- PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG: ASSESSING CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG:
ASSESSING CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
=======================================================================

ROUNDTABLE

before the

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION
__________

JULY 14, 2010
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Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

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C O N T E N T S

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Page
Opening statement of Douglas Grob, Cochairman's Senior Staff
Member, Congressional-Executive Commission on China............ 1
Mann, Sharon, Senior Counsel, Congressional-Executive Commission
on China....................................................... 2
Martin, Michael F., Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 3
Keatley, Robert, Founder and Editor, the Hong Kong Journal,
Former Editor, the Wall Street Journal Asia, Wall Street
Journal Europe, and South China Morning Post................... 6
DeGolyer, Michael, Hong Kong Baptist University, Professor of
Government and International Studies and Director, the Hong
Kong Transition Project........................................ 9
Bork, Ellen, Director, Democracy and Human Rights, Foreign Policy
Initiative..................................................... 12

APPENDIX
Prepared Statements

Keatley, Robert.................................................. 26
DeGolyer, Michael................................................ 27
Bork, Ellen...................................................... 30

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG: ASSESSING CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2010

Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 3:06
p.m., in room 138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Douglas Grob
(Cochairman's Senior Staff Member) presiding.
Also present: Sharon Mann, Senior Counsel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS GROB, COCHAIRMAN'S SENIOR STAFF
MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Mr. Grob. Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very
much for joining us here today.
My name is Doug Grob, and I am Cochairman Sander Levin's
Senior Staff Member on the staff of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China [CECC]. I would like to recognize, in the
audience, Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director of the
Commission. On behalf of Chairman Byron Dorgan and Cochairman
Levin, we would like to welcome you to this Congressional-
Executive Commission on China roundtable on ``Prospects for
Democracy in Hong Kong: Assessing China's International
Commitments.''
I apologize for the slight delay in getting started. We are
awaiting our last speaker, but we will proceed now,
nonetheless.
Today we are going to be looking at prospects for democracy
in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's basic freedoms, for the most part,
have been maintained under the ``one country, two systems''
framework. In June of this year, Hong Kong took its first steps
toward constitutional reform since the British handed the
territory back to China in 1997.
In this roundtable today we are going to examine these
recent constitutional reforms, mainland China's engagement in
Hong Kong, and how Hong Kong may contribute to the development
of democracy and civil society in China. Perfect timing, Mr.
Keatley. Thank you very much. We have only just gotten started.
Thank you.
And I would like to introduce my colleague, Sharon Mann,
Senior Counsel on the Commission staff, for some introductory
remarks.
Sharon?

STATEMENT OF SHARON MANN, SENIOR COUNSEL, CONGRESSIONAL-
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Ms. Mann. First, I would like to welcome you to this
roundtable on Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a place that is near and
dear to many of us. I think there are a number of people here
who spent a good deal of time there. It is also a very
important platform for people who are interested in development
of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in China.
The only place in China to really enjoy freedom of the
press, free speech, and freedom to organize and question your
own government is Hong Kong. An example of this was when, in
2003, half a million people in Hong Kong turned out when the
government proposed legislation on national security, and the
government pulled back the legislation. Also, every year on
June 4, Hong Kong is the one place in China where there are
commemorations. There is a peaceful demonstration commemorating
the Tiananmen protest.
So Hong Kong is a very important place, but the
relationship between Hong Kong and China is a two-way street. I
think it's very useful to keep an eye on development of
democracy in Hong Kong and what that means for democratic
development in China, and then what type of democracy in Hong
Kong China will allow. I believe this is important not only for
people who are interested in Hong Kong, but for anyone
interested in China.
Before I turn this over to our panelists, I wanted to give
a special welcome to John Kamm, who is in the audience. He is
the founder and head of a human rights organization called Dui
Hua, which works on behalf of human rights defenders who have
been imprisoned in China. John has very deep ties to Hong Kong.
I'm hoping he'll be here for the Q&A and ask some very good
questions and have excellent comments.
Anyway, I'd like to turn it over to Michael Martin.
Mr. Grob. Actually, I've got to do some introductions.
Ms. Mann. Okay. Sorry.
Mr. Grob. I have the privilege of introducing our speakers
today. We have, to my left and in the order in which they will
speak, Michael Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs for the
Congressional Research Service; to my immediate left, Robert
Keatley, Founder and Editor of the Hong Kong Journal, and
formerly an editor with the Wall Street Journal Asia, Wall
Street Journal Europe, and South China Morning Post; to my
right, Professor Michael DeGolyer of Hong Kong Baptist
University, where he is Professor of Government and
International Studies, and Director of the very important Hong
Kong Transition Project; and finally, to my far right, Ellen
Bork, Director of Democracy and Human Rights for the Foreign
Policy Initiative.
I'd like to ask our speakers to please limit your remarks
to 7 to 10 minutes, if possible--and even if not possible--so
that we can ensure that we have enough time for a vibrant and
free-flowing question and answer session following our
speakers' presentations. So at this time I'd like to turn the
floor over to Michael Martin.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL F. MARTIN, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. Martin. Okay. Well, thank you, Douglas and Sharon, for
this invitation to speak today. I need to start with a couple
of disclaimers. Although I am here as a staffer of the
Congressional Research Service, my comments are not necessarily
reflective of the official views of the Congressional Research
Service, but they are my own.
The second disclaimer is a slightly different one, which is
to say I have a long--longer than I want to think about--
history back in Hong Kong, including working at Baptist
University--back then Baptist College--where I met Michael
DeGolyer.
I worked for the Hong Kong Trade Development Council for
four and a half years, spanning the Handover period. In
addition, I married a woman from Hong Kong, and most of her
immediate family still lives, resides, and works or studies in
Hong Kong. So, Hong Kong is part of my life.
So let me proceed, trying to be clear, concise, and quick,
because I have a fair number of things that they asked me to
cover in 7 to 10 minutes.
Since I am here on behalf of the Congressional Research
Service [CRS], or as part of CRS, I'm going to focus my
comments particularly on congressional interests or concerns,
so I'm not speaking on behalf of the Executive Branch,
President Obama, the State Department, or any other aspect of
the U.S. Government; they may speak for themselves when they
choose to.
I guess I'll start out with what is going to be not the
best of jokes, but I'll say it anyway. Several of my friends
from the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office are here. Also,
when I go to Hong Kong and speak to Hong Kong Government
officials, I often tell them, be careful what you ask for from
Congress. They often say, we don't get enough interest from
Congress. I sometimes point out, getting more interest from
Congress isn't necessarily to your advantage.
But that having been said, I think the 1992 Hong Kong
Policy Act still, to a great extent, reflects congressional
concerns, interests and preferences about the situation in Hong
Kong. In particular, let me point out certain aspects of that
law, which are still U.S. law, and certain aspects that aren't
in that law.
In particular, it starts out with a recognition of what for
shorthand I'll call the Joint Declaration--I'll explain that in
a minute--which guarantees a high degree of autonomy, with the
exceptions of defense and foreign affairs, for Hong Kong.
Second, it recognizes ``one country, two systems'' which you've
heard about earlier and the notion of the preservation of the
Hong Kong lifestyle for 50 years, or up until 2047.
There's an explicit statement of supporting democratization
in Hong Kong--and it's called ``democratization''--recognition
of the desire to safeguard human rights in Hong Kong and for
the residents of Hong Kong; a desire to maintain strong
economic, cultural, and other ties with Hong Kong, including
the continuation of any existing international agreements, and
the ability to forge new bilateral or multilateral agreements
in the future.
Then the last thing is a requirement for an annual report
to Congress about the situation in Hong Kong, a separate
report. That only went through the year 2000. It was continued
year by year in appropriations bills. It lapsed a couple of
times, mostly because it just didn't get noticed that the
continuation of the report wasn't included in the language.
But I point that out just to indicate that there has been a
desire for Congress to keep a specific eye on what's going on
in Hong Kong every single year and a separate accounting of
what the situation is like.
Let me get back to that Joint Declaration that was
recognized in the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. Its official
name and why it is called the Joint Declaration is--and I'll
have to put my glasses on--``The Joint Declaration of the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Government of the People's Republic of China
on the Question of Hong Kong.'' Thus, you can see why we call
it the Joint Declaration.
What's interesting about that statement--and I was there at
the time that this was being negotiated--the Hong Kong people
were not direct parties in the negotiation of their future
fate. It was strictly between the British Government and the
Chinese Government on what was going to happen to Hong Kong.
It was concluded and signed on December 19, 1984. For
today's presentation, the key points are threefold. First, it
calls on China to create something called the Basic Law for the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [SAR]. Second, it
explicitly states that there's going to be preservation of the
political and economic rights that currently exist in Hong
Kong. Third, it creates something called the Chief Executive to
replace the governor, and continues the legislature of Hong
Kong, and explicitly states--this is the Joint Declaration--
that the former, that is the Chief Executive, is to be
``appointed by the Central People's Government after
consultation or elections in Hong Kong, whereas, the
legislature shall be constituted by elections.'' That's the
full extent of what it says.
I want to point out that neither of those provisions say
anything about democracy or universal suffrage, so there's
nothing in the Joint Declaration that advocated democracy or
universal suffrage in Hong Kong. That only came about when the
Basic Law was passed on December 4, 1990, by the National
People's Congress, a legislature of China.
We call it the Basic Law. Here's a copy right here.
Everybody carries one, right? The ``Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China.'' It is sometimes referred to as Hong Kong's mini-
constitution. Maybe in some of the presentations today they
will refer to these issues as constitutional issues, although
some lawyers that I've spoken to said technically this isn't a
constitution, so that term shouldn't be used. But I'm not a
lawyer, I'm an economist.
Looking at the Basic Law, the key points that I want to
highlight are, first, it creates effectively an executive-led
government. If you will, in some ways it inverts the political
system we have here in the United States. The Chief Executive
has much of the power, including the power to introduce
legislation before the Legislative Council. The Legislative
Council's ability to introduce legislation is quite limited.
For example, it can introduce legislation that involves
budgetary matters on its own.
Once introduced, the Legco--that's shorthand for
Legislative Council--can either approve or disapprove. If they
disapprove, they can go back to the Chief Executive for
modification and come back. If it's disapproved a second time,
then it initiates a governmental crisis that could lead to the
removal of the Chief Executive. But basically, put in
shorthand, the Legco vetoes proposed legislation coming from
the executive, not the other way around. Now, that's an over-
characterization, but I don't have a lot of time.
In the Basic Law, there's something called Annex I, and it
specifies the means of selecting the Chief Executive. It
creates the election committee, a committee of 800 people that
are appointed by the Chinese Government. It is composed of four
equal groups representing important sectors of Hong Kong
society. In rough terms: 200 members from the business
community; 200 members from what they call the professionals;
200 from labor, social services, religious groups, and other
groups considered that sort; and then 200 members that, for the
most part, are Hong Kong or Chinese Government officials.
This committee, according to the Basic Law, makes
recommendations on who should be the Chief Executive, but the
official
appointment of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong is done by the
Chinese Government.
Annex II specifies the means of selecting the Legco
members. It basically stipulates a gradual change to a 50/50
split between what are called geographical and functional
constituencies. Geographical, as the name implies, says that
members of Legco will be elected according to districts,
geographical districts. Functional constituencies, the other
half of the members, currently 60 members, or 30 people,
represent what are considered key social sectors of economic
sectors in the economy.
So you have labor union representatives, you have
representatives from religious groups, you have representatives
from different groups, and they are selected by that
subcommunity in ways that I don't have time to get into. This
is in many ways an adaptation of the system for the Legco that
existed under British rule.
The first references to the concept of universal suffrage
appears in the Basic Law, Article 45, which covers the Chief
Executive. It says, ``The ultimate aim is the selection of the
Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a
broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with
democratic procedures.'' By the way, that's the first time you
see the word ``democratic'' anywhere.
Article 68, which covers Legco, says, ``The ultimate aim is
the election of all members of the Legislative Council by
universal suffrage.'' However, both of those articles contain
provisions that indicate that this change in procedure is to be
made ``in accordance with principles of gradual and orderly
progress,'' which has been in many ways underlying the
political dynamic in Hong Kong, in my estimation. Also, the
Basic Law stipulates that the first possible date for the
selection of either by universal suffrage was after the year
2007.
Now, in the roughly negative 30 seconds that I have left,
let me talk briefly about the attempts at political reforms
that have taken place in Hong Kong over the last few years. In
2005, Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen introduced a
proposal to Legco. It was voted down.
Its two main components were expanding the selection
committee beyond the current 800 members to 1,600, as well as
adding new seats to the legislative counsel with an equal split
between geographical and functional constituencies. This was
considered unacceptable by enough members of the Legislative
Council that it failed.
After that, there was discussion about possible further
reform in time for the 2008 elections, but in December 2007 the
Standing Committee of the Chinese Government issued a
declaration indicating that that was not to be allowed, that
the soonest date would be 2012, ending the debate and the
discussion in Hong Kong about possible election reforms for
2008.
One last thing. So where do we stand in 2010? In 2010,
after a long discussion, there were new proposals that were put
forward. In many ways they looked very similar to the proposals
in 2005, and according to some estimates were headed to the
same fate: failure.
However, there was a last-minute compromise between the
Democratic Party and the Chinese Government directly that made
it possible for those reforms to be approved, the two motions
which are very sparse. I'll talk about that more later if we
have an opportunity.
So we did get changes. We'll talk about that a bit more.
However, an outcome of that was an alliance among different
political parties that were supportive of democracy appears to
be split in different camps. One of the major political
parties, the Democratic Party, appears to be also split
internally with infighting. Two names, Szeto Wah and Martin
Lee, who are fairly well-known outside of Hong Kong and are
members of the Democratic Party, although still friendly to
each other, profoundly disagreed on this issue, and there's
some discussion that Martin Lee may actually leave the
Democratic Party because of their decision.
With that, I'm out of time. I appreciate this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Grob. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Martin.
Now, Robert Keatley.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT KEATLEY, FOUNDER AND EDITOR, THE HONG KONG
JOURNAL, FORMER EDITOR, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA, WALL
STREET JOURNAL EUROPE, AND SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST

Mr. Keatley. Thank you. I apologize for being late. Despite
what it says plainly on my invitation, I had 3:30 fixed in my
mind for no good reason.
I'd like to try to give a brief overview of Hong Kong
politics and why it matters to China, and why it should matter
to us.
As Michael has explained, Hong Kong has the ``one country,
two systems'' policy, which means that Hong Kong is recognized
as an integral part of China, but with generally separate
civil, political, legal, and economic standards. Hong Kong
people running Hong Kong with a degree of autonomy is the
golden rule, with Beijing cited for foreign affairs and
security.
The ultimate goal is that local elections eventually will
be by universal suffrage, but there is no official timeline
yet. The lack of one is a major issue inside Hong Kong and has
been for a couple of decades. Progress toward that goal has
been limited, but there has been some. Beijing has said
universal suffrage could be, but not necessarily will be,
applied to the 2017 election of a new chief executive and to
the 2020 election--10 years from now--of the legislature.
The reality of this high degree of autonomy doesn't always
match the theory, but in some ways this broad political outline
could be considered fairly generous, considering that it comes
from a Leninist state that has no tolerance for political
disagreement and dissent.
So why did Beijing do this? Given its enormous suspicions
of, and frustration with, the Democrats and others in Hong
Kong, why has it allowed this separate system to continue? Let
me suggest a few reasons. In the beginning, Beijing almost
certainly wanted to enhance its international reputation and
prestige.
By negotiating terms with London, organizing a lavish
handover ceremony, and absorbing Hong Kong with no more than a
token presence of the military--and the People's Liberation
Army [PLA] has been largely kept out of sight ever since--China
could call itself a nation willing and able to seek its
objectives by normal diplomatic means. In reality, of course,
it was an incredibly tough negotiator, with its officials
seeing non-existent British conspiracies everywhere. They
accused the British of trying to loot the Hong Kong treasury,
plant political agents, and otherwise deny China its just
desserts, just as in the 19th century.
The handover ceremony was also a great domestic political
event for China and for the Communist Party. It could, and did,
take credit for retaining lost territory, which its
predecessors could not do. The final ceremony, with a beaming
Jiang Zemin taking charge as Prince Charles and the last
British governor sailed away into a stormy night, was a
brilliant propaganda event for the ruling party, partly because
it was a bit humiliating for the British. Ever since, Beijing
has taken credit for living up to the terms of the agreement
and it is important that it be seen to be doing so, even if
many people would argue about just how they've done it in many
important details.
There are three other reasons that Beijing often cites,
too. The first, is economic. Hong Kong is no longer as crucial
to the Chinese economy as it was a few decades ago when I first
lived there. Deep into the 1970s, it was by far the main source
of foreign exchange for China, which then had nothing like the
$2.5 trillion in the bank that it has today.
But Hong Kong can still teach much about management,
logistics, finance, and so forth. For example, China is using
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to float initial public offerings
[IPOs] in the international market, IPOs of Chinese companies.
It is gradually letting the renminbi be used for international
trade and settlements through Hong Kong-based financial
institutions. That edges it slightly toward convertibility and
gives some practical experience, but there's a long way to go.
A Chinese Ambassador once told me that Hong Kong was safe
as long as it could keep ahead of the mainland economics and
set a positive example. Its exact role is changing over the
years, but it remains important and Hong Kong is being tied
ever closer to the mainland economy.
Second is Taiwan. The ``one country, two systems'' policy
was devised originally by Deng Xiaoping for Taiwan, not for
Hong Kong. But Taiwan, for the most part, isn't really very
interested and it doesn't want to join the mainland in any kind
of variation on the Hong Kong system.
But Beijing still hopes that success in Hong Kong will set
a positive example that will influence Taiwan to some degree
and speed reunification. What happens across the Strait
directly between Beijing and Taipei is much more important, of
course. But China hopes Hong Kong will have a positive
influence and, perhaps more importantly, it knows that if
things go seriously wrong in Hong Kong the negative impact on
Taiwan would be enormous.
Thus, over the past year there have been many direct links,
new ones, between the Taiwan and Hong Kong Governments. There
are several quasi-official agreements on trade, finance,
travel, and so forth. Their officials travel back and forth,
and I think Chief Executive Donald Tsang will probably call on
Taipei by the end of the year. This all supports the mainland
policy.
Finally, there is politics. For the record, mainland
spokesmen have said full democracy is good for Hong Kong.
Further, they say Hong Kong needs a free society if it's to
develop its economic potential to the limit. ``Democracy can
best free human beings, and humans are the most important
element of productivity.'' That's from Wang Jemin, vice dean of
the Tsinghua University Law School who, more importantly, is a
member of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee under the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress, and is known as a
chief theorist behind the mainland's policy toward Hong Kong.
He also says Hong Kong will influence events, political events,
inside China itself, but I wouldn't take that one too far.
My main point is that Beijing has several good reasons for
wanting to avoid any kind of social or political crisis in Hong
Kong, and will work hard to prevent one. The 500,000-people
demonstration of 2003 has already been mentioned and, as also
mentioned, last month there was a political concession that
allowed the latest election reform bill to pass the
legislature. Most important is that it followed, for the first
time, direct negotiations between mainland officials and Hong
Kong democrats, the people China usually denounces as
unpatriotic, working for foreigners, and so forth. How long and
how deep the split in the democratic camp is, and how long it
will last, I think, are open questions.
As for U.S. interests, we also have an economic motive.
Hong Kong's an important financial and commercial center and a
base for corporate operations in China and across east Asia.
There are about 1,400 American companies with offices in
Hong Kong, and 900 or so have regional responsibilities. More
than 60,000 American citizens live in Hong Kong. U.S. exports
to Hong Kong last year were $22 billion. Our investments there
are about $40 billion. It's a free port, low-tax city with a
reliable legal system based, like ours, on British common law.
Beyond that, the U.S. Government has direct cooperation
with the Hong Kong Government on issues like money laundering,
counterterrorism, and port security. So the large economic and
financial interests of all these will not go away.
Finally, as a nation, we believe that more democracy is
better than less democracy, so we have an interest, as
explained already, in encouraging the development of a free
political system in Hong Kong for its own sake. There's also
the hope that Hong Kong will set a positive example for China
regarding its own political system, free flow of information,
legal standards, fighting corruption, and so forth.
Needless to say, the current record on that, the current
trends inside China, is not particularly encouraging. But time
passes and things do change. The United States has an interest
in change, so there's every reason to maintain a serious
interest in Hong Kong's internal development, while avoiding
the kind of heavy-handed meddling that could backfire.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keatley appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Mr. Keatley.
And now, Mr. DeGolyer.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DeGOLYER, HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY,
PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND DIRECTOR,
THE HONG KONG TRANSITION PROJECT

Mr. DeGolyer. In assessing the significance of these
reforms just passed, I have three questions for you to
consider: How often does China implement policies promoting
democracy; how often do Chinese officials change policy after
officials, including the vice president in charge of the
portfolio, announce rejection of any changes; how often does
the Chinese Government change policy after negotiations with
those it deems hostile forces and subversive elements?
The answers are: seldom, almost never, and never, before
now. Never before has the central government negotiated with
the Democratic Party of Hong Kong. That party is led by Albert
Ho, a member of the group that organizes the annual
commemorations of the Tiananmen massacre, and which demands an
accounting of the same from the Communist Party of China.
He, and other party members like Emily Lau, have long been
banned from even traveling in mainland China, but now Beijing
officials have met with him as equals across the negotiating
table. We can conclude--on the basis something has happened
that is totally unprecedented--that with the recent
constitutional reforms in Hong Kong, something significant is
up in China.
The question is, what is up? How will it affect the Hong
Kong-China relationship and how significant is it to China and
to the rest of the world? First, in establishing the
significance and meaning of these reforms, the central
government has promised that direct elections for the chief
executive may take place in 2017. They may take place for all
legislative counsel seats in 2020.
The reforms just passed make the fulfillment of at least
the timeframe for these direct elections more likely. Of
course, the details of precisely how nominations for chief
executive will be done remain unclear. We also do not know how
all members of Legco will be directly elected.
But the fact is, China's richest city will take democratic
steps forward in 2012 and will likely continue onward. Second
in significance and meaning, these steps move beyond those
stipulated in the Basic Law. As Michael Martin was saying, the
Basic Law was the national implementation of an international
agreement, the Sino-British Declaration of 1984.
So this reform vote represents the first step beyond the
bounds agreed in an international process. It is a purely local
and national step forward in permitting greater democracy. It
was not driven by international pressures or configured
according to international binding agreements. It shows China
today is willing to take unprecedented political steps and is
willing to compromise with some social and political forces
outside Communist political control.
Third, the reforms for 2012 in Hong Kong also build on a
district representation framework which was adopted by mainland
cities starting in 2008; there was some precedent--elections--
in 2000 in Beijing. A number of the leading urban centers in
China began to organize and hold district elections in that
year, 2008, though in terms of contested open elections, these
have far to go.
These district elections and the powers given district
counselors bear some similarity to Hong Kong's district council
system, just as the Hong Kong village elections in the New
Territories begun in 1926 and reformed in the 1950s seem to
have influenced China's rural village elections, begun in 1982
and reformed in 1998.
The reforms of 2012 in Hong Kong, in turn, appear to have
been influenced by mainland concepts of mixing indirect and
direct election systems with controlled forms of nomination
followed by direct election processes.
We do not yet know how fully open the nomination processes
for the added Hong Kong district council seats to Legco will
be, and there will be 6 seats now out of a total of 70 seats in
Legco from district councils, so that's a significant
proportion.
But in any case, the reforms represent a significant
compromise at the highly constrained electorates of the
existing functional constituency system, and they perhaps
represent a way forward in
either dramatically widening the electorates for all these
seats or toward the replacement--of the current tiny
franchises--with other forms of election. The possibility of a
fully, directly elected legislature by 2020 cannot be simply
dismissed out of hand anymore.
Fourth, and most important for the significance of these
reforms, district seats are directly elected with open
nomination. Having a system of nomination by such directly
elected members is a more open nomination system for candidates
than presently exist in mainland China. Such a system of open
nomination and direct election, followed by nomination by such
electees for candidates to higher bodies, which are then voted
on by all voters, would be a serious move forward in political
reform of the Chinese system.
As an SAR, Hong Kong technically comes above the provinces
in the Chinese structure of government. These reforms may not
have direct implications for provincial congresses.
Nevertheless, odds are high that Hong Kong's election of a
chief executive involving direct vote of residents after some
more limited form of nomination
committee is a model that at least some factions of the central
government are willing to try at higher levels. This model
potentially removes the barrier to greater democracy on the
mainland posed by the present cadre's only nomination system.
The reforms for 2012 and the promise of direct elections in
2017 for chief executive, plus the district elections in urban
areas of China in 2008 altogether indicate that the long-
stifled demand for political reform is being given substance
and a timeframe for investment in at least one part of China.
It is hard to imagine this step being an isolated and one-off
move. It is more likely an indicator that resistance to
political reform has weakened.
Second, turning to the effects of the reform on the Hong
Kong-mainland relations, in terms of the effects, it's quite
clear that the lack of progress in changing Hong Kong's
increasingly inadequately representative and accountable
governance system was having a strong negative effect.
In November 2009, according to Hong Kong Transition
Project's survey, about two-thirds expressed satisfaction with
the PRC Government's general handling of Hong Kong affairs. By
May, satisfaction had dropped to 57 percent, but by mid-June,
two weeks before the vote on the reform, it had fallen to
barely a third satisfied, which is the lowest level that we had
recorded since 1997.
When asked directly, ``Are you currently satisfied or
dissatisfied with the performance of the Chinese Government in
handling Hong Kong's constitutional reform'' 49 percent
expressed dissatisfaction; only 43 percent were satisfied.
Among students, 3 out of 4 were dissatisfied on this issue.
This represented, I think, a significant danger.
In June, 74 percent of respondents agreed with the
statement: ``Beijing must amend the reform proposal to make it
more democratic,'' while just 11 percent disagreed. The focus
had clearly shifted from the local to Beijing by June 2010.
Only two amendments could create a majority supporting
reform. One of those amendments was abolishing corporate voting
in the functional constituencies, and the other was Beijing
issuing a promise to abolish the functional constituencies
altogether.
Beijing officials also were assigned the highest degree of
blame if the reform package failed. Nearly 3 in 10 assigned
Beijing officials a great deal of blame, and majorities blamed
Beijing officials and the Chief Executive for failure. No other
party came even close in terms of blame.
Beijing and the local government faced, just days before
the vote, a crisis of governance, with 15 percent of the
population, an even higher percentage of students, and 5
percent of all men strongly supporting actions and protests,
such as blockading government offices and hunger strikes. We
expect those tensions to have cooled since the reform was
agreed to, but we were also at the time indicating that if
reforms were not agreed we could expect an outbreak of violence
in Hong Kong for the first time in a very long time.
The success of these reforms in Hong Kong will surely
encourage reformers on the mainland. It should reinforce belief
among central government officials that one effective way to
handle restive urban populations is to begin a process of
political reforms.
Now, it may also stimulate conservatives to new levels of
resistance, but clearly this vote in Hong Kong was a win for
the reformers. It may also have some impact on the national
party elections in 2012. Reformers favoring political change
could gain after long conservative dominance. Conservatives
certainly lost in Hong Kong.
In terms of global significance, as with economic reforms,
China insists it will choose its own timing and forge its own
path of political reform. The economic collapses of the United
States and other Anglo-American and European-influenced
economic models in 2008-2009 have considerably raised
confidence among Chinese cadres in their own economic model.
They are also gaining confidence in their process of
incremental experimental reform characterized as ``crossing the
river by feeling the stones'' beneath one's feet. It's hard to
argue that the Chinese process of economic reform has been a
failure.
Certainly there's room for improvement in democratic models
and processes of democratization. The perceived sclerosis of
the European model, stagnation of the Japanese model,
incompetence of the Indian model, and the violence and
increasing polarization of American democracy since 1963, as
well as collapses of many post-colonial forms of democracy have
convinced the Chinese that not only can they forge their way
forward, they must.
Now, Hong Kong is in a unique opportunity for the Chinese
to build step-by-step on economic successes and on quasi-
Western, but indigenously influenced and developed political
reforms toward their own practice of democracy. I think
outsiders should approve and support Chinese leaders ``feeling
the stones'' toward political reform and their own form of
democracy rather than flinging stones at them because they are
going, in their opinion, either too slowly or in a direction
toward a model outsiders disapprove of or misunderstand.
For those who got the forecast of China's economic
development badly incorrect or who forecast the collapse or
breakup of China back in the 1990s, or who said economic
development would never, and could never, result in political
change, the best policy after these reforms were approved might
be to simply watch this space. Our current economic woes in the
West give us ample grounds--and I find myself remarkably
agreeing with George W. Bush here--to be a bit more humble in
our foreign advice giving.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeGolyer appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Mr. DeGolyer.
And finally, I'd like to give the floor to Ellen Bork.

STATEMENT OF ELLEN BORK, DIRECTOR, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE

Ms. Bork. Thanks very much. It's nice to be here. It's
great that the Commission is giving some attention to Hong Kong
and that the community of people who care about Hong Kong is
reconstituted here for a short time. I'm going to make a few
points, without reading through everything, so that we can move
into discussion.
It won't surprise you necessarily to know that I take a
more negative assessment of the reforms. I think they were so
minuscule as to have had a really negligible effect, if any, on
Hong Kong people's ability to govern themselves.
I'm not going to go through the fine points, which Michael
did so well, of the way the system works, but I'd just point
out that the way the Legco functions with ``split voting'' and
the disadvantage to pro-democracy legislation remains intact. I
think it's laughable that the expansion of the committee to
choose a chief executive from 800 to 1,200 is regarded as any
kind of real step forward in an electorate the size of Hong
Kong.
It was interesting throughout the process that Hong Kong
people grew less positive about the reform package, especially
after the televised debate between Chief Executive Donald Tsang
and Civic Party Legislator Audrey Eu. I think they grew to be
more concerned about the vagueness and the lack of commitment,
and that they were being asked to commit to something very
modest without any expectation of future movement.
I can see how someone might argue that any movement
forward, especially given Beijing's intransigence on this, is
positive. But I think the Hong Kong people's voice needs to be
better heard. I think it was heard in the Bye elections, which
unfortunately were portrayed as a failure for the democratic
camp, whereas, in fact, against very harsh odds, they attempted
to do something creative and to build a mandate, which in a
sense they got.
If there hadn't been a boycott by the Hong Kong Government,
I think they would have gotten even more of one. But 500,000
people came out voting for pro-democracy candidates.
Considering what the system is now, I think that really
shouldn't be discounted.
But aside from the fine points of the legislation, I'd like
to focus on two other negative effects that have come out of
this that are not, strictly speaking, about the package itself.
One, is this portrayal of the democratic camp as hardliners,
extremists, and radicals. It used to be that it was very clear
who was saying ``no,'' and that was Beijing and still is. It's
a reflection of the position that democrats have been put in,
that they are now being portrayed in this manner. That's
extremely unfortunate. Frankly, a lot of people who are doing
that should know better.
Another bad outcome is the erosion of the ``one country,
two systems'' principle, and the normalizing of Beijing's role,
direct role, in determining the course of events there.
Margaret Ng, the legislative councilor spoke very powerfully
about this on the floor of the Legco. She said that `` `One
country, two systems' is no longer a sustainable illusion''
after the meetings between Beijing representatives and members
of the Democratic Party that Michael DeGolyer described.
Again, this is a different interpretation of the import of
those meetings. I would take a different view. One can ask, is
it a good thing that those meetings between the Beijing side
and the Democrats happened in the way they did, or does it
reflect something else, or at least a change, a change in this
notion of ``one country, two systems'' and who ought to be
driving the process of Hong Kong's political development?
Actually Beijing historically never took ``one country, two
systems'' terribly seriously, and there's a lot of evidence to
that effect in the historical record. But the United States and
the United Kingdom did take this seriously and made this the
cornerstone of our policy. We've clung to that, for good reason
and for a very long time. If there's any one good thing that
comes out of this episode with it is that the curtain has
really been drawn further on Beijing's role and the failure of
``one country, two systems.''
We should now be looking at Hong Kong's democracy movement
in a different way not through the lens of the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law, which served Beijing's purpose
to limit democracy in Hong Kong. I think the analysis that
Michael Martin gave was excellent, but the existence of those
documents and the absence of a really clear democratic way
forward in those documents in no way should deprive the Hong
Kong people of their right to democracy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bork appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much, Ms. Bork.
I'd like to thank all of our panelists for outstanding
remarks and for staying within the requested time limit,
because that enables us now to open the floor to questions and
answers.
I would just like to preface this part of the program by
mentioning that we do have a transcriber present. We will be
producing a published transcript, both of the panelists'
presentations and the question and answer period. It will be
available on our Web site, as is the case for all our
roundtables and hearings.
I would ask, if you do have a question, that you raise your
hand, wait to be recognized, and please avail yourself of the
microphone here to your left in the front. If you wish to
identify yourself, please do so and your name will appear in
the transcript. If you wish not to identify yourself, feel free
not to identify yourself and your question will appear simply
with the notation ``audience participant'' in the official
transcript.
I'd like now to turn the floor over to Sharon Mann for the
first question.
Ms. Mann. The first question is, what, if anything, should
the U.S. Government or other governments be doing to encourage
further democratization in Hong Kong? There's a certain risk
that in any engagement in Hong Kong, or encouragement, is seen
as interfering in Hong Kong's affairs or in China's affairs.
With that in mind, there is some concern as to whether
encouragement could backfire. But any thoughts as to how we can
support movement in Hong Kong? That is for anybody on the
panel.
Mr. DeGolyer. I think one of the best ways is not
necessarily a one-on-one kind of talks, like between Sino-U.S.
discussions, but to try to encourage what you might say are
workshops on various types of democracy--presidential systems,
parliamentary type systems, the various experiences and
problems that countries have had in reforming and improving
their democratic systems.
So a kind of roundtable process in which you got other
countries involved, with different systems, in which the
Chinese are also invited to participate and to interact might
be a useful way forward because that way you don't have the
sense of wagging your finger and preaching at them, but
actually saying, this is the way we do it, and this is the way
they do it, and there are different approaches that you can
take, and here are some of the different ways that it has been
done historically. I think that would be useful.
Ms. Mann. Sort of soft diplomacy.
Mr. DeGolyer. A soft diplomacy approach, yes.
Ms. Bork. I would like to put in a plug for sort of more
traditional diplomacy. I think interference is largely in the
eye of the beholder, and that Hong Kong people wouldn't regard
clear statements from the United States about what real
democracy and democracy development entails as interference.
That integrity is something that the United States is
continuing to forfeit when it comes to Hong Kong, by not
recognizing the difference between real and phony democracy.
Mr. Keatley. Following up on Michael, I think a few years
ago Christian Chung, who was then with the National Democratic
Institute, ran workshops in Hong Kong for political parties,
organizations, structure, all that, for all parties, open to
everyone. I think she got denounced as being a CIA agent by
some of the pro-Beijing parties, but eventually some of them
came around and there was broader participation at the end than
there was at the beginning.
I think more of that would be good. Various kinds of
exchanges would be good. Public statements from the United
States would also be encouraging. It is not that the Hong Kong
people find the United States meddling. Of course, it's the
hyper-sensitive Beijing officials who get very upset, or
pretend to be, whenever something is said about democracy in
Hong Kong. But it doesn't mean we shouldn't, with caution,
continue to be encouraging in every way we can. Thank you.
Mr. Grob. Questions from the audience? [No response].
Well, I will take this opportunity to ask a question.
Professor DeGolyer, you mentioned conservative factions and
other domestic political factions on the mainland and their
attitudes toward political reform, generally speaking, and
toward political reform in Hong Kong specifically. Do you have
a sense of the alignment of positions on political reform in
Hong Kong with positions on other issues? In other words, if
you speak of conservative factions on the mainland, with what
other positions on other types of political issues do they tend
to be associated? That is, do those who hold a particular
position vis-a-vis political reform in Hong Kong tend also to
hold particular positions on other issues? Is there any
clustering of political positions across issues?
Mr. DeGolyer. I think the most interesting thing to point
out is that the Government of China is a factionalized
government.
Before 2003, Hong Kong had been given over to the conservative
element, the conservative faction. There was just a very minor
contingent of folks from what we might characterize as the
reformist faction, the more business-oriented modernization
group, pushing modernization.
The conservatives blew it because they were not expecting
at all the massive turnout that showed up on July 1, 2003, when
you have got over a half a million people marching in the
streets. The government at that time, the conservative folks,
were predicting 30,000 people would turn out. Christine Loh,
who is a former legislator, now head of Civic Exchange--a very
good think tank in Hong Kong--and I were discussing what we
thought the turnout would be.
We had agreed that it was going to be around, or perhaps
more, than 300,000. In that case I got very angry because I
missed it by a factor of two, whereas the guy who made the
30,000 turnout forecast, well, I think I would have shot myself
if I was supposed to be predicting things. What happened after
that, was that there was a huge influx of the various groups
and research arms and elements of the Chinese Government
sending in people, and many of them are still there. They are
not interfering in Hong Kong affairs.
I mean, this is one way people see this, that there is a
lot of these mainland officials going around asking questions,
and they see that as interference. Actually, I think if you
talk with these folks and pay attention to what they're asking,
is they're interfering with each other. They're sending reports
back to their various research groups, who in turn feed in to
these different interest groups and factional groupings in the
central government itself.
So they no longer trust each other on Hong Kong and what's
going on Hong Kong, or the best way to handle Hong Kong. In
fact, I think the reform vote we just saw showed clearly that
the conservatives had decided, well, we're not going to change
anything.
Then the story is, right up to the very top, that Hu Jintao
himself intervened to force this compromise to accept the
Democratic Party's proposal. If so, this would be entirely
unprecedented that he would come off the fence. Hu Jintao has
largely been on the fence in terms of the reform versus the
conservatives. But coming down now on the side of the reformist
is a very interesting development and something we definitely
must watch in terms of what goes on in China in 2012, who
becomes president, and how the factions line up in 2012.
So I'm not saying that we can tell anything for sure now,
but we know that something for sure is happening. Whether or
not the conservatives will be able to recover from this or
whether we actually do see something breaking out of the logjam
that has been holding up reform for a very long time, well,
that's the interesting thing to watch.
Ms. Bork. Doug, if I could just join in with Michael's
analysis and again ask whether the only interpretation of Hu
Jintao's intervention in favor of what is really a minuscule
change in the way Hong Kong is ruled means that this is a step
forward or instead a management tactic, perhaps in connection
with this issue of unrest or something else? Is this meaningful
as a change of heart on Beijing's side or is it something else?
Mr. DeGolyer. Very interesting questions. I think our
survey, our data--and if you want to get a copy of this
yourself, this is a report we put out on the 18th of June which
was entitled, ``To The Brink: Rising Danger of Disruption in
Hong Kong.'' This was based on a survey that we did in early
June and released just five days before the vote. It's at
HKTP.org. You can download it there from the report section.
It showed very clearly that there was a rising possibility,
particularly of students and unemployed young people, who--just
like in the United States--have a much higher level of
unemployment particularly than is normal, than we've seen in a
very long time. They were particularly angry at the government
and it looked as though we were heading for disruption, but the
indicators were, from some of the conservative folks, that they
believed that if there was trouble, they could crack down on it
and actually turn public opinion in their favor. So they were,
in a way, welcoming a confrontation. They were, in a sense,
provoking a confrontation.
So it seems the reformist folks did not want to have that
kind of confrontation, perhaps for fear of the damage that
would have, not just to their economic interests, but perhaps
also to some of their political interests on the mainland.
It seems as though people who have usually kept their head
down stuck their head up and pushed this compromise, which, as
I pointed out, is utterly unprecedented. It has never happened
before. Now, in terms of whether or not this is a significant
reform, the key thing is, the NPC--National People's Congress--
said you can't change the ratio between functional constituency
and geographic constituency, directly elected and tiny
franchise elected, from 50 percent to 50 percent. You can't
change it.
That was the grounds on which they refused to accept the
Democrats' proposal, because the Democrats had proposed that
what is now the five new seats, that while they want pretty
open nominations, anybody who's got a substantial connection
with the district councils can be nominated to run, and then
everybody who does not currently have a functional constituency
vote now gets to vote for these five candidates, or one of
these five candidates, which means that technically the
directly elected element is going to get closer to 40 versus
30, rather than 35 versus 35.
While that looks incremental, that also means that in
future, in 2016 and 2017 when they go to the next level of
reforms, the odds are much higher that, with the requirement
for 60 percent, you have to have a 60-percent vote in favor of
reform to pass Legco, and that's what failed in 2005. They just
got it for the first time just a few weeks ago. But with more
directly elected people, the odds are better that the next
level of reforms will pass. It tilts. It kind of puts the
finger on the scale.
Now, whether you consider that minor or not, it depends on
how many times, I guess, you weigh the finger on the scale.
Every time they vote now there's going to be a finger on the
scale. For the next four years, there are fingers on the scale.
So that finger tilts things--toward greater democracy. It
doesn't determine--it does not mean that they have achieved
democracy, but it tilts it that direction. It tilts it off of
dead center, and that's where the significance comes in, also
in how they did it, I think.
Mr. Martin. If I may add a couple of comments. One, I would
suggest some caution, or at least clarification when you start
using such terms as ``conservative'' and ``reformist,'' both in
the mainland Chinese political context and also in the Hong
Kong context. Now, let me explain. There may be an, I think,
inaccurate assumption that some may be making, or inference
that people will be making. That is, in the mainland, there's a
reformist pro-democracy group and a conservative anti-democracy
group.
I don't see Chinese mainland politics that way. I think it
was reflected in the quote that we got earlier about how they
view democracy in general. There is very little notion that I
see--it's beginning in some places--at least in the Party in
China, regardless of their ideological faction that they're a
part of, of democracy as a value independent of other factors.
Now, the quote points out that democracy is part of a
process of greater economic development. It is a tool or an
instrument to get a larger, other, important goal. It isn't a
goal in and of itself, for the most part, in mainland China.
That's a view we may have in the West, but isn't particularly
common in China.
To a certain extent--and this may be a little contentious--
it may not be extant in Hong Kong either. Part of this, I
think--and I was talking about this the other day in another
context--we tend, in the West, to separate human rights or
political rights from economic rights and treat them as
categorically separate. I think in China they lump them
together. You can't talk about human rights without talking
about economic rights. So, they see them as encompassing both.
The other aspect underlying all of this is the notion for a
desire, and the big word in mainland China these days, for
harmony. So if you implement any type of political reform or
human rights reform and create some sort of social disharmony
or economic disharmony, regardless of ideological faction in
China, I think you will find opposition to the notion. So it's
not a compartmentalized thing that we can talk about democracy,
good or bad. It has to be in a larger context. To a certain
extent, I think that may be true in the Hong Kong population,
at least in their political development at this time. That's
the first thing.
The second thing, going inside the Hong Kong politics, bear
in mind that, for example, what's called the Democratic Party
in Hong Kong, if you were to transport them into the United
States would probably be primarily Republicans, just in general
terms. The strongest supporters of the Beijing government in
Hong Kong tend to be business leaders, and they're the most
conservative segments of Hong Kong society, from our political
framework.
The opposition, the pan-democratic groups, tend to be more
to the left, including my favorite party just simply because of
their name, the League of Social Democrats, or LSD. It's not
accidental that they're called LSD. I've spoken to some of the
founders of the party and they have their own political notion
of how they want to do politics, which is a little bit
different. They're fun to talk to.
But basically if you put it this way, the avowedly
socialist People's Republic of China has their strongest
supporters in Hong Kong among the most pro-capitalist business
leaders. So using conservative/liberal notions or conservative/
reform notions can give you a kind of skewed image of what's
going on in Hong Kong.
Now, if I can take one more second, I think one of the
things that I would like to point out was that when this
compromise, this last-minute deal was bartered, that the Chief
Executive seemed to be effectively a non-player in the process.
This is disconcerting to some in many ways.
In the past when there have been other similar crises about
policy in Hong Kong, if you'll remember about the residency
issue, the right to abode issue, there again, you had the Chief
Executive effectively not being able to implement policy, not
being able to move things forward and being sort of side-
stepped in the process.
So in that respect I would echo a little bit of the concern
that Ellen is reflecting, which is, to what extent are you
seeing a little bit of crumbling of the edges of the ``one
country, two systems,'' in that the resolution requires the
direct intervention of Beijing?
Ms. Mann. John Kamm?
Mr. Kamm. Yes. My name is John Kamm and I'm interested in
hearing the views of the panel on whether or not Article 23
legislation might in fact be introduced in Hong Kong, and if
so, when and what form it would take? It's my understanding
that Macao has, in fact, passed Article 23-type legislation.
There has been some impact on freedom of movement, including
by, I think, Hong Kong legislators and journalists into Macao.
I don't recall seeing much coverage of the Macao Article 23
legislation, and I'm just wondering, what is the status of
Article 23 legislation in Hong Kong? Is anyone proposing that
this legislation be reintroduced? I throw that open to the
panel.
Mr. Martin. Since I have it right here [holds up
document]--see? It's always good to carry the Basic Law with
you. Article 23 is one of the articles of the Basic Law. It
reads, and I will paraphrase, the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit
any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the
central people's government, basically the Chinese Government,
or theft of state secrets, and it goes on for other things. It
was basically a requirement that they have a law of this sort.
It was proposed. Chief Executive Donald Tsang proposed such
legislation and was in fact the precursor to this massive rally
that occurred in Hong Kong, and also, just for the record----
Mr. Kamm. Wasn't that C.H. Tong?
Mr. Martin. C.H. Tong. I'm sorry. C.H. Tong introduced
Article 23 legislation. It created massive protests, and it
also ended up creating this group that eventually became one of
the political parties in Hong Kong, the Civic Party.
Mr. Kamm. My question is, is there any consideration being
given to re-introducing Article 23?
Mr. DeGolyer. No. Peter Wong, who's an NPC delegate,
brought this up and was roundly slapped down. No change at all
while Donald Tsang is Chief Executive. After that, maybe, but
more than likely it's going to be in incremental pieces.
According to HKU scholars at the HKU Law School, there are
several sections of the current law, some of the elements that
were in Tung Chi Hwa's bill, would actually clarify and be
improvements of human rights because they would really specify
terms that now, under the common law and under the language of
the present existing law, are unclear. There are other
elements, of course, which were pernicious in their effect,
which is one reason why we had such a massive turnout.
But in Hong Kong politics, if there is a third rail--just
like in U.S. politics it's Social Security, touch Social
Security and die--in Hong Kong politics it's, touch personal
and media freedoms and die. Seriously. Every time we see even
an incident occur, like for example just a few weeks ago
students were carrying statues of the goddess of democracy and
the police stopped them and declared it was an illegal assembly
and confiscated their statues.
We saw immediately a tripling of ``great concern'' for
freedoms in Hong Kong. I mean, just almost instant response. We
see that every time. All it takes is an arrest, a story, an
incident, and people are extremely sensitive to that and they
respond instantly. The government is acutely aware of this, so
I think they're going to tread extremely cautiously in going
forward on Article 23.
Mr. Keatley. I could agree entirely. Every time I go to
Hong Kong I ask that question of political leaders, including
Regina Ip, who is associated with the last go-round, and the
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong
Kong [DAB] and others. I get the feeling that, no, this is not
coming forward. It was--at least the DAB feels--one of the
items on the agenda that Beijing wanted Donald Tsang to deal
with and get out of the way before he leaves office, but I have
a feeling he won't and it will pass on to the next group.
Mr. Grob. Other questions from the audience?
Ms. Campbell. Hi. I'm Kaitlin Campbell. I'm with the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission. Sort of
branching off from what you're talking about, tactical
management, Ms. Bork, when we were talking about the future
chief executive election and the Legco election in, I think,
2017, 2016, 2020, to what extent [inaudible] Beijing promises
that it may allow universal partial suffrage. To what extent
can we really--what are we really expecting out of that? Is
this just management of perception for now? We'll say we're
going to give it to you in a couple of years, but what can we
really expect out of that? Open to everyone.
Ms. Bork. You mean, what can we expect from Beijing about
that?
Ms. Campbell. To what extent can we trust that more
progress will be made in future elections?
Ms. Bork. I don't know what can be relied upon at this
point, given the vagueness of the way forward. I think that was
one of the things that caused such concern to many of the
Democrats in Hong Kong and the people of Hong Kong, that that's
not clear and that definitions remain wide open about what full
democracy is.
I have to say, I like, in some way, the idea that Michael
put forward of continuing to discuss forms of democracy and so
forth, but on the other hand it seems to me that Beijing and
Hong Kong's people, the Government of China and Hong Kong's
people, are expert at this point and don't really need to
consider all the options.
They need to be given the ability to sit down and have a
convention or some other process where they determine their
form of government freely. So at this point I don't think
anything that Beijing has done up to this point, including the
most recent developments, suggest that we should have any
confidence in something much closer to full democracy coming
about at the next opportunity.
Ms. Mann. I'd like to turn it over to Michael Martin, and
then Michael DeGolyer.
Mr. Martin. Well, let me clarify a little bit about the
procedures here, and to a certain extent explain a little bit
of what happened most recently. There was, in the decision that
came from Beijing, an enumeration of a process by which further
political reforms can move forward.
Basically, the current Chief Executive's term is limited,
so it will be the next Chief Executive who will have the task
of going to Beijing and saying circumstances in Hong Kong have
changed significantly so that we can consider further political
reform. At that point, according to the procedures, it'll be a
domestic issue. There will be a consultation process, a
development of proposals, and at that point it would be a good
opportunity to intervene in the discussion of why we'd be
moving forward.
It will be the next Legco and the next Chief Executive who
eventually will have to vote on whatever motions are
introduced. If that gets passed, then you have the possibility
of further development. It was the statement of the current
Chief Executive that he did not have the full mandate or
authority to look down the road on what the next incremental
step was, so he intentionally stayed with, ``This is what I can
do this time. I can't tell you how we're eventually going to
get there. That's the next Chief Executive and the next
Legco.''
That is why, as Professor DeGolyer, Michael, pointed out,
the membership in the next elected Legco can be quite pivotal
in how far the reform process may be able to move forward. Now,
the question of whether they'll get to the timeline of 2017 and
2020 is a whole other matter altogether.
But if I understand your question correctly, Beijing's
official ability to intervene is if the Chief Executive goes up
and they say circumstances have changed in Hong Kong, we can
move forward, and Beijing says, no, they haven't, and they
could cut off the process that way. But if indeed they would
abide by that request from the Chief Executive, then the
procedure moves forward.
Mr. Keatley. I hope this responds, in part. I'll just say
that I knew many people in Hong Kong, democratic politicians
and others--when you talk about 2017--who do expect the Chief
Executive to be elected by popular vote in that year, and there
will be two or more candidates running.
The question, of course, is who gets to run. That would
have to be nominated by this appointed nominating committee,
which is pretty reliably pro-Beijing, and whether or not any
outsiders, a more democratic-inclined person, could get the
minimum number of nominations within that committee to get on
the ballot is an open question.
But you're more likely to have two or three people that
Beijing deems suitable running for the office, and the one with
the most votes will get the job. But this goes back a little
bit to, a lot can depend on the nature of the person in that
office. I would think Donald Tsang has not exercised what
powers or abilities he might have to the maximum during his
time in office, any more than his predecessor did.
It would be possible for someone to show a little more
initiative, a little more populism, whatever, and make
important changes in public policy, what gets done, and not
just wait for orders or be timid about taking initiatives. If
you ask a bureaucracy for a decision you'll get one, and if you
avoid asking in the first place you could probably do a lot
more. I think that's the Hong Kong situation.
Ms. Bork. So you're referring to Beijing as the
bureaucracy?
Mr. DeGolyer. We asked that question of Hong Kong people
and there's quite a fair portion who are skeptical about the
timetable as being a firm promise. Only about 10 percent or so
believe that it's a firm promise with a fixed timetable. About
15 percent or so just think it's totally empty rhetoric, has no
meaning at all. A lot of people under age 30 feel that way, an
even higher proportion of them, which was one of the things we
pointed out to the government was a very dangerous thing and
one reason why they needed to make compromises to ensure that
we get reform this time.
In terms of whether or not it's going to happen, well,
there was a lot of questioning going on about this prior to the
vote on reform. The Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland
Affairs and the Chief Executive both said that even if Legco
voted this down, the 2017 date was a fixed date and there would
be direct elections for Chief Executive. Since they're not
going to be around at that time, most people totally discounted
that.
On the other hand, the central government indicated that if
the legislature passed reform this time, that they could deal
going forward. The Democratic Party has indicated that they
expect, and the mainland government has confirmed, ongoing
discussions even though the Democratic Party has said it's not
going to join the government, it's not going to join the
executive council, et cetera. But they have agreed to continue
talking.
So again, when you look at the balance, we're running a
survey right now in which we're re-asking that question. I
expect to see some movement toward a firming of people
beginning to gain a little bit more confidence that perhaps we
will get some sort of movement by 2016, 2017.
As Robert pointed out, we now have the balance tilted in
the favor of direct elections. Again, it does matter who gets
elected Chief Executive next. The way things are shaping up,
there's some very interesting candidates who are coming
forward. Depending on who gets in, since they can technically
be reelected for a five-year term, if it's a person who is more
open to elections then the odds go up; if it's a person who's
not, the odds probably go down. So I think there's a lot to
watch going forward between now and 2012, and then following
2012 to the next round of reforms, some very interesting stuff
going on in Hong Kong.
Ms. Bork. If I could, I'd like to throw out there that you
give Hong Kong civil servants, as estimable as they are, a
great deal too much confidence. For everybody who's operating
under, effectively, a Communist system, and that for all of the
attempts to provide a structure through which Hong Kong would
enjoy this autonomy, Beijing's hand is very clear, not only in
setting it up, but in their willingness at crucial moments to
interfere. And I can certainly understand your interpretation
of this last engagement. I don't agree with it, but I certainly
can understand that.
But purely the fact of that intervention or engagement
begins to show how little control the system that Hong Kong
people put their faith in really determines their future. I
just can't believe that a Hong Kong chief executive is going to
be able to function as a politician in a free system could, to
drive through, to build support for, to make arrangements and
deals that would lead to something that Beijing doesn't want.
I think that by focusing so much on the system that's been
put in place, we, ourselves, and the democratic community and
the world, run the risk of not recognizing that this is now
effectively an issue to raise with Beijing and to make it a
priority in our China policy.
Mr. DeGolyer. I think we should be cautious about
underestimating what Donald Tsang did. The inside story is
that, after he was firmly turned down by the Vice President,
Tsang went outside the accustomed norms, the technical bounds
of who he was supposed to talk to, and he went directly to Hu
Jintao with this issue and got him to intervene.
Now, if that's the case, effectively what he did was he
pulled rank on the Vice President of China. That's one reason
why I commented that we might see conservatives react to this,
because this was an extremely powerful challenge to the
bureaucratic structure, the administrative structure of the
Chinese system. He really stuck his neck out, so I don't think
we should discount that. If the Chief Executive of Hong Kong--
you say if he has to go to the President that's bad.
Ms. Bork. Right.
Mr. DeGolyer. I'm saying that he went around the Vice
President. He went directly to the President and he got a
direct intervention. Maybe that indicates that he's more
influential than we might think. I think one of the good things
is, the veil is off. Beijing now realizes it can't hide behind
a chief executive. That's what they did with Tung Chi Hwa. They
hid behind him.
Ms. Bork. Yes, I agree.
Mr. DeGolyer. And really, everybody talked about, the first
thing he did was, instead of turning over and saying good
morning to his wife, he would turn, pick up the phone and call
Beijing to find out what he was supposed to do. That was the
joke on Tung Chi Hwa, the first Chief Executive. This kind of
changes that. Also, I think a lot of people have begun to focus
on Beijing and they realize they can't hide behind the local
government anymore.
Now, you could have a negative view like Margaret Ng takes
of this, and I highly respect Margaret. On the other hand, you
could say that basically this really puts the cards on the
table. This is also why I think that this gives us some
indicator that something else is going on on the larger table
of China as a whole, because Hong Kong is no longer isolated.
Hong Kong is no longer the exception to every rule. Hong Kong
is no longer the odd man out of the Chinese system. Hong Kong
is in the system and it's having an effect on the system. Just
as the system is affecting it, it is affecting the system. This
is exactly what happened in terms of economic reform. We're now
seeing this in political reform. Everybody thought that Hong
Kong would become like China. Instead, China has become much
more like Hong Kong in terms of economics. I think the same
thing is going on politically.
Ms. Bork. It's a two-way street.
Mr. DeGolyer. It's a two-way street.
Mr. Grob. Thank you very much.
As much as I'm sure we'd all like to continue this very
vigorous discussion, I'd like to refer you to our Web site,
which will include the full transcript of this proceeding. With
that, thank you all very much for coming. Thank you for your
interest in this issue and your interest in the work of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
With that, we will adjourn.
[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the roundtable was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

=======================================================================

Prepared Statements

----------

Prepared Statement of Robert Keatley

july 14, 2010
I thought I would try to give an overview of the Hong Kong
political situation, why it matters to China and why it should matter
to us here in the United States.
As you know, Hong Kong is governed by a ``one country, two
systems'' policy. Broadly speaking, this means Hong Kong is recognized
as an integral part of China but with generally separate civil,
political, legal and economic standards. ``Hong Kong people running
Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy'' is the golden rule--with
Beijing responsible for foreign affairs and security issues.
The stated ``ultimate'' goal is that local elections eventually
will be by universal suffrage, though no official timeline has been
set--and that lack of a definite schedule remains a basic issue inside
Hong Kong to this day. Progress toward that goal has been limited. But
there has been some, and Beijing has said universal suffrage could be
(not necessarily will be) applied to the 2017 election of a new chief
executive and to the 2020 election of all legislators.
The reality of this ``high degree of autonomy'' does not always
match the theory. But the broad political outline could be considered
rather generous, considering that it comes from a Leninist state with
no tolerance for political disagreement or dissent--even if
implementation has been much slower and much more grudging than hoped
for 10 or 20 years ago.
Why did Beijing do this, and--given its enormous suspicions of and
frustrations with pro-democrats in Hong Kong--why has Beijing allowed
this separate political system to continue? Let me suggest a few
reasons.
In the beginning, Beijing almost certainly wanted to enhance its
international reputation and prestige. By negotiating terms with
London, organizing a lavish handover ceremony and absorbing Hong Kong
with no more than a token presence of the military (and the PLA has
essentially been kept out of sight ever since), China could portray
itself as a nation willing and able to seek its objectives by normal
diplomatic means. In reality, China was of course an incredibly
difficult negotiator, with its officials seeing nonexistent British
conspiracies everywhere. They
accused the British of trying to loot the Hong Kong treasury, plant
political agents and otherwise deny China its just rewards--as in the
19th century.
The handover ceremony was also a great domestic political event for
the Communist Party. It could and did take credit for regaining lost
territory, something its predecessors could not do. The final ceremony,
with a beaming President Jiang Zemin taking charge as Prince Charles
and the last British governor sailed away into a stormy night, was a
brilliant propaganda event for the ruling party--partly because it was
a bit humiliating for the British.
And ever since, Beijing has taken credit for living up to terms of
that agreement, and it is important for Beijing's international
reputation to be seen as doing so--even if many people would argue
about important aspects of how it has done so.
Beyond that, there are three other reasons often cited by those who
speak for China.
The first is economic. Hong Kong is no longer as crucial to the
Chinese economy as it was a few decades ago; well into the 1970s it was
by far the main source of foreign exchange for China, which then had
nothing like its current $2.5 trillion of reserves in the bank. But
Hong Kong still has much to teach about management, logistics, finance,
law and so forth. For example, China is using the Hong Kong stock
exchange to float mainland IPOs on the international market, and it is
gradually letting the renminbi be used in international trade and
settlements through Hong Kong-based financial institutions. That edges
the renminbi toward convertibility and gives some practical experience,
though there is a long way to go. A Chinese ambassador once told me
that Hong Kong is safe as long as it keeps ahead of the mainland
economically and sets a positive example. Its exact role is changing
but Hong Kong remains important and it is being tied ever closer to the
mainland economy.
Second, there is Taiwan. The one country, two systems policy was
devised originally by Deng Xiaoping for Taiwan, not Hong Kong. And
Taiwan, for the most part, has not been particularly impressed by the
offer, and doesn't want to join the mainland in some variation of the
Hong Kong system. But Beijing still hopes that success in Hong Kong
will set a positive example that will influence Taiwan to some degree
and speed reunification. What happens across the strait directly
between Beijing and Taipei will always be more important. But China
hopes Hong Kong will have a positive influence, and knows that if
things go seriously wrong in Hong Kong the negative impact would be
enormous.
Thus during the past year direct links between the Taiwan and Hong
Kong governments have increased dramatically. There are now several
quasi-official agreements on trade, finance, travel, and so forth.
Senior officials from both sides have made visits for the first time,
and Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang will probably call on Taipei
by the end of the year. From the mainland side, all this supports the
broader effort to improve relations across the strait.
Finally, there is politics. For the record, mainland spokesman have
said ``full democracy is good for Hong Kong.'' Further, they say Hong
Kong needs a free society if it is to develop further its economic
potential. ``Democracy can best free human beings, and humans are the
most important element of productivity,'' according to Wang Zenmin,
vice dean of the Tsinghua University Law School, and a member of the
Hong Kong Basic Law Committee under the Standing Committee of the NPC--
and who, I understand, is in line for a promotion within the Communist
Party. Professor Wang also says the development of a democratic system
in Hong Kong can help the mainland improve its own political system--
even if the two develop at quite different speeds and in different
ways--though it remains to be seen if the Communist Party will ever
adopt any of Hong Kong's freer political ways.
You can take all this with however many grains of salt you choose.
But my main point is that Beijing has several good reasons for wanting
to avoid any kind of social or political crisis in Hong Kong, and will
work hard to prevent one. For example, when 500,000 people demonstrated
against legislation that threatened to undermine civic freedoms back in
2003, it had the Hong Kong government withdraw the bill and in effect
fired an unpopular chief executive. And last month, it offered the Hong
Kong democratic camp a political concession to ensure that an election
reform bill would pass in the legislature. More important may be the
fact that the concession resulted from the first-ever direct
negotiations between mainland officials and Hong Kong democrats, people
China often has denounced as un-patriotic, working for foreigners and
so forth.
This suggests that Beijing, for the sake of political peace in Hong
Kong (and to avoid more radical politics there) will bend from time to
time. There are limits, but China has several good reasons for wanting
to avoid trouble.
As for the US interest in all this:
First, like China, we also have an economic motive. Hong Kong is an
important financial and commercial center, and a base for corporate
operations in China and East Asia.
For example, about 1,400 American companies have offices in Hong
Kong, of which more than 900 have regional responsibilities. More than
60,000 American citizens live there. US exports to Hong Kong last year
exceeded $22 billion, and US investments in Hong Kong equal about $40
billion. It is a free port, low tax city with a reliable legal system
based, like ours, on British common law. Beyond that, the United States
government has direct cooperation with the Hong Kong government on a
variety of issues, such as money-laundering, counterterrorism and port
security. In brief, the United States has large economic and financial
interests in Hong Kong and this won't change.
Second, as a nation we believe that more democracy is better than
less democracy. So we have an interest in encouraging the development
of a free political system in Hong Kong for its own sake. There is also
the hope that Hong Kong will set a positive example for China regarding
its own political system, the free flow of information, legal
standards, fighting corruption and other matters. Needless to say, the
current Chinese record on that isn't particularly encouraging. But time
passes and things do change, and the United States has an interest in
seeing change. So there is every reason to maintain a serious interest
in Hong Kong's internal developments while avoiding the kind of heavy-
handed interference that could backfire.
______

Prepared Statement of Michael E. DeGolyer

july 14, 2010
1. the significance of these reforms
Three questions can help us assess the importance of these Hong
Kong constitutional reforms:
How often does China implement policies promoting democracy?
How often do Chinese officials change policy after officials
including the vice president in charge of the portfolio announce
rejection of any changes?
How often does the Chinese government change policy after
negotiations with those it deems ``hostile forces'' and ``subversive
elements? ''
The answers are:
Seldom
Almost never
Never, before now
Never before has the central government negotiated with the
Democratic Party of Hong Kong. That party is led by Albert Ho, a member
of the group that organizes the annual commemorations of the Tiananmen
Massacre and which demands an accounting of the same from the Communist
Party of China. He and other party members like Emily Lau have long
been banned from even traveling in mainland China. But now, Beijing
officials have met with them as equals across the negotiating table.
We can conclude, on the basis something has happened that is
totally unprecedented, that with the recent constitutional reforms in
Hong Kong something significant is up in China. The question is what is
up, how will it affect the Hong Kong-China relationship, and how
significant is it to China and to the rest of the world?
First in establishing the significance and meaning of these
reforms, the Central government has promised that direct elections for
the Chief Executive may take place in 2017. They may take place for all
Legislative Council seats in 2020. The reforms just passed make the
fulfillment of at least the timeframe for these direct elections more
likely. Of course, the details of precisely how nominations for Chief
Executive will be done remain unclear. We also do not know how all
members of Legco will be directly elected, but the fact is that China's
richest city will take democratic steps forward in 2012 and will likely
continue onward.
Second in significance and meaning, these steps move beyond those
stipulated in the Basic Law. The Basic Law was the national
implementation of an international agreement, the Sino-British
Declaration of 1984. So this reform vote represents the first step
beyond the bounds agreed in an international process. It is a purely
local and national step forward in permitting greater democracy. It was
not driven by international pressures or configured according to
international binding agreements. It shows China today is willing to
take unprecedented political steps and willing to compromise with some
social and political forces outside communist political control.
Third, the reforms for 2012 in Hong Kong also build on a district
representation framework which was adopted by Mainland cities starting
in 2008. A number of the leading urban centers in China began to
organize and hold district elections in that year, though in terms of
contested, open elections these have far to go. These district
elections and the powers given district councilors bear some similarity
to Hong Kong's District Council system, just as Hong Kong's village
elections in the New Territories, begun in 1926 and reformed in the
1950s, seem to have influenced China's rural village elections, begun
in 1982 and reformed in 1998. The reforms of 2012 in Hong Kong in turn
appear to have been influenced by Mainland concepts of mixing indirect
and direct election systems, with controlled forms of nomination
followed by direct election contests. We do not yet know how fully open
the nomination processes for the added Hong Kong District Council seats
to Legco will be, but in any case, the reforms represent a significant
compromise of the highly constrained electorates of the existing
Functional Constituency system and perhaps represent a way forward in
either dramatically widening the electorates for all these seats or
toward their replacement with other forms of election. The possibility
of a fully directly elected legislature by 2020 cannot be simply
dismissed out of hand anymore.
Fourth and most important for the significance of these reforms,
district seats are directly elected with open nomination. Having a
system of nomination by such
directly elected members is a more open nomination system for
candidates than presently exists in mainland China. Such a system of
open nomination and direct election, followed by nomination by such
electees for candidates to higher bodies, which are then voted on by
all voters, would be a serious move forward in political reform of the
Chinese system. As a Special Administrative Region Hong Kong
technically comes above the provinces in the Chinese structure of
government; these reforms may not have direct implications for
provincial congresses. Nevertheless, odds are high Hong Kong's election
of a Chief Executive involving direct vote of residents after some more
limited form of nomination committee is a model that at least some
factions of the Central Government are willing to try at higher levels.
This model potentially removes the barrier to greater democracy on the
mainland posed by the present cadres-only nomination system. The
reforms for 2012 and the promise of direct elections in 2017 for Chief
Executive plus the district elections in urban areas of China in 2008
indicate that the long stifled demand for political reform is being
given substance and a timeframe for advancement in at least one part of
China. It is hard to imagine this step being an isolated and one-off
move. It is more likely an indicator that resistance to political
reform has weakened.
2. effects of the reform on hong kong-mainland relations
In terms of the effect of the reform compromise on Hong Kong
attitudes toward the Central Government, it is quite clear that the
lack of progress in changing Hong Kong's increasingly inadequately
representative and accountable governance system was having a strong
negative effect. In November 2009, according to Hong Kong Transition
Project surveys, about two-thirds expressed satisfaction with the PRC
government's general handling of Hong Kong affairs. By May 2010
satisfaction had dropped to 57 percent. By mid June two weeks before
the vote on reform, it had fallen to barely a third satisfied. (See the
report titled ``To the Brink: rising danger of disruption in Hong Kong?
'' released 18 June and available at http://www.hktp.org.) Forty-nine
percent expressed dissatisfaction when asked directly: Are you
currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Chinese
government in handling Hong Kong's constitutional reform? '' Only 43
percent were satisfied. Among students, three in four were dissatisfied
on this issue with barely one in ten satisfied. This represented a
significant danger because students had become increasingly restive
since January 2010. This was also an extremely dramatic shift in
attitude toward the central government from the Olympic summer of 2008
by all, especially students.
In June, 74 percent of respondents agreed with the statement:
``Beijing must amend the reform proposal to make it more democratic''
while just 11 percent disagreed. The focus had clearly shifted from the
local government to Beijing by June. Only two amendments to the reform
package would create clear majority support for a reform package that
every survey but the government's indicated fell short of majority
support. These two amendments involved abolishing corporate voting in
the FCs (something Beijing had indicated it opposed) and Beijing's
promise to abolish the FCs altogether.
Beijing officials also were assigned the highest degree of blame if
the reform package failed. Nearly three in ten assigned Beijing
officials a ``great deal'' of blame. Majorities blamed Beijing
officials and the Beijing approved Chief Executive for the failure. No
other party or group came close to a majority assigning it blame for
failure, ranging from some blame to a great deal of blame--not even the
League of Social Democrats or the Civic Party, the two groups leading
the most vociferous opposition to the proposed reforms. Beijing and the
local government faced a crisis of governance, with 15 percent of the
population and even higher percentages of students and those under age
30 supporting strong actions in protest, such as blockading government
offices and hunger strikes. Subsequent cooling of tensions and
pressures on the local and national governments should reinforce belief
among central government officials that one effective way to handle
restive urban populations is to begin a process of political reforms.
The success of reforms in Hong Kong will surely encourage reformers on
the mainland. It may also stimulate conservatives to new levels of
resistance, but clearly this vote in Hong Kong was a win for the
reformers. It may also have some impact on the national party elections
in 2012. Reformers favoring political change could gain after long
conservative dominance. Conservatives certainly lost in Hong Kong.
3. global significance of the reforms
In terms of global significance, as with economic reforms, China
insists it will choose its own timing and forge its own path of
political reform. The economic collapses of the US and other Anglo-
American and European influenced economic model-states in 2008-09 have
considerably raised confidence among Chinese cadres in their own
economic model. They have also gained confidence in their process of
incremental, experimental reform characterized as ``crossing the river
by feeling the stones'' beneath one's feet. It is hard to argue that
the Chinese process of economic reform has been a failure. It is also
hard to argue that Russia's attempt to put political reform prior to
economic reform is better than China's practice of reforming economics
first, though we have yet to see the complete results of China's
approach in terms of political development. Certainly there is room for
improvement in democratic models and processes of democratization. The
perceived sclerosis of the European models, stagnation of the Japanese
model, incompetence of the Indian model, and the violence and
increasing polarization of American democracy since 1963 as well as
collapses of many post-colonial forms of democracy have convinced the
Chinese that not only can they forge their own way forward--they must.
Hong Kong is a unique opportunity for the Chinese to build step by
step on economic success and on quasi-western, but indigenously
influenced and developed political forms toward their own practice of
democracy. Outsiders should approve and support Chinese leaders
``feeling the stones'' toward political reform and their own form of
democracy rather than flinging stones at them because they are going,
in their opinion, either too slowly or in a direction toward a model
outsiders disapprove of or misunderstand.
For those who got forecasts of China's economic development badly
incorrect, or who forecast the collapse or breakup of China back in the
1990s, or who said economic development would never and could never
result in political change, the best policy might be to simply watch
this space. Our current economic woes in the West give us ample grounds
to be a bit more humble in our foreign advice-giving. While we can and
should share our experiences with democratic forms of governance with
Chinese officials and public, we must admit that no democracy has
perfectly and permanently solved all its problems of representation and
accountability, nor have we solved the issues of regulation or control
of corruption and influence by the powerful. Liberal democracy--rule
of, by and for the majority of the people with effective safeguards for
the rights of minorities--appears to be a permanent goal, not a
permanent accomplishment. China and Hong Kong should of course be
encouraged to reform and improve their systems. It would do us well to
admit that we face the same challenge. Such an atmosphere of mutual
exchange of perspectives and experience with developing and reforming
governance models and methods would likely be more effective than many
of the means employed hitherto to encourage China to move forward with
democratic reforms in Hong Kong and on the mainland.
______

Prepared Statement of Ellen Bork

july 14, 2010
Hong Kong's recent changes to its system of constituting the
legislature and picking the chief executive are a net negative. While
the Hong Kong governments, and others, have attempted to claim a
victory for ``progress'' with the passage of the legislation, in fact,
the minor tweaks to the system reinforce the undemocratic
characteristics of the system without a commitment to full democracy or
even agreement on what that really means.
The changes are being presented as a modest expansion of the
democratic basis for the government. However, the change in the
people's control over their governance is practically zero. There will
be ten new seats, including five democratically elected ones. ``Split
voting'' persists--a clever procedure instituted by Beijing which
raises the bar for pro-democracy proposals in the legislature by
forcing the chamber to vote in two halves, one of which is dominated by
pro-Beijing ``functional constituencies'' representing mainly business
and professional associations. (In other words, undemocratically
selected representatives.) The so-called expansion of the franchise for
choosing the chief executive is laughable. Now there will be 1200
electors up from 800, even though Hong Kong has over 3 million
registered voters. The compromise over the seats that enabled
legislators of the Democratic Party to sign on does not indicate a
change of heart by the central government. Instead, it represents a
further erosion of the barrier to Beijing's involvement in the
territory's affairs.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A more positive interpretation of one aspect of the package is
that the small change in the way the functional constituencies are
constituted could lead to the seating of more pro-democracy
representatives in the Legco, that is, in the half of the chamber that
usually obstructs democracy legislation. While that is theoretically
possible, it is not likely. It is simply impossible to imagine that
this maneuver--billed as a compromise on the part of Beijing--
represents a sincere effort to expand democracy in Hong Kong.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A poll showed that opposition to the package among the Hong Kong
people grew after the televised debate between Chief Executive Donald
Tsang and Civic Party legislator Audrey Eu. The public was not
reassured by Mr. Tsang's performance in which he called opponents of
the package irrational and was vague about how full democracy would be
reached. He addressed criticisms of the legislation by saying ``there
are things to be ironed out but we can do so after we pass the
package.'' In fact, virtually every indicator of the public's opinion
indicates a strong majority would like to move to full democracy
immediately.
The pro-democracy members of the Legco who accepted this argument
fell into a trap. In future, it won't matter what tiny changes were
made to the functional constituencies or the selection process for the
chief executive. Democrats will have voted for the continuation of
functional constituencies and for a system of a chief executive
appointed by Beijing and rubber stamped by 1200 people. It will be
exceedingly difficult from here on to move to full democracy. Beijing's
role is confirmed, the democratic camp is split and the undemocratic
features of the system are being entrenched.
While the effects of the legislation for expanded democracy are
virtually nil, there are other important, and negative, effects. One is
that now those who to move to real democracy and to have a firm
commitment for doing so are being depicted as ``hardliners'' and
``extremists.'' This is the brilliant achievement of Beijing. The
system, which is Beijing's creation, is engineered to deny the
possibility of real, institutional changes. The democracy camp was
criticized for the ``referendum movement'' in which five pro-democracy
members of the legislature resigned their seats and ran again, in by-
elections, in order to get a mandate for democracy. In fact, they got
the mandate. True, the turn-out was low in percentage terms, but
500,000 voters chose the pro-democracy position by returning the pro-
democracy candidates in those elections. If the government had not
boycotted the elections, the turn-out would have been more and the
tally for the pro-democracy candidates, and their position, would have
been even higher.
The second bad outcome is that the maneuvering over the legislative
package and in particular confidential dealings between the Democratic
Party and Beijing representatives has normalized Beijing's role in
controlling Hong Kong's democratic development. Margaret Ng, a
Legislative Councilor, said it very well in her speech to the
legislature on June 23.

``[T]he final deal is closed behind closed doors, and
ostensibly between the Democratic Party and the representatives
of the Central Authorities. No one who is not already in the
know is allowed time to digest these developments. By his lack
of action, the Chief Executive [Donald Tsang] has made clear
that he no longer represents [the] people of Hong Kong, and
`one country, two systems' is no longer a sustainable
illusion.''

There was always a high degree of fiction involved in the ``one
country, two systems'' arrangement. We know that the Chinese communist
government, for its part, never took it seriously. As Steve Tsang wrote

``the idea of Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong within
the framework of `one country, two systems' may imply that
after 1997 Hong Kong will be free to run its own domestic
affairs with no interference from Beijing as long as PRC
sovereignty is acknowledged. Such an interpretation is totally
unacceptable to Beijing.''

And on the matter of elections within Hong Kong, it was clear that
Beijing never contemplated real democracy. Before the handover, Deng
Xiaoping asked rhetorically, ``those who can be entrusted to administer
Hong Kong must be local residents who love mother China and Hong Kong.
Can popular elections ensure the selection of such people? '' For him,
and other communist leaders, the answer was no, and Beijing set about
to control the levers of power in Hong Kong.
However, Hong Kong's people took this promise seriously, and the
United Kingdom and the United States purported to do so as well.
Washington made autonomy and the ability of Hong Kong people to develop
full democracy there the cornerstone of U.S. policy.
The ``one country, two systems'' fiction gave the United States and
other democracies something to hide behind. The curtain has now been
drawn, and reality can be dealt with. That is the only good thing to
come from this episode. It would have been better, which is to say,
principled, for the United States, to show that it knows the difference
between real and phony democratic reform and to tell the truth about
the defects in the reform package. By approving of last month's
developments in the Legco, as Ambassador Jon Huntsman did, Washington
acquiesced to Beijing's direct involvement in Hong Kong affairs and its
ultimate control, which is to say, obstruction, of democracy there. It
will only become harder to change course, but it is possible and
essential not only for U.S. policy toward Hong Kong, but also the
People's Republic of China.