[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-105]
DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC
THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT IED
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 29, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
GLENN NYE, Virginia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
Sean McDonald, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Trey Howard, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, October 29, 2009, Defeating the Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Reviewing the
Performance and Oversight of the Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO)....................................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, October 29, 2009....................................... 39
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2009
DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC
THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT IED
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee...................... 1
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 2
WITNESSES
Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., USA, Director, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization..................... 6
Schear, Dr. James A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, Department of
Defense........................................................ 3
Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
Government Accountability Office............................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F...................................... 55
Schear, Dr. James A.......................................... 48
Solis, William M............................................. 68
Wittman, Hon. Rob............................................ 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Davis................................................... 93
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Snyder................................................... 97
DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC
THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT IED
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 29, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. Snyder. Good morning. The hearing will come to order.
Welcome, gentlemen. I think for most of you this is your first
time in our temporary hearing room here, but this lovely room
is here in the Capitol.
This is the second hearing that this subcommittee has had
in the last couple years on the performance and oversight of
the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat
Organization, known as JIEDDO. This hearing follows last year's
hearing, which I believe was in September of last year, and
will explore the question: Is current oversight of JIEDDO
within the Department of Defense (DOD) sufficient for an
organization receiving funding of such considerable size,
flexibility, and importance?
IEDs remain the number one cause of casualties to coalition
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although IEDs are not a new
threat, they have been used with unprecedented frequency in
Iraq and Afghanistan. While the decrease in successful attacks
in Iraq is encouraging, that success has not been replicated in
Afghanistan, which has seen an increase in the success and
lethality of attacks with our increase in forces there.
Since former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander
General Abizaid called for a Manhattan Project-like effort 5
years ago to defeat IEDs, Congress has provided nearly $17
billion to DOD's efforts. This effort has grown from a 12-man
Army task force to the Joint IED Defeat Organization, or
JIEDDO, which currently employs a staff of about 3,600
dedicated government, military, and contract personnel.
There is no doubt that despite the complexity and
difficulty of its mission, JIEDDO and its predecessor
organizations have made significant contributions to the
counter-IED effort. But we should still ask, is this effort as
successful as it could be? Have the financial controls of
oversight kept pace with an organization of this size?
One thing we want to learn today is whether DOD's own
oversight over the JIEDDO functions has evolved to an
appropriate level and with sufficient controls. Last year this
subcommittee recommended that JIEDDO reexamine whether JIEDDO's
reporting arrangement to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(DEPSECDEF) was appropriate. Has this been done and what were
the conclusions?
As the subcommittee noted in last year's report on JIEDDO,
having such a high-ranking, high-level senior boss can easily
lead to little senior attention during this very, very busy
time for our forces in the Pentagon. For this hearing, as last
year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has had
difficulty deciding on a witness who could comment on OSD
oversight of JIEDDO.
I look forward to this hearing today. We very much
appreciate all of your efforts, appreciate the efforts of
JIEDDO and all the personnel, both military, civilian, and
contract, who work in this organization.
I now turn to Mr. Wittman for any comments he would like to
make.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Chairman Snyder.
And good morning to our witnesses. Thank you so much for
taking time out of your busy schedule to join us today.
As the gruesome events that unfolded in Baghdad earlier
this week prove, improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, remain
a deadly threat, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.
In fact, the number and lethality of IED incidents in
Afghanistan continues to grow and the nation of Pakistan is
suffering frequent IED attacks also.
Even the United States is not immune to this threat and our
deployed troops cannot ever let their guard down. Despite the
best efforts of JIEDDO and others, it is still far too easy for
evildoers to make and deploy bombs that indiscriminately kill
and maim scores of innocent people.
If there were an easy human or physics problem here we
would have had the solution already. I know we have made
progress, but I would like to know how we can do better and
what it will take to get there.
Today we are following up on the subcommittee's excellent
report in November 2008, which quoted General Metz, who is here
as a witness today, as saying that the IED threat would never
be completely removed from the battlefield. And I am sure
General Metz is correct. The enemy will always seek
vulnerabilities to attack, and we cannot harden everything and
still be effective in counterinsurgency operations.
Even so, I am disturbed by the negative trends in
Afghanistan. A year ago this subcommittee noted that effective
attacks against coalition forces were increasing compared to
previous years. Since then the number of effective attacks has
continued to climb, and climb at a rate well beyond the
increased number of coalition forces deployed in country.
Despite this ever-worsening operational threat to our
troops, funding for JIEDDO has been significantly reduced.
Maybe this funding reduction reflects better conditions in Iraq
and doesn't reflect a reduced effort in Afghanistan. It is
difficult to tell from here, since DOD continues to request
JIEDDO funds as colorless money that can be spent as command
wishes without informing Congress how the work is prioritized.
The subcommittee expressed concern with this funding
mechanism in last year's report, and our concern was not
addressed and as you can see has now led to real questions
about JIEDDO's priorities. With attacks in Afghanistan
increasing, I asked for General Metz to provide us some detail
on efforts being made in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
In addition, I ask all witnesses today, as they are able, the
status of the issues raised in our November 2008 report.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for calling this hearing,
and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Our witnesses today are Dr. James Schear, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and
Stability Operations in the Department of Defense; Lieutenant
General Thomas Metz, the U.S. Army director of the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO.
General Metz, you are leaving soon, are you not at some
time?
We appreciate your service.
And Mr. William Solis, the Director of Defense Capabilities
and Management, the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Dr. Schear, we'll begin with you. The clock will be for
five minutes; if you see the red light and you have some more
things to tell us feel free to carry on. So, Dr. Schear.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES A. SCHEAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Schear. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Members of the committee--of the subcommittee, ladies and
gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to testify here today about
the important work that the U.S. Department of Defense is doing
in countering the threat of improvised explosive devices, and
it is a particular honor to be able to appear here this morning
with Lieutenant General Tom Metz, who has provided superb
leadership for this effort over the past two years.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
that my written testimony be submitted----
Dr. Snyder. Yes. All statements will be made part of the
record.
Dr. Schear. Thank you. Let me also begin by thanking you,
and along with you Congressman Wittman and the members of this
committee, and indeed the full committee, for your unwavering
support for our armed forces service personnel who serve
courageously in hostile environments in today's irregular
warfare battle space. The wars of the past decade have
challenged our military greatly to adjust and adapt rapidly to
deadly tactics devised by our enemies on the battlefield, and
your unstinting support has been critical in meeting those
challenges.
Clearly, as Mr. Wittman has said, sir, one of the biggest
challenges we face is the IED. It remains, without question,
the violent extremist's weapon of choice against U.S. armed
forces. Over the past year we have seen an increase in the use
of IEDs against U.S. forces in Afghanistan not only as a
standalone weapon but also increasingly part of complex attacks
involving more conventional direct-fire weapons. The IED is the
weapon responsible for inflicting the most casualties on U.S.
forces in Afghanistan.
Although we have seen on the Iraq side a decrease in the
number of attacks and IEDs have become less effective against
U.S. personnel there, the insurgents continue to use IEDs to
attack and destabilize the Iraqi government.
Additionally, IEDs have become a major source of concern in
parts of Africa, other parts of the Asia Pacific region, and
Latin America. In this time of growing asymmetric threats we
believe the use of IEDs will remain the most likely weapon of
choice for violent groups because they are low-cost, high-
impact weapons that inflict maximum casualties at minimum risk
and expense.
Within the Defense Department the Joint IED Defeat
Organization has the responsibility, as you know, to lead,
focus, and advocate all counter-IED efforts. Secretary Gates
and his leadership team strongly support JIEDDO and the
institutionalization of its beneficial impact throughout our
large and diverse defense community.
The unique authorities and capabilities of JIEDDO enable us
to rapidly experiment, develop, and field both material and
non-material solutions to the grave and persistent threat of
IEDs. Perhaps most important, JIEDDO is delivering for our
customers. Our combatant commanders continue to confirm that it
provides a unique and vital capability to counter IEDs.
As this committee knows, JIEDDO is truly a joint
organization that relies on inputs from across the Department.
In my written testimony I provide more detail on JIEDDO's
three-tiered governance structure, but let me summarize its key
features quickly.
JIEDDO first presents its initiatives to the Joint Resource
and Acquisition Board, so-called JRAB, which is composed of O-6
and senior civil service members from across the Department.
After that analysis the initiative is then briefed to the Joint
Integrated Process Team, the JIPT. This board includes general
and flag officers as well as civilian senior executive service
members.
Finally, issues that are approved by the JIPT for senior-
level review go to our DEPSECDEF-chaired senior resource
steering group, which includes the deputy as well as three- and
four-star officers, including the vice chiefs of staff of each
of the services. And it is drawn from the same organizations
that support the effort at lower levels. When recommendations
are teed up in a written form for the deputy he makes a final
decision on whether to fund a proposed initiative.
I appreciate how complex this oversight structure may
appear. It is, indeed, multifaceted. It remains a work in
progress. JIEDDO expects to publish a revised governance
structure by the end of November and the applicable DOD
Directive 2000.19E is due for revision next year.
In terms of the distinctive role played by the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, let me provide a bit
more detail--and I realize I am already overstepping my time,
sir. Our Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, serves
as the principal staff assistant to DEPSECDEF and a principal
advisor to JIEDDO regarding DOD policy and plans to ensure that
the organization's activities are fully supportive of our
larger defense and national security strategies.
When OSD Policy meets within--serves on the governance
structure we typically ask six questions: First, has the
combatant commander requested this specific IED capability?
That is usually easy to determine but sometimes we have to do
some special digging.
Secondly, has the capacity been appropriately tested for
both field uses and to ensure that it will work as expected?
While we are acutely conscious of the need to ensure fast
fielding of systems we also want to keep defective or non-
performing items out of the field.
Question three: Does the initiative fit within other DOD or
U.S. Government policies? And in cases where issues do arise,
how are we to resolve actual or potential conflict?
Question four: Does the initiative provide a comprehensive
approach that includes a plan for acquisition, training, and
sustaining the capability over time? While JIEDDO initiatives
rely upon the services to take on these tasks after the first
two years of funding, it is essential that the basics for those
first two years be well laid out.
Question five: Is JIEDDO maintaining a balanced portfolio?
That is, are we doing everything we can to balance short-term
acquisition and medium-term research and development
investments? And how well are we balancing high-risk, big-
return efforts against lower-risk, moderate-return efforts? And
are we providing defensively-focused force protection in
relation to our ability to work on the offensive side, on the
attack-the-network priority?
And finally, the last question: What can we do to improve
our coalition counter-IED efforts, including especially with
members of the coalition who operate alongside of or in lieu of
our service members in today's irregular warfare environment?
I would say, sir, of all those questions I would lay
special emphasis on the last one. OSD Policy works with JIEDDO
to assist our partners and allies in developing compatible
counter-IED technology and training. We have worked to provide
the necessary authorizations and funding so that counter-IED
equipment, like the SYMPHONY system, and tactics can be
provided to our coalition partners.
In the future we have, regrettably, high confidence that
the use of IEDs by terrorists, insurgents, and criminals will
continue across the globe and probably increase. And while the
need to have an organizational steward like JIEDDO for this
critical mission may be affected by changes in the size of our
expeditionary deployments over time, the requirement itself
will not disappear.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to
testify. We look forward to working closely with members of
this committee on this important task in the future. Thank you,
sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Dr. Schear.
General Metz.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS F. METZ, USA, DIRECTOR, JOINT
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
General Metz. Chairman Snyder and Congressman Wittman, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and report on the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, which I am
indeed honored to lead.
Since our last meeting in September there have been over
10,000 IED incidents in Iraq. These incidents are diverse, and
the devices that were used reflect a wide range of arming and
firing switches ranging from relatively simple command wire to
sophisticated radio-controlled and passive infrared switches.
Yet in spite of the large volume and the diversity of the IED
attacks the number that are effective against our forces
continued to decline for the second straight year.
While I am pleased with the progress in Iraq, our work is
not yet done. Our organization is poised to support our
continuing diplomatic mission and U.S. forces as the drawdown
proceeds in accordance with the security agreement.
In addition, while we have learned an enormous amount from
our experience in Iraq, not all of these lessons translate to
our efforts in Afghanistan. The environment and the enemy in
Afghanistan pose many different and difficult challenges.
Although initially slower to develop in Afghanistan, the
IED has now replaced direct-fire weapons as the enemy's weapon
of choice. Furthermore, Afghanistan local insurgents, tribal
faction, and the Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to
emplace large numbers of IEDs in movement corridors such as the
Ring Road, which are so vital to our success.
Our challenge is further compounded by these groups'
intimidation of the local populace. To ensure the most
comprehensive support to this complex theater, JIEDDO is
deploying over 100 initiatives to Afghanistan.
IEDs also pose a significant threat outside of CENTCOM.
Nearly 300 IED incidents every month around the globe confirm
that the dangers from this weapon reach far beyond the borders
of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September of 2008 there have
been more than 3,500 total IED incidents outside of Afghanistan
and Iraq, and the number is growing. Able to rapidly exploit
readily available commercial technology, violent extremists
easily share the results of their efforts across the near real-
time global communications grid.
We support all the combatant commanders as they respond to
these IED threats through a rapid acquisition process that we
call the Joint IED Capabilities Approval and Acquisition
Management Process, the acronym JCAAMP. Congressionally-
directed funding allows us to act with a sense of urgency
inside 24-month period where the Department's budget processes
cannot normally operate. As a result, over the past three years
the JIEDDO has evolved as the Department's premier agency for
rapid development and delivery of capabilities in the hands of
warfighters.
The JCAAMP is not perfect, but it allows us to bypass
current cumbersome, risk-adverse processes associated with the
service acquisition efforts in support of their force
modernization programs. The exploitation and use of information
is one of the greatest asymmetric advantages we have. The
Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, or the acronym COIC,
establishes this for JIEDDO by fusing near real-time
information from over 100 databases and delivering requests for
support back to warfighters in record time for use at the
tactical level of targeting.
However, I continue to believe the ultimate key to our
success has been and will always be world-class training.
Unfortunately, no one anticipated the sheer amount and
complexity of the training required to successfully counter
IEDs.
JIEDDO's mission is to grab emerging and hard training
problems and find ways for the services and our partners to
overcome them. We are making great progress but much remains to
be done.
Since our last meeting I have become more convinced than
ever that we live in an era of persistent conflict. I agree
with Secretary Gates that the clear lines that distinguish
conventional and irregular forces have blurred.
We now confront complex hybrid forms of conflict ranging
from near-peer competitors who will use irregular and
asymmetric tactics to non-state and rogue state actors capable
of generating violence across a broad spectrum. These weapons
range from IEDs to weapons of mass destruction.
We have been in this fight for eight years, and I believe
this enemy will continue to fight us for the foreseeable future
and probably beyond my lifetime. Violent extremists will
continue to wage conflict against human targets, and their
weapon of choice will continue to be the IED.
As a result, we can never be satisfied with the results we
have achieved until we have diminished the strategic effects of
the IED, reducing their appeal for increased and global
employment. We must strive for an ever greater impact on the
continued aggressive developments of new, innovative ways to
make this weapon system too costly to produce and too risky to
employ. While we will never completely chase this weapon off
the battlefield, we must continue to eliminate its ability to
affect us strategically.
A permanent JIEDDO, funded in the base budget, sends a
clear signal that we understand the complexities of the
challenge. We must be willing to invest the money, the time,
the energy, and the talent to make sure we win. This is not an
easy task, but I believe that it is necessary.
In closing, allow me to point out that I have proudly worn
the uniform of the United States Army for over 43 years. As I
near retirement, I could not have asked for a better
assignment. I could not be more proud of the men and women who
are helping me defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic
influence. They are passionate about our mission, and they
display a sense of urgency as they work to defeat the device,
attack the networks, and train the force.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the
Members of Congress and the subcommittee for your continued
support of JIEDDO, the sincere interest in making sure that our
warfighters have an agile, responsive, passionate organization
focused on providing them the best counter-IED capabilities the
Nation has to offer. Thank you for inviting me here today to
discuss the issue I feel most passionate about, and I look
forward to your questions. And I apologize for going----
Dr. Snyder. You are fine. Thank you, General Metz.
[The prepared statement of General Metz can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Solis.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Solis. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, members
of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here
today to discuss DOD's management and oversight of its efforts
to defeat improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. As mentioned
earlier, these devices continue to be the number one threat to
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD created JIEDDO in January 2006 to focus its counter-IED
efforts and positioned it to report directly to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense rather than through traditional lines of
authority and oversight. Since that time we have issued several
reports on JIEDDO's management and operations, including one we
are going to issue today.
My testimony today will draw on this latest report plus
ongoing work to discuss: one, steps JIEDDO and DOD have taken
to improve the management of counter-IED efforts; and two,
challenges affecting DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO.
Since its creation JIEDDO has taken several steps to
improve management of counter-IED efforts. These actions
include developing an overarching framework for Department-wide
counter-IED efforts, which delineates specific roles and
responsibilities for organizations involved in those efforts,
and working with the services to improve visibility over their
counter-IED efforts.
While these actions represent some progress, we have
identified several challenges that continue to affect DOD's
ability to oversee JIEDDO. First, JIEDDO and the services lack
full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD
even though many officials told us that such visibility would
be of great benefit in coordinating and managing the
Department's counter-IED programs.
For example, although JIEDDO was mandated to focus all DOD
actions to help defeat IEDs, most of the organizations engaged
in the counter-IED efforts prior to JIEDDO have continued to
develop, maintain, and in some cases expand their own counter-
IED capabilities. Although JIEDDO and several service
organizations have developed their own counter-IED databases,
there is no comprehensive database to combine this information.
Further, these service databases do not capture all the
counter-IED efforts, limiting their ability to provide JIEDDO
with timely and comprehensive summary of their existing
initiatives.
Second, JIEDDO continues to face difficulties coordinating
the transition of funding responsibilities for counter-IED
efforts to the services. Transition is hindered by funding gaps
between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget
cycle. It is also hindered when JIEDDO does not fully consider
service requirements in the acquisition process.
For example, in 2007 JIEDDO funded a fielded man-portable
IED jammer. Although the system was developed in response to a
Central Command requirement, the Army and Marine Corps have no
formal requirement for it, casting doubts as to which DOD
organizations will be required to pay for the continued
procurement and sustainment of the system. This could delay the
transition of the program, forcing JIEDDO to continue to fund
it at the expense of new initiatives.
Third, JIEDDO lacks clear criteria for defining what
counter-IED training initiative it will fund. As a result,
JIEDDO has funded training activities that have primary uses
other than defeating an IED, such as role players and simulated
villages to replicate Iraqi conditions at various combat
training centers.
Fourth, JIEDDO lacks the means as well as reliable data to
gauge the effectiveness of counter-IED efforts. For example, we
found that JIEDDO lacks key data needed to evaluate the
effectiveness of its counter-IED initiatives.
Fifth, JIEDDO has not consistently applied its counter-IED
initiative acquisition process, which was referred to earlier
as JCAAMP. For example, we found that 48 of the 56 JIEDDO
counter-IED initiatives we reviewed have been excluded from all
or part of JIEDDO's review and approval process, including 16
that required approval by the DEPSECDEF or the JIEDDO director.
Sixth, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls required to
provide DOD assurance that it is achieving it objectives. In
July 2009 JIEDDO reported that a material weakness has existed
in its internal controls since the organization was
established. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's
ability to meet its objectives.
In conclusion, although JIEDDO has taken important steps,
the Department continues to face a number of challenges that,
if unaddressed, may result in the potential duplication of
effort, unaddressed capability gaps, and inefficient use of
resources in a fiscally-challenged environment. Further, the
Department will lack the basic confidence that it has retained
the necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the
long term.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy
to take any answers from you or the subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the
Appendix on page 68.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Solis.
We have been joined by some members who are not members of
the subcommittee, and they will be allowed to participate in--
--
You will get bumped down the line if we have some other
subcommittee members come in, but we will give everyone a
chance to----
Mr. Solis, you said DOD concurred with your
recommendations. Who specifically concurred--what person?
Your microphone is not on, sir.
Mr. Solis. I would have to see, but it was not--we have
that? It was JIEDDO for the Department.
Dr. Snyder. I am sorry?
Mr. Solis. JIEDDO for the Department.
Dr. Snyder. JIEDDO. That is not really a person, though, is
it?
Mr. Solis. I would have to look.
Dr. Snyder. I was actually wondering who the individual
person was.
General Metz, I want to go through some of the criticism
that GAO made and give you a chance to respond, and I am going
from the draft I was given a day or two ago--I am going to read
from their conclusions. First, JIEDDO and the services lack
full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD.
First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of
all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility
over counter-IED efforts across the Department.
Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system
that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's
acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded
initiatives, not those being independently developed and
procured by the services and other DOD components. What is your
response to that criticism?
General Metz. Well, sir, I appreciate the report including
that we are working on that database. It was obvious to me when
I came in that the pace at which business had been done, that
sense of urgency was needed.
When General Meiggs stood up the organization the IEDs in
Iraq were about 1,500 a month and they were to grow to 2,500 a
month and remain there for most--the last of 2006 and the first
of 2007. So I am sure his priorities were to help the
warfighter. Knowing that we needed that data, we have worked on
developing our internal database effort.
Now, as it relates to us not having the visibility of the
other services or agencies that are doing things, I think we
do. I think there are multiple----
Dr. Snyder. So you don't agree? You do not agree with Mr.
Solis' criticism?
General Metz. I do not agree that we don't have any
awareness of what is going on across the Department because
there are enough forums that----
Dr. Snyder. I think his criticism was not that you didn't
have ``any awareness.'' His criticism is you lack a
comprehensive database. You agree you lack a comprehensive
database?
General Metz. I agree that we lack a comprehensive database
and we are working on not only ours but to work out how we
interface with others to ensure that we don't have those--a
duplicative effort. I think, however, that an overlapped effort
may be wise to ensure gaps and seams are covered, but we do
need to work to create that database.
Dr. Snyder. To assess that you have an overlapped effort,
though, implies that you would actually have a database that
you could look at and say, ``Yes, they are working on that too
and we are working on it, but that is okay.''
Second--this is again from the GAO--the services lack full
visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass
JIEDDO's acquisition process. With limited visibility both
JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating efforts.
What is your comment about that?
General Metz. Sir, the services participate in our JCAAMP
process, which includes ``A''-level assessments of initiatives,
flag-level, and if it is--and now in almost every case the
cumulative efforts are above $25 million, which our directive
says I have got to go to the Secretary. So the senior resource
steering committee gets a four-star and above-level look at all
those initiatives.
And I think your concerns are those initiatives that don't
go through the JCAAMP process----
Dr. Snyder. This is a specific criticism that you have--
that there are initiatives that are funded by JIEDDO that, in
the words of GAO, ``bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process.'' They
would not come before the groups that you referred to.
General Metz. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Do you agree that GAO's criticism is----
General Metz. Well, I agree that there are some initiatives
that I have approved below the $25 million level that I have
moved quickly to the warfighters because I saw the urgency and
made that decision. I believe that we have, during that
process, tried to be as transparent as we possibly could, and
we certainly aren't hiding data from anyone.
But we could be rightfully criticized if indeed someone
says that we did not fully disclose. But my efforts to be
transparent in the leadership of this organization is one of
the very high priorities----
Dr. Snyder. My time is about to run out, but I think you
talk about in your--everyone wants you to have speed at moving
things to the warfighter, but the criticism is that the
services who oversee the warfighters directly, that they lack
full visibility over things that you fund. I mean, that is
their criticism. It is either accurate or it is not.
But you are saying if things move the warfighters and
services do indeed know about it. Is that what you are saying?
General Metz. I think that we cross over in so many forms
throughout the Department----
Dr. Snyder. Right.
General Metz [continuing]. That I believe that the
knowledge is there, and I would have to work carefully with
each piece of data that the GAO has collected.
Dr. Snyder. Yes. My time is expired.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today.
General Metz, I want to go back and talk a little bit about
JIEDDO funding. And you had spoken about the number of attacks,
and acknowledging that the threat is growing, alarmingly so,
and especially here on the home front.
If you look at the funding you see in 2008 $4.3 billion
allocated for JIEDDO; in 2009 $3.1 billion; in 2010 $2.1
billion. As we are seeing the attacks on our troops overseas
and the worldwide threat growing my question is, why was your
funding cut almost in half during that period of time?
General Metz. Sir, I think that that cut reflects the fact
that we have harvested many of the low-hanging fruit efforts.
For example, pushing the enemy off of radio-controlled arming
and initiation devices in Iraq was a very expensive effort to
proliferate those jammers--develop them, ensure that they were
interoperable, get them to the force--that was a huge amount of
money, in a couple of those years close to $1 billion. Now that
we have that technology and we have that capability there was
no need for a continued funding line for that particular
initiative, the remote control improvised explosive device
(CREW) initiative.
Also, many of the material solutions that were expensive
have been invested in and are being used. It is interesting to
me, and it may be counterintuitive to many, but many of the
non-material solutions are not as expensive, yet they have been
able to allow us to aggressively attack the networks and
actually cost us less. And so over time we are working on some
very, very hard physics problems, but that investment has not
required as much money.
So I think the energy and the focus is absolutely still
there, but we have been able to maintain the pace of what we do
in defeating the device, attacking the network, and training
the force with less funds. And we want to be prudent with those
funds, and we do not want to ask for more than would be wise
for us to use in fighting the IED at the level we think we can.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. I wanted to ask you a little bit
about things going on in Afghanistan. We are looking at the
rates of attacks going up; we are also looking at an increase
in lethality of those attacks. Can you give me some indication
about that, and then what are we doing to reverse those trends?
General Metz. Well, certainly as we--as over the past year
we have pushed more soldiers and Marines into Afghanistan and
into places where we had not been before the enemy was ready
with a very thick array of IEDs, and so those soldiers or
Marines ran into those IEDs and it was what we predicted.
I think we are seeing that the enemy is having a difficult
time replacing those IEDs, and that the fight is on, and I am
confident in the training and capabilities of those forces to
continue to manage the level and begin to bring it down as they
become accustomed to worked, especially in Regional Command
(RC) South.
We have seen the enemy--and this is warfare--he looks at
the solutions we have put on the battlefield, and he works to
counter those. And he has really upped the total volume and
explosive power of his IEDs, and that is probably the main
trend that I would report to you in Afghanistan, is that his
increased size of his IED increases its--well, obviously its
lethality, and then challenges some of the solutions we had,
mainly the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and
MRAP-like vehicles that we bought in order to protect our
troops.
Mr. Wittman. One last question: I was impressed when I
visited COIC about the efforts to get information back to the
front in real time. And when I visited there obviously the
focus was on Iraq.
Now with this growing threat of lethality in Afghanistan my
question is, are you able to communicate as effectively with
our Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in Afghanistan as you were in
Iraq? And are you able to support the troops at the same level
as we have supported them in Iraq?
General Metz. The only thing that limits us duplicating our
effort in--well, there are several things--in Iraq and
Afghanistan with the COIC, there are some outlying operation
bases that may not have a secure internet protocol router
network (SIPRNET) to them and may have limited bandwidth. That
would cause us some difficulty to get the information out. But
at the headquarters level I think that we have got the full
capability and bandwidth to get the information there.
What is really different in the two theaters is that over
time in Iraq, as we were experiencing 1,500, 2,500 IEDs a month
and finding and clearing half of them we were gaining an
enormous amount of forensics and biometrics information. We use
that in the COIC to our advantage; it is our asymmetric
advantage, as you witnessed.
The IED was not an important--was not a well-used and
important weapons system for many years in Afghanistan. We have
seen that increase and we are--just like Iraq we are finding
and clearing about half of the IEDs.
We will continue to build the data on Afghanistan but it is
just less now. And over time I am confident that our great tool
of the COIC will be ever more important to the commanders in
Afghanistan. In fact, I have got the director of the COIC here
who is just back from Afghanistan, and we have kept that flow
of leadership to ensure that we are as up to date as possible
with the needs of the commanders in Afghanistan and we meet
their request for support in what we call the latest time of
value, just as we did in Iraq.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Metz. We are going to move
on to Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General Metz, thank you for your lifetime of service.
You know, it is so easy, sometimes, to forget the incredible
sacrifice that all of the people in uniform make, but when a
person gets stars on their shoulders it really reflects a
profound contribution to human freedom, and thank you very
much.
And I know that your success at JIEDDO has direct results
on the ground in counted and saved lives, so it is a big job
that you do. I also know that the IED is at once simple and
monstrously complex, and with an adaptable enemy that is always
changing things and looking at what we do, and it is a very,
very difficult thing to handle.
How do you stay ahead of this adaptability that the enemy
has? How do you keep trying to get ahead of them and what is
your mechanism to do that? It is sort of an ethereal question,
I guess, but what methods do you employ to try to stay one step
ahead of them?
General Metz. Well, certainly one method is to collect the
data and work hard at developing the metrics so we can
understand not just the inputs that we have done in this
organization and not just the outputs, but what are the
outcomes that we are producing? And the only way to really know
that is to spend time in the theater.
As a three-star I will cost a lot of time and energy, so I
limit my trips to twice a year. My sergeant major that is with
me today, as I mentioned Mr. Larkin and others, spend time in
the theater so we can ensure that we are connected with the
commanders and understand what their problems are and what they
see coming.
On the other hand, back here inside of the Washington area,
inside my headquarters we have created what we call the
Competitive Strategies Group. I am a firm believer from my
career that you must look at yourself through the enemies'
eyes, and that is a well-defined program called red teaming.
And my competitive strategies effort is red teaming and
more; in addition to red team efforts we include a technical
gaming staff that are looking at the technologies that are
available to the enemy that he could use. So each initiative is
bounced against the red team and the technical gaming team to
ensure we understand what the counters are going to be and
begin already to develop the counter to the counter.
Mr. Franks. Yes.
General Metz. This is, I think, absolutely critical in
today's warfare because there are not just good guys and bad
guys on the battlefield. There is an enormous domain in
between. And it is a cultural domain, it is a social domain, it
is a technical domain, and you need to understand that.
For example, when I was visiting U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM) I stressed to them that the telecommunications industry
is not going to go into an austere environment and put copper
cables and plug into my belt. The telecommunications industry--
and it may be Asian--will put in the very best that they can to
make money. And we need to understand those systems and be able
to compete and operate inside those systems because the enemy
is.
Mr. Franks. Yes, sir.
General Metz. And so for that reason, inside my
organization the Competitive Strategies Group, in a tight link
with what is going on in the theater and understanding the
commanders' concerns about the future, helps us do what you ask
us to do.
Mr. Franks. Well, General, I also read in an article just
recently that it discussed how your--how JIEDDO is expanding
its role to include examining the broad networks of insurgents
necessary to sustain an IED campaign, like, you know, the
people who finance it, and the couriers, and those who ferry
the explosives, the bomb assembly technicians, all of the--sort
of the upstream. And, you know, in Iraq, Iran was providing a
lot of the explosive formed penetrators (EFPs), and they were
some of the really most dangerous ones that we were facing.
So I guess my question is twofold. I know some criticism
has come that says this perhaps diverts you from your primary
purpose, but it occurs to me that if you can prevent the source
and the advancement of some of these it is a very wise thing.
So I would like for you to touch on that and also tell us what
role Iran continues to play in any IED or explosive formed
penetrator supply in Afghanistan.
General Metz. The first part of your question, I would tell
you that we--I apologize, sir. I have concentrated on the
Iranian part too much and----
Mr. Franks. No, that is all right. Just the fact that I
know that you have expanded JIEDDO recently, or at least the
indications are that puts kind of verbal responsibility on
getting to the sources.
General Metz. Well, sir, the term that we would use in my
organization would be ``left of boom.'' We spend a lot of time
initially working to defeat the device and give the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and Marines the protection that they
rightfully deserve if they got inside that explosion.
We are constantly working more and more left of boom, and
that gets into attacking the networks. That gets into getting
involved in the financing of them, the supplies, the techniques
of how the bomb is made and emplaced, and in some cases very
unique arming and triggering devices.
We work that because the payoff is enormous to work
yourself left of boom because what you are essentially doing is
not just attacking an almost infinite array of ways to present
the bomb and arm it and ignite it, but you are moving upstream
so that you can get a bigger bang for your buck.
And we really do--as I have mentioned before, those non-
material solutions to attack the network are paying significant
dividends, all the way back to working with Commerce, Justice,
and Treasury, and finding those that either inadvertently or
directly are supplying the components to our enemies.
Most of that that I would like to talk about Iran I think
we need to take to a closed session, or I can answer in a
classified for the record. But we do, because of the lethality
of the EFP, look very closely at where it may be coming from.
Fortunately we have seen only what we think are homemade
platter-charged kind of directional attacks in Afghanistan and
have not seen the very sophisticated EFPs that we saw in Iraq,
and the ones in Iraq have dropped in effectiveness. And so I
think that the close link that we did see, there is some
problem there, and fortunately our troops aren't facing the
very lethal EFPs that we faced a couple years ago.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Rogers for five minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year I went down to Alabama, and we had a field
hearing, and they showed us where the Marines were using off-
leash canine assets that they had deployed to Iraq, and I
understand they have 18 of these teams, and not one of those
teams has suffered a loss that is using those. Are you familiar
with that technology?
General Metz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Is it limited in what it is useful for or is it
something we could expand? Because when they showed them to us
the dogs went out ahead of the convoy, and they meandered
around the road, and they were just great.
General Metz. Yes, sir. I have seen likewise. I visited the
Army's maneuver support center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and
they are working an initiative for off-leash dogs.
I think that the combatant--I mean, the commanders know
this capability. If they want more of this capability I think
that that would come to us--maybe not directly to JIEDDO, but
the joint urgent operational need that they would submit for
more canine support would arrive at the Joint Staff and be
validated, and OSD may not give it to us but may turn that
joint urgent operational need to the services.
But I do know of the capability. I do know of the success.
And I am confident that the commanders know of it, so I think
that we are on top of that one.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Hunter for five minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, first off for what you do and what
JIEDDO is doing. You are saving lives, and that is the most
important thing.
My problem is this: If the President came to you today or
Secretary Gates came to you today and said, ``I want you to
mobilize right now. I don't want one more IED dug into the
ground, buried, between Helmand and Nangarhar, as of one week
from today not a single IED to be dug in,'' and you were to
mobilize America's industrial base, our contractor base, all
the former Special Forces (SF) guys that are now doing
contractor stuff for us and doing it really well--basically, if
you were to mobilize this country to stop what is the number
one way that the enemy is taking American lives right now, you
could do it. We would not have another IED buried.
And what I have seen is as the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) exponentially increases and gets sent
over to Afghanistan, as the money spent in JIEDDO goes up and
up and up, and as we have great programs--and they are great
programs, and I am looking forward to all of them coming to
fruition--the numbers of assets, the numbers of programs, and
the dollars spent is almost in an inverse proportion to the IED
deaths in Afghanistan, meaning the more money JIEDDO gets, the
more ISR--and the ISR, as you know, has gone up at 100 percent
in Afghanistan over the last year, and it is going to go up
more--so have our American deaths due to IEDs. There is no
correlation right now between money spent, programs, or ISR in
theater, so what we are missing is the execution.
And what I don't understand is this: You have one window--
when you talk about getting left of that boom, you have one
window to catch an IED emplacer, when he is bigger than the
IED. When I was in Fallujah in 2004 things were going crazy,
you had guys using backhoes to dig in holes to put 155 shells
in; it took like 4 or 5 hours.
So we let guys use backhoes--enemy terrorists use backhoes
in our area of operation (AO) because we didn't have eyes in
the sky watching the roads 24/7. The only window of opportunity
that you have is when they are emplacing the IEDs. You can
attack the network, go after finances, and everything else, but
the window where you see them putting it in, that is when you
can kill them.
And if the President came to you tomorrow and said, ``I
don't want one more IED dug in. You need to watch every road
24/7 where our operations are,'' and that is a very small area.
I have seen the maps where all the IED hits are. It is a very
small area. It is under 100 clicks [kilometers] if you want to
put it all together where 90 percent of the IEDs go off--100-
click area.
So my question is, what are we doing tomorrow--what are you
going to implement tomorrow to make sure that no more IEDs go--
and once more, all the different programs that we have had,
that JIEDDO does, I have been briefed on them. They are all
fantastic--Project Liberty, Task Force Observe, Detect,
Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN), everything is going in, and it
is going to be set up at some point in the near future. We have
been being told that since I got into office in January, ``It
is going to be there soon, sir. It is going to be there soon.
It is going to be there soon.''
It isn't there now, and we are losing guys every day. So
what are we going to do tomorrow to defeat IEDs so that we
don't have any more IED deaths? Where is the Task Force ODIN of
Afghanistan?
General Metz. Sir, please let me take that. And first of
all, I want to thank you for initiating your efforts. We are
recognizing that is that indeed the loss of life that is the
bottom line metric, and it is those lives and those limbs and
serious burns and eyesight that I work to try to prevent every
day because I think they indeed map to the strategic influence
that the IED is having on us.
We are an enabling organization. We answer those needs from
the commanders. We look for the gaps and seams that we can help
them fill. And we fan out across industry and academia and the
federal labs, the federally-funded research corporations to
find those solutions.
We do our very best to get them there, but the commanders
use those tools to fight their fight. And as you very
accurately describe, Task Force ODIN-like efforts really have
an impact on the enemy. And I think that one of the things that
we do via the COIC is to show them where those hot spots are,
where the enemy is concentrating, and help the commanders
concentrate their own ISR capability.
Just this morning I left two days--the third day of a
technical outreach conference where we are indeed tapping the
capabilities of the country to look at the transportation
networks and work to give those route clearance companies and
the land owner commander the capabilities to keep those roads
and transportation means free of IEDs. I may not go as far with
you as just 100 kilometers are important, but you are right,
there are hot spots we need to focus on, and we work hard to
guide the commanders to that.
But having been a commander, I am not going to try to
become the 12,000-mile screwdriver. I am going to give them
every capability I can. I want to stay in touch with them. They
have got a very tough fight to fight.
I think we can do more, and that was one of the things that
I was working with industry this week on. We will work with
anybody I can to improve the capability.
I think there is--we have got some excellent potential
ideas, as you have mentioned, and particular initiatives. We
need to net those together. We need to help the commander with
the architecture that brings them together. And, sir, you make
great points, and we will continue to work hard to meet your
points.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, General, for your service.
And Sergeant Major, great to see you. Thank you for being
here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to bring up one more thing--I thank you
for that. There is an article here about the Marines in Helmand
15 in particular. I will just read from it: ``But some of the
Marines operating in Afghanistan's Helmand Province say they
have only seen one part of their drones in the past two or
three months, leaving the fight against IEDs largely in the
hands of ground troops.'' This article came out today--NPR
article.
The Marines frequently patrol with handheld minesweepers, a
version of what people use on a beach to find coins. General
Mickelson says his best weapons against the bombs is what he
calls the mark-one eyeball--that is Marines being over there,
soldiers being over there, being there for six months, noticing
that strange carcass that wasn't there yesterday is shaped
funny with red wire coming out of it, that is the IED.
This doesn't make me feel really comfortable that we are
truly doing everything that we can right now. Once more, if
Secretary Gates said, ``No more IEDs to be buried''--I
understand that there are tons in the ground right now in
Afghanistan, and they could be turned on like that at any point
in time--but we could do that. We could stop IEDs from being
buried if we mobilized to do it.
And we want to talk politically about this war too--it
would fall off the map if nobody was dying. Iraq is not in the
paper anymore because nobody is dying. One reason is we have
knocked off IEDs huge in 2007 and 2008 with ODIN by killing
over 3,000 IED-emplacers.
Project ODIN, with IEDs, killed more people than every
single other person in Iraq put together with all the offensive
operations--ODIN killed more, and they were all bad guys, not
one single civilian. They were all inputting an IED.
If we can do that--and we have done it--I don't understand
the stopping point--and you are truly the only organization
whose only mission is to stop IEDs. So I understand we don't
want to meddle with what those ground commanders want to do,
but it is only you. The buck has to stop with you because we
don't have anybody else; there is no other IED defeat
organization in Washington or anywhere else in the U.S.
Government that I know of whose sole mission is to stop IEDs.
And Congress--we will give you anything, and we have, I
think--billions upon billions of dollars, as much manpower as
you want, anything that you need. I just think we could do
more. And if we have to say, ``You are using the assets wrong,
General Whoever, you are using the assets wrong. We are going
to go in with an ODIN.'' And one of the things about ODIN, too,
it was ODIN--it was purely for IED defeat. We don't have that
in Afghanistan, meaning other ground commanders can task out
those ISR assets that you send over there purely for IED
defeat, they can put those into kinetic operation oversight so
they can have them watching ops. Whereas you could step in
maybe--I don't know how this chain works--you could step in and
say, ``This is here and we are going to take back the roads in
Afghanistan. That is our number one mission.''
That is the number one killer of Americans right now and
maiming of Americans right now in coalition forces. It is IEDs.
It is all IEDs. So let us just stop them.
Why not put 24/7 eyes in the sky? I have been approached by
contractors--and I know contractors get a bad rap--from all
over who say, ``For $10 million we can cover 100 clicks of road
24/7. We need night vision goggles (NVGs) and a satellite (SAT)
phone. We don't need a one-year project to make all these
special things so we can intercept phone calls. We need NVGs,
and we are going to call into the chain of command (COC) and
say there are guys digging in 155 shells on the corner of Fifth
and Main,'' because they are there 24/7.
There are people out there to do it; we have the assets to
do it; we have C-12s. Shoot, you could use crop dusters.
I am just not seeing what is stopping us from doing it
right now, tomorrow, going out there and saying, ``Let us stop
them. Let us really stop them.''
Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.
You see, gentlemen, I think--here is the issue that we
have, and it is why I was reading through Mr. Solis' cumbersome
language, and that is what the Congress and the American people
think is what is motivating you all, it is what the American
people want us to work on is what Mr. Hunter is talking about.
The concern of this subcommittee for the last 18 months or so
is that we think there are some things going on within the
processes of government that may be interfering with our
ability to do exactly what Mr. Hunter wants to do.
And it seems obtuse, it seems convoluted, it seems
bureaucratic that we are asking these questions, but your guys
on the ground are not yet satisfied with where they are at
despite all the efforts and the absolute commitment I know that
you all have to doing this.
So General Metz, I will give you a chance to respond to
anything that Mr. Hunter said. And then I am going to go back
to the laborious nature of reading the GAO criticisms because I
think that the only way we get to where Mr. Hunter wants to be
is we have got to be sure everything is functioning as well as
it can be in lines of authority, in funding streams. And that
is how human beings get things done is to be as efficient as
they can be so that the ultimate, you know, final product is
what they want it to be.
So, General Metz, is there any response you have to Mr.
Hunter----
General Metz. The main thing I would like to respond to
Congressman Hunter's comments and just underline his accuracy
with the fact that the soldier, Marines, sailor, and airmen's
vision and sense is still the best sensor on the battlefield,
and that tells me that the more realistic training we can give
them the better they will be at this business. So it does give
us the opportunity to underline the value of realistic
training.
I think it also gives us the opportunity to underline the
need to help the commanders understand how they can fuse their
information, use the ISR, the abundance that we are trying to
push there, to better focus it and better use the assets, and
then when they need more assets we need to supply them. But
those are the main comments and----
Dr. Snyder. One specific question with regard to Mr.
Hunter's comments: You all define IED much broader than just
things getting buried in the ground, correct? You include
things strapped on to suicide bombers, car bombs, things thrown
from windows, I mean things----
General Metz. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. I mean, in fact the September 11th
attack was an improvised explosive device. I mean----
General Metz. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. It is much broader than that.
All right, back to the GAO comments, General Metz, quoting
now, ``JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning joint IED
defeat initiatives to the military services in part because
JIEDDO and the services have difficulty resolving the gap
between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's budget cycle. As
a result the services are mainly funding initiatives with
supplemental appropriations rather than their base budget.
Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with supplemental
appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those
initiatives in future years, since these appropriations are not
necessarily renewed from one year to the next.''
What are your comments on that?
General Metz. Sir, there----
Dr. Snyder. And this is a topic we talked about last year
also.
General Metz. Yes, sir. And because we talked about it last
year it has been up front and one that I have worked closely
with men and women I have known my whole career.
We were set up in order to work inside that very quick
trade space probably inside two years. Now, having said that,
we do spend some money, and we do look forward to some
technical efforts that we could pull forward, but basically I
want JIEDDO to be in the trade space of helping warfighters.
And as you do that there will be, I think, a natural
friction between the services who are operating in the normal
budget cycle and we that are operating with the tremendous
resources that the Congress has given us. But I believe that
the process is maturing, and we are dampening out the problems
of the services because they know what we are working on, they
know as we do the operational assessments the initiatives that
are looking good and may come to them.
Dr. Snyder. But that relates back to the previous
criticism, though, doesn't it, in my last round, which was that
GAO says the services lack full visibility. When you say they
know what you are doing----
General Metz. Well, sir, I think that we----
Dr. Snyder. You are trying----
General Metz [continuing]. There are enough forums that we
are--that there are not black boxes that no one knows anything
about but a particular office.
Dr. Snyder. Let me go to this next one. This transition
also is hindered when service requirements are not fully
considered during the development of joint funded counter-IED
initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems.
As a result, JIEDDO may be investing in counter-IED solutions
that do not fully meet existing service requirements. What is
your comment about that GAO criticism?
General Metz. Well, sir, it was interesting when I took
over from General Meiggs, he said, ``The good part about your
tenure is you are going to be out of the jamming business.''
The problem is the enemy votes, and the enemy has stayed
adaptive in his use of the electromagnetic spectrum. So
although we thought we had done enough in the jamming business
that it would then transition to the services, we needed to
stay in the jamming business because the enemy decided to move
to different frequencies and make things more complex.
I recognize that this was a friction point between us and
the services, and so I went to my experiences, and I went to
General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman, and said, ``I think this
needs to be a Joint Requirements Oversight Council issue.'' A
little over a year ago we took it to that process, came out
with clear definitions of what we would do, what the single
manager--the Navy as a single manager for electronic warfare
(EW) would do, and what the services would do.
But the enemy keeps voting, and we keep having to keep up,
and we think we are the organization that needs to watch the
threat. And as needed, we need to offer the technical updates.
The services will continue and should continue to define their
requirements out into their programs. There has been friction
but I think it, especially in the CREW, is beginning to dampen
out, and we are really understanding where these programs are
and how they have messed with each other.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman for five minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Metz, I think what you are hearing today is just--
is concern about coordination of efforts, effective
communication, and I know that it is a very complex process.
There are lots of things going on and timing this is of the
issue there.
My question goes back to I guess the synthesis of what you
are hearing today from Mr. Hunter and Chairman Snyder. You
know, Mr. Hunter is, I think, bringing up a great point about
how do you really get assets to the field that our warfighters
would be effective to them, looking at that in an application
setting, also some of the criticisms brought up by the GAO.
Is there a way that you can bring all those things
together? And secondly, is it an issue--and I may have asked
this question a little bit earlier--is it an issue of
resources? Is it an issue of--and when I say resources I am
talking about dollars--or is it an issue of human resources? Is
it an issue of trying to coordinate things in a more timely
fashion and make sure that you have those internal controls
there? You are also looking externally, you are getting that
information from the warfighters, from the combatant commanders
in a way that you can get to the point like Mr. Hunter brings
up and get out there and try to provide the assets to find
these folks that are placing these IEDs, in addition to,
obviously, other threats that are out there?
Is it an issue of resources or placement of those
resources? Can you give us an idea about how you would
collectively respond to, I think, some of the things that are
coming up here?
General Metz. My first comment is that as I see the plans
of Fiscal Year 2010 and the plans for 2011 I don't think that
it is an issue of resources. I think it is the complexity of
being able to put the architecture in place and put the
sensors, the training, the entire complex spectrum of things
that have to be done to really focus the force on what is the
most strategic problem, which is the IED.
Having said that, the commanders in the field are facing
the complexities of fighting a counterinsurgency battle inside
of which the IED has probably most significantly limited their
ability to work with the population and the mobility, and so
counter-IED----
And General McChrystal clearly expressed to me his
understanding that we have got to fight the IED when I visited
him in June. I think what we have got to do is continue to use
the resources that come together in the Joint IED Defeat
Organization to do just as Congressman Hunter says, focus the
effort so that that focus turns out to reduce the loss of life.
You map that back to the--you force the enemy to have less
wherewithal, less supplies, less money to do it.
Congressman Hunter is right--the last time you really get
to affect it is when he is putting it in. And so commanders
make decisions whether or not they kill the person putting it
in, which they have got the rules of engagement to do, or they
follow him to understand his leadership or understand where his
cache is, or understand where the bomb maker is. So we can help
in that because we can sit back in the comfort of--and the
protection of where we are and work for the commanders to help
them produce the net-centric capability that I think our Nation
can offer to fight this weapons system.
Mr. Wittman. One follow-up: How capable is JIEDDO of
responding to suggestions from our warfighters and combatant
commanders that may be outside of what--the stock set of
conditions that we have been used to dealing with? So in other
words, if somebody came up and said, ``Hey, why don't we do
this?'' and it is something outside of what we normally look at
about countering these devices, jamming them, trying to stop
their placement, I just want to make sure that that
adaptability and flexibility is there within JIEDDO.
So if you have something that is sort of outside the box it
can be incorporated or is at least looked at with an open mind
to say, ``Yes, maybe that is something we haven't thought of.
We ought to incorporate that in our thought about how we look
at the overall threat.'' How capable is JIEDDO of considering
those suggestions and then putting them into place as far as
defeat measures?
General Metz. Sir, I think that that is one of our real
strengths. We have enough expertise now, having a couple years
at it, to understand what has worked and what has not worked.
And I think the passion and sense of urgency that my workforce
has, we are constantly seeking those new and good ideas.
Having said that, there are some that come to us with to
them what is a new and good idea that we have tried before. So
I think we have got a good pulse of the technology that will
work and we need to pursue.
But as I mentioned before, much of the low-hanging fruit
has been harvested so we are left with some real tough physics
problems. In order to build a radar that can look underneath
the ground as you are traveling 40 miles an hour down the road
in your MRAP and do it with a low false positive rate in order
soon enough for you to stop is a tough physics problem. But I
do think that we--that is what we can offer.
Now, we also have enough tentacles out in the force to
understand what their needs are. And the advantage to having
the Joint IED Defeat Organization is that we can begin to work
the solutions to the problems they are seeing as the process
begins to take place.
We are working in tandem and not in sequence so that we are
not waiting for everything to come through out of Afghanistan,
through CENTCOM, to the joint staff and OSD, and finally maybe
get to us. We know what they need, and we are working on those
gaps and seams, and we will certainly marry-up the joint urgent
operational needs statement as it comes, but I think what you
have touched upon is one of the things I am very proud of the
organization.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to associate
myself profoundly with Mr. Hunter's previous comments and yield
back.
Dr. Snyder. See, it is easier for us to associate ourselves
with this Mr. Hunter since he was in the Marine Corps than the
previous Mr. Hunter since he was an Army Ranger. So I
associate----
Mr. Hunter?
General Metz, continuing the GAO summary questions--by the
way, I am just reading from kind of their key one. They go in
quite detailed in some other--quoting again from GAO,
``JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training
initiatives it will fund has impacted its counter-IED training
investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training
initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating
IEDs.
``In March 2009 JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for
joint training initiatives by listing new requirements.
However, these guidelines also could be broadly interpreted.
Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives,
DOD may find that it lacks funding for future initiatives more
directly related to the counter IED mission.''
That is the end of the GAO comment. Do you have a response
to that?
General Metz. First of all, sir, I would say that upon
arriving at the organization it was clear to me that--and I
have talked with General Abizaid, and I know him well--that the
Manhattan-like Project effort, which was initially focused on
the device that General Meiggs had worked up to ensure that it
was broad, and we were fighting the networks, and I came with
the experience that told me I needed to make sure the force was
trained to do both.
And I have worked hard to ensure that the Joint Center of
Excellence out at Fort Irwin, California, and the Services
Center of Excellence--the Marines, for example--at 29 Palms are
as aggressively helping the force train as possible.
And as those training initiatives can be, in my mind,
linked with winning the IED fight I have been in full support
of them. And an example would be that realistic training that I
think we owe our young men and women we have invested in and
have transferred to the--in the larger case--to the Army and
the Marine Corps insurgents on the battlefield.
And in some cases you don't need just a role player; you
need someone that is technically and culturally educated to the
position. For example, when a young Marine company commander or
an Army company commander has got to work with a village, he
needs to train working with someone that is replicating the
mayor, the senior imam, the tribal leaders, the police, the
army, so that he gets that experience before he goes.
Now, that is not razor sharp focused on counter-IEDs, but
that training will help him with the network--the fight of the
IED network in that training environment. So that is one of the
examples, I think, that we developed insurgents on the
battlefield and have now handed that off to the Army.
Does that put a burden on the Army? Yes, sir, it does. And
the Army has got to decide how much of that insurgent on the
battlefield funding that they will accommodate.
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Schear and Mr. Solis, we have let you off
pretty easy so far this morning.
But Dr. Schear, we appreciate you being here, and as I
alluded to briefly in my opening comments, it is our
understanding that the Defense Department was scrambling a
little bit to figure exactly who on the civilian side should
come, that there--was that your impression, I mean, that the
lines of authority were perhaps not as clear and defined as
maybe they would like, given how mature the JIEDDO organization
is now? Do you have any comments on the DOD structure with
regard to the management and oversight of JIEDDO?
Dr. Schear. Sir, you raised a fair question. Oversight is a
challenge because of how broadly this effort draws from almost
every stakeholder constituency in this Department, from the
acquisition community to the intel community, policy community,
cost and program evaluation communities. That is, in part, the
reason why this effort plugs in at such a high level.
Now, there is a span of control challenge for our deputy,
and even farther down the echelon. The problem we face is that
if the oversight plugs in at a lower level than we have
fractionated oversight, and there is a cost associated with
working those problems out.
So, sir, in particular response to your question, I don't
think there was an issue about identifying the individuals
involved; it was just a question of schedules and here-and-now
priorities, given other challenges.
But I obviously cannot carry the full portfolio that Bill
Lynn would here, as the deputy, and I understand last year we
offered up a range of views and a very large panel from these
various constituencies, which probably sort of symbolized how
broad-gauged this is. But it is a challenge, and I take your
point.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Platts, would you like to be recognized for
five minutes?
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No questions, and I
apologize coming from two other hearings. Challenge of being on
seven subcommittees right now.
But I want to just appreciate your efforts and would echo
the final question there, or the concern about the oversight
and the management. For four years I had the privilege of
chairing the Subcommittee on Financial Management and Overall
Management under Oversight and Government Reform and worked
closely with GAO, and I know in my years of chairmanship, as we
worked with agencies and departments, that GAO was often seen
as an adversary instead of an assistant. And I would encourage
the Department and all the military, and especially in the
important mission you have, to really embrace GAO as an ally,
as they try to use their expertise to improve your operation.
Because ultimately the beneficiary will be not just the
taxpayers here at home but the men and women in harm's way. So
just to encourage that partnering with GAO and their
recommendations as you go forward.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Gentlemen, we have three votes but we will come
back and have--I don't think we will keep you a long time after
that, but we do have several more questions. So we are in
recess.
[Recess.]
Dr. Snyder. We will resume here. I think Mr. Wittman will
be coming back, but----
I appreciate, men, you waiting.
Dr. Schear, I wanted to continue the discussion we were
having about complexity, and on page four, which you read, you
stated, ``I appreciate how complex this overall structure may
appear. It is indeed a multifaceted undertaking, and it remains
a work in progress. JIEDDO expects to publish a revised JCAAMP
procedure by the end of November and DOD Directive 2000.19E is
also due for revision in 2010,'' and that was the end of your
statement.
That gets to it, doesn't it, I mean, how complex, and we
are asking a lot out of General Metz and his organization in
terms of all these different activities. Let us see, how long
have you had your job now?
Dr. Schear. Mr. Chairman, I have been in six months.
Dr. Snyder. Six months.
Dr. Schear. I consider myself still a newbie, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Well, that is all right. When you were a
newbie, what was your understanding at the time of what was to
be your interaction with JIEDDO and how many times have you and
General Metz met?
Dr. Schear. I have had the pleasure to meet General Metz
several times since I have been--and his staff, most notably a
day-long deep dive we did a couple of months ago that Vice
Chairman Cartwright appeared at. And it has been part of the--
within Policy--part of the larger stability operations
portfolio for some period of time within Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD
SOLIC) under ASD Michael Vickers. So it has been a clear
priority.
That said, as we have heard here today, sir, it is a very
complicated portfolio, and it involves, from the policy
standpoint, some stewardship for Title 10-like capabilities,
responsibilities in addition to the operation and support. So
it puts us in an interesting position with the services as well
as combatant commanders.
Dr. Snyder. The JIEDDO structure was set up--and General
Metz talked about it, and I think you talk about it--to kind of
go around what are perceived as some of the cumbersome
processes that the normal Pentagon structure was intended to
help us get things to the warfighter as quickly as possible.
And this structure does fine when we think it is doing fine.
Human activities don't always go well. So GAO has made some
criticisms, Mr. Hunter--perhaps it wasn't a criticism, but it
was an expectation. So who within the Pentagon organization is
going to say--you know, the new Duncan Hunter made a very
passionate view of the perspective of an infantryman on the
ground that things need to be done better. Who is the point
person for the President to go to and say, ``We need to do
better''?
What is the line of authority? Is it clear to you what the
line of authority is? Our impression was that it is not, given
that there was some scrambling around to figure out who to have
testify today. But I don't think it is clear. What do you
think, Dr. Schear?
Dr. Schear. Sir, at the level you are suggesting in your
hypothetical that would come directly to the Deputy Secretary,
and at that point we would pull together in a small group and
decide on a course of action. It would involve----
Dr. Snyder. This is Mr. Lynn?
Dr. Schear. Yes. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder. General Metz, how many times have you met with
Mr. Lynn?
General Metz. Sir, I meet with Mr. Lynn in a very routine
way every single month, and I have had additional particular
subjects--one that comes to mind is the special access
programs. But we have never missed a monthly update. And so
since he has been in office I have seen him each month and
there have been two or three--I can check for the record, but--
times that I have met him on special projects.
May I engage in this discussion a little bit?
Dr. Snyder. Sure.
General Metz. Because I anticipated this question I put
some thought to it. And as I look back through my career this
job I have now has more supervision than any that I have ever
had, and I look at it maybe a different a way, because I plug
into the Deputy Secretary. If the Joint IED Defeat Organization
has got a coalition engagement challenge or we want to get some
disclosure authority or anything in the policy arena, I have
got oversight from the Under Secretary for Policy and the staff
that does that business for her, Secretary Flournoy.
In all of our technical business Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (AT&L) helps foster us through that process. Dr.
Keesee here, my vice director, sits with the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and all of the service
research and development councils, and therefore that is
another venue that we get oversight.
In the intelligence business--we are not an intelligence
organization. All I am seeking is their IED information, and I
get plenty of oversight and help from OSD Intelligence and the
agencies.
We have had an internal process for the Department of
Defense advisory working groups. We have had several of those
meetings focused at JIEDDO's business.
You know, we are coming up on our fourth birthday and we
are on our fifth topic in the GAO looking at us. I have used,
as Congressman Platts suggested to us, I do exactly what he
suggested. I use these great eyes to help me mature this
organization in the right way, and when they have been critical
of our personnel accounting I took that aboard, and I think we
have got a very robust and accurate accounting of people now.
We have built out a comptroller organization and developed the
tracking of the financial expenditures.
And I can list a number--a long list of all the different
things, but I think we are well overseen. Nevertheless, we do
plug into a very high level of the Department, so if the
President wanted something to happen he would tell the
Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and it
would come directly to me, and I would execute it, but I would
have plenty of very senior people watching their pieces of the
Department as they relate to me.
Dr. Snyder. My time is up. We will go another round. Let us
go to Mrs. Davis for five minutes, just joined us, and then we
will go to Mr. Wittman.
Mrs. Davis for five minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here. I am sorry I wasn't able to hear
the earlier testimony, but I think one of the big questions--
and excuse me if this has already been answered--but how does
JIEDDO actually measure its effectiveness in achieving its
mission to defeat the IED?
General Metz. I will take that down three avenues. One
avenue would be that we collect for the Department the data
about IEDs--location, size, switching, kinds of bombs. There is
a lot of data information that once collected--and of course we
are somewhat dependent on the theater forward to collect that
data for us--but we are able then to understand what is
happening with the IED and associate or--and understand how
effective our initiative may be.
An example would be, as the enemy went away from radio-
control devices to command wire, we believe the enemy did that
in direct response to the fielding of jammers. And so there is
a whole series of in-theater data that we collect.
Based on the GAO's earlier report, this metrics effort--we
took our entire outcomes from each part of the JIEDDO,
developed what those metrics would be, and I have taken two
very deep dives quarterly now to look very carefully at those
metrics. Are we creating the outcomes that we need to be
creating?
And the third avenue would be, as we put those initiatives
into the theater, putting an assessment behind those
initiatives so we can measure their effectiveness in the
counter-IED fight.
So those are, you know, three major ways that we have
responded to the GAO report to get it metrics, but the metrics
are very tough for two reasons: We have got a thinking enemy
who wants to counter us, and we are dependent on the warfighter
forward to use or not use the initiative we are trying to help
him with. And so there are a lot of humans in this piece and
the metrics are indeed difficult to----
Mrs. Davis. Are there some areas in which you have actually
been surprised by those results? You know, where you expected
that you would have certain outcomes which just have not
materialized, that whatever it is that you are doing just
hasn't been effective? And how, then--where do you shift in
that case, then?
General Metz. I will give an example. We felt that in East
Baghdad there was a concentrated effort by the enemy to use
explosively formed projectiles, so we deployed an initiative
that we thought would focus on those networks. We called it
FOX. It was a very robust--a number of things from canines to
soldiers that were trained in detailed tracking.
We put a lot of assets into the FOX initiative. And it was
very successful, we think, and we took it to the conclusion
that as the tremendous off-ramp of IEDs occurred in Iraq, and
the great reduction of explosively formed projectiles, that we
didn't need that initiative anymore, and so I was able to
terminate it.
I am trying to think of an example where we--one didn't
turn out as we expected it would turn out. I can tell you that
there is often a significant delta between the testing
environment, for example in Yuma Range, and as it turns out in
Afghanistan or Iraq. Something that can test marginally in
Yuma, and you take it to the theater and it tests very well.
Copperhead is a sensor that we have deployed into
Afghanistan that did not seem--that tested very well in Yuma
and has had a tough time in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a
sensor Desert Owl, a very similar technology that will see a
changed detection, marginally tested in Yuma and has been a
gangbusters success in Iraq.
So I think what I am reporting to you is this is a very
dynamic and often not intuitive business that we are in, and it
requires a constant alertness to what is happening and being
able to shift in order to support the warfighter.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And let me just shift for a second
because I know that on National Public Radio (NPR) there have
been a series of discussions about this, and I am just--have
you had a chance to review any of that? Do you think that the
public is getting the information that they need about this?
And are there any misperceptions that are out there as a result
of those reports that you have had to counter?
General Metz. I have not heard all of them. I participated
in an interview for that particular program. What I have heard
is accurate and beneficial to the public.
I think they are properly articulating the complexity of
the IED problem, of some of the solutions, and--but I must
admit I haven't listened to each one of the segments by NPR.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Metz, I want to kind of go back to the whole issue
of communications and just get your overall candid opinion.
Looking at the whole system of communications within
Afghanistan, within Iraq, back and forth, providing information
based on the IED threats, are there any weaknesses either in
the communication systems that you see within theater or the
communication systems that exist within JIEDDO, the COIC, or
the TCOIC, as far as how information is traded back and forth,
to make sure that we are, in the best manner possible, getting
these solutions to the challenges and problems that our
commanders face in the theater?
General Metz. Sir, I think that we have good communication,
and I think it can get better. And one of the things we are
taking a new look at is our Web site that was kind of our
premier outlet for information on IEDs. It was managed down at
Joint Forces Command. I am taking another look at it because I
think in this quick, dynamic environment we really need to have
that Web capability that has got the latest deaths, and I am
taking another look at how it should be managed.
I am not as concerned about where the servers are located
or who necessarily the technical people that manage it, but I
want to make sure that we have a very tight loop between what
is happening in the theater--and quite frankly around all the
world and the COCOMs--and what is posted so that our
warfighters have the very latest and best information. So I am
taking a look at that capability.
But nothing comes to mind very quickly that we have got a
real fault in the overall flow of information and
communication.
Mr. Wittman. It was mentioned earlier that in certain areas
of Afghanistan there is lack of bandwidth, maybe even lack of
capacity to be able to communicate in some of those remote
areas there. It seems like to me in those situations, where
there are certainly challenges there, that that lack of
communications could certainly have a potential impact on the
ability of the combatant commanders there to get the things
they need or to get information back. Do you see that--give me
your estimate or what you know about the communication system
there in Afghanistan as it relates to getting information from
the combatant commanders back through the chain of command back
to JIEDDO.
General Metz. As I mentioned earlier, I think that there
probably are some very small forward operating bases in very
remote locations that probably have limited bandwidth and some
limited communication. In those cases I do know that the
commanders--we work hard to allow them to go in with much of
the data so that they don't have to get streams of all the
data, they just need to get the updates. And so there is some
compression and techniques that are far beyond my information
technology (IT) background.
But again, I think as the lessons are learned we are
plugged in to a deep enough level that we are absorbing them
and in as quick a fashion as we possibly can get them back. But
there is no substitute for personally going, and so I go, and
as I have mentioned Mr. Larkin here, that runs the COIC, has
spent a lot of time recently in the theater. Sergeant Major
just got back last night--yesterday--from the theater. So
keeping the pulse is important, as is the hardware technical
communication, and I think there is the personal piece that we
are trying to do too.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. Snyder. Maybe at this point--I have got several other
questions--but Mr. Solis, you have been very patient there. Any
comments that you have on anything you have heard, particularly
about General Metz's response to your report or anything else
you want to----
Mr. Solis. I think first off I just want to reiterate, we
have had a good working relationship with JIEDDO. I mean, I
think they have been very open and transparent with us, and I
think they are listening. That being said, I think a number of
things that you have mentioned in our report and that we were
reporting today as well as our testimony are significant issues
that are going to have to be dealt with as JIEDDO goes forward.
JIEDDO was created because of the growing IED problem in
Iraq, as everybody has mentioned. That was created back in
2006, and it was put at the DEPSECDEF level to lead, advocate,
and coordinate all activities at the Department.
I think, again, it is important to note that it is not only
JIEDDO that is doing IED countermeasures. I think if you look
at some of the programs of record, most notably like MRAP, some
of these other things that have been brought to the floor
because of the--problem are not necessarily within the confines
of JIEDDO, which fits into what we were saying before in terms
of our very first point.
In terms of understanding all the different things that the
Department is doing so that the warfighter, at the end of the
day, and the Department has assurances that what is being
fielded is the best in terms of the problem set that is being
faced by the warfighter out in the field. And I think to
understand all the different solutions that are out there, all
the different things that folks are working on in different
organizations are critical.
I think the other thing--and you have talked a little bit
about the transition issues--I think there are close to almost
500 different initiatives out there. At some point they are
going to have to be transitioned and funded, and asked for
funding. If there is still a disconnect between what the
services want, what the COCOMs want, I think it is going to be
a problem in terms of transition. And as I pointed out, more of
these staying with the sustainment under JIEDDO, that is
potentially less dollars that they may have for other new or
creative solutions to the problem in the field.
But I think, again, this is going to take not just JIEDDO.
It is going to take a Department effort to really address the
things that we are doing here. And I think it is also
important--and we haven't talked a lot about
institutionalization--and I think all these things are
important to deal with before we think about
institutionalization of JIEDDO, because I think until these
issues are dealt with it is going to be very hard for this
organization to continue in the vein that it is.
Dr. Snyder. Then you have also made the point if you don't
deal with institutionalization as we move away from
supplementals as being a primary funding source for what goes
on in Afghanistan and Iraq then JIEDDO is at risk of being left
out somehow. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Solis. That is a fair statement. That is a fair
statement.
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Schear, you went into some detail about the
three-tier system, the Joint Resource and Acquisition Board,
you say JRAB, and then the second part was the Joint Integrated
Process Team, and then the third, chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Senior Resource Steering Group
(SRSG). That is for funding decisions.
What kind of advisory process, decision process is used for
decisions other than funding decisions--decisions about what to
do about a new approach in Afghanistan, decisions about
organizational structure, discussions of how to respond to GAO?
Who makes those kinds of--what is the process for decision-
making aside from funding decisions? And maybe I am reading it
wrong but I think in your statement you very clearly said this
is the mechanism set up for funding decisions----
Dr. Schear. Right.
Dr. Snyder [continuing]. But don't refer to other
decisions.
Dr. Schear. You are absolutely right, Chairman. The three-
tiered structure is programmatically focused in on funding. The
larger corporate issues you have identified work within a small
leadership group that covers the range of issues that the
Deputy Secretary, Mr. Lynn, would feed into that, given his
role as the steward for JIEDDO.
But that is not a--there is no designated structure--and
General Metz may correct me if I am wrong on this--but there is
no corporate structure that provides that focused guidance that
you are referring to outside the programmatic vein that I
described.
Dr. Snyder. General----
General Metz. Well, as I said a year ago I had the quick
opportunity to make a decision if I was going to take this job
or not, and I obviously did. And I think the first thing is
that the Department looks to me and the experiences I brought
to this directorship as one that is responsible for the whole
effort. And therefore, I don't do this effort in a vacuum. And
I really have the entire Secretary's staff to help me make
sure.
So yes, what was articulated were funding decisions. But I
will give you an example: We realized as we have made our shift
and focus into Afghanistan that, given a coalition fight, we
really needed to share the information with the coalition in a
much more transparent way.
That required me to go to Dr. Schear's boss, Secretary
Flournoy, and ask for the disclosure authorities to begin to
train a contracting officer's technical representative (COTR)
that can do the disclosures properly in order to release
information to the coalition. So there was a non-funding
decision that I had tremendous help from the Secretary's staff
to allow me to get the job done. And those kind of things,
outside of the funding, are frequent but it allows me to take
my experience and not have to bother the Deputy Secretary of
Defense to go work in action with one of his major staff
officers.
They certainly cascade the problem to the level at which
the work gets done with my staff, but I think we get tremendous
oversight that way and ensure that we are moving forward in
those non-financial decisions that have to occur as we do this
holistic fight.
Mr. Wittman.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought perhaps you had dealt with this issue, but maybe
not. Could you help us understand, where are you in terms of
interagency work and coordination on these issues? How many
other agencies are involved? Where is there a lack of that
involvement where there should be? What can you tell us that
can push this further on?
General Metz. Well, let me use a couple examples. One
example would be, we help chair a supply chain working group
for the purposes of understanding with all the forensics
information we get out of IEDs that we find and clear, and so
we bring together much of the interagency--for sure Commerce,
Justice, and Treasury--in order to take that forensics
information----
Mrs. Davis. Department of Homeland Security? FBI?
General Metz. Yes, ma'am. And inside of the organizations
like the Counter-IED Operations Integrations Center there is a
long list of liaison officers that the interagency has given us
to ensure that we are in sync with many of the activities that
they are doing.
Mrs. Davis. Is there an area that, you know, you have been
a little frustrated feeling that we need to bring them along to
a greater extent, or some piece of this that----
General Metz. My initial reaction----
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. Where there is so much duplication
it is not helpful?
General Metz. Well, I think my initial reaction is not only
in the Department of Defense but across the government the IED
is recognized as that weapons system of choice of the enemy
now. They recognize its strategic impact and we have good
coordination.
Homeland Security is very concerned about the IED in the
homeland. They know that we are the nexus of information about
the IED. We use U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as our
military link back into Homeland Security, but we work closely
with a number--with FBI because they are doing some of that
forensics, tearing down and allowing that to be evidential data
and information. So we are close to a number of the
interagency, and to my knowledge it is a pretty smooth, good
working relationship.
Mrs. Davis. Dr. Schear, do you agree?
Dr. Schear. Yes, ma'am, very much. We have heard good
things about the give and take, especially on the Homeland
Security side, and now that is actually a very explicitly
stated concern in terms of the DOD directive and how that
apportions responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. So the link to Homeland Security is very----
Mrs. Davis. And you think it has improved--by what degree
would you say it has improved?
Dr. Schear. Ma'am, I am not in a position to give you a
good answer on that, but I would be happy to take that and
provide a response.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 93.]
Mrs. Davis. Okay.
Mr. Solis, would you----
Mr. Solis. We haven't looked at that issue. We are aware
that there are interagency efforts going on but we have not
looked at that as of yet.
Mrs. Davis. Yes, okay. Great. Thank you.
Is there any area in terms of rapid acquisition that you
feel you don't have the authority to move forward?
General Metz. No, ma'am. I think that the DOD Directive
2000.19E that governs us, and as we hope to update it in 2010,
we have the authorities we need to support the warfighter in a
very rapid way. As the GAO has indicated, we are not perfect.
We can learn; we can get better.
But I think that especially in the use of the funds that
the Congress has given us to rapidly produce solutions we are
getting pretty good at that. We have gained a lot of
experience.
It is keeping that workforce passionate is one of the
leadership challenges I have got, to have a sense of urgency.
We have got to get this done. And that is my challenge as a
leader to do.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much. I appreciate that because,
you know, we can talk here about the physics of it but the
reality is to thousands of families and our men and women
serving in theater this is very personal.
Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Solis mentioned at some point the
institutionalization of some of these activities and at some
point within the budget structure of your whole process or
organization, General Metz.
Dr. Schear, your last sentence in your written statement
is: We look forward to working closely with your committee and
with Congress more generally to develop ``an enduring
structure,'' which is yet undefined.
Let me ask both you, General Metz, as at some point we will
be leaving this duty, what is your advice as we look forward to
what the enduring structure should be for JIEDDO?
And any comment, Dr. Schear, that you might have, too.
General Metz. Sir, in the almost two years I have been the
director it has become very clear to me that the weapon of
choice of the violent extremists is the IED and will remain the
IED for some time. I think that we need to continue to work to
develop the Joint IED Defeat Organization as a permanent
organization. I think that the amount of funding will
certainly, as Congressman Wittman brought up, will go down
somewhat because we have harvested the low-hanging fruit, but
we will still need to be able to react to the changes the enemy
makes and work hard to move into that domain of being proactive
instead of reactive.
I think the size of the organization is heavily dependent
on the number of initiatives we have out and the pace at which
we are doing business. So as that ebbs and flows over the next
decade or so we will be able to reduce the numbers of people
based on the energy and efforts that we have.
But because the threat is--I don't think is going to go
away, and because we will want--in my opinion we will want to
deter it in other combatant commander areas, we should
institutionalize and make permanent for the Department, and
then that would call upon us to place in the base budget
funding for those enduring things and then recognize that there
will be operational needs that will come with inside the budget
cycle. And there will be some historical knowledge, and it will
dampen out to a more and more accurate figure over time. But
there will be those things that occur on short notice that we
will need to be able to react to.
But I just see the enduring nature of the threat and the
need to counter that and bring the Department together in a
joint way for joint solutions.
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Schear.
Dr. Schear. Sir, I would strongly subscribe and support--
subscribe to and support what General Metz has just said. One
of the big challenges in any transition--institutional one--is
to maintain that sense of urgency. We don't want to simply rely
on the enemy to convey that; we want to be anticipatory and
look ahead where we need to be, you know, making our
investments.
My leadership would certainly want to look holistically at
this to take the insights that our senior officers who have
been directly involved in JIEDDO could bring to this as well as
our combatant commanders to assess, collectively, their input
as we chart a way ahead. It is a challenge.
Advocacy organizations convey urgency; they are also a
constructive irritant in the larger system, which I think is
valuable. But how you sustain that over time is an open
question, and we would certainly seek opportunities to draw in
your views and comments as we proceed.
Dr. Snyder. Isn't the goal of having an enduring structure
to guarantee that all the good things that we want to have done
will continue so you have the agility to respond, but we want
to do it in such a way that you have--you know you are going to
have a funding stream, you don't depend on supplementals, that
there is the appropriate oversight when things go wrong? But
because we talk about an enduring structure doesn't mean that
somehow it has to take on kind of all the dark side of what we
think about when we think about government funding streams or
government approval processes, or one of your words,
cumbersome.
I mean, we want to maintain your agility but have the good
things that come from being part of a more institutionalized
structure. Isn't that the goal?
General Metz. Absolutely, sir. I think we--again, as we
approach our fourth birthday we have learned a lot, and I think
a year from now and four years from now we will have learned
more, we will have continued to mature and settle in, but
settle in--as I talk with my workforce, settle in for a
marathon run but not settle in for being a slow, bureaucratic,
not responsive to the warfighter.
We have got to settle in for the marathon because I think
it is a long fight against IEDs in a world that is going to
have a lot of instability, but settle in to understand what are
the techniques that can really move an idea to the warfighter
in a rapid way and be transparent with the Congress and with
everybody involved--except the enemy--and ensure that we all
understand how we are moving and the value of that quick
movement against a very agile enemy.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman, I have used another five minutes--
--
One of the comments, General Metz, in your written
statement you say no one could have anticipated the sheer
amount and complexity of the training required to successfully
counter IEDs. I always get a little bit jumpy when I hear
someone say ``no one could have anticipated.'' It takes me back
to when the 9/11 Commission issued their report and in their--a
lot of the public discussion that went on after they issued
their report, the phrase ``a failure of imagination.'' A
failure of imagination that anyone could have--no one could
have foreseen this.
In fact, Floyd Spence, who is now dead, and I mean for
months before he was, here in our committee hearings, was
saying, ``This can happen right now.'' Now, he didn't say there
were going to be people in the airline pilot programs and they
were going to get on planes and hijack them, but he was very
much a believer that we were at risk as a country right then.
And in fact, I suspect we could find people who could have
anticipated that. I mean, we have had wars for a long time in
which people have had improvised devices, whether it is punji
sticks or other kinds of things Duncan Hunter's--Congressman
Hunter's dad had to deal with as an Army Ranger. I mean, it is
not a surprise that people take what is laying around and make
weapons out of it.
But I appreciate your comment, but we should not be
surprised that enemies are agile also. Is that a fair comment?
General Metz. Sir, that is a very fair comment and maybe I
was--went too far in that statement because, as you have
already articulated, our definition of an IED has been--that
thing has been around for a long time. I think what was
surprising to us was the enemy recognizing its strategic value.
I think the ambush and lethal ambush has been around the
battlefield for a long time, and it is certainly very effective
in a tactical sense.
And the enemy moved it to the operational sense because he
knew that he could counter the--our strategies and doctrine for
counterinsurgency by limiting our mobility. And he also
realized that it had the strategic effect--and I think that I
would hold to the argument that that was probably a surprise
that the enemy would use a weapons system like the IED to try
to get back to the homeland to try to affect our coalition
partners from a strategic point of view.
Dr. Snyder. The last question I wanted to ask is with
regard to--Mrs. Davis talked about how do you measure success?
And I think for a year or two or maybe even a little bit longer
we were seeing the drop in IED attacks go down perhaps as a
reflection of both your work and also the improvement of the
security situation in Iraq, and--in fact, I think we talked
about that some last year during the hearing, that that was a
sign of success.
Well, if we say that then we also have to say, don't we, as
we see the attacks go up in Afghanistan, that maybe things
aren't going the direction we want with regard to JIEDDO? It is
probably fair to say that we shouldn't look at either one of
those as how we measure. I mean, we are not satisfied--as Mr.
Hunter so passionately and eloquently pointed out, we can't be
satisfied with what is going on now.
But I think we do have to have, perhaps, some better
metrics for measuring, do we think we are doing the right thing
by our men and women in uniform? What are your thoughts about
metrics? Is it a bottom line business--as long as we see one
attack in Afghanistan and Iraq as too many, or what do you
think is a fair way of measuring how the American taxpayer
should be putting these resources?
Should we ever make decisions about more drones, less
drones, more sniper teams, less sniper teams--what should be
the things by which we measure your success?
General Metz. Sir, as I lead this organization the real
bottom line is the loss of life or limb, serious burns, the
loss of eyesight. And I think each day that I pull up the data
and I see that loss, I know that there has been some failure
somewhere along the line because we lost that soldier, that
sailor, that airman, or Marine.
Having said that, when a commander comes out of the theater
and we do our back briefs and that commander says that the
training you gave me better enabled me to fight the IED, to me
that is an outcome affirmation or metric that we were
successful. When, for example, we shut down a company and
indict someone for sending components through Iran to the enemy
in Iraq to bomb our--IED our forces, that, to me, is a
measurement of success.
And there are a number of those, and the problem in this--
the other bottom line is, how many lives and limbs were saved?
And I don't think we will ever be able to measure that.
And so this metric business is very difficult. It eludes us
in some ways, and in others may work against you when you talk
about life or limb. In other words, last year when I was here I
was praising our movement from when I was the corps commander
and every IED caused a casualty to going in Iraq now to--we are
up 9 or 10. We forced the enemy to put a whole lot more out.
That is a whole lot of effort.
But when you have to put the colors of the Nation into the
next of kin's hands because of an IED that is--to that person,
to that family we didn't make it. We didn't meet the bar well
enough. As Congressman Hunter said, we let an IED get through
the system.
And so I admit that this metric business is tough, and it
doesn't let me off the hook. We are constantly looking for ways
to measure how well our initiatives supported the warfighter,
what are the outcomes that my staff is producing, what are the
assessments of those initiatives, so we can guarantee, or to
the very best of our ability, that the resources the Nation
gives us are properly used for the force.
Dr. Snyder. And that probably is a good place to stop
today.
I know that you are interested, I know the Administration
is interested, and the Congress is certainly interested in
making sure our men and women have everything that they need
and that we can give to them. And all of this discussion about
lines of authority and funding sources and
institutionalization--it is ultimately about achieving what Mr.
Hunter wants to achieve and what you just--well, what we talked
about, which is to help people stay alive and keep from getting
injured while they are pursuing the national security
objectives of this country.
We will continue this discussion.
Thank you all for being here today. I apologize for the
votes. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 29, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 29, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
October 29, 2009
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Dr. Schear. During my testimony on 28 October 2009 on oversight of
the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Representative Davis
requested additional information on actions taken by the Department of
Defense and JIEDDO to increase cooperation among the other Departments
of the U.S. government with respect to homeland defense.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security and America's Security Affairs (OASD (HD&ASA)) and JIEDDO are
working with other U.S. government agencies to ensure a whole of
government approach both to support deployed forces and homeland
defense.
Specific examples of recent and ongoing partnerships between JIEDDO
and the interagency include:
Coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) and Department of Justice's Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to fulfill the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-19 requirement to create a Joint Program
Office (JPO) for Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives (TUE) in the
homeland. JIEDDO will continue active participation in this JPO to
ensure implementation of tasks directed within HSDP-19.
The OASD(HD&ASA) and JIEDDO attend the monthly TUE Joint
Program Office meeting at FBI HQ where they continue to work with DHS,
FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and others to make
progress on the various tasks and actions assigned to federal
departments and agencies in the HSPD-19 Implementation Plan.
Establishment of a memorandum of agreement (MOA)
formalizing partnership with Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS) for the use of contacts, data bases, and industry
expertise to help interrupt the supply chain necessary to create IEDs
and to assist industrial partners with the rapid deployment of emerging
counter-IED technologies and systems.
Establishment of a MOA to deploy ATF bomb specialists to
Iraq and Afghanistan to assist DoD in exploiting IEDs, enable ATF
explosive forensics experts to train DOD personnel in explosive-related
crime scene procedures, and put ATF Liaison Officers at the DoD
Counter-IED Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) and JIEDDO HQ.
DoD has worked with the FBI's Terrorist Explosive Device
Analytic Center (TEDAC) to create a weapons technical intelligence
process. All IED components, after in country exploitation by DoD, are
evacuated to the TEDAC at Quantico, for additional exploitation.
The JIEDDO Science Advisor chairs the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (DDRE) C-IED Science & Technology (S&T)
Working Group which brings together S&T representatives from the
Services and several agencies including DARPA and DHS. The working
group's objective is to coordinate and de-conflict counter-IED S&T
programs across the interagency.
JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
Interagency Partnership Team (IAPT) includes a senior executive council
of full-time government liaison officers (LNO) who work on-site to
coordinate and integrate relevant C-IED information. These LNOs provide
rapid access to both time-critical information and long-term analysis
that the JIEDDO COIC uses to tailor C-IED support for forward deployed
units. Participating agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), Department of Justice (DOJ), National Security Agency (NSA),
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency (NGA), Department of Energy (DOE), and the National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC).
Please let me know if I may be of any additional assistance in this
matter. [See page 33.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 29, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER
Dr. Snyder. Is the level of oversight appropriate for an
organization of this size, with this level of funding, and with such
unique flexibility in its funding and mission? Specifically, can the
Deputy Secretary of Defense provide sufficient management oversight of
JIEDDO?
Dr. Schear. The fact that JIEDDO reports directly to the Deputy
Secretary is indicative of the importance the Department of Defense
places on this mission. The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and
Acquisition Management Process assists the Deputy Secretary in his
oversight role through its three-tiered structure of advisory boards
that review, evaluate, and coordinate on specific initiatives prior to
a final decision on funding. This governance structure cuts across
institutional lines to provide a broad and balanced look at JIEDDO
initiatives. It consists of:
A Joint IED Defeat Requirement, Resources, and
Acquisition Board (JR2AB) composed of O6/GS-15 members from across the
Department, including representatives from the Services, various
sections of the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The JR2AB meets weekly to review initiatives and highlight any issues
that need to be resolved.
A Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT), composed of
military flag officers or civilian senior executive service members
from the same organizations as the JR2AB, that also meets weekly. The
members of the JIPT provide written recommendations to the Director of
JIEDDO. For proposed initiatives costing less than $25 million, the
JIEDDO Director can approve the funding. For those costing more than
$25 million, the initiative is staffed through the Senior Resource
Steering Group.
The Senior Resource Steering Group is chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and consists of three and four star
military officers (including the Vice Chief of Staff for each military
service) and equivalent senior executive service personnel, again from
the same organizations. These high ranking defense officials provide
written recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then
makes the decision on whether to fund the proposed initiative.
The Deputy Secretary is able to provide the appropriate level of
oversight for JIEDDO. In fact, it would be difficult for anyone at a
less senior level to provide adequate oversight given that JIEDDO's
work touches components throughout the Department. The Joint IED Defeat
Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process ensures that the
Deputy Secretary's decisions take into account concerns from across the
Department.
Dr. Snyder. How effective are the coordination mechanisms between
JIEDDO, the Services, Defense Agencies, and geographical combatant
commands? What might be done to improve coordination?
Dr. Schear. JIEDDO works across the Department to support our
deployed warfighters against the IED threat.
The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition
Management Process, a three-tiered structure of advisory boards
composed of representatives from across the Department, provides for
senior departmental stakeholder participation in the validation and
funding decisions that JIEDDO executes in responses to urgent
warfighter needs.
This same process also helps manage the counter-IED
technology development portfolio; in conjunction with the Services and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO ensures the integration
of DoD's counter-IED science and technology efforts.
JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center draws
both on in-house expertise and, through liaison officers from various
federal agencies, expertise across the U.S. Government to give
warfighters unprecedented capability to attack networks by delivering
near real-time fused information in support of tactical unit targeting
of human networks.
In conjunction with the Joint Center of Excellence at Ft.
Irwin, JIEDDO rapidly incorporates feedback from its deployed field
teams, unit debriefing teams, and in-theater surveys into Service
training programs. In addition to funding substantial modifications to
combat training centers and home station training programs, JIEDDO
provides pre-deployment battle staff training for brigade and
regimental combat teams, as well as division and corps headquarters.
JIEDDO is working with the United States Joint Forces
Command to publish capstone counter-IED doctrine for Joint Forces.
JIEDDO continues to identify further steps it can take in improving
these processes and supporting the warfighter. DoD Directive 2000.19E,
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, is scheduled for
revision next year. The review process will provide the opportunity for
Departmental review, coordination, and consideration of modifications
to C-IED authorities and processes.
Dr. Snyder. When and how (through what mechanism) did OSD approve
the expansion of JIEDDO's charter, mission, and organization?
Dr. Schear. JIEDDO's charter, roles, and missions are established
in DoD Directive 2000.19E. There has been no expansion of its charter.
JIEDDO continues to focus on its core mission areas of rapid
acquisition, operations and information fusion, training support, and
strategic planning to defeat the IED threat. While JIEDDO's charter and
mission have not changed, its organizational structure has changed to
increase JIEDDO's effectiveness and efficiency.
Dr. Snyder. What is unique about JIEDDO for rapid acquisition, as
opposed other rapid acquisition authorities DOD has?
Dr. Schear. There are three elements that distinguish JIEDDO from
the Department's other rapid acquisition organizations.
First, dollars appropriated through the Joint IED Defeat
Fund are three-year, ``uncolored'' funds. This flexibility allows
JIEDDO and its supporting solution developers the flexibility to commit
funds quickly in response to rapidly emerging requirements.
Second, JIEDDO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, allowing for timely interaction with senior leadership and
greater responsiveness to the warfighter.
Finally, JIEDDO staff includes a number of individuals
with first-hand knowledge of the dangers posed by IEDs, including
coalition officers who bring their unique perspectives to the
organization's efforts.
Dr. Snyder. Some think that some JIEDDO capabilities such as the
COIC might be redundant with in-theater capabilities, and that its
training initiative runs counter to Title X authorities of the Services
and COCOMs. What will you do about duplicative capabilities?
Dr. Schear. JIEDDO works with both theater commanders and the
Intelligence Community (IC) to fuse their intelligence products in near
real time and deliver the knowledge the warfighter needs for tactical
targeting against IED networks.
Several intelligence working groups, liaison officers embedded in
the COIC, and formalized working relationships keep all C-IED
organizations aware of each other's efforts. Fusion cells in
Afghanistan under the command of GEN McChrystal include COIC
representatives who work with in-theater members of the Intelligence
Community.
All training eventually becomes a Title X authority issue. However,
no one anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training
required to counter IEDs. JIEDDO's mission is to capture those
emerging, hard training problems and find ways for the Services and
partners to overcome them. The Services still retain their basic Title
X training role. JIEDDO provides a capability to adapt training rapidly
across DoD in order to counter changing enemy technologies, tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
Dr. Snyder. What actions have been taken to address any of the
findings and recommendations that this committee made in its report on
JIEDDO from November 2008?
Dr. Schear. JIEDDO has taken, and continues to take, steps to
improve, streamline, and build accountability into its operations and
processes. It has undertaken several actions that address the
recommendations from the November 2008 committee report.
JIEDDO is streamlining its budget estimation process and has
implemented procedures that will provide a better analysis capability
in building future requests. JIEDDO is working to establish the
appropriate budget for JIEDDO along with the necessary contingency
funds to meet our operations and development initiatives.
As the November 2008 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations report indicates, our tolerance for risk
is a function of urgency. JIEDDO uses the Joint IED Defeat Capability
Approval and Acquisition Management Process to manage and mitigate
risk, with the expectation that not all initiatives will bear fruit.
JIEDDO has recently revised this process to address issues of risk
tolerance, risk assessments, areas of oversight, and coordination with
Services and DoD components.
JIEDDO has improved its transition, transfer, or terminate process.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is now briefed on initiatives
requiring transition or transfer to the Services, adding a critical
oversight function to the process. What is most important is that
JIEDDO continues to demonstrate that DoD can respond to urgent
warfighter needs collaboratively with transparency and comprehensive
oversight.
DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.19e, Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization, February 2006, is scheduled for its periodic
update by February 2010. DoD began review and coordination of this
directive in October 2009. The review process will provide the
opportunity for departmental review, coordination, and consideration of
modifications to C-IED authorities and processes.
Although measuring effectiveness is challenging, evidence clearly
suggests that JIEDDO has had a positive impact on the IED fight by
saving lives. JIEDDO measures its effectiveness by continuing to
publish DoD metrics that monitor overall trends in the C-IED fight; by
dedicating analytical assets to explore new techniques to isolate and
link JIEDDO's contribution to these DoD metrics; and by implementing a
set of component-based performance measures within the organization
focused on outcomes.
Dr. Snyder. Should we use the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval
and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) as the model for rapid
acquisition throughout DOD?
Dr. Schear. Although JIEDDO was established to address a particular
wartime threat, many of its attributes and authorities are applicable
to rapid acquisition organizations within DOD, particularly those
responding to Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements or other urgent
wartime requirements.
Dr. Snyder. Who is the chair of the Joint Resource and Acquisition
Board? Does it consider initiatives other than JIEDDO?
Dr. Schear. The Joint IED Defeat Requirement, Resources and
Acquisition Board is co-chaired by the Chief, Technology & Requirements
Integration Division, Captain Brian Brakke, and the JIEDDO J8/
Comptroller, Captain Douglas Borrebach. The board considers only
initiatives requesting JIEDDO dollars. Although the board receives
information on other initiatives and programs related to counter-IED,
it does not formally endorse or manage those initiatives or programs.
Dr. Snyder. Who is the chair of the Joint Integrated Process Team?
Does it consider initiatives other than JIEDDO?
Dr. Schear. Dr. Robin Keesee, JIEDDO's Vice Director, is the chair
of the JIPT, the higher approval level for those initiatives approved
by the JR2AB. The board receives and reviews information on initiatives
and programs related to counter-IED. It formally endorses those
initiatives costing less than $25 million; those costing more $25
million must be approved by the Senior Resources Steering Group, a
Deputy Secretary of Defense-level advisory board.
Dr. Snyder. What process is being used to examine and decide on
what enduring structure(s) will host/house which enduring C-IED
capabilities?
Dr. Schear. JIEDDO transitions those initiatives that are expected
to provide an enduring capability for the joint force to a Service,
Combatant Command or agency to be established a program of record
funded through the President's budget. Those initiatives that are
serving the current conflict but not expected to fulfill a longer term
requirement are transferred to a Service or Combatant Command and
sustained through that components Overseas Contingency Operations
supplemental request.
JIEDDO's Transition Working Group, whose members include Service
representatives, meets monthly to present initiatives when approved for
funding and again as they reach subsequent transition points. The
group's members provide input to JIEDDO's transition and transfer
recommendations, and forward these recommendations to their respective
leadership. In this manner, the Services and agencies have visibility
over the initiatives moving through the rapid acquisition process and
can assess the enduring potential of each initiative.
JIEDDO updates the Joint Staff's Protection Functional Capabilities
Board quarterly on initiatives that it plans to transition and
transfer. It informs the Joint Capabilities Board, Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, and Senior Resource Steering Group of its final
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on an annual basis.
Dr. Snyder. How does JIEDDO measure its effectiveness in achieving
its mission to defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence? How
can this be demonstrated?
General Metz. We measure our impact in three distinct ways. First,
we continuously examine, analyze and publish the approved Department of
Defense (DoD) metrics that monitor overall trends in the Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) fight. These metrics are intended
to evaluate trends in the use of IEDs by type, location, effectiveness
and other characteristics of concern and, when possible, to correlate
trends in IED use to efforts and capabilities of the deployed forces.
Second, we continue to implement and mature a set of component-
based performance measures that are focused on outcomes and are
designed to measure the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization's (JIEDDO) effectiveness as an organization. For example,
these measures attempt to evaluate how rapidly we meet warfighter
requirements, how efficiently we utilize our resources to develop new
solutions, and how effective JIEDDO-funded training prepares deploying
forces. To date, JIEDDO has completed two thorough performance reviews,
and we continue to refine our measures after each one.
Finally, we continue to conduct focused operational assessments of
individual C-IED capabilities to evaluate how well those proposed
solutions support the deployed warfighter in the face of an adaptive
threat.
Clearly demonstrating JIEDDO's effectiveness is no simple task and
defining the clear causal linkage from a JIEDDO-funded initiative to a
measureable outcome in the C-IED fight has proven to be elusive. JIEDDO
is an enabling organization and the employment of its deployed
initiatives is a function of the decisions made by the recipient unit
in the face of tactical demands and operational requirements. But even
more challenging, those units face an aggressive and adaptive threat
that has quickly recognized and understood the capabilities of the
fielded C-IED initiatives and has rapidly modified their techniques and
procedures to minimize or neutralize those deployed capabilities.
Certain trends do, however, suggest that JIEDDO has made an impact
and have reinforced my confidence that JIEDDO is constantly making a
difference. When unit commanders report that their pre-deployment
training has postured them to be effective in the C-IED fight, then
JIEDDO has had an impact. When the enemy abandons a particular
technique in the face of a JIEDDO-provided capability, for example the
enemy's migration from Radio-controlled IEDs to command wire initiated
IEDs in the face of JIEDDO's C-IED Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare
capability, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When the number of IEDs that
the enemy must employ in order to generate one United States casualty
increases, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When specific initiatives are
cited for their ability to defeat IEDs and save warfighters' lives, for
example vehicle mounted rollers, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When
warfighters report that the fused information provided by the JIEDDO
Counter IED Operations Integration Center enabled them to eliminate a
threat IED cell, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When JIEDDO's efforts
have enabled the detection and elimination of actions by commercial
companies who are inadvertently or intentionally supplying the enemy
with IED components, then JIEDDO has had an impact.
Dr. Snyder. In your letter of 15 Sept 2009 to Sen. Carl Levin, you
urged the Senate to oppose a provision in the FY2010 NDAA passed by the
House that would have moved $100M from JIEDDO to the Irregular Warfare
Support Program. In this letter you note that, ``. . . specifically on
the rise in Afghanistan, IED incidents have more than doubled from
August 2008 to August 2009 and are now at the highest levels that we
have experienced to date.'' After $17B over more than five years and
still we're seeing a doubling of IED incidents in Afghanistan, why
shouldn't we give what amounts to less than 5% of JIEDDO's FY2010 funds
to another organization and see if they can provide effective
solutions?
General Metz. The doubling of Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
incidents in Afghanistan is based on several factors. In Afghanistan,
local insurgents, tribal factions, and the Taliban enjoy a greater
freedom of action to emplace large numbers of IEDs in movement
corridors vital to our success. Our challenge is further compounded
because these groups intimidate local populaces, preventing their
cooperation with the often suspiciously viewed Afghan government and,
in turn, with us. This is why the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) is focused on attacking the enemy's
network. Diverting $100 million away from Attack the Network Counter-
IED (C-IED) solutions at this time would have a detrimental impact on
the C-IED fight.
In response to last year's National Defense Authorization Act
authorizing $65 million out of the Joint IED Defeat Fund to support
Irregular Warfare Support Program (IWSP), my staff diligently worked
with IWSP for more than 11 months to vet C-IED focused proposals. Out
of the dozens of proposals initially vetted, and the final 11 submitted
to the Social Dynamics Awareness Broad Agency Announcement, five were
funded. At the end of FY09, there was only $35.33 million of C-IED
programs in the IWSP portfolio. While JIEDDO is eager to partner with
IWSP on C-IED solutions, the majority of submitted proposals were not
C-IED focused, and were therefore outside of JIEDDO's mission and
charter.
Dr. Snyder. Are there C-IED activities that should be funded but
aren't, for example Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently requested money
for the Irregular Warfare Support Program (IWSP), which seems involved
in many of your same mission areas. How is the IWSP mission distinct
from JIEDDO's?
General Metz. The Irregular Warfare Support Program's (IWSP)
mission is to support Joint, interagency, and international partners
who conduct irregular warfare. This mission is not counter-improvised
explosive device (C-IED) focused. They seek to do this primarily by
supporting the Theater Special Operation Commands. As the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), our mission
is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense
actions in support of Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint
Task Forces' efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons
of strategic influence.
IWSP submitted 12 proposals to JIEDDO's Social Dynamics Analysis
Broad Area Announcement (BAA), five of which were found to be C-IED in
nature and were funded by JIEDDO in fiscal year 2009. Of these five
projects, only one operates in Afghanistan, while none operate in Iraq.
The remaining seven proposals submitted to the BAA were not funded by
JIEDDO and to JIEDDO's knowledge, none operated in Iraq or Afghanistan.
JIEDDO is not aware of a request by General McChrystal to
specifically support the IWSP. JIEDDO has received one request for an
IWSP program from the Combined Forces Special Operations Component
Command-Afghanistan. That program has been funded and is now being
assessed for effective application in Theater.
Dr. Snyder. What actions have been taken to address any of the
findings and recommendations that this committee made in its report on
JIEDDO from November 2008?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) continually seeks to improve, streamline, and
build accountability into our operations and processes. We benefit from
the numerous and ongoing audits and reviews of JIEDDO's operations and
I think the oversight level of JIEDDO as it currently stands is
effective and appropriate. As a maturing organization we continue to
develop a greater understanding of our capabilities and those areas
where improvement is required. Reports provided to JIEDDO by the
Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense Inspector
General, and other oversight entities provide a context for JIEDDO to
evaluate our progress. We have undertaken several actions that address
the recommendations from the November 2008 committee report.
Currently, our budget authorities allow JIEDDO the freedom to
execute our programs and achieve rapid acquisition. We face an
extremely agile and adaptive enemy who would love nothing more than for
us to be pulled into the normal budgetary process. The Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Fund's three-year colorless money provides us
great flexibility in supporting our Combatant Commanders' Joint Urgent
Operational Needs.
We are working with the Department to establish an appropriate base
budget for JIEDDO along with the necessary contingency funds to rapidly
develop and deliver Counter-IED (C-IED) initiatives to the warfighter.
We have improved our budget estimation process to provide a more
accurate forecast of budget requirements as well as implemented
procedures that will provide a better analytic capability to develop
future budget submissions.
As the November 2008 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations report indicates, our tolerance for risk
is a function of urgency. JIEDDO is willing and able to assume a high
level of risk on initiatives that show promise in the early development
process. We do not underwrite undue risk, but conduct assessments on
initiatives to rapidly appraise system maturity and effectiveness.
JIEDDO mitigates risk during the development and delivery process
through assessments that involve key stakeholders in the Department of
Defense (DoD), including the warfighter. We use the Joint IED Defeat
Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) to
manage and mitigate risk, with the expectation that not all initiatives
will bear fruit. A revised version of JCAAMP, signed on 6 November
2009, addresses the issues of risk tolerance, risk assessments, areas
of oversight, and coordination with services and DoD components. The
JCAAMP also provides a transparent, collaborative, analytically driven
set of processes that operate at the Department's most senior level to
oversee the process.
JIEDDO is the only organization in the United States government
solely focused on IEDs by supporting all 10 Combatant Commands with
rapid development and delivery of C-IED capabilities. JIEDDO operates
across many domains--both in the DoD, across government agencies, and
with our international partners. While this may cause some of our
efforts to overlap with other organizations pursuing other missions,
they don't have our focus and don't deliver our results. Some
duplication is healthy in time of war to ensure the seams are always
covered. This is not an area where we want to assume too much risk by
seeking efficiencies that may put men and women in harm's way.
JIEDDO is responsible for integrating all of DoD's C-IED technology
efforts--we accomplish this with regular meetings of working groups
that conduct horizontal integration on a vast array of efforts.
However, further improvement is required to develop a comprehensive
Department-wide data base to better inform these efforts.
JIEDDO has improved its transition, transfer, or terminate process.
Beginning in 2009, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is now
briefed on initiatives requiring transition or transfer to the
Services, adding a critical oversight function to the process. What is
most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate that DoD can
respond to urgent warfighter needs collaboratively with transparency
and comprehensive oversight.
Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.19E, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization, February 2006, is scheduled for
its periodic update by February 2010. DoD began review and coordination
of this directive in October 2009. The review process across DoD will
provide the opportunity for departmental review, coordination, and
determination of modifications to C-IED authorities. The proposed
updates to our authorities laid out in DoDD 2000.19E will result in
process refinements intended to reduce the inherent tensions between
rapid acquisition and capability development and DoD programming
requirements, which have been identified since JIEDDO's inception.
Defining success in the IED fight is dependent on the adaptive
enemies we face. Although measuring our effectiveness is challenging,
evidence clearly suggests that JIEDDO has had a positive impact on the
IED fight by saving lives. We measure our effectiveness through DoD
metrics that monitor overall C-IED trends; by dedicating analytical
assets to explore new techniques to isolate and link JIEDDO's
contribution to these DoD metrics; and most recently by implementing a
set of internal performance measures within my organization focused on
outcomes. These performance measures cover key efforts of the
organization. To date, JIEDDO has completed two thorough performance
reviews, and we continue to refine our measures after each one.
Regarding the recommendation to consider expanding JIEDDO's
portfolio to other asymmetric threats, when I first arrived in JIEDDO I
may have had a different answer, but I am more convinced than ever that
we need to keep a laser focus on IEDs. We live in an era of persistent
conflict where violent extremists will continue to wage conflict
against human targets and the weapon of choice will continue to be the
IED. We need to make an enduring commitment to this effort. JIEDDO sits
at the center of that commitment. A permanent JIEDDO--funded in the
base budget--is the clear signal that we understand our challenges for
the foreseeable future and that we are willing to invest the money, the
time, the energy, and the talent to make sure we win.
Dr. Snyder. How is the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center
(COIC) different from other intelligence gathering and fusion entities?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JIEDDO COIC)
focuses on the Counter-IED (C-IED) problem at the tactical level. This
focus is complementary to, but substantially different from, other
organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence
Community (IC) that also may focus on parts of the C-IED network
structure. The JIEDDO COIC possesses capabilities that no other United
States government entity provides with regard to the coordination and
rapid dissemination of C-IED information to deployed forces at the
tactical level of battalion and below within the broad spectrum of C-
IED capabilities and analyst tools. The capabilities that reside solely
at the JIEDDO COIC include focused data fusion efforts that draw on
information and expertise from across the spectrum of military, IC, and
interagency partners.
One of the most unique aspects of the JIEDDO COIC is its focus on
providing tactical-level C-IED products to deployed forces that meet
rigid Latest Time of Value (LTOV) requirements from local commanders.
The LTOV is the latest time when crucial data can be effectively
integrated into a commander's planning and execution cycle. LTOV is a
crucial aspect of tactical operational planning. Without meeting the
LTOV time parameters, C-IED information would not be integrated into
operational plans, heightening the threat to forces on the ground.
While many organizations within the IC and Combatant Commands (COCOMs)
have the capability to produce detailed analytical products, there is
no other organization in the United States government focused on time-
sensitive C-IED tactical support to deployed forces engaged in ongoing
combat operations.
The advanced all-source data fusion and network analysis is also a
unique JIEDDO COIC capability that has the ability to access all-source
intelligence, human terrain (i.e. environmental, ethnic, social
factors, etc) and other C-IED data at one location using resident C-IED
Subject Matter Experts. This is unmatched anywhere else in the IC,
Services, or COCOMs.
The Advanced Network Analysis attacks IED networks with three
unique analytical teams. First, the Network Analysis Cell is a National
Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) entity collocated with the JIEDDO
COIC, representing a single IC focal point for maintaining the IED
network knowledge base. Second, the Network Dynamics Analysis (NDA)
cell is a unique analytical team focused on effects-based targeting of
IED networks. The NDA cell integrates traditional intelligence analysts
supplemented by social network analysis, former law enforcement
professionals, a psychologist, and a center of gravity analyst. Third,
the Social Network Analysis (SNA) Cell applies a unique methodology
that addresses shortfalls in typical network analysis by combining
mathematical and qualitative assessments to multi-intelligence
discipline datasets collected by military units deployed globally.
Current IC assessments typically focus on first-order relationships
between enemy combatants without regard for second- and third-order
factors such as social-cultural dynamics of the networks, similarities
between node profiles, and the impact of friendly operations on the
importance of nodes within the network. The SNA Cell addresses these
unique variables and applies them to IED networks.
The JIEDDO COIC is committed to limiting duplication of its
capabilities through effort coordination with partners across the IC,
the military Services, and governmental organizations. Currently, the
JIEDDO COIC has 19 Liaison Officers from various agencies and
organizations including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), NGIC,
National Reconnaissance Office, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical
Center, Joint Training COIC, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency. In addition to these agencies, the Department of Energy has an
embedded staff officer performing a liaison function between the JIEDDO
COIC and the National Labs.
Additionally, the Director of JIEDDO conducts quarterly Senior
Intelligence Leader Advisory Board (SILAB) meetings with senior leaders
from across the IC to focus on technical solutions; identify tactical
gaps, methodologies, and analytical approaches; and address policies
and governance in an effort to foster communication between
participating organizations regarding C-IED and Attack the Network
issues.
The SILAB provides a forum for leaders to discuss topics relevant
to C-IED efforts, including ongoing initiatives at the JIEDDO COIC. The
JIEDDO COIC benefits from SILAB executive-level discussions and forums
to gain information on other agency C-IED programs and initiatives, as
well as share the JIEDDO COIC efforts with the IC. Members of the SILAB
are leaders (e.g. Directors and Deputies) from across the IC, military,
and interagency partners including the CIA, DIA, NSA, NGIC, Service
Intelligence Divisions, and the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence.
Creating C-IED support products is a process that inherently
minimizes redundancy and duplication due to the origin of the requests
coming directly from the field to the JIEDDO COIC. Units deployed
through Iraq and Afghanistan submit Requests For Support (RFS) that
drive the JIEDDO COIC workload. Products are requested from the JIEDDO
COIC directly by warfighters for use immediately in the field. The
JIEDDO COIC teams forward in Iraq and Afghanistan ensure the highest
support and least redundancy possible.
The JIEDDO COIC currently provides 106 support professionals
embedded with units across the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) battlespaces. In OIF there is a total
of 55 personnel, 22 of which make up seven teams serving at the
Division and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) levels. There are 51 JIEDDO COIC
personnel deployed in OEF. Of these 51 personnel, 24 are serving 12
teams at the Division/Regional Command and the BCT levels. These
critical support positions ensure that warfighters receive the
requested information, clarify the JIEDDO COIC questions regarding the
requests, and serve as a direct link to JIEDDO in theater. In addition,
JIEDDO conducts after action reports with returning BCTs and Regimental
Combat Teams to discover how adequately the JIEDDO COIC support
products reach the field, and further ensure that critical information
has been provided and filtered down to appropriate levels. Finally,
quality is indicated by the prevalence of units that have used the
JIEDDO COIC support in the past and continue to request additional
support over time. Since January 2007, the JIEDDO COIC has answered
5,334 RFSs.
Dr. Snyder. The GAO noted that transfer of initiatives to the
Services was an ongoing problem. How are you working to solve this
problem?
General Metz. With few exceptions such as Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW) 3.1 and
CREW 3.2, every JIEDDO effort slated to transfer to the Services has
transferred when planned. We conduct monthly Transition Working Group
(TWG) meetings to vet the proposed initiatives for transition,
transfer, or termination. The TWG is comprised of action officer-level
Service representatives. In addition, we conduct quarterly briefings to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Protection Functional Capabilities
Board, and an annual brief to the Joint Capabilities Board, Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and Senior Resource Steering
Group of our final transfer proposals prior to forwarding the
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a decision.
Endorsement from the JROC in the form of a JROC memorandum adds weight
to our transfer recommendations, and our decision to advance the
process by six months greatly increased the opportunity for the
Services to consider these initiatives during their Program Objective
Memoranda developmental cycle. Through these various boards consisting
of members from the Services, JCS, and offices of the Under Secretaries
of Defense, we have improved coordination and transparency of our
processes and initiatives.
Further, I recently updated our JIEDDO Capability Approval and
Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) that ensures JIEDDO-funded
efforts do not bypass this process. Furthermore, in early 2009 I
instituted requirement to brief all development efforts to our Joint
IED Defeat (JIEDD) Requirements, Resources & Acquisition Board and the
JIEDD Integrated Process Team.
These measures will ensure Service visibility on JIEDDO-funded
efforts as early as possible and will provide updates as efforts mature
into proven capabilities. These measures increase the time available to
the Services to assess the enduring nature of the initiative and
develop a funding strategy to integrate the capability represented.
Dr. Snyder. How does JIEDDO work with other agencies to get a
comprehensive view of Counter IED challenges and solutions? Give
specific agency (domestic and international) examples.
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) continues to expand contact with a myriad of
United States government agencies to ensure a whole of government
approach to support our deployed warfighters in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as well as homeland defense
and, by extension, the broader global Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
threat. JIEDDO is both enabling and leveraging other federal agencies
to meet Counter-IED (C-IED) capability requirements. JIEDDO's Counter-
IED Operations Integration Center's (COIC) Interagency Partnership Team
program embeds Liaison Officers (LNO) from federal agencies to help the
JIEDDO COIC access information, supply warfighters with multi-source C-
IED support packages, and minimize any duplication of effort with the
rest of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community
(IC), and the interagency. Additionally, JIEDDO headquarters has
established formal partnerships with several federal agencies in direct
support of the warfighter, including the Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Industry and Security (DoCBIS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC).
A recent example of ongoing partnerships between JIEDDO and the
interagency is JIEDDO and ATF's Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to deploy
ATF bomb specialists to the Central Command theater to assist DoD
warfighters exploit IEDs, enable ATF explosive forensics experts to
train DoD personnel in explosive-related crime scene procedures, and
put ATF LNOs at the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence and JIEDDO
headquarters. Additionally, the FBI's TEDAC processes Level III cases
supporting theater exploitation efforts in OEF and OIF.
Another example is JIEDDO's coordination with the Homeland Defense
Combatant Commander, North American Air Defense-Northern Command, to
assist with Federal prevention, protection, response, and recovery
operation efforts concerning potential use of IEDs in the North
American Area of Responsibility (AOR).
A third example of partnering is the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) and FBI's
coordination with JIEDDO in the creation of a Joint Program Office
(JPO) for combating terrorist use of explosives in the homeland. JIEDDO
will continue active participation in this JPO to ensure implementation
of tasks directed within the Homeland Security Presidential
Directorate-19.
JIEDDO has also partnered with DoCBIS to create a MOA that
formalized the use of contacts, data bases, and industry expertise to
help interrupt the supply chain necessary to create IEDs and to assist
industrial partners with the rapid deployment of emerging C-IED
technologies and systems.
JIEDDO has also encouraged the United States Agency for
International Development to collaborate on efforts that would defeat
IEDs through nongovernment organization (NGO)-run early education
programs. This relationship has connected several NGOs with appropriate
JIEDDO divisions and teams, including the JIEDDO Science Advisor as
Chair of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering C-IED Science
& Technology (S&T) working group. This working group enabled JIEDDO to
share understanding of gaps and broader S&T efforts in C-IED S&T
programs with key S&T representatives from Services and several
agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and
DHS.
Finally, JIEDDO's Weapons Tactical Intelligence Task Force is
currently involved in multiple material and non-material solution
initiatives to solve current information sharing gaps and a lack of
standardized reporting both within the United States Joint Force/
Interagency environment, as well as with our Coalition Partners
operating throughout Afghanistan. Our goal is to achieve a streamlined
approach to information sharing, with coalition partners within the
Afghanistan theater of operation to communicate on one system.
Dr. Snyder. How does the COIC work with the U.S. Air Force
Intelligence Wing at Langley Air Force Base?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
installed two Federated Nodes (FEDNODEs) at 480th Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Wing's Distributed Ground
Stations (DGS) at Langley Air Force Base (AFB) (DGS-1) in Langley, VA
and Beale AFB in Sacramento, CA (DGS-2) to increase the ability to
share ISR across all Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and with specific
elements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Installation of FEDNODEs at Ramstein
AFB in Germany (DGS-4) and Hickman AFB in Hawaii is underway. The
JIEDDO COIC plans to begin installation of a FEDNODE at Osan AFB in the
Republic of Korea (DGS-3) during fiscal year 2010.
The FEDNODE architecture provides a significant increase in web-
based data access, information sharing, and analysis capabilities for
operations against IED networks and other asymmetric threats world-
wide. With each additional site added to the federation, the additional
architecture enhances the combined situational awareness, timely
decision making, and collaborative analysis for all users that can gain
access through any standard computer connected to a Secure Internet
Protocol Router or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.
The JIEDDO COIC uses the 480th Intelligence Wing's Imagery Access
Server to download imagery for Defense Common Ground System (DCGS)
platforms as well as the 480th Intelligence Wing's Unicorn target
database which is an end-to-end mission, collection, and dissemination
management system that automates the entire processing, exploitation
and dissemination cycle for DCGS platforms including Global Hawk, U2,
and Predator. The data from these servers are layered with the JIEDDO
COIC's other data sources to build products for COCOMs related to ISR
optimization.
Dr. Snyder. Specifically which agencies or organizations have
liaison offices at JIEDDO headquarters, at COIC, or in theater? Do they
include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; state and local
law enforcement; FBI; or the Joint Terrorism Task Force?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
Interagency Partnership Team includes full-time government liaison
officers (LNO) who work on-site to coordinate and integrate relevant
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) information. Participating
agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), National Security
Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office,
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, and the
National Ground Intelligence Center. The JIEDDO COIC LNO from TEDAC is
an Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agent who informally links
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). There are currently no formal FBI
or ATF LNOs at the JIEDDO COIC; however, there are LNOs from ATF and
Joint Forces Command located at JIEDDO's headquarters. When certain
military units are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan an LNO from that
unit is located at the JIEDDO COIC. Currently, there are six LNOs from
deployed military units located at the JIEDDO COIC.
While there is no Joint Terrorism Task Force liaison at JIEDDO
COIC, both the Joint Interagency Task Force for Counterterrorism and
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency have offices co-located with the
JIEDDO COIC. The Army Law Enforcement Program has an element embedded
at the JIEDDO COIC that performs liaison with Federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies.
JIEDDO is working to establish one North American Air Defense-
Northern Command Integrator. Additionally, efforts to locate one ATF
LNO at the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence in Ft. Irwin, CA are
underway. In theater, representatives from several United States
government agencies other than the Department of Defense (DoD) are
committed to the C-IED effort and work with JIEDDO elements; however,
none are assigned as LNOs to JIEDDO.
Dr. Snyder. Which office at NORTHCOM is lead for IEDs?
General Metz. The North American Air Defense-Northern Command
(NORAD-NORTHCOM) NC34, Office of Current Operations, is involved in
most of the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) tasks, but is
not designated as the C-IED lead. All C-IED tasks are directed to the
NORTHCOM Chief of Staff, who delegates them to the appropriate staff
sections.
Dr. Snyder. How ``joint'' is the Joint Training COIC (JTCOIC),
specifically which Services/organizations have a presence or which send
people for training? What is TRADOC's role? Do any other Services/
organizations have training COICs?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization's (JIEDDO) Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device Operations and Integration Center (JTCOIC) was formed in early
2009, with JIEDDO serving as its parent organization and the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as its executive agent. As
executive agent, TRADOC provides the facilities and personnel required
to execute the mission. The proof of concept phase will last for two
years, concluding at the end of fiscal year 2010. As such, JTCOIC is
still evolving in its efforts to best support the warfighter.
The ``jointness'' of the JTCOIC derives from the support it
provides to Service and Joint Forces in the use of COIC tools. JTCOIC's
specific mission is to support Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force
on Service-identified, COIC-related training requirements. JTCOIC
provides support to service institutional training with teams in
support of the Marine Corps' Training and Education Command, the Air
Force's Air Education Training Command, the Navy's Expeditionary
Training Command, and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Through
these teams, the JTCOIC is now working with all of the Services to
institutionalize Attack the Network methodology at their centers and
schools. The JTCOIC has training teams working for each of the services
and Special Operations Command preparing Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and
Marines for deployment. JTCOIC also provides direct support to the
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for exercise support to units deploying to
Iraq and Afghanistan. As part of this support, JTCOIC plays an
important role in the Joint Event Life Cycle process that prepares
units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. JTCOIC also participates
in JFCOM scenario development for Counter-IED (C-IED) exercise planning
for units that are deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. JTCOIC's use of
operational data to provide each of the Services and JFCOM with
modeling, simulation and gaming solutions that are the most accurate
and current representations of enemy tactics, techniques and procedures
is a unique and highly beneficial contribution to C-IED training.
The individual Services do not maintain their own training COIC.
The JTCOIC is the only organization that trains the COIC's Attack the
Network tools. Its training support teams tailor the training to fit
the unique needs of each Service. For example, a Navy Explosive
Ordnance Disposal unit might use COIC specific tools for trend
analysis, while Marine combat engineers might use those and others for
their Attack the Network situational awareness prior to a route
clearing operation.
Dr. Snyder. How joint is the Joint Center of Excellence (JCE) at
Ft. Irwin? Specifically which Services/organizations have a presence or
send people for training? What is TRADOC's role? Why is the JCE not at
the Joint Readiness Training Center in Ft. Polk?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) is joint in its
organizational structure, personnel complement, execution of funds, and
execution of training. Its headquarters, located at Fort Irwin, is
supported by four distributed Centers of Excellence (COE): Air Force
COE at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), TX; Army COE at Fort Irwin, CA;
Marine Corps COE at Twentynine Palms, CA; and Navy COE at Indian Head,
MD. These centers link various Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-
IED) training support programs such as electronic warfare, biometrics,
and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) across the
Services. There are total of 32 Service members, representing all four
Services assigned to the JIEDDO JCOE and subordinate COEs.
Coalition partners and United States Federal Law Enforcement have
representatives at the JCOE. A Sergeant Major from the United Kingdom
trained in Tactical Site Exploitation/Search, and a Senior Special
Agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
gives a depth of knowledge and expertise required to face the C-IED
training support challenge. Military personnel assigned to the JIEDDO
JCOE are not service specific to their posted location. As an example,
the Air Force COE has representatives from all four services at their
Lackland AFB location.
JCOE funds initiatives benefitting all Services in its support to
C-IED training. In fiscal year 2009 it provided $38 million to Marines,
$99 million to Army, $5 million Navy, and $5 million to the Air Force.
When the Services send their troops to the Combat Training Centers
(CTCs) for pre-deployment training the JIEDDO JCOE has personnel and
courses of instruction in place to execute. In addition, home station
pre-deployment training for Joint forces is conducted with assistance
from the JIEDDO JCOE Mobile Training Teams. The JIEDDO JCOE also
provides an in-theater training support presence with seven man teams
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The total number of service members
trained this year is: 63,000 Army; 3,188 Marines; 1,317 Navy; and
47,306 Air Force.
The JIEDDO JCOE is aligned with the service training commands, such
as the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), USMC Training and
Education Command (TECOM), USAF Air Education and Training Command
(AETC), and the Navy School Explosive Ordnance Disposal, which is a
joint service command. The JIEDDO JCOE has a liaison representative at
TRADOC. Additionally, members from the JCOE attend the TRADOC
Integrated C-IED Development Team General Officer Steering Committee
and other quarterly meetings. The JIEDDO JCOE also has a contractor
representative at TECOM and has a relationship similar to that of
TRADOC. JCOE's other liaison locations include: 1st Army in Ft. Gillem,
GA; the Maneuver Support Center in Ft. Leonard Wood, MO; and at Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas.
The AFCOE is located at the same AFB as the headquarters for AETC.
This has resulted in C-IED training improvements to Air Force Basic
Military Training as well as predeployment training for Security Forces
and Individual Augments. The NCOE actively coordinates with the Navy
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) School and the Navy EOD Technical
Division for development, test, and fielding of Radio Controlled IED
and EOD training equipment.
The JIEDDO JCOE was headquartered at Ft. Irwin in 2006 because of
the large throughput of military personnel trained, existing training
support infrastructure and desert terrain. The Commanding General of
the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin also serves as the
Director of the JIEDDO JCOE.
The relationships between the JCOE and the Services are enhanced
through its component locations: ACOE is at the NTC, the Army's leading
Combat Training Center; MCOE is located at Twentynine Palms CA, where
Marine units undergo predeployment training; AFCOE is at Lackland AFB
for coordination with AETC; and the NCOE is located at Indianhead MD,
where it has daily interaction with the Navy Expeditionary Combat
Command.
JCOE has also established C-IED training teams at the Joint
Readiness Training Center in Ft. Polk, LA, as well as the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany.
Dr. Snyder. It seems the term ``IED'' is becoming all inclusive.
Discuss what the definition of an IED should be--road, house (booby
trap), person (suicide bomber), vehicle (car bomb), airborne (9/11),
ship borne (U.S.S. Cole), etc. What have we learned from the British
(mail borne IEDs, etc.) and the Israelis?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) Weapons Tactical Intelligence (WTI) Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) Lexicon defines an IED as: ``A device placed or
fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal,
noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy,
incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores,
but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Refers to a type
of IED incident that involves a complete, functioning device.''--WTI
IED Lexicon, Second Edition (Dec 2008)
Additionally, there are definitions within the Lexicon for water-
borne IED, person-borne IED, under vehicle IED, aerial-borne IED,
vehicle-borne IED, and large vehicle-borne IED. While these further
refine the methods of employment of the IED weapons system, they are
considered `tactical design' designators of a device, and are not
included in one overarching definition for an IED.
All of the examples cited have been improvised devices that
explode, and JIEDDO is actively pursuing a defeat of those devices.
More specifically, JIEDDO's mission is to eliminate the strategic
effect of such devices. Thus, a letter bomb probably does not have
substantial strategic effect as there are extensive mail handling
facilities that have been effective at stopping letter bombs.
JIEDDO is in ongoing consultation with all of our allies, and
conducts extensive discussions with the British and Israelis multiple
times throughout the year. We regularly meet with Israelis to discuss
ongoing issues and have worked with them to share technology that they
have found helpful in the past and improved upon it for current uses in
the field.
JIEDDO's information sharing with our British partners is constant
and ongoing. In addition to regular working group meetings,
conversations and conferences, JIEDDO has a number of expert British
officers embedded within JIEDDO to ensure constant sharing of best
practices and lessons learned.
Dr. Snyder. Your testimony focuses on brigade and regiment through
corps level. Is this what is meant by the tactical level rather than
battalion and below?
General Metz. At the tactical level, operations are planned and
conducted by Brigade (Army) and Regiment (Marine Corps) and below. In
the current conflict, Division and Corps headquarters link tactics and
strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish
the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational
objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about
and sustain these events.
We differentiate between Division and above and Brigade and below
because they have distinctly different employment mission sets and
therefore require different training.
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO)
training has a powerful impact on Counter-IED (C-IED) success at both
the tactical and operational levels. The training provided by the
JIEDDO Joint Training Counter Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC)
focuses on Division and Corps staffs. A Division is a tactical
headquarters while the Corps serves as the seam between tactical and
operational level warfare. Training provided at the JIEDDO Center of
Excellence focuses on training at the Brigade and Regiment level and
below--the tactical level.
Tactical level training by the JCOE is further supported by the
various Service Centers of Excellence: the Marine Corps at Twentynine
Palms, CA; Army at Fort Irwin, CA; Navy at Indian Head Naval Surface
Warfare Center, MD; and Air Force at Lackland AFB, TX. Training at the
tactical level also takes place at the 57 home station training lanes
located at 55 military installations throughout the United States, and
in Germany and Korea.
Dr. Snyder. Your testimony for ``Train the Force'' mentions
``signatures and social dynamics.'' Please describe and explain. Which
agencies and organizations are trained by JIEDDO or through JIEDDO
funding--State, USAID, contractors, NGOs, UN, or foreign partners?
General Metz. There are basically two types of ``signatures''
training. The first type deals with Homemade Explosives (HME). The
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Joint
Center of Excellence (JCOE) funded a HME Mobile Training Team (MTT)
that provides home station training support to teach troops at the
Brigade Combat Team and below level on how to identify HME observables.
The HME MTT also provides training to Combat Training Centers and Home-
station Train-the-Trainer personnel. The JIEDDO Joint Training Counter-
IED Operations Integration Center does the same at the Division and
above level, concentrating on training leadership and staff planners.
HME detection packages are being deployed to the field to assist ground
forces institute this signatures training. JIEDDO is working with
Central Command to begin training collection managers and analysts on
the use of HME signatures. The JIEDDO JCOE also teaches HME detection
and signatures to Explosive Ordinance Disposal and Engineer units via
mobile training teams. These courses of instruction emphasize HME
indicators, precursors and ingredients, explosive hazards and immediate
actions. They are ``train the trainer'' focused and have had
participation from all services, as well as the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Department of Homeland Security.
The second type of ``signatures'' training focuses on the
scientific research being conducted in the area of visual detection of
IEDs. As assessed by our criterion measures, both inherent traits and
experience-related characteristics proved essential to IED detection
performance. Our results suggest that IED detection is largely a
cognitive task, relying on visual, attentional, and memory processes.
One significant finding that emerged indicates certain hobbies are
relevant to successful IED detection. Specifically, participation in
hunting, puzzles, art, and music predicted superior performance, as did
time in service, deployment experience, and age.
JIEDDO is currently reviewing proposals and ideas which would
address the issue of cultural and social dynamics in training, but none
have reached the implementation stage yet. A social dynamics trainer,
or training program, will probably never be a stand-alone initiative.
It will more likely be incorporated into other Counter-IED efforts,
particularly for the intelligence capability within battle staffs for
HME signature detection and for maneuver units for visual detection of
IEDs.
Dr. Snyder. What percentages of the JIEDDO workforce are military,
reserve component military, contractors, and government civilians?
General Metz. As of 1 October, the JIEDDO workforce requirements
totaled 3,685 military, government civilians and contractors. Of the
3,685 personnel, 134 are military personnel (comprising 3.6% of the
total JIEDDO workforce), 135 are government civilian personnel
(comprising 3.6% of the total work force), 0 reserve component military
personnel, and 3,416 contract personnel (comprising approximately 92.7%
of the total JIEDDO workforce). In addition to the current JIEDDO
workforce, JIEDDO has received approval from the Department of the Army
for 119 additional Army reserve component military positions; however,
these 119 positions were not included as part of the 1 October 2009
personnel numbers. On 6 November 2009, the Department of the Air Force
approved 13 Air Force reserve component military positions. The
additional 119 Army reserve and 13 Air Force reserve positions brings
the total JIEDDO approved manpower requirements to 3,717 (3,685 plus
119 Army reserve and 13 Air Force reserve positions). As of 6 November,
the JIEDDO reserve component military positions comprise 3.5% of the
JIEDDO total workforce. JIEDDO has requested an additional 23 reserve
component military positions from the USMC and 30 reserve component
military from the USN. If these are approved, the JIEDDO will have a
total reserve component military of 185 (all Services), increasing the
total JIEDDO workforce requirements to 3,770 (3,717 plus 23 USMC
reserve and 30 USN reserve positions), and the total JIEDDO reserve
component military personnel requirements will comprise 4.9% of the
total JIEDDO workforce. These personnel calculations are based on
JIEDDO's 1 October 2009 baseline personnel numbers.
Dr. Snyder. Describe some specific instances or examples of how the
Deputy Secretary of Defense has provided management oversight to
JIEDDO.
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization's (JIEDDO) high impact is due to its direct reporting
chain to Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and to special
Congressional funding. Both are vital--they give JIEDDO unimpeded
access anywhere it needs to go to solve the Improvised Explosive Device
(IED) problem.
Through my reporting chain I have a direct line of communication to
the DEPSECDEF and I am updating the Deputy Secretary on the IED threat
and JIEDDO's countermeasures on a monthly basis. As our force strength
migrates to Afghanistan where the IED threat is on the rise, this
JIEDDO reporting chain should be retained to interact with our most
senior leaders in the Department.
I meet with the DEPSECDEF at least monthly on JIEDDO matters to
ensure that he has a complete understanding of our requirements and
activities. Furthermore, all JIEDDO initiatives that are equal to or
above $25 million require approval from the DEPSECDEF prior to the
obligation of those funds.
Additional oversight is provided to proposed JIEDDO Counter-IED
efforts by Flag or SES-level representatives from the Offices of the
Under Secretaries of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration, the Department's General Counsel,
and Director Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE)
through their participation on our Joint IED Defeat (JIEDD) Integrated
Process Team. Efforts requiring funding that exceeds $25 million are
reviewed by the JIEDD Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG), an
advisory body to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. SRSG membership
consists of the Principal Deputies of the Under Secretaries of Defense,
the Principal Deputy ASD, Principal Deputy General Counsel, the Deputy
Director CAPE, and Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, as well as
the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-8.
Finally, since JIEDDO's establishment there have been five Deputies
Advisory Working Group meetings at the Deputy Secretary of Defense
level to grapple with key problems requiring a decision from the
Department.
Dr. Snyder. Some think that some JIEDDO capabilities such as the
COIC might be redundant with in-theater capabilities and that its
training initiative runs counter to Title X authorities of the Services
and COCOMs. How will you integrate acquisition plans with the Services
and COCOMs?
General Metz. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) works with both theaters and the Intelligence
Community (IC) by fusing their intelligence products in near real time
and delivering the results as knowledge to the warfighter, enabling
tactical targeting against Improvised Explosive Device (IED) networks.
It is a highly refined use of intelligence products.
Several intelligence working groups, Liaison Officers embedded in
the JIEDDO Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), and
formalized working relationships keep all involved organizations
situationally aware of each other's efforts. Fusion cells in
Afghanistan under the command of GEN McChrystal include COIC
representatives who work with other in-theater members of the IC.
JIEDDO constantly strives to raise the bar on behalf of the
Services by rapidly countering changing enemy technologies tactics,
techniques, and procedures and infusing our cutting edge responses into
our training base across the Department of Defense (DoD). Home Made
Explosive training at the Joint Center of Excellence is a perfect
example of this.
Unfortunately, no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and
complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs.
JIEDDO's mission is to capture those emerging, hard training problems
and find ways for the Services and our partners to overcome them. To
guarantee our continued success in this area, we are in the process of
developing a comprehensive DoD-wide Counter-IED (C-IED) training
architecture that will give us an evolutionary jump forward by
federating all ongoing C-IED training across the Services, the
interagency, and our partner nations. Proven training capabilities will
transition or transfer (T2) to the Services for sustainment and further
integration. Six such initiatives T2'd this fiscal year and 13 more are
currently slated to T2 during both FY11 and FY12. These numbers are
subject to modification pending the FY10 Appropriations bill. By
sharing our resources, insights, and practices, we plan to achieve a
level of training synergy never seen before. The key to our success has
been, and always will be, world-class training.