[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE LISBON TREATY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 15, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-69
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
FloridaUntil 1/4/ EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
10 deg. RON PAUL, Texas
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts MIKE PENCE, Indiana
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CONNIE MACK, Florida
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, ChairmanAs of 12/2/09 deg.
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada TED POE, Texas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South
VACANT CarolinaAs of 12/2/
09 deg.
Cliff Stammerman, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brian Forni, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Richard Mereu, Republican Professional Staff Member
Celia Richa, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State........ 10
Karen Donfried, Ph.D., Executive Vice President, German Marshall
Fund of the United States...................................... 31
Ms. Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs,
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation.. 42
Daniel Hamilton, Ph.D., Richard von Weizsacker Professor and
Director of Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University..................................................... 50
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Philip H. Gordon: Prepared statement............... 13
Karen Donfried, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 35
Ms. Sally McNamara: Prepared statement........................... 44
Daniel Hamilton, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 55
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 84
Hearing minutes.................................................. 85
THE LISBON TREATY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D.
Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Delahunt. This hearing will come to order. It has been
my customary practice when I would chair the Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight to make
it rather informal in the sense of rules. In fact my ranking
member, another gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher,
described it as the committee without rules, and it would be my
intention to continue to have that informality and flexibility
in terms of the 5-minute rule, the 10-minute rule, but we would
ask all of our witnesses to be circumspect in terms of the
amount of time that they use. But I prefer that people feel
comfortable, take their time, and it also applies to members.
We generally have a conversation, members are allowed to pursue
a line of questioning without being concerned about the gavel.
But in any event, let me first extend I guess my welcome,
or it should be his welcome to me, to my other friend from
California, the ranking member, Mr. Gallegly, with whom I have
served some 14 years on the House Judiciary Committee. We have
an excellent working relationship. We agree on some things on
the Judiciary Committee, like what, what is it, Elton? But I
presume on this subcommittee there will be much agreement with
occasional disagreements, but they will be done in such ways as
I know our personal relationship has always been one of mutual
respect and good camaraderie.
So it is with a deep sense of responsibility that I am
conducting my first hearing as chair of the Subcommittee on
Europe. As I agree with the observation of Secretary Clinton,
who noted that Europe is our essential partner, and that the
subject of today's hearing, the Lisbon Treaty, would appear to
signal a substantial change in the infrastructure of the
European Union, and thus it behooves us to be especially aware
for the potential implications for that partnership as there is
no other relationship closer or more significant for the United
States and for that matter Europe.
The economic data is empirical proof of that premise.
According to the delegation of the EU to the United States,
transatlantic flows of trade and investment amount to far in
excess of $1 billion a day, and together our global trade
accounts represent 40 percent of world trade and 50 percent of
global GDP. Furthermore, it is my own belief that this
partnership is a predicate for political and economic stability
and the expansion of democratic values globally. Now the
evolution of a European entity has been dramatic in a
historical context since Robert Schuman's famous speech back in
1951 proposing that France and Germany pool their coal and
steel resources into a new organization that other European
nation states could join.
Now I won't take the time to review the history that led to
the Lisbon Treaty, but I believe that as the evolution and
growth of the EU proceeded over time, our partnership with the
EU became ever more critical and will clearly continue to do
so. As President Obama recently stated in response to the final
approval of the Treaty, a strengthened and renewed EU will be
an even better transatlantic partner with the United States.
Some experts suggest that the passage of the Lisbon Treaty
will have positive implications for the United States, Europe,
EU relations, in part due to the creation of new posts such as
the European Council President and High Representative for
Foreign Affairs, along with an increased role for the European
Parliament, dear to the heart of many Members of the United
States Congress, I might note. That combined with more
authority in specific policy areas, these changes would provide
the EU with a more coherent voice, and given our shared vision
for democracy, human rights and global security, these new
allocations of power within the EU system could offer the U.S.
a more active and assertive overseas partner in addressing our
shared challenges and in promoting our common causes.
While some cast the premise that deeper integrations and
enlargement of the EU are threats to America's leverage over
individual member states, it is my own conviction that the
interest of having a stable and dependable multilateral partner
in Europe outweighs the short term interests of any particular
bilateral relationship. Now, why hold a hearing on the
implications of the Lisbon Treaty at this admittedly premature
juncture? Much ambiguity exists as to the Treaty's
implementation within the EU even among its own member states,
much less in working relations with other nations.
It is indeed accurate to say, as with all reform, that only
trial and practice will reveal a measure's true character and
consequence. But as we have seen all too often, in the cases of
wars on terror and wars on drugs, financial regulation, and
global warming, it is our lack of foresight and thoughtful
consideration to anticipate and prepare for new challenges and
opportunities that diminishes our ability to promote and
preserve the interests and well being of our own citizens. It
was our sixth President of the United States, John Quincy
Adams, who warned, ``Idleness is sweet and its consequences are
cruel.''
For those of you who attend these subcommittee hearings in
the future, be prepared for constant references to John Quincy
Adams. He was not only the first Ambassador to Russia, but he
is my immediate political predecessor, in other words I am his
direct political descendant since he and I are the only native
sons of Quincy, Massachusetts, to serve in the United States
Congress. He is therefore a very quotable source for me. I only
hope that I don't end like John Quincy Adams, whom some of you
might know was President and then came back to the House of
Representatives and happened to die in the chamber of the House
of Representatives. But he was obviously a large figure in
American history.
So proactive inquiry and thoughtful consideration facing
the EU-American relationship will not only inform us what may
occur, but better prepare us for whatever options may be
available as we move forward. So it is with this purpose that
we hold today's hearing. Understanding the meaningful reforms
encompassed in the Lisbon Treaty will assist our Government in
making the most of the essential relationship. President Obama
has aptly stated that in America there is a failure to
appreciate Europe's leading role in the world. I concur with
that. With this in mind, and by holding this hearing here
today, we are taking Europe and the EU and the individual
member states seriously. So with that I will conclude and yield
to the ranking member, Mr. Gallegly, for any comments he wishes
to make.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding this hearing on the Lisbon Treaty and its
effect on the U.S.-EU relationships. Dana is always coming
through, he may be a little more tolerant of the no rules or
the diminished structured rules, but I am sure we are going to
work well together, it has been an honor to serve with you on
the Judiciary for all these many years, and while as you
mentioned we have had some disagreements as it relates to
issues philosophically and maybe even politically on occasion,
but I don't think we have ever been disagreeable on any issue
we have ever dealt with, and as the former chairman of this
committee for a couple terms when Rob Wexler was my ranking
member, and then something happened somewhere along one of the
political cycles that changed all that, I did have the honor to
work with Rob as the chairman and as his ranking member, and I
enjoyed every minute of it as I look forward to working with
you, Mr. Chairman.
As we all know, on December the 1st, following ratification
by all 27 member states in the European Union, the Lisbon
Treaty went into force. In the end, the goal of the Lisbon
Treaty is to streamline decision making in the EU and make it
more active and united actor in international affairs. I don't
have a strong view on whether the Lisbon Treaty will be
beneficial to the people of Europe, this is the decision for
the nations of the EU and their citizens to ultimately make.
They are the best judge on the best way to organize their own
political and economic affairs.
However, I will be monitoring the implementation of the
Treaty to determine its effect on the United States
relationship with the sovereign countries in Europe. For
example, will the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in any way
impede our close bilateral military and intelligence
relationships that we maintain with certain European countries?
Or will the new Treaty make it more difficult for the countries
of Europe to cooperate with us, particularly in places like
Afghanistan.
Finally, I was very interested to read Ms. McNamara's
statement in which she cites the provision in the Lisbon Treaty
that requires EU countries to consult the other members before
undertaking international action and to ensure that such
actions are consistent with the EU policy. I find this
provision to be potentially troublesome. Judging by its recent
history, one can only imagine what the EU reaction would be to
the actions taken by some of our close allies such as Britain
on a variation of national security issues. Again, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today, I welcome
and look forward to hearing the testimony of all our witnesses
and certainly welcome Assistant Secretary Gordon. And I would
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Gallegly. And let me note the
presence of the chairman emeritus way down at the end, Mr.
Wexler. I am sure he is here to monitor my performance, I am
sure shortly after the conclusion of this particular hearing I
will be receiving a report card from Professor Wexler. But let
me yield to him to see whether he has any comments that he
wishes to make. With that, the gentleman from Florida, my
friend Bob Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, just one. Understanding that
Secretary Gordon is quite a draw, I had the privilege of
chairing this committee for 3 years and none of you guys ever
showed up, and now it is a full boat. So what does that have to
say?
Mr. Delahunt. I think it says a lot, Bob, actually.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much, please proceed.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. Do any other members wish to make
an opening statement? The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations, I
am sure that we are going to be able to work on many issues
together, some not so closely as others, but you know that I
appreciate and I respect your friendship. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding today's hearing. On December 1st the
Lisbon Treaty went into effect. The Treaty was designed to
improve the procedures of the European Union in hopes of
progressing the Union's work in Europe and around the globe. I
applaud the EU members for their achievement in passing this
substantial reform after years of negotiations.
However, despite the lengthy deliberation it remains to be
seen how the Lisbon Treaty will affect the work of the European
Union in practice and how this reform may impact U.S. relations
with the EU and its members. Also, with this long process
completed, I am eager to see where the new European Union will
focus its energies next. I look forward to hearing from today's
expert witness and welcome you to the hearing. And I would like
to end by saying I enjoyed very much working with former
Chairman Wexler on this committee for the years that he was
here. Thank you very much.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too want to
congratulate you on your first hearing as the chairman of the
Europe Subcommittee. Surely anyone who arises or sends up to
this chair has big shoes to fill, but perhaps no more so in the
history of this committee as now as you fill the shoes of
Congressman Wexler. But we all know that you are up to it, and
we look forward to your leadership as we all know you are a
passionate leader on the issues that exist between our country
and Europe and also how important that partnership and
friendship is and that you are a strong advocate for
strengthening that bond. And as a new member of course I wish
you the best in this influential subcommittee and look forward
to working with you.
And again thank you for calling this timely hearing on the
Lisbon Treaty. Secretary Gordon, thank you for being here
today. The Lisbon Treaty's ratification and its subsequent
employment has left the United States with as many exciting
prospects of increased cooperation as with questions on the
future of U.S.-EU relations. Personally, I would encourage and
invite our counterparts in the European Parliament to be more
active on the Hill and to address these concerns as we will
seek to interact with them as well.
Mr. Chairman and Secretary Gordon, I am actually
particularly concerned over noted trends toward protectionism
in the European Union. Aside from hampering U.S. industry in
the EU and hurting the EU economy, many fear that new rules,
particularly the alternate fund managers directive, could lead
to U.S. retaliation in the sort of a damaging trade dispute in
the area of financial services. Furthermore, I have questions
about the EU's new internal market chief Michael Barnier and
his views on this legislation. We are encouraged by the work of
the Transatlantic Economic Council to promote increased
dialogue between legislators on this matter, Mr. Gordon, and we
look forward to your testimony and your comments on these very
important issues and as always are grateful for your appearance
here. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. And next let me go to the gentlelady from
Nevada who chairs the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue which
just met recently with our European counterparts in New York
and I understand it was a very robust and very productive
session. Ms. Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations.
I am looking forward to working with you on these issues as
well as so many others. And of course my dear, dear friend Bob
Wexler, if I praise him any more he is going to get a very
swelled head, but he knows how much I will miss him and wish
him well in his new endeavors. As the chairman said, I chair
the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue. For those that don't
know what that is, it is an ongoing discussion between Members
of the United States Congress and our European Union Parliament
counterparts.
We just attended our 67th meeting, it has been going on for
well over 30 years with and without me. I have been chair for
the last few years, and I can honestly say it has been an
extraordinary experience for me. We meet twice a year, once in
the United States, and we just concluded our 67th meeting in
New York City, and once in Europe depending on who had the
presidency of the EU. Our dialogue encompasses a number of
issues starting many years ago just on foreign policy, and of
course we talk about the Balkans and Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan,
our relationship with Russia, the Middle East.
But we have started to expand the scope of our discussions
and we are now talking about the collective economies,
especially in light of the financial meltdown that continues to
plague all of us, trade issues, the TEC, that has become a
large part of what we talk about. So I can tell you without
fear of contradiction that at this latest meeting which took
place last weekend in New York, the euphoria felt by the
members of the European Union Parliament that were in
attendance was palpable, and they are most excited to take this
new Treaty and translate it into positive action not only among
EU members and have a stronger, more transparent, and a better
EU, but vis-a-vis their relationship with the United States and
a strengthening of the transatlantic coalition.
I am curious in you remarks and perhaps during Q&A, the
Europeans have made a number of proposals to the American side
of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, everything from as
simple as exchanging interns during the summer, which I think
would be a very good thing, to strengthening our involvement in
the TEC, additional meetings throughout the year rather than
the two, we can certainly be doing video conferencing on
specific issues, and tailoring our meetings so that maybe since
we have now a good contingent of both Europeans, 27, and we had
14 Congresspeople at the last TLD meeting, so it is a good
number of people and many have areas of expertise that we would
like to hone in on.
But one of the most intriguing suggestions by the EU
members is that they are setting up an office, a TLD office,
here in the United States starting on January, right after the
new year, that will interact with Members of Congress, so that
legislation that we are considering they will get a handle on
and its impact on the EU prior to enactment. They have asked
that the United States Congress do the same, and I am curious
as to what your opinion is. It is easy enough to do, we could
pattern it after Helsinki and their arrangement, and so we have
lots of possibilities, and I would be curious to hear, Mr.
Gordon, what you think about that and where you see the TLD's
role in this enhanced EU relationship through the Lisbon
Treaty. And I thank you very much for your kind attention.
Mr. Delahunt. I thank the gentlelady. And I would also
echo, you know, the suggestion in terms of an American office.
In fact the gentlelady I am sure is unaware but there was a
former Member from Minnesota by the name of Gil Goodnik whom,
along with myself, chaired the Congressional study group on
Germany, and working with the then Chair Henry Hyde of the full
committee raised that potential because it became clear to us
that Members of Congress to a very large degree were unfamiliar
with the basic structure of the EU and there needed to be a
presence given the significance of Congress as an institution
in American foreign policy. So I look forward to working with
you on this.
Ms. Berkley. It seemed, if I could, Mr. Chairman, there was
discussion that the United States Congress is the weak link in
our foreign policy discussions and involvement with the
European Union, and I would rather not be considered the weak
link in anything.
Mr. Delahunt. Well I can assure you, you personally are not
considered a weak link in anything. But with that, let me
determine whether the gentleman from Georgia wishes to make an
opening statement?
Mr. Scott. Yes I would, Mr. Chairman, and let me start off
by congratulating you on your new assignment. And I would like
to add, for those of you who may not know, the chairman is the
only Member of Congress with the distinctful photograph of him
taken in Moscow downtown with the statue of John Quincy Adams.
Many people did not know that John Quincy Adams has a statue of
him in downtown Moscow, and the chairman was there and I was
very proud.
Mr. Delahunt. My memory, Mr. Scott, is that you were the
photographer.
Mr. Scott. Yes I was.
Mr. Delahunt. I have not received the invoice yet, but I
appreciate the photo.
Mr. Scott. It was a great, great photo, and it was a great
honor for me to take it, and I enjoyed that. And to you, Mr.
Wexler, we really appreciate, I enjoyed serving on this
subcommittee with you, and I wish you great success in your
future endeavors. This is indeed a very timely hearing with the
EU, some very perplexing questions and issues certainly present
themselves. It is going to be very interesting to see how these
reforms from the Lisbon Treaty impact on multiple layers.
One, there are so many, but one that strikes out is what
areas of conflict and duplication do we have now with the EU
and NATO? Particularly in the new reform of mutual assistance,
where one member enters into any kind of armed conflict the
other members come to their aid, and that of course is the same
of I think it is a chapter or amendment 5 within the NATO
agreements as well. So I think that that is an area that
certainly raises some questions.
The other is, will the reforms of Lisbon Treaty in terms of
the common defense that this reform has put forward strengthen
a more aggressive foreign policy, a more protective one, and
particularly as it relates to terrorism and what is going on in
the Middle East? And particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan,
will they offer a similar line of support as NATO? And then the
overlapping of NATO and the EU, and one is 23 countries I
believe, the other is 27, but they are many of the same
countries, so that is a very area.
And will there be a more aggressive approach to Russia
particularly in the area of energy security and the monopoly
that Russia has in that region in supplying nearly 40 percent
of its natural gas and Russia's tendency to use that monopoly
as a political tool, will they be more aggressive in how they
respond to that? And I think that in terms of their efforts to
move forward in a more responsive way with Iran on the
sanctions, we have not had that.
So I am really looking forward to this, I think that the
Lisbon Treaty is very positive, and I think that we really need
to examine it very thoroughly here, hopefully we can accomplish
through our examination a sense of urgency to move the European
Union to be more forceful, and it is good to see the underlying
agreements within this Treaty appear to be moving the European
Union in a more aggressive way in terms of a more robust
defense, security, and foreign policy. And I look forward to
hearing you and certainly asking some questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
And before I go to my colleague on the Republican side, let
me conclude and inquire from the vice chair, I understand, of
this subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Costa,
whether he wishes to make a statement.
Mr. Costa. Yes, very quickly. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and congratulations to you and your good work and to
our past chairman as he seeks greener pastures. My colleagues
who have commented about this being a very timely hearing I
think are quite correct, and, Secretary Gordon, we are looking
forward to your testimony as it relates to what portends with
the Lisbon Treaty. As the vice chair of the Transatlantic
Legislators Dialogue, I want to associate myself with the
comments that the chair just made, it is I think a robust
discussion that is taking place. As the European Parliament
continues to participate under the Lisbon Treaty, we will
continue to see exchanges.
I think most of us are aware that the largest trading
partner that the United States has is with Europe, and the
dynamic nature of the relationship that has a tremendous
history is important as we look forward. I also want to make
comments as the chair of the Transatlantic Partners Network,
and we work in collaboration, and what is less known is as a
member of the smaller Portuguese caucus, Mr. Chairman, the
Lisbon Treaty is so named because during the tenure of the
Presidency of Portugal the Lisbon Treaty was finally concluded,
and although it took several years to ratify we are honored to
have the Ambassador from Portugal is here in the audience
today, Ambassador Joao de Vallera, who has taken a great
interest as all the members, 27 nation states of Europe, in
successfully seeing the Treaty enacted.
What this portends as to the Lisbon Treaty, stronger more
coherent voice with the European Union is one of the goals,
more streamlined decision making in their process, and
increased transparency and democratic accountability. As the
European network has expanded, we can only think 20 years ago
the euro really had not developed, and today of course the euro
is a very robust, strong currency that has created tremendous
economic vitality not just in Europe but around the world. One
can only imagine what 20 years from now the new European Union
with the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, or as we would say in
Portuguese, Lisboa Treaty, we can hope whether or not it
ultimately leads to some formation of a United States of Europe
remains to be seen.
We do know that when our country was formed and we achieved
our independence we had the Articles of Confederation that were
fairly ineffective and which ultimately led to the development
of our Federal form of government and our Constitution. This is
a very exciting time period, and the Lisbon Treaty, or as we
would say Lisboa, is a work in progress. We look forward to the
testimony that the secretary will provide us during this
transition that is currently existing, and would like to get
your insights as to what we might expect. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Costa. Let me echo your kudos
for the Ambassador from Portugal and for serving as a venue as
well as a force in terms of the conclusion of this Treaty that
we are discussing here today.
And now let me, as I look to my right one more time, I am
going to have to go to one of the best ranking members anywhere
in the Congress, a lot of people were I think surprised by our
ability to work on some extremely difficult issues together
when I chaired the Oversight Committee, but I think we
accomplished much more than was ever anticipated, and it was
terrific working with the gentleman, my friend from California,
Dana Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I am here to wish you good
luck in your new endeavor, but I do want to remind you that
even today, if you will notice, I am not on your right, I am on
your left. And I know that is very difficult to discern when
you are talking about your good friend, Dana. About the remarks
that were just made in terms of our European friends and the
euro et cetera, I remember when in the 1990s when we used our
currency stabilization fund to save the euro. The euro was
going down, I was very upset that President Clinton, you know,
saw it in his power, which was not granted him by Congress, to
stabilize the euro with our funds when the fund that he was
using was for the United States dollar.
But we did that and we saved the euro, and I think that it
was certainly an act of good will on the part of the people of
the United States, because there wouldn't even be a euro now. I
am very anxious to find out whether or not our European friends
are being reciprocal in that, whether or not now that the
dollar is under attack, what are they doing to help us
strengthen the dollar, or are they instead taking advantage of
a situation and kicking a friend while he is down?
Mr. Chairman, again congratulations for assuming this new
chairmanship. Today we have heard congratulations and best
wishes to Representative Wexler for the job that he has done, a
great job that he has done, for the many accomplishments that
he has had. We have also heard some very hopeful words about
the Lisbon Treaty and the sense of optimism that that might be
something that will play a positive role in the future. Let me
fully identify myself with the former words of congratulations
and not the latter words of hopeful, perhaps irrational
optimism. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
And last but not least certainly, a senior statesman in the
U.S. Congress, the gentleman from Tennessee, the retiring John
Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. Mr. Chairman, I may add my good wishes to you
in your new endeavor and thank Mr. Wexler for his past
leadership. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. As you
know, I have been very active in the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly. Mr. Scott touched on some of the matters that we just
recently discussed at our fall plenary meeting in Scotland. I
have been going to NATO PA since General Joulwan was SACEUR.
General Joulwan, General Clark, General Jones, General Ralston,
General Craddock, and I just met with Admiral Stavridus 3 weeks
ago. All of them have I guess in one way or another bemoaned
the fact that the coordination between NATO and the EU, and
with respect to Afghanistan right at the moment, is lacking.
And I would be very interested in your insight and your
opinions as to how the Lisbon Treaty, if it will, will help
that situation, because there are so many things that the EU
could do that NATO is not the best vehicle in terms of some of
the civilian projects, PRTs and so on. The other question I
would have, or observation, is the scarcity of resources. Many
of the EU members are also NATO members, and the last thing we
need is duplicity in a resource scarce world with regard to
that, and I would be very much interested in your insight as to
that. So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, it
is very, very timely.
Mr. Delahunt. Well thank you, Mr. Tanner, and I know that I
speak for everyone when I say thank you for your long and
significant service to issues such as NATO and our national
security and our relationship particularly with Europe. Without
any further ado, thank you for your patience, Assistant
Secretary Gordon, it is great to have you here. I will be brief
in your introduction. The assistant secretary was nominated as
assistant secretary in March of this year and took the oath on
May 15th.
From 2000 to 2009 he was a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institute in Washington where he focused on a wide range of
Europe and United States foreign policy issues. He was Director
for European Affairs at the National Security Council during
the Clinton administration where he played a key role in
developing and coordinating NATO policy in the run up to the
Alliance's 50th anniversary summit in Washington. He has an
extensive background academically as well as service to his
country. So thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, and please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gallegly, and
thanks to all of you. I would also like to begin by
congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on taking over this
committee. As you all know I have had extensive engagement with
this committee over the years, and I will look forward to
continuing that under your leadership. And I too would like to
acknowledge and thank your predecessor, Mr. Wexler, we all
benefitted from his leadership of this committee over the years
and note he will stay engaged on all of these issues.
I also want to thank you for inviting me to testify on this
subject at this time, because as many of you have pointed out,
this really is a potentially important development that the
United States should be paying close attention to as we think
about our own interests. I have submitted more detailed
testimony for the record, so if it is all right with you and
abiding by your encouragement to be brief, I will just make a
short opening statement.
Mr. Delahunt. Please.
Mr. Gordon. The United States and the European Union form a
community of shared values and a partnership of shared
interests. Our 800 million democratically governed citizens are
bound together by enduring links of culture and commerce, by
our shared history, and by our common hopes for the future. The
European Union is one of our most crucial partners in
addressing regional and global challenges around the world. Our
shared priorities cover all the major United States foreign
policy concerns, including stabilizing Afghanistan and
Pakistan, contending with the Iranian nuclear program,
addressing global climate change, pursuing comprehensive peace
in the Middle East, managing our responses to the global
financial crisis, enhancing energy security, and promoting the
spread of democratic and market reforms to every corner of
Europe.
The United States-Europe economic relationship is one of
the central drivers of the world economy, our links are not
just those of shared values, trade, and political traditions,
but also consist of the millions of our citizens who travel
each year to our countries to work, study, or simply visit. In
view of the many ties that bind the United States and Europe
together, the Obama administration welcomed very much the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1st. We believe
that this Treaty marks a milestone for Europe and its role in
the world.
It creates several new institutions, including the
permanent presidency of the European Council, a new EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and a
new European External Action Service. There will also be an
enhanced role for the European Parliament. These new and
strengthened institutions will further promote the evolution of
the European Union toward a more consistent, coherent, and
effective foreign policy. We believe that a strong and cohesive
Europe is very much in the United States national interest, and
we look forward to the development of these institutions and to
engaging with their new leaders, incoming President Herman Van
Rompuy and the new High Representative Catherine Ashton, as
well as with President Barroso of the European Commission and
the leaders of the European Parliament.
We are hopeful that a permanent presidency of the Council
will allow for the development of a long term consultative
relationship at the head of state and government level. The new
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
will combing responsibility for EU foreign policy coordination
with a greater capacity to make strategic use of the EU's
substantial foreign assistance budget, and will function as the
permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, the monthly
meeting of EU foreign ministers.
Secretary Clinton met with Catherine Ashton during her
December 4 visit to Brussels for the NATO ministerial, and they
have talked about an early visit by High Representative Ashton
to Washington. High Representative Ashton will be supported by
a new External Action Service that will ultimately function as
a sort of diplomatic service for the EU and offer counterparts
to U.S. officials. The Lisbon Treaty brings other noteworthy
institutional changes. The European Parliament has gained
increased powers over issues of justice and home affairs, the
EU budget, agricultural policy, and trade agreements.
We hope that ties and contacts between Members of Congress
and EU legislators will continue to strengthen as the European
Parliament's authority broadens. I think this reinforces a
point made by many of you about the need for that, which we
certainly support. A number of members of this committee, as
Representative Berkley pointed out, met on December 4 to 6 with
their European counterparts in New York under the Transatlantic
Legislators Dialogue in what we understand were some of the
most robust consultations so far between our legislators, and
that can only be a good thing, and I hope in the question and
answer period to be able to elaborate on this, but certainly
given that this is a democratic space on both sides of the
Atlantic we need to be connecting with the legislators and
citizens on these foreign policy issues.
The EU also continues to take steps toward fulfilling the
European vision of the EU that contributes as much to diplomacy
and defense as it does to trade and economics. Under Lisbon,
the EU's European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP, is renamed
the Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP. The Treaty
expands the scope of the EU in terms of crisis management
deployments, peacemaking, supporting third countries in
combating terrorism in their territories, and defense
coordination. It is the policy of this administration to
support a strengthened European defense capacity.
We believe that CSDP can make an important contribution to
international security and stability. We also believe that NATO
and the EU, with 21 common members, can complement each other
and should work closely together on their shared priorities. In
our view, there is more than enough work to around, so it also
makes sense, and again this addresses a point that several of
you have made, it also makes sense for the two organizations to
coordinate their efforts to make the most efficient use of
scarce resources by minimizing duplications of capabilities,
infrastructure, and operations.
And let me conclude with what I think is the essential
point behind our thinking. It is clear to all of us that the
United States faces a daunting array of global challenges that
no single country can handle on its own. For a variety of
critical issues from climate change to the Doha Round of trade
talks, the Balkans, Iran, I could name many others, solutions
will require working in close concert with our European
partners. We believe that the Lisbon Treaty represents an
important effort by our EU partners to streamline their policy
making process.
We understand that, as with all efforts to reform complex
institutions, and the EU is certainly one, this is a work in
progress and it may take time for the new institutions to
demonstrate their impact. Nevertheless, we hope that changes
brought by Lisbon will make the EU a stronger partner for the
United States and increase the role of Europe on the world
stage. We want the EU to be that stronger partner and we
certainly intend to do our part to engage closely with the new
institutions. Ultimately, their effectiveness will be
determined by the will of the EU member states to invest in
them. Let me thank you again, Mr. Chairman, all the members of
the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you on this
important subject, and I look forward to your questions and our
discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon
follows:]Philipi Gordon deg.
Mr. Delahunt. Well thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, and
as I was listening to your testimony, I found it thought
provoking in the sense of future hearings. I have always
contemplated the concept of a transatlantic free trade zone as
you reference our commercial trade relationship, and have
always been curious as to why it has not had more attention and
more focus. I also, as I indicated earlier, serve on the
Judiciary Committee, where both Mr. Gallegly and I have served
on the Immigration Subcommittee, which implicates the Visa
waiver program. And I am aware of the fact that there are some
countries in Eastern Europe that have an interest in
participating in that program and I think that ought to be a
subject of a hearing.
And I also concur with your statement about the need for
coordination between the EU and NATO and a more efficient
relationship there. But I am just going to ask one question,
because if needs be I can always ask at the end before we
conclude your testimony. But I have always been surprised, not
just by the European ignorance of the role and the function of
Congress in our Federal system, in our American democracy, but
clearly the opposite is also true.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, to the American, the
concept of the EU, you know, represents something at first
blush as very simple, but it becomes much more arcane when the
details are reviewed. There is a commission, there is a
council, there is a Parliament and it is in Brussels, and what
is it doing in Brussels? With all due respect to Brussels. The
point is that this lack of understanding I think carries with
it great risk. I think there are perceptions on the part of
Members of Congress that sometimes there is animosity when in
fact there is none, and are minimal disagreements as opposed to
animosity. And I think it is very, very important to maintain a
consistent, constant dialogue.
And I respect the work that my colleagues under the
leadership of the Congresswoman from Nevada have done, but I
don't think we can afford at this point, with a new entity
post-Lisbon that will be more efficient hopefully in terms of
its decision making, not to have a significant presence in
Brussels where there are consistent, constant, open lines of
communication as opposed to an ad hoc series of meetings. And I
intend to discuss this with Ms. Berkley, but I just put out on
the table, why not a Congressional office? Obviously it would
be bipartisan in nature, but having a presence with a well
qualified staff, given the seriousness of the issues that we
all know face both Europe and the United States?
Mr. Gordon. Well I can certainly say I share your
perception that there is insufficient familiarity on both sides
with the institutions of the other, including on the
parliamentary side, that partly stems from very different
practices. We certainly encourage when visitors come here to
talk foreign policy, we do encourage them to come up to the
Hill, and a number of these European countries, their
parliaments don't play the sort of role in foreign policy that
ours do, and it is important for them to understand ours.
In terms of the other direction, I would say this, one
theoretical at least advantage of Lisbon is to be easier to
understand. You know, we can forgive some Americans for not
having mastered the intricacies of the council, the commission,
the European Parliament and how that interrelates to the
countries. And again in theory, this has to be proved in
practice, but one of the ideas is to have a more identifiable
interlocutor. And so now with a standing President of the
Council and a standing High Representative, if you will foreign
minister, it is a little bit clearer who is speaking for them
on foreign policy.
That said, and this comes to your point, Mr. Chairman, you
know, let us not pretend that that will answer this question
once and for all and that there will be just one phone number
or individual, it will remain quite complicated and we are
going to have to take advantage of your suggestion to
understand it better including the European Parliament, which
will play a greater role in foreign policy than it has. I don't
really have a specific view on your idea of a Congressional
office in Brussels, maybe that is something that could be
explored and similarly in the other direction, but I certainly
agree with the notion that it is worth thinking about how we
can get our parliaments to understand the other side better.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Assistant Secretary, it is my
understanding that the European Parliament is or is about to
open an office here in Washington, and without having a
counterpart in Brussels I think we stand at a disadvantage. And
like I said, I look forward to having this discussion with
Congresswoman Berkley to see whether legislation (a) is
necessary, or whether Congress as an independent institution
can just simply appropriate the money and say that we are going
to do it. But in any event I intend to make it a priority for
myself and for this committee.
With this I will yield to the ranking member Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, can
you give us your assessment as to how you see the impact that
the Treaty will have on the U.S.-EU economic and trade
relationship?
Mr. Gordon. I think the Treaty will have limited impact on
the economic and trade relationship. It has potentially
significant impact on the general foreign policy relationship.
Economics and trade is one area that was already significantly
integrated in EU structures even prior to Lisbon. The
Commissioner for Trade has for a long time been a powerful
figure. EU member states a long time ago agreed to grant
significant authority, for example when there is a trade
negotiation it is the Trade Commissioner who is really
empowered to act on behalf of all of the member states in a way
that has not been true and remains untrue for foreign policy.
So I don't think that we should expect Lisbon to have a major
impact on that. EU common institutions have already been quite
empowered, and that will not change with the Lisbon Treaty.
Mr. Gallegly. How do you see the impact that the enhanced
role of the European Parliament might have on the U.S.-EU
relationship?
Mr. Gordon. That is more of an open question because the
Lisbon Treaty does give the Parliament a greater role,
including to some degree on foreign policy and including
something that is a tradition in this country as holding
hearings for and approving some of the appointments that will
be part of the foreign policy apparatus. And the Parliament
will also play a greater role in justice and home affairs,
issues that at least indirectly affect our interests.
But precisely how, so we can confidently say the European
Parliament will play a greater role. What we can't say, because
it will depend in part on who gets elected to the European
Parliament and how assertive they want to be and how resistant
the people who fill the new posts want to be, is precisely what
impact that will have, we don't know what direction that they
will want to go in, but it comes back to the chairman's point
about being better aware of developments taking place within
the Parliament so that we know where they might be trying to
push things.
Mr. Gallegly. In another area, how do you see such things
as a commitment of troops to wars and around the world or in
areas of trade policy where a more coherent EU could pose some
difficulties to the U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Mr. Gordon. It could in theory pose difficulties for U.S.
foreign policy objectives. But as I suggested in my testimony,
we actually believe it is more likely to provide benefits in at
least two ways. One is to have a more coherent European view of
the situation and a more clear address for us to consult with
on foreign policy challenges. And again through the new
President of the Council and the High Representative we will be
able to have this dialogue in a more direct manner with more
direct representatives of the European Union. That is not going
to be a cosmic jump from one situation to another.
Member states of the EU, in particular the bigger, more
active ones, will still play a predominant role and ultimately,
and let us be clear about this, member states will still decide
on issues such as whether to send forces abroad. When it comes
to Afghanistan, not just because we are doing it in a NATO
context, but anything like that, these questions will still be
decided by countries and the institutions don't provide for it
and we shouldn't expect the new President of the Council or the
High Representative to take decisions like that. Nonetheless,
they can play a coordinating role and a role in engaging with
us.
We also believe that by having a more coherent foreign
policy and spokespeople for that foreign policy will help
Europeans think strategically and raise their sights. By
empowering people to think about these things and lead the EU
we believe these institutions will give Europe a more prominent
role on the world stage and therefore better balance the
transatlantic relationship when it comes to thinking about
these big foreign policy challenges.
Ultimately, the reason we see more positives than negatives
in this is that ultimately our foreign policy interests are
very much in line with those of the European Union, whether it
is stabilizing Afghanistan or responding to a crisis in Africa
or keeping the peace in the Balkans, we really don't see major
differences with our democratic like minded European allies.
And therefore the more they get engaged in these things, as I
noted there is a theoretical prospect for a difference or a
tension, but in most cases we are actually likely to see the
European Union pursuing very much the same interests as us.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Chairman, just one last question because
I see we have several members that want to jump in here, but
maybe in short term you could give me what your assessment is
and the effect that the Treaty might have on the bilateral
relationships that we currently have with individual national
capitals?
Mr. Gordon. Those important bilateral relationships will
continue to exist. Again, I don't think anybody believes that
we are seeing a dramatic shift away from particular bilateral
relationships toward an exclusive or even dominant relationship
with the new EU institutions. I think this is a gradual
process, and the relationship with Brussels or the new
President of the Council or High Representatives will in no way
replace these historic relations that we have with a number of
key European partners. I would like to believe that they will
complement those bilateral relationships and reinforce them
with another place to turn, but I think in the near term at
least there is not going to be a significant change in how we
deal with some of our key partners.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Ambassador.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually asked for
comment in my opening statement with regard to the interplay
between NATO EU with respect to common defense matters, the
EU's role may be in more of the civilian side of the war
effort. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Tanner. It is a longstanding
issue, the relationship between the two organizations. And in
the past the United States, including in the Clinton
administration in which I served, was very concerned about
potential for competition and duplication. And those concerns
continue to exist, and I had mentioned that in my testimony,
the last thing we need to do is duplicate institutions or
structures or resources that are all too scarce.
But we are confident that our interests are harmonized
enough and the relations between the two organizations--which
as pointed out significantly overlap, you know, 21 of the
countries are in both--that we can avoid such unnecessary
duplication and actually see benefits to ourselves in having
the EU play a more prominent role. It is inevitable that the
United States, when it comes to security challenges around the
world, will think first about NATO. NATO is the one of these
two organizations that we are in, and obviously we would like a
seat at the table and we play a major role.
It is also unlikely that if NATO is ready to act in a
certain situation that our European allies won't go along with
that. When the United States is ready to play a leadership or a
major role, it is likely that Europeans who are in both
organizations will want that to be the case. There may,
however, be other situations where we choose not to play a
leadership or any role at all where we should welcome the fact
that the EU is ready to do so. And there have been a number of
conflict intervention situations over the past decade or so
where that has been the case and where the EU has in fact
gotten involved, and that is something that we should welcome.
Rather than worrying that somehow the EU is going to go off
and use military force in a place that we wouldn't want it to,
much, much more likely that they would go and help stabilize a
situation that we might not have the available resources or
political commitment to doing. I mean currently in Bosnia where
NATO and we initially deployed significant military forces,
NATO is out and the European Union is running the peace mission
there, there have been interventions in Africa, and likely to
be others where we should welcome the fact that the European
Union is getting more involved in stabilization exercises.
Finally, let me just note, the two organizations have
different mandates and capabilities. The EU is more
comprehensive than NATO and can bring a long political element,
civilian element, foreign assistance element, that NATO
historically at least has not played a major role in. So on
balance, while we are always going to be cautious and focused
on issues of duplication, on balance we think it is a positive
thing.
Mr. Tanner. May I ask, have you given any thought to the
inherent difference, I would say not conflict but difference,
between the mutual assurance clause and Article 5 of the NATO
treaty, may I ask for comment?
Mr. Gordon. Sure. As noted by you and others, NATO has an
Article 5, it is our bedrock guarantee, we are absolutely
committed to it and any member of NATO operates under the
premise that attack on one is an attack on all. The European
Union has moved toward further commitments to its mutual
security, and it has long been understood among EU states that
they are committed to each other's security but its mutual
assistance clause is not as strong or binding as NATO's and
obviously doesn't apply to us. We would naturally take very
seriously any assault on the territorial integrity of a
European member state, and all of the European member states
would be committed to each other's security, but that is
different from an Article 5 commitment which we would only
undertake if a country joined NATO and the senate agreed to
that.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Sires?
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, Assistant
Secretary, as I listen to question and comments, I get a sense
that there is more layers now in the EU, and I get a sense that
maybe working in concert may become a little more difficult,
since every country still makes their own decision, let us say
like Afghanistan, whether to send soldiers there or not or the
amount. And there are 8,000 new jobs that comes deg.
with this, sounds like a jobs bill to me. But how does it play
with such questions as Turkey and the issue of Cyprus, you
know, you have a new President and you have a High
Representative, who is going to make the final decisions on
this?
Mr. Gordon. You ask lots of good questions to which the
answers are not yet entirely available. As I have stressed,
this is going to be a process. And certainly with the enactment
of Lisbon the EU has not gone from one system to a dramatically
different system, these things are going to evolve over time.
For example the jobs you are referring to, I think you are
referring to this new European External Action Service, which
will gradually be put together over the coming years and the
Europeans have a lot of work to do in figuring out exactly how
that is going to work.
I think many of those jobs will not be new jobs but there
will be a gradual process of diminishing some national
representations and bolstering the EU's own representation and
tranforming it as well. At present the European Commission
already has representations in just about every country in the
world, and what will happen over time is that these Commission
representations, which in the past were only dealing with
issues that the Commission dealt with like trade or finance,
will take on a broader role in actually representing the
European Union, but this is a process that is just getting
underway and I suspect it will be years before there are EU
embassies in the United States and other countries.
I don't think it creates more layers, the idea is that it
will lead to fewer layers ultimately, but it does not change
the reality that on a question like sending force, I mean the
current practice is only a member state is going to decide
whether its soldiers get sent abroad and that is not going to
change with this. What we hope will change is that the European
Union has a more coherent and consistent foreign affairs
representation. The rotating presidency, which was the way they
represented themselves in the past to us and to the rest of the
world, had the deficiency of being rotating. Every 6 months
there was a different leadership chairing EU meetings and
speaking for the EU abroad.
So just again to put it in our terms, the U.S.-EU summit,
at each one would be a different set of leaders, and it is hard
to build continuity and talk about the same issues. Now, for at
least 2\1/2\ years, we will have the same interlocutor that we
can talk to and an institutional memory, and there will be an
opportunity to shape their views and work together on common
challenges. So again, it is a process but we believe that over
time this process will actually lead not to more layers but a
more coherent partner.
Mr. Sires. And the question of Turkey and Cyprus, how does
this play with the new treaty?
Mr. Gordon. It won't change the reality, I mean there are
several Turkey Cyprus aspects to address. It won't change the
reality that to take in a new member state, such as Turkey
wants to be, all current member states will have to agree. So,
you know, the new President of the Council or High
Representative will not have the power to take in a new member,
that would have to be done by consensus, and so in that sense
it doesn't really change Turkey's accession process. It does
mean that any new applicant would have to agree to be part of
this new foreign policy, and that is something that applicants
will have to consider for themselves.
The other relevant Turkey Cyprus aspect is an unfortunate
one, which is that two countries' ongoing dispute about NATO EU
relations, and in response to some of the other questions I
noted how important it is for NATO and the EU to work together,
that cooperation is imperfect because of the Turkey Cyprus
dispute. And Cyprus is a member of the EU but not NATO and
Turkey is a member of NATO but not the EU, consistently block
each other's participation in the organization that they are a
member of. And that is unfortunate and we have been working to
try to overcome that difference, but it stands in the way of
the sort of EU NATO cooperation that we would like to see.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
Mr. McMahon?
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I said in my
opening statement, I think we all believe that a stronger, more
coherent, more effective EU can be borne out of the Lisbon
Treaty, and it is an important thing with our ongoing
partnership and friendship. However, as I said I am concerned
about some protectionism that you seem to be hearing coming out
of the EU Commission, especially in the area of financial
services which concern me, I represent New York City, Staten
Island, and Brooklyn in particular.
And the alternate fund managers directive, which you know
is legislation which places unjust regulations on EU managers
raising funds outside the EU or marketing a non-EU fund within
the EU as well, as with a U.S., Swiss, or other non-EU manager
that is marketing a fund within the EU. And more importantly,
and what is widely seen as a protectionist measure, non-EU
managers such as those in New York must be established in a
country with EU equivalent credential regulations and ongoing
supervision can start marketing to EU only after 3 years of
time. So that is something that would hamper the
competitiveness of American financial industries. And so I am
wondering if you can respond to questions about that particular
policy and in the broader sense are we worried about a growing
protectionism coming from the EU first as it has to do with
that initiative but also in the broader sense.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you for raising that. I am not familiar
enough with the details of that particular directive to give
you an answer, although I am happy to look into it. As a
general comment I would say, obviously we are always on the
lookout for protectionist measures because the U.S.-EU trade
relationship is so important to us. I don't think that we have
detected a protectionist move from the EU, and I certainly
don't think Lisbon will push it in that direction.
And given the economic crisis that we have gone through on
both sides of the Atlantic in the past year, one might have
feared worse. It is conceivable that both sides could have
turned to protectionist measures as unemployment rose and
economic difficulties also rose, but that hasn't really
happened, and I think that leaders on both sides, I think if
you look at the new team in place in Brussels and certainly is
the case for the Obama administration understand the importance
of free trade and open markets and globalization, and certainly
in the United States-European context we believe that both
sides benefit tremendously from keeping that open.
Mr. McMahon. No, and I appreciate that, but just to belabor
the point a little bit, if we were talking about, you know,
agricultural products or manufacturing products, you know, the
alarms would go off much more clearly because we would worry
about getting into a traditional type of trade war, but the
same could be true in the financial services industry as well
if America takes retaliatory action. So would you look at that
directive and then follow up with us? I will have my office
contact you, if we could follow up on that I would appreciate
it.
Mr. Gordon. Absolutely.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. McMahon.
Mr. Costa?
Mr. Costa. Yes, a couple questions. Mr. Assistant
Secretary, we were talking about earlier in comments that were
made about extending formal structure to the current relations
now that the European Union is thinking of setting up an office
here in Washington and whether or not we might reciprocate in
kind in Brussels. Your portfolio obviously includes Europe and
Eurasian affairs, is it the intention of the State Department
or this administration to make any structural changes as it
relates to in response to the Lisbon Treaty in terms of how we
go forward with this new refined partnership?
Mr. Gordon. It is an interesting question, they are
changing their structures, do we need to change ours in
response? There will obviously be changes in certain
mechanisms, such as the U.S.-EU summit that I mentioned, there
is going to be a different team on the other side and we need
to think about the best way to carry on that tradition and work
with those new institutions. We will have to work with the new
European External Action Service, but again we have to wait and
see what it looks like and how it is represented, and so I do
think that will entail some changes in the way we engage but it
is something that we are going to have to figure out over time
as they figure out exactly what role that.
Mr. Costa. So that will be a work in progress as well?
Mr. Gordon. That will be a work in progress as well.
Otherwise, you know, I will have, I mentioned, you know, as
they set this up, assistant secretaries in the State Department
should have a new counterpart in their structure and we will
have to figure out how that works.
Mr. Costa. Who they are and how they move forward.
Mr. Gordon. Yes, and what their responsibilities are.
Mr. Costa. In my opening comments I talked about, you know,
looking back 20 years and looking forward 20 years, and none of
us have a crystal ball obviously, but what is the
administration's expectations as, and sometimes we overplay
that expectation level so we all should be cautious about that,
but as to what this new Lisbon Treaty may portend in the next 5
years, the next 10 years, realizing that it is going through a
transition. But on the positive side, what are your
expectations and on the negative side or the down side, what do
you think we should be concerned about in the next 5 and 10
years?
Mr. Gordon. Again, a good question, I think you are right
to talk in that sort of a time table. When you look at the
history of European integration, it tends to move very slowly
and in fits and starts, sometimes two steps forward, one back.
Mr. Costa. Such as the Lisbon Treaty.
Mr. Gordon. The Lisbon Treaty took a lot longer than
initially planned just to get ratified.
Mr. Costa. A number of steps forward, backwards, laterally.
Mr. Gordon. Exactly. And I would say, you know, expect
more. I have had, you know, some people come up and say, oh now
that is done. Well actually it is not done, it is just
beginning. What is done is the ratification, but as I think my
testimony has demonstrated, there are an awful lot of
questions, and it is not just our questions, you know, ask the
Europeans themselves, they have big questions about how this
will work, and it will take time. And just as our own
institutions or anybody's institutions, they can be implemented
in different ways.
Will the President of the Council and the High
Representative be strong leaders who bring the EU along in a
coherent manner or will they not have much of an impact on the
member states? Depends in part on how successful they are in
managing this. There is very much still to be determined. So by
putting it in a longer term time horizon, just as----
Mr. Costa. The practical positive expectations could be
what in the next 5-10 years?
Mr. Gordon. Could be a European Union, which again is our
key partner on all of the global challenges we face and the
place in the world with the most resources, economic and
military, and democracies and the entity with which we really
need to cooperate on Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Middle East,
climate change, the positive scenario could be, you know,
within 5 years or whatever time table you want to put on it,
representation of that partner that is more global thinking,
that thinks globally, and that is able to act more coherently
with fewer internal contradictions. In other words, really a
partner for the United States so that when we face these
challenges it is easier for us to talk to that interlocutor and
reach agreement on how to move forward together and they put
more behind the common effort and it is a more balanced
transatlantic partnership. That is the positive outcome.
Mr. Costa. And the down sides?
Mr. Gordon. The down side, I mean there are other
scenarios, one would be not much change at all where the new
structure has come into place but in the end it is still
divided, difficult to find consensus, still a useful partner
but the new institutions don't bring about the more coherent,
effective partner.
Mr. Costa. The more streamlined decision making process,
not greater efficiency, and the transparency we are looking
for.
Mr. Gordon. Right. And, you know, there is a theoretical
negative scenario, but it really is unlikely, I mean some worry
about a rival, that somehow if Europe is more united then we
have a more difficult partner that we won't be able to
influence. But as I have stressed, you know, given that their
interests on all of these questions line up very significantly
with ours, I think that is an unlikely prospect, there is more
to be gained than lost.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes, and we have been joined by the gentleman
from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman. Mr. Boozman?
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just real quickly, I
am a member of the NATO Parliament, Mr. Tanner is actually the
President, Albio is also, but I guess my question is, I know
there is many opportunities for Congress, Congressmen
specifically to interact with our cohorts in Europe through
various entities, can you talk a little bit about the
importance of us participating in those kinds of things and
being present, and as you have talked about there are so many
things that are on the table right now, and again I would just
like your opinion on that.
Mr. Gordon. No, thank you for the opportunity to do that.
As you mentioned, as others have mentioned, you have the
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, you have the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, these are opportunities for the
democratically elected representatives of the people on both
sides of the Atlantic to talk about the challenges we face, and
I think that is increasingly important, it is increasingly
important as the European Parliament plays a greater role in
Europe, and as we look to our European friends and allies to
join us in dealing with these tremendous challenges. Again,
because we are both democracies on both sides here, you can't
do this without the involvement of legislators and citizens.
And, you know, we have seen that before when our Government
might have appealed to European governments to join us in some
enterprise and then those governments go their people or their
parliaments and the Parliament says, you know, we don't want to
do that. Well, that is because we didn't manage to convince
those legislators and people that we have common interests and
we should be doing it together. And I think that is extremely
useful and healthy. And, you know, frankly you face the same
challenges, you know, you have skeptical populations who wonder
why they should be dealing with Afghanistan or Iran or whatever
it might be, and you can compare notes on the best way to
approach what we think are really common interests.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you.
And last but not least, the chairman himself, Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. I want to thank Chairman Delahunt for his very
kind words and wish him the best; I know it will undoubtedly be
a very successful tenure. I especially want to thank Mr.
Gallegly for the 5 years, I believe, that I had the privilege
of serving with him, as the ranking member and as the chairman,
for the always dignified and respectful way in which he dealt
with me and everyone else. It was a professional privilege to
have the opportunity to work with him. I also want to thank the
secretary for his friendship and cooperation over this
relatively short period, and undoubtedly President Obama and
Secretary Clinton I believe made a very effective choice as
assistant secretary for your position. And I deeply want to
thank all of the colleagues who were very kind to say things
today and at other times.
I would be remiss if I didn't take this chance just to ask
you about Turkey given Prime Minister Erdogan's recent trip
with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. For all the articles that have
been written essentially suggesting that Turkey is turning
eastward or Turkey is somehow minimizing its relationship with
the West, I understand the basis of those articles, the basis
of concerns, but to listen to the Prime Minister himself, to
listen to Foreign Minister Davutoglu, it seems quite apparent
to me that what Turkey is exercising is a regional policy, and
a regional policy that more often than not coincides with the
interests of the United States with some notable exceptions.
And if anyone had suggested 5 years ago that Turkey would
be in a major process of engagement with Armenia few of us
would have believed it possible. If someone had suggested 5
years ago that Turkey would entertain a democratization effort
that provides needed freedoms to its Kurdish and other
minorities, few of us would have thought it possible,
understanding that all of these efforts will have bumps and
grinds and obstacles. And even in the context of Syria and
Iran, where I myself at times differ, it would seem to me that
the benefit to America, the benefit to the West, of having
Turkey deeply engaged with its neighbors will almost by
definition always outweigh the detriment.
Having said that, I would like to more importantly hear
your conclusions or your impressions, given the extensive time
that Prime Minister Erdogan was here and spent with the
President and with others, in terms of the status of our
relationship with Turkey, and as to the issue of Turkey turning
one way or the other, if you would care to comment. Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Congressman, both for your kind
words and for asking that important question or giving me the
opportunity to address it. I of course have seen the same
articles and the same analysis of Turkey turning eastward, and
you are right that they are playing a more active role in the
region and see for themselves a very important role in the
region, and frankly it is also true that on some of those
issues we have expressed different views and the Prime Minister
and President Obama had a chance to talk about some of those,
including on the approach to Iran and Israel and Syria.
That said, I believe it is a misimpression to somehow think
that Turkey is turning its back on decades of cooperation with
NATO and the United States and Europe and the West in pursuit
of some Eastern agenda. Indeed, the very fact of having the
Prime Minister and spend several hours engaging with the
President on how to deal with these common challenges hardly is
the sign of a country turning away from the United States, just
as their continued interest in joining the European Union,
which is not always welcomed in some parts of Europe, is hardly
a sign of moving away from Europe.
So yes it is true that the Turkish Government is very
active in seeking to play a major role in the Middle East and
elsewhere, but it is also true that they remain a close partner
of ours with whom we cooperate on such a range of hugely
important issues, regional ones but also more global ones--
Turkey has been a strong partner in Afghanistan where we have a
special relationship and they have a special historical
relationship, and we are doing good work together and they are
contributing--but also on energy issues and other regional
issues including normalization with Armenia. So we have a big
agenda with Turkey, and it remains hugely important to this
administration to continue to engage Turkey to make sure it
remains the partner that it has been for a long time.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes, thank you, Mr. Wexler, and let me echo
your sentiments and the implications in that question, I think
you know that I share your view on that particular issue.
Mr. Assistant Secretary, it looks like that is it. I have
one other just observation: The relationship between the EU and
NATO. Oftentimes, we hear concerns about the EU supplanting
NATO from some quarters here in the United States, which would
obviously remove the U.S. from the decision making process,
from the equation, if you will. And yet, I am sure it in some
ways is befuddling, for lack of a better term, for the
Europeans to hear a drumbeat of criticism of NATO and its role
both in the recent past and currently in Afghanistan. It is
almost like I think we here in the United States have to seek
some clarity in terms of how we view and how we articulate our
understanding of the relationship between NATO and any European
military efforts. If you choose to comment, you can, and if
not, you are off the hook.
Mr. Gordon. I am happy to provide a brief comment. You
know, in the past some have sought to clarify that relationship
very specifically or almost in institutional or treaty
language. And the reality is that, you know, it would be
impossible to reach such an agreement and it is probably also
not necessary. We need to the extent possible to reach some
agreements on avoiding unnecessary duplication, but we are just
not going to agree in advance on which organization does what
in every circumstance.
What I am confident of is that our interests are similar
enough that this should be something we can work out and that
when the United States wants to lead and play a major role, the
Europeans will be quite happy to see that, and so I don't think
we have to worry that there will be cases where we want to be
involved or we want NATO to be involved and somehow the EU will
insist that it be done in a different way. And therefore we
should be pleased that the EU is building the capacity to do
things in cases where we and NATO are not prepared to be
involved.
Mr. Delahunt. Let me just add again going back to my
original observation about the need for presence, when I see
the dichotomy or diverse views on the same issue, which
criticism being allocated in a fairly equal way between EU's
own efforts in terms of its security and then the criticism for
NATO, I think that communication and that dialogue, because a
lot of it comes from Congress, would be very positive and
constructive in terms of, okay let us be clear about what we
are talking about here.
And I think it goes to, and I agree with your statement, I
think it is unnecessary to have a treaty, but I think at the
same time a full and ample discourse on those issues could go a
long way to not muting justified criticism but making sure that
the criticism is accurate and is stated with a full
understanding of what the realities are. In any event, thank
you for bearing with us, and you are excused, and thank you
again.
Mr. Delahunt. And now if we could have the next panel come
up. And let me extend my thanks again for your patience. It has
been several hours, and I understand that we are going to have
votes around 4:00, which means I am going to be very brief in
my introductions and then would ask you to see if we can
conclude your opening statements and then come back for a Q&A,
I presume not all the members will return so there will
probably be a fewer number of us to have to deal with.
So first let me introduce Dr. Karen Donfried, who is the
executive vice president of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States. Again, I am going to truncate a very long
curriculum vitae to say that I have had an opportunity to deal
with Dr. Donfried and I know she is an excellent witness, she
is extremely conversant with these issues, and welcome. Next is
Dr. Daniel Hamilton, who is the Richard von Weizsacker
Professor at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins. He is a noted author, I have had the
pleasure of hearing his testimony previously, he is extremely
knowledgeable, and I look forward to his testimony.
And finally, Sally McNamara, who is a senior policy analyst
in European affairs at the Heritage Foundation's Margaret
Thatcher Center for Freedom. She was formerly the director of
International Relations for the American Legislative Exchange
Council. Before coming to the United States in 2004 she served
as chief parliamentary aid to Roger Helmer, a member of the
European Parliament in Brussels. Previous to that she acted as
regional press officer for the British Conservative Party in
the East Midlands of the UK. And she is a native of Nottingham,
England. I love to say Nottingham, I was always enthralled as a
youth by the Sheriff of Nottingham. Well thank you all for
being here, and without further ado, please proceed with your
statements. Let us begin with Dr. Donfried.
STATEMENT OF KAREN DONFRIED, PH.D., EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Ms. Donfried. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to begin by congratulating you on assuming the
chairmanship of this important subcommittee, and thanking you
for the opportunity to testify today. It is a real pleasure to
participate with you and the other distinguished members of
this subcommittee to talk about the future of transatlantic
relations under this new Lisbon Treaty structure. I would like
to ask that my written remarks be submitted to the record.
Mr. Delahunt. Without objection.
Ms. Donfried. I would like to highlight how the United
States might constructively engage this post-Lisbon European
Union. At its core, the Lisbon Treaty seeks to improve how a
European Union of now 27 member states and 500 million citizens
functions. The hope in this capital is that the European Union
will now look beyond Europe and capitalize on more effective
and more efficient decision making structures to help the
United States meet the many global challenges that face us.
What I would like to do is talk first about how Congress might
engage this new EU and then focus on a couple of ideas for the
Executive Branch.
I wanted to start close to home for you and others by
looking at the new legislative powers that the Lisbon Treaty
provides for. If you look at the history of European
integration, the European Parliament is the one EU institution
whose power has consistently increased with each treaty
revision, and that is no different here. And what we see is
that the Parliament is expanding its ability to have an equal
footing with the Council on most legislation. Parliament will
also now have a decision making role on the entire budget of
the European Union.
What is interesting in the Lisbon Treaty is it not only
increases the power of the European Parliament, it also
increases the power of national parliaments, which will now
have the opportunity to challenge a piece of European
legislation if national parliaments deem it unnecessary. These
changes were intended to make the European Union more
democratic, as parliaments are in all systems the most
democratic expression of public opinion. What does this mean
for the U.S. Congress?
As we know, and Congresswoman Berkley was here earlier, the
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue has been the main forum
through which Members of the European Parliament and Members of
the House of Representatives have interacted. There is, of
course, a separate web of bilateral exchanges at the national
level between U.S. Members and their European counterparts, and
the German Marshall Fund even participates in some of those.
Given those existing structures and knowing that time is at a
premium for Members of Congress, how do you structure deeper
relationships recognizing that you don't have a lot of time for
that? We can't just add meetings.
The suggestion that I wanted to make is that we target a
limited number of legislators on both sides focused on
discrete, substantive topics, so that you are engaging members
of the European Parliament and members of the national
parliaments around specific topics, creating an issue specific
dialogue. It seems to me that if each parliamentarian came away
from these dialogues feeling that they had gained something for
their own legislative process back home, these meetings become
``need to do,'' rather than just something that is ``nice to
do.''
And I think we have to admit that it is hard to engage
American Members in Europe. We need to engage them on the
topics, whether it is homeland security or immigration, on
which they have a legislative role to play. I think the Europe
Subcommittee is well poised to try to generate ideas for how
you might deepen this dialogue. I did notice that former
colleagues, I used to work at the Congressional Research
Service, are here in the room and you might want to see if CRS
wants to prepare a report that is generating some new ideas on
how to deepen this transatlantic parliamentarian relationship
under the new Lisbon Treaty.
Now if we think about the Executive Branch and how it
engages the EU. We just heard from Assistant Secretary Gordon
that the Obama administration looks forward to an EU that will
play a larger role on the global stage. My question is, how do
we encourage that development? I am asking that question
because we need to acknowledge that the Lisbon Treaty offers
the European Union the promise of a political role in the world
commensurate with its economic weight, but the Lisbon Treaty
only lays the framework that would provide the EU with the
capacity to act, it does not guarantee a willingness to act.
We have to remember that the European Union remains an
intergovernmental undertaking. The powers of the European Union
can only grow to the extent that the member states surrender
more of their national sovereignty to this unprecedented
multinational enterprise. Today, foreign policy still remains
in the hands of national leaders. Yes, we have President Van
Rompuy, yes we have High Representative Ashton. It is
interesting, some of the press around these appointments has
complained that they are not political rock stars. The
Economist went so far as to refer to the two of them as ``two
mediocre mice.''
I honestly think these critics are missing a fundamental
point. Washington, and for that matter the world, will listen
to Mr. Van Rompuy and Baroness Ashton if they genuinely speak
for a united European Union. The Lisbon Treaty may solve the
structural problem in providing the infrastructure to make
possible a coherent voice for the EU, but only the member
states can muster the requisite political will. To take just
one example, will France and the United Kingdom be willing to
give up their national seats on the United Nations Security
Council some day in favor of a European Union seat? And the so-
called ``Big Three,'' the UK, France, and Germany, are the key
drivers of foreign policy at the EU level.
If we think about the United States, we are facing serious
challenges on many fronts. The Obama administration may well
not be picky about whether effective partnership with Europe
comes through bilateral, NATO, or European Union channels, as
long as it is forthcoming. That said, if the EU can prove
itself to be an effective mechanism for catalyzing substantial
European contributions to global challenges facing us, simply
put, if the EU can show that it can deliver, then it would very
quickly become a preferred partner for Washington.
Now, how can the administration encourage that development
if we think it is a positive one for U.S. interests? Certainly
one way is how President Obama will engage and work with
President Van Rompuy. Another is how Secretary Clinton will
engage High Representative Ashton. Beyond that, let me make two
admittedly modest but concrete suggestions.
First, in the opening months of 2010, President Obama could
make a visit to Brussels and engage the European Union and
embrace publicly its post-Lisbon architecture. Such a visit
could be a fitting and bipartisan bookend to the trip that then
President Bush made to Brussels in February 2005.
Then President Bush met with representatives of the
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission to express U.S.
support for the development of the European Union into a more
effective strategic actor on what most believed, wrongly it
would turn out, was the eve of the European Constitution being
approved, which as we know then failed. Given the continued
phenomenal popularity of Barack Obama across Europe, even a
short stop in Brussels could be a powerful sign of both United
States support and also of heightened U.S. expectations for
this relationship.
Second, I would encourage the Obama administration to
engage in a full court press to encourage a substantial EU
civilian surge in Afghanistan. Ideally the European Union could
announce this stepped-up commitment at the international
conference on Afghanistan that will take place in London on
January 28th of next year. British Prime Minister Brown and
German Chancellor Merkel, together with French President
Sarkozy, pushed for this conference as a place to discuss plans
for handing control of Afghanistan back to local authorities
over time, as Afghan capabilities are strengthened.
A key deliverable at this conference will be the concrete
measures the international community will pledge to support
Afghanistan in this decisive phase. This conference would be an
ideal venue for the EU to step up to the plate and redouble its
efforts, again for the EU to show that it can deliver on an
issue of great importance to the transatlantic community. I
think it would be a fitting way to mark with action the
enhanced foreign policy role the Lisbon Treaty outlines with
words.
The European Union has been, by almost any measure, a huge
success. Two key elements of a state's sovereignty are money
and troops. The EU has already succeeded in creating a common
currency, the euro. It may seem light years away from
establishing a European army, and certainly the Lisbon Treaty
does not do that. None of us can know today where this
remarkable experiment will end. What we do know is that, as
revolutionary as many of the EU's accomplishments may seem, the
process of European integration is in fact an evolutionary one.
The EU will continue to grow and change, sometimes
gradually and sometimes in spurts, over time. We Americans have
played a critical role in fostering that evolution. We need to
decide how and to what extent we want to continue to do that in
the 21st century. It is easy to criticize the EU's weaknesses
and even to exploit them. The question is whether we want to
help strengthen the union and if so how. I would argue the
post-Lisbon architecture gives us new opportunities to engage
and encourage a stronger partner on the other side of the
Atlantic. Thank you so much for this opportunity to share my
thoughts with you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Donfried
follows:]Karen Donfried deg.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Dr. Donfried.
And now we will go to Ms. McNamara.
STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY MCNAMARA, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST,
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Ms. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gallegly, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
holding today's hearing on this very important issue. Mr.
Chairman, with your agreement I would like to request that my
prepared testimony be entered as my formal statement for the
record and just offer brief remarks to you today.
Mr. Delahunt. Without objection.
Ms. McNamara. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of this
distinguished committee, as legislators who uphold the
democratic values of openness, honesty, transparency, and rule
of law, it is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty has
finally been ratified after 8 years without a shred of
democratic legitimacy or public support. The appointment of two
anonymous and underwhelming figures to the EU's top post,
Herman Van Rompuy and Cathy Ashton, was described by the Times
newspaper as a Byzantine Brussels stitch-up.
This largely describes how much of Europe feels about the
Lisbon Treaty, a treaty that takes Europe in a direction
inimical to people's interests and inimical to the interests of
the United States of America. On the face of it, it is easy to
see why the U.S. would welcome the Lisbon Treaty. The EU argues
that it finally has one telephone line to Europe and successive
United States administrations, both Republican and Democrat,
have called for Europe to shoulder a greater share of the
world's security problems.
However, there is nothing in the institutional
restructuring of the EU that will mean greater resources and
political will to do more in places like Afghanistan, the
Middle East, or Iran, just to name a few security hot spots.
The EU might tell you that the Lisbon Treaty now means that
Europe will speak with one voice on external relations, however
sovereignty cannot be traded for influence. As the EU has grown
in size it has essentially lost punch, taking forward the
lowest common denominator positions which often frustrate
American leadership on the world stage.
It is vital that the United States recognizes the value in
dealing with its enduring allies on a bilateral level and
appreciates the Lisbon Treaty's threat to these relationships.
On issues of foreign affairs, defense, security, justice, and
home affairs, including counterterrorism, bilateral relations
work best for the United States. Replacing individual European
allies with a single EU foreign minister means inevitably
America's interests will lose out most in the discussions that
really matter, or as Dr. Henry Kissinger says, when the United
States deals with the nations of Europe individually it has the
possibility of consulting at many levels and to have its views
heard well before a decision is taken.
In dealing with the European Union by contrast, the United
States is excluded from the decision making process and
interacts only after the event. Growing estrangement between
America and Europe is being institutionally fostered. It is
worth considering what has taken place to date as a forewarning
of what is to come. The EU has consistently frustrated the
prospect of tougher sanctions against Iran and has acted, in
the words of Oskar Fischer, as a protective shield for Tehran
against the United States.
The EU rolled out the red carpet for brutal Zimbabwean
dictator Robert Mugabe in 2007, officially suspending its own
travel ban on him to welcome him to Lisbon. In Afghanistan, the
EU has been nothing more than a bit part player with a police
training mission criticized by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
as too small, underfunded, slow to deploy, inflexible, and
geographically restricted. However, it is the EU's disastrous
handling of the Russia-Georgia war that fully illustrates the
EU's limitations as a regional power.
Then EU President Nicolas Sarkozy took the reigns of
leadership following Russia's illegal and immoral invasion in
August 2008. Yet despite the failure of Sarkozy's cease fire
and Russia's redrawing of Europe's borders by force, the EU
abruptly and without warning to NATO returned to business as
usual with Moscow. Coincidentally, at the height of the crisis
in the south Caucasus, the EU signed a deal with Moscow to
provide Russian helicopters for an under-resourced EU mission
to Chad, and it was recently announced that France is $0.5-
billion Mistral class helicopter carrier to Russia.
The Lisbon Treaty also reigns in its members from taking
independent action on the world stage and potentially from
standing alongside the United States where and when they choose
to do so. The Lisbon Treaty poses the biggest threat to
national sovereignty in Europe since the Second World War. It
hands power to unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats far removed
from member states. It removes Europe's policy commitment to
free and undistorted competition and instead favors
protectionism, which will likely see the continued persecution
of successful American companies.
It duplicates NATO's roles and functions and decouples
America from Europe, killing the concept of indivisible
security which has kept the peace in Europe for 60 years. The
Lisbon Treaty will do huge damage to American interests in
Europe, and contrary to any democratic tradition it is a self
amending treaty which can aggrandize power not explicitly
conferred on it by the treaties. As Lady Thatcher states in
``State Craft,'' that such an unnecessary and irrational
project as building a European super state was ever embarked
upon will seem in future years to be perhaps the greatest folly
of the modern era. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McNamara
follows:]Sally McNamara deg.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Ms. McNamara.
Dr. Hamilton.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL HAMILTON, PH.D., RICHARD VON WEIZSACKER
PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS,
THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is a pleasure
to be here again before this committee. And let me again extend
congratulations to you at the helm of this subcommittee. I have
a prepared statement which I would like to submit and I will
just summarize briefly.
Mr. Delahunt. Without objection, thank you.
Mr. Hamilton. The other witnesses have stressed
particularly foreign policy issues, and in fairness, not to
duplicate that same testimony, I think it is probably
appropriate to identify a few other elements of Lisbon that I
believe affect American citizens and American interests and
perhaps have not quite gotten as much attention. And I think
the reason for thinking about these things is a point that you
made, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gallegly made and others, that if you
think about the relationship between the United States and
Europe, the societies, the deep integration of our economies,
we really have the most complete relationship we probably have
with any countries in the world, and it is one that reaches so
deeply into our domestic societies that one has to look not
just at the foreign policy dimensions of what Europeans do or
what we do, but how it affects really people.
Our estimate, our latest estimate, we do an annual survey
of the transatlantic economy, it is about to come out, is that
this is a $5 trillion economy, employing up to 14 million
people on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans employ more
Americans in the world than they do any other nationality, and
American companies employ more Europeans than any others in the
world. It makes a real difference in people's lives the way
this relationship works. So the area I would suggest that
Lisbon is probably going to have more of an immediate impact is
actually not in foreign policy but actually in justice and home
affairs.
It was mentioned briefly, but if one looks at the
provisions of the treaty, this is an area that will move faster
I believe than building the External Action Service, and it
puts freedom, justice, and home affairs, as it is discussed
freedom, justice, and security in EU terms, also what we would
call homeland security, at the center of EU priorities. It has
the potential for giving us a partner that is more effective to
dealing with human trafficking, crime issues, terrorism,
building up European societal resilience to challenges that we
face potentially with the United States.
The Congress passed recently, ratified treaties that we
have had with the EU now on mutual legal assistance and
extradition, there is much work to be done in this area,
discussions about legal agreements and data protection, on
principles in combating terrorism, these all go centrally to
issues of our domestic security and that of our major partners.
So there are significant areas to develop here. One result of
Lisbon in this area is a discussion of forming within the
European Council a committee on internal security.
This would be a new development, it would perhaps take on
functions similar to the National Security Council, and it is
something I think to watch because it could directly influence
U.S. efforts. Another development which is in the Treaty is
what is called a solidarity clause, and that is in the event of
any natural or man-made disaster to civilian societies in
Europe, each of the European EU members would come to each
other's assistance. This has I think considerable ramifications
for how the Europeans will organize their societal security,
and given the fact that terrorism knows no bounds, could have
implications for the United States.
Mr. Tanner mentioned the questions about Article 5 of the
NATO treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, and as you know, over
this coming year there is a debate going on in the NATO
strategic concept about how we think about Article 5 today. Our
obligation across the Atlantic is through NATO. It is defined
in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as coming to each
other's defense in the event of ``armed attack.'' And yet today
we face a different realm of security challenge, and that is
the networks that move people, goods, services, ideas across
the Atlantic, the networks upon which free societies develop,
are increasingly vulnerable.
And we have yet to really in a systematic way address those
challenges to our security, societal security. I believe while
NATO can play a role there, and we have identified that in the
report we issued earlier this year, it is at most a supporting
player, and that if these are challenges to civil society, then
certainly the main instruments of our civilian interaction,
that is the U.S. and the EU, have to come together and think
hard about how we protect the networks that frame our society.
When the airplanes flew into the World Trade Center on
September 11th and the Pentagon, The Economist noted this was
not only an attack on freedom, it was an attack through
freedom, using the very instruments of free societies to attack
and disrupt those societies. We face the same challenges today,
either through intimidation of cyber networks, of energy, or
directly through terrorism. I would propose that we must
consider now a supplementary clause, a pledge that we would
make to each other through the U.S.-EU channel, and that is a
transatlantic solidarity pledge.
That is, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster
that we would come to each other's assistance at the invitation
of political authority and as deemed appropriate. It would not
compete with the NATO clause of armed attack, it would actually
supplement it and provide us a new bond across the Atlantic to
deal with what I believe is a much more direct security
challenge that we have yet to face. A second area in which
there is considerable change is in the area of development
assistance and humanitarian assistance.
The Lisbon Treaty gives the EU a legal basis for control
over this, the High Representative would have huge resources
now at her disposal in this area, and together the United
States and the European Union provide 80 percent of the world's
development and humanitarian assistance. Certainly we can try
to work to harmonize that better or be more effective together.
At the last U.S.-EU summit the United States and the EU revived
the high level dialogue on development, and I believe if you
read the summit statement you see they moved ahead with some
low hanging fruit, I would put it, but I believe there is much
more that could be done to make, as was mentioned earlier,
better use of our scarce resources, really devoting attention
to build synergies in development assistance, humanitarian
assistance, and to reach out to other donors.
It is in fact odd that we together provide 80 or more
percent of assistance in both of these areas, and yet there are
many other potential donors that we should be reaching out to,
both in the Islamic world and I think to rising powers that
could play more of a role. Another area that I think is perhaps
underestimated but could potentially have considerable
repercussions as yet uncertain is that in the Lisbon Treaty
there is a reference to what is called the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. This was a charter approved some years ago,
was tried to be incorporated into what was called the
constitutional treaty that failed, and yet in Lisbon, there is
a reference to the Charter and it accords it legal status,
which means that now the Charter of Fundamental Rights has
equivalent legal status throughout the European Union as well
as these treaties.
And before, those were unenforceable principles, but today
they will become European law, and it is important to look at
those principles and those rights now because they are
considerable. They not only include most U.S. rights under the
American Constitution, rights that we are familiar with, but a
catalogue of social rights, and positive social rights that the
U.S. to date does not adhere to, rights to education, health,
environmental protection, social assistance, unjustified
dismissal, for instance, and a new right to petition, which is
actually much more in the American tradition but had not
existed in Europe before that, as 1 million European citizens
can now petition their legislators to address issues which they
had not before.
I think it is uncertain what this catalogue of rights will
mean, but it will mean that European Court of Justice will
start to interpret this type of legal catalogue similar in ways
to what the U.S. Supreme Court does now for the United States,
and yet it is a whole other body of rights for which we have
not experience, it will affect American citizens living in
Europe, it will affect those American companies operating in
Europe, and I think it is worth examining a bit further than
seems to have been the case.
Another element which has already been mentioned, I will
only mention briefly then, is the growing role of the European
Parliament. This has been stressed but I think it is important
to look at specifically what is happening, and that is that
this co-decision right, so called co-decision right, and
budgetary authority in a whole range of new areas, including
trade, Mr. Gallegly asked Assistant Secretary Gordon whether
there would be an impact on trade.
Actually I think Lisbon doesn't change the trade piece on
the executive side but it does on the legislative side. The
European Parliament has co-decision, has to give approval now
on many elements of trade as well as justice and home affairs,
budgetary matters, agriculture, agriculture was mentioned
before, transportation issues. It now has to agree to a whole
range of international agreements, when the EU enters
international agreements under these provisions it has to have
the European Parliament on board.
This makes the European Parliament essentially the only
Parliament in Europe with powers approximating those of the
U.S. Congress, and I think distinguishes now the Parliament
from national parliaments in many different ways, even though
national parliaments also have a new role. So back to the point
that has been the theme of this hearing in a way is, if we are
not appreciating the role of each other's legislatures, this
will now become even more significant with these changes.
And so I have submitted to Congresswoman Berkley and to the
European members of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue a
report we have produced recently suggesting very specifically a
range of proposals of how the U.S. Congress, European
Parliament, and national parliaments could have a more
effective dialogue, and not only dialogue but engagement. I was
pleased to see that those principles, those recommendations
that I had sent her, were endorsed last week by the
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue.
I think there are a couple elements that are worth bearing
in mind. One is that the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue
only involve members of the House, there are not members of the
Senate involved. And likewise, on the European side only
members of the European Parliament, even though national
parliaments also under Lisbon now have more of a role. Our
proposal is in fact to include members of the U.S. Senate in
this dialogue, that in the House that the members of the
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue be made speaker appointments
so they have a formal role within the House structure, and that
on the European side there is another body within the EU called
COSAC which is a grouping of the European Affairs Committee
chairs in the national parliaments.
They will now play more of a role and yet they are not part
of the dialogue. And as we have said, individual member states
of the EU have to go along with what is going on here, they
have to implement much of this legislation, and to exclude
national parliamentary members from a U.S.-EU dialogue I think
misses some of what the dynamic will be. We have also suggested
that the Congress should in fact open an office in Brussels,
and the reason is not just because of Lisbon but my first
point, which is the deep nature of our interactions across the
Atlantic.
Actions by the U.S. Congress deeply affect European
societies and European economies. Actions now by the European
Parliament and many European parliamentary authorities deeply
affect the way Americans live today, they reach deep into our
societies. There is more, you know, United States-European
investment in any of the states that you represent, any single
one, for instance in California or Massachusetts, more
investment in the state of Massachusetts than all of U.S.
investment in China and Japan put together. And those create
jobs, and those deeply affect our communities.
And so understanding the impact of our legislation now I
think becomes critical, and it should start first with this
type of inter-crash across the Atlantic, because that is where
globalization is actually happening quicker than other areas in
ways that affect our citizens. Other things that could happen
besides such a larger step is a joint consultative committee on
the extraterritorial application of our respective legislation,
simply an early warning system as members consider any
legislation that might have this extra reach or the same for
European parliamentarians that we are at least notified about
this, because as you know, in recent years many of our
frictions have come from the impact of these extraterritorial
applications.
We recommend that the members of the Transatlantic
Legislators Dialogue or Members of Congress and the Parliament
be full members of the Transatlantic Economic Council, of the
new Transatlantic Energy Council which has just been created,
and along the lines of what I proposed about the solidarity
clause and justice and home affairs, we propose the creation of
a Council of Resilience, a Resilience Council across the
Atlantic to deal with these issues, and clearly members of
parliaments and the Congress should be fully part of those.
So a whole range of areas, very specific ones, that we have
submitted, I have it as an appendix in my testimony, which I
would urge that the Congress give some due consideration to. In
result, Lisbon I think together with a whole host of other
issues that we are facing around the world today, we have to
make this relationship more strategic. This is an important
relationship with the European Union, but it is not strategic,
and by strategic I mean a fluid, interactive way to interact
with each other to confront the challenges we face and to look
at the tools we have at our disposal, whether they be NATO, the
EU, or bilateral relationships.
That is not the relationship we have yet, particularly with
the EU. NATO is indispensable but it is insufficient to the
broader range of challenges we are facing, it does not have the
full toolbox, and only by supplementing our NATO agenda and
expanding it with the European Union do I believe we can really
adequately address the kinds of challenges we are facing, not
only very far away in Afghanistan or the Middle East, but
actually right here at home when we deal with the fundamental
issues about people's livelihoods, about their jobs, their
prosperity, and their freedom. I believe those are the kinds of
specific issues we now must look at. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamilton
follows:]Daniel Hamilton deg.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton. And I know my staff
has a copy of the proposal you have put forward, and I want to
state that I find that interesting and I do really think the
order of magnitude of the engagement has to be ratcheted up
substantially, and it does come back to this Parliament to
Parliament, particularly as you indicate, the enhanced role of
Parliament almost becoming more of a counterpart to our own
institution here. Your suggestion about the Senate, however, is
problematic.
Mr. Hamilton. I am very sorry about that.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes. I am going to go first to the ranking
member, I will save my questions for last, and then I will
start and I will try to be the clean up hitter. Elton?
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
stay away from the Senate for a few minutes, we will have to
deal with them another time. Ms. McNamara, thank you very much
for your statement along with the other witnesses at the desk,
but I would like to get your assessment of what you believe the
EU could do to improve the perception of what has been referred
to as the legitimacy concern among many of its citizens?
Ms. McNamara. Well it could start by obeying its own rules.
When the Lisbon Treaty was first constructed it was called the
European Constitution. It was rejected in two free and fair
referenda in France and Holland, and the EU went away, made
some very minor cosmetic changes and changed the name of it and
said, the only thing we need to do now is not have referenda.
This is completely illegitimate. You can't just keep going back
and asking for the right answer.
Under the Lisbon Treaty a rejection by one was meant to be
a rejection for all. Ireland rejected it in a referenda, and
perhaps I have a nice passion for Ireland because my father is
Irish, but I don't like bullying. Ireland was badly bullied by
the EU into saying yes. President Sarkozy preceded a visit by
calling them bloody fools. I don't think I have ever seen
diplomacy on this level. So I think the EU should start by
obeying its own rules, quite frankly.
Mr. Gallegly. Dr. Hamilton, do you want to touch that one?
Mr. Hamilton. Well clearly as Dr. McNamara said, the
process leading to this treaty was fraught with problems, and I
agree with her that there were issues there involved. But I
think democracy is an evolving process, and so the previous
treaty, the constitutional treaty, was rejected, there were a
few other elements that were taken out of it and amended, it
was submitted again, and in other referenda and in this process
of ratification it was approved by all member states and by
these other additional referenda. So there was a democratic
process there, it was simply an evolving one, elements that
didn't work were revisited. So we can look at it from here I
guess and evaluate if it meets our standards, it seemed to meet
the standards of the people of Europe and the EU, and now I
think our question is how do we deal with it. As I said, I
think there are elements pro and con maybe for American
interests here.
Mr. Gallegly. But more specifically, the perception, what
more definitively can be done to improve on that?
Mr. Hamilton. Well I am happy to give advice to my European
colleagues of how they can improve their democracies, but as I
said there is one element in the Treaty about this right to
petition which does give some authority to citizens. How it
evolves, as Assistant Secretary Gordon said, will take time,
but it is an innovation that didn't exist there before. As we
said, the national parliaments are also given a role now, an
important principle of the European Union sometimes advanced in
the breach is that of what is called subsidiarity, that is the
basic principle that decisions within the EU should be taken at
the level most close to the citizen.
That doesn't always work, and there was no procedure for
trying to assure that in the past. What Lisbon does is now give
national parliaments two measures in which they could flag
their objections to proposed legislation that is at an EU level
when they believe it should either be at a national or even
local level. And so there is a procedure now, again, will be
tested, that would allow any national Parliament to flag
concern about this type of legislation. How that will
development I don't know, but I think that was an effort to try
to address some of this question of legitimacy of the
institutions.
Mr. Gallegly. Dr. Hamilton, I posed a question to
Ambassador Gordon, and I would like to get your perception or
assessment. Do you see a more coherent EU as being problematic
for U.S. foreign policy as it relates to future commitments of
troops to different parts of the world?
Mr. Hamilton. As Assistant Secretary Gordon said, it is
very hard to say that in advance because much of it is case by
case. I think the basic realization that is important is that
we are talking about the same set of forces across the
Atlantic, 21 of the countries are in the same institutions NATO
or the EU. There is not a creation of a separate army here or
any other elements of defense. Defense is not in the Lisbon
Treaty, and so it is still the prerogative of national
authorities. The question is how do we, as a united set of
nations, try to aggregate the potential we have together and
deploy it to deal with the security challenges we face.
We have a block between EU and NATO, part of it is related
to the Turkey Cyprus issues that we discussed, but there are
elements that we could explore that I think get around that or
address issues we have to face right now. For instance, a more
coherent Europe in the, as I mentioned, the internal security
world is in American interests. In fact after September 11th it
was the United States frankly that pushed the Europeans to
create what is now a European arrest warrant and what is called
Eurojust, an area of justice and home affairs.
That debate had been going on for years inconclusively
until the United States after September 11th says, we need this
coherent Europe because we are directly threatened and a weaker
Europe does not allow us to deal with that. It was the Bush
administration that pushed that, and it was successful, and
there are some treaties also negotiated during the Bush
administration that I mentioned that have advanced that. So we
clearly in that area have interests in coherent Europe.
The other area I think which is worth exploring, we have
submitted some recommendation, is not just in the purely
military area but in civil reconstruction and stabilization.
When we send our troops to places around the world they do
their business, but usually stability is not ensured by the
military alone. We see that in Afghanistan today. And so the EU
is actually the framework in which the civilian deployments, as
Dr. Donfried mentioned, are where that resides. The United
States is trying to build up in the State Department this
civilian response corps.
The idea is to build and to be able to deploy rapidly
civilian authorities and experts to deal with these kinds of
civilian crises. There is a tremendous interest in the State
Department in working with the EU in this area of civilian to
civilian cooperation, where a more coherent EU capability would
certainly be in U.S. interests. We are just building in fact
our capability, the EU already has eight missions underway
around the world in this area where they deploy civilians, they
have 3,000 or more people on the ground in other countries
doing things either with the United States or instead of the
United States because it is relieving some of the burden.
This is not an area we have developed very well, it is an
ad hoc set of arrangements. It could be something that could be
developed much further and I think in fact relieve NATO from
some of the efforts it is having to do. Instead of sending our
troops to do these kinds of tasks for which they are not
trained, it could be a supplement. As I say, I think many of
these areas are supplementary, not competitive, if we would
manage it right, with what we do within the Alliance itself.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, if I
might just have one final quick question, and the same one
would be posed to Ms. McNamara, follow up to Dr. Hamilton's
statement?
Ms. McNamara. I slightly have a different perspective. When
it comes to defense there are three areas in the Lisbon Treaty
where qualified majority voting will take place now, so it is
not all exclusively in the unanimity voting category. One of
those areas was the appointment of the foreign minister, the
High Representative Cathy Ashton. The Poles suggested when a
suitable candidate couldn't be found maybe they should do
interviews to try and find the best person for the job, and
they were told to shut up, go away, we will find someone
tonight. You know, a revolutionary concept, try and find the
best person for the job.
Under Article 28 of the Lisbon Treaty there is now the
legal basis for an EU army. This inevitably will lead to
duplication. We already have a certain amount of duplication,
we have a European Defense Agency, I believe in
interoperability, but we should be using NATO for that, the
Allied Command Transformation. The EU has its own operational
headquarters when it was offered to use NATO's shape. And the
EU now wants to create a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men.
Now this would be great if there 60,000 men out there to help
out with European security problems, but as we have seen in
Afghanistan, Europe doesn't have 60,000 men that it can deploy
on a moment's notice, so I think this definitely does pose a
challenge to missions that America wants to undertake in the
future.
In terms of where the EU can help, I agree with both of my
fellow panelists here that the EU could do civilian things.
When Sarkozy was challenged, why doesn't the EU become a
civilian complement to NATO since you like doing peacekeeping
missions, since this is the sort of thing that the EU is made
up for? He outright said, absolutely not, the EU will be a
military power too.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Ms. McNamara. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Elton.
Mr. McMahon?
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Donfried, I want
to thank you again for what the German Marshall Fund has done
through the years in forcing transatlantic relations and
keeping them strong. In your testimony you recommend for the
Obama administration to seek a civilian surge, if you will, for
Afghanistan, and then you make reference in footnote number 9
in your testimony to an article that you had co-written. Could
you elaborate a little bit for the committee how you envision
that?
Ms. Donfried. Absolutely, and in a sense this is connected
to the conversation that we were just having as well, which is
how can the EU best contribute to the challenges that we face?
I would argue that it is on the civilian side much more than
the military side, and I think the test for the EU is, if it
can produce a result that is greater than the lowest common
denominator, if it can produce the result that is not just the
sum of the individual parts. There are 27 member states in the
EU, and certainly the United States can approach each one
bilaterally and say, we need help with Afghanistan, what can
you do?
If instead Secretary Clinton could go to High
Representative Ashton and say, you do this for us, you rally EU
resources for Afghanistan, that would be hugely beneficial.
Now, you can look at the glass as half full or half empty and
you can say Europe hasn't made a huge contribution to
Afghanistan, or you can say $1 billion a year for Afghanistan
is helpful to what the United States is trying to do. Could the
Europeans do more, would we like them to do more? Absolutely.
Let us try to figure out the right mechanism for doing it.
I was struck when Secretary Clinton was at the NATO foreign
ministers meeting in early December, Assistant Secretary Gordon
referenced that in his testimony, and NATO put forward 7,000
additional troops for Afghanistan. Interestingly, Germany and
France were not willing at that point to step up their military
commitment to Afghanistan, saying they wanted to wait for this
international conference on Afghanistan in late January. So we
have two of the big member states already having given
incredible significance to this conference in late January, and
that is why my hope is that if we encourage not only those two
member states but the EU as the EU to step up and say, in the
wake of this renewed commitment that the Obama administration
has made to Afghanistan, we too want to be there on the
civilian side as a key partner. So maybe that is a hope, maybe
it is an aspiration, but I do think it is an area where we
should be pushing.
If I could just make one comment on the democracy point
that Congressman Gallegly raised, because I don't want to leave
the impression that the EU is an undemocratic institution. If
we think about the Council, the Parliament, the Commission, the
Council represents the member states and all of those
individuals are directly elected, the heads of state. If we
think about the Parliament, those are members that are directly
elected. And you have the Commission, commissioners are
proposed by the member states and then their selection has to
be approved by the Parliament.
Beyond the fact that the Parliament's powers were increased
and the role of the national parliaments was increased, with
Lisbon there are democratic controls that exist. We should be
careful to distinguish between direct democracy and
representative democracy. Referenda represent direct democracy.
We tend not to have those in the U.S. We have a system of
representative democracy. You all are elected by your
constituents and if they don't like what you do here, then you
are not reelected 2 years later.
Mr. Delahunt. Please, Doctor.
Ms. Donfried. That would not happen in your case, I am
sure. But my point is that in this country we feel
representative democracy is a reasonable way to check the
legitimacy of action. So the referendum isn't necessarily the
only instrument of democracy and in fact may not be the favored
one unless you have a system of direct democracy. So I just
want to suggest that representative democracy is alive and well
in Europe and also is reflected in the way the European Union
is structured.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Dr. Donfried. And now, Ms.
McNamara, I got the sense from your testimony and what you said
in follow up is that you are really not a big fan of this
Lisbon Treaty, is that fair to say?
Ms. McNamara. That is a fair assessment, sir.
Mr. McMahon. And do you have the same feeling toward the EU
itself, its existence, do you think it is also the height of
folly?
Ms. McNamara. If the EU were a collection of member states
where we all get along and it was an intergovernmental alliance
I think it would be a jolly good thing. I think it would be
silly to say that we shouldn't get on with our neighbors.
However, good fences make good neighbors, not supranational
treaties.
Mr. McMahon. The thing is though, I guess----
Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield for a moment?
Mr. McMahon. Certainly.
Mr. Delahunt. I think there is a certain philosophical
view, is it fair to say, and you quote Margaret Thatcher, that
she would not be a fan of a United States of Europe for
example?
Ms. McNamara. No one is really a fan of the United States
of Europe, history is against it. If you look at the European
Parliament as well, turnout for the European Parliamentary
elections was 43 percent. If you had a 43 percent turnout for
your Presidential elections you would think it was a crisis.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, please, you are getting on very thin
ice here because we have had some elections recently that we
are happy to get 20 percent. I find it interesting that, you
know, you quote Margaret Thatcher, and I didn't realize that
she and another very popular conservative prime minister had
such a disagreement, because back in 1946 at Zurich it was
Winston Churchill who said, the time has arrived for a United
States of Europe, given the lessons learned from World War II,
and he certainly wasn't submitting it as a purely economic
relationship with neighbors. It was clear if one reads the
speech in full that he was talking about engagement in a very
real way in terms of a political relationship that would evolve
over time. But I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I yield
back.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I had the same.
Mr. Delahunt. You can see me afterward, Ms. McNamara.
Ms. McNamara. I would love to get into a conversation about
Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher.
Mr. Delahunt. We will have a jolly good time.
Ms. McNamara. Just to quickly say, I think Churchill would
turn in his grave if he ever thought that his words were used
to subsume Britain's sovereignty in a United States of Europe.
He said famously he wasn't going to fight the Second World War
to be subservient to the Germans.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, he also said this in that same speech,
the structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to
make the material strength of a single state less important.
Ms. McNamara. I would love to have this debate further, but
he also says, you know, we will trade with you, we will be
partners with you, but by God we will never be governed by you.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, we can have it, I just can't take the
time from Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Of course, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
actually I had the same quote from Winston Churchill here. No,
I am kidding.
Mr. Delahunt. Well I know you do your homework, Mr.
McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, sir, and I appreciate you following
up on those points that I think is well taken and certainly it
is a debate to have further because I think we, and you should
know, that we in America certainly do not want to go back to
those days when every European country had that fence up around
it and it meant two world wars and continued conflicts in the
Balkans and hundreds of thousands of lives, millions in Europe
and hundreds of thousands of Americans as well. So there has to
be I think some steps in the right direction, I guess you think
the Lisbon Treaty goes too far. Do you envision an EU that
makes sense to you in your philosophical parameters?
Ms. McNamara. I think the EU makes far better sense as an
economic entity than as a political entity, although I believe
that the EU now is in danger of killing the goose that laid the
golden egg. In the EU we have regulations now about the
curvature of bananas, about what kind of light bulbs you can
buy. With that amount of overregulation, which is also being
applied to American companies, and we saw how Microsoft was
terribly persecuted for creating a very successful product, I
think the EU is going in the wrong direction.
The Lisbon Treaty takes out for the first time the EU's
commitment to undistorted competition. Overwhelmingly we are
going down a protectionist direction. President Sarkozy has
convened a meeting of 22 EU member states, not the United
Kingdom and those who are in favor of reforming, in order to
protect the common agricultural policy. Now, I am not here to
defend American agricultural subsidies, I know you guys have
some of your own, however, Europe's agricultural subsidies are
far higher and they kill more Africans every year than they
should.
Mr. Delahunt. Ms. McNamara, I am just going to have to cut
you off because I want these other members to have an
opportunity. So let me go to Mr. Boozman. The thing is we are
having votes, so I want to give everybody a chance and not ask
the three of you to linger any longer, you have been remarkably
patient.
Mr. Boozman. Well I really don't have a question, but in
entering into the discussion, I think that the EU has the same
problem somewhat we as Americans, if we entered into a North
American, you know, pact and ceded sovereignty to Mexico and
Canada, in my district I would have major problems explaining
with that and it would be a huge problem. And so that is
something that I would be very much against, I get a lot of
mail, you know, about things like that. So these are difficult
problems, they really are, and I guess the real balancing act
is trying to figure out, you know, how your populations are
happy with the final product that you come up with. So like I
say, it takes the wisdom of Solomon.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Congressman Boozman.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you so much. Congressman Scott from
Georgia. First of all, Ms. McNamara, what I get you saying is
that the military component, this joint defense, is the major
cog in the wheel that brings about your major level of
discomfort. Let me ask each of you, do you see this Lisbon
Treaty making now the European Union a threat to the United
States because of that? I have a number of questions, so if you
could be real quick?
Ms. McNamara. If I can go first, to answer quickly, yes I
think the EU, the idea for an EU common foreign policy came out
of this whole idea that we need to counter balance the United
States of America, it was the French Defense Minister who said
America is a hyper-puissance, is a hyper-power, and we need to
find a way and it is only the EU that can counter balance that.
I could bore you to death with about 100 quotes from European
leaders who have said similar things, but I won't do so on the
basis of time.
Mr. Scott. Let me follow that up with, do you see the EU
being, there is some validity to your statement, because one
has to question whether or not the EU with a military component
serves as a confrontational conflict within NATO who has a
military component, but also within the 23 nations themselves
who each have their own military component, I mean, which takes
precedence over which? Then on the other side though there is
the argument that a military component being added to the
European Union could very well, if used properly and
strategically, add to the effort for global security,
particularly in an area that we have not touched upon but is a
major growing threat, and that is of piracy. And so I am
wondering if each of you might comment very briefly on the pros
and cons of this to kind of get an opinion of what do we have
to gain from EU getting a military component and what do we
have to fear?
Mr. Delahunt. If the gentleman would yield for a moment, I
just would make the note that in fact, in terms of the
antipiracy effort that is ongoing in so called hot spots, there
is an EU presence and then there is a NATO presence, which I
think there is compatibility and there seems to be
coordination, even with nations such as Iran with whom we have
a frosty relationship.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, let me tell you what I am really
getting at here.
Mr. Delahunt. Sure.
Mr. Scott. The big problem with the piracy situation is
that we have no mechanism to get in and do what is essential to
bring about some resolve to it, which is to provide a way to
give some stability to that fledgling government, if it can be
called that, in Somalia.
Mr. Delahunt. Right.
Mr. Scott. And with al-Qaeda and terrorists and al-Shebaab
building up going against that force, and that becoming again
another threshold of terrorists in that Horn of Africa region,
several of us in the NATO meetings examined that and it is a
very, very topical issue within NATO and how we can respond to
that. But let me get to a couple other questions, I want to
know about the future enlargement, your opinions on the future
enlargement of the European Union.
One critical point is that of Turkey, will the Lisbon
Treaty give any movement one way or another to Turkey's request
to become a part of the European Union, and do you see a
problem with that, and isn't it a good counter for the movement
by some in the European Union do not want Turkey because of the
Muslim culture, but that is also checkmated because Turkey has
a very, very significant European and Christian foundation? So
I am wondering will we see more positive movement of them
bringing Turkey into the European Union as a result of this
Lisbon Treaty?
Ms. McNamara. It is my expert opinion that Turkey will
never be a member of the European Union. I believe that the
are deg.forces hostile to its membership are too
large to make it happen. I think you saw President Obama, who
is wildly popular, he went over to Europe and to Turkey and
advocated for Turkey's membership and he got incredible
pushback on that. The main problem here which I see is that the
EU is not a good faith actor in negotiating with Turkey, it is
bringing Turkey along saying, you have got to fulfill the
acquis communataire, you have got to do X, Y, and Z, but
ultimately I don't think politically it will ever happen
because as long as France and Germany and Austria don't want it
to happen I don't think it will happen. The Lisbon Treaty I
think will allow Croatia to get in and some of the less
controversial accession countries, but I cannot see a situation
where France is going to allow Turkey to accede.
Mr. Scott. Do you agree, Dr. Donfried?
Ms. Donfried. On the question of Turkey and the EU, we are
engaged in a negotiation process that will last for the next
10-15 years. There are 40,000 pages of EU legislation that
Turkey has to assume. And my fervent hope would be that the
Austrias and Frances of Europe would not talk about Turkish
membership and whether they want it or not because it is not
going to happen in Sarkozy's term in office. And so I would
prefer to say, let us have the negotiating process, wherever it
ends, I think everyone agrees it is a good thing for Turkey to
be looking west and coming closer to western institutions. So
my hope would be that you could have this process of
negotiation without prejudice to what the outcome is, because
in 15 years it will be a different Turkey and it will be a
different EU, so that is what I would say on that.
On your point about an EU military role, we have experience
in this, the EU is engaged now in multiple military operations,
and, I think for the most part, it has been beneficial to the
United States, whether it was NATO handing over the military
role in Bosnia to the EU, whether it is the EU piracy operation
Atlanta that we are talking about off the Horn of Africa, that
coordination has worked quite well. And the EU is not something
out there, the EU is a creation of its member states. Why? Not
because they want to create some multilateral nightmare, but
because these countries of Europe realize they are losing
national power.
The British Foreign Secretary in October gave a compelling
speech where he said the choice for Europe is simple, get our
act together and make the EU a leader on the world stage or
become spectators in a G-2 world shaped by the United States
and China. The member states want to use the EU to aggrandize
their power, and in all of the cases I have seen this has been
good for the U.S. The EU having more power has meant that the
EU can play a greater role in the world. Their interests, in 99
percent of the cases, are compatible with ours. So my concern
is not too much Europe, it is too little Europe.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Dr. Hamilton, I want you to get into
this and respond to that, but I also want you to respond to a
very profound statement that you made that I grabbed at the
end, and I think you were saying this Lisbon Treaty with new
reforms for the European Union will have a direct impact here
in the United States on our domestic situation particularly in
terms of jobs, the economy, and so forth, and I would be very
interested for you to explain to us how this Treaty and the
reforms through the European Union will help us with our own
domestic concerns of jobs and the economy here, as well as you
can take your shot at those other questions as well. And thank
you, Mr. Chairman, that will conclude my questions.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, just to enter back into this
debate. You know, we are in this debate on the security side as
if this is an either or kind of choice between NATO and the EU,
and I go back to my basic point, these are all the same
nations, 21 of the countries are the same countries, and the
others are all members except one of the Partnership for Peace
with NATO. If you ask, you know, who is with us? Traditionally
not aligned countries like Sweden, which are not in NATO, are
actually some of our best allies.
And they are not creating some separate entities here, this
is one set of forces on the military side, they are double- or
triple-hatted depending on the kinds of engagements they are
in, and we have to step back a minute and not get locked into
this institutional debate it seems to me because we are all the
same countries we are trying to engage on these kinds of
issues. And if we look at that, it is not the luxury of, you
know, which institution gets to go deal with these challenges.
As Assistant Secretary Gordon said, there is enough to go
around. And given strapped resources for the United States and
for our European allies, if they can pick up some of the slack
in areas where the United States either does not want to be or
cannot engage because of our other preoccupations, that should
be welcome.
Our concern should not be about a competitive, strong, you
know, European counterweight at the moment, although I agree
there are some in Europe that think that way, it is a weak
Europe, it is the weak Europe that has gotten us into trouble
in the past. It is a weak and fragmented Europe that was the
principal preoccupation of the United States in the 20th
century, and it is the potential for a stronger Europe that
could be our counterpart and not a counterweight that I think
would be strongly in the United States' interest.
Mr. Delahunt. Excuse me, Dr. Hamilton, but we have 2
minutes left.
Mr. Hamilton. Okay, very briefly then, if I could.
Mr. Delahunt. Sure.
Mr. Hamilton. On the NATO EU, as the chairman said, on
piracy it is a combined effort, and there is I think
realization that both institutions have to work together in
that. But as you said, the real answer to piracy is not in sea,
it is on land. Here again the question is, can we work
together, exchange watch lists of failing states with the EU
Crisis Center, can we deploy the civilian authorities to deal
with terrorism that is now building in Somalia and Yemen and
other places? That is actually through the EU that we would do
that, it is not a NATO per se effort. And so those are the
kinds of things we have to do.
On the enlargement issue, the basic principle that has I
think given us success is that of the open door. Who is to say
today what Europe will look like in the future? As Dr. Donfried
said, our successes have come to say, let us build in the
dynamism of change and, you know, 15 years from now it may be
different. The President said, let Turkey in on the same
conditions that you have let other countries in, no more, no
less, it will take years, it is not an operational issue for
today, for this administration I believe, it will be something
for the future.
And finally on your question about domestic, my point was
simply that our relationship per se with Europe reaches deep
into our societies, is driven by the private sector, is driven
by our people. We have no deeper links than across the
Atlantic, and those links since the end of the Cold War, seems
counterintuitive, have deepened, not loosened. And so as I
mentioned, the state of Georgia, there are just tens of
thousands of Georgians who are employed by European companies,
more than anybody else in the world. On shore jobs come from
Europe, most of them, in the United States. So how Lisbon
affects that, whether it helps or hinders those kinds of rules
to provide free flow of goods and services and ideas, will be
important to Americans. That is my basic point.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Dr. Hamilton.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. And we are just about out of time. It has
been a great panel, you have all educated us. I think I spotted
Ms. McNamara's not being a Sarkozyphile, is that a fair
statement?
Ms. McNamara. I think he is a great advocate for French
interests.
Mr. Delahunt. Okay. I noticed that you said in your written
statement, above all it is a treaty that underscores the EU's
ambition to become a global power and challenge American
leadership in the world. You know, that conjures up in my mind
a little cabal sitting over in the corner plotting our demise.
I tend to agree that, you know, these are not those stark kind
of choices, and I don't think they are necessarily adversarial.
And maybe it is because of my age, I have learned one thing,
and the only certainty is that there will be change, and what
we are trying to accomplish is change that is nonviolent and
change that evolves over time with import from everyone. But
you have been a great panel, and I conclude this hearing, and
we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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