

**NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLEMENTING A  
NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE WORKFORCE**

---

---

**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,  
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON  
HOMELAND SECURITY AND  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 30, 2009

Available via <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

51-023 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2010

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: [bookstore.gpo.gov](http://bookstore.gpo.gov) Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800  
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, *Chairman*

CARL LEVIN, Michigan  
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii  
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware  
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana  
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri  
JON TESTER, Montana  
RONALD W. BURRIS, Illinois  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine  
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma  
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona  
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio  
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada  
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, *Staff Director*  
BRANDON L. MILHORN, *Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel*  
TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, *Chief Clerk*

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL  
WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, *Chairman*

CARL LEVIN, Michigan  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana  
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio  
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina

LISA M. POWELL, *Chief Counsel and Acting Staff Director*  
JOEL C. SPANGENBERG, *Professional Staff Member*  
JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, *Minority Staff Director*  
BENJAMIN B. RHODESIDE, *Chief Clerk*

# CONTENTS

Opening statements:	Page
Senator Akaka .....	1
Senator Voinovich .....	3

## WITNESSES

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009

Nancy H. Kichak, Associate Director, Strategic Human Resources Policy Division, U.S. Office of Personnel Management .....	4
Major General William A. Navas, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), Executive Director, National Security Professional Development Integration Office .....	6
Ronald P. Sanders, Ph.D., Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital, and Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of the Director of National Intelligence .....	7
Hon. Bob Graham, Former Senator from the State of Florida, and Chairman, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism .....	21
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Guiding Coalition Member, Project on National Security Reform .....	23
James R. Thompson, Ph.D., Associate Professor, and Head, Department of Public Administration, University of Illinois-Chicago .....	25

## ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Graham, Hon. Bob:	
Testimony .....	21
Prepared statement .....	63
Kichak, Nancy H.:	
Testimony .....	4
Prepared statement .....	35
Navas, Major General William A., Jr.:	
Testimony .....	6
Prepared statement .....	38
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R.:	
Testimony .....	23
Prepared statement .....	73
Sanders, Ronald P., Ph.D.:	
Testimony .....	7
Prepared statement .....	48
Thompson, James R., Ph.D.:	
Testimony .....	25
Prepared statement .....	85

## APPENDIX

Article titled "Disease and Terror," submitted for the record by Mr. Graham ..	88
Questions and Responses for the Record from:	
Ms. Kichak with attachments .....	90
General Navas .....	104
Mr. Sanders .....	107
Mr. Graham .....	109
Mr. Pickering .....	112
Mr. Thompson .....	115



**NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM:  
IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL SECURITY  
SERVICE WORKFORCE**

---

**THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009**

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT  
MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,  
AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA**

Senator AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee to order.

I want to say aloha and welcome to our witnesses, and thank you so much for being here today. I should tell you that I was just notified that we expect to have a vote soon, so we will go as far as we can, and possibly there might be a short recess and we will continue. So, in the meantime, let me give my opening statement.

Today's hearing, "National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service Workforce," will examine the need to invest in strengthening the Federal civilian and national security workforce and proposals to do so.

Recruiting, retaining, and developing the next generation of national security employees is critically important both to our current operations and in light of the impending Federal retirement wave that we expect. Half of the Department of Defense civilians will be eligible to retire within the next few years. About 90 percent of senior executives governmentwide will be eligible to retire within 10 years. We must ensure that the Federal Government is able to attract the best and brightest national security workers. As these workers rise to more senior levels in government, we must also prepare them to work across agency lines in confronting the complex challenges that they will probably face. Such a rotation program should have a strong focus on training and mentoring participants so they get the most from their experiences.

There are several elements that I believe are critical to developing world-class national security employees, which I hope the witnesses will address today.

The first key element is rotational programs to improve government coordination and integration. A number of events this decade have demonstrated the need for greater coordination and integration. These include the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and the reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military already has a Joint Duty program which has fostered unified effort across military organizations. Likewise, developing a rotation program for civilians in national security positions can improve coordination and support a more unified effort across government.

I am a strong supporter of rotational programs. In 2006, my amendment to start a rotation program within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) became part of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. This program is supporting integration and coordination efforts within DHS, but we can benefit from an even broader, interagency focus on the national security workforce.

Two interagency rotation programs have been created in recent years. The Intelligence Community's Joint Duty Assignment Program was set in motion by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Today, joint duty rotational assignments and a leadership development program generally are required for IC employees to be eligible for promotion above the GS-15 level. The other rotation program is part of the National Security Professional Development Program created by an Executive Order in 2007. This program envisions the participation of a broad array of national security workers at a number of Federal agencies.

Another key element needed to better develop the national security workforce is a stronger student loan repayment program. Student loan repayments help the Federal Government to attract the best and brightest to government service and to encourage advanced education in relevant fields. The current Federal student loan repayment program has been underused, if you can imagine that, in part because agencies must balance funding loan repayments for its employees against other priorities. Current operations often are prioritized over investing in the long-term development of employees. However, recent trends show that agencies are beginning to understand the importance of this valuable recruitment and retention tool. We must make sure agencies prioritize investing in this workforce and that they have funds to do so.

Similarly, national security fellowships to support graduate students could help the Federal Government attract and develop national security leaders. Fellowships could be targeted to help fill critical national security skills gaps, for example, by focusing on graduate students pursuing studies in foreign languages, science, mathematics, engineering, and international fields. Fellowships could also be used to help current Federal employees obtain the skills needed to meet our national security requirements.

Finally, agencies should be required to improve their strategic workforce planning to ensure that they have the workforce needed to meet national security objectives.

In 2003, I introduced a bill that would have addressed all of these key elements to building a stronger national security workforce, the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act. Many of the proposals I have outlined were contained in that bill. I hope that today's hearing will provide additional information that will be useful in the introduction of a similar bill that builds upon the changes that have taken place since then.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as we explore how we can build a stronger, more integrated national security civilian workforce.

Now I would like to call on our Ranking Member, Senator Voinovich, for his opening statement.

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH**

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, reforming the Federal Government's human capital management has been one of my highest priorities as Chairman and now Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and I am thankful for the partnership the two of us have forged to tackle these issues which affect the Federal Government's most critical asset—its people. I suspect that there is not two ranking members or chairmen that have been at something as long as we have, and I am glad we have because, in order to get change, it takes a while.

In preparing for today, I was reminded of the March 2001 hearing I chaired on the national security implications of the human capital crisis. The panel of distinguished witnesses that day included former Defense Secretary Jim Schlesinger, a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded, "As it enters the 21st Century, the United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government. The maintenance of American power in the world depends on the quality of the U.S. Government personnel, civil and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet future challenges. It is the Commission's view that fixing the personnel problem is a precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs repair in the institutional edifice of the U.S. national security policy."

Eight years later, a great deal of action has been taken to improve the human capital management for our national security agencies, and we are daily building momentum for future reform. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we reasigned personnel, redistributed resources, and reorganized agencies in order to make the security of our homeland our top national priority. I am not sure that I would have done it the way we did, but that is the way we did it.

We created the Department of Homeland Security. Overall, the intelligence community implemented many recommendations from the 9/11 Commission. The dangers and opportunities of our international environment require us to renew our human capital efforts. Creating a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people depends on a highly skilled na-

tional security workforce held accountable for their individual performance.

The Bush Executive Order establishing the National Security Professional Development Program (NSPD) provides us with a road map for improving collaboration between our national security agencies through individual development, better enabling our government to carry out what I like to refer to as “smart power.”

I look forward to hearing the initial results of the National Security Professional Development Program from our witnesses. It is essential that Federal agencies have all the tools necessary to recruit, hire, train, and promote individuals with the right competencies.

The new Administration gives us the opportunity to find solutions that reinforce our commitment to the individual employee. I look forward to an engaging discussion with our witnesses as we consider whether additional workforce reform is necessary to meet our national security mission.

I thank the witnesses for being here.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Both of us welcome our first panel of witnesses to the Subcommittee today. They are:

Nancy Kichak, Associate Director for the Strategic Human Resources Policy Division at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management;

Major General William Navas, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), Executive Director of the National Security Professional Development Integration Office;

And Dr. Ronald P. Sanders, Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I ask each of you to stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Ms. KICHAK. I do.

General NAVAS. I do.

Mr. SANDERS. I do.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let it be noted in the record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

I want our witnesses to know that your full written statements will be placed in the record, and I would also like to remind you to keep your remarks brief, given the number of people testifying this afternoon.

Ms. Kichak, will you please proceed with your statement?

**TESTIMONY OF NANCY H. KICHAK,<sup>1</sup> ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,  
STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

Ms. KICHAK. Thank you. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich, I appreciate your invitation to be here today to discuss national security professional development. We must do everything we can to strengthen the government’s capacity to protect the

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Ms. Kichak appears in the Appendix on page 35.



American people. This includes continually looking at ways to improve the ability of the Federal agencies to work across organizational boundaries to protect our Nation and advance our national security interests. We, at the Office of Personnel Management, stand ready to do all we can to support this vital initiative.

The effort to promote national security professional development began in May 2007, with Executive Order 13434, which sought to “promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions,” in Executive Branch agencies so that these professionals would be equipped to carry out coordinated national security operations with their counterparts in other Federal agencies and in non-Federal organizations. It directed the creation of a National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals for achieving this objective.

Once the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals was issued, the Executive Steering Committee developed a NSPD Implementation Plan. Federal agencies, in turn, developed their own implementation plans based on the National Strategy and the Implementation Plan.

Executive Order 13434 charges the Director of OPM with leading the establishment of a national security professional development program that provides for interagency and intergovernmental assignments and includes professional development guidelines for career advancement. To facilitate that development, OPM issued a recommended technical qualification for selection into the Senior Executive Service positions that are designated as national security professional positions. The qualification is for demonstrated ability to lead interagency, intergovernmental activities, or comparable cross-organizational activities.

OPM held two forums on the recommended technical qualifications in December 2008 and January of this year. We cosponsored these sessions along with the NSPD Integration Office and shared with the agencies a template for implementing the new qualification and provided an opportunity for detailed discussion of implementation approaches and issues. Agencies were then required to develop their own policies for implementing the qualification where appropriate.

OPM also has a broad oversight role regarding human resources policy related to the implementation of the order. We recognize that the competencies that national security professionals need to have will vary for each mission area and organization. Therefore, the particular agencies that employ these individuals should, in large measure, determine the content of their training and program implementation. OPM is responsible for ensuring that training policies, as well as other human resources policies, comply with applicable laws and regulations, and that the NSPD effort is administered consistently within and across agencies. For example, we want to make sure that training opportunities do not result in pre-selection of job candidates.

OPM has supported national security professional development in other ways as well. For example, we continue to contribute to the development of web content for the NSPD website, and we participate in the National Security Education and Training Consortium. The Consortium is a network of Federal education and train-

ing organizations that support the development of national security professionals, including by making recommendations for training and educational courses that should be available.

We are prepared to provide ongoing policy support regarding the selection, training, and development of national security professionals and related matters. This issue is likely to remain one of critical importance to the Federal Government and the American public for a very long time.

Thank you again for inviting me, and I will be happy to answer any questions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Kichak. Now we will hear from General Navas.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.,<sup>1</sup> U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATION OFFICE**

General NAVAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing today to discuss the important issue of strengthening our Nation's national security workforce. I also want to take this opportunity to acknowledge Dr. Sanders' and Ms. Kichak's contributions to the National Security Professional Development Program as members of the Executive Steering Committee during the past year.

The National Security Professional Development Program (NSPD) was established in 2007 by Presidential Executive Order 13434 to promote and enhance the development of national security professionals in 17 Federal agencies. The program was designed to facilitate and integrate professional development education, training, and interagency experience opportunities for individuals who have national security responsibilities. Let me state at this time that the current Administration strongly supports the intent of this program and is considering its way ahead. Although I am prepared to discuss the history of the program, it would be premature for me to speculate on how this program will be configured or implemented in the near future. But please know that serious discussions have been ongoing, and once decisions are made, I will be more than happy to provide the Subcommittee with an update on the program.

Mr. Chairman, as this Subcommittee well appreciates, our Nation must be able to rely upon a national security workforce with the knowledge, training, and interagency experience to see the big picture, to connect the dots, to coordinate effectively, and to act decisively. We need to develop professionals who can operate across agency boundaries and understand how the combined efforts of multiple organizations are necessary to leverage all of the elements of national power and influence. That is precisely why the National Security Professional Development Program was established, and I am pleased to say that this effort is already underway, although there is much more to be done.

Executive Order 13434 of May 2007, signed by President George W. Bush, made it the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future profes-

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of General Navas appears in the Appendix on page 38.

sionals in national security positions across the Federal Government. A National Strategy expanding on the direction of the Executive Order was approved by President Bush in July 2007. An Executive Steering Committee, comprised of the Secretaries or Directors—or their designees—of 17 designated Federal agencies and departments provide oversight for program implementation. The Executive Steering Committee, which reports to both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council, is responsible for coordinating cross-agency integration and implementation of the program.

In September 2008, a program implementation plan was developed by the Executive Steering Committee and was approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Departments and agencies have developed their own implementation plans.

During the first year of program implementation, significant progress has been made, and this sets a good foundation upon which the program needs to build. In addition to the departments and agencies developing and executing their program implementation plans, there are many other important steps that have been taken which are highlighted in my written statement, and I would be glad to discuss them during the question-and-answer period.

Despite the challenges, I remain optimistic about the future of the program and our government's ability to lead the national effort to build the national workforce necessary to protect the Nation in the 21st Century. The current Administration is in strong agreement with the overall intent of the program and is developing a way ahead to build on past successes while charting new directions where necessary.

The Administration looks forward to working closely with you in a collaborative fashion to help build upon and improve this critical program for advancing the vital interests of our Nation.

I welcome any questions that the Subcommittee might have, thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. May I call now on Dr. Sanders.

**TESTIMONY OF RONALD P. SANDERS, PH.D.,<sup>1</sup> ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL, AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE**

Mr. SANDERS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify at today's hearing on creating a national security workforce, and I would also like to thank you and Senator Voinovich for your strong, sustained leadership in this area. It is my pleasure to update the Subcommittee on the implementation of the intelligence community's Civilian Joint Duty program, which may serve as a model for developing a national security workforce.

Per your letter of invitation, I will discuss the implementation of that program, including its associated challenges in the broader context of the National Security Professional Development Initia-

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Mr. Sanders appears in the Appendix on page 48.

tive, and offer some recommendations based on our experiences in that regard.

As you know, human capital policies are among the most powerful levers available to an institution intent on transforming its culture, and the IC is certainly no exception. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has led the design, development, and implementation of a number of ground-breaking strategic human capital initiatives with this particular end in mind. The Joint Duty program is one of these. It is essential to the community's transformation and the creation of a culture of collaboration that is critical to our national security.

Our program is mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). It authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the rotation of IC personnel amongst its agencies by making "joint"—that is, interagency—duty a condition of promotion to certain positions specified by the DNI. Indeed, Congress specifically said that the DNI was, to the extent practicable, "to duplicate joint [military] officer management policies established by . . . the Goldwater-Nichols . . . Act of 1986."

Goldwater-Nichols was arguably the most sweeping reform of our Nation's military since the National Security Act of 1947, and as the impetus for military jointness—it required a joint assignment as a prerequisite for flag rank—it serves as our philosophical, conceptual, and intellectual foundation.

Like Goldwater-Nichols and Executive Order 13434, our Civilian Joint Duty program is intended to ensure that as a minimum, the approximately 100,000 IC professionals, managers, and executives come to know firsthand, through one or more extended interagency rotational assignments, the entire intelligence enterprise to build and leverage the collaborative networks that will support its mission. Although joint duty assignments are strictly voluntary, we have issued IC-wide regulations that say that by October 1, 2010, some form of joint duty experience will be a prerequisite for promotion to almost all of the IC senior civilian positions. The cross-cutting challenges of today's IC demand nothing less.

Thus, we share the same goals as Executive Order 13434, and our program has given us a head start in achieving them. However, in so doing, we have had to grapple with a host of complex implementation and operational issues. Difficult enough in their own right, they have been made even more complicated by the complex interagency framework in which we operate. Professor Jim Thompson on your second panel calls this a "federated model." Thus, as a community of 17 agencies in six different Cabinet departments, we have had to collaboratively develop criteria for receiving joint duty credit; procedures for advertising, applying for, nominating, and selecting joint duty candidates; a process for granting waivers and claims; and policies governing how employees on joint duty assignments are to be fairly evaluated and considered for permanent promotion while away from their home agency. We have also had to establish procedural protections and oversight mechanisms to ensure that no one is discouraged or penalized from accepting a joint tour.

Now, 3 years since the first of these regulations was issued, our Civilian Joint Duty program continues to enjoy the strong support

of our senior leadership as well as the vast majority of our employees. We estimate that well over 3,000 employees are currently on some type of joint assignment, with another 3,000 plus having completed one over the last several years. Over 500 senior positions now require joint duty as a prerequisite, with several hundred more to be covered this fall. No waivers have been requested to date, and only about a dozen positions—civilian physicians—have been exempted from the requirement. However, we are still in our infancy, and the program remains fragile.

As we help pave the way for NSPD, I would offer some hard-won lessons learned over the last 3 years.

First, this requires strong, unequivocal senior leadership commitment. Senior agency leaders need to own the program. It cannot be seen as an HR program.

Second, any government-wide rotation program should be flexible. Given the diversity of missions and organizations in the Federal Government, one size cannot fit all.

Third, it is imperative that the detailed enabling policy and program infrastructure be addressed, including all of the myriad administrative details outlined in my written statement. Without those details, broad policy pronouncements will not go very far.

And, finally, those details must be built collaboratively, with all the stakeholders involved. Here again, Professor Thompson has documented the advantages as well as the challenges of such an approach.

The IC Civilian Joint Duty program remains one of the DNI's top priorities, and we are pleased to note that in September 2008, Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government recognized it with one of its coveted Innovations in American Government Awards. However, the Subcommittee should note that the program is but one part of a comprehensive 5-year human capital strategy that is intended to renew and replenish our workforce, integrating and transforming the IC's organizations and cultures to support our vital national security mission. That strategy also includes innovations in recruiting, including a proposed Intelligence Officer Training Corps based on a program originally sponsored by Senator Graham, who is also part of the second panel.

These will all ensure that we have a pipeline of capable, committed professionals to meet our mission critical needs. It also includes other human capital innovations that are detailed in Professor Thompson's report.

In conclusion, I would note that the success of the National Intelligence Strategy depends on our people. It requires nothing less than dedicated intelligence professionals who are "enterprise" in orientation, integrated and joint in action, able to lead and leverage collaborative networks that are the IC's connective tissue. Our Joint Duty program is a cornerstone of that effort.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I am going to call for a brief recess, and we will be right back. Senator Voinovich will probably call us back to order for questions. We are in recess.

[Recess.]

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. The Chairman asked me to reconvene the meeting and start the questions, and so here we go. Again, thank you for being here today.

This is a question to all of you, and it gets back to a question I first asked when I came to the Senate, and I sent out a letter to 12 agencies, and I asked them, "How much money are you spending on training?" And 11 came back and said they did not know. One came back and said, "We do know, but we will not tell you." In order to do the job that we want you to do, you have to have the people to get the job done. Do you have money earmarked for training in your respective budgets? And has it been adequate for you to do the job that we have asked you to do?

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, I will speak for the agencies and elements of the intelligence community. Since our inception 4 years ago, almost to this day, we have had three Directors of National Intelligence, and they are all on the same page that you are. They understand the importance of human capital. They have all invested heavily in human capital generally and in training. I cannot share budget numbers with you because as you know they are classified, but I can tell you that we invest millions and millions in language training. Director Blair has just committed substantial funds, in the millions of dollars, for our Joint Leadership Development program.

The intelligence community has been blessed with senior leaders that understand you have to invest for the long-term development of the workforce.

Senator VOINOVICH. General Navas.

General NAVAS. Senator, our office, as you are aware, is an office that does not control any funding or resources and basically promulgates policy and provides oversight on how the departments and agencies execute that policy.

Having said that, we need to have an analysis of the requirements—the training educational requirements. That is a function for the National Security Education and Training Consortium and its board of directors to advise the Executive Steering Committee.

Once those requirements are established for participating agencies to reprioritize their budgets and give a higher priority to the development of their national security professionals.

Senator VOINOVICH. Have you done that?

General NAVAS. No, sir, not at this time.

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Kichak, OPM has lots of things to do. Have you had the resources that you need to do the job we have asked you to do?

Ms. KICHAK. I think that I am going to answer that question not just for national security professional development, which is just now getting off the ground, at least as far as this initiative is concerned, but what we are seeing now in the HR community that we are working with that enough resources are not being devoted to the development of human resources staff in the offices, that we believe that training needs a lot more attention to develop the kind of folks that are needed to recruit and retain the next generation of Federal employees.

Senator VOINOVICH. Have you done an analysis of what it is that you think the agencies you are working with need in terms of re-

sources to do the job that you think that they need to do? And if you have, have you communicated it to OMB?

Ms. KICHAK. We have not put a dollar figure on that. We have done some analysis of the kind of training we think is lacking, and as you know, we have a new Director who is turning his attention to that. And so I would expect those conversations will happen in the future.

Senator VOINOVICH. Now, this is kind of a follow-up for you, General Navas. Your testimony discusses the development of additional training programs for agency leaders, and given the current size of the workforce, short-term stimulus hiring needs, retirement projections, and resource constraints, will our national security leaders be able to access this training? Do we need to increase the number of national security personnel to build a training float, as recommended by several witnesses on our second panel? It is the same thing we have in the State Department today. They need additional people so that they can move people off the job they are doing for training, and at the same time have enough to fulfill the other responsibilities that they have.

General NAVAS. Yes, Senator. The issue of the float is a valid one, and if you look at the experience in the military, one of the reasons that the joint duty assignment and the joint professional military education has been successful is that the armed services have that float. They call it different, but it is about a 10-percent element that they have to send individuals to school, to assignments outside their parent organization and still not jeopardize their ability to execute their functions.

We are not at that level of flexibility in our civilian workforce, and at some point a combination of interagency exchanges, and an opportunity to provide additional slots to the agencies to be able to send some of their people to these assignments. In the case of some of the smaller agencies, you may need to have a combination of the space and also the dollars to be able to execute that. In the smaller agencies the funding becomes critical.

That is one of the issues that has been discussed in the Executive Steering Committee as a way forward. Initially, we were concentrating on the senior executive level, SES National Security Professionals. We have been able to leverage some of the existing courses there. For example, the Army has been conducting a program for their senior executive development, and they have been very gracious in providing additional slots that we offer to the member agencies at no cost except for the travel, per diem, and the individual's salary. These are short courses that have been conducted, and the individuals that have participated have found very valuable.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. How often do you talk with OPM about it? I just said does OPM think they have the resources to get the job done you are supposed to do. Ms. Kichak said she does not think that resources are there that people have been able to do it. Have you been discussing that? Because your job is to make sure this thing gets done, isn't it?

General NAVAS. Yes, sir. And like I mentioned, Ms. Kichak is a member of the Executive Steering Committee. She has been participating with us, with the other representatives of the 17 agen-

cies, one of which is Dr. Sanders here as the representative of the ODNI.

The issue is establishing those requirements, which have not yet been established. Once the requirements are established, then the agencies and departments need to prioritize their existing funds. That is an internal function of the Secretaries and Department heads to do as they submit their budgets.

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, if I may, you missed my eloquent statement, but we have about 6,000 people who have already completed or who are on interagency joint duty assignments in the intelligence community as we speak. We have found that our large agencies have enough inherent float in just the dynamics of their workforce that they have not needed to budget for additional positions. But for the smaller agencies, we have created a bank of positions, and DEA and others have used them to support joint duty assignments because they are literally too small to be able to absorb the loss of a person going off on interagency assignment. They use that bank to be able to backfill.

So we have been able to blend the large agencies who can absorb it with the small ones who cannot to make the system work.

Senator VOINOVICH. So your observation should be that Dr. Sanders is doing the job he is supposed to do?

Ms. KICHAK. Well, my observation was for HR professionals throughout the Federal Government, not specifically national security professional development. We have been looking at the stand-up of this program and the rotational assignment, and we see much of what is here is a very robust training program, not that there does not need to be supplemental training, but I was not speaking just to the national security professional development. And, yes, I would observe that what ODNI is doing is robust training.

Senator VOINOVICH. General Navas, the National Security Professional Development Plan was due September 2008. The December 2008 report indicates the plan was still in progress. When is the plan going to be finished?

General NAVAS. Sir, the Implementation Plan was published and approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security and for Homeland Security, and it is being implemented. Subsequent to that, the agencies developed their implementation plans. This is a living document that will probably be revised and adjusted, but we have a plan in place. The agencies are executing to that plan. The plan calls for identifying who are the national security professionals in each of these 17 agencies.

We have identified about 14,000 national security professionals within the 17 agencies, GS-13 and above, of which 1,200 of them are SES's. The numbers for the intelligence community are classified and are not included within this group.

The second requirement that we had for the plan was that the identified national security professionals would take two online courses. Those who had a national response framework or a domestic function would take the FEMA online course on the National Response Framework. Then we conducted a series, in conjunction with FEMA and Homeland Security, of orientation, lessons learned and best practices sessions, using the model of Hurricane Katrina



as the training vehicle. Admiral Thad Allen came and spoke to us. Christine Wormuth from the CSIS presented her paper on “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” and then we had several sessions from which the participants developed a set of keys to success to dealing with in interagency cooperation.

Subsequently, with the help of the Naval Postgraduate School, we developed a similar module for those nontraditional national security agencies on the basics of national security, the Organization for National Security, the roles and functions of the different departments, etc.

Senator VOINOVICH. This is all online?

General NAVAS. Online, through a national security professional development web portal.

Senator VOINOVICH. How long has that been in being? And have you measured its effectiveness?

General NAVAS. Sir, the initial NRF was placed in the Web portal around June of last year. The agencies have reported their individuals taking the course. The other module was put online around September of last year. The agencies are monitoring that.

One of the issues—and it could be a measure of effectiveness—was the response that we have had to the forest fires and the response that we have had to the catastrophe of the bridges in the Twin Cities showed some improvement in the interagency coordination.

We stood up the Web portal, as Ms. Kichak said. This is an initiative that is being funded through OPM and OMB through existing programs. And we have continued developing the requirements for orientation and training.

Senator VOINOVICH. Has there been any kind of effort made to inquire from the people that are taking the training about whether or not they think it is any good and whether they feel it is good for their professional development? Is it relevant stuff, or is it something they are just looking at and saying, “I have got to do this because they told me we have to do it” and, “Who needs this?”

General NAVAS. We did a survey of the participants after the four sessions. We had some very good returns. Both modules also have a feedback function. It is tracked internally by the agencies. We have a master task list and a self-assessment scorecard that is produced and reported to our office on a quarterly basis by the agencies on how they are tracking the implementation tasks.

Now, one of the issues raised by Dr. Sanders is the concept that “one size does not fit all.” Not all agencies are the same, not all have the same missions. So it is more of facilitating and assisting the agencies. Ultimately the responsibility of developing their national security professionals rests with the individual departments and agencies.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I just think it is a good idea to get the folks that are there, particularly if it is kind of a same plan for a lot of them, to have them come back and sit down and share with you whether or not they think the training they are receiving is relevant to the job that they are doing.

Do you get that kind of feedback at all from your people, Dr. Sanders?

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, I will go one step further. In my view, this is one of the things that is essential to making a broader program work. We actually incorporate these interagency leadership skills in our employees' appraisals. So the training is a means to an end. Our workforce needs to be equipped and to perform better in an interagency context.

In the IC, we have defined the entire intelligence community, not just pieces and parts but the whole IC, as requiring those interagency competencies. So we have built it into our employee appraisals. We have built it into our senior officer appraisals.

Senator VOINOVICH. So the thing is they have to take the courses as part of their performance evaluation.

Mr. SANDERS. The courses, the assignments, and then they have to actually demonstrate the behaviors on the job. That is the bottom line.

Senator VOINOVICH. And from your point of view, the fact that they have had the training, that they are growing in their job, and you see the results of that training and the performance of the functions you have asked them to undertake.

Mr. SANDERS. Well, again, if you will permit me, I will broaden the response. We have seen far more collaborative interagency cooperation and teamwork in the intelligence community since the advent of the IC Joint Duty program. I think our senior leadership gets it. Our newer employees—we have more than 50 percent of the IC with 5 years or less of service—get this. And our most recent employee climate survey results say that now upwards of 84 percent of our workforce understands that these kinds of skills are essential to our mission.

And so training is an important part of it. In my view, the most important part is this interagency assignment where you go walk a mile in another agency's shoes. But it is the combination of all those things as well as being evaluated on it that will really make something like this work.

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Kichak, General Navas, the Executive Order charged the Director of OPM with leading the establishment of this program, and I think all of us know that the person that headed it up was Clay Johnson. And just for the record, do you agree that the M in OMB should be the person that should be the orchestra leader and the quarterback on it? And does that person have enough time to do the work that is necessary here to provide that leadership?

Ms. KICHAK. I cannot assess whether that is the appropriate person to chair the organization or not. I would say two things.

Because this is a national security professional development effort, I think that the leadership does have to have a role in national security because the training has to be and the development of employees has to be focused on national security. And I think OPM needs to have a strong role in it because these are, after all, employees and they need the oversight that OPM can give on these issues.

Senator VOINOVICH. So you think the way it has worked is appropriate?

Ms. KICHAK. Well, of course, that is all under discussion, as Secretary Navas said, but I think that the folks at the Homeland Se-

curity Council and the National Security Council have a valid interest in making sure the leadership reflects their oversight.

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Akaka is back. One of the things you talked about in your testimony is that the program has not been administered consistently within and across agencies. And what I would like to know would be what agencies could use additional guidance and oversight. And it gets back to what I asked you before, doing an inventory of whether they have got the resources to do the job.

Ms. KICHAK. We think that each agency, because of their varying missions, needs to administer the training differently. The training for each mission could be different. We do not have any agencies identified who have not done a good job based on their mission. We only want to recognize that each agency has differing needs in this, and they need to have the flexibility to pick the training and administer the training appropriate for their employees and their mission.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I would sure like to—how many of the agencies that were out there would have a national security dimension in them. You say 17 agencies.

Ms. KICHAK. Seventeen.

Senator VOINOVICH. Dr. Sanders has got a little cluster there, and that—not a little. It is a pretty big cluster, and real important. But the fact is that you have got a thread that runs through all of them, and it is, I think, a little easier to move and expedite some of these things as contrasted to different agencies, as you point out, that have different roles. So the challenge there, it seems to me, is a lot more formidable maybe in Dr. Sanders' area. And it sure would be comforting to me to have a real analysis of that, of where they are, and try and see if we cannot up the priority that is being given to this.

Ms. KICHAK. Well, when we had the training sessions for all of the agencies on how to develop some of their job descriptions to take account of the technical qualification, all agencies participated, and I believe all agencies did their implementation plan. We were there. We worked with all of them. It is just that some agencies have a handful of folks working on this, where in other agencies, this is a much bigger part of their mission.

Senator VOINOVICH. They are different agencies, but the fact of the matter is to get into dotting the I's and crossing the T's. Another suggestion—and maybe you have done it already—has Dr. Sanders or any of his people ever been asked to look at what is going on in some of these agencies and perhaps evaluate them and suggest how they might be helped, and maybe you might even have some resources that you could make available to them or tell them where to go?

Mr. SANDERS. I have viewed that as our role in the Executive Steering Committee. We have been at this 3 years, and we have been through the struggles, and we have been able to share a lot of lessons learned with Secretary Navas and Ms. Kichak and the rest of the members of the Executive Steering Committee.

The notion of creating or requiring some sort of interagency assignment as a requisite for SES promotion, OPM and Secretary Navas' office sponsored a workshop, and my staff was instrumental

in putting that together because, again, we had established that requirement a couple of years ago and were familiar with how it could be phased in.

Senator VOINOVICH. So the fact of the matter is that you are pitching in and trying to help them because you——

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK, good.

General NAVAS. Sir, if I may, what we are trying to do is a transformational process—to create a culture of collaboration among these national security professionals to cut across the vertical stovepipes and to be able to operate as a national security professional across these agencies.

The idea is to have an understanding through the training and education of what that means and then having the experience of having participated in the interagency. That should be the ultimate goal.

Now, we have 17 agencies at various levels, very mature, the Foreign Service Corps in the State Department, the intelligence community since the inception of the office of the ODNI; Department of Defense in the military side first, but still making great progress in the civilian; Department of Homeland Security. They have come together, 22 agencies. They have a robust internal system.

The other nontraditional, if I could use that term, agencies like Department of Commerce, Department of Interior, they are taking baby steps. What is encouraging is that they all banded together, and they produced a common Implementation Plan that they share. So they are mentoring each other. The larger agencies are also doing that.

So I think that this is a program that we need to build from the bottom up, because at the end of the day our goal is to have this culture of national security, writ large. You can see what is happening today with the pandemic flu. It involves immigration, diplomacy, health, border. I mean, it is the whole of government.

So that is what we are striving for. But this is not easy. We have a national security system vintage 1947 that operates like a regulated steel mill. And today our enemies act like franchises, so we need to be flexible enough to operate in that environment.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. Senator Akaka, I have had almost 20 minutes, so it is all yours. [Laughter.]

Senator AKAKA [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Ms. Kichak, as you know, in 2003 I introduced the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act. Among other provisions, that bill included an enhanced student loan repayment program with a specified funding stream. The existing student loan repayment program, although growing in use by agencies, is still hindered by agency budget limitations. The current economic crisis may increase the demand for the student loan repayment program while decreasing agencies' flexibility to provide program funding.

What is OPM doing to ensure that agencies are providing adequate funding for this program?

Ms. KICHAK. What we are doing on student loan repayment is, unfortunately, we are not helping them with their funding, but we

are helping them with the administration of their programs. We are reporting on the use of student loan repayment and its effectiveness. We are continuing to educate agencies on the use of it.

Senator AKAKA. Well, as you probably know, in 2007, over 6,000 employees participated in that program, and the future seems to indicate that we need to expand this program as much as we can.

Dr. Sanders, the IBM Center for the Business of Government Report identified a concern by some agencies that those who serve in joint duty assignments might be disadvantaged with respect to promotions upon their return. What steps has the IC taken to overcome this concern?

Mr. SANDERS. We have taken three steps. First, as I said earlier, we have built these interagency competencies into employee and senior officer appraisals, and we also evaluate our senior executives on how well they are promoting the program.

When an employee is on joint duty, in the past they were evaluated by their home agency, even though they had left. That disadvantaged many, so one of the major rule changes we instituted was that for the last 3 years now, as an employee is off on an interagency assignment, the gaining agency does the evaluation. That is where they are contributing. That is who evaluates them. That is who gives them their performance bonus.

Permanent promotions remain with the home agency, but we have set up a very rigorous oversight mechanism. We collect quarterly statistics to enforce a policy that says employees who are or have been on joint duty must be promoted at rates comparable to their peers. Again, a lesson learned from the military. So every quarter, we look at promotion rates, how many people with joint duty have been promoted, how many without, how many total vacancies have been filled, and we are doing a pretty good job of maintaining that parity.

The third requirement, of course, is that we are phasing in the mandatory prerequisite for joint duty to be promoted to senior executive rank. So that is the ultimate acid test here.

We already have several hundred positions covered. Come October 1, 2010, virtually all of the senior positions in the IC—and by the way, we have five different senior services in the IC: The regular SES, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, two senior services in the Department of Defense, and the FBI–DEA SES. But all of those agencies and all those agency heads have said we are going to come together on this requirement and make this a mandatory prerequisite.

Senator AKAKA. Well, I am glad to hear that the move is in that direction.

General Navas and Ms. Kichak, the Project on National Security Reform recommends the creation of a National Security Fellowship Program to recruit and train highly qualified individuals for national security service in areas such as science, technology, language, and culture.

Do you agree that a National Security Fellowship Program, as described by PNSR, would be an effective recruitment and retention tool?

General NAVAS. Sir, we have been working together with PNSR and particularly with their Human Capital Working Group, and I

would say that the way our Executive Order and our strategy as established today would be compatible with such a program, and in the future I hope that would still be the same case.

Ms. KICHAK. Yes, I believe that such a program would be a good tool to recruit people with difficult-to-find skills, certain languages, etc. So I concur.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

General Navas, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget issued the NSPD Implementation Scorecard in December 2008. The Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture had a number of tasks that had not yet been completed.

What mechanisms are in place to ensure that these departments complete those tasks?

General NAVAS. Sir, as we mentioned earlier, the departments and agencies are responsible for the implementation. The Executive Steering Committee, and assisted by the Integration Office, provides guidance and support. We monitor that and assist the agencies, and we had a system, the scorecard has a green-amber-red, where amber was a task not completed by the time that the implementation plan specified, but there was a reason for it, and there was a time to be completed where it did not affect the overall program. In those very few instances where there was a red was that not completing the task by the time expected would have an adverse impact, and those were very few, and most of them have been resolved.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that.

Dr. Sanders, in your testimony you mentioned that, as part of their annual inventory of all senior IC positions, each agency involved may exempt senior positions from the joint duty requirement. According to policy, this may happen in narrowly focused areas of the IC.

How are you ensuring that agency use of this exemption is as narrow as intended?

Mr. SANDERS. The approval of exemptions, as well as the approval of waivers in individual promotion actions, resides exclusively with the Director of National Intelligence or, for DOD agencies, his Director of Defense Intelligence, Under Secretary Clapper. So only two people in the intelligence community can approve those exemptions.

And I might add that, to our agencies' great credit, while we anticipated a fair amount of requested exemptions, for example, for some of our very highly technical positions, senior crypt analysts and the like, our agencies only asked for a dozen exemptions out of a couple of thousand senior positions, and those exemptions involved highly specialized medical professionals and physicians. So less than one-hundredth of 1 percent of the IC senior position population has been exempted.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Kichak, it is important that we recruit and retain employees to support our national security efforts, of course. Has OPM or the Chief Human Capital Officers Council performed a skills gap analysis focused on the national security workforce? If so, what were the results?

Ms. KICHAK. We have not performed a skills gap analysis specifically for that community. We have been working with that community for certain hiring flexibilities for certain occupations that they have identified, but we have not, nor do I think we would be permitted to because of some of the security issues, been able to do an assessment of employees needed for the mission of some of the security agencies.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Sanders, the IBM report observed that IC professionals in one element may not have the specialized skills needed to succeed in another element. This may be a challenge for the IC in its rotation program.

What have you done to enhance training and mentoring to mitigate skill gaps that may emerge in the rotation programs?

Mr. SANDERS. We have done a number of things, but let me just recommend one that has, I think, really been key to our success to date.

There are lots of mechanical things you can do to measure skill gaps and close them, build them into your training budgets. We do all of those things. But when Ambassador Negroonte, the first Director of National Intelligence, issued the first regulations creating the program, he also commissioned our agencies' Deputy Directors as a Leadership Development Council, and he gave them the power to oversee all of this. They are the ones that actually run the agencies. They are the chief operating officers of our agencies. And as I said in my testimony, to me the single most important element of success is that this be owned by senior leaders. They are the ones that set the requirements. They are the ones that are going to invest in the future. If it is seen as an HR program, its chances of success are diminished.

That is why I think it is important that OPM and OMB maintain the partnership that they have within NSPD—OPM to help with the policy piece of it, but ultimately it is OMB and bodies like the President's Management Council that will make NSPD a success, just as our Leadership Council of Agency Deputy Directors has been key to our success in the intelligence community.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Sanders, you testified that 3,000 IC employees currently serve on some type of joint duty assignment, and that is encouraging to know. However, you state that application rates for joint opportunities posted on the ODNI website remain low.

Why do you believe this is? And are you doing anything to address that?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, we are. We are doing two things.

First, with respect to joint duty postings—and these are individual positions that are filled ad hoc—we have expanded our website. We are about ready to unveil an unclassified version of it because the website we have now is only on our high side, our classified system, and the agencies of the IC that do not have access have found it difficult to see the vacancies and the postings.

But, actually, I think a more powerful too in this regard is what we are loosely referring to as “joint manning documents.” The National Counterterrorism Center, for example, when it was stood up, literally said it was intended to be a joint organization, the IC's version of a combatant command in DOD. And they went to the individual agencies and said, CIA, you owe us X number of intel-

ligence analysts, FBI, you owe us Y number of intelligence analysts; build that into your staffing plans so that year in and year out you furnish your best and brightest to us on rotation—not filling the individual jobs ad hoc but filling them through a regular rotation built into the agency staffing plans.

We have found that to be very successful and, in fact, that is emerging as the principal way of filling joint opportunities rather than through ad hoc individual postings. So that is one of our lessons learned, again, that we have passed on to OPM and OMB.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

General Navas, you state in your testimony that the criteria for identifying and designating a position as a national security professional position is set at the department and agency level. How well does this work? Do agencies have any reason to underreport their national security professional positions?

General NAVAS. Sir, as we mentioned, the determination of the mission of the different departments and agencies is an evolving issue. It is very clear in the traditional national security agencies, like the Department of Defense, Department of State, the intelligence community. The other agencies sometimes struggle with defining and visualizing what their role is in the national security environment, and then determining who are the individuals that would be performing these functions.

The Executive Order established a broad enough definition that the agencies used; that the report we got was that in the 17 agencies we have at the GS-13 and above level about 14,000 national security professionals.

Now, this is a number that is continuously revised as agencies better define their mission. As we progress and start conducting exercises, training and education, and developing scenarios (for example, Project Horizon) that should inform the agencies, and thus get a much more granular picture of who are the national security professionals are. Right now the 14,000 that I mentioned; if we could just get them to this training, education, and professional development opportunities—that would be a major, significant, progress towards our goal.

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much for your responses. It will be helpful to this Subcommittee, and I want to thank you for being here today and wish you well in your future work. We have so much more to do, but we are going to have to work together to do it.

I want to welcome the second panel. It is good to have you here with the Subcommittee.

Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism.

Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, Guiding Coalition Member of the Project on National Security Reform.

And Dr. James R. Thompson, Associate Professor and Head, Department of Public Administration at the University of Illinois-Chicago.

Welcome to all of you, and as you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I would ask all of you to please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the



testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. GRAHAM. I do.

Ambassador PICKERING. I do.

Mr. THOMPSON. I do.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let it be noted for the record that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

I just want the witnesses to know that your full written statements will be placed in the record, and I would also like to remind you that your remarks should be brief given the number of people that we have as witnesses.

So, Senator Graham, it is good to have you, and will you please begin with your statement?

**TESTIMONY OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,<sup>1</sup> FORMER SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM**

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich. It is an honor to be back on this side of the table. [Laughter.]

You have indicated that our full statement will be entered into the record, so I would like to summarize my comments around four points.

First, our Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism has found that this issue of a weapon of mass destruction being used someplace in the world is real. This is not a fanciful concern, and the consequences are grave.

Second, it is not only an important issue, it is an urgent issue. The next 5 years, in our judgment, will be a critical time in terms of our efforts to mitigate this potential problem.

Third, the good news is that there are steps that can be taken which would have the effect of reducing the probability of a weapon of mass destruction being used.

And, fourth, the role of the Congress is critical and central to mitigate the risk of a WMD attack.

I would like briefly to elaborate on those four points.

The Commission had three principal findings: First, that the United States is increasingly vulnerable to a weapon of mass destruction attack, and that we are less secure today than we were 10 years ago. Our Commission was composed of nine persons—five Democrats, four Republicans, each of whom had backgrounds in areas such as the Congress, the Executive Branch, the military, the intelligence services, and academic areas relevant to this topic. It was our unanimous conclusion that our margin of safety is eroding.

Second, it was also our unanimous conclusion that it is more likely than not that there will be a weapon of mass destruction used somewhere in the world before the end of 2013. So we now have less than 5 years before the window that we found was a probability of use of a weapon of mass destruction. Shortly after our report was issued in early December 2008, the Director of Na-

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 63.

tional Intelligence made a statement which was very consistent with that probability.

And, third, that it is more likely that the weapon of mass destruction will be a biological rather than a nuclear weapon.

We think that this current example of the swine flu epidemic and the concern that it has created helps frame the importance of this issue. This epidemic, as of 11 o'clock this morning, had approximately 100 reported and confirmed deaths in Mexico. The Mexican Government has ordered the suspension of all non-essential activities, including all schools, which contain 33 million students. All restaurants and bars have been closed. All retail stores have been closed. All museums, movie theaters, and outdoor sporting events have been suspended. That is what has happened with this event. Imagine if this had been a biological terrorist attack which had not killed a hundred people, but had killed thousands or tens of thousands of people. Imagine what the reaction would be in the country in which it occurred and around the world. We think this matter is urgent, that time is not on our side.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask to submit for the record a piece which is going to appear in the next issue of *Newsweek Magazine* called "Disease and Terror," written by Dr. D.A. Henderson, who is the Dean Emeritus of the School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins.<sup>1</sup>

In this very informative and, frankly, frightening article, Dr. Henderson states that the central driver to attacks is the increasing interconnected world in which we live. As the world becomes smaller, the impacts of catastrophic events are more significant than what in the past would have seemed to be sufficient distance away; a geographical level of protection no longer is the case.

I think this urgency of time is particularly important for the two areas that you have identified for today's hearing, issues of agency collaboration and the development of a national security workforce.

There are steps which can be taken to reduce the probability of an attack. These steps can be found in the Commission's recommendations.

First, under the category of the national security workforce, the U.S. Government should recruit the next generation of national security experts by establishing programs of education, training, retraining, and joint duty, all with the goal of creating a culture of interagency collaboration, flexibility, and innovation. The intelligence community should expedite efforts to recruit and streamline the hiring process for people with language capability and cultural backgrounds, especially those coming from an ancestry in the regions of the world from which our greatest threats are now emanating.

Second, to improve interagency cooperation, there should be a policy change in the area of sharing of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism intelligence. This should be a top priority for the intelligence community. An acceleration of these efforts is necessary to assure that analysts and collectors receive consistent training and guidance on handling sensitive and classified information.

<sup>1</sup>The article submitted by Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 88.

Third, we need to address the weakening science and technology base in our nuclear science and biotechnology programs. Secretary of Defense Gates recently commented on the state of science at our most important National Laboratory, Sandia, in New Mexico. He stated that half of our scientists at Sandia—the laboratory that is primarily responsible for our nuclear program and supporting our efforts in Russia through the Nunn-Lugar program—are over 50 years of age, and many of those under 50 have limited, or no involvement, in the design and development of a nuclear weapon. Within the next several years, three-quarters of the workforce in nuclear engineering at the National Laboratories will reach retirement age. We have an urgent need to begin to rebuild this workforce.

The President was requested by our Commission within 180 days of taking office to present to the Congress an assessment of changes that are needed in existing legislation to enable the intelligence community to carry out its counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction counter terrorism missions. I would urge this Subcommittee to ensure that the Administration is fully aware of this suggested timetable and to be able to present you with such recommendations before the August recess.

The final point is the fact that the Congress must play a central role in order to change the intelligence community. There is a natural resistance to change within any bureaucracy. It is going to take the actions by this Subcommittee and your counterparts in other areas affected by this challenge to see that real reform is achieved.

I would like to conclude by asking the question that one of our former colleagues, Sam Nunn, has asked, and that is, “On the day after a weapon of mass destruction goes off someplace in the world, what are we going to say that we did in order to have avoided that now reality?” That is the question that all of us are going to have to face if and when it occurs.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.

And now we will hear from Ambassador Pickering. Thank you.

**TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING,<sup>1</sup>  
FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND GUIDING COALITION MEMBER,  
PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM**

Ambassador PICKERING. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich, thank you for inviting me here to speak today to you on national security workforce issues. They are at the heart of comprehensive national security reform.

The Project on National Security Reform is grateful for this Subcommittee’s initiative in addressing national security workforce issues, including its past efforts with S. 589. Evidence of the importance of workforce reform can be found in the government’s experience in Goldwater-Nichols. Title 4 of the Act, which addressed joint personnel policies and added training, education, and joint assignment requirements for career advancement, was essential to pro-

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the Appendix on page 73.

ducing the unified and joint workforce capabilities of the Defense Department.

Many talented employees devote their lives to assuring America's security. Their achievements occur, however, despite rather than because of the system's human capital policies, programs, and procedures. Many reforms are needed involving structural, process, knowledge management, visioning, strategic planning, and resource management decisions and issues. Developing a national security workforce, however, will begin to create the culture and capabilities needed for other changes to occur. In essence, people are central.

I want to talk about the current human capital challenges and then the solutions that we propose. The system does not hire, train, educate, or develop the necessary workforce adequately to meet the requirements. It is unable to correctly allocate workforce capabilities. The cultures and interests of the departments and agencies trump the need for interagency collaboration. Leaders have not paid sufficient attention to building institutional capacity, nor have they paid sufficient attention to the interagency mission.

Proposals for reform. What should we think about in terms of rectifying these problems? I would like to discuss eight of the principal proposals of the Project on National Security Reform for addressing these problems.

First, develop a National Security Human Capital Strategy and an associated Implementation Plan. The strategy and the plan are necessary to align human capital capabilities with the national security system's programs, needs, and priorities. These documents will define the tools, the capabilities, the core competencies, and the needs of the national security workforce. They will outline both the goals for the workforce and the means for achieving the goals.

Second, create a Human Capital Advisory Board consisting of public and private sector experts on human capital and the national security system to advise the President and the National Security Council (NSC.)

Third, enact career planning processes and require rotational assignments, joint duty. Career planning should be used to guide careers and to make position assignments and promotion decisions. National security professionals should also be required to fulfill extended assignments in departments or agencies other than their own. The workforce reform element of Goldwater-Nichols and the Foreign Service Officer tenure requirements serve as useful models in this area.

Fourth, enact training and educational requirements. These are essential to ensure individuals know how to work with and to use all the government's tools to develop and implement national security policy. Training should include both orientation to the system as well as continuing instruction on the system and how it operates. Training and educational requirements will assure professionals continue to develop their knowledge and talent and make government service more appealing.

Fifth, create professional development programs. Potential programs include a national security fellowship, something I know you have already thought about a great deal, and a cadre of interagency professionals to lead the system.

Sixth, enact, enhance, and fund the National Security Education and Training Consortium. The consortium should consist of public and private sector educational institutions whose curricula should address the full range of national security issues and requirements.

Seventh, provide tuition reimbursement and loan repayment plans to train foreign language speakers, assure technical expertise, and other needed competencies. Such programs should target both current and graduated students.

And, eighth, build a professional float for personnel to enable career development opportunities. Many departments can barely meet their programmatic needs, which gives them little or no ability to incorporate systematic education, training, and career development opportunities in their programs. These opportunities will only succeed if the Congress authorizes and appropriates money for a civilian personnel float that will allow individuals to take advantage of these career development opportunities without having to pull people out of operational tasks with no replacements.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, these proposals will substantially improve the system and its ability to support and enable our national security workforce. The U.S. Government has a talented and dedicated national security workforce. They work incredibly hard and with unsurpassed dedication. Too much of their hard work is wasted by a dysfunctional system. Working longer hours and harder is no longer just the only answer. Our national security workforce deserves a better system. Our national security and survival, as Senator Graham has made crystal clear, requires a better system.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am submitting a full written statement for the record, and I am happy, obviously, to address any questions that you or your colleagues may have.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ambassador Pickering.  
Now we will hear from Dr. Thompson.

**TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. THOMPSON, PH.D.,<sup>1</sup> ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-CHICAGO**

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on national security workforce reform.

My colleague, Rob Seidner, who is also here today, and I wrote a report for the IBM Center for the Business of Government last year titled "Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model." The report is about the intelligence community's efforts to put into place a common human resource management framework across the entire community. That effort was driven by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which directed the intelligence community to identify a set of common personnel human resource management practices. That law, in turn, was driven by the 9/11 Commission report, which found a need for enhanced collaboration across the intelligence community and which determined that a common human resource management framework would contribute to enhanced collaboration within the community.

<sup>1</sup>The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson appears in the Appendix on page 85.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has proceeded to drive a process whereby all the agencies within the intelligence community have participated in an effort to develop this framework. One of the most important elements of that framework is the intelligence community's joint duty program, modeled after that in the armed services.

It is too early to say definitively whether or not that program has been a success, but we think the early signs are auspicious. Most importantly, for the purpose of this discussion, we think there are some important things that can be learned by the national security community from what the intelligence community has experienced to date.

First and foremost, I would like to re-emphasize a point made by Dr. Sanders in the first panel, which is that for a joint duty program to succeed, it is important that there be an infrastructure in place. For example, within the intelligence community, before they implemented the joint duty program, they put into place a common set of performance elements across all the intelligence agencies so that when a senior officer in one agency goes on temporary assignment in another agency, he or she knows that he or she is going to be appraised according to the same elements as in his or her home agency.

Another issue is the "out of sight, out of mind" issue, which was referenced in the first panel. This refers to a concern by some intelligence officers that if they leave the agency for some period of time, they will be forgotten when opportunities for promotion come around. And so, as Dr. Sanders referenced, the ODNI has put into place an effort to monitor the promotion rates for those who are on joint duty as well as those who are not on joint duty.

Also as referenced in the first panel, there is this issue of a personnel float. As the ODNI went around to the different agencies trying to encourage the officers to participate in the joint duty program, what they often heard was, "Well, my manager or my boss will not let me go," because the boss, of course, driven by mission considerations, was reluctant to let the person go on joint duty. So it is important that there be a personnel float so that the agency can fill in behind these people that are on joint duty.

Perhaps most importantly with regard to how the intelligence community has proceeded with its joint duty program is that the program was designed in a collaborative manner. Contrary to how things usually work in the Federal Government—where things are designed at the top and, by and large, imposed on the various agencies—in this case, because the ODNI was structured, without direct line authority over the individual agencies, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was forced to engage in a collaborative process with the agencies whereby they had to come to consensus on the elements of the joint duty program. And as we talked to the human capital officers in the different agencies, we found a great deal of support for the program, largely based on the fact that it had been a collaborative process and that they had all had an opportunity to contribute to its design. So we think that is an important element and something to be learned by the national security community as well.

But it is also important that there be a central entity promoting and pushing the process, which, of course, within the intelligence community was the Office of the Director of National Intelligence itself. They were pushing the process. It is not quite clear within the national security community which entity would serve the purpose of making sure that the process moves and that the effort comes to successful fruition.

One possibility would be, of course, the National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee, which has already been created by Executive Order 13434. I have speculated in my testimony that one option that might be considered would be to actually allow the central management of the SES-ers within the national security community by this board, by the National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee. As it is now, the careers of these officials are, of course, managed by each individual agency.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Thompson.

Senator Graham, in your testimony, you urged Congress to take the lead in reforming how we recruit, develop, and retain the national security workforce for the 21st Century. Congress previously has taken the lead in establishing joint duty programs for military officers and in the IC. In 2003, I introduced legislation that would have established a similar program for national security workers.

Do you believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides a good model for the establishment of an effective national security inter-agency rotation program?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, and I think the history of Goldwater-Nichols is also instructive. Prior to 1947, each of the major military branches had its own Cabinet-level Secretary. In 1947, the Department of Defense was established with a Secretary of Defense who essentially sat on top of what had been two organizations, but became three with the establishment of the Air Force.

It took from 1947 until 1986 to make the conversion from that organizational chart to what Goldwater-Nichols provided for, which was organizing around the principle of regional combatant commands and requiring joint duty among the branches to staff those various combatant commands. I do not think that we have 30 years to wait to act on the issue that is before us. I think we have got to move with a far greater sense of urgency.

Frankly, I am discouraged that your legislation, which has many very important components, was introduced in 2003 and we are now at April 30, 2009, talking about it as something that should be done rather than what we should be doing here which is evaluating how well it is being implemented.

So I hope that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Voinovich will continue with tenacity and, if necessary, aggressiveness to move this forward, because time is not our ally.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator.

Ambassador Pickering, in your testimony you state that a National Security Human Capital Strategy and a National Security Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan would align national security goals through program execution. The National Security Council would likely provide this guidance.

How do you foresee the National Security Council working in partnership with the Executive Steering Committee, the inter-agency group charged with implementing this program?

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that these recommendations are predicated on another set of recommendations which recommend, in fact, that the National Security Council do for the country at large our strategy, our budgeting and programming guidance, so that, in fact, the agencies in the national security cluster of agencies would have a common effort. This would be done with the full participation of the agencies rather than a top-down dicta.

Once we see, in fact, where an Administration wishes to go, we then have some better ideas of what personnel resources are required to be brought to bear to deal with those, and the personnel strategy would answer that question. Then, obviously, beyond that, which is policy, comes implementation. And we feel very strongly that an implementation plan would be required—again, with the full participation of the agencies.

As the national intelligence establishment has shown us, in order to have buy-in, you have to have participation, and this is extremely important. But we all demonstrated in the past in many different ways that this can happen. And so this kind of an approach with planning incorporated at an early stage I think is an efficient way. And certainly the bodies that you mention would be very important players in this process.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Ambassador.

Professor Thompson, in your report you identify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency as agencies that have been able to work out the skills gaps among individuals rotating between agencies.

Do you have any additional information about how those agencies were able to overcome these potential skills gaps?

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not specifically have information on those two agencies. My general observation would be that at some level the job becomes predominantly one of leadership, and that leadership skills that are relevant in one context could also be relevant in another context. If one is a good leader within the CIA, presumably one can be an effective leader within the FBI or the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

So I think at the SES level we are predominantly talking about management and leadership skills that can, in fact, translate across agency lines. In some cases, there are issues relating to technical skills, but, in general, with possibly some exceptions, I think those kind of gaps can be overcome.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. We will have a second round. Senator Voinovich, your questions.

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, I would like to thank all of you for being here. I apologize I was not here, Senator Graham, at the beginning of your testimony. It is good to see you again. And, Ambassador Pickering, it is good to see you. And, Mr. Thompson, thanks for coming over.

Mr. Thompson, you had a chance to hear Mr. Sanders talk about what they were doing at DNI, and he has 18 agencies that are under his jurisdiction. And I heard the testimony of Senator Gra-



ham, and it did not seem to reflect what Dr. Sanders' testimony was in terms of what they are doing over in his shop. I would like to get your observations on that.

And I will also ask you, Senator Graham, when you were making the point about getting some of this stuff done, have you distinguished between what is being done in the 17 agencies outside of the DNI versus what they have been doing?

Mr. THOMPSON. Again, our conclusion based on our interviews and the data that we collected was that, to a large extent, the effort within the IC has been substantially successful in terms of inducing a fairly significant level of interagency collaboration, at least on the human resource element of their efforts; and that, again, it is largely attributable to the fact that the ODNI was forced to engage in a fairly collaborative effort to design this new framework and to design these specific policies.

As a result, there is a very substantial and significant level of buy-in by the individual agencies, which historically have been very autonomous and somewhat insular in their approach to human resource management. So the fact that we found as high a level of buy-in to the new framework as we did, I think, is an encouraging sign. The fact that it appears to have been sustained over the Presidential transition is also an encouraging sign because efforts like these, which otherwise induce resistance are often lost when there is a transition from one Administration to the next.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I am really pleased that Mr. Sanders is there and continuing. One of the things that happens around here is that when we take on transformation, and then it is 6 months or 7 months before somebody else takes their place, and you lose the momentum that you have. Mr. Sanders, keep it up.

Your observations—and I did not give you a chance—

Mr. GRAHAM. Senator, to answer your question, the answer is yes. In the report from our Commission called "World at Risk," we identified the progress that has been made in the intelligence community as one of the most significant positive signs, and in many ways a road map for other agencies that needed to move aggressively in that direction. And I want to also say that, in addition to the reasons that Dr. Thompson has given for the ability of the intelligence community to achieve its success, do not overlook the value of having some very competent and capable people such as Dr. Sanders, running the systems. Our Nation is fortunate to have him in the position that he is occupying.

Ambassador PICKERING. Senator Voinovich, could I make a couple of points on your question very briefly?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes.

Ambassador PICKERING. Certainly there is no question at all, I think all of us agree that the intelligence community is a model that now should be spread to the rest of the national security group of agencies. I would also want to tell you with some humility that for the last 50 years, 60 years, our embassies have operated in an integrated way—not perfectly, but they have drawn from sometimes as many as 40 agencies. They have all been working under the authority of the ambassador. You provided for that here in the Congress. It has been extremely important. It is the first example, I think, of across-the-board national security working together ar-

rangements. They have had their problems, but in many cases they have done extremely well. And obviously this critical question of leadership, willingness of agencies to cooperate and be part of a team has been a significant contribution to that kind of activity. The problem has been how do we get that in Washington.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, what you are saying to me—now, as I travel the country, that we have located people in the intelligence community at those places, which I guess has not happened in the past. What you are saying is a good idea. The one thing I am interested in—in fact, I brought to the attention of Secretary Clinton, is that the report from the Academy of Diplomacy on Foreign Affairs budget for the future, and she was before us today in Appropriations, and they are asking for \$7.5 billion out of the supplemental to do some things, and one of the things in the report that was made, if you will recall, was that they needed enough people so that you could get a float in the State Department. And today, because of the lack of resources, that has not been available.

It would seem to me that if we are going to deal with this problem the way we would like to, each of the agencies need to be looked at in terms of the human capital commitment that has been made in the agencies, and also whether or not you have some folks there that, when they leave, they are not being held there because their boss says, “We do not want you to go because if you go, we are not going to be able to get the job done.” And so it is going to take—when we had Ms. Kichak in here, somebody has to go in there in each of these agencies and examine it, where are you at, how many do you have, and what is the program. And I think that in DNI and what Mr. Sanders has done, it is a leadership thing.

I have to tell you, Senator Graham, Senator Akaka and I, that is all we have been concentrating on over here, is human capital. I think that probably in the last 10 years we have made the largest change in Title 5 since 1978. But a lot of what needs to be done is part of leadership. And I know Clay Johnson seemed to be interested in it, but I would be interested in your observations about where do you get the leader that is going to make sure that this gets done. Where should that person be? And how should it be organized so that a year from now we can say that some significant progress has been made?

Ambassador PICKERING. We have to start on this, I think, at the very top. The Project on National Security Reform, in fact, said that the President has clearly wanted—needs and wants to need to have the national security restructure reflect how and in what way the 21st Century provides the challenges. So I think it is very much at that level that you have to have it. The Cabinet Secretaries have to know that this is the kind of direction which people want to go.

There needs to be, I think, great care in this process because the Cabinet departments and agencies have the funding and the personnel to carry out many of the implementation tasks. That cannot all be taken away from them and put into some other box where, in fact, then we have to come back to you and reinvent the entire government. But there is, I think, a crying need for training, for education, and, indeed, for preparation for people to work even more vigorously on an interagency basis, on a cooperative basis, on

a whole of government basis than we have seen. The intelligence community is leading the way across the intelligence community, and I think that the Defense Department has led the way within its own structures. Now is the time to bring the rest of the civilian portions of the government together and the national security cluster of issues to do everything we can to improve that efficiency. But I think it has to be something that the President has to say he wants.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, should it be out of OMB?

Ambassador PICKERING. OMB has an important role because money lubricates all work in the government. And OMB does not run the President. The President runs OMB. And the President, I think, can make it very clear. I think cooperation between the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget is essential to make this happen, just as you have to bring in the key Cabinet departments. They have to be part of the answer to the problem. They do not become—if they do not, they become part of the problem.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. There has been a vote that has been called, and I would like to ask a final question on my side, and any final question you may have.

Senator VOINOVICH. Go ahead.

Senator AKAKA. I thank you very much for your testimonies. This question is to the three of you, and what I want to ask you to do is please list your top three recommendations for ensuring that we have a strong national security service workforce.

Mr. GRAHAM. First, we need a clear set of what our expectations are. We still have a woefully deficient number of people in our national security agencies who can speak the languages of the regions of the world from which our greatest threats are coming, and who understand the history and culture of those regions. That is illustrative of a goal that must be clearly articulated and monitored by the Congress. Are we making progress in building the national security workforce we need?

Second, we need to have a regular pipeline. I am a great advocate of the military's ROTC approach where it is able to assure an adequate number of young men and women coming into the Officer Corps of all of our military services. I think we need something analogous to that for our other national security agencies.

And, third, once we get people into these agencies, we need to understand the importance of maintaining and expanding their professional competencies. We were told in our Commission that the average military officer will spend as much as 25 percent of his or her time during their period in the military in some form of training. That percentage is dramatically lower for most of our other national security agencies. I think we need to try to use the military example as the point at which we are trying to move and assuring the continued professional development of the people that we have recruited and hired into our national security agencies.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Ambassador PICKERING. I will try to be brief because I think they reflect what Senator Graham has said. I think we first need to know what it is we have to do, and that obviously is a principal

question. Without knowing what it is we have to do, any reform will or will not get us there.

Second, we need the plans and programs, many of which you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Voinovich have already proposed, that are going to get us there—things like joint duty, which we know can work and has worked and will continue to work, much better training.

I have in my career learned two languages from the bottom up, had one polished, and studied five more. And my feeling is that that kind of ongoing training and education is critically important. For the State Department and other agencies, they do not have enough positions to do training without pulling people out of the line. And everybody is either on the line or on training. And so we badly need help across, I think, the spectrum of national security agencies to find a way to provide for that. The State Department estimated they need 1,200 people—positions for 1,200 people adequately to do the training and the other rotational assignments that are critical. So the programs are very important.

Then, finally, the funding. These are not big-dollar items. They are really critical items, and they involve investment in the long term, as Senator Graham has said. If you can teach somebody to speak a foreign language, you can use them for the rest of their lives in many different assignments centered around that capability. And, of course, we know we have still huge shortages. We had in Arabic, and it continues to be large. We have in many of the languages in the areas where the terrorist threat is larger, in Farsi, Persian, Urdu, and Hindi, and other languages where we can continue, I think, to expect troubles coming at us.

And so funding programs and understanding where it is we want to go are my three top priorities.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I would actually focus more broadly, and I would focus on the structure of the SES itself, going beyond just the national security professional workforce, which is, I think, there is a general consensus that the SES has not achieved its original vision as put forth in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which is that it was intended to be a corps of generalist managers and executives whose careers would routinely take them across agency lines so they would get a broad perspective. It has never achieved that mission, and that is the case largely because the careers of these individuals are managed at the departmental level.

So my first recommendation would be look at the option, which is what they do in Great Britain, whereby the careers of the senior executives are managed centrally, by a central body, of which OPM would have to be a part, maybe OMB or whatever, but to actually look at that model where the loyalty of these individuals is not so much to their individual agency but to the service, as a service. So they act in ways that induce interagency collaboration.

So that would be my first recommendation, to look at the structure of the SES as a whole and at least contemplate the option of moving towards the British model.

Then the other issue, of course, is that which Senator Voinovich has emphasized, which is training. We have systematically under-

invested in training in the Federal Government. I think having a more centralized model might facilitate expanded investment in training, at the Executive level as well as at subsidiary levels.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

Senator VOINOVICH, any last comments or last questions?

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Graham, who in the Administration is going to read your report? I notice it is not a real big report, so somebody should be able to read that, I think, maybe in a couple of hours.

Mr. GRAHAM. We briefed President Bush in December on this report. We met subsequently with Vice President-to-be Biden, who was given the point on this issue for the Administration. We have met with the leadership of both the House and the Senate, so I believe that the significance of this challenge has been heard by the people who have the greatest responsibility and opportunity to increase our level of security.

Senator VOINOVICH. That is good news. Senator Akaka and I can talk about trying to figure out how we are going to quarterback this or oversight it to make sure that it gets done. I think the first test is going to be what the State Department does. It is going to be that—that will be the first test: What are they willing to do over there? And do they get it? I think they know they need more people, but we will see how they are doing. And Ms. Kichak was here, and I think we ought to have her come back and tell us exactly what her evaluation is in each of the departments and what needs to be done, because this stuff has all got to be reflected in somebody's budget.

Thank you very much for being here. We will follow up.

Senator AKAKA. Again, let me say thank you very much to this panel. You have helped us. Your comments have been great. It will help this Subcommittee. I am planning to introduce legislation that provides effective tools to recruit, retain, and develop national security employees, and your responses will help us do that as well.

The hearing record will be open for one week for additional statements or questions other Members may have. Again, thank you so much for your help to this Subcommittee.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]



# APPENDIX

---

STATEMENT OF  
Nancy H. Kichak  
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE  
FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

on

NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

APRIL 30, 2009

Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate your inviting me to be with you today to discuss national security professional development. We must do everything we can to sustain and strengthen the Government's capacity to protect the American people. This includes continually looking at ways to improve the ability of Federal agencies to work across organizational boundaries to protect our nation and advance our national security interests. We at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) stand ready to do all we can to support this vital initiative.

*History of national security professional development initiative*

The effort to promote national security professional development began in May 2007, with Executive Order 13434, which sought to "promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions" in executive branch agencies. The Executive order was intended to ensure that national security professionals are equipped to carry out coordinated national security operations with their counterparts in other Federal agencies and in non-Federal organizations. It directed the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to submit a National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals. The purpose of the strategy was to establish a framework that would provide "integrated education, training, and professional experience opportunities" for security professionals that would enhance their mission-related knowledge, skills, and experience and thereby improve their ability to protect national security. The order established an Executive Steering Committee,

chaired at the outset by the Director of OPM, to facilitate the implementation of the national strategy.

The Executive Steering Committee comprises officials from 17 Federal agencies and provides strategic direction for national security professional development. Leadership of the Steering Committee shifted to the Office of Management and Budget at the beginning of 2008, and an Integration Office was established a month later to provide program management. The Integration Office tracks agency progress on implementation of the national strategy, including development of agency regulations and training programs.

Once the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals was issued, the Executive Steering Committee developed an NSPD Implementation Plan, which was approved by the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council last September. Federal agencies, in turn, have developed their own implementation plans based on the National Strategy and the Implementation Plan.

#### *OPM's role*

While Executive Order 13434 charges the Director of OPM with leading the establishment of a national security professional development program that provides for interagency and intergovernmental assignments and includes professional development guidelines for career advancement, the leadership of this effort shifted to the Office of Management and Budget in early 2008. OPM issued last November a recommended technical qualification for selection into Senior Executive Service (SES) positions that are designated as national security professional (NSP) positions. The qualification is for demonstrated ability to lead inter-agency, inter-governmental activities, or comparable cross-organizational activities. In issuing the technical qualification, we have highly recommended that individuals selected for NSP SES positions have previous inter-agency experience related to national security in a leadership capacity on either a temporary or permanent assignment, on a multi-agency task force, or in an inter-agency liaison capacity. The experience could have been attained either professionally or as a volunteer.

OPM held two forums on the recommended technical qualification in December 2008 and January of this year. We cosponsored these sessions along with the NSPD Integration Office. The forums included presentations by OPM staff and representatives of the Integration Office, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We shared with the agencies a template for implementing the new technical qualification and provided an opportunity for detailed discussion of implementation approaches and issues. Agencies then were required to develop their own policies for implementing the recommended technical qualification.

OPM also has a broad oversight role regarding human resources policy related to the implementation of the order. First, we recognize, as does the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals, that the competencies that national security



professionals need to have will vary for each mission area and organization, while incorporating the core competencies established by the NSPD Integration Office. Therefore, the particular agencies that employ national security professionals should in large measure determine the content of their training and program implementation. OPM, though, is responsible for ensuring that training policies, as well as other human resources policies, comply with applicable laws and regulations, and that the NSPD effort is administered consistently within and across agencies. For example, we want to make sure training opportunities do not result in pre-selection of job candidates. We strive to balance the need for consistency with the need for flexibility; OPM's role is critical in this regard.

OPM has supported national security professional development in other ways as well. For example, we continue to contribute to the development of web content for [www.nspd.gov](http://www.nspd.gov), and we participate in the National Security Education and Training Consortium. The Consortium is a network of Federal education and training organizations that support the development of national security professionals, including by making recommendations for training and educational courses that should be available to them.

#### *Looking forward*

Some organizational and structural elements of the national security professional development program may need to be subject to ongoing review – for example, whether leadership of the Executive Steering Committee should reside in OPM, the Office of Management and Budget, or some other designee of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. However such matters are resolved, OPM stands ready to provide ongoing policy support regarding the selection, training, and development of national security professionals and related matters. This issue is likely to remain one of critical importance to the Federal Government and the American public for a very long time.

Thank you again for inviting me here today. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

38

**Statement for the Record**

**of**

**Major General (retired) William A. Navas, Jr.**

**Executive Director**

**National Security Professional Development Integration Office**

**Before the**

**Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

**Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce,**

**and the District of Columbia**

**United States Senate**

**April 30, 2009**

Statement for the Record of Major General (retired) William A. Navas, Jr.  
Executive Director, National Security Professional Development Integration Office

Introduction

Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing today and focusing on the vital issue of strengthening our Nation's national security workforce.

The National Security Professional Development Program was established in 2007 by Presidential Executive Order 13434 to promote and enhance the professional development of national security professionals in 17 federal agencies. The program is designed to facilitate and integrate professional development education, training, and interagency experience opportunities for individuals who have national security responsibilities. Today, I will briefly describe the National Security Development Program, the progress made since the program was launched, as well as the challenges encountered.

Imperative for Reform

Let me begin by thanking the subcommittee for highlighting this important issue—of the need for an effective national security workforce.

As this subcommittee is well aware, the challenges that confront our Nation, and the global community, are increasingly complex, intensely acute, highly dynamic, difficult to discern and predict, and potentially devastating. Scientific and technological developments, modern media and business practices, globalized access and trade, tectonic demographic changes, and the increasingly important role that non-state actors, NGOs, multi-national organizations, and other constituencies play, create an environment that is significantly different from that of the

past, and often extremely difficult for today's national security workforce to successfully negotiate.

Our Nation must be able to rely upon a national security workforce with the knowledge, training, and interagency experience to see the big picture, connect the dots, coordinate effectively, and act decisively. We need to develop professionals who can operate across agency boundaries and understand how the combined efforts of multiple organizations are necessary to leverage all of the elements of national power and influence. That is precisely why the National Security Professional Development program was established, and I am pleased to say that the effort is already underway, although there is still much more to do.

#### National Security Professional Development Program

In recognition of the need to cultivate and groom a workforce of national security professionals with the ability to successfully contend with modern national security threats and events, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13434 on May 17, 2007, which stated that: *(I)t is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies (agencies).*" A National Strategy expanding on the direction of the Executive Order and adopting a decentralized approach to implementing the program was approved by President Bush in July 2007.

#### National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee

The 2007 executive order established a National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee (ESC) comprised of the Secretaries or Directors (or their designees) of fifteen designated federal departments and agencies, plus any other officers

designated by the Chairman, to provide oversight of program implementation. Two additional federal departments were later added to the ESC.

The ESC reports to both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. While at the outset, Executive Order 13434 charged the Director of OPM with leading the establishment of a national security professional development program, for most of 2008 and through January 20, 2009, the ESC was led by Mr. Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the previous Administration. An interim ESC chair has been identified within the Executive Office of the President as the new Administration determines its way ahead.

As an interagency body, the ESC is responsible for coordinating cross-agency integration and implementation of the program. In order to accomplish this, a program implementation plan was developed by the ESC and approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism in September 2008.

Departments and agencies have developed their own respective implementation plans. It is through these implementation plans and periodic progress reports that the ESC has provided oversight and monitored progress on implementation of the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program.

#### National Security Education and Training Consortium Board of Directors

A National Security Education and Training Consortium Board of Directors advises the ESC on education and training strategies and serves as the governing body that encourages the sharing of education and training courses, information, and approaches among consortium

members, and to address any gaps that may exist. The Board establishes the criteria and procedures for admitting and integrating new and existing public and private institutions.

#### Chief Human Capital Officer Council

The Chief Human Capital Officer Council serves an important role in the National Security Professional Development program. As the federal government's advisory and coordination body for federal departments and agencies on cross-cutting human capital matters, the Chief Human Capital Officer Council ensures that the integration of education, training, and professional experience opportunities provided to national security professionals across the Federal Government are in compliance with existing policy and law.

#### National Security Professional Development Integration Office

The National Security Professional Development Integration Office was established to provide support to the ESC, coordinating the implementation and monitoring the progress of the NSPD program. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) serves as the executive agent for the office, providing funds necessary to support office operations; however, it does not oversee, manage, or set policies for the NSPD program. Other than the office support funding that the Defense Department provides, the implementation office does not have its own program budget.

#### National Security Professional Development Program Accomplishments

During the first year of program implementation, significant progress has been made that sets a good foundation upon which the program can continue to build. In addition to the departments and agencies developing and executing their program implementation plans, there are many other important steps that have been taken. Let me name but a few:

*Identification of the National Security Professional Workforce.* The ESC led an effort by the 17 departments and agencies resulting in the identification of approximately 14,000 Senior Executive Service (SES) and GS 13 through 15 level positions as national security professional positions. Approximately 1,200 of these positions are SES positions. These numbers do not include those identified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which are classified. The criteria for identifying and designating a position as a national security professional position is set at the department and agency level, and agencies may continually refine their internal criteria and lists as needed. These employees (the nearly 14,000 National Security Professionals or “NSPs”) are our primary target audience, and the objective of the program is to ensure that they are properly educated, trained, and experienced to successfully conduct national security interagency activities and operations.

*National Security Professional Development Web Portal.* A website/portal is used to inform NSPs, and others, to learn about the program, view special notices, and gain access to on-line courses and other relevant resources. Efforts are underway to further expand the capabilities of this portal to enhance its utility, including facilitating professional networking and information sharing. A web content management working group was formed and meets regularly to evaluate and continually improve website offerings and capability. The Intelligence Community’s “A Space” system provides a possible model for developing cross-organizational professional networking and information sharing systems which could be used to support NSPs.

*Regulations for Senior Executive National Security Professionals.* In order to establish interagency experience as a major priority for national security professional development, the

ESC worked closely with the Director of OPM to have OPM guidelines promulgated for departments and agencies to develop regulations making interagency experience a requirement for selection as a Senior Executive in a national security professional position. OPM staff provided technical assistance at two roundtable forums in order that departments and agencies could more easily draft the implementation regulations.

*National Security Professional Orientation.* Last year, departments and agencies conducted orientation conferences to begin familiarizing NSPs with critical aspects of the new NSPD program. All NSPs were required to take an on-line training and orientation course (“National Security Objectives, Structures, and Procedures: An Introduction”). Those SES NSPs who have National Response Framework (NRF) responsibilities were also required to take the on-line Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) NRF training course. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and our office also co-hosted a series of “Interagency Cooperation and Collaboration Lessons Learned/Best Practices” seminars for NSPs. Additionally, departments and agencies have conducted numerous “town hall” orientation training conferences to ensure that their NSPs have a good understanding of their responsibilities.

*Senior Executive National Security Education Resources.* Working with participating departments, agencies, and other organizations, a limited number of class seats for highly-coveted senior education courses are announced and offered to NSPs on a periodic basis. Examples include the U.S. Army Senior Executive Education course and DHS’s “DHS 101 course.” DHS has also established a three-level certification program for its NSPs, providing a template for other agencies to consider within the framework of their own national security professional development program.



Additionally, several departments and agencies have already moved ahead with initiatives that support the advancement of interagency national security professional development:

*Senior Executive Interagency Management.* Two examples of management policies that support interagency experience are DoD's policy for "Career Lifecycle Management of the Senior Executive Service Leaders Within the Department of Defense" (October 2007) and the Intelligence Community's "Human Capital, Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignments, Intelligence Community Directive Number 601" (May 2006) and "Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.01" (June 2007).

*National Security Professional Seminar Programs.* The U.S. Department of State's (DOS) Foreign Service Institute sponsors the "National Security Executive Leadership Seminar" program as part of its NSPD offerings, and participants are invited from numerous federal departments and agencies. Additionally, DOS hosts roundtable sessions called "State Department's Role in National Response Framework" for NSPs from various agencies, providing opportunities for interagency professionals to hear from knowledgeable experts and leaders, as well as valuable networking across numerous disciplines and communities of interest. Other department and agency programs for senior leaders, such as DoD's "Defense Senior Leader Development Program Seminar" and the Intelligence Community's "Joint Leadership Development Program" which is under development, will also provide NSPs opportunities for broadening their understanding of national security matters.

### Challenges

As with any new federal program, the first year of implementation met several challenges that are worth noting, as they may offer insight in how best to proceed in the months and years ahead. Let me also say that, as this subcommittee is well aware, interagency programs in general can pose significant implementation challenges due to the multitude of jurisdictional and organizational issues that need to be negotiated at program start and throughout a program's implementation.

Implementing a comprehensive cross-agency approach to professional development is a very challenging concept that cuts across the grain of current practices. In that sense, this program is transformational in nature; and transformational changes require effective leadership, and successful leadership requires a compelling, shared vision if significant stakeholder buy-in is to be attained.

To its credit, the previous Administration took the initiative to heed the call of experts and practitioners by initiating this important program. However, perhaps because of timing—e.g. establishing the program close to the end of the second term of an administration—efforts to build buy-in and consensus on implementation may not have been sufficient to fully extend the program's first year potential.

### The Future of National Security Professional Development

Although challenging for all of the reasons stated earlier, I remain optimistic about the future of this program and our government's ability to lead the national effort to build the national workforce necessary to protect our Nation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Our ESC members are interested in supporting the important task of building capacity for successful interagency planning, coordination, and execution.

I understand that the current Administration is in strong agreement with the overall intent for the program and is developing a way ahead to build on past successes while charting new directions where necessary. Once the Administration determines its way ahead, I look forward to providing an additional update.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you again for this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. I look forward to working with you in a collaborative fashion to help build upon and improve this critical program for advancing the vital interests of our Nation.

**Dr. Ronald P. Sanders**

**Associate Director of National Intelligence for  
Human Capital**

**before the**

**Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government  
Management, the Federal Workforce,  
and the District of Columbia**

**National Security Reform:  
Implementing a National Security Service Workforce**

**30 April 2009**



**Statement for the Record**

STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD P. SANDERS  
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL and  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER

HEARING BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL  
WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
U.S. SENATE

“National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service Workforce”  
April 30, 2009

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify at today’s hearing on creating a National Security Workforce. It is my pleasure to update this Subcommittee on the implementation of the Intelligence Community’s Civilian Joint Duty Program (“Joint Duty”). Per your letter of invitation, I will:

- Discuss the implementation of Joint Duty, including associated challenges;
- Discuss the Joint Duty Program in the broader context of the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program; and
- Offer recommendations regarding the NSPD program and interagency rotation programs.

In general, strategic workforce policies are among the most powerful levers available to an institution intent on transforming its culture, and the Intelligence Community (IC) is no exception. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has led the design, development, and implementation of a number of ground-breaking strategic human capital initiatives with this end in mind. The Joint Duty Program is one of these flagship initiatives; it is

essential to the Community's transformation and to the establishment of a culture of collaboration that is critical to our national security.

Specifically mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is directed to facilitate the rotation of IC personnel through various agencies of the IC by making "joint" duty (that is, interagency duty within the IC) a condition of promotion to certain positions specified by the DNI, in a manner that "...to the extent practical, seek to duplicate joint [military] officer management policies established by...the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." The Goldwater-Nichols Act was arguably the most sweeping reform of our Nation's military since the National Security Act of 1947, and as the impetus for military joint duty (it required a joint assignment as a prerequisite for flag rank), it serves as the philosophical, conceptual, and intellectual foundation of our program.

The IRTPA authorized the DNI to "prescribe mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of [civilian] personnel of the intelligence community through various elements of the intelligence community in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, users, and capabilities." Like the Goldwater-Nichols Act (and Executive Order 13434: National Security Professional Development), the Joint Duty Program is intended to ensure that as a minimum, IC professionals, managers, and executives come to know first hand, through one or more joint duty rotational assignments, the entire intelligence "enterprise" and their interagency responsibilities in executing its missions. Indeed, the cross-cutting problems faced today by the IC require nothing less.

To begin implementing these provisions, the DNI issued Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 601, *Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignments*, in May 2006. With the issuance of ICD 601, the DNI made civilian joint duty an essential part of becoming (and being) a senior leader in the IC. Although joint duty assignments are strictly voluntary, some form of “joint” experience will, by October 1, 2010, be mandatory for promotion to almost all senior IC positions. Effective upon issuance, the Directive established overarching policies and procedures for identifying, applying for, serving in, and receiving credit for joint duty assignments, which normally range between 12 to 36 months. This program covers all civilian personnel permanently employed by the IC, as defined by the National Security Act. While the Directive does not apply to members of the military services, the IRPTA specifically provides that assignment to the ODN of commissioned military officers shall be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In June 2007, the DNI issued detailed implementing instructions for the Joint Duty Program. Among other things, the instructions provide that the joint duty requirement for promotion to senior positions be phased in over three years, beginning with the most senior leadership positions in the IC and incrementally expanding coverage until all non-exempt senior positions require joint duty as a condition precedent to promotion or reassignment. Thus, effective October 1, 2007, absent a waiver or exemption, senior positions with a direct reporting relationship to the head of an IC agency required joint duty as a prerequisite. Similarly, effective October 1, 2008, those senior positions immediately below those that report to the head of an IC agency now require joint duty as a prerequisite. On October 1, 2009, the next lower tier of senior positions will be covered. All remaining senior civilian positions which require joint duty experience will be covered on October 1, 2010, absent a waiver or exemption. This phased

approach gives our Community the time to adjust to the Program's requirements and allows those thousands of employees who aspire to (and have the potential for) a senior leadership position the time to seek out an appropriate joint duty assignment, as well as corresponding joint training and development.

Other key features of the program can be broken down into three categories: what constitutes a joint duty assignment, key administrative features, and program management and evaluation.

**Joint Duty Assignments:**

- **Criteria for Joint Duty Credit.** An employee receives joint duty credit for an assignment at General Schedule (GS) grade 13 and above (or equivalent) of at least 12 months in another IC agency, so long as that employee received performance ratings of "fully successful" or higher during the assignment. Multiple assignments of not less than 90 consecutive days may be cumulatively applied to satisfy the 12-month minimum requirement for joint duty credit, so long as the minimum requirement is met within a 24-month period. The assignment must be approved by the employee's first-level supervisor and second-level manager, in coordination with the individual's career service or career program (where applicable); have duties and responsibilities that require that employee to acquire and apply substantial practical knowledge and understanding of the organization to which assigned, including its mission, structure, key personnel, and culture; be part of, and consistent with that employee's career development plan(s); and be consistent with applicable competency requirements and career path(s) established by the individual's professional community.



- **Diversity of Assignments:** In order to maximize the opportunity for joint duty credit or experience, the instructions provided that IC employees may be able to receive joint duty credit not only for traditional interagency rotations, but for a wide variety of assignments.

- **Intelligence Centers and Interagency Organizations.** Employees will receive joint duty credit for assignments to organizations that include (but are not limited to) the ODNI or one of its components, including the National Counterterrorism Center, the National Counter Proliferation Center, the National Counterintelligence Executive, designated DNI Mission Managers, and other ODNI organizations; a National Center, Service, or equivalent organizational unit managed by an IC agency, where that IC agency has officially been designated by the DNI as the IC Executive Agent; the National Security Council; the Homeland Security Council; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the President's Intelligence Advisory Board; and/or other comparable interagency organizations. Additionally, certain inter-governmental, private sector, non-governmental, academic or educational organization professional experiences may qualify for joint duty credit.

- **Internal Assignments.** In addition, the DNI (and for the Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) when designated as the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI)) may determine that an assignment internal to an IC agency may provide employees of that agency with sufficient interagency experience to qualify as the equivalent of a joint duty assignment outside of that agency. To qualify as a joint duty assignment, such an internal assignment must involve significant policy, program, managerial, operational, liaison, tasking, or coordinating responsibility for resources, programs, policies, or operations that are carried out by the employee's agency, in conjunction with one or more other IC agencies and/or organizations external to the IC, to include combatant commands; other

Federal agencies; state, local, or tribal governments; Joint Terrorism Task Forces; foreign partners; or international organizations, such that the assigned employee is required to acquire and apply extensive, first-hand knowledge and understanding of one or more other IC agencies or external organizations.

- o **Combat Zones.** Any individual deployed on a Permanent or Temporary Change of Station or Temporary Duty basis for 179 days or more to a designated combat zone will satisfy the 12-month minimum requirement for joint duty credit.

**Key Administrative Features:**

- **Inventory of Positions Requiring Joint Duty.** Annually, the heads of each executive department or independent agency with IC employees provide the DNI an inventory of all senior IC positions/employees, to include title, senior position tier level, functional area, and duty location. The annual report also provides the number of employees who have successfully earned joint duty credit. As part of that annual inventory, each executive department or independent agency with IC employees also identifies those senior positions that may be exempted from the joint duty requirement, as well as those positions or assignments internal to an agency that may provide employees of that agency qualifying joint duty experience. That inventory is published by the DNI each year.

- **Identification and Selection of Joint Duty Assignments.** Because joint duty is a prerequisite for most senior promotions, and because the number of positions that provide such joint duty experience will be relatively small compared to the pool of IC employees who may be eligible for them, the Program requires merit-based competition for all but a very few of such assignments. Thus, when an IC agency has a joint IC duty position, it is required to provide an

appropriate vacancy announcement to other IC agencies, as well as to the DNI's central Joint Duty Web site. Most nominees for joint IC duty rotational assignments must be identified through a competitive process or interagency agreement, and only individuals ranked as "highly qualified" by an IC agency are eligible for nomination. In addition, as a matter of common practice, the head of an agency, or senior designee, must review and endorse all joint duty nominees, as a final quality control check. Gaining agencies reserve the right to decline a joint duty nominee for appropriate reasons (for example, qualifications).

- **Joint Duty Claims.** The Program permits the head of an IC agency to determine that an IC employee's relevant military, professional, technical, managerial, and/or leadership experience outside the IC qualifies as the equivalent of a joint duty assignment. In addition, civilian employees may claim that one or more previous permanent or temporary assignments within the IC provided joint duty experience. To qualify for joint duty credit, the assignment must have been completed after September 11, 2001 and meet the other required criteria. As an exception to that time limit, a civilian employee may claim that a temporary or permanent assignment to another IC agency completed on or before September 11, 2001, but begun on or after January 1, 1997 qualifies as providing joint duty credit where the head of an IC agency determines that such assignment clearly and directly contributed to a "joint" (that is, inter- or multi-agency) function, activity, or operation.

- **Joint Duty Exemptions.** The DNI (and for DoD the USDI when designated as the DDI) may exempt a particular senior position from the joint duty certification requirement, where it has been demonstrated that the senior position is unique: requires rare or exceptional technical skills or expertise not found elsewhere in the IC; and/or is part of a narrowly focused, highly specialized scientific, technical, or professional community that exists only within a particular IC

agency. The head of an IC agency may request such an exemption at any time and/or in conjunction with the annual senior position inventory.

- **Waivers for Certain Promotions.** The DNI (and for DoD the USDI when designated as the DDI) may also waive the joint duty requirement in the case of the proposed promotion, where it has been demonstrated that there are no “highly qualified” alternative candidates with joint duty certification, and that the mission of an IC agency would be adversely impacted if that particular individual cannot be appointed, promoted, or placed into the senior position in question. Individual waiver requests may be submitted by the head of an IC agency. Each waiver request must also include a detailed description of the experience and qualifications of the individual for whom the waiver is being requested, in comparison to those other candidates for the position who have earned joint duty certification, including justification as to why the individual in question has been unable to satisfy the joint duty requirement, and a detailed description of the adverse mission impact that would result if a waiver is not granted in the particular case.

- **Permanent Promotions.** The employing IC agency remains responsible for the permanent promotion of those of its employees who are on (or who have completed) a joint duty assignment. In that regard, eligibility, consideration, and selection for such permanent promotions will be in accordance with policies and procedures established by the employing agency for the promotion of its employees generally, except that joint duty credit will be considered a quality ranking factor in the merit promotion process and accorded additional weight in the consideration of candidates for promotion to a rank or a position of GS-14 or above (or pay band equivalent), including senior officer positions. However, candidates with joint duty certification or credit are not guaranteed promotion. In those cases where a “highly qualified”

candidate with current or prior joint duty credit is not selected for a particular permanent promotion, the agency will document the reasons for such non-selection in writing and retain such documentation in its official files.

- **Performance Management.** The Directive provides that the annual performance evaluations of employees on joint duty will be completed by management officials in the gaining agency who have been designated as the individual's immediate supervisors/performance rating officials, but in accordance with the performance management system of each individual's employing agency. The reviewing official will consult with a designated official of that agency and provide that official with an opportunity to review and provide additional written comments on the employee's performance, but the final decision on the employee's rating rests with the gaining agency. That gaining agency also determines whether an employee on joint duty will receive a performance bonus, with funding for such bonuses being the responsibility of that gaining agency.

- **Authority to Back-Fill Behind Joint Duty Detailees.** Normally each fiscal year, the Intelligence Authorization Act establishes end-strength ceilings for activities covered by the National Intelligence Program, and because IC employees on joint duty assignment remain on the official employment rolls of their employing agency, those ceilings limited agencies from back-filling behind that employee. This could be a major impediment to the program, so in March 2008, the DNI, in consultation with the Congress and Office of Management and Budget, gave IC agencies the authority to backfill behind employees on joint duty without regard to the employment levels requested in the President's Budget. Congress expressed support for this approach in past intelligence authorization bills.

**Program Management and Evaluation:**

- **Number of Senior Officers with Interagency Experience:** This is perhaps the most important “bottom line” measure of the Program’s success. Since our objective is a senior leadership corps with a Community-wide focus, then the number of senior executives and senior professionals who have completed one or more interagency assignments is an effective gauge of that objective. We began collecting these statistics in FY 2007, to establish a baseline for the IC.
- **Number of Employees on Interagency Assignments:** Since the number of senior civilians with joint experience is a lagging indicator, it is also important to measure the IC’s leadership development “pipeline” to ensure that our leadership succession pool is becoming sufficiently joint. In this regard, the mathematical model noted above will help us determine how many employees with joint experience we need to fill projected vacancies in the six separate senior civilian services in the IC, including the “regular” Senior Executive Service.
- **Review of Promotion Rates.** Generally, the Program requires that employees who are on joint IC duty rotational assignments, or who have completed such assignments, will be appointed or promoted at an overall rate comparable to the aggregate population of their peers in the employing agency. This requirement also applies to permanent base pay increases for senior executives or senior professionals. To that end, an employee’s joint duty assignment(s) will be taken into account as a “ranking factor” in the promotion process. The ODNI collects agency promotion statistics on a quarterly basis to ensure that the above requirements are being met. Historically, leaving one’s agency had a negative career impact (the employee was literally “out of sight and out of mind”). In order to protect IC employees from such adverse impact, we pay very close attention to this metric. The ODNI may require an agency to take appropriate

corrective action where it determines that employees who are on or who have completed joint duty have been improperly disadvantaged in the promotion or senior employee pay adjustment process. However, except in extraordinary cases, such corrective action will not involve an individual employee or individual personnel action unless there is a specific finding of substantive policy violation or misconduct.

- **Joint Duty Forecasting Model.** The ODNI has engaged the RAND Corporation to develop mathematical modeling that will forecast how many employees must move through joint duty assignments and training to provide a sufficient pool of competitive candidates for senior positions. In so doing the model predicts annual senior-grade vacancies that will have to be filled through promotion taking into consideration: attrition losses from GS-13 through GS-15 (or equivalent) of those who have acquired joint experience, expected promotion outcomes for GS-13 through GS-15 (or equivalent) of those who have acquired joint experience, and the number of joint duty detailees needed to produce a sufficient pool of senior-grade candidates.

Its Goldwater-Nichols lineage notwithstanding, our Joint Duty Program has faced a number of unprecedented challenges, all stemming from the fact that its target population is exclusively civilian (with a completely different “social contract” than military officers) and spread across six cabinet level Departments and 17 agencies with no single organizational chain of command. Thus, as Joint Duty nears the end of its third full year of implementation, and while it enjoys the strong support of our senior leadership, as well as the vast majority of our employees, the program remains fragile. Although we estimate that almost 3,000 employees are currently on some type of joint duty assignment, application rates for joint duty opportunities posted on the ODNI web site remain low.

In July 2008, we surveyed almost 2,000 IC employees to determine their perceptions of the Program and found that with less than two years from full implementation, its promotion requirements were not yet “real” to many of them. In response, we have begun an intensive internal communication campaign – primarily web-based, with a joint duty “blog,” streaming video of the IC senior leadership underscoring the importance of joint duty, and frequently asked questions – to educate our workforce on these new requirements. We also discovered a number of administrative issues were hampering the assignments process and we are considering corrective action.

The IC Civilian Joint Duty program remains one of the DNI’s top priorities, and we are pleased to note that on September 9, 2008, the IC Joint Duty Program was honored with the Innovations in American Government Award by the Ash Institute of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. The Program was one of six awardees, and one of only two Federal-level programs, chosen from over 1,000 nominations. In making the presentation the awards program director, the Honorable Stephen Goldsmith remarked that the Joint Duty Program is both an “innovative solution for improving cross-agency understanding” and a “rewarding professional experience for Intelligence Community personnel.”

Now that I have described the Joint Duty Program, I can discuss it in the broader context of the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) initiative. As you know, Executive Order 13434 requires, among other things, “...the establishment of a national security professional development program...that provides for interagency and intergovernmental assignments” to ensure that National Security Professionals (NSPs) know and can operate effectively in a collaborative, multi-agency mission environment. In this regard, the NSPD Implementation Plan provides an overarching framework for identifying interagency experiences



for NSPs; requires agencies to identify types or categories of interagency developmental assignments; and consistent with security requirements, requests that agencies post those opportunities on the NSPD Web site. Finally, the Implementation Plan requires Departments and agencies, in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management, draft regulations that, consistent with merit principles, require documented interagency NSP experience for selection or promotion to certain Senior Executive Service and equivalent positions. The IC intends to meet these requirements through the Joint Duty Program.

As the implementation of NSPD goes forward, I would offer some advice based upon my experience of implementing the Joint Duty Program. First, it is imperative that the supporting policy and program infrastructure is built and agreed upon by all parties that will be involved. We cannot simply decree that rotational assignments will become a requirement for promotion to the senior ranks in the national security establishment and then expect Departments and agencies to make it a reality. A comprehensive set of administrative requirements must be developed to address the types of issues I mentioned above, such as application procedures, performance management, promotions, and making claims for previous professional experiences.

Second, I believe that rotational assignments generally work best and provide the best return on investment when they are between agencies with common mission areas. Third, any rotational program established by law or regulation should be flexible. For example, I believe that the IRTPA provides greater latitude than the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the IC benefited from that. The challenges with which senior career executive branch officials are wrestling on a daily basis are constantly changing. As these challenges evolve, so must the manner in which we prepare our future leaders. Any rotational program should take that into account.

In conclusion, I would note that the success of the National Intelligence Strategy depends on our people; it requires nothing less than a unified corps of dedicated intelligence professionals that is bold and innovative, focused on results and on the future, collaborative and self-evaluating, and led by senior officers who understand and leverage the capabilities of the entire US intelligence enterprise. The Joint Duty Program is a cornerstone of our efforts to achieve that vision.

Thank you. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

**Statement of Senator Bob Graham, Chairman  
of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Proliferation and Terrorism  
Before a Hearing of the  
Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal  
Workforce and the District of Columbia  
April 30, 2009**

Thank you, Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee and share my views on two of the Commission's 13 recommendations, those dealing with the increasing need to hire, develop and retain a national security workforce for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (recommendation 11), and the need to improve interagency cooperation (recommendation 10).

The nine-member bipartisan Commission was created by Congress to address the grave threat that the nexus of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose to the security of the United States and the world. The Congress asked our Commission to assess the U.S. government's current activities, initiatives, and programs aimed at preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism, and to lay out a clear, comprehensive strategy for the next administration and Congress – including a set of practical, implementable recommendations.

The Commission's principle conclusions were that: (1) the United States is increasingly vulnerable to a WMD attack; (2) such an attack is more likely than not to take place somewhere in the world before 2013; and (3) that such an attack is more likely to use a biological weapon rather than a nuclear device due to the increasing availability of the relevant dual-use materials, equipment, and know-how, which are all spreading rapidly throughout the world.

In light of these findings, the Commission released its report in December 2008 containing 13 recommendations to address these threats. Since then, five of the 60

months, or about ten percent of the five-year window prior to the end of 2013 has elapsed. The clock is ticking. The failure to move with expedience and sustained commitment exacerbates our vulnerabilities. If we are to keep America safe, we must move forward with all deliberate speed.

### **A 21<sup>st</sup> Century National Security Workforce**

Recruiting, developing and retaining a 21<sup>st</sup> Century national security workforce across all of our professional disciplines is the backbone of our national security community. An observation by General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, that “Soldiers aren’t in the Army, they are the Army,” holds equally true for both our military and civilian workforces. Trained professionals, not technologies, are the cornerstone of our efforts to keep Americans safe; they are the cornerstone of every successful organization. And as our technical and scientific workforce retires, and we are unable to replace highly skilled personnel, our agencies and departments will be stretched increasingly thin, which will create needless vulnerabilities.

As the Commission worked throughout 2008, we were impressed with the gravity of this situation and the importance of the task before both today’s and tomorrow’s national security workforce. Today’s national security community includes all the traditional organizations such as the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and our intelligence community, but also includes organizations as diverse as the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Many of these positions, because of their increasingly important security missions, take on even greater importance than they did in years past. The question is, will we have the qualified people to fill them? Without your action, the answer will be, “no.”

One specific example of this fact was brought to the attention of the Commission during our visit to Sandia National Laboratories, but no one has better stated the case than Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: “...half of our scientists at Sandia are over 50 years

old, and many of those under 50 have limited or no involvement in the design and development of a nuclear weapon. By some estimates, within the next several years, three-quarters of the workforce in nuclear engineering and at the national laboratories will reach retirement age.” Without that workforce, our long-term national security will be threatened.

We as a country have sufficiently studied the problems facing the federal workforce and how best to develop what I call human capital. As I will point out, we know what needs to be done.

Our Commission Report, *World at Risk*, recommended that:

(1) the United States government should recruit the next generation of national security experts by establishing a program of education, training and joint duty with the goal of creating a culture of interagency collaboration, flexibility and innovation;

(2) the National Security Professional Development Implementation Plan, required as part of Executive Order 13434, signed by President Bush in May 2007, must meet its requirement to recruit, train and retain sufficient national security professionals, including at the U.S. national laboratories;

(3) the Implementation Plan must ensure incentives for distributing personnel with experience in combating terrorism and WMD. The President’s top national security officials should consider assignments in more than one department or agency as a prerequisite for advancement to the National Security Council or to department or agency leadership level; and

(4) the intelligence community should expedite efforts to recruit people with critical language capabilities and cultural backgrounds. In conjunction with this effort, the intelligence community should streamline the hiring process, especially for applicants with critical language capabilities.

Senator Akaka, you and your colleagues Senators Voinovich, Durbin and Allen, in your proposed legislation, S. 589, the *Homeland Security Workforce Act of 2003*, recommended significant programs to make federal service more attractive to college students and recent college graduates. One way to do that is through financial incentives. The U. S. Army offers up to \$80,000 in student loan repayments. Why not create a similar program to attract young talent into the civilian national security work force who possess key skills or education? Why not offer scholarships to undergraduates and fellowships to graduate students in critical areas of study? The Director of National Intelligence is suggesting an Intelligence Officer Training Corps (IOTC) similar to the military's ROTC. These programs would provide the American taxpayer with an excellent return on their investment.

To make especially clear, when I mention key skills of these new recruits, I emphasize native fluency in the languages of the Middle East and Central Asia. Six years after the 9/11 attacks, the CIA admitted that less than 4 percent of its case officers could speak any of these critical languages with proficiency, and only 8 percent of new hires have the ethnic background and language skills demanded by counterterrorism work. This is not the formula for success in the intelligence community.

Since the findings and recommendations of the U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21<sup>st</sup> Century (better known as Hart-Rudman) a decade ago, the legislation proposed in 2003, and the various reports and studies of the IBM Center for the Business of Government, there have been many similar recommendations. We all seem to be in general agreement about the problem and what needs to be done. What we need now are more verbs and fewer nouns. It is time to act.

At the same time, there also remain entrenched parochial interests in every federal department that resist necessary changes. Peter Roman, then with the Stimson Center, keenly observed after President Bush signed E.O. 13434 that "...many departments...will be inclined to do the minimum necessary to comply with the Executive and subsequent

implementation directives....” and that professional development might be sacrificed because the departments stone walled. Roman’s skepticism is entirely understandable.

As the Joint Congressional Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission both observed, personnel are the primary driver of organizational transformation. But the development of plans to create tomorrow’s national security workforce is not the real challenge. Drafting a plan is comparatively easy. What is more important and more difficult, as I wrote in my book, *Intelligence Matters*, is follow-through.

The need for congressional follow-through is something that Senator Talent and I appreciate with clarity, because we have stood in your shoes. The key to our national success in this effort resides primarily with the Congress. Only through thoughtful, thorough and ongoing oversight will you be able to ensure that plans become reality, and only then will we achieve the workforce capabilities needed to keep our country safe.

Congress has the decisive role to play. Much like the monumental reforms, cultural changes and major operational improvements brought about through the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Congress must now take the lead in reforming how we recruit, develop and retain the national security workforce for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Congress must also step up its oversight function to ensure that federal agencies and departments fully implement these programs rather than approach them in a check-the-box manner. The security mission is too important, our foes too determined, and the consequences of failure too great for us to allow the status quo to prevail.

#### **Improving Interagency Cooperation**

More than seven years after the attacks of 9/11, much remains to be done to improve interagency cooperation.

It is insufficient that we employ skilled and motivated personnel; they must also work within an effective national security culture – one that transcends bureaucratic and organizational boundaries. The Project for National Security Reform’s recently released report, “Forging a New Shield,” states that there is no ‘national security culture’ outside of our military that motivates individuals in civilian departments to align policies and coordinate programs in support of broader national security interests. For a variety of reasons, the objectives and policies of individual agencies oftentimes supercede larger national objectives. That must change.

In order to improve national security interagency cooperation, the Committee recommended an acceleration of the integration effort among the counter proliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities. Therefore, the intelligence community should:

(1) improve the sharing of WMD proliferation and terrorism intelligence as a top priority, and accelerate efforts to ensure that analysts and collectors receive consistent training and guidance on handling sensitive and classified information;

(2) expedite efforts to recruit people with critical language capabilities and cultural backgrounds. In conjunction with this effort, the intelligence community should streamline the hiring process, especially for applicants with critical language capabilities;

(3) address its weakening science and technology base in nuclear science and biotechnology and enhance collaboration on WMD issues with specialists outside the intelligence community, including nongovernmental and foreign experts; and

(4) continue to focus and prioritize collection (with the law enforcement community) on WMD state and non-state networks that include smuggling, criminal enterprises, suppliers, and financiers, and they should develop innovative human and technical intelligence capabilities and techniques designed specifically to meet the intelligence requirements of WMD terrorism.



Furthermore, the President, in consultation with the DNI, should provide to Congress within 180 days of taking office an assessment of changes needed in existing legislation to enable the intelligence community to carry out its counter terrorism, counter proliferation, and WMD terrorism missions. In so doing, the intelligence community must keep WMD terrorism a top priority while ensuring that the broader counterterrorism and counter proliferation efforts do not suffer.

The National Security Professional Development Implementation Plan required in the executive order requires an annual report to Congress. The latest report states general progress on the part of most agencies and on most issues. That is to be commended; however, more than half of the departments have failed to establish Senior Executive Service promotion regulations—the means to link professional development and joint assignments to promotion to senior leadership positions. A fundamental tenet of professional development is that if you want to change organizational behavior – if you want to dramatically change culture, which we must -- you must reward such actions. This link between the requirement for joint assignments and promotion to flag officer was a key to the success of Goldwater-Nichols, and it will also be critically important to improving interagency cooperation.

The failure to improve interagency cooperation makes it easier for terrorists to execute another 9/11-type of attack – only this time they could be using biological or nuclear weapons. Where organizational focus and teamwork are concerned, I liken the challenge before us to that of a tug-of-war: Every department, every agency and every individual at the national, state and local level must be pulling on the same length of rope, at the same time, and in the same direction if we are to succeed. Every explanation for why we should not implement needed reforms this year withers away if our failure makes a terrorist's job easier.

Reconciling and aligning competing interests – achieving genuine institutional change -- will require uncommon leadership, from the President and cabinet secretaries

all the way down to frontline supervisors. Congress has a vital role to play in elevating the importance of this issue and in drafting the legislation needed to ensure the necessary level of cooperation. Improving interagency cooperation, whether we are discussing weapons of mass destruction or improving DoD-State cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan, is of no less importance today than was enactment of the *National Security Act of 1947*, which created the Department of Defense or the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The more complex nature of today's threats requires similarly momentous reforms.

### **The Need to Act**

I can think of no more succinct an observation on the need for us to dramatically improve interagency cooperation, not only with respect to weapons of mass destruction, but across our entire national security community, than by sharing a conversation that Senator Talent had with an Israeli general within their intelligence community in 2004. When Jim asked how the Israeli military and its intelligence and law enforcement communities overcame the hurdles that impeded effective interagency cooperation, the general responded, and I quote, "We learned to work effectively together because our survival depends on it."

In addition, all of you know that the Taliban, having secured control of the once peaceful Swat valley in northwest Pakistan, is now carrying its battle to impose Sharia law across all of Pakistan. I would like to remind the Committee that Osama bin Laden stated that obtaining weapons of mass destruction is a "religious duty," and is reported to have sought to perpetrate another "Hiroshima." Taliban forces are reported now to be within 60 miles of Pakistan's capital.

If there remains any skepticism on the need to rapidly implement the Commission's recommendations, a recent incident in Ukraine should dispel any doubts. Last month, the Ukrainian Security Service (USS) arrested three people, including an elected official, who were attempting to sell nuclear material. They were "advertising" their product as plutonium—the critical component in an improvised nuclear device.

After the three were arrested, the USS discovered this was, in fact, not plutonium, but it was material that could have been used to produce several radioactive dispersal devices (dirty bombs). This was just the most recent of many such incidents. Let there be no question in your mind, today there is an international market for WMD materials and expertise. We must close that market.

The experts with whom we spoke all agree that terrorists are determined to attack us again – with weapons of mass destruction if possible. While government officials and experts outside of government believe that no terrorist group currently has the operational capability to carry out a mass casualty attack, they could quickly acquire that capability. For a sufficient amount of cash, all technical expertise and materials can be obtained. This is particularly the case with bioweapons because they do not require the massive investment and infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. The Commission is not so concerned with terrorists becoming biologists, but with biologists becoming terrorists.

If our greatest failure leading up to 9/11 was, as many have said, our failure to imagine that people would attack civilians in such a barbaric and unconventional manner, no member of this committee or of the U.S. Congress should harbor any doubt, nearly eight years later, that fanaticism is more commonplace, not less so, in troubled regions of the world, or that nuclear and biological weapons, related technologies, materials and the sophisticated technical expertise required to make these weapons is increasingly available for hire. As we stated at the outset of our report, every trend is moving in the wrong direction; America's margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

What is lacking today is a sufficient sense of urgency and importance across both the executive and legislative branches to get the job done. I ask for your support in providing the authorizations where needed to put programs in place. I ask that you perform your oversight function this year and in future years in a rigorous manner so that reforms are implemented fully and in a timely manner. And I ask on behalf of the Commission for the support of every member of this committee to obtain the appropriations needed to fund these programs.

I think that the most poignant question raised over the past few years regarding a potential attack using weapons of mass destruction was posed in an op-ed written by former Senator Sam Nunn in which he asked, 'If the United States were to be attacked, we would regretfully ask ourselves the next day, 'What could we have done to prevent such a thing?' Ladies and gentlemen, we fervently believe that we have the opportunity to reduce the probability of such a day – but only if we take these entirely reasonable and feasible steps now.

We provided 13 recommendations in our Commission report. The two that I have discussed today are of fundamental importance to our nation's security. There can be few higher national security priorities than recruiting, developing and retaining tomorrow's national security workforce and placing that workforce in an organization and culture fully and effectively committed to reducing the risk to American and the world of the worst weapons falling into the hands of the worst people.

**Statement for the Record**  
**of**  
**The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering**  
**Before the**  
**Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**  
**Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,**  
**the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia**  
**United States Senate**  
**April 30, 2009**

Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak today on the workforce issues that are at the heart of national security reform.

At a time when the global financial crisis, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the swine flu outbreak are dominating the headlines, it is easy to focus on the crises of the day and not think about the system that addresses them. Now, more than ever, as we deal with current challenges and prepare to address future threats and opportunities, it is essential to focus on how we can better organize our national security system to address the increasing and evolving threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Workforce reform is an essential element of these efforts.

Comprehensive reform involves changes in the structures, policies, processes, and ways of doing the business of government. It is the people, however, who bring those changes to life and make them a reality. Evidence of the importance of workforce reform can be found in the government's experience with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While the creation of the combatant commands was a key enabler of its efforts to create unity of command, many believe Title IV of the Act, which addressed joint personnel policies and added training, education, and joint-assignment requirements for career advancement, was essential to producing the unified and joint workforce capabilities of the Department of Defense. As General Schwarzkopf said to the

Senate Armed Services Committee of his subordinates during the Gulf War, “[T]he quality of the people that were assigned to Central Command at all levels changed dramatically as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.”<sup>1</sup>

The Project on National Security Reform [PNSR] is grateful for this subcommittee’s initiative in addressing national security workforce issues. While many other reforms will be needed in areas such as structure, process, knowledge management, visioning, strategic planning and resource management, developing a national security workforce will begin to create the environment and capabilities needed for these other changes to occur.

There are many talented employees throughout the national security community who devote their lives to assuring America’s security. Their achievements occur, however, despite – rather than because of – the system’s human capital policies, programs, and procedures. As Congressman Geoff Davis has said, “[T]he personnel policies are not equipped statutorily to even support the nature or the types of missions that we’re fighting.” That must change. Our national security workers deserve better; our nation needs better.

## **I. Introduction**

The Project on National Security Reform’s workforce recommendations were developed in the context of our mandate for reforming the national security system as a whole. PNSR was established to assist the nation in identifying problems and implementing comprehensive reform within the national security system. In November 2008, the Project released its study, *Forging a New Shield*, which analyzed the problems inherent in the current system and proposed recommendations for a sweeping overhaul of the national security system. In addressing the system’s problems and proposing recommendations for reform, PNSR analyzed the current and historical structures, processes, resources, knowledge management, and human capital aspects of the national security system. The Project found that, as currently constituted, the national security system is no longer able to formulate coherent national strategy or effectively integrate the diverse expertise and capabilities of our nation’s workforce. As PNSR Guiding Coalition Member and Former Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director John McLaughlin said, “The key message is that we have many impressive capabilities in national security – and they work well individually – but today’s complex problems require more integrated effort and agility than the current system can deliver.”<sup>2</sup>

To better address our national security challenges, we must improve our strategic thinking and planning and ensure that we are using and integrating all tools of national power to

---

<sup>1</sup> James R. Locher, III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, p. 7 (2006).

<sup>2</sup> Benson, Pam, “Study: US Security System Still Broken,” CNN.com 28 July 2008, 28 April 2009 <<http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/28/national.security.reform/index.html>>.

strengthen and secure the nation. Furthermore, the study concluded that the United States' national security workforce is the foundation of the national security system, and human capital reform is essential to bolstering our national security.

## **II. Current Human Capital Challenges for the National Security Workforce**

PNSR's recommendations for change are based on a rigorous analysis of the current national security system and the challenges it faces. In the study, the Project identified several findings with regard to the human capital aspects of the national security system:

1. The system does not hire, train, and develop the necessary workforce.
2. The system is unable to correctly allocate its workforce capabilities to address the country's national security needs and priorities.
3. The cultures and interests of individual departments and agencies dominate the system, inhibiting the ability of the government to work with a unified effort.
4. Leaders within the government pay insufficient attention to building the government's institutional capacity.
5. Leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions.

1. *The system does not hire, train, educate and develop the necessary workforce.* A successful workforce should include: an adequate number of workers to fulfill the needed positions; individuals hired for positions that match their skills; and adequate career development. Failing to successfully execute these requirements can cause problems for departments and agencies. This also creates challenges for the interagency, which, as a result, lacks the requisite talent pool for addressing significant national security interagency issues.

The use of contractors can complicate the problem. Although many departments and agencies have made strategic decisions to effectively use contractors, other departments use contractors because qualified employees cannot be found, creating a cycle in which the government never develops the needed capabilities required to handle certain national security issues.

2. *The system is unable to correctly allocate its workforce capabilities to address the country's national security needs and priorities.* A significant finding of PNSR's study is that while individual departments' and agencies' missions are important to national security, national security needs and priorities must be defined government-wide and not merely within individual departments and agencies. Currently, the national security mission is not supported by a strategic human capital plan that identifies critical human capital needs across the whole-of-government. Moreover, there is no means for agencies or individuals within the interagency to request workforce resources for national security missions.

The experience of establishing Provisional Reconstruction Teams [PRTs] in Afghanistan provides a prominent example of this:

In some cases, civilian positions remained vacant when individuals completed their tours and were not immediately replaced by their home agencies. Other times, positions were filled with contractors or junior personnel [who] could command few resources from their home departments .... The lack of training has been compounded by the difficulty of finding experienced and appropriately qualified personnel. In reference to this problem, Deputy Special Inspector General Cruz described interviews with PRT personnel where she “met a veterinarian developing agriculture programs and an aviation maintenance manager co-leading a PRT.”<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, while the success of an interagency team requires group achievement, information sharing, and collaboration, current performance evaluation metrics in departments discourage these efforts by focusing on an individual’s performance within his or her agency and not on national security missions or team performance. Congress reinforces this by allocating funds to individual departments and agencies and rarely allocating dollars or positions to interagency functions.<sup>4</sup> This results in a lack of incentives for departments and agencies to shift resources to interagency missions and activities. In fact, it discourages them from doing so as such takes away from other congressionally mandated programs.

3. *The cultures and interests of individual departments and agencies dominate the system, inhibiting the ability of the government to work with a unified effort.* Organizational culture is composed of the shared values, beliefs, and assumptions that enable an organization to achieve its ends.<sup>5</sup> The culture of an organization is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”<sup>6</sup> As bureaucratic professionals become indoctrinated in their organizations, they learn their organizations’ culture. As a result, when individuals come into contact with officers or personnel from other departments or agencies, they do not see the world or respond to its problems based on a shared understanding of the national security mission or on a shared culture to understand how to design cross-agency solutions. In fact, the incentives currently encourage individuals to support their department or agency missions over government-wide national security missions, thus inhibiting productive interagency collaboration. There must be equal attention to, and incentives for, building an interagency culture that supports the national security mission.

General Wesley Clark’s work with Richard Holbrooke in dealing with Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic is a prime example of both the disincentives for individuals performing successfully in an interagency capacity and the problems caused by the lack of a common culture. To deal with Milosevic, Clark and Holbrooke formulated an integrated and effective

<sup>3</sup> David Kobayashi, “Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (Washington: Project on National Security Reform, 2008).

<sup>4</sup> “Current System Analysis,” Project on National Security Reform – Resources Working Group, August 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985).

<sup>6</sup> James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 90.



diplomatic and military approach. However, as David Halberstam wrote, General Clark's collaboration with Holbrooke was seen as disloyalty and irritated his parent organization, the Department of Defense.<sup>7</sup> At the root of the Department of Defense's response was the culture clash caused by Holbrooke acting like a "typical diplomat," making it up as he went along, to deal with each event at hand, and not like a military officer, who would make specific, long-term plans. As the national security mission requires the integration of both approaches, it is essential that the system incentivize cross-agency teamwork; that agencies reward, not discourage, individuals working with other agencies; and that a national security culture that respects the differences between specific agency cultures is created.

4. *Leaders within the government pay insufficient attention to building the government's institutional capacity.* The political and career leaders who are responsible for running the national security system must find a better balance between the immediate solution of national security crises and the building of needed long-term capacity within the national security system. Historically, immediate concerns have driven attention from longer-term institution building.

The system contributes to leaders' lack of attention to institution building. On average, political appointees serve fewer than two years in specific positions, which often results in a focus on shorter-term issues. Understandably, political leaders also tend to focus on high-profile policy issues. These high-profile national security policy issues dominate and require immediate attention and resolution. As a result, while institution building, including improving the workforce – with skills such as strategic planning, analysis of long term trends, and such techniques as scenario planning – would improve the system's ability to respond to and resolve crises and, it is often ignored.

5. *Leaders pay insufficient attention to interagency missions.* Senior officials often find themselves defending the interests and prerogatives of their organizations at the expense of interagency solutions that endanger these interests and prerogatives. Senior leaders, and particularly Cabinet officials, have fundamentally conflicting roles. On the one hand, they are responsible for running a department, and on the other hand, they are presidential advisors. As the leaders of departments or agencies, senior leaders must build institutional capacity and manage their departments. This responsibility, however, often conflicts with their role as presidential advisors, in which they must be ready to sacrifice department equities when doing so will improve the chance of success for multiagency or interagency missions. Senior leaders of departments and agencies also have strong tendencies, and incentives, to believe missions are best accomplished either through the singular efforts of their individual departments or agencies or, at a minimum, by assigning their department or agency the lead role for accomplishing a mission. Thus, senior leaders must be incentivized and retrained to focus on interagency missions.

### III. Proposals for Reform

While *Forging a New Shield* identified a number of significant problems with the current national security system, it also proposed a series of recommendations to address and solve the

---

<sup>7</sup> David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals* (2001) 362, 456 ff.

system's identified problems. The Project's human capital proposals are a fundamental subset of these overall recommendations that helps lay the groundwork for our other proposals for change.

#### **A. Imperatives for Changes**

Our recommendations are based on four imperatives for improving the human capital workforce:

1. Thinking Strategically.
2. Developing Common Culture.
3. Investing in the Workforce.
4. Encouraging Strategic Leadership.

In identifying the problems with the system, it became clear that at the heart of the system's human capital problems is the lack of sufficient attention to think strategically, develop a common culture, invest in the workforce, and encourage strategic leadership. We need to invest in the development of political and career leaders who can think and act strategically, while balancing the needs of their individual departments with those of the interagency national security mission.

As Ambassador Henry Crumpton said, "Wars of the 20th century taught us the need for joint operations rather than separate army, navy or air operations, as manifested in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 9/11 taught us that we cannot afford to act as independent agencies. Our success against the enemy largely derives from our mastery of joint, highly integrated operations that unify all the elements of national power into a coherent whole."<sup>8</sup>

#### **B. Programmatic Proposals for Human Capital Reform**

Based on the imperatives listed above, the Project on National Security Reform has developed a number of granular and programmatic recommendations for improving the national security system.

##### Strategic Thinking and Planning

1. *Develop a National Security Human Capital Strategy and National Security Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan.* In support of the imperative of thinking strategically, it is necessary to create both a National Security Human Capital Strategy and a National Security Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan. These documents should be based on a rigorous review of the current national security workforce by the National Security Council staff and be written to align national security human capital capabilities with the national security system's

---

<sup>8</sup> "Interagency Coordination in Combating Terrorism," Hearing, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, 4 April 2006.

needs and priorities. The documents should be created on a biannual basis and regularly updated based on changes to the system and its priorities.

The review and resulting National Security Human Capital Strategy and Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan should define and take into account the tools, capabilities, core competencies, and needs of the entire national security workforce. The Strategy and Plan would outline both the goals for the workforce and the means for meeting those goals. We recommend the creation of two separate documents because a successful strategic implementation plan must be based on a defined strategy.

These documents cannot merely be “bookshelf” documents, but must be operational. To help ensure this:

- a) Departments and agencies must be consulted by and required to cooperate with those reviewing the system and drafting the Strategy and Plan;
- b) The Strategy and Plan must be disseminated to and enacted by individual departments and agencies;
- c) Departments and agencies must develop and task individuals with strategic vision to administer the enactment of the Strategy and Plan; and
- d) The appropriate congressional committees must support the Strategy and Plan through legislative authorizations and appropriations based on the identified needs.

Creating such documents will help ensure that programs to hire, train, educate, and incentivize the national security workforce are aligned with the national security system’s goals, objectives, and outcomes.

*2. Create a Human Capital Advisory Board to advise the President and National Security Council.* As part of its effort to ensure the system is thinking strategically and creatively and to ensure the National Security Human Capital Strategy and Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan are being appropriately reviewed, considered, and enacted, a Human Capital Advisory Board should be created. The Board should include public sector experts on human capital, individuals with a broad sense of national security and the needs of the system; individuals from the private sector that have experience with workforce issues and can advise on best practices for managing and improving a workforce; and representatives of workforce stakeholder groups. Members should serve for an extended period of time and, ideally, across administrations. The Board will function as a forum both to receive feedback and to involve national security workforce stakeholders in the strategy and planning process.

### Career Development

Thinking strategically can create processes and plans for improving the system, but unless those processes and plans are enacted through workforce development, they will not be effective. Professional development, education, and training are the three essential elements of career development. Strengthening the national security system's career development opportunities and requirements will enhance the system by both improving individuals' ability to successfully execute their specialties and create a common national security culture that will enhance the ability of individuals to work within the interagency.

Career development opportunities should be neither one size fits all nor limited to specific types of workforce members. They must be tailored for both employees and leaders in the system, and to ensure that individuals develop the skills they need for their positions and the system develops important, strategic leadership capabilities. New career development opportunities should build on the excellent work begun under Executive Order 13434 related to national security professional development.

3. *Enact career planning processes and require rotational assignments.* Professional development must consist of career planning and rotational assignments. Both must be implemented to ensure that individuals advance in their specialties and develop skills necessary for working in the interagency environment.

Career planning shall include, but not be limited to, guidelines for position selection, training, education, and types of assignments, and be used to guide careers and in making position and promotion decisions.

National security professionals should also be required to fulfill extended assignments in departments or agencies other than their own. Rotational assignment requirements for service in interagency positions are especially important because, like the military's jointness requirement, they expose individuals to different parts of the government and encourage thinking about the government as a whole institution. These requirements should be significant and, while they will take time to phase in, apply to all individuals serving in national security positions with interagency responsibilities.

The workforce reform elements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Foreign Service officer requirements serve as useful models for requiring rotational assignments. Under Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint specialty officers must participate in joint duty assignments to meet promotion requirements, and individuals may not be promoted to the rank of General or Admiral without first serving in a joint duty assignment. Similarly, prior to receiving tenure as a career Foreign Service officer, junior Foreign Service officers are expected to serve in at least two functional fields (administration, consular, economic/commercial, political affairs, and public diplomacy) and in consular work abroad for at least ten months. Both the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms and the Foreign Service officer tenure requirements are successful because

they make a rotational assignment a requirement for promotion. Both the military and the Foreign Service have benefited from these requirements, which gave their officers a broader set of experiences, enhancing their performance capabilities. As demonstrated by the military and Foreign Service officer experience, rotational assignments should be a prerequisite for the promotion of national security professionals to ensure their individual success and the success of national security workforce reform.

Also, a concerted effort must be made to ensure that a) departments and agencies do not attempt to avoid rotational assignment requirements for their best and brightest by claiming exceptions or tracking them to non-interagency careers; b) departments and agencies do not avoid defining positions as interagency or requiring interagency expertise; c) individuals are correctly evaluated for their performance as part of an interagency team when working in an interagency or rotational assignment; and d) that individuals are rewarded for supporting their interagency team's mission and efforts rather than protecting a department or agency's turf.

The work done to implement Executive Order 13434 and the joint assignment initiatives of the intelligence community are examples of steps in the right direction for promoting professional development and rotational assignments.

4. *Enact training and educational requirements for national security professionals.* One of the keys to the military's success in developing its members is that whenever someone is not in an operational assignment he or she is in a training or educational assignment. Training and educational requirements and opportunities are essential for a professional's career development. Military officers spend a significant percentage of their careers in training and educational opportunities that are unmatched by any other department or agency. Even the most qualified and dedicated non-military national security professionals will not be sufficiently trained or educated and have the full career development opportunities of their military counterparts.

For example, the Foreign Service has rotational assignment requirements, but limited educational and training requirements and opportunities. In fact, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, a strong advocate of addressing the lack of training for Foreign Service officers, contrasted his experience in the military – spending six out of an almost 36 year career in school – with the few months of area studies, and related non-language training, a typical Senior Foreign Service member received. Secretary Powell called his experience an “enormous investments on the part of the Army in getting [him] ready for whatever came.”<sup>9</sup>

Training requirements must be put in place for individuals working in national security and the interagency. Such requirements are essential to ensure individuals know how to work with and use all the government's tools when developing and implementing national security

---

<sup>9</sup> John K. Naland, “Training America's Diplomats: Better Than Ever, but is it Enough? How Underinvestment in Foreign Service Training is Hurting U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Service Journal*, p. 71, October 2008.

policy. Training should include both orientation to the national security system and the specific jobs within it, and continuing instruction to help national security professionals do their jobs better and use the tools of the system.

A successful orientation program will, among other things, teach national security professionals about the components of the national security system – federal, state, local, and tribal – including their authorities, responsibilities, and how they interact and work together; interagency skills and the tools for implementing interagency integration; the budgeting process and how it relates to planning and implementing interagency national security missions; and the federal government’s national security strategy. Training programs should be enabled, but not limited, by statute. The world is fast-changing, and what is needed now to improve the system may be different than what is need by the system 5, 10, or 15 years from now.

Similarly, educational requirements and opportunities must also be created for national security professionals. Educational requirements and opportunities should focus on both the skills and knowledge an individual needs to succeed within his or her specialty and the skills and knowledge an individual needs to be successful in the interagency. Such continuing education will both improve the quality of national security professionals and make entering and remaining in this line of service a much more appealing opportunity.

As will be discussed in more detail below, the success of additional training and educational requirements and opportunities is dependent on the creation of a personnel float to allow individuals to spend adequate time in training and educational assignments without hampering departments and agencies.

5. *Creating professional designation and programs.* Improving the development of national security professionals is not a one size fits all proposition and cannot happen through immediate action. It must happen through a number of designations and programs that address specific types of workers and employees. This would include a National Security Fellowship that would train professionals in important skills – such as strategic thinking, planning, joint operation implementation, and operation assessment – and require enhanced rotational assignments to encourage whole-of-government thinking. The system should also create a cadre of interagency national security professionals to lead the system for whom, like Generals and Admirals, there would be even higher education, training, and rotational assignment requirements.

6. *Enact and enhance the National Security Education and Training Consortium.* The National Security Education and Training Consortium should be established and funded in statute. The Consortium would consist of public and private sector educational institutions that address national security issues and train national security professionals. The Consortium, in consultation with the National Security Council and department and agency chief human capital officers, should oversee the development and implementation of training and education curricula

for national security professionals that augment both individuals' knowledge and skills related to their specialties and their ability to perform within the interagency. Current federal national security training institutions such as the National Defense University, the Foreign Service Institute, and the National Defense Intelligence College would work in partnership as the backbone of this Consortium.

7. *Tuition reimbursement and loan repayment plans for foreign language speakers and technical experts.* Congress should adapt current, or create new, tuition reimbursement and loan repayment plans to cover foreign language speakers, technical experts, and other competencies that the national security workforce needs and has trouble recruiting. These programs should be used both to recruit individuals that have finished educational programs as well as those currently enrolled in an educational institution. The Undergraduate and Graduate Foreign Affairs Fellowships, which provide funding to participants as they are preparing academically and professionally to enter the U.S. Foreign Service, would be models for fellowships for current students pursuing careers in national security.

Individuals with education and experience in these areas are essential to our national security, and efforts must be made to recruit and retain them. Tuition reimbursement and loan repayment plans are tools that can support such recruitment and retention efforts.

8. *Build a personnel float to enable career development opportunities.* As mentioned above, the system's career development goals can only be met through the creation of a civilian personnel float. Many departments can barely meet their current personnel needs, giving them little to no ability to incorporate systematic education, training, and career development opportunities. In contrast, the military not only allows, but also encourages such opportunities. This is enabled by its personnel float, which permits members to participate in training, education, and joint assignments opportunities.

For example, The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, in a report titled *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* suggest that beyond the need to expand American staffing within the State Department by 1,099 employees by Fiscal Year 2014, another 1,287 individuals must be hired to create the necessary float for increased training and education within the Department.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols recommended creation of a personnel float of about a 1,000 career civilian positions in the office of the Secretary of Defense and defense agencies to enable its non-military personnel to have adequate education, training, and rotational assignment opportunities.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=708>.

<sup>11</sup> Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, Kurt M. Campbell, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report*, p. 9 (2004).

Professional development, training, and educational requirements and opportunities will succeed, and the national security workforce will meet its potential, only if Congress authorizes and appropriates money for a civilian personnel float, like the military's, that will allow individuals to take advantage of these career development opportunities.

### **III. Conclusion**

PNSR Guiding Coalition member and former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Admiral James M. Loy, aptly summarized the system's problems and needs: "The focus must shift to national missions and outcomes. This will require strategic direction to produce unity of purpose and more collaboration to achieve unity of effort."

The United States government is fortunate to have a most talented and dedicated national security workforce. They are working incredibly hard and with unsurpassed dedication. Too much of their hard work, however, is squandered by a dysfunctional system. Working harder is no longer the answer. Our national security workforce deserves a better system, and the nation needs a better system. The human capital and other proposals included in PNSR's *Forging a New Shield* will substantially improve the system and its ability to support and enable our national security workforce.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am happy to answer any questions you and your colleagues may have.



Testimony of James R. Thompson  
Associate Professor and Head, Department of Public Administration, University of Illinois –  
Chicago  
Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and  
the District of Columbia  
April 30, 2009

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on "National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service Workforce." My expertise on matters relating to the national security workforce derive from a report that my colleague, Rob Seidner and I wrote for the IBM Center for the Business of Government entitled, "Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model." Our report documents an initiative underway within the Intelligence Community (IC) to develop a common human resource management (HRM) framework pursuant to the direction provided by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2002 (IRTPA). Many of the provisions of IRTPA in turn, were based on the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the "9/11 Commission." The commission concluded that the intelligence failures that led to the terrorist actions of September 11, 2001 were in large part attributable to a lack of cooperation and collaboration between units within the IC. As one means of fostering greater interagency cooperation, IRTPA directed the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to create common personnel policies and programs for the IC.

Perhaps the most critical element of the new HRM framework is the joint duty program that has been instituted for senior, civilian executives within the IC. The IC's joint duty program is modeled after that implemented by the armed services pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In both instances, the objective is to encourage inter-agency cooperation and collaboration by providing senior executives and/or officials with direct work experience in an agency other than the one in which their careers are anchored. The executives thereby gain knowledge of the work practices, cultures and personalities of sister agencies which can facilitate long-term operational collaboration.

Executive Order 13434 issued by former President George W. Bush in May 2007 references the creation of a joint-duty-type program for national security professionals, a recommendation that I support. Just as cross-agency collaboration is key to the successful accomplishment of intelligence objectives, so too can such collaboration contribute to the effective accomplishment of national security objectives more broadly. However, as the national security community embarks on this journey, important lessons can be learned from the experience of the IC in setting up its joint duty program.

One lesson is that the success of a joint duty program is enhanced to the extent that it is compatible with other HRM systems. For example, prior to implementing its joint duty program, the IC first identified a common set of elements according to which the performance of all IC employees is assessed. With the new performance elements in place, managers accepting temporary assignments in sister agencies can be assured that their performance will be assessed according to the same criteria employed by the home unit.

Those participating in a joint duty program also need to be reassured that they won't lose promotional advantages as a consequence. In our investigation of the IC's program we heard concerns from managers about being "out of sight" and therefore "out of mind" when promotional opportunities arose in the home agency. To address this problem, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has instituted a procedure whereby agencies are required to report the promotion rates of those who participate in joint duty as well as of those that do not.

For joint duty to succeed, the needs of the home units of joint duty participants need to be accommodated. To continue to meet operational demands, provision must be made for these units to fill in behind those on temporary assignment to another agency. This requires an increase in overall staffing levels to allow for the creation of a personnel "float" in the form of positions that can temporarily be assigned to units with members on joint duty assignments.

Although the IC's joint duty program is still in the early stages of implementation, members of the community with whom we talked, including in particular the chief human capital officers of the various IC components are optimistic about its success. An important reason for their optimism is the collaborative manner through which the policy was designed. Collaboration was necessitated by the ambiguous nature of the authorities granted the DNI. Congress deliberately did not grant the DNI line authority over the other intelligence units and hence ODNI did not have the option of simply imposing a new policy framework on the community. Instead, all members of the IC had to agree on the final product. This insured that agency as well as community-wide needs were addressed and the broad acceptance of the policy that has resulted will enhance prospects for successful implementation.

As the national security community proceeds with the implementation of a joint duty program, I recommend that careful consideration be given to the process through which program specifics will be designed. If policies are designed centrally and imposed on the participants, problems are likely to surface. First, it is less likely that the resulting program will accommodate the operational needs of the agencies and second, without agency buy-in, implementation will become problematic. The experience of the Department of Homeland Security holds important lessons in this regard. I therefore recommend that the governance structure for the program require consent to the final policy by all participants.

Inevitably, a program like joint duty which runs counter to a tradition of agency autonomy on matters of job assignments and to one whereby the careers of relatively few officials cross agency lines will run into resistance from those with an interest in preserving the status quo. To overcome that resistance, it is important that an entity within the national security community be assigned a role similar to that of ODNI within the IC. The Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee (SPDESC) created by E.O. 13434 and chaired by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management is the obvious candidate for this purpose.

In my view, the effectiveness of SPDESC will be enhanced to the extent that its mandate is expanded and that it is given general authority for approving the job assignments of senior executives within the national security community. This would provide the committee with the "teeth" needed to gain the interest and attention of the participant agencies as well as to overcome the inevitable resistance that will emerge. Allowing the careers of SES members to be managed at a central level is further consistent with the original vision of the SES as a corps of generalists whose career paths would routinely cross agency lines and whose affiliation is to the corps rather than to a particular agency.

Finally, I recommend limiting the scope of a joint duty mandate to members of the SES or those at equivalent levels. The IC discovered during its design efforts that the numbers of prospective participants grows exponentially as the scope of the program is extended into the GS-15, 14, and 13 ranges. For reasons of administrative simplicity as well as of program coherence it is therefore advantageous to limit the scope of the program to members of the SES.

## Newsweek

### Disease and Terror

**The swine-flu outbreak caught health officials completely by surprise—just as a bioterror attack would.**

**D. A. Henderson**  
**Newsweek Web Exclusive**

A complacent America, growing ever less concerned about the threat of pandemic bird flu, was startled last week by the sudden appearance of a major epidemic of swine flu in neighboring Mexico. Cases were soon reported from New York, California, Texas and Ohio, as well as France, New Zealand, Canada and Britain. So far, the apprehension and confusion about what to expect resembles the early days of the anthrax attacks of 2001, when a fine powder of weaponized anthrax bacteria showed up in the U.S. mail. Then, as now, health authorities were taken completely by surprise, and the public panicked out of all proportion to the actual threat.

The similarities between the flu and biological terrorism are not coincidental. In recent years the world has changed in ways that have made the threats of natural and man-made epidemics more and more alike. As we deal with the increasing prospects of a bioterrorist attack, we are also struggling with the challenge of emerging diseases: AIDS, pandemic strains of influenza and the "mad-cow disease" that terrified Britain only a decade ago. The way these threats unfold—and the responses they call for—are becoming ever more similar.

The central driver is the increasingly interconnected world we live in. Even the most remote areas of the planet can now be reached in less than 48 hours. Diseases now plaguing those in refugee camps, heavily populated and growing slums or the most remote tropical rainforests can, without warning, show up in far-flung towns and cities. A devastating hemorrhagic-disease epidemic in Africa or South America could rapidly become the hemorrhagic epidemic of Boston or Bordeaux. Even good clinicians rarely have the knowledge to diagnose and treat exotic tropical diseases. Until a month ago, our attention was focused on Asia—the source of the last two influenza pandemics, in 1957 and 1968—as the likely source for the next one. And yet it appeared in Mexico while we weren't looking.

A revolution in biology and medicine has recently given us powerful new tools to fight infectious diseases. It has also given us bioterrorism. The potential for terrorists to develop, grow and spread biological weapons has increased rapidly with the proliferation of knowledge and laboratories. As we discover the secrets of the cause and spread of disease, we are also finding ways of engineering a virus or bacterium to be more virulent or perhaps to evade antibiotics or vaccines. It's difficult to overstate the threat. As disastrous as the explosion of an atomic weapon would be, the strategic use of biological organisms such as smallpox, anthrax or plague could be even more devastating.

It is virtually impossible to stop or interdict terrorists bent on using biological weapons. The bioagents can be made in inexpensive labs, and are light and easily transported across borders without detection. A powder of anthrax or smallpox organisms would float as an invisible, odorless cloud, driven by breezes. Those unfortunate enough to inhale it would be unaware of the infection for days—and then suddenly develop a severe, disabling disease wholly unfamiliar to local physicians. As cases mount, health workers would isolate victims and distribute antibiotics or vaccines. The risk of panic would be great. In 2001, only 11 people inhaled anthrax and five died, but widespread fear of almost any powder led to the evacuation of hundreds of office complexes. What if hundreds had died?

The only way out of these potential catastrophes is to sharpen our health-care response. Rapid diagnosis and response are critical. We need to foster a greatly expanded international network of epidemiologists (so-called disease detectives) and laboratory scientists who continually investigate new outbreaks and look for better methods to diagnosis and treat diseases, wherever they might be occurring. States and communities play a pivotal role and are the basic foundation for combating major catastrophes, whether due to bioterrorism or pandemic influenza (or hurricanes or earthquakes, for that matter). Community organization and planning are key to success. Mayors, public-health authorities and hospitals need to plan how they will care for large numbers of patients and provide needed vaccines or drugs. Voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross must be part of the effort. The threat of a swine-flu pandemic is a good excuse to better organize and strengthen emergency plans. Other, even less pleasant surprises are in our future.

*Henderson led the campaign at the World Health Organization to eradicate smallpox in 1980 and worked to address the 2004 bird-flu outbreak. His book "Smallpox: The Death of a Disease" will be published in June. He is currently professor of medicine and public health at the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh.*

URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/id/195422>

**Post-hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to Ms. Nancy H. Kichak  
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka**

**“National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service”  
April 30, 2009**

1. **It is important that we recruit and retain employees to support our national security efforts. As you stated at the hearing, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has not performed a skills gap analysis focused on the national security workforce.**

- a. **What steps will OPM and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council (CHCOC) take to conduct this analysis in a governmentwide fashion?**

OPM has worked with the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Council in the past to identify a number of Governmentwide mission-critical occupations (MCOs), and to create Governmentwide tools and strategies for closing competency gaps in these MCOs. The Governmentwide MCOs are Human Resources Management, Leadership, Acquisition and Information Technology. OPM will begin this month to explore with the CHCO Subcommittee for Hiring and Succession Planning the designation of the national security professional (NSP) workforce as a Governmentwide MCO, as well as the feasibility of conducting Governmentwide skills assessment, gap analysis, and competency gap closure strategies. One option, contingent on adequate resources, would be to add NSP to the current suite of Governmentwide MCOs covered by the Federal Competency Assessment Tool (FCAT), which is provided by OPM to agencies on a biennial basis.

- b. **When will this analysis be completed?**

A complete analysis of skills gaps for the Governmentwide NSP workforce would take a minimum of 18 months. The first step in this process is to develop a competency model for the NSP workforce. Currently, there is no accepted NSP competency model for the Federal Government as a whole. The design and validation of a competency model normally takes at least one year. OPM can explore options for streamlining this process by drawing on existing, validated competency models to construct a Governmentwide profile for the NSP workforce. Contingent on budgetary resources, the validated competency model can then be incorporated into the FCAT, which OPM administers every two years. The next FCAT assessment period is tentatively scheduled for the summer of 2010. Assessment results, gap analysis, and targets for closing competency gaps could be reported to OPM as early as December 2010, as part of agencies' Human Capital Management Reports (HCMRs).

- c. **Do OPM and the CHCOC have any plans to conduct a skills gap analysis for all mission critical occupations governmentwide? If so, when?**

Skills gap analysis for MCOs is an ongoing part of agencies' strategic human resources management. All agencies are required annually to identify their MCOs, assess their current MCO workforce competencies, analyze gaps, and implement gap closure strategies. Agencies use a range of assessment tools and gap closure strategies, designed to meet their strategic needs. Agencies report annually to OPM on the results of these efforts. In addition, OPM has designated four Governmentwide MCOs that agencies are required to report on. The current Governmentwide MCOs are Human Resources (HR) Management, Leadership, Acquisition and Information Technology. OPM's FCAT is available to agencies to assess their HR Management, Leadership and IT workforce. Acquisition workforce assessment is managed by the Federal Acquisition Institute.

2. **The IBM report entitled *Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model* states that the vast majority of Senior Executive Service (SES) members spend their entire careers in a single agency.**

- a. **What percentage of SES members has spent their entire career in a single agency?**

This is not a statistic OPM tracks regularly, so there is no official figure. However, based on a special analysis done in response to this request, we can estimate that, as of March 2009, 58 percent of SES members had served in only a single agency.

- b. **How has this percentage changed since the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978?**

Our information does not permit us to go all the way back to the founding of the SES in 1978. However, we can estimate that in the last 20 years the percentage of SES members employed in a single agency has declined somewhat, from about 68 percent in 1989 to about 58 percent in 2009.

- c. **How is OPM ensuring that most current and future SES members are gaining experience at other agencies?**

OPM has taken a number of steps to help ensure current and future SES members are gaining experience at other agencies. First, under OPM's authority to provide

for the continuing development of senior executives or to require agencies to establish programs for continuing development that meet criteria prescribed by OPM (5 U.S.C. 3396), OPM released a memorandum encouraging agencies to develop policies and take appropriate actions to ensure continuing development of senior executives. This memorandum, which is available at <http://www.chcoc.gov/Transmittals/TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalID=1696>, encourages SES members to participate in developmental opportunities and rotational assignments to gain a broad Governmentwide perspective. It also encourages agencies to include, as part of their policies and programs, the requirement that all SES members, at least once every 3-5 years, pursue developmental opportunities to broaden their perspective, including:

- Details, sabbaticals, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments outside the Federal Government, or significant participation in interagency projects, or
- Rotations to a new executive position

Secondly, OPM has included a requirement in the proposed revised regulation on supervisory, managerial, and executive development (part 412 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations) that all SES members must have an Executive Development Plan (EDP). The EDP should address developmental assignments and/or rotations, as well as other developmental opportunities. These EDPs should be updated on a periodic basis. OPM has developed a sample EDP, which is available on OPM's website at [http://www.opm.gov/ses/executive\\_development/index.asp](http://www.opm.gov/ses/executive_development/index.asp).

However, if an SES member goes on a rotation to another agency, the home agency typically is concerned about getting the work done during the individual's absence. To help address this concern, OPM allows agencies to apply for temporary position allocations for developmental purposes, which allow a space to the "losing" agency when an SES member participates in a developmental detail. For details, see OPM's memorandum entitled "Allocation of Temporary Senior Executive Service (SES), Senior Level (SL), or Scientific and Professional (ST) Spaces to Support Continuing Development of Career Senior Leaders", issued April 10, 2007, to Chief Human Capital Officers. It is available at <http://www.chcoc.gov/Transmittals/TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalID=835>.

Finally, OPM issued a memorandum in November 2008, which recommends a multi-agency experience as a technical qualification for all SES positions designated as National Security Professional positions. This memorandum is available at <http://www.chcoc.gov/Transmittals/TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalID=1709>. To help agencies develop the technical qualification policy, OPM and the NSPD-Integration Office hosted two interagency workshops in December 2008 and January 2009. Agencies may exercise discretion in defining the qualification requirement, based on their positions and mission demands.



11/07/2008



The Director

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  
Washington, DC 20415

**MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS**

**FROM: Michael W. Hager  
Acting Director**

**Subject: Guidelines for Broadening the Senior Executive Service (SES)**

As many leaders retire, the Federal Government faces a challenge – and opportunity – to improve the effectiveness of the leadership corps across Government. A recent U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) survey of Senior Executives highlighted concerns about the lack of development and career mobility among individuals in many agencies, in contrast to the broad careers envisioned by the creation of the SES. Recent history has also proven the disadvantages for national security and disaster preparedness when leaders lack a Governmentwide perspective or are not experienced in working across agency lines to respond to national threats or issues.

Under OPM's authority to provide for the continuing development of Senior Executives or to require agencies to establish such programs which meet criteria prescribed by OPM (5 USC 3396), this memorandum encourages agencies to develop policies and take appropriate actions to ensure continuing development of Senior Executives, including meeting the guidelines listed below.

The purpose of this memorandum is to encourage agencies to:

- o Promote continual learning in the context of agency missions
- o Promote broader perspectives supporting a results-oriented, sustainable, high-performance culture across Government
- o Increase collaboration within large departments and across departments and agencies
- o Maximize leadership expertise

We ask agencies, through their policies and associated actions or programs, to ensure Senior Executives understand the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of other organizations and disciplines; exchange ideas and practices; build mutual trust and familiarity, especially among those with differing perspectives; minimize obstacles to coordination; and enhance strategic thinking in an interagency environment. Inter-office, interagency, and inter-governmental assignments, fellowships, and exchanges, to include those with appropriate non-governmental organizations, will provide Senior Executives with a wealth of information about the capabilities, missions, procedures and requirements of their counterparts across the government.

SES members are encouraged to participate in developmental opportunities and rotational

assignments to gain a broad Governmentwide perspective. For the long term, we hope to build a results-oriented, sustainable, high-performance culture across Government by broadening perspective through the establishment of enterprise-wide, cross-agency competencies, with Senior Executives serving as leaders and role models.

Ideally, all SES members, at least once every 3-5 years, should pursue developmental opportunities to broaden their perspective, including:

- Details, sabbaticals, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments outside the Federal Government, or significant participation in interagency projects, or
- Rotations to a new executive position

#### **Policy considerations**

In developing these programs, agencies should keep in mind developmental opportunities take many forms, including those outlined in the September 12, 2006 memorandum to Chief Human Capital Officers (“Guidelines for Managerial Development”). Developmental opportunities may also include:

- A detail or assignment to another major component within a large department (e.g., DOD, DHS, USDA)
- A detail or assignment to another agency or department
- Cross-agency projects which involve substantive participation where the SES member gains practical knowledge and understanding of other organizations
- Assignment to certain “liaison” positions which provide the individual significant inter-agency experience

In line with the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals, agencies should place particular emphasis on rotations for SES members who are designated as National Security Professionals under Executive Order 13434, May 17, 2007.

Agencies may use current authorities to support development, including the information technology exchange authority, and the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) that allows for exchange of personnel between the Federal Government and state, local, and Indian Tribal Governments, as well as non-profit organizations, institutions of higher education, and Federally funded research and development centers.

In addition, agencies may apply for temporary allocations for developmental purposes which allow a space to the “losing” agency when an SES member participates in a developmental detail (see the attached April 10, 2007 memo for Chief Human Capital Officers).

It should also be noted that mandating interagency rotations without exceptions is likely to be difficult and impractical, especially for small agencies and very specialized positions. As a practical matter, it would be prudent to promote or to provide incentives for mobility and rotational assignments rather than to require them unilaterally. There are alternatives, such as interagency projects, that can also cultivate broad perspectives. Two current initiatives take this

middle ground approach (Defense and ODNI Joint Duty programs), allowing some exceptions and/or restricting the requirement to certain categories of positions.

Agencies should consider using their Executive Resources Boards (ERB's) or similar corporate entity to manage this initiative and provide direction and oversight, including: 1) reviewing the development of each SES member annually, 2) determining opportunities that will broaden the individual's perspective, and 3) establishing metrics for assessing the implementation of the agency policy. It is also a good idea for all SES members to have Executive Development Plans (EDP's) that address developmental assignments and/or rotations, as well as other development. These EDP's should be updated on a periodic basis (OPM has developed a sample EDP—it is available on OPM's website at [http://www.opm.gov/ses/executive\\_development/index.asp](http://www.opm.gov/ses/executive_development/index.asp)).

The original concept of the Senior Executive Service (SES) was a cadre of mobile, interchangeable leaders. Agency policies may establish mobility agreements or contracts for each new SES to sign at the time of entry into the SES for ongoing development and mobility (OPM is developing a template for agencies to use for such agreements). Additionally, agencies may want to emphasize the importance of multiple agency experiences in hiring into senior level executive positions.

If you have questions about this memorandum, please contact Nancy Randa, Deputy Associate Director, Center for Learning, Executive Resources, and Policy Analysis at 202-606-0142, [Nancy.Randa@opm.gov](mailto:Nancy.Randa@opm.gov), or your agency Human Capital Officer.

Attachment

cc: Human Resource Directors

**SAMPLE**  
**Executive Development Plan Template**

<p>The Executive Development Plan is meant to serve as the "blueprint" for all short-term and long-term developmental activities which will enhance an executive's performance. Developmental activities, whether participating in a detail assignment, taking a course, or reading a book, should develop a broader perspective and deeper knowledge of the agency and Federal government. Plans should be updated periodically (e.g., at least once every three years).</p>	
<p><b>Name/telephone number</b> John Smith, 202-555-1111</p>	<p><b>Series/grade</b> ES-0340</p>
<p><b>Position title</b> Associate Director of Public Affairs</p>	<p><b>Occupational field</b> Public Affairs</p>
<p><b>Developmental Goals</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I am new to the SES and would like to improve my leadership skills to effectively and efficiently manage the directorate</li> <li>Keep up-to-date in the Public Affairs field</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Employee signature</b></p>	<p><b>Date</b></p>
<p><b>Supervisor signature</b></p>	<p><b>Date</b></p>
<p><b>ERB signature (optional)</b></p>	<p><b>Date</b></p>

I plan to develop the following Executive Core Qualifications (ECQs) and associated Competencies: Leading People (Conflict Management), Results Driven (Accountability), and Building Coalitions (Political Savvy)

<u>DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>DATE STARTED</u>	<u>DATE COMPLETED</u>	<u>EXPECTED OUTCOMES</u>
<p><b>1. Training Course:</b> OPM Federal Executive Institute Course: <i>Leadership for a Democratic Society: Historical Foundations for Leading Contemporary Transformations</i></p>	11/9/08	12/5/08	Gain broader understanding of the Constitution and how it fits into our modern-day government; develop insights into my leadership strengths and areas for development; devise a plan to improve the organization's performance; and increase my networks for problem-solving support
<p><b>2. Books:</b> 1) <i>It's Your Ship</i>, by Captain Michael Abrashoff 2) <i>Generations at Work</i>, by Ron Zemke, Claire Raines, and Bob Filipczak 3) Find other books on similar topics (will add over time)</p>	5/1/08	1/1/10	Incorporate suggestions, recommendations and solutions from these books into my leadership and management practices
<p><b>3. Rotational Assignment:</b> 60-day detail assignment with Department of Treasury. My detail assignment will be to manage the Acquisition Division</p>	2/1/09	4/15/09	To gain a broader understanding of the Acquisition field and to learn to manage people who are in a different career field
<p><b>4. Webinars/Pod casts:</b> 1) American Management Association Web cast: <i>How Ordinary People Become Extraordinary Leaders</i> 2) Find other webinars on similar topics (will add over time)</p>	4/1/08	4/1/10	Incorporate suggestions, recommendations and solutions from these webinars and pod casts into my leadership and management practices
<p><b>5. Other:</b> Work with executive coach over several sessions</p>	8/1/08	1/1/10	Discuss strategies for overcoming barriers in my agency; Learn new techniques and improve old ones in conflict management and problem solving; Learn how to balance work, family needs, friends, and hobbies so I do not face burnout

04/10/2007



UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  
Washington, DC 20415

The Director

#### MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS

**FROM:** Linda M. Springer  
Director

**Subject:** Allocation of Temporary Senior Executive Service (SES), Senior Level (SL),  
or scientific and Professional (ST) Spaces to Support Continuing  
Development of Career Senior Leaders

On September 12, 2006, I sent you a memorandum transmitting the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) *Guidelines for Managerial Development*. In that memorandum I stated that we believe the time is right to recommit the Federal Government to developing effective leaders. The purpose of the current memorandum is to tell you about an initiative by which OPM will promote your efforts in this regard.

One of the most effective ways to develop good leaders is by exposing them to new challenges. We want to encourage you to actively develop career senior leaders through strategic short-term assignments that will strengthen them for more effective service. When you evaluate the challenges your agency must meet, assess the capabilities and potential of your senior leaders, and choose to send them on temporary assignments that will prepare them for higher level service in your agency or elsewhere in Government, we intend to support that choice.

From time to time, OPM grants a temporary space to support an agency sending an executive or senior professional on a short-term assignment, e.g., an interagency detail, during which the individual will occupy an agency space even though he or she is not available for agency work. I want to remind you that OPM grants spaces for this purpose and to point out that this practice holds great potential for supporting continuing development of your career senior leaders.

When you determine that a carefully selected assignment ranging from 12 to 24 months will strengthen a career senior leader for higher level service but your agency cannot afford to lose the SES, SL or ST space encumbered by the individual during that period, I invite you to explore whether OPM can allocate a temporary space to support your plan. For example, we will make temporary spaces available to support certain intra-agency details, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments, short term transfers that involve a reemployment right (e.g., to an international organization), and short-term reassignments, if the position to which the individual would be reassigned cannot be established within the agency's current allocation.

We are developing a streamlined process for requesting these temporary spaces through the Executive and Schedule C System and will implement this as soon as possible. In the meantime,

you may submit your requests to Ms. Cathy Penn, Manager, Executive Resources Services Group by fax at (202) 606-2126 or by mail to the Office of Personnel Management, 1900 E Street NW, Room 6484, Washington, DC 20415. An outline of the information you should submit to enable us to efficiently assess and respond to your requests is attached.

We look forward to giving you the support you need to develop the best possible leaders for the future. If you have questions about this initiative, please contact Mr. Paul Thompson, Manager, Center for Learning, Executive Resources, and Policy Analysis at (202) 606-1429 or [paul.thompson@opm.gov](mailto:paul.thompson@opm.gov), or Ms. Penn at (202) 606-2671 or [cathy.pennla@opm.gov](mailto:cathy.pennla@opm.gov).

cc: Human Resources Directors

#### ATTACHMENT

Please include the following information in your request for a temporary space to support continuing development of an SES, SL or ST employee.

1. Identify who will be going on the development assignment. Provide the individual's name, position, organizational component, location, and current appointment type.
2. Describe the development assignment. Identify the position to which the individual will be assigned; the type of assignment, e.g., detail, transfer, reassignment, including any applicable statutory or regulatory authority, such as the Intergovernmental Personnel Act or Detail or Transfer to International Organizations; the agency, organizational component and location; and the planned duration of the assignment.
3. Identify the challenges or development opportunities that the assignment will provide that the individual has not had in previous positions.
4. Describe the agency's future plans for the individual, presuming the anticipated benefits of the developmental assignments are fully realized. What position or positions will this assignment prepare the individual to assume?

You may submit your request to Ms. Cathy Penn, Manager, Executive Resources Services Group by fax at (202) 606-2126 or by mail to the Office of Personnel Management, 1900 E Street NW, Room 6484, Washington, DC 20415. If you have further questions about how to make your request, you may contact Ms. Penn on (202) 606-2671 or by email at [cathy.penn@opm.gov](mailto:cathy.penn@opm.gov).



UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  
Washington, DC 20415

The Director

November 13, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS

FROM: MICHAEL W. HAGER  
Acting Director

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael W. Hager", written over the printed name.

Subject: Recommended National Security Professional Qualification for NSP SES

In order to support implementation of Executive Order 13434--National Security Professional (NSP) Development (May 17, 2007), OPM is issuing the attached, which is recommended as a technical qualification for all NSP-designated SES positions. Agencies may exercise discretion in defining the qualification requirement based on their positions and mission demands.

NSP Executive Steering Committee members had an opportunity to review and comment on a draft in late August, and their comments were incorporated into the attached guidance.

If you have any questions, please contact Nancy Randa at [Nancy.Randa@opm.gov](mailto:Nancy.Randa@opm.gov) or 202-606-1491.

Attachment



**Recommended National Security Professional  
Qualification Requirement for NSP SES**

As stated in the National Security Professional Development Implementation Plan, the goal of professional development experiences is to:

“help National Security Professionals (NSPs) understand the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of other organizations and disciplines; exchange ideas and practices; build trust and familiarity among each other, especially those with differing perspectives; minimize obstacles to coordination; and, enhance strategic thinking in an inter-agency environment. Inter-agency, inter-governmental, and selected intra-agency assignments, fellowships, and exchanges, to include those with appropriate state, local, and non-governmental organizations will provide NSPs with a wealth of information about the capabilities, missions, procedures, and requirements of their national security partners.”

In support of this outcome, OPM and the NSP Executive Steering Committee (ESC) encourage agencies to implement a qualification requirement for specific NSP-designated SES positions for demonstrated ability to lead inter-agency, inter-departmental, inter-governmental activities, or comparable cross-organizational activities. Agencies may exercise discretion and flexibility in defining and elaborating upon the qualification requirement based on their positions and mission demands.

This policy recommends a multi-agency or equivalent experience for selection into NSP SES positions. OPM and the ESC have defined the qualifying “inter-agency” experience as follows:

Individuals should have “inter-agency” experience related to national security serving in a leadership capacity (formal or otherwise) on a temporary or permanent assignment, on a multi-agency task force, in an inter-agency liaison capacity, and/or as a volunteer. The experience should meet the following criteria:

- extensive involvement (i.e., substantial time commitment or decision-making responsibility);
- tangible results or accomplishments; and
- separate experiences in at least two organizations or a single experience involving multiple organizations.

The organizations referenced above can include Federal, state, local or foreign government entities, non-profit or non-governmental organizations, private sector organizations, international organizations such as NATO, and/or academic institutions. Departments may define multiple organizations to include their major components as appropriate.

The NSP ESC will work with the departments and agencies to define and establish the qualification standard, if needed, including an appropriate transition as agencies implement inter-agency rotational programs. Agencies and departments will need to:

- Determine the specific occupations and/or positions to which this requirement may apply.
- Conduct job analyses in support of the requirement, as required by the *Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures*, (1978), 43 FR 38290 (August 25, 1978) and 5 CFR 300.103; agencies may contact the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for information on their job analysis methodology in support of this qualification.
- Provide broad access to multi-organizational experiences to ensure a sufficient pool of qualified individuals to make sure resulting selections are merit-based and avoid the appearance of pre-selection.
- Determine, in consultation with the ESC, if exceptions will be allowed, and under what circumstances (e.g., grandfathering or there are no highly qualified candidates with inter-agency experience and it would be a detriment to the agency not to fill the position with available candidates).
- Determine an appropriate transition for implementing this requirement

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to Ms. Nancy Kichak  
From Senator Roland W. Burris**

**“National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service Workforce”  
April 30, 2009**

- 1) I recognize the importance of having a workforce that can operate across agency boundaries and respond to complex situations created by disasters and other national security hazards. However, what is the importance of rotating our workforce in order to accomplish this?**

Rotations offer employees an opportunity to gain work and leadership experience in environments outside their home departments and agencies. Operating across agency boundaries can expand leaders’ perspectives, leadership skills, and ability to adapt to changing environments. In addition, rotation assignments can serve as a vehicle for establishing key job-related contacts and developing interpersonal relationships – key requirements in effectively responding to complex situations created by disasters and other national security hazards.

Other advantages include:

- Rotations can infuse organizations with new ideas and alternate perspectives.
- Interagency staff members are able to reach back to their home organization assisting with collaboration and synchronizing efforts.
- The ability to rotate can keep work force motivated and increase retention.
- Development of a more capable and experienced employee able to rapidly integrate into another organization and respond during a crisis

**a. How much rotation training is currently being done?**

In terms of the Senior Executive Service, recent analyses indicate executives participate in a substantial amount of rotation training. The analyses show that more than 75 percent of executives have held positions in multiple agencies during their careers and over one-fourth have changed jobs during their SES tenure.

**b. How can we measure the success of rotation training?**

While the ultimate measure of success is improved security of the American people, success of rotation training can also be measured by increased productivity and innovation in the workplace. Leaders may emerge from rotational assignments with greater initiative and insight to apply to confronting natural disasters and other potential threats to national security.

- 2) I understand that the Executive Steering Committee (ESC), though initially chaired by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), has since been moved to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).**
- a. What is the reason for this move? What individual or office within OMB is responsible for the direction of the ESC?**
  - b. In your opinion, does this move make more sense than keeping direction of the ESC within OPM? If yes, please explain. If not, what agency or office do you think can best meet the goals of the ESC?**

During the last Administration, the Executive Steering Committee for the National Security Professional Development program was chaired initially by the Director of OPM, and subsequently by the Deputy Director of Management at the Office of Management and Budget. This move occurred because of the realization that the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council of the White House should have a more prominent role, in view of the fact that national security professionals respond to critical national security issues. OPM concurred that the White House Councils at that time were best positioned to oversee and direct the implementation of the NSPD Executive Order.

Since the Obama Administration took office, the National Security Council has been reorganized to combine the NSC (National Security Council) and HSC (Homeland Security Council) Staffs. It continues to be logical that the White House through this National Security Staff be the overseer over interagency coordination for the NSPD. The Strategic Planning Office of the current administration's NSC has the mission of Interagency Institutional Reform so it will likely be closely involved in the NSPD's implementation and refinement.

When the ESC moved to OMB, OPM appropriately played a supportive and consultative role. OPM continues to serve in this role with the new administration.

**Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted by Major General William A. Navas, Jr., USA, Retired  
to Senator Daniel K. Akaka**

**Hearing: April 30, 2009, "National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service"**

In Dr. Sanders's testimony, he stated that certain inter-governmental, private sector, non-governmental, academic or education organization professional experiences may qualify for joint duty credit in the Intelligence Community's (IC) joint duty program.

Question: Does the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program also allow these types of experiences for program participants?

**Response: As described in the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals, interoffice, interagency, and intergovernmental assignments (as well as fellowships and exchanges) will provide national security professionals with a wealth of information and a variety of challenging and engaging professional experiences that will enable them to better serve the mission of national security. As national security professions also exist in other realms, such as the private sector and academia, the Strategy also encourages similar professional development activities with appropriate non-governmental organizations.**

Question: If so, how many program participants currently are pursuing these assignments and can you give some specific examples of positions they are filling?

**Response: The NSPD program does not currently maintain a central database for recording and tracking cross-agency/inter-agency assignments (e.g. rotation training). Departments and agencies independently manage the professional assignments of their national security professionals.**

Dr. Sanders identified some evaluation measures he uses for the IC's joint duty program. These measures include the number of senior officers with interagency experience, the number of employees on interagency assignments, and a comparison of promotion rates for program participants with nonparticipants.

Question: Does the NSPD Program have evaluation measures in place to capture this or similar data?

**Response: At present, no. Currently, the Executive Steering Committee has not established program-wide requirements and standards for professional development of National Security Professionals. Once specific program**

**requirements are established, the next logical step will be to develop appropriate measurements/metrics to evaluate the program's effectiveness and progress.**

Question: If not, when does the NSPD Program intend to establish these types of measures?

**Response: As stated above, once specific program requirements are established, the next logical step will be to develop appropriate measurements/metrics to evaluate the program's effectiveness and progress.**

Question: Has the NSPD Program worked with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to learn more about the mathematical forecasting techniques for joint duty that it intends to employ?

**Response: As the NSPD program is still in its nascent stages, requirements have not yet matured to a state that calls for forecasting models. The next phase would include assessment and leveraging of the best available forecasting and workforce management tools for this program.**

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to Major General William A. Navas, Jr.  
From Senator Roland W. Burris**

**Hearing: April 30, 2009, "National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service"**

- 1) I recognize the importance of having a workforce that can operate across agency boundaries and respond to complex situations created by disasters and other national security hazards. However, what is the importance of rotating our workforce in order to accomplish this?

**Response: In accordance with the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals, it is critical to the success of this initiative that national security professionals achieve a well-rounded understanding of the many complex and multi-faceted national security issues facing our Nation. While education and training opportunities are essential components in this effort, enhancing one's core capabilities through a variety of challenging and engaging professional experiences is key to professionals' ability to understand more broadly the goals, roles, responsibilities, policies, and priorities of national security missions. A proven and effective way to accomplish this is through interdisciplinary assignments throughout the national security community.**

- a. How much rotation training is currently being done?

**Response: The NSPD program does not currently maintain a central database for recording and tracking cross-agency/inter-agency assignments (e.g. rotation training). Departments and agencies independently manage the professional assignments of their national security professionals.**

- b. How can we measure the success of rotation training?

**Response: Currently, the Executive Steering Committee has not established program-wide requirements and standards for professional development of National Security Professionals. Once specific program requirements are established, the next logical step will be to develop appropriate measurements/metrics to evaluate the program's effectiveness and progress, including cross-agency assignments (e.g. rotation training).**

Post-Hearing Questions and Answers for the Record  
Submitted to Dr. Ronald P. Sanders

Hearing Date: April 30, 2009  
Committee: HSGAC/OGM  
Member: Senator Akaka  
Question 1 of 4

**Question:** (U) In your testimony, you stated that certain inter-governmental, private sector, non-governmental, academic or education organization professional experiences may qualify for joint duty credit in the Intelligence Community's (IC) joint duty program. How many IC joint duty program participants currently are pursuing these assignments and can you give some specific examples of positions they are filling?

**Answer:** (U) The IC civilian workforce is large, numbering in the tens of thousands, and is spread across six cabinet level departments and two independent agencies. As such, it is challenging to know how many employees may be on what types of assignments at any given time, and the ODNI does not have the capability to track that type of data. Once the IC implements the Personnel Data Repository program, the ODNI will be able to access this type of information from across the entire IC. To the best of our knowledge, there are no IC employees currently working in the private sector, non-governmental, academic or educational organizations who will request joint duty credit as a result of those assignments. We know that there are some IC employees working outside of their respective agencies in organizations such as the National Security Council and other interagency assignments, and those will provide joint duty credit.

Hearing Date: April 30, 2009  
Committee: HSGAC/OGM  
Member: Senator Akaka  
Question 2 of 4

**Question:** (U) In your testimony, you identified a joint duty forecasting model that the IC intends to employ. How could the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program office also benefit from the use of this model?

**Answer:** (U) The RAND Corporation developed a forecasting model that projects the number of potential senior executive candidates with joint duty experience needed to establish an adequate pool of qualified candidates to fill the average annual number of executive-level vacancies that occur within the IC. The model takes several factors into account, including the regular rate of attrition of individuals with joint duty experience at the various grade levels in the pool of potential applicants and expected promotion rates of individuals with joint duty experience. The NSPD Program is likewise working to require individuals seeking Federal executive positions within the national security establishment to first have an "out of agency" experience. Therefore, a similar model could be developed for the NSPD Program to help it forecast the numbers of individuals with such experience needed to meet future executive staffing requirements.

Hearing Date: April 30, 2009  
Committee: HSGAC/OGM  
Member: Senator Akaka  
Question 3 of 4

**Question:** (U) As you know, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) can issue waivers to allow IC professionals to be promoted above the rank of GS-15 without obtaining their joint certification. Such a situation might occur for employees who have highly-specialized or needed skills. Has the DNI had to issue any waivers yet, and if so, how many?

**Answer:** (U) To date there have been no requests for promotion waivers and the DNI has not approved or issued any waivers.

Hearing Date: April 30, 2009  
Committee: HSGAC/OGM  
Member: Senator Akaka  
Question 4 of 4

**Question:** (U) The IBM report entitled *Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model* stated that an operational issue for the IC joint duty program has been determining who will pay the salary of an individual on joint assignment. How significant is this obstacle proving to be and what solutions are being worked out?

**Answer:** (U) For the vast majority of IC agencies there has been no significant operational issue regarding who pays the salary of an individual on a joint duty assignment. The joint duty implementing instructions provide that assignments may or may not be subject to reimbursement. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis by mutual agreement of both the home agency and the gaining agency. However, the cost of sending employees on joint duty assignments has been a challenge for the smaller intelligence "home" agencies. To remedy this, a joint duty reserve fund was established to provide funding to these agencies that send individuals out on joint duty assignments so that they can more easily backfill the positions vacated by those individuals. As an example, the Drug Enforcement Administration has requested such funding to facilitate its efforts to send its employees on joint duty assignments.



**Answers to Questions Submitted for the Record  
by Senator Daniel K. Akaka from Senator Bob Graham**

**Hearing: "National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service"  
April 30, 2009**

Question 1a: Do you believe that the absence of a personnel float at national security agencies will impair their ability to participate in an employee joint duty development program?

Sen. Graham: The absence of a personnel float will substantially diminish the ability of agencies to support joint assignments and professional development programs on anything but a sporadic basis. No national security organization that I am aware of has all the personnel it requires to accomplish all of its important missions on a timely basis. For that reason alone, many supervisors and managers want their personnel assigned in support of mission, rather than lose them for a year for additional schooling or a joint assignment that is considered, mistakenly, by some as unimportant. Thus, for want of an adequate personnel float, the pressing nature of the immediate mission crowds out important longer-term initiatives such as joint assignments.

I would argue that the lack of a personnel float is not only a stumbling block for an agency that wants to provide further professional development for its people through joint assignments, it virtually ensures that an organization cannot prepare itself to operate successfully in the future. While a sports metaphor may be imprecise, it would be like fielding a professional baseball team with only nine players, a limited budget and no farm system.

The Project on National Security Reform, in its November 2008 report, *Forging a New Shield*, was unambiguous in support of creating a personnel float. The report offered a compelling case for why we must overcome stovepipes and parochialisms that characterize many organizations, which joint duty assignments will help to accomplish. We cannot, especially with men and women in the field, afford to have each department and agency focused on its own mission, oftentimes to the exclusion of the larger U.S. mission. We must, as I conveyed in my prepared statement, have everyone pulling on the same length of rope, at the same time, and in the same direction. Or, as the PNSR report said, our civilian workforce must acquire what our military has: a national security mindset, which will allow us to more effectively and simultaneously integrate the military, diplomatic and other aspects of American power.

The report was also unambiguous, and entirely correct, in observing that the current threat environment "puts a premium on foresight – the ability to anticipate unwelcome contingencies," which "constitutes the critical precondition for actively shaping the global security environment in ways conducive to achieving national security goals." The way to develop the ability to anticipate is, in large part, to develop junior and mid-career professionals who have broad skills, excellent analytical and planning capabilities, and the ability to operate across organizational boundaries. Thus, the absolute need for a personnel float extends well beyond an agency's ability or inability to assign people to joint duty assignments. It is essential

for that organization's ability to operate successfully in an increasingly complex threat environment. The bottom line here is that we must allocate sufficient resources to fully fund a float for each agency, and then ensure that personnel are assigned and trained appropriately to ensure that objectives are met and capabilities are improved.

Our military services set the standard when it comes to budgeting for a personnel float. The officers of our services will spend approximately 25 percent of their time in various training and professional development courses. Such a practice has been routine within the Department of Defense for decades, but would be impossible were it not for the use of a personnel float. It is essential, even in time of war, to continue to provide professional development opportunities for its junior, mid-career and senior officers. To do otherwise would be the equivalent of eating an organization's seed corn.

The insurgencies that we confront today, and will likely face in the future, will be complex conflicts. If we are to succeed -- and we must -- we must have civilian personnel at all levels who can and will work together, with the military, and think beyond their own organization's defined mission.

Question 1b: If you believe that personnel floats are necessary, how do you recommend putting them in place at agencies participating in joint duty assignments?

Sen. Graham: Experience, planning, and training will afford leaders the tools to properly size and budget for a personnel float for their organization that would allow a meaningful number of personnel to participate in joint duty assignments and other professional development programs on an annual and recurring basis. In addition, I would incentivize joint assignments as did Goldwater-Nichols. Congress should make joint duty a prerequisite for promotion to senior leadership positions. Congress should also track each agency's annual progress toward the goal of  $x$  number of personnel assigned to joint duty, and  $x$  number to other professional development programs such as graduate school. Whether or not most agencies meet their goals will be a function of the willingness of Congress to conduct meaningful oversight, and if need be, to mandate compliance, until joint duty assignments and a properly funded personnel float are accepted practice.

Within an agency, the decision to create, fund and sustain an adequately sized personnel float is ultimately a question of leadership. Absent that leadership, Congress must force change just as it did with Goldwater-Nichols. Personnel are the primary driver of organizational transformation, as the Joint Congressional Inquiry, the 9-11 Commission and I have written elsewhere. The capabilities we develop to meet today's needs, and those of tomorrow, will largely be a function of our appreciation for that fundamental truth.

Our intelligence community, as you know, has been praised for its Joint Duty Program, which is meant, among other things, to foster interagency communication and collaboration. We must now require similar programs across all other national security agencies.

Question 2: Are there other topics that should be a training focus for national security professionals? If so, what are they?

Sen. Graham: The answer to that question is almost open-ended in nature. We must improve our knowledge of many critical languages, cultures and ethnic groups. The National Security Education Program is a good example of how to address national security requirements, but the number of personnel we require far exceeds the number of students trained through this outstanding program. Our intelligence agencies need additional case officers, analysts and support personnel. The intelligence community must also address its weakening science and technology base in nuclear science and particularly in biotechnology. We must interest enough young Americans to become scientists and engineers, regardless of where they want to work, but we absolutely must recruit almost an entirely new generation of scientists and engineers to work in our national laboratories.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering  
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka

“National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service”  
April 30, 2009

1. The IBM report entitled *Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model* identified the need for a “personnel float” to give the Intelligence Community greater flexibility to invest in training. The lack of a float appears to be a potential stumbling block for agency participation in an even broader, national security joint duty program.
  - a. Do you believe that the absence of a personnel float at national security agencies will impair their ability to participate in an employee joint duty development program?

Yes. The creation of a personnel float at national security agencies and agencies with national security components is essential to the success of every element of national security professional development. A float will ensure that there are individuals to fill positions necessary for accomplishing agency missions while others are on training, education, or joint duty assignments. The long-term success of the military in developing its fighting forces and its leadership is the most powerful and successful example that we have of the necessity for making this investment. However, as the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism noted in their report, “unlike the Defense Department, the intelligence community and most other national security agencies lack the manpower to assign officers to extended training programs without suffering a drop in operational capability.” The need for a personnel float to support additional professional development is further supported by the American Academy of Diplomacy’s and the Stimson Center’s report *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* that argues for the creation of a personnel float to allow increased training for foreign service professionals.

While the WMD Commission Report and *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future* refer to training programs requiring the hiring of additional employees as a personnel float, such equally applies to instituting joint duty assignments. Like extended training, joint duty assignments take individuals out of their agencies for an extended period of time, leaving those positions unfilled. Agencies will only allow and encourage employees and executives to serve in joint duty assignments if they are certain of their ability to fill the now empty positions with individuals of equal or greater competence. Until an adequate personnel float is created, agencies will not be assured of having such ability and will likely discourage employees and executives from serving in joint duty assignments and preference individuals that stay at their home agencies when making decisions about promotions and other incentives.

The creation of a personnel float will also create incentives for agencies to send individuals on joint duty assignments as sending individuals on such assignments will open up positions for other employees who need positions to fill.

**b. If you believe that personnel floats are necessary, how do you recommend putting them in place at agencies participating in joint duty programs?**

The process of putting in place a personnel float will have to take place over a period of time. Through their workforce analysis and planning program, agencies must first identify how many national security professionals they have and, based on that number, how large a personnel float they will need to fill positions while other agency employees and executives are on training, educational, or joint duty assignments. After the number of individuals necessary for a personnel float is calculated, the agencies should calculate the period of time required to phase in a personnel float without overwhelming the system. Finally, to make the float a reality Congress and the Executive Branch must work together to create such a float, with the Executive Branch creating a timeline for phasing in new employees and Congress overseeing that timeline and appropriating the necessary funds to hire new employees and executives. Our best estimate is that a 10-15 percent float can be effectively and efficiently integrated in most organizations over a 3-5 year period.

The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center report *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* may provide a model for calculating the size of the float needed. Based on looking at specific needs, the report suggests that 1,287 individuals must be hired to create the necessary personnel float for increased training and education within the Department of State.<sup>1</sup>

**2. As you know, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism identified several important training topics for national security employees, including crisis response and combating terrorism and WMD proliferation.**

**Are there other topics that should be a training focus for national security professionals? If so, what are they?**

As the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism said, a “government-wide professional education and training program for the national security officer corps, covering multiple stages of officers’ careers [should be established].” While the Commission focused on the three issues mentioned, such training should cover multiple issues and, as Commission’s report notes, cover “multiple stages” of an employee’s career.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=708>.

In fact, training for national security professionals should include four parts: 1) orientation and training for all national security employees, regardless of level, on the national security system, its components, and how those components work together; 2) training in competency areas required for all national security professionals; 3) specialty training for individuals based on their agencies, expertise, and career paths; and 4) leadership development.

Orientation and training on the system should be focused on teaching both new and continuing national security professionals about how the national security system and its individual pieces work as well as the best means to optimize the tools of national power. Continuing education and training should ensure that national security professionals continue to be up to date on the components and efforts of the national security system. This initial training is also a critical component of introducing employees to the national security culture.

Training in core areas – like three mentioned by the Commissions, crisis response, combating terrorism and WMD proliferation – is essential to assuring national security professionals and the system has basic core knowledge and competencies. To define these core competencies, a National Security Human Capital Strategy and Implementation Plan should identify the core competencies needed by system professionals based on the strategic goals, objectives and outcomes identified as part of the nation's national security strategy. These competencies should then become the basis for topics in which national security professionals should be trained. Among the potential topics are: strategic thinking, planning, joint operation implementation, and operation assessment.

While it is important to train people in the competencies needed by all national security professionals, it is also important to train individuals to ensure they are able to best fulfill their responsibilities to their home agencies. The military is successful in training service professionals because it develops within its leaders both specialized skills and those skills necessary to be a generalist.

Leadership development is also essential to national security professional training. The system must not merely train individuals to operate within the system, it must also train individuals to be the system's leaders and ensure that the system operates at the highest level. Good leaders are necessary for successfully implementing, strengthening, and continuing the national security workforce that this country and its citizens need.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to Professor James R. Thompson  
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka**

**“National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service”  
April 30, 2009**

**1. In the IBM report entitled Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model, you identified the need for a personnel float to give the Intelligence Community greater flexibility to invest in training. The lack of a float appears to be a potential stumbling block for agency participation in an even broader, national security joint duty program.**

**a. Do you believe that the absence of a personnel float at national security agencies will impair their ability to participate in an employee joint duty development program?**

Response: I do believe that the absence of a personnel float at national security agencies will impair their ability to participate in an employee joint duty development program. Absent a personnel float, that is, a system whereby, when a person goes on a joint duty assignment, provision is made to fill in behind that individual, there will be strong disincentives on the part of that person's superior to allow participation.

**b. If you believe that personnel floats are necessary, how do you recommend putting them in place at agencies participating in joint duty programs?**

Response: To the extent that provision is made by the gaining agency to reimburse the employee's home agency for his/her salary costs, no additional resources would be required. However, in the Intelligence Community, it has been left to the individual agencies to negotiate such compensation. When that compensation is not forthcoming, the home agency is left in a budgetary hole.

As an alternative, provision could be made at the agency level to provide the resources required to fill in behind individuals on joint duty since agency level rates of participation will likely remain relatively constant from year to year. This could be done simply by reducing an agency's anticipated vacancy rate. If, for example, an agency's budget is set based on the presumption that 4% of all positions, on average will be vacant at any one time, a reduction in the vacancy rate to 3% will provide additional resources to fill in behind individuals on joint duty assignment. It is also incumbent upon Congress and upon the Office of Management and Budget to acknowledge the need for a float in setting full-time equivalent ceilings.

- 2. You stated in your testimony that if policies for a joint duty program are designed centrally and imposed on the participants, program governance problems are likely to surface. How do you recommend getting early buy-in from agencies in developing the guidance for joint duty programs?**

Response: Simply put, all the players need to be at the table. Agencies don't react well when programs are forced upon them from above. They are further fairly adept at undermining programs which they don't perceive to be in their interest. The Intelligence Community provides a fairly compelling example of how, when agencies are allowed to participate in the design of a program, they generally tend to buy into the result and have a stake in making it work. That said, there also needs to be a driver; an entity that forces the process so that agencies can't simply stall. In the case of the Intelligence Community, that entity was the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

- 3. The IBM report stated that an operational issue for the IC joint duty program has been determining who will pay the salary of an individual on joint assignment. How significant is this obstacle proving to be and what solutions are being worked out?**

Response: Based on the Intelligence Community example, it does not seem to be a significant problem. Agencies have been able to work this out among themselves. The ODNI has stated that the flows of individuals on joint duty between agencies have generally been in balance; i.e. the same number of individuals come from an agency as that go to the same agency. In these situations, there is not a disproportionate and adverse financial impact on any one agency. Should, in fact, the flows be out of balance, then the financial issues will have to be addressed.