[Senate Hearing 111-581]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-581
LESSONS FROM THE MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACKS--PARTS I AND II
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HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
of the
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 8 AND 28, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Deborah P. Parkinson, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
John K. Grant, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1, 29
Senator Collins.............................................. 3, 30
Senator McCain............................................... 47
Senator Bennet............................................... 49
WITNESSES
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Charles E. Allen, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security........................... 5
Donald N. Van Duyn, Chief Intelligence Officer, Directorate of
Intelligence, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 8
Hon. Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, City of New York..... 11
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor, The RAND Corporation...... 32
Ashley J. Tellis, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace............................................ 35
J. Alan Orlob, Vice President, Corporate Security and Loss
Prevention, Marriott International Lodging..................... 38
Michael L. Norton, Managing Director, Global Property Management,
Tishman Speyer................................................. 40
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Allen, Charles E.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Jenkins, Brian Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 32
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 78
Kelly, Hon. Raymond W.:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 72
Norton, Michael L.:
Testimony.................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 103
Orlob, J. Alan:
Testimony.................................................... 38
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 96
Tellis, Ashley J., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Van Duyn, Donald N.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 67
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Norton................................................... 113
Mr. Orlob.................................................... 111
LESSONS FROM THE MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACKS--PART I
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:41 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good afternoon and welcome to this
hearing. I thank our witnesses from the law enforcement and
intelligence community for your presence here today for this
hearing on lessons that we here in the United States can learn
from the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
As we all know, on the night of November 26, 2008, 10
terrorists made an amphibious landing onto the jetties of
Mumbai, India, and proceeded to carry out sophisticated,
simultaneous, deadly attacks on multiple targets, including the
city's main railway station, two of its most prominent hotels,
a popular outdoor cafe, a movie theater, and a Jewish community
center.
Three days of siege and mayhem followed. As the world
watched on television, these 10 terrorists paralyzed a great
metropolis of 12 million people and murdered nearly 200 of
them. The victims were Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and
Jews. They were citizens of many nations, including six
Americans. Senior American intelligence officials have placed
responsibility for the attacks on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a
terrorist group based in Pakistan.
I know that I speak for all of my colleagues on this
Committee and in the Senate in expressing our sympathy to the
families and friends of the victims of these attacks and also
to express our solidarity with the people of India and their
government in the wake of the attack.
I had the opportunity to travel to New Delhi just a few
days after the Mumbai attacks and the honor of meeting with
Prime Minister Singh, Foreign Minister Mukherjee, and National
Security Advisor Narayanan. The Indian people and their leaders
were understandably and justifiably angry and intent on
demanding and achieving justice. Prime Minister Singh and his
government have acted firmly and responsibly in response to
this attack. The terrorists wanted to divide and radicalize
people in India and to provoke a war with Pakistan, but India's
government, indeed, India's people have proven stronger and
wiser than that, while being persistent in demanding that those
responsible for these attacks be brought to justice.
I also had the opportunity right afterward to visit
Islamabad, where I met with Prime Minister Gilani, General
Kayani, and other senior officials with whom I discussed
Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Mumbai attacks. I was encouraged that
the democratically-elected leaders of Pakistan understand the
threat of Islamist extremism to themselves and their neighbors
and that the Pakistani government has taken steps to crack down
on LeT, including abiding by the sanctions imposed last
December at the United Nations.
But much more is needed and quickly. It is absolutely
imperative that Lashkar's leaders are not just detained by
Pakistani authorities, but that they are prosecuted for the
terrorist acts they are accused of planning and helping to
carry out.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine those attacks on
Mumbai and determine what lessons can be drawn from them for
America's homeland security.
First, we need to understand who carried out these attacks
in the most broad and yet also specific detail. In other words,
what is Lashkar-e-Taiba, and what are its ideologies and
history? What is its relationship to al-Qaeda and other
Islamist terrorist groups? Does it threaten the United States
in any way? What are its ties, both past and present, to the
Pakistani army and its intelligence agency, the Directorate for
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)?
Second, we need to understand how the men who carried out
these attacks were recruited, trained, funded, indoctrinated,
and radicalized, the process on which the one surviving
terrorist, Ajmal Amir, in Indian custody, has already cast some
light. The problem of radicalization is one that this Committee
has closely examined in the last 2\1/2\ years and one that the
three governmental agencies represented by our three witnesses
have also closely studied.
It is particularly important in Pakistan, given that many
of the attacks against the United States and our allies, both
failed and successful, have had links to Pakistani-based
groups, particularly Pakistani-based training camps.
Third, we need to understand the implications of some of
the tactics used successfully in these attacks. For example, we
know that the attackers traveled undetected from Karachi in
Pakistan to Mumbai by boat. What are the implications of this
attack from the waters on our own homeland security here in the
United States?
We also know that leading-edge technologies were used to
facilitate the attacks. The terrorists apparently, for
instance, used Google Earth to surveil their targets and
communicated with each other and with their controllers back in
Pakistan using BlackBerrys and Skype. How does the use of such
tools impact our own efforts to prevent terrorism here at home?
Fourth, we need to look at the targets of this attack and
determine whether we are doing as much as we can and should be
doing to appropriately protect our own ``soft targets,'' a term
generally given to facilities that are not traditionally
subject to a high level of security, such as nuclear power
plants and defense locations, but would include hotels,
shopping malls, and sports arenas. While there are practical
limits, of course, to protecting such targets in an open
society such as ours or India's, it is imperative that we take
smart, cost-effective security measures here in the United
States through means such as security awareness training,
exercises focused on soft targets, and improved information
sharing about potential threats.
Fifth, we need to examine how we can strengthen our
homeland security cooperation with the government of India and
other allied governments in the wake of this attack. Over the
past few years, we have literally transformed America's
relationship with India across a broad array of shared
interests and activities. This bilateral relationship is now
emerging as one of America's most important strategic
partnerships in the 21st Century. I hope we are exploring ways
in which we can cooperate to protect the citizens of both of
these great democracies from terrorist attacks.
When I was in New Delhi, I discussed with Prime Minister
Singh his administration's plan to overhaul the way the Indian
government is organized to protect homeland security in the
wake of Mumbai. Needless to say, I hope we can find ways in
which we can assist our Indian friends in this critical effort
and how, in turn, they can assist us in protecting our homeland
from terrorism.
I am very grateful that we have as witnesses today three of
the leading authorities in government on matters on terrorism,
Charlie Allen from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Commissioner Ray Kelly from the New York Police Department, and
Donald Van Duyn from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Your willingness to be here today before this Committee is
appreciated and also, I think, attests to the seriousness with
which you and the men and women in your agencies take the
ongoing terrorist challenge.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we begin a new
year, this hearing is a sobering reminder of the continuing
threat that terrorism poses to this Nation and to civilized
people throughout the world.
The consequences of the Mumbai attack reverberate
worldwide. Six Americans were among the more than 160 victims,
once again raising concern for the safety of our citizens at
home and abroad. In addition to the tragic loss of life, the
attack temporarily crippled the financial center of India, the
world's largest democracy and a friend of the United States.
The implicated terrorist group, LeT, has links that reach
far beyond South Asia. In 2004, for example, two men sentenced
for violent felonies admitted to helping members of a Virginian
jihadist network gain entry to Lashkar training camps in
Pakistan.
The murderous assault on Mumbai deserves our attention
because it raises important questions about our own plans to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorist attacks in the
United States. Careful analysis of the tactics used, the
targets chosen, and the effectiveness of the response will
provide valuable insight into the strengths and weaknesses of
our own Nation's defenses.
The Mumbai attacks focused, as the Chairman has pointed
out, on soft targets, like hotels, restaurants, a railway
station, and a Jewish cultural center. And the Mumbai attackers
used conventional, but still dreadfully lethal, weapons like
automatic rifles and hand grenades to carry out their bloody
mission.
While terrorists will certainly still seek to acquire and
use a weapon of mass destruction, the Mumbai attack underscores
the threat posed by a few well-armed and well-trained
individuals. It also raises the critical question of whether
the attack may signal a shift in terrorist tactics toward
conventional weapons and explosives used in coordinated attacks
by small groups. Indeed, in 2007, a group of homegrown
terrorists plotted a similar low-tech attack against Fort Dix
in New Jersey.
Such tactics and goals may require rethinking our standard
response doctrines. For example, is securing a perimeter and
waiting for specialized tactical squads the best way to deal
with terrorists who are moving about and seeking to inflict
maximum bloodshed? Do local and State law enforcement agencies
need improved rapid access to building plans and prearranged
contacts at all likely targets, from transportation hubs and
government buildings to large shopping malls, schools,
theaters, hotels, and restaurants? Do the Federal Government,
State and local officials, and the private sector have
sufficiently well-developed information sharing procedures for
use both before and during attacks and other emergencies?
By examining the command, control, and coordination of the
Indian government's response as well as the adequacy of their
equipment and training and the public information arrangements
in place during the Mumbai attack, can we improve our own
efforts to prevent similar attacks?
On the diplomatic front, we clearly must redouble our
efforts to persuade and pressure states like Pakistan that
tolerate terrorist safe havens.
Finally and of great interest to this Committee, we need to
ask whether the Mumbai atrocities shed any new light on the
nature of the violent extremist mindset and on the
opportunities for the United States and the international
community to work cooperatively to prevent and counter the
process of violent radicalization.
I commend the Chairman for convening this hearing and I
welcome our witnesses and look forward to hearing their
testimony on the lessons that we can draw from the attacks in
India. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for that excellent statement.
We will now go to the witnesses, beginning with Charlie
Allen. After a long and extraordinary career of service to our
Nation at the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Allen was good
enough to join this new Department of Homeland Security in its
infancy. He serves as the Chief Intelligence Officer of the
Department and holds the title of Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis.
Mr. Allen, thanks very much again for being with us.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN,\1\ UNDER SECRETARY FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Collins. It is a pleasure to be here and a pleasure to be here
with my colleagues, Don Van Duyn, with whom I worked at the
Agency, and also it is always an honor to be with Commissioner
Kelly.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Allen appears in the Appendix on
page 61.
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I think it is important that we have this hearing, that we
learn here in our country the lessons of Mumbai, and I think
the three of us have probably some unique perspectives on this.
The attacks were shocking. They were brazen. The brutality
was, without question, some of the worst that we have seen in
terrorism in modern times. Terrorists using fairly ordinary
weapons wreaked great havoc and destruction. So we need to know
what happened, how it happened, so we are better prepared to
deal with potential attacks of a similar nature in this
country.
My office routinely conducts analysis on threats around the
world to understand them, to understand how they could affect
the homeland, and it is critical that our analysis,
particularly in our Department, be promptly and thoroughly
shared with our State, local, tribal, and private sector
partners, and I will speak a little bit about that in a couple
of moments.
We began looking at the Mumbai just as the attacks got
underway and then we continued to work through Thanksgiving and
the weekend until the 72 hours passed and the terrorists were
suppressed. What we saw there in Mumbai were members of a well-
armed and well-trained terrorist cell, as Senator Lieberman
said, making this maritime entry to the coastal city, then
fanning out in multiple locations and attacking targets
including transportation, commercial, and religious facilities.
We are reminded that delayed or disrupted plots are likely
to resurface. Indian authorities arrested a Lashkar-e-Taiba
operative in February 2008. He carried with him information
suggesting Mumbai landmarks, including the Taj Mahal Hotel, had
been targeted for surveillance, possibly meaning future
terrorist operations. We cannot say whether the plans had been
delayed because of something the Indian government had done or
whether the plotters were just not ready until November, but it
does remind us that plots can lay dormant for a long time and
then appear at the time of the plotter's choosing.
A heightened security posture had an impact, perhaps, on
the timing of the attack, but the targets nonetheless remained
in the cross-hairs of the plotters. This reminds us that we
cannot let our guard down and we must develop sustainable ways
to address possible credible threats. We are reminded here, of
course, of our Twin Towers and how they were attacked in 1993
and then again in 2001.
We are reminded also that a determined and innovative
adversary will take great efforts to find security
vulnerabilities and exploit them. The Mumbai attackers were
able to ascertain the routines and vulnerabilities of the
security forces at the primary targets during the pre-
operational phase. They entered by water where security was the
weakest. They thought that they could greatly increase the
likelihood of their success if they came by sea.
Because it is impossible to maintain heightened security
indefinitely at all possible points, including extensive
shorelines, we have learned that it is important to vary
security routines and establish capabilities to surge security
forces. We have done this very frequently in the Department.
The Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams
that we run have had 1,000 of those exercises over the last
year and a half.
We are also reminded that security must be unpredictable
for the adversary. It needs to be predictably responsive to
those who need to implement the measures, however. During a
period of heightened security earlier this year, several of the
hotels in Mumbai installed security scanning devices. According
to open source reporting, some of those devices were not in
operation during the attacks and all security personnel were
not properly trained on how those devices work. This, of
course, means that security device measures have little value
if they are not used or the personnel who use them do not
adequately understand how to effectively operate them.
Thus, we are reminded that training of private sector
security personnel and first responders is an essential element
of securing our Nation's critical infrastructure. As many
possible soft targets are controlled by private organizations,
the private sector must be a full partner in efforts to protect
the homeland.
Also, we are reminded that thorough knowledge of the target
can dramatically increase the effectiveness of the attack, and
conversely, lack of similar knowledge by responders can
significantly diminish an effective response.
Much of the information the Mumbai attackers required to
mount a successful attack was accessible through readily
available sources. Hotels, restaurants, and train stations, by
their nature, are susceptible to extensive surveillance
activities that might not be necessarily noticed. Such
information can give attackers significant advantage during the
attack because they know traffic patterns and escape routes.
We should remember that such surveillance activities by
terrorist operatives or support personnel also represent an
opportunity to identify and interdict terrorist operatives. The
Department is working with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), the FBI, and our State, local,
and city partners to establish a comprehensive Suspicious
Activity Reporting System that will systematically identify and
collect information regarding possible pre-attack activity.
We are also reminded that low-tech attacks can achieve
strategic goals and can be dramatically enhanced by technology
enablers. The attackers were able to fend off responding forces
just using automatic rifles, grenades, and some improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), basically the weapons of a basic
infantryman. They also used satellite and cell phones to
maximize effectiveness, and they monitored press coverage of
the attack through wireless communication devices they had
taken from hostages to obtain up-to-date information regarding
the actions of the Indian government rescue forces.
We are also reminded that a response to a similar terrorist
attack in a major U.S. urban city would be complicated and
difficult. We saw how the chaos the attacks created magnified
the difficulty of mounting an appropriate response. We also saw
how essential it is to ensure that first responders are up to
the task. They must first and foremost have adequate
information as to the details of what is happening as well as
to have appropriate tools to mount an effective response.
In Mumbai, we saw attackers were able to exploit the
initial chaos and move on to new targets while responders still
focused on the initial targets. So from that perspective,
preparedness training for this type of attack might not have
prevented it. The effects could likely have been mitigated and
reduced if authorities are well prepared and have exercised
responses to terrorist attacks across all levels of government.
We also are reminded that the lack of a unified command
system can significantly hamper an effective response. In the
homeland, we have developed the National Response Framework,
which provides us with a unified command system to respond to
terrorist attacks and natural disasters. This framework would
not eliminate the chaos generated during a terrorist attack,
but it does provide guidance on organizational roles and
responsibilities during response and recovery operations.
Again, we are reminded that public-private interactions are
crucial and must be developed before an incident occurs.
Developing those relations before an incident helps facilitate
the flow of information during crises and may help ensure that
the data conveyed to first responders is accurate, such as
changes in floor plans and access routes. Within the
Department, our Office of Infrastructure Protection manages
many such private-public partnerships.
We are reminded also that training exercises that integrate
lessons learned are crucial. We do this, and we learn greatly
from it. We did not do this prior to September 11, 2001. The
exercises that we conduct today have been absolutely
invaluable.
You asked that we discuss the Department's information
sharing with India following the attack. We certainly can do
that, but we would respectfully request to discuss that in
private closed session.
But, on an information sharing basis, we have certainly
worked very hard to get the information out to State and local
government, working with our colleagues here in the FBI. We
sent out threat assessments. And then on December 3, we sent
out a more sustained and developed instruction on what we saw
of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the Mumbai
attackers. My office also published a primer for all State and
local officials on Lashkar-e-Taiba, its history, and its modus
operandi.
In closing, I would say that what we have done was a very
useful exercise. I am very pleased with the amount of
information that we were able to get out to our partners, both
in State, local, and the private sector. I am also pleased with
the way we worked very closely at the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) and with our good colleagues in the FBI and our
colleagues at the State and local government level.
I just came from a Homeland Security Advisors Conference
that was run here in Washington. It is clear that they believe
that we are making the progress that we need to make in sharing
information at the State and local level. We need to do more,
Senator, but we have come a long way in the last couple of
years.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. I agree on both counts. Thanks for your
testimony. Every time you said, ``We are reminded,'' I was
hearing it as either we drew a lesson from this, or, in fact,
we were reminded of some things by Mumbai that we had already
seen evidence of here. I would like to come back during the
question and answer period and ask you to develop a few of
those matters that we were reminded of.
We go now to Donald Van Duyn. He came to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in August 2003, after 24 years of service at
the Central Intelligence Agency. In September of last year, Mr.
Van Duyn was appointed by Director Mueller to be the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the FBI. In that capacity, you are here
and we are very glad to have you here. Please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DONALD N. VAN DUYN,\1\ CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Van Duyn. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, thank
you very much for inviting me today with my two distinguished
colleagues to discuss the lessons learned from the recent
terrorist attacks in Mumbai and how the FBI is working with our
U.S. intelligence community and law enforcement partners to
apply those lessons to protect the homeland.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Van Duyn appears in the Appendix
on page 67.
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I would like to begin by briefly describing the FBI's role
in overseas investigations in general and our response to the
Mumbai attacks, in particular. We appreciate the Committee's
understanding that this is an ongoing investigation with FBI
personnel on the ground, and that our participation in it is at
the behest of the Indian government. Because of that and the
diplomatic sensitivities involved, there are likely to be
questions that I cannot answer in this forum. We would be
pleased, however, to provide additional information in a closed
session, however.
As advances in technology, communications, and
transportation continue to blur international boundaries, the
FBI is increasingly being called on to address threats and
attacks to U.S. interests overseas. To help combat global crime
and terrorism, we are using our network of 61 Legal Attache
Offices to strengthen and expand our partnerships with foreign
law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world.
In the event of an attack on U.S. citizens or U.S.
interests abroad, our Legal Attache obtains approval from the
host government and the U.S. Embassy for the FBI to provide
investigative assistance. The appropriate FBI operational
division then deploys personnel and equipment and runs the
investigation. The Counterterrorism Division has the lead for
the FBI's investigation of terrorist attacks overseas.
To give you an idea of the scope of the FBI's presence
abroad, on any given day, there are about 400 to 500 FBI
personnel deployed overseas. About 60 percent of those are
permanently assigned to the Legal Attaches while 40 percent are
temporarily deployed to war zones, including Afghanistan and
Iraq, and extraterritorial investigations, such as Mumbai.
In response to the Mumbai attacks in particular, the FBI
obtained approval from the Indian government and the U.S.
Embassy in New Delhi to deploy personnel to assist with the
investigation. The team, which arrived in Mumbai on November
29, 2008, has two major jobs. One is the pursuit of justice,
which involves traditional forensic-based investigative work to
track down those who have murdered Americans and to determine
who the attackers' co-conspirators were. Two, and equally
important, is the pursuit of the prevention mission, which
involves generating new information to determine who else might
be out there who potentially poses a threat to the United
States, our citizens, and our allies.
While the Mumbai investigation is still in its infancy, the
FBI is working with our Indian law enforcement and intelligence
partners to help uncover information about how the attacks were
executed, how the attackers were trained, and how long the
attacks took to plan. We can and have already begun to share
that information, in conjunction with DHS, with our Federal,
State, and local partners at a classified and an unclassified
level and to use it to bolster our efforts to protect the
homeland. But the most valuable lessons learned will come at
the conclusion of this investigation.
So far, the Mumbai attacks have reinforced several key
lessons. One, terrorist organizations don't need weapons of
mass destruction, as Senator Collins pointed out, or even large
quantities of explosives to be effective. The simplest weapons
can be as deadly. It comes as no surprise that a small,
disciplined team of highly-trained individuals can wreak the
level of havoc that we saw in Mumbai. Other terrorist groups
will no doubt take note of and seek to emulate the Mumbai
attacks. The take-home lesson for the FBI and the DHS and law
enforcement is that we need to continue to look at both large
and small organizations with the right combination of
capabilities and intent to carry out attacks.
Two, we need to reenergize our efforts to keep the American
public engaged and vigilant. That is critical to the effort to
prevent something like the Mumbai attacks from occurring on our
shores. As we engage the public, we want to attempt to avoid
what happened before the first World Trade Center attacks in
1993. People observed the eventual perpetrators of that attack
mixing chemicals and engaging in suspicious behavior. They
talked about it, but they did not report it to the authorities.
A key tool for engaging the public and our law enforcement
partners is eGuardian, a web-based application to track
suspicious incident reporting. As we receive information on
threats from law enforcement, other Federal agencies, and the
general public, we input these reports into the system, where
they can be tracked, searched, analyzed, and triaged for
action. No threat report is left unaddressed. Although roughly
97 percent of these incidents are ultimately determined to have
no conclusive nexus to terrorism, we believe we cannot afford
to ignore potentially important threat indicators.
We have begun a pilot deployment of a new system called
eGuardian, which is an unclassified system that enables
participation by our State, local, Federal, and tribal law
enforcement partners. The eGuardian software will enable near-
real time sharing and tracking of terrorist information and
suspicious activities among State, local, tribal, and Federal
entities.
Finally, we must remember that terrorist organizations may
begin as a threat to their surrounding localities, but can
quickly gain broader aspirations. The Mumbai attacks reinforce
the reality that Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group believed to be
responsible for the Mumbai attacks, has the capability to
operate outside its own home base of Kashmir. These attacks
remind us that we must examine other groups that appear to be
active only locally and determine where they have the
operational capability and strategic intention to undertake a
more regional or global agenda.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as the threats to the United
States become more global, the FBI is expanding our
collaboration with our law enforcement and intelligence
partners around the world. We are working with our
international partners to prevent terrorist attacks and assist
in their investigations when they do occur. And, as we have
done with the Mumbai attacks, we will continue to analyze and
share lessons learned from these investigations to help prevent
future attacks at home or against U.S. interests abroad.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Van Duyn.
Just a point of clarification--and you don't have to refer
to this case--I take it that it is possible for the FBI, if it
determines it is in our interest, to request extradition of
accused individuals in foreign cases to be tried here at home,
with the permission of the foreign country?
Mr. Van Duyn. That is correct.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
The three of you, just looking at Commissioner Kelly's
record, have an extraordinary number of years in public
service. Because I respect Charlie Allen, I won't count the
years here publicly.
Commissioner Kelly began in the Vietnam War, served 30
years in the Marines, the Marine Corps Reserve, joined the New
York Police Department, served there for 31 years, that
culminating in 1992 in his selection as Commissioner. A few
years later, he retired from that and went into the private
sector and then came back to public service. He served our
National Government as a Commissioner of the U.S. Customs
Service and as Under Secretary for Enforcement at the Treasury
Department, where he was responsible for the U.S. Secret
Service, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Office
of Foreign Assets Control, and then returned now for his second
time as Commissioner of the New York Police Department (NYPD).
We are very grateful you took the time to be here. I must
tell you that we have had a wonderful working relationship on
this Committee with the NYPD in a wide array of areas. This
Department is, with all deference to other local police
departments around the country, so far ahead in its
counterterrorism programs that it really does set the standard.
Perhaps, some might say, well, that is understandable because
of the World Trade Center attack in 1993 and then, of course,
September 11, 2001, but the fact is you have done it,
Commissioner. You have played a significant part in it.
I have looked at your testimony. I am very impressed by the
extent to which you already have a program, which I know you
will talk about, to try to raise the guard at so-called soft
targets, which I think could be a model for other cities around
the country. But thank you for being here and we look forward
to your lessons learned from the Mumbai attacks.
TESTIMONY OF HON. RAYMOND W. KELLY,\1\ POLICE COMMISSIONER,
CITY OF NEW YORK
Mr. Kelly. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Senator Collins. Thank you for inviting me to speak about
the lessons that the New York City Police Department has drawn
from the events in Mumbai.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly appears in the Appendix on
page 72.
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Within hours of the end of the attack, the NYPD notified
the Indian government that we would be sending personnel there.
On December 1, 2008, we dispatched three senior officers. Their
assignment was to gather as much information as possible about
the tactics used in the attack. This is in keeping with the
practice we have followed for several years. In all cases, our
officers do not take part in investigative activity.
In Mumbai, our officers toured crime scenes, took
photographs, and asked questions of police officials. They
relayed what they learned back to New York. These officers are
part of the Department's Overseas Liaison Program, in which we
post experienced personnel in 11 cities around the world. They
partner with local police and intelligence agencies and respond
when terrorist incidents occur.
In this case, the most senior officer in the group had
served as a liaison in Amman, Jordan. In July 2006, when seven
bombs exploded in Mumbai trains and railway stations, he flew
to the city on a similar mission. The relationships that he
forged during that trip proved helpful in November.
As you know, it is believed that the perpetrators of both
attacks were members of the radical Islamist group Lashkar-e-
Taiba, which has been fighting Indian security forces for
decades. From the perspective of the New York City Police
Department, one of the most important aspects of this attack
was the shift in tactics, from suicide bombs to a commando-
style military assault where small teams of highly-trained,
heavily-armed operatives launched simultaneous sustained
attacks. They fanned out across the city in groups of two and
four.
They carried AK-56 assault rifles, a Chinese manufactured
copy of the Russian AK-47. It holds a 30-round magazine with a
firing rate of 600 to 650 rounds per minute. In addition, the
terrorists each carried a duffel bag loaded with extra
ammunition, an average of 300 to 400 rounds contained in as
many as 12 magazines, along with a half-dozen grenades and one
plastic explosive or IED.
The attackers displayed a sophisticated level of training,
coordination, and stamina. They fired in controlled,
disciplined bursts. When our liaisons toured the hotels and
railway stations, they saw bullet holes that shots were fired
in groups of three aimed at head level. With less-experienced
shooters, you would see bullet holes in the ceiling and floor.
This group had, we believe, extensive practice, and the numbers
of casualties show it. Ten terrorists managed to kill or injure
almost 500 people.
They were experienced in working together as a unit. For
example, they used hand signals to communicate across loud and
crowded spaces. And they were sufficiently disciplined to
continue their attack over many hours. This had the effect of
increasing the public's fear and keeping the incident in the
news cycle for a longer period of time.
These are a few of the differences from what we have seen
before. Consistent with previous attacks around the world were
some of the features of the target city. The country's
financial capital, a densely-populated, multi-cultural
metropolis, and a hub for the media and entertainment
industries. Obviously, these are also descriptions of New York
City.
The attackers focused on the most crowded public areas and
centers of Western and Jewish activity. This, too, is of
interest to the police department. The two New Yorkers who were
killed were prominent members of the Chabad Lubavitch religious
movement, which is based in Brooklyn, New York.
We are also mindful that the attackers approached Mumbai
from the water. That obviously is an issue in a major port city
like New York. For that reason, our harbor officers are trained
in and equipped with automatic weapons. They have special
authority to board any ships that enter the port. Our divers
inspect the holds of cruise ships and other vessels as well as
the piers they use for underwater explosive devices. We engage
in joint exercises with the U.S. Park Service to protect the
Statue of Liberty from any waterborne assault, and heavily-
armed Emergency Service officers board the Queen Mary II at
Ambrose Light before it enters New York Harbor to make certain
no one tries to take over this iconic ship when it enters city
waters. These are a few examples.
As much as we do, the NYPD, even with the Coast Guard's
formidable assistance, cannot fully protect the harbor,
especially when one considers the vast amounts of uninspected
cargo that enters the Port of New York and New Jersey. I have
testified before about the urgent need for better port and
maritime security. Mumbai was just another reminder.
Our liaisons arrived in Mumbai on December 2, 3 days after
the attacks ended. By December 5, our Intelligence Division had
produced an analysis, which we shared with the FBI. That
morning, we convened a special meeting with members of the NYPD
Strategic Home Intervention and Early Leadership Development
(SHIELD) program. This is an alliance between the Police
Department and about 3,000 private security managers based in
the New York area. We had the leader of our team in Mumbai call
in and speak directly to the audience. We posted photographs
and maps to help them visualize the locations. We also reviewed
a list of best practices in hotel security. This is a set of
items we routinely share when our counterterrorism officers
conduct training for hotel security.
Through another partnership, Operation Nexus, NYPD
detectives have made thousands of visits to the kind of
companies terrorists might seek to exploit, truck rental
businesses or hotels, for example. We let them know what to
look for and what to do if they observe suspicious behavior.
With hotels, we focus on protecting the exterior of the
building from a vehicle-borne threat, but we also emphasize
knowing who is in your building and recognizing that the attack
may be initiated from inside the facility. We talk about how to
identify a hostile surveillance or the stockpiling of
materials, controlling points of entry, and having a thorough
knowledge of floor plans and a widely distributed emergency
action plan.
In Mumbai, the attackers appeared to know their targets
better than responding commandos. With this in mind, since the
beginning of December, the New York City Police Department has
toured several major hotels. Supervisors in our Emergency
Service Unit are documenting the walk-throughs on video camera,
filming entrances and exits, lobbies, unoccupied guest rooms,
and banquet halls. We plan to use the videos as training tools.
Through a vast public-private partnership, our Lower
Manhattan Security Initiative, we also have access to hundreds
of private security cameras owned and operated by our private
sector partners in Manhattan's financial district. These are
monitored in a newly-opened coordination center in downtown
Manhattan.
In an active shooter incident, such as we saw in Mumbai, by
far the greatest number of casualties occur in the first
minutes of the attack. Part of the reason the members of LeT
were able to inflict severe casualties was that, for the most
part, the local police did not engage them. Their weapons were
not sufficiently powerful and they were not trained for that
type of conflict. It took more than 12 hours for Indian
commandos to arrive. By contract, the NYPD's Emergency Service
Unit is trained in the use of heavy weapons and the kind of
close-quarter battle techniques employed in Mumbai.
In addition, we have taken a number of steps to share this
training more widely among our officers. On December 15, 16,
and 17, our police recruits received basic instruction in three
types of heavy weapons. They learned about the weapons'
operating systems, how to load and unload, and how to fire
them. They were the first class to receive what will now be
routine training for our police academy recruits.
On December 5, we conducted two exercises, one a tactical
drill for Emergency Service officers, the other a tabletop
exercise for commanders. Both scenarios were based on the
attacks in Mumbai. In the exercise with our command staff, we
raised the possibility that we might have to deploy our
Emergency Service officers too thinly in the event of multiple
simultaneous attacks, such as those in Mumbai. We also
recognize that if the attacks continued over many hours, we
would need to relieve our special units with rested officers.
In response to both challenges, we have decided to provide
heavy weapons training to experienced officers in our Organized
Crime Control Bureau. They will be able to play a supplementary
role in an emergency. Similarly, we decided to use the
instructors in our Firearms and Tactics Unit as another reserve
force. Combined, these officers will be prepared to support our
Emergency Service Unit in the event of a Mumbai-style attack.
Chairman Lieberman. Commissioner, excuse me for
interrupting. Don't worry about the time. Do I understand,
then, that as a direct reaction to the Mumbai incidents, you
have expanded this training of both your recruits and back-up
forces in the use of the heavy weapons that will be necessary
to respond?
Mr. Kelly. That is correct. We had the recruits who were
still in training----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. So we gave them that training
immediately. Now, we are not going to issue them heavy weapons,
but at least they are now familiar with it.
We will start training of specialized units, senior
officers in our Narcotics Division, our Vice Division, and what
we call our Organized Crime Control Bureau. They will receive
heavy weapons training and some tactical training. They will
each receive 5 days of specialized training.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you have a departmental standard, a
kind of goal, of the time in which you aim to get your
personnel to a shooting incident, for instance?
Mr. Kelly. Well, obviously we have the patrol officer who
will respond.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kelly. Those officers are performing normal patrol. But
I think it is important to point out that our Emergency Service
officers, the officers armed with heavy weapons and going
through 6 months of specialized training, they are on patrol,
as well. So they can respond very quickly. They are not in any
garrison. They are out on the street. Our heavy weapons are out
on the street.
What we are concerned in this instance about, as I say, is
sustained engagement, where we will need to relieve those
officers.
Chairman Lieberman. Go right ahead.
Mr. Kelly. The other issue that we examined in our
exercises last month--and that was the subject of a New York
Times article yesterday--is the ability of the terrorist
handlers to direct operations from outside the attack zone
using cell phones and other portable communications devices.
With this comes a formidable capacity to adjust tactics while
attacks are underway.
We also discussed the complications of media coverage that
could disclose law enforcement tactics in real time. This
phenomenon is not new. In the past, police were able to defeat
any advantage it might give hostage takers by cutting off power
to the location they were in. However, the proliferation of
hand-held devices would appear to trump that solution. When
lives are at stake, law enforcement needs to find ways to
disrupt cell phones and other communications in a pinpointed
way against terrorists who are using them.
Now, all of the measures that I have discussed are part of
a robust kind of terrorism program that we have built from the
ground up since 2002, when we realized that we needed
additional focus on terrorism.
Now, we know that the international threat of terrorism is
not going away. Terrorists are thinking creatively about new
tactics. So must we. And while we have to learn from Mumbai and
prepare to defend ourselves against a similar attack, we cannot
focus too narrowly on any one preventive method. We need to go
back to basics, strengthen our defense on every front, stay
sharp, well trained, well equipped, and constantly vigilant.
And we must continue to work together at every level of
government to defeat those who would harm us.
I want to thank the Committee for your crucial support in
making this possible and for your opportunity to share our
lessons learned.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Commissioner, for
very helpful, impressive testimony.
Let me begin with you, if I might. I think the answer may
be implicit or explicit in your testimony, but do you view
Mumbai as a turning point in the war that the terrorists are
waging against us in the sense that it employed a different
strategy and a series of different tactics that we now have to
worry will be emulated elsewhere in the world?
Mr. Kelly. Well, it certainly could be, and that is exactly
what it is, a low-tech approach. We have been concerned, and
understandably, about suicide bombings that have happened
throughout the world. Here, we see 10 individuals armed with
very basic weaponry. We don't believe that the AK-56 that they
had, the weapons, were even automatic. We believe they were
semi-automatic. So these were basic weapons that created almost
500 deaths and serious injuries.
So yes, we certainly look to learn more from our Federal
colleagues as their investigation moves forward, but it could
very well be a turning point in a sense that the relative
simplicity of this attack is picked up by others.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Van Duyn, in what is now a longer
war on terrorism, and longer yet ahead of us, is this the
opening of a new tactic on familiar battlefields?
Mr. Van Duyn. I think it certainly has that potential. The
issue is, I think, terrorists are very attuned to the media.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Van Duyn. They look to see what is successful and what
they can do. We sometimes focus on tactics that may be exotic
and esoteric like weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which
clearly would be horrible, but for most terrorists, they are
looking for what works. So this was an attack that
unfortunately was clearly successful, so I think we can expect
that groups will look to that as a model for themselves.
Chairman Lieberman. This is what struck me, which is that
one difference between Mumbai and at least the other more
notorious terrorist incidents of recent years was that it went
over a period of time. It was not the suddenness, the awful
suddenness of the attacks of September 11, 2001, or the attacks
on subways, for instance, or transit facilities in Madrid or
London, but it was basically laying siege to a city, and you
are absolutely right, taking advantage of media coverage to
create a general sense of terror well beyond the city where it
occurred.
Mr. Allen, do you have a response to that question, how you
would put it in the context of this overall war on terrorism?
Mr. Allen. Yes. I think it does demonstrate something I
have long believed, that terrorists continue, whether it is
Madrid or whether it is July 11, 2006, in Mumbai. You will
recall there were train explosions which cost more lives.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Allen. The attacks were virtually concurrent. But it
did not galvanize the world. Here, the attack was on the
financial and entertainment centers of Mumbai and they were
able to galvanize the world for 72 hours. So I think what we
take away from this is a very sober thought, that soft targets
can create for political effect exactly what extremists want
because it is clear that some of the Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders at
the time were, and remain, I think, very enthusiastic that they
were able to bring great attention to their cause. Now they are
under some suppression today.
But I think we ought to take away from this, as Mr. Van
Duyn said, that we spend a lot of time working esoteric
threats, which are horrific, but there are other horrific ways,
and the sheer brutality of this attack certainly, I believe, is
a kind of thing that can be conducted against soft targets
around the world.
We are very fortunate that we have not had these attacks.
The Bureau has done a great job. We remember in Rockville,
Illinois, we had an individual who was caught in a sting
operation who was going to throw a hand grenade and perhaps use
a pistol to shoot his way in a shopping mall on December 6,
2006. Fortunately, he was caught. But this kind of attack, I
think we have to be prepared for it and be prepared for soft
targets to be attacked. Shopping malls must have evacuation
plans, and I am afraid to say not many of them really have them
or exercise them.
Chairman Lieberman. I want to come back to that in my
second round of questions, but finishing up on this first
round, I want to ask about Lashkar-e-Taiba because it was
hardly known. Almost every American has heard of al-Qaeda. I
doubt very many had heard of LeT before the Mumbai attacks, or
I doubt today whether very many people in this country, even in
Congress, know that this group has already had an effect in the
United States.
As Senator Collins said in her opening statement, we have
arrested, and in some cases convicted, individuals in the
United States who were intending to carry out a terrorist
attack or beginning to do so who were trained at Lashkar-e-
Taiba training camps in Pakistan. Since September 11, 2001, as
this Committee has documented in our own hearings, we have
learned over and over again that homegrown terrorists who
actually train with an Islamist terrorist organization are much
more capable of eventually carrying out an attack.
Commissioner Kelly, let me start with you. Looking forward,
what would you say is the likelihood that more individuals in
the United States, once radicalized, will travel to South Asia
to train with Lashkar-e-Taiba or groups like it?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we have seen that in the past, so
obviously it is an area of concern for us, to travel to
Pakistan. We have seen people from the United Kingdom going
there with great frequency, and of course, it is just a hop,
step, and a jump over the pond, so to speak, to come here. So
the possibility or the capability of going to Pakistan and
receiving the training to come back and hurt us in a major way
is certainly there and we have seen it as an ongoing issue.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Mr. Van Duyn, do you want to add
anything to that, just on the probability? I am correct, I know
that we have on record people from this country who have gone
to the LeT camps in Pakistan and come back and conspired to
carry out terrorist attacks. Is that likely to continue on into
the future, perhaps at a greater rate?
Mr. Van Duyn. We certainly share that concern and the fact
that there are still LeT camps plus the camps of other groups.
LeT is just one of a number of Pakistani-Kashmiri militant
groups, many of which have training camps. You will recall that
in 2004, there was a group in Lodi, California, that we also
disrupted that had trained in Pakistan.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Van Duyn. I think just as important as Pakistan,
however, is the recognition that people who travel to train
with the mujahideen anywhere in the world can represent a
threat. There have been recent press reports about young
individuals from Minneapolis, for example, going to Somalia to
fight there. This is something of which we are profoundly aware
and are attempting to monitor.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Yes. I would just say that we have to worry
about people being attracted to this form of extremism, not
only Somalis but others, and we have had these connections.
Particularly, we have had British citizens who have gone into
Lashkar-e-Taiba camps. We have had also al-Qaeda members who
have had informally connections with Lashkar-e-Taiba. I won't
say that one is controlled by the other, which it is not, but
there has always been that linkage. You must remember, Abu
Zubaydah, who was caught in March 2002, was the first major
high-value terrorist to be caught after September 11, 2001, and
he had been staying in a safe house that belonged to Lashkar-e-
Taiba. So there are these linkages that go back, and informal
linkages go back between al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba and that
should give us something to worry about, as well.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, exactly. So when we in the United
States press our allies in Islamabad and the Pakistani
government to take action to clean up and bring to justice LeT
and other terrorist groups operating in Pakistan, it is not
just a short-term response to the Mumbai attacks or in defense
of the majority of law-abiding people in Pakistan and India who
will be targets of those terrorists potentially, but when we
ask our allies in Pakistan to take action against terrorist
camps within Pakistan, it is also to protect the homeland
security of the American people because of the path that
radicalized Americans have taken in going to those camps in
Pakistan to train, to come back and carry out attacks here in
the United States.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Van Duyn, to follow up on the Chairman's question, you
stated in your testimony that LeT had already demonstrated its
capability to operate outside its home base. I read with alarm
the reports of some in the Somali community in Minnesota
potentially being recruited to go to Somalia to fight.
Terrorist groups have two approaches here. They can either send
operatives from other countries into our communities to try to
launch attacks, or they can try to cultivate homegrown
terrorists, which has been a major source of this Committee's
activities, looking at the domestic threat of radicalization.
Taking that approach, however, involves considerable
expense and the risk of being caught by local law enforcement.
How prevalent do you think the activities are of terrorist
groups such as LeT coming into our country, not with the
purpose of launching attacks themselves, but rather recruiting
Americans through a radicalization process?
Mr. Van Duyn. We clearly see groups, and not only LeT, who
either through contacts with individuals in the United States
or sometimes by travelling to the United States, may propagate
a radical message, which can lead to the radicalization. Also
there is interest, as in the case of the al-Shabaab, in
recruiting individuals to go fight in the jihad. We also see a
fair amount of fundraising by a host of groups inside the
United States among populations that are associated with the
countries from which the groups emanate.
So we are clearly seeing this. I think it is fair to say,
though, that we do not see anything on, say, the order of what
may be occurring in the United Kingdom or in other places in
Europe, that it is more fragmentary and unconnected than that.
But nonetheless, yes, it is occurring.
Senator Collins. And is the FBI continuing its outreach
activities to Muslim Americans in the major cities, for
example, Detroit, that we have heard previously about, in an
attempt to identify individuals who may be caught up in the
radicalization process and also to develop counter-messages?
Mr. Van Duyn. Yes, very much so. All 56 of our field
offices have outreach programs. We have an outreach program
that also emanates from our headquarters here that involves the
Director and others. Out in the field, we have a number of
programs. We have instituted a new Community Program. We have
one program where we will bring people back to Quantico,
Virginia, to talk to them about the FBI and the U.S. Government
and what we do. We have now the Community Program, which is a
2-week program in which we bring in community leaders to talk
to them and to try and establish a degree of trust.
We also developed another vehicle when you have a situation
like we have seen with Somalis, which is to go out to the
specific communities in a more targeted fashion. So this is
very much a part of our efforts and in conjunction with DHS
because the issues for the local communities frequently involve
the whole of the U.S. Government in many respects, so it is a
joint effort. But we consider it to be very important and
really a foundation for what we are doing.
Senator Collins. Mr. Allen, Commissioner Kelly described
two very impressive efforts, the SHIELD program and Operation
Nexus, in which NYPD reaches out to the private sector to try
to involve them and to extend the eyes and ears of the police
department. I am very impressed with those types of activities
because when you are talking about soft targets, it is an
almost infinite universe and virtually impossible for law
enforcement on its own to protect every potential target.
What is the Department doing to reach out to the private
sector, since 85 percent of critical infrastructure assets are
owned by the private sector and thus are potential targets that
Government is not directly involved in protecting?
Mr. Allen. Well, I think we have a very vigorous program
here, working with my own Critical Infrastructure Threat
Analysis Division and working with the Infrastructure
Protection Directorate, under the leadership of Assistant
Secretary Bob Stephan, which together are called the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), which
is directed right at the private sector. Between Bob Stephan
and my own office, we immediately, as soon as we began to
understand what had occurred on the ground in Mumbai, had a
conference call with hundreds of infrastructure sector
councils. We had 250 people from the private sector on the
teleconference and we went through in great detail some of the
information that Commissioner Kelly, Don Van Duyn, and I have
just relayed here today to get them thinking about the problem.
Commercial facilities sector, in particular, have to think
about this because they have theme parks, they have all kinds
of things that fall under their oversight. These are people
with whom we can also talk at classified levels.
So we have a very vigorous program. I send analysts, along
with Bob Stephan, the Secretary's specialist, right across the
country on a regular basis every week to talk to them about
techniques, tactics, and procedures. The program is vigorous
and we have to sustain it and I am very pleased with what we
are doing.
Senator Collins. Commissioner, what is your assessment of
DHS's efforts to reach out to local law enforcement and share
information on tactics, the threat, etc.?
Mr. Kelly. We work very closely with DHS. I think their
effort is significant and absolutely essential for us. They are
sharing information as never before. Of course, that is also
true of the FBI, as well. We have 125 investigators working on
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in New York City. That is
up from 17 investigators on September 11, 2001. So we are
working closer than ever before with our Federal partners.
Senator Collins. I am very impressed that by December 5,
the NYPD had already produced an analysis of the Mumbai
attacks, which it shared with New York City private security
managers through your SHIELD program. That kind of quick
turnaround is very impressive. Do you share it also with other
major police departments in the country?
Mr. Kelly. Certainly, if they ask, but there is no easily
accessed distribution channel. We share it with the FBI, and
that is the means of it going throughout the country. There are
56 field offices and 56 JTTF components that can get the
information, as well.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
Commissioner Kelly, I want to go for a moment to something
you testified to, which is how media coverage of an ongoing
attack can disclose law enforcement tactics in real time and
how that is particularly frustrated by modern communications
equipment, which makes it harder for you to close off the
ability of the terrorists or the hostage takers to communicate
with one another.
As you probably know, the Indian government released a
dossier to the public but also to the Pakistani government
making a compelling case, I think, for the fact that there were
Pakistani nationals involved in the Mumbai attacks. The dossier
includes some stunning conversations, really chilling, between
the attackers and those directing the attacks from Pakistan. I
am going to read briefly from one of them.
Caller One: ``Brother Abdul, the media is comparing your
action to September 11, 2001. One senior police officer has
been killed.''
Terrorist One, as denoted in the transcript: ``We are on
the 10th and 11th floor. We have five hostages.''
Caller Two: ``Everything is being recorded by the media.
Inflict the maximum damage. Keep fighting. Don't be taken
alive.''
Caller One: ``Kill all the hostages except the two Muslims.
Keep your phone switched on so we can hear the gunfire.''
Terrorist Two: ``We have three foreigners, including women
from Singapore and China.''
Caller One: ``Kill them.''
That exchange not only documents the obvious disregard for
human life of any kind among the terrorists, but also that they
were seeking to maximize media attention. In a society where
the press is free, it is again a challenging question as to how
we address that vulnerability.
I wanted to ask you, for instance, does the NYPD have any
kind of informal agreements with the New York news media about
how to manage news in this kind of hostage-taking situation, or
do you know of any standards for doing that at other police
departments around the country?
Mr. Kelly. Through the years, I can think of incidents
where they have been cooperative----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Kelly [continuing]. And withheld information, but it is
on an ad hoc basis. It depends on the incident. We have no set
policy. This is the world in which we live, this instant
communication. I read those transcripts and they are very
sobering.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kelly. But we have to cope with that. I said in my
prepared remarks that one of the challenges is to see if we can
somehow shut down that communication without impeding anybody
else's communication.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Kelly. We have means that we are able to shut off all
communication in an area, but is that necessarily the wise
thing to do?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, including cell phone
communication.
Mr. Kelly. Correct. Is that what we want to do?
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. So now you are looking at
whether you have got the ability to target in on particular
phones or PDAs or whatever.
Mr. Kelly. Correct.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Allen and Mr. Van Duyn, anything to
add in response to this question about how we deal with news
coverage in real time that may assist terrorists?
Mr. Allen. I think this really prolonged the siege because
regardless of the responsiveness of the Indian government, the
fact that the terrorists with controllers abroad were able to
monitor their activities and monitor what was going on because
the assault teams were covered live globally and the ability to
see what was occurring certainly aided and abetted the
longevity of this crisis, which went on for 8-plus hours. We
have to believe that in the future, with any kind of sustained
standoff rather than, say, the Mumbai train attacks, which were
over in a matter of minutes, we will have to find ways to work
with the free and open press to deal with this kind of
activity. This is one that is going to take a lot of dialogue
with the press.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Van Duyn.
Mr. Van Duyn. Yes, I would echo what Commissioner Kelly and
Mr. Allen say. We approach this on an ad hoc basis.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Van Duyn. We have had some good success when we can
explain the case and where it will be a risk to human life. But
it is on an ad hoc basis and we have to make our case to them.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. I just raise the question whether
it is worth initiating talks with some of the national news
organizations about this in case an incident of this kind
should occur? I leave you with that and we will go on briefly.
Let us talk about these so-called soft targets. As we saw
in Mumbai, in some cases, these are publicly owned and operated
facilities, such as a railway station. But for the most part,
these will be privately owned and operated, as they were in
Mumbai--hotels, restaurants, and a community center. Obviously,
we always worry here in the United States and certainly in this
Committee about shopping malls, as an example. So we have the
extra challenge here of needing to engage the private sector in
taking action that is preventive and protective of these soft
targets.
In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007, we created a voluntary private sector preparedness
accreditation and certification program in the Department of
Homeland Security which would allow interested private sector
companies to be certified as complying with voluntary
preparedness standards. But, of course, this only provides one
thin layer of protection.
Under Secretary Allen, maybe I should begin with you, and I
would be willing to forgive you if you don't have an answer
because this is somewhat out of your area of intelligence, but
do you have any report on the status of both that voluntary
program at DHS and also anything else that might be going on to
engage the owners of soft targets in America to protect those
targets or to be ready to warn of any possible attacks?
Mr. Allen. I am aware of the program. I am not current on
the level of participation voluntarily by the private sector.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Allen. Let me get back to you and to Senator Collins in
writing.
Chairman Lieberman. Fine. How about the other program that
you talked about, the Suspicious Activity Reporting System?
Mr. Allen. Yes, and that is something we can host. We don't
own it or try to direct it. New York City is very much engaged
in developing very focused methodological means to begin to
make sense out of all the activities that are reported. Much of
the suspicious activity, as you know, can be explained away.
The work is being undertaken by Boston, Los Angeles--under
Chief Bratton--and Miami, and there are also several States
that are working directly on this issue. The program manager
for the information sharing environment is engaged in this
along with the Department of Justice. We are taking a look at
that.
Some of the work that is underway today on which the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary at Homeland Security has
been briefed, we are very pleased with. We certainly want to
support it. We are not certain that we should try to own it.
That is not our job. But we think working in partnership with
the cities across the country, and the States, that we are
going to get a lot better methodological approach because too
often we simply have collected data without having the
methodological tools to interpret it.
I know that the Commissioner may have some views on this.
Chairman Lieberman. So you are saying that this rightfully
and practically ought to be owned by the local governments.
Mr. Allen. Owned in conjunction with the support from
ourselves, from the Federal level, from the Department in
particular. Secretary Chertoff spoke this morning to the
Homeland Security Advisors about this----
Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Mr. Allen [continuing]. And he has stated his commitment,
and I am sure the new Secretary of Homeland Security will do
so, as well. We are in the pilot phase of the project. I am
sure within 6 months to a year, we can come back and brief you
on where we stand with the pilot project.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. Commissioner Kelly, let me turn
to you now and ask you to talk in just a little more detail
about what the NYPD tells owners of soft targets in New York
City about how better to prepare themselves or how to know
suspicious activity.
Mr. Kelly. Well, a very effective vehicle for us to get
information out is the NYPD SHIELD program that I mentioned in
my prepared remarks.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. We have over 3,000 participants. These are firms
and companies that are participating with us. We communicate
with them.
Chairman Lieberman. They own hotels----
Mr. Kelly. Hotels, the financial services industries,
hospitals, and major department stores. They all have
representation there, and we have segmented it somewhat. For
instance, we have a separate unit that works with hotels to get
information from them and to give them information and best
practices. We communicate with them on a daily basis. About
every 6 weeks, we have major conferences in our headquarters
where we will have presentations on what is going on throughout
the world and what we think can afford them a better level of
protection.
So not only are we working in general with private security
in the city, we are working with individual sectors, as well,
hotels, for instance. And the feedback is very positive.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask this final question, because
I have gone over my time. All of this, both the Federal program
that we have begun and what you have done, which is, I think,
way ahead of what most other cities have done, is ultimately
voluntary. Do you think there ought to be some government
regulation here, that there ought to be some mandatory program,
that there ought to be some particular help from DHS to the
local police departments to facilitate this program, or is it
really best done in this way that it is being done now by you?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think perhaps some study should be given
to whether or not there should be basic levels of training for
security personnel throughout the country.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. We are moving in that direction in New York
City, so we have a comfort level that security personnel have
at least the rudiments of what to do----
Chairman Lieberman. Private security personnel.
Mr. Kelly. Private security, I am talking about. Perhaps
that area should be examined. We think the voluntary aspect of
what we are doing is working. We have people knocking on our
door to join and we welcome them. There is a lot of
participation. As I say, the feedback is very positive because
they are getting something of value. Again, I would say that,
positively, a basic level of training for security personnel.
Chairman Lieberman. Fine. My time is way beyond my limit,
so I would ask Mr. Van Duyn and Mr. Allen to think about, as
you go away from here today, whether there is any additional
programmatic or even regulatory assistance that would be
helpful from the Federal level.
Senator Collins. Commissioner, last year, the Chairman and
I authored a law that we referred to as the ``See Something,
Say Something'' law that provided protection from lawsuits when
individuals reported suspicious activity in good faith in the
transportation sector to the appropriate authorities. It was
difficult, but we were able to get that signed into law.
Do you think that we should look at expanding that law so
that if an individual in good faith reports suspicious activity
that could indicate a terrorist plot to the appropriate
authorities, regardless of whether it relates to the
transportation sector, those individuals would be protected
from lawsuits?
Mr. Kelly. I think it made eminent good sense, that law,
and I certainly would recommend that it be expanded if at all
possible. It is based on sort of the good samaritan approach.
Senator Collins. Exactly.
Mr. Kelly. So I thought it was an excellent piece of
legislation. I commend you for it.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Glad I asked the question.
[Laughter.]
It is always risky to ask one when you don't know what the
answer is going to be.
I think that is something that I would certainly be
interested in working with the Chairman on, because as I looked
at your programs, which, as I said, I find to be so
comprehensive and far-reaching, they really do depend on people
speaking up and cooperating with you----
Mr. Kelly. Right.
Senator Collins [continuing]. And if they are fearful of
being sued for doing so, that is going to inhibit their
willingness to report.
Mr. Kelly. One thing we do very well in New York City is
sue. [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Exactly. Mr. Allen and Mr. Van Duyn, do
you have any comments on whether broadening that law, which
became law last year, would be helpful to your activities?
Mr. Allen. I think it would be very helpful to the
Department. We get a lot of activity, some of which we
investigate. The Bureau does a lot of investigation based on
suspicious activity. As Mr. Van Duyn knows, the Bureau runs to
ground all leads that appear suspicious. We were able to look
at suspicious activity on ferries in the Puget Sound a year and
a half ago. We have done a number of activities that if it is
not terrorism activity, it may well be criminal activity. We
see things that look very suspicious. The Commissioner is
concerned about chemical plants in New Jersey. There have been
suspicious activity reports. All of those, I think, are useful,
and I think good citizens, good Americans ought to be free and
able to report this without fear of a lawsuit, without fear of
being sued.
Senator Collins. Mr. Van Duyn.
Mr. Van Duyn. Yes, and we would concur. The public is our
eyes and ears, along with State, local, and tribal law
enforcement. And as you noted, the Fort Dix plot, that was
tipped off because of an alert person in a pharmacy.
Senator Collins. Correct. Thank you. Mr. Van Duyn, I want
to go back to the issue of terrorist groups recruiting
Americans to be trained to participate in terrorist plots. It
makes sense to me that LeT or al-Qaeda or another group would
try to radicalize Americans because then they are able to more
freely travel. They know the communities in which they life.
They are less likely to arouse suspicion.
But what puzzles me are the reports of terrorist groups
recruiting Americans and radicalizing them to fight overseas,
as in, for example, the case of Somalia. I would understand if
LeT or some other group were recruiting Americans in the United
States to commit terrorism within the United States, but why go
to the expense and trouble of recruiting Americans to bring
them overseas to engage in combat where they may die or even
become a suicide bomber?
Mr. Van Duyn. That is actually an excellent question and it
is one that we have been pondering in relation to the Somalis
who may have been going over, in terms of what the capabilities
they brought to the fight. I think there is a sense, a pan-
national sense of contributing to the global jihad and they
will look for anybody who can contribute to that, whether it is
in Chechnya, Russia-Georgia, or Somalia.
I think the difference with the groups that have an intent,
and particularly al-Qaeda which has the intent to attack the
homeland, there, they would be looking for people with, as you
point out, that ability to travel. And it may also not be with
the ability to travel back to the United States. We have to
consider that the interest in Americans may be to have them
travel to somewhere else in addition to fighting.
In part, I believe the fighting also is a way to vet
people's commitment to the cause as a way to train them. A fear
that we have also is that people who fight overseas and come
back, they have skills, they are committed, they can also serve
as cadres for recruitment, if you will. They will have a street
credibility that will attract young people to them. So while
they may not have been wanted to attack the United States when
they were overseas, that may change over time. So we are
concerned that people will acquire skills and attitudes that
may lend them with the intent or capability to attack the
United States when they return.
Mr. Allen. Senator, may I speak to that just briefly?
Senator Collins. Mr. Allen, please do.
Mr. Allen. I believe the Somalis, many of whom arrived
here, maybe 160,000 since our intervention in December 1992 in
Somalia and East Africa, I think many who have gone, of the
numbers that we can talk about, some dozens apparently have
gone to East Africa, they really still identify very much with
their family and sub-clans in Somalia. They have not
assimilated well into the American society as yet. So I think
there is a real distinct difference here. So that is one reason
that they are willing to go fight overseas.
The real worry is that once they learn, as I believe
Commissioner Kelly said, how to use a simple AK-47, they can
come and use such a weapon here in the United States. Now, we
don't know of any that plan to do that, and for that we are
very thankful, but this is a very different problem from Muslim
Americans who, as a Pew Research Center study showed, most of
them are well situated and more comfortable as Americans, well
situated in this country and stand for its core beliefs.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
would just say that I, too, read the transcripts of some of
those calls and they are so chilling in the Mumbai attack. You
can't help but be struck also by the use of technology that the
handlers apparently in Pakistan were instructing the commandos
as the attack was underway. And then for me, the most chilling,
in addition to the ``kill them'' instruction, was ``leave the
line open so that we can hear the gunfire.''
Chairman Lieberman. I couldn't agree more. Thanks, Senator
Collins.
I have one more line of questions and then will yield to
Senator Collins if she has any more. This goes to this
difficult question of how do we secure the coast that we have.
We have an enormous coast in the United States of America. Not
all, but most of our great cities--I hope I don't get in
trouble with too many cities--are located on water. That is
historically where great cities began. Commissioner Kelly, you
have described what the NYPD is doing to protect the City of
New York from damage from the water, but said quite honestly
that you can't fully protect the harbor.
Understanding that we are never going to be 100 percent
safe in this wonderfully open country of ours, what more could
the Federal Government do to assist municipalities or even
State governments in providing more security from attack that
comes from the sea?
Mr. Kelly. Well, in my previous testimony, I really talked
about the examination of cargo in overseas ports, which has
been started by Customs and Border Protection. I would like to
see a lot more of that. The so-called Hong Kong model, I think
is viable. I think it is something that we should look very
closely at.
As far as an attack from the sea similar to what happened
in Mumbai, it is difficult. We are doing a lot. We have boats
that are deployed 24 hours a day. We work closely with the
Coast Guard. As I say, we are authorized to board vessels. The
Coast Guard has given us that authority. But you can only do so
much. There is no magic answer. That is why intelligence
really, at the end of the day, is the key, I mean, information
as to what is going to happen as opposed to hoping to luckily
intercept an event on the water. We have committed a lot, but
there are no guarantees.
Chairman Lieberman. It is a very important point, your last
one, which is that intelligence has always been important in
war, but never more important than in this unconventional war
that we have been drawn into with terrorists. Because of the
way in which they operate, from the shadows, not in
conventional boats at sea or armies on land or planes in the
air, and the fact that, of course, they strike intentionally at
undefended non-military targets, intelligence is critically
important.
Mr. Allen and Mr. Van Duyn, do you have anything to add
about anything ongoing? Now, I know there have been some
attempts to begin to try to check small craft or----
Mr. Allen. Right. We have a Small Vessel Strategy. The
Secretary has made this a centerpiece of some of his work. For
the last year, our Office of Policy and our Coast Guard have
been working with the International Maritime Organization to
create Small Vessel Security Guidelines. That is one thing that
we think would be important, particularly for boats under 300
tons. If they are foreign vessels, we want to get a much better
look at it. We have a Great Lakes Strategy that we are working
because there are millions of boats in the Great Lakes and they
could be used for various and sundry purposes as well as used
for recreation and commerce.
So this has been a centerpiece of the Secretary's efforts
over the past year, to improve our control of ingress to our
major ports. We have put out a lot of radiation detection
devices in all ports, the Puget Sound, and inland waterways. So
this has been a significant effort and I think the Secretary,
as he leaves office, will look back on this particular effort
as one that is going to bear fruit in the coming years.
Chairman Lieberman. We appreciate that and will be in
communication with the Department and the new Secretary as we
go forward to determine how we can help not only enable that
program, but perhaps to give it some greater statutory
standing.
Mr. Van Duyn, do you want to comment on this question of
how to defend us from attacks from the sea?
Mr. Van Duyn. Our focus is really on what Commissioner
Kelly was talking about, which is developing the intelligence
to penetrate and disrupt networks before they get here, working
with our international, Federal, State, and local partners. We
are not really a maritime organization, to be honest. We have
had in the past, though, an outreach program to dive shops,
because there was at one point a concern about scuba-borne
attacks, so we did establish those links at that time.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have nothing
more.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Thanks to the three of you. This, self-evidently, is the
first hearing this Committee has held in this 111th Congress,
and thanks to the testimony of the three of you, who are
extraordinarily informed and experienced in these matters, it
really sets a tone for our ongoing work as the Homeland
Security Committee of the Senate.
Obviously, the Mumbai attacks remind us, as if we needed
it, that the enemy is still out there, that they are prepared
to strike wantonly and brutally at innocents, and that the
United States remains a target of those terrorists.
The other quite remarkable combination of impressions I
have is that we have really gone a long way toward disrupting
al-Qaeda, which was the initial enemy here, who attacked us on
September 11, 2001, and earlier, but now there emerge other
terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba who we have to worry
about and remind us how much we have done since September 11,
2001, so much of it through the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, and extraordinary work by some local police
departments, led by the NYPD, but also that we have so much
more to do.
This Committee is going to work this year on a Department
of Homeland Security authorization bill. We hope we can do that
on a regular basis to make our own statements as a Committee
about what the priority needs of the Department are, to
recommend to our colleagues on the Appropriations Committee
numbers that we think will help meet those homeland security
needs, but also to make substantive changes in policy to enable
the Department to do a better job. That is why I urge you, as
you go away from here, to think about whether you have
suggestions for us as to changes in law or program, not to
mention funding, that will help you better do the job that the
three of you and your coworkers have done so ably already in
protecting our homeland security in the age of terrorism. I
thank you very much.
We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 15
days if any of you have anything you would like to add to your
testimony or if any of our colleagues or the two of us want to
submit questions to you for the record.
Again, my profound thanks to you for what you do every day
and what you have done for us today.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]
LESSONS FROM THE MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACKS--PART II
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Burris, Bennet, Collins, and
McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning and welcome to the
hearing. Let me welcome the witnesses and also welcome the new
Members of the Committee. There has been a very refreshing
shuffling, shall we say, of our line-up and it is great to have
Senator McCain joining the Committee and I look forward very
much to working with him here as we do in so many other areas.
I welcome the recently minted, newly sworn-in Senator from
Colorado, Michael Bennet, who brings great experience in the
private sector and his work as Superintendent of Schools in
Denver, and most particularly brings the irreplaceable
experience of having spent most of his childhood in Connecticut
and having been educated at Wesleyan, where his dad was the
president, and even at Yale Law School. So later on when it
comes to your time, you can speak in your defense.
I thank everybody. Let us go right to the hearing.
On the evening of November 26, 2008, 10 terrorists began a
series of coordinated attacks on targets within the city of
Mumbai, India, the largest city and financial capital of that
great country and our very close ally. Over the next 60 hours,
as the entire world watched, these 10 terrorists paralyzed the
city of more than 13 million, killing nearly 200 people and
leaving hundreds more wounded before the situation was brought
under control, with nine of the terrorists killed and one
captured.
On January 8, 2009, this Committee held a hearing to
examine the lessons learned from these attacks that could help
us strengthen our homeland security here in the United States.
We heard from three government witnesses representing the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the New York Police Department (NYPD).
We examined a range of issues related to the attacks, including
the nature of the threat posed by the terrorist group that most
apparently carried it out, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the tactics
used by the attackers, and the efforts to protect so-called
``soft targets,'' and this really will be in many ways a
critical focus of our hearing today.
The Mumbai terrorists attacked hotels, an outdoor cafe, a
movie theater, and a Jewish community center, places that are
not traditionally subject to a high-level of security, which is
why I suppose we call them soft targets. This hearing today
will address some of those same issues with particular emphasis
on what we here in the United States, public and private sector
working together, can do to better protect these so-called soft
targets.
Our witnesses today are each from outside the government,
representatives of the private sector, including a great
American hotel chain and a real estate company, each of which
owns overseas properties and manages a very significant number
of soft targets. We also are very privileged to have two well-
respected and known experts on both terrorism and national
security and international relations, Brian Jenkins and Ashley
Tellis.
The protection of these kinds of soft targets is a
challenge to an open society, such as ours or India's. By
definition, they are facilities that must be easily accessible
to the general public and are often used by large numbers of
people at one time, making them inviting targets for terrorists
who don't care about killing innocents. But that, of course,
does not mean that we can or should leave these targets
undefended.
A range of activities and investments can be deployed to
enhance soft target security, including training for personnel,
physical security measures, and effective information sharing
between the government and the private sector. A basic level of
security, of course, is also important across all commercial
sectors to commerce itself.
In 2007, this Committee created, within the Implementing
the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of that year,
the Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness Accreditation and
Certification Program in an attempt to incentivize private
sector companies to be certified as complying with voluntary
professional preparedness standards, and I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses from the private sector today about
how that and other similar programs are working and what we can
do, public and private sectors working together, to enhance
that security.
We are going to explore additional issues in this hearing,
privileged as we are to have Mr. Jenkins and Dr. Tellis here,
including the threat posed by Lashkar-e-Taiba, the tactics they
used in the Mumbai attacks, the challenges of responding to
such attack, and, of course, what we can do with our allies in
India to increase the security that our people feel at home in
each of our two countries.
And now, Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
thanking you for holding this follow-up hearing on the
terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The witnesses appearing before us
today represent two important additional perspectives on these
attacks. As you have mentioned, they represent non-governmental
organizations and private businesses. The two hearings that we
have held will provide valuable insights that can be used to
improve and strengthen security policies in our country.
With approximately 85 percent of our country's critical
infrastructure in private hands, a strong public-private
partnership is essential to preventing attacks and to promoting
resiliency when disaster strikes. Through the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), DHS and the private
sector have cooperatively developed best practices that will
improve our ability to deter attacks and to respond and recover
in a crisis. By bringing together representatives from the 18
infrastructure sectors, the NIPP process also builds and
strengthens relationships between public and private sector
officials that promote better information sharing.
The plans developed through this process must not be
allowed to just gather dust on shelves in Washington. It is
critical that the Department and its private sector partners
translate these planning documents into real-world action. If
that link is not made, then even the best laid plans will
provide little security benefit.
The relationships fostered between the Department and the
private sector are absolutely critical, and we learned at our
last hearing of the work that has been done by the New York
Police Department in cooperation with private security guards.
I was very impressed with that program.
The fact is that the government working alone simply does
not have all the resources necessary to protect all critical
infrastructure from attacks or to rebuild and recover after a
disaster. It has to be a cooperative relationship. That is why
effective preparedness and resiliency relies on the vigilance
and cooperation of the owners and operators of the private
sector facilities as well as the general public.
I mentioned at our last hearing that Senator Lieberman and
I authored legislation that was included in the 2007 homeland
security law to promote the reporting of potential terrorist
threats directed against our transportation system. We have
already seen the benefit of reports by vigilant citizens such
as those which helped to thwart an attack on Fort Dix, New
Jersey. The good faith reports of other honest citizens could
be equally important in detecting terrorist plans to attack
critical infrastructure or soft targets like the hotels,
restaurants, and religious institutions that were targeted in
Mumbai. That is why I believe that we should consider expanding
those protections from lawsuits to cover other good faith
reports of suspicious activities.
As the analysis of the response to the Mumbai attacks
continues to crystalize, it is also becoming increasingly
apparent that the Indian government failed to get valuable
intelligence information into the hands of local law
enforcement and the owners of facilities targeted by the
terrorists. That is why I am particularly interested in how we
can improve information sharing with the private sector in this
country. The Mumbai attacks demonstrate the perils of an ad
hoc, poorly coordinated system.
Finally, as the Chairman has indicated, the instigation of
the Mumbai attacks by a Pakistan-based terrorist organization
underscores the importance of this Committee's ongoing work in
seeking to understand and counter the process of violent
radicalization no matter where it occurs. The U.S. Government
must continue to press the Pakistani government to eliminate
safe havens and to starve LeT and similar terrorist groups of
new recruits for their deadly operations.
I intend to explore all of these issues in depth with our
witnesses today. I welcome our witnesses and look forward to
hearing their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
As is our custom on the Committee, we welcome Senator
Burris who has joined us. We will now go to the witnesses.
We are holding this hearing to answer two questions: What
lessons do we learn from the Mumbai terrorist attacks, which as
we said at our first hearing certainly seem to us to represent
a different order, if not of magnitude, certainly of tactics, a
kind of urban jihad carried out there? And second, what can we
in government and the private sector do together to protect
Americans and American targets from similar activities or
attacks here in the United States?
We are very grateful, again, to have Brian Michael Jenkins,
Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, who has been well known
as an expert in these matters for a long time, to bring his
experience and expertise to us this morning. Please proceed,
Mr. Jenkins.
TESTIMONY OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS,\1\ SENIOR ADVISOR, THE RAND
CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, Members
of the Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be
here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last November, while the Mumbai attack was still ongoing,
RAND, as part of its continuing research on terrorism and
homeland security, initiated an analysis to determine what
lessons might be learned from that event, and that report of
which I and others at RAND, including Dr. Tellis, are
coauthors, has been made available to the Committee. Let me
here simply highlight some of the more salient lessons.
First, and I think it directly addresses your point,
Senator Lieberman, terrorism has increasingly become an
effective strategic weapon. I mean, terrorists are dangerous
when they kill, but even more dangerous when they think, and
that is the salient feature of the Mumbai attack. The
masterminds of the Mumbai attack displayed sophisticated
strategic thinking in their meticulous planning, in their
choice of targets, their tactics, and their efforts to achieve
multiple objectives. They were able to capture and hold
international attention, always an objective of terrorism.
They were able to exploit India's vulnerabilities and
create a political crisis in India. They also sought to create
a crisis between India and Pakistan that would persuade
Pakistan to deploy its forces to defend itself against a
possible action by India, which in turn would take those forces
out of the Afghan frontier areas and take the pressure off al-
Qaeda, Taliban, and the other insurgent and terrorist groups
that operate along the Afghan frontier.
The Mumbai attacks also make it clear that al-Qaeda is not
the only constellation in the jihadist universe, that there are
other new contenders that have signed on to al-Qaeda's ideology
of global terror, and this suggests not only a continuing
terrorist campaign in India, more broadly, it suggests that the
global struggle against the jihadist terrorist campaign is far
from over.
The Mumbai attack also demonstrates that terrorists can
innovate tactically to obviate our existing security measures
and confound authorities. We tend to focus, understandably, on
terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, and that truly is
worrisome. But in Mumbai, the terrorists demonstrated that with
simple tactics and low-tech weapons, they can produce vastly
disproportionate results. The Mumbai attack was sequential,
highly mobile. It was a departure from the by-now-common
suicide bombings. But the tactics themselves were simple--armed
assaults, carjackings, drive-by shootings, building take-overs,
barricade and hostage situations, things that we have seen
before, but put together in this impressive complex of attacks.
The attack was carried out by just 10 men, armed with
easily obtained assault weapons, pistols, hand grenades, simple
improvised explosive devices, little more than the arsenal of a
1940s infantryman, except they had with them 21st Century
communications technology--cell phones, satellite phones,
BlackBerrys, and GPS locators.
The attackers embedded themselves among civilians, using
them not only as hostages, but as shields to impede the
responders and to maximize civilian casualties, and I think
this is a tactic that we have seen elsewhere and that now we do
have to be prepared for, that is, terrorists deliberately
embedding themselves with civilians to increase the ultimate
body count as the response takes place.
Terrorists will continue to focus on soft targets that
offer high body counts and that have iconic value. I think
there is one category that you mentioned in particular, Senator
Collins, which is especially worrisome for us. One of the two-
man terrorist teams in Mumbai went to Mumbai's central train
station. Now, we tend to look at the whole attack, but one two-
man team went to the central train station where they opened
fire on commuters. The attack at the train station alone
accounted for more than a third of the total fatalities of the
event, and that underscores a trend, and that is, terrorists
view public surface transportation as a killing field. Surface
transportation offers terrorists easily accessible, dense
populations in confined environments. These are ideal killing
zones for gunmen or for improvised explosive devices, which
remain the most common form of attack.
According to analysis that was done by the Mineta
Transportation Institute, two-thirds of all of the terrorist
attacks on surface transportation over the last 40 years were
intended to kill, and 37 percent of those attacks resulted in
fatalities. Now, that compares with about 20 to 25 percent of
terrorist attacks overall, suggesting that when terrorists come
to surface transportation, they do view it primarily as a
killing zone. Indeed, 75 percent of the fatal attacks involved
multiple fatalities and 28 percent involved 10 or more
fatalities. So the intent here clearly is slaughter.
Terrorist attacks on flagship hotels are increasing in
number, in total casualties, and in casualties per incident,
and that trend places increasing demands on hotel security,
which Mr. Orlob, who is a recognized authority internationally
on this topic, will address.
Pakistan continues to play a prominent and problematic role
in the overlapping armed conflicts and terrorist campaigns in
India, Afghanistan, and in Pakistan itself. Al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, LeT, and other insurgent and terrorist groups find
sanctuary in Pakistan's turbulent tribal areas. Historically,
some of these groups have drawn on support from the Pakistan
government itself.
Indeed, some analysts suggest that Pakistan, since it
acquired nuclear weapons, has been willing to be more
aggressive in the utilization of these groups, confident that
with nuclear weapons, it can deter or contain violence from
going to the higher levels. On the other hand, Pakistan's
principal defense against external pressure may not be its
nuclear arsenal but its own political fragility, that is, that
its government's less than full cooperation may be preferable
to the country's collapse and descent into chaos.
Now, the success of the Mumbai attackers in paralyzing a
large city, a city of 20 million people, and commanding the
attention of the world's news media for nearly 3 days certainly
is going to encourage similar operations in the future, and
that leads to the final question--Could a Mumbai-style attack
happen here in the United States?--and I believe it could.
The difference lies in the planning and scale. Assembling
and training a 10-man team of suicidal attackers seems far
beyond the capabilities of the conspirators identified in any
of the local terrorist plots that we have uncovered in the
United States since September 11, 2001. We simply haven't seen
that level of dedication or planning skills. However, we have
seen in this country lone gunmen and teams of shooters, whether
motivated by mental illness or political cause, run amok,
determined to kill in quantity. The Empire State Building
shooting, the Los Angles Airport (LAX) shooting, Virginia Tech,
and the Columbine cases all come to mind.
Therefore, an attack on the ground carried out by a small
number of self-radicalized homegrown terrorists armed with
readily available weapons in this country, perhaps causing
scores of casualties, while still beyond what we have seen thus
far is not inconceivable. It is also conceivable that a team of
terrorists recruited and trained abroad, as the Mumbai
attackers were, could be inserted into the United States,
perhaps on a U.S.-registered fishing vessel or pleasure boat,
to carry out a Mumbai-style attack. This is a risk we live
with, although I would expect our police response to be much
swifter and more effective than what we saw in Mumbai. Thank
you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Jenkins. That was a very
thoughtful, insightful opening statement. It struck me as you
were describing Mumbai, it was as if you were describing a
battle, which it was, and reminds us we are in a war. Their
tactics and deployment of the use of weapons--if you have so
little regard for human life that you are prepared to do what
these people are prepared to do, there is no limit to how you
will carry out the battle as you see it, so thank you.
Ashley Tellis has served our government and been outside
government in various stages of his life. He is now coming to
us as Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and we welcome you this morning. I gather
that you are just back from a trip to India.
Mr. Tellis. Yes, I am.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Welcome.
TESTIMONY OF ASHLEY J. TELLIS, PH.D.,\1\ SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Tellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Collins. I am going to speak today on the three issues that you
invited me to address in your letter of invitation: To describe
the nature of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as a terrorist
organization; to assess what the threat posed by LeT to the
United States is; and then to explore what the United States
can do in the aftermath of these attacks.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Tellis appears in the Appendix on
page 84.
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Let me start by talking about LeT as a terrorist
organization, and I think the simplest way to describe it is
that of all the terrorist groups that are present in South Asia
today, LeT represents a threat to regional and global security
second only to al-Qaeda. This is because of its ideology. Its
ideology is shaped by the Ahl al-Hadith school of Saudi
Wahhabism and its objectives are focused on creating a
universal Islamic Caliphate, essentially through means of
preaching and jihad, and both these instruments are seen as co-
equal in LeT's world view. A very distinctive element of LeT's
objectives is what it calls the recovery of lost Muslim lands,
that is, lands that were once governed by Muslim rulers but
which have since passed to other political dispensations.
The objective of creating this universal Islamic Caliphate
has made LeT a very close collaborator of al-Qaeda and it has
collaborated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan since at least 1987.
Its objective of recovering lost Muslim lands has pushed LeT
into a variety of theaters outside South Asia. We have
identified LeT presence in areas as diverse as Palestine,
Spain, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Eritrea.
From the very beginning, LeT was one of the principal
beneficiaries of the Pakistani intelligence service's
generosity because of its very strong commitment to jihad,
which was seen by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the
Pakistani intelligence service, as being particularly valuable
in Pakistan's ongoing conflict with India.
LeT's objectives, however, have always transcended South
Asia. If you look at the LeT website, if you listen to the
remarks made by Hafiz Saeed, the leader of the LeT, and read
its numerous publications, there are recurrent references to
both Israel and the United States as being co-joined targets of
LeT objectives in addition to India, and there is frequent
reference to the Zionist-Hindu-Crusader axis, which seems to
animate a great deal of LeT's antipathy to liberal democracy,
which it sees as being implacably opposed to Islam.
Today, Indian intelligence services assess that LeT
maintains a terrorist presence in at least 21 countries
worldwide, and this terrorist presence takes a variety of
forms, everything from liaison and networking to the
facilitation of terrorist acts by third parties, fundraising,
the procurement of weapons and explosives, recruitment of
volunteers for suicide missions, the creation of sleeper cells,
including in the United States, and actual armed conflict.
Despite this comprehensive involvement in terrorism, LeT
has managed to escape popular attention in the United States
primarily because it operates in the same theater as al-Qaeda,
and al-Qaeda's perniciousness has essentially eclipsed LeT's
importance. After Mumbai, that, however, may be on the cusp of
changing.
Let me say a few words about the threat posed specifically
by LeT to the United States. It is useful to think of this
issue in terms of three concentric circles: Threats posed by
LeT to U.S. global interests; threats posed by LeT to American
citizens, both civilian and military worldwide; and threats
posed to the U.S. homeland itself.
When one looks at U.S. global interests, which would be the
first circle, it is easy to conclude that LeT has been actively
and directly involved in attacking U.S. global interests
through its activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine,
Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. And in many of these
theaters, there has been explicit cooperation with al-Qaeda,
and particularly in Southern Asia with both the Afghan and
Pakistani Taliban.
Where LeT's threats to U.S. citizens are concerned, that is
U.S. citizens worldwide, both civilian and military, these
threats traditionally have been indirect. And until the events
in Bombay, LeT did not direct lethal attacks on American
citizens directly. However, it has a long history of
cooperating with other terrorist groups who make it their
business to attack American citizens and American interests.
When one looks at the third dimension, LeT threats to the
U.S. homeland, thus far, these threats have only been latent.
LeT cells within this country have focused on fundraising,
recruitment, liaison, and the facilitation of terrorist
training, primarily assisting recruits in the United States to
go to Pakistan for terrorist training, but they have not
engaged in lethal operations in the United States as yet. This
has been, in my judgment, because they have concluded that
attacking targets, including U.S. targets in India, are easier
to attack than targets in Israel or the United States.
U.S. law enforcement has also been particularly effective
in interdicting and deterring such attacks, particularly after
September 11, 2001, and LeT always has to reckon with the
prospect of U.S. military retaliation should an event occur on
American soil.
My bottom line is very similar to that deduced by Brian
Jenkins. LeT must be viewed as a global terrorist group that
possesses the motivation and the capacity to conduct attacks on
American soil if opportunities arise and if the cost-benefit
calculus is believed to favor such attacks.
Let me end quickly by addressing the question of what the
United States should do. I would suggest that we have three
tasks ahead of us in the immediate future.
The first order of business is simply to work with India
and Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the attack in Bombay
to justice. We have to do this both for reasons of bringing
retribution, but more importantly for reasons of establishing
deterrence. Attacks like this cannot go unanswered without
increasing the risk of further attacks against American
citizens either in the United States or abroad.
The second task that we have is to compel Pakistan to roll
up LeT's vast infrastructure of terrorism, and this
infrastructure within Pakistan is truly vast and directed not
only at India, but fundamentally today against U.S. operations
in Afghanistan, secondarily against U.S. operations in Iraq,
and finally against Pakistan itself. We have to work with both
the civilian regime, the Zardari government that detests the
LeT and detests extremist groups in Pakistan, as well as the
Pakistani military with whom we cooperate in our operations in
Afghanistan, but regrettably still seems to view support to
groups like LeT as part of its grand strategy vis-a-vis India.
The third and final task before us is to begin a high-level
U.S.-Indian dialogue on Pakistan and to expand U.S.-Indian
counterterrorism cooperation, which unfortunately has remained
rather languid in the last few years. We need to focus on
intelligence sharing. We have made some progress, particularly
in the aftermath of the Bombay attacks, but this intelligence
sharing is nowhere as systematic as comprehensive as it ought
to be. We also need to look again at the idea of training
Indian law enforcement and their intelligence communities,
particularly in the realm of forensics, border security, and
special weapons and tactics. And finally, cooperative
activities with India in the realm of intelligence fusion and
organizational coordination, the issues that Senator Collins
pointed out, too, I think would be of profit to both countries.
These tasks are enormous and the work that we have ahead of us
has only just begun. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Tellis. Excellent
statement, very helpful.
Incidentally, as you know, I think there is a program that
this Committee has worked on that does support joint bilateral
efforts in research and training, etc. Senator Collins and I
have worked on that. There are eight countries in it now, but
India is not yet one of them. There is 50-50 sharing, but very
productive joint efforts. We are going to meet soon with the
new Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, and urge
her to initiate discussions with the Indian government to
develop that kind of joint program, which will be mutually
beneficial in terms of homeland security. I thank you.
Now we go to the private sector. We are very pleased to
have the next two witnesses with us, really in the middle of
exactly what we want to hear about. J. Alan Orlob is the Vice
President for Corporate Security at Marriott International and
deals with this all the time and, as Mr. Jenkins said, is a
recognized international expert in this area.
Thanks for being here. We look forward to hearing you now.
TESTIMONY OF J. ALAN ORLOB,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, CORPORATE
SECURITY AND LOSS PREVENTION, MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL LODGING
Mr. Orlob. Thanks, Chairman Lieberman, and Senator Collins.
It is nice to be here today. I am going to talk today about the
attacks that occurred in Mumbai and specifically about what
happened at the hotels and what we are doing at hotels.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Orlob with an attachment appears
in the Appendix on page 96.
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On November 26, when the attacks occurred, four of the
shooters entered the Taj Mahal Hotel. Another two entered the
Trident and Oberoi Hotels. I traveled to Mumbai 3 weeks after
the event with my Regional Director to see what had happened.
We went to the Taj Hotel, expecting to spend less than an hour.
Instead, we were there for almost three hours inspecting the
scene of the carnage briefly and then spent considerable time
with the Taj Group Executive Director of Hotel Operations as to
how they could secure their hotel in the future. As reported in
the media, he was frustrated with the intelligence provided by
the government and the police response.
The tactics used against the hotels in Mumbai were not new.
A similar attack had been staged at the Serena Hotel in Kabul,
Afghanistan a year earlier. In September, the Marriott Hotel
had been attacked by a large truck bomb in Islamabad, Pakistan.
The Hyatt, Radisson, and Days Inn Hotels were attacked by
suicide bombers in Amman, Jordan, in 2005. The Hilton Hotel in
Taba, Egypt, and the Ghazala Gardens Hotel in Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt, were attacked in separate incidents. The J.W. Marriott
Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, was struck by a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (IED) in 2003.
Hotels present attractive targets. In many cities, they are
icons of commerce and tourism. Our guests include celebrities
and diplomats. As the U.S. Government secures its buildings
overseas, terrorists shift to softer targets, including hotels.
Sixteen years ago, as Marriott expanded its international
footprint, we developed a crisis management program. We wrote a
crisis manual and designated a crisis team. We conduct
training, including tabletop exercises. We subscribe to a
number of commercial security services that provide
intelligence. We have analysts based in Washington and Hong
Kong to give us a 24-hour capability. Based on these
assessments, we develop specific procedures for hotels to
follow.
Using a color-coded threat condition approach, we direct
hotels to implement those procedures. Under Threat Condition
Blue, our lowest level of enhanced security, we have nearly 40
procedures. Threat Condition Yellow adds additional security
layers. At Threat Condition Red, our highest level of security,
we screen vehicles as they approach the hotel, inspect all
luggage, and ensure everyone goes through a metal detector.
In response to our risk assessments, we have added physical
security measures, particularly in high-risk locations,
including window film, bollards, and barriers. X-ray machines
are present in many of our hotels, and where appropriate, we
employ explosive vapor detectors and bomb-sniffing dogs. We
have developed advanced training programs for our security
officers working in high-risk locations. In the wake of the
Mumbai attacks, we recently developed an active shooter
program, combining physical security with operational security
and awareness programs.
Last September, the Islamabad Marriott was a victim of a
terrorist attack. This hotel was operating at Threat Condition
Red. On September 20 at 8 p.m., a suicide bomber drove a large
dump truck to the hotel. As he made a left turn into the
driveway, he shifted into first gear and accelerated,
attempting to drive through the barriers. The hotel was using a
combination of a hydraulic barrier coming up from the pavement,
commonly called a Delta barrier, and a drop-down barrier to
stop vehicles before they were inspected. These barriers
contained the vehicle and it was not able to move further. When
the bomber detonated his charge, 56 people were killed. Thirty
of them were members of our hotel staff. There were nearly
1,500 people in the hotel at the time. It was Ramadan and they
were dining, breaking their fast. Our security measures saved
hundreds of lives.
Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, a noted terrorism researcher in
Singapore, wrote an article shortly afterwards calling the
Islamabad Marriott ``the world's most protected hotel.'' We had
196 security officers, 60 of them on duty at the time, 62
closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras looking both inside
and outside the hotel, and bomb-sniffing dogs. It was the type
of security that you would never expect to see at a hotel.
Terrorist tactics continue to evolve. Our security must evolve,
as well.
In my department, we study terrorist attacks against
hotels. The attacks in Mumbai presented several lessons to be
learned. It was widely reported that the terrorists had been in
the hotel for several months, at times posing as guests, taking
photographs, and learning the layouts of the hotels. We believe
awareness training should be conducted for employees to
understand what may be suspicious and should be reported. We
recently developed a program to place discipline-specific
posters in non-public areas of the hotels outlining suspicious
activities to increase awareness. The housekeeper cleaning a
room who finds diagrams of the hotel should report it. In high-
threat areas, a covert detection team should be employed which
is specifically trained to identify individuals conducting
hostile surveillance.
According to media reports, the police responding were not
familiar with the building layout. Plans provided to them were
outdated and did not indicate where recent renovations had
taken place. We believe hotel management should develop a
relationship with local authorities and conduct joint training
exercises. Current building plans with detailed photographs and
video should be provided to the authorities.
The Taj Hotel management reported that intelligence agents
had provided information which resulted in the hotel lowering
their security measures. We believe hotels should develop
independent intelligence analysis capabilities. Security
professionals should interpret intelligence and determine
mitigation measures. Hotel managers in most cases are not
trained in intelligence analysis and do not understand
countermeasures necessary to deter or mitigate an attack.
The hotel lacked physical security measures which would
have made it more difficult for the attackers. This included
multiple entrances, lack of a sprinkler system, and open
stairways. We believe hotel designs should consider security
features early in the architectural planning stage.
I hope my comments have been helpful. I am happy to provide
more detail, and thank you for inviting me to testify.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Orlob. They have been very
helpful. We look forward to the question period.
Finally, we have Michael Norton, who is the Managing
Director of Global Property Management and Operations of
Tishman Speyer. Thanks for being here.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. NORTON,\1\ MANAGING DIRECTOR, GLOBAL
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, TISHMAN SPEYER
Mr. Norton. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins,
and Members of the Committee for this invitation to address the
Committee and discuss lessons learned from the Mumbai terrorist
attacks.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Norton appears in the Appendix on
page 103.
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I am responsible for managing and directing all global
property management activities at Tishman Speyer. Tishman
Speyer is one of the leading owners, developers, operators, and
fund managers of first-class real estate in the world. Since
1978, Tishman Speyer has acquired, developed, and operated over
320 projects totaling over 115 million square feet throughout
the United States, Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Some of our
properties include New York's Rockefeller Center, the Chrysler
Building, and the Met Life Building.
Today, our in-house property management specialists are
responsible for more than 200 buildings reflecting 84 million
square feet of Class A office, residential, and mixed-use
properties in 34 markets across the world. In 2005, Tishman
Speyer became the first U.S. real estate company to sign a
joint venture agreement to develop in India. Today, we are
pursuing projects in multiple cities, including Mumbai, New
Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Tellpur, and Chennai.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Real Estate
Roundtable, where our company's Co-Chief Executive Officer,
Robert Speyer, is chair of the Homeland Security Task Force. I
am also testifying on behalf of the Real Estate Board of New
York and Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA)
International, two organizations where I personally sit on
senior governing boards and councils. In addition to my work
with these organizations, I am also a Lieutenant Colonel in the
Marine Corps Reserve. Next month, I enter my 25th year of
service.
Looking forward, for the owners and operators of high-
profile commercial buildings, there are at least five areas of
continued concern in light of these Mumbai attacks.
One, the need for ever-improved communications
capabilities, both in-house and with local law enforcement and
emergency response agencies.
Two, the still not fully tapped potential of employees at
commercial office buildings to help law enforcement and
homeland security officials detect threats and assess
vulnerabilities.
Three, more fully addressing our interdependence and co-
location with mass transit and other major soft targets.
Four, acknowledging and improving our role as the first
responders in the period between the initiation of an attack
and the arrival of law enforcement.
And finally, acknowledging our dependence on well-informed
and well-equipped law enforcement and homeland security
emergency officials for effective deterrence and response.
Shortly, I will suggest some specific areas for making
progress in each of these areas, but first, let me talk a
little more about the changing threat environment and some of
the steps our company and others in the industry have taken
since September 11, 2001, to better manage those.
Given the primary role of local law enforcement in
deterring terrorists from commencing with commando-style
attacks, the core mission for building owners in the event of
such an attack should be to limit loss of life and property for
as long as it takes law enforcement to control the situation.
To that end, security and building staffs will be acting as
first responders. It is important to remember, however, that
unlike traditional first responders from the police force, our
personnel are unarmed. In our view, this critical interim role
requires more attention.
Building personnel can and should be trained to identify
suspicious behavior, especially behavior consistent with
surveillance or casing of our facilities. When we look at some
of the post-September 11, 2001, office building initiatives
that are now set in place, we see many that will assist us in
meeting our goal of protecting the lives of our tenants. These
initiatives or practices can be organized into six basic
categories: Communications, training programs, emergency
response, target hardening techniques, information sharing, and
coordination initiatives. While all of these play a significant
role in managing the risk of the Mumbai type of an attack, I
would like to focus principally on communications, training,
and target hardening.
The single greatest lesson learned from September 11, 2001,
was the need for robust local communication channels with
emergency response officials. We have made significant progress
in achieving this goal in many of the larger cities that we own
properties in. New York City has, in my opinion, become the
gold standard in this regard.
As an example, the NYPD gave a briefing on the Mumbai
incident to the security directors just one week after the
attacks that included a live commentary from an NYPD captain
who was still on site in India. To varying degrees, this kind
of public-private communication is happening in Washington, DC,
Chicago, and Los Angeles. More can and should be done to
improve these programs in those cities and to bring a similar
spirit of partnership to other U.S. cities.
Since September 11, 2001, the security industry has
improved the training of its employees in key areas, such as
surveillance techniques, observation skills, and building
layout designs. For example, the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU), the largest services union in North
America, has developed a 40-hour course for their officers in
New York City, and I think they are going to adopt that in
other cities, most recently Washington and San Francisco.
Almost every terrorist attack requires a great deal of
planning and preparation, including site visits to determine
how the target is protected, both during business hours and
after business hours. If trained in how this surveillance is
likely to occur, our security personnel will be in a better
position to act as the eyes and ears of the police and to
detect this kind of suspicious behavior.
Local law enforcement also needs to train in a way that is
geared toward specific types of buildings or even specific
iconic structures. As Police Commissioner Ray Kelly said in his
testimony before this same Committee earlier this month, in
Mumbai, the attackers appeared to know their targets better
than the responding commandos. At the very least, local police
should be aware of the layout of all high-profile buildings and
who owns or manages them. DHS has conducted threat assessments
on many iconic properties, and in some but not all cities,
local police do that, as well. I believe this is an extremely
important pre-attack planning need. Just as terrorists conduct
pre-raid surveillance acts and intelligence gathering
operations, we need to do the same.
After September 11, 2001, building owners have hardened
many commercial office properties in ways that could assist in
defending against a Mumbai-type of attack, but we must be
realistic and recognize that our security officers are all
unarmed and most building lobbies are accessible to the public.
Well armed, walking terrorists would have no trouble gaining
access. This is why the key to preventing a Mumbai attack in
major cities will be our reliance on the quick actions of our
local police and regional law enforcement.
Hardening measures are shared through the exchange of best
practices, both in the United States and sometimes in our
counterparts overseas. One London program that has gained the
support of the private sector is called Project Griffin. Under
this program, the City of London Police and the Metropolitan
Police train private sector security officers in a wide range
of procedures to combat urban terrorism, offer them weekly
intelligence briefings, and deputize them during periods of
high-threat alerts to perform certain functions.
At the beginning of my testimony, I mentioned five key
areas where we need to continue to make progress. Taking these
points one by one, let me offer some quick suggestions.
Communications and information sharing: Our goal in the
commercial real estate high-rise office industry is to best
protect the lives of our tenants and visitors until the local
law enforcement can appropriately deal with the situation. To
that end, effective information sharing partnerships with local
officials will be critical. Programs such as the NYPD Strategic
Home Intervention and Early Leadership Development (SHIELD)
program and Project Griffin in London need to become the norm
in major urban areas. Federal and State policy should encourage
the launch of such programs on an expedited basis.
Terrorism awareness training and exercise: Local law
enforcement and emergency response officials should also be
encouraged by State and Federal policies to train and exercise
jointly with the private sector. Just as we need to learn more
about likely emergency response actions in an emergency,
government officials need to better understand our facilities
and our personnel's capabilities and limitations in a crisis.
Interdependence with mass transit: One specific area that I
recommend would be further advanced is joint training regarding
the interdependencies, including co-location of iconic
buildings and mass transit facilities. Specifically, we need to
develop effective tabletop exercises between local police,
fire, medical, public health, and our building staff using
scenarios based in part on the Mumbai-type attacks that affect
the government and private sector. We would be happy to offer
use of our buildings and some similar iconic buildings as the
site for such an exercise in the future and we encourage other
building owners to undertake similar joint exercises with mass
transit officials.
I have mentioned that our building staff and security
officers will be the first responders if a terrorist targets
our office environment. Improving training of building staff on
building operations, emergency procedures, first aid, and a
means to effectively evacuate, shelter in place, or close off
sections of a property is crucial. In addition, I believe now
is the time to consider offering to these brave men and women
the special financial and medical coverage that other first
responders, like police and fire, can obtain in the event of
terrorist events.
While I know all of you understand this, it bears
repeating. At the end of the day, the private sector has a
support role in dealing with Mumbai-type of attacks. The
primary responsibility is with local law enforcement. We have a
huge stake as an industry in programs including Federal
programs that offer those brave men and women the training,
cutting-edge intelligence, and equipment they need. I believe
we can and should do more in that regard.
This concludes my oral testimony. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Norton.
We will do 6-minute rounds of questions. Both of you have
described very active programs for Marriott and Tishman Speyer.
Am I right to conclude that almost all of this is self-
generated and not incentivized by government in the first
place?
Mr. Orlob. In our case, that is certainly true.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Mr. Norton.
Mr. Norton. A little of both, more so private though, and
like I said, in the New York sector, we get a lot of
participation with NYPD. So we work closely with them.
Chairman Lieberman. So New York is, in a way, an exception,
or as you said, the gold standard. That is the one case where
you are working very closely with a governmental entity.
Mr. Norton. More so than other markets, yes.
Chairman Lieberman. Have you had any contact with the
Department of Homeland Security in Washington in the
development of the security programs that you have? Mr. Orlob.
Mr. Orlob. About a year ago, there were a few of us in the
hotel industry that formed a group called the Hotel Security
Group, and basically, we took the 10 biggest hotel companies
and reached out to their corporate security directors. So we
brought them in, and the purpose of it is information sharing.
But also, we reached out to the State Department's Overseas
Security Advisory Council (OSAC), and we also reached out to
DHS. DHS came to us and explained to us that the training that
they offer, especially in surveillance detection, is the type
of things we were looking for. So they have reached out and
they have offered to provide those programs.
Chairman Lieberman. How about you, Mr. Norton?
Mr. Norton. We have. In the post-September 11, 2001, era
DHS has done threat assessments on some of our iconic assets
and we have worked closely with them on evaluating those and
have used some of their standards to implement while we
purchase other assets.
Chairman Lieberman. I know that a number of organizations
have issued standards and guidelines to help the private sector
secure critical infrastructure. I wanted to ask you now to
indicate the extent to which industry associations have
assisted you in the development of the security steps that you
have taken.
Mr. Norton. I think it is more not so much industry, but
working together as real estate companies, so sharing best
practices, sitting in groups like the Real Estate Board of New
York with other owner-operators, and every day buildings trade
hands, trade ownership. We are purchasing, we are acquiring, we
are developing, and it becomes best practices. So it is more of
internally within the private sector we are sharing best
practices. We are doing our own threat assessments and we learn
lessons from the blackout we had in 2003 and from obviously the
post-September 11, 2001, era that we work in. There is more so
of that. And there are some industry associations. BOMA
International has guidelines that they provide us and that we
live by and that we look at as we execute certain things in our
buildings.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you think that the security measures
that Tishman Speyer have taken are typical of large real estate
entities in our country or is your company unusually active and
aggressive in this area?
Mr. Norton. I think that they are very similar when you put
it in a Class A format.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Norton. And there are five or six real Class A
operators of that kind of real estate and I think they are
pretty much using the same standards and methods, yes.
Chairman Lieberman. But probably others have not, in part,
I assume because of the cost, is that right?
Mr. Norton. Everything is market-driven and cost is the
key. Tenants are escalated the costs of security, cleaning,
engineering, and it is what the tenant is willing to pay. As
you know, in Washington, DC, you can walk freely into buildings
without turnstiles, but in New York City, you can't walk freely
in without checking an ID, then getting a pass to go through a
turnstile. So it is a different flavor.
Chairman Lieberman. Correct. And I assume, just to make the
point, that part of why your company is investing so much money
in security also has to do with a financial calculation, that
the security itself is a commercially attractive asset.
Mr. Norton. Absolutely. It is an investment, and we hope to
attract Fortune 500 tenants to those types of assets, who then
pay higher rents because they are in a secure environment.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Mr. Orlob, talk a little about the
hotel industry. I also was fascinated because sometimes big
things are done in little ways, the idea that you would train
the housekeepers to be alert to what they may observe in the
course of just cleaning up a room. As you said, if they see
blueprints of a hotel, that should ring some alarm bells and
they should report. Are all of Marriott's employees now being
sensitized to look for that kind of information?
Mr. Orlob. Well, certainly they are in what we call high-
risk environments.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Orlob. When we look around the world, we have about 40
of our hotels at what we call Threat Condition Red.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Orlob. I think we have 42 of our hotels at Threat
Condition Yellow, and I think we have close to 70 hotels at
Threat Condition Blue. So these are the hotels that have
enhanced security. We started the program there, rolling it out
to those hotels because we wanted them to get that information
right away so that those employees are sensitized to it. But as
we continue to roll this program out, we want to get this out
to all our employees.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Tellis, let me just ask you--this
is a big question and I don't have much time left, but I
thought it was significant that you pointed out that Lashkar-e-
Taiba is now second to al-Qaeda in that part of the world. But
also, because it is very important, the first news reports,
some of them indicated that this is a group that was focused on
Kashmir and the dispute between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir. Now, you are saying, and I know you are accurate here,
that all you have got to do is listen to them and read their
stuff. This is a much more global Islamist group, correct? And
that is why the relevance to the United States--although as you
said, they are here, but the threat is latent--is important for
us to focus on.
Mr. Tellis. That is right, and the record, I think, speaks
even more clearly than what they say, because LeT started
operating in Afghanistan in 1987. It moved into Kashmir only in
1993, and it did so really at the behest of the ISI. The track
record of the group's evolution clearly shows that Kashmir came
somewhat late in the day as an operational theater to them.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Tellis. They really have a global agenda.
Chairman Lieberman. You make an important factual point. To
the best of your knowledge, Lashkar-e-Taiba was not founded by
ISI. I take it that it was founded before, but I gather at some
point a link was made, is that correct? Because some have said
it was founded by ISI.
Mr. Tellis. No. It was founded by three individuals, one of
whom was supposedly a mentor to Osama bin Laden. But it became
very quickly tied to ISI because its motivations and its world
view were very compatible with the leadership of ISI at that
time.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Thanks. My time is up. Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would note that
we have a vote on. Do you want us to proceed for a time, or how
would you like to----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. I will tell you what. If we can do
it, why don't you proceed. I will go over----
Senator Collins. OK.
Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. And hope to come back in
time, and we will keep going as long as people are here.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. Good.
Senator Collins [presiding]. Mr. Jenkins, you mentioned
that the attack on the train station in Mumbai accounted for
more than one-third of the deaths and you talked about the fact
that if you look at other terrorist attacks around the world,
mass transit is frequently a target because of the number of
casualties. How would you evaluate the security that we have in
the United States and the priority that we are placing on
securing train stations and other areas of mass transit?
Mr. Jenkins. The challenge in protecting public surface
transportation in this country is the fact that it is public,
that is, we have to begin with the idea that this is a public
facility that is supposed to be convenient for passengers to
use. It is an even greater challenge than aviation security. We
can't take the aviation security model and apply it to surface
transportation. We now employ 45,000 screeners to screen
approximately two million passengers a day boarding airplanes
in this country. The number of people who use public surface
transportation in this country is many times that, so cost,
manpower, and delays would prohibit that kind of model.
Surface transportation is clearly a vulnerable target. It
is an attractive target. What we are looking for are mechanisms
with which we can do several things. We must increase the
deterrence and preventive measures without destroying public
surface transportation, and that takes both capital investment
and training, and indeed, according to some, we are behind in
funding that, in closing that vulnerability.
We also need to be able to put into place mechanisms that
provide a platform so that in high-threat environments, or say,
in the immediate wake of something like the attacks in Mumbai,
London, or Madrid, we can go up several notches for our transit
systems but have the training and platforms for doing that. So
if we have to increase the number of patrols or go to selective
searches, we can do that, and we are trying to do that now.
The third area has to do with response, crisis management,
and things of that sort, and we are behind in that, and I think
the operators can do more than that. There is a recent DHS
report out that says that--we reported on this for the first
time--we are probably behind in developing our emergency
planning and response capabilities.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Orlob, I, too, was struck by the statement in your
testimony where you talked about training the housekeepers who
are in high-risk hotels to report suspicious activity, such as
finding diagrams of the hotel in a room. I believe that one of
our principal weapons in detecting and disrupting a terrorist
attack is vigilant citizens reporting suspicious activity.
I mentioned in my opening statement that to encourage that
kind of reporting in the transportation sector, the Chairman
and I authored a bill that became law to give immunity from
lawsuits if someone in good faith reports to the proper
authorities evidence of a terrorist plot or other suspicious
activity. Currently, however, the law is very limited. It only
applies to reports of suspicious activity in the transportation
sector. Would you support expanding that law to provide
immunity from lawsuits to individuals who in good faith report
suspicious activities to the appropriate authorities? Do you
think it would help your efforts?
Mr. Orlob. I think that it makes a lot of sense. I am sure
there is some sensitivity among some of our employees to report
things like that just because of what you are talking about,
and I think if they knew that they were not subject to any type
of lawsuit or prosecution, that certainly that makes a lot of
sense.
Senator Collins. Mr. Norton.
Mr. Norton. My only real exposure to that is obviously in
New York City, they have a campaign--if you see something, say
something--and it is inundated throughout the city. Again, I
think it would be helpful to educate people as to what does
that mean and am I protected if I am going to make a phone
call. But frankly, I think, in New York, people are very quick
and willing, especially in the post-September 11, 2001, era, to
make that call. We have a lot of tourists that come, take lots
of pictures, lots of videos, but when they are doing things in
railway stations or in loading docks, people make that phone
call. So I think that you have to encourage it. You have to
encourage people to make that call. It will save lives.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Senator McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the
witnesses for being here.
Mr. Jenkins, I will read your book immediately. I thank you
for your important contribution and that of RAND to helping us
understand this attack. I do think we should highlight the fact
that it is the first attack that has been as well orchestrated,
as well trained, as well equipped. They obviously outgunned
until the commandos showed up. They weren't necessarily suicide
individuals, that they were able with just a handful of people
to hit 10 targets. I think there are a whole lot of lessons
here that maybe we haven't paid that much attention to.
Mr. Jenkins, what do you think is the danger, in going
along with your book, that the terrorist organizations within
Pakistan might be able to obtain the nuclear weapons that we
all know Pakistan has?
Mr. Jenkins. I think it is a real concern. We do receive
regular reassurances from the Pakistani authorities that they
have the nuclear weapons under tight control, but one does
worry. When we look at the nexus in Pakistan between organized
crime figures like Dawood Ibrahim and terrorist organizations,
and we look at the black markets that were created to support
Pakistan's own nuclear program through A.Q. Khan, I mean, this
is a set of connections between organized crime, government
authorities, and terrorist organizations that does raise the
specter of the possibility of large-scale finance and real
concerns if they move into weapons of mass destruction.
I don't want to exaggerate the threat because I still do
believe that terrorists get a tremendous amount of mileage out
of doing low-tech things without attempting to do some of the
more technologically challenging things, and the Mumbai attack
was, as I mentioned before, an example of basically small-unit
infantry tactics that paralyzed a city of 20 million people for
the better part of 3 days.
Senator McCain. And obviously knew the territory, at least
far as the Taj Hotel is concerned, a lot better than any of the
people who were trying to eliminate them.
Dr. Tellis, very quickly, and I apologize because we have a
vote going on, you said the terrorists have got to be brought
to justice and the Pakistanis have to roll up the terrorist
organizations, but particularly LeT. What do you think the
chances of that happening are? It hasn't yet.
Mr. Tellis. The chances are remote, but they can't afford
to keep it that way because we have essentially seen this game
evolving now for close to 20 years and the costs of these
terrorists staying in business have progressively increased.
Senator McCain. Does that then over time increase the
likelihood that the government of India will feel they may have
to take some action?
Mr. Tellis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. It is a real danger.
Mr. Tellis. It is a real danger. In fact, the current
crisis is not over yet.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Madam Chairman. I apologize. I
have about 20 more questions, but I appreciate the witnesses
and their testimony here this morning. Thank you.
Senator Collins. We will suspend the hearing just briefly
until Senator Lieberman returns. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks very much. The
hearing will resume. Thanks for your patience and
understanding.
I gather Senator McCain was in the middle of his
questioning, but we will wait until he comes back and then
bring him on.
Senator Bennet, it is an honor to call on you for the first
time in the Committee. We are very pleased that you have joined
the Committee. You bring considerable talents both to the
Senate and to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee, and we look forward to working with you. Thank you
very much.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNET
Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say
thank you to you and the staff for being so welcoming to me as
the newest Member, and to Senator Collins, as well, for her
leadership in the Committee. I look forward to serving.
I had a couple of unrelated questions. One, Mr. Jenkins,
you mentioned that as we look at Pakistan, the choice might be
less than full cooperation on the one hand versus, I think you
described it as internal chaos on the other hand, and I
wondered whether we can glean anything from their response to
the attacks in Mumbai to give us some indication of whether
those remain our only two choices or what a third choice might
be if there is one.
Mr. Jenkins. The government of Pakistan did make some
response in doing some things under great pressure. Their
response is certainly not regarded as adequate by the Indian
authorities.
One of the problems that the Pakistani government also
faces is public opinion in Pakistan itself. I mean, according
to public opinion polls, the No. 1 long-term national security
threat to Pakistan is the United States. No. 2 is India. And
you go way down the list before you come to al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, LeT, and the other groups, so that the government of
Pakistan really has to almost defy public opinion to do
something. Moreover, we do have the reality that the civilian
elected government's authority over the Pakistan military and
intelligence services is limited. So we can keep on pressing
them, as we should, but I think we have to accept that this is
going to be a long-term diplomatic slog before we really can
enlist Pakistan as being fully cooperative against terrorism.
And, by the way, the problem didn't begin with this
government or even the previous government. It was recognized
by the National Commission on Terrorism in 1999 and 2000 that
Pakistan was not fully cooperating against terrorism.
Senator Bennet. In view of that, it is obviously hugely
problematic since that is where these groups are being
harbored. What is it that can be done? I mean, we have got the
diplomatic slog on the one hand, but what steps are we taking
or should we take, or India take, to protect these targets
knowing that we won't get the sort of cooperation immediately
that we need from the Pakistani government or military?
Mr. Jenkins. I think we have to work directly with the
military to bring about at least a shift among some in the
military to increase cooperation in going after these groups
along this turbulent tribal area, in this border area. We do
have some relationships that have been developing. I think our
long-term goal there is to create a more effective military
capability to deal with these groups.
Pakistan has been somewhat schizophrenic. At times, it has
tried to make deals in some of these turbulent areas and
negotiate ceasefires. That hasn't worked. At times, it has gone
in with military force, and its own forces haven't fared well.
I think we can do a lot more in terms of creating with military
assistance some new relationships and a long-term effort to
create some new capabilities. We have put billions of dollars
into this and it is slow going. Dr. Tellis will have more to
add about this, but I am not wildly optimistic in the short
term.
Senator Bennet. Dr. Tellis, would you like to comment?
Mr. Tellis. I think it is going to be a long slog, but
Pakistan's own positions, or at least the army's positions with
respect to terrorist groups has changed over the years. For the
first time now, the Pakistan army, both the Chief of Army Staff
and the head of the ISI, are publicly willing to admit that
Pakistan's central problem is terrorism and not India. This is
a big shift.
There is still a lag, however, between that appreciation
and actually doing something about it, and so the hope is that
if they are successful, at some point, there will be a catch-up
and the rhetoric and reality will somehow come together. But
this will take time, and so we have to keep at Pakistan, and it
will be a combination of both incentives and pressure. I don't
think we have a choice.
But the point I want to make is that, historically, when
the Pakistani state, meaning primarily the army, has made the
decision to crack down on certain terrorist groups, they have
actually done it very effectively. And so it is simply a matter
of getting the motivational trigger right, and that will
require a certain degree of comfort that they have with us and
with the Indians, and with a bit of luck, we will move in that
direction.
Senator Bennet. Mr. Chairman, I am about out of time, but I
had one other question.
Chairman Lieberman. No, go right ahead. Since it is only
you and me, take some time.
Senator Bennet. Thank you. And more on topic for today,
when I read the materials, it seems that there was a general
sense that something major was going to happen and that was not
communicated, that there was a lapse of communication of some
kind between India and others, that there was no communication,
it appears, between India and authorities in Mumbai, and
undoubtedly none with the private sector that was there.
I wonder, sort of extrapolating from all that and not
concerning ourselves so much with the history of that
particular event, as we think about our potential soft targets
in the United States--and we still have yet to really develop a
consciousness around this, I think we heard some discussion
about the hardening of targets in New York and other places,
but it is not the general norm. How do we need to think about
improving our communications so that people really do
understand when there is risk and fill those gaps between the
Federal Government, local law enforcement, and our private
sector?
Mr. Jenkins. We have improved in information sharing. I
mean, what India learned in Mumbai is the problem of connecting
the dots. They had dots. They didn't connect them. We had that
driven home to us in September 11, 2001, and clearly there has
been a great deal of improvement. The amount of information
that moves around between Federal authorities, State
authorities, local and tribal authorities now is much greater
than it was before, although it is still a challenge. I don't
think we can say with confidence that we are delivering the
necessary information to those who need it to make decisions on
the front line in every case, but it has improved.
I think we do have to make a distinction between
information and intelligence. Intelligence is concerned with
who did it and how we know that, and that is not what many of
our local operators or local police departments even need to
know. What we need to know in these cases is what happened and
how they did it. Who did it doesn't make any difference at the
local operator level when you are making decisions about
increasing security and doing these things. So that is
something we can continue to work on.
We have, I think, funded the fusion centers. These are
really all-hazard response organizations. They do have an
intelligence function, but they are primarily intended to
respond to all hazards. Those need continued support, but we
need to enhance local capabilities further. We can't think of
this as a Federal top-down, hub-and-spokes system. We have to
create more capability at the local level, and our local
governments and State governments are really strapped. So we
need to make that happen.
We need to probably even elevate information sharing to a
higher level of priority within DHS for the new Secretary to
really push hard on that as a priority area. We have some
initiatives which really merit support and can fall into the
bureaucracy, some of these shared mission communities and other
mechanisms for collaboration that are in danger of being
missed, and we need to do that.
And I think, finally, in terms of information sharing, we
really need to take a fundamental look at our clearance and
classification system. We are still operating with clearance
procedures that were created during the Cold War to deal with a
different spectrum of threats. We are now dealing with nebulous
networks, fast-moving developments, and we have to come up with
a much more streamlined process for moving intelligence and
information around in this system than this somewhat cumbersome
thing that we have inherited from half a century ago. That has
become an impediment now.
Senator Bennet. Mr. Chairman, that is all I had. I do have
a statement that, with your permission, I would like entered
into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bennet follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNET
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member
Collins for holding this hearing. I respect the leadership you both
have exercised over this Committee, and I am honored to be its newest
Member. In addition, I'd like to thank our witnesses for being here
today for this second hearing on the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist
attacks.
I would first like to offer my heartfelt condolences to the
families of all 172 victims of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. As
someone who spent some time in India during my youth, I was
particularly troubled by these senseless attacks, and I sympathize with
all those who have been affected by these acts of terrorism.
The attacks on Mumbai involved new tactics and new technology
designed to inflict maximum damage on the public. We have learned that
the attacks employed uniquely coordinated teams of attackers, targeting
multiple and changing locations--a departure from past suicide bomber
attacks. They used cell phones and GPS, and, throughout the 62-hour
ordeal, the attackers remained in contact with remote ``handlers.'' In
addition, the attackers targeted hotels and other public locations--
``soft targets'' known for tourism and commerce.
As we examine what happened in Mumbai, we know that we cannot sit
back and simply hope it will never happen again. It is the unfortunate
reality of our time that groups of extremists are bent on destroying
the safety, security, and ideals America and her partners hold dear.
Armed with the hope that we will one day defeat these terrorists,
we must do everything we can to keep our country safe. As we study the
trends used in the attack in Mumbai and elsewhere, I hope we can help
develop a set of best practices for intelligence authorities, local law
enforcement officials, and private businesses in the U.S., India, and
other countries that will help us make the world a safer place.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered. Thank
you, Senator Bennet.
Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Not at all. We will do another round.
I appreciate what you said, Mr. Jenkins. I think it is an
important point as we try to sort out responsibilities that on
these matters of protecting soft targets, there is no question
that this is initially private sector because most of these are
privately-owned. The Federal Government has a role here, which
I want our Committee to explore as to what we can do--both of
you made suggestions--to incentivize or assist the private
sector in preparedness and upgrading security on soft targets.
But then the real work has to be done at the local level.
That is the natural place. It is certainly obvious. As our
friends in India found out, if you are dealing with a central
national response, it is hard to get them there in time. We
would like to think we would get our people there more quickly
than happened in Mumbai, but still, the first order of
response, as Commissioner Kelly made very clear when he was
with us, is local, and the natural interaction, the much easier
interaction between law enforcement and the private sector is
at the local level. It is just not going to happen nationally.
So part of what we have to decide--I agree with you. I
repeat, I think Commissioner Kelly and the NYPD are the gold
standard. There are others--Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington--
doing well, but then there are a lot of other places in this
country which have soft targets where the local police simply
have not had the capacity to get involved, and that is where I
would like to see--we are feeling strapped, too, these days
financially--how we can assist the local police departments in
assisting the private sector in getting this done.
While you were out, Senator Bennet questioned. I have
started a round and I will go right to you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask you just in that regard, and
I will start with Mr. Norton because you had some suggestions
on this, to develop a bit more what you have in mind that the
government can do in those particular areas that you focused
on--communications, training, target hardening--to either
incentivize or assist the private sector.
Mr. Norton. I think it is important to just know in the
industry itself, security officers have about 110 to 125
percent turnover rate. So from our perspective, we want to do
anything we can to incentivize, give them dignity, give them
benefits, make them feel good that they have a job that they
can go to, and most importantly, create continuity and
consistency, because when you have a high turnover of upwards
of 125 percent, your people may be trained one day. The next
day, they are gone to a new job and you have the next guy in.
So I think creating standards and best practices that we
can implement and execute and making it attractive as an
industry would be very helpful. I think that is starting to
happen. It hasn't fully been executed yet here in the United
States. It all started with the cleaners. It is sort of ironic.
You have a security guard making $8 an hour and he is the front
teeth of a $1 billion asset, and the guy pushing the broom can
walk into a union, make $20 an hour, and speak no English and
really, I think, it sets a different tone. That is why you have
such a high turnover. So I think we need to somehow continue to
push that if we are going to secure these soft targets.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I agree. It is a few years since I
have heard this, but at one point in the last 2 or 3 years,
security guards were the fastest-growing job sector in our
economy, but that doesn't mean that they were getting paid well
or that they were well trained. We know that some of the
private companies do very well at this. Others do not. And we
have actually done some work, including legislative work, on
this.
Let me, in the few minutes I have left on this round, go to
Dr. Tellis and ask you to respond to this. Mr. Jenkins said, I
think, something to me that seems quite right, which was that
in many senses, but in one particular sense I want to ask you
about, Mumbai was for India what September 11, 2001, was for
the United States. And in the one sense I am talking about, for
us, obviously, it revealed the stovepiped Federal agencies,
State and local, were unable to connect the dots. I think one
of the most significant things we have done after that was to
create the organized, coordinated Director of National
Intelligence and particularly the unsung but very critical
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
In your testimony, you talked about these attacks offering
us an opportunity for improved cooperation with India on
counterterrorism, including intelligence sharing and law
enforcement training. I wonder if you would speak in a little
more detail about and also indicate whether you think the first
round of Indian legislative response, which has occurred, will
deal with this stovepipe problem and will make it more likely
that the dots will be connected if there is a next time.
Mr. Tellis. Let me address the last question first.
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. Tellis. I think the legislative response that they have
engaged in has been quite inadequate because what in effect
they have done is they have created a new investigative agency
to deal with the problems after they have occurred.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Tellis. It is an investigative agency that essentially
will bring perpetrators to justice. Now, that is important, but
it doesn't help them solve problems in terms of prevention.
They still have to create something like the equivalent of the
NCTC. They haven't done that yet. They are struggling with the
issues of classification that Mr. Jenkins mentioned, because
traditionally, the information that they got has been primarily
through technical intercepts which are shared by a very small
group of people. They have not had a system where this
information is rapidly disseminated to law enforcement and to
those elements on the front line.
And so the big challenge for them is fusion. How do you
fuse the information coming from diverse sources, different
organizations, maybe even different levels of classification,
and getting it to the people who actually need to have it? This
is where I think we really can make a difference, bringing them
to the United States, really giving them the tour, having them
intern in institutions like NCTC so that they get a feel for
how we do it. Now, obviously the submission can't be replicated
in exactly the same way, but the basic principle of fusing
information coming from different sources and making it
available to people who need it, I think, is something that
they still have a lot of work to do.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a very helpful response. As you
know, I visited New Delhi with Senator McCain about a week
after Mumbai. We talked with Mr. Narayanan, the National
Security Advisor, about what could we do to help. He said he
had been in New York, I believe for the General Assembly of the
U.N. last fall, and spent some time with Commissioner Kelly and
went to one of our fusion centers, and that is good. But I
think you have a very relevant idea, which is we ought to try
to get some high-ranking Indian officials to come back and
spend some time with the DNI and particularly at the National
Counterterrorism Center because I agree with you. My impression
from here has been that they have not done enough.
And this is not easy. As we can tell you, these are
entrenched bureaucracies all working for the national interest
but really not wanting to share information. I will never
forget the first trip that Senator Collins and I made out to
the National Counterterrorism Center. The director took us
around the floor, quite impressive, every agency there, real
time, 24/7, with constant information sharing. He said, ``This
gentleman at this desk is with the CIA. This lady at this desk
is from the FBI. Note there is neither a wall nor a door
between them.'' That was an advance. [Laughter.]
Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I remember that
trip very well, too, and I do think it is making a real
difference. While it is not discussed nearly as much as the
other reforms of the September 11, 2001, bill, the intelligence
reforms of 2004, I think it is one of the most important as far
as making a difference, and it brings us back to the importance
of information sharing.
Dr. Tellis, you made a comment in your testimony about LeT
having the capability to launch attacks in the United States,
and you also referred to the fundraising and recruitment
activities that LeT is conducting in our country. On the way to
work this morning, I heard on NPR a report of a case that has
troubled me where citizens of Somali descent are disappearing
from Minnesota and there was concern, and it had been a
classified concern but I heard it on the radio this morning,
that there was a plot against our new President around
inauguration that originated in Somalia.
So we are seeing activity right here in the United States
to recruit American citizens. Now, this makes sense if you
think of the advantage of having an American who can travel
freely, who isn't going to be under the kind of surveillance as
someone who has to come into our country. But what we are
finding, or what we are told is that in some cases, American
citizens who have become radicalized are being recruited to go
fight elsewhere, to conduct suicide missions overseas. Why
would groups like LeT and other terrorist organizations go to
the expense and trouble of recruiting Americans to die in an
operation overseas?
Mr. Tellis. I think it is ideological. I mean, there is a
vision that there is a global struggle against the United
States and if you can find people from outside to conduct the
struggle and if the foot soldiers are entirely from the
outside, then it becomes an ``us versus them'' problem. It
breaks down across national lines. It is the United States
versus the rest, or others versus the United States.
If you can get people from the United States to join this
movement, then essentially what you have done is you have
exploited corrosion from within, and this is really part of the
vision. The vision that LeT has in particular is that the West
is decadent, that the West is immoral, that it will crumble. It
needs to be assisted in the process of doing so. And so I see
this as being part and parcel of this very corrosive vision
that takes them wherever they can go.
In fact, the fascinating thing about LeT, and we noticed
this actually in the early 1990s, way before global terrorism
was on anyone's agenda, was that LeT had moved out of the
subcontinent in a very big way. We noticed their presence in
West Africa, fundraising. We had noticed their presence in
Europe. These are not places that you would think of in the
1990s as being ripe for terrorist activity, but LeT saw
opportunities and they were there.
And so the important thing about this group is that they
are extremely opportunistic. They are extremely adaptable. And
the point that Mr. Jenkins made earlier, their vision is
utilizing the best of modern science and technology for their
ideological ends.
Senator Collins. It also struck me when you were talking
about not only their capabilities, but their ability to form
alliances with other terrorist groups, and that is very
threatening, as well.
I would wager that if you surveyed 10 Americans on the
street, every one of them would have heard of al-Qaeda. I bet
you not a one of them knows about the threat from LeT, and
part, I believe, of our mission is to try to raise public
awareness that the threat is not just from al-Qaeda, but from
like-minded terrorist groups, and also--and we have done a lot
of work on this--from groups or individuals who are inspired by
the extremist Islamist ideology but aren't linked to any of
these groups. That is where we get the homegrown terrorists,
and we have seen evidence of that kind of radicalization in our
prisons, for example. So this is an area where I think we need
to do a lot more work.
I want to ask our two private sector witnesses, you have
talked about the need for information sharing, but what about
training? Do you think DHS could be helpful to you in that
area? I noticed that the FBI and the DHS, and I don't know
whether you have seen this, but they have come up with a
private sector advisory that has a checklist on how to detect
potential terrorist surveillance and what you should do,
everything from identifying locations that the terrorists must
occupy to view security or to identify vulnerabilities. It
states that many terrorists lack the training to conduct
skillful surveillance and they will make mistakes, which can be
how you can catch them.
Are you familiar with these efforts by DHS? I am trying to
assess how helpful DHS is to you.
Mr. Norton. I am familiar with that, and I think I talked
to your staff a couple of weeks ago about this. Something that
was very helpful to us was working with the Red Cross in New
York--last year, actually--where we had Red Cross Awareness
Day. They set up booths in our buildings and they gave away
kits to our employees and the tenants of the buildings,
everything from a flashlight, to a bottle of water, to a
blanket. They get on the train every day and don't think, this
could break down, we could get attacked, we might be stuck here
for a long period of time, we take that for granted. But now we
are trying to make people more aware and be safer.
We gave them home plans, things that they can do at their
own homes to be prepared in the event that they have to shelter
in place at their house for a period of time. So how do you
lock down, make a fire emergency plan, have water and food, and
keep your children safe.
I think it was a great tool. We got tremendous feedback
from the tenants and it is keeping New York safe and it is a
program that we are going to take to the next level and roll it
out into our other markets.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Orlob.
Mr. Orlob. I think that is a good tool. What we have to
look at is we need to develop something specific to the hotel
industry, and I talked about earlier, we even have to make it
specific to what they do in the hotel. The housekeeper is going
to be looking at something different than a bellman, for
instance. So that is what we have tried to do, is take this
information and then make it specific to what they do in the
hotel.
The other challenge we had as we started developing this is
we have a lot of people who speak a lot of different languages.
Not all of them speak English. So we tried to make something
with as many pictures as possible so that they could visualize
it rather than read it.
My original concept as we developed this was to come up
with a booklet that people could look at, and then we started
talking about the different languages and the challenge of
doing that and that is when we decided we needed to shift to
another way of educating them and making them aware and we
started putting these posters together, again, with a lot of
pictures that they could look at because we operate in so many
countries around the world and not everyone speaks English.
Sometimes we think a little U.S.-centric at times and we need
to kind of get out of that mindset and think around the world.
We have a lot of American citizens staying in our hotels,
too. So we have a real challenge there to make sure that all
our hotels are safe to take care of everyone staying there.
Senator Collins. That is a challenge, and I appreciate both
of you sharing your expertise with us.
My final question is for Mr. Jenkins, if I may.
Chairman Lieberman. Please.
Senator Collins. I am thrilled to have your book because
the Chairman initiated hearings last year on the threat of
nuclear terrorism and we have done a lot of work. I realize you
can't sum up your entire book in 2 minutes, but I am going to
ask you to try, nevertheless, to answer the question you posed
on the cover, ``Will terrorists go nuclear?'' Not that I am not
going to read the entire book, I hasten to say. [Laughter.]
But given the work that you have done, I know it is a
little bit off our hearing topic today, I thought I would take
advantage of your being here.
Mr. Jenkins. Senator, unfortunately, I am not nationally
recognized in the field of prophecy, so I am not able to offer
probabilistic statements about the likelihood of terrorists
going nuclear. I think there have been some exaggerated
statements indicating that it is not a matter of if, but when,
or it is going to happen within 5 years in this country. I am
not quite sure how to judge those because as I say, I have no
basis for making probabilistic statements.
I think it is a frightening real possibility. Whether or
not I can make a prediction is not important. I will regard
myself as a prudent agnostic and say that it is of sufficient
concern that I want to see us taking all of the necessary steps
to prevent it from occurring, and that includes those efforts
that already have been taken to ensure the security of nuclear
weapons worldwide--our own arsenal, the Russian arsenal, and
others--and of highly enriched uranium (HEU), both in military
programs--leftover HEU from the decommissioning of weapons--and
HEU that is available in civilian research reactors.
I think we have to do more to discourage the development of
a potential nuclear black market. That means sting operations.
No one should have the certainty, whether a potential buyer or
a potential seller, that their seller or buyer is not an
intelligence agent or a law enforcement official, and I think
we can do a lot more in that area.
I think we also have to think about the frightening
possibility of, heaven forbid, an event occuring in this
country. How would we respond to that nationally? What
decisions would we confront? That is the kind of thing we do in
games that are conducted in the Pentagon and elsewhere.
A final point is, I do think we have to make a distinction
between nuclear terrorism and nuclear terror. Nuclear terrorism
is about the frightening possibility that terrorists may
acquire and use nuclear weapons. Nuclear terror is about our
apprehension of that event. Nuclear terrorism is about
intelligence, assessments, capabilities. Nuclear terror is
driven by our imagination.
We have to be very careful that we don't allow our
terrorist adversaries to take advantage of our understandable
anxieties and exploit those to crank up a level of nuclear
terror even without possessing on their part any nuclear
capability. And at the same time, we have to make sure that we
as a society are psychologically prepared for that event. It
would be a horrific human tragedy, but it would not be the
world-ending event of a full nuclear exchange such as existed
during the Cold War. We would survive, but we want to make sure
that we survive as a functioning democracy and not commit
suicide ourselves in the wake of a terrorist attack.
That is the best I can do in a couple of minutes.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, you have certainly aroused my
interest in reading your book. [Laughter.]
Thanks. Senator Bennet.
Senator Bennet. I don't have any other questions, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Bennet.
I am just going to ask one more question while I have the
four of you here. Senator Collins in her opening statement, and
then you, Mr. Jenkins, in your statement, mentioned the problem
of rail and transit security. This is something that has
unsettled this Committee for some period of time. We have
really done very well at improving our commercial aviation
security at this point. I know it is different and difficult to
deal with rail and transit, but when you see what happened in
Mumbai and, of course, Mumbai earlier with the trains, and then
London and Madrid, you have got to worry about it.
I know we are doing some things now. We have more dogs on.
We have more personnel, more police on various rail and
transit. I think the number is something like more than 14
million people ride mass transit every day in America. And the
conventional answer is, well, you can't do what we do with
planes because people wouldn't use the subways and the trains
anymore if you forced them to go through security.
I just wonder whether any of you have any, both from the
public think tank, private sector point of view, any ideas,
because this is going to continue to be a focus of this
Committee. What more can we do to improve security on non-
aviation transportation in the United States?
Mr. Jenkins. One of the answers is controversial. You are
correct: We can't go to the aviation model of 100 percent
passenger screening. That is probably not realistic. We can
go--and Amtrak has done so, Washington Metro has done so, New
York has done so, and a couple of other places have done so--to
selective screening.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Jenkins. Now, that doesn't mean screening on the basis
of racial or ethnic profiling. That would be inappropriate, as
well as stupid security. But certainly we can do more with
selective screening and putting into place the platforms for
programs that can be rapidly expanded if threat conditions
warrant expanding them.
There are some capital investments that probably we can
make to take advantage of some of the technologies both in
camera surveillance and in explosive detection. DHS is doing
some terrific work on improvised explosive devices, but there
the challenge is working out as, our capabilities of improving
our detection of explosives improve, the operational and policy
issues that come up.
If, for example, we can remotely detect the suspected
possession of explosives by one individual in a crowd of
people, we have that information, now how do we respond? Do we
say, ``You are a suicide bomber,'' and then what? How do we
handle that? So there are a lot of operational and policy
things that we need to work on.
I am mindful of the most recent Department of Homeland
Security report card, in effect. This is the first time the
Department looked at the preparedness of surface transportation
for response, and this was a set of criteria. I forget the
exact statistics, but fewer than half of the entities that were
surveyed made it to the standards required. Hopefully, that
report card will become an incentive for people to do things
that don't require major capital investments, but things like
tabletop exercises, crisis management plans----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Jenkins [continuing]. And liaison with local police. A
lot of things that we saw didn't work in Mumbai, we won't
replicate those errors here.
Chairman Lieberman. That is helpful. Do any of the other
three of you have anything you want to add about rail and
transit? I know it is not particularly in your area. I thank
you.
I want to just say this. Senator Collins, do you have
another question?
Senator Collins. I don't.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Collins was talking about how
people in the United States don't know about Lashkar-e-Taiba.
She is absolutely right. We are all focused on al-Qaeda because
of September 11, 2001. I do want to say my own impression is,
based on my service on this Committee and on the Armed Services
Committee, that we have actually done serious damage to al-
Qaeda in various ways. But I don't mean they are done, and this
is a war in which a few people with no concern about their own
life or anybody else's could do terrible damage. But they are,
I would really say, in retreat. I mean, that is that they are
weakened.
But the threat goes on, and here you have another group
showing both a willingness and a capability to really not only
kill a lot of people in Mumbai, but engage the attention of the
world, which is a great strategic role. So this is going to be
a long war, although we are learning as we go on and we are
getting better at both preventing and responding, and I think
the four of you have really helped us today in a very real way
to dispatch our responsibility. We are now going to be working
with the Department of Homeland Security to see the ways in
which we can together apply the lessons of Mumbai, and I thank
you very much for what you have done to help us do that today.
Do you have anything you would like to say?
Senator Collins. I don't. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. The record of this hearing will be kept
open for 15 days in case any of you want to add anything to
your testimony or any of the Members of the Committee want to
ask you questions for the record.
But I thank you very much, and with that, I will adjourn
the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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