[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: STILL JUST A VISION OR REALITY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 12, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-66
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Jane Harman, California, Chair
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Laura Richardson, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Al Green, Texas Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Staff Director
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Meghann Peterlin, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Ms. Caryn A. Wagner, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Mr. Bart R. Johnson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
A DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: STILL JUST A VISION OR REALITY?
----------
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Thompson, Clarke,
Richardson, Green, Himes, McCaul, Dent, and Broun.
Ms. Harman [presiding]. Good morning. The subcommittee will
come to order. We are meeting today to receive testimony on the
state of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and the continuing
efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing at the
Department.
Today's hearing is entitled, ``A DHS Intelligence
Enterprise: Just a Vision or a Reality?'' I now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Nearly 8 years ago this--excuse me. Nearly 8 months ago--
time flies--this subcommittee received testimony from then-
acting Under Secretary Bart Johnson, a career law enforcement
officer, about his vision for the DHS Office of Intelligence
and Analysis. The Chairman, who has just joined this hearing,
and I were very impressed. In fact, I recall him saying,
``Wow,'' as Mr. Johnson completed his oral testimony.
Mr. Johnson's testimony set a new tone for information and
intelligence sharing at I&A--one that embraced the key role
that State and local police and sheriffs can play in
encouraging an alert public to ``See Something and Say
Something,'' or ``iwatch,'' as the LAPD campaign in my own
Congressional district suggests.
Mr. Johnson said, ``Every day across the country State,
local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement and other
officials gather information in the course of their work of
providing emergency and nonemergency services to their
communities. This information may serve as the first indicator
of a potential threat to our National security.'' Obviously
these words became crystal clear last week with the
apprehension of Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square
bomber.
Mr. Johnson suggested that a number--a number of practical
ideas for intelligence sharing, including a comprehensive
outreach effort to make sure that intelligence products provide
State, local, territorial, Tribal, and private sectors with the
information they want, at the time they want it, and in the
form they need it. He suggested creating a Single Point of
Service program that handles information requests by State,
local, and Tribal partners and developing an analytic
capability and methodology for assessing suspicious activity
reporting data.
Mr. Johnson suggested that I&A should create baseline
capabilities and help improve analytic capacity at State and
major urban area fusion centers in order to support
information-driven decision making by State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and Federal homeland security and law enforcement
officials. He nailed it, and this subcommittee has been waiting
to see his vision become reality.
Now that an under secretary has been named and confirmed--
and I am glad that Caryn Wagner is joining us today--we are
meeting to evaluate I&A's progress. As I am sure is now clear,
we believe I&A's core mission is to ensure not just horizontal
sharing among intelligence agencies, but vertical information
sharing up and down between the Federal and local government
and law enforcement. This is our vision; I think this was Mr.
Johnson's vision 8 months ago.
Yet, the testimony today, in my view, seems more focused
once again on I&A's horizontal relationships with other Federal
intelligence agencies. I confess I am a bit disappointed, and I
wonder whether we are pedaling backwards.
We have recent and excellent real-life examples of how
information shared with and by law enforcement can make all the
difference. It was a beauty supply shop owner who provided key
information that led to the unraveling of Najibulla Zazi's plot
to blow up the New York subways. As we all know, two alert
veterans alerted law enforcement to Shahzad's smoking vehicle
planted in Times Square.
An alert public and proactive police force will continue to
make the critical difference, especially as terror tactics
evolve. After all, they are the ones who know their communities
best and will notice first when something odd is occurring.
It should be clear that many terrorist groups and, alas,
some homegrown terrorists want nothing more than to strike us,
to cause physical and economic damage, and to make us fear
them. They are not giving up.
We will never be able to achieve 100 percent security, but
we can certainly improve the odds. That is why we are here
today. When Americans are prepared, not scared, they too can
play a key role in keeping us safe.
So, my question for both witnesses today is, are we going
to implement the inspired vision we heard 8 months ago from Mr.
Johnson? How are you both leveraging the eyes and ears of the
public and local law enforcement to keep our communities and
our country safe in an ever dangerous world?
I welcome you both and look forward to your testimony.
[The statement of Chair Harman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chair Jane Harman
May 12, 2010
Nearly 8 months ago, this subcommittee received testimony from
then-acting Under Secretary Bart Johnson--a career law enforcement
officer--about his vision for the DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.
The Chairman of the full committee and I were very impressed.
Mr. Johnson's testimony set a new tone for information and
intelligence sharing at I&A--one that embraced the key role that State
and local police and sheriffs can play in encouraging an alert public
to ``see something and say something'' or ``iwatch'' as the LAPD
campaign in my own Congressional district suggests.
He said: ``Every day across the country, state, local, tribal and
territorial law enforcement and other officials gather information in
the course of their work of providing emergency and non-emergency
services to their communities. This information may serve as the first
indicator of a potential threat to our national security.''
This became crystal clear last week with the apprehension of Faisal
Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber.
Mr. Johnson suggested a number of practical ideas for intelligence
sharing, including a comprehensive outreach effort to make sure that
intelligence products provide State, local, territorial, Tribal and
private sectors with the information they ``want, at the time they want
it, and in the form they need it.''
He suggested creating a ``Single Point of Service'' program that
handles information requests by State, local, and Tribal partners and
developing an analytic capability and methodology for assessing
Suspicious Activity Reporting data.
And Mr. Johnson suggested that I&A should create baseline
capabilities and help improve analytic capacity at State and major
urban area fusion centers in order to support information-driven
decision making by State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal
homeland security and law enforcement officials.
He nailed it--and this subcommittee has been wanting to see his
vision become reality.
Now that an Under Secretary has been named and confirmed--I'm glad
Caryn Wagner is joining us today--we are meeting to evaluate I&A's
progress.
As I'm sure is now clear, we believe I&A's core mission is to
ensure not just horizontal sharing between intelligence agencies, but
vertical: Up and down between the Federal and local government and law
enforcement.
Yet the testimony today seems more focused on I&A's horizontal
relationships with other Federal intelligence agencies. I confess I am
disappointed and wonder whether we are peddling backwards.
We have recent and excellent real-life examples of how information
shared with and by law enforcement can make all the difference.
It was a beauty supply shop owner who provided key information that
led to the unraveling of Najibullah Zazi's plot to blow up New York
subways. And two alert veterans alerted law enforcement to Shahzad's
smoking vehicle planted in Times Square.
An alert public and proactive police force will continue to make
the critical difference, especially as terror tactics evolve. After
all, they are the ones who know their communities best and will notice
first when something odd occurs.
Terrorists want nothing more than to strike us, to cause physical
and economic damage, and to make us fear them. They will not give up.
We'll never be able to achieve 100% security, but we can certainly
improve the odds. That is why we are here today.
When Americans are prepared, not scared, they can play a key role
in keeping us safe.
My question for the witnesses today is: Are we going to implement
the inspired vision we heard from Mr. Johnson? How are you leveraging
the eyes and ears of the public and local law enforcement to keep our
communities and our country safe?
I welcome you both and look forward to your testimony.
Ms. Harman. Now I yield 5 minutes to the Ranking Member for
his opening comments.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to welcome the witnesses, Under Secretary
Wagner and Principal Deputy Under Secretary Johnson. We are
delighted to see you here today. I hope you are equally as
delighted to see me and Jane.
I also want to praise--the communication between your
office and with us on the committee has greatly improved, and I
appreciate that. I hope you see this, as I do, as an
opportunity for us to discuss some of the challenges faced by
I&A and the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, and as an opportunity
to work together to find solutions.
Nidal Hasan is an American citizen who had contact with al-
Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki over the internet, and Federal
authorities knew it at that time. But Hasan went on to brutally
murder 13 innocent people at Fort Hood, just outside of my
district, on November 5. No one ever told the base commander or
Hasan's immediate superiors that they had a potential problem
on their hands. That attack demonstrated a devastating
information-sharing failure between the FBI and the Department
of Defense, and in my questions I would like to expand upon the
National fusion center and how this could potentially prevent
any future Hasans from occurring.
We had Abdulmutallab, the terrorist who trained with al-
Qaeda, whose violent radicalization was brought to the
attention of the State Department by his own father. In
addition, the NCTC had threat information coming in.
Nevertheless, he attacked us--or attempted to--on Christmas
day with a bomb that he brought onto an airplane. This wasn't
just a failure to connect the dots and identify terrorist
targeting the homeland; it has also shown a weakness in our
ability to detect terrorists boarding airplanes with
explosives.
Mr. Shahzad, also an American citizen, tried to blow up
Times Square in a terrorist attack just 11 days ago, and while
law enforcement did an outstanding job identifying and
apprehending him quickly, Shahzad showed us difficulties in
updating watch list information to the airlines, as well as our
vulnerability to individuals who simply are not on anyone's
radar screen.
The list goes on--15 terror plots within the past year. We
are still under attack today as much as we were on the morning
of September 11 and the subsequent creation of the Department
of Homeland Security.
We have been lucky. We have been very lucky. But that
cannot be the basis of our homeland security policy. Next time,
we may not be so lucky.
A robust system of homeland security intelligence and
information sharing must work, and I think we all agree that
failure is not an option. We have come a long way over the past
few years, particularly in the creation of a network of State
and local fusion centers around the country, which has
transformed information sharing between all levels of
government.
I know that the men and women at DHS are wholly committed
and patriotic to their mission to do their very best to protect
this Nation. But the Department of Homeland Security continues
to be so burdened with internal troubles that it cannot fully
execute its mission to keep the American people safe from
terrorists, drug violence along the southwest border, threats
of weapons of mass destruction, or to prepare for National
disasters.
Do we set ourselves up for failure by trying to fix all of
the external problems DHS faces without DHS fixing itself
first? In my view, I think we need to get the house in order
first before we look to the external.
Since its inception, the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis has been plagued by a confused mission, low employee
morale, hiring and retention problems, and an evolving
organizational structure. To no one's surprise, this has
resulted in poor analytical intelligence products.
It is that reason, Madam Chair, I am grateful to you for
holding this important hearing. We have an obligation to make
intelligence and information sharing within DHS as robust as we
want it to be between DHS and other Federal agencies and State
and local partners. We have an obligation to look at what may
be wrong within the Department itself that prevents it from
being the best it can be.
Recently--I think we need to give credit to the two
witnesses--we have seen signs of improvement and are hearing
good things. But we are still a long way from where we need to
be.
Just recently, Under Secretary Wagner, we had a very good
meeting, I think, in my office, and I have high hopes that
under your leadership that the DHS Intelligence Enterprise can
realize the level of greatness that is required.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
The Chair now yields 5 minutes to the Chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson, of Mississippi, for opening remarks.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Welcome, Ms. Wagner. I understand that this is your first
appearance before the committee since your confirmation, as we
had a chat one Sunday afternoon, but we didn't get a chance to
see each other, so I am happy to have you.
Mr. Johnson, it is always good to see you.
As I am sure you have discovered, you have a particularly
challenging position. As the under secretary for intelligence
and analysis you must continue to build that organization, as
you have said, to be trusted leader in meeting our Nation's
homeland security intelligence needs.
Simultaneously, as chief intelligence officer you must
craft a strategic approach to support and leverage the unique
intelligence capability of each of the Department's components.
As you know, we created I&A 6 years ago in part to break down
traditional stovepipes, set mission-based agendas, and develop
an integrated Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. As I
said in September and unfortunately must say again, we are
still not there.
Unfortunately, your I&A has never established a specific
set of effective strategic plans that both describes and
delivers results, measures those results, and helps course
correct if or when those results are insufficient. Without such
a plan I fear that I&A risks failing its unique opportunity as
an intelligence coordinator for State and local consumers
within DHS or for the intelligence community.
Consider, if you will, the recent Times Square attack. We
have all heard the successful contributions made by CBP to
capturing Faisal Shahzad. They rightly are to be congratulated.
However, absent from Congressional briefings has been what, if
anything, I&A or DHS Intelligence Enterprise brought to the
table, and we will talk a little bit about that.
Further, the recent designation of Rand Beers as under
secretary for the national protection and programs directorate
as DHS's lead for counterterrorism raises questions about where
you fit in the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise.
Simply put, Ms. Wagner, I&A is at a crossroads. It has the
potential to become the premier provider of information to
homeland security intelligence consumers, but will only succeed
if organizational ambiguity that I identified is addressed, a
strategic vision in place, and a dedicated people who work for
you can: No. 1, demonstrate specific results; No. 2,
proactively embody the position--both inside and out of DHS--of
a trusted leader in meeting our Nation's homeland security
intelligence needs.
I look forward to your testimony. Perhaps you can help
clear the air on some of these issues.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
May 12, 2010
Welcome, Ms. Wagner. I understand that this is your first
appearance before the committee since your confirmation. As I am sure
you have discovered, you have a particularly challenging position. As
the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, you must continue to
build that organization to, as you have said, ``be the trusted leader
in meeting our nation's homeland security intelligence needs.''
Simultaneously, as the Chief Intelligence Officer, you must craft a
strategic approach to support and leverage the unique intelligence
capabilities of each of the Department's components.
As you know, I&A was created 6 years ago, in part, to break down
traditional stovepipes, set mission-based agendas, and develop an
integrated Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. As I said in
September and, unfortunately, must say again, we are still not there.
Unfortunately, your I&A has still never established a specific and
effective strategic plan that both describes and delivers results,
measures those results, and helps course correct if or when those
results are insufficient.
Without such a plan, I fear that I&A risks failing in its unique
opportunity as an intelligence coordinator for State and local
consumers, within DHS, or for the intelligence community.
Consider, if you will, the recent Times Square attack. We have all
heard of the successful contributions made by CBP to capturing Faisal
Shahzad, rightly, are to be congratulated. However, absent from
Congressional briefings has been what, if anything I&A or DHS's
Intelligence Enterprise brought to the table.
Further, the recent designation of Rand Beers, Under Secretary for
the National Protection and Programs Directorate, as DHS' lead for
counterterrorism raises questions about where you fit into the Homeland
Security Intelligence Enterprise.
Simply put, Ms. Wagner, I&A is at a crossroads. It has the
potential to become the premier provider of information to homeland
security intelligence consumers but will only succeed if the
organizational ambiguity that I identified is addressed, a strategic
vision is in place, and the dedicated people who work for you can:
Demonstrate specific results and proactively embody the position--both
inside and outside of DHS--of ``the trusted leader in meeting our
nation's homeland security intelligence needs.''
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I now welcome our witnesses this morning. Ms. Caryn Wagner
was confirmed on February 11, 2010, as the under secretary for
intelligence and analysis at the Department of Homeland
Security. In this role she serves as the head of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis and as the chief intelligence officer
for the Department.
In her career she has served as the budget director for the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, HPSCI, where
I first met her, and she has also served in the office of the
director of national intelligence as the assistant deputy
director of national intelligence for management and for the
first chief financial officer for the national intelligence
program. Ms. Wagner spent many years with the Defense
Intelligence Agency, most recently as the director of DIA's
liaison to the United States European Command and NATO.
Bart Johnson is the principal deputy under secretary for
intelligence and analysis, and he was the acting under
secretary for a period. Appointed on May 18, 2009 to the
Department, he also served--well, I just mentioned that--as the
acting under secretary.
Prior to his appointment, Mr. Johnson served as the
director of homeland security and law enforcement at the office
of the director of national intelligence. His work focused on
bridging the intelligence community with State, local, and
Tribal customers.
Before this, Mr. Johnson served as a colonel with the New
York State Police and possesses over 30 years of law
enforcement experience. I should add that the committee, I
think, on a bipartisan basis, feels that the experience he
brings to this position is enormously helpful, especially
because our view is that the primary mission of I&A is
information sharing on a vertical basis with State, local, and
Tribal agencies.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask Secretary Wagner to summarize
her statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Wagner. Thank you very much, Chair Harman, Ranking
Member McCaul, Chairman Thompson, other Members of the
committee. I am very pleased to be here before you today for
the first time. This is the 3-month anniversary of my first day
on the job at I&A, and I am very happy to be here with Bart
Johnson, who is my partner at I&A. As the Chair has already
mentioned, Mr. Johnson's distinguished career and credibility
with National and local law enforcement has made him an
indispensible asset to the Department and to achieving the
Department's goals.
As has been mentioned, Mr. Johnson did an outstanding job
as acting under secretary for 10 months, and he and I are now
in the process of building on the foundation that he laid to
hopefully take I&A to a new level and address some of the
issues that you all have raised.
I find the subject of this hearing--``DHS Intelligence
Enterprise: A Vision or Reality?''--actually very appropriate
since the major focus of both of our efforts has been on
building a true homeland security enterprise. In fact, I think
we see this as being two interlocking enterprising--one that is
within the Department and one that is between the Department
and all of its State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private
sector partners.
As the chief intelligence officer I am primarily focused on
leading the effort to create that internal DHS enterprise,
while Mr. Johnson is leading the effort to create the
distributed homeland security enterprise, made up of the State
and local fusion centers, who then all have their own
enterprises at their--at the State and local level. So we are
trying to create a fabric across the Nation.
After 3 months on the job, I can say I have never been in
an organization that has the broad range of customers and
requirements that I&A does. We are responsible for supporting
the Secretary and senior Departmental leadership, the diverse
set of DHS operational components, the State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and private sector partners, other Federal
partners, and also the intelligence community.
In order to provide the best intelligence support to that
wide range of customers it is important that the intelligence
activities of the components of the Department be synchronized.
That is the job of the chief intelligence officer, or CINT, and
it is accomplished largely through the Homeland Security
Intelligence Council, or HSIC.
The HSIC is made up of the intelligence chiefs of the
components and other key elements of the Department, such as
infrastructure protection and ops coordination. It meets
regularly; it is supported by a staff to follow up on its
actions; and it has undertaken and overseen many important
tasks over the past year.
It has overseen the production of the first ever
Department-wide production plan to coordinate and deconflict
analysis. It has overseen the process of developing and
validating standing information requirements to be used to
leverage the intelligence community on behalf of the components
and the State and local fusion centers.
It has also been used to charter, recently, a working group
to standardize and streamline our process of homeland
intelligence reporting across the entire Department, which
requires standardization and improvement to make it more timely
and useful, again, to our customers in the State and local
fusion centers and in the intelligence community. We have also
recently chartered a working group to improve--accelerate
classified connectivity to the components along the border.
So I believe that the HSIC is operating in a collegial and
effective manner to improve the coordination of the
Department's intelligence efforts, and I would like to point
out that we actually have several key members of the HSIC
present here today to support us, and they are sitting behind
me, and I would like to call out Admiral Cindy Cougan, from the
U.S. Coast Guard; Mr. Jim Woosley, from ICE; Mr. Don Crusetti,
from Citizenship and Immigration Services; and Ms. Cindy
Farkas, from TSA. I appreciate their willingness to be here in
solidarity with us.
As the CINT, I am responsible not only for coordinating
current intelligence activities but also advising the Secretary
on the overall intelligence posture of the Department to meet
our future needs as defined in the recently completed
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. I recently received
briefings from all of the components on their programs, and I
will be advising the Secretary on my recommendations for the
2010 budget bill process, and I am also working with the
components to refine and justify their intelligence
initiatives.
A recent example, I think, of how the DHS enterprise
operates is the new Silent Partner aviation security screening
program that I know you are familiar with. While the details of
the program are classified, it is an intelligence-driven
program that significantly improves our aviation screening
efforts.
The program itself is the result of an outstanding
collaboration between CBP and TSA, for which I&A takes
absolutely no credit. But our role in this is to work with them
and the intelligence community to brief the intelligence
community on what is needed to support this program and to make
sure that we have the processes and procedures in place to get
that information to them on a timely basis. That partnership, I
think, is emblematic of the enterprise and the way that it
should operate.
Another good example of where the enterprise is at work is
along the southwest border, where we are working hard to
improve the coordinated efforts of I&A, CBP, ICE, Coast Guard,
and also the other elements, such as DEA, DOJ, and the
Department of Defense, that are down there.
So, two other quick things to highlight: We now are having
a weekly intelligence VTC at the senior level with the
components to make sure that we are on top of these very
concerning threat streams and we are sharing our information,
and I think that has been very helpful. We have also increased
manning levels for the DHS Threat Task Force, which I believe
you are familiar with, which is made up of elements from the
components and I&A and is focused on keeping on top of those
threats.
So overall, I believe while we have still room for
improvement, I think it is fair to say that the DHS internal
enterprise is reality, and we are focusing our efforts to
provide better products and support to the other part of our
enterprise, which is the State and local part, which Mr.
Johnson is now going to address, so I will turn it over to him.
[The joint statement of Ms. Wagner and Mr. Johnson
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Caryn A. Wagner and Bart R. Johnson
May 12, 2010
introduction
Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the vision and goals for the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). This is my
first testimony before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment since my confirmation on February
11, 2010. I am honored to serve as the Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer for DHS. I look forward to
working closely with this subcommittee and the Congress to lead and
strengthen the critical intelligence mission of the Department.
the office of intelligence and analysis strategic vision
I&A's overarching vision is to be the trusted leader in meeting our
Nation's homeland security intelligence needs. This vision drives our
core focus of strengthening the Department's and our partners' ability
to protect the homeland by accessing, integrating, analyzing, and
sharing timely and relevant intelligence and information, while
protecting the privacy and civil rights and civil liberties of all
Americans.
I&A's programs and activities align with the core DHS missions
designated in our recently completed Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review (QHSR). Intelligence and information sharing are identified as
key activities for the Department in the QHSR. To that end, I&A plays a
critical role to DHS' success in all of its core mission areas:
Preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing and managing our
borders; enforcing and administering our immigration laws; safeguarding
and securing cyberspace; ensuring resilience to disasters; and
strengthening and maturing the Department.
I have spent considerable time reviewing the roles, missions,
functions and alignment of I&A since my confirmation in February. Much
of my review has focused on what I&A must do to enhance its support to
core customers at the Department and to its non-Federal partners at the
State, local, Tribal, and territorial levels. I have also evaluated how
I&A can improve upon the services that it already provides to the
Intelligence Community (IC) and its interaction with Congress. I am
focusing now on four main areas:
Creating a true homeland security information-sharing
enterprise through greater focus on the State, local, and major
urban area fusion centers;
Unifying and sustaining a DHS intelligence enterprise as the
Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department;
Producing first-rate analytic products tailored to the needs
of core customers, including to those not often served by
traditional members of the IC; and
Establishing the program management processes necessary to
improve the morale, efficiency, and professionalism of I&A as
an organization.
In the last few months, we have made substantial progress in
defining priorities, improving management processes, and determining
the best structure for I&A to meet the goals that I have set forth. I
would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation for the
outstanding work and leadership of Principal Deputy Under Secretary
Bart Johnson during his tenure as Acting Under Secretary; much of what
I propose today builds on his foundational efforts. The following
specific steps, already under way, will translate I&A's goals into an
organizational and program-execution reality.
executing the strategic vision
Two basic themes drive I&A's need for realignment: (1) The need for
I&A to maximize support to core customers and; (2) the need for I&A to
take better advantage of its collective resources.
I have also identified areas in which we can improve I&A's
organizational structure. I&A's proposed realignment consolidates
similar activities, invests more resources in areas of required core
competencies, and frees up existing resources for new endeavors.
I&A's proposed realignment establishes four core offices, three of
which are supervised by a Deputy Under Secretary: Analysis; Enterprise
and Mission Support; and Plans, Policy and Performance Management; and
the fourth by a Director of the Department's new Joint Fusion Center
Program Management Office (JFC-PMO). The I&A Principal Deputy Under
Secretary will have direct responsibility for overseeing the overall
fusion center effort. We plan to forward a reprogramming action to
consolidate the resources of the legacy State and Local Program Office
(SLPO) into the JFC-PMO. We are also determining the relationship the
JFC-PMO will have with the emergent National Fusion Center Program
Management Office (NFC-PMO) directed by the White House.
I will now describe in further detail some of the key initiatives
underway that support the four focus areas previously described: (1)
Supporting State and local fusion centers; (2) strengthening the DHS
intelligence enterprise; (3) providing first-rate analytic information
to core customers; and (4) improving I&A management and processes.
These focus areas are the guiding principles under which I&A's goals
have been established.
1. Supporting State and Local Fusion Centers
A primary role of I&A is to share intelligence and information with
our partners at the State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private
sector levels. The State, local, Tribal, and territorial first
responders and first preventers are the leading edge of the homeland
security enterprise. The linchpin of our interaction with our non-
Federal partners is through stronger partnerships with State and local
fusion centers. Fusion centers are a vital tool for strengthening
homeland security, and it is I&A's job to work closely with State,
local, Tribal, and territorial partners on some of the Nation's most
pressing homeland security issues. Further strengthening this
capability is a top priority.
We are continuing to expand the level of cooperation and
information sharing with our State, local, Tribal, and territorial
partners via a robust network of intelligence and law enforcement
agencies participating in State and local fusion centers. Secretary
Napolitano approved the plan to implement the Joint Fusion Center
Program Management Office (JFC-PMO) on March 15, 2010. The JFC-PMO will
bring to bear all the Department's resources--not just I&A's--to
support information sharing among State, local, Tribal, territorial,
and Federal law enforcement partners, as well as to coordinate relevant
support from all DHS elements, not just from I&A. The Department is now
considering how the JFC-PMO will align with the White House's direction
that DHS be the lead agency in establishing the National Fusion Center
Program Management Office (NFC-PMO). I&A developed an implementation
plan for the NFC-PMO with the assistance of State and local
representatives and more than 15 Federal agencies. The implementation
plan was widely coordinated throughout the Federal Government and will
soon be sent to Secretary Napolitano for her review.
To leverage the capabilities of our non-Federal partners, I&A has
deployed 55 intelligence officers to fusion centers Nation-wide and
plans to deploy a total of 70 officers by the end of fiscal year 2010,
with the ultimate goal to deploy personnel to all 72 designated fusion
centers and assign 10 regional coordinators to the field. I&A has
installed the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), which allows the
Federal Government to share Secret-level intelligence and information
with State, local, and Tribal partners, at 33 fusion centers.
Additional centers are undergoing facilities certification to be
accredited to house HSDN. This burgeoning network greatly expands two-
way information sharing flows between Federal and non-Federal homeland
security partners. We are also partnering with the DHS Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office to provide
training to Federal, State, and local fusion center personnel, to
ensure privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are appropriately
addressed in fusion center activities and products.
2. Strengthening the DHS Intelligence Enterprise
I&A is continuing to take concrete steps to promote a unified,
collaborative DHS intelligence enterprise. Our goal is to make
intelligence activities at DHS more integrated, efficient, and
effective, and to allow DHS, both headquarters and components, to give
and receive better intelligence support. A critical tool in this effort
is the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), which I chair in
my role as Chief Intelligence Officer. The HSIC is comprised of
component intelligence leaders and other key officials representing a
broad range of DHS activities that require intelligence support. The
HSIC is focused on governance-level, DHS intelligence enterprise-wide
objectives, such as overseeing the completion of the first coordinated,
enterprise-wide analytic production plan, playing a leading role in
reviewing DHS-wide protocols for disseminating Homeland Security
Intelligence Reports and preparing a fiscal year 2012 consolidated
intelligence budget recommendation to the Secretary.
Another successful example of the power of the DHS intelligence
enterprise is the DHS Threat Task Force (DTTF). The DTTF was
established in the summer of 2009 to support the Zazi and Headley
investigations. The DTTF is composed of I&A analysts and
representatives from the DHS operational components and ensures that
all the Department's information and expertise is brought to bear on an
issue or investigation. Last summer, the DTTF provided information to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on hundreds of additional
individuals who were determined to be potentially relevant to specific,
high-profile cases. DHS reactivated the DTTF on Christmas day, after
the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253. We
institutionalized this task force to focus and unify the efforts of the
whole Department on mitigating terrorist threats to the homeland. These
efforts have directly contributed to the effective use of watch lists
and have supported Department programs for passenger travel analysis
and airport screening procedures.
I&A recently completed a comprehensive set of Standing Information
Needs (SINs) that uniformly document on-going intelligence and
information needs of the entire Department. These SINs improve DHS'
ability to participate in the IC's collection management processes and
the quality and quantity of information received in support of those
needs, as well as the information I&A produces. In addition, since
October 2009, our Collection and Requirements Division assisted more
than 20 fusion centers in developing their own SINs, with the goal of
improving the level of support they can receive from the Department and
the rest of the IC. We are putting in place tools to ensure our
analytic products adhere to information needs of both Departmental and
non-Federal partners. These same SINs also provide the starting point
for I&A's planning and performance measurement activities.
3. Providing First-Rate Analytic Information to Core Customers
I&A's analytic programs now better align with the Secretary's
priorities and the Department's SINs, and encompass those analytic
topics that are most meaningful for homeland security. Our analysts--in
partnership with National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the FBI--
address threats to the homeland from both international and domestic
terrorist groups and actors and also analyze terrorist tactics,
techniques, and procedures to inform the development of protective
measures at home. As a result of recent trends, I&A is working closely
with its IC partners to develop a framework for analysis of homegrown
violent extremism that is consistent with protecting privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties.
I&A has primary responsibility within the IC to analyze, evaluate,
and disseminate analysis on threats to homeland critical
infrastructure. Through our robust relationship with the private sector
and partnership with DHS' Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), we
routinely assess the impact of threats to industry and, with our IP
partners, identify specific vulnerabilities and consequences that could
result from terrorist attacks or other hazards. We are working with IP
to improve the partnership and the utility of the products produced in
this area.
Our border and immigration security analysts focus not only on
terrorist threats to the United States on or at our land and maritime
borders, but also address trends regarding travel, asylum, and refugee
issues and the rising violence on the Mexican side of the southwest
border. I&A, in fact, uniquely supports the U.S. Government's efforts
to identify, track, deter, and prevent terrorists from traveling to the
homeland. I&A's role in preventing terrorist travel focuses on
providing targeted intelligence analysis that leverages unique DHS
databases and expertise, and on sharing information broadly within DHS
and also with the U.S. Government and foreign partners. I&A plays a key
role in monitoring changes to and effects of global immigration and
travel security policies, provides direct support to DHS asylum and
refugee programs, informs Customs and Border Protection targeting rules
and Transportation Security Administration screening measures, and
produces unique assessments on alien smuggling and illicit travel
patterns in support of the IC and other customers.
I&A also possesses a cyber intelligence analytic program. This team
provides a National intelligence analytical framework in support of key
cybersecurity customers, such as the DHS National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), the DHS United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and the Industrial Control
Systems CERT. We are working with partners in the community to
collaborate on strategic cyber analysis, and we continue to determine
the amount of analytic support necessary to the Department's
cybersecurity mission.
I&A also maintains expertise in the fields of health intelligence
and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues to
serve its Departmental, Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
private sector partners. DHS is a co-founder, with the Defense
Intelligence Agency, of the National Center for Medical Intelligence at
Fort Detrick, Maryland, which focuses on a broad range of foreign
medical risks that could threaten the United States. We use our
combined research and analytic talents to produce all-source threat
analyses on human health, agriculture, and food security to support DHS
components--a recent example being the health intelligence we provided
to support first responders' relief efforts in Haiti--as well as
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial government agencies and
the private sector. Our analysis goes beyond just the science of health
threats to address relevant foreign policy and socio-economic issues
that could adversely affect homeland security operations and critical
infrastructure and key resources.
On CBRN issues, our experts collaborate with their IC partners on
broad-ranging assessments and National-level exercises; provide the
threat basis for risk assessments that drive DHS policy formulation and
detection and response programs; and provide practical insights to
State, local, Tribal, and private sector partners on CBRN indicators
they might encounter in the course of their operational and law
enforcement roles.
4. Improving Management and Processes
To ensure that I&A is able to meet the broad range of its
responsibilities, I am placing great emphasis on strengthening its
planning, management, and performance oversight functions. I&A is
making considerable progress developing fair and transparent policies
and decision-making processes, aligning resources to priority missions,
and assessing the efficacy of investments. I&A has established
leadership-level policy, personnel, and resource requirements boards to
improve the management of I&A's workforce, programs, and budget. As
part of my commitment to improving management, policy development, and
business processes, I&A's realignment proposal establishes a Deputy
Under Secretary for Plans, Policy, and Performance Management (PPPM),
as discussed earlier in this testimony. This new element will enable
more streamlined and integrated strategic planning, programming and
performance measurement, and budgeting life cycle processes. PPPM will
further the Department's intelligence mission by providing DHS
intelligence enterprise and Departmental information sharing management
guidance by overseeing the Executive Directors of both the Homeland
Security Intelligence Council and the Information Sharing Governance
Board. For example, PPPM will be the focal point for our partnership
with the DHS Chief Information Officer to improve Departmental
information-sharing governance and establish enterprise-wide best
practices.
The new Deputy Under Secretary's responsibilities will include
developing and unifying applicable strategies, plans, and policies for
the entire intelligence mission cycle, leading to integrated DHS
intelligence and information-sharing enterprises focused on mission and
customers. PPPM will also develop a detailed I&A strategic action plan
that will include a mapping of all organizational activities and
performance management metrics to measure program execution and
effectiveness. This, in turn, will institute valid metrics to measure
success and create a systemic cycle that facilitates organizational
improvement. Finally, it will serve as I&A's primary focal point for
intelligence policy planning and representation of the intelligence
mission to the rest of DHS, the larger IC, and the National security
policy community.
I&A's proposed Office of Enterprise and Mission Support is intended
to centralize intelligence mission support functions for I&A, as well
as the larger DHS intelligence enterprise. It is designed to maximize
the effectiveness of our information technology knowledge management,
counterintelligence, training, collection requirements, and external
operations programs.
Intelligence training is a critical capability that will enable
fulfillment of I&A's strategic goals, and the proposed Office of
Enterprise and Mission Support will build on existing I&A training
successes. This program, which will be staffed by additional
intelligence trainers, is intended to support the establishment of a
culture of disciplined intelligence work in I&A.
immediate way forward
These steps are a beginning, and I&A will undergo further
refinement over time. I&A must--and will--continue to mature its
management and business standards; move towards more proactive,
collaborative and prioritized process planning and; ensure that all of
its activities align with DHS missions and goals.
conclusion
Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the strategic vision for I&A. I&A has made
significant strides, and we continue to adapt ourselves to the
continuing emerging needs of the Department. I&A has a vital and unique
mission, and we will continue to improve our strategic posture to more
effectively support core customers.
I&A's efforts to gather, assess, analyze, and share intelligence
and information will continue to be guided by the dual imperatives of
protecting the country from those who wish to do it harm, and
protecting our privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. With your
support, the leadership of Secretary Napolitano, and the fine men and
women of I&A, I believe we can accomplish our goals and fulfill these
imperatives. I look forward to keeping the subcommittee apprised of
I&A's continued progress.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF BART R. JOHNSON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Johnson. Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, good morning, and
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to
hopefully discuss some very concrete and positive steps and
activities that have occurred since my last appearance before
you.
When I appeared before you last September, I had 4 months
under my belt, and you advised me that you wanted to see real
progress made as it relates to interacting with our State,
local, and Tribal partners. I took that direction very
seriously, and I would now like to walk through with you some
of those concrete examples.
First and foremost, I am very gratified and happy, quite
frankly, that after 10 months of being the acting under
secretary there is now a Senate-confirmed under secretary
seated to my right, Ms. Caryn Wagner. Ms. Wagner brings to bear
a considerable amount of experience and credibility from the
intelligence community.
I have worked side-by-side with Ms. Wagner for the past 3
months and have watched her embrace this role in both her
capacity as the under secretary and also the CINT, and I can
say with a great deal of confidence that we are partners in
this effort to make this a reality.
Ms. Wagner has empowered me and given me the leadership
role within I&A regarding matters related to State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement and which will, in turn, allow me to
provide even more focus to this very important part of our
National security enterprise.
Over nearly, now, the past year I have come to appreciate
the role of I&A, and in particular I would like to compliment
all the employees who are working very hard within I&A, who
have been so supportive to me personally and to the Department
in all they have contributed. I, too, would also like to
acknowledge the Members seated behind me from the component
agencies who have really developed that kindred spirit of
teamwork.
So what have we done to implement, in a concrete example,
some of the things that we spoke about back in September? We
have taken very seriously the need to provide more timely and
useful information to fusion centers, and I believe, based on
the feedback that we are getting on a regular basis, we are
making progress.
We have made our bulletins reports more actionable and have
developed, at your encouragement, new products that have been
well received by the field. We have worked very closely with
the Department of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to provide
training to fusion centers and make certain that we respect the
rule of law.
We have reinstituted the I&A fellowships program, and right
now have a member from the NYSIC, the New York State
Intelligence Center, assigned to I&A. We are also in
partnership with the ODNI hosting our first ever fusion center
directors course to be held in Monterey, California, in June
2010.
We have accelerated our deployment of analytical training
to build those analytical centers of excellence. We have
accelerated our deployment of HSDN secret connectivity, and
also the deployment of I&A reps to the field. We are working in
lockstep with the components, once again represented behind me,
along the southwest border as it relates to integrating the
HIDAs and the fusion centers into an information sharing
environment and enterprise that could better protect the
homeland.
Obviously, to institutionalize these efforts we would need
to ensure that not only these are words, but these are built in
a very institutionalized and sustained way. So to that end, we
have not only developed a Joint Fusion Center Program
Management Office that is bringing together the Department-wide
efforts, we are also building the National Fusion Center
Program Management Office, which is going to be a nimble, lean
group of individuals to bring the wealth of experience of the
Federal Government.
As evidenced by the terrorist activity of 2009 and thus far
in 2010, the threat to the Nation is persistent, particularly
as illustrated by Zazi, Hasan, Abdulmutallab, and now Shahzad.
These incidents clearly illustrate that there are individuals
overseas, and yes, now living within our borders, who have and
do want to do us harm. Building the capabilities at the
National Network of Fusion Centers and working with our Federal
counterparts, it is now more important than ever to continue to
build this enterprise.
Based on my previous law enforcement interactions it is
obvious to me that an alert law enforcement officer,
firefighter, or other public safety personnel, or, as evidenced
by the Times Square incident, the public will be the first to
potentially identify a threat or suspicious activity, thereby
making established relationships and institutionalized and
practiced information sharing vital to our National security.
It is our responsibility to provide these first preventers of
the homeland the information they need, and I believe I&A is
working very hard to do that, and that is our role and mission
within the Federal Government.
In conclusion, we have made some concrete steps to
accomplish these goals. However, I know there is much more that
needs to be done. With your support and the support of others,
we within I&A will continue to work with our Federal partners
to support State and local fusion centers along with the first
responders to ensure that they are empowered to be a key
defense and an integral part of our National security. Once
again, I look forward to doing that in partnership with Under
Secretary Wagner.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, both of you. Thank you.
We will now turn to questions. I will recognize myself
first, followed by the Ranking Member, and then recognize
Members for questions in the order that they arrived at the
hearing. Mr. Thompson assures me that he will be back to ask
questions.
First, let me congratulate each of you for introducing the
other as a partner. I think that is critically important.
Ms. Wagner, you didn't miss it--certainly the noise
emanating from me--that I thought it was critical that someone
with law enforcement background occupy the position as head of
I&A. I said that because people with that background
instinctively and on the basis of experience understand how
important vertical information sharing is. So now that you are
in this position--and we welcome you--I am very happy that you
embraced Mr. Johnson as a partner and that he embraces you as a
partner. Good start.
I am also happy, as you mentioned, that you are working
hard on aviation screening. That clearly is a place where we
may need to improve, based on the Christmas bomber experience,
although, as you point out, CBP was a hero in making it work in
the latest New York City bomber case.
So congratulations on that. I will be at my home airport, a
twice-intended al-Qaeda target, LAX, this weekend, and I plan
to walk through with TSA and others, exactly what has changed.
So I think that is hopefully an improving story.
My question is based on my opening comments. I believe
strongly--and I think my view is shared by others here--that
vertical information sharing is the primary responsibility of
I&A. Organizing better in the Department and having a chair at
the table--the intelligence table--across the Federal
Government are also tasks that have some urgency, but your
primary mission is to get accurate, actionable, and timely
information to local law enforcement, to a public consistent
with helping them be prepared, and to the private sector,
because many of the things that we fear could happen in private
firms or by leveraging private sector assets.
So my question to you specifically, Ms. Wagner, is: Do you
agree that vertical information sharing is your primary
responsibility?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, ma'am, I do agree, understanding that
information sharing goes both ways. I wholeheartedly agree with
that, and I think that is one of the major authorities and
responsibilities of this office.
We need to make sure that the information flows down to
allow those first responders and first preventers to do what we
need them to do. But at the same time, we are expecting that
valuable information that they are privy to to flow back up,
because the point of the whole two-way flow is making the
country safer, and the two-way flow is required in order for us
to accomplish that.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for that comment.
Mr. Johnson, do you agree?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, ma'am, very much so. In fact, as
evidenced by Abdulmutallab and the fast-pacedness of that
investigation and the concern about follow-on attacks, that
information flow did occur. It is encouraging, also, to know
that even some of the material that we were receiving had ready
built into them tear lines, so we were much more readily
available and able to pass to our partners to include the
airlines.
Conversely, the information flow up--that is why, through
the PMO, the program manager's office, we need to continue to
partner with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, who has the lead
on the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which
was led in part by the LAPD with Mike Downing and Joanie
McNamara. That is being continued to roll out, and we are going
to partner with them, because as Ms. Wagner referred to, there
is a lot of information out there, and it is the first
responders who are going to touch it, and we need to have
access to it legally and lawfully and then pass it up.
Ms. Harman. I enthusiastically agree that information
sharing--vertical information--is in two directions and just
thought I would impart a bit of good news to all of our
Members, and I hope to you too. This subcommittee was
responsible for legislation on over-classification. Over-
classification is a problem because, as Cathy Lanier, who is
the chief of the Washington Police, will tell you, sometimes
they are afraid to share information up because they are afraid
it will get classified--this is declassified information--and
then their folks won't get access to it later.
We passed, I thought, pretty responsible legislation out of
the House, and that legislation has been taking a long time to
get through the Senate. My understanding is yesterday or today
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security finished its report
on the legislation, and it will be hopefully on the Senate
consent calendars soon in a form that it will pass here again.
So soon we will be able to deal with this problem, and a
subcommittee initiative that was bipartisan and unanimous, I
hope, will become law.
My time has expired. I now yield to Mr. McCaul for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I agree that vertical information sharing is very
important. I also think horizontal sharing is important. When
we looked at particularly the Hasan case and the Christmas
bomber--and this is where I want to lead toward the National
fusion center; I think this is a monumental task for you to
pull this thing off, and who are the partners, and who will be
sharing the information?
We know that Hasan, as I mentioned in my opening
statement--that the Joint Terrorism Task Force had information
that he had been in touch with the cleric in Yemen, and yet
none of that information was shared with the commander at Fort
Hood, General Cohen, who I spoke with at the memorial service.
``Wouldn't you have liked to have had that information?''
``Absolutely.''
How many more Hasans are out there? We don't know.
That is horizontal. How will this--and let's talk about the
Christmas bomber.
You have threat information coming in from the State
Department that this father--his father came in to the embassy,
warned them that his son was in contact with extremists in
Yemen. At the same time, NCTC is getting threat information. In
fairness to them, they are getting a lot of threat information
every day, but that is, again, a horizontal issue.
So how do you envision this National Fusion Center to work?
Who will be the partners? Specifically, will DOD be a partner
to that? How will this work to prevent--in those two cases,
prevent something like that from happening again?
Ms. Wagner. I think I will defer to Bart to answer the
question on the National Fusion Center since he has been the
person personally responsible for working to establish the
plans with the White House, so I will turn that question----
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. As it relates to the National Fusion
Center enterprise, we are meeting with the--I actually met with
Assistant Secretary Paul Stockton, DOD, and he shared a lot of
your concerns as it relates to force protection. In fact, we
are stepping out an opportunity to assist them, you know, with
the special activity, to assist them with a force protection.
Additionally, we are interacting with the high-intensity
drug-trafficking areas to ensure that that horizontal
information sharing is occurring; and also, obviously, building
the capabilities and capacities of the fusion centers.
As it relates to the information flow within the Federal
Government, from FBI to DOD, I would really like to defer, you
know, answering that, but suffice to say that the fusion
centers need to be considered part of this fabric, part of this
enterprise. They need to be trusted colleagues.
They are secure space; they are secure connectivity; they
have Federally-recognized clearances. So the Federal Government
needs to look at them as partners and leverage them to share
the information and make them better informed as to what to
look out for and certainly what to report back into the system.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Johnson, as I understand it DHS has been
tasked with the lead responsibility for the Nation in terms of
the National Fusion Center. That is where I am concerned when
you say, ``Well, I can't--this is DOD and FBI, Joint Terrorism
Task Force,'' all that. How can we help you make sure that
there is a proper level of information sharing between the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces out there, the HIDAs, the
Department of Defense, and DHS?
Mr. Johnson. As it relates to deferring, I meant just the
particular case facts. But to your point, yes, we have been
given the lead based on Mr. Brennan's memorandum of 17 December
putting the Secretary as the Executive agent for this National
Fusion Center PMO.
So the help that we could, you know, get from you,
obviously, and we are already getting it, quite frankly, is,
you know, to build that enterprise and once again illustrate
the effectiveness of it, the supportedness of it, the need for
sharing the information. We are partnering very well with the
FBI. Deputy Assistant Director Eric Velez is a true partner in
this.
In fact, he came from the JRIC, the Joint Regional
Intelligence Center, so he gets it; he is understanding it. I
was in Florida. I am going out to California with him to really
effectively show the SACs and partnerships with the fusion
center directors about what could become of this once the full
support of the Federal Government is put behind it.
I am confident as this matures you are going to see more
information percolating to the surface as relates to the
observations being made in the field.
Mr. McCaul. I know that I think the Chair agrees with me.
We do want to work with you and help you in this effort because
you have been tasked as a lead agency, and it is a monumental
task. I think to give you the authority where you can go to the
Department of Defense, or the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or
even, you know, the intelligence community, and say, ``Look, we
are--I have the lead responsibility to protect the Nation and
the homeland and you need to work with us.''
Mr. Johnson. Thanks for that.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate that last comment by Mr. McCaul.
We have said often that we are your partners, we are not your
adversaries, and we share exactly your goal. We actually
represent the communities in which some future terror attack
could occur, and we depend on you to work with us to make
certain that, to the maximum extent, those in--people in those
communities know what to look for and what to do and hopefully
can prevent or disrupt a future plot, not just respond to it.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Broun.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Under Secretary Wagner, Mr. Johnson, thank you so much for
taking your time to be with us here today. In light of the
recent bombing attempt at Times Square, I believe that this
hearing is as timely as ever, and I thank you for your
testimonies.
There are media reports that the would-be Times Square
bomber, Faisal Shahzad, appear at Government travel lookout
lists, Travel Enforcement Compliance Systems, or TECS, between
1999 and 2008 because he brought approximately $80,000 cash or
cash instruments into the United States.
TECS is a major law enforcement computer system that allows
its approximately 120,000 users from 20 Federal agencies to
share information. The database is designed to identify
individuals suspected of or involved in violation of Federal
law.
My questions are for both of you. First, can you confirm
the presence of Shahzad on the TECS lookout list?
Ms. Wagner. Yes.
Mr. Broun. Is TECS an effective way for DHS to be
communicating the travel of suspicious people into the country?
Ms. Wagner. I think I would answer that by saying that we
have a very--we have a layered system to prevent travel into
the country, of which that is one aspect. I think CBP's data,
TSA's data and authorities interact very effectively on the
aviation side--of land crossings at the border. So I believe it
is an effective tool, but it is not effective by itself. It is
effective when used in conjunction with a range of other--
training of the CBP and TSA people who are protecting our
borders.
Mr. Broun. What changes need to be made in order to ensure
that DHS is identifying, tracking, and preventing terrorists
from entering the United States?
Ms. Wagner. I think we already have several efforts under
way in response to recent events. In fact, I have already
mentioned the Silent Partner program, which is already in
effect. TSA is also working on putting in place a system called
Secure Flight, which will improve our ability to quickly notify
airlines of no-flies. I believe we are going to be attempting
to accelerate the completion of that program in light of Faisal
Shahzad's ability to get on the flight.
So there are a lot of activities that are already under way
to improve this, and we have, as we demonstrated, however,
already a layered system of redundant efforts so that even
though the airline had not updated its no-fly list we were
still able to identify the fact that he was on the plane in
time to get him off. So we will continue to ensure that we have
that layered defense.
I don't know if Bart has anything he would like to add.
Mr. Johnson. The only thing I would like to add is the
effectiveness of what Ms. Wagner referred to before, was the
DHS Threat Task Force, which really was very much supported by
the Homeland Security Intelligence Council seated behind us, as
it relates to CBP, and ICE, and CIS, and Coast Guard, and TSA,
and others, situating some of their best and brightest at the
table with us within I&A. They provided a significant role and
reached back not only to the components but keeping the
Secretary very much informed to implement many of these things
that Ms. Wagner just referred to as it relates to the
concentric circles of intervention and support as we moved out.
It was so successful, in fact, that it has been
institutionalized by Ms. Wagner and made a permanent part of
I&A, and we continue to look forward to working with the
National Counterterrorism Center in support of what they are
doing on a regular basis in partnership with the Department.
Mr. Broun. Okay. Additionally, if Mr. Shahzad had brought
those funds by way of a prepaid or a stored value card, which
could be purchased in any convenience store, would he have been
placed on the TECS list?
Ms. Wagner. To be honest, I don't know the answer to that
question, so I would like to get you a response for the record,
if I could, unless Bart knows.
Mr. Johnson. All I know is, you know, regarding that, we
actually produced a product about the stored value cards in
partnership with Immigration Customs Enforcement, so yes, we
are aware of that new type of way to transmit. But I concur
with Ms. Wagner that I won't have a specific answer to the
question, but we will get back to you, sir.
Mr. Broun. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I will
yield back.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Broun.
I would like an answer for the record. If this is possibly
a loophole I think we would be very interested in working with
you to fix it.
Mr. Green is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you so much for
the hearing and the opportunity to speak. You are a part of the
avant-garde when it comes to these issues, and I am eternally
grateful that I have the opportunity to serve with you.
I also thank the Ranking Member, who is a friend from
Texas. Thank you for your efforts and for things that you do to
help us as well. Nice to have two friends sitting so close to
each other.
I would like to start by complimenting the many persons
that you work with. It is important for them to know that we
have some great amount of appreciation for the difficult work
that they do under unusual circumstances. Very difficult--very
difficult.
You do great work under adverse circumstances. If there is
one thing that the New York circumstance called to our
attention it is the importance of the vendor on the street
working closely with the officer on the beat. That marriage,
that integration of information, was crucial. It was critical,
of paramount importance. For the two to work together to the
extent that they did at a critical time made all the difference
in the world. So we have to compliment them.
I also want to compliment the people of New York, because
unfortunately and unfairly, New Yorkers are sometimes depicted
as persons who would just walk on by. I am appreciative that
the vendor didn't just walk on by. I am appreciative that the
officer had received proper training so that that information
was passed on appropriately.
With these things said, and complimenting the Chair for
mentioning the vertical integration, Ranking Member for the
horizontal integration, what are the chief obstacles to
vertical integration of information and horizontal
dissemination of information--the chief obstacles that you can
call to our attention? I would like for each witness to answer,
and I will defer to the lady first.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you for that question, because we give
that a lot of thought, especially in the wake of things that
don't go exactly as we would have preferred them to go.
I think the chief obstacle to horizontal integration tends
to be, in the intelligence community side at least, what we
call sort of signal to noise, which is not so much connecting
the dots, but the fact that there is so much fragmentary
information that it is very difficult to know at the time,
until something happens to give you sort of hindsight, which of
those pieces of information are significant enough to follow up
on.
That is just a continuing challenge that the community and
the homeland security community will face, and we are working
on putting in place. You know, the automation helps to a
certain extent, but some of this is also, you know, people and
training and mindset.
One of the main improvements, I think, that is being made
in the intelligence community is the idea of these pursuit
groups, where we are charging people to take hold of a specific
piece of information and follow it all the way through, to pull
that string to find everything else, and to institutionalize
that approach so that we don't have compartmentalization, you
know, like, ``I am assuming that this guy here did something on
this so I am not going to check to make sure it got done.'' We
can't afford to do that. I don't know that that happens very
often, but we can't afford to have it really happen at all. So
the idea of pursuit groups, I think, is one way to get at that
signal to noise problem horizontally.
I think vertically--and I look forward to actually hearing
what Bart is going to say on this--I think one of the
challenges is one that the Chair has already mentioned, is
classification and sort of ownership of data. We are working
through those issues, but there is a lot of information that we
have to push down and we have to figure out how to get it
sanitized to move to lower classification levels and yet still
make it useful enough for the State and locals that if we give
it to them they can do something with it.
So I would tend to say that those are at least two of the
challenges, and then I will turn it over to Bart for his views.
Mr. Johnson. Thanks for your comments about New York State.
Having retired from the New York State Police a little while
ago, and I have been involved in this since September 11, since
2001, and ``See Something, Say Something'' actually originated
in New York State, NTA Chief Bill Morange, and it is great to
have a street vendor make that type of observation and report
it.
But what if, you know, it was during the planning stages
and the acquisition stages and the storage stages? We need to
make certain that that same citizen or police officer or first
responder made that same report. So we need to institutionalize
the processes associated with that, and I think that goes to
the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and have
a fusion center have the capacity and capability to receive it,
analyze it, share it, and in the process, to pass it up to the
intelligence community.
I applaud Director Blair as it relates to his
responsibility to provide as opposed to a need to know, so we
always need to work from the premise of ``let's share it unless
you could tell me otherwise'' as opposed to ``let's not share
it and show me why we need to share it.'' I believe that we are
stepping out in that regard.
Some of the obstacles, obviously, you know, include a
leadership, you know, or lack thereof, accountability--holding
people accountable to the statutes and the premises and
policies that are being built--connectivity, trust, and things
associated with that. That is something, you know, in
partnership with Ms. Wagner, we are earnestly trying to do, and
certainly with the support of the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Mr. Green.
Chair now yields 5 minutes to Mr. Dent, of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Dent. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Under Secretary Wagner, in your prepared testimony before
the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee on March 4 you stated that as a result of recent
trends I&A is working closely with its IFC partners to develop
a framework for analysis of homegrown extremism that is
consistent with protecting civil rights and civil liberties.
Could you elaborate on that collaboration?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, I can. As a result of the Christmas Day
bombing there were a number of actions that were taken to
address issues that were identified then, and one of them was
the DNI tasked I&A Homeland Security to lead an interagency
effort to, you know, develop a plan to improve our analysis on
homegrown violent extremism.
So DHS has taken the lead on that project, working very
closely with the FBI and NCTC, to put together a plan to
improve our understanding of the motivations of some of these
homegrown violent extremists and also to lay out a plan of
action for interacting more with State and locals to get a
better understanding of their views of their communities and
the factors at play there.
So we are doing this hand-in-glove with our civil rights,
civil liberties, and privacy officers from the beginning to
ensure that whatever we put in place is consistent with the--
civil liberties.
Mr. Dent. What are the other agencies that you are
partnering with here?
Ms. Wagner. FBI and NCTC, primarily.
Mr. Dent. Okay.
Ms. Wagner. Looking at the international terrorism and the
domestic terrorism----
Mr. Dent. What metrics are you using to develop this
framework?
Ms. Wagner. I think we are in the process of defining what
those metrics are now, again, making sure that whatever we are
going to measure ourselves on is consistent with privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties. But I would be happy to come up
and talk to you about that in the future when those things are
finalized.
Mr. Dent. Is the Homeland Security Advisory Council part of
this framework?
Ms. Wagner. I don't believe that we have discussed this
with them yet, no.
Mr. Dent. I understand that Secretary Napolitano, in
February 2010, asked the Department's Homeland Security
Advisory Council to develop recommendations on how DHS can
develop community-based law enforcement to tackle homegrown
terrorism. Would you elaborate on the status of that review and
its recommendations, either one of you? Ms. Wagner.
Ms. Wagner. I think I will defer to Mr. Johnson on that.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, the Secretary has asked the Homeland
Security Advisory Council to look at countering violent
extremism as it relates to community-orientated policing, the
buy-in of the community, the understanding of the community in
very proactive and trusting ways.
So about a month ago I was fortunate enough to be able to
interact with major city chiefs, the intel commanders, that was
started up by Chief Mike Downing and Chief Mike Grossman and
really elicited a lot of best practices on how they do it,
because obviously we are not going to solve that within the
beltway; we need to get back to the boots on the ground, the
patrol officer, the trooper, the deputy, to understand and have
the trust and relationship with the public.
So as it relates to the recommendations, the
recommendations are nearly complete. I actually had an
opportunity to review a draft of them the other day. They
haven't been presented to the Secretary yet so if it is okay I
would prefer not to illuminate on any of them, but suffice to
say it covers a number of topics and goes to, I believe, what
this committee would----
Ms. Harman. Mr. Dent, would you yield to me for 1 second?
Mr. Dent. I would.
Ms. Harman. I would like to request, Mr. Johnson and Ms.
Wagner, that we be briefed as soon as possible on this
material.
Thank you.
Mr. Dent. Just finally, what is I&A doing, really, to help
improve our Government's understanding on this whole notion of
domestic radicalization and extremism?
Ms. Wagner. I think what we are doing is being done in the
context of the interagency effort that I just mentioned. We are
going to be taking a variety of approaches, including looking
for best practices potentially overseas with our partners,
reaching out to academia, open source, and leveraging expertise
wherever we can find it. Again, be happy to talk to you in more
detail on the details of the plan that we have laid out.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Dent. I just want to commend you
for raising the privacy and civil liberties issue, and just to
use the airwaves afforded by this hearing to call on the
administration, again, to appoint the privacy and civil
liberties oversight board, which is mandated by the 2004
intelligence reform law, and which has not been filled--the
positions for which have not been filled by this
administration.
I think that would go a long way to making--toward making
sure that all the practices we are talking about by fusion
centers and new regulations and proposed legal remedies comply
fully with our Constitution. That is something we are all
concerned with, and so--and I know that you are, too. I would
just point out also, for the record, that we have had hearings
in the past with the privacy and civil liberties officers at
DHS to talk about the need to make sure that on the front end
policies take account of privacy and civil liberties of law-
abiding citizens.
In introducing Ms. Clarke, I want to give a shout out to
the NYPD and the New York State Police. First of all, they did
a heroic job in connection with the Times Square bomber
apprehension. But also, they get my attention always since all
four of my children and all three of my perfect grandchildren
live in New York City, and I am very glad that they are well-
protected.
I now yield to Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking
Member McCaul. It is a very timely hearing, and I know that
there was quite a bit of conversation around the New York City
Times Square event, but I would like to raise a concern that I
have.
I want to add to your equation, Madam Chair, the
observation and quick thinking of the civilians in this whole
equation, and I don't think we can underestimate how important
it is to have the type of campaign we have had going on in New
York City for quite some time, which is the ``See Something,
Say Something.'' But having said that, I want to address, you
know, our thinking around the whole lone actor scenario.
Following the recent attempted car bombing in New York
City's Times Square Federal authorities swiftly investigated
the incident, proving the post-incident counterterrorism
cooperating across Government is improving. Roughly 53 hours
after the incident the FBI, New York City Department--Police
Department and its intelligence officials quickly identified
and arrested the suspect.
However, the goal should be to detect and thwart these
plots--even small-scale plots such as Mr. Shahzad--as early as
possible. Of course, small-scale attacks would and should be
handled differently than large-scale attacks. A large-scale
attack is generally easier to detect because it will involve
many people and there are more opportunities for someone to
leak information.
Clearly, local law enforcement is at the front lines with
regard to detecting small-scale attacks in our communities.
However, I want to know, how can we use our National
intelligence infrastructure--namely the Intelligence Enterprise
and the newly institutionalized DHS Threat Task Force--to
better detect the lone actor who may appear normal to his
neighbors but has been radicalized either in person or by the
internet?
Ms. Wagner. I will take this, and then I will see if Mr.
Johnson has anything to add. I think one of our primary
missions in terms of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise is to take
all of the intelligence information on a specific event and put
that out to State and locals in a way that would be useful for
them in terms of understanding what were the actions that the
perpetrator took leading up to the event that could potentially
be recognized and reported on so that we are in a position
where, as you point out, we could prevent or disrupt instead of
respond.
We have put out numerous products on what we call the
tactics, techniques, and procedures of how the bombs were
built, how they were delivered, and any kind of suspicious
behaviors or activities that could be used by local law
enforcement to potentially disrupt these attacks. You know,
in--we have also identified in the past the kinds of things
that would be bought; I think someone already mentioned the
example of the hair care products. Fertilizer is obviously a
key issue that we also alert people on.
So that is how we approach this problem. I think we do a
pretty good job of doing that, but we have a training and
education issue as well, as you point out, not just at the
local law enforcement, but then within their areas with the
actual civilians who might see something along the lines of the
``See Something, Say Something'' campaign.
I will let Mr. Johnson add his comments.
Mr. Johnson. As Ms. Wagner referred to, it is important to
get from the intelligence community those indicators and
warnings that can be applied to every day practice and law
enforcement. As I mentioned before and I agree with you--``See
Something, Say Something''--the importance of that, and to
articulate to the law enforcement and first responders really
what to look for.
So, for example, in New York State, you know, we knew where
the storage facilities were; we knew who the ammonia nitrate
distributors were; we knew who was renting large vans and
things like that; we had the ability to, you know, work with
law enforcement, the NYPD. In the words of Commissioner Kelly,
Mr. Shahzad was unremarkable. So that goes to your point,
ma'am, about how can you detect it before it becomes
remarkable, and those little indicators and warnings that he
may very well display.
To build upon what Ms. Wagner said, also, the criticality
and the importance of CBP and TSA and ICE and the information
holdings that they also have, and how do you leverage them to
really try to identify a person who may be doing other type of
criminal activity but may also be involved in a terrorist
activity, and the linkages to the JTTFs. I think they do that
quite well. A lot of the components do have assets apply to the
JTTFs and they played a critical role in this, you know, this
investigation.
So it is really, you know, right across the board with
everything that we are doing and everything that you support.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Ms. Clarke.
As everyone knows, this line of questions and this
information is central to what this subcommittee cares about.
New York City and New York State are very sophisticated and
very well-resourced in terms of their law enforcement and
public awareness effort. Our hope is that other States--all
other States--will get up to speed, too. Obviously California
is doing pretty well--especially Southern California--but
terror attacks could occur anywhere, anytime, and the whole
country needs to be protected, not just parts of the country.
Now I yield 5 minutes to Ms. Richardson for questions.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Johnson, I understand that the I&A analysts receive the
opportunity to attend training offered to and by other members
of the intelligence community. To what extent does the I&A
facilitate DHS component intelligence analysts to participate
in these types of training?
Mr. Johnson. First and foremost, you know, Dawn Scalise--
she has been assigned from the Central Intelligence Agency. She
has been on, I think, since September. She brings to bear a
considerable amount of experience as it relates to analytical
capabilities, and she is in the process and has implemented a
number of programs, to include mentoring a lot of the young
analysts, training a lot of the young analysts. Before Mr. Mike
Morell became the deputy director she had been interacting with
him on a regular basis to do exactly what you just described
about the cross-fertilization of analysts and training and
experiences and exposures.
But also, equally important is the relationship with the
field and the analysts from the field, and the first week of
June we are going to be bringing in some analysts from the
field--from the fusion centers--to share with us their
experiences and also have them share with us, you know, a lot
of the best practices and some of the information that they
need.
Under the leadership of Ms. Wagner, she is also exacting
training as it relates to sourcing and citing and all the
elements that make up what the ODNI has been doing with Dr.
Peter Lavoy and a lot of the expertise resident within there.
I would also defer to Ms. Wagner as it relates to, you
know, some of the efforts that she is undertaking and directing
within I&A.
Ms. Wagner. I would just add that we do work hard to
provide--make training available to the components so that the
analysts in the different Department operational elements have
access to training that helps them understand how to leverage
the intelligence community and how to interact with the rest of
the intelligence elements of the Department. We are working
with them as part of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council
to understand what other training requirements they might have
that I&A then could meet as part of our service to the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise.
Ms. Richardson. Would it be accurate to say that the
analysts have a list of all the training that is available?
Ms. Wagner. I believe they do. I think it is posted and
they have access to it. We are able to take advantage of any
courses that are offered by the intelligence community, so
there is a very full roster of possibilities.
Ms. Richardson. Would you verify to this committee that, in
fact, the analysts are aware and have received information of
what is available to them?
Ms. Wagner. I will certainly go back and confirm that all
of the courses are posted where they can have access to it and
that they know that.
Ms. Richardson. That they are aware that that is where it
is.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
For this next question--I apologize, I came in a few
minutes late; I was presenting in the Jobs Task Force, so if it
was asked I apologize--what is the progress in getting the next
generation systems, such as the HSIN 2.0 and the HTSN on-line?
That seemed to be a big bulk of----
Ms. Wagner. Flip a coin on this----
One of the areas that I am trying to focus on now working
very closely with Mr. Johnson is trying to solidify the
information architecture to serve the enterprise, both at the
SCI level, which is the HTSN, at the secret level, and at the
unclassified level. I think we are making progress in
understanding where we want to go, but there is still room for
improvement in terms of the speed with which we are
implementing some of these solutions. In terms of any more
details, I probably have to defer to Bart.
Mr. Johnson. Ms. Wagner has been meeting with Richard
Spiers, the chief information officer, over the past couple
months, and that is certainly a partnership that is developing
as it relates to his expertise along with our responsibilities
for those classified systems. We are working, also, with Ms.
Sue Reingold, at the program manager's office, for the
information-sharing environment at the secret level to make
sure that those systems are sustainable and they contain within
them the information that is required.
If you recall, back in September I gave a little bit of an
overview about our efforts to get more information that is
resident on sippernet as it relates to helpful tactics and
techniques and plans for not only the components but for the
fusion centers regarding VBIEDs, TATP, and really some of the
materials that go into making them. To your point about HISN,
we are currently working with HSSLIC, the Homeland Security
State and Local Information Committee, and right now we are
working with Ops, Operations, and NOC, the National Operations
Center, to transition it to Next Gen. We are----
Ms. Richardson. Excuse me. I apologize. My time has
expired. But what I wanted to make sure you answer the question
was, when do you expect it to be on-line?
Mr. Johnson. HISN Next Gen? That is going to be over the
next year or so, and we are taking it very carefully because we
don't want to diminish any of the services that are available
on HSSLIC right now. However, other organizations have already
been transferred over to Next Gen and we are just monitoring
and watching it for the partners and the components.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Ms. Richardson.
We have discussed whether to go to a brief second round of
questions, and we are planning to do that. I will start with
me, and if you are both interested in doing that, please stay.
First of all, on Ms.--to follow up on Ms. Richardson's
question, I would strongly urge that you consult the users of
these on-line services. We learned when we did a number of
field visits to fusion centers around the country that they
were not using some of the homeland products because they found
other products to be much more effective.
The goal is not just to consult horizontally in Washington,
DC. The goal is to make sure that information sharing
vertically works. Therefore, I would urge you--and I know this
is something you would instinctively do, Mr. Johnson--but to
consult carefully to make sure that your new products will be
well received. Thank you.
Let me ask you two questions that Mr. Thompson had planned
to ask if he had been able to stay for the rest of this
session. First of all, he mentioned in his opening remarks that
Rand Beers has now been named the top counterterrorism official
for the Department. He, Rand Beers, was part of the panel that
briefed us last week on the New York City bombing.
The question is, Ms. Wagner, what is his relationship with
you with respect to--how does his appointment as chief
counterterrorism official to the Department affect your duties
as the chief intelligence officer? Do you now report to him, or
do you work on parallel tracks? You know, why aren't you the
counterterrorism official for the Department?
Ms. Wagner. Well, I would characterize my relationship with
Rand as being, we are partners. He is, you know, as we all
know, a distinguished public servant. We discussed as a
Department in the recent bottom-up review process that we are
doing in the wake of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
how many of us have terrorism as a key element of our mission,
and it ends up being almost every component and departmental
element of the Department.
So the Secretary wanted to ensure that we had an effective
mechanism for pulling all those pieces together and she
appointed Rand to be the CT coordinator. So no, I don't report
to him, but I work very closely with him. In fact, we do
function as partners. When the Secretary goes to the White
House for the terrorism briefing, if he doesn't go I go, and he
actually took the briefing yesterday because I was testifying
in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on my
budget at the time.
So I think we have a very constructive relationship and
what we are both trying to do is to serve the Secretary as best
we can to make sure that all of the elements that are focused
on counterterrorism are rowing in the same direction.
Ms. Harman. Your answer makes me smile, since we have that
problem up here. We have counterterrorism subcommittees of
every committee, and this is the only committee called ``The
Homeland Security Committee.'' I think we are somewhat
jurisdiction-starved, so I get it, that there is a need to
coordinate, and I understand better. I have known Rand Beers
personally for years and think he is a very capable fellow.
But the bottom line here is, we don't want big org charts
and people doing duplicative functions; we want straight, fast
info sharing, right? Okay.
The second question that the Chairman would have asked is
about the use of outside Federal contractors. I remember being
appalled to learn that the ratio was 60/40, outside to inside,
or maybe even worse. Mr. Johnson, you pledged 8 months ago to
help fix that. I think the goal was to get to 40/60, which is
still not terrific. Where are we?
Ms. Wagner. Well, I think Mr. Johnson had already made
considerable progress when I came on board. We are moving in
the right direction but we are only down to about 55 percent,
now. It has dropped 15 percent since the beginning of the
fiscal year. I am working----
Ms. Harman. Excuse me, 55 percent what?
Ms. Wagner. Fifty-five percent contractors.
Ms. Harman. So it is 55/45?
Ms. Wagner. Down from 60 percent to 55 percent, a 15
percent reduction since the beginning of the fiscal year. We
are looking very hard----
Ms. Harman. Excuse me, maybe I can't add. How is 60 to 55 a
15 percent reduction?
Ms. Wagner. It was 60 percent; it is now 55 percent. So it
was a 15 percent reduction in total contractors on the----
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Ms. Wagner [continuing]. From the beginning of the fiscal
year. We are looking very hard at seeing where we can make
further reductions, but I must be honest that with the amount
of work to be done, unless I can figure out a way to
dramatically increase my level--my rate of hiring of Government
employees, it will be difficult to draw down too much too
quickly.
We are working very hard to remedy this ratio. Bart and I
are doing everything we can to micromanage the hiring process,
and we are working with our Department to try to advocate for
direct hire authority from OPM to allow us to make some headway
on these billets, because we all know there are too many vacant
billets and we are trying to address that problem.
Ms. Harman. Right. Well, I think my time has expired, but
this is an administration-wide problem, and it has huge
implications for I&A, which you know, and again, for your--for
successfully achieving your mission.
I now yield to Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a couple of
organizational questions to add on the last questions I asked,
but I do want to just focus on the specific cases.
Hasan, we had threat information prior to the incident and
intelligence coming in. In the Christmas bomber case we did. Is
it your testimony that in the Times Square bomber there was
really nothing we could have done to have prevented that?
Ms. Wagner. He was not watch-listed, and I think that he is
an example of a new paradigm--a difficult paradigm--that we are
having to deal with of individuals who are mounting very small-
scale, unsophisticated attacks without having a great deal of
communication or support from others, necessarily, although
obviously this investigation is still on-going and----
Mr. McCaul. I agree that that is a challenge. They have
indicated they are going to smaller-scale attacks and it is
very difficult to detect this prior to prevent it. I know he
went to Pakistan, and perhaps that was looked at, but there was
nothing further to indicate that he would be a threat in any
way?
Ms. Wagner. There are many, many tens--I don't even know
how large the number is--of people that go to Pakistan
regularly, so there--no, we need a little bit more than that.
Mr. McCaul. This may be a little bit out of I&A's
jurisdiction, but the no-fly list, UAE did not have him down.
It wasn't refreshed every 12 hours; now it is down to 2 hours
they will refresh that, is that correct?
Was there an alert that was sent out, though? It seems to
me in this type of case that an alert should have been sent out
to all the airlines saying, ``Don't let this guy get on a
plane.''
Ms. Wagner. He was, as you point out, expedited onto the
no-fly list, and unfortunately the airlines under the previous
rules were only required to update that information I believe
it was every 12 hours. So the new rule that TSA is putting in
place will require them to update those expedited no-flys every
2 hours----
Mr. McCaul. Every 2 hours, but can't you send out an alert
separately just saying, ``Special alert,'' you know?
Ms. Wagner. I believe that those are the special alert. But
again, if we had----
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. Refresh----
Ms. Wagner. But when the Secure Flight system is completely
implemented, we will not have this problem any longer. It will
be automatic.
Mr. McCaul. That is the good news here.
Two quick issues, and they are big: One, tripling the
intelligence agents representatives down on the southwest
border, that was--the Secretary said that that was going to be
done. Can you update me on that?
Then the second one on cybersecurity. This is one of those
issues that a lot of people--it is not on their radar screen,
but I consider it to be one of the biggest threats that we have
to our National security. Can you tell me what you are doing in
that regard, too?
Ms. Wagner. Yes. Cybersecurity, and it was tripling of
the----
Mr. McCaul. We were told that--basically that there would
be a tripling of the intelligence analysts down on the
southwest border. Has that occurred yet, and what is happening
down there?
Ms. Wagner. I think its--whether it is officially tripling
I do not know, but we have substantially increased the level of
intelligence support that we have located within the El Paso
Intelligence Center. We now have, I believe, 12 people on our
homeland intelligence support team down there doing analytic
support to the operational elements on the border.
We have also added a collection manager, with another en
route to assist in working with the intelligence community to
leverage their capabilities in support of the operation. We
have got a network of State and local fusion centers, HIDAs,
elements of DOJ, DOD, everybody working together, and we are
trying now to formalize sort of the new interagency
intelligence coordination body at IPIC, which is being worked
at the highest level with CBP, ICE, DEA, and us.
Mr. McCaul. That is good. Because as you know, it is
getting very dangerous down there.
Ms. Wagner. Yes.
Mr. McCaul. Cybersecurity? I only have about 35 seconds.
Ms. Wagner. Cybersecurity is--we have created that as a
major mission area within the Department as part of the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and we work very closely
with NPPD, with Rand Beers and Phil Reidinger, specifically, to
figure out what intelligence support to bring to bear for their
responsibilities to secure the dot-gov network.
We are attempting to increase the level of cybersecurity
analysis we are doing to look at this unique source of data
that we have within the Department--the CERT data--and try to
see if we can improve our ability to do predictive analysis and
attribution.
Mr. McCaul. That is good. That is very good.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Ms. Wagner, I just wanted to bring to your
attention that for quite some time we have been hearing about
the deployment of Secure Flight--at least since I have been in
Congress, and I was elected and started here--elected in 2006
and started here in 2007. During that time we have had a number
of events that we keep referring back to when we have Secure
Flight up and running.
Do you have a sense at all of when Secure Flight will
actually be deployed in its full glory with the capability of
doing everything that we expect it will do?
Ms. Wagner. Ma'am, I actually would prefer to defer that
question to TSA----
Ms. Clarke. Okay.
Ms. Wagner [continuing]. To come and speak to you, because
it is not really an intelligence issue; it is more of a
Departmental issue----
Ms. Clarke. Yes.
Ms. Wagner [continuing]. And I don't have the exact date.
Ms. Clarke. But it would seem to me that it would be a
major tool for the intelligence community.
Ms. Wagner. It will be a major tool for the homeland
security and law enforcement communities, and it will certainly
assist us in ensuring that the no-fly information is acted on
immediately.
Ms. Clarke. So it just seems to me that there should be
some urgency in everyone's mind around the Secure Flight
program. I will share that with you because, you know, you
raised this with Mr. McCaul, which is the issue of the fact
that we have thousands of people that fly to Pakistan every
year, if not tens of thousands.
Many of the folks who fly to Pakistan every year come from
my district. If we are going to get really solid intelligence
it is like finding a needle in a haystack when you have a
system that doesn't weed out the bad actors from the
misidentifications from folks who we really know are out there
to do our Nation harm.
So I just raise that because I think there needs to be a
clarion call coming from every part of the homeland security
community that is relying on clear intelligence that this
program be expedited. But having said that, that is just my own
pet peeve.
I want to ask about the costs associated with building
secure spaces that are needed for the installation of
information sharing technology systems. Many fusion centers do
not have connectivity to secret--excuse me, connectivity to
secret-level DHS networks. However, TSA uses storable, secure
laptops and devices, allowing the TSOs to access classified
networks from remote locations.
To what extent has I&A looked into this option or a similar
way of providing access to secure networks for fusion centers?
Ms. Wagner. Thank you for that question. If I could go back
to your previous question just for a moment, because my TSA
colleague has just given me some information to pass on, which
is that there is going to be a briefing for Members tomorrow on
this topic, that they are expecting the Secure Flight to be
implemented domestically in early summer and internationally by
the end of the calendar year.
On to your question about secure coms, we--as I think Mr.
Johnson mentioned earlier, and I will let him add his remarks
to this--we are looking at an overall secret-level architecture
to support not just the components but also the State and local
fusion centers.
We know that TSA has had some success with their Trace
architecture, which uses the talon card, and we are looking at
whether or not there are circumstances where it would make
sense for us to employ that.
We don't necessarily view it as a substitute for getting
our HSDN secret connectivity because it doesn't have all the
same functionality, and it does have some disadvantages
associated with its use in terms of it has to be locked--you
know, the card has to be locked in a safe, and there are some,
you know, security issues that you have to weigh in the
balance. But we do believe that it is possible that for some of
our folks it would be a good interim solution, and we are
reviewing that.
Mr. Johnson. Additionally, we have accelerated the
deployment of HSDN to the field, and you are exactly right
about the need to build out secure space, secure coms. So we
are pretty optimistic by the end of the year we will have 64
HSDN terminals deployed to those fusion centers capable of
receiving it.
Another critical thing is the components and their ability
to have HSDN and give them the connectivity that they need. I
recall using Trace back in 2004 during the RNC in New York
City, and it is effective, but yes, it is a stop-gap, and we
are not going to rely on that to be the final solution. We want
to roll out HSDN as effectively as we can.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Ms. Clarke.
Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony,
and the Members for their brilliant questions.
This partnership has been going on a long while and we
expect it to continue. We need this partnership to work. Our
country will not be safe if it doesn't work. Our country still
may face future attacks, but the chances of that are somewhat
reduced if this partnership is robust and successful.
So I thank you, Ms. Wagner, for agreeing to submit some
additional information for the record. That was requested, and
I strongly support it, and if there is a loophole--we were
exploring this--we obviously want to work with you to close it.
Having no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]