[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING THE MERIDA INITIATIVE:
A REPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-109
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona DAN BURTON, Indiana
ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American ELTON GALLEGLY, California
Samoa RON PAUL, Texas
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
RON KLEIN, Florida
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
Mr. Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade Team,
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)........... 10
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement......................... 3
Mr. Jess T. Ford: Prepared statement............................. 13
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 36
Hearing minutes.................................................. 37
The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida: Prepared statement........................... 38
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement............... 39
Written responses from Mr. Jess T. Ford to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel................. 40
ASSESSING THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: A REPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Engel. The subcommittee will come to order.
Our hearing today is ``Assessing the Merida Initiative: A
Report from the Government Accountability Office,'' or the GAO.
On Sunday, 18 people were murdered in cold blood at a party
in northern Mexico. This came just 3 days after a car bomb
killed several people in Ciudad Juarez. And it came a week
after the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered
immigration judges to seriously consider granting asylum to
Guatemalan women who fear they will be murdered in a country
where more than 3,800 women have been killed since 2000.
Nobody can bring back the lives of the many people
tragically killed through drug-related and other violence in
Mexico and Central America. But if we are to avoid future
tragedies of this magnitude, we must redouble our efforts to
support a holistic security strategy.
Such a strategy must confront drug cartels head-on while
also investing in drug and violence prevention and treatment
programs, both in Latin America and here at home. One such
effort that I have championed here in Congress is the Merida
Initiative.
Today, the Government Accountability Office is releasing a
report that I commissioned, along with Ranking Member Mack, on
the Merida Initiative and the Central American piece of Merida,
which is now known as the Central America Regional Security
Initiative, or CARSI.
Let me start with the good news from the report.
In December, the GAO issued an interim report on the slow
speed of Merida assistance to Mexico and Central America. Since
then, the GAO reports that the Obama administration has picked
up the pace in getting essential equipment and training to our
partners in these countries.
I commend President Obama and Secretary Clinton for cutting
through our Government's red tape to get the Merida Initiative
moving. In the coming months, we must continue to expedite our
assistance to Mexico and Central America.
On a more disappointing note, however, today's report notes
that, nearly 3 years and $1.6 billion after the announcement of
the Merida Initiative, our counternarcotics assistance to
Mexico and Central America lacks fundamental measurements of
success.
Specifically, the GAO found that the State Department's
performance measures, and I quote from the report, ``do not
provide measurable targets and do not measure outcomes.'' As
the GAO report notes, and I quote again, ``Without targets to
strive toward, State cannot determine if it is meeting
expectations under the Merida Initiative.''
Now, I just want to say this, and I want to say it very
emphatically: Our long history of counternarcotics spending in
the Western Hemisphere demands that we had better define our
goals.
You all have heard me express my concerns in this
subcommittee about coordination of the Merida Initiative. The
GAO report notes that tracking Merida funds is difficult, as
each of the three State Department bureaus managing these funds
has a different method. It is really incredible to me that
there is still no consolidated database for tracking these
funds. If the State Department cannot track its own funding,
then how can we in Congress exercise appropriate oversight? We
can and must do better than this.
I have long called for a coordinator at the State
Department for our security programs in the Americas, and this
is just another reason why we need it. I have had this
discussion with Secretary Clinton, and she was favorable. I
hope we can move forward and get a coordinator for our security
programs in the Americas. This would help us in Merida funding;
it would help us understand what is happening with the funding.
It is ridiculous to keep calling the State Department and, each
time, getting a different person to find out what is really
going on with Merida.
With regard to the Central America Regional Security
Initiative, or CARSI, I was stunned to learn that the narcotics
affairs section at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City serves as
the account manager for funds destined for Central America. I
cannot understand why this extra layer of bureaucracy is
needed.
And, finally, unlike Mexico, in Central America there is no
formal coordination mechanism in place between U.S. agencies
and their host-government counterparts working on CARSI
implementation. This cannot continue and must be improved.
I would like to thank the Government Accountability Office
for its excellent report. In addition to Mr. Ford, who is
testifying here today, I greatly appreciate the contributions
from Juan Gobel, Marc Castellano, Marisela Perez, Erin Saunders
Rath, and Judith Williams.
Thank you.
And I now call on Mr. McCaul for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing on a foreign policy issue that I consider
to be one of the most important facing the United States and
Mexico.
I remember years ago traveling down to Mexico City with--I
see Congressman Cuellar just arrived. We visited with newly
elected President Calderon, talked to him. He said security was
his number-one issue. And he said, ``But I need your help,''
and, in a very bold way, asked for military assistance from the
United States. And I say that was bold for a Mexican President
to be able to make that ask. I am glad to say that we met that
request by President Calderon, and we began the Merida
Initiative.
Since that visit, though, about 25,000 people have died in
Mexico at the hands of the drug cartels. In recent weeks, we
have seen that violence escalate, the U.S. Consular Office in
Juarez being under attack, under siege; Nuevo Laredo; and this
past week, as the chairman referenced, a car bomb, in a sort of
Iraq-Afghanistan style, went off in Juarez, just south of the
border from El Paso, Texas, my home State.
Their expanding expertise reinforces the belief that the
cartels are actively working with terrorist organizations. And
it is crucial that the United States stand strong in its
commitment to dismantle the drug trafficking organizations and,
in doing so, that we uphold our commitments to the President of
Mexico, as he aggressively attacks the drug trafficking
networks.
He does not take this lightly, nor do I. We all know how
violent the situation is and how dangerous it is for the
Mexican administration to be cracking down on these very
dangerous elements that are exporting drugs into this country,
and violence.
The last hearing we held on this topic highlighted the slow
manner in which the U.S. assistance is reaching the programs
established under the Merida Initiative. I appreciate the GAO
coming here to testify, to report on possible improvement in
this area, as well as better coordination between U.S. agencies
supporting the Merida Initiative and with our Mexican
counterparts in securing our southern border against illicit
activity.
This coordination between the United States and Mexico
needs to be institutionalized as a standard of our bilateral
relationship to guarantee that progress cannot be undone. We
need to strengthen security of our borders, enforce the laws we
have on the books, and utilize the funds we have appropriated
for the Merida Initiative to address this violence and illegal
activity.
And as we hear from the GAO's witness on the
recommendations for better performance metrics in the Merida
Initiative, I will also be looking to hear how our current
strategy will address the balloon effect of the drug trade.
I must express my disappointment, as well, to the chairman
that, since this initiative has begun, only 46 percent of the
funds have been obligated and only 9 percent of those funds
have been expended. I understand that this takes time. I
understand that it takes time to build helicopters and military
hardware. But I hope, Mr. Chairman, for the sake of our two
countries, that we can expedite this very important initiative.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul, for an excellent
statement.
And I want to also add my voice to my admiration for
Mexican President Felipe Calderon, who I think has done a
really excellent job in confronting the drug cartels and
letting them know that violence and drug dealing is
unacceptable, and we are not going to just look the other way
and pretend it doesn't exist.
So, with that, I call on Mr. Sires for an opening
statement.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing.
Mr. Ford, nice to see you again.
Mr. Ford, I remain extremely concerned about the escalating
violence within Mexico and the precipitating violence against
American citizens in and around our own borders. The revised
strategy of the Merida Initiative has the potential to improve
programs already on the way and to decrease crime and violence.
However, my colleagues and I on this subcommittee have heard
numerous testimonies accounting the historical slow
distribution of the Merida assistance. And I fear that, while
this new strategy may provide the positive changes we need to
decrease violence, without changes in the distribution of
assistance this new strategy may not reach its full potential.
It is estimated that of $1.6 billion in Merida Initiative
funds intended to actively support projects in Mexico and
Central America, only about 46 percent of the funds have been
obligated, and only 9 percent have been expended. In recent
months, we have seen some equipment assistance and training
provided, but there still remains a much larger portion of
assistance that has yet to be allocated, making it extremely
difficult to fully understand the results the Merida Initiative
could provide in both countries. We must continue to find ways
that the Merida assistance can be allocated in the most
efficient and responsible fashion.
We must also continue to work with the Mexican agencies so
that we may better understand their needs and ensure
improvements are made within their agencies in order to
guarantee transparent allocation of funding. It has come to my
attention that the narco groups have circumvented the Mexican
Government's authority across agencies. And we must ensure that
the new Merida strategy aims to reduce this phenomenon and
decreases bloodshed in both countries.
Again, thank you, Chairman Engel, for holding this hearing.
And I look forward to Mr. Ford's testimony.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
Ms. Lee?
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for
this hearing.
And I want to welcome Mr. Ford to this committee. And I
want to thank you and your team at GAO for your efforts in
putting together this very thorough report.
Today's hearing is really very timely, as we work to
address the vicious spread of illicit drug use and
narcotrafficking in the United States and Mexico, which
continues, and increasing so, to devastate families and
communities at home and abroad. This report makes it obvious
that we need better monitoring and evaluation of our
counternarcotics assistance programs, which, as many of us
know, is true of our foreign aid programs more generally.
However, I have been critical, myself personally, from the
start of the initiative, in that it has focused overwhelmingly
on military aid and supply-side counter-drug efforts. If we
continue to operate in a vacuum and ignore the root causes of
drug trafficking and related violence, then we will continue to
see our counternarcotics efforts fail. We need to begin to
shift amounts of our foreign counter-drug assistance dollars
away from military and supply-side policing efforts toward
judicial reforms, institution-building, human rights, and at-
risk youth programs.
Also, I am a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on
State and Foreign Ops, and I requested that at least two-thirds
of our ESF and our INCLE funding in the Fiscal Year 2011
approps bill go toward good governance, rule of law, and human
rights activities.
Also, we need to aggressively and holistically address drug
use here in our own country at home and the societal harm that
drugs continue to cause. I support the bill that Chairman Engel
has introduced, the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission
Act, which passed the House in December. And it would create a
commission to evaluate not only our supply-side counter-drug
strategies but best practices around the world for demand-side
policies, as well.
Finally, let me just say, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ford, I
think we need to aggressively combat illicit arms trafficking
from our own country, which any expert in the region will tell
you is contributing significantly to the spiraling violence
that we are witnessing today. I wish we could reinstate the
assault weapons ban.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Ms. Lee. And I agree with you about
the illicit gun trafficking. That is something that we have to
deal with.
Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today.
I want to thank Director Ford for the GAO report and for
appearing before our committee today.
Almost daily, my hometown newspaper, the Houston Chronicle,
publishes stories on the violence taking place across the
border in Mexico. I am sure many of you have learned of the
senseless killing of 17 people this past weekend in Torreon,
Coahuila, a Mexican state that borders the Rio Grande River.
Media records indicate that the killings are believed to be
connected to the growing rivalry between two of Mexico's
largest drug trafficking organizations, the Gulf Cartel and the
Zetas.
Last month, Rodolfo Torre Cantu, the leading candidate in
the governor's race in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, which
also borders Texas, was assassinated. It has been reported that
the murder of Dr. Torre Cantu was also connected to the drug
war and the rivalry between the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas.
I am sure everyone is well aware of the murders of Lesley
Ann Enriquez, a staff member at the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad
Juarez; her husband, Arthur Redelfs, an El Paso sheriff's
deputy; and Jorge Alberto Salcido, the husband of a Mexican
employee at the consulate, this past March. These murders are
also believed to be linked to drug trafficking organizations.
The Congressional Research Service has reported that, in
2008, 5,100 people were killed in drug-trafficking-related
violence in Mexico. In 2009, that number grew to 6,500.
Understandably, people in our district and throughout the
Southwest are very concerned about this violence and its
potential to spill over into the United States.
Almost 3 years ago, the United States and Mexico agreed on
the Merida Initiative to stem the tide against organizations
like the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels, which are responsible for
bringing hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin into this
country and for eroding civil society in Mexico. Similar drug
trafficking organizations are producing similar results in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
This Congress and the American people are expecting
results, and we cannot afford to allow damaging effects of the
illicit drug trade and its related violence to continue. We
cannot allow further delays in Congress's efforts to provide
support to our neighbors. We cannot wait for months at a time
to go by, due to a slow negotiation between agencies.
This is one of the paramount security concerns of this
country and our people. We need results, and we need tools and
performance measures, and we need targets to strive toward.
This is necessary if we want to know if we are even winning
this war or if we need to examine this matter further and
redouble our efforts.
And, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, again, Director Ford, thank you for being here.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Green.
It is now my pleasure to call on Mr. Cuellar, who is not a
member of the committee but has done a lot of work with me on
these issues. And he chairs the Committee on Homeland
Security's Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism
Subcommittee. And we held a joint hearing, this subcommittee
and his subcommittee.
So, welcome, Mr. Cuellar. And you may make an opening
statement.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the leadership that you have taken on the Merida
Initiative. And, of course, thank the ranking member from
Texas, also, and the members of the committee for allowing me
to be here.
Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things we have to keep in
mind--and, as you know, I am from Laredo, Texas. I live on the
border. My brother is the sheriff down there on the border
itself. He has been doing narcotics with the State for about 27
years before that. So I am very familiar with what is happening
in Mexico.
The bottom line is, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the
things--and yesterday I was on a panel with the Mexican
Ambassador, and I know he doesn't like it when I say this, but
I think Mexico is where Colombia was in the 1980s, 1990s,
whether we say no or yes to that. But the situation is, one
thing we learned from there is that this is going to be a long-
term battle. It is not going to happen overnight, where we are
going to win this.
And this is why these performance measures are so
important, setting the goals, making sure that we address the
goals so we know whether we are winning or not. Because it is
going to take a long time.
I know we have some friends from SEDENA coming in tomorrow
to talk to us, and we will be talking to them. And I understand
what Ms. Lee is saying that, I think the first part of Merida
was on the military, but now we have to go into what we call
institution-building, the capacity-building, making sure the
judiciary system works well, making sure that the prisons, the
prosecutorial system, and, of course, professionalizing the
police.
If you look at a prosecutor on this side, that prosecutor
will have about at least a 95 percent chance of prosecuting
somebody. In Mexico, if you look at it, if they get caught--if
they get caught--and put in the legal system, the prosecutor
has less than a 2 percent chance.
So, therefore, in order to build up the institutions, it is
going to take time. It is going to take time. And as we build
the police force and as we start looking at the prosecutorial
system and, of course, the judiciary and the prison system, all
of this is going to take time.
And I think this GAO report is important because we need to
know what are the--not the big goals of the Merida Initiative
is, but what are the goals that we want to measure, and what
measures are we going to be using to measure those goals.
Otherwise, we won't be able to--you know, we can talk about
measuring activity. How much money have we spent? Nine percent.
How much has been obligated? Forty-something percent. I
understand, like Mr. McCaul and the chairman said, you know, it
takes time to buy helicopters, it takes time to do all this,
but eventually we are measuring activity--that is, buying the
equipment.
But I think what is important is, are we winning down
there? Because if they win down there, if they are successful,
and for us on the border, we live on the border, we have our
families there, we drink the water, breathe the air down on the
border, we want to make sure that that violence doesn't spill
over.
So, again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your
committee for the leadership that you are taking on this Merida
Initiative. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Cuellar. We are happy
to have you with us today.
I am now pleased to introduce our distinguished witness
today, Mr. Jess Ford. Jess is the director for international
affairs and trade at the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
where he has worked since 1973. He joined GAO in 1973 and has
worked extensively in international affairs, the national
security affairs area, concerning trade, foreign assistance,
and foreign policy issues. He has managed GAO audits of the
Agency for International Development, the State Department, and
the Department of Defense.
In January 1994, Mr. Ford was selected into GAO's Senior
Executive Service and is currently director, International
Affairs and Trade. He has directed the completion of numerous
studies on U.S. National security issues, foreign assistance,
counternarcotics, border security, and foreign affairs
management activities, and has testified before Congress over
40 times on these topics.
So, Mr. Ford, welcome to the subcommittee. We are all ears.
Obviously, the GAO had an important role to play in this
report, and we are very anxious to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF MR. JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND TRADE TEAM, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
(GAO)
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S.
support to Mexico and Central America on the Merida Initiative.
As you mentioned, crime and violence in Mexico and Central
America has continued to increase in recent years and poses a
threat not only to those areas but also to the United States,
particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border.
To address this growing narcotics and crime issue, in
October 2007 the United States and Mexico launched the Merida
Initiative, a $1.6 billion effort aimed at supporting law
enforcement. The Department of State manages the Merida
Initiative and, in cooperation with several other U.S.
agencies, is responsible for its implementation.
My remarks today are based on our report, which is released
today, entitled, ``Merida Initiative: The United States Has
Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs
Better Performance Measures.''
I plan to focus on three topics: First, the status of the
Merida program implementation; secondly, coordinating
mechanisms that are in place for the Merida program; and,
third, what the State Department strategy for implementation is
for the Merida program.
In brief, Mr. Chairman, we found that, while the United
States has provided assistance, better performance measures are
needed to improve the management and accountability of the
Merida Initiative.
The United States has delivered various forms of equipment
and training under the Merida Initiative. As was mentioned by
several members, as of March 31st of this year, 46 percent of
Fiscal Year 2008 and 2010 moneys have been obligated for this
program, and approximately 9 percent has been expended. This is
an improvement from what we reported back in December of last
year.
In Mexico, the United States has delivered items including
five Bell helicopters, biometric equipment, immigration
computer equipment, software, laboratory equipment, and
canines. In addition, the United States has assisted in the
training of over 4,000 Federal police recruits in Mexico, has
established a law enforcement academy in Mexico. And, in
Central America, it has delivered some forms of equipment,
vehicles, and training designed to address the crime and gang
problem in those locations.
While the pace of delivery has been slowed by a number of
implementation challenges, it has increased, as I mentioned, in
the last 6 months. Deliveries of equipment and training have
been delayed by challenges associated with insufficient numbers
of staff to administer the program, negotiations on interagency
and bilateral agreements, delays in the procurement processes
for some forms of equipment, some changes in local governments
which slowed the delivery of equipment, and funding
availability. U.S. agencies are working to address these
challenges, particularly the Embassy in Mexico City and in
Central America locations, who are attempting to expedite the
delivery of assistance.
The State Department has primary responsibility for
coordinating the Merida Initiative, which has diverse program
components that are being implemented by a wide range of U.S.
agencies under the leadership of the State Department. Although
State has not comprehensively documented its coordinating
structure for Merida, we were able to identify several of the
mechanisms they put in place to coordinate the program.
At the highest policy level, the National Security Council
is, of course, the primary agency for coordinating policy-level
efforts with Merida. Within the State Department, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for North America and Western Hemisphere
Affairs is the principal Merida coordinator. However, other
State Department offices, such as the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement and other bureaus within the
State Department, also have focal points who are involved in
the implementation of the Merida Initiative.
Similarly, at the Embassy level, there are several
coordinating mechanisms that have been put in place, both
internally, to coordinate all of the agency efforts at the
Embassy level, and a bilateral coordinating mechanism with the
Mexican Government, which we had an opportunity to participate
in during our visit there back in March.
At this point, there is no formal coordinating mechanism
for the Central American aspect of the Merida program. And we
are waiting to see how the administration will announce the
strategy under CARSI and what type of mechanisms they may put
in place to coordinate the program once that gets under way.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about the lack of
performance measures for the program.
Earlier this year, the United States and Mexico announced a
new strategy predicated on four goals: First, to disrupt
criminal groups; secondly, to reform rule of law and respect
for human rights; third, to create a 21st-century border; and,
fourth, to develop strong and resilient communities.
While the State Department has developed some performance
metrics for the delivery of assistance, we found that no
performance metrics have been established for any of these four
goals to date. For example, the State Department's strategic
documents do not include performance measures to indicate
progress toward achieving any of these goals or timelines for
all future deliveries and completion of Merida program moneys.
Our prior work has shown that including these types of
elements is important because it helps decision-makers
determine whether or not the program is being successful and
whether or not adjustments may need to be made if things are
not working in accordance with what the expectations of our
Government are.
In general, State Department's performance measures do not
align with the existing goals, do not establish targets to
measure against, and do not discuss what the outcomes are that
are expected under the programs. To address this issue, we add
in a recommendation in our report that the State Department
establish these goals. And they have told us they are in the
process of attempting to do this.
Finally, on the issues of timelines, we found that the
State Department has developed some timelines on deliveries of
equipment and training, but they do not have, at this point, a
comprehensive set of timelines for the delivery of equipment or
training for the entire program.
Again, we recommended in our report that they establish
such timelines, again, so you have a better understanding of
when things will be delivered, what the schedule looks like,
and, if they are going to make adjustments, you will be in a
position to understand what the adjustments are. Again, the
State Department in their comments to us on our report
indicated that they planned to address this issue and establish
better timelines for the delivery of both equipment and
training.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to conclude and try to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford.
Let me start with this. In your report, you argue that the
State Department's performance metrics for the Merida
Initiative do not provide measurable targets and do not measure
outcomes.
Can you give us examples of what specific targets and
outcomes you think should be measured by the State Department
in evaluating Merida? In other words, how should we define
success?
Mr. Ford. Okay, I think that is an excellent question. Let
me start with the basics first.
We haven't seen any statements of how they are going to
measure success under these new four objectives that they just
established with the Mexican Government. So I can only
notionally answer this in terms of what would be the kind of
metrics one might look for. I can't tell you that these are the
ones being considered by the administration at this point. So I
need to make that clear.
I mean, we have worked in the counter-drug area for years
at GAO, and there are areas where one could reasonably see
potential goals and objectives that can be measured to try to
judge the success of a program.
So, in the case of Plan Colombia, the goal was established
to try to reduce the level of cultivation of coca plants in
that country and the potential for production of cocaine over a
specified period of time. Specifically, it called for a 50
percent reduction over 6-year period.
We wrote a report on that in 2008, and we found part of the
goals were achieved in the area of poppy cultivation, and that
the goals for coca cultivation were not achieved, although
there were reductions. The most recent data issued by the ONDCP
indicates that, as of 2008, there has, in fact, been a greater
reduction in the amount of cocaine that can be produced.
Those metrics are available. There are numbers you can
measure against them, and you can track the progress on a year-
to-year basis. Now, that is just a notional example based on
the Colombia program, and I am not suggesting that that would
be one you would apply here in Mexico.
But the important point here is, you want to establish a
goal. You want to establish a benchmark you are going to
measure against. You want to establish a way of tracking that,
a target that you want to establish. And that helps one
determine whether or not you are moving the ball forward and
whether you are seeing progress. So that is notionally how we
see how you might be able to determine whether this program is
moving forward or not.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
In the report, you say that tracking Merida funds is
difficult because each of the three State Department bureaus
managing Merida funds has a different method for tracking. And
you note that the State Department currently has no
consolidated database for these funds. I mentioned that in my
opening remarks.
If the State Department can't even keep track of its own
funding, how can Members of Congress exercise oversight of the
Merida Initiative? This is obviously a serious problem. How
serious do you think it is? Does it go beyond Merida and impact
on our other foreign assistance programs? And, if so, what
needs to be done to fix this?
Mr. Ford. Okay, let me start by saying, yes, in fact, it is
a challenge for the State Department to provide, particularly,
real-time information on the current status of funding
obligations, expenditures, and also a delivery schedule on
equipment that is going to be provided over a specified period
of time.
With regard to the funding part of this issue, the State
Department's accounting system is not set up based on a concept
of programs. It is set up based on a concept of the funding
accounts that the Congress appropriates the money under. So,
for example, Congress provides money under the Economic Support
Fund concept. They provide money under the INCLE concept, which
is counternarcotics money that goes to INL. They provide money
under other budget accounts. And that is the way the State
Department's accounting system tends to track money, in terms
of obligations and expenditures.
What they do not do--and I can certainly say this for
Merida, and I can't say conclusively for other programs,
although I have reason to believe it is true, as well--is that
for programmatic programs that Congress puts out, they don't
have a readily available system to track, at a program level,
what obligations and expenditures are. And that is what the
problem is with the Merida program.
As we mentioned in our report, you have three different
bureaus in the State Department tracking money that Congress
has provided. Part of it is FMF money, part of it is the INCLE
money, and part of it is the ESF money that Congress has given
under this program. They have three different bureaus tracking
it. They don't all have the same process in place. They are
trying to put in place a spreadsheet, for lack of a better
term, that will enable them to get this information on a more
real-time basis so that they can give you answers to the
questions when you call them and say, ``Where do we stand as of
today?''
I brought an example. This is not a funding example, but
this is a spreadsheet that State Department created for the
delivery of their equipment to Mexico. And it is fairly
detailed. It gives you a good idea of what they have already
delivered and what they plan to deliver. But it is not
comprehensive, and it is something that they just put together
based on a spreadsheet. It is not based on any system they have
in place.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. McCaul?
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Ford, thank you for your testimony.
This is not all good news. There is no performance metrics,
or none have been developed, for any of the four goals stated?
Is that your testimony?
Mr. Ford. That is my testimony, but I want to add
something, if I might.
The original goals established under the Merida program in
2008 are different than the ones we have now. There are some
similarities. Those goals were more directly related to law
enforcement issues, interdicting drugs, supporting law
enforcement.
At that time, the State Department did, in fact, begin to
develop some performance metrics based on those goals. Now, we
critique some of those in our report. We said the goals that
they put in place, some of them were fine; others, they didn't
have benchmarks, they didn't know what the starting point was.
Some of them didn't have targets, so you didn't know--they had
a good goal, but they didn't know what the target was, how far
along do we need to be before we achieve something. So we
critiqued that in our report.
Unfortunately, what the State Department has done is, they
developed those on the old goals, and they haven't yet
developed any for the new goals. So that is why we are in an
awkward situation, where we know they have tried to do this
when they started the program, but now they are evolving into
something new and we haven't seen it.
Mr. McCaul. And there are three different bureaus tracking
the funding, according to your testimony?
Mr. Ford. Yes.
Mr. McCaul. How do you propose to fix that?
And I say that because we appropriated this money in Fiscal
Year 2008, $1.32 billion. Only 46 has been obligated; only 9
percent has been expended. In the current budget request for
2011, we have an additional $480 million. And yet we can't seem
to move this thing forward.
Mr. Ford. Okay, you know, I am not the administration, so I
am going to try to give you my perspective based on our work.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that.
Mr. Ford. I think in the beginning of the program there
were a lot of organizational issues that needed to be dealt
with. We didn't have many staff to administer the program in
Mexico, for example. The NAS down there, I think we had about
15 people, and now they are up to about 50. So part of it was
you just didn't have enough people to administer the program.
Then another problem was, we needed to sign letters of
agreement with the Government of Mexico, which authorizes the
exchange of the equipment based on certain laws and everything
that have to be met in our Government and in their government.
For the last two letters of agreement, it took an inordinate
amount of time for them to finalize them.
The first time they did this, it was our understanding that
it was because the two governments had not had a major program
expansion like this, and it was just a case of both governments
understanding the terminologies and what everybody had to do.
And that kind of explained why there was a delay the first go-
around.
The second go-around, I can't explain why there were
delays. But we know that the second letter of agreement, which
was just signed in May, which obligated another $200-some-odd
million, that agreement took several months. And we don't know
the reason why that took as long as it did.
And then you have the issues related to procuring major
pieces of equipment and how long it takes. Like Black Hawk
helicopters, you know, it takes 18 months or more----
Mr. McCaul. Can I ask you about that? I mean, we just can't
afford to delay anymore. There is a crisis going on on the
border and in Mexico.
And, you know, the helicopter issue is just one example.
When we talk to the manufacturers, they say, ``Sure, we can
build them.'' But there is a delay, as you testified to, in the
procurement process. What can we do to expedite that?
Mr. Ford. I am not sure for the big-ticket items like the
Black Hawks. It is not clear to me what can actually be--they
have to follow the procurement rules that are specified by DOD
and by law. I don't have an answer for how they can more
quickly acquire them.
I do know the State Department attempted to finance, I
think, three of the Black Hawk helicopters without going
through the FMF process that DOD manages, and that their goal
was to acquire those Black Hawk helicopters, three of them I
believe, more quickly than they could if they went through the
FMF process.
Mr. McCaul. My time is running out, but I just wanted to
end on this question. There has been some reference to
Colombia. How would you compare--now, Plan Colombia actually
eventually was a successful model. Are there lessons learned
that we can take from what we did in Colombia to what is
happening now in Mexico?
Mr. Ford. Well, I believe, based on our work there, that--I
am going to sort of mirror what Congressman Cuellar said. I
think that we need to accept the fact that it takes a while for
these things to turn around.
The beginning years of Plan Colombia, we had a lot of the
same sorts of problems that we are now talking about in Mexico.
We had problems with getting the equipment down there on a
timely basis. We had problems in being able to train the
Colombian police and the Colombian military to use the
equipment once we got it to them. We had problems with
negotiating agreements with the Colombian Government to ensure
that human rights were going to be honored as we increased our
security assistance down there.
There were a lot of what I would characterize as early
planning and implementation challenges in Plan Colombia. And if
you had measured that program in the first 2 or 3 years of its
existence, some of the things that I am reporting now probably
would have--you know, that is what happened then.
Eventually, we were able to turn that around, because we
did develop institutional capacity down there, not only with
the security forces but also with their judiciary and some of
the civil side. And that led to more successes, you know, in
terms of stabilizing that country.
So I am not saying that is a model, but I will say that I
believe patience is needed if we are going to try to change the
dynamic in Mexico in a manner that will reduce violence and
lessen the threat to our border.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Sires?
Mr. Sires. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Ford.
The shift away from military assistance toward a greater
assistance for civilian police training, do you see this
improving our ability to spend the money the right way, or do
you think it is going to be a hindrance, the shift away from
the fact that it is not as concentrated on the military?
Mr. Ford. Well, that is hard to argue, at this point. I
mean, let me say it this way: I think anything we do to improve
the law enforcement capability in Mexico is going to be a plus.
Spending resources on that and ensuring that we get what we pay
for and that the Mexican Government follows through with
building that capacity, I see that as a value to what we want
to achieve there.
I can't really comment on whether or not a shift from the
military to law enforcement is a good thing or a bad thing. I
just think that supporting the law enforcement community down
there is important, and if we are going to do that, we just
need to make sure that we do it effectively.
Mr. Sires. And you said we haven't spent any money on the
rest of the other countries? There is moneys in there for some
of the other Central American countries. Has any money been
spent?
Mr. Ford. Yeah. It is in our report. I am going to refer to
that.
Again, this is as of March 31st of this year. For the
Merida aspects of Central America, we had obligated about $65
million, which is about 25 percent of the amount that has been
allocated by Congress. And they expended approximately $20
million, which is, oh, maybe 8 percent. That is where we are as
of March.
Mr. Sires. Are we encountering the same problems there
also?
Mr. Ford. We are encountering--yeah. Yes. The answer is,
yes, we are, the same problems in terms of coming up with
delivery schedules that allow us to get the programs up and
running. We are running into the same issue.
The difference is, in Central America, we are not spending
a lot of money on hardware, like helicopters and things like
that. A lot of the money is for technical assistance and
training for law enforcement in those countries.
Mr. Sires. On that spreadsheet that you showed before, are
there fixed dates when certain things should be achieved or
anything like that?
Mr. Ford. With regard to items that are pending, they
report it three different ways. They have some by month, by
October 2010. They have some by 2010 or 2011. And they have a
couple of cases when they have a specific date.
Mr. Sires. That is just reporting, but it is not a goal?
Mr. Ford. No, this is their planned schedule for delivery.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any more
questions.
Mr. Engel. Okay, thank you, Mr. Sires.
Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Ford, President Calderon's government has expanded
its cooperation with the United States to a level unprecedented
in our bilateral relations historically. And there appears to
be more information-sharing and true partnership with Mexico in
the fight against drug trafficking.
Can you characterize the existing level of cooperation with
Mexico? And I don't know if you have a historical perspective.
Do these changes extend across the breadth of the working
relationships with the various ministries in Mexico, or is it
just certain ones that we have better luck with?
Mr. Ford. Well, first of all, let me comment sort of
broadly, since we issued a report in 2007 on the
counternarcotics program in Mexico, which was pre-Merida, and
the level of our effort at that time was much smaller than it
is today.
I can say, based on all of our meetings in Mexico, meeting
with not only U.S. officials, including all of our law
enforcement components, of course the Ambassador and other
people associated with dealing with all different ministries in
the Government of Mexico, almost uniformly we heard positive
feedback in terms of the level of cooperation that we are
getting from the Mexican Government in general.
Now, of course, like any other place, there are some
agencies within the Mexican Government that are a little more
reticent than others in terms of working with us. But, overall,
we heard very positive comments from virtually everybody we
talked to down there.
Mr. Green. I know it is interesting, having traveled to
Mexico it seems like my whole life, that joke about, ``We are
from the government, here to help you.'' If you go down to
Mexico and say, ``We are here from the United States and we are
here to help you,'' it is a problem, although I have noticed in
the last 2 years there has been so much more cooperation. And I
think President Calderon's leadership has been there for that.
In the GAO report, it shares that negotiating agreements
between beneficiary governments in reaching understanding with
the U.S. agency on implementation logistics can be time-
consuming. From your research, is there a more effective way
for these negotiations to shorten that time? And is it on us or
is it on the Republic of Mexico?
Mr. Ford. I would say it is a little bit of both. Some of
it is us. We just don't do a good job of--well, part of it is
just setting good expectations. When we were down there in
March, we talked to several Mexican Government officials who
sort of felt like they were instantaneously going to get them
equipment, or the U.S. Government said we were going to send
them brand-new armored cars, and they would be there within a
month or so, not realizing that it takes time for these things
to happen. So part of it is basically setting good expectations
with our partner.
And then, in terms of the actual implementation, clearly,
on our side there were delays, for lots of different reasons,
some of which I articulated earlier. And then, I think on the
other side, on the Mexican side, in some cases they weren't 100
percent always clear about what exactly they wanted or what
they really needed.
And what they are doing at the Embassy to address this
issue is they have established a formal working group with
Mexican officials and U.S. officials. They are going to work
together so these day-to-day problems can be resolved.
Hopefully, that will help expedite the delivery of the
assistance.
Mr. Green. Okay. And I know the three bureaus have tracked
the funds in the State Department--and you have discussed that.
Is it possible for any of these agencies on the U.S. side to be
merged, so we can see maybe fewer decision-makers and more
decisions being made?
Mr. Ford. Yeah, I think that--well, first of all, let me
say this: The State Department recognizes they have this
problem, that they cannot readily track the moneys, that they
have sort of a fragmented approach. They have indicated to us
they are going to try to address that, or they are in the
process of trying to address it, by coming up with a more
streamlined system. We haven't yet seen that, so I can't really
comment on it, in terms of whether I think that is going to fix
the problem.
But the fact that they recognize that they need to put
something together that will provide more real-time information
to Congress on what is really going on I think is a step
forward. The real key is, can they really implement something
that will allow you all to get information on everything that
is going on? Right now, it is fragmented.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My frustration, I guess, is that this has been going on,
and I know it was a President Bush initiative, but I would hope
we would see much more quicker response on the United States's
part, because this problem is in Mr. Cuellar's district, in my
district, and it will be in New York, and of course Mr.
McCaul's district in central Texas. And if we don't help our
neighbors in Mexico, it will surely be in our backyard.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you. I certainly agree. And we will
keep exploring this. Thank you, Mr. Green.
We have been joined by Ms. Giffords of Arizona. And I am
going to give her an extra minute so she can incorporate her
opening statement into her questions.
So, Ms. Giffords, you have 6 minutes.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Ford, thank you for joining us today.
It is interesting, when you look back from the first
conversations we had a couple of years ago under the former
administration about the Merida plan, and we had a lot of
questions and a lot of skepticism. And the challenge for us is
how we support the Calderon administration, which is really
doing some very heavy lifting in a very, very difficult
situation, but also having the ability to go to back to our
constituents and our taxpayers, those of us who actually live
on the border, and explain and justify to them this
extraordinary amount of money that we are, of course, sending
to Mexico.
I come from the worst part of the district, so if I sound a
little angry, it is because I am. I represent half of the
Tucson sector, which, by far--about 10 years ago, we had over
700,000 apprehensions. And last year we were down to 242,000
apprehensions, but over 1.2 million pounds of marijuana was
actually seized in my sector.
And when people say that the border is more secure now than
it has ever been, I beg them to come down and actually talk
directly to my constituents, to the ranchers out in Cochise
County, to the Krentz family, who had a family member that was
murdered on his own land, and explain how much safer it is,
when their property values have absolutely plummeted and they
don't feel safe.
So the challenges we have--and I was fortunate to have the
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee with us a couple of
weeks ago down for a border tour and for a chance to spend time
with the ranchers and to do a rancher town hall meeting, for
the chairman to hear directly about what is working and what is
not working. And, with that, we had the sector chief of the
border patrol alongside.
And so, my questions--and, again, I know we are talking
about different programs; we are talking about north side of
the border and south side of the border. But the reality is, it
is all one big area when it comes to drugs that are moving up
northward and we have cash and arms going in the other
direction. And if we are going to get operational control of
the border, we are going to have to think bilateral.
And so my question to you is, what sort of coordination is
going on with the expenditure of the Merida money and the plans
with the sector chiefs, particularly in the worst areas of the
border?
Mr. Ford. Okay, that is a very good question. Here is my
challenge in answering that. We know that there are a lot of
efforts between our Government and Mexico on the border being
undertaken primarily with DHS, ATF, the law enforcement
community, State and local government. Many of those
activities, as far as we know, are not really connected to the
Merida program in terms of the assistance that we are providing
to Mexico.
There are some programs that are directly related to the
border, such as providing communication equipment. For example,
the Department of Defense is providing communication equipment
to their counterparts. ATF is running their gun-runner program,
which is on the border. ICE has their gun program and their
anti-smuggling programs.
A lot of those efforts, to our knowledge, are not directly
associated with the Merida program. So I can't answer your
question holistically in terms of what our Government is doing
on the border. I know there are lots of things going on. We
didn't study in detail many of those other programs for this
particular job that I am reporting on.
But to the extent we had information about what we are
providing to the Mexican counterparts--like, the customs
service, we are giving them equipment; we are providing canine
units to prevent smuggling--that should work for both sides of
the border, there are a number of things we are financing with
the Merida money.
But it is only part of, I think, your broader question,
which is, what is the government as a whole doing to protect
the border? And I don't know enough about how to answer that
for the whole government. But I will say, for the Merida
program, there are programs designed to help address the border
specifically, not just the broader going after the drug
traffickers.
Ms. Giffords. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ford, you know, when you
are actually on the front line and you have spend a lot of time
with the law enforcement agents and the border patrol and the
people that live there, you know, it becomes pretty--and then
you look at the numbers, and the numbers just speak for
themselves.
You know, the Tucson sector has more than all of the other
areas combined, when it comes to seizures of narcotics. So,
there is potential on all sorts of coming in from the Canadian
border or on the coasts, but the reality is it is coming
through Arizona right now in huge, huge numbers.
So with the deployment of the National Guard that is going
to start in a couple of weeks, we are spending a lot of money
on bringing the Guard in. We have a huge supplemental we are
waiting to have the Senate pass through with $700 million, as
well, that is going to go toward increased Border Patrol and
ICE agents and, you know, a huge increase of resources.
But if the coordination isn't taking place--and I beg
people to come down, drive along the border, and see if you see
one Mexican vehicle patrolling--one. I mean, of all of the time
that I have been in Congress and all the time I spend out
there, I have never seen one vehicle on the other side of the
border--not one camera, not one radar system, not one balloon,
not any type of surveillance.
So, you know, the numbers speak for themselves. You know,
we are spending a lot of money, and I am not saying it is a
waste. I am just saying that we know where the drugs are coming
in, because we can just estimate by the seizures that we have.
Yet, here we are spending money. We have DOD money, we have
Department of State money, we have DHS money, we have a lot of
money flowing. But when you talk to my sector chief that is on
the front lines, he is not being asked, you know, ``Should we
put the resources south of Douglas or south of Nogales?'' No
one is talking to him.
And that is where I just--I don't get it. I don't know how
we can sit here and, with straight faces, talk about why this
is a good program if that just on-the-ground coordination is
not taking place.
Mr. Ford. You know, I don't know what to say. I mean,
again, part of the reason we think that they need to develop
these metrics we talked about is so that you can get an answer
to that question. Right now, I don't see any way how the
administration can answer that because they don't have a way of
saying whether or not the border effectiveness, from the
Mexican side, is being improved because of our money. There is
no way for us to know that, at this point.
Ms. Giffords. And, Mr. Chairman, you know, I would love to
work with you and others to figure this out. Because,
obviously, this is an extraordinary sum of money that we are
spending to secure the border and to try to reduce the amount
of drugs that are smuggled in. But if we don't have the metrics
and if we don't have a coordinated plan, then I would argue
that we need to rethink this.
Mr. Engel. Well, let me just say, Ms. Giffords, I would be
delighted to work with you. As you well know, I have a Tucson
connection, with my son graduating from the university there.
And I am hoping that your constituents do know that you are
doing an excellent job fighting for these things. And I do hope
we can have that hearing in Tucson or around Tucson before the
end of the year. So I look forward to working with you on that.
As you can tell, we have been called for a vote, but we
have been joined by Mr. Meeks of New York, who says he has one
quick question before we adjourn.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And my question is not exactly like the gentlelady from
Arizona's, but it is similar in regards to coordination. We
know that when we initially started talking about Plan
Colombia, we had to work out some things, and I think, finally,
we have it working.
But coordination is the key to success. And I know that we
have initiatives now in Central America and initiatives in the
Caribbean. And some argued against the Merida money initially
because they say what happens is you close it off at one end
and the drugs will come through another end.
So I am wondering whether or not you are also looking at
the coordination between Central America and the Caribbean, so
that it is not that, you know, one end going one way, then it
goes someplace else, all still coming into the United States.
And where it is Arizona that may have the key problem today,
but it could be Florida tomorrow.
Is there any coordination between the Merida Initiative and
the Caribbean and Central America? That is my question.
Mr. Ford. Okay. The short answer is I don't know, because
the CARSI program that has been announced, the administration
hasn't put its strategy out yet for that, so we don't know
exactly what we are trying to do there. We don't know who is
going to exactly administer the program.
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which I presume is
linked to that, same thing: We don't quite know what the
strategy is and what the implementing pieces of that are going
to be.
The Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy that was
promulgated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
which involves many U.S. agencies on the border designed to
stop the flow of arms, bulk cash, and other things, we are not
quite sure who is responsible for coordinating that, along with
these other initiatives.
So my answer to that is, I think it is important that
Congress ask the administration how they plan to coordinate all
of these security initiatives. There may be a notional idea of
how they plan on doing it, but we haven't seen it. And so I
don't know how to answer that.
If you are asking me, do you think we have a coordination
mechanism in place, I don't know that, at this stage.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, you know, I was and am a big supporter of
Merida, but we have to make sure that we know how the money is
being spent and that it is being coordinated so that we know
that we are getting the best bang for our buck. Otherwise, we
need to rethink what we are doing, because if it is not doing
anything, we don't need to just throw money away.
So I would join Ms. Giffords in that vein, in saying, if we
are doing it and we are doing it right, I am all for it, let's
do it. But if not, then we need to rethink what we are doing.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Ford, I want to thank you for your very excellent
testimony. I actually agree with everything you have said, as I
have agreed with everything that has been said up here. I think
we are all in sync on this and we realize how important it is,
in terms of making sure that Mexico gets the help it needs but
making sure that, when we send the help, it is being used
properly. And I think we all have a stake in that. So I want to
thank you for testifying.
I want to thank Mr. McCaul for ably filling in for Mr. Mack
today. And Mr. McCaul, of course, is always a very valued
member of this subcommittee, as well.
So, again, Mr. Ford, we look forward to continuing this
discussion with you.
And the subcommittee hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
Minutes deg.
Mack statement deg.
__________
Smith statement deg.
__________
QFR--Engel deg.
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[Note: The GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, ``MERIDA INITIATIVE,
The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support
but Needs Better Performance Measures,'' was submitted for the record
but is not reprinted here. It is available in committee records or may
be accessed via the Internet at: http://www.hcfa.house.gov/111/
GAO072110.pdf.]