[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-147]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2010
______
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 25, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Requests from the U.S. Pacific
Command and U.S. Forces Korea.................................. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 25, 2010......................................... 33
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Sharp, Gen. Walter L. ``Skip,'' USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea 5
Willard, Adm. Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 40
Sharp, Gen. Walter L. ``Skip''............................... 83
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 37
Willard, Adm. Robert F....................................... 44
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 111
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 115
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 25, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Today, our committee will
continue its posture hearings.
Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the United States
Pacific Command [PACOM]; General ``Skip'' Sharp, Commander of
United States Forces in Korea [USFK].
At the outset, let me welcome both of you back to our
committee and thank you for your excellent leadership. We are
downright proud of you. We all thank the troops that you lead
along with their families and the incredible service and
personal sacrifice that they have.
There is an ever-present danger that we in Washington are
so focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iraq that security
challenges elsewhere in the world don't get the attention that
they merit. More concretely, as a result of the last nine years
of operations, the readiness posture of all the combatant
commands outside of the Middle East has suffered, creating a
high strategic risk. There are clear examples of these problems
in the Asia-
Pacific, and I believe that we ignore them to our peril.
Let me review just a few of the daunting challenges ahead
in the Asia-Pacific area. The rebasing of United States Marines
from Okinawa to Guam is one of the largest movements of
military assets in decades, estimated to cost over $10 billion.
The challenges are there.
Changes planned as part of the move not only affect our
bilateral relationship with Japan, they will shape our
strategic posture through the critical Asia-Pacific region for
at least 50 years, yet the path forward remains unclear.
Japan is reassessing the agreement to move troops from
Okinawa to Guam. It does not appear that the budget includes
sufficient funds to accomplish the agreement. And the
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] has identified problems
with the rebasing plans' environmental projects.
We must get this right, and I assure you that this
committee will work to make sure that we do.
Last year, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile over
Japan, conducted a second nuclear test, kicked out inspectors,
pulled out of the Six-Party Talks, and restarted its nuclear
facilities. All this occurred in the context of an uncertain
leadership and succession environment that may have fed some of
these very concerning events.
At the same time, our presence in South Korea is
transforming. We are undertaking tour normalizations in Korea
and substantially relocating our forces in an effort we will
hear about today.
There are also questions about how the new U.S. and South
Korean command relationship started in 2012 will work. And I am
interested in an update on those issues.
Never to be forgotten in this entire region, of course, is
China, which recently suspended high-level military and other
contracts with our country in response to a U.S. arms sale to
Taiwan. While China announced a defense budget increase for
this year, it is less than it has been in the past. Their
budget is still growing rapidly, and the linkage between their
stated strategic intentions and their actions remain unclear in
certain areas.
China conducted an unexpected midcourse missile
interception test earlier this year, and reports of cyber
attacks from China against Google and other large U.S.
companies continue to be troubling. We must be proactively
engaged in the Asia-Pacific region on multiple fronts. We must
realize that our own actions may well influence the choices and
actions of others.
We must be able to pursue opportunities for security
cooperation with regional allies and partners. And that is very
important. At the same time, we must ensure that our force
posture allows us to deter or to confront any security
challenge that might emerge in that part of the world.
We have difficult work to do. I am pleased that the
Department of Defense [DOD] and this Administration have
already taken a number of positive steps in this direction.
I now turn to my Ranking Member, my friend, Buck McKeon,
the gentleman from California, for any statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we conclude our series of posture hearings with the
Commanders from U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. I
would like to welcome back Admiral Willard and General Sharp,
both of whom have traveled great distances to be with us this
morning.
I am glad we were able to spend the whole week here so we
wouldn't have to ask you to come back again.
Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and service to our
Nation, and please pass on my gratitude to our extraordinary
military men and women who are serving in the Asia-Pacific
region to protect Americans' national interests.
Gentlemen, you are no strangers to this committee. Admiral
Willard, when you were here a couple of months ago, we had an
opportunity to examine the Administration's policy toward China
and how such a policy is aligned with our overall approach to
the region.
Let me begin with where our discussion left off in
January--with my speculation, or rather my fear, that the China
threat would be downgraded to justify last year's and future
cuts to key defense programs. According to open-source reports,
the White House National Security Council [NSC] directed U.S.
intelligence agencies to lower the priority placed on
intelligence collection for China.
If true, I am interested in hearing what impact, if any,
this would have on PACOM's ability to understand China's
military modernization. You can provide this information in a
classified format if you prefer.
Now, turning to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR],
when we last met, Congress was weeks away from receiving the
final draft of the QDR. What we know now is that, unlike the
2006 QDR, which explicitly called out China as having the
greatest potential to compete militarily with the United
States, the most recent QDR understates the requirements
required to deter and defeat challenges from state actors, and
it overestimates the capabilities of the force the Department
would build.
While the QDR did an excellent job of delineating the
threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities, notably
China, it does little to address the risk resulting from the
gaps in funding, capability, and force structure. This is where
I would like to focus our discussion.
Admiral Willard, how would the U.S. assess China's
intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive
technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial
as well as for nuclear, space, and cyberspace? As you know, it
is vital for our national security interests that it maintain
an upper hand when it comes to America's capabilities to
project power in China's neighborhood and reassure our allies
in the region.
From the PACOM perspective, do we have the right range of
capabilities to counter China's anti-access/area-denial
capabilities? How is PACOM adjusting in its scenario planning
to ensure we maintain access to the global commons and
proximity to Taiwan?
Are we making the necessary investments in updating our
scenario planning to take into account advances in these anti-
access capabilities in the mid- to long-term?
I think it is critical this committee ensures that we
maintain our military superiority in undersea warfare and in
environments where there is advanced anti-aircraft, ballistic
and cruise missiles, and cyber and space threats. China is not
the only nation of concern, but it is one that requires our
immediate attention.
I would like to emphasize that this is not an over-the-
horizon problem, but it is a gap that we face today.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you in this
regard.
Now, turning to a nuclear-armed, missile-ready, and
unstable North Korea. Since last year's posture hearing, North
Korea conducted a nuclear test, and we have seen considerable
developments in its short-, mid-, and longer-range missile
programs.
We know that North Korea has a history of cooperating and
proliferating with such nations as Syria and Iran.
Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I hope that you will
address the following questions. First, how do we define the
outlook of North Korea as both a regional and global threat?
How is the United States working with our key allies in the
region to expand our defensive capabilities?
Also, as we hear more about increasing demands for missile
defense in Europe and the Middle East, I would like to learn
what that means for the Asia-Pacific AOR [area of
responsibility] and if assets will be taken away from PACOM.
Again, I look forward to an informative and candid
discussion, and I thank you for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my entire statement be
included for the record where I address other issues facing
PACOM and USFK.
The Chairman. Without objection, the statement will be
submitted for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
The Chairman. Before I ask each of you to testify, we wish
to welcome the Admiral's wife, Mrs. Donna Willard, and thank
you very much for being with us today.
Admiral, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, so that we can get to the committee's
questions sooner, I will keep my remarks brief. But I ask that
my full statement be included for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Admiral Willard. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the United States Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific
region. Seated behind me, as you have already acknowledged,
sir, is my wife, Donna, who has been at my side for 36 years.
She is an outstanding ambassador of our Nation and a tireless
advocate for the men and women of our military and especially
their families.
I also would like to thank you for your interest in our
area of responsibility. I have either met many of you en route
to the region, or I have followed your travels in the region
with great interest. Your presence and interest sends a strong
message, and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on
your way into the region so my staff and I can brief you on the
security environment or on your return trip in order that I may
hear your insights from the engagements that you encounter.
Today is my first posture hearing as the Commander of
United States Pacific Command. Since taking command last
October, I have had the chance to meet with many of my
counterparts, travel throughout the region, and exercise
several of our contingency plans.
When combined with my previous years of experience in the
Asia-Pacific, this has led me to the following conclusions,
which I hope that we can expand on during today's hearing.
The Asia-Pacific region is quickly becoming the strategic
nexus of the globe as a consequence of its economic expansion
and potential. Key to our commitment in the region is our
forward-deployed and postured forces. We face constraints in
building partner capacity from shortfalls that exist in our
security assistance programs.
The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-
Pacific though China's rising influence is changing regional
power dynamics in ways that create both challenges and, I
think, opportunities.
Advancing our relationships with our allies and strategic
partners is vital to maintaining security in the region. China
continues to progress in the rapid, comprehensive
transformation of its armed forces, elements of which appear
designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region.
And, finally, India's strategic location, shared democratic
values, growing economy, and evolution as a regional power
combine to make them a partner with whom we need to work much
more closely.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Asia-Pacific
region is a region of great potential and is vital to the
interests of the United States. Every day, the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians of Pacific Command are
working with our allies, partners, and friends to help maintain
this region's security. Our success has been enabled by this
committee's long-standing support. You have provided us with
the most technically advanced systems in the world and with
military quality of life worthy of the contributions of all of
this volunteer force.
On behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the
United States Pacific Command, thank you for your support and
for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture of this
critical region of the world.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you.
This is not, by any means, the first appearance of our
friend, General Sharp, and I want to welcome you back, and we
would love to receive your testimony.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WALTER L. ``SKIP'' SHARP, USA, COMMANDER,
U.S. FORCES KOREA
General Sharp. Chairman Skelton and Congressman McKeon and
distinguished members of this committee, I do appreciate this
opportunity, and I am honored to report to you today on the
state of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and
U.S. Forces Korea.
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean War.
Since 1950, Congress and the American people have made an
enormous investment in blood and treasure to first defeat and
then deter North Korea aggression. The alliance continues to
reap the returns of that investment.
The Republic of Korea bears the majority of the burden of
defending itself, and in 2012, wartime operational control
transitions from Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint
Chiefs of Staff [ROK JCS]. Beyond its borders, the Republic of
Korea has become an important part of the international efforts
to keep peace and respond to disasters. With significant forces
deployed to Lebanon, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, and other
missions, the Republic of Korea is fast becoming a global
strategic ally envisioned by the 2009 Joint Vision Statement
signed by Presidents Lee and Obama.
With our long-term commitment of 28,500 troops, we continue
to deter aggression and maintain peace not only in the Korean
Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia. Last year, I spoke
about three command priorities. And thanks to your support and
funding, I am able to share with you the progress that we have
made since then.
First, the United States Forces Korea, in the Republic of
Korea-U.S. alliance, is prepared to fight and win. I flew here
directly from our annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle combined
exercise. This exercise demonstrated that the United States and
the Republic of Korea Forces and staffs are trained and ready
to fight tonight on the Korean Peninsula.
Second, the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance continues to
grow and strengthen. Militarily, we will be prepared to
transition wartime operational control to the ROK JCS on 17
April 2012. In last year's Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise, we
successfully stood up and tested many of the post-OPCON
[operational control] transition command and control structures
and organizations.
Through our strategic transition plan, future Ulchi-Freedom
Guardian exercises and the final certification exercise will
ensure the readiness of the ROK JCS to accept wartime
operational control in April of 2012 and the ability of the
U.S. Korea Command to become the supporting command.
The Republic of Korea is also deferring a significant
portion of U.S. Forces Korea costs. Under the five-year Special
Measures Agreement, Korea will provide U.S. Forces Korea with
approximately $700 million per year of cost-sharing funds.
My third priority is improving quality of life for the
command personnel. We are making substantial progress here, and
with Congress' support, we will achieve all of our goals. We
are improving the quality of life through two key initiatives.
The first is the relocation of U.S. forces.
By consolidating U.S. forces from 105 facilities maintained
in 2002 to 48 sites in two hubs, we will make better use of
limited resources and be better postured to support our service
members and families.
The second initiative toward normalization goes hand in
hand with the relocation. As we consolidate bases, we are
building world-class facilities in housing that are
transforming U.S. Forces Korea from a command where one-year
tours are the norm to one where single service members serve
for two years, and those with families stay for three.
In the last 2 years since June of 2008, the number of
families on the peninsula have increased from about 1,600 to,
today, over 3,900 families. By keeping trained military
personnel in Korea for normal tour lengths, we retain
institutional knowledge and create a more capable force and are
better able to support the alliance and deter aggression and,
also, demonstrate our commitment to Northeast Asia.
At the same time, we are eliminating unneeded,
unaccompanied tours and building the strong families that are
key to retention and the effectiveness in this time of ongoing
conflict.
To close, the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance has never
been stronger. The alliance has successfully deterred
aggression on the Korean Peninsula for 57 years. In doing so,
it has helped to make Northeast Asia a remarkably peaceful and
prosperous place.
With the Republic of Korea contributing a substantial
portion of the alliance costs, we are maintaining combat
readiness and improving the quality of life of our military
personnel and their families.
I thank you for supporting the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines, and DOD civilians and their families serving our great
Nation in the Republic of Korea. And I look forward to the
questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in
the Appendix on page 83.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Admiral, bring us to date on the proposed plan of moving
8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. How is it today? What are
the major challenges that you see?
Admiral Willard. Mr. Chairman, the Defense Posture Review
Initiative, the DPRI, the realignment arrangement with the
Government of Japan, has been ongoing for some time, and
contains many moving parts, to include the movement of air
forces and consolidation from urban areas on the main island of
Honshu to other attendant smaller moves throughout Japan.
And as you suggest, one of the main thrusts of this is the
relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
Currently in discussions with the Government of Japan is
one element of the Marine Corps move that has to do with an
airfield relocation at Futenma, which is the rotary-wing Marine
Corps lift that is attendant to our Marine Air-Ground Task
Force in Okinawa. And this--the new Government of Japan has
chosen to relook at the Futenma replacement facility issue, and
we are looking forward to their response back, which Prime
Minister Hatoyama has contended will be by next month or--
excuse me--by the month of May.
So we are looking forward to hearing back from the Japanese
on this review.
In our assessment, across Okinawa, having discussed this
with the Japanese for about the last 17 years, we believe that
the current plan for the Futenma replacement facility is the
best plan on the island of Okinawa.
Other issues with regard to the movement of 8,000 Marines
to Guam pertains to Guam itself. And as has already been
suggested in opening statements, there is an ongoing draft
environmental impact study, and we are presently in
negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] on
criticisms of the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] thus far
which I would be happy to explain in greater detail if you
would like. But the EIS is scheduled right now to be concluded
with a Record of Decision by late summer. And we are
aggressively pursuing the corrective actions that may come with
the discussions with EPA.
But to answer the issues pertaining to the EIS in time, to
then execute the budget for Guam that has been established thus
far, so we have, you know, the discussion is ongoing with Japan
and issues with Guam's infrastructure and others, our EIS
process, and the combination of the two and the timing of that,
I think, will establish our ability to move forward with DPRI.
The last point that I would make, sir, is that this is a
very complex series of moves associated with DPRI. Many moving
parts. And in order to achieve it against the timeline and
within the budget that has been prescribed, will require the
commitments of both the United States Government and the
Government of Japan across many departments, in our case, and
across multiple ministries in the case of Japan.
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you.
General Sharp, you explained the length of tours and the
fact that families will be increasing accompanying the troops
to South Korea. But would you please tell the committee and
bring our committee up to date on the moves within South Korea,
what is being built up and from where are they being moved?
General Sharp. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, several years ago, the Republic of Korea came
to the United States and said we would like you to move the
forces that you have in Yongsan, where my headquarters is, from
Yongsan down to another location further south near Osan Air
Force Base.
That was a program called the Yongsan Relocation Program,
and we agreed to that. And the Republic of Korea is burdening
all of the cost to construct all the facilities, to replace
what we have on Yongsan today.
At about the same time, we said we would also like to
consolidate forces up north of Seoul, primarily 2nd Infantry
Division, and consolidate them also down to what is now
becoming called U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys.
That progress, in order to be able to build up Camp
Humphreys--U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys--is progressing very
well. The Republic of Korea has already purchased the land that
is needed in order to be able to expand Camp Humphreys. It will
expand three times from what it originally was. It will go from
a population of about 6,000 military and dependents to over
49,000.
We are on track over the next five or six years to complete
all of the construction down there. We will actually start
moving down there in 2012 and then phase that in over the next
several years following that.
As with the move to Guam, this is very complicated because
I have to not only make sure all the facilities are in place
but make sure I have unit integrity so that we could fight
tonight if we had to. So we are working through, with the
Republic of Korea, on a very detailed plan in order to be able
to have all of that move complete.
Once consolidated down there, thanks to your support and
really the support of the Republic of Korea, U.S. Army
Garrison-Humphreys will be an outstanding Army installation.
And it should be if you can build it from the ground up, which
we are going to be able to do.
So we are on track, and I can report good progress, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. What date do you anticipate it will all be
finished?
General Sharp. Sir, again, the goal is within the next five
or six years, and I know that is not a definitive date. We are
trying to do it as quickly as possible to be able to return
this land to the Republic of Korea and to consolidate our
forces to improve the quality of life for our service members.
What we are doing now is taking the very detailed engineer
work to be able to get all of those moving pieces in place and
seeing where we can shorten the time by--I mean, such simple
things as creating another access road into Camp Humphreys
greatly reduces the amount of time it takes to construct.
I mean, one example is, in 2012 alone, there will be $2
billion worth of construction going into Camp Humphreys. And
the number of trucks that are coming in and out of the gates
and the number of folks that we have to card to make sure that
they have access in is what we are trying to reduce and
minimize as much as possible.
But, again, to specifically answer your question, I am very
comfortable to say within the next five or six years, it will
be complete. But we will have moved a lot of people down there,
soldiers down there, well before that as the land and the
construction is complete.
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
My friend, Buck McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for taking us there last year and giving us a
chance to see some of that dirt being moved and this air site
in Okinawa. That was a good, worthwhile trip to get a hands-on
of what was happening in the area.
As I stated earlier, the QDR did a good job of delineating
the threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities, most
notably China, but it did little to address the risk resulting
in gaps in funding, capability, and force structure.
Admiral Willard, from PACOM's perspective, how would you
assess China's intentions and capacity to develop and field
disruptive technologies, including those for anti-access and
area denial? Specifically, can you comment on China's anti-ship
ballistic missile capability and how it is evolving?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Congressman McKeon. I can. And
thanks for the question.
The China military capacity has been growing, by and large,
unabated for the past 10 to 20 years. The past 10 years have
been pretty dramatic. And as you suggest, this has included
investments in what has broadly been termed anti-access
capabilities. Area-denial capabilities is another way to think
about it.
And these range from the investments in submarine
capabilities to investments in integrated air and missile
defense capabilities to, as you suggest, anti-ship ballistic
missile capabilities at extended ranges from the mainland of
China as well as cyber capabilities and anti-space
capabilities, all of which we have been monitoring very closely
for some years.
In terms of China's intentions, one of your questions--it
is truly the question that we would endeavor to see answered--
the uncertainty that comes with investments of this type
generates concern not just for the United States military that
has patrolled this region and maintained security in this
region, by and large, for the last 150 years, but for the
regional allies and partners that we have in the region as well
whose own navies, air forces might be challenged by these same
capabilities.
So this is a challenge that we are attempting to address
with the Chinese that is broader than just the U.S. military
and the Western Pacific, but I would offer, the entire Asia-
Pacific is interested in understanding what the long-term plans
are for capabilities such as you described.
We have worked hard to identify the gaps that you suggest
and the insufficiencies that are required to deal with area-
denial capabilities such as this, and we continue to. And they
range from the way in which we develop our concepts of
operations to actual technologies that the program produces.
And Pacific Command continues to provide its input both
individually and through its service components to identify the
concerns with regard to gaps and insufficiencies as we proceed.
Mr. McKeon. I think the concerns I have are if we feel like
or if it is perceived that we are being pushed back, then
neighbors, allies in the area start taking different positions
to make sure they have more options. And I think this sets us
on a path that we don't want to be on.
What is PACOM doing to ensure that the United States will
maintain its current access within the global commons and its
proximity to Taiwan?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, sir. And related to the final
statement that you made to the China question, we are not being
pushed back. I maintain the same forces forward that we have
enjoyed, again, for decades in both the sea space and air
space.
These are commons that we have maintained a presence in to
guard sea lanes of communication that carry over a trillion
dollars in commerce per year that not only supports the economy
of the United States but the economies of our close allies and
partners in the region and China as well.
So our presence is being sustained in the region. And as
you suggest, it is very much an assurance to our allies that we
are here to stay. And we will continue to work with China over
time to attempt to ascertain what their long-term intentions
are but, also, to see them emerge in the Asia-Pacific region as
a constructive partner, which is truly, I think, all of our
desire and all of our intent.
But at the same time, it is very important that it, through
our presence, through the application of extended deterrence,
and through the partnering and capacity building that we do in
the region, that we assure our allies and partners in the
region and try to suppress the urge to proliferate weapons and
build up armies as a consequence of the concerns that are being
generated by this changing dynamic in the Asian area.
Mr. McKeon. That is very important because we--the question
what are their intents, we don't know. And we can never know
another person's full intentions or another country's, so it
really behooves us to always be prepared.
I am reminded of President Reagan's comments about all the
wars in his lifetime never came because we were too strong. So
I think it is important that we always maintain that area of
strength.
Admiral Willard, General Sharp, I am deeply concerned about
North Korea's provocative behavior during the last year. In
your judgment, will North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks?
If not, beyond our tools of diplomacy and sanctions, what are
we doing to expand our defensive capabilities?
And, also, as we hear about increasing demands for missile
defense in Europe and the Middle East, what does that mean for
the Asia-Pacific AOR? Is it your understanding that assets will
be taken away from PACOM?
General Sharp. I will start first with the Six-Party Talks.
We highly encouraged Kim Jong-il to come back to the Six-Party
Talks. It is the way that I think that he has the opportunity
to be able to stop the downward spiral that has happened in
North Korea over the last several years.
I do believe that the UN [United Nations] Security Council
resolutions have made a difference in North Korea and, again,
we hope that Kim Jong-il takes this opportunity.
What we have done specifically on the Korean Peninsula in
order to make sure that we are prepared for any contingency
from North Korea is along several lines. First, we continue to
develop our plans to make sure that we do have the full range
of plans to deal with all possible scenarios.
Secondly, we have worked very closely between the ROK JCS
and Combined Forces Command in between the U.S. Embassy, led by
Ambassador Stevens, and MOFAT [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade] in order to be able to make sure that we, in South
Korea, and we, as the U.S. alliance, along all elements of
power, are saying one thing to North Korea. And we work very
hard to make sure that that single voice comes out.
I also do believe that, as we move towards OPCON
transition, that is strengthening our force and it is clearly
demonstrating to North Korea the strength of the Republic of
Korea military that they will be ready to take the lead in
2012.
And, again, I am confident along all those lines that we
were prepared for North Korea.
Mr. McKeon. Okay.
Admiral Willard. As the United States and the other party
members of the Six-Party Talks all encourage and are attempting
to bring North Korea back into the talks forum, I would offer
that our actions, as General Sharp has already described, the
deterrence that is represented by the ROK-U.S. alliance, is a
cornerstone of our response to potential aggression from North
Korea and has been for 60 years.
I would also offer that our strong alliance with Japan is
equally a deterrent and that Japan and Russia and China, the
United States and the Republic of Korea, together, as Six-Party
members, offer both the impetus to North Korea to return to
talks and, in our teaming, a deterrent value in itself.
And then lastly, we have other issues with North Korea than
just on the peninsula. The potential proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction [WMD] or the proliferation of the delivery
systems represented by United Nations Security Council
Resolution [UNSCR] 1784 are an example of concerns that we have
that North Korea has in the past, and may continue to be, a
proliferator.
And then the provocations that we encountered through the
sequence of missile tests that occurred last year are another
example of the actions that we take in this ballistic missile
defense [BMD] area to deal with North Korea and the instability
that this regime represents.
On the subject of European ballistic missile defense, I am
an advocate of the way ahead in Europe. I think that what the
maritime BMD dimension brings to our missile defense capability
is very powerful and very flexible. At the same time, as we
develop that maritime capability into the future--so this is
the number of Aegis ships that we transition to be BMD-
capable--and as we develop the missiles themselves that provide
our BMD capability and, especially, the follow-on missiles that
will greatly expand the envelope and reduce the requirement for
as many ships on scene as currently exist--those are the
capability developments that I think all of the COCOMs
[Combatant Commands] are watching with great interest, very
interested to see progress on a timeline.
Thus far, as we have shared ballistic missile assets
between Pacific Command, European Command [EUCOM], and Central
Command [CENTCOM], this has been manageable. But I would offer
that we still are producing the weapons, and we are still
producing--you know, transitioning our ships at a pace that
must be managed very carefully in order to provide that
capability into the future as quickly as we need it.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you so much for joining. It is good
to see both of you again. And thank you for your service.
Admiral Willard, I wanted to discuss with you the Marine
Corps move from Okinawa to Guam. And as you may be aware, this
realignment of forces has been a great concern for this
committee.
In the end, this committee is dedicated to ensuring that we
realign the forces correctly and that it does not adversely
impact the residents of Guam. I have been briefed that the
Department believes an additional 80,000 military, civilians,
construction workers, and their dependents beyond the 180,000
current residents are expected on the island of Guam by the
year 2014.
The EPA has reviewed the Department's plans and has
expressed great concern that the Department will adversely
affect the residents of Guam because of insufficient utility
infrastructure. There are additional concerns regarding
workforce's housing, medical care, and other community
infrastructure.
And of course, I am a great believer in us having a forward
presence. Just a couple of questions. With the 80,000
additional residents in 2014, including 20,000 construction
workers and their dependents, do you believe that Guam will be
adversely impacted by the Marine Corps relocation? And what
steps would you recommend that the Government of Guam take to
better prepare for this relocation?
And, finally, what steps should the Federal government be
taking to support the Marine Corps relocation? I think that
this is a very important move. I think that--I am a great
believer in having forward presence with what we see in that
area. And maybe you can give us some insight or enlighten us on
this move.
Admiral.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Congressman.
The move is a very important one to me as well. The forward
presence of our Marines in Okinawa currently provide great
flexibility to General Sharp in terms of responses to the
Korean Peninsula, in our obligations in accordance with our
alliance and defense agreement with Japan.
These same Marines are knowledgeable of the area of
responsibility of the Asia-Pacific region, and they are
constantly engaged in capacity building with our partners. They
are my first-to-respond forces for non-combatant evacuation
operations [NEOs] or for humanitarian assistance and disaster
response.
So the III Marine Expeditionary Force, very, very vital as
a forward-postured force in the Western Pacific.
The move to Guam of 8,000 of those Marines and their
families, in order to maintain that forward posture, very, very
important to Pacific Command and, I think, important to the
Nation that, as the chairman commented in his opening remarks,
that we get it right.
There is no question that the construction pressures on
Guam through a port that, thus far, is inadequately suited to
handle the shipping and amount of work that is likely to come
with the construction efforts in Guam, and that the pressures
on infrastructure in Guam will be challenging.
I don't think anyone in the course of our environmental
impact study and in the course of the deliberations over the
challenges and issues expressed by the Environmental Protection
Agency--I think it is acknowledged that Guam infrastructure is
suffering from inadequacies now given the population on Guam
and that any additions to the population are likely to
pressurize its water systems, power systems, waste disposal
systems, sewage systems, and the like.
In order to get it right, we are working with the
Environmental Protection Agency, but, just this past week, I
sent my senior representatives to Guam with Ms. Sutley, the
President's environmental adviser, in order that they could see
first-hand and listen first-hand to the concerns regarding the
outside-the-fence requirements on Guam, the infrastructure
concerns that Guam has.
And it is our intention to work closely with the EPA,
closely with Ms. Sutley, closely with the Government of Guam,
in order to identify where the inadequacies are and then to
work across the departments in this Government in order to
determine the best solution for the corrective actions that
need to be taken as a consequence of this relocation effort.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. The people of Guam are great people,
and I don't want them to feel that we are taking them for
granted. I am glad that you are coordinating all these other
agencies to support and build a good infrastructure and, like
the Chairman said, to do it right.
Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Virginia, Randy Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Willard, thank you for being here.
General Sharp, we thank you for your service.
And, Admiral Willard, let me just begin with you. We
received a breakdown of a list of unfunded requirements that
the Navy needed. Did you have any part at all in helping to
create that list of unfunded requirements for the Navy?
Admiral Willard. The impact that our combatant command
would have in the Navy's determining a list of unfunded
requirements would be based on the IPL, the integrated priority
list that I provide into the Joint Staff process, and it is
exposed to the Navy, so they will know what Pacific Command's
particular requirements and concerns are and, as a consequence,
where it has a maritime dimension to it--and the naval staff
concurs with that--they will normally include that in their
unfunded requirements list if it is not already being attended
to in other ways.
Mr. Forbes. By definition, I take it, if it is a
requirement, it would be something you need to fulfill your
mission, or is there another definition for that requirement?
Admiral Willard. I think when we discuss requirements in
the Pentagon or as combatant commanders in our regions, we are
talking about the needs to fulfill our mission. That said,
across the globe, not all of our requirements are necessarily
ever being met to the maximum. And as a consequence, we
mitigate to the requirements where shortfalls exist or gaps
exist.
Mr. Forbes. General Sharp, would you concur? Do you have
any role at all in participating in the unfunded requirements
that the Army would have? And would you agree with Admiral
Willard that they were requirements needed to fulfill the
mission?
General Sharp. Yes, sir. I go through the same process. I
submit my requirements in order to be able to execute my plans
through Admiral Willard who then consolidates them, as he said,
and submits them to the Joint Staff.
Mr. Forbes. One of the things that I would ask you both--
not today because I don't expect you to have that information
now--we are in the business of making sure you have what you
need to do your jobs, and when we get that list of unfunded
requirements, we assume that they are requirements and we want
to try to see how we can get them.
One of my worries is always our ability to assess the risk
factors we have of not getting those requirements. I would just
ask each of you if you would be kind enough to submit for the
record, at some point in time, which of those requirements
would impact you and some assessment as to the risk we run if
we do not fulfill those requirements.
Could you provide that for us at some later date? Again,
don't expect you to have that information----
Admiral Willard. Yes, Congressman. I will provide you that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 111.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you very much.
Admiral, the last thing I would like to ask you, one of the
things that we always worry and hear about is when we see that
spiraling curve of ships that the Chinese are creating and we
see a downward move in the ships that we have, how do we have a
mechanism that adequately deals with the risk factor of those
two curves changing?
And you and I had the ability to talk about this before.
And I would just wonder if you could tell us today, one, at
what point does quantity start mattering? You know, sometimes
we always love to say, well, the quantity is different, but we
are looking at capabilities. But at some time, quantity has a
role to play there.
Secondly, how comfortable do you feel with our risk
assessment mechanisms? I mean, are there weaknesses there? And
thirdly, what is the role that modeling and simulation might be
able to play in cutting that down?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, sir. Those are excellent
questions, all three.
And I think the answer to the first is that quantity has
its own quality now. So those of us that have regional
responsibilities, and especially the Asia-Pacific which relies
so heavily on forward presence and posture and time-distance
factors that are profound in this region of the world that
encompasses half the globe, that the ability to be present in
all of the places that we are required to be demands that
certain quantities of force structure be made available to this
particular region.
I think the 60-40 split that has been decided upon in terms
of submarine force structure and aircraft carrier force
structure are examples of the bias toward meeting the quantity
demands of Pacific Command.
But, again, to your question, quantity is important to all
of us now, I think.
In terms of our ability to, you know, view or quantify our
forces into the future, I think the--it will be very important
for us to ensure that we identify where the forces must be
present, how they must be present, and to describe that back to
our, both down to our, service components and back to our
leadership in the Pentagon.
And so, once again, I think the ability to gauge risk
associated with quantity shortfalls, the importance of being
able to characterize the risk that might be attendant to our
contingency plans or the risk that might be attendant to our
ability to meet our peacetime requirements, are important
elements to quantify. And when we account for risk at the unit
level and walk it up to a strategic level, there is a compound
risk factor that I think needs to be accounted for as well.
And these things are not entirely objective. Sometimes some
subjective and difficult, as you have suggested, to understand,
to quantify, and to discuss in an apples-to-apples way. I think
that modeling and simulation is a mechanism that would assist
us in accomplishing that.
So this is the idea that, in a modeling and simulation
approach, that risk factors could be incorporated into that
quantitative or, in the case of modeling and simulation that
occurs in a qualitative way, qualitative fashion.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you gentlemen not only for your
service to your country but for making a very long trip back to
Washington to testify before the committee.
Admiral, you know, our Nation has got a lot of challenges.
I am told that this year, the Social Security Trust Fund starts
paying out more than it collects in taxes. Same for Medicare. A
trillion dollar annual operating deficit and it just doesn't
get any easier when you look at replacement of the Ohio class,
the Joint Strike Fighter coming on board, et cetera, et cetera.
With regard to the Ohio class, the early estimates are is
that ship is going to cost in that neighborhood of $7 billion.
And unfortunately, my experience here is, if someone tells me
it is going to cost $7 billion, it means it is $9 billion by
the time it is actually delivered or more.
The primary reason for the Ohio replacement is to carrier
the D5 missile which travels approximately 5,000 miles. So my
question to you as the person with the toughest job in the
Navy: Should we be building a sub that fits the D5 missile? Or
should we consider--and I want to just use the word
``consider''--building a missile that will fit the Virginia-
class submarine which has proven to be a very good acquisitions
programs, and I am told by those who operate those vessels, a
fine submarine?
If you are uncomfortable talking about that in public, I
would welcome your thoughts in private, but it is a decision
that is going to affect shipbuilding budgets starting about the
year 2019 in a very significant way. And in the purest terms,
in 2019, we can buy a carrier and a sub a year, and there is no
money for anything else. And I know that is unacceptable.
Secondly, to Mr. Forbes' comment about--Mr. Forbes, I can
assure you today, you are going to have an opportunity to cast
a vote to grow the Navy. I am going to put that on the table
and give you that opportunity. Okay? We only want to go one way
on this committee, and that is for a bigger fleet.
And lastly, General Sharp, I wanted to say this. I like
Koreans. I take tae kwon do from a Korean guy. They are smart,
diligent, hard-working people. I took the opportunity to visit
four of the most phenomenal shipyards in the world. They are
all in Korea. It was a humbling experience as a guy who
represents shipbuilders to see the money that they have
invested in those yards. It is a beautiful modern country.
I mean, most Americans, including myself, have this image
from the show ``M*A*S*H'' of Korea in the 1950s. It looks
nothing like the nation now.
Having said all of that, at what point could we declare a
victory and bring those 28,000 Americans home? Because, again,
that is a very modern, well-financed country with sharp,
hardworking, diligent people and, again, a phenomenal
manufacturing base.
So at what point do we still need to be there, in your
opinion?
Admiral Willard. Congressman, I will begin with your
question regarding Ohio class, the Virginia-class option with
regard to replacement for our SSBNs [ballistic missile
submarines].
Fundamentally, the missions differ greatly between our
fast-attack submarine [SSN] force and our ballistic missile
submarine force.
Mr. Taylor. I understand that, sir.
Admiral Willard. I think that alone calls for a
recapitalization of our SSBN force when the time comes. And I
take your point that submarines are very expensive----
Mr. Taylor. I guess, to my point, do you need a 5,000-mile
missile? What is the magic number, if there is such a thing,
for the distance that that missile should need to travel in
order to fulfill your needs?
Admiral Willard. Senator, I think we ought to--I think we
ought to----
Mr. Taylor. I think that is the question.
Admiral Willard. Okay. That is probably a subject more
appropriately taken in closed committee.
Mr. Taylor. Would you, at some point, get me that answer.
Admiral Willard. I will.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. Thank you.
General Sharp, to my second question?
General Sharp. Sir, first off, as you just pointed out, the
Republic of Korea has greatly advanced since the end of the
Korean War. Their military has, likewise, greatly advanced.
And they are taking more and more responsibilities not only
for the defense of their own country, as evidenced by the move
towards OPCON transition, also evidenced by, since 1994 when
the ROK JCS has been responsible for and in charge of OPCON of
their forces during armistice, but also what they are doing
globally in order to be able to, as I said in my opening
statement, to help build peace and security around the world
with all the different peacekeeping missions that they are in.
They are about ready to go back into Afghanistan.
Having said that, I really do think that presence makes a
big difference in any part of the world. And I think that our
presence and our teaming with the Republic of Korea for the
foreseeable future, just as it has for the last 57 years, will
ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia for the
foreseeable future.
So I think our investment of 28,500 troops, which our
President and Secretary Gates have said is the force level that
we will maintain for the foreseeable future, is a great
investment in order to be able to help build the ROK military,
as I think we have helped greatly along those lines so that
they can globally engage, and to be able to have peace and
security remain in Northeast Asia.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
And to Mrs. Willard, you look much better off than your
husband does after those 38 years. You have held up great.
But my question is, going with--being a Marine spouse or a
Navy spouse can, at times, be lonely, fulfilling, exhilarating,
and just not fun sometimes. So thank you for your service as
well.
Tying into Ranking Member McKeon's question, when it comes
to access--and I am talking forcible access. Just really
quickly, what would you rate our forcible access capability on
an A through F grade when it comes to the Pacific?
Admiral Willard. We believe that, in our contingency plans,
that we can achieve the access required to win those plans.
Mr. Hunter. So it would be an A-plus then? You can be
anywhere that you needed to?
Admiral Willard. I would offer that, to be quantitative--I
mean, to describe this in the way that you desire, my
preference would be to do this in a closed hearing.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Okay. We can do that. That was my
question. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen, please.
Mr. Larsen. Can I have the rest of Mr. Hunter's time?
[Laughter.]
Just kidding.
Gentlemen, thanks for coming and helping us out. I want to
start with General Sharp. I have to tell you, there is no
better advocate for tour normalization in Korea than a spouse
from my district. And so when you matched her up with my wife
and me--or your predecessor did when we were there last--I
heard about it on the way back, so, no better advocate. And I
want to ask a question about that with regards to tour
normalization.
So we are headed to this, and it is a great idea, but what
are the resources that you need, and how are you planning for
those resources to accommodate the, you know, two-year and
three-year tours?
General Sharp. We are approaching tour normalization in a
process to make sure that, as I tell the folks in my command, I
don't get ahead of my own headlights because we have got to
make sure we have got the right infrastructure from schools,
from housing, from medical in order to be able to do the right
thing for these families.
So the phases that the Department is going through right
now is we are in, if you will, right now the first phase of
tour normalization, which is to get the number of families
there that I can accommodate with the infrastructure that I
have in place, basically, right now.
And that number is about 4,900 families. And, again, we are
at about 3,900 right now. The goal is to get to that 4,900 and
the services, mainly the Air Force and the Army, are committed
to that by the end of, really, next summer. And, again, I am
confident that we can get there. We are increasing about 100
families a month in Korea right now.
The next phase is really what we are working through right
now with the POM '12-'17 [Program Objective Memorandum 2012-
2017] work that is going on right now in the Department and how
quickly we are going to be able to get there. It is also--we
have also got to link it to the move down to Camp Humphreys and
the completion of Camp Humphreys because, again, that will be
the place where we have the majority of Army service members
and families. There will be many still down at Daegu, but the
big hub is going to be at Camp Humphreys.
So there is going to be some time in there where we are
concentrating on moves and concentrating on building that Camp
Humphreys infrastructure. And then, again, it gets down to, you
know, the resources in order to be able to move forward to get
all the facilities needed.
And, again, you will see that, well really, next January
when the Department submits the '12-'17 POM.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thanks.
Admiral Willard, two questions for you. In your testimony,
on page 12--as I am leafing through this--on page 12, I think
you really wrap up the issue with China--China's interest a
peaceful, stable environment that will support the country's
developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving
military capabilities that appear designed to challenge the
U.S. freedom of action in the region. That is sort of this
conundrum that we are in with this relationship with China.
On page three, you talk about the growing presence and
influence in the region create both challenges and
opportunities. And we have been through some of these--you have
talked through some of these challenges. Anti-access, we have
talked about the ASAT [anti-satellite] tests, the military
modernization.
But I was wondering if you can talk about, you know, what
kind of opportunities line up against that. And the final
question I would have for you, if you would include separately,
is you say we face challenges in building partner capacity in
the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to
support our security assistance efforts.
Can you briefly wrap up your answer by talking about what
does that patchwork look like and what does it need to look
like to be cohesive for it to work for you?
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, Congressman Larsen.
In terms of opportunities with China, when you consider the
capacity building that has been ongoing, particularly as it
relates to the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy, the
potential for China to contribute constructively to security of
the region and to contribute to ongoing prosperity in the
region, the protection of commerce and the like is excellent--
terrific.
To date, we haven't seen them dedicate their assets to that
goal. Although, were they to emerge as a constructive partner,
I think the region would be better for it. And when we look
across the capabilities that they have produced, their ability
to demonstrate a contribution to counter-piracy in the Gulf of
Aden, their ability to contribute into Haiti, and what that
could look like in an ability to contribute into the Asia-
Pacific region in our every-eight-week disaster response on
average or through the soft areas of humanitarian assistance, I
think China has great potential in all of that.
Mr. Larsen. And, Mr. Chairman, could we get for the record
the answer to the third question about security assistance and
the patchwork and some of the changes Admiral Willard would
like to see happen to make that work better for him?
The Chairman. Yes. If the Admiral would furnish that,
please?
Admiral Willard. I would be happy to furnish that, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found on pages 30
through 31.]
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thanks, Chairman.
General Sharp, Admiral Willard, thank you so much for your
service to our country.
General Sharp, you mentioned the movement of our troops
from the northern part I guess towards the demilitarized zone
[DMZ] of South Korea down to Camp Humphreys. And I understand
that the South Korean Government is paying for those costs.
General Sharp. Sir, they are paying for the cost of
rebuilding the facilities that I have at Yongsan where my
headquarters is now in Seoul. The cost to consolidate and to
move the 2nd Infantry Division, which are in the camps and
stations north of Seoul to Camp Humphreys is a shared burden
between the United States and the Republic of Korea.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. And the policy change from an
unaccompanied tour to a longer accompanied tour where the
families of U.S. military service personnel are now going to
South Korea, I understand probably now for, instead of a year
assignment, now the personnel will stay on station for three
years.
But is that the U.S. cost--is that a cost to the U.S.
taxpayers to build those schools, to build that infrastructure?
General Sharp. Primarily, yes. And we are looking, again,
at how to best do that to partner through many different
mechanisms in order to be able to have that to be the most
reduced cost. There is savings in and of itself where you don't
have to, you know, send somebody every year. Just the cost of
moving people around, I think, is a cost that you are going to
save by longer tours over there.
Mr. Coffman. Sure.
General Sharp. The other thing is the tour normalization,
as we call it, really bring us is, of course, a much more
capable force. If I don't have to train a new service member
every year but I have got them for two or three years, that
really greatly increases just our overall capability.
Secondly, is it really does reduce stress. Why have an
unaccompanied tour anywhere in the world if you don't have to?
And, finally, it really does, I think, show our commitment to
Northeast Asia, which is critical.
Mr. Coffman. I think that is my question, about showing our
commitment. And I would raise the point, can't we demonstrate
commitment by having, say, annual scheduled military
exercises--as we do currently, is my understanding--where we
bring forces from the United States, when available, but to
have annual exercises with the South Korean military where we--
instead of having our forces permanently there, that we bring
them there?
And we will certainly know that, when the situation would
dictate, that intelligence or say the political environment and
the military environment, the security environment in South
Korea is such that it is coming to a boiling point, then we
deploy our forces there.
So is it necessary in this day and time to permanently
have--if I understand the numbers right--28,000 U.S. military
personnel in South Korea?
General Sharp. Sir, first off, as you said, we do do
exercises throughout the year, several very big ones. But I
guess I personally believe that presence consistently around
there in order to be able to develop the relationships, in
order to be able to help work together military-to-military, is
a requirement and gives us huge benefits to be able to do that.
So I think, again, that presence is a requirement in an
important part of the world like Northeast Asia.
Secondly, to your point on being prepared and being able to
have forces come, you know. As you know, North Korea has the
great majority of their forces currently stationed very close
to the DMZ. And the ability for them to be able to attack with
little notice is there. And that is why we have to be prepared,
shared with, you know, with the Republic of Korea who really
has the forces along the DMZ to be prepared for that short
contingency and to be able to get--our family members out of
there--the other American citizens out there and then to be
able to receive other forces that come in.
So, again, and the number, sir, is 28,500. I do believe it
is a great investment and has proven itself for 57 years in
order to be able to maintain stability in not only Korea but
Northeast Asia.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Thank you.
Admiral Willard, it would seem like, with China, that they
could be participating in the Six-Party Talks a lot more than
they are; that they certainly have the capacity to put pressure
on North Korea that they are not putting on North Korea. It
would seem to me that they feel that they benefit by having an
uncertain security situation in North Korea and by forcing us
to provide our assets in that direction.
Could you comment on that?
Admiral Willard. Congressman, I think we are convinced that
the Chinese are committed to the denuclearization of North
Korea as we are. And they have made efforts, increasing
efforts, I think, over the past year to exert their influence
over North Korea. At the end of the day, the choice to reenter
into Six-Party or not has been a North Korean refusal.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and testifying
today.
Admiral, in looking at--we talked about our forward
presence in relation to China and looking at it on a routine
basis where there is not heightened tensions between the two
nations. As we move forward, and if we--and not looking at a
specific that we have a mission there to carry out where we
insert to do certain things. But as we move forward, if there
was a time of say, heightened tensions, could we maintain that,
with what we anticipate the Chinese to do, could we maintain
that forward presence and still have safety in our fleet?
Admiral Willard. If I understand your question correctly,
Congressman, I think the answer is yes.
We maintain a forward presence in the region for many, many
purposes, and, again, the safety of the maritime domain, the
safety of the sea lines of communication, and the international
air space is a main reason why we are there.
We respond to heightened tension and have, in my
experience, on a fairly regular basis, last year's provocations
out of North Korea being a perfect example.
And I am very confident in my ability to consolidate forces
where I need them when I need them should a contingency arise.
Mr. Kissell. And we have talked about China and its
relation with the United States and Japan and Korea. What about
in the other parts of Southeast Asia, the other countries? As
we see the presence of China grow and that influence change, do
you see any response in those countries in how they might be in
relation to us, the Chinese, and how that might be changing?
Admiral Willard. Well, I think that China's influence is
very wide-ranging throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and I
would offer farther than that. I mean, we have all read and
understand China's influence in Africa, China's influence in
South America and so forth. I mean, this is a greatly expanding
economy, and they are very influential.
Likewise, their military-to-military contacts are also
expanding throughout the region such that, wherever I go,
whether I am speaking to military leadership or civilian
leadership, we often have a discussion with regard to China,
their influence in the region, their expanding military
capacity, and what our views on it are.
I think there will be comparisons drawn regarding the
presence and influence of the United States military and the
growing influence of China, you know, for a long time. And now,
those comparisons are drawn and often written about or
commented on throughout the region.
Mr. Kissell. At this point in time, there is changing
relationships in the recognition of China and its objectives.
Is there anything exceptionally negative there towards our
relations with other nations that are taking place?
Admiral Willard. I think on the contrary. The other nations
are very receptive to U.S. presence, so this has been mostly a
discussion regarding our staying power in the region and their
desire for our continued influence in the region.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you. And, General, the move in Korea to
Camp Humphreys, is that more strategic? More political? A
combination? What for? What are the things that went into that
thinking?
General Sharp. First off, I think we are going to get a lot
more efficient because we are able to consolidate. We are going
down from over 105--approximately 107 camps and stations that
were basically there at the end of the Korean War down to about
45 camps and stations and consolidating many of those forces
going into Camp Humphreys.
So just the efficiency that comes with that consolidation,
I think, is very important.
Secondly, again, it is able to be able to give back to the
Republic of Korea some of the land that is very valuable, and I
think that strengthens as far as the strategic alliance in
order to be able to do that.
Mr. Kissell. And one last question. The expansion of the
time--the rotation. We have been through all the reasons why. I
am assuming this is popular with the service and their
families?
General Sharp. Sir, thank you for that question. It really
is. And it is popular for a couple of reasons.
Number one is, of course, we have many unaccompanied tours
for service members that are going to Iraq and Afghanistan and
other places, and there is no need to have an additional one in
Korea.
And secondly, the Republic of Korea is a great place to
live. It is a great place to serve. The training that we are
able to give our service members because of the ranges, because
of the joint environment that we do with other services and the
combined that we do with the Republic of Korea military. It is
a great place to train our military.
It is extremely safe. The people in Korea understand the
importance of U.S. forces there. A recent State Department poll
gave us 87 percent of the people in Korea say it is important
for us to be there. So it is a great place to serve.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson, please.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral and General, thank you very much for your
service.
I had such a great opportunity last year to go with a
delegation the chairman led to Hawaii and to the very beautiful
island of Guam, to Iwo Jima, Okinawa, to Korea. And everywhere,
the American troops would just make you so proud.
And what you have achieved--one of the longest periods of
lack of conflict in the Pacific in history, and it is because
of your good work and the good work of our troops. I am
particularly grateful because my dad served in India and China
during World War II. And I learned firsthand growing up the
business spirit of the people of those two countries. And it
has been exciting as the past co-chair of the India Caucus, the
largest country caucus here in Congress, reflecting the new
partnership between India and the United States.
And so, Admiral Willard, how is the Pacific Command
engaging with India to help address terrorism concerns and
strengthen the U.S.-India security partnership?
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much for that question.
We regard India as a particular area of focus for growing
the strategic partnership that India and the United States
currently enjoy. And the military-to-military relationship is a
very important part of that. In the five months that I have
been at Pacific Command, I have traveled to India twice and
had, you know, very encouraging and good discussions with my
counterparts there.
I think that the India-U.S. relationship right now is
stronger than I have ever enjoyed. As you know, because of our
history, we have only been truly engaging with India mil-to-mil
[military-to-military] for about the last half a dozen years.
And yet it has been pretty profound how far that has come.
We are engaged with India now with regard to their
counterterrorism challenges, particularly as it relates to
Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist groups that emanates from
Pakistan and attacked into Mumbai, and what we believe to be
their presence in areas surrounding India. And PACOM has a
responsibility to develop the contingency plans to deal with
that in support of our Indian friends.
So I think, from foreign military sales [FMS] to other
means of security assistance, to high-level strategic talks and
the counterterrorism concerns that we both have, the Indian-
U.S. relationship is terrific.
Mr. Wilson. And as you said, it is exciting. This has only
been a recent phenomenon. And the world's largest democracy,
India, with the oldest democracy, the United States, and to see
us working together. I want to thank you.
Another success story, obviously, is Korea, General. And I
had the opportunity to meet with Korean troops in Afghanistan
at a provincial reconstruction team site. What an example Korea
is of recovery, success after a war. And so with that, I know
our relationship now is going to evolve into a Joint Vision
Statement.
Can you tell how that will work?
General Sharp. As I said, both President Lee and President
Obama signed a Joint Vision Statement in June that really takes
a look at how can the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance engage
globally through all elements of power in order to be able to
help security and stability, to be able to help economically
around the world.
I think President Lee's vision is to be able to--because of
the great prosperity and the great progress that the Republic
of Korea has made since the end of the Korean War, to be able
to give back some of that to the rest of the world. I mean, he
is doing it--I will speak on the military side--very well with
the different places that they are in UN peacekeeping missions
around the world.
And I think any sort of mechanism that increases that
alliance between the Republic of Korea and the U.S., whether it
is militarily or economically, really strengthens us in
Northeast Asia and, really, globally.
Mr. Wilson. And I can remember, as we were studying to go,
that Korea had a per capita income back in 1960 of like a
hundred dollars, today--which is equivalent to Afghanistan,
but, today, one of the wealthiest countries on Earth. And so we
can't anticipate that for Afghanistan, but we can sure try to
create the environment.
A final question, Admiral, we do have international
terrorism in that region. What is our success, particularly the
Philippines?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, sir.
The Philippines is now a longstanding engagement in support
of the armed forces of the Philippines counterterrorism
efforts. It has been very successful and particularly so in
about the last 24 months where significant accomplishments
against the Abu Sayyaf group have occurred.
As you suggest, in our region, we have concerns in
Indonesia. The Indonesian Government has been successful there,
and we are now engaging the issues in and around India that I
just described.
So we have our own counterterrorism responsibilities that
we are accomplishing through the great efforts of our forces
every day.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis, please.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you so much for your service, both of you, and for
joining us today.
General Sharp, I actually am very pleased that many of my
colleagues have asked about the normalization in South Korea,
and I appreciate that as a spouse who was there in Japan many
years ago during the Vietnam War.
I actually have been wanting to kind of go and see with my
own eyes. One of the concerns that I understand that may be
changing some points of view for families are the high cost of
housing, and I want to ask you quickly about that.
Is it that we are not raising the bar sufficiently? We
don't have, I would assume, enough housing on any of the bases
to accommodate those families.
General Sharp. We, of course, go through recurring looks at
how much cost of housing for those that are not on-post, are
not on one of our bases, and we adjust in order to be able to
accommodate that, so I believe that we are paying the amount
that we need in order for families to get to standard housing
off-post.
Mrs. Davis. And of those families that you--when you see
them coming on, you mentioned about a hundred a month--what
percentage are on-post? What percentage are on the economy?
General Sharp. It depends upon where they are going. All of
them up north of Seoul are on the economy because we are moving
out of those locations, and we are not going to build housing
up in that area.
I had to make the decision can we bring families to what we
call Area 1, 2nd Infantry Division, or not have any families
there until the move to Camp Humphreys. I talked to a lot of
people, and people understand that, when they come command-
sponsored up there, the facilities that they are going to get,
but it is a family choice to be able to do that.
And, again, they get housing allowance to get into true
standard quarters off-post in Yongpyong--and the other places
up north. Down where we are in Seoul, the great majority are
on-post as is down in Osan on the Air Force base down there.
That is kind of why I am capping at 4,900 until we make the
move so that we can balance what we have both on-post and off-
post. And let me just be a little more specific in Seoul. It is
either on-post or Government-leased quarters which we have some
around Seoul as to where the families are living. They are
allowed to live on the economy, but that is what we have
available at Seoul.
Mrs. Davis. And on the economy, it has to be three years
even for the economy--or can it be two years accompanied as
well?
General Sharp. Right now, it can be two years or three
years. The service member gets to make that choice. And the
Department decided to start at that so that, as someone
mentioned earlier, there is still a vision within a lot of our
families, of ``M*A*S*H'' in Korea. And until we get the word
out that, no, Korea is a modern country and it is a great place
to live, the service members are being given choice. You can
either come for two years and bring your family, or you can
come for three years.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
I wanted to ask about public opinion in both of the AORs
and the extent to which I guess, in Korea, that the fact that
you do have more families on the economy, what impact that has
at all.
But, also, speaking to Japan, you mentioned, Admiral
Willard, the need to keep that relationship strong. I am
wondering, also, about the messages that Members of Congress
can send on any visits they make to Japan or even in your AOR.
I mean, how important is that? Is that something that you would
encourage more of?
We know that members do travel, a lot, you know, certainly,
to the war theater. But as well, we probably need to be making
some of those contacts as well. We certainly do some of that,
but perhaps it could and should increase.
Admiral Willard. Thank you. I don't think there is any
place in the world where the U.S. message is regarded as so
important and so valued as in the Asia-Pacific. You know, we
are polling and trying to understand the extent to which we are
understood and the extent to which we are supported in the
region.
I would offer that, in recent surveys in Japan, the
alliance is very, very highly regarded by the Japanese people,
and I think that the recent statements by the Japanese
Government as well have reinforced that.
But I think Congress' messages, whether they are delivered
here in Washington or whether it is during your travels into
the Asia-Pacific, that have to do with our commitment to the
region, the importance that our presence in the region, in your
views, shares. I think these messages are invaluable. So thank
you for delivering them and look forward to hosting you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have no questions.
Well, on second thought, I will ask about----
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir. I will ask about Guam. The
water facilities, the facilities, the infrastructure to deliver
water, electrical generation facilities, landfills or some way
of doing away with trash and garbage, sewage capacity, those
kinds of things on the island as it is now would be--are
already--those systems are termed as being inadequate. Is that
correct?
Admiral Willard. Congressman, I think that there are
different levels of adequacy and insufficiencies associated
with Guam infrastructure. It is important to remember that, by
and large, this is infrastructure that was created after World
War II and probably into about the 1970s, and they do have, you
know, many concerns, challenges that they face.
In the area of water, they have an aquifer in the north and
a reservoir in the south actually on Navy property. And the
sufficiency of the aquifer is, right now, a concern of
scientists in evaluating Guam's ability to absorb more.
So as you suggest, there are waivers and other challenges
associated with Guam infrastructure, by and large, across the
board of the items that you discussed.
Mr. Johnson. I mean, what would we do with trash and other
waste products for 80,000 people at peak construction? How
would we handle that? Is there a plan in place right now?
Admiral Willard. Well, Guam is in the process of developing
another solid-waste disposal area on the island.
Mr. Johnson. A landfill?
Admiral Willard. They are expanding their landfill capacity
now. But I think the answer to your question is, one, that, you
know, the private enterprise could assist with and that we have
to think broadly about how Guam fulfills its needs for its
people through this, you know, peak capacity of new
construction and with the additional 8,000 Marines and their
families that, ultimately, would settle there.
So there is analysis to be done to the extent that it
hasn't to ensure that we know and that the Government of Guam
settles on what capacities and corrective actions need to be
taken.
Mr. Johnson. This is an island that, at its widest level
is, what, 12 miles from shore to shore? And at its smallest
level or smallest location, it is 7 miles between one shore and
the other. Is that correct?
Admiral Willard. I don't have the exact dimensions, but to
your point, sir, I think Guam is a small island.
Mr. Johnson. A very small island and about 24 miles, if I
recall, long. So 24 miles long, about 7 miles wide at the least
widest place on the island and about 12 miles wide on the
widest part of the island.
And I don't know how many square miles that is. Do you
happen to know?
Admiral Willard. I don't have that figure with me, sir. I
can certainly supply it to you if you would like.
Mr. Johnson. Yes. My fear is that the whole island will
become so overly populated that it will tip over and capsize.
Admiral Willard. We don't anticipate that. The Guam
population, I think, currently about 175,000 and, again, with
8,000 Marines and their families, it is an addition of about
25,000 more into the population.
Mr. Johnson. And, also, things like the environment, the
sensitive areas of the environment--coral reefs and those kinds
of things. And I know that, you know, lots of people don't like
to think about that, but you know, we didn't think about global
warming either.
Now, we do have to think about it. And so I am concerned
from an environmental standpoint whether or not Guam is the
best place to do this relocation, but it is actually the only
place. Is that correct?
Admiral Willard. This is the best place. This is the
farthest west U.S. territory that we own. And, you know, this
is part of our Nation. And in readdressing the forward presence
and posture importance to Pacific Command, Guam is vital to
this decision.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder, please.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Willard, the comment was made earlier today that in
order to justify cutting our defense budget, the somehow
perceived threat from China was decreased in order to justify
defense cuts. Do you have any reason to think that that is
accurate?
Admiral Willard. I think that the Quadrennial Defense
Review, in characterizing the capabilities that have been part
of what we have discussed here in terms of China's advances, I
think the QDR report accurately--it captures the concerns that
I have regarding China.
I think, likewise, the Secretary's recent report to
Congress on China capabilities accurately captures the concerns
that we have with regard to China as well as we have already
discussed some of the opportunities.
So I do believe we understand the issues that we face out
there. I spend a great deal of time and focus ensuring that I
know these things and in communicating those to my counterparts
and to my boss back in the Pentagon.
Dr. Snyder. This is my 14th year here, and through the
years I have occasionally asked this question, and I will ask
you because I don't think you and I have talked about it
before.
At the highest ranks of Navy leadership, when you look at
what the Chinese military is doing as their economy has grown
over the last 2 or 3 decades, as they modernize their military,
as they look to widen their military capability to extend out
into the Pacific, how do you evaluate, if you were a Chinese
Navy admiral, how do you evaluate, from your perspective, what
is appropriate modernization consistent with their stature as a
country with a growing economy versus behavior that we would
think is not appropriate for a nation? Or does it matter from
your perspective as U.S. Navy----
Admiral Willard. I think it does matter, and I think, sir,
you are capturing the dilemma that we have with them. So this
is China's global strategy and regional approach. The stated
intentions versus the actions that we actually see and the type
of capabilities and so on that they develop, so to the extent
the stated strategy is a peaceful contribution to a harmonious
existence throughout the region and across the globe and what
is developed are area-denial weapons and capabilities and power
projection capabilities. The incongruence in that is what we
are endeavoring to both understand and to answer.
And in our engagement with China, while we seek to
cooperate in areas of common interest, we want to have frank
dialogues on exactly what you have suggested is the question.
Dr. Snyder. All right. Thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today and your
service to our Nation.
I would just like to turn to a couple of areas, both cyber
issues and missile defense, if I could.
If I could, could you tell me what PACOM is doing in terms
of defending our cyber assets if you are thinking of how PACOM
has responded to recent reports of cyber attacks originating
from China against Google. Clearly, this is--modern warfare has
probably changed, and our cyber systems are at risk, and we
can't move quick enough as far as I am concerned to protect
those assets.
I also wondered, if you could, respond to China's missile
defense--China's midcourse interception test earlier this year
and how has PACOM factored that into the work that it does. And
could you also give me an update on where we are on the Navy's
role in missile defense, particularly in your AOR?
Admiral Willard. Yes, sir. I will.
As you suggest, cyber is a concern that I think is
manifested in our Nation, let alone, in our military.
Certainly, a concern in Pacific Command. We have been
contending with intrusions, some of which are likely emanating
from the People's Republic of China [PRC] for years at this
point. And I think you have seen the culmination of some of
that as some of those intrusions have reached into our
corporate communities most recently.
The actions that we have taken in Pacific Command to
contend with this range from passive defense actions to more
active defense actions where we are endeavoring to understand
all of the cyber domain as it relates to our command and
control capabilities and information sharing capabilities and
exactly how to defend them.
And this is a combination of organizational adjustments,
process adjustments, and technological additions to our systems
that will help protect it as well as the mitigating actions
when we do come under attack and how we deal with it.
So we take many actions day to day. We have plans for
contingency, and we are working very closely with Strategic
Command [STRATCOM], the newly formed Cyber Command, and the
Pentagon to ensure that our requirements in Pacific Command are
understood and met. We think we are pretty central to the
problem out there, and we are exercising to it as well in our
large-scale exercises.
Mr. Langevin. Are you factoring in resilience and
redundancies so that, should the system go down as a result of
the cyber attack, that you will be able to respond, bounce back
quickly?
Admiral Willard. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, in passive
defenses, that is hardening. That is the resilience and
redundancy as well as our ability in, under attack, to come
back with a secondary plan, a branch plan in order to continue
to command and control.
So this is a very multidimensional approach and, again, we
are advancing in this, and I think we, as a Nation, have a long
way to go to be assured that we are protecting our cyber
domain. I think, inevitably, this will be a global challenge
that will be discussed internationally and, ultimately, solved
internationally.
On your question of China's missile defenses, the question
arises as to whether or not the most recent exercise by China
that had to do with a missile intercept was an anti-satellite
test or a missile defense test. And we are monitoring China's
capabilities in this area very closely, particularly concerned
with their approaches to counter space.
Mr. Langevin. And status on your role in integrating
responsibilities in missile defense?
Admiral Willard. In my previous assignment as the Pacific
Fleet Commander, I was immersed in missile defense capabilities
on the maritime side, the use of our Aegis platforms, and the
naval dimension of missile defense but also its integration
into our theater missile defense plans, regional missile
defense plans, and national missile defense plans which now
incorporate ground-based interceptors, THAAD [Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense] missile systems, Patriot, and the like.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. It appears no one else
has a question. Let me end with one question.
Admiral, China has recently suspended the military-to-
military contacts since American arms sales to Taiwan. What is
the status of that now? And is China continuing to cooperate
with us on maritime security issues?
Admiral Willard. As you suggest, after the last
announcement of Taiwan arms sales, China, once again, suspended
military-to-military relations with the United States. If I
were to look across all the forms of engagement across the
departments of the U.S. with China, our military-to-military
engagement is probably lagging all other forms of engagement as
a consequence of both lack of substance at times in the
engagement as well as the suspensions that routinely
characterize it.
We are seeking to reengage with China at multiple levels,
and we look forward to the opportunity to reengage mil-to-mil
both in terms of visitation and in terms of a variety of forms
of contact with them.
I think the broader issue is China's appreciation for the
value of mil-to-mil on a continuum, which we believe very
strongly contributes to not just the military-to-military
understanding and dialogue between the two countries but our
ability to prevent misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and
sometimes miscalculation.
So we are encouraging our Chinese counterparts to consider
mil-to-mil differently than they have in the past.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen has an additional question.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And this will save staff time on the question for the
record. It gets back to the security assistance and the
patchwork of programs that you have, and just a quick comment
for context.
A lot of discussion, obviously, on China, on Korea, and
Japan, but showing our commitment to a lot of the smaller
countries in terms of population and maybe they don't get in
the news a lot. These programs that we have that can help with
our outreach on the military side of some of these countries is
very important.
What changes to the patchwork of programs would be
necessary to help with the security assistance that will, you
know, underscore that message of engagement that we are trying
to have with these other countries in the region?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Congressman Larsen.
The importance of this, as you suggest, in capacity
building and capability growth among our partners in the
region, critically important. I think if you were to poll them
and say, ``What in security assistance is lacking in your
relationship with the United States military?'', it is often
our ability to deliver to their needs with speed.
And so this gets into the processes associated with our
foreign military support--FMS--our ability to execute foreign
military sales and even some of the vehicles that we go to for
other means of security assistance to fund to their immediate
needs.
So in lieu of years of effort in order to achieve a sale to
one of these countries or an offer of excess capability to one
of these countries, they are seeking assistance, often, in
weeks and months. And our aged systems, processes, don't
support that.
So I very much endorse Secretary Gates' initiatives to try
and streamline, particularly FMF [Foreign Military Financing],
FMS processes--foreign military sales processes--in order to
meet some of the speed demands that I perceive in the region.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Taylor has an additional
question.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, I am very much in support of the
President's decision to move our national missile defense on
ships. I was an early convert to Admiral Roughead's decision to
truncate the 1,000 [DDG-1000 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer] and go
back to building 51s [DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyers].
But given the complexity and the added dimension of another
nation's anti-ship missile that is now a factor, do you feel
like we are doing everything we need to have a fleet that can
defend itself while it is providing our Nation's missile
defense while it is obviously engaged in other actions around
the world? Or is there something that we need to be doing
additionally that, because of the new requirement for missile
defense, has that changed the things you need? And are we
getting you the things that you need?
Admiral Willard. I think there are a couple ways to answer
that. One is, in missile defense itself, there is the point
defense requirements that our units need in order to be
protected, so there are layered defenses that come down to a
very internalized defense that each ship needs to be capable
of.
And I think we understand what those are, but our ability
to contend, as you suggest, in an area-denial environment where
we are relying on our ships for missile defense but also for
four or five other mission areas in their multimission
assignment, very important that they have the capabilities both
in layering to defend themselves and as individual units to
defend themselves.
As I have viewed into the programs that are in work, both
in areas that are kinetic and in areas that are non-kinetic, we
are addressing these issues. I have advocated for many years
for a better anti-ship capability within our fleet, and I think
that, in the areas of development, we are seeking to understand
what those requirements are.
So to your point, yes, our units need to defend themselves.
And it becomes increasingly important as we rely on them in
this new and very critical mission area. I think we are
addressing these areas. I think they are vitally important that
we pay attention to what those programs are and ensure that
they are followed through.
Mr. Taylor. I guess the simple question is: With that
additional mission, are 313 ships enough? Or does that number
have to go up again, keeping in mind that they not only have to
defend us from missiles, but they have to defend themselves or
else they are no good to us in the first instance?
And that has got to have changed--plus the threat of that
missile that everyone knows is out there.
Admiral Willard. Some of the ballistic missile defense
developments on the weapons side--so this is SM-3
developments--and the theater-level missile terminal
capabilities that are under discussion and in development--I
think these are the areas that will allow us to continue to
incorporate these as multimission platforms across broader
areas.
I think that CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], right now,
characterizes 313 as a floor, and I agree with that. I think
that our shipbuilding, ship numbers, quantity of fleet are very
important to United States Pacific Command, and I would expect
that all the combatant commanders feel the same.
So there is an importance in our continuing our
shipbuilding efforts. I think that the answer with regard to
this particular mission area across the multimissions of these
units is a more multifaceted answer than simply numbers. It is
the follow-on weapon developments as well.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, you know my concerns. You are in town.
I would welcome the opportunity to talk to you off the record.
Admiral Willard. I would be happy to do that, sir. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen.
General Sharp, thank you so much for being with us again.
It is good to see you.
And, Admiral Willard, we hope to see you many times in this
role, so with that, we thank you for your service and the
service of those you represent. The hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 25, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 25, 2010
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
MARCH 25, 2010
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Admiral Willard. The United States Pacific Command develops the
Integrated Priority List (IPL) as part of the Comprehensive Joint
Assessment response to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
IPL is my top ten capability gaps derived from analysis and assessment
of the Pacific theater operational and contingency plans. The IPL
becomes the ``war fighter's voice'' within the Pentagon and exists to
provide a transition from planning to programming. I rely upon the
Services and defense agencies to use the IPL too as a foundational
element as they develop their individual Program Objective Memoranda
(POM). When the Services are unable to fund all the needs within their
POM, they use the unfunded requirements mechanism to identify
additional resources for emergent and growing operational needs.
Navy's FY11 unfunded list for Aviation Spares, Ship Depot
Maintenance, and Aviation Depot Maintenance are all key to sustaining
crucial operational capabilities in the Pacific.
I cannot stress enough the importance of sustaining and maintaining
the fleet. I depend upon the Navy and the Commander of the Pacific
Fleet to provide prompt, capable, forward naval presence to continue
our engagement strategy across the region. Our allies and regional
partners depend on our naval aviation and maritime capabilities to
assure and deter. I strongly endorse the Navy's effort to sustain war
fighting capabilities they seek in their FY11 unfunded list to mitigate
risk to the Pacific Command. [See page 15.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 25, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, the 4 phases of the
Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) provide some direction on the
development of missile defense in Europe, but it does not address the
PACOM region specifically. How do you see the Phased, Adaptive Approach
(PAA) applying to PACOM? What are the milestone dates to gain a
capability in PACOM? What specific systems and inventory levels will be
required to support a PAA in PACOM? What sites are likely candidates
for land-based SM-3s and what is the status of host nation agreements
for those sites?
Admiral Willard and General Sharp. [The information referred to is
classified and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, please discuss the
threat that North Korean ballistic missiles pose in the region. How do
you assess the current threat and the near-term threat over the next
five years? I am especially concerned about the progress the North
Koreans made in longer-range ballistic missiles last year and I would
like to hear your assessment of where we stand today and in the future.
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
General Sharp. North Korea continues to develop its ballistic
missile forces in order to threaten not only the Republic of Korea,
USFK, and all of Japan but increasingly U.S. bases and territory in the
western Pacific and beyond. Already possessing hundreds of theater
ballistic missiles capable of doing significant damage to the South
Korean and Japanese economies, we believe North Korea is now focused on
improving the range, accuracy, and overall quality of its missiles.
Recently, Pyongyang fielded a long-range theater ballistic missile,
probably capable of threatening U.S. bases on Guam and the Aleutian
Islands.
North Korea's announced intention on 29 April 2009 to conduct an
``intercontinental ballistic missile'' (ICBM) test launch--coming
shortly after the 5 April 2009 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) apparent satellite
launch attempt--suggests a separate line of long-range missile
development that could bring Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. mainland
under threat of attack. Moreover, Pyongyang is likely interested in
eventually developing a more survivable mobile ICBM--a natural
evolutionary step given its goal of maintaining a credible deterrent
and considering all other mature North Korean ballistic missile systems
are mobile. If North Korea pursues robust research & development and
testing, it is certainly possible for it to have an operational ICBM-
range missile in five years' time.
With the 2009 launches of the multistage TD-2 Space Launch Vehicle
and multiple-theater ballistic missiles, North Korea probably gained
valuable testing experience, furthering the development of long-range
missiles. Future TD-2 Space launch attempts may also serve as a test
bed for other long-range missiles in development and the TD-2 itself
could probably be used as a backup or alternate ICBM. Considering North
Korea's steady pursuit of both longer-range missiles and nuclear
weapons, we believe the Kim Jong-il regime seeks to hold U.S. territory
throughout the Pacific and the continental U.S. at risk of nuclear
missile attack.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, the
Administration's shift to the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) in
missile defense last Fall drives many force structure changes. As AEGIS
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships are allocated to the
Middle East and European missile defense to meet PAA milestones, does
PACOM retain enough AEGIS-based missile defense capability to meet its
needs against the growing threats in the region? What is the specific
PACOM requirement for BMD-capable ships today? What do you project as
the requirement in 5, 10 or 15 years?
Admiral Willard and General Sharp. [The information referred to is
classified and retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, Admiral, the cyber
attack against Google in China highlights an existing vulnerability for
the United States. Our technological edge is a double-edged sword.
There have been many initial steps taken to respond to the very real,
and growing cyber threat. What has PACOM done specifically to respond
to the threat and how do you assess the cyber threat to your
operations?
Admiral Willard. PACOM has increased its cyber security posture as
well as its vigilance regarding cyber threats to thwart any adversary's
intrusions on PACOM networks. Specifically, we have created a Cyber
Fusion Center to coordinate directorate responses to network intrusions
and to prevent network intrusions when possible. Through the Cyber
Fusion Center, we have recently published theater Tailored Response
Options and an Information Assurance situational awareness report to
increase the theater's and headquarters' situational awareness
regarding PACOM's cyber threat. We assess the current cyber threat to
our operations as high.
General Sharp. I will address this question from the perspective of
United States Forces Korea (USFK). We agree that there is a persistent
and evolving cyber threat against USFK. We assess the current risk to
USFK operations as low due to our ability to implement countermeasures.
Historically, we have implemented a layered computer network
security defense structure termed Defense-in-Depth that has
successfully mitigated the risk of cyber threat Computer Network Attack
(CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). A Red Team assessment
that simulated cyber threat activities during March 2010 validated our
secure and strong defensive posture. However, cyber threat actors have
discovered new ways to circumvent our Defense-in-Depth structure with
varying degrees of success. As such, in order for USFK to maintain
confidence in the protection of our networks, we must continue to
identify and resource new technologies that defend against the evolving
threats. The discussion below outlines the mitigation steps USFK
implements on a daily basis to respond to cyber threats.
USFK employs various layers of Defense-In-Depth countermeasures to
thwart off attacks similar to the Google Aurora cyber threat; to
include four different commercial vendors of network layer Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) used at the network layer which identify network
traffic at the source and destination. We also use web cache engines
that screen malicious content, and reverse proxy servers for public-
facing web servers. Secure external remote access to our networks is
achieved through Virtual Private Network (VPN) concentrators and Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication.
USFK has implemented additional host security tools. These products
defend against known, unknown zero-day exploits, and malware. We
utilize four different vendors for remediating and identifying
vulnerabilities in our Defense-In-Depth architecture. Units in Korea
are given the Army Gold Masters (AGM) software image for ensuring a
secure baseline is being maintained; this software baseline is also
validated daily with the Host Based Security System (HBSS) tool. There
are three different antivirus vendors that are used to ensure the
malware is detected, stopped, and eradicated from the Email servers.
The Common Access Card (CAC) utilizes PKI for identity management.
These combined technologies provide user confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation when using information systems.
USFK users are required to sign an Acceptable Use Policy, and receive
annual security awareness training to reinforce security focused usage
on government networks. PKI has been detrimental in email phishing
attempts like those used in the Google Aurora cyber threat.
Note--USFK was used as the test bed for DOD's deployment of HBSS,
Hercules, and Retina Enterprise Manager (REM). Since we were one of the
first enterprises to successfully deploy HBSS, Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) and McAfee have modeled their BBPs off of our
deployment methods.
In the past 6 months, DISA performed two Command Cyber Readiness
Inspections (CCRI) on the Korean Peninsula. Both Kunsan Air Base and
Joint Command Information Systems Activity (JCISA) inspections resulted
in monitor compliance and excellent marks, respectively. The 1st Signal
Brigade Korea-Theater Network Operations and Security Center (K-TNOSC)
is scheduled for their CCRI in June.
Microsoft released a patch for this zero-day vulnerability on the
21st of January 2010; one week after the initial US-CERT notice. Before
this patch was made available, USFK IA/CND informed their community of
the vulnerability and available countermeasures recommended in JTF-GNO,
US-CERT, and other civilian reports. USFK maintains a robust
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) program. As of 31
March 2010, USFK is currently 99.40% compliant for this particular
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA).