[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHINA'S FAR WEST: CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG ONE YEAR AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS
AND RIOTS
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 19, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 1
Kan, Shirley A., Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research
Service........................................................ 2
Toops, Stanley W., Associate Professor, Department of Geography
and International Studies Program, Miami University............ 5
Richardson, Sophie, Asia Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statement
Toops, Stanley W................................................. 28
Submissions for the Record
Prepared Statement of Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Correspondent
for BNA Inc., Freelance Journalist............................. 35
Statement of the Chairman and Cochairman: Xinjiang--One Year
After Demonstrations and Rioting............................... 36
CHINA'S FAR WEST: CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG ONE YEAR AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS
AND RIOTS
MONDAY, JULY 19, 2010
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:03
p.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte
Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, presiding.
Also present: Kara Abramson, Advocacy Director.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, STAFF DIRECTOR,
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Good afternoon. I'm Charlotte Oldham-
Moore. I'm Staff Director at the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. You are here today at the fifth roundtable
of the year for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[CECC].
We have one panelist, Ms. Shirley Kan, on her way to the
hearing room. Unfortunately, we have another panelist who got
snagged in Minneapolis in a flight slowdown and had to return
home. So, unfortunately, Ms. McLaughlin will not be joining us.
But we have present here today Dr. Stanley Toops and Dr. Sophie
Richardson.
At this CECC roundtable panelists will examine conditions
in the far western region of Xinjiang one year after
demonstrations and rioting occurred there. Events in July 2009
exposed long-standing tensions in the region and Uyghurs'
grievances toward government policies that threatened their
basic rights. Authorities pledged, in 2010, to improve economic
conditions in Xinjiang and appointed a new Party secretary for
the region.
The questions that will be examined at today's roundtable
are: How will these new developments shape Xinjiang's future?
Is the government effectively addressing Uyghur grievances? How
have government controls over the free flow of information
affected our understanding of events in the region?
Before I turn to the panelists, I want to make a couple of
brief announcements. First, we have a wonderful group of people
in our audience today, but I certainly want to give particular
attention to Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. Many of you know Ms. Rebiya
Kadeer. She is head of the Uyghur American Association, and
also head of the World Uyghur Congress. She is joined by many
of her associates; some of you may have met them.
Ms. Kan? Great. So glad you could make it. I am also joined
by Kara Abramson, our Senior Analyst on Uyghur issues, as well
as religion and minority concerns, at the Commission. Many of
you know Ms. Abramson's work. She does outstanding analytic
pieces for the Commission, and she is with us here today.
I am going to turn to introduce our panel. Then after the
panelists give their statements, we will turn to the audience,
you, for questioning of the panelists.
Our panel of witnesses, as I mentioned, will examine the
current conditions in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region one
year after demonstrations and rioting took place in the capital
city of Urumqi.
To help us understand these developments, we have three
distinguished witnesses who will speak today. First, Ms.
Shirley Kan, a Specialist in Asian Security, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division at the Congressional Research
Service. For those of you who cover Asia for the Congress, you
know Shirley's work very well. She is really just an
outstanding resource for Members of Congress and their staffs.
Next, we have Dr. Stanley Toops. He is Associate Professor
in the Department of Geography and International Studies
Program at Miami University. Dr. Toops will address demographic
and economic developments in Xinjiang. Finally, Dr. Sophie
Richardson will speak. She is the Asia Advocacy Director at
Human Rights Watch. Dr. Richardson will discuss disappearances
in the aftermath of the July demonstrations and riots, which,
as all of you know, took the lives of many Han Chinese, as well
as Uyghur citizens of China, a very tragic event for the
country. She will discuss other recent human rights events in
the region as well.
So I am going to turn it over to you, Ms. Kan. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY A. KAN, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN SECURITY
AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE
DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Kan. Thank you. I'm going to briefly go over the
political and security implications of the People's Republic of
China's [PRC] response in the past year to the unrest in
Xinjiang in July 2009.
The Communist Party of China [CPC] changed leaders in
Xinjiang, convened the first Xinjiang Work Conference, and
expanded security forces. These developments have added
complexity because the PRC regime tends to target Uyghurs with
a tinge of ``terrorism.'' What are the implications for the
PRC's approach to internal security and for the United States?
First, the CPC changed leadership, both civilian and
military leaders in Xinjiang. In September 2009, the CPC
replaced the Secretary of the Communist Party of Urumqi. Then
the Party Secretary of Xinjiang since 1995 was expected to be
replaced also, but the top rulers apparently waited because
Wang Lequan is also a Politburo member and they could not
appear to bow to dissent.
In April, General Secretary Hu Jintao convened a Politburo
meeting on Xinjiang and removed Wang Lequan, putting him under
Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang as his deputy
in the Politics and Law Commission.
Wang appears to be the only member of the Politburo to be
demoted. Assigned as the new Xinjiang Party Secretary was Zhang
Chunxian, formerly the Party Secretary of Hunan Province, where
he reportedly paid attention to public opinion. Before that,
Zhang was a professional bureaucrat as the Minister of
Transportation, but he is still an outsider to Xinjiang and a
Han.
Zhang continued the call on the military forces to crack
down on the ``Three Evil Forces,'' which is a PRC term that
conflates religion, ethnicity, and fighting into one threat. In
June, the leadership replaced the Political Commissars of the
Production and Construction Corps and the People's Liberation
Army's [PLA] Xinjiang Military District.
Second, the CPC leaders convened a Xinjiang Work
Conference. Like the Tibet Work Conferences, with the fifth one
held in January, there was the first Xinjiang Work Conference
in May. All nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee
attended both the Tibet Work Conference in January and the
Xinjiang Work Conference in May. While it appears that General
Secretary Hu has the lead on the Tibet Work Conference and
fourth-ranked Jia Qinglin has the lead on the Taiwan Work
Conference, ninth-ranked Zhou Yongkang has taken the lead on
Xinjiang. With Zhou as the Chairman of the Politics and Law
Commission, the indication is that security has the priority in
Xinjiang rather than economic development.
Ironically, this fact was brought home on the first
anniversary of last July's unrest. Even an effort to showcase a
supposed return to business as usual at the famous
international bazaar in Urumqi saw Uyghur vendors selling
scarves and such alongside armed police with guns, batons, and
shields. I am sure that is just great for business and tourism.
Third, the CPC leaders expanded security. They transferred
5,000 elite special police from around China from last July
until this April, and recruited 5,000 special police from
within Xinjiang, starting in February. In March, the
paramilitary People's Armed Police [PAP] added a new elite,
rapid-reaction unit, as what they themselves call a ``fist'' in
Urumqi.
PAP units have trained in the use of helicopters for armed
assaults on people on the ground and trained special operation
units for armed raids, even into residences. The PAP set up
rapid-reaction units in other cities as well.
In the military, the PLA, there has been at least one army
aviation unit with helicopters that appears to have the mission
of rapid reaction and long-distance deployment. They also have
increased spending on security in 2010. Just this year,
security spending increased by 88 percent, to $423 million.
The police have been installing 60,000 security cameras in
the city of Urumqi alone, and that is to be completed by the
end of this year. They take pictures of all drivers and
passengers in every vehicle near that famous bazaar I mentioned
earlier.
In conclusion, what are some implications for internal
security? The PRC's new approach appears to be comprehensive,
involving economic, security, military, religious, legal,
energy, diplomatic, propaganda, transportation, and local
policies--that is, the governments of other localities in
China.
The impact on Uyghurs and Hans appears to be mixed. There
is now top-level attention from the top leadership which would
encourage economic development, but that raises the political
cost of any unrest and the incentive to take harsh, or even
preemptive, measures to crack down in the name of
``stability.''
On the plus side, there has been recognition that the root
of the unrest last July was internal problems, not external
forces as the officials had charged. Second, there was the
implicit admission that the local leaders were part of the
problem, even a Politburo member.
Externally, the PRC regime has allowed foreign reporters,
both last July as well as for this first anniversary. The PRC
also allowed for the first time some foreign monitoring,
including the first visit to Xinjiang by the Organization of
the Islamic Conference [OIC] in June. OIC's Secretary General
visited Xinjiang, including Kashgar, and called for attention
not only to the economy, but also cultural concerns.
Improved crisis control could provide more accurate and
objective information for restraint in the use of force. There
could be more economic benefits, including use of the region's
own energy resources. There could be greater respect for the
culture and religion of Uyghurs. The Work Conference I
mentioned could be regularized to continue to assess problems
as well as progress.
On the negative side, if there is another protest, the
beefed-up security forces are likely again to overreact to
unrest. There is likely greater use of intelligence, including
using informants in their own communities, and monitoring of
people's everyday lives: through emails, phone calls, cameras.
Even with the implicit admission of an internal and
economic problem, there is no change to the rhetorical use of
the tinge of ``terrorism'' through attacks on the so-called
``Three Evil Forces.'' There is no indication that there are
reversals in the flows of Uyghurs, particularly women, out of
Xinjiang to work where they face discrimination, and of greater
numbers of Hans into Xinjiang.
As can be seen in the ethnic or cultural grievances around
the world, including in the United States, economic
determinants alone are not sufficient to address perceived
wrongs. Moreover, the PRC's economic policies and increased
transportation could actually result in even greater numbers of
Hans going to Xinjiang. Based on the PRC's policy to force
Uyghurs to learn the Mandarin language, there is implicit
admission that economic benefits are biased toward those who
use Mandarin, especially the Hans. There is also the implicit
dismissal of the Uyghur language, but actually their Turkic-
based language historically has helped with trade ties to
central Asia and Europe.
In short, there does not appear to be a fundamental change
in the PRC's approach of the Hans controlling the Uyghurs:
assimilation, not autonomy as promised even in the name of the
so-called ``Xinjiang Autonomous Region.''
What are some implications for the United States?
Consideration of whether to work with the PLA in Xinjiang in
support of U.S. military operations in central Asia requires a
great deal of caution. There are acute tensions, crackdowns are
likely, and communication is even more tightly controlled.
Second, the PRC's claim that the Uyghur-linked terrorism is
the greatest threat to China is not credible. There could be a
different problem for Americans and other foreigners,
especially businesses, of greater discontent and lawlessness
throughout China.
Let us look at just reported bombs on buses in 2010 so far.
In February, there was an explosion on a bus in Yunnan Province
that killed the bomber himself and injured 11. Earlier this
month, an explosion on a bus in Jiangsu Province killed 24
people and injured 19. Then, over months, attackers terrorized
innocent children in schools in at least five incidents. The
PRC did not call the suspects ``terrorists'' or ``suicide
bombers.''
As President Obama said at the U.S.-PRC Strategic and
Economic Dialogue last July, ``Religion and culture of all
peoples must be respected and protected'' and ``all people
should be free to speak their minds.'' He said, ``That includes
ethnic and religious minorities in China . . . ''
Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Ms. Kan.
Now we have Dr. Stanley Toops, please.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY W. TOOPS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT
OF GEOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM, MIAMI
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Toops. Thank you very much.
I am a geographer, an academic, and I study demography and
development. I've been going to Xinjiang on and off for the
past 25 years, as I found it a very interesting place to look
at for demography and development, as that is what the bulk of
my research has been upon.
I will talk about two things. One is essentially looking at
the development issues as transpired or the policies with the
Xinjiang Work Forum--or the Xinjiang Work Conference, I've seen
it both ways--and then the other part is to look at the
demographic components of Xinjiang and think a little bit about
the possible impacts of the policies derived in the Xinjiang
Work Conference.
Xinjiang is, of course, the largest territorial unit within
China, about one-sixth of China's total area, so it's actually
quite large. There's a population of 21 million, a large
population, but compared to, say, Sichuan, not so much.
When you look at it, also, you realize that while the
population in total is kind of sparsely populated for China,
given the climate and the physiography within Xinjiang,
actually 20 million is a large population; there is just not
enough water for everybody eventually.
Xinjiang, as a part of China, has been involved in the
Western Development Program, which developed in 1999 to address
regional inequities faced by China's western regions. Eastern
China had already gone through development programs, so in some
ways the current policies with the Xinjiang Work Forum really
expand upon the Western Development Program.
When you take a look at development in Xinjiang, you
realize that prior to the advent of, say, the People's Republic
of China, you can see economic activities in herding, oasis
agriculture, trade, but certainly in the modern era, the latter
part of the 20th century with oil exploration and oil
development, that production has been very important in
Xinjiang's development overall. So, oil, textiles, agri-
business. Given the size of Xinjiang, the transportation
construction development--road, air and rail--has also been
fairly important when you take a look at it.
Many of the transportation linkages on the rail side of
things were very much concentrated around Urumqi, and that
connects then by rail on to Beijing. That was built in the
1960s. It was not until the 1990s that that rail link then
continued on to Kazakhstan, the former Soviet Union. The rail
goes to the south, by 1999, all the way to Kashgar.
So this rail system is very important, just taking a look
at the economic development of the area overall. I mean, part
of the rationale for having the rail into the south is because
the south is also where you start to find oil in the Tarim
Basin in southern Xinjiang. There had already been oil
discoveries in northern Xinjiang and Karamai, so the rail
linkage and pipelines are also important for that area, but I
think the rail connections into southern Xinjiang then connect
both in terms of development, as well as the demographics.
On the agricultural side of things, the state created the
Xinjiang Production Construction Corps [XPCC], or the Bingtuan,
that is, it's an army [bing] corps [tuan]. In English, it's
just translated as ``corps,'' but it's an army corps composed
of demobilized units from the PLA, and also Guomindang soldiers
in the area, and some other local soldiers.
These state farms kind of ran out in the 1960s at the end
of the Cultural Revolution, but then they were brought back as
a way to maintain development, but also stability and control.
So you have got circumstances in Xinjiang with the oil, and
then with the state farm system, the Production Construction
Corps, that are different from other parts of China. Of course,
in the eastern coastal areas there is oil, but you do not
really have these kinds of state farms in other parts of China
now. All those have gone by the wayside.
The development program, through the People's Republic of
China, ended up restructuring, reorienting the development
landscape, whereas before you had traditional centers in
Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja--that is, Ili--now, of course, it's
much more concentrated around Urumqi, and then the oil centers,
such as in Karamai.
So we have that kind of economic distinction here, so that
now with the rail connections in northern Xinjiang, that is the
area that has been developed mostly and has higher levels of
income or per capita GDP. Southern Xinjiang does not. The
economy there is mostly focused on agriculture, and with some
small amounts of industry. But with the oil production in the
Tarim, in the southern part of the region, you will probably
see things increase there.
So with oil, we see the impact in northern Xinjiang and
Karamai, and then processing in Urumqi. We see the beginnings
of economic development in the south as far as oil, but this
oil does not necessarily contribute to the economic development
for local people. It goes into the regional kind of overall
character, but not necessarily translated into the local area.
Many of the oil crews are from, say, eastern China, so they are
not really involved in development of the local landscape.
So if we take a look at the Xinjiang Work Conference, the
new policies that Dr. Kan spoke about, there are several
different aspects. One is the regional component. So what is
going on now? The policy as it has developed is that, say,
Beijing will be responsible or help the Hotan area. Shenzhen
will help the Kashgar area.
So you have all of these coastal provinces that are
targeting or are going to be linked up as maybe sister cities
or sister prefectures with various parts of Xinjiang. It seems
that the southern area is actually getting the attention to
have more economic development in the south. However, when you
start taking a look at the types of projects, it seems that
most of it is geared toward infrastructure and not necessarily
development of human capital.
Then you see, for example, that Shenzhen, which is next to
Hong Kong and specializes in the export markets, is going to
work with Kashgar. That is a completely different situation.
Kashgar's neighbors are Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, in contrast
to, say, Xinjiang's neighbor being Hong Kong. It is a much
different kind of circumstance.
So, looking at that, you see the infrastructure development
issue, then also this kind of regional development issue. In
terms of demography, much of the central areas around Urumqi,
you have a larger percentage of Han population compared with
the south, where you have more of the Uyghur population.
According to the government statistics, of the 21 million,
Uyghurs are about 46 percent; the Han, 39 percent; and Kazakhs,
7 percent. That does not count, of course, the floating
population into the area, or military, which would be a much
smaller number.
Han migration has come into the area and has followed
mostly and matches up fairly well with urban and transportation
linkages. So with the rail linkages into Urumqi, and we see, of
course, Urumqi is now 80, 90 percent Han population, Uyghur a
much smaller percentage, and then even I think with the rail
connection going to Kashgar, whereas Kashgar in the past has
been 90 percent and more Uyghur, we expect to see that there
will be more Han population coming into the area.
The migrants have come from Sichuan in particular, also
Hunan and Gansu. Gansu, of course, is a neighboring province,
so you would expect that. Sichuan is a little farther away, but
there seems to be a kind of a connection through perhaps the
Bingtuan, the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps, or
others.
So we see that the population here is young and ethnically
diverse. There are a number of recent migrants, perhaps up to
10 percent of the population according to the 2000 census, and
we will see what the 2010 census shows.
So probably with the projects continuing, we will see a
larger percentage of workers moving into Xinjiang from other
parts of China, and most of these migrants will be Han. We will
see a population shift, certainly in the north that has already
occurred, so then it will be, to how much of an extent will
that occur in southern Xinjiang?
I think with the construction of the railroad system and
then this new plan with the Xinjiang Work Conference, Xinjiang
Work Forum, that would probably entail some transfer of
personnel and not just money into the area, coming from the
east coast, people with special skills and other types of
skilled labor. That would probably increase the relative
percentage of Han in southern Xinjiang as well.
So, in that case then southern Xinjiang would probably
become more like northern Xinjiang. So there is a very strong
kind of regional component to my analysis and taking a look at
the sorts of changes that we are expecting.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Toops appears in the
appendix.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Dr. Toops. We very much
appreciate it.
Now, Dr. Sophie Richardson. She is, as I mentioned,
Advocacy Director for Human Rights Watch [HRW] in Asia.
STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, ASIA ADVOCACY DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Richardson. Thanks very much for inviting me to be with
you this afternoon. It should go without saying, but I will
repeat it here, that we are big fans of the CECC's work.
I am going to try to get quickly through a couple of
topics, starting with a report that we released in October
2009, in which we examined the aftermath of the July 2009
protests in Xinjiang, which according to the Chinese
Government, killed at least 197 people. While it is clearly the
Chinese Government's duty to uphold public order, thoroughly
investigate incidents of violence, and punish perpetrators in
accordance with the law, our research indicates that instead of
launching an impartial investigation in accordance with
international and domestic standards, Chinese law enforcement
agencies have instead carried out a massive campaign of
unlawful arrests in the Uyghur areas of Urumqi, many of which
resulted in the disappearances of detainees.
This report documents the enforced disappearances of at
least 43 Uyghur men and teenaged boys--the youngest was 13--who
were detained by Chinese security forces in the wake of the
protests. It is worth clarifying that enforced disappearances
are some of the most alarming kinds of abuses that we deal
with, so it is worth explaining what exactly we mean by this
term.
An enforced disappearance occurs when state authorities--
state authorities, not random people, but state authorities--
detain a person and then refuse to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or the person's whereabouts. This is highly
problematic because it places the person outside the protection
of the law and increases the likelihood of other abuses, such
as torture and extra-judicial execution. Given the Chinese
Government's already appalling track record particularly with
respect to torture of detainees, this takes on particular
significance in Xinjiang.
To date, the Chinese Government has failed to respond to
all the inquiries made about these arrests; perhaps there is
somebody here with us this afternoon from the Embassy, if you
would care to explain that to us. We included in a copy of this
report, which is standard operating procedure for us, a letter
we sent to the Chinese Government in advance of publication
asking a series of questions about number of detainees, the
ethnic breakdown of them, what people were being charged with,
where they were being held.
Not only did we not get a response after the report was
released on October 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesperson was asked about the report. He replied that he
``didn't know on what grounds we based our assertions'' and
said that HRW had ``fabricated rumors to attack China on many
occasions.''
The severe and ongoing limitations on access to Xinjiang
complicate what we can know about what has happened since that
time. One of the journalists who recently traveled there
reported having been stopped seven times by Public Security
Bureau personnel on her first day, and she later suggested to
us that that was actually the best day of her visit.
We have not yet begun to conduct new investigations, but it
is our understanding that the problem remains as serious now as
it was then. Another journalist who was in Urumqi last month
quoted a 33-year-old Uyghur resident of Urumqi as saying,
``Every single family on this block is missing someone.''
One of the issues I was asked to touch on today has to do
with violations of due process that have compromised the
possibility of fair trials for defendants. It is worth pointing
out that these are all problems that are pervasive throughout
China, where the judicial system is highly politicized.
The first problem has to do with restrictions on legal
representation, including the fact that judicial authorities in
Urumqi and Beijing, on July 11--so just a few days after the
protest started--effectively warned lawyers against accepting
cases related to these protests.
At the same time, partners of law firms were told to
``positively accept monitoring and guidance from legal
authorities and lawyers' associations,'' meaning, let the Party
decide how these cases should be handled, not the law. Multiple
examples of the over-politicization of the judiciary here would
point to the president of the Xinjiang High People's Court, a
memo dated July 16, 2009, saying that the Xinjiang judicial
authorities to hear these particular cases have been ``selected
politically qualified personnel drawn from the entire region,''
so again, not really much of an interest there in upholding the
law.
Third, I would point to the failure to publicly publish
notification of the trials. This is a clear violation of
China's own criminal procedure laws. Then, fourth, the failure
to hold genuinely open trials, which is also mandated by law in
China. The same July 11 warning that placed certain limitations
on lawyers also prohibited them from talking to the media or
discussing these issues online.
In the past, we know that authorities have arbitrarily
restricted people's ability to actually be in the courtroom,
and instead essentially packed the room with court personnel
and civil servants. And while we do not know who was actually
present at these trials, we know who was not. That includes
members of the foreign press, diplomatic representatives,
family members, or other associates of the people being tried.
Very little information is available about the trials that
have taken place to date. We, and others, are aware of the
announcement made by Nur Bekri in March 2010 that 198 people
have been tried, but that is really about it. We have no reason
to believe why these trials should be any better than any of
the ones that preceded them in either Xinjiang or in any other
part of the country.
We do not know all that much about the sentences that
people have been given. We know that reeducation through labor
has been a very common penalty applied in the past, which has
the additional effect of keeping people from talking to their
family members or appealing their charges, and it is a way also
of circumscribing criminal investigations.
With the appointment of Zhang Chunxian, who has sort of
been offered up as the warm and fuzzy alternative to Wang
Lequan, the questions are, will his leadership really result in
any sort of policy changes? Will it be better, will it be
worse? He seems--it is a relatively recent development, but
from our perspective--he seems to be trying to bring a new
style of governance to the region.
He appears to be trying to be popular, which is setting the
bar kind of low. By the time Wang Lequan finished, he had not
only alienated Uyghurs, but he had alienated a significant
chunk of the Han population by not being tough enough on
Uyghurs. So, there is really no place to go but up.
He seems to be trying to administer the province along more
sort of normal lines rather than as a special security problem.
He is engaged in a flurry of activities, including talking
publicly about the importance of opening up the Internet and
trying to be sort of more visible. We will see whether this
turns out to be a good thing or bad thing.
From our perspective, there also appears to be a little bit
more of an acknowledgement of the socioeconomic roots of ethnic
disenfranchisement and possibly--possibly--an attempt to reach
out to a new generation of Uyghur graduates that is conversant
in both cultures, but this really could go either way. This
could be a very concerted effort. We have seen similar efforts
elsewhere in the country to co-opt this generation rather than
actually give it real autonomy.
In retrospect, it looks like the July protests finally
prompted Beijing to allow some discussion over issues that were
previously politically taboo, contrary to Tibet where the
united front has really blocked the way for policy adjustments.
Beijing has acted with uncharacteristic speed and determination
in the case of Xinjiang. The $64,000 question, of course, is
whether this will be enough and whether this will be a good
thing, and the jury is really out on that.
Fundamentally, some of the policy changes or adjustments
that we have seen in the last few months are ones of magnitude,
not of direction. The simple take-away here is that Uyghurs are
still excluded from the decisions about the future of their
homeland. They are no more empowered to participate in those
discussions now than they were at the time of the protests.
Discussions about autonomy are absent from the political
discourse, and there is no discussion of the issues that top
the list of Uyghur discontent, including discrimination, Han
in-migration, and ever more invasive curbs on language,
culture, and religious expression.
I would couple with that some particularly aggressive
externally oriented policies we have seen from the Chinese
Government about Uyghurs, not least incredible pressure from
the Chinese Government on Cambodia and a couple of other
central Asian governments to force back to China Uyghurs who
were seeking asylum, and also a whole new level, I think, in
the campaign to essentially paint all Uyghurs worldwide as
terrorists.
At the end of the day, this is a pretty volatile mix. The
chief source of Uyghur alienation is a perception that they are
becoming strangers in their own land, and without any sort of
stake in the place's future, I think people may wind up
behaving very differently regardless of what the policies
actually are.
I want to touch very quickly on some of the recommendations
that we have made, particularly to the Chinese Government: That
it end the practice of enforced disappearances; that it release
accurate information on all those detained, released, and
formally arrested in the aftermath of the protests; that it
release all of those against whom no charges have been
brought--that is a pretty novel concept; ensure that peaceful
religious observation and practice are not equated with, or
incur liability from, state security forces; and end the
criminalization of the advocacy for Uyghur autonomy.
Quickly, on the recommendations that we have made to the
U.S. Government and to other members of the international
community, ensure that your own policies regarding terrorism
and counterterrorism do not exacerbate problems in Xinjiang.
The threat of
terrorism cannot be used to justify the repression of a
particular ethnic minority, and I am not entirely confident
that the U.S. Government is really following through on this.
It is a very important part of the debate.
The United States and others should extend full and active
support to an international investigation into the Urumqi
events under the auspices of the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. The United States should
continue to press the Chinese Government for accountability.
The United States should offer asylum to Uyghurs under
threat of being returned to China. Every U.S. Ambassador
worldwide: if you have Uyghurs and if they are under some sort
of threat of being sent back to China, don't mess around. Open
the door, let them into the Embassy, bring them here. It is no
more complicated than that.
Then last but not least, reject the idea that any
discussion of the human rights in Xinjiang, Tibet, or any other
part of the PRC constitutes a violation of the ``core
interests'' articulated by the People's Republic. This is a
term that is nothing more than the PRC saying we don't want to
talk about this, and if anything should direct the U.S.
Government's human rights agenda in China, it is precisely that
which the Chinese Government labels as a core interest.
Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Sophie. It's always a pleasure
having you here.
Now we are going to open it up to our audience.
So, the first question will come from Kara Abramson, and
then we'll turn to the audience. You can project if you know
you're good at vocalizing. Stand up and just project. If you
know you need a little electronic help, we have a microphone up
here.
Kara is going to start us off.
Ms. Abramson. Thank you. And thanks to all of the panelists
for your testimony today.
I'd like to ask a question about the Xinjiang Work Forum
which took place in May. My question is, are these new
initiatives likely to be successfully implemented? The scope is
large. It's a really ambitious program. Some aspects of it, on
paper anyway, could be potentially positive, and other aspects,
clearly less so.
We have seen plenty of cases of Chinese Government projects
that have fallen flat on implementation, and the Work Forum has
set some very ambitious targets: 2015 to meet basic goals, 2020
to have an all-around ``healthy society'' in Xinjiang.
Already we have seen criticism of existing counterpart
programs in Xinjiang, where cities and localities on the
eastern seaboard of China provide assistance to Xinjiang. These
programs already have been in place in Xinjiang for 13 years, I
think. We have seen criticism that, to date, they have not been
that effective. So in terms of the current Xinjiang Work Forum,
how successful is the government going to be in implementing
various objectives? Is there the will and the resources to make
it different this time?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Any panelist who wants to take this
question, please? You want to, Stan? Great.
Mr. Toops. I think that the Xinjiang Work Forum or Xinjiang
Work Conference is interesting in that, in part, it seems to be
modeled on previous conferences and work forums in Tibet. So it
is kind of taking a Tibet model--and that has been very
successful of course [winks]--to take a look at that in
Xinjiang.
The other kind of component is that it is having various
provinces involved, and to what extent will the provinces feel
that, yes, we support the central government, therefore we are
also going to support the activities going on in Xinjiang. So
it depends on the kind of attitudes for the various east coast
provinces.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Can you talk about that in some detail?
What that means is east coast provinces have to fund, send
their money, to Xinjiang. Isn't that right?
Mr. Toops. Well, in some cases it is more money or
technology or experts, or some sort of assistance. So it's kind
of like overseas development assistance, but it's situated
within China. So, it's like an internal development program, in
a way. In the United States, in different parts, you have
various kinds of policies for poverty-stricken areas and those
kinds of things.
But it's to have it that somehow one province is going to
take responsibility for what is happening in a prefecture of a
city in Xinjiang, which is a kind of an interesting pairing to
take a look at. I think that is where the difficulty, at least
in terms of the logistics, might be. But maybe then it would
involve these various provinces, and it's not just a central
government kind of program.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Good. Okay. Yes? Then we'll go to the
audience.
Ms. Richardson. I would just tack on two quick points, one
of which is that the Tibet model hasn't necessarily worked all
that well in Tibet. I mean, the Chinese Government can spend as
much money as it wants, but this is not a problem fundamentally
that you can spend your way out of.
And while I can't speak nearly as well as the other
panelists can to whether the Chinese Government can follow
through on sort of the hard data--spending, education, those
sorts of things--the idea that by 2015 they will have
established a harmonious society in Xinjiang is reasonably
laughable, as long as the population itself does not get to
have a part in that conversation.
One of the things that concerns me, actually, about the
goals set out by the Work Forum is that the narrative that the
central government has given out, and that I think a lot,
particularly, of the urban Han population has bought into, is
that the central government has pumped enormous resources into
this region and into Tibet, and look at these ungrateful
minorities. Look at what they turned around and did to us,
right?
And as we're seeing the economy slow down in a couple of
different parts of the country, it really concerns me that if
they continue to pump a lot of money into Xinjiang, the stakes
are going to be that much higher to deliver on some kind of
security, but it shouldn't necessarily be confused with a kind
of stability.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Great. Thank you.
Let's go to the audience. The gentleman with the blue
shirt?
Audience Participant. This question is for Sophie
Richardson. Even though the Chinese police forces are in some
way [inaudible] are there any indications that these abducted
civilians are being forced into a form of human trafficking?
Ms. Richardson. We have no information that would enable me
to answer that question. None. Sorry.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Anybody else want to take that on? No.
Okay, to another question. Mr. Pillsbury?
Mr. Pillsbury. Michael Pillsbury--I have a question about
the Uyghurs outside of China [inaudible] Han in some of the
regions [inaudible] as well. I'm trying to understand the
difference between the world reaction to Tibet over the last 20
or 30 years and contrasted to Uyghurs in the sense of asking
this question: What would it take to have the same level of
concern about the Uyghurs as the world has about Tibet? Now, I
can think of some more specific sub-questions. It seems to me
the Tibetans have a long history of involving Western
governments.
If you look at various memoirs, even in the 1950s they were
already making contact [inaudible] they have the Dalai Lama as
a religious figure. They have a government in exile. They have
a
parliament they elect people to. They seem to have a set of
organizations around the world with names like the
International Campaign for Tibet. So my specific question is,
is there anything like that for the Uyghurs now, and what would
it take to have that sort of thing [inaudible] much worse level
of oppression [inaudible] in Xinjiang before that will ever
happen. Then [inaudible] Muslim world should be more concerned
about Xinjiang than they are. So my general question is, what
is the level of concern by governments on the outside of
Xinjiang for Uyghurs in Xinjiang?
Ms. Kan. Because I work at CRS, I really cannot get into
any policy recommendations. But I would just note, in answer to
your question directed at me, that there has been increased
attention by foreign governments, including the U.S.
Government, to Uyghurs because of what has happened since 2001.
There's been more attention than ever.
If we think back to the 1990s and the unrest and crackdowns
and manhunts that took place in the 1990s, very few Americans
actually knew about what was going on. We had groups like
Amnesty International that tried to show the spotlight when a
lot of people didn't understand.
So actually the Uyghurs have seen an increase in attention,
international attention, and an increase in governmental
support, no less by the President of the United States himself.
President Bush met not once, but twice, with Rebiya Kadeer, the
leader of the democratic organization for the Uyghurs.
Second, the Uyghurs also have seen increased legitimacy
around the world, legitimacy provided not only right here in
the Congress, but also as I mentioned by the White House itself
and by the increased attention of a lot of groups, like the
National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, and
Amnesty International. So, there's been increased attention at
the official level and increased legitimacy as compared with
the Tibetans.
For those who have worked in Congress for many years, we
can remember days when we would talk about the PRC and Tibet,
and that would be the end of it. Today, it is different. It
would be the PRC, people in Tibet, and people in East
Turkistan, or Xinjiang. Now, we see people talking about the
Tibetans and the Uyghurs in the same sentence. So, that is also
a change.
Also, in 2002, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor himself went to Xinjiang. We
have not seen that repeated, but it's possible. It is also
possible that our current President could meet with Uyghur
leaders. But that has been the trend over several years.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Shirley.
Sophie, did you want to comment? You don't need to, but if
you want to. Okay.
Ms. Richardson. I would associate myself with everything
that Charlotte and Shirley have just said, although would toss
out the clarification that this White House doesn't seem to
have gotten around to receiving Mrs. Kadeer yet. At the same
time, this administration could undo one of the Bush
Administration's mistakes and think really carefully about
whether there even is an organization called ETIM and whether
it deserves to be on the terrorist watch list.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. What is ETIM? No acronyms.
Ms. Richardson. The East Turkistan Independence Movement,
which is an organization the Chinese Government insists exists
and is a terrorist organization. Many other knowledgeable
people dispute that claim.
And one of the huge obstacles the Uyghur community globally
has been combating over the last 10 years is that really sort
of one of the first gestures of attention to Xinjiang, at least
in recent memory, was either Gitmo, where you saw a lot of
perfectly innocent Uyghurs getting locked up and labeled, in
effect, by the U.S. Government as terrorists, and then followed
by the somewhat schizophrenic position that the Uyghurs who
were let go had to be resettled someplace other than China
because they have a legitimate fear of persecution if they were
sent home.
But putting ETIM on that list at the Chinese Government's
request really contributed, I think, to a perception worldwide
that Uyghurs, you know they're Chinese, but they're Muslim, but
we're not really sure who they are, and it all sounds a little
dodgy. I mean, there's a fair amount of just ignorance and
racism at work here, coupled with shortcomings or oversights in
U.S. or European policy. I think it's a problem that this is
not just a question of how the United States or Europe has
responded. I think it's also that the global Muslim community
has not stood up really on behalf of the Uyghurs.
To the extent that there was anything positive in the
fallout from the protests last year, it was that you saw a
little bit of flag flying from Muslim communities in Turkey and
in Indonesia, which showed a little bit of solidarity, but you
don't see the big organizations speaking out about the
persecution of Uyghurs.
But to answer your approximate question very quickly, yes,
there is a World Uyghur Congress. Some of the people who are
sitting behind you can explain that to you. There are a number
of NGOs that do research and advocacy work, but they simply do
not have the global footprint or recognition that the Tibetans
have had.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes, sir. I'm sorry. Did you want to say
something, Kara? Okay. Yes, sir?
Mr. van der Wees. Hi. My name is Gerrit van der Wees. I
work for the Formosan Association for Public Affairs in
Washington, DC. I have a question on the linkage between East
Turkistan and Taiwan. In a sense, it's a followup from Mike
Pillsbury's question.
Last year, Mrs. Kadeer was blocked from entering Taiwan
[inaudible] and the showing of her movie. Just last Friday, one
of her associates was also blocked by the present government
[inaudible] human rights and democracy, and there's really a
very [inaudible] notion of justice and democracy in Taiwan. The
Government in Taiwan is increasingly leaning toward the PRC
[inaudible].
So my question is, connecting the dots here, that Tibet
[inaudible] Taiwan, can we look at this in a holistic fashion
because the PRC Government is trying to [inaudible] one-by-one
and then focus on the next one. [Inaudible.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you for your question, because we
hear, again and again, core interests: Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang.
These are our core interests, stay out. So, thank you for your
question.
Does anybody want to respond? Ms. Kan?
Ms. Kan. There was concern last year, when Taiwan's
Minister of Interior baselessly branded Rebiya Kadeer as a
``terrorist'' and denied her a visa, apparently when she didn't
even apply for one. Now we see that her daughter is there for a
screening of ``Ten Conditions of Love.'' There are reports that
Kadeer, again, was not welcomed.
This policy repeated again this year is likely to increase
concerns about Taiwan's Government, because its approach is at
odds with that of the United States, Japan, and other
countries. It does not make any sense, because that implies
somehow the United States is harboring a ``terrorist'' right
here in Washington with an office practically across from the
White House. President Bush would not have met with such a
person, so it does not make any sense, and it will increase
concerns. Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Do you want to say anything, Lisa? Okay.
No? Okay. It's outside our mandate, so I'm not going to speak
to that, but it's a very provocative and interesting point.
Yes, sir? Please.
Audience Participant. Just a more general question. Is
there any evidence of foreign organizations or countries
aggravating the situation?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That's a very good question. I don't
know. Do you mean on the ground in Xinjiang?
Audience Participant. Mostly on the ground.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Anybody want to take that, or take a
pass?
Ms. Richardson. I need to know a little bit more what you
mean by ``aggravating.''
Audience Participant. Such as supplying any form of
terrorist action or simply [inaudible] for reasons of their
own.
Ms. Richardson. Well, if you're talking about something
like selling weapons to some sort of Uyghur separatist groups,
I don't think I can help you very much on that.
Again, I would point to governments who have taken
rhetorical or political positions that have helped make it
easier for the Chinese Government to paint Uyghurs as
terrorists, but there are a number of academics, and certainly
people in the security community, who do follow these sorts of
things and I'd be happy to point you to some of their work.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. I have a question, if one of you would
like to take it real fast. There was a tremendous amount of
Uyghur-on-Han violence. During that very dark, hot summer last
July in Xinjiang, there was a lot of Uyghur-on-Han violence,
and there was also a great deal of Han-on-Uyghur violence. Both
groups suffered tremendous harm.
If you could flesh out for me or explain and fill in for me
a little bit, what were the Han grievances? What are the Han
grievances or beefs with the Uyghur community? Maybe Dr. Toops
could share with us what your understanding is of resentments
or grievances the Han may have about the current situation in
Xinjiang.
Mr. Toops. I think there are different kinds of things.
One, is to look at the violence in July last year. Then there
was a response from some members of the Han community to attack
members of the Uyghur community within Urumqi, but that was as
much saying that the state somehow was not doing enough to
protect them. This was also, along with the cost, to have the
leadership, the Party leadership, change within Xinjiang, and
now that has, so in some ways you can look at it in that kind
of context.
In another kind of context, it is more a view about, say,
kind of affirmative action policies in Xinjiang, if you're
Uyghur, if you get a score, you get added points to maybe go to
college or something like that. Of course, the college exams
are in Chinese, so it's not like you get that much points to
compensate overall. But somehow a feeling that there's some
sort of a sense of entitlement.
But I think it works the other way as well, where some
Uyghurs would feel that the Han have a sense of entitlement
within their region, and to call it the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region when it is not so autonomous is very
problematic. So I think it works on different levels. The part
about the violence, that's unfortunate no matter who is
involved there.
But the other kind of feelings about, somehow in Xinjiang,
many people feel they are a minority, that Han in Xinjiang feel
they are a minority, that it's not a situation where the Han
are the dominant in the demography of the area. Then for
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, or others, they also feel that they're a
minority. So, everybody has a little bit of that, so I think
that's a broader kind of construct rather than talking about,
say, the issues of the violence.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That's extremely helpful, thank you.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Fox. Hi. My name is Henry Fox. I'm an intern here on
the Hill. I think it's significant that we're actually
discussing this in this room--the Indian Affairs Committee
room--which has a lot of pictures in this area about autonomy
and its history in this country. It's relevant that the
[inaudible] national lacrosse team did not get access to
England to get to the [inaudible] tournament. There are a lot
of issues [inaudible] political assassinations. So given that
we have issues within our country and we have one of the most
represented democracies in the world, what would an ideal
situation for autonomy be for this group in China?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That's excellent. Do you want to take
that, Kara? Shirley, do you want to take it? Kara, you should
reply, too.
Ms. Kan. Well, I think this might not be the time to inject
Hawaiian sovereignty into the discussion. Anyway, that's
another story. We don't want to get sidetracked into something
very much alive, even here, with Hawaiian sovereignty. But
there is a question of autonomy.
One possible way is to basically call it like it is. I
mean, I think it's questionable when reporters, researchers, or
people who should know better continue to use the term
``Xinjiang [Uyghur] Autonomous Region'' without pointing out
that there is no autonomy and that's just an Orwellian term to
use. That's one thing, to recognize that there is no autonomy,
just like in Tibet.
The second thing is that I think there have been some calls
for dialogue. I think some people have mentioned about looking
at the Tibet experience--I don't want to say model, but let's
say experience. There is a record to go by, and the United
States has supported dialogue. So is there some way to look at
that experience? I'll stop there.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That's great.
Ms. Richardson. I would just add onto that that, like a lot
of Chinese laws, the autonomy law is pretty good on paper. I
would strongly urge you to go and read it and understand
exactly what it spells out as not just possible, but what
actually ought to be happening and contrast it to the reality.
I mean, what the government has on paper already committed to
is not bad. The problem is, there is absolutely no
followthrough on it.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. I think the CECC, in its reports and
recommendations, previous, has said implementation of Chinese
laws on autonomy would be a huge step forward. Chinese laws on
the books on autonomy and how that is structured are not bad.
If those laws were actually fully implemented, it would be a
significant step forward.
Ma'am?
Ms. Hopkins. Hi. I'm Lisa Hopkins and I work at the Army. I
would like to ask, how does information flow or not flow out of
Xinjiang, and how is it that we know that we understand the
situation on the ground?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Lisa, you may know more than we do on
that question. Does anybody have anything to say on that? Lisa,
do you want to comment on that? I'll take your name out of the
transcript.
Ms. Hopkins. [Inaudible.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Okay. Oh. Excuse me. Shirley?
Please.
Ms. Kan. As I mentioned in my remarks, I think it's been
encouraging that foreign reporters were allowed into Xinjiang,
both last July as well as this year. That really contrasts with
the lack of foreign reporting, I think, in Lhasa in 2008.
During the riots in 2008, there was only one foreign reporter
who just happened to be there. He was a British reporter, and
he was able to get out some very good information.
Then someone else earlier mentioned about the harassment.
So even when reporters are going in from Japan, from the United
States, from Hong Kong, from other places, they face severe
harassment. They have been beaten up, where it has required
diplomatic protests.
So with these kinds of things, there would be a question of
whether the U.S. Government follows up on such harassment,
would seek to get greater assurances against these kinds of
physical as well as other kinds of harassments against foreign
reporters, and would continue to encourage a good trend, to
give some credit where credit is due, when there are foreign
reporters who have been allowed in.
Second, American diplomats. We do not have a consulate
there--we have one in Chengdu, but there would be a question of
whether American diplomats would be able to travel. Now,
significantly, I have not seen our ambassador go out there. So,
I mean, how many times can you go to Shanghai? [Laughter.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. No. But it's a very good point you raise.
Ms. Richardson. In a perfect world, we are able to actually
send researchers openly to the country that they're working on,
and in a perfect world we're able to have conversations
directly with a variety of the actors who are involved in
whatever the kind of problem is, hence the letter here to the
government.
With a country that is incredibly hostile to, among others,
international human rights organizations, obviously you've got
to play things a little bit differently. We try to talk to as
many people as we can, particularly people who we suspect might
tell us something other than what we expect to hear. We try to
talk to lots of different communities geographically and we try
to consult with as many other people who have looked at the
same situation to see if the information somehow significantly
differs.
In a case like this where you're talking about an
unbelievably tense security environment, a lot of restrictions
on movement, enormous restrictions on the people that you're
trying to talk to, and then you superimpose on top of that a
seven-, eight-, nine-month-long blackout on all communications,
which we haven't really talked about much----
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes. Which is the Internet shutting down,
basically.
Ms. Richardson. Internet, cell phones, SMS capabilities.
Lots of forms of communication to the entire region just shut
down made it that much more difficult.
If I'm remembering correctly, this report involves
interviewing people in 11 different countries. Well, we'll
leave it at that.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes, please?
Ms. Kan. And since we are here in Congress, it's very
important that there is another option to consider, which would
be the visits by staff and Members--and there's someone in the
room now, talk about giving credit where credit is due--whereby
staff have gone and reported on their visits to Urumqi and what
was happening on the ground. And that kind of thing can also be
important for getting information as well as showing
international attention and monitoring. Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes, please?
Ms. Richardson. Can I just make a quick recommendation to
the Commission, if it is within your mandate? I think actually
it would be incredibly helpful if somebody kept and publicized
a roster of who is asked to go and when, and whether they got
turned down, because I'm aware of various staff members who
have asked to go, I'm aware of people in the Embassy in Beijing
who have asked to go. Just because they get turned down doesn't
mean that we should acknowledge their efforts, but it can be
very hard to know even who has made the effort, and when.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. There is an amendment floating around in
Congress that would mandate reporting on visa and permit
requests by U.S. academics, and U.S. Government officials,
including Congressional and State Department staff, to visit
China or specific regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. The
amendment would require that our government report on the known
number of those requests, and the number of visa and region-
specific denials the Chinese Government imposed. Many Members
of Congress continue to be alarmed by the number of China
academic experts who are denied visas, because the Chinese
Government is displeased by their research topics. Also, they
are alarmed by the number of U.S. Government officials and
staff who are not permitted to travel to China. This is the
case despite the large numbers of Chinese academics and Chinese
officials who travel to the United States without facing
significant obstacles in entry.
Yes, ma'am? Please.
Audience Participant. Hi. Thank you for doing this.
[Inaudible] from the [inaudible] we've reported pretty
extensively on this, but I always wondered what we're leaving
out. I know that [inaudible] on this last week [inaudible] on
the anniversary of the demonstrations and riots. I'm just kind
of wondering, is there any information that [inaudible] but is
there anything big that we're not reporting? [Inaudible.]
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That's a great question. Let's go, girls
and boy. Now's your chance.
Ms. Richardson. I'm happy to tell you what's at the top of
my list, which is really detailed information, pretty granular
stuff, about the number of death sentences that have been
handed down and carried out.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Dr. Toops, is there something you think
should receive greater coverage in the mainstream media?
Mr. Toops. I think a lot of times elements of the
mainstream media, they might have some experts that speak
Chinese and they know something about China, but very few would
speak Uyghur or Tibetan or something like that. So then they
have to go through third parties as translators, and sometimes
these things just don't translate very well.
So a long-term analysis, at least from an academic
perspective, is really lacking in terms of looking at what's
coming out of the media. So, it's rather to try to understand
the kind of social contacts that are going on in Xinjiang.
There was some mention here made about Hawaii. It was like,
well, there are lots of issues in the United States. Of course,
that's not the purview of this Commission, but in some ways
they're similar, and in other ways, not. At the same time,
there have been riots in the streets in different parts of the
United States. So, I have to kind of take it into overall
context.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes.
Ms. Kan. I guess I will just say two things, briefly. One
would be, from the perspective--I know you're writing for a
Japanese newspaper, but I think this does not pertain only to
U.S. security interests, this would also pertain to a lot of
the security interests of Japan and the countries around the
world. We are very concerned about the ability to stabilize the
situation in central Asia in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Stability requires a comprehensive multilateral, multinational
approach involving the resources and attention of many
countries, and Japan has contributed significantly to our
efforts.
The Uyghurs in Xinjiang are very well-positioned to provide
the links to play a greater role in the economic development
and the greater stability of central Asia. They have the
linguistic links. They have the historical links. They have the
trade ties. They may even have family ties. They can play a
much greater role, and it does not necessarily require people
to be forced into learning Mandarin or something like that. So
there are contributions that perhaps we may be missing, or we
could encourage, or we have not seen in terms of economic and
humanitarian people-to-people links.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Great.
Mr. Halpin?
Mr. Halpin. Yes. I was going to comment about this question
about access. An issue for [inaudible] and I think when I made
my famous ill-fated trip to Xinjiang--what we were talking
about, it led to a reaction where there was the rounding up and
actually detention and abuse of Mrs. Kadeer's children. But we
were very fortunate to be [inaudible] there was one Fulbright
scholar who was actually there, and we did get to meet her and
have a very good discussion.
I would just say there's nothing like striped pants on the
ground, as opposed to boots on the ground. In Mr. Lantos' act,
he called for us to try to negotiate a consulate in Lhasa, and
the same could be said for Urumqi or other places in western
China. We see this with Shenyang and the Korean border and
refugee issues.
As restricted as UNHCR is in Beijing, as restricted as we
are, we've had some great information come out of that
consulate in Shenyang by [inaudible] at least the general
proximity of the Korean Autonomous Prefecture. There's always
been officers in Shenyang who really contributed a lot to our
understanding. So I think we know the Chinese, they're great
horse traders. They still want, I guess, Atlanta, Boston----
Ms. Oldham-Moore. And Hawaii. They want Hawaii.
Mr. Halpin. Yes. Atlanta, Boston, and Honolulu. Right. I
guess we've got the American Presence Post, open up that APP,
that old Condoleezza Rice idea of the one-person post. But
another one person and another city on the east coast of China
does not meet the national interest of the United States.
So I guess in response, I guess it has to be
legislatively--and it can't even be as nice as Mr. Lantos was,
suggesting to the State Department or to, whether it's the Bush
Administration or the Obama Administration, that you would have
consulates, but to say on reciprocity, there will now be no
Chinese consulate in Boston, or Honolulu, or Atlanta until we
have consulates in these western areas of China.
They are supposedly wanting to expand trade, the ``Go West,
Young Man'' movement to develop these areas, and they are going
to be more internationalized. We had an issue where there was
an arrest in Tibet of American citizens. As tourists, we have
consular issues. I guess you just have to legislatively say, if
you want Boston, we want--if you want Honolulu, we want Urumqi.
Make it very clear as a reciprocity issue.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you. Thanks.
Ms. Kan. I'd just add one thing.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes.
Ms. Kan. Outside of government, there are, of course, a lot
of universities and academics doing a lot of research. One of
the problems that we hear about over the years is some sort of
a blacklist that would be kept on certain academics. So the
question then for our side is: What are these universities
doing about it? Are they standing up to it, are they holding
their own united front, or are they appeasing at the expense of
intellectual freedom and academic pursuits?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. That is a very excellent question.
Somebody want to take this on? Do you want to respond, anybody?
Okay. Yes. Amy?
Ms. Reger. I'm Amy Reger from the Uyghur Human Rights
Project. I think one of the things we're trying to stay
concerned about is the [inaudible] acknowledge, certainly on
the part of the Chinese Government, but also on the part of the
international community, that there was use of live fire by the
state last year--and there has been [inaudible] on the
aftermath and repression of Uyghurs, such as [inaudible]
excellent Human Rights Watch [inaudible] this last December.
There has been, in my opinion [inaudible] to Uyghur
accounts of violence committed by the state against Uyghurs,
and we certainly appreciate the [inaudible] in response to the
questions about information, it is certainly very difficult for
us to get information about [inaudible] information that we
have gotten from interviews of Uyghurs who were in Urumqi on
July 5 and afterward, and also that Amnesty International has
gotten from Uyghurs [inaudible] accounts [inaudible] against
Uyghurs [inaudible] more international attention [inaudible]
but if I can ask another question, I just wanted to remark on
Dr. Toops' comment about the perceived perception of Uyghurs
having special privileges. I think that's a really good
observation.
I recently [inaudible] that was written by [inaudible] I'm
not sure if they were from Beijing or if they were from
[inaudible] but they also remarked on these, what they
perceived to be special Uyghur privileges, such as the lower
requirements to get into university or the allowance of Uyghurs
to have more children. I just wondered if you could speak more
about whether you think now [inaudible] government policies
[inaudible] perceived privileges or if perhaps there might be
an implication of [inaudible].
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Thank you. I think I got the second
part of the question, which was Han perceptions of special
privileges for Uyghurs. Do you guys want to speak to that
again? No, I guess not. Amy, we got it. I think we can have a
further conversation up here. Okay? Thanks.
Does anybody else have a question, a quick question before
we close down? One last question. Come on. How about the man in
the uniform? No? No? We all want to hear from you. Anna
Brettell.
Ms. Brettell. You started talking about the news blackout
in Xinjiang, but could you tell us a little more about the
scope and timing of the blackout? What has happened recently,
is the Twitter site working? Do people across the province have
access to the Internet?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. And is Twitter up?
Ms. Richardson. Twitter?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. I can answer that question: No.
Ms. Richardson. I'm showing my age. But the question about
the media blackout, the Chinese Government revised its
playbook, I think, in responding to these protests, clearly by
looking back at what, from its perspective, had gone wrong in
Tibet. From its perspective, one of the problems became not
letting the media in itself. I mean, this is just a total no-
brainer, if you know journalists. If you don't let them in to
report, not letting them in to report becomes the story.
So the response in Xinjiang was to let them in, but to try
to control the story. The other piece of the puzzle was
essentially to shut down really all means of communicating with
the outside world. It became very difficult for, I think it was
about nine months, to have any kind of email exchange, any sort
of electronic communications. Again, I don't want to give Zhang
Chunxian any credit before he's actually earned it, but he was
the one who said, shortly after being appointed to this new
position, ``There can't be an open Xinjiang without an open
Internet.''
Now, that's a very nice idea. We'll see if his idea of an
open Internet is consistent with what people who are accustomed
to a genuinely open Internet would think of or whether he's
talking about what the Chinese Government thinks of as an open
Internet, which is still not nearly what we would all like it
to be. The ability to report on and get information in and out
is still very difficult. Getting people in and out, getting
stories in and out, getting information corroborated can be
very difficult. That's ongoing.
Twitter, as I understand it, over the last couple of weeks,
has kind of come and gone. We've done a little bit of Tweeting
with some of our friends; sometimes it's worked, sometimes it
hasn't. But as I understand it, there are a couple of different
potential technological explanations for that.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Thank you.
And Kara Abramson will wrap up.
Ms. Abramson. Great. Actually, may I wrap up with one
question?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes.
Ms. Abramson. Do we have time? Great. I will take advantage
of having the microphone and do that.
One issue that we haven't touched on today is the Chinese
Government project to demolish and reconstruct the old city of
Kashgar. I would be interested in hearing the panelists'
perspectives on why this is being done. Dr. Toops, you've
looked at Silk Road tourism. The old city of Kashgar is a huge
tourist site, so on one level we have to ask, isn't the Chinese
Government shooting itself in the foot by getting rid of this
excellent tourist attraction? I'd like to hear from all of the
panelists, or whoever would like to address this. Why this is
taking place and what's the logic behind it?
Mr. Toops. The stated logic behind the destruction of those
old buildings is that they are old and that it's unsafe and
it's not up to standards for housing, and to have a more
developed society you need to have better housing. So the older
style housing, which may be only a few stories, it may be
earthen, and those are being demolished. People have
opportunities to move into newer apartments that are on the
outside of town, so a little bit further away from work, so not
everybody takes advantage of that. You get some fiscal
compensation, but not that much.
In some ways it's analogous to what's gone on in other
parts of China, in Beijing or other areas, where some older
kinds of buildings have been demolished and then brought in
with the new one. What's happening, though, in Kashgar in this
context, is that the newer buildings are then being populated
by people who are not from Kashgar, but are maybe from other
areas, and so it's also connected with a population shift, I
think. As far as the tourism kind of aspect of it, yes, there's
certainly a lot of tourists that went to see the old city of
Kashgar.
But the concession to get in there, the concession was
granted to the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps because
they have a lot of skills in managing things, so you're paying
the Production Construction Corps ticket entry fee, but it
doesn't really go to the local neighborhood. So there's an
issue kind of at the cultural level, and then of course there's
the economic components.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thanks.
Shirley, do you want to speak to this?
Ms. Kan. Well, I just find it interesting, as I mentioned
earlier, that the Secretary General of the OIC just was allowed
into Xinjiang last month and he was able to visit Kashgar. So
one question is whether this policy to demolish the Uyghurs'
cultural center will still continue, given that the Muslim
world is watching what happens.
Second, it's not just a question of demolishing the old
cultural center in Kashgar. There have been reports that the
PRC authorities were seeking to demolish the Rebiya Kadeer
building right in Urumqi, the famous landmark in Urumqi right
down the road from the two famous international bazaars. What
would happen to the Uyghur women trying to eke out a living and
other things around that landmark?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. What is the Rebiya Kadeer building?
Ms. Kan. It is a very tall, commercial-looking building
right in the middle of Urumqi, just down the road from the two
major international bazaars. There have been questions about
what would happen to them, possibly in retaliation. A lot of
women make their living out of that building.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Great. Thank you.
Ms. Richardson. I'll just add on that the stated logic is,
new modern housing, won't that be nice for everybody, that
should go a long way toward addressing some of the grievances
that the local population has. From our perspective, not only
are there problems like this rampant across China, and there's
an obvious lack of compensation and consultation--I mean, under
Chinese law people have the right to say, no, I don't want to
move, and only be moved if the circumstances are shown, through
a legal proceeding, to be extraordinary and necessary, which
obviously we don't think really happens all that often.
But I think to do this, even if you left out the cultural
dimension and the fact that the parts of Kashgar that got razed
have been designated by the World Heritage Organization as
important monuments, I think it's a pretty potent way for a
centralized government to say to people, we will remake this
place the way we want it to be. We do not care what you want,
we do not care what your history is, we do not care what you
think, we will make it our way and you will like it or you will
lump it. I think that's a pretty ill-informed policy,
particularly in a region that's already as restive as it is.
Ms. Abramson. Great. We've reached our time limit. I'd like
to thank all of our panelists for their testimony today, and
everyone here for coming. We will have a transcript of this
roundtable on our Web site, www.cecc.gov. We will also have the
written testimony of Kathleen McLaughlin, the journalist who
has reported from Xinjiang who was unable to join us here
today, so please visit our Web site. We look forward to seeing
you at future events. Thank you. [Applause.]
[The prepared statement of Ms. McLaughlin appears in the
appendix.]
[The joint statement of Senator Dorgan and Representative
Levin appears in the appendix.]
[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the roundtable was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Stanley Toops
july 19, 2010
Demographics and Development: Xinjiang Work Forum May 2010
Thank you for the opportunity to present these remarks to you
today. I am an Associate Professor of Geography and International
Studies at Miami University. I have been conducting research on
demographic and development issues in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region of northwest China for 25 years. My remarks will focus on two
facets concerning the policies outlined in the May 2010 Xinjiang Work
Forum in China. The first is to situate the policies of the Xinjiang
Work Forum within the general trends of China's development efforts in
Xinjiang. I will discuss how economic development varies in different
parts of Xinjiang depending on local inputs of agriculture, industry
and transportation access. I will examine the Xinjiang Work Forum and
see how the stated goals of the Work Forum will impact the different
areas of Xinjiang. The second is to examine the demographic components
of Xinjiang. I will be talking about the distribution of population in
Xinjiang. One focus is on the changing ethnic composition of Xinjiang
in terms of Han, Uyghur, Kazakh and others. Another element to consider
is migration within the region as well as the Han migration to
Xinjiang. I will examine recent demographic trends.
What is now the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has been
labeled a variety of names. This Inner Asian area is composed of the
Tarim Basin, the Turpan Basin, the Dzungarian Basin, and the Ili
Valley. This area is known as Eastern Turkistan to distinguish it from
Western Turkistan, the former Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, the largest of China's political units, covers an
area of 1,650,000 square kilometers, one-sixth of China's total area,
three times the size of France. Xinjiang now has a population of 21
million. Located in the northwest of China, Xinjiang is bounded on the
northeast by Mongolia, on the west by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, and on the south by Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
Xinjiang's eastern borders front Gansu, Qinghai, and Tibet (Figure 1).
economic development
China started the Western Development Program in 1999 to address
some of the regional inequities faced by China's western regions in
comparison to the more developed eastern portions of China. China's
development programs are addressed to the needs of its various regions.
The current policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum expand on the
Western Development Program.
Developmental change occurs in Xinjiang based on the dynamism of
the region. Xinjiang is composed as well of different localities that
vary in character and responses to government policies. The traditional
economic landscapes of this Silk Road region were herding, oasis
agriculture, and trade. On top of that the state has added the modern
including distribution (road, rail, air), as well as production (oil,
textiles, agri-business) and consumption (urban and rural).
The state's project of developing Xinjiang restructured the
economic landscape. Transportation linkages lead to Urumqi and thence
to Beijing in a hierarchical centralized fashion. Traditional economic
centers such as Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja are superseded by Urumqi's
industries based petrochemical and textiles. Oil found in the north at
Karamay (black oil in Uyghur) and the current oil exploration in the
Tarim has added to Xinjiang's economic value to China. Oasis
agriculture by the Uyghurs and animal herding by the Kazakhs were
superseded by commercial agriculture on state farms. The state created
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) out of
demobilized elements of the People's Liberation Army in the 1950s to
run the state farms. The XPCC still runs these state farms and has
branched out into industry as well. In terms of consumption, Urumqi has
been the focus of the economy with people paying high prices, earning
not so high wages and living in high rises. In rural areas in the south
farther from the markets, people still live in poverty. Border trade
was nonexistent in the 1960s, limited in the 1970s, and grew in the
1980s-1990s.
China embarked on a ``develop the west'' campaign in 1999. Policies
in the 1980s focused on developing the eastern coast while the western
interior should prepare for future development. After the coastal
development strategy of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC began to turn its
attention to rural poverty much of which was located in the interior.
In June 1999, Sec. Jiang Zemin formally opened the western development
strategy at CCP and government meetings. This policy elaborates on Deng
Xiaoping's coastal program by turning to regional inequalities in the
west.
Reasons for the new ``develop the west'' campaign focus on reducing
regional inequality. In the 1990s, the interior regions began to be
discontent with the siphoning off of resources, human and natural, to
coastal development. Lack of economic growth in the west meant
underdevelopment--in turn leading to social instabilities.
For western regions that have areas characterized by poverty and a
larger percentage of minority population in the ethnic makeup, there is
a potential for political instability as well as social instability. So
the basic formula of development leading to stability is one that is
followed in China.
Under the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the PRC
commanded a great restructuring of the area. That restructuring
occurred through many different programs. Their focus has been an
orientation of Xinjiang to Beijing. Historically, Xinjiang's centers of
power and activity were in Kashgar, Turpan and Gulja. In modern
Xinjiang under the PRC, the centralizing force of the state has meant
that Urumqi has become the dominant center in terms of productions,
administration, culture, population, and power. For Xinjiang this has
meant a re-orientation to Beijing and lessening of the status of
Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja in a hierarchy of power. This re-orientation
to China has created a geography of development. The reconstruction of
the development landscape has meant the distribution of productive
forces and their concentration in central Xinjiang. As migrants from
other portions of China move to Xinjiang, a new development landscape
is created which means further directional shift--toward Beijing.
Agriculturally, the hallmark of Xinjiang's development has been the
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Large amounts of central
investments and subsidies were directed to rebuilding the land. At the
same time central funds and
demobilized troops contributed to the consolidation of central control.
Animal husbandry has continued growth but the production policies
during the collectivization period hindered the pastoralists. Most
disastrous was the formation of agro-herding complexes that plowed up
rangelands for grain. Xinjiang has the capacity to be a great meat
producer for China. Production gains in agriculture must be understood
in the context of reversals in animal husbandry.
Production in industry and agriculture as well as the tertiary
sector inscribes an activity region of Xinjiang and smaller sets of
regions within Xinjiang. Regions of cultural identification in Xinjiang
are constituted through relations between and within ethnic groups. The
region is the medium for social interaction; the relationships that
link together institutions and people shape that region. Northern
Xinjiang has most of the industry and commerce. Substantial numbers of
Han and Uyghur along with Kazakh reside here. The focus of the north is
found in the industrial municipalities of Urumqi, Karamay, and
Shihezi--this is the modern day core of Xinjiang's economy populated
mostly by Han. In contrast Southern Xinjiang is more rural, with an
agricultural economy. Much of the population in the south is Uyghur,
Kashgar in the south is mostly Uyghur; however there are more Han in
the cities now especially in Korla and Aksu.
As the region modernized most of the industrial advancements took
place in the core Xinjiang area of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi. The
economy is focused on this area. Urumqi was connected to the rest of
China by railroad in the 1960s and by 1990 to Kazakhstan. Urumqi and
Karamay have the largest values in industrial production. Urumqi is
well diversified in industrial output including heavy industry,
petrochemicals and textiles. Karamay's industry derives mostly from oil
production, besides crude oil and gas production, processing also
occurs here. Karamay is connected by pipeline to Urumqi. Districts in
the south, such as Aksu and Kashgar, produce mostly for local use
(cement, fertilizer, food processing). The railroad was extended to
Kashgar in 1999. Processing of the Tarim oil adds to the GDP of Korla
in Bayangol; otherwise industrial GDP in southern Xinjiang is not
large.
Karamay leads in per capita GDP, because of its oil processing and
relatively low population. Urumqi has approximately double the average
for Xinjiang. Other leaders include Bayangol, Turpan, and Shihezi. The
low points in this economic landscape are Hotan, Kizilsu and Kashgar,
all in the south and far from the economic heart of Xinjiang. Urumqi is
the major economic center. The traditional centers of Kashgar and Ili
fall short, while the traditional center of Turpan has made a bit of a
comeback because of oil.
All in all the impact of oil (Karamay, Urumqi and even Bayangol and
Turpan) is clear. Refining all of the oil in the XUAR would add to the
GDP. For the south having more refineries in Bayangol, Aksu or Turpan
would boost local GDP. Urumqi's refineries take in most of the Tarim
and Turpan oil. Most of the oil crews are from Northeastern China, for
example Daqing. Thus the oil migrants add their labor force to the
local areas.
What is the nature of the development landscape in Xinjiang?
Production is up as is GDP per capita. However these two measures show
only part of the picture. Much of the rise in GDP is due to the
processing extractive products; there is an over reliance on oil to
describe a rosy scenario. Much of labor force is still in the
agricultural sector. Many basic needs have been met. The difficulty
comes with seeing the regional differentiation. There is an
underdeveloped south compared with developed north. The historical
economic centers of Turpan, Kashgar and Gulja have been superseded by
the new modernized economic centers of Urumqi, Shihezi, Karamay, and
Korla.
To develop southern Xinjiang along the lines of northern Xinjiang
would require significant amounts of capital investment. The ``develop
the west'' campaign would seem on the surface to bring new investment
to Xinjiang, but most of those capital and labor flows will be directed
to northern rather than southern Xinjiang.
The new policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum have a more
detailed plan for Xinjiang's development prospects. Representatives
from the various coastal provinces met with counterparts in Xinjiang
earlier this year before the Work Forum to start the planning for these
projects. One key aspect is the regional component. Attention is paid
to southern Xinjiang. There is also an interesting pairing up of
provinces on the east coast with the prefectures of Xinjiang.
Beijing Municipality--No.14 Division (XPCC), Hotan Prefecture--7.26
billion yuan ($1.06 billion) over the next five years for housing and
protected agriculture
Guangdong Province--Tumushuke City of the XPCC's No.3 Division, Kashgar
Prefecture--9.6 billion yuan ($1.41 billion) over the next five years
for infrastructure construction and public services
Shenzhen--Kashgar City and Taxkorgan County--supply of financing,
technologies, talent and management expertise
Jiangsu Province--No.4 Division and No.7 Division of the XPCC, Yili
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture--
people's livelihoods, education, vocational training and oil pipeline
projects
Shanghai Municipality--Kashgar Prefecture--earthquake-resistant housing
projects, vocational training and agriculture facilities
Shandong Province--Kashgar Prefecture--earthquake-resistant housing
projects and safe drinking water projects
Zhejiang Province--Ala'er City of the No.1 Division of the XPCC, Aksu
Prefecture--a total investment of 16.7 billion yuan ($2.45 billion)
over the next 10 years in industries, modern agriculture and social
welfare
Liaoning Province--Tacheng Prefecture--180 million yuan ($26.36
million) as disaster relief for residents affected by the blizzard in
2009, job training and modern agriculture
Henan Province--Hami Prefecture and No.13 Division of the XPCC--
orchards, protected agriculture and reconstruction of dilapidated
houses
Hebei Province--No.2 Division of the XPCC and Bayingolin Mongol
Autonomous Prefecture--an investment 1.8 billion yuan ($263.62 million)
in agricultural technologies, housing, employment and education over
the next five years
Shanxi Province--Wujiaqu City of the XPCC's No.6 Division, Changji Hui
Autonomous Prefecture--coal mining, education and reconstruction in
shanty areas
Fujian Province--Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture--investments in the
textile industry, social welfare and rural infrastructureHunan
Province--Turpan Prefecture--affordable housing programs and coal
mining
Hubei Province--Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture and No.5 Division
of the XPCC--protected agriculture, tourism and educationAnhui
Province--Hotan Prefecture--an investment of 1.3 billion yuan ($190.4
million) over the next five years in protected agriculture and modern
industries
Tianjin Municipality--Hotan Prefecture--fruit processing and
construction of railways and roads
Heilongjiang Province--No.10 Division of the XPCC and Altay
Prefecture--mining, education and job training
Jiangxi Province--Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture--an investment
of 2.07 billion yuan ($303.16 million) in infrastructure, education and
people's livelihoods
Jilin Province--Altay Prefecture--flood prevention projects and
people's livelihoods
(Hu Yue, ``Hand in Hand,'' Beijing Review June 7, 2010, No. 23
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2010-06/07/)
Southern Xinjiang then will have connections with Beijing,
Guangdong, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Shandong, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Tianjin.
This direct pairing may be useful, yet there are some problems. Take
for example Kashgar's pairing with Shenzhen. Shenzhen is a special
economic zone administered separately from Guangdong province, Shenzhen
has special economic rules compared with the rest of Guangdong.
Shenzhen specializes in the factories for the global export market.
Shenzhen is to supply financing, technologies, talent and management
expertise. While the financing of projects in Kashgar may be useful,
talent and technology will not go very far in Kashgar. Shenzhen's
economic success has depended on its neighbor Hong Kong for investment
and expertise. Kashgar's nearest neighbors are Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan
in contrast. There is of course an overseas community of people from
Xinjiang that is Uyghur and Han in other countries. Perhaps their
expertise and skills could be tapped into. This artificial pairing of
East Coast--Xinjiang partners would need to go beyond sister city
pairing to be beneficial.
Another interesting part of the plan is that Divisions of the XPCC
are also partners. This reflects the economic reality of the Xinjiang--
the XPCC forms a major part of Xinjiang's economy. It functions as a
separate company. The Xinjiang Production Construction Corps XPCC
(Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan) was established in 1954. The Corps as the
other state farm systems was dissolved after the Cultural Revolution in
1975 but was reinstated by 1981. The Corps is still organized along
military lines; indeed, the Chinese name Bingtuan identifies the XPCC
as an Army Corps. The XPCC has developed a vast state farm system as
well as factories, hotels, and whole cities. The Corps utilizes migrant
Han labor as well as prison labor. The Corps receives substantial
support from the state and has been a major element of state control in
Xinjiang. In the 50 years of the Corps' existence, it has become a twin
to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government, both twins cast
large shadows. Fifty years have past but the Corps numbers 2.5 million
members, making it the largest state organization after the People's
Liberation Army in China. So the plan provides for east coast provinces
to support a Centrally administered entity--the XPCC.
The types of programs are also of interest. Much of the projects
are for material infrastructure. These include housing, agriculture,
pipelines, mining, fruit processing, textiles, and modern industries.
There are some projects on education and ``people's livelihood'' which
deal more with the human infrastructure. Investment in human
infrastructure will have a more beneficial impact than more road
construction in the region. The coordination of all these projects will
be quite difficult particularly since the experts form the east coast
may not be very familiar with local conditions in Xinjiang.
One of the focuses should be on education and literacy for southern
Xinjiang. Investment in human as well as natural resources is a key to
sustained development. Education though needs to be followed by
employment. Education without employment is a short ticket to
disastrous development. Another issue is that of language. Would
Xinjiang be able to follow a path of bilingualism? Can a Uyghur get
ahead in society without also being fluent in Chinese? Can a Han get
ahead in society without being fluent in Uyghur? Given the current
answers to these questions (probably no and definitely yes) the
language of instruction is critical for Xinjiang. The universities in
Xinjiang have moved from a bilingual (Chinese and Uyghur) to a
monolingual system (only Chinese). This changed has continued in the
Xinjiang educational system with ramifications on down through primary
school.
demographic landscape
The demographic landscape of Xinjiang has undergone changes as
well. There has been an influx of Han migrants thus changing the ethnic
composition of the region. The migrations were regionally selective as
well thus changing the distribution of population. Xinjiang ethnic
diversity forms a basis for regionalization. With a variety of ethnic
groups living in the area, all of their experiences and traditions can
be brought to bear on any issue. An understanding of the distribution
of the ethnic groups provides clues to the cultural landscape of the
area.
Of the 30 different ethnic groups in Xinjiang, 13 have made
Xinjiang their home. The 13 are Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatar,
Xibo, Manchu, Mongol, Daur, Han, Hui, Tajik, and Russian. They
represent different language groups, religions, and customs. Within
Xinjiang's 2008 population of 21.3 million, Uyghur account for 46
percent, Han 39 percent, Kazakh 7 percent, and the rest 8 percent.
Within the cities one may see a great variety of ethnic groups, but
most of the minority groups live on the periphery. A definite Central
Asian component is the population base in the region, particularly
outside of the capital Urumqi.
Han migration has filled in many corners of Xinjiang. Much of the
migration has focused on the major lines of transport, Urumqi south to
Korla, Urumqi west to Shihezi. Kashgar and Gulja have maintained their
general ethnic composition. The central portion of Xinjiang has
continued to grow with Han migration. In the future, though, Xinjiang
sees a problem with water supply, especially in Urumqi. Xinjiang is
large but not all of its land can be settled.
When considering the level of development, one also needs to
consider the ethnic composition of the population. Xinjiang is about 40
percent Han. There are higher percentages of Han in the northern
corridor in Urumqi, Shihezi and Karamay. The south is mostly Uyghur in
contrast. An interesting observation, though, is the relative increase
in the Han population in the south. Kizilsu, Kashgar and Aksu have the
most relative change in the numbers of Han. Much of this new population
is urban, so the effect is even stronger in Kashgar City, Artush City
and Aksu City. Modern population settlement and migration patterns have
followed the railway. This increase in Han population is probably due
to the new railway extended to Kashgar in 1999.
Han populations match up well with urban and transportation
linkages, roads and railroads; migrants tend to follow transportation
lines. Xinjiang has distinctive nationality concentrations. The cities
as well have distinctive ethnic neighborhoods, for example, Uyghur in
Urumqi, or Hui in Turpan. Uyghurs live in the south, which is the
poorest area. Han live in the wealthier urban corridor of the north.
The 2000 census like the 1990 included questions on migration
Respondents were asked if they were registered in other localities. In
Xinjiang, over 1.4 million people (7.64 percent) indicated they were
registered elsewhere; I assume most of these were Han or Hui, most
likely not Turkic minorities. Not all migration data from the census
has been released. The registrants came from all over China, primarily
from the Southwest, North, and Northwest. Major sources for the
registrants are Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu. The Sichuan migrants (over
400,000) are well known in Xinjiang, witness the large number of
Sichuan restaurants. Sichuanese have been coming to Xinjiang since the
1950s. There are many registrants who have come to Xinjiang from the
Three Gorges area. The Henan people coming to Xinjiang are Yellow River
people. There are many ties from the north China Plain to Xinjiang
going back to the 1950s. The Gansu people are true north westerners who
have moved along the Hexi corridor into Xinjiang. These migrants are
working in industry and agriculture, in oil and in cotton, in
households and in government, as cadres and as maids. Like any
immigrant group they are seeking a better life, in this case primarily
economic life. Xinjiang is a very different place from Sichuan or
Henan, not so different from Gansu. Migrants are aided and recruited.
There are centers in Urumqi, Korla and other major cities to facilitate
the flow of the migrants for jobs and housing. Or recruiters, whose
original home is in Sichuan, go back to Sichuan to bring labor to
Urumqi. Since there is a surplus of labor in Sichuan, since the people
speak the same dialect, since jobs are scarce in Sichuan and the
population is large, why not go to Xinjiang for a time to make some
money?
What is the nature of the demographic landscape in Xinjiang? The
population is concentrated in two segments, Northern Xinjiang and
Southern Xinjiang. In both cases the roads and now railroads linking
the settlements have proved to be the major paths for migration. The
population has a male/female ratio comparable with the rest of China,
the Uyghur have a lower male/female ratio than the Han. Xinjiang's age
profile is younger than other parts of China; southern Xinjiang is
particularly young. In terms of nationality (minzu /millet) the Uyghur
are still in the south and the Kazakh are in the north. The Han are
migrating in a steady stream into the central area and following paths
of migration to the other urban centers. Major sources of migrants are
from Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu.
What direction does this young, ethnically diverse population with
large numbers of migrants take? If the border were open to cross border
migration, some Kazakhs might move to Kazakhstan or Uyghurs to Central
Asia. But there is no Uyghur land across the border. Indeed if the
border were open there might well be many Han in Kazakhstan and Central
Asia rather than the few who are there now. South to Pakistan, north to
Russia and Mongolia does not seem readily possible, although the local
connections to these neighboring countries are strong. Given economic
tendencies Han migrants are looking not to Xinjiang but to Shanghai,
Hong Kong, Beijing, and further afield to US, Canada, Australia or
Europe. 50-60 million Han live outside of the country as huaqiao
overseas Chinese.
Looking across the border to Kazakhstan, one sees a similar
situation a young ethnic diverse population, with a large number of
migrants from Russia rather than China. Of course, since 1990 the
political situation is now quite different.
Xinjiang's demographics show a population that is getting older
little by little and more urban. The demographic trends also show a
population that is becoming less ethnically diverse with more migrants.
That is the future of Xinjiang's demography.
Xinjiang has certainly prospered materially. I first studied in
Urumqi in 1985; since then cell phones, cable TV, computers, and 20-
story buildings are commonplace. There has been a technological growth.
Transportation improvements air, rail, and highways connect the region
together, focusing on Urumqi. Now all taxicabs in Urumqi have Global
Positioning Systems.
Han hold many of the technological and jobs in Xinjiang. A higher
percentage of Uyghurs have advanced education than in the past, but to
get a good job is not so easy in Xinjiang, to do so one needs
connections or guanxi. Tapping onto the network of connections one
relies on government, university, family, kith and kin. Connections for
Han are more forthcoming than for Uyghur. Of course a well-connected
highly educated Uyghur has more chance than a poor Han peasant from
Hunan. A well-qualified individual has a better chance among his or her
own ethnic group. Ham migrants have contributed greatly to the economic
development of the region but not necessarily to the local inhabitants
of Xinjiang. Those who have worked in technical fields training local
Uyghur and Kazakh population have also contributed to the social
development of the region and its inhabitants.
The plans for development in Xinjiang place a great deal of
emphasis on physical infrastructure (roads and railways). For example,
World Bank loans were previously used for improving the highway between
Urumqi and Turpan, between Kuitun and Sayram Lake. In contrast the
Tarim Basin Project is aimed at poor farmers in the south. China also
has a World Bank Project aimed at education among indigenous peoples in
Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou. This is a good example of a project that
could be adapted to southern Xinjiang.
The new policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum will also have
a considerable impact on the local demography. Often times with work
projects in China, the skilled workers move into the areas. So many of
the jobs in the new infrastructure projects would go to people with
experience in those fields. This would entail more people migrating
from eastern China to Xinjiang. And since the projects would go deep
into southern Xinjiang, there will be more migration of Han into the
traditionally Uyghur populated areas of southern Xinjiang. Usually the
supervisors and foremen at job sites would be Han and prefer have a
work force that operates in the Chinese language. So it is more
difficult for a Uyghur to get hired in this formal sector of the
economy. This Xinjiang development program could lead into an east-west
population transfer across China.
The resultant impact of the development program on the demographic
character of Xinjiang lies in two areas: the combination of ethnicity
and migration. The development program will entail a movement of
population from the east. Prior migrations from the east have been
directly organized by the center. The major migration of Han into the
region occurred during the 1950s. Many soldiers as well as peasants and
urban dwellers settled in the region. In some cases, demobilized
soldiers formed the new Production and Construction Corps. Oftentimes
this settlement extended into land that was used for pastureland,
converting it to agricultural purposes. Or new patches of ``desert''
were converted by tapping into the local aquifer (such land could only
be used for a few years before nature would reclaim it). Many from as
far as Shanghai came, as well as Sichuan and Hunan, in addition to the
traditional flow of migrants from Gansu and Shaanxi. Migration slowed
in the 1970s as the political situation stabilized.
In the 1990s a new element began to appear--the floating
population. China has about 100 million people that can be classified
as floating population. We do not know how many there are in Xinjiang.
These could also be described as temporary or circular migrants, in
that they do not move permanently but could constitute an extra 10
percent of any urban population. In Urumqi, the temporary migrants can
be seen at the train station, emerging from the 3-4 day journey. There
is a large enclave of the temporary migrants living near the train
station. Downtown, there is an office for the temporary residents where
they can line up jobs and get housing. A stroll by this area and a
discussion with the migrants shows that many of them are looking for
construction or other skilled labor jobs. The better skilled can
command 2000 yuan per month. Similar facilities are available in Korla
and Aksu. So there is a provision for the temporary migrants even
though a permanent move may not be in the future for them. Many would
only plan to stay a while to try their luck in the city. This new
development program would bring more formal migrants as well as
floating population into Xinjiang. Most of the migrants had been
heading toward the central areas of Urumqi and Shihezi. Now there will
be more migrants headed toward Kashgar and southern Xinjiang. The vast
majority of these migrants will be Han. Thus the cultural character of
southern Xinjiang will change from one predominantly Uyghur to one with
a larger Han component.
Finally, what are the prospects for population growth? Population
growth continues in Xinjiang, as does the migration to the region from
other parts of China. If anything, the migration seems to be increasing
in recent years, particularly with the addition of the floating
population. This migration will ensure a larger percentage of Han in
the region. The focus for the Han population will continue to be
northern and central Xinjiang around Urumqi. With the completion of the
railway to Kashgar, migration flows into southern Xinjiang will
continue. Already the Han proportion of the population in southern
Xinjiang has begun to increase. The only real limit to population
growth in the region is access to water not access to land. The state
has decided to tap into local aquifers and is using that water for
agricultural expansion, oil production, construction and industry and
residential use. In the oases of southern Xinjiang, overexploitation of
water points to a serious ecological disaster in the making.
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Correspondent for
BNA, Inc., and Freelance Journalist
july 19, 2010
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and thanks very much to the
CECC for
inviting me to take part in this important discussion. As a journalist
and not a scholar, I'd like to focus primarily on the difficulties
journalists face in reporting on Xinjiang, and how the strict barriers
to reporting on the region have left the international media with a
general lack of facts and understanding about what is happening there.
When deadly riots erupted in Urumqi last summer, foreign
correspondents in China expected the same kind of scenario we had
encountered the year earlier when violent riots hit Tibet. Most of us
believed that Xinjiang would be blocked off to reporters and the
outward flow of information tightly controlled.
So it was a pleasant surprise to find that the capital of Xinjiang
was relatively open to foreign correspondents. Though Chinese media
were not allowed free access to the region, foreign reporters flocked
to Urumqi, where dozens of them found they had relatively open access
to the city.
There were some problems, some hassles with police (including one
incident in which reporters were beaten up), but given the violent and
potentially dangerous situation, reporting conditions in Urumqi were
far less difficult or complicated than most had expected. I personally
did not go to Urumqi but was told by several colleagues who did that
they moved about with relative ease, and that a government-established
press center with a dedicated Internet line was quite helpful in their
work. The region's Internet was shut down, so journalists were
scrambling to file stories and communicate.
A few months after the riots, Chinese officials acknowledged that
they had made a deliberate, top-level decision to open the Xinjiang
capital to foreign journalists, saying that they believed it was in
China's best interest to let open reporting prevail and allow the facts
to come out. In many cases, the facts did emerge from Urumqi. Foreign
journalists were able to talk with both Han Chinese and Uighurs who
were involved in the riots, and detailed accounts emerged from Urumqi.
But the entirety of Xinjiang was far from transparent. Kashgar, the
political and cultural heart of Xinjiang, was largely shut off to
foreign journalists and remains so to this day. Reporters have been
turned away at the airport upon landing in Kashgar, followed and warned
by police and ordered to leave the city. In my own case, I travelled to
Kashgar at the end of last year and managed to escape police notice for
nearly a week. That ended on my last night in town, however, when I had
to check into a hotel on my own passport, which contains a journalist
visa. The manager did what is required in all of China and notified
police that a foreign journalist had checked into his hotel. Within 30
minutes, five officers were knocking on my door, demanding to know why
I was in Kashgar and when I would be leaving. One officer took my
passport and checked me in for the first departing flight back to
Urumqi.
And even though was able to stay in Kashgar for several days before
being noticed, reporting was extremely difficult because locals did not
want to be interviewed. I was told there were clear directives that
residents should not be speaking with foreign journalists and that all
local tour guides had been issued guidelines to report journalists to
the local police. This has been borne out by the experience of other
journalists who have tried to work in Kashgar over the past year. It's
a marked turnabout from conditions before the riots, when Kashgar was
relatively open to reporters and locals talks with journalists without
extreme fear of reprisals. That's no longer the case.
As a result, the flow of information from Kashgar and other parts
of Xinjiang has been barely a trickle. This should perhaps not be a
surprise. After all, the root of the riots likely started in Kashgar,
though we still don't know exactly what or how things transpired.
The initial spark for the riots was ignited at a toy factory in
Guangdong Province in late June, when what has been described as either
a fight or an attack left at least two Uighurs dead at the hands of Han
Chinese coworkers. After several days and no arrests in the Shaoguan
toy factory murders, it seems that Uighurs began organizing protests
which later escalated into the July 5 riots in Urumqi.
As I mentioned earlier, I didn't go to Urumqi during the riots or
their immediate aftermath. Instead, I travelled to Shaoguan to try to
find out what had happened at the toy factory. What I found was that
hundreds of Uighur workers (most from Shufu, a suburb of Kashgar) who
many say had been pressured to moved to Guangzhou under the governments
outward migration push, were sequestered off from the rest of the
factory, the bosses said for their own safety. Residents, businesses
owners and factory workers around the giant toy factory had been told
not to speak to journalists, but many did. Still, despite the chatter,
what emerged was a picture as clear as mud. There was a clear
atmosphere of ethnic tension between Uighurs and Han Chinese in the
factory town in the aftermath of the murders, but it was far less clear
what tensions led to the incident. Wide disagreement remains to this
day over what sparked the brawl and how many people were killed.
Uighurs I spoke with in a nearby factory town said they were forced
through economic pressures to leave Kashgar and work in Guangdong. They
said their friends in Shaoguan were under tight controls and directed
not to speak of the incident. They had very real concerns for their
safety and that of their families.
To this day, essential facts remain unknown about what happened
last summer, and what caused Urumqi to devolve into China's deadliest
ethnic riots in decades. What led to the riots, how they were
organized, and what happened to those involved are all questions that
have not been satisfactorily answered. China has earned credited for
allowing free flow of information during the Xinjiang riots, but the
flow was not free enough to answer imperative questions.
In a recent survey of our correspondent members, the Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China found that most journalists who responded
believe government restrictions make it impossible to do balanced and
accurate reporting on Xinjiang. Travel restrictions and intensive
pressure on sources are major barriers. Even though Xinjiang is
ostensibly open to foreign journalists, correspondents liken it to
Tibet--the only part of China where journalists are still required to
get prior government permission to visit. Correspondents reported being
harassed and monitored while working in Xinjiang in recent years,
particularly in Kashgar and other non-Urumqi locations during and after
the riots. The pressure seems to have ramped up even higher around the
one-year anniversary of the riots earlier this month.
Reported one correspondent who travelled to Xinjiang last year:
``We were followed and forced to leave Kashgar by the police. Some
people were too scared to talk to us.''
Too often in Xinjiang, this seems to be the case. Sources face very
real repercussions for speaking to journalists, which has become an
effective tool for containing information. Without the ability to
investigate the facts or talk to people who live there, we may never
know the real story of the Xinjiang riots and so many other things
about life and politics there.
Thanks very much for your attention and I look forward to the
discussion.
______
Statement of the Chairman and Cochairman: Xinjiang--One Year After
Demonstrations and Rioting
july 9, 2010
We are deeply concerned by human rights conditions in Xinjiang, one
year after demonstrations and rioting in the region. Events that
started on July 5, 2009 resulted in injury and death to Han and Uyghur
citizens alike. Repressive policies in the region have continued, and,
in some cases, have intensified.
In the aftermath of last year's violence, the government tightly
restricted the free flow of information, and curbed Internet access for
10 months. Authorities intensified security campaigns and conducted
large scale sweeps and raids. Security forces detained some Uyghurs,
primarily men and boys, whose whereabouts still remain unknown. We are
alarmed by reports that trials have been marred by violations of
Chinese law and international standards for due process.
We are concerned by reported curbs on independent legal defense and
a general lack of transparency in trials. Conditions in the region
today remain tense. The Internet is back up, but a number of Uyghur Web
sites remain shuttered. And throughout the last year, the government
issued regulations to restrict free speech. As we noted immediately
after last year's tragic events, we urge the Chinese government, when
addressing events in Xinjiang, to abide by its domestic and
international commitments to protect citizen's fundamental rights and
to promote the rule of law, and we urge the Chinese government to
address the longstanding grievances of the Uyghur people, especially
those related to official suppression of Uyghurs' independent
expressions of ethnic, cultural, and religious identity.