[Senate Hearing 111-551]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-551
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN OVERSEEING THE SAFETY OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HOUSING, TRANSPORTATION, AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON
BANKING,HOUSING,AND URBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN OVERSEEING THE SAFETY OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
EVAN BAYH, Indiana MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JON TESTER, Montana MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Edward Silverman, Staff Director
William D. Duhnke, Republican Staff Director
Dawn Ratliff, Chief Clerk
Devin Hartley, Hearing Clerk
Shelvin Simmons, IT Director
Jim Crowell, Editor
______
Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana, Ranking Republican Member
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York BOB CORKER, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
JOHN TESTER, Montana JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
Michael Passante, Transit Staff Director
Harold J. Connolly, Housing Staff Director
Travis M. Johnson, Republican Staff Director
Lisa Frumin, Legislative Assistant
Mitchell S. Warren, Professional Staff Member
Joe Hepp, Professional Staff Member
Bonnie Graves, Legislative Detailee
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2009
Page
Opening statement of Chairman Menendez........................... 1
Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of:
Senator Warner............................................... 2
Chairman Dodd................................................ 6
WITNESSES
Ray LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Accompanied
by Peter M. Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit
Administration................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Responses to written questions of:
Chairman Dodd............................................ 59
Barbara Mikulski, U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland........ 14
Prepared statement........................................... 31
John B. Catoe, Jr., General Manager, Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority.............................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Responses to written questions of:
Chairman Dodd............................................ 59
Senator Cardin........................................... 61
David Wise, Director, Physical Infrastructure Team, Government
Accountability Office.......................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Responses to written questions of:
Chairman Dodd............................................ 64
Brian Cristy, Director, Transportation Oversight Division,
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Responses to written questions of:
Chairman Dodd............................................ 67
William Millar, President, American Public Transportation
Association.................................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Responses to written questions of:
Chairman Dodd............................................ 68
Additional Material Supplied for the Record
Statement of Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator from the State of
Maryland....................................................... 73
Statement of Arun Vohra, P.E., President MINI, LLC............... 74
Statement of Richard W. Clark, Director of the Consumer
Protection and Safety Division of the California Public
Utilities Commission........................................... 78
Transit Safety Bill.............................................. 89
DOT Fact Sheet--The Public Transportation Safety Program Act of
2009........................................................... 104
(iii)
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
OVERSEEING THE SAFETY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community
Development,
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met at 9:33 a.m., in room SD-538, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Senator Robert Menendez (Chairman of
the Subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROBERT MENENDEZ
Chairman Menendez. Good morning. This hearing of the
Banking Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community
Development will come to order. I would like to, first of all,
thank Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby and Senator
Vitter and their staffs for working with us to put together
today's hearing.
Chairman Dodd is a busy man these days. He is in the midst
of achieving the most important reform in our health care
system in a generation, while at the same time working hard to
completely overhaul our regulatory financial system, not to
mention his central role in formulating legislation to jump-
start our economy and create millions of new jobs. So in the
interest of giving him a few minutes this week to sleep and
eat, I volunteered to lead on this hearing. So we appreciate
everything he is doing.
I want to start off by praising the work of Secretary
LaHood and Administrator Rogoff. They are overseeing transit
policy at a time of historic ridership, but also at a time when
States and localities have few resources to meet this demand.
They have proven themselves able and visionary leaders in these
trying times.
As seen by the proposal they will be discussing today,
their leadership on safety has been particularly important. In
transportation policy, safety must always be of paramount
importance. This past summer, the tragic Metro crash claimed
the lives of nine people, including a retired commanding
general of the D.C. National Guard and his wife, two working
moms, a retired teacher, and a woman who worked with nurses
around the world. We must never forget that coming up short on
safety results in tragedies that must be avoided at any cost.
As we begin this discussion, there are a few key points I
would like to make.
First, the way we currently regulate mass transit safety
simply does not make sense to me. There is basically no Federal
role in transit safety oversight, and, frankly, that is pretty
shocking. We have 27 States with a mishmash of regulations who
are underfunded, understaffed, who are lacking in safety
training and oversight, and who are often not doing a good job
of maintaining transit assets.
Second, in the past 2 years, there has been a disturbing
trend in transit safety. Fatalities, injuries, and derailments
all seem to be trending upwards, and we must act promptly to
make sure this trend is stopped and reversed.
Third, it is important to keep in mind that despite the
lack of Federal oversight and the disturbing trends in recent
years, mass transit is still, however, by most measures the
safest mode of transportation that there is, much safer than
driving, safer than flying, even safer than commuter rail,
which is governed by a very robust Federal safety system.
The last point I would like to make is that no matter how
well we regulate transit safety, we cannot expect safe systems
if we do not invest in new infrastructure. According to an FTA
report this past April, it would cost $50 billion just to get
the Nation's seven largest transit systems to an acceptable
state of good repair. A jobs bill is being put together as we
speak, and I am hopeful that robust rail modernization funds
will be part of that bill. Rail modernization funds spend out
quickly, they create jobs, and they are an investment in
infrastructure that is critical to our economic health. These
funds must be part of any effort to make transit safer.
So I want to thank the Administration for a well-thought-
out proposal. I look forward to working with them and the
Chairman to make transit safety an important Federal priority.
This issue is of the utmost importance and cannot be held
hostage, in my view, by the reauthorization process. Therefore,
despite a quite full Committee schedule, I certainly hope and
expect that we will mark up transit safety legislation early
next year.
With that, let me recognize the distinguished Ranking
Member, Senator Vitter, for his comments.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am eager to hear
the testimony, so I will simply thank you and the Committee for
this hearing and welcome Secretary LaHood, and I had the honor
and pleasure of serving with him in the House. So thanks for
your continuing service, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Menendez. Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK R. WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
the chance to be here and thank you and the Ranking Member for
holding this important hearing. My apologies on the front end
to the Secretary and Mr. Catoe and some of the others on the
other panels. I have to step out in about 20 minutes.
I want to, first of all, again echo the Chairman's comments
on the importance of transit safety and the fact that it has
been an area that I think has often been, at least at the
Federal level, overlooked, and I have to acknowledge, as a
former Governor, perhaps at the State level overlooked as well.
So I want to start, again, by applauding the Secretary for his
collaborative approach he has taken in trying to see how the
Federal Government can be involved in strengthening these State
and local efforts in terms of transit safety, and I really look
forward to working with the Chairman and the Ranking Member and
you on making sure we move forward with this.
You know, echoing again what the Chairman said, the recent
incidents on Metro are more than just an incident to me since
this is a network that serves my communities in Virginia. And
we all remember the tragic accident in Maryland in June. But as
we know, there had been a series of other incidents that had
taken place over the last few months, three of them actually in
Virginia, one as recently as November 29th in West Falls
Church. So this string of incidents really heightens the need
for our attention and focus.
Echoing again what the Chairman said, we need to make sure
we have got adequate Federal funding, and I am happy to see
that the recently released conference report on the fiscal year
2010 Transportation, HUD appropriations bill includes about
$150 million in new funding for grants, and WMATA can go after
some of those to address safety and maintenance issues. I think
one of the things all of us who live in the greater capital
area realize is the Metro system--which I can still remember
when we prided it as brand spanking new--is getting up in age
now. [Inaudible], whom I have worked with for many, many
decades, reminded me it is about 35 years old, 35, 40 years old
at this point, and just like any house that gets that age,
things all of a sudden start breaking down at one. And I think
we are seeing that, at least on the maintenance side with
Metro, it is showing its age.
So I echo the Chairman's comments that not only do we need
to increase our focus on safety, but we also have to increase
our focus on maintenance.
I just want to make two final points before the Secretary's
comments. I hope we would look at this from the standpoint of
how we get transit safety right. There very well probably
should be an increased Federal transit safety role. As I echoed
earlier, so many States, perhaps with the exception of
California, most States do not do a very good job on transit
safety. I know we have gone back to my Secretary of
Transportation--or Governor Kaine's Secretary of
transportation, who was also my Secretary of Transportation,
and trying to look at what authority we thought we had in
Virginia to take on transit safety. And it has just never been
high enough on our priority list, and there is some uncertainty
on what kind of authority at the State level we have.
And in terms of Metro, that is further compounded because
of the challenge with the three jurisdictions. I know that the
biggest divide oftentimes talked about in this area is
oftentimes viewed as the Potomac River between Virginia,
Maryland, and the District. And with these three jurisdictions
here in the Metro system, we are going to have to find a way to
perhaps strengthen the tri-jurisdiction oversight board; we are
going to have to look at how we strengthen both local and State
abilities to look at safety.
And since I am not going to be here for Mr. Catoe's
comments, I do want to at least pose a couple questions. One is
that we have read that Metro has lost a number of its
experienced employees in the normal course of retirement, and
as we have seen, some of these positions, particularly in terms
of safety oversight, may be being replaced by much younger
employees. I would hope to hear from Mr. Catoe's testimony what
he is doing to emphasize safety in terms of training of all
employees, how we make sure that safety is a high priority and
is measured and employees are measured on their safety
performance. And I am wondering, in light of the fact that we
have had this attrition, what else we can do to slow further
attrition of an experienced workforce; what new safety training
programs are you putting in place; and then, third, has there
been any thought to, at least on some short-term basis, even
perhaps bringing back some of the recently retired employees
who have got an expertise in safety on how they might help
consult or further train this newer workforce.
So while I will not be here to hear his responses, I look
forward to getting the answers to those questions and, again,
look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary and Members of
this Committee, on trying to get this right. Thank you.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. I just want to recognize and welcome Mr.
LaHood. It was a pleasure serving with you in the Congress,
Ray. And also Peter Rogoff, who was very kind and able when he
was here in the Senate. Thank you, Peter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Menendez. And he is still kind and able, right?
Senator Reed. Well, we will see.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Menendez. Well, that is why I posed the question.
Thank you.
Let me introduce Secretary LaHood, whom we all know very
well. He is the 16th United States Secretary of Transportation,
and while he has had a relatively short tenure, he has already,
I think, distinguished himself in the role. Several of us have
had the opportunity to serve with the Secretary back in the
House of Representatives where we proudly served with him on
the Transportation and Infrastructure Chairman.
So, with that, Mr. Secretary, we welcome you and are ready
for your comments.
STATEMENT OF RAY LaHOOD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY PETER M. ROGOFF, ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. LaHood. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you
very much for the opportunity to testify on our proposed
legislation to reform the Department of Transportation's role
in overseeing the safety of our Nation's rail transit systems.
With me today is Peter Rogoff, whom all of you know. He is our
Transit Administrator now and doing a great job.
Traveling by rail transit in the remains extraordinarily
safe, yet serious accidents do occur, such as this summer's
tragic Washington Metro crash and other recent accidents in
Boston and San Francisco. We believe additional action is
needed to make rail transit even safer.
Rail transit is currently the only mode within the
Department that operates without comprehensive Federal safety
regulations, oversight, or enforcement authority, and we must
remedy that gap. Rail transit systems carry far more passengers
daily than either our domestic airlines or passenger and
commuter railroads, where safety is stringently regulated by
the FAA and the FRA, respectively. Yet the DOT is prohibited by
a provision in the Urban Mass Transportation Act from issuing
national safety regulations for rail transit systems. That
antiquated provision was put into law 45 years ago. I ask you
to change it now so that we can address the safety needs of the
more than 14 million Americans that use these rail transit
systems every day. This is an antiquated law, and it needs to
be changed.
At present, the Nation's major metropolitan subway and
light rail systems from Seattle and San Francisco, to Chicago,
Boston, New York, and Atlanta, are subject only to the Federal
Transit Administration State Safety Oversight program. This
program lacks Federal statutory authority to establish
meaningful minimum safety thresholds in States where rail
transit systems operate. Each rail transit system is permitted
to determine its own safety practices. It is up to State
governments, not FTA, to determine the extent of regulatory
oversight and enforcement authority granted to each transit
system.
This results in a patchwork of 27 separate State oversight
programs guided by a regulatory framework of inconsistent
practices, limited standards, and marginal effectiveness. What
is more, most States devote insufficient resources to these
safety programs nationwide, with one exception: State safety
oversight agencies employ an average of less than one full-time
person per year to do this work. Under these conditions, we
risk transit safety problems going unidentified and
uncorrected, especially as the transit infrastructure gets
older and available revenues for transit remain tight.
Clearly, urgent reform is needed now. Under the leadership
of our Deputy Secretary John Porcari, our Department has
developed a legislative proposal that has now been formally
transmitted to you all on behalf of the President, to the
Speaker of the House, and the President of the Senate, and I
ask you consider our reform proposal seriously and promptly.
Our legislative proposal would accomplish three goals to
strengthen transit safety nationwide.
Number one, through the FTA, it would establish and enforce
minimum Federal safety standards for rail transit systems that
receive Federal transit funding.
Two, it would establish a safety certification program that
would provide Federal assistance to eligible States that elect
to carry out federally approved public transportation safety
programs and enforce Federal regulations. Through this
provision, we seek to ensure that States will now have the
manpower and training and the enforcement tools to conduct
meaningful oversight. In States that choose to opt out, the FTA
will enforce the new Federal standards.
And, three, the program would ensure that any State agency
overseeing transit systems would be financially independent
from the transit systems it oversees. This morning, I have
informed Congress that we would establish a transit rail
advisory committee to develop new rail transit safety
recommendations for FTA's consideration. The advisory committee
will be made up of safety specialists from transit agencies,
labor, and academia. Their expertise will guide much of our
regulatory effort. Our goal is not to impose highly detailed
regulations but, rather, to encourage rail transit agencies to
use modern risk analysis to identify their own unique safety
vulnerabilities and then take action.
Safety remains our highest priority at DOT. We have
established in the Department a DOT Safety Council that will
tackle critical and cross-cutting safety issues across all
transportation modes. Our transit safety legislation proposal
was brought before our council and approved through the input
of safety experts across the entire Department. I believe our
proposal offers a critical and necessary step to provide the
consistent oversight the rail transit industry needs to ensure
safe operations for transit workers and the traveling public.
We look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you again for your leadership, for Chairman Dodd's leadership,
and allowing us to be here to testify today.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
testimony.
Let me welcome and call upon the distinguished Chair of the
full Committee, who I guess I gave just enough time to have a
little breakfast before he got here.
Chairman Dodd. Well, I thank you for that.
Chairman Menendez. With everything you are doing, in my
opening statement--we are amazed that you actually--health care
reform, the jobs package, financial regulatory reform. So we
are thrilled to have you here.
Chairman Dodd. Well, I would not miss Ray LaHood, a friend
and colleague.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
Chairman Dodd. I will be very, very brief.
First of all, let me thank Senator Menendez for doing this.
He has a strong interest, obviously, in the subject matter, and
you see by just the participation here of Senator Vitter as
well as Mark Warner and Jack Reed and others. This subject
matter is one that all of us have a great deal of interest in,
and, Ray, we are very excited, obviously--and you and I have
worked already on a number of issues together--about your
leadership in this effort. So I appreciate that very, very
much.
As I said before, this is a--we often talk about win-win
issues. I often describe this issue as a win-win-win-win-win,
and basically what that means is it cuts down traffic
congestion, what we are talking about, transit policies,
revitalizes communities, reduces our dependence on foreign oil,
protects our environment, and perhaps most importantly,
connects people to jobs and services. And so this is an issue
that truly demands our ongoing attention.
And you may have said this already, Mr. Chairman, and if I
am repeating some of your remarks, I apologize. But I was
stunned to see the numbers on ridership--and I know you and I
have talked about this, Ray, already, but the highest numbers
since 1956, 10.7 billion trips taken last year on public
transit. And so as Chairman of the Committee working with
Senator Menendez and others, Senator Shelby, we want to work
with you to increase that number in the years to come as well.
But a first priority, obviously, is security of our transit
systems, and even though there are problems and we read about
them and highlight it, I think it is important to note that
among the safest modes of transportation is transit. From 1998
to 2007, incidents on public transportation rail systems fell
by half, which is a very positive sign, despite the notoriety,
obviously, of some of these major problems we have seen. But a
recent series of high-profile accidents have some Americans
concerned, and rightfully so. Since last spring, there have
been accidents in Boston, San Francisco, and here in
Washington. Nine people have lost their lives, 133 have been
injured--obviously, number that are not acceptable. But, still,
I think the record overall has been a pretty good one.
The Transit Administration has limited authority, as you
have pointed out, to implement and enforce national transit
safety standards, and we need to correct that, meaning that we
have gone without a proper national safety program. States
handed an unfunded mandate have been forced to scrap by the
State Safety Oversight Boards. Many of these boards lack
authority and expertise, as you point out, and here is where we
have got to close that gap, obviously. This is an ad hoc
approach to transit safety. Oversight has got to be replaced
with a clear national transit safety standards, and I support
you in that effort.
Secretary LaHood and Administrator Rogoff have taken a
leadership role, and we are deeply grateful to both of you for
doing so, and we will closely review it and work with you, and
by improving our oversight structure, it will not be enough. We
need to address the enormous backlog of needed investments in
transit infrastructure, and you and I have talked a lot about
this.
Metro North, which provided nearly 40 million trips in
Connecticut last year alone, has not had a collision in more
than 25 years. But we cannot keep running along aging rail
lines and decaying tracks and bridges and expect the record of
safety to continue. It just will not happen.
A recent rail modernization study by the FTA of the
Nation's nine largest transit operators, including Metro North,
found that one-third of the studied agencies' assets are near
or have exceeded their expected life span and are in either
marginal or poor condition. We are running about a $50 billion
deficit in funding for the needed repairs, which is just going
to only grow.
Funding levels for the Fixed Guideway Modernization Program
lag well behind what is needed to address backlogs in repair
and replacement and must be addressed in the next
transportation bill.
We can get a head start on catching up by funding the
transit capital investment, the jobs bill, something I think we
ought to do. Rebuilding and repairing our infrastructure will
create jobs, obviously, we all know and create more reliable
systems. No rider should ever wonder if they are safe on our
transit systems.
So I commend you for what you are doing, and I should note
that Senator Mikulski is also testifying today, and she has
taken a great interest in this issue as a result of the tragic
accident last summer on the Washington Metro system. So I would
like to thank our witnesses in advance and, Ray, for your
testimony as we move forward on this, and obviously, the
opportunity here for us to take advantage of what people now
perceive as a needed area of interest and concern ought to be
utilized. And so I thank you.
I thank again Bob Menendez, who has done just a wonderful
job on this issue as well, and we share, obviously, in our
region, along with Jack, this tremendous dependency and a
growing dependency and an opportunity for us to really expand
and lead the country in so many ways in this area. So I thank
you and I thank Bob.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you, Chairman.
We will turn to a round of questions here. We will put 5
minutes on the clock. Let me start off. Mr. Secretary, again, I
want to reiterate I think this is a strong proposal that sets
us on the path to a much safer national transit system, but I
have got a few questions.
One--and, you know, the Administrator is sitting next to
you--is FTA ready for this type of change? Up until now, I view
the FTA as much more of a grantmaking organization, and my
understanding is that it has less than full-time employees--
three full-time employees that are focused on safety. So the
question is: Can FTA effectively change its mission and can it
effectively ramp up, assuming the Congress passes the
legislation and sends it to the President? Is that something
that you envision being able to happen?
Mr. LaHood. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. We believe that upon
enactment and having this bill signed, whatever you all do, it
will take upwards of 3 years to really implement it, and during
that time we will be able to staff up and work with the States
on really developing the very best safety program possible. We
believe it is possible, and if you do not mind, I will let
Peter say a word about this also.
Chairman Menendez. Absolutely.
Mr. Rogoff. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have been working with
OMB in development of the 2011 budget proposal of the President
to make sure that there is a meaningful funding increment to
hire the necessary staffing both in terms of folks who write
regulations, economists, attorneys, but also to better finance
the State partners in the field so they can buildup their
expertise and inspections, the training costs, the salary costs
to stand up this system.
Chairman Menendez. Which brings me to my second question,
some of the details which have to be fleshed out, and those
details are going to determine whether the safety regime is
going to be successful or not. When do you envision being able
to give us insights as to what type of oversight authority
States are going to need to meet Federal standards? And how
much are we talking about in terms of projected costs as well
as, you know, what type of staffing will be necessary in order
to meet these new more rigorous standards?
Mr. Rogoff. Well, sir, the funding increments and the
funding needs of the program have about 30 components. First,
as I mentioned, is getting the necessary folks in--house in FTA
to do the regulation writing. Importantly, because the State
have stood up sort of the bare minimum in terms of State
oversight, our proposal envisions the Federal Government taking
over that cost and growing it in terms of their--you know,
right now, as the Secretary said in his opening statement,
these State agencies, with one exception, average less than one
person per year. We do not think that is anywhere near
adequate. So we would propose through Federal grants to grow
that resource both to handle the staffing costs and the
training costs.
Now, overall, in terms of hard numbers, we are not in a
position while the 2011 budget is being developed to talk about
hard numbers, but we are comfortable saying that it will be
well less than 1 percent of the FTA's total budget. We are
fine-tuning with OMB those needs right now.
In the area of authorities that we would expect the safety
partners in the States to have, in order for us to certify them
as an adequate State partner to enforce Federal regulations, in
general we want them to have the necessary teeth to actually
compel the attention of the transit agencies they oversee. And
that is something we have not seen to date. So that could--not
necessarily but could--include the ability to assess fines.
They would have to have full access to inspect those systems.
They would have to have full access to all of the agencies'
documentation. And if we found them to be inadequate, we would
have Federal FTA personnel handle the oversight in that State.
Chairman Menendez. One last question. Mr. Secretary, you
talked about in your testimony the desire to have performance-
based measurements when evaluating whether an agency is
operating safely or not. What type of performance measurements
are we talking about? Are we talking about the number of
accidents, personnel dedicated to safety, condition of systems?
What are we looking at?
Mr. LaHood. Well, we have some experience with this through
the FRA and also through our pipeline safety program in the
Department, and we would probably look at those standards and
issues in relationship to what best practices have been with
the FRA and our pipeline safety, and then work with the transit
organizations to make the highest safety standards and our
ability to really oversee those in a way that reflects the
values that, you know, safety is number one.
We had a meeting, Peter and I convened a meeting of transit
groups from around the country--this was a few months ago--to
explain to them that we felt it was important for the
Department to step up on safety and to elicit their ideas on
how we could use their expertise, whatever they had, with our
expertise to really develop these kinds of standards.
So we are going to take best practices from around the
country. We are going to take best practices from within our
own Department through the FRA, which, you know, does some of
this, and also our pipeline safety, and really try and use best
practices to develop these new standards.
Chairman Menendez. Just one quick follow-up. I think it is
great to have the stakeholders with you. What was their
attitude?
Mr. LaHood. Well, I will let Peter talk about that. I think
the fact that Mr. Catoe is here today, he just told me before
we began, he supports what we are doing, and he has given us a
lot of encouragement to move ahead with it. I think that is a
very strong signal from one of the largest Metro systems in the
country--America's Metro system, if you will. And we appreciate
the fact that he is here today supporting our efforts, and I
think that is true. But Peter was actually interfacing with
these folks a little more than I was.
Mr. Rogoff. Mr. Chairman, I would say there are a lot of
elements of our legislative proposal that have been infused by
our meetings with the stakeholders, not just--we had State DOT
commissioners at that meeting. Senator Warner talked about his
State commissioner who frankly admitted at that meeting that he
did not know, until the issue of the Norfolk rail system came
to him, that he even had this responsibility in his agency. Two
other State transportation commissioners basically confessed
the same thing as part of that stakeholders meeting.
So, clearly, we took from that the need to raise the
visibility and either raise the capability of the State
partners or, frankly, replace them with a Federal presence to
make sure that the issues are being attended to.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Chairman Dodd. Just quickly----
Chairman Menendez. Senator Dodd.
Chairman Dodd. Senator Menendez asked the one question, but
we are doing a lot of opting out today in various proposals
around Congress, whether it is public options or the like. And
I notice here, despite the efforts--and I commend you for
them--you allow the States to opt out here. And just given the
budgetary constraints and all the other pressures that every
one of our States is facing across the country--I talked to my
Governor the other today, spoke to the Speaker of the House
last night on matters in Connecticut, and they are all facing
it. And I just wonder, how are you going to encourage the
States not to opt out, it seems to me, given the pressures they
are under?
Mr. Rogoff. Well, sir, we are talking about adopting,
basically taking on the State costs as a Federal cost in this
instance. So we would be covering--if they would grow the
inspection presence and grow their authorities to do an
adequate job, we would cover the salaries, we would cover the
training, we would cover the travel of those State partners.
They could still opt out. There are a couple of States--
Wisconsin might be one that has a very short amount of mileage;
Arkansas might be another that has only less than 4 miles of
rail transit service. They may opt out only because the effort
might not seem worthy given the size of their systems. But, in
general, if we are taking on the costs, we would hope that they
would continue to participate with us.
Chairman Dodd. Well, I hope you are right, as well. Let us
know. Let us know in what ways we can incentivize that even
more, because that will be critically important.
Last, let me just raise--and Peter, let me quote you,
because I thought this was a very strong statement and one I
couldn't agree with more. And the quote that you made in
August, I think it was, of this year, you said, ``Deferred
maintenance items, if deferred long enough or left undetected,
can become critical safety risks. The issues of the conditions
of our transit infrastructure and the safety of our transit
systems are inextricably linked,'' end of quote. I mean, it is
a very concise, clear statement, it seems to me. So I also hope
that we think of ways, Ray, to start talking about addressing
the backlog.
These problems just grow. I mean, I talked about the $50
billion now. Those numbers really become exponentially larger
with every passing day and week, and particularly if ridership
is up and more demand is on it, more stress on the systems. I
mean, all of these factors contribute to that.
And I realize this is hard. We have got to think more
creatively about how we finance and budget these things. I know
you have heard me and my colleagues probably ad nauseam to the
boredom of many of them, I think. I am talking about this
Infrastructure Bank idea, particularly for regional and
national infrastructure needs of the country. There are other
ideas, the bonding ideas that Ron Wyden has talked about. I am
sure there are many other ideas.
We will never do this out of the normal appropriation
process. Despite the Herculean efforts of our colleague from
Maryland and others, there just are limits. I mean, talk about
the magnitude of the problem and the ability either to cut
other spending or to raise taxes, obviously, we all know who
have been here more than a week, that is impossible. So we have
got to think differently about how we do this, and we don't
have a lot of time, in my view, because the problems become so
monumental and the stresses on the system even larger all the
time.
So I hope there is a high priority, and even though it
doesn't necessarily produce the job tomorrow that people would
like, and I would like it, as well, we had better start
thinking about these longer-term ideas and how sustaining these
systems--or, frankly, this is all going to be--we are going to
have more safety problems. I don't care how many bills we pass.
You let your system begin to collapse as it is, that deferred
maintenance just predicts the kind of safety problems you are
going to have. So they are inextricably linked, to quote Peter.
Mr. LaHood. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, I know
that you know this, but it is worth saying. At the economic
summit that President Obama hosted at the White House, he sat
in on the infrastructure panel that I was a part of and he
talked about the Infrastructure Bank. The President is very
keen on this idea, so obviously we are very keen on it. There
is a lot of momentum growing for the Infrastructure Bank for
the very reason that you say. There is just not enough money to
do all the things we all want to do around here and this is a
pretty good way to really identify some big things that can be
done. I think you will see a lot of interest from this
Administration, from the President on down, for this idea.
Mr. Rogoff. Sir, could I just add two things real quickly
to that point? When the Secretary took office, we established a
new strategic plan for the Department, and one of those five
priorities for the Department is the state of good repair of
the transportation system. It is not just limited to transit.
It covers the highway system and the pipeline network and all
those things. But I think you will see going forward a budget
emphasis on not just expanding new systems, but also on
focusing on what is the condition of the existing
infrastructure.
Also, recognizing that that backlog exists, and as you
point out, we are not going to buy it down tomorrow. We think
this proposal is essential to that because it requires folks to
use safety management systems, recognizing that the system may
be in poor repair. How do we identify what the greatest safety
risk is first, before the accident happens? That is an
elemental part of this proposal.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Chair Menendez, and
thank you again, gentlemen, for not only your testimony today,
but your service.
Just following Senator Dodd's point, if we subsidized these
transit systems at the rate we subsidize the airline
infrastructure and the road infrastructure, these problems
might be self-correcting because the money would be adequate to
do this. I think every system wants to do this. This is not
something that they are saying, no, no, no, don't bother us.
They want to have a safe system.
But let me ask a very specific question, and that is,
within the legislation, there is a proposal to expand coverage
to bus systems and there are two possible ways to do that. One
would be the bus--or there are several possible ways. One is
the bus systems that are linked to the transit rail systems you
are proposing. The other would be to bus systems are not, and
that is the case in Rhode Island, where we have a statewide bus
system which has a reasonably good record, but we can always do
better.
Just can you both, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Rogoff, comment on
this. Will you exercise this authority? Is this something just
good to have on the books? Or is this part of a specific plan
with a time table?
Mr. LaHood. Well, I will let Peter comment, too. It is a
part of really trying to look at this in a comprehensive way.
As Peter indicated, our number one priority at DOT is safety in
all modes. We know that people ride not only trains, light
rail, but buses, and we just think there needs to be attention
paid to this, and we didn't want to leave it out and then be
criticized for, how come you are not taking care of this mode
of transportation?
Mr. Rogoff. The only thing I would add, sir, it is not in
our near-term plans to take on the bus regulatory agenda. We
want to walk before we run. We think that the greater focus
should be on rail. But since we are prohibited by law since
1964 from regulating in either area, we felt it important when
coming to you and asking that prohibition be lifted that we
address the entire transit universe and have the option of
getting into the bus area if we feel it is necessary.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that. It helps clarify your
intentions.
I understand, not directly, but at least indirectly, for
the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency and the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, they have--probably not
coordinated, but they have authority in this area. Is the first
step to sort of coordinate their activities, existing
activities? Is that something you are thinking about?
Mr. Rogoff. Before--again, our emphasis is really on the
rail area.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Rogoff. We wanted to reserve the statutory authority
that the Secretary makes the necessary finding to get in the
bus area. But if we got to that point, we would have very clear
delineations of authority, as you correctly point out. NHTSA
and FMCSA have different regulatory authorities, depending on
whether it is focused on the driver or the vehicle. If we were
to get into this space, we would focus more on the systems, and
like I said, that is not in our near-term plans.
Senator Reed. Just a final question. The thrust of the
legislation is to have a transit system independent safety
oversight body. I don't know, is that the system today
everywhere, or will some States and localities have to modify
their approach? And also, how do you ensure this independence?
And it goes, I think, to a question Senator Dodd raised about
paying for this and making requirements on States and
localities and not being able to fully satisfy their funding.
Mr. Rogoff. Well, we would like to fully satisfy their
funding by doing it through grants to the State participants.
But importantly, they would have to--a number of them would
have to change their governance structure. This is one of the
deficiencies that we wanted to address head-on. Right now, some
of these transit oversight agencies actually depend on the
transit system they oversee for their budget. It is a conflict
of interest we don't allow anywhere else in Federal
transportation safety. We don't allow the airlines to decide
how much the FAA inspectors will get paid this year or what
their numbers will be. We don't allow the freight railroads to
determine how many rail inspectors there will be and how much
they get paid.
But somehow, this current system for transit rail safety
has evolved into where certain systems have been allowed to
either pay their safety oversight entity or not. By taking over
at the Federal level those costs, we hope to eliminate that
conflict of interest, and yes, there would have to be some
governance structures as well as boosting of staff and
capability.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Well, let me thank you, Mr. Secretary and Mr.
Administrator. We appreciate it and look forward to continuing
to work with you and the Chairman of the Committee.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you very much.
Chairman Menendez. As you depart, let me welcome our
distinguished colleague from Maryland, Senator Mikulski, who
has been a vocal advocate for more Federal oversight of the
transit safety issue and recently introduced S. 1506, the
National Metro Safety Act, which I know she is going to want to
talk about today.
Senator Mikulski, thank you for joining us and we look
forward to hearing your testimony.
STATEMENT OF BARBARA MIKULSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
MARYLAND
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for those nice words of introduction.
I really want to thank you for your national leadership on
transportation safety in general and also on this transit
safety issue in particular and the entire Committee. You were
prompt in responding to my request to take a look at these
issues affecting the Washington-Maryland-Virginia Metro System,
and I really would like to compliment Secretary LaHood and the
President.
You know, we have had these terrible accidents and the
reaction has been swift, it has been urgent, and it has been
thorough. And I think if we all work together, the executive
and legislative branch, you as the authorizers, we as the
appropriators, we can really, within the next year, really do
something that we can feel proud of and that our constituents
can rely on. I feel like it is a new day, that there is a
freshness in leadership and a commitment to rigorous follow-
through.
I recognize that transit safety is a national problem. But
I am here today to speak about the Washington Metro that serves
Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. I am here to
speak up for all the people in the Capitol Region, over 2
million people who every day ride the Metro, go to school on
the Metro, keep their doctors' appointments on the Metro, and
use the Metro.
But the Metro also serves the Nation. It is America's
subway. Your constituents and many people from around the world
use the Metro when they come to Washington and they need to be
able to rely on Metro for not only the reliability of
timeliness and adherence to schedule, but also for safety.
I want to commend today the day-to-day staff at Metro, the
worker bees at Metro, the people who actually get out there
every day and operate it. They have done a fantastic job, and I
just remind you that on 9/11, they helped evacuate the District
of Columbia at some considerable risk and fear to their own
lives. They also did a spectacular day on Inauguration.
But Metro is facing very serious problems. Yes, they do
need money. They remind us about it continually. But I think
that they need a more vigorous, aggressive form of management
and they need to know their Federal Government is on their side
in terms of a national framework for public safety.
I am calling for really a sense of urgency, both by Metro
and ourselves, because I want to tell you some shocking things
just in the last year. In the last year, there have been 11
deaths on Metro. Eleven people have died on Metro. In June, a
Metro train struck another train during the evening rush hour.
Eight passengers were killed, including one from Maryland, and
also a Metro employee. Over 50 passengers were injured.
Then in August, another Metro employee died, a track
repairman. And guess what? He was hit by Metro maintenance
equipment. We have trains owned and operated by Metro that are
the cause of the problem. This wasn't a terrorist bomb on the
tracks. This wasn't a drunk driver cutting in front of the
train. This was Metro equipment that failed the people who were
riding it and failed the people who were working on it.
And in September, there was another employee death. A
communication technician was killed, guess what, from injuries
caused by being hit by a train. I wonder, what is Metro doing?
And all the riders and the workers have gotten is lip service,
a lip service commitment to having change.
My observation of Metro management is they think that
having a meeting about the problem is solving the problem
rather than the kind of aggressive work that you do. There is a
pattern of laxity, passivity, and lip service. I would hope
that the Metro Board would take appropriate action. I can tell
you this. The Metro leadership, as you know, wouldn't even let
the inspectors from the three jurisdictions on the tracks. So
we have got problems with Washington Metro, itself, and I don't
want to have more meetings. I want to have more action.
But guess what? We have let Metro down, too. I asked
Secretary LaHood to investigate some of the Metro safety
practices. But what is loud and clear is that we have not
followed through on the National Transit Safety Board
recommendations. I have met with the NTSB and said, what do we
need to do? They went over recommendation by recommendation,
going back in the last years since 2002 and 2006. They said
that FTA has not taken any action on their recommendations. FTA
says it doesn't have the authority, and even if they had the
authority, they don't have the money. So, you know, we are
passing rail cars. I mean, we need to act.
So as you can see, I am really hot about this, and what I
would like us to do is pass legislation that not only fixes
Metro, but deals with the larger issues. My legislation is
complementary to what the President is advocating and Secretary
LaHood discussed with you today. My legislation is focused on
the implementation of the National Transit Safety Board's
recommendations. It would require the Secretary to implement
the prior recommendations, particularly in emergency evacuation
standards, the crashworthiness of their cars, and the data
event requirements. These are NTSB's most wanted.
You know, we have systems that regulate everything. We have
Federal safety standards for buses and airplanes and even
commuter rail, but not for subways. So one would be on crash
worthiness standards for train cars. I think you would find
interesting that there is no standards for the safety of these
cars. So we need to be able to prevent the cars from
telescoping in crashes. I don't want to go into ghoulish and
grim details, but people died and were injured because the cars
telescoped. The NTSB offered a recommendation in 2006. Nothing
happened.
Then we need to have data event recorders, just like we
have on airplanes. They recommended it in 2002. Nothing
happened.
The other was emergency entry and evacuation standards for
train cars. You know how you can get out of an airplane? You
don't know how to get out of these cars. They recommended that
they have car design standards to provide safe and rapid
emergency ability to get out and for the first responders to
get in. There are no standards in this area. NTSB reports that
the FTA has delegated this to the American Public
Transportation Association. Well, that is nice, but we have a
job to do. I mean, I respect the American Public Transportation
Association, but they can't be the ones to develop the
standards. We need to develop them.
Then last, but not at all least, is the hour of services so
that train operators have 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep
between shifts. This is almost like what we regulate for people
who drive buses on interstate and also on airplanes.
And also, we need to retire the older cars and replace them
because they can't stand the shock.
So, Mr. Chairman, I just want you to know, I am no novice
with Metro and I am no Janie-come-lately. Working with the
Congressional delegations across the Potomac, the Virginia
Senators and their Members, Tom Davis, Frank Wolf, men known to
you, Hoyer, Mikulski, Van Hollen, Sarbanes, now Cardin. We have
worked together. We have gotten them the money. We have helped
get them a dedicated revenue stream. When the omnibus passes
over the next 72 hours, we are going to make a first
installment of $150 million. We now will have the beginning
downpayment on the money, but we now need fresh, aggressive
management at the Metro and we need to have Federal standards
for not only us, but for the Nation. And we look forward to
working with you and the President's team on this.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks.
Chairman Menendez. Well, Senator, let me thank you for your
leadership in this regard, your advocacy. I couldn't think of
anybody better to be on our side in terms of making this happen
than yourself, certainly from your perch in the Appropriations
Committee, which is going to be an important part of this. So
we thank you very, very much for your insights and for your
leadership.
I know I have no questions. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. No, I don't. I just want to thank the Senator
for her great work and her great support, not only of transit
in the metropolitan region, but transit all over the country
and particularly in Rhode Island. Once again, you have taken
the lead, so thank you very much.
Senator Mikulski. Well, thank you. Senator Reed, I know you
are also a leader on national security. But as you know with
BRAC, we have moved so many facilities now to Fort Belvoir,
they need the Metro. It is a national security issue in terms
of safety and reliability.
Senator Reed. And environmental protection and----
Senator Mikulski. And environmental protection.
Senator Reed. ----a long, long list.
Senator Mikulski. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much.
As Senator Mikulski departs, let me call up our final
panel.
John Catoe is the General Manager for the Washington
Metropolitan Transit Agency. Mr. Catoe has served as the
Authority's General Manager since 2007, and before joining the
Authority, he was the Deputy Chief Executive Officer for the
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. We
welcome him today.
Brian Cristy is the Director of the Transportation
Oversight Division of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities, where he has been the Director there since 1992. In
that position, he oversees State safety oversight of the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.
David Wise is the Director of the Physical Infrastructure
Team at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. In that
role, as the team director, Mr. Wise leads a team that
specializes in assessing the U.S. Government's role in surface
transportation. We appreciate their work.
And finally, William Millar is the President of the
American Public Transportation Association, which consists of
over 1,500 member organizations across the United States,
including numerous transit systems and rail operators. He has
been before the Committee many times and we welcome him again
for his expertise.
Let me ask each witness to keep your statement to about 5
minutes. Your full written statement will be included in the
record, without any objection so that we can have time for
questions.
And with that, we will start off with you, Mr. Catoe.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF JOHN B. CATOE, Jr., GENERAL MANAGER, WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Mr. Catoe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
Let me begin by reiterating a point I made when I testified
here in August. Like many transit agencies, Metro needs to
expand our system's capacity to meet future ridership growth.
But like other agencies, we are struggling even to maintain
what we have in a state of good repair because funding has not
kept pace with the capital needs of our aging system. If not
addressed, I believe this combination of increasing transit
demand, aging infrastructure, and lack of sufficient funding
will combine to form a perfect storm that will eventually
undermine transit success.
I reiterate this point today because safety and state of
good repair are two sides of the same coin. The ability of
transit agencies to continue to provide safe and reliable
service depends on our ability to maintain our systems in a
state of good repair. I encourage the Subcommittee to keep this
in mind as you consider ways to improve safety at our Nation's
transit systems.
Before I talk about oversight, let me tell you about some
of the things we are doing at Metro to improve safety. We
continue to respond to the June 22 accident in several ways,
including operating trains manually and developing software to
alert us to track circuit problems on a real-time basis. We
also have undertaken a number of other safety initiatives,
including more worksite inspections, stricter hiring standards,
and tougher disciplinary action for safety violations, such as
cell phone use while operating a Metro vehicle.
In addition, we have started and continue to expand
additional training classes for all of our Metro employees,
particularly those in the operations department. Also, I have
taken a resource within the agency and reassigned our Chief of
Police, a long-term transit safety professional, who previously
worked with the Federal Transit Administration, to give new
guidance to our overall safety program.
Our internal efforts to ensure Metro's safety are overseen
by the Tri-State Oversight Committee, known as the TOC. I think
it is fair to say that Metro, TOC, and the witnesses here today
all share the same basic goal: Effective oversight that results
in a safe environment for transit riders and employees.
To meet that goal, I believe the Federal Government should
take a more active role to ensure consistency and quality of
oversight across the country. In particular, I believe that
effective oversight should include five key elements.
First, an oversight agency must have full-time, trained,
and experienced staff and sufficient funding to attract and to
retain them. Let me also note that it is equally important for
the transit agency itself to have sufficient resources,
including staffing and training, for its internal safety
programs.
The second element of effective oversight of subway systems
like Metro is a system safety focus, by which I mean that the
oversight agency will not develop standards relating to
individual components on rail cars without considering all the
components and complications of the system in its entirety.
Third, I strongly endorse the involvement of transit
experts in the development of any safety standards. Transit
professionals know technical requirements and operating
conditions best because we operate it every day.
Fourth, effective oversight requires meaningful enforcement
authority. I encourage you to consider ways of ensuring
compliance other than fines or withholding of funds, which
would further reduce our already limited funding.
Finally, I believe that the use of cost-benefit analysis
for safety requirements would stimulate the development of
realistic, workable solutions for safety issues. It is
important to understand that almost every element of a subway
system has a potential impact on safety. If transit systems
have to rob Peter to pay Paul and defer needed capital
investments to address new safety requirements, there is a
potential to create new safety issues.
Thank you again for giving me this opportunity to testify
in front of this Committee and I look forward to answering any
questions that you may have.
Chairman Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Catoe.
Before I introduce Mr. Wise, I am going to ask Senator Reed
to chair for a while. I have been called to the Majority
Leader's office for a meeting. I hope to get back, because I
have read all your testimony, and then I have a series of
questions. But Senator Reed, if you would chair at this point,
I would appreciate it.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Wise, please.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. WISE, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Wise. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Vitter, and
Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
provide testimony at this hearing on the mechanisms in place to
oversee the safety of the Nation's rail transit systems.
Rail transit moves more than seven million people in the
United States daily and generally has been one of the safest
forms of public transportation. As Department of Transportation
Secretary LaHood noted in his December 8 testimony to the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, ``Rail transit,
however, does have the potential for catastrophic accidents
with multiple injuries, considerable property damage, and
heightened public concern.''
My statement today will cover two topics. First, the
results of a report we issued in 2006 to the House T&I
Committee which focused on the State Safety Oversight Program
for rail transit. Second, our preliminary observations on DOT's
proposal to change the agency's role in safety oversight.
The Federal Government does not directly regulate the
safety of rail transit in the United States. However, in 1991,
Congress required the Federal Transit Administration within DOT
to issue regulations requiring States to designate an oversight
agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit
agencies and withhold Federal funds if a State did not comply.
The State Safety Oversight Program generally covers rail
transit systems that are not subject to Federal Railroad
Administration oversight and receive New Starts or Urbanized
Area Federal funds. These include systems such as fixed, light,
heavy, or rapid rail, monorail, inclined plane, funicular, and
trolley. As you know, under the program, State safety agencies
oversee transit systems. FTA provides oversight of those State
agencies.
We found in 2006 that State oversight and transit agencies
generally viewed the program positively. For example, some told
us that the safety plans benefited transit agencies and that
State safety oversight agency reviews had influenced the
transit agencies' ability to make safety-related capital
investments.
Our report also found a number of challenges to the
program's effectiveness. Funding challenges in State government
limited the number of staff to a level that 14 of the 24 State
oversight agencies that we contacted said were insufficient.
Expertise varied significantly among the State agencies. Eleven
had staff without expertise in rail safety. Nineteen State
agencies had no enforcement authority if transit agencies did
not follow their safety recommendations or violated standards.
Ten State agencies relied on the transit agencies under their
purview for a portion of their budgets, including reimbursement
for oversight expenses. Finally, FTA had fallen behind its
stated schedule to perform audits of the program every 3 years.
To address these challenges, we recommended that FTA
reinvigorate the program, establish a training curriculum, and
provide funds to assist with travel for training. FTA has acted
on these recommendations.
Regarding DOT's proposal, it is likely to address the
problem of staffing levels because it would require FTA
certification of State programs and provide funds to the
agencies. By providing FTA explicit enforcement authority, the
proposal would also address the problem of States having no
power to compel safety improvements by transit agencies.
Finally, as stated by Secretary LaHood at the December 8
T&I hearing, the new program is intended to ensure that a State
agency is fully financially independent from the transit
systems it oversees.
In our view, there are also several issues for Congress to
consider with regard to this proposal. First, is oversight and
enforcement better accomplished at the State or Federal level?
The answer may vary by State and by transit agency.
Second, what enforcement tools would be appropriate given
that transit systems need to serve their riders and they are
typically funded by fares and taxes?
Third, what will be the cost of this program and what
should be the source of funds?
Finally, what will be the challenges in Federal regulation
of an enormously varied industry?
Mr. Chairman, oversight of transit rail safety is a key
Government function required to ensure a safe system and
maintain the public's trust.
This concludes my statement and I am happy to answer the
Subcommittee's questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Wise.
Mr. Cristy, please.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN CRISTY, DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION OVERSIGHT
DIVISION, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
Mr. Cristy. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Vitter, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, which is the
designated State Safety Oversight agency for the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority, and suggestions for improving the
SSO program and rail transit safety on a national level.
The MBTA, which is over 100 years old, is the fifth largest
transit authority in the United States, and it provides service
to over 1.3 million passengers per day. The Department's safety
oversight of the MBTA was originally established in 1964,
pursuant to the MBTA's enabling legislation. The Department
instituted the SSO program in 1995, as mandated by 49 C.F.R.
Part 659.
The Department's safety-related oversight of the MBTA
includes the ability to promulgate rules and regulations and
issue administrative decisions that require corrective actions
by the MBTA. For example, in January 1980, the Department
mandated hours-of-service regulations for rail transit
operators. In August of this year, following the May 2009 Green
Line accident at Government Center in Boston, the Department
became the first rail transit oversight agency to prohibit all
MBTA train operators and bus operators from using a cell phone
or having a cell phone in his or her possession while on duty.
The success of the Department's safety-related oversight of
the MBTA depends upon maintaining an open dialog and consistent
line of communication with the MBTA on all safety-related
issues. This includes around-the-clock access to MBTA property
to conduct or participate in meetings, audits, training, and
investigations. Further, the Department has direct access to
the MBTA's general manager and other upper management
officials, and it receives automatic electronic notification of
any safety-related incident that takes place on the MBTA's
property.
The Department supports the Administration's proposal to
establish Federal Transit Administration safety regulatory
authority over fixed rail transit systems as this proposal will
strengthen the existing SSO program. The proposal would cause
the FTA to become a safety regulatory partner rather than an
adviser.
The Department, however, respectfully submits that
enhancements to the SSO program including the following: one, a
phase-in period of any new FTA requirements to allow States and
transit systems sufficient time to meet new requirements and/or
standards; a Federal venue for SSO agencies to seek fines for
issues of noncompliance on the part of a transit system, and we
believe these fines should be imposed by FTA on behalf of the
SSO; and, three, additional training opportunities for the SSO
community, together with a Federal requirement that transit
system staff and management participate in training specific to
this program, and to the extent possible require that the
transit authority director of safety be a direct report to the
general manager or transit system CEO.
In addition, any Federal legislation should take into
account the uniqueness of each transit system. For example, a
new start will not have the same safety issues as a legacy
property such as the MBTA.
Finally, most critical to the success of any oversight
program is funding, and there must be a source of funds
identified and provided based on an agreed-upon formula and
criteria. The funding should provide for staffing, training,
certification, and for flexibility in hiring. For instance, an
SSO may want to hire a consultant for a short-term project
rather than a full-time staff person.
In closing, the Department supports a strong rail transit
system SSO program with new enhancements to allow the FTA to
become a more active participant in the safety regulatory
process. The Department submits that in order for any program
to succeed, the local transit authority must be an equal
partner with full support of the program coming from the top of
the rail transit agency down to the operator level.
Thank you for allowing me to testify this morning.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Cristy.
Mr. Millar, please.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MILLAR, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Millar. Thank you, Senator Reed, and it is a pleasure
to be back before this Committee and a great honor indeed. On
behalf of the 1,500 members of the American Public
Transportation Association, we do appreciate this opportunity.
Public transportation systems in America are safe and well
used. In 2008, Americans took a modern record of 10.7 billion
trips on America's public transportation systems. This is 15
times the number of trips that they took on the Nation's
domestic airlines, and according to the U.S. Department of
Transportation data, a person is many, many times safer as a
passenger riding on rail transit than as a passenger riding in
a motor vehicle.
That said, things could always be made safer, and we
commend this Subcommittee, Senator Mikulski, Secretary LaHood,
Administrator Rogoff, and others who are working on this
important aspect, this important need, and we are certainly
looking forward to working with all of you as you develop
various ideas.
Now, APTA and the industry have worked for decades to
improve safety. Indeed, the enviable safety record that the
industry as a whole has is a result of these many decades of
work. Through our safety activities for our members, our safety
audit program, our peer review process, to name just a few
things, APTA and its members have developed the expertise to
continue to improve rail safety in America.
We have been briefed on the proposal that Secretary LaHood
outlined to you this morning, and we generally support these
efforts in this specific proposal. We do have a number of
concerns, which I outlined in my written testimony, and I would
like to describe some three key points to you this morning.
First, on the issue of standards, APTA has a highly
technical and rigorous standards development process. We have
developed more than 170 consensus standards to ensure safe
operations, including 96 rail safety standards. For example, in
the last 2 years, APTA has worked with the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers to publish standards on crash-worthiness
for new heavy-rail and new light-rail vehicles to ensure
minimum safety in the event of a collision. Generally, our
standards are performance-based, and we would strongly
recommend that these standards, which have been partially
funded by the Federal Transit Administration, be used in any
new safety oversight program.
Second is the issue of Federal preemption in this safety
area. Recently, Secretary LaHood said that a passenger who uses
rail transit in Chicago expects the same level of safety when
he or she travels to San Francisco and boards a rail transit
car there. We certainly agree with that, and the most effective
method of achieving this goal is by adopting uniform national
performance-based standards. We believe that uniformity and a
national focus are essential elements of the performance to be
achieved by applying safety standards. While we understand some
State or local authorities may desire to raise the bar on some
particular aspect of safety, to do so would ultimately detract
from the overall effort. A standard created in one location
would, through the threat of litigation, become a de facto
national standard. This de facto standard would supplant the
considered judgment of the Federal Transit Administration,
informed by collective experience of the entire industry, and
substitute a disjointed collection of highest bars driven by
the courts.
There is also a practical reason for this concern, and that
is, there is a demonstratable need for uniformity of safety
requirements in, for example, rail transit cars. This is a very
small market. About 300 heavy-rail cars and about 70 light-rail
cars are built each year for use in the U.S. market. Now, these
cars could be built to specifications in accordance with a set
of widely adopted industry consensus performance standards or
federally adopted standards.
If States were allowed to set differing rail car standards,
the manufacturer would have to design, engineer, test, and
build various versions of the same model. This is problematic
for two reasons: one, the reengineering and redesigning to meet
differing safety criteria extensively significantly increases
the cost of the cars, and, again, these are funded in large
measure with Federal taxpayer dollars, and may stifle
competition by reducing the number of rail car manufacturers
willing and able to big. This is an important topic with a lot
of nuance, and over the coming weeks we do need to work
carefully on this point.
The third point I wish to make is the matter of funding. It
will take many actions to improve transit's enviable safety
record. It will also take significant financial investment to
bring public transit systems up to a state of good repair, to
increase the training of the men and women who work in our
industry and are ultimately responsible for its safe operation,
and to correct safety deficiencies that may be identified. If
safety is to be taken to the so-called ``next level,''
investments must be made. It is not enough just to pass laws
and issue regulations.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to
be here. We commend you, the Subcommittee, Senator Mikulski,
DOT, and especially FTA for opening this dialog on the safety
issue, and we look forward to working together to improve rail
safety across America.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Millar, and you have
been a great source of advice and counsel to this Committee
when I was chairing it and when I was the Ranking Member, and
so thank you for being with us today.
Let me take up the point that you concluded with and ask
both you and Mr. Wise, this funding issue--in fact, if anyone
would like to join in, you could. This funding issue is
absolutely critical. Authorizing is good. Appropriating is
better in some respects. And we have a challenge here of both
maintenance, training, and then safety supervision. And with
limited resources, there is always a competition between those.
Can you comment just about the general--how much we need on
a notional value to do these things, to what extent investing
in safety supervision is a higher rate of return than some of
these other investments, training and maintenance? Mr. Millar,
and then, Mr. Wise, if you have ever looked at this.
Mr. Millar. Well, let me start with the very big picture.
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials, in their bottom-line report, says that we should be
investing from all sources over $59 billion a year in public
transportation to upgrade it to meet the increasing demand for
it.
With regard to safety, there can be no doubt, although the
statistics are hard to come by, that a system that is not kept
up to date, that is not able to apply the latest in safety
technology, is, I think, commonsense-wise, not as safe as it
could be.
There is a great deal of focus on technology and on
equipment, and that is very important when it comes to safety.
But there is way much less focus, in my personal opinion, very
little focus on the actual training and development of the
expertise of the men and women who work in the industry.
Also, while it is commendable that FTA wishes to increase
its staffing in the safety area and it is commendable that they
wish to increase the staffing in the State oversight agencies,
the fact of the matter is there are not colleges and
universities and community technical schools turning out these
type of safety experts in public transportation.
We have suggested--and I am happy to report the
Administrator has said, ``Send me a paper on it.'' We have
suggested that maybe some kind of joint program--maybe we could
take advantage of the University Transportation Center Program.
Maybe there are community college resources that could be put
together with proper curriculum, building on the Oklahoma
Safety Center work, the National Transit Institute in New
Jersey work. There are a number of basic pieces of work done.
We need to knit them together, scale them up so that the
industry and those who would regulate the industry have the
proper safety expertise to proceed.
It is certainly in the tens of millions of dollars on just
that training piece alone in addition to the overall work that
needs to be done on the state of good repair.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Wise, from your perspective, any sort of notion of
these issues of overall cost or prioritizing training versus
maintenance versus safety supervision?
Mr. Wise. Well, we have not studied the overall costs for
coming up with a system to address all these issues. But in
2006, we did look at the training issue and made a
recommendation to FTA that it needed to establish a training
curriculum, and it has done that. And there has been a fair
amount of activity in that direction toward getting an enhanced
training regimen for the State safety officer. So that point I
think is something positive.
On the other point about the relative importance of the
various components, I think there is no question that an
integrated approach is required and that, as an example,
clearly there is a nexus between an aging rail transit system
and the issue of safety. As the system gets older, there are
parts more prone to break and tracks become aged, and so as a
result you do have implications for safety. If there are
budgetary pressures and funds are moved from capital operating
budgets, again, there is an impact, a potential impact on
safety.
Senator Reed. Let me just follow up quickly. In that 2006
review of GAO, you made recommendations but you did not
recommend a Federal Government takeover, as proposed in this
legislation. Any comments on that? Did you consider it? Or did
you explicitly exclude it to simply did not reach the issue?
Mr. Wise. There are a couple of points to make there. We
did consider the issue, but in 2006, I would say the
environment in safety at that time was a bit different. At that
point in time, there really was not any kind of movement in the
Administration that favored the idea of trying to bring in a
very robust Federal role toward safety oversight. So we tried
to craft a recommendation to work within the existing system,
and we felt that there were opportunities within the existing
structure to improve and monitor the system with more limited
changes and modest costs to the Federal Government.
So what we are seeing today I think is a much different--
well, two things occurred, I think. One, there has been a
number of incidents since 2006 that I think have heightened
awareness toward strategy that have even occurred in the last
10 or 12 months. And, second, there is a different perspective
in this Administration toward the Federal regulatory role in
rail transit safety.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Mr. Catoe, you have a very challenging job. Anyone who
drives in in the morning and listens to the radio knows that.
And as the record indicates, this concern has been prompted by
several different incidents all through the country. But one
basic question is: Do you think this proposal, if enacted,
would go a long way to precluding the accident that your system
saw--and other systems, but I think you can only speak really
to your system.
Mr. Catoe. It will be a step in the right direction. As I
mentioned in my testimony, there are many different actions we
must take. One is the State oversight or Federal oversight to
ensure consistency in safety programs throughout the United
States.
The other that has been mentioned is the need of keeping
our system in a state of good repair. If you have
infrastructure--or the example that we have in Washington with
an older series of rail cars that need to be replaced and there
is no funding to replace those, then your safety issues could
still be there from an equipment standpoint.
The third issue--and it will be a major one confronting
transit systems this year, but we must confront it and take
actions--is to move monies, operating dollars, to additional
safety training. We have a safety training program, but it is
clear that additional training is necessary, and that means
shifting of funds that were set aside for operating will now go
into additional training, which will impact the levels of
operations.
I think a combination of all of those actions will focus on
reducing transit incidents here in Washington and around the
country.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Mr. Catoe, you indicated that one
of the remedial steps that you have taken is to actually have
manual operation of the trains.
Mr. Catoe. Yes.
Senator Reed. Which raises in my mind sort of the--I am old
enough to think that the driver is always driving the train,
but I guess that is not the case. But these computer systems
were initially installed because they would have been sort of
fail-safe, that they would have been much better than a manual
operation. Now, ironically, you find that manual operation is a
way to deal with your system's problem.
Can you just comment on this whole issue of manual
operation versus computers?
Mr. Catoe. Yes, sir. The manual operation was instituted
after the June 22nd accident here in Washington. As you are
aware, the National Transportation Safety Board is conducting
that investigation, and one of the interim recommendations that
they made to us was to do increasing testing of the signaling
system to make sure there are no malfunctions.
Given that the absolute cause of that accident has not been
communicated to us, but we know it is some type of signaling
error that occurred in the automatic control system, we
believe--and, again, that is not finalized--it is prudent to
have our operators operate in manual mode and at the same time
to run twice-daily tests to determine if there are any signal
malfunctions.
Now, we are in the process of testing a new system that
will in real time detect any lack of signals or any improper
signals being sent on the system, but that is in the testing
stage, and we expect to have that system fully tested and ready
to implement sometime during the next year.
But manual mode is in place until we can determine all of
the correct fixes to the cause of the accident.
Senator Reed. I would think--and I am not an expert, but
that seldom stops us from asking questions. I would think,
though, that these systems, as they are deployed today, would
have as a major feature basically indicating that there is
something wrong, you know, that you would not find it out in an
accident. Maybe Mr. Millar can help. Do most--and, again, the
newest systems, I would assume. But do most systems, if there
is any kind of uncertainty about the status of the system,
basically start flashing red and you can switch to manual or
you can--do you know?
Mr. Millar. There is a saying in our business that if you
have seen one transit system, you have seen one transit system.
Each system is unique in its design. Some systems, particularly
in the heavy-rail area, in the newer heavy-rail systems, very,
very highly automated, very, very complex software and
technology that drives the system, rarely two systems with
exactly the same systems, though. And so each system has its
own characteristics. No system is perfect. Each system has some
different strengths, and they were designed that way for a
couple reasons: one, the point in time where they were
designed, the technology was whatever state it was at that
point; and, two, the unique characteristics that were expected
to be faced in that situation.
After the NTSB put out its urgent request, and reinforced
by FTA this summer after the WMATA accident, NTSB, FTA, many of
the transit systems, as well as the private sector companies
that have this expertise, have been meeting to try to see, both
to help analyze what could be done with legacy systems, but
also what could be done with future systems to make them safer.
We believe that is the correct approach, and we strongly
support what Mr. Catoe said, that until we know finally and for
sure what the cause of this accident was, as well as others
that the NTSB is looking into, we should not jump to
conclusions. But there are good operational, prudent
operational decisions that can be made, and we believe WMATA
has made one of those prudent decisions.
Senator Reed. Just a quick follow-up. I would presume that
in the new Federal role that is proposed, either the Federal
agency or the delegated authority to the State with Federal
support would, as a minimum, certify these systems as being
functional, and that would be something that would have to be
done?
Mr. Millar. Yes, I think we need to understand what would
make sense in that area. The FTA proposal, as I understand it,
calls for certifying the State agencies, for example. Once
standards are agreed to, we expect that that certification
would move on down the line.
Senator Reed. Yes. There is a difference between certifying
an agency and certifying a system.
Mr. Millar. Yes, we agree.
Senator Reed. There are a lot of certified agencies
operating systems that are not that good.
Mr. Cristy, thank you for joining us today. There is an
issue here of sort of regional operations. MBTA operates into
Rhode Island, a commuter rail. I am correct, I hope.
Mr. Cristy. For the purposes of commuter rail, but that is
separate from this program.
Senator Reed. Right. I just want to clarify the lines here,
that your understanding is that the commuter rails are still
subject to other jurisdiction. This is not implicated. But just
in general--and this might go to the whole panel--are there--I
presume there are metropolitan systems that operate across
State lines with transit. How do we sort of do this joint
certification? Or is that something that is in the legislation
and that you are comfortable with?
Mr. Cristy. In the State of Massachusetts, the only system
impacted by this Federal legislation, current and proposed, is
the MBTA's rail fixed guideway system. The other 15 regional
transit authorities in Massachusetts are bus only. The commuter
rail is subject to FRA jurisdiction, and it does go into your
State, yes.
Senator Reed. Mr. Millar, do you have a point?
Mr. Millar. Yes, there are several systems that do operate
across State lines, and, of course, we will look forward to
working with FTA on what is practical in that regard. But
uniformity of regulation is something that our members hold as
a very important value. They do not want to be--if they operate
in two States, they do not want to be regulated one way in one
State and a different way in the second State.
Senator Reed. Right. And, Mr. Cristy, you have a bus system
as well as a subway system as well as a commuter rail system.
And as we talked with the Secretary and the Administrator,
there is language at least which in the future might
incorporate the bus system into this overall. Would you think
from your perspective as an operator that would be a good
approach, a bad approach? How should it be done?
Mr. Cristy. Well, as the oversight agency in Massachusetts,
we also have jurisdiction over the other 15 bus-only transit
systems, and we do conduct safety oversight of those other 15
transit bus systems now and have since the early 1960s with
respect to bus safety as well.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another question that I raised
with the previous panel, and that is, the independence. You
have an independent--I presume. You can for the record explain.
You have an independent agency. You do not--MBTA does not pay
your salary or anything else.
Mr. Cristy. No, sir. It is the public utility commission.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. Cristy. So by nature they are independent regulatory
agencies.
Senator Reed. And you are self-funded?
Mr. Cristy. We are a separate line item in the budget for
the State budget, but have no relationship to the authority
whatsoever.
Senator Reed. And in terms of the ability to fund these
operations, would you say it is robust or it lags behind other
agencies--other responsibilities you have?
Mr. Cristy. Well, that is one of the provisions of the
proposal that most interests the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts----
Senator Reed. And the State of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cristy. ----is that the possibility to obtain Federal
funding which be greatly appreciated.
Senator Reed. Well, gentlemen, if there is an issue that
you want to raise, I thank you for your testimony, and it is
perspectives of operators as well as the industry as well as
the GAO, which has a very valuable and insightful voice on
these matters. If there are no further comments, I want to
thank you for your testimony.
This will conclude the hearing on transit safety. I want to
thank the witnesses for participating and helping the Committee
learn more about this topic. The record will remain open for 1
week to allow Senators a chance to follow up questions in
writing. We ask that you please try to respond promptly.
The hearing will now come to a close. Thank you very much,
gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Prepared statements, responses to written questions, and
additional material supplied for the record follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAY LaHOOD
Secretary, Department of Transportation
December 10, 2009
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Vitter, and Members of the
Subcommittee: Let me thank you for inviting us to testify on the role
of the Department, and more specifically, the role of the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA), in overseeing the safety of our Nation's
rail transit systems. With me today is Peter Rogoff, the FTA
Administrator.
Safety is my Department's highest priority. In hearings held in the
House and Senate shortly after the tragic Washington Metro crash, FTA
Administrator Rogoff testified that I had convened an expert working
group within the Department to develop transit safety reforms, and that
we would be sending those reforms to Congress. This week I have
followed through on that promise by submitting, on behalf of the
President, a transit safety bill as our first legislative proposal. I
ask this Committee to consider it seriously and promptly.
Background
As we address this issue, it must be remembered that traveling by
rail transit in the United States remains an extraordinarily safe way
to travel--far safer than traveling on our highways. Public transit
moves millions of passengers to work, school, and home every day
without incident. That fact makes it essential that our transit
agencies maintain their infrastructure and equipment to a standard
where they can provide riders with service that is reliable,
comfortable and safe. Any safety-related concern that prompts commuters
to abandon transit and get back into their cars is unacceptable.
While rail transit is safe, the Administration believes we must
take serious steps now to make it even safer and ensure that it remains
safe. We are all aware that rail transit has the potential for
catastrophic accidents with multiple injuries, considerable property
damage, and heightened public concern. We all must focus our attention
and resources on this important issue, if we are to maintain public
confidence. Moreover, while transit remains a safe mode of travel,
providing almost four billion passenger-trips a year, we see warning
signs regarding the frequency of derailments, collisions, and passenger
casualties--on which we must remain focused.
In the past year, rail transit systems in Boston, San Francisco,
and Washington, DC, experienced train-to-train collisions killing 9
people, injuring 130 others, and resulting in millions of dollars in
property damage. Also this year, three rail transit maintenance workers
were struck and killed while working on the tracks.
While these rail transit systems carry more passengers daily than
either our domestic airlines, regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), or our passenger and commuter railroads,
regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), they are also
the only transportation mode within the Department of Transportation
without comprehensive Federal safety regulation, oversight, and
enforcement. Indeed, the Department of Transportation is prohibited by
law from issuing regulations on the safety of rail transit systems.
That means, at present, our Nation's rail transit systems operate
under two very different Federal safety regimes. In 2008, rail transit
system passengers made almost four billion trips. This is seven times
the number of trips made on commuter rail, but only commuter rail
passengers receive the benefit of robust safety oversight. For example,
commuter rail systems that operate on the general railroad system of
transportation (such as Maryland's Maryland Area Rail Commuter,
Florida's Tri-Rail, and Washington State's Sounder) fall under FRA's
safety regulatory system. FRA's aggressive safety program includes
mandatory national safety standards and on-site spot inspections and
audits by Federal technical specialists and inspectors with backgrounds
in signal and train control, track performance, operating practices,
and other disciplines. FRA is also empowered to prescribe safety
regulations, issue emergency orders, and assess civil fines on this
group of rail transit operators for any violations found.
Conversely, the larger universe of transit trips on subway and
light rail systems (such as the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transportation Authority (WMATA), San Francisco's BART and MUNI
systems, Atlanta's MARTA, Houston's METRO, Dallas's DART, Seattle's
Link, Boston's MBTA, Chicago's CTA, and the New York City subway
system) are not subject, as a general rule, to FRA oversight. Instead,
those systems are covered under FTA's State Safety Oversight (SSO)
program.
Under the SSO program, Congress tasked States with the primary
responsibility for establishing State safety oversight agencies
(SSOAs). These SSOAs, in turn, were charged with ensuring that local
transit systems create and implement their own safety programs. Under
the existing SSO framework, however, each rail transit system is
allowed to determine its own safety practices and the State reviews
those safety practices. FTA lacks the statutory authority to establish
meaningful minimum thresholds. As a result, we have a patchwork of 27
separate State oversight programs. Each agency has only as much
regulatory, oversight, and enforcement authority as it has been granted
by its State government, and in many cases the oversight agency lacks
the authority to compel compliance by or enforce standards on the rail
transit system it oversees. The result is a regulatory framework of
inconsistent practices, limited standards, and marginal effectiveness.
Another problem with the current SSO program is that many States
view it as an unfunded mandate. As a result, most States devote
insufficient resources to the program. Nationwide, State staffing
levels for each SSOA average less than 1.3 full-time equivalent
employees (FTEs). That is less than 1.3 FTEs to carry out the agency's
entire mission for the year. That number drops further when you remove
from the calculation the staff associated with one large SSOA--the
California Public Utilities Commission. When you look collectively at
all the other SSOAs across the country, the average staffing level
equals less than one full-time employee for each agency, and many of
these employees have no career or educational background in transit
safety. Most often, that one employee handles transit safety oversight
for the entire State simply as a collateral duty. The lack of
resources, the lack of authority, and the lack of financial
independence, in some cases, mean that the vast majority of States
implement the bare minimum when it comes to transit safety
requirements. At the Federal level, we fare little better. FTA
currently has only 2.5 FTEs dedicated to rail transit safety oversight.
Furthermore, the lack of statutory authority to regulate the safety of
public transportation has prevented FTA from considering a number of
recommendations by the National Transportation Safety Board--
recommendations that followed accidents with fatalities and serious
personal injuries. The Department views this status quo as inadequate
and in need of urgent reform.
In the wake of the WMATA tragedy in June, I instructed my Deputy
Secretary, John Porcari, to convene a team of safety officials and
experts to address this gap between the regulatory oversight for rail
transit passengers and commuter rail passengers and develop options for
transit safety reforms. The working group collaborated with other modal
administrations within the Department with safety regulatory authority,
including FRA, FAA, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA). They were also assisted in the analysis by the Research and
Innovative Technology Administration. This team reviewed the many
alternative models within DOT to address safety, as well as the
statutory authorities on safety for transit and developed the
legislative proposal described below. In addition, the working group
and I met with Federal safety professionals and participated in
outreach sessions involving the public, transit officials, labor union
representatives, and State and local governmental officials. In the
end, we concluded that without minimum national safety standards,
programs intended to prevent major rail transit accidents will continue
to be uneven, with no assurance that safety issues are adequately
addressed.
Administration Proposal
The Department's legislative proposal would do three things:
First, it would require the Secretary of Transportation, acting
through FTA, to establish and enforce minimum Federal safety standards
for rail transit systems, other than those subject to regulation by
FRA, that receive Federal transit funding. The legislation also
provides the Secretary the option to establish a safety program for
public transportation bus systems that receive Federal transit
assistance.
Second, the Secretary would establish a safety certification
program whereby a State would be eligible for Federal transit
assistance to carry out a Federally approved public transportation
safety program. States would not be preempted from establishing
additional or more stringent safety standards, if the standards meet
certain criteria. States would receive training and staffing support
from the Federal Government, as well as Federal certification to carry
out enforcement activities on behalf of the FTA, similar to the Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program in FMCSA. Where States choose to
``opt out'' of enforcing the new Federal transit safety regime, then
FTA would enforce Federal safety standards in those States.
Third, the program would ensure that a State agency overseeing
transit systems would be fully financially independent from the transit
systems it oversees.
Currently, there are SSOAs that receive their funding directly from
the transit agencies they oversee. We find this situation presents a
potential conflict of interest that is unacceptable. We do not allow it
in any other mode of transportation. For example, we do not allow an
airline to have control over how many Federal inspectors oversee their
operations and how much those inspectors are paid. Similarly, we do not
allow freight railroads to exert influence or control over the number
of Federal railroad safety inspectors or their compensation. We need an
identical guarantee of independence when it comes to transit safety
oversight, and our legislative proposal would require such
independence.
Overall, we believe our legislative approach will restore public
confidence in rail transit as being one of the safest modes of
transportation, and it will go a long way toward ensuring that the
Federal transit capital investments are adequately maintained and
operated to meet basic safety standards. Furthermore, because the
Department will be proactive in the setting of Federal safety
thresholds, a reformed rail transit safety program will result in
greater consistency and uniformity across all rail transit systems in
the United States.
In developing those Federal safety standards, FTA will benefit from
the guidance and leadership of a new Federal advisory committee to
specifically address rail transit safety. Using my existing authority
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, this week I presented to
Congress formal notification establishing the Transit Rail Advisory
Committee for Safety, or ``TRACS.'' This new advisory committee will be
tasked with developing recommendations to present to the FTA
Administrator in the area of rail transit safety. Where specific
minimum safety standards are deemed appropriate, we will work with
TRACS to first look at existing industry standards and best practices
as the starting point. We are excited about the establishment of this
Committee and we look forward to working with the rail transit
industry, labor, and other expert stakeholders to develop appropriate
national rail transit safety standards.
We want to make clear that, in placing a rail transit safety
responsibility in FTA, it is not our goal to simply replicate the FRA
regulatory model, and bring it to bear on subways and light rail
systems. To the contrary, our goal is to take a performance-based
approach through the establishment of quality Safety Management Systems
for each rail transit agency. We are not interested in creating
voluminous and highly specific regulations. Instead, we are interested
in each rail transit system actively identifying its greatest safety
vulnerabilities through modern risk analysis and then taking the
necessary actions to address those risks. Safety Management Systems are
information-based iterative processes that the airlines are
implementing successfully to address their greatest risks. Given that
the rail transit universe is made up of transit operators that are
unique in their technologies, ages, and operating environments, we
believe that the establishment and expansion of Safety Management
Systems is the more appropriate, affordable, and productive approach
for rail transit.
To reiterate, rail transit provides almost four billion passenger-
trips each year, and safely moves millions of people each day. However,
as evidenced by the recent accidents and incidents, in order to
maintain this level of safe performance, aggressive reform is needed in
the existing Federal transit oversight authorities. We cannot rest on
the laurels of a good safety record--especially as our transit
infrastructure ages. We must take action to ensure consistency in the
way rail transit safety oversight is addressed. As I stated earlier,
``Safety is my Department's highest priority.'' I believe our
legislative proposal presents a critical and necessary step to provide
consistent oversight to help ensure safe operations for the transit
workers and the traveling public.
Again, thank you for the invitation to testify before your
Committee. I look forward to working with this Committee as we enhance
rail transit safety for the users of our Nation's public transportation
systems.
I welcome any questions you might have.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA MIKULSKI
Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Vitter, for your
leadership in holding this hearing today and inviting me to testify on
my metro safety bill. I recognize transit safety is a national problem,
but I am here today to speak up for Washington Metro, which serves
Maryland, DC, and Virginia and all the people in the Capital Region who
rely on DC Metro to get to work, get to school and get around.
Washington Metro is America's subway. Your constituents use Metro
when they come to Washington. So what happens in our Nation's Capital
has national ramifications. There is much to commend the day-to-day
staff at Metro for: the worker bees who do all the operations, their
fantastic job on the 9/11 evacuation and their great job on the
inauguration. But Metro is facing very serious challenges--management,
money and increased public safety. That's why I introduced the National
Metro Safety Act.
There have been 11 metro deaths this year. Let me repeat that: 11
deaths in the past six months. In June, one Metro train struck another
train during evening rush hour on Metro's busiest rail line. Eight
passengers were killed, including one Marylander from Hyattsville and
one Metro employee. Over 50 passengers were injured.
In August, another Metro employee died. He was a track repairman
from Silver Spring, Maryland, and he was hit by maintenance equipment.
In September, there was yet another employee death. A communications
technician was hit by a train and later died from his injuries. Metro
has promised changes, but all we have gotten is lip service.
Last month, I asked Secretary LaHood to investigate Metro's safety
practices after reports that Metro was denying safety inspectors access
to tracks. Metro cannot turn inspectors away or say when and where they
can inspect the tracks. Why have inspectors then?
I met with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
immediately after the June crash with members of the National Capital
Region Delegation. NTSB briefed us on the cause of the crash and their
initial investigation findings. NTSB said it had recommended that the
Federal Transit Authority (FTA) establish Federal safety standards but
that FTA hadn't taken action. NTSB provided information on other
previous recommendations it had issued to Washington Metro and FTA, all
of which had been ignored.
As you can see, I am really hot about this. I was shocked to learn
Federal safety standards don't exist for metro systems. Even though we
have Federal safety standards for buses, airplanes and commuter rail
systems like MARC.
That's why I introduced the National Metro Safety Act to begin this
important discussion and give the U.S. Department of Transportation
this authority. My bill gives Secretary LaHood the authority to
develop, implement and enforce national safety standards by working
with NTSB. It requires Secretary LaHood to implement the NTSB's prior
recommendations that have fallen on deaf ears.
These recommendations relate to crashworthiness. NTSB's most wanted
are emergency entry and evacuation, data event recorders and train
operator fatigue management procedures--the most important safety
recommendations that must be implemented.
Over the years, NTSB has made very sound recommendations for
reform, which FTA has ignored. NTSB recommended that FTA develop
minimum crashworthiness standards to prevent train cars from
telescoping in crashes and establish a timetable for removing equipment
that can't be modified to meet new safety standards. NTSB reports FTA
has not implemented this recommendation. FTA has been slow to action
and slow to take charge. FTA has been working with industry groups and
the Federal Railroad Administration.
NTSB recommended FTA develop car design standards to provide safe
and rapid emergency responder entry and passenger evacuation like
emergency window exits. NTSB reports FTA has delegated this
responsibility to the American Public Transportation Association and
standards are not yet completed.
NTSB recommended that FTA require event records on cars. Old cars
are not equipped with recorders. NTSB reports FTA washed its hands of
this one. FTA responded it does not have the regulatory authority to
establish this requirement. Why didn't FTA ask us?
NTSB has also made recommendations for reform to DC Metro which
have also been ignored. NTSB has recommended Metro either retire its
oldest train cars or retrofit them with the most modern collision
protection. NTSB reports Metro said it had no plans to overhaul the
older cars and could not replace them until the end of 2014.
I am not happy about Metro management. I have no confidence in
Metro. Every time you turn around or turn a page there is another
problem. There is a pattern of laxity, passivity and lip service. Metro
leadership wouldn't let inspectors on the tracks. That's when I called
for a Federal investigation.
It was only last week that the head of safety was reorganized out.
Safety responsibilities were concentrated in one place and now they are
dispersed. Once again, we are lurching around: too little, too late and
all coming to Congress to testify. There are severe management
difficulties at Metro. I call upon Metro's board to take appropriate
and immediate action.
I am no novice with Metro. No Janie-come-lately. Money is a factor
affecting Metro. As a member of the Appropriations Committee, I have
tried to make sure Metro has funding. I have worked with Maryland
Senators Sarbanes and Cardin. I worked with former Banking Chairman
Sarbanes and Senator John Warner to complete the originally planned
103-mile system and extend the Blue Line to Largo Town Center in Prince
George's County.
In 2008, I worked with Senator Ben Cardin to authorize dedicated
funding for Metro, a total of $1.5 billion over 10 years. This year, I
worked with Senator Patty Murray to get the first installment of these
funds, $150 million, in the annual spending bill.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, it is about money, but also management.
We need strong management at Metro and at the Federal level. I want to
work with you on a legislative framework that follows the
recommendations of NTSB. These aren't my recommendations. We also need
the right resources. That will make America's Subway, and subways all
across America safe, reliable and sound. Thank you for inviting me to
testify this morning.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN B. CATOE, Jr.
General Manager, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
December 10, 2009
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I am John Catoe, General Manager of the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, known as WMATA, or Metro. I last testified
before this Subcommittee a few months ago on August 4, 2009. At that
hearing, I discussed Metro's capital needs over the next 10 years and
made several recommendations about ways that the Federal Government
could help rail transit systems meet their infrastructure needs. In
that testimony, I stressed that the ability of transit agencies to
maintain aging infrastructure in a state of good repair has a direct
impact on the safety and reliability of transit service. Today I will
focus on the oversight of rail transit safety and Metro's experience
with the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) State Safety Oversight
program.
Background on Metro
Let me begin by providing some background on Metro. The agency was
created in 1967 through an Interstate Compact agreed to by the
Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of
Columbia, and approved by the Congress. Metro is the largest public
transit provider in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area and the
second largest subway, sixth largest bus system, and the eighth largest
paratransit system nationally. Sometimes known as ``America's Transit
System,'' Metro serves a population of over 3.5 million within a 1,500
square-mile area, as well as visitors to our Nation's capital from
across the country and around the world. Not only is the Metro system
critical to the economic vitality of this region, it was created to
serve the Federal Government and continues to do so. For example,
nearly half of all Metrorail stations are located at Federal
facilities, and Federal employees comprise about 40 percent of
Metrorail's rush hour riders.
During Metro's most recent fiscal year (July 1, 2008-June 30,
2009), we provided on average 748,000 rail trips, 446,000 bus trips,
and 7,000 paratransit trips every weekday. The Metrorail system
operates a fleet of 1,100 rail cars on a 106-mile system with 86
stations, and the Metrobus system operates a fleet of more than 1,500
buses serving more than 12,000 bus stops along 340 routes in the
District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. But perhaps our greatest
asset is our human capital. Every day, our employees--operators,
mechanics, technicians, inspectors--come to work committed to providing
safe and reliable service to thousands of customers.
A Changing Industry
In many ways, moving people on transit today is much the same as it
was 30 years ago. The focus of the station manager, vehicle operator,
mechanic, or track inspector is the same. We support safe mobility in
our communities today just as we did decades ago, by providing cost-
effective transportation to jobs, healthcare, education, Government
services, shopping, and entertainment.
Yet there have been changes over the last decade that make this
period unique in the history of the public transportation industry.
Today, people are using transit more than at any time since the
Eisenhower Administration. Here in the Washington area, ridership on
the Metrorail system has grown by 15 million annual passenger trips
over the last 3 years--a 7 percent increase. Ridership on our other
modes is growing as well: Metrobus has grown by 2 million annual
passenger trips (a 2 percent increase), and MetroAccess ridership is up
by 43 percent since FY2007. While we are currently seeing a decline in
ridership growth as a result of the economic downturn, which we hope
will be short-term, our growth rate in recent years has put us well
above original expectations for the capacity of the system. The
Metrorail system was designed in the late 1960s and early 1970s to
carry 500,000 daily passengers. Today, we routinely provide nearly
750,000 rail trips each day.
At the same time, transit infrastructure across the country is
aging, and existing capital resources have not kept pace with needs. As
highlighted in the FTA's Rail Modernization Study earlier this year,
there is a significant and growing backlog of investment needs among
our Nation's major rail transit systems. These needs include repairing
leaking tunnels and crumbling platforms, upgrading tracks and
associated infrastructure, fixing escalators, replacing buses and rail
cars at the end of their lifecycle, and updating critical software.
The combination of increasing transit demand, aging infrastructure,
and inadequate funding will combine to form a ``perfect storm'' that
will undermine transit's success if we do not take steps to address
them now. Both service and safety would suffer if our Nation's transit
systems do not receive the resources needed to maintain a state of good
repair. This Subcommittee's examination of these issues could not be
more timely.
Safety Oversight at Metro
As the Members of this Subcommittee are aware, on June 22 of this
year, a collision of two Metrorail trains resulted in the loss of nine
lives, including the operator of the striking train, and more than 70
injuries. This was the worst accident in Metro's 30-year history, and
we are cooperating fully with the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), the lead agency in the accident investigation. While it may be
months before the NTSB issues a final report, we are not waiting for
the final report before taking action to improve safety for our riders
and employees. We have already taken a number of steps to ensure that
the system is as safe as possible, including operating trains manually,
increasing the frequency of our track circuit monitoring, and
requesting an independent peer review of our entire track signaling
system by a team of train signaling experts. We have also started
testing the software that would alert us to circuit problems on a real-
time basis, per the NTSB's interim recommendation to all transit
agencies in September.
These efforts complement the wide range of initiatives, programs,
and audits that Metro uses each day to enhance our system's safety. For
example, we have increased the number and frequency of work-site
inspections, including safety checks at all track maintenance work
sites on all shifts. We have adopted stricter hiring standards and more
stringent disciplinary actions for safety violations such as cell phone
use while operating a Metro vehicle. We are working to provide
refresher training to our front-line employees, and the Metro Transit
Police Department has trained over 2,400 operations employees in
emergency response, to provide better coordination between responding
agencies to major service disruptions. Most recently, we began a pilot
program of placing warning signals on station platforms to alert train
operators of maintenance work at upcoming stations. We also conduct
regular inspections and preventive maintenance on all systems and
components of the Metro system--including tracks, vehicles, aerial
structures (bridges), and stations--to ensure that they are as safe as
possible.
Our internal efforts to ensure the safety of the Metrorail system
have been overseen since 1997 by the Tri-State Oversight Committee
(TOC), which carries out FTA's State Safety Oversight program in our
region. The TOC is composed of two members from each of Metro's Compact
jurisdictions: the District of Columbia, State of Maryland, and
Commonwealth of Virginia. The TOC is a partner in our efforts to
maintain the highest levels of safety, and we have a strong,
cooperative working relationship with the TOC.
Metro interacts with the TOC in a variety of ways. In addition to
monthly meetings, which also include FTA staff, Metro and TOC staff
members meet every two weeks for detailed discussions on current
issues. The TOC has reviewed and approved our System Security Plan
(SSP) and System Safety Program Plan (SSPP), which outlines the policy,
goals, elements, processes, and controls for maintaining system safety.
Metro notifies the TOC of incidents that meet certain thresholds in
terms of property damage or injury. In addition, Metro provides the TOC
with a variety of information and reports regarding, for example,
accident investigations, hazard management, emergency management, rules
compliance, training and certification, and internal safety reviews,
audits and inspections. Metro also works with the TOC to develop
corrective action plans to improve safety at the agency. The TOC
oversees Metro's annual review of our SSP and SSPP, and reviews and
approves our internal safety and security audits. The TOC also
completes extensive triennial reviews of our safety programs, with the
next review scheduled for later this month.
TOC is aware of our limited resources, and we work together to
manage a set of corrective action plans that address many long-term
issues, such as the need to replace more than a quarter of our
Metrorail fleet, for upgrades to our electrical and software systems,
and for additional employee training. Many of these issues require
funding that we simply do not have. The FTA is also kept abreast of
these funding challenges through its regular meetings with TOC and
Metro, as well as the TOC and FTA triennial reviews.
Strengthening Transit Safety Oversight
Let me turn now to the specific focus of this hearing--how to
maintain the highest level of rail transit safety. While today's
witnesses represent a variety of different perspectives, I believe that
we all share the same basic goal: effective oversight that results in a
safe environment for transit riders and employees. In order to meet
that goal, I believe that the Federal Government should take a more
active role than it does today, to ensure consistency and quality of
oversight across the country.
As you examine the current safety oversight program and consider
ideas for its improvement, I would like to share what I believe would
be the key characteristics of effective safety oversight for heavy rail
transit based on my first-hand experience:
1. Full-Time, Trained, and Experienced Staff
Safety oversight is not something that takes place only in periodic
meetings or reviews. Effective oversight requires continuous monitoring
and interaction with the transit agency. In order to carry out its
function, the oversight agency must have a thorough knowledge of the
systems, technology, infrastructure, and procedures at the transit
agency. The effectiveness of an oversight agency is dependent on the
quality of its staff. Funding must be made available to the oversight
agency to attract and retain qualified, full-time staff. In a 2006
report on the State Safety Oversight program, the Government
Accountability Office identified the lack of sufficient staffing, and
sufficiently qualified staff, as key weaknesses in the current
oversight program.
Let me also point out that it is equally important for the transit
agency itself to have sufficient resources for its internal safety
programs, including staffing and training. I cannot stress this enough.
In this time of unprecedented budgetary challenges, transit agencies
will have to make hard choices about how to use scarce dollars.
Additional Federal investment in the ``human capital'' of transit
agencies could significantly benefit our efforts to improve transit
safety.
2. A ``System Safety'' Focus
The current State Safety Oversight rule covers diverse forms of
fixed guideway transit. Heavy rail systems (i.e., subways) such as
Metrorail are unique in several ways from other rail transportation and
even from other fixed guideway transit. They do not share tracks with
other revenue vehicles (as commuter trains do with freight trains);
they do not operate over grade-crossings (such as some light rail
systems); and they do not operate on city streets (as do some light
rail and trolley systems). Heavy rail subway systems are self-contained
and operate using technology and equipment that is customized for each
system, due to differences of geography, geology, climate, population/
ridership, and age of the system. Therefore, the focus of heavy rail
safety oversight must continue to be on ``system safety,'' as it is in
current System Safety Program Plans. Heavy rail transit vehicles
operate in a closed, more controlled environment than vehicles which
operate in ``mixed traffic.'' Safety is designed not only into the rail
cars, but also into the other elements of the system, such as train
control, power supply, communications, track access procedures, and
intrusion protection. Therefore, I recommend that any standards or
regulations relating to heavy rail transit be developed or adopted not
as isolated elements, but as part of a system safety approach which
considers how all of the components of a heavy rail system work
together to ensure safe operation.
3. Involvement of Industry Experts
I commend Secretary of Transportation LaHood for convening a
meeting of stakeholders in August to discuss rail transit safety and
for including transit industry leaders in that meeting. I also applaud
the FTA for taking the initiative to establish the new Transit Rail
Advisory Committee for Safety (TRACS), which I hope will be a vehicle
through which FTA will take advantage of the wealth of real-world
knowledge and expertise in the U.S. transit industry.
In addition, I would urge Congress and the Administration to
consider the national standards that already exist, and were developed
by expert professionals with years of transit experience. Many of these
standards have been or are being developed by the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) and cover a breadth of system safety
elements such as operating practices, train operator hours of service,
inspection and maintenance of vehicles, signals and communications, and
fixed structures (such as yards, shops, stations, tracks, and
electrical substations). APTA also collaborated with the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers to develop a heavy rail crashworthiness
standard--using the application of crash energy management--that is
used by transit agencies around the country.
Transit professionals know best the technical requirements and
operating conditions of heavy rail transit. Their knowledge has already
made, and will continue to make, significant contributions toward
increasing the safety of transit systems.
4. Meaningful Enforcement Authority
Effective regulation requires the ability to ensure compliance when
the situation warrants. However, it is important to keep in mind that
unlike other transportation providers like freight railroads and
airlines, transit agencies are not profit-making entities. Any fines or
withholding of funds would have to come not from profits, but from our
limited pool of public funding, which, if depleted further, could
actually have the unintended consequence of reducing system safety.
I encourage the Congress and the Administration to consider
alternative means of ensuring compliance. The Federal Government
regulates or oversees numerous other industries and activities besides
transportation, and I expect that a thorough review of compliance and
enforcement mechanisms used by the various Federal agencies would yield
some ideas that could be effective in the transit context without
adversely impacting system safety.
5. Cost/Benefit Analysis for Safety Recommendations and Requirements
As I noted earlier, one of the major challenges we face in
implementing corrective actions identified by the TOC, or safety
recommendations from other agencies, is lack of sufficient funding.
Transit agencies' choices are constrained by available resources. One
way to address this challenge is for the oversight entity to use cost/
benefit analysis to help develop workable solutions that can
realistically be implemented by the transit agency.
The FTA's Rail Modernization Study found that more than one-third
of transit agencies' assets are either in marginal or poor condition.
At Metro, we have identified more than $11 billion in capital needs
over the next 10 years, the majority of which is needed to maintain the
current bus, rail and paratransit systems in a state of good repair and
to deliver safe and reliable service. Perhaps the most important idea I
want to convey to you today is that rail transit safety is not limited
to those issues that you read about in news reports. While it is easy
to say that scarce transit funds should be spent first on safety, it is
important to understand that almost every element of a rail transit
system has a potential impact on system safety. If transit agencies
have to ``rob Peter to pay Paul'' and defer maintenance or other needed
capital investments to address safety recommendations or requirements,
there is the potential to create new safety issues.
Conclusion
I appreciate the Subcommittee's interest in the safety of public
transportation. We at Metro take our responsibility for providing safe
and reliable transportation very seriously, and we would welcome
additional oversight to help us achieve that goal. In particular, I
strongly urge the Congress to make sure that additional oversight comes
with the funding to make sure that it is effective. In addition, I urge
you to provide a higher level of investment in rail infrastructure to
ensure that transit agencies across the country can maintain our
systems to a level that allows us to provide the safest and most
reliable service. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID J. WISE
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government Accountability
Office
December 10, 2009
PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN CRISTY
Director, Transportation Oversight Division, Massachusetts Department
of Public Utilities
December 10, 2009
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, my name is Brian Cristy and I am the director of
the Transportation Oversight Division of the Massachusetts Department
of Public Utilities (Department). I thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the role and responsibilities of the Department as a State
Safety Oversight (SSO) agency and suggestions for improving the SSO
program and rail transit safety on a national level.
Introduction
The Department is the designated SSO agency for the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), the Commonwealth's fixed rail
system. The MBTA, which is over 100 years old, is the fifth largest
transit authority in the United States, and it provides service to over
1.3 million passengers per day. The Department's safety oversight of
the MBTA was established in 1964, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 161A, 3(i)
(See, also, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-40, 49 U.S.C. Section 5330; 49 C.F.R. Part 659). The
Department instituted the SSO program in 1995.
The Department's Role as SSO Agency
The Department's safety-related oversight of the MBTA includes the
ability to promulgate rules and regulations and issue administrative
decisions that require corrective actions by the MBTA. For example, in
January 1980, the Department was the first oversight agency to mandate
hours-of-service regulations for rail transit operators. Further,
following several derailments of the MBTA's Green Line No. 8 low-floor
vehicle (No. 8 Car) in 1999 and 2001, and the investigation that
followed, the Department ordered the MBTA to prepare a Corrective
Action Plan (CAP) that would, among other things, address the adequacy
of the wheel-rail interface for the No. 8 Car's center truck to prevent
future derailments. With the approval of the Department in March 2003,
the MBTA began a gradual reintroduction of the No. 8 Car. In addition,
in August 2009, the Department became the first rail transit oversight
agency to prohibit all MBTA train and bus operators from using a cell
phone or having a cell phone in his or her possession while on duty.
The success of the Department's safety-related oversight of the
MBTA depends upon maintaining an open dialogue and consistent line of
communication with the MBTA on all safety-related issues. This includes
around-the-clock access to MBTA property (including computer databases)
to conduct or participate in meetings, audits, training, and
investigations. Further, the Department has direct access to the MBTA's
general manager and other upper management officials, and it receives
automatic electronic notification of any safety-related incident that
takes place on the MBTA's property. In addition, the Department
communicates directly with the MBTA concerning the SSO program by
providing mandatory training to MBTA upper management that is
specifically related to the program.
In an effort to further promote an efficient oversight program, the
Department coordinates various oversight activities with the MBTA's
safety department. Such protocol is designed to ensure that the safety
department is an active participant in any corrective measures, and it
provides an opportunity for the MBTA to enhance safety internally. For
example, the Department and the MBTA jointly conduct mandatory
quarterly meetings, cochaired by the Department's oversight manager and
the MBTA's safety director, to discuss and formulate action on a number
of safety issues. From these meetings, investigations, and analyses of
hazards, evolve the aforementioned CAPs designed to reduce or eliminate
the identified hazards. The Department is required by the current
Federal program to accept or reject all CAPs submitted by the MBTA, and
the Department tracks the CAPs to completion. This function is unique
to local oversight given that CAPs are tracked in ``real time,''
something that may not be practical at the Federal level. It should be
noted that CAPs often take weeks, months, or even years to fully
implement.
The Proposed Legislation
The Department supports the Administration's proposal to establish
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) safety regulatory authority over
fixed rail transit systems, as this proposal will strengthen the
existing SSO program. The Department, however, respectfully submits
that enhancements to the SSO program are necessary and should include
the following: (1) a phase-in period for any new FTA requirements to
allow States and transit systems sufficient time to meet new
requirements and/or standards; (2) a Federal venue for SSO agencies to
seek fines for issues of noncompliance on the part of a transit system
(these fines should be imposed by FTA on behalf of the SSO); (3)
additional training opportunities for the SSO community, together with
a Federal requirement that transit system staff and management
participate in training specific to this program and to the extent
possible; (4) a requirement that the transit authority director of
safety be a direct report to the general manager or transit system CEO;
and (5) the continued emphasis on communication and cooperation between
the oversight agency and the transit authority.
The Department submits that problems associated with the existing
oversight program should be identified and ``designed out.'' For
example, SSO agencies should have access to transit system property and
records related to the oversight function, as this is critical to
promoting local relationships and partnerships that traditionally may
not have been practical at the Federal level. Further, the Department
suggests that the CAP process can be improved. For instance, a limit
should be imposed on the number of extensions requests a transit
authority can seek before submitting to the oversight agency a final
report regarding the cause of the accident or incident. Ultimately,
this would reduce the length of the CAP review process and expedite the
approval of corrective action measures to be taken by the transit
authority.
In addition, any Federal legislation should take into account the
uniqueness of each transit system. For example, a new start will not
have the same safety issues as a legacy property such as the MBTA,
which is over 100 years old. Finally, most critical to the success of
any oversight program is funding, and there must be a source of funds
identified and provided based on an agreed-upon formula and criteria
that would apply to both the SSO community and rail transit systems.
The funding should provide for staffing, training, certifications, and
for flexibility in hiring. For instance, an SSO may want to hire a
consultant for a short term project rather than hire a staff person.
Conclusion
The Department supports a strong rail transit system SSO program
with new enhancements to allow the FTA to become a more active
participant in the safety regulatory process. The Department submits
that in order for any program to succeed, the local transit authority
must be an equal partner with full support of the program coming from
the top of the rail transit agency down to the operator level. A
revised oversight program must also include a dedicated funding source
with realistic performance measurements. With the considerations
outlined above, the Department submits that a revised oversight program
will result in a more balanced program and, therefore, a safer public
transit system.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony on behalf
of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MILLAR
President, American Public Transportation Association
December 10, 2009
Introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Vitter, and Members of the
Housing, Transportation and Community Development Subcommittee, on
behalf of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and its
more than 1,500 member organizations, I thank you for the opportunity
to testify today as your Subcommittee seeks to examine the role of the
Federal Government in the ongoing effort to maintain safe public
transportation operations.
Public transportation systems in America are safe and well used. In
2008, Americans took a modern record 10.7 billion trips on public
transportation, 15 times the number of trips taken on domestic
airlines. Each weekday, public transportation vehicles are boarded 35
million times. According to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA),
from the period of 2003 to 2008, heavy rail passenger fatalities
dropped by 50 percent and there were zero light rail passenger
fatalities. As well, according to the FTA, this means a person is at
least 142 times less likely to die as a passenger on rail transit
rather than as a passenger in an automobile.
Achieving the highest levels of safety for riders, employees, and
the public remains our number one goal. APTA and our industry continue
to develop and promote wide ranging safety standards, conduct safety
audits, convene working groups to address implications of new
technologies on system safety, while meeting higher ridership demands,
and dealing with aging infrastructure and procurement complications
associated with building state of the art transit systems.
Unfortunately, despite the industry's unyielding commitment to safety,
accidents do sometimes happen. As we meet here today to discuss the
possible expansion of the Federal role in public transit safety and
potential legislative proposals, I hope to provide you with a better
understanding of what our industry is already doing to increase safety
and to ensure that public transportation continues to be, by far, the
safest mode of surface transportation in the Nation.
While it will take many steps to improve transit's enviable safety
record, it will also take significant financial investment to bring
public transportation systems up to a state of good repair, to increase
the training of transit employees, and to correct safety deficiencies
identified. It is simply not enough to pass laws and issue regulations,
if safety is to be taken to the next level, investments must be made.
About APTA
The American Public Transportation Association is a nonprofit
international association of more than 1,500 public and private member
organizations, including transit systems and high-speed, intercity and
commuter rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance
firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
APTA member systems.
APTA Safety Programs
The American Public Transportation Association has been designated
as the standards development organization for public transportation.
For more than 20 years, APTA has partnered with the U.S. transit
industry, the FTA, and its predecessor the Urban Mass Transit
Administration (UMTA), to develop standardized programs for safe,
efficient, and secure transit operations. APTA has also developed and
continues to manage a number of safety specific programs that provide
safety audits for transit operators on a triennial basis and other
services. In the early 1970s, APTA members began applying to new rail
transportation systems the concepts of a safety system first developed
by the military and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). In collaboration with UMTA and the U.S. Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Volpe Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, APTA
developed a Safety Management Program and published its guidance
document, commonly referred to as the APTA Manual, on how to create a
System Safety Program Plan. In 1987, APTA developed a companion
industry audit program, based on the Manual, as a voluntary program for
rail transit agencies to measure their progress and to help develop
benchmarking of effective practices. This program, which was later
expanded to include commuter rail and bus services, serves the purpose
of being a developmental, self correcting safety process that
emphasizes continuous improvement toward the goal of safety excellence.
This program also served as the basis for the existing FTA State Safety
Oversight (SSO) program, found at 49 CFR Part 659, and has been
incorporated by reference in the Transport Canada Safety Management
Systems regulation as well. Since its inception as a voluntary program,
our independent audits have been conducted at 75 APTA member transit
agencies, with over 415 audits completed during the last 20 years.
The APTA Safety Management program along with its audit component
has been used effectively by transit agencies to locate weaknesses in
their operations and to demonstrate their diligence to safety and
security, it has even been used as evidence to insurance carriers to
justify lower premiums. In addition, the program has provided a forum
for the exchange of effective safety and security practices, spurred
the development of tools and resources to the industry, and gave rise
to a national and international methodology for assessing operating
risks. The audit program incorporates the APTA standards into the
elements whenever there are standards that address safety critical
areas. The external audit concept has also created the concept of the
APTA Peer Review program which is a targeted audit process drawing from
industry subject matter experts to assist transit agencies in dealing
with specialized program areas. To date, over 110 Peer Reviews have
been performed for agencies seeking help with problematic areas of
their operations. APTA's safety programs are recognized internationally
in North America, Europe, and Asia and are designed to examine every
area of transit planning, construction, acquisition, operations,
security, emergency preparedness, and maintenance to ensure the safety
of our public transportation passengers and employees.
APTA Rail Transit Safety Standards Program
Congress is currently considering legislative proposals to assign
statutory responsibility to the FTA for developing mandatory Federal
bus and rail transit safety regulations. On behalf of APTA and its
members, who have provided unmatched access to subject matter experts
volunteering countless hours over 20 years to promote safety for all
passengers and employees, I ask Congress and the FTA to build on our
existing safety standards program to serve as the backbone of this
initiative.
APTA's commitment to safety is the basis of our Standards
Development Program. Initiated in 1996, APTA is continually developing
standards in the areas of rail transit, commuter rail, bus operations,
procurement, intelligent communications interface protocols, and
security. We are an officially accredited Standards Development
Organization (SDO), recognized by the U.S. Department of Transportation
and partially funded through grants provided by the FTA. Since Fiscal
Year 2007, the FTA has provided $3 million in grant funding to APTA to
develop standards for the public transportation industry, in addition
to more than $3 million from members who have provided access to 2,000
subject matter experts volunteering tens of thousands of hours to
develop this program. We develop standards using formal methods
patterned after the process required by the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI). This multifaceted approach includes:
a balanced representation of interested parties
a required public comment period
a formal process to respond to comments
the availability of an appeals process
a balloting group broadly representative of the industry
consensus as defined as a super majority of the balloting
group
and a formal method to respond to requests for
interpretation of or changes to the standard
Partnering with other SDOs, including the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the American Rail Engineering and
Maintenance of Way Association (AREMA), as well as a wide range of
experts in the fields of transit system operation, car manufacturers,
vehicle operations management, technical consultants, safety
professionals and Government representatives, APTA has created and
implemented nearly 170 consensus based standards that promote safe and
efficient transit system operations. Our robust standards programs have
been designed to guarantee that reviews are conducted on an ongoing
basis and provide the flexibility to make updates and amendments as new
issues and technologies arise.
Particularly relevant to the topic of the hearing today is APTA's
collaborative efforts on the ASME Rail Transit 1 and Rail Transit 2
standards, commonly referred to as RT-1 and RT-2. RT-1 applies to the
carbody of newly constructed light-rail transit vehicles, and RT-2
applies to the carbody of heavy rail transit vehicles. Neither standard
covers vehicles that fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA). The focus of this program, which was
initiated in 1998, is to support industry efforts to write structural
standards for rail transit vehicles. According to ASME, RT-2
specifically ``defines requirements for the incorporation of passive
safety design concepts related to the performance of the carbody of
heavy rail transit vehicles in conditions such as collisions, so as to
enhance passenger safety, and limit and control damage.'' Published in
2008, this standard highlights the industry's commitment to ensuring
the highest level of passenger safety is achieved in the event of an
impact.
Several weeks ago, APTA hosted a 2-day meeting of the ASME Rail
Transit Standards Committee to reexamine the RT-2 Standard to
specifically address the possible inclusion of enhancements that may
become necessary to further address over-ride protection in the event
of a high-speed impact. Collaborative industry partnerships built upon
long-standing relationships allow us to convene meetings of our
standards setting committees to ensure our program is relevant and can
quickly address safety issues as they arise. Similarly, in response to
multiple incidents resulting from distracted drivers, APTA is in the
process of finalizing safety standards for transit agencies regarding
this issue.
Congress has previously recognized the importance of promoting
these voluntary industry-based standards to create uniformity within
the legal and regulatory structure of the United States. The National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-113)
encourages Government agencies to work together with industry leaders
to develop private, voluntary safety standards for Federal grantees.
APTA has met this directive by working together with the FTA, the FRA
and other Federal agencies, public transit systems, academics, and a
variety of outside experts to develop a wide-range of industry safety
standards.
There are many tangible benefits of the APTA program in particular,
such as:
improving safety of operations and services
reducing operating and maintenance costs
creating a process where transit systems share best
practices
increasing and improving transit system/supplier
communication
making development of procurement specifications easier and
less costly
making legal defense more effective in liability cases
helping States establish and improve safety oversight
programs
providing much needed guidance to new start transit systems
creating opportunities for reliability and efficiency
improvements
decreasing training costs
State Safety Oversight Program
Pursuant to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991, better known as ISTEA (P.L. 102-240), the FTA was directed by
Congress to establish a State Safety Oversight program that would be
created and managed by the States. Effective since 1997, States are
mandated to establish State Oversight Agencies (SOA) that design and
implement safety oversight and audit programs for the light-rail and
subway systems within their jurisdiction. Understanding that each
transit agency has its own unique characteristics, the FTA wisely opted
against a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach and instead sought to create
an SSO program flexible enough to take into account these distinctions.
State Oversight Agencies were tasked with creating their own standards
and then measuring the compliance of each transit agency through
audits. Currently there are 26 State Oversight Agencies that oversee 48
rail transit systems.
States with larger transit systems such as California,
Pennsylvania, and New York have taken proactive approaches and
instituted statewide regulatory procedures, while others States with
perhaps a small single transit system have opted to allocate less
resources and less stringent guidelines. This has resulted in widely
disparate funding and staffing levels, as well as varied staff
capabilities, that in some cases may be inadequate to fully address
safety concerns. A 2006 report by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) on rail transit issues revealed that in interviews with
representatives from 24 oversight agencies, 16 officials indicated that
they lack adequate numbers of qualified staff. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rail Transit:
Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTSA's State Safety
Oversight Program, GAO-06-821. July 2006, Summary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
APTA believes the current SSO program is uneven in its
effectiveness and varies greatly from one State Oversight Agency to the
next. Therefore, we suggest the FTA, in concert with all stakeholders,
identify the SSO programs that do work and use those programs to
develop a Federal template for requirements to which each State
Oversight Agency must adhere. Further, in order for an SSO program to
be successful, there must be adequate and consistent staffing levels
and training, and uniform standards for monitoring and auditing that
are flexible enough to integrate new and emerging technologies.
To further improve the existing SSO program, there is also a
critical need to strengthen oversight of the program at the Federal
level. We recommend restructuring the FTA Office of Safety and
Security, which currently manages the SSO program by significantly
expanding their program personnel and in-house expertise to properly
develop, implement and manage an effective oversight program.
We believe the Administration is generally on the right track in
its proposal to enhance the State Safety Oversight structure, though a
small number of our members would prefer to eliminate the SOAs and
instead have the FTA conduct the program. With proper authority,
sufficient funding, training, and personnel, we believe SSO agencies
can effectively manage and enforce rail transit safety regulations.
Additional Considerations
To achieve the goals of the proposed legislation, the role of the
Federal Transit Administration must evolve from acting solely as a
grant-making agency. A clear mandate from Congress which provides the
FTA with not only the authority to run a Federal rail transit safety
standards and management program, but also the ability to provide
enforcement capabilities ensuring compliance with such programs is
necessary. To this end, if safety standards for rail transit systems
are to be established by Federal regulation, I urge the FTA to consider
adopting the practice of using consensus-based industry standards as
the foundation, as supported by the Technology Transfer Act, and where
appropriate, incorporating pertinent voluntary standards by reference
into regulation. APTA has provided to the staff of this Subcommittee a
list of existing voluntary standards, and those in development, that we
suggest the FTA should consider for initial incorporation into
regulation. The industry has made significant investments, along with
the FTA, to develop these standards. It only seems logical to build off
of the hard work and expertise that has gone into their development
instead of pioneering an entirely new standards program. The ultimate
goal must be to build a Federal program that, when properly
administered, produces an improved level of safety than is currently
the case.
Where feasible, standards should be performance-based rather than
prescriptive to accommodate local conditions and diverse operations, as
well as to foster innovation in technology and problem-solving. We must
also consider whether or not this new program must fit into the local,
State, and regional criteria put forth by local planning agencies.
Additionally, any Federal program should incorporate a Federal
preemption to ensure that efforts at the State level remain
concentrated on identified national safety priorities. In creating a
coordinated Federal approach for a standards program, the FTA should
provide the fundamental safety principles from which States can use
different methodologies to create programs that meet the specific needs
of their unique transit system. Once a Federal transit safety standards
program is established, State safety oversight agencies should
consistently enforce the Federal standards as well as provide necessary
technical assistance based on their training and specialized
understanding of an individual transit system.
To fully support the adoption and implementation of these programs,
it will become necessary for Congress to provide enforcement
capabilities to the Federal Transit Administration to ensure
compliance. Such authority should be vested in the form of ``grant
conditions,'' meaning that the FTA has the ability to direct grant
funding to be used to correct major inadequacies and significant
incidences of noncompliance that will effectively improve safety. It
goes without saying that leveraging monetary penalties, including
fines, as an enforcement tool would be counterproductive as transit
agencies are public entities funded by fares riders pay and taxpayer
dollars. We suggest establishing a timetable to allow systems to be
brought into compliance without penalty and incorporating a progressive
ratings system whereby instances of noncompliance are evaluated based
on risk and/or necessity. To this end, an appeals process must be
instituted to ensure fairness in the dispensation of violations.
Transforming the safety mission of the FTA is a goal that will
require new funding and staff. APTA fully supports providing the FTA
with new funding to ensure there are adequate personnel and subject
matter experts on staff at the Federal level. Funding will also be
required to ensure SSAs are adequately staffed and properly trained to
carry out the critical functions of an oversight agency, and proper
funding for transit agencies will also be required to succeed in
improving safety.
To meet the new staffing levels required an immediate problem will
be encountered: A significant shortage of trained safety personnel who
understand the public transportation industry. Congress should provide
funding to create a national FTA rail transit safety standards
certification program. Although related programs for this do exist, the
training is neither standard nor does it result in recognized
certification. In order to expand the workforce of properly trained
rail transit safety professionals, a program with a standardized
national curriculum must be established. APTA would welcome the
opportunity to work with the FTA to determine core safety competencies
required for effective safety management at all levels, to implement
such a program.
There is also a critical need for an improved and reliable national
transit operations database that agencies and other industry
practitioners can use to benchmark their operating performance,
including trends in safety. Federal safety priorities must also address
the delivery of adequate resources to support and sustain research to
close gaps in the body of knowledge to enhance safe transit operations.
Conclusion
The Nation's 48 rail transit operations are safe and their
customers should utilize them without hesitation, but safety can always
be improved. Day in and day out we hold ourselves to the highest degree
of accountability to ensure safe transit for all passengers and will
continue to do so. Through ongoing partnership, collaboration and
communication we have been able to create standards that provide an
inherently safe mode of transportation. If it is the will of Congress
to federalize these standards, one can expect the same level of
dedication and commitment to safe passenger transit from our agencies
across the country. APTA commends the Department of Transportation and
the FTA for opening this critical dialog and we look forward to
beginning the work we have ahead of us with the Transit Rail Advisory
Committee for Safety (TRACS). Once again, I thank the Subcommittee for
holding this hearing and for providing me the opportunity to present
APTA's views. I look forward to answering your questions.
RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN DODD
FROM RAY LaHOOD
Q.1. How will FTA oversee State agencies that opt into the new
program if enacted?
A.1. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) proposes to use
its staff to audit the performance of State agencies that have
adopted a Public Transportation Safety Program. FTA will ensure
that each participating State program meets or exceeds the
minimum Federal standards for adequacy in the areas of
staffing, training, and statutory authority to conduct
meaningful oversight. Similar to existing FTA program audits,
the safety audit process will include a scheduled program
review (probably on a 3-year cycle) with unscheduled spot
audits of specific activities.
Q.2. Staffing needs will vary from State to State based on the
number and size of rail systems within each State. What
methodology will FTA use to determine the proper staffing level
at FTA needed to carry out this regulatory role?
A.2. FTA will need to build internal staff to develop and
maintain the regulatory program as well as monitor State
agencies and enforce Federal regulations in those States that
``opt out.'' In determining proposed staffing levels, FTA
performed an initial preliminary workforce analysis factoring
such considerations as the complexity of existing rail transit
infrastructure; the number of personnel engaged in current
Federal oversight activities; the number of transit systems and
their current geographic locations; the number of track miles
associated with the State safety oversight program; and,
current and projected ridership. Workforce analysis will
continue to be refined as the program evolves based on State
participation and the specific requirements of the regulations
that are developed.
------
RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN DODD
FROM JOHN B. CATOE, Jr.
Q.1.a. In light of the recent accidents nationwide, many
believe there should be a stronger role for the Federal
Government in transit safety. What do you believe is the proper
amount of authority and oversight at the Federal level?
A.1.a. I believe that there needs to be consistency in safety
oversight across the country. To ensure that, I believe that
the Federal Government needs to take a more active role in
transit safety oversight. As I discussed in my testimony,
Federal authority should be designed to ensure consistency
across the country in the following elements: funding for
qualified staff; enforcement authority; and regulations that
are focused on system safety and that were developed using a
cost/benefit analysis.
Q.1.b. What are the concerns of the industry in regards to the
Administration's proposed new Federal role in transit safety?
A.1.b. Assuming that the elements I mentioned above are
addressed, the key concern that I have is how transit agencies
will find the resources to address any changes required by a
new Federal safety regulator. As I mentioned in my testimony,
if a regulator tells a transit agency it must spend funds to
correct an identified safety issue without providing at least
some of that funding, the agency may have to defer other needed
maintenance, with the potential to create other--perhaps more
serious--safety issues.
Q.1.c. What should FTA consider when developing standards if
this proposal is enacted?
A.1.c. If the Federal Government is going to establish
standards, I would strongly recommend that it start with the
national standards that have already been developed by the
American Public Transportation Association, and also that it
recognize the importance of conducting cost/benefit analysis
for any regulatory proposal.
Q.2.a. GAO stated in their testimony that some states have
given their oversight agencies enforcement authority, but many
of these oversight agencies have ``rarely, if ever, used it.''
How will enforcement authority help oversight agencies be
effective?
A.2.a. As I stated in my testimony, effective oversight
requires the ability to ensure compliance when the situation
warrants. However, the most effective oversight will come from
having the staffing and expertise to work collaboratively with
the transit agency. Enforcement authority must be part of an
overall oversight mechanism that also includes funding for
qualified staff.
Q.2.b. Moreover, current law allows for FTA to withhold 5
percent of formula funds from a State that is not in
compliance. Has this been effective? If not, what enforcement
tools would be effective?
A.2.b. As General Manager of the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, I can state that my motivation for
maintaining safety is to assure the highest level of safety for
our customers and employees. We do what is needed to maintain
safety because it is part of the job of providing this
important transportation service and it is essential to protect
the lives of those in our system--not because we fear that we
will get a fine.
As the Congress considers new Federal transit safety
legislation, I encourage you to consider alternatives to fines
or withholding of funds. Unlike other transportation providers
like freight railroads and airlines, transit agencies are not
profit-making entities. Any fines or withholding of funds would
have to come not from profits, but from our limited pool of
public funding--which, if depleted further, could actually have
the unintended consequence of reducing system safety.
As I stated in my testimony, the Federal Government
regulates or oversees numerous other industries and activities
besides transportation, and I expect that a thorough review of
compliance and enforcement mechanisms used by the various
Federal agencies would yield some ideas that could be effective
in the transit context without adversely impacting system
safety.
------
RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CARDIN
FROM JOHN B. CATOE, Jr.
Q.1.a. In Thursday's hearing, Senator Jack Reed asked about the
warning system in place to notify the control station of
signaling errors. How many signaling errors occur per day?
A.1.a. My only mention of signaling errors in my December 10
testimony referred to the failure of train detection (wrong-
side failure) as it pertains to the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) findings of the June 22 collision. The
signaling system is an extremely complex system with literally
millions of components performing diverse functions over the
213 miles of mainline track; in the service, inspection and
storage yards; and onboard the transit vehicles. There are
several malfunctions per day of different components throughout
the system; however, wrong-side failures are extremely rare.
Only two other similarly severe wrong-side failures of the
signaling system are known in the history of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). These incidents,
which are well publicized, occurred in the Rosslyn tunnel and
at the Potomac Avenue Metrorail station.
Q.1.b. How are the errors that trigger these warnings dealt
with both in the short term and the long term?
A.1.b. In the short term, WMATA has increased testing and
performs twice-daily reviews of track circuit performance.
WMATA instituted a formal business process that enlists the
services of several departments. The review begins with
engineers evaluating the performance of all mainline track
circuits twice a day by reviewing central computer data for all
train movements during peak service. Data anomalies are
reported for investigation by maintenance personnel.
Unexplained data that appear to indicate hazardous conditions
receive immediate attention, and maintenance personnel are
dispatched. Once the cause of the data anomaly has been
corrected the equipment is restored to service.
To address system anomalies in the long term, an automated
real-time warning system will be developed and deployed. As I
testified, we expect to deploy this system later this year. The
warning system will notify Central Control personnel within
seconds of a track circuit difficulty with train detection.
Using future internal controls developed around the warning
system, the Central Control supervisory staff would stop trains
as they approach the problem location, allow manual operation
passage at slow speed, and initiate track circuit maintenance
personnel response, all within seconds of the alarm.
Q.2.a. In your testimony, you mentioned that the Tri-State
Oversight Committee has overseen internal safety efforts since
1997. You described them as a partner in your efforts to
maintain the highest safety levels. Yet on November 9, 2009,
the Washington Post reported that Metro denied the Tri-State
Oversight Committee from inspecting the rails. Does Metro have
any obligation to let the Tri-State Oversight Committee conduct
investigations or follow their recommendations?
A.2.a. The Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC) is the State
Safety Oversight (SSO) agency for the WMATA Metrorail system,
Under Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulation 49 CFR
Part 659, which went into effect in 1997, all States with a
defined rail transit system that is not under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) must develop and
maintain a SSO agency, In general, almost all heavy-rail rapid
transit systems such as WMATA, the New York City subway system,
other large-city subway systems, and light rail systems are
outside the jurisdiction of the FRA and thus come under the
jurisdiction of the SSO, if they are funded by the FTA.
Under the regulation, each State is responsible for
designating an agency to carry out the SSO requirements. The
States have latitude to determine which entity can conduct the
oversight, as long as it is not the transit agency itself. At a
minimum, the regulation requires that the SSO agencies do the
following: develop standards for the transit system's safety
and security plans; approve these plans; investigate accidents
and hazardous conditions which meet certain criteria prescribed
in 49 CFR Part 659; require the transit system to develop
corrective action plans to address safety deficiencies; approve
the corrective action plans; and conduct independent reviews of
the implementation of the safety and security plans on at least
a triennial basis. The SSO agencies can also conduct other
activities as they deem appropriate based upon state specific
requirements. If the FTA determines that a State is not in
compliance with the SSO requirements, it can withhold up to 5
percent of the grant funds to that State transportation or rail
system.
Unlike the FRA or FAA, however, SSOs have no authority
under 49 CFR Part 659 or by any other FTA regulations to
enforce their findings with fines, civil actions, or other
penalties. Any such authority must come from State
legislatures. The FTA intended the SSO program to function as a
``cooperative'' effort with the transit agencies and as such it
was not designed to operate under the traditional regulatory
framework of fines and penalties.
Over the past 6 months, WMATA and the TOC have worked
together to review the effectiveness and implementation of a
variety of initiatives and recommendations. Most recently, TOC
urged WMATA ``to take immediate, short-term action to better
ensure the safety of workers in the Right of Way (ROW),'' TOC
had provided to WMATA's Executive Leadership Team a report
titled, ``WMATA's Rail Transit Special Safety Study-Roadway
Worker Protection.'' WMATA carefully reviewed this report and
implemented the following immediate actions:
A copy of this report was provided to senior
leadership of ATU Local 689 and to safety and track
maintenance experts at four peer transit agencies
around the Nation, as well as to the FTA, for review.
A ROW safety workshop was conducted January 11-13,
2010, with TOC as an active participant. During this
workshop, key themes were identified (e.g., practical
field testing, tunnel walks, announcements, and general
awareness of the location of workers on the ROW).
WMATA will focus efforts on reviewing the rules and
protections for lone workers, track walkers, and
temporary/emergency work sites.
Key sections of the Rulebook will be reviewed and
redeveloped.
``Roll-out'' training will be implemented for the
new ROW Worker Protection Program.
We look forward to continuing the partnership with TOC to
review and strengthen WMATA's rail program.
Q.2.b. What was the reason for not letting the Tri-State
Oversight Committee conduct an inspection?
A.2.b. WMATA at no time denied the TOC the ability to conduct
an inspection. WMATA did, however, work with the TOC to
determine the safest possible way to achieve their goals. In a
December 2, 2009, news article published by WTOP.com. TOC
Chairman Eric Madison stated, ``We want to make it clear. Metro
wasn't barring us from the tracks. The issue was how we access
the tracks. Metro's concern was that we access the tracks as
safely as possible. And we wanted to make sure that we were in
compliance with their rules as well. I think we have a clear
understanding now of what we are trying to achieve and how
Metro can help us do that.''
Q.3.a. Metro's publicly announced its plan to increase
accountability. I applaud this action. Can you tell me what has
resulted from this new increased accountability policy?
A.3.a. In recent months, the WMATA Board of Directors has taken
several actions to improve safety oversight at WMATA. For
example, on November 19, 2009, the Board established a new
Board policy requiring WMATA staff to cooperate fully with the
federally recognized safety oversight agency, the TOC. During
its monthly Customer Service, Operations and Safety Committee
meetings, the Board receives regular reports on safety and
operational performance, including summaries of information
such as rail injury and fatality rates, distance between bus
incidents, and smoke and fire incidents. The operations report
reviews information such as rail on-time performance, bus on-
time performance, and elevator and escalator availability.
WMATA recently established an Office of Performance with
the stated mission of using performance information to guide
actions, to promote WMATA's benefits in the region, and to
unify employees to accomplish our goals. The staff includes
seven people with expertise in performance measurement, data
validation and analysis, and other areas such as strategic
planning, finance, and organizational management. Deliverables
from this new office will be grounded in WMATA's five strategic
goals and include execution plans that link departmental work
to those strategic goals, a performance tool that will track
agency progress towards achieving WMATA's vision of being the
``Best Ride in the Nation,'' and an annual performance report.
Key safety performance and operational reliability measures
will be incorporated into these products based upon available
data, current performance reporting efforts, and industry best
practices.
In addition, WMATA has formed a Safety Action ``Report
Out'' Team which meets every 2 weeks and is responsible for
tracking safety performance and addressing specific actions to
improve safety in all operations work areas. The team will
report directly to the General Manager, the Deputy General
Manager of operations, and the Chief Safety Officer to drive
accountability for safety at WMATA. The Board will be carefully
monitoring the progress of the Safety Action Team.
Q.3.b. What measures of accountability have occurred and where
does the buck stop?
A.3.b. WMATA has instituted a number of improvements to
transparency and accountability including:
increasing review of criminal history and
credentials of potential employees;
partnering with other transit properties and
national safety facilities to ensure current and robust
employee training;
revising the Metrorail and Metrobus Safety Rules
and Procedures and the Authority's System Safety
Program Plan;
meeting with frontline management to reinforce
their responsibility to ensure safe workplace and
service; management will report to me periodically on
safety in their work sites;
Ongoing training and coaching to develop a safety
culture;
Changing executive management structure where
necessary;
Partnering with unions, FTA, TOC, and other transit
properties to achieve goals.
It will take the efforts of every WMATA employee to make
WMATA the safest system possible. However, no one is more
accountable than I am.
------
RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN DODD
FROM DAVID WISE
Q.1. In light of the recent accidents nationwide, many believe
there should be a stronger role for the Federal Government in
transit safety. What do you believe is the proper amount of
authority and oversight at the Federal level? What are the
concerns of the industry in regards to the Administration's
proposed new Federal role in transit safety? What should FTA
consider when developing standards if this proposal is enacted?
A.1. In determining the proper amount of authority and
oversight at the Federal level, it is important to consider
whether uniform Federal standards are needed and the capacity
of the States versus FTA to carry out transit safety oversight.
Regarding standards, FTA's current regulation on
the State Safety Oversight (SSO) Program requires that
transit agencies' safety plans include various minimum
components of safety management, such as a process for
identifying, managing, and eliminating hazards. In
addition, State oversight agencies may choose to
develop technical standards, such as requirements for
the strength of track or crashworthiness of rail
vehicles.
Regarding the capacity of the States to perform
safety oversight, we found in 2006 that, while most
oversight agency staff believed they were doing a good
job, the levels of resources, staff expertise, and
enforcement powers varied across State oversight
agencies. Oversight agencies were unsure whether they
had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a
transit agency's operations; 13 of 24 agencies
estimated dedicating less than one full-time equivalent
staff member to the oversight task. Many State
officials stated that they were unsure if they were
adequately trained. Also, we found that 19 agencies had
no punitive authority, such as authority to issue
fines, and those that did have such authority stated
that they rarely, if ever, used it. In response to our
recommendation, FTA developed a suggested training
curriculum for State oversight staff and, currently,
over 50 percent of these agencies have staff who have
completed at least the first tier of this training.
Regarding the capacity of FTA to perform safety
oversight, the agency currently has a small number of
safety staff (5 filled headquarters positions) as well
as a contractor for the SSO program with about 4-5
staff. To fulfill its proposed role, it would need to
significantly enhance its internal and contractor
staffing and expertise.
It may also be helpful to compare FTA's authority with that
of other modal administrations within DOT. FTA currently has
less authority to regulate and oversee safety than these other
agencies. For example, the Federal Railroad Administration,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Aviation
Administration, and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials safety
Administration promulgate regulations and technical standards
that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective
modes must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of
these agencies use Federal inspectors and, in some instances,
State inspectors to determine compliance with the safety
regulations and guidance they issue. Finally, these agencies
can mandate corrective actions and levy fines to transportation
operators, among other actions, for noncompliance with
regulations. However, FTA historically has been primarily a
grant-making agency.
We do not have information on the views across the transit
industry on the Administration's proposal. However, as part of
our ongoing review of challenges to improving rail transit
safety, we intend to interview officials of major rail transit
systems and will ask for their views on the proposal.
If the proposal is enacted, FTA will face challenges in
developing safety standards for an industry that varies a great
deal. For example, transit systems use different types of
vehicles and these vehicles operate on different types of track
with different power sources. FTA could develop standards that
are flexible enough to apply to varying types of transit
systems or develop separate more specific standards for the
different types of vehicles and track. The latter approach
could be a lengthy process and could require multiple parallel
rulemakings. DOT has noted that it does not plan to develop
highly specific regulations but instead, as a first step, would
require each transit system to implement ``Safety Management
Systems'' that would identify its greatest safety
vulnerabilities through risk analysis and then take the
necessary actions to address those risks. Risk management is a
systematic approach for dealing with the risks posed by safety
hazards (such as collisions, derailments, or worker or
passenger injuries). Risk management can help to improve
systemwide safety by systematically identifying and assessing
the risks associated with various safety hazards and
prioritizing them so that resources can be allocated to address
the highest risks first. It also can help in ensuring that the
most appropriate alternatives to prevent or mitigate the
effects of hazards are designed and implemented.
FTA established the Transit Rail Advisory Committee for
Safety in December 2009. This Committee, which will consist of
up to 25 voting members, is charged with analyzing transit
safety issues and developing recommendations for minimum,
national transit safety standards. We believe this is a
positive step that will enable FTA to tap into the expertise of
various key stakeholders in developing regulations.
Q.2. GAO stated in their testimony that some States have given
their oversight agencies enforcement authority, but many of
these oversight agencies have ``rarely, if ever, used it.'' How
will enforcement authority help oversight agencies be
effective? Moreover, current law allows for FTA to withhold 5
percent of formula funds from a State that is not in
compliance. Has this been effective? If not, what enforcement
tools would be effective?
A.2. Based on prior work on enforcement of transportation
safety regulations, we believe that providing FTA and
participating States with enforcement authority could help
better ensure that transit systems take corrective actions when
problems are found. For example, safety inspection and
enforcement can lead to the correction of safety problems and
improved compliance with safety regulations and, as a result,
reduce accidents.
Under the current SSO program, FTA can withhold State
formula funds from States that are not meeting SSO
requirements. Prior to 1999, FTA has withheld formula funds
twice: (1) about $95 million from one State for its failure to
designate a State safety oversight agency, and (2) about $2.3
million from another State for failure to meet the FTA rule's
implementation deadlines. Since then, FTA has not withheld
formula funds from any States due to noncompliance with these
requirements.
The transit agencies FTA oversees usually are publicly
owned and face many financial challenges. As a result, fines
and penalties could be counterproductive to enhancing safety
when funding is at a premium and local riders or taxpayers
could ultimately bear the cost of fines. There are other
enforcement options available, however. For example, in
addition to penalties, FRA may order a locomotive, freight car,
or passenger car out of service or may send warning letters to
individuals if a safety violation is found. The American Public
Transportation Association also has suggested a timetable to
allow transit systems to be brought into compliance without
penalty as well as providing FTA with the ability to direct
grant funding for transit systems to be used to correct
significant incidences of noncompliance. In addition, the
negative consequences of noncompliance--such as those stemming
from lawsuits and bad publicity--can serve as a deterrent.
------
RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN DODD
FROM BRIAN CRISTY
Q.1. In light of the recent accidents nationwide, many believe
there should be a stronger role for the Federal Government in
transit safety. What do you believe is the proper amount of
authority and oversight at the Federal level?
A.1. On behalf of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities (DPU), I support the Administration's proposal as a
means to provide robust Federal safety oversight of rail
transit systems. I agree with the Administration's intention to
institute a performance-based approach to oversight by
establishing a quality safety management system for each rail
transit agency. In exercising oversight authority, I agree with
Secretary LaHood that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
must be permitted to establish and enforce meaningful minimum
safety standards for all rail transit systems. These standards
should address, among other areas, hours-of-service regulations
for rail transit operators, crashworthiness standards for rail
vehicles, and the installation of event recorders on all rail
vehicles. Further, as part of the proposed safety certification
program identified by Secretary LaHood, I believe that State
oversight agencies should be authorized to investigate and
discover minimum standard safety violations, and report such
violations to the FTA. In turn, the FTA should be permitted to
enforce these standards through the assessment of monetary
penalties against a rail transit authority for noncompliance.
Further, the proposed legislation should provide for safety
training and staffing support in order to effectively implement
the FTA standards. Finally, I agree that the proposed
legislation should not preempt States from establishing more
stringent safety standards.
Q.2. What are the concerns of the industry in regards to the
Administration's proposed new Federal role in transit safety?
A.2. Because the final regulations have not yet been
promulgated, I have some concern regarding the ability of the
local rail transit system to implement the Federal requirements
in an efficient and expeditious manner, while maintaining the
paramount objective of public safety. The most effective set of
minimum standards will be those that are easy to interpret and
implement by existing rail transit systems. Further, the
specific requirements of the program (e.g., minimum standards,
inspections, reporting, etc.) should not unduly constrain,
administratively, financially, or otherwise, either the
oversight agency or the rail transit system. That said, I am
encouraged by Secretary LaHood's testimony that the proposed
legislation is not intended to create voluminous and highly
specific regulations.
Q.3. What should FTA consider when developing standards if this
proposal is enacted?
A.3. In addition to the above considerations, I agree with
Secretary LaHood's testimony that each rail transit system
should identify its safety issues and take the necessary
actions to address those risks. Thus, I would encourage the FTA
to communicate directly with the oversight agencies and the
individual rail transit systems in developing safety standards.
More specifically, however, I believe that the FTA should
carefully consider the role of the rail transit system's safety
department, as this group is responsible for maintaining day-
to-day safety on the system. I spoke to some extent in my
initial testimony about the important relationship between the
MBTA's safety department, and the DPU, as the oversight agency.
It is my belief that any safety training and staffing support
provided by the new legislation should be directed to
maintaining an experienced, well-trained safety department.
Q.4. GAO stated in their testimony that some States have given
their oversight agencies enforcement authority, but many of
these oversight agencies have ``rarely, if ever, used it.'' How
will enforcement authority help oversight agencies be
effective?
A.4. Enforcement authority is an important part of a safety
oversight program. As I noted above, the FTA should be
authorized to institute fines for noncompliance with minimum
safety standards. I believe the assessment of a monetary
penalty will provide the necessary incentive for an otherwise
noncompliant entity to ensure that it continues to meet Federal
regulations. The FTA should retain the authority prescribe
appropriate due process mechanisms related to the assessment of
monetary penalties.
Q.5. Moreover, current law allows for FTA to withhold 5 percent
of formula funds from a State that is not in compliance. Has
this been effective? If not, what enforcement tools would be
effective?
A.5. I believe that the current law allowing for the FTA to
withhold 5 percent of formula funds from a noncompliant State
is not effective in most cases, at least as it applies to
Massachusetts. The reason for this is because the formula funds
are distributed to all transit systems in the Commonwealth, not
just the MBTA. Thus, if 5 percent of the funds are withheld
because of a violation incurred by the MBTA, the remaining
transit systems (i.e., buses) are adversely impacted, as well.
As noted above, an effective enforcement tool would be the
assessment of a monetary penalty against the rail transit
system.
------
RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN DODD
FROM WILLIAM MILLAR
Q.1. In light of recent accidents nationwide, many believe
there should be a stronger role for the Federal Government in
transit safety. What are the concerns of the industry in
regards to the Administration's proposed new Federal role in
transit safety?
A.1. Rail transit in America is an extremely safe mode of
transportation, but it can always be made safer. APTA believes
the Administration's proposal is a good start in the effort to
strengthen the Federal role in transit safety. We appreciate
the Congress' and the Administration's willingness to consider
APTA's views and to work with the industry as this proposal
moves forward. If Congress enacts this proposal, we will work
cooperatively with the Administration as it implements this
program. As I discussed in my testimony, we believe that the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is the appropriate agency
to oversee this program, and we support adequate Federal
funding to implement this program, to ensure the availability
of qualified safety experts and to bring systems up to a state
of good repair which should have a positive effect on safety.
Further, we are appreciative of the anticipation that this
proposal would envision the use of APTA as a Standards
Development Organization (SDO).
The industry has several concerns in regards to the
Administration's proposed new Federal role in transit safety.
The most important aspect in creating a new regulatory program
is consistency. There must be consistent application, adherence
and enforcement in order for any new Federal program to be
successful. The public transit industry believes that to ensure
consistency, Federal safety standards should preempt State and
local standards. Uniformity and a national focus are the
essential elements of achieving a successfully applied Federal
safety standards program. While some States or local entities
may seek to separate standards for safety, to do so might
ultimately detract from the overall effort. Standards created
in one location would, through the threat of litigation, become
a de facto national standard. Such de facto standards would
serve to supplant the judgment of the FTA, an agency whose work
is crafted by the collective experience of the industry, and
will thus create a disjointed collection of separate standards
driven by decisions handed down by the courts. Uniformity is
essential to ensuring that the Federal investment is
effectively used for safety initiatives that reflect national
safety priorities.
In addition, we are concerned that the proposal does not
contain clear language outlining enforcement mechanisms. Public
transit agencies are public entities funded with taxpayer
dollars and fares from riders, therefore, levying monetary
fines is counterproductive as an enforcement scheme. The most
effective method of providing enforcement may be to vest the
FTA with the authority to impose ``grant conditions'' on
grantees, requiring significant safety findings be fixed prior
to allowing an agency to move forward with other projects.
Q.2. What should FTA consider when developing standards if this
proposal is enacted?
A.2. If this proposal is enacted, the FTA should consider that
the development of effective Federal transit safety standards
requires the involvement of transit industry expertise.
Adequate funding must also be provided for the FTA to
accomplish this mission.
Since 1996, APTA has been creating consensus based
voluntary transit industry standards. Over 170 standards have
been created to date, with nearly 96 rail transit safety
standards in operation across the country. The APTA standards
program was developed by thousands of industry volunteers
serving on numerous working committees, creating standards for
bus, rail transit and commuter rail operations, maintenance,
procurement and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).
Funded in part by over $3 million in grants received from the
FTA, our organization is an officially accredited SDO that is
widely recognized as the leader in developing transit
standards. Further, the APTA standards program for commuter
rail has been used by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
and is incorporated into their regulatory program.
APTA's consensus based standards are currently being
utilized by public transit systems throughout North America to
achieve operational efficiencies and safety improvements in
services, facilities and vehicles. It is important to
understand that the transit industry not only assists in
developing the APTA standards but also operationally implements
these standards at transit properties. As such, there is no
reason for the FTA to create an entirely new program. We
strongly encourage the FTA to use APTA's existing standards
program as the foundation of their new initiative.
Incorporating, where appropriate, the existing APTA standards
program already in practice will serve to substantially reduce
the cost of developing standards and will also provide for a
more effective transition period and final implementation.
Furthermore, using existing standards also follows a
Congressional directive put forth in the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 2005 (P.L. 104-113), which
encourages Government agencies to work together with industry
leaders to develop private, voluntary safety standards for
Federal grantees.
As was the case with the initial creation of State Safety
Oversight Agencies (SSOAs), the unfunded Federal mandate left
States scrambling to find funding to employ properly trained
staff and to implement effective programs. As a result, the
program we currently have is disjointed, uneven in its
effectiveness and varies greatly from one agency to the next.
To make certain that a similar situation does not reoccur, the
FTA must work with Congress to ensure that adequate funding is
provided to hire and develop additional personnel and subject
matter experts at the Federal level, to properly train and
staff State oversight agencies, and to create a national FTA
transit safety standards certification program to ensure that
there is a national network of uniformly trained transit safety
professionals at the Federal, State and transit agency levels.
The FTA organization structure must also be reorganized so that
it can properly support the new program.
Furthermore, Congress and the Department of Transportation
must also ensure that both passenger rail regulatory agencies
(the FRA and the FTA) work to create a consistent and
coordinated approach to regulations as there are many locations
where both agencies operate side-by-side or are operated
jointly by the same multimodal public transportation agency.
GAO stated in their testimony that some States have given
their oversight agencies enforcement authority, but many of
these oversight agencies have ``rarely, if ever, used it.''
Q.3. How will enforcement authority help oversight agencies be
effective?
A.3. State Safety Oversight Agencies tend not to use their
enforcement authority because it is rare that such action is
necessary. The public nature of the industry and its commitment
to provide a safe public service is a higher priority than all
other duties, therefore, when a significant safety hazard is
identified, corrective actions are usually taken. Of the few
SSOAs that do possess such authority, it is extremely rare that
safety situations go unchecked or escalate to a point which
would necessitate the utilization of enforcement powers.
Public transit agencies are extraordinarily aware of and
sensitive to public perception, local politics and customer
service. Whereas private carriers may perceive fines from
Federal regulators as a natural cost of doing business, public
transit business models are simply unable to withstand similar
monetary and public perception penalties. Public transit
agencies are public purpose, not-for-profit entities funded
with taxpayer dollars and fares from riders. There is no profit
from which to pay fines. A substantial fine would result in
less revenue, which would lead to a reduction in service or
higher fares, either of which would push riders to use less
safe modes of travel. As previously stated, the most effective
method of providing enforcement is for the FTA to impose
``grant conditions'' on transit agencies, requiring significant
safety issues be fixed prior to allowing an agency to access
funds for regular needs and planned projects.
To the extent that monetary fines are inappropriate
penalties for public transit agencies, we recognize that there
must be measures of accountability in the event corrective
actions are overlooked or ignored. Through our successful APTA
Safety Audit Management Program, it has been our experience
that once a safety issue is identified through an audit, a
transit agency will immediately work to correct the deficiency.
Moreover, current law allows for FTA to withhold 5 percent
of formula funds from a State that is not in compliance.
Q.4. Has this been effective? If not, what enforcement tools
would be effective?
A.4. Under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Enhancement Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)
the FTA was permitted to begin withholding up to 5 percent of
an entire State or urbanized area's 5307 Urbanized Area Grant
Formula funding if a transit agency is found to be noncompliant
on rail transit safety matters. This is not effective for
several reasons. As the statute is currently written, safety
noncompliance at an individual transit agency can result in an
up to 5 percent reduction of an entire State's or Urbanized
Area's (UZA) 5307 funds. Nowhere in the statute does the
language identify that this penalty in the form of a funding
reduction can be conveyed upon a particular transit agency,
instead the statute explicitly allows for the entire State or
UZA to be penalized, complicating matters for States and UZAs
that have more than one transit agency. Furthermore, funding
reductions prevent already cash strapped transit agencies from
being able to properly leverage all available funds for
critical corrective safety actions.
Recognizing the inequities associated with such a penalty,
State oversight agencies have historically opted against
reporting infractions as an enforcement tool. A much more
effective enforcement mechanism would be to permit the FTA to
impose ``grant conditions'' on grantees that are found to be in
significant noncompliance with federally imposed safety
regulations. Requiring transit agencies to direct their 5307
Urbanized Area Grant Formula funding to address significant
incidences of noncompliance would better ensure that mandatory
Federal safety requirements are met.
The imposition of ``grant conditions'' should be
incorporated through an adequate timetable, allowing transit
agencies to bring their systems into compliance without
incurring any form of penalty. Once the initial compliance
period has elapsed, a progressive ratings system should be
instituted, whereby instances of noncompliance will be
evaluated based on risk and/or necessity. Further analysis is
necessary to determine if 100 percent of 5307 funds of a
noncompliant agency should be redirected towards corrective
actions, or if instead, a similar evaluative ratings process
should be instituted, allowing for progress in correcting
safety issues while simultaneously providing transit agencies
with the flexibility to adequately fund other existing
programs.
Additional Material Supplied for the Record
STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
MARYLAND
Chairman Menendez, thank you for the unique opportunity to issue a
statement in your Subcommittee about this important issue that hit all
too close to home for me on the afternoon of June 22 this year.
The safe operation of Metro, and any transit system must not just
be promised but also delivered. I share Senator Mikulski's frustration
with WMATA's record on improved safety measures when just 2 weeks ago,
on November 29th, yet another Metrorail accident occurred near Falls
Church, Virginia, injuring three Metro employees and destroying three
rail cars.
We have heard a lot of talk about the steps being taken at Metro to
improve safety but what we need to see are results and accountability
for when the safety of costumers and employees is compromised.
Part and parcel to the safe operation of any transit system is
having adequate resources to maintain, repair and upgrade when
necessary the essential infrastructure that deliver riders to their
destinations. I have worked hard in the Environment and Public Works
Committee to improve the funding authorizations for transit funding. In
2008 I was able to secure a 10 year $1.5 billion authorization for
Metro. Building on that, I was very pleased that Senator Mikulski
through her role on the Appropriations Committee was able to
appropriate the first $150 million dollar installment of funds to
Metro.
I completely understand that some of the most basic safety
improvements require financial resources. Funding shortfalls have
caused Metro to make repairs instead of replacing aging equipment or
structures throughout the system. Repairing last year, I visited the
Shady Grove Station and witnessed first-hand how they literally are
using wood planks and iron rods to prop up station platforms. They have
been forced to make such accommodations to keep the system running in
the safest way possible.
Metrorail is the second busiest commuter rail system in America,
carrying 1 million passengers a day. It carries the equivalent of the
combined subway ridership of BART in San Francisco, MARTA in Atlanta,
and SEPTA in Philadelphia each day. But more than three decades after
the first trains started running, the system is showing severe signs of
its age. Sixty percent of the Metrorail system is more than 20 years
old. The costs of operations, maintenance, and rehabilitation are
tremendous.
I believe that we must look at this not only as the responsibility
of the local jurisdictions--Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC--but
also as a Federal responsibility. Federal facilities are located within
footsteps of 35 of Metrorail's 86 stations. Nearly half of Metrorail's
rush hour riders are Federal employees. Approximately 10 percent of
Metro's riders use the Metrorail stations at the Pentagon, Capitol
South, or Union Station, serving the military and the Congress. In
addition, Metro's ability to move people quickly and safely in the
event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster is crucial. The Metro
system was invaluable on September 11, 2001, proving its importance to
the Federal Government and to the Nation during the terrorist attacks
of that tragic day. There is a clear Federal responsibility to this
system.
The devastating June 22 Metrorail accident that claimed nine lives
and injured more than 70 passengers is the most devastating by any
measure in Metro history. I want to once again send my deepest
sympathies to the families, friends, and all those whose lives the
victims of this tragedy.
The investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board is
ongoing and I am happy to hear that Metro is cooperating with these
Federal investigators. However, when regional authorities came out to
inspect certain sections rail lines they were denied access. Metro's
mishandling of the resolution of this catastrophe and further
accidents, some fatal, that have occurred since the June 22 accident
raise a number of reasonable questions about the condition of Metro's
infrastructure and WMATA's grasp on how to safely run the system.
News reports found that the train car that caused the fatal
accident was an older model that Federal officials had recommended for
replacement. It did not have a data recorder or modern improvements to
stand up to a collision, safety measures also recommended by NTSB to be
put in place on metro trains. The cars were also 2 months behind on its
scheduled maintenance. Metro officials are replacing these aging cars
that date back to the 1970s. These costly replacements are being made,
but the pace is too slow. In the meantime, Metro is repairing some of
these older cars to keep them in service until new ones can be
purchased.
I am proud to sponsor Senator Mikulski's National Metro Safety Act
(S. 1506) to establish Federal safety standards for America's transit
systems. While transit is statistically one safest modes of
transportation in the country, the lack of oversight and accountability
when tragedies do occur is unacceptable. Currently, the U.S. Department
of Transportation, which provides considerable funding for transit, has
no authority to determine public safety measures of the projects they
help fund.
As we work towards providing better resources for transit systems
across the country we must also help ensure the safety of our Nation's
transit systems for the traveling public. Giving DOT and the NTSB
similar safety standards authority over transit systems that it has
over buses and airplanes will provide greater safety assurances for the
millions of people who rely on public transit systems everyday. As we
learn more about the causes of the June 22 Metro accident it is
becoming increasingly apparent that it was only a matter of time before
an incident like this happened. We must take steps to prevent these
types of accidents from happening again and I look forward to working
with Senator Mikulski and the Members of this Committee to improve the
safety of our Nation's transit systems.
______
STATEMENT OF ARUN VOHRA, P.E., PRESIDENT MINI, LLC
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Vitter, and Members of the
Subcommittee, my name is Arun Vohra. I am the President of MINI, LLC, a
woman-owned small business that has expertise in high technology
applications for transportation, infrastructure, energy, and
manufacturing. I am a Registered Professional Engineer in Maryland, and
have been working on one of the largest unserved safety issues of
subways since 2001. The safety issue is dirty electrical insulators
which support the electrified third rail. When dirty, they leak
electricity to the ground, causing additional safety issues, as well as
electrical energy losses, increasing operating cost and infrastructure
corrosion. I have walked on the tracks of the largest U.S. subways and
have seen that they all have dirty insulators, especially in the
tunnels.
I fully agree with and support the Public Transportation Safety
Program Act of 2009 proposed by the Honorable Ray LaHood, Secretary of
Transportation (DOT) and the Honorable Peter Rogoff, Administrator of
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). Federal safety regulation,
oversight and enforcement are desperately needed for subways. Congress
and the Administration should establish and enforce Federal safety
standards, protect the public, enhance economic development, increase
energy efficiency and reduce the carbon footprint of subways to make
safe, reliable, well maintained, and efficient subways and a strong
America.
Safe subway operation depends on the chain of proper design,
construction, operation, maintenance, service, repair and replacement
of track, structure (tunnels, bridges, stations) controls, and rolling
stock. The weakest link in the chain of safe subway operation is
maintenance that has been deferred, sometimes for years, because of
tight budgets. The reason why the subways run as well as they do is
because of the expertise, experience, and dedication of the long
serving, unrewarded, and unseen workers who are doing the best they
can, but need help, to provide safe and smooth subway operation.
I will illustrate the need for Federal safety regulations by
describing the critical need for cleaning dirty third rail insulators.
My remarks apply to insulators on all subway systems including the
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA), Baltimore; Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA); Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA); Chicago Transit Authority (CTA); New
York City Transit (NYCT); Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA); Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART); and Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA). Although the press articles quoted
below concern WMATA, other subways also have the same insulator issues
as WMATA. Pictures of dirty insulators from some of these subways are
shown below.
At the present time, most subways are operating in a survival mode
with substandard operation due to lack of maintenance. Track
infrastructure maintenance has often been deferred year after year due
to budget issues. When maintenance is deferred, systems fail. When
systems fail, risk is generated and safety is compromised. While this
rarely results in loss of life, it leads to degraded operation and
consequently delays and cancellations, causing inconvenience to
passengers. According to the Washington Post of December 4, 2009, `` .
. . Metro's projected budget gap for next year has grown
significantly--to $175 million . . . Metro's recommendation to close
the gap include . . . shifting $30 million set aside for preventive
maintenance to the operating budget.'' The proposed FTA safety
regulations will ensure that the track infrastructure is well
maintained and supports current and future demand for rail services,
and does so safely and reliably.
Subways rely on insulators to keep the electricity that powers
trains flowing through the third rail where it belongs. The high-
voltage third rail sits on insulators spaced 6 to 10 feet apart,
depending on the subway, which means there are 500 to 900 insulators in
just one mile of track. There are about 1,200,000 insulators to be
cleaned in the Nation's major subways. Keeping so many insulators clean
enough to break the electric conduction path is an expensive challenge
to safety and reliability. In the U.S., insulators are rarely, if ever,
cleaned because cleaning is a manual, slow and costly process
compounded by limited track availability and space constraints around
insulators. An automated cleaner has not been available so far, because
manufacturers have not been willing to invest large amounts of money in
research and development of cleaners because of the high risk,
difficulty, and the cost of design and construction. Subways defer
systemwide insulator cleaning and resort to breakdown replacement. As a
result, subways routinely replace dozens of burnt out insulators every
year at considerable cost. In contrast, the Vienna, Austria, subway
cleans every insulator by hand, every year, because Vienna sees the
value of safe and reliable service and is willing to pay for it. Dirty
insulators can have other side effects that are very costly in the long
run.
Dirty insulators fail due to the accumulation of electrically
conducting particulates and dirt on the insulators. The dirt contains
carbon dust from carbon brushes on the traction motor commutators, dust
from brake pads, rust particles scraped by the collector shoe from the
third rail, lime and winter road salt deposits from evaporation of
water dripping from roads above the rail line, and dirt. Normal
maintenance of the tracks includes rail grinding that generates a
significant amount of iron particles that also coat the insulators. The
dirt eventually short circuits the insulator, causing a corona
discharge, electrical arcing, smoke, and flame. If the insulator is
made of fiberglass composite or wood, it will burn. Ceramic insulators
can become white hot, incandescent and melt. On rare occasions, when a
ceramic insulator flashes over (fails), it explodes with an ear
splitting bang, jeopardizing the safety of workers and customers. The
explosive failure may possibly be due to the instantaneous and enormous
thermal stresses at the point of flashover, which far exceed the
tensile and compressive strength of the ceramic material from which the
insulator is made. Ceramic insulator failure sometimes results in a
plasma ball, with a temperature of about 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit which
can vaporize a concrete tie and rebar. Wood ties can be set on fire.
The reduced support to the running rails due to a burnt out tie,
especially on a curve, may cause a derailment of a train with
catastrophic results. The third rail safety cover is typically made of
fiberglass or wood, and it can also burn. An overheated insulator can
cause the plastic cover of an adjacent electric supply cable to
overheat. If the insulator flashes over, the plastic covering can burn,
releasing possibly lethal toxic smoke. Failed insulators can shut down
train operations until action is taken to resolve the situation. Failed
insulators are among the most frequent causes of downtime in many
subways. As an example, according to the Washington Post of Sunday,
August 9, 2009, `` . . . Smoke Closes Metro Station. The L'Enfant Plaza
Metro station was closed for nearly 90 minutes Saturday after Metro
police noticed heavy smoke coming from the tracks on the Green and
Yellow lines. A preliminary investigation indicated that the smoke
developed after an insulator on one of the tracks caught fire or an
object came into contact with the insulator . . . .''
Dirty insulators also leak electricity continuously and increase
cost. The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
(NYSERDA) funded a landmark study in 2008 that showed that the NYCT
subway loses $2 million per year from leaking electricity from dirty
insulators. The NYCT Subway has over 440,000 insulators. There are
about 1,200,000 insulators nationwide.
Based on the NYSERDA study, the estimated total annual U.S.
electricity leaking from dirty insulators is 59.4 million kilowatt
hours at a cost of $12 million. If the insulators were to be cleaned,
the carbon reduction from the reduced fuel used in the electric
generating plants would be 7.5 metric tons per year. Based on data from
subways and the National Transit Database on reported annual insulator
fires, service outage time per fire, and numbers of customers waiting,
and the value of customer's time as established in a study sponsored by
the American Public Transportation Association, the U.S. estimated
annual passenger delay time cost is $175 million. Based on an estimated
cost of $10 to clean a heavily encrusted insulator, cleaning would save
$187 million/1,200,000 or about $156 per insulator. The follow-on
routine insulator cleaning will be much less costly.
Stray currents caused by leaking insulators, are another
significant issue. Stray currents can cause operational problems with
train control circuits, and significantly increase corrosion of metal
components and structures in bridges, tunnels and neighboring utilities
and other metal infrastructure on the tracks. One subway has indicated
heavy rusting of their bridges and of a fuel pipeline near their
tracks, and cracking of concrete ties that contain steel reinforcing
rods. Another subway installed a $4 million cathodic protection system
to prevent corrosion on a critical part of their system and will have
to spend $1 (one) million dollars every 5 years to maintain it.
According to a Washington Post article on December 4, 2009, regarding
the Metrorail extension to Dulles Airport, there is a safety issue on
the 32-year old foundations to be used in a new bridge to be built over
Interstate Highway 66: `` . . . inspections of rust and corrosion and
tests to determine whether electrical currents from the existing Orange
Line could have caused pilings to deteriorate, a concern of Metro
Officials . . . ''.
The ``electrical currents from the existing Orange Line'' are
probably leaking electricity from dirty insulators that have not been
cleaned. The eventual replacement of bridges and other metal
infrastructure, including the steel reinforcing bars in the tunnels,
concrete ties, and structures, that have corroded due to leaking
current from dirty insulators will run into many, many billions of
dollars. The corrosion of metal conduits that carry the signal
communications could also lead to train control malfunction and tragic
accidents.
Although there is no safety standard on cleaning dirty insulators,
the FTA is to be congratulated for thinking ahead, recognizing the
importance of this issue and supporting development of a high speed
automated in-place insulator cleaner that will make the cleaning
process safer and affordable. In-place cleaning saves the labor cost of
$60 to $100 to replace an insulator, and $15 to $70 for a new
fiberglass or $60 to $100 for a new ceramic insulator. NYSERDA is also
to be congratulated for providing additional support for a
demonstration of the cleaner at the NYCT subway. Every dollar spent on
insulator cleaning will save over 15 dollars in avoidance of electric
wastage and passenger delays alone.
Establishing Federal safety regulations would eliminate insulator
failures, support continued safe, secure, and reliable operation; and
stimulate economic growth by eliminating passenger delays due to
insulator failure. Energy diversity would be increased by increasing
the energy efficiency of subways and Greenhouse gas emissions would be
reduced.
In summary, Federal safety regulation, oversight, and enforcement
will sustain the future, maintain the present, and repair the past.
Congress and the Administration should establish and enforce Federal
safety standards, protect the public, enhance economic development,
increase energy efficiency, and reduce the carbon footprint of subways
to make safe, reliable, well maintained, and efficient subways and a
strong America.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. CLARK, DIRECTOR OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
SAFETY DIVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
Chairman Menendez and Members of the Committee, my name is Richard
W. Clark. I am the Director of the Consumer Protection and Safety
Division of the California Public Utilities Commission. I am pleased to
have the opportunity today to submit this testimony discussing rail
transit safety and the proposed restructuring of the Federal and State
regulatory effort.
This testimony has been prepared by the Consumer Protection and
Safety Division. The Division has the responsibility for the regulatory
oversight of rail transit safety in California. This testimony will
describe the Commission's program, comment on the proposed Public
Transportation Safety Program Act of 2009, and discuss some examples of
California's success in exercising its safety jurisdiction over rail
transit and fixed guideway systems.
The California Rail Transit Safety Program
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) oversees the
safety and security of all rail transit systems within California.
There are 12 rail transit systems under the CPUC's jurisdiction,
including light rail systems, heavy rail transit, funiculars, automatic
people movers, and trolleys. Collectively these systems account for
millions of passenger trips every year. The CPUC is responsible for
investigating all reportable accidents, as well as conducting regular
audits and inspections of rail transit systems. Additionally, at any
given time, rail transit agencies have dozens of new projects,
extensions, and retrofits in progress, all of which must pass the
rigorous CPUC safety certification process before carrying passengers.
Through the California Public Utilities Code, California State law
gives the CPUC jurisdiction over rail transit safety. For example,
Public Utilities Code (PU Code) section 99152 states:
Any public transit guideway planned, acquired, or constructed,
on or after January 1, 1979, is subject to regulations of the
Public Utilities Commission relating to safety appliances and
procedures. The commission shall inspect all work done on those
guideways and may make further additions or changes necessary
for the purpose of safety to employees and the general public.
The commission shall develop an oversight program employing
safety planning criteria, guidelines, safety standards, and
safety procedures to be met by operators in the design,
construction, and operation of those guideways. Existing
industry standards shall be used where applicable. The
commission shall enforce the provisions of this section.
Other code sections provide this authority individually to rail
transit agencies in operation before January 1, 1979. Additionally, PU
Code Section 778 provides authority over rail transit highway-road
crossings:
The commission shall adopt rules and regulations, which shall
become effective on July 1, 1977, relating to safety appliances
and procedures for rail transit services operated at grade and
in vehicular traffic. The rules and regulations shall include,
but not be limited to, provisions on grade crossing protection
devices, headways, and maximum operating speeds with respect to
the speed and volume of vehicular traffic within which the
transit service is operated. The commission shall submit the
proposed rules and regulations to the Legislature not later
than April 1, 1977.
The Commission also has State level accident investigation
responsibilities. Transit accidents directly or indirectly related to
maintenance or operation activities resulting in:
loss of life,
or injury to person or property,
and which requires, in the judgment of the Commission, an
investigation,
may result in Commission order(s) or recommendation(s) it deems
appropriate. Further, every transit agency shall prepare and submit an
accident report to the Commission under rules prescribed by the
Commission. Finally, no order or recommendation of the Commission, nor
any accident report received by the Commission, shall be admitted as
evidence in any action for damages based on or arising out of such loss
of life, or injury to person or property. (See, Cal. Pub. Util. Code
315.)
The CPUC has quasi-legislative rulemaking authority, and uses it to
develop General Orders. CPUC General Orders are an integral part of the
CPUC oversight program, mandating minimum requirements, are specified
in the following:
General Order 143-B, Safety Rules and Regulations Governing
Light Transit, original implementation date June 27, 1978.
General Order 127, Rules for Maintenance and Operation of
Automatic Train Control Systems--Rapid Transit Systems,
original implementation date August 15, 1967.
General Order 75-C, Rules for Grade Crossing Equipment,
original implementation February 14, 1973.
General Order 88-B, Rules for Altering Public Highway Rail
Crossings, original implementation February 14, 1973.
General Order 95, Regulations Governing the Rules for
Overhead Electric Line Construction (e.g., Catenary System),
original implementation July 1, 1942.
General Order 26-D, Regulations Governing Clearance on
Railroads and Street Railroads with Reference to Side and
Overhead Structures, Parallel Tracks, Crossings, and Public
Roads, Highways, and Streets, original implementation date
February 1, 1948. This General Order applies to joint-usage or
shared track railroads such as San Diego Trolley, Inc. and
other rail transit systems not specifically excluded from its
requirements.
General Order 164-D, Rules and Regulations Governing State
Safety Oversight of Fixed Guideway Systems, original
implementation September 27, 1996.
Subsequent to the adoption of Section 3029 of the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, which requires
each State to develop and implement safety plans for all fixed guideway
transit systems, Governor Pete Wilson designated the CPUC on October
13, 1992 as the agency responsible for ensuring California compliance
with that Section.
On December 29, 1995, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
issued 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659, Rail Fixed Guideway
Systems: State Safety Oversight. The Rule required States to oversee
the safety of rail fixed guideway systems through a designated
oversight agency. The Governor's designation of the CPUC fulfilled this
requirement. This rule was revised by the Federal Transit
Administration, effective May 1, 2006.
The CPUC has both State and Federal obligations, and the authority
to enforce both State and Federal law in the pursuit of rail transit
safety.
Rail Transit Safety Section
The CPUC currently has the following 20.5 person-year positions
dedicated to the rail transit safety program:
One-half of a Program Manager's time
One Program and Project Supervisor
Two Senior Utilities Engineer Supervisors
One Senior Transportation Operators Supervisor
One Senior Utilities Engineer Specialist
One Regulatory Analyst
Three Railroad Inspectors
Eleven Utilities Engineers
Rail Transit Safety staff performs the following functions:
Conducts triennial safety and security reviews of the rail
transit systems, performing four audits each year, which covers
the 12 agencies in the 3-year period.
Approves rail transit System Safety Program Plans.
Provides safety certification for new rail transit agency
systems or new extensions on existing agency systems.
Audits System Security Plans.
Performs accident investigations.
Writes and publishes accident investigation reports for the
more severe accidents.
Initiates and/or supports CPUC rule promulgation. The
Commission currently is considering new regulations that the
staff has drafted to ban personal electronic device use by
safety-sensitive rail transit personnel. The Commission
currently is also formally considering ``roadway worker
protection'' rules for rail transit wayside employees.
Initiates and/or supports formal Commission safety
investigations. Past examples include:
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Tunnel Fire--1979
BART Derailment at A05 Interlocking--December 17, 1992,
CPUC Case 9867
San Francisco Municipal Transportation Authority (MUNI)
State Safety Oversight
San Francisco International Airport AirTrain Collision
at Storage Yard--August 4, 2002
San Francisco International Airport AirTrain System
Safety Program Plan and Regulatory Authority--Investigation 02-
07-014
Conducts routine inspections of track, equipment, and
signal and train control systems.
Conducts operations compliance observations.
Participates in rail transit agency internal safety audits.
Community outreach through staff participation in Operation
Lifesaver, the national rail safety education organization.
Proposed Public Transportation Safety Program Act of 2009
The proposed Public Transportation Safety Program Act of 2009 will
change the Federal-State relationship regarding rail transit safety
oversight and regulation. From the material provided us for this
hearing, we understand that the proposed new regulatory structure
would:
Eliminate the statutory prohibition against the imposition
of safety standards that has been in law since 1965.
Require the Secretary of Transportation to establish and
enforce minimum Federal safety standards through the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) for rail transit systems not
already regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. In so
doing, the Act also provides the Secretary the option to
establish a safety program for public transportation bus
systems.
Give each State a choice of assuming Federal enforcement
authority or ``opting out'' with the FTA taking the enforcement
role for States that ``opt out.''
Require States that choose to assume Federal enforcement
authority to demonstrate that they have an adequate number of
fully trained staff to enforce Federal regulations, have been
granted enforcement authority under State law, and have
sufficient financial independence from any transit systems
under their purview.
Provide Federal assistance to participating States to cover
the salary and benefit costs, as well as the training,
certification and travel costs of the State agency in
overseeing and enforcing Federal transit safety regulations.
Authorize State agencies participating in Federal
enforcement to (1) conduct inspections, investigations, audits,
examinations, and testing of a public transportation system's
equipment, facilities, rolling stock, operations, and persons
engaged in the business of a public transportation system, (2)
issue reports, subpoenas, and discovery requests, and (3)
conduct research, development, testing, and training.
Create nationally uniform Federal regulations, considering
existing industry standards to the extent practicable.
Allow States to establish more stringent safety standards
than the Federal standard.
The CPUC's Consumer Protection and Safety Division supports the
Administration's proposed regulatory initiative. We understand that the
intent of the proposed Public Transportation Safety Program Act of 2009
(Act) is to preserve the well-functioning State rail transit safety
programs' ability to continue with full authority to raise the level of
public rail transit safety while ensuring consistency in safety
oversight quality in all States.
The current proposal to create national rail transit safety
standards has many similarities to the Federal initiative in the late
1960s on the Nation's railroads. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of
1970 (FRSA) created national standards for freight and passenger
railroads, and was passed under similar conditions on the railroad that
we find described today in the rail transit safety proposal. The CPUC
has 39 years of experience with regulating railroad safety in concert
with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under FRSA. Originally
created in 1879 as the California Railroad Commission, in 1911 the
Commission began regulating railroad safety. California experienced the
FRA regulatory scheme introduced in 1970 as a clear benefit to safety,
but has also experienced some serious pitfalls as well.
California's greatest concern with railroad safety regulation under
FRSA has been in the area of Federal preemption. Fortunately, in
contrast to FRSA, the proposed Act is being presented as not preempting
State safety regulation above the minimum levels set by the Act.
Whereas FRSA has thwarted attempts by the States to regulate safety
areas on railroads, we understand that the Act as proposed will not
preempt States from imposing their own regulations as long as they are
at least as strict as the Federal regulations.
Staff's view in general is that Federal-State relationship should
be based on the relative strengths of the two levels of Government.
Federal Government has the advantage of an economy of scale
for such things as research, equipment testing, and
promulgation of regulations that would be applicable across all
properties such as accident reporting, equipment
crashworthiness, inspector training, and system-safety program
plans.
State government has the advantage of being ``on the
ground,'' more familiar with the systems and their different
situations, environments, operating conditions--such as
operating rules, equipment, track, geography, traffic
interface, and local transportation infrastructure.
State government has the advantage of establishing
regulatory compliance relationships with local systems through
inspections and compliance follow-up.
Federal Government has the advantage of being able to set a
minimum floor of safety requirements that the less safe State
systems must follow when the local government does not have the
will, authority, or resources to institute sufficient safety
requirements.
State government has the advantage of being able to specify
the level of safety that the affected population desires and
funds above any minimum requirements.
State government has the advantage of trying out new
regulatory innovations on a test scale.
State governments should be able to set safety requirements that
exceed any Federal safety requirements, either in the level of
specification of a certain type of regulation or the level of resultant
safety through a different type of regulation, for example, a
performance standard versus an explicit standard.
The FRA-State participation model has worked well in California for
promoting freight and passenger railroad safety, and would be a good
model for the FTA to adopt--if the lessons learned over the years since
the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 were acknowledged and adopted:
A national minimum floor of regulations has been
beneficial.
The prohibition against State regulatory promulgation has
been detrimental. States were expressly preempted from
promulgating regulations more strict than the minimum Federal
regulations where the subject matter was covered, and court
precedents have severely restricted the interpretation of
``covered subject matter.'' For example, the 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals decision on a Texas Railroad Commission walkway
regulation ruled that a walkway surface adjacent to the track
was preempted because the subject matter was covered by the
Federal regulations regarding track structures. \1\ This ruling
did not recognize that providing a safe walkway surface for
brakemen and switchmen served a different safety purpose than
did the Federal purpose of creating a roadbed to support
trains. In contrast, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that similar California walkway surface standards
were not only important for employee safety separate from train
support, but that the employee walkways and track structure
support were different subject matters that had coexisted
independently for over 20 years. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas,
948 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 507 U.S. 1050, 123 L. Ed. 2d
649, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993).
\2\ Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. Public Utility Comm. of
State of Cal., 647 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd per curiam 820
F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1987).
Federal regulations were often set at a ``lowest common
denominator'' level of safety, bringing up the safety level for
lagging States and systems and dropping the safety level for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
achieving States and systems.
The prohibition against State regulatory promulgation has
been detrimental even where the original intent was to allow
uniquely strict State regulation where local conditions created
a particular safety hazard. However, court precedent since FRSA
was enacted has eviscerated the original intent of the Act to
allow the States to adapt regulations to local conditions. For
example, after a severe derailment and toxic spill that
poisoned the Sacramento River for 40 miles, the CPUC adopted a
track standards regulation at the Cantara Loop in Northern
California. The new State standards exceeded the Federal track
standards to provide greater track strength and derailment
resistance at this uniquely dangerous steep curved part of the
mountain grade on a bridge over the river. The railroad even
stated in formal testimony that the increased strengthening was
needed to prevent derailments at that site. Even so, the 9th
Circuit Court ruled that California could not adopt such a
stricter regulation, \3\ and to-date, the FRA has not done so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Union Pac. R.R. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 346 F.3d 851 (9th
Cir. 2003).
The 50-percent Federal funding for State participation
inspectors, since discontinued, was essential in getting State
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
inspection programs started.
States can often adopt NTSB safety recommendations
immediately, whereas a nationwide regulatory proceeding could
delay safety improvements.
Federal economy-of-scale resources have been beneficial.
For example, inspector and investigator training and the
subsequent certification by the FRA have greatly benefited the
California railroad safety program.
Key Elements for Regulatory Reform
CPUC staff believes that the following elements should be
considered in the new Federal-State safety regulatory structure.
1. Expand FTA jurisdiction to include authority to develop and
impose minimum safety standards.
2. Maintain State authority to impose greater rules/regulations; do
not preempt State authority but allow for more stringent rules/
regulations than Federal minimum standards.
3. Funding for State programs. Funding should be allocated for the
cost of operating the State program, including salary and
benefits of State staffing and actual expenses in executing
rules/regulations.
4. State oversight program needs. Number of staff positions should
be equitably established using metrics such as route miles and
number of rail transit agencies regulated. Consideration should
be given to specific needs of States with interstate systems.
Staffing levels should include sufficient staff positions to
also oversee rail transit agencies that do not participate in
FTA funding programs. Safety oversight should not be linked to
funding as criteria for that oversight. The following positions
should be funded:
a. Program manager
b. Engineering staff (licensed professional engineers with
discipline specific training: mechanical, electrical, traffic,
civil)
c. Discipline specific inspection staff (operating practices,
track, signal and train control, motive power and equipment,
hazard management)
d. Analytical staff
e. Administrative staff
5. FTA should establish criterion for State safety and security
oversight programs. Criterion should dictate that designated
State safety and security oversight agency be separate from
agencies that promote rail transit use, and administer grants
and funding for regulated rail transit agencies. Safety
programs housed within State departments of transportation may
not receive support needed for the program as those agencies
predominately focus on highways and funding programs.
Therefore, we recommend that the SSO program be housed in an
agency whose mission is dedicated to safety and segregated from
promotion of rail transit usage and funding and/or
administration of funds.
6. Compensation levels for State staff should be competitive with
private industry in order to recruit and retain expert staff.
7. Discourage the use of contractors for safety and security reviews
and other State responsibilities. Support development of staff
stability and institutional expertise to efficiently and
comprehensively execute oversight responsibilities, minimizing
the need for consultant/contractors and the resultant loss of
expertise and function when contracts expire.
8. Training for State managers and staff. Robust training and
certification program fully funded by FTA is essential to the
success of the program. Course curriculum should include all
aspects of rail transit industry technology as well as
regulatory procedures and jurisdiction. Discipline specific
training and certification for inspectors is necessary to
provide the skills set necessary to conduct efficient
oversight. Training should include, but not be limited to:
a. Industry specific technical training
b. Investigative techniques
c. Report writing, digital photo documentation
d. Performance measurements
e. Threat and vulnerability analysis tools
f. Security sensitive information training
g. Auditing techniques
h. Drug and alcohol program
i. Fitness for duty
j. Evaluation of the structure and effectiveness of system
safety program plans
k. Safety culture
9. Credentialing and background checks for State employees. Safety
and security oversight is closely linked with the essential
characteristics of the systems that will fall within this
regulation. Safety certification and day-to-day oversight
activities may expose rail transit agencies to vulnerability if
those effecting the Federal and State rules and regulations are
not properly vetted and trained in security matters. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is equipped to continue
its role in the prevention of terrorism and that this element
should continue to reside within that segment of the Federal
Government. However, safety is closely linked to security in
many elements. Therefore, it is essential that State employees
are fully vetted and cognizant of security elements associated
with intentional harm to public transportation systems.
10. States should have authority to mark documents as security
sensitive information to ensure that security sensitive
information is protected from public disclosure. The current
regulations in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659
extend that authority only to the rail transit agencies and not
the State safety oversight agencies. The rule mandates that the
States oversee the agency(s) security program plans and conduct
triennial reviews of those programs but has no provision to
protect these documents from being released in the public
domain.
11. Investigative authority for States. As illustrated by the recent
banning of State safety oversight staff from the Washington
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (WMATA) from trackside
inspections it is imperative that States are vested with full
investigative authority. The authority relegated to NTSB
inspectors might serve as a model for this authority.
12. For States without relevant subpoena authority, establish
authority in Federal regulation for use in accident
investigation and other records and data needs. For those
States with such authority, allow enforcement under both
sources of authority.
13. Civil penalties and individual agency fines for willful
violations of safety-critical rules/regulations should be
included in new regulations. Enforcement tools are vital to a
successful program. These penalties should include compliance
with Federal and State regulations as well as rules and
procedures established by individual rail transit agencies.
Current regulations allows for FTA to withhold 5 percent of
formula funds from a State that is not in compliance. Those
States with multiple rail transit agencies are reluctant to
report infractions as the monies are withheld from the State
and not the egregious agency only. States need a robust
citation/violation program that can easily be executed.
14. The regulation should include a licensing/certification program
for safety-critical rail transit employees such as train
operators, control operators, and roadway workers. The FTA
should maintain a database to maintain status of employees and
issue the license/certification. This program would provide an
essential enforcement tool if tied to specific safety critical
regulation/rule infraction that may result in employee
forfeiting license/certification with a progressive time and
training element.
15. States managers should be at the table for all research and
development projects, including the development of industry
standards with the American Public Transportation Association
(APTA), Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Transportation Research Board, and other academic research
entities. Completed products should be readily available to
States.
16. Regulatory reform should not depend on APTA standards.
Consideration must be given to the conflict-of-interest of
APTA. This organization serves as the lobbying organization for
the industry. While APTA deserves much credit for creating
consensus-based standards and guideline development, safety-
focused independence is lacking. States are generally not
members of APTA and have limited input into product
development. FTA should develop its State safety and security
oversight program independent from APTA. APTA standards and
guideline development processes are often cumbersome to
complete, often taking several years to reach consensus before
being published. APTA should be commended for its
accomplishments, but existing standards and guidelines should
be adopted outright.
These standards should be used as reference materials in
developing Federal minimum standards, and should be fully
vetted with State oversight managers. The current partnership
between the FTA and APTA should be expanded to include all
States oversight agencies to capitalize on the benefits of this
organization.
17. An organization that includes FTA, State, industry and labor
organization representatives should be developed to offer a
platform for idea and information sharing. Such an organization
could collectively develop standards, guidelines, and best
practices for the industry. State participation in this
organization should be funded by the FTA.
18. Information sharing is essential to a successful program. States
should be included in communications from FTA to stakeholders,
both from the FTA headquarters and the FTA regional offices.
States should be included in both safety and security
communications. Too often FTA efforts are focused on funding
alone--safety and security should be elevated to a higher
priority level.
19. FTA should establish fitness-for-duty standards for rail transit
employees who perform safety critical duties, including
wellness programs, annual physical examination requirements,
and fatigue management.
20. The FTA should establish and fund project management oversight
contractors (PMOC) for State use in safety certification
projects--throughout conceptual stages and the life of the
project. These resources should be separate from the FTA region
contractor list to avoid conflict of interest.
21. Standardize reporting thresholds and guidelines between 49 CFR
Part 659, National Transportation Database (NTD) and the
Research and Innovation Technology Administration (RITA).
Establish Web-based reporting forms for both States and rail
transit agencies to minimize workload. Include employee
accident data in the reporting thresholds.
22. FTA should establish an interactive database or expand the NTD
to assist States and rail transit agencies in their accident
trend analyses, accident prediction modeling, and hazard
management. Applications should include Web-based accident/
incident/hazard notification, tracking matrices for corrective
actions, and document storage (e.g., audits, reviews). The
database should accommodate queries for proactive trend
analysis and incorporate GIS technology. States should have
access to all data.
23. Reorganize FTA staff. Safety functions should report to directly
to the Administrator consistent with the FTA recommendation
that transit agency safety staff report to the chief executive
office of those agencies. Add resources to Federal safety staff
and utilize FTA regional offices for safety oversight and
resources.
24. Link FTA grant funding to safety requirements. Establish a
program where safety critical infractions of an agency will
result in penalties.
25. Develop a grant program for safety-critical findings of States.
Provide funding for safety-critical corrective action plans
prompted in audits, accident investigations, random and focused
inspections, and NTSB recommendations.
26. Improve communication and coordination between regional offices
and States.
27. Establish audit standards where region, State, TSA/DHS, and
contractor audits are linked or related. Multiple audit
schedules are often repetitive and cumbersome. DHS/TSA and FTA
Regions should coordinate audits with State managers. A
coordinated effort between all agencies would be more effective
and reduce audit fatigue. Audit findings should be shared
between all Federal and State agencies with safety and security
oversight responsibilities of rail transit.
28. Quarterly meetings between FTA and State managers. An annual
meeting is not sufficient to maintain consistency and optimize
progress.
29. Succession planning for State oversight agency personnel,
particularly for the smaller State agencies. Retirements and
career moves can cause program disruption in terms of lost
institutional knowledge, expertise, and professional networks.
30. The security element descriptions and specifications in Title 49
CFR Part 659 should be enhanced. The link between safety and
security should be emphasized. Coordination between DHS/TSA and
State oversight agencies should be emphasized to better utilize
the skill sets of both agencies. Communications and
coordination descriptions should be enhanced. DHS/TSA should
focus on terrorism. States should focus on other security
issues. DHS/TSA and States should share information and
findings. States programs and personnel must be vetted and
credentialed. States should be required to maintain
Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC).
Emergency response and recovery plans development and
implementation should include all stakeholders, including State
managers.
Successes of Rail Transit Safety Oversight Jurisdiction
Safety oversight is often reactive. Public attention is aroused too
often only after catastrophic events and media attention. Good
governance demands a proactive approach where there are clear standards
and practices to identify and mitigate hazards before they become
tragic events. Proactive safety oversight built upon a systems safety
approach and hazard management is necessary to the advance of public
transportation. The CPUC's mission in rail transit safety is to
proactively ensure the safe design, construction, and operations of
rail transit. The following sections describe some of the benefits of
the CPUC's exercise of safety jurisdiction over rail transit agencies
in California.
BART Automatic Train Control
An example of the CPUC's safety experience is illustrated by its
General Order 127, Rules for Maintenance and Operation of Automatic
Train Control Systems--Rapid Transit Systems, which was adopted on
August 15, 1967, before rapid transit construction was expanded in
California. The concept for the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) was first
envisioned in 1946, with engineering studies and design work beginning
in 1963 and with construction beginning in 1964. Promulgated by the
CPUC under the authority granted by PU Code Section 29047, \4\ General
Order 127 ensured that safety was addressed early on in the project.
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\4\ California Public Utilities Code, Division 10, Transit
Districts, Part 2, San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District,
Chapter 6, Powers and Functions of District, Article 5, Rapid Transit
Facilities and Service, 29047 Safety appliances and procedures.
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Revenue service on BART commenced in 1972. Prior to the
commencement of revenue service various tests of BART's automatic train
control systems were conducted. Through these tests, the Commission
staff learned that the automatic train control system could not always
detect the presence of a single dead or unpowered car. Also, in the
opinion of the staff, the testing of the train braking, propulsion,
protection, and interlocking systems was insufficient. The staff
recommended to the Commission that it not authorize full automatic
train operations, but that the use of the established and proven manual
block override method of operation for train separation protection and
provide a two-station separation mode between trains.
The Commission ordered that the, ``train control system be
supplemented by manual override consisting of a trained operator at the
controls of each train with a back-up of supervisory personnel at key
stations to provide positive train control in accordance with rules to
be agreed upon and filed with the Commission.'' \5\ The CPUC further
mandated that the train control system be supplemented by manual
override remain in effect until further order of the Commission. \6\
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\5\ CPUC Resolution S-1358, August 31, 1972.
\6\ CPUC Decision No. 81248.
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Subsequently, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, as consultant to the
California Senate Public Utilities and Corporations Committee,
conducted failure-mode analyses as part of an independent evaluation of
the technical merits of the BART Computer Aided Block system. The
objective was to reduce the two-station separation mode to a one-
station separation mode as proposed for the transbay operation and that
the ``worst case'' failure should be an ``uncovered failure-mode,''
that is, the collision protection should revert to that provided by the
basic automatic train control system in the event of a one-station
separation failure.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) recommended several
modifications and additions to the train control system.
Recommendations included the establishment of zero speed gates to
automatically stop a train in the case of a station run-through; a
revision of computer algorithm to require positive detection of a
released train in the block past a station platform before the release
of a following train; the revision of the existing hardware for the
transbay tube train-detection; integrity tests to ensure that the
computer hardware and software actually perform their intended
functions; abnormal operations performance tests; and a full-scale (36-
train) dynamic performance test.
It wasn't until August 27, 1974, after staff reviewed and confirmed
BART's installation and testing of the Sequential Occupancy Release
(SOR) train control system \7\ and implementation of all other LBL
recommendations, that the Commission allowed automatic train control in
place of manual override. \8\
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\7\ LBL-developed redundant software for train detection and train
separation as recommended by the failure-mode analyses.
\8\ CPUC Decision No. 83339.
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Subsequent to the tragic Washington Metropolitan Area
Transportation Authority (WMATA) collision on June 8, 2009, the NTSB
made urgent recommendations to the FTA as follows.
Advise all rail transit operators that have train control
systems capable of monitoring train movements to determine
whether their systems have adequate safety redundancy if losses
in train detection occur. If a system is susceptible to single
point failures, urge and verify that corrective action is taken
to add redundancy by evaluating track occupancy data on a real-
time basis to automatically generate alerts and speed
restrictions to prevent train collisions. (R-09-007) (Urgent)
Advise all rail transit operators that use audio frequency
track circuits in their train control systems that postaccident
testing following the June 22, 2009, collision between two rail
transit trains near the Fort Totten station in Washington, DC,
identified that a spurious signal generated in a track circuit
module transmitter by parasitic oscillation propagated from the
transmitter through a metal rack to an adjacent track circuit
module receiver, and through a shared power source, thus
establishing an unintended signal path. The spurious signal
mimicked a valid track circuit signal, bypassed the rails, and
was sensed by the module receiver so that the ability of the
track circuit to detect the train was lost. (R-09-17) (Urgent)
Advise all rail transit operators that use audio frequency
track circuits in their train control systems to examine track
circuits that may be susceptible to parasitic oscillation and
spurious signals capable of exploiting unintended signal paths
and eliminate those adverse conditions that could affect the
safe performance of their train control systems. This work
should be conducted in coordination with their signal and train
control equipment manufacturers. (R-09-18) (Urgent)
Advise all rail transit operators that use audio frequency
track circuits in their train control systems to develop a
program to periodically determine that electronic components in
their train control systems are performing within design
tolerances. (R-09-19)
It is possible the State oversight similar to that which required
the redundant train control measures in California, may have prevented
the WMATA accident.
Cell Phone Use Ban
We contend that State Safety Oversight must be empowered with tools
to take immediate action as necessary to ensure safety following
accidents and/or the identification of hazardous conditions. California
has empowered the CPUC with these tools as illustrated in the CPUC
emergency Resolution SX-88 which prohibits the use of personal
electronic devices by train operators. The CPUC adopted this order
within 6 days of a commuter rail catastrophic accident where use of
personal electronic devices is believed to be one of the most probable
causes. At this time, the CPUC is in the process of rulemaking to
determine if the ban should be made permanent and if so, the content
and structure of the resultant rule.
BART Fire in the Transbay Tube
Two days after a fire in the BART transbay tube on January 17,
1979, the CPUC ordered that the transbay tube be closed until further
order. \9\ The CPUC ordered that six conditions be met before
resumption of revenue service in the transbay tube. Conditions included
the development of a detailed evacuation plan, improvement of
communications, provisions of an extensive public information program
on evacuation procedures, modifications of exit doors within the tube
to allow rapid egress, employee emergency drills, testing of emergency
procedures, and physical modifications to hatch covers and gallery
structures to reduce fire risk and improve ventilation capability.
Following hearings, the CPUC allowed resumption of service in the
transbay tube on April 4, 1979, with a stringent set of requirements
that included:
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\9\ CPUC Decision No. 89902.
The complete elimination of polyurethane materials from the
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seat assemblies in cars within 270 days.
A plan of action with a timetable to reduce fire risks
associated with fiberglass reinforced plastic materials used in
the floors, ceiling, and sidewall linings of cars, to reduce
fire hazard.
Requirement for BART Board of Directors to develop a
detailed plan to oversee public safety in its operations with a
subsequent annual report to the CPUC. The plan included the
organization form and levels and types of manpower devoted to
safety.
A detailed plan for training, practice, and repeat training
of train operators and safety personnel in appropriate safety
and emergency procedures.
Improved communications capability for emergency situations
and for instruction of passengers in emergency procedures.
Ongoing passenger safety educational programs, including
provisions for non-English speaking and handicapped persons.
Directional signs within the transbay tube indicating the
nearest gallery door and the distance to the near alternative
door in the opposite direction.
Provision of back-up emergency personnel at BART Central.
Provision for walk-through track inspections in the event
of unexplained in-service train stoppages.
Provisions for airpacks, megaphones, portable radios, and
other such devices for attendants on transbay tube trains to
facilitate the ability of train attendants to function safety
and efficiently outside the train in emergency conditions.
Further studies of safety issues not fully explored,
including the option of a second BART employee in addition to
the train operator on all trains through the Berkeley tunnel.
The submission of a proposal within 30 days of the order to
study the toxic effects of car combustion and the impact on
evacuation procedures. \10\
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\10\ CPUC Decision 90144, April 4, 1979
It is notable that following the investigation of the Chicago
Transit Authority (CTA) derailment and passenger evacuation in a tunnel
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environment in 2007, the NTSB made the following recommendations.
Recommendations to the FTA:
Modify your program to ensure that State safety oversight
agencies take action to prompts rail transit agencies to
correct all safety deficiencies that are identified as a result
of oversight inspections and safety reviews, regardless of
whether those deficiencies are labeled as findings,
observations, or some other term. (R-07-009)
Inform all rail transit agencies about the circumstances of
the July 11, 2006, Chicago Transit Authority subway accident
and urge them to examine and improve, as necessary, their
ability to communicate with passengers and perform emergency
evacuations from their tunnel systems, including the ability to
(1) identify the exact location of a train, (2) locate a
specific call box, and (3) remove smoke from their tunnel
systems. (R-07-012)
Recommendations to the State of Illinois:
Evaluate the Regional Transportations Authority's (State
safety oversight agency) effectiveness, procedures, and
authority, and take action to ensure that all safety
deficiencies identified during rail transit safety inspections
and reviews of the Chicago Transit Authority are corrected,
regardless of whether those deficiencies are labeled as
findings, observations, or some other term. (R-07-013)
Angel's Flight Railway Company
Another example of the necessity for strong safety oversight
authority is illustrated in the CPUC actions following a severe
accident that occurred on February 1, 2001, on the Angels Flight
Railway Company. The CPUC ordered closure of the Angels Flight
funicular after a mechanical failure caused a collision between the two
vehicles resulting in one fatality and seven injuries.
The Angels Flight Railway Company is a privately owned funicular
system that was originally built in 1901 and operated until 1969 when
it was dismantled. Beginning in 1993 the Angels Flight funicular was
reconstructed approximately \1/2\ blocks from its original location.
Operation resumed in 1996 using the original two cars. The system
operates at a 33 percent grade and moves people approximately 298 feet
from the bottom of Bunker Hill up to a commercial area.
Restoration efforts are in progress under the close scrutiny of
CPUC staff; however revenue service will not be authorized by the CPUC
until all outstanding recommendations made in the CPUC accident
investigation and those from the NTSB have been closed acceptable. It
has become clear to the staff that two outstanding NTSB recommendations
requiring end gates on the vehicles and an emergency ingress and egress
walkway would not have been implemented were it not for the CPUC's
safety certification role.
San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency
The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), commonly
referred to as MUNI, was brought under the umbrella of the CPUC's State
Safety Oversight in 1997. During the time between 1997 and 2005, MUNI
reported an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions. Generic
statewide statistics of rail transit accidents during the time period
between 1997 and 2005 indicate an overall reduction in crossing
collisions of 76 percent, \11\ reduction in derailments of 84 percent,
and a reduction in serious injuries of 75 percent. However, fatalities
during this same time period increased by 12.5 percent. The SFMTA
system is the oldest transit system in the State and, consequently, has
many age-related problems which the Commission continues to identify
and works to correct.
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\11\ Following the enactment of the Federal Transit Administration
final rule, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 659, effective
May 5, 2006, reportable crossing collisions have increased due to the
change in the reporting criteria that mandates all accidents at
highway-rail crossing be reported.
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A more recent example of proactive State safety oversight and
hazard management practices is illustrated in the SFMTA track
rehabilitation in its subway. CPUC inspectors identified egregious
track conditions and mandated that SFMTA take immediate steps to return
its tracks to a State of good repair. CPUC mandated that SFMTA not only
correct deficiencies noted by its inspectors, but that SFMTA conduct
ultrasonic testing and inspection of the entire rail transit system
with a geometry car, and repair all discovered defects.
Grove Farmers Market Trolley
The benefits of a separate proactive safety oversight program such
as California's is important and is illustrated by an incident that
occurred in August 2009 on a small trolley operation at the Grove
Farmers Market in Los Angeles. CPUC staff following an on-site
inspection made recommendation to the trolley that a park bench located
over the tracks at the end of the line in front of the wheel stops be
removed. The staff concern was that in the event a mechanical
malfunction caused a brake failure, the trolley could collide with the
bench and injure members of the public sitting on the bench. Just 2
weeks after the removal of the bench pursuant to staff's request, a
brake failure occurred and the trolley slammed into the concrete
planters that had replaced the bench. Severe injuries and possibly
fatalities had been prevented by California's safety oversight where no
Federal safety oversight existed under current law.
TRANSIT SAFETY BILL
DOT FACT SHEET--THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY PROGRAM ACT OF 2009
What Does the Act Do?
The proposed legislation does three things:
First, the bill would authorize the Secretary to establish
and enforce Federal safety standards for rail transit systems
that receive Federal transit assistance--effectively
eliminating the statutory prohibition against imposing broad
safety standards that have been in place since 1965.
Second, the Secretary would allow States to be eligible for
Federal transit assistance to hire and train State oversight
personnel to enforce new Federal regulations. State programs
must be well staffed and adequately empowered by State
governments to fully enforce Federal regulations in order to be
eligible for Federal funds.
Third, the program would require the State agencies
conducting oversight to be fully financially independent from
the transit systems they oversee. The Federal Transit
Administration would enforce all Federal regulations where
States chose not to participate in the program or where the
State program is found to lack the necessary enforcement tools.
Why Rail Transit Regulation?
The current system for Federal rail transit safety
oversight does not guarantee a consistent level of safety for
transit passengers among all transit systems in all States.
More than 14 million passengers use rail transit systems
every weekday. Yet, the responsibility for their safety is
currently left to a patchwork of 27 State agencies with
inconsistent standards, inadequate powers and insufficient
staffing.
While rail transit remains a safe way to travel, the Obama
Administration believes we must take serious steps now to make
it even safer and ensure that it remains safe in the years to
come.
Additional Details of ``The Act''
Under the Administration's proposal, the FTA and State
agencies participating in Federal transit safety enforcement
will be authorized to conduct inspections, investigations,
audits and examinations, as well as test public transportation
systems' equipment, facilities, rolling stock, operations, and
persons engaged in the business of a public transportation
system.
FTA will also have the authority to issue reports and
subpoenas, require the production of documents, take
depositions, and establish recordkeeping and reporting
requirements.
The Secretary would establish a safety certification
program under which a State that chooses to participate would
be eligible for Federal transit assistance to carry out a
federally approved Public Transportation Safety program.
Participating States would be required to demonstrate to the
Secretary's satisfaction that the State agency has
an adequate number of fully trained staff to enforce
Federal regulations;
been granted sufficient authority by their governor and
State legislature to compel compliance by the transit systems
they oversee; and
sufficient financial independence from any transit
systems they oversee.
In all States where either the State agency has ``opted
out'' of participation or where the Secretary has found the
requesting State agency to be inadequate, the Secretary, acting
through the FTA, would enforce all Federal safety regulations.
States would not be preempted from establishing more
stringent safety standards than the Federal standards, if the
standards meet certain criteria.
The bill also would allow the Secretary to establish a
safety program for public transportation bus systems that
receive Federal transit assistance.
Secretary LaHood also announced the formation of a Transit
Rail Advisory Committee on Safety (TRACS) that will help guide
the Department's rail transit safety regulations.