[Senate Hearing 111-678]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-678
VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM--2009
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
of the
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2009
VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT IN AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
EIGHT YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE
HOMELAND
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AS OF MARCH 11,
2009
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AS OF SEPTEMBER
30, 2009
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
PAUL G. KIRK JR., Massachusetts
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Todd M. Stein, Legislative Director, Office of Senator Lieberman
Gordon N. Lederman, Counsel
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Seamus A. Hughes Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Ivy A. Johnson, Minority Senior Counsel
John K. Grant, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1, 51
Senator Collins.............................................. 3, 54
Senator Bennet............................................... 15
Senator Voinovich............................................ 15
Senator Burris.............................................. 17, 68
Senator Kirk................................................. 51
Senator Tester............................................... 71
Senator Levin................................................ 75
Prepared statements:
Senator Burris............................................... 68
Senator Lieberman.......................................... 89, 138
Senator Collins............................................ 92, 140
Senator Bennet............................................... 143
WITNESSES
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Andrew M. Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National
Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence................................................... 5
J. Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National
Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Department of Justice.......................................... 8
Ken Menkhaus, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Davidson
College........................................................ 25
Osman Ahmed, President, Riverside Plaza Tenants Association,
Minneapolis, Minnesota......................................... 31
Abdirahman Mukhtar, Youth Program Manager, Brian Coyle Center,
Pillsbury United Communities, Minneapolis, Minnesota........... 35
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 56
Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 58
Hon. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........ 60
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Ahmed, Osman:
Testimony.................................................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 119
Leiter, Hon. Michael E.:
Testimony.................................................... 60
Prepared statement........................................... 165
Liepman, Andrew M.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 93
Menkhaus, Ken, Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 105
Mudd, J. Philip:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 100
Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III:
Testimony.................................................... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 158
Mukhtar, Abdirahman:
Testimony.................................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 125
Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.:
Testimony.................................................... 56
Prepared statement........................................... 144
APPENDIX
Hon. Keith Ellison, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Minnesota, prepared statement............................... 133
Omar Hurre, Executive Director, Abubakar As-Sadique Islamic
Center, letter dated March 12, 2009............................ 135
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Liepman.................................................. 171
Mr. Mudd..................................................... 172
Mr. Menkhaus................................................. 178
Secretary Napolitano......................................... 179
Mr. Mueller.................................................. 193
Mr. Leiter................................................... 198
VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT IN AMERICA
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Burris, Bennet, Collins, and
Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning, and welcome to this
morning's hearing, which we have called ``Violent Islamist
Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America.''
This hearing falls, coincidentally, on an important date.
This is the fifth anniversary of the Madrid, Spain, train
bombings that killed 191 people and wounded another 1,800. The
Madrid train bombings were a turning point in Islamist
terrorism, turning from a centrally controlled movement to one
that had also begun to act through autonomous cells, in some
cases with direct links to al-Qaeda or other international
terrorist groups, but in some others cases with no or very
slight contact. This expanded the reach of violent Islamist
ideology and made terrorism that much harder to detect and
prevent.
We have, for instance, seen the al-Qaeda franchise itself
around the world, in the now effectively defeated al-Qaeda in
Iraq--although there is some lingering elements still in a few
of the cities--in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operating in
North Africa, and in al-Shabaab fighting and training
terrorists in Somalia, which is in part the subject of the
hearing today. But the turn toward more diffuse international
terrorism is the reason why the radicalization and recruitment
of individuals in the United States by Islamist terrorist
organizations has been a major focus of this Homeland Security
Committee's work over the past 2\1/2\ years.
The Committee has held seven hearings to date, the most
recent only last July that focused on Islamist ideology as the
essential ingredient to Islamist terrorism. Last May, the
Committee released a report titled ``Violent Islamist
Extremism: The Internet and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat''
that described the influence of online content produced by al-
Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and other Islamist terrorist groups on
individuals like those who have now gone missing from the
Somali-American community in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Today, we are going to focus on what appears to be the most
significant case of homegrown American terrorism recruiting
based on violent Islamist ideology. The facts, as we know them,
tell us that over the last 2 years, individuals from the
Somali-American community in the United States, including
American citizens, have left for Somalia to support and in some
cases fight on behalf of al-Shabaab, which, incidentally, was
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by our
government in February 2008.
There are ideological, tactical, financial, and also
personnel links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab was
credited with sheltering some of those responsible for the
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Just last month, al-
Qaeda released a video titled ``From Kabul to Mogadishu'' in
which al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, praises
al-Shabaab and calls on Muslims throughout the world to join
their fight in Somalia.
Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, continues to release recruiting
videos targeting Westerners, and those videos are surely being
watched by some potential followers here in the United States.
In the most graphic and deadly example of a direct
connection between the Somali-American community and
international terrorism, Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S.
citizen living in the Minneapolis area, returned to Somalia
within the last 2 years and killed himself and many others in a
suicide bombing last October. According to Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller, Shirwa Ahmed, who
was radicalized in Minnesota, is probably the first U.S.
citizen to carry out a terrorist suicide bombing.
One of the witnesses on our second panel, Abdi Mukhtar, who
is the youth program manager at the Brian Coyle Center in
Minneapolis, which is a gathering place for young Somalis, was
friends and attended Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis with
Shirwa Ahmed. In his testimony, which I find very compelling
and important, Abdi Mukhtar will explain how he and Shirwa
Ahmed had similar internal identity conflicts about being
Somali and American, but in the end resolved those conflicts in
very different ways. Abdi Mukhtar chose America, and Shirwa
Ahmed chose Islamist terrorism.
This morning, we want to understand why, to the best of our
ability, each made this choice and what we together can do to
make sure that others, including succeeding generations of
Somali-Americans and, more generally, Muslim-Americans make the
right choice.
I do want to say here that there is no evidence of
radicalization of the Somali-American community generally. In
fact, in my own vision of this, the Somali-American community
are victims of a small group of extremists who are essentially
terrorizing their own community, who are recruiting and
radicalizing young people within that community. And, of
course, our hope here this morning is to figure out how we can
work together with the Somali-American community, with the
Muslim-American community, and with law enforcement, as
represented on our first panel, to protect young Somali-
Americans and perhaps other Muslim-Americans--though we have
noted in our earlier hearings that the Muslim-American
community, because it is more integrated seems to have been
much less vulnerable than Muslim communities in Europe to
recruitment and radicalization. Nonetheless, the hearing today
and other evidence that this Committee has compiled shows that
the problem, though it may be less severe here in America, is
here. And that I think is what is jarring about the story that
we are going to hear described today.
There obviously are people here in the United States
recruiting young Somali-Americans to go over to Somalia to be
trained to fight and, of course, as we will hear from our
witnesses and this Committee will ask, perhaps--worrisome
particularly to us--being trained to return to the United
States to carry out terrorist attacks here.
The primary questions for this hearing, as I see them, are:
Who influenced these young men, apparently at least 20 of them,
maybe more, to return to Somalia and join al-Shabaab? Who
financed their trips? What, if any, role did local mosque
leadership play in recruiting the young men to join al-Shabaab?
What role did the Internet play, both in the form of online
content and e-mail communications from those who have already
returned to Somalia, in recruiting and radicalizing the young
men? What influence does Islamist ideology in Minneapolis play
in creating a fertile ground for al-Shabaab recruiters? Will
those who have disappeared use their American passports to
return and then plan and execute terrorist attacks here in our
homeland? And why does al-Shabaab want American and other
recruits from the West, when there are presumably plenty of
young men willing to fight in Somalia?
Those are important questions. They go directly to the
mandate that this Committee has had to protect the homeland
security of the American people. I thank all the witnesses who
have come before us, particularly those who have come from the
Somali-American community in Minneapolis. It takes some courage
to do so. I think it is both love of their own ethnic community
and dedication to America that brings them here, and for all of
that, we are grateful and look forward to hearing them.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The most effective border security system cannot protect
our Nation from ``homegrown terrorists,'' individuals already
living in our country who become radicalized and committed to a
violent ideology. Three years ago, as the Chairman has
mentioned, this Committee launched an investigation into
homegrown terrorism and the process by which individuals within
our country could become radicalized and commit terrorist
attacks.
Our investigation has examined radicalization among prison
populations, the efforts by Federal, State, and local law
enforcement to counter the homegrown threat, as well as the
role of the Internet in the radicalization process. This past
October, however, the threat of homegrown terrorism took
another disturbing turn when a young man from Minnesota carried
out a suicide bombing in Somalia. As the Chairman has noted,
FBI Director Mueller believes that this suicide bombing marked
the first time that a U.S. citizen had carried out a terrorist
suicide bombing. Although the bombing took place in Somalia,
Director Mueller stated that it appears that the individual had
been radicalized in his hometown of Minneapolis. Even more
disturbing, this young man apparently was not the only American
citizen to have traveled to Somalia to join the terrorist group
known as al-Shabaab.
The danger brought to light by these revelations is clear.
Radicalized individuals, trained in terrorist tactics and in
possession of American passports, can clearly pose a threat to
the security of our country.
Our discussion today is not just a consideration of the
counterterrorism tactics and intelligence gathering needed to
counter this growing threat, but also should serve to remind us
that there is a personal side to this story. These young men
left behind families who care deeply for them and who want to
see them come home unharmed. They left behind a community which
lived, worked, and worshipped with them and which now in some
ways lives under a cloud of suspicion, worrying that perhaps
tomorrow their own children might not come home.
Two of our witnesses have traveled from Minneapolis to talk
about this side of the story with us today. Like so many Somali
immigrants, these are patriotic American citizens who have
bravely come forward to tell their story and to help us find
the answers to the questions that trouble all of us, the
questions that the Chairman has so eloquently outlined. Let me
add a few more questions.
We need to better understand what drew these young men to
adopt a violent extremist ideology with such fervor that they
traveled thousands of miles to join a terrorist group. As the
Chairman indicated, I am particularly interested in the
question of why terrorist groups thousands of miles from our
shores would recruit Americans when there are plenty of willing
recruits in their own country.
Is there an individual or a network operating within the
United States facilitating recruitment or providing financial
support for al-Shabaab?
How can we better work with the Somali-American community--
and with any other community where a violent extremist ideology
might take root--to ensure that other young Americans do not
stray down the same path?
These are among the important questions that we will
explore as our Committee continues to examine the threat of
homegrown terrorism.
Again, I want to thank the Chairman for his leadership in
this area and our witnesses for appearing today. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
In fact, this Committee's investigation to answer the
question of is there recruitment of Islamist terrorists and
radicalization occurring in the United States began under
Senator Collins' chairmanship and leadership, and it has been
my pleasure to continue this important work in partnership with
her.
Let's go right to the first panel. We have Philip Mudd,
Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security
Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation with us. Mr. Mudd,
thanks for being here again, and we welcome your testimony now.
Or are you going to yield to Mr. Liepman? Based on age or----
Mr. Mudd. Looks. [Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. Lack of hair? OK. On the
top of his head, I meant. All right. Let me just introduce you.
You can rebut if you would like, Mr. Liepman.
Andrew Liepman is the Deputy Director of Intelligence of
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). For those who do
not know, the NCTC was created as part of the post-September
11, 2001, reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission. It is the
central place, along with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, but this is really the place where all
of America's intelligence and intelligence-related agencies are
working together 24/7 to share information, to raise
information, and to make sure that the dots are connected in a
way that they were not before September 11, 2001, which meant
we were not able to prevent that tragic event.
So, with that, Mr. Liepman, thank you.
TESTIMONY OF ANDREW M. LIEPMAN,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Liepman. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Collins. We welcome the opportunity to appear before you today
to share our perspectives on the radicalization of Somali youth
in America. And I do appreciate the opportunity to appear
beside my longtime colleague Mr. Mudd from the Bureau. I will
focus on what factors contribute to the radicalization and some
of the particularly vulnerabilities of the Somali-American
community. I will defer to Mr. Mudd to talk about the FBI
activities. Let me start with a bit of context, a very brief
history of events in Somalia.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Liepman appears in the Appendix
on page 93.
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The turmoil and instability in Somalia dates back to the
collapse of the government there in 1991, which resulted in a
descent into factional fighting and anarchy. In 2006, following
multiple failed attempts to bring stability, a loose coalition
of clerics, local leaders, and militias known as the Council of
Islamic Courts took power in much of Somalia. The Somali
Transitional Federal Government joined with Ethiopian forces
and routed the Islamic Court militias in a 2-week war. It is an
important milestone. It also represents an important rallying
point for Somalis, both in Somalia and in the diaspora.
Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab--the militant wing of the
council--has led a collection of clan militias in a violent
insurgency, using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics
against the transitional government and the Ethiopian presence
in the region.
Just to give you some sense of the Somali-American
diaspora, they began arriving in the United States in
significant numbers in 1992 following the U.S. intervention in
Somalia's humanitarian crisis. The Somali-American population
is distributed in clusters throughout the United States, with
the heaviest concentrations in Minneapolis, Columbus, Seattle,
and San Diego. There are a variety of estimates of the size of
the Somali-American population. It is a fairly difficult number
to give you with some precision. I think generally we accept
the range from 70,000 to as many as 200,000.
Despite significant efforts to facilitate their settlement
into American communities, many Somali immigrants face
isolation. The adjustment to American society has reinforced
their greater insularity compared to other, more integrated
recent immigrant communities and has aggravated the challenges
of assimilation for their children.
One of the main reasons that Mr. Mudd and I are here today,
obviously, is the concern we have over the travel by some tens
of Somali-American young men back to Somalia, some of whom have
trained and fought with al-Shabaab. The involvement of this
foreign terrorist organization, al-Shabaab, means we cannot
simply categorize this as homegrown violence. We are concerned
that if a few Somali-American youth can be motivated to engage
in such activities overseas, fellow travelers could return to
the United States and engage in terrorist activities here.
Let me stress we do not have a body of reporting that
indicates U.S. persons who have traveled to Somalia are
planning to execute attacks in the United States. We do not
have that credible reporting. But we do worry that there is a
potential that these individuals could be indoctrinated by al-
Qaeda while they are in Somalia and then return to the United
States with the intention to conduct attacks. They would, in
fact, provide al-Qaeda with trained extremists inside the
United States.
One of the main questions that we try and answer is: What
causes the radicalization of a small but significant number of
Somali-American youth? The answer is complex. It is the result
of a number of factors that come together when a dynamic,
influential, and extremist leader gains access to a despondent
and disenfranchised group of young men. Sophisticated extremist
recruiters target these individuals who lack structure and
definition in their lives. The recruiters subject them to
religiously inspired indoctrination to move them toward violent
extremism. They target vulnerable young men--many of them
refugees who came here as small children or who are the
children of immigrants--torn between their parents' traditional
ethnic, tribal, and clan identities and the new cultures and
traditions offered by American society.
Among Somali-Americans, the refugee experience of fleeing a
war-torn country, combined with isolation, perceived
discrimination, marginalization, and frustrated expectations,
as well as local criminal, familial, and clan dynamics, make
some members of this community more susceptible to this sort of
extremist influence.
And let me stress, just as you said, Mr. Chairman, we are
not witnessing a community-wide radicalization among Somali-
Americans. When I speak of the Somali-American community, I do
not mean to generalize; rather, I am describing a problem
limited to a small fraction of the community, most of which
came to America to get away from violence, not to commit it.
The overwhelming majority of Somali-Americans are or want to be
contributing members of American society, trying to raise their
families here and desperately wishing for stability in their
ancestral homeland.
But as I said, the Somali community is in some respects
more susceptible to the influence of extremist elements. A
number of factors that have mitigated radicalization among
other ethnic religious American communities are less evident in
the Somali community here. These include some level of faith in
the American political system, access to resources to defense
civil rights and civil liberties, and interaction with non-
Muslims, and a greater focus on domestic rather than
international events.
You asked about the role that the Internet plays in
radicalizing Somali youth. It is not an easy metric for us to
measure. It is clear, though that access to the Internet and to
such material on the Internet alone is rarely enough to cause
an individual to become radical himself. It is also clear,
though, that the Somali-American youth who have traveled abroad
to join in fighting for al-Shabaab were exposed to al-Shabaab's
extremist ideology here in the United States, both in terms of
face-to-face contact with extremist elements and on the
Internet. And they tended to reinforce each other. The easy
availability of extremist media on the Internet provides a
range of themes that extremist recruiters can use to appeal to
disenfranchise young men. As you mentioned, al-Qaeda senior
leadership in recent months have weighed in with their own
support for al-Shabaab, praising it and depicting Somalia as a
local manifestation of the broader conflict between the West
and Islam.
I should note that this al-Qaeda stamp of approval does not
guarantee either greater success or enhanced impact. In fact,
it could backfire. Many potential ethnic Somali recruits would
prefer to join a group that is focused explicitly on Somali
issues rather than signing up for the global jihad and joining
an al-Qaeda affiliate.
Let me end with a couple of comments on NCTC's role in this
process and address your reference to this being a turning
point, the fifth year of the anniversary of the Madrid attack.
Indeed, it is a turning point in many respects. I think in
2004, if we remember back, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence did not yet exist. NCTC was in its
infancy. It was then called the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center. And I would like to think that the community has come a
long way since then. In fact, Somalia represents a great
example of the type of challenge that I think NCTC can assist
in. It is the intersection between a foreign problem that parts
of our community study in Somalia and a homegrown problem that
our domestic organizations are focused on. And we, in NCTC, are
trying to bridge those two communities and, I would like to
think, helping in that effort.
With that, what I would like to do is turn the floor over
to Mr. Mudd for some comments on what the FBI is doing.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Liepman. That was a good
beginning.
Now to Phil Mudd of the FBI.
TESTIMONY OF J. PHILIP MUDD,\1\ ASSOCIATE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Mudd. Thank you for having me here. I think in the
interest of full disclosure, it is a great pleasure to be
sitting at the table with Mr. Liepman. He and I have known each
other for almost a quarter century, so having him refer to me
as ``Mr. Mudd'' is going to be the source of great amusement
later today, and I must appreciate that.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mudd appears in the Appendix on
page 100.
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I do not really have an oral statement. Senator Collins
talked about people telling stories. I wanted to tell a story
of how this looks to someone who in the past has looked at
terrorism overseas and who for the past 3\1/2\ years has been
posted at the Bureau, to tell you the story of a complicated
picture and, if I succeed, make it coherent in 9 minutes and 23
seconds, so I will give it a try.
Think of this as an example of globalization. If you wake
up in the morning and want to know what is happening in the
stock market, you look at the DAX in Germany, you look at what
is happening in the European and Asian exchanges. This is an
example of globalization on a different front.
I will talk about a couple of intersecting trends: The
first Mr. Liepman talked about, in 1991, the fall of the Siad
Barre government; the rise of warlordism in the 1990s; and the
rise of the Islamic Courts in the 1990s and into this century.
So the first trend, if you will, is ``ungoverned space,'' as
people refer to it, a place where somebody like al-Shabaab can
develop training camps, a place that looks something like the
tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, or the Sahel--Mali,
Chad, and southern Algeria. So that is your first piece; places
around the world that lack governance happen to correspond with
places where you have problems. Yemen would be another example.
The second trend I would point to is, if you look at Bosnia
or Kashmir or Afghanistan from the 1980s after the Soviet
invasion, you have magnets of activity for Islamic extremists.
Somalia is a bit different. For example, Somali-Americans and
Somalis in general did not flock to jihads elsewhere but,
nonetheless, al-Shabaab has linkages to this global Islamist
movement. Its leadership has linkages to al-Qaeda leadership.
So I think the second trend I would point to, again, in the
context of globalization, this is another example. After
examples in places like Bosnia or Chechnya, of Islamist
activity serving as a magnet for international jihadists, I
would point out that not only are Americans showing up; we have
Western Europeans, Brits--we had a Brit blow himself up
recently in Somalia. We have Nigerians, Chadians, and Malians.
And the third and perhaps the most significant--and I want
to emphasize this because I think some will say, well, this is
just another example of global jihad--is the nationalist aspect
of this. We saw a change in the American community in 2006 when
the Ethiopians invaded, and part of the draw for people in this
country is to go fight for their country against a foreign
invader. So global issues, issues in the Horn of Africa having
an immediate impact, a ripple effect on communities in
Columbus, Ohio; in Cincinnati; in Seattle; in San Diego; and in
Minnesota--it is a real example of what globalization means in
the new information world. And I use the phrase ``information
world'' advisedly. You have direct connectivity between Somalia
and the United States. It does not have to be by the Internet.
It can be Skype or e-mail, friends talking to each other. And
this is a very tight community where that kind of information
is getting around independent of any Internet websites.
Let me overlay some more micro issues onto that sort of
macro witch's brew of these trends of ungoverned space and an
Islamist magnet nationalism. You have a community that comes
here, in contrast to some other immigrant stories--immigrant
stories, for example, of Indian communities or Pakistani
communities, communities with doctors and engineers. These are
folks who come here because they are escaping great trauma in
their home country. They are working here in meatpacking
plants, poultry processing plants, there is often not a great
command in the first generation of the English language among
their parents.
If you look at many of the people we are talking about,
they are coming from single-family homes, in particular, homes
that are led by sisters or grandmothers or mothers, where there
is not a father figure.
There are echoes of what we see overseas. Again, I want to
emphasize that we are not alone in looking at this problem. I
want to sign up to what Mr. Liepman said. This is not a
community problem. In a sense, we do not have radicalized
communities. We do have radicalized clusters of people,
typically youths between, let us say, 17 and above, although we
have seen efforts to radicalize kids as young as 12, 13, or 14
years old in this country.
Like what you would see in Europe, it is not necessarily an
al-Shabaab person in Somalia radicalizing a youth in the United
States. These are issues within the community where people from
these kinds of families might see an older brother or father
figure who starts to spot-assess and recruit--as we say in the
spy business--someone who might be vulnerable and eventually
sets them on a path to take a plane ticket to Somalia or
Ethiopia or someplace else that is an avenue to get into
Somalia.
This is important because this is the kind of thing you
might see in Western Europe or Britain. And, in fact, in
talking to my friends in even the Arabian Peninsula, we may
think that we are much different from a place like Saudi
Arabia, but you see that kind of cluster recruitment by
friends, older brothers, or community figures elsewhere around
the world.
I think there is a popular conception from people in this
country reading books or watching movies that there are
terrorist cells with an established leader and somebody to
provide finance and communication. In fact, whether it is this
problem of al-Shabaab activity or extremism in the United
States or other Sunni extremism in the United States, more
often you have clusters of people who are talking to each
other. They do not have assigned roles. They do not know what
they are going to do. They may never do anything, but they are
talking about committing acts of violence. They may radicalize
off each other, as kids do in environments across the United
States. In schoolyards, when I was growing up, I went to throw
rocks at cars because the kid next to me said let's go do it.
So you have clusters of youths who are talking to each
other. There may be a center in the community of
radicalization. There is not radicalization and then
recruitment, typically. It is recruitment into this circle, and
then kids are radicalized and spotted and maybe seen as someone
who will go overseas.
The last thing I would tell you to put this in context is
we are talking about a particular aspect of this issue, which
is the Somali diaspora. We are here to work with communities.
We are here to work with our State and local partners. We get
terrific support on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces from the
Minneapolis police, the police in Columbus, from county
officials in Minneapolis, for example, who are working within
the communities. But we are not talking about radicalization
among an entire community.
We need help from the communities. We need them to talk to
us. It is of concern to us that people like this are coming
from areas where Federal authorities are suspicious people. We
have to break that down. We are not here to look at a mosque. A
mosque is a building, a church is a building, a synagogue is a
building, and a temple is a building. We are here to look at
people who might be thinking about or have committed acts of
violence or are supporting those who do so. This is about
individuals who are small segments of a community and who do
not represent the beauty that this country brings to
immigrants.
I come from an Italian-Irish-Dutch-British family, and I
see these folks in the same context that my family might have
been in this country 100 years ago.
And, last, context within the FBI. This is a priority for
the FBI. It is one of a handful or more of priorities. We also
have issues in this country about violent crime, expanding gang
activity in this country--Mara Salvatrucha, for example, and
other Latin American gangs. We have a major public corruption
problem in this country. We have massive mortgage fraud we are
looking at in this country. And we have other aspects of
extremism--extremism that might be linked to one of our key
concerns, that is, continued al-Qaeda core activity in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. We have fundraising for Palestinian groups. So
I want to emphasize that we are not looking at a community. We
are looking at individuals who are sending kids in the wrong
direction. We want to work with families who are as concerned
or more concerned than we are. And I want to put this in the
context of a lot of priorities we have. This is not one of a
couple. This is one of many. And we will continue to focus on
it, but in the context of other priorities we have.
Thanks again for having me here today, and I look forward
to talking to you with my friend, Mr. Liepman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Mudd.
Let me begin the round of questioning. We will do 7-minute
rounds and keep going as long as Senators want to ask
questions.
I heard you say this is a priority. It is one of several
priorities, obviously. That is what we understand, the priority
being not just the Somali-American community, but the prospect
of recruitment and radicalization of Islamist terrorists from
America. Am I correct in that?
Mr. Mudd. That is right. I think if you look at one of the
contrasts with the European experience, if you look at a
country like Britain, for example--and people have drawn
parallels--I think there are significant differences that make
extremism a challenge in this country.
If you look at Britain, you have pockets of people on the
extremist side, first, second, and sometimes third-generation
folks, very dense, interconnected in places like Birmingham or
Manchester.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mudd. In this country, we see more dispersed
communities, more dispersed activity. Activity in Los Angeles
might not have linkages or typically will not have linkages to
what we see in New York, Arizona, Florida, or Georgia.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me pursue this, and I hear you. Am
I correct in assuming that the FBI is on the ground, so to
speak, in the Somali-American community, both in terms of
outreach to the community, at which the Bureau has really done
very well generally, but also investigating recruitment and
radicalization?
Mr. Mudd. That is correct. I would point to outreach,
first. The second is we do have partnerships with the local
police in Minneapolis and Columbus. And third is we have a
substantial amount of investigative resources looking not only
at recruitment but also the issue of fundraising in this
country.
Chairman Lieberman. I take it there is no doubt that there
have been some Somali-Americans recruited, radicalized here who
have gone to Somalia. Correct?
Mr. Mudd. That is correct.
Chairman Lieberman. And the number is a bit vague. I have
heard some people say as many as 20, some people say maybe a
lot more because families are hesitant to report people gone to
Somalia for fear that they will not be able to come back. What
is your best estimate of how significant this problem is?
Mr. Mudd. I would talk in terms of tens of people, which
sounds small, but it is significant because every terrorist is
somebody who can potentially throw a grenade into a shopping
mall.
I would point out the reason this is fuzzy, as Mr. Liepman
said, there are as many as a few hundred thousands just in this
community of Somalis in the United States. There are thousands
of people, thousands going to the Horn of Africa every month.
You can go to Kenya to look at game parks, and it is hard for
me to tell you somebody is going to a game park or going to al-
Shabaab.
So I am sure that there are people out there we are
missing. It is a country with 300 million people, with a lot of
travel to this area. But I would put it in the range of tens of
people.
Chairman Lieberman. Tens, OK. So accepting that as a
baseline for purposes of discussion, assuming that tens of
Somali-Americans have gone to train and presumably fight with
al-Shabaab in Somalia, I assume from what you both said that,
therefore, we can assume that there are recruiters or leaders
in the Somali-American community who are responsible, at least
in part, for that movement of people. Is that right?
Mr. Mudd. I think that is fair.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. So now let me go to the question
both Senator Collins and I asked, which is: Why would an
Islamist terrorist organization like al-Shabaab want to recruit
and radicalize Somalis in America when presumably they can and
there are ample numbers to recruit and train for terrorism in
Somalia?
Mr. Liepman. I am not sure that it is to fill their ranks.
Chairman Lieberman. Really.
Mr. Liepman. I do not think they are looking at America as
a broad recruiting ground to collect hundreds or thousands of
fighters that are the vanguard of their force.
I think they are looking--first of all, it is a two-way
street. I think they are accepting non-Somali fighters from all
over Africa, from the United States, and from Europe. In a way,
I think it adds to their credibility. It raises their profile.
It is a public relations bonanza for them to have a
multinational force fighting the Ethiopians, for example. It
makes it appear that it is not just Somalia versus Ethiopia,
but a broader conflict, particularly on the continent of
Africa.
And I do think that they are looking for small numbers, and
it is not just the recruiters coming to America to try and
bring people. They are reacting to a demand among the small
fraction of the Somali community who have said they are
interested in going. So there is a meeting of the minds there.
Chairman Lieberman. From what we know about the way these
groups operate, do you assume--I understand the difficulty of
making a judgment about the motivation. Your answer is helpful
to us. But seeing the recruitment that we see, do you assume
that the local recruiting is being done at the request of al-
Shabaab leadership in Somalia? Or is it self-generated here?
Mr. Mudd. I would think of it--I think Mr. Liepman is
right--as more push than pull at this point. A couple quick
points. This is a global jihad.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mudd. There are people from Chad, Mali, and Nigeria,
and we should look at that in that context. But it is not like
people in East Africa are saying, ``I wish I had another five
Americans.''
The second point that is important, the first wave of
people we saw from 2006 to 2007 roughly, were not Somali-
Americans. The first wave of people we saw were Americans,
people like Chris Paul--not in this circumstance, but somebody
who was prosecuted earlier for fighting overseas.
Chairman Lieberman. Going to Somalia?
Mr. Mudd. That is correct.
Chairman Lieberman. For training?
Mr. Mudd. That is correct, underscoring the point that this
is a jihad issue that is not simply restricted to American
Somalis.
Third and final point, it is important, when we try to put
this in the context of terrorism, to understand what these kids
are doing out there: Ambushes, convoys, and improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mudd. This is a paramilitary conflict and they are not
necessarily getting training on how to develop a covert cell in
Minneapolis.
Chairman Lieberman. So the final question from me in this
round, obviously some of these Somali-Americans are traveling
with American passports or papers that would enable them more
easily to get back into the United States. I understand, Mr.
Liepman, you said we have no evidence now that any of this
recruitment for training in Somalia is being done with the aim
of sending them back here to carry out terrorist acts. But it
would be easier for them to get back in, and my question is--
and this really goes to the NCTC with all the cooperation among
agencies you have: Are we putting up any special filters to
watch out for the return of some of these Somali-Americans to
America for fear of what they might be inclined to do here?
Mr. Liepman. I would go back to something that Mr. Mudd
said.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Liepman. I think the most important tool for us is the
outreach to the Somali-American community to know who is going
to the Horn of Africa, and for what purposes.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Liepman. And you are absolutely right. They are
traveling under American passports, which enables them to
travel rather freely.
In terms of looking at travelers who appear to have gone to
Somalia, for example, I think that there is an effort to make
sure that that is being scrutinized fairly closely, to
understand what it is they did there. And just to reinforce a
point I made earlier, the intentions of Somali kids who are
going to Somalia may be very different than what happens once
they get there and they are trained with al-Shabaab. And that
is, I think, what we worry about.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. My time is up. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Let me pick up where the Chairman left off. Mr. Liepman, we
know that in 2007 poor information sharing by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention with the Department of Homeland
Security prevented DHS from identifying an individual with
drug-resistant TB who was traveling back and forth on
international flights. And 2 weeks ago, ABC News reported that
some of the individuals who had fought in Somalia had returned
to the United States.
Now, regardless of the validity of that particular report,
it raises the question of whether information sharing is
sufficient within the Federal Government to ensure that
immigration authorities at the U.S. border handle any returning
Somali-Americans in an appropriate way. And this is complicated
by the fact that they are Americans with American passports.
So what is being done to flag these individuals should they
attempt to return if there is concern that they have been
engaged in terrorist training overseas?
Mr. Liepman. I would just make two quick points on that.
The first is, Senator Collins, you are absolutely right, this
is a problem that is complicated by our attention to civil
liberties and our desire not to restrict the travel of
Americans without pretty good reason.
I do think that the information-sharing system that we are
operating under now is far superior to that of 3 or 5 years
ago. We are not perfect. But we are much better, and we are
much better in terms of knowing when an individual should be
watchlisted, for example, understanding when we have a piece of
information, that information is shared with the appropriate
agencies.
What I think we are most concerned about is what we do not
know about those travelers who are going to the Horn of Africa,
who visit Kenya, and who we do not know went into Somalia. That
makes it much more difficult to control their ability to travel
back and forth if we are not aware of what their activities
were.
Senator Collins. Mr. Mudd, when our Committee staff visited
Minneapolis, the local police officials expressed concern that
they were providing information to Federal officials but were
getting little in return. Just yesterday, the Chairman and I
were briefed by the Markle Foundation, which was particularly
critical of information sharing across the levels of law
enforcement, the FBI with State and local law enforcement in
particular.
Could you comment on information sharing in this case with
State and local officials? Because obviously this is very
critical. There is no one who is more tuned in to what is going
on in the Somali community in Minneapolis than the local police
force. And it seems to me that a greater understanding could
result if there were more information sharing.
Mr. Mudd. I think a couple things here. First, I want to
thank again the police departments in places like Columbus and
Minneapolis. They participate with task force officers who are
on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). They have
visibility from these task force officers into our
investigations against violent extremists in the United States.
They should have visibility into every aspect of those
investigations. We also have participation at fusion centers
across the country.
In terms of cooperation with State and local law
enforcement, I would point out, the Somali community in
Minneapolis is probably 100,000 plus, and in many respects, in
places like Hennepin County or Ramsey County, where you have
Minneapolis-St. Paul, the police are going to have better
insights into the community than we do--not just because they
are looking at the extremist problem with us, but because you
have gang and drug activity. There is more than a handful of
Somali gangs in Minneapolis alone.
So I think there is visibility on the task force. There is
visibility from the JTTF executives in those cities. I could
not tell you how strong that is across an entire large police
force. We have relatively small offices in these cities. But
they are participating full-time on our Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, and this is a priority for those JTTFs.
Senator Collins. Do you see Somali gangs as being a
precursor to the kind of radicalization that we are talking
about?
Mr. Mudd. I do not see a one-to-one correlation between
gang activity and terrorist recruitment and radicalization.
Mr. Liepman. In many cases, they are actually alternatives
to each other. They will go down two different avenues.
Senator Collins. One or the other.
The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has done a lot
of work on domestic terrorism, homegrown radicalization, and,
in general, the police department has found that individuals
generally begin the radicalization process on their own. But in
each case that NYPD examined, there was what the department
called ``a spiritual sanctioner'' that provided the
justification for jihad that is essential to a suicide
terrorist. It is essential to the progression of the
radicalization process.
Have you seen that in the case that we are discussing
today, Mr. Liepman?
Mr. Liepman. Senator Collins, I agree entirely with the New
York study on radicalization. I think it was an excellent
study, and we have actually worked very closely with NYPD with
their perspective on the ground. And as I mentioned, it would
be a mistake to look at either the Internet in a vacuum or at
the influential leaders of the community in a vacuum. It is the
interaction between the two.
And I think we found both domestically and overseas as
well--and it is the experience of most of our partners in the
United Kingdom and Canada--that perhaps the most important
element of the radicalization process is that charismatic
leader who intervenes and who, as Mr. Mudd said, spots and
recruits a vulnerable young man and gets to him at the right
point with the right message.
Senator Collins. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. This is really important to understand because
the suggestion earlier, I think there is a popular
misconception about terrorism among people who sort of watch
movies or read books, and that is that there are these cells of
people who operate clandestinely. I used a word that I learned
from NYPD, and they have some extremely talented analysts up
there. That word is ``clusters''--there are clusters of people
who bounce off each other.
Internet content, in my experience, might help feed an
emotional sense in a kid who is already bouncing off
individuals. This is a people business. So I would see the
Internet often as a tool that helps someone along a path, but
not the proximate cause that leads someone to get a ticket to
go to Mogadishu.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
I appreciate that there are three other Senators here. We
will call on them in order of arrival: Senator Bennet, Senator
Voinovich, and Senator Burris.
Senator Bennet, thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNET
Senator Bennet. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I apologize for
being late. This is fascinating testimony, and I do not have
any questions yet.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Bennet. Senator
Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. I thank the witnesses for being here.
Has there been any kind of a declaration by al-Shabaab as Osama
bin Laden did in 1998 and declare war against the United
States?
Mr. Liepman. No, Senator. And I will take the opportunity
to just emphasize, al-Shabaab is a very different organization
than al-Qaeda. It is really an alignment of a variety of
different groups. The individual fighters on the ground in
Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia may not actually reflect the
views of their top leadership. And the top leadership does have
identified linkages to the leadership of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
But whether that trickles down to the average 17 or 20-year-old
fighter on the streets of Somalia is really quite questionable.
They are devoted to the fight in Somalia. They are not yet,
most of them, devoted to Osama bin Laden's global jihad.
Senator Voinovich. So the fact is that, to your knowledge,
there may be some indirect linkages but no formal linkages. And
in terms of someone's intent of having people come back from
there and do something bad here in terms of some of the things
that we are trying to defend against, terrorist attacks and so
forth, is there any indication at all of anything like that?
Mr. Liepman. Clearly, one of the reasons why we are looking
so closely at this issue is the linkages between the al-Shabaab
leadership with the al-Qaeda leadership and the possible
influence on al-Shabaab agenda, which has to date been quite
local, and then ultimately the trickle-down effect on the
recruits that are being trained with al-Shabaab.
But, no, as I said in my testimony, we do not have a
credible body of reporting right now to lead us to believe that
these American recruits are being trained and instructed to
come back to the United States for terrorist acts. Yet
obviously we remain concerned about that, and watchful for it.
Senator Voinovich. Well, one of my concerns--and this is
tough because we are concerned about things and we are in a
dilemma, and the dilemma is the more we talk about it, does it
become a self-fulfilling prophecy? It is like neighbors that do
not talk to each other, and before you know it, they do not
like each other. And I think more than anything else, I would
be interested in what we are doing to make sure that we do not
have something like that radicalized era here in the United
States. And what is the community trying to do in terms of
making sure that this does not happen? That is the big issue
here.
It has, I think, more to do with it than intelligence to
handle this, and we will be hearing from another panel, but I
would be interested in your observations about where are we
right now and what can we do to make sure that we have a better
situation, including maybe improving our relationships with the
Somalis overseas.
Mr. Liepman. I think you have that exactly right. We really
cannot solve the problem simply through outreach to the
American Somali community. It is an essential ingredient of the
solution. I think this is essentially a Horn of Africa problem,
and without attention to that decades-long crisis, we cannot
attend one or the other end of this. It is really both.
Mr. Mudd. I think that is right. From the Bureau's
perspective, there are a lot of issues here that are well
beyond our control, issues overseas that have to do with the
motivation of these individuals. For example, what is the
impact of the Ethiopian withdrawal on a community in the United
States? I think the impact is probably substantial because a
lot of these kids are going over--as I said, there are
intersecting themes, not only for an international jihadist
movement but also for nationalist purposes, to fight the
Ethiopians.
Domestically, there are issues here I talked about that put
us in common with people and places like Europe, and that is,
when you have families--this is a very traditional clan-based
culture, a patrilineal culture, where there is no father figure
there, and where somebody comes in and plays the father figure,
where the mother does not speak English very well, where you
are working at a meatpacking plant or have to work a couple
jobs as a taxi driver. I mean, this is a classic immigrant
experience in some ways, and it is a difficult social
environment for these folks.
And so we can talk about looking at people after it is too
late, those who are going overseas--but the underlying cause is
motivations from the Ethiopian invasion or motivations from the
environment of people who are escaping violence and difficult
economic conditions. Those are things obviously that are well
beyond our control.
Senator Voinovich. So a lot of it has basically to do with
some concerns about people that have come here that are
concerned about what is going on over there. It is like a lot
of other nationality groups. The Armenians still want to do
something about--go back to what the Turks did, and the
Kosovars and the Serbs--we have a lot of ethnic groups in Ohio.
You can try to deal with them, but there are still things that
are really ringing bells in those communities, and people are
upset about them. Where does that level go to some other kind
of activity?
Mr. Mudd. That is right, and I should be blunt, there are
other concerns about dealing with Federal officials, for
example, in a community where many people have immigration
problems. So we are trying to build bridges through outreach
and working with police departments, for example, and having
people like our Special Agent in Charge in Minneapolis meeting
with community leaders.
I was just talking to one of the leaders behind me about
traveling to Minneapolis soon, although I would like to wait
until after the snow melts, as a native Floridian. But the
issue has to do with, as I say, things within the community--it
is a very closed community--and their concerns as well about
dealing with us because they are worried about whether we are
going to collar a kid if they come and tell us or whether there
are other Federal issues like immigration fraud that might come
up. And, again, we have to work through that with our partners
in places like DHS.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. Senator
Burris, good morning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
Senator Burris. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome you to the Committee. This is a
very complicated subject, and I want to commend you all for the
work that you are doing. My questions may seem a little naive
because of the difficulty of the subject, but generally what I
am concerned about is we are talking about two separate
situations, are we not? The Somalis that voluntarily or
forcibly go back to get trained and, second, whether or not we
are talking about normal American disgruntled citizens that are
volunteering to go over there? Is that what we are looking at?
Mr. Liepman. To my knowledge, we are not aware of a
situation where someone has been forcibly repatriated to
Somalia. These are volunteers. And I do think there are two
things going on. One is that you have a generational struggle
in Somalia; and, on the other hand, you have an American Somali
community that is in many ways different than other ethnic
communities in the United States in that they tend to be a bit
more isolated and more attached to their homeland than many
others.
So the combination of isolation and a difficult process of
integration into the United States and this linkage back to
their homeland has resulted in a tendency to be more willing to
volunteer to go back than in many other communities. But they
are not being forced to return, as far as I can tell.
Mr. Mudd. It might interest you to know some of the
experiences they are having when they get there to give you a
sense of what they think going over.
First, some get there and believe this is a place where
Sharia law--that is, the law of Islam--is being practiced and
it is a great place to live. And some of these folks will never
come back.
Some get there and become cannon fodder. We talked about
the difference between terrorism and insurgency/
counterinsurgency. These folks are not going over there to
become part of terrorist cells. A lot of them are being put on
the front line, and some of them from the United States. I
think, have been killed on the front line.
And, last, some are going over there saying, ``Whoa, this
is a serious war, there is serious lead flying,'' and they sort
of lie, cheat, and steal their way to get back because they are
in an environment where they say, ``I cannot take this.'' So
they are coming home saying, ``That is not what I signed up
for.''
So there is a range of responses when these kids actually
get out there.
Senator Burris. So this question may have been asked, but
you are saying that they are over there either for the war or
to defend their homeland. What is the danger then of some of
those really coming back here, having been trained or given
indoctrination to come back and try to do some of the jihad or
September 11, 2001, activities in America? And can we detect
that type of person coming back or if he was not a part of it,
how do you distinguish that Somali as a person who wants to
come back and repatriate himself with America and not then be
classified as a terrorist who would do danger to our homeland?
Mr. Liepman. It is a tough problem. To set the groundwork,
though, going to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab, al-Shabaab
is a designated terrorist organization. So the distinction
between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is an important one, but those
who volunteer to fight with al-Shabaab are also materially
contributing to a terrorist organization.
That evolution from volunteering to fight against the
Ethiopians in Somalia to embracing the global jihad and the al-
Qaeda message that espouses attacking the West, that is a
difficult thing to detect. It happens inside their heads, and
it is very difficult for us to know unless they tell someone,
and I think reinforces the importance of outreach and
interaction with the community and with the families who likely
will be the first people to detect this transition from Somali
defense to the global jihad.
Mr. Mudd. I think this story will have a ways to play out.
I had an interesting conversation last week with an
acquaintance of mine who is a psychologist in Saudi Arabia who
deals with their deradicalization program. And he made a
distinction between disengagement--in other words, for example,
somebody coming back here disengaged from al-Shabaab--and
deradicalization. His view, from working with many people--in
this case, in Saudi Arabia--was if you want long-term stability
with people like this, you cannot have that stability if you do
not deradicalize.
So what I am saying is if someone disengages from the fight
but does not deradicalize, long term you have to think how
psychologically is that going to play out in a year or 2 years.
What if they find when they get back that the job environment
is closed to them? What if there is another Ethiopian invasion?
And as a security service, we cannot only be concerned about
someone who has committed a Federal violation. If someone has
gone overseas to fight and comes back in this month, seems like
he has disengaged, should we assume that person is
deradicalized after he has already committed an overt act to go
fight a foreign enemy? Boy, that is a tough one long term. So I
expect that we will have some echoes of this for a while.
Senator Burris. And another area in terms of the Somali
community, which my briefing tells me that it is primarily in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, there is a major community there, and
that is where a lot of recruiting is going on. Has the
community really stepped up to come forward from the Somali
community to give information and say, look, we know that we
have to work in conjunction with all the U.S. forces to try to
prevent something of this magnitude, even the young person
going over there?
Mr. Mudd. We have made progress, but we have a ways to go.
The progress says you have communities with parents and
grandparents and siblings who are concerned. We have FBI
officers and people from police and our task forces who are
watching people shed tears in our offices when they find out
their kids have gone. Communities are concerned about
recruitment from within, and I think that will become even
greater with the Ethiopian withdrawal, because you cannot now
say, ``I am going to fight the foreign invader.'' You are going
to fight more in clan fighting. Especially in the past few
weeks or months, there have been some very positive political
developments in Somalia that I would think would make it a bit
harder to recruit.
That said, we have a ways to go. Again, you have
communities that, first, for I think very defensible reasons,
are concerned about interacting with Federal authorities. They
are concerned about what we will do with their children. There
is a lot of disinformation out there, and I should put this on
the record. I hope some of the community folks in Minneapolis
are watching. There are people out there saying that we will
take their kids and put them in orange jumpsuits and send them
to Guantanamo. This kind of propaganda from people who want to
corrupt kids is hurting us.
So there are community concerns in additional areas, as I
said earlier, about things like are we going to look at
immigration problems as part of this. So we have made progress.
We have great relations with some of the community folks that
you will see later today--a really great and heartening
immigrant story--but we still need more community help to
understand what is going on within communities. This is not
simply a law enforcement or intelligence problem. This is a
problem about integration of a community over decades.
Senator Burris. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, and if there
is a second round, I might have some more questions. But I
would like to thank the witnesses for their candid and
forthright statements. I think we really have something we have
got to deal with here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Burris.
I want to ask just one or two additional questions. If any
other members wants to, we will do that in a quick second
round, because I want to get to the next panel.
I do want to make clear first, Mr. Liepman, I think you
answered a specific question from Senator Burris, and it may
appear inconsistent, though I do not believe it is, when you
said these young people are volunteering, that they are not
being coerced. But this is not purely volunteering because, as
both of you have said, they are being recruited, they are being
affected by a spiritual sanctioner or leader. Right?
Mr. Liepman. That is right, and I did not mean to suggest
that--what I wanted to say was they were not being tied up and
bundled into a plane.
Chairman Lieberman. Exactly. Understood.
Mr. Liepman. But it is a process of mental coercion.
Chairman Lieberman. Right, it was not a thought that they
just had on their own to say, ``I want to go over and fight
with al-Shabaab.''
Mr. Liepman. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. Either they got it over the Internet or
usually a combination of Internet and a spiritual sanctioner.
By total coincidence, yesterday the Senate Armed Services
Committee had its annual hearing with the Director of National
Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair, and with the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), General Michael Maples.
Senator Collins and I, both members of that Committee, were
there.
General Maples actually testified that from information
that he has received, DIA has received, he believes a formal
merger between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab is forthcoming soon. We
have obviously seen an increasing connection between these two
terrorist organizations over the last year, particularly in
online content; the statement made by Ayman al-Zawahiri just a
month ago in a video embracing al-Shabaab.
So here is my concern: If there is a former merger between
al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, doesn't that raise our concern about
the potential that the recruiting going on of Somali-Americans
here will result in people being sent back here--or perhaps to
other countries--because people are traveling with American
passports?
In other words, if we accept the premise that al-Qaeda has
made clear that its intention is not primarily about the
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia but really is about world jihad,
isn't there a concern that if al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab merged,
this is really a game changer, and that the possibility of
these recruits from America being sent back here for purposes
of attacking gets higher?
Mr. Liepman. The conversations between al-Shabaab and al-
Qaeda have been occurring now for quite some time. We have
heard rumors of an imminent merger, and it has been imminent
for a while.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Liepman. It could happen very soon. It could happen
sometime down the road.
We have several precedents of organizations that have
merged with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is
the most recent example. It is a couple years old.
Two years ago, when they merged, I think we had the same
concerns as you have just stated, that group would suddenly
look beyond Algeria and North Africa, and start targeting
Europe and the United States. And it has been much slower to
happen than I think we feared.
I think that a merger certainly increases that danger, and
as the global jihadist philosophy evolved into the
organization, they will be mindful of additional targets
outside Somalia. We see al-Shabaab really focused right now on
the fight in the Horn of Africa. And I think it would take some
time to develop the capabilities and really to change that
mind-set.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Mudd
Mr. Mudd. Yes, I keep wanting to contradict Mr. Liepman,
and I am looking for an opportunity to do so. But I think he is
right here. I think the word ``merger'' can be a bit misleading
because, I agree, I am not sure this will happen. But merger
does not necessarily mean operational linkage to al-Qaeda. I
think people who look at al-Qaeda through the lens of it being
just a terrorist organization are mistaken. This is a
revolutionary movement, and having someone on a beachhead of
the Horn of Africa who, regardless of operational linkages,
raises their hand and says, ``I am part of the movement,'' as
they have done in al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda of
the Two Rivers of Sudan, and al-Qaeda in Iraq. These are
representative of an effort by al-Qaeda to push out the
movement, not necessarily always representative of direct
operational linkages that might represent a clear increase in
threats to the United States, although as Mr. Liepman says, we
have got to watch out for this. This is long term.
Chairman Lieberman. A final point, if I may, to you, Mr.
Mudd, and then a question. I want to report to you that my
staff, which has spent some time in Minneapolis on the ground
in preparation for the hearing, has found some concern among
the Minneapolis Police Department that they are not adequately
involved in the FBI work there, and that they have more than
they can bring to the table with regard to their own longer-
term interactions in a positive way with the Somali community
in Minneapolis. I know you are on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force with them, but they feel that they can contribute more.
The second is just to wrap this part of the hearing up, in
a sense, in a way of reassurance, because we may have said some
things to alarm people here, but that the FBI is involved in an
investigation which is aimed at--we understand you are involved
in outreach, as I said, to the community. But you are involved
in an investigation which may result in the arrest of some
individuals who are involved in the recruiting and
radicalization. Is that correct?
Mr. Mudd. There are ongoing investigations, and I think I
will sort of defer any further comment on them. But it is a
significant concern to us.
Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. Thank you. Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Mr. Mudd, it is expensive to take someone
from Minneapolis to Somalia. It is complicated to get a person
there. The evidence we have is that the plane ticket for the
young man in question cost around $2,000. That is money he
clearly did not have personally.
Where is the money coming from?
Mr. Mudd. I do not think that the people who are going over
there are all supplying all their own cash. I think it is worth
understanding that, like other diaspora communities, there are
informal ways--you are probably familiar with the hawala
method, for example, which exists in this community to pass
money that is very difficult to follow. The vast majority of
this money is going for remittances, the same thing you would
see, for example, in a Sri Lankan or a Bangladeshi community.
Some small portion of that money, I think, is probably
going to help fund these folks going over. I am not sure I
would buy your suggestion that this is really expensive. If you
are talking about tens of people who are going over in pretty
difficult environments over there, not for high-end terrorist
training but to become in some cases cannon fodder, you have a
ticket, you have somebody at the other end who will be a
facilitator, and then somebody who is in a general training
camp with other folks.
Given the extensive amount of money raised in large
diaspora communities here, I personally would not think it
would be that hard to skim off a little bit of that in various
places and fund some plane tickets for tens of people.
Terrorism is cheap.
Senator Collins. Well, I guess what I meant is compared to
the income of the young men in question, it is not as if they
have this funding.
Mr. Mudd. I am agreeing that I do not think they are self-
funding all this.
Senator Collins. Right.
Mr. Mudd. This is part of the apparatus that we are talking
about here.
Senator Collins. That is my point.
I want to end my questions on this round by going back to a
fundamental question: Why recruit Americans? As Mr. Liepman
said, it is not to fill up the ranks. There are plenty of
people in-country who would perform this role.
It also does involve expenditures that would not otherwise
be incurred. It is difficult. There is a risk of being caught.
And that is why I am wondering if part of the reason is to sow
seeds of fear within the Somali diaspora. I wonder if part of
the reason is to create the kind of dissension within the
community that we have seen in Minneapolis. I wonder if it is
in part the terrorists wanting to cast a cloud of suspicion
over the Somali-American community that might lead to further
alienation of some of the young people.
Could you comment on this issue further?
Mr. Mudd. Sure. I think it is pretty straightforward. This
is a push, not a pull. It is a pull in the sense that you have
a jihadist environment where people from Somalia in this
country, a few people, might say, ``I want to go fight,'' as
others from other communities might have said, ``I want to
fight in Afghanistan'' in the 1980s. But by push, I mean people
here who are saying, ``I want to do this''--maybe because this
is an example of a place where we have a foreign invader, or an
example of a place where we can live in a country that is ruled
by Sharia law. You mentioned recruitment. I do not see people
out there saying, ``Can we have another 10 Americans?''
So I think it is a simple story of people saying, ``I
either want to fight for my country'' or ``I want to go live in
a different social kind of religious environment,''--and it is
relatively inexpensive to get there--not people at the other
end saying, ``I wish I had more Americans.'' In fact, in some
cases the Americans can be a security risk for them. Who are
these folks who are traveling from outside, traveling from
roots that might be vulnerable to exploitation? So it is not
always a plus for the guys on the other end.
Senator Collins. Mr. Liepman.
Mr. Liepman. I agree with that, and I think that is the
case not just with Americans but the British recruits. There
are communities around the world of Somalis who feel very
attached to their homeland, some of whom have expressed a
desire to go back and fight. And I think that desire is being
facilitated.
Senator Collins. But that is the key to me. I agree with
you that, based on our investigation, individuals generally
begin the radicalization process on their own. But based on our
intensive study, there is almost always a catalyst, a person,
the ``spiritual sanctioner,'' in the words of the NYPD; the
operational leader in cases where the plot becomes operational.
Mr. Mudd. I see where you are going. If I could take
another shot at this, sometimes we think of these
organizations, whether it is al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda, as
hierarchical, sort of pyramid-like, which is classic American
concept. You might want to think of this as hub and spoke.
These are first-generation folks, whether they are the small
sliver who are involved in extremism or just people sending
remittances back. All of them in independent communities across
the United States have linkages back home. So they all would
have an independent way to call somebody and say, ``I am going
to send a few folks over. Can you facilitate them when they get
there, get to the right camp?'' It is close linkages back home,
close clan linkages, and those linkages have persisted since we
have had the diaspora community starting probably in the early
1990s.
Mr. Liepman. Just to reinforce, I said before that it would
be a mistake to correlate al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab too closely.
They are very different kinds of organizations. Al-Shabaab is
more of a movement of young people with a wide variety of goals
and clan affiliations. So as Mr. Mudd said, you can make
connections with al-Shabaab much easier than you can with the
leaders of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
Senator Collins. But don't you think that there is also a
public relations angle, for lack of a better word, to this,
that if al-Shabaab can say, ``See, we have Americans. America
pretends it is the best country in the world, and yet we have
Americans coming here to join in jihad?'' Isn't that a play
here, too?
Mr. Liepman. Sure, I think that is a factor. And it would
be easier for the folks back in Somalia to respond to the
desire to come by saying, ``You are actually more of a burden
than you are a help in our fight.'' But they do, they welcome
them, not just Americans but Brits, South Africans, and
Nigerians.
So I do think there is an element of broadening the base of
that opposition, first, to the invasion by the Ethiopians, and
now to the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. I do
think they are doing propagandizing.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Mudd. If I could flip your optic, I would think of it
instead, if you look at statements by people like Ayman al-
Zawahiri, the second in charge of al-Qaeda, as an
organization--and I talked about it as a revolutionary
movement, saying if you want to join the movement, if you are
Nigerian or Malian, whoever you are, one of the forefronts is
Somalia. And some of that echo effect, ripple effect, reaches
people in the United States who might be predisposed to join
the movement already.
So their perception is al-Zawahiri in a sense might see
himself as a statesman. He is the statesman responsible for the
revolutionary message of al-Qaeda, and that message is there
are beachheads in Pakistan, which is a difficult place to be as
a foreign fighter now; Iraq, which, as you said, Senator
Lieberman, a difficult place. There is another beachhead. So
whether you are American, British, Danish, Nigerian, come on
down, we have got a place for you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Voinovich, do you have any further questions.
Senator Voinovich. I would just follow up on the same
thing. In other words, the recruitment or the encouragement is
coming to Somalis all over the world. So it is not just
concentrating on the United States.
Mr. Liepman. That is right.
Senator Voinovich. This is come on in and help your country
out, and incidental thereto may be that you are going to be
helping al-Qaeda. But you said earlier that there was not, to
your knowledge, any formal links between them but there may be
some informal relationships there.
Mr. Liepman. There is a formal link between the top leaders
of al-Shabaab and the leaders of al-Qaeda, but not
organizationally yet, no.
Senator Voinovich. In terms of al-Shabaab doing what al-
Qaeda would like to do or something of that sort.
Mr. Liepman. Right. We do not see that at this point.
Senator Voinovich. And that the young people that are
leaving here, the motivation for them is that they see a cause
of some sort, and to your knowledge, there is not some big
organized effort here to go out and find as many people and
send them over to Somalia, but that it is kind of a
spontaneous--coming from groups of people around that have
different little tribes or it is that they have moved here to
the United States, and some are more involved than others.
I remember after the declaration of the Bosnian War that we
had certain ethnic groups here in the United States that got
involved, and they were not really trying to do anything to us.
They were just trying to do something to the other people that
were here in this country.
So I would like that to be very clear because I do not want
anybody to think that somehow the Somalis--that it is an
organized effort, they are sending them over here, they are
sending them back here, and look out because they are going to
get involved in some terrorist type of activity. And that is
where it is at right now, and as I mentioned earlier, our goal
right now is to look at some of the reasons why some of them
maybe pop up and say, ``I have to get out of here, and I have
to go overseas and see if that can be responded to.'' And
probably that has to be done right in the community among their
own people to say, ``Here is the deal.''
Mr. Liepman. Senator, I think you described it well. They
are going to Somalia to fight for their homeland, not to join
al-Qaeda's jihad against the United States--so far.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Burris, do you have any further
questions?
Senator Burris. Not this round.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. Mr. Liepman and Mr. Mudd, thank
you for your testimony. I am sure we will see you again before
long. Or we will subpoena you if you will not come back
voluntarily. [Laughter.]
We will call the second panel now: Ken Menkhaus, Professor
of Political Science at Davidson College; Osman Ahmed,
President of the Riverside Plaza Tenants Association; and Abdi
Mukhtar, Youth Program Manager at the Brian Coyle Center.
Thanks very much, gentlemen, for your willingness to be
here.
Dr. Menkhaus, we would like to begin with you. We
appreciate it. You have spent some time, probably more than
most, in developing expertise, doing research, and doing some
writing in the general subject matter area that we are covering
here today. We are grateful that you could come, and we welcome
your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF KEN MENKHAUS, PH.D.,\1\ PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE
Mr. Menkhaus. Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, I thank
you both for the opportunity to speak here today. I would like
to offer a few observations about the current Somali crisis,
the role of the diaspora in Somalia, and the question of
recruitment of diaspora youth into the extremist group al-
Shabaab.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Menkhaus appears in the Appendix
on page 105.
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Somalia has been beset by one of the longest and most
destructive crises in the post-Cold War era. The Somali people
have endured 19 years of complete state collapse, civil war,
chronic insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises. An
estimated 1 million Somalis are today refugees scattered across
the globe. This has been an exceptionally traumatic period for
the Somali people.
Over the course of this long period of statelessness,
Islamic institutions--charities, schools, sharia courts, and
political movements--have helped to fill the vacuum left by the
collapsed state. Somalis increasingly look to Islam as an
answer to their plight. The ascendance of political Islam is an
enduring trend in Somalia, and in general terms, this need not
be viewed as a problem for or a threat to the United States.
The period since 2006 has been especially violent and
destructive. In 2006, an Islamic administration briefly arose
in Mogadishu and for 6 months provided very impressive levels
of public order. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), was very
popular with Somalis as a result. Ultimately, hard-liners in
the ICU, including political figures commanding a small
committed militia, known as al-Shabaab, marginalized political
moderates in the Islamic movement and took actions which
threatened the security of neighboring Ethiopia. With U.S.
support, Ethiopia launched an offensive in December 2006,
routing the ICU and militarily occupying the Somali capital,
Mogadishu.
Predictably, Somalis of all political persuasions deeply
resented the Ethiopian occupation, and within weeks an armed
insurgency arose. The counterinsurgency by Ethiopian forces and
the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was very
heavy-handed, and within months Mogadishu was the site of a
catastrophe. Seven hundred thousand residents of the city were
displaced by the violence. Much of the capital was damaged.
Thousands died, and an epidemic of assassinations and assaults
by all sides gripped the city. By 2008, the violence spread
throughout the countryside. Three million Somalis are now in
need of humanitarian aid, prompting the U.N. to declare Somalia
the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
For our purposes, two important developments arose from
this catastrophe. First, it generated an enormous amount of
anger among Somalis, both at home and abroad. This has
manifested itself in high levels of anti-Ethiopian, anti-
American, anti-Western, and anti-U.N. sentiment. Second, one
group--the hardline Islamist militia, al-Shabaab--emerged as
the main source of armed resistance to the TFG and the
Ethiopian occupation. Al-Shabaab successful conflated its
radical Islamist ideology with Somali nationalism. In the eyes
of most Somalis, al-Shabaab was a legitimate national
resistance to a foreign occupation. Al-Shabaab was seen by many
Somalis as freedom fighters, not terrorists, even by Somalis
who found their radical policies appalling and their rumored
links to al-Qaeda very worrisome.
In March 2008, the United States declared al-Shabaab a
terrorist group. The many Somalis who had provided indirect or
direct support to al-Shabaab were thereby immediately
criminalized. In May 2008, the United States launched a
Tomahawk missile attack which killed the top al-Shabaab leader,
Aden Hashi Ayro. Thereafter, al-Shabaab announced an intent to
attack U.S., Western, and U.N. targets, both inside and outside
Somalia. Its principal focus remains the national struggle, but
we are now formally a target of them as well.
Al-Shabaab is today the strongest single armed group in the
country, controlling territory from the Kenyan border to the
outskirts of Mogadishu. It has links to al-Qaeda. But recent
developments are working against al-Shabaab. Ethiopia withdrew
its forces in Somalia in December 2008. The unpopular TFG
President, Abdullahi Yusuf, resigned in December 2008. A new
U.S. Administration has taken office and is reviewing its
policies on Somalia. And a peace accord, known as the Djibouti
Process, has forged a new governing alliance of moderates from
the TFG and Islamist opposition, now led by President Sheikh
Sharif.
Al-Shabaab has been deprived from its main raison d'etre
and now faces growing resistance from Somali militias allied
with the new unity government. Al-Shabaab also faces internal
divisions, including tensions between hard-core members and
those who joined the cause mainly to rid their country of a
foreign occupation.
Put another way, not all al-Shabaab members are committed
jihadists, making it problematic to label the entire group
``terrorists.'' Somalis who were willing to support al-Shabaab
when it represented the main source of resistance to Ethiopian
occupation appear uninterested in supporting al-Shabaab in its
bid to grab power and impose its extremist policies on Somalia.
Al-Shabaab may well have hit its high watermark in 2008 and now
faces declining support and possible defections. If so, this is
good news. It would mean that the threat of al-Shabaab
recruitment among the diaspora will be less of a threat in the
future.
An assessment of the threat of terrorist recruitment among
the Somali diaspora must start with an understanding of the
diaspora's role in Somalia today. The principal role the
diaspora has played over the past 20 years has been an economic
lifeline to Somalia. Its remittances are by far and away the
most important source of income in Somalia, estimated at $1
billion remitted to Somalia each year.
Chairman Lieberman. Is that just from the U.S. or
worldwide?
Mr. Menkhaus. Worldwide. It is fair to say that the
diaspora keeps much of Somalia alive. The diaspora is also
pressured to contribute to communal fundraising, some of which
is used for good causes like community projects. In other
cases, the fundraising can support militias or even extremist
groups like al-Shabaab. The diaspora does not always control
how their money is used.
Somali business, political, and civic life is increasingly
dominated by the diaspora. An estimated 70 percent of the new
TFG cabinet, for instance, holds citizenship abroad, and the
new Prime Minister himself is a Canadian Somali, who has
resided for years in Virginia.
In sum, Somalia has become a diasporized nation. Many
Somalis with citizenship abroad return to Somalia often to
visit family, check on business investments, manage nonprofits,
or pursue political ambitions. This makes it increasingly
difficult to draw meaningful distinctions between the Somalis
and the Somali diaspora. Virtually every Somali enterprise,
whether the shareholder group of the Coca-Cola bottling plant
in Mogadishu, which is still working, or the new TFG
administration, or al-Shabaab itself, is likely to have a
significant diaspora component. Extensive travel to Somalia and
financial and other interactions by Somali-Americans with their
home country should not constitute, therefore, a high-risk
profile.
The Minneapolis case of Shirwa Ahmed and other youth who
have been recruited into al-Shabaab raises a basic question
that you have both asked this morning. Why would al-Shabaab
actively recruit diaspora members? What can a diaspora recruit
do that a local militia fighter cannot?
First, it is clear that the diaspora are not much value as
rank-and-file militia for al-Shabaab or any other fighting
force in Somalia. Somalia is already saturated with experienced
teenage gunmen and has no need to import more. In fact,
evidence from the ICU in 2006 suggests the Somali diaspora as
well as foreign fighters were as much a liability as an asset.
They were unfamiliar with the countryside, often spoke the
Somali language poorly, were more likely to become sick, and
required a fair amount of oversight.
But the diaspora are useful to other al-Shabaab and other
armed groups in Somalia in other ways. Their familiarity with
computers and the Internet is a valuable communications skill,
and to come to the point of our hearing, a young diaspora
recruit is, upon arrival in Somalia, entirely cut off socially
and, therefore, in theory, easier to isolate, indoctrinate, and
control for the purpose of executing suicide bombings. Were
this not the case, it would be much less risky and expensive
for al-Shabaab to simply recruit locals.
From this perspective, a young diaspora member who heeds
the call by a recruiter to ``join the cause'' of fighting to
protect his nation and religion is not so much a terrorist as a
pawn, exploited by the real terrorists, those who are unwilling
themselves to die for their cause but who are happy to
manipulate a vulnerable and isolated youth to blow himself up.
In my assessment, a Somali diaspora member groomed to be a
terrorist is of most utility to al-Shabaab for suicide
operation either inside Somalia or in the region of the Horn of
Africa--Kenya, Djibouti, and especially now Ethiopia. The
reason for this is that these recruits would need ``handlers''
both to help them navigate through unfamiliar situations and to
ensure that they go through with the attack. I am much less
convinced that al-Shabaab would be willing to risk sending a
trained and indoctrinated diaspora member back to the United
States as a ``sleeper'' for a future terrorist attack in the
United States. The risks to al-Shabaab would be enormous. They
would not be in a position to easily manage and control their
recruit. The recruit could even defect and provide damaging
information on al-Shabaab to U.S. law enforcement. And even if
al-Shabaab managed to send totally committed recruits back to
the United States, a al-Shabaab-directed terrorist attack
inside the United States would almost certainly have disastrous
consequences for al-Shabaab, not only in terms of the U.S.
response, but from Somali society as well. Recall that
remittances from the diaspora are the economic lifeline of
Somalia. Anything that jeopardizes the status of Somalis living
abroad imperils the entire country, and al-Shabaab would face
enormous blowback from within the Somali community.
In sum, my sense is that the threat of an American of
Somali descent joining al-Shabaab and then returning as a
sleeper to the United States is quite low. The threat still
requires careful law enforcement attention, but should not be
overblown. There is one exception to this assessment. A Somali-
American who joins al-Shabaab and who has then proceeded to
Pakistan or Afghanistan and who becomes an al-Qaeda operative
is of much greater concern. The reasoning for this is
straightforward. Al-Shabaab's agenda is still essentially a
nationalist one, while al-Qaeda's is global. Al-Qaeda would not
weigh the costs of a terrorist attack in the United States on
the Somali economy and the Somali diaspora, whereas al-Shabaab
would. A Somali-American acting through the ideological prism
of al-Qaeda would be more willing to serve as a sleeper than
would a al-Shabaab member.
I would like to conclude with just a few thoughts on the
Somali experience with and response to law enforcement
authorities, much of which has already been alluded to this
morning.
First, Somalis have a long and unhappy experience with the
state and the police back in their country of origin. As a
result, not all Somalis view the State, law enforcement, and
the law as a source of protection and order; some view law
enforcement with fear, as something to avoid. Behavior which
appears to be evasive or untruthful can often be traced back to
this generic fear of law enforcement and should not be
misinterpreted. Sustained police programs to socialize Somali-
American communities and reshape their perception of the state
and the law are essential if this is to be overcome. They need
to appreciate the difference between ``rule of law'' and ``rule
by law'' and feel confident that the U.S. law enforcement
system reflects the former and not the latter.
Some Somali households are likely to be nervous about any
attention from law enforcement not because of links to
terrorism, but because of the risk that U.S. law enforcement
will in the process uncover other ``irregularities,'' including
illegal immigration, putting the community's interests at risk.
All communities have their ``dominant narratives'' and
Somalis are no exception. Their dominant narrative is a story
of victimization and persecution both at home and abroad. It is
very easy for some in the Somali-American community to
interpret current U.S. law enforcement attention as yet another
instance of witch hunting and persecution, reflecting a
combination of anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-African
sentiments. Some flatly deny there is a problem with al-Shabaab
recruitment at all. The only way to produce better cooperation
with this community is through routinized communication that
builds trust with local law enforcement and which gives Somalis
a clearer sense not only of their legal and social obligations
as citizens but also of their legal rights.
The U.S. Government needs to provide much clearer
guidelines to Somalis about what constitutes legal and illegal
behavior with regard to political engagement in their country
of origin. If not, we run the risk of criminalizing routine
diaspora engagement in Somalia. The fact that al-Shabaab was
not designated a terrorist organization before March 2008 but
then was so designated is an example of the legal confusion
facing Somalis. Something that was legal in February 2008 is
now aiding and abetting terrorism. As you know, this is a
question of relevance to many other immigrant communities in
the United States whose country of origin is embroiled in war
or whose charities have come under suspicion of serving as
terrorist fronts. The U.S. Government cannot ask its citizens
to abide by the law if the laws themselves are too opaque to be
understood, and this is especially the case if legal charges
can be made retroactively for affiliations with groups which
were acceptable in the past but then designated terrorist.
Finally, it goes without saying that the main
responsibility for policing Somali youth to ensure they do not
become members of criminal gangs or terrorist groups falls
squarely on the shoulders of Somali parents and community
leaders. To the extent that Somali communities need additional
outside support to provide for a safe and controlled
environment for their children to grow up, we should try to
provide it. Most importantly, we need to ensure that first-
generation Somali-Americans are growing up with a strong sense
of being American citizens with all the rights and
responsibilities that entails. A Somali diaspora population
that feels it belongs neither here nor in Somalia will be much
more susceptible to radical movements promising their own sense
of identity and belonging.
I hope these brief observations are of help as you exercise
oversight on a topic with both important implications for
national security and civil liberties. Like many U.S. citizens,
I was greatly moved by President Obama's promise in his
inaugural speech: ``We reject as false the choice between our
safety and our ideals.'' I am confident that we can address the
security concerns raised by Somali-American recruitment into
al-Shabaab without violating their civil rights and those of
the community. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. I agree. That was very
helpful. I will have questions for you in the question and
answer period, but let me just as a baseline ask you to give
the Committee a sense of the size of the global Somali diaspora
as compared to the population in Somalia.
Mr. Menkhaus. Our estimates of the global Somali population
are about 1 million out of a total Somali population--Somalis
citizens, not the 4 million who are Ethiopian Somalis and
400,000 who are Kenyan Somalis--of about 9 to 10 million. So
roughly one in 10 or more are abroad now.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. Thanks very much.
The next witness has come to us from Minneapolis. We again
thank you, as I did in my opening statement, for being here to
make this personal, to help us to understand what is happening
within the community. Obviously, as I said at the outset, we
consider you our allies, our fellow Americans, and in a very
direct sense the victims of those who are recruiting from among
your families.
First, we are going to hear from Osman Ahmed, who is the
President of the Riverside Plaza Tenants Association in
Minneapolis. Thank you very much for being here.
TESTIMONY OF OSMAN AHMED,\1\ PRESIDENT, RIVERSIDE PLAZA TENANTS
ASSOCIATION, MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
Mr. Ahmed. Senators Lieberman and Collins, I would like to
thank you on behalf of the family members of the children who
were recruited to Somalia, members of the Somali community, and
on my own behalf for inviting us to the congressional hearing
committee. I would like to also thank Omar Jamal, who is the
Director of Somali Justice Advocacy Center, who helped us, and
worked a lot of time.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ahmed appears in the Appendix on
page 119.
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We would also like to thank the senatorial officials who
came all the way to Minneapolis on February 28, 2009, to meet
with the family members and the community. Also, I want to
acknowledge the FBI office in Minneapolis and its agents who
work day and night to locate our children. We do indeed feel
grateful of their extreme efforts.
The first time we became suspicious was when we received a
message from Roosevelt High School saying that our kid, Burhan,
missed all school classes on November 4, 2008.
Chairman Lieberman. Excuse me, Mr. Ahmed. Say his name
again so we get it clear.
Mr. Ahmed. Burhan Hussan.
Chairman Lieberman. Was he a relative of yours?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes, he was my nephew.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Mr. Ahmed. It was November 4, 2008. That to us sounded
strange and we were stunned. We roamed around the metropolitan
area and even beyond, nationwide. We went to Abubakar As-
Saddique Mosque and Dawa Mosque, called our building security,
called Hennepin County Medical Center, hospital emergency
rooms, and the airport. After that, his mother looked into his
room and found that his travel luggage was missing, his clothes
were not there, and his passport was missing also. We
immediately notified respective law enforcement agencies. We
immediately contacted the local police office and the FBI
office in Minneapolis.
We have been up on our heels since we have realized that
one of our children was mentally and physically kidnapped on
November 4, 2008, on Election Day.
Understanding challenges the Somali community in
Minneapolis faces today--there are many challenges that the
Somali community in Minnesota faces like other first-generation
immigrants. These include limited language proficiency, limited
skills, and the cultural barrier, as well as the Minnesota
weather. Most of these Somali-American families are headed by
single mothers.
The system is an alternative approach, but understanding it
is also a barrier. The neighborhood, particularly the West
Bank/Cedar/Riverside area, has limited resources that could be
of value to the community members.
Perspective of family members of the recruited kids--the
missing Somali-American children created anguish and fear to
the immediate family members and in the general communities. No
one can imagine the destruction this issue has caused for these
mothers and grandmothers. They are going through the worst time
in their lives. Imagine how these parents feel when their
children are returned back to the country were they originally
fled from the chaos, genocide, gang rape, and lawlessness.
There are five children among the many that were sent to
Somalia: Burhan Hassan, 17 years old, senior at Roosevelt High
School; Mohamud Hassan, 18 years old, studying engineering at
the University of Minnesota; Abdisalam Ali, 19 years old,
studying health at the University of Minnesota; Jamal Aweys, 19
years old, studying engineering at Minneapolis Community and
Technical College, and later at Normandale College here in
Minnesota; as well as Mustafa Ali, who is 18 years old,
studying at Harding High School in St. Paul.
These Somali-American kids were not troubled kids or in
gangs. They were the hope of the Somali-American community.
They were the doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, and
leaders of the future of our strong and prosperous nation. For
instance, Burhan Hassan was a brilliant student with straight
A's and on top of his class. He was taking college courses--
calculus, advanced chemistry--as he was about to graduate from
high school. These classes were sponsored by the University of
Minnesota. He was an ambitious kid with the hope to go to
Harvard University to study medicine or law and become a
medical doctor or a lawyer.
All these youth shared common things. They all left Somalia
in their infancy like my nephew, Burhan Hassan. He was 8 months
old when they arrived in Kenya. He was less than 4 years old
when he arrived in the United States, February 12, 1996. Like
his peers, Burhan Hassan was never interested in Somali
politics or understood Somali clan issues. Burhan grew up in a
single-parent household. His immediate family members,
including his mother and siblings, are educated. He studied
Islam at a nearby Abubakar As-Saddique Mosque like the rest of
the kids since 1998. Abubakar As-Saddique was opened a couple
of years ago. Before then, it used to be called Shafi'e Mosque
in the Cedar Riverside neighborhood area when Burhan started.
He attended its youth group. These kids have no perception of
Somalia except the one that was formed in their mind by their
teachers at the Abubakar Center. We believe that these children
did not travel to Somalia by themselves. There must be others
who made them understand that going to Somalia and
participating in the fighting is the right thing to do. To
address the issue from a factual perspective, it is the dream
of every Somali parent to have their children go to the mosque,
but none of them expected to have their children's mind
programmed in a manner that is in line with the extremist's
ideologies. In the case of Burhan, he spent more than 10 years
going to the mosque. This is evidenced by others who also
attended the mosque.
One thing for sure is that the methods of indoctrination
are highly sophisticated. The plan of al-Shabaab is basically
to destroy the world peace, and they will turn every leaf to
achieve that. Their mission is not isolated into Somalia but
has far-reaching goals.
The Somali-American youth were isolated because they have
been told that if they share their views with others, including
their family members, they will not be understood and might as
well be turned over to the infidel's hands. These children are
victims on every side. They have been lied to. They were told
that they will be shown the Islamic utopia that has been hidden
from them by the infidels and the brainwashed parents. Our
children had no clue they were being recruited to join al-
Shabaab. We are getting a lot of information back home from
Somalia. We also heard that when kids arrive, they are
immediately shocked at what utopia is, and all their documents
and belongings are confiscated. They are whisked to hidden
military camps for trainings. They are also told if they flee
and return home that they will end up in Guantanamo Bay. They
do not know anyone in Somalia.
Why is al-Shabaab interested in American and Western kids?
We believe the reason al-Shabaab is interested in American and
Western kids is that these kids do not have any relatives in
Somalia. They cannot go back to their countries for they will
be reported to the authorities by local al-Shabaab recruiters.
They are also very valuable in interpreting for al-Shabaab
trainers of American and Western descent.
They could be used for anything they want. They could be
trained or forced to become suicide bombers in Somalia, and
they can do it out of desperation. For many of them, Burhan,
for example, have no idea where to go for help in Somalia. This
is the first time he has been to Somalia in his life. These are
basically the main reasons why al-Shabaab is recruiting from
the Western countries.
Another issue of paramount importance is the fact that we
are the first family members who informed the law enforcement
about the missing of these youth. Family members whose children
sent to Somalia were scared to even talk to the law
enforcement. We have been painted as bad people within the
Somali community by the mosque management. We have been
threatened for just speaking out. Some members of Abubakar As-
Saddique Mosque told us that if we talk about the issue, the
Muslim center will be destroyed, and Islamic communities will
be wiped out. They tell parents that if they report their
missing kid to the FBI, the FBI will send the parents to
Guantanamo jail. And this message has been a very effective
tool to silence parents and the community.
They do have a lot of cash to use for propaganda machine.
They strike fear on a daily basis, here in Minneapolis, among
Somali-speaking community in order to stop the community to
cooperate with the law enforcement agencies. Public threats
were issued to us at Abubakar As-Saddique Mosque for simply
speaking with CNN, Newsweek, and other media. The other mystery
is that they say one thing on Somali TVs and at their
congregations, they say something contrary to that in English
while speaking to the mainstream media or community.
They also told us not to talk to the media because that
will also endanger the Muslim leaders. We have been projected
as pariah within the community by these mosque leaders. We are
tormented by the fact that our children are missing and
imperiled. These members are scaring us so that we stop talking
to law enforcement.
Perspective on al-Shabaab to attract young people to their
cause--The most important factor on how al-Shabaab attracts the
young Somali-Americans is the indoctrination of the children.
They are programmed to understand that it is their duty to
confront the infidels. There are youth programs that in some
instances have some hidden agendas. These agendas include that
whatever issues that might come across in life is twisted as
being the work of the infidels. They have been told to
understand that the Ethiopian troops in Somalia are an act of
aggression against the Islamic religion. Al-Shabaab is not only
interested in recruiting Somali-American youth but others in
other Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany,
Canada, and Australia. The main reason for al-Shabaab to
recruit from these countries is that these youth have different
views than a typical Somali in Somalia. They do not know much
about Somali clan and have no political affiliation whatsoever.
There are some radical groups who were a minority in their
thinking. However, when the Ethiopian troops came to Somalia,
some Somali-American professors clearly declared the war
against Ethiopian troops. This has been a scapegoat for their
extremist political views. It encouraged radical Islamic groups
in the United States who previously were not active in the
political activities here and in Somalia.
In conclusion, we the families of the missing kids have
been conducting an outreach campaign to reach out to those
families that have not come forward. We believe this is the tip
of the iceberg. In our outreach, we have been very successful
to help some families to come forward and trust the law
enforcement like we did.
Recommendations for preventing recruitment in the future:
Educate members of the Somali community on the importance of
cooperation between law enforcement and the community.
Empower the families of the missing kids to continue the
outreach to those families who did not come forward.
Bring to justice those who are responsible.
Create special task forces to combat the al-Shabaab
recruitment in Minnesota, Ohio, Seattle, Washington, and
Boston.
Scrutinize the funding of suspicious nonprofit agencies
that undertake youth activities possibly related to radical
views.
Investigate if taxpayers' money was involved in the
brainwashing of our kids because Abubakar Center is a nonprofit
that might have been getting taxpayers' money for youth
programs.
The mosque controls a large amount of money, which is
raised in these mosques, quarterly or sometimes yearly
fundraising which lacks transparency--huge amounts of cash--and
portions of that money could have gone to al-Shabaab groups.
Second, we are requesting more connection between our community
and the FBI, so the FBI has to do more outreaching programs to
the community.
We need a protection for our children so that they can
escape enemy hands.
We need our U.S. Government to forgive these youth to
enable us to find ways and means to bring them back to their
homes. And this will give confidence to many more families to
come out of darkness.
Warning: Al-Shabaab recruiters have the agility and ability
to change form. They usually are well represented not only in
certain mosques but wherever Somali children and young adults
are concentrated, such as community centers, charter schools
operated by Somalis. They could sometimes pose as Somali
community leaders and advise politicians and other agencies
that are outreaching to the Somali community. Al-shabaab
recruiters can be active and target the youth at where ever
Somalis are. Definitely, we don't know who is exactly behind
this crazy venture. Nonetheless, we need to be vigilant at all
times. Again, I want to thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Ahmed, I want to thank you for your
courage in standing up in a dangerous situation, including
against some in the community, and the U.S. Government really
owes you exactly the kind of support and outreach that you ask
for. I will say this--I will have questions for you, but the
picture you paint is clearly not a situation--the word
``volunteer'' was used before, and I know the witness on a
previous panel said he meant to say that they were not coerced.
But you are describing a situation--and we will get back to
it--where these were not just young people who stood up, woke
up, and after a period of time talking to their families and
said, ``I want to go back to Somalia.'' They were clearly, by
your telling, radicalized, recruited, and then if I heard you
correctly, in the case of your nephew, Burhan Hassan, he just
disappeared. He did not tell anybody he was going, correct?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes. He did not tell anybody.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. We will come back to that.
Our final witness today is Abdi Mukhtar, Youth Program
Manager from the Brian Coyle Community Center, which I gather
is a community center at which a lot of young Somali-Americans
in Minneapolis congregate. Thanks for being here, sir.
TESTIMONY OF ABDIRAHMAN MUKHTAR,\1\ YOUTH PROGRAM MANAGER,
BRIAN COYLE CENTER, PILLSBURY UNITED COMMUNITIES, MINNEAPOLIS,
MINNESOTA
Mr. Mukhtar. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins,
and Members of the Committee, thank you. Before I start my
statement, also as a parent who has children, I emphasize, and
I send my sympathy with the family members who are missing
their kids, and the majority of the Somali-American community,
sends their sympathy for the families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mukhtar appears in the Appendix
on page 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. Mukhtar. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today. The Somali youth issue is very important for me
personally and professionally, and I am honored to have a
chance to share my experience and expertise about this issue as
a Somali youth issue expert.
My name is Abdirahman Mukhtar. I was born in Somalia. I
fled Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, when the civil war
started early January 1991. I went to a refugee camp in Liboa,
Kenya. I stayed 7 years in refugee camps and the capital city
of Nairobi in Kenya. I moved to the United States in August
1998. After moving to the United States, I attended and
graduated from Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, and I went
on to pursue higher education from the University of Minnesota
with a degree in kinesiology. I am planning to go back to
graduate school for doctorate of physical therapy in the near
future.
I have been working with youth for over 8 years--first with
the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Department, then with the
Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota as a Youth
Diversion Coordinator, and currently as the Youth Program
Manager at the Brian Coyle Center.
The Brian Coyle Center serves as a central hub for
resettlement assistance, social services, adult education,
employment counseling, youth programming, recreation, and civic
engagement for the Somali community in the Minneapolis
metropolitan area. The center includes a gymnasium, community
room, commercial kitchen, numerous classrooms, a food shelf,
and a computer lab. Along with Pillsbury United Communities,
the organization that I work for, there are other organizations
that have their offices in the building, which includes the
Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota; the Oromo
Community, which is an ethnic Serbian community; Emerge
Community Development (EMERGE); Somali Youth Network Council;
Cedar Riverside Neighborhood Revitalization Program; the West
Bank Community Coalition; Somali Education and Social Advocacy
Services; East African Economic Development Center; Haboon
Magazine; and the Somalia Family Advocacy Group. All are
nonprofit organizations.
Assimilation to the Minneapolis Community--The main
difficulty I had assimilating to the mainstream community was
the language barrier, because I did not speak in English and at
times people had difficulty understanding me. Second, I
experienced racial and cultural misunderstandings; many people
in the American society were not well educated and did not know
about my culture, religion, and other differences. Many of the
Somali youth and their parents have similar experiences such as
limited formal education caused by the Somali civil war and
settlement in different refugee camps. Somali students like me
were enrolled into classrooms in the United States based on age
rather than academic level, making it very difficult to
succeed. When classes are challenging beyond a person's current
capability, it often leads to students skipping school and
dropping out.
Since parents have to support their families and provide
food and shelter, but can only get lower-wage jobs--such as
assembly work, cleaning, temporary jobs, and some of them
struggle with small businesses that barely make a sustainable
income--they do not have the time to be involved in their
children's academic and recreational activities. Not only are
families working hard to meet the basic needs to support their
children in the United States, they also are responsible for
sending money to extended families back in Africa. The
expectation of the school system on parents for parent
involvement adds to the challenges for Somali families and
students. Somali parents and the Somali community value
education.
When I started high school, I was fortunate enough to have
bilingual teachers to assist me in my education and adaptation
to the education system in America. Now, due to the cutbacks
and policies, Somali students don't have culturally appropriate
programs and the support of bilingual teachers in their
schools.
It was not easy for me to attend high school because my
family back home expected me to support them, even though I was
in my teens. I was encouraged to get a GED instead of finishing
high school, so I could get a full-time job. Instead, I started
working 20 hours a week at the Mall of America and continued to
work towards my high school diploma.
During the summer, I worked full time while also attending
summer school to pass the basic standards tests in math and
English. In my senior year, I took a commanding English class
at the University of Minnesota in order to improve and be ready
for college. I was able to take this class through the post-
secondary options program. Because of my GPA, leadership, and
extracurricular activities, I was accepted to attend the
General College of the University of Minnesota, which no longer
exists.
Somali youth today experience the same barriers I faced as
a new immigrant in the United States; however, they do so with
even fewer resources than what was available for me. Language
is still a barrier as young Somalis try to achieve success.
Identity crisis and cultural conflict are a reality for Somali
youth--for example, Somali culture at home versus American
culture at school. Parents expect you to keep your culture,
while the American education system and way of life forces you
to assimilate. Many have difficulties adjusting to the new way
of life while facing cultural barriers that seem hard to
overcome. As a result of identity crisis and frequent
challenges, many youth lose hope and start making poor choices.
The current economic situation also adds to the problem since
jobs are not available for youth. They become truant, getting
involved in gangs and using drugs like their peers. However,
there are many successful Somali youths who overcame these
obstacles.
Somali families tend to be large, mostly with single
parents who are working to make ends meet. Many Somali parents
also provide for relatives, thus reducing their income status
and livelihood. Even though parents care deeply for their
children, this continues to be a strain on the support provided
to Somali youth.
Somali families for the most part live in high-density
housing in the lowest-income neighborhoods in the city. The
Cedar Riverside neighborhood where I live and work has a median
household income of just $14,367 a year. Let me say that again.
It is a median household income which is $14,367 a year. The
unemployment rate is 17 percent--that is according to the 2000
census--so it is much worse, especially in the economic crisis
we are facing now. Across the street from the Brian Coyle
Center, in one apartment complex there are 3,500 residents, of
which 92 percent are immigrants and 1,190 are under the age of
18.
This is the highest concentration of low-income children in
Minnesota, some people say in the Midwest, and most of them are
Somalis. Many opportunities and resources are not available in
neighborhoods that Somalis reside compared to other areas in
the city. Services are often inaccessible due to lack of
appropriate local, city, and State agencies offering culturally
competent services to Somalis. We operate our programs in a
city-owned building for which the park department doesn't even
cover the expenses they are required to by contract, so we
manage with minimal resources.
When youth don't have access to healthy options to fill
their free time, they fall into the typical trappings
associated with youth culture, for example, the Internet--peer
pressure and cyber predators. Many Somali youth are nowadays
involved with drug use and gang violence. This seems to be the
biggest distraction because resources and many important
opportunities are not available for these youth.
People without college degrees are limited with regard to
employment. They are reduced to manual labor and factory work.
Moreover, racism and employment discrimination still exist in
many blue-collar establishments. This leads to problems such as
high divorce rates and child neglect because they are unable to
provide for their families and other family members.
Somali youth report a high level of discrimination across
the board. This includes schools, colleges, the media, in the
community. and by law enforcement. Discrimination is based on
ethnicity, culture, and religion. When I asked a group of youth
ranging in ages 10 to 20 what were their greatest challenges,
50 percent answered harassment by the police. Because of how
young Somali-Americans dress, even some of their own community
members stereotype them.
Second-generation immigrants are different than first-
generation. Like many immigrant communities, there is a stark
difference between first and second-generation Somali
immigrants. Parents maintain a lifestyle that essentially is
like living from a suitcase; they hope to return. They
experience language barriers and have difficulty interacting
with the larger society. Second-generation Somalis are more
settled and hope to build their lives here; they are more
immersed in American culture and they are fully engaged.
Somali immigrants experience frustration with the education
system, and new sets of barriers occur for second-generation
immigrants. Institutions often are not empowering, for example,
keeping students in English language learner (ELL) even if they
don't need such courses. Second-generation Somali youth often
speak English well, but are stereotyped and wrongly assigned to
low-level classes. Inner city schools still have a graduation
rate for Somali students well below their white American peers.
Second-generation Somalis consider themselves Somali-Americans,
but they experience stereotyping by the broader society who
sees only their ethnicity and religious affiliation.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Mukhtar, excuse me for
interrupting. You are considerably over the time we normally
allow the witnesses. I do not want to cut you off. Let me
suggestion two things.
First, you are getting to the Shirwa Ahmed story. I would
like to ask you to tell us that story. We will then print your
entire statement in the record, and then we will draw out some
of your recommendations for solutions in the questions and
answers. So why don't you proceed and see if you can tell us
about Shirwa Ahmed.
Mr. Mukhtar. Shirwa Ahmed and I went to Roosevelt High
School together, and we are both from Somalia. Recently, it was
reported, as we said earlier today, that Shirwa was the first
American citizen known to be a suicide bomber.
The Somali community is not a monolithic community; it is
highly diverse. As a first-generation immigrant, I faced many
challenges in my life, and I had many responsibilities with
regard to supporting my life. I made decisions that reflect my
history and experiences. It is difficult to map out the lives
of people. Many of my classmates took different paths in life
and ended up in different roles. Some are highly trained
professionals, some are in jail, some are in the workforce
earning low wages, and some are in the U.S. Army.
When learning about Shirwa's role as a suicide bomber,
people were shocked and angry because it goes against the
Somali culture and it is also inherently anti-Islamic. Many
Somalis are not convinced that it happened because the idea
seems too far out of people's comprehension. Throughout
Somalia's history, particularly in times of war, suicide
bombings never occurred, and this is this case.
I have been asked, ``Do Somali youth talk about Shirwa?''
Somali youth talk more about March Madness, Kobe Bryant, the
NFL draft, and basic things. They face different local
challenges than what the topic of this hearing is today.
I will just stop there so I can answer the questions since
I went over my time.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, and we will
include your full statement and those of the other witnesses in
the record.
Let me begin my questioning, and let me begin it with you,
Mr. Mukhtar. So you knew Shirwa Ahmed. He was your classmate, I
gather, at Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, correct?
Mr. Mukhtar. Actually, he graduated a year ahead of me, but
we went to the same high school.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. And I gather a good student,
serious student?
Mr. Mukhtar. He was a very quiet guy, good student, but as
I told you, he was a class ahead of me.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. So am I correct, as in the case
of Mr. Ahmed's nephew, that this was a surprise when he left
for Somalia?
Mr. Mukhtar. I only heard from the media about his suicide,
and when the FBI Director mentioned it was the first American
suicide bomber.
Chairman Lieberman. OK, I understand. So your contact with
him was not close. Based on your interaction with Somali-
American youth in Minneapolis, how do you explain what happened
to Mr. Ahmed?
Mr. Mukhtar. You mean what happened to Shirwa Ahmed?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, Shirwa Ahmed. Yes, how did he end
up going to Somalia? I mean, you assume he was recruited by
somebody?
Mr. Mukhtar. No. That is why I made my own personal choice,
and there are a lot of my classmates who also are in jails or
in gangs. So I don't know how he ended up in that situation.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me go now to Osman Ahmed, because
in your testimony--let me ask about Mr. Hassan first, your
nephew. Am I correct that he has called at times now from
Somalia to talk to his family to tell him he is there?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. And I thought your testimony was very
interesting. I think I have it right--well, here is what it
said to me: That when they get there, basically their identity
is taken away, their papers are taken away. So in some sense,
they are trapped, and that may be one reason why the recruiting
of Americans goes on because they are left with no way to get
out, so they are much more controlled by al-Shabaab.
Mr. Ahmed. Yes, that is the main reason they are recruited,
because the local Somalis, if they desired to flee from their
terrorist group, they have a place to return. They have a
family, and also they have a protection.
Chairman Lieberman. Right
Mr. Ahmed. But these kids, they don't have a protection,
they don't have their clan, they don't have any family members
back home. So they have nowhere to go.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Mr. Ahmed, in your testimony, you
used the word ``they'' several times, ``they'' when describing
those who recruited and radicalized both your nephew and other
young men in the Somali community in Minneapolis. And I wanted
to ask you if you could say a little bit more about who you
think ``they'' are?
Mr. Ahmed. There are different minority groups who are
spreading this ideology of extremism. And before, they never
came up and shared their views to the community until the
Ethiopian troops entered Somalia. So at that time, they got
excused.
After 2006, those minority groups, they started spreading
to two mosques in Minneapolis----
Chairman Lieberman. Mostly through the mosques.
Mr. Ahmed. Two mosques, even though we also suspect at some
other mosques around the United States.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Ahmed. They changed the management of those two mosques
to have influence to the community, and that is how we believe
after 2006 they started recruiting the kids, and also spreading
their ideology of extremist.
Chairman Lieberman. So you are convinced that it is people
within the mosque who are having this effect on some of the
young men in the Somali community in Minneapolis.
Mr. Ahmed. Of course, let me give you an example. These
kids, especially my nephew, he was well connected to the
mosque. He does not have any friends outside. He used to go to
school, home, and the mosque.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Ahmed. And there is no way he could get that ideology
from the school or home.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, and that is a very important
point. So his family does not believe in this Islamist
extremist ideology.
Mr. Ahmed. No way.
Chairman Lieberman. Obviously, he was not getting it in
school.
Mr. Ahmed. Nothing.
Chairman Lieberman. Also, again, to point this out--and it
seems to be a pattern as you described some of the young men
who had gone, these were, generally speaking, young men who
were doing pretty well at school, correct?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes. All of them, they were A students.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And were all of them regular
attenders at one or more of the mosques?
Mr. Ahmed. As far as we heard from their families, yes.
Chairman Lieberman. You also advocated in your testimony
for more transparency with regard to the funding for the
Abubakar mosque because, as you suggest, you are worried that
some of the money may have been sent to al-Shabaab. Why do you
think that that is so?
Mr. Ahmed. Actually, that money, it is not only for the
Abubakar Mosque. There is another mosque which is Da'wan, in
St. Paul.
Chairman Lieberman. In St. Paul?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes. They are collecting quarterly, sometimes
monthly, sometimes yearly, and they are telling the community
that they are spending the money for expenses of the mosque and
the salaries. But the community have questions about where that
money really is going. And there is no transparency at all.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. So your concern, obviously, is
that some of the money being contributed to the mosque is going
to al-Shabaab.
Mr. Ahmed. Actually, we are cautious about that, because,
one, there is no transparency. They can use that money wherever
they want to use it.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. I have a feeling Senator Collins
is going to ask this question, so I will begin it. But as we
trace this rather remarkable path that we believe from people
who have followed it that Burhan Hassan, your nephew, took, he
went with a group of other young men. They split up. Some went
to Boston. Some went to Chicago. They had many stops along the
way before they got to Somalia. And the estimate is that this
was being coordinated as a way to perhaps deceive people who
would be following them, but also it cost a fair amount of
money, an estimated at least $2,000.
Is it fair to say that you would be surprised if Burhan
Hassan himself had $2,000 to spend on the trip?
Mr. Ahmed. No way, no way he could get it. He never worked,
so definitely there is a group who are going to organize these
kids, funding, arranging even the travel stuff. Even some of
them, they cannot call the travel agents and get tickets
because of their age.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. I am now going to yield to
Senator Collins. You have been very helpful to the Committee.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mukhtar, let me pick up where the Chairman left off.
You gave us some very compelling statistical information about
the low level of income of the Somali households in your
region. So would you agree that it is very unlikely that these
young men were able to finance their own trips?
Mr. Mukhtar. Actually, allow me to say that Abdisalam, who
is one of the kids that left, I know him very well. He was in
my youth program when I used to work at Elliott Park. So
Abdisalam used to work. He had a job while he was a full-time
student at the university of Minnesota. Some of the older
youth, according to community members, had jobs. But I am not
sure who--I don't exactly know who paid their trip and why,
because I deal with the challenges that face the young people
every day. And the mosques, the issue of the mosques, the
mosques are the essential life of Muslims--not only the Somali
community. Every Muslim, their essential life is the mosque
because we pray five times a day.
My kid goes to the mosque to learn his Islamic roots. So
what happens is that these mosques, they are community built,
not individuals. So we cannot blame the mosques. We can blame
individuals. You can create friends and foes, as it happened on
September 11, 2001.
So, please, I am encouraging you--I personally want to know
who is recruiting these kids because every day that is what I
do. I want to make sure that these young people make the right
decisions and want these young people to be productive
citizens. So I have the right to know who is recruiting them.
Senator Collins. You do believe that they are being
recruited, though.
Mr. Mukhtar. There are rumors within the community. The
only recruitment that I know, I know gangs who are recruiting
these kids.
Senator Collins. Right.
Mr. Mukhtar. And that is the local challenge that I face as
a youth manager.
Senator Collins. Mr. Ahmed, you made a really important
point in your testimony that was different from the previous
panel whom we heard earlier. You make the point that for these
young people, America is their homeland, that your nephew was 8
months old when he came to America.
Mr. Ahmed. Yes
Senator Collins. That he had never been to Somalia. Is that
correct?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes.
Senator Collins. So, in your judgment, this was not a case,
as far as you know, of his feeling this connection to Somalia
that would lead him to volunteer to go fight for his homeland,
because America is his homeland. Is that correct?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes.
Senator Collins. I think that is a very important point
here, because it leads to your conclusion that there is
indoctrination or radicalization going on. And I am not trying
to put words in your mouth, but is that correct?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Collins. Obviously, the events of the last several
months have clearly heightened the awareness of the Somali
community in Minneapolis of the dangers of radicalization and
the risk to the young people, your relatives, your friends,
your family members.
A key to combating that radicalization is for individuals
and communities, youth leaders, and local mosque leaders to be
aware of the dangers before this radicalization process occurs.
To your knowledge--I am going to ask both of you this
question--was that awareness in existence prior to the
disappearance of these young people? Mr. Mukhtar.
Mr. Mukhtar. In this case, there was not much awareness,
no, because we were focusing on the local violence issues. In
the last year, while the Minneapolis mainstream violence went
down by six points, the Somali youth violence went up six
points. It is totally the opposite. We had six Somali young men
who were killed by Somalis, gangs or other ways, last year
alone. I personally lost a volunteer who was a work/study I
recruited, Ahmed Nur Ahmed Ali, on his first day of his job in
front of Brian Coyle Center.
So I focused on the local issues, but, on the other hand,
we control our computer lab because Internet plays a role in
this issue, as this Committee reported in May in your report.
So we control our computer lab--you cannot go to YouTube. You
cannot watch anything. We don't allow MySpace or other social
things.
So we are aware youth are very vulnerable when it comes to
the Internet, but as to this issue, I focus on the local issues
which actually the community talked more about before this
happened.
Senator Collins. Mr. Ahmed, in your judgment, was there an
awareness of this risk to the Somali youth in Minneapolis prior
to the disappearance of these young men?
Mr. Ahmed. Before I answer that question, I want to
clarify.
Senator Collins. Yes.
Mr. Ahmed. We are not blaming the mosque.
Senator Collins. Right.
Mr. Ahmed. Mosques are our places we worship. What we are
blaming is the management. The mosque itself cannot
indoctrinate for the kids.
Senator Collins. That is an important distinction.
Mr. Ahmed. Yes. The answer to this question is we do not
have to mix it, the gang activities going on in Minnesota and
the missing kids. It is two separate issues. These kids, they
can harm us in United States and our security. But the gangs,
they can only harm us with the gang stuff. So we don't have to
always mix it for those two issues, those kids who are
traveling back home and the kids who are in gangs.
When it comes to the Internet, I do not believe that the
Internet played a big percentage. First time we believe they
get indoctrinated might be the end when they get brainwashed 10
percent or 15 percent a day, they could get somebody from the
Internet. That is what we believe.
Senator Collins. When your nephew has called back home from
Somalia, has he given any indication of why he left or what he
is doing or whether he plans to return?
Mr. Ahmed. He looks like somebody who was being instructed
by another person who is in there. His mom tried to ask him a
couple of questions, and he just keep returning, ``Mom, I am
safe. I am in Mogadishu, Somalia. I will call you back.'' So
couple of times he has called his mom, she tried to ask couple
of questions, and somebody maybe was instructing him what to
say.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Menkhaus, I want to thank you for your insightful
information about that whole situation. It was really
educational and informative. My questions probably will be
directed at the other witnesses.
Either one of you, do you know if any adult Somalis have
volunteered to go back for the war?
Mr. Ahmed. There is no way that somebody who has the best
hospitals, best schools, and lives with best society, can go
back and join a terrorist group.
Senator Burris. Do I understand, you do not know of any of
your----
Mr. Ahmed. There is no way a person who is in the United
States that has the best schools in the world, best hospitals,
live with best society in the world, can go back and join a
terrorist group. There is no way.
Senator Burris. OK. Because at times you will see this has
happened in America where the various ethnic groups are here as
Americans, and they have gone back to their homeland
voluntarily sometimes to assist. So you said you know of no
Somali adults that have gone back to say that we now want to
try to defend our homeland or join the services. Is that what
you are saying?
Mr. Ahmed. Yes, even though some people justify going back
for fighting with Ethiopian troops. Let me give you example.
Last year, October 29, 2008, there were two explosions in
Somalia, and that area, it is a peace area; there is no
Ethiopian troops. So what are they justifying those who are
saying we want to go back and fight the Ethiopian troops? There
is no Ethiopian troops in Somalia there.
Senator Burris. Do you two gentlemen feel any danger as a
result of your coming here and testifying? You mentioned gangs
and----
Mr. Mukhtar. No, I personally--as a Somali community member
and a Somali-American, I have the responsibility, and we all
care about the safety of America. Let me be clear about that.
The Somali community is very peaceful, and we care about--and
that is why I decided to come for the sake of the American
country and the Somali-American community who have been
victimized because we have an issue of guilt by association,
not only the people that left, but in Minnesota and everywhere,
Somalis are being considered as homegrown terrorists. But that
is not who we are. There are people like us, there are people
like Osman, who are here to testify about this issue.
Senator Burris. That is admirable on your part. That is
what we do as Americans, and the Somalis have adopted this as
their country, and I see that you are saying that this is your
country now, and you are going to speak up for your country of
America. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Mukhtar. Not only me but the whole Somali community.
Senator Burris. Terrific.
Mr. Mukhtar. Yes, and that is why maybe this small number
of people that have different ideas, but the majority of the
Somali-Americans and the Muslim community is very safe, and
they consider this their homeland, and that is why some of them
are even in the army, to protect this country.
Senator Burris. And that is what we call America, and I am
so proud of the Somalis who are here and who have adopted this
country because I am a descendant not of Somalia but somewhere
out of Africa, which I do not even know where. And for you all
to come to the country voluntarily and adopt this country as
your own and to say you are going to make America even greater
and make your family greater, that is what it is all about. I
do not want to seem like I am lecturing to you, but you bring
tears to my eyes when I see you are committed in that fashion.
So you do not feel any danger, and you are seeking to try
to stop these young people from being recruited. Do you know
who is really doing the recruiting to get them over there? If
it is the managers of the mosque or somebody has been taking
them out, who is doing it?
Mr. Ahmed. First of all, I am comfortable coming here and
testifying even though I was getting big pressure from the
minority group who are leading some of the mosques. But I am
not really in danger at all.
The other question, which is who is recruiting, it is
definitely clear. These kids, they were American mainstream
kids. They did not come up with their own idea to go back to
Somalia and have a ticket. Definitely, there is a minority
group who are working, recruiting, financing. And I hope the
law enforcement agencies will bring them to justice soon.
Senator Burris. So you are saying that there are
investigations going on as to who----
Mr. Ahmed. That is what we believe, of course, yes.
Senator Burris. Thank you, gentlemen. No more questions,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Burris. First, I want
to say Senator Burris really was speaking for all of us. You
are an inspiration. Each one of us is from ethnic communities
that immigrated here, and I was raised in a family that said
that in America, you did not have to be like everybody else to
be a good American. Part of the strength of America was to be
yourself, that from that diversity--cultural, religious,
whatever--that you made America stronger. And the Somali-
American community is contributed to that.
Incidentally, may I say to the two of you that you are
setting a great role model for the young people coming up in
the community after you. I appreciate what you said about the
mosques, and just to clarify, from the Committee's point of
view, the problem here is not the mosques. The problem is that,
from what you have said, there may be some people--one or two
or however many--inside the mosque who are using the mosque to
recruit, essentially to take away some of your children. I
mean, obviously, one of the great things about America is the
First Amendment right to freedom of religion, and that is what
the mosques are all about. So we approach the mosques with
respect. If we have any concerns, it is about the people who
are operating within them.
First off, we have good reason to believe that there is law
enforcement work going on and that it is aimed at some of the
people who are causing this problem and who obviously are a
minority and do not reflect the interests or the opinions of
the Somali-American community.
But, generally speaking, tell us what the community is
doing to try to combat this--I will call it ``an evil
influence'' aimed at your children and what, if anything, local
or State government is doing to help you and what can anyone do
to help you bring your children to the right path.
Mr. Ahmed. The reality, it is not an easy task to find out
really those who are involved. But as a parents, we tried every
angle that we can get information and working with the law
enforcement agencies. We even contacted people back home in
Somalia to get some information. And still we are working to
the law enforcement agencies. We are trying to speak to
families that do not come forward and explain they are not in
danger and explain if they come forward and talk to the law
enforcement agencies and register their kids, in the future,
they may get protection from the American Government.
So it is not really an easy task, but we are trying to work
and knock on every door. And I hope one day we will succeed
that idea.
We did not get that much help from the authorities back
home in Minnesota, what I am talking, from mayor or other
officers.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Ahmed. We only have contact with the FBI and some of
the local law enforcement agencies. And I hope we will try to
go everywhere that you can get help.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, if there is a way we can help, I
hope you will let us know. It is a remarkable story because we
found that in previous hearings--you would not expect it, but
the agency of the Federal Government that has the most outreach
and, I would say, positive outreach to the Muslim-American
community--in this case, the Somali-American community--is the
FBI, surprisingly.
I want to ask you, Mr. Mukhtar, a final question. From the
work you are doing at the community center, what is your
judgment about the extent to which radical websites, Islamist
websites, extremist websites are having some effect on
children? Are the kids going to use them a lot?
Mr. Mukhtar. I mean, kids are tech savvy nowadays, and they
would rather use the Internet than listen to radio or watch TV.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mukhtar. So the only thing I would say is also in my
statement under the recommendations. But I would say is that
extreme--you should be able, this Committee, the FBI, or the
law enforcement should be able to control the Internet use.
Last year alone in America, 6,000 cyber predators have been
reported by families. So you can imagine that is the only
people that are reporting that they know they cannot report
this to the law enforcement.
My community, my parents, they do not speak English, so
there is no way they can report such things like that. They do
not know anything about computers. So it is very important that
we protect our kids from the Internet, whether it is the
Islamic extremists or other issues. But it is very important
that we do that.
Chairman Lieberman. Very good. Incidentally, this Committee
made some protests about YouTube--which is now owned by
Google--and they created a process where, when we and any of
you who want, you can do it through us, can identify a website,
they will check it. And if they believe it is encouraging
violence, they will take it down.
Mr. Mukhtar. It is not only YouTube, but it is also local
media. Each ethnic group has their own media that influence. So
you can also add to that. You can filter that, too.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a good point.
Dr. Menkhaus, thank you for being here. Your testimony was
very helpful. I want to clarify, because you have described a
changing picture on the ground in Somalia, with al-Shabaab
somewhat in--I would not say ``retreat,'' but waning somewhat
because of changes, and particularly because the Ethiopians are
not there anymore.
Is al-Shabaab effectively in control of some parts of
Somalia now still?
Mr. Menkhaus. Absolutely. It controls, again, all the
territory from the Kenyan border down to the outskirts of
Mogadishu. It has some strongholds inside Mogadishu as well.
There were fears that when the Ethiopians withdrew in December
that al-Shabaab might overrun the capital. That has not
happened. What we have seen is that there has been pushback, by
clan militias affiliated with this new emerging unity
government. And we suspect that is because Somali political,
social, and business leaders in the country understand full
well the severe consequences of an al-Shabaab takeover. They
were willing to see al-Shabaab used to fight the Ethiopians,
but are not interested in seeing them come into power.
It is going to take some time to deal with al-Shabaab.
There is a process of both negotiation, to co-opt some of the
members of al-Shabaab, and then marginalize the rest. But we do
have some reason to believe that they are not as strong as they
were and they are likely to get weaker.
Chairman Lieberman. So let me suggest this to you. As I
listened to you and think about what we heard, somewhat on the
first panel, but particularly from General Maples, the head of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, who coincidentally testified
for the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday. He testified
about all the trouble spots in the world, but this idea that
al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have been growing closer together and
there may well be an actual ``merger,'' insofar as that is an
accurate term--that is the term he used yesterday, I believe.
Having heard that from him yesterday and putting it in the
context of what you have told us today makes me wonder whether
this is essentially a marriage of convenience, not only
ideology, and to the extent that these both have jihadist or
revolutionary world elements in them, but that you have one
group, al-Shabaab, which is now in some difficulty in Somalia,
but still in control of part of the country. You have al-Qaeda
now perhaps looking for a foothold, a sanctuary somewhere. It
obviously does not have it anymore in Afghanistan, nor in Iraq.
They are coming under great pressure in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but still they are there. And
I wonder whether they are thinking that this may be, to the
great detriment to the people of Somalia, a kind of sanctuary
for them.
Mr. Menkhaus. I don't think that they will attempt to use
Somalia as a base and a major safe haven.
Chairman Lieberman. Interesting.
Mr. Menkhaus. They tried that earlier. In 1993-94, there
was an attempt by the East African al-Qaeda cell to penetrate
Somali-inhabited areas of the Eastern Horn, and it went badly
for them, actually. It turned out to be as non-permissive an
environment for them as it is for those of us who work in
relief agencies and embassies.
As for al-Qaeda, I think you are exactly right. This is a
marriage of convenience. This is a low-cost, high-yield region
of the world in which to cause mischief for the United States.
There are a lot of soft targets in places like Nairobi,
Ethiopia, and Djibouti, that we have to worry about because of
al-Qaeda's involvement there. But they have not demonstrated to
date a level of commitment to, for instance, making Somalia
into an equivalent part of Afghanistan or Pakistan. And I don't
think they would want to. I think that there are other roles
that Somalia can play for them--as a transshipment point, as a
temporary base for a handful of operatives--but not a major
base.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Menkhaus. For al-Shabaab, I think it makes sense that
they would be looking to al-Qaeda now because their strength
has always been their ability to project themselves as the
Somalis fighting the foreigners--the Ethiopians, the West,
whoever. And so for them, globalizing their struggle is really
the only currency that they have got left.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Menkhaus. For instance, I worry now, as their fortunes
decline inside Somalia, that they are going to be spending more
time fighting in Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, because
there they can portray it as the Somalis versus the Christian
highlander Ethiopian imperialists, etc.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, it frankly makes it all the more
heartbreaking said in that context, the story of these young
Somali-Americans, good kids, good students, religious, getting
swept up in this, ending up somewhere where they are basically
trapped, and they become pawns in a game much larger than
themselves, but in which their lives are either ruined or
endangered, unless we can somehow get them out. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today for deepening
our understanding and for your willingness to come forward, and
I am going to ask just one final question of each of you, and
that is, if you had one recommendation to Federal, State, or
local law enforcement how they could best work with the Somali-
American community to combat this terrible problem that is
robbing the community of some of its most promising young
people, what would that recommendation be? Professor, we will
start with you.
Mr. Menkhaus. I will go back to a recommendation that I
made at the conclusion of my written remarks, and that is, if
we can provide clarity to the Somali community as to what is
legal and what is illegal behavior, that would go a long way
toward helping them understand how they can be constructively
engaged in their home country and not risk crossing a line when
they do not know where the line is. Somalis used al-Barakat, a
remittance company, for years to remit money. And then in late
2001, we froze its assets and declared that it was an
organization that was linked to al-Qaeda. That was an example
of the problem: ``Who do I work with in terms of remitting
money?'' Al-Shabaab poses the same problem for them. There is
an enormous amount of confusion as to just what they can and
cannot do.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Ahmed.
Mr. Ahmed. All right. I think unless we involve the Somali
community, the law enforcement agencies alone cannot achieve
the goal. So what I would like to say is now we have a place to
start. We have the parents that will come forward, those whose
kids have been already exploited and are gone, recruited by a
minority group. So I would say if we empower the parents, those
who already have experiences, it is the truth that you can
reach the community and also to work with the law enforcement
agencies. Unless the community comes up and works with the law
enforcement agencies, only the law enforcement agencies cannot
reach these goals.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Mukhtar. I also made those recommendations in my
statement, but the first recommendation is the law enforcement
itself to work together, whether it is local, Federal, that
itself helps. And in terms of the Somali community, the Somali
community has the experts and the capacity to work with the law
enforcement and a Committee like you guys.
And, last, I will say Somali communities should be educated
about their rights and responsibilities. And what we really
need is a true partnership with a Committee like this and the
law enforcement.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. I
thank all of you for being here. I appreciate what you have
said. We extend our hand to you in the partnership that you
have suggested. We want you to keep in touch with our staff. We
will keep in touch with you.
Bottom line, there is a problem here, and it is a problem
that not only threatens American security, but it threatens
something more fundamental, which is the American dream, the
reality of the American dream for all the children who grow up
here, including, of course, Somali-American children or Muslim-
American children generally.
So this, as I say, is the most graphic and clear evidence
that we have had thus far of a systematic campaign of
recruitment of American youth, and in some ways, the most
promising of American youth, to leave the country to go fight a
war that really will bring them to no good, and potentially
could threaten us here at home as well, but certainly will
bring them to no good.
So we have learned a lot. We thank you for your courage. We
thank you for your testimony. In the normal course of what we
do here, we leave the Committee record open for 15 days if you
want to add anything to what you said. Some Members of the
Committee, either those who were here or those who were not
here, may ask you questions in writing. We will ask you to
respond to those. But I really thank you all for what you have
contributed to our effort to protect the security and the
freedom of the American people.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
EIGHT YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE
HOMELAND
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Pryor, Tester, Burris,
Kirk, Collins, and McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning to everyone.
Secretary Napolitano, if you can believe this, is stuck in
traffic. [Laughter.]
This is probably not a major threat to our homeland
security. She is totally plugged into all communication
networks. She will be here in a couple of minutes. But I
thought in the interest of time we will proceed and she will
understand.
Before I give my opening statement, I want to welcome to
this Committee the newest Member of the U.S. Senate, Senator
Paul Kirk of Massachusetts. I have had the privilege of knowing
Senator Kirk for a long time. He is an extraordinary, able,
honorable individual with a great skill set. Obviously, he
comes to the Senate for reasons that are sad for all of us,
most particularly for him because he was such a dear, long-time
friend, and confidant of Senator Ted Kennedy. But I do not
think anybody would be happier or prouder than Teddy to know
that Paul Kirk is here.
I just joked with him that Teddy is probably up there in
heaven sort of laughing and saying, ``OK, Kirk. Now let me see
what you can do in the Senate.'' [Laughter.]
So, Senator Kirk, it is a great honor to welcome you here
to this Committee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRK
Senator Kirk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
really my honor as well to be part of a body that is so
important to our democracy and which Senator Kennedy obviously
loved as an institution. And as you say, the circumstances of
my being here provide me with an incredible honor as part of my
own life, and I hope to be able to work closely with you and
Senator Collins.
I know this Committee enjoys a great record and has an
important mission as we look out for our security here at home
and protect our troops abroad. And if I can contribute in any
way to what we are doing here as an important body of the
Senate, I will be delighted.
So I thank you for your kind comments and look forward to
working with you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Kirk. I am sure you
will contribute substantially, and I am delighted that you have
chosen to be on this Committee.
Today's hearing, which is titled ``Eight Years After 9/11:
Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,'' was
scheduled and planned more than a month ago as part of our
Committee's responsibility to monitor the terrorist threat to
our homeland and to oversee our government's defense of us from
that threat.
In fact, for the last 3 years, our Committee, under Senator
Collins' leadership and then mine, has had a particular focus
on the threat of homegrown Islamist terrorism, that is, the
threat of attacks planned against America by people living in
our country, as opposed to the attackers of September 11, 2001,
who, obviously, came from outside.
Then, quickly, in the last 2 weeks, we have had arrests in
very serious cases of homegrown terrorism: Two lone wolves--
Michael Curtis Finton and Hosam Maher Smadi--and one more
ominous cell led by Najibullah Zazi.
These are certainly not the first such plots against our
country that have been broken since September 11, 2001. In
fact, we have been a Nation regularly under attack in this
unconventional war with terrorists. Just in the last few
months, going back to May, a group was arrested who were
quartered around Newburgh, New York, who had planned to launch
an attack against an Air National Guard base there, and then
was caught in the act, they thought, of planting a bomb at a
synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx.
In June, another homegrown terrorist, who, in fact, had
gone to Yemen for training, walked into a U.S. Army recruiting
station center in Little Rock, Arkansas, shot and killed an
Army recruiter, and wounded another.
And in July, there was an arrest of seven people in North
Carolina who were planning an attack on our base at Quantico.
So in a way that is dispersed and, therefore, I think often
not seen by the public, we have regularly been under attack
since September 11, 2001. But these three cases in the last
several days were significant and in some senses different and
bring a sense of real-time urgency to our hearing today.
Mr. Finton, who is the gentleman from Illinois, was about
to detonate a bomb against the Federal building in Springfield,
Illinois, and Mr. Smadi was in the process of what was thought
to be an attack with explosives against the Wells Fargo Motor
Bank in Dallas, Texas.
These three cases realize both our worst fears about
homegrown Islamist terrorist attacks against America and, I
add, our best hopes for our government's capacity to defend us
from them.
The Zazi case is the scenario that many of us have worried
about and watched out for: A legal permanent resident of
America, free, therefore, to travel in and out of our country,
going to Pakistan, connecting with al-Qaeda there, receiving
training and perhaps directions, and returning to America to
join with others here in an attack on New York City.
When Senator Collins and I were first briefed on the Zazi
case, we each had the same reaction, which was a sense of
gratitude that all the things that have been done by Congress,
the Bush and Obama Administrations, and hundreds of thousands
of U.S. Government employees since September 11, 2001, worked
in the Zazi case.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), and a lot of others, such as the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and many others,
worked smoothly with each other and, where relevant, with State
and local law enforcement to stop Zazi and his cell before they
could attack. Those working for us in the government brought a
wide range of resources--technical and human--brilliantly to
bear on this group of attackers and literally connected the
dots in a way that I do not think they would have been
connected before September 11, 2001, and in a way that led them
from New York to al-Qaeda in South Asia and then back to New
York.
The Finton and Smadi cases are less complicated but, from a
law enforcement point of view and in the contemplation of our
Committee that has been focused on homegrown terrorism, also
quite daunting because they involve individuals operating,
incidentally, outside of the major metropolitan areas that we
have assumed were the priority targets for terrorists, such as
New York, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, and Chicago--individuals
operating alone who we call ``lone wolves'' because they
apparently did act alone in these two cases and were,
therefore, less likely to turn up on the many technological and
human walls we have built since September 11, 2001, to protect
our homeland and our people.
And yet their lonely terrorist plots were discovered by the
people in the Federal Government working for us, and they were
stopped. So as we convene this hearing, I hope these three
cases will lead us to two conclusions.
The first is obvious, which is that, although we have won
significant victories over al-Qaeda around the world since they
attacked us on September 11, 2001, and we thereafter declared
war against them, al-Qaeda is still out there, and, in fact,
they are in here, and they maintain a patient and hateful
desire to attack the people of the United States as well as
every other segment of humanity that does not share their
fanatical and violent theology, ideology, and ambition for
conquests and suppression of freedom. This war, and its
attendant threats to our homeland, is not over and will not be
for a long time.
I think the second conclusion that we should take from
these recent cases is that we have together made enormous
progress in our ability to protect our people from terrorism.
For this, I particularly, this morning want to thank the three
leaders who are before us as witnesses and their organizations,
those who preceded them, and all those who work with them,
including the men and women of our intelligence community who
necessarily are unseen.
In this war, however, in which our enemy requires only a
small number of fanatics who do not care about their lives or,
obviously, the lives of others, we require enormous numbers of
people to defend our free and open country against those
terrorists, we are only as good as our ability to have stopped
the last terrorist plot against us.
Eternal and extensive vigilance is, in this war, truly the
price of our liberty. So the work of homeland security goes on
365 days a year, but this morning, I want to pause as we begin
this hearing to say thank you to Secretary Napolitano, Director
Mueller, and Director Leiter, and all who work with you for all
you do every day to protect the American people.
I look forward to your testimony and to hearing your
evaluation of the current state of the terrorist threat to our
country and what we are doing about it and ultimately what
Congress can do to help you do your jobs for us. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have given an
excellent overview of why we are here today. Let me start by
welcoming our new colleague to the Committee. This Committee
likes to have a minimum number of New Englanders on it.
[Laughter.]
And with the addition of Senator Kirk, we have finally met
the minimum allotment.
And I will now begin my formal remarks.
Deter, detect, disrupt, and defend--these four simple words
form the core of our Nation's mission to prevent terrorist
attacks.
Their simplicity, however, belies the complexity of the
challenge. They fail to capture the dedication and perseverance
that the men and women of our military, intelligence, law
enforcement, and homeland security agencies must demonstrate
constantly to stay ahead of the evolving terrorist threat.
Eight years removed from the attacks of September 11, 2001,
our Nation must remain vigilant against the Islamist terrorist
threat we face. Recent cases drive home the reality of this
threat. Four separate terrorist plots have been uncovered in
the past month alone.
The allegations against Mr. Zazi raise particular concerns
because his level of planning reportedly was quite
sophisticated. According to the FBI, Zazi received training in
an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan and had purchased bomb-making
components. In his car, a computer that the FBI recovered
contained images of handwritten notes that contained
instructions for manufacturing explosives.
Investigations in Springfield, Illinois, and Dallas, Texas,
have not only resulted in arrests, but may have prevented
horrific casualties.
Details of a new plot in an ongoing case also came to light
last week. Prosecutors filed a new indictment in the case
against Daniel Boyd and Hysen Sherifi, alleging that they
conspired to murder Marines at Quantico.
While these and other cases are cause for alarm, as the
Chairman has pointed out, recent successes demonstrate that our
vigilance, our strategies, and our hard work to date have paid
off. Authorities identified suspects who intended to commit
terrorist acts, they initiated sting operations, and they
prevented the attacks.
Our antiterrorism work must be relentless. It requires
effective coordination across the Federal Government and with
our State and local partners. As the Chairman has noted, these
recent successes demonstrate the considerable progress that we
have made since 2001. By creating the Department of Homeland
Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
and in some ways most important of all, the National
Counterterrorism Center, we have encouraged information sharing
and collaboration across the Federal Government to ensure that
the dots will indeed be connected. We have also strengthened
the relationship with our partners in State and local
governments. These successes represent significant strides in
what will be a long war against terrorism.
Despite these successes, however, some of these recent
domestic plots demonstrate that coordination among Federal
agencies and State and local law enforcement may have been
uneven.
For example, the perpetrator of the shootings that the
Chairman mentioned at a military recruiting center in Little
Rock was under investigation by the FBI. But it is less clear
whether State and local law enforcement, who responded to the
shooting, knew of this investigation.
We need to examine how we can build on the improved
information sharing with State and local officials, including
whether technology gaps hinder current efforts.
We must ask what further resources are necessary to allow
us to be better prepared to respond to threats. And we must
always remember that while our Nation has been hard at work
realigning our defenses and strengthening our response systems,
the terrorists have been busy, too.
Disturbingly, the perpetrators in these recent cases are
mostly homegrown terrorists. We must work to better understand
the path that leads to violent radicalization in this country
and increase our efforts to interrupt this deadly cycle. Our
intelligence and law enforcement officials must carefully
analyze how the next generation of terrorists is being funded,
trained, and supplied.
Outreach to communities affected by violent radicalization
will have to continue to be a priority. These outreach efforts
were evident when the Committee examined how more than 20 young
Somali-American men from Minneapolis were recruited to travel
to Somalia to join the militant Islamist group.
The FBI and State, and local law enforcement have engaged
in outreach to the Somali community in this country, and recent
events underscore the critical importance of such efforts. As
we meet, the FBI is investigating reports that a Somali-
American from Seattle carried out a suicide bombing in
Mogadishu just a few weeks ago. Last October, a Somali-American
from Minneapolis allegedly participated in a similar attack.
And, of course, the fear is that if these Americans are
traveling overseas for training, they may use this training to
come back and attack our homeland.
For this reason, we must strengthen our efforts to work
with community leaders to understand what factors caused these
young men to travel halfway around the world to participate in
terrorist attacks. Understanding is necessary to our hopes of
breaking the cycle of violent radicalization.
Mr. Chairman, I share your pride in what has been
accomplished. I had the same reaction that you did in the
briefing. The kind of coordination that we heard in the Zazi
case, the sharing of information, the connecting of the dots,
simply did not occur 8 years ago. But I am also concerned that
complacency, that our very success in thwarting these attacks,
could cause us to back off on the effort. The absence of large-
scale attacks in the United States and our success in thwarting
terrorist plots should not lull us into a false sense of
security.
We must not return to a pre-September 11, 2001, mentality.
I look forward to discussing these critical issues with our
witnesses today, and I thank you for your leadership.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for that statement.
Secretary Napolitano, good morning. Thanks for being here,
and we welcome your statement now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET A. NAPOLITANO,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, for this
opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security
and our actions to address these threats to our homeland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the
Appendix on page 144.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Senator Collins just said, the threat of terrorism is
always with us, but recent weeks have reminded us of the
importance of our continuing work--the New York plot, Colorado
plot, the Illinois plot, the Texas plot, by way of example. And
I would like to compliment not only my colleagues here, but
also the many men and women, in the Federal, State, and local
governments, who have been working tirelessly on these and
other efforts.
These episodes have shown that the threat of terrorism can
come from people in many different areas of the country with a
broad range of backgrounds. And within this threat environment,
the Department's role is to build up our overall national
capacity to counter any threat that may arise.
Security from terrorism is a shared responsibility, and DHS
is designed to strengthen our many layers of defense to address
terrorism, to participate in and support Federal law
enforcement action, but also to help build up the capacity of
State, local, and tribal governments, particularly through
information sharing. And, also, government cannot do it alone.
We must engage communities. We must engage our international
partners. We must have outreach as well as intelligence
gathering in these efforts.
Now, in terms of Federal law enforcement, the law
enforcement components engage in a number of aspects of
counterterrorism. These include the Secret Service, Immigration
and Customs enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and the Federal Air Marshals Service.
They are our boots on the ground in terms of securing the
aviation and marine sectors and also in terms of collecting
data that can be shared with our law enforcement partners.
We also are part of integrated Federal law enforcement
approaches. For example, we participate in the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTF) that are led by the FBI.
Now, in terms of strengthening State and local law
enforcement, we do this in a number of ways, but information
sharing is particularly important in bridging the gap between
the intelligence community here and law enforcement nationwide,
helping law enforcement make sense of what they may see on the
beat, and helping secure their communities against terrorist
threats.
We are in the process of realigning our own intelligence
and analysis function to focus on meeting the needs of State
and local partners and to strengthen our role in Fusion
Centers, where Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement can meet and share threat-related information.
We now have a Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office
to help coordinate those efforts. And instead of keeping all of
our intelligence and analysis function here in Washington, DC,
we have deployed 70 analysts already to Fusion Centers. And all
72 Fusion Centers will have access to the Homeland Security
Data Network by the end of fiscal year 2010.
We have just announced a partnership for select Fusion
Center personnel to access classified terrorism-related
information from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) program, and my goal
is for all Fusion Centers to be centers of analytic excellence,
focused on law enforcement needs throughout the country.
Now, in terms of working with communities and individuals,
as I mentioned, communities share a responsibility to ensure
that our country is not a place where violent extremism can
take root. We have now a Violent Extremism Working Group to
coordinate throughout the Department our actions on this issue,
and particularly through our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Section, we do important outreach work with communities such as
Arab-Americans, Somali-Americans, and Muslim leaders. Within
these communities, we are working to help preempt the
alienation that many believe is the necessary precursor to
violent extremism.
We have engagement teams now active in eight metropolitan
areas, and we also are working to help improve our cultural
awareness and competency throughout the Department.
Our Citizenship and Immigration Services Department is also
providing assistance to organizations that aid immigrants. This
is also part of increasing the capacity, the potential to
reduce the alienation that so often can lead to violent
extremism. And our Science and Technology Directorate is
conducting research on that violent radicalization and
informing partnerships with other countries in this regard.
Indeed, I have had meetings with my colleagues and many of our
European allies who have also suffered from this same
extremism.
So as you can see, our Department's actions are focused on
building up all of the Nation's rings of defense against any
terror threat that arises.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be
happy, of course, to answer any questions that you have. I have
a more complete statement that I ask be included in the record
of this hearing.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Secretary Napolitano. Your
statement and all the other witnesses' statements will be
included in the record in full.
I just want to note in passing my appreciation for what you
have done to strengthen and deepen the ties, the working
relationship between your Department, the Federal Government,
and State and local law enforcement. From September 11, 2001,
we have all felt that we had a resource out there, hundreds of
thousands of boots on the ground, if we brought them in and
worked with them. And I think through the Fusion Centers and
the deployment of your now 70 personnel from your intelligence
unit, you have taken some very significant steps forward in
that regard, so I thank you for that.
Director Mueller, before I call on you, it is very rare
that reading an indictment of someone makes me smile. But you
probably saw this part, but I just want to mention it for the
record. In the indictment of Mr. Finton, who is the individual,
the lone wolf, who was planning to blow up the bombs near the
Federal building in Springfield, Illinois, there are statements
recorded by him where he is telling his co-conspirator, who
turns out to be an undercover agent, all his anger toward
America and this bomb that he is going to set off will not be,
as he says, ``as big as those on 9/11, but will be up there
with 9/11.''
And then in Section 57 of the document, he says, ``Finton
said that he had wondered at first whether this was all a set-
up, but he knew it was not because law enforcement authorities
in America were not that smart.''
You had the last laugh on our behalf.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Director Mueller.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,\1\ DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Collins and Members of the Committee, for having
me here today. I am happy to be here with my colleagues Janet
Napolitano and Mike Leiter to discuss the current terrorist
threats to the homeland and our efforts to protect the United
States from future terrorist attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix
on page 158.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 8 years since September 11, 2001, have seen significant
changes at the Bureau. While we remain committed to the
criminal programs, including violent crimes, gangs, and white-
collar crime, we have shifted our priorities with national
security at the forefront of our mission. Today, the FBI is a
stronger organization combining greater capabilities with a
longstanding commitment to the security of the United States
while upholding the Constitution and protecting civil
liberties.
The nature of the terrorist threat facing the United States
has also changed in the last 8 years. We still face threats
from al-Qaeda and many of its affiliated groups and receive
credible reports that they remain committed to attacking the
United States and U.S. interests abroad. And while several
factors have combined to diminish al-Qaeda's core operational
capabilities, we and our partners continue to monitor, collect
intelligence, and investigate their reach into the United
States.
As both of you have pointed out, threats also come from
self-directed groups not part of al-Qaeda's formal structure
which have ties to terrorist organizations through money or
training. An example is the case that was in the news last week
where individuals in Denver and New York were plotting to
undertake an attack, and one of the individuals, as has been
pointed out in that indictment, apparently received training in
Pakistan and brought that skill set back to the United States.
Since 2001, we also face a challenge in dealing with
homegrown extremists in the United States. These individuals
are not formally part of a terrorist organization, but they
accept the ideology and wish to harm the United States. Often,
that ideology is a result of their interest in what they see on
the Internet.
While the intent and capability of homegrown extremists
varies widely, several FBI terrorism subjects with no known
nexus to overseas extremist networks or groups have taken steps
to move from violent rhetoric to action. An example already
pointed out is the May 2009 arrest of four individuals for
plotting to detonate explosive near a Jewish community center
and synagogue in New York. And as Senator Lieberman has pointed
out, they also planned to attack military planes at the Stewart
Air National Guard Base, also in New York.
And just last week, we arrested two individuals at various
stages of planning activities to do harm within the United
States, as you both pointed out, and a Dallas, Texas,
individual was charged with attempting to bomb an office tower.
A coordinated undercover law enforcement action thwarted this
effort and ensured that no one was harmed.
And, separately, a 29-year-old Illinois man targeting a
Federal building was charged after attempting to detonate a
vehicle bomb without knowing it contained inactive explosives.
These cases illustrate not only the threats but the
challenges presented by the self-radicalized homegrown
extremists. They lack formal ties to recognized groups, making
them particularly difficult to detect.
Our mission at the Bureau is not only to disrupt plots but
to dismantle networks so that they no longer pose a threat. And
targeted intelligence gathering takes time, requires patience,
precision, and dedication. It is a labor-intensive process that
often does not provide a complete picture quickly, but it is
the core of understanding the threats to the homeland, and it
is a picture that was put together not only by us but with our
Federal counterparts and without a doubt our State and local
counterparts as well.
Indeed, our partnerships are critical to protecting our
Nation and its citizens here at home through our Joint
Terrorism Task Forces and abroad with our legal attaches and
international partners. We share real-time intelligence to
fight terrorists and their supporters.
We use eGuardian, a threat-tracking system, for State,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies which provides a
central location for law enforcement suspicious activity
reporting in an unclassified environment. Our local community
outreach program, along with the DHS outreach program, enhances
our efforts. And working closely with DHS, whether it be
through the Fusion Centers, working closely with NCTC, and
working closely with other intelligence community partners, we
are engaging communities to address concerns and to develop
trust in the Federal law enforcement intelligence agencies and
our efforts to protect the homeland.
In closing, the Bureau has long recognized that it is a
national security service responsible not only for collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, but for taking
timely action to neutralize threats within the homeland to
prevent another terrorist attack.
In so doing, however, we also recognize that we must
properly balance civil liberties with public safety in our
efforts, and we will continually strive to do so.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
also look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Director Mueller.
Our final witness is Michael Leiter who is the Director of
the National Counterterrorism Center. This is probably the
least well known of the three organizations before us.
Everybody knows about the FBI. Most people today probably know
about the Department of Homeland Security. The National
Counterterrorism Center is less well known, but plays a
critically important role. It is a post-September 11, 2001,
creation recommended by the 9/11 Commission and created by
legislative enactment that I am proud to say came out of this
Committee. It is really the place ultimately where the dots are
connected.
Interestingly, just for the record and for those who are
here and listening and watching, NCTC reports to the Director
of National Intelligence in its intelligence analytical work
but, in its role as a strategic counterterrorist operational
planner, reports directly to the President of the United
States.
Mr. Leiter, thanks for your work, and we will welcome your
testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins,
and Members of the Committee. Thank you for those very kind
words about NCTC, and although I know that will do a great deal
to continue to bolster our already high morale, I will say none
of us are ready to pat ourselves on the back for a job done.
The job has, I think so far, been relatively well done with our
very close partners, Janet Napolitano and Bob Mueller. But
there is much work that remains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter appears in the Appendix on
page 165.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From our perspective, al-Qaeda is under more pressure today
and is facing more challenges and is more vulnerable than at
any time since September 11, 2001. But that being said, they
remain a robust enemy, and although I believe we have done much
to deter attacks and defend against attacks, attacks in the
United States remain quite possible. Most importantly, al-
Qaeda's safe haven in Pakistan is shrinking and becoming less
secure, complicating their ability to train and recruit people
and move them within Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda and its allies have suffered significant
leadership losses over the last 18 months, interrupting
training and plotting and potentially disrupting plots. But
again, despite that progress, al-Qaeda and its allies remain
intent on attacking U.S. interests at home and abroad.
We assess that the al-Qaeda core is actively engaged in
operational plotting and continues recruiting, training, and
transporting operatives to include individuals from Western
Europe and the United States.
Three years ago, the British, with U.S. help, disrupted a
plot in the late stages that could have killed thousands of
people flying across the Atlantic. Two years ago the United
States, working with the Germans, helped disrupt a plot that
was also near execution. And I think, as has already been made
clear by your statements and the statements of Director Mueller
and Secretary Napolitano, the case of Najibullah Zazi again
highlights the threat that we continue to face.
Now, beyond what I refer to as ``core al-Qaeda,'' the
group's affiliates continue to develop and evolve, and many of
these have now begun to pose an increased threat to the
homeland. The affiliates have proven capable of attacking
Western targets in their regions, and they aspire to expand
operations further.
In Yemen, we have witnessed the reemergence of al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula and the possibility that it will become a
base of operations for al-Qaeda.
In Somalia, as has been mentioned previously, the leaders
of the Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist group al-Shabaab
are working with a limited number of East Africa al-Qaeda
operatives. Al-Shabaab has obviously engaged in terrorist
attacks against Somali Government and its supporters, including
troops from the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). And
although al-Shabaab's rank-and-file fighters remain focused on
removing the current government of Somalia by pursuing al-
Qaeda's agenda, we are particularly concerned with training
programs run by al-Shabaab that have attracted violent
extremists from throughout the globe, including the United
States.
In North Africa, al-Qaeda has expanded its operational
presence beyond Algeria and has conducted more than a dozen
attacks against Western interests in the region.
And in Iraq, although we assessed that al-Qaeda's ability
to attack beyond its borders has been substantially diminished,
it continues to pose a force in the region. And although we
have focused on al-Qaeda today, I think it is worth noting that
in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, an al-Qaeda ally, continues to
pose a threat to a variety of interests in South Asia. The
group's attacks in Mumbai last year resulted in U.S. and
Western casualties, and the group continues to plan attacks in
India that could have major geopolitical consequences for the
U.S. fight against terrorism.
Again, as has been noted, here in the United States,
homegrown extremists have sought to strike within the homeland
since September 11, 2001, and although they have lacked the
necessary tradecraft and capability to effect significant
attacks, the recent events, again, point to the very real
danger that they pose.
It is this threat environment and the future threats that
we discern that, as the Chairman noted, NCTC seeks to counter
through our coordination responsibilities to the President. Our
responsibility to all elements of national power, including
diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland
security, and law enforcement activities, goes to that
responsibility to make sure that we have a synchronized effort
against all of these threats.
Now, there is a baseline strategy which covers four basic
areas: Protecting and defending the homeland, attacking
terrorist capabilities overseas, undermining the spread of
violent extremism, and preventing the acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
But rather than going through that plan, I would simply
like to briefly highlight a few of the more focused efforts
that we have undertaken, again, working with partners such as
DHS and the FBI, to ensure these efforts are synchronized.
In July 2007, at the White House's request, NCTC, with our
partners, created an interagency task force that looks at
current threats and ensures that current defensive measures,
domestically and overseas, are well synchronized. At the same
time, this interagency group, including members of DHS and the
FBI, looks at threats as they come into the center and
determines whether or not new elevated measures are required.
In response to last year's attack in Mumbai, again, working
with DHS and the FBI, NCTC formulated and facilitated exercises
for State and local officials to respond to evolving terrorist
tactics to ensure that they could, in fact, respond if a
similar event occurred in their locality.
On the front of combating violent extremism, we have
attempted to coordinate efforts both domestically and abroad.
In particular, in dealing with Somali-Americans, we have worked
closely with DHS and the FBI to help take best practices from
throughout the country and export those to other communities.
And, finally, near and dear to budgetary hearts, we work
closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
ensure that programs, current programs and future programs are
well aligned to these threats.
In conclusion, and as I had opened, although I think the
past months and years and the fantastic work of the FBI and DHS
show that we have indeed, made progress, many of these efforts
must continue and accelerate.
I do very much thank both you, Senator Collins and Chairman
Lieberman, who we know affectionately as ``the parents of
NCTC,'' for all you have done to enable some of the progress
that we have made.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Director Leiter. I appreciate
that very much. We will start the questioning and have 7-minute
rounds.
I want to ask a few questions coming off of the Zazi case.
I understand that there is a limit to how much you can say
about an ongoing investigation. Perhaps I should ask that
question first. Is the Zazi case, Director Mueller, an ongoing
investigation at this time?
Mr. Mueller. It is.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. And just to clarify, there has
been some discussion in the media as to whether there remains
an imminent threat related to the Zazi plot.
Mr. Mueller. We do not believe there is an imminent threat.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. And, Secretary Napolitano, I
think it would be interesting if you take a moment to just tell
us, to the extent you can, about the role or roles that various
components of the Department of Homeland Security played in the
investigation of the Zazi case.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, again, it is an ongoing
investigation, and my comments will be limited by that.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Napolitano. But different components of the
Department did play different roles.
For example, CBP and TSA, now because they are in the same
Department, are able to facilitate checking things like travel
records, immigration records, and the names that are developed
during the course of any investigation, and those names spill
out to us, and we are able to very quickly pursue those names
at that level.
One of the most important roles was to provide State and
local law enforcement, particularly through the Fusion Centers,
with contextual information about even an ongoing
investigation, and so I think we have now delivered or sent out
at least 11 different products related to the Zazi
investigation, to State and local law enforcement.
The whole goal, of course, is creating this web between
State, local, and Federal law enforcement, not just for this
investigation but for other matters involving any type of
terrorist activity.
So those give you some sense of the dimension of DHS's
involvement, and literally dozens of our employees were
involved.
Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Director Mueller, I have tremendous regard for the FBI and
the New York Police Department (NYPD). There were some news
media reports about some disagreements between the FBI and the
NYPD in the investigation of Zazi. I have had the occasion to
talk to both you and NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly about these,
and I wanted, to the extent you are comfortable, just to ask
you to respond briefly for the public record on that. How are
your relations with the New York Police Department?
Mr. Mueller. I believe our relations are exceptionally
good, as good as they have been in a long time. I do believe
the news media exaggerates issues that come up in any
investigation. We talk ourselves, through our New York office,
with NYPD. It is not just daily, but because we are embedded in
each other's shops, we are working closely together day in and
day out.
The New York Police Department has done a remarkable job in
understanding the domain and allocating resources to address
threats. And the relationship, I think, is as good as it has
ever been at this juncture, and the exchange of information
through the Joint Terrorism Task Force has been fulsome and
enabled us to take the steps that we have taken to disrupt this
latest threat.
Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate hearing that. As I said to
you when we talked about this, I had occasion to be with
Commissioner Ray Kelly of the New York Police Department. I
asked him the same question, and he gave exactly the same
answer. You are just two national treasures in terms of law
enforcement and counterterrorism, and I am reassured to hear
that you are working well together.
Following the investigation and arrest of Zazi, the FBI and
the Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin warning
transit systems and railroads to be on the lookout for
improvised explosive devices. That bulletin included
recommendations such as increasing random sweeps and patrols
for heightening security measures.
I wonder, Director Mueller and Secretary Napolitano, how
you at this moment today would assess the current threat to
transit agencies, either specifically in New York or more
generally around the country.
Mr. Mueller. I will speak with regard to the timing of this
bulletin going out and say that there was no direct threat
information in the course of this investigation as to a
particular threat, or to the transit systems, in general.
However, when you have an investigation and an activity
that has gone as far as this, I believed it important that we
identify vulnerabilities, and I will turn it over to the
Secretary to follow up on that.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Secretary Napolitano. That is right. Because we did not
have specifics about location, time, or target of any potential
attack, what we were doing was providing a situational
awareness, to use the Senator's term, on an area that we know
has been from other intelligence raised as a possibility for
attack. And so it is all about leaning forward. It is all about
thinking ahead. It is all about using the hundreds of thousands
of eyes and ears we have out there in law enforcement,
particularly in an environment such as this one where we did
not have specifics.
Mr. Mueller. Could I add one other thing, Senator?
Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
Mr. Mueller. And it goes to a certain extent, in the course
of the investigation, you identify certain explosives, and as
you identify those explosives and see how those explosives may
have been used in the past on a subway system, that raises a
red flag in terms of the possible use of the explosives that
were being developed in this particular case, which then
results in the generation of that warning.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Obviously, we have seen some
evidence of a trend which is of al-Qaeda, and perhaps other
international terrorist groups, attempting to recruit
Westerners or people who live in Western countries, not just
Zazi but the arrest and indictment 2 months ago of Bryant Neal
Vinas from Long Island who traveled to Pakistan also and
trained in an al-Qaeda camp and participated in an attack
against the U.S. military in Afghanistan before his capture.
I want to ask you, how concerned are you, any or all of the
three of you, with this dimension of the al-Qaeda threat? And
what, if anything, can we do to try to disrupt their use of
Westerners to carry out attacks?
Mr. Mueller. I think it fair to say that all of us are
concerned by it. For the last several years, we have picked up
intelligence that al-Qaeda has made a concerted effort to
recruit Europeans and Westerners, understanding that they can
fly under the radar in terms of passing through border
controls. And, on the other hand, the Internet, as I alluded
to, is also a recruiting tool that initiates persons not
contacted by anybody in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, but
radicalizes people to the point where they reach out to get the
training and fall into exactly what core al-Qaeda wants, which
is additional operatives.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I would say, over the past
several years, travel of Westerners, particularly U.S.
citizens, to either Pakistan or Somalia has been our single
biggest concern. They obviously bring with them an
understanding of our society which enables them to operate more
easily here. They obviously do not have to go through the
border controls that non-Westerners and non-U.S. citizens have
to go through. And, clearly, simply the ability to go and
travel provides them with a potential level of sophistication
of training that they might not otherwise be able to obtain. So
it is the issue at which we look closest.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leiter, let me start with you. Our Committee has
focused a great deal recently on the threat of a terrorist
group obtaining access to a biological agent that could be used
in an attack, and we have introduced a bill to tighten the
regulation of labs that may contain such pathogens as the Ebola
virus, smallpox, or anthrax.
The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction has projected
that it is more likely than not that somewhere in this world
within the next 5 years we will experience a biological attack.
What is your assessment of that threat?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think the threat is very real,
although, frankly, I am loathe to assign some sort of
percentage as to the likelihood.
I think with the spread of biological technology for good,
it can also be used for nefarious means, and the sophistication
of biological understanding is increasing exponentially across
the world. So I think some of the elements of your bill, in
fact, provide some very valuable measures to protect against
some of those risks domestically. I think now that the Director
of National Intelligence is providing some support with that
bill, some technical assistance, and I think that is quite
valuable.
We have yet to see a sophisticated effort beyond core al-
Qaeda on most of these biological weapons, and, happily, since
September 11, 2001, some of the work that has gone on in
Afghanistan and Pakistan we believe has disrupted some of their
most advanced efforts.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Director Mueller, in assessing the threat of homegrown
terrorists in this country, we have always taken comfort in our
tradition of integrating new populations--new immigrants--into
our broader population. And we have contrasted the American
experience with that in Western Europe, where immigrant groups
tend to be more isolated and not assimilated.
Two years ago, the NYPD testified before this Committee
that this longstanding tradition of absorbing the diaspora
population of other countries has protected the United States
and retarded the radicalization process at home.
Do we need to rethink that theory in light of what we have
seen in the Somali community in Minnesota and perhaps in
Seattle as well?
Mr. Mueller. I think much of what is said in terms of the
fact that we are a Nation of immigrants, we are a part of the
diaspora, puts us in a different place than, say, the United
Kingdom and some other countries where there are more insular
communities than you have in the United States.
That being said, we do have some communities--you pointed
out the Somali community that has been perhaps more insular
than some others--that warrant greater outreach, efforts at
assimilation, understanding, and education. But, for the most
part, I think we do stand somewhat differently than other
countries. But, again, we cannot be complacent, as you pointed
out at the outset.
I will also say that some 2 or 3 years ago--I think it was
2006--where in Canada they arrested approximately 15 or 16
individuals who were going to undertake an attack against the
parliament, and that plot was well along. And so the extent
that one thinks that it is individuals from insular communities
that can undertake such attacks, that is not altogether true,
believing that Canada is much like us, is a Nation of
immigrants with the same type of combination of immigrant
groups that generally seek to assimilate.
So that was a warning that you cannot be complacent and
rely on the fact that we have very few, I would say, groups
that are insulated.
Senator Collins. Some of the cases that we have referred to
this morning involve individuals who appear to have been
radicalized in prison, and the very first hearing that we did
to look at homegrown terrorism examined violent radicalization
within the prison communities.
What is the FBI doing to try to identify radicalized
prisoners and to prevent radicalization within prison?
Mr. Mueller. Well, we work very closely in the Federal
prison system to identify pockets of radicalization. The
Federal prison system has a fairly substantial intelligence
operation in the sense that it is not just radicalization but
gang violence and the like. And so utilizing those same
capabilities to identify gang members and potential places of
violence, we work with the Federal system, and then each of our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces has as one of its responsibilities
outreach to the State and local places of incarceration and to
develop liaison and to keep track and to alert and educate
those who are responsible for the State and local prison
systems to be alert to this possibility and to let us know when
there is that eventuality.
Senator Collins. Let me switch to a different issue. We
want to make sure that the FBI has the tools that it needs to
be effective. In 2007, however, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Inspector General (IG) revealed that there were problems in how
the FBI had used one of its intelligence-gathering tools, the
one known as National Security Letters (NSLs). And the IG found
that in some cases the FBI agents did not understand or follow
the required legal procedures when using the NSLs.
What steps have you taken to ensure that there is better
compliance? This is so important because, otherwise, Congress
is likely to act to restrict the use of what may be an
invaluable tool.
Mr. Mueller. As was pointed out in previous IG reports, we
did not have a management system in place to assure that we
were following the law or our own internal protocols--reports
that began, I believe, in 2006.
There is another class of NSL called an ``exigent letter''
that I will talk about in a second, but generally, in handling
NSLs, what we have done is put in a completely different
software package that leads agents through the process to
assure that all the i's are dotted and the t's are crossed.
Every one of our NSLs, as they are prepared in the field
offices, are reviewed by the division counsel. Most importantly
for us, we established a compliance department office. It would
have been something recommended by outside attorneys to
corporations that get into problems, but it was one that we
needed where we identify those vulnerabilities in other areas
and move to fix them before they are found by somebody else.
And so those are three of the steps we have taken.
There is still a report to come out which addresses the
issue of exigent letters. The statute allowed us back then--
still does--in an emergency to request from a communications
carrier specific information. We, at that time, had issued
those letters indicating that either a grand jury subpoena or
other paper would follow. It did not follow our protocol.
We have put an end to those letters as of 2006, but my
expectation is there is another report that will say that
particular individuals who are involved in this were not
following appropriate management procedures. I will tell you it
is my responsibility to put into place those procedures, and
those procedures have been put into place.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
In this Committee, we call Members in order of their
arrival without regard to seniority. By this calculus, Senator
Kirk would be next, but he has asked to go last among the
Senators. And I would simply say that this respect for
seniority will carry you far rapidly here in the Senate.
[Laughter.]
So we go to Senator Burris, then to Senator Tester, and
then to Senator Kirk.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I did have an opening statement. I would like
unanimous consent that it be submitted for the record and then
go into my questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Burris follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
Thank you Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins.
Violent extremism does not threaten one nation, one race, or one
religion--it threatens the entire world order. Combating this evolving
threat therefore requires close collaboration between all levels of
government, law enforcement agencies, and everyday citizens.
I am eager to learn more about the anti-terror efforts being made
at the highest level of government, but I am also looking forward to
hearing about the efforts being taken at the ground level. We must
continue to encourage our local governments and law enforcement
agencies to work with communities to address potential threats and
develop working relationships based on trust. After all, we are all
working toward the same goal, and that is to secure our communities and
make sure our homeland is safe.
Today's terrorists are not always easily identifiable and are
utilizing more innovative means to carry out their destructive
missions. This is no more evident than in the case of Michael Finton, a
man from my home State, who was recently arrested after trying to set
off explosives in a van outside a Federal courthouse in Springfield,
Illinois. The case of Mr. Finton, who exhibited the typical ``lone
offender'' characteristics, illustrates how far reaching the ideals of
al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations have spread.
It is my hope that we will be able to curb this type of activity in
our homeland. I look forward to learning more about our progress from
today's expert witnesses, and I will have a few questions.
Thank you.
Senator Burris. My question would be directed to Secretary
Napolitano initially in terms of your comment where you say
that we want all the communities to be vigilant and try to help
us identify some of this local domestic terrorism that is
coming up.
Madam Secretary, I just wonder, in terms of this young man
that the FBI just caught in my State capital trying to blow up
an Illinois Federal building, how do we reassure our
communities that you all are doing what you can to catch these
people and that fear does not set in that? It would cause just
total chaos, especially in smaller communities. We take care of
New York and we take care of Chicago. But I come from a small
town of 14,000 people, Centralia, Illinois, and if they had a
homegrown terrorist there, and they strike there, I think that
would send panic throughout the entire country.
So are we dealing with the first responders to train--how
are we handling this, Madam Secretary? Can you help me out?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Senator Burris, and the point
you make is so vital. We cannot limit our efforts to a few
urban areas, and so the Department's responsibilities extend
nationwide, urban and rural, throughout the country. And it is
the Fusion Centers where we collocate Federal, State, and local
law enforcement. It is training that includes officers from
departments large and small. It is exercises that cover both
urban scenarios, and also rural scenarios and scenarios where
you may have several events happen simultaneously, both in
urban and rural areas. And it is also communicating that our
security is a shared responsibility. No one Federal department
can do it, no matter how good it is; that we need State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners, and we need the citizenry to
be involved as well.
And when you do that, and when everybody recognizes it is a
shared responsibility and that training, preparation,
exercising, collocation, Fusion Centers, and all the rest are
all happening, then they can address this issue out of a sense
of preparation and not out of a sense of fear. And that is the
way the Department operates.
Senator Burris. Now, are we possibly having a resource
problem when it comes to this? Because I am just trying to
anticipate the magnitude that would be involved, and some
taxpayers may say, this is a waste of money, this is a waste of
time. But all it takes is one incident, one thing to happen.
Oklahoma City really woke us up, but now we almost had another
Oklahoma City in Springfield, Illinois, in my State capital.
And thank God, I do not know how all of it was coordinated, but
Mr. Mueller says that the FBI antiterrorist force was the one
that set this thing up. So--yes, go ahead.
Secretary Napolitano. I am sorry to interrupt. But,
Senator, yes, and Oklahoma City is such a powerful reference to
me because I was the U.S. Attorney in Arizona at the time, and
we were heavily involved in the investigation of Oklahoma City
since a lot of the planning was done in our State.
But to your point, it is really a sense of everybody
leaning forward and not being complacent and recognizing that
these events can happen anywhere in our country at any time;
that there are those who ascribe to al-Qaeda who are in our
country and have operational training, as Mr. Leiter just said;
but there are others as well.
And so every law enforcement department is vested in this
and invested in this. Our job is to make sure that those
investments are sound, efficient, and coordinated.
Senator Burris. Which follows up on the other question,
because we have to have so many agencies involved. Homeland
Security has to let the FBI know something, or we have to let
the local law enforcement officers know something. Is the
coordination really there? Or are there other barriers that you
all are running into that may seem to be and could be
challenged or that Congress can help out with in order to try
to clear the path with bureaucracy?
Secretary Napolitano. I will let my colleagues answer that
question as well, because coordination is an easy word to say.
It is a difficult thing to achieve.
Senator Burris. Absolutely.
Secretary Napolitano. But it is something that I think is
much better than it was prior to 1995, when the Oklahoma City
bombing happened; it is much better than it was prior to
September 11, 2001. And, indeed, things have happened even in
the last 8 or 9 months that I think have even improved
coordination. But it is something that we are always working
on.
Senator Burris. Director Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. If you look at the disruptions in the last 2
weeks--Denver, New York, Springfield, Illinois, Dallas, North
Carolina--every one of those cases was handled by the Joint
Terrorism Task Force which has a number of Federal agencies
represented and, most particularly and most importantly, in
every one of those communities it has State and local agencies
as participants in it.
Senator Burris. Can you say whether or not it was
originated with local or was it originated from the top?
Mr. Mueller. Some of the cases have been originated from
the local and then brought to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Senator Burris. OK.
Mr. Mueller. Others come from the community directly into
the Joint Terrorism Task Force. There are a number of ways we
get the cases.
But one point you did make in terms of resources is
important, and that is, with the budget woes that many
communities have now, and police departments, there is a
squeeze on in terms of manpower. We think it is tremendously
important that we continue to have the participation of State
and local law enforcement in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
but it is becoming increasingly more difficult for a police
chief to assign that officer.
Senator Burris. Some of them are cutting back. They are
laying off local law enforcement----
Mr. Mueller. Well, and if there is one thing that I do
think would be helpful, it is as monies are allocated from
Congress through the Department of Justice that would be
allocated to encourage State and local law enforcement to
participate in Federal task forces, despite the budget concerns
that the individual department might have.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, if I may on the coordination point.
Senator Burris. Yes.
Mr. Leiter. I think both the Secretary and Director Mueller
are exactly right, that the coordination over the past month or
2 months is markedly improved over just 3 years ago.
The second point I would make is in terms of sharing
information with State and local officials so they know what
they should be looking for, although the press just picked up
over the past 2 or 3 weeks some of the information that was
passed to State and local officials about some of the
improvised explosives that might be involved in current
threats, roughly those same products for State and local
officials were provided more than a year ago--not based on what
we are seeing here now today, but based on the integration of
foreign intelligence, seeing what terrorists were doing
overseas, taking those lessons learned, and providing them to
State and local officials here.
Senator Burris. That is terrific. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I see my time has expired. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Burris. It just
makes the point that we have talked about in this Committee--
and the Springfield case does--that when you are dealing with
lone wolves and homegrown terrorism, every part of America is
vulnerable. Naturally, we know that there is a higher
probability that great metropolitan centers like New York,
Washington, Los Angeles, and Chicago may be higher-priority
targets for the terrorists, but, here you go in these cases,
Springfield, Illinois, and Dallas, Texas. Now, Dallas, Texas,
is a big city, but it would not probably be on anybody's list
of the top 10 targets for terrorism.
So this speaks to the great importance of the national
coverage that the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Fusion
Centers and all the work that you are doing gives us.
Senator Tester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER
Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not mean to
disagree with your analysis of Senator Kirk's deference, but
being the most junior Senator not too long ago, my
recommendation would be if you get a chance to jump ahead, do
it. [Laughter.]
I want to thank Secretary Napolitano and Director Mueller
and Director Leiter for being here today. I was over at the
Veterans' Affairs Committee, and so I apologize for being late.
I very much appreciate the work you do in helping make this
country more secure and as secure as I think it possibly can
be. So thank you for that.
Madam Secretary, good to see you again. I want to get at
something you said in your written testimony. You stated that
DHS is reinvigorating collaboration with the State, local, and
tribal law enforcement. I think to be bluntly honest, I do not
know if we are where we need to be yet. At least in Montana, I
think that there is a ways to go.
There is no doubt that in many Northern border areas our
law enforcement up there are first responders because the
reality is the Border Patrol cannot be everywhere, even though
they try to be.
Last year, the sheriff of Toole County, which is right up
on the northern Canada border--right at the port of Sweet
Grass, in fact--told the Committee that on any given week
deputies from his agency assist Federal authorities in
apprehending port runners, border jumpers, and locating
undocumented foreign nationals. So the role of local law
enforcement is critical. I think you know that.
But that means that our local folks need to know what to
look for. They need to know about drug smuggling. They need to
know if the folks in Director Leiter's office issue an advisory
that relates to the Northern border. My understanding is that
that information is not well shared between CBP and local
communities.
There is a Fusion Center in Montana. Unfortunately, it is
200 miles away from the border in Helena, so it is difficult
for local law enforcement folks to go to a 1-hour meeting at a
Fusion Center when it is a 4 to 6-hour drive round trip, and
sometimes longer. If you lose an officer in some of these small
counties, like Phillips County, for an entire day, that takes a
chunk out of your law enforcement duties. The Operation
Stonegarden grants help alleviate equipment and overtime needs.
We like those. But how can we actually improve intelligence
sharing among local law enforcement areas when they are,
frankly, in my opinion, as much a part of border security, or
could be, as the Border Patrol itself?
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator, and I totally
agree with you that this is an evolving issue, and we do not
rest on where we are, but we continue to work.
Sparsely populated rural areas are some of the most
difficult to cover because of long distances. And you are
right. Sparsely populated areas typically have small economic
bases, they have small law enforcement departments. They do not
have a plethora of Federal agents there, so everybody has to
work together.
First, there is the increasing use of technology is going
to help us bridge these gaps. For example, a secure video
teleconferencing capacity so that people do not have to drive
to meetings is something that we are improving and enlarging.
Second, making sure that our own agents, as they are
deployed in these border areas, have their own training and
understanding this culture of sharing that we must have and are
having their own outreach to local law enforcement.
The third thing is to recognize--and I think it is good to
explain the difference between a JTTF and a Fusion Center. A
JTTF is really focused on terrorism and terrorism-related
investigations. Fusion Centers are almost everything else. And
some Fusion Centers are very good, very mature, others are not,
but the whole concept of a Fusion Center is still a relatively
new concept.
Our plan is over the next years to really work with those
Fusion Centers, concentrate funding on those Fusion Centers,
recognizing the differences between one that is in a rural area
and one that is in an urban area, and how it makes outreach to
small towns.
Senator Tester. Thank you for that. I want to get to port
modernization, which I am sure you knew we were going to talk
about.
Eight years ago in Montana, before September 11, 2001,
those ports were secured, in the most loosest term, by putting
down an orange cone. That was on September 10, 2001. Since that
time, we have got gates. We are somewhat better off. But those
have their holes also, as you well know.
A lot of folks, including myself, have been asking for port
modernization and how much that is going to cost. Frankly, we
are looking forward to the answers to those questions on how
that money is to be used by the CBP. And, quite frankly, we
still have questions on some of the legitimate oversight. You
know that. We still have questions that have to be answered.
On this border it is critically important. There have been
a lot of reports and there are a lot of folks up there that
know that we need to spend some money on these ports. They are
not doing a suitable job today under the threats we have--
asbestos-contaminated wells. At one of the ports, you probably
know, they detain the bad guys by locking them up in a
bathroom. It does not meet 21st Century threats.
So I guess the question is that we are in the middle of a
30-day reassessment of those dollars. I have been told that
those costs are going to come back lower than they were first
as in April. I just think that it is important that we spend
the money to match the threat. Let us just put it that way.
Spend the money to match the threat. I do not think a cookie-
cutter approach can be used at all. I think you have the people
in your office who can determine what that threat is and how to
deal with it.
I just want to know how that assessment is really changing
the CBP ports and what you anticipate will be coming out of
that 30-day assessment.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator. Yes, because
questions were raised, we put a 30-day assessment in there. And
to give the taxpayers confidence that these monies were not
being wasted, the press was characterizing these as $15 million
for five-car-a-day ports, and that was not a correct
characterization. These are not cookie-cutter ports, and they
do have threats that they have to match.
What I hope comes out of this is a fair and objective look
at the planning that has already been done and the contracts
that already have been let. If changes need to be made,
obviously, to the extent we can, we will make them. But I will
share with you, Senator, I have been through those northern
ports now with a fine pencil and feel very confident that this
review will overall show that these ports match the threats for
the areas for which they are designed.
Senator Tester. OK. Well, I look forward to those reports,
and hopefully we can get detail as far as how the money is to
be spent, what it is to be utilized for, and, quite frankly,
hope it will not be classified information and we know what
those threats are.
Just one last question, if I might, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
Senator Tester. And I apologize. When I first got here, the
input that we got, Director Mueller, was that the threats on
the Northern border dealt with drugs and terrorism, mainly. The
threats on the Southern border revolve around immigration. I
think when you look at Canada, where 90 percent of their
population lives within 100 miles of the border, and the fact
that you just talked about, I think 16 terrorists were going to
do some damage to their parliament, I guess the question I
have: Has that assessment changed at all over the last 3 years
or 2\1/2\ years as far as what the threats are and what we
really need to focus on as far as those two borders?
Mr. Mueller. In my mind, that threat has always been there,
and look back to when Ahmed Ressam, who came down from
Montreal, was caught on the border coming in to Washington on
his way to blow up the Los Angeles airport. And with the
breathing of new life into al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and some of
the communities not only in Europe but also represented in
Canada, and the experience before with Ressam, that means in my
mind that we have to be aware of the threats from the Northern
border. As people tend to concentrate on the Southern border,
we have to be equally aware of the threats on the Northern
border.
Senator Tester. Thank you, and I appreciate that. I have
always said that the border is only as strong as its weakest
link, and we need to make sure that we secure it in a way that
makes sense, not only to this country's national security but
also to the taxpayers of this country. So I appreciate that
very much. I appreciate you guys being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the flexibility.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Tester. Senator
Kirk, it is an honor to call on you for questions for the first
time.
Senator Kirk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
associate myself with other Members of the Committee who have
given well-deserved salutes to the panel here this morning for
all the work they have been doing improving this process of
vigilance going forward.
One of the questions that came up in the Zazi case, at
least as I understand it, there was some speculation about Zazi
and his associates having in mind densely populated, non-
governmental entities like fashion week or sports stadiums and
so forth--I was just wondering, as we head into the baseball
league championship series and the National Football League is
underway, is there some coordination, conversation with the
league officers or their individual franchises with hints of
difficulty; or even if there are not, that secure measures are
taken in those densely populated venues?
Mr. Mueller. Whenever we get information relating to a
possible threat to--it can be a State--collegiate football,
National Football League, or other venues, baseball--that is
passed on to the security directors of the various leagues, and
it is coordinated.
As I said, there is no imminent threat that we see at this
juncture, but, again, as I stated before, we do not want to
become complacent. But there is coordination with the league
offices when we do get a threat.
Senator Kirk. Thank you very much.
A question on the Fusion Centers. In the testimony there
are references to the densely populated urban areas, like
Boston, or State of Massachusetts offices and so forth and a
reference to sometimes the Federal judicial districts.
Is the Fusion Center just a coordination of those various
levels in sort of a task force? Or are we envisioning some sort
of a new regional office when we talk about Fusion Centers?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator Kirk, Fusion Centers take
many different appearances. The classic form of a Fusion Center
is a collocated Federal, State, local, tribal--or territorial,
if that is relevant--facility where not only do you have
officers collocated, but you have access to databases and you
have a certain number of State and locals who are cleared to
receive some types of classified information. Some Fusion
Centers meet that; others are, quite frankly, very small and
very isolated, and, as Senator Tester indicated, perhaps not as
able of receiving and getting the kind of information that we
need.
So as we now have decided--and this is a fairly recent
decision--that the Fusion Centers will be the focus and a major
portal through which we share information, particularly non-
terrorist-related information, now we will work through the
grant process and otherwise to make sure all of them reach a
certain basic standard.
Senator Kirk. Good. Thank you very much. The other question
that I had is in terms of the outreach to communities in
Boston. We have a significant Somali-American community, and
without getting into any information that should not be
disclosed--I understand it is sort of a proactive outreach. Is
it more to encourage the members of those communities to fully
understand their rights and responsibilities as American
citizens? Is it that kind of affirmative outreach? Or is it
basically intelligence gathering or a combination of the two?
Mr. Mueller. When we talk about outreach, we talk about our
special agents in charge. We have 56 of them around the
country. They are not co-extensive with the 93 judicial
districts, unfortunately--or fortunately. But there are 56
field offices, and each of our special agents in charge has a
mandate to educate, meet, learn about, become friends with the
members of the Muslim-American community, Arab-American
community, and Sikh-American community so that the communities
understand what we do and why we do it, and the efforts we
spend protecting civil liberties and civil rights.
We have a class that is a citizens academy in each of our
offices where we will bring members of the community for a
several-weeks course where one night a week we will explain
various aspects of the Bureau.
In the wake of learning about the travel of Somali youth to
Somalia to participate in the actions there, we would make a
specific concentrated outreach to that community through
specialists, and that is far different than developing sources.
This is an effort to educate, explain, and to have them
understand our concerns in a way that makes them a partner with
us in addressing the threat.
Mr. Leiter. And, Senator, if I may, I think it really is
worth noting, of the more than 100,000 Americans of Somali
descent here in the United States, we are talking about
literally minute percentages that have been drawn to the fight
in Somalia and al-Qaeda's messages--in the dozens at most, 20
or so. So I think it is particularly important. This outreach
is very much designed not to develop sources, but instead to
explain to them the rights of American citizens, ensure that
they understand the immigration system, and ensure that they
understand the dangers of their sons being associated with
groups like al-Shabaab and what can happen to them.
So it is really not meant to develop intelligence. It is
much more to ensure that they do not become a group like some
of the South Asian communities in the United Kingdom, isolated
from the larger U.S. society.
Senator Kirk. Thank you. Very helpful. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Kirk.
Senator Levin, welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome
to Senator Kirk. We are delighted to see him here, and we will
welcome him on the Armed Services Committee, more
appropriately, since I am Chairman there. I am sure our
Chairman here has already done the honors.
Senator Kirk. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin. Secretary Napolitano, first let me raise
questions with you about the Fusion Centers. You have already
testified about them. We have, I think, two of them now in
Michigan, and the question is the funding. And you have
indicated, I think in your last testimony, that we are going to
make sure that we reach a basic standard through the grant
process in terms of financial support for these centers. And
the problem is that the grant process does not guarantee a
steady stream of funding for the Fusion Centers because there
is a lot of competition for those grants.
And so there is a real stress on the Fusion Center that we
have. The one I am most familiar with is the Michigan
Intelligence Operations Center, which is Michigan's Fusion
Center. We have State, local, and Federal agencies all
represented there. But in terms of funding, there are some real
problems in terms of future funding.
How are you going to assure through a grant process that
Fusion Centers are going to be adequately funded given the
competition for dollars?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, obviously we cannot provide
a guarantee, but what we can do and are doing is steering the
dollars that we have discretion over in the grant process to
fund the things that we think should receive priority.
Now, with respect to Fusion Centers, let me put on my
former governor's hat for a moment. Of course, every budget is
under stress, and Michigan's is under more stress than perhaps
any other State. But they are a good deal from a law
enforcement expenditure perspective in terms of basically the
yield per officer, in terms of what you get particularly from a
prevention standpoint.
So we will have a very active outreach program with
governors and mayors, and part of that is making sure they know
what the Fusion Centers do and how they, really from a
budgetary standpoint, are a very good expenditure of the
limited dollars they have.
Senator Levin. I hope you will really take a look at that.
It should be a priority. Coordination is what has been so
lacking over the years. I know everyone is making an effort to
improve coordination, integration of information, and that is
where it is done in terms of these assessments at a State and
local level. So I hope that you will really pay some attention
to that issue.
On the operational side, where are operations coordinated?
And here I will look to Mr. Mueller on this. We have task
forces. Is that where operations are coordinated?
Mr. Mueller. Yes. We have now, I think, 106 Joint Terrorism
Task Forces. Represented on those task forces are the other
Federal agencies in that area and the State and local law
enforcement. Any threat information comes in, it is immediately
investigated. And so it is a combination of intelligence
gathering and then the immediate investigation to follow
whatever leads there are about a potential threat. And that is
where it is coordinated.
Senator Levin. All right. Now, looking at the information
side of this, is there one place where all information about
potential threats is centralized now? Can a law enforcement
person call one number and say, ``Hey, there is a guy here at
the border'' or ``We have just arrested somebody. What do we
have on him?'' Is there one place in this country with people
from Customs, the Treasury, the FBI, Homeland Security, State
police, and you name it, where all the information goes?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, I would say that my friend to the left
from the National Counterterrorism Center, who has access to
all of our databases----
Senator Levin. No, not access to. Is there one database
where somebody can make a phone call, a cop at a local level
calls up and says, ``Hey, we have got a guy''?
Mr. Leiter. The answer is yes, Senator. A cop at a local
level in Michigan or Connecticut or Maine or Massachusetts, a
consular official checking a visa in Islamabad, a Customs and
Border Protection agent, they type into their own computer and
they will get information about that person, whether or not
they are associated with terrorists. And if they have a
question, they are going to pick up the phone----
Senator Levin. And that information comes to the NCTC?
Mr. Leiter. That comes to the NCTC and is supported by the
Terrorist Screening Center of the FBI. So, yes, there is one
place that it all comes together at NCTC.
Senator Levin. OK. With one phone number, that person gets
all the information about that individual from all sources.
Mr. Leiter. Correct.
Senator Levin. Are there any missing pieces? Are there any
sources that are not inputting their information into that
single computer?
Mr. Mueller. There are no sources of information that the
U.S. Government holds about known or suspected terrorists that
are not there.
Senator Levin. Secretary, did you want to add something?
Secretary Napolitano. No. I would echo what Mr. Mueller
said.
Senator Levin. Now, going back to the Zazi case, I know,
Director, you have commented on this, saying that it was
overblown that there was any kind of disconnect between, I
guess, the local police in that case and the FBI. Is that
correct?
Mr. Mueller. I believe so.
Senator Levin. Putting aside whether it was overblown or
not, was there a problem?
Mr. Mueller. Well, in every investigation, and particularly
a fast-moving investigation, there are steps that are taken
that may or may not work out. This is no different than any
other investigation, and----
Senator Levin. Is there any procedural or structural
failure at all here?
Mr. Mueller. I do not believe that there is a procedural or
structural failure. There is one thing that happens in an
investigation--an investigation never goes the way you want it
to, and----
Senator Levin. I understand that, and I know you understand
it better than I will ever understand it. Is there something
that somebody should have done or not done?
Mr. Mueller. In retrospect, there will always be things
that you would do differently, but----
Senator Levin. Is there a lesson to be learned----
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. It does no good to----
Senator Levin. I understand.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Go and dissect----
Senator Levin. No. It does do good. We want to learn
lessons. I am just asking. I know things are overblown. That
does not mean there is nothing there.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Levin. Is there a lesson to be learned?
Mr. Mueller. On this one, I do not think so.
Senator Levin. Good. That is responsive to my question, and
that is all I needed to hear. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Levin.
If you can put up with it, we will do one more round, which
will be quick because there are fewer of us here.
Let me go back to the question of infiltration of
terrorists from abroad who come from the United States, and I
want to deal with the al-Shabaab case. This is the most unusual
case of the Somali-American community in Minneapolis and
elsewhere. We have had testimony here. Mr. Leiter, you are
right, this is a very small fraction of that community. In
fact, the community is feeling a combination of outrage, anger,
and fear that this has happened.
But this is an unusual case because they also seemed to be
recruited to be part of the conflict over in Somalia. But,
naturally, we are concerned that once they are there and
involved in a terrorist group--which al-Shabaab does have ties,
we had testimony here, to al-Qaeda and others--because they are
American citizens and they have legal status here, they will be
able to return to carry out attacks against us.
Do you share that concern, Director Mueller?
Mr. Mueller. Absolutely. And not just with those who travel
to Somalia but those who travel, say, to Yemen to maybe train,
those who travel to the western part of Pakistan, the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas. We had the example of an individual
by the name of Vinas from New York who was trained in the
camps, and----
Chairman Lieberman. In Pakistan?
Mr. Mueller. In Pakistan, but then participated in an
operation, as I think you or others pointed out, in
Afghanistan.
Chairman Lieberman. I mentioned it, right.
Mr. Mueller. And then returned to the United States--well,
actually was returned to the United States. But our concern
would be the same.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. So is there any evidence that
there is any intention by al-Shabaab to send these recruits
back to the United States for this purpose?
Mr. Mueller. I think at this juncture--I would defer to Mr.
Leiter on this, but I think that we have seen some information
that the leaders would like to undertake operations outside of
Somalia, but no hard information or evidence that has been
effectively pursued. And I would defer to him on whether he----
Chairman Lieberman. Do you want to add anything, Mr.
Leiter?
Mr. Leiter. I think Mr. Mueller is exactly right. There is
al-Shabaab, and the leadership of al-Shabaab is clearly
associated with al-Qaeda elements in Somalia.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Leiter. And it is those al-Qaeda elements that we fear
will push al-Shabaab members----
Chairman Lieberman. To send people back.
Mr. Leiter [continuing]. To change their focus.
Chairman Lieberman. And we are obviously watching that to
the best of our ability.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask a different kind of
question, Secretary Napolitano, related to the Zazi case. The
Homeland Security Advisory Council, as you well know, recently
completed its review of the color-coded threat level system,
and I guess I would ask you what your reaction to their
recommendations is or where you are in the process of deciding
what to do with that. But in regard to the Zazi case, I am
interested in knowing whether at any point you considered
raising the threat level in response to what we are learning
about the Zazi plot, even perhaps for a particular region or
sector--well, of course, once it became public, it was
essentially raising the threat level.
So I am interested in the extent to which the color-coded
system was in your mind as you were learning about this really
significant, and in some sense unprecedented since September
11, 2001, plot to attack the United States.
Secretary Napolitano. Two parts to your question. One is,
yes, I did appoint a task force to review the color-coded
system. It has been in place a number of years now, and it is
time to take a fresh look. They have given me their
recommendations. I am in the process of reviewing those. Then I
will submit those into the interagency process and ultimately
to the President. So that review is ongoing.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Secretary Napolitano. And that is where it is right now.
In terms of Zazi, we thought about it and rejected it,
because we did not have in the Zazi investigation any kind of a
specific location, time, threat that in our view would justify
actually raising the color code. So it was contemplated and
rejected, given the nature of the investigation and the nature
of the intelligence that we had.
Chairman Lieberman. OK. Good enough.
Let me ask a final series of questions about how some of
the people in these cases become radicalized, because
obviously, to the extent that we are able, if we could figure
that out, we try to stop it from happening or counteract it.
Am I right that in Zazi's case there is no evidence that he
was radicalized when he came here 10 years ago or that he was
sent here on a mission 10 years ago?
Mr. Mueller. I do not believe there is any evidence of
that.
Chairman Lieberman. So that he became radicalized here.
Mr. Mueller. Well, much of his family resides in Pakistan,
and he visited Pakistan, so I think it is----
Chairman Lieberman. Good point. So I guess I would say he
became radicalized after he came here in 1999, but it may well
not have happened here. It may have happened over there.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, I think that is fair to say.
Chairman Lieberman. So that may be a somewhat unique case
because he was traveling--we do not have any particular
information now, I gather, about whether he became radicalized
in a mosque, over the Internet, here, or wherever.
Mr. Mueller. Well, at this point, because of a continuing
investigation, I am hesitant to go into any more detail on it.
Chairman Lieberman. OK, understood. And in the case of
Finton in Illinois, as was discussed with Senator Collins,
there was a case where, to the best of our knowledge, we know
he converted in prison. Is there evidence yet that he was
radicalized in prison, or did that come later?
Mr. Mueller. I think, again, it is in the stages of
litigation, but I do believe that the conversion and
radicalization is principally attributable to that time that he
was in jail.
Chairman Lieberman. Incarcerated.
Mr. Mueller. But there were probably other factors
afterwards that continued to contribute to it.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Obviously, that raises exactly
the questions that you answered that Senator Collins raised
about what prison authorities should be doing to try to deter
that from happening.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. And in the case of Smadi in Texas, I
gather he is a Jordanian citizen who came here on a student
visa.
Mr. Mueller. I believe that he was in the United States on
a B2 temporary Visitor Visa.
Chairman Lieberman. And then he overstayed. Is that right?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, that is right. It expired in September
2007.
Chairman Lieberman. But do we have any knowledge of what
turned him into a bomber?
Mr. Mueller. I think with Finton and Smadi, as you say, the
Internet played somewhat of a role, particularly with the one
in Dallas.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. I know this is tough stuff, but
what kinds of lessons can we draw about what possibly we can do
to deter--I mean, we are talking about large communities here
in which there are a very small number of people who become
radicalized. How do we fight it? And do, for instance, the
engagement teams that you are sending out fight it.
Now, incidentally, as I told you the other day, Director
Mueller, we had a hearing here earlier in the year with leaders
of the Muslim American community, and I was interested and, I
will tell you, surprised to hear that the Federal agency that
they had the most extensive and, they thought, constructive
relations with was the FBI, which is a tribute to your special
agents around the country. But tell me about the engagement
teams and whether you think they are having any effect on
deterring the radicalization process.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, these are teams that
are sent out to have outreach in a way, as described by Senator
Kirk, to talk to people about America, the rights, the
liberties that people have here, the responsibilities that
people have here, get to know them, get them to know us.
One of the things we have learned from the United Kingdom,
for example, is that alienation is a factor or an element that
is present oftentimes when someone is in the process of
becoming radicalized. And so to the extent that we can engage
undercuts at least that feature of the radicalization process.
We are really working with some of our partners such as the
United Kingdom, who have had more experience with this kind of
domestic radicalization than we have, to see what other
practices that they have begun or started that we could
profitably employ here.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. Thank you. My time is up. Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have had a great deal of discussion this morning about
the importance of coordination and information sharing.
Obviously, a great deal of progress has been made, but there
are some areas that are still rough and not perfect, and,
Director Mueller, I want to ask you about one of those. The
Justice Department's Inspector General recently released a
report on the FBI's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
coordinator program, and the report found that even though the
WMD coordinators are supposed to serve as the Bureau's WMD
experts in the field, many of them were unable to even identify
the top WMD threats and had not received adequate training.
According to the report, there was little interaction between
the WMD coordinators and the intelligence analysts who compiled
the WMD assessments.
What is your reaction to the findings in that report and
the recommendations?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I think there are 13 recommendations, if
I am not mistaken, in that report, and we have followed up on
each of those recommendations.
It must be 2 or 3 years ago that we established with the
consent and approval of Congress a WMD Division and have stood
that up from scratch, pulling the personnel from a variety of
other divisions to focus on weapons of mass destruction. This
is in part as a result of the anthrax attacks in 2001.
And so it has some birthing pains as it grew, and what we
now have throughout the country in each of our 56 field
offices, I believe, is not only interested but educated and
have professional persons who can address these particular
issues.
Whenever there is--and we still get a ton of them--an
envelope with white powder, there is a response that brings in
not only our experts but experts from DHS and other experts to
find its way in response to that particular threat. Key to that
are our personnel on the ground, but also key to it is being
able to get back on a coordinated call with the experts in this
field to decide what you are going to do in each step.
So we have grown the division, the WMD Division. The
recommendations that the IG made we have followed up on, and I
think we still have a ways to go, but are doing much better in
terms of response to any threat in the WMD arena.
Mr. Leiter. And, Senator, if I may.
Senator Collins. Yes.
Mr. Leiter. Just to give you an anecdote of something that
would have been, I think, unheard of before September 11, 2001,
the FBI's WMD operational component at headquarters is actually
collocated with NCTC's WMD analysts, who are collocated with
the foreign operators and intelligence analysts who work on
WMD. So they are literally side by side sharing that
information.
Senator Collins. That is terrific to hear.
Mr. Leiter, you mentioned earlier the creation of the NCTC,
which I always thought was the most important part of the 2004
reforms in addition to the creation of the Director of National
Intelligence. And I really commend you and everyone who is
working there for bringing our concept to life in such an
effective way.
I do want to ask you, because there was so much controversy
at the time, how the authority to engage in strategic
operational planning is working. There is no doubt that the
other side of the shop, the sharing of information and having
the analysts sit side by side, is working very well. But are
you engaged in strategic operational planning?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, we are, but I would agree with you, it
is not nearly as advanced as the intelligence sharing that in
many ways was an evolutionary responsibility; whereas, the
strategic planning responsibilities are really revolutionary
since they cut across all departments and agencies and are a
direct report to the President.
What it requires, because of the way in which the law is
written, without a command authority--which I think is quite
appropriate--is a true partnership. And what I have seen over
the last 8 months with the change of the Administration is a
new set of eyes and new approaches from people who may have not
been as wedded to doing things the old way and an appreciation
that there must be slightly stronger synchronization of
activities across the worlds of law enforcement, homeland
security, but also diplomacy, military, and so on.
So the planning is going on at a high level strategically.
It is going on at a more granular level, as I said, in helping
to ensure that our outreach efforts both domestically and
overseas are speaking to the challenges we see in some of our
Somali population, and then all the way down to the budget
level to make sure those programs are well aligned.
Senator Collins. I hope that you will keep in close touch
with this Committee on that issue.
Let me just ask one final question of all of our panelists,
and it is a variation of the ``What keeps you up at night?''
question, which the Chairman is very fond of asking our
witnesses. But let me make it more precise.
What gaps in our knowledge or our capabilities concern you
the most? We will start with you, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you. I was going to say
what keeps me up at night is preparing for hearings.
[Laughter.]
But I think I want to go back to Senator Levin's question
about is there one number you call where you can get all
relevant information. Our ability to do that I still think is
in the developmental stage. I think that for any well-trained
law enforcement official, he knows several places to call which
will get him to the right answers. But in some instances there
may be classified information that cannot be shared. In some
instances the information may be spread among different
departments still.
So our ability to really not only collect information but
to fuse it is really part and parcel of where the Department is
moving so you have that direct connectivity with an officer on
the street.
Right now I think officers on the street or State police
officers may know to call the JTTF, they may call a Fusion
Center; they may call the Department of Homeland Security in
Washington, DC. They know to call somewhere, that somewhere
someone can get them to the right information. But the whole
business of fusing consolidation and making sure that we have
streamlined this as much as possible given that some
information will have to remain classified is, in my view,
still a work in progress.
Senator Collins. Mr. Mueller, gaps in capabilities or
knowledge?
Mr. Mueller. Well, my greatest concern still is the ability
of al-Qaeda to use western Pakistan and Afghanistan as a
sanctuary. To the extent that I worry, and do, about a weapon
of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist, it is that
orchestrated out of that sanctuary there will be the capability
of either developing or obtaining a weapon of mass destruction.
If you look at the most serious case we have had recently,
which is the Zazi case, it was training in Pakistan that gave
him the capability of undertaking the attack. And the ability
to obtain intelligence, to reduce the threat from that area is,
in my mind, absolutely key to protecting the homeland.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Leiter.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think what keeps me up at night, the
capability that is a challenge, is that in a country of more
than 300 million people, where the overwhelmingly vast majority
finds terrorism abhorrent, how do we as a team locate those
one, two, 10, or 20 who feel differently? And how do we do that
in a way that is not invasive of those other 300 million plus?
And how do we ensure that you as a Congress and those 300
million plus people have sufficient trust in our organizations
that we can do this with a level of secrecy so it is not played
out in the press but individuals like yourself and others in
the Congress and the public believe that we are not
inappropriately invading their privacy and their civil
liberties in a way that should not be done.
Ensuring that we can strike that right balance remains a
challenge, and I think even 8 years after September 11, 2001,
remains a very significant one.
Senator Collins. Thank you for that very thoughtful
response.
I think the issue of the lone wolf, the individual who has
been radicalized perhaps using the Internet, is so difficult
for us to deal with, and I commend all of your efforts and the
progress that you have made. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What is going to
keep me up tonight is a number of things, but one of them will
be the difference in the answers that I received to my question
from you, Secretary Napolitano, and you, Director Leiter, as to
whether or not there is a place where all information
concerning potential terrorists or people who might threaten us
is accumulated and can be given promptly to, immediately to
somebody who is in law enforcement who has arrested somebody.
We all know the story of what happened before September 11,
2001, where the CIA had information it would not share with the
FBI. I know we are way beyond that. I hope we are way beyond
that.
But talking about fusion, now there is some confusion
because----
Mr. Leiter. And if given an opportunity, I would be happy
to clarify.
Senator Levin. Yes, let me give you that opportunity.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I tried to phrase my answer quite
precisely, which is there is one place in the U.S. Government
where all information about known and suspected terrorists
comes, which is the National Counterterrorism Center, which is
subsequently shared with the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center.
So if any one of those screeners come across someone and they
have a question, they should know to call the Terrorist
Screening Center, and, in fact, that data will be held at NCTC,
and they will be able to provide information to that police
officer or consular official.
What I think Secretary Napolitano said, and which I would
agree with wholeheartedly, is really two challenges. One,
ensuring that the police officer on the beat understands that
system and knows to whom to turn, which is different from
asking whether or not there is a place within the U.S.
Government where all that information resides. It is reaching
that last tactical mile to ensure there is an understanding and
a streamlined way in which it can be done, and that police
officer or that port official understands that.
The second piece that I think is equally important,
Senator, is that my organization holds statutorily that
responsibility to hold information about known and suspected
terrorists. The U.S. Government, ranging from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to the Department of Homeland Security
and every other acronym that we have here in Washington, DC,
holds other data. What we do not hold is all of that data
together. Is there a piece of data out there at DHS or at the
IRS, for that matter, that might in some way be a bit of data
that relates to someone that we do not yet know is a terrorist?
Absolutely.
Senator Levin. Well, obviously, there is.
Mr. Leiter. And that is a challenge.
Senator Levin. I can see that, but as soon as it does
relate to an individual, presumably it is sent to your Fusion
Center.
Mr. Leiter. That is correct.
Senator Levin. I do not understand, then, your answer as to
how that answer is the same as Secretary Napolitano's answer,
which is that--we better get to Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Director Leiter and I spend a
lot of time together, so I think our answers are very
consistent.
Senator Levin. Good. Try your answer again. What is
missing?
Secretary Napolitano. What I am saying, Senator, is the
process of training and attuning all law enforcement, no matter
what level or where located, about where to call or where to go
is still ongoing and is one of the functions, I think, or one
of the great things that will happen when, as the Fusion Center
concept develops, whatever it is, you will have something right
there that everybody knows at least to call there.
But I will share with you that the hypothetical you raise,
someone at the border who comes in, those screeners are going
to know.
Senator Levin. I said the cop on the street. I said, Is
there a number he can call where all the information that is
known about a particular information has been centralized? That
was my question, and the answer I thought was yes coming from
Director Leiter, and I thought that you said we have got quite
a ways to go in that regard. I understand that maybe there are
some law enforcement officers out there who are not aware that
they could call that number. That is just a matter of educating
every----
Mr. Leiter. The beauty of the system, Senator, is it is
transparent to that cop on the street. When that cop----
Senator Levin. That was not my question, whether it is
transparent. My question is: Is it complete? Is all the
information that all the agencies have about individuals who
might constituent a threat to this country filtered or supposed
to be filtered into that one number? That was my question.
Mr. Leiter. All of the information about known and
suspected terrorists is held by the National Counterterrorism
Center.
Senator Levin. And it is supposed to all go there and all
the agencies know it.
Mr. Leiter. Correct.
Senator Levin. Maybe every police officer does not know to
call that number, but every agency--State, local, Federal--
knows all information about potential threats to the United
States is supposed to go to that central place.
Mr. Leiter. Correct.
Senator Levin. Now, is that true?
Secretary Napolitano. That is true. The National
Counterterrorism Center holds the raw data, and so a trained
police officer ought to know either to call there or to call
his local Fusion Center to get connectivity there.
Senator Levin. That is fine. That is what you said, too,
Director Leiter. He may not know to call there, but if he knows
to call there, it will all be there.
Mr. Leiter. Yes.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Senator Levin. OK. Well, I think I have a minute left, so
let me just ask a question about these demonstration projects.
Chairman Lieberman. A minute and a half.
Senator Levin. These international interoperable
demonstration projects, Secretary. I have forgotten how many,
like four or six we have funded. Do you know the status of
those cross-border projects between us and Canada and us and
Mexico? We have these demonstration projects which apparently
are somewhere in the works. Do you know what the status is of
that? And if not, would you give us that for the record?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, we will.
Senator Levin. And, also, if you would, Madam Secretary,
for the record--you indicated that there are some discretionary
funds that you could steer to the Fusion Centers, and if you
could for the record identify what those sources are.
Secretary Napolitano. I would be pleased to do so.\1\
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\1\ The information submitted for the record from Secretary
Napolitano in responses to questions from Senator Levin appears in the
Appendix on page 189.
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Senator Levin. Thank you all.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Levin.
Since Senator Collins asked a variation of my ``What keeps
you up at night?'' question, I want to exercise the prerogative
of the Chair and ask you a quick question, which is in terms of
what we can do to help you further.
Is there one thing that we can do that you need, either by
way of additional statutory authority or resources for a
particular program that we are not supporting now that would
assist you in the work of counterterrorism that you do? Mr.
Mueller.
Mr. Mueller. I will leap into the fray and say, yes, the
PATRIOT Act is going to be debated. I know it has been--those
provisions have been very essential to us, particularly the
first two which relate to the business records provision.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mueller. And, second, the roving wiretaps. And a third,
while it has not been used on lone wolf, it will be and is
important if we get the similar situation that we had with
Moussaoui in 2001. So I would urge the reenactment of those
provisions.
I also would make a point in terms of National Security
Letters. Our success and our information is in large part
attributable to the information we can gather not of
substantive conversations but of the telephone toll data that
we obtain by reason of National Security Letters. And so it is
really retaining these capabilities that is important.
The other point that I did make, tried to make, and that
is, in terms of continuing the vigilance and the participation
of State and local law enforcement on the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces in a time where their budgets are being hit, I would
encourage as Congress and the Administration allocate monies to
State and local law enforcement, that it is done as an
incentive to participate in that which is very important to the
national well-being but not so important when the police chief
is more concerned about violent crime on the streets.
Chairman Lieberman. Sure. That is very helpful. To me it is
very significant that your first answer was about the PATRIOT
Act reauthorization and then the National Security Letters. I
hope our colleagues will keep that in mind.
Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I would add to Director Mueller
that supporting funding that assists not just the JTTFs but the
Fusion Centers as well.
And then to build on something that was mentioned earlier,
we call it homeland security, but homeland security begins in
many instances abroad. And particularly what happens in
Pakistan and Afghanistan is a source for many of the threat
streams ultimately that we are expending resources on, there is
an impact here in the homeland.
So really commending that understanding, that homeland
security does not actually start at the borders of the United
States.
Chairman Lieberman. Well said. Mr. Leiter.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, two quick areas I would say.
First, continuing to enable the softer elements of national
power domestically and overseas, so we have the diplomatic
corps and the foreign aid, so you can get to these areas and
try to undermine the spread of violent extremism before it
occurs.
Second, more theoretical and less tangible, something you
cannot put into a law, but continue to urge, as you always do
on this Committee, to approach counterterrorism with a truly
bipartisan spirit. Really, the fact that Mr. Mueller and I
served in the Bush Administration and serve now today I believe
is testament to the fact that it matters not what party you
are. Certainly Zazi or any of these other fellows we have been
talking about would not have cared whether or not they were
Democrats or Republicans in charge. And what we do is in almost
every instance nonpartisan anyway.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a very important statement. A
perfect one to end on. We try our best to reflect that attitude
of national interest first on this Committee, and generally
speaking on these matters, I think that is reflected throughout
the Congress.
I thank you for the time you have given us. I come back to
my thanks to you at the beginning for the extraordinary
progress I think we have made in the 8 years since September
11, 2001, but we know that we have a patient and persistent and
fanatical enemy out there, and it is going to be a long time
before we can really declare victory here against this
particular enemy.
Senator Collins, would you like to say anything?
Senator Collins. Thank you. You said it well.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much.
The hearing record will be kept open for 15 days for
additional statements or questions. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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