[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HUMAN RIGHTS IN XINJIANG:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
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ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 13, 2009
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Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 1
Grob, Douglas, Cochairman's Senior Staff Member.................. 2
Reger, Amy, Researcher, Uyghur Human Rights Project.............. 3
Turkel, Nury A., Attorney with Kirstein and Young, PLLC.......... 6
Kaup, Katherine Palmer, Associate Professor of Political Science
and Chair, Department of Asian Studies, Furman University...... 10
Greve, Louisa, Program Director for East Asia, National Endowment
for Democracy.................................................. 13
APPENDIX
Prepared Statement
Reger, Amy....................................................... 27
HUMAN RIGHTS IN XINJIANG:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
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FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2009
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:04
a.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte
Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, presiding.
Also Present: Douglas Grob, Cochairman's Senior Staff
Member; Kara Abramson, Advocacy Director; and Toy Reid, Senior
Research Associate.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE,
STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Good morning. My name is Charlotte
Oldham-Moore and I am Staff Director of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China [CECC], which is chaired by
Senator Byron Dorgan. I am joined by Douglas Grob, Senior Staff
Member to Cochairman Representative Sander Levin.
Today we are very fortunate to have an expert panel to
discuss ``Human Rights in Xinjiang: Recent Developments.'' We
also have in the audience Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. We welcome her and
thank her so much for attending this morning.
Today our panel of witnesses will examine recent
developments in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, an area
inside China's northwest border, which is home to a Muslim
Turkic Uyghur population and several other ethnic groups.
As many of you may know, human rights abuses in the region
have long been severe. The CECC has noted in its Annual Reports
that the government has used anti-terrorism campaigns as a
pretext for enforcing repressive security measures and for
controlling expressions of religious and ethnic identity,
especially among the Uyghur population.
Last year, in our annual report on human rights and rule of
law developments in China, we noted an increase in repression
in Xinjiang amid security preparations for the summer Olympic
Games in Beijing and elsewhere in China. This involved
intensive anti-terrorism campaigns in the region and heightened
social controls following protests among ethnic minorities in
China.
In Commission monitoring of news in the aftermath of these
events, in part based on reports by the Uyghur Human Rights
Project and, of course, the Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service,
which does fine work, we have found the government continues to
implement an array of security measures in Xinjiang while
maintaining policies aimed at promoting ethnic assimilation.
I am going to turn to Doug Grob, who will introduce our
distinguished guests, and then after they have made their
statements, we will turn to the audience for the question-and-
answer session. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS GROB, COCHAIRMAN'S SENIOR STAFF MEMBER
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Charlotte, and thank you all
for joining us here today. It is a great pleasure to introduce
our distinguished panel to you. First, I have the honor of
introducing you to Ms. Amy Reger. Ms. Reger is Researcher at
the Uyghur Human Rights Project. She has authored numerous
reports and publications on Uyghur human rights issues, and
also has spoken on these issues at government forums, both in
the United States and abroad. Her reporting has significantly
raised awareness of Uyghur issues both among congressional
staff and Members of Congress, as well as among staff and
officials within the Executive Branch. We are very pleased and
honored to have her here today to speak on recent developments
in Xinjiang, including information on education policies and
security campaigns in the region.
Also, to my left, is Mr. Nury Turkel, an attorney with the
law firm of Kirstein & Young, PLLC. Mr. Turkel is a gentleman
with extraordinary expertise in Uyghur human rights issues, and
many years of experience working to promote the rule of law in
China and Central Asia. He has written commentaries on public
policy and legal matters in major U.S. publications, and has
appeared on numerous news and public affairs programs. His
testimony today will focus on current trends affecting the
Uyghur people in areas including freedom of religion, cultural
rights, freedom of movement, and China's global influence.
To my right, I have the privilege of introducing to you
Professor Katherine Palmer Kaup, Associate Professor of
Political Science and the Chair of the Department of Asian
Studies at Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina.
Professor Kaup is also the Director of China Programs at the
Richard W. Riley Institute of Government, Politics, and Public
Leadership. Professor Kaup is the author of the book ``Creating
the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China,'' and she is the author
of several articles on the impact of state policy and of
administrative divisions on ethnic identity and mobilization in
China's southwest regions as well as in Xinjiang. And in 2005,
she served as a Special Adviser on Minority Nationality Affairs
at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. So we are
very pleased to have you back today to provide us with
information on the Chinese Government's ethnic minority
policies in general, and toward Xinjiang in particular, and to
discuss broader, long-term trends in the region.
Finally, also to my right, I have the honor of introducing
to you Ms. Louisa Greve, who is Program Director for East Asia
with the National Endowment for Democracy. The National
Endowment for Democracy makes grants to democracy and human
rights organizations in more than 80 countries. Ms. Greve has
studied, worked, and traveled in China since 1980, and has
testified before congressional committees on human rights in
China and democracy promotion in Asia. Her work has been of
extraordinary importance and impact, and has made a significant
contribution to this Commission's understanding of conditions
in China. She will speak today on the connection between
developments in Xinjiang and China's broader human rights and
rule-of-law development, and also will look at issues including
China's rights defense movement and ethnic claims in
transitioning societies.
So, with that, I would like now to turn the floor over to
Amy Reger. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF AMY REGER, RESEARCHER, UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
Ms. Reger. I would like to thank the CECC and Charlotte
Oldham-Moore and Doug Grob for holding this panel and providing
such a rare opportunity for us to have a public forum to
discuss Uyghur human rights issues. And I especially want to
thank Kara Abramson, who I know has worked really hard on
putting this together, and who is always very helpful to us in
our work, and it is really an honor for me to speak on this
panel with Kate Kaup and with Louisa and Nury, both of whom I
consider as great mentors.
Members of the Chinese Government delegation asserted
during this week's Universal Periodic Review process that there
is no ethnic conflict in the People's Republic of China [PRC],
except for conflict stemming from a very few individuals backed
by foreign forces aiming to split China. However, the reality
for the Uyghur people is much different from this rhetoric. The
past year marked a period of extreme oppression for Uyghurs,
marked by a sharp increase in arrests for state security crimes
and security crackdowns aimed at the broader Uyghur population.
The Chinese Government intensified its use of the war on
terror to persecute Uyghurs through mass arrests, detentions,
and executions, the mobilization of armed police and security
forces to the region, and ideological campaigns aimed at
stamping out the ``three evil forces'' of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism.
Remarks in just the past two months by top officials in
East Turkistan indicate a stepped-up security drive and an
intensified crackdown on peaceful expressions of Uyghur
identity and dissent. On January 11, Provincial Party Secretary
Wang Lequan told members of the People's Armed Police Forces
that the ``three evil forces'' appeared to be preparing a
series of attacks in the region. Deputy Communist Party
Secretary Nur Bekri was quoted in official Chinese media as
telling 500 government delegates on January 7 to be on guard
against the ``three evil forces'' and to be prepared for a
long-term battle against these elements.
In September of last year, Nur Bekri delivered a lengthy
speech accusing Western countries of instigating terrorism,
separatism, and extremism in East Turkistan. Bekri's remarks
are consistent with previous Chinese Government assertions
linking outside forces with alleged domestic terrorism. In line
with earlier official claims regarding Uyghur terrorism, Bekri
did not offer any evidence to substantiate his assertions.
Chinese officials, led by Wang Lequan, have consistently
attempted to link human rights organizations with terrorism and
alleged terrorist groups in order to discredit their human
rights efforts. In recent months, both Nur Bekri and Wang
Lequan have also frequently resorted to character assassination
with respect to Uyghur democracy leader Rebiya Kadeer in a
clear attempt to demonize her and discredit her human rights
advocacy. In his speech in September, Bekri directly targeted
the World Uyghur Congress, a German-based organization led by
Ms. Kadeer that promotes democracy, human rights, and freedom
for the Uyghur people.
Following a series of violent attacks in and around the
cities of Kucha and Kashgar that took place during the Olympic
period, Wang Lequan announced a life-or-death struggle in East
Turkistan. While PRC authorities claimed the security measures
implemented in the pre- and post-Olympic period were aimed at
punishing individuals involved in the violent attacks that
occurred, the scope of the crackdown represents a broad, far-
reaching campaign of intimidation and fear aimed at the Uyghur
community.
Security measures carried out during this period included
the arrest of 160 Uyghur children aged 8 to 14 years old for
participating in so-called illegal religious activities.
Religious restrictions were implemented during the Muslim holy
month of Ramadan in 2008 at an unprecedented level. Students
and government employees were not permitted to fast during
Ramadan this year or attend mosques in general. Restaurants
were also forced to open during fasting hours.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, PRC authorities
have used the war on terror as a pretext for cracking down on
religious and political dissent in the region. Tens of
thousands of Uyghurs are believed to have been detained and
hundreds executed in the years since 2001. Individuals caught
up in this campaign include Tohti Tunyaz, a Ph.D. scholar who
was released this past Tuesday from prison after serving an 11-
year sentence for conducting historical research in East
Turkistan deemed subversive by government officials; and
Nurmemet Yasin, a young Uyghur poet and intellectual who was
imprisoned for writing an allegorical story that was viewed as
separatist.
Uyghurs in East Turkistan suffer a broad scope of abuses to
their civil, political, economic, and social rights, including
the fierce suppression of their religion; arbitrary detention,
torture, and execution; PRC Government support of the influx of
huge numbers of Han Chinese economic migrants into East
Turkistan; the forced transfer of young Uyghur women to inland
China to work in very poor conditions; discrimination in hiring
practices; unequal access to healthcare services; and the
elimination of Uyghur language schools under the current
``bilingual education'' policy.
``Bilingual education'' is a very symbolic aspect of a
government-driven project to assimilate Uyghurs by attacking
and diluting their culture. Drives to expand ``bilingual
education'' have paralleled heightened campaigns to promote
security and battle separatism. The recent announcement of a
plan to train another 16,000 bilingual teachers for elementary
schools over the next six years coincides with the recent
remarks made by Wang Lequan and Nur Bekri regarding the need to
battle the ``three evil forces.''
According to Chinese Government propaganda, ``bilingual
education'' is being put into place throughout East Turkistan
to improve educational and employment opportunities for Uyghur
children. One of the major problems with this type of
justification is that ``bilingual education'' is not bilingual
at all but, rather, monolingual. Another factor that challenges
the Chinese Government's official assertions regarding its
motivations of providing a truly bilingual education is the
removal of Uyghur children from their cultural environment and
placement into Chinese language ``Xinjiang classes'' located in
12 inland Chinese cities. This program is widely viewed in the
Uyghur community as an attempt to Sinify young Uyghurs.
The ``bilingual education'' policy has been pursued for the
past decade, but with increasing intensity since 2002. The
ultimate goal of ``bilingual education'' appears to be to
replace Uyghur language instruction with Chinese language
instruction in all areas of East Turkistan and to phase out the
use of the Uyghur language among young Uyghurs. From 2002 to
2005, ``bilingual education'' was implemented in universities,
high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools. And in
2005, the ``bilingual education'' push was expanded into East
Turkistan's preschools.
The motivations behind the Chinese Government's
implementation of the ``bilingual education'' policy and the
Xinjiang classes are varied and complex. While Wang Lequan
himself is quoted as saying that the chief goal of Xinjiang
classes is political thought training, not academic
preparation, the Chinese Government likely hopes to eliminate
any sense of a unique identity on the part of Uyghurs that it
perceives would contribute to opposition to government
policies. Because of the centralized nature of this and other
Chinese Government policies, Uyghurs remain excluded from
planning and decisionmaking processes in East Turkistan. This
is extremely convenient to the government in a region that has
vast mineral wealth, which is exploited for the benefits of
China's eastern boomtowns.
Without working toward the mitigation of growing social,
economic, and political challenges that face Uyghurs in East
Turkistan, and without implementing any mechanisms by which
Uyghurs may address their grievances, the ``bilingual
education'' policy will not create stability in the region, nor
will it improve the livelihood of Uyghurs. The continued
application of this policy will have the inevitable result of
further alienating the Uyghur people.
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Amy. Now I would like to
turn the floor over to Mr. Turkel.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Reger appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF NURY A. TURKEL, ATTORNEY WITH KIRSTEIN AND YOUNG,
PLLC
Mr. Turkel. First, I would like to commend the Commission
for placing a strong emphasis in its 2008 report on the
worsening human rights situation in East Turkistan. The Uyghur
people greatly appreciate any efforts that contribute to
promoting and protecting their democratic freedoms, including
the right to be Muslim.
In January 2003, Chinese Communist Party Xinjiang Secretary
Wang Lequan said, ``Xinjiang will always keep up the intensity
of its crackdown on ethnic separatist forces and deal them
devastating blows without showing any mercy.'' As promised,
Chinese leaders have ruthlessly punished the Uyghurs, even
those who have peacefully expressed dissent and opposed China's
ongoing onslaught against Uyghurs' ethno-national identity.
These aggressive policies are mostly targeted at Uyghurs'
religious and cultural identity.
China's Constitution and many of its laws contain
guarantees of religious freedom, but Uyghurs only have as much
religious freedom as local and national authorities allow at
any given moment. A primary purpose of this highly repressive
regulatory framework is the enforcement of loyalty to the
Communist Party and the Chinese state. On the one hand, Uyghurs
believe in freedom of worship and don't care for Communism.
Public expression of dissent or deviance from the Party line
can be grounds for charges such as ``harming national unity,''
``disuniting nationalities,'' or even ``harming state
security.'' These charges carry very heavy penalties and
punishments under China's criminal law.
China implements much stricter religious policy with
respect to Uyghurs compared to other Muslims, particularly Hui
Muslims. Also, non-Uyghur groups in East Turkistan aren't
perceived as presenting a secessionist threat, as Uyghurs are.
The reason for this is that China sees Uyghurs' ethno-national
identity as a threat and Islam is perceived as feeding Uyghurs'
ethnic identity. So the subordination of Islam to the Chinese
state is used as a means to ensure the subordination of Uyghurs
as well. As such, China strictly controls and manages all
mosques and stifles religious traditions that have formed a
crucial part of the Uyghur identity for centuries.
As a result, devout Uyghur Muslims experience harassment in
their daily lives. Observing religious holidays, studying
religious texts, or showing one's religion through personal
appearance are strictly forbidden in schools, government
offices, and even public places. The government has instituted
controls over who can be a clergy member, what version of the
Qur'an may be used, where religious gatherings may be held, and
what may be said on religious occasions. For example,
government officials, state employees, children under 18, and
women are prohibited from entering mosques and conducting
religious activities. Violations of these regulations can
result in expulsion, heavy fines, negative entries into
Uyghurs' personal dossiers, and administrative punishment,
including detention and imprisonment.
Religious figures with the leadership qualities, separatist
tendencies, or disloyal political views had faced harsh
punishment,
including imprisonment. For example, a number of young and
progressive-minded imams have been removed or even imprisoned
because of their refusal to use mosques to praise the
motherland and the Party. In June 2008, a mosque near Aksu city
was demolished because of its refusal to put up signs in
support of the Beijing Olympics.
According to the media reports, including ones reported by
Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service broadcast during the month of
Ramadan in 2008, prayer in public places outside the main
mosque was forbidden and imams' sermons were limited to a half-
hour. Local authorities required some Uyghur-owned restaurants
to remain open during the day, when Muslims normally fast. Free
lunches forced Uyghurs to break their fasting and, most
importantly, identified believers. Government employees were
told to shave their beards, and police ordered women to remove
their veils.
For most Uyghurs the overriding issue isn't religion per
se, but the perceived threat that religious repression poses to
their distinct identity, coupled with their acute feeling of
being colonized. Uyghurs view the tight restrictions placed by
the Chinese authorities on Uyghur Islam as an attempt to debase
their very identity, as Islam is an essential component of
their traditional identity and values.
China's attempt to suppress Islam as a motive force for
separatism by confining it to tight state control not only
profoundly violates human rights principles, but also further
alienates the Uyghurs, drives religious expression further
underground, and encourages the development of more radicalized
and oppositional forms of religious identity. If the current
trend continues, moderate voices that could mediate tensions
between the Chinese state and Uyghurs are likely to shrink.
China effectively exploited the post-9/11 climate that
followed the attacks in the United States. The arrests of some
Uyghurs in Afghanistan/Pakistan helped China to consistently
and successfully portray Uyghurs as the source of a serious
terrorist threat in China. This perception seems to have now
become dominant among the Chinese public. The lack of a free
media has made it almost impossible to compare sources of
information and to make independent judgments about these
claims. It is mind-boggling that some Western media
organizations also helped to further this perception with
reports that lacked a careful examination of Chinese claims.
The hasty designation of East Turkistan Islamic Movement
[ETIM] as a terrorist organization gave a ``green light'' to
China to intensify its crackdown on political dissent in the
region. China has used the ETIM designation as a propaganda
tool to ``confuse'' the Uyghur populations by suggesting that
the United States is helping China to destroy Uyghurs' ethno-
separatist aspirations. Also, China opportunistically used the
post-9/11 environment to make the outrageous claim that
individuals disseminating peaceful religious and cultural
messages in East Turkistan are terrorists who have simply
changed tactics. Many devout Uyghur Muslims have been subjected
to arrest, imprisonment, torture, and even execution.
China's cultural repression of the Uyghurs is not
reactive--it is rather a deliberate policy to control, monitor,
and sterilize Uyghur culture so that it cannot be a vehicle for
self-rule. Late last August, Wang vowed ``preemptive strikes''
on Uyghurs. He has been also advocating a ``reeducation'' drive
to enhance Uyghurs' ``identification with the Chinese nation
and culture.'' Han Chinese people treat Uyghurs as inferiors
and look down on Uyghur culture. Two top Chinese officials in
Urumchi have helped to create a public perception that Uyghurs'
cultural heritage is ``outdated'' and inferior to that of the
Chinese, saying that, ``Uyghurs must embrace the Han Chinese
culture and language.'' For example, Wang said that the
adoption of Chinese will ``improve the quality of ethnic
minorities, because indigenous languages are out of step with
the 21st century.'' Uyghur education is under the current
``bilingual education'' policy, which is in theory a
monolingual/Chinese-language-based education system. The
program is designed to assimilate Uyghurs by attacking and
diluting their culture.
The Chinese Government arbitrarily detains and imprisons
Uyghur historians, poets and writers; burns books on Uyghur
history and culture; and shuts down Uyghur publishing houses,
for example, closure of the Kashgar Uyghur Publishing House.
Targets also include ``terrorism in the spiritual form''--which
targets Uyghur intellectuals, writers, and musicians.
Journalists are arrested for ``advocating separatism.''
Funding for Uyghur cultural reservation and promotion
programs have been limited or reduced. Discriminatory hiring
practices are implemented that openly discourage Uyghur
applicants who otherwise possess the necessary education,
experience, and skills. Some Uyghurs feel that being a Uyghur
isn't such a great thing.
Some Uyghurs share the sentiment, expressed by the Dalai
Lama, that a form of cultural genocide is taking place in East
Turkistan akin to that of Tibet. The apparent problem is that
China lacks the appreciation of a culturally diverse society.
Eventually, China will create a new generation of Uyghurs who
won't appreciate their own cultural and ethnic heritage.
The Chinese Government has restricted Uyghurs' domestic and
international freedom of movement. Large numbers of Uyghurs
were evicted from major Chinese cities before the Olympics, and
most of them were not allowed to return after the Olympics.
Racial profiling and targeting of Uyghurs because of their
ethnicity, appearance, and origin are common in inner Chinese
cities. Basic services such as lodging, transportation, and
even public bathhouses are not available for the Uyghurs in
inland Chinese cities. For example, ``No Uyghurs in our Hotel
and Bathhouse'' ``[I]n compliance with a request from the local
PSB substation, starting today, investigations will be carried
out on the lodging circumstances of all individuals of Tibetan
and Uyghur ethnicity
residing at inns and bathhouses of the Haidian District.
Reinforce inspection and verification of any lodger matching
the description above and report all cases to the local
dispatch station.''
China discriminatorily implements its passport law.
Uyghurs' passports have been almost universally confiscated
since early 2007. Chinese citizens can obtain passports through
a fairly simple process, but Uyghurs and Tibetans face much
greater hurdles obtaining a passport. Article 1 of China's
passport laws, enacted on January 1, 2007, guarantees PRC
citizens the rights of exiting and entering China and promotes
international travel and cultural exchange with foreign
countries. Article 6 instructs the authorities to process and
issue a passport within 15 days after receiving an application.
If an application is not approved, the authorities should give
the applicant a written explanation and inform him of his right
to apply for an administrative review or to lodge an
administrative lawsuit. Also, authorities deny the issuance of
a passport if they believe that the person leaving China will
do harm to state security or that their departure will result
in serious losses to the benefit of the state. This has
prevented family unifications and visits overseas. For example,
parents could not attend significant events such as weddings
and funerals. The restriction on Uyghurs' freedom of movement
and travels reminds us of the Jewish experience in Nazi Germany
in the late 1930s.
China has dissuaded governments historically sympathetic to
Uyghurs. Case in point, Uyghur democracy leader Rebiya Kadeer's
visa issues--at the request of the Chinese Government, Turkey
has rejected her visa applications, even for attending National
Endowment for Democracy's [NED] democracy conference in
Istanbul in spring 2006. Last week, a Turkish MP requested an
explanation from the Foreign Minister on this issue. South/
Central Asian countries have participated in the deportation,
extradition, or rendition of Uyghurs to China. Most of them
have been executed and many are serving long prison terms. For
example, Uzbekistan deported a Canadian Uyghur to China in
2006. He was sentenced to life in prison in 2007. To date, the
Canadians don't have access to him.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] assists China
in suppressing Uyghurs' aspirations for self-rule. The SCO
fights against the ``three evil forces''--separatism,
terrorism, and religious extremism. Uyghur citizens of central
Asian countries cannot openly sympathize with the Uyghur
freedom movement, because of concerns for their own safety.
This has effectively created Uyghur resentment toward and
disappointment in other Turkic peoples in Central Asia.
China has effectively pressured and stopped countries that
may have provided humanitarian assistance to Guantanamo
Uyghurs. Despite being cleared for release as early as 2003,
the Guantanamo Uyghurs are still languishing in prison because
no country is willing to take them. Reportedly, the U.S. State
Department reached out to over 100 countries, but none agreed
to accept the Uyghurs. The economic and diplomatic threat of
straining relations with China by accepting the Uyghurs has
been enough to scare a number of governments away from taking
them.
I would like to make a quick recommendation to wrap up my
testimony. First, China should revisit and acknowledge failed
minority policies, particularly in East Turkistan and Tibet.
Second, recognize that harsh treatment will not help achieve
security. It never worked in world history. Stop the propaganda
campaign against Uyghurs and provide channels for legitimate
grievances to be heard. Last, restore Uyghurs' religious and
cultural rights, and stop coerced abortions carried out on
Uyghur women.
The role of the United States is extremely important in
that she needs to be the Uyghurs' main source of hope. To do
that: President Obama should publicly express serious concerns
over the deteriorating human rights situation in East Turkistan
and allow the 17 Guantanamo Uyghurs to resettle in the United
States. The emptying of the Guantanamo prison cannot be
achieved without the cooperation of America's allies, and that
cooperation cannot be realized without America's firm
leadership. And President Obama is in a very good position to
do so. Freeing the 17 Uyghurs in the United States primes the
pump and removes Europeans' reluctance to help. It also gives
tremendous hope and sends a positive message to the Uyghurs in
East Turkistan that the United States is not helping the
Chinese Government to suppress Uyghurs' democratic aspirations.
Also, a senior State Department official should visit the
region to meet with dissidents and family members of political
prisoners. The United States should appoint a Special
Coordinator for Uyghur affairs at the State Department. The
United States should also encourage China to grant Uyghurs
cultural and religious rights.
Uyghurs rightfully could ask ``If you prick us, do we not
bleed? '' But they shouldn't fall into the traps that the
Communist leadership has intentionally set up. They should
continue to condemn all acts of violence. Uyghurs should
remember Ghandi's quote: ``There is a limit to violent action
and it can fail. Non-violence knows no limits and it never
fails.'' Continuing to build grassroots support among youth is
critically important. They should carry out public education
through media. They should also work with Western democracies
to prevent China's misuse of its global influence. Uyghurs
should also encourage critical thinking about CCP messages
regarding Uyghurs and other minorities. Most importantly,
Uyghur should work to raise awareness among Chinese democratic
activists and democratic-minded Chinese about PRC policies.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Mr. Turkel.
For those of you who are interested, the full text of Mr.
Turkel's remarks will be included in the roundtable record, and
any points you want to address with him, you can do it in the
Q&A session.
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Mr. Turkel.
Now I would like to turn the floor over to Professor Kaup.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE PALMER KAUP, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF ASIAN STUDIES,
FURMAN UNIVERSITY
Ms. Kaup. Thank you. And my thanks also to the Commission
for inviting me to speak today.
There is no doubt in my mind that there are serious flaws
in the Chinese Government's minority policies. Policies in
Xinjiang need to be changed. Unfortunately, however, there are
no simple solutions to resolving ethnic tensions in Xinjiang.
There are numerous competing interests at stake in the region.
Numerous human rights organizations, including those
presenting here today, have well documented the extensive human
rights violations occurring in Xinjiang. Precisely because the
impacts of these policies are felt so dramatically by
individuals living within the region, discussion of human
rights conditions in Xinjiang often turns polemical. The
Chinese Government hurls accusations of widespread
international terrorism activity among the Uyghurs, while
critics of the regime accuse it of using terrorism purely as a
pretext to annihilate the Uyghur culture. There is a tendency
on both sides to oversimplify the situation and assume that the
other is simply intransigent and unwilling to implement or
accept proper policies.
Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to resolving
ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. Nor is there agreement on what
proper policies might be. There are, instead, numerous
competing interests at stake in the region. Failure to
recognize the complexity of the issues facing the Chinese
Government and failure to place these policies into broader
context hinders human rights activists' ability to engage the
Chinese Government in any kind of constructive dialogue.
Though the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law is supposed to
guarantee the minorities a number of rights, even properly
implemented the law alone cannot protect minority rights in
Xinjiang. Only mutual trust can enable the minorities and the
central government to co-exist.
China is a self-proclaimed, unitary, multinational state,
and autonomous areas are required, as noted by Article 7 of the
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, to ``place the interests of the
state as a whole above anything else.'' Natural resources
throughout the country belong to the central government. Though
the head of the government of each autonomous area must be a
member of the titular minority, as elsewhere in the country,
these leaders are not popularly elected at the county or the
provincial level, nor are there mandates for ensuring minority
representation within the Communist Party, where most power
remains.
It is, therefore, only through building mutual trust that
the
minorities and the central government can learn to co-exist and
recognize any mutual interest. The current policies, along with
widespread rhetoric equating ethnic activism and international
terrorism, are weakening whatever trust exists, even as
Xinjiang's economic indicators as a whole are improving. The
Chinese Government's current policies in Xinjiang are working
at odds with its own goals.
In my time remaining, I would like to divide my comments
into three parts. First, I will address why resolving ethnic
tensions in Xinjiang is at once so important and yet so
challenging to the central government. I will then illustrate
how two fundamental assumptions inform all of the Chinese
Government's minority policies and lead to policies that tend
to exacerbate rather than alleviate ethnic tensions in the
region. Finally, I will conclude with some brief
recommendations for improving ethnic relations in Xinjiang.
First, why is resolving ethnic tension in Xinjiang at once
so important and yet so challenging to the Chinese Government?
It is important to remember that the Xinjiang question is much
bigger than just Xinjiang. Mishandling policies in Xinjiang
could have dramatic impact throughout the country. More than
125 million residents of the PRC are officially classified as
ethnic minorities. Integrating them and ensuring their loyalty
to a unified Chinese state has not been easy.
Minorities are spread across two-thirds of China's land
mass, often in the most resource-rich areas of the country.
Despite living in these resource-rich regions, minority
educational levels fall overwhelmingly below those of the Han
Chinese, as do numerous other socioeconomic indicators. Income
levels are, on average, less than half that of the Han Chinese.
Many of the minorities do not speak Mandarin Chinese and
have traditions as well as legal and customary practices that
at times conflict with state laws. Finding a proper balance on
how best to protect individual citizens and minority groups
while developing the nation as a whole has been a complex
challenge for the central government.
Resolving ethnic tensions in Xinjiang has been particularly
challenging for the central government. Xinjiang accounts for
one-sixth of China's total land mass and is home to vast coal,
oil, and natural gas reserves. Though there was a period of
relatively loose control in Xinjiang in the 1980s, the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991 alarmed the Chinese Government and
heightened its interest in keeping the minority territories
under control.
Xinjiang borders eight countries, several of which were
once ethnic republics under the Soviet Union. The expansion of
oil exploitation in the region in the early 1990s only
increased tensions over exactly who should benefit from these
state-owned resources. Han Chinese were sent to the region in
increasingly large numbers to exploit the oil, which Uyghurs
were arguably not positioned to do yet due to the dearth of
trained Uyghur technicians and engineers.
Two large-scale protests against restrictive ethnic
policies in 1990 and 1997 further strained relations and
resulted in increased government crackdowns over expressions of
Uyghur ethnic identity. The government responded to these
protests by cracking down harshly on dissent, further fueling
ethnic tensions.
Chinese efforts to alleviate these ethnic tensions and
integrate the country are grounded on two key assumptions:
First, the government assumes that economic development is the
key to resolving all ethnic problems; and, second, that Han
Chinese are inherently more politically reliable than
minorities. Grounded in Marxist theory, the Chinese Communist
Party has continuously asserted that development is, in the
words of Hu Jintao, ``the key to solving all problems of China
and the key to solving the difficulties and problems in ethnic
regions.''
The Chinese Government is wary of minority leaders'
intentions and has sent by its own admission tens of thousands
of Han cadre into minority territories specifically to combat
what it calls ``domestic and foreign forces' vain attempts to
stir up ethnic separatism.''
Rapid economic development in Xinjiang and exploitation of
the vast natural resources requires more technically trained
personnel than the local population can currently provide. In
order to rush economic development in hopes of solving ethnic
tensions, the government offers incentive packages to educated
personnel from the interior, predominantly Han, territories.
The intent may be to increase the region's economic development
as a whole, but the fact remains that the best positions in
Xinjiang are overwhelmingly dominated by Han Chinese, and the
government pays those coming from the interior more than locals
holding similar positions. This is specifically mandated by
government policy. Central government intentions may not be
pernicious but the policies, nonetheless, lead to ethnic
resentment and increased tensions in the region.
So where do we go from here?
First, it is crucial to recognize that there are no clear-
cut solutions on how best to protect minority rights while
simultaneously ensuring the territorial integrity of a unitary
Chinese state. Better acknowledging the challenges facing the
Chinese Government while continuing to urge the government to
ease restrictions on Uyghur identity may lead to a more
constructive dialogue.
I would like to propose four recommendations that the U.S.
Government might encourage the Chinese Government to consider.
First, the Chinese Government should consider reducing its
encouragement of mass migration to Xinjiang. Until educational
levels in Xinjiang are raised and Uyghurs are able to compete
more equally with Han Chinese, the Uyghurs will only resent
those offered higher salaries and better positions and will
discount any of their contributions.
Two, the Chinese Government should consider further
increasing investments in the educational system within
Xinjiang. Long-term success in Xinjiang depends on providing
the Uyghurs the tools they need to participate fully in the
region's economic development. The pace of development needs to
be better managed, probably even slowed, until Uyghurs can play
a more crucial and central role in the process.
Three, the Chinese Government should consider offering
incentives to well-educated Uyghurs willing to remain in
Xinjiang. Policies encouraging the transfer of skilled labor
from Xinjiang to the interior should be halted immediately.
Four, the Chinese Government should recruit more minorities
into the Chinese Communist Party and promote them to positions
of real leadership. Though the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
requires the head of each autonomous area to be drawn from the
titular minority, real power in the country remains in the
hands of the Communist Party. Policies barring religious
believers from party membership should be waived to encourage
greater minority participation and enable those with real ties
in the local communities to succeed within the party.
In conclusion, properly recognizing the complexities facing
the Chinese Government may enable more constructive dialogue on
human rights issues in Xinjiang. The Chinese Government hopes
to ease ethnic tensions through rapid economic development and
assuring that Han Chinese retain control of key government and
party positions. These two policies, however, are exacerbating
rather than alleviating tensions. Combined with strict security
policies, these policies may eventually radicalize a currently
peaceful minority.
Thank you.
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Professor Kaup.
And now I would like to turn the floor over to Ms. Louisa
Greve. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LOUISA GREVE, PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR EAST ASIA,
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Ms. Greve. Thank you. My topic today is the relationship
of the situation in Xinjiang to that in the rest of China. In a
word, it is a yawning chasm. The gulf between trends in
Xinjiang and trends elsewhere in China is dramatic,
particularly in the areas of rule of law, civil society
development, personal freedoms, transparency, and governance,
as you have heard.
I will give several illustrations of this gulf and then go
on to give some forward-looking observations.
The first illustration is the subjective or experiential
dimension of living as a Uyghur and, in some cases, other
minorities in Xinjiang. If you talk to Uyghurs about any of the
human rights abuses that are common in China, throughout China,
that the CECC frequently documents in its reports, the Uyghurs
will talk about it differently, the experience differently.
They are a distinct minority. The things that threaten their
families, their choices in life, their personal freedoms, are
not just violations of individual rights, but in many cases
they feel it threatens their existence as a national group,
that is, an ethnic group, their ability to choose their own
cultural development.
Several have been mentioned today. I will mention one more:
the one-child policy. Of course, the one-child policy applies
throughout China, and as an officially designated minority,
Uyghurs technically are able to live under a more lenient
provision, where, for example, they might be able to have two
children, where a Han in the same situation would be able to
have one child. But the Uyghurs experience this not, again, as
a limitation on individual autonomy but, rather, as a state-
sponsored policy that limits people's choices about family and,
in fact, effectively limits the growth of the people who belong
to this identity and, as a way to control the ethnic group as
well as individuals.
Another example of this subjective dimension is to look at
freedom of information and political discussion in China. We
know that despite all kinds of Internet censorship, nonetheless
a very lively discussion of very interesting ideas goes on,
partly because of the Internet and blogging. You talk to
Uyghurs and they say, ``There is just no comparison between
what intellectuals and students and activists are able to do in
heartland China compared to what we would be able to do.'' The
same thing goes for the ``weiquan,'' or rights defense, legal
movement, networks of environmental NGOs--nothing like that is
possible for Uyghurs who would like to organize on any of these
public policy issues that affect their lives.
The second dimension of the gulf is the prominence of
ethnicity. Government-supported racism is a daily fact of life
for Uyghurs and other minorities, with openly discriminatory
job announcements and the rest. Restrictions on Uyghurs'
ability to check into hotel rooms in inner China, heartland
China, is a blatant example, and quotas restricting hiring of
Uyghurs in government positions as well, in the party and the
government. There are even lists indicating the ethnicity of
the chairman and the deputy chairman positions, which should be
Han, which should be Uyghur, and vice versa, in different
cases. These last are not open but ``neibu,'' confidential
documents.
The third dimension is government rhetoric. The PRC's
``patriotic education'' campaigns have been fairly intense,
especially since 1989. But the content of ``patriotic
education'' has a very different flavor in Xinjiang compared to
other places in China and other minority regions. Great
emphasis, of course, on ethnic unity. Great emphasis, of
course, particularly since 9/11, on anti-terrorism and the
military imagery that goes along with that. And, third,
overall, the language just feels very old. When you look at the
billboards, you read what the newspapers say, it will feel like
China of 15 or 20 years ago with lots of language about the
``motherland,'' as was quoted already.
One example: In 2004, Xinjiang celebrated the 50th
anniversary of the ``liberation'' of Xinjiang, and below the
statues featuring lots of Mao, displays featuring Mao as, you
know, a wonderful figure in Xinjiang's history and China's
history--that doesn't occur very much elsewhere in China. The
slogan was, ``Fifty years of harmony between the Uyghur and
Chinese people.'' In other words, a very Orwellian flavor to
public propaganda.
Fourth, I wanted to mention some structural things about
Xinjiang governance that make it stand out and are not found
elsewhere. Of course, people know about the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps, which is a frontier mechanism modeled,
of course, in part, on some historical means used by Chinese
empires in settling and cultivating and securing, garrisoning
frontier land. This happened after the establishment of the
People's Republic of China. Few people know it was actually
abolished in 1975 and was brought back in 1981 with the
explicit objectives of countering Soviet encirclement,
countering the East Turkistan independence movement--remember,
this is 1981 and therefore, long before the 1990s incidents
that we all think about--countering Islamic fundamentalism and,
of course, the cultivation of frontier lands and economic
development not found elsewhere. The Corps employs 2 or more
million people out of a population of over 18 million.
Governance. Wang Lequan, Party Secretary of the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party of
China, and first political commissar of the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps, has been in that office since 1994.
Students of elite politics in China can tell us a little bit
about what it means that he has been in that position for 14
years and is not subject to the same rotation rules as
governors elsewhere or party chairmen.
And the fifth dimension really is about the scale and types
of human rights violations. This has been mentioned already
this morning. I will just mention the statistic reported in
January in the official Chinese press, that almost 1,300 state
security-related arrests had been carried out in Xinjiang from
January to November 2008. The Dui Hua Foundation's research
shows that about one-half of all trials in China related to the
crime of endangering state security takes place in Xinjiang.
The crime of ``endangering state security'' includes
trafficking in state secrets, separatism, espionage,
subversion, and so on, and it does carry the death penalty. If
half of these arrests take place in Xinjiang, that is another
dimension where you are seeing something very different
happening in Xinjiang than the rest of China.
Now, I did promise to give some forward-looking
observations. I will make them brief. More Han Chinese need to
acknowledge the gulf. Things really are different. Too often
you talk to Chinese human rights activists, and they say,
``Well, Han suffer human rights violations, too.'' And that is
true. But there are differences, and that needs to be
acknowledged.
Related to that, even very active Chinese democrats,
liberal thinkers, people who want constitutionalism in China,
are infected by the propaganda and think that any Uyghur who is
an activist, politically active, is advocating for an
independent country. In a public presentation, a Uyghur will
say, ``We are looking for human rights,'' and give all kinds of
details, and the question from a Han audience member will
begin, ``Well, since you're asking for independence, . . .''
and they cannot hear the difference.
Second, Han and Uyghurs have to think more about the
future: federalism, governance, how to resolve tensions.
Third, those who are outside China, Chinese and
international human rights NGOs, should focus on where they can
make a difference, and I am afraid to say that recommending
things to the Chinese Government is a very long-term project.
In the shorter term, it is possible, as Nury mentioned, to do
more to enable Uyghurs who are not in China to receive
protection. For example, it is important to ensure that third-
party governments are not bullied by the Chinese Government
into returning Uyghurs who have applied for political asylum or
have refugee status to China, to face terrible mistreatment,
imprisonment, and even execution.
And then, finally, I do want to say that raising
international awareness, as the CECC has done so much to do, I
think, again, in the long term can make a big difference.
People who have the courage to speak should do so. People in
China cannot. And many Chinese intellectuals have blinders on
that make it hard for them to look at it. Eventually, with more
discussion and careful documentation, I believe that this will
filter through and enable Chinese activists who themselves are
intellectuals and lawmakers who are the ones who are going to
have to force the solutions, we want to help them by getting
the information out there so that they can eventually learn
from it.
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Ms. Greve.
And now, as we turn to the question-and-answer period of
today's roundtable, I have the great pleasure of introducing to
you Ms. Kara Abramson, senior staff specialist on Xinjiang with
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. I would like
to thank you, Kara, for your hard work putting this program
together. And just so all of you know, aside from being a
Harvard-trained lawyer and a historian, Kara also is a linguist
who reads, writes, and speaks Mandarin, Japanese, and Uyghur. I
would like to turn to her to kick off the Q&A session--in
English. [Laughter.]
Ms. Abramson. Dr. Kaup discussed several strategies for
engagement in her testimony, and I'd like to continue
discussing this issue. Given the political sensitivities of
this issue, given that the government has ramped up rhetoric
against ``Western hostile forces'' infiltrating China in the
name of human rights, and given that Xinjiang authorities
continue to vilify Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer, is
there even an opening to begin to talk about these issues and
engage with the Chinese Government? In addition, could some
type of engagement also come from within China? I'd like to
pose this question to all the panelists.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Brief answers so we can go right back to
the audience. Thanks.
Ms. Kaup. I agree with Louisa that this is certainly a very
long-term strategy, and the Chinese Government is
extraordinarily reluctant to talk about these issues,
particularly to talk about Xinjiang. I am not suggesting we are
going to sit down and say ``we feel your pain'' and, the
Chinese Government is then going to ask to sit down to chat
about what to do in Xinjiang. That is just not going to happen.
That said, I think that presuming to understand the
intentions of the Chinese Government and accusing it of using
terrorism simply as a pretext to annihilate Uyghur culture is,
frankly, just not productive. Whether or not you believe it to
be true, it is simply not productive to make such harsh
accusations, and the tone immediately puts the Chinese
Government on the defensive.
It would be much more constructive to say instead that the
current policies are working at odds with the central
government's own goals, and are driving into a corner those who
would otherwise not find violence at all appealing.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Just very quickly, for those who did not
hear the question, Kara asked: How can the United States and
others constructively engage China on this issue?
Ms. Abramson. And the second part--and these questions are
for all of the panelists--if it is hard to engage from our end,
or in addition to doing it from our end, is this type of
engagement possible from within China and by whom?
Ms. Greve. It is a very good question. In fact, at the
National Endowment for Democracy [NED], we have thought this
needs a lot of encouragement. We ourselves have conducted a
series of meetings, starting in about 2004, with people of
various ethnicities coming together. It is very hard, even when
you get a group of committed, pro-democracy activists who have
sacrificed their own lives, some of them served time in prison,
they still find it very hard. So, one, realize that multi-
ethnic dialogue is important and is going to be difficult, and
it can start with anybody. Nobody can do it--if you get it
started anywhere, those people can then be ambassadors in an
otherwise very bleak picture of people willing to listen and
truly engage with people from another point of view.
Second, the blogosphere, the alternative press, is one
place to start things that can filter through, and certainly
NED has been encouraging the more than half a dozen Internet-
based publications which are not subject--which are maintained
on servers outside of China so they cannot be literally shut
down, and then readers inside China can access them through
using proxies. That kind of people, people are trying to push
the boundaries of freedom of expression and getting away from
the constraints of censorship inside China. This has to be one
of the topics that is on the agenda for them.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Nury, please.
Mr. Turkel. There are a lot of things that the United
States can do. The fundamental problem is that the leaders of
the free world have not expressed strong concerns publicly over
Uyghurs sufferings, particularly on the ongoing onslaught
against Uyghurs. People just mention Uyghur issues in passing
and, as far as I know, no one yet brought up a list of specific
issues to the Chinese and asked them to make improvements.
President Obama and Secretary Clinton could say to the Chinese
that it is okay to be Muslim and Uyghur, there is nothing wrong
with it, and you need to respect their religious and cultural
rights. I don't think anyone has said that to the Chinese yet.
And the United States is in the best position to do that. It
has been done on behalf of the Tibetans in the past. As a
result, the Chinese Government is fairly careful in their
dealing with the Tibetans inside China.
Number two, the United States should send a high-level
official, perhaps Secretary Clinton, to East Turkistan and
deliver a speech that the United States cares about the
Uyghurs. That would be very powerful because it will give
Uyghurs a hope that there will be a light at the end of the
tunnel. We have heard President Obama's message of hope to the
nation in the last two years, and some of that hope needs to be
delivered to the Uyghurs.
Finally, the State Department and the other government
offices here in Washington need to have someone with a full-
time responsibility working on the Uyghur issues. Again, the
Chinese are not taking Uyghur issues seriously because there is
not much work done on behalf of the Uyghurs.
Ms. Reger. I would just like to say it is very important
for American officials to consistently raise Uyghur issues,
like Nury was talking about, both inside China and in the
United States when we have a forum to talk with Chinese
officials. The U.S. Government should consistently raise Uyghur
human rights issues. At the very least, this will bring hope to
the Uyghur people, and despite the difficulty of perhaps
effecting broader policy changes in the PRC or in East
Turkistan, at the very least we can hope to achieve small
victories.
For instance--and perhaps this is not a small victory, but
without the intervention and the pressure exerted by U.S.
officials, Ms. Kadeer would not have come here a few years ago.
Just a few months ago, U.S. Congressmen and other officials
raised the issue of forced abortion in East Turkistan,
particularly focusing on the case of Arzigul Tursun. She was
six months' pregnant, and in contravention of Chinese law,
local officials attempted to force her to have an abortion. But
after U.S. officials raised concerns about her case, she was
allowed to return home and continue with her pregnancy.
And I also would like to point out--I am not normally in a
position to comment on U.S. policy issues, but I believe it
would be in the best interests of the United States to foster
support and engagement with Uyghurs considering that they are
among the most pro-American and pro-Western Muslims in the
world, since they live across the border from a very volatile
region. So it would make sense if the United States would
express support for this population.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Nury has one more comment, and then I
want to say something, too.
Mr. Turkel. I forgot to mention that there is a large
Uyghur population outside China, and how the United States
handles the Uyghur issue, how much support the U.S. Government
gives to the Uyghurs have a direct impact on the lives of the
Uyghurs living in Central Asia, Europe, and other parts of the
world. To me, the countries that have Uyghur populations have
been shaping up their Uyghur policies based on the United
States' Uyghur policies. So it is, like Kate said, the Uyghur
issue is not a simple domestic issue in China. Rather, it is a
cross-broader and geopolitical issue. So the United States
should also actively engage in and talk with other players,
particularly countries in Central Asia that have a sizable
Uyghur population, to urge those governments to grant civil
rights to their own Uyghur citizens and stop harassing the
Uyghurs residing or visiting their respective countries. That
would be a tremendous help.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. I want to follow up on what Nury said
because it is important to note the efforts of some Members of
Congress who have worked on the Uyghur issue. They include
Senator Sherrod Brown, who has introduced a resolution
concerning Uyghurs, Senator Inhofe, and Representative Ros-
Lehtinen, among others.
[Inaudible, off microphone.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Thank you very much. Nury, please?
Mr. Turkel. On the issue of self-determination, it is very
hard to get a real sense of what people really want for their
nation because there is no freedom of expression in China. It
is hard to poll public opinions among the Uyghurs to find out
what they really want.
But the pressing issue for the Uyghurs both inside and
outside China is how to save the Uyghurs as a distinct ethnic
group or nation, if you will. That is the most important,
paramount issue. And, of course, Uyghurs would like to run
their own national, political, and economic affairs. But
prioritizing what needs to be done, the Uyghurs are highly
focused on preservation of their cultural heritage at the
moment.
On your second question, the answer is yes and no. Yes,
because Tibetans have built such a strong, worldwide grassroots
movement. That is something that the Uyghurs can and should
learn. And no, because, in my view, Tibetans should know it
better, but I do believe that Tibetans' genuineness, offers,
and efforts are not being appreciated by the Chinese. And I
think that is a good lesson to learn, but I do not think it is
something good for the Uyghurs to follow.
The Chinese Government did not show any good intentions.
Some Tibetans believe that the dialogue is something that
should be continued and it helps to further publicize Tibetan
issues. Of course, it gets lots of media attention, media
coverage. But I have not seen and/or heard specific
improvements made as a result of the ongoing dialogue with the
Chinese. As for the last question, the concerns about the other
minorities are well understood, but as I point out in my
statement, the Chinese Government's policy toward those
minorities, including the Kazakhs and others, are not as nearly
oppressive as they have been to the Uyghurs. So the Uyghurs
always have been a target for China's oppressive policies. So-
called minority conflict in East Turkistan is a modern
phenomenon. As you may know, in 1944 there was a multi-ethnic,
republican system of government established in East Turkistan,
and the head of the government was Uzbek, and some of the most
senior military leaders were Kyrgyz and Kazakh. It is fair to
say that there was no ethnic conflict between various groups in
East Turkistan before the Chinese took over the region.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Great. Thank you very much.
Please, in the back.
Ms. McCoy. Jenny McCoy, China Aid. Thanks for your
comments. I have a question about how to advocate on behalf of
political prisoners in Xinjiang.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Excellent.
Ms. Greve. Again, an often overlooked element of your press
list would be the Chinese language publications that try to
reach Chinese readers so that they, too, can become aware of
how to speak about political and religious prisoners in the
ethnic minorities area, whether it is Mongol or Tibetan, Uyghur
or Kazakh, Uzbek, and so on, in universalistic human rights
terms. In general, that is something that Chinese civil society
and intellectuals are still learning, and certainly about
people in Xinjiang. So I would say always please include on
your list all Chinese language publications.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That is great.
Ms.Perkins. This is a question for all panelists. What do
you think about the approach of empowering Uyghur minority
groups on the ground? Can we provide funding? I understand that
we have some restrictions on U.S. funding to groups on the
ground in China. But we also have some exceptions, including
funding programs that preserve culture and environment for
other ethnic groups, such as Tibetans. Do you think this
approach would work well in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region?
Ms. Greve. It has been done. The Congress has taken up for
Tibetans this kind of funding to support education and
entrepreneurial grassroots economic development that is well
distributed and so on. And it is absolutely to be encouraged to
have the Congress explore this for Xinjiang. I think Nury would
be able to speak better to the particular circumstances. And,
in fact, in Tibet, it is very hard, as you know, to get the
work done, lots of blocking of programs and very suspicious
local government wanting to check everything, and that would go
probably 10 times for Xinjiang. But it is absolutely worth
trying.
Mr. Turkel. What immediately can be done? I agree with
Louisa. What immediately can be done is that the U.S. Congress
sets up a scholarship for Uyghur college graduates to come here
to enroll in graduate programs and return afterward. And that
would be tremendously helpful.
Ms. Reger. I just wanted to add one thing--it is, of
course, important to foster civil rights for Uyghurs in East
Turkistan. One additional thing that the United States and
other governments can do that have ethnic Uyghur populations is
provide programmatic and financial support for groups that
are--or Uyghur organizations forming to preserve and maintain
the Uyghur language and culture and historical documents and
materials. I believe that there is one such organization that
is forming in the Washington area, so that is another sort of
program that could be developed.
Ms. Kaup. I wonder if I could combine a couple of the
questions to frame my comments. I think the question that was
raised about how many Uyghurs want self-determination
illustrates the importance of recognizing the complexities
facing the Chinese Government while pressing it to change its
treatment of minorities in Xinjiang. Current policies clearly
repress and prohibit any discussion of claims for self-
determination, but there is a legitimate concern on the Chinese
Government's part about what happens when those controls are
loosened. And if we just discount that, whether ``we'' be the
U. S. Government or international rights organizations or
scholars, if we just discount it and continue to claim that the
Chinese Government is being entirely unreasonable and has no
legitimate concerns and is just interested in annihilating the
Uyghur culture, I think we miss an opportunity to engage in
dialogue. We miss an opportunity to discuss with the Chinese
Government how we have handled dissent, or how other countries
have, or indeed how any nation can handle demands for self-
determination without exacerbating the tensions and inequities
inspiring such demands. How can the Chinese Government protect
freedom of expression and, precisely through protecting such
freedoms, therefore show Uyghurs that they can flourish within
a unified state? This is the question we want to address.
I would also like to respond to the earlier question of
what can be done by those working within China. Security is so
tight right now that one can barely even talk about issues in
Xinjiang in China.
So I think that if movement is going to come from within
China, it has to be done in areas that the Chinese Government
is going to find acceptable. It can be very difficult to
cooperate with the Chinese Government in this area,
particularly if one objects strongly to its policies. But there
are certain policy arenas, education, for example, in which the
Chinese Government is willing to allow international
participation. I think Nury's recommendation that the U.S.
Government provide scholarships to Uyghur students to study in
the United States is an excellent idea. It is also important to
work with NGOs strengthening educational opportunities for
minorities within Xinjiang. The central key to alleviating
ethnic tensions in Xinjiang is not breakneck-rate economic
development, but enabling and empowering the Uyghurs to
participate in their own cultural and economic development
within the PRC. Improving educational opportunities can move us
one step in this direction.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Great. Anybody else? Yes, please.
[Inaudible, off microphone.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. She asked: How have other Muslim
minorities responded to the persecution--persecution by whom? I
am sorry.
Audience Participant. Of the Uyghurs.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Of the Uyghurs.
Mr. Turkel. I would love to respond to that question.
Muslim countries have been unfavorable and they don't seem to
care about their fellow Uyghur Muslims. It is ironic. The
Uyghurs have been persecuted by the Chinese in China and
ignored by the West mostly because they happen to be Muslim.
You know, being a Muslim is not such a great thing in these
days. And Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
and many others, to that extent, are collaborating with the
Chinese. For example, Pakistan has rounded up Uyghurs who were
sympathetic to the Uyghur cause or involved in Uyghur political
activities. Pakistanis repatriated many of those Uyghurs to
China where they were tortured, imprisoned, or executed.
Another Muslim country, Uzbekistan, arrested a Uyghur
Canadian, a Canadian citizen in Tashkent. And he was deported
to China and sentenced to life in prison. To date, Canadians
have not been granted counselor access to him despite personal
involvement of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper.
And other countries in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia
politicized pilgrimage issue. Saudis will not issue visas to
the Uyghurs unless they have pre-approval or clearance from the
Chinese. That has subjected the Uyghurs to Chinese harassments
and humiliations. As far as I am concerned, Saudis don't apply
the same restrictions to the Muslims from other countries. Last
year, nearly 1,000 Uyghurs in Pakistan demonstrated in front of
the Saudi Embassy and applied for visas. Their applications
were denied and one individual died during the demonstration.
With the help of U.S. Government officials and Members of
Congress, Saudis allowed the Uyghur Muslims to travel to Saudi
Arabia for pilgrimage. I mean, the situation for the Uyghur
cannot be worse than this. Often times, people think, ``Oh,
Uyghurs are Muslims, so they are getting all the help from the
other Muslim states or Arab states or Middle Eastern states.''
That's not the case at all. Actually, it is the opposite.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
Yes, sir, please?
Audience Participant. I'd like to ask panelists to discuss
educational and cultural issues, including the threats we face
through ``bilingual education'' and the challenge of protecting
our culture.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. The CECC agrees with you that the
education issue is an extremely important one, and I want to
draw your attention to our Xinjiang reprint from the 2008
report. An extended addendum is dedicated to bilingual
education in Xinjiang and goes into quite a lot of depth on the
very issues you are raising. So thank you very much for your
point.
Kate, please?
Ms. Kaup. I would like to pick up on your mention of
cultural issues. We have been talking quite a bit about what
might be done both within and outside of China to help protect
Uyghur rights and the Uyghur culture. One very important
contribution that I think the Uyghur diaspora movement could
make is to introduce the world to Uyghur culture rather than
focusing almost exclusively on human rights violations in
Xinjiang. The Tibetan movement has drawn more attention than
that of the Uyghur people in part because people are interested
in Tibetan culture. They think it is ``cool,'' to use Nury's
word. I think very few Americans, very few people outside of
Xinjiang, in fact, know what Uyghur culture is. We certainly
need good monitoring of human rights issues and violations in
Xinjiang. But instead of hammering on human rights atrocities
exclusively, let's learn instead about Uyghur food, or Uyghur
short stories, or Uyghur art. Let's hear more about why it is
so important to preserve Uyghur culture, not just that it is
difficult to do so.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes, thanks. Dennis Halpin, and then Toy
Reid, and then I think we may need to close.
Mr. Halpin. [Off microphone]. [Inaudible].
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Dennis, it should be noted, does an
enormous amount of heavy lifting in the U.S. House of
Representatives on behalf of human rights issues that concern
China, so it is an honor to have him here today.
Do any of our panelists want to take his question--yes,
please?
Mr. Turkel. From what we know, the Uyghur issue is already
on President Obama's desk because of the Guantanamo Uyghurs.
There are some valid criticisms that have been made on Bush's
overall detention policies but we should acknowledge the fact
that the Bush Administration successfully resisted the pressure
from the Chinese on their request to repatriate the Guantanamo
Uyghurs. While maintaining close relations with China, the
United States did not give into the pressure to ship the
Uyghurs back to China. That worked.
Also, one other thing that the United States did in the
last several years was to refuse to designate additional Uyghur
groups as terrorist organizations. That also worked.
And President Obama is in a very good position to do
something for the Uyghurs at the moment; that is to release the
Uyghurs into the United States. It would be a symbolic step
that would eventually help Obama to empty the prison camp in
Guantanamo. Also, by doing that, he can show to the Chinese
that he knows what is right and what is wrong. He can explain
to the Chinese that his administration did whatever was
necessary after careful review and investigation, along with
judicial process and found no evidence that the Uyghurs pose a
security threat to the United States. That would be a very
specific and important thing that the U.S. Government can do in
the foreseeable future for the Uyghurs.
The other benefit is that it will help President Obama to
encourage other governments in Europe, European allies to help
to take the rest of the cleared detainees who cannot return to
their countries. There are about 60 detainees out of 250
prisoners in Guantanamo who cannot go back to their country. Of
those, 17 are Uyghurs.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
Toy Reid, you have the last remark--a question, I hope.
Mr. Reid. It is a question. Thank you. I am Toy Reid with
the CECC. The prominent question is this: why should we allow
the Chinese Government to define the terms of this discussion
and set limits on what topics it is willing to discuss? As I
was listening to some of the views expressed, there were a
couple of themes that I picked up on.
One thing I noticed was when we talk about this issue
within the Chinese framework, the Uyghur people, along with
many other nationalities, are typically referred to as ``ethnic
minorities.'' I often think about whether or not these groups
perceive of themselves in those terms. To the best of my
knowledge, even in Chinese, the term ``ethnic minorities'' or
``shaoshu minzu,'' is a relatively new invention. The 1920s is
the earliest reference that I know of to the term. And so, I
wonder if there aren't historical and political reasons that
might cause us to reflect critically on the use of that
terminology.
In addition, it was also mentioned that getting the Chinese
to talk about these issues at all is quite difficult. It is
regarded as a non-starter. And I understand that frustration
and difficulty. But I also wonder, are we giving up too much by
allowing the Chinese authorities to unilaterally set the terms
of what is and is not a proper subject for dialogue? Does our
use of PRC Government terminology reinforce their claim that
Uyghurs are an ethnic minority within China, that Xinjiang is
completely a domestic issue, and therefore, we have no right to
get involved?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. There is a question in there. I know
there is.
Mr. Reid. The question is: should we allow the PRC
Government to set the terms of what they are willing to talk
about? And should we be more careful about adopting various
terms that they use to describe the situation--terms that may
not be universally embraced by those who are being described by
such terms?
Ms. Kaup. Good questions. You have clearly been very well
trained. [Laughter.]
I actually hope that is not the message you took from my
comments, though. I am not at all suggesting that we should let
the Chinese Government set the parameters of our discussion
with them. I am saying that it is dangerous within China to
raise Uyghur issues. There are just certain topics that can be
discussed safely and others that cannot. One can raise certain
issues about minorities. One can talk about economic
development strategies for minorities. One can talk about
minority languages within certain frameworks. It is just not
wise, however, within China to be publicly raising questions
about Uyghur rights at this moment. But I am not at all
suggesting that we should let the Chinese Government tell those
of us outside of China what topics are taboo to raise, discuss,
or promote.
You also asked about the use of the term ``minzu'' and
whether we should use the Communist Party's classification
system of labeling minorities. The term ``minzu'' has been used
for at least 100 years, and the concept has been adopted by
most minzu themselves. I actually wrote a book called
``Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China,'' that looks
exactly at this question of how many minorities have adopted
and utilized the state's classification categories to promote
their own interests.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes, Amy, please.
Ms. Reger. I just wanted to make a short comment, which is
that ``minzu'' has been used, as Kate noted, for a long time to
describe so-called ethnic minorities, among them Uyghurs. But
in Chinese, it has a rather ambiguous meaning, which could mean
ethnic minorities or ethnic nationalities. And what we have
been seeing in recent years is that they are sticking with--the
Chinese Government is sticking with the use of the word
``minzu'' in Chinese, but in English, they are being very
sensitive to using ``nationality'' instead of ``ethnic
minority.'' So, for instance, the Central
Minority Nationality University in Beijing--I hope I got that
right--they just recently changed the name to Central Minzu
University. It seems like they are trying to ward off any sort
of perception that the people, you know, the students attending
the school or the nationalities being learned about at that
school are, in fact, a unique nationality as opposed to a
minority in the context of the greater PRC. And I think it is
important for us to--it is important for any nation or any
people to be able to define themselves according to their own
definition.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. A last remark.
Mr. Turkel. Thank you. This is not completely related to
what we have been talking about this morning but I would like
to make something really clear here on the name of the Uyghurs.
The Uyghurs have only one name: Uyghurs. No adjective, no
adverb is needed. It is not Chinese Muslims, not Muslim
Uyghurs. We have been hearing or reading a bunch of different
descriptions of the Uyghurs. But I believe they are all
unnecessary. Uyghurs are Uyghurs. Again, no adverbs or
adjectives are required. And as all of you know, there is
another separate Muslim group called Chinese Muslims in China.
Sometimes they are also called Hui Muslims. Uyghurs do not
represent them or the other Muslim groups in China. We are just
Uyghurs. I want to make that very clear, especially to the
people from the press.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Thank you so much. I want to thank
all the panelists for coming today and offering us unique
perspectives and information on this issue. Amy Reger, Nury
Turkel, thank you for your overview of recent developments;
Katherine Kaup and Louisa Greve, thank you for providing a
broader context, and also for some excellent recommendations on
moving forward.
Have a great day.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statement
----------
Prepared Statement of Amy Reger
february 13, 2008
During this week's Universal Periodic Review of China at the UN, a
member of the Chinese delegation asserted that there is no ethnic
conflict in the People's Republic of China. Chinese ambassador Li
Baodong emphasized what he called ``preferential policies'' for Uyghurs
and other minority nationalities, citing lower score requirements for
university entrance exams. According to the Chinese delegation, the
only discontent that exists among Uyghurs is sown by hostile foreign
forces aiming to split China--and this discontent does not represent
the happy majority.
Unfortunately, the reality for Uyghurs in the PRC is much different
than the Chinese delegation's rhetoric would have us believe. It is
hard to reconcile these remarks with security clampdowns that have been
ongoing in East Turkestan (also known as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region) in the past year, and a human rights situation for Uyghurs that
is more severe than it has been in many years. The year 2008 was one of
disappointment for those who hoped that the Olympics might expand
freedoms for Uyghurs.Underlining the PRC's massive campaign against
Uyghurs in 2008 was a rise in reported arrests for terrorism, extremism
and other state security charges in East Turkestan. According to an
official Chinese newspaper report, nearly 1,300 people were arrested in
East Turkestan on state security crimes in 2008, marking a steep
increase over previous years. The 2008 figures marked a very sharp
increase over 2007, which saw only 742 people arrested on state
security crimes throughout the entire PRC. Under Chinese law,
individuals can be prosecuted for ``endangering state security'' if
they are believed to have engaged in subversion, ``splittism,'' and
``illegally providing state secrets to overseas entities,'' all charges
that are of a highly subjective nature in the PRC.
The PRC government has undertaken a fierce campaign of repression
in East Turkestan since the Olympic Games period, when a series of
violent attacks took place in and around the cities of Kashgar and
Kucha. Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan announced a ``life or death
struggle'' in East Turkestan on August 14, as well as a hardening of
measures designed to manage Uyghur issues.
One of these measures, according to the Hong Kong-based Information
Center for Human Rights and Democracy, was the deployment of around
200,000 public security officers and armed police to East Turkestan to
``prevent terrorist attacks'' in the post-Olympic period. News reports
have indicated the implementation of intensified ideological campaigns
throughout the region in subsequent months.
While PRC authorities claim the security measures are aimed at
punishing individuals involved in the violent attacks that took place
during the Olympics period, the scope of the crackdown represents a
broad, far-reaching campaign of intimidation and fear aimed at the
Uyghur community.
Security measures carried out in 2008 targeted large numbers of
Uyghur civilians, including many not suspected of involvement in any
crime, in contravention of both Chinese law and international law.
Particularly in the period leading up to and during the Olympics, UHRP
noted a widespread clampdown among Uyghurs and a corresponding rise in
arrests and detentions. These included the arrests of more than 1,000
individuals in security sweeps in the cities of Kashgar and Kucha, and
the arrest of 160 Uyghur children, aged 8 to 14 years old, for
participating in ``illegal religious activities.'' Authorities also
used the tactic of detaining family members and associates of alleged
attackers in an attempt to bring in suspects.
Emerging evidence has undermined the basis for the PRC's
government's repression in East Turkestan. Chinese Government officials
accused a number of Uyghurs of conducting the attacks in the Kashgar
and Kucha areas, adding that the suspects had received substantial
assistance from international terror groups. However, no evidence has
ever been produced to support the allegations of international
assistance in the attacks.
A September 29 New York Times article cast doubt on Chinese
Government claims about the deadliest of the attacks, in which 16
people reportedly died in Kashgar. Independent photographs suggest that
events did not occur as the Chinese Government claims. The photographs
show men in police uniforms carrying out the attack against other
policemen, casting doubt on Chinese Government claims that a vegetable
seller and a taxi driver were responsible.
In the first half of 2008, the PRC government issued a series of
specific Olympics-related terrorism claims, without providing evidence
to support its accusations. These included an alleged plot by a young
Uyghur woman to blow up or crash an airplane on its way to Beijing on
March 7, and the arrest of some 45 people in April on suspicion of
planning to kidnap athletes and carry out suicide bomb attacks to
sabotage the Olympics.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, PRC authorities have used
the ``war on terror'' as a pretext for cracking down on religious and
political dissent in the region. Tens of thousands of Uyghurs are
believed to have been detained in the years since 2001, and hundreds
are believed to have been executed. Individuals caught up in this
campaign include Tohti Tunyaz, a Ph.D scholar who was released this
week from prison after serving an 11-year sentence for conducting
historical research in East Turkestan deemed subversive by government
officials, and Nurmemet Yasin, a young Uyghur poet and intellectual who
was imprisoned for writing an allegorical story that was viewed as
separatist.
Uyghurs in East Turkestan suffer a broad scope of abuses to their
civil, political, economic and social rights, including the fierce
suppression of their religion, the use of the legal system as a tool of
repression against Uyghurs who voice discontent with the government;
PRC government support of the influx of huge numbers of Han Chinese
economic migrants into East Turkestan; the forced transfer of young
Uyghur women to work in poor conditions in eastern China;
discrimination in hiring practices; unequal access healthcare services;
and the elimination of Uyghur language schools under the current
``bilingual education'' policy.
``Bilingual'' education in East Turkestan has evolved in an
increasingly repressive political environment, as one aspect of a
government: driven project to assimilate Uyghurs by attacking and
diluting their culture. It was conceived around the time of the
founding of the post-Soviet Central Asian states in 1991, a turning
point in the PRC's view of East Turkestan, when the government began to
become obsessed with ``security'' and ``stability'' in the region.
Drives to expand ``bilingual education have paralleled heightened
campaigns to promote security and battle separatism. For instance, in
2004, the year in which a particularly harsh ``strike hard, extreme
pressure'' campaign aimed at repressing ``the three evils'' of
``separatism, extremism, and terrorism'' resulted in the arrest of
hundreds of Uyghurs, the rate at which ``bilingual'' education was
eliminating Uyghur from East Turkestan's schools increased
dramatically.
A recent Xinhua news article described the policy as aiming ``to
encourage Xinjiang native teachers to teach both languages as a way to
safeguard culture and promote the national standard.'' According to
Chinese Government propaganda, ``bilingual education'' is being put
into place throughout East Turkestan to improve educational and
employment opportunities for Uyghur children. One of the major problems
with this type of justification is that ``bilingual education'' is not
``bilingual'' at all, but rather monolingual. Another situation that
challenges the Chinese Government's official assertions regarding its
motivations of providing a truly bilingual education is the removal of
Uyghur children from their cultural environment and their placement
into Chinese-language ``Xinjiang classes'' located in 12 inland Chinese
cities. This program has not been well-received among Uyghurs in East
Turkestan, who view ``Xinjiang classes'' as an attempt to Sinify young
Uyghurs, while there exists no parallel effort to educate young Han
Chinese students in the Uyghur language and culture. A third challenge
to the official portrayal of the ``bilingual education'' program lies
in the relative lack of access to English-language instruction for
Uyghur students at the high school and university level. Uyghur high
school students who study at ``minkaomin'' schools (schools in which
they receive Uyghur-language instruction) are not given any English-
language instruction, while English-language instruction is widespread
at ``minkaohan'' schools (schools in which courses are all taught in
Chinese). Uyghur university students are required to study Chinese as
their second language, and not English.
The ``bilingual education'' policy has been pursued for the past
decade, but with increasing intensity since 2002. Past policies were
more egalitarian and allowed Uyghur parents more of a choice in their
children's languages of instruction. Over the past seven years,
government efforts at eliminating Uyghur language schools have
accelerated dramatically, as compulsory Chinese language education has
been expanded at every educational level and every township in East
Turkestan. The ultimate goal of ``bilingual'' education appears to be
to replace Uyghur language instruction with Chinese language
instruction in all areas of East Turkestan, and to phase out the use of
spoken Uyghur among the young Uyghur population.
Since 2002, with the exception of Uyghur languages and literature,
classes at Xinjiang University have been taught solely in Chinese,
virtually removing Uyghur as a language of instruction at the region's
most prestigious university. Local governments have committed to
eliminating Uyghur language instruction, even in areas with large
majority Uyghur populations. ``Bilingual education'' was implemented in
high schools, middle schools and elementary schools, and in 2005, the
``bilingual'' education push was expanded into East Turkestan's
preschools.
At least one official newspaper reported that the number of
students in ``bilingual education classes'' in East Turkestan grew from
5,533 students in 1995 to 294,000 in 2007, and the number of schools
offering ``bilingual classes'' grew from 220 in 1995 to 8,788 in 2007.
Official sources reported recently that within the next five years, the
state would provide free training to 11,264 bilingual pre-school
teachers, and within the next six years, the XUAR would recruit around
16,000 teachers to supplement the current pool of bilingual primary
school teachers. Xinhua reported that since 2003, China has invested
130 million yuan, or 19 million U.S. dollars, to train bilingual
teachers for elementary and high schools. Xinhua also reported that
there were 18,000 ``bilingual teachers'', 5,000 bilingual classes and
150,000 bilingual pupils in East Turkestan in 2008.
The bilingual teachers who are set to be trained in the next
several years will almost certainly be drawn from the Han Chinese
population, and many Uyghur teachers who cannot pass stringent language
tests may be expected to lose their jobs. Many Uyghur teachers
throughout East Turkestan have already been fired from their jobs, and
many others have been forced to completely stop teaching their students
in Uyghur and use only Chinese, even if all of the students are
Uyghurs.
Remarks by Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan at the National
Party Congress in March 2008 indicate that provincial authorities, with
the support of the central government, plan to invest 3.7 billion yuan
in order to implement ``bilingual education'' programs in 85% of the
region's kindergartens in the next three to five years.
As the Han population has increased, Han individuals have also
received a greater share of the economic benefits from East Turkestan's
growth, including economic and employment opportunities not available
to Uyghurs. While the Chinese Government asserts that ``bilingual
education'' will provide ethnic Uyghurs with the Mandarin language
skills necessary to succeed in China's competitive job market, many
Uyghur graduates who are fluent in Mandarin Chinese report facing
employment challenges due to rampant ethnic discrimination among
employers. As one former Uyghur teacher recalled, when he traveled with
his Chinese-speaking Uyghur students to job fairs, they observed signs
flatly stating 'we don't want minority people'.
The program of the ``Xinjiang classes'' mentioned above was
established in inland Chinese cities in 1997. ``Xinjiang classes''
remove top minority students in East Turkestan from their cultural
environment and enroll them in classes with Chinese language
instruction in high schools in large inland Chinese cities. Parents of
such students report being pressured into sending their children.
Official media have quoted Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan as
saying that the chief goal of ``Xinjiang classes'' is ``political
thought training'', not academic preparation, and other government
officials have described the program as a way to ``deepen national
feelings'' and ``strengthen correct political attitudes'' as part of a
``long term important strategic policy decision... to protect the unity
of the motherland and safeguard the nation's long and peaceful order''.
In some of these schools speaking Uyghur is prohibited, even in
student dormitories, where pupils are watched by an on-site monitor.
Children from one ``Xinjiang class'' in Qingdao were forbidden to
communicate in Uyghur, even when visited by an officially approved
ethnic Uyghur journalist. By 2006, ``Xinjiang classes'' had been
expanded from 12 to 26 Chinese cities and had a total enrollment of
over ten thousand students.
By forcing Uyghur children to study in a language other than their
mother tongue, the PRC government is in clear violation of its own laws
and agreements, including Article 4 of the PRC's Constitution,
Compulsory Education Law and Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law. The PRC is
also a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which
guarantee minorities protection of their language rights. In addition,
the PRC's ``bilingual education'' policy, as it is being implemented,
serves to increase tensions between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in East
Turkestan.
The PRC should end its current policy of eliminating Uyghur
language education from East Turkestan and, at a minimum, return to the
policy of allowing for both Uyghur and Chinese language education
systems. ``Bilingual education'' will work only if authorities support
schools in which both Uyghur and Chinese are recognized as important
regional languages and serious academic classes are offered in both
languages. Government support of the Uyghur language would both improve
ethnic relations and contribute to economic growth in East Turkestan.
Many observers have noted that language issues play a large role in the
ethnic tensions of the region. A commitment to Uyghur language on the
part of the government would ultimately contribute to the goal of
stability by easing an area of serious Uyghur discontent.