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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

**BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
JUNE 4, 2009



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[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 4, 2009.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon. I think we will go ahead and get started. It is right at one o'clock. We certainly expect other members to come drifting in as we proceed, but I want to be respectful of the Admiral's time and get started on time.

Welcome, as always, before our subcommittee, Admiral Olson. It is always pleasure to see you up here, and certainly we appreciate the work you do for our country in leading the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

I have an opening statement that I have written that I will submit for the record.

Just briefly, I want to say how important the Special Operations Command is to our Nation's national security and how much we really appreciate and respect the job that you and all of the people under you have done in protecting our national security all over the world in many, many places, some of which are well-known, like Iraq and Afghanistan, others of which many people are not aware of, but in many ways are just as important, certainly, for the future of the broader conflict against violent extremists. And I think that the holistic approach that the Special Operations Command has brought to winning that fight is invaluable.

Without question, you are the best in the world at finding and disrupting terrorist networks, at targeting individual terrorists and either capturing or killing them; and that skill, regrettably, will continue to have an important role in our national security.

But you also understand how important it is to win the broader ideological war, to work with our partners out there in other countries in the world to get them to take the lead in countering insurgencies, to give them the training and help they need. Of course, nowhere is that truer or more in need right now than in Pakistan, and that training will be an important part of the suc-

cess there as well. And also just the broader message issues: How do we communicate; how do we do counter radicalization?

Both your command, and I think as impressively, the individual soldiers, marines, airmen, Navy SEALs out there, have developed skills in those areas that are invaluable not just to the Special Operations Command, but have proven to be valuable to the broader Department of Defense and Intel Communities, in truly understanding what we are up against, how to confront it, and also how to build on alliances that are out there.

What has been learned out there on the battlefield has really been very helpful in terms of preparing on all of those issues. We know Special Operations Command takes a strong leadership role.

Our subcommittee is very interested in being supportive and being helpful. We know there are inevitable battles over funds, but you always seem to do a very, very good job with what we provide. And I do believe the Congress has also recognized the importance of this role and has done our best to provide what you need to fight that fight.

So we appreciate what you are doing and look forward to hearing your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 23.]

Mr. SMITH. With that, I will turn it over to the Ranking Member, Mr. Miller, for any opening statement he might have.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement I would like submitted for the record.

I would like to say welcome, Admiral, I hope your travels up were good. Thank you for the hospitality. I had a wonderful chance to visit with you and Marilyn, Monday evening, and we thank you so much for hosting us and look forward to your testimony today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 24.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

With that, Admiral Olson.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral OLSON. Well, thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Congressman Miller. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee to highlight the current posture of the United States Special Operations Command. I will say that thanks to the foresight, advocacy and strong support of this body—and we recognize that we were a product of the Congress—we do remain well positioned to meet the Nation's expectations of its Joint Special Operations Forces.

Primarily, as you well know, U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible through its service component commands, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and Naval Special Warfare Com-

mand (NAVSPECWAR), for organizing, equipping, training and providing fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to serve under the operational control of geographic combatant commanders around the world.

In this role, the United States Special Operations Command headquarters shares many of the responsibilities, authorities and characteristics of a military department or a defense agency, including a separate major force program budget established by the Congress for the purpose of funding equipment, materiel, supplies, services, training and operational activities that are peculiar to Special Operations Forces.

The United States Special Operations Command has also been designated as the combatant command responsible for synchronizing Department of Defense planning against terrorists and terror networks globally, a function that requires robust daily activity, punctuated semiannually by a conference that now attracts over 1,000 people from about 40 different agencies and organizations.

Additionally, we have been assigned proponentcy by the Department of Defense for security force assistance. In this role, we expect to foster the long-term partnerships that will shape a more secure global environment in the face of global challenges such as transnational crime, extremism, and migration.

The Joint Special Operations Force itself, those assigned to the United States Special Operations Command by the military services for most of their military careers, comprises Army Special Forces, Rangers, Navy SEALs, combatant craft crewmen and mini submarine operators, Marine special operators, fixed- and rotary-wing aviators from the Army and the Air Force, combat controllers, pararescue jumpers, practitioners of civil-military affairs and military information support; all of these, and more, augmented, supported, and enabled by a wide variety of assigned logisticians, administrative specialists, sensor operators, intelligence analysts, acquisition professionals, operations planners, strategists, communications experts, budget managers, doctrine writers, trainers, instructors, scientists, technologists and many more, who are great men and women, Active Duty and Reservists, military and civilian, who generally work within the Special Operations community for an assignment or two.

This is truly a team of teams. It is a force that is well suited to the irregular operating environments in which we are now engaged, as you mentioned in your opening statement, sir, and its proven abilities have created an unprecedented demand for its effect in remote, uncertain and challenging operating areas. Whether the assigned mission is to train, advise, fight or provide humanitarian assistance, the broad capabilities of Special Operations Forces make them the force of choice.

And while the high long-term demand for Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to 86 percent of the overseas force currently being deployed to the United States Central Command area of responsibility, Special Operations Forces do maintain a global presence.

In fiscal year 2009, Special Operations Forces have already conducted operations and training in 106 countries around the globe. Throughout these operations, Special Operations Forces have taken

a long-term approach to engagement designed to forge enduring partnerships contributing to regional stability. This balance of effective direct and indirect actions, the combination of high-end tactical skills and an understanding of the operational context of their application is the core of Special Operations. From support to major combat operations to the conduct of irregular warfare, Special Operations Forces are normally the first in and last out, accomplishing their missions with a very small, highly capable, and agile force.

Given our current environment, it is important to note that the traditional activities of irregular warfare are not new to Special Operations Forces. Unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs operations, information operations, psychological operations, foreign internal defense, are longstanding Special Operations Forces core activities. As a result, significant resources are required to ensure that Special Operations Forces are properly manned, trained and equipped to operate globally and with unmatched speed, precision, and discipline.

The United States Special Operations Command fiscal year 2010 budget request includes the resources necessary to continue providing full spectrum, multi-mission global Special Operations Forces that will equip the United States with a comprehensive set of unique capabilities.

While the United States Special Operations Command's major force program (MPF) 11 budget has historically been robust enough to meet the peculiar Special Operations mission requirements, the success of Special Operations Forces depends not only on SOCOM's dedicated budget and acquisition authorities, but also on Special Operations Command's service, parents and partners. Special Operations Forces rely on the services for a broad range of support.

Some of the enabling capabilities that must be provided by the services include mobility, aerial sensors, field medical capabilities, remote logistics, engineering, planning, construction, intelligence, communications, security and more. And with the combination of the United States Special Operations Command budget and the support from the services, Special Operations Command seeks a balance, first, to have a sufficient organic Special Operations peculiar force for speed of response to operational crises; and, second, to have enabling capabilities assigned in direct support of Special Operations Forces for sustainment and expansion of operations.

The United States Special Operations Command headquarters will continue to lead, develop and sustain the world's most precise and lethal counterterrorism force. We will provide the world's most effective Special Operations trainers, advisers and combat partners, with the skills, leadership and mind-set necessary to meet today's and tomorrow's unconventional challenges.

This Nation's Joint Special Operations Forces will continue to find, kill or capture our irreconcilable enemies; to train, mentor and partner with our global friends and allies; and to pursue the tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies that will keep us ahead of dynamic emerging threats.

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will conclude my opening remarks with a simple statement of pride in the Special Operations Force that I am honored to com-

mand. Special Operations Forces are contributing globally well beyond what its percentage of the total force would indicate. Every day, they are fighting our enemies, training our partners, and, through personal contact and assistance, bringing real value to tens of thousands of villagers who are still deciding their allegiances.

I stand ready for your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I have several questions. We will adhere to the five-minute rule, just to keep structure to the questioning.

The first question I have is about 1208 authority, which I know has been a critical tool for what you have been able to do in a number of different places. You are asking for an expansion of a little bit of the money. I think it is \$35 million now. You are asking for \$50 million.

Can you tell us how those funds are used and why they are so important to what you are doing?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. The 1208 authority is peculiar to Special Operations. It requires that the funds be used to support ongoing Special Operations. This is really enabling the Special Operations Forces to extend their operations through the use of surrogates and counterparts to conduct activities in partnership or in support of the Special Operations Forces who are on that operation.

It is an authority, not an appropriation. It authorizes the United States Special Operations Command to recommend to the Secretary of Defense, after coordinating with the geographic combatant commander and the chief of mission in the country, to utilize up to currently \$35 million of Operation and Management (O&M) funds from within the Special Operations budget. So it is an issue of prioritization within our budget.

It is enormously important because it is an agile fund. It is a focused fund. It is used for purposes that are well-coordinated. And in a closed session I could provide a fair bit of detail about how it has had effect around the world.

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. I think it is a program that we strongly support. And I think it essentially contributes to sort of the second area of questioning, and that is the importance of interagency cooperation in what you are doing, which is increasingly important.

When we look at this broadly, globally, as a counterinsurgency fight, there are a lot of different pieces that are going to have to be pulled together in order to make this work. I think from what I have seen of Special Operations Command under your leadership, and also out in the field under the leadership at one point of General McChrystal, I think pulled those pieces together about as effectively as anywhere I have seen in government.

As we go forward and you look outside of areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, where I think we are specifically familiar with the struggles there, but you look at some of these emerging threat environments around the Horn of Africa and Yemen and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Maghreb, what do you think is most important towards pushing forward that level of coopera-

tion between SOCOM, other elements of DOD, State and the Intel Community?

Admiral OLSON. The most important thing to push forward are structures that provide a forum so that the interagency community can provide the content to the discussions. These are relationships that are building over time. We are way better than we have ever been. We are not as good as we will be next year or the year after.

But so much of it has to do with just understanding each others' organizations and cultures. And we are even seeing now what I call second or third generation, or second or third order effects of people who have worked together in one place, coming together in another place, and already having a relationship so that they can move much more quickly together.

General McChrystal, I think, set the standard aggressively at the operational level. I think the United States Special Operations Command is serving as a model of sorts at the higher headquarters level. We wake up every day with about 85 uniformed members of the Special Operations Command going to work in other agencies of government inside the National Capital Region; most of the agencies that you would expect, and perhaps some you wouldn't normally expect us to be in, in small teams, typically two to four people with an O6 colonel or Navy captain as the team leader.

We also wake up every day at our headquarters at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa with about 140 members of other agencies coming to work in our headquarters. Full members of the team, sitting in on all the discussions, sitting in on all the global collaboration kinds of briefings, and this has provided a transparency in the interagency environment that is very helpful.

It is hard now, having seen it in action for a few years, to imagine, to remember back what it was like before we—back when we used to look around the room and see only uniformed members. It really is a good, solid team effort at this point.

Mr. SMITH. That is something we really want to encourage. I think you hit upon the absolute key to it, is getting people from the different agencies to actually work together side by side, day in and day out with each other, in different forums. You have done an excellent job, as you mentioned, in sprinkling some SOCOM people out in other places. Other agencies need to do that as well. I think the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is a good forum for that. But we want to see that happen more and more and look for ways to encourage it.

I think in particular some of the Title 10, Title 50 conflicts between Intel and DOD can be resolved better if we start having more sharing back and forth. Now, obviously, we understand all of those different pieces have personnel to manage. That is the great challenge, I know, for you. And if your personnel is sent all over a bunch of different other places, you have a core mission to accomplish.

So if along the way, if there are ways we can help you free up more personnel, please let us know. I know you have got an ongoing issue in terms of just the management just within your own entity of different service members, and we are communicating that concern to DOD and trying to give you the authority you need to better manage your own personnel within SOCOM.

Certainly we look for those opportunities also to build those relationships and really just sort of continue on with the Goldwater-Nichols principle and now apply it across agency lines as well as within the DOD. We look forward to that.

With that, I will yield to Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I serve on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and I have had an opportunity to visit with some of our NATO allies, and they are indeed proud of the contributions they are making, certainly within the SOF community and certainly in Afghanistan.

What I would like to ask you for the record, if you would, explain the impact of the SOF capabilities of those partners in the current fight as it exists in Afghanistan, and, if you could, an update as well on Iraq as we transition out.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. From your visits to the NATO SOF Coordinations Center, you understand how this team is coming together and the bonding that is occurring across the Special Operations Forces of NATO at the headquarters environment. I think it is inspired. It certainly stimulated the activities of some Special Operations Forces being provided to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort in Afghanistan.

So I am not the expert on how individual nations' Special Operations Forces are performing, what their activities are in Afghanistan. That is outside my realm of responsibility, and I am not sure my monitorship is strong enough to give a coherent and an accurate answer on that at this point.

I will say in my discussions with NATO's SOF leaders, there is a sense of community that is forming across the Nation's Special Operations communities. I would term it, loosely perhaps, special operations forces, the special operations flag is something around which NATO forces can rally. It is a relatively inexpensive, relatively low-level investment in a much broader military capability that NATO can provide.

The NATO-SOF Coordination Center now, as you know, is less than three years old, but it has got its legs up under it pretty well.

Mr. MILLER. What do you think we can do to assist our allies as they develop their SOF units?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, there is already robust activity in NATO, and we are seeing some NATO countries step forward in terms of presenting their Special Operation Forces as subject matter experts in particular disciplines and then using that to attract others to exercise and train with them. So there is a synergy that is occurring bilaterally in areas where the United States isn't involved, and multilaterally and bilaterally where we are.

I think that my shortest answer to that would be to explore ways to operationalize the NATO SOF Coordination Center, and I am not knowledgeable enough about how NATO works organizationally to understand the details and nuances of that.

The NATO SOF Coordination Center director is now a dual-hatted American two-star general who serves in his primary role as the commander of Special Operations Command/European Command, so I would suggest exploring ways by which we might form a separate director for the NATO SOF Coordination Center.

Mr. MILLER. One question, moving away from NATO, involves where we are with our gunships. Certainly with AFSOC in my district, it appears that there is a shortfall. But the budget doesn't request any additional funding for gunships this year.

Can you talk about our plans, or your plans, to address that particular shortfall, along with your plans to maintain, modernize and upgrade the existing aircraft that are out there?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. We have a recapitalization program for most of the rest of our C-130 fleet, 37 MC-130Js will come into our program. That was a higher priority initially than the AC-130 gunship for recapitalization because of the ages of the airframes involved.

The recent level of activity in Afghanistan is causing us to understand again how important precision firepower is in that tactical environment, and we are understanding clearly that our capacity is insufficient and that other platforms, substitute platforms, simply don't bring the same response to troops in contact that an AC-130 does.

The AC-130 is not a precision-fire platform. It is actually an area-fire weapon that is extremely accurate with its sensors and guns. So what we are doing to augment the AC-130 fleet, what we are seeking to do immediately is modify our MC-130W fleet to serve as a platform for a standoff precision-guided munition as a primary weapon and a 30-millimeter gun as a secondary weapon. All proven systems. It is simply a matter of integrating them in a platform that hasn't been used for that purpose before.

We are seeking funds to do this, and we think that because the technology risk is so low, that we can deliver it very quickly.

Mr. MILLER. That is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. McIntyre is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you for being with us, Admiral, and thank you again for your hospitality last year when I was able to join you down in Tampa. And thank you for the service you give to us here at home and around the world.

The concern about wear and tear on equipment I know is one we have had, especially since the situation occurred in Iraq. Tell me, with regard specifically to the Special Operations Forces equipment and resources, what resources are you finding under your command that are experiencing the greatest wear and tear, and to what exactly do you attribute this extraordinary aging process, and do you have some thoughts you can share with us about how we might can best help you address that situation?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. I don't think it will surprise anybody; the answer is that it is our mobility systems that are suffering the most wear and tear because of the ways they are used and the pace that they are used. So I asked my staff just recently to give me the top five items in terms of what we are seeing in wear and tear, and it is exactly what you would think. It is our fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation, it is our ground mobility fleet, and in one case it is a maritime platform.

We are simply flying more hours, we are driving more miles, we are spending more time on the water, and this is just at a pace beyond what we had predicted when those systems were procured. So

we are refurbishing them more often, and we have been resourced adequately to do that.

My concern, looking ahead, is simply that we sustain the level of resources that will permit us to keep this equipment going. As we look forward to some forces perhaps drawing down, in Iraq especially, we don't see that happening for Special Operations Forces at all. So as we have come to depend on some special funding means to keep this equipment going in the operational environment, we are going to have to find a way to work that into our baseline budget in order to sustain this equipment over time.

Mr. SMITH. Sorry to interrupt you. Just on that point, as we are drawing down our conventional forces, I know there are some challenges in terms of your staying there in the same numbers, in terms of making sure you continue to get the support equipment that you need. A lot of that you get from the conventional forces in the field.

How is that playing out? Are you satisfied that those concerns are being met, or is there more that needs to be done?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think it is playing out well. Recently we have had service chief-level talks with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the Army. We are in complete accord about what the challenges are and seeking ways together to resolve those.

I think there is a broad understanding that whether it is a small force in an area or a large force in an area, you still need somebody to control the airspace, operate the airfields, provide the quick reaction force, provide the medical support to do all the rest of it that it takes to look after the force that is forward.

So we are helping them help us by doing the detailed analysis of exactly what it is we think will have to be left behind, if you will, by the forces that draw down in order to sustain the activity that stays behind. So I think we are on a good track with that in our conversations with the services.

Mr. SMITH. Thanks. I apologize, Mike.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Can you tell us what the typical rotational cycles are of SOF personnel, particularly in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and how that may be affecting what you best feel like you can do with regard to keeping up with such a pace in terms of the rotation to personnel? I know that is an issue that has come up in the broader context with our military, but I specifically want to be concerned about how that is affecting you with Special Operations Forces.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. The service components have sort of evolved into different rotational paces, depending on the nature of the force, the type of equipment they use, the nature of the operations they are conducting. So it ranges from about 90 days on the short end for some of our aviators who fly an awful lot of hours at night, on night vision goggles, and who burn up their allotted flying hours more quickly and therefore need to come back and sort of reset, through about seven months for our Special Forces operational detachment A teams, the Green Berets, who are at battalion-level rotations at that pace. And then it extends beyond that to one-year rotations for many of the people assigned to the higher

headquarters in order to provide a campaign planning continuity to the effort at the more senior levels.

The rate now is sustainable. Our predictions about how long we could sustain it were wrong. We didn't think that we could sustain it at this pace this long, but the force is proving resilient beyond our estimates.

I think personally that we are at about the maximum rate that we can sustain, but I think that we can sustain this rate for some time longer. It has now become the new normal. It is the way we operate. People who are doing this have been doing it long enough to know that this is what it is they can expect to do, and our retention rate remains high and our recruiting remains healthy.

So if the demand didn't increase, we are probably pretty okay. But what we see is an increasing demand for Special Operations forces, so we have got a growth plan in place to accommodate that.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. It is good to have you here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ellsworth is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral. I apologize for being late. I had some Hoosiers in the office that didn't want to let me go.

If this question has been discussed, let me know and I will move on to something else. Can you talk, Admiral, about some of the interoperability between the agencies? If things are being done in the most efficient manner between the interagency cooperation, some of the challenges you might have faced, what is the best practice and what are our successes and what challenges are you facing in the meld there?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, we did address that to some level, and what I said, very quickly, is it is better than it has ever been. It will get better. We are now at the point where the structures have evolved to provide the venues for these kinds of interactions to occur. Now it is a matter of the people getting the knowledge of each others' organizations and traditions and, frankly, languages in order to optimize the efficiency of it. The trend is certainly one in the right direction. We are way ahead of where we thought we might be just a couple of years ago.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. If you would—this is totally unrelated but an area of particular interest to me—discuss what you can about our attempts and our movement in the non-lethal field, where we are at on that, whether vehicle stops or personnel stops. I know that is not what normally would be discussed in Special Ops, but certainly it would be a valuable part in winning hearts and minds, if you wouldn't mind telling me where we are at and what we need.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, we are all in favor of every applicable non-lethal technology. We understand as well as anybody, I think, that killing people is not the way to success in either Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else that we work, and that a non-lethal effect that can then give you time to sort out the situation, sort the people, would be a great advantage on the battlefield.

Special Operations is in favor of any feasible appropriate technology. Our position, though, is that those technologies have a much broader application than Special Operations Forces. So we are advocates of it, we are champions for it, we are supporters and

cheerleaders for it, but we have very few of those programs initiated within the Special Operations budget itself.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I have seen some of the things. I am embarrassed to say, being in Congress and on Armed Services, that I am watching the Discovery Channel and seeing some of the new technology about the heat-projecting apparatus. I don't even know what you call it, but it is very interesting. Is that on the edge of being used?

Mr. SMITH. My staff is telling me it is called the active denial system.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is a great name for that. I couldn't have named it better myself. Is that in the prototype stage? Is it being used?

Admiral OLSON. I saw that demonstrated, but it has been a couple years ago, and I don't know what has happened since then.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. A couple areas I want to ask about, and we will go back through the members as well.

Piracy has been emerging as a threat and a challenge. I guess—congratulations, I guess, is the word on running a very, very good operation in rescuing the *Maersk* crew here about a month or so ago.

We had an opportunity to get briefed by Captain Moore and a couple others who had participated in that operation—a very impressive accomplishment—but all those years ago you were trained to do that. Basically you were set up so that if there was a hostage situation anywhere in the world, you would respond very, very quickly.

You have been doing a lot of other things in between. But it is impressive to see that training paid off and we knew what to do.

Going forward in terms of how we confront piracy, certainly it is a challenge in that part of the world, off the coast of Somalia, and has huge implications that we need to try and confront. As at the same time, as we have mentioned in this hearing, you have a wealth of other opportunities that are also important in Afghanistan and Pakistan and a variety of other places. And one of my concerns is with the media attention on piracy coming up, if we shift too much of our focus in that direction we distract from these other very important missions as well.

I just wonder if you could comment on how you see SOCOM's role in combating piracy in that part of the world and how it may distract from some of the other missions?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Obviously, across the military there is robust capability to take on piracy in different ways, and Special Operations contributes some of the capability to that, as was evidenced here a couple of months ago.

How that force is used is a matter of policy. It is my responsibility to train the force to do what it is asked to do. We do keep some elements of our force on standby, on alert, to respond to that kind of situation. So that if they are infrequent, then I think we would consider it not to be much of a burden on the force.

Mr. SMITH. That has always been the case. Even with everything that has gone in the last eight years, it has always been the case you have had that standby force.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.

Admiral OLSON. Again, it is more of a policy issue. But the question is really are we going to prevent piracy or are we going to respond to piracy with a military force? Today, we have been more in the business, with my force, of providing those who respond to it, and we are able to continue with that mission without impacting on our others.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. I will pass.

Mr. SMITH. I have got more questions. Mr. McIntyre, do you have anything you want to add?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I just want to ask you if you feel like the partnership with NATO and their Special Operations capability is working well?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, we did address that briefly earlier, but the NATO Special Operations Coordination Center, the NSCC, headquartered in Mons, is an up-and-running organization. It is not fully manned, it is not fully capable yet, but the relationships that have occurred within that organization have developed quite strong bonds among the NATO Special Operations Forces.

I was able to attend their first annual conference last year. Twenty-eight countries, I believe, came to that conference; and it was remarkable how similar the conversation was, the vision is across the Special Operations Forces of NATO, some of which say they feel that they have more in common with the Special Operations Forces of other nations than they do with other forces of their own nation because of the way that they train and exercise together.

I think that there is an opportunity to take that to the next step. I am just not certain what the next step is. What I mentioned before is we might explore a way to operationalize the NATO SOF Coordination Center in some way and provide it an independent director, who is now a dual-hatted officer.

Mr. SMITH. Following up on that, a trip I took in January with some Members, on the way back from Iraq we stopped in Mons and had the opportunity to visit Special Operations Forces in NATO Command, and I just can't tell you how impressed we were by the degree of coordination. And without getting into too many detailed aspersions here, we did not find similar coordination in other parts of NATO that we met with.

Certainly that is a major, major challenge in Afghanistan, is figuring out how to get all of our partner nations—it would be far too ambitious to stay on the same page, but at least in the same book, when it comes to how we are going to confront Afghanistan and Pakistan.

NATO is set up the way it is set up. It is an important alliance. It is very difficult to manage that many different countries coming from that many different perspectives, so I certainly have a fair amount of respect for the difficulty the organization faces.

But we went through all of these meetings on that with increasing frustration. Actually at the last meeting, which regrettably we didn't have as much time as I would have liked for, was to visit the SOF force, and it was inspirational, because we saw that it can

work. You can in fact bring that many different nations together to coordinate in a way that is effective.

I guess my plea would be that the SOF forces over there try to spread that message out more broadly among the other aspects of NATO. I think it would be very, very critical.

A couple of things I wanted to ask you about——

Admiral OLSON. Sir, if I could make one additional point, I didn't mean to attribute more countries to NATO or more to this conference. What we are seeing, actually, is an extension of Special Operations cooperation beyond NATO, and those who participate in other operations where they may work with a NATO-SOF country are now becoming part of this team.

So this first annual conference we came to last year was actually attended by some non-NATO countries because they choose to develop those relationships. It is really encouraging to see this play out.

Mr. SMITH. It is invaluable, the mantra of counterinsurgency—by, through, and with—you want to work with the host nations, and many of them are now participating in this and learning the necessary skills and how to implement that policy.

I want to ask a little bit about some of the contracting issues. It is something we have dealt with. What we have always tried to do on this committee is find ways to enable SOCOM to have a slightly more nimble approach to acquisition. The normal processes are difficult when you are operating at such speed and with so much technology that is rapidly changing. If you go through a normal 18-month acquisition process, by the time you acquire the product it is out of date. So we have tried to speed it up in a couple of different areas. I am curious how you think that is going in general. I also wanted to give you an opportunity to respond.

I know The Washington Post had written an article recently, critical of some of that contracting, that it hadn't followed the process in some instances. I have a very strong bias that drowning the DOD in process is one of the things that is inhibiting our ability to move forward. But that is not to say we don't need to have some transparent process so that we make sure it is all on the up-and-up and done in the best interests of the taxpayers.

I just want to give you an opportunity to comment on a couple of those issues and where you see it headed.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. I certainly agree with you and I am encouraged by all that Secretary of Defense Gates has said about re-looking at how acquisition is done Department-wide, with an eye towards cost reduction and streamlining the acquisition processes.

Within the Special Operations Command, as you said, we are intended by Congress, I believe, to be more agile than the services can be with their large acquisition programs using our MFP-11 budget for the Special Operations' peculiar acquisition procurement actions that we take.

I focused on this a couple of years ago in investigating our own house. I realized that many of the barnacles that have grown on our process were barnacles that we let grow. As I termed it within our own headquarters, I thought we were operating comfortably, sort of in the middle of our authorizations, and certainly not pushing the edge of it.

So we have several initiatives within our own headquarters to provide more agility internally along the way. We have sought and been granted relief from participation in some of the servicewide joint acquisition processes which had been applied, probably improperly, to the Special Operations programs. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who runs some of this process, he has relieved us of those where the acquisition program is a Special Operations' peculiar program.

We do operate under all the same laws and policies and reporting requirements. We have got a ways to go in terms of continuing to scrape the barnacles off, but I think we are making progress in that regard, and we will certainly continue to report to you how that is going. But I am encouraged by what we have seen here just in the last few months.

With respect to the DOD Inspector General (IG) report, that was not an acquisition contracting issue; that was a contract that we let with a single provider of many services to the Special Operations community. They modify equipment, they maintain equipment, they repair equipment and refurbish it, they store equipment for us. They do build sort of small "one of" items for us, they design and build those. It is a comprehensive set of activities that they perform for us, and the DOD IG look into that—which we appreciate—highlighted three findings, two of which we concurred mostly with and have taken several internal actions to resolve working with IG and I think to their satisfaction.

The third one actually had to do with a potential Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation, which it was our responsibility to conduct a preliminary review of. We did that. Our preliminary review identified that the finding had some merit. There is the potential of an ADA violation, and so this week my comptroller has initiated a formal investigation into that finding, which is our responsibility to do.

We have nine months to report the results of that investigation. We have 90 days to respond formally to the release of the final IG report.

Mr. SMITH. I have one more question. I want to see if any of my colleagues have anything else.

Just focusing for a moment, as long as we have you here, it would be interesting, your take on Afghanistan and Pakistan and the various situations there. In particular, two areas. In both—and this is something General McChrystal highlighted in his comments yesterday and the day before yesterday in front of the Senate, talking about the balance between confronting the enemy and being able to track down the terrorists that threaten us, and, at the same time, protecting against civilian casualties and taking a more classic counterinsurgency approach.

And I agree with General McChrystal that we need the Afghan people on our side, and right now the two greatest threats to them being on our side are, number one, the civilian casualty issue, both real and, in some cases, I think generated by Taliban propaganda. But we need to get better at countering that propaganda, getting our own message out. But also it is a very, very real concern.

Then, of course, the other issue is the efficacy of the Afghan government, which the people of Afghanistan do not believe in. And

I think certainly the best approach there is to try to go local as much as possible. The Afghan people are far more likely to trust their local tribes and work with their provisional governments than they are to buy off on whatever the national government winds up looking like, not to say we shouldn't try to make the national government a little bit better as well. But in balancing that with an Afghanistan going forward, how do you see the best approach to striking that balance?

The second question, with regard to Pakistan, this issue affects Pakistan as well. In fact, David Kilcullen testified before our committee a while back and had a pretty good summary of that, saying the drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are actually fairly well thought of in the FATA because the people who live there have been dealing with these violent psychopaths who have been running their communities.

It is in Pakistan itself and in Afghanistan where the civilian population sees this as a threat to their sovereignty and therefore is less likely to be supportive of us.

But also, specifically, Pakistan needs to learn counterinsurgency. And I won't go through the litany of challenges there, you know them well. But we need to be able to help them, while at the same time we have a limited role to play. Their sovereignty is very important. It is incredibly important in getting support for their government that we not have too heavy a hand there.

So I guess my two questions at the end of all that are: What can we do to better help Pakistan get to the counterinsurgency level that they need to get at, because as successful as they have been in Swat and other regions recently, it has been a pretty heavy-handed conventional approach that has created 2 to 3 million refugees even as it has driven back the Taliban, number one.

And, number two, how do you see us striking the balance in Afghanistan between fighting the people we need to fight and stopping the number of civilian casualties?

Admiral OLSON. Well, sir, I think you just said it better than I could, and I certainly support everything that General McChrystal said in his confirmation hearing a couple of days ago.

If I could go to Pakistan first, I think that we can't help Pakistan more than they want to be helped. And one of the filters on sort of their willingness to be helped is how the Pakistan military is perceived within Pakistan. It is the strongest element of Pakistan historically. It is the element of government upon which the people depend. And I think that we have to be very careful in recognizing that we cannot take actions that would cause the Pakistan military to appear to the Pakistani people to be an extension of ours. We can only help them in a way that truly helps them, and they are much more expert in that than we are.

So I think the best thing that we can do is develop the relationships that will erode whatever atmosphere of distrust exists, help the Pakistani people understand that our interests there are theirs, and that our commitment is a long-term commitment for the good of Pakistan and the stability of the region. But it will require us to work very carefully and very wisely with the Pakistan Government and with the Pakistan military and the Frontier Corps.

Regarding Afghanistan, I would highlight that Afghanistan is a uniquely complex environment. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is very different than it has been anywhere else where we have operated. It is really a village-by-village, valley-by-valley counterinsurgency.

One of the things I have found myself saying more often is, presence without value is perceived as occupation; and in Afghanistan, in particular, occupation is resisted. It is simply their culture to resist outsiders, and they pride themselves on a long history of resisting outside influence.

Much of Afghanistan has not felt the presence, the impact of a central government in Kabul ever. And, as you said, I think a large part of our goal there is to encourage the people who are now deciding where their allegiance will be. It is causing them to decide to place their bet with a legitimate government, at whatever level that is. Whether it is a legitimate tribal, local, regional or Federal Government, it will come down to ultimately where they place their bet. And I think in absence of solid metrics, it will be our sense of where the people are beginning to place their bets that will lead us to understand whether or not our efforts are successful in the hinterlands of Afghanistan.

That will require a careful approach. It will require as small a footprint as we can get away with in the places we go, with the capability and the security considerations as part of that. It will require, I believe, more of a shift towards true local regional knowledge, however that is obtained.

We have to get beyond generalizations in Afghanistan, into true deep knowledge of tribal relationships, family histories, the nuances of the terrain and the weather, and how that affects how business is done, how money is made, how their world operates.

If we are to be predictable in our effects, I think an awfully large part of what we have got to develop is an ability to be—I said that wrong. I don't mean "predictable" in our effects, I mean "accurate" in our predictions of our effects. We have got to have a better sense of the impact of our behavior as we put our plans together to work in the remote regions of Afghanistan.

I think this is a long-term commitment for us in order to build that depth of knowledge, and then allow it to have the impact in the places where that needs to occur. This will not be people deciding overnight where their allegiance is. It is going to have to be convincing them over a long period of time that they are better off placing their bet with the local regional government than with the illegitimate power players in the region.

Mr. SMITH. As so frequently happens, in asking you that question, I thought of one more.

Shifting to Africa for the moment, I recently did a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) throughout many portions of Africa, but we went to Burkina Faso and we got a little bit of a brief on AQIM and sort of the surrounding area there—Mauritania, Mali, Algeria—and we know there is activity of violent extremist groups there. Al Qaeda has set up a franchise most present in Algeria, but also in vast areas of Mali and Mauritania that are largely unpopulated. We know that there is some activity from Al Qaeda-sympa-

thetic groups. We have some presence in different places, not a great deal.

How concerned are you about that area, and is that an area where we need greater coverage, at least in terms of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)? Because there are these huge, vast, open spaces out there. There is stuff going on but we don't have a lot of coverage of it, so we don't know exactly. Is that something we should be really concerned about or not?

Admiral OLSON. I think we should understand that as pressure is applied, as it was in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, and as the Pakistanis are applying pressure in Pakistan, that this will not necessarily end the activity. It will shift some of the sanctuaries to other places. And I think that in these large expanses of what are often called undergoverned regions, simply because the governments don't have the capacity to govern in some of the places where they have the will, then we have got to find ways of having a better understanding of what is happening there. ISR would be one of those possibilities.

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. Thank you very much. I don't think my colleagues have any more questions.

I just want to conclude by saying our subcommittee has many roles, but one them we consider to be the most important is being as supportive as possible to what the Special Operations Command is doing. We could not ask for a better partner than we have in you as the commander there. I look forward to continuing that relationship.

Thank you for coming out and testifying. We look forward to working with you.

With that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JUNE 4, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 4, 2009

**Statement of Terrorism, Unconventional Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee
Chairman Adam Smith
Hearing on FY 2010 Budget Request for USSOCOM**

June 4, 2009

“Today, the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee will meet to discuss the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act Budget Request for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This hearing provides us with an opportunity to review the status of the United States Special Operations Command and its policies and priorities. I would like to thank Admiral Eric T. Olson for attending and lending his expertise to this important discussion. We welcome you and your thoughts.

“The Defense Budget outlined by Secretary Gates recognizes that the threats we face today, and the emerging threats of the future, require us to make adjustments to our defense spending, including funding for our Special Operations Forces.

“SOCOM is a critical tool in our efforts to confront threats to our security around the globe and we must ensure it is postured and equipped to confront the enemies we face today and in the future.

“Furthermore, Secretary Gates articulated three strategic goals to be supported through the FY2010 defense budget request: Take care of our people; develop the right capabilities for today and tomorrow; and reform the procurement, acquisition, and contracting process. With this hearing, the committee looks forward to hearing how SOCOM plans to shift their investments to meet these strategic goals.

“Undeniably, improvements have been made to confront the enemies we face today and in the future, but much more must be done. This subcommittee will continue to evaluate our defense priorities and seek feedback from the professionals who implement these programs to ensure we are constantly updating our strategies to confront these ever changing, irregular threats.

“Again, I thank Admiral Eric T. Olson for being with us today and look forward to discussing this important issue.”

**Statement of Terrorism, Unconventional Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee
Ranking Member Jeff Miller
Hearing on FY 2010 Budget Request for USSOCOM**

June 4, 2009

Washington, D.C. – U.S. Rep. Jeff Miller (R-FL), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, today released the following prepared remarks for the subcommittee’s hearing on the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget request for the U.S. Special Operations Command:

“I would like to personally welcome Admiral Eric Olson here today. I passed through MacDill Air Force Base earlier this week and very much enjoyed your hospitality during my visit to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). I would especially like to thank you for your service to our nation and your testimony today.

“We are here to discuss SOCOM’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget request and overall mission preparedness. SOCOM plays a central role not only in on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in ‘Phase 0’ operations around the world—helping to keep volatile and instable regions from progressing further along the spectrum of conflict. Accordingly, the subcommittee and its members have been very engaged this session on issues such as irregular warfare and counter-insurgency, as well as more specific issues related to SOCOM’s operations.

“Currently, we are underway with our review of the Fiscal Year 2010 budget request and are taking a close look at how Secretary Gates balances capability against threat. Very appropriately, the Department’s priorities include taking care of people; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); irregular warfare; and global defense posture, among others. Given SOCOM’s prominent role in our nation’s defense, we seek to ensure the command is appropriately resourced for its many missions.

“Therefore, we will be interested in your view of what the appropriate force structure for SOCOM should be; how the 2010 budget resources that desired force structure; what authorities SOCOM needs to effectively conduct its mission set; and what needs to be done to better integrate SOCOM into interagency activities. Additionally, the 2010 budget summary speaks of adapting General Purpose Forces (GPF) towards irregular warfare. Many among us believe irregular warfare is where Special Operations Forces (SOF) operate best, so an explanation of how you see SOF and GPF operating in a coordinated and synchronized way in an irregular warfare environment would be most helpful.

“Ultimately, ensuring SOCOM is successful is one of this subcommittee’s highest priorities. Well before other forces arrive, SOF are on the ground; and well after other forces are withdrawn, SOF will remain—engaged in unilateral operations as well as working ‘by, with, and through’ coalition and partner forces. You can rest assured that America is thankful to have the dedicated and professional men and women under your command, even if many of their victories go unpublicized. I look forward to hearing your testimony today.”

ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Introduction and History

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report on the state of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Created by the Congress just over 22 years ago, the Command implemented its original charter and Title 10 authorities primarily as a resourcing headquarters, providing ready and relevant Special Operations Forces (SOF) in episodic engagements against threats to the Nation and its vital interests. Following the attacks of 9/11, USSOCOM quickly became a proactive, global and strategically focused headquarters while the joint special operations forces were employed primarily in decisive direct action missions against terrorists and insurgents. Throughout, we have also taken a long-term approach of engagement in CENTCOM and other regions, designed to forge enduring partnerships contributing to regional stability. This balance of direct and indirect actions, the combination of high-end tactical skills and an understanding of the operational context of their application, is the core of special operations. Success of special operations depends on USSOCOM's dedicated budget and acquisition authorities to meet SOF-peculiar mission requirements, heavily supported by general purpose force capabilities.

Combatant Command Functions

USSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing Department of Defense planning against terrorists and terrorist networks globally. In this role, we receive, analyze and prioritize the Geographic Combatant

Commanders' regional plans, and make recommendations to the joint staff on force and resource allocations. We also serve as an extension of the joint staff in the interagency arena. We have established effective collaborative venues to do this, collectively known as the global synchronization process. Because USSOCOM does not normally have operational authority over deployed forces, the plans and operations themselves are executed by the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

In October 2008, USSOCOM was designated as the Department of Defense proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA). This designation will cause USSOCOM to perform a synchronization role in global training and assistance planning that is similar to our role in synchronizing planning against terrorist networks. This role will be another collaborative effort that is nested within our existing global synchronization process.

Additionally, USSOCOM is now the Department's designated lead for countering Threat Financing. In this capacity, we advocate the Department's policies in direct coordination with our interagency partners, primarily within the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments.

Although synchronization is a robust daily activity, a key element is the semi-annual Global Synchronization Conference, coordinated and hosted by USSOCOM, designed to provide a venue for structured determination of roles, missions and priorities among organizations with equities in the outcome.

Military Department-like Functions

Special Operations Forces must be manned, trained and equipped to operate globally with unmatched speed, precision and discipline within a culture that promotes innovation, initiative and tactical level diplomacy. To enable this, USSOCOM has responsibilities and authorities similar to Service Departments and Defense Agencies. The key element of our ability

to assure the readiness of SOF is the Major Force Program (MFP) 11 budget line.

The people of the special operations community are its greatest asset, but we refer to MFP-11 as "the pearl of USSOCOM" because it is the single greatest contributor to our ability to train, equip and sustain our force. We are grateful for the wisdom of the Congress in providing MFP-11, and in its continued strong and knowledgeable support for the peculiar needs of special operations forces.

A manifestation of this support is the recent expansion of USSOCOM's Section 1208 authority for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009.

We pride ourselves on our understanding of the needs of our operational force and continually seek ways to accelerate delivery of essential equipment and systems. To this end, USSOCOM established a new Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T) in early FY09. S&T is responsible for technology discovery, technology developments and demonstrations, and rapid insertions of new capabilities to SOF in concert with our Acquisition Executive.

New to the S&T portfolio is a unique 'rapid exploitation' capability comprising a distributed network of SOF operators, technicians, engineers, and managers tasked to identify timely technical solutions to solve operational problems.

Development of the Three-Dimensional Operator

The complexity of today's and tomorrow's strategic environments requires that our SOF operators maintain not only the highest levels of war fighting expertise but also cultural knowledge and diplomacy skills. We are developing "3-D Operators" - members of a multi-dimensional force prepared to lay the groundwork in the myriad diplomatic, development, and defense activities that contribute to our Government's pursuit of our vital national interests.

Fundamental to this effort is the recognition that humans are more important than hardware and that quality is more important than quantity. Investments in weapons platforms and technologies are sub-optimized if we fail to develop the people upon whom their effective employment depends. Within USSOCOM, we strive first to select and nurture the extraordinary operator and then to provide the most operationally relevant equipment.

SOF Retention and Recruiting

SOF retention remains one of our highest priorities. The factors that most influence retention of the force are the quality of the mission, the quality of individual and family support, operational tempo and monetary compensation. In 2008, Congress granted a two-year extension of current SOF incentives designed to keep our senior operators in billets requiring their special skills and experience. Our retention is good, but long-term sustainability remains a concern.

In November 2008, thanks to a very positive response by the Secretary of the Army and the approval of the Secretary of Defense, we made progress in one of USSOCOM's high priority initiatives: increasing our level of regional expertise through the recruitment of native heritage speakers. As of today, over 100 legal non-permanent residents (LPNR) with special language skills and abilities have joined the Army under a pilot program. This new program, Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI), is something of a phenomenon within certain foreign populations of the United States and attracts highly qualified candidates. Some of these will serve in special operations units.

SOF recruitment and retention programs must be innovative, flexible and open to possibilities previously deemed impractical. We will continue to refine our overall recruitment and retention strategies in coordination with the Department and the Services.

Health of the Force

Special operations forces remain strong and ready despite an unprecedented operational tempo. They are, for the most part, doing what they joined the military to do and feeling that their impact is positive and meaningful. Still, we are asking a lot of them and their families, and we have every indication that they will be in ever-increasing demand.

We must continue to support our personnel and their families to confront the future fragility of the force. We know well that psychological trauma is often observed in the families before it is manifested in the SOF operators themselves.

SOF Care Coalition

USSOCOM recognizes the correlation between supporting our wounded personnel and their families and overall mission readiness. As such, we have continued to develop programs within our award-winning (both the 2006 Armed Forces Foundation's Organization of the Year, and the 2008 Navy SEAL Warrior Fund's "Fire in the Gut" Award), nationally-recognized USSOCOM Care Coalition that looks after our entire SOF family. The Care Coalition is a responsive, low-cost clearinghouse that matches needs with providers and currently supports 2,300 wounded SOF warriors with every benefit of treatment, recovery, and rehabilitation to improve their opportunity to return to duty or to succeed in post-military service. Working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the Department of Veterans Affairs, the USSOCOM Care Coalition has resolved myriad financial, logistical, social, occupational and other support issues for our wounded Service members and their families.

Service Enabling Capabilities

Demand for special operations forces is on the increase; yet, by their very nature, Special Operations Forces are limited in size and scope.

I am already on record as stating that SOF cannot grow more than three-to-five percent per year in those key units and capabilities that must be developed within our own organizational structures and training pipelines. This growth rate will not meet the already obvious appetite for the effects of SOF in forward operating areas.

The solution, beyond the necessary continued steady and disciplined growth of specific special operations capabilities, is to mitigate the demand on SOF by developing and sustaining supporting capabilities within the Services that are beyond their organic needs, and can therefore be used in direct support of special operations commanders. This will enhance the impact of forward-deployed SOF without placing additional demand on SOF's own limited enabling units.

The enabling capabilities that must be provided in greater number by the Services include mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close air support specialists, security forces and others that permit SOF operators to focus more directly on their missions. Assigned at the unit or detachment level to support joint SOF commanders away from main bases, the effects of such a combined force can be impressive.

Our goal is balance: first, to have sufficient organic SOF-peculiar enablers to permit rapid response to operational crises; and second, to have enabling capabilities assigned in direct support of SOF for longer term sustainment and expansion of the operation. We are and will be dependent upon our Service partners for key force enablers. The non-availability of these force enablers has become our most vexing issue in the operational environment. Another growing challenge, especially as we begin a responsible general purpose force drawdown in Iraq, is base operating support and

personnel security for SOF remaining in dangerous areas after the larger force departs, as SOF cannot provide for itself.

Personnel Management and Readiness Enhancing Authorities

Combat readiness depends on personnel readiness. Ready and relevant special operations forces can only be sustained with the recognition that our people, both our SOF operators and the full range of supporting personnel, are our top priority.

Although Title 10 holds the Commander, USSOCOM, responsible for the combat readiness of special operations forces, many of decisions and processes that impact SOF's readiness are held within the Services. To address this situation, Section 167 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act tasked USSOCOM to submit proposals to enhance SOF personnel management. The USSOCOM plan submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense contains initiatives intended to improve coordination of personnel management, including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention.

Budgetary and Acquisition Authorities

The Department's FY10 base budget submission, along with the Overseas Contingency Operations request, recognizes the increasing role of special operations forces (SOF) across the globe. As the Administration rebalances toward an Irregular Warfare (IW) portfolio, we anticipate the importance of, and Services support for, IW will continue to increase. USSOCOM is actively participating in the Department's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) with the view that the budget request before you this year will adequately serve as the bridge toward the results of the QDR and the FY11 budget submission.

In addition to an appropriate baseline budget, SOF readiness requires investment in the rapid fielding of both existing solutions and cutting edge technologies, even when the relatively small purchase quantities do not

optimize production costs. USSOCOM's aggressive use of our acquisition authority is a key factor in providing wide-ranging, time-sensitive capabilities to our widely dispersed and often isolated forces. Because our budget authority is limited to SOF-peculiar equipment and modifications, USSOCOM also depends heavily on Service acquisition programs that develop and procure Service-common mobility platforms, weapons, ammunition, and other equipment that we then modify to meet SOF's mission needs.

We are constantly evaluating our acquisition processes and looking for new opportunities to streamline and accelerate our acquisition procedures. An example of this is USSOCOM's Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA) process which provides a rapid acquisition and logistics response to critical combat mission needs statements (CMNS) submitted by deployed SOF. Most UDA capabilities are delivered to operational forces within six months after receipt of the requirement. We will continue to sustain and modernize the force by equipping our operators, upgrading our mobility platforms and further developing persistent ISR sensors and systems. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and their associated analysis and information distribution systems are now essential to success. Our needs for ISR are still undermet, and we must ensure that our ISR fleet is appropriately balanced for enduring global requirements. We will continue to rely on service ISR programs as we develop new capabilities to meet the dynamic special operations mission needs. We will continue our tactical focus with high-grade sensors on both manned and unmanned platforms. While some capabilities are truly SOF-peculiar and are within USSOCOM's processes, most special operations capabilities are based upon Service-provided systems. It is therefore important that we immediately and collectively transition from a platform-based acquisition cycle to one that is capabilities-based, wherein capabilities such as ISR collection suites or specific weapons packages can be "rolled on and rolled off" a

variety of ground, air, and maritime platforms to increase our tactical and operational reach. Implementation of such a cycle would allow USSOCOM to buy, try and modify capabilities without being constrained by Service platform considerations, and also would allow USSOCOM to upgrade modular capabilities at the pace of technology advancement.

SOF Mobility

Future SOF will require a robust mobility fleet tailored to global demand and an ever-changing strategic environment. Our intent is to recapitalize our 37 oldest C-130 aircraft with modern C-130J aircraft. The first platforms in this program are already funded. USSOCOM continues to evaluate the modernization options for the remaining aircraft to provide the optimum in force capability to the war fighter.

USSOCOM's Non-Standard Aviation program answers long-standing operational requirements for small team intra-theater movement in politically sensitive areas.

We continue to evaluate the proper aviation capacity tailored to each Geographic Combatant Commander's prioritized needs in order to provide troop and cargo movement, aerial refueling and surveillance or penetration of denied areas through higher readiness rates and increased aircraft availability. We continue to explore emerging technologies that will enable these missions to be performed in a higher threat environment.

The CV-22 remains one of USSOCOM's premier programs. This transformational platform provides sufficient speed for long-range vertical lift missions within a single period of darkness. The CV-22's defensive systems, enhanced situational awareness, and Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) capabilities provide greater survivability for SOF aircrews and ground operators. We decommissioned USSOCOM's fleet of venerable MH-53

Pave Low helicopters in October 2008, making accelerated delivery of CV-22 a top priority.

The proliferation of inexpensive and advanced surveillance technologies and capabilities threaten SOF's unique access capabilities, particularly in denied or politically sensitive maritime surface and subsurface environments. To meet both the known and projected threats, we continue to seek designs and technologies that permit special operations forces to go where they are not expected.

In 2007, USSOCOM commissioned an analysis of ways that the US military can clandestinely move special operations forces over strategic distances into and out of littoral, medium-to-high threat environments. This study, combined with several other exhaustive analytical studies, led to the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible (JMMS) program. JMMS will provide longer range transits, through extreme water temperatures, with greater on-station endurance than current SOF undersea mobility platforms; thereby permitting a wider range of options to answer national requirements. Additionally, USSOCOM needs to evaluate the potential to conduct long range, clandestine infiltrations by air.

USSOCOM also commissioned an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to address undersea mobility requirements in the 2015-2030 timeframe. The AOA was completed in February 2008 and confirmed the need for a new mobility system, now referred to as the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS). The SWCS program, initiated in 2008, will replace the legacy SEAL Delivery Vehicle and provide a significant increase in shallow water, clandestine access.

SOF Precision Strike Systems

Special operations forces require a family of precision strike systems to address current and future static and mobile targets. The current inventory and capabilities of AC-130 "gunships" and smaller manned and

unmanned platforms are insufficient to meet our need for guided munitions that minimize unintended deaths and damage. I intend to fill this capacity gap by installing a platform neutral Precision Strike Package on our existing MC-130W aircraft, and to field them as soon as practical. I will accept short term risk in SOF's aerial refueling fleet in order to do this quickly, recognizing that a future program will be required to address the resultant shortfall.

Security Force Assistance

As the designated DoD proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA), USSOCOM leads a collaborative effort to develop and provide DoD elements to enhance the capabilities of our allies and partners. We will assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense by recommending overarching priorities for force and resource allocation. Our product will be informed by several non-DoD government agencies, including the Department of State, and will be fully coordinated with the Services and Joint Forces Command. Our work in this very important area will include development of policy and legislative proposals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international military assistance programs.

One method by which USSOCOM is now able to assist in the development of foreign special operations capabilities is through the reallocation of funds under Section 1208 authorities.

USSOCOM also strongly supports the Administration's requests for Section 1206, Section 1207, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding.

Language and Culture Program Expansion

Last year we called attention to the importance of language and regional knowledge as essential to strengthening relations and facilitating

more effective operations with foreign partners. We initiated recruiting, training, and personnel management mechanisms, and partnered with OSD and the Services to expand the pools from which the Services recruit. As mentioned earlier, the MAVNI program is a small and growing success in this regard. Historical models, such as the Korean KATUSAs and the Alamo Scouts who operated in the Philippines during WWII, are also being evaluated. To meet more immediate tactical needs, we initiated steps to dedicate in-service translators and interpreters to our Army component for joint use. Individual development aimed at correctly aligning language testing, career management, and incentives remains important to our capability; therefore, we strengthened our institutional programs at the Army, Air Force and Marine Component level and worked closely with the Services and OSD to support our career model. We have a long way to go in recognizing and incentivizing such expertise as an operational necessity before we can truly develop and sustain real experts in specific key regions around the world. I call this "Project Lawrence," after T. E. Lawrence of Arabia.

SOF Personnel Growth

As stated earlier, our assessments indicate that SOF cannot grow more than three-to-five percent per year in those key units and capabilities that must be developed within our own organizational structures and training pipelines. And this growth rate will not meet the appetite for the effects of SOF in forward operating areas.

A partial solution is to mitigate the demand on SOF by developing and sustaining supporting capabilities within the Services that are beyond their organic needs and can be assigned in direct support of special operations commanders. This solution will enhance the impact of forward-deployed SOF without placing additional demand on SOF's own enabling units.

Looking to the Future

Today, USSOCOM is a strategic-level organization that addresses global threats to our national interests. USSOCOM observes trans-regional dynamics from a uniquely cross-organizational perspective. This perspective provides us with a comprehensive appreciation of the strategic environment that suggests that the type, scope, and scale of the security challenges facing our nation have changed significantly in recent years. In light of this knowledge, our approach to the security environment must be increasingly agile and adaptive.

The problems we must be prepared to address include the inability of nation states to deal with increasingly complex challenges or to meet the needs and expectations of their populations. These challenges are exacerbated by the growing number of non-state actors who have strategic effect in a networked and interconnected world. In the vacuum created by weak or failed governments, non-state actors have achieved greater influence over benign populations by addressing their basic needs and grievances, and by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing them into submission. When governments fail to address the needs of the population, they become irrelevant and the people will make choices that are shaped by their own immediate needs for survival.

One such choice is to leave their current situation in the hope of finding greater opportunity. As a result, uncontrolled migration is occurring across the world and the challenges associated with this dynamic are manifesting themselves in numerous ways. A few examples are the accelerating urbanization that is overwhelming many under-developed cities; the burgeoning diasporas that are becoming increasingly difficult to assimilate into host nation societies; and the continuing brain drain that hinders growth in the developing world.

Another choice that people make is to turn to non-state organizations, groups, or "super-empowered individuals" that demonstrate state-like capacities. In the best case, people will turn to a benevolent non-state actor such as a non-governmental organization, a moderate and tolerant religious group, or a local ethnic or traditional institution. However, we also see populations that must turn to extremist or criminal organizations, many of which are sponsored by rogue nation states. Non-state groups such as Al Qa'eda, Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, MEND, Jamal Islamiyah, FARC, and MS-13 are growing in influence and shaping the choices of populations as nation states fail to adequately address their needs and grievances. In short, non-state actors effectively compete for sovereignty with the traditional nation state system.

Taken alone, uncontrolled migration, extremism, or crime are significant problems, but in combination the difficulty and complexity of these problems grow exponentially. We see a dangerous convergence of these problems, producing corrosive effects across the entire nation state system. Our perception of what constitutes a threat to our national security ought to consider these non-traditional and persistent threats, and therefore, we need to strike the proper balance within the Department of Defense and across our government to address these threats.

USSOCOM favors a "populace-centric" approach in lieu of a "threat-centric" approach to national security challenges. More specifically, we believe that SOF must focus on the environmental dynamics and root causes that create today's and tomorrow's threats and adversaries. This belief requires an approach that is integrated with the long-term work of civilian agencies, especially the State Department and USAID, to foster US credibility and influence among relevant populations.

USSOCOM, as a strategic headquarters, applies an Irregular Warfare (IW) mindset towards national security. Irregular Warfare is a logical, long-term

framework that focuses on relevant populations and describes the activities that the Department of Defense will perform to support State, USAID and other civilian agencies to address the many complex environmental challenges that are emerging on a global scale. The Irregular Warfare approach seeks a balance between direct and indirect activities that focus on the operational environment within the context of interagency and international collaboration.

It is important to note that Irregular Warfare is not new to SOF. Unconventional Warfare, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, Civil-Affairs, Information Operations, Psychological Operations, and Foreign Internal Defense are traditional Irregular Warfare activities and historic SOF core activities. What is new is that an Irregular Warfare approach requires broader participation on the part of the entire Department of Defense. We must also develop the appropriate mechanisms to effectively mesh DoD Irregular Warfare activities with the diplomatic and development efforts of our interagency partners.

This comprehensive appreciation of the strategic environment is why USSOCOM is committed to developing the "3-D Operator." Understanding the synergy of development, diplomacy and defense, we see the "3-D Operator" as an essential element of a strategy that employs both "hard power" and "soft power" methods.

Conclusion

Thank you again for the opportunity to update you on USSOCOM Headquarters and the Special Operations Forces community. It remains a profound honor to be associated with this extraordinarily capable and uniquely innovative force and to represent them before this esteemed body.

USSOCOM headquarters will continue to lead and to manage the development and sustainment of the worlds most precise and lethal

counterterrorism force. We will provide the world's most effective special operations trainers, advisors and combat partners. We will provide advice and comment on issues of national security.

This great Nation's joint special operations forces will continue to find and kill or capture our irreconcilable enemies, to partner with our global friends and allies, and to pursue the tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies that will keep us ahead of dynamic threats.

You have much cause for deep pride in your special operations forces. They, and I, thank you for your continued service and support.

