

# NATO: REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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## **NATO: REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS**

**THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Shaheen, Kaufman, and Lugar.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS**

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

We are very fortunate today to be joined by one of America's leading diplomats. And as we begin this hearing, I'm reminded of an event just the other day to celebrate Madeleine Albright's work, with a number of distinguished participants, including the current Secretary of State, who spoke about Secretary Albright's accomplishments. And I had the privilege of saying a few words, and I mentioned that she once was asked who the toughest negotiating partner she had in all her years as U.N. Ambassador and as the Secretary of State. Senator Lugar, I want you to know, she didn't miss a beat. She said, "That's easy. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms." [Laughter.]

I promise you, Madam Secretary, this is not going to be that kind of session. We are very appreciative for your willingness to come back here today and testify before the committee on the important topic of NATO.

Last year, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen asked Secretary Albright to chair an expert group responsible for guiding NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. And today she's here to offer her findings as part of the ongoing discussion on NATO's future, a topic of considerable concern to all of us, given the changing nature of the challenges to NATO and, indeed, to the European community and to all of us together.

Like a lot of international institutions that defined the second half of the 20th century, NATO needs to struggle, and is struggling a little, with the changes of the 21st century. In many ways, we continue to wrestle with a similar question to the one with which the Clinton administration wrestled, which is: How can alliance built in the middle of the 20th century, in the context of the cold war, evolve to meet 21st-century threats?

Obviously, a strong alliance of like-minded democracies grounded in mutual defense is a major strategic asset in confronting different

global problems. NATO's 28 member states represent some 840 million people who, collectively, account for nearly half of the world's GDP.

But unless we actively shape the institution to match new challenges, we simply can't take for granted that NATO is going to perform the role that it was created for: the protection of its member states.

Our definition of security is now expanding to include new challenges, the obvious ones of the post-9/11 world: terrorist networks, but many others, including cyber crime, energy security, the security consequences of climate change, and the struggle of religious radical fanaticism. These are just a few of the many issues on which member countries are seeking greater cooperation. And each deserves further exploration from NATO.

In Afghanistan the alliance has taken on a new and very challenging mission, its first outside Europe. And while we mourn the death, now, of some 1,000 American service men and women—there's a poignant 2-page example of that cost in the Washington Post today, where you see the photographs and small bios of each of the most recently fallen soldiers—we have to recognize that our NATO allies, too, are serving heroically and are experiencing losses.

As we contemplate future NATO missions, we need to have processed and thoroughly understood the military and political lessons of Afghanistan. One of them is that a modern military mission needs to be fully integrated with a civilian effort, and that security within NATO is sometimes going to mean acting beyond its boundaries.

In addition, whatever missions we undertake have to be formulated in a way that continues to attract the support of member-countries' citizens, ours included.

Reinventing NATO also means building stronger, more stable relations with our former enemy, Russia. It is encouraging that both the United States and NATO have made significant progress. And we're very optimistic that we can deepen this cooperation, with the signing of the New START Treaty. I believe that we need to carefully balance our improved relations with Russia with strategic reassurances that our Eastern NATO allies can depend on and deserve.

We also need to address a series of practical challenges that have become apparent since the last Strategic Concept was drafted in 1999.

First, it's clear that the European Union's foreign policy responsibilities have multiplied, and the two organizations have to find a way around the existing impasse in order to improve cooperation.

Second, NATO needs to improve its decisionmaking ability, while preserving the principle of consensus.

Third, members of the alliance should continue to pool resources under joint commands—and eliminate those commands that are no longer necessary. We all know that we're struggling right now to get some member countries to ante up to the challenge that NATO, by consensus, has accepted. And it's proving very difficult—to get either troops or resources in some cases.

Fourth, NATO must do more to protect its own infrastructure and critical systems against cyber attacks, and consider how the alliance is going to respond to this very new and very dangerous threat.

Finally, we need to address the difficult question of tactical nuclear weapons. NATO's agreement to discuss this question as an alliance is a good one. We shouldn't be negotiating piecemeal what is, at core, a question of collective security. There's a great deal of interest in these questions on the committee, and they've already been proffered in the course of a number of hearings on the New START Treaty with respect to Russia's tactical weapons and with respect to Europe.

These aren't easy questions. The dangers present at the creation of NATO have now largely been supplanted by a new set of urgent concerns. But NATO has often been described as a "living alliance." And the proof will be in what we succeed in defining, in terms of NATO's mission, over the course of these next years.

As Secretary of State during the second half the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright already presided over two pivotal moments in NATO's history: NATO's decision to use military force to end the genocide in Kosovo; and the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance. Secretary Albright has already played a profound role in shaping NATO's present, and now she's been asked by NATO to help shape its future.

Last October, Secretary Albright appeared before the committee to discuss this ongoing work. And now she and a group of distinguished experts from allied countries have released the finished product, "NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement." And we look forward to discussing that here this morning.

Senator Lugar.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witness. And I was relieved, as you were, that neither one of us were named as the more difficult negotiator. [Laughter.]

But, leaving that aside for the moment, we look forward to hearing the details of the report on the future of NATO issued on Monday by Secretary Albright and the Group of Experts. This report will serve as a key contribution to ongoing discussions on the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted this fall by NATO heads of state.

In particular, I am hopeful that today's hearing can contribute to deliberations on several questions about the direction of NATO's defense plans.

First, before we can chart a course forward, the alliance must ask what the NATO strategic review is intended to achieve. In response to the new threat environment that has emerged since the previous Strategic Concept, written in 1999, the alliance has fielded more than 100,000 troops and 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and has undertaken new missions in the realm of energy security, cyber defense, antipiracy, and WMD interdiction. In other words, the alliance's conceptual thinking has already evolved significantly. The new NATO Strategic Concept

should not only solidify this evolution, it should create momentum for addressing national deficiencies with regard to public opinion, defense reform execution, and budgeting, which remain the most difficult obstacles to alliance success.

Second, what role should nuclear weapons play in NATO's strategic posture? While some allies have made unprecedented calls for the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, the planned sharing of these weapons on allied aircraft still is a key element of NATO's defense plans. The new Strategic Concept must consider the consequences that altered nuclear planning would have on the security of Eastern European states. It also must consider how NATO's nuclear planning will affect proliferation decisions of allies, especially those proximate to Iran, such as Turkey.

And, third, how can we strengthen conventional Article 5 deterrence? Following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, many have rightly called for measures to reassure Eastern European allies. The reality is that most allies view the presence of United States troops and hardware as the ultimate guarantor of their security. Failing an alliance consensus on the role new allies may play in hosting NATO infrastructure, the implementation of reassurance measures, including missile defense plans, infrastructure upgrades, and troop deployments, will continue to be hampered.

Fourth, what constitutes an attack under Article 5 in today's strategic environment? The decline in the deterrent value of Article 5 became most apparent with the onset of a string of energy crises in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies with respect to oil and natural gas arrangements with the Russian Federation. When I speak with leaders from Eastern European countries, they are especially concerned with the threats posed by cyber war, energy cutoffs, and hazardous materials. Since 2006, I have advocated that energy security be incorporated into Article 5, and I continue to believe that the alliance must undertake planning to establish a credible deterrent against emerging unconventional threats.

I thank the chairman again for calling this hearing, and we look forward very much to discussions of these matters with our distinguished witness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No; thank you, Senator Lugar.

And I appreciate the presence of the chair of our Subcommittee for Europe, Senator Shaheen.

Also, Ambassador Kutelia, of Georgia, is here. And we welcome you back to the committee. Thank you.

So, Madam Secretary, we look forward to your testimony. You can summarize or put the whole statement in the record, whatever you prefer.

Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, Senator Shaheen.



It's a pleasure to be with you. And thank you very much for inviting me.

When I came here last fall—that NATO group of experts—we were just beginning our work. And now that we've finished, I really am very pleased to present the recommendations to you.

As you know, the group was conceived a little bit more than a year ago at the alliance summit at Strasbourg-Kehl. And its mandate—and I have to—we have to make this very clear—its mandate was to provide analysis and recommendations to NATO's Secretary General as he prepares the Strategic Concept for allied consideration in November in Lisbon.

The experts group, just like NATO, is diverse. So, we had some fairly spirited internal debates. But, also like the alliance at its best, we were able to end up speaking with a single voice. So, this is a consensus report.

In fact, most of our recommendations flow from two basic conclusions: first, that the alliance has an ongoing duty to guarantee the safety and security of its members; and, second, that it can achieve that objective only if it engages dynamically with countries and organizations outside its boundaries.

So, to safeguard security at home, the alliance has to continue to treat collective defense as its core purpose. And this does reflect the primacy of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and our belief that the security of each ally cannot be separated from that of all.

Accordingly, NATO has to maintain a flexible mix of military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense. And it has to conduct appropriate contingency planning and military exercises so that allies may feel confident that their borders will indeed be protected.

These measures are fundamental to NATO's identity and purpose, but they aren't sufficient. Between now and 2020, the alliance will face a new generation of dangers from sources that are geographically and technologically diverse. And some—you have both mentioned some of these. These include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, cyber assaults, and attacks on energy infrastructure and supply lines.

Because such perils can arise rapidly and from any direction, the alliance has to be much more versatile. And to this end, we have the following suggestions: It should accelerate transformation through the development of military forces that are sustainable, deployable, and interoperable; it should improve its capacity for rapid response; it should attach a high priority to shielding information from cyber attacks; and with resources tight, it should allocate defense funds wisely by increasing its commitment to joint procurement and specialized needs.

All this is vital, for NATO's good intentions have to be matched by its capabilities.

The alliance has to be strong, but it also must be smart. And in our era, nothing is smarter than having capable partners. I think this is one of the most interesting innovations that we talked about. The Group of Experts was united in its view that partners should play an increasing role in NATO activities, and that the alliance should explore every opportunity for strengthening its

partnership ties, both as a pragmatic means for solving problems and as an instrument of political dialogue.

Accordingly, NATO should improve its ability to work with other countries and organizations, especially in situations where a blend of military, economic, and political measures are required. And this principle applies to countries that are part of a formal partnership arrangement with NATO and those that are not.

So, for example, Australia and New Zealand have contributed troops to Afghanistan, and the Republic of Korea intends to send troops, and Japan has supplied money for fuel. One of our recommendations is that such operational partners be given a significant role in planning and shaping the missions to which they contribute.

Another partnership that attracted discussion within our group is that between NATO and Russia. For reasons of history and geography, some allies are more skeptical than others about Russia's commitment to a positive relationship. And this divergence was reflected among the experts. But there was no disagreement about what NATO's policy should be. It is clearly in NATO's best interest to work with Moscow to build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order, and to respond to such shared concerns as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, piracy, and drug trafficking. Partnership, as we know, is a two-way street. But, from the alliance perspective, the door to cooperation with Moscow should remain open at all levels.

NATO can also influence its security environment by continuing its policy of gradual enlargement. Prospective NATO members in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the Euro-Atlantic region have a right to fair consideration, based on the same guidelines that steered decisions about new members in the past.

NATO today is busier than ever, but this does not mean that the alliance must go everywhere and do everything. There are limits to its resources and responsibilities. Indeed, the new Strategic Concept should propose criteria for making wise decisions about when and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries.

In addition, alliance leaders should learn from the experiences in Afghanistan by recognizing the imperative of political cohesion, the desirability of a unified command, the value of effective planning, the importance of public communication, and the need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended period of time.

There should be no question that NATO's fundamental purpose is to protect the security of its members, but providing security is a more complicated proposition than in the past. Thus, NATO should consider the possibility, when resources are sufficient and legal authority is clear, of helping the world respond to catastrophic emergencies, whether caused by nature or by human beings.

Further, we should recognize that NATO is more than just a military alliance. It is also a political community and should therefore make more regular and creative use of the mechanism for consultations under Article 4.

All of these measures should be accompanied by a commitment to organizational reform. The Secretary General must have the authority and mandate to streamline decisionmaking, prune the

bureaucracy, and identify savings that can be used for military transformation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in the past 8 months, the Group of Experts has had to think deeply about the issues that some fear could undermine the future cohesion of the alliance. And these include the apparent tension between homeland defense and expeditionary missions, the difference in attitudes toward Russia, the imbalance in military expenditures, and the nuclear question.

And when we started out, I have to confess to harboring some doubts about whether we would be able to define a common approach toward these and other issues. But, as we went along, I really found that there was such a desire for agreement, and that that outweighed the dubious pleasures of argument, and that, with sufficient patience, the basis for a common approach could be found.

Now, no one can expect an alliance of 28 members to function without occasional grumbling and dissent. But I did arrive, at the conclusion of this process, with more optimism about NATO's continued unity and future success than when I began. And I have to say, I was truly honored to chair this very interesting Group of Experts, and to have something to do with making NATO a versatile and agile instrument in a period of great unpredictability.

Thank you all very much. And I look forward to answering questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and thank you for inviting me.

When I came before you last fall, the NATO Group of Experts was just beginning its work.

Now we have just finished and I am pleased to share with you our recommendations.

As you know, the Group of Experts was conceived a little more than a year ago at the Alliance summit in Strasbourg-Kehl.

Its mandate was to provide analysis and recommendations to NATO's Secretary General as he prepares a new Strategic Concept for Allied consideration in Lisbon this coming November.

The Experts Group, like NATO, is diverse—and so we had spirited internal debates.

But also like the Alliance at its best—we were able in the end to speak with a single voice.

In fact, most of our recommendations flow from two basic conclusions.

First, the Alliance has an ongoing duty to guarantee the safety and security of its members.

Second, it can achieve that objective only if it engages dynamically with countries and organizations that are outside its boundaries.

To safeguard security at home, the Alliance must continue to treat collective defense as its core purpose.

This reflects the primacy of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and our belief that the security of each ally cannot be separated from that of all.

Accordingly, NATO must maintain a flexible mix of military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense.

It must also conduct appropriate contingency planning and military exercises so that allies may feel confident that their borders will indeed be protected.

These measures are fundamental to NATO's identity and purpose—but they are not sufficient.

Between now and 2020, the Alliance will face a new generation of dangers from sources that are geographically and technologically diverse.

These threats include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, cyber assaults and attacks on energy infrastructure and supply lines.

Because such perils can arise rapidly and from any direction, the Alliance must become more versatile.

To this end:

- It should accelerate transformation through the development of military forces that are sustainable, deployable, and interoperable;
- It should improve its capacity for rapid response;
- It should attach a high priority to shielding information from cyber attacks; and
- With resources tight, it should allocate defense funds wisely, by increasing its commitment to joint procurement and specialized needs.

All this is vital—for NATO's good intentions must be matched by its capabilities.

The Alliance must be strong, but it must also be smart and—in our era—nothing is smarter than having capable partners.

The Group of Experts was united in its view that partners should play an increasing role in NATO activities, and that the Alliance should explore every opportunity for strengthening its partnership ties both as a pragmatic means for solving problems and as an instrument of political dialogue.

Accordingly, NATO should improve its ability to work with other countries and organizations, especially in situations where a blend of military, economic, and political measures are required.

This principle applies to countries that are part of a formal partnership arrangement with NATO and those that are not.

For example, Australia and New Zealand have contributed troops to Afghanistan, the Republic of Korea intends to send troops, and Japan has supplied money and fuel.

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For reasons of history and geography, some allies are more skeptical than others about Russia's commitment to a positive relationship.

This divergence was reflected among the experts, but there was no disagreement about what NATO's policy should be.

It is clearly in NATO's best interest to work with Moscow to build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order and to respond to such shared concerns as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, piracy, and drug trafficking.

Partnership, as we know, is a two way street—but from the Alliance perspective, the door to cooperation with Moscow should remain open at all levels.

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Prospective NATO members in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the Euro-Atlantic region have a right to fair consideration based on the same guidelines that steered decisions about new members in the past.

NATO today is busier than ever, but this does not mean that the Alliance must go everywhere and do everything—there are limits to its resources and to its responsibilities.

Indeed, the new Strategic Concept should propose criteria for making wise decisions about when and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries.

In addition, Alliance leaders should learn from its experiences in Afghanistan by recognizing the imperative of political cohesion, the desirability of unified command, the value of effective planning, the importance of public communications, and the need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended period of time.

There should be no question that NATO's fundamental purpose is to protect the security of its members.

But providing for security is a more complicated proposition than in the past.

Thus, NATO should consider the possibility, when resources are sufficient and legal authority is clear, of helping the world respond to catastrophic emergencies, whether caused by nature or by human beings.

Further, we should recognize that NATO is more than just a military alliance; it is also a political community, and should therefore make more regular and creative use of the mechanism for consultations under Article 4.

All of these measures should be accompanied by a commitment to organizational reform.

The Secretary General must have the authority and the mandate to streamline decisionmaking, prune the bureaucracy, and identify savings that can be used for military transformation.

Mr. Chairman, in the past 8 months, The Group of Experts has had to think deeply about issues that some fear could undermine the future cohesion of the Alliance.

These include the apparent tension between homeland defense and expeditionary missions; the difference in attitudes toward Russia; the imbalance in military expenditures; and the nuclear question.

When we started out, I confess to harboring doubts about whether we would be able to define a common approach toward these and other issues.

But as we went along, I found that the desire for agreement outweighed the dubious pleasures of argument and that, with sufficient patience, the basis for a common approach could be found.

No one can expect an Alliance of 28 members to function without occasional grumbling and dissent.

However, I arrive at the conclusion of this process with more optimism about NATO's continued unity and future success than when I began.

Thank you; and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

If all those things can work, it sounds very encouraging and positive.

I want to try to press you, in terms of the experience that we've been through, and measure it a little.

Can you share with us how people dealt with the reality of the divisions that exist today over participation in Afghanistan as people look at the spotty record of some in participation—the “very tailored” or “carved out” special approaches that other nations have chosen; i.e., they won't put in combat forces; they'll provide police, or they'll provide money, or else send certain kinds of assistance, but not any else. It's such a tug-of-war to get people to understand, this is not about the United States. After all, Madrid was bombed, London was bombed. There have been other terrorist events in Europe.

Is their attitude just different about this than ours regarding Afghanistan, and therefore, are we trying to fit NATO into an inappropriate challenge? And if there are other challenges, maybe there would be greater unity on them? How did you, as you talked this through, resolve these very obvious differences of approach to this threat?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, one of our real questions was: To what extent should we spend time on Afghanistan? And—because this is supposed to be a Strategic Concept for the next decade, not for the next year—and clearly, Afghanistan is a major issue. So, what we decided to do was, in our second seminar, we really looked at what the lessons learned were out of these out-of-area operations. And Afghanistan, obviously, was the major issue.

And there were a number of issues that came up with regard to that, that in many ways deal with the questions that you pose. And it requires a little bit of going back to how NATO got into Afghanistan.

What happened, as you know, is that it was the first time that Article 5 was activated. After 9/11, one of the allies had been attacked, and others had a responsibility to respond. And they did. The problem was that, to some extent, there was a desultory—or I don't know what the exact right word is—response to using NATO as the instrument, and there were ways that there were—putting together coalitions of the willing—various ways that the

United States decided to deal with that. And then we turned our attention to Iraq.

So one of the questions was: How did this whole operation get put together in the first place? And, what was expected of the various allies? And how was the whole command pulled together?

We took these questions as a lesson. And concluded that in the future there had to be some unity of command, that there shouldn't be national caveats, that there had to be common planning, and that there had to be a way to obviate the very things that you spoke about, and in terms of understanding who contributes what.

The other part—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that was achieved?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. No. Well, we were talking about the future. We met with the military authorities many times, and we obviously raised these issues when we were talking to—

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Other experts. But we put it down as something that had to happen in the future if these kinds of expeditionary missions were to be undertaken—the lessons learned.

The other part that came out and is now part of the vocabulary—what Afghanistan has taught is what we are calling “the comprehensive approach,” which is that maybe the future kinds of missions like this are not ones that can be only won by the military; there has to be a civilian and military component acting together. So, we recommended that a part of the NATO structure have a small civilian unit that could help coordinate the nonmilitary components of an international response to a complex situation.

Another point is that we did not want to make Afghanistan the be-all and end-all of NATO. It is a mission, a very important mission, and lessons have to be learned from it, but the Strategic Concept has to go beyond just Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm a little either confused or troubled by the notion that they can deal with the future, but not the present, and I'm not sure what gets them to perform differently in the future if they're unwilling to do so now. What if there's the same desultory response to some particular challenge—if one other nation gets hit, and they say, “Well, now we all have to respond.” What is there to suggest that they will do so differently than they have in this particular instance?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I believe that they—from everything that I could tell in dealing with the people in NATO, they have taken on board what the problems have been in Afghanistan. The Secretary General has gone out there and really gotten additional troops, has made the point about the national caveats, has made the point about the sustainability of having deployed forces. He's also made the point about countries contributing resources.

And I think they have learned. They have been learning. There's no question in my mind about that. And I didn't mean to intimate that they were not learning on the job; I think they are. I think they're trying to figure out how to make up for some of the problems that have existed for the last 7 years.

For instance—it's interesting. I was in Australia recently. The Australians have clearly contributed many forces to Afghanistan.

They were not involved in the original planning. They are now very much part of what is going on, in terms of the partnerships.

So, I think a lot has been learned. There are a lot of NATO forces in there. But, I was speaking more to the point of what we were trying to do in the Strategic Concept, because we were not dealing specifically with instructions to NATO forces right now. But, having a civilian representative and a military representative—all those things, I think, are part of the learning process dealing with the U.N. and other organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me come back, in the next round, if I can. Thank you Madam Secretary.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Albright, several allies have called for withdrawal of the remaining United States tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, which are in the form of gravity bombs that can be deployed on allied dual-capable aircraft. As you know, these weapons were not included in the START Treaty negotiations, and have not been the subject of prior arms control agreements with Russia. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal exceeds the NATO arsenal by nearly 10 to 1. And Russia is not only modernizing its tactical system, but is also placing greater reliance on nuclear weapons, as we heard from Secretary Gates on Tuesday.

Now, my questions are: How do you view the role of NATO and Russian tactical weapons in Europe? And what strategy do you recommend for engaging Russia on reducing its tactical nuclear arsenal? And second, what approaches have the other nuclear-weapon states in NATO, namely Great Britain and France, taken on the question of NATO's nuclear posture in Europe?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Senator Lugar, we spent quite a lot of time on this and, I think, had some of our livelier discussions on this particular issue. And we have written about this very specifically. Let me just go into this a bit and respond to what you asked.

First of all, it's very clear that NATO continues to rely on conventional and nuclear weapons. That is part of the deterrent posture. And we also believe that, as long as nuclear weapons remain a part of the system, that the alliance has to have a nuclear component. And we've tried to fit that in to the general discussion that it would be—the world will be better off without nuclear weapons. But, so long as they exist, NATO must take that reality into account.

So, one of the aspects that we looked at was specifically—and this was not easy, because, as we were speaking about this, various Parliaments were making unilateral statements about what they desired to do, and also the fact that, when we were in Russia, there were discussions about what to do about the substrategic—and so, what we came up with was that we felt it was very important that as long as nuclear weapons existed, that whatever decisions were made on the tactical nukes had to be made as an alliance, which I think is a very strong statement, especially given what some of the political discussions were about. And I was very glad that we were able to get that kind of a consensus agreement.

We also did believe that it was very important to have discussions with the Russians over this. As you know, there are some who believe that we should just do this unilaterally. We came up

with the idea that there be, in fact, talks, and that the special consultative group on arms control be reestablished in order to be able to have this kind of a dialogue both internally within the alliance and with the Russians on this issue. And I think that was a pretty good consensus approach to it, given what some of the political issues on all this are.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I thank you for that answer and likewise for citing specifically what is in the report that you have been authoring and will be considered by our NATO allies.

Let me now address the issue of energy security. Energy security constitutes one of the often-mentioned 21st-century threats that many people, including myself, believe NATO must take a lead on. While some have argued that these tasks should be left to the European Union, the EU has, for a number of reasons, shown it's not really up to the task. I've been encouraged that NATO has made energy security a part of its operational duties through activities such as infrastructure protection and intelligence analysis.

My question is: How do you believe energy security can be made a part of NATO's core operation? And is this addressed in the report that you're presenting?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Again, we had a very interesting discussion on this. And I know, Senator, this is one of the issues you've brought up when I was here before, and I specifically wanted to direct our discussions to deal with this issue. Also, the vice chair, selected by Secretary General Rasmussen, was Jeroen van der Veer, who had been the former CEO of Royal Dutch Shell. So, we had an energy expert. And it was very interesting, in terms of how we talked about what the issues were. And we tried to kind of unpackage the whole question.

Clearly, one of the major issues to deal with energy security is for the various countries involved to try to find alternative sources and conservation. And we did talk about that. However, there's no question that a certain number of the countries are dependent on imported energy supplies. And so, on—via pipelines and shipping. And the way that we parsed this—I know what you just said about the EU, but the bottom line is, in terms of some of the issues that have to do with diplomacy, that the EU should have a role in it. We also thought that, since we spent quite a lot of time talking about the potential uses of Article 4, which were consultative issues and make this a political community, that one could, in fact, raise issues of energy supply within NATO under Article 4, but that there was a partnership with the EU. We also did consider the fact that, if there were attacks or sabotage or something that involved the physical destruction of rigs or pipelines, that then NATO should have a role in dealing with that.

So, we kind of unpacked all this. And we did say—and again, the recommendation that we made, if I might just cite it, is, “The potential for major energy supply disruption should figure prominently in NATO's strategic assessment and contingency planning activities. Thought should be given in advance to how the alliance might work with partners in an emergency situation to mitigate harm to its members and find alternative sources.” So, we did consider this at some length.



There was also the issue of the High North, what would happen there. And what really happened was, countries thought that they should deal with it on a national basis.

So, definitely on the agenda, and unpacked in a way that I think provided some guidance for the Secretary General on this.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I understand Senator Kaufman has a pressing engagement, and Senator Shaheen is allowing him to go ahead with his remarks.

So, thank you, Senator Shaheen.

And, Senator Kaufman, you're recognized.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

And thank you, Senator Shaheen. One of the bad sides of being a Senator.

We had a good discussion before you kind of went off and solved these problems.

First, I want to thank you for your service. Your service is incredible, what you do. And what you bring to our whole effort is just wonderful.

And I want to, kind of, take a little, slight divergence to what Senator Kerry said. I agree totally with what he said. But, you know, the problem here—and I agree with—totally what—everything he said. If we can't do it in Afghanistan, what makes us think you're—we'll be able to do it down the road? But to get back to what—the discussion we had before you left, and that is, you've got an organization here that's done incredible good for the world—for Europe and for the world—NATO—which I have been a very strong supporter, and everybody I've ever worked with has been a strong supporter for, and I know you're a strong supporter—as a—it's changed the face of Europe. By forcing people to change their internal governance in order to be members of NATO, the impact has been incredible.

But, now we find ourselves with an organization that has 28 members. How does it ever—I know we've talked about this before—how do you ever operate, in a military situation, with 28 members? And I think what the chairman's talking about is—in Afghanistan—is an example of how difficult it is to operate militarily, with 28 folks. So, can you—the Group of Experts—kind of, what do they see, in terms of the actual NATO, totally as a military operation, trying to operate with 28 members?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I went over my testimony from last time, and your questions, and that you had doubts. But, I think what is interesting is that, in some ways, NATO—the way you posed the question—is the victim of its own success.

Senator KAUFMAN. Right.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Because, it is an organization that people—countries want to be members of. And it does have that catalytic effect of producing democratic governments and governance and resolving interethnic strife, or they can't get in—various issues like that.

We spent a lot of time on the question that you've asked. I mean, there's the whole issue about whether an operation like this can operate by consensus. It is very hard, again. And I just described

what happened in our group is that we went and had an “away day” with the NAC—we met with the NAC, officially and unofficially. And there is no way that the consensus concept is going to disappear at the NAC level. Countries are asked to contribute troops. And I think the United States wouldn’t want to be without that.

So, what we began to look at was whether there were ways that the bureaucracy—military, as well as the civilians—could be pruned, and how to ensure that decisions could be made in a more rational way. We also said that decisions reached by NAC shouldn’t be undermined at lower levels.

We spent a lot of time with the military authorities, in terms of their looking at how to do more common planning, common procurement, more specialization, and put on the table ways that we thought that a big alliance could, in fact, operate together more rationally.

But, here the issue is—and I really do believe that major mistakes were made on how we pursued the Afghan campaign, early on, and that we have to learn from those mistakes. And what I find interesting is the way that the Secretary General is pushing countries to be more respectful of the common command; of giving troops and having them do what they’re supposed to do in the region where they are. I am the Secretary of State that first took NATO to war. And we saw what the problems were, in terms of doing that in the Balkans.

Yesterday, I appeared with Admiral Stavridis, the SACEUR, who gets this, totally, and also General Abrial, who is in ACT, which is the forward-looking aspect of this, with the French. They are looking at exactly the issues that you’re talking about. And I think it is worth pursuing, and our military authorities are working with them, and the CHODs have their role. It is not—we raised the issues, and we put some ideas on the table, but this is the ongoing reform that the Secretary General is going to push with Admiral Stavridis.

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Thank you.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Good morning.

I want to echo my colleagues in thanking you for the work that you’ve done on the Strategic Concept and, of course, all of your service to this country. It’s very nice to have you here.

I had the opportunity to hear firsthand and really see the impact of the stability that NATO can provide to countries in Europe, when I visited the Balkans last February with Senator Voinovich. And what we heard—we visited most of the countries in the western Balkans—and what we heard, without exception, was the importance of providing MAP for Bosnia, because of the stabilizing effect that would have. And I was very pleased to see that NATO did, in fact, provide that, with conditions, for Bosnia. And hopefully it will have the kind of stabilizing effect that people talked about.

One concern that we heard from some of the countries that we visited was that there is enlargement fatigue and that there will be obstacles to allowing countries into NATO as we go into the future. Can you talk about the extent to which that might exist, and how the Strategic Concept addresses that issue?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I'm glad you went to the Balkans, because I do think that the role that NATO has played there has been, obviously, crucial and instrumental in getting any change. The points that you made, in many ways, address the issue of the catalytic effect of holding out that a country will be a member of NATO. I think that is a very important part.

We did address the whole issue of the open door and enlargement, and felt that there needed to be the continued holding the door open, according to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that that should be pursued, and that there had to be guidelines that follow on Article 10, to make clear that joining NATO is not just a privilege, it is a responsibility. And that does entail having democratic governance, civilian control over the military, a general way of being able to run a country without disputes. And so, I think it's important to keep that there.

And also, what's been very interesting, Senator, is the way that various glide paths have been kind of expanded and subdivided. I mean, when I first started out on this, I was U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. I went with General Shalikashvili to explain what Partnership for Peace was about. That was the initial glide path. And then there were—how that worked—and then the MAP, and then the pre-MAP. And so, there are different ways that countries are prepared for their membership.

So, I think that path is there. Article 10 is there. And we wanted to make sure that that would happen. It is a large alliance. But, I think that it should have members in it that are prepared to carry out their responsibilities and then be able to live up to what they promise. So, that's where we left that.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

You talk, in your testimony, about the Strategic Concept proposing criteria for making decisions about when and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries. Can you talk about what that criteria should be?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. And if I might, specifically—because I think—and it goes a little bit to the question that Chairman Kerry asked—is—

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. We are in Afghanistan. How is it—what are the lessons learned out of it?

First of all, let me just say this. We do believe that NATO is the premier military alliance that exists. But, it isn't the only way that one can answer every problem. And one of the—there were great images that came up. When we had our first meeting, we put all the problems on the table—kind of, the horrors of the world. And then we began to think: How could NATO deal with these issues? And then somebody said, "We can't have NATO be like a Swiss army knife with all the blades extended, because when that happens, you can't even pick it up." And so, you have to figure, what is the appropriate instrument? What are the partnerships?

And NATO, we said, was a regional organization, not a global organization. It expands its power by having partnerships with countries and organizations, but it can't do everything.

But, what we did say was that—when the issue came up, on a case-by-case basis, that deliberations within the NAC should give

weight to such factors as—and if I might actually list them—the extent and imminence of danger to alliance members; the exhaustion or apparent ineffectiveness of alternative steps; the ability and willingness of NATO members to provide the means required for success; the involvement of partners in helping to ensure an effective and timely remedy to the problem at hand; the collateral impact on other NATO missions and needs; the degree of domestic and international public support; conformity with international law; and the foreseeable consequences of inaction.

So, we really put down quite a lot of guidelines that create a kind of sieve that the NATO members really have to think about: What other organizations are there? What partnerships?

So, I think we were pretty careful about this, because—back to what the chairman said—we could not spend all our time on Afghanistan, but we did want to draw the lessons from the Balkans and Afghanistan for future guidelines.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

When you were here last year, as you were starting this process, one of the questions that came up was the concern about burden-sharing and how—given the different capacity and resources of the members of NATO, how resources could be shared in a way that had everybody participating and taking responsibility, but that recognized that some people didn't have the same capacity as other members, to participate. So, can you talk about how much of an issue that was, and how you think the Strategic Concept has resolved that?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, first of all, we believed, and we said, that countries needed to live up to their responsibilities. Unfortunately, many of them are not. Each country is supposed to devote 2 percent of their budget to defense, and only six are actually doing that. So, that—it is a real problem.

We were also doing all this in the middle of a financial crisis, and one of the issues that we talked about is, What happens now? Most of the countries in NATO have a sizable deficit, and the question is, How do they now come up with this?

I did a number of interviews earlier this week in Brussels with the Secretary General, who emphasized that NATO contributes to stability without which countries would have even deeper economic problems than they do.

Yesterday, Admiral Stavridis made a very important point in a discussion that we had—which is that as budgets fall the 2 percent actually becomes a smaller number. There's not an absolute number of what countries have to invest. But the fact remains that countries had to live up to their obligations.

Now, we also tried to look at the cost-saving aspects of common funding and similar measures. We also recommend giving the Secretary General more authority to find ways to save money through reforms, common procurement practices and common funding. So, we hit this on all levels. There has to be living up to responsibilities, there has to be smarter spending, and you can't ask an alliance to do more with less. So, there has to be smarter spending, and that's what we were looking at.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.

I know our chairman will be back in just a moment. But, let me continue the questioning, sort of, carrying on the conversation on Senator Shaheen's question.

One of the criticisms of the NATO alliance over the last few years has been, essentially, the diminishing of defense budgets by most of our allies, across the board. Fewer and fewer dollars—or euros—and fewer people, and to a point where, even if NATO decided upon an expeditionary force in Afghanistan or elsewhere, there would be fewer and fewer personnel for that force, most of the objective being internal domestic boundary situations. That still seems to be continuing.

And this, you know, leads to a question, I suppose, Can European countries, in particular, many of whom have a very strong social safety net—an allocation of more and more of their resources to pensions, or to education, or to internal transportation, or to other domestic situations—but are dependent upon the alliance, and maybe us, the United States and the transatlantic aspect—I'm just curious whether the Commission tried to get into this business of the values of expenditures and budgets, the trends of all of this, and whether this is going to work, in terms of the future.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I think, Senator, there obviously was a recognition of the fact that the United States is the big country with all the power in this, and provides the bulk of troops in Afghanistan and in other places. And what I think is evident here is, many of us have grown up with NATO, but there is a whole new generation of people, in Europe and in this country, who have no idea what this alliance is about. And so, one of the things that we felt was important, and will continue to be important, is the transparency of what we've been doing, and trying to get support for it, especially given the financial situation everywhere.

And we talked about the fact that this was an alliance of equals—on the other hand, that there were some who did more than others, and that there had to be a way that there was a buy-in by all the countries, in terms of their responsibilities. I think this is going to be the big push and the big issue.

The Secretary General—a European—is very much aware of this, and has made this a cause, and, in fact, has already begun his arguments, including the fact that contributions to NATO provide for internal stability.

So, it's an argument that has to be made. We made it. I know that there's a sense that there are those who are not doing their share. I think more and more are. I think the response to the Secretary General, as well as to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, on getting more support for Afghanistan is there.

The thing that I found interesting—and we were never totally able to resolve, in terms of how one counts this—but, if one talks about the comprehensive approach of military and civilian, and the kind of work that has to be done in training forces, or training the police, or dealing on reconstruction teams, they—the allies are making a variety of very strong contributions.

The question is, Do training and development contributions count toward an ally's 2 percent? Not necessarily. So, these are the

kinds of issues we all have to continue to deal with. But, the Europeans on the Group of Experts understood fully the message that this was not just the United States bearing the burden, but that they had equal responsibility here.

But, it's hard—there's no question—they have their economic problems, and that's why it's so important that we try to get the younger generations to understand the value of this alliance.

Senator LUGAR. I would conclude by noting that perhaps by the time you come to the final conference with the allies, we will know more about whether the Greek economy has stabilized, and if the challenging situation facing the economies throughout the Eurozone is looking better in general. There are pessimists who say that this will not be resolved very soon, and could even put great pressure, regardless of intent, upon, not only those countries that are under much scrutiny, but all of the others in the alliance who are trying to support them and are trying to support the euro.

This is a larger question than the ideas before us today specifically regarding NATO. But, your comments have underlined that a great deal of thought is being given, obviously, by the United States and our NATO allies, as to the impact these issues could have upon our economies and budgets.

So, I know that you will be observant of this situation, as will those who are going to be around the table with you.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Let me just respond to this—not as the chair of this Group of Experts, but as a political scientist and observer of the international scene—there is a major shift going on here. The European Union was, in fact, with all the discussions over the Lisbon Treaty, was moving into a phase of more integrated institutional structures. And all of a sudden, with the financial crisis, there is a tendency to kind of go national again.

We are watching what the trends are. There are certainly those within the European construct who are pushing very hard to make sure that the eurozone continues to work together. It's very interesting to watch how the central banks are operating—whether they're going to be able to get their monetary and fiscal policies together. To what extent is there dedication to the European experiment? And I think it's a very important time.

As an American, I want to see a strong Europe. I actually think we're better off with it. And so, I'm hoping that that actually works and that the NATO part of this can help in terms of stability. Obviously we talked a lot about this because, except for the Canadian and me, all the other experts were Europeans.

And if I just might say, back on Afghanistan—there are 40,000 non-U.S. troops in that country. And although it's not a great way to measure things, in terms of per-capita casualties, No. 1 is Estonia, second is Denmark, third is Canada, and the United States is fifth. In addition, Norway has 4½ million people and they contribute 450 troops. So, if you think about 450, it doesn't seem so big. But, it's a pretty small population. And we have to look at the various aspects of how this is done.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Madam Secretary, I'm interested as to how you all approached this review. Was there an automatic assumption and agreement that NATO has a purpose that is defined for the 21st century? Or did you have to work your way to that? In other words, was there a challenge to whether or not NATO, in fact, ought to exist and has a relevance in the modern context, particularly given the EU issues, the AU, the regional defense discussions, and other things going on?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, we pulled that apart in many different ways. I think what is interesting is, there clearly is a default drive that says, "Once an institution exists, it ought to continue existing." I mean, that's a part of the system, in many ways.

But, we went through two phases. One was, as I mentioned, that all of a sudden, NATO was supposed to do everything. I mean we put the horrors of the world on the plate and thought, "Well, NATO could do this. NATO could do that." And we became, I think, much more surgical, in terms of the things NATO should be able to do.

It was—it's very interesting—we're in the third phase of NATO. The first phase was very clear. It was an alliance against the Soviet Union, and we—in many ways, we knew how to do that.

Then the second phase was the post-cold-war phase where there was clearly a desire from countries to join NATO, and it was what you were saying, Senator Shaheen and Senator Kaufman—and just, you know, "Here we are. Great club. We should—people should belong to it," but a little unclear about how it should operate. And was it worth carrying on? And trying to persuade the Russians that it was not against them.

I think we are now in the third phase of how this instrument, which really is quite remarkable, can be used for these new threats. And so, we then focused on how to make it more agile and versatile in a period of unpredictability, not saying that it had to do everything. But, from the perspective of a decisionmaker, you've got problems out there; which alliance or group are you going to pick up? And we felt that NATO still was the alliance that was able to deal with these issues, versus a coalition of the willing. And I know women are not great at sports analogies, but the bottom line is, it's better to have a team that trains and operates together, and knows how to react in various situations, than just going to a pickup operation.

So, I think that that's where we came out; not NATO, everywhere, all the time, as a global organization, but a much more streamlined, clear, operational way of keeping together countries that have a commonality and that understand that their security depends on each other. So—

The CHAIRMAN. That's helpful.

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. We argued both, frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in the context of where you did land, you suggested that NATO would benefit with stronger partnerships with the entities that I mentioned—

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The EU, the AU, Japan—

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Russia, et cetera. But, you also pointed out that it suffers from this internal coordination problem

and insufficient capacity of the Article 4 consultation. Given that, how do you get from here to there?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, first of all, I do think that the partnership part was a discovery, for many people. In our third seminar that we had, we had a discussion with partners. We found out there were more partners than allies. And so, there were a number of different types. There were those that were organizational ones. We did meet with the EU. I have to admit, it was at a moment when the EU was feeling more robust than later. It has to do with your question, Senator Lugar. And we felt that there were—obviously, the EU and NATO have a lot of overlapping members and taxpayers. And so, there—we felt that there needed to be a better way that those organizations work together. But that the partnerships—in order to be useful, there had to be a coordinating mechanism within the bureaucracy of NATO to be able to really interact with the various partners, and to be able to use them in a way to deal effectively with the different issues.

So, I think that we did look at that. And the coordination is something that we said the Secretary General—the countries have to get their head around this; there's just no question. And it doesn't work by making one more committee. It actually works by trying to pair a lot of the committees.

And what I find interesting—Secretary General Rasmussen is on the case. I mean, a lot of changes have happened already. They're in the process of reform. I hope the United States and other countries will continue to push on this. The partnerships help extend NATO's reach—I mean, look at Australia and New Zealand, various other countries—but they have to be part of the planning, early on. So, a lot of work has to be done on that score.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you.

I need to go meet with President Calderon.

I thank you for your expertise on this, which is really important and enormously helpful to the committee.

I'd like to leave open the record. Although I don't want to burden you with a lot of questions, there are a few additional ones that would help us.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. OK. Very happy to.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you don't have the State Department at your disposal to help you put them all—but, you've got—

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Good volunteers.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Capable staffs there. So it would help us a lot.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. And I may say, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think that this is going to be an effort, a public effort. This is the most transparent working of a Strategic Concept, ever. And—partially at the direction of the Secretary General and partially my own instincts on it—I think it's a treaty that is definitely viable and important for the 21st century. But it will not happen if the American people don't understand it, and the publics in the other countries. So, while we have been officially disbanded as a group, we liked each other so much that—and everybody thought this was such a worthy project, that we're going to keep talking about it.



But I think having your help in all of this is going to be absolutely essential. So, whatever you need, we'll be very, very happy to provide.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think it's key——

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I thank you all.

The CHAIRMAN. I was very struck by the point you made about the generational shift. You know, a lot of us take NATO for granted. But, it is true that probably three-quarters of the Nation doesn't really have a sense——

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What it means. That's a lot of folks who need to be reconnected to how it's going to have an impact on their lives. That's why I think the relevancy and the new definitions of threats, and how they're going to act is going to be key.

But NATO itself is going to have to define itself in ways that matter to the American people. And if they don't show up, or hold back, or there is this division, it is inevitable that there will be a serious reevaluation in this country.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen, will you chair, at this point?

Senator SHAHEEN. I'm actually going to go over to——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you are——

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. See——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Going over also? Well, why don't——

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. President Calderon.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you would—it's your questions, until you feel compelled to go over.

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. OK.

I have just one question, and it speaks to the issue that you were just talking about, about transparency and how do we engage the next generation.

One of the things that I was curious about was that you—I understand you actually set up a Web site where people could make comments about the Strategic Concept and ideas for the alliance, going forward. Did that work? And did it produce thoughtful comments and real ideas that could be used?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, everything is on—the report was made. And I think it's interesting that a report that is a recommendation for the one that's actually going to happen, that the Secretary General wanted that. Yes. I mean, there have been lots of different comments. There have also been various other organizations that have had kind of Web seminars on this. And there have been a lot of comments. We can let you know what—how many hits there really have been. And it's been interesting. But there still is the issue out there of how to get people generated——

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. And interested in it. And there are the kind of questions that you all have asked: Why? What? Who pays? Why are we in this at all? And the issue of how Afghanistan works. So, absolutely.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you——

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. Again, very much.

Senator KAUFMAN [presiding]. Madam Secretary, I'd just like to spend a few minutes because I think what the chairman said was right, in terms of selling this thing. I think, first off, "worthy project" doesn't begin to state how good what you did and what your experts have done. And the fact that you're staying together is wonderful.

But, I really am struck, from my experience in Bosnia and Kosovo and Afghanistan, how difficult it is to operate a military operation, when you have to operate by consensus. And I think selling this is really, really important. So, I think we ought to—we're going to have to sell it on what it is and all the good things it does—NATO. And I think trying to sell it as a military operation, going forward—because I think that 28 people sitting in a room—and these people are making great sacrifices, the NATO troops that are sent—but, when you sit—in not just—in all these operations with NATO that I've been involved in—just sit with the military people, and they don't even complain. It's kind of like—they look on it kind of like the weather. Trying to figure out how you have a united front in these very complex civilian-military operations, when you don't know—you can't get a commitment on how we're going to provide—and you're asking some people to go into harm's way, and others won't go into harm's way—trying to, you know—I mean, it's just a nightmare, from a standpoint of having a cogent, concentrated military operation to reach fairly fixed objectives. So, I'm a little concerned.

And the thought I was thinking—what I was thinking was, these things are now—and I think it's great—they're now not military operations, they're military-civilian operations. We now have counterinsurgency. I think this is a great opportunity to do things that I know you believe in, I believe in. And, you know, the military's an important part—clear-hold. But, the build part is the essence to success. Can't do it without clear and hold, but the build part—and then, transfer—is really the key to this thing.

So, I mean, does NATO—did you talk at all about—you said there's a small civilian unit being set up in NATO. I mean, I look out there, wherever I go where NATO's involved, and civilian—everything from training the police, right on through. We need more people—administrators. We need more—to do more of these things—we don't—our civilians serve—we have, like, less than 400 people—United States people outside of Kabul in Afghanistan. And I don't want to bring it back to Afghanistan, because I think this—but, I mean, just the idea that maybe the place to be, for NATO, in terms of the military operation and cooperation, is in the civilian area. Did you talk about that at all? Or what do you think about that?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Well, we did talk about it a lot, in terms of the whole enlargement, in certain ways, of the civilian component, and there are people who said, you know, "This alliance is only for classical warfare." It was. It isn't anymore.

Senator KAUFMAN. Right.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I mean, it is really adapting, and in exactly the way you describe it.

The thing that I would—I'm speaking personally—that I would like to see is more credit given for the civilian part of this. The truth is that the civilians that are out there are exposed to danger. It isn't as if they are, you know, just sitting at the beach. They really—have very difficult issues to deal with. And one of the problems—and maybe this is something that can be worked on—is how to quantify the quality of the work that is done. Because there's a great deal in the reconstruction teams that has to be done, that countries are comfortable doing, and are good at, and are providing real added value. We talked about it. And I think it's something that needs to be pushed within the system.

The hard part—and I know exactly what you're saying—when you think about how you get 28 countries—but how do you get away from the consensus part of this, in the military, if people are contributing? So, what we thought was, there was no way—absolutely no way to get away from consensus at the NAC level. But, we did think that there were ways that the lower-level committee decisions could be made in a quicker way. And so, I do think that was taken on board.

We did meet with the military authorities—we went to SHAPE. We've spent a lot of time with the military committee, as well as with the SHAPE people. And I think people get it. I just think that attention needs to be paid and pushed. And we put out the guidelines for it.

Senator KAUFMAN. I tell you, it's really remarkable, in Afghanistan—to come back to Afghanistan—how much the military appreciates and now understands the civilian effort. I mean, it's one of the great organizational, informational things I've ever seen. I mean, wherever you go—I've been there three times now—wherever you go, from the lowest soldier up to the four-stars, they all believe in counterinsurgency, and they all understand that a very important part of it is the civilians. And I think that, when you look at what's going on over there, in RC East especially, and how the civilians are beginning to integrate themselves into what the Afghan Government's doing, and also with the military—and the military's right there. I mean, it's really—so, I think there's a real change coming, in terms of general understanding of how important the civilian piece of this is. And I think it's in all our interest, all of us that believe we've shortchanged the diplomatic side of everything we do. Like—and Secretary Gates is incredible, in terms of talking about this.

So, I think the time is coming when people will be—really will appreciate the civilian effort, because I think, in Afghanistan, it's going to make a big difference, and it's going to be—people are going to see it is, and the military is going to come back and say how helpful they were in organizing these different things, and how—Marjah—how difficult it is if you don't have the right civilian people in Marjah—the military saying that.

So, I really do think that, you know, this is coming. And I really would like you to think about it, because I have so much respect for you and for the other people in—the experts—to think about, maybe when we're selling NATO, it is not going to be a classical military operation anymore. And selling it as a classical military operation leaves you open to just getting—you know, as the chair-

man said, as we introduce this thing, let's not overpromise what it is. And the fact that we've changed, the world has changed—I just think that having, ready to go, in a time of a counterinsurgency—in the State Department, but also in NATO—the ability to put people on the ground as fast as we put combat troops on the ground, to handle not just AID and not just the agricultural, but administration, and all the other—what General McChrystal calls “government in a box.” But, all the different pieces, so, literally, when the military shows up, they have with them a group that's as well trained as the military, as conversant in what's going on as the military, that have been operating together, that can go—that are willing to make these—as you said, these absolutely incredible sacrifices. I just think that's—you know, as we look down the road and beyond Afghanistan, this is the—we're going to be doing these counterinsurgency things, unfortunately, for quite a while to come.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I fully agree with you. And I think that what has to happen is, there has to be thought given to it ahead of time—

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. So that there is a comfort level for the civilians and the military operating together. And this whole—I mean, it—you know, how vocabulary kind enters international parlance—this comprehensive approach is the way that there is a blending of the civilian and military. But, there has to be planning in that, too, so that people from the various agencies know what each other is doing and how they're operating and what they're going to do. And I think—we did put this on the table—and I personally am going to keep talking and pushing about it—

Senator KAUFMAN. Great.

Dr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Because I understand how State and Defense need to work together on this. And I appreciate your role in this, because it is the way to sell it. And there are a lot of people, young people, who actually want to serve in that kind of an operation.

Senator KAUFMAN. But, it goes back to recruiting.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator KAUFMAN. I mean, you can't—you know, people—the example I always use—people who join the Department of Agriculture are good people, but they didn't join because they want to speak a foreign language—

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right.

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. Or go to a foreign country. I mean, they self-select to go to—

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right.

Senator KAUFMAN. Right? And so, there are plenty of people out there who want to make a difference, would love to be involved in agriculture as part of a team that would go to a country—

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Right.

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. Once we're involved with them. Thank you.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you for your service.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. I guess that's it.

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

