but the legislation mandates it.
Finally, Federal representation on the Metro board was an
important concept, and that has not taken place yet. It hasn't
taken place because Congress has not adopted the changes to the
Metro compact. Representative Hoyer has pending legislation
that will do that. All three of the States have amended the
Metro compact through their State legislatures and city
counsels. Now the Federal Government has to do it, and I think
as quickly as possible so the President can appoint two Federal
members to the Metro board.
Now, why is this important? It is important because,
although Virginia and Maryland and the District have
representatives on this subway system, the natural tendency--
and I have been in local government for 15 years before I came
here--is to be rather provincial in terms of how you look at
the system. Is it good for Maryland? Is it good for Virginia?
Is it good for stations in my district? Having that Federal
representation on there, that Federal expertise, I think will
add a level, if you will, of maturity and a level of analysis
that I think will be helpful to this system. The President has
to make good appointees, but I think we can count on them to do
that. So that has to happen, as well.
The legislation also expanded wireless service on the Metro
system. Prior to this, it was reserved for one operator. This
expands it. We think this is helpful, particularly in cases of
accidents and crime.
Finally, let me say that I think the NTSB has identified
some improvements that need to be worked on immediately: this
new signaling system, monitoring and tracking systems. I think
there is stimulus money available. It would be helpful if the
Congress pushed to get a slug of money up there, right there,
to make these changes right away so that the kind of tragedy
that happened on June 22nd will not happen again and we can
make those changes.
Other than that, I want to thank the Members up here in the
House for being so supportive of Metro over the years. It was
the Senate that held the legislation up for 4 years. And you
all have been great to work with.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis III follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
And I want to add to Mr. Connolly's remarks about you, Mr.
Davis, and how, as chairman of this committee, you were very
fair and bipartisan and provided a great example, I think, of
strong leadership in the Congress during your time here.
At this point, I would like to introduce Ms. Jackie Jeter.
She is the president of the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local
689. Ms. Jeter began her career with the Transit Authority as a
part-time bus operator in 1979 and has worked as a full-time
bus operator, train operator, and interlocking operator. Ms.
Jeter is a member of today's women's caucus of Local 689 and
has the distinction of being the first female assistant
business agent of Local 689.
And I also want to express my heartfelt sympathies for you
and your members. I know you lost a valued member of your local
union, Local 689, in Jeanice McMillan on the day of this
accident. And we understand that her conduct at the time of
this accident, in slowing the train down, may have saved lives,
in terms of her own action here.
But, again, we thank you for your attendance here. And you
are now recognized for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JACKIE JETER
Ms. Jeter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. It is my honor
to serve as a witness before you today.
As a rail operator of 22 years and as president of the
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689, I am deeply and
personally affected by the tragic WMATA rail accident of June
22nd. I join my union members and others to urge swift
corrective actions.
We stand ready to help find solutions, improvements, and
technological advancements capable of advancing the problems of
the aging WMATA system. I firmly believe that we cannot afford
to spend time on expensive studies and multiple meetings, but
must instead move into implementation mode without further
delay.
When the National Transportation Safety Board's report from
its investigation into the June 22nd accident is in hand, we
will have a much better idea of what went wrong and how to
resolve those problems. I urge the committee to be cautious
about drawing any conclusions from this hearing. I believe that
it would be premature to publicly conjecture about the causes
of the crash.
I also call on WMATA and the NTSB to be transparent in
their investigation for the sake of the workers, the public,
and policymakers.
Local 689's motto is ``We Make It Work.'' Jeanice McMillan,
the operator killed in the crash, embodied that spirit. Her
actions epitomized the heroism sometimes required of our
members.
Safety is the No. 1 priority of Local 689. It is what we
work hard to deliver every day to every rider on the buses and
trains. As president of the workers union, one of my primary
goals is to ensure that every worker receives appropriate
safety measures and training from WMATA.
While we do not yet know the exact causes of the accident,
there were troubling patterns of WMATA's responses to previous
NTSB recommendations. Since the first fatal accident on WMATA
in 1982, the NTSB has recommended installing car-borne monitors
in every WMATA car to provide advanced performance data for
every department. None of the 1000-series cars in the system
are so equipped, including those involved in the accident.
After the 1996 Shady Grove accident, the NTSB recommended
WMATA evaluate all series of Metrorail cars with respect to
resisting car body telescoping and providing better passenger
protection, and make the necessary modifications.
After the 2004 Woodley Park accident, the NTSB made a
specific recommendation to either retire or retrofit the Rohr-
built 1000-series cars based on their crash worthiness. WMATA
again failed to comply with these recommendations, citing costs
and binding lease agreements through 2014.
The NTSB made an urgent recommendation to include specific
instructions when responding to rollback situations, and WMATA
responded that it would not address the issue. The
recommendation was left as ``open, unacceptable response,'' in
the NTSB reports.
It is unfortunate that the NTSB can do little more than
make recommendations based on these findings. It has no power
as an agency to enforce any of its own suggestions.
Furthermore, there is no independent body with oversight of
WMATA other than Congress.
Over the years, Local 689's leadership has continually made
suggestions to WMATA for procedural and equipment changes.
WMATA is allowed to choose, ignore, defer recommendations until
it deems the time ripe for implementation. Safety should not
fall victim to fiscal constraints or internal priorities. Any
legislation for the WMATA system should include regulations,
enforcement, and oversight.
WMATA is heavily constrained by its funding--and I see that
my time is running out--and I believe that funding is important
for WMATA. We need dollars. It is an aging infrastructure, and
in order to make that infrastructure work for the members of
Local 689 and all of the employees of WMATA, we have to put the
money where this Nation wants it. If public transportation is
something that we need--and we sorely need it; based on the
economy itself, it has been proven that public transportation
is needed--then we need to put the dollars where it is needed.
And I thank you so much for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jeter follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentlelady.
Our next witness is Mr. William Millar, who joined the
American Public Transportation Association in 1996 and has
worked to increase Federal investments in public
transportation.
From 1973 to 1977, Mr. Millar worked for the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation, where he created Pennsylvania's
free transit program for senior citizens. Mr. Millar also spent
13 years as the executive director at the Port Authority of
Allegheny County.
Mr. Millar, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MILLAR
Mr. Millar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank you
for holding these hearings today. And I appreciate very much
the opportunity to be here on behalf of the public
transportation industry.
You know, when a terrible tragedy such as the one that is
the subject of this hearing occurs, all of us certainly feel a
great loss. We feel certainly great sympathy, and our prayers
and our sympathies go out to the victims, to their families, to
their loved ones. It is a tragedy like this that causes us to
take a step back, to examine what we do, to see how we might
improve the way we do things in order to prevent these types of
accidents from happening.
As others have already said, we do not yet know the exact
causes, but that shouldn't stop us from taking prudent steps to
move forward. And I know later in this hearing you will hear
testimony from WMATA and others about steps that are being
taken.
Our association stands ready to support WMATA, this
committee, and any other bodies involved here in trying to make
our systems safer.
Now, notwithstanding the terrible tragedy we are discussing
today, Americans are using public transportation in modern
record numbers. There are many reasons why Americans are using
public transit, but there is one undeniable common thread: Tens
of millions of customers rely on public transportation every
day because our systems are fundamentally safe, but, as this
terrible tragedy demonstrates, they can always and must be made
safer.
Years of proven performance records have instilled a
confidence in the riding public that our systems will transport
them safely. I continue to use Metrorail for my commute on a
daily basis because it is a safe system and because the
alternatives are much less safe.
The U.S. Department of Transportation data shows that a
person is 29 times safer when using heavy rail public
transportation such as WMATA operates rather than taking the
same trip in an automobile.
Further, the congressionally created National Surface
Transportation Revenue and Policy Study Commission indicated
that highway travel accounts for over 94 percent of all
fatalities and then 99 percent of all injuries on the Nation's
surface transportation system.
This data clearly indicates that the public's trust in
public transportation is not misplaced. Public transit is one
of the safest modes of transportation available.
But, numbers and statistics aside, nothing is infallible.
Therefore, APTA and its members remain vigilant in continuing
our commitment to advancing transit safety and promoting the
safety operation of rail transit systems.
I have been asked to comment on several areas by the
committee regarding safety standards and procedures in the
industry. Please note, I am not speaking of WMATA specifically
but rather presenting information generally about the industry,
much of which would be applicable to WMATA.
For decades, we have been the leading force in developing
safety programs and standards for public transportation
operations, maintenance, and procurement. In the 1980's, APTA
was asked by the rail transit industry and FTA's predecessor,
the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, to develop a
standardized program for rail transit safety, which we
established under the auspices of what was then known as the
Rail Safety Review Board.
APTA's commitment to safety was also the basis for our
standards development program initiated in 1996, which
currently include standards for rail transit, commuter rail,
bus operations, procurement, intelligent communications
interface, and security.
Our organization has been designated as a standards
development organization [SDO], by the U.S. Department of
Transportation and is funded, in part, through grants from the
Federal Transit Administration.
Congress has also officially recognized the importance of
promoting voluntary, industry-based standards as a way of
creating uniformity within the legal and regulatory structure
of the United States.
My written testimony contains much more detail on the
nature of these standards, the process that is used, and things
of that sort.
I do think it is important to realize we don't rely just on
our own members or our own expertise. We involve many other
organizations, such as the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers, the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance
Association, and a host of others, as well as working with the
Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Railroad
Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, and
others in developing these standards.
To date, we have published over 170 rail standards in
categories applicable to heavy rail transit and such as those
used by WMATA. The heavy rail crash worthiness standard
developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in
corroboration with APTA is a good example, developed after some
5 years of work at the professional level.
Now, there is much more in my written comments. I
appreciate I have exhausted my time here, and I would certainly
look forward to answering any questions you might have. Thank
you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Millar follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
I now yield myself 5 minutes.
Let me just say that I know there are four or five Federal
agencies that have shared responsibility here, and this has
resulted in an inordinate amount of acronyms being used at this
hearing. So I would just caution people to at least, before you
use the acronym, just describe the full title of whatever that
is you are referring to.
And for those listening or watching at home, ``WMATA''
stands for Washington Metro Area Transit Authority. And so you
will hear that constantly referred to. WMATA is the Metro.
Easier to understand it in that sense.
Let me ask, Ms. Jeter, you are in a unique position, I
think. And I know we were introduced previously to Steve
McDougall, who is the president of Local 589 in the Boston
area. And we have had situations on the T in Boston with train
collisions.
Now, I understand where we are on the Metro. And I am a
rider, as well; I am a commuter. I don't have a car down here,
so I find myself on the Metro quite a bit. But there are two
systems, and one is to have a manual operating system where the
conductor actually operates the train manually, and then there
is an automated system that is used.
As I understand the circumstances of the most recent
accident, Train 214, which was the first train in line, was
being operated manually by that conductor, while the one that
Ms. McMillan was operating, hers was on automatic.
Ms. Jeter. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. And the way it should have worked was that Ms.
McMillan's train, 112, should have detected the train in front
of her and should have automatically stopped the train or
slowed it down. And, as I understand it, she visually made a
report that there was a train ahead. So all the indications
were that she recognized the threat but that, mechanically, the
system did not work and it failed.
When you have this seeming conflict--and I am not sure why
the first train was manually operated. Maybe that was a
decision by the conductor in that case. I understand those
signals weren't operating in that area, or they were operating
intermittently in that area. It may have been a decision on the
part of the conductor just to switch to manual operation. I am
not sure.
But where you have this conflict, is there a way to safely
resolve that? What are your own observations, having been in
the seat yourself and being very, very familiar with the
circumstances, for your conductors, for your employees? How
best might we resolve that conflict between going in manual
operation and automatic operation?
Ms. Jeter. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say
that, under no circumstances, whether the train was in manual
or in ATO, should it have happened. Safeguards are in place to
protect that kind of accident from occurring whether you are in
manual or in automatic.
I think that the operators are trained to know when it is
best for them to move up in a manual or switch from automatic
to manual.
And, also, from my experience and history as an operator, I
have also seen where all you should have to do is let central
know that you have encountered a problem. Once you let them
know that you have encountered a problem, they know that manual
operation is needed.
I believe in the system. I believe in it wholeheartedly. I,
like you, believe that it is a safe system, although it should
be safer at this point. But I do know that, under no--and I
hope I answered your question, because, under no circumstances,
should it have occurred, period.
Mr. Lynch. I thank you.
And I now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz from
Utah, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Davis, if you could expand a little bit about
the funding itself, what would happen if the funding were not
to go forward, from your perspective and history?
And then the second part of that question is, is the
funding alone going to solve the problem, or are there other
challenges that you see above and beyond just the funding, lack
of funding?
Mr. Davis. Money doesn't always solve problems by itself.
That is why we put the independent IG into this legislation and
Federal representation. We thought all of these would enhance
oversight over the system, to help it being spent correctly
along the way.
The history of this is it came under the old District of
Columbia Committee. Every other transit in the country came
under the Transportation Committee, Transportation and
Infrastructure [T&I]. But this came under the old D.C.
Committee. This goes back to the days of President Eisenhower.
And so, when we were putting together transportation bills,
you know, whether it was TEA-LU or whatever the machination
was, Metro's funding wasn't included in that. There was no
grab-bag for Metro to get money outside of the annual Federal
appropriation. So we want a separate route through this
committee to get the authorization bill together. But that is
one of the reasons I think that money was not as forthcoming.
Of course, second, although the Metro system operates in
three different jurisdictions--D.C., Maryland, and Virginia--
when it comes to transportation funding, it is a grab-bag. And
whether it was under the Federal Transit Administration or
UMTA, its precursors, we are not able to get it in the same
way, because we weren't on the same list. We operated
independently and separate. That is why Metro needed its own
funding legislation that we put forward.
Mr. Chaffetz. But the consequence, if the funding doesn't
happen--I mean, it wasn't in the President's first budget. If
these things don't come to fruition, what do you see happening?
Mr. Davis. There is a $6 billion documented need. Our
legislation addresses $3 billion of it, which is half Federal
and half local dedicated revenue, which they never had before.
Under the President's budget, there would have been nothing
in there originally. And that is why we are grateful that the
House put it in. Nothing proceeds. By the way, if the Federal
Government doesn't put their $150 million in, the local
jurisdictions may decide not to, too. So it is almost a $300
million hit.
But it looks like it is on its way.
Mr. Chaffetz. Ms. Jeter, let me ask you real quickly in the
brief moments that I have here, as the chairman was talking
about the manual versus automatic, can you talk a little bit
about the morale and things that you are seeing happening now?
Because I really get concerned that when we have Federal
employees and the public at large traveling here. Obviously,
any crash is devastating.
You were quoted as saying, ``We haven't received anything
that would make us think this was an isolated incident. I do
need to know that this is not going to happen again. I do have
people out there who are afraid.''
Ms. Jeter. Yes. You know, as operators report to work every
day, I think the main thing to remember is that we are trained
to be professionals, but your own basic need for survival and
your instincts kick in, you know, at some point.
And because early on in the investigation we had received
information from different operators that there had been other
instances where, even though a crash had not taken place, that
their train did not respond to the commands, or the wayside
equipment did not command the train as it should have. And so,
for that reason, yes, we do have employees that are
apprehensive about whether or not this will occur again.
But I do believe that, as professional as we all try to be
in our occupations and as we report to our jobs, the operators
will continue to work. Those who would like to go back to the
bus and maybe don't have the stomach anymore for operating a
train, I am sure that Mr. Kubicek will make sure that they have
the opportunity to do so.
Mr. Chaffetz. And real quickly, I only have seconds left
here, but maybe if each of the three of you could just address,
what is the No. 1 thing you would like to see us do?
Mr. Millar. Well, certainly, as Mr. Mica said, getting good
funding in place for safety, getting a long-term transportation
bill with sufficient resources so not only WMATA but transit
systems across the country can address their fundamental needs
is critical.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Sorry, my time is short.
Ms. Jeter.
Ms. Jeter. I think the funding is essential. No matter what
you talk about, whether you talk about training, whether you
talk about enhanced technology, you need dollars, no matter
what.
Mr. Davis. Two things. First, adopt the Metro Compact
amendments. The Federal Government has not adopted their share.
I think that enhances the annual funding $150 million, which is
put in. And second, I think we ought to take a shot at some of
the stimulus money and bring it right here to correct these
problems right now.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. I thank you.
I want to recognize that Mr. Tuite has agreed to join us
now. Let me just do a brief introduction, and then I am going
to have to swear Mr. Tuite so that he can respond to questions.
Mr. Patrick Tuite is currently the associate chair and head
of the master's of arts program in theater and history and
criticism at the Catholic University of America. He has also
taught at the University of Notre Dame and the Ohio State
University. At the time of this accident relevant to this
hearing, Mr. Tuite was in the front of the second car of train
112, the one that actually came forward and then struck 214,
and he helped people exit the train after the collision
occurred.
Mr. Tuite, it is the custom of this committee to have
witnesses sworn who are here to provide testimony. Could I ask
you to stand and raise your right hand?
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record show that Mr. Tuite has answered
in the affirmative.
I will now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from northern
Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask my predecessor Mr. Davis, if we don't amend the
compact for Metro, is the Federal money tied up until we do?
Mr. Davis. No. My understanding is it's not tied up. One of
the reasons the administration didn't fund it is because, under
the law, without the compact being amended, they weren't
obligated to fund it. But I think this just puts it in motion,
and it makes it a lot easier to get money in the outyears. One
hundred fifty million dollars in this environment is tough.
Mr. Connolly. With respect to my colleague Mr. Chaffetz's
question, is it not true that Metro has either the highest fare
box recovery rate or the second highest in the United States;
do you know?
Mr. Davis. Second highest.
Mr. Connolly. So the users are, in fact, certainly paying
their fair share.
Mr. Davis. I think they are, as somebody who uses it.
Mr. Connolly. And until this legislation, most of the
financial burden in terms of subsidies has fallen on the State
of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the localities in
Virginia; is that not correct?
Mr. Davis. That is correct. That's where the subsidies come
from, right out of local and State budgets.
Mr. Connolly. Is there any other subway system in America
that bears the brunt of almost 15 million visitors from all
around the country, and indeed around the world, other than the
Metro system?
Mr. Davis. Yeah, I mean, New York may. I don't know the
answer, but New York has a State funding mechanism and a
completely different mechanism. It was built at a different
time in a different era.
Mr. Connolly. And isn't it true, Congressman Davis, that
perhaps the largest single beneficiary daily of the Metro
system being here is, in fact, the Federal Government moving
its Federal work force?
Mr. Davis. It's Federal Government moving its workers, it's
tourists who come here to visit their Nation's Capital. You
know, the Moscow subway system is an elaborate system, and they
didn't chintz on it. They funded it; this was a statement of
how they wanted the world to see their government.
Unfortunately, I don't think it's been the same here.
Mr. Connolly. I think that's really a good point. This is
the Nation's Capital. It's arguably been called the capital of
the free world. And the Federal Government has some
responsibility, beyond the initial construction costs, to help
make sure that system remains healthy and safe and, indeed,
hopefully can be expanded in what is, after all, a
nonattainment region in terms of air quality, with, by some
measurements, the second worst congestion in the United States.
Mr. Davis. And that was President Eisenhower's vision, that
this would be the Nation's subway system, it wouldn't just be
another local subway system competing with all the other local
subway systems.
Mr. Connolly. Ms. Jeter, you were being asked about
previous statements you made about the nervousness of the work
force. And, of course, I do think it's important to put in
perspective, the tragedy notwithstanding, in the 33 years of
operation of the Metro system, it has functioned on a daily
basis as one of the safest transit systems in the United
States; is that not correct?
Ms. Jeter. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. And, as a matter of fact, I think we've had a
total of three major accidents in the history of the system; is
that not correct?
Ms. Jeter. That's correct. But I would also like to add,
Mr. Connolly, that even though we have not had those types of
accidents, as a rail operator I know that when an accident
occurs, it occurs.
Mr. Connolly. Absolutely. And one of the things that
occurred, Ms. Jeter--and, Mr. Millar, you may want to comment
as well--was because we were having what's called 1000-series
cars, some of the very earliest cars in the system, in the
front of the train that crashed into the stationary train; is
that correct?
Ms. Jeter. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. And the 1000-series cars are, in terms of
crashworthiness and safe haven for passengers, a lot less safe
and reliable than more recently constructed cars; is that
correct?
Ms. Jeter. They are the weaker-built cars.
Mr. Connolly. And is it also true, to your knowledge, that
there is no Federal standard in terms of crashworthiness and
safety of passengers on transit systems; there is for rail
systems like Amtrak, but there is not for transit? And my time
is up, but perhaps you would like to comment on that.
Ms. Jeter. Not that I know of.
Mr. Millar. What there is is the federally endorsed
voluntary standard system, crashworthiness, that I describe in
my testimony that's been developed. Obviously, older cars were
built under the practices of the time. As newer cars are built
and purchased, they will be bought, presumably, to the
standards of that time. And cars that are bought 10 years from
now will have to their standards; continuously moving and
improving over time.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but this is an
issue that has come out of the regional delegation's
examination of the tragedy of June 22nd, this anomaly in
Federal regulation where we do regulate for hard railcars on
railroad systems, but not for transit. It's a voluntary system
of safety. And this committee may want to take a fresh look at
that.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
I would now like to recognize the gentlewoman from the
District of Columbia Ms. Holmes Norton, who has been a driving
force, along with Mr. Cummings and Mr. Connolly, on this issue.
The gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Millar, your testimony is replete with standards. I
mean, they're the kind of standards that I think the public
thought were required.
First I want to know who has adopted these standards? And
then I want to ask you why you believe the Federal Government
has done no more than give you a charge to develop standards
while apparently not giving anyone the charge to enforce
standards?
Mr. Millar. Yes. The standards are developed under Federal
law that allow for industry-developed standards. The
development of our standards has been funded both by our own
members as well as the Federal Transit Administration when it
comes to rail transit and bus transit standards. When it comes
to commuter rail standards, those have also been worked on by
the Federal Railroad Administration as well. It is up to each
transit property themselves to adopt standards as----
Ms. Norton. So what is the usual practice? When you develop
standards, have you found that transit systems across the
United States readily develop these standards, and did WMATA do
so?
Mr. Millar. Yes. We have found that once the standards are
developed and agreed to--they're called ``consensus standards''
because there is agreement that this is the right standard--
then we find transit systems do, in fact, use those standards
because they want to improve safety, and the standards do that.
As to whether WMATA----
Ms. Norton. They are common carriers, and, of course, in
our law you would expect them to improve and want to do so.
Let me ask Mr. Davis, who knows so much about the system
and began us in this process, you heard the testimony here that
we have a long list of standards. Do you believe the time has
come, Mr. Davis, for the Federal Transit Administration or some
agency of the Federal Government to, in fact, enforce some of
these minimal standards for safety of passengers in transit
systems throughout the United States?
Mr. Davis. Sure. But let me note one other thing. There is,
to my knowledge, no identifiable grant source to buy railcars
outside of the New Starts Program. So when you start talking
about our ability to buy railcars and the like, it comes right
out of Metro's hide. They can't go to the Federal Government
for that.
Ms. Norton. Are you implying that the Federal Government
does not have the authority under the interstate commerce
clause to require minimal standards?
Mr. Davis. No. I think they have the authority.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask Ms. Jeter.
Ms. Jeter, you talk about people aging out. These are union
jobs, which, as far as I know, are high-paid union jobs. May I
offer again my condolences to you and to the excellent work
force at WMATA, and congratulate you especially for what you
did through the inauguration. You were way beyond the call of
duty.
Ms. Jeter. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. But here you talk about operators aging out.
The operator who sacrificed her life worked her way up the
ladder. Is there some difficulty in attracting people to these
high-paid union jobs?
Ms. Jeter. I think there is to a certain point. Let me say
this: WMATA, the union we have right now, the majority of the
7,900 or so employees, the majority of them have less than 10
years of service. So you have a relatively young work force,
young in the amount of time that they have been on the
property.
I think that where transportation is concerned, although it
is a very well-paid position, it can be something that some of
us don't enjoy doing. As a person who has been employed by
WMATA for 30 years, there are many Christmases and
Thanksgivings that I did not spend with my family. There were
plenty of PTA meetings----
Ms. Norton. But is there a work force ready and willing to
step up as the work force ages out?
Ms. Jeter. I think that there have been some changes that
have been made. I know as soon as Mr. Catoe got on board,
probably about 6 months after I became president and he became
the general manager, we had a conversation about bringing
people in full time versus part time so that they would be
willing to step into regular positions.
I don't think that WMATA has any trouble recruiting. I
think that transportation, because of its stringent rules and
regulations, have trouble staying, to be honest.
Ms. Norton. I see my time is up. I hope we have a second
round, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Maryland, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony.
Mr. Millar, when I was looking at the Washington Post this
morning, they were talking about the NTSB and their letter that
they apparently sent to you all within the last few days, and
your immediate response, which I thought was good. And I'm just
wondering, is the level of automation on the operation of the
WMATA system unusual compared to other systems?
Mr. Millar. I would say yes. I would say that at the time
that it was designed, only the BART system in California really
had comparable, and WMATA really even went a step further. On
the other hand, around the world, newer systems now have much
more advanced systems. So at the time, absolutely; today, not
so much.
Mr. Cummings. And in your opinion, what are the particular
risks that come with relying on such a high level of
automation?
Mr. Millar. Well, you have to make sure of the proper
design of the automation. You certainly have to make sure of
the proper maintenance of the automation. You have to be very
careful that when any changes are made--for example, if a new
technology fix is intended to be brought in--that there aren't
unintended consequences. You certainly have to make sure that
the employees are well trained and familiar with both how to
maintain and how to use the service. You also have to make sure
that you don't expect it to deliver more than it can deliver.
So you always have to use your technology appropriately. This
is no different.
Mr. Cummings. And how do you make sure that the things that
you just said are done? The other day I went to get my brakes
fixed, and when I got in my car, literally my foot went down to
the metal, and the car wasn't stopping. I won't name the
company, but the reason why I mention that is I think that when
you have automation, it takes human beings to make sure that
all of that stuff works. And I'm just trying to figure out how
do you make sure that you've got everything. It seems like when
you're depending upon a train to stop or to do certain things,
and it could result, as here, in the loss of life and
significant injuries, how do you make sure that you have layers
of compliance and make sure that people do what they're
supposed to do? And I'm not saying they don't.
Mr. Millar. A couple of ways I would answer your question.
First, each transit agency in America is a public agency; it
has its own procedures, it has its own adopted processes, it
has its own responsibility to train its employees in those
processes. More recently, over the last few years, APTA, in
cooperation with FTA and others, has been developing standard
operating procedures and maintenance procedures that can be
used. You gave the example of brakes on your car. That's one of
the very early areas that we develop standards in so that
employees can have a standard to work against.
We also now have a certification program in our industry. I
believe WMATA participates in that certification program so the
men and women can know what the standards are, know what the
procedures are, be trained in those, tested in those to make
sure that they are well qualified to work. So those are usually
the general ways that these things are handled.
Mr. Cummings. And in response to two WMATA accidents in
2006, the NTSB determined that the lack of rule compliance
testing and enforcement on the WMATA system contributed to both
2006 WMATA accidents. And how does WMATA's rule-compliance
testing measure up to other systems?
Mr. Millar. We have worked with WMATA and other transit
systems in this particular area. Recently, WMATA has been
particularly placing emphasis on safety and compliance with
safety. I believe when the WMATA folks testify later in this
hearing, they could tell you much more about that than I'm
capable of relating to you. If there is a followup question
after that, I would be happy to supply it to you and for the
record as the committee might desire.
Mr. Cummings. Ms. Jeter, I heard the last few seconds of
your answer to a question. One of the things that you said is
that they need the resources. I think you were talking about
funding; I caught that. How confident do you feel that if the
money were there, that it would be used for the right things?
Ms. Jeter. I feel relatively confident. I also think that,
along with funding, you also have to have regulations, and you
have to have those criteria in place when they're supposed to
do it.
In your questioning, you were talking about the training
that people would have to have in order to do all of this.
Funding provides the money for the training, but I also think
that we have to stop paying lip service and actually do it. If
it's necessary to train the entire fleet of employees in a
particular new technology, then all of them need to be trained,
not just part of them today, and then 6 months later we get to
the other part. By the time we get to the other part 6 months
later, a number of things have occurred. So I think that's some
of what we have to do.
As an employee I've watched where 25 people go to training
for one particular thing, and then we don't see that training
anymore, we move on to the next thing. We have to stop doing
that. I think we, as transit, have to stop doing that to ensure
that all employees are trained on all things that concern any
part of transit.
Mr. Cummings. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair is now pleased to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Bilbray, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize to the committee because I like to get into the
weeds; you know, once a transit operator, always a transit
operator. I guess the question will be technical, but also from
the union's point of view.
One of the things that was developed in the early 1970's
and late 1960's was this concept that automation was the thing
of the future. It wasn't until late in the 1970's that we
started seeing that you still have to have somebody in the cab.
Now, my question is this: As I remember, in 1978 when we
were building our LRT system in San Diego, we were told by
BART, we were told by Edmonton, we were told quietly out of
D.C. that the system of having automated operation with a
manual override--which is basically what we have now--was not
the way to go; that the fact is the opposite should be the way
to go, have manual operation and an automated override. Now,
there may be the issue of proximity of trains and everything
else, but what we were told when we were talking to the people
on the front line was that the fatigue of an operator was more
when they were not operating the car itself, were sitting and
basically just keeping an eye on the machine than to physically
operate the system.
Has anybody done a system study on the reaction time of
somebody who is not actually operating the vehicle as opposed
to somebody who is physically doing the operation?
Mr. Millar. I'm not familiar if there is such a study. I
can tell you the question you've posed is an unresolved
question. There are transit systems built today in the world
that are fully automatic, no manual override whatsoever. There
are transit systems in the world that have some automatic
train-control features but much more heavily reliance on the
operator.
Where there is clear agreement, is that having automatic
train protection systems, such as was included earlier in
testimony today about in the Rail Safety Act last fall. There
is no disagreement about that. That needs to be done and is
being done around the world.
But I am not familiar with such a study. I will check our
records, and if I find such a study, I will be glad to make it
available for you, sir.
Mr. Bilbray. Ma'am, from the labor point of view.
Ms. Jeter. I believe that running a system automatic is the
right system to run in. The train just runs smoother as a
whole. I think that having a human being there stops whatever
from occurring whatever problems you might have with the system
from occurring. And the operator can override and put it in
manual. But I do believe, as an operator, that running that
system on automatic, we are supposed to have an automatic
system, it should be able to run and run sufficiently in
automatic.
Mr. Bilbray. But, see, that's the theory. And we had the
bells and whistles; you basically had the engineers that like
to engineer everything and try to engineer the human factor
out. But we were strongly urged, after BART got into operation,
not ignore the impact on the human of not doing anything. The
mind ends up drifting off; there is a lack of concentration. So
the reaction to an emergency is going to be much slower for
somebody who's not actually engaged in the operation than
somebody who is observing it and then is expected to impose on.
I think that we've got to be open and frank.
I'll give you an example. When you fly a B-2 bomber,
they're being flown by the person in the pilot seat, but the
computer can override and stop you from doing the wrong things.
We've got technology that's one of the most sophisticated
systems that Americans ever developed operating off that mode,
and we're operating on a 1970 mode that machines and computers
can do it. And it was all actually an afterthought that we put
people on board as a backup.
I'm not so sure that we shouldn't be taking the time to
study this, and make sure the assumptions we made earlier in
the 1970's are the best assumptions going into the next
century. I think we need to legitimately say we assume that the
driver will respond to the crisis in a timely manner as opposed
to the other way around. And I think we should rethink that.
I'll tell you personally, as somebody who was building a system
back in the late 1970's, I still remember being told again and
again by drivers to watch out for this system, it has this
problem. And when the accident happened, Madam Chair, I thought
back to those warnings I kept hearing.
Go ahead.
Ms. Jeter. The other part of that is when you operate for 8
hours manually, you also run the risk of someone getting tired.
So I think that it has a dual effect on individuals.
You know, as a seasoned operator, I say when you get tired
and you feel yourself maybe not paying attention, stand up, do
something other than just sit there and be lulled with the
movement of the train. You have to condition yourself to know
that being alert; is your job, that's what you're supposed to
do. When you're not operating that train in manual, you're
supposed to be alert, you're supposed to know what that train
is doing at all times.
Mr. Bilbray. Madam Chair, I appreciate the time. I think it
may be time to go back and study the human impact on this. We
always are looking at the machines, but I think we've got to
integrate the human factor. Assumptions made 20, 30 years ago
may not be reality today, and I think that we ought to
ultimately and frankly discuss that.
Ms. Norton [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Tuite, the chairman promised that on the second round
of questions, we would let you begin, because we have not yet
heard from an eyewitness who was involved in this accident. You
have 5 minutes to summarize your testimony, please.
Mr. Tuite. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Ms. Norton. Could I just say that I have received word, Mr.
Davis, that you may have to leave. I want to thank you for the
chairman and the committee for taking the time to follow
through on what you began here when you were Chair of the full
committee. So if you have to leave, you will be excused with
thanks and gratitude.
Mr. Tuite.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK TUITE, EYE WITNESS AND METRORAIL TRAIN 112
RIDER
Mr. Tuite. I want to apologize first for my delay. I knew
that I had to be here at 2 o'clock. I live in Kensington, MD. I
decided for the first time since the accident to take the Red
Line. I left my home at 12:37. I did not arrive here at Capitol
South until 2:55.
Ms. Norton. The Red Line is being held up because of the
accident, I take it.
Mr. Tuite. Yes. And the elevators weren't operating at
Forest Glen, and there were a number of other problems that
caused that delay. So I apologize, but please appreciate my
frustration in even giving you that apology.
On the afternoon of June 22nd, I was on my way to teach a
night class at the Catholic University of America. I decided
that night, on a whim to save some gas, to park at the Wheaton
Metro, and take the Red Line down.
I normally ride in the first car of the train, but on that
evening it was hot, I was dressed for work, I decided to stay
in front of an air conditioner on the platform at the Wheaton
station, and because of that got on the second car of the train
and sat on the forward-most right-hand side facing forward near
the forward-most doors, if that helps at all.
While riding the train, I read the paper, as I do in the
tunnel. And then, as we came out of the tunnel, approaching the
Silver Spring station, somewhere around Silver Spring or
Takoma, I got a little tired and put down the paper. The
operator came on and told us to expect a delay. This was a
typical announcement, this was nothing unusual. I could hear
the operator's voice. She reassured us that we would take a
delay, stop in between stations, and then start back up again.
So as the train came to a stop somewhere south of Silver
Spring or south of Takoma, I don't remember which, I closed my
eyes and relaxed a little bit. The train began to move again
while my eyes were closed. I had put the paper down. And then
somewhere in there we got to a normal cruising speed, I'll call
it, when I heard a screeching noise. A shuddering feeling came
through the car; someone yelled behind me that she believed
that we had derailed, and then one of the loudest bangs I've
ever heard in my life.
Everyone in the second car--and there weren't many of us--
were thrown from their seats. I hit the seat in front of me. I
don't remember much of that, but I do remember being on the
floor of the second car with a lot of dust, a lot of smoke, not
much in the way of screaming, but all my belongings had been
thrown to the front of that car.
It's at that point--first of all, there was no noise. All
the electricity was down. You could see the sunlight coming
through, but it was very difficult to make out what was going
on. A gentleman who had been sitting forward of me got to his
feet and told everyone in the car we should go, everyone get
out of the car.
So people did get up. We moved in an orderly fashion;
again, no screaming. A woman opened the emergency lever to get
the center doors open. The center doors did not open. I helped
by reaching in and sliding one of the doors open to the left,
and we proceeded to get people out of that car and onto the
rocks below. It was quite a big jump. I mean, it's a good 4\1/
2\ feet, 4 feet up to the rocks at that point. So we helped
lower people out of the car. And it's only at that point when I
paused, looked to my left out of the door, and realized that
the car of the train was actually in the air.
I could see debris on the ground, things thrown from the
first car into the fencing. There was at least one man that I
saw on the ground, khaki shorts, moving, but he did not look
good; he was bleeding profusely from his legs. People were
already moving toward him so that the people in my car decided
to just exit as quickly as we could, as safely as we could, and
then move to the back of the car--or all the way to the back of
the train.
We helped people off the train. When everyone was out of
our car, I noticed two gentlemen had gotten into the second car
and were moving to the doors in the interior of the car. I got
back onto the train to assist those two gentlemen. They were
attempting to open the interior door that connects the second
car to the first car. That door was stuck. I learned later that
the car I was in was also a 1000-series car, and what had
happened was the roof of the car actually dimpled like a soda
can. If you take your Sprite can or something, turn it
sideways, imagine it's like the car and just press on the top,
that's what happened to that second car. Because the roof was
down, the struts that support that roof were also down. That
prevented the door in the second car from opening enough for
anyone in the first car to exit.
There were two gentlemen with me. We could see, as we were
trying to remove that door, that possibly we could take some
ceiling panels down. We did that. That didn't work because the
metal struts underneath that ceiling panel were stronger, we
couldn't rip those out. So the door was stuck.
We could hear the people at this point in the first car,
and it didn't--it was pretty chaotic. They were screaming, they
were upset. I could see through the window there were about
four to five people in the rear-most section of the first car.
I could not see beyond that, which would be the rear-most door
as the side doors that open; you couldn't see past that because
the flooring had crushed accordion like into that section, so
all the handrails, all the seating was askew. We had handrails
and posts pointing toward us, almost like tooth picks, and then
four to five people trapped inside there.
When this one young man on the other side realized that we
could not open our door, he told us that he was going to break
the glass. So he took his shirt off, wrapped it around his
wrist, and started punching the glass. It was at that point
that myself and the two other gentlemen moved out of the way to
avoid the broken glass.
At this time--and this is the first time that a first
responder came to us--a WMATA operator, I don't know where
from, but obviously not on our train, had come in through the
third car into the second car. He had the vest, the walkie-
talkie, goatee, and told us that we should just exit that car
as quickly as possible, that he would take care of that
situation as best he could, and that first responders were on
their way.
So we moved through the cars themselves. They were empty at
that point. The second and third car were empty. We moved into,
I believe, the fourth car, jumped from the car, and then just
got more people out of the cars as best we could, helped lower
them. Again, I did not see a lot of first responders at this
point because I had not been to the back of the train itself.
I don't know what the time was, I don't know how long this
narrative would account for, but when we got out of the train
and were moving people out, someone shouted that they needed
doctors and nurses. And that was quite vivid for me because I
was lowering a woman in scrubs from maybe the fourth or fifth
car, and she said, I'm a nurse, but I'm hurt. We said, we need
you, and she went to the first car.
After that, we pretty much moved everyone to the back of
the train. It was very confusing. We saw two, I believe, plain-
clothes policemen in shorts with safety vests. I don't know who
they represented, but they told us to stay away from the third
rail, stay grouped at the back of the train.
We had people wandering away from the scene. We had four
passengers, at the very least, that I witnessed who picked up
their belongings at the end of the train and simply walked
north. They left. And there were not enough first responders to
prevent them from leaving, and certainly none of us had our
wits about us to say, don't go. We just let them go.
The firemen who arrived on scene went to the parking lot
between the Community Gardens north of New Hampshire Avenue
bridge and the Jabroe--I think it's Jabroe Printing that has a
parking lot there. They could not get to us because we had
fencing between the CSX tracks and the Metro tracks. There are
four sets of tracks at that point by the New Hampshire Street
bridge. The Metro tracks are in the middle. There is fencing
there to this day, with barbed wire on the top.
The firemen can't get to you. The firemen's equipment,
their trucks and whatnot, could not get on the tracks. So they
had to lug their gear, things like jaws of life, diamond-
cutting saws, and other equipment, on stretchers, manually
carrying that equipment toward the first car. This is when we
started to see people at the back of the train. So we just
waited. We waited and took care of one another as best we
could.
Mr. Lynch [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tuite follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2712.024
Mr. Lynch. At this time I would like to recognize the
gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Holmes Norton,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. I need to get on to Mr. Millar and Ms. Jeter,
but I must ask you, were you injured, Mr. Tuite?
Mr. Tuite. No, but I did have some soreness in my neck and
back. I eventually was triaged, along with the other people in
the parking lot. I just stayed. And toward the end of the
evening, some of the first responders told people, look, if
we've got your name and number, and we've looked after you,
you're free to go, which I thought was a surprise.
Ms. Norton. Your testimony has been really indispensable to
this hearing. It's riveting testimony. I'm sure it's been
helpful to the NTSB as well.
Because I have only a short period of time. Mr. Millar,
would you have advised WMATA to do what it now has done, to
place the 1000-series cars in the middle and the more
crashworthy cars at either end, yes or no?
Mr. Millar. Yes. That seems like a prudent thing to do.
Ms. Norton. Do you understand why they would not have done
it before?
Mr. Millar. I don't know what information they might have
possessed then.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask you this: Therefore, faced with
choices that you can pull 30 percent of your fleet that goes
back almost 40 years or put them in the middle, the choice
should have been to put them in the middle so that either end
would have the most crashworthy cars. Have you ever recommended
anything of that kind?
Mr. Millar. That is not a type of detailed recommendation
we would normally participate in.
I would caution that what looks like a very good idea,
given the circumstances that we think we understand now, could,
in a different set of circumstances, look like a very bad idea.
Ms. Norton. And we will question the next panel on that.
Ms. Jeter, it's important to hear your testimony about
automatic versus manual. You know that some members of the
public have been concerned about reports of a Metro operator
who seemed to be sleeping. I tell you one thing, it's easy to
go to sleep on any kind of moving vehicle, especially a train.
There was concern, and we are so pleased to learn that the
operator didn't even have her cell phone with her, so we know
that she was paying close attention.
I understand what automatic does, but I really have to ask
you, what is there, and shouldn't there be something, that the
operator has to do fairly often during the trip to keep her
alert in light of human instinct to get bored if you're just
sitting there doing the same thing over and over again? Isn't
there something more that should be done, either you or Mr.
Millar, to keep people alert?
Ms. Jeter. Well, actually we do. The operators are
responsible for opening and closing the doors at this point. We
are also responsible for giving out announcements. It's our job
to listen to the radios and monitor the radios so that we know
what is going on in the railroad ahead of us.
Ms. Norton. So you really think there is enough to keep
people alert already.
Ms. Jeter. I do.
Ms. Norton. And I see you shaking your head, Mr. Millar.
Mr. Millar, in your testimony, I note that you say this
fundamental system, that WMATA had adopted, also provides safe
and effective service in other major cities. You name Boston,
Atlanta, Baltimore, Miami, Philadelphia and San Francisco. Do
you believe that the system here is as safe as those systems
you had enumerated in your testimony?
Mr. Millar. It's at least as safe. I have full confidence
in the Metro system here.
Ms. Norton. In reading your testimony, Ms. Jeter, I
sometimes, because I don't understand enough about trains, had
to try to distinguish between what WMATA could have done and
what was too costly to do. You were generous in saying WMATA
didn't have a lot of money to do what really needed to be done.
You recommended retrofitting some of the cars. Given the
age of this car and the kind of funds it would take to
retrofit--and I suppose I should ask this question to Mr.
Millar--40-year-old cars, and make them crashworthy, was that a
real option for WMATA? Mr. Millar, yes or no, do you think that
was a real option?
Mr. Millar. I don't know the facts specifically here, but I
agree with the fundamentals of your point that if you're going
to be retiring a car soon, you want to do only what is
absolutely necessary to keep safety and operational efficiency.
Ms. Norton. I will have to ask whether it was worth the
investment.
Let me ask about your testimony, Ms. Jeter, about car-borne
monitors. You say that NTSB recommended car-borne monitors in
every WMATA car to give advance performance data. Now, would
that have been costly? And do you believe that WMATA installed
what it could that was not excessively costly, or that
contraptions like these car-borne monitors could have and
should have been installed in any case?
Ms. Jeter. I think over the years WMATA probably purchased
new cars hoping to alleviate the problems that had been
identified. It would be harsh for me to say that they
purposefully did not follow----
Ms. Norton. No, but that's not my question. You talk about
rollback, and there are some things that they didn't install.
Ms. Jeter. Correct.
Ms. Norton. Do you think that WMATA, given the
circumstances it faced with Congress not providing the money
and the system not having anything like the funds, did what it
could to prevent this accident, assuming that it didn't have
the money for all new cars or maybe even retrofitting cars?
Ms. Jeter. Where this accident is concerned, to be
perfectly honest, I think there was part of the situation that
was missed, either through supervision, whether or not it was
monitoring that should have taken place after some of the
circuitry was changed on the rails. I think that's a place
where we probably need to go back and look at what the
procedures are so that we would have the procedures in place.
It's my understanding that once that Wee-Z bond was
changed, or once there was a problem identified with that Wee-Z
bond, there should have been certain things done to assure that
it was operating as it should have been. And apparently it
wasn't, because it's my understanding that train 112 wasn't
even seen. So if the train wasn't seen, why? Was that a bond
that prohibited that train from being able to be monitored by
either central control or some other manual?
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Ms. Jeter.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Now I would like to recognize the gentleman from Maryland,
Mr. Van Hollen, who has been an active and attentive Member on
this issue, a member of our full committee. I recognize the
gentleman for 5 minutes.
Mr. Van Hollen. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
bringing this together on this very important issue, and I
won't use the whole 5 minutes.
I do want to thank our former colleague Mr. Davis, who had
to leave, again for his longtime leadership on the question of
WMATA. All of us from this region are very pleased that we were
able to get the $150 million appropriation from the
Appropriations Committee subcommittee. And obviously that's the
first step in providing the Federal component of the ongoing
funding.
To Mr. Tuite, it's great to have a fellow resident of the
town of Kensington with us. And thank you for sharing your
story.
I thank all of our witnesses.
In fact, my colleague Ms. Norton asked some of the
questions I was going to ask of the other two of you. So in the
interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will move to the next one. I
want to thank you.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
We want to thank each of you for your testimony here today.
As always, there are a number of other hearings going on at the
same time. Also, as you know, we've had votes on the floor. I
will ask that you remain responsive. If Members who were not
here at the hearing today have any questions that they would
submit in writing, I would forward them to you and would ask
that you respond to them within 5 days.
With that, I want to thank you for your testimony today,
and I bid you a good day. Thank you.
The Chair would like to call forward our second panel.
Good afternoon. I would like to welcome our second panel
and thank you in advance for your testimony.
It is the custom of this committee to ask witnesses to be
sworn who are to provide testimony before it. So could I ask
you all to rise and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record show that all of the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative.
In the interest of time, what I would like to do is just to
offer a brief introduction of each of the witnesses, and then
we will go back and allow the witnesses to provide an opening
statement.
Council Member Jim Graham became chairman of the Metro
Board in January 1999. Mr. Graham currently serves on the
Council of the District of Columbia representing Ward 1. He
also chairs the council's committee on public works and
transportation. Mr. Graham served as executive director of the
Whitman Walker Clinic from 1984 to 1998. Previously Mr. Graham
served as staff counsel for Senator Abe Ribicoff, a Democrat
from Connecticut, and clerked for Chief Justice Earl Warren,
now retired.
Mr. John B. Catoe has more than 30 years of experience in
public transportation. As general manager of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, he oversees the second
largest rail transit system and the fifth largest bus network
in the United States, with more than 10,000 employees, a $1.3
billion operating budget, and a $3.1 billion 5-year capital
improvements program.
Ms. Deborah A.P. Hersman was sworn in as the 35th member of
the National Transportation Safety Board on June 21, 2004.
Since her appointment to the Board, Ms. Hersman has been the
member on scene at 15 major transportation accidents. Before
joining the NTSB, Ms. Hersman was a senior professional staff
member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation from 1999 to 2004.
Mr. Eric Madison joined the Mass Transit Administration as
transportation planner in 2007. Mr. Madison was appointed as a
district representative to the Tri-State Oversight Committee
for State safety oversight of the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority Metrorail system, and in April 2007 became
Chair of the committee. Mr. Madison began his career with the
District Department of Transportation in 2003 as an
administrative management officer for the Public Space
Management Administration.
Mr. Peter M. Rogoff was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as
Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration in May
2009. Prior to joining the Federal Transit Authority, Mr.
Rogoff served on the staff of the Senate Appropriations
Committee for 22 years, including 14 years as the Democratic
staff director of the Transportation Subcommittee. Mr. Rogoff
has a strong background in Federal infrastructure, budgeting
and finance, and has played an active role in the financing of
the last three comprehensive surface transportation
reauthorization bills.
I would now like to recognize Mr. Graham for 5 minutes for
an opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF COUNCILMEMBER JIM GRAHAM, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; JOHN
B. CATOE, GENERAL MANAGER, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT
AUTHORITY; DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, MEMBER, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; PETER M. ROGOFF, ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION; AND ERIC MADISON, CHAIRMAN,
TRI-STATE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF JIM GRAHAM
Mr. Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Chaffetz, Delegate Norton, Congressman Connolly and
Congressman Van Hollen. I am here today in my capacity as
chairman of the Metro/WMATA board.
June 22, 2009, was and will always be a date of great
tragedy for our agency and for all who rely on it. Those most
directly impacted remain in our hearts and prayers and motivate
our every action. I want to especially thank Mr. Tuite for
coming here today to share his personal experience, which I
found very impactful.
As a first step, our board did act within 24 hours to
authorize the general manager to provide emergency hardship
relief funds to those who were victims of this tragedy. That
relief was not contingent on anything, and it was made clear
that it had no ramifications of a legal nature insofar as
ultimate liability. It was, rather, a humanitarian gesture to
relieve immediate hardship. And I know firsthand from working
with certain of these families that it was really very much
appreciated.
On behalf of our board of directors, I want to say that we
believe in our management, and we have confidence in the skill
and dedication of our general manager John Catoe. We believe
our system is safe, and we will do all we can to ensure that
once the probable cause or causes of the accident are
identified, action will be taken by the authority to remedy and
address those problems.
Please keep in mind that in all of our history, there has
been but one other fatality involving passengers, and that was
more than 25 years ago. But for pressing infrastructure needs,
we need real action by the Congress to make good on the promise
in last year's authorization act and thereby provide a full
payment of $150 million in fiscal year 2010 Federal
appropriations.
Presently, our local jurisdictions carry nearly the entire
burden. For example, D.C. taxpayers will send some $300 million
to Metro/WMATA in fiscal year 2010. We are very encouraged, Mr.
Chairman, by the action that was taken yesterday by the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation to take that
first and extraordinarily important step in appropriating $150
million for fiscal year 2010.
I want to commend everyone that was involved in this, most
particularly our regional delegation. Some of the Members are
here today: Delegate Norton, Congressman Connolly, Congressman
Van Hollen, and others. And I also want to single out our
Majority Leader Mr. Hoyer for his fine role in all of this.
I believe that if Congress acts to finalize the $150
million for fiscal year 2010, that D.C., Maryland, and the
Commonwealth of Virginia will all find the matching funds to
bring together $300 million annually for each of the next 10
years. This money will make a critical difference in our
abilities.
Mr. Chairman, I remember our last hearing where you were so
diligent in terms of making sure that we had put everything out
of the path in terms of obstacles in order to make sure that
this money would become available. But, Mr. Chairman, we also
need to have the active commitment of President Barack Obama
and his administration to find emergency stimulus dollars for
immediate assistance with these infrastructure issues. I noted
that Congressman Davis made a particular point of this in his
comments today.
Finally, we appreciate the support of our local
congressional delegation, as I have said, and it's continued to
work to move all of this forward. Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Mr. Catoe, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN B. CATOE
Mr. Catoe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and also Ranking Member
Chaffetz. I'mhappy to be here today to testify in front of you
in the position of general manager of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority [WMATA], or Metro.
The basic facts of what happened on June 22nd are really
described in my written testimony, as well as the testimony
from the National Transportation Safety Board. And through this
questioning this afternoon, I'm sure we will cover every aspect
of that.
I do want to say that we were working with the National
Transportation Safety Board to provide support in their
investigation, and they have the lead responsibility for the
investigation of this accident.
Today, I will focus on the steps that Metro has taken since
the accident to ensure the safety of our riders and employees,
and also touch on the capital needs of this organization.
First, I would like to extend my sympathy and those of all
Metro employees to the families of those who died in this
accident. I, as well as all Metro employees, are saddened by
this event, but my grief is only small compared to the grief of
the families of those who lost their lives.
Our thoughts are also with those who are injured, and we
pray for their speedy recovery. This is a difficult time for
them and their loved ones, and we would do whatever we can to
help them come through this process.
I would also like to take a moment to acknowledge and thank
the first responders from the District of Columbia as well as
from other local fire departments, police departments, as well
as members of the Metro Transit Police and our employees, who
responded to this accident and provided assistance in a very
quick, in my judgment, time period. My written testimony also
includes the list of those who provided assistance, for which I
am truly, deeply grateful.
Safety is at the foundation of what we do at Metro. We have
always taken our responsibility to safety seriously, and we
have always taken a number of steps to ensure that this system
is as safe as possible.
First, upon notice of this accident, we began to operate
all of our trains in manual mode, rather than automated mode,
to ensure, again, the integrity of the system.
Second, within days of discovering that a track circuit in
the area of the accident had lost its ability from time to time
to detect trains, we physically inspected each of the 3,000
track circuits in our rail system. And we are also running
daily computerized tests on those circuits.
Third, we have arranged for an independent review of our
automated transit train control system. In working with the
National Transportation Safety Board, this review will be
conducted by a group of outside transit signal experts. And I
appreciate the assistance provided by the American Public
Transportation Association for assistance in this effort.
Finally, while they are safe to operate, I decided to place
our oldest railcars in the center of trains. We plan to replace
those cars as soon as funding is available and funding is
secured.
As you may be aware, yesterday the National Transportation
Safety Board recommended that Metro enhance redundancy in our
train control system by using real-time data and automatic
alert. We have already begun contacting vendors with experts or
expertise in this area. And we are preparing an estimate of the
cost to develop and implement the automated system.
When we are able to determine the steps necessary, we will
move forward with this system. We will do what we have to to
ensure that this system is put into place. However, it requires
a specialized development for the WMATA system, but we would
dedicate the necessary resources to implement this
recommendation as soon as that system is ready.
This meeting and this process will not begin next week; it
has already begun. And, in fact, a meeting is scheduled
tomorrow morning with the vendors within WMATA to begin the
process of moving forward to meet the recommendations by the
National Transportation Safety Board.
We also recognize and I realize that this is an
inconvenience to many of our customers, of operating our system
the way we are doing so today. We have not been able to return
to pre-accident levels of service, and we will not be able to
do so until this investigation is completed.
Finally, I would like to thank the Subcommittee on
Appropriations for including the $150 million in funding for
Metro's capital needs. Our capital needs over the next 10 years
total $11.4 billion. And what I am asking that this committee
and the Congress do is to pass the compact amendments necessary
to make the changes in our compact and to also appropriate the
$150 million and pass it through the House so we can receive
those funds for needed capital improvements.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Catoe follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Hersman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN
Ms. Hersman. Thank you for the invitation to appear before
the committee, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Chaffetz, and members of the
regional delegation. Ms. Norton has been a long supporter of
NTSB's investigations. And Mr. Van Hollen and Connolly, who is
my representative, have been very engaged on this accident
investigation.
Since 1982, the NTSB has investigated seven accidents on
WMATA's property, resulting in 76 recommendations on a variety
of issues. I am here today to brief you on the accident that
occurred on June 22nd involving two Red Line trains traveling
inbound near the Fort Totten station.
There were nine fatalities and scores of injuries
transported to local area hospitals. On behalf of the Board, I
would like to extend our thoughts and prayers to those who lost
loved ones and those who remain in recovery from this accident.
We launched our team within hours of the collision. Parties
to our investigation involve many of the people that you see at
this table: WMATA, FTA, Amalgamated Transit Union that was at
the table before, and the Tri-State Oversight Committee.
We were also assisted, as is customary in our accident
investigations, by the FBI's Evidence Response Team,
documenting evidence on scene, as well as in the early stages
of the investigation by many local responders from the area,
who did a great job assisting us.
Let me begin by reviewing some factual information about
our investigation.
The standing train, Train 214, was a six-car train
consisting of four 3000-series cars and two 5000-series cars
placed at the rear of that train. It had stopped before
entering the Fort Totten station. It was following a train that
was servicing the platform at Fort Totten. The striking train,
Train 112, was a six-car train composed of six 1000-series
cars, and it was following Train 214.
As you heard from the eyewitness to the accident, when we
interviewed passengers after the accident, they told us that
there was an announcement that came onboard that there was a
train ahead of them, they slowed or stopped, and then they
began accelerating, and then the collision occurred. There was
no communication between the train operators and Metro's
Operations Control Center prior to the collision.
Metro's railcars are approximately 75 feet long. That lead
car of the striking train telescoped into this last car of the
standing train. Approximately 50 feet of that car's survivable
space, or two-thirds of that car's survivable space, was
compromised in the collision. Our investigators found metal-to-
metal compression marks consistent with heavy braking on both
rails of the track for about 125 feet about 425 feet before the
point of impact.
Trains operate under the direction of WMATA's Operations
Control Center [OCC]. They utilize an automatic train control
system that is supplemented by wayside signals at
interlockings. The system is designed to prevent collisions
regardless of whether or not trains are operating in the manual
or the automatic mode. Speed commands for individual train
movements should not allow for more than one train to occupy a
track circuit at a time. And the maximum authorized speed for
this section of track was 59 miles per hour.
Post-accident testing shows that the track's circuit at the
accident site intermittently failed to detect a train that was
at that location. On the day of the accident, the system did
not detect the stopped train, and the following train did not
receive speed commands to slow or to stop prior to the
collision.
WMATA's maintenance records show that, on June 17th, 5 days
before the accident, that an impedance bond, pictured in the
slideshow, was replaced in the track circuit as part of a
multi-year program for scheduled maintenance.
Investigators are continuing to examine the train control
system's circuitry and recorded data to better understand how
the train control system functioned prior to the accident. In
addition, we will be conducting, with the assistance of WMATA,
some sight distance tests on that stretch of track between
Takoma and Fort Totten this weekend.
The Operations Control Center computer system receives
real-time train location data. It displays this information on
a monitor in the control center. After a post-accident review
of the circuit data, WMATA reported that the track circuit
intermittently lost its ability to detect a train after June
17th.
WMATA has now assigned personnel to review recorded data
once a day to identify anomalies systemwide. They do not have
an automatic monitoring system that would identify and promptly
report a situation in which a train stops being detected by the
system.
That is why we issued two urgent safety recommendations
yesterday, one to WMATA and one to FTA. The recommendation to
WMATA asks that it enhance the safety redundancy of its train
control system that monitors track circuit data so that it can
detect any lost trains and immediately alert the control center
so that they can stop or slow the trains. The safety
recommendation to FTA urges it to alert other transit operators
that have systems similar to Metro's to determine if their
systems have adequate safety redundancies and, if they don't,
to take corrective action.
Thank you for inviting me here today. I am happy to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Rogoff, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PETER M. ROGOFF
Mr. Rogoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Chaffetz, and other members of the subcommittee. The Federal
Transit Administration appreciates very much being called to
testify on the overall safety posture of our Nation's rail
transit systems and the FTA's very limited role in overseeing
rail transit safety.
As we address this issue of transit safety, it is essential
to remember that rail transit remains our safest form of
surface transportation by far. The citizens of the Washington
area are always far safer riding in a Metro railcar, any type
of Metro car, than traveling on the highway. The Metrorail
system has experienced 13 on-board crash-related fatalities
during its 33-year history. And while every one of those
fatalities has been a tragedy, the fact is that automobile
accidents on the roads of the Washington area claim the same
number of fatalities every 2 weeks. Any proposal that could
result in passengers getting in their cars versus riding Metro
will immediately degrade safety.
That said, the Obama administration believes that there are
improvements and reforms that can and should be made to make
our transit systems even safer.
While it is not very widely known right now, our Nation's
rail transit systems operate under two very different Federal
safety regimes. Commuter rail systems, like MARC and the VRE,
are subject to the Federal Railroad Administration's very
extensive safety regulations. Those rail transit systems are
governed by national mandatory safety standards and may undergo
onsite spot inspections and audits by Federal inspectors. Those
Federal safety inspectors are empowered to dictate operating
practices and assess fines for any deficiencies found.
By contrast, rail transit systems, like Washington Metro,
the New York City Subway, the trolley operations and the ``T''
in Boston, and 45 other systems are subject to a very different
Federal safety regime. In the case of those rail transit
systems, the States are expected to establish and implement a
safety program. The role of the Federal Transit Administration
is limited to setting minimum program requirements and assuring
that the States have a safety authority in place.
In performing our safety oversight role, the FTA is
prohibited, as a matter of Federal law, from dictating safety
practices or setting mandatory national standards. FTA does not
have the authority to assess fines, set operating rules, or
even mandate the level of technical expertise the State
authorities must have. And, unfortunately, the vast majority of
these State agencies, including the tri-State authority that
oversees Metro, are very thinly staffed.
The distinction between these two safety systems was
plainly apparent at the site of the recent Red Line crash. When
I visited the crash site at the invitation of Member Hersman, I
saw a chainlink fence that separated the Metro tracks from
other tracks in the same corridor that served Amtrak, MARC, and
CSX trains. Under our two separate safety systems, the Federal
inspector that periodically inspects the tracks serving Amtrak
and MARC cannot inspect the track on the other side of the
fence, the side serving Metro.
As the new team has come on board with the Obama
administration, we find the status quo to be unacceptable and
we expect to propose reforms. Secretary LaHood has established
a multi-modal departmental committee chaired by Deputy
Secretary Porcari to identify alternative approaches to address
what we consider a gap in transit safety oversight. The team
will review the different safety authorities and inspection
regimes we have at DOT with an eye toward proposing reforms to
Congress soon.
Now, on the matter of financing, it is impossible to
discuss the issue of safety of our Nation's transit systems
without simultaneously discussing the financing of those
systems. At the FTA, we find that the systems that are
adequately financed are those with a dedicated funding source
that provides a predictable revenue stream, and WMATA does not
have such a system.
WMATA does benefit from a regular stream of Federal formula
grants that totaled approximately $220 million in 2008. Also,
WMATA operates in the only region of the United States where
the Federal Government has mandated transit benefits for all
Federal employees. That generates an additional $170 million
each year in fare box revenue for WMATA.
In addition to these Federal resources, the Secretary and I
do support congressional efforts to make matching Federal
grants available to WMATA for 2010, while working within the
overall spending ceiling established in the President's annual
budget. We believe strongly, however, that these Federal
matching funds must be used by WMATA to address the most safety
critical issues in the system as identified by appropriate
vulnerability assessments.
I want to make clear that in calling for reform and
endorsing additional funding for WMATA, I do not intend to
leave the impression that the cause of the recent Red Line
disaster was related to inadequate safety rules, inadequate
safety oversight, inadequate funding, or poor compliance on the
part of Metro. Only the NTSB investigation will reveal to us
the true cause or causes of the accident. And we at the FTA
stand ready to review and implement any recommendations that
arise from the Board's investigation, just as we did yesterday
evening, while working within the very limited safety
authorities we have under current law.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I hope I will have an
opportunity later to respond to the concerns raised by Mr. Mica
regarding our grant rules. And maybe we can do that in Q and A.
And, with that, I thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogoff follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Madison, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ERIC MADISON
Mr. Madison. Distinguished members of the committee, good
afternoon, and thank you for inviting me to discuss rail
operations and safety at the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority [WMATA], and the tragic accident of June 22,
2009, as well as the activities of the Tri-State Oversight
Committee [TOC].
Before I begin, I would like to take this opportunity, on
behalf of the members of the TOC, to express our heartfelt
sympathies and condolences to the victims and the families of
those who were affected by this tragic accident. We will
continue to keep them in our thoughts and prayers.
The members of the TOC are fully committed to working
closely with WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration, the
NTSB, and Congress to improve safety operations and prevent
another similar accident from ever occurring again.
My testimony will provide a brief overview of the State
Safety Oversight program in general, as prescribed by 49 Code
of Federal Regulations, Part 659, and the TOC's roles,
responsibilities, and authorities. I will also discuss the
TOC's recent history and address the limitations faced by the
TOC in performing safety oversight and regulation of WMATA.
The TOC is the State Safety Oversight agency [SSO],
responsible for overseeing Metro's rail safety program. Under
49 CFR, Part 659, each State with a rail transit agency, like
the Metro system, that receives FTA funding and is not under
the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad Administration must
designate a State agency to carry out the SSO requirements. The
TOC is a joint effort of staff from State government agencies
from the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland.
State safety oversight agencies approve a transit agency's
safety and security plans, review accident reports and
corrective action plans, and conduct periodic safety audits,
among other tasks. Unlike some transportation regulators like
the FAA and the FRA, the TOC lacks the authority to levee fines
or enforce civil penalties for noncompliance.
In 2006, the Government Accountability Office conducted an
assessment of the SSO program on a national level, including a
case study on multistate SSOs including the TOC. The GAO report
made note of administrative, financial, and organizational
issues facing the TOC, to which we have responded by
streamlining our organization, further empowering the TOC
Chair, and improving our working relationship with WMATA.
In addition to the GAO report, the Federal Transit
Administration audited the TOC program in 2007. The audit
resulted in eight findings of ``noncompliance'' and four
findings of ``compliance with recommendations.'' Working with
WMATA, TOC was able to close all but two findings of
``noncompliance'' and one finding of ``compliance with a
recommendation.'' The TOC is in the process of preparing its
next audit response submission to the FTA and expects to
satisfy the three remaining audit findings in the near future.
While the administration of the TOC program has improved,
significant challenges remain. These include the lack of a
traditional regulatory structure and continued funding
constraints.
The TOC has limited regulatory authority under 49 CFR, Part
659. The only authority inherent to 659 is the ability of the
SSO to recommend to the FTA to withhold 5 percent of grant
funding if the rail transit agency is noncompliant. Compliance
with the SSO program is a requirement for FTA funding; however,
SSO agencies themselves receive no FTA funds for program
administration.
Despite its limitations, State safety oversight programs
nationwide have improved and expanded in the last few years.
For example, the FTA now funds some training through the
Transportation Safety Institute as well as hosting workshops
for SSO managers. Such courses have helped to improve the
program overall and should be continued.
The TOC is professionally and personally invested in the
safety and security of the Metrorail system. Our members, as
well as their friends and loved ones, are regular Metrorail
riders. We hope our testimony can assist Congress with
assessing and improving the SSO program and, in turn, improve
rail transit safety nationally.
With that, I conclude my statement and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Madison follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
I now yield myself 5 minutes.
We obviously have some votes pending, but what I would like
to do is to keep the hearing going so that we are not here at
an unreasonably late hour.
Mr. Graham, in trying to follow the budgetary priorities
for the Washington Metro Area Transportation Authority, I know
that the administration and Oversight Committee just
preliminarily approved a $177 million system infrastructure and
rehab program.
And trying to follow those items, it appears--and I may be
wrong, so I am not opposed to being corrected on this--like the
project includes new escalators, platform rehab, track repairs,
upgrades to the train power system and, most relevant here, the
automatic train controls, but I could not find any allocation,
probably because of the significant cost, to new train sets. In
other words, retiring that 1000-series and bringing in the 7000
or whatever the next iteration of that train set might be.
What are the plans? And does the work that was done last
night by the local regional delegation and Mr. Olver on the
Transportation Appropriations Committee of $150 million change
the dynamic here, and what might we expect?
Mr. Graham. Mr. Chairman, it most definitely does change
the dynamic. As you know, we have an RFP, which we have
received bids on, for replacement of the 1000-series cars, as
well as new cars for the expansion to Dulles, and what we are
waiting on is the dedicated funding. There is no question about
it.
And if I may add, in terms of the $177 million Red Line
rehab, it has gone through the committee but has not been
approved by the board of directors. In fact, our board is well
aware of the fact that there may be additional demands that
will take a higher priority than what has been set forth in
that proposal.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
I still have several minutes left, and I am going to have
to take these answers on the record. I would like to ask each
of you what you think the priorities are for the next step.
What has to happen next in terms of whatever you think the top
priorities should be, whether it is in response to this
accident or infrastructure needs, operational needs, or the
grant programs that Mr. Rogoff was talking about earlier.
And I am going to yield, and I am going to allow the
answers to go on the record. And I am going to ask Mr. Eleanor
Holmes Norton to take the chair and to continue with the
process and use her allocation of time.
But could we just use the next few minutes to go down the
line and list what the priorities should be?
Mr. Catoe.
Mr. Catoe. Mr. Chairman, since I am next in order, I will
go.
The first response and use of moneys will be to respond to
the recommendations of the National Transportation Board
regarding this accident. That is the first commitment this
agency will make in spending its dollars. Any future
recommendations concerning our system, we need to have moneys
to respond to those.
In order of magnitude, the next response would be the
replacement of the 1000-series cars. They are very old; they
need to be replaced. And, as our chairman, Mr. Graham, has
said, we have had the RFP and we are ready to go; all we need
is the funding to do that.
Third, as I have mentioned many times, Metro has an urgent
need of additional capital funds to maintain its infrastructure
in a state of good repair. And that would be the third step.
So, first, safety from the requirements of this accident,
any other safety needs, the replacement of the 1000-series
cars, and continuous work on the aging infrastructure of the
system.
Mr. Rogoff. As far as priorities for our role in the FTA, I
think our highest priority right now is to get a reform plan
developed under Deputy Secretary Porcari and get that plan to
Congress.
We have a number of concerns as we look at statutory
authorities before us, the inspection resources that Mr.
Madison and the other SSOs do not have, and the authorities
that we do not have within the FTA to mandate adequate
resources. And that is what we are doing, as it relates to
developing reform plans.
As it relates to specifically the needs of WMATA, I think
the most important thing is that we not prejudge the outcome of
the investigation; that we keep our mind open in terms of what
is the highest and most important capital need for those
matching dollars that, at least as an interim step, seem to be
coming forward from Congress.
Because railcars, while important, are really our last line
of defense in an accident. The most important thing we always
must be focused on is avoiding the accident and collision
entirely, as Mr. Catoe has been very articulate about. You are
not going to develop a railcar that is going to leave
passengers harmless if they are colliding at 59 miles per hour.
So we really need to be focused on capital investments that
avoid that incident and similar incidents, and develop a
capital plan around those safety assessments.
Ms. Norton [presiding]. Mr. Madison.
Mr. Madison. Our first priority is to continue working with
WMATA and the NTSB on the investigation and to implement the
recommendations that come out of the final report.
Our next priority would be to work on improved legislation
for the SSOs that give us greater authority to actually make
some serious recommendations and to have those rules be taken
seriously.
And I guess our last priority is increased funding that
would also help with continued training for SSOs and also for
staffing.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Hersman, did you have a list of priorities?
Ms. Hersman. I would say the NTSB's first priority is to
get to the bottom of what has happened in this accident
investigation, and then we can make appropriate recommendations
to WMATA and others who may need to be the recipients of those
recommendations. We have already begun that, working with the
others, issuing an urgent recommendation yesterday.
With respect to the priorities for WMATA, FTA, and others,
it is very encouraging to hear their responses to the question
about what their priorities are. I think we would say, from the
Safety Board, our priorities would be for them to implement the
safety recommendations that we have issued in the past. And
what I heard from many of the responses here was that was what
they were going to be looking at doing.
We have now 11 open recommendations to WMATA, with the 1 we
issued yesterday. And some of those are in open status; two of
them are in an unacceptable status. We were very pleased with
the quick response that we received from FTA and WMATA
yesterday when we issued our recommendation, that they are
beginning to work on it immediately.
So I think, going forward, we'd like to see implementation
of our recommendations.
Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. Madam Chair, may I add something about the
probable cause issue because we are extraordinarily concerned
about this. We are very respectful of the NTSB's pronouncements
and all of the work that they are doing, some of which is
central, some of which is peripheral, but let me make some
basic points here.
On June 17th, this signal device--let me call it a device,
because it has various component parts--which has become the
focus of suspicion about the probable cause of this accident,
was replaced in the course of routine scheduled maintenance.
There was no indication, to our knowledge, of any problem
relating to the functioning of this device.
On June 22nd, of course we had this horrendous accident.
And thereafter we went back, and we saw that, in a subsequent
review of this device functioning, there was this fluttering,
so that at one point it was signaling the presence of a train
and at another point it wasn't, which was obviously a very
substantial problem.
But what happened was we replaced the device. And this is a
very important point, Madam Chair. We replaced the device. You
would think that would remedy the issue, that with a new device
there might be some technical or other problem with the old
device, that we would have solved the problem insofar as this
particular situation. In fact, Madam Chair, the new device that
was replaced continued the same fluttering as the former
device.
And so we are left--and I am making this point, Madam
Chair, very intentionally. The Metro board and the Metro
management have issued a statement on this. We are left with a
very compelling mystery as to what is going on here. And we
have to focus all of our energies in determining just what is
wrong.
And let me say there is another significance to this, and
the other significance is that, for those who are concerned
about the slow movement of our trains and the fact that we are
on manual operation, I think with this mystery outstanding it
is very important that we do just that until we figure out what
happened. This is a probable cause situation, we believe, where
the answers and the solutions are not immediately apparent.
Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Graham.
Indeed, that segues into one of my questions. Mr. Catoe
initially thought this was a ``freak occurrence'' with the
flickering on the track circuit. You indicate, Mr. Graham, the
flickering continues.
I believe that you are now testing on a daily basis, and I
must ask you, was there any reason why more frequent testing
was not done before?
Mr. Catoe. I can sit here today and look back and say, was
the testing that we did on a monthly basis insufficient? You
know, to go back in time and to make a conscious decision to
look forward at the degree of testing, our testing for 30 years
served us well. But something----
Ms. Norton. Is this a new device of a kind you never used
before?
Mr. Catoe. No, this is not a new device of the kind we have
never used before.
Ms. Norton. So you have been running this device all along,
and, despite tests and changes, you have never seen the
flickering before?
Mr. Catoe. I am not aware of flickering as a result of this
device. And when I say ``I am not aware,'' I have not
personally found that in any of the records, of that occurring.
The investigation is still under way, and I think we will
continue to investigate and review our records to determine if
that is the case.
But the question has been with change processes. In the
urgent recommendation from the NTSB yesterday, they thought
that was a good first step, but we are required to do more,
and, as a result of that, we are going to be doing more.
Ms. Norton. And I repeat, this hearing is not about
assigning cause. We don't have the slightest idea. Nobody could
possibly know. This hearing is being held because the public
needs to know what you know now.
Mr. Catoe. Right.
Ms. Norton. And we are very pleased that, as the
information develops, you are making that information public
and transparent.
Mr. Catoe, I would like to ask about the recent decision to
put the 1000-series trains in the middle, with presumably more
crashworthy trains at either end.
First, did the union recommend that, as I believe the union
has indicated? And has it been done elsewhere? We are stuck
with 30 percent of your fleet this way.
Mr. Catoe. Let me answer the second part first because that
is the easiest. I am not aware of it being done elsewhere. The
cars are specifically placed based upon some decisions of
crashworthiness.
Ms. Norton. Did it occur to no one at WMATA, given the fact
that you were stuck with these trains because Congress had not
come forward with money and there is no other way to raise it,
that perhaps that would have been the better thing to do?
And, Ms. Hersman, did you ever recommend that?
Mr. Catoe. WMATA and myself were focused on making sure
that crashes did not take place. As mentioned before, at 59
miles per hour, you might have vehicles that will not so-called
``telescope'' as much, but you are going to have severe damage.
Our focus was keeping the system safe and to prevent accidents
from occurring.
Ms. Norton. Well, Ms. Hersman, you are the expert, or at
least the Transportation Board is the national expert. You know
these people cannot replace these cars. And you have done your
duty over and over again and said, ``Replace those cars.'' That
message needed to come here, and of course it wasn't heard in
time.
Why did you not recommend what looks like a common-sense
recommendation that doesn't require a bunch of experts: ``Hey,
at least don't make the crash occur in the front end or the
back end?'' And that is where crashes are first felt. ``Take
these 1000-series cars and don't line them all up like sitting
ducks,'' the way they were on June 22nd. Why did you not
recommend that?
Ms. Hersman. Ms. Norton, we recommended after the Shady
Grove accident in 1996 that Metro look at all of their fleet,
in consultation with some engineering experts, to determine
what needed to be done to improve the crashworthiness of their
entire fleet, whether it was retrofitting, making those cars
more robust----
Ms. Norton. But that is not my question, Ms. Hersman. These
people are not the crash experts. And my question is very
specific: Did it occur to anybody at NTSB what, I must tell
you, was the first thing to occur to know-nothing me and, I
suspect, to many people in the region? Because I was on
washingtonpost.com for an hour right after the accident. And
somebody wrote in, ``Why didn't they just put one of the better
cars at each end?'' I said, ``You have read my mind. I'll make
sure I will ask that question of Mr. Catoe and the experts.''
My question is very simple. You knew these people could not
possibly replace the trains. Over and over again, you said,
``Do the impossible.'' Absent any way for them to possibly
replace 30 percent of their fleet--you didn't recommend that
they take them out of service--why did the Transportation Board
not at least recommend this rather, low-tech, low-cost step? I
mean, was there a technical reason why? Is it just so in-your-
face that even the experts didn't see it?
Ms. Hersman. Well, I think the challenge here is, because
there are no standards and there is not crash testing done,
that we don't have the engineering data to necessarily support
the placement----
Ms. Norton. Well, in that case, should they do this or not,
Ms. Hersman? We don't know anything, according to the prior
testimony, about crashworthy standards, thanks to the Federal
Government and Mr. Rogoff's agency particularly because we have
disallowed you.
So I am asking, is what they did the right thing to do? Or
now, in hindsight, would you say that doesn't make a lot of
difference?
Ms. Hersman. I think the Safety Board has not taken a
position on whether or not putting the cars in the center was
the right thing to do. We did ask them to look at the
evaluation of these cars in a scientific way----
Ms. Norton. I must tell you, Ms. Hersman, that falls short.
Even if we give Mr. Rogoff the kind of perhaps authority he
ought to have, I can tell you without fear of contradiction--
leave aside the recession we are in, let's suppose we are in
the false boom economy we just came out of--that there is no
transit system in the United States that isn't operating with
old cars and cannot replace them quickly.
Therefore, in this hearing, we are really looking for
answers. It is real easy to say, ``Spend a billion dollars, and
you will be safe,'' but I have to ask you whether you are
prepared, at least in the future, to look at interim
possibilities when the only answer the NTSB has been able to
come up with since 2004 is ``spend some money.''
The public needs to know, short of spending money, do the
experts have a response that can increase our feeling of safety
when we get aboard the Red Line that we have no alternative but
to board?
Could you consider that, in the event your recommendation
costs a lot of money, and given what you know about resources,
would you consider offering recommendations short of spending
the money that could increase safety?
Ms. Hersman. Ms. Norton, it is completely up to the
recipients who are the experts in their----
Ms. Norton. It was up to the recipients----
Ms. Hersman [continuing]. To respond to us----
Ms. Norton. Ms. Hersman, I am not going to let you get away
with that.
Ms. Hersman [continuing]. To respond to us with
alternative----
Ms. Norton. No. That is just not fair. It was up to the
recipients to buy new cars. You had no hesitation two or three
times telling them, when they rolled back, when they rolled
forward, to change the cars. That, you didn't mince your words
on.
We are dealing with millions of people who get on these
trains, including people who visit the city. We are trying to
learn whether or not there is anybody interested in doing what
seemed to us to be minimally necessary.
If you do not have the money, what do the experts have to
say to the system about interim steps? I think that is a fair
question, and you either are prepared to look into that or not.
And I want to know if you are prepared to look into interim
steps, such as Mr. Catoe has now taken, such as the union
apparently advised, neither of which is presumed to have the
background and expertise you do. Are you prepared to consider
interim steps when the funds are not available to do what you
think is the best thing to do, yes or no?
Ms. Hersman. Yes. And we often consider interim steps.
Ms. Norton. That is all I need to know. We are not trying
to second-guess anyone. We are trying to be forehanded. We are
really not blaming anyone for anything. We think that this
accident was so unforeseeable that our only duty here is to
say, what little things can we do to make sure this doesn't
happen again?
Frankly, I think that the victims and the public is
entitled to hear any interim step we can take, however minor,
besides saying ``spend a gazillion dollars,'' which everybody
knows WMATA doesn't have, and, Ms. Hersman, we don't have it
either.
I have to ask you, Mr. Rogoff, the region met House and
Senate Members, and the first thing we thought of was,
goodness, where are the Feds, or you, more specifically. And
you say in your testimony that the FTA is prevented by law from
establishing safety standards, requiring inspections of the
kind that are required on other common carriers, etc.
What Federal law prohibits you from acting?
Mr. Rogoff. That specifically----
Ms. Norton. What Federal law prevents you from acting? And
do you believe that there is at least a minimum obligation on
the part of Federal authorities to adopt minimum standards that
perhaps States and cities can go beyond, but minimum standards,
so that Ms. Hersman knows, minimally, what is required, so that
the operators know? Would that not be a reasonable thing for
the Congress to do?
Mr. Rogoff. Well, we certainly think so.
I want to answer both parts of your question.
The language that has been both litigated and found by the
courts to be most limiting to us is Section 5334(B)(i) of Title
49. And I am just going to read it, because it is short enough.
``Except for purposes of national defense or in the event of a
national or regional emergency, the Secretary may not regulate
the operation routes or schedules of public transportation
systems.''
Ms. Norton. What is the date on that, please?
Mr. Rogoff. This has been in law, really, from the
beginning of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, going back a
great many years.
Ms. Norton. What was the reason, do you believe, we
prohibited ourselves from providing for the safety of the
public and rapid transit the way we do in other common
carriers?
Mr. Rogoff. I think it is twofold, Mrs. Norton.
One, from the birthing of these agencies, going back to the
birthing of DOT in 1966, UMTA grew up as part of the Urban
Renewal and Urban Redevelopment Agenda in the Johnson
administration. And it was thought to be a grantmaking agency
and persisted as a grantmaking agency----
Ms. Norton. So should some other Federal agency have been
charged as more and more cities and States developed mass
transit systems?
Mr. Rogoff. Well, you know, what has developed is somewhat
of a hodgepodge system where we do have commuter rail
operations under the Federal Railroad Administration, with
hundreds of Federal inspectors across the country.
Ms. Norton. So the problem was the transit systems weren't
under the usual regulatory agency, the Federal Railroad
Administration?
Mr. Rogoff. Well, those that are said to be off the
National Railroad System, which is to say they are in a closed
system. So you even have some operators that run both closed
systems, like the MTA in New York runs the New York City
Subway. They also run the Long Island Railroad in Metro North.
Long Island Railroad and Metro North are inspected by the FRA;
the subway is not.
Ms. Norton. So typically, there must be dozens of subway
systems across the Nation that are by the seat of their own
pants.
Mr. Rogoff. Well, 48 systems, to be exact, in about 28
States. And to the extent that they are regulated, they are
regulated by these State organizations, such as Mr. Madison
speaks. And as you heard me and Mr. Madison say, Mr. Madison is
concerned that they don't have enough authority in their legal
statute, and we don't have the ability even to set minimum
standards for them. We can set minimum program requirements,
but that gets into the issue of available funding.
I mean, one of the great concerns that we are looking at as
part of our process as we look at this, is the scant funding
and the scant staffing of those organizations.
Now, I would like to use that just for a second to segue
into an issue that Mr. Mica raised, because it is a source of
considerable confusion and concern. Mr. Mica is asking the
question, ``Well, FTA, why don't you let your grantees use
their Federal money to provide grants to the SSOs, the State
safety organizations?''
Our simple and first answer to that is that it is a
conflict of interest that we don't think should abide. We do
not believe that we would ever want to have a situation where
the grantee is using their funds, whether it is through a
Federal grant or other grants, to pay for the operating costs
of their regulators.
Ms. Norton. Now, that parallels the Federal Railroad
Administration----
Mr. Rogoff. Exactly. In fact, there used to be rail safety
user fees that went into a fund, and those fees were repealed
by the Congress because they did not want the users to be
paying the operating costs of their regulators and inspectors.
You know, we just had a Southwest flight land with a hole
in it about the size of a football, about 12 by 18, last night.
It lost compression. The FAA has dozens of inspectors that
inspect nothing but Southwest Airlines aircraft. We would never
want Southwest Airlines to be paying the salaries of those
inspectors. And I don't think we should necessarily----
Ms. Norton. So you don't think you are the people who ought
to be regulating?
Mr. Rogoff. What I am saying is we are not comfortable
having our grantees use their moneys to pay for their
inspectors. We think they should be paid for adequately,
robustly, but by someone else.
Ms. Norton. Again, as the money was in our court, I think
this issue is in our court. I needed your testimony on the
record, however, because if we want to really do something
besides put up the money in the future, considering that what
happened here could happen in 48 systems, we have an obligation
now, now that we know from this experience here.
Mr. Madison, my staff was charged with researching issues
about this crash, and they inform me that they couldn't even
find a Web site for your agency, the Tri-State Oversight
Committee that has the jurisdiction that I understand how
minimal it is--Mr. Rogoff does not have.
Why is there such a lack even of public information letting
the public know what it is you do?
Mr. Madison. The Tri-State Oversight Committee is formed up
of members from each of the three jurisdictions. In relation to
the question about the Web site, we have had some discussion
about that because we are not really sure who would maintain
the Web site and what information we would have on there.
Ms. Norton. Well, I mean, you would maintain it. Do you
have any staff?
Mr. Madison. No, I mean, our staff. If it would be----
Ms. Norton. How many staff do you have?
Mr. Madison. We currently have eight staff members.
Ms. Norton. Well, couldn't you just say, ``You will
maintain the Web site?''
Mr. Madison. But the staff are in three different
jurisdictions, and we work out of different agencies.
Ms. Norton. I see. ``All right, you, D.C., will do it this
year. You, Virginia, will do it next year.'' I mean, why is
that so difficult to just have a Web site at least so people
can understand what, I will confess, I did not even know
existed? I didn't know we had a regional safety organization.
Mr. Madison. Well, we weren't sure if it was difficult or
not. It was something that we hadn't considered.
Ms. Norton. Well, would you consider putting up a Web site
and assigning each jurisdiction around a duty with respect to
that? I understand you are sparsely funded.
That guess back to the jurisdictions, Mr. Graham. I mean, I
know what you have had to go through just to get the funds that
are necessary in order for us to release the funds. So I won't
say how come you haven't been pouring money on this board,
particularly since I can't believe people seek to find out that
there has any such board, as it is, particularly well-funded.
Given the lack of oversight from the transportation
administration, I am sure that people decide to put their money
elsewhere.
Do you have regulations, Mr. Madison? Are they codified
anywhere?
Mr. Madison. Yes.
Ms. Norton. What power do you have, if you are the only
agency that can look at safety?
Mr. Madison. Yes, in Part 659, there is a stipulation that
the State safety oversight agency has to develop what is called
a program standards and procedures. The Tri-State Oversight
Committee does have a document called the ``Program Standard
and Procedures.''
Ms. Norton. Is that an enforceable document?
Mr. Madison. No. Really what it is is it's a document that
lays out how the TOC is executed, but also----
Ms. Norton. So you don't have any enforcement authority, is
that right? You can't tell them to do anything.
Mr. Madison. No, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Well, I can understand your frustration, but
apparently, you recommended that the FTA withhold 5 percent of
Federal grants when WMATA was noncompliant, although you know
full well that WMATA didn't have any way to get the money.
Wasn't that counterproductive, to say, ``OK, take away
their money,'' when they don't have any money? Wouldn't it be
better to make some other kind of recommendation?
Mr. Madison. Actually, the TOC hasn't made a recommendation
to withhold funding to WMATA, because we understand that----
Ms. Norton. You can do that, is that----
Mr. Madison. Yeah, we can do that.
Ms. Norton. OK. And you have not done that?
Mr. Madison. No, we have not.
Ms. Norton. Because you recognize that if that is all they
are giving you, they are not giving you any tools. If all they
can give you is to recommend that Federal funds be withheld,
they haven't given you anything to work with. I understand
that. Nor can the local agencies.
So, as a practical matter, the reason I haven't much heard
and the public hasn't much heard of your board is not that you
don't desire to do regulation, but you don't have any authority
to do any regulation, to maintain the safety of the system, or
to enforce it, do you?
Mr. Madison. No, we do not.
Ms. Norton. I have to ask Mr. Catoe to comment on what we
have read, indeed, what we have heard here in the Congress,
unrelated to this accident, about lease-backs.
Now, first let me say that, particularly because this
hearing isn't about ``why didn't you do what you should have
done,'' but about trying to explain why some things which may
seem strange perhaps aren't, or certainly to give you the
opportunity to explain them. Therefore, I preface this question
by saying, you have been operating with no way to do capital
costs, and the only system with no dedicated funding.
So somebody, some smart financial person did what has been
done all over the country; it may, indeed, have gotten us in
this fix. We have been working with you to say take advantage
of the fact that if you go to the banks to own the cars, they
will have an incentive to buy the cars. Because, unlike you,
Mr. Catoe, you will explain why, they can depreciate cars as
they age because they can take the customary loss and write off
taxes.
So the notion occurs that the longer you keep the cars,
from the point of view of banks, the better for them. And this
arrangement apparently goes until 2014. And we are informed
that if somehow these cars are retired before 2014, it's a
straight-out money deal, it's not a safety deal, but a
desperate transit authority with no way to get the money.
But, correct me if I am wrong on this, that if you retire
these cars before 2014, that the system would have to pay a
$250 million penalty.
Now, we have a 2006 letter after the NTSB recommendation
that Metro replace these cars, where you say WMATA is
constrained by tax advantage leases which require that WMATA
keep the 1000-series cars in service at least until 2014.
Were these cars in service for tax reasons because you were
constrained by the way in which you had to finance the new
cars, or, for that matter, what cars you had bought?
Mr. Catoe. Well, let me go a little bit into the
discussion. In the late 1980's, early 1990's, transit agencies,
as well as other municipalities such as water districts, were
able to basically sell their equipment, like rail cars, and
receive a sum of moneys for doing that. They took some of the
moneys and invested those dollars into their systems. A portion
of the moneys they set aside to make payments, those lease
payments back over the number of years that agreement was in
place. That was an agreement that at the time was considered
legal, and it was encouraged in certain corridors. Since that
time, that type of arrangement has been determined to not be
legal.
Ms. Norton [presiding]. Yes. I want that on the record.
At the time that you would have engaged in this, there was
no indication from the IRS or Federal authorities that this
should not be done?
Mr. Catoe. No. There was no indication.
Ms. Norton. Indeed, the financial incentive was, in fact,
to do this.
Mr. Catoe. It was a financial incentive for transit
agencies and, again, other municipal operations, not just
transit, to be able to do that.
But to get to your question--and there is many pieces to
that--of the 2006 letter in response to the NTSB
recommendations on the replacement of rail cars, while 2014 was
the coverage date under the agreement that we had with various
banks on the 1000-series cars, the agreement did allow
substitutions. For an example, if we decided to replace the
1000-series cars, we could use a newer car to substitute for
the time period remaining under that agreement. So the letter
sent in 2006 had an error in it. It was an interpretation.
Ms. Norton. So you weren't constrained, though, from
replacing the cars. You would not suffer a $250 million
penalty?
Mr. Catoe. So long as we have a substitution, no.
Ms. Norton. Do you have a substitution?
Mr. Catoe. Yes, we have a substitution.
So even though that is what the letter said at the time,
since that period of time, WMATA has been in the process of
replacing those vehicles, of identifying funding sources as
well as developing the specifications for a new series of rail
vehicles, which several months ago we did put out the bid, and
we have received new bids on those vehicles. If we could
replace those cars today, I would replace them and substitute
another car until the agreement of 2014 has arrived.
So, yes, we could; we could substitute other vehicles.
Mr. Rogoff. Ms. Norton, I just think it's important to
point out, for people who may not be familiar with these
transactions, this is not a transaction that's unique to WMATA.
We've got railcar operators across the country that during the
same period that WMATA entered into these transactions did the
same thing in order to leverage some additional dollars out of
their rolling stock. I just want to clarify that, lest anyone
think that this is a Washington Metro unique arrangement.
Ms. Norton. Indeed. Thank you, Mr. Rogoff. In fact, we are
aware that when WMATA came here, along with virtually every
other transit system that was involved--which is every big
transit system--to get some kind of relief from having to pay
essentially penalties by having the loan called so quickly. Is
that still a problem?
Mr. Catoe. Well, yes. Again, let me go back with what
happened. These agreements had to be insured by an insurance
company. It just so happened that the majority of the
agreements that we had were ensured by AIG.
Ms. Norton. Just your luck, Mr. Catoe.
Mr. Catoe. Yes. It was the perfect storm, so to speak.
When their rating dropped, we were in technical default
because the agreement specified that the insurers had to have a
certain rating. Well, AIG was not the only one whose ratings
dropped. Every other insurance company in the world, during
these bad economic times, had their ratings dropped. So we and
every other transit agency, as well as municipalities and water
districts, were in technical default of our agreements.
Given that the banks could no longer write off a loss
because of an interpretation by the Internal Revenue Service
that this transaction was not legal, they came after the
various agencies demanding payment, even though we had made
every lease payment required over the years.
Ms. Norton. No missed payments?
Mr. Catoe. No missed payments whatsoever. Transit agencies
in other municipalities were in danger of losing hundreds of
millions, if not several billions of dollars in taxpayer
moneys. We came to Congress, and we also went to Federal court
to block the effort of that bank to do so. We were successful
to a certain degree in Federal court, and Congress has also
been very supportive.
We're in the process now, and we have unwind several of
these agreements, and we have unwind those agreements for the
moneys that were set aside for the payments, so no additional
cost to the taxpayers. However, there are still multiple
agreements here in WMATA as well as across the United States
that have not been unwound. And there is congressional action
pending to deal with those issues.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. I'm very sorry you had to go to
court on this one. It was a terrible situation.
Mr. Chaffetz is back, and I am pleased to ask him if he has
any questions. He's back in time to ask questions of this
panel.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. My apologies for being away during
the votes. I appreciate your indulgence and your understanding
of my apologies if I'm hitting something that had been
addressed while we were away.
Mr. Catoe, there was a quote in there, a Metro statement
that said ``will devote all of our resources'' to developing
additional protections. Can you give me some reassurances to
``will devote all of our resources'' and what that means,
specifically?
Mr. Catoe. Well, WMATA has limited capital resources,
obviously. Our capital dollars are from Federal 5307 funds, the
local jurisdictions' commit funds, and we have a capital
budget. There are dollars that we have identified for various
programs we plan on doing this year during the budget year. My
comment was that if there is a recommendation that identifies a
capital project or need within the agency to ensure the safety
of our system for our customers and our employees, I will
reprogram those dollars--or recommend to the board and move to
reprogram those dollars to fund that program.
Mr. Chaffetz. So as you get the first tranche of dollars,
where do you anticipate spending that first set of dollars? If
you had to prioritize maybe one, two, or even three, what's at
the top of your list?
Mr. Catoe. Safety and----
Mr. Chaffetz. Can you be more specific than that?
Mr. Catoe. Implementing the recommendations outlined by the
National Transportation Safety Board. That's No. 1.
Mr. Chaffetz. Now, my understanding from Ms. Hersman--and
correct me if I'm wrong from what I heard--there have been 76
recommendations along the way. How many of those have or have
not been implemented, not just from this incident, but from
past incidents?
Mr. Catoe. If I recall, this is off the top of my mind.
Mr. Chaffetz. Sure.
Mr. Catoe. There are eight recommendations that have not
been implemented, two from an investigation from 1996, and I
believe six from a report in 2006. My numbers might be slightly
off, but I believe there's 8 out of the 70-some-odd
recommendations.
Mr. Chaffetz. Ms. Hersman, is that your understanding?
Ms. Hersman. Over the 7 investigations, we've issued 76--
and actually with our work yesterday, 77. And of those, there
are only 10 that remain in an open status now. Eight of them
Metro is continuing to work to address the concerns that we've
raised; they address operating issues, track issues, equipment
issues. Two of them are classified in an unacceptable status,
and they deal with specific issues----
Mr. Chaffetz. I'm sorry to interrupt you with our limited
time, but just for the clarification of staff and myself and
whatnot, can we get some sort of summary as to which ones have
not been implemented and maybe some degree of justification as
to why they were not?
Let me move on in the interest of time here. I know time is
short.
Mr. Catoe, would you encourage riders to record and report
negligent behavior? I mean, we've had a couple of those reports
in the last couple of weeks. What would you say to riders?
Would you encourage that, not encourage that? What should they
do or not do?
Mr. Catoe. I have encouraged that since the day I walked in
the door. I would encourage any of our employees or customers
who see an operation that they felt is unsafe or that would
hinder the operation of this organization, to report that.
Mr. Chaffetz. And how would you assess the morale, and what
are we going to do to help those that are working hard and
diligent, and do a good job? Obviously the morale maybe
suffers. How would you assess that, and what can we do?
Mr. Catoe. Well, any time you have an event in an
organization such as occurred on June 22nd, the morale is low,
but I can share with you also that employees that I have had a
discussion with concerning the videos that most of us have seen
on TV or YouTube are angry, angry at those workers because the
overwhelming majority of our employees do an outstanding job of
providing customer service. All it takes is one or two or three
to ruin the image and the reputation of the entire agency.
So morale, of course, is impacted by what occurred, but
also, there is an anger of those individuals--those few
individuals who obviously are not following our safety
procedures and policies.
Mr. Chaffetz. And finally, let me just ask you, one of the
general concerns is the idea of implementing best practices. To
the degree in which you are communicating with counterparts and
others to implement those best practices and understand what's
working and not working, but could you maybe address that and
what you're doing and not doing in that regard and how we can
perhaps improve that?
Mr. Catoe. If I understand, the general question was the
implementation of best practices, and we do. We have a safety
officer that looks at best safety practices. Our operations
staff look at best operations practice as defined by the
industry.
Mr. Chaffetz. How would you grade yourself on that?
Mr. Catoe. I grade ourselves high. I have not thought about
an A or a B in that regard. But again, I want to clarify the
definition of best practices. One organization might say their
practices are best; I might not agree, and therefore I will not
implement those. But it is the best practices that have been
certified through a process. We all move forward and we work
toward implementing all of those if they apply to our type of
operation.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
I want to thank Ms. Holmes Norton for pinch-hitting for me
again. I understand that the Rules Committee is still meeting,
so that means Mr. Van Hollen and Mr. Connolly are both in the
Rules Committee.
However, I wanted to followup on one question. On the 17th,
when the bond in the circuit that was malfunctioning was
replaced, what was done right after that, Mr. Catoe, in terms
of making sure that it was functioning properly? Is there a
testing protocol that has to be implemented? Because it seemed
to be at the heart of the problem.
Mr. Catoe. Yes. The replacement was done on this circuit on
June 17th, and at that time it was tested to ensure that it was
working properly. Our records indicate that it was working
properly at that time; the records I have seen.
Again, monthly, we were running this test to determine
whether or not there were problems with any of the circuits in
the system. Postaccident, we did run that test, and it
demonstrated that this particular circuit was fluttering over a
period of time up to the accident itself and postaccident.
Mr. Lynch. Yeah, I'm just wondering what happened
immediately after you repaired the system on the 17th. I know
you say your systems indicate that it was acting properly. What
do you do to determine that? Do you run a bunch of test trains?
Or tell me about that.
Mr. Catoe. No. We do not run a bunch of test trains to
determine if that particular circuit is running because we have
3,000 circuits in the system, and we were going through a
program to replace all of those circuits.
The individual circuit is tested. And again, monthly we
test the whole system. So we were in the process of not just
replacing that circuit but other circuits on that line. And we
did a site test on the circuit to make sure it was receiving
the signals and connected properly.
Mr. Lynch. And where is that operating from? Is that a
manual test at the junction, or is it back in the operations
room?
Mr. Catoe. I believe it's a manual test at the site, but I
am turning around to look at my rail expert to be sure.
I was correct, it is a manual field test onsite.
Mr. Lynch. Maybe, Ms. Hersman, you can talk about this as
well: the more reliant we become on technology, I think the
more important it is that we make sure that the technology is
operating, because in this instance there was little indication
of a malfunctioning circuit that had very grave circumstances
for a lot of people. And this technology, we're becoming more
reliant on it, and there are no fallback or fail-safe measures
by which we can determine whether these things are still
operating. You've got trains loaded with people, operating at
high speeds, and we can't have this level of malfunctioning
going on. We just have to be more vigilant about testing these
safety systems to make sure they're working. We see the
consequences of this today.
But in retrospect, I'm probably a little surprised we don't
have these things more often. I think we just take a lot for
granted. And if we're going to rely on these systems to replace
operator ability to override the system when it becomes
necessary, then we have to make sure these systems work.
Ms. Hersman, are you seeing a lot more of this in other
systems as well? And does the NTSB have recommendations
regarding the routine or the regular scheduling of these
inspections?
Ms. Hersman. I think the question you're asking has a lot
of answers to it, and so one of the things that I want to make
sure that we cover is, as Chairman Graham talked about, what
happened after we identified that there were some problems.
We've been changing out components. That particular impedance
bond that was replaced, we looked at it with a shunt on the
track, we looked at it with an exemplar train on the track, we
replaced it with a brand new impedance bond, we replaced it
with the old impedance bond that was in before. There are still
intermittent failures; sometimes it's working, sometimes it's
not, even with those changes. We've walked back the cable to
see if there might be some cabling issues. There are a lot of
challenges here, and we are changing out some components to
identify what the problem is. That's why the work is still
ongoing.
But with respect to the redundancy, I think that's what
you're raising, a vital system that everyone is relying on to
perform; that's what our recommendation yesterday was about is
to have a monitoring system so that you know when something
fails. You've got to get an alert when something fails. If
people are relying on that system to be vital, and 100 percent
of the time it's got to be accurate, you've got to know when
there's a malfunction or a loss of detection. They can do that
now by looking back at their data.
What we want is for there to be a realtime notification
when that happens that there's an alert. So we've seen this on
the pipeline side or on the aviation side. So, for example, if
you're monitoring a pipeline, and you see a loss of pressure,
the person who's monitoring that pipeline gives an immediate
alert that is aggressive, and it grabs their attention so they
can start shutting that pipeline down if they're having a leak.
Air traffic control. If they have aircraft that are coming
too close to the ground, they get a low altitude or alert on
their scope. Those air traffic controllers are compelled then
to tell the pilot, ``you need to pull up, you're getting low,
there's terrain there.''
What we want to make sure is that when the system itself
isn't functioning the way it was intended, that there's some
way to get notification about that so you can intervene.
Mr. Rogoff. Mr. Lynch, can I just speak to one element
about it? It doesn't have to do with the specific elements of
the technology here, but it's really a more macro observation.
Earlier, Mr. Davis talked about and identified $6 billion
in deferred maintenance on the WMATA system. Nationally we just
completed a study for just the seven largest rail transit
operators, including the T in Boston, which indicates we have a
$50 billion deferred maintenance backlog. That's just the seven
largest systems. We're updating that study to even incorporate
a larger universe of systems.
But this is really a more macro issue for reauthorization
because one of the things obviously we see in these studies,
Metrorail is a comparatively young system, but the Red Line is
the oldest segment. It's 33 years old. Even the newer systems
are starting to age. And it makes the need to face the deferred
maintenance issue sort of head on, because, as we can say
generically, not in the context of this particular accident or
any other one, but deferred maintenance issues, if deferred
long enough, become safety issues. And that's an issue that the
administration and the Congress is going to have to take on
more broadly.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
I'm sure we didn't exhaust the full menu of questions to
all of you today, but if there are some issues that you wish to
amplify or hit on that members of the panel here have not
asked, I would like to hear those. And, as I have said with the
earlier panel, there are other Members here: Mr. Connolly, Mr.
Van Hollen, Mr. Cummings, as well as Mr. Bilbray and Mr. Issa
may want to submit some questions in writing, and so we would
ask that you diligently respond to those questions, if
possible.
But I'd like to give you at least a couple of minutes each
in closing to hit on the areas that you think are the most
important going forward for the system to operate in a reliable
and safe manner the way we all would like it to.
Mr. Graham, you are recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. Graham. Well, I would say just very briefly, Mr.
Chairman, that we need to have the probable cause of this
accident identified, and we need to have a preliminary report
from the NTSB. If it doesn't pinpoint the precise cause of the
accident, it should at least describe the challenges we're
facing because our experience, Mr. Chairman, is that there's a
great deal of half information, misinformation, misleading
information which is in circulation at the present time. This
is why I took Delegate Norton's time a little bit to try and
focus the issue because if we could just get the public to
understand what it is that we're wrestling with at this point,
I think that would go a long way in reassuring the public that
we want that manual operation, we want 35-mile-an-hour speed
limits on the Red Line, and it would also better focus the
decision of what we're dealing with.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Catoe.
Mr. Catoe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe many of the speakers today really, from a broad
perspective, talked about the issues. As we look at public
transportation now and into the future, there must be a balance
of system expansion but with that expansion, an assurance that
moneys are there to maintain the system.
When we look at all capital programs, we can't just look on
the side of what are we going to get new, and what type of
celebration are we going to have because of a new line? But we
must also plan for the maintenance of that line for the next
decades into the future. This is a discussion that's going on
within the industry today, the state of good repair of the
organizations and the systems, and it is something that we must
focus on.
And finally, in talking about the aspect of oversight,
oversight sometimes might be difficult because it takes time.
But if oversight is focused on the safety of a system to ensure
the safety of our customers, then I welcome that, and also to
provide the necessary authority on the part of the agencies
that have that responsibility to take action.
Mr. Lynch. All right.
Ms. Hersman.
Ms. Hersman. I've heard many of the concerns that were
raised here today by Congresswoman Norton and Chairman Graham.
I will definitely take those back and take them to heart.
We make many recommendations based on what we think is
best. We don't have to consider cost-benefit analysis when we
make our recommendations. And today we held a board meeting to
determine the probable cause of an accident that occurred up on
the Green Line in Newton, Massachusetts. We had an operator
that was killed up there last year. We made a recommendation in
that board meeting this morning for the Federal Transit
Administration and for NBTA to look at putting positive train
control on that line. We understand that's a cost constraint
for them. The Green Line is the only line that doesn't have a
form of positive train control on it. We know it's their oldest
line up there, too, and that will be a significant cost to
them, but we do believe that's what's needed to save lives.
So we do make recommendations, Ms. Norton, and we don't
have to pay for them. And so I do recognize the frustration,
but our charge is not to do that part of it; our charge is to
recommend what we think is in the best interests for the safety
community. We are the conscience and the compass of the
transportation industry, and they get to decide if or how they
implement it.
With respect to Chairman Graham's concerns, we do have a
number of rail investigations that are pending, about 16. We
will work very hard to get the cause of this determined. We
have another NBTA accident. I was up on Mother's Day for
another Green Line accident, and so we have many in the queue.
But even if we don't complete a final report on the Metro
accident, we will do as we did yesterday. When we identify
safety issues that are acute in nature, we will issue
recommendations to address whatever improvements we think need
to take place.
And so we recognize everyone would like us to determine the
probable cause of the accident yesterday. We will work to do it
as quickly as we can, but in the meantime, we will put out
recommendations to address the issues we think we need to look
at.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Rogoff.
Mr. Rogoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will certainly echo what Mr. Catoe said about the state
of good repair. Ironically enough, both the FTA and WMATA had a
scheduled roundtable for the whole Nation for transit operators
on the state of good repair, which was planned several months
before the accident, and we hosted it together just last week.
I'm glad Member Hersman raised the issue of the Back Bay
recommendation, because it's very telling on this whole issue
about whether we need to reform the legal authorities as it
relates to safety enforcement.
The Board's recommendations to the FTA is to facilitate the
installation of positive train control. The reason why it says
``facilitate'' is because we are not allowed, by law, to
mandate it. At the very same time, the Federal Railroad
Administration is moving a regulation to mandate positive train
control on the rail operators on the systems that they inspect
and they have a legal authority over. So, it really brings to a
head the legal issues we're raising here.
Now, we talked a lot here about the FTA model versus the
FRA model. And I want to emphasize that there are other models
out there that may be appropriate for a reformed Federal
Transit Administration. Within the Federal Motor Carrier
System, the Motor Carrier Safety Administration, within
pipeline safety, we provide Federal funds to State enforcement
agents so they will be adequately resourced to not only enforce
State regulation, but also Federal regulation.
So we recognize the need to take a hard and fresh look at
these legal authorities, but we don't want to just run out and
say, we need to Federalize this right away. We will be back to
Congress in a few weeks with a reform plan that tries to
capture the best model for this particular industry that works
with our State partners as best we can.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Rogoff.
Mr. Madison.
Mr. Madison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just reiterate from the SSO standpoint the need for
funding and legislation that actually gives the SSO some
authority.
There are currently 27 SSOs throughout the country. I've
met most of them, and they're really good people. We don't want
to imply by anything that has been said today that the lack of
authority means that there is a lack of effort on the part of
the people who work in the SSOs. They work very hard with the
resources that they have, and we try to make our systems as
safe as possible.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I want to thank you for your
willingness to come before this committee and offer your
testimony to help us.
Just in closing, we all have a special responsibility here.
Running a public transit authority is a very serious
responsibility. We had nine people who went out to work one
evering, like we all do every day, got on the Metro, and put
their trust in the system, probably not giving it a second
thought because of the level of trust that was built up in that
system over the years. Because of failure in the system,
members of the public were killed. Those families are dealing
with those consequences, and there were dozens of riders that
were hurt that day and still have not recovered. Those are very
serious consequences when we don't run a system as well as we
should.
And so I think that everyone's heart and mind is in the
right place on this, but it is a serious business. Hopefully,
with the injection of resources brought in by Ms. Norton, by
Mr. Connolly, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Cummings, and
others, some of those needs will be met. But it will require
our diligence to make sure that money is spent properly and
that our priorities are what they should be.
And we thank you all for the role in this that you play in
making it safer for the riding public. We will just continue to
work with you as we move forward and try to improve the system
for everyone.
Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony today. And
we bid you good day.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Hon.
Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Hon. Gerald E. Connolly, and
additional information submitted for the hearing record
follow:]
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