- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

[Senate Hearing 111-701, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 111-701, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3454

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

----------

PART 1

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL'' POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES
COMMAND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

----------

FEBRUARY 2, 23, 25; MARCH 4, 9, 11, 16, 26; APRIL 20; DECEMBER 14, 2010

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011--Part 1

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL'' POLICY b DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY b DEPARTMENT OF THE
NAVY b DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND b U.S. NORTHERN
COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND b U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND b U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA b BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES
AND PROGRAMS b LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

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62-155 PDF

______

2011

S. Hrg. 111-701, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3454

__________

PART 1

__________

FEBRUARY 2, 23, 25; MARCH 4, 9, 11, 16, 26; APRIL 20; DECEMBER 14, 2010

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

(Before July 22, 2010)

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware

______

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

(After July 22, 2010)

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
CARTE P. GOODWIN, West Virginia

Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

----------

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture and to Receive Testimony Relating to the ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell'' Policy
february 2, 2010

Page

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 11
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 21

Department of the Army
february 23, 2010

McHugh, John M., Secretary of the Army........................... 180
Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army....... 228

Department of the Navy
february 25, 2010

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy............... 316
Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations............... 324
Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps...... 342

Department of the Air Force
march 4, 2010

Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force.............. 453
Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 464

U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Joint Forces
Command
march 9, 2010

Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command... 538
Ward, GEN William E., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command........ 576
Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command 595

U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command
march 11, 2010

Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command, and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command........................................................ 655
Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.. 672

U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command
march 16, 2010

Olson, ADM T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command... 735
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command..... 742

U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Forces Korea
march 26, 2010

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 839
Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 851
Sharp, GEN Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces-Korea..................... 867

Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
april 20, 2010

Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 919
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 929
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency.. 933
Macy, RADM Archer M., Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Organization, and Deputy Director for Force
Protection, J-8, The Joint Staff............................... 942

Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition
december 14, 2010

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E. Jr., Secretary of the Navy................ 1018
Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations............... 1020
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 1021
Pandolfe, RADM Frank C., USN, Director, Surface Warfare Division
OPNAV N86...................................................... 1023
Labs, Eric J., Ph.D., Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and
Weapons, Congressional Budget Office........................... 1023
O'Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 1032
Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 1042

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ``DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL'' POLICY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman), presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill,
Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerard
J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W.
Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips,
professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff
member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Pablo E.
Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV,
professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional
staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional
staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member;
Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jennifer R.
Knowles, Christine G. Lang, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher
Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa
Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer
Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to
Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to
Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and
Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning everybody. The committee this
morning welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral Michael Mullen for
our hearing on the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2011
budget request and the associated Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2010
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
Gentlemen, as always we are thankful to you and to your
families for your dedicated service to our Nation, to the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home, and in harm's
way around the globe, and to their families. Your commitment to
the welfare of our troops and their families shines through all
that you do. The American people are grateful for that and we
are grateful and eager to help whenever we can.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $549 billion
for the base budget and $159 billion for the ongoing wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of this $708 billion request for
2011, the administration has included a 2010 supplemental
request of $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to
support the President's Afghanistan policy announced last
December.
The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last
year to rebalance the force toward the military capabilities
necessary to prevail in today's conflicts, to buy weapons that
are relevant and affordable, and to assure that tax dollars are
used wisely.
The long-anticipated 2009 QDR report was also submitted on
Monday with the Department's 2011 budget. This is, and the
report is explicit, a wartime QDR. The Department's analysis
and decisions place the focus and priority on policies,
programs, and initiatives that support the current fight in
Afghanistan and Iraq and against al Qaeda. The QDR makes and
justifies tough choices and indicates that more tradeoffs will
be necessary in the future.
I'll note that along with the budget request the
administration submitted the BMDR. This review was required by
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2009. This is the first comprehensive policy and strategy
framework for missile defense and it is long overdue.
Secretary Gates' cover memo to the report notes that ``I
have made defending against near-term regional threats a top
priority of our missile defense plans, programs, and
capabilities,'' and that statement is consistent with what
Congress has been urging for many years.
The report also says that before new missile defense
programs will be deployed, they must first be tested
realistically to demonstrate that they are effective and
reliable. It also states that our missile defense programs must
be fiscally sustainable over the long term, and emphasizes
international cooperation with our allies and partners, and
expresses an interest in cooperation with Russia. Those are all
important elements of a sound missile defense policy.
Consistent with the reform goals set out by Secretary Gates
and the results of the QDR, a top priority for DOD must be the
critical requirements for the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. This committee has sought to ensure that our
combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in those
conflicts, including technologies to counter improvised
explosive devices (IEDs); mine resistant ambush protected
(MRAP) all-terrain vehicles (ATVs); intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and additional helicopters.
This committee will continue to support the needs of our men
and women who are in those conflicts.
I have long argued that the principal mission in
Afghanistan should be training the Afghan security forces so
that they can take responsibility for the security of their
country. What we heard during our recent visit to Afghanistan
was that President Obama's speech at West Point in December had
a tangible, positive effect on the recruitment of Afghan
security forces. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, the head of
NATO training mission in Afghanistan, told us that President
Obama's setting of the July 2011 date for the beginning of U.S.
troop reductions in Afghanistan energized Afghanistan's
leadership, made clear to them that President Obama means
business when he says our commitment is not open-ended, and got
them to focus on planning for the shift in responsibility for
Afghan security that is highlighted by that 2011 July date.
Even more than a pay raise, General Caldwell told us, the
July 2011 date increased recruiting of Afghan soldiers because
Afghan leaders called for and reached out to local leaders to
produce new recruits across the country. The number of Afghan
recruits in training has jumped from 3,000 in November to over
11,000 as of last month.
Key to the success of the mission of strengthening the
Afghan Army will be the partnering of coalition and Afghan
units together on a one-to-one unit basis and for Afghans to
take the lead in operations. The budget the President sent over
yesterday includes significant resources for the training and
partnering mission, including increased funding for the Afghan
Security Forces Fund in both the 2010 supplemental and the 2011
request. The fully-integrated partnering of coalition and
Afghan units, living together and integrating their lives
daily, is at the heart of our troops' mission.
Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the Commander of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command in
Afghanistan, has promised to get us data, indicated on a chart
that I have up behind me and a handout which is circulated, on
the number of Afghan units fully-integrated with coalition
forces and how many of those Afghan units are in the lead-in
operations. This effort is key to the transition to an Afghan
lead-in providing for the Nation's security and we will track
this data very closely.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Levin. While I'm pleased with the increased
partnering in the field, we were disappointed with the
shortfall in trainers for the initial training needed for the
Afghan Army and police. General Caldwell told us that he had
only 37 percent of the required U.S. and NATO trainers on hand
and NATO countries were about 90 percent short of meeting their
commitment to provide about 2,000 non-U.S. trainers. That's
simply inexcusable and our NATO allies must do more to close
the gap in trainers.
In the area of personnel, I am pleased that this budget
request provides increased funding for military personnel and
for the defense health program. The budget request includes
funding to support the care and treatment of wounded warriors,
including $1.1 billion for the treatment, care, and research of
traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) and psychological health. The
budget would also increase funding for family support programs
by $500 million over last year's levels and include the funding
necessary to support the temporary increase to the Army's
active duty end strength to 569,400, which will help improve
dwell time and reduce stress on the force.
The catastrophic January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti
reminded all of us just how indiscriminate natural disasters
can be and renewed America's commitment to Haiti. DOD has
mobilized resources and manpower to aid in the relief effort in
support of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
Just last week, the committee approved a $400 million
reprogramming to ensure that DOD was adequately resourced for
that important support mission. We are prepared to continue to
work with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to ensure DOD is
able to continue providing support to this critical
humanitarian disaster response effort in the weeks and months
ahead, and we all greatly appreciate the skill shown by U.S.
Service personnel in response to the Haiti disaster.
Now, following this hearing, as previously announced, at
around noon we're going to turn to the issue of Don't Ask,
Don't Tell (DADT). I would appreciate questions on that subject
being asked after Secretary Gates' statement on the subject at
that time.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your
testimony, and now I turn to Senator McCain for any opening
remarks that he may have.
[The prepared statement by Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
This morning, the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
Mullen, for our hearing on the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal
year 2011 budget request and the associated Future Years Defense
Program, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2010
Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
Gentlemen, as always we are thankful to you and your families for
your dedicated service to the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines at home and in harm's way around the globe and to
their families. Your personal commitment to the welfare of our troops
and their families shines through all that you do. The American people
are grateful for that and we are grateful and eager to help wherever we
can.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department of Defense
includes $549 billion for the base budget and $159 billion for the
ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of the $708 billion
request for 2011 the administration has included a 2010 supplemental
request of $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to support
the President's Afghanistan policy announced last December. The budget
request continues the defense reforms begun last year to rebalance the
force toward the military capabilities necessary to prevail in today's
conflicts, to buy weapons that are relevant and affordable, and ensure
that tax dollars are used wisely.
The long anticipated 2009 QDR Report was also submitted on Monday
with the Department's fiscal year 2011 budget submission. This is, and
the report is explicit, a wartime QDR. The Department's analysis and
decisions places the focus and priority on policies, programs, and
initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
against al Qaeda. The QDR makes and justifies tough choices--and
indicates that more tradeoffs will be necessary in the future.
It is also worth noting that this QDR's force sizing framework is
no longer based on a combination of simultaneous or sequential major
regional conflicts, as it has in the past, such as the ability to fight
and prevail in two major wars. Instead, the analysis used a series of
wargames through a range of plausible strategic scenarios to inform
decisions on force structure and capability or capacity adjustments.
The QDR assumes that our security challenges and the operational
environment will be as taxing into the future as it is today.
Therefore, the emphasis remains on appropriately sufficient force
capability and capacity to support current operations and ensuring the
sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force through the rotational
demands that appear likely over the next several years. As we all hope,
over time, forces no longer needed to support operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, will shift their focus to preparing for and deterring
future adversaries--in other words, rebuilding our military strategic
depth, which is critically important for long-term security of our
Nation.
I would note that, along with the budget request, the
administration submitted the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
This review was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009. This is the first comprehensive policy and strategy
framework for missile defense, and it is long overdue. Secretary Gates'
cover memo to the report notes, ``I have made defending against near-
term regional threats a top priority of our missile defense plans,
programs, and capabilities.'' This is consistent with what Congress has
been urging for several years.
In addition to outlining our national priorities for defending the
homeland against missile threats from nations like North Korea and
Iran, and for flexible and adaptable regional missile defense, the
review describes several important policies. For example, it says that
before new missile defense systems will be deployed, they must first be
tested realistically and demonstrate that they are effective and
reliable. It also states that our missile defense programs must be
fiscally sustainable over the long term. It emphasizes international
cooperation with our allies and partners, and expresses an interest in
cooperation with Russia. I believe these are all important elements of
a sound missile defense policy.
Consistent with the reform goals set out by Secretary Gates and the
results of the Quadrennial Defense Review, a top priority for the
Department must be the critical requirements for the ongoing conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq. This committee has sought to ensure that our
combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in those conflicts,
including technologies to counter improvised explosive devices; MRAP-
All Terrain Vehicles; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
assets; and additional helicopters. I am confident that this committee
will continue to support the needs of our men and women who are in
these conflicts.
The next 12-18 months will be critical in Afghanistan. Based on
what I saw and heard during my visit to Afghanistan in January, I am
somewhat more optimistic than I was after my last visit in September
that the fully-resourced, counterinsurgency strategy announced by
President Obama is the right strategy and is starting to take hold.
This strategy focuses on the security of the Afghan people. Our troops
understand and embrace this people-centered approach.
I have long argued that our principal mission in Afghanistan should
be training the Afghan security forces so they can take responsibility
for the security of their country. What we heard during our visit to
Afghanistan was that President Obama's speech at West Point in December
had a tangible, positive impact on the recruitment of the Afghan
security forces. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, the head of the NATO
Training Mission in Afghanistan, told us that President Obama's setting
of the July 2011 date for the beginning of U.S. troop reductions in
Afghanistan energized Afghanistan's leadership, made clear to them that
President Obama means business when he says our commitment is not open-
ended, and got them to focus on planning for the shift in
responsibility for Afghanistan's security that is highlighted by that
July 2011 date. Even more than the pay raise, General Caldwell told us
the July 2011 date has increased recruiting because Afghan leaders
called for and reached out to local leaders to produce new recruits
across the country. As a result, the number of Afghan recruits in
training jumped from 3,000 in November to over 11,000 as of last month.
Key to the success of the mission of strengthening the Afghan Army
will be the partnering of coalition and Afghan units together, on a one
unit-to-one unit basis, and for Afghans to take the lead in operations.
The budget the President sent over yesterday includes significant
resources for the training and partnering missions, including increased
funding for the Afghan Security Forces Fund in both the fiscal year
2010 Supplemental and the fiscal year 2011 request.
The fully integrated partnering of coalition and Afghan units--
living together and integrating their lives daily--is at the heart of
our troop's mission. Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the commander
of the ISAF Joint Command in Afghanistan, has promised to get me data,
indicated on the chart behind me and the handout that was circulated,
on the number of Afghan units fully integrated with coalition forces
and how many of those Afghan units are in the lead in operations. This
effort is key to the transition to an Afghan lead in providing for
their nation's security. Accordingly, I intend to track the data on
this chart very closely.
While I am pleased with the increased partnering in the field, I am
disappointed with the shortfall in trainers for initial training needed
for the Afghan Army and police. Lieutenant General Caldwell told us he
had only 37 percent of the required U.S. and NATO trainers on hand, and
NATO countries were about 90 percent short of meeting NATO's commitment
to provide about 2,000 non-U.S. trainers. This is simply inexcusable,
and our NATO allies must do more to close the gap in trainers.
Other areas where progress appears to be happening are in equipping
the Afghan security forces, including with equipment coming out of Iraq
as U.S. forces draw down there, and in putting in place a plan for
reintegrating lower-level Taliban fighters willing to lay down their
arms and abide by the Afghan Constitution. In both of these areas, U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan have been aided by authorities provided by
Congress in last year's National Defense Authorization Act.
Also challenging over the coming months will be maintaining
security and stability in Iraq. Following Iraq's national elections,
the posture and mission of U.S. forces in Iraq will change
significantly, as they draw down from over 100,000 to under 50,000
soldiers, and the U.S. combat mission comes to an end in August of this
year, as called for by President Obama. The U.S.-Iraq status of forces
agreement sets a December 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Iraq.
Even as operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, we also must
continue to bring the fight to al Qaeda and its affiliates as they look
for new operational hubs. We have already seen al Qaeda's interest in
places like Yemen and Somalia, but we must attempt to ensure we are a
step ahead of al Qaeda in places like West Africa and the South
Pacific. Assisting our allies and partners in these regions is critical
and DOD's focus on building the capacity of our allies and partners is
welcome.
Turning to the readiness of our Armed Forces, the fiscal year 2011
budget request provides adequate levels of funding including support
for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The war funding request
includes $21.3 billion for repairing and replacing equipment and $2.8
billion in the base budget to reset and reconstitute equipment. This
committee has long advocated for the Department to shift funding for
reset and reconstitution from the war budget into the base budget and
it appears they have finally begun to do so in this year's budget
request. We must recognize however that the $2.8 billion is a modest
down payment against our long term reset and reconstitution
requirements and this level of funding will need to be sustained
several years after forces have withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Readiness funding in this year's budget request increases by 8.5
percent to account for additional costs associated with depot
maintenance, flying hours, steaming days, training, force growth, and
other increases in operational tempo. It is imperative these vital
readiness accounts are protected and fully funded. However, while our
deployed forces remain ready as they go into combat, until there is a
decrease in operational tempo, force readiness for non-deployed units
will continue to suffer historical lows, which poses significant risk
and adverse impacts to our National Military Strategy.
In the area of personnel, I am pleased that this budget request
provides increased funding for military personnel and the Defense
Health Program. The budget request includes funding to support the care
and treatment of Wounded Warriors, including $1.1 billion for the
treatment, care, and research of traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and
psychological health. The budget would also increase funding for family
support programs by $500 million over last year's levels and include
the funding necessary to support the temporary increase of the Army's
active-duty end strength to 569,400, which will help improve dwell time
and reduce stress on the force.
I am disappointed, Secretary Gates, that you have announced that
you will recommend a veto if the Defense bills include funding for the
F136 alternate engine. Apart from the attributes afforded by
competition in improving technology and ensuring better contractor
performance, I believe that the business case today may be different
than the one the Department faced 4 years ago when the Department made
the original termination decision. Based on the information that I have
been provided, it would appear to me that the additional investment
that Congress has made in the program since that original decision
would change the business case for going forward with this program. At
the time of the original decision, the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA) assessed that the F136 alternate engine would have to achieve
savings of roughly 18 percent to make economic sense, a figure in
excess of the historical averages achieved in previous procurement
programs, which IDA assessed as being 14.6 percent. With the additional
investment that we have made since that time, it would appear that the
required savings threshold would now be closer to 13 percent, or a
figure below the average that procurement competitions have yielded in
the past.
The catastrophic January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti reminded
all of us just how indiscriminate natural disasters can be and renewed
America's commitment to Haiti. DOD has mobilized resources and manpower
to aid in the relief effort in support of the Department of State and
U.S. Agency for International Development. Just last week, the
committee approved a $400 million reprogramming to ensure DOD was
adequately resourced for this important support mission, and we are
prepared to continue to work with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen to
ensure DOD is able to continue to provide support to this critical
humanitarian disaster response effort in the weeks and months ahead. We
appreciate the skill shown by U.S. Service personnel in response to the
Haiti disaster.
Following this hearing, as previously announced, at around noon, we
will turn to the issue of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' I would appreciate
questions on that subject being asked after Secretary Gates' statement
on the subject.
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your testimony.
Now I will turn to Senator McCain for any opening remarks he may have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
join you in welcoming the witnesses to discuss the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2011 and the 2010 QDR and its
impact on the FYDP for DOD.
Secretary Gates, I greatly appreciate that you continue to
place the highest priority of the Department on supporting the
men and women of the Armed Forces. I am consistently amazed and
heartened by the courage, commitment, and dedication of the
brave men and women who choose to answer the call to defend the
Nation. We all know they endure long, hard work under very
demanding conditions and in some cases making the ultimate
sacrifice. They in turn ask their families to endure unwelcome
separations and the burden of managing the homefront. Your
country's volunteer force and their families are a national
asset and they deserve our steadfast and united support.
Informed by the 2010 QDR, your 2011 base budget request of
$549 billion builds upon the substantial changes you outlined
in last year's budget by establishing strategic priorities and
identifying where DOD needs to spend scarce resources.
Secretary Gates, last year I supported your view that winning
the wars of today, while deterring and preparing for the
conflicts of tomorrow required a balancing of risks. I look
forward to your assessment of why this year's budget and the
QDR that it's based on entail an acceptable amount of risk
between our present and future priorities.
The 2011 overseas contingency operations (OCO) request of
$159 billion and 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion
support our men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I fully
support your efforts to use OCO and supplemental funding to
address many operational shortfalls in Afghanistan through
increased funding for ISR assets, electronic warfare
capabilities, and increasing the end strength of our Special
Operations Forces (SOF).
Your request includes significant funding for building the
Afghan security forces. I remain very concerned that we're not
on pace to achieve the end strength of 400,000 by 2013 as
recommended by General McChrystal. I'm eager to hear whether
you think your funding request will enable us to achieve that
goal.
On the issue of a 2011 withdrawal, from speaking with the
President of Pakistan to the tribal leader in Kandahar who
fought against the Russians, there's great uncertainty out
there because of the President's statement. There's great
uncertainty whether we're going to stay, and it was raised to
me by every leader that I met with, including the tribal chief
who had fought against the Russians, who looked at me and said:
``Are you going to stay or are you going to leave like you did
last time?''
Our allies and friends in the region need to be reassured
that 2011 is not the date for withdrawal and, although your
words and that of the Secretary of State have been excellent,
the President has not made that statement in a way that would
be reassuring to our allies as well as to our enemies.
Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their
families to sacrifice so much, both Congress and the
administration must be ready to make some tough funding
decisions, something we've failed miserably at in previous
years. Despite numerous calls last year for earmark reform, the
fiscal year 2010 defense appropriations bill signed into law a
bill that contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion
in unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the
alternative engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). That's
$7 billion that the Department had to eat in programs that it
didn't request or need.
This business as usual spending that we've come to accept
is unnecessary, wasteful, and it diverts precious funding from
other, more pressing military priorities.
Secretary Gates, I was encouraged in your rollout of the
budget yesterday that you laid an early marker with Congress by
indicating that if we added funds to continue the C-17 and
alternate engine for the JSF in 2011 you would recommend that
the President veto the bill. I strongly support such a
recommendation, but feel it may fall on deaf ears up here
unless that veto threat comes early, consistently, and directly
from the President.
We cannot continue to condone spending billions of dollars
on programs that the Department doesn't want or need. If the
President is really serious, if he's really serious about not
wasting billions of dollars more of the taxpayers' money, he
should also say that he will veto any appropriations bill that
comes across his desk with earmarks and pork barrel spending on
it. It has to stop.
On the F-35 JSF program, I appreciate the management
decisions you announced yesterday to replace the program
executive officer and withhold more than $600 million where
accountability required that those changes be made. As you
appropriately stated yesterday during your press conference:
``When things go wrong, people will be held accountable.'' I'd
like to see that happen in some other areas of government.
I am nonetheless concerned about your comment during the
press conference that it was clear there were more problems
with the F-35 than you were aware of when you visited the Fort
Worth plant last August. With your recently announced
management decisions, I hope the process by which you get
reliable, up to date information about important aspects of the
program when you need it has improved.
However, I am still concerned about whether the Services
will get sufficiently capable JSFs when they need them. Just a
few weeks ago, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
found that continued production concurrent with the slow
increase in flight testing over the next 2 years will commit
DOD and the Services to test, training, and deploy plans with
substantial risk. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) recently
determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy's version of the
JSF may end up being too expensive to operate, with each flight
hour flown costing about $31,000 compared with around $19,000
per flight hour for the Services' current F/A-18 Hornets and
AV-8B Harriers. I'd appreciate if you could comment on these
and potentially other issues you see facing this program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates
and Chairman Mullen today to discuss the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2011, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and its
impact on Future Years Defense Programs for the Department of Defense.
Secretary Gates, I greatly appreciate that you continue to place
the highest priority of the Department on supporting the men and women
of the U.S. Armed Forces. I am consistently amazed and heartened by the
courage, commitment, and dedication of the brave men and women who
choose to answer the call to defend our Nation. They endure long hard
work under very demanding conditions, and in some cases making the
ultimate sacrifice. They, in turn ask their families to endure
unwelcome separations and the burden of managing the homefront. Our
country's volunteer force and their families are a national asset. They
deserve our steadfast and united support.
Informed by the 2010 QDR, your 2011 base budget request of $549
billion builds upon the substantial changes you outlined in last year's
budget by establishing strategic priorities and identifying where the
Department needs to spend scarce resources. Secretary Gates, last year
I supported your view that winning the wars of today while deterring
and preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow required a balancing of
risk. I look forward to your assessment of why this year's budget, and
the QDR that it is based on, entail an acceptable amount of risk
between our present and future priorities.
Your 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request of $159
billion and 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion supports our men
and women in Iraq and Afghanistan. I fully support your efforts to use
OCO and supplemental funding to address many operational shortfalls in
Afghanistan through increased funding for intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities
and increasing the end strength of our Special Operations Forces. Your
request includes significant funding for building the Afghan security
forces. I remain concerned that we are not on pace to achieve the end
strength of 400,000 by 2013, as recommended by General McChrystal. I am
eager to hear whether you think your funding request will enable us to
achieve that goal.
Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to
sacrifice so much, both Congress and the administration must be ready
to make some tough funding decisions--something that we have failed
miserably at in previous years. Despite numerous calls last year for
earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill signed
into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in
unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the alternative engine
for the Joint Strike Fighter. That's $7 billion that the Department had
to eat in programs that it didn't request or need. This business-as-
usual spending that we have come to accept is unnecessary, wasteful and
it diverts precious funding from other more pressing military
priorities. Secretary Gates, I was encouraged in your rollout of the
budget yesterday that you laid an early marker with Congress by
indicating that if we added funds to continue the C-17 and alternate
engine for the Joint Strike Fighter in 2011, you would recommend that
the President veto the bill. I strongly support such a recommendation,
but feel it may fall on deaf ears up here unless that veto threat comes
early, consistently and directly from the President. We cannot continue
to condone spending billions of dollars on programs that the Department
doesn't want or need. If the President is serious about not wasting
billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money, then he should use every
opportunity this year to vow to veto any appropriations bill that that
is laden with pork barrel spending.
Mr. Secretary, on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, I
appreciate the management decisions you announced yesterday--to replace
the program executive officer and withhold more than $600 million--
where accountability required that those changes be made. As you
appropriately stated yesterday during your press conference, `When
things go wrong, people will be held accountable.' I am, nonetheless,
concerned about your comment during the press conference that it was
clear there were more problems with the F-35 than you were aware of
when you visited the Fort Worth plant last August. With your recently
announced management decisions, I hope the process by which you get
reliable, up-to-date information about important aspects of the Program
when you need it, has improved.
However, I am still concerned about whether the Services will get
sufficiently capable Joint Strike Fighters when they need them. Just a
few weeks ago, the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation found
that continued production concurrent with the slow increase in flight
testing over the next 2 years will commit the Department and Services
to test, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk. NAVAIR
recently determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy's version of the
Joint Strike Fighter may end up being too expensive to operate, with
each flight hour flown costing about $31,000, compared with around
$19,000 per flight hour for the Services' current F/A-18 Hornets and
AV-8B Harriers. I would appreciate it if you could comment on these and
potentially other issues you see facing this program.
Thank you Chairman Levin.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
I will put the balance of my statement in the record and if
there's part of your statement that you didn't give, of course,
that will be made part of the record, too, if you wish.
Secretary Gates, we welcome you, Admiral Mullen, and Mr.
Hale. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011.
I first want to thank you for your support of the men and
women of the United States military these many years. These
troops are part of an extraordinary generation of young
Americans who have answered their country's call. They have
fought our wars, protected our interests and allies around the
globe, and, as we have seen recently in Haiti, they have also
demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of
incomprehensible loss.
I have a brief opening statement to provide an overview of
the budget request. My submitted statement includes many more
details that I know are of interest to the committee.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, I'm going to interrupt you
at this time and do something which I know you would love us to
do, which is to approve a number of nominations. We have a
quorum present and we should take advantage of that. Forgive
the interruption. I will ask the committee now to consider 5
civilian nominations and 1,802 pending military nominations.
First, the civilian nominations of Douglas Wilson to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Malcolm Ross
O'Neil to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology; Mary Sally Matiella to be Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller;
Paul Luis Oostburg Sanz to be General Counsel of the Department
of the Navy; and Jacqueline Pfannenstiel to be Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment.
Is there a motion to report these nominations?
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye. [Chorus of ayes.]
That is approved.
Finally, I'll ask the committee to consider the 1,802
pending military nominations. They've been before the committee
the required length of time. Is there a motion?
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. Second. All in favor say aye. [Chorus of
ayes.]
Opposed, nay. [No response.]
The motion carries. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Gates. A most worthwhile interruption.
The budget requests being presented today include $549
billion for a base budget, a 3.4 percent increase over last
year, or 1.8 percent real increase after adjusting for
inflation, reflecting the administration's commitment to
modest, steady, and sustainable real growth in defense
spending. We're also requesting $159 billion in fiscal year
2011 to support OCOs, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus
$33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support
the added financial costs of the President's new approach in
Afghanistan.
The base budget request reflects these major institutional
priorities: first, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation's
commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest
strategic asset; second, rebalancing America's defense posture
by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current
conflicts while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in
the future; and third, continuing the Department's commitment
to reform how DOD does business, especially in the area of
acquisitions. Finally, the commitments made and the programs
funded in the OCO and supplemental requests demonstrate the
administration's determination to support our troops and
commanders in combat so they can accomplish their critical
missions and come home safely.
The budget continues the Department's policy of shifting
money to the base budget for enduring programs that directly
support warfighters and their families, whether on the
battlefield, recovering from wounds, or on the homefront, to
ensure that they have steady, long-term funding and
institutional support.
The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the
2010 QDR, which establishes strategic priorities and identifies
key areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR and fiscal year
2011 budget build upon the substantial changes that the
President made in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to
allocate defense dollars more wisely and reform the
Department's processes.
The fiscal year 2010 budget proposals cut, curtailed, or
ended a number of programs that were either performing poorly
or in excess of real world needs. Conversely, future-oriented
programs where the United States was relatively underinvested
were accelerated or received more funding.
The fiscal year 2011 budget submissions and QDR are
suffused with two major themes. The first is continued reform,
fundamentally changing the way this Department does business,
the priorities we set, the programs we fund, the weapons we
buy, and how we buy them. Building on the reforms of last
year's budget, the fiscal year 2011 request two additional
steps aimed at programs that were excess or performing poorly.
They include terminating the Navy EPX intelligence aircraft,
ending the Third Generation Infrastructure Surveillance
Program, cancelling the Next Generation CGX Cruiser,
terminating the Net-Enabled Command and Control Program, ending
the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)
due to cost overruns and performance concerns, completing the
C-17 program and closing the production line, as multiple
studies in recent years show that the Air Force already has
more of these aircraft than it needs, and ending the alternate
engine for the F-35 JSF, as whatever benefits might accrue are
more than offset by excess costs, complexity, and associated
risks.
I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue
building the C-17 and proceed with an alternate engine for the
F-35. So let me be very clear: I will strongly recommend that
the President veto any legislation that sustains the
unnecessary continuation of these two programs.
The budget and reviews are also shaped by a bracing dose of
realism, with regard to risk, and with regard to resources. We
have in a sober and clear-eyed way assessed risks, set
priorities, made tradeoffs, and identified requirements based
on plausible real-world threats, scenarios, and potential
adversaries.
Just one example. For years, U.S. defense planning and
requirements were based on preparing to fight two major
conventional wars at the same time, a force-sizing construct
that persisted long after it was overtaken by events. The
Department's leadership now recognizes that we must prepare for
a much broader range of security challenges on the horizon.
They range from the use of sophisticated new technologies to
deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air,
space, and cyberspace to the threat posed by non-state groups
delivering more cunning and destructive means to attack and
terrorize, scenarios that transcend the familiar contingencies
that dominated U.S. planning after the Cold War.
We have learned through painful experience that the wars we
fight are seldom the wars that we planned. As a result, the
United States needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities
with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of
conflict. This strategic reality shaped the QDR's analysis and
subsequent conclusions, which directly informed the program
decisions contained in the budget.
Before closing, I would like to offer two thoughts to
consider when assessing the U.S. investment in national
defense. First, the requests submitted this week total more
than $700 billion, a massive number to be sure. But at 4.7
percent of gross national product, it represents a
significantly smaller portion of national wealth going to
defense than was spent during most of America's previous major
wars, and the base budget represents 3.5 percent of GDP.
Second, the President recently exempted the defense budget
from spending freezes being applied to other parts of the
government. It is important to remember, however, that, as I
mentioned earlier, this Department undertook a painstaking
review of our priorities last year and as a result cut or
curtailed a number of major programs. These programs had they
been pursued to completion would have cost the American
taxpayer about $330 billion.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of
this committee again for all you have done to support our
troops and their families in light of the unprecedented demands
that have been placed upon them. I believe the choices made and
the priorities set in these budget requests reflect America's
commitment to see that our forces have the tools they need to
prevail in the wars we are in, while making the investments
necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
President's budget requests for fiscal year 2011. I first want to thank
you for your support of the men and women of the U.S. military these
many years. I know they will be uppermost in your thoughts as you
deliberate on these budget requests. Our troops are part of an
extraordinary generation of young Americans who have answered their
country's call. They have fought this country's wars, protected our
interests and allies around the globe, and, as we've seen recently in
Haiti, they have also demonstrated compassion and decency in the face
of incomprehensible loss.
The budget requests being presented today include $549 billion for
the base budget--a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or 1.8 percent
real growth after adjusting for inflation, reflecting this
administration's commitment to modest, steady, and sustainable real
growth in defense spending. We are also requesting $159 billion in
fiscal year 2011 to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),
primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus $33 billion for the remainder
of this fiscal year to support the added financial costs of the
President's new approach in Afghanistan.
The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which establishes strategic
priorities and identifies key areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR
and fiscal year 2011 budget build upon the substantial changes that the
President made in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to allocate
defense dollars more wisely and reform the department's processes.
The base budget request reflects these major institutional
priorities:

First, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation's
commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest
strategic asset;
Second, rebalancing America's defense posture by
emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current
conflicts, while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in
the future; and
Third, continuing the department's commitment to
reform how the Department of Defense (DOD) does business,
especially in the area of acquisitions.

Finally, the commitments made and programs funded in the OCO and
supplemental requests demonstrate this administration's determination
to support our troops and commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq so they
can accomplish their critical missions and return home safely.
At this point, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider when
assessing the U.S. investment in national defense:
First, the requests submitted this week total more than $700
billion--a massive number, to be sure. But, at 4.7 percent of gross
national product, it represents a significantly smaller portion of
national wealth going to defense than was spent during America's
previous major wars.
Second, the President recently exempted the defense budget from
spending freezes being applied to other parts of the government. It is
important to remember, however, that this department already undertook
a painstaking review of our programs and priorities last year, and
proposed to cut, curtail, or end a number of programs. These programs,
had they been pursued to completion, would have cost the American
taxpayer about $330 billion.
care for our all-volunteer force
The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $138.5 billion for
military pay and allowances, an increase of $3.6 billion--or 2.6
percent--over last year. This includes an increase of 1.4 percent for
military basic pay, which will keep military pay increases in line with
those in the private sector. This amount funds bonuses and other
incentives to meet recruiting and retention quality and quantity
goals--especially for our most critical skills and experience levels.
The military deserves generous pay because of the stress and danger
these jobs entail. In recent years, Congress has added 0.5 percent to
the administration's requested military pay raise--an action that adds
about $500 million a year to our budget now and in future years, and
reduces the funds available for training and equipping the force. In
this time of strong recruiting and retention, I urge Congress to
approve the full requested amount for the fiscal year 2011 military pay
raise but not to add to the request.
Wounded, Ill, and Injured
This budget supports the department's intense focus on care for our
wounded, ill, and injured military members. As I've said before, aside
from winning the wars themselves, this is my highest priority. Key
initiatives include:

Achieving a seamless transition to veteran status for
members leaving the military and increased cooperation between
the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs;
Ensuring a high standard at facilities caring for
wounded warriors, including first-rate hospitals and the Army's
Warrior Transition Units;
Enhancing case management of individuals transitioning
to civilian life--especially those needing long-term care;
Establishing a better Disability Evaluation System--to
create a simpler, faster, more consistent process for
determining which members may continue their military service
and helping them become as independent and self-supporting as
possible; and
Working with the VA to create Virtual Lifetime
Electronic Records to improve veteran care and services by
improving the availability of administrative and health
information.

The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $2.2 billion for
enduring programs for our wounded, ill, and injured. It also includes
$300 million to complete the Army's Warrior Transition complexes and
new medical facilities in the Washington, DC, capital region. The $2.2
billion for these programs is $100 million more than the fiscal year
2010 enacted amount and is more than double the fiscal year 2008 level
of $1 billion.
Military Health System
The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $50.7 billion for the Unified
Medical Budget to support the Military Health System that serves 9.5
million eligible beneficiaries. Over the past decade, U.S. health-care
costs have grown substantially, and defense health costs have been no
exception, more than doubling between fiscal year 2001 ($19 billion)
and fiscal year 2010 ($49 billion). These costs are expected to grow
from 6 percent of the department's total budget in fiscal year 2001 to
more than 10 percent in fiscal year 2015.
Military Family Support Programs
The department remains fully committed to providing assistance to
our troops and their families in light of the unprecedented demands
that have been placed on them. As the President stated in the State of
the Union Address last week, our men and women in uniform and their
families have our respect, our gratitude, and our full support. The
budget reflects the department's policy of shifting money to the base
budget for enduring programs so that they will not disappear as war
funding declines. The fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $8.1
billion for a variety of family-support programs vital to the morale
and well-being of our military members and their families--an increase
of $450 million over last year. The OCO request includes $700 million
for family support--bringing the total to $8.8 billion.
Build and Sustain Facilities
The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $18.7 billion to fund critical
military-construction and family-housing requirements, including
substantial funding to recapitalize many department schools for
children of servicemembers.
The fiscal year 2011 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) investment
funding of $2.4 billion is less than prior years because most of the
funding needed to implement the 2005 round of BRAC decisions has
already been appropriated for 24 major realignments, 24 base closures,
and 765 lesser actions--all of which must be completed by September 15,
2011, in accordance with statute.
We have requested $14.2 billion to modernize the department's
facilities; to support the recently completed growth in the Army and
Marine Corps; to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Okinawa
to Guam; and to recapitalize medical facilities and schools for
servicemembers' children.
rebalancing the force--the wars we are in
Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the
top of the institutional military's budgeting, policy, and program
priorities. We now recognize that America's ability to deal with
threats for years to come will largely depend on our performance in the
current conflicts. The fiscal year 2011 budget request took a number of
additional steps aimed at filling persistent shortfalls that have
plagued recent military efforts, especially in Afghanistan.
Rotary-Wing Aircraft
To increase these capabilities, this request includes more than
$9.6 billion for the acquisition of a variety of modern rotary-wing
aircraft, including the creation of two Army combat aviation brigades
by fiscal year 2014. The goal is to train 1,500 new Army helicopter
pilots per year by 2012.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues efforts to increase
ISR support for our fighting forces. The ISR Task Force was formed in
April 2008 to generate critical operational ISR capacity--primarily in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, the department has worked to secure
substantial funding to field and sustain ISR capabilities. In the
fiscal year 2011 budget, that includes:

$2.2 billion for procurement of Predator-class
aircraft to increase the Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) available to
deployed forces from 37 to 65 by 2013; and
Doubling procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper over the next
few years.
Electronic Warfare (EW)
The fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the QDR's call for
better EW capabilities for today's warfighters. The Navy procurement
budget includes $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $2.3 billion in
fiscal year 2012 for the addition of 36 EA-18G aircraft, with 12
procured in fiscal year 2011 and 24 in fiscal year 2012. These
resources and capabilities will help fill an imminent EW shortfall that
has been consistently highlighted by the combatant commanders as one of
their highest priorities.
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $6.3 billion for USSOCOM--
nearly 6 percent higher than in fiscal year 2010. The department plans
to call for SOF funding to increase sharply over the next several
years, including an increase of about 2,800 personnel in fiscal year
2011.
rebalancing the force--preparing for the future
The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $189 billion for total
procurement, research, and development. This investment reflects the
fact that the United States needs a broad portfolio of military
capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible
spectrum of conflict, including conventional conflict with the
technologically advanced military forces of other countries. To meet
the potential threats to our military's ability to project power, deter
aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners in environments
where access to our forces may be denied, this budget request includes
substantial funds for conventional and strategic modernization.
Tactical Aircraft
The fiscal year 2011 budget funds programs to develop and buy
superior aircraft to guarantee continued air dominance over current and
future battlefields, most importantly the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF). The fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $10.7 billion for
continued development of the F-35, and for procurement of 42 aircraft.
An additional JSF is purchased in the OCO budget. This budget reflects
a restructuring of the JSF program to stabilize its schedule and cost.
The department has also adjusted F-35 procurement quantities based on
new data on likely orders from our foreign partners and realigned
development and test schedules.
Mobility and Tanker Aircraft
The fiscal year 2011 budget continues to support development of a
new aerial refueling tanker. The KC-X, the first phase of KC-135
recapitalization, will procure 179 commercial derivative tanker
aircraft to replace roughly one-third of the current aerial refueling
tanker fleet at an estimated cost of $35 billion. Contract award is
expected in the summer of 2010 and procurement should begin in fiscal
year 2013. To support this long-range effort, $864 million has been
requested for research into the next-generation tanker.
The fiscal year 2011 budget ends production of the C-17, supports
shutdown activities for production of new aircraft, and continues the
modification of existing C-17s. With the completion of the program, the
United States will have 223 of these aircraft, more than enough to meet
current and projected requirements.
Shipbuilding
The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects the department's formulation
of a realistic, executable shipbuilding plan through the Future Years
Defense Program. Overall, the fiscal year 2011 budget includes $25.1
billion for fiscal year 2011 procurement of new ships, equipment and
research and development into future construction--including $15.7
billion for Navy shipbuilding and conversion activities. It reinforces
the ongoing transition to a naval force that can meet the needs of
today's warfighters and reduce reliance on very costly and increasingly
vulnerable large surface combatants in the future. The fiscal year 2011
request and planned out-year funding would allow the department to:

Build a new aircraft carrier every 5 years;
Shift large-deck amphibious ship production to a 5-
year build cycle to maintain a long-term force structure of
nine large-deck aviation ships to support amphibious
operations;
Stabilize near-term production quantities for the
Littoral Combat Ship and the Joint High Speed Vessel to support
irregular warfare operations;
Produce two attack submarines per year beginning in
fiscal year 2011 and continue development of a new strategic
deterrent submarine; and
Build three Mobile Landing Platform ships--one ship
per year in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year
2015.
Ground Forces Modernization
The fiscal year 2011 budget advances restructuring of the Army's
Future Combat Systems, principally through Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
modernization. The fiscal year 2011 request for BCTs is $3.2 billion,
mostly for research and development.
The fiscal year 2011 budget also supports the development of a new
ground-vehicle program to replace aging systems. The new program will
take into account the hard battlefield lessons of recent years,
especially with respect to threats posed by improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), and will include a role for the MRAP and M-ATV vehicles
that have been so important in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Space and Cyber Capabilities
Just about all of our military forces--land, sea, and air--now
depend on digital communications and the satellites and data networks
that support them. The role of space and satellites has never been more
crucial to military operations--from GPS-guided munitions and
navigation to missile defense and communications. The fiscal year 2011
budget continues to strengthen U.S. capabilities in space, with $599
million allocated to procure Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellites instead of the Transformational Satellite, which was
cancelled in the fiscal year 2010 budget.
With cheap technology and minimal investment, adversaries operating
in cyberspace can potentially inflict serious damage on our command and
control, ISR, and precision strike capabilities. The fiscal year 2011
budget continues to fund the recruiting and training of new experts in
cyber warfare begun in fiscal year 2010, and supports the stand up of a
new U.S. Cyber Command.
Ballistic Missile Defense
DOD continues to pursue missile-defense systems that can provide
real capability as soon as possible while taking maximum advantage of
new technologies. In accordance with the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, our goal is a missile-defense program that balances
capabilities and risks in order to deter aggression; project power and
protect U.S. and allied interests; and respond to warfighter
requirements.
This year's base budget request includes $9.9 billion total for
missile defense--almost $700 million more than last year, mostly for
the Missile Defense Agency.
This includes funding for:

Enhanced missile defenses for deployed forces, allies,
and partners to defend against regional threats--including
THAAD battery ground components and interceptors, as well as
the conversion of additional Aegis ships.
The ``Phased Adaptive Approach'' for missile defense:
a flexible, scalable system to respond to developing threats.
This has particular applicability to Europe, where the new
approach allows us to adapt our systems more rapidly as new
threats develop and old ones recede. In the short-term, we will
be able to provide immediate coverage and protection by
deploying current and proven systems such as the Aegis and SM-
3.
A viable homeland defense against rogue threats--
including ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
Expansion of the flight-test program to test
capabilities against medium-, intermediate-, and long-range
threats.
Investments in break-through technologies to improve
our ability to counter threats during the boost phase while
focusing on the most promising new technologies.
Nuclear Weapons
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) being released in March will
outline the policy framework for achieving the President's objectives
to reduce nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of elimination; and
maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal as long as these weapons
exist. It will also provide steps to strengthen deterrence while
reducing the role of nuclear weapons. While the NPR conclusions are
still being developed, the President's budget requests for the Defense
and Energy departments reflect several priorities already established
in our review:

Funding to sustain a nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers under the New START Treaty; and
Increased National Nuclear Security Administration
funding for infrastructure, warhead life extension, and science
and technology.

Details of these and other elements of our nuclear posture will be
presented in the final NPR report in March.
Building Partner Capacity
In a world where arguably the most likely and lethal threats will
emanate from failed and fractured states, building the security
capacity of partners has emerged as a key capability--one that reduces
the need for direct U.S. military intervention, with all of its
attendant political, financial, and human costs. To provide more
resources, predictability, and agility to this important mission, the
department will seek an increase in Global Train and Equip authority in
the fiscal year 2011 budget to $500 million--authority that includes
coalition activities to support current operations.
reforming how the department of defense does business
President Obama is committed to ending unneeded and troubled
programs and achieving a better balance between capabilities needed to
succeed in current conflicts and capabilities needed to prepare for the
conflicts we are most likely to see in the future.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request builds on the reforms of last
year by ending a number of unneeded or troubled programs:

Next Generation Cruiser CG(X): Cancelled due to
concerns about costs and utility in future combat scenarios.
Any resulting capability gap will be filled by an enhanced Navy
destroyer program.
Navy Intelligence Aircraft EP(X): This Navy-planned
EP-3 replacement was cancelled because of cost and its
redundancy with other technologies and systems.
Third Generation Infrared Surveillance: This sensor
system was cancelled because there are better alternatives.
The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
(DIMHRS): DIMHRS has been in development for over 10 years and
cost $500 million--with little to show and limited prospects.
Net Enabled Command and Control: This joint program
has had cost overruns and performance shortfalls.
JSF Alternate Engine
One of the tougher decisions we faced during this budget process
was whether or not to formally add the alternate engine to the Joint
Strike Fighter program. It has been the position of this department
since 2007 that adding a second JSF engine was unnecessary and too
costly.
Over the past year, as part of our thorough review of the overall
JSF program, we took a fresh look to determine whether the second
engine option had reached a point in funding and development that
supported a different conclusion. We considered all aspects of this
question and, in the end, concluded that the facts and analysis simply
do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program. There
are several rationales for this conclusion:
First, even after factoring in Congress' additional funding, the
engine would still require a further investment of $2.5 billion over
the next 5 years.
Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings
generated through competition. Even optimistic analytical models
produce essentially a break-even scenario.
Third, the solution to understandable concern over the performance
of the Pratt & Whitney program is not to spend yet more money to add a
second engine. The answer is to get the first engine on track. Further,
the alternate engine program is 3 to 4 years behind in development
compared to the current program, and there is no guarantee that a
second program would not face the same challenges as the current
effort.
Fourth, split or shared buys of items, particularly from only two
sources, do not historically produce competitive behavior since both
vendors are assured some share of the purchase. Another reality is that
the JSF is designed to support a wide diversity of military customers,
including the Navy, Marine Corps, and overseas buyers, many of whom are
unable or unwilling to purchase from two engine manufacturers.
For all these reasons, we are firm in our view that the interests
of the taxpayers, our military, our partner nations, and the integrity
of the JSF program are best served by not pursuing a second engine.
I believe most proponents of this program are motivated by the
genuine belief that a second engine is the right thing to do. I look
forward to engaging Congress in this discussion and sharing with them
our facts and analysis. However, we have reached a critical point in
this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the JSF is
unnecessary, wasteful, and simply diverts precious modernization funds
from other more pressing priorities. Accordingly, should Congress add
more funds to continue this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend
that the President veto such legislation.
C-17
The fiscal year 2011 request completes the C-17 program and begins
shutting down the production line. At present, we have 194 C-17s (plus
111 C-5s) in our strategic airlift fleet. By the end of this fiscal
year, the department will have procured 223.
Three department studies completed over the past 5 years have
concluded that the U.S. military has more than enough strategic airlift
capacity, and that additional C-17s are not required. Some factors to
consider:

In 2004, the Air Force Fleet Viability board
determined that the fleet of C-5As--the oldest variant--will
remain viable until at least 2025. The Air Force and the
manufacturer believe that the C-5 fleet will remain viable
until 2040. Ongoing modernization and refurbishment efforts are
intended to increase the reliability, availability, and
maintainability of the C-5 fleet;
Despite the demands of the current military campaigns,
the existing C-17 fleet is not being ``burned up.'' With the
exception of 2003--when there were only 111 aircraft in the
fleet that were being surged to begin the Iraq war--the annual
use of the C-17 inventory has been within program limits; and
While it is true that the C-17 can land places where
the C-5 cannot, of the 200,000 landings made by C-17s since
1997, less than 4 percent were in places that were not
accessible to the C-5. In summary, for these and other reasons,
the department has concluded that the current C-17 is more than
sufficient to meet the military's airlift needs. Should
Congress add funds to continue this program, I will strongly
recommend a presidential veto.
Acquisitions
The department is implementing initiatives that will increase the
numbers and capabilities of the acquisition workforce, improve funding
stability, enhance the source-selection process, and improve contract
execution. Our intent is to provide the warfighter with world-class
capability while being good stewards of taxpayer dollars.
To operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by
an appropriately-sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the
right skills and training to perform their jobs. To address these
personnel deficiencies, DOD will increase the number of acquisition
personnel by 20,000 positions--from about 127,000 in fiscal year 2010
to about 147,000 by fiscal year 2015. We will be making significant
increases in training and retention programs in order to bolster the
capability and size of the acquisition workforce.
Civilian Workforce
The fiscal year 2011 budget funds a pay raise of 1.4 percent for
DOD civilians--the same as the military pay raise. The request includes
funding to transition out of the National Security Personnel System
(NSPS)--as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010.
About 225,000 DOD employees are covered by NSPS. These employees
must convert to a successor statutory personnel system. The fiscal year
2011 budget includes $23 million to implement NSPS transition and $239
million for estimated higher civilian pay for employees transitioning
out of NSPS.
The request supports the DOD plan, announced last year, to grow its
civilian workforce by in-sourcing--replacing contractors with DOD
civilian employees. DOD is on track to reduce the number of support
service contractors from the current 39 percent of our workforce to the
pre-2001 level of 26 percent, and replace them with full-time
government employees. DOD will hire as many as 13,400 new civil
servants in fiscal year 2010, and another 6,000 in fiscal year 2011, to
replace contractors and up to 33,400 new civil servants in place of
contractors over the next 5 years. This includes 2,500 acquisition
personnel in fiscal year 2010 and 10,000 through fiscal year 2014.
fiscal year 2010 supplemental request
As the President stated, the goal of the United States in
Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda
and to prevent its resurgence in both countries. The international
military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this
overarching goal. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if
not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates
operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I believe the strategy
announced by the President represents our best opportunity to achieve
our objectives in a part of the world so critical to America's
security.
The fiscal year 2010 supplemental requests $33.0 billion to support
the President's buildup of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for the rest of
this fiscal year and fund other related requirements, including $1
billion for Iraqi security forces. DOD urges Congress to approve this
supplemental by the spring to prevent disruption of funding for our
troops in the field.
The fiscal year 2010 supplemental includes $19.0 billion to support
an average troop level in Afghanistan of 84,000 U.S. troops--16,000
higher than the 68,000 assumed in the enacted fiscal year 2010 budget.
Troop levels are expected to reach 98,000 by September 30, 2010. The
additional troops will consist of:

Two Army counterinsurgency BCTs;
An Army Training BCT;
A USMC Regimental Combat Team; and
Enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams.

The supplemental also includes $1.1 billion--on top of the $11.3
billion already enacted--to field and sustain critically important
lifesaving MRAPs and M-ATVs for troops already there and for the
additional forces being deployed this fiscal year.
fiscal year 2011 overseas contingency operations
To fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in fiscal year
2011, we are requesting $159.3 billion, comprised of these major
categories:

Operations ($89.4 billion): Incremental pay for
deployed troops, subsistence, cost of mobilizing Reserve
Component personnel, and temporary wartime end-strength
allowances.
Force Protection ($12.0 billion): Body armor,
protection equipment, and armored vehicles to protect forces--
including the rapid deployment and sustainment of MRAPs and M-
ATVs.
IED Defeat ($3.3 billion): To develop, procure, and
field measures to defeat improvised explosive devices
threatening U.S. and coalition forces.
Military Intelligence ($7.0 billion): To enhance U.S.
intelligence capabilities and operations including ISR.
Afghan Security Forces ($11.6 billion): To build and
support military and police forces capable of conducting
independent operations and providing for Afghanistan's long-
term security.
Iraqi Security Forces ($2.0 billion): To continue
building and sustaining Iraq's efforts to defend its people and
protect its institutions as the United States removes troops by
the end of 2011.
Coalition Support ($2.0 billion): Reimbursements and
logistical sustainment for key cooperating nations supporting
U.S. military operations.
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) ($1.3
billion): To provide flexible funds for commanders in the field
to finance urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs.
Reconstitution/Reset ($21.3 billion): To fund the
replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment and
munitions that have been consumed, destroyed, or damaged due to
ongoing combat operations. This request includes funding to
procure one Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to replace the combat
loss of an F-15.
Military Construction ($1.2 billion): To expand the
logistical backbone and operational foundation for our fighting
forces.
Temporary Military End Strength ($2.6 billion): To
support temporary end-strength increases in the Army and Navy
for ongoing military operations.
Non-DOD Classified Programs ($5.6 billion): To fund
non-DOD classified activities that support ongoing military
operations--the President's counterterrorism strategy in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the drawdown of U.S. forces in
Iraq.
Iraq Force Levels
This request supports the President's goal of a responsible
drawdown of U.S. forces and transfer to full Iraqi responsibility and
control. Troop levels in Iraq are projected to decrease to 50,000 by
August 31, 2010. Further reductions will occur in accordance with the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The projected forces levels would be:

Six Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) by August
31, 2010.
Six AABs for the first part of fiscal year 2011,
decreasing to approximately four AABs (approximately 35,000
personnel) in Iraq by the end of fiscal year 2011.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this committee for
all that you have done to support our troops and their families. I
believe the choices made and priorities set in these budget requests
reflect America's commitment to see that our forces have the tools they
need to prevail in the wars we are in while making the investments
necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon.
Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen.

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of this committee: Thank you for the chance to appear
before you and discuss the state of our military as well as the
President's fiscal year 2011 defense budget submission. I also
thank you all for the extraordinary support you provide each
and every day to our men and women in uniform as well as their
families. That they are well equipped, well trained, well paid,
and enjoy the finest medical care anywhere in the world is
testament in no small part to your dedication and stewardship.
I've seen many of you in the war zone, in hospitals, and at
bases all over this country. So have our troops. They know you
care. Just as critically, they know their fellow citizens care.
All they want right now is guidance on the mission before them
and the tools to accomplish it. That's why I'm here today to
speak on their behalf about the guidance they are getting from
this Department and to secure your continued support for the
tools we want to give them.
Secretary Gates has already walked you through the major
components of the QDR and the President's fiscal year 2011
defense budget submission, both of which, when combined with
the new BMDR and our OCOs fund request, build upon the reform
effort of last year and represent as comprehensive a look at
the state of our military as I have seen in my experience.
I will not endeavor to repeat his excellent summation and I
would ask you to accept without further comment my endorsement
of the findings contained in each of these documents. Let me
leave you rather with three overarching things to consider as
you prepare to discuss these issues today and as you prepare to
debate this budget request in the future.
First, there is a real sense of urgency here. We have well
over 200,000 troops deployed in harm's way right now and that
number includes only those in Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom. Tens of thousands more are meeting our
security commitments elsewhere around the globe and many of
those missions are no less dangerous, certainly no less
significant.
I am sure you have stayed abreast of our relief efforts in
Haiti, where more than 20,000 of your soldiers, sailors,
marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen are pitching in feverishly
to help alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people. It is
truly an interagency and international mission and these troops
are blending in beautifully, doing what is required, where and
when it is required, to support the Government of Haiti, USAID,
and the U.N. mission there.
We also continue to do what is required to win the wars we
fight, and the one that needs fighting the most right now is in
Afghanistan. You've seen the reports and you know the
situation. The Taliban have a growing influence in most of
Afghanistan's provinces and the border area between that
country and Pakistan remains the epicenter of global terrorism.
You no doubt followed with great interest the development of
the President's strategy to deal with this threat, a strategy
that in my view rightly makes the Afghan people the center of
gravity and the defeat of al Qaeda the primary goal.
We have already moved over 4,500 troops to Afghanistan and
expect that about 18,000 of the President's December 1st
commitment will be there by late spring. The remainder of the
30,000 will arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and
early fall, making a major contribution to reversing the
Taliban momentum in 2010. Indeed, by the middle of this year
Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the first time since 2003 as
the location with the most deployed American forces.
Right now, the Taliban believe they're willing. Eighteen
months from now, if we've executed our strategy, we'll know
they aren't, and they'll know that they can't.
Getting there will demand discipline and hard work. It will
require ever more cooperation with Pakistan, and it will most
assuredly demand more sacrifice and more bloodshed. But the
stakes are far too high for failure. That's why we're asking
you to fully fund our fiscal year 2010 supplemental and the
fiscal year 2011 OCOs request. It's why we want a 6 percent
increase for Special Operations Command. It's why we need your
support to develop and field a Next Generation Ground Combat
Vehicle, to allow us to grow two more Army combat aviation
brigades, and to continue rotary wing production, including
nearly $3 billion for the V-22 Osprey program.
In keeping with the Secretary's strong emphasis on ISR, an
emphasis more than justified by our long experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we are asking for more capability in unmanned
aircraft and ground-based collection systems, including nearly
$3 billion to double the procurement rate of the MQ-9 Reaper by
fiscal year 2012.
Our future security is greatly imperiled if we do not win
the wars we are in. As the QDR makes clear, the outcome of
today's conflicts will shape the global security environment
for decades to come. I'm very comfortable that we can and will
finish well in Iraq, remaining on pace, despite a spate of
recent violence to draw down American forces to roughly 50,000,
ending our combat mission there, and transitioning to an advise
and assist role.
But without your continued support, we will not be able to
show the meaningful progress in Afghanistan that the Commander
in Chief has ordered, the American people expect, and the
Afghan people so desperately need. This is no mission of mercy.
This is the place from which we were attacked in 2001, the
place from which all--from which al Qaeda still plots and
plans. The security of a great nation, ours and theirs, rests
not on sentiment or good intentions, but on what ought to be a
cold and unfeeling appraisal of self-interest and an equally
cold and unfeeling pursuit of the tools to protect that
interest, ours and theirs.
That leads me to the second thing I'd like to consider:
proper balance. Winning our current wars means investment in
our hard-won irregular warfare expertise, a core competency
that should be institutionalized and supported in the coming
years, and we are certainly moving in that direction. But we
must also maintain conventional advantages. We still face
traditional threats from regional powers who possess robust
regular and in some cases nuclear capabilities. These cannot be
ignored. The freedom to conduct operations in support of joint,
allied, and coalition efforts, assuring access and projecting
combat power, can only be preserved through enduring
warfighting competencies.
In the air, this means sufficient strike aircraft and
munitions capable of assuring air superiority. At sea, it means
having enough ships and enough sailors to stay engaged globally
and keep the sea lanes open. On the ground, it means
accelerating the modernization of our combat brigades and
regiments. On the whole, it means never having to fight a fair
fight.
Thus, the President's budget request will buy us another 42
F-35s. It will maintain a healthy bomber industrial base and it
will fund development of a prompt global strike system, as well
as efforts to upgrade our B-2s and B-52s.
For ship construction, the spending plan totals some $18
billion, procuring 10 new ships in 2011, including 2 Arleigh
Burke destroyers, 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2 Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs), and a brand-new Amphibious Assault Ship.
It puts the Navy on track to maintain aircraft carrier
production on a 5-year build cycle, resulting in a long-term
force structure of 10 carriers by 2040.
Our budget request also seeks $10 billion for ballistic
missile defense programs, including $8.4 billion for the
Missile Defense Agency, and it develops ample resources to
improving our cyber defense capabilities. Again, it's about
balance, it's about deterring and winning the big and the small
wars, the conventional and the unconventional--two challenges,
one military.
But where balance is probably most needed is in the
programs and policies concerning our most important resource,
our people. That's my final point. This QDR and this budget
builds upon superb support you and DOD have provided our troops
and their families for much of the last 8 years. Stretched and
strained by nearly constant combat, many of them on their
fifth, sixth, and seventh deployments, our men and women are
without question, and almost inexplicably, the most resilient
and battle-ready in our history.
On the one hand, we keep turning away potential recruits,
so good is our retention and so attractive our career
opportunities. On the other hand, we keep seeing an alarming
rise in suicides, mental problems, prescription drug
addictions, and mental health problems. Deborah and I meet
regularly with young troops and their spouses and, though proud
of the difference they know they are making, they are tired.
Quite frankly, many of them are worried about their futures,
their children.
So you will see in this budget nearly $9 billion for family
support and advocacy programs. You will see child care and
youth programs increased by $87 million over last year, and you
will see a boost in warfighter and family services, to include
counseling, to the tune of $37 million. Military spouse
employment will get a $2 million plus-up and we will increase
the budget to $2.2 billion for wounded, ill, and injured
members. In fact, the health care funding level for fiscal year
2011 is projected to provide high-quality care for 9.5 million
eligible beneficiaries.
Lastly, we are pushing to dramatically increase the number
of mental health professionals on staff and advance our
research in TBIs and post-traumatic stress. We know the strain
of frequent deployments causes many problems, but we won't yet
fully understand how--we don't yet fully understand how or to
what extent.
So even as we work hard to increase dwell time, aided in
part by the additional temporary end strength you approved last
year for the Army, we will work equally hard to decrease the
stress of modern military service. Indeed, I believe over time
when these wars are behind us we will need to look closely at
the competing fiscal pressures that will dominate discussions
of proper end strength and weapons systems. A force well suited
for long-term challenges and not necessarily married to any
current force planning construct will be vital to our national
security.
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you again
for your time and for the longstanding support of this
committee to the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. They
and their families are the best I have ever seen. On their
behalf, I stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee; it is my privilege to report on the posture of the U.S.
Armed Forces.
I begin by thanking you for your support of our service men and
women, their families, and the communities that do so much to help
them. We can never repay them for their sacrifices, but we can support
their efforts. As leaders, we necessarily debate the best course of
action to secure our Nation in a dangerous world. But our service men
and women do not hesitate. When the decision is made, they go where
they are needed most, where dangers must be confronted and adversaries
defeated. I'm humbled as I visit them around the world, defending our
Nation in very trying conditions. They care deeply for this country,
and they care most that they have the Nation's clear backing. The
support of Congress and the American people remain essential to their
strength and resolve. I am grateful for your unwavering recognition of
the service of our forces and their families.
Today's Armed Forces are battle-hardened, capable, and ready to
accomplish the Nation's missions. They are the most combat experienced
yet most compassionate force we have ever fielded, and continue to
learn and adapt in ways that are truly remarkable. They are the best I
have ever seen. I thank the committee for taking the time to understand
the stresses, strains and concerns of our servicemembers. Your
continuing legislative support of our Armed Forces makes all the
difference.
key developments
Over this past year, our wartime focus has shifted to Afghanistan
and Pakistan. As I have testified before Congress on many occasions,
the threats to our national security from al Qaeda and affiliated
movements based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain real and
persistent. We require a stable and reasonably secure Afghanistan and
Pakistan--inhospitable to al Qaeda's senior leadership, capable of self
defense against internal extremist threats, and contributors to
regional stability.
Our increasing focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan confirmed the
border region to be al Qaeda's center of gravity. It also showed the
situation to be more dire than previously understood. The Afghan-
Taliban's post-2005 resurgence produced a widespread paramilitary,
shadow government and extra-judicial presence in a majority of
Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistan
Taliban) showed itself to be a bold and audacious enemy of the
Pakistani people, ruthlessly seizing control of Swat in late spring.
Nine Pakistani military operations against the Taliban that began last
March have reversed their territorial gains. Throughout this year, we
have constantly and carefully reviewed our objectives for the region. I
concur completely with the President's strategy, and believe we have
now matched the right strategy with the required resources. The
decision to authorize an additional 21,500 American forces into
Afghanistan in early 2009, followed by the President's commitment of
additional forces in December set conditions to reverse Afghan-Taliban
gains. It will also enable the Government of Afghanistan to build the
security and governance necessary to eliminate the insurgency as a
threat. Setbacks marked much of 2009, but with a new leadership team,
appropriate resources, improved organization, and a better strategy, we
are confident of success against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Success will
not come easily or swiftly, but we will succeed. The hardest work to
achieve our regional aims remains ahead of us, especially in 2010-2011.
Al Qaeda's central leadership has suffered significant losses over
the past several years. Though its operational capacity has declined,
al Qaeda's senior leaders remain committed to catastrophic terrorist
attacks against the United States and our allies. Actions in the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, in Iraq, and elsewhere have met with
marked success. That said, al Qaeda successfully sought new approaches
to plot attacks. The disrupted terrorist plot against New York City was
planned in al Qaeda's Pakistani safe haven and intercepted in Denver.
The failed Christmas Day bombing attempt over Detroit was crafted by
and ordered from those in Yemen's growing safe havens. Both incidents
demonstrate the resolve of al Qaeda and its ever-evolving strategy.
While the danger remains real, like-minded governments and people
around the world--especially those in the Muslim community--
increasingly reject al Qaeda, its affiliates and what they stand for.
Most want a brighter future for their children and grandchildren, not
al Qaeda's endless war and intolerance. They see daily evidence that al
Qaeda and its affiliates deliberately target and kill thousands of
innocent Muslims in cold blood. They know al Qaeda continues a ruthless
and deadly campaign against the people of Islam in Iraq, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Indonesia, Turkey, and elsewhere.
Continued progress against violent extremism will require enhanced, but
prudent, partnerships with key governments and movements, including
consistent efforts to counter al Qaeda's bankrupt message.
The behavior of the Iranian Government is of grave and growing
concern. Tehran's leadership remains on a trajectory to acquire a
nuclear capability, in defiance of international demands and despite
widespread condemnation. Iran's government continues to support
international terrorist organizations, and pursues a coercive and
confrontational foreign policy. These efforts exist alongside some of
the greatest internal unrest Iran has faced since the Islamic
Revolution in 1979. These events and conditions risk further
destabilizing an already unstable region.
The unpredictable has also galvanized our military, requiring a
significant force commitment in Haiti, making it one of our most
significant humanitarian missions in history. As of January 31, nearly
20,000 American troops are in direct support of the Government of
Haiti, the United Nations, USAID and supporting American and
international aid agencies. From port openings, to security and
distribution of supplies, U.S. Southern Command's military Joint Task
Force has delivered over 1.6 million bottles of water, 67,000 meals and
56,000 pieces of medical supplies to Haiti's earthquake survivors.
Military medical teams also supplement the U.S. Health and Human
Services, and have already have seen over 2,800 patients and performed
nearly 100 surgeries. We are committed to this assistance until the
situation on the ground stabilizes.
Several policy initiatives over the past year have provided the
military with new direction. President Obama's June speech in Cairo set
the stage for a new relationship between the United States and more
than a billion people across the Muslim world. Throughout 2009, this
Congress supported the rapid and necessary deployment of more forces to
Afghanistan. We also began negotiations with Russia for a Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty follow-on treaty, which will reduce nuclear
weapons stockpiles while maintaining U.S. deterrence. As mandated by
Congress, we have reviewed current and future threats and developed
appropriate strategies in the Quadrennial Defense Review. We look
forward to working with Congress to forge a common understanding of the
threats our Nation faces, and how best to counter them.
Key alliances continue to matter greatly in our global security
efforts. Our North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and other
non-NATO partners expanded support in Afghanistan over the past year.
We now work there with 43 countries and nearly 40,000 international
troops. Although the world avoided a widespread economic depression in
2009, many of our partners were financially challenged and may spend
less on combined security and stabilization efforts. Other critical
allies faced internal considerations that could adversely affect U.S.
and regional security interests if not managed closely. Our close
alliance with Japan, in particular, suffered strain around basing
rights in Okinawa. I am confident we will work through these and other
issues, but it is a reminder that even our strongest allies cannot be
taken for granted.
Against this backdrop, the strategic priorities for the military
remain unchanged from my last annual testimony before Congress:
defending our interests in the broader Middle East and South/Central
Asia; ensuring the health of the Force, and balancing global strategic
risk. With your ongoing help and support, we continue to address each
of these priorities.
defend our interests in the broader middle east and south/central asia
The Broader Middle East and South/Central Asia, remains the most
dangerous region of the world.
Our main effort within the region has changed. The Government of
Iraq is taking firm control of its own security. We have shifted our
priority to Afghanistan and Pakistan, long under-resourced in many
ways. That shift in focus will take the movement of some quarter of a
million troops and their equipment in and out of the Central Command
theater over the next several months. This is a herculean logistics
effort. By the middle of 2010, Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the
first time since 2003 as our location with the most deployed American
forces.
Despite this surge, the security situation in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan remains serious. The Afghan-Taliban have established shadow
governments--featuring parallel judicial, taxation and local security/
intimidation systems--in a clear majority of Afghanistan's 34
provinces. Attacks by the Taliban have become far more numerous and
more sophisticated. We are now establishing conditions--with military
forces and expanded civilian agency presence--to reverse the Taliban's
momentum. Yet we face both a resilient Taliban insurgency and an Afghan
public skeptical of their government's good will, capacity, and
capability.
As of late January 2010, we have already moved nearly 4,500 troops,
and expect that 18,000 of the President's December 1st commitment will
be in country by late spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will arrive
as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall, making a major
contribution to reversing Taliban momentum in 2010.
These forces are joining some 68,000 U.S. forces and more than
30,000 coalition forces already in Afghanistan--all of which have
undertaken a fundamental shift in how they are being employed across
the country. Our troops are now focused on protecting key population
centers--separating them from the intimidation and influence of the
Taliban. Simultaneously, they are training and partnering with Afghan
security forces to enable Afghans to assume lead security for their own
country as soon as possible. The next 12-18 months must be the time to
reverse insurgent momentum and assess partnership progress.
The brave men and women we charge to implement this fundamental
shift in Afghanistan security strategy need the strong support of this
Congress. We need your assistance in key areas like funding for Afghan
National Security Forces, who will ultimately bring about success and
security. In the short term, the Commander's Emergency Response Program
is needed to adequately protect the population, and enhanced special
construction authorities and equipment procurement accounts will be
critical to putting enough force on the ground to make a difference.
The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter
of global terrorism. This is where al Qaeda plans terrorist attacks
against the United States and our partners--and from where the Taliban
leadership targets coalition troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan's ongoing
military operations against extremists in these areas are critical to
preventing al Qaeda and associated groups from gaining ground.
In Pakistan, the extremist threat, a fractious political system,
economic weakness and longstanding tensions with India continue to
threaten stability. We are working to rebuild our relationship with
Pakistan and re-establish trust lost between our two countries. We aim
to demonstrate to Pakistan--in both our words and our actions--that we
desire a long-term relationship. Our recent concerns with Pakistan's
approach to U.S. visa requests is further testimony to the challenges
of the relationship; and, it will affect increased capacity for
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, to include support for
development projects. Nevertheless, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency
Fund and the Coalition Support Funds earmarked for Pakistan remain
essential components of our support to this critical ally. I urge you
to continue them. Enhanced contact and engagement between Pakistan and
the United States is a critical component of a maturing, long-term
partnership. Thus, we are focusing on expanded military education
exchange programs, joint training opportunities and especially Foreign
Military Sales and Financing. The budget before you requests additional
funds for these critical partnership endeavors.
South Asian security tensions and political dynamics significantly
impact our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The longstanding
animosity and mistrust between Pakistan and India complicates regional
efforts. Yet India and Pakistan must both be our partners for the long
term. Bilateral military relationships are an essential component in a
wide array of cooperative activities. We must recognize this and
address it as part of our policy. While we acknowledge the sovereign
right of India and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we
must demonstrate our desire for continued and long-term partnership
with each, and offer our help to improve confidence and understanding
between them in a manner that builds long-term stability across the
wider region of South Asia. As part of our long-term regional approach,
we should welcome all steps these important nations take to regenerate
their `back channel' process on Kashmir.
While Afghanistan and Pakistan remain the critical terrain, we must
remain vigilant in denying al Qaeda unfettered physical safe havens
elsewhere across the Broader Middle East and South Asia, including
Northern and Eastern Africa. These efforts will not require tens of
thousands of American troops. Instead, we can work quietly and
persistently with regional allies and Coalition partners to deny al
Qaeda territory from which to plot, train, and project global terror
operations. Similarly, we continue to undertake collaborative,
supporting efforts with like-minded governments across the broader
Middle East. We now work to help the Yemeni government build the
information base and the military capacity necessary to combat the al
Qaeda threat within its borders. We applaud Yemeni efforts to confront
al Qaeda operatives, and continue to offer Sana'a the support necessary
to achieve this aim. We have worked with the concerned neighbors of
Somalia to contain the worst aims and objectives of the Islamic Courts
Union and al Shabaab. This must continue. In these areas--as well as
others including Indonesia and the Philippines--our military engages
with willing partners in a manner detrimental to al Qaeda's
aspirations. We undertake these partnerships in conjunction with those
from American intelligence, diplomatic and economic organizations. I
must stress that in today's environment, training and equipping partner
security forces to defend and protect their own territory and coastal
waters is a core military mission. We appreciate Congress' continuing
support for these important undertakings.
The Iranian Government continues to be a destabilizing force in the
region. The government's strategic intent appears unchanged--its
leaders continue on a course to eventually develop and deploy nuclear
weapons. This outcome could spark a regional arms race or worse. It
will be profoundly destabilizing to the region, with far-ranging
consequences that we cannot fully predict. Tehran also continues to
provide a range of support to militant proxy organizations, including
Hamas and Hezbollah, fomenting instability outside its borders. Its
increasingly reckless nuclear and foreign policy agenda is now playing
out against the backdrop of a shrinking economy and a growing rift
between the Iranian Government and its people. I remain convinced that
exhaustive--and if necessary coercive--diplomacy with Iran remains the
preferred path to prevent these grave outcomes. To this extent, the
Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and I support all efforts to steer
the Government of Iran off of its hazardous course. However, as with
any potential threats to our national security, we will have military
options ready for the President, should he call for them.
Iraq continues to progress, although more is needed. U.S.
partnership with Iraqi security forces has been fundamental to this
progress since 2005. Last year's level of violence was the lowest since
2003, testifying to the success of our approach. Al Qaeda is still
present and has carried out a few large-scale attacks. But, Iraqi
Security Forces and government leaders responded to them in a
restrained, professional, and relatively apolitical manner. Upcoming
elections will not be free from tension. However, I believe Iraqis are
now more concerned about economic growth than domestic security
threats. Credible elections are important. Foreign direct investment
and expanded political engagement by other regional powers are also
important as more diplomatic and economic progress will spotlight
Iraq's return to the world stage as a sovereign nation.
U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) remains on track to draw down American
forces to roughly 50,000 and end our combat mission by August 31, 2010.
Our security partnership will then shift to training, advising, and
supporting Iraqi security forces. More broadly, the U.S. military will
transition from a supported to a supporting effort in Iraq as we
normalize relations. The State Department will increasingly be the face
of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The U.S. military will strongly support their
leadership. We request continuing congressional support for the Iraqi
Forces Fund and for the Equipment Transfer Provision of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. These transfers are a
critical component America's transition to a limited, but reliable
partner in Iraq's assumption of a responsible and Baghdad-led security
future.
health of the force
Our Nation's security is founded upon a well-trained, well-equipped
All-Volunteer Force. We must care for our people and their families,
reset and reconstitute our weapon systems, and take on new initiatives
that increase wartime effectiveness. Care for our People
Our service men and women, their families, and their communities
are the bedrock of our Armed Forces. Their health, resilience, and
well-being are at the heart of every decision I make. Frankly,
investing in our people remains the single greatest guarantee of a
strong military. Competitive pay, selective bonuses, expanded access to
mental health care, continued health benefits for tens of thousands of
our Wounded Warriors--those with seen and unseen wounds--and their
families are critical to this investment.
Our military families and communities continue to play a unique and
growing role in our national security fabric, one not seen in more than
a generation. They support us and sustain us in ways we do not yet
fully understand. They deserve the admiration and support of a grateful
nation. I applaud the efforts of this body's Military Family Caucus,
and encourage significant attention and funding for their programs of
greatest concern. My conversations with spouses and children around the
world tell me these concerns center on caring for those affected by
these wars, child care, education, health and deployment issues.
We remain competitive in attracting the country's best talent. For
the first time in the history of the All-Volunteer Force, the Active
Duty, Guard, and Reserve components all exceeded annual recruiting
goals for 2009. This success was reflected in the quality of our
recruits as well as their numbers. Ninety-six percent of our accessions
earned a high school diploma or better. Each Service also met or
exceeded its 2009 retention goals. Our ability to recruit and retain
underscores the fact that this is the best military I have seen in my
42-year career. While competitive pay is a critical factor in this
success, it does not stand alone. Other critical `people' programs
supported by Congress--like the new GI Bill, adequate housing, access
to quality schooling for military children, and attractive family
support centers--come together to make the harsh burdens of military
life acceptable.
We must not forget the challenges that this excellent All-Volunteer
Force faces every day. More than 8 years of wartime operations have
come at a cost. Most Army brigade combat teams are preparing for their
fourth major deployment since September 11, with some of them preparing
for their fifth--unprecedented in our history. The Marines Corps is in
the same boat--their deployments are shorter but more frequent, and
their pace is grueling. Our people spend less time at home, and this
shorter dwell time between deployments does not allow for respite or
for training along the entire spectrum of military operations. Our
irregular warfare expertise--hard won over the last 8 years--has come
at a price. Conventional warfighting skills have atrophied and will
require attention. Yet this overdue attention will have to wait. The
gains we anticipate from the coming draw-down in Iraq will be absorbed
by our necessary efforts in Afghanistan for at least 2 more years.
Resetting the force requires significant effort and sustained
commitment now and post-conflict. We will continue to rely heavily on
our Navy and our Air Force.
Dwell time--the ratio of time deployed to time home--remains a
concern, and one we must manage closely this year and into 2011. Dwell
time for the Army is at 1:1.2 and the Marine Corps is slightly better
at 1:1.5. We will not see significant dwell time improvements across
all Services until 2012. Deployment rates for Special Operations Forces
(SOF) and other low-density, high-demand specialties also remain very
high. While our force is strong and resilient, these trends cannot
continue indefinitely.
The challenges remain significant, but are manageable thanks to the
support of Congress for increased end-strengths in the Army and Marine
Corps. We are only now starting to feel the positive impact from these
2007-authorized increases in the baseline force--stabilizing deployment
rates and dwell times. Coupled with the additional temporary increase
of 22,000 troops within the Army, Congressional support for our wartime
military manning needs has been critical.
The stresses of protracted war extend beyond the deployments
themselves. Our number of dead and wounded continues to rise, as does
the strain on their families and their communities. Other social costs
of war--divorce, domestic violence, depression, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome--are unacceptably high and continue to increase. We
have much more to do.
Suicide deserves special attention. Despite our best efforts, 2009
witnessed a record level of suicides, with increases in both the Active
and Reserve components. We have not begun to study suicides among
family members and dependents. While there is not one cause for
increased servicemember suicides, we know enough to be certain that
better prevention training programs for leadership, for at-risk
servicemembers, and robust funding and attention toward sober study of
the problem are absolutely necessary.
We should provide a lifetime of support to our veterans. I urge you
to continue funding the programs supporting those that have sacrificed
so much, including those aimed to reduce veteran homelessness and that
focus on rural health care options. The demands on our active and
veterans care services will continue to grow, and require the attention
found in this budget. Yet we must conceive of Wounded Warrior Support
in a manner that goes beyond the traditional institutions. Public,
private, and individual sources of help represent a ``sea of goodwill''
towards our veterans. Our focus must be more on commitment than
compensation; and more attuned to transition and ability than upon
disability. Our veterans want the opportunity to continue to serve, and
we should enable that opportunity.
Reset and Reconstitute
My concerns about the health of our force go beyond our people. Our
systems and capabilities are under extraordinary stress as well. The
high pace of operations is consuming our capital equipment much faster
than programmed. The Air Force and Navy have been essentially
performing non-stop, global operations for 19 years, since Operation
Desert Storm. The Army and Marine Corps have had the majority of their
combat forces and equipment in the combat theater of operations for
nearly 6 years. The unforgiving terrain of Afghanistan and Iraq causes
extensive wear and tear, especially on our ground vehicles,
helicopters, and supporting gear.
The demands of the current fight mean we must increase capacity in
several areas, including rotary wing, ISR, electronic warfare and SOF.
We sustain necessary rotary wing capacity through the addition of two
active Army Combat Aviation Brigades, continued production of the tilt-
rotor V-22, as well as our helicopter force, and a seventh SOF
helicopter company. I support this budget's rebalancing in favor of
more commercial airborne ISR capabilities for combatant commanders.
This budget continues increasing the number of unmanned combat air
patrols, coupled with the ability to fully exploit the intelligence
coming from these platforms. We should expand current technologies to
fill electronic warfare shortfalls and develop next-generation
technologies for manned and unmanned aircraft.
New initiatives
Too many of our processes and programs remain geared to a peacetime
clock, but several new initiatives focused on supporting our war
efforts show promise. I strongly support the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands
program and ongoing initiatives that increase the number and skill of
our civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. I also
strongly back the USAF's initiative to use light aircraft for enhanced
capacity building of key allies and partners for light mobility and
attack.
Our current acquisition process remains too unwieldy and
unresponsive. Adding 20,000 more acquisition experts by 2015 will help,
as will increasing the rigor and efficiency of our internal processes.
Stability in our programs, comprehensive design reviews, better cost
estimates, more mature technology and increased competition will make
the process more responsive. Once fielded, our systems are the finest
in the world, because of the experienced and capable program managers
and engineers building them. We need more of managers and engineers,
and they need better support and leadership.
Finally, I am growing concerned about our defense industrial base,
particularly in ship building and space. As fiscal pressures increase,
our ability to build future weapon systems will be impacted by
decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions.
We properly focus now on near-term reset requirements. However, we may
face an eroding ability to produce and support advanced technology
systems. Left unchecked, this trend would impact war fighting
readiness. The Department, our industry leaders, and Congress need to
begin considering how to equip and sustain the military we require
after our contemporary wars come to an end.
balancing global strategic risk
Balancing global risk requires sustained attention to resetting the
force. It also means making prudent investments to meet the challenges
of an increasingly complex and challenging worldwide security
environment. As the President recently noted, it is the United States
that has helped underwrite global security with the blood of our
citizens and the strength of our military. America's interests are
global, and our military must secure these interests. Where possible,
we will act first to prevent or deter conflict. When necessary, we will
defeat our enemies. Whenever able, we will work in concert with our
many allies and partners.
For many decades, but especially since 1989, U.S. conventional
overmatch has guaranteed our security and prosperity, as well as that
of our many allies and partners. We have helped protect expanding
global commons, including into space and cyberspace. We have seen the
likelihood of conventional war between states drop. We have used the
tools designed for war not against human adversaries, but instead to
support humanitarian operations. Most recently in Haiti, but elsewhere
over the past 60 years, the military's unmatched capacity to transport
goods and services have provided relief in the face of tragic natural
disasters. In short, many nations have benefited from an
extraordinarily capable and ready U.S. military, even as we have
defended our own interests.
That capability must continue to span the full range of military
operations. But in this post-Cold War era--one without a military near-
peer competitor--we should not be surprised that adversaries will
choose asymmetric means to confront us. They will seek to use both old
and new technology in innovative ways to defeat our advantages.
Terrorism will remain the primary tactic of choice for actors to
conduct warfare ``on the cheap''. Both state and non-state actors will
seek weapons of mass destruction through proliferation. Increasingly,
states will attempt to deny our ability to operate in key regions,
through the development and proliferation of ballistic missile systems,
or by exploiting space and cyberspace. Taken together, these are
diverse threats that require a broad set of means.
Winning our current wars means investment in our hard won irregular
warfare expertise. That core competency must be institutionalized and
supported in the coming years. However, we must also stay balanced and
maintain our advantage in the conventional arena. In the air, this
advantage requires sufficient strike aircraft and munitions capable of
assuring air superiority and holding difficult targets at risk. At sea,
we require sustained presence and capacity supported by a robust ship-
building program. On the ground, we must accelerate the modernization
of our combat brigades and regiments. Without question, these are
expensive undertakings. But our present security challenges demand
them.
Countering weapons of mass destruction means investing in new
research, securing nuclear materials, and preparing a layered defense.
Improving our ability to neutralize and render safe critical targets is
vital. We maintain the ability to respond to their use against our
citizens. But while improving responsiveness to the use of such weapons
is critical, more important is to counter their proliferation and deter
their use. I advocate diverse investments in nuclear forensics and
expanding our biological threat program, in addition to continuing
investment in the highly effective counterproliferation programs that
are central to our success in this critical endeavor. These relatively
small funds will have a disproportionately positive impact on our
security.
The ability of potential adversaries to challenge our freedom of
movement and the peaceful use of the global commons--sea, air, space,
and cyberspace--has grown in recent years. Anti access-technologies and
capabilities are proliferating, which could prevent us from deterring
conflict in some regions. We must preserve our ability to gain access
even when political, geographical or operational factors try to deny us
the same. This requires funding for improvements to our missile defense
capabilities, expanded long range and prompt global strike systems, and
hardened forward bases. Threats in cyberspace are increasing faster
than our ability to adequately defend against them. Cyber attacks can
cripple critical infrastructure, impose significant costs, and
undermine operational capabilities. Meanwhile, space-based systems
critical to our global awareness and connectivity are aging and have
proven vulnerable. A determined enemy could degrade existing space
systems, significantly impacting our strategic intelligence and warning
capabilities, as well as global positioning and communication. I ask
Congress to support the stand-up of U.S. Cyber-Command and provide
funding for cyber and space initiatives to redress these growing and
worrisome vulnerabilities.
Rising states may present a strategic challenge, but also offer
opportunities. China's economic strength, military capability, and
global influence continue to grow. While our military relations remain
generally constructive, we seek much more openness and transparency
from China regarding the growth of its conventional and nuclear defense
forces. We also believe that China can--and should--accept greater
responsibility for and partner more willingly to safeguard the global
trade and investment infrastructure. This requires Beijing to work more
collaboratively when determining fair access to transportation
corridors and natural resources. China also should demonstrate greater
clarity in its military investments. Absent a more forthcoming China in
these critical areas, we must prudently consider known Chinese
capabilities, in addition to stated intentions. As we seek to establish
a continuous military-to-military dialogue to reconcile uncertainties
and gain trust, we will pursue common interests in agreed upon areas
such as counter-piracy, counter-proliferation, search and rescue,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As a Pacific Rim nation
with longstanding interests throughout Asia, we will continue to play a
vigorous regional role.
Our present dialogue with Russia is multi-faceted. It acknowledges
points of contention as well as opportunities to ``reset'' our
relationship on a positive trajectory. We seek Moscow's cooperation in
reducing the number and role of strategic nuclear weapons. These
discussions have been constructive, and negotiations are near fruition.
I believe the resulting treaty will benefit the United States, Russia,
and the world. Moscow has also helped us establish a supplemental
logistics distribution line into Afghanistan. Russia also helped our
diplomats pressure Iran, and we look toward Moscow to do even more in
this process. On the other hand, Russia continues to reassert a special
sphere of influence with its neighbors. The Russian military is
simultaneously modernizing its strategic forces and many conventional
forces. Our obligations under Article V of NATO remain clear and we
remain poised to fulfill them.
North Korea's autocratic government makes it a persistent wild card
in Asia. Today, Pyongyang continues to pursue intercontinental
ballistic missile technologies, develop nuclear weapons, and export
weapons in contravention to international law and treaties. It also
maintains an unfortunate and threatening posture toward our ally South
Korea, and an unhelpful disposition toward our ally Japan.
Of course, we can best defend our interests and maintain global
order when we partner with like-minded nations. By forging close
military-to-military relations with an expanding number of nations--
providing training, equipment, advice, and education--we increase the
number of states that are interested and capable of partnering with us.
While tending to long-term allies, we should also cultivate our
relationships with other liked-minded powers around the world. Making a
small investment now will pay dividends in reducing our security burden
and global risk.
We need full funding of Defense Theater Security Cooperation
programs, International Military Education and Training activities, and
the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of
State. Preventative strategies require providing foreign partners with
the capacity to promote stability and counterterrorism. With your help,
we have made considerable strides in adapting our tools for security
force assistance, but more is needed. I urge your complete support of
the Global Train and Equip initiatives (under section 1206
authorities), the future evolution of the Global Stability fund (under
section 1207 authorities), as well as funding for special operations to
combat terrorism (under section 1208 authorities).
The majority of threats facing the United States require integrated
interagency and international initiatives. Supporting interagency
cooperation programs, to include expanding the number of exchanges
between the Department of Defense and other Executive Agencies, will
improve interagency capacity to meet future security threats as well.
Please urge your colleagues who oversee the Department of State to
fully fund Secretary Clinton's requests. I ask Congress to promote
legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of non-military
Executive Agencies. Our future security concerns require a whole-of-
government effort, not just a military one.
conclusion
This past year witnessed significant achievements by America's men
and women in uniform. Their efforts and sacrifices--as part of a
learning and adapting organization--have sustained us through more than
8 years of continuous war. Thanks to them we are in position to finish
well in Iraq. Thanks to them, we can begin to turn the corner in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In conjunction with our many partner nations,
they've provided humanitarian relief assistance to millions, helped
contain a threatening H1N1 pandemic, expanded support to national law
enforcement for enhanced border security, and disrupted terrorist
sanctuaries world-wide. Thanks to them, we have a global presence
protecting our national security and prosperity.
The demands of the present remain high, and our military role in
national security remains substantial. This will continue for the
foreseeable future. Yet as I have testified before this body in past
appearances, the military serves America best when we support, rather
than lead U.S. foreign policy.
On behalf of all men and women under arms, I wish to thank Congress
for your unwavering support for our troops in the field, their families
at home, and our efforts to rebalance and reform the force to assure
that we win the wars we are in and are poised to win those we are most
likely to face in the future.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
We'll try a 5-minute first round here. Mr. Secretary, the
change in our Afghanistan policy is what drove the requirement,
apparently, for a supplemental funding request this year. Is it
your goal to avoid a supplemental funding request for fiscal
year 2011?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, it is. Our hope would be that
the OCO's approach is a preferred way to do this. As we saw
this time unforeseen circumstances brought us up here to defend
another supplemental. I think I'm on the record last year as
expressing the hope we wouldn't be doing another one of those,
but here I am. But it is our intent that for fiscal year 2011
the OCO fund would be sufficient.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, the President, you, the
Admiral, and others have all pointed out that a principal
mission for our forces in Afghanistan is the training up of the
Afghan security forces to take over responsibility for the
security of their country. Yet our NATO allies are 90 percent
short of meeting their commitment for trainers for the Afghan
troops. These are the ones who are in that early 8-week basic
training period, not out in the field, where I think we're
doing very well and we are meeting what the goals are in terms
of kind of on-the-job training, partnering unit with unit.
But back to that basic training, the NATO non-U.S.
countries committed 2,000 trainers. They've produced 200. Now,
what are we going to do to get General Caldwell those
additional trainers which are so essential?
Secretary Gates. My understanding is that General
Caldwell's short about 1700 trainers. Our hope is that with the
additional commitments of somewhere between 7 and 10,000
additional forces by our NATO and other partners, that out of
that number we can more than fill the requirement for trainers.
Certainly Admiral Stavridis, General Petraeus, and General
McChrystal have been talking to them about this. But I might
add, Admiral Mullen just met with the heads of the European
militaries last week. I might ask him for a comment.
Chairman Levin. If you could just briefly say, are you
confident that the need is going to be filled, because it's
just totally unacceptable that the commitment is made and then
not kept?
Admiral Mullen. We all agree it's unacceptable. It's the
top priority there and it's a top priority from this meeting
with some 28-plus CHODs to go back to their capitals and meet.
There's a conference later this month to focus specifically on
that.
Chairman Levin. The ``CHOD,'' what does that mean?
Admiral Mullen. Sorry. My counterparts, the chiefs of
defense for these countries in NATO.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Gates, the BMDR report says that, in contrast to
the practice over the last decade of fielding missile defense
capabilities that were still being developed, that the
administration ``will take a different approach, best described
as fly before you buy, which will result in a posture based on
proven technology in order to improve reliability, confidence,
and cost control.'' That's a welcome change.
My question: Will we be deploying ground-based interceptors
(GBIs) that have not been tested and demonstrated?
Secretary Gates. We have deployed GBIs at Fort Greely. We
have a very aggressive test program that has been successful.
We believe that those interceptors give us the capability to
deal with launches from either Iran or North Korea, a small-
scale threat.
The fact is we are continuing--in addition to robustly
funding increases in theater level missile defense, we will
also continue to spend. We have in this budget $1.35 billion to
continue the development and test program for the GBIs, both
the three-stage that are now deployed and the two-stage that we
were going to deploy in Poland.
So I think we, both for homeland security and for our
allies and our troops in the field, have very strong programs
going forward.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the
Christmas bomber should be tried in civilian court or by
military commission?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I would defer to the Attorney
General and the proper jurisdiction for such people.
Senator McCain. When you fill out your form when we confirm
you for the U.S. Senate, you sign that you would give your
honest and candid opinion in response to questions. Do you want
to give me an opinion?
Secretary Gates. My honest opinion is that I think that the
Attorney General is in the best position to judge where these
people get tried. After all, we have----
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
It was reported in the media that ``When President Obama
convened his national security team on January 5 to discuss the
Christmas incident, the decision to charge the suspect in
Federal court was specifically discussed and again nobody
present raised any objection to it. In fact, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates made the point that even if Abdulmutallab
had been transferred to military custody, it is unlikely that
any more information could have been gleaned from him since
enhanced interrogation techniques have been banned by the
administration.''
Is that a true depiction of your view?
Secretary Gates. What I actually said was that I believed
that a team of highly experienced Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and other interrogators could be as
effective in interrogating the prisoner as anyone operating
under the Military Field Manual.
Senator McCain. So that's a direct contradiction to the
Michael Isikoff piece in Newsweek magazine. So you agree with
Director of National Intelligence Blair when he said ``We did
not invoke the HIG''--that's the trained interrogators--``in
this case. We would have.'' Do you agree with Admiral Blair?
Secretary Gates. I think we did not have the high-level
interrogators there that we now have protocols in place to
ensure would be present in such a situation.
Senator McCain. Do you agree that they should have been
there?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you believe it was possible in 50
minutes to exhaust the possibilities for getting all of the
information that was needed from the Christmas bomber?
Secretary Gates. I'm just not in a position to know the
answer to that, Senator.
Senator McCain. I see. Again, media reports state that you
thought so.
Is it your view that, absent enhanced interrogation
techniques, that the Intelligence Community provides no value
in the interrogation of a terrorist?
Secretary Gates. No, I don't believe that.
Senator McCain. Well, I thank you.
On the issue of the F-35, to what do you attribute the fact
that you were not appraised of all the major problems
associated with the program last summer, when it seems to me
you needed to be?
Secretary Gates. We had not yet undertaken at that time,
Senator McCain, an independent cost analysis that is now one of
the requirements under the Acquisition Reform Act that you
passed last year. Our Under Secretary for Acquisition launched
such an exercise. He himself spent about 2 weeks full-time
looking into the F-35 program, and as a result of the
independent cost estimate and his own investigation came to the
conclusions that the program required restructuring.
Senator McCain. Can you give us, either verbally or in
writing, the delays and cost overruns that we now expect?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I would say that, in terms of
delivery, even with the restructured program, we still expect
the training squadron to be at Eglin in 2011. We expect initial
operational capability (IOC) for the Marine Corps in 2012, for
the Air Force in 2013, and the Navy in 2014, the fourth quarter
of 2014.
There will be fewer delivered aircrafts at IOC. That's the
result of reducing the production ramp, as has been recommended
to deal with some of the issues associated with that.
[The information referred to follows:]

At the time of this hearing, the Department knew that the Joint
Strike Fighter Program would need additional funding of approximately
$3 billion to complete the System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
phase. Additionally, SDD would require an additional 13 months to
complete. Procurement costs were also estimated to be higher. The
Department reduced the procurement ramp to align with recommendations
from an Independent Manufacturing Review Team, to pay for the increased
development costs and to reduce concurrency.
Since the hearing, the Department has benefited, and will continue
to benefit, from insight gained during the Nunn McCurdy review, and the
subsequent bottoms up Technical Baseline Review of the development and
test program. The Department is utilizing all of the independent
reviews, analysis, and actual program performance from the past year to
develop the fiscal year 2012 budget, and document the cost and schedule
for the program going forward. That work is still ongoing.

Senator McCain. Well, in conclusion, given your
responsibilities to the men and women who are serving in the
military in the defense of this Nation, I hope you will come to
a conclusion as to how enemy combatants should be treated as
far as their trials are concerned and our ability to assure the
American people that they will not be returning to the
battlefield, and whether they should be tried and incarcerated
in the United States rather than Guantanamo. I look forward to
your views on that because I view that clearly in your area of
responsibility, not the Attorney General, who has obviously
botched this one very, very badly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen for being here to discuss the 2011 defense budget, and
to thank you for your service and the service of all the men
and women in our Armed Forces, and I also welcome Mr. Hale.
Secretary Gates, you have mentioned that beyond winning the
wars themselves, the treatment of our wounded and ill is your
highest priority. As a result of today's continuing conflicts,
the psychological effects of those conflicts within the ranks
of the U.S. military have never been more profound. Secretary
Gates, what do we need to improve our treatment of mental
illness and how does this budget address that?
Secretary Gates. Well, as Admiral Mullen mentioned in his
opening statement, there is over $1 billion in this budget for
the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and TBI.
All of the Services have very extensive programs for dealing
with psychological problems. All of the leadership, I think,
have weighed in on this very heavily.
I would say that there are two problems that we still are
wrestling with. One is the shortage of mental health care
providers. We are--and frankly, we've discovered it's a
national shortage; it's not just a shortage in the military,
because we're all over the country trying to hire these people.
We've hired a lot, I think something on the order of 1,000 or
1,400 over the last 18 months or so. But we still need more.
The second is still overcoming the stigma of seeking help,
of getting not only our soldiers, but also their families, to
get the psychological help that is available to them.
But let me ask Admiral Mullen if he'd like to add a word or
two.
Admiral Mullen. I think the Secretary has captured the two
big issues. We dramatically increased the number of mental
health providers in recent years, but we're still short. We're
just beginning to understand the real impacts of TBI.
Then the other piece I would ask for your help on is, how
do we work with other committees here? Secretary Gates and
Secretary Shinseki have certainly set the standard shoulder-to-
shoulder that both DOD and VA need to work this together,
because many of these young people transition certainly from
DOD to VA. I really believe it has to be a three-part team that
includes communities throughout the country.
So how do we ensure that those who sacrifice so much
receive the care across this entire continuum, and we
understand their needs, which change over time. It's those who
suffer greatly in uniform, but it's also families who have been
under great stress. So that would be the third piece that I
would add to the Secretary's answer.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, IEDs remain the number one
cause of casualties in Afghanistan. The administration recently
announced the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to
Afghanistan. As a result, more of our men and women will be
exposed and vulnerable to this deadly form of attack. The Joint
IED Defeat Organization was created to lead and coordinate all
DOD actions in support of combatant commanders' efforts to
defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Mr. Secretary,
what is your assessment of DOD's efforts in protecting our
troops against IEDs, and if improvement is needed what can be
done to improve those results?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I think that we have a number of
very forward-leaning efforts to try and deal with the challenge
of IEDs. My concern a few months ago was that these efforts
were not adequately integrated and put together in a way that
we derive maximum benefit from the efforts that we had under
way.
I asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, as well as General Jay Paxton, to
co-chair an effort, a short-term effort, to see what more we
could do, both in terms of better structure for how we deal
with this problem, but also if there were some specific areas
where additional attention was needed. They've brought to me
some recommendations in terms of significant enhancements for
long-term full-motion video so we can watch roads, we can watch
the areas around our encampments, aerostats, a variety of other
technical solutions.
The commanders have increased the requirement for the MRAP
vehicles, particularly the ATVs, so there is an additional
requirement that actually is already funded or is taken care of
in this budget for about 10,000 more MRAPs. 6,600 of those will
be the all-terrain version that are designed especially for
Afghanistan to protect our troops.
So we have a number of efforts. There were identified
problems, such as the labs we had--we had a lot of labs working
the IED problem in Iraq. We hadn't put as many labs into
Afghanistan yet. So this is a dynamic process and I would say
to you we have a number of initiatives under way to improve the
strong work that was already being done, because this is
absolutely the worst killer and maimer of our troops and we
are, with your support, sparing no expense and no effort to try
and reduce those casualties.
The MRAPs have made a huge difference, but the enemy is a
thinking enemy and they change their tactics and their
structures.
Another thing we're doing is, a very high percentage in
Afghanistan of these IEDs are made from the fertilizer
component ammonium nitrate, which is illegal in Afghanistan. So
now we're establishing an effort to try and hit the smuggling
networks that bring this ammonium nitrate in to be used for
these IEDs.
But we have a lot of different efforts going on, and if the
committee is interested I'd be happy to have Secretary Carter
and General Paxton come up and brief on their endeavors.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start off by saying I disagree with Senator McCain
on his statements on the C-17 and I disagree with him on the
statements, his past statements on the F-22. It concerns me
that we keep hearing, well, this is something that the military
doesn't want, they didn't ask for, and all that. Then I go over
there and that's not their attitude at all. They have needs
over there. Our lift capacity is in dire straits. We're still
using those old, beat-up C-130E models that we keep losing
engines on. We actually lost two engines on one not too long
ago when I was over there.
The state of the art is still there in the C-17s and I
think that we are going to have to do some surgery on that and
some of the other things on this budget when the Senate Armed
Services Committee gets together.
Now, on the F-22, just yesterday we read about the T-50
that they're coming out with, a fifth generation that the
Russians have. I'm not at all as confident as everyone else is
that our F-35s are going to be on line when we say; as Senator
McCain just said, that we have cost overruns, we have problems
that just recently have surfaced. I'm concerned about this.
I guess if we're down to 187 F-22s, and I think out of that
what, only 120 are actually combat-ready and used for combat.
Yet, as I read this article on the T-50, they're starting to
crank these things out and India, is talking about buying 200
of them. Who knows who else is going to be buying them?
So I am concerned about it. I guess it goes beyond just
that. I look at the Senate Armed Services Committee. On these
two vehicles I mentioned, the F-22 and the C-17--in Oklahoma I
don't have a dog in that fight. We don't have any parochial
interest there. But it's the capability that we're going to
need.
I look and I see and remember so well testimony that our
defense for 100 years averaged 5.7 percent of gross domestic
products (GDP). It's now down to 3.7 and, as you project it by
the figures that I'm getting, it will go down to 3 percent by
2019. This is what really concerns me, is we're just not doing
the job that we need to be doing to defend America, if you
consider that the number one function of government, which I
happen to.
I do agree with Senator McCain on his concern over pulling
the rug out from under Eastern Europe on the third site. I read
something yesterday that Russia doesn't want us to have any
ground-based capability. I don't know.
I guess the first thing I would ask you, Mr. Secretary--and
I should know this, but I don't: If we're talking about having
the capability of the SM-3 and getting that working, where
would it be used? Is this Aegis or where would we have this
capability?
Secretary Gates. In the initial phase it would be based on
ships, but we have money in the budget for a land-based
Standard missile. So it would be deployed in Europe and perhaps
elsewhere, depending on the agreements that we reached with
other countries.
Senator Inhofe. You don't think you'll have a little bit of
a problem, in that we negotiated, and we went over there, with
the Czech Republic for its radar and then Poland for the site
of the GBI, and then changed our minds? Isn't that going to
create a little bit of a problem, or have you already initiated
any kind of a discussion with any of the European countries to
have that capability there?
Secretary Gates. Yes, and in fact we've reached agreement
with the Poles already to move advanced Patriots into Poland.
So I think, frankly, we----
Senator Inhofe. That's a different capability than getting
up, what we were talking about before.
Secretary Gates. As I say, I don't think we'll have a
problem.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. All right.
Well, Army modernization, I've been concerned about that.
:ook at our capability on the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) cannon.
First we were going to have a Crusader and then that was axed
by the Republicans, by President Bush, right when we were in
negotiations, I might add, in the Senate Armed Services
Committee on putting together a program. So I'm concerned about
that.
Now we do have the Paladin Integrated Management program
and that's good on the Paladin. But I have to tell you, that's
the same technology they had when I was in the U.S. Army, so I
am concerned about that.
I'm concerned that General Casey and General Chiarelli both
have stated many times that we're burning up equipment as soon
as they can be procured. Yet the Army procurement funding
decreased in this budget by $31 billion from fiscal year 2008
to fiscal year 2010. Is that a good idea?
Secretary Gates. I think a good part of that was for the
Army's Future Combat Vehicle and we're restructuring that
program, and I think that you'll see a significant increase
when the Army moves into production of that vehicle.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I hope that's the case and I hope
that we're here to be able to see that as a reality.
My time has expired, but just one last question if I could,
Mr. Chairman. On the section 1206, 1207, 1208, and so forth,
the 1206 is fine. I appreciate the fact that we have enhanced
that program and some of the others. The 1207, that's the
civilian-to-civilian. That now is going to go back to the State
Department, and one of the original reasons we wanted to have
this in the DOD was the timing, so that when a decision is made
we'll be able to get it done. Do you think that's a good move
or do you think we should try to reverse that in terms of the
1207 in the train and equip program to bring it back the way it
is today?
Secretary Gates. First of all, Senator, I want to thank you
for your support and your help on section 1206, 1207, and 1208.
But I think when I testified here last year the plan was to
begin transferring the 1207 money to the State Department. I
think the plan you have in front of you essentially simply
accelerates that process.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my appreciation to you and your families for
your distinguished service.
I've long been an advocate for benchmarks or measures of
progress and I think we need to continue to do so objectively
so we can gauge our efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I
know this administration, as well as our NATO allies, are
committed to objective benchmarks for measurement and we've
done so with past strategies, and we've all talked about this
so many times, most recently in December, about both
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
During that hearing in December, it was noted that measures
of progress were being used and evaluated. I thought at that
time those benchmarks would be forthcoming to our committee,
but at least I have yet to see them. It seems to me that one of
the most important times to inform the process is at the very
onset of any change, and as this mission changes course, the
way in which we measure efforts will change as well.
Have comprehensive and final benchmarks or measures of
progress been developed to reflect this new strategy, and if so
when will these be made to the committee? Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. I think they have and I frankly thought
that they had already been provided to the committee, and I'll
check on it after the hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]

In accordance with section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), the President submitted to Congress on
September 24, 2009, a statement of the objectives of U.S. policy with
respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the metrics to be utilized to
assess progress toward achieving such objectives. Section 1117 also
includes a reporting requirement to provide Congress an assessment of
the progress of U.S. Government efforts in achieving the objectives of
U.S. policy by March 30, 2010, and every 180 days thereafter using the
metrics submitted in September 2009. The President will submit the
first report in Mach 2010 and semi-annually thereafter.

Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, thank you.
Could you talk a little bit about some of the areas of
measurement that would be in these measures of progress?
Secretary Gates. I think a couple that are pretty obvious
are are the Afghans meeting their recruitment goals for the
Afghan national security forces, are they meeting their goals
in terms of limiting attrition, how many--are they meeting the
number of units being fielded that are in the plan, are they--
there are benchmarks associated with their training. So I think
those are the kinds of things, at least with respect to the
security forces, that we're talking about.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have anything that we might
relate to our measures of progress with respect to our
particular efforts?
Secretary Gates. I think in some respects the President has
made his expectations pretty clear. He has some clear
expectations and is benchmarking us on how fast we can get
30,000 troops into Afghanistan and watching that carefully. I
think he has clearly set a marker in terms of beginning to
transfer security authority to the Afghans beginning in July
2011, so that's a clear benchmark that must be met. So I think
we do have some.
Another for us is the number of civilians we're getting
into Afghanistan from the State Department, USAID, and other
agencies.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are you working with the State
Department jointly in that effort? Because I know they've set
some measures of progress of their own.
Secretary Gates. Absolutely. This is as integrated an
effort as I've ever seen the U.S. Government undertake.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
I'd like to talk to you just a second about our contractor
conversion efforts. You announced in the spring of 2009 that
DOD would scale back the role of contractors in support
services. Quite honestly, my sense is that for too many years
we were outsourcing too much with perhaps too little emphasis
on why and whether it was justified.
But regardless of the makeup, outsourcing or insourcing has
to make sense and be oriented towards the best utilization of
resources, both money and people. Is there in place a strategic
plan for the right mix of contractor, government, civilian, and
military personnel, and what are we doing to execute such a
plan?
Secretary Gates. First of all, our goal is to take the
number of contractors in DOD as a percentage of the workforce
back to where it was prior to September 11, which would mean
taking it from 39 percent to 26 percent. The plan--first of
all, I think one of the effects of what we have seen in Iraq in
particular has been the revival of acquisition in a couple of
the Services where that as a career field had withered. I think
this is particularly true in the Army, where a number of
measures, including the allocation of general officer positions
and so on, to revive that career field as an attractive career
field. Some other Services have done better.
I think that Under Secretary Carter has a clear idea of the
right mix between contractors and civilians. But I think that
the first place we need to look is that we probably shouldn't
have contractors evaluating contractors. So I think that's the
first area as we make these conversions, which I might add are
on track 1 year in.
Senator Ben Nelson. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Just to implement the point Senator Nelson
made, I believe in this year's budget proposal you are
proposing maybe 10,000 contractor jobs be eliminated and
changed over to employees of DOD. I don't know the exact
number, but is that not true? It's in the budget?
Secretary Gates. Our goal is 20,000, to increase the number
of acquisition professionals from 127,000 to 147,000. 10,000 of
those will be the conversion of contractor jobs to civil
service jobs. Another 10,000 will be new hires.
Chairman Levin. That's in this year's budget, is that
correct?
Secretary Gates. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. I just wanted to clarify that point.
Admiral Mullen. 20,000 total is over 2010 to 2014, Senator
Levin.
Chairman Levin. Over 4 years.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Chairman Levin. How many in this year's budget?
Admiral Mullen. The total is about 6,000. That would
include acquisition and everything else. I'll have to get you
the number specifically for acquisition.
Chairman Levin. To clarify the benchmarks point made by
Senator Nelson, which he's been very persistent on, to the
benefit of everybody in the Nation, the only thing that we've
received from DOD is a draft set of benchmarks and they were
classified. So he is right, we have not received benchmarks,
although we were promised them. We need both the benchmarks,
but also in an unclassified way.
Secretary Gates. The benchmarks that I was talking about
were interagency benchmarks that had been agreed, and those
were the ones that I thought had been delivered and I'll pursue
after the hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your good
leadership. You're an excellent chairman. We do have a lot on
the agenda today: talking about the defense budget, the QDR,
two wars, the BMDR, DADT, terrorist trials. I guess I would
just say, I don't think we can do it all justice today. I hope
we'll have more hearings as we go forward. Some of them, we
need the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.
Just briefly, Mr. Secretary, on the Christmas Day bomber. I
saw your former colleague, Attorney General Mukasey, this
morning on the television pointing out that, yes, they tried
Moussaui in Federal court, he tried the case as a Federal judge
at the time, but he pled guilty and the sentencing phase took a
year. He said it was made into a circus. He pointed out that
Guantanamo was created for the purpose of these kind of trials.
When a person like the Christmas Day bomber leaves Yemen
armed with a bomb from al Qaeda, on directions of al Qaeda, and
flies into the United States, I suggest he's an unlawful enemy
combatant and perfectly suited for detention and trial, if need
be a trial, in military custody. I think DOD needs to know
about those things because the intelligence that could be
gathered from a prolonged interrogation by people knowledgeable
in Yemen could have added greatly to this.
Now he's been advised he has a right to a lawyer. He's no
longer going to cooperate or talk. He's going to be entitled to
a speedy trial. There are a lot of problems with that.
So I just hope you will be alert to that as it goes by. I
think the military has a real responsibility.
I just would briefly say that I've come to understand and
feel more strongly about the concern Senator McCain has about
setting an absolute date for beginning to leave in 2011. We'll
hardly have our troops in place by then, the surge in place by
then. We see things like President Karzai beginning to talk to
the Taliban. It makes you wonder if he's looking beyond our
departure date. I worry about that.
Mr. Secretary, you talked about the supplemental. I've been
baffled a bit by that. It seems to me that when you're in a
war, a supplemental is an appropriate way to handle funding for
that. To try to force into the baseline budget funding
specifically for these two operations, with a couple hundred
thousand troops deployed, is not a good policy. Why do you feel
like we should do this only within the baseline budget?
Secretary Gates. I absolutely do not believe we should do
it within the baseline budget. I think that the purpose of
providing the OCOs funding budget is I think that it's actually
in response to considerable pressure from Congress for
greater----
Senator Sessions. I know you have gotten pressure from
Congress on that.
Secretary Gates.--greater predictability----
Senator Sessions. But not out of me.
Secretary Gates.--greater predictability about how much is
going to be spent in these wars, and so that those budgets can
be considered within the framework of the normal consideration
of the budget. So I think that it's certainly not a part of the
base budget, but it is provided in advance in a way that gives
Congress the opportunity to review it in the same way it
reviews the rest of the budget.
Senator Sessions. I'm not sure. It seems we should be able
to review the supplemental as well. But I guess in a way you're
creating a discrete funding program that we could review, and
maybe that would be acceptable.
Admiral Mullen, with regard to our procurement of major
weapons systems, I know that DOD has focused on life cycle
costs, and I guess you would agree that things such as fuel and
maintenance are important factors to evaluate if you're going
to evaluate the cost of a weapons system over a period of
years?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I know we did that on the tanker
aircraft. In fact, fuel and that sort of things are counted as
evaluating that aircraft. Should that be applied to a
procurement program like the LCS; the cost of fuel over its
lifetime, should that be accounted for?
Admiral Mullen. I've long been concerned about life cycle
costs. Senator Sessions, I think you know that long before now.
The Secretary pointed out, and I think very importantly, in his
opening statement that the programs that he cut last year
actually had some life cycle value focused on about $330
billion. As far as what's in a request for proposal (RFP) and
what it's going to be focused on, that's something that I
really can't comment on----
Senator Sessions. I don't know. We have an RFP in the LCS
that I'm told does not have any factor for fuel costs.
Admiral Mullen. You know more about it than I do. I haven't
seen it.
Senator Sessions. If that's so, would you be willing to
look at it and ask questions if that's a wise decision?
Admiral Mullen. Again, as I said, for a long time I've been
concerned about life cycle costs. Actually, I think one of the
weaknesses of the acquisition system is typically that the line
is not involved in it. The uniformed side is not involved in
that. So I'm not involved from that point of view and would
under actually no circumstances see an RFP or look at its
evaluation criteria in what I'm doing right now.
Senator Sessions. I would think it would be your ultimate
responsibility as part of the procurement of the Department to
see that at least basic requirements are being met. I think I
hear you say that life cycle costs, which certainly would
include fuel, should be a factor in evaluation of the bids or
the proposals. Wouldn't it?
Admiral Mullen. I've said life cycle costs are an important
factor and have been for a long time.
Senator Sessions. We'll have to follow up on that.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Udall is next.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here with us
today.
Secretary Gates, we have a proposal from the President
which I fully support, to freeze nondiscretionary spending for
nondefense programs in fiscal year 2011. I think we're going to
face tighter budgets in future years and we may have the
potential need to trip Pentagon budgets as well. Could you talk
about how you're posturing DOD to be able to react to that
potential?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I think that the situation
out there in the world doesn't change, and the world is
becoming more complex and I would say more dangerous, rather
than less so. I think that as people think about where we are,
there are many reasons for the deficit and DOD certainly spends
a lot of money. But if you look at where DOD is today, it's
very much within historical norms in terms of both GDP and a
percentage of the budget in terms of what we're spending.
That said, I would tell you that if DOD received
significant reductions in its budget, that we would have to
sacrifice force structure. We cannot do it any other way. So
the result of that would be a reduction in military capability
and a reduction in our flexibility.
Senator Udall. If I might, let me thank you for your focus
on acquisition reform. I want to associate myself with Senator
McCain's remarks and I hope that this committee will continue
to support you as you make some tough decisions, so that we
extract every penny of value from every dollar that we spend. I
just want to acknowledge the important work you've done there.
Let me turn to Afghanistan. Senator Sessions expressed some
concern, but I would like to comment that you make peace with
your enemies, not with your friends. I've been interested,
Admiral Mullen, in the re-integration of the low-level Taliban
proposals that have been forthcoming. There was a recent
conference I believe in the United Kingdom some significant
monies pledged.
Could you comment on those plans to the extent that you're
comfortable?
Admiral Mullen. The reintegration piece is clearly an
important piece of this, and every commander feels that way.
Very specifically, the reintegration is really bringing those
who are literally the fighters who are against us right now,
bringing them into the fold. In fact, General McChrystal is
very focused on that. We are in the execution of this strategy
which includes that, so getting everybody on the same page for
exactly what it means and how rapidly it happens or doesn't
happen is where we are very much at the beginning. But we think
it is an important part. There is no view at this point that is
a panacea, because we just don't see that many at this point.
The other term that is used that I think it's very
important to understand is the reconciliation piece, which is a
term that is focused on I would call the senior leadership of
the Taliban or the senior leadership of the enemy--much more
complex, and President Karzai has made it clear that he wants
to get on this path. But again, it's at the beginning. We're at
the beginning of that process.
I think we have to be clear about the terms and what they
mean, and also look at a realistic pace in terms of both
expectations and actually what's happening. In that regard,
we're just at the beginning.
Senator Udall. Let me turn to Iraq. We have elections
looming. There is some increased violence. Do you still believe
we're on schedule to redeploy, as General Odierno has put in
place?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I do. We were very focused on the
elections in early March. It's the elections after which we
start coming down fairly dramatically, 104,000 today is what we
have on the ground. We will come down to approximately 50,000
by August. In that timeframe, another big issue is they will be
standing up a government and it will take them several months
to do that, sort of the summertime, to stand up this newly-
elected government.
So it's a great time of transition. General Odierno, and
Ambassador Hill on the civilian side, are very focused on all
aspects of that. But right now, overall the indicators are
positive.
Senator Udall. I see that my time's expired. I want to
thank you again for your leadership and for this comprehensive
set of statements today and for a budget, Secretary Gates, that
I think clearly leads us in the right direction.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your outstanding
service and for appearing today and responding to some of our
questions.
Secretary Gates, I wanted to take up with you the
recommendations in the budget and the QDR. Going back to the
2006 QDR, there was a recommendation in there to develop a
follow-on bomber. You've made it clear that you support the
development of a new bomber. Last April you opted not to pursue
a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until
you had a better understanding of the need, the requirement,
and the technology.
As part of the effort to better understand the requirement
for a new bomber, I also understand that you stood up a Tiger
Team to do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the new
QDR. In reading the new QDR on page 33, it looks, however, like
you have still not made a decision to move forward with the new
bomber program, but instead have commissioned yet another
study.
My question is, what conclusions were drawn by the Tiger
Team regarding the development of a new bomber and are those
conclusions available to us, at least in writing for the
record?
Secretary Gates. I will get you an answer for the record on
that, Senator. But there is, I think, $1.7 billion in the
budget for next generation bomber and long-range strike. I
think one of the issues that we're still wrestling with is what
kind of a bomber would we be looking for. Do we want a stand-
off bomber? Do we want an attack bomber? Do we want a manned
bomber or an unmanned bomber? Or do we want variations, where
you could have a platform that could serve both purposes?
I think we still have a lot of life left in the B-52s, as
old as they are, and there is modernization money for both them
and the B-2s in the budget. We're talking about a bomber that
would probably not appear into the force until the late 1920s.
So we're just trying to figure out, looking ahead a generation,
what the right configuration for that would be.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Tiger Team to which you refer was formed to study the need,
requirement, and technology for a follow-on Air Force long-range strike
aircraft. That team completed its work last November. The team was
supportive of pursuing a new long-range strike aircraft, but recognized
that additional analysis was needed to explore options for reducing
overall program costs and determining fielding timelines. Another
conclusion of the Tiger Team's study was that the Department should
sustain the industrial base for early-stage design work and
technologies for a new long-range strike aircraft while the Department
continues to study all options. Through the Quadrennial Defense Review,
the Department provided industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011
and fiscal year 2012 to prepare for the potential start of a new long-
range strike program. I decided that a more in-depth analysis was
required in order to evaluate and compare the capabilities of new long-
range strike aircraft designs in the context of the full range of
supporting capabilities that would be relevant to the operation of such
aircraft in future combat scenarios.
The Department is now undertaking a follow-on effort to examine the
appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades to legacy
bombers; manned and unmanned options; stand-off and penetrating
requirements; new and improved cruise missiles; electronic warfare
improvements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance demands;
and conventional prompt global strike options. The goal of this ongoing
assessment is to ensure that the Department fully understands how all
potential long-range strike options and supporting capabilities could
contribute to U.S. security goals before committing to one or more
major development programs. I anticipate that our analysis will inform
decisions shaping the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

Senator Thune. The 2006 QDR had suggested, I think,
fielding a new bomber by 2018. I understand the concerns that
you raised about what type of bomber that might be. But I
guess--and by the way, I think the $1.7 billion is a multi-year
number. Isn't that like a 4-year number?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Thune. But why is it necessary to have another
study? I mean, the thing has been studied and studied and
studied and studied, on whether or not we want to move forward
on developing a follow-on bomber. When would you expect that
study to be completed?
Secretary Gates. I'll have to get an answer for the record.
I think what the studies up to now have been is whether, and
now the study is what.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Tiger Team that was initially formed to study the need,
requirements, and technology for a follow-on Air Force bomber completed
its work last November. The team's conclusions were supportive of
pursuing a new bomber, but the team recognized that additional analysis
was needed to explore options for reducing overall program costs and
determining fielding timelines. Additionally, I decided that a more in-
depth analysis of how a new bomber might compare with other long-range
strike options was required. Consequently, the Department chartered
another study to look at a broader array of long-range strike options
to include upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned options for
future bombers; stand-off and penetrating options for future bombers;
new and improved cruise missiles; and conventional prompt global strike
options, such as land-based and sea-based conventional ballistic
missiles. The new study will also examine the support requirements for
various long-range strike options, such as electronic warfare,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and secure, high-data-
rate communications.
The rationale for this new study is to ensure the Department fully
understands how all potential long-range strike options could
contribute to U.S. goals before we spend billions of dollars. I
anticipate that results from the new study will be available in time to
support the formation of the fiscal year 2012 budget.
Another of the initial Tiger Team's conclusions was that the
Department should sustain the industrial base for early-stage design
work and technologies for a new bomber while the Department continues
to study long-range strike options. Consequently, the Department
provided industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year
2012 to prepare for a potential start for a new bomber program.

Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, with regard to the FYDP
force structure that's set out in the new QDR for the Air
Force, the QDR proposes five long-range strike wings with up to
96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest Air Force
Almanac, the Air Force has 153 bomber aircraft and I understand
some of these aircraft are dedicated to testing, but over 50
aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you plan on retiring
any bomber aircraft in the near future? I guess a follow-on
question would be, what are the assumptions underlying what
appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, I'm not aware that we are,
although I certainly would want to check for the record to make
sure that I have that right. But there certainly hasn't been
any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.
If I could speak just briefly to the other issue you raise,
one of the things that's happened in the last two budgets in my
view is it's put us on a pace and with a view that evolves.
Some of the previous laydowns, the 2006 QDR, were from my
perspective incredibly aggressive. So part of my answer to the
question of why we're still doing this is because this is a
very difficult problem. We want to get it right, and it has a
huge impact, quite frankly, on the future of the Air Force
because of the capability requirement.
I think what you're seeing is a process that is led by
Secretary Gates to move us through a deliberative process that
really focuses on getting it right for the future. As he
indicated, the previous study was as to whether or not, and now
we look to the future as what it should be. I'm supportive of
that. These are tough decisions we absolutely want to get
right.
Senator Thune. Could you for the record get to that
question, though, of the number? Of the 96 bombers that are
assumed in the five wings, with 153 Air Force bombers, a
certain number of them allocated to testing, but that does seem
like a significant number, whether or not there is any plan to
retire and any assumptions underlying that, what would appear
to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers.
Admiral Mullen. We'll supply it for the record, but I think
a lot of them may be for training. I think you're talking about
primary aircraft, coded aircraft. There are a number designated
for training and testing, as you say. But we'll supply the
details for the record.
Senator Thune. That would be great.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I'd like to get
for the record a response to a question dealing with the START
Treaty in sort of the same vein. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman Levin. We will expect that answer for the record
relative to Senator Thune's question on START.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, for
your testimony today and for your dedication to our men and
women in the military.
Secretary Gates, I applaud you for the tremendous job DOD
has done in carrying out and supporting the relief efforts that
have been under way in Haiti. The ability of our maritime
forces to operate from a sea base while rapidly transitioning
personnel and equipment ashore is something that I believe is
an excellent demonstration of what our military is capable of
doing and especially useful in a situation in Haiti where
there's limited capacity for air transport.
I believe it's important that we maintain our advantage in
projecting sea power across the range of military operations
from humanitarian relief to combat. My question, Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen, is do the military departments and
combatant commanders have sufficient amphibious operational
capabilities to address the full spectrum of requirements, both
military and humanitarian, anticipated within the QDR?
Admiral Mullen. Ma'am, as I go back over the last 10 to 15
years and then look at the future, my overall answer to that
would be yes. We certainly have this within DOD over the years,
debated this and there's been tension. I think it's good
tension to get this right, and it focuses very specifically on
the amount of amphibious lift capability that we have.
Actually, one of my concerns specifically--so right now,
yes. One of my concerns about the future--and I'm certain that
the Commandant of the Marine Corps shares this--how is the
Marine Corps has become very heavy. Obviously, it's now in the
sixth or seventh year of fighting a land war, which is not what
it wants to do. So there are an awful lot of adjustments that
have to be made for the future. The Marine Corps is going to
have to get lighter than it's been in the past.
So I think this discussion will continue. But as far as my
view of the future, I think we have it about right as we sit.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I know that we've already discussed some of the IEDs, but I
know that in Afghanistan the mountainous terrain and the
limited communication infrastructures certainly pose a
distinctly different IED threat as opposed to what we have seen
in Iraq. We need additional personnel at the battalion and
company levels with the appropriate expertise and technical
equipment to detect the IEDs in areas such as Afghanistan,
where the insurgents utilize the primitive forms of IEDs with
very little metallic content that is buried into the ground.
What type of feedback are you receiving from CENTCOM and
the component commanders in theater with respect to their
personnel requirements encountering the IEDs, and what do you
expect to do to address any shortages that exist?
Secretary Gates. A substantial number of the 30,000 troops
that will be going are in the category of what we call
enablers. That includes engineers, route clearance specialists,
counter-IED specialists, all of whom are--and people associated
with ISR--all of which are part of the counter-IED effort.
One of the initiatives that this temporary task force that
I've set up under General Paxton and Dr. Carter is looking at
is establishing, at the battalion level, what we would call a
warehouse approach for counter-IEDs, which would basically,
instead of giving every battalion the same set of equipment,
rather have an array of equipment that is available to that
battalion, so that each of the teams going out can select the
equipment that seems most appropriate to that mission that day.
We have a wide range of these detectors and intelligence
capabilities and so on, and the idea is some of these units are
better, frankly, with certain kinds of equipment than others.
There's more than a little art in this. So what we're trying to
do is figure out how, at the battalion level, we in essence
could have an array of equipment that a team going out could
take advantage of.
So I think that there is an understanding on the part of
General McChrystal and General Petraeus that we are pouring
every bit of counter-IED capability into Afghanistan that we
can.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen. We do have a lot to
talk about, and I share Senator Sessions' view that it would be
nice to have you back. I hope the chairman will be able to
arrange that.
My first question is about the 313-ship Navy, Admiral
Mullen. The Congressional Budget Office recently testified that
the current shipbuilding budgets are not enough to fund the
Navy's plan to increase the fleet to 313, and I think we all
know that. I assume you agree with that. At 283, the Service
has the smallest fleet since 1916. That's pre-World War I. We
need to build more than 12 ships per year for the next 18 years
to arrive at 313.
Is 313 still the requirement, Admiral Mullen? How does this
budget, how does this QDR, support the goal of a 313-ship Navy?
Admiral Mullen. It is still the goal. It was when I led
that analysis and generated that requirement as Chief of Naval
Operations. It remains the floor. It was a number that was
achieved with an understanding of what the risk would be. We,
the total ``we''--that's the Services, the Department, those
that build ships, certainly congressional support--have been
working for years to get more money into the shipbuilding
account. I think, as we laid out, there's some $15 billion this
year. It's 10 ships, 1 of which is an Army ship.
One of the things that we're not going to be able to do is
build to that number if ships keep costing a whole lot more
than we expect they will. The acquisition reform is really a
critical part of that. I'll use the littoral combat ships as an
example. That has cost--while I had expectations the costs
would go up, certainly not to the degree that it has.
So that has to be contained. We don't need the perfect ship
or the perfect airplane as we look to the future. So I argued
for years there has to be a strategic partnership across all
three of those entities in order to get shipbuilding and major
procurement right. I think this budget takes some steps in that
direction. But you can just do the math and see that we're not
going to get to 313, and I would not want to be satisfied with
283, which is sort of what the projection is right now, given
the demands that we have for our military and our Navy.
Senator Wicker. So it's going to take acquisition reform to
get us to that floor number of 313. When do you think we might
be able to actually make some progress in that regard?
Admiral Mullen. I think the Secretary and many others,
myself included, have taken steps to really put our--get our
arms around requirements growth, having expertise there,
holding people accountable. Those are some of the things that
are certainly in great focus right now, and there's more to do.
But it's going to take a few years, I think, before that
really takes a grip and starts to have the kind of impact to be
able to generate the kind of capability you need within cost.
I'm encouraged by this shipbuilding program. It has two
submarines in it. This is the first year it has. I can tell you
it took almost 10 years to make that happen. So we will
continue to--I think it continues to need to be an area of
focus. It's a vital capability for our country and, as you
indicated, it's the smallest Navy we've had for many, many
decades. For a country that has big bodies of water on both
coasts, that's a maritime country, that's a great concern.
Senator Wicker. Would it be fair to say we are
shortchanging part of the mission? Could you enlighten us as to
what aspects of our mission are we shortchanging because of the
lack of these 313 ships?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy is very pressed right now,
operating at a very high tempo. I think Admiral Roughead, who
will certainly have an opportunity to speak for himself, would
say that he is sort of at the edge of being able to meet the
commitments in terms of global commitments. He and our Navy is
heavily focused in the Gulf as well. The sea base that was just
created very quickly in Haiti is certainly well within what we
expect and can do. But given the operational tempo (OPTEMPO)
that our Navy and our Air Force, quite frankly, is under, which
sometimes gets lost in the focus on our ground forces--their
OPTEMPO has increased as well, and so Admiral Roughead's
concern is that we are wearing capability out and we're not
replacing it at a rate that gets to that kind of number that
you're talking about.
Senator Wicker. I see.
Let me move back to a point that Senator McCain was making.
I just returned also from Afghanistan and Pakistan. I agree
with Senator McCain that this July 2011 date is mentioned when
you talk to leaders over there. There was a term that we came
back with from our Congressional Delegation with Leader
McConnell, and that was a ``deficit of trust.'' It's not just
the date for the beginning of the drawdown, but also
specifically with regard to Pakistan it's the decade of really
very ill will between the United States and the Government of
Pakistan.
Do you agree, Secretary Gates, that there is a deficit of
trust about the United States' intention to be a long-term
strategic partner with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and what are
we doing to address that deficit of trust?
Secretary Gates. I think there definitely is such a deficit
of trust with Pakistan, and I think it's historical. The
Pakistanis will speak of three or four American betrayals, only
the most recent of which are turning our backs on Afghanistan
and them after the Soviets withdrew, and the other the
implementation of the Pressler amendment and cutoff of military
to military relationships.
I think, frankly, the way that trust is rebuilt is with
time, effort, and actions. I think Admiral Mullen at this point
has in his 2\1/2\ years as Chairman been to Pakistan probably
15 or 16 times. He has an extraordinary relationship with
General Kayani. I think there is a good personal trust there.
But I think for Pakistanis as a whole, it is our sticking
with them. It is our attention to their problems, including
their economic problems. So we commend the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
bill, which is very important. But I think being steadfast is
important.
I was in Pakistan just a couple of weeks ago and spoke
directly to this, and I would say that in some areas it's more
than a deficit of trust. There are conspiracy theories over
there about our wanting to take their nuclear weapons, about
our wanting to divide them up, all kinds of things. I spoke to
that directly. So I think honesty in dealing with them, but a
long-term effort, is what's going to be required.
In Afghanistan, my personal sense is that we have--in the
various visits that I have made and Admiral Mullen and others,
they understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process
and that there is no deadline on that process. But there also
is an acknowledgment by some of the Afghans that in effect they
needed that kind of wakeup call in order to begin to realize
they were going to have to take responsibility themselves for
defeating the Taliban, that this wasn't something that
everybody else could do for them.
So I think that what we need to continue to communicate to
the Afghans is that even as our security forces draw down over
the next several years, that our presence there, our
willingness to partner with them, our willingness to be a part
of their economic and political life going forward, is a long-
term, decades-long commitment by the United States to that
country, not to having huge military forces there, but helping
them get control of their security situation and then them
being in charge of their country.
But I think the July 2011 timeline is controversial. My own
view is that it provided exactly the right incentive for them
to begin to accept responsibility, but by having no terminal
date on it, it allows us to do a conditions-based withdrawal
that I think makes sense.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we have the recommendations of the QDR. We have
your budget proposal. This is not the moment to comment from
our side of the table on the details in there.
I would like to thank Senator Wicker for his comments about
the size of the Navy and the challenges in the Navy. Obviously,
I do not think it is an appropriate budget item for the Navy to
think that they can spend a billion dollars in upgrading a
nice-to-have facility in Mayport at the same time when we're
looking to try to build a fleet up to 313 ships. Admiral
Mullen, you'll recall when you and I were commissioned in 1968
we had 930 ships in the United States Navy. We went down to
479. When I was Secretary of the Navy it went up to 568.
But I want to set that aside. I want to make sure you know
we're still going to continue that discussion. I want to set
that aside because I only have 5 minutes and I want to talk
about something else. That is that I don't believe, quite
frankly, that the DOD budget should be sacrosanct when it comes
to looking at the constraints and the examinations that we
ought to be putting on different programs.
Secretary Gates, I take your point about not wanting to go
into force structure reductions. But at the same time, I
believe you can meet the challenges and adapt for the future
and still clean up a lot of unnecessary programs that exist in
the Pentagon by taking a hard look at programs that don't
produce a clear bottom line and are not simply hardware systems
or force structure issues.
I very much appreciate the efforts that you've made in
terms of program reductions, which you mentioned in your
opening statements. But I think there comes a time every now
and then to sort of shake things down. I remember when I was
Secretary of the Navy the Gramm-Rudman Act was passed over
here, 1987. We had to implement it in 1988. It mandated a 10
percent across-the-board reduction in defense programs, because
it was a 5 percent government-wide mandate and half of the
programs at that time were fenced.
They went too far. They clearly went too far. I resigned as
Secretary of the Navy because they cut into force structure too
far. But it doesn't hurt to really get into efficiencies in an
area where we're not getting an appropriate bottom line.
Let me give you three data points and I would ask today for
you to make a commitment to really examine these types of
programs. You and I are familiar with the Blackwater program
that I wrote you about in 2007, and we came to some resolution
on it, where out in San Diego they were going to spend more
than $60 million for a private contractor to train sailors how
to do their job, basically how to defend themselves on-board a
ship.
The first question I had on that was the fact that this is
something that active duty people should have been doing, not a
contractor. But the major concern I had was that this program
came from operations and maintenance block funding. It had
never been authorized. It had never been specifically
appropriated as a program. It was just approved by a lower
level official in the Department of the Navy based on the needs
of the fleet. As we examined it, we found out that the
Secretary of the Navy didn't even have to review that program
unless it was a $78 million program.
There's a program existing right now, and I don't know the
extent of it, where we're basically sending military officers
over to staff and fund think tanks. Your own Under Secretary of
Defense was part of creating a think tank, CNAF. My
understanding of these programs is they get military fellows.
These are active duty people. They go over, they get their full
pay and allowances. But not only that, they get tuition. The
numbers that I saw were $17,000 a ``semester,'' whatever a
semester is while you're over there, to pay the rent, the
computers and all the rest of that.
Essentially what that means is the American taxpayer is
funding think tanks, basically to keep them in business. They
don't produce any really added value to DOD in my view in terms
of a direct contribution.
Another example that just came up over the past couple of
months is this mentors program, where, according to news
reports, you can have retired high-ranking general officers and
admirals making well in excess of $100,000 a year in their
retirement, 80 percent of these people working with defense
contractors, and then going in and making up to $2,600 a day to
give their advice. In other words, a retired admiral or general
can make more in a day than a corporal in Afghanistan will make
in a month, basically to do what he's supposed to do anyway,
and that is fulfill his stewardship from having spent a career
in the military.
I don't know the full cost of that, but according to USA
Today these people are being paid between $200 and $340 an hour
plus expenses. They are hired as independent contractors, so
they're not subject to government ethics rules. They operate
outside public scrutiny, and many of them work for weapons
makers and in effect are able to either gain information for
companies or exchange data.
That's not the military I grew up in. That's not the
military you and I served in, Admiral. That's not the Pentagon
that I served in in the 1980s.
So these are the kinds of things, Mr. Secretary, I think we
can do and not affect force structure.
Secretary Gates. We certainly will continue to look at
these things. I will tell you on the mentoring program, the
Deputy Secretary has been reviewing this and I think you will
see some--we think there is great value in the program, but you
will see some fairly dramatic changes in the way it's
administered.
Senator Webb. I would certainly hope so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
for being here today to answer our questions.
Secretary Gates, when we capture an enemy combatant in
Afghanistan or Iraq, do we read them their Miranda rights?
Secretary Gates. No.
Senator LeMieux. So why should we do so if we capture one
in this country?
Secretary Gates. That's a question better addressed to the
Attorney General, Senator.
Senator LeMieux. You were the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency before you were the Secretary of Defense?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator LeMieux. So I assume you have an opinion on this.
Secretary Gates. My view is that the issue of whether
someone is put into the American judicial system or into the
military commissions is a judgment best made by the chief law
enforcement officer of the United States.
Senator LeMieux. Before they get into either commission,
there's a question of being able to ask questions, and
certainly we know there's a chilling effect when we give
someone their Miranda rights. So if we're not doing it
overseas, I'm not sure why it makes sense that we would be
doing it in this country.
Secretary Gates. We have in place protocols now that--and
there is authority under the law--that if a person is deemed to
be a threat to the national security as a self-confessed
terrorist would be, that there can be delays in Mirandizing to
allow time for questioning. So we have the authority to do that
even in the Article III system.
Senator LeMieux. My colleague from Virginia was just
talking about Mayport and that he has a different view than you
expect that I would. You put in the QDR that, to mitigate the
risk of a terrorist attack, accident or natural disaster, the
Navy will homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport. I know you
support that and I appreciate that.
But there is no money in the budget, as I understand it,
for the nuclearization projects or other projects that need to
be completed.
Admiral Mullen. There's $239 million in the FYDP for
military construction for Mayport.
Senator LeMieux. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Mullen, will you officially designate a ship to
Mayport in the coming months?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, it's not mine. I think that in
the end that would be a decision that the Navy would recommend
and it would come up to the Secretary.
Senator LeMieux. Are you planning on making a
recommendation soon?
Admiral Mullen. As soon as the Navy brings one up, and I
just don't know where they are in that process.
Senator LeMieux. Maybe we can follow up on that later.
I want to speak a little bit about acquisition reform. A
number of my colleagues have mentioned this. Specifically, Mr.
Secretary, about the JSF, we recently were given some
information about the fact that it's 35 percent over budget,
which I think is about $18 billion if my numbers are correct.
This program started in the mid-1990s. It occurs to me I think
we went to the moon quicker than we've produced this plane.
So I appreciate your efforts to try to get this under
control, and I saw that there was a suspension in the
performance bonuses. My question to you is, in terms of
acquisition reform, it seems to me that there needs to be
reform across DOD, probably across the government, and not just
performance bonuses being withheld, but performance penalties
under the contracts that we have with vendors.
Is there a person that you charged as responsible solely to
lead the effort on acquisition reform, and are you looking at
these contracts to make sure that the vendor would bear the
cost if programs were delayed?
Secretary Gates. Under Secretary Carter is responsible for
that and he is taking a very close look at a large number of
contracts.
Senator LeMieux. I had an opportunity to be at CENTCOM
yesterday and I spoke with General Petraeus. In the follow-up
to my trip to Afghanistan at the end of October, which I went
on with Senator Burr and Senator Whitehouse, one thing that we
noted is that our information work there in terms of trying to
get the message out to the Afghan people may be not doing as
good of a job as it could be.
General Petraeus talked about the fact that we were
successful in the surge in Iraq because of the power of ideas,
not just the power of our forces. I'm wondering if this is on
your radar screen, the need to commit more focused energy and
potentially more funds to providing information to the Afghan
people to counteract what the Taliban does. The Taliban will go
in and say, oh, we just killed a bunch of children. It's
misinformation.
There are some good efforts that are being done. I met with
a Colonel Kraft who was doing some very good work with trying
to get radios out there to folks, working with territorial
governors to get information out quickly so that we could
counteract propaganda from the Taliban.
Is that something that's risen to your level and do you
understand the need to maybe improve our efforts?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely, and in fact we have spent a
good bit of time on this in the situation room with our
interagency.
Senator LeMieux. I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to
ask just one more question for the Admiral.
On the 313-ship Navy, the plan I guess is currently to have
10 carriers. Is that sufficient? We're refitting the
Enterprise. Do we need to keep the Enterprise in operation
until the Ford comes on line? What's your thoughts?
Admiral Mullen. I think that the current requirement is for
11 and I support that. The 10-carrier issue is to be decided
literally decades down the road. Obviously, how we build them
generates how many of them there are and when we retire them.
I don't think we should keep the Enterprise. I think the
Enterprise is unique, incredibly costly, and the decision to
decommission it after its next deployment and take the risk in
that gap I think--it is a decision that I support, recognizing
there is some risk associated with that.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to add my thanks, gentlemen, for the wonderful
service that you do for our country. For those of our military
personnel in Haiti, I just want to extend my thanks to them,
and also remind our government that we're there to assist and
not to take over or occupy a country, as some people are
concerned about. So make sure that we keep that message going
forward.
Mr. Secretary, the DIMHRS, the largest enterprise resource
planning program ever implemented for the human resource
system, would replace over some 90 legacy systems. It's
intended to bring all payroll and personnel functions of the
military into one integrated, web-based system.
In August 1996, a DOD task force concluded that the
multiple service-unique military personnel and pay systems
causes significant functional shortcomings, particularly in the
joint arena, and excessive development and maintenance costs.
Their central recommendation was that DOD should move to a
single all-Service, all-component, fully-integrated personnel
and pay system with common core software.
This is a program that DOD said at one time was necessary.
Why is it considered a poorly performing program today, Mr.
Secretary, and why is it not necessary and what has changed?
Secretary Gates. Well, this is one where I think both
Admiral Mullen and I have something to say. First of all, after
10 years of effort, poor performance and difficulties with that
program, I would say that what we've gotten for half a billion
dollars is an unpronounceable acronym. Many of the programs
that I have made decisions to cut have been controversial
within DOD. I will tell you this one was not.
Admiral Mullen. Both in my prior life as head of the Navy
and actually even before that as a budget officer and certainly
through this, this program has been a disaster. The
characteristics you describe, Senator, are good characteristics
to have. I talked earlier about making a program too perfect
and you just can't get there, too complex. It was proven that
DIMHRS couldn't get there time and time again.
So I applaud the termination of the program. That doesn't
mean we shouldn't try to create the kind of enterprise effort
that you just described, but we have to do it in a way where
we're not spending the kind of money that we were spending
going nowhere in DIMHRS.
Senator Burris. Gentlemen, is that where we run into a
military bureaucracy, that people don't want to give up
something? I think it's more of that. If we can pay under the
Office of Personnel Management all civilian employees under one
payment system, why can't the military also exercise one
payment system? It would be my assessment that you would run
into turf problems that the military is not willing to say that
a person at a grade 6 in the Navy should be paid as a person
who's a grade 6 in the Army, with the same system. So you cut a
paycheck and you don't have all these--what have you got, five
or six different payroll systems in the military? We can save
millions and millions of taxpayers' dollars by combining those
systems.
Admiral Mullen. I don't disagree that theoretically we
could get there and we should have that. However, it was
costing us a tremendous amount of money to go nowhere in this--
--
Senator Burris. Then why----
Admiral Mullen. Senator, even in the private sector, when
you talk to individuals who have tried to combine, who have
combined various multi systems, it is always a challenge. So
the challenge is there. I think the goal is one that's a good
goal. We just were not getting there with DIMHRS. We were
wasting our money.
Senator Burris. Are you going to take it up in the future?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I'm sure we will. It sounds like
we will.
Senator Burris. Let me shift gears for a minute. Why is the
funding for Iraq security forces nearly doubling from the
fiscal year 2010 budget to the fiscal year 2011 budget? When I
was in Iraq it was my understanding we were standing down and
that we wouldn't need to be spending extra money for training
for the security forces. Is there an explanation why the budget
is increasing?
Secretary Gates. Sir, $300 million in the 2011 OCO is to
set the conditions for the transfer to the State Department for
responsibility for training the police.
Chairman Levin. Repeat what ``OCO'' means?
Secretary Gates. The overseas contingency operations bill.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Gates. The new supplemental.
So there are a number of categories like that. A lot of
it--there's only $158 million--of the billion dollars for 2010,
for example, only $150 million of that is for equipment. The
rest of it is all connected with our transfer of
responsibilities from--costs associated with transfer of
responsibilities either from ourselves to the Iraqis or from
DOD to the Department of State after our troops come out. So
most of those costs are associated in that area, along with
sustainment of and training for the Iraqis who are going to be
taking our places.
Senator Burris. My time has expired. But gentlemen, I hope
that we will revisit this personnel system. If the civilians
can do it, you get one paycheck and one pay scale system, the
civilians, the military can do it without five or six different
systems existing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
A couple quick items. Feel free to submit that
unpronounceable acronym for the record.
Secretary Gates. DIMHRS.
Chairman Levin. You made reference in an earlier answer to
the Article III system, and you were referring to the civilian
court system.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, one housekeeping announcement before I
call on Senator Collins. When we begin our hearing on DADT,
which it looks like we're on schedule to begin maybe even
before noon, we're going to follow the same early bird order as
we have for this hearing, so that everybody can be put on
notice. We're going to recognize Senators in the same order as
they appeared for the current hearing when we reach the DADT
hearing.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. So the last will be first for
that next hearing?
Chairman Levin. I didn't say reverse order. I said the same
order. [Laughter.]
I wish I could say otherwise. We're struggling here with
what is the best way to do it and we decided the best way to do
it is to put everyone on notice.
Senator Collins. Just don't tell them that we're starting
early, then.
Chairman Levin. Okay, you have a deal. [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, according to the QDR, on any given day
there are more than 7 million DOD computers that are being used
to support our warfighters and for other DOD operations. We
also know that every single day there are attempts to hack into
those computers. Some of these attacks are from nation-states
like China.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of DOD's
current cyber security efforts?
Secretary Gates. I think that we actually are, particularly
with our classified systems, in good shape. Most of the attacks
that we encounter, too, are to unclassified systems. But
frankly, we're not happy with where we are, and particularly as
we look ahead. That's why we have an initiative to create Cyber
Command and also have money in the budget and have made a
priority in the QDR and in the budget for cyber in terms of
training significant additional individuals who are expert in
this area. We've made it a top priority for the Services to
fill all the slots in the education programs for cyber.
So I would say I think we're in good shape now, but we look
with concern to the future and we think a lot more needs to be
done.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, last year the President announced a major
policy change on how our country would extend protection
against ballistic missiles to our NATO allies. I joined Senator
Levin on a trip to talk to the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Russia about this very issue last March. I support the change
in direction.
Part of the change in direction is that sea-based Aegis
surface combatants would become a primary means of
accomplishing that important mission. Now, ships dedicated to
perform this mission will likely be tied to specific areas of
operation. That means that they're not going to be fully
available to perform many of the other more traditional
missions that we've typically assigned our major surface
combatants. A number of analysts have suggested that that means
we will need a larger number of major surface combatants if all
of these missions and roles are to be executed successfully.
How does the decision to assign major surface combatants to
this new dedicated missile defense mission affect your
assessment of the size of the overall fleet?
Admiral Mullen. It starts with an earlier discussion we had
on the need to get to that floor of 313 ships, which we're
below target right now. One of the things that I've worried
about for years is that we would have enough in particular
surface combatants to be able to meet the needs that are out
there, although I do not subscribe to the theory that these
ships would become ships like our strategic ballistic missile
submarines, in other words it's the only thing that they do.
We've invested too much in the broad capability of our surface
ships, wide-ranging capability of our surface ships, to
dedicate them to one mission.
I think as this program has been adjusted, it focuses on
regional, theater, evolving threats and I think that's the
right answer. So we would have certainly some indications and
warning. We have enough ships to flood, if you will, to a
certain area, understanding what the threat is.
So I think we need to look carefully at how many we need. I
also think we need to upgrade the ones that we have. While we
are upgrading some, I think that we need to look pretty
seriously in modernization at do we have enough upgrades for
the ships that we've already built to meet this threat in the
longer term, as well as looking to see if we need more. I'm
more focused on the upgrade right now than I am additional
Aegis ships per se.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, I want to compliment you on
the relief efforts in Haiti.
The American military leads. You are the point of the
spear. You make it happen. Please consider that for the future,
for the long term, we're going to have to do something
different. I was just told a very troubling story of a relief
effort by a group of Floridians, doctors, prominent people,
that took a private planeload of medical supplies down to a
number of our doctors who have been on the ground just doing
heroic stuff. Just before they got there, the customs had been
turned back over to the Haitian Government, and as they're
unloading the plane of all the medical supplies to get it to in
this case to University of Miami doctors, who were there the
day after the earthquake, the customs officials wanted bribes
to release the medical supplies.
We just can't allow this kind of thing. So you have done
tremendous things in getting us to where we are, the
humanitarian mission. But for the long term, we're going to
have to have some kind of international trusteeship that's
going to be led by the international community, that will take
this kind of nonsense away from the people who have done this
for 200 years in Haiti.
I'm not expecting a response. I just want to compliment you
for what you've done.
Now, I have the privilege of chairing the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee and as we withdraw our
conventional forces in Iraq, the requirement for the SOF is
projected to remain. But they, the SOF, rely on the
conventional counterparts for many of the support functions. So
what do we do to ensure that our SOFs are being adequately
supported as we withdraw the conventional forces from Iraq?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I think there's a two-part
answer. I'll take the equipment part and ask Admiral Mullen to
take the people part.
One of the things that we are doing is moving the base--
moving the funding of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
from the supplementals into the base budget. We believe SOCOM
is going to have the capability that this country is going to
need far into the future, and so in terms of their equipment,
we're plussing up the equipment that they are supplied with,
much of which is unique to them. We are increasing the number
of slots that they have by this budget for fiscal year 2011,
increases the SOCOM personnel by 2,800 people.
So I think that in terms of equipment and so on, we are
putting ourselves on a long-term footing to sustain that
capability.
Admiral Mullen. Part of--and this is in the QDR and in the
budget--part of moving to the future is investing in the wars
that we're in, and there's no more critical capability to my
view that we are investing in in these wars than the Special
Forces capability. That will serve us well for the future.
I don't know if I'll get these numbers exactly right, but I
think we started these wars at about 38,000. We're at some
56,000 Special Force operators or Special Force military
members now, and these, as the Secretary said, are growing by
2,800. This is, at least from my interaction with Admiral
Olson, this is about as fast as we can grow, as fast as we can
find the people to do this.
A document which has struck both the Secretary and myself
has been Admiral Olson's guidance for this year in 2010. I have
said for years I believe our whole military has to be looking
at the kinds of characteristics--swift, agile, lethal,
engaging, all those kinds of things that is a part of our
Special Forces, as we look to the future for our conventional
forces.
The tension that you describe--and I think it's a healthy
tension--between the Special Forces and the Services that
provide the people, provide a lot of the early training, go out
and recruit them, is a good tension and we'll have to continue
to deal with that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Just a quick comment, if you would,
Admiral, about the role of Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft in Afghanistan? You have
provided adequately in the budget for keeping JSTARS as a
viable option by re-engining these old platforms. What's the
role in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. It is principally tracking targets on the
ground more than anything else. But as you ask that question,
Senator Nelson, I think of JSTARS being the revolutionary
aircraft that it was for Operation Desert Storm--actually, I'm
sorry, even in the mid-1990s, early to mid-1990s in the
Balkans, where we deployed them prior to the time that we
actually finished successfully testing them, and they have
provided an extraordinary capability. Yet, the adaptation in
these wars to the persistence requirement which we've achieved
much more readily with our unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than
we've been able to do with any manned aircraft per se.
But they're incredibly valuable, particularly in tracking
targets on the ground, which is one of the reasons this
investment is so important.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, sir.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. First I want to thank you, Secretary
Gates, and I hope that your office will continue to cooperate
with information we've requested on a number of different
topics for the subcommittee that I chair in Homeland Security
on contracting.
One of the things we're trying to get to the bottom of is
whether or not some of the contracts on the earmarks have been
competitive. There is--it is said that--I think the chairman
accidentally called on me before Senator Bayh and I want to
make sure--I'm happy to----
Chairman Levin. Just let me thank Senator Bayh. There's a
mistake I made here and I appreciate your courtesy in dealing
with it. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. I want to thank you for the cooperation
in trying to get to the bottom, because I think that there is
in some instances a fiction that some of these earmarks are
being competitively given out, when in reality the Senators'
requests are being honored, maybe informally. But we're trying
to get to the bottom of it and make sure we have as much
transparency as possible.
I've read everything I can get my hands on on the JSF, and
when we're going to actually use these fighters. I'm confused
about the date. Depending on whether you're talking about the
analysis team that went out from DOD or whether--I see quotes
from General Schwartz or whoever--let's get that on the record,
Secretary Gates. When do you think the JSF is going to be
operational for our military?
Secretary Gates. Even with the restructuring of the
program, the training squadron is still scheduled to deploy to
Eglin Air Force Base in 2011. The Marine Corps will have their
IOC in 2012; the Air Force in the second quarter of 2013; and
the Navy the fourth quarter of 2014. Those are the latest
estimates that I've been given.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. I heard you say those earlier. I
just wanted to make sure that it was clarified.
I want to tell you how much I respect the fact that you
fired somebody. You've done this several times. I've watched
you do this, and it is unusual. I don't think anybody around
here realizes how unusual it is for a Secretary of Defense to
fire people when these things happen. Traditionally, there have
not been people that have been fired. I just want you to know I
noticed and I think it's hard to do, but I think it's very
important that you send that signal of accountability.
Let me ask you about the modernization of the C-5s. I'm
going to try to go at the C-17 a little bit differently. I
would like to ask this question: If your hands were not tied by
Congress in terms of the modernization of the C-5s, would you
continue to modernize or would you retire?
Secretary Gates. We would continue to modernize a good
portion of the C-5s. But there would be some of the older C-5As
that we would retire.
Senator McCaskill. Are you advocating that we repeal the
statutory tying of your hands while you're advocating for the
closing of the line on the C-17s? Are you also advocating that
Congress quit tying your hands as it relates to retiring the C-
5s?
Secretary Gates. Any greater flexibility I can have to
manage the program, I would welcome.
Senator McCaskill. I want to make sure that I get your
endorsement for us retiring our hand-tying of you, obviously,
the modernization of the C-5s has had huge problems. It turned
out to be much more expensive than it was ever intended to be.
I know that it's my understanding we're not using C-5s in
Haiti, correct?
Secretary Gates. I don't think so.
Senator McCaskill. In fact, we're using, as we always do,
the reliable, easy to land on short runways, load them up, get
them out, cheaper to fly, C-17 in Haiti; isn't that correct,
Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. I just wanted to make sure.
Secretary Gates. Although I would just say for the record,
200 and some, 204,000 landings for strategic lift since 1997, 4
percent have been at airfields that a C-5 could not access, and
half of those were in Iraq.
Senator McCaskill. I understand that and I know that. But
it's important to remember that the Iraq capability was pretty
darn important over the past 6 to 8 years in terms of military
operations. I think we're going to have the same situation in
Afghanistan. Aren't there air strips in Afghanistan that are
certainly more friendly to a C-17 than a C-5?
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Senator McCaskill. I would like to briefly get into
prescription drugs and our military. I think we are all
painfully aware of the suicide problem that we have. I think we
are also aware that there has been a ``modernization,'' of
prescription drug availability in the military as it relates to
PTSD and other mental health issues. I know that we have a task
force looking at prescription drug use.
I wanted to also bring to the attention of the committee,
and to you, I think as this task force is looking at
prescription drug use, not only should we be looking at the
anti-depressants that I think have become ubiquitous in some
instances as it relates to treating our deployed forces when
they're having stress issues, but also the prescription drug
for pain. I particularly have mentioned to General Casey
Oxycontin, and the highly addictive nature of Oxycontin and the
widespread availability of Oxycontin within the military, and
the fact that we now know that in some parts of our country
Oxycontin has a higher street value than heroin because of the
highly addictive nature of the drug.
I wanted to ask your cooperation, Secretary Gates--and I
will be sending you a letter--that the prescription drug task
force also take a look at how widely available Oxycontin is in
the military and whether or not its overall effect has been
harmful or positive.
I wanted to ditto Senator Webb on the mentoring program.
Pretty ugly. We have to get that under control and make sure
it's transparent. The revolving door at the Pentagon deserves
as much attention as the revolving door in Congress.
Thank you, Secretary Gates.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Bayh, again with our thanks.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me compliment Senator McCaskill for her line of
questioning. Claire, Harry Truman would be proud. You're
focused on saving the taxpayers' money. It reminds me in a
previous incarnation when I was our State's governor during
difficult financial times. I used to scrub the budget so
carefully I had a nickname in some quarters as ``Evaneezer.''
So I really do appreciate your efforts.
Mr. Secretary, I'd like to begin by complimenting you and
associating myself with what Senator McCaskill was saying. It
was a breath of fresh air that you're bringing increased
accountability to some of these programs. Some of the practices
that have been allowed to exist for too long in DOD contracting
of weapons systems would never survive in the private sector.
So the fact that people are being held accountable and the
contractors themselves are being asked to share some of the
burden for the delays and the cost overruns I think is
absolutely the right thing to do. I want to commend you for
that and I hope we'll see more of the same.
We are gathered here at a time of great financial and
economic distress for the American people and for our
government. People are being asked to make sacrifices. The
President has called for a freeze and nonsecurity discretionary
spending, and yet we are being asked to appropriate, I think
you indicated, a 3.4 percent increase in Defense spending. Is
that correct?
Secretary Gates. 1 percent, 1.8 percent in real growth.
Senator Bayh. In real growth. My point is I support that
because of the challenges that we face. I just wanted to put it
in the context of people are being asked to make real
sacrifices. It makes even more important your efforts to try
and save tax dollars wherever possible.
It seems to me that, looking at the big items, the prospect
for any real meaningful savings in the future have to do with
our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and perhaps the
prospect that they will head in a better direction, allowing us
to perhaps save some money there. So I'd like to ask you about
both of those conflicts.
I know you've given us your best--or your most likely case
estimate about what it will take in both of those conflicts. If
you had to say that it was going to be something other than the
most likely case--let's start with Iraq. The way things are
trending there, would it be more or less likely that we would
be able to withdraw more aggressively there than you're
currently planning on, and in so doing save some of the money
that we're being asked to commit to to Iraq?
Secretary Gates. I think that General Odierno's view would
be that it would be very risky to try and accelerate the
withdrawals beyond the timetable that he already has.
Senator Bayh. So no real prospect for savings beyond what
has been estimated there?
Secretary Gates. I think not.
Senator Bayh. In Afghanistan, my own view is that skeptics
who look at that conflict and say, we're going to do our part,
we're making a major commitment to stabilizing that country, to
keeping the Taliban and the al Qaeda from having a platform to
attack us--there's no doubt in my mind we'll do what is
necessary. The question is whether the Afghans are capable and
willing to do their part. You look at the history of that
country, the complexity of that country, I think skeptics kind
of wonder whether even with our best efforts we'll be able to
get the job done.
Would it be your assessment that there probably is not much
prospect for--well, if events are going to deviate from the
most likely scenario, it's more likely to be on the down side
than the up side in Afghanistan, no real prospect for
additional savings there?
Secretary Gates. I suspect not. But I would tell you,
Senator, that, as the President announced, there will be a
review of our strategy in Afghanistan at the end of this year,
and I think both Admiral Mullen and I are committed that if we
determine that our strategy is not working that we will not
recommend just plunging ahead blindly without a change of
course.
Admiral Mullen. If I could just quickly, I think a healthy
skepticism is good. I think a terminal skepticism at this point
is--it's far too soon. In fact, we see signs in many places now
of uplifted spirits on the part of the Afghan people where
security has turned around. I'm not underestimating the
significance of the challenge, but from a strategy standpoint,
a resourcing standpoint, a leadership standpoint, and a
commitment on the part of the Afghans that we can see as a
result of what the President announced, it's better than it's
ever been and we're just a few months into it.
Senator Bayh. We're all hopeful, but I think we all realize
we have to be realistic as well. Mr. Secretary, I think that's
what you've outlined here: a review in progress, assessing our
partners both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then making the
hard decisions at the appropriate time.
Let me ask a couple of other questions. Have you requested
all the Predators and Reapers you can use and you need?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. We have pretty much maxed out
the lines. I would just say that those capabilities in some
instances, in more than a few instances, the challenge is not
just the airframe or the platform; it's the ground station,
it's the crews, it's the linguists that enable us to use the
information. So it's the whole package that we have to put
together.
Senator Bayh. For a long time there was a shortage of
pilots as I recall. But we've----
Secretary Gates. It was both airframes and platforms. But I
would say over the last year to 15 months the Air Force has
really leaned into this problem, and General Schwartz has told
me that they are now training more UAV pilots than they are
fighter-bomber pilots.
Senator Bayh. That's quite a change. But it's one of those
systems that's really been delivering for us here. So I'm
delighted at your request.
Finally--and my time has expired--along with five of my
colleagues, I was in Kabul and at the Bagram Air Base earlier
this month, or last month now that it's February, and I just
want to--please convey, we have met with many of the members of
the Armed Forces, and particularly the Special Operations folks
down there at Bagram, they're doing an outstanding job and I
want you to, if you can, please relay our appreciation for the
service they're rendering our country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. Some points have
been raised with respect to the trial of Abdulmutallab and I
think, Mr. Secretary, you sort of indicated that that decision
was the province of the Attorney General. But just as a matter
of fact, had he been turned over to military custody he would
have been provided a lawyer, I presume; isn't that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Given the fact that we've harmonized the
rules of interrogation between the FBI and other agencies of
the government, including the military, that the tools
available for an interrogation would have been very much the
same?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. I think something else, too. Again, this is
not a question of venue; this is a question more of how we
combat these terrorists. A lot of them describe themselves as
holy warriors, and if we reinforce their self-described holy
warrior description, trying them essentially in a military
trial and not a civilian trial, doesn't that reinforce what
they think they are, which is basically that they're not
terrorist criminals, they are some type of holy warrior?
Secretary Gates. Well, I suppose that that's the case. I
just think that we're in a good place when you have the ability
to use both the civilian court system and the military
commissions and to be able to make decisions on how to
prosecute an individual based on a case by case basis depending
on those specific circumstances. The Attorney General consulted
with me in terms of the decision on the Christmas Day bomber
and I told him that I would defer to him on that. I think we
need to use both of those venues, but I think it will depend on
the circumstances in each case.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Mullen, in Afghanistan there has been I believe an
increase in recruits to the Afghani forces, which are
absolutely essential to our long-term strategy. I know there's
been a pay increase that has helped. But what other factors
have helped?
Admiral Mullen. I think an intangible that I would put out
there is the fact that the commitment on the part of the United
States and NATO nations specifically to this fight and to the
totality of it, not just the military side. I think the
leadership in Afghanistan visibly more committed, General
McChrystal out in battlefield circulation with the President,
who has connected with his people in ways that have been very
important as well, along with--and I think it's a combination
of standing up for their country, which I am told routinely and
which their leaders feel strongly about, in addition to the
incentivized pay increases specifically.
What we're struggling with is, while the recruiting was at
116 percent over the last couple of months, having the
institutional capacity both from a training infrastructure
standpoint as well as trainers to absorb that many. That's
just, quite frankly, an area that we haven't focused on enough
in the past and we're trying to get right right now.
Secretary Gates. I should correct the record. The Attorney
General consulted with me on the five September 11 terrorists,
not the Christmas Day bomber.
Senator Reed. Thank you, because it's important to have the
record accurate.
Mr. Secretary, you have I think once again proposed robust
funding for basic science in DOD in this budget. I think that's
critical. Could you give an idea of where you're proposing to
spend this money?
Secretary Gates. Let me do that for the record if I might.
[The information referred to follows:]

The $200 million increase relative to the Fiscal Year 2010
Department of Defense request will be directed to basic research in
high-priority areas that are promising for transformational defense
capabilities. These include nano-manufacturing science, synthetic
biology, advanced energy science, materials modeling for force
protection, computational neuroscience and quantum information science,
among other highly promising areas. We have increased the investment in
the Army by $29 million, Navy by $25 million, Air Force by $34 million,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency by $102 million and with
smaller changes in other Defense Agencies. The research will be
conducted at universities and other nonprofit institutions, industries,
and Government laboratories, in distribution similar to the base budget
for basic research. The increased funds will support individual
investigators and research teams, including students.

Senator Reed. You're quite welcome to do that for the
record.
Admiral Mullen, in the QDR there is a discussion of dealing
with anti-access environments and utilizing the advantages of
sub-surface operations, which I presume is not just submarines,
but also unmanned undersea vehicles. Can you amplify what your
plans are?
Admiral Mullen. Broadly, I think the presumption is exactly
right. We've focused on investments there for some years. I'd
have to get back to you with what the specifics of that would
be. I would only say, from actually every capability area that
we have, that the ability to create and sustain access
globally, oftentimes is very important. Oftentimes this is very
focused on the Western Pacific, but, quite frankly, it's much
broader than that and those capabilities are vital for our
future.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here, and I am the last one
standing I think on this round of activity. So let me try to be
very quick. I have some very Alaskan issues, but first a little
more global.
Again, thank you for all the work you're doing in Haiti and
the impact that we have down there. Can you tell me, just so I
have the number correct, what's our total capacity down there
right now in regards to troops that we have there?
Admiral Mullen. We actually had over 20,000. With the
release of the aircraft carrier Vinson, who actually left her
helicopter capability ashore in Haiti, but with the release of
her we're down to just under 17,000 today.
Senator Begich. Do we have an idea of what the resource
cost has been so far to DOD?
Secretary Gates. It's about $150 million so far.
Senator Begich. Do you have an estimation of what you think
in this budget process that you're planning to expend for the
next year?
Mr. Hale. Well, I am not sure of the duration and length of
this. We estimated $300 to $400 million during the first 30
days, and I think we'll have to revise that depending on how
long we're there and the degree of our commitment.
Senator Begich. Do you have within the budget that the
President has presented the resources to meet that goal?
Secretary Gates. No.
Senator Begich. Okay, that's good. That's what we need to
know.
Secretary Gates. We can cash flow it, but we need to be
repaid.
Senator Begich. Understood.
Mr. Hale. We do have the money right now, thanks to the
committee and Congress, to cash flow it.
Senator Begich. Okay. Do you think and believe you have a
clear mission of what you should be doing Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I think we do.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. It's very clear and it's in
support of, obviously, first of all the Haitian people, the
Haitian government, the UN mission. We're in support of USAID,
who has also been magnificent in this effort. So it is a
supporting effort specifically.
Senator Begich. Very good. If I can go very quickly on
another subject that Senator McCaskill brought up, on
Oxycontin. The other piece I would like, maybe at another time
for the record, not only what the drug activity in the sense of
distribution, but the efforts for individuals who are trying to
get off of it. I have talked to several soldiers who have had
Oxycontin as their pain management and other things, but now
they're trying to get off it and we have limited resources. So
if you could, maybe for the record, just give me kind of how
that works and what you do for those soldiers that are trying
to now get themselves out of that situation, if you could do
that for the record, Admiral.
[The information referred to follows:]

We have come a long way in identifying and treating substance abuse
in recent years, but our work is not done. The Department continues to
work diligently to assure the appropriate use of pain medications and
prevent their misuse.
Foremost, alternative non-opioid pain treatments are being
developed and used when possible. Physical modalities, non-opioid
adjuvant medications, integrative modalities, and injection and
interventional modalities all provide treatment for pain in some cases
and thus militate against some opioid use.
An excellent example is the Defense and Veterans Pain Management
Initiative (DVPMI). The DVPMI seeks to improve the management of pain
in military and civilian medicine. Through clinical research efforts,
it has become a model for effective integration of acute and chronic
pain medicine. Through the efforts of the DVPMI, peripheral nerve
infusion pumps and patient-controlled analgesia pumps have been
approved for battlefield use and for flights on military aircraft.
The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary
of Defense to develop and implement a comprehensive policy concerning
pain management. The Task Force Report contained numerous
recommendations, and is currently being operationalized into a six
phase Comprehensive Pain Management Campaign Plan that will standardize
and optimize pain management.
Additionally, alternative pain management methods are being
considered which will allow a portion of servicemembers to avoid the
possibility of addiction in many cases where opioid pain medications
would otherwise have been used.
When opioids are the proper choice for patient care, programs and
standards of care are being improved to more effectively manage those
patients. Closely managing patients reduces the likelihood that the use
of opioids will lead to addiction. Efforts to improve the patient
management process include embedding pain physicians in the wounded
warrior clinics. We anticipate that improvements in Health Information
Technology will also reduce duplicative prescribing and dispensing of
medication. This includes tracking beneficiary data for prescription
information and working with civilian organizations on the Prescription
Drug Monitoring Program.
In some cases, a servicemember requires opioids and their use can
lead to addiction. In these cases, there are a variety of treatment
options available. A primary care provider is the first step in a whole
continuum of treatment levels. Patients move through the continuum of
care as more resource intensive treatments may become necessary.
In addition, Military OneSource allows soldiers to receive mental
health counseling. The program leverages civilian resources to prevent
those with addiction issues from failing to seek help.

Senator Begich. Then give me the Iraq status again. We had
how many troops there about a year ago?
[The information referred to follows:]

In February 2009, we had roughly 146,400 military in Iraq: 108,100
Army; 11,100 Air Force; 6,200 Navy; and 21,000 Marines.

Admiral Mullen. Sorry?
Senator Begich. How many troops did we have in Iraq about a
year ago? What was our peak level, do you think? 140?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, I would say 140, 150. We're at 104,000
today.
Senator Begich. 104,000 today?
Admiral Mullen. Right, and the marines are out.
Senator Begich. Then by the end of August, you think we'll
be down to?
Admiral Mullen. About 50.
Senator Begich. 50,000 remaining?
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Begich. Then the other date of next August, where
will we be?
Admiral Mullen. The following year, actually end of 2011,
we'll be out.
Senator Begich. Again to echo what I think you said to
Senator Udall, we're on track?
Admiral Mullen. We are.
Senator Begich. Very good. I'm trying to rapid-fire these,
knowing my time is limited.
In your DOD presentation of the budget, do you still have a
very robust--another issue, separate--alternative, renewable
energy program? I know that's been a big plus, to be very frank
with you, with the military. You have been leaders in this
area. Are you still fairly, in your mind, aggressive in this
arena?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Begich. Let me now be parochial, as you probably
had anticipated. But first with regards to the GMD, I
appreciate the missile ground defense system and the work
you've been doing in Alaska and the efforts you've done over
the years in kind of transition of what's been going on with
overall missile defense.
The way I understand this is you'll finish off field 2. Do
you have the resources in this budget or do you allocate
utilizing other resources to get to that final completion of
the 12 and then the decommissioning of the 6?
Secretary Gates. That's budgeted for.
Senator Begich. In this cycle?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Begich. Is there anything beyond even the six
decommissioned? Do you have to budget for that or do you think
you have that also in this cycle?
Secretary Gates. I think it's all in the budget.
Senator Begich. If there is a difference, you'll let us
know?
Climate change, Arctic policy. I know you mentioned it and
you started talking about it within this process, and I think
it's important. There is an issue, and maybe again at a later
time--we have three, the European Command, the Northern
Command, and the Pacific Command that kind of manages it all
together. Is there a process you're going through now to try to
bring some unified command, be it a joint command. How do we
deal with that, because I know that's an issue that keeps
popping up. Are you going through the process now, Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. I think, Senator, we would use the normal
process, which would bring all of that back here certainly from
the combatant commander's standpoint. We do that routinely
across a host of issues. There's no view that I've heard of or
certainly I don't see it from an intention standpoint to create
another command to handle this. But we are looking at the
policy. We actually want to give Thad Allen and the Coast Guard
a lot of credit here because they've actually done great work
and brought it to our attention in the last couple years. We've
moved ahead. We still have a long way to go there.
Senator Begich. My time is up, but that is exactly--you
stated that the Coast Guard's really been hollering out there
at all of us. As you move forward on that, I would love to be
engaged in that. As you're well aware, a huge opportunity, also
potential huge conflicts. So your work there would be greatly
appreciated.
My time is up. I tried to give you a variety pack and you
did a great job.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Chambliss is on his way. He has not had a first
round yet. I think maybe we'll just see if anyone has one
question for a second round. I have one, and then I'll see if
others do. Okay, I'll call on you too, Senator Burris.
My question is the following. There was a study that the
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) did on that alternate
engine for the F-136. My question is: It's now about 3 years
old. They looked at how much was invested, how much would need
to be invested to develop it, what would be the possible
benefits, what would be the costs for that alternate engine. My
question is, will you ask the IDA to update that study, since
we've had a couple of years now of additional investment? Can
you do that, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. Let me take a look at it, Senator, Mr.
Chairman. I don't know why not, but let me get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department does not intend to contract with the Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA) to update their 2007 study. The Fiscal Year 2007
National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department to sponsor a
Federally Funded Research Center (FFRDC) to conduct one of the three
independent studies on the Joint Strike Fighter propulsion system. The
Department selected IDA. The Department's Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (CAIG) was also directed to complete one of the studies. The
Department's Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office,
formerly the CAIG, recently updated their 2007 study to account for
investment in the alternate engine since that time, as well JSF
programmatic changes. The Department is satisfied with the CAPE's
analysis and believes that contracting with an FFRDC to do the same
analysis would not be a prudent use of Department resources.
The Deputy Secretary provided the CAPE's updated analysis to
Senator Levin via separate correspondence.

Chairman Levin. All right. Is there anyone--let's just try
one question for everybody. Senator Burris--well, wait a
minute. Let me see. Senator Collins would be next if you had a
question.
Senator Collins. No.
Chairman Levin. Okay, Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question, gentlemen, goes to the ability of small
contractors to have the opportunity to do business with DOD,
where they may need some type of assistance with their
development project, which I understand that there are millions
of dollars sometimes spent to get a piece of equipment that the
military may need. I have a specific company in mind where it's
been cleared through generals and been authorized, but you
can't get the decision to be made, because we're talking about
saving--this is technical equipment for our space stations and
our drones and other military aircraft. It seems like the
bureaucracy with the bigger companies just seem to charge much
more money and they sometimes try to subcontract or either sub-
contract with these contracts, but this could be sold directly
to the military, but there just seems to be a bureaucracy that
these small companies run into.
Gentlemen, is there some system or device that a small
business can really get an opportunity to sell their product to
DOD, which is a better product and a cheaper product, which
will save taxpayers' dollars?
Secretary Gates. Let me give you an answer for the record
on how we deal with small business, Senator. If you will
provide us with the specifics of the case you have in mind,
we'll look into it.
Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, I certainly will do that.
Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. If I just could respond briefly, my
experience in this is exactly what you've said, Senator. I
think it's very difficult to get small, innovative, creative
companies into the business. My experience is too often
competing against the bureaucracy, they just can't afford it.
They can't afford the overhead. They don't have the people. It
puts them out of business. So they go too often in the private
sector. There are some great ideas out there. I've seen small
companies go other places, put out of business, or be consumed
by the larger defense contractors.
My engagement with larger defense contractors over the
years has been to try to get them to support these smaller
companies. Some of them have. But it's a real challenge, and I
think it's a shortfall in what we do overall, in our overall
contracting business, if you will, as we try to look to the
future.
Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, we will get this information
on this small company, because we're talking about saving, if
the numbers are correct, hundreds of millions of dollars.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
If you can just have one question, because we need to take
a 5-minute break here for everybody's sake.
Senator Begich. Mine's very quick. Secretary and Admiral
Mullen, I just want to follow from the comment you made earlier
in regards to I think it was the life cycle of equipment and so
forth and how the procurement process works and how sometimes
the line folks are not engaged in that. I guess the question
is, are you making efforts to change that, because I agree with
you 100 percent, if the line people are not involved you end up
with a product--and a good example might have been the payroll
issue, but I won't go into that. As a former mayor, I dealt
with payroll transformation. It's a nightmare. Is there
something you're working on to make that transition?
Admiral Mullen. I think in the area of acquisition reform,
this is an area of focus. But we have a system right now that
would only allow me to pull something in. It does not come to
me naturally or, quite frankly and more importantly, to the
Service Chiefs naturally, particularly on the acquisition side.
Senator Begich. Are you working to change that?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, I am. But I don't see--I don't see
healthy change coming in that regard in the near future,
because that fundamental principle that was laid out in 1986 in
Goldwater-Nichols that separates us is still there.
Senator Begich. Let us know how we can help. I agree with
you on what you're trying to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We're going to call just now on Senator Chambliss, Senator
Lieberman. We're going to really break no later than noon here.
We all need a 5-minute break. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I was not going to get into a discussion on
F-22 particularly. We've been down that road. But when you
responded to Senator McCain's question about why you didn't
discuss the problems with the F-35 when we were having the
debate last summer, your response was that you didn't have the
independent cost analysis that you have now. I thought it was
pretty ironic that the report from the independent commission
came out about 2 days after the vote in the Senate, where the
F-22 in effect was killed. I couldn't understand why you didn't
know about that, didn't know that report was coming.
But really, the 2009 report was simply a validation of
exactly what that same commission reported in 2008. Now, I
assume you knew about the 2008 report and for whatever reason
you didn't give much credence to it. Am I incorrect in that
assumption? Did you not know about the 2008 report from that
independent commission, or did you just seek to ignore it?
Secretary Gates. I honestly don't remember, Senator. The
restructuring of this program has been due not just to the
report of the JET from last fall, but to the time that the
Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
spent on this issue just in the last few weeks, and that's the
reason that the restructuring has only been announced in the
last few days. It's because he completed his investigation, of
which the JET was one part, just within the last couple weeks
or so.
Senator Chambliss. Well, I heard your comment yesterday
about your not intending to in any ways revisit the F-22 issue.
Is that a correct statement?
Secretary Gates. Correct.
Senator Chambliss. That's even in spite of the fact that we
now know that the assumptions that you based your decision on
last year were wrong, that the F-35 is going to slip, and that
your department has no idea of what the cost of an F-35 is
going to be, as we've been told in a hearing by Dr. Carter. Now
it's gotten to the point where I understand you've even
relieved your program manager of his duties as of yesterday on
the F-35.
So you're not going to in any ways revisit that, even
though we're struggling with the issues that we talked about
might come about with regard to the F-35?
Secretary Gates. No, sir, because the IOCs, based on
information that I was given in preparation for this hearing,
the IOCs for the Services, for the arrival of the training
squadron at Eglin, all remain pretty much on track. The
difference will be somewhat fewer aircraft delivered.
Senator Chambliss. Do you intend to allow the expiration of
foreign military sales (FMS) of the F-22?
Secretary Gates. My impression is that that's prohibited by
law.
Senator Chambliss. Well, you've been instructed in the
authorization bill last year that you will do a review of FMS
and the prospect of those sales. There's another independent
commission outside DOD that's also tasked with that. So is that
review not under consideration at this point?
Secretary Gates. I'll have to check, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Could you get me an answer on that,
please, sir.
Secretary Gates. Sure, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The report required by section 1250(a)(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, and in
consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, to submit a report on
potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the F-22A fighter aircraft.
The report was completed and transmitted to the Defense Committees, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on August 26, 2010. Section 1250(c) of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary to contract with a Federally
Funded Research and Development Center to submit an additional report
on the impact of F-22A FMS on the U.S. aerospace and aviation industry.
The Department contracted RAND to complete the report. RAND expects to
complete the report in early 2011.

Senator Chambliss. Let me just ask you a quick question on
the budget. I want to go back to the MRAP that's specifically
designed for Afghanistan. Tell me again about that vehicle?
What's the difference in that and what we're using in Iraq, and
what's the budget difference there?
Secretary Gates. The cost per vehicle is roughly the same
for the ATV and the R-31 MRAP. The MRAP being designed for
Afghanistan is designed to operate off-road, where the MRAPs in
Iraq, designed for Iraq, were designed to operate on the road.
So there's quite a difference in the engineering as well as in
the power train and so on.
Senator Chambliss. Any of those vehicles in Afghanistan
today?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. We probably have somewhere
between 500 and 700 of them now. We're ramping up the
production right now and our expectation is that we'll be
sending in between 500 and 1,000 a month pretty quickly here.
Senator Chambliss. Do you have any idea when that will
begin? Will it begin before the weather warms up?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. Again, we're probably either
this month or next going to be at 500 a month going into the
country.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the witnesses for your service. It strikes me
after 3 hours that we're coming close here to violating your
rights under the Geneva Convention. But I thank you for your
strength as shown here today.
Frankly, seriously, I don't think we've had a better team
than you at DOD in a long time, and I thank you for your
service in every way. I think this is a very good budget.
Obviously, we'll go over it in a series of subject matter
hearings, but I think it meets the needs of our military within
the resources that we have.
I want to ask a question I think hasn't been addressed.
Both of you talked about, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen,
about the proper balance between allocating funds to meet the
unconventional threats we're facing in the war against Islamist
extremism, terrorism, and then being set to meet threats later
on from large potentially peer competitors. Somewhere in the
mix with both of those is Iran, now still the major state
sponsor of terrorism in the world, according to the State
Department.
It seems to me that it is also the most significant threat
multiplier out there if it goes nuclear. We all want to find a
diplomatic way to get the Iranians not to go nuclear. The
Senate passed a very strong sanctions bill last Thursday
unanimously, which goes to conference now and hopefully it will
come back soon.
But I wanted to ask you the extent to which the budget that
you present to us will enable us to deal with this threat. If
Iran goes nuclear, it greatly strengthens their terrorist
proxies, including some that have killed a lot of Americans in
Iraq and are causing some trouble in Afghanistan. It probably
ends the nonproliferation, nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Admiral Mullen, at one point I saw you quoted somewhere a
while ago that said just in the normal dispatch of your
responsibility it's your responsibility to prepare plans for
potential use of military force against Iran regarding nuclear
weapons. Then General Petraeus said something similar recently.
I wanted to ask you if that's the case and how you would
describe that, in what context you would put that preparation?
Admiral Mullen. I put it in the context I think, Senator,
that you laid it out. I think the potential for instability is
still there, that I'm, as many are, hopeful that the engagement
dialogue has legs and actually can produce something. I would
agree with your assessment that them achieving that capability,
it becomes a whole new ballgame in terms of what the down side
potential is. I don't see much upside potential. We certainly
over a long period of time have recognized that and focused on
that. We work contingencies all the time, and it was really in
that context that I was speaking of that.
The President has said, Secretary Gates has said, I've
said, all options remain on the table and certainly the
military is one of them.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary Gates, let me ask you a
different side to this. In recent trips over the last year or
so that I've taken to the Middle East, both to the Arab
countries and to Israel, it seems to me that there is a kind of
increasing military connection in a very positive sense between
ourselves and our allies there. I wonder if you'd comment on
that, and to what extent you see it in relationship to the
current or future Iranian threat?
Secretary Gates. We have made considerable progress over
the past 2 years or so in developing a regional maritime
surveillance, air and missile defense cooperation in the Gulf
region. It is a step at a time. It is in my view clearly
motivated--they are motivated--because of their concerns with
Iran's armaments programs and, leave aside nuclear weapons, the
number of missiles they're building and so on. So we have made
considerable progress in those relationships.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you. My time's up. I know we
want to give you a minute or 2 off. Thank you again.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
That concludes this hearing. The chart I referred to, which
I prepared relative to the Afghan Army, will be made part of
the record. Secretary Gates, we would ask you and Chairman
Mullen to present this chart to your folks, make sure that it's
accurate. If there's any errors in it, please let us know
immediately, and ask General Rodriguez please to provide us the
information that he has committed to provide.
Admiral Mullen, you have your hand up.
Admiral Mullen. Just one for the record, and it's brief. On
Senator Thune's question, he was asking about decommissioning
bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is
consideration for a reduction in the number of bombers in the
overall START negotiations, which are ongoing and which have
not come to conclusion yet.
Chairman Levin. We will ask his staff to give him that
information.
We're going to recess now for 5 minutes. When we come back,
after opening statements we are going to call on Senators in
the same order that we called on them for the first hearing.
We'll stand adjourned for 5 minutes.
[Recess from 12:03 p.m. to 12:08 p.m.]
Chairman Levin. The committee is now going to receive
testimony from our senior leadership of DOD as we begin the
task of addressing the DADT policy on gays in the military. I
believe that ending the policy would improve our military's
capability and reflect our commitment to equal opportunity. I
do not find the arguments used to justify DADT convincing when
it took effect in 1993 and they are less so now.
I agree with what President Obama said in his State of the
Union address, that we should repeal this discriminatory
policy. In the latest Gallup poll, the American public
overwhelmingly supports allowing gays and lesbians to serve
openly in the military. Sixty nine percent of Americans are
recorded as supporting their right to serve and many in fact
are serving.
As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John
Shalikashvili said--and he supports ending the policy--``A
majority of troops already believe that they serve alongside
gay or lesbian colleagues.'' One recent study estimated that
66,000 gays and lesbians are serving today, at constant risk of
losing their chance to serve.
Other nations have allowed gay and lesbian servicemembers
to serve in their militaries without discrimination and without
impact on unit cohesion or morale. A comprehensive study on
this was conducted by Rand in 1993. Rand researchers reported
on the positive experiences of Canada, France, Germany, Israel,
and The Netherlands and Norway, all of which allowed known
homosexuals to serve in their Armed Forces. Senator McCain and
I have asked DOD to update the 1993 report.
Ending this discriminatory policy will contribute to our
military's effectiveness. To take just one example, dozens of
Arabic and Farsi linguists have been forced out of the military
under DADT at a time when our need to understand those
languages has never been greater. Thousands of troops, 13,000
by one estimate, have been forced to leave the military under
the current policy. That number includes many who could help
the military complete some particularly difficult and dangerous
missions.
I have long admired the merit-based system of advancement
employed by the U.S. military that allows service men and women
of varied backgrounds to advance to positions of high
leadership. An Army is not a democracy. It is a meritocracy,
where success depends not on who you are, but on how well you
do your job. Despite its necessarily undemocratic nature, our
military has helped lead the way in areas of fairness and anti-
discrimination. It has served as a flagship for American values
and aspirations, both inside the United States and around the
world.
We will hold additional hearings to hear from various
points of view and approaches on this matter. This committee
will hold a hearing on February 11, when we will hear from an
independent panel. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs
will all be testifying before this committee during the month
of February on their various budgets, and they, of course, will
be open to questions on this subject as well during their
testimony.
My goal will be to move quickly, but deliberatively, to
maximize the opportunity for all Americans to serve their
country, while addressing any concerns that may be raised. We
should end DADT and we can and should do it in a way that
honors our Nation's values while making us more secure.
My entire statement will be made part of the record. A
statement of Senator Gillibrand will also be inserted in the
record following the statement of Senator McCain.
Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
The committee continues our hearing this afternoon to receive
testimony from the senior leadership of the Department of Defense as we
begin the task of addressing the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy on
gays in the military. I believe ending the policy would improve our
military's capability and reflect our commitment to equal opportunity.
I did not find the arguments used to justify ``Don't Ask, Don't
Tell'' convincing when it took effect in 1993, and they are less so
now. I agree with what President Obama said in his State of the Union
address, that we should repeal this discriminatory policy.
In the latest Gallup poll, the American public overwhelmingly
supports allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military.
Sixty-nine percent of Americans are recorded as supporting their right
to serve--and many are in fact serving. As former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs General John Shalikashvili, who supports ending the policy has
pointed out, a majority of troops already believe they serve alongside
gay or lesbian colleagues. It's hard to know for sure, but one recent
study estimated that 66,000 gays and lesbians are serving today, forced
to hide their orientation and at constant risk of losing the chance to
serve.
Supporters of this policy argue that allowing gays and lesbians to
serve openly would damage unit cohesion and morale, crucial factors in
building combat effectiveness. But there is no evidence that the
presence of gay and lesbian colleagues would damage our military's
ability to fight. Other nations have allowed gay and lesbian
servicemembers to serve in their militaries without discrimination and
without impact on unit cohesion or morale. The most comprehensive study
on this was conducted by Rand in 1993. Rand researchers reported on the
positive experiences of Canada, France, Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands and Norway, all of which allowed known homosexuals to serve
in their Armed Forces. Senator McCain and I have asked the Department
to update this 1993 report.
We should end this discriminatory policy because ending it will
contribute to our military's effectiveness. To take just one example:
dozens of Arabic and Farsi linguists have been forced out of the
military under ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' at a time when our need to
understand those languages has never been greater. Thousands of
troops--13,500 by one estimate--have been forced to leave the military
under the current policy. Certainly that number includes many who could
help the military complete its difficult and dangerous missions.
Supporters of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' accuse those who would
change it of trying to impose a social agenda on the military. But at
this point in our history, when gays and lesbians openly work and
succeed in every aspect of our national life, it is the ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell'' policy that reflects a social agenda out of step with the
everyday experience of most Americans.
I have long admired the merit-based system of advancement employed
by the U.S. military that allows service men and women of varied
backgrounds to advance to positions of high leadership. An Army is not
a democracy. It is a meritocracy where success depends not on who you
are, but on how well you do your job. Despite its necessarily
undemocratic nature, our military has helped lead the way in areas of
fairness and anti-discrimination, as it did in ending racial
segregation in America. It has served as a flagship for American values
and aspirations both inside the United States and around the world.
We will hold additional hearings to hear from various points of
view and approaches on this matter. This committee will hold a hearing
on February 11 when we will hear from an independent panel. The Service
Secretaries and Service Chiefs will all be testifying before this
committee during the month of February and they will be open to
questions on this subject during their testimony.
Change is always hard, especially when it involves social issues or
personal beliefs. We will proceed fairly, trying to hear varying
opinions. I hope those who favor change will not mistake open and fair
process for undue delay.
My goal will be to move quickly but deliberately to maximize the
opportunity for all Americans to serve their country while addressing
any concerns that may be raised. We should end ``Don't Ask, Don't
Tell,'' and we can and should do it in a way that honors our Nation's
values while making it more secure.

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to thank you Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen for what's
turning into a very long morning for them. We appreciate your
patience and your input on this very, very important issue.
We meet to consider the DADT policy, a policy that the
President has made clear, most recently last week in his State
of the Union Address, that he wants Congress to repeal. This
would be a substantial and controversial change to a policy
that has been successful for 2 decades. It would also present
yet another challenge to our military at a time of already
tremendous stress and strain.
Our men and women in uniform are fighting two wars,
guarding the front lines against a global terrorist enemy,
serving and sacrificing on battlefields far from home, and
working to rebuild and reform the force after more than 8 years
of conflict. At this moment of immense hardship for our armed
services, we should not be seeking to overturn the DADT policy.
I want to make one thing perfectly clear upfront. I'm
enormously proud of and thankful for every American who chooses
to put on the uniform of our Nation and serve at this time of
war. I want to encourage more of our fellow citizens to serve
and to open up opportunities to do so. Many gay and lesbian
Americans are serving admirably in our Armed Forces, even
giving their lives so that we and others can know the blessings
of peace. I honor their sacrifice and I honor them.
Our challenge is how to continue welcoming this service
amid the vast complexities of the largest, most expensive, most
well-regarded, and most critical institution in our Nation, our
Armed Forces. This is an extremely difficult issue and the
Senate vigorously debated it in 1993. We heard from the senior
uniformed and civilian leaders of our military on eight
occasions before this committee alone. When Congress ultimately
wrote the law, we included important findings that did justice
to the seriousness of the subject.
I would ask, without objection, Mr. Chairman, that a copy
of the statute, including those findings, be included in the
record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator McCain. I won't quote all those findings, but three
points must be made. First, Congress found in the law that the
military's mission to prepare for and conduct combat operations
requires service men and women to accept living and working
conditions that are often spartan and characterized by forced
intimacy with little or no privacy.
Second, the law finds that civilian life is fundamentally
different from military life, which is characterized by its own
laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including many
restrictions on personal conduct that would not be tolerated in
civil society.
Finally, the law finds that the essence of military
capability is good order and unit cohesion and that any
practice which puts those goals at unacceptable risk can be
restricted.
These findings were the foundation of DADT, and I'm eager
to hear from our distinguished witnesses what has changed since
these findings were written such that the law they supported
can now be repealed.
Has this policy been ideal? No, it has not, but it has been
effective. It has helped to balance the potentially disruptive
tension between the desires of a minority and the broader
interests of our All-Volunteer Force. It is well understood and
predominantly supported by our fighting men and women. It
reflects, as I understand them, the preferences of our
uniformed services. It has sustained unit cohesion and unit
morale while still allowing gay and lesbian Americans to serve
their country in uniform. It has done all of this for nearly 2
decades.
Mr. Chairman, this is a letter signed by over 1,000 former
general and flag officers who have weighed in on this issue. I
think that we all in Congress should pay attention and benefit
from the experience and knowledge of over a thousand former
general officers and flag officers, where they say: ``We firmly
believe that this law which Congress passed to protect good
order, discipline and morale in the unique environment of the
Armed Forces deserves continued support.'' So I think we should
also pay attention to those who have served, who can speak more
frankly on many occasions than those who are presently serving.
I know that any decision Congress makes about the future of
this law will inevitably leave a lot of people angry and
unfulfilled. There are patriotic and well-meaning Americans on
each side of this debate, and I have heard their many
passionate concerns. Ultimately, though, numerous military
leaders tell me that DADT is working and that we should not
change it now. I agree.
I would welcome a report done by the JCS based solely on
military readiness, effectiveness, and needs, and not on
politics, that would study the DADT, that would consider the
impact of its repeal on our armed services, and that would
offer their best military advice on the right course of action.
We have an All-Volunteer Force. It is better trained, more
effective, and more professional than any military in our
history, and today that force is shouldering a greater global
burden than at any time in decades. We owe our lives to our
fighting men and women and we should be exceedingly cautious,
humble, and sympathetic when attempting to regulate their
affairs.
DADT has been an imperfect but effective policy, and at
this moment, when we're asking more of our military than at any
time in recent memory, we should not repeal this law.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Gillibrand follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, I appreciate your leadership in hosting this important
hearing today.
James Madison once said, ``Equal laws protecting equal rights . . .
the best guarantee of loyalty and love of country.''
Lesbian and gay service men and women have been serving in our
Armed Forces bravely while being denied the full equality they deserve.
Since 1993, more than 13,500 American troops have been discharged from
the military under ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' (DADT), at an estimated
cost of over $400 million. Those discharges include more than 800
specialists with skills deemed mission critical by the U.S. military,
including at least 323 linguists, approximately 10 percent of foreign
language speakers, 59 of which specialized in Arabic, and at least 9 of
which specialized in Farsi, the official language of Iran. Among these
specialists were pilots, engineers, doctors, nurses, and combat medics,
all of which the military has faced shortfalls of in recent years.
These brave Americans were not discharged because of poor
performance, but rather because of their sexual orientation.
According to a recent study by the Williams Institute, an estimated
66,000 lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are serving in the U.S.
military. According to data provided by the Department of Defense,
discharges under DADT in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps
declined to 428 in 2009 from 619 the previous year. This represents a
65 percent drop since 2001, the highest number on record.
In a time of war, discharges have decreased, even as anecdotal
evidence strongly suggests larger numbers of lesbian and gay
servicemembers are serving openly. Despite the current law, individual
commanders are deciding to retain otherwise qualified personnel.
Why is this the case? Because the Armed Forces is experiencing
shortfalls in several types of mission-critical personnel, especially
in the midst of fighting ongoing wars, and is losing additional trained
and highly qualified personnel under DADT. It has been estimated that
the U.S. military loses more than 4,000 gay and lesbian military
personnel each year, which it would have otherwise retained, had the
servicemembers been able to be open about their sexual orientation, and
that more than 40,000 recruits might join if the ban is lifted.
Commanders on the ground believe what many of us strongly believe--it's
time to repeal DADT.
In a January 2007 op-ed article published in The New York Times,
General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
when the policy was enacted, stated that his opinion was that DADT
should be repealed. He argued that due to the U.S. military being
stretched thin by its current deployments in the Middle East, the Armed
Forces need to accept every American who is willing and able to serve.
Last week I was proud to share another statement from General
Shalikashvili, 1 of only 17 people in the country's history to serve as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling for an end to this
failed policy. In his statement he said:

``When I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my
support of the current policy was based on my belief that
implementing a change in the rules would have been too
burdensome for our troops and commanders at the time.
``The concern among many at that time, was that letting
people who were openly gay serve would lower morale, harm
recruitment and undermine unit cohesion. ``DADT'' was seen as a
useful measure that allowed time to pass while our culture
continued to evolve. The question before us now is whether
enough time has gone by to give this policy serious
reconsideration. I believe that it has.''

Twenty-five foreign militaries now let gays serve openly, including
our closest ally, Britain. I sit on the Foreign Relations Committee and
I am acutely aware that most of our allies--Israel, Britain, France, 22
of 26 NATO nations in all--allow gay and lesbian soldiers to serve
openly and I believe the American military should follow suit. At a
time when our Nation is fighting two wars, and with increased national
security threats, we can ill afford this loss of personnel and talent
in our national defense. Our military is the best in the world. Once
gay and lesbian servicemembers are allowed to serve openly, our
military will still be the best in the world.
As we look at the path that has brought us to this hearing today,
regarding how best to repeal the DADT policy, I am reminded of several
leaders in the fight to allow openly gay servicemembers into the Armed
Forces.
One is then West Point Cadet, Lt. Alexander Raggio. In his 2006
award winning thesis he stated:

``The military should abandon the false acceptance of DADT
and allow the open service of homosexuals immediately.'' He
added, ``Current policy cannot be rationally explained except
as a reflection of the personal prejudices of those who create
and enforce it and, rationalized by faulty logic and double
standards.''

These steps towards equality are our duty. I strongly believe that
equality is an inalienable American right--and should not be ascribed
based on gender or race, religion or sexual orientation or gender
identity. America must lead by example when it comes to equality and
justice. Freedom from discrimination is a basic right that all
Americans should enjoy. Lifting the ban on DADT is not only necessary
for realizing equality, but it's necessary for ensuring that our Armed
Forces remain the best in the world.
Pepe Johnson, a former Sergeant, U.S. Army sums up the moral
imperative on why we have to change this policy. Every day this policy
remains we ask these soldiers to lie about who they are, Pepe said
``Honesty and integrity are everything in the army. I felt if I was
lying, I didn't have it. I wasn't serving with integrity. I felt
trapped. Lying is not the way of the Army--I felt I was violating
regulation.
``During the 3 years I served I only wanted to be all I could be--
to borrow the old recruiting slogan--but DADT forced me to be something
other than what I was. That's not consistent with the Army's Values:
'Leaders are honest to others by not presenting themselves or their
actions as anything other than what they are, remaining committed to
the truth.' (FM 6-22, Army Leadership) As long as DADT exists, there is
a hole in the integrity of the entire military.''
We must recognize that human dignity and respect are part and
parcel of who we were as Americans--male or female, African American or
Caucasian, gay or straight, bisexual or transgender.
We must ensure that our Armed Forces are fully prepared with the
best resources we can muster. DADT is a threat to our men and women in
uniform and our national security. We cannot afford to handicap our
efforts because of ignorance or hatred.
This policy is wrong for our national security and inconsistent
with the moral foundation upon which our country was founded. It is
critically important for this Congress to take up President Obama's
call to permanently end the ban on LGBT Americans serving in our armed
services. We will strengthen America--both militarily and morally--by
repealing this discriminatory policy.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Gates.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, last week during the State
of the Union Address the President announced he will work with
Congress this year to repeal the DADT law. He subsequently
directed DOD to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal
of the current law and policy.
I fully support the President's decision. The question
before us is not whether the military prepares to make this
change, but how we best prepare for it. We received our orders
from the Commander in Chief and we are moving out accordingly.
However, we can also take this process only so far, as the
ultimate decision rests with you, Congress.
I am mindful of the fact, as are you, that unlike the last
time this issue was considered by Congress more than 15 years
ago, our military is engaged in two wars that have put troops
and their families under considerable stress and strain. I am
mindful as well that attitudes towards homosexuality may have
changed considerably, both in society generally and in the
military, over the intervening years.
To ensure that DOD is prepared should the law be changed,
and working in close consultation with Admiral Mullen, I have
appointed a high-level working group within DOD that will
immediately begin a review of the issues associated with
properly implementing a repeal of the DADT. The mandate of this
working group is to thoroughly, objectively, and methodically
examine all aspects of this question and produce its finding
and recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by
the end of this calendar year.
A guiding principle of our efforts will be to minimize
disruption and polarization within the ranks, with special
attention paid to those serving on the front lines. I am
confident this can be achieved.
The working group will examine a change of lines of study,
all of which will proceed simultaneously. First, the working
group will reach out to the force, to authoritatively
understand their views and attitudes about the impact of
repeal. I expect that the same sharp divisions that
characterize the debate over these issues outside of the
military will quickly seek to find their way into this process,
particularly as it pertains to what are the true views and
attitudes of our troops and their families.
I am determined to carry out this process in a way that
establishes objective and reliable information on this
question, with minimal influence by the policy or political
debate. It is essential that we accomplish this in order to
have the best possible analysis and information to guide the
policy choices before the Department and Congress.
Second, the working group will undertake a thorough
examination of all the changes to the Department's regulations
and policies that may have to be made. These include potential
revisions to policies on benefits, base housing, fraternization
and misconduct, separations and discharges, and many others. We
will enter this examination with no preconceived views, but a
recognition that this will represent a fundamental change in
personnel policy, one that will require that we provide our
commanders with the guidance and tools necessary to accomplish
this transition successfully and with minimum disruption to the
Department's critical missions.
Third, the working group will examine the potential impacts
of a change in the law on military effectiveness, including how
a change might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention,
and other issues crucial to the performance of the force. The
working group will develop ways to mitigate and manage any
negative impacts.
These are, generally speaking, the broad areas we have
identified for study under this review. We will of course
continue to refine and expand these as we get into this process
or engage in discussion with Congress and other sources. In
this regard, we expect that the working group will reach out to
outside experts with a wide variety of perspectives and
experience. To that end, the Department will, as requested by
this committee, ask the Rand Corporation to update their study
from 1993 on the impact of allowing homosexuals to serve openly
in the military.
We also have received some helpful suggestions on how this
outside review might be expanded to cover a wide swath of
issues. This will be a process that will be open to views and
recommendations from a wide variety of sources, including of
course members of Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I expect that our approach may cause some to
wonder why it will take the better part of a year to accomplish
the task. We have looked at a variety of options, but when you
take into account the overriding imperative to get this right
and minimize disruption to a force that is actively fighting
two wars and working through the stress of almost a decade of
combat, then it is clear to us we must proceed in a manner that
allows for the thorough examination of all issues.
An important part of this process is to engage our men and
women in uniform and their families over this period, since,
after all, they will ultimately determine whether or not we
make this transition successfully.
To ensure that this process is able to accomplish its
important mission, Chairman Mullen and I have determined that
we need to appoint the highest level officials to carry it out.
Accordingly, I am naming DOD General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, and
General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Army-Europe, to serve as
the co-chairs for this effort.
Simultaneous with launching this process, I have also
directed DOD to quickly review the regulations used to
implement the current DADT law and within 45 days present to me
recommended changes to those regulations that within existing
law will enforce this policy in a fairer manner. You may recall
that I asked DOD's General Counsel to conduct a preliminary
review of this matter last year. Based on that preliminary
review, we believe that we have a degree of latitude within the
existing law to change our internal procedures in a manner that
is more appropriate and fair to our men and women in uniform.
We will now conduct a final detailed assessment of this
proposal before proceeding.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: DOD
understands that this is a very difficult and in the minds of
some controversial policy question. I am determined that we in
DOD carry out this process professionally, thoroughly,
dispassionately, and in a manner that is responsive to the
direction of the President and to the needs of Congress as you
debate and consider this matter.
However, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and
their families, I also ask you to work with us to insofar as
possible keep them out of the political dimension of this
issue. I am not asking for you not to do your jobs fully and
with vigor, but rather that as this debate unfolds you keep the
impact it will have on our forces firmly in mind.
Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our thinking on
this important policy question. We look forward to working with
Congress and hearing your ideas on the best way ahead.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Last week, during the State of the Union address, the President
announced that he will work with Congress this year to repeal the law
known as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' He subsequently directed the
Department of Defense to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal
of the current law and policy.
I fully support the President's decision. The question before us is
not whether the military prepares to make this change, but how we best
prepare for it. We have received our orders from the Commander in Chief
and we are moving out accordingly. However, we also can only take this
process so far as the ultimate decision rests with you, Congress.
I am mindful of the fact, as are you, that unlike the last time
this issue was considered by Congress more than 15 years ago, our
military is engaged in two wars that have put troops and their families
under considerable stress and strain. I am mindful, as well, that
attitudes towards homosexuality may have changed considerably--both in
society generally and in the military--over the intervening years.
To ensure that the department is prepared should the law be
changed, and working in close consultation with Admiral Mullen, I have
appointed a high-level working group within the department that will
immediately begin a review of the issues associated with properly
implementing a repeal of the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. The
mandate of this working group is to thoroughly, objectively and
methodically examine all aspects of this question and produce its
finding and recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by
the end of this calendar year. A guiding principle of our efforts will
be to minimize disruption and polarization within the ranks, with
special attention paid to those serving on the front lines. I am
confident that this can be achieved.
The working group will examine a number of lines of study, all of
which will proceed simultaneously.
First, the working group will reach out to the force to
authoritatively understand their views and attitudes about the impacts
of repeal. I expect that the same sharp divisions that characterize the
debate over these issues outside of the military will quickly seek to
find their way into this process, particularly as it pertains to what
are the true views and attitudes of our troops and their families. I am
determined to carry out this process in a way that establishes
objective and reliable information on this question with minimal
influence by the policy or political debate. It is essential that we
accomplish this in order to have the best possible analysis and
information to guide the policy choices before the Department and
Congress.
Second, the working group will undertake a thorough examination of
all the changes to the department's regulations and policies that may
have to be made. These include potential revisions to policies on
benefits, base housing, fraternization and misconduct, separations and
discharges, and many others. We will enter this examination with no
preconceived views, but a recognition that this will represent a
fundamental change in personnel policy--one that will require we
provide our commanders with the guidance and tools necessary to
accomplish this transition successfully and with minimal disruption to
the Department's critical missions.
Third, the working group will examine the potential impacts of a
change in the law on military effectiveness, including how a change
might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention, and other issues
crucial to the performance of the force. The working group will develop
ways to mitigate and manage any negative impacts.
These are, generally speaking, the broad areas we have identified
for study under this review. We will, of course, continue to refine and
expand these as we get into this process or engage in discussion with
Congress or other sources.
In this regard, we expect that the working group will reach out to
outside experts with a wide variety of perspectives and experience. To
that end, the Department will, as requested by this committee, ask the
RAND Corporation to update their study from 1993 on the impacts of
allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military. We have also
received some helpful suggestions on how this outside review might be
expanded to cover a wide swath of issues. This will be a process that
will be open to views and recommendations from a wide variety of
sources, including, of course, Members of Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I expect that our approach may cause some to wonder
why it will take the better part of the year to accomplish this task.
We looked at a variety of options, but when you take into account the
overriding imperative--to get this right and minimize disruption to a
force that is actively fighting two wars and working through the stress
of almost a decade of combat--then it is clear to us that we must
proceed in manner that allows for the thorough examination of all
issues. An important part of this process is to engage our men and
women in uniform and their families over this period since, after all,
they will ultimately determine whether we make this transition
successfully or not.
To ensure this process is able to accomplish its important mission,
Chairman Mullen and I have determined that we need to appoint the
highest level officials to carry it out. Accordingly, I am naming the
Department of Defense General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, and General Carter
Ham, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, to serve as the co-chairs to for
this effort.
Simultaneous with launching this process, I have also directed the
Department to quickly review the regulations used to implement the
current Don't Ask, Don't Tell law and, within 45 days, present to me
recommended changes to those regulations that, within existing law,
will enforce this policy in a more humane and fair manner. You may
recall that I asked the Department's General Counsel to conduct a
preliminary review of this matter last year. Based on that preliminary
review, we believe that we have a degree of latitude within the
existing law to change our internal procedures in a manner that is more
appropriate and fair to our men and women in uniform. We will now
conduct a final detailed assessment of this proposal before proceeding.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of this committee, the
Department of Defense understands that this is a very difficult and, in
the minds of some, controversial policy question. I am determined that
we in the Department carry out this process professionally, thoroughly,
dispassionately, and in a manner that is responsive to the direction of
the President and to the needs of Congress as you debate and consider
this matter. However, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and
their families, I also ask that you work with us to, insofar as
possible, to keep them out of the political dimension of this issue. I
am not asking for you not to do your jobs fully and with vigor, but
rather that as this debate unfolds, you keep the impact it will have on
our forces firmly in mind.
Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our thinking on this
important policy question. We look forward to working with Congress and
hearing your ideas on the best way ahead.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
and thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss with you
this very important matter.
The Chiefs and I are in complete support of the approach
that Secretary Gates has outlined. We believe that any
implementation plan for a policy permitting gays and lesbians
to serve openly in the Armed Forces must be carefully derived,
sufficiently thorough, and thoughtfully executed. Over these
last 2 months, we have reviewed the fundamental premises behind
DADT as well as its application in practice over the last 16
years. We understand perfectly the President's desire to see
the law repealed and we owe him our best military advice about
the impact of such a repeal and the manner in which we would
implement a change in policy.
The Chiefs and I have not yet developed that advice and
would like to have the time to do so in the same thoughtful,
deliberate fashion with which the President has made it clear
he wants to proceed. The review group Secretary Gates has
ordered will no doubt give us that time and an even deeper
level of understanding. We look forward to cooperating with and
participating in this review to the maximum extent possible,
and we applaud the selection of Mr. Johnson and General Ham to
lead it. Both are men of great integrity, great experience, and
have our complete trust and confidence.
Mr. Chairman, speaking for myself and myself only, it is my
personal belief that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly
would be the right thing to do. No matter how I look at this
issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we have
in place a policy which forces young men and women to lie about
who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens. For me
personally, it comes down to integrity, theirs as individuals
and ours as an institution.
I also believe that the great young men and women of our
military can and would accommodate such a change. I never
underestimate their ability to adapt.
But I do not know this for a fact. Nor do I know for a fact
how we would best make such a major policy change in a time of
two wars. That there will be some disruption in the force I
cannot deny. That there will be legal, social, and perhaps even
infrastructure changes to be made certainly seem plausible. We
would all like to have a better handle on these types of
concerns and this is what our review will offer.
We would also do well to remember that this is not an issue
for the military leadership to decide. The American people have
spoken on this subject through you, their elected officials,
and the result is the law and the policy that we currently
have. We will continue to obey that law and we will obey
whatever legislative and executive decisions come out of this
debate.
The American people may yet have a different view. You may
have a different view. I think that's important and it's
important to have that discussion. Frankly, there are those on
both sides of this debate who speak as if there is no debate,
as if there is nothing to be learned or reflected upon. I hope
we can be more thoughtful than that. I expect that we will be
more thoughtful than that.
The Chiefs and I also recognize the stress our troops and
families are under, and I have said many times before, should
the law change we need to move forward in a manner that does
not add to that stress. We have two wars going on, a new
strategy in Afghanistan, and remaining security challenges in
Iraq. We're about to move forward under a new QDR. We still
have budget concerns and a struggling economy, and we have a
host of other significant security commitments around the
globe. Our plate is very full, and while I believe this is an
important issue, I also believe we need to be mindful as we
move forward of other pressing needs in our military.
What our young men and women and their families want, what
they deserve, is that we listen to them and act in their best
interests. What the citizens we defend want to know, what they
deserve to know, is that their uniformed leadership will act in
a way that absolutely does not place in peril the readiness and
effectiveness of their military. I can tell you that I am 100
percent committed to that.
Balance, Mr. Chairman, balance and thoughtfulness, is what
we need most right now. It's what the President has promised us
and it's what we ask of you and this body.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
So that everyone has a chance within a reasonable period of
time, we're just going to have a 3-minute first round.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, we need more than 3 minutes.
We need more than 3 minutes.
Chairman Levin. We can have a second round then. We have to
also have a schedule here. So we'll go to a second round if we
can fit that into Secretary Gates' schedule. If not, we'll pick
this up at a later time.
Well now, this schedule was shared with everybody here, I
know.
Senator McCain. Not with me.
Chairman Levin. It was indeed shared.
Senator McCain. You're the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, the Washington Post I think
this morning reported that the Military Services will not
pursue any longer disciplinary action against gays and lesbian
servicemembers whose orientation is revealed by third parties.
Is that one of the degrees of latitude within existing law that
you're looking at?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, a preliminary assessment,
which fits within the 45-day review that I mentioned in my
prepared statement, is that we can do the following within the
confines of the existing law. We can raise the level of the
officer who is authorized to initiate an inquiry. We can raise
the level of the officer who conducts the inquiry. We can raise
the bar on what constitutes credible information to initiate an
inquiry. We can raise the bar on what constitutes a reliable
person on whose word an inquiry can be initiated. Overall, we
can reduce the instances in which a servicemember who is trying
to serve the country honorably is outed by a third person with
a motive to harm the servicemember. We also have to devise new
rules and procedures in light of the appeals court decision in
Witt versus the Department of the Air Force for the areas of
the country covered by the appellate court.
So I would say all of these matters are those that will be
reviewed within this 45-day period. So it's a little more
complicated than the Washington Post conveyed.
Chairman Levin. But all of those are possibilities?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, would you--assuming that even if it
requires legislation, would you support a moratorium on
discharges under DADT during the course of this up to year-long
assessment that DOD is going to be making?
Secretary Gates. I would have to look into that, because
the problem that we have is that all of the issues that both
Admiral Mullen and I described in terms of what we have to look
into in terms of the effect on the force, in terms of
everything else, is what we need to examine before I could
answer that question.
Chairman Levin. While you're going to be examining the
other points that you're looking at, the other flexibilities,
would you add this to the questions you're going to look at and
let us know promptly----
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Chairman Levin.--as to whether you would support a
moratorium pending this period on discharges? That doesn't mean
you couldn't discharge at the end of the period, but there'd be
a moratorium.
Secretary Gates. We will look at it, Mr. Chairman. I would
tell you that the advice that I have been given is that the
current law would not permit that, but--
Chairman Levin. I'm saying would you support a change in
the current law if necessary in order to permit that. That's
what we need to hear from you on.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I'm deeply disappointed in your statement,
Secretary Gates. I was around here in 1993 and was engaged in
the debates, and what we did in 1993 is we looked at the issue
and we looked at the effect on the military and then we reached
a conclusion and then we enacted it into law. Your statement is
the question before us is not whether the military prepares to
make this change, but how we best prepare for it.
It would be far more appropriate, I say with great respect,
to determine whether repeal of this law is appropriate and what
effects it would have on the readiness and effectiveness of the
military, before deciding on whether we should repeal the law
or not. Fortunately, it is an act of Congress and it requires
the agreement of Congress in order to repeal it. So your
statement obviously is one which is clearly biased, without the
view of Congress being taken into consideration.
Admiral Mullen, you're the principal military adviser to
the President and you have to consult with and seek the advice
of the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders.
What in your view are the opinions of the other members of the
Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders about changing this
policy?
Admiral Mullen. Senator McCain, as the chairman indicated
earlier, they'll obviously be out in their posture hearings in
the near future, and I would certainly defer to them in terms
of exactly----
Senator McCain. Well, in the near future I'd like you to
ask them and we could have it on the record what their position
is, in the near future.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Each of the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders has appeared
before the committee, where they had the opportunity to express their
views. I can tell you that all the Chiefs are concerned with current
combat operations and the associated stress on the force. Given what is
currently being asked of our force and their families, the Chiefs would
all like to better understand the exact nature of the impact of any
repeal of the law. This is why all of us support a comprehensive review
of the issue in order to better advise the Secretary of Defense and the
President.

Senator McCain. I would like it as soon as possible.
Admiral Mullen. Actually, I've worked very closely with
them over the last months in terms of understanding what their
concerns and what our overall concerns are, and I would
summarize them by saying it's really important for us to
understand that if this policy changes, if the law changes,
what's the impact and how we would implement it. Secretary
Gates' point about the study is to really understand
objectively the impact on our troops and on our forces, and
that is their biggest concern.
Secretary Gates. I would say, Senator McCain, I absolutely
agree that how Congress acts on this is dispositive.
Senator McCain. Well, I hope you will pay attention to the
views of over a thousand retired flag and general officers.
Mr. Secretary, what kinds of partnerships or unions would
the military be prepared to recognize by law in the event that
this DADT is repealed?
Secretary Gates. That's one of the many issues that I think
we have to look at, Senator.
Senator McCain. So again, you are embarking on saying it's
not whether the military prepares to make the change, but how
we best prepare for it, without ever hearing from members of
Congress, without hearing from the members of the Joint Chiefs,
and of course without taking into consideration all the
ramifications of this law. Well, I'm happy to say that we still
have a Congress of the United States that would have to pass
the law to repeal DADT despite your efforts to repeal it in
many respects by fiat.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this very important hearing.
I want to acknowledge, Secretary Gates, the work you've
done to put a plan in place. Admiral Mullen, I think the
centerpiece of your statement will be long remembered for the
courage and integrity with which you outlined your own personal
beliefs and how we can proceed.
I'm proud to hail from a region of the country, the Rocky
Mountain West, where we have a live and let live attitude. Some
people would call it small ``l'' libertarianism. People's
personal lives, the choices that people make, are not the
government's business. I can't help but think about a great
Arizonan--I grew up in Arizona. My father was an Arizonan, my
mother was a Coloradan, and I have the great honor to represent
Colorado now. Barry Goldwater once said: ``You don't have to be
straight to shoot straight.'' That's the opportunity that we
have here today as Congress and the Pentagon moves forward.
I have a few concerns I'd like to share in the couple of
minutes that I have, and I'll pepper my comments with questions
and hopefully there'll be time for you to respond. There have
been a lot of studies done, Mr. Secretary, Rand, and there's a
recent study in the Joint Force Quarterly. It's not clear to me
that the study group needs a full year to study the
implementation and transition. I want to just put that out
there.
I want to ensure that the focus of the group is on how to
implement repeal of the policy, not whether, and I want to ask
you to assure me that the end point of the study would be a
road map to implementing repeal, and that Congress would then
be in a position to take legislative action that the Pentagon
as a whole could support.
Before you answer, I'd like your reaction to a legislative
proposal that you may have seen. It would be to write into
repeal legislation the period of time you suggest you need, say
1 year, while legislating that at the end of that time we would
have finality, in other words a complete end to DADT. During
that year-long transition, the DOD would have full authority
and discretion with respect to DADT investigations and
discharges.
Language like this would certainly make me much more
comfortable since I want, and so many others, a clear path to
full repeal, and I'm not sure I see finality in the study.
Again, thank you, gentlemen, and hopefully there's a little
bit of time left for you to answer.
Secretary Gates. I think the purpose of the examination
that we're undertaking frankly is to inform the decisionmaking
of Congress and the nature of whatever legislation takes place.
It's also, frankly, to be prepared to begin to implement any
change in the law. We obviously recognize that this is up to
Congress and my view is, frankly, that it's critical that this
matter be settled by a vote of Congress.
The study is intended to prepare us along those lines so
that we understand all of the implications involved. Frankly,
there have been a lot of studies done, but there has not been a
study done by the military of this, and this is the kind of
thing that Admiral Mullen was talking about.
I would just say with respect to your second point that I
think we would regard--if legislation is passed repealing DADT,
we would feel it very important that we be given some period of
time for that implementation, at least a year.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, if I may, the only thing I would
comment about all the studies and all the polls, I would just
urge everybody that's going to be involved in this, look at
those studies and polls deliberately and what they actually
looked at specifically, and to just reemphasize what the
Secretary said: There really hasn't been any significant
statistically significant and objective survey of our people
and their families. That gets to the Chiefs' concern and mine
as well, which really is engaging them in a way that we really
understand their views on this. That just hasn't been done and,
as urgently as some would like this to happen, it's just going
to take some time to do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know this is
an important issue. We need to think it through, and every
American is entitled to fairness and justice as we deliberate
these issues. I do think we should do it at a high level.
I would note, however, a bit of a concern that arises from
something Senator McCain suggested. That is that the President
as the Commander in Chief has announced a decision, and the
Secretary of Defense apparently supports that decision. Admiral
Mullen now has declared that he personally believes in this
decision. So then presumably someone below you will do some
work on the policy, whether this is a good policy or not. So I
guess if it was a trial we would perhaps raise the undue
command influence defense.
I think we need an open and objective and fair evaluation
of this. A lot of things that have been said I would note that
are not accurate, at least in my view, at least misrepresent
certain things. One of them is 10,000 people have been
dismissed from the military or voluntarily left the military
under this provision. But that's over 10 years. It would be 1
percent maybe, if it was 1 year less than that, maybe if it was
1 year less than that, maybe .75 of 1 percent. But over a
decade, it would be one-tenth of 1 percent or less.
Also, there will be costs. I noticed--and I give the
military credit. A lot of people don't know this, Admiral
Mullen, how open the debate and discussion you are. There's an
article in the Joint Forces Quarterly that basically supports
this change. It was an award-winning article, and they raised a
lot of different issues both for and against, and the military
welcomed that. I salute that. I think that's healthy.
But one of the points it made is that Charles Moskos, one
of the original authors of the DADT points out that the number
of discharges for voluntary statements by servicemembers--
presumably, they come forward and say that they are
homosexual--accounts for 80 percent of the total, and the
number of discharges for homosexual acts have declined over the
years. Do you think that's approximately correct?
Admiral Mullen. Senator Sessions, I think it is
approximately correct. But it does go to again sort of a
fundamental principle with me, which is everybody counts. Part
of the struggle, back to the institutional integrity aspect of
this----
Senator Sessions. Well, I know. I appreciate your view.
Admiral Mullen.--and putting individuals in a position that
every single day they wonder whether today's going to be the
day and devaluing them in that regard just is inconsistent with
us as an institution. I have served with homosexuals since
1968. Senator McCain spoke to that in his statement. Everybody
in the military has, and we understand that. So it is a number
of things which cumulatively for me personally get me to this
position.
But I also want to reemphasize what I said, is I am not
all-knowing in terms of the impact of what the change would
have, and that's what I want to understand, and any impact and
understanding readiness and effectiveness is absolutely
critical.
Senator Sessions. Well, it's pretty clear what your view is
and it would be clear on all your subordinates, every single
servicemember in uniform. I don't think that they are required
to lie about who they are. I think that's an overstatement,
although I think the rule of DADT has seemed to work pretty
well.
I would note from the Christian Science Monitor here that
the Chiefs of the Services met with the Chairman, Mike Mullen--
I'm quoting from the article--``and the consensus seemed to be
that, the military fighting two wars and now responding to a
new mission in Haiti, now is not the time to make such a big
change to military policy.'' That's my understanding of the
status of things.
I just hope that as we discuss it you'll recognize first
that Congress has made the decision, it's not yours to make,
and we'll have to change it if we do change it; and second, you
shouldn't use your power to in any way influence the discussion
or evaluation of the issue.
Secretary Gates. Senator, I would just say that we can't
possibly evaluate the impact on unit cohesion, on morale, on
retention, on recruitment and so on, unless we encourage people
to tell us exactly what they think and exactly what their views
are honestly and as forthrightly as possible. Otherwise there's
no use in doing this at all.
Again, I just can't emphasize enough, we understand from
the beginning of this that this must be an act of Congress.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. Senator Sessions, for me this is about--
this is not about command influence. This is about leadership,
and I take that very seriously.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I want to say that I applaud your efforts
in commissioning a thorough evaluation of DADT and how to
implement a repeal of the policy in order to minimize
disruption in military readiness. I was just wondering, within
this study how will you study--how will the study take into
account the views of the combatant commanders in theater in
order to minimize any disruption in the military readiness?
Secretary Gates. The combatant commanders and the Service
Chiefs will all have a part in this. The one thing that I have
asked is that as we go through this process we try to--try not
to disrupt or impact the deployed forces, and particularly
those in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have enough on their minds
and it seems to me we can get the answers that we need to the
questions that need to be asked by not adding to their burden.
So the one limitation I've put on this, which obviously does
not apply to the combatant commanders, is that we try and have
as little impact on the deployed force as possible.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, as we move
to end discriminatory practices within our Armed Forces, is
there any reason to believe that the dedication and
professionalism of our leaders in uniform is based in any way
upon your sexual orientation, and that the moral fitness of our
men and women should be based upon their sexual orientation? If
not, then on what grounds do you believe that there remains a
need to discriminate based on a servicemember's sexual
orientation?
Admiral Mullen. Senator Hagan, I personally don't think
sexual orientation, again, has a place for these kinds of
decisions. I actually, I think there's a gap between that which
we value as a military, specifically the value of integrity,
and what our policy is. But again, that's personally where I
am. I think it's really in the review that would take place
over the course of the next--by the end of this year, that I
would look to certainly understand it much more fully,
understand the impact if and when the policy changes, the
impact on our people.
That's really--rather than at the end of this, we're to
some degree at the beginning of really trying to understand
that. That's in light of many other opinions on this, including
the opinions of those who've retired, all those things. But it
really is--what I need to understand is to get it from our
people and their families, and incorporating that in addition
to all the other requirements that are here will be the goal of
the review over the next better part of this year.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, am disappointed with this decision by the
administration. But I'll say this for our two witnesses. They
understand the chain of command. I think we understand that
elections have consequences, and these two gentlemen see their
charge as moving forward with the directives of their
commander. I think Secretary Gates said it explicitly in his
statement: ``We have received our orders from the Commander in
Chief and we are moving out accordingly.''
So we'll have a debate about this and we will appreciate
the information that the Department gathers for us.
Senator McCain referenced in his statement more than 1,000
retired flag and general officers. Actually, I think it's
upwards of 1,160 retired flag and general officers from all the
armed services who have come out against a change in this
policy. For my colleagues, their statement urging continued
support for the 1993 law is contained at
www.flagandgeneralofficersforthemilitary.com.
I would commend to the members of this committee an op-ed
written by Carl E. Mundy, Jr., a retired four-star general and
former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, who points out--who
mentions the strong support for the current policy by this
overwhelming number of retired flag and general officers, and
points out that certain findings were made by Congress in
support of the 1993 law to ensure clarity concerning the
rationale behind the current statute. Key findings included
that the primary purpose of the Armed Forces is to prepare and
to prevail in combat, not to promote civil rights or social
justice or compassion or individual fairness, but to prepare
for and prevail in combat.
Further findings include that success in combat requires
military units that are characterized by high morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion; and further, that one
of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit
cohesion, that is the bonds of trust among individuals
servicemembers.
I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that this op-ed dated January
12, 2010, by General Mundy be included in the record at this
point.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Wicker. So I appreciate the situation that our two
witnesses find themselves in and I look forward to the debate
and hope that the policy remains.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me see if we can review the facts here. This
is obviously quite an emotional issue, but it's also a
legislative issue. My understanding from hearing both of your
statements is this year period that you're going to take in
order to examine the issues will be followed then by clearer
observations about the implications of changing the law. Would
that be a correct way to state it? So you're not coming in here
saying, we're going to change the law and this is the year that
we're going to put into figuring out how to implement the
change?
Secretary Gates. Our hope would be that the information we
would develop during the course of this review would help
inform the legislative process.
Senator Webb. Right. I salute both of you for very careful
statements. Admiral Mullen, I salute you for the courage, for
what you said, but I want to also emphasize that you balanced
that in your statement saying you don't know what's going to
come out of this. We don't know.
What we're looking for here is an examination of the
present law, what is the most damaging aspect of the present
policy? I think, Admiral Mullen, you made a very powerful
statement in terms of the integrity of the individual as your
deciding factor on your personal view.
What is, on the other hand, what's the great value of this
law if we were to do away with it and move into something else?
Again, what are the perils of undoing the law? Where are we
going? Would we know we are going in the proper direction? We
don't. We can't really say that today.
I think that when you say that this is something that will
ultimately be decided by Congress, I'd also like to emphasize
my own agreement with what you have been saying about how
important it is to hear from people who are serving, because
whether the ultimate decision might be here with Congress, that
decision can't be made in a proper way without a full and open
input from all of those who are serving, not just combatant
commanders--family members, people who are in the operating
units.
The way that I am hearing this, which I would agree with,
is that we have a duty here in a very proper way to understand
the impact of this on operating units, to raise the level of
understanding of the complexity of this issue among the
American people and up here, as well as attempting to deal
fairly with this issue.
So again, I salute you both for a very responsible and
careful approach to how we examine this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just as was stated by my friend Senator Udall, I think that
a live and let live policy is not a bad policy to adhere to,
and that's what we have in place in the military with DADT
right now.
To you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, you're in a
tough spot and we understand that. This is an extremely
sensitive issue. Everybody on this committee, I'm satisfied, is
very sensitive to the issue, both inside and outside the
military. In the military, it presents entirely different
problems than it does in civilian life, because there is no
constitutional right to serve in our Armed Forces. Today we
know we have gay and lesbians soldiers serving. They've served
in the past. They're going to serve in the future and they're
going to serve in a very valiant way.
But the primary purpose of the Armed Forces is to prepare
for and to prevail in combat should the need arise. Military
life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that
military society is characterized by its own laws, rules,
customs, and traditions, including restrictions on personal
behavior that would not be acceptable in civilian society.
Examples include alcohol use, adultery, fraternization, and
body art. If we change this rule of DADT what are we going to
do with these other issues?
The Armed Forces must maintain personnel policies that
exclude persons whose presence in the Armed Forces would create
an unacceptable risk to the Armed Forces' high standards of
morale, good order, and discipline, and unit cohesion. In my
opinion, the presence in the Armed Forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would very likely create an unacceptable risk to those high
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and effective
unit cohesion and effectiveness.
I'm opposed to this change and I look forward to a very
spirited debate on this issue, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
I believe Senator Burris is next. Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to extend my deep admiration for our two
distinguished leaders and their position. Not only are you
following the direction of the Commander in Chief, but, Admiral
Mullen, you expressed your personal view, which is to be
commended.
What we need is a policy that allows any individual who has
the integrity and the commitment to serve this country, to
serve this country. We can go back to President Truman, who
took the audacity to integrate the Services. At one time my
uncles and members of my race couldn't even serve in the
military. We moved to this point where they're some of the best
and brightest that we've had, generals and even now the
Commander in Chief is of African American heritage.
So what we are doing here now is not looking at the
integrity and the commitment that individuals can make, not
based on their sexual orientation, but in defense of this
country. I say the policy needs to be changed, the policy must
be changed, and we must have everyone who is capable, willing,
and able to volunteer to defend this country, defend this great
American tradition of ours, to have the opportunity to serve
regardless of their sexual orientation. So based on that, we
must continue to have the American spirit and have individuals
who are willing to serve.
I don't have a question, Mr. Chairman. I just have this
statement. I hope that we will look at legislation. By the way,
the House has drawn up a bill. There are 185 members on this
House bill. It's House Bill 1283 and I'm hoping and praying
that we will get it and move on this issue and not be wasting
the taxpayers' time and all of the energy on something that is
so basic in human rights and opportunities for individuals in
this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Burris.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
unlike my colleagues, I do have some questions rather than just
a statement to ask.
Admiral Mullen, we know that many of our NATO allies allow
gays and lesbians to serve openly and many of these countries
have deployed troops who are serving with us in Afghanistan.
Are you aware of any impact on combat effectiveness by the
decision of our NATO allies to allow gays and lesbians to serve
openly?
Admiral Mullen. Senator Collins, I've talked to several of
my counterparts in countries whose militaries allow gays and
lesbians to serve openly and there has been, as they have told
me, no impact on military effectiveness.
Senator Collins. We've heard today the concern that if DADT
is repealed that it would affect unit cohesiveness or morale.
Are you aware of any studies, any evidence, that suggests that
repealing DADT would undermine unit cohesion?
Admiral Mullen. I'm not. In fact, the 1993 RAND study
focused heavily on unit cohesion and that became the principal
point put forward by the military leadership at the time, and I
understand that. I understand what it is, I understand what
goes into it, and that there are--there's been no thorough or
comprehensive work done with respect to that aspect since 1993.
That's part of what needs to be addressed as we move forward
over this year.
Secretary Gates. I would just underscore that. Part of what
we need to do is address a number of assertions that have been
made for which we have no basis in fact.
Senator Collins. Exactly.
Secretary Gates. We need--the purpose of the review that we
are undertaking is to find out what the force, what the men and
women in our Armed Forces, and, as Senator Webb said, and their
families really think about this. The fact is at this point we
don't really know.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Lieberman is next and then, assuming nobody else
comes in, then Senator McCaskill would be next, and then
Senator Reed. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I opposed the DADT policy when it was created by this
committee in 1993 and I remain opposed to it today. Therefore I
support repealing it as soon as possible. My feeling, stated
simply, then was that what mattered most was not how a member
of the military lived his or her private sexual life, but that
they were prepared to risk their lives in defense of our
country; and that my judgment was that in a combat situation a
member of the military in a tank or an MRAP today is going to
care a lot more about the capability and courage of the soldier
next to them than they are about the sexual orientation of that
soldier, just as over the years, as Senator Burris referred to,
they came to care a lot less about the race of the soldier next
to them than about his or her courage or capability.
Therefore, I'm grateful that the President has said he
supports the repeal of DADT. I thank you, Secretary and
Chairman, for saying that the question now is not whether, but
how, and I think for us really when, we will repeal DADT. Am I
right that what you're telling us today is that what you're
going to do as soon as possible, at least after 45 days, is to
determine how you can reduce the impact of the DADT within the
current state of the law? Is that correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. The numbers actually have gone
down fairly substantially. They were about 600 and some in
2008, 428 in 2009. We don't know--I mean, we can't quantify
what the possible changes that I have talked about here, what
impact they would have on that. But at least it would--if we
are able to do something like that, would make these folks less
vulnerable to somebody seeking revenge or whatever their
motives in terms of trying to wreck somebody's career.
Senator Lieberman. Am I correct, just to ask the question
and get it on the record, that your judgment as advised by
counsel is that it requires an act of Congress repealing DADT
for the actual policy itself to be ended in the military? You
can't do it by executive action.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Lieberman. I wanted to ask you if--I'm sure one of
the reactions to what you announced today will be that this is
a delay. I want to ask you to consider not only the 45-day
limit, but whether you would think about providing regular
reports to Congress, and therefore the public, on the progress
of the study that you're doing during this next year?
Secretary Gates. I don't see any reason why we can't do
that.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Then the final obviously is that it's up to us in Congress
and in the Senate. We have to get 60 votes to repeal DADT or
else it will remain in effect.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Unless there's a provision inside the
defense authorization bill that goes to the floor, which would
then require an amendment to strike it from the bill, in which
case the 60-vote rule would be turning the other way.
Senator Lieberman. It's good. It is with great appreciation
that I accept the higher wisdom of the chairman of the
committee. I think that's a great way to go.
Chairman Levin. That's on the record, everybody.
[Laughter.]
Thank you, Joe.
Senator McCaskill is next.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to make sure that we're crystal clear about a
couple of things here. First, are gay and lesbian Americans
currently serving in our military?
Admiral Mullen. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. In fact isn't the foundation of the
current policy that we welcome their service?
Admiral Mullen. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. Are you aware of any morale issues or
disciplinary problems surrounding the current service of gay
and lesbian Americans as members of our military?
Admiral Mullen. Certainly not broadly.
Senator McCaskill. Now, I think what you're embarking upon
is important. I think it is welcome. But here's my problem. We
now have established that we have gay and lesbian Americans
serving in the military, that they are not broadly causing any
kind of disciplinary or morale problems, that we welcome their
service.
So the issue isn't whether or not gay and lesbian Americans
are serving in the military. It's whether or not we talk about
it. So how are you going to get their input in this survey?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, my take on that is--well, hang on
a second. [Pause.]
I think that we would have to look very carefully at how we
would do that.
Senator McCaskill. That's the point I would like to leave
you with today, is that unfortunately because of this policy we
welcomed their service. They're serving bravely and well. We
don't have any kind of issues with morale and cohesiveness
surrounding their service. But yet when it comes time to
evaluate their service, they're not allowed to talk about it.
So you have a real challenge in getting perhaps maybe some of
the most important input you may need as you consider this
policy. I'll be anxiously awaiting how you figure that one out.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Gates. One approach, Senator, is to talk to those
who have been separated.
Senator McCaskill. I think that's terrific. I think the
ones who have been separated would be a great place that you
can get good information. But I don't know that you're going to
be able to get at those that are currently serving, because
obviously they're not going to e able to step forward and talk
bout it. But I agree, Secretary Gates, that's a great place
because so many of them voluntarily separated because of issues
of integrity.
Thank you
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up the point that Senator
Collins made. It was my understanding that both Canada and the
United Kingdom have allowed gays and lesbians to serve openly,
in the case of Canada since the early 90s and Great Britain
since at least early 2000. They are fighting side by side with
us today in Afghanistan, and in fact I would think that we
would like to see more of their regiments and brigades there.
Does that I think suggest, as Admiral mentioned to me
before, that their combat effectiveness has not been impaired
and we've had the opportunity to work with them in joint
operations. Does that add credibility, evidence, or weight to
the discussions that you're undertaking?
Secretary Gates. I think that it is clearly something we
need to address. We need to talk to those countries' militaries
in a more informal and in-depth way about their experience. I
think that their experience is a factor, but I also would say
that each country has its own culture and its own society and
it has to be evaluated in those terms as well.
Senator Reed. I think one of the aspects you referred to in
your prepared remarks is the at least presumptive difference in
terms of the attitudes at different ranks within the military.
Is that something you can comment upon now? Have you done any
research or, Admiral Mullen, can comment about the attitudes
based on age or based on other factors?
Secretary Gates. I think that really goes to the point of
what we need to do in the months ahead. I think Admiral Mullen
would agree that we don't know. We don't have information based
on rank or anything like that.
Admiral Mullen. Anecdotally, it would be my only comment:
There really hasn't been any objective review of this. So I
think it would be too soon to comment, because actually
anecdotally, there are young poeople, noncommissioned officers,
senior officers, on both sides this issue. It gets to this
strongly held views driving this, as opposed to really
understanding objectively what this policy change would mean.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask a final question, which I
think is implicit in your overall testimony. That is--and this
is rather simplistic, but there will be a decision and then
there will be the implementation of that decision. I would
assume that, at least in part, those have to be coordinated or
referenced, so that part of this discussion and analysis going
forward is not only a decision, but it's also about how this
policy would be implemented in a very detailed fashion. That
would be something that would be available to Congress before
they made the decision, or can you comment at all about that
aspect?
Secretary Gates. Let me just start by saying, sure, because
one of the things that we will look at is, if there is a
problem with unit cohesion, how would you mitigate it? How
through training or regulations or other measures do you--if
Congress were to repeal the law, then how would we implement
it, just as you say. Part of our review process is, as we look
at the different aspects of it, what are the problem areas that
we're going to see and how do we address those?
As I said in my statement, it's everything from base
housing to various policies and regulations and so on. All of
those have to be addressed.
Admiral Mullen. For me, Senator, it's understanding the
impact. It is then in that understanding that speaks in great
part to potential implementation, and that then really goes to
the core of where I am on this, which is leadership. So I mean,
understanding that and they are integral to each other, impact
and implementation, then says to me, Mullen, here's how you
lead this, this is what you need to do to move through it if
the law changes.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Just briefly following up Senator Reed and Senator Collins'
point about other militaries, and Senator Reed's point that our
military is fighting side-by-side and with militaries who do
not have a discriminatory policy against open service by guys,
have you noticed any impact on our troops who serve with
Canadians or with Brits because of a British or Canadian policy
that allows gays to openly serve? Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. Since these wars started in 2003, it has
not been brought to my attention that there's been any
significant impact of the policies in those countries on either
their military effectiveness or our ability to work with them.
Chairman Levin. I have to make one comment on a suggestion
that somehow or other, Admiral, you were simply following
orders here of your Commander in Chief, who's made a decision,
in your testimony this morning. I think your testimony was not
only eloquent, but it was personal. You made it very clear that
you were reflecting your personal view, which you are obligated
under the oath you take to give to us. We thank you for that,
and I thank you not just because it happens that I agree with
what you said, but more importantly because you are required to
give us a personal view, and it was clear to me and I think
clear to most of us that this was a view that you hold in your
conscience and not giving to us because you were directed to by
anybody, including the Commander in Chief.
This statement of yours in my judgment was a profile in
leadership this morning. It's going to take a great deal of
leadership to have this change made. I hope it is--the sooner
the better, as far as I'm concerned. But with the kind of
leadership you've shown this morning, I think it's very doable,
hopefully in a short period of time.
One other comment and that has to do with what can be done
in the interim--you're going to be looking at that--without
legislative change. Secretary, it's my understanding that when
servicemembers are discharged under DADT with an honorable
discharge, that DOD policy now is that they only receive half
of their separation pay which is authorized by statute. You're
authorized to either get half or full pay. Would you take a
look at that as something we can do in the interim here to
indicate a greater sense of fairness about this issue.
You're sitting there quietly, Senator Udall. I should have
asked, do you have a final question?
Senator Udall. No, thank you.
Chairman Levin. I thank you both. It's been a long hearing
this morning and we very much appreciate you, the men and women
that serve with you and your families. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
tactical signals intelligence/electronic warfare
1. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, it has been brought to my
attention that during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces enter
areas believed to be infiltrated by the Taliban and, because of the
widespread availability of cell phone and satellite phone technology,
their efforts to capture the enemy are thwarted when lookouts provide
early warning of their approach. What efforts can be undertaken to
provide readily available, comprehensive, and continuous support to
defeat this enemy capability? Please provide a detailed response (in
classified form, if necessary).
Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

2. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, it has also been brought to my
attention that during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have had
to rely on physical searches of caves and other dangerous areas to
locate Taliban propaganda radio stations. What capabilities exist to
locate and defeat these facilities, and are they sufficiently deployed
to prevent these facilities from operating? Please provide a detailed
response (in classified form, if necessary).
Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs
3. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the current ability of the Air
National Guard (ANG) to perform its Incident Awareness and Assessment
(IAA)/Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission to
support law enforcement, counter-narcotics, weapons of mass destruction
response, search and rescue, border and maritime security, and National
Security Special Events requirements within the United States has been
degraded due to the transfer of 6 of the 11 ANG RC-26 aircraft to
support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as an enduring U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) requirement. These transfers, combined with
maintenance and upgrade requirements, have reduced the number of
available aircraft in the Continental United States to as few as one
operational aircraft at times. What efforts are underway to
reconstitute this domestic capability?
Secretary Gates. No timeline has been established for the return of
the six RC-26 aircraft supporting OCO in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility. Although I do not expect the RC-26 to be permanently
deployed, I anticipate the aircraft will maintain a prolonged presence
in theater to help offset the current airborne full motion video
shortfall.
The ANG is nearing completion of a capabilities based analysis that
will identify domestic requirements for a fixed-wing aircraft with
capabilities similar to those on the RC-26 (results expected in May
2010). This analysis will provide a basis for which the U.S. Air Force
and ANG can better identify and fill domestic incident awareness and
assessment requirements.

4. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, are sufficient ISR assets
currently dedicated to U.S. Africa Command? Please explain (in
classified form, if necessary).
Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

medical evacuation
5. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the progress being made in
Afghanistan by the United States in connection with minimizing the time
between battlefield injury and arrival at a facility with surgical
capabilities is admirable, and the performance of our medical
evacuation and combat search and rescue crews can only be described as
heroic. Are you committed to maintaining the current standard in
Afghanistan as additional forces are deployed and operations spread
over a larger geographic area?
Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

6. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, several of our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies also provide medivac support in areas
occupied by U.S. forces. What efforts are underway to shorten the NATO
90-minute standard for medical evacuation from the battlefield?
Secretary Gates. Less than a year ago (June 18, 2009),
International Security Assistance Force Command (COMISAF) issued
Fragmentary Order 318-2009 (Reassessment of Medical Evacuation
(MEDEVAC) timelines) reducing the NATO standard for MEDEVAC timelines
from 120 minutes to 90 minutes. COMISAF also directed that the regional
commands conduct assessments to determine whether service personnel are
receiving appropriate and expedient medical care. General McChrystal's
goal is for medical treatment to be made available to all assigned
forces of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A) within 60 minutes of receipt of the medical
request. The current COMISAF MEDEVAC plan is based on the 60-minute
standard, and includes aircraft necessary to meet this timeline.
Additionally, the Departments of Defense and State continue to
encourage our Allies and partners to invest in additional helicopters
and the associated technology required for MEDEVAC in adverse
conditions, as well as to drop those caveats that preclude currently
deployed airframes and aircrew from responding in a timely manner.

7. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, I have been informed that certain
NATO allies have caveats on their medical evacuation aircraft that
limit their support during certain times of the day and under certain
battlefield conditions. When U.S. combat forces operate in these areas,
they are often required to provide their own medical evacuation
capabilities because of the NATO 90-minute standard and the caveats on
their operations. What is being done to remedy this issue?
Secretary Gates. Seven nations currently have caveats on MEDEVAC
missions that include minimum night vision goggle illumination
requirements, dust limitations, constraints on flying in mountainous
terrain, requirements for landing zones to be secured, or have higher
headquarters approval processes. Although the Departments of Defense
and State consistently appeal to ISAF nations to remove operationally
restrictive caveats, we are realistic that limitations in training,
budgets, and political desire will preclude all caveats being dropped.
Therefore, as part of the President's increase in forces to
Afghanistan, a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is being deployed in RC-
North to provide, among other missions, timely MEDEVAC coverage.
Additionally, General McChrystal has directed regional commanders to
ensure that all Allied service personnel receive appropriate and
expedient medical care, ideally within 60 minutes of receipt of a
MEDEVAC request.
To support achievement of the goal of 60 minutes for our service
men and women, in June 2009 I issued a memorandum to Commander, U.S.
CENTCOM directing him to achieve medical evacuation parity between
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with the
standard for both theaters at 60-minute mission completion time. I
further instructed General Petraeus to improve MEDEVAC response times
in Afghanistan by:

(1) establishing procedures to expedite MEDEVAC mission launches
without having to wait for approval;
(2) creating a process to identify, analyze, and report all
MEDEVAC missions that take longer than 60 minutes;
(3) reviewing existing MEDEVAC approval and launch procedures
across Afghanistan;
(4) directing USFOR-A to review ISAF/NATO procedures and Standard
Operating Procedures, and making recommendations to ISAF for
streamlining current requirements; and
(5) requiring all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM to review and
understand existing MEDEVAC procedures.

8. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2011 budget
request supports creation of two CABs. What is the timetable for
standing up these units?
Secretary Gates. The 12th Active Component CAB, currently
designated the 16th CAB, is planned to be fully operational by 2012.
The majority of the personnel requirement for this CAB already exists,
as this formation was consolidated utilizing existing aviation force
structure. Some personnel growth is required to grow the headquarters
for an assault battalion, an aviation support battalion, and the
brigade headquarters; the spaces required for these formations were
resourced in Total Army Analysis 12-17 (TAA 12-17).
The Army Staff will present a recommendation for stationing
location and timelines for the 13th Active component CAB to the
Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) in late
May 2010. There are multiple courses of action affecting the
recommendation for the final stationing timeline which are dependent on
available military construction, equipping and production line
capabilities. Once the SecArmy and CSA have made their final stationing
timeline decision we will be able to provide Congress with an expected
timeline and final stationing locations for these units.

9. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, will priority be given to the
standup of the associated medivac companies to support combat medical
evacuation in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]

10. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, what procurement is planned for
fiscal year 2011 to ensure that these units are able to be fielded as
rapidly as possible?
Secretary Gates. One of the two CABs is being reorganized from
existing aviation force structure and will not require additional
procurements. The second CAB is being built incrementally as manning
and equipment become available. Fiscal year 2011 procurement includes 4
CH-47F helicopters, 16 UH-60M, and 2 HH-60M MEDEVAC helicopters.

11. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, of the UH-60M aircraft proposed
for procurement in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, how many will
be allocated to replace the aging fleet of UH-60A aircraft currently
being used for medical evacuation?
Secretary Gates. Due to a growth in medical evacuation requirements
across the Army, the Army projects that it will not start replacing UH-
60A aircraft with HH-60M aircraft until fiscal year 2015. Prior to
fiscal year 2015, the HH-60Ms that the Army procures will fill the new
requirement for additional MEDEVAC aircraft.

12. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the Afghanistan mission of the
aging fleet of combat search and rescue aircraft has been expanded to
include medical evacuation. This means that the direct combat support
role of these HH-60 aircraft and the associated wear and tear on these
aircraft has been dramatically increased. How many additional HH-60
aircraft will be procured in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 to
replace existing combat search and rescue aircraft?
Secretary Gates. The Air Force is purchasing four HH-60 aircraft in
fiscal year 2010 and the fiscal year 2011 budget requests the purchase
of three additional HH-60 aircraft during fiscal year 2011. There are
an additional three aircraft identified in the fiscal year 2011 OCO
request.

13. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have placed a dramatic strain on the UH-60 aircraft. What is the
principal factor limiting the acquisition of new aircraft to support
the UH-60 mission: production capacity, cost, lack of available or
appropriate alternative aircraft, or some other reason?
Secretary Gates. The Army is committed to procure UH-60M aircraft
as part of the Army's overall plan to modernize the UH-60 Blackhawk
Fleet. The UH-60 fleet is the largest helicopter fleet in the U.S.
Army. The Army manages its UH-60 fleet modernization using Army force
generation requirements to meet operational demands. There are no
constraints to acquire the full number of aircraft required within
budgeted resources. The maximum UH-60 production capacity has not been
exceeded and the Army is procuring over 70 UH-60M aircraft each year
through fiscal year 2015 for a total of 451 aircraft.

improvised explosive device defeat
14. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, in Afghanistan, the largest
percentage of U.S casualties is being suffered directly from the
employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by enemy forces. What
is the status of your review regarding IED defeat in Afghanistan and
when can forces on the ground expect to see additional support?
Secretary Gates. We have a number of very forward-leaning efforts
underway to try and deal with the challenge of IEDs. Last November, I
asked the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and
Logistics (AT&L) and the Joint Staff, Director of Operations (J-3), to
co-chair an effort focused on integrating Counter-IED programs across
the Department of Defense (DOD). They made a number of recommendations,
most recently to significantly enhance long-term full motion video
platforms like aerostat blimps. In addition to this larger integration
effort the theater commanders increased their requirement for Mine-
Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles, particularly the MRAP all-
terrain vehicles. There is an additional requirement that is funded, or
reflected in the OCO request, for approximately 10,000 more MRAPs--
6,600 of those will be the all-terrain version that is designed
specifically for Afghanistan. Another important step has been to work
collaboratively with the Government of Afghanistan to ban ammonium
nitrate, the ingredient in the most prevalent IEDs in Afghanistan.
Afghan National Security Forces and the coalition are aggressively
pursuing smuggling networks that bring ammonium nitrate into the
country to be used for making IEDs.

rapid prototyping and acquisition capability
15. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, as you know, when a requirement
is received from the battlefield, it is almost always a current
requirement. However, the defense acquisition process is not set up in
such a way to facilitate immediate or near-term fulfillment of these
requirements. In many cases, these requirements can be met immediately.
In other cases, minor modifications to existing technologies can be
made. In past wars, when the United States was less dependent on
contractor support, these modifications could be made on the fly, often
in the theater of operations. Similar requirements are being developed
today. However, because of the current force structure and requirements
process, these modifications or off-the-shelf requirements languish
while our forces remain at risk. What efforts are currently underway to
develop rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition capabilities and
centers to address these requirements as quickly as possible?
Secretary Gates. Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom
clearly demonstrated the importance of developing a Departmental
structure capable of rapidly responding to urgent warfighting needs. To
respond to these urgent requirements, the Department has created
several organizations that work with the Services to provide rapid
prototyping and rapid acquisition. The Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) and the Rapid Fielding Directorate (RFD) within the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) are indicative of flexible
organizations focused on expeditiously addressing the Joint urgent
operational needs of our warfighters. When necessary, I have also
formed task forces to quickly respond to emerging threats, such as the
MRAP and the ISR Task Forces. Additionally, each of the Services and
the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have developed rapid
acquisition processes to respond to Service-specific urgent needs.
Rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition have enabled the Department
to develop and field the all-terrain version of the highly successful,
MRAP vehicle. The MRAP program made excellent use of rapid prototyping
and rapid acquisition to accelerate schedules and deliveries of this
lifesaving, highly effective vehicle. Additionally, within the last 6
months, the Department has used the Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) Program to rapidly develop and demonstrate
persistent ground surveillance technologies that will directly benefit
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The success of this recently accelerated
JCTD (Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS)) will deliver
increased force protection and persistent surveillance sensors and
command and control. The rapidly developed and procured Distributed
Tactical Communication System now permits remote forces to stay in
contact with friendly forces. The Transnational Information Sharing
Cooperation (TISC) JCTD's ``All Partners Access Network'' is enabling
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to coordinate with non-governmental
organizations, coalition and interagency partners in support of Haitian
disaster relief. Each of these systems was rapidly developed to respond
to Warfighter and humanitarian assistance needs in less time than
conventional defense systems.
As I have previously stated, stability and counter-insurgency
missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The
Department is infusing innovative thinking and flexibility into its
sometimes rigid procurement processes and adapting our policies and
organizations to rapidly meet today's threats to servicemembers and
missions.

special operations
16. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention from
a variety of sources that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in
Afghanistan do not have sufficient medivac, manned ISR platforms, and
dedicated air assets. As a result, forces are at increased risk. What
is being done to remedy this situation?
Secretary Gates. Deployed SOF in Afghanistan currently have
sufficient medevac resources to support current operational
requirements.
Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast DOD can
deliver more manned ISR platforms to Afghanistan. Training pipelines
for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum
throughput to operate and employ newly acquired hardware, and DOD
continues to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to
effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data.
To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
additional Chinooks will arrive in December 10 and June 11,
respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. DOD
is also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
requiring them, and the Department anticipates adding five more CV-22s
to the fleet in the coming year. Additionally, Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) initiatives will grow SOCOM's helicopter fleet by
eight MH-47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015, and SOCOM's CV-22 Osprey
fleet will grow from the current 12, to 50 by 2016.

17. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, when can these units expect to
receive additional support? Please provide a detailed response (in
classified form, if necessary).
Secretary Gates. Deployed SOF in Afghanistan currently have
sufficient medevac resources to support current operational
requirements.
Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast DOD can
deliver more manned ISR platforms to Afghanistan. Training pipelines
for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum
throughput to operate and employ newly acquired hardware, and DOD
continues to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to
effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data.
To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
additional Chinooks will arrive in December 10 and June 11,
respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. DOD
is also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
requiring them, and the Department anticipates adding five more CV-22s
to the fleet in the coming year. Additionally, POM initiatives will
grow SOCOM's helicopter fleet by 8 MH-47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015,
and SOCOM's CV-22 Osprey fleet will grow from the current 12, to 50 by
2016.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
foreign language development strategic plan
18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) recently reported that while DOD is developing a foreign
language development strategic plan, DOD doesn't know when it will be
finished. In the absence of an approved plan, it will be difficult for
DOD to guide the Services as it develops its approach to foreign
language and regional proficiency transformation. Furthermore, it will
be difficult for DOD and Congress to assess progress toward a
successful transformation. Do you have an estimate as to when DOD will
issue a strategic plan?
Secretary Gates. The Department is nearing completion of its
strategic plan for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural
capabilities. We anticipate its release by late summer of 2010.

19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, how will this plan address the
development of foreign language skills for all servicemembers to better
perform warfighting and non-warfighting activities?
Secretary Gates. The strategic plan, built on the foundation laid
in numerous strategic documents, will address the development of
foreign language skills by focusing on identifying needed capabilities
and requirements of the combatant commands and Defense Agencies. The
plan will also outline specific steps how to build these capabilities
into the Department.
The strategic plan is designed to provide a comprehensive,
systematic, and actionable way ahead. The plan's vision statement,
goals, objectives, and tasks will focus on building and enhancing
language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities as vital
enablers for the Department to shape and respond to national security
issues. The desired result will be the institutionalization of language
skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities across the
Department and the generation of a globalized force, with the right
combination of skills and in the right numbers, equipped with the
capabilities needed to meet the diverse operational needs of the 21st
century.

asia-pacific region readiness
20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, it is impossible to overstate
the importance of our military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
It's obvious that there are many challenges in this area, given the
administration's emphasis on this vital region. If one looks at
continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional adversaries
are getting better and it is critical we maintain our superiority in
the region. Given the many demands on the defense budget and the unique
mission and environment we have in the region, how does DOD's fiscal
year 2011 budget impact our military readiness in the Pacific region?
Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which identifies the unique mission
and environment of the Pacific Region. The United States has been a
Pacific power for more than a century. The vast distances of the
Pacific and the low density of U.S. basing and infrastructure there
place a premium on forward stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces.
We seek to sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and
partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure
sustainable peace and security in the region, while also promoting
contributions by our allies and partners to global security. Toward
this end, the fiscal year 2011 budget request supports augmenting and
adapting our forward presence, which reassures allies of the U.S.
commitment to their security. At the same time, we will encourage our
allies and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular
multilateral security cooperation within the region to build trust,
increase transparency, and reduce the risks of crisis or conflict.

u.s.-pakistan military engagement
21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, you were recently quoted in a
speech at the Pakistan National Defense University that rebuilding
relationships with this generation of Pakistani officers--who have had
little or no interactions with the American military--cannot be done in
just a few months. Rather, it will take years--requiring openness,
transparency, and, above all, continuous engagement on both sides. What
is U.S. and Pakistan progress in this area and how we can improve?
Secretary Gates. Critical relationships are built through many
aspects of DOD's engagement program. For example, under the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), DOD brings Pakistani
officers into U.S. Professional Military Education (PME) programs,
where they and their families can gain an appreciation for the United
States and its citizens that pays dividends long after the officers
return to Pakistan. Within Pakistan, the best examples are the training
and equipping activities that U.S. forces carry out every day in
various locations throughout the country-coaching, teaching, mentoring,
and enabling soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers.
These opportunities, and the progress achieved through them, are
difficult to quantify because they are based on the complexity of
personal contacts and commitment; nonetheless, the progress is quite
real. As an example, from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010,
Pakistan IMET funding rose from $2.3 to $5.0 million, which supported
132 Pakistani students in fiscal year 2009 and is forecasted to support
197 students in fiscal year 2010. We continue to seek to expand
opportunities for such interchanges through IMET and other avenues.
Where DOD has built such relationships, the PAKMIL leaders with whom
DOD interacts have allowed us to expand our training and assistance,
teach PAKMIL forces far more sophisticated tactics, and the
fundamentals of Military Intelligence. Conversely, in those places and
with those PAKMIL units where we are still struggling to build such
relationships, there has been far less progress.
The primary organization that engages the Pakistani Military
(PAKMIL) on a continuous basis is the Office of Defense Representative
Pakistan (ODRP) in Islamabad, Pakistan. This joint military
organization, led by the three-star flag officer who also commanded our
Humanitarian Relief efforts after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan,
provides the direct, military-to-military engagement for U.S. CENTCOM
and DOD.
ODRP's ongoing efforts to strengthen and enable the PAKMIL's
ongoing combat operations against violent extremist organizations are
fundamentally based on the establishment and nurturing of personal
relationships with a broad range of PAKMIL officers and servicemembers.
The ``trust gap'' that divides our countries and our militaries is
quite real, and will take years to overcome. By focusing on personal
relationships, DOD has learned that it can still create opportunities
for real progress in achieving DOD's goals to improve the PAKMIL's
skills in conducting counterinsurgency operations and strengthening its
defense capabilities.
We also utilize the DOD's Near East South Asia (NESA) Center's
initiatives, which host Pakistani military officers and familiarize
them with U.S. political values, governmental structures, policymaking
processes, and policies related to South Asia and other regions of
special interest to Pakistan. These initiatives are another essential
piece in building the U.S.-Pakistan military relationship.

electronic health record systems
22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD and the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to accelerate their exchange of
health information and to develop capabilities that allow for
interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data)
by September 30, 2009. It also required compliance with Federal
standards and the establishment of a joint interagency program office
to function as a single point of accountability for the effort. In a
January 2010 report, the GAO noted that the DOD-VA interagency program
office is not yet positioned to function as a single point of
accountability for the implementation of interoperable electronic
health record systems or capabilities. In addition, GAO also stated
that if the program office does not fulfill key management
responsibilities as GAO previously recommended, it may not be
positioned to function as a single point of accountability for the
delivery of future interoperable capabilities, including the
development of the virtual lifetime electronic record. What is the
status of the virtual lifetime electronic record?
Secretary Gates. Following the President's announcement of April 9,
2009, DOD and VA accelerated efforts already underway to develop an
approach to achieve the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER). On
August 21, 2009, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs
endorsed a development approach for VLER's health component, leveraging
the Federal Health Architecture's Nationwide Health Information Network
(NHIN) concept and standards. The VLER approach is multi-phased. The
initial two phases will aid in defining additional pilots and the VLER
implementation timeline, which is anticipated to occur in six month
increments.
A VLER Pilot in San Diego was implemented on January 30, 2010. The
San Diego Pilot participants were DOD's Naval Medical Center San Diego,
VA's San Diego Medical Center, and Kaiser-Permanente. They demonstrated
the use of the NHIN to exchange a selected set of data elements of a
``Continuity of Care'' document. Kaiser Permanente is a contract
provider for VA, but not for DOD in the San Diego area, so DOD had no
shared patients with Kaiser Permanente. Lessons learned from the San
Diego Pilot are being incorporated into the next Pilot in Tidewater,
Virginia.
Subsequent phases of VLER will include additional VA and DOD sites,
live patient information, expanded data domains, different document
types, and the ability for additional civilian sector partners to
participate. VLER will build on the San Diego Pilot data set and expand
it initially to Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, the VA Medical Center
Hampton, and private sector partners in the Tidewater/Hampton Roads
area in Virginia. The target date for activation of Phase 1b is July
31, 2010. The hospitals at Fort Eustis and Langley Air Force Base will
be incorporated into the pilot after the initial activation. The
Departments anticipate selecting additional sites for implementation by
January 31, 2011.

23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, what is your assessment of the
progress being made and what are your thoughts on how the DOD and VA
should proceed?
Secretary Gates. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans
Affairs (VA) are making substantial progress with electronic health
record (EHR) systems. Historically, their respective systems existed in
mutually exclusive lifecycles, with DOD serving beneficiaries from
accession until retirement or separation and VA providing services from
that point forward. Each Department's EHR capability evolved to meet
functional requirements, mission-specific and shared. Each Department
also developed a system to obtain clinical information from private
providers of purchased care.
The historical EHR model is evolving as the Departments collaborate
on and deliver health information technology solutions that improve the
secure sharing of electronic benefits, personnel, and health
information. Today, DOD and VA share more health information for
clinical use than any other two health organizations in the Nation.
Each Department has real-time access to the other's health data on more
than 3.5 million shared patients, including over 173,300 patients who
are in theater. Further, since 2001, DOD has securely shared 1.6
terabytes of data on over 5.0 million patients using the Federal Health
Information Exchange initiative. Shared data includes patient
demographic data, medication and allergy data, laboratory results,
radiology reports, discharge summaries, consult reports, and health
assessments.
Today, each Department is modernizing its EHR capability and
migrating from outdated legacy technologies to enable more rapid,
flexible, and scalable responses to evolving national health care and
computer industry standards. Common requirements will be treated as
opportunities to consider common capabilities. A disciplined process
for reviewing and identifying potential opportunities for shared
acquisition or development is in place to ensure that shared efforts
support the effective execution of each Department's medical mission.
The end-to-end lifecycle of health care will become a seamless process.
The Departments' efforts coincide with the movement to national
standards led by the Department of Health and Human Services. As the
Nation develops an increased capability for health information exchange
using the Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) portfolio of
services, DOD and VA are developing a Virtual Lifetime Electronic
Record (VLER) that will employ NHIN services. Over time, VLER will
become the primary method for DOD and VA to exchange clinical
information with each other and with purchased care providers in the
private sector. Until then, legacy system interoperability will be
maintained.

futenma airbase
24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, there has been growing concern
over a possible delay of the implementation of the move of the Futenma
Airbase on Okinawa's remote east coast. Japan has said that it needs
more time to consider the base's future following recent elections.
What is your assessment of the situation and how does DOD plan to
proceed?
Secretary Gates. I recognize that implementing the Futenma
realignment agreement has been a challenge. The process has spanned
three U.S. administrations and multiple Japanese cabinets.
Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the
issue by May. I look forward to resuming work with the Government of
Japan to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our
force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's operational
capabilities remain sustainable politically and operationally.

don't ask, don't tell
25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Gates, in the President's State of the
Union speech, he said he will work with Congress and the military to
repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT). DOD has a lot on its plate, from
fighting two wars, supporting contingency operations in Haiti, to
trying to build and maintain the best military force in the world in a
fiscally constrained environment. What are the men and women in uniform
telling you regarding this issue?
Secretary Gates. As I announced in my statement previously before
this committee, I have appointed a high-level Working Group within the
Department to review the issues associated with properly implementing a
repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. Over the course of the next
8 months members of the Working Group will meet with a wide array of
individuals of all Services, ranks, ages and assignments, officers and
enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a
repeal and how it should be implemented.

26. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, a repeal of DADT will have an
effect on many levels of the military. As a former commander, you have
had to deal with how changes in policy have affected those under your
command. It has been argued that a repeal could present some very
complicated issues in the daily lives of our military. It has also been
said that these resulting changes could affect morale and discipline in
the ranks. Have you had the opportunity to talk to military leaders of
our allies who allow individuals to serve in their militaries
regardless of sexual orientation? Please provide comments on anything
that you have learned from them.
Admiral Mullen. I am familiar with the militaries of a number of
countries, typically western-style democracies, that have lifted the
ban on homosexual conduct. I have spoken with the chiefs of many of
these militaries. Their experiences are informative, but as the
Congressional Research Service notes, we must be careful in making
comparisons to other militaries. Our military is uniquely American,
shaped by our unique national experience. I want to understand the
range of issues repeal presents within our forces, and how those issues
might be managed.
That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue
to better understand the dynamics of any repeal.

suicide prevention conference report
27. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, suicide prevention is difficult
and challenging. There have been a lot of people in the Services and
the VA who have worked diligently on this issue. The Services have
experienced a rise in the number of suicides since the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq started. There is a need to understand suicide,
look at the causes, and get to a point where we can prevent it. I would
like to request a report on the results of the recent DOD/VA 2010
Suicide Prevention Conference. In particular, what follow-up actions
are to be required from the two departments, as well as what is the
timeframe which specifies the goals and actions that are to be
achieved?
Admiral Mullen. The 2010 DOD/VA Suicide Prevention Conference,
Building Strong and Resilient Communities, was attended by
approximately 980 people from DOD, VA, the Services, and other Federal
and civilian agencies. The conference was hosted by the Suicide
Prevention and Risk Reduction Committee (SPARRC), which is chaired by
the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and
Traumatic Brain Injury and VA and also includes representatives from
DOD, the Services, and other Federal agencies. The conference
demonstrated the progress DOD and VA have made in suicide prevention
efforts, but also identified six key areas that need additional
attention, including families; dissemination of resources; postvention
activities; reducing stigma; building resilience; and additional
research. Postvention refers to all activities after a suicide event.
The SPARRC members and its partners will continue to collaborate this
year to address some of the most pressing suicide prevention issues as
highlighted during the conference.
The conference identified the need for additional outreach,
training, and education for families. Families should be viewed as the
first line of defense in recognizing the signs and symptoms associated
with suicide risk. SPARRC has formed a family subcommittee, which
includes representatives from the Services, National Guard, and
Reserves to focus on the needs of families, such as outreach,
education, and training. During the course of calendar year 2010, the
subcommittee will identify the most pressing needs of family members
and provide recommendations on how SPARRC can best address those gaps.
The subcommittee held its first meeting in March 2010 and will provide
recommendations to the SPARRC in December 2010.
The dissemination of resources and tools to servicemembers,
veterans, and families is another area that requires additional focus.
Many innovative resources and tools currently exist, but
servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians need to be aware of
and have access to them. Populations in rural areas, particularly as it
pertains to the National Guard, Reserves, and veterans are especially
difficult to reach. One of the top priorities this year is to launch
the SPARRC website. This website will serve as a ``clearinghouse'' for
suicide prevention resources and practical tools for servicemembers,
veterans, families, and clinicians. It will also create a collaborative
space and allow for further improvement of dissemination and sharing of
resources. An easily accessible web-based location for resources will
ensure servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians know where to
go for help and have access to critical resources no matter where they
are located.
The conference emphasized the need for consistent postvention
activities within DOD. To address this issue, SPARRC has formed a
working group to draft a DOD policy memo on postvention activities.
Members of the working group will include representatives from the
Services, National Guard, Reserves, VA, other Federal partners, as well
as civilian organizations. The group will leverage existing postvention
initiatives and best practices to develop a policy applicable to DOD.
The working group expects to have a draft completed by September 2010.
First hand testimonies from the conference emphasized the
importance of seeking help, support and treatment. Stigma remains a
toxic threat to access to care and needs to be eliminated. SPARRC and
its partners will continue working to proactively transform culture
through public education campaigns such as Real Warriors
(www.realwarriors.net), the Marine Corps ``Cover Me'' video, and
numerous other efforts to reduce stigma and encourage help-seeking
behaviors to prevent suicide. Reducing stigma is an ongoing effort that
DOD and VA will engage in throughout year.
The conference also demonstrated the importance of engaging leaders
at all levels to proactively mitigate risk through building resilience.
The second highest priority highlighted by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's strategic guidance for 2009-2010 states, ``we will
focus on Health-of-the-Force by considering holistically how to better
prepare our force and care for our people.'' Development of a Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) is currently underway to
address Total Force Fitness based on the CJCS's guidance. The estimated
completion date for the CJCSI is fiscal year 2011.
Finally, the conference highlighted the need for additional
research and evidence-based models. The RAND Corporation conducted a
study to identify state of the art suicide prevention practices. This
effort was discussed at the conference and the results will be
disseminated by May 2010. The Department will continue to engage in
other research efforts to inform suicide prevention efforts throughout
the DOD.
SPARRC and its partners will work aggressively this year to
accomplish these initiatives, but also recognize that suicide
prevention is an ongoing effort. Continued collaboration between SPARRC
members will ensure completion in a timely manner. Further, the SPARRC
will facilitate communication and dissemination of emerging knowledge
and tools through sustained outreach to military line leaders, health
care professionals, family members, and communities.

28. Senator Akaka. Admiral Mullen, DOD has made significant
progress caring for our military heroes with mental health issues. But,
before we can care for them, we must first identify them. One of the
biggest issues we must address is reducing the stigma related to
seeking counseling. You recently stated at the DOD/VA Suicide
Prevention Conference last month that the stigma still exists among
servicemembers. It is imperative to get the message to our warriors
that it would be courageous to reach out for help. How would you assess
DOD's continuing efforts to tear down the stigma that still deters many
from seeking treatment for problems such as Traumatic Brain Injury and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and what do we need to do as we move
forward?
Admiral Mullen. Current DOD-wide resilience and anti-stigma
initiatives are focused on research and evaluation of the range and
effectiveness of military resilience programs, to include, the Real
Warriors Campaign to combat stigma, to increase servicemembers
awareness of and encourage use of resources, utilization of the Warrior
Resilience Conference to enhance and integrate core principles, DOD/
Federal programs development and utilization, promoting leadership in
health and well-being, and providing practical tools for units and
colleagues.
Information on DOD Wide Real Warriors Campaign program is provided
in attachment one. Although the Services do not have individual anti-
stigma campaigns, anti-stigma efforts are reflected at all levels of
their programs (see attachment two) including imbedded psychological
health providers in personnel communities and primary care clinics (to
avoid concern about seeking behavioral health services from the medical
community), removal of personal information in psychological heath
utilization reports to leadership, confidential counseling services,
lower stigma options for seeking care for issues such as sleep
difficulties rather than mental health, and many other new initiatives
delivered within the units, aleviating stigma concerns.
Finally, and most importantly, a robust series of evaluation
initiatives are underway to provide objective measurement of the range
and effectiveness of resilience programs in the military. These
evaluation efforts are outlined in detail in the third attachment.

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
readiness funding concerns
29. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the fiscal
year 2011 budget materials request an 8.5 percent increase in Operation
and Maintenance (O&M) funding from last fiscal year's budget. The
budget materials claim to rebalance the force. Yet without a decrease
in operational tempo, force readiness continues to be consumed as
quickly as it is created. How does this request rebalance the force if
the lack of readiness in our nondeployed forces continue to cause
significant risk to our National Military Strategy?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. In the absence of force cuts,
DOD needs real growth to sustain its operations because some major
programs grow faster than inflation--for example military health and
readiness requirements.

Sustains air, ship, and land forces operations
Increased fuel costs
Interoperable communications
Intelligence and security activities
Information, surveillance, and reconnaissance
activities

The DOD also made significant progress to shift the financing of
enduring programs from the OCO budget to the base budget. Adds were
made to the base program for flying hours, servicemember and family
support, intelligence, and special operations previously funded through
OCO.
Also DOD faces higher operating costs for more sophisticated
weapons--e.g., stealth materials and technologies require more
expensive maintenance.

Depot maintenance for land forces equipment, ships,
and aircraft
Related contract logistics support

Training costs associated with more sophisticated weapons are
higher.

Advanced skills training such as flight training

30. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is the reset
funding request for fiscal year 2011 sufficient and when will we begin
to see a return on its investment in reset in terms of improved
readiness?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department's reset funding
request of $21.3 billion is sufficient, based on an examination of
individual military Service requests, reconciled with the
administration's ground rules for items acceptable for inclusion in
reset funding. This amount will cover requirements for replenishing
ammunition and missile stocks expended in operations and training,
replacement of equipment lost in battle or worn beyond economic repair,
and maintenance activities based on scheduled need. If funding is
provided as requested, the Department will maintain the highest level
of readiness that is achievable, but readiness levels are dependent on
other Overseas Contingencies Operations funding as well, such as
Military Personnel, O&M to maintain operating tempo levels, and Force
Protection funding, to mention a few.

31. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would
additional reset funding restore readiness levels sooner and what are
the anticipated reset costs for the out-years?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department's reset funding
request of $21.3 billion is sufficient for fiscal year 2011, based on
an examination of individual military Service requests, reconciled with
the administration's ground rules for items acceptable for inclusion in
reset funding. It is anticipated that reset funding will be needed for
at least 2 years after the contingencies end. The Department will
assess the need for future reset funding based on force levels in the
theater of operations, as well as specific equipment battle losses and
damage as those are incurred. Outyear funding requirements are not
precisely known at this time, as they are dependent on those
circumstances, as well as the timing of eventual force drawdown.

32. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, to what
extent has DOD evaluated the impact of sending additional forces to
Afghanistan on overall force readiness?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Through our quarterly Global
Force Management Board (GFMB) process, the Department routinely
evaluates the impact and risk associated with force sourcing before the
decision to allocate additional forces is approved. Furthermore, as a
major component of the Chairman's Readiness System (CRS), the Joint
Combat Capabilities Assessment (JCCA) process evaluates our ability to
execute plans based on our current force posture and readiness. In
turn, the Joint Staff examines and evaluates the results of the JCCA
process and reviews force readiness on a quarterly basis through the
Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR).

33. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how confident
are you that the supplemental request will or will not be sufficient to
cover all costs, considering the disaster assistance currently being
provided to Haiti by our military forces?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Based on the current force
assumption, the fiscal year 2010 OCO supplemental request will be
sufficient assuming congressional support for a Haiti supplemental. The
Department is requesting a supplemental of $655 million to support
operations in Haiti. The Haiti supplemental includes $400 million to
reimburse the Component's for Haiti operations and $255 million for the
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civilian Assistance
(OHDACA).

34. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is the
plan to recoup those costs which are currently being taken out of O&M?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department is requesting a
supplemental of $655 million to support operations in Haiti. The Haiti
supplemental includes $400 million to reimburse the Services for funds
that were transferred from the O&M appropriation to the OHDACA
appropriation for the Haiti operations. It also includes $255 million
for the OHDACA to cover the costs for DOD's humanitarian support to
Haiti and other contingencies that are affected by natural disasters.

reset/reconstitution and readiness in afghanistan
35. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, as DOD begins
to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps have
been adjusting their plans to redeploy equipment from Iraq. Some of
this redeploying equipment, which was scheduled to return to the United
States, is now being redirected to units headed to Afghanistan. In
addition, we understand that some forces will move directly from Iraq
to Afghanistan. How is DOD handling the reset of this equipment to
original capability before it goes into Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The equipment directly
transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan is combat-ready and is being
transferred without going through a reset event. The transferred
equipment is primarily Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) that units
deploying to Afghanistan will fall in on. Use of TPE reduces
transportation requirements, a particularly important consideration for
supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. In rare cases based on
operational need, some units were transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan
with serviceable, combat-ready organizational equipment and TPE. Some
equipment items, such as MRAPs, are being reconfigured to meet
operational requirements and repaired as required en route to
Afghanistan at an in-theater facility; however, this is not a reset
event. As most TPE has been in theater for more than 6 years, the
Services anticipate higher than normal wash-out rates as well as
increased repair costs in future years. The organizational equipment
assigned to units redeploying from Iraq to home station will be reset
as appropriate after return.

36. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are the
cost implications for reset/reconstitution given increases in troop
levels and new platforms such as MRAP vehicles and Multipurpose All-
Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs)?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department will assess the
need for future reset funding based on force levels in the theater of
operations each year, as well as specific equipment battle losses and
damage as those are incurred. Equipment Reset costs will be more
dependent on equipment already in theater that will be scheduled for
maintenance cycles and possible replacement, than the presence of new
platforms such as MRAPs and M-ATVs. Outyear funding requirements are
not precisely known at this time, as they are dependent on those
circumstances, as well as the timing of eventual force drawdown and
equipment return to the continental United States (CONUS).

37. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
additional training is being provided to those forces that will move
directly into Afghanistan from Iraq?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The combatant commander and
joint service provider of forces transitioning from Iraq to Afghanistan
is responsible for ensuring those forces receive any required
Afghanistan specific training prior to assignment to that area. Core
competency training associated with the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility
(AOR) and the Request For Forces (RFF) requested capability(ies) has
previously been completed by those forces already deployed to Iraq.
Afghanistan specific training will be provided based on RFF
requirements and can include but not be limited to Rules of Engagement
(ROE), cultural training, enemy threat briefs, detention procedures,
medical and casualty evacuation (MEDEVAC/CASEVAC) procedures, and other
force protection measures. Additional training and briefings on various
Afghanistan command directives such as the July 2009 ISAF headquarters
(HQ ISAF) tactical directive will also be incorporated into individual
and unit training requirements as required.

38. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is there
sufficient basing in Afghanistan to handle the additional troops, and
given the logistical challenges in Afghanistan, has DOD synchronized
the arrival of troops with their equipment, and if not, what is the
operational impact?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. A. The basing in Afghanistan
will have to expand in order to handle the additional troops the
President ordered, but U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-
A) have structured a plan to send Engineers in early to build
additional Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and expand existing FOBs to
accommodate the additional forces prior to their arrival. As for
synchronization, CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command conducted
planning conferences in December and again in late January. These
planning conferences refined requirements for personnel and associated
equipment and developed a phased transportation plan to ensure
synchronized force build up. The Global Force Management process is now
closely managing the deployment of those forces to arrive in country at
virtually the same time as their equipment, so the troops are not
waiting without their equipment.
B. I agree with what Secretary Gates said. I think it is important
to realize, the basing standard we are building to is the Initial
Standard, which is expeditionary, with our troops living in austere
conditions utilizing unit organic tentage, with force protection and
basic life support services provided but not much more. Our intent is
to improve the facility infrastructure over time to a Temporary
Standard. In order to improve the sustainable living environment of our
forces, we have asked for some Military Construction (MILCON) funds to
facilitate these improvements and appreciate your continued support in
these efforts. To the question of phasing, the forces are arriving in
three phases and the engineers are timed to arrive in time to prepare
FOBs for the troops arriving for the next phase. The FOB construction
and expansion plans are on track and the additional 30,000 troops the
President ordered will be closed by the end of August this year as
planned. Finally, I would just note that the Department continues to
improve synchronized force flow through prudent planning and expanded
air, road and rail routes across Europe and Central Asia, routes also
known as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The NDN augments
other well-established routes running through Pakistan and is an
important part of our capacity and synchronization solutions.

earmarks
39. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, every year our committee
receives letters from Senators requesting earmarks. While we have taken
significant steps to increase earmark transparency to the general
public, the process for evaluating and which to support has essentially
remained the same over the years. As a result, in order to support a
few earmarks we must make funding cuts in other areas to meet budget
resolution top line requirements and the President's budget request.
Unfortunately, cuts sometimes take additional risk in DOD's O&M
accounts. How can you help us better determine what earmark requests
are in line with real military value or requirements and what are
simply wasteful spending?
Secretary Gates. What you are asking essentially is for assistance
in cutting the President's defense budget request in order to fund
earmarks that we did not request. Your question acknowledges that
earmarks cause additional risk in DOD's O&M accounts, and that is what
I would underscore. If certain earmarks have some military value, that
does not alter the fact that those earmarks would displace genuine,
higher priority requirements in our request. When our DOD leaders
formulate each year's budget request, we always have to omit certain
requirements because they cannot be accommodated in a constrained
topline. Each year's budget request includes our most pressing military
needs, and cuts to the request increase the risks for our current and
future warfighters.

40. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, what would
constitute a valid member request?
Secretary Gates. In my opinion, the program needs to have military
value to the Department and be a priority of the administration. The
budget request that the President submitted for fiscal year 2011
reflects the most pressing needs of our military warfighters that could
be accommodated within the constrained Defense topline. Any action by
Congress to reduce the budget request for Defense to fund programs not
requested by the adminsitration increases the risk for current and
future warfighters.

41. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, from your experience, how would
you characterize the additional risks are we accepting to military
readiness by making cuts in O&M accounts?
Secretary Gates. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
balances our needs, including O&M accounts, to secure and advance U.S.
security interests around the world. Reduction to any appropriation
account increases the risks of not being able to meet our mission
requirements. The fiscal year 2011 budget supports our force structure
requirements and will sustain our readiness levels. Should significant
cuts be made to operating budgets, readiness goals will be put at risk.

full disclosure budget
42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Gates, in last week's issue of Defense
Daily, retired Pentagon senior budget analyst, John King, proposed a
``full-disclosure budget, where all parties can see the real military
requirement backed by quantifiable rationale, the budget plan, and any
gap created by affordability or other development or acquisition delays
. . . To re-channel all the misspent pork war energy, DOD can set up a
show-and-tell office, where companies, research institutes, and
universities can bring their ideas and proposals. DOD conducts a hard-
nosed evaluation of how the proposal adds military value and fits into
the budget plan.'' This process would be open to the public as well.
What is your take on this idea and how feasible is it?
Secretary Gates. A full disclosure budget is feasible, and that is
exactly what DOD uses. So this proposed process is essentially already
used and is not a new idea. Every DOD budget request is backed by
quantifiable rationale to justify the military requirements being
funded. Our budget plans or presentations discuss development or
acquisition delays, or affordability issues. And companies, research
institutes, and universities have full access to bring their ideas and
proposals in response to DOD requests for proposals (RFPs).
______

Questions Submtited by Senator Mark Begich
energy security
43. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, over the
course of the past several years, DOD has engaged in a number of
initiatives to increase its energy security. Energy security is
critical to national security. How important do you believe it is for
DOD to achieve energy security and what specific steps is DOD taking to
get there?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. It is critical that the
Department achieve energy security. The U.S. military's reliance on oil
and other fossil fuels poses four broad security challenges. The first
is the growing risk to operating forces. Attacks on our supply lines in
Afghanistan and Iraq are increasingly sophisticated and effective,
resulting in a growing number of casualties. The ability of potential
adversaries to attack our fixed energy supplies and delivery forces
will continue to improve. In short, our fuel inefficiency endangers our
troops and threatens our missions.
A second challenge is the insecurity of the global commons. Most
petroleum products are transported by sea, and much of this trade
passes through vulnerable chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz and
the Straits of Malacca. The free flow of energy through these vital
channels may be threatened by piracy, political instability, or
military action. Thus, fuel inefficiency is a strategic as well as a
tactical threat.
A third challenge has to do with oil supply, demand, and price
volatility. Tightening global oil supplies and political instability
within some oil-producing nations created significant price volatility
in recent years, raising our costs and making budget and acquisition
decisions more difficult. The challenge will increase as the growing
demand for energy--particularly in Asia--outstrips projected oil
production and refining capacity.
A final challenge is grid vulnerability. The Department's reliance
on a fragile commercial grid to deliver electricity to its 500-plus
installations places the continuity of critical missions at risk. Most
installations lack the ability to manage their demand for and supply of
electrical power and are thus vulnerable to intermittent and/or
prolonged power disruption due to natural disasters, cyber attacks, and
sheer overload of the grid. Because of U.S. combat forces' increasing
reliance on ``reachback'' support from installations in the United
States, power failures at those installations could adversely affect
our power projection and homeland defense mission capability. For
example, the Department operates Predator drones in Afghanistan from a
facility in Nevada and analyzes battlefield intelligence at data
centers here at home. This means that an energy threat to bases at home
can be a threat to operations abroad.
The Department has made meaningful progress in addressing energy
security, though we have much more to do. In keeping with the
requirements of the 2009 NDAA, I have created the Office of Director
for Operational Energy Plans and Programs. The President has nominated
Sharon Burke to head this new Directorate, and I hope the Senate will
confirm her very soon. The Military Departments are standing up their
energy offices as well and they are developing detailed strategic
plans. The Service Secretaries have also made energy a high priority.
For example, in October, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus announced a set of
ambitious new goals to boost the energy efficiency of the Navy and the
Marine Corps. His plans include fielding a completely sustainable
carrier strike group (nuclear vessels and ships powered by biofuel),
dubbed ``the Great Green Fleet,'' by 2016, and producing half of the
Navy's installation energy requirements from renewable sources by 2020.
Secretary Mabus also stated recently that energy-related costs will
become a greater consideration in Navy acquisition decisions. We have
seen how the vulnerability of logistics forces, coupled with a huge
demand for fuel, creates an operational risk that must be reduced. As
Congress has directed, I will develop and implement the Energy Key
Performance Parameter in the requirement development process and the
Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in the acquisition process to help drive
down this risk to forces and the cost of assuring operational energy
security.
With respect to fixed installations, under my direction the
Department has pursued a two-part investment strategy that is designed
to: (1) reduce the demand for traditional energy while (2) increasing
the supply of renewable energy sources. In addition to the Department's
military construction budget, financing for these investments has come
from our Energy Conservation Investment Program, Energy Savings
Performance Contracts and mechanisms such as Enhanced Use Leases, and
Power Purchase Agreements.
Efforts to curb demand--through conservation measures and improved
energy efficiency--are by far the most cost-effective way to improve an
installation's energy profile. A large fraction of energy efficiency
investments go to retrofit existing buildings; typical retrofit
projects install high-efficiency heating, ventilation, and cooling
(HVAC) systems, energy management control systems, new roofs, and
improved lighting. The Department is also taking advantage of new
construction to incorporate more energy efficient designs, material and
equipment, using LEED Silver standards as a guide. From 2005 to 2008,
DOD reduced the energy intensity of facilities by 11 percent through
conservation and investment in energy efficiency.
On the supply side, military installations--which are large and
disproportionately located in the southwest and on our coasts--are
well-situated to support solar, wind, geothermal and other forms of
renewable energy. For example, Nellis Air Force Base in southern Nevada
built a 14-megawatt (MW) photovoltaic solar array using a public-
private partnership. The military's interest in renewable energy is
nothing new. Naval Air Weapons Center China Lake in California has been
operating a 270-MW geothermal plant since 1987. The Department
renewable energy goal is to produce or procure 25 percent of energy
from renewable sources by fiscal year 2025.
The assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, and the Office of the Director for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs are also leading an effort on
grid-related energy security relative to DOD operations. The purpose is
to ensure DOD's critical missions continue unimpeded during
interruptions in grid power and to inform the interagency and industry
on DOD's needs related to grid-supplied power.

44. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how does
the budget and the QDR budget reflect a move towards energy security?
Please describe in detail.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The recently released QDR makes
clear that crafting a strategic approach to energy and climate change
is a high priority for DOD.
To achieve operational energy reductions, the Department tripled
investment in energy security technology over the last 4 years, from
$400 million to $1.2 billion. DOD is investing to improve the
efficiency of aircraft engines, which account for a large fraction of
all operational energy consumption. One promising project is the Highly
Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine, based on a high-pressure ratio,
high-temperature core turbine technology that should reduce fuel
consumption by 25 percent and also be applicable to commercial
aircraft. The Army is developing technology to reduce the fuel
consumption of tactical ground vehicles such as the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) by 30 to 40 percent in the future.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is spending
$100 million on an 18-month project to develop affordable algae-based
synthetic fuels. DOD is testing a more advanced approach within the
Net-Zero Joint Concept Technology Demonstration program that would
allow a FOB to create all the power it needs within its own perimeter
fence--largely through renewable energy. The demonstration is hosted at
the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. Generators used to
provide HVAC at FOBs are another major consumer of operational energy.
In 2008, DOD began spraying insulating foam on tents, trailers and
other temporary structures in Iraq, and later Afghanistan, with
significant results. Estimates of the fuel saved for heating and
cooling in these structures are approximately 50 percent. In one
demonstration, DOD insulated 9 million square feet of temporary
structures and reduced daily fuel demand by an estimated 77,000
gallons, which can translate to 13 fewer trucks convoying fuel each
day. Once confirmed, the Director for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs will lead the creation of a DOD-wide Operational Energy
Strategy setting priorities and informing how the Department addresses
energy in its core planning, requirements, acquisition, and budgeting
processes.
With respect to fixed installations, the Department is pursuing a
two-part investment strategy that is designed to: (1) reduce the demand
for traditional energy; and (2) increase the supply of renewable energy
sources. In addition to the Department's military construction budget,
financing for these investments has come from its Energy Conservation
Investment Program, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, and
mechanisms such as Enhanced Use Leases and Power Purchase Agreements.

ballistic missile defense
45. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, last year,
the administration made significant changes to the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The
decision was made to decrease deployment of interceptors in the United
States from 44 to 30. Additionally, deployment of a European GMD
capability was cancelled in favor of a phased-adaptive approach to
address a range of threats in the area. The new approach is intended to
augment the existing GMD long-range capabilities in the United States.
As a result of the decision to cancel deployment of GMD Europe, Alaska
and California are the Nation's only line of defense against a long-
range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). How does the fiscal
year 2011 budget and the BMD review reflect a robust strategy and
investment in the GMD program to provide defense of the Nation with 30
operational interceptors?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011
President's budget request lays out a funded plan to expand the
integration of the GMD capabilities into the larger Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS). This will include deploying 30 operational
ground-based interceptors (GBIs), as well as delivery of 4 additional
interceptors as operational spares (based on reliability estimations)
and 18 additional interceptors to support the flight test program. The
GMD element will maintain operational effectiveness and reliability
through a number of initiatives designed to: thoroughly test the
performance of the system; achieve a high state of readiness; monitor
the health of the deployed interceptors; and modernize the system with
technology improvements to the interceptor and supporting ground
systems.
The Department plans to complete the construction of Missile Field
2 in Fort Greely, AK, by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and making
those silos operationally ready. This will both replace older,
inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a reserve capability
to deploy up to 8 additional GBIs rapidly from the pool of interceptors
currently designated for testing. Although the Department does not
currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these extra
operational silos will provide an additional hedge against future
threat uncertainty. The Department does not require the procurement of
additional GBIs for this purpose. The Department will also complete a
second GMD Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK, by the end of calendar
year 2011.

interceptor infrastructure
46. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
decisions have been made with respect to infrastructure required to
deploy interceptors, specifically at Fort Greely, Alaska?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. There are currently two
completed missile fields at Fort Greely, AK--Missile Field 1 and
Missile Field 3 with 6 and 20 silos, respectively. The fiscal year 2011
President's budget request reflected the funding needed to continue the
operations, sustainment, and maintenance of Missile Field 1 and to
complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration.
This effort also requires continued use of fiscal year 2009 funds
previously appropriated for work on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year
2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend work on Missile Field 2.
MDA submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's Comptroller
for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funds
and $16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the BMDS
Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile Field
2. This configuration's additional silos will enable future flexibility
to increase GBI inventory in response to emerging threats.
Upon completion of Missile Field 2, Missile Field 1 will be
decommissioned. Missile Field 1 was originally designed as a test bed,
so it lacks required hardening and redundant power, and has significant
infrastructure reliability issues. The Missile Field 2 design includes
shielding and addresses the reliability concerns of Missile Field 1.
Missile Field 1 will not be decommissioned until Missile Field 2 is
fully available for emplacing GBIs. In the meantime, Missile Field 1
will be closely monitored and maintained in a high state of readiness
through intensive maintenance procedures.

47. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, has DOD
taken any measures to preserve deployment capacity as a hedge against
the increasing threat in the event more than 30 operational
interceptors are required?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Yes, The Department plans to
buy 52 GBIs, 30 of which will be operationally deployed, 4 of which
will be held as operational spares, and the rest of which will be test
articles. DOD expects this level to provide sufficient protection of
the homeland, while allowing the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to pursue
a robust test program and enabling operational flexibility should a new
threat emerge. DOD will maintain readiness and continue to develop
existing operational capabilities at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg
Air Force Base, CA.
DOD will hedge against an increased threat in numerous ways,
including:

Complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely
to hedge against the possibility that additional deployments
become necessary.
Continue development and assessment of a two-stage
GBI.
Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for
missiles launched at the United States by Iran or other
potential adversaries in the Middle East.
Invest in further development of the Standard Missile-
3 (SM-3) for future land-based deployment as the ICBM threat
matures.
Pursue a number of new GMD system enhancements, and
develop next generation missile defense capabilities.

48. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how is the
deployment capacity in Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely funded, and is
this all in fiscal year 2011 or a reprogramming?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011
President's budget request contains funding needed to complete Missile
Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration. The request reflects funds required
in addition to fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work
on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated
to suspend work on Missile Field 2.
The MDA submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's
Comptroller for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009
RDT&E funds and $16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the
BMDS Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile
Field 2.

49. Senator Begich. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
deficiencies and readiness are achieved by continuing completion of
Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo starting capacity?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Completing Missile Field 2 in a
14-silo configuration allows for the decommissioning of Missile Field 1
and provides future flexibility to increase the number of interceptors,
if the threat evolves. When Missile Field 2 is completed and fully
available for emplacing GBIs, the MDA plans to transfer six GBIs
currently deployed in Missile Field 1 to Missile Field 2.
Once Missile Field 2 is fully operational, Missile Field 1 will be
decommissioned since it was designed as a test bed only and is not
hardened or sufficiently reliable for a long-term operational
deployment. Specifically, Missile Field 1 lacks backup power and has
significant infrastructure reliability issues. These reliability issues
include extensive mold contamination in the Missile Field 1 utilidor,
requiring personnel to suit up for a hazardous environment; inadequate
valve connections in the chilled water system, resulting in leaks of
glycol; and dust intrusion at Mechanical Electrical Building-1. The
Missile Field 2 design includes shielding and addresses the reliability
concerns of Missile Field 1.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
modernization and recapitalization
50. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
particular programs address the Services' modernization and
recapitalization?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.
Guardian Armored Security Vehicle (ASV):
Modernization:

Product Director (PD), ASV, is addressing
limited modernization (Engineering Change Proposals
(ECPs)) through existing modification and services line
or by modernization through spares.

Reset (Operations and Maintenance, Army-funded):

Planning is underway to reset approximately
1,500 ASVs during fiscal year 2011-2017.
While the average age of ASVs is 3 years, some
ASVs in theater accumulated 20,000-plus miles per year
(peacetime OPTEMPO is estimated at 2,729 miles per year
for a useful life of 20 years).
Reset will bring ASVs to fully mission capable
condition, to include replacing basic issue items such
as shovels and tire jacks.

Recapitalization (RECAP--Other Procurement, Army
(OPA), funding is required):

The Army has not programmed RECAP funding in
POM fiscal year 2012-2017.

OPA funding currently ends in fiscal
year 2011, with production ending in fiscal
year 2012.

However, in accordance with a recent
Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the ASV Product Office
will continue to collaborate with the Combat Developer
on desired upgrades. Potential outcome of this
collaboration could result in an ASV RECAP requirement.
Stryker:
Modernization:

Evolutionary acquisition approach to achieve
the full Stryker Capability Development Document
Planned as separate and distinct program from
base Stryker
Provides suspension, structure and power
growth capability to support planned upgrades
Includes modified lower hull for under belly
IED protection as well as upgraded suspension to
support up to a 60,000-pound GVW
Key Upgrades include Lethality, Survivability,
360 degrees Situational Awareness, Sniper Detection
Assumes JTRS & Battle Command Upgrades
30-ton Capacity Configuration

Reset:

Army selected Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, as
centralized Reset facility for the Stryker Family of
Vehicles.
Stryker vehicle resets for OCONUS based
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (2nd Brigade, 25th
Infantry Division--Schofield Barracks, HI, and 2nd
Cavalry Regiment--Vilseck, Germany), as well as the 1st
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division SBCT (Fort Wainright,
AK) may still be conducted at home station.
Stryker Reset provides annual scheduled
service level plus maintenance action, does not return
vehicles to zero hours/zero miles standard.

Recapitalization:

Stryker does not perform RECAP efforts.

defense support to civilian authorities
51. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, please
explain how the mission to provide defense support to civil authorities
is addressed.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. During the 2010 QDR, I directed
a significant emphasis to domestic military operations, including
Defense Support of Civil Authorities. After considerable analysis in
the QDR, the Department will make a number of changes in its approach
to support civil authorities responding to Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents in
the United States.
First, the Department will re-structure CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Force 1 (CCMRF-1) to be larger and faster than it
is today, with more life saving capabilities. CCMRFs 2 and 3 will be
significantly downsized to become command and control (C2) elements,
each able to handle up to 45,000 Title 10 general purpose and
specialized forces in the event of multiple, simultaneous incidents.
Most significantly, rather than building three large Federal-level
response forces to be employed by U.S. Northern Command, the Department
will start placing a National Guard-based Homeland Response Force (HRF)
in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions
beginning at the end of fiscal year 2011. Each HRF, routinely operating
in State status (State Active Duty or in duty under Title 32, U.S.
Code) at the direction of a governor, will consist of approximately 560
personnel. The HRFs will include CBRNE capabilities similar to the
existing National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages
(CERFPs), as well as additional robust C2 and security capabilities. I
anticipate that the HRFs will serve as a catalyst for promoting greater
regional integration within the FEMA regions and promoting closer
working relationships with the FEMA Regional Administrator offices,
Defense Coordination Officers, and individual States.

overseas contingency operations
52. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what role
will the ongoing contingency operations play in future force-sizing?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. All of our servicemembers
(Active and Reserve) continue to perform extraordinarily in light of
the demands we have placed upon them. We cannot fail to have the right
numbers and kinds of uniformed personnel to win our wars and deter
potential adversaries. Additionally, our force, Active and Reserve,
must be large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but also
have a base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and
their families. We believe we are currently at an appropriate force
level. As our future challenges evolve and requirements change, we will
work closely with Congress to determine if adjustments are necessary.

guantanamo detainee operations
53. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how does
the budget support the President's decision on Guantanamo (GTMO)
detainee operations?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President's fiscal year
2011 OCO budget request includes $350 million to finance all detainee
operations at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility or another site.

don't ask, don't tell
54. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, taking a
look at discharge statistics provided by DOD, it appears that the
number of individuals discharged during years of conflict drop off
drastically. Can you explain these numbers--noting that reports of
homosexual conduct are not covered under the military's stop-loss
policies?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. I cannot speculate as to why
separations under the homosexual conduct policy have declined in recent
years. However, the Department has not changed how it applies 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 654 in ``years of conflict.''

55. Senator Burris. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, once this
change is enacted, how will you address the cases involving pending and
previously discharged servicemembers?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. If the law is repealed, any
pending homosexual conduct discharge cases would be ceased. Those
servicemembers previously separated would remain separated. As part of
their assessment, the working group will examine re-accession policies
for such servicemembers if the law is repealed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
program management of the f-35 lightning acquisition
56. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I am gratified by the
management decisions you announced yesterday to instill accountability
in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program by replacing the program
executive officer and withholding more than $600 million. Does the
withhold reflect the outcome of pending discussions between your office
and the prime contractor, following the instructions you issued in
December 2009 to restructure the program, to have the contractor fund
part of the proposed extension in development?
Secretary Gates. A more accurate way to portray the handling of the
$614 million withhold is that the Department is changing the paradigm
under which the contractor can earn that fee. I decided that the
current award fee structure would not properly incentivize the
contractor. Therefore, the Department took the future fee that the
contractor could have earned and redistributed it in a fashion that
better reflects the behavior I expect. The criteria are objective, date
certain, and designed to accomplish major events in the program with
the appropriate level of detail to ensure the event is successful
instead of just complete. In addition, the fee is back-loaded, with a
major portion applied to the ability of the contractor to meet the
estimate at completion. Failure to do so results in the complete loss
of that fee.

57. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, under what circumstances, if
any, could the prime contractor recoup that withholding?
Secretary Gates. The remaining fee for the contractor's development
effort is $614 million. We are restructuring that $614 million and
revising the SDD contract structure to reward measurable progress
against significant schedule events and ensure event-based fees, to
include completion at or under the estimate at completion. The
contractor can recoup the withheld fees only if these events are
successfully completed according to the schedule and the estimate at
completion is achieved.

f-35 testing and engineering issues
58. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as you of course know, I am
concerned about the F-35 Lightning acquisition program, even with the
restructuring you announced in December 2009. A few weeks ago, the
Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that
``[c]ontinued production concurrent with the slow increase in flight
testing over the next 2 years will commit the Department and Services
to test, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk.'' Will
extending development of the JSF, as is being proposed under the budget
request, be supported with additional flight test aircraft, the
delivery of software, and an adequate pace of testing, so that
operational testing of fully integrated and capable aircraft will occur
on time in 2016?
Secretary Gates. The program office is currently working with all
the test stakeholders, including the Operational Test (OT) community,
to finalize the test schedule outlining both the timing and the
appropriate allocation of resources for a successful completion of
System Development and Demonstration as well as successful transition
to OT. The restructured program will mitigate cost and schedule
challenges. The restructured program funds the F-35 program to an
Independent Cost Estimate, adds additional schedule to development
test, moves the full rate production decision to April 2016, adds
additional test assets to flight test to build on the successful
ongoing ground test, and expands the software integration capacity.
These actions are in-line with multiple independent assessments
performed in 2009 covering cost, schedule and capacity.

59. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain how your budget
request will ensure that program management emphasizes maintaining
robust engineering and test forces; early completion of detailed test
plans; fully resourcing those plans; and rigorous accreditation of
models and labs.
Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the JSF
program is the result of rigorous analysis by a Joint Estimating Team
(JET), led by the Office of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program
Evaluation. The JET's analysis informed a senior leadership JSF Task
Force that led to a restructure of the JSF development and test
program. The program office is currently working with all the test
stakeholders, including the OT community, to finalize the test schedule
outlining both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources
for a successful completion of System Development and Demonstration and
transition to OT. The Department will conduct an even more in-depth
review of the JSF program as part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification
process. All aspects of the program, to include engineering manning,
test plan scheduling, resourcing, and lab and modeling accreditation
will be reviewed.

60. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, to what extent will your
budget proposal ensure that the delivery of assets for OT&E and initial
training will be managed consistent with plans approved for OT&E?
Secretary Gates. The Department has fully funded F-35 System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) to the Joint Estimating Team (JET)
II estimate, which includes adequate funds for both developmental and
operational testing. The funds are adequate to purchase and deliver
aircraft and all the necessary support equipment to the OT community.
In addition, the Department has fully resourced, across the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP), for adequate organic and contractor
support of developmental and operational testing. The program office is
currently working with all the test stakeholders, including the OT
community, to finalize the test schedule outlining both the timing and
the appropriate allocation of resources for a successful completion of
SDD.

61. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you expect that the
delivery of those test and training assets will deviate from those
plans? If so, please explain.
Secretary Gates. I expect delivery of test and training assets to
happen on a timeline commensurate with the restructured program. The
program office is currently working with all the test stakeholders,
including the OT community, to finalize the test schedule outlining
both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources (including
training) for a successful completion of System Development and
Demonstration as well as successful transition to OT.

62. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, during the hearing, you
explained that, at this moment, the program is holding schedule in
terms of the expected initial operating capability (IOC) dates for all
the variant aircraft except that fewer quantities may be delivered.
Please explain.
Secretary Gates. At the date of the hearing, the Services were
still evaluating how the restructured program would impact IOC dates.
The Services have completed their review, and the Marine Corps IOC is
still projected for December 2012 with Block 2 capability, while the
Air Force and Navy IOCs are now projected for 2016 with Block 3
capability.

63. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the concurrency structured
into the JSF program's test, production, and training plans has
obscured the mission capability of low-rate initial production (LRIP)
aircraft and support systems. How will DOD, under its proposed budget,
improve the process by which the mission capability of LRIP systems
will be accurately and credibly predicted well before delivery?
Secretary Gates. Concurrency was a choice made at the outset of the
program, which was a sound strategy for the Department. It is designed
to replace legacy aircraft and provide the Warfighter a 5th generation
strike fighter as quickly as possible, allowing the Department to reach
a more economic order quantity while still thoroughly testing the
aircraft. To that end, DOD intends to produce aircraft at a rate
consistent with the Independent Manufacturing Review Team
recommendations to the maximum extent possible. To mitigate concurrency
risks, a great deal of upfront investment was made in design tools
giving us a greater level of confidence in the design of the aircraft
than we would have for legacy systems such as the F-16 or F-15. Early
ground and flight test data closely match model predictions for flying
qualities, performance, and structures, justifying our upfront
investment. The maturity of the physical aircraft and the restructured
program give us confidence that our predictions will remain sound
concerning the capabilities of the F-35.

64. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I understand that the JSF
program office is executing a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded
live fire test plan. However, the program recently removed shutoff
fuses for engine fuel hydraulics lines. Coupled with the prior removal
of dry bay fire extinguishers, this may increase the likelihood of
aircraft combat losses from ballistic threat induced fires. At present,
only the Integrated Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression
system. Though the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) has approved the
Joint Program Office's (JPO) request to remove these safety systems as
an acceptable system trade to balance weight, cost, and risk, DOT&E
remains concerned regarding the aircraft's vulnerability to threat-
induced fires. Why is DOT&E's concern here not valid?
Secretary Gates. The Department is committed to delivering the most
affordable, supportable, lethal and survivable F-35 aircraft that meets
the needs of the warfighter. The overall survivability posture of the
F-35 is without equal due to advanced avionics and sensor suite, 5th
generation stealth performance, advanced countermeasures and robust,
balanced vulnerability reduction design. The warfighting effectiveness
of each design feature is carefully balanced against the overall system
impact to cost, weight and supportability. According to the JPO, the
removal of PAO (polyalphaolefin) coolant shut-off valves and fuses for
engine fuel-draulic lines resulted in a minimal (.05 Pk) impact on the
vulnerability assessment, no impact on the safety assessment, avoids
11 lbs. per aircraft in weight, avoids $40,000 (CTOL and CV)--$50,000
(STOVL) per aircraft in procurement cost, and avoids $1.4 million in
development cost. The JESB decision included a requirement to update
the vulnerability assessment after conclusion of the live-fire testing
in calendar year 2011. All F-35 aircraft vulnerability data will then
be re-assessed.

65. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, looking ahead to 2010, exactly
what milestones does the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (DCAPE) believe the JPO and prime contractor must complete
on time and on budget to achieve stated IOC dates?
Secretary Gates. DCAPE has identified five performance metric areas
for tracking in fiscal year 2010 that CAPE will monitor closely to
assess whether the JPO and prime contractor are making reasonable
progress against what the Joint Estimating Team (JET) schedule forecast
and cost estimate prepared in fall 2009 (also known as the ``JET II
estimate''). These areas are: 1) Progress in software for Block 0.5 and
1.0 releases; 2) the status of Mission System Hardware qualification
activities; 3) the level of engineering change traffic resulting from
ongoing flight test and early production activities; 4) the
availability of flight test aircraft at test sites; and 5) the status
of sortie generation rates, flight test hours completion, and test
point verification completion.

66. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, to what extent will the
verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of labs and models
as test venues be event-driven, subject to disciplined oversight by the
government and independent review?
Secretary Gates. The JSF Program Office employs a specific process
for verification, validation and accreditation of each model, lab, and
simulation intended as a test venue. A joint government/contractor team
reviews the validation evidence and accreditation support packages. The
team makes a recommendation to accredit the venue to the government
accreditation authority in the program office, which is either the
chief engineer or the program executive officer. Independent review of
the validation and accreditation process or content is not currently
included in the process but would be useful in helping to ensure
adequate F-35 test data are used in the validation phase and that
models are not used before accreditation is complete.

67. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, to what extent will these labs
and models not be used to close verification success criteria unless
formally approved for that use?
Secretary Gates. I expect the JSF program office leadership to
follow the process and assure any verification success criteria
dependent on model accreditation are not considered closed unless the
model successfully completed an adequate validation and accreditation
process.

impact of iraqi elections on drawdown plans
68. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the budget request is based on
assumptions that include the ability to withdraw all combat forces from
Iraq by the end of fiscal year 2011, leaving a non-combat U.S. military
training and assistance force of about 50,000. The ability to make
substantial reductions in combat forces hinges on the timing of the
next round of Iraqi parliamentary elections that were first scheduled
for January and which have now slipped to March. Domestic political and
security considerations in Iraq may lead to further delays. The bombing
in Baghdad on February 1, 2010, was the fifth suicide attack in Baghdad
in a week. While it's not totally unexpected given the national
elections in March, a sudden deterioration in security could have
considerable implications for the withdrawal of most U.S. troops later
this year. Do you anticipate General Odierno will recommend that the
estimated 65,000 U.S. combat troops return this August?
Secretary Gates. DOD is on schedule to draw down to 50,000 U.S.
forces in Iraq and to end the combat mission by August 31, 2010. The
remaining U.S. forces will be engaged in training, equipping, and
advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); targeted counterterrorism
operations; and protection of U.S. military and civilian efforts. U.S.
forces will continue to draw down responsibly in compliance with the
Security Agreement.
DOD's ability to continue the drawdown of U.S. forces is a
testament to the increasing capability of the ISF, as evidenced by
their performance during the elections. Since U.S. forces repositioned
from the cities in June 2009, the ISF have had the lead for operations
in Iraq, with U.S. forces playing a supporting role through partnering
with and enabling the ISF.

69. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what will be the budget impact
if forces in Iraq cannot be withdrawn according to the current plan?
Secretary Gates. The budget impact would be proportional to the
size of the force that is not withdrawn. The budget impact could be
substantial because it is very expensive to sustain deploy forces, even
if the operating tempo is moderate compared to active combat. Still, I
remain confident that U.S. forces can be withdrawn according to our
current plan.

70. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how will that impact the
ability to source the increase of troops in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq
continues forward as planned and will be executed concurrently with the
increase of forces in Afghanistan. The Iraqi national elections and the
plan to drawdown U.S. military forces in Iraq do not adversely affect
the ability to source the force increase in Afghanistan. The Iraqi
national elections were successfully conducted on March 2010. The
security environment established by the ISF prevented any large scale
effective attacks by insurgents or extremist elements seeking to derail
the conduct or outcome of the elections and demonstrated the increasing
capability of the Iraqis to provide security for themselves. As our
requirements in Iraq continue to decrease, units that redeploy from or
are no longer required to deploy to Iraq will return to the pool of
forces available to deploy in support of the mission in Afghanistan or
other global requirements.

71. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, I remain concerned that Iraq
will not have the training and equipment that it will need to maintain
a credible defense after most of our forces leave later this year. What
are we doing to ensure that Iraq receives the equipment and training
necessary to ensure we can responsibly withdrawal as scheduled?
Admiral Mullen. In spite of Iraq's recent budgetary challenges that
impact both manning and equipping the ISF, we remain confident that
with continued and focused U.S. support, specifically the $3 billion in
requested Iraqi Security Forces Funds, the ISF will be capable of
providing internal security and foundational external defense by the
time U.S. forces withdraw at the end of December 2011.
As of February 2010, the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program
had executed 144 cases valued at $5 billion. Between now and the end of
2011, USF-I will continue to support the training and equipping of the
ISF. We are currently working with Iraq on 96 additional FMS cases
valued at over $4 billion. In addition, thanks to critical authorities
provided by Congress in the 2010 NDAA, the United States will transfer
equipment to the ISF to further assist Iraq in meeting critical
equipping requirements.

military pay raise
72. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, for the last 3 years, Congress
has increased the administration's proposed increase in pay by half a
percentage point. What is the impact on the DOD budget by such a
directed increase in fiscal year 2011 and beyond?
Admiral Mullen. The cost of an additional half percent pay raise
increase to the fiscal year 2011 budget is $339 million in fiscal year
2011 and $2.2 billion across the FYDP. Increases in pay beyond DOD
requests contribute to a reduction of funding for our readiness
accounts which will jeopardize our ability to meet defense objectives
to prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to
defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and
preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.

u.s. forces in korea
73. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what will be the total costs in
terms of infrastructure, family support programs, and other operating
costs to achieve DOD's long-term goal to phase out all unaccompanied
tours in Korea?
Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011 FYDP includes $536 million to
increase the total number of families in Korea to 4,900. Additional
increases in the number of families in Korea, as part of the
Department's long-term goal to phase out unaccompanied tours, will be
addressed in future budget requests.

74. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are these costs reflected in
the budget request for fiscal year 2011 and the FYDP?
Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 FYDP includes $536 million to
increase the total number of families in Korea to 4,900. Any further
increases in the number of families in Korea, as part of the
Department's long-term goal to phase out all unaccompanied tours, would
be addressed in future budget requests.

force structure in afghanistan
75. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, GAO recently reviewed military
readiness issues and raised concerns that the flow of forces into
Afghanistan, including critical enabling forces, is being impeded by a
force cap placed on the total number of troops equal to 68,000 plus the
President's announced increase of 30,000, with a 10 percent buffer of
3,000 additional troops. This 10 percent buffer, which could
temporarily raise troop levels above the maximum of 98,000, can only be
authorized on a case-by-case basis by you. Is there a hard cap on the
number of troops in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD's commitment of
significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
for redeployment.

76. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is this cap driven by
operational factors, budget concerns, or other policy considerations?
Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD's commitment of
significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
for redeployment.

77. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, should there be any arbitrary
cap on the total number of forces that may be temporarily in
Afghanistan if such forces are necessary to establish the capability to
succeed in the mission?
Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD commitment of
significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
for redeployment.

78. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are there indications from
CENTCOM that the build-up of forces in Afghanistan is being impeded by
the cap on forces?
Secretary Gates. No, the U.S. CENTCOM has indicated the build-up/
increase of U.S. forces approved by POTUS in December 2009 is not being
impacted by the total authorized force. U.S. CENTCOM has worked a very
detailed transportation plan to ensure a majority of these forces
arrive in-country by late summer and this plan still remains feasible.

79. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if the President's priority is
to rapidly increase U.S. force levels in Afghanistan to turn the tide
in the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda so the U.S. can begin to
withdraw forces by July 2011, is managing the flow of forces to stay
below an arbitrary cap consistent with that priority?
Secretary Gates. In December 2009, President Obama committed an
additional 30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18
months. Since taking office, the President has committed 52,000
additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of 92,000.
The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended
surge will be largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard
cap on the number of forces in Afghanistan. DOD's commitment of
significant military resources to support this effort is consistent
with the President's strategy set forth in March 2009, and is directly
linked to the progress of General McChrystal's civil-military plan to
reverse the Taliban's momentum and create time and space to develop
Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force
level through July 2011. During this time, we will regularly measure
our progress and, beginning in July 2011, transfer lead security
responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces
for redeployment.

80. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will a delay in the supply of
trainers for Afghan security forces, or a decision by NATO allies not
to provide trainers, affect the need for U.S. forces above the 30,000
approved by the President?
Secretary Gates. Ensuring that the NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A) has sufficient institutional and operational
trainers remains a top priority. DOD is currently working with NATO to
resource NTM-A. A series of SHAPE-led force generation efforts have
resulted in a significant number of international commitments to help
meet the institutional and operational trainer shortfall. The U.S.
Government continues to be engaged in very active diplomatic efforts to
urge our coalition partners to provide additional trainers and
mentoring teams for the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). We are
also examining DOD's own contributions to ensure we are doing
everything we can to fill the requirement.

overseas contingency operations budget request
81. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, among the items in the fiscal
year 2011 OCO supplemental budget request is a request for one F-35 JSF
aircraft. I understand that this aircraft is intended to replace an F-
15E fighter plane from the 336th Fighter Squadron, Seymour Johnson Air
Force Base, North Carolina that crashed while conducting combat
operations in eastern Afghanistan, near the Ghazni province on July 18,
2009. I also understand that the existing ground rules for determining
what projects can be funded with the supplemental budget allow for the
replacement of combat equipment as a result of loss during combat
operations.
I have been told that because the Air Force can no longer procure
F-15E aircraft from the prime contractor, you elected to procure a
fighter aircraft currently in production. I am troubled by this
request. The JSF aircraft you are proposing to buy here will cost $205
million, as opposed to the F-15E unit cost of around $65 million. More
importantly, the very earliest that the Air Force can accept delivery
of its first operationally capable aircraft will be 2013, and
development of the JSF will not be completed until a few years later.
Would you please provide a major cost breakout and explain why you are
asking $205 million for this one JSF aircraft?
Secretary Gates. In early summer 2009 the Air Force provided an
estimate for a fiscal year 2011 OCO F-35 aircraft. At that time, the
estimate was $204.9 million. This cost control was subsequently used to
develop the detailed cost breakout that appeared in DOD's fiscal year
2011 President's budget (PB) Justification. If Congress approves the
additional OCO aircraft, the unit cost for 23 aircraft (fiscal year
2011 22 aircraft plus 1 OCO aircraft) would be approximately $182.5
million. OCO funds appropriated above this amount will be used for
initial spares associated with the OCO F-35. The table below reflects
the numbers which were submitted in the fiscal year 2011 PB
documentation for the base and OCO request, and what the OCO numbers
should have been in the documentation for the same weapon system unit
cost ($182.5 million).

82. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as a cost effective
alternative to buying a JSF aircraft here and to ensure timely fielding
of needed strike fighter capability in theater, to what extent have you
explored the possibility of refixing a legacy F-15E intended for
retirement, or one that has actually been retired, pursuant to the Air
Force's Combat Air Forces (CAF) Restructure Plan?
Secretary Gates. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seat all-weather
ground attack aircraft designed for high-speed interdiction and is a
derivative of the F-15C Eagle that is used for air superiority. The F-
15Es are some of the newest fighters in the Air Force (AF) active
inventory, and as of today, none of them have been retired or are
planned to be retired.

bmd-capable ships and sm-3
83. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, with the growing threat from
China, North Korea, and the Middle East, does DOD have enough BMD/SM-3
resources/assets to defend the United States, its allies, and forward
deployed forces in the region? In answering this question, please break
out your responses by BMD-capable ships and SM-3 missiles.
Secretary Gates. The Department will have 20 Aegis BMD ships and 81
SM-3 interceptors available for worldwide deployment by the end of
fiscal year 2010. The Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors deployed to
the East Asia, Middle East, and Europe are sufficient to carry out
assigned missions in those regions.
The Department also plans to have 23 Aegis BMD ships operationally
available in fiscal year 2011, along with a total of 110 SM-3
interceptors. By Phase 2 of the EPAA in the 2015 timeframe, the
Department plans to have 37 Aegis BMD-capable ships along with 112 SM-3
Block IA and 180 Block IB interceptors available.
The Department understands that demand for regional BMD
capabilities will outstrip supply for quite some time. Given this
reality, DOD is pursuing a collaborative approach with Allies and
partners to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. It is
important to note that as we manage U.S. resources, our objective is to
provide a steady-state capability that can be augmented for added
defensive capability for a limited duration in times of increased
threat. This is the essence of the phased adaptive approach to regional
architectures.

84. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does the Navy have enough
Aegis Class Destroyers to support both MDA and Navy requirements?
Secretary Gates. The Navy currently has sufficient large surface
combatants to meet the demand for Aegis destroyers. The Navy does not
have the capacity to meet the entire BMD requirement. In the near term,
DOD will employ a comprehensive Global Force Management (GFM) process
to most effectively allocate available surface combatants with Aegis
BMD capability. A modernization program is in place to increase BMD
capacity to meet the additional Combatant Commander's forward presence
requirements for BMD capable ships. The restart of the Aegis
shipbuilding program is aligned with providing the required Aegis BMD
capacity.
By spring 2010, Navy will have 21 BMD capable ships, and by 2015,
new construction and modernization will bring the total of BMD capable
ships to 27. The Navy will continue to work with the MDA to support
global BMD demands. It is important to recognize that Navy force
structure is not sized to utilize multi-mission Aegis ships for an
exclusive use mission on an enduring basis. Such single mission use
invariably results in shortages in other mission areas and a loss of
operational flexibility for the Joint Force Commander. Navy's long-term
plan is to make all Aegis destroyers and up to 15 Aegis cruisers BMD
capable to provide BMD forward presence ``in stride'' while also
performing its other missions.

contract oversight personnel
85. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, last May, the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) found that
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the lead
element for training Afghan security forces, did not have ``the
mechanisms necessary to ensure that U.S. funds are managed effectively
and spent wisely.'' In particular, the SIGAR noted a lack of qualified
contracting personnel in the command. Have you increased the number of
personnel overseeing these training contracts, and if so, by how much?
Secretary Gates. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) takes
contracting oversight seriously. Every resource that is misallocated
due to inefficiency, miscommunications, and undue delay cannot
contribute to improving the operational capabilities of the Afghan
National Security Forces. Concerning contracting oversight, we have
taken the following specific actions in the areas of oversight, quality
assurance, contract management, and senior leadership review:

Oversight: For our large Continental United States
(CONUS) based contracts that require a substantial degree of
effort to implement adequate contract oversight, we have
coordinated to have the contracting command provide a full-time
'in-country' Contract Officer Representative (COR) located with
CSTC-A.
For contracts that are awarded in Afghanistan and for small
CONUS based contracts CORs have been appointed from either
CSTC-A or other USFOR-A personnel. Additionally, for certain
contracts that require technical competence (such as vehicle
and weapons maintenance) we are arranging for U.S. Government
civilians from Army Depots (e.g. Red River Army Depot) to
deploy and provide us with oversight assistance.
Quality Assurance: We are enforcing the requirement
for Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) for CSTC-A
contracts and have in place a tracking system to ensure
designated CORs are verifying compliance with the QASP. During
the contract planning phase, requirement generators develop a
detailed written QASP and the associated COR coverage
requirements identifying the quantity, locations, and required
qualifications & skills for required CORs to provide adequate
oversight coverage to reasonably ensure compliance with the
QASP.
Contract Management: We established a six-person CSTC-
A Contract Management team that has developed improved
processes and they also monitor CSTC-A contracts to validate
contract oversight and share best practices across the command.
We are in the process of implementing a systemic approach to
review the contract oversight and standards for every contract.
Additionally, each month we identify COR requirements for every
location where contracted services are provided and update the
description of the oversight responsibilities that need to
performed.

86. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in this audit, the SIGAR
described a particular $404 million training contract where the
government contracting personnel were located in Maryland and
Pennsylvania--nine time zones away from where the work was actually
being performed. Is DOD planning to deploy more DOD contract oversight
personnel out to the field in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Yes. Overall the DOD has increased the numbers of
Contracting Officer Representative (CORs) and Contracting Officer
Technical Representatives (COTRs), and placed military commanders at
each training site associated with this contract. In addition, DOD has
taken the following steps to increase oversight:

Established a contract management cell within Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.
Added greater flexibility in assignment of contract
advisors with the ability to more geographically and among the
levels of Advisor/Trainer (Ministerial Systems, Institutional
Training, Field level).
Issued orders in theater on how to select, train and
place CORs for the upcoming Research and Development and
Engineering Command Contract.
Developed a contract statement of work to reduce the
number of contract advisors and identify other efficiencies and
increased contractor oversight in so doing.

The Department takes its contingency contracting oversight
functions extremely seriously and will continue to keep Congress
informed of how the Department performs this important function.

naval readiness
87. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, as you recall, the only
priority that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) identified as
unfunded in your last budget submission was ship depot maintenance.
Over the last few months, a number of press accounts have come out
describing problems directly related to how ineffectively the shipyards
are maintaining the readiness of the Navy's oldest surface combatants.
I understand that this year's proposed budget increases total funding
for ship depot maintenance by almost $800 million over last year. To
what extent does that proposed amount fully fund the Navy's current
requirement for ship depot maintenance and capture depot maintenance
volume that has accumulated from chronic underfunding over time?
Admiral Mullen. The fiscal year 2011 budget request in the O&M
baseline and Other Contingency Operations accounts is $6.1 billion and
funds 99 percent of the total projected ship maintenance requirement.
This request, and the percent of requirement funded, clearly reflects
the Navy's commitment to ensure that ships are properly maintained to
support current operations, and reach their expected service lives.
The request also funds the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management
(SSLCM) activity. Established in May 2009, SSLCM mission is to provide
centralized SSLCM. In conjunction with Naval Sea Systems Command and
Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF), the SSLCM activity conducted a
detailed review of fiscal year 2011 surface ship maintenance
requirements. The fiscal year 2011 budget request incorporates the
results of this review. The SSLCM activity is assessing maintenance
requirements for each ship class based on engineered technical
requirements necessary to reach expected service life, and any
additional requirements that are identified will be included in future
budget requests.

c-17 acquisition programs
88. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, over the last 4 years, the
Senate Appropriations Committee added 44 C-17s that we neither needed
nor could afford, at a total cost of over $14 billion above DOD's
requests--in the form of earmarks. As DOD had done in the preceding few
years, you proposed last year to cancel the C-17 Globemaster program
and argued against a congressional earmark that intended to buy 10 more
of those aircraft for $2.5 billion. You stated that the cost of buying
and operating those additional aircraft would ``invariably result in a
reduction in critical warfighting capability somewhere else in the
defense program.'' Is this view shared by the Service Chiefs and
unified and combatant commanders?
Secretary Gates. The current C-17 fleet is in excess of our
strategic airlift needs, resulting in increased operating costs at the
expense of other priorities. This position, supported by the Services
and Combatant Commanders, is based on the findings of several recent
mobility studies to include the Mobility Capabilities Requirements
Study 2016 (MCRS-16). The objectives of MCRS-16 were to determine the
mobility capabilities and requirements needed in support of the
National Military Strategy in the 2016 timeframe, to determine
capability gaps/overlaps associated with the programmed mobility force
structure, and to support the QDR and decisions regarding mobility
programs. The study found that the planned capacity of the programmed
strategic airlift fleet, consisting of 223 C-17s and 111 C-5s, exceeds
the most demanding projected requirements. In addition, the report
noted that C-17s could be used to support intra-theater missions
without adding to the peak demand for C-17s. Both of these insights are
consistent with findings from previous mobility studies.
Based upon this information no additional C-17s should be procured,
and I request your support in granting me the authority to allow for
the proper management of the strategic fleet by providing the
Department greater flexibility in retiring C-5 aircraft and eliminating
the current statutory requirement to maintain a minimum fleet of 316
strategic airlift aircraft.

89. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what affect would the purchase
of yet more C-17s, as some Members might insist on again this year,
have on our ability to field critical warfighting capabilities?
Secretary Gates. Unnecessary acquisition programs deplete funding
for our readiness accounts which jeopardize our ability to meet defense
objectives to prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict,
prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of
contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.
I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building the
C-17, but I will strongly recommend that the President veto any
legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of this program.

90. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, while I appreciate your
commitment in your opening statement to recommend a veto for further C-
17 funding in the current budget request, will you request that that
the President directly signal his intent to veto this bill if it
authorizes any expenditure for more C-17s, as was done with F-22
funding last year?
Secretary Gates. I will continue to strongly recommend to the
President that he veto any legislation that sustains the unnecessary
continuation of the C-17 program for the reasons stated in my
testimony.

missile defense
91. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the supply of missile defense
assets, whether it be Aegis cruisers, SM-3 missiles, THAAD units, etc.,
pales in comparison to the worldwide demand of our combatant
commanders. How does DOD and this budget seek to satisfy the stressing
needs of the new European phased adaptive approach while also
continuing to meet those needs of our ongoing efforts in the Pacific,
the Middle East, and the Homeland?
Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
affirms and continues the decisions made in the fiscal year 2010 PBR to
realign BMD programs and plans to focus on regional missile defenses.
Toward this end, investments in regional missile defenses amount to
about $3.8 billion in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget request,
or almost half of the MDA budget request. Significant investments will
continue over the FYDP, enabling the Department to make progress in
closing the gap between demand and supply. By 2015 DOD plans to have 6
THAAD batteries with 281 interceptors, along with 292 SM-3 interceptors
and 37 Aegis BMD-capable ships.
As the Department makes progress on fielding additional regional
missile defenses, I will also work to build on a strong foundation of
cooperative relationships and utilize appropriate contributions from
Allies. It is important to note that as we manage U.S. resources, my
objective is to provide a steady-state capability that can be augmented
for added defensive capability for a limited duration in times of
increased threat. This is the essence of the phased adaptive approach
to regional architectures.

92. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does modernization and
sustainment of our GBIs and the development and testing of a two-stage
GBI remain a priority for DOD?
Secretary Gates. Yes. I believe that defending the homeland against
the threat of limited missile attack is a high priority for the
Department. Therefore, the DOD is committed to continue modernizing and
sustaining the GMD system.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request lays out a funded
plan that includes fielding 30 operational GBIs, as well as delivery of
4 additional interceptors as operational spares (based on reliability
estimations), and 18 additional interceptors to support the flight test
program. The GMD sustainment program will maintain and support an
effective defensive system, meeting Warfighter requirements over the
expected 20-year life cycle.
As part of a hedging strategy for homeland defense against long-
range ballistic missile attacks, the Department is continuing the
development and assessment of the two-stage GBI. The planned two-stage
flight testing also supports three-stage data collection requirements
and adds to our confidence in and sustainment of the GBIs.

93. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are you committed to the
modernization and sustainment of our GBIs and the procurement of
additional GBIs if it were determined that technological advancements
with the SM-3 do not come to fruition in the planned timeframe?
Secretary Gates. I am committed to modernizing and sustaining the
GMD system as the Department defends the United States against
ballistic missiles.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request lays out a funded
plan that includes completing the fielding of 30 operational GBIs;
delivering 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability, and
operational spare requirements; and refurbishing 16 of the original 52
GBIs for both operational and flight test rotation during the FYDP. The
budget request also provides for continued Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV) software upgrades for the GBIs with focus on improved probability
of kill while leveraging improved sensor data. Additionally, we will be
completing the establishment of a second command and control node at
Fort Greely, AK.
The GMD sustainment program maintains and supports an effective
defensive system, meeting Warfighter requirements over the expected 20-
year life cycle. This program is planned within established Army and
Navy standards for missile field and depot-level support, including the
surveillance and testing of GBIs over their lifetime. A service-life
extension decision is anticipated in the 2027 timeframe.
Development and testing of the two-stage GBI will continue as a
hedge alternative should the SM-3 Block II A/B not emerge as
anticipated. The first two-stage GBI test will occur this summer.

nuclear weapons complex
94. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in the past you have been
quite vocal on the need for modernization of the nuclear weapons
complex. The fiscal year 2010 budget lacked adequate funding to address
the dire infrastructure needs. More than a year has passed since you
stated that ``there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible
deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without
either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
program.'' Do you believe the President's fiscal year 2011 budget
addresses the critical needs for modernizing our nuclear weapons
complex?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I believe that the fiscal year 2011 budget
provides a credible modernization program to meet the national security
needs of the United States. The fiscal year 2011 budget for the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reverses a decade's
long decline in the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise in terms of both
stockpile management and the recapitalization of aging and
unsustainable nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety
standards.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2011 NNSA budget requests funds to:

Revitalize warhead surveillance efforts, and the
science and technology that supports stockpile assessment and
certification in the absence of nuclear testing.
Protect human capital--including the expertise to
design, develop, and field warheads-through a stockpile
management program that fully exercises these capabilities.
Design and build a modern facility at Los Alamos--the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear
Facility--for plutonium R&D and pit production support.
Design and build a modern facility at Y-12--the
Uranium Processing Facility--to support Highly Enriched Uranium
(HEU) and related operations.

funds for the closure of gtmo
95. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the OCO portion of the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes $350 million
in a transfer fund for the detention facilities at GTMO, provides
funding to make improvements at the Illinois State Prison at Thomson,
IL, in the amount of $150 million, and includes another $158 million
for information technology improvements at the Rock Island Arsenal, IL,
to support DOD detainee operations at Thomson. These funds are in
addition to another $150 million in the Department of Justice (DOJ)
budget request to purchase the Thomson facility from the State of
Illinois. Current law prohibits bringing detainees from GTMO for any
reason except for detention during trial or for other legal
proceedings.
Why are the amounts requested for purchase and improvement of
Thomson and information technology support, a total of nearly $458
million, so high considering that the existing prison and courtroom
facilities at GTMO were built for about $240 million?
Secretary Gates. The $350 million request is for detainee
operations in general and not just for Thomson. Of the $350 million,
approximately $100 million is for improvements at Thomson Correctional
Center, approximately $50 million is for improvements at Rock Island
Arsenal, approximately $35 million is for procuring capital equipment
for the facility, and approximately $60 million is for capital
equipment and supplies for detention operations. The remaining $105
million is for operations at GTMO and Thomson.
The $458 million request includes DOJ purchase, DOJ operations, DOD
renovations, and DOD operations. When operations costs are excluded,
the relevant comparison for ``GTMO'' facility investment at Thomson is
approximately $200 million (DOJ's purchase price of DOD's portion of
the prison plus DOD's renovation costs).

96. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are these amounts in addition
to the more than $200 million per year that it is estimated to cost to
try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his four September 11 cohorts in New
York?
Secretary Gates. The $200 million per year was estimated by New
York City officials as their cost to conduct the trials. The amounts
requested in the President's budget are separate from this estimate.

97. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the estimated amount
of funding necessary to carry out all September 11 terrorist trials in
GTMO?
Secretary Gates. I cannot estimate a number at this time. The cost
per trial varies depending on the number of pre-trial motions,
witnesses, and other variables which are difficult to predict.

98. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the estimated amount
to try all the detainee cases the DOJ believes can be tried, which I
understand is about 35 total cases, in GTMO?
Secretary Gates. I cannot estimate a number at this time. The cost
per trial varies depending on the number of pre-trial motions,
witnesses, and other variables which are difficult to predict.

99. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, why is $158 million needed for
information technology improvements at Rock Island to support detention
facilities at Thomson?
Secretary Gates. Of the $350 million request, only approximately
$35 million is for procuring capital equipment, which includes
information technology hardware at both Thomson and Rock Island.

100. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does this request include
funding for military housing and other base support facilities at
Thomson and Rock Island for the military personnel that will be
stationed to support the new facility?
Secretary Gates. No, it does not. There are no plans to build
military housing because the Department's initial preliminary
environmental assessment shows that the local economy can support the
estimated number of personnel that will work at Thomson and Rock
Island.

101. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how many military personnel
will be assigned to Thomson and where will they be housed?
Secretary Gates. I estimate that approximately 800 military
personnel will be assigned to Thomson in a temporary duty status at
initial operational capability. The exact number of military personnel
assigned to Thomson will be determined by the Commander, U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM). These personnel will leverage the local economy for
housing, and initial environmental planning documents affirm that the
local economy can support them.

102. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how many additional military
personnel will be assigned to Rock Island to support detention
operations at Thomson and where will they be housed?
Secretary Gates. Pending completion of NORTHCOM's planning efforts,
I estimate that up to 500 personnel supporting the detainee operations
will be assigned to Rock Island at initial operational capability. The
exact number of personnel assigned to Rock Island will be determined by
the Commander, NORTHCOM. These personnel will leverage the local
economy for housing, and initial environmental planning documents
affirm that the local economy can support them.

103. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if Congress approves a change
in the law to allow long-term detention without trial in the United
States, and also approves the funding requested to purchase and improve
detention facilities at Thomson, what is the timeline to begin
detention operations at Thomson?
Secretary Gates. From the date the restriction on long-term
detention without trial in the United States ceases to have effect, and
the funding requested to purchase and improve detention facilities at
Thomson becomes available. I would not give any estimate because there
are too many variables to work through.

104. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when do you estimate the
Bureau of Prisons would purchase the Thomson facility from the State of
Illinois?
Secretary Gates. The Bureau of Prisons cannot begin negotiating a
purchase price until enactment of the portion of the President's fiscal
year 2011 budget that contains the DOJ appropriations and provides
funding for planning and assessment to continue at Thomson.

105. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when would the extensive
improvements at Thomson and Rock Island begin?
Secretary Gates. Improvements could not begin until the
environmental assessment is completed, the Bureau of Prisons purchases
the facility, and DOD receives authorization and funding from Congress.

106. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when would the IOC for
detention operations at Thomson be achieved?
Secretary Gates. I estimate that initial operational capability
would be achieved 10-13 months after DOD receives authorization and
funding from Congress.

107. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when is the earliest date
that military commission trials be held at Thomson under this plan?
Secretary Gates. Military commission trials could be held when
initial operating capability is achieved.

108. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when would the Final
Operational Capability (FOC) for detention operations at Thomson be
achieved?
Secretary Gates. Full operational capability would be achieved in
13-18 months after DOD receives authorization and funding from
Congress.

109. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the difference in
terms of the number of detainees that could be held or the nature of
detention operations between IOC and FOC?
Secretary Gates. There is no difference in either the number of
detainees that could be held at IOC and FOC or the nature of detention
operations at IOC and FOC.

110. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on what date would detention
operations at GTMO actually end?
Secretary Gates. Detention operations at GTMO could end shortly
after Thomson is operational.

disposition of gtmo detainees
111. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the President established a
Joint Task Force (JTF) shortly after taking office last January to
review all the available information on the detainees at GTMO and to
make recommendations on whether they should be tried, released, or held
long-term without trial. These recommendations were to extend to
whether trials should be by military commission or by Federal courts,
and the location of such trials. After extending the deadline for their
work by 6 months, the media now reports that the report has been
completed and recommendations on all the detainees have been made. When
will the JTF report be made available to Congress, since the details it
contains will influence our consideration of funding for alternatives
to GTMO?
Secretary Gates. The report was completed on January 22, 2010, and
subsequently sent to the White House. It is not my decision to release
the report.

112. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will the administration come
forward with a legislative proposal to repeal the current restrictions
on bringing detainees from GTMO to the United States in time for
comprehensive review before Congress receives the JTF report or takes
action on the funding request for the closure of GTMO?
Secretary Gates. The administration is reviewing a number of
possibilities relating to this issue, and it will not move any
detainees to the United States unless it is in full compliance with
U.S. law.

113. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if an administration's
legislative proposal is forthcoming, will it address other aspects of
detention policy such as:

a prohibition on release of detainees into the United
States;
denial of any immigration status to detainees,
including refugee and asylum status, if detainees are ordered
released by a Federal court as a result of habeas corpus
challenges to their detention;
authorization for long-term detention without trial
within the United States; and
uniform rules for Federal courts to apply in
conducting habeas corpus proceedings reviewing the detention of
terrorists captured during our ongoing armed conflict with al
Qaeda and the Taliban, and associated forces, which are
responsible for the attacks of September 11?

Secretary Gates. The President said that we will not release any
detainee into the United States who will endanger American lives, and
that we will use all lawful and appropriate means to protect the
American people. The authority to detain individuals under the
immigration laws pending their removal from the United States,
particularly where they pose a threat to national security, is but one
mechanism that may be relied upon, if necessary, to ensure that
detainees will not endanger our citizens.
Furthermore, denial of any immigration status to detainees has
already been constituted. Section 552(f) of the fiscal year 2010
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which was signed
into law by the President on October 28, 2009, specifically bars
immigration benefits for detainees including ``classification as a
refugee or applicant for asylum.''

law of the sea treaty
114. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the U.S. has not ratified the
Law of the Sea Treaty while China has continued efforts to assert
sovereignty over contested areas in the South China Sea and in other
areas where such claims support China's national security interests.
Beijing has now suspended military-to-military exchanges as a result of
the recent U.S. announcement to continue defensive arms sales to
Taiwan. How are we managing our relationship with China in disputed
areas such as its maritime claims?
Secretary Gates. Despite China's recently announced suspension of
military-to-military relations, I remain highly committed to
strengthening the mechanisms that the Department has in place to engage
China on this and other security issues, including the U.S.-China
Defense Consultative Talks, the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination
Talks, and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
process. These mechanisms provide for open and sustained channels of
communication to build greater confidence and mutual understanding,
discuss candidly our differences, and improve understanding and
application of safety standards and rules of the road for operations
that improve the safety of sailors and airmen of all countries in the
region.
I regard any suspension of discussions on operational safety as
potentially dangerous, and I regard the suspension of these discussions
on political grounds as particularly unfortunate. PLA General Xu Caihou
and I both reaffirmed our commitment to maintaining open dialogue on
security and safety issues during his visit in October. The United
States remains committed to all of our dialogue mechanisms with the
PLA.
Regarding China's maritime claims and the competing claims by other
states around the South China Sea, U.S. policy continues to be that we
do not take sides on the competing legal claims over territorial
sovereignty, including those in the South China Sea and East China Sea.
Furthermore, the United States does not propose to arbitrate or mediate
the underlying conflicts between the competing claims. However, it is
my view that our strong and continued presence in the region does
provide a sense of stability and a modicum of breathing room for the
claimants to pursue political means to resolve these issues. In short,
the U.S. presence is a stabilizing influence for all claimants in the
region.

115. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you think the
relationship with China will develop as we continue to share the global
commons--sea, air, space and cyberspace--as our interests clash or
diverge?
Secretary Gates. As U.S.-PRC interactions at sea, in the air, in
space, and in cyberspace become more frequent, it will become
increasingly important that the United States and China have effective
mechanisms for communication to avoid miscalculation or
misunderstanding. I believe that the United States and China should
seek to recognize and expand shared interests in upholding the
stability of, and access to, the global commons, and work together
cooperatively in support of those interests. Where our interests
diverge, we must ensure that each has a clear understanding of the
other's intentions, and that open channels of communication exist to
avoid escalatory reactions or perceptions that could breed mistrust or
inadvertently destabilize the overall bilateral relationship. Whether
addressing shared or divergent interests with China, I have been
diligent to ensure DOD's positions are advanced in accordance with
customary international law.
DOD has several existing mechanisms to facilitate discussion with
China on the topics you mentioned, and the Department is examining ways
to expand their scope and effectiveness. In 1998, then-Secretary Cohen
signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China's
Minister of Defense, and under its auspices the U.S. and China have
held discussions on maritime operational safety, at sea and in the air.
In 2005, DOD established what became the Defense Policy Coordination
Talks as a forum for discussing, among other things, issues of maritime
security. In 2008, DOD also began a Dialogue on Nuclear Policy and
Strategy, and, in October 2009, General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of
China's Central Military Commission, visited U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and engaged in discussions with General Chilton and his
staff on the issues under STRATCOM's purview.
The American and Chinese Governments have not yet reached the point
where these interactions are sufficiently consistent or substantive to
constitute the solid foundation needed for a stable and productive
relationship--one that can withstand the stresses that inevitably
emerge between two countries with interests as diverse as those of the
United States and China. Going forward, I believe that a whole-of-
government approach on both sides of the table provides the best
formula for building the necessary foundation.

okinawa to guam realignment
116. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on February 17, 2009, the
U.S. Government reaffirmed its support of an agreement with the
Government of Japan (GOJ) concerning the implementation of the
relocation of 8,000 marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam by
2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Since then, Japan
elected a new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who has asked the U.S.
Government to consider new options for the Futenma Replacement Facility
(FRF), which is part of the larger agreement for Guam. I note that the
agreement stipulates that the Japanese Government must demonstrate
tangible progress regarding the FRF, which has been defined to include
a signature by the Governor of Okinawa on a landfill permit required to
commence construction. This action was currently planned to take place
in mid to late 2010. In a press conference yesterday, you suggested
that we should demonstrate patience in the negotiations with the
Japanese Government on the future of the agreement. With that said, the
fiscal year 2011 budget request contains $387 million in military
construction funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation
of marines from Okinawa. This is in addition to $160 million authorized
for construction in the 2010 defense bill. If the Japanese position
does not change regarding Futenma, will DOD still proceed with the
award of construction contracts on Guam to support the relocation of
the marines?
Secretary Gates. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is $452
million in military construction funds for infrastructure on Guam to
support the relocation of marines from Okinawa. The NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2010 approved $514 million to support the relocation effort.
The framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment is the U.S.-
Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued following the May
1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
Committee. This framework confirms that the Okinawa-related realignment
initiatives are interconnected and, specifically, that the III Marine
Expeditionary Force (III MEF) relocation from Okinawa to Guam is
dependent on, among other things, tangible progress toward completion
of the FRF.
The relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue.
I have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
support of the combatant commander and to meet our commitments to
Allies and partners in the region, including under the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
The Department is currently waiting for the GOJ to complete its
review of the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to
resolve the issue by May, and I look forward to resuming work with the
GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our
force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's operational
capabilities remain politically and operationally sustainable.

117. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what other options are
acceptable to DOD for the relocation of Marine Corps aviation units
from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma?
Secretary Gates. The FRF, included in the May 2006 U.S.-Japan
Realignment Roadmap, resulted from several years of bilateral
coordination that took into account the political, operational, safety,
noise, environmental, and infrastructure requirements associated with
the Marine Corps forces in Okinawa. These forces, which consist of air,
ground, logistics, and command elements, remain dependent upon the
interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises, and
operations.
I am not aware of any other options that meet these criteria. DOD
is prepared to review what the GOJ comes up with to determine its
feasibility, including operational, safety, noise, environmental, and
infrastructure aspects, as well as to discuss its political
sustainability given local conditions. DOD remains committed to the
FRF--as reflected in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap--as the best way
to move forward with the strategic transformation of U.S. presence in
Okinawa.

118. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when do you expect to see a
resolution on the status the FRF?
Secretary Gates. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to
resolve the issue by May. The GOJ is conducting a review of options and
has asked the U.S. Government to be patient as they prepare to present
an official alternative. I look forward to resuming work with the GOJ
to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force
posture in Okinawa to be more politically and operationally
sustainable.

119. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would you recommend to the
President the continuation of the movement of marines to Guam absent an
acceptable solution for the FRF?
Secretary Gates. The current framework for U.S.-Japan force posture
realignment is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,
issued following the May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-
Japan Security Consultative Committee. This framework confirms that the
Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected and,
specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)
relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things,
tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
(FRF).
A suitable FRF is considered the ``lynchpin'' for III MEF
relocation to Guam. The relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not
a basing issue. I have a responsibility to provide operationally ready
forces in support of the combatant commander and to meet our
commitments to allies and partners in the region, including under the
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
The Department is currently waiting for the GOJ to complete its
review of the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to
resolve the issue by May, and I look forward to resuming work with the
GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our
force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's operational
capabilities remain politically and operationally sustainable.

120. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if the GOJ fails to approve
the current roadmap regarding Futenma, is the United States prepared to
nullify the current framework and remain in Futenma?
Secretary Gates. The current framework for U.S.-Japan force posture
realignment is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,
issued following the May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-
Japan Security Consultative Committee. While a suitable FRF is
considered essential for an enduring presence on Okinawa, the
Department is prepared to stay at Futenma if no replacement facility is
approved by the GOJ.
The GOJ is reviewing the FRF; Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated
that he intends to resolve the issue by May. We look forward to
resuming work with the GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective
of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance's
operational capabilities remain sustainable, politically and
operationally. We have a responsibility to provide operationally ready
forces in support of the combatant commander and to meet our
commitments to allies and partners in the region, including under the
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

international pilot training
121. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, many of our allies choose to
conduct fighter pilot training here in the United States for various
reasons ranging from the availability of adequate ranges to cost and
the quality of training. This obviously affords the U.S. Air Force an
outstanding opportunity to partner and train with NATO and other allied
pilots. From what I have been told, the Secretary of the Air Force's
International Affairs office manages the program. Does DOD normally
guide or influence a partner nation's selection of the best location
among candidate bases already conducting similar missions in the United
States to conduct training to maximize efficiency for cost, quality of
training, and access to ranges?
Secretary Gates. There is no initiative in the U.S. Air Force
concerning a decision to influence or guide international partner pilot
training to a particular location. The Air Force provides tuition-based
pilot training at 14 locations. Each location, with the exception of
undergraduate pilot training, is the sole provider of tuition-based
training for a particular model of aircraft. For example, all F-16
tuition-based training is done at Tucson Air National Guard Base
(ANGB), AZ, through the 162d Fighter Wing and their assigned F-16
aircraft and instructor pilots.
When a partner nation desires to bed down its own aircraft at a
continental United States (CONUS) air force base, the Secretary of the
Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) provides options based on
the country's requested training needs and budgetary requirements. When
presented with available locations, training capabilities, and pricing
information, the partner nation selects the training venue that best
meets their needs. The U.S. Air Force is committed to providing the
most effective training venue available for our international partners
consistent with their training needs and budget by dispassionately
providing the facts and costs for the available training.

122. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would the office of the
Secretary of Defense have any reason to provide guidance to Secretary
of the Air Force's International Affairs office to encourage an allied
nation to remain at a certain location, regardless of the cost or
quality of training? If so, what would be those reasons and why?
Secretary Gates. There are occasions when discussions take place
between the appropriate DOD offices and a partner nation concerning
their choice of a bed down training location, usually when information
is requested by the partner nation. Cost and quality of training are
always considered in these discussions and are provided on all
available training locations. Once the data are provided, we expect the
partner nation to make the decision that best meets their training
needs and budgetary requirements.
When a partner nation requests tuition-based training for a
specific aircraft, there are no alternatives and the requesting nation
is limited to the stated location and standard student cost.

contractor performance for the missile defense agency
123. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in the fiscal year 2011
budget press conference for the MDA, David Altwegg, Executive Director,
was asked about the quality of work being conducted by contractors on
MDA acquisition programs. Altwegg responded stating:

``I'm not going to name names today, but I'm going to tell
you we continue to be disappointed in the quality that we are
receiving from our prime contractors and their subs--very, very
disappointed; quality-design issues, but more in quality of
products delivered, which then results in rework and which
reserved--because most of these contracts are cost contracts,
it costs the taxpayer more.''

Given the cost-plus nature of many of these contracts and the
allegation that reckless failures by contractors are resulting in
unnecessary cost increases, how do you intend to address these
concerns, both within MDA and across DOD?
Secretary Gates. MDA has consistently expressed concern over the
magnitude and frequency of quality problems encountered in the
development and manufacture of the various elements that make up the
Missile Defense System.
MDA made significant changes in its acquisition processes over the
past several years that both Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the MDA
Director, and I believe will improve the quality in the manufacture of
our weapons systems. Specifically:

MDA established a robust quality organization within
the Agency, which focuses on tackling problems identified
during development and testing. One of the first steps of this
organization was the development of a MDA Assurance Plan, and a
MDA Parts, Materials and Process Plan. These plans require
major contractors to adopt disciplined processes and procedures
that lead to enhanced quality, a reduction in rework, lower
costs, and preventing ``parts'' quality issues from progressing
to the finished components. Second, MDA Quality Safety and
Mission Assurance now conducts periodic mission assurance
audits at contractors' facilities to monitor compliance and
ensure the contractors are following their approved policies
and procedures for the manufacture of systems. Following the
audit, any deficiencies identified are tracked and reported to
the MDA Director until they are successfully closed out.
MDA made significant changes to the award fee process
and quality control has received increased emphasis over the
past year. Prior to the beginning of each award fee period, the
contractor is provided with an expectations letter clearly
articulating the areas that the fee determining official
considers to require emphasis during the period. The award fee
expectations letters outline to contractors that poor quality
will not be tolerated and will reduce award fee earned when
appropriate.
MDA also moved away from cost plus award fee contracts
to cost plus incentive fee contracts, an approach that measures
contractor performance more precisely. Cost overruns result in
lower fees, while the contractor has also the opportunity to
earn more based on demonstrated positive performance against
objective criteria.
MDA performs an annual assessment of its contractor's
performance that is recorded in a database called Past
Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) where these
assessments are retrieved and used as part of past performance
evaluations supporting future source selections throughout DOD.
Negative reports, such as poor quality control, can lead to a
contractor not being selected for a competitive contract award.
MDA embarked on efforts to re-compete many of its
major contracts. The Agency's expectation is that the
competitive process will result in lower cost, better
performance, and higher quality.
MDA clearly articulated to companies that it will not
authorize future contract scope when a clear trend of poor
quality assurance is not addressed by senior personnel and they
do not initiate changes to cause enduring improvement in the
quality and reliability of products.

124. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what steps can be taken to
ensure that contractors are held responsible to provide quality
products without unnecessary increases in cost?
Secretary Gates. I believe that the greater use of incentive-type
contracts with cost incentives and objective criteria, rather than
award fee contracts with more subjective criteria, should improve
contractor performance. In addition, greater emphasis on past
performance as a discriminator during contract competitions will
incentivize sources to achieve quality performance.

125. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain to what extent
the fee structure of those contracts covered by Executive Director
Altwegg's comment can be better designed to incentivize optimal
performance. What specific remedial efforts do you intend to employ to
achieve that result?
Secretary Gates. The contract fee structure is just one element in
how we motivate or incentivize better contract performance. We will
monitor contractor performance under the revised incentive structure
over time and propose new steps when appropriate. The steps taken by
MDA will accomplish our mutual goal of achieving optimal contract
performance. Specifically:

MDA established a robust quality organization within
the Agency, which focuses on tackling problems identified
during development and testing. One of the first steps of this
organization was the development of a MDA Assurance Plan, and a
MDA Parts, Materials and Process Plan. These plans require
major contractors to adopt disciplined processes and procedures
that lead to enhanced quality, a reduction in rework, lower
costs, and preventing ``parts'' quality issues from progressing
to the finished components. Second, MDA Quality Safety and
Mission Assurance now conducts periodic mission assurance
audits at contractors' facilities to monitor compliance and
ensure the contractors are following their approved policies
and procedures for the manufacture of systems. Following the
audit, any deficiencies identified are tracked and reported to
the MDA Director until they are successfully closed out.
MDA made significant changes to the award fee process
and quality control has received increased emphasis over the
past year. Prior to the beginning of each award fee period, the
contractor is provided with an expectations letter clearly
articulating the areas that the fee determining official
considers to require emphasis during the period. The award fee
expectations letters outline to contractors that poor quality
will not be tolerated and will reduce award fee earned when
appropriate.
MDA also moved away from cost plus award fee contracts
to cost plus incentive fee contracts, an approach that measures
contractor performance more precisely. Cost overruns result in
lower fees, while the contractor has also the opportunity to
earn more based on demonstrated positive performance against
objective criteria.
MDA performs an annual assessment of its contractor's
performance that is recorded in a database called PPIRS where
these assessments are retrieved and used as part of past
performance evaluations supporting future source selections
throughout DOD. Negative reports, such as poor quality control,
can lead to a contractor not being selected for a competitive
contract award.
MDA embarked on efforts to recompete many of its major
contracts. The Agency's expectation is that the competitive
process will result in lower cost, better performance, and
higher quality.
MDA clearly articulated to companies that it will not
authorize future contract scope when a clear trend of poor
quality assurance is not addressed by senior personnel and they
do not initiate changes to cause enduring improvement in the
quality and reliability of products.

tricare fees
126. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your recent press comments
on the fiscal year 2011 budget request, you stated that reasonable
tradeoffs had to be made to control cost growth in the TRICARE program.
What is the administration's rationale for charging military families
or retirees higher out of pocket fees for health care they earned in
return for their military service?
Secretary Gates. There are no proposals in the fiscal year 2011
budget request that will raise discretionary fees for military families
or retirees. However, fees for the TRICARE program have remained static
since its inception in 1995, while health care costs have soared. For
example, the Prime enrollment fee has remained $460 a year for a
retiree family since 1995. As a result, many beneficiaries are
returning to the Military Health System (MHS), opting to use their more
generous TRICARE benefits versus other health plans.
MHS costs have more than doubled between fiscal year 2001 ($19
billion) and fiscal year 2010 ($49 billion). At this growth rate, MHS
costs are projected to approach $64 billion by fiscal year 2015, more
than 10 percent of the Department's top line budget. While the
Department continually looks for opportunities for savings and
efficiencies within the MHS, these efforts are unlikely to solve the
long-term sustainability issues of the TRICARE benefit without changes
to the beneficiary cost-sharing structure

extending benefits to new categories
127. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Senate Committee on
Veterans Affairs has recently adopted legislation that would extend
TRICARE benefits to certain current and former members of the Armed
Forces and their family members for health problems occurring as a
result of exposure to environmental hazards at Camp LeJeune and the
Atsugi Naval Air Facility if so determined by an advisory board on
military exposures. What is your position on expansion of eligibility
for TRICARE to cover such individuals, including those who may be
otherwise ineligible for DOD health care benefits?
Secretary Gates. Before we would extend health benefits, we would
need evidence of causality between consumption of contaminated water
and any adverse health conditions. The Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has
not yet established linkage between the consumption of contaminated
water at Camp Lejeune and health conditions in the population who
consumed the contaminated water.
Health benefits coverage should be limited only to those conditions
where there is sound scientific evidence of a causal relationship
between exposure, including the amount of exposure dose, and specific
disease outcomes. Absent information on exposure dose and in accordance
with proposed Senate legislation, this determination would be made by
an Advisory Committee and a Scientific Review Committee. In addition to
consideration of causally-related associations with the particular
contaminants identified, consideration must be given to the severity of
exposures (dosages) that individuals may have encountered while
residing at Camp Lejeune or the Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan. The
doses of contaminates are critical in determining risk, as many low
dose exposures do not create significant health risks. The Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is embarking on a series of
studies to better identify the exposed personnel and then to study
disease outcome in those individuals in order to identify any positive
associations.
It should also be noted, in accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Marine Corps contracted
with the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council (NRC))
to review the evidence regarding potential associations between
exposure to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and adverse
health effects in prenatal children, children, and adults. The NRC
review report concluded that while former Camp Lejeune residents and
workers were exposed to unregulated solvents, there are no conclusive
associations between adverse health effects and exposure to the
contaminated water at the base. The report noted that for the chemicals
of greatest concern, tetrachloroethene and trichloroethene, the highest
levels measured in the mixed-water samples at Camp Lejeune were much
lower than the lowest dose that caused adverse effects in the most
sensitive strains of species of laboratory animals. The review
concluded, however, that even though adverse effects were unlikely,
they could not be ruled out completely and that the Department of the
Navy (and other policy makers) should move forward with responses they
deem appropriate based on available information.
In regard to the personnel who were assigned at Naval Air Facility
Atsugi, Japan while the Japanese Shinkampo incinerator was operational,
a number of comprehensive health studies were accomplished by the U.S.
Navy Environmental Health Center. As a result of these assessments, it
would be difficult to attribute any particular cancer occurring in this
population that is related to the incinerator emissions.

128. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if enacted, how would the
TRICARE program implement health benefits coverage limited to
conditions related to exposure to environmental hazards?
Secretary Gates. The Department provides or arranges for medically
necessary health care for those entitled to the MHS benefit. In the
broad sense, we do not deny care to those entitled to care based on the
cause of their medical condition. If the statute is changed and the
Department is directed to provide care for a new category of
beneficiary, we would use existing regulatory procedures to define
eligibility and health care coverage.

payments to civilian hospitals
129. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what amount of savings is
assumed in this request as a result of payment reform for civilian
hospitals, such as application of Medicare outpatient prospective
payments, and payments to sole community providers?
Secretary Gates. TRICARE implemented its Outpatient Prospective
Payment System (OPPS) on May 1, 2009 to bring its reimbursement rates
for hospital outpatient services into alignment with Medicare rates.
All public comments were taken into account before the final rule was
published on December 10, 2008. The rule provided a phase in period of
four years for network hospitals and three years for non-network
hospitals to buffer the effect of the decline in payments. Prior to
this rule, TRICARE paid billed charges for emergency room visits and a
CHAMPUS Maximum Allowable Charge for outpatient radiology, pathology,
and ambulatory surgery. In total, the payments reflected approximately
45 percent of overall billed charges.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget for the Defense Health
Program assumes $366 million in savings associated with this change.
The calculation included the phase in schedule as well as the
assumption that some hospitals would qualify for Military Contingency
Payment Adjustments which offset the effect on facilities serving a
significant number of active duty servicemembers and their families.
These adjustments may be applied if certain volume or TRICARE revenue
thresholds are met by the hospital. This provision was designed to
ensure continued access to care in military communities. Sole community
hospitals are among those affected by the OPPS regulation.
Based on the first 3 months of fiscal year 2010, we are on track to
realize these projected savings. TRICARE Regional Offices are assisting
hospitals with documentation of their claims history to qualify for the
Military Contingency Payment Adjustment.

130. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do civilian hospitals lose
money every time they care for a TRICARE patient? If so, why? If not,
please explain, based on data available to DOD.
Secretary Gates. We have no evidence that civilian hospitals lose
money. Statute (10 U.S.C. 1079(j)(2)) requires TRICARE to pay
institutional providers according to the rules which apply to Medicare
reimbursement to the extent practicable. In comparing OPPS
reimbursement to the prior formula, our analysis of a nationwide sample
of 73 hospitals indicated reimbursement would drop from approximately
45 percent of overall billed charges to 30-40 percent. This amount
exceeds publicly available cost to charge ratios in all but four States
(Wyoming, Utah, Nebraska, and Alaska), thus covering hospitals' costs
for the care.
While TRICARE's OPPS represents a significant change for hospitals,
it aligns our program with Medicare, covers hospital costs, and
includes considerations for hospitals seeing a large volume of TRICARE
patients.

medical facilities in the national capital region
131. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, nearly all of our Nation's
seriously wounded and ill warriors return to medical facilities in the
National Capital Region (NCR) even if they do not become inpatients
here. It is imperative that the quality of care at Walter Reed and Fort
Belvoir retain the high degree of excellence provided today as well as
achieve additional attributes of world-class care in the new joint
facility.
In its independent review of DOD's plans for the new Walter Reed
National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), an advisory committee of the
Defense Health Board (DHB) found that there is an ``urgent need to
clarify the vision, goals, and expectations'' for the new facility and
to ``consolidate organizational and budgetary authority in a single
entity.'' The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to delineate
budget and operational authority to provide and operate world class
military medical facilities in the NCR as part of a plan that must be
submitted to Congress by March 31, 2010. Are funds included in DOD's
FYDP to invest in the existing facilities at Bethesda to raise them to
world-class standards?
Secretary Gates. The Department has developed a Comprehensive
Master Plan for the NCR, which provides a roadmap to continue improving
the finest healthcare facilities possible for our military families.
Military medicine in the NCR incorporates many of the world-class
attributes and capabilities as defined in the DHB panel's recently
established standard. Since our 2009 review of the DHB report, the
Department has institutionalized even greater requirements than the
report outlined and has undertaken a Master Facilities Planning process
to define and execute the requirements as part of our Comprehensive
Master Plan. This plan will inform the DOD's FYDP starting fiscal year
2012.

132. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are the plans for DOD
and the JTF, NCR Medical, to address the issues of command and control,
resources and staffing, both military and civilian, of the integrated
care system for the NCR?
Secretary Gates.
Command, Control, and Resources:
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation that
realigned operations from Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to a
new WRNMMC, Bethesda and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH), was
the Department's first step in a larger effort to transform, realign,
and significantly enhance the way it delivers healthcare in the NCR.
Taking into account the recommendations of the DOD's 2007 Independent
Review Group and the President's Commission on Care for America's
Returning Wounded Warriors (Dole-Shalala), the DOD Senior Oversight
Council recommended, and the Department established, the Joint Task
Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED) as a standing JTF to
oversee these efforts.
The NCR BRAC Health Systems Advisory Subcommittee of the DHB's
independent review of DOD's plans for the new WRNMMC, Bethesda, and
FBCH identified authority issues in the NCR as ``foundational'' and
recommended empowering a single official with complete organizational
and budgetary authority in the NCR.
The Department is developing and implementing a comprehensive
master plan for the NCR Medical as required under section 2714 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 that will address this.
Manpower Document:
The Department has determined an Active-Duty Force mix distribution
for the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH and the Services have identified
the resources to meet the defined manning requirements. At WRNMMC,
Bethesda the Active-Duty Force mix will be approximately 41 percent
Army, 54 percent Navy, and 5 percent Air Force. At FBCH, it will be
approximately 62 percent Army, 36 percent Navy, and 2 percent Air
Force. The distribution of forces is necessary to understand where the
future requirements for the civilian workforce will be located.
An Intermediate Manpower Document (IMD) is being developed and will
be used to facilitate the development of the ultimate Joint Table of
Distribution (JTD). The IMD is an authoritative database that supports
the underlying manning documents for each Service. It will allow the
compilation of all personnel requirements for the eventual JTD while
maintaining more flexibility for changes during the transition and as
experience is gained operating the new hospitals. The IMD will look
exactly like a JTD in all aspects, which will facilitate its eventual
migration to the JTD. The final iteration of the Department's draft JTD
version 3.0 was renamed the IMD. Following the completion of the IMD,
JTF CAPMED and the Services will develop a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to commit resources in support of the IMD. Until the Department
makes its final determination on the ultimate governance alignment of
JTF CAPMED, the IMD can remain a local database, with necessary MOAs,
allowing flexibility for position changes and realignments.
Civilian Personnel:
Retaining the skilled workforce in the NCR is imperative to
operating the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. A Joint manning solution
coupled with a comprehensive human capital strategy will allow the
Department to incorporate the rich legacies of both WRAMC and NNMC as
national icons in establishing the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. While
attrition levels of government civilians at WRAMC remain normal,
individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned about their jobs and
location in the end state. The Department is engaged in comprehensive
communication efforts with the current workforce to ensure transparency
and maintain trust.
The Department has established a Civilian Human Resources (CHR)
Council to oversee the transition of civilian employees in the NCR. In
February 2010, the CHR began matching current permanent WRAMC civilians
to work locations at either WRNMMC, Bethesda or FBCH. Utilizing a
workforce mapping model to execute a Guaranteed Placement Program
(GPP), the Department will be able to identify placement options for
the vast majority of WRAMC government civilians at their desired work
location performing their preferred work assignment. Placement options
will also include reassignment opportunities and career progression
opportunities that do not exist today. By July 1, 2010 notifications
will be made to civilian employees of their future work assignments and
locations at WRNMMC, Bethesda, FBCH or other opportunities within the
GPP. Government civilians will not incur any loss in pay as a result of
the transition.
The Department is taking significant actions to accommodate work
location preferences for as many civilians as possible. Approximately
1,500 of the WRAMC civilian personnel will be placed at WRNMMC,
Bethesda. Surveys indicate that approximately 405 current civilian
employees prefer to work at FBCH, which includes 355 civilian employees
assigned to WRAMC and 50 civilian personnel assigned to NNMC. DOD may
be able to expand WRAMC placement opportunities for civilian personnel
at WRNMMC Bethesda through workforce mix analysis, insourcing and/or
other initiatives. All new permanent civilian hires at WRAMC and NNMC
are being advised that their work and position may move to FBCH in
2011. This change was effective as of February 2010. In addition, DOD
will leverage attrition over the next year and a half to create
additional positions at WRNMMC, Bethesda in order to place current
permanent WRAMC civilians. DOD is committed to maintaining a highly-
skilled workforce in the NCR able to meet the unique healthcare needs
of the Nation's servicemembers, retirees, and their families.

133. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what steps has DOD taken and
what additional steps are necessary to apprise civilian health care
employees at Walter Reed and Bethesda of their future status within the
new facility in order to retain the highest quality staff now serving?
Secretary Gates. Retaining the skilled workforce in the NCR is
imperative to operating the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. A Joint
manning solution coupled with a comprehensive human capital strategy
will allow the Department to incorporate the rich legacies of both
WRAMC and NNMC as national icons in establishing the new WRNMMC,
Bethesda and FBCH. While attrition levels of government civilians at
WRAMC remain normal, individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned
about their jobs and location in the end state. The Department is
engaged in comprehensive communication efforts with the current
workforce to ensure transparency and maintain trust.
The Department has established a CHR Council to oversee the
transition of civilians in the NCR. In February 2010 it began matching
current permanent WRAMC civilians to their work locations at either
WRNMMC, Bethesda or FBCH in the end state. Utilizing a workforce
mapping model to execute the Guaranteed Placement Program (GPP), the
Department will be able to place the vast majority of WRAMC government
civilians at their desired work locations doing the work they want to
do and will provide reassignment opportunities and career progression
opportunities that do not exist today. Notifications will be made to
Federal Government civilians, who will be transitioned to a single DOD
civilian manning model, of their future work locations at WRNMMC,
Bethesda, FBCH, or other opportunities within the GPP by July 1, 2010.
Government civilians will not incur any loss in pay as a result of the
transition.
The Department has taken significant actions to meet work location
preferences for as many civilians as possible. The Active-Duty Force
mix across these hospitals will facilitate the placement of
approximately 1,500 of the WRAMC civilian personnel to be placed at the
WRNMMC, Bethesda. Surveys indicate that more than 355 Federal
Government civilians at WRAMC and 50 at NNMC desire to go to FBCH.
There are approximately 230 contract billets planned for FBCH and 475
for WRNMMC, Bethesda and depending on the skills needed, DOD may be
able to use some of those contractor billets to expand WRAMC personnel
placements at Bethesda. In addition, effective February 2010, all new
permanent hires at WRAMC and NNMC are being advised that their work may
move to FBCH in 2011. DOD will also be leveraging attrition over the
next year and a half to create additional ``spaces'' at Bethesda to
place current permanent WRAMC civilians. DOD is committed to
maintaining a highly-skilled workforce in the NCR able to meet the
unique healthcare needs of the Nation's servicemembers, retirees, and
their families.

support for military families with special needs
134. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010
required DOD to establish an Office of Community Support for Families
with Special Needs, and to significantly improve programs both in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and throughout the military
departments to assist military families with special educational and
medical needs. What are DOD's plans to implement this program in fiscal
year 2010?
Secretary Gates. We have established the Office of Community
Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family
Policy. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the office to develop
and implement a comprehensive policy on support for military families
with special needs.
An Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Services working group
has been meeting since April 2009, on how to better support military
families with special needs, for both Active Duty and the Reserve
component. The working group has begun developing the policy and will
develop standards and metrics by which to measure the effectiveness of
the support provided.
We met with military families with special needs to better
understand their needs and will continue to involve them. We will also
consult with military and civilian specialists supporting families with
special needs to help us develop the family support program.
In November 2009, the Department sponsored joint service training
for over 300 military personnel who serve military families with
special needs.
The Department has established a repository of information for
military families with special needs at Military OneSource
(www.militaryonesource.com/specialneeds). The launch page provides a
central location for families to learn about services and support
available from the military as well as from the communities outside the
gate.

135. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, why does the request for
fiscal year 2011 omit any request for funding this mandate?
Secretary Gates. Although the Department did not request funds in
the fiscal year 2011 budget, we understand the importance of this
program. We are reviewing our funding options for fiscal year 2011 and
will work with Congress to resolve any concerns.

136. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is DOD's estimate of the
funds required to meet this mandate in fiscal year 2011 and how will it
be achieved?
Secretary Gates. The Military Community and Family Programs office
under the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
continues to refine the implementation plan, including the requirements
of the program management office. Once the implementation plan is
complete, funds will be realigned within available resources, or
reprogrammed during the Omnibus reprogramming action to meet the
initial fiscal year 2010 funding requirements of the Office of
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs. The
implementation plan will also lay out the fiscal year 2011 funding
requirements and strategies. As necessary, the Department will submit a
reprogramming action to meet fiscal year 2011 requirements.

rotary wing support in afghanistan
137. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, on September 28, 2009,
Newsweek released an article titled ``Not So Special Forces''
describing a shortage of aviation assets, particularly rotary lift, to
support SOF in Afghanistan, including a claim that nearly 80 percent of
aviation requests made by SOF in Afghanistan were rejected. Aware of
the vital role SOF play in our efforts against terrorism, the 2010 QDR
calls for a substantial increase in SOF personnel and a correlating
increase in key enabling assets for SOF, including rotary lift. While
this increase is necessary to support the growing end strength of SOF,
it will not provide near-term relief to already strained resources in-
country. What is your current assessment of the availability of
enabling forces, including rotary lift, for SOF in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. We continue to have shortfalls in ISR and rotary
wing support to SOF in Afghanistan. Personnel training is the biggest
factor limiting how fast we can deliver more ISR to Afghanistan.
Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are
operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ newly acquired
hardware, and we continue to ensure proper numbers and placement of
analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence
data.
To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
additional Chinooks will arrive in December 2010 and June 2011,
respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. We
are also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
requiring them, and we anticipate adding five more CV-22s to the fleet
in the coming year. Currently at initial operational capability, CV-22
units cannot currently sustain a permanent presence in Afghanistan and
they are limited to 4-6 month deployments to accommodate training new
crews. However, their presence will become more enduring as the fleet
grows and the CV-22 reaches full operational capability in fiscal year
2011.

138. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what steps, if any, have been
taken to alleviate the shortage of key enabling forces, including
rotary lift, in Afghanistan for SOF?
Admiral Mullen. We continue to have shortfalls in ISR and rotary
wing support to SOF in Afghanistan. Personnel training is the biggest
factor limiting how fast we can deliver more ISR to Afghanistan.
Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are
operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ newly acquired
hardware, and we continue to ensure proper numbers and placement of
analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence
data.
To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one
additional MH-47 will be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two
additional Chinooks will arrive in December 2010 and June 2011,
respectively. Additionally, five CV-22s deployed in April to support
SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. We
are also accelerating delivery of CV-22s to better support the forces
requiring them, and we anticipate adding five more CV-22s to the fleet
in the coming year. Currently at initial operational capability, CV-22
units cannot currently sustain a permanent presence in Afghanistan and
they are limited to 4-6 month deployments to accommodate training new
crews. However, their presence will become more enduring as the fleet
grows and the CV-22 reaches full operational capability in fiscal year
2011.

139. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, do you believe that U.S.
forces will have adequate rotary medical evacuation lift in Afghanistan
once the surge of 30,000 forces is in place?
Admiral Mullen. The Joint Staff stood-up an operational planning
team to examine the current and future requirements for rotary medical
evacuation, or MEDIVAC, platforms in Afghanistan given the increase in
number of deployed forces. I expect to be briefed on the team's
assessment by 10 May and I will subsequently provide the results to the
committee. That said, we will do all we need to do to ensure there is
adequate rotary medical evacuation lift in Afghanistan once the surge
of 30,000 forces are in place.
The Joint Staff is working closely with U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. Joint
Forces Command (JFCOM) to accurately define the CENTCOM Commander's
requirements and sourcing solutions. Additionally, in order to be
adequately prepared to source solutions once the Commander's
requirements are finalized, U.S. Joint Forces Command is working
closely with the Services, Reserves, and National Guard Bureau to
determine readiness and availability of forces.

impact to readiness from off-shore drilling
140. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the President stated his
support for new off-shore drilling initiatives during his State of the
Union Address. As you may know, the issue of drilling in the Eastern
Gulf of Mexico has raised concerned within DOD over potential impacts
to the test and training air ranges in that area. Some of this concern
has been addressed with recent negotiations with the Department of the
Interior about acceptable methods of drilling. What is the current
position of DOD concerning the issuance of additional leases in the
Eastern Gulf of Mexico to support off-shore drilling operations and the
current concerns about the impact to military readiness?
Secretary Gates. On April 2, 2010, the DOD transmitted a report to
the Department of Interior (DOI) on the compatibility of DOD activities
with oil and gas resource development on the outer continental shelf.
Transmittal of the report occurred after months of discussions with the
DOI and was in response to the Mineral Management Service's ``Draft
2010-2015 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Sale Plan.''
The report applied greater analytic rigor than past reports, going
beyond the former binary analysis where areas were either compatible or
incompatible with development, to include areas of conditional
compatibility (drilling with stipulations such as periodic evacuation
or no permanent surface structures). While only a small portion of the
Eastern Gulf was found to be compatible without restrictions, larger
areas were found to be conditionally compatible. The report only
examined military mission and did not address environmental issues.

don't ask, don't tell policy
141. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in your testimony on February
2, you were clear that the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed their
best military advice about the impact of a repeal of the DADT policy
and the manner in which you would implement a change in policy. You
stated that you would like to have the time to do so. However, many in
Congress intend to move quickly through legislation to repeal 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 654 as quickly as possible.
In view of the time needed to perform the high level review, do you
support legislative change to the current homosexual conduct policy
before the Chiefs have formulated their advice?
Admiral Mullen. I agree with the approach that the Secretary of
Defense has proposed, which calls for a careful review of this policy.
Given all we are currently asking of our force and their families, I
think we owe it to them to understand the exact nature of the impact of
any repeal of the law. I also believe this review will be useful to
Congress in your deliberations. This is why we are undertaking a
comprehensive review of the issue, and I support taking the time to do
so. I do not support legislative change to current homosexual conduct
policy before the Chiefs have formulated their advice, tied to the
results of the ongoing comprehensive review.

142. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you testified that a high-
level working group within DOD will review the issues associated with
properly implementing a repeal of the DADT policy. Part of this review,
you testified, will be to reach out to authoritatively understand the
views and attitudes of the force. Please explain in detail what steps
DOD will take to implement the President's direction to begin the
preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and policy.
Secretary Gates. As I have directed, the Working Group will solicit
the views of a wide array of individuals including military families.
Over the course of the next 8 months members of the Working Group will
meet with a wide array of individuals of all Services, ranks, ages and
assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and
concerns regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. The
Working Group will thoroughly, objectively, and methodically examine
all aspects of this question, and produce its finding and
recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by the end of
this calendar year.

143. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are the actions you are
directing intended to strengthen the argument for repeal of existing
law?
Secretary Gates. The Comprehensive Review Working Group is
conducting a comprehensive review of the issues associated with a
repeal of the law. I have directed this effort be carried out
professionally, thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner responsive
to the direction of the President and to the needs of Congress this
matter is debated and considered.

144. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what difference will it make,
if any, in DOD planning if a significant proportion--say 50 percent--of
servicemembers and their families register objection to a change in the
policy?
Secretary Gates. I am not in a position to speculate as to what the
Working Group may find and conclude in the course of its review. I do
know that the Working Group will undertake its review in an objective
and thorough manner, and I expect that the Working Group co-chairs will
provide me with their best assessment of the impact of repeal,
regardless of what that may be, to permit me to determine, as I said in
my testimony, how best to prepare for implementation of a congressional
repeal.

145. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain in detail how
you intend to authoritatively understand the views and attitudes of
Active and Reserve servicemembers.
Secretary Gates. Over the course of the next 8 months members of
the Working Group will meet with a wide array of individuals of all
Services, ranks, ages, and assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek
their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a repeal and how it
should be implemented. The Working Group is in the process of
developing appropriate means by which to accomplish this.

146. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as part of your review, do
you intend to seek the views of veterans or retired members of the
Armed Forces? If no, why not?
Secretary Gates. The Working Group will seek to hear from the many
responsible voices of those individuals and groups with diverse views
on this important matter, including veterans and retired members of the
Armed Forces.

147. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, please explain in detail how
the working group will attempt to gauge the impacts of a change in the
law on military effectiveness, including how a change might affect unit
cohesion, recruiting, and retention.
Secretary Gates. As stated in my testimony, the Working Group will
examine the potential impacts of a change in the law on military
effectiveness, including how a change might affect unit cohesion,
recruiting and retention, and other issues crucial to the performance
of the force. To accomplish this task, I have directed the Working
Group to systematically engage the force and in an appropriately
balanced manner engage Members of Congress, key influences of potential
servicemembers, and other stakeholder groups who have expressed a view
on the current and prospective policy.

148. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you have outlined plans for a
study about changing, or more likely, repealing the current law
regarding military service by homosexuals. Please describe the
regulatory or legislative changes you will seek or direct this year
with respect to DOD's DADT policy and title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 654.
Secretary Gates. The Working Group will produce its findings and
recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by the end of
this calendar year. I anticipate recommended regulatory and legislative
changes will be included in this report. Additionally, as announced in
my testimony, I have directed the Department to quickly review the
regulations used to implement the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell law,
and within 45 days present recommended changes to regulations that will
enforce this policy in a fairer manner within existing law.

149. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, you are the principal military
adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but under law,
you must consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. What are the views
of the other Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders about
changing the existing homosexual conduct policy?
Admiral Mullen. Each of the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders
has appeared before the committee, where they had the opportunity to
express their views. I can tell you that all the Chiefs are concerned
with current combat operations and the associated stress on the force.
Given what is currently being asked of our force and their families,
the Chiefs would all like to better understand the exact nature of the
impact of any repeal of the law. This is why all of us support a
comprehensive review of the issue in order to better advise the
Secretary of Defense and the President.

150. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen,
subparagraph (a) of section 654 of title 10, U.S.C., sets forth 15
findings of fact concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces. Do you
disagree with any of the findings? If so, how?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. I fully support the President's
decision. The President announced a plan to work with Congress this
year to repeal 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654. He subsequently directed DOD to
begin the preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and
policy. I have directed this effort be carried out professionally,
thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner responsive to the
direction of the President and to the needs of Congress this matter is
debated and considered. The Comprehensive Review Working Group will
solicit the views of a wide array of individuals from the different
Services on this subject. This working group is conducting a
comprehensive review of the issues associated with a repeal of the law.
With the preparation and conclusions of the working group completed,
the next stage will be Congressional deliberation and decision, as only
Congress can repeal 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654.

151. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would you
please explain your views about what conditions are now present in the
Armed Forces that justify repealing the current homosexual conduct
policy now.
Secretary Gates I support the President's decision to work with
Congress this year to repeal 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 and to direct DOD to
begin the preparations necessary for a repeal of the current law and
policy. The Comprehensive Review Working Group I have established will,
among other things, solicit the views of a wide array of individuals
from the different Services on this subject, and I look forward to the
continued progress of the working group as they undertake their
important task in the months ahead.
Admiral Mullen. Given all we are currently asking of our force and
their families, I think we owe it to them to understand the exact
nature of the impact of any repeal of the law. I support the approach
that the Secretary of Defense has proposed, which calls for a careful
review of issues and impact related to this policy and its potential
repeal. This review will help us better understand the conditions in
today's Armed Forces related to this law and policy.
My personal view, as I have expressed, is that current law and
policy conflict with our core value of integrity--as individuals and as
an institution. But I need to understand the full impacts of any change
to the law, and how to best ensure the wellbeing of the force should
the law change.
It is premature for me to speculate now regarding what the review
will find. I look forward to working with leaders within DOD to conduct
this review in a manner that preserves the high state of readiness of
the U.S. military.

152. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, you have extensive operational
and command experience, including command of three ships. Even on
today's most modern ships and submarines, living conditions are
spartan. The same is certainly true for deployed ground forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and around the globe. What is your message to military
personnel of any rank who object to being required to live and work
under such conditions with an openly gay individual?
Admiral Mullen. We ask much of our servicemembers, and we put them
into situations where they are living and working, day in and day out,
under tough conditions. At all times, we must be attentive to good
order and discipline and morale, and maintaining military
effectiveness. We will always take the steps necessary to preserve
effectiveness and readiness, consistent with our core values and
military ethos, and our mission.

153. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, we should anticipate that many
military leaders, officer and enlisted, will object to changes in the
current DOD homosexual conduct policy. Yet you have testified about
your personal view that good leadership requires military leaders to
support changes to the policy. Please expand on your views about
military leadership and the burden of implementing the homosexual
conduct policy.
Admiral Mullen. For the record, I testified that understanding the
impact of any change to the law gets to the core of where I am at on
this issue, which is leadership. We must be prepared to lead if the law
changes.
I do not expect to try to change someone's views about
homosexuality. I do believe that we can have clear standards of conduct
and behavior, and hold people accountable to those standards. To ensure
we can lead effectively, we are undertaking a comprehensive review of
the issue to better understand the dynamics of any repeal. Leadership
requires preparation, and it is my responsibility to ensure our leaders
are ready for any decision Congress should make.

154. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what is your message to
officer and enlisted leaders who oppose change but whom you consider
key to making changes to the policy work successfully.
Admiral Mullen. I do not expect to try to change someone's views
about homosexuality. I do believe that we can have clear standards of
conduct and behavior, and hold people accountable to those standards.
To ensure we do this effectively, we are undertaking a comprehensive
review of the issue to better understand the dynamics of any repeal.
I have great confidence in the quality of our officer and enlisted
leadership and know that with sound preparation they can lead the force
successfully, should the law and policy change.

155. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in your view, to what degree
and how would repeal of the current law and DOD homosexual conduct
policy improve military readiness?
Admiral Mullen. I cannot say what all the impacts of repeal of the
law would be. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of
the issue to better understand the impacts of any potential change. A
balanced, reasoned assessment will best serve us as we consider this
matter.

156. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what effect would repeal of
the current law and policy have on recruiting and retention?
Admiral Mullen. I cannot say for certain how repeal might affect
these areas. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of
the issue to better understand the impacts of any potential change. It
is important for us to understand these dymanics in order to lead the
force, should the law change

157. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has
the current law and DOD DADT policy hindered the military's ability in
a measurable way to recruit and retain qualified personnel to meet
service manpower requirements?
Admiral Mullen. I know that some schools have expressed concern
over the presence of recruiters due to the existence of this law. Our
recruiters currently are able to accomplish their mission, and we will
continue to work through issues directly with those schools that
express concerns.
However, I cannot say for certain how the current law affects
recruiting and retention overall, or its how its potential repeal might
affect recruiting and retention. That is why we are undertaking a
comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the impacts of
any potential change of current law and policy.

158. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has
the current law hindered the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to
expand in recent years?
Admiral Mullen. The Marine Corps has already completed its growth
to new active duty end strength levels of 202,100. The Army is on track
to grow to 547,400, and I am confident that the Army will be successful
in getting to that level. I cannot say how current law has helped or
hindered this process. Recruiting and retention are impacted by many
factors, and it is important that we understand these as best we can.

159. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has
the requirement to separate homosexual personnel under section 654
created a measurable impact on readiness of the force?
Admiral Mullen. The number of annual separations is small (less
than four-tenths of 1 percent of all separations). No one likes to see
talent leave the Service, but it is our job to follow the law. I
support Congress' examination of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, and should the
law change we will work within any new guidance. Related to your
deliberation, I support the approach the Secretary of Defense has
proposed, which calls for a careful review of this policy.

160. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, do you
think the repeal of the current law and DOD homosexual conduct policy
would affect military readiness, cohesion, morale, good order, and
discipline?
Admiral Mullen. We have fair and responsive disciplinary and
administrative processes by which we promptly investigate and
adjudicate instances of inappropriate conduct. Our standards and
processes apply to conduct, regardless of orientation, rank, or gender.
However, I cannot say exactly what all the impacts of repeal of the law
would be. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review to
better understand the issues associated with any potential change. A
balanced and thorough review will support effective leadership within
the force, should the law change.

161. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what effect would a repeal of
current law have on the propensity of prospective recruits to enlist
and on the propensity of influencers (parents, coaches, teachers, and
religious leaders, for example) to recommend military service?
Admiral Mullen. I cannot say for certain how repeal might affect
recruiting and retention. I would expect a range of views among
influencers, who guide our young Americans towards public service as
policemen, firemen and first responders, as well as towards the armed
forces. Through our comprehensive review of the issue we aim to better
understand the impacts of any potential change from current law and
policy.

162. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, according to data provided by
the Services and DOD, the number of discharges for homosexual conduct
consistently has been significantly less than 1 percent, compared to
discharges for other reasons. The Congressional Research Service
concluded that most discharges occur among younger, less experienced
personnel. Do you consider the numbers of discharges under the existing
DOD policy to adversely affect the readiness of the Armed Forces?
Secretary Gates. The Comprehensive Review Working Group will
examine impacts--both positive and negative--of repeal of the law. This
will include the impact of no longer discharging servicemembers for
homosexual conduct, as is currently required by law.

163. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what percentage of
separations on the basis of the policy can be attributed to statements
only, i.e., individuals who identify themselves as homosexual or
bisexual?
Secretary Gates. In fiscal year 2009, there were 428 homosexual
conduct separations. Of these, 341, or approximately 80 percent, were
based on the member making a statement that he or she was homosexual,
bisexual, or words to that effect.

164. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what percentage of total
discharges has been based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., third-party
reports?
Secretary Gates. The Department does not currently track homosexual
conduct discharges this way. All discharges are due to a military
member engaging in one of the forms of conduct set forth 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 654: (a) engaging in, attempting to engage in, or soliciting
another to engage in a homosexual act, (b) stating that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, or (c) marrying or
attempting to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex. Of
the 428 separations in fiscal year 2009, 341 were statements cases, 80
were acts cases, and 7 were marriage cases.

165. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the 2008 Military Times poll
of active duty subscriber/respondents found that 10 percent said they
would decline reenlistment if the law is repealed, and another 14
percent would consider ending their careers. Even a smaller proportion
of losses among mid-career people would cause many difficulties in
short-handed units. What weight do you give to this 2008 Military Times
poll regarding the views of currently serving individuals?
Secretary Gates. These sentiments, as well as many others held by
servicemembers, will be one of many data points the Working Group will
consider in its review.

166. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you think that
servicemembers with more than 10 years of military service should be
given a temporary retirement option or some other separation payment if
they express objection to serving on Active Duty with openly gay
servicemembers?
Secretary Gates. No, I do not believe a temporary retirement option
nor other separation pay should be given in these circumstances.

167. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, if the effective date of the
law were postponed, how could current law be enforced pending that
date?
Secretary Gates. I do not have a position on the implications of
such an arrangement. However, I do not support a moratorium on
homosexual conduct discharges while the Working Group is undertaking
its review.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
air force tanker competition
168. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, I understand that many
factors in the previous RFP that favored a larger, more capable
aircraft have been removed from the RFP and many factors that favor a
smaller, less capable aircraft are now mandatory. If the pending tanker
RFP fails to result in a real competition, meaning at least two teams
decide to bid, then we really do not have a competition. What steps are
you taking to ensure that both sides stay at the table and bid on the
pending draft RFP?
Secretary Gates. I pledged to Members of Congress a fair, open, and
transparent process. DOD and the Air Force favor a competition but will
let the RFP process run its course. The RFP is structured to be fair to
all sides and, above all, to the taxpayer and warfighter. The process
of procuring a new Air Force tanker needs to recommence without delay.
Numerous meetings with potential offerors were held as part of the
draft RFP process. Careful consideration is being given to all requests
and comments, and all questions are being answered to ensure that the
Department is crystal clear on how the winning offeror will be
selected. The approach will be crafted to favor no one except the
Warfighter and taxpayer. The Department has steered straight down the
middle.

169. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, what steps do you plan to
take if one of the sides does not bid and we do not have a real
competition?
Secretary Gates. As I stated at the House Armed Services Committee
hearing on February 3, 2010, ``We would like to have a competition . .
. and we hope that both companies will agree to participate. But we
will move forward. We have to have new tankers. We hope very much that
there will be a real competition. We hope very much that both
competitors stay in the competition. But should that not prove to be
the case, we will--we have to move forward. It's been delayed too long.
We need to get this thing started.''

national missile defense
170. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, last year the President's
budget request, as it pertained to NMD, called for cutting back the
deployment of GBIs from 44 to 30 while curtailing further
modernization. Thanks to your efforts, this year's budget request seems
to indicate a commitment to continue to improve the GMD system, while
also purchasing additional missiles for testing and stockpile
reliability. Can we continue to count on your support for a robust GMD
modernization program that will ensure the system keeps pace with the
threat?
Secretary Gates. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM threats, I
will preserve a position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing the
current midcourse defense capability. The fiscal year 2011 President's
budget request provides a substantial investment in the GMD element to
ensure it remains effective and viable over the long-term. This is
accomplished by funding element and system improvements, including:

Refurbishment or delivery of 22 GBIs for testing and
operational spare requirements;
New software upgrades to expand GMD integration with
the BMDS and improve interceptor discrimination capability;
Interceptor obsolescence mitigation and avionics
upgrades;
The completion of Missile Field 2 with 14 silos at
Fort Greely, AK, by fiscal year 2012, increasing the number of
silos available for operational use if needed to address the
threat;
The completion of the Future Power Plant at Fort
Greely, Alaska to address survivability and reliability
concerns; and
Implementation of a GMD reliability, availability, and
maintainability program;

Fiscal year 2011 funding will complete the establishment of a
second GMD Command and Control node at Fort Greely, AK. The fiscal year
2011 budget also requests funds to continue executing operationally
realistic ground and flight testing of the GMD element of the BMDS, and
to validate BMDS system performance through robust models and
simulation anchored by flight test data.

171. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, can you assure us there
will not be a break in production for the GBI until DOD determines how
many GBIs are needed for testing and stockpile reliability over the
life of the system, as per section 233 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2002?
Secretary Gates. The MDA's most recent purchase of GBIs occurred in
December 2006. As a result, lower-tier GBI suppliers began completing
delivery, i.e., began a ``production break,'' in 2007 for sub-
assemblies to support the manufacture and delivery of the remaining
GBIs on contract. All remaining third- and fourth-tier GBI suppliers
are expected to complete their deliveries in fiscal year 2010 with the
exception of Aerojet and Rockwell Collins.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request (fiscal year 2011
PBR) lays out a funded plan that includes completing the fielding of 30
operational GBIs; delivering 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile
reliability and operational spare requirements; and refurbishing 16 of
the original 52 GBIs for both operational and flight test rotation
during the FYDP.
The three requirements set forth in section 233 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2010 have either been met or will be met shortly. First, I
delivered the BMDR to Congress on February 1, 2010. Second, in the
fiscal year 2011 PBR, MDA states plans to acquire five additional GBIs,
beginning in fiscal year 2011, to satisfy Integrated Master Test Plan
(IMTP) and stockpile reliability testing requirements to support the
service life of the GMD element of the BMDS.
With respect to the third requirement, within the next several
weeks, a report on the GBI production line will be submitted to the
congressional defense committees. The report will detail the
Department's plans to utilize the additional $50 million fiscal year
2010 appropriation to keep the manufacturing lines for critical
suppliers warm through fiscal year 2010, with most of the component
suppliers completing deliveries in fiscal year 2011. This investment
along with the planned five additional GBIs, plus additional hardware
components to support GBI scheduled maintenance and refurbishment
activities, will sustain third and fourth tier GBI suppliers until
fiscal year 2013.
GBI purchases after fiscal year 2013 will likely include
manufacturing line restart costs for third- and fourth-tier GBI
suppliers. Also, any additional GBI purchases beyond the planned 2011
purchases will likely include redesign/development costs due to parts
obsolescence. With ongoing refurbishments for operational and flight
test GBIs, the first- and second-tier GBI manufacturing lines will
remain warm beyond 2016.

european missile defense
172. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, the Phased Adaptive
Approach to missile defense in Europe calls for fielding land-based SM-
3 Block IB missiles in Europe starting in 2015. Is the IB missile on
schedule, and have you identified the two countries that will host its
deployment in 2015?
Secretary Gates. Yes. The SM-3 Block IB missile is on schedule for
flight testing in fiscal year 2011, deployment on Aegis ships in 2013
and fielding on land in 2015.
In February 2010, Romania agreed to host the land-based SM-3
Southern Europe site planned for deployment in Phase 2 (2015
timeframe). In the coming months, the U.S. and Romanian Governments
will work together and begin discussions on the system, including the
steps necessary to establish a missile defense facility in Romania.
In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a similar Northern Europe
site in Phase 3 (2018 timeframe). I expect that by the planned time of
this deployment, the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA will be available.
The Department has concluded a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) with Poland and the Polish Government recently agreed to an
updated BMD basing agreement that will enable us to move forward with
the land-based SM-3 site in Poland. The supplemental SOFA has been
ratified by the Polish Parliament and entered into force. The BMD
Agreement was signed but has not yet been ratified by the Polish
Parliament.

173. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, last year you testified
that the two-stage GBI will continue development as a hedge against
technical difficulties with the SM-3 Block IIA and IIB missiles. Is
this still the plan?
Secretary Gates. Yes. As part of a hedging strategy for defense of
the homeland against long-range ballistic missile attacks, the
Department is continuing the development and assessment of the two-
stage GBI. My overall testing strategy for the two-stage GBI, which
includes flight testing, supports three-stage data collection
requirements as well.

174. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, how and when would we know
that it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the SM-3 Block
II missile?
Secretary Gates. There are two planned versions of the SM-3 Block
II, the SM-3 Block IIA and the SM-3 Block IIB. The SM-3 Block IIA is
planned for use aboard ships first, and then for use ashore until the
Block IIB is developed and available. The Aegis BMD ship-based SM-3
Block IIA will remain an operational need independent of decisions
related to developing and producing two-stage GBIs or Block IIBs.
MDA will know if it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI
for the Block IIB after the Block IIB flight testing, which is
currently planned for fiscal year 2016. The MDA is engineering the
systems and maturing the technologies for the SM-3 Block IIB. The
technical maturity will be determined through a series of knowledge
points that tie achievement of critical information to reducing
developmental risk and increasing confidence in capabilities. These
knowledge points will measure confidence in the SM-3 Block IIB through
the end of fiscal year 2016, providing data that will be used to
determine whether development should continue or whether alternative
designs should be considered.

175. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, what has been Russia's
reaction to the new missile defense plans for Europe?
Secretary Gates. Russia's initial reaction to the new system was
positive. Although the Department is transparent with Russia about the
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), Russia recently expressed concern that
the adaptive nature of the system makes is appear to be open-ended, and
in later phases could undermine Russia's strategic deterrent. The new
system poses no threat to Russia, and I believe Russia has an interest
in working with the United States and Europe to defend against the
growing missile and nuclear threat from Iran and other states. I will
continue to be transparent with Russia about our plans for the PAA to
try to allay its concerns, and I will seek avenues for cooperation in
this area.

176. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, I've seen press reports
that Russia may now be concerned that the SM-3 Block II missile may be
a threat to their strategic forces and that Russia will seek to limit
its deployment in the ongoing Strategice Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
follow-on negotiations. What can you tell me about this?
Secretary Gates. Russia expressed concerns that the SM-3 Block IIB
interceptors that we would deploy in Phase 4 of the Phased, Adaptive
Approach (PAA), in the event that the threat environment evolves to
require the deployment, could be capable of engaging their ICBMs. The
Department is in discussions with Russia on the nature of the threat
presented by various ballistic missile programs and the potential for
missile defense cooperation. During our consultations with Russia, DOD
stressed that the PAA is not directed at Russia. I believe that Russia
may be unnecessarily concerned simply because the SM-3 Block IIB is
still in development and thus Russia could be suspicious about the
final capabilities of the interceptor. I will continue to be
transparent with Russia on DOD's BMD capabilities, including the SM-3
Block IIB interceptor, to allay their concerns and build trust.
Regarding New START Treaty, I have been clear with Russia that U.S.
missile defense systems are not directed against Russia and that the
new treaty is about strategic offensive arms.

177. Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates, the administration's new
approach to missile defense in Europe hopes to solicit allied
participation. We are hearing, however, that NATO is facing a funding
crisis due to the operational demands related to Afghanistan. How
likely is it that we can expect European contributions to the defense
of their territory against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles?
Secretary Gates. I believe that, as an alliance, NATO can best
contribute to European territorial missile defense in two areas--
political commitment and command and control (C2) infrastructure.
In terms of political commitment, I am seeking a decision by NATO
to take on territorial missile defense as a mission for the alliance.
If NATO adopts such a mission, there will be a NATO-wide BMD effort to
which the United States can contribute through the European Phased,
Adaptive Approach (PAA). Furthermore, Allies will be able to contribute
their current and future missile defense capabilities to this effort,
augmenting the overall defense and the PAA.
Regarding C2 infrastructure, NATO is developing a C2 network that
will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets together, called
the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program.
By linking Allied assets, including those of the U.S. PAA, NATO and the
United States can create a more efficient and cost-effective
architecture.
Currently, NATO is funding the component of ALTBMD that will
provide C2 for defense of deployed forces only, rather than territorial
missile defense. I strongly support continued funding for ALTBMD, as
well as the ongoing study to determine the implications of expanding
ALTBMD to include C2 for territorial missile defense. To date, NATO
spent =159 million of the total =451 million cost for the current
ALTBMD program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
funding for contsrtuction/restoration
178. Senator Graham. Secretary Gates, some military agencies do not
appear to be spending funds appropriated by Congress for construction,
cleanup and restoration activities. The Air Force Center for
Engineering and the Environment and Naval Facilities Engineering
Command has yet to obligate hundreds of millions of dollars
appropriated. The United States Army Corps of Engineers continues to
fall further behind in awards for the New Orleans Hurricane Risk
Reduction Program and for the Everglades restoration. The funds for
these projects represent a large number of jobs which could be filled
by capable DOD contractors. What is the root cause of the delay and
what is being done to remedy this situation?
Secretary Gates. I fully support the President's budget and will
continue to fully execute the construction, cleanup and restoration
projects for which funds are authorized and appropriated. The root of
the ``problem'' is the global economic downturn. As a result of that
downturn, during fiscal year 2009, the Department was able to award
many projects below initial government estimates, producing bid
savings. DOD is making every effort to quickly apply those bid savings
to offset a variety of requirements such as increases in costs on other
projects and reductions to programs levied by Congress in fiscal year
2010. In those rare circumstances when the Department cancels a
project, we notify Congress as required by statute.
Regarding the New Orleans Hurricane Risk Reduction Program, the
Army Corps of Engineers is awarding construction contracts at a rapid
pace, and construction work is progressing throughout the New Orleans
area. As of mid-April 2010, the Army Corps awarded 251 of 361 planned
construction contracts and obligated $8 billion of the $14.5 billion
appropriated for the program.
The Everglades restoration projects experienced contract award
delays stemming from complications in establishing required cost share
agreements with non-Federal sponsors. The Corps has made significant
progress in completing agreement negotiations with the South Florida
Water Management District (SFWMD), the primary non-Federal sponsor for
Everglades restoration projects, by executing a Comprehensive
Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) Master Agreement in August 2009.
This agreement provides the foundation for all future Project
Partnership Agreements by establishing basic terms of cooperation for
CERP projects including cost sharing, construction, operations and
maintenance, replacement, rehabilitation, and oversight by agency
technical staff. The Corps is awarding contracts more rapidly since
putting this agreement into effect. Additionally, to accelerate
contract awards, the Corps is improving coordination with SFWMD during
respective agency review and approval of draft agreements and allowing
construction contract advertisements to be made prior to execution of
partnership agreements, thus permitting earlier contract award
following execution of those agreements.

air force tanker competition
179. Senator Graham. Secretary Gates, regarding the competition for
the new Air Force tanker competition, some have advocated a dual buy of
tankers, wherein DOD would buy aircraft from the two major competitors
who have previously proposed aircraft as the new aerial tanker. What is
your position on this proposal?
Secretary Gates. I am not planning for a dual award at this time.
The Air Force considered all options per congressional direction, but
ruled out split buy and dual award approaches based on budget
affordability and fleet concerns including increased training,
operations, maintenance, and support costs. I am committed to a single-
award, competitive strategy for a commercial derivative tanker as it
provides the best value for the Warfighter and taxpayer.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
start treaty
180. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, a January 25, 2010, article in
RIA-Novosti, a Russian press outlet, stated that the United States and
Russia have coordinated a number of disputed issues in relation to the
START follow-on treaty. Specifically, the article said an agreement has
been reached to reduce the number of nuclear delivery vehicles, meaning
bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles, of 700 to 750 systems.
Today, the United States deploys about 883 delivery vehicles, when
ghost or phantom systems are taken off the books. Testimony before the
House in July indicated that the Russians at best can deploy 500
delivery vehicles through the course of the START follow-on treaty. At
the delivery vehicle levels of 700 to 750 reported in the Russian
press, where will these significant cuts come out of our triad?
Secretary Gates. I believe that the New START Treaty allows the
United States to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. Under the
draft New START Treaty, both the United States and Russia have seven
years after entry into force of the treaty to meet the treaty limits.
The Department will have sufficient time to align our forces and to
effect the necessary eliminations to fulfill our obligations under the
New START Treaty with regard to our strategic delivery vehicles and
their associated warheads. The specific mix of systems to be maintained
was closely examined during the Nuclear Posture Review, with a final
decision deferred pending signing of the Treaty.

181. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, at the delivery vehicle levels
of 700 to 750 reported in the Russian press, is Russia actually giving
up any delivery vehicles?
Secretary Gates. As of October 1, 2009, Russia declared 809
deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and their
associated launchers, deployed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers
under START counting rules. Some of these systems may not be
accountable under the New START Treaty, but others may still represent
delivery vehicles that will be eliminated during the treaty's seven-
year elimination period following entry into force.

next generation bomber
182. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, the 2006 QDR made the decision
to develop a follow-on bomber, and you have made clear that you support
the development of a new bomber. However, last April you opted not to
pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until you
had a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the
technology. As part of this effort to better understand the
requirements for a new bomber, I understand that you stood up a Tiger
Team to do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the new QDR.
However, on reading the new QDR, on page 33, it looks like you have
still not made a decision to move forward with a new bomber program,
but instead have commissioned yet another study. What conclusions were
drawn by the Tiger Team regarding the development of a new bomber?
Secretary Gates. The Tiger Team to which you refer was formed to
study the need, value, and technology for a follow-on Air Force long-
range strike aircraft; that team completed its work last November. The
team was supportive of pursuing a new long-range strike aircraft, but
recognized that additional analysis was needed to explore options for
reducing overall program costs and determining fielding timelines. The
Department decided that a more in-depth analysis was required in order
to determine how a new long-range strike aircraft might compare with
other options. An assessment of the various support functions for long-
range strike assets was also needed. Consequently, the Department
chartered another study to look at a broader array of options to
include the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades
to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned options; stand-off and
penetrating requirements; new and improved cruise missiles; electronic
warfare improvements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
demands; and conventional prompt global strike options.
The goal of this new study is to ensure that we fully understand
how all potential long-range strike options could contribute to U.S.
security goals before spending billions of dollars. We anticipate that
the new study will be completed in time to inform decisions shaping the
Department's fiscal year 2012 budget.
The final conclusion of the Tiger Team's study was that the
Department should sustain the industrial base for early-stage design
work and technologies for a new long-range strike aircraft while the
Department continues to study all options. The Department provided
industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 to
prepare for the potential start of a new long-range strike program.

bomber force structure
183. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, with regard to the FYDP force
structure set out in the new QDR for the Air Force, the QDR proposes
five long-range strike wings with up to 96 primary mission aircraft.
According to the latest Air Force Almanac, the Air Force has 153 bomber
aircraft. I understand some of these aircraft are dedicated to testing,
but over 50 aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you plan on
retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future?
Secretary Gates. The total number of bombers in the Air Force
inventory is 162 (66 B-1, 20 B-2, and 76 B-52 aircraft). 96 represents
the total number of combat coded aircraft with the difference being
made up from training, backup, attrition Reserve, and test airframes.
The table below shows the breakdown by aircraft type and coding. The
attached slides show the geographic location, coding, and correct
number for each bomber in the Air Force inventory. At this time, the
Air Force has no plans to retire any of the 162 bombers currently in
the inventory. I believe that the 2011 President's budget provides for
aggressive modernization for all three types of bombers, to keep them
relevant far into the future.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combat Coded Training Attrition
Airframe Total (CC) (TF) Backup (BAI) Reserve (AR) Test (CB)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1......................... 66 36 16 9 1 4
B-2......................... 20 16 0 4 0 0
B-52........................ 76 44 16 11 2 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atch: Bomber inventory slides

184. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, what are the assumptions
underlying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of
bombers?
Secretary Gates. At this time, there are no plans to retire any of
the bombers currently in the inventory. The fiscal year 2011 budget
provides for aggressive modernization for all three types of bombers,
to keep them relevant far into the future.

qdr red team
185. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, I understand you appointed a
so-called ``Red Team'' of retired senior officers and outside defense
experts to give you an outside assessment of the QDR. I understand that
the Red Team reviewed the QDR's assessments and conclusions through the
summer of 2009, and submitted a memo to you in the fall of 2009. As you
know, you are required by the QDR statute in Title 10 to appoint an
independent panel to assess the QDR. However, that panel will not be
able to provide a report to us until July of this year, meaning that we
may very well have completed work on the National Defense Authorization
Bill for Fiscal Year 2011 before we see an independent assessment of
the QDR. Since we won't be able to read an independent assessment of
the QDR in a timely way, please provide us with a copy of the Red
Team's memo to you, with the names of the Red Team members redacted to
protect any confidentiality agreements.
Secretary Gates. When I appointed the QDR Red Team, I assured the
members that their insights would help inform my decisionmaking and
would not be subject to outside review. I did this to foster frank and
forthright advice for use by the Department in its internal
deliberations. However, the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
General James Mattis, and Director of Net Assessment, Mr. Andrew
Marshall, served as co-chairs of the QDR Red Team. They would be happy
to provide Members their perspectives on the QDR.
The QDR Independent Panel has begun its work and has indicated it
will publicly deliver interim findings before the release of its final
report in July 2010.

186. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, are any members of the Red
Team that assessed the QDR also now members of the independent panel
assessing the QDR?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net
Assessment, and General James Mattis, Commander U.S. Joint Forces
Command, served as the co-chairs of the 2010 Red Team. The identities
of other members of the QDR Red Team remain confidential. I believe
that it is critical that I maintain the ability to have candid
discussions with senior defense thinkers outside of government on a
non-attribution basis.
I selected members for the QDR Independent Panel based on their
ability to offer an objective, independent, and non-partisan
perspective.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
army aircraft modernization
187. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, I am glad to know that the
QDR places success in today's wars as its first priority. It is our
foremost responsibility to provide for our national defense. Just as
the tactics and strategies have adjusted to that of our enemy, so must
our approach to investing the necessary resources to rapidly equip the
warfighter for success.
I also appreciate your stating that this budget is shaped by
embracing a dose of realism. One dose of realism that we can't avoid is
the long-term impacts that the current deficit forecast is going to
have on all sectors of the government, to include DOD. Given that
realism, it is increasingly important that we do our best to get the
best long-term benefit out of the investments we make to fulfill our
immediate needs.
One major focus area of this budget is to increase the availability
of helicopters by procuring more aircraft and improving aircraft
capabilities. Due to the cancelation of the armed Scout helicopter
program, DOD is planning to invest well over a billion dollars in the
aging Kiowa Warrior. That investment has transformed from performing
safety enhancements to a long-term modernization program. I now hear
discussions ranging from engine upgrades to reconstituting a production
line.
While many of these improvements are necessary to maintain
operational capability, none will result in the performance
capabilities that are desired. Yet, I don't know of any investments
being planned on other fleet assets that would reduce your risk of
providing more capable Scout capabilities and could realistically
achieve the 80 percent of optimal solution that you have mentioned in
the past.
Are there any newer aircraft in the Army's fleet that could be
enhanced, which would significantly exceed the capability of the legacy
Scout helicopter, and could also provide returns on that investment
much further into the future?
Secretary Gates. The Army is exploring all options to leverage
existing and potential developmental solutions to replace the legacy
scout helicopter. Investment in the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) as a
bridging strategy is critical in fulfilling the Army's immediate
reconnaissance needs in support of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
requirements. This investment will address immediate obsolescence,
safety, and weight reduction issues and will enable the aircraft to
perform better in the current combat environment until a viable
replacement is procured. The Army is conducting an Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) to address Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) capabilities and
determine a replacement for the KW. The study will be completed in
April 2011 at which time the existing KW path ahead will be re-
evaluated along with the future AAS recommendations for a leadership
decision.

188. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, would you be supportive of
the Army exploring all options to leverage existing assets to provide
the highest level of Scout capability until the Army acquires and
fields its future Armed Aerial Scout aircraft?
Secretary Gates. The Army is exploring all options to leverage
existing and potential developmental solutions. In July 2009, the
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) directed the Army to conduct an AoA
to meet Armed Aerial Scout capabilities and determine a replacement for
the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. This AoA will determine the appropriate
materiel solution(s) to address any capability gaps and meet Army
requirements. The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases
with the preliminary results completed in December 2010 and final
results published in April 2011.
On April 14, 2009, the Secretary of the Army approved a strategy to
reinvests in the Kiowa Warrior helicopter to address obsolescence and
sustainment until a viable replacement is procured. The strategy
includes a funded ACAT II program called the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade
Program (CASUP). The CASUP addresses obsolescence, safety, and weight
reduction to perform better in the current combat environment. The Army
expects to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025.

mine resistant ambush protected vehicles
189. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, you mentioned the funding
requested in the budget for an additional 10,000 MRAPs, of which 6,600
are the new M-ATV. What type of MRAP vehicle makes up the remaining
3,400?
Secretary Gates. The most recent purchase of MRAP family of
vehicles includes 1,460 more Oshkosh M-ATVs, 1,050 Navistar MaxxPro
Dashs, 250 GDLS RG-31s and 58 BAE RG-33s. The remaining 582 vehicles to
fulfill the estimated requirement for Afghanistan have not yet been
defined.

190. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, will these platforms be sent
to Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. All of the vehicles most recently purchased are
being sent to Afghanistan.

191. Senator Wicker. Secretary Gates, how will they compliment the
M-ATVs?
Secretary Gates. MRAP vehicles are designed to meet mission
requirements. The M-ATV was uniquely designed for missions requiring
off-road mobility. The earlier variants in the MRAP family of vehicles
were designed for other missions ranging from urban area patrolling,
route clearance and Special Forces missions. The Department continues
to make available all vehicles under the MRAP family of vehicles to
Warfighters upon Combatant Command requirements. Our most recent
purchase of MaxxPro Dashs, RG-31s and RG-33s will include improved
suspension systems that are more suitable to the rough terrain in
Afghanistan. I believe that these vehicles will complement the M-ATVs
by supporting other, but closely related missions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
information operations
192. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, in October, I traveled to
Afghanistan with Senators Burr and Whitehouse. While there we learned
of the good work being done by our SOFs in the area of strategic
communications--particularly in countering the enemy's false messages.
However, I am concerned that too often we are not getting our message
out to counter the enemy's. Some of the soldiers in Afghanistan are
using what is called radio-in-a-box technologies to try and counter
enemy propaganda. I think this approach should be more prevalent in the
military. What is in this budget to help our soldiers get the best
message out to local Afghans?
Secretary Gates. During fiscal year 2011, I will ensure that DOD
will allocate funds specifically for the dissemination of messages to
the Afghan people down to the local level. DOD collaborates with the
ISAF and the Department of State (DOS) to commit significant resources
to ensuring the U.S. Government is getting our message out, and when
necessary countering the enemy's propaganda. DOD and ISAF fund programs
in Afghanistan that capitalize on radio and television programming, as
well as a variety of printed products to disseminate messages that
support U.S. and coalition objectives. The messages are directed at key
audiences at multiple levels from national to local and are focused on
objectives such as increasing support for Afghan National Security
Forces, reducing support for insurgents, and increasing reporting of
illicit activities. The majority of DOD and ISAF efforts are
concentrated on content development and dissemination, and DOS has made
a significant commitment to building the communications infrastructure
in Afghanistan. The radio-in-a-box provides tactical military
commanders a very capable temporary solution to short-range radio
broadcasts in areas not covered by permanent stations. The funds
provided to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan allow commanders
the flexibility to purchase more of these systems should they determine
it is necessary to bridge the gap until DOS or another organization's
efforts provide a permanent solution.

193. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, do you believe our forces
are well-trained and doing enough to project good news in the warzone?
Secretary Gates. I believe that U.S. forces are the best trained
military in the world to fight and win America's wars. DOD committed
significant resources to increase cultural awareness among U.S. forces
and improve the understanding of the environment in which U.S. forces
operate. DOD made significant progress in information operations,
working closely with the ISAF, DOS, other U.S. Government agencies, and
nongovernmental organizations to ensure the Afghanistan people and the
international community understand the coalition's commitment to the
future of Afghanistan. U.S. and ISAF forces conduct face-to-face
engagement with leaders at all levels, develop and disseminate messages
through radio, television, and printed products, and participate with
our Afghan partners in civil-military activities. As technology
advances, and the infrastructure develops in Afghanistan, DOD will
continue to develop new methods of getting the message to the audience.

194. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, what is the training
pipeline for soldiers who conduct information operations?
Secretary Gates. Both the service components and the Joint
community have specific training requirements for personnel who conduct
Information Operations (IO). Specific service requirements are varied
and driven by their unique operational and doctrinal requirements. I
expect all servicemembers assigned to a combatant command to have had
appropriate exposure to joint operational concepts and procedures;
particularly within the area of IO and so will focus my comments on the
Joint IO community.
Within the Joint IO community, training requirements and the
training pipeline are clearly described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 1630.01, Joint Information Operations Force.
Based on the policy established in CJCSM 1630.01, members of the Joint
IO Force are drawn from commissioned officers in grades O-4 through O-9
and non-commissioned officers in grades E-6 through E-9. The manual
further stipulates that these individuals must have completed either a
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) certified Joint IO Planning Course or
a JFCOM-certified Joint IO Core Capabilities Specialist Course and
occupy a billet requiring Joint IO education and/or training. At
present there are 159 joint billets requiring JFCOM-certified IO
planners and 153 Joint billets requiring JFCOM-certified IO Core
Capability Specialists.
Commissioned and non-commissioned officers, in the grades I
previously mentioned, enter the Joint IO training pipeline upon
assignment to a JFCOM-certified IO Planning or IO Core Capability
Specialist Course. The Joint Forces Staff College's Joint IO Planners
Course constitutes the only JFCOM-certified Joint IO Planning Course at
present. JFCOM-certified Joint IO Core Capability Specialist Courses
include the Joint Military Deception Training Course, the Joint Theater
Electronic Warfare Operations Course and the Joint Network Attack
Course. Besides these courses, Joint Operations Security and
Psychological Operations courses are currently under development.
Upon designation by the appropriate service component, an officer
or noncommissioned officer, who has already completed service component
IO training, will attend one of the JFCOM-certified IO training
courses. After graduation, these personnel should be assigned to an
OSD-level, Joint Staff, combatant command staff or JTF. In the case of
an OSD-level, Joint Staff or combatant command assignment, this tour of
duty will normally be 36 months. For a JTF, the tour duration could
range from 60 days to more than a year.

195. Senator LeMieux. Secretary Gates, how is the private sector
being utilized to help the military adopt best practices for
information operations?
Secretary Gates. DOD seeks partnership with the private sector to
understand the information environment and improve DOD information-
related capabilities. DOD has developed and continues to identify
relationships with communication companies, media companies, software
developers and producers, academia, and defense contractors to remain
abreast of technological advances, media resources, and access to
information not readily available to the military. These relationships
are very important to DOD capability providers and help DOD adopt best
practices. For example, one of the five core capabilities of
information operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), utilizes the
private sector to produce high-quality products targeted at specific
foreign population segments. Public Affairs use the private sector to
assist in monitoring the enormous number of global media sources and
outlets, to gain cultural understanding, and for translation support.
Information operations planners integrate applicable information
capabilities consistent with U.S. Government guidance and policies to
support the Commander's information goals and objectives. The
Department recently forwarded an extensive report to Congress outlining
our efforts to align information operations with other U.S. Government
activities via the strategic communication process.

196. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Mullen, do you believe we need to put
more resources toward information operations?
Admiral Mullen. The information environment plays an increasing
role in all the Department's activities and we're looking at
Information Operations (IO) across the board to determine future
requirements. Although IO is a relatively small part of the defense
budget, several combatant commands have highlighted its importance in
their Integrated Priority Listings; specifically in support of the
VOICE programs and for cyber activities.
Currently, there are numerous IO-related studies in various stages
of completion looking specifically at what we will need in the future.
The Joint Force Information Operations Study is evaluating joint IO
organizations, roles and missions, training and education, and measures
of effectiveness. The Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document
and the PSYOP Capabilities Based Assessment are reviewing those
capabilities at the Service level. The PSYOP Capabilities Based
Assessment will validate whether or not there is a need for growth in
the active and Reserve components to support both special and
conventional forces. These are detailed studies and their
recommendations are expected later this year. The results of these
studies will influence SOCOM's and JFCOM's requests for additional
future resources. It is my opinion that we wait to allow those studies
to inform future IO funding recommendations.

197. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Mullen, how are we empowering the
Afghans to spread news more rapidly to local populations?
Admiral Mullen. HQ ISAF, alongside the U.S. Embassy and the U.K.
Embassy, are working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA) to bolster their Government Media Information
Center (GMIC). The central GMIC in Kabul provides GIRoA the ability to
rapidly disseminate news to all critical outlets. Additionally, the
Kandahar GMIC, located on the Governor's Compound, is expected to be
operational in April and will provide similar capacity and capability
for the southern region. ISAF has embedded planners and liaison
personnel in both of these facilties. To assist the security
ministries, ISAF has partnered with the MoD and MoI to establish the
Security News Coordination Center (SNCC). The SNCC is already
operational and ensures shared situation awareness among MoI, MoD, and
ISAF strategic communication teams. MoI, MoD, and ISAF personnel man
the SNCC together, and will ultimately provide 24/7 media response
capability. Regular meetings between President Karzai's spokesman, Mr.
Wahid Omar, and the ISAF's Communications Directorate Staff ensure key
issues are clarified and resolved, delivering one common voice to the
Afghan people.
Most of the direct production and distribution of information is
supported by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
initiatives in Afghanistan; programs like journalist training and media
programming/content management training are successful examples. That
said, the IJC-in heavy consultation with Afghans-produces a wide array
of media for public consumption. Radio programming provides the
greatest outreach across Afghanistan. Recently, the IJC produced a
``radio drama'' portraying key security issues (reintegration, for
example) in a culturally appropriate way. Television, newspapers and
pamphlets also cover areas where literacy and access to electricity are
greatest.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
optempo and dwell times
198. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, a
previously identified and ongoing problem our military faces is an
incredible operational tempo with inadequate dwell times between
deployments. Today you stated that ``we will not see significant dwell
time improvements across all Services until 2012.'' Unforeseen events
such as the Haiti relief effort will only serve to further exacerbate
this problem. Have you accounted for contingency troop deployments,
such as Haiti, in your calculations?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Barring a major contingency
operation that requires a substantial ground campaign, Army and Marine
Corps forces will begin to approach a 1:2 BOG to Dwell ratio in fiscal
year 2012. U.S. forces can absorb some small scale operations such as
Haiti relief, but multiple occurrences may impact forces in Dwell.
Overall, we anticipate 24-36 months following redeployment from Iraq
and Afghanistan to reset and train the force for full spectrum
readiness.

199. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, when do
you expect to achieve the goal of 2 years at home for every 1 year
deployed?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The pace of operations in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has
not yet allowed our ground forces to achieve the dwell goal of 2 years
at home for every 1 year deployed. Although we have seen some small
dwell improvements over the past year, the Department does not
anticipate achieving this goal until late in calendar year 2011.

200. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, should
more be done now to increase dwell times for an already stressed
military? If so, what are your recommendations?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The temporary increase in Army
end strength has been helpful, particularly in regard to ensuring that
units have sufficient personnel to address those individuals who cannot
deploy. This increase does not affect the unit's dwell time, but does
provided for needed personnel replacements and ensures a more ready and
deployable unit. Although we have seen some small dwell improvements
over the past year, with the surge in Afghanistan, we do not anticipate
achieving the goal of a 1:2 dwell ratio until late in calendar year
2011 for ground forces. We do not anticipate any unit will spend less
than a year at home before being deployed again. We, as a Department,
are managing dwell times closely, and based on projected demand for
ground forces, we anticipate some very real and significant
improvements in dwell in the next 2 years.

civil executive agencies
201. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, you have asked Congress to
``promote legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of non-
military executive agencies'' stating that ``our future security
concerns require a whole-of-government effort.'' According to National
Security Presidential Directive 44, DOS is now the lead for stability
operations. Should your request be interpreted to mean that DOS and
other non-military executive agencies are currently failing in the
execution of their overseas roles in parallel to DOD efforts?
Admiral Mullen. State continues to develop and strengthen its
capacity to execute its overseas roles. National Security Presidential
Directive 44, has been further enhanced by the Reconstruction and
Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (Title XVI, P.L. 110-
417), which codifies State's role as the lead for reconstruction and
stabilization by establishing the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) under the Office of the
Secretary of State. S/CRS is leading the establishment of a whole-of-
government civilian response capability, the Civilian Response Corps,
which responds to failed and failing states either in conjunction with
the military or in the absence of military forces. The Civilian
Response Corps is comprised of active and standby members from eight
participating civilian agencies and, when fully implemented, will serve
as the main non-military expeditionary force of the U.S. Government.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $184
million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which funds the
stand-up of the Civilian Response Corps, and supports S/CRS's efforts
to manage and deploy this civilian force. I urge Congress to fully fund
and support this request.

202. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, in your opinion, is DOS
adequately prepared to assume agency primacy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
future conflict areas as hostilities transition to stabilization and
reconstruction activities?
Admiral Mullen. I simply don't have the visibility inside State to
tell you whether they are prepared for that role today. I do know that
the State Department is working hard to build that capacity. The
Secretary of State, through the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), has been developing a whole-
of-government civilian response capability that can deploy to both
conflict and post-conflict situations. The Civilian Response Corp, or
CRC, is gaining strength to meet this mission. Furthermore, the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $184 million for
the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which funds the stand-up of the
CRC, and supports S/CRS's efforts to manage and deploy this civilian
force.
As is now happening in Haiti, I envision a gradual transfer of
responsibility based on the situation on the ground. In that sense, DOD
and DoS, through the leadership of General Odierno and Ambassador Hill,
will gradually shift ``primacy'' from a military to a civilian led
force. I expect this same gradual transition in Afghanistan when
appropriate.
On a parallel note, Defense has supported S/CRS by transferring
over $350 million under the Section 1207 authority to State for
conflict prevention, stabilization and security projects and by urging
congressional support for S/CRS's budget request and for soft power
overall.

203. Senator Vitter. Admiral Mullen, what specific legislated
increases in expeditionary capacity of non-military executive agencies
do you recommend?
Admiral Mullen. I recommend that Congress fully fund the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative, which will allow the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to continue to build
and deploy a whole-of-government civilian expeditionary response
capability to failed and failing states.
I also recommend that Congress fully fund the Complex Crisis Fund
in State, which is intended to replace the Section 1207 transfer
authority.
Finally, I recommend that Congress authorize flexible hiring
authorities, already granted by Congress to State for hiring civilian
to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, to S/CRS to more rapidly stand-up
the Civilian Response Corps, as well as any other personnel authorities
necessary for the CRC to reach its full potential as quickly as
possible.
I would also recommend a pooled fund, as proposed by Secretary
Gates, continue to be considered for security capacity building,
stabilization, and conflict prevention. State, USAID, and Defense would
contribute to these funds and no project could move forward without the
approval of all agencies. Although there are obstacles to this concept,
it is worth continued consideration as it could further support the
activities of the Civilian Response Corps under future reconstruction
and stabilization crises. We need agility, flexibility, effective
oversight mechanisms, and tools that foster cooperation across the
executive branch which could also enhance cooperation across
jurisdictional boundaries among congressional committees--thereby
actually strengthening congressional oversight in the national security
arena. We believe this pooled fund is the first step.

f136 engine
204. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, Congress has been very clear
in its support of the F136 competitive engine for the JSF for about 15
years. Why does it not make sense to make the investment needed to
complete program and capitalize on the benefits of competition in
production just like the Air Force did on the F-16 in the mid-1980s,
particularly since we're talking about a production of over 4,000
engines during the procurement of the JSF?
Secretary Gates. Maintaining two engine suppliers would result in
increased development, production, and support costs. Recent experience
with engine development for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F indicates that sole
source risks are modest and acceptable, and the Pratt & Whitney F135
engine continues to meet or exceed our stringent performance
requirements. The risks involved with a single engine supplier are
acceptable, and savings associated with competition, which may be
realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront
development costs when competing against existing Department
priorities.

205. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, history has shown that it's
very difficult to control costs on a sole source program. If you
terminate the F136 engine, you will have a $100 billion sole source
program on the engines for the JSF. What would be the incentive for the
sole source supplier to control costs when they would know that DOD
would have no alternative to their engine?
Secretary Gates. In my view, maintaining two engine suppliers would
result in increased development, production, and support costs. Recent
experience with engine development for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F indicates
that sole source risks are modest and acceptable, and the Pratt &
Whitney F135 engine continues to meet or exceed the Department's
stringent performance requirements. The risks involved with a single
engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with
competition, which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently
offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing
Department priorities.

206. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, how does DOD intend to ensure
cost control under a sole source circumstance?
Secretary Gates. Pratt & Whitney leadership committed to assist the
Department in correcting the cost growth concerns on the F135 engine.
In addition, company leaders agreed, from corporate funds, to fund a
number of affordability initiatives that require investment in order to
further reduce the cost of the F135 engine. The Joint Assessment Team
proposed that, with commitment and funding, the cost growth trends can
be reversed and I have every expectation that the Department will
accomplish that. DOD will continue to work with Pratt & Whitney, with
affordability as a major concern, to take actions that will continue to
lower the price of the F135 for the future. The company's incentive is
to please one of its primary customers, as there will likely be an
opportunity for Pratt & Whitney to pursue future DOD and partner-nation
work, and a failure on its part to achieve affordability could likely
be a deciding factor in the future.

c-17 acquisition programs
207. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, over the last 4 years, the
Senate Appropriations Committee added 44 C-17s that we neither needed
nor could afford, at a total cost of over $14 billion above DOD's
requests--in the form of earmarks. As DOD had done in the preceding few
years, you proposed last year to cancel the C-17 Globemaster program
and argued against a congressional earmark that intended to buy 10 more
of those aircraft for $2.5 billion. You stated that the cost of buying
and operating those additional aircraft would ``invariably result in a
reduction in critical warfighting capability somewhere else in the
defense program.'' Is this view shared by the service chiefs and
unified and combatant commanders?
Secretary Gates. I believe that the current C-17 fleet is in excess
of our strategic airlift needs, resulting in increased operating costs
at the expense of other priorities. This position, supported by the
Services and combatant commanders, is based on the findings of several
recent mobility studies to include the MCRS-16. The objectives of MCRS-
16 were to determine the mobility capabilities and requirements needed
in support of the National Military Strategy in the 2016 timeframe, to
determine capability gaps/overlaps associated with the programmed
mobility force structure, and to support the QDR and decisions
regarding mobility programs. The study found that the planned capacity
of the programmed strategic airlift fleet, consisting of 223 C-17s and
89 C-5s, exceeds the most demanding projected requirements. In
addition, the report noted that C-17s could be used to support intra-
theater missions without adding to the peak demand for C-17s. Both of
these insights are consistent with findings from previous mobility
studies.
Based upon this information, it is my position that no additional
C-17s should be procured, and I request your support in granting me the
authority to allow for the proper management of the strategic fleet by
providing the Department greater flexibility in retiring C-5 aircraft
and eliminating the current statutory requirement to maintain a minimum
fleet of 316 strategic airlift aircraft.

[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris,
McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, Burr,
Vitter, and Collins.
Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff
member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and William
K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul
C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw,
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R.
Knowles, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Caroline Tess,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to
Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
LeMieux; Kyle Ruckert, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Chip
Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, Secretary McHugh and General Casey will testify
before our committee on the plans and programs of the U.S. Army
as part of our review of the fiscal year 2011 Annual Budget and
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request.
Gentlemen, we are thankful to you for your dedicated
service to our country, and to your families for their support
of your service.
As the committee meets again this year to review the Army's
posture, we find ourselves, as always, inspired by, and proud
of, what our soldiers have accomplished and what they continue
to do.
General Casey, I understand that you will be introducing
some special guests later on this morning. We look forward to
meeting them, to hearing their stories from you, and thanking
them in person for their service and their sacrifice.
America's Army today is as great as any other in the Army's
nearly 235 years of service to the Nation. Great service,
however, always comes with great sacrifice. Our Army remains
globally committed and overstretched by nearly 8 years of
continuous combat. Thankfully, the drawdown of U.S. forces in
Iraq has begun, but over 96,000 American soldiers remain
engaged in operations there, contributing to the continued
strain on our forces. I'm hoping that, at a minimum, we will
achieve the planned withdrawal of additional units from Iraq,
set to reach 50,000 by the end of this August.
Much depends on the ability and willingness of the Iraqis
themselves to preserve hard-fought gains; and, in turn, that
will depend in large measure on whether the political steps
Iraqi leaders have consistently promised to take will be
completed.
At the same time we see the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the
administration has shifted its strategic emphasis and resources
to the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and support to
help Pakistan confront the al Qaeda and Taliban threats.
An additional 30,000 troops--many Army--will be committed
to support operations in Afghanistan to implement a people-
centered counterinsurgency strategy to help defeat al Qaeda and
the Taliban and more quickly build up the capabilities of
Afghanistan security forces.
Last week, coalition forces, including large numbers of
Afghan Army units, started a major offensive operation in
Helmand Province to take control of key populations away from
the Taliban and build support for the Afghan Government by
leaving security and services in the wake of removal of the
Taliban to them. Hard fighting continues, and some of our best
and bravest have been lost and wounded.
I've long argued that the principal mission in Afghanistan
should be training the Afghan military and police so that they
can take responsibility for the security of their country. It
is essential to the success of our objectives in Afghanistan
that we strengthen the Afghan army, deepen the partnership of
coalition and Afghan units, operating together on a one-unit to
one-unit basis, and for Afghans to take the lead in achieving
security. In this respect, operations in Helmand could be a
turning point for the Afghan people and their government, their
security forces, and the people of this critically important
region. But, we are still short thousands of trainers in
Afghanistan for the initial 8 weeks of training. That is
totally unacceptable. Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies have provided only 10 percent of the trainers
that they committed.
Although the Army continues to meet the demands of
counterinsurgency and support operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq and around the world, the Army--soldiers and their
families--are stressed in many ways. In order to gain and
sustain necessary higher readiness levels in our deployed
forces, the readiness of our nondeployed forces has been at
historic lows. Most of our nondeployed Army units are not ready
to quickly respond to an unforeseen contingency. Consequently,
getting those units reconstituted and ready for their next
rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan is that much more difficult and
risky. This Nation faces substantially increased risk, should
we need the Army to respond to another contingency, despite the
amazing resilience of our troops and their families.
In light of this challenge, the Department of the Army,
over the last 3 years, has set a goal to reestablish a balance
within the force by 2011. By balance, we understand that
soldiers and units would have twice as much time at home as
they would deployed. Nondeployed units would achieve required
levels of personnel, equipment, and training readiness
necessary to meet other strategic contingencies; budget
pressures to support current operations would ease, allowing
greater investment in modernization; and Army families would
enjoy greater stability and less stress. The committee is
interested to learn more about how the Army's fiscal year 2011
budget request will achieve balance in 2011, even assuming that
declining operational demands on the force keep pace with
current strategic plans.
An issue of concern to the committee, and related to the
strain on the force, is the size of the Army. In order to deal
with getting units ready for the rotational requirements of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Secretary of Defense has permitted
the Army to retain 22,000 soldiers, temporarily, above its
authorized end strength of 547,000. Additional troops, plus
limiting the growth of Active component Army combat brigades to
45, are intended to address the Army's soldier shortages in
units getting ready to deploy. However, questions of additional
permanent Army end strength, as well as unit structure, need to
be carefully considered, in light of the inevitable and heavy
near- and long-term budgetary pressures that such increases
will put on the Army's investment and modernization accounts.
We'd like the witnesses to address the Army's analysis of
its current and future end strength and unit structure
requirements, and their ideas on how to manage the growth of
personnel costs.
Nothing in our defense establishment is as important or as
expensive as our people. In fact, the 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) makes preservation of the All-Volunteer Force an
overarching national defense strategy objective. The Army's
2011 budget request supports this objective and makes a strong
commitment to ensure that we are taking care of our
servicemembers and their family.
Much of the defense budget's growth can be attributed to
significant and necessary increases in pay and benefit
accounts. For example, the fiscal year 2011 budget request
continues the Army's major commitment to expand and improve
programs for wounded soldiers and their families, as well as
for the prevention, identification, and care of soldiers and
their families suffering from the stress of ongoing operations.
I commend the Army for your commitment. I look forward to
the witnesses' discussion of these programs today.
The long anticipated 2009 QDR, submitted with the fiscal
year 2011 budget, places the Department of Defense's (DOD)
focus and priorities squarely on policies, programs, and
initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and
Iraq and against al Qaeda around the world.
The QDR recognizes the tremendous contributions that the
Army has been providing in this fight over the last several
years, and emphasizes that these types of contingencies are
more likely the wave of the future. Accordingly, the 2009 QDR's
recommendations support much of what the Army has already been
doing, but it includes new direction for building or realigning
capabilities and force structure that will make it more
structurally relevant to the requirements of irregular or
unconventional warfare.
We look forward to the witnesses' assessments on the 2009
QDR, what it means for the Army today and into the future, and
how their 2011 budget request supports the changes that are
directed.
As challenging as meeting the demands of current operations
is today, the Army must also ensure that it remains
technologically dominant across the range of potential
contingencies and assure our future security. Army
modernization, however, has proven difficult to manage and
achieve. Army technical modernization, as part of a broad
transformational effort, appears to have been consistently
falling short of plans and promises. Secretary Gates' decision
last year to restructure the Future Combat Systems (FCS)
program, including cancellation of the previously planned
manned combat vehicle systems, require the Army to
fundamentally change its approach to modernization.
The 2011 budget request carries the Army deeper into yet
another modernization strategy that attempts to rationalize the
demands for new, immediately ready technologies needed to
quickly support the current fight with the opportunities that
other less mature technologies may offer for the force in the
next 5, 10, or 15 years, such as the Army's commitment to a new
ground combat vehicle.
The Army must also manage its modernization investment
risks carefully and consistently with our recently enacted
Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. It also needs to guard
against allowing its enthusiasm for modernization and the near-
term availability of resources to lead to a high-risk schedule-
driven program, where the necessary technologies are not mature
and the operational requirements are not urgent.
We look forward to the witnesses' report on their efforts
to establish an Army modernization program that meets the many
challenging goals of simultaneously being comprehensive,
relevant, technologically achievable, manageable, affordable,
and enduring.
So, Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Nation could
not be more proud of the Army, its soldiers, and their
families, and we are grateful for your leadership of our Army
and our Army family.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General Casey
here today.
Gentlemen, I thank you for your leadership in these
challenging times.
I've also had the opportunity of saying hello to our
wounded warriors and spouses and brave Americans, and I look
forward to your introduction of them to the committee. I thank
them for their service and sacrifice.
We all know the Army has been operating at a high
operational tempo for the past 8 years, while meeting wartime
requirements a half a world away, so we should consider the
implications of the President's 2011 budget request in the
context of our most pressing challenges, which are, of course,
success in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I applaud Secretary Gates' recent statement that,
``Achieving our objective in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to
the top of our institutional military's budgeting policy and
program priorities.'' I look forward to your explanation of how
the budget priorities of the institutional Army directly
support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and continuing
efforts to succeed in Iraq.
General Casey, you have expressed concern, and very
legitimate concern, about the effect of continued deployments
on our All-Volunteer Army. While stretching our forces does
create risk, we have demonstrated that the best way to reduce
that risk is by succeeding in theater. The Iraq troop surge
offers an important lesson in that regard.
Now we have the right mission and the right leadership in
place in Afghanistan. The additional 30,000 troops ordered by
the President are beginning to arrive, and the burden on the
institutional Army is high. It's incumbent on you to field the
best-trained and -equipped force in the world, and it is
incumbent on us, in Congress, to approve resources sufficient
to do so. We are committed to the long-term success of
Afghanistan and Iraq as stable states that can govern and
secure themselves and will not become bases of attacks on the
United States, on our allies.
I would also point out, incredibly, that retention and
recruitment is at an all-time high in the history of the All-
Volunteer Force. Many are surprised by that; in fact, I am
pleasantly surprised. But, the fact is, it's a testimony to the
patriotism and willingness to serve of young Americans all over
this country.
The competition for resources frequently pits development
of future capabilities against the cost of sustaining current
operations, and this gets to the heart of the Army's
modernization efforts. Last year, we supported Secretary Gates'
decision to restructure the Army's FCS program with spinouts of
mature technologies to the current force.
The Army has done much over the past year to develop a new
acquisition strategy based on an incremental Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) modernization plan. This new acquisition plan, like
the previous FCS program, will be a multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program that is the centerpiece of the Army's
transformation efforts. I'm interested in hearing from our
witnesses how the Army plans to transition from the FCS program
to the BCT modernization program. Specifically, what is the
Army's BCT modernization strategy and spinout plan, and what is
the impact of an incremental modernization strategy on the
Army's budget for 2011 and beyond?
Since taking office, Secretary Gates has taken decisive
action to increase capabilities available to our deployed
forces, especially those forces in combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
As we all know, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
continue to be the greatest killer of American troops in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and I applaud the Army and DOD for fielding
technologies to protect our men and women on the battlefield.
Congress authorized and appropriated billions for mine-
resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, and their increased
use has reduced the Army's reliance on other lightly-armored
vehicles.
Enhancing capabilities of our fighting forces is critical
to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I support the Army's
budget request to field more helicopters and aircrews, create
two combat aviation brigades, and fund new unmanned aircraft.
Recently, Mr. Secretary, I was down at the Yuma Proving
Ground. I was very impressed by the coordination and
communication between field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the Yuma Proving Ground, as we face these ever-evolving new
technologies that the enemy is using in developing new and more
lethal IEDs. From the battlefield to testing and response, I
was extremely impressed.
Finally, I'm interested, of course, in the views of General
Casey and Secretary McHugh on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)
policy. We will continue to listen to our military leaders. As
I pointed out before, recruitment and retention is at an all-
time high in the history of the All-Volunteer Force, and
obviously changes in a policy that, I think, is working would
have to be carefully considered.
I want to make perfectly clear that I am enormously proud
of every American who puts on an Army uniform to serve in a
time of war, and we want to encourage more of our fellow
American citizens to serve and to open up opportunities to do
so.
So, with that, I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary. I
think this is your first inquisition here, and we certainly
welcome you on the other side. We want to thank you, again, for
your outstanding service for many years as a member of the
House Armed Services Committee, and the work we did together.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh
and General Casey here today. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership
in these challenging times. I would also like to welcome the soldiers
and spouses who are seated behind you and take this opportunity to
thank them for their service and sacrifice. The Army has been operating
at a high operational tempo for the past 8 years while meeting wartime
requirements half a world away. So we should consider the implications
of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request in the context of
our most pressing challenges, success in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I applaud Secretary Gates' recent statement that ``achieving our
objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the
institutional military's budgeting, policy, and program priorities.'' I
look forward to your explanation of how the budget priorities of the
institutional Army directly support ongoing operations in Afghanistan
and continued efforts to succeed in Iraq.
General Casey, you have expressed very legitimate concern about the
effect of continued deployments on our all-volunteer Army. While
stretching our forces does create risk, we have demonstrated that the
best way to reduce that risk is by succeeding in theater. The Iraq
troop surge offers an important lesson in that regard. Now we have the
right mission and the right leadership in place in Afghanistan. The
additional 30,000 troops ordered by the President are beginning to
arrive and the burden on the institutional Army is high. It is
incumbent on you to field the best-trained and -equipped force in the
world and it is incumbent on Congress to approve resources sufficient
to do so. We are committed to the long-term success of Afghanistan and
Iraq as stable states that can govern and secure themselves and that
will not become bases for attacks on the United States or our allies.
I would also point out that retention and recruitment is at an all
time high in the history of the All-Volunteer Force. Many are surprised
by that, but I believe it is testimony to the patriotism and
willingness to serve of young Americans.
The competition for resources frequently pits development of future
capabilities against the cost of sustaining current operations. This
gets to the heart of the Army's modernization efforts. Last year we
supported Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the Army's Future
Combat Systems (FCS) program with spin-outs of mature technologies to
the current force. The Army has done much over the past year to develop
a new acquisition strategy based on an incremental Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) Modernization plan. This new acquisition plan, like the previous
FCS program, will be a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program that is
the center piece of the Army's transformation efforts. I am interested
in hearing from our witnesses how the Army plans to transition from the
FCS program to the BCT Modernization Program. Specifically, what is the
Army's BCT modernization strategy and spin-out plan and what is the
impact of an incremental modernization strategy on the Army's budgets
for fiscal year 2011 and beyond?
Since taking office, Secretary Gates has taken decisive action to
increase capabilities available to our deployed forces--especially
those forces in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) continue to be the greatest killer of American troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan and I applaud the Army and the Department of
Defense for fielding technologies to protect our men and women on the
battlefield. Congress authorized and appropriated billions for mine-
resistant vehicles and their increased use has reduced the Army's
reliance on other lightly armored vehicles. Enhancing capabilities for
our fighting forces is critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
and I support the Army's budget request to field more helicopters and
air crews, create two Combat Aviation Brigades, and fund new unmanned
aircraft.
I would note here that I was at Yuma Proving Ground last week and
was very impressed by the coordination and communication taking place
between field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Proving Ground
as we face ever evolving IED technologies used by the enemy. The short
response time between testing of new technologies and their application
on the battlefield was extremely impressive.
Finally, I'm interested in the views of General Casey and Secretary
McHugh on the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. We will continue to
listen to our military leaders, and as I have pointed out, recruitment
and retention is at an all-time high in the history of the All-
Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is working and changes
to it would have to be carefully considered.
I want to make perfectly clear that I'm enormously proud of every
American who puts on an Army uniform to serve at a time of war. I want
to encourage more of our fellow citizens to serve and to open up
opportunities to do so.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony. Thank you Chairman
Levin.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
A special welcome to you, Secretary McHugh. You're battle-
tested over in the House, so you come with a great background.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McHugh. It does look a little different from down
here than it does from up there, I'll just say. [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary McHugh. I should say, I've never missed being in
Congress so much as I do right now. [Laughter.]
But, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want
to thank you, sir, and you as well, Ranking Member McCain, for
your very kind and very gracious comments, not just in support
of me, but in support of this absolutely incredible Army.
It is a privilege, although somewhat intimidating, to be
before you here today, but I do it with great pride, because we
are here, along with the Chief of Staff, in support of
America's Army.
As was noted, it was just a few short months ago that I sat
before you as President Obama's nominee for our Nation's 21st
Secretary of the Army, and at that time, I recall very clearly,
I promised you, and assured you, of my dedication and
commitment to support our men and women in uniform, Army
civilians, and the great families, who, I know all you
understand so very well, stand with them. I pledged to work
with you, as well, in support of that great institution.
It's some 5 months later, and I want to tell you, I come
before you again reaffirming that commitment; but, doing so
having been in the Pentagon, having worked with these great men
and women for that time, it brings an even greater appreciation
of those wonderful Americans who serve within the Army ranks,
and the vital role they play in defense of our great Nation.
One-point-1 million soldiers, some 279,000 civilians, and,
as I noted, their families, proudly serving in some 80
countries around the world, and they continue to be at the
forefront in ongoing counterinsurgency operations against our
enemies, assisting other nations to build their own security
capacity, supporting homeland defense, deterring and defeating
hybrid threats and hostile state actors, and, as we've
witnessed, I think, so proudly, in recent days in Haiti,
providing life-saving humanitarian assistance in response to
natural disasters.
At the risk of stating the obvious, every member of this
committee, and every member of the House and the Senate at
large, are critical to the success of these vital missions, in
your capacity as our congressional overseers. As was mentioned,
I know full well, from my nearly 17 years of service on the
House Armed Services Committee, that a strategic partnership
between Congress and the Army is critical to the Army's
success. I think I can speak from experience, as well; without
exception each and every one of you has partnered with us to
ensure that our soldiers, civilians, and family members receive
the very best in training, equipment, healthcare, and vital
family programs. I want to say, on behalf of a grateful Army,
thank you for your leadership and for your unwavering support.
This morning, if I may, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
other distinguished members, I'd like to share, just briefly, a
few of my priorities and some of the perspectives I've gained
over the past several months on where the Army is now, and
where it's heading in fiscal year 2011.
Admittedly, over the last several months, I've been on kind
of a crash course. I learned I was not quite as smart as I
routinely said every 2 years in my campaign for reelection.
But, through the process of studying our programs, visiting
installations in the United States and overseas, examining
units in all stages of what we call R4 Gen, and most
importantly, talking with our soldiers, civilians, and their
family members throughout the force, how well and yet the
challenges that lie before us.
I have been, in this time, both impressed and challenged
personally by what I've observed and what I've discovered.
Frankly, I've found an Army that is clearly fatigued by nearly
9 years of combat, but through it all is today a resilient,
determined, and extraordinarily effective. Our soldiers today,
through nearly 9 years of war, have more expertise, more
education, more training, and more lethal capabilities than
ever before, and due to the advancement, equipment, training
and doctrine, are more likely than ever before to return safely
to their loved ones and to a grateful Nation.
But, in spite of those significant gains, the stress on our
personnel and their families remains all too real. For all our
efforts, as has been referenced, and as the Chief of Staff has
said repeatedly, we remain out of balance. As I know all of you
clearly understand, the All-Volunteer Force is a national
treasure, as Senator McCain mentioned. If we wish to sustain
it, supporting our critical family and quality-of-life programs
for our soldiers and their families must be a top priority. If
I say nothing else here today, I want to assure you, for those
of us in the Army family, it is the top priority. The 2011
proposed budget rightly focuses on those initiatives that
support our soldiers, families, and civilians. The submission
requests $1.7 billion in 2011 to standardize and fund those
vital family programs and all those that they serve.
We're attempting to aggressively address the cause of
stress on individuals resulting from the effects of multiple
deployments, including the essential effort to increase dwell
time. As all of you know, and has been referenced here already
this morning, with continuing deployments in multiple theaters,
this has been no easy task. But, I want to assure you in the
strongest terms, the Army is committed to our wounded warriors
and those critical programs that support them, and to building
dwell ratios, bringing back a sense of stability in terms of
their redeployments.
We fully believe it is our solemn obligation to provide
world-class care and transition services to our wounded, ill,
and injured through properly led and properly resourced Warrior
Transition Units. Your Army is committed to ensuring that the
quality of life for those who serve, or who have served, is
commensurate with the quality of their service.
On the subject of family programs, I've heard from many of
the good Senators on this panel about reductions in base
operation support (BOS) budgets in installations across the
country. Earlier this month, General Casey and I announced the
Army's plan to increase BOS funding by $500 million in fiscal
year 2010.
The Army Installation Management Command continues to work
with each installation to guarantee that essential BOS needs
are met.
We also will conduct a comprehensive mid-year review of all
BOS accounts to ensure that adequate funding is maintained to
meet Army priorities through the remainder of the fiscal year.
I want to make it clear that as our installations look for
ways to operate more efficiently, as they should, family
programs will be sacrosanct; they will not be touched. That
isn't to say we won't ask, ``Is this program working? Is the
money well spent? Are there better ways to provide necessary
care?'' Where change is required, we'll change things, but
where money is best directed, we'll so direct it. But, through
all of that, Army families will not be left behind.
Second, I found an Army with equipment systems and networks
in need of reset while simultaneously requiring significant
modernization to ensure our soldiers maintain a decisive edge
on the battlefield of today, as well as superiority over
threats of tomorrow. Nowhere is this challenge more evident
than in the need to repair, replace, and recapitalize equipment
affected by the harsh realities and environment of war. As the
responsible drawdown in Iraq continues and the flow of forces
and equipment to Afghanistan grows, we'll confront this reality
anew.
Additionally, we have to strive to modernize efficiently in
an era of growing fiscal challenges. As such, with this year's
budget, the Army is embracing what I believe is an affordable
yet effective modernization strategy designed to revamp our
vehicle, network, aviation, and logistical systems. We've
requested $31.7 billion for research, development, and
acquisition which includes $3.2 billion for the BCT
modernization, $1.29 billion to fund tactical vehicle
modernization, $2.74 billion to fund Army network systems, and
$6.41 billion to fund aviation modernization. Fully funding
these programs is vital to our soldiers' welfare this year and
beyond.
Third, I found an Army acquisitions system that, while
improving, still lacks the workforce and flexibility needed to
efficiently and affordably purchase the right weapons,
services, and equipment to our soldiers. Here, too, the
proposed budget will help us better meet our continued
commitment to growing the Army's acquisition workforce by
thousands of positions over the next few years, thereby
ensuring that we have the best available equipment for our
soldiers, while being responsible stewards of the taxpayers'
dollars.
But, I would tell you, workforce improvements are not
enough to fix the procurement system, and I know you on this
committee, particularly the chairman and the ranking member,
who worked so hard on the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) of last year, know that full well. The entire process
must be retooled, and in that way, more fully adopt an agile
system that rapidly develops, purchases, and fields innovative
solutions. This approach will require more streamlined
procedures and flexible rules, and for that, we need your help.
As I mentioned, in 2009 Congress significantly reformed how
DOD purchases major weapons systems. Thank you to this
committee and its leadership in that regard. But, as the
chairman and the ranking member so correctly noted, both at
that time and since, it's only a start. Now it's time to
address how we purchase services, and on that front, we look
forward to partnering with you to develop better ways and
better systems that achieve that critical objective.
In the end, I would tell you we have an Army that is strong
in spirit, strong in ability, and strong in results. We need to
recognize, too, this is an Army that, after 8 years of
uninterrupted war, is tired, stressed and too often burdened by
the inefficiencies of bureaucracy. This must change, and with
your help, we'll make those changes.
Let me close by highlighting, again, my deep appreciation
for the men and women in uniform, the civilians and the
families who support them, and by so doing, support this
Nation. Every day, I'm humbled by their dedication. I'm so
blessed to have the chance to walk into a building every
morning to go to work where the word hero really means
something. All of you on this great committee are part of that
magnificent formula for freedom. Thank you, again, for all you
do in support of our men and women in uniform, our Army
civilians, and their families.
I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear here before
you, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and
General Casey follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John M. McHugh and GEN George W.
Casey, Jr., USA
introduction
America's Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has
since it was established nearly 235 years ago. Today our Army is
fighting two wars, assisting other nations as they build their own
security capacity, supporting civil authorities at home, helping the
people of Haiti rebuild after a devastating earthquake, and preparing
to deter and defeat new threats. The Army's soldiers, civilians, and
families faithfully shoulder the load that our Nation asks of them.
With the support of Congress, we are on track with our 4-year plan to
put the Army back in balance.
Though their sacrifices can never be fully repaid, the Nation
continues to recognize and honor our soldiers and their families by
supporting them before, during, and following deployments. Our soldiers
rely upon the best training and equipment that our Nation can provide
to accomplish their mission. Yet even with this continued support, the
demands of 8 years of war weigh heavily on our Army. The strain of
multiple deployments is evident on soldiers and their families.
Equipment is used at a pace that seriously challenges our maintenance
and replacement capabilities and resources. The stress is present in
our institutions as we change 20th-century systems and processes to
meet the demands of the 21st century.
Our Nation faces the difficult challenge of balancing when, where,
and how to engage in a dynamic and uncertain world while meeting
important priorities at home. However, when the security of our
citizens or allies is threatened, the Nation can depend on America's
Army--the Strength of the Nation.
strategic context
The United States faces a complex strategic landscape with an array
of diverse security challenges. We are fighting wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan while preparing for future challenges to our national
security. For the foreseeable future, violent extremist movements such
as al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations comprise the most
immediate threats. Current global economic conditions, changes in
demographics, cultural pressures associated with globalization, and
competition for scarce resources exacerbate the uncertainty and
volatility of the strategic environment. Within this setting, the
American soldier stands as our Nation's most visible and enduring
symbol of commitment in an era of persistent conflict.
persistent conflict
For the near future, persistent conflict--protracted confrontation
among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly
willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological
ends--will characterize the global security environment. Security
crises will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and last
for uncertain durations. These challenges will take place in all
domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Natural disasters and
humanitarian emergencies will continue to be frequent and unpredictable
missions, requiring the commitment of soldiers and resources. In this
dynamic environment, the Army will conduct operations that span the
spectrum of conflict from humanitarian and civil support to
counterinsurgency to general war, often simultaneously.
global trends
Several global trends will continue to shape the international
security environment and the conflicts confronting our Nation.
Globalization may increase prosperity, but it can also spread
destabilizing influences. The unequal distribution of benefits creates
societies with divisions between ``haves'' and ``have nots''--divisions
that can be exploited by extremist ideologies and lead to conflict.
Fault lines reflecting protracted competition and friction can erupt
unpredictably as societies struggle to adjust to the move toward
modernity and greater interdependence. Meanwhile, increasingly
available and affordable technology provides our adversaries
sophisticated tools to enable a networked approach to recruiting the
disenfranchised and exporting terror.
Shifting demographics and rapid population growth that is
increasingly urbanized can continue to break down traditional,
localized norms of governance, behavior, and identity, and further
strain already stressed governments. This is especially true where a
lack of economic opportunity increases the potential for instability
and extremism. Those who are disaffected may rebel against perceived
western interference, challenges to traditional values, and ineffective
governments. Increased resource demand, in particular energy, water,
and food, is a consequence of growing prosperity and populations. The
growing global competition for resources will continue to produce
friction and increase opportunities for conflict. In this environment,
climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult
conditions in developing countries by igniting humanitarian crises,
causing destabilizing population migrations, and raising the potential
for epidemic diseases.
The two trends of greatest concern are the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and failed or failing states. A catastrophic
attack utilizing WMD has the potential to be globally destabilizing.
Failed or failing states, lacking the will or capacity to maintain
effective territorial control, contribute to regional instability and
provide ideal environments for terrorist groups to plan and export
operations. The merging of these two trends constitutes a significant
and compelling threat. Together, these trends make conflict in the
decades ahead more likely.
character of conflict in the 21st century
Global trends and recent conflicts--such as those in Lebanon and
Georgia--and our own recent combat experience indicate the evolving
character of conflict in the 21st century.
Conflicts will be waged among diverse actors--state and non-state--
with the latter employing capabilities that, during the last century,
remained largely the purview of nation-states. Motives, objectives, and
often the identities of these actors will be difficult to discern, and
are likely to shift as some act covertly and others use proxies. The
battle to gain influence over, and support from, populations will be
central to our success. Therefore, conflict will be unavoidably waged
among the people.
The initiation, location, duration, and intensity of conflicts are
increasingly unpredictable. In an interdependent world, conflicts are
more susceptible to the potential for spillover, creating regionally,
and potentially globally, destabilizing effects. All of this will occur
under the unblinking scrutiny of the 24-hour global media cycle and the
internet. Details of conflict as well as misinformation will flow
equally across social, communications, and cyber networks. Our
adversaries will exploit these media and communication sources locally
and globally.
We are more likely to face hybrid threats-diverse and dynamic
combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal
capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages. Hybrid
threats require hybrid solutions-adaptive military forces that can
function in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national,
allied, and indigenous partners. Given the strategic environment,
enduring global trends, and the character of 21st-century conflict, the
Army will operate as part of a Joint, interagency, inter-governmental,
and multi-national team to fulfill its global commitments.
roles of land forces
More than 1 million of our men and women have served in the ongoing
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 3,900 American soldiers have
given their lives, and more than 25,000 others have been wounded during
this longest period of sustained conflict ever fought by an All-
Volunteer Force. Today, America's Army has over 255,000 soldiers and
more than 18,500 Army civilians serving in nearly 80 countries around
the world--with the remainder stationed within the United States
supporting domestic missions, resetting from recent deployments, or
preparing for an upcoming deployment.
Our soldiers are performing magnificently around the world every
day, and the roles for land forces in this environment are becoming
increasingly clear.
First, the Army must prevail in protracted counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations. Not only must we prevail in our current missions in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Philippines, we must be prepared to prevail in any
future COIN operation.
Second, the Army must engage to help other nations build capacity
and to assure our friends and allies. Through security force
assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations' military and
police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny
sanctuary to terrorists--thereby helping avoid future conflicts that
might otherwise develop. American soldiers are currently deployed to
Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous
security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service
Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and
humanitarian organizations in Africa.
A third role that the Army fulfills is to provide support to civil
authorities at home and abroad. In the past year alone, American
soldiers have fought fires in the west, conducted search and rescue
operations in the Rockies and Alaska, and assisted with tsunami relief
in American Samoa, in support of civil authorities. The Army has also
provided a sizeable force to support the relief efforts in Haiti
following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed its capital. Army
units from both the active and Reserve components remain prepared to
react to a variety of crises as consequence management and response
forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a lead organization in
providing DOD support to civil authorities for disaster relief at home
and engineering support to the U.S. Agency for International
Development overseas. Abroad, the Army has also supported civil
authorities in many ways, such as sending Agribusiness Development
Teams from the Army National Guard to Afghanistan.
Finally, the Army must deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile
state actors. As an Army, we recognize that we must remain prepared to
meet and defeat hostile state actors that threaten our national
security. But we recognize that the probability of facing a nation that
will challenge America's military head-on is lower than it was during
the Cold War and other periods in our history. Our readiness and
capability to confront near-peer competitors also deters war by raising
the stakes for nation-state and hybrid actors who would threaten our
security interests.
To meet these threats, Army units continue to participate in joint
and international training exercises around the world, ensuring that
military skills and cooperative partnerships remain strong. The Army
continues to position forces in Korea and at various missile defense
sites in order to discourage actors who seek to disrupt regional
stability and security.
two critical challenges
The Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years, and
while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of
balance. Demand for Army forces continues to exceed the sustainable
supply. Against that backdrop, the Army continues to meet the wartime
requirements of our Nation while it addresses the two major challenges
facing our force--restoring balance and setting conditions for the
future. In 2007, we established a 4-year plan to restore balance to an
Army that had experienced the cumulative effects of years of conflict.
The fiscal year 2011 budget supports the final year in that plan. As we
continue to restore balance to the force, we are also setting the
conditions for the Army of the 21st century--an Army that fulfills our
strategic role as an integral part of our Joint Force.
restoring balance: the army's four imperatives
With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over
the past 3 years in our plan to restore balance--a plan founded on four
imperatives. Yet today the Army remains out of balance. We've improved
our ability to sustain the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians;
prepare forces for success in the current conflict; reset returning
units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare
for future deployments and contingencies; and transform to meet the
demands of the 21st century. As a result of this progress we now are in
a better position to achieve balance than we were 2 years ago. Critical
to this was the growth in the size of the Army.
The security agreement with Iraq that transferred security in urban
areas to Iraqis was a momentous and welcomed accomplishment. The hard
work and sacrifice of our soldiers with the support of Congress helped
make this achievement possible and set the conditions for our
responsible drawdown of combat forces in Iraq this year. Coupled with
our growth, the drawdown in Iraq allowed for our increased commitment
of forces to Afghanistan to stem the rising violence, and disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda while reversing the momentum of the
Taliban insurgency. However, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
continue to create demands that have our Army operating beyond
sustainable capacity. In fact, in 2009 more soldiers were deployed in
Iraq and Afghanistan combined than during the height of the Iraq surge.
Presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic
flexibility, and we continue to accumulate risk. We continue to stress
our soldiers, families, civilians, equipment, and institutional
systems, so our efforts to restore balance must not waiver.
Sustain
Sustaining our All-Volunteer Force is our first imperative. Nowhere
is the stress on our force more profound than in the toll it takes on
our people, as is tragically evident in the rising number of suicides
and increasing need for counseling among our soldiers and families. We
are aggressively addressing the causes of stress on individuals
resulting from the cumulative effects of multiple deployments, and
seeking to build resilience in soldiers, families, and civilians. The
Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life of those who
serve the Nation is commensurate with the quality of their service.
Goals
To sustain the force, the Army continues to pursue four major
goals. Our first goal is to recruit and retain quality soldiers and
civilians dedicated to service to the Nation. Next, we are committed to
furnishing the best care, support, and services for soldiers, families,
and civilians by improving quality of life through meaningful
initiatives such as the Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family
Covenant, Army Community Covenants, and the Comprehensive Soldier
Fitness Program. It is our solemn obligation to provide world-class
warrior care and transition to our wounded, ill, and injured warriors
through properly led and resourced Warrior Transition Units. Finally,
by supporting the families of our fallen comrades we honor their
service and sacrifice.
Progress and Accomplishments
The Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals for
2009, and achieved both numeric goals and quality benchmarks
for new recruits.
All components exceeded 105 percent of their
reenlistment goals.
We reduced off-duty fatalities by 20 percent, to
include a 15 percent reduction in overall privately-owned-
vehicle fatalities and 37 percent reduction in motorcycle
fatalities.
In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental
Health, the Army began a seminal study into suicide prevention
that will inform the Army Suicide Prevention Program and
society's approach to suicide.
We began instituting Comprehensive Soldier Fitness--an
all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family,
and physical fitness--as the foundation to building resiliency
within the Army.
We initiated an unprecedented series of construction
projects at five major hospitals as part of our commitment to
modernize our healthcare system.
The Army established the Warrior Transition Command
and reorganized Warrior Transition Brigades to provide
centralized support, rehabilitation, and individualized
transition planning to our recovering warriors.
We expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000
family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and
enhancing survivor benefits for the families of our soldiers
who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
We implemented the post-September 11 GI Bill,
significantly increasing educational benefits for Active Duty
soldiers, veterans, and family members.
The Army Reserve established Army Strong Community
Centers to support geographically-dispersed soldiers and
families. Together with Army National Guard Family Assistance
Centers and Soldier and Family Assistance Centers on active
duty installations, these centers provide help to soldiers'
families near their hometowns.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Provides $1.7 billion to standardize and fund vital
family programs and services to include welfare and recreation;
youth services and child care; Survivor Outreach Services; and
expanded education and employment opportunities for family
members.
Provides a 1.4 percent military basic pay raise and
civilian pay raise, a 3.9 percent basic allowance for housing
increase, and a 3.4 percent basic allowance for subsistence
increase.
Warrior Transition Units for our wounded soldiers will
continue to receive strong support in fiscal year 2011 with $18
million in military construction funds allocated to resource
construction of barracks spaces.
Supports Residential Communities Initiatives program,
which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for
soldiers and their families living on-post, and continues to
offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-
post.
Prepare
Our soldiers face determined enemies--so preparing the force for
our current conflict is complex and time-consuming, but essential for
success. Our units must have the people, training, and equipment they
need to prevail. Meanwhile, our institutions and systems must adapt to
provide those critical capabilities in a timely manner and in
sufficient quantities.
Goals
To prepare the force, we have four key goals. First, we accelerated
the pace at which we needed to Grow the Army to our end strength and to
grow our modular brigades to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and nearly
230 Support Brigades. Second, the Army is committed to improving
individual and collective Training to better prepare soldiers and
leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Next, we
continuously work to provide our formations with effective equipment in
a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and protects our
most critical resource--the soldier. Finally, we must transform the
Army to a rotational model--Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)--the core
process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a
sustained and rotational basis--to meet current and future strategic
demands.
Progress and Accomplishments
We began the phase-out of stop-loss, starting with the
Reserve Component in August 2009 and the Army National Guard in
September 2009, and followed by the Active Army in January
2010. Today, no mobilizing or deploying units have stop-loss
soldiers in their ranks.
The force achieved its ``Grow the Army'' end strength
goal of 1.1 million in 2009. The Active component continues to
grow toward its additional authorized temporary end strength in
order to improve unit manning within the already existing Army
structure as we eliminate stop-loss.
Fifteen-month tours effectively ended in November
2009, when the last soldiers on those extended deployments
returned.
We completed fielding nearly 12,000 Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan and
delivered the first MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) to
Afghanistan--just 15 months after identifying the need for that
capability. As of the beginning of February, we have provided
nearly 800 M-ATVs to Afghanistan.
This year, we successfully manned, trained, equipped,
and deployed 67 brigade equivalents.
The Army exceeded fleet readiness of 90 percent for
ground equipment, to include MRAPs, and 75 percent for
aviation.
We established Army Training Network (ATN)--a 21st
Century Approach to Army Training. This revolution in training
knowledge access is now providing a one-stop portal to share
training best practices, solutions, and products across the
Army.
The Army increased its employment of biometric
technologies enabling the Army to better identify the enemy
among the populace.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Funds permanent, Active component end strength at
547,400; Army Reserve at 205,000; and National Guard at 358,200
in the base budget and supports a 22,000 temporary increase in
the Active component through the Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) request.
Procures and upgrades the Army's UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-
47 Chinook, and AH-64 Apache helicopters, which are vital to
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Provides over $1 billion for flight crew training in
all components to fund flying hours, maintenance, fuel,
airfield operations, and specialized skill training.
Reset
With the pace of continuous combat operations in two wars for the
past 8 years, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build
it. Reset restores returning units--their soldiers, families, and
equipment--to a level of readiness necessary for future missions.
Goals
Our Reset plans include four goals. Our efforts to revitalize
soldiers and families seek to reestablish and strengthen relationships
following deployments. The Army's comprehensive efforts to repair,
replace, and recapitalize equipment affected by the harsh environments
of the war are essential to resetting units. In particular, achieving
responsible drawdown in Iraq while increasing our commitment of forces
and equipment to Afghanistan will require an unprecedented reset
effort. The Army must retrain soldiers, leaders, and units to build
critical skills necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict in
the current security environment. Lastly, we are identifying and
applying the lessons learned from the Reset Pilot Program that was
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reset
process. Army Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only
as long as we have forces deployed, but an additional 2 to 3 years
after major deployments end.
Progress and Accomplishments
The Army completed the reset of 29 brigades' worth of
equipment in fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13
more. In total, we have reset more than 98,000 pieces of
equipment as depot production has doubled since September 11,
2001.
We began executing a responsible drawdown in Iraq
which will redistribute, transfer, or dispose of 3.4 million
pieces of equipment; redeploy 143,000 military and civilian
personnel, and 147,000 contractors; close 22 supply support
activities; and consume or dispose of over 21,000 short tons of
supplies.
In 2009, more than 160,000 soldiers and family members
participated in over 2,600 strong bonds events designed to
strengthen Army families.
The Army continues to revise its approach to training
by emphasizing doing fewer tasks better, making judicious use
of field time, and maximizing the use of mobile training teams
and distributed learning.
We completed our Reset Pilot Program and will begin
instituting the full Reset model across the Army in 2010.
The Army fostered partnerships by executing more than
$24 billion in new foreign military sales.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Provides $10.8 billion to reset Army equipment through
the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.
Supports training and sustainment of Army forces to
include individual skills and leader training; combined arms
training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased
training based on the ARFORGEN process.
Transform
Since 2004, the Army has been transforming our force to provide the
combatant commanders tailored, strategically responsive forces that can
dominate across the spectrum of conflict. Transformation is a
continuous process that sets the conditions for success against both
near-term and future enemies.
Goals
Our goals for transformation include continued modular
reorganization to standardize our formations to create a more
deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. We will accelerate fielding
of advanced technologies to ensure our soldiers retain their
technological edge. The Army will operationalize the Reserve components
by systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing
predictability for these soldiers, families, employers, and
communities.
Completing the requirements of the Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) statutes is central to restationing forces. soldier and leader
development will ensure that we produce the next generation of agile
and adaptive military and civilian leaders who are supremely competent
in their core proficiencies and sufficiently broad enough to operate
effectively in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-
national environments.
Progress and Accomplishments
The Army is 88 percent complete on the modular
conversion of its brigades. The fiscal year 2011 budget will
support the near completion of this process.
The Army consolidated existing aviation force
structure to create a 12th Active component combat aviation
brigade (CAB) forming an additional deployable CAB without
adding force structure.
The Army activated the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort
Polk, LA, providing a dedicated and enduring capability to
prepare combat advisors to train and build capacity in foreign
security forces. Trainers from the brigade are now deployed to
Afghanistan to assist with the training and development of the
Afghan security forces.
The Army developed a new incremental capability
package approach to modernization which will allow
technologically mature, soldier-tested, proven technologies to
be prioritized, bundled in time, and fielded to the force more
quickly than ever before.
We provided combatant commanders with dedicated,
regionally based network operations support, and integrated
cyber security capability in the form of Theater Network
Operations and Security Centers, unique within the Department
of Defense.
This past year, the Army closed three active
installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on
course to complete BRAC in fiscal year 2011. To date, we have
awarded 265 major military construction projects, of which 59
are complete.
The Army built a Leader Development Strategy that
balances experience, greater opportunities for professional
education, and training in full spectrum operations.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Invests nearly $3.2 billion in BCT modernization
programs that include procurement of the first incremental
changes packages for Infantry BCTs and additional research,
development, testing, and evaluation funding for subsequent
change packages as well as initial development of the Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV).
Provides funds to begin equipping a 13th CAB.
Supports the increase in intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaisance (ISR) platforms to include the Extended
Range/Multi-Purpose, Raven, Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and the Extended Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and
Surveillance System.
setting conditions for the future
21st Century Army
The second critical challenge facing the Army is setting the
conditions for the future through a continuous process of
transformation. We must ensure that our Nation has the capability and
range of military options to meet the evolving challenges we face in
the 21st century. We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable
and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to
provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum
operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies--at a tempo
that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.
Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army.
It enables our forces and institutions to effectively execute
operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our modular heavy, Stryker,
and light brigades provide a versatile mix of forces that can be
combined to provide multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity
to accomplish a broad range of tasks from peacetime engagement to major
combat operations.
Our modular units are designed to be tailorable. Brigades now have
capabilities previously found at division level and higher. These
brigades can be tailored for specific missions and combined with
support units and key enablers such as ISR, communications, civil
affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and
expanded logistics support, to accomplish a wide variety of missions
and increase the land options available to combatant commanders.
The network is essential to a 21st-century Army. Networked
organizations improve the situational awareness and understanding
leaders need to act decisively at all points along the spectrum of
conflict, while providing connectivity down to the individual soldier.
The network allows dispersed Army organizations to plan and operate
together, and provides connectivity to joint, combined, and interagency
assets. To support this objective, the Army will use the Global Network
Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as our strategy to transform LandWarNet to
a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network
capable of supporting an expeditionary Army.
To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces at a tempo
sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force, we will put the whole Army
under a rotational model-ARFORGEN.
The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools--Reset, Train-
Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a
versatile force package, available at varying time intervals based on
its readiness level. Each force pool consists of an operational
headquarters (a corps), 5 division headquarters (of which 1 or 2 are
National Guard), 20 BCTs (3 or 4 are National Guard), and 90,000
enablers (about half of those are Guard and Reserve). Each will be
capable of full spectrum operations once we reach a steady-state, ratio
of time deployed (known as ``boots on the ground'' or BOG) to time at
home (dwell) of 1:2 (BOG:dwell) for Active component forces and 1:4 for
Reserve component forces. This versatile mix of land forces could
sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At lower demand levels, a
sustainable BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for Active component forces and 1:5
for Reserve component forces provides ready, global reaction forces and
regionally-oriented forces for engagement in support of Theater
Security Cooperation Programs. This process also allows strategic
flexibility to surge in response to unexpected contingencies across the
spectrum of conflict, and provides operational depth with more forces
available for longer commitment times.
The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the
size of our Active component (AC) force, require that we continue to
integrate Reserve component (RC) forces as part of our operational
force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to
sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational
experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, sufficient Army
National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to
their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises.
We are building an integrated Army in which our RC forces are included
in the rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate of about half that of
their AC counterparts.
The ARFORGEN process increases predictability for soldiers,
Families, employers, and communities, and enables our RC to remain an
integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation
with the strategic depth (i.e. those nondeployed units which are 2 to 3
years from commitment) and operational flexibility to meet unexpected
contingencies.
The Army has undergone significant changes in recent years, and we
must continue to change in order to keep pace with an environment of
uncertainty and complexity in this era of persistent conflict. The same
requirements that drive the imperative to change also drive our
modernization efforts and need for institutional adaptation.
Realizing Change
To become the Army the Nation needs in the second decade of the
21st century, we are transforming the Army and prioritizing programs
and efforts that show the most promise for today and tomorrow.
Similarly, we are transforming business processes across the Army,
including how we identify requirements, acquire, and provide materiel
capabilities to our soldiers, and how we adapt our institutions to
align with the ARFORGEN process.
On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to the
defense program as part of the President's budget proposal for fiscal
year 2010. The Secretary's decisions had an immediate and major impact
on our FCS-centric Army modernization effort. He terminated the MGV
portion of FCS, directing that we ``reevaluate the requirements,
technology, and approach--and then re-launch the Army's vehicle
modernization program . . . .'' He further directed the Army to
``accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out
technology enhancements to all combat brigades,'' and retain and
deliver software and network development program in increments, and
incorporate MRAP into our force structure. Secretary Gates' intent for
these bold adjustments was clear--to better reflect the lessons that we
were learning from ongoing operations and better posture Army forces
for a broader range of future challenges.
To fully implement the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Army
has developed a comprehensive plan. We refer to this new program as the
Army's ``BCT Modernization Plan,'' which is a subset of our overall
Army Modernization Strategy.
BCT Modernization Plan
We will leverage the lessons learned from the last 8 years to
provide effective and affordable equipment now, while reducing the time
it takes to develop and field new and updated materiel solutions. BCT
Modernization includes four elements: modernizing the network over time
to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously
expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force;
incorporating MRAPs into our force; rapidly developing and fielding a
new GCV that meets the requirements of the 21st-century Army; and
incrementally fielding capability packages that best meet the needs of
soldiers and units as they train and then deploy.
army network
Central to the Army's modernization efforts is an enhanced and
interoperable communication network that gives the Army a decisive
advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The network supports leaders
in making timely, informed decisions, and supports organizational
agility, lethality, and sustainability. It allows our soldiers to know
where the enemy is, where other friendly forces and civilian
populations are, and what weapon systems are available for them at any
given time. The network links soldiers on the battlefield with space-
based and aerial sensors, robots, and command posts--providing
unprecedented situational awareness and control and enabling the
application of precise lethal fires on the modern battlefield.
Maintaining our technological advantage is a constant challenge.
The Army's battle command network must be continuously upgraded to
ensure security and provide improved capability, capacity, connectivity
and operational effectiveness. The Warfighter Information Network
(Tactical) (WIN-T) is designed to extend the network ultimately to the
company level for BCTs and provide real-time information, such as high
definition imagery, from surveillance sources. The Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) was born joint with the specific requirement to resolve
radio interoperability among the services. It will provide soldiers at
the tactical level with connectivity at extended ranges, including
voice, data, and video, enabling them to move information from platoon
to higher-level command posts in complex terrain (including urban and
mountainous areas).
mrap strategy
In response to deadly IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation made
a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have saved lives by
providing significantly improved protection for our soldiers. The Army
is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations.
Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP as the foundation
for the M-ATV, modifying it for the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan
and in other regions around the world. The MRAP family of vehicles
provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move around the
battlefield, particularly in an IED environment, with the best
protection we can provide.
ground combat vehicle
Combining the lessons learned from the survivability of the MRAP,
the tactical mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the
operational mobility of the Stryker, the Army is developing a GCV that
possesses all of these qualities. Providing soldiers protected mobility
is our top design criteria. The first combat vehicle designed from the
ground up to operate in an IED environment, the GCV will have enhanced
mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and
off-road environments. It will be designed to host the Army's network.
Perhaps most importantly, it will have the capacity available to accept
future upgrades incrementally as technologies mature and threats
change.
The GCV will be versatile enough to support our expeditionary
requirements and be capable of carrying an infantry squad. It will
combine sustainability features that match the availability rates of
the Stryker while consuming less fuel than current vehicles of similar
weight and power. The pace of change and the operational environment
demand an expedited acquisition timeline, so the Army is pursuing a GCV
program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in 7
years.
capability packages
Capability packages provide the Army a regular, timely process to
enable our deployable units with the latest materiel and non-materiel
solutions based on the evolving challenges of the operating
environment. The best available capabilities will go to the soldiers
who need them most, based on the threats they are likely to face. These
bundles of capabilities will include materiel, doctrine, organization,
and training to fill the highest priority requirements and mitigate
risk for soldiers. This incremental packaging approach will enable
leaders to make timely, resource-informed decisions, and will help
ensure that we provide the best available technologies to fulfill
urgent needs to soldiers in the fight--all driven by the cyclic
readiness produced by ARFORGEN. These capability packages will upgrade
our units as they prepare to deploy by providing them improved
capabilities such as precision fires and advanced Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).
The Army Modernization Strategy
The Army's BCT Modernization Plan is a key element of our overall
Army Modernization Strategy. The Army Modernization Strategy reflects
our overarching vision of how we will achieve our ends, which is to:
Develop and field an affordable and interoperable mix of the best
equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in both
today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations.
The Army Modernization Strategy relies on three interrelated lines
of effort:

(1) Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified
capability ``gaps'' through traditional or rapid acquisition processes.
In support of this Line of Effort in fiscal year 2011 we have requested
$934 million to develop the Army's new GCV, which will overcome
critical capability gaps in both current and future operations. It is
envisioned to have the tactical mobility of a Bradley, the operational
mobility of a Stryker, and the protection of an MRAP. We are also
requesting $459 million to procure the Extended Range Multi-Purpose
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. This extraordinarily capable platform, which
is already making a difference in Operation Enduring Freedom, gives
commanders longer dwell ISR capabilities across a joint area of
operations.
(2) Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future
capability needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization,
refurbishment, and technology insertions. Army efforts in this line of
effort include our request for $887 million for the procurement of 16
Block III AH-64 Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64
Helicopters to Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort
to improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and
sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to
modernize the Army National Guard Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this
line of effort, we have requested $505 million to upgrade Shadow RQ-7
UAVs. This key upgrade will increase the payload capacity and enhance
the performance of this key ISR asset for our BCT Commanders.
(3) Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current
operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in
accordance with the Army Resource Priorities List and ARFORGEN Model.
Meeting the constantly evolving needs of theater commanders and the
demands of persistent conflict will require unprecedented agility in
our equipping and modernization programs. One example of this agility
can be found in our Kiowa Warrior fleet. We are currently maneuvering
our fleet of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Light Helicopters to meet Army and
combatant command requirements based on the ARFORGEN model. As Air
Cavalry Squadrons return from conflict, their OH-58D helicopters are
placed into Reset. Units in Reset have very few aircraft, if any.
Because the Kiowa Warrior fleet is short 35 aircraft overall, when the
squadrons transition into the Train/Ready Phase of ARFORGEN, they are
provided a number of helicopters sufficient to conduct training (25),
but less than what they are fully authorized (30). When the units move
into the available phase, they are provided their full complement of
aircraft. It is this agility that has allowed Army forces to meet the
needs of theater commanders for over 8 years of sustained combat.

What do we need? Congress has been very supportive of Army
Modernization needs in the past. Their tremendous support has ensured
that the Army soldier is the best equipped and most respected combatant
in the world. In order to execute Army Modernization and ensure the
continued success of soldiers and units, we depend on a variety of
resources, not the least of which is predictable funding. For fiscal
year 2011, we have requested $31.7 billion for procurement and
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.
Adapting the Institution and Transforming Business Practices
In addition to modernizing our operating force, we are transforming
our institutional Army. As required by section 904 of the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the appointment of the Under
Secretary of the Army as the Army's Chief Management Officer (CMO) has
allowed the Army to develop a series of initiatives to adapt the
institutional Army and transform our business practices. In accordance
with section 908 of the 2009 NDAA, these efforts will result in the
development and implementation of a comprehensive program that
establishes a series of measurable performance goals and objectives.
Specifically, the comprehensive program will address the following:

Developing and implementing a business transformation
plan focused on running the Army as effectively and efficiently
as possible.
Continuing the Army's business process reengineering
activities, led by OSD's Business Transformation Agency.
Developing an integrated business systems architecture
that emphasizes transparency and seamless access to data, and
provides timely and accurate information to decisionmakers.
Preparing Army leaders to take a greater role in
inculcating the Army with a cost-conscious culture.

While the Army transformed its operating force--building versatile,
agile units capable of adapting to changing environments--the
institutional Army continued to use processes and procedures that were
designed to support a pre-September 11 Army based on tiered levels of
readiness. To support this new operating force, the Army must have an
updated institutional Army--our generating force.
Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and
continuously adapt--tailoring force packages and quickly adjusting
training, manning, and equipping--to ensure units have all of the
physical and mental tools necessary to succeed.
Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities that
present themselves. To that end, the CMO and Office of Business
Transformation will build upon progress that has already been made
toward the Army's institutional adaptation, specifically:

Improvement of the ARFORGEN process-aligning the
generating force and its processes to better support soldiers,
families, and units within the operating force.
Adoption of an Enterprise Approach-developing civilian
and military leaders who take a collaborative, holistic view of
Army objectives and resources to make better decisions for the
Army.
Reformation of the requirements and resource
processes--delivering timely and necessary capabilities at best
value.

This transformational approach will overlay everything that the
institutional Army does, with the unwavering goal of effectively and
efficiently providing trained and ready forces to meet combatant
commander requirements.
stewardship and innovation
The Army remains devoted to the best possible stewardship of the
resources it is provided by the American people through Congress. The
establishment of the CMO and initiatives related to the transformation
of Army business practices represent the Army's effort to act as a
responsible steward. Several other initiatives serve to conserve
resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible.
The Army achieved full operating capability of the new Army
Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and Mission and
Installation Contracting Command in 2009. These organizations are
dedicated to ensuring professional, ethical, efficient, and responsive
contracting.
Civilians are assuming increased responsibilities within the Army.
The Army is recouping intellectual capital by in-sourcing former
contracted positions that were associated with inherently governmental
functions. In fiscal year 2009, the Army saved significant resources by
in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army
civilians. We plan to in-source 7,162 positions in fiscal year 2010,
and are programmed to in-source 11,084 positions during fiscal year
2011-2015, of which 3,988 are acquisition positions. These positions
were identified in the Army's ongoing contractor inventory review
process.
In the Employer Partnership program, the Army Reserve works with
public agencies and private employers to leverage their shared
interests in recruiting, training, and credentialing highly skilled
citizen-soldiers. The Army Reserve has signed more than 800 partnership
agreements with corporations, state agencies, and local police
departments.
Energy security is a key component of Army installations, weapons
systems, and operations. The Army has developed a comprehensive energy
security strategy, and is acting now to implement initiatives to make
us less dependent on foreign sources of fuel and better stewards of our
Nation's energy resources. In support of these goals, we fielded the
largest hybrid vehicle fleet within the Department of Defense. Energy
will continue to be a key consideration in all Army activities in order
to reduce demand, increase efficiency, seek alternative sources, and
create a culture of energy accountability, while sustaining or
enhancing operational capabilities.
The Army is committed to environmental stewardship. Through
cooperative partner agreements and the Army Compatible Use Buffer
Program, the Army protected more than 28,000 acres of land at 14
locations in fiscal year 2009. Through creative solutions, the Army
continues to conduct realistic training on its installations while
protecting threatened and endangered species on Army lands.
america's army--the strength of the nation
The professionalism, dedicated service, and sacrifice of our All-
Volunteer Force are hallmarks of the Army--the Strength of our Nation.
Our soldiers and their families quietly bear the burdens of a
Nation at war. Our civilians stand with them, dedicated to the Nation
and the Army that serves it. Despite the toll that 8 years of combat
has taken, these great Americans continue to step forward to answer our
Nation's call. In an environment in which we must make hard choices,
they deserve the very best we can offer, commensurate with their
dedication and sacrifice.
To continue to fulfill our vital role for the Nation, the Army must
sustain its efforts to restore balance and set conditions for the
future. We have made significant progress this year, but challenges
remain. The continued support of Congress will ensure that the Army
remains manned, trained, and equipped to protect our national security
interests at home and abroad, now and in the future. America's Army--
the Strength of the Nation.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Casey.

STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY

General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee.
As the chairman said, I would like just to begin by
introducing four representative members of this great Army that
we have.
First, I'd introduce Mrs. Donna Engeman. Donna's husband,
John, was killed in Iraq 4 years ago, and she currently runs
our Survivor Outreach Services Programs. It's a program we put
in place, about 2 years ago, to increase what we were doing for
surviving family members. Her son, Patrick, is on his second
tour in Iraq.
Next to her is Staff Sergeant Christian Hughes. He was
wounded in Afghanistan in October. He's recovering from his
wounds in Walter Reed, and he looks forward to rejoining his
unit as soon as he can.
Next is Sergeant First Class Shana Tinsley. Her husband,
Arthur, is a Master Sergeant. He leaves for Afghanistan
Thursday, I think, and she will be here with her children,
working here with us in the Pentagon.
Lastly, Sergeant First Class Jeff Lawson. He has recently
completed a program at the University of Pennsylvania that
qualifies him to be a master resilience trainer, and this is an
important part of our Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program
that I will talk about a bit later. He has three tours in Iraq,
himself.
So, thank you all, very much, for coming out. [Applause.]
Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much for bringing
these special guests to us. I just want to give them a special
thanks for their service, their families' service, their
dedication and commitment to this country. We stand in awe of
you. Thank you.
General Casey. Thank you.
Now, if I could, Mr. Chairman. As you noted, I've been
saying for the past 3 years that the Army is out of balance,
that we're so weighed down by our current commitments that we
can't do the things we know we need to do to sustain this All-
Volunteer Force and to prepare to do other things. I can tell
you that, with the help of the committee, we've made progress
over the last year to get back in balance, but we're not quite
out of the woods yet.
That said, fiscal year 2011 budget completes the
procurement funding to finish our conversion to modular
organizations that we began in 2004 and the growth that we
began in 2007. It also contains the military construction
funding to complete the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
moves of 2005. So, your continued support will allow us to meet
the goals we set 6 years ago to build an Army that was both
relevant to 21st century challenges and back in balance.
Now, this plan that we put in place to get ourselves back
in balance was centered on four imperatives. We had to sustain
our soldiers and families; they're the heart and soul of the
force. We had to continue to prepare our soldiers for success
in the current conflict. We had to reset them effectively when
they return. Then we had to continue to transform for an
uncertain future.
Let me just give you a short progress report on where we
are.
Our first objective was to finish our growth. You'll
recall, the administration, in January 2007, directed that we
increase the size of the Army by 74,000. Originally, we were
going to do that by 2012. With Secretary Gates' and your
support, we completed it last spring. When that did not prove
to be sufficient, we were granted a temporary increase of
22,000 soldiers, and we will evaluate, later this year, that
entire amount. This growth, coupled with the drawdown in Iraq,
has allowed us to meet the need for additional forces in
Afghanistan without returning to 15-month deployments and
without going back on stop-loss.
Our second key objective was to increase the time our
soldiers spend at home. I will tell you, after almost 3 years
in the job, I'm more convinced than ever that this is the most
important element of putting ourselves back in balance, and for
several reasons. One, our soldiers need time to recover from
repeated combat deployments. What we continue to see across the
force are the cumulative effects of these deployments. We
recently completed a study that demonstrates what we
intuitively knew, that it takes 2 to 3 years to recover from a
1-year combat deployment. That's why it's so important for us
to meet our near-term objective of 2 years at home between
deployments for our Active Force and 4 years at home between
deployments for our Reserve components. As demand decreases, we
plan to move to more sustainable goals of 3 and 5 years,
respectively, between deployments.
More time at home also gives us more stable preparation
time for the next mission and more time to prepare to do other
things. When you're only home for a year, you barely have time
to finish your leave before you have to begin preparing to go
back. I've recently visited units that had 18 months home. The
difference between 18 months at home and 12 months at home, and
the pace of the tempo that they're home, is significant.
Additionally, as time at home increases, we'll be able to
see more units training for the full spectrum of operations,
and we will gradually rekindle some of the skills that have
atrophied over the past several years.
Our third objective was to move away from our Cold War
formations to organizations that are more relevant for the
challenges we'll face in the 21st century. In 2004, we set out
to convert all 300-plus brigades in our Army to modular
organizations. Today, we're almost 90-percent complete, and
these formations are demonstrating their versatility and their
value in Iraq and Afghanistan every day.
We also set out to rebalance the skills resident in these
formations. This involved converting, retraining, and equipping
around 150,000 soldiers from all components to new jobs. By way
of example, in the last 6 years we have stood down around 200
tank companies, artillery batteries, and air-defense batteries,
and we've stood up a corresponding number of military police,
engineers, civil affairs, and Special Forces companies. This
has paid tremendous benefits in the current operations.
So, together, the rebalancing and the modular conversions
represent the largest organizational transformation of the Army
since World War II, and we will have done this while fighting
two wars.
Fourth, we are moving to put the whole Army on a rotational
readiness model, much like the Navy and Marine Corps have been
on for many years. This model will allow us to more efficiently
and effectively provide a sustained flow of land forces that
are trained for the full spectrum of operations to our
combatant commanders. It will also allow us to have forces
available to hedge against the unexpected contingencies that
you spoke of. It will also allow us to do this in a way that's
predictable and sustainable for this All-Volunteer Force.
Our fifth objective was to complete our restationing, and
we're just over half way through these efforts. We're on track
to complete the 2005 BRAC by the end of 2011. This will affect
over 380,000 soldiers, family members, and civilians. While
it's a lot of turbulence, the construction on these new
installations will significantly improve the quality of life
for our soldiers and families.
So, the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is we've made progress,
but we still face challenges as we work to restore balance and
set the conditions for the future.
I'd like to conclude my remarks with comments on three
areas that are very important to us and, I would hope, also
important for this committee.
First of all, sustaining our people. This budget contains
money for housing, barracks, childcare, youth centers, Warrior
Transition Units, and surviving spouse programs--all critically
important to sustaining our soldiers, civilians, and families
through a period in which our country is asking so much of
them. In general, we're strengthening our programs to build
resiliency into the force, to help them deal, not only with the
challenges of the past, but with the challenges of the future.
We've all seen the manifestations of the stresses of 8\1/2\
years at war--elevated suicide rates, increased demand for
behavioral health counseling and drug and alcohol counseling,
increased divorce rates, increased numbers of soldiers
temporarily nondeployable from nagging injuries from previous
deployments--and we've been moving aggressively to give our
soldiers and families the skills they need to deal with these
challenges.
In October, we began a program that we had been working on
for more than 18 months with some of the best experts in the
country. The program is called Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.
I've spoken about it here before. It's designed to give mental
fitness the same level of effort that we give to physical
fitness. We intended to provide our force the resiliency skills
that they need to succeed in an era of persistent conflict.
This program consists of four components: an online self-
assessment to identify resiliency strengths, this assessment
has already been taken by over 250,000 soldiers; next, online
self-help modules; third, master resilience trainers, like
Sergeant Lawson. These are designed to conduct resiliency
training down to the unit level. We've trained over 600
Sergeant Lawsons at the University of Pennsylvania already.
Finally, there will be resiliency training at every Army Leader
Development School. This program shows great promise, and I'd
be happy to discuss it further in the questions and answers.
Second, the reset of our equipment will be increasingly
important as we complete the drawdown in Iraq over the next 2
years, and for 2 to 3 years after the conclusion of combat
operations. It's important to note that our reset efforts have
been a key factor in maintaining the high operational readiness
rates for ground and air systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
budget provides almost $11 billion to reset our equipment, and
sustained funding for reset will be essential to the long-term
health of the force.
Finally, this budget, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
contains a significant adjustment to our modernization
strategy. I believe that we are in a period of continuous and
fundamental change, and that we must continually adapt to deal
with evolving threats. So, in conjunction with the Secretary of
Defense, we've transitioned away from the FCS program to what
we believe is an achievable, affordable modernization program
for our BCTs. This program leverages the lessons that we've
learned at war and the lessons that we learned from the FCS
program itself. It contains four elements. First of all,
incrementally modernizing our networks over time to take
advantage of rapid advances in technology. Second,
incrementally fielding capability packages to put the best
equipment into the hands of our soldiers as rapidly as it is
available. Third, incorporating MRAP vehicles into our force.
Lastly, rapidly developing and fielding a new ground combat
vehicle that meets the requirements of a 21st century Army.
We intend to make this program a model for the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), and we look forward to
working with the committee on it.
In closing, I'd like to reiterate how proud I am of what
the men and women of this great Army continue to accomplish at
home and around the world. We've made progress in restoring
balance, but we still face a tough road ahead, and we could not
have done it without the committee's support.
Thank you very much. The Secretary and I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. We appreciate
that testimony.
Let's try a 7-minute first round.
This goes, first, to you Mr. Secretary; the fiscal year
2011 budget request for DOD includes $549 billion for the base
budget and $159 billion for the ongoing wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Now, on top of the $708 billion request for 2011,
the administration has included a 2010 supplemental request of
$33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to support the
President's policy announced last December, and much of that
additional funding is required to support the Army's operating
costs. What is your estimate, Mr. Secretary, of how far into
the current fiscal year the Army can cover its war costs before
you're going to need that appropriation of additional funds?
Secretary McHugh. I appreciate you asking this, Senator,
because obviously it is something we spend a lot of time
talking about on the Army side. I recognize full well that the
process of introducing, and ultimately passing and having
signed, a supplemental, under any conditions, is not always
subject to a calendar, but there are realities, as you just
mentioned.
Our budget people tell us, including DOD Comptroller Hale,
that the last possible moment in which we can comfortably fund
this would be at the end of June, beginning of July.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
The WSARA was designed to address the problems that we've
had with weapons systems that take too long and cost too much,
by getting the programs off on a sounder footing, with better
systems engineering, better cost estimates, more mature
technologies, and better developmental testing. Is the Army on
track to rebuild its systems engineering, cost estimating, and
developmental testing capabilities, as required by that Act?
Secretary McHugh. We believe we are. I've jokingly said,
over the last several months, as a prime cosponsor of that bill
in the House, that had I known I was going to be Secretary of
the Army, I probably would have read it more carefully. But,
having the chance now to work with it, we're working very hard,
particularly in programs like the ground combat vehicle, to
meet the kinds of standards and the kinds of milestone
judgments and prototype competitions that is envisioned in this
act.
I would tell you, we have a challenge on insourcing and
growing that workforce. If you look at the statistics over the
last 10 years, there's been a 15 percent cut in the acquisition
workforce in the Army. At the same time, we've been called upon
to execute approximately a 500 percent increase in contracted
dollars. I think the workforce, as strained as they have been,
have done a good job in that regard. Over 2008 and 2009, we had
about 1,000 protests to the contract lettings through our
systems, and yet, of those 1,000, approximately only 8 were
sustained.
Nevertheless, the long pole in the tent, it seems to me, is
bringing in more contract expertise. We had a good start. We've
insourced about 900 core functions. We've saved about $41
million. We have, though 2015, a plan to insource nearly 4,000
new positions. Targets sometimes are hard to achieve. But, I
think we've done, thus far, a pretty good job in respecting
both the intent and the letter of that law.
Chairman Levin. In general, you feel you're on track.
Secretary McHugh. I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, on the Wounded Warrior Transition Command, you've both
made references to our responsibility to our wounded warriors.
The Army has set up a Warrior Transition Command to oversee the
care and support of wounded or ill or injured soldiers. In your
judgement, is that new command now in operation, and is it
effective?
General Casey. It has been fully operational, Mr. Chairman,
and it has been increasingly effective. We've continued to
improve our facilities, the staffing, and actually how we
process soldiers through the Warrior Transition Unit system. We
are trying to shift our focus away from just disability, over
to rehabilitation. We focus them on goal-settings, to move them
more rapidly through the process.
The other bit is, we've added an automation component to
this, and we're automating the evaluation board process, and I
think that's going to help us streamline this, as well. Short
answer, it has improved the way we handle our warriors.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Relative to the DADT law and policy, Secretary Gates
testified that he's appointed a high-level working group to
review the issues that are associated with implementing a
repeal of the DADT law and policy. Admiral Mullen has testified
that he and the Service Chiefs are in support of that approach.
Let me ask both of you; would you object to a moratorium on
discharges for homosexuality until completion of that review?
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary McHugh. Mr. Chairman, I hate to parse words, but
it depends what you mean by support.
Chairman Levin. Well, I said, would you object to a
moratorium?
Secretary McHugh. We don't feel we have the legal authority
to impose that, from the Department side. But, quite honestly,
if it were the will of Congress and the President to institute
that moratorium, I can't see that we would object to that, per
se.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General, if Congress adopted a moratorium, would you object
to that? Would you recommend against it? What would be your
position?
General Casey. Senator, I would recommend against it. Aside
from the legal issues that the Secretary mentioned, it would
complicate the whole process that Secretary Gates had laid out.
We would be put in a position of actually implementing it while
we were studying implementation, and I don't think that would
be prudent.
Chairman Levin. If the moratorium were simply a moratorium?
In other words, you're not implementing anything, you're just
withholding discharges until that study is completed.
General Casey. Mr. Chairman, this process is going to be
difficult and complicated enough. Anything that complicates it
more, I think I would be opposed to.
Chairman Levin. Well, if we do that, we'll try and make it
simple and straightforward.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
General Casey, you've put forward the goal of increasing
dwell time for soldiers, so they can spend 2 years at home for
every year deployed. I think it's a laudable goal. Obviously,
there's two ways of reaching it: reduce our commitment overseas
or increase end strength. What would be the effect of making
the temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers
permanent? Would that be helpful?
General Casey. Senator, it would have a slight impact on
dwell across the Army. I can tell you that, with the drawdown
in Iraq and the plus-up in Afghanistan, we actually get 70
percent of the Active Force to our goal of 1 year out, 2 years
back, in 2011, and 80 percent of the Guard and Reserve meet
their goal. So, we are well on the way to getting that, because
of our growth and because of the drawdown in Iraq.
Senator McCain. Do you still think we can get close to your
objectives by 2011?
General Casey. I do, Senator.
Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, how much of the Army's
OCO request could be placed in the base budget?
Secretary McHugh. About $8 billion, sir.
Senator McCain. Out of $100 billion.
Secretary McHugh. A hundred-plus, yes.
Senator McCain. So, we will probably see supplemental
requests for a long period of time.
Secretary McHugh. Well, I can't speak to that. There is
certainly an expectation--a hope, if you will--amongst the Army
leadership and, I expect, most of the Services, as we are
engaged in named overseas operations, that we would have
supplemental support.
Senator McCain. In other words, you think we need
supplementals?
Secretary McHugh. If we're going to operate in these types
of theaters, yes, we absolutely do.
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary and General Casey, as we
know, they are going to stop making the Humvee. The 2011
request ends production in the Humvee line of vehicles. Maybe
you could provide, for the record, the long-term plan for a
wheeled-vehicle fleet. I understand the President's budget
request. I hope that we have some plans on a replacement for
that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The long-term plan for the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet is to
support the development and procurement of the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) and to modernize the existing High Mobility Multi-
purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet through recapitalization.
The Army is currently reviewing the LTV requirement, which
currently stands at approximately 150,000 vehicles. As JLTV is
projected to start procurement in fiscal year 2013, the HMMWV
requirement will decrease proportionately. The Army will divest based
on criteria in favor of the most modern, capable versions of armored
and unarmored HMMWVs.
The Army recognizes there will continue to be a requirement for
both armored and unarmored HMMWVs in the fleet. As JLTV is fielded and
its capabilities evaluated, the role of both armored and unarmored
HMMWVs will be reassessed, and the fleet will be adjusted accordingly.

Senator McCain. General Casey, do you feel that the
operational commanders also ought to have input into this issue
of how to address the DADT issue?
General Casey. Their input is certainly welcome, but we're
the ones responsible for organizing and preparing the forces
that they employ. So, I believe that we, the Service Chiefs,
have a greater stake in it. But, their reasoned opinions are
always welcomed.
Senator McCain. Of course, since they have to implement
your personnel policies, and are given that responsibility, it
seems to me they should be consulted, as well.
I think it's pretty obvious what the next step is in this
effort to repeal DADT. Senator Levin just said, now instead of
going through the study that the Secretary of Defense has
called for, the forces now will want a moratorium before any
decision is made. Not unexpected, but certainly it flies in the
face of what the Secretary of Defense committed to, and that
is, before a decision is made to change a policy that, in my
view at least, is working, we would then impose a moratorium.
What are the plans for this long-range study that the
Secretary of Defense is going to implement? Do you know,
Secretary McHugh?
Secretary McHugh. In general terms, Senator, it's still
being set up; and, in fact, some of the basic construct of the
seniors group was worked out this weekend.
If I may, before I go to that, just to return to the
chairman's question. My answer about a moratorium was
predicated upon the assumption that if Congress were to pass
it, we would respect and obey that.
Senator McCain. But, that was not the chairman's question.
Secretary McHugh. Well, that's how I took it. I want to be
clear. If you're asking for my personal opinion as to the
effects of a moratorium, we have any number of cases underway,
pursuant to the current law, that would be greatly complicated
were there a moratorium; but if it were passed, obviously, and
the intent of my answer was to say, we would follow through
with that.
Chairman Levin. What are those cases, if I could just
interrupt?
Secretary McHugh. Well, we have Lieutenant Choi, a member
of the New York Reserve, for example, who's in a process now,
whose Federal recognition has been withdrawn, who's not had
final action.
Chairman Levin. Who is being discharged?
Secretary McHugh. We've not yet seen the recommendations
and paperwork out of the State, but certainly with the process
of withdrawing his Federal recognition, that would certainly
lend to that decision and others. I'm not trying to prejudge
the appropriateness of that discharge or any other discharge,
I'm just saying it would bring a legal complication to the
circumstances.
But, if Congress were to pass it, and the President were to
sign that, we would step forward and respect it and implement
it.
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, but that's not the question.
The question is, would you support a moratorium before the
review, as conducted by the Secretary of Defense, is completed?
Secretary McHugh. If the question is my personal opinion,
if asked, the preference would be, we would not enact a
moratorium.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Unfortunately, last year we put hate crimes on the defense
authorization. For the first time in history, we put a
legislation that didn't have anything to do with defense
authorization on the authorization bill, and I'm greatly
concerned about what would be put on this authorization bill
since the precedent was shattered last year by the majority by
putting on legislation that had nothing to do with the Nation's
defense.
I thank you for your candid answers, and I thank all of you
for your service to the country.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Just while we're on DADT, am I correct in concluding, based
on your testimony, two things; one, if Congress adopted a
moratorium on enforcement of DADT or adopted repeal and the
President signed it, that you would carry out those those laws?
Is that correct?
Secretary McHugh. Absolutely.
General Casey. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. The second question is, on the question
of repeal of DADT, what I'm hearing both of you say--maybe you
want to fill it in--is that, this morning, you are neither
supporting nor opposing repeal. Is that correct?
Secretary McHugh. I have a somewhat different position on
this matter, under the constructs of my responsibilities as
Secretary. I work for the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Defense. I entered this job with a full
understanding, and the President has been consistently clear,
that he supports repeal of this policy. Recent developments, of
course, are the first steps by the administration to take steps
to work in a way in which he believes can bring about an end to
that. My job is to try to provide, as the Secretary of Defense
is doing at this moment, the best possible information and
views, from the Army's side, so that they can formulate
whatever decision forward and way forward they may choose, and
thereafter, to best explain and represent the policies that the
Commander in Chief has put forward.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
I know, when we talked about this a while back, General
Casey, I thought I understood you to say that you had some
questions about a repeal, but that you were not taking a hard
position either for or against, at this point.
General Casey. Senator, I think that's fair. As I mentioned
to you, I do have serious concerns about the impact of the
repeal of the law on a force that's fully engaged in two wars
and has been at war for 8\1/2\ years.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. We just don't know the impacts on readiness
and military effectiveness.
Secretary McHugh. Exactly.
General Casey. That's why I fully support what Secretary
Gates has laid out. I'll fully participate in that. I feel I
can provide my informed military judgments to the Secretary of
Defense, the President, and Congress.
Senator Lieberman. Good enough.
Let me go on to the end strength question that Senator
McCain took up for a moment in his questioning. We worked very
hard to give you the increase in temporary end strength of
22,000 soldiers. Based on the dwell time, the time back at
base, that our troops have and the stress that they're under,
and also, of course, based on the unpredictability of the two
hot wars we're involved in, in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is
to say, what demands there'd be on manpower we never can
foresee--I notice there's a story in the paper this morning
suggesting that, because of uncertainties surrounding the
election in Iraq and the post-election negotiating to form a
new government, that it may be necessary to keep more of our
soldiers in Iraq longer than we had originally hoped. It's not
clear yet, but while we're surging in Afghanistan. So, I want
to get clear, just for the record, General Casey. Have you
filled that 22,000 increase in end strength now?
General Casey. We have not. We will fill up to 15,000 this
year.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. Then we'll make a decision, later this year,
whether of not we want to complete the last 7,000. It's tied,
as you would suggest, to the demand on our forces--and the
drawdown in Iraq. I will tell you, because of what was already
spoken of here--the military personnel costs--we will work to
find the right balance between an Army that we can afford and
an Army that is able to meet the Nation's demands at
sustainable deployment rates for its soldiers.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it. We had a hearing
yesterday with Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton about a
status report on where we are in the operations in Afghanistan
and Marja, and based on statements that General McChrystal and
General Petraeus have made, this is the beginning of a turn-
the-momentum-against-the-Taliban operation that will presumably
go from Marja in Helmand Province into Kandahar. These are all
very troop intensive operations, and we know that, in this kind
of conflict, numbers matter. So, I just want to express my
hope--first a concern, if I can--that in the budget that you're
receiving, this end strength increase temporarily goes to 2012.
My concern is that you're going to get squeezed budgetarily to
make a decision against the troop increase that we may need in
Afghanistan and Iraq, because the truth is that personnel
really do cost a lot of money. The net effect of that, I fear,
will be that we will increase the stress on our forces and not
do so well in combat. In a sense, the Secretary of Defense's
decision--which I support with the fiscal year 2011 budget--to
add two additional combat aviation brigades--which I supported,
because it provides much needed aviation assets for the Army--
also creates additional manpower and budgetary demands on our
overtaxed force.
So, you get my point. I'm concerned that the Army's going
to be pressured, for reasons of money, not effectiveness in the
field or your goal, which I totally support, of increasing
dwell time, to not have the personnel we need to achieve those
ends. How would you respond?
General Casey. Senator, I share your concerns, and I assure
you that we won't get pressed by that to do something that will
impact a force that's already stretched by 8\1/2\ years of war.
As I talked to you in your office, the Secretary and I will let
you know, here, as we get closer to this, about how we're
thinking on it and where we're going.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. I'll keep asking the
question.
Mr. Secretary, do you want to add anything?
Secretary McHugh. Well, I would simply say, Senator, as
both the Chief and I have discussed, we deeply appreciate that
plus-up; and it was through yours and other great members of
this committee that that came about. We feel that if our plans
for drawdowns in Iraq and the continued plus-up goes according
to the outlines, that we can meet our dwell objectives without
that end strength. But, obviously, as General Odierno's
comments in the media this morning suggest, this is a situation
that could change, and we need to make that judgment at the
appropriate time.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. Thank you.
You have a lot of allies here in that cause, so thank you
very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, again, thanks for your service.
Mr. Secretary, you and I have been good friends for a long
time, and I'm very proud of your service and your continuing
commitment to our military Services, particularly the U.S.
Army.
My State continues to be at the forefront of both the war
in Afghanistan and the conflict in Iraq. The 48th Brigade of
the Georgia National Guard is in the process of returning home
right now, after another very successful engagement, this time
in Afghanistan. Of course, the 3rd Infantry Division is on
their fourth tour in Iraq now and, again, just doing a terrific
job. We're very proud of those folks.
General Casey, you referenced in your statement that this
budget includes all the remaining funding to complete the round
of BRAC. While the Taliban can't stop the U.S. Army in
Afghanistan, it appears that the red cockaded woodpecker in
Georgia has at least slowed down the transfer of the Armor
School. Can you give us an update on that, and does your budget
reflect the fact that we're going to complete that in the short
term?
General Casey. The budget reflects the fact that we're
going to complete the construction. Frankly, I am not up to
speed on where we are with the red cockaded woodpecker.
Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you have the data either.
I'll find out, and let you know.
[The information referred to follows:]

The move of the Armor School and stand up of the Maneuver Center of
Excellence (MCOE) at Fort Benning is on track to meet the September 15,
2011, BRAC 2005 deadline. The Sierra Club and the Southern
Environmental Law Center have expressed concerns and discussed possible
litigation regarding the adverse impact the military construction and
subsequent training at the MCOE will have on the red cockaded-
woodpecker (RCW), a federally listed endangered species. Thus far,
several of the concerns expressed by the Sierra Club and the Southern
Environmental Law Center have been satisfactorily addressed. Remaining
issues of concern are expected to be resolved in late March 2010 when
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issues a supplement to the existing
Biological Opinion that will provide greater clarity and specificity on
the requisite procedures to ensure proper management of the RCW.

General Casey. I was down at Benning probably 2 months ago,
and they told me that they were on track. They mentioned some
problems, but they didn't think those were going to keep us
from meeting that September 2011 date to have Armor Center down
there.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Well, if you could just give us a
followup on that in writing, or have your staff give me a call,
that would be fine.
Mr. Secretary, we previously discussed the issue of Fort
Stewart and the Army's decision not to grow the additional
three BCTs, as previously stated. With that in mind, the QDR
mentions two pending reviews of our four European-based BCTs.
As you well know, we eagerly await the outcome of those reviews
and hope that the Army will give a hard look at where those
BCTs should be based, and keep in mind both your commitments to
NATO allies, as well as the need to have troops based in the
continental United States.
Now, in that regard, the fiscal year 2010 defense
appropriation bill called for a review to be completed within
60 days of enactment of the Department's efforts to mitigate
the impact of the brigade basing decisions that I mentioned
above on local communities. Can you give us the status of that,
since we are at the 60-day mark?
Secretary McHugh. The one thing I've learned, Senator,
since my 5 months in the Pentagon, is that 60 days usually
means 75. I've not yet seen that report. I promise you we will
attempt to find out where it is for you and provide that
information for you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Per the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Legislative
Affairs congressional report tracking system, OSD (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) is writing this report and is expected to
have it completed in the near future.

Secretary McHugh. As to the rebasing, we expect the NATO
review and the attendant U.S. posture reviews, as to the four
brigade teams' end in the European theater, to be concluded,
and, hopefully, a decision can be made whether they'll be
retained in Europe or, perhaps, one or both be brought back
home by the fall of this year.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
With respect to the reset and replacement of the equipment
that we are using, or have used, in Iraq over the last several
years, it's pretty obvious, when you're on the ground over
there, that a lot of this equipment is just simply worn out. If
we're truly going to leave the Iraqis in a position to be able
to maintain security, both internally and also threats from
external sources, we're probably going to have to leave some
equipment with them. What's the plan of the Army now with
respect to how much of this equipment is truly going to be
brought back to the United States to be reset, how much is
going to be left there for the Iraqis, and how much is simply
too worn out to do either of the above?
General Casey. Senator, that is a great question. In fact,
we have been working on the drawdown in Iraq for over 18
months, and putting in place the stewardship boards to ensure
that we have a good handle on this. As you suggest, just to
give you an idea of the scope of this, this is about 3 million
pieces of equipment in Iraq, and as you say, in various states
of repair. About 70 percent of that equipment belongs to Army
units. That will come back to the United States, get reset, and
get put back into units. The remaining 30 percent is
nonstandard equipment. About 95 percent of that will be
retained for our future use. It's things like X-ray machines
that we use at entry sites. About 5 percent will be made
available to State agencies for emergency use.
Right now, it looks like we will leave about half a billion
dollars worth of excess equipment to the Iraqis, and that
includes trucks, Humvees, rifles, generators, and those kinds
of things. Part of that has been provided by the authorities
that came from this committee. But, of all the billions of
dollars, only about half a billion dollars will be left there
for the Iraqis.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. I think Senator McCain touched on
the issue of the 22,000 personnel that we've plussed-up and
whether or not we ought to make those permanent. But, without
repeating the specific question that he asked--I hope I'm not--
General Casey, what are your thoughts on making the current
temporary increase of end strength at 22,000?
General Casey. Senator, because of the costs of personnel
and the impact of that on the rest of the programs within the
budget, I want to look at it very closely. As I mentioned to
Senator Lieberman, if we meet the drawdown in Iraq targets
about as they've been laid out, we may not need the entire
22,000, and we may not need to keep it. But, it's something
we'll look very, very closely at here, probably over the next 6
months.
Senator Chambliss. I would fully expect this committee is
going to support your decision, whatever it may be, but the one
issue that I keep hearing, back home as I visit the Army posts,
is the operational tempo issue, and it primarily comes from
spouses, the same as what you already know, I'm sure. Trying to
deal with that issue is not easy, but one way to do it is to
make these 22,000 troops permanent.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
General Casey, the Marines deployed, initially, MRAP
vehicles that had specialized suspension for Afghanistan. Where
is the Army in that process? Is that something you intend to
do?
General Casey. I was up at Aberdeen, and I looked at one of
those systems up there, and we have a plant in Kuwait that is
actively transitioning some of the MRAP vehicles that we have
in theater to the new suspension system. So, we're actively
working on that.
Senator Reed. Is it your goal to fully equip all our Army
forces in Afghanistan with those vehicles, or what is the plan?
General Casey. My recollection, Senator, is that we're
converting a certain type of MRAP vehicle. All MRAP vehicles
don't necessarily need that kit, and so we'll continue to
outfit those.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Both for the Secretary and for the Chief of Staff; as we go
forward, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, hopefully the need for
combat brigades will decrease, and the need for trainers will
increase. How are you trying to accommodate that shift in the
future?
General Casey. We have been creating, probably for the last
6 months or so, Senator, advise-and-assist brigades for Iraq
and modular brigades that are augmented with additional
trainers for Afghanistan. There's a two-phase training process:
one, that when they go to their mission rehearsal exercise at
one of our training centers, they get some training there; and
then, last year, we stood up a new brigade whose sole mission
is to conduct security force assistance trainings for general-
purpose units. So, the leadership of those units also receives
additional training in the skills required to work with
indigenous forces, much like our Special Forces do. We're
having great success with the combination of those.
The other thing, Senator, I was down visiting a brigade
from the 82nd at one of their exercises, and I said, ``What's
the story, guys, can we really do this? Can conventional units
do this training?'' There was silence, and then one of the
battalion commanders said, ``Sir, it's what we've been doing
for the last 4 years.'' Since 2005, our conventional forces
have been actively working with the indigenous forces in Iraq
and also in Afghanistan. So, we're getting much better at it.
Senator Reed. This proposal you're talking about is the
embedded trainers or units working with American brigades?
General Casey. We put additional field-grade officers into
existing brigades so that they can partner with divisions and
border brigades, things like that.
Senator Reed. But, at some point, the presence of
brigades--in Iraq first, and then Afghanistan--will be minimal,
and what about individual trainers or training structures that
don't depend upon the brigades?
General Casey. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have structures to
stand up the institutional side of their armies. It's called
MNSTC-I, in Iraq, and it's called CSTC-A, in Afghanistan.
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, USA, has been working in
Afghanistan to stand it up. Frankly, it was under-resourced. In
fact, we've just sent about 50 senior leaders from that
training brigade to Bill Caldwell to augment his staff and
continue to get things going there. That is where, currently in
Afghanistan, he is having problems with the trainers, the
institutional trainers that I think the Chairman mentioned in
his opening statement.
Senator Reed. Going forward, General and Mr. Secretary, are
you consciously planning to resource this effort with qualified
noncommissioned officers on an extended basis? Is that built
into your plan?
General Casey. Absolutely. In fact, we have begun selecting
lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders, off of a command
select list to command in those organizations.
Senator Reed. Another aspect to this training issue is
interagency training, prior to deployment. Is that going on,
and how effective is that?
General Casey. It is, but it's tough, Senator. What we wind
up doing is contracting retired interagency folks to come out
and give us that expertise as we're going through the training.
The other agencies just aren't big enough to provide the folks
that are actually going to be out there in time. So, that
continues to be difficult.
Senator Reed. So, there's no sort of training as you do
before deploying military units to bring all of the relevant
parts together, train for a period of time, and then deploy.
You have surrogates, and then when they get in the field, they
get together with the actual agency partners.
General Casey. Right. If we're getting the actual partners
there, it's by exception and not the rule.
Senator Reed. There's been a lot of discussion about the
DADT policy. Have you heard anything from commanders in the
field in Afghanistan or Iraq about the readiness of British
forces or Canadian forces, which do allow gay servicemembers to
serve openly? Is there any reluctance, by American units, to
cooperate? Any feedback from individual soldiers about their
policies?
General Casey. I have heard nothing from anyone about any
conflicts with British or Canadian soldiers, or any other
country's soldiers, that have already implemented that policy.
Senator Reed. Have you had anybody suggest that their
battle readiness was impaired by that policy?
General Casey. I have not, Senator.
Senator Reed. As you go forward, you're reorganizing the
military--as you point out, the most significant reorganization
in decades--is there any thought about changing the construct
of the Reserve Forces, of putting more or less combat service
support elements there? If there is, can you comment?
General Casey. We're always trying the get the mix of
Active component and Reserve component forces right. We made a
conscious decision in 2004 to get through this, to complete
this reorganization that we've done. Now we're reassessing and
we're taking a hard look at ourselves to see if we have the mix
right. That will take place over the next 6 months, and I'd be
happy to keep you abreast of it as we go forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
I just want to recognize and commend you Mr. Secretary for
your leadership. We were all very gratified when the President
nominated you, and your performance since then, Mr. Secretary,
has been very exceptional, and I thank you for that service.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me echo my appreciation to both witnesses for their
service. To reiterate what I said when Congressman McHugh was
nominated by the President, I think the President chose well,
and we're proud of the Secretary.
Just to follow up on Senator Reed's question, General. Have
you had conversations with British or Canadian generals of like
rank about the transition and their observation with regard to
DADT?
General Casey. I have not, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay. But, don't you think that might be a
good idea, something you might pursue?
General Casey. We will do that as part of this process.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you.
There's been a lot of discussion about MRAP vehicles today.
In your prepared testimony, gentlemen, you say the Army is
incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations. I
understand that Secretary Gates mentioned sharing MRAP vehicles
with our allies. To either one of you, are we going to do that,
or is that just a notional concept? Would we be giving them to
other countries? Would we be selling them under a foreign
military sales-type program? Specifically, how many MRAP
vehicles do we have in Iraq today? I have information that it's
about 23,000. Would that be a fair number?
General Casey. No, Senator. We have probably about 9,300
MRAP vehicles or so in Iraq.
Senator Wicker. Ninety-three hundred?
General Casey. That's the total for the Army now.
Senator Wicker. The Army.
General Casey. We have almost 12,000 total deployed and
about 600 of these MRAP all-terrain vehicles (MATVs) out there.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
General Casey. That number of 23,000 sounds high, but it
may be all of the other Services thrown in there.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Is this part of the equipment that
Senator Chambliss was talking about? Will some of these be left
in control of the Iraqis? Are we going to bring them all back?
Secretary McHugh. We're not through that process, as yet,
Senator. I will tell you that, with respect to discussions to
provide MRAP vehicles or any other piece of hardware to our
allies, obviously we want them to be equipped as they help us
on this or any other battlefield, they have adequate
protection. But, the last I knew, the Secretary of Defense's
position was that we must meet U.S. solders' requirements first
and foremost.
As to the means of disposal of those, either through some
sort of in-kind donation or should they pay up front, it will
be on a case-by-case basis, should we get to that point.
Senator Wicker. Okay, now this refurbishing that Senator
Reed asked about is taking place in Kuwait. Is that to make
them ready for the different terrain in Afghanistan?
General Casey. It's to put a more agile suspension system
on them, yes.
Senator Wicker. Will all of them have to go through this
refurbishing before they're sent to Afghanistan?
General Casey. Senator, I don't believe so, but I don't
know exactly. So, I will provide that to you for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Yes. All mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that are
being redistributed from Iraq to Afghanistan are routed thru the Army's
MRAP Sustainment Facility in Kuwait. This ensures all required
maintenance actions are performed before these vehicles are shipped to
our forces in Afghanistan.

Senator Wicker. Okay.
General Casey. It will apply to some models for sure. I
don't know that it applies to all the models, but I'll get you
that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Based on past experience, virtually all vehicles require some level
of maintenance work after being redeployed to Kuwait. Current
priorities at the mine-resistant ambush-protected Sustainment Facility
are the Maxx Pro (manufactured by International Military Group of
NAVISTAR), CAIMAN (manufactured by BAE, Inc.) and Force Protection
variants.
In the case of the Cougar, the Joint Program Office (JPO) is
planning to install an independent suspension system on 515 Cougar
vehicles on loan to the U.S. Army from the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S.
Navy. This system will better enable the Cougar to operate within the
challenging terrain of Afghanistan. The JPO has modified approximately
600 U.S. Marine Corp and U.S. Navy Cougars. These vehicles were
modified in Kuwait and are now operating in Afghanistan.

Senator Wicker. I understand we're transitioning from the
MRAP vehicle to the MATV. Are we going to be building any more
MRAP vehicles or are we going to start making MATVs
exclusively, at this point?
Secretary McHugh. My understanding is that the various
platforms of MRAP vehicles will continue. The theater demand is
for the MATV, but that doesn't suggest that some of the other
variants don't have suitability and applicability in other
uses, and that will be examined on a case-by-case basis. But,
clearly, from the battlefield, the MATV, particularly in
Afghanistan, is the high-demand platform.
We're getting the impression you're interested in MRAP
vehicles.
Senator Wicker. Indeed, and other members of the panel have
been interested in MRAP vehicles.
One other line of questioning, and that's with regard to
the Fire Scout vehicles. They've been made by Northrop Grumman,
in my State of Mississippi. I was disappointed when Secretary
Gates canceled the program.
We have eight Fire Scout vehicles manufactured, sitting in
storage in the manufacturing plant in Mississippi. The
President's budget indicates that the Army is working to
transfer existing assets to the Navy or Special Forces. But, my
question is, it would seem to me that the Army would need a
vertical takeoff-and-landing capability in Afghanistan, much as
the Fire Scout can provide. So, can either one of you tell me
why the Army decided to cancel the Fire Scout program? When
will the Army present Congress with its plan on moving forward
with existing assets that have been manufactured and are
sitting unused? Is the Army currently conducting any studies to
determine the need for a vertical takeoff-and-landing unmanned
air system capability in its future force?
General Casey. Senator, if I could, I'd answer those in
reverse. Right now, we don't have any studies ongoing for a
vertical takeoff and landing system. We will get you the plan
for how we intend to deal with the existing systems here within
the next 60 days.
[The information referred to follows:]

With the termination of the Class IV Unmanned Aerial System, the
U.S. Army considered several options for disposition of the eight U.S.
Army Fire Scouts that are currently at Moss Point, MS. While a final
decision has not yet been made, the Army anticipates transferring the
Fire Scouts to the U.S. Navy as soon as possible to facilitate their
continued development of the Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial System.

General Casey. Now to the question of why did we go down
this road to begin with? The bottom line is, Senator, that we
developed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strategy that gave
us more capability at less cost. We studied this over the last
year, and we looked at the payload, the cost, and the force
structure that was attendant to operating the different
systems. When we compared it to an improved Shadow, which is a
system that's already in the force, the Shadow gave us more
value for the money, and more capability for the money, as
well. While a vertical takeoff-and-landing capability is
convenient, it just didn't put it over the top, in terms of the
capabilities that the improved Shadow gave us for the cost.
Senator Wicker. The Shadow doesn't have that vertical
capability. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to Secretary McHugh and General
Casey, and I want to thank you for your distinguished service
to our country.
I also want to thank the men and women of our Army, both
uniformed and civilian, who serve our country proudly. Also, I
want to thank Army families, who make many sacrifices while
their loved ones serve our country.
Mr. Secretary, the number of servicemembers returning from
deployment who have mental health issues is a great concern.
Many servicemembers are reluctant to volunteer information that
could reflect negatively on the state of their mental health.
Secretary McHugh, considering servicemembers' reservations to
volunteer such information, can you update us on the Army's
efforts to proactively identify and assist soldiers in dealing
with mental health issues? Also, for those transitioning from
the Active component, how is the Army helping them to find
mental healthcare, either from the VA or from the civilian
sector?
Secretary McHugh. You raise a very important point,
Senator. There has long been the attitude, amongst men and
women in uniform across the Services, that somehow mental
health is a shortcoming, a handicap, a weakness. From the Army
side--and, I think it's fair to say, from all of the Services--
we're working very hard to try do change the opinions of those
who we hope will find themselves in a position to reach out for
help. Earlier, the Chief mentioned Comprehensive Soldier
Fitness, and this change of attitude has to begin at the very
basic level, and that is to have Army doctrine treat physical
fitness and mental fitness along the same par. That is the
attempt of this initiative. I think it's fair to say that,
combined with the online mental health assessments that are
available through that program, and coupled with the resilience
trainers that are increasingly going out into the units and
helping soldiers become more resilient, that they're beginning
to understand it's okay to seek out help.
We have the same challenge, quite frankly, that we see in
the civilian community, and that is a difficulty in bringing on
necessary behavioral health specialists. In fact, we're at
about 86 percent of our stated requirements for those
behavioral health providers, and we're working, each and every
day, to try build on that. But, we've had success, I would
argue, particularly in moving our concern about behavioral
health, and our focus on it, away from just the predeployment.
We're reaching out into the battlefields. We have the mental
health advisory teams that come back and provide advice to us
as to what we can do to extend that service. Now in the
battlefields, both Iraq and Afghanistan, we have mental health
specialists dealing with the troops, dealing with them on
patient-to-provider ratios that, frankly, are better than our
stated requirement. We have a requirement in theater of about 1
of these behavioral health providers for every 700 soldiers, in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. We're just about or just above the
1-to-600.
So, the way you get people to understand it's okay is to
act as if it's okay and by providing that kind of care and
destigmatizing it. That's key to our success in the future, and
it's certainly key to our activity, thus far.
Senator Akaka. The other part of that question was on
whether there are any efforts being made to help them plan for
their healthcare from either the VA or the private sector.
Secretary McHugh. We don't just turn people loose, Senator.
When soldiers redeploy, thanks to the work of both Houses of
Congress, and certainly this and the House Armed Services
Committee, we're now providing not one but two post-deployment
reassessments. We're trying to create a continuum where we can,
more early on, identify folks who are either likely or who are
encountering problems; and when those people are identified, we
try to provide for them in house.
Where distance becomes a challenge, as it often does with
respect to the Reserve component, we're working through the
Reserves, through the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, and
others to make sure that we can do everything we can to connect
people who are in need, based on their service challenges, to
those who can provide them help.
I don't want to suggest that we have this perfect. We
don't. But, it is, nevertheless, something we focus on every
day, and we're improving every day. But, we still have a ways
to go.
Senator Akaka. I'm very interested, Secretary McHugh, in
collaboration between the Services and the VA. Of note, the
Army has worked with the VA on a Physical Disability Evaluation
System pilot program, and a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record
systems. Mr. Secretary, can you give me an update on the pilot
program and how you are addressing the challenges of creating a
Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record system?
Secretary McHugh. I can provide you an overview, and I
think the Chief could give you more detail, because he's been
focused on this. I spent a lot of time in Congress, on the
House Armed Services Committee, frankly, frustrated at the
disconnect between the various evaluation systems maintained in
the military versus those in the VA, and we're working very
hard, particularly post what we found out at the Walter Reed
Army Medical Center. One of the great frustrators of soldiers,
in our Warrior Transition Units who were doing the
transitioning from the military to the VA disability system,
was that disconnect and the frustration of repetitive dealings.
The last report I got is that the model study is going
fairly well and they hope to have it completed and results in
the relatively near future. But, I'd defer to the Chief for any
fill-in-the-blanks he might have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Chief?
General Casey. The pilot is currently working at 10 places,
and we're going to increase it by another 5 in March. That,
frankly, is not as fast as I'd like to see it go, because
intuitively, we all believe it's the way that we should go.
The general feedback we get from the soldiers is, they see
the one physical given in the pilot is more fair, because it
allows them to start getting their benefits sooner.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both of you, for your service, and I look
forward to continuing to work with you to support the finest
Army this Nation, I think, has ever fielded. They've been under
great stress, and have exceeded all our expectations. I'm so
proud of the men and women that serve.
Just a few issues that I'd like to raise. General Casey, we
have a continual discussion about unmanned aerial systems, and
there was some confusion, for a period of time, about who was
going to be responsible for that. I think that matter has been
settled with clarity.
First, is that so? Second, we've seen how effective they
can be, is there any need to expand the number of military
units and reduce the size of the units that have access to this
kind of capability?
General Casey. To answer your first question, we have
worked very closely with the Air Force over the last 18 months
to resolve who's in charge, and at what level. I feel very
comfortable that we have resolved those differences.
Senator Sessions. Was that different from Secretary
England's decision? Have you made any changes from what I
understood his decision was?
General Casey. What I was speaking of, Senator, was the
employment aspect of it, not the procurement side of it.
The other thing I would say is I think you know that, in
this budget, we have been given some additional assets to
procure some additional UAVs. In fact, several companies of our
top-line UAV. I think we all feel that these systems give our
soldiers, not only a great capability to operate in irregular
warfare operations, but they are relevant across the spectrum
of conflict.
Senator Sessions. Well, like I said, we have MRAP vehicles
and we spend a lot of money on those protective vehicles. But,
there was an article in the paper, in the last few days, about
a young officer using an unmanned aerial system to identify a
group of people planting an IED in the road. So, it could save
lives in a lot of different ways. I just hope that you will not
hesitate to ask for what you need.
Second, with regard to the Commanders' Emergency Response
Program (CERP) funds and the funds, General Casey, that
soldiers have to deal with local civilians. Let's say, in the
Afghan theater, there's a village, remote from the central
government, that has always sort of taken care of its own
matters. What I think we learned in Iraq--and you were there
when it really happened--was that if you work with some of the
local leaders, and can help them have the resources to hire and
train local people who are going to defend the local community,
sometimes you get a lot better result than if you take those
young people and send them off to some distant part of the
country, where they have no family and not the same loyalty.
As I understand it, the commanders have certain abilities
to utilize funds through CERP to work with local leaders, but
the substantial majority of the money may be going through the
State Department, and often they're not in these more remote
villages. My question is: are you satisfied that you have
enough funds, based on the amount that's out there, to actually
work with local leaders, shake hands with them, make some
commitments, and be able to deliver on those commitments in a
way that can transform a whole village, region, or valley in a
more positive way?
General Casey. Senator, there's $1.3 billion in the fiscal
year 2011 budget for CERP funds. The bulk of that, $1.1
billion, is going to Afghanistan. That seems to me to be an
appropriate amount for what their needs are there, at the low
level.
Senator Sessions. Can that be used at the local level,
let's say, to help a local leader hire a police force, and pay
those people?
General Casey. Yes. I'm a little rusty on the exact
restrictions they have. Hiring people sometimes is outside of
the realm of CERP.
Senator Sessions. Well, there we go.
General Casey. But, certainly it can be used----
Senator Sessions. See that's the problem. It was in the
Washington Post; they had an interesting article about it.
Ambassador Eikenberry and Ambassador Holbrooke were quoted
about it, and they have concerns. Kabul has concerns. They like
everybody to answer only to them, of course. But, didn't we
have success in Iraq, when you were there, in creating loyalty
with the local leaders by the military people being able to
deliver, and help them provide jobs and security forces for
their people?
General Casey. Yes, Senator. I was just there before
Christmas and I'm not getting any feedback that that's not
happening in Afghanistan.
Senator Sessions. There's still some uncertainty about it.
I just hope, Mr. Secretary, sometimes DOD has to defend its
legitimate interest in the internal bureaucracies that are out
there. I don't know precisely where the line ought to be drawn,
but I know, in certain areas of Afghanistan, there really is no
State Department presence. The only presence there is a
trained, skilled military officer, who meets with a tribal
leader, and he needs to be able to offer that leader something,
and make decisions that could neutralize hostilities and save
lives. Is that something you've thought about?
Secretary McHugh. I have, and it's something that I agree
with you about. The workings between State and DOD on this
program took some time. My understanding is that now it's
working relatively well, that commanders on the ground do have
access to those funds that provide, as you correctly noted,
Senator, a great opportunity and a great option to create local
jobs through various construction projects, be it a repair of a
road, or be it construction----
Senator Sessions. What about security forces?
Secretary McHugh. I have to demur, as I think I heard the
Chief do.
Senator Sessions. Well, it's a pretty big issue, would you
agree that that's a big issue? Will you look at it? That's all
I'm asking.
Secretary McHugh. I'm not disagreeing. What I'm saying is,
I'm not certain, under the current construct, if direct hiring
is allowable under CERP. I just don't know of it is or it
isn't. Generally, a CERP is a construction program that
provides jobs and, obviously, economic security in that way. If
there's an opportunity for hiring of direct forces, we're
generally inclined to do that through other means. But we can
certainly check and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Direct hiring of local security personnel is not allowed under the
Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP may be used for
short-term security contracts that hire security personnel on a
temporary basis to guard critical infrastructure.

Senator Sessions. General Casey, just briefly, you did that
in Iraq. The forces were able to partner with local people, put
their local young men on the payroll as security forces, and
they ran al Qaeda out of their villages, time and time again,
didn't they?
General Casey. I think that happened afterwards. I don't
recall hiring security forces with CERP.
Senator Sessions. I don't know where they got their money
but I'm just telling you, that's a big deal. They don't have
time to send them off a year to Kabul to be trained and get
sent some other place in Afghanistan. I mean, the reality is
now; you've cleared a village or whatever, and you have some
support and I just think we need to cut through this and be
able to recognize, in some areas of the country, that the
military are the only real people there that make a good
decision, and they should have access to some of those funds,
if need be, to do that.
General Casey. I'll check on that and get back with you.
Secretary McHugh. I'll double check on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Military commanders in Afghanistan do have access to the
Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds and may use those funds to
contract for temporary security guards to protect critical
infrastructure, including neighborhoods and other public areas in a
village. The contracts must be short-term, usually for the life of the
project involved, but not to exceed 365 days.

Senator Sessions. I have some other questions I'll submit
to you in writing.
I, again, thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
I do believe that Senator Sessions is correct. I think the
CERP funding has been authorized at least for the reintegration
piece; it's not just for construction. I think it's been
specifically authorized for reintegration, which would include
payroll.
Secretary McHugh. We will certainly check and see how
that's being applied.
Chairman Levin. I think it is not only authorized, I think
it's been used for that purpose, at least to reintegrate some
of the lower-level Taliban with some pay for them.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your service.
I thank the members of the Army for your service, as well
as the families who support our men and women in uniform.
I'd like to turn to military construction (MILCON), just
for a moment, Secretary McHugh and General Casey. General
Casey, you and I have talked about reset and recapitalization,
so what I'm really addressing is, the budget request includes
significant funding increases to replace aging facilities for
the National Guard and the Reserves. Obviously, the investment
is critical, considering the Guard and Reserve personnel
comprise some 51 percent of your end strength. But, your
request for Guard and Reserve MILCON, while $1.2 billion, is
less than 1 percent of your total base budget, and only a fifth
of your total MILCON request. Some of Nebraska's Guard units,
for example, are lacking, currently, adequate space to store
and reset new equipment. For example, Nebraska units lack 33
acres for improved and unimproved parking to store new trucks,
tractors, and trailers, as well as 8,000 square feet of heated
storage and 3,500 square feet of security vault storage.
We'll take this for the record, but what is the current
state of our Guard and Reserve infrastructure at the present
time? Perhaps you could make some general comments. We'd like
to have something more for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The current state of Army Reserve infrastructure is adequate to
support its current missions but inadequate to support all its
missions. Competing requirements from mission areas such as Grow the
Army, Army Modular Force, Army Force Generation, provide facility lease
options to address Army requirements to support unit stationing plans
and others will always be a constraint to a modernized infrastructure.
The average age of Army Reserve facilities is over 42 years old, the
majority of facilities are under-sized for today's mission
requirements, encroached upon by local community activities and are
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection non compliant. Base Realignment and
Closure Act of 2005 (BRAC 2005) funding helped tremendously in
providing over 120 new Air Force Reserve Commands that meet today's
operational and training needs; however, BRAC 2005 funding modernized
only 11 percent of the Army Reserve Center facility inventory. The Army
National Guard has stated that they could use $1.5 billion per year for
20 years to address revitalizing their facilities.

Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh?
Secretary McHugh. Senator, as we have begun to
operationalize the Guard and Reserve, there have been
significant challenges. The first wave of those challenges were
based largely on the equipment side. If you look at the state
of both the personnel, as well as the equipment readiness for
Guard and Reserve, although still a work in progress, we've
made some successful steps. The personnel readiness ratings
have improved about 4 percent this year over last. The
equipment, right now, is at about 79 percent readiness. If you
count substitute equipment, that raises to about 89 percent.
But what that tells us is, we have a long way to go.
As to the distribution of MILCON, certainly, if I were in a
Guard or Reserve unit, I'd feel as though I wasn't getting what
I needed, and we have to admit that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, that's why, in taking them to an
operational Reserve, it has to be thorough with respect to not
only equipment, but to their facilities, so that the facilities
management is capable of taking care of the equipment and
keeping them an Operational Ready Reserve. So, that's my
concern, and obviously it's your concern, as well. But, I hope
that you can address that in more detail for us and for the
record.
Secretary McHugh. We will do that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Army fully supports the fiscal year 2011 President's budget
request. The fiscal year 2011 request completes the U.S. Army Reserve's
Grow the Army effort to provide new facilities for those additional
soldiers. However, funding is currently not sufficient to address all
of the Army Reserve's requirements to include modernizing our legacy
facilities, provide new/upgraded maintenance facilities, provide
leasing funded options to address Army requirements to field units
faster and upgrade our facilities to meet current mission standards and
anti-terrorism/force protection set back requirements. Long-term
solutions for all of the remaining requirements (such as recapitalizing
existing facilities for existing missions) necessitates a long-term
funding strategy beyond the Future Years Defense Program. Obsolete
legacy facilities adversely affect readiness, organizations, missions
and installations across the Army. This issue affects all Army commands
and components and adversely impacts the mission and organizations.

Secretary McHugh. As I said, we're making progress, but
it's incremental, at best, I would agree with you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, if we don't continue to make
progress, what we'll see happen is what would be fairly
obvious, that would be a sliding back of the capabilities of
the Guard and Reserve to be that Operational Reserve, and
readiness will suffer, I think, as we all understand.
On human capital, one of the biggest challenges will be
managing and expanding the new missions while maintaining the
fixed end strength. A significant number of questions have been
asked about that. What I'd like to do is focus on the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission seeing a
great deal of growth all across the services, due in part
because of this expansion of the UAVs. How will the Army be
able to staff the growing needs of these missions, both as to
the increased number of units and increased number of these
UAVs? What are we doing to be able to keep pace with the
growing nature of the use of such?
General?
General Casey. That's a great question, Senator, we have
learned a lot over the course of the last 8\1/2\ years about
intelligence, particularly in how to apply intelligence in this
environment. We are in the process of going through another
significant reevaluation of our whole intelligence structure.
As we look at this, we do very good analysis of where our gaps
and shortfalls are. But, what we don't do well, and what we are
working on, is redundancies, and how to get at redundancies. To
get at high-payoff forces, like the intelligence forces, we
have to continue to be able to free up redundant forces from
other areas, to put them in these high-payoff areas. That
process is hard, but it's ongoing right now.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think that we're maintaining an
adequate pace? Is it something we need to step up in order to
have our readiness there be as sufficient as we would like it?
General Casey. I think you always like to go faster. We are
keenly aware of the fact that we're at war and we have soldiers
deployed, and I think we're moving on this about as fast as is
reasonably possible, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. I've also noticed that the fiscal year
2011 request includes $507 million to buy 29 MQ-1 drones, and a
plan to spend $2.9 billion on 158 of these aircraft by 2015.
The Air Force's request, $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, to
purchase 48 MQ-9 drones, and they'll spend $7.3 billion on 341
MQ-9s over the same period.
Is there intercooperation between the Air Force and the
Army sufficiently on this so that there's no overlap or
underlap, in that we don't have a stovepipe situation
developing where we have ours, they have theirs? Obviously,
coordination of these efforts would strengthen our overall
military.
General Casey. You're exactly right. I've been working
directly with the Air Force Chief for almost 2 years on UAV
issues. I can't look you in the eye and tell you we've
eliminated all the redundancies, Senator, but we will continue
to work closely with the Air Force to avoid that.
Senator Ben Nelson. These are not only essential military
requirements we need to meet to have the sufficient number of
UAVs for certain, but we don't want to underlap the situation
in any significant way, because, obviously, the information can
be exchanged readily if there's a willingness to do it. I
appreciate the fact that you're suggesting to us that you're
working with your counterpart in the Air Force. I hope that
will continue. Obviously, I'm going to ask the Air Force the
same question. So, if I can smooth the process for you, I'll be
happy to.
General Casey. Use my name, yes.
Senator Ben Nelson. I'll use your name. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, 6 years ago this week, at a hearing before
the Personnel Subcommittee, you and I had a discussion about
the problem of sexual assaults in the military. At that time,
you stated that the Army had a zero-tolerance policy, and you
pledged your commitment to trying to deal with this growing
problem.
Last fiscal year, however, there were 2900 reports of
sexual assaults among servicemembers; and obviously, since the
Army's the biggest, on a percentage basis, the majority of
those assaults occurred among our soldiers. This reflected an
increase of 8 percent over the previous fiscal year.
Now, I understand that the Army is contending that this is
a result of better reporting and that our female soldiers, in
particular, feel more comfortable now coming forward to report
assaults, but it is still extremely troubling that we're seeing
those kinds of numbers. Why haven't we made more progress in
the past 6 years in this troubling area?
General Casey. Senator, that's a fair question, and I can
tell you, I still remember that hearing. As the Vice Chief, I
went back and we worked very hard to put together a prevention
and response program because we, frankly, didn't have one that
was effective. We worked very hard on it.
When I came back to this job--it was probably about 18
months ago, now--I was sitting down and getting a report on
where we'd come, and I was shown the data for the last year, I
think it was the year before, and we were clearly the highest
of the Services. I was told the same thing that you were,
``Well, we just report better.'' I said, ``Baloney.'' As I
bored into it, it was clear to me that we had a program that
was almost entirely focused on response, on helping the victim
after it happened, and not on the prevention. Secretary Geren
and I sat down and used Secretary Geren's experience when he
was working with the Air Force on this, to put together a
program to change our culture so that we could prevent the
assaults before they happened. We kicked that off in the end of
2008, and we put $28 million in his budget to bring that
program to fruition. We recognized--and we started it in 2008--
that it was a culture change and that it was going to take some
time. But, we're absolutely committed to staying on this until
we fix it. I still feel that we're zero-tolerance, and we have
to be.
Senator Collins. Secretary McHugh, would you like to add
anything?
Secretary McHugh. I would, Senator. As you and I have
talked before, there's very few, if any, other single issues
that are more contrary to the Army values than sexually
assaulting or harassing another member in uniform, or anyone,
for that matter. I made the pledge to you and to others in the
House--Congresswoman Harman, for example--and any number of
others who have, thankfully, focused on this issue so
carefully.
The Chief, I think, has highlighted what the Army needs to
do, and that is to change the culture. I can't tell you how it
came to the level it did. I don't want to say it was ever
acceptable, because it wasn't, but clearly, there was some kind
of disconnect amongst our young soldiers that didn't help them
understand more clearly, this is not just wrong, it's
unacceptable. The I. A.M. Strong program, under the SHARP
program, as you're aware, is the major means by which we convey
that new attitude of values. It's something we're working very
hard. The Chief correctly mentioned the $28-million
appropriation in the President's proposed budget for this.
But I think we need to, as well, while changing the
culture, help those victims understand that, if they do come
forward, they're going to be helped. That critically means that
we're going to pursue, legally, those that have committed these
acts. I think there was an attitude amongst many, largely
female, victims that if they reported, they'd become a victim
again by a system that just didn't follow through and somehow
didn't care.
We have worked hard to start, in our Judge Advocate General
schools, to put courses in for prosecutors to pursue these.
We've hired highly qualified experts and forensic scientists
who are skilled in pursuing crime scenes, and brought in new
prosecutors, as well, so that those soldiers who are the victim
of this horrendous, unacceptable crime, when they are brave
enough to come forward, see that it means something and we
follow through.
So, the Chief correctly said, it's frustrating, in that it
doesn't happen overnight, but we are fully committed to that.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
I know, from our discussions, that you also share my
concern about the enormous increase in suicides in the Army.
You've had a previous discussion with members of this panel
about the need for more mental health services. Secretary
McHugh, I just want to commend you for your emphasis in talking
about not just physical fitness, but mental and emotional
fitness. I think that's absolutely critical.
It's troubling that the Army had its worst year on record
last year, as far as the number of suicides. But, it's even
more troubling that we don't know why, that there doesn't seem
to be a correlation--at least that's what I'm told--between the
number of deployments or whether the person is in the Reserve
or on Active Duty. Are we any closer to understanding why there
is this troubling spike in suicides?
Secretary McHugh. Sadly, the answer is not much closer. We
have instituted--and I appreciate your kind comments--the
Comprehensive Social Fitness program, that I think is so
critical, and we're transitioning that now to families, as
well, to help people become more mentally resilient. That was a
lot of great work by the Chief and by my predecessor. Those
kinds of things need to continue to help people better cope.
But, as to why people take this step, particularly as to
why men and women in uniform do, we're still, in many ways,
befuddled. The best hope I see, in terms of understanding it
truly, is the 5-year longitudinal study that the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army has headed up for us, with the Institute of
Mental Health, that will take a cold, hard look, over a
necessary period of time, to try to better understand that.
Frankly, we don't have much better answers in the civilian
community either.
But, as you noted, 160 suicides last year in the Army, the
highest number ever, tells us that we have to focus in on this
even more strongly, and we're doing that.
The one thing I would say about this 5-year study--it seems
like a long time, and it is--is that there is a process for
quarterly reports, so that, as things hopefully come to light
as we begin to understand things we might do in the interim,
the data will be provided, and the guidance provided, for us to
step forward and to try to put into place some measures that
will hopefully provide some solutions.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey, thank you very much for
being here today, for your service and your testimony.
General Casey, thank you for bringing the individuals you
introduced.
I want to thank each and every one of you for your service
to our military.
I do want to say that we all know that we have the best
army in the world and that Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne Division
is leading the effort in the Regional Command East in
Afghanistan, and there are also elements of the 82nd throughout
Afghanistan and Iraq, advising, assisting, and partnering with
the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as the Iraqi
Security Forces.
I also want to point out the exceptional contributions to
the Army Special Forces in theater, as well as the 30th BCT
from the North Carolina National Guard. I can't tell you how
proud we are of the incredibly important job that they are
doing.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey, in your opening
statements, both of you talked about the commitment that you
have for the families. Secretary McHugh, you said that the
number one concern to you is the care for families and the
programs for them. General Casey, when you were talking about
getting the Army back in balance, you stated that dwell time
was the most important issue in order to get back in balance.
Then you gave details about that.
Obviously, ensuring family readiness plays a big role in
Army retention. Improving the quality of life of our Army
families allows our soldiers to operate in theater more
effectively. I'd like to have you comment on some of the
enhanced family programs that you have mentioned and which are
included in this budget.
Secretary McHugh. I appreciate, first of all, the great
service of all those great North Carolinians you mentioned, not
just in Fort Bragg, but your Reserve component soldiers. I was
over there; I had a chance to visit with some of them, and they
should make you proud. They make all of us proud.
If you can't tell, I will state it for the record, I'm a
big admirer of Secretary Pete Geren, my predecessor, and one of
many great things he did is work with the Chief of Staff and
really make a commitment to our Army families that we're going
to do everything we can to return the sacrifice that, as you so
correctly noted, Senator, they make, each and every day on our
behalf. The main conveyance of that was the Army Family
Covenant. It was one of the first acts I did when I came to the
Pentagon was to resign that in a ceremony that reaffirmed our
commitment to those families and the various programs that
we've instituted to try to attend to their needs.
We have done a good job on funding. In fact, over the last
several years, the appropriations for Army family programs has
doubled. It was about $750,000 when we started, now just 2
short years later, it's up to $1.5 billion. The President's
budget would increase it to $1.7 billion, and by the end of
2015 it would be up to $1.9 billion according to the planned
way forward.
It does a whole host of things. It provides respite care
for the caregivers and families whose soldier is deployed; it
provides respite care to those soldiers and their families who
have children with special needs; there's the Spousal
Employment that works with Fortune 100 and 500 companies to
provide employment opportunities for spouses. In fact, we've
had the great success through those terrific companies of
filling jobs for more than 35,000 Army spouses, and just on and
on and on.
It's just something we have to do. You noted, we sign up
the soldier, we re-sign the family. It's something that we
believe in very, very devoutly. We have a plan for creation of
50-some new child development centers, 7 new youth centers,
just trying to take the whole range of family needs and show
them that the family cares.
General Casey. The only thing I really can add is, as you
point out, keeping the families understanding that we really
are committed to them over the long haul is an essential part
of holding this force together over the next couple of years.
Senator Hagan. Well, I appreciate your signing of the Army
Family Covenant. I do think that's extremely important. I think
these programs, and the enhancement of the programs, are
certainly playing a big role in the families and the retention.
So, I thank you for that.
I know we've had a lot of discussion today about the MRAP
vehicles. I wanted to say that I'm supportive of the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program; however, I want to learn
more about how that program fits within the Army's long-term
ground vehicle strategy. When the JLTV program first began in
2006, the MRAP vehicle requirement did not exist, and the
unforecasted procurement of significant numbers of the MRAP
vehicles has impacted the overall JLTV program. The Army has
stated that the MRAP vehicles fill a short-term urgent joint
service requirement in order, obviously, to protect our
soldiers, while the JLTVs are the long-term solution.
Can you describe how it is in the best interests of the
Army to maintain the JLTV and the MRAP vehicle, given their
overlapping missions and requirements, and how does the JLTV
service the long-term solution in order to better protect our
soldiers?
Secretary McHugh. Let me take the first swat at that,
Senator. It really all starts with Humvees. The Army did an
assessment this year as to the requirements for the current
light tactical vehicle in the Army fleet, the Humvee. What we
discovered is, we had totally met our stated requirements for
that platform. As such, there are no funds included in this
budget for any more procurement, beyond the stated contract,
for Humvees.
The question we have to ask ourselves is: how do we provide
for a light tactical vehicle until the JLTV, the joint program
with the Marine Corps, is up and running? The answer to that is
really two-fold. One, we've experienced far fewer battle
losses, and far fewer breakdowns on the Humvee platforms than
originally expected. So we feel that we can meet a large part
of that through recapitalization and reset of the platforms we
have available. As you said, about 3,000 or so of the Humvee
requirements can be met by our MRAP vehicle stocks. So until
the JLTV comes onto line, we feel very comfortable that we have
a light tactical vehicle that will serve and keep safe our men
and women in uniform.
One of the concerns of the Humvee, of course, is that
commanders are telling us that it does not provide, in its
manufactured state, the level of protection that is necessary.
We hope the JLTV will meet that need.
General Casey. The other thing I'd add to that is in
response to another question over here about; what's our
wheeled vehicle strategy?
Senator Hagan. Right.
General Casey. We are in the throes of completing that.
But, DOD has had a significant investment in the MRAP vehicle,
and we have to figure out how to incorporate that into our
force, and into our overall wheeled vehicle strategy.
Senator Hagan. I have another host of questions concerning
this, but I believe my time has run out, so I'd put those on
the record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service.
When it comes to mental health professionals, I know
they're in short supply nationwide, but approximately many more
mental health professionals do we need to address some of the
problems related to suicide and just general mental health
problems? What's the strategy to find these people?
Secretary McHugh. The requirement of behavioral health
providers in the Army is 4,304 as I mentioned earlier, we are
at 86 percent of that, which, if my math is correct, is 3,714.
So, we are roughly about 600 short. The strategy is to try
to use the flexibilities that this Congress has provided us in
creating incentive programs and outreach programs to try to
convince those folks, who obviously are in great demand in the
private sector, to come and to serve their Nation in the Army.
Senator Graham. Do you have the tools you need to be
competitive with the private sector?
Secretary McHugh. We're making progress. I guess that would
suggest that we have sufficient tools. Certainly, as we go
forward, if more flexibility and more initiatives are needed,
we won't hesitate to ask.
Senator Graham. That's my invitation. Let us know. Is it
harder to recruit a mental health professional than it is just
a traditional doctor?
Secretary McHugh. Generally, recruiting of specialties and
subspecialties is more challenging, simply because you don't
have the density of personnel available.
Senator Graham. Is there a cross-training effort within the
military to get people who enjoy the military and are willing
to go into a new career?
Secretary McHugh. Well, we do have education opportunities,
through the university hospital system and scholarships and
such, that can be provided to candidates who meet the
qualifications.
Senator Graham. Okay, great.
When it comes to the Guard and Reserve, I think TRICARE has
been very helpful, making that available to Guard and Reserve
families, because a lot of them didn't have healthcare, it just
gave them an opportunity to purchase TRICARE for their Guard
and Reserve time, which I think is a pretty good deal for the
force.
The other issue I hear from the Guard and Reserve
everywhere I go is about lowering the retirement age. I know
there's several ideas floating around about how you can earn an
early retirement by doing more Active Duty tours and getting
credit for that. I do understand the need for the military to
sort of self-select, but I'm looking from the 20- to the 30-
year point. It used to be that most Guard and Reserve members
stayed in 30 years. A lot of them are getting out, now, at 20,
for a variety of reasons; multiple deployments being one
reason. Is there a strategy to deal with allowing people to
retire early, but incentivizing them to stay from 20 to 30,
based on the needs of the military?
Secretary McHugh. That's part of the process that we have
to do in deciding what kind of structure has to be put into
place to operationalize the Guard and Reserve.
Senator Graham. Right.
Secretary McHugh. The challenge I think we ultimately have
to face is: how do we sufficiently incentivize those good folks
to come from our communities, to periodically leave their jobs
and their families, to act as an operationalized Guard and
Reserve, but, at the same time, recognizing we have to keep
certain distance, in benefits and such, with the Active.
Senator Graham. You don't want to cross-purpose here.
Secretary McHugh. True.
Senator Graham. You don't want to get people out of the
Active Duty.
Secretary McHugh. Exactly.
Senator Graham. But, I don't really think it's that much of
a problem right now, with the benefit packages, from the 20- to
30-year period, a lot of people are leaving earlier, some of
our best and brightest, if they could earn their way to early
retirement, they might stay past 20.
Secretary McHugh. I think it's correct to say we're willing
to consider any kind of initiative.
Senator Graham. Yes.
Secretary McHugh. I know that there are many champions in
Congress of a variety of approaches.
Senator Graham. Yes.
Secretary McHugh. My good friend, who is now retired, Jim
Saxton on the House side, was very active in this regard.
Any ideas would be happily accepted.
Senator Graham. I'll give you some input, and I appreciate
your willingness to receive it.
General, moving on to Guantanamo Bay. General Petraeus said
Sunday that he believed it was in our national security
interest to try to close Guantanamo Bay. Do you share that
view?
General Casey. Senator, that's a policy issue that is
outside the purview of my job here, as the Chief of Staff of
the Army.
Senator Graham. Fair enough. Just from your travels, do you
think Guantanamo Bay is used by our enemies, still, against us,
the images of the past?
General Casey. I have read intelligence where I have seen
how the enemy has used that against us.
Senator Graham. That's fair enough.
We're looking at the DADT policy. I think you all have
given good answers about how we'll study it. Any movement to
change the role of women in combat? Has that time come?
Secretary McHugh. From the Army perspective, Senator, we
conduct, periodically, an assessment of all the MOSs and who is
eligible to serve in them. That's ongoing right now. It is not
directed specifically at women in combat, but, obviously, the
billets that are either open or closed to women would be part
of that review.
Senator Graham. So, General, what's your view about
expanding the ability of women to serve in combat roles?
General Casey. Senator, I believe that it's time that we
take a look at what women are actually doing in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and look at our policy. We've discussed this,
between ourselves here. We don't have an active effort going
on, but I think it's time.
Senator Graham. I agree with you, because, as I understand
it, women, on the aviation side, fly combat missions. Probably
the time has come to look at that, and if you could give us
some input, we'd appreciate it.
Thank you both for your service. I know these have been
stressful times for our men and women in uniform, and they've
delivered. I just want to make sure that we're here to deliver
for them, and that's why your testimony is so helpful.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Secretary McHugh, great to see you here.
Thank you for taking the time to come out to Colorado and visit
Fort Carson. I know you could spend every day of the rest of
your tenure visiting the facilities around the country, but
when you come back out, maybe we can join together and be
inspired by the men and women there at Fort Carson.
General Casey, thank you for your service. You and I have
had some conversations about the transition opportunity for
soldiers with Outward Bound. It's an organization I worked with
for 20 years, and it's a wonderful way to provide those
soldiers with the opportunity to get in touch with that
excitement, the adrenaline, the meaning that comes when you
serve in combat, but also how you make that transition with
those needs back to civilian life.
A couple of shout-outs. I wanted to acknowledge Master
Sergeant Rubio, who's here. She served as a fellow in my office
for a year. It's a wonderful program. General, you need to know
that, whether she's in uniform or in civvies, she brings a
complete game. I miss her. I know she's back with her first
love, but I wanted to acknowledge the great work she did for
me.
Then, Sergeant First Class Larson, thank you for what
you're doing as a master resilience trainer. I liked what
General Casey said about mental fitness. This thing up here is
the biggest, baddest piece of equipment we have but it needs to
be maintained and upgraded, it needs a little tender love and
care, sometimes the sights have to be recalibrated. But, thank
you for what you're doing in that regard. You're a brain
mechanic, it sounds like, and we have a lot more to learn. So,
thank you for pushing the envelope there.
I'd like to turn to two areas. One, I want to talk about
Combat Aviation Brigades, and then conclude with a couple of
comments on DADT.
We've seen, in these last few decades, just how important
aviation is. It's a combat multiplier. Everything from airborne
attacks to aeromedical evacuations. It appears in the fiscal
year 2011 budget that we're going to increase aviation assets,
it supports the development of a twelfth combat aviation
brigade, and then begins to acquire, it looks like, equipment
for a planned thirteenth aviation brigade.
When will you make stationing decisions for those brigades,
General and Mr. Secretary? Can you share some criteria that the
Army would use to make those decisions?
Secretary McHugh. Those are ongoing right now. Obviously,
there have been no final determinations made. As I think both
you and your colleague on your right from Alaska are aware, the
Army is looking very carefully at all the permutations of that
stationing, from environmental to training capacity, et cetera,
et cetera. So, I would expect, in the very reasonably near
future, those decisions will be finalized.
Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you in that
way. We have, certainly, mountainous terrain that rivals and
matches that in some of the theaters in which we're undertaking
operations today. We have, in Colorado, of course, a history of
training combat aviators up in the Eagle County region, at the
High-Altitude Army Aviation Training facility that the National
Guard runs so effectively. So, thank you for that outline.
Let me turn to DADT. What I heard both of you say is, when
the repeal occurs, you'll follow the leadership and the
dictates of the Commander in Chief and the Joint Chiefs
themselves. I appreciate that clarity.
If I might, I'd like to make a couple of comments on how I
see this. We did talk about the moratorium and how that might
work or be implemented. It was mentioned that a moratorium
would introduce legal complications; for example, in the case
of Lieutenant Dan Choi. It seems to me that that complication
would simply be that the Army would not, for the duration of
the moratorium, discharge an Arabic-speaking combat veteran
who's now participating in drills with his Guard unit, at the
request of his superior officers.
My belief is, the moratorium could be put in place as we
put this implementation plan together. I say that because the
testimony of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates was that the
review is not about whether, but it's about how we'll implement
the repeal. So, it seems that the eventuality of the repeal
isn't in question.
In that spirit, this Senator thinks that we ought to put a
moratorium in place during this implementation period. In other
words, the moratorium would be in effect until we begin to
implement this plan to repeal the DADT measure.
The Army and the military does human resources as well as
any corporation, as well as any organization I've ever seen. I
know that this is one of the challenges, and one of the reasons
we, maybe, need some time to study how you implement. How do
you deal with those servicemembers who are in the pipeline
right now, if you will, because of DADT, because they've been
identified as being gay servicemembers? I just think that we
should do everything possible, given that we're going to, based
on what the President, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen have
said, implement a repeal, that we should do everything possible
to ensure that as few servicemembers are discharged between now
and then.
Who's going to be the last gay servicemember to be
discharged under DADT? That would be a tragedy, in my mind,
because they're clearly patriots, they clearly want to serve
their country. Admiral Mullen made it very clear that they
shouldn't have to lead a lie to serve their country and defend
their country.
I'll end on this note, I mentioned Senator Goldwater in the
previous hearing. He was an Arizonan. I had the great privilege
to know him as a boy. He and my father, who served in
Congress--one a Democrat, one a Republican--loved Arizona, they
loved the libertarian spirit of the west, where it's live and
let live. Senator Goldwater famously said, ``You don't have to
be straight to shoot straight.'' I think that's what we've come
to be aware of, and that's why I so strongly support repealing
this policy, so that every single American can serve who would
like to.
You don't need to respond. I just wanted to, for my own
heartfelt reasons, make that statement to the committee.
Thank you again for your leadership. I'm just so proud to
know both of you and to be able to serve with you in my
capacity as you defend our Nation.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
I'm going to have a question on that issue, the DADT answer
of yours, on a second round, which will be brief, I think. But,
I will have another question or two on that same subject.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Thank you both for being here. I know you've been here for
several hours, so I'll try to give you a random selection,
because you've come through the snowstorm to my office, and I
appreciate that. We had a good time there, having a good
discussion about many issues. I have a couple of broad
questions, then I'm going to kind of bring it down a little
parochial.
First, if I can follow up on the dwell-time issue. Based on
the rebalancing that's occurring, for soldiers that are
listening, and for families that are listening, give me a sense
of the difference that it will be for a family, today or next
year versus 2, 3 years ago, in the amount of dwell time or time
home they might have. Can you put that in kind of a term that
people can see it and hear it?
General Casey. I can try, Senator, but for the last 5
years, a good portion of the force was deploying on 1 year out,
1 year back. We were, frankly, meeting ourselves coming and
going.
Senator Begich. Right.
General Casey. They'd come home, take their leave, come
back, and immediately start training to go back. So, the time
they were home, they weren't home.
Senator Begich. Right.
General Casey. I went down and visited a unit that was home
for 18 months. The difference in pace between 18 months at home
and 12 months at home was striking. The difference in pace
between 24 months at home and 12 months at home is going to be
even more striking. As I mentioned earlier, we expect to get 70
percent of the Active Force to 2 years at home by 2011, and 80
percent of the Guard and Reserve at 4 years at home by 2011.
Senator Begich. When you say 2011, do you mean calendar
year or fiscal year?
General Casey. By the end of the calendar year.
Senator Begich. End of calendar year 2011.
Very good. Thank you. I know you had mentioned it earlier,
and I just wanted to kind of reemphasize, because I agree with
you, and we've talked a little bit about this, in regards to
the amount of dwell time is critical for the long-term health
of the military. It doesn't matter if it's the Army or the Air
Force, but Army, specifically, because the amount of time that
you're out is going to be critical for the long-term health.
So, I want to say thank you for moving down that path.
Mr. Secretary, did you have something that you wanted to
add to that?
Secretary McHugh. I was just going to say there's another
component to it, as well, that, if families are listening, the
Chief and I certainly fully endorse the commitment that we're
not going to revert to 15-month deployments, and we'll be
sending folks out without the threat of stop loss.
Senator Begich. Excellent.
Secretary McHugh. That doesn't directly play into the dwell
time, although, in a very real way, it does, because it
requires more troops. But, families care very much about that,
and I think they would want to be assured of that, as well.
Senator Begich. That's great. That's a good point. It's a
combo package.
Let me ask a couple more general questions and then I'm
going to be on a couple of quick Alaska issues.
I want to follow up with Senator Graham on mental health
services and making sure you hire the right professionals. I
heard the pay differential between the private-sector mental
health providers and what we're able to pay, there's a gap
there. Is that one of the challenges you have? Because if
that's the case, I think this committee, or members, would be
very interested in trying to help solve that to make sure we're
competitive in the marketplace, especially as this economy is
now turning around. Healthcare providers in the private sector
will be one of the biggest fast-growth areas in the new
economy, and we're going to be competing with that. When I say
we, the military. I want to make sure we are not at an economic
disadvantage.
Is that something you could get to me and indicate, at some
point, if there is a gap? If so, what strategies do you have?
Because as this economy picks up, the fastest-growing industry
will be healthcare, and we will have a problem competing
against that. Is that a fair request?
General Casey. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Excellent.
When people do retire, do you do exit interviews with those
folks that are retiring, to determine why they're leaving
early? Is there an actual datapoint study that you guys
utilize?
General Casey. I don't know that we do retirees so much as
we do soldiers or officers who leave before retirement.
Senator Begich. Before retirement.
General Casey. I know we do very good sitdowns just to find
out what's on their mind and what's motivating them to leave. I
don't know that we do that with retirees.
Senator Begich. Actually, I misstated. The way you stated
it was correct.
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Begich. The early retirees, basically, people
getting out before their 20 or 30 years. Do you put that in any
kind of analysis that can be shared with this committee or with
members? I'd be curious, what are those two or three top things
that people say, ``This is why I'm leaving,'' based on data?
General Casey. Right. We do have that data available. In
fact, we recently completed a survey--it was finished up in the
end of the summer last year--and it's a general survey of the
force. As part of that survey, it was repeated deployments that
still remains the number one reason for soldiers leaving the
Army.
We also utilize our various intellectual centers, such as
we maintain at West Point. I'm thinking specifically of our
midgrade officers who were leaving the force in greater numbers
than we'd like, and in greater numbers, I think, than we would
expect. They've done some analysis to see what it was that they
felt they weren't getting as part of their Army service. In
large measure, it was educational and the rotations and to go
to the various schools and such that we're trying to respond
to. So, it's not something we look at holistically, but through
bits and pieces, particularly where we're finding challenges.
We try to get whatever answers we can.
Senator Begich. Very good. That helps.
Let me get to, very quickly, a couple of quick Alaskan
ones. This is one that you could respond to later, because it's
very, very specific. In Fairbanks, in the basic allowance for
housing, there was a study done. When they did the study, it
reduced the rates of what the soldiers would get for their
housing in Fairbanks. I can tell you, from my experience of
almost 25 years in the landlord business, that they did it at a
time when the utility rates were lower and vacancy rates were
higher, which is summer. It creates a problem, because then the
analysis sets the rate, which then they will have to pay for or
deal with as they go into the winter months, which was lower
vacancy rates and the higher utility costs. The end result is,
the soldiers--we've gotten calls on this--end up paying out of
their pocket to make sure they can compensate for the housing
allowance.
Would you take a look at that? We will send you something a
little more detailed. But, just in my 25-plus-years experience
in the real estate business, the timing of the survey was
probably not the most appropriate time, or they could have
extended it over the winter-fall to get a better picture.
Because you can go $2 or $3 a gallon heating-fuel differential
between those months, as an example, and the rates can
dramatically be different, based on winter and accessibility of
the fuel and other things, especially in Fairbanks, which is a
significant problem with heating issues. If you wouldn't mind,
just note that.
The last thing I'll say--only because Senator Udall isn't
here now, I can say it--that, of course, we have the best
training grounds. We don't have hills, we have mountains, and
all three of us have talked about that in the past. But, as you
progress on utilization of training facilities, the one, as I
mentioned to you, is the unmanned aircraft. I think we have
some superb locations that, as you consider all the deployments
and reassignments of equipment, obviously we want to be engaged
in that discussion. You know it better than I do by your ground
troops up there, but what we have up there is exceptional. I'll
tell Senator Udall later that I credited his and I didn't say
anything about mine.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Chairman Levin. You create a real problem for me, Senator
Begich, because I'm tempted to talk about our training areas in
Michigan, and I'm going to resist that temptation, only because
of time limitations.
I have a couple of questions. One has to do with equipment
that we have authorized to go from Iraq--or, more technically,
perhaps, Kuwait--to the Afghan Army. We are short on training
that army, not just in the shortage of trainers I pointed out,
but we also have not done what we need to do in terms of
equipment. So, we authorized, in the last authorization bill,
not just equipment that could go to the Iraqi army, even though
it was not excess equipment. The same thing is true with the
Afghan army.
We talked to one of our trainers over there, when we were
there a few months ago, and he indicated, as a matter of fact,
some of that equipment was beginning to arrive from Iraq-Kuwait
into Afghanistan for the Afghan army, not just for our guys.
In going through the numbers there, General, you indicated
that half a billion dollars of excess equipment, I believe, was
left for the Iraqis. Perhaps it was non-excess. I'm not sure.
But, in any event, we have authorized, not just excess
equipment, but non-excess equipment, understanding we're going
to have to replace that, but also understanding that it's
essential that we get equipment to the Afghan army if we're
serious about turning over responsibility for the security of
Afghanistan to that army.
Do you have any numbers at all on how much either excess or
non-excess equipment has gone from the Iraq theater to the
Afghan army or police?
General Casey. I know we've processed the Afghans'
uparmored Humvees, machine guns, and some ammunition and repair
parts, but I don't have any specific numbers.
Chairman Levin. If you could get us that for the record,
I'd appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of the Army is using multiple means and authorities
to transfer or sell equipment located in the Iraq Theater and other
locations to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Current
efforts to facilitate equipping the ANSF include: Foreign Military
Sales of 1,626 Non-Excess Up Armored HMMWVs (1,317 are for the Afghan
National Police and 309 for the Afghan National Army); excess defense
articles transfer of over 211,000 pieces of organizational clothing and
individual equipment; 1,260 machine guns; approximately 6.5 million
rounds of ammunition; and 2,500 life support items such as tents, light
sets and folding cots. Additionally, the Department is processing a
request for transferring over 5,000 pieces of excess, nonstandard
equipment located in Iraq (commercial nontactical vehicles,
communications, and maintenance-related equipment).

Chairman Levin. Now, on this question of DADT, what you've
indicated, appropriately, is that a moratorium could create
complications for pending legal cases. But, the decision of the
Commander in Chief to end the policy--the only issue being, in
his mind, how and when, and not whether--has also got to create
some complications for existing cases. If you were representing
somebody, in an existing case, who was being discharged or
threatened with discharge, I assume you'd ask for a stay until
there's a resolution of the matter.
So, what I will need from you is your lawyers' assessment
as to whether or not there are complications, currently, with
the decision of the Commander in Chief to end the policy, and
just to have a study as to how it's done, and to compare that
to any complications which might occur from having a suspension
of the discharges, pending a decision on whether to repeal.
Remember, a moratorium or a suspension is not a repeal.
That would mean that, if for some reason it were not repealed
down the road, then the current discharge policy would stay in
place.
So, my request of you is that you get an assessment from
your lawyers to this committee as to whether there are
complications from the decision that's been given by the
Commander in Chief, relative to repeal down the road, and
whether there are complications from a moratorium, which
obviously there could be, as well as from a down-the-road
repeal announcement, and to compare for us whether or not, one
way or the other, there are more or less complications.
That's not a question, other than to ask you whether or not
you will ask your lawyers if they could prepare that assessment
for us.
Secretary McHugh. Absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]

The analysis you requested is currently under review and
consideration as part of the Secretary of Defense's study of the
potential repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) law. The Army is
working closely with Department of Defense officials to assess the
personnel, readiness, legal, and operational issues and impacts
associated with action to suspend, modify or repeal DADT. Upon
completion, it is expected the analysis will include the information
outlined in the chairman's request, which will be shared with the
committee when available. While the Secretary's comprehensive study is
ongoing, the Army is committed to providing the committee with
information on the Army's implementation of current DADT law.

Chairman Levin. We thank you both. We thank the men and
women you lead. We particularly, again, want to acknowledge the
presence of your special guests here today. We thank them for
their service, for your son's service, Mrs. Engeman. We are
grateful for it. It's a grateful Nation that is united behind
our troops and our veterans, no longer facing the kind of
divisions we had in previous engagements, such as Vietnam, but,
regardless of policy differences, totally behind our forces,
our men and women who put on the uniform of this country.
Thank you all.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
adaptability of higher-end combat units to lower-end missions
1. Senator Levin. General Casey, the notion of a full spectrum
force has been a central and enduring organizing, equipping, and
training concept for the Army. Today's range of potential security
threats, and the likelihood that the Army will be called upon to meet
simultaneous conventional and irregular challenges, calls for a much
more adaptable, if still full-spectrum force.
Over the years, the Army has argued that, as a rule, most
capabilities required for higher-end combat operations can be adapted
for application to lower-end missions. The Army's modular brigade
combat teams (BCTs)--whether infantry, heavy, or Stryker--can be task
organized, or if necessary augmented, for lower-end missions such as
stability operations and security force assistance missions, while
remaining capable of full-spectrum operations.
On the other hand, since the start of counterinsurgency operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq several senior Army leaders have acknowledged
that the notion of lesser and included tasks at the lower end of the
spectrum were not in fact easily adapted in units trained and ready for
high-end conflict.
The 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognizes this challenge
and directs specific structural changes in the Army including the
conversion of at one heavy brigade to a medium Stryker brigade, the
potential conversion of heavy to lighter brigades in the future, and
increasing the number of combat aviation brigades to 13.
What are the Army's assumptions and observations today about the
adaptability of higher-end combat units, equipment, and training for
application in lower-end stability or counterinsurgency missions?
General Casey. We continue to rebalance the force to achieve the
right mix of capabilities to meet current demands while preparing for
future challenges. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that
the right mix of BCT-types, properly tailored for the mission, possess
full spectrum utility to protect our own forces as well as the local
population and successfully train and partner with indigenous security
forces. During the QDR we examined how to further institutionalize
lessons learned in current operations as well as next steps to posture
the Army to execute Full Spectrum Operations as part of the Joint Force
in the mid- to far-term. Full Spectrum Operations recognizes the
unpredictability of the environment and hybrid nature of kinetic and
non-kinetic threats. The key to meeting this guidance and maintaining
the balance outlined by the Secretary of Defense is the modularization
and rapid mission tailoring of the BCT through the Army Force General
(ARFORGEN) Cycle. This is the base general purpose force organizational
construct designed to balance the offense, defense, stability, and
civil support operations as part of the Joint Force.
The QDR outlines the importance of providing a highly adaptable,
versatile Security Force Assistance (SFA) capability for all combatant
commanders in the future. The BCT contains a range of experience in
combat arms, combat support and combat service support. This
composition serves as a firm base of trainers and advisors, together
with the integral supporting staff. It has the ability to task-organize
constituent elements to provide teams of the required size and skill
set for each mission, providing simultaneous sustained SFA across
multiple locations using organic command and staff capabilities.
The Army has developed numerous initiatives to improve and
complement the adaptability of BCTs for stability and counter-
insurgency missions. The Army's Institutional or Generating Force can
augment the operating force to conduct SFA. Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) is one example of this capability with 32 schools and
centers at 16 Army installations--all of which can provide ``Train the
trainer'' experts. The Army has developed a new SFA doctrine,
established a permanent SFA training formation and associated planning
teams in Geographic Combatant Commands. It has enhanced SFA-related
education, training and gaming; increased foreign language and cultural
training; and increased study and publication of SFA lessons learned.

2. Senator Levin. General Casey, what risks might additional
emphasis on non-conventional missions, in doctrine and training, pose
for the Army's ability to conduct traditional high-end combat missions?
General Casey. The nature of conflict today requires a flexible
approach for anticipating force requirements. Accordingly, the Army's
greatest emphasis must be on creating a versatile force. We must
prepare soldiers, units and their equipment for future missions, both
conventional and non-conventional, by providing adequate time to train
for full-spectrum operations and to reduce uncertainty and stress for
soldiers and their families. We continue to assess and transform the
force to meet combatant commanders' requirements by revising our
modernization strategy, completing transformation from Cold War legacy
formations to modular formations and improving business processes in
order to apply resources efficiently.
Although we are focused on prevailing in current counterinsurgency
operations, improving the Army's deployment to dwell time ratios will
increase training opportunities across the full-spectrum of operations
necessary to meet future requirements. Rebalancing the force remains an
essential part of mitigating risk from unforeseen contingencies for our
Army. Restoring readiness will enable the Army to prepare for and
accomplish all assigned missions as a member of the Joint Force.
Mitigating these risks will sustain our Army, which is the most
experienced combat force in the world.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
m4 carbine
3. Senator Lieberman. General Casey, I understand that although the
M4 Carbine performed to Army specifications during the battle of Wanat,
you are now reviewing options to improve that weapon's performance
during sustained firefights, namely by requiring a thicker barrel. I am
glad that the Army is making these improvements, and the only concern
that I have is that the process for approving them may take too long.
What steps are you taking to expedite the speed with which these
improvements for the M4 reach our troops in the field?
General Casey. The Army had previously approved the heavier barrel,
as well as a full auto trigger mechanism. These improvements are
already in use by our Special Operations units, who use the M4A1. We
are also incorporating an ambidextrous fire control selector into the
M4 series. The heavy barrel and ambidextrous selector will begin to
reach our conventional forces in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2010. The full auto trigger will be available in the second quarter of
fiscal year 2011. The next series of improvements include an improved
rail system and weapon bolt and carrier. These will be available in the
second and fourth quarter fiscal year 2012, respectively.
The Army is continually testing and upgrading the carbine. For
example, since 1991 more than 8 million rounds have been fired in
product improvement testing. As a result of this testing, over 62
performance enhancing improvements have been incorporated into the
carbine design to include the trigger assembly, extractor spring,
recoil buffer, barrel, chamber and bolt. These improvements have made a
significant difference to the mean time between stoppages (MRBF) for
the weapon. The requirement for the M4 is 600 MRBF, but with these
improvements applied testing has demonstrated the reliability is over
3,600 MRBF.

army force structure
4. Senator Lieberman. Secretary McHugh, the report accompanying the
Senate Armed Services Committee's mark of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included a special interest item
requiring a report providing an analysis comparison, and projected
impacts of limiting the Army's Active component to 45 rather than 48
BCTs through 2012. I note that the deadline for that report is March 1,
2010--can you reconfirm that you will submit this report by that
deadline?
Secretary McHugh. The Army anticipates providing the committee with
an interim report no later than 4 March and a final response by 30
April 2010. We are reviewing the recent troop increase in Afghanistan
and the Iraq drawdown plan to better assess the effects of maintaining
the Army at 45 versus 48 Active BCTs.

land warrior program
5. Senator Lieberman. Secretary McHugh, the Land Warrior system has
received positive reviews from the soldiers who have used it in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and it is my understanding that there are currently
units with operational needs statements that have not received Land
Warrior equipment due to funding constraints and production lead times.
In light of these recent requests for Land Warrior systems, is it fair
to conclude that the Army prematurely terminated this program?
Secretary McHugh. No. The Army learned valuable lessons from the
Land Warrior system but it did not represent the complete capability we
desired. The Ground Soldier System is expected to cost less, weigh
less, and provide greater operational mission duration using more
advanced technologies than were resident in the original Land Warrior
system. Fielding of the Ground Soldier System is expected to begin in
fiscal year 2012.

6. Senator Lieberman. Secretary McHugh, now that Ground Soldier
System is going into production, what lessons have been learned by the
Army from the Land Warrior fielding that would assist them in providing
this capability to dismounted troops in a timely manner?
Secretary McHugh. The Army learned a great deal from the Land
Warrior program, and we are applying these lessons to our Ground
Soldier System in order to get the best capability to our dismounted
soldiers in the most efficient manner possible. For example, the Army
learned that soldier acceptance of the system and its capabilities is
critical to achieving operational success; and effective training at
the individual and collective unit levels plays a vital role in that
acceptance. Soldier and unit leader input has resulted in
recommendations to improve form, fit, and function.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
army test range unfunded requirements
7. Senator Bill Nelson. General Casey, on February 22, the Senate
Armed Services Committee received a copy of a letter you wrote on
February 19 to Representative Buck McKeon, the ranking member of the
House Armed Services Committee, in which you provided a list of what
are called unfunded requirements. On that list were two items that
relate to the Army's test infrastructure: $18 million for Test and
Evaluation Instrumentation, and $23 million for Army Test Range
Infrastructure.
As the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee, I am glad to see the Army indicating that additional
funding for these items would, as you say in your letter, ``provide
added value to commanders in the field.'' This committee has been
concerned for many years about the need to improve our military test
and evaluation infrastructure.
Can you tell me how these additional funds would improve the Army's
ability to conduct test and evaluation of our ever more complex weapon
systems?
General Casey. The additional funds would be used for the
replacement and restoration of critical infrastructure and
instrumentation, such as radars, optics, telemetry and digital systems.
This new equipment/infrastructure will better align our testing with
changing requirements and will allow us to monitor/analyze more complex
technologies during evaluations and experiments. The funds would also
provide for modeling and simulation to address survivability,
reliability, maintainability and the increased complexity of
ballistics, which affects every major Army acquisition program.

national guard and reserve component operational tempos
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have transformed our Guard and Reserve
Forces from Strategic Reserves to an operational force. The increased
demand placed on these servicemembers has naturally led to increased
requirements for more training, equipment, and facilities. What are the
biggest challenges you face with the high operational tempo for the
Guard and Reserve Forces?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Even as the men and women of
the Army National Guard (ARNG) continue to demonstrate their dedication
to the Nation, the reality is that there are significant challenges for
Guard and Reserve Forces. While we continue with the transformation of
the ARNG into an Operational Force, the Army is using the ARFORGEN
model to try to make deployments predictable and to provide stability
for soldiers, families, and their employers. The ARNG also has Homeland
Defense and Civil Support missions, which place additional demands and
requirements on the soldiers and their equipment.
The men and women of the ARNG can meet the demands of the
operational tempo, provided that they are properly prepared physically
and have the resources available to complete their Federal and State
missions. The citizen-soldier must have access to proper medical and
dental care, before, during, and after mobilization because when
soldiers are not available for medical reasons, it has a ripple effect
as soldiers are pulled from other units to plug holes. Providing care
also promotes stability for families by reducing the financial and
personal impacts of serving as a member of the ARNG.
Equipment has also been strained by the operational tempo over the
past 8 years. The dual-use equipment within the ARNG is vital to both
the Federal and State missions. As conditions have changed outside the
borders of the United States, so too have conditions within the
borders. These changing requirements must be constantly evaluated to
ensure that the ARNG is equipped to meet the challenges of today and
tomorrow with equipment that is available, well-maintained, and
relevant.
The ARNG also faces a difficult challenge with regard to individual
soldier training. Soldiers awaiting training occupy a position within a
unit in the ARNG, even though they are nondeployable. This impacts
overall readiness and forces the ARNG to cross-level soldiers from
other units. As with the medically nondeployable, this has a ripple
effect over time that creates stress on soldiers, families, and
employers.

9. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
risk does your budget take with equipping and training the Guard and
Reserves?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The ARNG and Army Reserve are
being equipped based on a deliberate investment plan which is
commensurate with their mission and commitments. Over the last 4 years,
the ARNG and Army Reserve have been equipped and modernized at a pace
exceeding that of the Active component. Shortages do remain, but
working with the Reserve components we are ensuring they have the
necessary equipment to execute their State and Federal commitments.
From the Individual Training perspective, the ARNG accepts risk in
certain functional training courses in order to maintain the necessary
Duty Military Occupational Skills Qualification rate for deploying
units. This ensures that soldiers are qualified to perform their
primary duties when deployed. Functional courses teach soldiers
secondary skills such as advanced gunnery and maintenance courses, and
airborne or air assault training. The Army Reserve has adapted a
similar program. Soldiers from the ARNG and the Army Reserve also go
through Mobilization Training prior to deploying.

10. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, please
describe the Grow the Force initiatives that will increase the Army
Reserve Forces in Florida and other States.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Pursuant to the Grow the Army
Initiative, the Army Reserve was granted an increase in Force Structure
Allowance from 205,000 to 206,000. Additionally, the Army Reserve
restructured 16,000 unstructured Trainees, Transients, Holdees and
Students spaces into structured forces to help meet the Army's
increased operational requirements. Due to resourcing constraints, the
Army Reserve has programmed the activation of these new units over a 5
year period (fiscal year 2009-fiscal year 2014) with the majority of
actions occurring in fiscal year 2010-2011. In some cases, previously
scheduled inactivating units are retained in the force, resulting in no
local community disruption. Given that programming the force is a
continuous process, the original Grow the Army list has changed. Today,
there are 144 Army Reserve units programmed in 32 States and Puerto
Rico. Florida has 11 units in 6 communities in the Grow the Army
program. The ARNG has no ``Grow-the-Force Initiatives'' that will
increase forces.

11. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
additional military construction (MILCON) funding is needed to
rehabilitate and construct Reserve centers and National Guard
facilities for training and duty?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The funds requested in
President's fiscal year 2011 budget will be used complete the USAR's
Grow the Army efforts in order to provide new facilities for additional
soldiers. ``Military Construction Army Reserve'' funding, however, is
not sufficient to address all of the USAR's requirements, which include
modernizing our legacy facilities and upgrading our facilities to meet
current mission standards and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)
set back requirements. The Army Reserve would need $180 million in
additional MILCON funding to rehabilitate and construct these Reserve
centers for training and duty. These specific construction projects are
as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installation Location Project Title Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fort Collins................. CO Army Reserve $11,200
Center.
Homewood..................... IL Army Reserve 12,800
Center.
Rockford..................... IL Army Reserve 10,800
Center/Land.
Fort Benjamin Harrison....... IN Army Reserve 50,000
Center.
Kansas City.................. KS Army Reserve 16,000
Center/Land.
St. Joseph................... MN Army Reserve 9,000
Center.
St. Charles.................. MO Army Reserve 26,000
Center.
Greensboro................... NC Army Reserve 16,500
Center/Land.
Schenectady.................. NY Army Reserve 16,000
Center.
Orangeburg................... SC Army Reserve 11,400
Center/Land.
-----------
Total $179,700
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The ARNG requires $1.5 billion a year for 20 years to revitalize
its facilities.

mobilization for training for reserve component soldiers
12. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
Army recently withdrew the mobilization for training option for Reserve
component soldiers. This concept relieved pressure on the State
National Guard training budgets, and it lengthened the dwell time for
soldiers in some cases. What prompted this change in policy, your
assessment of the change, and whether or not it is something that
should be revisited?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Mobilization for Training is a
cumbersome system that was not being effectively used by the state
Adjutants General. In most cases, the Mobilization for Training program
was used to ensure that soldiers received their requisite military
education. With the current ARFORGEN cycle, however, soldiers are being
afforded time to get needed training. Funding the Army School Systems
budget will help to ensure that the Mobilization for Training program
is no longer necessary.

7th special forces group
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
Army's 7th Special Forces Group is in the process of moving from Fort
Bragg, NC, to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, to increase joint training
opportunities between the Army and Air Force Special Forces. What is
the status of the move?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The move of the 7th Special
Forces Group (SFG) to Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) in accordance with
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is proceeding as planned.
Construction is on or ahead of schedule and is to be completed no later
than 1 August 2011. The unit move is slated for August and September
2011. The 7th SFG has advanced party elements in place at Eglin AFB to
coordinate and facilitate the logistics, and the operations associated
with the arrival of the 7th SFG.

14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is the
move on time?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The BRAC move of the 7th SFG is
currently on schedule, and is to be completed by 15 September 2011.

15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
issues remain?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. There are no BRAC related
issues at this time.
______

Questions Submitted b. Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
guard and reserve military construction
16. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, your
budget requests include significant funding increases to replace aging
facilities for the National Guard and the Reserves. This investment is
critical considering the Guard and Reserve personnel comprise some 51
percent of your end-strength. However, your request for Guard and
Reserve MILCON is $1.2 billion, which is less than 1 percent of your
total base budget and only a fifth of your total MILCON request. Some
of Nebraska's Guard units are lacking adequate space to store reset and
new equipment. For example, Nebraska units lack 33 acres for improved
and unimproved parking to store new trucks, tractors, and trailers, as
well as 8,000 square feet of heated storage and 3,500 square feet of
security vault storage. What is the current state of our Guard and
Reserve infrastructure, both nationally and within Nebraska?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Army Reserve Nationally: The
average age of Army Reserve facilities is over 42 years old. The
majority of facilities are under-sized for today's mission
requirements, encroached upon by local community activities and not
compliant with Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) standards. BRAC
Act funding helped to provide over 120 new AFRCs that meet today's
operational and training needs, as well as to modernize 11 percent of
the Army Reserve Center facility inventory.
Army Reserve Nebraska: The Army Reserve will construct and
modernize 7 of 13 facilities within the next 7 years. The remaining 6
facilities are inadequate and are not AT/FP compliant. The facility in
Fremont will be rehabilitated in fiscal year 2015 and the remaining
five facilities are not currently programmed.
ARNG Nationally: The Army is proposing in the fiscal year 2011
budget submission Army National Guard MILCON funding of $874 million,
more than in any previous budget submission. In the fiscal year 2011
budget, the ARNG has 20 projects where it is proposing to either build
new or revitalize existing Readiness Centers to address space or
condition shortfalls or to support new missions.
The ARNG infrastructure has about 80 percent of the required square
footage, and the average facility requires about 20 percent of its
original value in repairs. Critical shortfalls include Readiness
Centers, Training Facilities, and Maintenance Facilities. Replacing
aging and inadequate facilities with modern facilities that allow
efficient training to support the ARFORGEN cycle is a high priority for
the Army and the National Guard.
ARNG Nebraska: Nebraska's ARNG infrastructure also has about 80
percent of required building square footage, and the average facility
requires about 20 percent of its original value in repairs. There are
two MILCON Projects proposed for Nebraska in the fiscal year 2011
budget: a Readiness Center in Mead and a Readiness Center addition or
alteration in Lincoln.

17. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, you
noted that there is a concern that the investment in infrastructure
isn't enough and that equipment may not be properly stored and
maintained. I am concerned that this will undermine the readiness. What
is being done to address what are known facility gaps?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The ARNG is pursuing a number
of options to address well-known facility gaps related to equipment
storage and maintenance. Storage issues alone total about $2.2 billion.
This number reflects the upfront costs related to the requirements of
an Operational Force. Projects include constructing secured parking
areas and storage buildings, acquiring land and modifying facilities
(especially arms vaults to meet code requirements and increase
capacity). Most states have taken a hard look at this shortfall and
have plans to execute the funds quickly to resolve increasing storage
requirements. Short-term solutions include installing portable vaults
and erecting unheated storage buildings, which will allow rapid
installation and construction. Many states have looked at longer-term
solutions, such as acquiring additional land. Nearly all states have
itemized their shortfalls and stand ready to remedy these and other
well-known facility gaps.

18. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, barring constraints from
other mission areas, what level of funding do you need to address all
your MILCON requirements?
General Casey. Competing requirements from other mission areas will
always be a constraint. MILCON funding is currently not sufficient to
address all of the Army's MILCON requirements. The Army has prioritized
its existing resources to support the Army Modular Force, Grow the
Army, completing BRAC, completing Global Defense Posture Realignment,
and completing the barracks modernization. Long term solutions for all
of the remaining requirements (such as recapitalizing existing
facilities for existing missions) necessitates a long-term funding
strategy beyond the fiscal year 2012-2017 POM. Obsolete legacy
facilities adversely affect readiness, organizations, missions and
installations across the Army. The level of funding that the ARNG
requires for the facility revitalization is $1.5 billion a year for 20
years. At this level of funding the ARNG will meet its readiness
requirements.

ballistic missile defense
19. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, in your letter of February
19 to the House Armed Services Committee, you indicated that one of the
so-called unfunded requirements of the Army is the Patriot missile
defense system. Your letter indicated that an additional $134 million
of funding for Patriot would be valuable to our combatant commanders.
The Patriot system is our only combat-proven missile defense system,
and is a critical element of our ability to defend our forward deployed
forces and allies against existing short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. Can you tell me how these additional funds would be used to
improve the Army's Patriot capability?
General Casey. The Patriot Advanced Capability-Phase 3 (PAC-3)
missile is a hit to kill surface-to-air interceptor. It provides the
most robust protection for troops and critical infrastructure against
Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Air Breathing threats. Funds are
necessary to repair and recertify PAC-3 missiles and return them to the
operational force. The Enhanced Launcher Electronic System (ELES) is
the upgrade kit applied to aging PAC-2 launching stations, to upgrade
them to fire the PAC-3 missile. The proposed funding would procure 24
additional ELES upgrade kits in fiscal year 2011, upgrading 24
additional PAC-2 launchers to the PAC-3 capability.

20. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, do you believe additional
Patriot capabilities would help meet the requirements of our combatant
commanders to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
from countries like North Korea and Iran?
General Casey. Given the rapid proliferation of short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles, it is critical that we continue to modernize
and grow our regional ballistic missile defense capabilities. We are
already increasing our Patriot capacity by growing our PAC-3 battalions
from 13 to 15 over the next 2 years. Within the broader ballistic
missile defense strategy, as articulated in the January 2010 Ballistic
Missile Review Report, 15 Patriot battalions is sufficient capacity to
address those threats that the Patriot can defend against. Our
modernization strategy will also focus on complementary ballistic
missile defense capabilities, including the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense system currently being fielded, the AN/TYP-2 radar, and
overarching command and control battle management architecture.
Additionally, it is important that we continue to procure PAC-3
missiles and Patriot launcher upgrades to enhance the capability of our
Patriot Battalions.

human capital
21. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, from a human capital
perspective, one of the biggest challenges facing the Services will be
managing expanding and new missions while maintaining a fixed end-
strength. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
mission is an area that is seeing a great deal of growth across all of
the Services due in large part to the significant expansion of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted aircraft. What is the
current state of your training pipeline for operators and analysts, and
how are you expanding it to meet demand?
General Casey. The Army approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
training is a systematic, module-based training program, which produces
highly trained, professional and Federal Aviation Administration tested
Enlisted UAS operators. We have Common Soldier UAS Operator training
for Shadow, Hunter, Warrior-Alpha, and the Extended Range/Multi-purpose
(ERMP) UAS.
Through 2004, we trained less than 1,000 operators and maintainers
per year on a single shift, Monday through Friday. In 2005, we expanded
to two shifts to meet the increasing demand. In 2008 and 2009, we hired
and trained 253 additional instructors and support personnel, and
currently train in three shifts at multiple locations to accommodate
the 2,000+ operators and maintainers programmed for 2010. Current
training throughput requires Libby Army Airfield (LAAF) operations 6
days per week, 16 hours per day. The Army is in the process of
validating the requirement to increase airfield operations at LAAF to 6
days per week, 24 hours per day in order to meet the future UAS
training requirements.
To meet growing requirements for analysts, the Army's Intelligence
Center of Excellence has doubled the annual number of Imagery Analysts
graduates over the past 5 years. Since 2005, over 1,500 Imagery
Analysts have been trained at Fort Huachuca. This has resulted in a
current on hand strength of 110 percent for Active Army Imagery
Analysts (MOS 35G) throughout the force.
Full Motion Video (FMV) training is an integral part of the 105-day
Imagery Analyst course where students are exposed to current tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs) used in overseas contingency
operations (OCOs). Students utilize the Distributed Common Ground
System--Army approved software for exploitation of all Full Motion
Video (FMV). Soldiers in training also receive further scenario-based
FMV training as they conduct convoy live-fire exercises with a UAS
flying in support of the mission. Additional exposure to FMV
exploitation in support of intelligence, surveillance and exploitation
comes during a 10-day capstone exercise during which students plan,
execute and exploit simulated UAS missions in support of BCT
requirements/operations.

22. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, what kind of retention rates
are you seeing in UAV pilot and sensor operators and intelligence
analyst specialties?
General Casey. The Army is retaining nearly 100 percent of its
warrant officer Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 150U, (Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Operations Technicians), who have
trained and deployed in this specialty over the past 5 years.
Although the Army transferred this specialty from Military
Intelligence to the Aviation in September 2008, it was originally
established under MOS 350U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations
Technician. Since its transfer, the MOS has been restructured to be
managed with the Army's other Aviation skills. It is currently in the
fourth year of a 5-year growth and integration plan within the Aviation
Branch and is at 89 percent of assigned strength.
This specialty's unusually high retention rate is to be expected
during its initial development. Personnel are selected for their
longevity and interest, and, therefore, are very likely to continue
service. As the specialty matures beyond the initial growth phase,
however, the Army expects to see an increase in losses that more
closely resemble other Aviation Warrant Officer specialties. Regarding
enlisted personnel, the 15W Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operators specialty
is retaining just under 95 percent of first-term inventory
(approximately 500 soldiers), as compared to the average first-term
retention across all enlisted specialties of just over 87 percent.

unmanned aircraft
23. Senator Ben Nelson. General Casey, with regard to mission
effectiveness, how are you coordinating efforts with the Air Force to
integrate your growing fleet of drones with their unmanned and manned
aircraft into concept of operations that will ensure safe and effective
mission execution?
General Casey. Each of the Services have missions that require
specific capabilities, which are often unique to that Service. For
example, the Navy has a requirement to support maritime operations
using shipborne systems. The need to share information across all
Services, however, is not unique. To that end, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has stressed interoperability between the Services as the
cornerstone of all manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance system acquisitions and employments.
Today, for example, a ground maneuver commander can expect full
motion video transmitted from any manned or unmanned aircraft overhead
will be received and displayed by another Service's remote video
receiver. This has been made possible through the Services working
closely together to develop interoperable data link protocols for
control, video and encryption. To ensure safe and effective mission
execution, we use joint processes, which apply to both manned and
unmanned systems, to ``de-conflict'' airspace and layer assets to
provide the best mission profiles.

24. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary McHugh, what process does DOD
have to produce a comprehensive plan to integrate policy and
requirements across the Services for unmanned aircraft programs?
Secretary McHugh. In 2007, due to the diversity of the Services'
unmanned aircraft programs, DOD created the UASs Task Force to
coordinate policies and acquisitions across DOD. Although the Services
retain their individual Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, this
organization, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, is the central clearinghouse for
interoperability protocols, national airspace access initiatives and
the development of common procurements where applicable. An example of
this close cooperation between the Services can be seen in real time
transmission of Full Motion Video (FMV).
By adhering to a set of uniform standards for interoperability, the
Army One System Remote Video Terminal, and similar systems in other
Services, receive real time FMV from all transmitting manned and
unmanned aircraft overhead. This interoperability enables joint support
of combat operations regardless of the Services involved. Additionally,
policy is being developed and published by the Joint Staff, which will
guide standards of training for UAS operators across the Services.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
transfer of ownership of fort monroe, va
25. Senator Webb. Secretary McHugh, it has come to my attention
that three critical health and safety projects at Fort Monroe, VA,
remain unfunded, in spite of the Army's plan to transfer ownership of
that installation's property to the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2011. I
realize BRAC law does not provide for new MILCON, however,
infrastructure remediation, modernization, and maintenance that will
affect the health and safety of the installation's current staff and
personnel or its future owner should be completed prior to the transfer
of this property. These critical projects are:

1. $10.1 million to upgrade the water supply system to provide
adequate supply for the fire-suppression system;
2. $15.0 million to bring sanitary sewer infrastructure up to
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality standards; and
3. $20 million to complete flood-protection projects.

What are the Army's plans to address these health and safety
requirements before Fort Monroe is transferred to Virginia at the end
of fiscal year 2011?
Secretary McHugh. The current conditions of these systems meets
current Federal health and safety standards and are operating properly
to ensure the safety of our soldiers, our civilians and their families.
We have invested funds to ensure that the fire suppression system meets
all operational requirements with no shortfalls in safety standards.
The sanitary sewer infrastructure meets Federal safety standards, and
in 2003 the Army initiated and completed a $26 million flood control
construction project.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
recapitalization of high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
26. Senator Hagan. General Casey, I understand the Army is in the
process of recapitalizing its Humvees to increase survivability and
mobility. What is the status of the Army's Humvee recapitalization
program?
General Casey. The Army is developing a program to continue the
recapitalization of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMWWVs) currently underway at Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots.
We have requested $983 million in fiscal year 2011 for this effort, and
may request permission to reprogram some amount of fiscal year 2010
funding to support this program.

27. Senator Hagan. General Casey, what are the requirements?
General Casey. The Army will recapitalize approximately 8,390
legacy High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to reduce
the fleet age as HMMWVs will remain in the Army's fleet through at
least 2025. We will also have the requirement to recapitalize over
7,000 Up Armored HMMWVs returning from theater as we responsibility
draw down from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

joint light tactical vehicle cost
28. Senator Hagan. General Casey, I understand it is difficult to
generate an accurate cost estimate of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
(JLTV) program because it is still in development. However, defense
analysts suggest the JLTV program may cost as much as $30 to $70
billion, depending upon the final unit cost of the vehicle and the
number procured. What is the Army's JLTV procurement requirement, and
what is the current estimated per vehicle cost?
General Casey. The current Army JLTV procurement requirement is
54,883 vehicles. However, the Army is in the process of developing and
refining our tactical wheeled vehicle strategy; therefore, a final
planned JLTV quantity has not been determined. The Army is creating a
flexible vehicle strategy emphasizing a mixed fleet approach that spans
performance, protection and payload. Planning figures are subject to
change as the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles strategy evolves, the
availability of base funding changes, and service requirements develop.
The average base vehicle cost is between $370,000-$400,000, including
general and administrative fees and profit. This base vehicle cost
includes hull/structure, suspension, power pack/drive train, auxiliary
automotive, ring mount, Gunners Protection Kit and Government Furnished
Equipment A-Kit (all in-dash wiring and items integral to the vehicle).

29. Senator Hagan. General Casey, will the Army have to reduce
total JLTV acquisition quantities or scale back JLTV capabilities in
order to deal with rising costs?
General Casey. The Army is actively pursuing this vehicle. Although
the final planned quantity has not been determined, the current
procurement requirement remains 54,883 vehicles. The program is in the
Technology Development (TD) Phase. The requirements and cost data
developed during the TD phase are being evaluated to provide an
affordable system that is balanced between payload, performance and
protection. Based on current estimates of quantity, schedule, and
technical capability, there has been no cost growth and no reduction in
acquisition quantities.

next generation ground vehicle
30. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Secretary
Gates emphasized the importance of having the Army adequately develop a
next generation ground vehicle capability that takes into account and
adapts to the lessons learned in theater. Can you discuss the status of
the Army's assessment with the Marine Corps on joint capability gaps
for ground vehicles?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Future Combat Systems
Acquisition Decision Memorandum, dated 23 June 2009, directed the Army,
in conjunction with the Marine Corps, to ``initiate actions to assess
joint capability gaps for manned ground vehicles.'' The Army
Capabilities Integration Center and the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command implemented a consolidated assessment process from June to
August 2009. Much like the Army's and Marine Corps' earlier assessments
for the JLTV, this review included comprehensive lessons learned,
current operational data for specific types of platforms and seminar
wargames with both Generating Force and Operating Force members.
In August 2009, the Army-Marine Corps Board approved the joint
capability gap assessment for manned ground vehicles, which addresses
protection, network, mobility and lethality shortfalls. This was
included in the Army's submission to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) as part of the approval process for the Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV) Initial Capabilities Document in November 2009. The next
formal step in the requirements process is submission of a Capabilities
Development Document to the JROC.

31. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, can you also
discuss how the assessment is providing new requirements for Army GCV
modernization?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The joint capability gaps
assessment for manned ground vehicles provided key insights into
prioritizing modernization efforts for all combat vehicles. We apply
these lessons learned in our analysis of vehicle upgrades, divestments
and new procurements. For example, the capability gaps in protection
underpin our efforts to improve Stryker protection.
The assessment also weighed heavily in drafting the operational
requirements for the GCV (e.g., new kinds of weapon systems and/or
equipment needed by the warfighter in current operations). For example,
the capability gaps identified regarding protected mobility and non-
lethal assets for manned ground vehicles led to specific operational
requirements in the draft GCV Capabilities Development Document.

32. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what effect
will the vehicle modernization program have on the Army's force
structure, operational capabilities, procurement, and budget
requirements?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army's combat vehicle
modernization is a combination of the new GCV program with divestiture
and recapitalization (RECAP) of other existing combat vehicles, to
include rebuilds and upgrades. RECAP will continue for the Abrams,
Paladin, and Stryker and RESET will continue for Bradley as interim
solutions until GCV is available. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicle variants will also provide protected mobility.
The GCV effort is part of a holistic Army plan to modernize its
combat vehicle fleet within the existing force structure. The GCV
platform will be highly survivable, mobile and versatile. The GCV is
the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate
in an improvised explosive device (IED) environment. It is envisioned
to have greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley,
greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP, and the cross country
mobility of an Abrams tank.
Our intent for the first installment of GCV procurement is conduct
a one for one replacement of Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicles in
Heavy BCTs with the first brigade being equipped in fiscal year 2019.
In conjunction with developing our program for fiscal year 2012-2017,
we will develop a balanced modernization effort across our platforms
based on capability needs and the resources available.

alternative fuel and power
33. Senator Hagan. Secretary McHugh and General Casey,
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain poses significant logistical
challenges, which drives up the cost of our operations in theater. I
believe we need to engage in significant research and development
initiatives involving alternative fuel and power sources, as well as
fuel efficient engines for the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles. What
are the Army Research Office and Program Executive Office doing to
increase the fuel efficiency of tactical wheeled vehicles?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Fuel efficiency is a Key System
Attribute (KSA) in the JLTV Capability Development Document. The JLTV
effort is the future of the light tactical vehicle fleet. The fuel
efficiency KSA states that the JLTV shall achieve 60 (Threshold) 65
(Objective) ton-miles per gallon as measured at gross vehicle weight
(including armor) using Test Operating Procedure 2.2.603 over the
Munson Standard Fuel Course. The Tank and Automotive Research,
Development and Engineering Center's analysis of the three technology
development contractor vehicles states that the JLTV is currently at 76
ton-miles per gallon. Clearly, this highlights the Army's commitment to
incorporating more fuel efficient vehicles into our Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle fleet.
The Army is also pursuing research and development initiatives in a
number of technological areas, which enable increased fuel efficiency
in the ground tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. Ongoing efforts include
development of the following: light-weight structural materials (armors
and composites, which can reduce the overall vehicle weight resulting
in more fuel efficient vehicles) and technologies to enable high
efficiency energy storage, efficient motors, exportable power and
thermal/power management for application on a hybrid electric vehicle.
In addition, the Army is evaluating a number of currently fielded
engines for their ability to perform in an operational environment
using alternative fuels. Although these fuels alone are not expected to
increase the vehicles' fuel efficiency, their widespread use could
reduce the Army's overall dependence on petroleum.
Finally, the Army Research Office is investing in promising
research in a number of fundamental technological areas, such as the
conversion of cellulosic materials into hydrocarbons, understanding the
chemical kinetics of hydrocarbon combustion, spray and combustion
diagnostics and new hydrocarbon spray methodologies. These basic
research investments have the potential to further enable the use of
alternative fuels and ultimately improve gas mileage.

army irregular warfare center
34. Senator Hagan. General Casey, I am pleased the Army is looking
into establishing an Irregular Warfare Center in order to streamline
irregular warfare doctrinal development. Has the Army made a decision
on the location of the Irregular Warfare Center?
General Casey. I have tasked TRADOC to assess and then recommend to
me whether we should establish an Irregular Warfare Center. Our
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth currently has proponency for
all warfighting doctrine across the full spectrum of conflict including
operations against traditional threats, counterinsurgency, and
stability operations. In the execution of this responsibility, they
will closely coordinate with the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort
Bragg, NC. I expect TRADOC's recommendation within the next 90 days.

35. Senator Hagan. General Casey, what is the TRADOC's position?
General Casey. The U.S. Army TRADOC and the Headquarters,
Department of the Army are examining the benefits of creating a center
for Irregular Warfare (IW). If created, the IW center would leverage
expertise, experience and core capabilities, from sources both internal
and external to the Army, as well as harness the intellectual capital
of the growing IW community. The center would focus on collecting
lessons learned, identifying best practices and informing concept
development. This would more effectively enable the integration of
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities across TRADOC and the Army.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
supplemental request
36. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, there is a
$20 billion supplemental request for fiscal year 2010 in addition to a
$102.2 billion OCOs request for 2011. If the supplemental is being
replaced by the OCO request, then why is there such a big disparity?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The $20 billion supplemental is
a requested increase to the $78 billion provided by the fiscal year
2010 OCO, which was enacted in December 2009. This is additional
funding required this fiscal year to support the increasing force
levels in Afghanistan. The fiscal year 2011 OCO request of $102 billion
is to provide fiscal year 2011 funding for all operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.

balancing the force
37. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, it is my
understanding that in a speech to the Association of the U.S. Army and
other forums last fiscal year, that you expected the Army will achieve
operational balance in the force by 2011. Do you still believe that the
Army will reach that goal, specifically, with achieving the dwell time
ratios?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Although the recent troop
increase in Afghanistan delays the Army's long-term goal of a 1:3/1:5
ratio of time deployed versus time spent at home station (i.e.,
``BOG:Dwell''), the Army's current growth continues to mitigate this
new Operation Enduring Freedom force demand.
Because of the growth of the Army over the past 5 years (more than
70,000 troops since 2004; 40,000 of them in the last 2 years) and the
drawdown in Iraq, the Army can execute this increase without going to
15-month deployments, without going to less than 12 months at home
between deployments and without continued implementation of stop loss.
Assuming the drawdown in Iraq continues on schedule, the Army will
achieve our BOG:Dwell goals. The Army estimates that approximately 70
percent of the Active component and 80 percent of the Reserve component
will achieve BOG:Dwell goals of 1:2 Active component and 1:4 Reserve
component by 2011. The remainder of the force will continue to see an
increase in its dwell rate and will meet these goals by 2012.

38. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, will you
meet the Grow the Army objectives that are part of achieving
operational balance?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army will meet the Grow the
Army objectives of building or converting 301 brigades across all
components by the end of fiscal year 2014. The support from your
committee continues to ensure the Army will be capable of achieving
operational balance and conducting full spectrum operations.

force protection
39. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, you
testified in the past that force protection is a major imperative with
current and future OCO. Why did you not request mine-resistant ambush
protected (MRAP) vehicles and other force protection vehicles as part
of your 2011 budget, OCO, or fiscal year 2010 supplemental requests?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. To date, the MRAP initiative
remains a joint program and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) submits requests for programmatic funding. All funding received
is managed and controlled by OSD and the Joint Program Office--MRAP.
In fiscal year 2010, OCO funds were requested to procure MRAP-All
Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) for the Army and other Services. There is no
MRAP procurement anticipated in fiscal year 2011, because the Army's
known needs will have been met.
The M-ATVs were requested for the Army as part of overall OSD
fiscal year 2010 OCO budget submission. Additionally, OSD recently
directed the procurement of an additional 1,300 MRAPs and 1,460 M-ATVs
for the Army in fiscal year 2010.
OSD anticipates that the MRAP initiative/program will transition to
individual Service management in fiscal year 2012. At that time, the
Army will assume budgetary control for our fleet of MRAP vehicles. The
Army is committed to incorporating the MRAP Family of Vehicles into the
future force structure.

40. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how does
your UAV budget request compare with the other Services' requests?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army's UAV budget request
is comparable to that of the other services. The total DOD budget
request for procurement and development of UAVs was approximately $5.1
billion. Of that amount, the Army requested $1.45 billion to procure,
retrofit and develop the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose UAS, to retrofit
the RQ-7B Shadow with Tactical Common Data Link, longer wings and laser
designators and to procure new the RQ-11B Raven Small UAS and retrofit
it with digital data link kits. For their UAV programs, the Air Force
requested $1.1 billion; the Navy and Marine Corps requested $.7
billion; and the Special Operations Command requested $1.8 billion.

41. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is separate
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement
necessary?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Separate RDT&E and procurement
budget lines are necessary, because each Service has different
requirements for its Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The Army UASs are
tactical platforms under the direct control of the Combatant Commander
used to provide immediate, responsive, real-time Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and, if deemed appropriate, attack
support to influence the current fight. The Air Force uses its UASs to
provide Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance information for
analysis at a strategic level in order to influence future battles.
Finally, the Navy has its own unique requirements, such as overwater
operations, and therefore, designs its UASs to operate in a salt water
environment. Although each Service may manage and develop UASs to meet
its individual requirements, where appropriate, the Army leverages the
technologies being developed by the other Services.

army national guard and reserves
42. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, I applaud
the level of integration of the ARNG and the Army Reserves into the
total Army. The Army has carried the lion's share of the OCO missions
and should be commended. How would you characterize the success of
their integration and support to the world-wide missions of the Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. During the last 8 years of war,
our Reserve component (RC), the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S.
Army Reserve (USAR), has consistently demonstrated its readiness and
ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. The
challenges facing the United States today and in the future require the
employment of the RC as part of a global operational force. To that
end, we have institutionalized the transformation of the RC from a Cold
War Era strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve.
The Army's procurement strategy for the ARNG/USAR is focused on
modernization on par with the Active component (AC) and in accordance
with the ARFORGEN model. Over the last 5 years (fiscal years 2006-2010)
the Army has invested a total of $28.4 billion in ARNG equipping.
Additionally, over the same 5 years, Congress appropriated an
additional $4.4 billion for the ARNG in the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Appropriation. Much of the equipment from the fiscal year
2008 and fiscal year 2009 procurements are now emerging from production
and are being fielded. This filled shortages and modernized equipment
on hand (EOH)--giving units increased capability, (although readiness
calculations may not appear to show significant improvement due to a
concurrent growth in requirements).
The overall EOH summary by Components at the end of March 2009 was:
AC 80 percent; ARNG 77 percent; USAR 80 percent. The Army has
programmed approximately $102.4 billion over the next 5 years to
address shortfalls and modernize equipment. Based on current
operational requirements, the Army anticipates bringing the AC to 86
percent, the ARNG to 83 percent, and the USAR to 81 percent EOH by
2017. Transforming RC to an Operational Reserve will require the Army
to develop new policies and make targeted investments in support of
desired outcomes: efficient delivery of medically ready and trained
soldiers to RC units; incentives programs to sustain family and
employer support for the Guard and Reserve; policies for utilization
and integration of the total force; and investments in RC unit
management programs and collective training.

43. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you see
a need to ask for more funding to cover the costs of full-time manning
for the National Guard and the Army Reserves?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. No. Our Reserve components are
able to leverage OCOs funding to mitigate war-related demands for
additional manning.

44. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, it appears
that the majority of the ARNG's portion of the budget request is in the
OCO and supplemental. Will the baseline request adjust when these two
budgets are no longer needed?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Yes. The baseline will be
adjusted when the OCOs and supplemental budgets are not longer needed.

recruiting
45. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the fiscal
year 2011 baseline $43.9 billion Operation and Maintenance request
funds the recruiting and training the All-Volunteer Force program. Is
there a study examining the possibility of having one recruiting
command that serves the needs of the total force vice having three
separate agencies?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army combined the Army
Reserve and Regular Army recruiting programs in the 1990s, but has not
taken action to add ARNG recruiting. This is primarily due to the
authority that the 54 States and territories exercise in determining
whether an individual will be enlisted in the Guard. There are no
formal studies examining the possibility of having one recruiting
command that serves the needs of the total force--Regular Army, Army
Reserve, and ARNG.

post-deployment and mobilization respite allowance
46. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army
issued an information paper on February 17, 2010 titled, ``Post
Deployment & Mobilization Respite Allowance.'' It is my understanding
that there are over an estimated 20,000 National Guard and Reserve
soldiers who exceeded their original deployment schedule that are
eligible to receive post deployment and mobilization respite allowance.
It is my understanding this process has taken over 3 years, and to
date, many have not been paid. Can you explain to me how this situation
occurred and what is the timeline to expeditiously resolve this very
unfortunate issue?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 604 (Public Law 111-
84), authorized the Service Secretaries to retroactively compensate
former servicemembers for Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence
(PDMRA) days earned from January 19, 2007, through the date the
Military Department implemented the PDMRA program. Under the statutory
authority, however, the Service Secretaries may provide such benefits
only in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense. The DOD implementation policy was approved on February 1,
2010, and the Army began payments on March 1, 2010. We will continue to
process and pay these claims until all eligible individuals are
appropriately compensated.

diversity
47. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army
has worked hard to advocate a robust diversity program that provides
opportunities for minorities and women to reach the highest ranks.
After reviewing your equal opportunity Army strength data, I see that
the overall number of minorities and women in the ARNG are very scarce
given that the Army National Guard makes up approximately 35 percent of
the total force. Is there not enough qualified minorities and females
officers available in the Army National Guard?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. At the national level, four of
the nine senior positions in the Army National Guard are occupied or
filled by a female or a minority officer. The percentage of female
officers in the Army National Guard has continued to increase over
time. In 1992, 7.8 percent of the Army National Guard officer corps was
made up of females compared to 12.2 percent at the end of fiscal year
2009.
Regarding African Americans, as of fiscal year 2009, 10.2 percent
of officers in the Active Army were African American, while in the ARNG
it was 7.9 percent. Although the disparity between the two is not that
great, there is obvious room for improvement. The ARNG has programs to
encourage African Americans, as well as other minorities to join the
Army. These programs apply to officer and enlisted personnel and are
integral to supporting the overall recruiting mission of the U.S. Army
Accessions Command.

48. Senator Burris. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is there a
plan to address this disparity?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Although the overall disparity
is not that great, whatever differences there are may stem from the
fact that each state looks at its program individually, as does the
ARNG. Diversity programs vary from State to State based on their
individual requirements and demographics. The ARNG is considering one
standardized framework for continuity and measurement purposes.
Although one blanket set of standards may not work for all states,
recruiting goals and objectives could be tailored to address these
areas.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
army to revise requirements generation process
49. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Lieutenant
General Reno (retired) recently completed an internal study of the
Army's requirement's generation process, which has not been shared with
Congress. We understand General Reno's report emphasizes the need to
make Army requirements realistically reflect resource constraints. This
would prevent the creation of future requirements which are neither
technologically nor financially obtainable. Do you agree with General
Reno's recommendation? Please explain how you plan to make the Army
requirements process better informed by resource constraints.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. In June 2009, Lieutenant
General (R) William Reno completed the Reforming the Requirements and
Resourcing Processes in Support of Army Institutional Adaptation study
known as The Reno Study. The purpose was to recommend methods by which
the requirements system could be reformed and better aligned with the
resourcing systems of the Army. The Army intends to deliver The Reno
Study to the committee in early March.
I wholeheartedly support LTG Reno's recommendations to improve our
requirements determination processes. We must continuously improve our
acquisition model to ensure the Army identifies capabilities that
provide the best operational capability at the best cost. The Reno
Study provides several recommendations to incorporate cost-based
analysis earlier in the Army requirements generation process, which
will improve decisions on required capabilities informed by life-cycle
costs and operational risk. The earlier use of analytics to determine
best value (best capability for best cost) will identify feasible
alternatives with associated costs across the doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities
(DOTMLPF) domains.
To implement these recommendations, we are updating our
requirements determination and programming policies, training analysts
to conduct cost-benefit analyses and placing them in our Capabilities
Development and Integration Directorates within the TRADOC, and
requiring cost-based analysis across the DOTMLPF domains for all new
requirements submitted to the Department. The culmination of these
efforts will enable our senior leaders across governance forums to
weigh choices based on best value and make better-informed decisions.

50. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, when will
this report be provided to the committee?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. In June 2009, Lieutenant
General (R) William Reno completed the Reforming the Requirements and
Resourcing Processes in Support of Army Institutional Adaption study,
also known as ``The Reno Study.'' The Army intends to deliver the study
to the committee in early March. The Army has conducted a detailed
analysis of the study, and has developed implementation proposals for
each of its 98 recommendations. The Under Secretary of the Army and the
Vice Chief of Staff Army are conducting final reviews of these
proposals.

end strength and deployment cycle time
51. Senator McCain. General Casey, you have put forward the goal of
increasing dwell time for soldiers so that they spend 2 years at home
for every 1 year deployed. There are two ways to achieve that goal: to
reduce our commitments overseas or to increase end-strength. What are
the budgetary and dwell-time implications of making the temporary end-
strength increase of 22,000 soldiers permanent?
General Casey. Budget: A sustained 22,000 increase would cost
$11.15 billion across the Future Years Defense Program (fiscal year
2012-fiscal year 2017) above the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
This cost estimate includes $4.71 billion Operations and Maintenance
(O&M), $5.67 billion Military Personnel Appropriation Army (MPA) and
$0.77 billion Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, assuming such
an increase would remain predominantly in grades E1 through E4.
Dwell: A sustained 22,000 increase above documented authorizations
would not add any rotational units to the force pool and therefore
would not have any impact on unit BOG: Dwell ratios. A sustained 22,000
increase would certainly relieve stress and strain on the force by
filling our deploying units appropriately, compensate for nondeployable
soldiers in deploying units, and improve readiness of units throughout
the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

52. Senator McCain. General Casey, in review of the 2009 QDR, I
noted that one of the objectives was ``to further rebalance the
capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and institutionalize successful
wartime innovations to better enable success in today's wars while
ensuring that our forces are prepared for a complex future.'' The QDR
went on to assert priorities for the sizing and shaping of the force
which assumed a range of conflicts and contingencies similar to what
our Armed Forces are presently facing. Yet the QDR proposed a force
structure for the Army that is essentially what you currently have,
without the 22,000 soldiers. In your testimony today, you state that
``the Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years and .
. . the strain has placed the Army out of balance.'' You go on to say
that ``the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands
that have our Army operating beyond sustainable capacity.'' I see a
disconnect between your testimony and the results of the QDR. Does the
QDR's recommendation regarding Army force structure allow the Army to
meet its goals regarding dwell time given the QDR's defense objectives
regarding prevailing in today's wars, preparing to defeat adversaries,
and preserving the force?
General Casey. The temporary manpower increase of up to 22,000 was
authorized by the Secretary of Defense to assist with near term manning
challenges and ensure units are appropriately manned prior to
deployment. The temporary manpower increase does not include force
structure and is intended to mitigate the increase in the soldier
nondeployable rate associated with the current high demand for forces.
With the upcoming responsible OIF drawdown and the subsequent projected
demand reduction on the force, the Army views the manning challenge as
temporary. Therefore, the projected decrease in demand on the
programmed Army force structure will allow the Army to achieve balance
by the end of 2011 and meet the rotation dwell time goals given the
QDR's defense objectives.

53. Senator McCain. General Casey, have you determined how many
deployed forces your current force structure levels can sustain to meet
your goals for dwell time? If so, what is that number?
General Casey. Our interim goal, only sustainable in the near-term,
is 2 years at home for every 1-year deployed for the Active Force and 4
years at home for every 1-year mobilization for the Reserve component.
At these dwell ratios, the Army can produce a continuous supply of 1
corps headquarters, 5 division headquarters, 20 BCTs, and about 90,000
troops worth of enablers.
Our long-term dwell goal, which we believe is necessary to maintain
the All-Volunteer Force, is a ratio of three periods at home for each
period deployed for the Active component, and 5 years for every 1 year
mobilized for the Reserve component. Our target for achieving this
long-term goal is 2015. At this dwell ratio, the Army can produce a
continuous supply of 1 corps, 4 divisions, 16 BCTs, and about 72,000
troops worth of enablers.

readiness of nondeployed readiness
54. Senator McCain. General Casey, in review of your February 23
testimony, I note your continued concern that ``presently, and for the
short term, we lack sufficient strategic flexibility, and we continue
to accumulate risk.'' This risk is reflected in the quarterly readiness
reports received by this committee that continue to show severely
degraded readiness for nondeployed units. I also note that the QDR does
not propose any initiatives or plans to specifically address the issues
of the reset or readiness of nondeployed forces in the Army and the
Marine Corps. In your opinion, why did the QDR not address the issue of
the readiness status of nondeployed units in the Army?
General Casey. We will continue to accumulate risk in the near-term
as we meet requirements for the current campaigns, and we anticipate a
tough few years ahead in providing sufficient strategic flexibility to
meet future contingencies. Eight and a half years at war builds latent
risks; risks that inherently impact soldiers and their families, and
their equipment.
The QDR addresses the primary readiness concerns to the Joint
Force. First, and most importantly, the QDR recognizes the need to
preserve the All-Volunteer Force and to sustain the health of our
soldiers, civilians, and their families. Next, the findings clearly
articulate the importance of managing deployment tempos and associated
challenges with resetting and reconstituting equipment. These two
issues directly impact readiness for the Joint Force, and particularly,
the Army.
Under the ARFORGEN's cycle, we do not apply a single, standardized
test of readiness to all units. Instead, different units in different
phases of ARFORGEN are expected to be at different levels of readiness.
As an example, ARFORGEN Reset phase is specifically designed without
any readiness expectations for unit personnel and equipment. Typically,
it is a 6-month process that systematically restores units--whether re-
deployed or nondeployed--to a level of personnel and equipment
readiness that permits resumption of training for future missions.
Reset encompasses those tasks necessary to reintegrate soldiers and
families, and tasks required to organize, man, equip, and train a unit.
As units progress from Reset to Train/Ready status, they possess the
soldiers and equipment required to train to a level of readiness that
will enable the Army to provide a surge capacity for contingencies. We
are not able to provide this now, but in the near- to mid-term we
expect to achieve this capacity and restore our strategic flexibility.
In the available cycle of ARFORGEN, soldiers and units are at a level
of readiness to execute assigned full spectrum operations.
Meeting the requirements of the last 8 years at war, the Army has
not achieved targeted deployment to dwell ratios creating heightened
stress to soldiers and their Families. By managing deployment tempos,
specifically deployment to dwell at home station time ratios, we build
readiness with predictability and sufficient physical and mental
recovery time for soldiers and their families. As dwell times at home
station stabilize and increase in time, individual soldier and unit
readiness will increase as they train and prepare for the full spectrum
of military operations.
As cited in the QDR, DOD is developing policies and initiatives to
assess the effects of stress to the force, the impact of low dwell
rates and measures to mitigate the same. Similarly, the Army has
implemented numerous initiatives to mitigate stressors to soldiers,
their families, and units. These initiatives, among many others,
include: the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army Suicide
Prevention Program, Army Family Action Plan and Warrior Care and
Transition.
Reset is essential in maintaining our equipment and Army Pre-
positioned Stocks (APS) readiness. During Reset, we repair or replace
destroyed, degraded and lost equipment. Although current support
provides for the full restoration and replacement of all equipment in
support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, success in restoring
readiness following responsible draw downs in both campaigns will
depend on reliable, timely and consistent funding to reset the force.
Of particular importance will be support to our soldier, families, and
veterans, and restoring the readiness of our equipment and pre-
positioned stocks. The combination of these actions will improve
readiness in the near- to mid-term.

55. Senator McCain. General Casey, what do you consider to be an
acceptable degree of risk for the readiness of nondeployed forces?
General Casey. The Army mitigates risk to the readiness of
nondeployed forces by progressively increasing unit readiness as they
cycle through the ARFORGEN force pools from RESET through Train/Ready
to the Available force pool.
The RESET force pool provides a unit time to reintegrate soldiers
with their Families, receive new personnel, field new equipment,
conduct individual training, attend institutional training and initiate
collective training. The Train/Ready force pool progressively increases
a unit's readiness by completing the fill of personnel shortages,
fielding equipment, conducting collective training and conducting
mission readiness exercises to validate unit readiness in meeting
Combatant Commanders' and Service requirements. Risk decreases as a
unit progresses from the RESET force pool, without any readiness
expectations, to the Available force pool.
Additionally, the Army is establishing ARFORGEN Aim Points to track
a unit's progression and focus resources to ensure its readiness
increase. The first Aim Point is when a unit emerges from the RESET
force pool. The second Aim Point is approximately 45 days before a
unit's mission readiness exercise. ARFORGEN will generate enough forces
to meet Combatant Commander and Global Force Management sustained
demands and to have depth to respond to contingencies.

56. Senator McCain. General Casey, what are your plans over the
next 2 years to mitigate this risk?
General Casey. The Army's plan to reduce risk to the force in the
near-term is contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell
ratios, adequately providing for soldiers, civilians, and families,
resetting our Soldiers and their equipment, and securing reliable,
timely and consistent funding.
With your support and no change to known troop requirements the
Army will reach a deploy-to-dwell ratio of 1 year deployed to 2 years
at home station for the Active component and one year deployed to 4
years at home station for the Reserve component in fiscal year 2012, as
well as begin to move towards our long-term deploy-to-dwell ratios.
Improving dwell times is critical to preserving the All-Volunteer Force
as we implement Army initiatives to improve and sustain the health of
our soldiers and their families, and provide them with a quality of
life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation.
We are developing a revised Modernization Strategy to build the
necessary capabilities required to meet future contingencies while
balancing capabilities between the Active and Reserve components.
Continued additional funding above the base budget is critical to
mitigating risk in the near to mid-term to allow us to reset equipment
and Army Prepositioned Stocks. This additional funding will be needed
for several years after completion of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

57. Senator McCain. General Casey, based on your plan, when is this
committee going to see an overall improvement in the readiness of
nondeployed units as reflected in quarterly reports?
General Casey. The Army plans to improve readiness by increasing
dwell times for Army units, reconstituting its Army Prepositioned
Stocks, and operationalizing the Reserve Component.
The recent approval of the Army's accelerated Grow the Army plan
was intended to rapidly improve the unit'' time deployed to time at
home'' ratio. As dwell time increases, we expect to see sustained
improvement in the readiness of nondeployed units. The Army is
continuing to transition the Reserve component to an accessible partner
of the total operational force and is integrating the ARNG and the U.S.
Army Reserve (USAR) into the Sustained Sourcing Approach. The Army has
programmed approximately $102.4 billion over the next 5 years to
procure shortfalls and modernize equipment, which is anticipated to
bring the ARNG and USAR to 83 percent and 81 percent Equipment On Hand
respectively by 2017 based on current operational requirements.
The current Army procurement strategy for ARNG/USAR is focused on
modernization and is on par with the active Component in accordance
with the ARFORGEN model. Integration of the Reserve Component into the
ARFORGEN cycle better enables Reserve Component employment as part of
the Joint Force while preserving some ability to expand the scope by
accelerating availability. With timely and predictable funding, we will
be able to provide units more of their required equipment earlier in
the process, not just-in-time for their deployment. This will also help
us restore the Army's strategic depth and increase our flexibility to
defend the Nation.

58. Senator McCain. General Casey, do you believe the funding
proposed for reset, manning, and training in the fiscal year 2011
budget and the Future Years Defense Plan will allow you to restore
readiness of nondeployed units to an acceptable level?
General Casey. The readiness of nondeployed formations continues to
be the biggest concern for the Army--it is the foremost concern driving
the Army's risk assessment for the Chairman. The Army has been at war
since September 11, and seen sustained growth annually in overseas
contingencies operations since the end of the Cold War. The fiscal year
2011 budget will help arrest the continued decline in the readiness of
nondeployed forces--but will not in and of itself reverse the decline
in nondeployed readiness. ARFORGEN accepts the proposition that some
forces are less ready due to their proximity in the deployment cycle.
Right now, too many nondeployed forces are at degraded readiness
levels. The readiness of nondeployed forces will not improve to an
acceptable level (based on ARFORGEN goals) until demand is reduced.

establishment of an army unit at thomson correctional facility
59. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the OCO
portion of the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes
$350 million in a transfer fund for the detention facilities at
Guantanamo Bay, provides funding to make improvements at the Illinois
State Prison at Thomson, Illinois, in the amount of $150 million, and
includes another $158 million for information technology improvements
at the Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, to support DOD detainee
operations at Thomson. The current plan calls for approximately 600-
1,000 permanently-stationed Army personnel to perform duties at Thomson
with base support provided by Rock Island Arsenal, which is about 60
miles from the Thomson facility. Do you support the use of Army
personnel and facilities for this initiative?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army is the Executive Agent
for detainee operations policy, and we are coordinating closely with
DOD regarding the potential use of the Thomson facility. If DOD assigns
this task to the Army, we will develop the appropriate personnel
structure to accomplish this mission to the best of our ability.

60. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, does the
Army have the available manpower authorizations to support this new
mission?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. If OSD assigns the Army this
task, we will thoroughly review the manpower requirements needed to
accomplish the mission.

61. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you
support the proposal to require Army personnel to commute 60 miles each
way to work at the Thomson facility?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. If the Army was directed to
perform this mission, the senior commander within the local area has
the flexibility to establish and define the local commuting area. A
distance of 50 miles, one way, is normally considered to be within
reasonable commuting distance of a station, but the 50-mile rule is not
inflexible.

62. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you have
any proposals or plans to mitigate the effects of this dislocation for
soldiers and their families?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. In addition to the senior
commander's authority to establish and define the local commuting area,
the Army could accommodate short distance moves within proximity of the
facility if the Army is directed to perform this mission.

military construction requirements for afghanistan
63. Senator McCain. General Casey, the budget request for fiscal
year 2011 OCO contains $761 million for facilities and infrastructure
to be constructed in Afghanistan, plus an additional $90 million for
future planning and design of facilities in Afghanistan. In the
justification documents provided with the budget request, most of these
projects are not proposed to be completed until mid-2012, almost a full
year after the President's announced goal for start of the withdrawal
of forces. In other words, we may be faced with a scenario where we are
still constructing facilities at the same time we are withdrawing
forces. I ask you only because the amounts are requested by the Army.
Does this make sense to you?
General Casey. Yes, the Army continues to plan for all scenarios
and will adjust plans and operations as the situation develops. The
Afghanistan projects requested in the fiscal year 2011 MILCON base
program were identified to support CENTCOM's Global Defense Posture
plan. These projects serve a dual purpose by supporting CENTCOM's
enduring mission post conflict and contingency operations prior to unit
drawdown and mission accomplishment. fiscal year 2011 OCO projects
support current contingency operations. All projects were coordinated
with CENTCOM and ARCENT with the current timeline taken into
consideration. Projects will be cancelled or scaled down as needed.

64. Senator McCain. General Casey, are the proposed dates for
completion of construction consistent with the President's policies and
goals?
General Casey. Yes, we are planning for operational requirements,
consistent with the administration's policies and goals, beyond 2012.
In addition, based on the Global Defense Posture Plan, the Army
will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan and other countries in
Southwest Asia. Projects in the base budget are required to support the
enduring force.

65. Senator McCain. General Casey, should I read in these documents
the military's plan to maintain forces in Afghanistan long after June
2011?
General Casey. Based on the Global Defense Posture Plan, the Army
will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan and other countries in
Southwest Asia. Our plans support operational requirements, consistent
with the administration's policies and goals, beyond 2012.

implications of iraqi elections
66. Senator McCain. General Casey, the U.S. presence in Iraq is
currently about 96,000 uniformed personnel. General Odierno said
yesterday that the planned withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by the
end of August 2010 could be delayed if conditions worsen in the coming
months as Iraqis choose a new government. Should the Iraqi elections
scheduled for March 7 be postponed, will the Army be capable of
sustaining the necessary forces in Iraq while fulfilling the
requirements of the troop increase in Afghanistan?
General Casey. All indications are the elections are going to take
place as planned.

equipment and readiness
67. Senator McCain. General Casey, with regard to excess military
equipment, specifically Class II, VII, and IX, currently located in the
Southwest Asia theater, what specific steps is the Army taking to
return excess equipment to nondeployed Army units?
General Casey. This question requires a two part answer:
First, with regard to excess Class II (general supplies) and IX
(repair parts), we will retrograde our serviceable stocks, and
redistribute them throughout the Total Army (to include Army
Prepositioned Stocks (APS)). The items may be redistributed to
Afghanistan, APS and other War Reserve requirements, as well as used to
offset the routine resupply of Army units worldwide.
Second, regarding excess Class VII (end items), our first priority
for materiel, which is not needed, is redistribution to satisfy
requirements in Afghanistan. If not needed there, it will redeploy to
the Continental United States, be Reset, and redistributed to
nondeployed units. The Army will use its Army's Resourcing Priorities
List to determine the distribution of this equipment. If not needed
within the Army anywhere, these items will be offered to Foreign
Military Sales customers as Excess Defense Articles, or will be
disposed of by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. Excess
non-standard gear no longer needed by the Army will be offered to U.S.
State and local governments, subject to their willingness to pay
transportation costs to return the items to the United States.

68. Senator McCain. General Casey, how is equipment that was rushed
to Iraq, like MRAP vehicles, being incorporated into the Army's vehicle
fleet?
General Casey. The Army has developed a predecisional allocation
plan for MRAPs as they return from theater. This plan was briefed to
Army senior leaders and is undergoing revision based on guidance to
conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis. The results will be presented
to Army senior leaders the end of March 2010. Other pieces of non-
standard equipment that have been acquired to meet operational
requirements are being reviewed through the Non-Standard Equipment
(NSE) disposition process. As a part of the NSE disposition process,
selected NSE items that have potential to become enduring capabilities
will be sent through the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition
(CDRT) process for additional detailed analysis. These processes use
wartime lessons learned and other inputs to determine if equipment
procured through non-traditional means should be incorporated into the
Army's long term force structure. If it is determined a piece of
equipment should be retained, a capabilities document is developed to
assist in the documentation of the structure, manning, training and
sustainment (including base budget) as the first step in the formal
process of becoming an acquisition program or being incorporated into
an existing acquisition program.

69. Senator McCain. General Casey, have these vehicles been placed
on units' property books?
General Casey. Yes, as the Joint Program Office issued MRAP
vehicles to units in theater, they were placed on unit property books.
Moreover, last year U.S. Army Central directed units in theater to
conduct 100 percent inventories to ensure all equipment (including MRAP
vehicles) appeared in our automated property book system, which
provides both accountability and visibility. We will continue to focus
on property accountability at every level during the drawdown in Iraq.

70. Senator McCain. General Casey, the President's 2011 budget
request ends production of the Humvee line of vehicles. In many
instances Humvees are no longer the preferred transport in theater,
having been supplanted by more heavily protected vehicles, like MRAPs.
When does the Army intend to finalize a tactical wheeled vehicle
strategy?
General Casey. The Army originally developed an overarching
tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) strategy in 2009. This strategy takes
maximum advantage of existing platforms; plans for the integration of
MRAP into the fleet; emphasizes a mixed fleet approach that spans the
``Iron Triangle'' of protection, payload and performance; and moves the
Army to a fleet of scalable protection. Additionally, we published a
TWV investment strategy on 30 October 2009.
We are currently working the latest updates to the strategy as part
of our POM 12-17 submission. This work includes the ongoing TRADOC MRAP
and TWV studies to determine the feasibility of adjusting the fleet
mix. This will inform long-term life cycle management decisions and
future investment strategies.

don't ask, don't tell homosexual conduct policy
71. Senator McCain. General Casey, in recent testimony before this
committee the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen,
stated his personal view that the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)
policy on homosexual conduct should be repealed. You testified on
February 23, 2010, to the effect that you are not ready to endorse
elimination of the DADT policy and that you want to first see the
results of the high level review that Secretary Gates has ordered
before you provide advice on this. Do you agree with the proposition
that some have advanced that the decision to repeal the DADT policy has
already been made by the President as Commander in Chief and that the
only reason for the review and delay is to formulate a plan for
implementation?
General Casey. In his State of The Union Address on 27 January
2010, President Obama indicated an intention to ``work with Congress
and our military to finally repeal [10 U.S.C. Sec. 654]. . . . ``
Secretary Gates stated, ``[t]o ensure that the department is prepared
should the law be changed, and working in close consultation with
Admiral Mullen, I have appointed a high-level working group within the
department that will immediately begin a review of the issues
associated with properly implementing a repeal of the ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell' policy.'' Therefore the reason for the review is to
identify issues associated with the proper implementation of a repeal
of DADT, should Congress act to change the law.

72. Senator McCain. General Casey, what do you view as the purpose
and utility of the high level review?
General Casey. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the
Army is participating in an OSD Task force to determine the potential
impact of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 to military readiness,
military effectiveness and unit cohesion and how to best manage any
noted impact during implementation if the law is ultimately changed.
The review will assess servicemember views and attitudes concerning
Don't Ask Don't Tell and will determine what changes to Service
regulations and policies may be necessary in the event that the current
law is repealed.

73. Senator McCain. General Casey, do you personally hold open the
possibility that you will review the outcome of the high level review
and determine that the DADT policy should remain in effect and not be
changed?
General Casey. The finding of the high-level review will certainly
inform my opinion as to whether and how the DADT policy should be
changed. However, the ultimate decision remains with Congress.

74. Senator McCain. General Casey, is it your understanding that
the DADT policy lawfully cannot be repealed or ignored, despite the
President's preferences, and that openly gay soldiers must continue to
be processed for separation until Congress repeals or modifies section
654 of title 10, U.S.C.?
General Casey. The Army's policy on homosexual conduct implements
DOD policy and Federal Law. DOD policy implements 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654
and applies to all branches of the Armed Forces. Due to current law and
governing policy, when a soldier has violated the homosexual conduct
policy, the commander must initiate separation procedures.

75. Senator McCain. General Casey, in your view, has the DADT
policy since 1993 affected the Army's military readiness negatively or
positively?
General Casey. Under the current homosexual conduct policy, the
Army continues to accomplish the mission of providing trained and ready
forces in support of the combatant commanders.

76. Senator McCain. General Casey, how would repeal of the current
law, in your judgment, affect recruiting and retention in the Army?
General Casey. The OSD Task Force study will help determine the
impact of repealing the current law on recruiting and retention. If any
impacts are identified and Congress changes the law, the Army will take
appropriate actions to address any effects on our recruiting and
retention programs.

77. Senator McCain. General Casey, has the current law and DADT
policy hindered the ability of the Army to increase its end strength in
recent years?
General Casey. The current law and ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' policy
has not negatively impacted the Army's ability to increase end
strength. The Army has enjoyed tremendous success in meeting the end
strength goals and is ahead of schedule (resulting in end strength of
543,645 for fiscal year 2008). The Army met the fiscal year 2010 end
strength goal of 547,400 in January 2009. As a result of meeting the
end strength growth early, the Army currently has enough enlisted
soldiers to fill all the current authorizations, which helps to
mitigate the stress of the high operational pace. The current fiscal
year 2010 end strength projection is 563,543 compared to our targeted
end strength of 562,400, which includes a 15,000 temporary end strength
increase. This success is based on both our recruiting and retention
programs.

78. Senator McCain. General Casey, in his testimony on February 2,
Admiral Mullen was clear that the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed
their best military advice about the impact of a repeal of the DADT
policy or the manner in which a change would be implemented. However,
many in Congress intend to move quickly through legislation to repeal
the law as quickly as possible, including imposition of a moratorium on
administrative separations while the high level review proceeds. Do you
support legislative change to the current policy before the Chiefs have
formulated their advice?
General Casey. The military must look hard at how a new policy
would be implemented and address any issues in the Armed Services that
may result from a repeal of the current law. It is important to have
accurate data on how soldiers and their families feel about
implementing a new policy. Because a moratorium would complicate the
process laid out by Secretary Gates, I would object to a moratorium
until the Services have a clearer picture.

79. Senator McCain. General Casey, what is the basis for your
objection to a congressionally-mandated moratorium on separations of
openly gay servicemembers under the DADT policy?
General Casey. It would complicate, and in some respects, undermine
the whole process that Secretary Gates had laid out. The practical
impact of a moratorium would be the same as the repeal of the current
law. We would be put in a position of actually implementing a
``repeal'' while we were studying the potential impacts of implementing
a repeal.

role of the joint chiefs of staff
80. Senator McCain. General Casey, Admiral Mullen is the principal
military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but
under law, he must consult and seek advice from the other members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Have you been
given adequate opportunity to state your views to date?
General Casey. Yes. The Chairman, Vice Chairman and Service Chiefs
meet regularly to discuss issues and collectively make decisions.

high level review of don't ask, don't tell
81. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, on February
2, Secretary Gates testified that a high-level working group within DOD
will review the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal
of the DADT policy. Part of this review, he testified, will be to reach
out to authoritatively understand the views and attitudes of the force.
Please explain what steps the Army has been asked to take in order to
implement the President's direction to ``begin the preparations
necessary for repeal of the current law and policy.''
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army fully supports the
working group established by Secretary Gates. General Carter Ham,
Commander, U.S. Army Europe, was selected as the co-chair of the
working group. It is my understanding that the group will seek input
from across the Army regarding the views and attitudes of the force
concerning changing the law and the current DADT policy. The group is
also expected to review the regulations used to implement the current
policy to determine if there are different ways to enforce existing
polices. Finally, the Army has ensured full participation in the
working group by assigning officers and enlisted personnel in the
specialties requested.

82. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is it
correct that the actions the Secretary of Defense has directed are
intended to strengthen the argument for repeal of existing law?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The actions directed by the
Secretary of Defense are intended to ``objectively and methodically
examine all aspects of this question, and produce its findings and
recommendations'' by the end of this calendar year.

83. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what
difference will it make, if any, in DOD planning if a significant
proportion--say 50 percent--of servicemembers and their family members
register objection to a change in the policy?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The views of soldiers and Army
families will be relevant to our assessment of the potential impact
that a repeal of the current law may have on military readiness,
military effectiveness and unit cohesion. DOD policy implements 10
U.S.C. Sec. 654, which applies to all branches of the Armed Forces. If
the existing law is changed, the Army will comply with the new law and
resulting DOD policy. We will deal with this issue with the same
professionalism that has marked our conduct during this war and that
has been a hallmark of this institution for 234 years.

84. Senator McCain. General Casey, according to data provided by
the Services and DOD, the number of discharges for homosexual conduct
has consistently been far less than 1 percent, compared to discharges
for other reasons. The Congressional Research Service concluded that
most discharges occur among younger, less experienced personnel. How
many soldiers have been discharged since September 11, 2001, for
violating DADT?
General Casey. The total number of Army Homosexual Conduct
discharges from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2009 (9 years) is
3,211.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001.......................................... 627
2002.......................................... 433
2003.......................................... 378
2004.......................................... 325
2005.......................................... 386
2006.......................................... 280
2007.......................................... 303
2008.......................................... 284
2009.......................................... 195
------------------------------------------------------------------------

85. Senator McCain. General Casey, does that number adversely
affect the readiness of the Army?
General Casey. As Chief of Staff of the Army, I am focused on my
Title 10 responsibilities of preparing and sustaining an Army at war.
That number of soldiers separated for violating the homosexual conduct
policy since September 11, 2001, has not affected the readiness of the
Army as we have accomplished the mission of fighting and winning this
nation's wars.

medium extended air defense system
86. Senator McCain. General Casey, the Medium Extended Air Defense
System (MEADS) is the Army's follow-on program to the Patriot missile
system. It is being co-developed by the United States (funding 58
percent), Germany (25 percent), and Italy (17 percent). MEADS is
designed to provide 360-degree coverage and protect against short-range
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and aircraft. In their most
recent assessment of MEADS, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
determined that many critical technologies have not matured since
development started in 2004 and will not be fully mature until the
production decision in 2012. During the program's preliminary design
review (PDR) in 2008, it was determined that this program carried
excessive risk and that at least an additional $1 billion and more time
would be needed prior to Critical Design Review, which is now scheduled
for August this year. What steps are being taken to ensure that the
program stays within budget and schedule?
General Casey. As an international cooperative program, the
overarching decision body for MEADS is the National Armaments
Directorate. The representatives or National Armaments Directors are
senior defense officials of partner nations. The U.S. National
Armaments Director is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). Program
direction and oversight is being migrated from a Joint Steering
Committee to a more senior tri-national Board of Directors (BOD). The
senior U.S. member of the BOD is OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (OSD-AT&L), The Office of Portfolio Systems Acquisition (PSA)
and is supported by the Army Acquisition Executive.
In an effort to contain costs and reduce program risks, the
National Armaments Directors agreed to pursue a rebaseline of the
original 110 month program. This would extend the Design and
Development program by up to 24 months. The nations are awaiting the
response to the proposal for the rebaselined program. Based on the
direction of the BOD, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization MEADS
Management Agency General Manager is conducting cost reviews and the
OSD-Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation is conducting an
independent cost estimate of the rebaselined program. Preliminary
projections indicate the extended program will add at least $700
million in cost to the U.S. over the remainder of the Design and
Development (D&D) program. Several changes are being sought to adjust
the program. We acknowledge the schedule and cost growth and are
discussing additional steps with the international partners to address
the cost and schedule changes in the upcoming years. The OSD-AT&L is
the lead for these international negotiations for the Department, so I
will defer to OSD-AT&L for a current status of those negotiations.

87. Senator McCain. General Casey, given the international
collaboration associated with MEADS, is it true that this program is
exempt from traditional DOD acquisition regulations? If so, was or is
MEADS in risk of breaching Nunn-McCurdy?
General Casey. The International (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)) MEADS Program is exempt from DOD 5000 Regulations.
It is governed by the negotiated tri-national Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). The International MEADS program is executed by a
NATO agent, NATO MEADS Management Agency, which complies with the MOU
and NATO rules and regulations.
As part of the normal stewardship of our funds, we assess the
program against typical program metrics, such as procurement and total
program unit costs as used in Nunn-McCurdy evaluations, as well as
requiring program documentation similar to those required by DOD 5000
(e.g. test plans, cost documents, etc.). Based on available estimates,
the U.S. MEADS current program assessments are within Nunn-McCurdy
thresholds. The department will have a more precise assessment at the
conclusion of the OSD Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation's Cost
Assessment.

88. Senator McCain. General Casey, is the Army looking at any
alternatives to a follow-on system for Patriot?
General Casey. The Army is continuing to program and plan for the
MEADS as a replacement for Patriot.

humanitarian missions
89. Senator McCain. General Casey, what effect will continuing
humanitarian operations in Haiti have on the Army's continuing missions
in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the ability to respond to contingencies
around the world?
General Casey. Assuming force requirements do not increase,
continuing humanitarian operations in Haiti should have little or no
effect on the Army's continuing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, or
the ability to respond to contingencies around the world. It is
anticipated units supporting Haiti operations will be redeployed with
sufficient time for reset and train-up for scheduled future
deployments.

90. Senator McCain. General Casey, what is the Army's understanding
of the duration, personnel, and equipping requirements in response to
the continued humanitarian mission to Haiti?
General Casey. Duration - Our understanding of the duration of the
humanitarian mission is that units will remain in place until relieved.
The mission will not impact operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Personnel - Units are currently transitioning based on U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) timeline.

U.S. Army South (USARSO) is assuming command and
control of Joint Task Force (JTF) Haiti, from 18 Airborne
Command Post (ACP), not later than 15 Mar 2010. 18 ABC ACP is
redeploying and will return to home station.
2/82 Airborne (ABN) is redeploying and will return to
home station by end of Mar 2010. There is no requested backfill
for 2/82 ABN. FORSCOM projects 2/82 ABN will assume GRF mission
on or around 01 Apr 2010.
377 Theater Support Command (TSC) replaced the 3rd
Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) Headquarters on 06 Mar
2010.

Equipping - Units deployed to Haiti with organic equipment.
Equipment will not be left behind unless directed by Command Authority.

91. Senator McCain. General Casey, how is the Army preparing to
deal with future disaster relief missions, to include assisting
partners to better prepare for these regional and global responses?
General Casey. The Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness program,
which was created at the inception of the Partnership for Peace program
in 1994, is the Army's primary means to assist partner nations in
enhancing their disaster preparedness and response capacities.
Annually, this program conducts bilateral and regional events that
support DOD and Army security cooperation objectives by enhancing
civil-military cooperation and building our partners' capacity to
respond to both natural and manmade disasters.
In fiscal year 2009, the program, which is funded by DOD and
managed by Headquarters, Department of the Army, conducted 23 events
with 14 countries using a budget of $1.4 million. In fiscal year 2010,
the Army plans to conduct 32 events in 16 countries including support
to U.S. Africa Command's emergency response events using a $1.8 million
budget. Recently, the program developed a new global assessment tool
called Providing International Disaster Emergency Support, or ProvIDES,
which quantitatively assesses a nation's capabilities and capacity to
establish requirements for enhancing effectiveness across all phases of
preparedness and response.
Additionally, the Army assists partners with disaster preparedness
through security cooperation activities executed by the Army Service
Component Commands as well as through programs at the Army Medical
Command and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC). Of note, since 2007 a total of 13 students from Chile have
participated in disaster preparedness training at WHINSEC.

mid-level officer shortfalls
92. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
committee heard outside testimony last year that the Army is projected
to experience a shortfall of approximately 3,000 captains and majors
until at least 2013. Please describe the current status of this
shortfall, its impact, and the Army's mitigation efforts.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army's current officer
shortages stem from force structure growth designed to support the
development of additional capabilities needed to meet emerging threats
in our OCOs. Based on this growth, we project the Army will be short
over 4300 captains and majors (across all officer competitive
categories) through fiscal year 2010, with the shortage dropping to
about 2900 in fiscal year 2011. We project the Army will be
specifically short approximately 3800 Army Competitive Category (ACC)
captains and majors through fiscal year 2010, with the shortage
dropping to about 2700 in fiscal year 2011. The Army expects to be
above full strength for captains in aggregate for fiscal year 2013 and
beyond.
A shortage of 1,000-1,300 (10 percent-12 percent) ACC majors will
continue from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, and we will
remain short 1,900-2,200 (10 percent-12 percent) majors across all
competitive categories during the same time period. The Army will not
be able to eliminate the major shortage in the foreseeable future, but
can ease its effects by using captains to fill certain major vacancies
after fiscal year 2012.
Examples of measures taken to mitigate captain and major shortages
include the following: increasing Regular Army accessions to 5500 by
the end of fiscal year 2010; Reserve Component calls to active duty
(over 1500 to date); and the use of ``Blue-to-Green'' inter-Service
transfers (over 500 to date). The Army is also implementing high
promotion rates to both captain and major (including 2 years below-the-
zone eligibility for selection to major). We will work to lower these
rates gradually to allow additional opportunities to differentiate
exceptional performers. We are also slowly increasing promotion ``pin-
on'' points for lieutenants and captains as our personnel inventories
become more healthy.
The Army is also using incentives to help mitigate our shortages of
captains and majors. We offered the Captains' Retention Menu of
Incentives in September 2007 through March 2009 with a goal of
retaining and managing critical skills in officers to complete the
Army's modularity conversion. As a result of this program, the Army
increased captain retention through fiscal year 2011 for over 16,000 of
the 23,000 captains, who were eligible to participate. We have also
continued to use the pre-commissioning Officer Career Incentive
Program, first implemented in fiscal year 2006. By adding 3 guaranteed
years of active service to the initial obligations of officers
commissioned through USMA and ROTC programs, this program has increased
retention at the 8th year of service from a historical 47 percent to
between 62 percent and 69 percent.

brigade combat team modernization program
93. Senator McCain. General Casey, this year's budget request
continues work begun under Future Combat Systems (FCS) with a multi-
billion dollar request for the Army's BCT Modernization program, which
includes the Early Infantry BCT (E-IBCT) component. The Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) reported in February 2010 that
``all E-IBCT systems require further development before fielding,''
that E-IBCT systems ``demonstrated reliability well below user
requirements,'' and that the ``systems [tested] were not in the same
configuration as the systems intended for purchase.'' Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD (AT&L)]
Carter recently approved the Army's request to move E-IBCT into Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP), but said that ``testing has identified
large reliability shortfalls'' and that the Army lacks ``a clear
operational perspective of the value'' of these systems in their
current form. Why is the Army moving ahead with LRIP of the E-IBCT set
of systems, when they have not met important reliability goals?
General Casey. The Army has just entered year 3 of a 4-year test
cycle for Increment 1 capabilities. The Army will not field any new
equipment until system performance is sufficient to satisfy the
capability requirements of the warfighter. Given our desire to get E-
IBCT capabilities into the hands of soldiers as soon as possible,
Increment 1 employs an extensive developmental and operational test
program. This will culminate with one brigade set of low rate initial
production equipment being tested as part of initial operational test
and evaluation in 2011. The ``test-fix-test'' strategy we are utilizing
has allowed the program to continuously mature hardware models and
software as it progresses through the development process. One key
element of this strategy has been the use of the Army Evaluation Task
Force. Comprised of combat veterans, these soldiers evaluate all of the
E-IBCT equipment and provide invaluable feedback to the program which
permits continual improvement to these systems.
In 2009, the second year of warfighter tests, results indicated
that Reliability, Availability and Maintainability scores fell short of
their requirements. The Army has implemented an aggressive reliability
growth plan that has identified 100 percent of the root causes. To
date, 98 percent of the known failures have been corrected and are
implemented for Limited User Test 10.
As directed in the December 2010 Acquisition Decision Memorandum,
the Program Office will report to the OSD the results of these tests,
which will factor into approval to proceed with production and fielding
plans.

94. Senator McCain. General Casey, how does the Army intend to
mitigate E-IBCT developmental delays?
General Casey. Increment 1 equipment and software has undergone
robust testing and evaluation. All programmatic milestones including
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) have
been met and approved through a series of Defense Acquisition Board
reviews and decisions ultimately leading to a Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) decision in December 2009.
Soldiers are part of a 4-year test and evaluation process. Early in
development the Army made the decision to deliver pre-production
equipment and network components to the Army Evaluation Task Force to
allow soldiers to test and evaluate the systems. Resultant soldier
feedback has played a key role in optimizing design throughout the
development phase leading to better product design. Increment 1
capabilities are only now in their third year of the pre-planned 4-year
test cycle.
OSD has asked the Army to report on the progress at the end of the
second year as these capabilities move through the 2010 test cycle. The
Army is required to report test and evaluation plans, risk mitigation
strategies and test and evaluation results at two Defense Acquisition
Board meetings in April 2010 and December 2010. These reviews will
shape the path ahead for the LRIP of the Early Infantry BCT (E-IBCT)
equipment sets 2 and 3.
The Increment 1 LRIP decision was based on sound acquisition
processes and multiple reviews/tests/evaluations of hardware and
software. Production will be intensely managed and will allow for
adjustments to be made in the LRIP stage as additional test results are
finalized. Such an incremental process will allow for technological
upgrades and refinements even during the fielding process.
The Government's interests are protected through a series of
established decision points.

1. Milestone C for Increment 1 in December 2009 authorized
acquisition of the first E-IBCT set of equipment. This decision was
supported by results from 2009 test cycle (year 2 of 4) and DODI 5000.2
Statutory and Regulatory requirements.
2. Limited User Test 2010 (year 3 of 4) assessment and breakout
decision review is scheduled for December 2010. This review evaluates
year 3 of 4 test and evaluation results plus risk mitigation plans
prior to authorization for the final two LRIP E-IBCT sets of equipment.
Finalization of the Full Rate Production (FRP) plan will also occur.
3. A FRP decision for the additional six E-IBCT sets of equipment
will occur in December 2011using all 4 years of test results. This
decision will be supported by the fiscal year 2011 (year 4 of 4)
testing including the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
demonstrating that Increment 1 production units are operationally safe,
effective, suitable, and survivable.

95. Senator McCain. General Casey, what are the advantages of
developing and procuring E-IBCT spin-out increments together under one
contract?
General Casey. The development effort and the procurement effort
are being acquired as two separate contracts. For clarification
purposes, there is only one planned spin out of the Early-Infantry
Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) capability. The Army, as directed by the
Milestone Decision Authority, is planning on two spin out programs
called increments. The Increment 1 E-IBCT program will field capability
to nine E-IBCTs and the Increment 2 program will field additional
capability to thirty-one IBCTs. The Increment 1 capability is
completing development under a cost-reimbursable development contract
(restructured from the former Future Combat Team Program). The
Increment 1 capability (systems) is being procured as an integrated set
for fielding to the E-IBCT under a separate fixed-price low-rate
initial production contract.

96. Senator McCain. General Casey, what would be the advantages or
disadvantages of incrementally upgrading E-IBCTs using multiple,
smaller contracts?
General Casey. For clarification purposes, there is only one
planned spin out of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
capability. A follow-on incremental capability is under development for
the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).
For purposes of responding to this question it is assumed that
``multiple, smaller contracts'' as used in this question refers to
platform level versus integrated system of systems performance
contracts.
Upgrading E-IBCTs using multiple, smaller contracts shifts overall
IBCT performance and schedule risk to the Government, which may or may
not be acceptable depending on the lifecycle phase. Breaking out
performance accountability across multiple contracts makes the
Government responsible for integrated performance versus the
contractor. Prior to completion of integrated operational test and
evaluation, this risk was determined unacceptable for E-IBCT given the
magnitude of cost and schedule impacts associated with managing and
fixing component (platform) deficiencies to meet the integrated
specification. Under a single contractor, that contractor is
responsible for meeting the integrated performance and, therefore,
responsible for any deficiency. Furthermore, if each platform is being
developed or enhanced under separate contracts, the Government becomes
responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of each platform.
Should effort under one platform fall behind schedule then it could
become grounds for Government caused delay and equitable adjustment
entitlement claims by contractors performing on the other contracts.
Post fielding, the advantage to using multiple contracts for
upgrade efforts is greater flexibility and insight in making platform
specific changes. The disadvantages of using multiple contracts are
contracting and administrative staffing needs substantially increase to
accommodate the award and monitoring of multiple contracts.
Additionally, contracts for associated E-IBCT systems may be impacted
by each platform change which would have to be contractually addressed.

internal threats to army personnel and their families
97. Senator McCain. General Casey, in January 2010, an independent
panel appointed by Secretary Gates to identify gaps or deficiencies in
DOD force protection policies following the horrific killing of 12
servicemembers, 1 Army civilian, and the wounding of 43 others at Fort
Hood, TX, on November 5, 2009, concluded that DOD was inadequately
prepared to address internal threats. Do you agree with that finding?
General Casey. The independent review chaired by Former Army
Secretary Togo West and retired Navy Adm. Vernon Clark identified
shortfalls in DOD's procedures for identifying and responding to
potentially dangerous internal threats.
I agree with their assessment and concur with Secretary Gates' view
that, as a result of the shortcomings revealed by the Fort Hood
tragedy, DOD must do more to adapt to the evolving domestic internal
security threat to American troops and military facilities that has
emerged over the past decade.

98. Senator McCain. General Casey, what actions have you taken
since the killings at Fort Hood to assess the specific threats posed by
violent extremism to U.S. Army personnel and their families?
General Casey. On 23 November 2009, the Army issued an All Army
Action message on Force Protection (DTG 231751ZNov 09). The message
directed the immediate review of force protection measures to identify
potential insider threats and to prevent or mitigate acts of violence
directed against the Army.
The message tasked Army leaders to become familiar with the ten key
indicators of terrorist activities and to use them in conjunction with
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training. It
also directed leaders to engage their soldiers and know their behavior
on and off duty, to train leaders in identifying indicators of
potential violence and terrorist behavior and to identify and report
soldiers exhibiting indicators of potential violence. The message
tasked senior leaders to ensure compliance with existing privately
owned weapons registration policies, ensure leaders emphasize SAEDA
training and ensure soldiers know how to report those suspected of
subversion and espionage. Leaders are to take appropriate actions
wherever soldiers exhibit behaviors that adversely affect good order
and discipline in the Army.
In addition, the message tasked mission commanders and installation
commanders to perform risk assessments of their installations and to
consider detailing, on a routine but random basis, law enforcement
officials to observe behavior at primary gathering places like
commissaries, schools and hospitals. It directed them to increase
community oriented policing programs, review and adjust Random
Antiterrorism Programs, and revitalize Neighborhood Watch Programs. The
message also tasked installation commanders to coordinate information
sharing between local civilian and installation law enforcement
officials so commanders receive feedback on off base activities.
My office is reviewing the findings and recommendations of the DOD
Independent Review of the Fort Hood Shootings, and, where appropriate,
is in the process of implementing many of the recommendations, in
accordance with Army policies and processes.

99. Senator McCain. General Casey, what actions have you taken to
reduce the risk that internal threats driven by violent extremism will
result in harm to U.S. Army personnel and their families, such as
improved awareness and reporting programs?
General Casey. On 23 November 2009, the Army issued an All Army
Action message on Force Protection (DTG 231751ZNov 09). The message
directed the immediate review of force protection measures to identify
potential insider threats and to prevent or mitigate acts of violence
directed against the Army.
The message tasked Army leaders to become familiar with the ten key
indicators of terrorist activities and to use them in conjunction with
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training. It
also directed leaders to engage their soldiers and know their behavior
on and off duty, to train leaders in identifying indicators of
potential violence and terrorist behavior and to identify and report
soldiers exhibiting indicators of potential violence. The message
tasked senior leaders to ensure compliance with existing privately-
owned weapons registration policies, ensure leaders emphasize SAEDA
training and ensure soldiers know how to report those suspected of
subversion and espionage. Leaders are to take appropriate actions
wherever soldiers exhibit behaviors that adversely affect good order
and discipline in the Army.
In addition, the message tasked mission commanders and installation
commanders to perform risk assessments of their installations and to
consider detailing, on a routine but random basis, law enforcement
officials to observe behavior at primary gathering places like
commissaries, schools and hospitals. It directed them to increase
community oriented policing programs, review and adjust Random
Antiterrorism Programs, and revitalize Neighborhood Watch Programs. The
message also tasked installation commanders to coordinate information
sharing between local civilian and installation law enforcement
officials so commanders receive feedback on off base activities.
My office is reviewing the findings and recommendations of the DOD
Independent Review of the Fort Hood Shootings, and, where appropriate,
is in the process of implementing many of the recommendations, in
accordance with Army policies and processes.

100. Senator McCain. General Casey, what actions have been taken to
improve the application of military personnel evaluation policies with
respect to medical personnel, and to hold accountable supervisors who
fail to report substandard performance?
General Casey. We are currently in the process of reviewing our
evaluation reporting systems including leader counseling and
development, roles and responsibilities of rating officials, and the
synchronization of evaluation report assessments with the
identification and selection of qualified leaders. Insights from
investigations into the Fort Hood tragedy are being carefully
considered in our review.

army suicide study
101. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, in July 2009, the Department
of the Army launched a $50 million study by the National Institute of
Mental Health on Army suicides. The study is reportedly designed to be
able to identify quickly potential risk factors that can inform
existing prevention strategies. What is the status of the research
project and how much DOD money has been expended to date?
Secretary McHugh. The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in
Servicemembers (Army STARRS) is a 5-year study being conducted through
a cooperative agreement grant award from the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH). In July 2009, NIMH awarded the grant to a
consortium consisting of the Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences, Columbia University, the University of Michigan, and
Harvard University. The research is being conducted by the grantees, as
well as NIMH scientists. Army scientists are also participating in
scientific coordination and review.
Army STARRS began receiving historical data from internal Army
sources in January 2010. This followed a detailed review to identify
relevant data sources, the establishment of a Data Use Agreement, and
demonstrating compliance with the Army's Information Assurance
protocol. Parallel Data Use Agreements with applicable DOD data sources
are being processed. The Study is scheduled to begin new data
collection from current soldiers and new recruits over the next 6
months.
The Army transferred $10 million to NIMH in June 2009 to cover the
fiscal year 2009 expenditures. An additional $10 million is programmed
for fiscal year 2010.

102. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, what specific findings, if
any, have been helpful in improving prevention strategies?
Secretary McHugh. From a scientific perspective, it is too early in
the study to have substantive findings. In the interim and at our
request, National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has provided a
report on civilian ``best practices'' regarding suicide prevention and
behavioral health care. NIMH and the Army are working together to
identify where relevant interventions could be implemented.

103. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, what are future deliverables
and when are they expected?
Secretary McHugh. The STARRS will report its progress and findings
on a quarterly basis, as well as on an ad hoc basis as it makes new
findings.
In the coming year, Army STARRS is scheduled to deliver initial
findings on risks and protective factors for suicide and related
outcomes. This will be based on analyses of historical data, as well as
detailed new information on the characteristics, exposures and
experiences of current soldiers and new recruits, with a particular
focus on known risk factors for suicide, such as mental health
problems.
In subsequent years, the study will follow soldiers over time,
identify those who have particular negative (or positive) outcomes and
deliver practical, actionable information on specific risks and
protective factors for suicide. This is designed to assist the Army
preventing suicide and improving soldiers' overall psychological
health.

traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress disorder
104. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, please
provide a comprehensive list and description of policy and program
actions which are underway in the Army to identify and treat traumatic
brain injury (TBI), including mild TBI, and post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army TBI program is a
standardized, comprehensive program that provides a continuum of
integrated care and services for soldiers and patients from point-of-
injury to return to duty, or transition from active duty and/or return
to highest functional level.
The policy documents supporting the program include the following:
the TBI Task Force report, the TBI Action Plan, four All Army Activity
messages, and the TBI Operations Order. The Army is also initiating an
``Educate, Train, Treat & Track'' campaign plan to facilitate leader
and medical collaboration to improve acute concussion identification
and management. The plan's goal is a cultural change in warfighter
management after concussive events to include identification and
treatment close to point of injury, documentation of the incident and
expectation of recovery with early treatment.
Key actions that facilitate identification and treatment of TBI
include: educating the Force on TBI; funding over 350 staff to provide
TBI care; implementing TBI screening for all medically evacuated
patients and all soldiers during post-deployment; implementing the
Military Acute Concussion Evaluation for initial concussion assessment;
and developing and implementing Clinical Practice Guidelines for the
management of soldiers with concussion in both the deployed and
nondeployed settings.
To help those dealing with PTSD and other psychological effects of
war, Army leadership is taking aggressive, far-reaching steps to ensure
the availability of an array of behavioral health services for soldiers
and their families. Key actions that have facilitate identification and
treatment of PTSD include: improving the distribution of behavioral
health providers in theater and increasing access to care; implementing
the Respect-Mil program to integrate behavioral healthcare into the
primary care setting; incorporating Battlemind training in the
Deployment Cycle Support program; producing two DVD/CDs that deal with
family deployment issues; screening soldiers using the Post-Deployment
Health Assessment and Reassessment; revising the questionnaire for
national security positions regarding mental and emotional health;
instituting post traumatic stress training for our health care
providers; and hiring approximately 350 additional behavioral
healthcare providers and 44 marriage and family therapists across the
Army Medical Command.
Additionally, on 1 Oct 2008 the Army established the Comprehensive
Soldier Fitness Program. The mission of this program is to develop and
institute a holistic, resilience building fitness program for soldiers,
families, and Army civilians. The program focuses on optimizing five
dimensions of strength: Physical, Emotional, Social, Spiritual, and
Family. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness expects this to enhance the
performance (capability) and build the resilience (capacity) of the
Force in this era of persistent conflict and high operational tempo.
Finally, the Army supports and conducts innovative TBI and PTSD
research. The Army Medical Research and Materiel Command manages the
Congressional Special Interest medical research program and serves as
the Executive Agent of the DOD Blast Injury research program. In
partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Defense Center
of Excellence, civilian hospitals and research institutes, as well as
other organizations such as the National Football League, the Army is
working aggressively to improve our understanding of TBI and
psychological health conditions.

105. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how much
is provided for these programs in the fiscal year 2011 request?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The President's proposed budget
for the fiscal year 2011 Defense Health Program (DHP) provides the Army
$285 million for TBI and psychological health, focused on initiatives
related to access, surveillance, quality, resilience and transition.
The DHP also enhanced funding for medical research, which will include
funds directed toward research on TBI and psychological health.

106. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, are there
any unfunded requirements for personnel, programs, treatment or
research with respect to TBI and PTSD? If so, please identify each such
requirement.
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The President's proposed budget
for the fiscal year 2011 DHP fully funds the Army's identified
requirements for personnel, programs and treatment with respect to TBI
and PTSD. Similarly, the combined Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation investment of Army and the DHP adequately addresses the key
gaps in our knowledge of TBI and PTSD, as well as the technological
development required to field improvements in medical treatment and
prevention.

nursing shortage
107. Senator McCain. Secretary McHugh, what is the current state of
the nursing shortage within the U.S. Army and what actions are underway
to increase the supply of nurses available to the Army, both in uniform
and civilian nurses?
Secretary McHugh. The Army Nurse Corps has been successful in
meeting its recruiting goals for Active Duty nurses. In the aggregate,
the Army Nurse Corps is over 100 percent of required end strength. As
such, the recruiting focus has shifted from building capacity to
building capability.
The Army Nurse Corps will continue its current accession
strategies, but enhance them through precision recruiting initiatives.
We have realigned recruiting incentives to make Army Nursing
competitive with incentives offered nationally. Our focus is recruiting
experienced nurses in specialties such as trauma/critical care,
emergency nursing and all behavioral health disciplines to ensure
position fill in low density, high complexity areas of concentration.
Incentive Specialty Pay for nurses, who achieve and maintain
certification in these areas of concentration, has been an effective
retention incentive that assists the Army Nurse Corps to maintain
capability in critical fill areas to support operations at home and
abroad.
Through effective recruitment, we have successfully increased the
number of civilian registered nurses (RNs) throughout the Army Medical
Command, even as the mission requirements of a protracted conflict have
generated an increased demand for healthcare providers. The staffing
strength has steadily increased to over 5,300 civilian RNs in 2009,
representing a 45 percent increase over the 2007 end strength.
The Civilian Nurse Loan Repayment Program (CNLRP) and the
Recruitment, Relocation and Retention Initiatives Program (3Rs) are two
successful civilian nurse incentive programs. The 3Rs support our newly
appointed and current employees by offering incentives commensurate
with service agreements. Since its inception, the CNLRP has supported
tuition loan repayment for over 283 RNs and 32 licensed practical
nurses. Central funding of the CNLRP at $1.5 million annually began in
2006. The use of 3Rs for Army Medical Command civilian nurses increased
from $4.8 million in 2007 to $8.2 million in 2009. Although the
recruitment and retention incentives for RNs have been successful, Army
Medical Command still had over 650 open hiring actions for RNs at the
end of 2009. These open actions represent about 12 percent of our
civilian RN workforce and are typical of the number of vacancies we
manage as part of routine turnover.
The Army Medical Command's success in attracting experienced nurses
into the military healthcare system may be partially due to the
downturn in the economy and private sector salaries. We must maintain
aggressive recruitment efforts and incentives for nurses, regardless of
the Economic environment, to ensure future success.

mental health resources in afghanistan
108. Senator McCain. General Casey, the Army's most recent Mental
Health Advisory Team study identified a shortage of mental health
providers for Army personnel serving in Afghanistan. What actions have
you taken to address that gap in staffing?
General Casey. There is currently no staffing gap in Afghanistan.
Based on the Mental Health Advisory Team's (MHAT) findings and
recommendations, the Army pushed additional behavioral health providers
into Afghanistan to close the staffing gap. There are approximately 104
behavioral health providers serving in Afghanistan providing clinical
services to the supported force. The ratio in Afghanistan of 1
behavioral health provider for every 663 servicemembers improves upon
the MHAT's recommended ratio of 1:700.

medical evacuation in afghanistan
109. Senator McCain. General Casey, in March 2009 Secretary Gates
directed that medical care and evacuation capabilities in Afghanistan
achieve parity with the Iraq theater. Have we achieved that goal?
General Casey. Critically wounded personnel in both theaters are
being delivered to surgical facilities consistently in less than 1
hour. The Army recognizes the strategic value of this mission, and have
reprioritized our resources, changed our structure and invested in
improvements to take care of the wounded in Afghanistan. The Army
implemented several initiatives to achieve this standard. The greatest
being the increase in assets deployed to the Theater.
In March 2009, there were 15 HH-60 medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
helicopters and 3 Forward Surgical Teams (FST) deployed. Today, the
Army has deployed 39 HH-60 MEDEVAC helicopters and an additional 6
FSTs. Additionally, the Army's increased assets include Level III
surgical augmentation and a medical brigade command and control
headquarters. Other initiatives include changing doctrine for
aeromedical evacuation to 1 hour for urgent and urgent surgical
missions, increasing force structure, increasing additional assets,
fielding improved aircraft capabilities, streamlining procedures,
establishing new data collection/reporting requirements and releasing a
VCSA SENDS Aeromedical Evacuation Message. The Army's force structure
changes include aggressively growing 9 additional MEDEVAC companies in
the Reserve component (two of which will be deployed this year) and a
force design structure change in each of the 37 MEDEVAC companies
increasing from 12 aircraft/12 crews to 15 aircraft and 20 crews. The
first of these newly designed companies will be deployed this year.
The Army also continues to modernize MEDEVAC aircraft with improved
engines, satellite communication capability and forward looking
infrared technology. We are committed to aggressively pursuing
initiatives that further improve medical care and evacuation
capabilities for our fighting forces.

110. Senator McCain. General Casey, are sufficient MEDEVAC
helicopters, crews, and forward surgical teams available in Afghanistan
to ensure rapid evacuation and care for the wounded?
General Casey. Currently we have sufficient evacuation capability
to ensure rapid evacuation of the wounded. The challenge is the surge.
Although we all know that requirements will go down in Iraq, the
reality is that future demand will have a short term net increase that
may exceed our available supply. In order to mitigate this challenge,
the Army has changed its sourcing strategy. The Army is beginning to
source the requirement with the new 15 aircraft/20 crew MEDEVAC
companies instead of replacing units in the fight with the older
construct of 12 aircraft/12 crew MEDEVAC companies. This strategy will
increase capacity and capability and mitigate surge requirements. These
efforts are part of a larger joint effort to ensure sufficient MEDEVAC
capability is sustained in Afghanistan.

111. Senator McCain. General Casey, what is the ratio of U.S.
personnel who are injured to those who die, and how does that compare
with experience in the Iraq theater?
General Casey. The ratio of U.S. personnel injured in Operation
Enduring Freedom to those who die is 1 Soldier Killed in Action for
every 7 Soldiers Wounded in Action (based on reports from theater since
October 7, 2001). For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ratio of U.S.
personnel injured to those who die is one soldier killed in action for
every nine soldiers wounded in action (based on reports from theater
since March 19, 2003). This information, from the Defense Manpower Data
Center Contingency Tracking System, is current as of February 6, 2010.

support for survivors
112. Senator McCain. General Casey, please provide information
describing the Army's Survivor Outreach Services (SOS) program.
General Casey. In fiscal year 2008, the Army began a holistic
review of programs, services, and policies for survivors of the fallen
to ensure we serve them in a manner commensurate with their level of
service and sacrifice to the Nation. The Army created the SOS program
to standardize services and ensure we meet our commitment to these
family members.
The SOS program has been operational for 1 year and provides a
holistic and multi-agency service delivery model to our survivors. The
SOS program supports all survivors--including Reserve component
survivors--who have lost loved ones while on active duty, regardless of
whether the loss was a result of combat, accident, illness or suicide.
The SOS Program services remain available until the survivors no longer
desire them; however, some services, such as medical care requires the
recipient be a DOD ID card holder. The SOS helps Survivors understand
their benefits and make timely and more accurate decisions that impact
positively on them and their families.
The range of services covers the entire spectrum of care, from life
skill education to treatment. Services are tailored to the needs of the
survivors and may include support groups, educational seminars,
financial counseling, advocacy, information, referral, and behavioral
health treatment.
The Army increased SOS Program staffing levels by adding support
coordinators and financial counselors at garrisons and communities
closest to where the families live. Support coordinators serve as the
long-term support agent and links survivors to programs and services.
Additional staff was placed at the Casualty Assistance Centers to
include benefit coordinators and trainers who are subject matter
experts on benefits and entitlements, and provide standardized training
for Casualty Assistance and Notification Officers.

113. Senator McCain. General Casey, what are the goals of the
program?
General Casey. Our Fallen Warriors have paid the ultimate
sacrifice, and the Army is committed to serving their families--both
Active and Reserve component survivors--for as long as they desire. The
goal of the SOS program is to deliver on this promise by expanding and
standardizing services, as well as building a comprehensive program
that embraces and reassures survivors that they are continually linked
to the Army for as long as they desire.

114. Senator McCain. General Casey, are sufficient resources
available to achieve those goals?
General Casey. The current fiscal year funding of $53.8 million has
been adequate to establish the program. To ensure we reach out and
fully support every survivor, as well as improve our case management
systems, the Army plans to increase our garrison and headquarters
capabilities by adding a full-time SOS Support Coordinator at every
garrison and increasing staffing at the Department of the Army level.

115. Senator McCain. General Casey, what additional resources or
legislative authority, if any, are needed?
General Casey. At this time, no changes to legislation are required
to support the SOS program. As we refine and develop the program, we
will request additional funding in future budget requests as necessary.

support for military spouses
116. Senator McCain. General Casey, please provide a comprehensive
description of training and support programs provided to military
spouses at all points in the career of Army personnel.
General Casey. Families are important to the Army, a priority to
soldiers, and a vital factor in the Army's overall readiness. A
prepared Family is better able to manage deployment, long-term
separations, and Army life in general. The Army has a myriad of
training and support programs that are geared towards our spouses, both
Active and Reserve Component.
To help new spouses adapt to the Army, we have developed the New
Spouse Orientation Seminar, which this available online.
The Building Strong and Ready Families is a commander-directed
program that is primarily for first-time soldiers and spouses as they
adapt to Army life.
Army Family Team Building classes provide junior spouses and those
new to the military with the skills and tools to successfully maneuver
through the Army system.
Senior Spouse Leadership Seminars are offered annually to spouses
whose soldiers are attending training at the Army War College and the
Sergeants Major Academy. These courses are designed to assist senior
spouses in enhancing their roles as mentors and advisors.
The Enlisted Spouse Outreach and Training Plan prepares enlisted
spouses for requirements of key assignments through drill sergeant,
recruiter, and first sergeant spouse seminars.
The Joint Senior Spouse Course is the only senior spouse course
regarding leadership. It is jointly conducted and is the 5-day course
for spouses of newly promoted general officers. This course complements
the CAPSTONE course for general officers conducted by the National
Defense University.
In addition to these training programs, there is a multitude of
programs and services, which offer support to spouses. Let me take a
few moments to highlight some of these programs.
Services for Multi-Cultural Families target support for Families
with foreign-born spouses.
Liaison for Citizen Immigration Services is available to Families
seeking guidance for the citizenship and residency application process.
Hearts Apart offers support to all waiting Family members--Active
Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard spouses and children.
The Operation Resources for Educating About Deployment and You
(Operation READY) training program assists commanders in meeting family
readiness objectives. Operation READY includes training modules and
resources designed to help soldiers and their families cope with
personal, Family, and financial demands of deployment.
Military Family Life Consultants (MFLCs) provide non-medical,
short-term, problem-solving counseling services which help soldiers and
families cope with the reactions to stressful or adverse situations
created by deployments and reintegration. The MFLC works directly with
Army Community Service, ARNG Headquarters and Army Reserve Regional
Commands to provide deployment and reintegration support to soldiers
and their families. Consultants with specialized skills (e.g.,
financial, child, and youth needs) may be requested to respond to
installation and Reserve Component needs. The goal is to prevent Family
distress by providing education and information on Family dynamics,
parent education, support services, and the effects of stress and
positive coping mechanisms. In April 2009, MFLCs increased the number
of nonmedical Behavioral Health counseling sessions offered for
servicemembers and their Families from 6 to 12 sessions per person/per
issue.
Family Readiness Group (FRG)/Rear Detachment Training is available
to FRG leaders and rear detachment commanders. Virtual FRGs (vFRG)
provide all the functionality of an FRG via a secure, online setting to
meet the needs of geographically dispersed units and families.
The Employment Readiness Program provides assistance to family
members in acquiring skills, networks, and resources that will allow
them to participate in the work force and to develop a career plan.
Employment services are available to all Army components regardless of
location. Services include: career counseling and coaching; employment
training classes; job fairs; Army Spouse Career Assessment Tool; job
listings; and information and assistance on the Military Spouse Career
Advancement Account.
The Army Spouse Employment Partnership (ASEP) is an expanding
partnership that is mutually beneficial to the Army and corporate
America. ASEP consists of a small group of committed partners from the
private sector, military, and Federal Government who have pledged their
best efforts to increase employment and career opportunities for
military spouses. The partnership provides Army spouses the opportunity
to attain financial security and achieve employment goals through
career mobility and enhanced employment options. Additional training
and support opportunities includes Battlemind Training for spouses,
which assists in understanding PTSD and TBI.
The Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) Program provides
education and training opportunities to eligible dependents of certain
veterans. DEA reduces tuition by offering up to 45 months of education
benefits.
The Stateside Spouse Education Assistance Program (SSEAP) is a
need-based education assistance program designed to provide spouses of
active duty and retired Army soldiers, and widows(ers) of Army soldiers
who died either on active duty or in a retired status, and residing in
the United States, with financial assistance in pursuing educational
goals. The program assists spouses/widows(ers) in gaining the education
required to allow them to qualify for increased occupational
opportunities. SEAP provides for up to $2,500 maximum per academic year
for fees, supplies, or books.
The Army has a website (Army OneSource) which provides detailed
information for all of these programs.

117. Senator McCain. General Casey, what resources are available to
support these programs in the fiscal year 2011 request?
General Casey. The resources requested for training and support
programs for military spouses has more than doubled from the fiscal
year 2008 budget of $116.9 million to the fiscal year 2011 budget
request of $321.1 million.

118. Senator McCain. General Casey, are there any unfunded
requirements with respect to programs to support military spouses? If
so, please identify each such requirement.
General Casey. All programs provided by Army Community Services
that support military spouses are fully funded.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
army structure
119. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the 2010
QDR states, ``In the mid- to long-term, U.S. military forces must plan
and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in
multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes maintaining
the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors.'' I
am concerned that DOD is being short sighted in our QDR and budgeting
process; that the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan is coming at the expense
to maintaining our long-term military capability. The Army's fiscal
year 2011 budget request appears focused more on maintaining the force
in the current fight and less on developing a force capable of winning
across the spectrum of future threats. Is the Army postured and
structured properly to counter the full spectrum of threats, low and
high end, in the near- and far-term?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army has outlined two major
priorities: Restoring Balance and Setting Conditions for the Future. To
restore balance, we are targeting the four imperatives of Sustain,
Prepare, Reset and Transform. First, we must sustain the All-Volunteer
Force by ensuring a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and
Army civilians that is commensurate with their quality of service.
Second, we must prepare soldiers, units, and their equipment for future
deployments by providing adequate time to train for full-spectrum
operations and to reduce uncertainty and stress for soldiers and their
families. Third, we must reset the force as it returns from extended
deployments, to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that
permits the resumption of training for future missions across the full
range of potential military operations. Finally, we must continuously
assess and transform the force to meet combatant commander requirements
by revising our modernization strategy, completing transformation from
Cold War legacy formations to modular formations, and improving
business processes.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget reflects how we have transformed the
Army and prioritized programs and efforts that show promise for today
and tomorrow. The Army incorporated a BCT modernization plan that
continuously modernizes equipment to meet current and future capability
needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment,
and technology insertions. Army efforts in this line of effort include
our request for $887 million for the procurement of 16 Block III AH-64
Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64 Helicopters to
Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort to improve
situational awareness, performance, reliability, and sustainment of the
Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to modernize the ARNG
Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested
$505 million dollars to upgrade Shadow RQ-7 UAVs. This key upgrade will
increase the payload capacity and enhance the performance of this key
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset for our BCT
commanders.
We are confident the current program provides the resources and
structure to meet the imperatives defined above while also setting
conditions for the future. The Army continues to serve the needs of the
Nation in an increasingly unpredictable global security environment.
While me must maintain access to consistent, timely and reliable
funding, we believe the fiscal year 2011 base budget and OCOs requests
provide the resources necessary to sustain the force, ensure deployment
readiness, reset the force, and to transform the Army to ensure an
adaptive, capable and dominant force in support of combatant commanders
and the Nation. The Army takes seriously its obligation to maintain
responsible stewardship of the resources appropriated to it by the
American public. Current enterprise initiatives are studying how to
continually improve Army business practices and policies to better
enable this stewardship.
As we responsibly draw down our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan
and train for Full Spectrum Operations, we must sustain reliable,
timely, and consistent funding. A force capable of deterring or
defeating emerging adversaries is supported by funding that restores
balance and readiness for our soldiers, families, and veterans, and
allows us to reset our equipment and Army Prepositioned Stocks.

120. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, does the
Army have the right equipment currently in inventory or being developed
to address these contingency requirements?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Yes. The current and future
strategic environments of persistent conflict require the Army to
modernize our capabilities continuously and aggressively to stay ahead
of our adversaries. The objective of the Army's modernization effort is
to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix of the best
equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full
spectrum operations both today and tomorrow.
The Army will accomplish our modernization goals by focusing our
efforts on three major lines of effort: develop and field new
capabilities to meet identified gaps through traditional and rapid
acquisition processes; continuously modernize equipment to meet current
and future needs through the procurement of upgrades, recapitalization
and divestment; and meet continuously evolving force requirements in
the current operational environment by fielding and distributing
capabilities in accordance with Army priorities. Examples include the
ongoing Apache Block III and Paladin Improvement Programs, new GCV and
Joint Light Tactical Truck Programs.

combat vehicles and helicopters
121. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army's
current fleets of combat vehicles and helicopters were developed and
procured over 30 to 60 years ago and are aging at an increasingly rapid
rate. The M1 Abrams tank was developed in the 1970s and fielded in the
1980s, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle was developed over 25 years ago,
and the M109A6 Paladin howitzer is on its sixth version. The Army's
helicopter fleet continues to get older and suffer the effects of
continuous combat operations, with ages ranging from 15 to 40-plus
years, with the CH-47 dating back to 1962 and on its seventh version
(CH-47F). How does the Army achieve a balanced and full spectrum
strategy when its fleet of combat vehicles and helicopters range from
30 to 50 years old?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army reduced the Fleet Age
of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles by conducting a
national level reset of its vehicles returning from deployments. This
combat vehicle reset restored capability or ``life'' lost during combat
operations. Additionally, the Army recapitalized these vehicles by
installing equipment upgrades to incrementally modernize the vehicle
fleet resetting a vehicles' age to zero hours/miles. These actions
reduced the fleet age in aggregate, while allowing the Army to
integrate lessons learned from OEF/OIF to enhance survivability and
battle command.
We are making a similar investment in the M109A6 Paladin 155mm,
Self-propelled howitzers and Field Artillery Ammunition Vehicles
(FAASV) with the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program. The PIM
program will produce a new chassis with Bradley common engine,
transmission and suspension systems. The new PIM chassis combined with
the current cannon turret will provide the needed power to maneuver the
howitzer and FAASV with the Abrams and Bradley fleets. In addition,
with Bradley common components, the PIM program will reduce the
logistic footprint of the Heavy BCT, while restoring the fleet age and
minimizing the overall maintenance costs.
The Army will also continue to modernize its aviation fleet through
procurement, recapitalization and reset. A total of 464 CH-47F model
aircraft are planned for delivery to the Army over the next 12 years.
Of these, 220 will be new builds and the remaining 244
``remanufactured'' aircraft utilize dynamic components from the
divested CH-47D. Unlike the CH-47D which was created on the same aging
frame of the CH-47A fleet, the CH-47F will include a new airframe,
wiring harness and hydraulic system. The current average age of the CH-
47D fleet is 20 years and the current age of the CH-47F fleet is 2
years. Other Army airframes are receiving similar attention like the
UH-60A to A to L RECAP Program, which recapitalizes 228 UH-60A ARNG and
USAR legacy fleet Black Hawk helicopters in fiscal year 2010 thru
fiscal year 2015.

122. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what is
the plan for Army helicopter modernization for fiscal year 2011 and
beyond?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Army Aviation continues to
transform and modernize to meet current and future full-spectrum
aviation requirements. The Aviation Transformation Plan, which guides
fleet modernization strategy and aviation formation transformation, is
based on a full, in-depth analysis that integrates lessons learned from
recent operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom. The Plan restructures Army Aviation warfighting units into 21
Combat Aviation Brigades (13 Active, 8 Reserve components).
Additionally, we have significant MEDEVAC and cargo/utility modular
capabilities above division level to support the combatant commander
requirements ensuring the aviation units are modular, capable, lethal,
tailorable and sustainable. To maintain our current capability, and
meet future requirements, we are executing a combination of aircraft
recapitalizations and remanufactures, in addition to replacing wartime
losses with brand new aircraft.
The future vision for Army Aviation is being assessed and developed
throughout the aviation community of operators and materiel
development. The challenge is to chart a future for Army Aviation while
maintaining and fighting the world's best rotary wing and unmanned
system fleets. To do this, we must continue the cooperation with
industry and academia to ensure we provide the incentive to make the
next leap in technology that will bring us the development of future
propulsion systems and revolutionary aircraft designs that will meet
our future requirements for faster, more capable, more efficient and
more easily sustained aircraft systems.
As part of the process, the Army is participating in several
studies looking at future Rotorcraft capabilities. These include the
DOD's Future Vertical Lift Study, the Joint Future Theater Lift effort,
and our own Joint Multi-Role Helicopter Study. These capabilities-based
assessments will lay out a strategic plan for the Department's vertical
lift that will take us to the next fleet of rotorcraft and vertical
lift aircraft in the 2025 timeframe.
The Army will also continue to modernize its aviation fleet through
procurement, recapitalization and reset. A total of 464 CH-47F model
aircraft are planned for delivery to the Army over the next 12 years.
Of these, 220 will be new builds and the remaining 244
``remanufactured'' aircraft utilize dynamic components from the
divested CH-47D. Unlike the CH-47D which was created on the same aging
frame of the CH-47A fleet, the CH-47F will include a new airframe,
wiring harness and hydraulic system. The current average age of the CH-
47D fleet is 20 years and the current age of the CH-47F fleet is 2
years. Other Army airframes are receiving similar attention like the
UH-60A to A to L RECAP Program, which recapitalizes 228 UH-60A ARNG and
USAR legacy fleet Black Hawk helicopters in fiscal year 2010 thru
fiscal year 2015.

ground combat vehicle program
123. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the
cancellation of the Armored Gun System, Comanche, Crusader, and the FCS
Manned Ground Vehicle program, along with recent reports on the
uncertainty of the GCV as part of the BCT Modernization program, gives
me cause for concern over the Army's capabilities in the coming years.
Since the Manned Ground Vehicle portion of FCS was terminated last
year, you have made it a priority to field the new GCV within the next
7 years. The press has been reporting that there is disagreement
between DOD and the Army about the Army's GCV program--``U.S. Army,
Pentagon at odds over new vehicle''--Reuters, February 17, 2010. Is
there disagreement and if so, what is it based on?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army and OSD agree on the
need to develop the new GCV in response to current and emerging threats
and the limitations of the existing combat vehicle fleet. In response
to the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Army has reviewed
requirements and developed an acquisition plan for GCV that is
consistent with DOD policy and law. As part of the Materiel Development
Decision approval process, the Army provided OSD with several briefings
to ensure that all questions and concerns were addressed. The shared
goal is to see the GCV program proceed in a way that will ensure its
success. As a result of Army's last meeting with OSD, the GCV Request
for Proposal was released. In accordance with DOD policy and law, OSD
will continue to be involved in the planning for the GCV program as it
moves toward a Milestone A decision.

124. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what are
you doing differently to ensure that the GCV doesn't suffer the same
fate as other failed programs?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The GCV program plan has
incorporated several mitigation strategies into the program plan. First
of all, we will have contractors deliver subsystem level competitive
prototypes early in the development. This will give the program manager
an undeniable indication of the contractor's progress. Second, we will
retain competition throughout the Technology Development (TD) and
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phases. This will keep
the competing contractors responsive and innovative; they will not have
any assurance that they are the sole source for GCV production. This
strategy required the contractors to maintain schedule and reduce costs
as they progress through the TD and EMD phases. Third, we will stay
focused on maintaining the program schedule during execution, even if
that results in slightly less capability. A 7-year schedule is the
constant even if that schedule results in an 80-85 percent solution.
Finally, the modular design approach with growth margin to support
system updates will support performance improvements over time and will
provide flexibility for emerging/changing requirements.

125. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, if the GCV
is fielded in accordance with your schedule, how long will the current
fleet of vehicles such as the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles remain
in the force?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The current fleet of combat
vehicles including the Bradley will remain in use through 2030. The GCV
will replace the Bradley in its Infantry Fighting Mission Role starting
in 2017 with replacement of the Bradley's other mission roles to
follow.

126. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what are
your plans to upgrade the other vehicles such as the engineer, field
artillery, ambulance, and command vehicles?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army continues to explore
an incremental approach to conduct modernization for its combat vehicle
fleet. This effort is tied to how the Army conducts its current fight
and adjusts its force structure and mix analyses. The Army has a
significant number of M113 variants which are serving in command and
control, engineer, field artillery and ambulance roles. There are about
5,200 of these variants required. As the Army builds its Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) 12-17 investment program, we will be
exploring options for the replacement of these vehicles. Those options
include using Strykers, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and MRAP vehicles to
fill some or all of these roles.

health and quality of the army
127. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army's
strength is in its soldiers, their families, and the Army civilians who
support them. Even after 8-plus years of combat operations, the Army
remains resilient and capable, a fact that never ceases to leave me in
awe. I applaud you, General Casey, for the emphasis you have placed on
the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army Risk Reduction
Program, and the Health Promotion Program as part of your stated
objective to ``sustain soldiers, civilians, and families.'' I also
applaud the Army in taking an aggressive approach last year to address
the soldier suicide issue and continue to pursue the right solutions
for the growing trend of suicides among family members. What is your
assessment of the health and quality of the Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Our soldiers, families, and
civilians are clearly stressed and fatigued by nearly 9 years of
combat. The Army is out of balance, and that balance needs to be
restored to sustain this All-Volunteer Force for the long haul. Yet
through it all, our Army remains amazingly resilient, determined, and
extraordinarily effective. Today, our soldiers have more expertise,
education, training and capabilities than ever before, and in fiscal
year 2009 our incoming Active component soldiers had the highest high
school diploma rates since fiscal year 2003.

128. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, where is
the Army in terms of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the
Army Risk Reduction Program, and the Health Promotion Program?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
(CSF) is a rapidly maturing program designed to develop psychological
and physiological resilience across the entire Army community,
including soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army
civilians. To date, over 395,000 soldiers have taken the Global
Assessment Tool, which is a web-based strengths assessment. Eight web-
based training modules that target resilience skills are currently
available to soldiers once they complete the Global Assessment Tool,
and 20 modules will be available by the end of fiscal year 2010.
Additionally, CSF has trained 829 Master Resilience Trainers at the
University of Pennsylvania and satellite locations, with a goal of
training at least 1,800 trainers by the end of fiscal year 2010. These
Master Resilience Trainers lead resilience development training in
their units and local communities. CSF is currently budgeted for $42
million annually over the next 5 years.
The Army considers reduction of soldier high-risk behaviors as an
ultimate goal. These behaviors, whether they be substance abuse,
domestic violence, financial problems, self-medication or others are
viewed by the Army as possible precursors to suicide, as well as
serious issues that must be dealt with individually. In essence, many
of our human services fall under the general rubric of risk reduction.
The Army also has a specific Risk Reduction Program that aids
commanders and human service providers in tracking 15 high-risk soldier
behaviors in units and addressing areas of high risk. This program is
now being expanded to deployed units and to the Reserve and National
Guard as a result of initiatives from the Army Suicide Prevention Task
Force.
The goal of the Army Health Promotion Program is to maximize
readiness, warfighting ability and work performance. Objectives include
enhancing the well-being of all soldiers, Army civilians, family
members, and retirees; and encouraging lifestyles that improve and
protect physical, behavioral and spiritual health. The Army Health
Promotion Program encompasses a variety of activities designed to
facilitate behavioral and environmental alterations to improve or
protect health and well-being. This includes a combination of health
education and related policies, organizational, social, behavioral,
spiritual and health care activities and initiatives. These are
integrated to produce a single comprehensive program evaluating
population needs, assessing existing programs and coordinating targeted
interventions.

129. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how have
the measures taken in 2009 helped to reduce the suicide rates in the
Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army had a record number of
suicide deaths in January and February 2009. If the trend had
continued, the Army was on track to exceed 200 Active Component suicide
deaths for 2009. The Army's senior leadership engaged this problem
head-on.
The Army conducted a ``suicide stand-down'' in March 2009, released
an interactive suicide training video and implemented several
initiatives to reduce the ``stigma'' associated with seeking behavioral
health services. The Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot
program in Schofield Barracks, HI; Fort Richardson, AK; and Fort Lewis,
WA allows self-referral into treatment programs without command
notification. Several ``tele-behavioral'' health pilot programs are
underway, which require all redeploying soldiers, from the senior
commander to the most junior soldier, to receive behavioral health
screening.
In 2010, we have continued this effort by expanding the training
for ``peer support'' using the Ask - Care - Escort model, developing
new interactive training videos, and increasing access to behavioral
health care thru telemedicine initiatives. Finally, the Army fully
supports the requirement set forth in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 for ``person to person''
behavioral health assessments for every servicemember upon their
redeployment from an overseas operation.

130. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what is
the Army doing to address suicides among family members?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. : The Army Suicide Prevention
Task Force and the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk
Reduction and Suicide Prevention have addressed family member and Army
civilian suicide prevention efforts.
Many of our outreach efforts have a specific family member focus.
For example, this year's interactive training video ``Home Front'' will
have specific scenarios for family member's--both spouses and children.
The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research developed Family Battlemind
training for use in both pre- and post-deployment settings. Key
components include teaching families the following:

Independence: the capability of having a fulfilling
and meaningful life as part of an Army-centric Family
Resiliency: The ability to overcome setbacks and
obstacles and to maintain positive thoughts during times of
adversity

The Army Medical Department has expanded access to behavioral
health within Military Treatment Facilities and through TRICARE. The
Army helped initiate the TRICARE Assistance Program and Tele-Behavioral
Health program for geographically dispersed Family Members. This
demonstration project will expand access to existing behavioral health
services by using audiovisual telecommunication systems, such as video
chat and instant messaging to access existing behavioral health
centers. It also expands access to the behavioral health call centers
and counseling services for eligible beneficiaries, which assists
Reserve component and Active component families, who do not live near
an Army post.

equipment reset
131. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, since
2003, Army units have left behind a significant amount of their
organizational equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan as with some given to
Iraqi or Afghan forces, some abandoned and some left in place to
provide future capability in theatre. In some instances, leaving this
equipment has created home-station training challenges for units going
through reset in preparation for another deployment. In the fiscal year
2011 OCO request, $10.8 billion is highlighted for reset of Army
equipment. As well, it was noted that ``the Army has reset 29 brigades
worth of equipment in fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13
more, with a grand total of some 98,000 pieces since September 11,
2001.'' As I understand reset, it is a continuous requirement,
occurring as brigades return from combat operations and prepare for the
next, and will have to continue well after operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have ceased. Is the Army experiencing any equipment
shortages due to reset or recap funding?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. No. The Army does have some
equipment shortages, but they are not due to inadequate reset or
recapitalization funding. The Army greatly appreciates all of the
support Congress has provided for Army equipment reset, which has
enabled the Army to meet all such requirements for redeployed units.
You are correct regarding continuous reset. As our Army
organizations return from operational missions, they immediately move
to reset to prepare for the next mission. When equipment shortfalls are
identified, the Army uses our ARFORGEN model as a mitigation strategy
to support training and homeland defense missions for nondeployed
forces. Many of our current equipment shortages can be traced to the
extraordinary demands imposed by fighting two wars simultaneously.

water purification
132. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the task
of supplying U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan is a daunting
task, a task that was challenging even without the deployment of
additional U.S. and coalition forces and the increase in ground
operations. Supply lines to Afghanistan are long and difficult, with
many of our operating bases in austere locations. One piece in a
February 14 New York Times article about the movements of a Marine
company in Helmand Province caught my eye--some of the Marines were
carrying 5-gallon jugs of water which increased the weight they were
carrying to 100 pounds or more. I have received reports from Army,
Marine, and Special Operations units regarding the need for man-
portable water filtration units. What is the current state of supply
operations to your soldiers in Afghanistan?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. U.S. Forces Afghanistan has the
capacity to produce and distribute both bulk and bottled water for
current forces, as well as for the future force structure.
Current bulk water requirements are 1.5M gallons per day and
147,000 cases of bottled water per day. With the surge, projected bulk
requirements will rise to 2.5 million gallons per day and projected
bottled water requirements to 220,000 cases per day. Today, the current
maximum bulk capacity for water production supporting Afghanistan is
3.4 million gallons per day and a bottled water capacity of 544,000
cases per day. This capacity is based on the forward positioning of
five commercial water bottling plants: two in Kabul, and one each in
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and United Arab Emirates.
We fully recognize that the major challenge in tactical water
operations in Afghanistan, as with any supply commodity in that
theater, is distribution, not necessarily capacity or wholesale
production. To address this distribution challenge, the Army has
deployed its full array of tactical water purification systems, as well
as water storage and distribution assets as far forward as possible.
These tactical systems range from larger capacity production units,
such as the 3,000 gal per hour Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit,
to lighter weight purification systems that are designed to support
smaller unit configurations, such as Teams, Platoons, and Company-sized
elements. These lighter systems are capable of being delivered by air
along with a robust storage capability to support them.
Moreover, there are currently seven Expeditionary Water Packaging
Systems (EWPS) being deployed to various operating bases in
Afghanistan, placing water production and distribution closer to the
forces. The EWPS are government owned, contractor operated water
bottling systems using tactical production equipment. Each is capable
of producing a minimum of 5,000 one-liter bottles per day.
Finally, we recently deployed six well drilling rigs, currently in
Afghanistan, to drill new wells closer to the point of consumption.
This will shorten the distribution leg. The CENTCOM water strategy
continues to be the development of water resources and the production
of water at the forward operating bases (FOBs); thus reducing
transportation requirements.
Currently, there are no Operational Needs Statement or Joint Unit
Operational Needs Statement or Rapid Equipping Force 10 Liner
requirements for a manportable water filtration unit.

133. Senator Inhofe. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, can you
check on our ability to purify water in austere locations, ensuring a
safe supply of drinking water for our soldiers in theater?
Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army has sufficient water
purification, storage and distribution systems available for employment
in a tactical environment. Each of these systems is approved for use by
the U.S. Army Health Command; thereby ensuring that the water is safe
for soldier consumption. These systems have been successfully
supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Our forces
continue to receive potable and palatable water on-time and in
sufficient quantities to meet all water requirements for consumption
and personal hygiene.
To ensure that water production capability is closer to the point
of consumption in austere areas, we have deployed six well drilling
rigs in Afghanistan, to expand water resources and production of water
at our FOBs.
Currently, we also have the following tactical systems, designed
for austere deployment, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom:
Water Purification Units:
The 600 Gallon per hour (GPH), trailer mounted,
Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) is capable of
purifying 600 gallons of seawater and 900 gallons fresh water
per hour. Eighteen (18) of these systems are in deployed status
providing a total capability of 10,800 GPH.
The 3000 GPH, trailer mounted, ROWPU is capable of
purifying 2,000 gallons of seawater and 3,000 gallon of fresh
water. Twenty-four of these systems are in a deployed status
providing a total capability production of 72,000 GPH.
The 1500 GPH, Tactical Water Purification System is
capable of purifying 1,200 GPH seawater and 3000 GPH fresh
water. Nine systems are in a deployed status providing at total
production capability of 13,500 GPH.
The Light Weight Purifier (LWP), which is the Army's
most expeditious reverse osmosis purification unit, is capable
of producing 125 GPH from a fresh water source and 75 GPH from
a salt water source. Both air transportable and air droppable,
26 systems are in a deployed status providing a total
capability production of 3,250 GPH.
Storage and Distribution:
Water Tank Rack (HIPPO) consists of a 2,000 gallon
potable hard wall water tank in an ISO frame with an integrated
pump, hose and fill stand.
Water Storage and Distribution Systems, which consists
of 800,000 and 40,000 gallon system, are collapsible tanks and
support equipment and that provide large volumes of bulk
potable water storage and distribution (two 800,000 and three
40,000 systems are in a deployed status providing a storage and
distribution of 1.7 million gallons of water).
The Expeditionary Water Packaging System, which is a
newly developed tactical water purification system capable of
bottling water, is being deployed to Afghanistan (7 systems
total). These systems are designed to operate at austere FOBs,
placing water packaging and distribution closer to U.S. forces.
Each system is capable of bottling 5,000 one liter bottles per
day.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
army aviation
134. Senator Sessions. General Casey, I am very happy about the QDR
plus-up of two Combat Aviation Brigades for the Army. With this plus-up
of aviation assets must come a plus-up in resources. Do you believe
adequate resources are available to support the growth in Army
aviation?
General Casey. Yes, I think we have what we need. The first of
these combat aviation brigades (CAB) was organized by consolidating
existing aviation force structure within the Army. With the exception
of adding some required headquarters personnel and common equipment
such as trucks and generators, the resources required were minimal. All
aircraft and crews required were already in the existing force
structure. As for the second CAB, the majority of the funding required
($5.5 billion) was provided. While we have determined that it is
feasible to activate this CAB, there is an unfunded requirement
remaining ($1.2 billion) to cover operations, training and some
personnel costs, which we will have to make adjustments for in our
budget process.

135. Senator Sessions. General Casey, are you planning to increase
resources for the Aviation Training Center at Fort Rucker?
General Casey. Yes. We have already begun increasing resources for
training at Fort Rucker. Funding there increased from $775 million
(fiscal year 2009) to $995 million (fiscal year 2010) to $1.067 billion
(fiscal year 2011) annually to cover increases in undergraduate and
graduate flight training. Fort Rucker has already hired 40 new contract
instructor pilots to train AH-64, CH-47, and UH-60 flight training with
plans to increase the total to 52 new instructors. The Aviation Center
has received an additional 21 AH-64Ds and 20 UH-60s to meet the
increased training requirements. New hangar ($36 million) and
maintenance facilities ($29 million) are being constructed in fiscal
year 2011 to support training increases. Additionally, $34 million in
improvements will be made this year to existing structures and ranges
to support increased training.

136. Senator Sessions. General Casey, will this plus-up of Army
aviation include manned and unmanned teaming increases?
General Casey. The Army has achieved great success by combining the
capabilities of manned and unmanned systems in combat operations, and
will maximize this new aviation organizational force design construct.
Additional Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) and their manned helicopter
assets will be paired with existing unmanned systems, to provide
greater manned-unmanned operations capability. In addition to teaming
with UAS resident within BCTs, the Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS
will be assigned to CABs. We are also developing concepts combining
Shadow UAS with manned scout helicopters in an Armed Reconnaissance
Squadron. These efforts will greatly expand the Army's manned-unmanned
capabilities.

137. Senator Sessions. General Casey, will the Center of Excellence
for unmanned aerial systems at Fort Rucker receive additional resources
to continue doctrine development, integration, and execution planning
for the manned and unmanned team initiative?
General Casey. The Army Unmanned Aircraft System Center of
Excellence (UAS CoE) is a critical organization that provides a
professional and focused team to ensure the Army maintains our
leadership role in the UAS community across all Army warfighting
functions. This includes our groundbreaking efforts to develop and
improve manned-unmanned operations.
The UAS CoE is currently a provisional organization and is
resourced through May 2010. Fort Rucker has forwarded a Concept Plan to
Headquarters, TRADOC to ensure that the UAS CoE remains as an enduring
organization with 6 military and 11 civilian personnel authorized on an
approved Table of Distribution and Allowances. As the Army reviews our
Generating Force personnel numbers (including TRADOC), our unmanned
systems mission growth is a key area upon which we will focus.

anniston army depot
138. Senator Sessions. Secretary McHugh, I just visited Anniston
Army Depot last week while working in Alabama. I understand that the
Army is considering placing the installation under the command of the
Army's Installation Management Command. The community is up in arms
over this decision. Do you believe Anniston Army Depot will increase
its productivity and lower its Army Capital Working Fund rates because
of this realignment of command?
Secretary McHugh. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Installation
Management Command (IMCOM) are in the process of conducting a transfer
of responsibility for base operation functions in a pilot at ANAD.
IMCOM will assume responsibilities for non-Army Working Capital Fund
(AWCF) base operation support functions.
Under the pilot concept, ANAD with the support of AMC and IMCOM
regional office, will create a virtual structure to determine if the
proposed transfer of non-AWCF base operating functions and costs to
IMCOM can be done with no impacts to the ANAD production mission and no
additional cost to Army as a whole. If the pilot is successful and
implementation is approved there will be a reduction in base operating
costs (overhead costs) that have to be allocated to stabilized
workload; however, due to the complex nature of rates this would only
be a good measure if all extraneous variables were held constant (i.e.
direct labor hours available to allocate overhead costs, direct labor
and material costs, Accumulative Operating Results adjustments, etc).

139. Senator Sessions. Secretary McHugh, if productivity does not
increase and Army Capital Working Funds rates are not reduced, will you
carry on with the reassignment?
Secretary McHugh. The Army will consider all factors prior to
moving forward with the reassignment. We have established three guiding
principles for assessing the results of the pilot: (1) maintaining or
reducing costs; (2) maintaining or improving mission effectiveness; and
(3) preserving the mission commander's flexibility to direct resources.
As we conduct the pilot program, we will adjust the parameters as
required to address any issues encountered.

afghanistan
140. Senator Sessions. General Casey, I think we would all agree
that the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq war was a great success and
signaled the beginning of stabilization in that troubled theater. A
recent Washington Post article that appeared on January 22 highlights
U.S. Central Command's use of local defense initiatives to similarly
train local militias as security forces to bridge the gap until more
Afghan army and police forces can be trained. Recent estimates imply
that 32,000 soldiers need to be added over the next 10 months in order
to meet the stated goal of 134,000 troops by the end of the year. While
not all lessons from the Iraq war can be applied to Afghanistan, former
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf recently wrote, ``Afghanistan for
centuries has been governed loosely through a social covenant between
all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is needed
again to bring peace and harmony.'' Would you agree that this program
will spread coalition influence into remote regions and bridge the gap
until we can recruit and train adequate Afghan army and police forces?
General Casey. Central Command (CENTCOM) is working on several
initiatives to achieve local security by incorporating more community
involvement. It's my understanding that these initiatives are Afghan
led and supported by the CENTCOM.

141. Senator Sessions. General Casey, do you think the Afghani
government can be persuaded to support this program or is this
something that will have to be implemented independently?
General Casey. I believe the Afghan government will proceed with
caution as the initiatives are more fully developed and implemented,
but I defer to CENTCOM for their assessment.

142. Senator Sessions. General Casey, what is your opinion on our
ability to adequately screen militia candidates for this program to
ensure that we are not training the wrong folks?
General Casey. I defer to CENTCOM to respond since they are on the
ground and better able to assess the situation.

143. Senator Sessions. General Casey, the Post article addressed
differences between DOD and the Department of State (DOS) concerning
implementation of a timeline. General McChrystal has already
implemented this program on a small scale using existing funding. In
order to fully implement, though, Ambassador Eikenberry must release
additional funds. How are existing Commander's Emergency Response
Program funds being used to support this program and are these funds
adequate to fully implement local defense initiatives?
General Casey. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
funding is used for short-term, private sector contracts for temporary
guards of critical infrastructure, not to train local militias as
security forces. The CERP program supports local defense initiatives by
funding development projects in targeted areas. As noted in the same
Washington Post article, ``In Afghanistan, compensation will be in the
form of money for development projects in areas where the groups
operate.'' Current CERP funding is adequate to accomplish these
development efforts.

144. Senator Sessions. General Casey, what support is needed from
DOS and what is DOD doing to resolve these differences in a timely
manner?
General Casey. I believe there is a lot of cooperative activity
taking place between DOD and Department of State. We have ongoing
partnerships with the Iraqi Security Forces and the Afghan National
Security Forces with a number of counter-terrorism initiatives ongoing.
As for the specific details regarding support that DOD needs from the
Department of State, I have to defer to DOD to respond.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
medium extended air defense system
145. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, GAO and OSD have confirmed
that MEADS will cost billions more than expected. What amount of
additional funding will be necessary that exceeds the existing budget
baseline?
Secretary McHugh. The cost growth for the International Program is
estimated to be over $1.2 billion to be shared by the three Nations.
The U.S. share of this is estimated to be in the range of $700 million
(preliminary estimates). The OSD for Cost Assessments and Program
Evaluation assessment is ongoing and will be used to refine these
estimates further.

146. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, why has the MEADS program
not been scrutinized under Nunn-McCurdy?
Secretary McHugh. We evaluate and assess the program against the
Nunn-McCurdy criteria as part of our normal program management. The
program has been reporting program unit costs against Nunn-McCurdy
criteria since September 2004, and current estimates are within the
thresholds. We continue to monitor the matter closely, and OSD directed
the Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation office to develop an
independent estimate.

147. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, MEADS was designed to
upgrade the capabilities of the U.S., German, and Italian Air and
Missile Defense (AMD) systems. However, the MEADS program is 9 years
behind to deliver the capability to our troops and our allies. What is
the reason and justification for this delay and how will we defend
ourselves from current threats while we continue to wait for MEADS?
Secretary McHugh. The MEADS Design and Development program of
record began in July 2004. Issues emerged during the program's
Preliminary Design Review, necessitating an Army and OSD independent
review. The independent review assessed the program to be approximately
18 months behind schedule, with a high degree of concurrency and risk
leading into Critical Design Review and testing. The independent review
team recommended a rebaseline of the program, adding approximately 18-
24 months (at additional cost), to reduce engineering and test
concurrency and reduce overall risks. The MEADS initiative has
experienced a series of starts and stops since the concept inception in
the early 1990s. Since the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board in
2004, the program has been fully funded but will require approximately
$700 million between fiscal year 2012-17 to support the rebaselined
schedule and effort.
The United States utilizes a combination of Air and Missile Defense
systems to provide required capability to the force today. Most
notably, the Patriot Missile System is forward deployed in multiple
Areas of Responsibility. These systems undergo periodic upgrades to
increase capability against an evolving threat, mitigate obsolescence,
and minimize sustainment costs. Patriot is the only combat-proven
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense in the force. Patriot continues to
match the threat and provide our troops with excellent Air Defense
coverage.

148. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, in addition to years of
program delays, cost overruns, and technological challenges for the
MEADS program, I understand there may be changes to the key performance
parameters (KPPs) for MEADS. What changes have been made to the KPPs?
Secretary McHugh. Currently, no changes to the KPPs are being made;
however the U.S. Army TRADOC has been tasked to review MEADS
requirements

149. Senator Vitter. Secretary McHugh, is it possible that an AMD
system could be centered around the upgraded Patriot AMD system, which
I understand would be a more cost-effective alternative to MEADS?
Secretary McHugh. While it is possible, even an upgraded Patriot
Air and Missile Defense system would not meet the MEADS requirements
for a 360-degree surveillance and fire control capability.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Begich, Burris, Inhofe,
Sessions, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V,
professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J.
Paul, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Juliet
Beyler and Gordon Peterson, assistants to Senator Webb; Julie
Holzhueter, assistant to Senator Hagan; David Ramseur,
assistant to Senator Begich; Brady King, assistant to Senator
Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
Senator Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker;
Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Chip Kennett,
assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We welcome
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway to our
committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs of
the Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year
2011 annual budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO)
request. This committee is grateful to each one of you for your
service to our Nation and for the valorous and truly
professional service of the men and women under your command,
and we are also grateful to their families.
Since our last meeting, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
completed the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). We look
forward to the witnesses' assessments of the 2009 QDR, what it
means for the Department of the Navy today and into the future,
and how their fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the
changes which were directed.
Our witnesses this morning are faced with a number of
critical issues that confront the Department of the Navy in the
budget, such as balancing modernization needs against the costs
of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
President's strategic review, concluded in December, called for
a surge in additional U.S. Marine Corps forces to Afghanistan,
including an increase to 18,500 marines in Afghanistan by March
2010, with that number rising to 19,400 by mid-April.
The recent launch of major operations in southern
Afghanistan represents a critical test of the President's
counterinsurgency strategy and the campaign plan developed by
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander,
General McChrystal, to implement that strategy. U.S. and ISAF
personnel, with the U.S. Marines playing a central role, are
partnering side by side with Afghan forces in support of
extending the authority of the Government of Afghanistan to the
Central Helmand River Valley, including the former Taliban
stronghold of Marjah.
The ratio of Afghan to U.S. troops in Marjah is almost one
to two, one Afghan soldier to two coalition troops, a
considerable improvement, as I've mentioned before, over the
one to five ratio which was the case when a number of us
visited the marines in Helmand Province last September. General
Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has
called this operation the initial salvo of a 12- to 18-month
military campaign. The extraordinary bravery of our soldiers
and marines, as well as our allies, reminds us once again how
truly heroic our men and women in uniform are.
I've argued for a long time that our principal focus in
Afghanistan should be the building of the capacity of the
Afghan army and police so they can take the lead in providing
for their country's security. In this respect, it is difficult
to understand why there has been a persistent shortfall in the
number of trainers available to provide the 8-week basic
training to Afghan security forces. That is a totally
unacceptable situation.
As we discussed in my office, General Conway, you and the
Marines are looking for ways to help out General Bill Caldwell,
the head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Training Command in Afghanistan, to help him to fill the gap by
deploying Marines on shorter rotation to Afghanistan to serve
as trainers for the Afghan army, and we're going to be
interested in getting your update on the progress in supplying
those marines as trainers.
We have proceeded with the drawdown of Marine Corps forces
in Iraq. Where these forces once averaged roughly 25,000
marines, as of last Friday there were only about 150 marines in
Iraq. By spring, the marines will have completed their
redeployment.
The Navy has also been contributing directly to the war
effort in CENTCOM as well. In addition to normal deployments of
ships and aircraft in support of these operations, the Navy
currently has deployed almost 12,000 individual augmentees
(IAs) to support these missions on the ground in Afghanistan
and Iraq. In total, the Navy provides approximately 15,600
sailors in the form of IAs, including 3,800 personnel in the
training pipeline to fulfill mission requirements of the
combatant commanders.
So we express the thanks of this committee for how well and
ably the men and women of the Department of the Navy and their
families are responding to these challenges.
Many of the challenges facing the Department of the Navy
center on acquisition programs. We have great concerns about
cost problems in the shipbuilding arena, the most notable
example being the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since
last year the Navy has decided on a winner-take-all acquisition
strategy for the contract for the two LCS vessels approved in
the fiscal year 2010 budget.
We also look forward to receiving all of the analytical
efforts that were required by our National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 regarding future surface
combatant production and the truncation of the DDG-1000
production line. We understand that the Navy decided to make
this change for a number of reasons, including mission
requirements and affordability. However, we want to ensure that
whatever program we pursue has a sound basis in reasoning
behind it before we launch on another vector.
If the Department of the Navy is unable to get control of
its acquisition programs and cost growth, there is no way that
the Navy is going to be able to afford the fleet of 313 ships
that Admiral Roughead says that he needs, and it is obvious
that other capabilities would suffer as well. I cannot
overstress the importance that the whole Navy Department
shoulders its responsibility to correct mistakes in acquisition
programs because the future strength of our Navy depends on it.
General Conway, lest you feel left out of the acquisition
discussion, you're pursuing the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
(EFV) program. In your prepared statement you emphasize the
importance of the EFV to the Marine Corps' amphibious assault
mission and of the continuing relevance of that mission and
capability to our Nation's defense. The Marine Corps'
amphibious assault concept rests on launching an assault from a
safe distance from shore, beyond where our ships can be easily
observed and attacked. This concept depends on an ability to
swim ashore from 20 to 30 miles out to sea with armored
vehicles, which is the purpose of the EFV.
The QDR heavily emphasized the need to overcome the so-
called anti-access capabilities and strategies that might be
employed by potential adversaries and approved continuing the
EFV program despite previous cost, schedule, and performance
issues with the program. So we need to understand how the
Marine Corps' amphibious assault mission relates to the anti-
access concerns and initiatives discussed in the QDR and what
are you doing in the EFV program to correct the previous
problems with the program.
The President last year signed the Weapons Systems
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). While I'm certain that this
legislation is going to help correct past problems, we also
know that we will succeed only through concerted efforts within
the executive branch to implement the spirit of that
legislation and improve past behavior within the Department. We
in Congress cannot legislate a culture change. So we look
forward to hearing how the Department of the Navy is proceeding
to implement the provisions of this act.
Another concern surrounds future ship and aircraft force
levels. We are facing the prospect that the current Navy
program will lead to potentially large gaps between the forces
that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has said that he needs
and the forces that will be available to his successors. For
instance, the Navy is facing a shortfall of as many as 250
tactical fighters needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier air
wings and 3 Marine Corps air wings in the middle of this
decade. With shortfalls that large, we could be faced with
drastically reducing the number of aircraft available on short
notice to the combatant commanders, either because we have
deployed under strength air wings or because we did not deploy
the carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages.
Since the last time we saw a Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), we've actually had a slight net loss of production of
new strike fighter aircraft over comparable years in the FYDP,
a result that cannot help this situation.
Turning to naval readiness, currently the Navy is operating
with a 1-year backlog in aircraft and ship depot maintenance.
When asked for your unfunded priorities in the fiscal 2010
budget request, Admiral Roughead, you only had two unfunded
items on your list, aircraft and ship depot maintenance in the
amount of $395 million. Both sides of the aisle on this
committee, as well as our House counterparts, authorized that
critical funding, but, unfortunately, that addition was not
supported by the appropriators. As a result, over $188 million
in deferred maintenance was not executed last year.
In the fiscal year 2011 presidential budget request, again
we have a very short list from the Navy of unfunded
requirements, including aircraft and ship depot maintenance and
aircraft spares to meet the Navy's maintenance requirements.
While we encourage the Navy's commitment to these vital
readiness accounts, we're very interested in hearing from the
witnesses today specifically why this funding is critical to
the Navy's mission, what were the effects of not receiving last
year's maintenance funding, and what are the potential
ramifications of not receiving additional fiscal year 2011
funds to support these needs.
Readiness rates need to be restored rather than delayed.
Additionally, I believe it is essential that the Navy not rely
on OCO funding to make up for maintenance shortfalls. Such an
approach does not contribute to long-term sustainment and risks
degrading the expected service life of the fleet.
We look forward to hearing your testimony. Again, we are
grateful to you and your families for supporting your service
and, of course, the men and women that you command.
Senator McCain is not here. Senator Inhofe is the acting
ranking member this morning.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to go ahead and
submit Senator McCain's statement for an opening statement. But
I'd like to make an observation. When we have these Navy
posture hearings, I look around and I see a very heavy
representation from coastal States, and I'm not sure why. I'd
like to remind my colleagues up here of something that may
surprise them a little bit: We in my State of Oklahoma are in
fact navigable. We have a navigation way that we put in many
years ago.
In fact, when I was in the State senate many years ago, the
head of the World War II submarine veterans came to me and he
told me the story of the submarine veterans, about how half of
them died in World War II and the other half took care of the
families of those others. He said, ``I'd like to do a memorial;
I'd like to bring a World War II submarine all the way up to
Oklahoma.''
We studied it and it could be done. So we went down to
Orange, TX, and got the USS Batfish and we took all 300 feet of
this thing all the way up the channel. It had to go down under
some of the bridges and have flotation and all that. All my
adversaries were saying, ``We're going to sink Inhofe with his
submarine.'' But we made it, so we have a submarine in my State
of Oklahoma.
We also have quite a presence, which surprises people, of
Navy and Marines, with TACAMO Operations for E-6s at Tinker Air
Force Base. There is a very large presence of Navy there. At
Vance Air Force Base we're doing primary training of not just
Air Force, but also Navy and the Marines. Then down at Fort
Sill we do most of the artillery training, General Conway, for
marines there at Fort Sill in my State of Oklahoma. So we have
a great personal interest in this hearing today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today to
discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 for the
Department of the Navy. I'm sure I speak for all members of our
committee when I say that our thoughts and prayers are with all the
deployed sailors and marines, with their families, and with particular
concern for those marines who are currently engaged in the combat
operations. I also want to commend the thousands of men and women of
the Navy and Marine Corps who deployed to Haiti within just a few hours
of the earthquake to support humanitarian efforts there. Their hard
work and dedication reflects the very finest traditions of the
Department of the Navy.
While supportive of your fiscal year 2011 budget submission, I do
have concerns about the Navy's future force that I would like to have
you specifically address.
For example, last year, the Navy estimated that its shortfall of
carrier-based strike-fighter aircraft was growing larger than previous
estimates--243 aircraft short by 2018. That number is now 100. I'd like
to know what the Navy's current appraisal of that ``strike-fighter
gap'' is and what steps it is taking under its budget proposal to
manage that issue. While this is undoubtedly an important issue,
protecting taxpayers' interests requires that any proposal to buy more
F/A-18s under a multi-year contract fully complies with applicable law.
On the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, with a newly
announced slip in development of 13 months, that program appears to be
headed into another breach of Nunn-McCurdy's cost growth limits. Among
my concerns here is whether the Navy and Marine Corps will be equipped
with the F-35 in time to have the capability they need, when they need
it. With the Marine Corps expected to take delivery of a squadron of
these fighters first among all the Services in 2012 and its acute
reliance on this Program to provide much-needed capability, my concerns
about this Program apply with the most force to them.
On ship depot maintenance, I am encouraged that this year the Navy
has added about $1.2 billion over last year's request to overhaul ships
and, in particular, restore those systems that affect safety and
current combat capability to established performance levels. But, that
amount does not cover the ship maintenance periods that were not funded
in last year's budget--because the appropriators saw it fit to strip
that money away to fund earmarks. Still, that leaves nine additional
ships that will not undergo repair work next year. From the witnesses,
I would like to hear their concerns about underfunding ship overhauls
and whether our surface fleet may be returning to the days of a hollow
force.
On the Littoral Combat Ships Program, the Navy will down-select to
a single sea frame and split its production between two competing
shipyards--reflecting a new acquisition strategy designed to reduce the
ship's overall cost. I would like to know whether the costs of that
troubled program will be below the congressional cost cap and whether
the Program will finally deliver the capability that it was designed to
provide at its inception.
Next, the LPD-17 amphibious ship program has too seen more
challenges than we had hoped. From the witnesses, I would like to know
if we are seeing a systemic problem with the readiness of the Navy's
amphibious ships and how the budget request addresses that issue.
Finally, the Navy's 30-year Shipbuilding Plan calls for the
replacement of 14 Ohio-class submarines and the multi-year procurement
of 2 Virginia-class attack submarines per year to replace Los Angeles-
class submarines. But, those ballistic missile submarines run about
$6.5 billion each and the Virginia-class submarines cost about $2
billion each. That alone consumes over 75 percent of the current
shipbuilding budget. Particularly in the context of our current
economic challenges, we have to be careful that our commitment to
recapitalizing the submarine fleet does not impinge on our commitment
to the surface fleet. I hope the witnesses can give us their views on
the impact of the Plan on our force projection capability in the future
and the shipbuilding industrial base.
I would like to take a moment to convey my support the Department's
decisions to terminate or cut back on those Navy and Marine Corps
programs that have benefited from a reassessment of our requirements or
suffered from a chronic inability to manage development and production
risk. Those programs include canceling plans to build two new joint
command ships; delaying the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program; and
terminating the EP-X manned intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance aircraft program, as well as the JSF Alternate Engine
program and the Next Generation Cruiser (CG(X)). According to the
Office of Management and Budget, those program cuts will save taxpayers
as much as $573 million over last year's budget, freeing up resources
much needed by our combatant commanders to fight the fights we are in
and defense against threats likely to arise in the future.
I look forward to hearing from these witnesses on these, and other,
tough but important issues, which go squarely to how we arm and equip
those men and women who serve their Nation so selflessly at home and
abroad.
Thank you, Chairman Levin.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Mabus.

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished
members of this committee, it's a real pleasure to be here
today with you. The CNO, the Commandant, and I are grateful for
the commitment that the members of this committee have shown to
the men and women in uniform in the Navy and Marine Corps. We
are exceptionally proud to be here today representing our
sailors, marines, civilians, and their families.
The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable
expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of
operations across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today 40
percent of our forces are deployed and over half our fleet is
at sea. In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000
marines are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency, and
engagement operations, including, as the chairman pointed out,
the effort to clear the Taliban from their stronghold in
Marjah. They're supported by naval aircraft flying close air
support from the Eisenhower and our forward-deployed
expeditionary aviation assets.
A total of 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and across the broader Middle East and another
9,000 sailors and marines are embarked on our ships at sea. Off
the coast of Africa, ships are protecting international
commerce off Somalia, and ships are operating as partnership
stations with our regional allies. Off the coast of South
America, more ships are stemming the flow of illegal drugs into
the United States.
Our ballistic missile defense forces are ready to defend
against any threat to international peace in Europe, the Middle
East, and the Pacific Rim, where our forward-deployed forces
continue their role as a strategic buffer and deterrent against
rogue states and potential competitors alike. Today in Haiti, 9
ships and 1,900 marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) continue to provide humanitarian aid, medical assistance,
and disaster relief.
The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and
everywhere our Nation's interests are at stake. Our global
presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us
to respond rapidly to any crisis.
I believe that the President's fiscal year 2011 budget for
the Department of the Navy is a very carefully considered
request that gives us the resources we need to conduct
effective operations and meet all the missions we have been
assigned. Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with
the findings of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in
today's wars, preventing conflict, preparing for future wars,
and preserving the force.
With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue
to maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a
strong American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for
rapid global response.
Across the FYDP, we have requested the funds to build an
average of 10 ships a year, including 1 carrier, 1 big-deck
amphibious ship, 10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 LCSs.
We'll leverage the technologies captured from the canceled
Future Cruiser Program and truncated DDG-1000 program into what
will become our Flight 3 Burke-class guided missile destroyers.
These technologies include the SPY-3 and air and missile
defense radar.
Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase
the size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In
our shipbuilding program, I believe we have made the most cost
effective decisions to achieve the most capable force, one that
achieves equal flexibility to confront missions across the
spectrum of conflict from the technically complex, like
ballistic missile defense and integrated air defense, to low
intensity, humanitarian response, and regional engagement.
In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000
aircraft across the FYDP, including both fixed and rotary wing.
Over the next year, the Navy and the Marine Corps will continue
to move ahead with changes to our acquisitions process. In
compliance with the WSARA, we are aggressively developing our
acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget
becomes the standard for the Navy and Marine Corps.
I'm grateful for the support of this committee for the
decision to recompete the LCS program when it failed to meet
program standards, and I can assure you that we will not
hesitate to recompete or cancel other programs whenever
substandard performance demands such a change.
Change is also required to address the way in which the
Navy and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is
an issue of national security and it's essential to maintaining
our strategic advantage, warfighting readiness, and tactical
edge. By 2020, I've committed the Navy to generate half of all
the energy we use from alternative sources.
Forty years ago, I stood watch on the deck of the USS
Little Rock as a young junior officer. Today I have the great
and solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf of our Navy
and Marine Corps in a time of war and national challenge. I'm
honored by the trust that the President and Congress have
placed in me and fully recognize the solemn obligation I have
to those who defend us.
I, along with the CNO and the Commandant, look forward to
hearing your thoughts, answering your questions about our
budget request, our specific programs, and our policies. I also
look forward to working closely with you as we move forward to
sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable
expeditionary fighting force in the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Raymond E. Mabus, Jr.
Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, it is a pleasure to be here
today with the Senate Armed Services Committee as the representative of
the nearly 900,000 sailors, marines, and civilians that make up the
Department of the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant
of the Marine Corps and I are privileged to lead some of the best men
and women in the country, who are selflessly serving the United States
all around the world in support of our safety, our security, and our
national interests.
The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary
fighting force in the world. We are America's Away Team. The mission
and experience of our team is well matched to the multiple and varied
challenges that threaten our Nation's security and global stability.
Today the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting operations across
the spectrum of military operations, from major combat and ballistic
missile defense to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Fifteen thousand marines are at the forefront of our Nation's
defense, serving in and around Helmand Province, Afghanistan. By spring
this number will grow to almost 20,000. It is a testament to the
responsiveness and combat capability of the Marine Corps that the first
troops to depart for Afghanistan in the wake of the President's
December 1 announcement were 1500 marines from Camp Lejuene, NC. The
new arrivals, who deployed before the end of last year, joined the
Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade already in place. Together they are
taking the fight to the Taliban and al Qaeda in their sector and
assisting the Afghan Provincial Government in reestablishing control.
General Conway describes their capability as a two-fisted fighter,
capable of simultaneously combating an adaptive and insidious
insurgency among the Afghan civilians while maintaining the skill set
to conduct major combat operations.
The Navy in Afghanistan is contributing Special Operations Forces,
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, Seabee civil engineering assets, all
of the airborne expeditionary tactical Electronic Warfare capability,
medical and intelligence professionals, and logistical support. From
our carriers operating in the Indian Ocean, we are launching a
significant percentage of the close air support that watches over our
marines and soldiers on the ground. The Navy has over 12,000 sailors on
the ground in Central Command supporting joint and coalition efforts in
both Iraq and Afghanistan and another 9,000 sailors at sea supporting
combat operations.
The Navy and Marine Corps today are globally engaged in a host of
other security and stability operations. In our cruisers and
destroyers, the Navy has built a strong ballistic missile defense
force. These multi-mission ships routinely deploy to the Mediterranean,
the Arabian Gulf, and the Western Pacific and extend an umbrella of
deterrence. Across the Future Years' Defense Program we will expand
this mission and operationally implement the President's decision in
September 2009 to focus on sea-based ballistic missile defense.
That capability is complemented by the continued preeminence of the
ballistic missile submarines in our strategic deterrent force, who
operate quietly and stealthily on station every day of the year.
In the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, Combined Task Force
151 is leading the international effort to combat piracy in the Gulf of
Aden. They are coordinating their operations with forces from the
European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a total of 24
Nations contributing ships, aircraft, and staff personnel as well as
operational and intelligence support.
Our ships and maritime patrol aircraft in the Caribbean and off
South America are working with the Coast Guard-led Joint Interagency
Task Force-South, which ties together information and forces from 13
nations to stem the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States.
In 2009 alone they contributed to the seizure or disruption of almost
220,000 kilograms of cocaine with a street value of over $4 billion.
Both the Navy and Marine Corps routinely conduct training exercises
and multi-lateral operations with nations all around the world to
solidify our relationships with traditional allies and forge
partnerships with new friends. Global Partnership Stations in Africa,
South America, and the Pacific are training hundreds of sailors,
marines, and coastguardsmen from dozens of nations and are supporting
regional diplomatic and humanitarian engagement efforts, like those of
the hospital ship USNS Comfort and the Fleet Auxiliary USNS Richard E.
Byrd in the summer of 2009. The two ships together treated over 110,000
patients in the Caribbean, South America, and Oceania, and the USNS
Comfort furthered an existing partnership with numerous civilian aid
organizations.
The Navy-Marine Corps team remains on the frontline of response to
natural disasters. In 2009 we provided humanitarian assistance to
Indonesia, the Philippines, and American Samoa, and delivered thousands
of tons of food, water, and medical supplies to those affected by
devastation. After the January 12 earthquake in Haiti, the Navy and
Marine Corps responded immediately. Within a week of the earthquake, 11
Navy ships, including the carrier USS Carl Vinson, the big-deck
amphibious ship USS Bataan, and the hospital ship USNS Comfort were on
station off the coast of Haiti. These ships embarked 41 Navy and Marine
Corps helicopters and approximately 2,000 marines of the 22nd Marine
Expeditionary Unit. On station, our units treated patients, provided
helicopter lift capability, and delivered hundreds of tons of relief
aid. Additional personnel and capabilities continued to flow in over
the next weeks. Our mission there will continue as long as required.
The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and everywhere
that our Nation's interests are at stake. The Navy and Marine Corps'
global presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows for
rapid response to a wide range of contingencies.
In order to ensure our continued global mobility, the Department of
the Navy strongly supports accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
The United States must continue to take maximum advantage of the
navigational rights contained in the Convention. Ratification would
enhance stability for international maritime rules and ensure our
access to critical air and sea lines of communication.
I have now been the Secretary of the Navy for 9 months, and in that
short period of time I have met thousands of our sailors and marines
serving on the frontlines at sea and ashore. I have been constantly
inspired by the high morale, courage, and commitment to serving our
country displayed by every one of them as they conduct our missions. In
return, I have continually expressed to them the appreciation of the
American people for the sacrifices they and their families are making
every day.
I have met our operational commanders and seen first-hand the
warfighting readiness of our Fleet and our Marine Forces. I have
inspected the facilities of our industry partners who are building the
Navy and Marine Corps of tomorrow. With the advice and support of my
leadership team, I have made some initial decisions to better prepare
the Navy and Marine Corps for the challenges of the future. These
observations and our initial actions have given me a good picture of
the Navy and Marine Corps, and from this vantage I can report to
Congress and the President the current state of the Services, the
budgetary requirements we need to successfully perform our mission, and
the future direction I believe we must take.
The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2011 budget request
reflects the President's priorities, Secretary Gates' strategic and
fiscal guidance, and fundamentally aligns with the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) priorities:

(1) Prevailing in today's wars
(2) Preventing and deterring conflict
(3) Preparing for a wide range of future contingencies
(4) Preserving and enhancing the All-Volunteer Force

This budget request of $160.7 billion will maintain across the
Future Years' Defense Program our commitment to a strong industrial
base. The fiscal year 2011 request of $18.5 billion for contingency
operations includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower,
equipment and infrastructure repair as well as equipment replacement to
support our focus on increasing threats in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, we have included funds for
nine ships, including two additional Virginia-class submarines, two
destroyers in the restarted Arleigh Burke line, a lower-cost commercial
variant of the Mobile Landing Platform, the multi-role Landing
Helicopter Assault Replacement, a Joint High Speed Vessel, and two
Littoral Combat Ships, which will be constructed under the terms of the
down-select we will conduct this fiscal year. In aviation, we have
requested 206 aircraft in fiscal year 2011, including 20 F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters for both the Navy and Marine Corps, 24 MH-60R and 7 P-
8As to begin replacing our aging anit-submarine warfare (ASW) and
maritime patrol squadrons, 18 MH-60S for logistics support, 28 H-1
variant helicopters, and 30 MV-22 for the Marine Corps, 22 F/A-18E/F
and 12 EA-18G to continue replacing the EA-6B. For Marine Corps ground
operations, we have requested funding for an additional 564 Logistics
Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) and High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) tactical vehicles. The fiscal year 2011 budget
request also contains development funding for the Navy Unmanned Combat
Aerial System and continues development of the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). We have continued our
support of the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, including funding
for a fourth Riverine Squadron.
The Department's long-range shipbuilding and aviation intentions
are designed to sustain our naval superiority and they achieve a
balance of capability and affordability that both wins today's wars
even while preparing for the challenges of the future.
There are four strategic, tactical, and personnel management
imperatives I believe the Department of the Navy must also address to
maintain preeminence as a fighting force and successfully address
whatever comes in the future. These four areas reinforce the strategic
framework of the QDR and address the areas of risk it identifies. They
are:

(1) Taking care of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their
families
(2) Treating energy in the Department of the Navy as an issue
of national security
(3) Creating acquisitions excellence
(4) Optimizing unmanned systems

They underpin the development of our fiscal year 2011 budget
request, execute Presidential policy, and comply with and respond to
congressional direction.
taking care of sailors, marines, civilians, and their families
Sailors and marines are the fundamental source of our success. They
are our most important asset, and they must always come first in our
minds and in our actions. One of my most important responsibilities as
Secretary is to ensure adequate compensation, medical care, and family
support services are provided to our sailors, marines, civilians, and
their families.
The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to recruit and retain the
same high quality individuals we brought into and kept in the service
in 2009. We remain committed to providing a competitive pay and
benefits package to aid recruiting. The package includes not only basic
pay and housing allowances, but also provides incentives for critical
specialties in health care, explosive ordnance disposal, and nuclear
propulsion.
Beyond compensation, we recognize that quality of life programs are
crucial to retention and the military mission. We are providing
expanded career opportunities, opportunities for life-long learning,
and a continuum of care and family support. The Department continues to
support a wide array of readiness programs, including deployment
support services, morale and welfare services, and child and teen
programs. Our innovative personnel management and human resource
programs were in fact recognized by civilian experts as among the best
in the country when, in October 2009, the Navy was named by Workforce
Management Magazine as the winner of the Optimas Award for General
Excellence.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, over 10,000 marines and
sailors have been wounded in action. Their service has been exemplary
and unselfish, and in their sacrifice they have given so much of
themselves for our country. The Department of the Navy, through the
Wounded Warrior Regiment and the Navy Safe Harbor Program, provides
support and assistance to our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers
and their families throughout recovery, rehabilitation, and
reintegration. We continue to provide encouragement and support for
wounded sailors and marines, in partnership with the Department of
Veterans Affairs, long after they have left the Service.
Our medical community has continued to strive for excellence in the
care of our sailors and marines. Navy Medicine has reached out to its
civilian colleagues, and we have established partnerships with civilian
hospitals to improve our understanding and care for those affected by
traumatic brain injuries, mental health issues, amputation, and
disfiguring injuries. I had the opportunity last fall to see this
first-hand, when I witnessed groundbreaking pro-bono work in
reconstructive surgery on behalf of Wounded Warriors at the UCLA
Medical Center.
We will continue to aggressively address the issues of sexual
assault prevention and response. Sexual assault is a criminal act that
is corrosive to the readiness and morale of a professional military
organization. In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, we have requested
funds to support a reinvigorated program under the supervision of a new
Office of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, which I created
within the Secretariat to focus attention on the issue, develop
effective training, and coordinate prevention and response programs
across the Navy and Marine Corps.
In 2010, the Department will move forward on expanding the
opportunities for women in the Navy. We will establish a process to
integrate women into the submarine force, beginning with nuclear-
trained and Supply Corps officers on our ballistic and guided missile
submarines.
After 8 years of continuous combat operations, the Navy and Marine
Corps' people remain strong, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and I are very focused on
maintaining the overall health of the force. The fiscal year 2011
budget request reinforces these goals and is designed to provide the
fiscal support necessary to sustain the force. The visible support of
Congress to our personnel programs is deeply appreciated and has been
vital in maintaining overall readiness.
energy reform
The way in which we use and produce energy is an issue of national
security and is essential to maintaining our warfighting capabilities.
At present, we simply rely too much on fossil fuels, which are
susceptible to both price and supply shocks caused by events in
volatile areas of the world largely outside the scope of our control.
Those potential shocks have, in turn, strategic, operational, and
tactical effects upon our forces. In addition, fossil fuel emissions
are the root cause of many of the impending security challenges of
tomorrow, and the QDR has correctly identified that climate change and
its effects: rising sea levels, pressure on natural resources, and
changes to the polar regions, will increasingly affect our force
structure and the global security environment as the 21st century
progresses. In order to improve our long-term strategic and fiscal
position, I have set the Navy and Marine Corps on a path to change the
way in which we use and produce energy.
In October 2009, I issued five energy targets. They are ambitious
in their scope, but I firmly believe that little will be accomplished
without bold, innovative, and timely action. The most important of the
targets commits the Navy and Marine Corps to generating half of all the
energy we use, including that used by the operational fleet, from
alternative sources by 2020. I have also committed the Navy and Marine
Corps to consider energy as a mandatory evaluation factor in
contracting, and to consider as an additional factor in our business
dealings, the energy footprint of the companies that sell to the Navy
and Marine Corps.
America is a world leader precisely because of our willingness to
not just embrace change, but to create it. The U.S. Navy has always
been a technological leader. We moved from wind to coal in the 19th
century, coal to oil early in the 20th century, and to nuclear power in
mid-century. In every transition there were opponents to change, but in
every case the strategic and tactical position of naval forces
improved. In this century, I have asked the Navy to lead again by
pioneering technological change through use of alternative energy. But
I want to reiterate that every action and program we undertake must and
will have as an effect improved warfighting capability. We will strive
in every case to improve energy efficiency and reach cost-neutrality
over the life of the program.
Many of our initiatives are already doing this. We conducted a
ground test of an F/A-18 Hornet jet engine this fall running on a
biofuel blend and we intend to conduct an airborne test of the ``Green
Hornet'' later this year. In late 2010, the Navy will also conduct
tests of a more efficient F/A-18 engine, which will increase the
aircraft's range. Afloat, the USS Makin Island, the first ship
constructed with a hybrid-electric drive that dramatically lowers fuel
consumption at lower speeds, saved approximately $2 million in a single
transit to her new homeport in San Diego. Over the life of the ship, we
estimate the savings will be up to $250 million using today's fuel
prices. Writ large across the Navy, as we begin to retrofit our DDG
fleet with similar propulsion systems, the potential fuel savings will
only grow.
In addition to these tactical applications, we have implemented a
number of energy projects at our facilities ashore, and numerous other
efficiency initiatives throughout the Fleet. As the President clearly
stated in Copenhagen, changing the way we use and produce energy is a
national security imperative.
acquisition excellence
The ships and aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps are unmatched
at sea and over land. Our precision munitions, networked targeting
systems, armored vehicles, stealth technology, and unmanned vehicles
are advanced systems that define the leading edge of warfare in all
domains.
These truths have been brought home to me during my visits with the
defense industry. I have had the opportunity to visit shipyards,
aircraft manufacturers, factories, and depots; and I applaud the hard
work and dedication of this country's skilled workforce--Americans who
take as much pride in their patriotism as they do in their
craftsmanship.
The issue before us all, however, is affordability. Acquisition
costs are rising faster than our budget's top-line, and without
deliberate, sustained action to reverse this trend, we put the size and
capability of the future force at risk. In accordance with the Weapons
System Acquisition Reform Act passed by Congress in 2009, the Navy and
Marine Corps will aggressively pursue additional ways to make the
acquisitions process more rigorous; we will prudently safeguard the
resources entrusted to us by the American taxpayer, and we will fully
meet the obligation we hold to our Sailors and Marines.
This requires close examination of the way we do business in our
policies, practices, priorities, and organization, with a clear focus
on controlling cost. The Navy and Marine Corps will continue
initiatives to raise standards, to improve processes, to instill
discipline in procurement, and to strengthen the professional corps
that manages our major defense acquisition programs.
We are pressing forward with key initiatives that promise to
improve our ability to affordably deliver combat capability to the
fleet.
We are improving the quality of our cost estimates, which underpin
our investment decisions. We are strengthening our cost estimating
group, requiring independent cost estimates, and incorporating
Departmental best practices in the formulation of our Service Cost
Position for all major programs. We are using these realistic cost and
schedule estimates to drive difficult decisions at the front end of the
requirements process.
We are developing our acquisition strategies with the intent of
expanding the use of fixed price contracts, leveraging competition, and
tightening up on the use of incentive and award fees to ensure quality
systems are delivered consistently on budget and on time to our sailors
and marines. When we could not achieve these objectives this past year
on the Littoral Combat Ship program, we rewrote the program's
acquisition strategy to improve performance through competition. I
thank the committee for its strong support of this revised strategy,
and I assure you that I will not hesitate to recompete or cancel
programs when substandard performance demands change.
We are demanding strict discipline in the execution of our
contracts. Before commencing production on new start ship programs, I
have reported to you the results of reviews conducted to ensure that
designs are mature. We are specifically clamping down on contract
changes, the most-often cited reason for cost growth, through improved
policies and increased oversight.
Our goals for modernizing today's force and recapitalizing the
fleet affordably cannot be accomplished without a healthy industrial
base and strong performance by our industry partners. We have worked
hard to procure our ships, aircraft, and weapon systems at a rate
intended to bring stability to the industrial base and enable efficient
production. The Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan was developed with
particular regard for maintaining the unique characteristics and
strength of the base and our efforts support the QDR's emphasis on
maintaining the defense industrial base with appropriate levels of
competition, innovation, and capacity. The Future Years' Defense
Program outlines construction of a balanced force of 50 ships, an
average of 10 ships per year, which requires the full breadth of
capabilities and services provided by our major shipbuilders and
vendors.
In the end, industry must perform. We will work with our shipyards,
aircraft manufacturers, and weapon systems providers to benchmark
performance, to identify where improvements are necessary, to provide
the proper incentives for capital investments where warranted, and to
reward strong performance with terms and conditions that reflect our
desire for a strong government-industry partnership.
To meet our objectives, we must be smart buyers. The acquisition
workforce has been downsized over the past 15 years and in truth our
professional acquisition corps has been stretched too thin.
Accordingly, and with your strong support, we are rebuilding the
acquisition workforce through a number of parallel efforts. We must
both increase the number of acquisition workers and restore to the
government the core competencies inherent to their profession. The
Department has added 800 acquisition professionals in the last year
towards the goal of increasing the community by 5,000 over the Future
Years' Defense Program. This represents a 12 percent growth in our
workforce.
unmanned systems
The complex nature of today's security environment, as well as
current and future anti-access threats faced by the United States
require that the Navy and Marine Corps investigate the contributions
unmanned systems can make to warfighting capability. Unmanned systems
are unobtrusive, versatile, persistent, and they reduce the exposure of
our sailors and marines to unnecessary threats. They perform a vast
array of tasks such as intelligence collection, precision target
designation, oceanographic reconnaissance, and mine detection, and that
array will grow exponentially year to year.
Navy and Marine Corps unmanned systems have already made key
contributions to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the counter-
piracy effort off the coast of Africa. Unmanned aircraft systems have
flown thousands of flight hours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
and Operation Enduring Freedom. Unmanned ground vehicles employed by
the Marine Corps have conducted thousands of missions detecting and/or
neutralizing improvised explosive devices. Unmanned maritime systems
have provided improved port security.
We continue to support research and development activities to
improve these capabilities and increase the level of autonomy in
unmanned systems. Over the Future Years' Defense Program we will
continue to focus on transitioning from research and development and
limited deployments, through test and evaluation, to full fleet
integration and operations. In order to best direct our research and
harness the capabilities of unmanned systems, I am tasking the
Department to develop a comprehensive roadmap for unmanned system
development, to include a coordinated strategy for air, ground,
surface, and subsurface systems focused on integration and
interoperability with our existing platforms and capabilities.
The initiatives and investments contained in the fiscal year 2011
budget request will move us onto this path. I look forward to reporting
continued progress throughout the year.
closing
In this statement, I have discussed the strategic and tactical
imperatives that guide the Department and influence the future
decisions we will make. Specific programmatic requests are reflected in
the fiscal year 2011 budget request, which I believe incorporates the
difficult trade-offs and disciplined decision making that you and the
American taxpayer expect of us. We have carefully weighed risks and
made proposals to you that will ensure we retain a ready and agile
force capable of conducting the full range of military operations. We
will continue to work hard to be effective stewards of the resources
you allocate to us.
Forty years ago I stood watch on the deck of the USS Little Rock as
a young junior officer. Today I have the solemn privilege of standing
watch on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps in a time of war and
national challenge. I am honored by the trust the President and
Congress have placed in me and I fully recognize the solemn obligation
I have to those who defend us.
That obligation fueled my desire to observe our people up close in
their varied and often dangerous jobs. I've seen first hand the courage
of our young marines in Helmand, the determination of a wounded SEAL to
walk despite losing two legs, the pride of a young sailor in a hot
engine room, the selfless dedication of corpsmen, nurses, and doctors
caring for the fallen.
Sacrifice and service created and preserve the freedom and
opportunity that we enjoy as Americans. Although we aspire to create a
world in which violence and aggression have been eliminated, we
understand that peace and stability are often secured only when strong
nations and good people are willing and prepared to use decisive force
against those who threaten it. The Navy and Marine Corps stand ready to
do so.
Your commitment to the service of our country and your recognition
of the sacrifice of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families
has been steadfast and is fully reflected in the support of this
committee for our key programs and our people.
I, along with my partners, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Roughead, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, look
forward to hearing your thoughts and answering any questions you may
have about our budget request or specific programs of interest. I also
look forward to working closely with Congress as we move forward to
sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable expeditionary
fighting force in the world.
Thank you and Godspeed.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Roughead.

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
Inhofe, members of the committee, it is my honor to appear
before you again representing more than 600,000 sailors and
Navy civilians. Sixty-five thousand of them are deployed,
12,000 on land in the CENTCOM area of operations, and 56
percent of our fleet is underway carrying out our maritime
strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010 QDR.
They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building
partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently
patrolling under the sea in every ocean, and providing
ballistic missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, the Western
Pacific, and the Eastern Mediterranean with pride and
determination.
They are even deployed on the first LCS, 2 years ahead of
schedule, and I think it's noteworthy that in the first week of
that ship's deployment it seized over a quarter of a ton of
cocaine.
It is our sailors and Navy civilians who make all things
possible, and thanks to your support we made important progress
in building tomorrow's Navy, remaining ready to fight today,
and supporting our sailors, Navy civilians, and families last
year. This year's budget submission will take us even further.
As the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have
stabilized end strength and the tone of the force remains
positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness
programs and medical and social services for our wounded
warriors, indeed for all who serve. For our fleet as a
continuously deployed force, we must continue to reset in
stride. Conducting regular maintenance and training so that our
ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives is
extremely important.
This year's budget aligns our baseline budget for operation
and maintenance (O&M) accordingly and reflects a significant
shift away from supplemental funding. I strongly request your
support for this important change.
While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to
reach our requirement of more than 313 ships. Last year we
commissioned 9 ships and over the next decade our plan procures
an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth for the
near term.
For aviation, we remain committed to bringing new
capabilities on line, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and
unmanned aircraft, and to maintaining the readiness of our
current naval air force, all of which give our Nation
flexibility in response unencumbered by overseas basing.
Affordability for all our plans will remain fundamental to
our decisions. The effectiveness of our unmanned systems,
ships, and aircraft is a feature of the systems which connect
them. Last year, I brought information capabilities and
resources under a single Information Dominance Directorate
within the Navy staff and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th
Fleet. I see benefits of that already.
I am proud of our Navy's accomplishments last year and I am
confident we can achieve more with this year's budget
submission. Our risk continues to trend towards significant and
achieving the right balance within and across my priorities
remains critical to mitigating it. But I remain optimistic
because of our outstanding sailors and Navy civilians and the
spirit of our Nation. We have seen more challenging times and
emerged prosperous, secure, and free.
I ask you to support our 2011 budget request and thank you
for all you do to make the U.S. Navy a global force for good
today and into the future. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Gary Roughead, USN
navy fiscal year 2011 posture statement
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is
my honor and pleasure to appear before you, once again, representing
the more than 600,000 sailors and civilians of the U.S. Navy. Every
day, our dedicated Navy men and women are forward deployed protecting
the global commons in every domain: sea, land, air, space, and
cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for them as our Navy
protects our Nation and our national interests.
When I signed our Maritime Strategy with General Conway and Admiral
Allen more than 2 years ago, I was confident that the strategy would
prepare us well for the current and future security environments. Since
then, it has guided our operations and investments, and I am further
convinced of its relevance to our operations today and of its enduring
attributes. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) validated the
underlying principle articulated in the Maritime Strategy that
preventing wars is as important as winning wars. The QDR also declared
that U.S. security and prosperity are connected to that of the
international system, that deterrence is a fundamental military
function, and that partnerships are key to U.S. strategy and essential
to the stability of global systems. These themes reinforce the tenets
of our Maritime Strategy and the six core capabilities it identified
for our maritime Services: forward presence, deterrence, sea control,
power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster response (HA/DR).
My priorities for the Navy remain unchanged: to build tomorrow's
Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and support our
sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. We are making progress in
these areas thanks to your continued support. Some highlights follow.
We added nine new ships to our fleet in 2009, including USS Freedom
(LCS-1), currently on its first deployment, and USS Independence (LCS-
2), our second Littoral Combat Ship. We delivered three DDG-51
destroyers and restarted the DDG-51 line to increase surface combatant
capacity for maritime security, deterrence, and anti-submarine warfare.
We are adapting our force to meet the President's demand for sea-based
ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe while sustaining our current
BMD missions in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Our Virginia-
class submarine program continues to excel with the delivery of USS New
Mexico (SSN-779) 4 months ahead of schedule. We rolled out our first
carrier variant of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (F-35C) aircraft, the
timely delivery of which remains essential to fulfilling our strike
fighter requirements. We are conducting the first deployment of our
Vertical Take-Off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and we
expect the first test flight of our Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System
demonstrator this year.
In the information and cyberspace domain, I established Fleet Cyber
Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet as the global operator of Navy's cyber,
networks, cryptology/signals intelligence, information, electronic
warfare, and space operations. I restructured the Navy staff to bring
all Navy information capabilities and resources under our new
Information Dominance Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and created the
Navy Information Dominance Corps, integrating more than 45,000 sailors
and civilians from our existing intelligence, information professional,
information warfare, meteorology/oceanography, and space communities.
About 1,400 of these sailors are deployed globally as individual
augmentees (IAs) today, most supporting operations in the Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.
More than 40 percent of our fleet is underway daily, globally
present and persistently engaged. Our forward presence enabled the
rapid response of our aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and numerous
other surface and USNS ships, helicopters, and personnel to Haiti to
provide humanitarian aid after the devastating earthquake in January.
We remain engaged in operations in Afghanistan and in the drawdown of
U.S. forces in Iraq. Navy has more than 21,000 Active and Reserve
sailors on the ground and at sea in CENTCOM. This includes a doubling
of our construction battalion (SEABEE) presence in Afghanistan and
ongoing IA support to both operations. I recently issued our Navy
Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges to shape how our Navy will
plan for, resource, and deliver a wide range of capabilities to
confront irregular challenges associated with regional instability,
insurgency, crime, and violent extremism at sea, in the littorals, and
on shore.
Our Navy continues to support our people and their families. We are
in the process of expanding opportunities for service at sea to women
in the Navy by opening to them assignments on submarines for the first
time in history. Our Navy has received 19 national awards in the past
18 months for its workforce planning, life-work integration, diversity,
and training initiatives. Most notably, Workforce Management magazine
awarded Navy the 2009 Optimas Award for General Excellence, which
recognized the U.S. Navy as an employer of choice among the ranks of
previous distinguished recipients such as Google, Intel, and Hewlett-
Packard. We have met or exceeded overall officer and enlisted (Active
and Reserve) recruiting goals for 2009 and we are on track to achieve
similar success in 2010. I appreciate the support of Congress for our
fleet and its dedicated sailors, Navy civilians, and their families
that serve our Nation every day.
I continue to focus on ensuring our Navy is properly balanced to
answer the call now and in the decades to come. Last year, I stated our
risk was moderate trending toward significant because of the challenges
associated with Fleet capacity, increasing operational requirements,
and growing manpower, maintenance, and infrastructure costs. This risk
has increased over the last year as trends in each of these areas have
continued. We are able to meet the most critical combatant commander
demands today, but I am increasingly concerned about our ability to
meet any additional demands while sustaining the health of the force,
conducting essential maintenance and modernization to ensure units
reach full service life, and procuring our future Navy so we are
prepared to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
The costs to own and operate our fleet continue to rise due to
increasing operational demands, higher maintenance requirements, and
growing manpower costs. Over the last decade, the overall size of our
active fleet decreased by more than 30 ships, about 10 percent, and our
active duty end strength decreased by about 13 percent, while
operational demands globally have grown. Our Navy's high tempo of
operations has placed additional stress on our smaller fleet of
sailors, ships, and aircraft and we are consuming the service life of
our fleet at a higher than expected rate. We are implementing force
management measures in the near term to stretch the capacity of our
285-ship force to meet increasing global requirements. Through our
Fleet Response Plan, we are tailoring our training and maintenance
cycles to generate ready forces, allowing us to meet the most critical
combatant commander requirements today. The impact of these measures on
our fleet has been felt in longer deployments and shorter dwell times,
which increase stress on our sailors and drive up maintenance
requirements and costs for our ships and aircraft. Regular maintenance
of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our crews
between deployments, is essential to our ability to sustain our force.
It is how we reset. This ``reset in stride'' is different from other
Services. It ensures our ships and aircraft maintain the required
continuous forward presence whether supporting coalition troops in
Afghanistan, deterring North Korea and Iran, or providing humanitarian
aid in Haiti. For our Navy, continuous reset translates into decades of
service for each ship and aircraft, a significant return on investment.
Our reset and readiness are tied directly to our operation and
maintenance (O&M) funding. Over the last decade, we have relied upon a
combination of base budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO)
funding to operate and maintain our Navy. Our fiscal year 2011 OCO
request for O&M is tightly focused on supporting our ongoing and
increased operations in CENTCOM. Our fiscal year 2011 base budget
request for O&M is focused on properly sustaining our ships and
aircraft so they reach their expected service life; funding enduring
readiness requirements, particularly in aviation; and funding price
increases, most notably in fuel, to support our enduring operations.
Together, our OCO and base budget O&M requests reflect our commitment
to resource current operations while preserving our fleet for future
operations. I ask for your full support of this year's O&M request.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget request achieves the optimal balance
among my priorities to build tomorrow's Navy, to remain ready to fight
today, and to develop and support our sailors, Navy civilians, and
their families. It supports our Maritime Strategy and the 2010 QDR and
continues us on the path we started in fiscal year 2010 to support our
forces forward, take care of our people, continue rebalancing our force
to meet current and future challenges, and reform how and what we buy.
Highlights follow.
build tomorrow's navy
Since the release of our Maritime Strategy, I have stated that our
Navy requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements
globally. This minimum, a product of our 2005 force structure analysis,
remains valid. We are adjusting our requirement to address increased
operational demands and expanding requirements, as outlined in the QDR,
for BMD, intra-theater lift, and forces capable of confronting
irregular challenges. Our shipbuilding plan addresses these operational
needs by growing our fleet to 315 ships in 2020 and peaking at 320
ships in 2024. Per the President's direction, we will improve our
capacity to conduct sea-based BMD of Europe by increasing our inventory
of Aegis-capable ships through our restarted DDG-51 production line and
modernization of our existing cruisers and destroyers. The funding for
these upgrades will deliver the capability and capacity of ships
required to perform this mission while maintaining sustainable
deployment ratios for our sailors. To fulfill combatant commander
requirements for intra-theater lift, we will increase the number of
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) in our Fleet; the large payload bays,
speed, and shallow draft of these versatile ships make them capable of
supporting a wide range of naval missions, including security
cooperation, security force assistance, and logistics support. To
provide forces capable of confronting irregular challenges, we will
continue to pursue the planned number of Littoral Combat Ships,
providing a flexible and modular ship optimized for operations close to
shore. We are moving from developing a Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) squadron optimized for high-end, forcible entry operations to
augmenting our three existing Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS)
with enhanced sea basing capabilities that are useful across a wide
range of military operations. The augmented MPS will support our
amphibious warfare force, which we will build to a minimum of 33 ships
to increase our capacity to conduct theater security cooperation,
sustain combat and assistance operations from the sea, and hedge
against future conflict.
We have improved the balance among capability, capacity,
affordability, and executabilty in our procurement plans by developing
a shipbuilding plan that procures our most needed capabilities,
increases Fleet capacity in the near-to-mid-term, and is fiscally
executable within the FYDP. It carefully manages increasing levels of
operational and institutional risk, recognizing that, for as much as
our Navy does to protect our national security and prosperity, the
overall economy of our Nation undoubtedly does more. I am confident our
near-term plan provides the capability and capacity we need to conduct
contingency operations and build partner capacity while retaining our
ability to deter aggressors, assure allies, and defeat adversaries.
Beyond 2024, I am concerned about the decrease in Fleet capacity that
will occur as our legacy cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and
amphibious ships reach the end of their service lives. Many of these
ships were brought into service during the 1980s, when we procured some
ship classes at a rate of four to five ships per year. While economic
and security conditions are sure to change between now and then, it
takes 10 to 15 years to design and build our ships, which then remain
in service for 20 to 50 years. A long view is necessary to ensure our
Navy has sufficient capacity to protect America's global national
interests in the future.
As directed by the QDR, we are working with the Air Force and
Marine Corps on an Air Sea Battle concept that will identify the
doctrine, procedures, training, organization, and equipment needed for
our Navy to counter growing military threats to our freedom of action.
This joint effort will help us inform investments and identify future
opportunities to better integrate naval and air forces across the
entire range of operations. We are already moving forward with the Air
Force to streamline capabilities, manpower, and resources related to
our unmanned aviation systems. We continue to pursue our unique
maritime aviation capabilities in carrier-based strike, anti-submarine
warfare, and naval special warfare missions.
Underpinning the capacity and capability of our fleet is a highly
technical and specialized industrial base. A strategic national asset,
our shipbuilding and aviation industrial base is essential to
sustaining our global fleet and remains a significant contributor to
our Nation's economic prosperity. Our shipbuilding industrial base
directly supports more than 97,000 uniquely-skilled American jobs and
indirectly supports thousands more through second and third tier
suppliers. The highly specialized skills in our shipbuilding base take
years to develop and, if lost, cannot be easily or quickly replaced.
Level loading and predictable ship procurement allow industry to
stabilize its workforce and retain the critical skills essential to our
national security.
I am committed to reducing the total ownership cost of our fleet so
that what we buy today does not pressurize our ability to operate
tomorrow. Significant cost drivers for our Fleet include increasing
technical and design complexity, changes in requirements, reductions in
the number of ships procured, and higher labor costs. To reduce these
costs, we are pursuing common hull forms and components, open
architecture for hardware and software, and increased modularity.
Moreover, we are considering total ownership costs in procurement
decisions. We are exploring new ways to design our ships with greater
affordability throughout their lives, including reducing costs of fuel
consumption, maintenance, and manpower and by increasing the efficiency
of our maintenance and support processes and organizations. We are
leveraging open production lines to deliver proven and required
capabilities, such as in our DDG-51 and EA-18G programs. We are
promoting longer production runs with our Virginia class SSNs, EA-18G
and F/A-18E/F, P-8A, BAMS, and DDG-51 programs. We are capitalizing on
repeat builds to control requirements creep and increase predictability
with our aircraft carrier, destroyer, and submarine programs. Finally,
we are pursuing evolutionary instead of revolutionary designs to
deliver required future capabilities. Our future missile defense
capable ship, for example, will be developed by spiraling capability
into our DDG-51-class ships, instead of designing and building a new
cruiser from the keel up.
I remain committed to delivering a balanced and capable fleet that
will meet our national security requirements. I seek your support for
the following initiatives and programs:
aviation programs
Aircraft Carrier Force Structure
The Navy remains firmly committed to maintaining a force of 11
carriers for the next 3 decades. With the commissioning of USS George
H.W. Bush (CVN-77) and inactivation of the 48-year-old USS Kitty Hawk
(CV-63), our last conventionally powered aircraft carrier, we now have
an all nuclear-powered carrier force. Our carriers enable our Nation to
respond rapidly, decisively, and globally to project power, as we have
done in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to deliver humanitarian assistance, as
we have done in Haiti, while operating from a small, yet persistent,
footprint that does not impose unnecessary political or logistic
burdens on other nations. Our carriers remain a great investment for
our Nation.
Our 11-carrier force structure is based on worldwide presence and
surge requirements, while also taking into account training and
maintenance needs. I thank Congress for granting us a waiver to
temporarily reduce our force to 10 carriers for the period between the
inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and the delivery of Gerald R.
Ford (CVN-78). We will continue to meet operational commitments during
this 33-month period by managing carefully carrier deployment and
maintenance cycles. After the delivery of CVN-78, we will maintain an
11-carrier force through the continued refueling program for Nimitz-
class ships and the delivery of our Ford-class carriers at 5-year
intervals starting in 2020.
CVN-78 is the lead ship of our first new class of aircraft carriers
in nearly 40 years. Ford-class carriers will be our Nation's premier
forward-deployed asset capable of responding to crises or delivering
early decisive striking power in a major combat operation. These new
carriers incorporate an innovative new flight deck design that provides
greater operational flexibility, reduced manning requirements, and the
ability to operate current and future naval aircraft from its deck.
Among the new technologies being integrated in these ships is the
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which will enable the
carrier's increased sortie generation rate and lower total ownership
costs. EMALS is on track for an aircraft demonstration later this year
and is on schedule to support delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015.
Strike Fighter Capacity: Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18 E/F
Our Navy remains committed to the JSF program. The timely delivery
of the F-35C carrier variant remains critical to our future carrier
airwing strike fighter capacity. Our Navy has the necessary tactical
aircraft capacity in the near term to support our Nation's strategic
demands; however, a January 2010 assessment forecasts a decrease in our
carrier-based strike fighter capacity that peaks in 2014 and remains
through 2019. We have a plan to address this capacity decrease that
involves several management and investment measures.
Our force management measures are targeted at preserving the
service life of our existing legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A-18 A-
D). We will reduce the number of aircraft available in our squadrons
during non-deployed phases to the minimum required. We will reduce our
Unit Deployed squadrons (UDP) from 12 aircraft to 10 aircraft per
squadron to match the corresponding decrease in Marine Corps
expeditionary squadrons. We are accelerating the transition of five
legacy F/A-18C squadrons to F/A-18E/F Super Hornets using available F/
A-18E/F aircraft and will transition two additional legacy squadrons
using Super Hornet attrition reserve aircraft. These measures make our
legacy strike fighter aircraft available for High Flight Hour (HFH)
inspections and our Service Life Extension Program, which together will
extend their service life and manage to some extent the decrease in our
carrier-based strike fighter capacity through 2018. These measures
expend the service life of our Super Hornets earlier than programmed,
so we are refining our depot level production processes to maximize
throughput and return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the fleet
expeditiously. Our fiscal year 2011 budget procures 22 additional F/A-
18E/F aircraft.
Our investment measures are targeted at extending the service life
of our F/A-18 A-D aircraft and procuring JSF. HFH inspections, which
have been in place for 2 years, provide the ability to extend the
service life of our legacy F/A-18 A-D aircraft to 8,600 flight hours,
while engineering analysis is underway to determine the SLEP
requirements necessary to reach the service life extension goal of
10,000 flight hours. The HFH and SLEP programs increase our
institutional risk by diverting investment and maintenance funds from
other accounts, but they are necessary measures to address our strike
fighter decrease while preserving our investment in JSF.
I remain committed to the JSF program because of the advanced
sensor, precision strike, firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will
bring to our Fleet. While the overall schedule for JSF has slipped,
causing us to reduce the overall rate of procurement, initial operating
capability is still planned for 2014 and we have not reduced the total
number of airframes we plan to buy. We are monitoring the JSF program
closely and managing our existing strike fighter capacity to meet power
projection demands until JSF is delivered. Procurement of an alternate
engine for JSF increases our risk in this program. The Navy does not
have a requirement for an alternate engine, and its additional costs
threaten our ability to fund currently planned aircraft procurement
quantities, which would exacerbate our anticipated decrease in strike
fighter capacity. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request procures seven F-
35C aircraft.
EA-18G Growler
The proliferation of technology has allowed state and non-state
actors to use the electromagnetic spectrum with increasing
sophistication. Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) provides one of the
most flexible offensive capabilities available to the joint warfighter
and it remains in high demand in traditional, irregular, and hybrid
conflicts. The Navy continues to provide extensive AEA support from our
carriers afloat and from our expeditionary EA-6B Prowler squadrons
deployed currently to Iraq and Afghanistan.
We are leveraging the mature and proven F/A-18E/F airframe
production line to recapitalize our aging EA-6B aircraft with the EA-
18G Growler. As directed in the QDR, we are planning to procure an
additional 26 EA-18G Growler aircraft across the FYDP to increase joint
force capacity to conduct expeditionary electronic attack. Our program
of record will buy 114 total EA-18G aircraft, recapitalizing 10 Fleet
EA-6B squadrons and four expeditionary squadrons. The program continues
to deliver as scheduled. In September, our first EA-18G transition
squadron, based at NAS Whidbey Island, reached Initial Operational
Capability and it will deploy as an expeditionary squadron later this
year. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for 12 EA-18Gs.
P-3 Orion and P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft
Your continued support of the P-3 and P-8A force remains essential
and is appreciated greatly. Our P-3 Orion roadmap focuses on
sustainment and selected modernization until it is replaced by the P-8A
Poseidon. These aircraft provide capabilities ideally suited for
regional and littoral crises and conflict, and are our pre-eminent
airborne capability against submarine threats. Our P-3s are in high
demand today for the time-critical intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance they provide to the joint force on the ground in CENTCOM
and for their direct contributions to our maritime domain awareness in
key regions across the globe.
P-3 Zone 5 wing fatigue has resulted in the unplanned grounding of
49 aircraft between 2007 and 2009, with more expected. Mitigation
measures include a combination of targeted Zone 5 modifications and
outer wing replacements. As of December, we have returned 12 aircraft
to service after completing Zone 5 modification and 32 aircraft are
currently being repaired. As part of our sustainment program, we have
included $39.6 million in our fiscal year 2011 budget request to
conduct outer wing installations on nine of our P-3 aircraft. P-3
sustainment and modernization programs are critical to ensuring
successful transition to the P-8A, while preserving essential maritime
and overland battle space awareness.
The P-8A completed it's first Navy test flight this past October
and will resume integrated flight testing in March of this year. The P-
8A will achieve initial operating capability and begin replacing our
aging P-3 aircraft in 2013. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request
procures seven P-8A aircraft.
MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter
The MH-60R and MH-60S successfully completed their first deployment
together this past summer with the USS John C. Stennis carrier strike
group. The MH-60R multi-mission helicopter replaces the surface
combatant-based SH-60B and carrier-based SH-60F with a newly
manufactured airframe and enhanced mission systems. With these systems,
the MH-60R provides focused surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare
capabilities for our strike groups and individual ships. Our fiscal
year 2011 budget request procures 24 MH-60R helicopters. The MH-60S
supports surface warfare, combat logistics, vertical replenishment,
search and rescue, air ambulance, airborne mine counter-measures, and
naval special warfare mission areas. Our fiscal year 2011 budget
request procures 18 MH-60S helicopters.
surface ship programs
Littoral Combat Ship
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a fast, agile, networked surface
combatant that is optimized to support naval and joint force operations
in the littorals and capable of supporting open-ocean operations. It
will operate with tailored-mission packages to counter quiet diesel
submarines, mines, and fast surface craft. The modular and open
architecture design of the seaframe and mission modules provides the
inherent flexibility to adapt or add capabilities beyond the current
Anti-Submarine, Mine Countermeasures, and Surface Warfare missions.
These ships will employ a combination of manned helicopters and
unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles.
USS Freedom (LCS-1) has completed her post-delivery testing, trial,
and shakedown periods and commenced her maiden deployment in February
to Southern Command and Pacific Command. Her deployment 2 years ahead
of schedule will allow us to incorporate operational lessons more
quickly and effectively as we integrate these ships into our Fleet. USS
Independence (LCS-2) completed builder's trials in October 2009 and
acceptance trials in November 2009. We accepted delivery of
Independence on 18 December 2009, and commissioned her 16 January 2010.
In March 2009, fixed price contracts were awarded for USS Fort Worth
(LCS-3) and USS Coronado (LCS-4) which are now under construction by
Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics respectively.
I am impressed and satisfied with the capabilities of both LCS
designs and am committed to procuring 55 of these ships. Affordability
remains the key factor in acquiring LCS in the quantities we require.
After careful review of the fiscal year 2010 industry proposals,
consideration of total program costs, and ongoing discussions with
Congress, we made the decision to cancel for affordability reasons the
Phase II requests for proposals for three fiscal year 2010 LCS ships
and adjust our acquisition strategy. In fiscal year 2010, we will
conduct a competition among the existing LCS industry participants to
down-select to a single LCS design. The winner of the down-select will
be awarded a block buy contract for up to 10 ships, to be procured from
fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014 at a rate of two ships per
year, built in one shipyard. To sustain competition and increase
capacity, the winner of the down-select will be required to deliver a
Technical Data Package to the Navy to support competition for a second
contract source. We plan to award up to five ships to a second source
beginning in fiscal year 2012 with one ship and continuing with an
additional two ships per year through fiscal year 2014. The winner of
the down-select will provide combat systems equipment, up to 15 ship
sets, for the ships built by the two contract sources: 10 sets for the
10 ships under contract with the winner of the down-select and up to 5
additional sets for the 5 ships being procured by the second contract
source. The five additional sets will later be provided as government-
furnished equipment to support the second source LCS contract. We
intend to procure all future LCS ships within the national Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 revised cost cap. Our
down-select strategy leverages competition to the maximum extent
practical, provides for economic procurement quantities, improves
learning curve and commonality opportunities, and ultimately provides
for program stability. We recently issued the requests for proposals
for this contract and expect industry bids in March of this year.
Consistent with our new strategy, our fiscal year 2011 budget
requests two LCS seaframes and an additional $278 million to secure an
LCS block buy, which is essential to lowering unit costs. I request
your support as we acquire LCS in the most cost-effective manner and
deliver its innovative capability in sufficient capacity to our Fleet.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) incorporates all aspects
of air defense against ballistic, anti-ship, and overland cruise
missiles. IAMD is vital to the protection of our force, and it is an
integral part of our core capability to deter aggression through
conventional means. The demand for sea-based BMD is increasing
significantly. The Navy's mature and successfully demonstrated maritime
BMD capability will play a primary role in the first phase of our
Nation's plan to provide for the missile defense of Europe. Aegis BMD
counters short, medium, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles
through active defense and is able to pass target information to other
BMD systems, thereby expanding the BMD battlespace and support of
homeland defense. Currently, 20 ships (4 cruisers and 16 destroyers)
have this capability and are being used to perform maritime BMD. All of
the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and nine of the Ticonderoga-class
cruisers are planned to receive BMD capability through our
modernization program.
DDG-51 Restart and Future Surface Combatant
To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship
missiles and deep-water submarine threats, as well as increase the
capacity of our multipurpose surface ships, we restarted production of
our DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (Flight IIA series). These
ships will be the first constructed with IAMD, providing much-needed
BMD capacity to the Fleet, and they will incorporate the hull,
mechanical, and electrical alterations associated with our mature DDG
modernization program. We will spiral DDG-51 production to incorporate
future integrated air and missile defense capabilities.
We are well underway with restarting DDG-51 production. We awarded
advance procurement (AP) contracts for DDG-113 and -114, and expect to
award an AP contract for DDG-115 in the coming months, to support the
long lead items necessary for production of these ships. I thank
Congress for supporting our fiscal year 2010 budget, which funded
construction of DDG-113. We anticipate a contract award for DDG-113
production this spring. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding
for the construction of DDG-114 and DDG-115 as part of our plan to
build a total of eight DDG-51 ships through the FYDP.
The Navy, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, conducted a Radar/Hull Study for future surface combatants
that analyzed the total ship system solution necessary to meet our IAMD
requirements while balancing affordability and capacity in our surface
Fleet. The study concluded that Navy should integrate the Air and
Missile Defense Radar program S Band radar (AMDR-S), SPY-3 (X Band
radar), and Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) combat system into a
DDG-51 hull. While our Radar/Hull Study indicated that both DDG-51 and
DDG-1000 were able to support our preferred radar systems, leveraging
the DDG-51 hull was the most affordable option. Accordingly, our fiscal
year 2011 budget cancels the next generation cruiser program due to
projected high cost and risk in technology and design of this ship. I
request your support as we invest in spiraling the capabilities of our
DDG-51 class from our Flight IIA Arleigh Burke ships to Flight III
ships, which will be our future IAMD-capable surface combatant. We will
procure the first Flight III ship in fiscal year 2016.
Modernization
As threats evolve, we must modernize our existing ships with
updated capabilities that sustain our combat effectiveness and enable
our ships to reach their expected service life, which in the case of
our destroyers and cruisers, is more than three decades. Our destroyer
and cruiser modernization program includes advances in standard
missiles, integrated air and missile defense, open architecture, and
essential hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) upgrades. Maintaining
the stability of the cruiser and destroyer modernization program is
critical to achieving relevant future Navy capability and capacity.
Our Navy plans to conduct DDG modernization in two 6-month
availabilities. The first availability is focused on HM&E
modifications, while the second availability, conducted 2 years later,
is focused on combat systems modernization. The program will commence
in fiscal year 2010 and focuses on the Flight I and II DDG-51 ships
(hulls 51-78). All ships of the class will be modernized at midlife.
Key tenets of the DDG modernization program include: an upgrade of the
Aegis Weapons System to include an Open Architecture (OA) computing
environment, an upgrade of the SPY radar signal processor, the addition
of BMD capability, installation of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
(ESSM), an upgraded SQQ-89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system,
integration with the SM-6 Missile, and improved air dominance with
processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
capability.
The Cruiser Modernization Program will modernize all remaining
cruisers (Baseline 2, 3, and 4). The first fully modernized cruiser,
USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), was completed in June 2009. The key aspects of
the CG modernization program include: an upgrade to the Aegis weapons
system to include an OA computing environment, installation of an SPQ-
9B radar, addition of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an
upgrade to Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Block 1B, an upgraded SQQ-
89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, and improved air dominance with
processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
capability. Six Baseline 4 cruisers will receive the BMD upgrade.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for the modernization
of three cruisers and three destroyers.
DDG-1000
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally
crewed, multi-mission surface combatant designed to fulfill long-range
precision land attack requirements. In addition to providing offensive,
distributed and precision fires in support of forces ashore, these
ships will serve as test-beds for advanced technology, such as
integrated power systems, dual band radars, and advanced survivability
features, which can be incorporated into our other ship classes. The
first DDG-1000 is under construction and approximately 20 percent
complete. We recently notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach in
this program as a result of our decision to reduce the number of DDG-
1000s in the original program. DDG-1000 will be a three-ship class. It
is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2013 with an initial operating
capability in fiscal year 2015.
Joint High Speed Vessel
Intra-theater lift is key to enabling the United States to rapidly
project, maneuver, and sustain military forces in distant, overseas
operations. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program is an Army and
Navy joint program that will deliver a high-speed, shallow draft
surface ship capable of rapid transport of medium payloads of cargo and
personnel within a theater to austere ports without reliance on port
infrastructure for load/offload. In addition, the Navy JHSV will be
capable of supporting extensive Security Force Assistance and Theater
Security Cooperation operations, including the hosting of small craft
for training. A JHSV Production Readiness Review was completed in
October 2009 and the first vessel construction began this past December
with an anticipated delivery to the Army in fiscal year 2012. The
second ship, a Navy vessel, is scheduled to be delivered in 2013. Our
fiscal year 2011 budget includes funds for the construction of Navy's
third JHSV. Navy continues oversight of JHSV procurement for the five
Army-funded vessels in this program. The Army assumes full
responsibility for these five vessels following acquisition.
submarine programs
Virginia-Class SSN
The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that
dominates in the littorals and open oceans. Now in its 13th year of
construction, the Virginia program is demonstrating that this critical
undersea capability can be delivered affordably and on time. Thanks to
Congress, these ships will begin construction at a rate of two a year
in 2011, with two ship deliveries per year beginning in 2017. The Navy
continues to realize a return from investments in the Virginia cost
reduction program and construction process improvements through
enhanced shipbuilder performance on each successive ship. These
submarines are under budget and ahead of schedule, and their
performance continues to exceed expectations with every ship delivered.
Three of the five commissioned ships completed initial deployments
prior to their Post Shakedown Availabilities, a first for the Navy. I
am pleased with the accomplishments of the combined Navy-Industry team
and look forward to even greater success as we ramp up production to
two submarines next year.
SSGN
Our Navy has four guided missile submarines that provide high-
volume strike and irregular warfare capabilities in support of
operations and missions across the broad spectrum of conflict. SSGNs
are performing well on deployment, and we are learning valuable lessons
from each mission. Combatant commanders value the long-range strike
capability they provide and we are investigating options to sustain
this capability in the most operationally and cost effective manner, to
include options for expanding the long-range strike capacity of the
submarine fleet.
SSBN and Ohio Replacement
Our Navy supports the Nation's nuclear deterrence capability with a
credible and survivable fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN). Originally designed for a 30-year service life, this
class will start retiring in 2027 after more than 42 years of service.
The United States needs a reliable and survivable sea-based
strategic deterrent for the foreseeable future. To ensure there is no
gap in this critical capability, our fiscal year 2011 budget requests
research and development funds for the Ohio replacement to support the
start of construction of the first ship in fiscal year 2019. The Ohio
replacement will be a strategic, national asset with the endurance and
stealth to enable our Navy to provide continuous, survivable strategic
deterrence into the 2080s. Appropriate R&D investment is essential to
design a reliable, survivable, and adaptable submarine capable of
deterring all potential adversaries. We completed our Analysis of
Alternatives study in 2009, and Milestone A is planned for April 2010.
The Ohio Replacement program will leverage the many successes of the
Virginia SSN program to achieve acquisition and total ownership cost
goals. The United States will realize significant program benefits as a
result of our close partnership with the United Kingdom's Vanguard SSBN
replacement program, particularly in the design and construction of a
common missile compartment. Our cooperation with the UK mitigates
technical risk and shares design costs.
amphibious warfare ships
Our amphibious warfare ships provide essential capabilities for the
full range of military operations, including theater security
cooperation, humanitarian assistance, conventional deterrence, and
forcible entry as part of major combat operations. With the unique
capability to move hundreds of personnel and substantial material
through complementary surface and air capabilities, these ships are key
to our ability to overcome geographic, political, and infrastructure
impediments to access. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and I have
determined that a minimum of 33 amphibious assault ships represents the
limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement for
supporting a forcible entry operation conducted by an assault echelon
of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). Our 33-ship force would be
comprised of 11 LHA/D amphibious assault ships and a mix of 11 LPD-17
amphibious transport dock ships and 11 LSD dock landing ships. At this
capacity, we are accepting risk in the speed of arrival of the combat
support elements of the MEB. The QDR and our 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
account for 29-31 amphibious warfare ships within the FYDP. We plan to
procure the 11th LPD-17 in 2012, which will allow us to realize a 33-
ship minimum amphibious force in about fiscal year 2016. We continue to
review options to achieve and sustain the minimum 33 amphibious ship
assault echelon force.
LPD-17 Class Amphibious Warfare Ship
The LPD-17 class amphibious warfare ships represent the Navy and
Marine Corps commitment to an expeditionary fleet capable of power
projection, security force assistance, and theater security cooperation
in diverse operating environments. These ships have a 40-year expected
service life and will replace four classes of older ships: the LKA,
LST, LSD-36, and the LPD-4. Two LPD-17 class ships have completed their
initial deployments, and USS New York (LPD-21), forged with steel from
the World Trade Center, delivered in November 2009. We continue to
apply the lessons learned during construction and initial operation of
the early ships to those under construction. Quality is improving with
each ship delivered as we continue to work closely with the shipbuilder
to address cost, schedule, and performance concerns.
LHA Replacement (LHA(R))
LHA(R) is the replacement for our aging Tarawa class ships, which
will reach the end of their already extended service life between 2011-
2015. LHA(R) will provide us flexible, multi-mission amphibious
capabilities by leveraging the LHD-8 design and increasing aviation
capacity to better accommodate the JSF, MV-22, and other aircraft that
comprise the future Marine Corps Air Combat Element. We laid the keel
of the lead ship, USS America (LHA-6), in April 2009 and our fiscal
year 2011 budget includes one LHA(R) which is split-funded in fiscal
year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
Mobile Landing Platform and Future Maritime Preposition Force
The Future Maritime Preposition Force (MPF(F)) program was
envisioned as a forward-deployed squadron of ships capable of at-sea
assembly and rapid employment of forces in an area of interest during a
crisis. Our requirement for amphibious and joint forcible entry
operations was reevaluated during the QDR and, as a result, we have
adjusted our approach to augment our three existing Maritime
Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) instead of developing an MPF(F)
squadron. MPF(F) was optimized for high-end, forcible entry operations,
while the augmented MPS will provide enhanced sea basing capabilities
across a wide range of contingency operations. Each existing MPS will
be augmented by one Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo
ship (transferred from the Army), a T-AKE combat logistics ship, and a
new Mobile Landing Platform (MLP). The MLP will be based on existing
designs for commercial ocean-going tankers and will meet most of the
mission requirements envisioned for the original MLP design. The three
augmented MPS reflect the QDR's emphasis on day-to-day deterrence and
partner capacity building, while continuing to meet forcible entry
needs. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request procures one MLP.
information dominance programs
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
We are investing in unmanned aircraft to meet an increasing
warfighter demand for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR), and we are making technology investments to expand UAS
operations to other mission areas. The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
(BAMS) UAS will enhance our situational awareness and shorten the
sensor-to-shooter kill chain by providing persistent, multiple-sensor
capabilities to Fleet and Joint Commanders. The VTUAV Fire Scout is on
its first deployment aboard the USS McInerney (FFG-8). We are
developing a medium endurance maritime-based UAS and a Small Tactical
Unmanned Aerial System (STUAS) that will support a variety of ships,
Naval Special Warfare and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units, and
Marine Corps elements.
The Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System demonstration (UCAS-D) is
designed to prove carrier suitability of an autonomous, unmanned, low
observable, carrier-based aircraft. This effort includes maturing
technologies for aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested
landings, as well integration into carrier-controlled airspace. Initial
flight tests to demonstrate carrier suitability are scheduled to start
later this year and autonomous aerial refueling demonstrations are
planned for 2013. We will leverage the lessons learned from operating
the demonstrator in developing a low-observable unmanned carrier-
launched airborne strike and surveillance system.
Mobile User Objective System
Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure
global communications capability that can support the command and
control requirements of highly mobile and distributed U.S. and
coalition forces. Satellite communications give deployed forces a
decisive military advantage and often offer the only communication
means to support on-going operations. Rapidly expanding joint demand
for more access at ever-higher data rates requires moving beyond our
current legacy Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite capabilities. The
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) will satisfy those demands when
initial operational capability is reached in fiscal year 2012. I
request your continued support of MUOS and the critical UHF satellite
communication capability it will provide to the joint warfighter as the
aging UHF Follow-On constellation degrades.
Next Generation Enterprise Network
The Navy is continuing its transition from disparate independent
computer networks to a single secure network environment. We are
currently evolving our ashore network from the Navy Marine Corps
Intranet (NMCI), the largest intranet in the world, to the Next
Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). NGEN Increment 1 is the follow-on
to the existing NMCI contract, which expires at the end of fiscal year
2010. NGEN will sustain the services currently provided by NMCI, while
increasing government command and control of our network and enabling
secure, reliable, and adaptable global information exchange. Future
NGEN increments will expand on services currently provided by NMCI and
support seamless transition between afloat and ashore environments. A
continuity of services contract is expected to be awarded this spring
and NGEN Initial Operating Capability is scheduled for the summer of
2012.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, which replaces the E-2C, will
improve nearly every facet of tactical air operations and add overland
and littoral surveillance to support theater Integrated Air and Missile
Defense against air threats in high clutter, complex electro-magnetic
and jamming environments. The airborne radar on the E-2D, with its
improved surveillance capability, is a key pillar of the Navy
Integrated Fire Control concept. The E-2D is scheduled to begin
operational test and evaluation in 2012. The first Fleet squadron
transition is planned for 2013, with deployment planned for October
2014. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests four E-2D Hawkeye aircraft.
remain ready to fight today
Our Navy continues to operate at a high tempo. We are filling new
combatant commander requirements for BMD, electronic attack,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), combat support,
combat service support, and maritime security force assistance, in
addition to conducting ongoing deployments in support of our maritime
and national strategies.
In CENTCOM alone, we have more than 9,000 sailors at sea, including
a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and air wing dedicated to providing 24/7
air support to U.S. and coalition forces on the ground. Navy Riverine
forces are on their sixth deployment to Iraq, conducting interdiction
patrols and training their Iraqi counterparts. Our surface ships in the
region are providing BMD and conducting counterterrorism,
counterpiracy, maritime security, theater security cooperation, and
security force assistance operations. On the ground in CENTCOM, we have
more than 12,000 Active and Reserve sailors supporting Navy, joint
force, and coalition operations. Navy Commanders lead 6 of the 12 U.S.-
led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. We have doubled our
construction battalions (SEABEEs) in Afghanistan, increasing our
capacity to build forward bases for U.S. forces and improve critical
infrastructure in that country. Our Naval Special Warfare Teams
continue to be engaged heavily in direct combat operations and our
Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams continue to conduct lifesaving
counter-Improvised Explosive Device operations on a daily basis. As we
shift our effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, demand for Navy individual
augmentees (IAs) has grown. We are providing IAs to support the
increase of U.S. forces in Afghanistan while our IAs in Iraq remain at
current levels to support the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops,
maintain detention facilities and critical infrastructure, and assist
coalition efforts until they can be turned over to Iraqi forces. During
my recent trip to CENTCOM, I met with many of our dedicated Navy men
and women supporting these efforts and I could not be more proud of
their contributions. Their expert skill, ingenuity, competence, and
drive are impressive and unmatched.
Our high tempo will likely continue as combat forces draw down in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Navy enabling forces will remain in CENTCOM to
provide protection, ISR, and logistics support to our troops and
partner forces in the region, while we will continue to maintain a
forward-deployed presence of about 100 ships around the world to
prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies, enhance
the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging
partners, and respond to crises. Global demand for Navy forces remains
high and continues to rise because of the unequalled and unique ability
of our naval forces to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military
impediments to access while bringing the persistence, flexibility, and
agility to conduct operations from the sea.
Reset in stride is how our Navy prepares our Fleet to deploy again.
Lifecycle maintenance and training between deployments is essential to
our reset and to the ability of our ships and aircraft to reach their
expected service lives. Although we are on pace to grow our fleet for
the next 10 years, our fleet reduced in size over the past decade. As a
result, while we continue to maintain the same number of ships at sea
assigned to combatant commanders, we have a historically low number of
ships available for at-sea training, exercises, and surge operations.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget request balances the need to meet
increasing operational requirements, sustain our sailors' proficiency,
and conduct the maintenance required to ensure our ships and aircraft
reach their full service lives. Highlights follow of initiatives that
ensure our Navy remains ready to fight today.
Depot Level Maintenance
Our ships and aircraft are capital assets that operate in
challenging physical and security environments. Keeping these assets in
acceptable operating condition is vital to their ability to accomplish
assigned missions and to reach their expected service lives. Timely
depot level maintenance, performed in a cycle determined by an
engineered assessment of expected material durability and scoped by
actual physical condition, will preserve our existing force structure
and ensure it can meet assigned tasking. Continued investment in depot
level maintenance is essential to our efforts to achieve and sustain
the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy.
Last year, I established the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management
(SSLCM) Activity to address deficiencies in our ship class maintenance
plans that could prevent our ships from reaching their full service
life. SSLCM has established an engineered approach to surface ship
maintenance that optimizes existing maintenance availability work
packages and better tracks ship material condition through robust
inspections and corrosion control tasks. We accelerated our review of
the requirements for certain ship classes, significantly improving the
accuracy of our surface ship maintenance requirements in fiscal year
2011 over prior years. We are committed to a full review of all surface
ship class maintenance plans, which will take several years. The value
of investing in an engineered approach to maintenance is evident in our
submarine force, where we have successfully extended the time between
scheduled availabilities based on demonstrated material conditions and
verification of engineering analysis. Because we have invested in this
engineering and planning effort, we have been able to safely recover
additional operational availability and reduce the overall depot level
maintenance requirement for our submarines. This significant step has
provided some of the resources needed to make additional investments in
surface ship maintenance.
Our combined fiscal year 2011 budget funds 99 percent of the
projected depot ship maintenance requirements necessary to sustain our
Navy's global presence. Our budget funds aviation depot maintenance to
provide 100 percent of the airframes for deployed squadrons and 96
percent of the nondeployed airframes. I request that you fully support
our baseline and contingency funding requests for O&M to ensure the
effectiveness of our force, safety of our sailors, and longevity of our
ships and aircraft.
Shore Readiness
Our shore infrastructure is a fundamental enabler of our
operational and combat readiness and is essential to the quality of
life and quality of work for our sailors, Navy civilians, and their
families. As I described last year, rising manpower costs and growing
operational demands on our aging fleet have led our Navy to take risk
in shore readiness. This risk increases our maintenance, sustainment,
restoration, and modernization requirements and continues our reliance
on old and less efficient energy systems. These factors increase the
cost of ownership of our shore infrastructure and outpace our efforts
to reduce costs through facilities improvements and energy upgrades. At
our current investment levels, our future shore readiness, particularly
the recapitalization of our facilities infrastructure, is at risk.
To manage our risk in shore infrastructure, our fiscal year 2011
budget request prioritizes funding for our most critical needs,
including Navy and Joint mission readiness, nuclear weapons security
and safety, and improving our bachelor quarters through sustained
funding for our Homeport Ashore initiative. To guide investment in
other areas ashore, we continue to pursue our capabilities-based Shore
Investment Strategy, which targets our investment in shore
infrastructure to where it will produce the highest return on
investment and have the greatest impact on achieving our strategic and
operational objectives, such as in areas that enable critical
warfighting capabilities, improve quality of life, and fulfill Joint
requirements.
We have made essential progress and improvements in nuclear weapons
security, child care facilities, and bachelor's quarters. Thank you for
funding all our requested military construction projects in 2010, as
well as 19 additional projects and our Reserve program. Your support
allowed us to address ship, aircraft, systems, infrastructure, and
training requirements, while enhancing the quality of life and quality
of service for our sailors and their families. Your similar support and
assistance through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
was also very helpful. As you requested, we identified Military
Construction projects for Child Development Centers and barracks and
prioritized them according to operational need and the ability to
obligate funds quickly. We selected infrastructure and energy projects
based on mission requirements, quality of life impact, environmental
planning status, and our ability to execute quickly. Our aggressive
execution schedule is on track; we have awarded all but 1 of our 85
initial projects and construction outlays are ramping up swiftly.
Training Readiness
Our Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) program provides realistic
operational training with seamless integration of geographically
dispersed Navy, Joint, Interagency and Coalition forces. Using virtual
and constructive training environments has allowed us to reduce our
energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions while providing the
level of sophistication necessary to prepare our sailors for
operational and tactical mission proficiency. We continue to evolve FST
to provide our sailors with exposure to a multitude of warfare areas.
Last year, we conducted our first BMD Fleet Synthetic Training event,
proving the viability and effectiveness of integrated Navy, Joint, and
partner-nation BMD training.
The proliferation of advanced, stealthy, nuclear, and non-nuclear
submarines continues to challenge our Navy's ability to guarantee the
access and safety of joint forces. Effective Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) training with active sonar systems is vital to meeting potential
threats. The Navy remains a world leader in marine mammal research and
we will continue our robust investment in this research in fiscal year
2011 and beyond. Through such efforts, and in full consultation and
cooperation with other Federal agencies, Navy has developed effective
measures that protect marine mammals and the ocean environment from
adverse impacts of mid-frequency active sonar while not impeding vital
Navy training. We continue to work closely with our interagency
partners to further refine our protective measures as scientific
knowledge evolves. It is vitally important that any such measures
ensure the continued flexibility necessary to respond to future,
potentially unforeseen national security requirements.
Over the last year, we completed environmental planning for seven
existing and proposed at-sea training and combat certification areas.
We expect to complete planning for another six areas by the end of 2010
as we continue to balance our responsibility to prepare naval forces
for deployment and combat operations with our responsibility to be good
stewards of the marine environment.
Conducting night and day field carrier landing practice (FCLP)
prior to at-sea carrier qualifications is a critical training
requirement for our fixed-wing carrier-based pilots, who must develop
and maintain proficiency in the fundamentals necessary to conduct safe
carrier-based flight operations. We continue to seek additional
airfield capacity in the form of an outlying landing field (OLF) that
will enhance our ability to support FCLP training for fixed-wing,
carrier pilots operating from Naval Air Station Oceana and Naval
Station Norfolk. The additional OLF will allow Navy to meet training
requirements and overcome challenges related to capacity limits, urban
encroachment, and impacts from adverse weather conditions at existing
East Coast facilities. In August 2009, the Navy announced that the
release of the draft environmental impact statement (EIS) for
construction and operation of an OLF would be delayed. This delay was
necessary to ensure JSF noise analysis is included in the OLF draft
EIS. The Navy is committed to developing, with local, State, and
Federal leaders, a plan to ensure the OLF provides positive benefits to
local communities while addressing Navy training shortfalls.
Energy and Climate
Energy reform is a strategic imperative. The Secretary of the Navy
and I are committed to changing the way we do business to realize an
energy-secure future. In alignment with the Secretary of the Navy's
five goals, our priorities are to advance energy security by improving
combat capability, assuring mobility, ``lightening the load'', and
greening our footprint. We will achieve these goals through energy
efficiency improvements, consumption reduction initiatives, and
adoption of alternative energy and fuels. Reducing our reliance on
fossil fuels will improve our combat capability by increasing time on
station, reducing time spent alongside replenishment ships, and
producing more effective and powerful future weapons. Most of our
projects remain in the demonstration phase; however, we are making good
progress in the form of hybrid-electric drive, delivered last year on
the USS Makin Island (LHD-8), bio-fuel engines, advanced hull and
propeller coatings, solid state lighting, and policies that encourage
sailors to reduce their consumption through simple changes in behavior.
Thanks to your support, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act
funded Navy energy conservation and renewable energy investment in 11
tactical and 42 shore-based projects totaling $455 million. Tactical
projects included alternative fuel, drive, and power systems, while
ashore projects included alternative energy (wind, solar and
geothermal) investments in 10 States and the installation of advance
metering infrastructure in three regions. Our fiscal year 2011 budget
continues to invest in tactical and ashore energy initiatives,
requesting $128 million for these efforts.
In our Maritime Strategy we addressed maritime operations in an era
of climate change, especially in the ice diminished Arctic. In May
2009, I established the Navy's Task Force on Climate Change to develop
policy, investment, and force-structure recommendations regarding
climate change in the Arctic and globally over the long-term. Our focus
will be to ensure Navy readiness and capability in a changing global
environment.
Second East Coast Carrier-Capable Port
Hampton Roads is the only nuclear carrier capable port on the East
Coast. A catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area affecting port
facilities, shipping channels, supporting maintenance or training
infrastructure, or the surrounding community has the potential to
severely limit East Coast Carrier operations, even if the ships
themselves are not affected. Consistent with today's dispersal of West
Coast aircraft carriers between California and Washington State, the
QDR direction to make Naval Station Mayport a nuclear carrier-capable
homeport addresses the Navy's requirement for a capable facility to
maintain aircraft carriers in the event that a natural or manmade
disaster makes the Hampton Roads area inaccessible. While there is an
upfront cost to upgrade Naval Station Mayport to support our nuclear
aircraft carriers, Mayport has been a carrier homeport since 1952 and
is the most cost-effective means to achieve strategic dispersal on the
east coast. The national security benefits of this additional homeport
far outweigh those costs.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The Law of the Sea Convention codifies navigation and overflight
rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global
mobility of our Armed Forces. It directly supports our national
security interests. Not being a party to this Convention constrains
efforts to develop enduring maritime partnerships, inhibits efforts to
expand the Proliferation Security Initiative, and elevates the level of
risk for our sailors as they undertake operations to preserve
navigation rights and freedoms, particularly in areas such as the
Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf, and the East and South China Seas.
By becoming a party to the Convention, the United States will be able
to expand its sovereign rights to the increasingly accessible outer
continental shelf areas of the resource rich environment of the Arctic,
as well as in other locations where technological advances are opening
up previously unobtainable resources. Accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention remains a priority for our Navy.
develop and support our sailors, navy civilians and their families
Our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families underpin our
Maritime Strategy and are the foundation of our Nation's global force
for good. We have great ships, aircraft, weapons, and systems, but it
is our skilled and innovative sailors who turn these ships, aircraft,
and technologies into capabilities that can prevent conflict and win
wars. In January 2010, we released the Navy Total Force Vision for the
21st century to guide our efforts to attract, recruit, develop, assign,
and retain a highly-skilled workforce and reaffirm our commitment to
supporting our uniformed and civilian people wherever they serve and
live.
We have transitioned from reducing end strength to stabilizing our
force through a series of performance-based measures. Our stabilization
efforts remain focused on maintaining a balanced force in terms of
seniority, experience, and skills while supporting growth in high-
demand areas such as cyber and special operations. We recognize the
importance of retaining the talent and experience of our sailors after
they complete their active duty obligation so we are actively removing
barriers associated with the transition between Active and Reserve
careers to allow for a continuum of service over a lifetime. Our fiscal
year 2011 budget requests authorization and funding for 328,700 Active
end strength and 65,500 Reserve end strength. We continue to request
OCO funding for our individual augmentees that are performing non-core
Navy missions in support of contingency operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. OCO funding remains critical to our ability to meet these
missions without adversely impacting fleet readiness or sailor dwell
time.
We continue to provide support to our sailors and their families,
including those who are wounded, ill, and injured, through expanded
Fleet and Family Support services, Navy Safe Harbor, and our
Operational Stress Control (OSC) program. We are addressing
aggressively the recent rise in suicide rates by implementing new
training and outreach programs for fleet commanders, sailors, and Navy
families to increase suicide awareness and prevention. We are focused
on reducing sexual assaults in our Navy through our new Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response (SAPR) Office and initiatives that emphasize
our intolerance for sexual assault and related behavior in our Navy. We
remain committed to helping our sailors balance work and family
commitments through initiatives such as 12-month operational deferments
for new mothers (the most comprehensive policy of all military
services), 21 days of administrative leave for adoptive parents, 10
days of paternity leave, a Career Intermission pilot program, and
flexible work options. I continue to emphasize diversity outreach and
mentorship to ensure we attract, leverage, and retain the diverse
talent of our Nation. Diversity among U.S. Naval Academy and Navy
Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) applicants and graduates
continues to grow each year. Through our Naval War College and Naval
Postgraduate School, we are providing Joint Professional Military
Education (JPME) and world-class higher education and training to our
sailors. We continue to build our Foreign Area Officer program to
strengthen existing and emerging international partnerships.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget request represents a balanced approach
to supporting our sailors and their families, sustaining the high tempo
of current operations, and preserving fleet and family readiness. I
request the continued support of Congress for our fiscal year 2011
manpower and personnel initiatives.
Recruiting and Retention
Our Navy has attracted, recruited and retained a highly-skilled
workforce over the past several years, and we expect this success to
continue into fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2009 marked the second
consecutive year Navy achieved its aggregate officer and enlisted
recruiting goals in both the Active and Reserve components. At the
forefront of this effort is our highly trained and professional
recruiting force, which has postured us to respond to changing trends.
We continue to attract the highest quality enlisted recruits in our
history. We are exceeding DOD and Navy standards for the percentage of
non-prior service enlisted recruits who have earned a high school
diploma and whose test scores are in the upper mental group category.
We met the Navy standard of 95 percent of recruits with a high school
diploma in fiscal year 2009 and are currently at 96 percent this fiscal
year. We exceeded the Navy standard of 70 percent of recruits in the
upper mental group category in fiscal year 2009 (77 percent tested into
this group) and we are currently at 78 percent this fiscal year.
Navy will remain competitive in the employment market through the
disciplined use of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Using a
targeted approach, we will continue our recruiting and retention
initiatives to attract and retain our best sailors, especially those
within high-demand, critical skill areas that remain insulated from
economic conditions. Judicious use of special and incentive pays
remains essential to recruiting and retaining these professionals in
the current economic environment, and will increase in importance as
the economic recovery continues. Our goal remains to maintain a
balanced force, in which seniority, experience, and skills are matched
to requirements.
Diversity
Our Navy draws its strength and innovation from the diversity of
our Nation. We continue to aggressively expand our diversity. We are
committed to implementing policies and programs that foster a Navy
Total Force composition that reflects America's diversity. We have
increased diverse accessions through targeted recruiting in diverse
markets, developed relationships with key influencers in the top
diverse metropolitan markets, and are aligning all Navy assets and
related organizations to maximize our connection with educators,
business leaders and government officials to increase our influencer
base. Recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce, reflective of the
Nation's demographics at all levels of the chain of command, is a
strategic imperative, critical to mission accomplishment, and remains
focus area for leaders throughout our Navy.
We continue to expand our relationships with key influencers and
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)-based affinity
groups to inform our Nation's youth about the unique opportunities
available in our Navy. To increase our accessibility to diverse
markets, we established NROTC units at Arizona State University and
Tuskegee University. Tuskegee University accepted students in the fall
of 2009, and ASU will accept students in the fall of 2010. Our
diversity outreach efforts have contributed to our 2013 U.S. Naval
Academy and NROTC classes being the most diverse student bodies in our
history. In the years ahead, we will continue to focus our efforts on
retaining this talent by building and sustaining a continuum of
mentorship approach that reaches out and engages sailors throughout
their career. This approaches includes social networking, strong
relationships with affinity groups, and various programs offered by our
sailors' immediate commands and associated leadership in addition to
their respective enterprises and communities.
Women on Submarines
The Secretary of the Navy and I are in the process of changing the
Navy policy that restricts women from serving aboard our submarines.
This move will enable our Navy and, specifically, our submarine force
to leverage the tremendous talent and potential of our female officers
and enlisted personnel. Initial integration will include female
officers assigned to ballistic missile (SSBN) and guided missile (SSGN)
submarines, since officer accommodations on these submarines have more
available space and appear to require less modification. The plan also
integrates female supply corps officers onto SSBNs and SSGNs at the
department head level. We are planning the first female submarine
officer candidate accessions into the standard nuclear training and
submarine training pipelines this year, making it possible to assign
the first women to submarines as early as fiscal year 2012. Integration
of enlisted females on SSBNs and SSGNs and integration of officer and
enlisted female personnel on attack submarines (SSNs) will occur later,
once the extent of necessary modifications is determined. This
initiative has my personal attention and I will continue to keep you
informed as we integrate these highly motivated and capable officers
into our submarine force.
Sailor and Family Continuum of Care
We remain committed to providing our sailors and their families a
comprehensive continuum of care that addresses all aspects of medical,
physical, psychological, and family readiness. Our fiscal year 2011
budget request expands this network of services and caregivers to
ensure that all sailors and their families receive the highest quality
healthcare available. Navy Safe Harbor, Navy's OSC Program, Reserve
Psychological Health Outreach Program, Warrior Transition Program
(WTP), and Returning Warrior Workshop (RWW) are critical elements of
this continuum.
Navy Safe Harbor continues to provide non-medical support for all
seriously wounded, ill, and injured sailors, coastguardsmen, and their
families through a network of Recovery Care Coordinators and nonmedical
Care Managers at 16 locations across the country. Over the past year,
Safe Harbor's enrollment has grown from 387 to 542. Over 84,000 sailors
have participated in OSC training, which is providing a comprehensive
approach designed to actively promote the psychological health of
sailors and their families throughout their careers while reducing the
traditional stigma associated with seeking help. The WTP and RWWs are
essential to post-deployment reintegration efforts. WTP, established in
Kuwait and expanded via Mobile Care Teams to Iraq and Afghanistan,
provides a place and time for individual augmentees to decompress and
transition from life in a war zone to resumption of life at home. The
RWW identifies problems, encourages sailors to share their experiences,
refers family members to essential resources, and facilitates the
demobilization process.
Stress on the Force
As we continue to operate at a high operational tempo to meet our
Nation's demands in the Middle East and around the world, the tone of
the force remains positive. We continue to monitor the health of the
force by tracking statistics on personal and family-related indicators
such as stress, financial well-being, and command climate, as well as
sailor and family satisfaction with the Navy. Recent results indicate
that sailors and their families remain satisfied with command morale,
the quality of leadership, education benefits, health care, and
compensation.
Suicide affects individuals, commands and families. We continue
efforts at suicide prevention through a multi-faceted approach of
communication, training, and command support designed to foster
resilience and promote psychological health among sailors. Navy's
calendar year 2009 suicide rate of 13.8 per 100,000 sailors represents
an increase from the previous year rate of 11.6 per 100,000 sailors.
Although this is below the national rate of 19.0 per 100,000
individuals for the same age and gender demographic, any loss of life
as a result of suicide is unacceptable. We remain committed to creating
an environment in which stress and other suicide-related factors are
more openly recognized, discussed, and addressed. We continue to
develop and enhance programs designed to mitigate suicide risk factors
and improve the resilience of the force. These programs focus on
substance abuse prevention, financial management, positive family
relationships, physical readiness, and family support, with the goal of
reducing individual stress. We continue to work towards a greater
understanding of the issues surrounding suicide to ensure that our
policies, training, interventions, and communication efforts are
meeting their intended objectives.
Sexual assault is incompatible with our Navy core values, high
standards of professionalism, and personal discipline. We have
reorganized our efforts in this critical area under the Navy SAPR
program, which takes a multi-faceted approach to raise awareness of
effective prevention methods, victim response and offender
accountability. Recent program reviews undertaken by the Government
Accountability Office, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the
Military Services, and the Navy Inspector General will help us to
identify program gaps and refine our program so we can continue to
promote a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault.
Learning and Development
Education and training are strategic investments that give us an
asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. To develop the highly-
skilled, combat-ready force necessary to meet the demands of the
Maritime Strategy and the Joint Force, we have 15 learning centers
around the country providing top-notch training to our sailors and Navy
civilians. We continue to leverage civilian credentialing programs to
bolster the professional qualifications of sailors in all ratings and
increase sailor equity in their own professional advancement. We are
balancing existing education and training requirements with growth in
important mission areas such as cyber warfare, missile defense, and
anti-submarine warfare. Cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise
remain essential to the Navy's global mission, and our budget request
supports expansion of the Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture
program for NROTC midshipmen, as well as implementation of the AF-PAK
Hands Program. We recognize the importance of providing our people
meaningful and relevant education, particularly JPME, which develops
leaders who are strategically-minded, capable of critical thinking, and
adept in naval and joint warfare. Our resident courses at Naval War
College, nonresident courses at Naval Postgraduate School and Fleet
Seminar program, and distance offerings provide ample opportunity for
achievement of this vital education. I appreciate the support of
Congress in the recent post-September 11 GI Bill. We have led DOD in
implementing this vital education benefit and continue to carefully
balance our voluntary education investments to further develop our
force.
conclusion
Our sailors are performing brilliantly, providing incredible
service in the maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace domains
around the world today. I am optimistic about our future and the global
leadership opportunities that our Navy provides for our Nation. Our
fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the progress we started in
fiscal year 2010 to increase fleet capacity, maintain our warfighting
readiness, and develop and enhance the Navy Total Force. I ask for your
strong support of our fiscal year 2011 budget request and my identified
priorities. Thank you for your unwavering commitment to our sailors,
Navy civilians, and their families, and for all you do to make our U.S.
Navy an effective and enduring global force for good.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral Roughead.
General Conway.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS

General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to report to you on the posture of your Marine
Corps. My pledge, as it has been over the years, is to provide
you with a candid and honest assessment.
Having recently returned from a trip to theater, I'm
pleased to report to you on the magnificent performance of your
marines and sailors in combat. If you count a 4-year enlistment
as a generation of marines, we are now experiencing our third
generation of great young patriots since our Nation was
provoked on September 11. The first generation broke trail,
leading strikes into Afghanistan and Iraq. The second
generation quelled a once-violent province of Anbar. Today
there are less than 150 marines in Iraq. But our third
generation has more than 15,000 serving in Afghanistan.
Your marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy,
but, with the Afghan Security Forces, they are once again
proving they are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold
of Helmand. Let me assure you from what the Sergeant Major and
I witnessed first-hand, the highest morale in the Corps resides
in those units that are posted to Afghanistan.
My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot
of the Corps and describes our near-term focus, long-term
priorities, and our vision of the future. That vision matches
closely the results of the QDR. The Secretary of Defense seeks
to create a U.S. military more closely focused on hybrid
threats, yet capable of responding to a major-level
contingency. That combination essentially describes the Marine
Corps that we have built today, a Corps that we call a two-
fisted fighter, able to perform equally well in a
counterinsurgency or in a high-intensity combined arms fight.
Our resource expenditures, moreover, reflect our dual, or
swing, capacity. That is to say that 100 percent of Marine
Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid conflict or in a major
fight. Equipment procurement is indeed our primary concern as
we look at the fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our
requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan and our
resolve to reestablish our maritime prepositioned squadrons
have driven equipment stocks to an all-time low in our
operating forces at home station. The ability to perform and
train for deployment and certainly the ability to respond to an
unexpected contingency is at significant risk based on this
increasing shortfall.
Congress has promised us resources for reset and
reconstitution, but increasingly we cannot wait for the guns to
fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask
for your help in this critical area.
Our military construction (MILCON) accounts in the fiscal
year 2011 budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain
the promise we made to our marines that they'll have quality
living spaces while they're home between deployments. One need
only visit some of our major bases and stations to realize that
we waited too long to begin the effort.
Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue
a heavy emphasis on education of our officers and senior staff
NCOs. A strong reservoir of strategic and operational thinkers
is a must on a sophisticated joint and combined battlefield.
Therefore, a quality Marine Corps University with facilities to
match our already world class student body, faculty, and
curriculum is a major priority. We trust we will receive your
fully support on our MILCON investments that will pay huge
investments in the years to come.
Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own
surprise that our Marine Corps and their families have remained
so resilient over these 9 years of conflict. They have been
incredibly determined, loyal, and courageous in an effort to
see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the credit
goes to you in Congress for providing them with the finest in
terms of equipment, warrior care, quality of life for families,
and compensation.
The number one question in the minds of our troops is
always: Is the country behind us? The Members of Congress have
answered that question in spades, both by your apportionment of
the Nation's precious resources and also through personal
efforts to visit both the troops in theater and our wounded at
Bethesda and Walter Reed.
As a result of the above and the natural tendency of
marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and
retention are at all-time highs. I predict that for the second
year in a row we will close out reenlistment opportunities for
first-term and career force halfway through the fiscal year.
Clearly, such a phenomenon would not be possible if marines and
their families were not happy in the service of their country.
One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic
extremists will be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a
second land army and will gladly rejoin our Navy brothers
aboard amphibious ships in order to project American global
presence, demonstrate American good will, and if need be
protect America's vital interests. Until that day comes,
however, your Corps will continue, as we say, to do windows.
That is, we'll continue to take aboard the indomitable youth of
America and make them marines, with the absolute conviction
that as a result they will one day be better citizens. We will
be trained and as equally prepared to route Taliban fighters in
Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered Haitians outside Port au
Prince.
With your continued support and that of our loyal
countrymen, we will do whatever the Nation asks us to do and do
it exceedingly well.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Conway follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Conway, USMC
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to provide a written report for the record on the
current posture of the Marine Corps. My pledge, as always, is to
provide you with a candid and honest assessment. On behalf of all
marines, their families, and our civilian employees, I want to thank
you for your concern and continued support.
This brief statement contains a summary of our near-term focus and
enduring priorities, an update on your Marine Corps today, a discussion
of the challenges we see ahead, and our vision of the future. In
addition to any testimony you wish to receive from me, I have directed
the Deputy Commandants of the Marine Corps to meet with you as
individuals and members of your respective subcommittees, and to
provide you any other information you require. Our liaison officers
will also deliver copies of 2010 U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and
Programs to the offices of each member of the committee. This almanac
and reference book contains detailed descriptions of all our major
programs and initiatives. We hope you will find it useful.
i. your marine corps
We believe that Americans expect their marines to be ready to
respond when our country is threatened; to arrive on the scene on short
notice anywhere in the world via the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy,
as was necessary when a disastrous earthquake recently struck Haiti;
and to fight and win our Nation's battles. The public invests greatly
in the Marine Corps. In turn, our commitment is to uphold their special
trust and confidence and provide them the best return on their
investment.
Characteristics
Your Marine Corps is a young force that provides great value to the
Nation.

The average age of a marine is 25 years old.
Almost half of the enlisted force--84,830 marines--is
between the ranks of private and lance corporal (pay grades E1-
E3).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As of 23 December 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost 70 percent of your marines are on their first
enlistment, and some 30,000 have been in uniform for less than
a year.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ As of 1 December 2009, the percentage of marines on their first
enlistment was 68.6 percent, and the number of marines with less than 1
year on active duty is 29,032.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ratio of officers to enlisted marines is 1:9--the
lowest of all the Services.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Authorized end strength of 202,000 = 21,000 officers + 181,000
enlisted marines = 1:9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More than 136,000 marines (67 percent) are in
deploying units--what we call the Operating Forces. Nearly
30,000 marines are forward deployed, forward based, or on
training exercises around the world.
For 6.5 percent \4\ of the baseline 2010 Defense
budget, the Marine Corps provides:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 6.5 percent of DOD budget represents fiscal year 2010 USMC
Green dollars and Direct Blue (Navy) dollars.

17 percent of the Nation's active ground
combat maneuver units
12 percent of the Nation's fixed wing tactical
aircraft
19 percent of the Nation's attack helicopters

Expeditionary
The Marine Corps is the Nation's naval expeditionary, combined-arms
force-in-readiness. To marines, expeditionary connotes fast, austere,
and lethal.

Expeditionary means rapid deployment by air or sea to
respond to crises of temporary duration. For example, within 24
hours of the speech by the President of the United States in
December announcing the current strategy in Afghanistan, the
lead elements of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines from Camp Lejeune,
NC, were en route to Afghanistan.
Expeditionary means being efficient and effective
while operating in an austere environment--a task-organized
force that is manned and equipped no larger or heavier than
necessary to accomplish the mission.
Expeditionary means being prepared for decisive
action--to be lethal, if necessary--but also possessing the
lesser-included capabilities for security cooperation,
humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief.
In summary, the term expeditionary to marines goes to
the very heart of our service culture, core values, and warrior
ethos. Service as part of an expeditionary force means
embracing a Spartan way of life and regular deployments on
foreign soil in furtherance of our Nation's interests.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ This is consistent with the official Defense Department
definition of an expeditionary force: ``An armed force organized to
accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.'' Joint Pub 1-02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Washington, DC: 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005), p. 193.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organization
The Marine Corps is the only general-purpose force in the
Department of Defense (DOD) that is trained and equipped as the
Nation's first responders.

We organize in Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).
Under a single command element, the MAGTF integrates three
major subordinate elements: (1) Ground Combat Element, (2)
Aviation Combat Element, (3) Logistics Combat Element. Each
element of the MAGTF is complementary, and Marine Corps forces
are most effective and best employed as MAGTFs within the joint
or multinational command structure.
MAGTFs are adaptive, general-purpose rapid response
forces. They are multi-capable, transitioning seamlessly from
fighting conventional and hybrid threats to promoting stability
and mitigating conditions that lead to conflict. For example,
in 2003, after completing a conventional, 350-mile attack over
land from Kuwait to Baghdad, I Marine Expeditionary Force--a
60,000-marine-plus MAGTF--was able to transition quickly to
security and stability operations.

Near-Term Focus
We understand the economic challenges facing our country and the
hard decisions Congress must make. We thank you for your unwavering
support. This report discusses the near-term focus of the Marine Corps:

The current fight in Afghanistan and the responsible
drawdown in Iraq
Readiness and reset of equipment
Modernization of the MAGTF
Preparing for the next contingency and the
uncertainties of the future
Enduring Priorities
Through the Future Years Defense Program and beyond, we are focused
on:

Providing the Nation a naval expeditionary force fully
prepared for employment as a MAGTF across the spectrum of
operations
Remaining the most ready when our Nation is least
ready
Providing for our marines and their families
ii. iraq and afghanistan
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Since testimony before your committee last year, the Marine Corps
has transferred authority for Anbar Province to the U.S. Army and is
near completion of a responsible drawdown from Iraq.

From 2003-2009, our force levels in Iraq averaged
25,000 marines.
As of February 19, 2010, there were 159 marines in
Iraq. By spring of this year, our mission in Iraq will be
complete and your marines will redeploy.
Operation Enduring Freedom
In Afghanistan, the mission has expanded.

As of September 23, 2009, there were more marines in
Afghanistan than in Iraq.
By March 2010, there will be more than 18,500 marines
in Afghanistan, and by mid-April, that number will grow to a
robust MAGTF of 19,400 personnel with equipment, and will be
commanded by a Marine two-star general.
Your marines have already had success and have made a
difference in some of the toughest regions of Afghanistan,
primarily Helmand Province in the south--formerly a Taliban
stronghold, and the source of the highest volume of opium
production in the world. However, more work remains to be done.
Summary
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the
Marine Corps to fight as a second land army. Although we have
been successful in our assigned missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, that success has come at the price of degraded
readiness for our designed missions. The Marine Corps will
always do whatever the Nation requires. But, as Congress has
authorized and resourced, the Marine Corps is trained,
organized, and equipped for our primary mission as a force in
readiness.
The harsh environments and tempo of operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan through 8 years of combat have accelerated wear
and tear on our equipment. The enemy's weapon of choice--the
improvised explosive device (IED)--has forced us to increase
the weight of our personal protective equipment and the armor
on our vehicles.
The distributed nature of operations has shown us that
our legacy tables of equipment were inadequate. The required
type and number of ground vehicles, radios, and other major end
items of equipment have significantly increased. In our
infantry battalions, for example, the number of tactical
vehicles has almost doubled while the number of radio sets has
grown sevenfold. Our preliminary estimates indicate that the
cost of restructuring the Marine Corps' tables of equipment
would be $5 billion over fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year
2015.
The amount of equipment that has been damaged,
destroyed, or has reached the end of service life from
accelerated use has increased, and the cost associated with
fixing or replacing this equipment has increased significantly.
Based upon the Marine Corps current analysis, our
estimated reset cost is $8 billion. The $8 billion consists of
$3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an
additional long-term reset liability of $5 billion upon
termination of the conflict.
Equipment on hand at home station to support training
has been serious degraded. Particularly worrisome is our
capacity to respond to other contingencies.
We are institutionalizing the lessons learned in Iraq
and Afghanistan in training, education, organization, doctrine,
and capability development. One of the ways we are doing this
is through the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.
The current operating environment in Iraq and
Afghanistan has led to an exponentially increased need for
intelligence collection assets down to lower levels of command.
The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Enterprise provides support to the MAGTF in this operating
environment by organizing all of the intelligence disciplines,
sensors, and equipment and communication architecture into a
single capability that is integrated and networked across all
echelons.
iii. readiness
1. Personnel Readiness
Our people--the brave men and women who wear our uniform and the
spouses, children, and the parents who support them--are our most
valuable resource. In 2009, your Corps lost 65 marines to enemy action
in combat. We also lost 52 marines who died by suicide--this serious
issue, which will be discussed later in this report, has my personal
attention.
End Strength
Current authorized end strength is 202,100 marines in the Active
component and 39,600 marines in the Selected Reserve.

During fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps requested
and received authorization to grow 27,000 additional personnel
by the end of fiscal year 2011.
We completed our growth during fiscal year 2009--2
years ahead of schedule. We attribute this to four factors:
quality recruiting, exceptional retention, reduced personnel
attrition, and a great young generation of Americans who want
to serve their country during wartime.
With this personnel increase, we will improve
training, upgrade readiness, and enhance the quality of life
for all personnel and their families. The goal is to build the
equivalent capacity of three Marine Expeditionary Forces--the
largest MAGTF and principal Marine Corps warfighting
organization.
We are continuing to shape the Marine Corps with the
right mix of units, grades, and occupational specialties.
Quality
Recruiting. In fiscal year 2009, we exceeded goals in
numbers and standards for the Active component and the Selected
Reserve. The Active component accessed 31,413 personnel, and
the Selected Reserve accessed 9,627 personnel. In fiscal year
2010, our goal is to access 27,500 enlisted personnel in the
Active component and commission 1,800 new officers.
Enlistment Standards. One of the DOD standards for new
recruits is that at least 90 percent will possess a high school
diploma. The Marine Corps has chosen to maintain a higher
standard; our goal is a high school graduation rate of 95
percent. In fiscal year 2009, for our combined active and
Reserve components, the high school graduation rate of our
recruits exceeded 98 percent.
First-Term Reenlistments. In fiscal year 2009, 8,011
first-term marines reenlisted, meeting 109.2 percent of our
goal. This represented a retention rate of 33.7 percent,
exceeding our traditional retention rate of 24 percent. In the
first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,194 first-term marines
have already reenlisted--77 percent of the goal for the entire
year.
Subsequent Term Reenlistments. In fiscal year 2009,
7,985 marines who had completed at least two enlistment
contracts chose to reenlist again. This number represented 107
percent of our goal and a 78.6 retention rate--the highest in
history. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,685
marines who had completed at least two enlistment contracts
chose to reenlist again--82 percent of the goal for the entire
year.
Officers. The quality of officers accessed and
retained remains high. In one example, the share of Marine-
option U.S. Naval Academy candidates in the top third of their
graduating class greatly exceeded representative levels in
2008. The number of Naval Academy graduates who chose to become
Marine Corps officers last year was 270--the highest number in
history for the second year in a row.
In fiscal year 2009, our officer retention rate was 93
percent and during fiscal year 2010, we expect officer
retention to remain stable.
Reservists
The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the total force. As
of January 2010, there were 39,164 marines in the Selected Reserve and
another 55,233 in the Inactive Ready Reserve. Marine Forces Reserve
includes 183 training centers in 48 States, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico.

The extensive contributions of the Reserve have
reduced deployment requirements for the Active component,
thereby improving the health of the total force. More than
54,000 marines from the Selected Reserve and the Inactive Ready
Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations
Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, or other operational
commitments around the globe.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ As of 3 January 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Every Marine into the Fight''
The majority of your marines joined the Corps after our Nation was
already at war. They expect to train, deploy, and fight because that is
what they believe marines are supposed to do. As such, the 2007 ``Every
Marine into the Fight'' initiative adjusted personnel assignment
policies so marines serving in nondeploying units or the supporting
establishment would have the opportunity to deploy. At the same time,
we monitor carefully the frequency and duration that units and
individual personnel spend deployed.

To date, 73 percent of the available marines have
deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom, or other operational commitments around the globe.
Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual
deployment tempo on a 2-year sliding scale--the number of days
deployed out of the previous 730 days. In the last 7 years, we
have seen a 20-fold increase in the individual deployment tempo
of marines in the Active component. In October 2002, the number
of marines who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a
2-year period was 4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 marines
had deployed for at least 120 consecutive days.
Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure
unit operational tempo is the ratio of ``deployment to
dwell''--months deployed to months at home station. We limit
the duration of deployments for units and individual marines to
no more than 7 months for battalions and squadrons. Higher
headquarters units deploy for 1 year.
Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio
in the Active component and a 1:5 ratio in the Reserve
component. Our Reserve units are currently operating at a ratio
that more closely approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of
our Active component units, on average, are nearing the goal of
1:2 (see Table 1).

Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment to Dwell Ratios \7\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Ratio (Months
MAGTF Element Deployed : Months Home
Station)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Element........................... 1:1.43
Ground Combat Element..................... 1:2.08
Aviation Combat Element................... 1:2.11
Logistics Combat Element.................. 1:1.79
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ As of 18 November 2009.

The subordinate units most frequently deployed are
Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01 (Command Element); Infantry
Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons,
1:1.10, and Attack Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation
Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies
1:1.30 (Logistics Combat Element).
Suicide Prevention
The number of marines who have died by suicide in recent years is
shocking and unacceptable. This issue has my personal attention, and we
have multiple programs at work to reverse this trend.

Causes. Our studies have shown that regardless of duty
station, deployment, or duty status, the primary stressors
associated with marine suicides are problems in romantic
relationships, physical health, work-related issues, such as
poor performance and job dissatisfaction, and pending legal or
administrative action. Multiple stressors are typically present
in a suicide. This is consistent with the findings of the other
services and civilian agencies.
Deployments. We analyze suicides monthly and annually
for combat-related trends such as the number of deployments and
dwell time. Although it is reasonable to assume that one or
more deployments may cause an increase in suicides, to date, we
have been unable to establish a direct correlation between
deployments and suicides.
Civilian Employees
Civilian employees are a vital part of the Marine Corps. In fiscal
year 2010, civilian Federal employees will number more than 25,000.
Through initiatives in management and career development, the Marine
Corps is dedicated to maintaining a civilian workforce with the
leadership skills and technical competencies necessary to meet the
challenges of today as well as those of the future.

Traditionally, civilian employees have served
primarily in the supporting establishment. Now, more than ever
before, they are deploying with the operating forces and
serving in positions traditionally occupied by Active Duty
marines. For example, we are in the process of hiring more than
260 tactical safety specialists, who will each rotate on
deployments with the operating forces. We are also
participating in DOD's program to build a deployable Civilian
Expeditionary Workforce.
Families
While we recruit marines, we retain families. More than 45 percent
of your marines are married, and we believe that investing in military
families is critical to the long-term health of the institution. When
marines know that their loved ones at home station have access to
quality housing, healthcare, child development services, and education,
they are better prepared to face the rigors of deployment and more
inclined to stay in uniform when they return home.

Family Readiness Programs. Our baseline budget in
fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for family programs is $399 million
per year. We have reformed our family readiness programs at
every level of command at all of our installations. As an
example, we have created more than 400 full-time positions for
family readiness officers down to the battalion and squadron
level.
Child Care. Today, we are currently meeting 64 percent
of potential need for child care spaces. To meet the DOD
standard of 80 percent of potential need based on the current
population, we would require approximately 3,000 additional
spaces. With your support, we have programmed an additional
2,615 spaces that will open over the next 18-24 months.
Families with Special Needs. With an increase of $11
million for the Exceptional Family Member Program in this
year's baseline budget, we have made great strides improving
the programs that support special needs family members.
Enrollment is now mandatory and more than 8,900 exceptional
family members are in the program. The Marine Corps assigns a
caseworker to each family, who assists during relocation,
deployment, and life events. In addition, the Marine Corps now
underwrites the cost of up to 40 hours of respite care per
month for families in the program. To date, the Marine Corps
has provided more than 250,000 hours of respite care.
Wounded Warriors
About 9,000 marines have been injured or fallen seriously ill while
serving in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom. We
are deeply committed to their care as well as the welfare of their
families. Since activation in April 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment
has provided a wide range of nonmedical care for the injured and ill.
The Marine Corps now also has wounded warrior battalions at Camp
Pendleton and Camp Lejeune.

Infrastructure. The Marine Corps is investing $50
million from the 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations
supplemental for the construction of resource and recovery
centers at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. These recovery
centers will provide spaces for counseling, physical therapy,
employment support, financial management, and other training
and outreach programs in support of our wounded.
Outreach. With a 24-hour call center for wounded
marines and their families, the Wounded Warrior Regiment has
contacted 99.4 percent of all marines (7,654 out of 7,703) who
were wounded since the beginning of Operations Iraqi Freedom
and Enduring Freedom, in order to determine their health
status. We also maintain a toll-free number to the medical
center in Landstuhl, Germany, for families to contact their
loved ones who have been wounded.
Recovery Care. The Marine Corps has 42 recovery care
coordinators, who coordinate non-medical services for marines
and their families during recovery, rehabilitation, and
transition.
Mental Health

Traumatic Brain Injury. Naval medicine
remains at the forefront of researching and
implementing pioneering techniques to treat traumatic
brain injury. One technique, Hyperbaric Oxygen
Treatment, is showing great promise. We anticipate a
study to begin this spring that tests the efficacy of
this revolutionary treatment. The Marine Corps has a
formal screening protocol for marines who suffer
concussions or who are exposed to blast events in
theater.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. We are
attentive to the mental health of our warriors and we
are dedicated to ensuring that all marines and family
members who bear the invisible wounds caused by stress
receive the best help possible. We developed the Combat
Operational Stress Control program to prevent,
identify, and holistically treat mental injuries caused
by combat or other operations.

With the increased workload, we do have concerns about
the capacity of mental health care in military medicine.
Operational support and current treatment facility demands
continue to stretch our mental health professional communities,
even though DOD has taken many steps to increase mental health
services. Our shortages of mental health professionals are a
reflection of Nation-wide shortages of this specialty. We are
actively engaged in discussions about possible solutions.
2. Equipment Readiness
We have sourced equipment globally, taking from non-deployed units
and strategic programs to support our forces in theater. As a result,
the amount of equipment remaining for non-deployed units to use for
training and other potential contingencies is seriously deficient.

For example, while the overall supply rating of Marine
Corps units in Afghanistan is near 100 percent, the supply
rating of units at home station is less than 60 percent.
Additional equipment is being procured with
supplemental funds, but the production rates are too slow to
meet our requirements for new equipment orders.
Equipment Reset
As mentioned previously, the distributed and decentralized nature
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown us that our legacy,
20th century tables of equipment are significantly inadequate.
Moreover, the tempo of operations has accelerated the wear and tear on
equipment. Also, the diversion of equipment in theater from Iraq to
Afghanistan has delayed reset actions at our logistics depots in the
United States.

Our preliminary estimates indicate that the cost of
restructuring the Marine Corps' tables of equipment would be $5
billion over fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015.
In light of the continued high tempo of operations in
Afghanistan, and the delay in reset actions due to the
diversion of equipment in theater, we estimate the cost of
reset for the Marine Corps to be $8 billion ($3 billion
requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an additional $5
billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict).
Aviation Readiness
All Marine Corps aircraft in support of overseas contingency
operations are exceeding programmed rates, and are thus consuming
service life at a rate sometimes three times higher than that scheduled
for the lifetime of the aircraft. (See Table 2.) This will eventually
result in compressed timelines between rework and, ultimately, earlier
retirement of the aircraft than originally programmed.

It is critical that our aviation modernization
programs, discussed in the next section of this report,
continue to receive the support of Congress.
The majority of our legacy platforms are at the end of
their service life and most of the production lines are closed.

Table 2. Fiscal Year 2009 USMC Aircraft Utilization Rates
Overseas Contingency Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Programmed
Aircraft Average Age Rates (Hours/ OCO Rates OCO Life Usage
(Years) Month) (Hours/Month)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AH-1W....................................... 19 19.5 32.7 1.7x
UH-1N....................................... 35 21.7 30.0 1.4x
CH-46E...................................... 41 13.6 31.1 2.3x
CH-53D...................................... 40 23.8 50.3 2.1x
CH-53E...................................... 21 19.2 33.6 1.8x
MV-22B...................................... 3 20.9 29.4 1.4x
AV-8B....................................... 13 20.9 24.1 1.2x
F/A-18A..................................... 23 25.5 72.5 2.9x
F/A-18C..................................... 16 23.9 65.5 2.7x
EA-6B....................................... 27 26.4 66.0 2.5x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Programmed rates are defined in the Weapon System Planning Document and are based on the projected dates
an aircraft will be replaced by a new platform or reworked to extend its service life. Programmed rates
include monthly flight hours and the associated logistical support required for each aircraft.

Strategic Prepositioning Programs
Marine Corps prepositioning programs trace their
origins back 30 years, when the Iranian revolution, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi attack on Iran, and the
deepening civil war in Lebanon collectively brought to the
forefront the limitations of strategic airlift to respond to
no-notice contingencies. The solution--the Secretary of Defense
testified in 1980, and Congress agreed--was prepositioned
combat equipment, ammunition, and supplies afloat on commercial
vessels underway or docked in strategic locations. The Marine
Corps developed three squadrons of maritime prepositioned ships
and, in 1982, began prepositioning equipment and ammunition
underground in Norway.
The first real test for these programs was in 1991,
during Operation Desert Shield. In 2003, in Kuwait, the Marine
Corps downloaded 11 vessels from all 3 prepositioned squadrons
and moved 648 principal end items from Norway in preparation
for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Without this capacity, the Marine
Corps would not have been able to move half of the entire
operating forces--more than 60,000 fully equipped marines--
halfway around the world for a 350-mile attack on Baghdad.
When completely loaded, Marine Corps prepositioning
vessels today carry more than 26,000 pieces of major equipment
including tanks, wheeled tactical vehicles, and howitzers, as
well as the necessary supplies to support the force.
When measured against authorized allowances, the
percentage of major item equipment (Class VII) currently
present in the prepositioned fleet is 94 percent; the
percentage of supplies currently present is in excess of 99
percent.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Data as of 18 February 2010. To clarify any misperceptions,
these are not the formal readiness percentages the Marine Corps uses in
separate reports to Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and Congress. The readiness percentages in those reports
are a measurement against MARES reportable items, a more select range
of equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Norway, the current percentage of on-hand major end
item equipment (Class VII) measured against authorized
allowances is 47 percent; the percentage of on-hand supplies is
78 percent.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Data as of 18 February 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to note that these programs are not
just a strategic war Reserve. Marine Corps prepositioning
programs support forward-deployed training exercises and, along
with the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy, the steady state
requirements of the combatant commanders. For example, using
the equipment positioned in Norway, the Marine Corps provides
security force assistance to partner nations in U.S. European
Command and U.S. Africa Command.
In summary, Marine Corps prepositioning programs are
vital to the Nation and they require the continued funding and
support of Congress.
3. Infrastructure
Bachelor Housing
Our number one priority in military construction is barracks. In
years past, due to fiscal constraints, we had focused on operational
concerns. We now have a program under way that will provide adequate
bachelor housing for our entire force by 2014. Table 3 depicts Marine
Corps fiscal year 2011 investment in new barracks.

Table 3. USMC Fiscal Year 2011 Barracks Construction
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Location 2011 New Barracks
Investment Spaces
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Twentynine Palms, CA.................... $53.2 384
Camp Lejeune, NC........................ 326.6 2,794
Cherry Point, NC........................ 42.5 464
Camp Pendleton, CA...................... 79.9 860
MCB Hawaii, HI.......................... 90.5 214
MCB Quantico, VA........................ 37.8 300
-------------------------------
Total................................. $630.5 5,016
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Marine Corps is committed to funding the
replacement of barracks furnishings on a 7-year cycle and to
funding the repair and maintenance of existing barracks to
improve the quality of life of marines.
Summary
Our equipment shortfalls are serious and the impacts
on readiness have been significant. Our nondeployed units do
not have the required amount of equipment they need to train or
support other contingencies. Moreover, the harsh environments
of Iraq and Afghanistan, the tempo of operations, and our
employment as a second land army since 2004 has accelerated
wear and tear on our equipment and delayed the reset activities
necessary to prepare for the next contingency.
We estimate that the cost of restructuring the Marine
Corps' tables of equipment from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal
year 2015 would be $5 billion and the cost to reset for the
Marine Corps will be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in fiscal
year 2011 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon
termination of the conflict).
Iraq and Afghanistan have not adversely affected
personnel readiness or the resiliency of the force. The Marine
Corps continues to recruit and retain the highest quality
people. Your marines want to make a difference; they understand
being a marine means deploying and fighting our Nation's
battles. Indeed, the marines with the highest morale are those
currently in Afghanistan.
The Marine Corps has achieved its goal of 202,000
active duty personnel and has done so with no compromise in
quality. However, the Marine Corps has not achieved the correct
mix of skills and paygrades. Continued funding will be needed
to balance the force correctly.
Our personnel growth has outpaced our growth in
infrastructure, and your continued support is needed to provide
the additional barracks, messing, and office spaces required.
iv. modernization of the magtf
Our modernization effort is not merely a collection of programs but
a means of aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF across the
spectrum of present and future security challenges. All of our
procurement programs are designed to support the full range of military
operations.
The Individual Marine
Marines are the heart and soul of your Corps. The trained,
educated, and physically fit marine enables the Corps to operate in
urban areas, mountains, deserts, or jungles. However, we are concerned
about weight. Depending on the enemy situation, and including helmet,
body armor, individual weapon, water, ammunition, and batteries, the
weight of gear for a marine on foot-patrol in Afghanistan can average
90 pounds. There is a delicate balance between weight and protection,
and we continue to pursue the latest in technology to provide marines
with scalable protection based on the mission and threat.
Tactical Vehicles
The Marine Corps currently has a total ground tactical vehicle
quantity of nearly 47,500. Over the next 10 years, we plan to replace
about 50 percent of that total.

We are planning, programming, and budgeting toward a
balanced fleet of vehicles. Our chief considerations are
mobility, survivability, payload, transportability, and
sustainability. Our goal is a portfolio of vehicles that is
able to support amphibious operations, irregular warfare, and
operations ashore across the range of military operations. We
envision a blend of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles, Marine
Personnel Carriers, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles,
and replacements for our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles.
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is the number
one modernization program in the ground combat element of the
MAGTF. The requirements of the current and future security
environment have driven the research and development of the
critical capabilities associated with the EFV. The Marine Corps
has not taken a myopic view of the EFV; we are well aware of
the fiscal realities and developmental challenges associated
with such a revolutionary vehicle. We are, however, convinced
that national security demands the capabilities of the EFV and
justifies the costs. This vehicle will save lives and enable
mission success across an extremely wide, and highly probable,
range of operational scenarios.
Fire Support
We are modernizing Marine Corps land-based fire support through a
triad of weapons systems--a new and more capable 155mm howitzer, a
system of land-based rockets, and a helicopter-transportable 120mm
mortar. Each of these is extremely accurate. This accuracy is critical
in counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare because accuracy
reduces the instances of civilian casualties and collateral damage to
local infrastructure.

The Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer (M777) weighs
about half of the cannon it is replacing and fires projectiles
to a range of 15-19 miles. Our Marine Expeditionary Brigade in
Afghanistan has 15 of these howitzers at 3 different locations,
which have collectively fired more than 600 rounds since April
2009.
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (M142
HIMARS) provides high-value rocket and missile fire in support
of ground forces. Each system carries six rockets or one
missile. Like our new lightweight howitzer, HIMARS has proven
itself over the past year in Afghanistan, delivering long-range
precision fires.
The Expeditionary Fire Support System is a rifled
120mm mortar, internally transportable 110 nautical miles by
both the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter. This will be
the primary indirect fire-support system for helicopter-
transported elements of the ground combat element. A platoon
equipped with these new mortars recently deployed with the 24th
Marine Expeditionary Unit.
Marine Aviation
Marine pilots are naval aviators; they are trained to fly from the
ships of the U.S. Navy or from expeditionary airfields ashore in
support of marines on the ground. We are in the midst of an
unprecedented modernization effort. By 2020, we will have:

Transitioned more than 50 percent of our aviation
squadrons to new aircraft
Added 5 more operational squadrons and almost 100 more
aircraft to our inventory
Completed fielding of the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey and
the upgraded Huey (UH-1Y) utility helicopter
Updated our entire fleet of aerial refuelers to the
KC-130J model
Fielded the upgraded Cobra (AH-1Z) attack helicopter
and the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35B)
Fielded an entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems
Introduced a new model of the heavy-lift CH-53 cargo
helicopter
The Joint Strike Fighter
The Marine Corps is on track to activate DOD's first operational
Joint Strike Fighter squadron in 2012. Although our investment in this
program may seem high, it is important to note that the Marine Corps
has not bought a fixed-wing tactical aircraft in 11 years, and that the
Joint Strike Fighter will ultimately replace three different types of
aircraft currently in our inventory.

The short-takeoff and vertical landing variant (F-35B)
of the Joint Strike Fighter will be transportable aboard the
amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy; it will be able to operate
under the same austere conditions as does the AV-8 Harrier; it
will be able to carry more bombs and loiter overhead longer
than does the F/A-18 Hornet; and it will be a better electronic
warfare platform than our legacy EA-6 Prowler.
The Osprey
We are very pleased with the performance of the tilt-rotor MV-22
Osprey. The Osprey provides greater speed, more range, and enhanced
survivability compared to other rotary wing platforms. It flies more
than twice as fast and carries three times the payload at more than six
times the range of the medium-lift helicopter it is replacing.

Osprey squadrons have completed three successful
deployments to Iraq and one aboard ship. One squadron is
currently in Afghanistan. We are nearing delivery of our 100th
operational aircraft, and at a current build of 30 Ospreys per
year, we are replacing our CH-46E medium-lift helicopter
squadrons at a rate of two squadrons per year.
Logistics Command and Control
Global Combat Service Support System--Marine Corps is the
cornerstone of our logistics modernization strategy.

The program is a portfolio of information technology
systems that will support logistics command and control, joint
logistics interoperability, secure access to information, and
overall visibility of logistics data. It will align Marine
Corps logistics with real-world challenges, where speed and
information have replaced mass and footprint as the foremost
attributes of combat operations; it will replace 30-year old
legacy supply and maintenance information technology systems;
and it will provide the backbone for all logistics information
for the MAGTF.
v. vision
The current transnational struggle against violent extremism will
not end anytime soon. Other threats--conventional and irregular--will
continue to emerge and the complexity of the future operating
environment will only increase. As we look to the future, we believe we
must refocus on our core competencies, especially combined-arms
training and operations at sea with the U.S. Navy.
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
We believe the report from the Quadrennial Defense Review offers an
accurate and informed analysis of the challenges in the future security
environment, particularly with respect to growing complexity of hybrid
threats and the spread of advanced anti-access capabilities.

We concur with the overarching need for a
comprehensive and balanced approach to national security--a
whole of government approach.
We agree with the need for a U.S. military that is
balanced in capabilities for irregular warfare and conventional
conflict. For the Marine Corps, we have always believed in such
a balance. Our equipment and major programs, and our means of
employment as an integrated MAGTF, reflect our commitment to be
flexible in the face of uncertainty. One hundred percent of our
procurement can be employed either in a hybrid conflict or in
conventional combat.
Finally, while our current focus is rightly on today's
fights, we believe it is critical that we do not underestimate
the need to maintain the ability to gain access in any
contested region of the world.
Seabasing and the Navy-Marine Corps Team
With oceans comprising about 70 percent of the Earth's surface and
the world's populations located primarily on the coasts, seabasing
allows our Nation to conduct crucial joint operations from the sea.

Seabasing is a capability and a concept. It is the
establishment of a mobile port, airfield, and replenishment
capability at sea that supports operations ashore. In effect,
seabasing moves traditional land-based logistics functions
offshore.
From the sea, U.S. forces will be able to conduct the
full range of military operations, from disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance to irregular warfare and major combat
operations. Sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, and
the use of the ocean as a medium for tactical and operational
maneuver permit U.S. forces to move directly from sea to
objectives ashore.
There are misperceptions that the United States has
not conducted an amphibious operation since Inchon during the
Korean War in 1950. Since 1982, our Nation has conducted more
than 100 amphibious operations. For example, the Navy-Marine
Corps Team has been on the scene in Bangladesh (1991), the
Philippines (1991), Liberia (1996), and East Timor (1999).

After September 11, U.S. amphibious forces,
from a seabase, led the first conventional strikes
against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
In 2004, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
was on station in Southeast Asia to support the relief
efforts after the Tsunami.
In 2005, from a seabase in the Gulf of Mexico,
the Navy and Marine Corps supported recovery efforts
after Hurricane Katrina.
In 2009, off the coast of Somalia, when
pirates boarded the Maersk Alabama, the 13th Marine
Expeditionary Unit and the USS Boxer were on station to
support the counterpiracy operations.

Last month, with Haiti's airfield overwhelmed and
their seaport disabled by wreckage following the earthquake,
the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd Marine
Expeditionary Unit provided a significant and sustainable
delivery of food, water, and other supplies without the
logistical burden ashore.
Seabasing--Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
Enhancements

Critical to seabasing are the logistics
vessels of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. As
discussed in the Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels, we
have restructured our Maritime Prepositioned Force
(Future) program and will enhance the current
capabilities of each of our three existing Maritime
Preposition Force Squadrons.
One mobile landing platform (MLP), one Large
Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship, and one
Lewis and Clark-class (T-AKE) cargo ship will be added
to each squadron of the MPF.
The MLP will interface with the LMSRs, which
are being added to each MPF squadron from fiscal year
2009-2011, thus providing the capability to transfer
cargo while at sea and making each MPF squadron highly
responsive to demands across the full-spectrum of
operations.
In summary, as the security environment grows
more complex, so does the value of amphibious forces.
Expeditionary Operations in the Littoral Domain
The littoral domain is where the land and sea meet. This is where
seaborne commerce originates and where most of the world lives.
Littorals include straits--strategic chokepoints that offer potential
control of the world's sea lanes of communication. The Navy-Marine
Corps team and the vitality of the amphibious fleet is critical to
overcoming anti-access challenges in locations along the coastlines of
the world where there are no American military forces or basing
agreements.

The QDR emphasized the need for U.S. naval forces to
be capable of robust forward presence and power projection
operations, while adding capability and capacity for working
with a wide range of partner navies. Amphibious forces are
perfectly suited for engagement and security force assistance
missions, as well as humanitarian missions such as are ongoing
in Haiti. In short, the strategic rebalancing directed in the
QDR places high demands on our amphibious forces.
Given the fiscal constraints facing the Department of
the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
and I agreed that 33 amphibious ships represents the limit of
acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement we
established in a letter to the committee on 7 January 2009.
We currently have a 31-ship force in the U.S.
amphibious fleet. The Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels
projects a 33 ship amphibious inventory in the near-term.
With a robust inventory of amphibious ships the Navy-
Marine Corps team will be able to:

Better address the growing steady state
combatant commander requirement for theater security
cooperation, forward presence, and crisis response.
Strengthen our Nation's relations with allied
and partner countries through peacetime engagement and
training exercises.
Better ensure our Nation is ready to respond
with humanitarian assistance when disaster strikes
anywhere around the globe.
In the event of major conflict, improve our
response time to gain theater access with combat forces
without having to rely on basing agreements with
foreign governments.

Finally, to clarify any misperceptions about the
numbers of amphibious ships cited in the 2010 QDR Report, those
numbers of ships are neither shipbuilding requirements nor
targets; they are simply statements of the amphibious ship
numbers across the fiscal year 2011-2015 Future Years Defense
Program.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report)
(Washington, DC: Feb 2010), p. xvi, 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training, Education, and Professional Development
``Two-Fisted Fighters.'' The QDR Report calls for
increased counterinsurgency capacity in the general purpose
forces of the United States.\11\ The Marine Corps has long
recognized the special skills required to operate with host
nation forces and among local populations. Evidence of this
dates back to the Marine Corps publications of Small Wars
Operations (1935) and the Small Wars Manual (1940), both
comprehensive texts on counterinsurgency operations and
irregular warfare. Today, through standing Marine Corps
organizations such as the Center for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning and the Center for Irregular Warfare, and
programs such as the International Affairs Officers Program, we
continue to build capacity in foreign language, and regional
and cultural skills.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report)
(Washington, DC: Feb 2010), pp. 20-26.
\12\ Each year, the Marine Corps selects officers for the
International Affairs Officer Program, which consists of two
professional tracks: Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and Regional Area
Officer (RAO). The International Affairs Officer Program provides
graduate-level study and language training for nine geographic areas.
There are 329 international affairs officers on active duty (262 FAOs,
67 RAOs). The officers in this program possess advanced knowledge and
expertise in the language, culture, and political-military affairs of a
given region. Since 2008, the Marine Corps has doubled the number of
accessions in the FAO program, and accessions will continue to increase
through 2015. Moreover, the Marine Corps provides mid-grade officers
(major-lieutenant colonel) for the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands
Program. Our current requirement is to provide 63 officers--3 cohorts
of 21 officers each.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leadership Development. We recognize the need for a
diversity of skills and specialties, and our standing guidance
to promotion, command, and special selection boards is to give
due consideration to personnel with special skills and
nontraditional career patterns.
Marine Corps University. Annually, a percentage of
Marine Corps officers from the rank of captain through colonel
attend year-long resident courses in professional military
education at Marine Corps University in Quantico. The Marine
Corps University is regionally accredited to award postgraduate
degrees and, in 2009 alone, University schools awarded 200
master's degrees.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Marine Corps also has a separate, voluntary graduate
education program, through which officers attend Naval Postgraduate
School and other secondary institutions to obtain advanced degrees.
There are 300 officer billets in the Marine Corps that require master's
degrees. The Marine Corps also maintains an active fellowship program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities are an integral part of supporting
professional military education. To that end, the Marine Corps
fiscal year 2011 military construction budget request includes
funding for additions in Quantico to the General Alfred M. Gray
Research Center and the Staff NCO Academy. These projects will
support our plan to upgrade the infrastructure of the Marine
Corps University.
Acquisition Professionals. The Marine Corps has an
active acquisition professional program in place to meet the
need identified in the QDR ``for technically trained
personnel--cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition
managers--to conduct effective oversight.'' \14\ There are
about 520 acquisition billets in the Marine Corps--400 are
entry and mid-level positions filled by enlisted marines and
officers, and 120 are senior-level acquisition professional
positions filled by field grade officers who oversee our major
ground and aviation programs. Our acquisition professional
officers are members of the Defense Acquisition Community; they
possess Level II certification, 4 years of acquisition
experience, at least 24 undergraduate credit hours in business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ DOD, QDR, p. 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Future Realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific
The Governments of the United States and Japan have agreed to
invest in a realignment of forces that will result in Marine Corps
forces postured in the Pacific for a long-term presence on Japan, Guam,
and Hawaii. Critical requisites to the implementation of this
realignment are:

Japanese construction of a replacement for Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma that meets both operational and
safety requirements.
An appropriate force laydown that supports the
operational requirements of the Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command.
Adequate available airlift and sealift within theater
to transport marines to training areas and partner countries.
Adequate training areas and ranges in Guam and the
Northern Mariana Islands that can maintain readiness as well as
support security cooperation with our regional partners.
An enduring, sustainable ``live where you work,'' base
on Guam that maximizes operational effectiveness, minimizes
encroachment, accommodates future development, and provides a
quality of life on Guam commensurate with any other U.S. base.
Continued political and financial support by the
Governments of the United States and Japan.

Refined planning and staff interaction processes within DOD have
made significant contributions to our efforts to align these
requirements. Planned and executed properly, this realignment effort
will result in an enduring solution that provides forward deployed
combat ready Marine forces to uphold our Nation's commitment to the
security and stability of the Pacific region.
Energy and Water Initiatives
We believe energy and water are two of our Nation's most valuable
resources. We are focused on improving our stewardship at our
installations and on the battlefield.

Our Installations. We have already gained efficiencies
and achieved savings at all our major installations. We have
three major goals:

1. From 2003-2015, reduce energy consumption by 30
percent
2. Through 2020, reduce water consumption by 2 percent
per year
3. By 2020, increase the use of alternative energy at
our installations to 50 percent of the total energy
consumed

On the Battlefield. Operations in Afghanistan have
forced us to reevaluate energy and water distribution and usage
in expeditionary environments. We believe the future security
environment will again require the Marine Corps to operate over
long distances in austere environments, and we are actively
pursuing a wide range of solutions to:

Lighten the combat load of our marines and
sailors
Reduce our overall footprint in current and
future expeditionary operations
Lessen energy consumption and dependence on
fossil fuels
Achieve resource self-sufficiency in
expeditionary environments
conclusion
As a naval expeditionary force in the form of an elite air-ground
team, the Marine Corps is ready and willing to go into harm's way on
short notice and do what is necessary to make our country safe. America
expects this of her marines. In the complex and dangerous security
environment of the future, the Marine Corps stands ready for the
challenges ahead. We appreciate the continued support of Congress.
Thank you again for this opportunity to report on the posture of your
Marine Corps.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. We can't thank
you and your marines enough for what they are doing in
Afghanistan and other places around the world. It was an
eloquent statement. We're appreciative.
I want to talk to you, not just about our marines, but also
about the Afghan forces that they're fighting with and how well
that's working out. We heard from ISAF the other day that there
are five brigades of Afghan Security Forces that are part of
Operation Moshtarak, and we want to know from you if you can
tell us, based on what you understand, just what your
assessment is as to whether or not the Afghan army particularly
is in the fight.
We heard from Marine General Nicholson that the Afghan
forces are not cosmetic, but what is your assessment?
General Conway. Sir, first of all, it's in their blood to
fight. They have a warrior culture and so that gives you good
raw material to draw from. There are issues with regard to
educated young men in Afghanistan to lead. But our experience
is, at least at this point, at the lower levels when you join
an Afghan infantry unit you have fighters at your flank.
That has been our experience now in the early days of the
assault onto Marjah. Not as many as we would like, but more
than perhaps we saw when Marine forces were first introduced,
before the President's decision on the 30,000.
I am concerned, as you noted in your opening statement,
sir, about the number of trainers and the ability to raise the
Afghan forces that will be needed to one day turn the country
over to them and walk away. But I'm also optimistic that as we
help to bridge that effort and as the Army trainers and perhaps
NATO trainers become more available to us that that will be
something that we will be able to accomplish.
Chairman Levin. I forgot to announce that we'll have an 8-
minute first round.
Are the Afghan forces and the Marine Corps jointly
coordinating planning and conducting the operations?
General Conway. We are, sir. There's an Afghan brigadier
general who's quite a charismatic character, who has brought
his officers into the planning sessions, and we've been very
satisfied with their tactical acumen and their ability to lead
their forces.
Actually, we have taken partnering to a new level, to the
degree that we have actually integrated Afghan units into our
company and platoon formations. As the Sergeant Major and I
arrived at Dwyer, we witnessed some of the rehearsal activity
that was taking place with both Afghan and U.S. units for the
helicopter-borne assaults that kicked off the first day of
Marjah, and they were knitted closely together.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral, I want to hear a little bit more
detail about the readiness and maintenance concerns. We added
some funding last year. It was not appropriated, and so I want
to ask you about the impact of not receiving last year's
unfunded maintenance requirements. What would be the effects on
naval readiness if you do not receive support for the unfunded
aircraft and ship depot maintenance requirements that you've
identified in the fiscal year 2011 budget?
Mr. Mabus. As the CNO pointed out in his opening statement,
the Navy resets in stride. Our O&M budget is essentially our
reset budget and it allows the Navy to make sure that our ships
reach the end of their operational life, that they are ready
for any eventuality that comes along.
We have requested a fairly substantial increase in
operational maintenance funds for this year and we think that
they are crucial to keeping Navy readiness at the place it
should be. If we receive the funds that we have requested, we
will have 99 percent of our depot maintenance for ships, 100
percent for deployed aircraft, and 96 percent for nondeployed
aircraft.
The unfunded requirements that you talk about, we would be
unable to do nine ship depot availabilities totaling about $35
million. For the aircraft, we'd be unable to do about 21
aircraft and 240 engines, the overhaul and upgrade. So that
would be the result of not receiving that
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. To follow on with the
Secretary, it is ensuring the current readiness of today, that
the systems are up, that the necessary repairs have been done,
so that we can stay in the deployment cycles that are part of
what we do as a Navy. It's also about getting those ships to
the end of their service lives so that we can realize the force
structure that we need. If we're not doing the maintenance on
them today, they're not going to live as long as they normally
would.
It also gets to the ability to train in the way that we've
planned to train. If the ships aren't ready to go, we can't get
out and do the training. Similarly with the aircraft. So that
it begins to have an effect on the competencies of our people.
So it all adds together, and that's why we made the move to
increase the percentage as we did this year.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We're going to be facing the issue of the Don't Ask, Don't
Tell (DADT) law and what actions, if any, should be taken in
this year's authorization bill or otherwise. Secretary Gates
testified earlier this month along with Admiral Mullen.
Secretary Gates said that he'd appointed a high-level working
group to review the issues associated with properly
implementing a repeal of DADT law and policy, and Admiral
Mullen testified that he's in complete support of Secretary
Gates's position, both professionally as our top military
officer, but also personally.
Secretary Mabus, let me first ask you and then I'll ask
your colleagues, what are your views on DADT? Should we repeal
it and, if so, what process should we follow in any event?
Mr. Mabus. Since DADT is the law, whatever happens resides
in Congress. I support the repeal of DADT. I do think the
President has come up with a very practical and workable way to
do that, to work through the working group that the Secretary
of Defense has set up to make sure that we implement any change
in the law that Congress makes in a very professional and very
smooth manner and without any negative impacts on the force.
Chairman Levin. Has that working group been appointed?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. It's headed by Jeh Johnson, the
General Counsel for DOD, and General Ham, the head of U.S. Army
Europe.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Roughead?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The DADT is the law and that
will be a matter for Congress to change or not change, and
clearly we will abide by that law.
I think the path that has been laid out is extremely
important to be able to perform the assessment that the
Secretary has called for, because there are comparisons made to
other navies, there are comparisons made to other forces, there
is a lot of anecdotal information, none of which really
addresses the current force that we serve in today. I believe
it is important to assess that force, the opinions of that
force, and also the families, because we as a Navy, as a
military, have made our families part of who we are in ways
that other services have not, other countries have not. The
assessment is extremely important and we are fully supportive
of that, and we have our very best people assigned to that
group that is being led by General Ham and Jeh Johnson.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Conway?
General Conway. Sir, my professional perspective, first of
all, is that our Commander in Chief has spoken and the
Secretary of Defense has a way to examine, based on data and
gathering of perspectives from the force, just how we should
proceed. My personal opinion is that, unless we can strip away
the emotion, the agendas, and the politics and ask, at least in
my case, do we somehow enhance the war-fighting capabilities of
the United States Marine Corps by allowing homosexuals to
openly serve, then we haven't addressed it from the correct
perspective. At this point, I think that the current policy
works. At this point, notwithstanding the results that the
study will bring forward, my best military advice to this
committee, to the Secretary, to the President, would be to keep
the law such as it is.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate that answer very much.
In your opening statement--and this goes both for the Navy
and the Marine Corps--right now you have some 30,000 marines
deployed, less than 20,000 in the theater of Iraq and
Afghanistan. At a time when the Navy and the Marine Corps are
being called on to project presence in more parts of the world
than ever before, I see an unacceptable growth in the risk of
the force.
When you take into consideration what's happening right
now--and I could read the whole list of the strike fighter
shortfall that's going to reach a peak of 263 aircraft by 2017.
We're looking at a lot of the resources dropping down. Would
you want to talk about a risk assessment? I would say both to
Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what would the risk
assessment be right now in light of the operational tempo and
the lack of resources that are out there?
Admiral Roughead. With regard to our risk, as I said in our
opening statement, Senator, we are trending towards
significant. It's not that the total force is at risk, but that
we have some pockets where it would be a challenge for us to
swing those capabilities. For example, our SEABEES are heavily
engaged, our explosive ordinance disposal is heavily engaged,
our SEALs are heavily engaged.
We have taken our maritime patrol aircraft that normally
are optimized for anti-submarine warfare, but because of the
systems that we have on them they are extremely effective in
the over-land fight and the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance mission, and so we essentially have that fleet
committed to the fight, appropriately so.
So there is risk should there become a maritime campaign of
being able to swing those types of assets. But, the fleet
response plan that we have in place makes us more flexible than
we ever have been. Still there are some pockets where we do
have some risk.
Senator Inhofe. The reason I bring this up, General
Conway--I've talked to you about this before. One of the
problems I have in these posture hearings when they come to
Washington, you hear a lot rosier of a scenario than you do
when you go out in the field and you talk to people in the
field. I guess a lot of that's because--and I'm talking about
everyone up here--when we go out to Iraq, Afghanistan, or
Djibouti or any of the other areas, you hear more about the
problems than how good things are.
So I always appreciate it if you can be as open as
possible. That's why I think using the term, what would the
risk assessment be, high, low, and so forth, that's a good way
to approach it during these hearings. Any thoughts on that,
General Conway, as far as your feelings?
General Conway. Sir, as I tried to provide in my opening
statement, we do have serious concerns actually. Our priority,
the Secretary of the Navy's priority, is that marines at the
front of the spear increasingly in Afghanistan will have
everything they need in order to be able to win that fight. But
in the process, we're taking away from our capabilities
elsewhere.
At this point, we're at about a 60 percent readiness factor
with regard to equipment in our home station forces. Should
there be a requirement for marines to flow elsewhere, we could
be in some serious straits. We would hold what we have in
Afghanistan, perhaps call on our Reserves, use our Maritime
Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) equipment, and all those things.
So we could get the job done, but it would not be nearly as
elegant.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Aren't you using a lot of your
resources, though, over there that otherwise you'd use in
training?
General Conway. Absolutely, 100 percent of what is required
in theater, 60 percent of what's available in home station.
That's an imbalance I'm uncomfortable with.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's significant. The Marine
Corps are famous for not complaining about anything. They're
the only Service that has retreads. Is that still true now?
General Conway. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. You're not complaining, right?
Let me just ask on another line. I've been active in Africa
for many years in things not even related to defense. But, when
we made a decision to go and become active in Africa right
after September 11, I think that was the right thing to do.
We're working on brigades there to help train or have the
Africans train the Africans and we're assisting, so that as the
squeeze takes place in terrorism and some of this terrorist
activity goes down through the Horn of Africa and Djibouti that
they'll be ready to do a lot of things.
I was also one that was very active in pursuing the idea of
taking the continent of Africa, that was in three commands, and
putting it in one command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). I
think that was good. I only wish that we were actually down in
Ethiopia or someplace instead of up in Germany for the
headquarters, but that's a political problem in Africa and I
understand that.
Admiral, because of the piracy and all these problems that
are going on, not just in the area in East Africa, but what's
happening in the Gulf of Guinea and around there, what is your
activity and what contribution are you making to some of those
coastal African nations?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you, and Africa has been
an area of focus for us. We are the only Service that has a
four-star component commander that addresses Africa.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I was over there and I visited with
them just recently.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, and I think that has paid great
dividends.
Clearly, we're working with several other navies on the
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast
of Somalia, and that has had some additional benefits of
bringing many people together that otherwise normally wouldn't
be--Russia, China, us, the European Union, and NATO. But we've
also very aggressively taken on this idea of Africa partnership
stations. Initially we began in the Gulf of Guinea and on the
west coast of Africa, but we now are operating an Africa
partnership station on the east coast of Africa.
Most recently, the Gunston Hall, the ship that was on its
way over to be the West Africa partnership station, we sent to
Haiti. The staff was already embarked, African officers who
participated directly, actively, and effectively in that Haiti
relief operation. So that actually enhances how they're able to
come along.
We've also reached out to South Africa. I'm the first CNO
to have visited there. We have had an aircraft carrier visit
there for the first time and also one of our nuclear submarines
was welcomed there.
So we're looking at the west coast. We're working with the
navies there, maritime strategic, humanitarian assistance, but
also just bringing the navies of Africa together in a
constructive and a very focused way so that we can get to some
of the issues that are going to be important for their
development.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, because I know that on the west side
around the Sea of Guinea some of the finds and the oil activity
and all of that, that's increased your activity and I know it's
draining a lot of resources.
General Conway, I visited your marines in Djibouti and
other areas down there. What's your activity down there?
General Conway. Sir, we think that Africa is going to be
tremendously important to our country in the long term, and so
at this point I think it's fair to say we're doing what we can.
My agreement with General Ward, the Commander of AFRICOM, is
that we substantially are going to take a rain check at this
point. We will work with our brothers in the Navy and we'll go
inside the continent where we need to to try to accomplish some
of his smaller-scaled engagement opportunities.
I would, at this point, like to tout our Reserves because
they are carrying the preponderance of that load. They are
stepping up and volunteering, coming on duty to do some of
these things at a time when our Active Forces are simply
engaged in the transition to go back now to Afghanistan.
So I would say at this point, sir, we appreciate the
importance. We want to be players in the long term and we're
doing what we can.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. It's kind of the
forgotten continent. People talk about other areas and they
don't talk about Africa as much. But you guys are doing a great
job there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you very much for
your extraordinary service to our country.
I don't have any questions about DADT, but I do really want
to respond to the answers that you gave Senator Levin, which I
appreciate, I think were thoughtful and honest. I want to make
two comments about them. General Conway, I agree with you that
ultimately the question of what we do about DADT has to be held
to the standard of military readiness. I'm supportive of
repealing DADT. I believe it's the fair and right thing to do.
But in the end, because we are fulfilling our constitutional
responsibility to provide for the common defense, as you are
and those who serve with you are, this has to pass the test of
military readiness.
I believe it will, based on my knowledge of what's happened
in other militaries, including those like the Brits and the
Canadians that we serve alongside today in Afghanistan and
Iraq. I visited Afghanistan in January. There is a British
general, General Carter, who our forces serve under the
direction of, and it seems to work very well.
But I want to say that I agree with that and I think it's
important that all of us go forward in that way. This has to
pass the test of military readiness. In fact, I hope that
repealing DADT will enhance military readiness, but that's yet
to be determined as the study goes on.
The second thing that gives me confidence about this, and
it's a factor that's hard to weigh prospectively, but we can
acknowledge it retrospectively, which is exactly the sense of
duty and honor that characterized your answers. This is the
law. If the law changes, the military will follow it. If the
Commander in Chief takes a position, the military will make it
work.
That's been the history of the military, taking us through
some transitions within the military that seemed very hard when
they were first mentioned. That too, which I wanted to express
my appreciation for, is what gives me confidence that on the
day this happens and the repeal occurs that there's an
intangible factor here that will make it work, which is that
the leadership will say that, these are our orders now from
Congress, from the Commander in Chief, and now we have to make
it work and make it work for the benefit of our military, our
country, and every individual who serves in our military.
So I thank you for what you said. I look forward to working
with you on that.
I want to go back now to the Navy, Mr. Secretary and
Admiral, and to say that I'm glad to see that this year's
budget and the 30-year shipbuilding plan includes an SSBN-X,
the new generation of strategic deterrence submarine. This is
the program that will provide a replacement for the Ohio-class
submarines that have so ably defended our Nation since 1981.
Admiral, I note that the 30-year shipbuilding plan states
that the requirement for SSBNs will be reassessed in the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). I understand that the
requirements-building process for our strategic deterrence
submarines is classified, but I think it is also important, to
the extent that we can in an open setting, that we explain to
the public that they're not made of whole cloth. In that sense,
I want to ask you the specific question: Could you describe, to
the degree you can in public session, the significance of
having a fully operational SSBN force and what risks could
result from a reduction in that force?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, Senator. For fear of
being a little parochial on that line, there's no question that
as we look at our strategic triad, all important to be sure,
but that the true stealth of our SSBN force in my opinion makes
it the most survivable leg of the triad. It is also a leg that
we can move, that we can protect through its stealth and
through its movement in ways that the other legs don't enjoy.
The SSBN-X that we are in the process of designing, its
last patrol will be in 2080.
So the importance of getting the design done properly and
thoroughly and thoughtfully is absolutely key to ensuring that
that very survivable leg of the triad remains almost to the end
of the century. If that capability were not to exist, it would
not be in the best security interest of the Nation.
Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say, Admiral, that
assuming we make progress in some of the nuclear reduction
negotiations we're in with the Russians and perhaps more
broadly and the number of our nuclear warheads goes down, that
the importance of the strategic nuclear fleet goes up because
of its survivability?
Admiral Roughead. I do believe that the importance does
increase. I also think it is important to understand that the
number of submarines that we need are not strictly based on the
number of warheads, but rather where you want the submarines to
be to provide that continuous coverage, and that also is a
driver of the number. It's where you put them and the rotation
that they're on. So those two things come into play and it's
not simply about the number of weapons.
Senator Lieberman. Well said.
Secretary, do you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Mabus. Just that in order for us to field the SSBN-X on
schedule to replace the Ohio-class that now is when we have to
do the design work, the engineering work, and we have to begin
building the first of those boats in 2019. We tried this year
in the 30-year shipbuilding plan to be very realistic in terms
of costs of each ship and in terms of historically what
Congress has appropriated for our total shipbuilding budget and
putting the SSBN-X in our core budget was part of that realism.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that answer.
Admiral Roughead, we have a perennial favorite here that
seems to blossom for our committee every year and that's the
question about the alternate engine for the JSF. When you were
asked about an earmark to develop an alternate engine for the
JSF last July, you said that space on an aircraft carrier is at
a premium.
I note that in your prepared statement which you gave to
the committee for this hearing you say that continued
development of an alternate engine would ``increase our risk in
the underlying JSF program.''
Could you draw out those two statements and tell us what
your feeling is today as we go forward with this battle again?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. My position on the alternate
engine is based on the operational needs that we have in the
Navy and the constraints that we face, not just on our aircraft
carriers, but JSF will also be in our large-deck amphibious
ships and they are even more challenged space-wise than our
carriers are.
One can look at a carrier and see a very large ship, but
when that ship is deployed we have things packed in almost
every nook and cranny in order to provide that reliability and
responsiveness. So having to stock two different types of
engines is just not practical for us.
The costs associated with the alternate engine in my
opinion would simply continue to pressurize a program that is
already being pressurized for a variety of reasons. So from the
perspective of the Navy and the support that I render to the
Marine Corps and their JSF, the best course of action for us
and my recommendation has been and will continue to be one
engine, because that's what serves us the best.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it. Thank you.
My time is up. I just want to say finally, General, that
when I went to Afghanistan in January and was able to spend
some time with General Larry Nicholson and the marines--and I
just want to validate what you said. The morale is very high.
The interactions with the Afghan forces are exemplary. It's
really inspiring to see, and I thank them and thank you.
General Conway. Thank you, sir. I'll pass your comments
along.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank each of you for your service.
I'm disappointed to have to raise the subject I'm going to
raise with you, Mr. Secretary, but I just feel no alternative
to it. Some might say you're worrying about a parochial
interest, but the LCS is a part of our Navy's future, as
Admiral Roughead and his predecessors have all committed to.
Fifty-five of those ships are expected to be built and we're
getting close to having a bid on it.
You would agree, I assume, that when you draft a request
for proposal (RFP) it should be fair, give each party a fair
opportunity to succeed, and properly set standards that serve
the interest of the Navy and the warfighter. I guess you do. So
I would take that as a yes.
I'm concerned about it. In October 2009, you made a speech
at a Naval Energy Forum in which you said, ``We have to change
the way we award contracts. The lifetime energy costs of a
building or a system and the fully-burdened costs of fuel in
powering those will be a mandatory evaluation factor when
awarding contracts.'' That makes sense to me.
Then later, at the Press Club in September 2009, you say,
``We no longer have the luxury to say this is a good deal
today, let's buy it. We have to get our arms around the life
cycle.''
In your testimony today you talk about having half the
Navy's fuel from alternative sources by 2020. I will just say,
that's a costly decision. I don't know that that's necessary as
a policy decision for the Navy. It's just going to deny other
money for other areas. But I would note that you're correct to
focus on energy costs, and one way to save energy is not use so
much, to use less.
So you said in your remarks today, ``I have also committed
the Navy and Marine Corps to consider energy as a mandatory
evaluation factor in contracting and to consider as an
additional factor in our business dealings the energy footprint
of the companies that sells to the Navy and Marine Corps.''
As you and I have discussed, I have to ask you publicly:
How is it that in this combat ship, this new transformational
littoral ship, that we have a factor capping the life cycle
costs, apparently all life cycle costs, not just fuel use, at 3
percent? Isn't that too small? Could it be a mistake and will
you reevaluate it?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. As we discussed, the whole
idea behind the LCS was a total ownership cost for the lifetime
of the ship--the crew size, the type of weapons, and the
maintenance costs that would be involved. All these things for
both variants are an important determinant for deciding to
build the LCS in the first place.
We believe that the way the RFP is written is an absolutely
level playing field, and is an absolutely fair way to pick the
down-select.
Senator Sessions. Does it meet your standard that you
announced last October that the lifetime energy cost will be a
mandatory factor? You have to fully and fairly evaluate the
lifetime energy costs, do you not?
Mr. Mabus. Sir, we believe that the way the RFP is written,
the lifetime energy cost will be fully and fairly----
Senator Sessions. All right. What if it becomes clear that
the 3 percent factor for total lifetime cost that you've
apparently capped in this RFP is not a fair evaluation of the
lifetime energy cost? Would you be willing to reevaluate it?
Mr. Mabus. I believe, based on everything we know today,
that the way the RFP is written and the only reason we down-
selected or made the decision to down-select the one variant
was because the bids came in at an unsustainable level for each
variant prior, that we are considering everything that involves
total ownership costs for each of those variants.
Senator Sessions. I know the cost was high, and I think
you've gotten all the bidders' attention. If they can't submit
a competitive bid, then they don't need to be selected. But
when you set up the criteria for the bid, don't you think it
should adequately reflect the lifetime fuel consumption costs
of the vessels involved?
Mr. Mabus. I believe that the RFP that we did does do that,
yes.
Senator Sessions. So the answer is yes. Would you not agree
that cost should not be the only factor, that value for the
warfighter, capability, should be also adequately considered in
the bid process?
Mr. Mabus. Our major concern is for capability and value to
the warfighter. However, we have determined through the first
two ships of each of these variants that either will give us
the capability that we need and will give us high value for the
warfighter.
Senator Sessions. That worries me, because you say these
are the only things we care about. For example, the ship that
would be built in Alabama can accommodate two helicopters, they
can land without a tether. The other ship can only account for
one and that has to be tethered to bring the helicopter down.
It has substantially more cargo space. It uses less fuel. It
cruises, I think we'll establish, with greater stability.
So if the prices came in exactly the same and one ship had
greater potential or even if one was slightly more expensive
than the other one, should you not be sure to give some credit
for that, rather than just say both meet minimum requirements?
Mr. Mabus. I think both meet far more than minimum
requirements. They meet all our requirements, each one of the
variants do.
Senator Sessions. Are you saying that you should or should
not give credit for what might be a substantial additional
capability?
Mr. Mabus. I think that both variants have shown that they
meet not only minimum requirements, but all the requirements
that the Navy has established for these ships. Both are
excellent competitors. As you pointed out, we have not received
any bids yet.
Senator Sessions. You can have two good automobiles, but if
you want to carry some cargo and one has a larger luggage
compartment and it costs $50 more and it has other capabilities
that you need like cruise control or some things, I think you
should give credit for that.
But regardless of that, I want to ask you again: Are you
saying that even if there is shown to be a RFP that fails to
meet your stated goal and the logical goal--this is a good
goal; you're correct to say this--that the lifetime energy cost
must be a mandatory evaluation factor, and if this RFP fails to
adequately do that would you consider changing it?
Mr. Mabus. Well, I do believe that the RFP does do it.
Senator Sessions. I know you said that, but if there's some
rare possibility that there was an incorrect accounting and
maybe a slip of the typewriter and it wasn't written quite
right, would you be willing to change that?
Mr. Mabus. At this point in the RFP process, Senator, we're
expecting bids in. Based on our view or the analysis that we
have done previously on the two ships that we have, and on the
projected use of those ships, frankly, it's unclear if either
has an advantage on energy consumption over the lifetime.
Senator Sessions. I think you should fairly evaluate it. I
certainly agree with that, and you should rigorously analyze
and compare the fuel savings that each claim to have.
I would just note that the Air Force tanker aircraft in
their second RFP changed the lifetime fuel costs, which they
calculated rigorously, from 25 years to 40 years, raising it
even to a greater level. You count the entire lifetime cost of
this ship at 3 percent and I think that's so far beyond the
actual relevant factors that it really needs to be evaluated.
I'm disappointed to have to spend this time raising that, but
you want the best ship for the Navy and we don't want to have
an RFP that does not get you that, along with a competitive
price.
Thank all of you. General Conway, we appreciate your
marines. They're doing such a fabulous job. Admiral Roughead, I
appreciate your service. You know this Navy so well and I
appreciate that. I thank you, Secretary Mabus.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Roughead, the Secretary of
Defense announced that women will be allowed to serve on
submarines. Can you give us an idea of when that will happen?
How long will it take to do the preparation, and what
significant steps do you feel we have to make to accommodate
that decision, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Mabus. The preliminary timeline that we have set forth
shows that if we get women into the pipeline to serve on two of
our classes of submarines, SSBNs and SSGNs, coming out of this
year's class, and we take them through the normal nuclear power
training and normal submarine training, the first women will be
on submarines late in fiscal year 2011.
We think that we've learned a lot from integrating women
into our surface ships almost 20 years ago and that those
lessons are very applicable today. Some of those lessons are
that you need a critical mass of women on a crew, and for that
reason we want to put enough women on each submarine. It also
is important to have more senior women or a more senior woman
officer on each submarine to act as mentors for the new people
coming in, and so we're looking at bringing supply corps
officers as department heads on these first tours. Once these
first tours are completed, the women that came into the
submarine force as ensigns will have the experience to be those
department heads.
Finally, the reason for choosing the SSGNs and SSBNs to be
the lead ships that we integrate women into is that neither
would require any structural modification to allow those women
officers to be integrated into the force.
Finally, one of the lessons that we learned and one of the
things that we are going to do in this integration is to make
sure that any questions are answered by the force, any
questions are answered by the families, and that we are very
open and transparent about exactly how we're doing this.
But we think this is a great idea and that it will be done
very smoothly and very professionally and that it will enhance
our warfighting capabilities.
Senator Reed. Admiral Roughead, any comments?
Admiral Roughead. We have a very good plan. We have great
interest. We're ready to go. The first young women will come
aboard at the end of 2011.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Conway, let me also join my colleagues in
commending your marines who are fighting so aggressively and
effectively today and doing a remarkable job, as they always
do. Let me look at another issue, though. In the fiscal year
budget you're restructuring the Maritime Prepositioned Force
for the future. In that restructuring, will that still allow
you to move to an offshore location and conduct operations
without any intermediate land base or adjacent land base?
General Conway. Yes, sir, it will. We still have as the
core element of the Maritime Prepositioned Force three brigades
of equipment that are embarked aboard the collective of ships.
The Maritime Prepositioned Force Future, which will allow us to
do sea basing in the aggregate, is still under development and
that will take some years to bring to pass.
But in the meantime, we have a steady and resilient
capability at about 44 percent these days of supply
availability, and we consider that in some ways very much a
national Reserve.
Senator Reed. Going forward, are your plans taking into
consideration what has become typically the more heavy and
larger vehicles that the Marine Corps is using, because of the
limitations on some of the ships?
General Conway. Yes, sir, we are. Frankly, some of those
vehicles won't fit aboard our ships, and so it is a cause for
concern. We don't want the Marine Corps of the future to be the
Marine Corps that we have today, for instance in Afghanistan or
that we saw in Iraq. We need to cut it back. We need to shed
weight. We need modular kinds of concepts so that if we do go
static we can add armor protection for our troops or those
types of things that a requirement might cite.
But in the meantime, our definition of expeditionary is
fast and austere, and those things call for us to be much
lighter than we are today.
Senator Reed. Is there a parallel discussion of different
types of equipment in the future that would make you lighter?
General Conway. Yes, sir. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
is a classic example of that. We emphasize the light. Our
partner in it is the Army. They're not quite as concerned about
it as we are. We are concerned about the additional weight of
the helicopters that we're going to see and what it does to
center of gravity on our L-class ships, those manner of things.
So it's something that we keep a constant eye on, sir, and
try to keep curtailed to the degree that industry can support
us.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Roughead, I want to associate myself with the
comments of Senator Lieberman about the wisdom of including the
SSBN development. But also in that area of undersea warfare,
there is a renewed emphasis on unmanned sub-surface vehicles
and sub-surface operations. Can you give us an idea of the
development of some of those systems, where you stand and where
you're going?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I mentioned in my opening
remarks that we've done a reorganization within my headquarters
that has given us a much better focus and effort into
unmanneds. Unlike the other Services, we in the Navy are the
only ones that will be exploring the underwater effort. We have
some very interesting concepts. We've made a prototype
deployment of some of those systems. It's clear to me that the
area that we have to spend most of our effort in is in power. A
lot of folks will want to hang a new sensor of some kind on
these vehicles, but we have to get to the power issue. That's
where we are focusing ourselves. That's where we are
encouraging our labs to look, to get into that. We have run
some experiments out in the Pacific with some unmanned concepts
that I find not only very exciting, but I'm very optimistic as
to where we can take those. It has my full attention.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
The QDR called for a new air-sea operational concept for
the Pacific theater of operations, beginning with the review
obviously. Can you give us some indication of how you propose
to conduct that review and who will the participants be, and in
general terms how do you go forward?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. That review is already under
way. We began bringing the group together from the Air Force
and the Navy, and the Marine Corps is also included because of
the air power that they also generate. The groups have been
formed and we are working our way through the various
scenarios.
I'll be getting an update here from them very shortly. I
think it's a great opportunity for us to look, not only at the
airborne systems, but the networks that are involved, and we
are well underway. We started before the QDR was published.
Senator Reed. So we can assume there's a cyber dimension in
this review of significance?
Admiral Roughead. My direction to my team was if you're not
talking about networks it's not going to pass the test.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
I appreciate the testimony of all three witnesses.
Secretary Mabus, I think you will agree with the members of
this committee that you are well served by the two gentlemen on
your right and left.
Mr. Mabus. It gives me an incredible feeling of comfort and
security to be surrounded by the CNO and the Commandant.
Senator Wicker. Right, and the committee and country are
well served by them also.
Let me just follow up on the DADT questions. Secretary
Mabus, I understand your position. It's very straightforward.
Yesterday with Secretary McHugh, Senator McCain asked a
question about whether there was any discussion pending the
survey of attitudes that's being done of a moratorium on the
current DADT enforcement. Have you been a part of any
discussion that enforcement actions might be suspended pending
a final decision?
Mr. Mabus. No.
Senator Wicker. Secretary Mabus, in the Navy are there some
discharges and actions pending at this time?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I don't know how many are pending.
There's usually a small number each year. I don't know what's
pending today.
Senator Wicker. But from the information that you have, the
law, as it currently is, is going to be enforced until such
time as the survey is completed and the law is changed; is that
your understanding?
Mr. Mabus. Until such time that the law is changed, we will
follow the law.
Senator Wicker. All right. Then let me ask you, Admiral
Roughead. You said something about comparisons to other navies
and anecdotal information. I wonder if you could just briefly
explain what you were getting to there?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The surveying and the attitudes
of the U.S. Navy have never been formally sensed or assessed.
There is often discussion about how other services and other
countries have implemented homosexual service into their navy,
army, air force, or whatever it may be. But while I have high
regard for those other Services, they are not us. They do not
come from our culture. They do not come from the beliefs that
the young men and women bring into the service. We have to be
able to assess our force and judge what our force believes and
what the attitudes within our force are. That's why this
assessment is so important, and not use surveys from other
militaries and other countries.
Senator Wicker. I thank you for clarifying that statement.
I want to ask about the cost as it relates to changing
requirements. I'll ask that question with regard to our
amphibious ships. I think I've had the conversation with both
the General and the Admiral about the well deck aspect. For
those within the sound of my voice who don't know, a well deck
is a hangar-like deck located on the waterline on the back of
some amphibious assault ships, and by taking on water the ship
can lower its stern, flooding the well deck and allowing boats
and amphibious landing craft to dock with ships.
We just completed at Northrop Grumman the LHD-8. That ship
has a well deck. Now, the next two ships will not have a well
deck, the LHA-6 and, as I learned at last year's hearing, most
emphatically the LHA-7 will not have a well deck. I think it's
fair to say that General Conway wishes that those did have a
well deck. Then the follow-on ship, the LHA, will indeed have a
well deck again.
Now, we're told that on the two ships where it was
eliminated, that the decision was made to enlarge the hangar
space to accommodate the F-35 and the V-22 Osprey, so the well
deck was eliminated.
If the design continues to change, gentlemen, isn't it fair
to say that this is a significant cost driver? We're interested
in commonality and the use of common hulls, and I would simply
submit that this is going to be a cost driver and it's
regrettable. Would either one of you like to comment on this?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. In fact, the Marine Corps and
the Navy have periodic warfighter talks. This was one of the
topics that we discussed just last week. There were decisions
made in years past about the configuration of the big-deck
amphibs and, as was pointed out, the weight, the volume of the
equipment has changed, and the interest in going back to the
well deck design is something that was a topic.
In order to get into looking in that redesign, there is a
cost associated with it, and then the cost of redesign.
Depending on when we do it, that cost can change, and I have
committed to the Commandant that we're going to take a very
hard look at this as we go into our 2012 budget to see how that
can best be done to support the needs of the Marine Corps.
General Conway. I would only complement the CNO's answer,
sir, to say that we're operating at risk with the numbers of
amphibs that we have. It's our view that those that are at sea
ought to have the maximum flexibility possible for whatever the
mission might require. Ergo, our desire to have well decks on
ships after the two that you referenced.
We also would like to have that ship in the 2016 budget
because we will need it for purposes of putting MEUs to sea and
that type of thing. So as the CNO said, we're going to look at
it from a business case perspective, analyze the costs against
the timeline, and hopefully make a very good decision.
Senator Wicker. Let me ask you about the requirement for 38
amphibious ships, as opposed to the QDR recommendation for an
amphibious fleet of 29 to 33. It is the testimony of both the
CNO and the Commandant that a 33-ship amphibious fleet
represents the limit of acceptable risk. So let me ask you
this: What is the risk of going below 33 and are you willing to
take issue publicly with the possibility in the QDR of 29, 30,
31, or 32? What are your major concerns about going below 33
amphibious ships?
General Conway. Sir, I think what the QDR reflects is the
5-year program on out, and the numbers are below 33 at that
point. There is then obviously additional risk. I think, to
give it perspective, though, you did acknowledge the agreement
that we have with the CNO on what we actually see as the
requirement, what that risk number is in and around 33.
If you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, it sort of
runs a sine wave. At one point we build to as many as 36. So I
think you have to look at it perhaps from a larger perspective,
realize that we also want a strong and balanced fleet out there
supporting our amphibs and that there are cost drivers.
So would we like more? Of course. Are we fiscally realistic
at this point? I'd like to think we're also that.
Senator Wicker. Admiral, is the 31 an acceptable risk? What
is the risk?
Admiral Roughead. I think the Commandant and I are in
agreement--that 33 is a risk that we believe is acceptable now,
because if you don't have that number then the speed and the
amount which you can flow becomes questionable. So, as the
Commandant mentioned, it is a question of balancing the many
shipbuilding demands that we have and building the fleet that
is balanced and gives us the broadest capability, and 33 is
acceptable.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say aloha to our esteemed panel of leaders here
today. First, I would like to thank each of you for your
dedicated service to our country. I also want to commend the
military and civilian men and women of the Navy and Marine
Corps for their outstanding service and thank their families
for the support of their loved ones.
The proposed fiscal year 2011 budget highlights the
Department's priorities of prevailing in today's war, preparing
for a wide range of contingencies, and managing its most
precious resource, its people.
I was pleased to hear the Department of the Navy has agreed
to fund a study that will address the health concerns from
drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. I look forward to
the results. I see this as a positive step to help determine
the true scope of the problem and the number of people
affected. I will include questions for the record on this
matter.
Secretary Mabus, I'm very interested in collaboration
between the Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA). Of note, the Department has worked with the VA on the
physical disability evaluation system pilot program and the
virtual lifetime electronic records system. Mr. Secretary, how
are you addressing the challenges of creating a virtual
lifetime electronic record system?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. I think it goes without
saying, but I want to repeat, that our care for our veterans,
and particularly our wounded warriors, is the most important
thing that we do. We have an obligation to those who have borne
the battle and who have come back to us wounded, to do
everything that we can to make whatever transition they have to
make whatever transition they have to make as smooth as
possible.
The things that we are doing on the subject that you talked
about, in Chicago, for example, we're putting together VA and
Navy medicine in one place, so that there's one stop for
everyone to go to, Navy, Marine Corps, and veterans.
You talked about the single physical and mental evaluation.
That pilot program is ongoing at our six largest personnel
installations. We are ready to extend that and make it
permanent, and we're working very closely with the VA to do
that.
Similarly, on the lifetime electronic records we're moving
forward to make sure that every servicemember and everyone who
has served will have that, so that there will be a seamless
transition between service and back to the community or service
and back to the unit.
I've been with the Commandant to Bethesda, and the
Commandant makes one statement and that is, to every marine: If
you want to stay a marine, regardless of your wounds, we'll
find a place for you in the Marine Corps. While there are a lot
of different decisions made by our wounded warriors as they
progress through rehabilitation as to whether to continue in
the Marines or the Navy or to go back to their community, the
idea that they are welcome as a marine has a very powerful
impact, I think, on those young men and women who have been
wounded.
Finally, in terms of employment, one of the things that we
are working very hard on and that we're proud of is we just had
an employer conference for our wounded warriors to allow those
who have decided to rejoin their communities, go back to the
civilian world, that they'll have a job when they get there. We
should be able to help them make sure that they have a good job
waiting for them when they finish their rehabilitation process.
I will end as I began, which is there is no more important
thing that we do than to care for our veterans, and
particularly our wounded warriors.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
Admiral Roughead, to ensure mission success the Navy must
have shipyards that are modern, flexible, and safe. The Navy's
public shipyards play a vital role in keeping the fleet
operating to meet the significant challenges posed all over the
world. In June 2009, the Navy reported a shortfall of $1.3
billion in sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects
at its four public shipyards.
Admiral, how is this shortfall affecting current and future
Navy readiness and how is the Navy addressing this situation?
Admiral Roughead. Sir, when we look at our accounts for our
public shipyards, which are extraordinarily important to us as
a Navy, but also for all of our shore infrastructure, and we
set what the shortfalls are, that is a figure that we use to
take us to the very highest level of everything that is there.
Obviously, as we work our way through the budgets and deal with
the many issues that we have there will be a difference between
absolute perfection and that which we bring our facilities to.
But I can assure you that the mission capability and the
safety, especially the safety aspects of our shipyards and our
facilities, are provided for, and we value that capability and
we ensure that we have funded to deliver on that safety and
mission capability.
Senator Akaka. Admiral, I'm glad to hear that the Naval
Academy's current freshman class is the most diverse in the
history of the great institution. I believe that diversity is a
real strength. Organizations that are diverse are able to use
to their advantage many different views and perspectives. I
understand that diversity is a very important issue for you.
Can you share with us your views in this area and how
you're approaching diversity in the senior levels of the
officer, enlisted, and civilian ranks?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator. I would also add that
not only did we achieve the most diverse class at the Naval
Academy, but our Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) class
was also the most diverse, simply because we have had a much
more aggressive outreach program and have really attracted
many, many bright young men and women to the Navy, and I'm very
proud of what we've done.
But it's more than just those who are coming in, it's
looking at the leadership that we have currently. What I do
periodically with the leaders of the various specialty areas
within the Navy is to sit down with them individually leader to
leader, not a staff function, and go through where their
underrepresented minorities are serving, the types of jobs that
they have, the types of educational and experiential
opportunities that we're providing them, because we know that
in order to be selected for promotion there are certain
experiences that are valued.
This is not a quota system. This is not a goal, but rather
we ask if we are bringing the bright young leaders of the
future along and putting them in positions and giving them the
experiences that they need. We do that routinely. As I
mentioned, we've just recently created an Information Dominance
Corps. Last week I did my first review of that group, and it
allows us to look at how we're developing that leadership.
You're right, sir; it's a very high priority for me.
Senator Akaka. Let me ask General Conway for any further
comments on this.
General Conway. Sir, my answers again are significantly the
same. It starts with a strong young cadre of diverse officers
that can go through the traditional assignments that will allow
them to prosper and grow, and we're seeing that. We have two
battalions attacking in Marjah. One of them is commanded, for
instance, by a very capable young black officer who just is
representative of what we're seeing increasingly in our Corps
all the way through the general officer ranks. So the process
works.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to each of you for your service. I was pleased that
my friend and colleague Jack Reed raised the issue of women
serving on submarines. Actually, I wasn't pleased, because I
wanted to be the first to raise that issue. But it was good to
hear your testimony that you do not see significant costs in
reconfiguring submarines to allow women to serve. I view this
as creating more opportunity for women in the Navy to go
through the ranks. I just want to start by commending you for
that decision.
Admiral Roughead, in your testimony you indicated that the
DDG-1000 program has recently triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach.
For the record, I just want to clarify my understanding that
this breach is solely due to the decrease in quantity from 10
to 3 DDG-1000s, as opposed to any dissatisfaction with the
performance of Bath Iron Works, which is slated to build all 3
of the DDG-1000s. Is that correct?
Admiral Roughead. That's correct, Senator. It's pure
mathematics. Fewer ships and the math triggers the breach.
We're in the process of complying with the requirement to make
the certifications that are necessary. But it's a mathematical
issue and, as I've been able to say on many occasions over the
last couple of years, the program is extremely well run by
very, very fine people. Of course, we know the great work that
comes out of Bath and look forward to that.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Mabus, that's your assessment as well?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, it is.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Mabus, Congress has previously strongly supported
the Navy's two previous uses of multi-year procurements for the
DDG-51 shipbuilding program. What we found is that multi-year
procurements have tended to reduce acquisition costs, they have
led to more stability in the workforce among our dual-source
shipbuilding industrial base, and that too has contributed to
reduced acquisition costs.
The Navy is proposing in its FYDP to procure a total of six
DDG-51 destroyers over 4 years between fiscal year 2012 and
fiscal year 2015 at alternating procurement rates of one or two
ships per year. Now, prior to the restart last year of the DDG-
51 program the Navy had procured the most recent DDG-51s in two
successive 4-year multi-year procurements, and I would note
that previous studies have found that the most efficient
procurement level necessary to meet force structure
requirements and maintain production efficiency is to do three
DDG-51s a year.
Has the Navy decided on an acquisition plan for procuring
these ships? Are you looking at doing multi-year procurements,
which could help you reduce the costs?
Mr. Mabus. In any procurement program that we do, we look
at all the alternatives, including multi-years. There are, as
you are well aware, certain thresholds that a multi-year has to
reach and, because the DDG-51 line, as you pointed out, was
restarted last year, we have not had sufficient ship numbers to
make a decision and to do the certifications necessary of
whether a multi-year will save us the requisite amount of money
or not.
Senator Collins. I would encourage you to take a close look
at that approach, which has been used successfully in the past.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, you have said strongly
and repeatedly that you view 313 ships as the minimum for our
fleet, and indeed there was a draft version of the QDR which
suggested that the Navy might request a minimum level of 324
ships. In any event, 313 is the number that you've consistently
testified is necessary.
Recently the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) gave
testimony before the House subcommittee in which it cast doubt
on whether the funding in the FYDP is adequate to meet that
minimum level. Indeed, the CBO has warned that its estimate
shows that the battleforce fleet could fall to only 270 ships
by 2025 with a $15 billion annual budget and estimated that if
there were a bit higher budget it might be 240 ships. But
still, in both cases the projections by CBO do not show us
meeting that 313-ship level.
Could you comment on the CBO analysis, please?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. The budget that we have
proposed and that is before you puts us on a trajectory and we
believe that we have adequately priced the ships that will take
us beyond the 313 minimum. As we get out into what I would call
the mid-years and the requirements that we have for building
the fleet, recapitalization of ships that we're building in
large numbers every year, as they fall off the scope as we
recapitalize the strategic deterrent, the funding does become
quite challenging in that mid-year period.
But the budget that we have before you and the plan that we
have laid out puts us on that trajectory to take us over 313
ships.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, I know you've been to my State and
I very much enjoyed your visits, both to Bath Iron Works and
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME. I want to
associate myself with the comments made by the Senator from
Hawaii about the importance of our public shipyards, which are
making such a contribution, particularly in the area of
submarine overhaul and maintenance. I believe that Senator
Akaka has made very good points about the backlog in
maintenance projects. The chairman also has referred to that. I
just want to pledge to work with you to make sure that you have
the funding needed.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Hagan arrived in the nick of time to be recognized.
Your timing is exquisite. I hope it was intentional so I don't
catch you by surprise.
Senator Hagan. Oh, no, that's fine. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. I just wanted to once again thank you for
being here and your testimony and especially your service, each
and every one of you. You're doing a great job.
I wanted to say that my office has received a signed
agreement in principle concerning the Camp Lejeune water
contamination study, and the signed agreement between the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Environment and the acting
Director for the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR), and I certainly appreciate the Department's
deciding to fully fund this Camp Lejeune water mortality study
in the ATSDR and Annual Plan of Work.
But I wanted to know when we can expect for this agreement
in principle to be solidified and when will the money be
transferred to ATSDR for the actual study?
Mr. Mabus. The money will be transferred as soon as we get
the voucher and it will take 3 or 4 days. But we are ready to
fund this. The agreement in principle is pretty much the
agreement. We're ready to move forward on this with all six
studies, four of which previously have been agreed to, with the
mortality study and with the health survey. We have committed
to fully fund whatever science comes out of the health survey
in terms of doing a fuller health study.
Senator Hagan. Great. I think the fact that we have so many
families that have had questions for so many years, that it is
time to begin this study so that we can get answers to the
family members who have served at Camp Lejeune over so many
years. So thank you on that one.
I also wanted to talk about that in Afghanistan, with the
challenging terrain and extremely limited infrastructure, it
serves as a formidable logistical challenge for our military.
Recent reports have indicated that DOD pays an average cost of
$400 per gallon for fuel that's delivered to and consumed in
Afghanistan's remote locations, where the Marines often
operate.
The extent of our current dependence on fossil fuels is a
strategic vulnerability that has the potential to influence
foreign policy and national security objectives. What does the
Marine Corps intend to do in order to lighten our energy
footprint, reduce energy inefficiencies in expeditionary
environments, and reduce energy dependencies? Are our Marine
Corps bases and stations vulnerable to the energy grid?
General Conway. Ma'am, let me correct something first of
all that was cited. A Defense Science Board study did determine
as much as $400 is sometimes spent on fuel, but for the most
part that's fuel that's flown up to Army forces in RC-East in
some very rigorous terrain. Our costs on average are more than
what you pay at the service station here, but not nearly
approximating those costs.
That said, frankly, I was stunned when I looked at what I
consider to be waste in terms of how we are going about the
fight. There's a lot of what I would call low-hanging fruit in
terms of how we can become more efficient in terms of our fuel,
in terms of the structures that we build and their ability to
retain cold or heat, in terms of water, and any number of
things that we consume on a daily basis that simply can be made
better.
So we have put in place an Expeditionary Energy Office, a
colonel with about 10 people both military and civilian that
will work for him. We're not going to burden the field
commander with this responsibility. That would be unfair. I've
been in his shoes and he simply needs to know what he needs and
how soon it's going to get there. But we think that we owe it
to the Nation to be better stewards of the resources available,
to cut back on our needs where we can, to keep young marines
and sailors off those convoys to the extent that we have
reduced demand, and we're very serious about going about that.
In terms of bases and stations, we think we're doing pretty
well. We have the mandate that's been placed on us. It is one
of the Secretary's four priorities, to cut back our energy
consumption about 30 percent by 2015, petroleum consumption by
20 percent at the same time, and we're working hard to be able
to do that.
We've had more success I would say at this point in our
western bases and stations because of solar energy and wind.
But across the Corps we're working hard to try to be more
efficient and again better stewards of our resources.
Senator Hagan. Do you have plans and procedures in place to
monitor how you're achieving these goals?
General Conway. Yes, ma'am, absolutely, only through
metrics and determining just what we can do. There have been
some things done already. For whatever combination of reasons,
the Army did not have need for eight solar water generation
kinds of capabilities. We took those happily and they're
already in Afghanistan.
But we have a series of metrics that the office of this
colonel is maintaining to give us a grade and see where we need
to go.
Senator Hagan. Great.
I have a question concerning the mental health care for our
returning servicemembers. As our service men and women continue
to rotate home from Iraq and Afghanistan, there are those among
them that are obviously returning with significant mental
health issues. Early intervention services for these men and
women may reduce the demands placed upon the VA once these
servicemembers are discharged.
What programs or initiatives are being put into place to
address the mental health concerns of our returning
servicemembers?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, as I said in answer to a previous
question, there's nothing more important that we do than to
care for the people who have borne the battle. That is equally
true of mental health as it is in physical health. The Navy and
Marine Corps are both doing a lot of work in both post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries
(TBIs). For TBIs, one key is very early diagnosis and care near
the battlefield. The Marine Corps in particular, supported by
Navy medicine, has been working to make sure that the symptoms
are recognized by both medical and non-medical personnel in the
field.
We do a mental evaluation before people go on deployment in
the Navy or in the theater as marines. We do a second one when
they come out to see if there has been any impact, and then
another evaluation some time after they return home.
For Navy IAs, as we bring them out of theater we have a
stop-over in Kuwait to allow them to decompress from what they
have been doing before they return home and be evaluated in
terms of physical and mental health. I know that the Commandant
and the CNO can give you other details, because we are working
very hard on these things.
One of our primary focuses is to make sure that there is no
stigma attached to asking for help for mental health issues.
One of the things we look at is to make sure that as people ask
for help that those people who ask are promoted at exactly the
same rate as the ones who do not need that assistance. So I
think that in our senior enlisted ranks and our officer ranks
that the understanding that we need to make sure that there is
no stigma attached to asking for mental health services, and in
fact that there's an imperative that if you need any help or if
people around you recognize the symptoms that they encourage
you to get help.
We're working as hard as we are on anything to make sure
that our returning warriors' mental health needs are absolutely
met.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. I do want to thank you again for
having the agreement in principle completed on the Camp Lejeune
water mortality study, and that obviously begins as soon as
possible. So thank you for that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you all, Admiral, General, Secretary, very
much for your service to our country, and I appreciate your
responses to the committee and the questions that you're being
posed today.
I would echo what the Senator from North Carolina has said
on the issue of energy. That's something I have a great
interest in. The Air Force has taken quite a fairly aggressive
goal out there in terms of trying to acquire 50 percent of
their domestic aviation fuel via alternative fuel blends in
which the alternative component is derived from domestic
sources. I think this issue of dependence, this dangerous
dependence that we have on foreign sources of energy, is a very
real issue, and of course the military is the biggest user.
I hope that the Navy and the Marine Corps can move in that
direction as well, because I do think it's not only a national
security issue, but it's also something that I think in terms
of the economic security of the country is really critical. I'm
hoping that you can pursue that path as well.
Admiral Roughead, I wanted to raise a question with you.
I'm very concerned about the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) follow-on treaty negotiations that we're currently
having with the Russians, and particularly worried about the
steep cuts that are being made to the number of delivery
vehicles and that it might necessitate making our nuclear triad
a diad. President Obama agreed in a joint understanding with
President Medvedev last July to reduce the nuclear delivery
vehicles somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems. Then a
few days later General Cartwright, who is the current Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and former head of Strategic
Command, testified before this committee that he would be very
concerned about the ability to maintain the nuclear triad if
the number of delivery vehicles would go below about midpoint
between 1,100 and 500 or, in other words, if the number went to
somewhere in the 800 delivery vehicle range.
So the question I have, Admiral, is do you share General
Cartwright's concern about the ability to maintain the nuclear
triad if the final START number agreed on for delivery vehicles
is below that 800 delivery vehicle number?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The negotiations are still
ongoing. But I think as you get into the lower numbers that
General Cartwright cited, it does become problematic. We have
been working with the Joint Staff and all the Services, and
clearly the value of the triad is well acknowledged.
Senator Thune. Do you see a scenario in which the triad
might be in jeopardy if they agreed to a number, though, that's
below 800, if you get down to 700, 750? There has been some
reporting in the Russian press that that's the range that
they're looking at.
Admiral Roughead. In the discussions that I've had,
Senator, I'm not concerned about that--nor have we had
discussions about any elimination of a leg of the triad.
Senator Thune. Good.
Admiral, the new QDR rightly dedicates a lot of ink to
deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments,
and it directs the Navy and the Air Force to develop a new
joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries with
sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities, which
in turn will help guide the development of future capabilities
needed for effective power projection operations.
I strongly support expanding and improving our Nation's
long-range strike and power projection capabilities and I was
pleased to see you mention in your prepared testimony that the
Navy, as directed by the QDR, is working with the Air Force to
develop this new joint air-sea battle concept, and I understand
that was discussed a little bit earlier this morning.
I understand that you and the Air Force Chief of Staff
signed a memorandum to begin developing this new operational
concept last September. In your view, how will long-range
strike capabilities fit into this new air-sea battle concept?
Admiral Roughead. I think that they will fit into the air-
sea battle concept, as will many other facets of that type of
operation. We've also included the Marine Corps in air-sea
battle. But I believe there's long-range strike that needs to
be considered. Even the ability for us to be able to engage in
an air-sea battle from under the sea becomes extremely
important, and also the importance of networks in how we knit
all this together is a key element, and I've made that point to
my people, that in addition to all of the kinetic
considerations that we also have to be thinking in terms of
networks, because any adversary is going to be looking at that
same thing as well.
Senator Thune. Last September the Manchester Guardian
reported that the President has rejected the Pentagon's first
draft of the NPR as being too timid and has called for a range
of more far-reaching options consistent with his goal of
eventually abolishing nuclear weapons altogether, according to
European officials, and that's a quote from that newspaper. Is
that an accurate report?
Admiral Roughead. I haven't read the Manchester Guardian,
Senator. But I've been involved in the NPR and I believe that
the process we've had, the considerations we've had, has placed
great value on our nuclear deterrent force, all legs of that
triad, and the considerations of being able to field the
strategic needs of the Nation. I haven't read the article, but
I'm very comfortable with the discussions we've had, the
involvement that we've had, and how we're looking at things.
Senator Thune. With respect to the delay on that, why is it
continually getting pushed back? We're now looking at April as
the latest date that we've heard in terms of that being
completed.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We continue to work with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense on this, and I'll get back
to you on the particulars of the delay.
[The information referred to follows:]

The delay reflects the fact that the current Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) is fundamentally different from the prior NPRs conducted in 1994
and 2001. The differences are of scope, process, and context.
On scope: The 1994 NPR was focused almost exclusively on force
structure and numbers. The 2001 review also addressed forces, but had
more to say about strategy than in 1994. In contrast, the 2010 NPR is
broadly reviewing capability, strategy, and policy. This comprehensive
approach reflects requirements applicable to the 2010 NPR that are in
section 1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181.
On process: The two prior NPRs were both conducted by the
Department of Defense with some coordination with the White House. As
stated in section 1070 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, the Secretary
of Defense shall conduct this NPR in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy and the Secretary of State, so this review is interagency in
character. From the review's start last April, the Departments of State
and Energy have been key partners in the process and have added
significant value to the comprehensive approach. Moreover, the review
undertook to provide results in the form of options, across all areas
of review, for discussion by senior leaders. This has facilitated a
broad, high-level discussion of nuclear posture and policy of a kind
not conducted in decades.
On context: The rising risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism since the 2001 NPR have underscored the need for a fresh
approach to strategy and policy. In Prague in April 2009, the President
articulated a vision for reducing 21st century nuclear dangers that
highlighted the commitment to the ultimate elimination of such weapons
globally. He then asked for a work plan of concrete steps that would
move demonstrably toward that goal, while also meeting continuing
requirements of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability.
Determining how best to accomplish these objectives has required broad
and deep analysis.

Senator Thune. That comes from a European newspaper. But
we've been led to believe that the analysis guiding the START
negotiations in the QDR was completed at the front end of that
NPR process, and that the first draft was reportedly scrapped
on a concern that it was too timid in terms of reducing the
number of nuclear weapons.
Maybe you don't want to comment.
Admiral Roughead. The too timid phrase is one that I had
not heard before. I think as we have worked our way through
what's a very complex process, I've been very comfortable with
the discussions that we've been having, sir.
Senator Thune. All right, good.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Burris is next.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to add my thanks to these three excellent
Americans for their dedication and commitment to the service of
our country. I would just like to let them know where I spent
last week--at the Marine Corps recruiting depot in San Diego
and the Marine Air Station in Miramar, where I experienced and
flew the Osprey simulator and crashed it about 20 times. Also,
Mr. Secretary, I visited the naval medical center in San Diego.
I must say, Commandant, I thought I was a pretty rough kid
coming up until I saw the basic training that those marines
were going through in preparing them to be warriors and to
defend this country. The leadership that I met was terrific,
from the officers on down to the enlisted personnel. I want to
compliment you for what you're doing in preparing those young
men.
General Conway. Thank you, sir. I'll pass that to the
troops.
Senator Burris. Also, on the question of DADT, gentlemen, I
hear the various positions and I know that you may have some
input into that major question that we will be confronting.
Keep in mind that at one time blacks could not serve with any
dignity in our military. We just heard the comment on where we
are now with this diversity issue and the top ranks. Not only
that, but we've had an African American who served as the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and of course we have currently an African
American who's the Commander in Chief. Also, at one time we
didn't allow women in our services, and now we're talking about
even having women on submarines.
So please keep that in mind in terms of what it is and how
we judge individuals by their orientation or by their sex or by
their race, so just by way of comment.
Mr. Secretary and General Conway, the JSF program has been
plagued with numerous delays and setbacks. If the program
continues to be beset with difficulties, at what point will
your readiness posture be significantly affected in terms of
that aircraft?
General Conway. Sir, we have seen setbacks in the program.
We, as a product of this 5-year defense plan, have seen a
reduction of 28 Marine Corps JSFs and that's a serious impact
on our readiness, because for about 11 or 12 years now we have
not bought an attack aircraft. We did not buy the E&F when the
Navy did and so we've been relying upon our F-18s A through D
types and on our venerable Harriers.
So we're really anxious to have the JSF come on line when
it's supposed to, with the capacities that we believe it has.
We're nevertheless encouraged that the supplier is going to
make his timeline that he's promised us, which is initial
operating capacity in 2012.
Senator Burris. Commandant, pardon me. That's not what my
information is. My information is that they're behind schedule,
that they're trying to test various components of it because of
the complications of it replacing three or four of those other
planes. If we have any information to the contrary, please----
General Conway. We'll have to compare notes, sir. December
2012 is what we have been tracking now for quite some time. We
have three aircraft at Pax River at our test facilities. We
will see vertical flight we think this quarter and delivery of
other airplanes before the end of the year.
It is the answer to your question, though, because 2012 is
really important to us in that we have gone for so long without
this capacity.
Senator Burris. Absolutely.
General Conway. If we don't make those kinds of timelines
it will almost immediately have an impact on our ability to
provide the strike fighter capacity that both the Navy and the
Air Force depend on.
Senator Burris. General, I applaud the level of integration
of the Navy and the Marine Corps Reserves into the total force
structure by the Navy and the Marine Corps. How would you
characterize the success of their integration into the overall
mission of the Department of the Navy?
Mr. Mabus. I think the integration of the Reserves of the
Marine Corps and the Navy has been an absolute success. We
simply wouldn't be able to do some of the missions that we do
without the Reserves. They perform an incredibly wide variety
of missions. Their training and readiness is exemplary, and
when they are called to active duty they are integrated
seamlessly and well. As I said, we owe our Reserves not only
the training and readiness, but also the things that I answered
previously about health care, mental health care, and when they
return from active duty.
Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, do you see the need for more
funding to cover the costs of fulfilling the manning of the
reservists?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I think that the budget that we
submitted will allow us to meet every mission, both Active Duty
and Reserve.
Senator Burris. Admiral, did you want to comment on that,
sir?
Admiral Roughead. I was just going to say that integration
is absolutely extraordinary. But even with that, we're not
satisfied. In the Navy we're continuing to look at ways with
which our Active and Reserve components can flow between the
two more seamlessly. A few months ago, by the time you got all
of the paperwork and admin done, it was about a 4-month
process. We now have that down to 8 days and my personnel chief
and my Chief of Naval Reserve know they have to get it to 72
hours.
We can do that because of the terrific professionalism and
the fact that we truly are one Navy. It doesn't make any
difference if we're Active or Reserve. We are one Navy.
General Conway. Senator, I would only comment on the
mentality of the Reserves. It's absolutely incredible to me,
but our Secretary of Defense has set aside guidelines and terms
of their usage and how frequently we can make use of our
Reserve formations. These people want to come on board active
duty and they want to come on board in most instances even more
frequently than what the policies will now allow for.
There are just tremendous people out there who really do
want to be a part of what's taking place in the world today.
Senator Burris. Commandant, you're making that comment and
I see this myself. Even those wounded warriors, the ones that
come back from combat injuries, or amputees--I saw some of them
out in San Diego Hospital or saw them over at Walter Reed. I'm
amazed at the commitment that they have.
I asked this young infantryman from the Army at Walter Reed
when I was out there a question. He was an amputee just below
the knee and he was being discharged that day. I asked him:
Okay, young man, what do you want to do? He said, ``Sir, what I
really want to do is to go back and join my unit.''
General, I couldn't hold it. I just cried right before him.
I mean, it's amazing to me. We have to give thanks to those
type of individuals, committed to give us protection and that
cause and help us to be the America that we are. We couldn't do
it without them.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris. Senator Burris
speaks for this entire committee with those eloquent comments.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you
for your service to the country. Thank you for the men and
women who serve in the Navy and the Marines.
As we had a chance to talk about last night, Florida loves
having the Navy and the Marines, not as many marines as we
would like, General, but we'll work on that. But from Naval Air
Station (NAS) Jacksonville and NAS Pensacola down to Key West
to Blount Island to Mayport, we're just very privileged and
proud to have you in Florida in the numbers that you're in.
I want to first commend you for the work that you have done
and are doing in Haiti. I had a chance to go on a Congressional
delegation trip 2 weeks ago and to visit the young men and
women who are down there who are helping in that rescue and the
humanitarian effort. It is as difficult a situation as one
could find in the world. They're doing great work, and I
appreciate the work that they continue to do.
The next thing I'd like to talk to you about is a topic
that we've discussed before. It will not come as a surprise to
you, and that is Mayport and the decision that the Secretary of
the Navy signed, the record decision to make Mayport a nuclear-
ready facility in order to have a nuclear-powered submarine.
Now, it's my understanding that we have enjoyed having an
aircraft carrier in Mayport since 1952 and it's been maybe not
continuously that way, but it was that way up and through 2006,
when the USS Kennedy was decommissioned.
Admiral Roughead, I know that there has been some
discussion about homeporting a carrier at Mayport. But it's my
understanding that the Navy has had a long policy of strategic
dispersal, that is dispersing your assets in numerous places in
order to best protect them, and that you do this, for example,
on the west coast of the United States. So is it true that the
Navy has historically had aircraft carriers homeported in
multiple ports on each coast, and that Mayport has been home to
several aircraft carriers in the past?
Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir.
Senator LeMieux. Also, is it true that the Navy maintains
more than one nuclear-capable port on the west coast and that
making Mayport nuclear-capable only makes a sensible strategy
just like the Navy employs on the west coast of the United
States?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator LeMieux. I've heard discussion that this is going
to be an extremely expensive proposition, talks about $1
billion to $2 billion, and that it's not going to be an
effective or efficient decision for the Navy. Can you comment
on that for me, Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We estimate the cost to be just
past $500 million. Some of those costs have already been
incurred because we are involved with dredging the basin there.
But the costs are also spread out over a period of years. It's
not one lump sum in any given year, it's spread out, and will
give us the opportunity to have an alternate carrier port on
the east coast, which would then make it possible for every
ship class that we have to have alternatives as far as where
they could go to be maintained or where they could go to put in
if they had emergency work to be done.
Senator LeMieux. I guess, Admiral, that part of the concern
is that if there is only one East Coast port for a nuclear
carrier and there were some kind of natural disaster or other
manmade disaster, that that would significantly limit our
strategic abilities.
Admiral Roughead. Particularly as it would apply to our
carrier fleet, yes it would, sir.
Senator LeMieux. In terms of the future of the Navy and the
ships that the Navy will have, it's my understanding that more
and more ships may be nuclear-powered, not just subs, not just
aircraft carriers, and that that's going to require proper
shore facilities to maintain those nuclear propulsion plants.
Admiral Roughead. Senator, as we look to the future,
nuclear power clearly is something that we will be looking at
as a propulsion source. There are many factors that come into
play--construction, maintenance, the manning, and the training.
But as we look to the future, fuel considerations, energy
considerations, and then the power that some of the newer
weapons systems are going to require, you're automatically
drawn to nuclear power as a source, and we're going to be
looking at that.
Senator LeMieux. So having those capabilities in multiple
locations to be able to service those ships is important?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator LeMieux. Last on the Mayport issue: I've heard some
talk about concerns about hurricanes and weather. In Florida
we've unfortunately, like other States, had hurricanes hit us
in the past. Has there been an evaluation as to whether or not
Jacksonville is as susceptible as the rest of Florida is to
hurricanes?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. That was one of the factors
that we looked at, because I think that one can easily conjure
up an image that anything in Florida is susceptible to multiple
hurricanes. But when you look at the historic nature of the
storm tracks, that area in the Jacksonville area is not prone
to what many perceive to be a high incidence of hurricanes.
The patterns either take them south or the patterns take
them up toward the Carolinas, and the area in Jacksonville
seems to be in a very fortunate pocket.
Senator LeMieux. It does. I'm not aware of a hurricane ever
hitting Jacksonville. Perhaps it has. It hasn't in the last 4
years that I'm aware of, and I don't think we've had one prior
to that. Maybe a long time ago, but it has been a long time.
That area does seem to be a pocket.
I want to next talk a little, if I may, Mr. Secretary and
Admiral, about the good work that the Navy is doing in relation
to Colombia. I had an opportunity to visit Colombia last week
on a delegation trip and meet with President Uribe as well as
Minister of Defense Silva and talk about the good work that
we've been doing for the past 8 years--longer than that, but
specifically in the past 8 years--to help the Colombian
military with fighting narcotrafficking and all of the
challenges that Colombia has had with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia.
It recently was mentioned to me by the Admiral that the
Fourth Fleet was able to achieve a major success with a drug
seizure on February 22 and disrupting a go-fast vessel and
recovering more than a quarter ton of cocaine.
I want to emphasize to you how important I think this work
is. The drug terrorists, these folks what are working from
Colombia all the way up through Central America into Mexico,
are very dangerous people. They are not just drug gangs. They
are terrorists. We recently saw this incident in Mexico where a
young soldier who had been killed in a firefight with one of
the drug cartels and then given a State funeral, that his
entire family was killed afterwards by the drug cartel in order
to make a point.
That is extremely worrisome to me. It's also extremely
worrisome to me, not to get into information that we can't
speak about openly, but we know that Iran is projecting its
image into Latin America. We know that Ahmadinejad has visited
Venezuela on several occasions. We know that there are concerns
about Hamas and Hezbollah in Latin and South America.
So I want to commend you on the work that you're doing with
the Colombians and with our other partners in Central and South
America. I had an opportunity to visit our friends in Honduras
as well and our good work that we're doing there in partnership
with them under the new government.
I want to make the point of how important I think it is
that you continue to do the work that you're doing with Joint
Interagency Task Force-South and with the Coast Guard and the
combined efforts with the Colombian military, because I find
that to be an emerging threat to our country and to our
national security. While we are focused, properly, on
Afghanistan and Iraq and other places in the world, we cannot
fail to look south. We cannot fail to make sure that we do not
have terrorist threats within this hemisphere.
So thank you for that good work and thank you for your
service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to follow on a bit, as you might expect, from the
comments of my good friend from Florida and my other good
friend from Florida arriving to make comments after I speak,
I'd like to emphasize that I do have a good deal of empathy for
that area of Florida for the fact that they have lost ships due
to retirement, and that there are ways to address that
situation.
But I would also like to emphasize that this discussion is
clearly not over, and that there are strong statements that
could be made contrary to what was just said. This isn't the
place. I have a very limited amount of time here and I want to
get into some detail with the situation in Okinawa and Guam,
General Conway.
But we are in a situation where we are going to have to
find ways to make better use of limited funds and we are going
to be wanting to put them in places that enhance our overall
ability to perform our national objectives, and that very
strongly includes making sure that we hit the mark on our
shipbuilding goals, Admiral, as you and I discussed when you
visited. There's a great deal of concern about this.
I just listened to Senator Collins mention a CBO study that
indicated that if certain trends were followed the size of the
Navy could be at 270 ships by 2025. I know that the bow wave
always looks good in the Pentagon. I spent 5 years over there.
Your testimony is that you can hit your 313 minimum in a
certain period of time.
But these are just as compelling strategic concerns as
dispersal. I've been through three different renditions of
strategic dispersal debates in my adult lifetime, one of them,
as you'll remember, during the Reagan administration, when we
were going to put a strategic homeport in Corpus Christi. I
went down there and made the speech when I was Secretary of the
Navy to open that one. They were talking about a strategic
homeport in Alaska.
You're familiar with the service of Admiral Joe Prueher, I
assume, former Vice CNO, commander of Sixth Fleet, former
Commander in Chief, Pacific, and former Ambassador to China,
who is not being paid by anyone as a lobbyist to express a
point of view, who stated his strong agreement that this amount
of money would be much better spent in shipbuilding than in
creating a redundant facility.
So I want to make that point, just because I'm sandwiched
here between two opposing points of view, but this discussion
is not over.
I just returned from a visit to Tokyo, Okinawa, Guam,
Tinian, and Saipan. The purpose of this trip was to first meet
with the new leadership of the Japanese Government, but then
also to listen to the viewpoints on Okinawa and in these other
areas in terms of this military base realignment. General, as
you recall, I spent a good bit of time out there in 1973 and
1974, walked and drove every square inch of the military lands
on Guam, Tinian, Saipan, went up to Okinawa, and looked at our
training areas.
Without going through the whole drill, there are two
questions that I am very concerned about right now. One is for
you, General, and the other is for you, Mr. Secretary. We have
gotten ourself into a box with respect to a 2014 timeline, not
only in the situation at Okinawa, which has been delayed
because of the Futenma relocation controversy, and we're
waiting for the Japanese Government to come forward with a
decision, but also in terms of the way we are dealing with the
situation on Guam.
This realignment of marines and these new bases were
arguably supposed to be completed by 2014. I think what is
happening out there is that the civilian populace in both
places are getting very nervous about the prospect of these
timelines, in Okinawa, one, because people see that it's not
really doable practically; and on Guam, because of the civilian
infrastructure itself that would be needed, you can't hit that
mark.
I would like to get your thoughts on that timeline,
General, and what our position might be on it.
General Conway. Sir, I share your concern. Of course, we
will await the Japanese decision, hopefully by May. But any
delay at this point I think is going to be reflected downrange
attempting to meet our timelines. Going all the way back to the
1970s probably, but certainly today, there's only a certain
workforce capacity on Guam to get things done. There is a lot
that needs to be done.
So our concern is that for every month we delay a decision
and action really on the part of both governments in cohort
with each other, it's going to have impact on our ability to
make the timelines.
Senator Webb. I think we're going to have to start talking
more realistically about what those timelines are and calm
people down. I would also strongly encourage looking at more
training areas and firing ranges on Tinian rather than Guam.
Guam is 208 square miles. They now say 210; somewhere they've
gotten 2 more square miles since I was working out there. But
one-third of that island is already military retention areas.
It's very difficult to put firing ranges and that sort of thing
on there.
Tinian is wide open. I went up and looked at it again. The
difficulty is it's not part of the specific plan that's being
discussed. But the utility long-term is very strong.
Mr. Secretary, I hope you will be able to raise the
importance of getting funding for the civilian side on this
Guam project if we're serious about doing this. We cannot
remain as a viable balancing force in the Pacific without these
bases. At the same time, the numbers I got from last year, just
to give you an idea of the disconnect here, were that, in terms
of MILCON projects for this buildup, there was $700 million in
the DOD budget inside the wire and only $51 million outside the
wire, and $50 million of that was DOD money for roads in Guam.
As the General mentioned, they're going to have to increase
workforce out there. They have school difficulties, hospital
difficulties. When I was there, there was a $50 million grant
that was supposed to come their way through the stimulus
package for the port authority that somehow did not happen.
This is American soil. This isn't like being off in Kuwait
somewhere. These are American citizens and the people who have
supported this have now started to wonder whether we are really
serious about doing it in a responsible way. That can only
happen, I think, through interagency coordination and strong
discussions with the White House.
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir, I agree. On the grant for the Apra
Harbor, I was a very strong advocate for that grant and met
with the Secretary of Transportation on two different occasions
to urge him to do that grant, for the exact reasons that you
just stated.
Senator Webb. I contacted the White House when I was on
Guam, trying to make the point that this isn't simply a
transportation issue; it's a national security issue. I think
that $50 million when they have $150 billion in unexpended
money from the stimulus package would go a long way towards
calming people down out there, but also getting this done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, before my dear friend
Senator Webb departs, we have certainly had a different
position with regard to our parochial interests on the
homeporting of a carrier. Florida has always been a second port
and the Atlantic fleet of carriers has always been dispersed.
It was up until 1987 that there was----
Senator Webb. Excuse me. We've had this discussion before.
I have a meeting I have to go to.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, as you are departing, I
just wanted to point out that you are a distinguished former
Secretary of the Navy, and in your confirmation hearing in
1987--well, the former Secretary and now Senator from Virginia
has just departed; I'll just finish the sentence. I went back
and checked the record, and indeed he supported strategic
dispersal of carriers in his confirmation hearing for Secretary
of the Navy.
Of course, it's the logical position, and that was 1987 and
the Atlantic fleet, just like the Pacific fleet, had always
been dispersed so that you don't put all your eggs in one
basket. There are three homeports for the Pacific fleet. There
have always been two homeports for the Atlantic fleet, and that
was the case up until 2\1/2\ years ago when the conventional
carrier John F. Kennedy was mothballed, and that left no
carriers in Mayport.
Since then a new carrier has come on line, a nuclear
carrier since we now have all nuclear carriers, but the Navy
has made its decision. This goes back. The record is replete.
In February 2005 the CNO, Admiral Clark, stated that the Navy
should have two Atlantic carrier ports.
In March 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and former
Secretary of the Navy Gordon England stated: A nuclear carrier
should be in Florida to achieve dispersion.
In March 2006, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Admiral Giambastiani, shared his judgment before this committee
that we should disperse our carriers.
These are all parts of the record of this committee, Mr.
Chairman.
In July 2007, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Mullen, stated, ``I am on the record more than once for this,
very supportive of strategic dispersal of our carriers.''
In December 2008, the Secretary of Defense wrote, ``Having
a single CVN homeport has not been considered acceptable on the
West Coast and should not be considered acceptable on the East
Coast.''
In January 2009, the Navy issued a record of decision to
establish Naval Station Mayport as a CVN homeport. Then we went
through all last year, the QDR, at the insistence of the
Senator from Virginia. When the QDR was complete, DOD validated
the Navy's position, stating in the QDR, ``To mitigate the risk
of terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S.
Navy will homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport, FL.''
I didn't intend to come here and speak on this. If I'd have
known that my colleague from Florida was going to speak on it,
I would have encouraged him not to. But it seems like that we
have to continue, and therefore I will continue. Just so the
record is understood, Admiral, you earlier testified that the
total cost of making Mayport nuclear-capable for a homeport of
a nuclear carrier would be somewhere around $500 million.
Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. You also stated, if I recall, because
I heard you on the television, that that included the amount
that was being spent now for the dredging as well as the
repairs to the wharf. Is that correct?
Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir. It's to make that
port nuclear carrier-capable, which I include to be a
maintenance capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. Therefore, I would like the record to
reflect that that was a matter that we took care of in the
defense appropriations bill for this current fiscal year. That
is law, and that money is appropriated and it's being spent,
and it is a total amount of some $70 million for the dredging
out to a mile and a half, and that's dredging down to 55 feet
to accommodate a nuclear carrier, as well as to the repairs to
the wharf, which are the two long-lead items that need to be
done.
So if my math is correct, $70 million already appropriated
from what the Admiral said, approximately $500 million. We're
talking about somewhere in the range of about $430 million left
over a several-year period to be appropriated to have a second
homeport for a nuclear carrier; is that right?
Admiral Roughead. That's correct, sir, give or take some
adjustments in there. But we've begun the process. The money is
spread over the FYDP, and this year what we need is to be able
to continue this plan. It's the money that allows us to do the
appropriate planning that allows us to most efficiently lay in
that improvement.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I certainly don't want
to continue to take the committee's time on this. The decision
has been made. A good slug of the appropriations are already
underway. The military has made its decision all the way up to
the Secretary of Defense with the QDR, and I'd like to move on.
But as long as this keeps being raised as an issue, I'm
going to have to have a fight in the Budget Committee over this
very same issue.
If that is the case, so be it. It seems to me that at some
point we ought to understand that the decision has been made
and it's been made for the purposes of securing the national
defense. If we disperse carriers in three homeports with
another two ports available in the Pacific, for a total of
five, we sure better not put all five Atlantic fleet carriers
in one port up river, which the commercial channel runs right
by the docks.
So I will stop right there. I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your patience.
I want to thank the CNO, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
indulgence of the General. I want to thank you all for your
public service. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
I have just a few additional questions. I don't know if any
other colleagues do, but if they do I'm sure they'll come back.
First, Secretary, on the WSARA of 2009, it was designed to
address some of the problems that we've had with weapons
systems that take too long and cost too much. An effort is
there in law, but it's going to require in the culture to
insist on early tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and
performance, better systems engineering, better cost estimates,
more mature technologies at the beginning, and better
developmental testing.
Is the Navy on track to rebuild its systems engineering,
cost estimating, and developmental testing capabilities as
required by our law?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir, we are. We are aggressively moving to
hire the acquisition professionals back into the Navy to get
those requirements on line.
Chairman Levin. The committee added nine F/A-18 E and Fs to
the budget request last year, in part to help with a real
shortfall in strike fighters. We understand the Department was
glad to get those additional aircraft. We've seen a
restructuring this year of the JSF program, with a resultant
slowdown, we believe, in the production of F-35s, with a slight
increase in the number of F-18s, but that increase does not
match the slowdown in the F-35 aircraft production.
What is the current assessment of the Navy of the maximum
size of the fighter shortfall, Admiral?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We have worked this management
of our tactical aviation very hard for the last couple of
years, and I believe we have done some very good work in using
attrition aircraft and transitioning squadrons a little ahead
of schedule. So right now as we sit and we look at what we're
going to have in the future, it's about 100 aircraft. In POM
2012 we're going to have to look at the life extension on some
of our earlier 18 A through Ds, and that's where our focus will
be.
Chairman Levin. Why not request the increase in the F/A-18
E and Fs procurement to compensate for that reduction in JSF?
Admiral Roughead. What we are looking at, Senator, is the
cost of the life extension on the A and Ds is not unattractive.
We have to look at that and that's where our focus is right
now. Getting the JSF on track and delivered is of paramount
importance, but we're going to look at the life extension
program on the earlier Hornets.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, your prepared statement says that,
``Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention remains a priority
for the Navy.'' Is that your personal and professional view
regarding accession to that convention?
Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, and it's even more important
than just the Navy, Senator. I believe that as we deal with
resource issues in the coming years and decades being party to
that treaty will be in the best interests of the Nation.
Chairman Levin. Secretary, your prepared statement said
that you support ratification of that convention, saying that,
``Ratification would enhance stability for international
maritime rules and ensure our access to critical air and sea
lines of communication.'' Secretary, what effects would you
foresee if we do not ratify that convention?
Mr. Mabus. Senator, I think that ratifying the convention
will give us much more ability to make those things happen in
terms of free access to sea lanes, and in terms of our ability
to use the sea as a maritime commons. I think that if we do not
ratify that convention we take some risk in being able to do
some of the things that we need to do.
Chairman Levin. Secretary and Admiral, let me join in my
commendation for the Navy for reassessing a prohibition which
it had on the assignment of women for service on our
submarines. I think you're doing the right thing and I commend
you for that leadership.
On the question of DADT, Mr. Secretary, you indicated that
you favor repeal of that program. I guess my question is would
you favor repeal the way you do, if you felt that it would lead
to a negative impact on readiness?
Mr. Mabus. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman Levin. So in favoring the repeal, then, is it fair
to assume or to believe that you believe it will not have a
negative effect on readiness?
Mr. Mabus. That's my personal belief, Senator. But I do
believe that the President has set forth a good plan in terms
of how to implement and I think that we should follow that
implementation plan.
Chairman Levin. The President has also indicated, or I
guess Secretary Gates has indicated, that there is going to be
an effort to see if there can be some modifications in the way
in which the rules are applied without a change in the law. Are
you familiar with that directive?
Mr. Mabus. I'm familiar that Secretary Gates has said that,
yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you know what he is referring to?
Mr. Mabus. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. I just wanted to mention a couple
things. It's pretty exciting, Admiral, as we're now looking
down the road, what does the new nuclear submarine look like.
Part of that is going to be designing the launch system of the
future. Would you share with the committee what we had talked
about before, the role that the Naval Ordnance Test Unit at
Cape Canaveral that has been so integral to the design of the
existing SSBNs, what that role might be in the future?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. As we begin to design the new
submarine that will serve our country for decades to come, one
of the components of it will be missile compartment and launch
systems. Clearly, the relationship that we've had with the
center down in Cape Canaveral is one that will continue. As we
look to the future, there will be opportunities for not just
that site, but also for employment as we begin to spin up and
get into various stages of development and test.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'd just like the record to reflect,
Mr. Chairman, that unfortunately, due to some misplaced
priorities in the development of the new rocket to follow on
the Space Shuttle, that rocket is not developed and as a result
there are going to be layoffs of some exceptionally talented
and trained and educated people at the Kennedy Space Center,
which will be a talent pool that is needed as the Navy gets
into this design work with regard to the future launcher of a
nuclear submarine. So I want the record to reflect that.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask General Conway. We
have the Lightweight Mine Roller System. It's listed as one of
your unfunded programs. It's my understanding--and I'd love to
hear your ideas--that it has been very effective in countering
the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan. Can you
describe that system and the Marines' attitude about funding
for that system?
General Conway. Yes, sir, I can. It has been effective,
sir. It's valuable to us because it's a steerable system that
fits on the front of virtually all of our mine-resistant
ambush-protected vehicles. There's no doubt that it has saved
lives.
They for the most part are blown away when the larger IEDs
go off. But in instances where they're not, it's easily
repairable and put back into operation, and that's what makes
it different from some of the others.
Sir, it's on the unfunded priority list because actually
we've done some discovery learning on the value of the system
since we worked our budget. Normally, unfunded priority list
types of things would not take precedence over our budget
items. That's by conscious choice. But in this case there are
probably two or three instances out of that $231 million that
we have found very valuable just in recent weeks or months in
Afghanistan that we wanted to put on that list.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, we want to keep talking to you
about that. Since this seems to be such an effective device, if
it's ready to be funded we want to try to provide that for you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Thank you for
pointing out that priority. It's a major priority. It has been
for this committee for as long as I can remember that these
IEDs be addressed in any way we possibly can, and we have never
that I can remember, ever not come forth with whatever funding
could be usefully spent to address that threat.
Gentlemen, we thank you and we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
suicide prevention
1. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, the Navy and Marine Corps still
face the tough challenge of preventing suicides. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq have placed additional mental burdens on our men
and women in uniform. I applaud the Navy and Marine Corps for their
campaign to increase the involvement of their leaders at all ranks in
suicide prevention efforts. Can you please update me on the Navy and
Marine Corps' efforts to prevent suicides, including adding more mental
health providers and substance abuse counselors?
Secretary Mabus. Sailors and marines are the Department of the
Navy's (DON) most important asset. The DON continues to develop and
deploy training that builds resiliency for the individual servicemember
while educating the force on the warning signs of a troubled sailor and
marine. No longer is training focused solely on the active duty member.
Training now includes DON civilian employees and is available to family
members. Service-specific efforts include:

Navy has developed the Operational Stress Control
(OSC) program to address the psychological health needs of
sailors and their families. To date more than 99,000 sailors
have received the initial OSC familiarization brief. Formal
training curriculum for key points throughout a sailor's career
is now in various stages of development and fleet introduction.
Navy recently updated its suicide prevention policy
guidance requiring commands to maintain written crisis response
plans and updating reporting requirements. Additionally, Navy
has initiated an overarching policy review to identify
potential barriers to seeking appropriate care or to the
successful reintegration of a sailor to a viable career path
following treatment.
Marine Corps (USMC) is implementing its Operational
Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) program. This program
assists leaders in prevention, early identification, and
treatment of combat and operational stress problems, using
medical, religious and peer support assets. OSCAR reduces
stigma associated with mental health issues and enhances other
behavioral health programs like suicide prevention, family
advocacy, and substance abuse by addressing all sources of
operational stress. All Marine Divisions will receive OSCAR
training by May 2010, with implementation to other commands
soon thereafter.
Marine Corps has updated its suicide prevention
training at Recruit Training, Drill Instructor School and the
Basic School. Furthermore, Marine Corps is now providing new
evocative suicide prevention training to junior enlisted, staff
noncommissioned officers (NCO) and spouses. The training is
peer taught, interactive, and personal. Nearly 100 percent of
all NCOs and Hospital Corpsmen have received the training. A
longitudinal study will be used to assess the training's
effectiveness.
Marine Corps will be participating in a National
Institute of Mental Health study to better understand unique
Marine Corps risk and protective factors, and to better inform
prevention programs.
The number of mental health provider authorizations
adjusts to meet the demand for medical services. The
combination of military, Federal civilian service and
contractor professionals provides flexibility and timeliness to
meet the operational and beneficiary care and missions. To that
end, between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2012 DON will
increase the number of military mental health authorizations by
137.

cultural awareness
2. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, there has been a continuing
emphasis within the Department of Defense (DOD) to increase cultural
awareness of our personnel so that they may better perform counter-
insurgency and stability operations. What is your opinion regarding the
Navy and Marine Corps' efforts at developing foreign language skills to
better perform warfighting and non-warfighting activities?
Secretary Mabus. Over the past years, Navy and Marine Corps have
made significant progress in language familiarization and cross
cultural competency training for in support the full spectrum of its
core capabilities missions.
Specifically, Navy has:

Established its Center for Language, Regional
Expertise, and Culture (CLREC), which leverages existing
foreign language, culture and area studies instruction, as well
as training tools, technologies and methodologies, to
facilitate professional development of Foreign Area Officers,
Intelligence, Information Warfare, and Cryptologic personnel.
Additionally, CLREC has developed practical, Navy-wide, cross-
cultural skills training needed to enhance relationships with
emerging partners.
Navy directs CLREC coordinated training and education
to operational forces through classroom instruction provided
during pre-deployment work-ups, or as mission-tailored Mobile
Training Teams (MTT) to units already deployed. In 2002, in
response to the attack on USS Cole, Navy established its
Regional Security Education Program, coordinated by the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. NPS faculty and
regional experts embark with Navy Strike and Amphibious Groups
to deliver underway instruction in regional history, current
affairs, threats and general cultural/religious awareness.
Navy is increasing regional and cultural content
through Navy Professional Military Education (NPME) developed
by the Naval War College (NWC), providing non-resident language
instruction to sailors and delivering in-residence training to
more officers. NWC offers a set of five Regional Concentration
Areas in its Elective Program within its resident intermediate
and senior PME programs.
For officer accessions, Naval Reserve Officers
Training Corps (NROTC) midshipmen now take a semester course in
regional studies, world culture and/or world religions, with
emphasis on Third World, Far East, and SW Asia. This
requirement uses existing university-taught courses. The U.S.
Naval Academy has established an International Programs Office
and a Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies. Starting with
the 2009-2010 academic year, Navy implemented an LREC Majors
program for NROTC. This program provides NROTC scholarships to
20-30 midshipmen per year who will major in select critical
languages, with a minor in associated regional studies, or
major in regional studies, with a minor in an associated
language. The goal, when fully implemented across 4 years, is
to have up to 120 total NROTC Midshipmen enrolled in the
program.
In July 2007, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander,
U.S. Pacific Fleet developed Navy Tactical Task 4.8.5
``Maintain Cultural Awareness,'' committing the fleet to a
gradual, but important enhancement of the Navy's awareness of
overseas cultures. CLREC is tasked to define the cultural
awareness training needed to meet the Mission Essential Task
(MET) and to prioritize and tailor development of country and
regional studies.
Navy's interest in, and support for, cultural issues
led it to volunteer to conduct a DOD-sponsored, Joint Staff-
led, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Capabilities
Based Assessment (REC-CBA) to develop a validated methodology
to identify combatant commander REC requirements. Army led an
associated Language CBA. The assessments have been completed,
and the resultant methodology has been submitted for
implementation pending review by the Joint Staff, combatant
commands, and Services.

The Marine Corps separates the needs of its Marines into three
broad categories, each with distinct cultural and language training
requirements. These three categories are:

(1) Professional Linguists (Intelligence Crypto-linguists and
Signals Intelligence, and Foreign Area Officers (FAO))
(2) Special Forces (those marines assigned to Marine Special
Operations Command)
(3) General Purpose Forces (GPF)

There are numerous organizations involved in the Marine Corps
efforts to improve the culture and language skills of our entire
uniformed force. In May 2005 the Marine Corps opened its Center for
Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) under Training &
Education Command as the central Marine Corps agency for operational
culture training and education. CAOCL's mission is to provide regional,
operational culture and operational language knowledge through
training, education, research and mentorship so that Marines and Marine
units can plan and operate effectively in the joint expeditionary
environment, anywhere in the world.
While CAOCL is primarily focused on the GPF, there are other Marine
Corps organizations and institutions that provide culture and language
training and education for Marines. Intelligence Department manages the
professional linguist community within the intelligence MOSs and those
Marines selected for attache duty. The Deputy Commandant for Plans,
Policies and Operations (PP&O) manages the International Affairs
Officer Program, which includes our FAOs and Regional Affairs Officers
(RAO). The Marine Special Operations Command manages the training of
its Marines with specific language and culture requirements and
receives support from CAOCL and the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
The goal of Marine Corps culture and language training and
education programs is to develop a force of marines that have the
operational culture and language skills needed to quickly and
accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively operate, in
any complex environment to achieve the desired outcomes. CAOCL, through
its direct programs and in concert with other Marine Corps and joint
institutions, ensures that our marines have the right culture and
language skills to perform both warfighting and non-warfighting
functions anywhere in the world.
The Marine Corps is:

Enhancing USMC capacity to meet the culture, regional
studies, and language needs of the GPF across the career
continuum, from accession until retirement, and in all
operating environments across the range of military operations
by working across the Marine Corps training and education
establishment. Our enduring effort to train and educate our
marines is encapsulated in the Marine Corps Regional, Culture,
and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program. Throughout the
program all career marines will study a specific strategic
region and corresponding language, while deepening their
ability to operate across all cultures. Providing operational
culture and language familiarization training to units
throughout the predeployment training program (PTP).
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
Over the last 3 years, over 68,000 deploying marines
received training in the country-specific operational culture
of Iraq or Afghanistan.
Over the same 3 year period, over 16,000 deploying
marines were trained in the tactical use of either Iraqi,
Pashto or Dari languages.
Building Partner Capacity & Security Force
Assistance--Providing country-specific cultural training and
robust, mission focused language training to support the
deployment of Marines to carry out Security Force Assistance,
Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Civil Affairs, Civil
Military Operations, Transition and Advisor team missions.
Coordinating and synchronizing efforts within DOD and
the Interagency to leverage culture and language resources and
minimize duplication of effort.
Expanding USMC research capacity and outreach to the
broader U.S. Government, academic, nongovernmental, and
international communities to increase our training and
education capabilities.
Formalizing and institutionalizing culture and
language training standards in a Training & Readiness Manual,
eventually being a readiness reportable item for commanders.
Creating a cultural mentorship program to provide high
quality heritage subject matter experts (SMEs) as operational
support to senior level MAGTF Commanders, both at home station
prior to deployment, and then while forward deployed. This
capability embeds cultural SMEs within the headquarters
elements to assist commanders and senior staff with mature
counsel when facing operational decisions that are effected by
culture considerations.
Fielding Language Learning Resource Centers at major
Marine Corps bases and stations that facilitate focused
language instruction in support of PTP and the RCLF Program.
Providing a number of computer-based language training
programs such as Defense Language Institute's (DLI) Head Start,
Rosetta Stone and Transparent Languages' CL-150. These and
other government procured software available to Marines for
self-paced study. Over 31 languages are currently offered.
Responsive to General McChrystal's desire to improve
the language skills of senior commanders to enhance Key Leader
Engagements (KLEs), the Marine Corps created an Incidental
Language Training Program for commanders. This program better
prepares commanders to conduct key leader engagements while
deployed in support of OEF.
In close coordination and partnership with the Navy
Staff, the Marine Corps actively participated in the DOD-
sponsored, Joint Staff-led, REC-CBA to develop a validated
methodology to identify combatant commander REC requirements.
The Marine Corps is creating an interdisciplinary
research capacity for USMC to enhance it's understanding of
culture and strategic regions and augment existing USMC culture
and regional studies training and education efforts in order to
ensure operational effectiveness. This capacity is blended with
seasoned operational experience to create academically sound
and operationally relevant publications and curricula.

educating sailors and marines in financial literacy
3. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, it is vitally important that our
citizens, both in and out of uniform, understand the importance of
saving, debt reduction, planning for retirement, and understanding
investments. It is also important that our troops be protected from
predatory practices of some companies that specifically target them.
Can you tell me what the Navy and Marine Corps are doing to educate
their members on the importance of financial literacy?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy and Marine Corps offer personal financial
management services to sailors and marines and their families to ensure
they have the knowledge, skills, and tools necessary to successfully
manage their personal finances. These services are provided by
certified financial counselors at Navy and Marine Corps installations
worldwide and include the following:

Individual assistance to help foster financial
responsibility and accountability with primary emphasis on
financial independence, sound money management, debt avoidance,
and long-term financial stability to increase personal, family
and operational readiness.
Education forums specifically designed to stimulate
changes in personal financial behavior at key career intervals,
including recruit training, initial skills training, Petty
Officer indoctrination, first-term and mid-career career
exploration workshops, Transition Assistance Program, and pre-
retirement seminars, with appropriate financial topics at each
lifestyle milestone.
The Navy launched ``Million Dollar Sailor,'' a
standardized wealth-building program, in February 2009 as a
means of teaching sailors how to develop positive financial
habits, how to be savvy consumers, and how to save and invest
to become future million dollar sailors. Navy Fleet and Family
Support Centers offer the program fleetwide.
Navy and Marine Corps Personal Financial Management
Program specialists work collaboratively with installation
Command Financial Specialists, on-installation banks and credit
unions, and DOD financial readiness partners to provide
information on financial planning and budgeting, credit and
debt management, military retirement plans, Thrift Savings
Plans, home and car purchases, insurance, investment
strategies, deployment cycle financial impacts, predatory
lending, and personal banking.
Both the Navy and Marine Corps participate in the
``Military Saves'' campaign, a DOD programs designed to
encourage military families to improve personal financial
savings.

jinkanpo atsugi incinerator
4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, the Jinkanpo Atsugi Incinerator
was a waste incinerator located near Naval Air Facility (NAF) Atsugi, a
base manned partly by several thousand U.S. Navy members and their
families. The incinerator, which closed in 2001, emitted harmful toxins
into the air that spread to surrounding areas. NAF Atsugi's proximity
to the incinerator potentially exposed its residents to these harmful
toxins. Can you please explain what the Department of the Navy has done
to identify and notify persons who have potentially been exposed?
Secretary Mabus. In April 1998, at the direction of Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)),
Navy Environmental Health Center developed a comprehensive risk
communication and health consultation program. This was coordinated
with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, NAF Atsugi, Branch Medical
Clinic Atsugi, Commander Naval Forces Japan, Bureau of Naval Personnel
and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The plan established
procedures for providing formal risk communication to personnel aboard
NAF Atsugi or who subsequently received orders to Atsugi.
One-on-one health consultations were conducted for all adults who
remained on station for more than 6 years, all adults who had children
under the age of six, those with chronic respiratory conditions and
pregnant or nursing women. Six years was chosen because the cancer risk
for adults residing at NAF Atsugi for 6 years was at a level of 1 in
10,000 above the current rate of cancer in the U.S. population. This
risk level falls at the upper end of the Environmental Protection
Agencies' acceptable cancer risk range. A standard entry was made in
medical records that described potential exposure conditions at NAF
Atsugi.
The program required that orders assigning personnel to Atsugi
include a statement regarding the air quality issue and referring
members to medical and base points of contact for further information.
Overseas medical screeners were required to discuss the health risks
and provide a focused health consultation for individuals with orders
to NAF Atsugi, and to provide a fact sheet addressing potential risks
of living and working at NAF Atsugi. A phased approach was established
to inform individuals of potential risks to adults and children living
or working at NAF Atsugi.
A Health and Environmental Risk Communication Plan addressed the
means for providing information to the community (e.g., base newspaper
articles, public availability sessions, fact sheets, web sites, library
repositories).
Several different medical record forms were used at NAF Atsugi to
respond to concerns from NAF Atsugi military personnel and their
families about medical documentation and full disclosure of their
potential exposure and possible health effects. All forms were placed
in personnel and family permanent health records. Branch Medical Clinic
Atsugi, with Bureau of Medicine and Surgery's approval, developed a
medical record form that listed the maximum sampling concentrations
measured in 1994 for 12 chemicals exceeding U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) or New York State ambient air quality standards
during the air quality study. These chemicals included: sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen dioxide, hydrochloric acid, carbon tetrachloride, benzene,
dioxins, cadmium, mercury, nickel, chromium, arsenic and respirable
particulates. (http://www-nmcphc.med.navy.mil/downloads/ep/Atsugi/
Appendix--A--appendices.pdf). Cancer risks were also provided on this
form. Beginning March 1, 1996, this form was inserted into the medical
records of all individuals who requested the documentation.
During health risk communication and consultation at NAF Atsugi,
which began in June 1998, a revised form was completed for every
individual at NAF Atsugi and those with orders to NAF Atsugi. This new
form documented full disclosure of potential exposures and possible
health effects, related to environmental conditions, for each military
member and family member based upon their medical history. The new form
was signed by each adult family member (18 years and older) to
acknowledge receipt of risk communication. The sponsor or spouse signed
the new form for children under the age of 18. Additionally, all
servicemembers and family members over the age of 17 indicated that
they received a risk communication briefing by signing an
``Administrative Remarks NAVPERS 1070/613 (Rev. 10-81),'' commonly
referred to as a ``Page 13'' entry, to be retained in the member's
military record. Prior to detachment from NAF Atsugi, another medical
form was completed to document arrival and departure dates, locations
of residence, schools attended and employment, while assigned to NAF
Atsugi.

5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, is there a current registry of
those exposed to environmental toxins at NAF Atsugi? If not, why?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy has assembled a comprehensive database of
personnel and their families stationed at NAF Atsugi during the
timeframe the Shinkampo Incinerator Complex was in operation. The Navy
Marine Corps Public Health Center in Norfolk, VA, maintains the
database.

number of navy personnel on ships off the coast of vietnam
6. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, a frequently cited estimate is
that around 800,000 personnel served on ships located off the coast of
Vietnam during the Vietnam war. Is this an accurate number? If not,
what is the Navy's accurate estimate of the number of Navy personnel
who served on ships located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam
war?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy does not hold records that would readily
allow for an assessment of the accuracy of the estimate that 800,000
sailors served in ships located off the waters adjacent to Vietnam or
provide the basis for an official Navy estimate. A rough estimate could
be based upon the standard complement of crew for those ships that
sailed within a particular proximity to the Vietnamese coast. The
creation of such a list of Navy ships would require a compilation of
those ships that earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for
Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed by research into their
deck logs to determine whether those vessels sailed within a defined
area off the coast of Vietnam. A more precise figure would entail
extremely detailed and extensive research into Navy personnel records.

ships' past locations
7. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, keeping track of a ship's
locations during its lifetime is an important operational and historic
function. Does the Navy keep track of where its current and past ships
have sailed?
Secretary Mabus. The deck logs submitted by Navy ships allow for a
detailed accounting of an individual vessel's movements. However, no
comprehensive resource or record exists that provides a list of all
Navy ships that sailed within a defined area during a particular time
period.

8. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, is such information readily
available? If not, how long would it take to compile such information?
Secretary Mabus. A single listing of all Navy ship locations is not
readily available. A list of ships that sailed within a particular
proximity to the Vietnamese coast could be compiled by creating a list
of Navy ships that earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for
Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed by researching those
ship's deck logs to determine whether they sailed within a defined area
off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to accurately estimate the
time necessary to complete such a list; however, it would require an
exceptional level of detailed and extensive research.

9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, can you provide the names of
ships that were located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam
war?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy does not hold readily available records
that would provide that information. A list of ships that sailed within
a particular proximity to the Vietnamese coast could be compiled by
creating a list of Navy ships that earned the Armed Forces
Expeditionary Medal for Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed
by researching those ship's deck logs to determine whether they sailed
within a defined area off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to
accurately estimate the time necessary to complete such a list;
however, it would require an exceptional level of detailed and
extensive research.

contaminated drinking water at camp lejeune
10. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, many military personnel and
their family members who were stationed at Camp Lejeune from the late
1950s through the late 1980s may have been exposed to contaminated
drinking water. The chemicals contained in the contaminated drinking
water are known toxins that have adverse health effects on humans.
Military personnel and their family members who may have been exposed
to the contaminated drinking water may have lost confidence in DOD's
and the Department of the Navy's ability to provide adequate,
appropriate, and needed health care that will result from exposure to
contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. What are DOD and the Department of
the Navy doing to identify personnel and family members who may have
been exposed to contaminated drinking water?
Secretary Mabus. The Department of Navy continues to reach out to
our marines, sailors, and civilians who worked or lived aboard Camp
Lejeune regarding potential exposure to drinking water contamination
prior to 1987. In September 2007, we launched a Notification Registry
which can be accessed via the internet or a toll-free phone line. The
registry was created so that former Camp Lejeune residents, workers, as
well as other interested parties can input their contact information so
that we may notify them and send them up-to-date information regarding
this important issue. We have used information from our personnel
records as well as print and radio advertising to solicit individuals
to register. To date, we have sent out over 200,000 direct
notifications and registered more than 155,000 individuals. The
registry can be accessed on the Camp Lejeune Water Study Website at
http://www.marines.mil/clwater or via the toll-free hotline at (877)
261-9782.
In addition to individual notifications, the Marine Corps continues
to use general notification tools (print and other media as well as
targeted outreach to VA centers and retirees) to reach former base
residents and workers to encourage them to register. General
notification will also be used to announce the completion of the
ongoing health study initiatives. The Marine Corps will keep
Congressional Members updated on our notification progress.
The Department of the Navy relies on science organizations like the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the
National Academy of Sciences to inform us on scientific matters through
their research initiatives. Currently, no association between adverse
health outcomes and exposure to impacted water at Camp Lejeune has been
demonstrated.

11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, what is the estimated number of
personnel and family members who may have been exposed to contaminated
drinking water?
Secretary Mabus. Detailed data for servicemembers and family
members who lived or worked on Camp Lejeune between 1957 and 1987 do
not exist. The Marine Corps can only make estimations using assumptions
that will likely produce conservatively high estimations. We estimate
that stationed at Camp Lejeune between 1957 and 1987 there were:

As many as 630,000 servicemembers.
As many as 60,000 spouses.
As many as 60,000 dependent children.
As many as 30,000 births.
Total population estimate = 500,000-800,000

Note: Data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, Camp Lejeune
housing, Camp Lejeune schools, and ATSDR studies were used to produce
these estimates. These estimates do not include Marine Corps Air
Station New River.
Patient care and Federal benefits for veterans and their dependents
are primarily a function of the Department of Veterans Affairs and not
a function of DOD or the Department of the Navy. Questions about
provision of patient care or Federal benefits as a result of or related
to exposure to impacted water should be directed to the Department of
Veterans Affairs.

12. Senator Akaka. Secretary Mabus, what are DOD and the Department
of the Navy doing to address the valid and pointed concerns of
veterans, military personnel, and their family members?
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy cares deeply about
current and former marines, sailors, civilian workers, and their
families. We believe the best way to assist them is to continue our
support of the research initiatives underway. This includes studies and
surveys being undertaken by the ATSDR. Additionally, a scientific/
medical literature review was conducted by the National Academies'
National Research Council and was released on 13 June 2009. Our hope is
that these efforts will help answer the many questions we all have
regarding exposure to the impacted water at Camp Lejeune, NC.
Furthermore, the Department of Navy and the Marine Corp is
proactively engaged in outreach to marines, sailors, and civilians who
worked or lived aboard Camp Lejeune prior to 1987. In September 2007,
we launched a Notification Registry that can be accessed via the
internet or a toll-free phone line to collect contact information of
former Camp Lejeune residents, workers, and other interested parties
who wish to receive information updates on this important issue. To
date, we have sent out over 200,000 direct notifications and registered
more than 155,000 individuals. The registry can be accessed on the Camp
Lejeune Water Study Website at http://www.marines.mil/clwater or via
the toll-free hotline at (877) 261-9782.
The Marine Corps also continues to use general notification tools
such as print and other media as well as targeted outreach to VA
centers and retirees to reach former base residents and workers to
encourage them to register. General notification will also be used to
announce the completion of the ongoing health study initiatives.

chinese naval activities
13. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead, China's economic growth has
led it to import large amounts of raw materials, much of which comes by
sea. There is speculation that China is considering establishing
overseas naval bases to protect these supply lines. The idea of Chinese
bases abroad, particularly in the Indian Ocean, immediately raises
concerns that China is growing more active and assertive in its naval
activities. What are your thoughts on whether or not the Navy has the
capacity and capabilities to address this developing scenario?
Admiral Roughead. Our Navy today has the capacity and capabilities
to protect U.S. national interests in the Western Pacific and Indian
Ocean. I am committed to maintaining the necessary forward presence of
ships and aircraft in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, with
credible combat power, to assure our allies and friends, deter
aggression, and build partnerships with nations that share our common
interests.
As I have stated before, we require a minimum of 313 ships to meet
and sustain combatant commanders' warfighting and forward presence
demands globally, while providing reasonable operational tempo for our
sailors and their families and conducting the maintenance necessary to
reach the expected service life of our fleet. Our 30-Year Shipbuilding
Plan grows our fleet capacity in the near term, which will enable our
continued, relevant presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean
region to support our national interests and counter both current and
future naval threats.

care for wounded servicemembers
14. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, I'm
encouraged with the additional funding in the defense budget for
wounded warrior care. The Navy Safe Harbor Program and the Marine Corps
Wounded Warrior Regiment show the continued commitment to our
servicemembers that we will take care of them and their families. How
would you each assess the approach within your respective Services to
care for our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their
families?
Admiral Roughead. I am confident that we are extending the highest
quality care to our wounded, ill and injured sailors, coast guardsmen,
and their families. Our Navy provides a continuum of care to sailors
and their families that addresses all aspects of medical, physical, and
psychological care. Through our Navy Safe Harbor program, recovery care
coordinators provide oversight of, and assistance with, delivery of
care to recovering servicemembers and families who move between DOD,
Veterans Affairs, and civilian facilities. Direct family member
feedback and survey results indicate high enrollee satisfaction with
the program.
General Conway. The Marine Corps' approach to caring for its
wounded, ill, and injured Marines and their families is solid and
robust. The foundation of its approach is compassionate and concerned
leadership that focuses its marines on their abilities and stresses
that they are still in the fight as they continue to contribute to the
mission of defending our Nation. With this foundation and
encouragement, the Marine Corps' Wounded Warrior Regiment provides a
wide range of nonmedical care ranging from family support and mental
health treatment coordination to financial security counseling and
employment transition assistance. The intent of our efforts is to
support a Marine's return to a full duty status or provide them with
the support resources they need to successfully reintegrate to their
communities. The Wounded Warrior Regiment continually assesses its
approach through personal feedback from Marines and their families
during command visits (including General Officer visits with our
wounded, ill, and injured marines and families), town hall meetings and
surveys. The Regiment reaches out to active duty, Reserve and veteran
marines and their families through the Sergeant Merlin German Call
Center, a recognized DOD ``Best Practice'' model. The call center,
named for a Marine who died from injuries suffered in Iraq, receives
requests for assistance and places outgoing calls to wounded, ill and
injured Marines to touch base with them and offer help. The call center
adds depth to our approach and reminds our Marines and their families
that they will always have a place to go for help.

cyber threats
15. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, our
National security is tightly linked to cyberspace, where conflict is
not limited by geography or time. The expanding use of cyberspace
places our Nation's interests at greater risk from cyber threats and
vulnerabilities. How are the Navy and Marine Corps responding to cyber
threats so that it can carry out its mission?
Admiral Roughead. I have elevated the role of information, cyber,
and networks in our Navy. I established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth
Fleet as the global operator of Navy's cyber, networks, cryptology/
signals intelligence, information, electronic warfare, and space
operations. I restructured the Navy staff to bring all Navy information
capabilities and resources under our new Information Dominance Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations and I created the Navy Information Dominance
Corps, integrating more than 45,000 sailors and civilians from our
existing intelligence, information professional, information warfare,
meteorology/oceanography, and space communities. These actions have
improved Navy's ability to ensure the availability, integrity,
confidentiality, and security of our information and warfighting
systems.
Additionally, the Navy has developed the Prometheus system, a
unique network defense capability that receives, processes, aggregates,
correlates, and fuses real-time and near real-time information from
multiple network sources to provide Network Domain Awareness (NDA).
This capability, supported by SIGINT and a Dynamic Network Defense
operational construct, provides the Navy with an exceptional ability to
develop a deep understanding of the network environment, to rapidly
characterize network activity and enable a preemptive response to
global threats in support of our warfighting missions.
General Conway. [Deleted.]

shipyard budget shortfall
16. Senator Akaka. Admiral Roughead, to ensure mission success, the
Navy must have shipyards that are modern, flexible, and safe. The
Navy's public shipyards play a vital role in keeping the fleet
operating to meet the significant challenges posed all around the
world. In June 2009, the Navy reported a shortfall of $1.3 billion in
sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) projects at its four
public shipyards. How is this shortfall affecting current and future
Navy readiness, and how is the Navy addressing this situation??
Admiral Roughead. Our public shipyards are fully functional and
safely meeting their Fleet mission requirements. Our $3 billion naval
shipyard restoration and modernization (RM) backlog represents the
investment required to meet the very highest level of shipyard RM
needs. Our Navy has steadily increased its investment in naval shipyard
recapitalization over the past several years through Operation and
Maintenance, Navy and Military Construction (MILCON) projects, and we
are developing future investment plans to reduce the RM backlog and
ensure that our public shipyards continue to meet their mission
requirements.

mental health care
17. Senator Akaka. General Conway, the Marine Corps has made
significant progress in caring for our military heroes with mental
health issues. But, before we can care for them, we must first identify
them. One of the biggest issues we must address is reducing the stigma
related to seeking counseling. Last summer, DOD launched the Real
Warriors campaign, a public education effort designed to reduce stigma.
It is imperative to get the message to our warriors that it would be
courageous to reach out for help. How would you assess the Marine
Corps' continuing efforts to tear down the stigma that still deters
many from seeking treatment for problems such as traumatic brain injury
(TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and what more do we
need to do as we move forward?
General Conway. First of all I would like to state that the U.S.
culture in general faces issues of stigma surrounding mental health
problems and care. The Marine Corps is no different in this regard, but
as an institution we understand that we have responsibilities and
options in tackling stigma reduction that are not present in the
civilian world.
The Marine Corps' approach to ensuring that all marines who need
help with Traumatic Brain Injury and Operational Stress issues is
focused in three major areas: strategic communications, engaged
leadership and ``meeting the Marine where he/she is.''
I expect all of my leaders, officer and enlisted, to treat a marine
with a TBI or TSI (Traumatic Stress Injury) in the same way they
approach other injuries with the provision of command support during
the treatment process with an expectation of improvement/resolution and
a return to full duty. I broadcast this message whenever I meet with
groups of Marines, which I do quite frequently. In addition, I have
filmed a specific message on this subject in which I directly address
the need for Marines to stay mentally as well as physically fit and
that getting the help they need is part of being a marine. This video
has been distributed throughout the Marine Corps and the informal
feedback I have received has been very positive.
The key weapon in the Marine Corps in addressing a wide range of
issues related to earlier detection of Marines having difficulties is
Engaged Leadership. No one is better positioned to notice a Marine
``not being quite right'' for any reason than the Marines that he or
she serves with everyday. I rely on my leaders at all levels to know
their Marines and intervene early when things seem to be veering off
course. Our Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) model as well as
our ethos as warriors makes leadership the front line in noticing
marines having a problem. That having been said, we also have a variety
of formal tools and processes that aid us in detecting TBI and TSI
problems. The Post-Deployment Health Assessment and Post-Deployment
Health Reassessment are requirements for all marines to complete and
represent real opportunities for these conditions to be detected.
Similarly, the Pre-Deployment process that involves a structured review
of a Marine's health status prior to deployment provides another
opportunity to discover a previously unknown medical issue.
Additionally, we are working with the other Services and the Office of
the Secretary on the implementation of the ``person to person'' post
deployment mental health evaluations that are now required as a result
of the NDAA 2010. We expect that there will be some questions related
to TBI as well as Traumatic Stress incorporated into these evaluations.
All of these efforts serve to ``normalize'' having a discussion about
psychological health and TBI and this normalization is a key element in
our drive to reduce the stigma sometimes associated with these issues.
Finally, while I would like all Marines to feel comfortable coming
forward to discuss their concerns about a TBI or TSI, for some this is
still difficult to do. As such, the Marine Corps has developed ways
that make it easier for marines to at least start these conversations.
Working with Navy Medicine we have assigned additional psychological
health professionals to operational units via the OSCAR initiative.
With OSCAR these professionals are part of a Marine unit. They train
with them before a deployment, return home with them and importantly
remain with the unit after returning. While I wish there were enough
psychological health personnel to put one of these teams with every
battalion that is just not the reality of the situation. To meet the
psychological health needs of all marines we have also instituted the
OSCAR extender training program that provides a comprehensive
curriculum to organic battalion level providers, typically general
medical officers and general duty corpsmen, as well as leaders
throughout the unit. With these initiatives, Marines have a very high
likelihood of having a known and trusted agent with additional
psychological health training working close by and thus reducing a
potential barrier to that critical first discussion.
The Marine Corps is not in this alone of course. We publicize and
support DOD efforts to provide other avenues for warriors, and their
families, to access assistance without necessarily involving the chain
of command. One prime example of this would be the ``Military
OneSource'' hotline. While I know that my leaders, officer and
enlisted, would prefer to be viewed by their Marines as accessible and
the ``go to person'' for a Marine having any difficulty, having some of
these other tools available that are outside the traditional chain of
command will continue to be valuable for the foreseeable future.
In summary, the Marine Corps recognizes that stigma is one of
several potential barriers to marines seeking the care they need and
deserve. We are addressing these barriers in a proactive way and the
message I am receiving is that these efforts are making a difference. I
sense this difference whenever I gather with a group of marines. We
still have more to do in this area, but I am optimistic that we are on
the right path on these issues and I will continue to pursue them with
vigor for the remainder of my time as Commandant.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Hagan
joint lightweight tactical vehicle
18. Senator Hagan. General Conway, reportedly, the Marine Corps is
considering removing itself from the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle
(JLTV) program because the vehicle's weight does not lend itself to
Marine Corps expeditionary operations. JLTV prototypes do not seem to
meet the Marine Corps' requirements in terms of improvised explosive
device resistance, weight, survivability, and mobility. The Marine
Corps is also concerned that the JLTV prototypes are too heavy to be
transported by helicopter and ships. Please describe additional
concerns the Marine Corps has with the JLTV program.
General Conway. Our team updating the ground vehicle strategy has
taken a hard look at capabilities and capacities needed by the MAGTF.
That work has underlined the critical need for about 5,000 light combat
support vehicles that provide the payload and mobility of the original
HMMWV, with all the protection we can get in an expeditionary (aka
fully transportable and maneuverable) vehicle. We are working hard to
ensure that those 5,000 vehicles that replace the current ECV and M-ATV
are substantially lighter than the M-ATV, and substantially more
protected than the ECV, but at a reasonable cost.
We are finding it challenging to develop a vehicle with
expeditionary qualities in an ACAT I program with all services. Over
the past 15 years we've worked successfully with the Army in building
smaller quantities of vehicles that are fully suitable to our
expeditionary needs. The Medium Tactical Truck Replacement is an
excellent example--probably the best medium tactical truck in the
world, built in relatively small quantities for the Marine Corps,
supported by TARDEC as appropriate.

19. Senator Hagan. General Conway, can you also describe some of
the interim solutions the Marine Corps has looked at?
General Conway. The Small Combat Tactical Vehicle Capsule (SCTVC)
is a lightweight highly protected system currently under development as
a part of experimentation activities at the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL). This vehicle would replace existing 2- and 4-door
vehicle cabins of the HMMWV Expanded Capacity Vehicle (ECV) fleet with
a protected capsule, incorporating best practices survivability design
concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull forms. If SCTVC
experimentation activities continue to produce positive results, an
SCTVC-like capsule recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades,
could be used by the Marine Corps as a low-cost recapitalization
``bridge'' to JLTV-level capabilities.

recapitalization of high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles
20. Senator Hagan. General Conway, reportedly, the Marine Corps is
in the process of determining whether to recapitalize and reset its
existing Humvees, or design an interim vehicle with a v-shaped hull
outside the auspices of the JLTV program. I understand the Marine Corps
is testing a blast capsule that goes over a Humvee chassis as a
probable solution to meet the Marine Corps' requirements to
recapitalize Humvees. Please provide an update on this initiative.
General Conway. The SCTVC is a lightweight highly protected system
currently under development as a part of experimentation activities at
the MCWL. It is built by Granite Tactical Vehicles Inc. SCTVC replaces
the existing 2- and 4-door vehicle cabins of the existing HMMWV ECV
fleet with a protected capsule, incorporating MRAP/JLTV survivability
design concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull forms and a lift
to increase standoff.
Key Points
HMMWVs will be in the Marine Corps' inventory through
2020. The existing HMMWV ECV is constructed from aluminum and
then outfitted with a series of often heavy fragmentation kits.
These kits add significant weight, stressing the payload and
mobility capabilities of the vehicle.
The SCTVC capsule increases protection levels while
not increasing the overall weight of the vehicle. Outside of
the capsule, SCTVC retains the characteristics and components
of the existing HMMWV. Other recapitalization improvements,
such as engine, suspension, and chassis upgrades, could also be
implemented if SCTVC experimentation continues to demonstrate
an effective capability.
MCCDC and MCWL are closely monitoring SCTVC
performance. SCTVC is being considered in the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Analysis of Alternatives as a ``product
improvement'' option for cost benefit comparisons.
If SCTVC experimentation activities continue to
produce positive results, an SCTVC-like capsule
recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades, could be
used by the Marine Corps as a low-cost recapitalization
``bridge'' to JLTV-level capabilities. SCTVC is not a
replacement to MRAP or MATV.
We have conducted blast and ballistic testing at
Aberdeen Proving Grounds with successful results. We are
currently building three more test articles to evaluate basic
safety and drivability, to include driveline overheating from
the enclosed drivetrain.
Plan Of Action and Milestones
Oct-Nov 2009: Blast and Ballistic testing conducted at
Aberdeen Proving Grounds
Jan-Mar 2010: Building of three additional test
articles for safety and drivability assessment.
April 2010: Safety and drivability assessment at
Aberdeen Proving Grounds
May 2010: Report submitted to MCCDC and MCSC on the
overall effectiveness of the SCTVC concept demonstrator

acquisition of combat vehicles and recapitalization needs
21. Senator Hagan. General Conway, within your prepared testimony
you commented on the fact that the distributed nature of today's
conflicts have revealed that the Marine Corps' legacy table of
equipment was significantly inadequate. You have also addressed the
requirement to replace aging equipment due to the fact that the wear
and tear generated by the extreme conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan
has reduced the service life of major end items. Understanding that the
Marine Corps' ground vehicle equipment set has grown heavier based upon
the demands of the current conflicts, does the Marine Corps believe
that the mix of combat vehicle programs that are currently in the
acquisition pipeline will sufficiently address its recapitalization
needs, and if not, what specific requirements does the Marine Corps
still need to address in order to meet its operational requirements?
General Conway. As we update our vehicle strategy to meet current
and future operating environments, we're finding the needed vehicle
capabilities are already documented in the three major programs being
pursued by the Marine Corps, EFV, MPC and JLTV. While the requirements
are sound, we're finding it takes longer than we'd like to get those
capabilities, with expeditionary qualities, built and fielded. Two of
our newer legacy systems, the LVSR, MTVR are superb vehicles, but they
are in fact being aged at an accelerated rate, along with the venerable
LAVs, and a host of legacy support vehicles. Our vehicle assessment
included a look at readiness risk in the next 5-10 years, cuing us of
the need to focus additional R&D on maintenance, reliability and fuel
efficiency to arrest some of the O&M cost growth we are seeing as the
average weight of our vehicle fleet grows. We are seeing a direct
relationship between vehicle weight and vehicle procurement cost, and a
comparable direct relationship between vehicle procurement cost and
annual O&M cost. So, for the Marine Corps, efforts to reduce vehicle
weight have a double return in that they ensure our vehicles have
expeditionary qualities, and contribute to O&M cost containment. So in
summary, the Marine Corps will continue our efforts to replace aged
equipment with new in the near term, and invest in weight and cost
reduction technologies for the vehicle fleet in the long term

realignment of forces in the pacific
22. Senator Hagan. General Conway, although the United States and
Japan have agreed to invest in the future realignment of forces in the
Pacific, there are a number of very real quality of life, capacity,
encroachment, training access, and operational effectiveness concerns
that still seem to be unresolved. What impact on training and readiness
are anticipated based upon your assessment of where we are right now in
planning for the future realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific?
General Conway. If done correctly, the realignment of forces in the
Pacific could result in improved training and readiness for Marine
forces at the individual, unit, joint, and coalition level.
Key to this will be a robust training capability to support marines
distributed on Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. While the ongoing Guam
relocation Environmental Impact Statement does not address all Marine
Corps training requirements, those requirements will be addressed by a
separate Environmental Impact Statement to be initiated by U.S. Pacific
Command. This second Environmental Impact Statement will address
longstanding shortfalls in the Pacific to conduct combined-arms, live-
fire, and maneuver training.
One of the biggest training and readiness advantages that this
future realignment offers is the basing of Marines on Guam where we can
conduct training with our allies and partners in the region. This
allows us to host training without the restrictions often associated
with deploying to foreign countries, reciprocate training that have
been hosted by our allies and partners, and build strong and meaningful
partnerships that improve our ability to respond to contingencies in
the region.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
joint strike fighter program
23. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) program has been plagued with numerous delays and
setbacks. If the program continues to be beset with difficulties, at
what point will your readiness posture be significantly affected?
Secretary Mabus. As we develop POM-12, any additional delays in the
JSF program will impact future readiness. While it is difficult to
define a tipping point per se, we will actively manage our transition
plan based on the JSF production challenges, growth in capabilities,
and remaining life on our legacy platforms. The PB11 tactical aviation
resource submission includes the management initiatives necessary to
retain our readiness posture while we conduct the transition to the
JSF. We will consider initiating an F/A-18 SLEP program, and further
optimize our tactical aircraft depot efficiencies in POM12.
General Conway. Readiness posture is a factor of many complex
variables and is monitored closely for the Department. Among those
variables are aircraft operational use; accidents; resources for depot
repair; the type of repair required (that cannot always be determined
until airframes are inspected); the outcome of service life extension
programs (SLEP); the availability of spare/repair parts; resources
provided to the Services; etc. As such, a precise date is difficult to
state or predict at this time. The PB11 tactical aviation resource
requirements include the management initiatives necessary to retain our
readiness posture while transitioning to the JSF by increasing the F/A-
18 SLEP program and further optimizing our tactical aircraft depot
efficiencies. In fiscal year 2010 we will continue to explore other
mitigation alternatives and refine our management actions to ensure
readiness as the transition matures.

integration of reserves into the total force
24. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, I applaud the level of integration of the Navy and Marine Corps
Reserves into the total force structure of the Navy and Marine Corps.
How would you characterize the success of their integration into the
overall missions of the Department of the Navy?
Secretary Mabus. The integration of the Navy and Marine Corps
Reserve Components (RC) into the Total Force is an absolute success.
The RC performs missions throughout the full spectrum of operations.
Their contributions are vital in achieving overall mission success.
Their training and readiness are exemplary, and when they are called to
active duty, they are integrated seamlessly and well. They stand
shoulder to shoulder with our Active component men and women overseas
at this very moment, and no distinction is made between Active or
Reserve. They truly are part of one Navy and Marine Corps team.
Admiral Roughead. We have had extraordinary success integrating our
Navy reservists into our Total Force. Navy reservists provide half of
the Navy's shore-based support to Overseas Contingency Operations in
Central Command and African Command, they participated in recent
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations in Haiti, and they
are called upon regularly to support short-term, emergent needs via
voluntary Active Duty for Special Work and Definite Recall assignments.
Navy Reserve personnel continually demonstrate their readiness to
respond to emergent missions across a broad spectrum of military
operations as an integral part of the Navy Total Force.
We have improved our processes to better facilitate movement
between our Active and Reserve Forces. Over the last year, we reduced
the average time it takes to transition from the Active to Reserve
component from 30 days to approximately 8 days and we are aggressively
working to reduce that further, to less than 72 hours. Additionally,
the efforts of our new Career Transition Office (CTO) have increased
the number of Active component officers who choose to affiliate with
the Reserves after they separate from 28 percent to 54 percent. The
Naval Personnel Command is in the process of expanding CTO operations
to also encompass transitions for enlisted sailors. We continuously
review and adjust our policies and practices to allow our Active and
Reserve sailors seamless transitions between the two components.
General Conway. The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the
total force and provides operational capabilities to meet requirements
across the range of military operations. The extensive contributions of
the Marine Corps Reserve have reduced deployment requirements for the
active component, thereby improving the health of the total force. More
than 54,000 marines from the Selected Reserve and the Inactive Ready
Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or other operational commitments around the
globe.

25. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, do you see a need to ask for more funding to cover the costs of
full-time manning for the reservists?
Secretary Mabus. The budget that the Department of the Navy
submitted will allow us to meet every mission.
Admiral Roughead. No, the budget as submitted meets our mission
requirements.
General Conway. No, we do not see a need to request additional
funding.

wear and tear on the force
26. Senator Burris. General Conway, for the better part of a
decade, the Marine Corps has been engaged in sustained ground combat. I
am concerned about the wear and tear on the equipment your marines need
to be successful. What potential problems do you see with regard to
equipment shortfalls and equipment replacement due to sustained
operations?
General Conway. To support the requirements in OIF and OEF, the
Marine Corps has been forced to deplete strategic in-stores equipment
and redirect equipment, originally slated to return to CONUS as part of
our reset, from Iraq and send it to Afghanistan. The result is that 65
percent of our non-deployed units are now in a degraded state of
readiness, with equipment being the largest contributing factor.
Equipment shortages negatively impact training and perhaps more
importantly, the Marine Corps' ability respond to another major global
contingency. Congress' continued support and investment is needed to
reset our ground and aviation assets to not only prevail in the current
fight, but also to ensure we are prepared to overcome future challenges
to U.S. interests and security.

27. Senator Burris. General Conway, how has equipment modernization
been affected due to the sustained operations?
General Conway. Our modernization effort is not merely a collection
of programs but a means of aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF
across the spectrum of present and future security challenges. All of
our procurement programs are designed to support the full range of
military operations. Due to the sustained effort of operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and our focus on the forward deployed warfighter, some
of our equipment modernization efforts have been delayed, but we
continuously reevaluate every program to ensure we remain on track to
meet the future security challenges.

28. Senator Burris. General Conway, has the Force reached its
breaking point in terms of stress on your personnel?
General Conway. Despite the increase in unit deployments and the
corresponding increase in the deployment tempo of our individual
marines, the Marine Corps has not observed any indicators of adverse
impacts, i.e., too much stress, to date. While continued high
deployment tempo could result in increased attrition, decreased
retention rates and decreased accessions, the Marine Corps has not
observed any indicators of these adverse impact to date.
Although not considered a ``breaking point'', we are also
monitoring indicators on suicides, sexual assaults, divorce rates, et
cetera, for signs of increased stress on the force and families. We are
taking deliberate action in prevention programming, training, and
leadership engagement. Examples include:

Expanding our program of embedding mental health
professionals in operational units--the OSCAR program.
Enhancing suicide prevention capabilities by reducing
stigma through senior/peer leadership and effective evocative
peer-led training for NCOs.
Redesigning family readiness training with LifeSkills
courses that specifically address the challenges of military
life in order to increase the resiliency of our marines and
their families.

29. Senator Burris. General Conway, what programs do you have in
place to address immediate and latent combat stress and mental health
issues?
General Conway. Addressing immediate and latent combat stress and
mental health issues in our marines is a paramount priority and a
leadership responsibility. The Marine Corps Combat and OSC program has
two goals: 1. Force preservation and readiness and 2. Long-term health
and well-being. Currently, Headquarters Marine Corps is implementing
the OSCAR program. OSCAR extends leadership capabilities and helps
build strength, resilience, and readiness in Marines. To further assist
leaders with prevention, rapid identification, and early treatment of
combat operational stress, we are expanding our program of embedding
mental health professionals in operational units--the OSCAR program--to
directly support all Active and Reserve ground combat elements. This
will be achieved over the next 3 years through realignment of existing
Navy structure supporting the operating forces, and increases in the
Navy mental health provider inventory. Currently there are six
authorized permanent billets, two at each active division. In fiscal
year 2011, 23 additional permanent billets will be authorized in the
Active and Reserve divisions. Ultimately, each Active division will
have three mental health providers, and each regiment will have two. In
the Reserves, the division will have four providers. OSCAR capability
is also being extended to all deploying units, but is specifically
focused and prioritized to support infantry battalions by providing
additional training to OSCAR Extenders (existing medical providers,
corpsmen, chaplains, and religious program specialists) to make OSCAR
expertise immediately available to more marines.

mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles
30. Senator Burris. General Conway, I know that force protection is
a high priority for our troops deployed in support of operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Have you and General Casey conferred on the
number of mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that are
required for our overseas operations?
General Conway. Along with the Joint Staff, the Army and Marine
Corps have been working very closely together to ensure both Services
have the right mix of vehicles for overseas operations. The Marine
Corps has loaned the Army 399 Category I Cougars and reallocated 400
MaxxPro Dashes for their use in Afghanistan. The Army has reallocated
25 MaxxPro ambulances and 34 M-ATVs to meet Marine requirements.
Currently we are completing the coordination to reallocate additional
vehicles to meet service-specific needs.

31. Senator Burris. General Conway, which Department has budgeted
for the MRAP vehicles?
General Conway. All MRAP funding to date has been received via the
MRAP Joint Program Office OCO funding requests. It is anticipated that
OCO funding will decrease with the completion of combat operations,
thus transitioning sustainment funding responsibilities to the
individual Services. Although, the Marine Corps has yet to be given an
official date when the MRAP sustainment costs would transfer we
anticipate that the Services will be directed to budget for the
sustainment of MRAPs as Programs of Record in the near future,
potentially as soon as POM-12.

32. Senator Burris. General Conway, will MRAP vehicles play a role
in the modernization of the Marine Corps?
General Conway. Our plans for use of MRAP vehicles place them in
our engineer and EOD units, supporting the Route Reconnaissance and
Clearance, EOD and other engineer support missions. We have added these
vehicles to our unit equipment lists to ensure adequate planning for
sustainment of MRAPs, and are currently integrating MRAPs into our MPF
planning cycles.
MRAP vehicles and the new MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) will be
included in the Marine Corps Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle (GCTV)
Strategy. M-ATVs have the potential to fill the armament carrier
mission role for the light vehicle fleet.
The approved course of action proposed that all MRAPs presently
allocated to the Marine Corps and determined to be in an appropriate
operational condition will be retained and designated for one of three
locations. (It is assumed for planning purposes that all 2502 MRAPs
will remain in serviceable condition upon the completion of
hostilities. 1218 MRAP/1284 M-ATVs)
Because none of the MRAP vehicles have the expeditionary qualities,
mobility or modularity needed by the MAGTF, we continue to be
aggressive in developing our Program Objective Memorandum to support
our long-term commitment to balancing our ground vehicles in both
traditional and irregular warfare, while accepting the MRAP investment
as a near-term bridge for protected mobility.

amphibious fleet
33. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Navy's
budget overview states that the 2011 budget provides for a deployable
force of 284 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 29 amphibious
ships. The Navy has stated that while 38 ships are needed in the
amphibious fleet to fully meet amphibious lift requirements, 33 ships
will meet minimal requirements at an acceptable level of risk. If a 33-
ship fleet already presents additional risk, how much extra risk is
present with the 29-ship fleet supported by the budget?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy has looked more closely at where it would
be willing to assume risk for the future and procure only those ships
which are absolutely necessary in executing the missions for which the
Navy is solely responsible. In completing this review, the Navy has
balanced the anticipated risk in the period with the uncertainties of
the future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources and
requirements possible. The shipbuilding plan provides a projected
battle force that balances the level of risk across the fleet; while
the long-term risk has increased above past assessments, it is
acceptable for the force.
The 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift, which drives the
33 ship assault echelon requirement, is an amphibious ship combatant
inventory demand necessary to support forcible entry operations in
Major Combat Operations (MCO). In any area of operations below that of
major warfare, augmented Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadrons
will enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will continue to
support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a reinforcing MEB
to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from one of the three MPS
squadrons.
The augmented MPS will enable limited seabasing operations by
introducing three core capabilities: transfer of vehicles and equipment
between ships at sea, delivery of equipment from over the horizon, and
sea based sustainment of forces ashore. This will facilitate the
routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a variety of
activities across the range of military operations (ROMO) and mitigate
the impact of lower than desired amphibious ship inventory levels.
General Conway. The Navy has looked more closely at where it would
be willing to assume risk for the future and not procure those ships
which are not absolutely necessary in executing the missions for which
the Navy is solely responsible. In completing this review, the Navy has
balanced the anticipated risk in the period with the uncertainties of
the future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources and
requirements possible. The shipbuilding plan provides a projected
battle force that balances the level of risk across the fleet; while
the long-term risk has increased above past assessments, it is
acceptable for the force.
Any additional risk in the amphibious force may be mitigated by the
Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP). The ALEP is a program of
record developed to mitigate the operational risk of the amphibious
lift requirement, specifically, the vehicle square footage shortfall.
ALEP is designed to provide augmentation to forcible entry lift
capability in response to national emergency.
The 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift is an amphibious
combatant inventory requirement in support of Major Combat Operations
(MCO). The augmented Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadrons will
enhance the operational capabilities of afloat prepositioning and will
continue to support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a
reinforcing MEB to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from one of
the three MPS squadrons.
The augmented MPS will enable limited seabasing operations by
introducing three core capabilities: transfer of vehicles and equipment
between ships at sea, delivery of equipment from over the horizon, and
sea based sustainment of forces ashore. The augmented MPS will
facilitate the routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a
variety of activities across the range of military operations (ROMO).
Given fiscal constraints, DoN will sustain a minimum of 33 total
amphibious ships in the Assault Echelon, accepting risk in the arrival
of combat support and sustainment elements of the MEB. The plan
maintains an adaptable amphibious landing force of approximately 33
ships.

34. Senator Burris. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, what is the
long-term plan to get to a 33-ship force?
Secretary Mabus and General Conway. It is anticipated that the
total number of amphibious ships will be at 33 in fiscal year 2016
(LHA-7 and LPD-27 are expected to deliver in fiscal year 2016,
resulting in a force of 8 LHDs and 2 LHAs, 11 LPDs and 12 LSDs).
Within fiscal constraints, the Department is committed to meeting
the Marine Corps lift requirements throughout the period of the 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan. In fact, the Navy begins procurement of the LSD-41
class replacement, LSD(X), in fiscal year 2017--roughly 3 years earlier
than necessary to ameliorate the drop-off in amphibious ship inventory
that results from the block retirement of the LSD-41 class. By building
the LSD(X) at a 2-year interval, the Navy will have a total of 11
LSD(X) in the inventory by about 2043. The objective force will be
comprised of 11 LPD-17 class ships, 11 LSD(X), and 11 large-deck
amphibious ships.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
dod homosexual conduct policy
35. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what are
your views about the current Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) policy?
Admiral Roughead. My views are shaped by what is in the best
interest of the U.S. Navy. At present, we have no empirical data upon
which to base an assessment of the impact that DADT has had or will
likely have on military readiness, recruiting, retention, end strength
or attrition. The comprehensive review directed by Secretary Gates will
allow us to assess the dynamics and impacts of the current law, as well
as identify issues and potential impacts of repeal of that law.
General Conway. I believe that the current policy has worked well
to carry out the requirements directed upon us by Congress via 10
U.S.C. Sec. 654.

36. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, do you
support retaining the current policy, or do you believe that the law
requiring this policy be repealed and a new policy permitting openly
gay servicemembers to serve in the military be put into effect?
Admiral Roughead. I believe it is essential to first complete the
comprehensive review directed by Secretary Gates to fully understand
all the potential issues and impacts associated with changing this law.
Since enactment of the law that governs the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
policy, we have been able to field ready forces, meet recruiting and
retention goals, dramatically reduce attrition, and meet our end
strength objectives. The thorough and objective review ordered by the
Secretary of Defense will allow us to assess the dynamics and impacts
of the current law as well as the possible impacts that may be
associated with repeal or amendment.
General Conway. The President and Secretary of Defense have given
us a way forward. We will participate in the year-long assessment that
the Secretary has directed. Once this study has been completed, we will
examine the issue based on the information gathered from all sources,
including marines and their families.
My primary interest will be on the effect of any change to
readiness and military combat effectiveness.
When I am asked for my advice on this matter, I will support the
way forward that, at a minimum, maintains the current exceptional
warfighting capabilities of the Marine Corps.

37. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in his
testimony before this committee a week ago, Admiral Mullen, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that he had worked
closely with you and the other Chiefs in understanding what your
concerns are about changing the policy. Do you think that your concerns
have been heard and listened to?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. The Chairman has always been receptive to
hearing my views on this and other matters affecting the U.S. Navy.
General Conway. The Chairman has always been open and receptive to
my input on this and other matters impacting the Marine Corps.
I expect that we will continue to discuss and consult on the study
and development on the Department's position on any future change to
the law.

38. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what do
you view as the purpose of the year-long review that Secretary Gates
testified about?
Admiral Roughead. DOD and the Joint Chiefs owe the President and
Congress an informed assessment of the implications of a repeal of the
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' law. As Secretary Gates has stated, we must
understand all issues and potential impacts associated with repeal of
the law and how we would manage implementation of any repeal in such a
way that minimizes disruption to a force engaged in combat operations
and other demanding military activities around the globe. The
comprehensive review will objectively and methodically examine all
aspects of this issue; specific lines of study will address personnel
policies, including benefits, base housing, and discipline, as well as
separation and discharge issues. This study will inform us all on this
important issue.
General Conway. As stated in the Terms of Reference, the
Secretary's review will examine the issues associated with the repeal
of the law, should it occur, and will include an implementation plan
that addresses the impact, if any, on the Department.

39. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, is the
year-long review to determine whether the current policy should change,
or has the decision already been made to repeal the policy in your
understanding?
Admiral Roughead. The memorandum from Secretary Gates, accompanying
the Terms of Reference for the comprehensive review, provides that
``The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I owe the President an
assessment of the implications of such a repeal, should it occur.''
General Conway. As stated in the Terms of Reference, the
Secretary's review will examine the issues associated with the repeal
of the law, should it occur, and will include an implementation plan
that addresses the impact, if any, on the Department.

high level review of don't ask, don't tell
40. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, on February 2, Secretary Gates testified that a high-level
working group within DOD will review the issues associated with
properly implementing a repeal of the DADT policy. Part of this review,
he testified, will be to reach out to authoritatively understand the
views and attitudes of the force. Please explain what steps the Navy
and Marine Corps have been asked to take in order to implement the
President's direction to ``begin the preparations necessary for repeal
of the current law and policy.''
Secretary Mabus. The Department of the Navy is participating in the
comprehensive review ordered by Secretary Gates. The review is designed
to assess the implications of a repeal and determine how to implement
any potential change Congress might make to the law. The Department is
providing participants to the Comprehensive Review Working Group and
the Executive Committee, comprised of senior service reps--civilian and
military, as well as administrative staff in support of this review. We
will continue to support the review which is due to report its findings
to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010.
Admiral Roughead. Navy is fully participating in the comprehensive
review, and is providing working group participants and administrative
staff in support of the effort. We will continue to support the review
which is due to report its findings by December 1, 2010.
General Conway. The Marine Corps is participating in the DOD
Working Group to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 654, should that occur, and develop an implementation plan for any
new statutory mandate.
The Marine Corps is providing representation to the Comprehensive
Review Working Group that will identify the impacts to the force of a
repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 in areas that include military readiness,
military effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting/retention, and family
readiness, and recommend actions that should be taken in light of such
impacts.

41. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, what difference will it make, if any, in DOD planning if a
significant proportion--say 50 percent--of servicemembers and their
family members register objection to a change in the policy?
Secretary Mabus. Our servicemembers are professional and dedicated,
and they will execute the direction provided by the chain of command. I
am confident we will continue to meet mission requirements. We owe our
servic members informed and thoughtful decisionmaking. That is why
Secretary Gates has asked all of the Services to participate in a
comprehensive review, not of whether the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' law
should change, but what the impact would be should Congress change the
law and develop an implementation plan for any statutory change. Our
department is providing participants to the Comprehensive Review
Working Group and the Executive Committee, comprised of senior service
reps--civilian and military, as well as administrative staff in support
of this review. We will continue to support the review which is due to
report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. Our
servicemembers have every right to expect us to proceed with careful
deliberation and to reach decisions that will enhance readiness and
advance mission accomplishment. But no matter what decision Congress
makes, I am confident our sailors and marines will execute their
mission fully and successful, just as they have always done.
Admiral Roughead. I cannot speculate on what impact opposition to a
change would have on DOD planning, but we owe our servicemembers
informed and thoughtful decisionmaking. The comprehensive review will
allow us to assess and better understand the impacts of the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell law. Our servicemembers and their families have every right
to expect us to proceed with careful deliberation and to reach
decisions that will enhance readiness and advance mission
accomplishment.
General Conway. It is not clear to me that this decision will be
made using strictly democratic principles. For me, given my title 10
responsibilities, the issue is the impact of any change to the current
law and policy on readiness and combat effectiveness, not on how many
people support that change.
As instructed, the Department is conducting a review and study of
the force to gauge the impact of a change to the current law and
policy. Our understanding is that this study will include input from
servicemembers and their families on the potential impact of a repeal
of the current law on readiness, military effectiveness and unit
cohesion, recruiting and retention, and family readiness.
Once the Department concludes this effort, the Service Chiefs will
provide review and comment. The Department and Chiefs will then have
the opportunity to deliver their best advice to the President, and then
to Congress. Armed with these recommendations, Congress will be able
determine the way forward and we will follow this direction.

cost growth in joint strike fighter aircraft
42. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, do you
expect that additional cost growth in the JSF program arising from
Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the program in December 2009
will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach? Please explain your answer.
Admiral Roughead. DOD reported a Nunn-McCurdy breach in the JSF
program in its December 2009 F-35 Selected Acquisition Report, which
was delivered to Congress on 2 April. The report was based on the
independent Joint Estimating Team (JET II) assessment, led by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation. The JET II determined that F-35 program cost increases were
a result of: higher than planned development costs due to weight-driven
performance issues identified in 2003, and the related schedule
extension to address them; an increase in labor and overhead rates;
degradation of airframe commonality; reduction in Department of Navy
planned procurement quantities, from 1,089 to 680 aircraft; increases
in commodity prices (particularly titanium); and major subcontractor
cost growth.
General Conway. Defer to OSD.

43. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in the
context of a projected shortfall in the Navy's tactical strike-fighter
capability over the intermediate- to long-term, what would that mean
for the Navy?
Admiral Roughead. The Department of the Navy (DoN) has the
necessary tactical aircraft capacity in the near term to support our
Nation's strategic demands; however, ongoing assessments forecast a
potential decrease in our strike fighter inventory that will peak at
the end of this decade. We plan on addressing this inventory decrease
through aggressive and precise management strategies that include
service-life extension programs to prolong the use of existing F/A-18
A-D aircraft, reducing the number of aircraft available in our non-
deployed squadrons to the minimum required, accelerating the transition
of seven legacy squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets (using F/A-18E/F
attrition aircraft in two cases), and maximizing depot level throughput
to return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet more quickly.
Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of our legacy
aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease manageable.
While the F/A-18 fleet continues to meet operational needs in the
current conflicts, the timely delivery of the JSF remains critical to
our future strike fighter capacity. I remain committed to the JSF
program and am watching it closely as the program restructures and a
new program manager takes office.
General Conway. The USMC will preserve our legacy fleets of
Harriers and Hornets with sufficient funding while awaiting the fifth
generation STOVL JSF. This is the best option to balance the
requirement to fulfill operational commitments with legacy aircraft,
while funding the development and procurement of the JSF. We are taking
proactive steps today to preserve the legacy fleets, maintain their
operational relevance, and continuing these efforts until the
production of STOVL is sufficient to fully transition our Harriers,
Hornets, and Prowlers to the STOVL variant.

44. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, the F-35
JSF program, already facing a 1-year delay, could be heading toward a
breach of Nunn-McCurdy cost growth limits. Will the Navy and Marine
Corps be equipped with the F-35 in time to have the required
capabilities they need, when they need it?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy remains on schedule to deploy its F-35C
carrier variant strike fighter with the required Block III capability
as planned in 2016.
While the JSF program restructuring directed by the Secretary of
Defense pushed back F-35C Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to 2016,
this IOC reflects our requirement for a squadron of 10 Block III
aircraft that have completed Initial Operating Test & Evaluation and
are ready to deploy. We will begin to receive JSF aircraft into our
squadrons in 2014 and anticipate their deployment in 2016.
General Conway. We are confident the action taken by the Secretary
of Defense to address the testing and production problems in PB-11
establish a viable program that continues to support a Marine Corps
December 2012 IOC.

45. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, I'm
concerned about the Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) recent finding
that the Navy's version of the F-35 JSF may be considerably more
expensive to operate than the legacy aircraft that it was intended to
replace. Is NAVAIR's analysis reflected in the Navy's budget proposal
this year?
Admiral Roughead. I have directed my leaders to study and
understand the total ownership costs (TOCs) of new and existing
systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost per flight hour is consistent
with that direction. It is not prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF
based on the NAVAIR study alone. Navy has not yet completed operational
testing of the carrier variant and flight hour costs are only one
aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority
for the U.S. Navy, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our
long-term operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft.
General Conway. No, the assessment you are referring to is not an
official estimate, or considered a finished product, nor has it been
refined or corrected to accurately compare operation and support (O&S)
costs between a legacy supportability construct and the JSF
evolutionary international collaborative approach to sustainment.
We are realizing today the Congressional Budget Office analysis
from 2001, age does cause higher O&S cost increases ranging from 1
percent to 3 percent for every additional year of age. The average age
today of our F/A-18s is 19 years and will reach 32 years by retirement
in 2023, increasing O&S costs by over 50 percent. The cost of
recapitalization and modernization of our legacy aircraft will soon
exceed the cost of procuring and sustaining an aircraft with more
relevant capabilities and technology that will substantially increase
survivability, reliability and maintainability.
Managing the future O&S costs of the JSF is a joint DOD and
international endeavor that requires deliberate action and finite
analysis now in the early acquisition phase of the program to ensure
affordability as the JSF ages through the next 30 plus years of service
life. The JSF program is just now maturing to the point where we can
move from modeling cost to assessing the actual cost of operating the
aircraft with our first deliveries in 2010.

f-35 joint strike fighter lightning testing and engineering issues
46. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, I continue to be concerned about the F-35 Lightning II
acquisition program, even with Secretary Gates' decision to restructure
the program in December 2009. Basically, at this point, I am concerned
about whether the program will make the deadlines by which it is
supposed to deliver aircraft with initial operating capability (IOC) to
each of the Services, the program's ability to manage software risk,
the testing program's ability to detect and anticipate problems, and
the capability of those aircraft that will be delivered under low-rate
initial production (LRIP). A few weeks ago, the Director, Operational
Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that ``[c]ontinued production
concurrent with the slow increase in flight testing over the next 2
years will commit DOD and the Services to test, training, and
deployment plans with substantial risk.'' Do you share that concern,
particularly as it relates to the Navy's version of the fighter?
Secretary Mabus. The F-35 program was structured with known
concurrency that will remain, though reduced, with the SECDEF directed
F-35 program restructure. The DOD decision to restructure the F-35
Program was in response to multiple Department studies and reports
including DOT&E's most recent Operational Test report. The F-35 program
restructure mitigates many of the risks highlighted by DOT&E and the
GAO, though the Department acknowledges that F-35 program risks will
continue, as would any major defense acquisition program. Software risk
will be mitigated by the addition of another software integration line
to preclude mission systems software from becoming a limiting factor
during SDD. The F-35 test program risks will be mitigated by the
continuation of a test program assessment in conjunction with the
support and advice of DOT&E. An Integrated Test Review Team composed of
experts in developmental test and operational test continues to mature
test program plans to ensure program technical maturity is aligned with
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) dates; operational assessments are
optimized; new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test
schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data
enables the planned operational test periods. To help mitigate aircraft
assets required during testing, the program is adding one carrier
variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program in order to expand
developmental testing capacity and will utilize three low-rate initial
production (LRIP) aircraft in support of development testing. USMC IOC
requirements encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support
metrics that will measure the progress of the program office to meet
our goals and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the tenets for
operational use of the F-35B are ready. The Navy IOC date is based on
sufficient aircraft quantities; desired capability to conduct all ORD
missions, to include, but not limited to, AI, OCA, DCA, CAS, SEAD/DEAD
and CSAR in a denied, near-peer environment better than legacy
aircraft; and completion of operational test of that capability. Based
upon the SECDEF directed F-35 program restructure and Navy/Marine Corps
IOC requirements, the Marine Corps F-35B IOC in 2012 and the Navy F-35C
IOC in 2016.
Admiral Roughead. I continue to watch the JSF program carefully.
The F-35 program restructure directed by the Secretary of Defense
mitigates many of the risks highlighted by the most recent DOT&E
Operational Test report; however, the Department acknowledges that risk
in the F-35 program will continue. To mitigate this risk, we will add
one F-35C carrier variant aircraft to the System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) program in order to expand developmental testing
capacity; we will utilize three LRIP aircraft in support of development
testing; and we will add another software integration line to preclude
mission systems software from becoming a limiting factor during SDD.
These three steps, taken together, establish a viable program and
continue to support the Navy's 2016 IOC and the Marine Corps' 2012 IOC.
General Conway. With the recent program restructuring approved by
USD(AT&L), the F-35B IOC is projected to be 2012 and the F-35C IOC is
projected to be 2016. The action taken by the SECDEF to address the
testing and production problems in PB-11 establish a viable program
that continues to support a Marine Corps December 2012 IOC. USMC IOC
requirements encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support
metrics that will measure the progress of the program office to meet
our goals and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the tenets for
operational use of the F-35B are ready.
Navy IOC is contingent on the requirement to deploy an ORD
compliant, Block 3 aircraft with IOT&E complete.

47. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, with the Navy to accept delivery of its first squadrons with
IOC in 2012 (for the Marine Corps) and 2014 (for the Navy), where do
you see the most significant risk with respect to the Navy's versions
of the fighter?
Secretary Mabus. Based upon the SECDEF F-35 Program Restructure,
the Marine Corps F-35B IOC will remain in 2012 and the Navy F-35C IOC
will be in 2016.
The earlier Navy IOC of 2014 was based on three items: sufficient
aircraft quantities; capability; and completion test. Based on the
program and test schedule restructure and delivery of fiscal year 2011
procured aircraft, the Navy IOC has been revised to be in 2016. The
most stressing Navy IOC capability requirement is Destruction of Enemy
Air Defenses which requires a highly integrated mission systems suite
and stand-off weapons. Further delays in delivery of capabilities are
the most significant risk to the Navy IOC--with any further delays
exacerbating the overall strike fighter shortfall. Moreover, the Navy
requires a sufficient ramp to stand-up a training squadron and a fleet
squadron prior to declaring IOC. The Navy's intent is to stand up
squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when sufficient
capability is tested and delivered. And as with any complex weapon
system development program, unforeseen discovery during F-35B/F-35C
test will remain a risk until completion of IOT&E.
Admiral Roughead. The most significant risk to Navy's version of
the F-35 JSF is further delay in the delivery of capabilities required
to achieve carrier variant IOC, which is currently scheduled for 2016.
IOC will occur once the capabilities identified in our Operational
Requirements Document for JSF are attained. Navy F-35C IOC is defined
as outfitting a squadron with 10 Operational Requirement Document (ORD)
compliant, Block III aircraft ready to deploy with Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) complete.
General Conway. The most significant risk to IOC is the late
delivery of aircraft to flight test and delays in mission system and
ALIS software build/test. Both have been addressed by the Secretary of
Defense in his restructure of the program in PB-11.

48. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, as you know, NAVAIR effectively determined a few weeks ago that
the Marine Corps and the Navy's version of the JSF may end up being too
expensive to operate, with each flight hour ultimately costing about
$31,000 compared with about $19,000 per flight hour for current F/A-18
Hornets and AV-8B Harriers--considerably higher than the costs to
operate than the legacy aircraft they were intended to replace. Have
you reviewed NAVAIR's analysis and, if so, do you agree with its
finding on expected operating costs of JSF?
Secretary Mabus. I have directed my leaders to study and understand
the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost
per flight hour is consistent with that direction. However, it is not
prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
The Department of the Navy has not yet completed operational testing of
its two JSF variants and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF
TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the
Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term
operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft.
Admiral Roughead. I have directed my leaders to study and
understand the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of
JSF cost per flight hour is consistent with that direction. It is not
prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
Navy has not yet completed operational testing of the carrier variant
and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding
and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, and we will
continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support
costs for all our ships and aircraft.
General Conway. The department is on the front end of reviewing JSF
TOCs and assumptions. The brief is a working document and has yet to be
coordinated across the program office, the services and senior
leadership.
The NAVAIR cost team brief on TOCs is a pre-decisional brief. These
types of briefs are developed to inform leadership of ongoing technical
analyses and provide options and consequences as we work to deliver
affordable programs. In a program such as the JSF, these analyses are
constantly evolving. The brief is an internal working document and
provides points for discussion in support of achieving successful and
affordable fielding of all variants of the JSF.
The operating and support (O&S) costs in the working document are
not definitive and are subject to variance based on potential courses
of action. The Navy Department is fully coordinated with OSD, the Air
Force and the Joint Program Office in executing this critical program.

49. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, if you do, what does that mean for the Navy's JSF program and
what kind of mix should we achieve in terms of the Navy's future
strike-fighter force?
Secretary Mabus. The Department's commitment to tactical aviation
integration is enduring. We view the integration of our forces as the
best means for the Department to balance operational and programmatic
risk. We are committed to making a mix decision at the earliest
opportunity based upon F-35 program maturity as defined by discreet and
successful program events and accomplishments. Among those key events
is F-35B test burn down; F-35B/L-class Sea Trials; F-35C test burn
down; F-35C/CVN sea-trials; and assessment of F-35B/CVN
interoperability. Upon completion of these, and other key program
milestones, the Department will make a determination on the proper mix
between F-35B and F-35C variants. We anticipate this decision could be
made after the completion of the JSF program SDD in accordance with the
F-35 program restructure.
Admiral Roughead. The Navy is committed to the JSF program and has
not changed the total number of JSF aircraft it intends to buy. Our
carrier air wings will continue to have a mix of Super Hornet and JSF
into the 2030s that will bring great capability across a wide range of
operations. Those capabilities include stealthy, deep penetrating
strike, netted far-reaching sensors, and lethal close air support to
troops in contact with enemy forces.
General Conway. The Department's commitment to tactical aviation
integration is enduring. We view the integration of our forces as the
best means for the Department to balance operational and programmatic
risk. We are committed to making a mix decision at the earliest
opportunity based upon F-35 program maturity as defined by discreet and
successful program events and accomplishments. Among those key events
is F-35B test burn down; F-35B/L-class Sea Trials; F-35C test burn
down; F-35C/CVN sea-trials; and assessment of F-35B/CVN
interoperability. Upon completion of these, and other key program
milestones, the Department will make a determination on the proper mix
between F-35B and F-35C variants. We anticipate this decision could be
made after the completion of the JSF program SDD in accordance with the
F-35 program restructure.

50. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, how is NAVAIR's assessment reflected in your current budget
proposal?
Secretary Mabus. I have directed my leaders to study and understand
the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost
per flight hour is consistent with that direction. However, it is not
prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
The Department of the Navy has not yet completed operational testing of
its two JSF variants and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF
TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the
Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term
operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft.
Admiral Roughead. I have directed my leaders to study and
understand the TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of
JSF cost per flight hour is consistent with that direction. It is not
prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone.
Navy has not yet completed operational testing of the carrier variant
and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding
and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, and we will
continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support
costs for all our ships and aircraft.
General Conway. The assessment you are referring to is not an
official estimate, or considered a finished product, nor has it been
refined or corrected to accurately compare O&S costs between a legacy
supportability construct and the JSF evolutionary international
collaborative approach to sustainment.

f-35 joint strike fighter and initial operating capability
51. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, when Secretary Gates testified here on DOD's budget request a
few weeks ago, he explained that, while the JSF program is holding
schedule in terms of when the Services can expect to take delivery of
fighters with IOC, he expects that fewer quantities may be delivered. I
understand that the JSF program's IOC date for the Marine Corps is 2012
and for the Navy is 2014. What is your understanding of how many
fighters with IOC will be delivered to the Navy and Marine Corps by
that time? Please explain.
Secretary Mabus. The current program plan stands up the first two
training squadrons (USAF and USMC) at Eglin in 2010 and delivers
production aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012, Air Force in 2013, and
Navy in 2014. Each service has differing requirements for Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) depending upon what capabilities each
Service requires at IOC encompassing aircraft performance, equipment,
training, testing, and support. Based upon the F-35 program restructure
schedule, the Marine Corps will have an IOC in 2012 and the Navy will
IOC in 2016. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with 10 BLK 2 F-35Bs and the
Navy plans to IOC with 10 ORD compliant BLK 3 F-35Cs.
Admiral Roughead. The current JSF program plan begins to deliver
production aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012 and the Navy in 2014.
Navy will begin to accept JSF aircraft into its squadrons in 2014, and
we expect Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the F-35C to occur in
2016 with 10, Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-compliant, Block
III aircraft that are ready to deploy. The Marine Corps expects to
achieve IOC of the F-35B in 2012 with 10, Operational Requirements
Document (ORD)-compliant, Block IIB aircraft.
General Conway. The current program plan stands up the first two
training squadrons (USAF and USMC) at Eglin in 2010 and delivers
production aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012, Air Force in 2013, and
Navy in 2014. Each service has differing requirements for Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) depending upon what `capabilities' each
Service requires at IOC encompassing aircraft performance, equipment,
training, testing, and support. Based upon the revised JET II schedule,
the Marine Corps will have an IOC in 2012 and the Navy intends to IOC
in 2016. The Marine Corps plan to IOC with 10 BLK 2 F-35Bs and the Navy
plans to IOC with 10 BLK 3 F-35Cs.

52. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, looking ahead to 2010, in your view what milestones do you
believe the Joint Program Office (JPO) and prime contractor must
complete on time and on budget to achieve the Navy's IOC dates?
Secretary Mabus. Key 2010 planned events include the following:
complete the first F-35B Vertical Landing [accomplished March 19,
2010]; complete the first F-35C flight; deliver Block 1.0 software to
flight test; deliver at least three aircraft to Eglin AFB; commence
flight training operations at Eglin AFB; deliver 11 test aircraft to
Naval Air Station Patuxent River and Edwards AFB; and complete 400
flight tests.
Admiral Roughead. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and prime
contractor should accomplish the following milestones planned for 2010:
completing the first F-35B Vertical Landing (accomplished on 19 March
2010); completing the first F-35C flight; delivering Block 1.0 software
to flight test; delivering at least three aircraft and commencing
flight training operations at Eglin AFB; delivering the required test
aircraft to Naval Air Station Patuxent River and Edwards AFB to
complete test programs supporting IOT&E completion in 2016.
General Conway. In 2010 we concur with the Joint Program Office's
objectives are the requisite milestones needed to keep on track to IOC.
These include; ALIS operational at the Eglin Integrated Training
Center, award of the LRIP 4 contract, delivery of Block 1.0 Software to
Flight Test, commence flight training at Eglin, complete training for
125 maintenance personnel, deliver at least 3 aircraft to Eglin,
deliver 11 test aircraft to Pax and Edwards, demonstrate flight test
rate of 12 Fts/Acft/Mo, and complete 400 test flights. For the Marine
Corps key milestones are the standup of the first training squadron at
Eglin, the completion of the West and East Coast Environmental Studies,
and starting flight training of the first STOVL pilots.

53. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, I know that the dates by which all the Services intend to take
delivery of JSFs with IOC are being maintained. While, for the Navy,
IOC means ``full warfighting capability and mission functionality'',
for the Marine Corps it means ``interim warfighting capabilities, basic
weapons and moderate mission system capabilities''. However,
development on the JSF is not expected to be completed (per Deputy
Secretary's statement a few days ago) before November 2015 or, more
likely (per the Joint Estimating Teams' original assessment), by April
2017. That is well after the IOC squadrons are supposed to be delivered
to the Navy in 2012 and 2015.
Therefore, it seems to me that the only way the Navy will be able
to take delivery of its IOC squadrons on time is by accepting less
initial capability and defer some requirements to a future upgrade
program. Given the likelihood that, in others words, the definition of
IOC for your JSF squadrons will have to change, what is that new
definition?
Secretary Mabus. With the recent program restructuring approved by
the Secretary of Defense, the IOC for the F-35B is 2012 and 2016 for
the F-35C. The actions taken by the Secretary of Defense include
procuring an additional F-35C aircraft to be used for flight testing,
loaning three early production aircraft to developmental test and
directing the addition of another software integration line to the
program. These three steps, taken together, establish a viable program
and continue to support the DoN IOC dates.
Each service has a somewhat different definition of IOC depending
on what capabilities they intend to have at IOC, their operational and
testing requirements, and the number of aircraft they require for IOC.
For the Marine Corps, IOC is defined as a squadron of 10 F-35B Block 2
aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR directed mission sets
and deploy on F-35B compatible ships and austere expeditionary sites.
For the Navy F-35C, IOC date is based on three items: sufficient
aircraft quantities, desired capability to conduct all ORD missions, to
include, but not limited to, AI, OCA, DCA, CAS, SEAD/DEAD and CSAR in a
denied, near-peer environment better than legacy aircraft; and
completion of operational test of that capability test.
Admiral Roughead. The Navy is retaining its definition of IOC as
Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-compliant, Block III aircraft
that have completed Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E). As a
result of the recent program restructuring approved by the Secretary of
Defense, the IOC for Navy's F-35C is currently in 2016.
General Conway. The F-35B Block 2B is a far superior aircraft than
any aircraft in the DoN inventory. With VLO survivability, a powerful
integrated sensor suite, fused information displays, interoperable
joint connectivity, a precision weapon capability, and self protect
anti-air weapons it is a total package of capabilities that will
revolutionize our expeditionary Marine Air-Ground combat power in all
threat environments while reducing the reliance on supporting aircraft,
tankers and jammers, and enabling joint interoperability with newer
systems.
The aircraft and equipment required to meet IOC were procured in
fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. The training facilities for our
aircrew and maintenance personnel are on track at the Joint Integrated
Training Center at Eglin AFB.
The remaining infrastructure that enables IOC to include
environmental studies, and facilities ashore and afloat is on schedule.
Our IOC requirements and associated metrics that encompass
capabilities, equipment, training, and support will measure the
progress of the program office to meet our goals between now and
December 2012 and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the elements
required for operational use of the F-35B are ready.

joint strike fighter--marine corps variant
54. Senator McCain. General Conway, the draft Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report released for DOD comment on February
12, 2010, lists a large number of critical issues facing JSF. In
particular, the Marine Corps IOC date of 2012 does not appear to be
achievable unless the Marine Corps accepts aircraft that are far below
full combat capability which will have to be upgraded later at
significant expense for retrofitting. The system development and
demonstration (SDD) phase for the F-35 extends until April 2017 under
the most recent December 2009 estimate cited by GAO based on multiple
sources including NAVAIR and DOT&E, and GAO predicts that technical,
manufacturing, and testing delays will further delay completion of the
SDD wring out of potential problems. Why would the Marine Corps accept
an IOC date that is 5 years or more before SDD shake out of the program
is complete?
General Conway. For the Marine Corps F-35B, IOC is defined as a
squadron of 10 aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR
directed mission sets and to deploy on F-35B-compatible ships and to
austere expeditionary sites. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a
multi-mission support capable Block 2B aircraft, primarily close air
support and enhanced air interdiction.
With the recent program restructuring, IOC is projected to be 2012
for the F-35B which is based on operational requirements and the
associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training,
and support that will measure the progress of the program to meet the
USMC requirements between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine
Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use of the F-
35B are ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these
requirements.

55. Senator McCain. General Conway, key milestones for the program
have shifted 2 to 3 years to the right since the Program of Record was
established in December 2008, yet the Marine Corps IOC has remained
unchanged as 2012. Does this indicate that an IOC of 2012 cannot be met
with an acceptable level or risk given the current delays in
development, production, and testing?
General Conway. We are confident the action taken by the Secretary
of Defense to address the testing and production problems in PB-11
establish a viable program that continues to support a Marine Corps
December 2012 IOC.

concerns about joint strike fighter
56. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, the concurrency structured
into the JSF program's test, production and training plans has obscured
the mission capability of LRIP aircraft and support systems. How will
DOD, under its proposed budget, improve the process by which the
mission capability of LRIP systems will be accurately and credibly
predicted well before delivery?
Secretary Mabus. The F-35 program was structured with known
concurrency that will remain, though reduced, with the SECDEF directed
F-35 program restructure. The DOD decision to restructure the F-35
Program was in response to multiple Department studies and assessments.
The Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) examined the
transition from development to production. The IMRT recommended the
program adopt a somewhat flatter and smoother ramp. The Joint
Estimating Team (JET II) accepted this revised ramp and moved it later
in time with the delayed progress of the development program. By doing
so, the risk of concurrency is lowered.
As part of the program restructure, several steps have been taken
to partially restore SDD schedule. To help mitigate aircraft assets
required during testing, Secretary Gates directed the procurement of
one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program in order to expand
developmental testing capacity, and will utilize some LRIP aircraft in
support of development testing. Secretary Gates also directed the
addition of another software integration line to the program, to
prevent the building of mission systems software from becoming a
limiting factor on the development schedule. Finally, contract
negotiations are currently underway to ensure the contractor is held
accountable in meeting or exceeding a defined set of milestones
connected to fee on the development contract.
The scrutiny of the review teams has informed the actions taken by
the Department to ensure the program is executable. It's also important
to note that during the extensive reviews that led to the program
restructure, no fundamental technology or manufacturing problems were
discovered, nor were there any changes to F-35 performance
requirements. All F-35 variants are projected to meet their respective
Key Performance Parameters.

57. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, I understand that the JPO is
executing a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded live fire test
plan. However, the program recently removed shutoff fuses for engine
fueldraulics lines. Coupled with the prior removal of dry bay fire
extinguishers, this may increase the likelihood of aircraft combat
losses from ballistic threat-induced fires. At present, only the
Integrated Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression system. Though
the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) has approved the JPO's request
to remove these safety systems as an acceptable system trade to balance
weight, cost, and risk, DOT&E remains concerned regarding the
aircraft's vulnerability to threat-induced fires. What is your
appraisal of DOT&E's concern here?
Secretary Mabus. The Department is committed to delivering the most
affordable, supportable, lethal and survivable F-35 aircraft that meets
the needs of the warfighter. The overall survivability posture of the
F-35 is without equal due to advanced avionics and sensor suite, fifth
generation stealth performance, advanced countermeasures and robust,
balanced vulnerability reduction design. The warfighting effectiveness
of each design feature is carefully balanced against the overall system
impact to cost, weight, and supportability. The removal of PAO shut-off
valves and fuses for engine fueldraulic lines resulted in a minimal
(.05 PK) impact on the vulnerability assessment, no impact on the
safety assessment, avoids 11 lbs. per aircraft in weight, avoids
$40,000 (CTOL and CV)--$50,000 (STOVL) per aircraft in procurement
costs, and avoids $1.4 million in development costs. The JESB decision
included a requirement to update the vulnerability assessment after
conclusion of the Live Fire Testing in calendar year 2011. All F-35
aircraft vulnerability data will then be re-assessed.

expeditionary fighting vehicle
58. Senator McCain. General Conway, the fiscal year 2011 budget
calls for $243 million in research and development (R&D) for
production, testing, and evaluation of seven SDD2 vehicles. That is
$34.7 million per vehicle in fiscal year 2011 alone. At what point and
based on what criteria will the Marine Corps determine whether it is
cost effective to continue the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program?
General Conway. The success criteria for the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle were stated in previous testimony, the Program must pass five
key decision points that will evaluate the planned operational
assessments, ability to meet KPPs, as well as the program cost and
schedule metrics.

mv-22 osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
59. Senator McCain. General Conway, readiness rates of the MV-22 in
Afghanistan have been reported as in the mid-60s, trending towards the
70s. On the other hand, the Army's new CH-47F is experiencing readiness
rates in Afghanistan in the 80s and 90s, consistent with refinement of
a platform that has been in use for decades. The CH-47F can reach
speeds greater than 175 mph and transport more than 21,000 pounds, and
with Aviation Extended Range Fuel System, has a mission radius of more
than 400 nautical miles. The CH-47F can carry 66 combat-loaded soldiers
or marines. Should the Marine Corps consider the CH-47F as an
alternative to the MV-22?
General Conway. No. The MV-22B is the premier medium lift assault
support platform in the inventory, and has performed all combat tasking
in Iraq and Afghanistan without any combat losses. The MV-22B has
several characteristics that make it superior to the CH-47D and F for
Marine Aviation purposes.

The MV-22B's ability to leverage its speed to rapidly
build combat power in an objective through shorter sortie cycle
times surpasses that of the CH-47. This was most recently
demonstrated in the assault on Now Zad in Afghanistan, when the
MV-22Bs were inbound with their second wave of troops as the
helicopters were landing with their first.
By virtue of its design, the MV-22B transits the
battlespace at 270kts ground speed in altitude sanctuary
compared to 160kts in the heart of the threat as is typical for
high-end traditional rotorcraft.
The MV-22B is built for survivability, including
excellent ballistic tolerance, low IR signature, low aural
signature, and widely dispersed and redundant systems.
The MV-22B combat radius with 24 combat troops is
325nm or better with internal fuel. No extended range fuel
tanks are required.
Much like the CH-53E that can carry 55 combat troops
with center-line seating installed yet carries 24 troops by
operational procedure, the CH-47 does not routinely leverage
its maximum seating capacity by convention in combat.
MV-22B fulfills the medium lift requirement for the
Marine Corps. The CH-47 would be a redundant heavy lift
platform.
BDM Federal noted in the 1994 Medium Lift Replacement
COEA Phase II:

``These studies generally showed that the productivity benefits
resulting from carrying larger loads are negated when aircraft
survivability is taken into account. That is, loading more troops onto
each aircraft meant that more assets would be lost when an aircraft was
downed as large capacity aircraft were also the least survivable.
Studies have verified a medium lift requirement when force
effectiveness is balanced against attrition.''

The MV-22B has specific design features to make it
suitable for shipboard operations, including folding blades and
wing, electromagnetic hardening, and powered steering for self-
taxi on the flight deck. To operate aboard ship, the CH-47
would have to add blade fold capacity and make landing gear
modifications.
The CH-47F operating cost of $6,899 per hour does not
include Depot Level Repair charges. The current Fleet MV-22B
operating cost of $11,488 includes Depot charges, which account
for roughly 50 percent of its parts costs.
At the completion of the current multi-year
procurement agreement, we will have procured 243 of our 360
program of record. Adding a second Type/Model/Series to conduct
the medium-lift mission would significantly increase the
program, training, and support costs.

procurement of h-1 helicopter
60. Senator McCain. General Conway, last year, the House of
Representatives cut H-1 funding by over $300 million as a funding
source for the F-35 alternate engine based on concern about Bell's
ability to meet the production ramp. Can Bell meet the ramp for 31 H-1s
requested in fiscal year 2011?
General Conway. Yes. Manufacturing planning, processes and tooling
are in place to support 31 aircraft production a year. Bell has
consistently delivered both the UH-1Y and AH-1Z production aircraft 30
days or more ahead of contract requirements. This performance has been
demonstrated and maintained even after a 6 week labor strike
experienced in July/August 2009.

61. Senator McCain. General Conway, how important are these H-1
assets for the fight in Afghanistan, given their increased capability?
General Conway. These aircraft are vital to fight supporting our
marines on the ground. Last November, Marine Light Attack Helicopter
Squadron (HMLA)-367 deployed to Afghanistan with a full complement of
nine UH-1Y aircraft. In their first three months HMLA-367 posted
mission capable rates in excess of 77 percent while flying an average
of 40 flight hours per aircraft per month--over two times the planned
utilization rate of 18.9--while also playing a critical role in
successes achieved in the Now Zad Valley of Helmand Province. The UH-1Y
has not missed an assigned launch to date and has flown a multitude of
missions in theater including troop and cargo transport, command and
control, aerial and armed reconnaissance, armed escort, and close air
support. The UH-1Y's increased payload, range and endurance has
resulted in the ability to carry more marines, more payload and more
ordnance while increasing time on station throughout the entire
spectrum of utility missions. The legacy UH-1N Huey forced aircrews to
sacrifice either payload, time on station, or both, whereas UH-1Y
aircrews no longer have to make those sacrifices. Additionally, the UH-
1Y's increased engine power and performance have been particularly
important during missions flown at higher altitudes and in hotter
temperatures.

energy alternatives
62. Senator McCain. General Conway, please describe the alternative
you are pursuing to reduce our reliance on fuel on the battlefield.
General Conway. Recently, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
establish an Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in Quantico,
VA. The ExFOB was supported by many organization inside and outside the
Marine Corps to include all of our fellow services energy experts and
OSD's Power Surety Task Force. Prior to our recent ExFOB evaluations we
reviewed approximately 200 commercial off-the-shelve (COTS)
technologies, in the end, we invited 29 vendors to ExFOB, 27 arrived at
Quantico for evaluation by our experts. For this phase of ExFOB we
focused on Energy, Water, and Shelter technologies that were COTS ready
and could be deployed to Afghanistan right away to reduce our reliance
on fuel. Of the 27 systems evaluated, 2xwater purification systems,
3xphotovotaie (PV) solar-based energy systems, 1x PV solar lighting
system, and 1xLED lighting system were selected for further evaluation
and deployment to Afghanistan.

63. Senator McCain. General Conway, which of those initiatives do
you think holds the most promise?
General Conway. The water purification systems that can be powered
by solar systems show the most promise at the tactical edge. As we have
discovered at the tactical edge, for every fuel truck on the roads of
Afghanistan, we have 6-7 water trucks. Getting small, lightweight,
alternative powered water purification systems to the battlefield is a
high priority. In addition, we are encouraged by replacing our
incandescent lights with LED lighting and PV solar-powered area lights
too.

iraq and afghanistan
64. Senator McCain. General Conway, I know you are proud of the
performance of our marines in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I share
that pride. I also noticed that this year's budget request includes
$4.1 billion in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for fiscal
year 2011 for Marine Corps operation and maintenance (O&M). The fiscal
year 2010 OCO amount was $3.4 billion, although the supplemental for
fiscal year 2010 raised that amount by about $1.1 billion to a total of
$4.5 billion for all of fiscal year 2010. What are driving your O&M
costs for fiscal year 2011?
General Conway. The primary driver of our fiscal year 2011 O&M
costs is related to Optempo ($850 million). Other significant drivers
include depot maintenance ($525 million), transportation associated
with the OIF draw down ($420 million), body armor and personal
protective equipment ($365), and deployment specific training ($350
million).

65. Senator McCain. General Conway, does the fiscal year 2011
request include everything you need to support the surge in
Afghanistan?
General Conway. Yes, the current fiscal year 2011 request will
support Marine Corps forces and operational requirements to support the
surge in Afghanistan.

66. Senator McCain. General Conway, do you have a good feel for
what the cost of resetting the force will be?
General Conway. In light of the continued high tempo of operations
in Afghanistan, and the delay in reset actions due to the diversion of
equipment in theater, we estimate the cost of reset for the Marine
Corps to be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011
OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination of
the conflict). However, this estimate will change the longer we
continue to remain in theater.

67. Senator McCain. General Conway, how many years after the final
draw downs from Iraq and Afghanistan will it take to reset the force
and what will it cost?
General Conway. We believe that after the final draw downs from
Iraq and Afghanistan, with appropriate funding, we will be able to
reset the force in 2 to 3 years.

laser-guided zuni
68. Senator McCain. General Conway, I am aware that the Marine
Corps has placed the Laser-Guided Zuni rocket on its most current
Marine Aviation Plan and on its Air-to-Ground Weapons roadmap. The
Marine Corps has also validated the Urgent Universal Need Statement
that requests 5-inch Laser-Guided Zuni rockets for use in combat
operations and is pursuing the smaller 2.75-inch Advanced Precision
Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets for helicopters. I have been briefed
that there is no money in the budget for the 5-inch Laser-Guided Zunis
for jet aircraft; however Marine Corps requirements documents call for
its development. In fact, the Navy's China Lake Weapons division has
partnered with industry to build and successfully test fire Laser-
Guided Zunis against fixed and moving targets. Can you tell me why the
Marine Corps has decided not to fund in the fiscal year 2011 proposed
budget the development of these precision rockets for its combat
forces?
General Conway. Senator, several years ago the Marine Corps
recognized the need for low collateral damage during combat operations
and set out to reduce collateral damage by developing an all-precision-
guided weapon inventory. In the fiscal year 2007 Air-to-Ground Weapons
Roadmap and Marine Aviation Plan we established a goal to create a
precision-guided capability for all air-to-ground weapons by 2015.
These documents included a precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket (I do
not use the term Laser-Guided Zuni (LGZ) as those terms have been trade
marked for a weapon that is not in the Marine Corps inventory). The
Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake has been operating with industry
since 2005 within a Cooperative Research and Development Activity
(CRADA) to fire a guided 5-inch Zuni rocket and prove the concept for a
precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket. This program, with MBDA Missile
Systems, is designed to upgrade our extensive existing 5-inch Zuni
rocket motors and warhead inventories by adding a Semi-Active Laser
(SAL) capability. Two successful ground-launched guided shots against
stationary and moving targets were completed in May and August 2009. A
precision-guided 5-inch Zuni will provide a high probability kill, low
cost weapon against tactical vehicles and other soft targets and the
Marine Corps needs it to fill the ``clear air'' forward firing missile
niche for legacy Marine Corps aircraft as they will not carry the
Joint-Air-to-Ground-Missile (JAGM). In fiscal year 2007 the Marine
Corps attempted a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), but
failed to gain the required joint support. The Air Force does not use a
5-inch rocket and the Navy is focusing resources on JAGM for F/A-18E/F.
A sole source Rapid Deployment Capability is now our preferred route to
funding and fielding a guided 5-inch Zuni rocket, but is unlikely due
to industry competition. The interest shown by many industry
representatives in the 2.75-inch fixed wing APKWS JCTD, a spinoff of
the successful rotary wing APKWS program, indicates that pursuing a
sole source acquisition strategy for the MDBA LGZ may be challenged by
formal industry protest. Several vendors have offered solutions that
provide a precision-guidance capability for the Zuni and a full and
open competition seems likely to be required. NAVAIR's Legal and
Contracts personnel are assessing the options. The precision-guided 5-
inch Zuni rocket will follow the APKWS II JCTD and will provide a low
collateral damage precision munition for Marine legacy fixed wing
aircraft. Adding precision guidance to the Zuni presents challenging
technical issues because of its mach speed release from the aircraft
and higher operation altitudes than the APKWS. Although APKWS and JAGM
are our precision-guided munition solutions for the near term and
require the scarce resources we have available for funding weapons, a
precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket remains a valid weapon requirement
for Marine Corps aviation. It is a capability being aggressively
pursued by us as we support the precision-guided Zuni CRADA effort at
China Lake.

69. Senator McCain. General Conway, are Laser-Guided Zunis included
in your Unfunded Priority List?
General Conway. Senator, developing a precision 5-inch rocket with
laser guidance remains a Marine Corps goal. Currently the JAGM and the
APKWS are the major Navy and Marine Corps weapons programs and have
high priorities for rotary wing aircraft. The Small Diameter Bomb is a
high priority program for our fixed wing F-35B aircraft. The precision-
guided 5-inch Zuni will fill gaps between the JAGM and APKWS and SDB
II, but it competes for scarce funds and is not yet on our Unfunded
Priority List

requirement for a 313-ship navy
70. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, for the past few years the
Navy has justified to Congress a need for 313 ships. Does this budget
support that requirement?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request grows
the capacity of our Fleet to 313 ships by 2020 and 320 ships by 2024.

71. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, I'm concerned that cost
overruns in shipbuilding programs will undermine future plans. What
specific actions is the Navy taking to mitigate cost overruns in
shipbuilding programs?
Admiral Roughead. To better control shipbuilding costs, the Navy is
reducing the types of our ships, maximizing the reuse of ship designs
and components, and pursuing open architecture and mission systems
modularity. These efforts permit longer production runs and cost
reductions associated with production improvements and economies of
scale. We continue to focus on program affordability by ensuring
designs are mature and requirements are well understood prior to the
start of construction, and by emphasizing design and affordability
concepts in initial design and follow-on procurements. We have also
improved acquisition governance and cost control mechanisms through the
following initiatives:

Executing an acquisition governance process where
leadership assesses technical maturity and programmatic changes
that typically drive cost growth
Using cost risk analysis in budget development, which
enables understanding of cost risk and uncertainty inherent in
the budget
Improving our ability to provide comprehensive cost
and earned value management analysis support
Rebuilding our core knowledge, skills and processes to
improve cost estimating
Implementing the requirement to submit a certified
cost position and ensure the program is fully funded at each
milestone

30-year shipbuilding plan
72. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, the Navy's 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan calls for the replacement of 14 Ohio-class submarines
and the multi-year procurement of 2 Virginia-class attack submarines
per year to replace Los Angeles-class submarines. Because the ballistic
missile submarines run about $6.5 million each and the Virginia-class
submarines cost about $2 billion each, those expenditures alone consume
over 75 percent of the current shipbuilding budget. Will the Navy be
successful in increasing its shipbuilding budget during that period of
robust submarine procurement so that overall surface ship production
will not decrease to just two surface ships per year?
Admiral Roughead. Building the required force structure will
largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat
systems) within an affordable range. We are committed to maintaining
stability in requirements, funding, and profiles to control costs. This
requires the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry,
and the combat systems industry. Working in conjunction with Congress,
the Navy will procure and sustain the force structure necessary to
deliver the naval capabilities needed to support our National
interests.

73. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, what will be the impact on
most importantly our force projection capability and second the
shipbuilding industrial base?
Admiral Roughead. The battle force inventory presented in our 30-
year shipbuilding plan provides the global reach, persistent presence,
and strategic, operational, and tactical effects required of our naval
forces within reasonable levels of funding. On balance, the force
structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding plan maintains our
ability to project power across the spectrum of challenges we are
likely to face throughout the time period of the report, albeit with
prudent risk where appropriate. One of the plan's three basic precepts
is the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding
design and industrial base necessary to build and sustain tomorrow's
Navy. The shipbuilding plan aims to maintain that base.
The SSBN(X) procurement will begin to constrain our shipbuilding
plan in the latter part of this decade because recapitalization of our
SSBNs will occur at the same time our SSN-688 submarines, CG-47 class
guided missile cruisers, DDG-51 class guided missile destroyers, and
LSD-41/49 class dock landing ships reach end-of-service-life. During
the years in which the new submarine is being procured, the procurement
of other ship types will be reduced, resulting in force level and
industrial base impacts. Even under these constraints, our shipbuilding
plan still achieves a peak battle force inventory of 320 ships in
fiscal year 2024 and averages about 303 ships between fiscal year 2020
and fiscal year 2040.

74. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, the recently released 30-year
shipbuilding plan uses the 313-ship battle force inventory as its
baseline. However, building the required force structure will largely
depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat systems)
within an affordable range. Will the Navy be able to maintain stability
in requirements, funding, and profiles in an effort to control costs?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. New construction will be funded consistent
with balanced investment profiles and expected future budgets. The Navy
will continue to focus on program affordability by ensuring designs are
mature, that affordability is a factor in design and procurement
concepts, and that requirements are well specified prior to the start
of construction.
The Navy is taking positive action to control costs and prevent
requirement creep, and to have a long view regarding reduced types and
models of ships, maximizing reuse of ship designs and components, and
using open architecture and mission systems modularity. Navy leadership
is engaged in managing cost and controlling requirements growth in our
shipbuilding programs. We have instituted an acquisition governance
process that causes leadership to assess technical maturity and
programmatic changes. NAVSEA is improving its ability to provide
comprehensive cost and earned value management analysis support and is
rebuilding core knowledge, skills and processes to improve cost
estimating.
Navy is committed to developing a stable long-term shipbuilding
plan to reduce industrial base volatility, which is a primary reason
for cost growth. Great care has been taken to describe a plan that is
fiscally sustainable over the 30-year planning horizon. The plan also
takes into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national
shipbuilding design and industrial base.

75. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, controlling shipbuilding
costs will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding
industry, and the combat systems industry. What is the Navy doing to
encourage fixed-price contracts and ensuring that requirements are
approved by the leadership and will not change? Please give some
discrete examples by program type.
Admiral Roughead. To encourage the use of fixed-price contracts,
the Navy has developed an acquisition policy defining certain
limitations and controls for use of cost-reimbursement type contracts
and emphasizing use of fixed-priced contracts, as appropriate, to
support the Department's mission.
For shipbuilding programs, the Navy has successfully used fixed-
price contracts where the design is very mature at the start and is
derived from existing ship designs and technical risk is low. In cases
where the initial ships of a class include complex technologies, the
Navy contracts for these initial ships under cost-type contracts;
however, as the respective class matures and we move into serial
production, the contracts typically used are fixed-priced. A specific
example is DDG-1000, which is a cost contract due to the innovative
design and high degree of technology insertion. Follow-on ships (DDG-
1001 and -1002) will be fixed-price contracts. An example of where
fixed-price contracts were used initially is JHSV. That design was
mature and derived from a well understood parent design. The lead JHSV
and all follow ships are contracted under a fixed-price contract.
Additionally, these recent solicitations for shipbuilding new
construction contracts have been fixed-price: The LCS (fiscal year 2009
and fiscal year 2010-2014 competitive solicitation); LPD-26/27; DDG-
113/114, DDG-115, and DDG-1001/1002. The fiscal year 2009-2013
Virginia-class multi-year contract was awarded on a fixed-price basis.
The upcoming solicitation for LHA-7 construction will be issued as
fixed-price.
To ensure that requirements are approved by leadership and changes
are closely controlled, the Navy has several acquisition oversight
processes that provide leadership visibility and vigorous control of
acquisition requirements. The Navy implemented a Peer Review Program in
fiscal year 2009 which applies to contracts for supplies, systems and
services and includes tiered review and approval levels. The CNO's
Resources and Requirements Review Board and Naval Capabilities Board
(NCB) are the Navy's 3- and 2-star forums for reviewing and making
decisions on requirements and resourcing issues. SECNAV's requirements-
acquisition governance (Gate Review) and Configuration Steering Board
(CSB) processes provide Service-level approval of capabilities
requirements. The annual Gate Six sufficiency reviews serve as the
forum for the CSB as part of the oversight process to stabilize
requirements and review any descoping-cost saving strategies. CVN-78,
LCS, DDG-51 and Virginia-class have planned Gate Six reviews this year.
The Navy is introducing rigor into the contract change management
process by limiting the amount of funding program managers may spend
without a Gate Six sufficiency review to not more than 40 percent of
the program funds budgeted for engineering changes. Release of
remaining funds to program managers will be based on the outcome of
CSBs that are held in conjunction with Gate Six reviews.

ddg-1000 destroyer program-critical nunn-mccurdy breach
76. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, on February 4, 2010, Secretary
Gates said the DDG-1000 destroyer program will breach Nunn-McCurdy's
cost thresholds. By operation of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009, it should be canceled or restructured and recertified.
Based on a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost threshold breach, should the Navy
go forward with buying the third DDG-1000 in light of the Nunn-McCurdy
cost breach and the growing requirement for more ballistic missile
defense (BMD) ships in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf?
Secretary Mabus. Pursuant to the Weapons System Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 and Section 2433 of Title 10, U.S.C. (``Nunn-McCurdy''
statute), the Secretary of Defense will terminate, or provide
certification of the program to Congress. Navy is supporting the
ongoing OSD-led certification process. A termination or certification
decision is due to Congress by late spring 2010.

amphibious fleet affordability and readiness
77. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Navy's
plan for a 33-ship amphibious fleet, according to the Navy's budget
proposal, represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the
requirement to deliver two Marine expeditionary brigades in a forcible-
entry operation. Is the Marine Corps' desire for 38 ships affordable
and are there ways to mitigate that risk when considering the entire
shipbuilding plan?
Secretary Mabus. The 38 ship force identified by the Marine Corps
represents the lift capacity necessary to support 2.0 MEB operations
including all of their combat support and combat service support needs
across their full range of expected missions. This risk/force level is
inconsistent with the risk levels accepted by the remaining Naval
Forces. Therefore, the Commandant and CNO reached an agreement to
benchmark the Amphibious Force at 33 ships and accept a modicum of risk
in the extent of combat support equipment available within the Assault
Echelon (AE) forces and to move that equipment in conjunction with
follow-on force equipment. Specific decisions made in support of this
agreement are:

The Navy plans to procure an LHA-6 class ship in
fiscal year 2011 and its 11th LPD-17 class amphibious transport
dock in fiscal year 2012. LSD(X), replacement for the existing
LSD-41 class, will begin in fiscal year 2017.

The Navy determined the LHA-6 class amphibious
assault ships previously designated for the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) would serve more
effectively in the AE force where they could be
employed in Marine forcible-entry operations. Within
the context of the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, these AE
amphibious ships will be procured in fiscal year 2011,
fiscal year 2016, and fiscal year 2021.
The Navy begins procurement of LSD-41 class
replacement, LSD(X), in fiscal year 2017, on a 2-year
build cycle.

The Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP)
provides additional lift capacity, but does not factor in
meeting the Marine Corps' 2.0 MEB AE requirement.

ALEP is designed to fill the gap in vehicle
square feet stowage.

The Navy plans to procure three Mobile Landing
Platforms (MLP) as well as the three previously appropriated T-
AKEs. These augmented Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
squadrons enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will
support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a
reinforcing MEB to ``marry up'' ashore with its equipment from
one of the three MPS squadrons. The augmented MPS facilitate
the routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a variety
of activities across the range of military operations (ROMO)
and mitigate the risk of lower than desired amphibious ship
inventory levels.

General Conway. Without a top line increase and/or a
reprioritization of missions and capabilities that form the basis of
the Navy's shipbuilding plan, the requirement for 38 amphibious assault
ships outlined in our 7 January 2009 report to Congress is
unaffordable. We have examined ways to mitigate risk within the context
of the entire shipbuilding plan and determined that sustaining a
minimum of 33 amphibious ships is adequate within today's fiscal
limitations.

78. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, are the
requirements for more amphibious ships greater because at least 15 to
20 percent of the amphibious fleet is not deployable because they are
in shipyards undergoing maintenance and repair?
Secretary Mabus. No. Under normal circumstances, no more than about
10 percent of the amphibious fleet is undergoing significant
maintenance and repair that would preclude operational availability in
the event of a national crisis. While there may be instances when
greater than 10 percent of the force is undergoing maintenance, we are
confident this assumption is consistent with the long term availability
of amphibious ships for contingency operations.
The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in the January 7,
2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure and the
Annual Report to Congress on the Long Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2011, calls for a force of 33 total ships
(11 LHA/LHD, 11 LPD, and 11 LSD). Under normal circumstances, 29-30 are
available for tasking, enough to support MEBs while accepting risk in
the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of
the MEB.
Without accepting this risk, the full requirement would be 38
ships. However SECNAV, CNO, and CMC agree that the 33-ship force
equates to an acceptable level of risk, as stated in the January 7,
2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure.
General Conway. The 38- and 33-ship numbers were based on the
mutually agreed-to assumption that amphibious ships were operationally
available 90 percent of the time based on OPNAVNOTE 4700 scheduled
maintenance availabilities.
The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in our 7 January 2009
report to Congress assumes that amphibious ships are not operationally
available-class due to maintenance approximately 10 percent of the
time. Due to the current maintenance challenges faced by the San
Antonio-class, amphibious shipping is trending near 75 percent
availability vice the 90 percent planned. We would work to improve
operational availability to close to the 90 percent level instead of
increasing our force structure requirement to offset a significantly
lower operational availability. This will require increased resources,
specifically maintenance funding for the upkeep of amphibious ships.

79. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the serious
engineering problems on LPD-17 class ships gives rise for a concern
about a broader readiness problem. The recent commissioning of the USS
New York in New York City harbor was a marvelous site, but now the ship
cannot get underway because of mechanical failures in the main
propulsion engines, generators, and failing piping welds that make the
ship unsafe to operate. The LPD-17 amphibious ship program has more
challenges than we had hoped. Are we seeing a systemic problem with the
readiness of the Navy's amphibious ships?
Secretary Mabus. No. While we have seen some recurring material
issues in LPD-17 class ships, the problems associated with a new
construction ship are not indicative of a systemic problem with the
amphibious ship readiness of the existing Fleet.
General Conway. The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to ensuring
we are ready to meet our amphibious mission requirements. While we have
seen some recurring material issues in LPD-17 class ships, we are
working with the shipbuilder to address these issues head on. An LPD-17
Class Strike Team was established in December 2008 to methodically
resolve recurring/systemic class issues. Top three issues in progress
are main propulsion diesel engine (MPDE) bearing damage, Geislinger
coupling (connects MPDE to main reduction gear (MRG)) leaks, and faulty
piping welds. In each case the Navy is working with the shipbuilder or
vendor to identify the root cause and resolve associated material,
workmanship, or inspection issues.

littoral combat ship
80. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, later this year the Navy will
down-select to a single sea frame for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
program and split its production between two competing shipyards--this
new acquisition strategy is designed to reduce the ship's overall cost.
Will the costs of this troubled program be below the congressional cost
cap?
Secretary Mabus. Although achieving the cost cap will be
challenging, the Navy is working to ensure the program costs are within
the parameters of the cost cap established in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The Navy will continue to apply
lessons learned to the LCS program and across the ship acquisition
enterprise. The Navy's acquisition strategy to competitively downselect
to a single LCS seaframe will further contribute to cost control on
this program. Navy remains committed to effective cost control, and
believes that the acquisition strategy for the fiscal year 2010 and
later ships and management practices provide the strongest possible
foundation for program stability and delivery of this urgently-needed
capability at the best value.

81. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, will the winning vessel be the
least expensive to operate as is required under the acquisition reform
law we enacted last year, which highlighted the total operating costs
of weapons programs?
Secretary Mabus. The acquisition strategy for the LCS program for
fiscal year 2010 and later vessels includes key tenets for competition
identified by the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, such
as competitive prototyping, dual sourcing, unbundling of contracts, use
of modular, open architectures to enable competition for upgrades, and
use of build-to-print technical data packages to enable production by a
second source. The goal of the Government is to arrive at a best-value
determination. The Government will however, consider life cycle cost
reduction initiatives as part of its evaluation under the technical/
management category. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle
costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjective rating, and factored
into the overall best value determination.
Throughout the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both
acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this
regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs
through the Navy's requirements for reduced manning, open architecture
and mission package modularity that have been key design parameters
since the inception of the program.

electronic aircraft launch system
82. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, I am concerned that problems
with developing the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS)
could delay the USS Gerald Ford's (CVN-78) entry into service. That
could increase the period of time during which the Navy has 11
operational carriers from 33 months to some longer period. What is the
status of that troubled program?
Secretary Mabus. EMALS is currently undergoing System Design and
Development (SDD) testing at Lakehurst, NJ, and is on track to conduct
manned aircraft launch later this year. Manufacturing of EMALS
production components is ongoing and is on schedule to support CVN-78
delivery dates. Motor generator components have the least schedule
float and are being closely monitored by the Navy.

83. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, do we expect that problems
associated with the EMALS will cause any delays to the delivery of the
CVN-78 it was designed to support?
Secretary Mabus. Current EMALS production schedules support on-time
delivery of CVN-78 in September 2015. Motor generators have the least
schedule float and are being carefully managed by the Navy to ensure
that required in yard dates are met.

84. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, should we be looking at a
conventional steam catapult solution if the contractor cannot resolve
its engineering issues?
Secretary Mabus. In 2009, Senior Navy leadership decided EMALS
would remain the CVN-78 class aircraft launching system following a
detailed assessment of the viability of both EMALS and steam catapults
on the CVN-78 class. While steam catapults were deemed at the
conclusion of the assessment to be a technically viable alternative to
EMALS, reverting to steam would have incurred a 12-18 month delay in
CVN-78 ship delivery, along with associated costs for redesign and
delay. The current EMALS System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
phase and production schedules continue to support the CVN-78
construction schedule. While the overlap of system-level testing and
shipset production hardware procurement decision induces some cost and
schedule risk, the management focus, review processes, and oversight
the Navy has employed continue to mitigate these risks. The Navy is
committed to EMALS as the launching system for CVN-78 class aircraft
carriers.

85. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, how confident are you that the
EMALS will come on line on time so as not to delay the delivery of the
CVN-78?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to EMALS as the launching
system for CVN-78 class aircraft carriers. EMALS technology was
fundamentally proven by the Navy during the Program Definition and Risk
Reduction phase using a full-scale, half-length prototype. Component-
level testing of production representative hardware is currently
verifying design predictions and system performance. A full-scale EMALS
catapult test site is operational at Lakehurst, with launching of
manned aircraft projected to begin later this year.
Implementation of the EMALS system for the Gerald R. Ford-class is
required to meet the fixed wing launch goals of the Navy, as well as
provide flexibility for future operations. All manufacturing components
are on schedule to support required in-yard dates for delivery of CVN-
78 in September 2015. The Navy is closely monitoring the production of
motor generators, the component with the least schedule float, to
ensure delivery remains on schedule.

ship depot maintenance
86. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, as you recall, the only
priority that you identified as unfunded in your last budget submission
was ship depot maintenance. Over the last few months, a number of press
accounts have come out describing problems directly related to how
ineffectively the shipyards are maintaining the readiness of the Navy's
oldest surface combatants. I understand that this year's proposed
budget increases total funding for ship depot maintenance by almost
$1.2 billion over last year. To what extent does that proposed amount
fully fund the Navy's current requirement for ship depot maintenance
and capture depot maintenance volume that has accumulated from chronic
underfunding over time?
Admiral Roughead. Our fiscal year 2011 baseline and Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) budget requests $6.1 billion for ship
maintenance. This funds 99 percent of our total projected ship
maintenance requirement, including depot maintenance.

navy strike fighter gap
87. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, the Navy testified last year
that the so-called fighter gap or shortfall of strike-fighter aircraft
on aircraft carriers was growing larger than previous estimates--243
aircraft short by 2018. Is the Navy taking appropriate action to
mitigate the gap and the operational implications of that gap?
Admiral Roughead. The Department of the Navy (DoN) anticipates a
decrease in our strike fighter inventory of about 100 aircraft that
will peak at the end of this decade. We are addressing this inventory
decrease through aggressive and precise management strategies that
include service-life extension programs to prolong the use of existing
F/A-18 A-D aircraft, reducing the number of aircraft available in our
non-deployed squadrons to the minimum required, accelerating the
transition of seven legacy squadrons to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets (using
F/A-18E/F attrition aircraft in two cases), and maximizing depot level
throughput to return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet more
quickly. Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of
our legacy aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease
manageable.

88. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, does the Navy have the
adequate carrier air wings to satisfy the needs of 11 aircraft
carriers?
Admiral Roughead. Yes.
Our carrier air wing (CVW) Fleet Readiness and Training Plan (FRTP)
is tailored to compliment the training and maintenance requirements for
our 11 CVNs. We will manage our tactical aviation inventory to ensure
we have the number of aircraft required to support our deployable CVWs.

89. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, how does this committee
reconcile different estimates of what this gap is likely to be in 2018
which Secretary Gates has offered is 100 aircraft?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy continues to evaluate and manage its
strike fighter inventory. We have updated our inventory estimates as we
have adjusted the assumptions in our models to reflect what we are
learning about the ability to extend the service life of our legacy
aircraft, and to adjust to procurement rates for JSF and the addition
by Congress of nine Super Hornets into our budget last year. Based on
current data and the application of specific management measures, the
Navy anticipates a shortfall in our strike fighter inventory of about
100 aircraft that will peak in 2018.

missile defense, ballistic missile defense-capable ships, and standard
missile-3
90. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, as you are well aware, the
supply of missile defense assets, whether it be Aegis cruisers,
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) units, etc., pales in comparison to the worldwide demand of our
combatant commanders. How does the Navy's budget request seek to
satisfy the stressing needs of the new European-phased adaptive
approach while also continuing to meet those needs of ongoing efforts
in the Pacific, the Middle East, and the Homeland?
Admiral Roughead. To meet increasing global demands for BMD, our
fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding to increase and accelerate BMD
capability and capacity in our Fleet.
Specifically, the DOD budget request funds six BMD installations
and one upgrade, in addition to Aegis modernization installs/upgrades
that were included in PB 10 for our existing surface combatants.
Additionally the budget request funds the construction of DDG-114 and
DDG-115, the second and third ship in our DDG-51 restart program.
Across the FYDP, our budget request increases our total number of Aegis
BMD-capable ships from 21 to 38, of which 27 will be deployable in
fiscal year 2015 to meet global requirements for BMD.
The Aegis BMD budget contains funding to increase the number of SM-
3 missiles in our inventory. Currently, we have 59 SM-3 missiles. The
projected inventory will be 61 by the end of fiscal year 2010 and 262
by end of fiscal year 2015.

91. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, with the growing threat from
China, North Korea, and the Middle East, do your forces have enough
BMD/SM-3 resources/assets to defend the United States, its allies, and
forward-deployed forces in the region? In answering this question,
please break out your responses by BMD capable ships and SM-3 missiles.
Admiral Roughead. We are meeting existing requirements for BMD
forces today. The implementation of the phased adaptive approach to
missile defense of Europe requires an increase in our capacity of BMD-
capable ships and missiles to continue to meet global requirements.
We are increasing the number of our BMD ships by accelerating the
installation of Aegis BMD on our existing cruisers and destroyers and
by restarting the DDG-51 shipbuilding program. By 2015, new
construction and modernization will bring the total number of BMD
capable ships in our Fleet to 27, up from 21 today. Our long-term plan
is to modernize all 62 Aegis destroyers and up to 15 Aegis cruisers
with BMD capability while building new, BMD-capable DDG-51 ships.
We are also increasing the number of SM-3 missiles in our
inventory. Currently, we have 59 SM-3 missiles. The projected inventory
will be 61 by the end of fiscal year 2010 and 262 by end of fiscal year
2015.

92. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, is BMD training for the crews
of these Aegis-BMD ships sufficient to ameliorate stresses on the force
that are being called on to satisfy other non-BMD mission requirements?
Admiral Roughead. In February, we completed a thorough analysis of
the Aegis modernization training program, including BMD and non-BMD
mission training requirements. The analysis informed curricula
improvements now underway in the technical training associated with new
BMD baselines and open architecture systems, enlisted specialized
skills training, advanced warfare team training, and command, control,
communications, and intelligence interoperability training.
Implementation of these curricula improvements will complete in fiscal
year 2013 and will enhance BMD and non-BMD mission proficiency among
our crews. As we increase the number of BMD-capable ships in the Fleet
to support the President's phased adaptive approach for missile defense
of Europe, we will further enhance our training programs to accommodate
increased student throughput at Aegis training commands.

93. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, to what extent does your
budget request address that issue?
Admiral Roughead. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding to
expand our training throughput from 20 to 23 BMD-capable ships by the
end of fiscal year 2011. The expanded training will provide specialized
skills for additional individual operator training, instructor
capacity, team training, and technical training aids that will be
necessary as we grow our BMD capability.

law of the sea treaty
94. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, the
United States has not ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty while China
has continued efforts to assert sovereignty over contested areas in the
South China Sea and in other areas where such claims support China's
national security interests. Beijing has now suspended military-to-
military exchanges as a result of the recent U.S. announcement to
continue defensive arms sales to Taiwan. How are we managing our
relationship with China in disputed areas such as its maritime claims?
Secretary Mabus. The U.S. Navy (USN) manages its relationship with
China in disputed areas such as its maritime claims as part of the
Joint Force, in coordination with the interagency, and in accordance
with the appropriate DOD policies. In support of the larger U.S.
Government effort, the USN uses consistency in both policy statements
and operations. Examples include:

Navy leadership regularly reiterates the U.S. position
with senior leaders from other maritime powers, such as on 08
February with the Chief of Defense Forces, Singapore Armed
Forces.
USN representatives engaging with Chinese officials
promote U.S. Government interpretations of UNCLOS and
international maritime law at the appropriate policy venues
(ex: Defense Policy Consultative Talks).
Naval forces in the PACOM AOR conduct missions such as
hydrographic and military surveys in accordance with customary
international law as codified in UNCLOS.
USN educational institutions engage in academic
discussions with Chinese counterparts.
Naval forces leverage cooperative opportunities such
as the HOA counter-piracy operation to develop military-to-
military understanding that can mitigate future tensions.

Additionally, the Navy maintains that U.S. ratification of UNCLOS
directly supports our National security interests.
Admiral Roughead. We are managing our relationship with China, and
all other nations, in the maritime domain in accordance with customary
international law. We continue to conduct missions that are consistent
with customary international law, including our hydrographic and
military surveys in the Pacific Command area of responsibility. We are
also leveraging cooperative opportunities, such as in counter-piracy
operations, to develop military-to-military understanding that can
mitigate future tensions. Navy is committed to maintaining our forward
deployed naval forces and rotational forward presence in the Asia-
Pacific region.
With regard to the Law of the Sea Treaty, customary international
law is not universally accepted and may be changed by States over time.
Customary law does not offer the future stability that comes with being
a party to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Ratification of the Law of the
Sea Treaty would codify our essential navigational rights and freedoms
in disputed areas, and grant the United States a seat at the table when
critical navigational, economic, and other rights are being applied,
interpreted, and developed by other nations. I continue to support
ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty as vital to our National
security interests and helpful in managing our relations with foreign
nations, including China.

95. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, how do
you think the relationship with China will develop as we continue to
share the global commons--sea, air, space, and cyberspace--as our
interests clash or diverge?
Secretary Mabus. The U.S. Navy is working to support the U.S.
policy of building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive
relationship with the People's Republic of China. China's re-emergence
as an actor of consequence on the international stage is increasing the
quantity of interactions between our two militaries in the global
commons. As a consequence, and in support of U.S. policy, the U.S. Navy
is working hard to ensure the quality of these interactions both
supports the growth of a positive military relationship and encourages
China to channel their growing naval capabilities towards providing for
the security of the maritime commons.
Maritime security is a key element of our Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower. It is also an area of mutual interest we share
with the PLA(N) as China has become more dependent on the stability and
security of the maritime domain. Both the U.S. Navy and the PLA(N) are
showing an increasing willingness to maintain a positive momentum in
the development of our relationship, and Navy is optimistic that both
sides will continue to seek to cooperate where our interests converge
and to work out differences in a constructive and effective manner
through open and frank discussions.
The U.S. Navy seek to ensure interactions at sea between naval
vessels of the two countries are conducted in a safe and professional
manner through venues such as the Military Maritime Cooperative
Agreement.
Admiral Roughead. The U.S. Navy is working to support the U.S.
policy of building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive
relationship with the People's Republic of China. China's re-emergence
as an actor of consequence on the international stage is increasing the
quantity of interactions between our two militaries in the global
commons. As a consequence, and in support of U.S. policy, the U.S. Navy
is working hard to ensure the quality of these interactions both
supports the growth of a positive military relationship and encourages
China to channel their growing naval capabilities towards providing for
the security of the maritime commons.
Maritime security is a key element of our Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower. It is also an area of mutual interest we share
with the PLA(N) as China has become more dependent on the stability and
security of the maritime domain. Both the U.S. Navy and the PLA(N) are
showing an increasing willingness to maintain a positive momentum in
the development of our relationship, and Navy is optimistic that both
sides will continue to seek to cooperate where our interests converge
and to work out differences in a constructive and effective manner
through open and frank discussions.
The U.S. Navy seek to ensure interactions at sea between naval
vessels of the two countries are conducted in a safe and professional
manner through venues such as the Military Maritime Cooperative
Agreement.

u.s. marines-okinawa to guam realignment
96. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, on February
17, 2009, the U.S. Government reaffirmed its support of an agreement
with the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of the
relocation of 8,000 marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam by
2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Since then, the
Japanese elected a new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who has asked
the U.S. Government to consider new options for the Futenma Replacement
Facility, which is part of the larger agreement for Guam. I note that
the agreement stipulates that the Japanese Government must demonstrate
tangible progress regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility, which has
been defined to include a signature by the Governor of Okinawa on a
landfill permit required to commence construction. This action was
currently planned to take place in mid- to late-2010.
Recently, the Secretary of Defense suggested that we should
demonstrate patience in the negotiations with the Japanese Government
on the future of the agreement. With that said, the fiscal year 2011
budget request contains $452 million in MILCON funds for infrastructure
on Guam to support the relocation of marines from Okinawa. This is in
addition to $160 million authorized for construction in the fiscal year
2010 defense bill. Also, the Japanese Government transferred $336
million to DOD in July 2009 for projects on Guam. Does DOD plan to
award construction projects on Guam with U.S. funds or funds provided
by the Government of Japan prior to resolution of the future of Marine
Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma?
Secretary Mabus. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is $452
million in MILCON funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the
relocation of marines from Okinawa. The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 provided $514 million in authorization for
construction to support the Marine relocation.
The framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment is the
United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued
following the May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee. This framework confirms that the
Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected and,
specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)
relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things,
tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
(FRF).
Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue.
We have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
support of the combatant commander and to meet our commitments to
Allies and partners in the region, including under the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
We are currently waiting for the Government of Japan to complete
its review of the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he
intends to resolve the issue by May, and we look forward to resuming
work with the Government of Japan to fulfill our longstanding mutual
objective of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that the
Alliance's operational capabilities remain sustainable politically and
operationally.
General Conway. No DPRI projects have been awarded. They will be
awarded after the Record of Decision (ROD) is signed. The ROD is
anticipated in August 2010. GoJ has stated they will provide resolution
on the future of the FRF in May 2010.
Fiscal year 2010 MILCON projects were designed to have broad impact
and enduring value to DOD stationed on Guam. For example Apra Harbor
Warf improvements and defense access roads will benefit DOD independent
of any Marine relocation. We have time with MILCON planning to receive
and analyze GoJ FRF proposals.
The construction plan is designed purposely to phase in
capabilities and design requirements. This allows flexibility during
the initial construction phase and ultimately allows the force laydown
to drive final facility requirements.
Initially, infrastructure and enabling facilities, such as at Apra
Harbor to improve throughput, will be constructed. These initial
construction projects have an enduring value no matter what the final
laydown may be. This will be followed by construction of support
facilities, such as the fire station and medical clinic, and housing.
General purpose operational facilities, such as warehouses and
headquarters buildings, will then be constructed. The final
construction projects will be unit specific buildings that would be
particular to the force laydown on Guam.

97. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, what other
options are acceptable to the Marine Corps for the relocation of Marine
aviation units from MCAS Futenma?
Secretary Mabus. The current Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
plan is a result of several years of bilateral planning culminating in
what was agreed to be the best answer for both parties. The Government
of Japan (GoJ) has not made any formal proposals for alternate options,
nor have they formally identified what is wrong with the current agreed
to plan. We continue to honor the Agreed Implementation Plans (AIPs)
and will respect the GoJ's processes of policy review. However, it is
the USMC position that any FRF option the GoJ may present must provide
the same or better capability of the current FRF plan.
General Conway. The current FRF plan is a result of several years
of bilateral planning culminating in what was agreed to be the best
answer for both parties. The GoJ has not made any formal proposals for
alternate options, nor have they formally identified what is wrong with
the current agreed to plan. We continue to honor the AIPs and will
respect the GoJ's processes of policy review. However, it is the USMC
position that any FRF option the GoJ may present must provide the same
or better capability of the current FRF plan.

98. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, would it be
in the best interests of the Marine Corps to move marines to Guam
absent an acceptable solution for the Futenma Replacement Facility?
Secretary Mabus. The U.S.-Japan negotiated agreements were a
comprehensive set of realignment initiatives to meet the strategic
needs for both allies. Although the Government of Japan is taking a
hard look at Futenma Replacement Facility options, we remain confident
they realize the strategic value of having marines on Okinawa for their
own defense and for security in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability must remain
on Okinawa to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
stationed there. We currently have that capability with Marine Aircraft
Group 36 at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue,
and we have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
support of the combatant commander. We need to look at force laydown in
the Pacific in total, which includes aviation capabilities on Okinawa.
A suitable Futenma Replacement Facility is considered the ``lynchpin''
for USMC force relocation to Guam. Therefore, it is not the USMC desire
or intent to alter the force laydown, to include moving any forces to
Guam, until the Futenma issue is adequately resolved.
General Conway. The U.S.-Japan negotiated agreements were a
comprehensive set of realignment initiatives to meet the strategic
needs for both allies. Although the Government of Japan is taking a
hard look at Futenma Replacement Facility options, we remain confident
they realize the strategic value of having marines on Okinawa for their
own defense and for security in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability must remain
on Okinawa to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
stationed there. We currently have that capability with Marine Aircraft
Group 36 at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. If a suitable replacement
facility proves to be untenable, for whatever reason, we plan to
continue operating out of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
indefinitely.
Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue,
and we have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in
support of the combatant commander. We need to look at force laydown in
the Pacific in total, which includes aviation capabilities on Okinawa.
A suitable Futenma Replacement Facility is considered the ``lynchpin''
for USMC force relocation to Guam. Therefore, it is not the USMC desire
or intent to alter the force laydown, to include moving any forces to
Guam, until the Futenma issue is adequately resolved.

99. Senator McCain. General Conway, on a related issue, the plan
for the stationing of marines on Guam calls for the acquisition of land
not currently under the control of DOD in order to provide adequate
live fire training ranges for the marines stationed on Guam. Initial
assessments during the environmental review of the plan suggest that
these land acquisitions may be problematic and marines may need to use
ranges on other islands such as Tinian and Saipan to conduct training.
In your view, how will the potential lack of adequate ranges on Guam
affect Marine Corps training and readiness?
General Conway. A lack of adequate ranges and training capability
that would adversely affect readiness is a show stopper. Before moving
marines to Guam, we must ensure that adequate training capability is
available.
The Marine Corps has always maintained that adequate training
capability must be available in the area commensurate with relocation
of our marines. Marine forces on Guam must have the ability to sustain
core competencies in order to meet the operational requirements of the
combatant commander.

100. Senator McCain. General Conway, is this development
significant, or are there acceptable alternatives for the training of
marines stationed on Guam?
General Conway. While training ranges currently planned for Guam
and Tinian provide limited individual-skills training capabilities,
these ranges do not provide for all requisite collective, combined
arms, live and maneuver training the Marine Corps forces must meet to
sustain core competencies. Those Marine Corps forces relocating from
Okinawa to Guam will have to travel off-island to maintain requisite
core competency.
As part of continuing efforts by DOD to address these existing and
ongoing training issues, as well as the training needs of other
services in the Western Pacific, the OSD has directed U.S. Pacific
Command to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for joint
training requirements in the Western Pacific. This EIS will include an
evaluation for additional training facilities in the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands and other locations in the Western Pacific
to address collective, combined arms, live fire and maneuver training
requirements for Marine Corps and joint forces in the area.

101. Senator McCain. General Conway, is the development of a
training range on Tinian Island feasible?
General Conway. Currently, the plan to develop four expeditionary
training ranges to augment individual skills training on Guam is
feasible. Development of ranges that could potentially support ranges
to meet individual, unit level, and integrated combined arms training
requirements for training of Marine, joint, and multilateral forces on
Tinian are unknown and will be addressed in a separate Environmental
Impact Statement to be conducted by U.S. Pacific Command.

102. Senator McCain. General Conway, does a potential exist that
the Marine Corps will be forced to accept and adapt to a plan that does
not provide for adequate live fire training ranges on Guam as
originally envisioned?
General Conway. The Marine Corps has always maintained that
adequate training capability must be available in the area commensurate
with relocation of our marines. A lack of adequate ranges and training
capability that would adversely affect readiness is a show stopper.
Before moving marines to Guam, we must ensure that adequate training
capability is available and we are moving in the right direction
towards that capability.

103. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, on February 17, 2010, the
U.S. EPA rated the Navy's Draft EIS as Environmentally Unsatisfactory:
Inadequate Information. This rating was based on two aspects: first, by
not providing a specific plan to address wastewater treatment and water
supply needs of the increase in Guam's population due to the influx of
construction workers related to facilities improvements on Guam which
may result in significant adverse public health impacts; and second,
because aspects of the project will result in what EPA views as
unacceptable impacts to the coral reef ecosystem in Apra Harbor. EPA
states that the impacts are of sufficient magnitude that EPA believes
that the proposed improvements to facilities in Guam should not proceed
as proposed and that improved analyses are required to ensure the final
EIS is adequate. Given this very negative position by EPA on the
current environmental analysis supporting the improvements of
facilities on Guam, and the aggressive 2014 deadline for facilities to
be ready to support the relocation of 8,000 marines and 9,000 family
members from Okinawa to Guam, what is the Navy going to do to correct
these apparent deficiencies?
Secretary Mabus. The Guam military build-up EIS is one of the most
complex EISs ever undertaken by DOD. We have worked closely with EPA
and other Federal and local agencies during the development of the
Draft EIS, and expected that formal agency comments would point out
deficiencies and areas requiring revision. We are currently analyzing
all comments received on the Draft EIS and are determining how best to
address these issues in the Final EIS. The White House Council on
Environmental Quality is also involved and is leading interagency
efforts to help determine how best to assess and address the indirect
impacts of the military buildup. DOD is committed to executing the
program on Guam in such a way that will not pose significant public
health impacts, so we are currently evaluating the major potential
causes of those impacts and developing mitigation solutions. We also
continue to work with other Federal agencies to find ``whole-of-
government funding'' solutions to address Guam's existing conditions
and potential impacts associated with the general population growth of
Guam.

104. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, can the Navy proceed with any
of the MILCON projects requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget
request, or projects to be funded by the Government of Japan, given the
need to carry out further environmental analyses to support the build
up on Guam?
Secretary Mabus. We are currently reviewing public comments
received on the DEIS, developing strategies for how best to address
them in the Final EIS, and determining whether any of the issues raised
by public comments received require further environmental analysis. As
of this time we have not identified any specific issues or items that
require additional environmental analysis such that we would not be
able to carry out projects funded by the Government of Japan in
Japanese fiscal year 2009 and 2010, and U.S. MILCON in fiscal year 2010
and 2011.
We must complete the Final EIS and sign the ROD before starting any
of the construction projects, regardless of funding source. Our
acquisition strategy allows for award of contracts for all projects for
which we have received GOJ or US funding immediately following the
signing of the ROD.

105. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, what projects are likely to
be delayed due to the need to address the issues raised by EPA?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy is currently reviewing the comments
submitted by EPA on the Draft EIS. While EPA has raised many serious
concerns, we are optimistic that we can respond to the issues raised
and make necessary changes to the Final EIS to address EPA's concerns
and thus avoid any delay in the program.
The following Government of Japan funded Japanese fiscal year 2009
and 2010 projects, as well as the U.S. MILCON fiscal year 2010 and 2011
projects, are scheduled to be awarded shortly after a ROD is issued
later this fiscal year.

JFY 2009 ACE Gate, U&SI Ph I, AAFB
JFY 2009 Apra Harbor, U&SI Ph 1
JFY 2009 Finegayan, U&SI Ph I
FY 2010 P-1003 Military Working Dogs
FY 2010 P-204 Apra Wharf Ph I (U/T) Increment I
FY 2010 P-100 North Ramp Utilities Ph I, AAFB
FY 2010 P-101 North Ramp Parking Ph I, AAFB
JFY 2010 J007 Waterfront Ops
JFY 2010 J008 Fire Station, Finegayan
JFY 2010 J006 Apra Harbor Clinic
JFY 2010 J017 U&SI Ph II, Finegayan
JFY 2010 J-010 BEQ, Finegayan
FY 2011 P-110 U&SI, Finegayan Ph I
FY 2011 P-202 North Ramp Utilities Ph II, AAFB
FY 2011 P-203 North Ramp Parking Ph II, AAFB
FY 2011 P-204 Apra Wharf Ph I (U/T) Increment II
JFY 2011 J-011 Base Admin Bldg
JFY 2011 J-012 MLG Admin Bldg
JFY 2011 J-015 Enlisted Dining Facility
JFY 2011 J-016 BEQ Site Adapt, 2 BEQs, Finegayan

106. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, how will this delay impact
the deadline to be ready for the marines to move to Guam by 2014?
Secretary Mabus. We are committed to the 2014 date agreed to in the
Realignment Roadmap between the United States and Japan. We are
currently reviewing public comments received on the DEIS and developing
strategies for how best to address them in the Final EIS and sign a ROD
in time to begin construction in fiscal year 2010.

china
107. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, are you comfortable with the
current number of U.S. submarines, especially at the rate that China is
building and deploying its submarine fleet?
Admiral Roughead. Our existing submarine fleet of 53 attack
submarines (SSNs) is meeting all critical combatant commander SSN
requirements, including any potential threat posed by the existing
Chinese submarine fleet.
Beyond the FYDP, our SSN force structure will dip below combatant
commanders' minimum force level requirement of 48 SSNs in 2024, as we
decommission Los Angeles-class SSNs at a rate of 3 to 4 per year. Our
ability to effectively counter submarine threats posed in this
timeframe hinges on our reaching and maintaining an increased
construction rate of two Virginia-class SSNs per year starting in 2011.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for this construction.

108. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead, how is the Navy planning
long-term to maintain its strategic and tactical dominance in Asia-
Pacific?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy will continue to maintain its strategic
and tactical dominance in the Asia-Pacific region through sustained
engagement with allies and partners and the persistent forward presence
of our combat-capable ships and aircraft in the region. Specifically,
we will continue to forward deploy naval forces and exercise the
freedom of maneuver necessary to deter aggression, assure our allies,
and enable our quick response to regional contingencies. We will employ
superior and resilient warfare systems, including sea-based BMD and
conduct exercises to improve interoperability with our joint service
and international partners. We will conduct regional maritime security
operations and partnership building activities to protect maritime
resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and counter
conventional and irregular challenges, including maritime-related
terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy,
environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. Navy
remains committed to sustained and active engagement in the Asia-
Pacific region over the long-term to protect our vital national
interests.

proposal for moratorium on discharges
109. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, in his testimony on February 2, Admiral Mullen was clear that
the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed their best military advice
about the impact of a repeal of the DADT policy or the manner in which
a change would be implemented. However, many in Congress intend to move
quickly through legislation to repeal the law as quickly as possible,
including imposition of a moratorium on administrative separations
while the high level review proceeds. Do you support a moratorium on
discharges of openly gay servicemembers while the high level review is
conducted?
Secretary Mabus. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium
because I believe that it would complicate the ongoing review directed
by Secretary Gates to assess the potential impact of a repeal of 10
U.S.C. Sec. 654. The Department of the Navy is participating in the DOD
Comprehensive Review Working Group to assess the implications of a
repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 and, should that occur, to develop an
implementation plan for any statutory change. That review is due to
report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. I strongly
believe we owe our servicemembers informed and thoughtful
decisionmaking.
Admiral Roughead. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium
because I believe that it would be extremely confusing to the force at
a time when they are engaged in two combat operations and other
demanding military activities around the globe. Moreover, a moratorium
could complicate the ongoing review directed by Secretary Gates.
General Conway. No.

110. Senator McCain. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General
Conway, what is the basis for your objection to a congressionally-
mandated moratorium on separations of openly gay servicemembers under
the DADT policy?
Secretary Mabus. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium
because I believe that it would complicate the ongoing review directed
by Secretary Gates to assess the potential impacts of a repeal of 10
U.S.C. Sec. 654. The Department of the Navy is participating in the DOD
Comprehensive Review Working Group to assess the implications of a
repeal of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654, should that occur, and develop an
implementation plan for any new statutory mandate. That review is due
to report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. I
strongly believe we owe our servicemembers informed and thoughtful
decisionmaking.
Admiral Roughead. I believe a moratorium would be extremely
confusing to the force at a time when they are engaged in two combat
operations and other demanding military activities around the globe,
and that a moratorium could complicate the ongoing comprehensive review
directed by Secretary Gates.
General Conway. Until such time as the law is changed, the Marine
Corps will follow the law.
Commanders in the field are executing the current law and policy to
the absolute best of their abilities.
During this time of war, Congress should either change the law or
not. Half measures, while the public debate and in-depth study are
ongoing, will only create confusion for commanders and marines and add
an additional level of friction to an already complex battlefield.

role of the joint chiefs of staff
111. Senator McCain. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, Admiral
Mullen is the principal military adviser to the President and the
Secretary of Defense, but under law, he must consult and seek advice
from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant
commanders. Have you been given adequate opportunity to state your
views to date?
Admiral Roughead. Yes. The Chairman has always been receptive to
hearing my views on matters affecting the U.S. Navy.
General Conway. Senator McCain, I believe that Admiral Mullen has
sought out, and provided me adequate opportunity to state my views. If
disagreement exists, the Chairman routinely shares the Service Chiefs'
views with the President and the Secretary of Defense. If the Service
Chiefs think we need a stronger reply, we are not hesitant to write and
sign a 16-star letter and send it forward.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
life cycle fuel consumption and costs
112. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, on December 3, 2009, I sent
you a letter and expressed concern that ``TOC, including fuel
efficiency, should be a critical factor of competitive cost
evaluation'' in the LCS request for proposal (RFP). On January 14,
2010, you responded in a letter and stated, ``reduced TOC has been
central to the LCS concept and requirements.'' Additionally, you stated
at the Naval Energy Forum in October 2009 that, ``the lifetime energy
cost of a building or a system, and the fully burdened cost of fuel in
powering those, will be a mandatory evaluation factor used when
awarding contracts.'' Where, specifically, in the final RFP do you
evaluate the lifecycle fuel costs in dollars for the LCS?
Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
2007).
The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
the program.
The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development
costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council.
With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
are today because of the inherent design features that have been
required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

113. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, how did you determine the
factors to address those lifecycle fuel costs in dollars and where was
the data generated to determine the lifecycle fuel consumption?
Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
2007).
The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
the program.
The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
each ship design. Total Ownership considers research and development
costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council.
With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
are today because of the inherent design features that have been
required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

114. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, why was the determination
of fuel consumption and lifecycle costs done in terms of percentages
vice real dollars?
Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
2007).
The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
the program.
The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development
costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council.
With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
are today because of the inherent design features that have been
required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

115. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, is the use of percentages a
common practice for evaluating these important criteria? If you think
it does or does not, please explain your rationale.
Secretary Mabus. The LCS fiscal years 2010-2014 block buy
solicitation does not specifically address life cycle fuel costs in
dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one of six technical/management
evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose specific life
cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs--
training, maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration
management, operations (including fuel usage), environmental impact and
disposal. These are common TOC categories in the Operating and Support
Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (October
2007).
The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its
evaluation under the price/cost category. Since the inception of the
LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and
life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost
considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy's
requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package
modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of
the program.
The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of
each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development
costs, investment costs, disposal costs, and O&S costs including
maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and infrastructure support. The
Navy's analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements.
In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the
estimated life cycle cost for each ship design, but are also highly
dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS mission.
Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly
based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time
profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications
was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform a single
wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other
significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or
anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned from
actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a
variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold
value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development
Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council.
With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship
of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they
are today because of the inherent design features that have been
required from the beginning of the program and the continued focus on
reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to include O&S costs in the
price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the Offerors would
have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective
designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed
changes to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition
process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing
acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to the program.
The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/
management category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-
proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated,
assigned an adjectival rating, and factored into the overall best value
determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will
therefore be a consideration in the Navy's best value determination for
this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the
proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the
contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable
long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design.

116. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, in your letter to me dated
January 14, 2010, you stated, ``prior to the fiscal year 2010 contract
award, the LCS program will be presented to the Under Secretary of
Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the Milestone
Decision Authority for a Milestone B decision. Here, the Navy's Life
Cycle Cost Estimate will be scrutinized against an independently
derived estimate for the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE).'' It is my understanding that the milestone
decision will occur after the source selection. Why would you wait
until after a source selection is made to evaluate the second most
important program cost criteria for the life cycle cost of the LCS?
Secretary Mabus. The contract award of the LCS fiscal year 2010-
2014 block buy solicitation will not occur until after the Milestone B
has been conducted. Rather, the Navy will prepare for and participate
in the Milestone B decision process concurrently with its evaluation of
competing proposals under this solicitation.
This approach has been used on other shipbuilding programs and was
most recently used on the competitive contract award of the Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV) in November 2008.
This approach is consistent with both the January 14, 2010 letter
and in my public statements before the Naval Energy Forum in October
2009.

117. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, has this approach ever been
used before, or is it common practice to consider life cycle fuel
consumption after the source selection is made? If so, please provide
the program name and dates where this approach was executed.
Secretary Mabus. The contract award of the LCS fiscal year 2010-
2014 block buy solicitation will not occur until after the Milestone B
has been conducted. Rather, the Navy will prepare for and participate
in the Milestone B decision process concurrently with its evaluation of
competing proposals under this solicitation.
This approach has been used on other shipbuilding programs and was
most recently used on the competitive contract award of the JHSV in
November 2008.
This approach is consistent with both the January 14, 2010 letter
and in my public statements before the Naval Energy Forum in October
2009.

118. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, do you feel that this
approach is consistent with your statements of January 14, 2010, in the
letter to me and your public statement before the Naval Energy Forum in
October 2009?
Secretary Mabus. Yes. From the inception of the LCS Program, TOC
has been addressed through the utilization of open architecture,
reduced manning, and reduced maintenance. Although fuel (energy) costs
are not a specific evaluation factor in the cost section of the LCS
Request For Proposal (RFP), the RFP strikes an appropriate balance
between the acquisition costs and O&S costs that make up the overall
TOCs.
The technical/management section of the RFP specifically focuses on
the drivers of TOC in an effort to further reduce O&S costs,
particularly in the area of energy usage or fuel costs. From the
beginning of the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both
acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this
regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both LCS
designs, through the Navy's requirements for reduced manning, mission
package modularity and open architecture that have been key design
parameters since the inception of the program.
The fiscal year 2010 LCS RFP addresses TOC as one of six technical
factors. This factor specifically focuses on future efforts to reduce
ownership cost in the areas of training, maintenance, supply support,
configuration management, operations costs (which include fuel),
environmental impact and disposal, all of which affect TOC. The RFP
includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management category
for life cycle cost reduction initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives
to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjective
rating, and factored into the overall best value determination.
Fuel costs are highly dependent on the speed-time profile assumed
for the LCS mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would
vary significantly based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover,
the speed-time profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build
Specifications was based upon an assumption that the ship would perform
a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect
other significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare
or anti-surface warfare, did not reflect any lessons learned from
actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include
a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for
representative operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the
threshold value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities
Development Document as ``Ownership Cost'' and approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council.

draft request for proposal sections l and m
119. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, why
was the decision made to not provide Sections L and M to the bidders
during the draft RFP comment period?
Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A-J were released to
industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by Naval Sea Systems Command Contracts Directorate
(NAVSEA 02) and Program Executive Office for Ships (PEO SHIPS).
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
Sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without Sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for Integrated Submarine Imaging Systems (ISIS) in support
of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract
award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG-51
program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were
issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without
protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of Sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

120. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, do you
feel this is a mishandling of the draft RFP and could serve as a
potential area of protest?
Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (Sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A-J were released to
industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

121. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, who
made this decision?
Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work. Draft RFP sections A-J were released to
industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
Sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of Sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure, and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

122. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, on
what other occasions has the Navy not provided these sections during
the draft RFP comment period?
Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A-J were released to
industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

123. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, what
was the outcome of those acquisition programs?
Secretary Mabus. The decision not to release a draft of sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work. Draft RFP sections A-J were released to
industry prior to the OSD Peer Review.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program
Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not
protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the
draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.
Admiral Roughead. The decision to not release a draft of sections L
and M until after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a
mishandling of the draft RFP, nor does it constitute a basis for
protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete (sections A-J) were
provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of
the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them to
provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure
of the statement of work.
DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems
acquisitions to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy
implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of
contracting processes, and facilitate sharing of best practices and
lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were not released to
industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based on a
joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS.
The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of
the draft RFP varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for
sections L and M to be released only after they have been finalized. A
draft RFP without sections L and M was issued for the competitive
procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this procurement was
not protested. For the DDG-51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only
the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was
successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing.

best value approach
124. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, you stated before this
committee on February 25, 2010, that, ``both ships meet the
requirements for the Navy.'' I understand that LCS-1 has made
engineering modifications after delivery to place stern extensions to
the hull to address performance issues. If that information is
accurate, how can you state that both ships met the requirements on
delivery?
Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

125. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, additionally, the final RFP
allows for changes and modifications to the hull to address weight,
trim, and stability. Are these changes to LCS-1 being allowed to
compensate for a design shortfall in the hull's performance even after
she was delivered to the Navy?
Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
years 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

126. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, does this then mean that
LCS-1 meets the performance requirements as outlined by the Navy?
Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

127. Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, if a provision can be made
to enhance the performance of one ship in these areas, why did you
determine that changes could not be made to descope the ships where
they over perform to allow for cost competitiveness?
Secretary Mabus. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are
required to meet stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the
ship's length is flooded. The Build Specification for LCS invokes this
requirement. LCS-1 meets these requirements with the addition of the
external tanks. The LCS-3 had already incorporated this change into the
fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline
for the fiscal year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the
LCS-4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel
and transom redesign, which is the performance baseline for the fiscal
year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal
year 2010-2014 block buy solicitation meet the Navy's standards.

u.s. marine corps requirements
128. Senator Sessions. General Conway, it is my understanding that
you toured the USS Independence (LCS-2) last year. Is a larger mission
bay more advantageous to Marine Corps operations when comparing LCS-2
to LCS-1?
General Conway. A larger mission bay would be advantageous,
however, the LCS has a limited interface capability and does not have
the capability for at-sea offload. The Marine Corps continues to
explore LCS options with the Navy.

129. Senator Sessions. General Conway, is a larger flight deck more
advantageous to Marine Corps operations when comparing LCS-2 to LCS-1?
General Conway. A comparison of LCS-1 versus LCS-2 shows that LCS-
2's larger flight deck would be preferable. It is large enough to
support landing up to a single CH-53E or a single MV-22 at a time and
possibly supporting dual operations of H-1 aircraft whereas the smaller
LCS-1 flight deck would only support landing a single H-1 at a time.
However, the LCS class of ships was not structurally designed to
support landing aircraft heavier than Navy MH-60 variants. This results
in neither ship being capable of supporting landing operations of the
USMC's primary assault support helicopters (MV-22/CH-53E). The Marine
Corps is currently working with the Navy in exploring current LCS
capabilities, determining the costs associated with possible flight
deck modifications, and how future LCS operations could incorporate
Marine Forces. Actions such as increasing the deck and point loading
strength of the LCS-2 or modifying the design of the LCS-1 flight deck
to support larger helicopters would enable safe and sustained landing
operations of all Marine Corps rotary-wing platforms. This ability
would enhance and provide flexibility to stated LCS mission sets such
as SOF support, NEO, HA/DR, and theater security cooperation/maritime
influence. This would in turn provide maritime component planners
greater flexibility in course of action development. We understand that
ultimately the Navy must find solutions that best support the LCS
mission.

130. Senator Sessions. General Conway, were Marine Corps
operational requirements taken into consideration during the
development of the draft RFP or final RFP for the LCS program? If so,
what were those requirements and if not, why not?
General Conway. Marine Corps operational requirements were not
taken into consideration. LCS was primarily designed to support three
Navy missions in the littorals: mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare,
and surface warfare.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
contract for lpd-26
131. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, I understand that a RFP has
been released for the LPD-26 and a proposal has been submitted.
Congress has appropriated significant funding for the LPD-26, and the
longer there is no contract, the more jobs that are at risk. Please
provide me with a status update on the contract.
Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding
plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding
contract awards. A Request for Proposal for LPD-26 with an option for
LPD-27 was sent to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) on May 4, 2009.
The shipbuilder provided their LPD-26 proposal to the Navy on January
26, 2010. The Navy immediately began fact finding on the proposal. The
review and audit of this proposal is ongoing, with negotiations
expected to start shortly. However, the speed of the resolution and the
final award will depend on the ability of both NGSB and the Navy to
reach an agreement that is fair and reasonable.
In June 2009, Navy awarded $213 million of LPD-26 long lead time
material (LLTM). An additional $200 million is in process in order to
maintain the contractor proposed production schedule.

132. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, how quickly will the Navy
take to approve a bid to move forward on the LPD-26?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding
plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding
contract awards. A Request for Proposal for LPD-26 with an option for
LPD-27 was sent to NGSB on May 4, 2009. The shipbuilder provided their
LPD-26 proposal to the Navy on January 26, 2010. The Navy immediately
began fact finding on the proposal. As a result of discussions between
the Navy and NGSB, the proposal is ongoing, with negotiations expected
to start shortly. However, the speed of the resolution and the final
award will depend on the ability of both NGSB and the Navy to reach an
agreement that is fair and reasonable.
In June 2009, Navy awarded $213 million of LPD-26 LLTM. An
additional $200 million is in process in order to maintain the
contractor's proposed production schedule.

133. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, can you give a definitive
deadline on when this will be approved?
Secretary Mabus. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding
plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding
contract awards. For the LPD-17 program, the Navy awarded $213 million
of LLTM to NGSB for LPD-26 on June 23, 2009. The Navy's Request for
Proposal (RFP), issued on May 4, 2009 for construction of LPD-26,
included options for LPD-27 LLTM and for LPD-27 construction. The Navy
received a proposal from NGSB for construction of LPD-26 and some LLTM
for LPD-27 on January 26, 2010, and is actively in discussions with
NGSB to reach an agreement.

information technology contracts
134. Senator Vitter. Secretary Mabus, the Department of the Navy
was visionary in their pursuit and implementation of the Navy Marine
Corps Intranet (NMCI), the single largest information technology (IT)
network in the world short of the Internet itself. NMCI has been in
place since 2000 and has proven to be invaluable to the Department of
the Navy as the world's preeminent command and control network and
placing the Department of the Navy ahead of both the Army and the Air
Force in IT capability.
We are now coming to the conclusion of this contract which will
expire in October of this year. It is my understanding the Department
of the Navy has decided to continue operations using a Continuations of
Services Contract (COSC) until the Department finalizes the RFP
necessary to procure for the Next Generation Enterprise Contract which
will be the program of record building on NMCI.
My question for you is in these challenging economic times wouldn't
it be best for the taxpayers and the Department of the Navy to contract
those services via a multi-year contract for the required duration of
the COSC, instead of a series of single-year contracts? We know these
multi-year contracts reduce program costs because they enable the
ability to plan and make the necessary arrangements well into the
future rather than negotiating program specifics on an annual basis
regarding workforce retention, supplier pricing, and asset cost
recovery.
Secretary Mabus. As a multi-year contract the Department of the
Navy would be locked into an extended non-competitive relationship with
predetermined minimums that would compromise the competitive
environment we seek to create for NGEN. The DoN goal is to transition
as quickly as possible from COSC to competitive contracts.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
public shipyards
135. Senator Collins. Secretary Mabus, last year I raised the issue
of maintaining the infrastructure in our four public shipyards. You
indicated that the Navy is trying to incorporate more mission critical
infrastructure improvement projects into the base budget rather than
relying on congressional earmarks for funding. Although the President's
fiscal year 2011 budget includes slight increases in MILCON and SRM
funding, I remain concerned about the material condition of Navy
shipyards. According to the Navy the current SRM backlog, as of last
December, was $3 billion. Can you please detail how the Navy plans on
addressing this backlog and upgrading our public shipyards?
Secretary Mabus. Shipyards are fully functional and safely meeting
their fleet mission requirements. The Navy has steadily increased its
investment in Naval shipyard recapitalization over the past several
years through Operation and Maintenance, Navy and MILCON projects.
In 2009, Navy completed a comprehensive condition assessment of the
Naval shipyards to assess restoration requirements. A configuration
analysis was also recently completed for modernization requirements.
We are developing future investment plans to properly address the
backlog to ensure that the public shipyards continue to meet future
mission requirements.

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich,
Burris, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald
J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W.
Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member;
and John H. Quirk V, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
and Jennifer R. Knowles.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Patrick Hayes, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator
Burris; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A.
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant
to Senator Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We will start with
a warm welcome to our witnesses. Secretary Donley, General
Schwartz, we welcome you back to the committee to testify on
the plans and the programs of the U.S. Air Force as we review
the fiscal year 2011 annual budget and overseas contingency
operations (OCO) request of the administration.
Gentlemen, please extend on behalf of our committee our
gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force and to their
families, for the many sacrifices that they have made on behalf
of our Nation; thanks to both of you for your long careers of
leadership and service.
The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last
year to rebalance the force towards the military capabilities
necessary to prevail in today's wars, to buy weapons that are
relevant and affordable, and to ensure that tax dollars are
used wisely. Consistent with those reform goals set out by
Secretary Gates and the results of the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), a top priority for the Department of Defense
(DOD) must be the critical requirements for the ongoing
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our committee has sought to
ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to
succeed in those conflicts, including technologies to counter
improvised explosive devices (IED) and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
We're confident that this committee will continue to
support the needs of our warfighters in those conflicts. I
would note in particular that the new budget is going to
support expanding the number of Predator Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) in theater from approximately 150 to 200. This
committee has been pressing for more UAVs I think every single
year for at least the last 15 years.
A number of critical issues confront the Air Force. We know
that the Air Force is providing forces to the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) war efforts in a number of traditional roles,
but is also providing airmen in support of land component
tasks. We look forward to hearing this morning about how the
Air Force is responding to the shift of emphasis from Iraq to
Afghanistan and how the Air Force is supporting these current
operations while preparing its forces to deal with future
demands.
The catastrophic January 12, 2010, earthquake that struck
the nation of Haiti reminded all of us just how indiscriminate
national disasters can be and renewed America's commitments to
the Nation of Haiti. DOD has mobilized resources and manpower
to aid in the relief effort in support of the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
We know that the Air Force has played a critical role in
supporting those relief efforts in Haiti, and we applaud those
efforts and stand ready to continue to work with the Air Force
to ensure that DOD is able to continue to provide support to
this critical humanitarian disaster response effort in the
weeks and months ahead.
We await receipt of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). We
also expect that the Senate will be presented with a new treaty
to succeed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Significant reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, both
deployed warheads and those in reserve, while maintaining the
remaining stockpile in a safe, secure, and reliable
configuration, should strengthen our security. We will be
having much more discussion on these topics in the coming
weeks.
The NPR, as well as the START follow-on treaty, could have
a significant impact on the Air Force. The budget request for
fiscal year 2011 includes funds to begin the next phase of the
life extension study for the B-61 nuclear bomb. This nuclear
gravity bomb is the only nuclear weapon carried by fighter
aircraft and is the only nuclear weapon carried by North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft.
The Air Force is looking at bomber force reductions, a new
bomber aircraft, and the possibility of some changes in the
Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force,
either in the number of deployed systems or the number of
nuclear warheads loaded on missiles. After the significant
failures in the management of the nuclear force structure, the
Air Force has taken significant steps to refocus on the nuclear
enterprise, including the recent standup of the Global Strike
Command. But there is much more that needs to be done. More
rigorous nuclear inspections have uncovered deep systemic
problems. There's been progress and a lot of hard work on the
part of many dedicated professionals, but the recovery is by no
means complete.
The most pressing space issue for the Air Force, together
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is to
address the management of space programs. Currently management
of space programs is very fragmented. One of the reasons for
this predicament is that the Air Force has been without an
Under Secretary since well before the end of the Bush
administration.
That extended vacancy in the Under Secretary's position
raises a more fundamental problem that the Air Force is facing
now. The President has nominated and the committee has
considered, and indeed unanimously endorsed, a number of well-
qualified people to fill vacancies in DOD. I intend to seek
again unanimous consent to move those nominations through the
Senate. They've been stalled far too long. It is unconscionable
what these holds are doing to nominees that are nominated to
fill essential positions.
I would hope that all of my colleagues, all of us on this
committee, will join in this effort to get these nominees
confirmed. They were unanimously approved by this committee,
and these vacancies matter and it makes it much more difficult
for the agencies, in this case the Air Force, to carry out
essential functions.
Another acquisition challenge facing the Air Force is the
closure of several production lines and the stretching out of
others. Once again, the Air Force has chosen not to request
funds for the C-17 aircraft program and the overall F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) program has been stretched out. I know
that the JSF program is being managed by a joint program office
with representatives from the Air Force and the Department of
the Navy. Also, at the current time, an Air Force official
serves as the senior acquisition executive overseeing the JSF
joint program office.
Given the recent revelations of troubles with the system
design and demonstration phase of the JSF program and the
relief of the program manager, as well as Secretary Donley's
indications this week that the initial operating capability
(IOC) date for the Air Force has slipped and the restructured
program may incur a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the committee will be
holding a hearing next week on the JSF program. I specifically
want to thank again Senator McCain for his bird-dogging of this
and so many programs. I just want to again let all the members
of the committee know that the hearing, which Senator McCain
has requested very appropriately, should be scheduled by the
end of next week, and we thank him for his focus on this matter
on behalf of all of us.
One program that appears to be moving forward as planned at
this time last year is the Strategic Tanker Modernization
program. The Department of the Air Force issued a new request
for proposals (RFP) late last month. We look forward to the Air
Force's proceeding on that program.
Underlying all these major acquisition concerns is an
acquisition management issue. Secretary Donley, both you and
your predecessor have made it a major goal to improve the Air
Force acquisition corps. I believe that we all realize that the
Air Force needed to take significant steps to build up the
acquisition workforce and restore confidence in the Air Force
acquisition program after the abuses and poor decisions that
were previously documented on the tanker lease program.
In addition, the President last year signed the Weapons
Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, which this
committee led in getting passed. While this legislation will
help correct past problems, I also know that we will succeed
only through concerted efforts within the executive branch to
implement the spirit of that legislation and to improve past
behavior within DOD. We cannot legislate a culture change. We
can do everything we can legislatively, and we have. We can
perform oversight, which we have a responsibility to do. But
the culture change, which is essential, can only come
internally.
We look forward to hearing from you this morning about what
progress you're making on this issue, expanding the acquisition
workforce, and dealing with the other issues that face the Air
Force.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming Secretary Donley and General Schwartz here
today to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year
2011 for the Department of the Air Force. Informed by the 2010
QDR and the aircraft investment plan for fiscal years 2011
through 2040, the Air Force's fiscal year 2011 base budget
request of $150 billion builds on the substantial changes that
both of you outlined in last year's budget. I want to
emphasize, I understand the Air Force is going through a period
of significant transition where winning the wars of today while
preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow requires balancing of
risks.
I look forward to your assessment as to how this budget
proposal achieves a desirable balance between our present and
future priorities. I want to again state, I greatly appreciate
your continuing to place the highest priority on supporting our
men and women who wear the blue uniform and their families.
There can be no doubt that, like our soldiers, sailors, and
marines, they deserve the most steadfast and united support we
can offer.
As the chairman mentioned, JSF is one of the Air Force's
top acquisition priorities, and I'm very concerned about the
stability of that program. Despite Secretary Gates' decision to
restructure the program, I remain concerned about the ability
of the test program to detect and anticipate problems, how
effectively software risk will be managed going forward,
whether deficiencies in the program's manufacturing processes
will be resolved so that flight testing and production hold
schedule, and the capability of those aircraft that will be
delivered under low-rate initial production.
As to the Air Force decision this week to extend the
deadline by which it is supposed to accept delivery of JSF
aircraft with IOC, I ask that the witnesses explain why the Air
Force decided to extend the IOC date, exactly what kind of
capability will those aircraft have, what effect that decision
will have on the cost of buying that aircraft, the Air Force's
anticipated fighter shortfall, and the basing plans for the
aircraft.
I want to thank the chairman for scheduling a hearing on
this very important issue. There are a lot of questions that
need to be answered. Given Secretary Gates' testimony before
the committee just early last month that the Services' IOC
dates would not change, it appears that just over the last few
weeks the Secretary and the Services have increased their
appreciation of the development and production risks associated
with the program.
In my view, that piecemeal process by which DOD has been
assessing risk and only in some cases notifying the committee
in a timely and appropriate manner of required changes to the
program frustrates the ability of this committee to subject
this program to proper congressional oversight.
Against that backdrop, I want to again thank Chairman Levin
for agreeing to hold hearings, and probably more than one, on
this very important weapons system.
I have serious concerns about the Air Force's commitment to
managing military space programs, for which $10.9 billion is
requested in the 2011 budget. I applaud the decision to move
away from some of the high-risk programs of the past, but I'm
concerned that the Air Force continues to make significant
investments without a designated executive agent for space or a
space posture review and strategy, which I now hear could be
delayed by as much as a year.
I look forward to hearing how committed the Air Force
remains to its space acquisition mission and, if so, exactly
how it intends to reverse the troubling trend of chronic
schedule delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and the widening gaps
in capability.
Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their
families to sacrifice so much, both Congress and the
administration must be ready to make some tough funding
decisions, something we have failed miserably at in previous
years. Despite numerous calls last year for earmark reform, the
Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill signed into law
contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in
unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the alternative
engine for the Air Force's version of the JSF. That's $7
billion that DOD had to eat in programs that it didn't request
or need, at the expense of more pressing military priorities.
I was encouraged by Secretary Gates laying an early marker
last month by indicating that if we added funds to continue the
C-17 and the alternate engine for the JSF in 2011, he would
strongly recommend that the President veto the bill. I look
forward to seeing the President himself issue that veto threat.
Now, I'd like to know whether our witnesses support Secretary
Gates' positions on both programs.
Finally, I'm interested in the views of General Schwartz
and Secretary Donley on the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy.
We will continue to listen to our military leaders. As I know,
recruitment and retention is at an all-time high in the history
of the All-Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is
working and changes to it would have to be carefully
considered.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I join you in welcoming Secretary Donley and General Schwartz here
today to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011
for the Department of the Air Force.
Informed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Aircraft
Investment Plan for fiscal years 2011 through 2040, the Air Force's
fiscal year 2011 base budget request of $150 billion builds on the
substantial changes that the both of you outlined in last year's
budget. Where winning the wars of today while preparing for the
conflicts of tomorrow require a balancing of risk, I look forward to
your assessment as to how this budget proposal achieves a desirable
balance between our present and future priorities.
I greatly appreciate your continuing to place the highest priority
on supporting our men and women who wear the blue uniform and their
families. There can be no doubt that like our soldiers, sailors and
marines, they deserve the most steadfast and united support we can
offer.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is one of the Air Force's top
acquisition priorities and I am very concerned about the stability of
that program. Despite Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the
program, I remain concerned about the ability of the test program to
detect and anticipate problems; how effectively software risk will be
managed going forward; whether deficiencies in the program's
manufacturing processes will be resolved so that flight testing and
production hold schedule; and the capability of those aircraft that
will be delivered under ``low-rate initial production''. As to the Air
Force's decision this week to extend the deadline by which it is
supposed to accept delivery of JSF aircraft with ``initial operating
capability'' (IOC), I ask that the witnesses explain why the Air Force
decided to extend that IOC date; exactly what kind of capability will
those aircraft have; what effect that decision will have on the cost of
buying that plane, the Air Force's anticipated fighter shortfall, and
the basing plans for the aircraft.
Given Secretary Gates' testimony before the committee early last
month that the Services' IOC dates would not change, it appears that
just over the last few weeks the Secretary and the Services have
increased their appreciation of the development and production risks
associated with the program. In my view, that piecemeal process (by
which the Department has been assessing risk and, only in some cases,
notifying the committee timely and appropriately of required changes to
the program) frustrates the ability of this committee to subject this
program to proper congressional oversight. Against that backdrop,
Chairman Levin has agreed to hold hearings as early as next week on the
status of the F-35 program, which I wholeheartedly support.
I also have serious concerns about the Department's commitment to
managing military space programs, for which $10.9 billion is requested
in the 2011 budget. While I applaud the decision to move away from some
of the high-risk programs of the past, I am concerned that the Air
Force continues to make significant investments without a designated
executive agent for space or a space posture review and strategy, which
I now hear could be delayed by as much as a year. I look forward to
hearing how committed the Air Force remains to its space acquisition
mission and, if so, exactly how it intends to reverse the troubling
trend of chronic schedule delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and widening
gaps in capability.
Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to
sacrifice so much, both Congress and the administration must be ready
to make some tough funding decisions--something that we have failed
miserably at in previous years. Despite numerous calls last year for
earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill signed
into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in
unrequested and unwanted funding for C-17s and the alternative engine
for the Air Force's version of the JSF. That's $7 billion that the
Department had to eat in programs that it didn't request or need--at
the expense of more pressing military priorities.
I was encouraged by Secretary Gates' laying an early marker last
month with the Congress by indicating that if we added funds to
continue the C-17 and alternate engine for the JSF in 2011, he would
strongly recommend that the President veto the bill. I look forward to
seeing the President himself issue that veto threat. For now, I would
like to know whether our witnesses support Secretary Gates' positions
on both programs.
Finally, I'm interested in the views of General Schwartz and
Secretary Donley on the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy. We will
continue to listen to our military leaders, and as I note, recruitment
and retention is at an all-time high in the history of the All-
Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is working and changes
to it would have to be carefully considered.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Secretary Donley.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. Donley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. It is a pleasure to be here today representing
almost 680,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen and Air
Force civilians. I'm also honored to be here with my partner in
this work, General Schwartz, with whom I came into this
position. He's been a phenomenal partner, and he is a tireless
public servant.
Today, I'm pleased to report that America's Air Force
continues to make progress in strengthening both our
contributions as part of the joint team and the excellence that
is the hallmark of our service. We're requesting $150 billion
in our baseline budget and almost $21 billion in the OCO
appropriation to support this work.
In the past year and in planning for the future, we've
focused on balancing our resources and risks among the four
priority objectives outlined by Secretary Gates in the
recently-released QDR. First, we must prevail in today's wars.
Your Air Force understands the gravity of the situation in
Afghanistan, and as we continue to responsibly draw down forces
in Iraq, we are committed to rapidly fielding needed
capabilities for the joint team, such as surging ISR assets
into theater and maximizing air mobility, to accelerate the
flow of forces into Afghanistan.
Second, we must prevent and deter conflict across the
spectrum of warfare. As we await the results of the NPR and the
New START, we continue concentrating on the safety, security,
and sustainment of two legs of the Nation's nuclear arsenal.
Last year, we stood up Air Force Global Strike Command and we
have now realigned our ICBM and bomber wings under the control
of a single commander. We also stood up the Air Force Nuclear
Weapons Center to consolidate the management of all our nuclear
weapons sustainment activities. To increase our engagement
across the world, we're building partner capacity in
Afghanistan and Iraq and developing a training framework
emphasizing light attack and mobility that can benefit other
nations.
Third, we must be prepared to defeat adversaries and to
succeed in a wide range of conflicts. We need to ensure that
we're providing the right capabilities with our strategic
airlift and ISR platforms and ensure our space-based assets
continue to deliver needed capabilities for the future.
In addition, the last two decades of sustained operations
have strained our weapons systems. We continue to determine
which aircraft we will modernize and sustain and which we
should retire and recapitalize. One of our primary efforts
includes retiring and recapitalizing many of our legacy
fighters and tankers and replacing them with JSFs and KC-X
aerial refueling tanker aircraft. These decisions require tough
choices as well as the ability to quickly field systems that
meet warfighter needs at an affordable price.
Because acquisition underpins this effort, we're continuing
our work to recapture excellence in this area. In the past
year, we've made great strides in reforming our internal
processes; we've added more program executive officers, and we
are growing our acquisition workforce by several thousand
professionals over the next 5 years.
Finally, we must preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer
Force. Airmen are our most valuable resource, and they have
performed superbly in every mission and deployment they've
undertaken. With the understanding that their families serve
alongside them, in July of last year, the Chief and I began a
year-long focus on our men and women and their families. This
Year of the Air Force Family recognizes their sacrifices and
looks to determine how we can better support, develop, house,
and educate them. We're determining which programs are
performing well and where we can do better.
Your Air Force is performing exceptionally well in
supporting the current fights, responding to growing demands
and shifting personnel priorities. But we're increasingly
stressed in the continental United States (CONUS). Rebuilding
the nuclear expertise that we need for the future will require
continued determination and patience. We're taking more risk in
non-deployed force readiness and facing significant challenges
in modernization and infrastructure.
At the same time, however, we are developing and fielding
new technologies and capabilities that bode well for our
future. I can tell you after a recent trip to the CENTCOM area
of responsibility (AOR), Mr. Chairman, that we are recruiting
and training some incredible airmen.
We're very grateful for your continued support, and we look
forward to discussing our proposed budget. One more point, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you for your opening comments concerning the
two Air Force nominations still pending confirmation, Erin
Conaton, the nominee for Under Secretary of the Air Force, and
Terry Yonkers, the nominee for Assistant Secretary for
Installations and Environment. Both of these individuals are
highly qualified, and we're aware of no issues concerning their
background, their capabilities, or their credentials.
More to the point of some concern to others, neither have
been involved in the Air Force KC-X tanker acquisition and,
looking ahead, should they be confirmed, neither would have
responsibility for source selection.
Both nominations were cleared by this committee on December
2, 2009. The Under Secretary position has been vacant for over
2\1/2\ years; the Assistant Secretary position has been vacant
for over a year and a half.
Similarly, the nominee for Dr. Carter's Principal Deputy in
the Under Secretary's Office for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Frank Kendall, falls into the same general category.
That position has been vacant for over a year, and his
nomination has been pending action by the full Senate since
October 29.
I thank the committee, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McCain, other
members, for your favorable reporting of these nominees, and I
ask that each member now support their speedy confirmation by
the full Senate. Their confirmation is important. The
individuals whose livelihoods and careers are being held in an
uncertain limbo deserve a vote, and we need to proceed with the
important work of the Air Force and DOD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Donley and General
Schwartz follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael B. Donley and Gen. Norton A.
Schwartz, USAF
The 2010 Air Force Posture Statement presents our vision of Global
Vigilance, Reach and Power as a vital component of the joint team,
defending our national interests, and guided by our core values of
Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do.
introduction
Today, the United States confronts a dynamic international
environment marked by security challenges of unprecedented diversity.
Along with our joint partners, the Air Force will defend and advance
the interests of the United States by providing unique capabilities to
succeed in current conflicts while preparing to counter future threats
to our national security. Over the last year, the Air Force made great
strides in strengthening the precision and reliability that is our
hallmark.
strategic focus
This year offers an opportunity to fully integrate our Service
posture with a new National Security Strategy, the Department of
Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and strategic reviews of the
Nation's space, nuclear, and ballistic missile defense postures.
Balance is the defining principle linking this budget request to our
strategic guidance.
In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense established four U.S.
defense objectives to guide our current actions as well as to plan for
the future: prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict,
prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of
contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. In
accordance with this guidance, the Air Force developed the 2011 budget
request to enhance our capabilities to meet these objectives, while
balancing risk appropriately. As the future security environment will
require a range of agile and flexible capabilities, investments for
today's conflict will also support our efforts to prepare, prevent, and
prevail, and preserve well into the future.
Prevail in Today's Wars
Our investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
as well as airlift, command and control, and building partner capacity
(BPC) reinforce the prominence of this priority in our budget request.
In addition, nearly 30,000 deployed airmen daily provide key
capabilities in direct support of combat operations.
Prevent and Deter Conflict
The Air Force made significant resource and cultural investments in
reinvigorating our portion of the Nation's nuclear deterrence over the
past 18 months. We are now institutionalizing these successes to ensure
the highest standards across the nuclear enterprise. Our initial
investments in a family of long-range strike capabilities mark our
commitment to sustaining power projection capabilities for the next
several decades.
Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of
Contingencies
This priority directly reflects the Air Force emphasis on balancing
our commitments to today's conflicts against preparing for mid- and
long-term risks. Awarding a contract this year to recapitalize our
aging tanker force is our top acquisition priority. Similarly, tile F-
35 will be the workhorse of the fighter force for decades to come. Our
investment in this program is timed with other modernization
initiatives and divestment plans to ensure sufficient capabilities are
available to deter and defeat potential enemies.
Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force
Preserving and enhancing our All-Volunteer Force provides the
foundation required for our flexible and agile posture. This budget
reflects a commitment to enhancing our force through education and
training, while also bolstering the overall quality of life of airmen
and their families.
strategy to resources
As we prepared the budget request described by this Posture
Statement, we structured our resource choices by balancing the twelve
Air Force Core Functions across the near- and long-term. When
considered together, the Core Functions encompass the full range of Air
Force capabilities, and serve as the framework for this Posture
Statement. While this document describes the core functions
individually, we recognize their inherent interdependence within not
just the Air Force, but also within the joint force and the whole of
government.

AIR FORCE CORE FUNCTIONS
Nuclear Deterrence Operations............. Special Operations
Air Superiority........................... Global Integrated ISR
Space Superiority......................... Command and Control
Cyberspace Superiority.................... Personnel Recovery
Global Precision Attack................... Building Partnerships
Rapid Global Mobility..................... Agile Combat Support

Nuclear Deterrence Operations
Since its inception, the Air Force has sewed as a proud and
disciplined steward of a large portion of the Nation's nuclear arsenal.
We steadfastly maintain and secure nuclear weapons to deter potential
adversaries, and to assure our partners that we are a reliable force
providing global stability.
The first Air Force priority during the last 2 years has been to
reinvigorate the stewardship, accountability, compliance, and precision
within the nuclear enterprise. This mission demands perfection. Last
year we reorganized our nuclear forces, consolidating responsibility
into a clear chain of command. All nuclear operations are under the
command of the Air Force Global Strike Command and all sustainment
activities are controlled by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. We
also added a fourth B-52 squadron to enhance nuclear surety through
greater mission focus. We continued these advancements in fiscal year
2010 by reassigning Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and
nuclear bomber forces to Air Force Global Strike Command as it proceeds
toward full operational capability.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues to invest in
sustaining the Air Force's ICBM and bomber fleets. We will invest $295
million across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to replace
fuzing mechanisms, and to sustain test equipment and environmental
control systems for the aging, but capable, Minuteman III ICBM weapon
system.
As we begin work to develop a future Long Range Strike capability,
we recognize the need to continue investing in our legacy bomber
fleels, including nearly $800 million for modernization. This budget
request provides the B-52, initially designed in the early 1950s, with
an internal precision-guided weapons capability, a new radar, and a
modern and effective anti-skid system. This request funds modernization
of B-2 analog defensive systems to ensure continued survivability
against increasingly capable air defense systems. Additionally, the UH-
IN replacement program supporting missile launch complexes is on track
and we anticipate IOC by fiscal year 2015.
Air superiority
Air superiority is a necessary precondition for most U.S. military
operations. American ground forces have operated without fear of enemy
aircraft since 1953. Although we operate in uncontested airspace in
current conflicts, we cannot assume this will be the case in the
future. The emergence of modern air defenses challenges the ability of
the Air Force to achieve air superiority. Potential adversaries are
leveraging readily accessible technologies by modifying existing
airframes with improved radars, sensors, jammers, and weapons. In
addition, several nations are pursuing fifth-generation aircraft
capable of all-aspect, low-observable signatures, and fully integrated
avionics and sensors. Adversary nations are also turning to advanced
surface-to-air missiles to augment or even substitute for aircraft
modernization efforts. The proliferation of these sophisticated and
increasingly affordable weapons presents an area denial capability that
challenges our legacy fleet. As the range of potential threats evolves,
the Air Force will rely on the F-22 Raptor as the workhorse of the air
superiority fighter force for the foreseeable future. Complementing our
187 modernized F-22s, we will continue to rely on F-15C/D aircraft to
provide an important component of our air superiority capability.
Our fiscal year 2010 budget included plans to accelerate the
retirement of some legacy fighter aircraft to pave the way for a
smaller but more capable fighter force. As we work with Congress to
execute this important plan, we continue to aggressively modernize our
air superiority fleet, including upgrading fielded F-22s to ensure
fleet commonality with current deliveries. Additionally, we began
modernizing 176 F-15Cs with the new APG-63(v)3 Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar. Along with these modifications, we are
continuing the development and procurement of the AIM-9X and AIM-120D
air-to-air missiles.
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $12.5 billion in the FYDP to
sustain America's air superiority advantage. To continue F-22
modifications, this request includes $1.34 billion to continue fleet
commonality upgrades, improving reliability and maintainability, and
adding training enhancements for the fleet. Building on the multi-role
nature of our most advanced aircraft, this request also includes $1.19
billion to add precision attack capabilities such as the Small Diameter
Bomb. The Air Force will also continue the development and procurement
of air-to-air munitions and defenses for the F-22 such as the AIM-9X,
AIM-120D, and electronic warfare capabilities. To sustain our legacy
aircraft viability, we included $92 million to continue the upgrades
and modifications to the new F-15 AESA radar. Recognizing that
Electronic Warfare remains an integral part of air superiority, we
request $251 million in fiscal year 2011 for upgrades to the EC-130H
Compass Call fleet. This request includes the conversion of an
additional EC-130H, as well as a combined flight deck and mission crew
simulator to increase training capacity.
Space superiority
America's ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict relies
heavily on space capabilities developed and operated by the Air Force.
We support the Joint force by developing, integrating, and operating in
six key mission areas: missile warning; space situational awareness
(SSA); military satellite communications; positioning, navigation and
timing; space access; and weather.
To enhance space support to the joint force, we are increasing
communications capability in fiscal year 2010 through two satellite
communications programs, the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) program to
replace the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system for protected
communications. We launched the second and third WGS satellites in
fiscal year 2010; each WGS satellite provides the equivalent capacity
of the entire legacy DSCS constellation. Additionally, the second on-
orbit Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit
payload was fully certified by U.S. Strategic Command to perform
strategic missile warning. Finally, spacelift remains the backbone for
national security space with a record 64 consecutive successful
missions.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request for $10.9 billion will improve
our stewardship of space with investment in space and space-related
support systems. With these resources, we will field several first-of-
their-kind systems--Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIF, SBIRS,
and AEHF satellite communications system. This request proposes $1.2
billion for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, $1.8 billion
for the Space Based Infrared System, and $1.3 billion for GPS. We also
included $135 million for Joint Space Operation Center Mission System
to improve SSA capabilities, and $94 million for the Operationally
Responsive Space program to pursue innovative capabilities that can be
rapidly developed and fielded in months rather than years. We request
$577 million to fully fund WGS to meet combatant commander bandwidth
requirements. Moreover, we will continue to maintain SSA ground-based
systems and explore space-based capabilities to ensure our continued
freedom to operate in this domain.
Cyberspace Superiority
Cyber threats ranging from individual hackers to criminal
organizations to state-sponsored cyber intrusions can challenge access
to, and use of, this domain. Although the freedom to operate in the
cyber domain is a precondition for our increasingly networked force,
many of our potential adversaries are similarly adopting information-
enabled technology, rendering them vulnerable to cyber attack as well.
Threats to freedom of access to the cyber domain present both
challenges and opportunities.
In fiscal year 2010, we continued the development and
institutionalization of cyberspace capabilities and integration into
the joint cyberspace structure. The newly activated 24th Air Force, the
first Numbered Air Force dedicated to cyberspace operations, recently
achieved initial operational capability and has been designated the Air
Force component for the sub-unified U.S. Cyber Command. We are also
focusing on cyber personnel by normalizing the cyber career path and
adding technical education courses.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects a continued commitment
to cyber superiority. We request $31 million for expanded rapid cyber
acquisition capabilities to keep pace with dynamic adversaries and
fast-paced advances in technology. In support of the national cyber
effort, this budget request dedicates $104 million to support
operations and leased space for headquarters staff at the sub-unified
U.S. Cyber Command. Additionally, we propose adding $15 million and
additional manpower over the next 5 years to increase the investigative
and law enforcement aspects of cyberspace defense.
Global Precision Attack
Global Precision Attack is the ability to hold any target at risk,
across the air, land, and sea domains. Many of our global precision
attack forces are meeting the current requirements of ongoing
contingency operations by performing precision strike and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support roles. In the longer
term, however, the proliferation of area denial and anti-access
capabilities will challenge the ability of current fourth-generation
fighters and legacy bombers to penetrate contested airspace.
The Air Force budget request in fiscal year 2010 recognized these
developments and continued improvements to aircraft and weapons
capabilities. This year, we will take delivery of 10 F-35s for
developmental testing and to train test pilots. We are also modernizing
legacy fighter aircraft to maintain sufficient capability and capacity
until the F-35 fleet is fully operational, and are continuing to
develop programs for preferred air-to-ground weapons. Upon completion
of the required reports to Congress later this year, we will implement
the planned reduction of 257 legacy fighters. We have had mixed results
in test drops of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator; however, we are
closely monitoring the progress of this important capability, and
future successes likely will result in a reprogramming request to
accelerate its development in fiscal year 2010. Finally, continued
development of the second increment of the Small Diameter Bomb will
give the Air Force even greater capability and flexibility.
Our $14.4 billion Global Precision Attack request for fiscal year
2011 reflects a balanced approach across the portfolio, prioritizing
investment in fifth-generation aircraft while sustaining legacy
platforms as a bridge to the F-35.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
The multi-role F-35 is a critical element of the Air Force's future
precision attack capability. In addition to complementing the F-22's
world class air superiority capabilities, the F-35 is designed to
penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of precision munitions.
This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the added benefit of
increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing across services and
partner nations.
Working in close collaboration with DOD, the F-35 program team
realized a number of accomplishments over the last year, to include the
first flight of the first optimized conventional take-off and landing
(CTOL) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) variant-aircraft AF-I.
Despite these important accomplishments, the program is
experiencing program challenges as it transitions from development to
production. Last year, DOD conducted multiple, independent reviews to
assess the impact of these challenges on the program's cost, schedule,
and technical performance. The results were consistent with a previous
fiscal year 2008 DOD independent assessment that projected a cost
increase and schedule slip.
The challenges being experienced are not unusual for this phase of
a major program. However, we are disappointed by the contractor's
failure to deliver flight test aircraft as scheduled during the past
year. The result of the late deliveries will be a delay in the flight
test program.
Although there appear to be recent improvements, the contractor
also has been experiencing assembly inefficiencies that must be
corrected to support higher production rates.
In response to the challenges still facing the program and the
findings of the independent reviews, we have taken numerous management
actions to reduce risk. Most significantly we have determined that it
is prudent to adjust the schedule and funding to levels consistent with
the most recent independent estimates. These cost and schedule
adjustments require that we initiate the process to confirm the program
is in breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act criteria, and details will be
reported later this spring.
The F-35 is our largest and most important program and we are
dedicated to successfully delivering these aircraft to both the United
States and to our international partners in this effort. The Air Force
fiscal year 2011 budget includes $5.6 billion for continued development
and procurement of 22 CTOL production aircraft.
Long-range Strike
Investments in our B-52 and B-2 fleets sustain nuclear deterrence
operations as well as conventional global precision attack capabilities
in the near-term, but we are adding R&D funds to accelerate development
of enhanced long-range strike capabilities. Building upon insights
developed during the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a
follow-on study to determine what combination of Joint persistent
surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities
will be best suited to support U.S. power projection operations over
the next two to three decades. The study will examine both penetrating
platforms and stand-off weapon options. As part of this assessment, the
Air Force is reviewing options for fielding survivable, long-range
surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive, phased
plan to modernize the bomber force. Additionally, the Navy and the Air
Force are cooperatively assessing alternatives for a new joint cruise
missile. Finally, the Department of Defense also plans to analyze
conventional prompt global strike prototypes and will assess the
effects that these systems, if deployed, might have on strategic
stability.
Rapid Global Mobility
The Air Force is committed to providing unmatched airlift and air
refueling capability to the nation. Air Force mobility forces provide
an essential deployment and sustainment capability for the Joint force,
delivering personnel, equipment, and supplies necessary for missions
ranging from conflict to humanitarian relief.
We are releasing the Request for Proposal for a KC-X replacement
tanker in early 2010, and will aggressively work toward awarding a
contract later this year. Additionally, we completed the successful
operational testing of the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine
Program (RERP) and will induct two more C-5Bs into low-rate initial
production. For tactical airlift, we recently concluded a test of our
Direct Support airlift concept and continue to work with the Army to
rapidly and smartly transfer the C-27J program to the Air Force.
The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects a balanced approach across the
tanker and airlift portfolios, which prioritizes recapitalization of
the oldest aircraft while ensuring the continued viability of the
legacy fleet. Investments in tanker capability are heavily weighted
towards the KC-X program--our top acquisition priority--and represent
$11.7 billion in the FYDP. However, while moving aggressively to
recapitalize the tanker fleet, we must also ensure the continued health
of legacy aircraft. This budget request includes $680 million in the
FYDP for airspace access modifications and sustainment of the KC-10 and
KC-1 35 fleets.
The Air Force Airlift budget request is focused on meeting mobility
requirements in the most cost efficient way possible, recapitalizing
only the oldest airlift aircraft. To ensure continued access to all
airspace, this budget continues to modernize and modify C-5s and C-
130Hs through Avionics Modernization Programs, and upgrades C-5B/Cs
with RERP. To complete the recapitalization of C-130Es, we request $1.8
billion over the next 5 years to procure 24 C-130Js. Additionally, in
accordance with the preliminary results of the Mobility Capabilities
and Requirements Study 2016, and subject to authorization by Congress,
we intend to retire some of the oldest, least capable C-5As and C-
130H1s. We have also requested $38.9 million in fiscal year 2011 to
transition from C-17 procurement to sustainment.
Special Operations
Air Force special operations capabilities play a vital role in
supporting U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and geographic
combatant commanders. As the Department of Defense increasingly
develops irregular warfare capabilities, the Air Force is investing in
special operations airlift, close air support, foreign internal
defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities.
In fiscal year 2010 we focused on growing and recapitalizing the
special operations aircraft inventory. By the end of the fiscal year,
three MC-130W Combat Spear aircraft will be modified with the Precision
Strike Package to provide additional armed overwatch capability for SOF
forces. Additionally, we will deliver the 16th of 50 CV-22s.
This fiscal year 2011 budget proposal includes $6.7 billion through
the FYDP to continue growing and recapitalizing the Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC). In fiscal year 2011 we will procure five
additional CV-22s and five MC-130Js for $1.1 billion. This request also
includes $1.6 billion in the FYDP to start recapitalizing our AC-130H
aircraft. We will rapidly recapitalize these aging aircraft through the
procurement of 16 additional MC-130Js, modified with the proven
Precision Strike Package. In fiscal year 2011 we will also increase
AFSOC's manpower by 258 personnel by fiscal year 2015 to support the
addition of 16 fixed-wing mobility and 2 rotary-wing aircraft.
Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The Air Force continues to rapidly increase its ISR capability and
capacity to support combat operations. Air Force ISR provides timely,
fused, and actionable intelligence to the Joint Force, from forward
deployed locations and globally distributed centers around the globe.
The exceptional operational value of Air Force ISR assets has led Joint
Force Commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa to
continually increase their requests for these forces. To help meet this
demand, the Air Force currently has more than 90 percent of all
available ISR assets deployed.
In fiscal year 2010, we are quantitatively and qualitatively
increasing aircraft, sensors, data links, ground stations, and
personnel to address emergent requirements. Over the last 2 years, the
Air Force increased the number of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)
fielded by 330 percent. We invested in a Wide Area Airborne
Surveillance (WAAS) system for new and existing MQ-9s to provide up to
50 video streams per sensor within a few years. By the summer of fiscal
year 2010, a quick reaction capability version of WAAS known as Gorgon
Stare will provide 10 video streams per MQ-9. Any ROVER-equipped ground
force will be able to receive any of these feeds. We also added four
RQ-4s, and graduated our first class of RPA-only pilots. Early in
fiscal year 2010, we proposed a shift in the nomenclature from
``unmanned aircraft systems'' (or UAS) to ``remotely piloted aircraft''
as part of normalizing this capability within the Air Force manpower
structure and culture. We will also maintain our current Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)-based Ground
Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) capability as we begin an Analysis of
Alternatives to determine the future of GMTI.
To complement remotely piloted capabilities, we are deploying MC-
12W Project Liberty aircraft to the theater as fast as they can be
delivered from the factory. This program progressed from ``concept to
combat'' in a record 9 months, and has a deployed maintenance
availability rate well above 90 percent.
Because analysis transforms data into actionable intelligence, we
are shifting approximately 3,600 of the 4,100 manpower billets
recaptured from the early retirement of legacy fighters to support RPA
operations, and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of
intelligence collected by manned and remotely piloted aircraft. We also
doubled the number of ISR liaison officers assigned to deployed ground
forces to ensure the seamless integration of ISR collection and
exploitation assets.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget proposal reflects the Joint Force
emphasis on ISR capacity, and builds on progress made in fiscal year
2010. The Air Force will reach 50 RPA continuous, combat air patrols
(CAPs) in theater by the end of fiscal year 2011. The budget request
increases MC-12W funding to normalize training and basing posture, adds
Wide Area Airborne Surveillance capability, and increases the total
number of our RPA platforms to enable fielding up to 65 CAPs by the end
of fiscal year 2013. As we request additional RQ-4 Global Hawks for
high altitude ISR, we also intend to continue operating the U-2 at
least throughout fiscal year 2013 as a risk mitigation effort. We will
sustain our ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination in the
Distributed Common Ground System, providing critical distributed
analysis without having to forward deploy more forces.
Command and Control
Theater-wide command and control (C2) enables efficient and
effective exploitation of the air, space, and cyber domain. The Air
Force maintains significant C2 capabilities at the theater level.
However, the highly decentralized nature of irregular warfare also
places increased demands on lower echelons of command. Matching the
range and flexibility of air, space, and cyberspace power to
effectively meet tactical requirements requires a linked C2 structure
at all echelons.
This year, we are expanding our efforts to provide C2 at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In fiscal year 2011, the
Air Force is requesting $30 million across the FYDP to fund equipment
and assured communications for U.S. Strategic Command's Distributed
Command and Control Node (DC2N), U.S. Northern Command's National
Capital Region-Integrated Air Defense (NCR-IADS), and U.S. Africa
Command's expanding air operations center. Tactically, we are
increasing training pipelines for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
(JTACs), establishing an Air Liaison Officer career field, fielding
advanced video downlink capabilities, and adding airborne radio and
datalink gateways to improve the connectivity of air support operations
centers and JTACS.
In fiscal year 2011, the Air Force request also includes
modernization and sustainment of both airborne and ground-based C2
systems. For Air Force airborne C2, we request $275 million for the E-3
Block 40/45 upgrade program. This upgrade modernizes a 1970s-era
computer network, eliminates many components that are no longer
manufactured, and adds avionics to comply with Global Air Traffic
Management standards. To improve ground-based tactical air control
operations, we are increasing manpower in the control and reporting
centers and investing $51.5 million with the U.S. Marine Corps for a
follow-on ground-based radar capability supporting air and missile
defense. This Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar will be
the future long-range, ground-based sensor for detecting, identifying,
tracking, and reporting aircraft and missiles.
Personnel Recovery
Personnel recovery (PR) remains an important commitment the Air
Force makes to the Joint Force. The increased utilization of military
and civilian personnel in support of Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) has dramatically increased the number of individuals who may find
themselves isolated. This has in-turn created an increasing demand for
Air Force rescue forces beyond the combat search and rescue mission.
Air Force PR forces are fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
Horn of Africa, accomplishing crucial medical and casualty evacuation
missions for U.S. and coalition military and civilian personnel.
This year, we will continue to surge critical personnel recovery
capability to the field, and will start replacing the aging fleet. To
bring the fleet back to its original size of 112 HH-60Gs, we will put
the first 4 operational loss replacement aircraft on contract.
Additionally, we will deliver the first two HC-1305 tanker aircraft,
starting the replacement of the 1960s-era HC-130P fleet.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the replacement of
operational losses and modernization of aging equipment. This request
funds the last eight HH-60G operational loss replacement aircraft by
the end of fiscal year 2012. Additionally, we begin the process of
recapitalizing the remaining fleet with the inclusion of $1.5 billion
to procure 36 HH-60G replacement aircraft in the FYDP. We also continue
our recapitalization of the HC-130P/N fleet with HC-130J aircraft.
Finally, we request $553 million in funding throughout the FYDP for the
Guardian Angel program, which will standardize and modernize mission
essential equipment for our pararescuemen.
Building Parnterships
The Air Force continues to seek opportunities to develop
partnerships around the world, and to enhance long-term capabilities
through security cooperation. In the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
area of responsibility (AOR), deployed airmen are working with our
Afghan and Iraqi partners to build a new Afghan National Army Air Corps
and Iraqi Air Force to strengthen the ability of these nations to
uphold the rule of law and defend their territories against violent,
non-state actors. We are also working to further partnerships with more
established allies with programs like the Joint Strike Fighter.
Similarly, the third and final C-17 procured under the 12-nation
Strategic Airlift Capability program was delivered in October 2009,
helping to address a chronic shortage of strategic airlift among our
European allies.
In fiscal year 2011, we will expand our capabilities to conduct
building partnership capacity (BPC) operations with partner air forces.
Past experience has shown us that we are more effective trainers when
we operate the same platforms as our partners. To increase our
interoperability, the Air Force requests resources to prepare to field
the Light Mobility Aircraft in fiscal year 2012 and the Light Attack/
Armed Reconnaissance aircraft in fiscal year 2013. These aircraft will
provide effective and affordable capabilities in the two most critical
mission areas for partner air forces: lower-cost airlift and light
strike/reconnaissance training. Additionally, we will continue to
foster BPC capability in our Contingency Response Groups. This request
also includes $51 million to continue investing in the Strategic
Airlift Capability program. Finally, we programmed $6.4 million
annually across the FYDP for Pacific Angel humanitarian assistance
missions in support of U.S Pacific Command theater objectives.
Agile Combat Support
Agile combat support underpins the entire Air Force, from the
development and training of airmen to revitalizing processes in the
acquisition enterprise. In terms of core functions, agile combat
support reflects the largest portion of the Air Force budget proposal,
totaling approximately $42 billion for personnel and training,
installation support, logistics, and acquisition.
Airmen and Families
Over the last year, we stabilized end strength. Retention rates
have exceeded expectations, but we continue to progress toward our end
strength goal of 332,200 active duty airmen. In addition to stabilizing
our end strength, we are also modernizing our training programs and
aircraft. To better partner with the joint and coalition team, we will
provide our airmen with cultural and regional expertise and appropriate
levels of foreign language training. We are also expanding foreign
language instruction for officer commissioning programs at the Air
Force Academy and in ROTC, encouraging cadets to take foreign language
coursework and participate in language immersion and study programs
abroad. This expanded training includes enhanced expeditionary skills
training to prepare airmen for deployment. Finally, as part of our
effort to modernize training systems, we have established a program
office to start the process of replacing the T-38 trainer with an
advanced trainer capable of teaching pilots to fly the world's most
advanced fighter aircraft.
Recognizing that family support programs must keep pace with the
needs of airmen and their families, we initiated the Year of the Air
Force Family in July 2009. We plan to add enough capacity to our child
development centers to eliminate the child care space deficit by the
end of fiscal year 2012, provide better support to exceptional family
member programs, and add 54 school liaison officers to Airmen and
Family Readiness Centers to highlight and secure Air Force family needs
with local school administrators.
The Air Force continues to expand its efforts to improve the
resiliency of airmen and their families before and after deployments.
This year we expanded deployment-related family education, coupling it
with psychological screening and post-deployment health assessments.
Additionally, we offer access to chaplains who provide pastoral care,
and counselors and mental health providers trained in post-traumatic
stress treatment at every base. We plan to further enhance support in
2010 by promoting and encouraging mental health assistance, and by
providing at-risk deployers with tailored and targeted resiliency
programs. To support this increased effort, we will enhance mental
health career field recruiting and retention through special pays and
targeted selection bonuses.
Acquisition Excellence
The Air Force continues to make progress within the Acquisition
Improvement Plan. In 2009, we hired over 2,000 personnel into the
acquisition workforce and continued contractor-to-civilian conversions.
The Air Force institutionalized early collaboration with acquisition
system stakeholders, senior acquisition leadership certification of
requirements, cost estimation improvements, and an improved budgeting
process to enhance the probability of program successes. The multi-
functional independent review teams conducted over 113 reviews,
ensuring acquisition selections are correct and defendable. As part of
our recent acquisition reorganization, we created 11 new program
executive officer positions to reduce the span of control and increase
their focus on program execution. These enhancements demonstrate our
commitment to restoring the public's trust in the Air Force's ability
to acquire the most technologically advanced weapon systems at a
competitive cost. In the near-term, this more rigorous approach to
acquisition is likely to identify problems and programmatic
disconnects. In the medium- and long-term, it should yield significant
improvements in Air Force stewardship of taxpayer resources.
Energy
As part of our institutional effort to consider energy management
in all that we do, the Air Force requests $250 million for energy and
water conservation projects in fiscal year 2011. This investment will
ensure we meet the President's efficiency goals by 2015. In fiscal year
2010, the Air Force finalized an energy plan that directs the
development and use of reliable alternative energy resources, and
reduces the life-cycle costs of acquisition programs. Additionally, the
plan recognizes that aviation operations account for over 80 percent of
the energy used by the Air Force each year, and directs airmen and
mission planners to continue managing aviation fuel as an increasingly
scarce resource.
Military Construction
The Air Force $1.3 billion MILCON request is austere, but provides
funding for new construction aligned with weapon system deliveries.
Additionally, the budget request sustains our effort to provide quality
housing for airmen and their families. Finally, the Air Force remains
focused on completing its Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005
program and continuing the legacy BRAC programs as well as the
environmental clean-up at legacy BRAC locations.
Strategic Basing
In 2009, the Air Force implemented a Strategic Basing Process to
ensure basing decisions are made in a manner that supports new weapon
system acquisition and delivery schedules as well as organization
activation milestones. The newly established Strategic Basing Executive
Steering Group directs these actions to ensure a standard, repeatable,
and transparent process in the evaluation of Air Force basing
opportunities. We are currently using this process to conduct an
enterprise-wide look at F-35 basing options.
Logistics
Air Force requirements for weapon system sustainment funding
continue to grow as aircraft age. In the long term, the increasing
requirements for sustaining an aging aircraft fleet pose budget
challenges and force trade-offs. We protected direct warfighter
support, irregular warfare capabilities, and the nuclear enterprise.
Since this year's budget includes a simultaneous OCO submission along
with a base budget, the Air Force optimized its flying hour program
funding to support only the peacetime flying hours we can fly, given
the number of deployed airmen and aircraft supporting these operations.
Due to the volatile nature of fuel prices, reprogramming may be
necessary to cover increased fuel costs. Over the longer term,
enactment of the Department of Defense's legislative proposal for the
Refined Petroleum Products Marginal Expense Transfer Account would
reduce disruptions to operations and investment programs by providing
the Department of Defense flexibility to deal with fuel price
fluctuations in the changing economy. The Air Force maintained its
commitment to transforming logistics business practices, including
total asset visibility and associated information technology, by
protecting funds associated with fielding the first increment of the
Expeditionary Combat Support System.
readiness and resourcing
Our efforts over the last year continued to stress both people and
platforms. Nearly 40,000 of America's airmen are deployed to 263
locations across the globe, including 63 locations in the Middle East.
In addition to deployed airmen, nearly 130,000 airmen support combatant
commander requirements from their home station daily. These airmen
operate the Nation's space and missile forces, process and exploit
remotely collected ISR, provide national intelligence support, execute
air sovereignty alert missions, and contribute in many other ways. To
date, the Air Force has flown over 50,000 sorties supporting Operation
Iraqi Freedom and almost 66,000 sorties supporting Operation Enduring
Freedom. During this time the Air Force delivered over 1.73 million
passengers and 606,000 tons of cargo, employed almost 1,980 tons of
munitions, and transported nearly 70,000 total patients and 13,000
casualties from the CENTCOM AOR. In doing so, airmen averaged nearly
330 sorties per day.
To support the efforts of airmen and to recruit and retain the
highest quality Air Force members, this fiscal year 2011 budget request
includes $29.3 billion in military personnel funding, to include a 1.4
percent pay increase. Our Active component end strength will grow to
332,200 Airmen as the Reserve component end strength increases to
71,200, and the Air National Guard end strength remains 106,700 in
fiscal year 2011. Our recruiting and retention is strong, but we
request $645 million for recruiting and retention bonuses targeted at
critical wartime skills, including command and control, public affairs,
contracting, pararescue, security forces, civil engineering, explosive
ordnance disposal, medical, and special investigations.
summary
The Air Force's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget of $119.6 billion
achieves the right balance between providing capabilities for today's
commitments and posturing for future challenges. The Air Force built
this budget to best achieve the four strategic priorities outlined in
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: (1) prevail in today's wars; (2)
prevent and deter conflict; (3) prepare to defeat adversaries and
succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and (4) preserve and enhance
the All-Volunteer Force.
Balancing requirements for today and tomorrow determined our
recapitalization strategy. We chose to improve our existing
capabilities whenever possible, and to pursue new systems when
required. This recapitalization approach attempts to keep pace with
threat developments and required capabilities, while ensuring
stewardship of national resources. In developing this budget request,
we also carefully preserved and enhanced our comprehensive approach to
taking care of airmen and Air Force families.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General Schwartz.

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE

General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members
of the committee: I'm proud to be here representing your Air
Force with Secretary Donley.
Let me begin by reaffirming that the Air Force is fully
committed to effective stewardship of the resources that you
and the Nation have placed in our trust. Guided by integrity,
service, and excellence, our core values, American airmen are
serving courageously every day, with precision and reliability,
on behalf of the American people.
The budget request supports these airmen and our continuing
efforts to rebalance the force, to make difficult decisions on
how and what we buy, and to sustain our needed contributions to
the joint team.
Secretary Donley and I established five priorities shortly
after taking office to ensure that our entire force was focused
on the right objectives. Most of the initial efforts centered
on reaffirming our long-established standards of excellence and
recommitting ourselves in areas where our focus had waned. I am
pleased to report to you today that our dedicated and talented
airmen broadly understood our intent and delivered in
meaningful fashion.
Although these priorities were not designed to change from
year to year, our progress with the nuclear enterprise is such
that we can now shift our efforts to sustaining the progress
that we've made. Thus, our first priority is to continue to
strengthen excellence in the nuclear enterprise. The rigor of
our nuclear surety inspections demonstrates a renewed
commitment to the highest level of performance. But we must and
we will do more to ensure 100 percent precision and reliability
in our nuclear operations and logistics as close to 100 percent
of the time as such a human endeavor will allow.
For our second priority, and that is partnering with the
joint and coalition team in today's fight, Secretary Donley
mentioned several ways that our airmen are providing critical
air and space power for the joint and coalition team. Your
airmen are also performing admirably wherever and whenever our
joint teammates require, including providing battlefield
medical support and evacuation, ordnance disposal, convoy
security, and much more.
Our third priority remains to develop and care for our
airmen and their families. We initiated the Year of the Air
Force Family shortly after our testimony last year in
recognition of the vital role that our families fulfil in
mission accomplishment and their contributions. Their sacrifice
is perhaps less conspicuous, but their efforts are no less
noble and certainly their contributions no less substantial.
Modernizing our inventories, organizations, and training,
our fourth priority, is among the most difficult tasks that our
service has undertaken in the last 18 months. In order to
achieve the balance that Secretary Gates has envisioned for our
force, we are compelled to decisions and to action. The budget
represents a continuation of that effort. We set forth on a
plan last year to accelerate retirement of some of the older
fighter aircraft. This year we will not be retiring additional
fighters, but we are transitioning from some of our oldest and
least capable C-130s and C-5s. We will modernize where we can,
but where modernization no longer is cost effective, we will
pursue recapitalization.
KC-X is one example. With the delivery of the RFP last
week, our top acquisition effort to procure the next generation
refueling aircraft passed another significant milestone.
A similar imperative is the JSF. I want to underscore
Secretary Donley's comment by noting that this weapons system
will be the work horse driving much of our Air Force and the
joint force forward.
Long-range strike is the last program I number among our
top priorities. The Air Force fully supports the development of
the family of systems providing both penetrating and standoff
capabilities for the next 2 or 3 decades, as described in the
QDR.
Finally, recapturing acquisition excellence, our fifth
priority, is now beginning to pay dividends with our
acquisition improvement plan at the heart of our reform
efforts. While promising, the initial successes must continue
for a number of years before we can declare victory on this
front. But we are fully aware that we must wring every bit of
capability and value that we can from the systems that we
procure. So this effort will require sustained focus on
acquisition excellence.
Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide our
best military advice and stewardship, delivering global reach,
vigilance, and power for America. Thank you for your continued
support of the United States Air Force and particularly our
airmen and their families.
As the uniformed member at the table, sir, may I reinforce
the comments concerning Erin Conaton. Secretary Donley and I
came into these jobs about 18 months ago. I think we both work
pretty hard. But I have had the benefit of a four-star deputy
throughout, General Fraser, now General Howey Chandler. The
Secretary has been without a deputy and that does need to be
remedied.
Finally, sir, on behalf of the Secretary, myself, and the
entire Air Force, we'd like to offer our sincere condolences to
the family of Terry Laughlin, with whom we have worked for many
years and for whom we have the greatest respect.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much, and thank you
for your reference to our professional staff member and friend
on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Terry Laughlin for your
condolences, and in joining us in those feelings. We and his
family certainly appreciate it.
Let's try a 7-minute first round here.
First as to the nomination, I just want to make it clear
for the record, in addition to the Air Force nominees on which
there have been holds placed since December, the two that you
mentioned, Mr. Secretary, we also have Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Frank Kendall, who has
been held up since last December. We have an Assistant
Secretary of the Army, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and
General Counsel for the Navy, who have been held up now for
over a month. We're going to do our very best to bring those
holds to an end. They are unconscionable. They are not
supported by any substantive opposition to these nominees. They
fly in the face of the unanimous vote of this committee. We're
going to press this issue very, very hard on the floor, and we
again would urge all the members of this committee to join in
that effort for the reasons that are obvious to us who spend so
much time on these issues, as well as the reasons that were
given by our Secretary here this morning and by General
Schwartz.
First, let me ask you about the issue of the C-5A aircraft.
Is it the intent of the Air Force, maybe I can start with you,
Mr. Secretary, and then ask General Schwartz, to retire C-5A
aircraft in fiscal year 2011?
Mr. Donley. It is, sir. I believe the proposed number to
retire is 17. To do that, we owe you a couple of reports.
Chairman Levin. Under WSARA, we require, if we're going to
succeed, better systems engineering, better cost estimates,
more mature technologies, and better developmental testing. Is
the Air Force on track, Secretary Donley, to rebuild the
systems engineering, cost estimating, and developmental testing
capabilities as required by WSARA?
Mr. Donley. Sir, we're making good progress on that, I
believe. As I mentioned in my statement, we have several
thousand additions planned over the next 5 years in our
acquisition workforce. We added over 700 personnel last year,
and we're on track to continue to grow that in the future in
the areas that you mentioned: cost estimating and systems
engineering. We've added nine program executive officers to our
acquisition structure, which will reduce the span of control
and give the senior officers more time to spend on fewer
numbers of programs, and this will align us much more with how
the Army and Navy have been doing business recently.
Chairman Levin. The Air Force is requesting an Active Duty
end strength of 500 more personnel than last year and a Reserve
end strength of 1,700 more personnel than last year. Why does
the Air Force need additional Active and Reserve end strength,
and what are the specific purposes that it would be used for?
Let me start with you, Secretary, and then go to General
Schwartz.
Mr. Donley. Let me give you a broad overview, Mr. Chairman,
and then provide some more specifics for the record. In
general, the Air Force is attempting to hold its Active Duty
end strength relatively constant. We do not plan to grow the
Air Force in any significant numbers going forward.
But while we have an essentially fixed top line for Active
Duty end strength, we do face demands for growth. We've needed
to put additional personnel on the nuclear enterprise. We have
needed to bring in and restructure the force to support the ISR
buildup that we have underway with the new Reaper and Predator
UAVs coming on board. That means crews, that means providing
operations and maintenance for their support, and it means
providing additional intelligence personnel to do the analysis
from all the data pulled down by the sensors from those
capabilities.
We have growth in several areas. Cyber is another area
where we're anticipating growth.
Chairman Levin. If you want to supplement that for the
record, we'd appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]

The difference between the 331,700 Active Duty (AD) end strength
authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2010 and the 332,200 AD end strength the Air Force requested in
the fiscal year 2011 President's budget is 500 AD. The 500 AD will
support the Defense Health Program (DHP) specifically due to the NDAA
for fiscal year 2008 reversal of planned military-to-civilian
conversions for DHP.
The Air Force Reserve military manpower increase of 1,700 personnel
between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 is a result of the fiscal
year 2010 President's Decision Memorandum III Reserve end strength
increase, which increases Air Force Reserve Command manpower in
association with AD end strength growth. Specifically, the manpower
increases were utilized in the following areas: nuclear operations
(70), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (930), modernizing
organizations to include Total Force Integration initiatives (400),
and stressed career fields (300).

Chairman Levin. General, anything you want to add to that?
General Schwartz. Sir, again I would just say that there
are two countervailing pressures here. One is that we do have
additional demand in certain mission areas. Certainly ISR is
one. At the same time, we recognize that personnel costs are a
very substantial part of our budget, and if we're not careful
as we grow, we will force out other essential content in the
portfolio.
This is the tension we face. As the Secretary suggested, I
personally do not favor growing the force except marginally, if
at all, and that we will have to adjust internally and find
ways to reallocate our manpower to the most pressing missions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Relative to ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' Admiral Mullen
testified that he and the service chiefs are in support of
Secretary Gates in repealing this program and expressed his
personal and professional belief, in the case of Admiral
Mullen, that allowing homosexuals to serve openly would be the
right thing to do.
First, Secretary Donley, do you support Secretary Gates in
this decision?
Mr. Donley. I do, Mr. Chairman. I support the President's
efforts to change the policy and change the law in this area.
There is an additional point I'd like to make on this. As it
happens, I was actually in this seat in 1993. I know many
members were also around when this change was made. I think
Secretary Gates' approach this year has put us in a much better
situation than we were in 1993. I think a full review of all
the potential implications of this change, done by the
community that is most affected by these changes, puts us in a
stronger position to reach sound judgments and develop sound
advice going forward on how to do this.
Chairman Levin. Subject to that qualification, you support
repeal?
Mr. Donley. I do.
Chairman Levin. General, do you support repeal of the
policy?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, the President has clearly
articulated his intent and, should the law change, your Air
Force will implement the new statute and policy faithfully. I
do have concern, however, with respect to what I consider
inadequate current scholarship on this issue and certainly
insufficient current survey data on our airmen and their
families.
Secretary Gates' effort to carefully evaluate and study
this issue I think is obviously essential to our getting to the
right spot on this, and that it's important that we carefully
investigate the facts, circumstances, potential implications,
the possible complications, and potential mitigations.
I do have two firm convictions on two matters. One is that
this is not the time to perturb a force that is stretched by
combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and important missions
elsewhere, without due deliberation. Second, that Air Force
standards, should the law change, will continue to apply to all
airmen. That is, standards of conduct will continue to apply to
all airmen, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I didn't intend to begin my questioning with ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell,'' but I will follow up. In other words, General
Schwartz, as you said, this is not the time to disturb the
force, when we are in two wars. Contrary, in all due respect,
to what the chairman just said, Admiral Mullen did not testify
that the Joint Chiefs supported, the chiefs of services
supported, repeal. In fact, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
has just come out in opposition to repeal. You have just stated
your concerns about disturbing the force.q
Should this survey, study, and in-depth evaluation be about
how to repeal ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' or should it be about
the effect of the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''? General
Schwartz, what is your view on that?
General Schwartz. Senator McCain, it is important to
understand what the consequences of the change would be. There
are things that have not been thoroughly thought through in my
view in terms of benefits, in terms of cohabitation, in terms
of discipline and such.
Senator McCain. So a moratorium would be foolish?
General Schwartz. I think, sir, that any interim change
would not be wise.
Senator McCain. Thank you. Again, I want to point out that
you reflect basically the views of General Casey, General
Conway, yourself, and we have yet to hear thoroughly from
Admiral Roughead. So this idea out there that's being pushed
that the service chiefs somehow support a campaign promise made
by the President of the United States is obviously untrue. We
need to look at this very, very carefully, and we do not want
to disturb the force, particularly since we are in two wars at
this time.
Also, General, I would like to congratulate you and the
other service chiefs, who have basically stood up under intense
pressure, including coming from your right. I'm very proud of
the uniformed service chiefs in the way that they have said
that an in-depth review is an absolute necessity before we
change the policy. Clearly, a moratorium would be a change in
the policy, just a back door way of doing it.
I'd like to return a second to the JSF. First of all, do
you support the Secretary of Defense's call for cancellation of
the C-17 aircraft, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Donley. I do.
Senator McCain. General Schwartz?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator McCain. All right. Maybe you could give us a
statement for the record as to why that is necessary.
[The information referred to follows:]

The recent release of the Mobility Capability Requirements Study
validated that our current strategic airlift program of record exceeds
the most demanding scenarios modeled. Continuing to grow a fleet that
is already postured to meet national defense strategies diverts
resources from other critical programs needed to enhance the security
of the Nation. For this reason, the Air Force believes it is prudent to
close the C-17 line and end production at the currently planned 223
aircraft.

Senator McCain. I want to get, in the few minutes I have
remaining, to the JSF. As a strong supporter of the JSF, as a
person who supported the termination of the F-22 because of the
viability and necessity of the JSF as a partial replacement,
I'm very disturbed at what has been the process here. We have
not, I believe, members of the Armed Services Committee or
Congress, been adequately informed of the full extent of the
difficulties with this program.
Now, according to published reports, there's going to be at
least a 2-year delay in the production of the JSF. Is that
true, Secretary Donley?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I think what has been established in the
acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) that Dr. Carter, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, issued is that the delay in development is going to
be about 13 months.
Senator McCain. What impact does that have on fulfilling
the mission requirements of our fighter aircraft?
Mr. Donley. We're working on that. As part of the
restructuring that the Secretary announced earlier in the year,
we added dollars to extend development. We moved, I think, four
aircraft from initial production back into the test program to
see if we could accelerate the flight test program, which is
behind, and to see if we could recapture time there. We have
lowered the production ramp. That doesn't mean we have stopped
production. We have, I think, 22 production aircraft in the
budget for this year. But, we have lowered the rate of growth
in that production ramp over the next several years.
DOD took out about 122 jets from its previous estimate of
last year and about half of those are Air Force jets. We're
working through the implications of that going forward for
completion of the test program and also the IOC date that is
out in front of us. It's up to General Fraser at Air Combat
Command to work through the IOC date with the program office to
determine the content that he needs in those production jets.
If I can make one other point here, in restructuring the
program, we're also restructuring the contract and putting, I
think, additional pressure and incentives on the contractor to
buy back some of the schedule slips that have been forecast by
the independent estimates.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. The chairman
has graciously, and I think very appropriately, agreed that we
need to have a hearing or hearings on this issue, so I'll
pursue further questioning on it at that time.
I just want to say that it's disappointing to all of us, in
these very difficult economic times, when we see these kinds of
delays and cost overruns. Hopefully, the legislation we passed
will help remedy some of these problems. But maybe, Mr.
Chairman, in 6 months, a year, or so we ought to look at the
effect of the legislation that we passed, because there are
still significant problems with the consolidation of the
defense industry, which has led to lack of competition and lack
of real brakes on cost overruns in acquisition of our weapons
systems large and small.
I'd love to see a success story some time, and maybe you
know one and would bring it to the committee's attention. Go
ahead, General.
General Schwartz. It's a modest one, but there is one, and
it's the MC-12 ISR aircraft. It does both full-motion video and
signals intelligence. From a cold start to first delivery was 8
months. There are things out there that are, I think,
representative of the kind of execution you expect.
Senator McCain. Good. Maybe you could provide us with some
of the detail on how that program succeeded. We'd be very
interested in that. I know we focus on the failures rather than
the successes, and we'd like to give the successes a little
more visibility.
[The information referred to follows:]

The MC-12W Liberty Project Aircraft program has proven that rapid
acquisition tools can deliver a product effectively, efficiently, and
at an affordable price, and still meet the warfighter's immediate
requirements. This effort was an immediate response to the Secretary of
Defense's demand for the Services to provide additional intelligence,
reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) capability to combat forces. The
Air Force, working through its specialized, rapid reaction, acquisition
program management team, and the ISR Task Force, developed the MC--12W
Liberty concept to deliver an ``80 percent solution'' quickly, and
continue to improve the system with feedback from operators in the
fight. These operator inputs are rapidly rolled into both hardware/
software and training in real time. The ISR Task Force provided
oversight to set and hold requirements, and provide immediate funding.
The MC-12W Liberty concept leveraged commercial off-the-shelf systems
integrated on a readily available and highly reliable manned airframe,
by a responsive and cooperative prime contractor with proven past
performance. Acquisition professionals and operators, working hand-in-
hand from the beginning, enabled the deployment of a full combat
squadron directly into the war zone in less than 10 months after
receipt of requirement. MC-12W aircraft have flown over 11,000 combat
sorties since June 2009. Of the 37 M-12W aircraft, 30 are deployed in
the overseas congtingency operations fight while the other 7 are
dedicated trainers--an unheard of ratio for a traditional aircraft
program of record. The MC-12W Liberty is a benchmark for Air Force
rapid acquisition.

Senator McCain. I thank you both. General Schwartz, again I
want to thank you and the other uniformed chiefs for standing
up for the men and women in the military and acknowledging that
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' is an issue that has to be examined
very carefully, with an eye to our battle effectiveness and
effect on the performance of the men and women in our military.
I want to thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thanks, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz for your
great leadership. It's hard to resist not asking a question or
two about ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' because it is before us
now. I want to do it quickly and then move on to the
acquisition programs.
General Schwartz, you said something that I think is very
important as part of this discussion of repealing ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell,'' which is that there must be an understanding
that--I believe you used the term ``standards of conduct''--the
standards of conduct for Air Force members and, for that
matter, members of the other three Services cannot be altered
in any way if ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' is repealed. We'd be
eliminating one policy, but then everybody in the military has
to live by those standards of conduct.
I just wanted to say to you as an advocate of repeal that I
totally agree with that. I think that the ultimate question I
want to just ask you both and, I understand what you've said,
that the repeal effort raises is whether one believes that men
and women in uniform who are otherwise capable and living by
the standards of conduct of the military should be discharged
from the military solely because of their sexual orientation.
Secretary Donley, do you believe that men and women in uniform
should be discharged solely because of their sexual
orientation?
Mr. Donley. My personal view is no, they should not. I'd
like to come back to the issue that the Chief raised just
briefly on conduct.
Senator Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. Donley. The Chief and I at our level have the
opportunity and the duty to review dismissal cases from the Air
Force, the highest level of review in the Air Force before
officers are dismissed from service. My experience in this is
that these cases do not depend on gender or orientation, but
rather the issue of good order, discipline, unit cohesion; it
depends on conduct. That's my experience in this job.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
General Schwartz, it's a direct question, but I think it is
ultimately the question: Do you believe men and women in
uniform should be discharged solely based on their sexual
orientation?
General Schwartz. Sir, I have to tell you that the answer
to that question is more complex than a yes or no. It is
dependent on the consequences, given a change in the policy. I
would reiterate that it is very important for us to understand
what's in each of the four corners of this issue. I would
submit to you, sir, respectfully, that I'm not sure that is the
case at the moment.
For example, have we had an opportunity to understand what
the thinking of our airmen and their families is? I have not
done that. I cannot give you a sense of what their current
views are. We need to know, and we need to understand what the
puts and takes are.
I take a pragmatic view of this, sir, not the philosophical
view perhaps that you've explored here. We need to be
pragmatic.
Senator Lieberman. Do you have a personal feeling on the
underlying question? I understand what you've said about the
potential impact of it.
General Schwartz. Senator, my personal feeling is acting
now is premature.
Senator Lieberman. Good enough for now, and we'll continue
the discussion as we go.
Mr. Donley. I would like to reinforce what has been said. I
think the Secretary of Defense has put us in a good place by
calling for this review. This is an important change to our
military, and we need to have the time and the space to work
through the implications of this in ways that have not, to be
honest, sir, fully been worked through in other parts of our
society in many dimensions. It would have particular impacts on
our military.
Senator Lieberman. Understood. My own reading and hearing
of what Secretary Gates said when he testified before the
committee, and of course Admiral Mullen backed it up in very
strong testimony, was that, based on the decision of the
Commander in Chief, the President, in favor of repeal, that the
question in Secretary Gates' mind is not whether to repeal, but
essentially when and how.
The bill that we put forward yesterday contemplates the
time going by with the study. It states a principle or goal,
which is repeal, but it contemplates the time passing. In fact,
it embraces a delayed time schedule to see that it's
implemented correctly.
I'm going to stop this one here for now. I think I
appreciate the sincerity of the answers. Let me go in the time
remaining to other issues. I'm really interested in what you
said about cyber, but I want to just briefly talk to you about
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
I've had a long-term interest in the JSTARS program and the
unique capability that the program has as a ground moving
target indicator.
This is all about the re-engining of the program. I was
very pleased when last September, Under Secretary Carter issued
an Acquisition Decision Memorandum designating JSTARS as a
special interest program and directing the Air Force to proceed
immediately with re-engining. The final fiscal year 2010
Defense Appropriations Act provided $185 million for JSTARS,
including $62 million to procure one engine set. This fiscal
year 2011 budget request provides $168 million in research,
development, test, and evaluation funding and $176 million on
procurement. That's $344 million total.
In the Air Force posture statement, General Schwartz, you
note that the Service will begin an analysis of alternatives
(AOA) to determine the future of ground moving target indicator
capability this year, although the Air Force previously
indicated that that would begin by April of last year. I want
to ask you this question. My time is running out. I was
surprised to see in the justification materials supplied in
support of the budget for the Air Force for fiscal year 2011
that although there are a total of 18 aircraft to be modified
with procurement funds, the Service has only funded 4 of those
18 aircraft through the Future Years Defense Program and only 2
aircraft are funded this year, preventing the program from
attaining economies of scale that would be achieved at the 4
ship sets per year.
I want to confirm that the re-engining program for the
JSTARS fleet remains, as the Air Force justification book for
procurement indicates, in your opinion a valid requirement.
General Schwartz. We received guidance from Secretary
Carter to execute--both to complete the development that
included two ship sets--and to acquire two production ship
sets, for a total of four, as you indicated. The backdrop on
this, Senator, is that you have a couple of issues, one related
to the JSTARS airframes that were used.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Schwartz. The pedigree on those airframes is not as
solid as we'd like it to be. Just a case in point. One of the
birds we had deployed forward had a cracked upper rear spar
recently, tail number 122 I believe it was, and we had to bring
it back for repair. There are issues with respect to the
longevity of these airframes that raise questions in our mind.
Second, the question about the AN/APY-7 sensor for JSTARS.
Is that the sensor to go forward with or is there a better
package to do both the mechanized movements on the ground as
well as movements of humans on the ground? They are different
requirements.
Third, the issue has to do with the fundamental question on
where should we invest for the future. That's where the AOA is
supposed to help us. Should it be an unmanned system, for
example, or should it be manned as currently?
The bottom line is, I think the wise thing to do here is to
proceed cautiously, to re-engine the four airplanes that we've
been directed to re-engine, and get the AOA and decide what the
best way forward is for us.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. My time is up, and we'll continue
the discussion. Obviously, I hope the AOA can go forward as
quickly as possible and that the four engine sets can go
forward as quickly as possible as well.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, let me echo the comments of Senator
McCain with respect to the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' repeal. I
know there's tremendous pressure on you from the administration
and other arenas to promote this change, and we look forward to
continuing this debate and to the study. I'm very pleased to
hear you say that you're going to go down to the very lowest
levels of the enlisted personnel in the Air Force because, at
the end of the day, we need to hear from everybody on this. I
thank you for your courage there.
Mr. Secretary, in your response to Senator McCain, I want
to make sure I'm clear on this. The IOC date on the F-35 has
slipped 2 years, is that correct?
Mr. Donley. Sir, the IOC decision is up to General Fraser,
who is the commander of Air Combat Command. We think meeting
the fiscal year 2013 date that had been on the books for a
couple of years is going to be very difficult, and our guidance
to General Fraser and Under Secretary Carter's guidance to us
at this point is to have the operating community, represented
by General Fraser, working with the acquisition community and
with the program office, to work through the implications of
the restructure for IOC.
Senator Chambliss. The restructure plan anticipates a 2-
year slippage, correct?
Mr. Donley. The restructure plan did not address that
specifically. It just told us to go work the IOC issues.
Senator Chambliss. So what do you think the slippage is?
Mr. Donley. I have indicated that it's going to be very
hard to meet 2013.
Senator Chambliss. Just answer my question, Mr. Secretary.
What's going to be the slippage in your opinion?
Mr. Donley. As I have indicated, certainly beyond 2013.
General Fraser's task is to establish the definition of what
IOC is and to work with the program office to determine the
content of the program going forward.
Senator Chambliss. Are we going to reach a Nunn-McCurdy
breach this year with the F-35?
Mr. Donley. I believe we will. I have indicated that in my
testimony. The content of that, again, we have not worked
through completely. But since the restructuring decision was
made earlier in the winter, we have been undertaking, and the
program office, under Under Secretary Carter's direction, has
been undertaking, all the actions as if the program were in a
Nunn-McCurdy breach. We're working through all the mitigation
steps necessary.
Senator Chambliss. The Joint Estimating Team (JET) prepared
a report on the F-35 in the fall of 2008 that indicated that
the F-35 would be significantly over cost and behind schedule
relative to the joint program office's prediction. Are you
aware of that report?
Mr. Donley. I am.
Senator Chambliss. About a week after the vote in the
Senate last year to terminate the F-22, the JET prepared
another report that said exactly the same thing. Were you aware
of that report?
Mr. Donley. Yes.
Senator Chambliss. Were you aware of both those reports
when you came to this committee and testified that there would
not be a slippage in the IOC date on the F-35, and that it
would meet test and production requirements?
Mr. Donley. Yes. This is where we were last year.
Senator Chambliss. Why didn't you tell us that the JET was
going to come out with a report that disagreed with the IOC
date being met?
Mr. Donley. This concentrated review of the program has
been a 2-year process. We received the JET report in 2008
indicating there was a difference between the program office,
as you have described, and the independent estimate. DOD
reviewed that and ended up adding dollars to the fiscal year
2010 budget for more system development and demonstration. It
did not recognize all the changes in the independent estimate
at that time, but it set in motion another review, which
delivered at the end of last year.
So we've had a close 2-year review of this program. I would
say that the restructure represents, in part, the work of this
committee and the House on the weapons system's evaluation
process and how to better accommodate independent cost
estimates, more realistic cost estimates in our program.
Senator Chambliss. Why didn't you tell this to the
committee?
Mr. Donley. DOD's judgment at the end of the year was that
we need to recognize this disconnect and fund closer to the
independent cost estimate, and that judgment was reached at the
end of the review.
Senator Chambliss. Why didn't you tell this committee last
year when we had testimony on the termination of the F-22
program that the JET was going to come back with a report a
week after the vote last year on the floor of the Senate that
confirmed their conclusions in the fall of 2008 that there was
going to be a 2-year slippage in this program? Why didn't you
tell us that?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I cannot speak to the specific dates
you're referencing. I don't recall the precise sequence of when
reports came in or when testimony was taken.
Senator Chambliss. General Schwartz, were you aware of
those two reports last year when you came before this
committee?
General Schwartz. I was aware of the substance of the
reports, yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Was there any reason you didn't disclose
that to this committee when we were discussing the termination
of the F-22 program?
General Schwartz. Those, the independent estimates, at that
time had not received a level of validation that I felt was
compelling.
Senator Chambliss. This week, the Air Force awarded a $223
million contract for the first two re-engining ship sets for
the JSTARS re-engining effort. I would certainly hope that it's
the Air Force's intent to procure these engines and install
them on JSTARS aircraft. Is that the Air Force's intention?
General Schwartz. It is for the four ship sets, sir.
Senator Chambliss. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force budget
includes funds for two additional JSTARS re-engining ship sets.
Since this is in the President's budget request, I assume that
you both support that; is that correct?
Mr. Donley. I do.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Are you fully committed to obligating
and executing these funds as soon as you're able to, assuming
they are authorized and appropriated?
General Schwartz. We are, sir. I would only indicate that
there is a need for a bit of reprogramming in order to execute
the fiscal year 2011 program, about $20 million.
Senator Chambliss. But you intend to make that request?
General Schwartz. We intend to request that approval, yes,
sir.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I want to begin by
thanking you for your leadership and your distinguished service
to our country. I want to recognize and thank our airmen and
civilians serving around the world and their families that
support them.
Secretary Donley, it is impossible to overstate the
importance of our military engagement in the Asia Pacific
region. We know that there are six of the world's largest
militaries that operate in this region. Our conventional
adversaries are getting stronger, and it is critical that we
maintain our superiority in this region.
Mr. Secretary, given the many demands on the Air Force
budget and the unique mission in the region, the question is
how does the Air Force and the Air Force's budget impact our
military readiness in the Pacific?
Mr. Donley. Certainly, Senator, we recognize the importance
of this region and, while we have been focused understandably
on the current work in the CENTCOM AOR, we've been very busy in
the Pacific working with Admiral Willard on his vision for that
region. Many of the systems that we are procuring and have
deployed are part of his plans for this region, both in terms
of peacetime engagement and in terms of wartime planning as
well, such as our long-range strike platforms, our mobility
platforms, our tanker assets, the future fighter attack
capability when we eventually field and deploy in the F-35, for
example. We also have our space assets and our ISR assets.
There are a broad range of Air Force capabilities that are
important to this region and that are getting support in the
program that we've tabled this year.
Senator Akaka. I'm glad to know that the F-22s are being
sent to Hickam Air Force Base and the Pacific area, as well as
Alaska.
General Schwartz, the Air Force is increasing its use of
UAVs. You mentioned in a speech recently that the Air Force
wants to acquire an additional 320 units over the next 5 years
and deploy most of them on combat air patrols. The men and
women who operate the UAVs face unique mental health challenges
as they experience the realities of combat remotely.
General, how does the Air Force plan to help UAV operators
deal with these unique mental health challenges, and any other
remarks on that?
General Schwartz. Sir, I would say that I would take the
question a bit more broadly. Certainly those remotely piloted
aircraft operators have a special challenge in that they, for
some part of their day, are in the midst of combat and, in some
parts of their day, they are much removed from that, in a more
domestic setting.
But more broadly, the question is how do we sustain the
resilience of our airmen? That is, how do we prepare them both
physically and mentally to withstand the rigors of today's
demanding missions, whether they're forward deployed or whether
they're in the rear? We have several programs underway to
reinforce our efforts to make sure that our airmen have the
psychic support, the medical attention, to ensure that there is
a chaplaincy which is readily available and accessible, as well
as commanders who care, so that we can assure the resilience of
this talented and precious pool of airmen.
We are concerned, for example, about suicide rates, which
were higher last year than they were the year before, and we're
running ahead again this year, both with our civilian and
military personnel. This is another application of our efforts
to improve resilience among our Air Force members, both
civilian and military members.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I'm happy to hear about the progress you
have made in enhancing the acquisition workforce. Can you
discuss any improvements within the Air Force acquisition
system to help prevent a requirements creep and obtain the best
possible estimates?
Mr. Donley. Senator, I think there are several efforts
underway here. But I think the one that I would mention front
and center is KC-X. As the Air Force went back to define the
requirement, the mandatory requirement set for KC-X, we were
very careful to include those things that we needed to go to
war on day 1. There is a bit of acquisition reform in this as
well in the manner in which we have done this. We would expect
to get that capability right off the production line and not to
have to send an aircraft back for modifications any time soon.
We would not expect to have to negotiate additional
capabilities with who ever is selected for that airframe. But
we have designed the requirements to be what we need on day 1
and to limit that defining very precisely.
Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, President Obama has called
on Americans to lower our reliance on fossil fuels and change
the way we produce energy. The Air Force's energy strategy is
to reduce demand, increase supply, and change its culture.
General, please tell us about the status of efforts to meet the
Air Force's strategic energy goals by reducing fuel demand,
increasing energy supplies, and changing Air Force culture?
General Schwartz. Sir, there are a couple of parts to this.
We, as you well know, are the largest consumer of hydrocarbons
in DOD. There are things that we can do as a matter of course
that reduce our demand for those hydrocarbons. In fact, over
the last several years we've reduced our demand in the double
digits through process, through procedures, through careful
mission planning, and so on.
That is part of the deal here, which is reminding our
people that hydrocarbons are a precious resource, they are a
cost driver in our cost of operations, and they must use these
petroleum products judiciously. That's one part.
The other thing we've done, as you probably know, is we
have qualified a number of our aircraft--the KC-135, the C-17,
the B-52; the F-22 is pending--on mixes of fuel, hydrocarbon
and synthetic derivatives, for which we think there is a market
for that fuel. We don't want to be the producer, but we can be
the consumer of those blended fuels, which we know will work in
our airplanes and certainly will enhance availability.
The third part of this is the fundamental question of
whether we can get beyond hydrocarbons. Our research laboratory
is working that aspect as well. Hydrogen is one example, and
there are a number of other promising technologies.
I would conclude by saying that this is not just about
airplanes. Our installations are large consumers of electricity
and so on. An example of one initiative is the solar farm at
Nellis Air Force Base, where over 50 percent of the electricity
consumed at Nellis now is produced via solar. That's again
representative of our efforts across the board, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I remain deeply, deeply troubled by the process that
resulted in this dramatic alteration of the RFP for the KC-X
tanker aircraft. It's such a dramatic change that it has, I
think, stunned the entire contracting world. I believe that the
Air Force correctly chose the preferred airplane the last time.
There were technical problems with the way that RFP went
forward, and it was legitimate to come back and look at it
again. But to have 11 significant changes and 9 of those favor
one aircraft, to change the RFP to a degree that when you have
two aircraft, each offering different values, and to craft the
RFP so it directly favors only one aircraft is a stunning
development. I think is going to have ramifications throughout
the defense community.
I believe no matter if the Northrop team decides to bid--
and I hope they do, I hope they do, but I don't know that they
will--it's still going to be a problem that is not going away.
There is now a perception, and I believe a correct one, that
politics somehow influenced the changes that were made.
I took notice from my colleagues in the Seattle Times after
the new RFP came out. This is the lead sentence in that
article: ``The final RFP for the long-delayed $40 billion Air
Force refueling tanker contract, issued Wednesday, appears to
heavily favor Boeing's Everett-built 767 plane over the
rival.''
It goes on to quote Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as saying:
``This is not a price showdown.'' But they note: ``But analysts
noted that only in very limited circumstances will credit be
given for extra capabilities.''
The article goes on to say: ``The much larger Airbus 330
can deliver more fuel per trip than the Boeing 767 and carry
extra troops and cargo, but the evaluation process will credit
those items only if the two bids are within 1 percent of each
other on cost.''
Lauren Thompson, defense industry analyst at the Lexington
Institute, said: ``This becomes nothing more than a cost
competition and a bigger plane costs more.'' He goes on to say:
``It's Boeing's competition to lose. This is playing out just
the way Northrop feared.''
I'm a believer in DOD. I believe in the integrity of DOD,
but I am very troubled. I remember with great clarity Senator
McCain challenging the Air Force's decision with Darleen Druyun
to give, in effect, a sole source contract to Boeing, and what
did we find out? Ms. Druyun went to jail and members of the
leadership team at Boeing had to resign, if not be prosecuted.
I think some were prosecuted. It was a very, very sad thing.
Politics should not enter into this. I just would tell you,
I know it was made an issue in the campaign. Senator McCain,
who saved $8 billion by advocating that this not be a sole-
source contract for DOD, was criticized in the campaign for his
activity that virtually this whole committee supported. Senator
Levin supported it. We required a bid. We passed a law that
said this will be bid. There are only two bidders in the world.
So, if you doctor a bid that favors only one configured
aircraft over another and don't consider the total value to the
Country, then you've I think done something that frustrated,
really, the intent of Congress.
Secretary Donley, don't you feel that in a procurement of
this size that the Air Force should insist that the aircraft
chosen not only just the cheapest price--that's not the only
thing--but also that we should consider the other capabilities
that the Air Force has and that the RFP should be crafted in
such a way that those extra capabilities are given legitimate
weight in the evaluation?
Mr. Donley. Senator, we've had this conversation and, with
all due respect, I think we probably disagree on how to
characterize the RFP. DOD has been very careful about how it
structured this competition and how it structured the
requirements and the acquisition strategy. We believe this is a
fair approach, it's balanced, and it has favored no one.
Senator Sessions. So you believe that?
Mr. Donley. The Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary Carter,
and I have played this, DOD has played this, straight down the
middle as best we possibly can, given all the pressures on both
sides of these arguments.
I would also like to remind the committee that in the
context of the acquisition strategy, the capabilities of the
aircraft are evaluated in the wartime model, in the peacetime
fuel burn, and in the needed military construction (MILCON). So
we have multiple evaluations of the aircraft involved in the
evaluation upfront. That is part of our work.
We've been very careful to identify what we need to go to
war on day 1.
Senator Sessions. So you would disagree with the paper's
reporting?
Mr. Donley. Air Mobility Command has been scrupulous in the
way this has been put together.
Senator Sessions. The article says the evaluation process
will credit those extras only if the two bids are within 1
percent of each other.
Mr. Donley. Sir, I understand that there are extra
capabilities beyond the 1 percent gate. But before the 1
percent gate, the costs and benefits of smaller airplanes and
larger airplanes are measured in the warfighting model, in the
peacetime operating model, and in the MILCON costs. So the
advantages of one plane over another in that evaluation is
undertaken before you get to the 1 percent gate.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. My time is up. I don't agree.
This is not going to go away, and I just feel it's just so sad
that we're in this. I think anybody in DOD or the Air Force who
have talked to me about this bid process will know I never
asked for any special advantage. I simply said you should craft
a process to select the best value, not just the more expensive
or cheaper aircraft, but the best value for the Air Force.
I think there was a dramatic change in this bid process
after you took office than there was previously, and I think
it's resulted in a troubling situation. That's just my
assessment. I have to say it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. The wisest man in the world, King
Solomon, faced the problem of who a baby's parent was between
two women that said the baby was theirs. King Solomon solved
the problem by saying: ``Well then, we'll just cut the baby in
half and give a half to each.'' Then, of course, the real
mother of the two said: ``No, no, your majesty; please give the
baby to her.'' King Solomon then knew whose baby it was.
Maybe the rumors are true out there that you're going to
give this tanker aircraft contract to both contractors, and
that's percolating. So I'd be interested to find out where the
truth is here.
I want to ask you for the record, because I have such a
little bit of time, and if you'll just get back to me for the
record, on space infrastructure.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Air Force is implementing the Launch Enterprise Transformation
to support increasing launch demand. Ongoing range modernization and
sustainment efforts are improving range reliability, availability, and
maintainability. These efforts are enabling the Air Force to divest
excess range infrastructure in favor of optimally sited, more reliable,
and sustainable assets. Additionally, the Air Force is transitioning to
greater use of on-board systems for tracking and command functions
essential to range safety. In the near term, the Air Force is moving
from primary reliance on radar tracking to a combination of on-board
Global Positioning System (GPS) and inertial guidance tracking. Over
the longer term, the ranges will transition from ground-based safety
processes and systems to on-board autonomous flight safety systems. The
decreased reliance on ground-based infrastructure increases range
agility and enables the ranges to better satisfy the demands of
changing launch schedules.
In addition to these efforts, the Air Force is pursuing several
initiatives to achieve greater launch flexibility. These include
improving the launch manifesting process to maximize launch slots,
optimizing launch vehicle throughput, and investigating the feasibility
of launching GPS satellites from the west coast.
The Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC) and the Director,
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) chartered a Tiger Team to
recommend a revised way ahead for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) program. Among the items the Tiger Team is evaluating are a more
flexible and transparent contract structure, and multi-vehicle
procurement to include an fiscal year 2011 pathfinder ``Block Buy'' of
launch services with the NRO and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. The Tiger Team is also looking at various pre-planned
product improvement and sustainment options for EELV.
The team is also reviewing a more flexible manifesting process.
This ``Whitetail'' concept would manifest and start the manufacturing
of an EELV that could launch any of several different spacecraft.
Specific spacecraft assignment would occur later, thereby using finite
launch opportunities more efficiently. This concept was utilized in the
most recent Current Launch Schedule Review Board. As a result, some of
the EELV's manifested for launch in the next year have multiple
spacecraft assigned for the same launch date. This provides flexibility
in the event a specific spacecraft slips from its assigned launch date,
then another spacecraft has the opportunity to launch.
The results of the Tiger Team efforts will provide the basis for
the fiscal year 2010 congressional reports required for both EELV
sustainment and multi-vehicle procurement. The estimated completion
date for a new acquisition strategy is on or about June 1, 2010.

Senator Bill Nelson. Our Air Force range system is not as
flexible as it needs to be to ensure the growing number of
launches that are required. I want you to respond to us in
writing, what are your thoughts to upgrade the ranges and to
support more flexible approaches to space launch? What are you
looking at with regard to the buying of launch vehicles, and
the fact that 80 percent of communications for the military now
go on commercial satellites. What is the right mix, and is the
Air Force discussing any future plans to increase military
satellite communications capacity beyond the current generation
of Wideband Global Satellite and Advanced Extremely High
Frequency satellites?
Next is the issue of space situational awareness. What are
the ramifications for ensuring space situational awareness if
your increased request in your budget is not appropriated?
[The information referred to follows:]

Ensuring our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have reliable,
consistent access to communications is critical to successful military
operations. The fielding of Wideband Global Satellite and the upcoming
launch of Advanced Extremely High Frequency greatly improves access to
Satellite Communications (SATCOM). However, these constellations cannot
by themselves satisfy 100 percent of demand and commercial SATCOM will
continue to provide needed service to the warfighter. The Air Force and
the Department of Defense are reassessing SATCOM requirements and the
Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) architecture, to include
an analysis of the balance of commercial and military SATCOM.
The increased funds proposed in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget would keep the development of new SSA capabilities, specifically
Space Fence, Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Follow On, and SSA
Environmental Monitoring (SSAEM) on schedule to replace the existing
aging Space Surveillance Network infrastructure, and to maintain
continuity of SSA services. Failure to fund these efforts will slip the
delivery of these new capabilities and result in: (1) risk of a loss of
near earth small object detection (Space Fence); (2) loss of Deep Space
monitoring and tracking (SBSS) upon end of life of SBSS Block 10, and
(3) loss of key environmental capabilities (SSAEM) that affect all
space services to the warfighter.

Senator Bill Nelson. Then, I have questions about
operationally responsive space. What are your thoughts on
increasing support to that?
[The information referred to follows:]

The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request of $94 million for
ORS continues to fund the enablers needed to build an ability to
rapidly reconstitute, augment, and surge space capabilities. We believe
this level of funding supports the enabling capabilities. We continue
to closely monitor the ORS-1 satellite development and are prepared to
address execution issues should they arise.

Senator Bill Nelson. I would just add my comments on
JSTARS, and I'd like to be kept in the loop, that, given the
importance of this asset to the current fight, I'd like to have
a timeline for a decision on the ground moving target indicator
requirement, and on the re-engining. So if you'd put me in that
information loop.
[The information referred to follows:]

Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) requirements will be
evaluated as part of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) which was
formally initiated on March 16, 2010. The AoA will determine what GMTI
sensors and platforms are best suited to address the Department of
Defense's current capability gaps. Results from this effort are
expected to be available in March 2011 to support the Air Force's
fiscal year 2013 budget preparation.
In parallel, the JSTARS program office is taking steps to address
recommendations of the Air Force Fleet Viability Board (FVB) with
regard to E-8C structural condition. The Air Force has recently placed
Boeing on contract to determine the service life of the underlying 707-
300 structure on which the E-8Cs were built; preliminary results of
this effort are expected to be available in September 2010. Additional
FVB remediation activity such as documentation review and a vertical
stabilizer teardown will continue through early 2012.
Development activity is ongoing for the JSTARS re-engining program.
The first two production shipsets are expected to be available in July
2012, at which time they will be installed on E-8C aircraft to support
operational testing. Problems, however, have been identified with the
new engine's bleed air design. The bleed air redesign is expected to be
complete by July 2012. If the bleed air redesign is not complete in
time for the engine delivery then a post delivery retrofit will be
necessary. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requests funding for
two additional shipsets for purchase in 2011--these would be available
for install in early fiscal year 2014.
If the results of the AoA and E-8C structural analysis indicate
that the JSTARS should be modernized, the Air Force will have the
opportunity to include additional E-8C engine production in the fiscal
year 2013 President's budget. Execution of such funding would be
contingent on a successful operational test in March 2012.
If, based on the AoA and structural analysis, the DOD decides to
replace the JSTARS with a different GMTI capability, the Air Force
would continue to sustain the E-8C while that replacement is designed,
produced, and fielded.

Senator Bill Nelson. Now, the remaining time that I have, I
just want to say that last night I got a disturbing phone call
about the Air Force's proposal to shut down 48 F-15s at Tyndall
Air Force Base and that the job loss is not 594 personnel as
originally expected. Last night, I found out it's 801
personnel. I've been told the change is due to factors that
were unaccounted for during your June 2009 study. But there's
been no change in the number of departing aircraft.
This is 15 percent of the total workforce at Tyndall Air
Force Base that's going to be gone under your present plans. I
would say that this hasn't been particularly well managed,
particularly in light that there's not a follow-on mission
there. We had been advocating to get F-35s to replace those F-
15s, and now you've already testified that the F-35s are going
to be considerably delayed.
You know the excellent base that we have. You put the F-22s
there for pilot training because of the huge Gulf Training and
Testing Range that we have, which by the way I will continue to
protect; in spite of the Air Force and the Navy's efforts, I
will continue to protect so that you don't have the invasions
there so that you can't test, train, and drop live ordnance.
I would appreciate very much if you would check out this
follow-on mission for Tyndall Air Force Base.
Do you have any comments?
General Schwartz. Senator Nelson, just a bit of background
on the 594 to 801 increase in personnel cuts. There were a
couple of factors involved in this, but the largest one was an
expectation that we would in-source the F-22 back shop
maintenance. In other words, it's currently done by contract,
and the expectation was we would migrate that into blue suits,
which would help maintain blue suit manpower at Tyndall.
For a number of reasons, we're not prepared to do that. We
may well do it in the future, but it's not the right time. That
is the largest component of the reason for the 174, I guess,
increase in the numbers, from 594 to 801.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The committee notes the difference would be 207 personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I did share this in person yesterday with another member of
the Florida delegation. Please forgive me for not getting to
you in time.
Tyndall is a very important place. The F-22 would not be
there if it were not. As you suggested, the range availability
there is precious.
We have not made decisions on training space. It is true,
the recent restructure of F-35, has pushed a little bit to the
right decisions about where we would bed down the second
training location. The first one is----
Senator Bill Nelson. At Eglin.
General Schwartz.--at Eglin, and it's 59 aircraft. The
environmental impact statement is underway as we speak.
It is clear to me that there's capacity at Eglin \2\ and we
as an Air Force need to make prudential use of that capacity.
We just haven't gotten to the point where we've decided exactly
what that is. But it's well understood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ General Schwartz intended to refer to Tyndall Air Force Base,
as indicated by the later remarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Bill Nelson. You said ``Eglin,'' but you meant
``Tyndall.'' It's clear to you that there is capability at
Tyndall.
General Schwartz. Tyndall.
Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for your
service in performing very difficult jobs. We keep making more
and more demands and resources get more and more constrained
all the time. I think the discussion this morning is a good
example of that.
General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you about, among other
things, you placed the B-1 bomber high velocity maintenance
funding as number one on your unfunded priority list. I
understand that a part of that, the B-1 portion of this item,
is around $25 million. Can you explain your rationale as to why
this important maintenance for the B-1 wasn't funded in the
base budget?
General Schwartz. Sir, the background on high velocity
maintenance is, the basic principle comes from the commercial
sector, where you take airplanes into depot-level maintenance
more frequently, in this case maybe every 18 months as opposed
to every 4 or 5 years, and the net result of that is you have
much less discovery; when you have airplanes come in after long
intervals, then you discover things that are wrong that you
didn't know about, such as with the structure and so on and so
forth.
The principle in the commercial sector demonstrates that
looking at airplanes more frequently at the depot level can
save you money. It is an appropriate initiative. But the bottom
line was we were pressed. Just as in a case in point, we
deferred in our budget, trying to make balance all the demands,
109 depot visits of aircraft and 163 engine overhauls. That
unfunded priority request helped bring some of those overhauls
back, including the high velocity maintenance on the B-1s.
I mean, think about this, Senator Thune. We're asking for
additional dollars for sustainment, not for a platform, not for
something you would expect, but to maintain our machines and to
make sure that we maintain readiness. But the bottom line is we
have pressures, we made choices, and the number one unfunded
priority is sustainment.
Senator Thune. How many B-1s do you think would be impacted
by that requested funding?
General Schwartz. We have 66, sir, and ultimately it would
be all of them.
Senator Thune. General, the integration of the Sniper
Advanced Targeting Pod into the B-1 bomber, and other Air Force
aircraft, has contributed greatly to effective close air
support in Afghanistan. However, there seems to be a lack of
these advanced targeting pods for training because they're in
such high demand in theater. Crews then are using these
advanced targeting pods overseas in combat. However, they're
having a limited ability to train on them here at home.
Does the Air Force have a need for additional advanced
targeting pods for training use?
General Schwartz. Sir, you make a good point. The program
of record which is funded is to grow to 375 sniper pods in the
Air Force. We've had 241 delivered thus far. When we get to the
full program, we will be able to dedicate the pods to specific
tail numbers. But until we get there, typically what we are
doing, it is true, is bringing the pod to the unit that will be
deploying 3 to 4 months in advance of their deployment, so they
can refine their skills and such with respect to the precision
targeting.
Again, this is a matter of a temporal issue. This is not a
funding issue. We will get well as the additional pods are
delivered.
Senator Thune. Due to General McChrystal's directive
restricting close air support operations, my understanding is
that B-1 crews are frequently being used,instead of for their
sniper pod capability, to provide ISR to ground troops without
resorting to any sort of kinetic strike. Do you have any idea
or notion of how frequently air crews are being utilized by
ground troops in Afghanistan simply for ISR purposes?
General Schwartz. Frequently, sir, I don't think that we
should find that to be a problem. If the aircraft are airborne
and they do not have a valid target to engage, to support our
folks on the ground with the view from above and be able to
provide that view via datalink to folks with Rover terminals on
the ground, is exactly what we should be doing.
I can understand why folks would ask this; they know their
primary mission is delivering iron on target. If it's not
needed during that sortie, certainly we should make the best
possible use of the capability of the airplane, including the
sniper pod.
Senator Thune. General Schwartz--and Secretary Donley, I
direct this to you as well--with regard to the Future Years
Defense Program force structure set out in the new QDR for the
Air Force, there is a proposal for 5 long-range strike wings
with up to 96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest
Air Force Almanac, the Air Force currently has 153 bomber
aircraft.
Now, when I posed a question about the substantial cut to
the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said
there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number
of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty.
That's cause for concern in my view because I have long
expressed the fear that it would be proposed by the
administration in effect as a way to negotiate the bomber leg
of the nuclear triad away.
Are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force as are
being envisioned by the QDR?
General Schwartz. Sir, there actually are 162 bomber
platforms, B-1 and B-52 and B-2. The 96 are what we call
combat-coded aircraft. So you have training aircraft, you have
attrition Reserve. It's a complicated formula. In reality, 96
translates to the current fleet of 162.
But with respect to potential changes in mission, I do not
foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an
adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1
is not a nuclear-tasked platform; the B-52 is. If there is a
requirement for fewer B-52s on the nuclear side, we will still
require their capability on the conventional side. They simply
will no longer be dual tasked.
Senator Thune. Do you think that the cuts to delivery
vehicles contemplated in the START Treaty, though, in those
negotiations, are likely to come primarily out of the bomber
force?
General Schwartz. Sir, I don't think that'll be the case. I
do not.
Senator Thune. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman. But if
I have one quick question, can I ask?
Chairman Levin. All right, yes.
Senator Thune. General Cartwright indicated--and this is
quick--that we run the risk of making the triad a diad if we go
below 800 delivery vehicles in the follow-on START. Do you
share that concern?
General Schwartz. The issue for the Air Force, sir, is what
I would call critical mass, both on the bomber side and the
missile side. This has less to do with being able to meet
targeting requirements than it does to be able to maintain the
talent pool, the expertise in the nuclear enterprise that we
need. If you get too small, you don't have enough people to
fill the enterprise with the kind of talent you need.
So for me, there is a minimum size that really is driven by
human capital concerns, less than sort of traditional sort of
targeting concerns.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Nelson, I'm going to have to
leave for a few minutes. If I'm not back, I'd appreciate your
calling on the next person. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Will do.
Gentlemen, I appreciate your service and the men and women
in uniform and civilians that do such a great job on behalf of
the American people through the Air Force and through your
leadership.
The 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska operates
a fleet of uniquely equipped RC-135 aircraft. Of course,
they're individually equipped with unique combinations of ISR
collections systems. Up to now, these collection capabilities
are not fully supported by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
In the budget request in fiscal year 2011, the request
includes $2.2 billion for UASs and supports an increase in
combat air patrols from 37 to 65 by 2013. Obviously, the
primary focus of this expansion is via ISR, and it's been on
UASs. My question is: As the Air Force budgets to meet these
mission requirements and begins divesting itself of older
airframes to pay for new technologies and programs, how do you
see the technology of remotely piloted platforms affecting
platforms like the RC-135? Perhaps, General Schwartz, you'd
like to respond to that first.
General Schwartz. Sir, I would say that is not an immediate
concern. The issue for us right now really is the high-altitude
transition between the U-2 and the Global Hawk, and getting the
Global Hawk, particularly the so-called Block 40 Global Hawk,
which has a radar sensor--the Block 30 is the more signals
intelligence-based platform--getting those fielded. That is the
real issue that we are dealing with.
I do not foresee remotely piloted aircraft beginning to
supplant the large fixed-wing capability that particularly
resides in the RC-135 in the near term.
Senator Ben Nelson. What efforts are underway in fiscal
year 2011 to modernize the RC-135 to obviously keep it at the
highest level of performance?
General Schwartz. Sir, I'd like to take that question and
give you a detailed answer for the record, if that's okay.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, I don't want to use all my time on
that.
General Schwartz. This airplane continues to improve.
Certainly the sensor capability on the machine improves. We
have initiatives there to deal with new signals, new modes of
collection, and what have you, as well as the airframe, re-
engining, and such, that you're aware. But I'll get you a
detailed answer on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Fiscal year 2011 will see the continued development and upgrade of
the RC-135. These upgrades ensure the RC-135 remains operationally
viable and tactically relevant in its ability to collect, process,
analyze, and disseminate evolving and emerging adversarial threats--
specifically the collection of advanced digital low-power systems used
by terrorists and insurgents worldwide. These programmed upgrades will
enable the RC-135 to continue to rapidly and reliably respond to
national Intelligence Community taskings, as well as the time-sensitive
threat warning and force protection requirements of commanders in the
field.
Fiscal year 2011 modernization efforts will be the start of the
largest technology refreshment ever introduced in a single RC-135
baseline upgrade and will include the following:

1. CORVUS: Replaces the Automatic ELINT Emitter Locator System
(AEELS) which has been on-board the RC-135 since 1991. Due to
diminishing vendor inventories, the AEELS is at a critical juncture and
must be replaced or faces potential mission failure in the near future.
CORVUS significantly improves the probability to intercept signals from
integrated air defense systems, surface-to-air missile systems, and
advanced adversary fighter aircraft.
2. Digital Multi-threaded Collection Architecture (DMCA):
Fields a common digital hardware and software architecture for all core
communications exploitation applications to include searching, copying,
and geo-locating high-priority targets of interest.
3. Wideband Global Satellite (WGS): Accomplishes initial
engineering test and hardware integration for WGS receiver equipment
on-board the RC-135. WGS will provide the bandwidth needed for nearly
all near-term distributed operations capabilities. Currently the single
greatest barrier to enhanced enterprise integration for the RC-135 is
lack of data link connectivity bandwidth. WGS will fix this
shortcoming.
4. Ship-wide Interphone: Full replacement of cockpit and
reconnaissance compartment interphone, voice radio access, and recon
audio access/control functions for communications; allows timely
support to national and theater intelligence consumers.
5. External Communications Suite Upgrade: Deploys new NSA
software (Radiant Mercury), providing a data guard that allows multi-
level secure communications. Ensures tactical data links are segregated
without compromising the integrity and security of any network
(collateral links from SCI networks). Fields an upgraded suite of
digital line-of-sight and SATCOM radios compatible with current and
programmed strategic and tactical secure communications networks.
6. General Technology Refreshment: Re-hosts 51 of 54 computer
processors, ensuring state-of-the-art capability to keep pace with
ever-changing enemy technologies; purchases new digital recorders to
archive collected data for real-time and post-mission analysis and
reporting; purchases new Local Area Network (LAN) switch mainframes;
and replaces legacy communication receivers with state-of-the-art
digital tuners.
7. Signal Search Research and Development (Special Signals):
Upgrades legacy equipment, ensuring continued collection capability
against advanced, digital, high-capacity special signals of interest.
This upgrade purchases enhanced recording functions and upgrades
existing analysis systems. This upgrade ensures the RC-135 continues to
have one of the most technologically advanced mobile signals search and
analysis capability of all fielded ISR platforms.
8. Maintenance Upgrades: Equipment replaces aging maintenance
equipment, including new cooling systems for multiple computer
processors, allowing sustained system reliability.
9. Enhanced Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT):
Capability provides highly precise fused national/tactical geo-location
to theater and battlefield commanders.
10. Expanded Aircrew Capability Extension System Applications:
Supports distributed operations with ground collection and processing;
net-centric enabler integrates the RC-135 into national intelligence
processing, analysis, and reporting systems; supports in-garrison
linguist training and expanded combat proficiency.

Senator Ben Nelson. That would be helpful.
In that connection, I understand that there is no effort
underway right now to grow the end strength. But as we bring in
new missions, new technology, and retain existing technology
and existing systems, there's going to be pressure on personnel
and the human capital will obviously be affected by that. Are
you planning training differences or is there a reduction in
force required for certain systems over other systems?
General Schwartz. Sir, let me give you a quick example and
perhaps the Secretary will want to amplify. Right now we have
put more than 4,000 people, airmen, into the ISR mission. That
is, as the Secretary suggested earlier, both operators and
maintainers and a very substantial number of intel folks to
process the data take. We cannot sustain that indefinitely. We
can't go from 50 to 65 percent and keep doing it just the same
way.
What that suggests is technology has to help us. For
example, at the moment we have one pilot and one sensor
operator, fly one platform with one sensor on it, looking at
one spot on the ground. So it's a one to one to one to one
relationship. What we need to be able to do is get to the point
where one operator can operate multiple aircraft, maybe as many
as four, perhaps more, and gain efficiencies there.
Likewise, we need on the processing side to use the kind of
software that we know is available, that you and I saw when we
were watching the Olympic Games or when we watch football on
Sundays. We need to have automation in the process of watching
video, picking out the relevant pieces of video and so on. That
will reduce the manpower demand.
Part of this is right now doing what we have to do. This is
not the way that this needs to be structured indefinitely.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that.
Mr. Donley. Just to amplify on the personnel side, I think
our Air Force has a very strong reputation for the relationship
that we have between the Active, the Guard, and Reserve
components, a very close lashup among the Reserve components
with the Active-Duty component. We've applied that in many
different mission areas.
One of the initiatives I put out this year, and we hope to
get some results on further along in the calendar year, is
taking those success stories at individual locations and
establishing for the Air Force as an institution a little bit
better business case analysis, a little bit better model for
the cost effectiveness of our total force initiatives across
all components, especially in some areas where we have many
airmen involved but who do not always deploy abroad. There may
be a slice of the force that requires deployment forward at any
given time, but in many ways CONUS-based operations or static
operations, if you will, even though they're in support of the
combatant commanders, need us to find out whether or not we can
get better, cost-effective combinations of our Active, Guard,
and Reserve personnel, and our civilian workforce as well.
We're looking for better cost-effective models in that
broad area going forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. There's one other question. My time's
out. I'd like you to respond back in writing on this. I noticed
in the Air Force's unfunded requirements under MILCON an entry
item of $57.1 million to address Guard and Reserve vehicle
replacement and equipment. I know the Army in its posture
hearing last week expressed some concerns about being able to
deal with the MILCON requirements for the Guard and Reserve.
Perhaps you can outline to me whether or not the Air National
Guard (ANG) is suffering from the same facility requirements
and shortfalls as well. Obviously, as we use the Air Force and
the Guard as Operational Reserves, their MILCON requirements
are going to be increasing over a period of time.
I thank both of you for your time. Did you have a response
to that?
Mr. Donley. Sir, we can give you a more specific response
for the record, but we have been taking increased risk in our
infrastructure. Tactical and administrative vehicles is an area
that also gets typically less attention and is an area where we
take risks. These are things that affect all of our force. But
we'll get you a more specific answer on the Guard.
[The information referred to follows:]

In our fiscal year 2011 budget request, we had to make a number of
difficult choices, including continued risk in some of our
infrastructure accounts. However, we believe that these risks are
necessary, given numerous other priorities that we face in this time of
conflict; and, we have ensured that our budget request remains aligned
to our fundamental priorities. Therefore, the Air Force is placing its
most urgent military construction projects in the Future Year's Defense
Program (FYDP) and we are working to ensure that all critical
requirements are met. We will re-examine the requirements for both
Active and Reserve components during the fiscal years 2012 to 2017 FYDP
development.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Thanks, both of you.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. General Schwartz, your comments about
the Olympics and the technology there made me think about our
Olympic team, almost another form of an Air Force, Olympic Air
Force, though a lot of them operating without chutes and nets.
What a great result we had in Vancouver.
I was at another hearing in the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, and I missed the exchange on ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell.'' I understand it was healthy and frank, and I want
to compliment everybody involved in this important discussion
for being forthcoming with their point of view.
I remain a stalwart supporter of the Lieberman-Levin
legislation. I have no doubt, given the exemplary fashion in
which human resources operate in the military, that once we
decide how to implement this change, that the military will do
it in a way that makes us proud. Thanks to both of you for
being clear with your points of view.
If I might, let me turn to the legacy aircraft retirement
situation. You've announced plans to retire legacy aircraft in
order to, as I understand, fund a smaller, more capable force
and redistribute those personnel to higher priority missions.
The plan raised some questions here, and I'd like to ask you in
that context if you have a plan to recapitalize the ANG units,
which are performing air sovereignty alert missions and whether
there are concerns you have about potential gaps in the
homeland defense systems?
General Schwartz. Sir, we certainly do have a tight
coupling, as the Secretary suggested, with the ANG. With
respect to the air sovereignty alert, there are 18 locations, 2
of which are Active Duty, 16 are covered by the ANG. Of those,
we have two of which are soon to be F-22 locations. You have,
if I recall correctly, six are F-16, and the remainder are F-15
covered.
The bottom line is that that mission will not diminish in
coverage as a result of the reductions that we've recommended,
and that we will make sure that the air sovereignty mission and
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)-U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) requirements are satisfied through
either reallocation of assets if we have to or service life
extension if that's required. Clearly, some of that coverage
will be performed by F-35s in due course.
Senator Udall. I think it wouldn't surprise you and the
Secretary to know that the Guard, whether it's the ANG or the
Army Guard, are always keen to take advantage of equipment that
may be available. They make the most with equipment that often
has been used.
General Schwartz. I think and I do believe that our Guard
and our Reserve are models for complete integration within the
larger total force context of our Air Force, and I certainly
would expect that as we get additional equipment and personnel
and modernize, I would say both in terms of the tankers and in
terms of the fighters, you will see an appropriate contribution
from the Guard and the Reserve in both those mission areas.
Senator Udall. Good luck in that regard. By the way, I
think Boeing and Northrop are both great companies.
Let me move to the space posture review. Senator McCain
mentioned we required in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2009 a report by December 1 last year. I
understand it won't be completed until the summer. Can you tell
us anything about what's in the works that's been performed so
far, the QDR process, and how that might have affected
modernization and investment plans for security space systems?
Mr. Secretary, do you care to comment, or General Schwartz?
Mr. Donley. I wouldn't want to preempt the policy
discussions that are underway, but I'll just highlight that
they do reflect themes that are familiar to this committee and
to prior year testimony from the Air Force, and from Air Force
Space Command in particular, about the importance of this
domain to our national security establishment. We need to set
the right balance between U.S. and partner capabilities as we
think about those aspects of our major mission areas like
missile warning, satellite communications systems, weather,
intelligence and surveillance, all these are mission areas
within the space domain, and what kind of capabilities we need
as a military going forward. We also must find the right
balance between those that we need to own and those that we can
buy or lease from others, how to set up more effective
partnerships with our international partners, and our
commercial partners going forward.
These are roughly the themes that you will see. Space is
more crowded than it was 20 or 30 years ago, more congested and
more contested. The importance of space situational awareness
as a foundation for our work going forward I think is very
important. We need to have the capabilities in place that help
us understand what is happening in that domain with full
knowledge of all the actors and capabilities that are operating
in that domain and to be able to attribute actions in that
domain that could potentially impact U.S. capabilities.
Senator Udall. I look forward to the report, obviously.
Let me, in the remaining time I have move to cyberspace. We
have the 24th stood up at Peterson Air Force Base. We're
honored to be able to host the 24th and Peterson in general.
Can you give us a little bit of an update on the 24th and the
cyberspace mission in general?
General Schwartz. Just to clarify that, of course, Air
Force Space Command at Peterson is the senior headquarters to
the 24th. Actually, the 24th is based in San Antonio, sir.
Senator Udall. I thank you for that clarification. I didn't
want to suggest to my friends from Texas that the 24th is in
Colorado.
General Schwartz. I understand.
I think the key thing about 24th is that it is the focus
for our efforts in cyberspace. There are two major components
of that. One is defending the net, defending our networks,
because they are not just administrative entities; they are
command and control, they're involved in command, control,
operations, and so on. Defending the net is a major obligation
and they have infrastructure and people in the command
relationship to execute that mission.
In addition, there is the question of what I would refer to
as the offensive use of cyber. That is, use of cyber in ways
that would support other aspects of the Air Force mission. For
example, if you are trying to neutralize an integrated air
defense system, you can do that with kinetic weapons or
perhaps, perhaps, you could do it with some cyber capabilities.
So the 24th is focused on that part, not more broadly, but
to those kinds of capabilities that would enable other Air
Force missions. That's the basic theme for 24th. They're
growing. They will have the talent of our Air Force with
respect to all things cyber, and it will also be the Air Force
component command, for the subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
when it's established.
Senator Udall. Thank you, General.
One final comment. My time has expired. There's an
interesting analogue here between the conversation we're having
about offensive activity in space and offensive activity in
cyberspace. I think there are probably lessons that we can
learn and discussions that will parallel each other as we
grapple with those tough, but very serious, questions.
Thanks again, gentlemen, for being here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, thank you so much
for your service and for your testimony today. The Air Force
contributes so much to today's irregular warfare environment in
substantial ways, and our airmen do an excellent job in
providing situational awareness and air-ground integration on
the battlefield.
I also want to emphasize the contributions of our Air Force
Special Operations combat controllers who conduct combat search
and rescue operations, set up air assault zones, and manage the
air space.
Lastly, I want to thank you for the Air Force contributions
to the efforts in Haiti. I understand there were 600 airmen
supporting over 120 flights a day and handling at least 12
million pounds of relief supplies and emergency response
equipment. The 21st Special Tactics Squadron from the Pope Air
Force Base did a fantastic job in managing the air space and
ensuring the flow of supplies. I thank you for that.
Secretary Donley, I wanted to follow up a little bit, too,
on the cyber security issue. You mentioned that the Air Force
is investing additional personnel in cyber security. I
understand Senator Udall might have just asked some of the
questions concerning cyber security, but how is the Air Force
consolidating efforts to protect our computer networks and how
is the Air Force Space Command going to work with the newly
created Cyber Security Command?
Mr. Donley. Well, as the Chief mentioned a few moments ago,
the 24th Air Force standup in San Antonio is the focus, and has
been the focus, of our effort of consolidating our network
operations and network defensive capabilities. 24th Air Force
reports to Air Force Space Command and 24th Air Force will be
the Air Force component to the CYBERCOM which is being created
at Fort Meade. So that's the institutional and the operational
relationship.
Space Command has done a tremendous job in overseeing the
standup of 24th Air Force in the last year, and especially in
the development and consolidation of career fields for this
important area, so that we are well positioned with the right
kind of talent and the right kind of backgrounds.
We're anticipating that the future demand for how much and
precisely what kinds of capabilities need to be developed will
await the standup of CYBERCOM. We'll get the demand signal from
the joint community on that, probably later this year. We're
undertaking the actions that we can and should within our Air
Force, but we think there's more work to be done on the joint
side, and we'll probably get tasked more specifically later.
General Schwartz. Ma'am, if I can just elaborate on one
point. You may wonder why we aligned the 24th with Air Force
Space Command. The reason is because space and cyber, I would
argue, are both fundamentally engineering disciplines. You have
a command that is focused on space and cyber. There was a lot
of synergy between the two, as Senator Udall suggested, and we
think that that was the right institutional alignment, as the
Secretary suggested.
Senator Hagan. What about the career development and
finding the right people to go into this area? Can you explain
a little bit further on that?
General Schwartz. Sure. There are two aspects to this. One
is creating organic capability, and so there are joint courses.
The Navy runs a major course at Pensacola, for example. We also
have courses at Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi that will
prepare our airmen with the skills in order to do this work.
There's advanced kinds of things which other agencies within
DOD to help us train and maintain the readiness of our airmen.
The other part of this, though, is recognizing that it is
unlikely that DOD will ever be able to have all the cyber
talent it needs and that actually, the predominance of that
talent's going to be in the private sector. One of the things
we're doing, which I think has lots of merit is, let's say we
have an ANG unit in the State of Washington and its purpose is
cyber. It can access the talent pool in Everett or in Seattle
with Microsoft and elsewhere or, in the case of California, in
Silicon Valley, where we can have folks that every day do their
work in the cyber business, but also serve in the ANG or the
Reserve. We think that is a high payoff strategy.
Senator Hagan. Let me mention, too, that North Carolina has
an excellent Research Triangle Park with a lot of talent that
might be utilized also.
One of the most important issues to me is ensuring family
support programs across the services are appropriately
resourced. Improving the quality of life for our airmen and
their families is extremely important. How is the Air Force's
family support program keeping pace with our current operations
and what are some of the latest initiatives with respect to
family support?
Mr. Donley. We have a number underway, Senator, and this is
an extremely important area for our Air Force, especially given
the pattern of deployments that we've experienced over the past
several years. We have underway an Air Force Year of the Family
that is completely reviewing the whole set of capabilities and
programs that we have with respect to spousal support and
education, with respect to housing, with respect to health,
child care, et cetera. We have a full range of programs in
place already.
A couple that we have bumped up in importance over the last
year or so involve greater focus on families with exceptional
family members who need additional support as they move from
installation to installation for their particular family member
to meet those special needs of those family members.
We've focused more attention on the key spouses program in
our Air Force and the support network of spouses that support
our airmen and their families when airmen are deployed forward.
It's an extremely important early warning network for us. It's
an extremely important reinforcing of the Air Force community
at the local level.
General Schwartz. If I might add, ma'am, we're also paying
attention to schools. Schools are the coin of the realm to most
families. So that is a very important aspect of making bases
attractive, ensuring that schools there to support the
education of the youngsters in the best possible way.
Senator Hagan. Secretary Donley, you mentioned about
spouses and education. It has come to my attention that so many
people have registered and taking advantage of that program
there might have been a hold put on participation. Can you
elaborate on that?
Mr. Donley. We are familiar with this. This is a program
administered at the DOD level which was so popular that it
became overwhelmed, and so there was a need to take a pause and
that is underway. But I know Dr. Stanley, Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is working this very hard
with the rest of the manpower community to determine the proper
way forward there.
Senator Hagan. I think a lot of the people who were
currently receiving tuition assistance had not been notified
that a hold has been put on that, and I think that there's a
lot of consternation and a lot of upset spouses at the moment.
Mr. Donley. We understand.
Senator Hagan. What's the plan going forward?
Mr. Donley. We don't have that plan worked out just yet.
The OSD folks are working on that with the rest of the manpower
community. We can get back to you as soon as we have an answer
from DOD. I have not heard in the last 48 hours the future plan
for that particular program.
Senator Hagan. I would appreciate that, because there are a
lot of spouses in North Carolina that are calling my office.
Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Last month, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) placed the
My Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) spouse tuition assistance program
on hold. As of 13 March, MyCAA resumed operations for military spouses
with currently existing accounts. These spouses are able to submit and
receive approval for financial assistance. OSD is still developing
long-term program options and expects to announce details soon. Until
that time, no new accounts can be created. OSD/Military Community and
Family Policy has advised the Air Force it is reviewing software
applications, financial assistance documents, and the overall program,
and that the short pause in the program will allow it to better assess
the program and ensure it is meeting the goal of providing spouses
access to education and training for portable high-growth careers.

Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you. General Schwartz, good to see you
again. I consider you an Alaskan from many aspects. But thank
you very much for being here today, and especially in your
position. I didn't think, back when you were in Alaska and I
was on the city council and then later mayor, that we would
probably visualize us both here across the table. It's an
amazing thing, but it's good.
Let me, if I can, just lay a little bit out, following up
on Senator Udall's and others in regards to the retiring of the
F-15s. You're very familiar, obviously, with this. For
Elmendorf Air Force Base there are 24 aircraft that will be
totally retired and literally go to the lower 48 States to
another Guard unit or Guard units, however you determine that
and deploy that.
You understand the importance of the F-15 as part of the
19th Fighter Squadron. It's dedicated solely for air
sovereignty alert missions. That is run by NORAD in partnership
with Canada. Putting that over here for a second, recognizing
the retirement that's occurring in regards to those, the F-15s,
we also have the 36 F-22s, which we're very proud of, in the
two squads there. But the reality is, those are used on
multiple missions. One squad seems to always be down in Guam,
for some of the work that's there, training, maintenance, and a
variety of other requirements for the F-22s.
How are we going to accomplish the mission that the F-15s
have been so successful at and have been literally from
Alaska's perspective, and I think from the Nation's
perspective, a real shining bright star? How are we going to
have that mission, knowing that the F-22s are already being in
some cases maximized in their utilization, at least from our
perspective, in the work that they do for Pacific Command as
well as NORTHCOM?
General Schwartz. Sir, as I indicated earlier, this is both
true in Alaska and Hawaii, and while there is a deployment
requirement, and the F-15s actually had a deployment mission as
well, over the last decade or two, since Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, there's been a relatively modest need for
air superiority kind of deployments. The bottom line is that
both in Alaska and in Hawaii the F-22s will support the air
sovereignty mission.
With respect to whatever capacity is left, and it will be
substantial, they will be available for deployment for other
missions in support of other combatant commanders. But I have
no doubt that those machines will support the air sovereignty
requirement that's specified by NORAD and NORTHCOM.
Senator Begich. Can you walk me through the force
restructuring? I know, and I can't remember the exact timing,
but the force restructuring, the capability gaps, and the whole
report that's due at some point. Can you give me an update?
General Schwartz. In fact, the report was, if I'm not
mistaken--perhaps the staff can confirm--delivered yesterday. I
read it one last time on Sunday cover to cover, and at least in
my view it makes a pretty compelling case.
Senator Begich. I guess the thing I recognize, and you
understand the uniqueness of what we have in Alaska, so I just
want to underline my concern still because of the capacity and
the amount of responsibility that our units have up there. I
agree with Hawaii, too, but I want to underline my concern
there.
If I can move to maybe three other areas very quickly.
First, and this is more of a comment, when Senator Bill Nelson
was talking about launches and so forth, we would underline
that Kodiak is a great investment that the military has made
and we would encourage you to continue to look at that as an
asset. I know some might think because of the cost, and
question if it is the right location and so forth, but in a lot
of cases it is. I would hope that you would consider the Kodiak
Launch Complex as an important asset in how you utilize assets
around the country for launches.
We know they have done some incredible work and the
military and the Federal Government have put an enormous
investment in that. We would not want to see that become an
idle investment when there's a value for it, especially as we
move into more and more space activity.
I know you know this, and I always get to do this, my
friend from Colorado, Senator Udall, I always get to do this
when he's out of the room. We have superior air space in our
State. He'll tell me later--the last time I said something
about the mountains and he harassed me and I told him Colorado
has hills; we have mountains.
Chairman Levin. You realize, Senator, these proceedings are
being recorded.
Senator Begich. Absolutely, and my Alaskans will appreciate
it. [Laughter.]
But I know there is a lot of discussion ongoing about
utilization of air space and making sure we have enough air
space and uninterrupted air space. That is becoming a growing
problem for every branch. So again, I know there's a lot of
work the Air Force has been focused on and looking at Alaska in
some respect. I just want to continue to keep that point
clearly on your radar screen. I know it is because you're very
familiar with the air space there.
I don't know if you have any comments you want to dare to
dive into, knowing the chairman will probably add about his air
space, too, and my colleague to the right will, too.
General Schwartz. Senator, clearly there are a couple of
places in the country that are extraordinary in terms of the
availability of air space. Alaska is one. Clearly, the Barry
Goldwater Range in Arizona is another. The Nellis Range in
Nevada, the Utah Testing and Training Range in Utah. There are
others, but those are the major ones.
I would just make the point that it is very important, it
is a national imperative, that we manage this air space
carefully. There are pressures from development to energy,
numerous, numerous pressures. We have to be very, very careful
about eroding those very precious places where we have, as you
said, continuous, contiguous air space that allows us to train,
that allows us to test in a controlled fashion, and again,
underwrites the readiness of all the forces.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you.
My time is up, and I'll just leave you this for the record,
if you could. You folks recently provided me some information
on radars and the air defense mission for fiscal year 2010. In
there, there's about $31 million, give or take a few dollars of
unfunded tasks for some of the projects, as well as contractor-
required parts. Can you give me, again for the record, what the
strategy is there to deal with that underfunding and long-term
ability to make sure we continue to move ahead on the
maintenance issues, which only get more expensive as time goes
on. Delayed maintenance just means delayed costs, increase
means increased costs. Please, if you could do that for the
record.
General Schwartz. Just to clarify, sir.
Senator Begich. Sure.
General Schwartz. You're talking about long-range radar
sites?
Senator Begich. Yes.
General Schwartz. Yes, got it.
[The information referred to follows:]

Currently, the Air Force supports numerous long-range radars,
including 15 FPS-117 radars in Alaska. These radars are a key component
in the defense of our Nation and provide support to Operation Noble
Eagle. To ensure they remain fully operational, the Air Force added
$19.7 million in the fiscal year 2010 President's budget for the
replacement of long-range radar essential parts. The Air Force
continued its commitment by including $34.9 million in the fiscal year
2011 President's budget for the replacement of essential parts and an
additional $12.75 million for the long-range radar service life
extension program.

Senator Begich. Great. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last but not least, gentlemen. I don't know if there will
be another round, but I just want to extend my thanks for your
service, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz. Just one little
comment, because I know I have several points here. Mr.
Chairman, I certainly will submit my other questions for the
record.
Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on your position with
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' I would just like to ask the
General. You seem like a young man, much younger than I am. But
General, in terms of the service, we did not have the best and
brightest in the service prior to the integration and President
Truman making his statement, making his executive order. Though
we had separate services, you saw the Tuskegee Airmen, how they
performed under very adverse conditions because they were
committed to the service and to the survival of this great
Country of ours.
I also learned since I've been in the Senate, and I did not
even know anything about it, but Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
from Texas spoke about the Women's Air Force that came
together, paid their own way to Texas, had to pay their way
back home to train because we had so many men in the military
that they couldn't fly the missions and women flew the
missions. There was also discrimination against women,
discrimination against blacks.
All the Services, General, have adjusted to this to get the
best and the brightest. We've had an African-American Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, under that program if we had
started studying and waiting Colin Powell never would have made
it, probably never would have made it, because of the delays in
the understanding a need to integrate.
So General, I just hope, in the interest of consideration,
that you would think about this, that a person's sexual
orientation has absolutely nothing to do with his or her
ability and commitment. They're already lying to get in to
serve this Country voluntarily, to defend this Country, and
they have to lie to do it. I agree with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, who made the statement that--
that's where I got the statement from--that they lied.
So just keep that in mind as you go through your thoughts,
General, and consider the decision.
General Schwartz. I absolutely will, sir.
Senator Burris. I appreciate that.
Now, General, Scott Air Force Base is the home of three
major commands, whose missions include providing strategic
airlift and aerial medical operations in support of Iraq and
Afghanistan. An increase in the missions and personnel on the
base presents some challenges to providing base services down
there. In your operations and maintenance request, what
priorities did you have or did you give to the requirement for
Scott Air Force Base in terms of the demands being placed on
that facility?
General Schwartz. Certainly, Scott Air Force Base, being
the headquarters for both our Air Mobility Command and the
Joint Transportation Command, is a location that has at least
an equal distribution of our support dollars relative to other
installations. A case in point is there's a new facility there
at Scott which is absorbing one of the component commands of
the Transportation Command, in this case the Army's component
command, that moved to Scott as a result of base closure.
There's a new facility, and there was a consolidation of
Transportation Command elements from around the base, which
were important. The opening, the grand opening, if you will,
will occur in July of this year.
Senator Burris. General, as I understand it, there are some
construction projects that are underway, but there might be
some delays. I just hope those are funded. I don't know whether
or not, Mr. Secretary, but there is a need for covering some
expansion, for the growth of the facilities and land
acquisition down there. I hope that that's also covered in the
2011 budget. Is that correct?
General Schwartz. As the Secretary suggested, Senator
Burris, we are tight on military construction. There's no
question about that. This is a case of first priority. We will
offer for you the exact profile of what's happening at Scott
for the record, but I can assure you that with a unified
command and an Air Force major command at that installation,
they are getting at least equal treatment.
[The information referred to follows:]

Scott Air Force Base, IL
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007............................... ADAL/TRANSCOM 83.8
Consolidation (BRAC).
2007............................... Addition To EOD 0.9
Facility.
2007............................... Contractor Logisitics 4.4
Support Storage
Facility.
2007............................... Dormitory (120 Rm).... 20.0
2007............................... Mobility AF(MAF) 8.8
Logistics Support
Cen(LSC), Phase II
(BRAC).
2007............................... Squadron Operations 10.2
Facility.
2008............................... Child Development 8.2
Center.
2008............................... Construct Pavements 1.5
And Grounds Facility.
2008............................... Security Forces 16.7
Operations.
2009............................... USTRANSCOM Joint 14.0
Intelligence
Operations Center.
2010............................... Aeromedical Evacuation 7.4
Faciuty.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Senator Burris. General, you mentioned something, because I
was down at Scott and you talked about the school facilities,
and we got a little bit more money for the impact that they
would make. I was down there and saw what Scott Air Force Base
is doing for the community of Mascoutah, IL, which is the
closest school district to Scott Air Force Base. We actually
dedicated or broke the ground for a new high school, and the
colonel was there at the groundbreaking. The Scott Air Force
Base personnel are very involved in the community, and that
just really excited me, to see that type of support.
General Schwartz. I would just emphasize, sir, that this is
an example of a cooperative effort. It may be the lasting thing
that comes out of our Year of the Air Force Family, is to make
our installations more inviting, more accommodating to
families, to make them magnets for folks that want to live at a
place where they can still leave their doors unlocked, where
their kids can be safe.
Senator Burris. I wish that would happen. Don't come to
Chicago.
General Schwartz. I understand. But where kids can play,
you don't have to fret, and you can get good education for your
kids. We're working hard on it. That will be, I think, one of
our lasting accomplishments.
Senator Burris. I grew up about 30 miles from Scott Air
Force Base. My hometown is Centralia. So I am really glad to
see that the Air Force is doing a lot for that facility.
Did you want to say something, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Donley. Sir, I'd just like to follow up just very
quickly, to reemphasize the point that you made and that
Senator Hagan made about the Air Force support to operations in
Haiti, and especially at Scott, the importance of the Tanker
Airlift Control Center. It is playing a critical role right now
in the surge and in helping Air Mobility Command and
Transportation Command manage the tremendous pressure on the
transportation system to deliver capabilities to theater. It's
a tremendous capability.
As we put the operation together in Haiti, it played a key
role, along with our 1st Air Force and our 12th Air Force as
well. It was a tremendous team effort across the Active and
Reserve components as well. So Scott has played, and plays a
critical role, and I believe does get good support from our Air
Force.
Senator Burris. Mr. Chairman, just one last question if I
may, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Senator Burris. Thank you so much.
I'm concerned about the cancellation of the C-17. Isn't
that going to impact our readiness and our ability, because all
those C-130s? I mean, I flew in one of those things in Iraq. It
shook me to death. It was about 40 years old, and they're using
spit, wire, and glue to keep the thing together. How are we
going to be ready if we cancel the C-17? Please help me.
General Schwartz. Sir, the C-130 that you flew on is a
little different place in the inventory than the C-17s. The
logic is that too much aluminum is as bad as not enough. By
that, I'm saying if you have more airplanes than you need in a
surge scenario, you are using resources and people in a way
that, in a situation where you have limited resources, limited
manpower, is not the most efficient way.
Our view is that 223 C-17s is enough and that the remaining
89-plus C-5s, which will be both re-engined and non-re-engined
versions of the C-5, will satisfy the requirements that we have
for surge transportation.
Senator Burris. General, I'll just have to take your word
for it. I'm concerned about our ability to transport our troops
in the field with equipment that's not broken down and needing
repairs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
General, first of all, Senator Burris' eloquent comments
reflect my own views and a number of others, obviously not all
the members of the committee. But in addition to taking to
heart his heartfelt comments, I would also hope that, if you
haven't already done so, you talk to some airmen who have been
discharged solely because of their sexual orientation, who have
led units and been highly decorated. I have met with those men
and women, and I think it's just an unconscionable policy.
Other allies of ours do not follow that policy and have had no
problems of morale or cohesion.
I would hope that you would, in addition, again listen very
carefully to what Senator Burris' comments on our history were,
that you would also take some time to talk to some of these
discharged men and women. They'd be very happy to talk to you.
Finally on that subject, while you're looking and
determining whether there are any impacts from a change in
policy, I also hope you give some thought to the unfairness
that would be involved in discharging people now solely for
sexual orientation while we're considering whether to end this
policy. To me, it's just unconscionable that someone's going to
be discharged next month for sexual orientation and nothing
else if 6 months or 8 months from now, that person would not be
discharged, and when we know that there is either likely to be
a change or there's going to be a serious effort to make a
change and when the Commander in Chief and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs think it is wrong to discharge people solely for
sexual orientation.
I hope you would also give some thought to this interim
issue as to whether we should not suspend the discharges while
we are going or you are going through this process of assessing
impacts. If you'd give that some thought, too, I'd appreciate
it.
Senator Burris, do you have any additional comments?
Senator Burris. No.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
alternate engine for the joint strike fighter
1. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on May 2, 2009, said, ``the facts and analysis
simply do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program.
There are several rationales for this conclusion: First, even after
factoring in Congress' additional funding, the engine would still
require a further investment of $2.5 billion over the next 5 years.
Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings
generated through competition.'' Secretary Gates cited additional
factors before concluding that ``we have reached a critical point in
this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the [F-35
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)] is unnecessary, wasteful, and simply
diverts precious modernization funds from other more pressing
priorities. Accordingly, should Congress add more funds to continue
this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend that the President
veto such legislation.'' Do you agree with the Secretary's conclusion
that continued development of the alternate engine would be unnecessary
and wasteful?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force supports
Secretary Gates' conclusion to not pursue a competitive engine.
Maintaining two engine suppliers will result in increased development,
production, and support costs in the near-term. The Air Force maintains
that the risks involved with a single engine supplier are acceptable,
and savings associated with competition, which may be realized in the
future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when
competing against existing Department priorities. Recent experience
with engine development for the F-22 and F/A-18/E/F indicates that sole
source risks are modest and acceptable. Despite the recognized
developmental issues and schedule delays experienced so far, the F135
Pratt & Whitney engine continues to meet or exceed the stringent
performance requirements associated with the F-35 propulsion system.

2. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
also agree with the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
office conclusion that even if Congress were to continue funding the
development alternate engine, we have not yet passed the halfway mark
in terms of the total funding the alternate engine would require before
it could be competed against the current JSF engine?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We agree with the CAPE
office assessment that the program will require approximately $2.9
billion to get to a competition culmination point. Their estimate
includes development funding, but also considers the production funding
necessary to perform directed buys and the support costs associated
with maintaining the additional engine. It is reasonable to include all
the costs associated with the alternate engine as the Services would
incur these costs to continue the alternate engine program.

3. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
support Secretary Gates' recommendation that the President veto any
bill that contains funding for the alternate engine? Please explain.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We support the Secretary's
decision not to pursue an alternate engine.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
personnel training
4. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley, our Nation and military must
grow our foreign language capability. In a recent speech, you mentioned
the Air Force Culture, Region, and Language Flight Plan as a means to
help our airmen understand other cultures and languages. How will this
plan address the development of language skills and cultural knowledge
for our airmen to better perform warfighting and non-warfighting
activities?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force Culture, Region, and Language
Flight Plan provides a framework to ensure our strategy, requirements,
and force development policy and programming are synchronized to
achieve the desired end-state of all airmen being developed and
sustained with appropriate levels of culture, region, and language
knowledge.
The plan's overarching objective is to develop airmen capable of
influencing the outcomes of U.S., allied, and coalition operations, and
to maximize our operational capabilities through building partnerships.
One of the ways we do this is by ensuring all airmen receive
appropriate culture and language training prior to deployments.
Specific to language skills, we will continue to focus on our
cryptolinguist and regional affairs strategist capability, but we will
also execute the Language Enabled Airmen Program. This program will
build surge capability and ensure our ability to meet current taskings
by building a ready foreign language capability across all specialties.
Execution of the program will include identifying individuals with a
propensity to study languages, based on overall academic standing,
demonstrated foreign language proficiency and foreign language aptitude
and motivation, through recruiting and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA)
and Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) commissioning
programs, providing these individuals with initial and recurring
training, and sustaining their capabilities throughout their career.
These personnel will be utilized for missions across the spectrum, from
building partnerships to combat. Additionally, all airmen are receiving
culture education and training through professional military education
as well as prior to deployments with the goal of developing cross-
culturally competent airmen.

5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley, it is vitally important that
our citizens, both in and out of uniform, understand the importance of
saving, debt reduction, planning for retirement, and understanding
investments. It is also important that our troops be protected from
predatory practices of some companies that specifically target them.
Can you tell me what the Air Force is doing to educate its members to
become more financially literate?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force recognizes that many airmen enter
the Service young and with little to no prior financial education or
training, making them vulnerable to financial difficulties. Because of
this, we begin financial readiness training at Basic Military Training,
instructing airmen on financial readiness fundamentals such as personal
financial responsibility, budgeting, saving, and investing. New airmen
are again given mandatory financial readiness training at their first
duty station, including more in-depth discussions of saving and
investment, estate planning, consumer protection, debt, credit
management, and awareness of predatory trends and/or practices.
Throughout their careers, airmen and their families are also eligible
for one-on-one financial counseling services or topic seminars via our
Airman and Family Readiness Centers which educates and assists with
financial management needs by offering free training and counseling to
help airmen and their families achieve their financial goals.
Additionally, Air Force installations actively participate in ongoing
financial awareness campaigns, such as Military Saves, to reinforce the
message of responsible spending and saving. This year during Military
Saves week, over 4,500 airmen took the ``Savers Pledge'' and
participated in more than 100 financial presentations, seminars, and
activities across the Air Force.

acquisition process and personnel
6. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley, last April, Secretary Gates
announced a multiyear plan to increase the Department of Defense (DOD)
in-house acquisition workforce by 20,000. That number included an
allocation of more than 4,800 positions for the Air Force, of which
3,400 positions will come from contractor-to-civilian conversions. Such
action is needed to reduce costs and increase efficiencies. Another way
to address cost overruns is to limit the expansion of initial
requirements and existing performance requirements for items that are
obtained through the Air Force acquisition process. Can you give me an
update on your hiring efforts, as well as any efforts to enhance the
Air Force acquisition process to help prevent requirements expansion
and obtain the best possible cost estimates?
Secretary Donley. We started on our journey to strengthen the
acquisition process back in September 2008. A major part of this
endeavor was to ensure that we had the right number of people that were
adequately trained and experienced to meet the acquisition mission
demands in support of warfighter needs.
To date, the Air Force has programmed over 5,200 new civilian
acquisition workforce positions by the end of the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP), starting with 1,100 civilian positions in fiscal year
2010. With the help of Expedited Hiring Authority and the resources
provided through Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, the
Air Force has been and is projecting to be successful in both hiring
this acquisition workforce growth and replenishing the normal
workforce. Moreover, the Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) directs the
implementation of six actions to improve the requirements generation
process and help prevent requirements expansion:

1. Ensure acquisition involvement and leadership in support of the
lead command early in the development of program requirements;
2. Require that the Service Acquisition Executive and when
appropriate, the Commander Air Force Materiel Command or Commander Air
Force Space Command certify that the acquisition community can
successfully fulfill the requirements in the warfighter command's
requirements document;
3. Require the Program Executive Officers to coordinate the system
requirements document used in conjunction with a Request for Proposal
with the lead user Command Commander or his/her designee based on
acquisition category level;
4. Carefully minimize the number of Key Performance Parameters
(KPP) and other requirements to the appropriate level for each program,
and ensure all requirements are finite, measurable, prioritized, and
can be evaluated during a source selection;
5. Require consideration of incremental acquisition strategies
that reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk, and produce operational
capability earlier; and,
6. Freeze program requirements at contract award, and require
subsequent changes to Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) KPPs be
accompanied with adequate funding and schedule considerations that are
reviewed and agreed upon by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and
similarly require changes to other requirements be reviewed or proposed
by the lead Major Command (MAJCOM) commanders (or his/her designee).

These six AIP institutionalized improvements will continue to pay
dividends for years to come.
In addition, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
requires that the Director, CAPE, and the Directors of DOD component
cost agencies, state the confidence level used in establishing the cost
estimate for MDAPs and Major Automated Information Systems programs,
the rationale for selecting the confidence level, and if the confidence
level is less than 80 percent, the justification for selecting the
lower confidence level.

strategic capabilities
7. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, it is
crucial that America protect and defend its vital interests in the
realm of cyberspace. A recent memorandum to all airmen stated that
cyberspace is critical to today's fight and to the future U.S. military
advantage over our adversaries. This memo also stated that the Air
Force would provide a full spectrum of cyberspace capabilities to Joint
Force Commanders whenever and wherever needed. What unique capabilities
does the Air Force bring to this vital domain and are any additional
resources required to help Joint Force Commanders fully confront the
cyber-related challenges of today and tomorrow?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The U.S. Air Force is
evolving and integrating the unique capabilities we bring to the Joint
fight. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC), as the lead Air
Force Major Command for cyber, has the following activities underway:

Positioning the Air Force with enhanced and
differentiated capabilities complementing those of our sister
Services, executed through our 24th Air Force at Lackland AFB,
TX.

The Air Force will seek to develop cyber
capabilities that complement those of other Services
and will explore the combination of cyber with other
non-kinetic capabilities to achieve synergies.
Assuring the mission by securing the Air Force
portion of DOD's information networks under one
commander, the 24th Air Force commander who is also the
Commander of Air Force Network Operations.
The Air Force will establish an integrated
cyber operations center that is fully integrated with
those of our joint partners to serve as the
intersection for a full range of cyber capabilities.

Fusing cyber and intelligence functions to create
seamless operations.

The Air Force will work to integrate space and
cyberspace indicators and warnings to develop an
advanced early warning architecture across the Air
Force information networks. Like offense and defense in
the other operational domains, operations and
intelligence in cyberspace must not be separated.

Institutionalizing a cyber culture and mindset.

The Air Force is changing its cultural mindset
in the day-to-day execution of cyber operations. The
importance of cultivating a new mindset demands a
fundamental shift in leadership that encourages
creative, yet critical thinking, and rewards innovative
activities and solutions. Cyberspace does not function
independently of other capabilities provided by the Air
Force or other DOD agencies. In addition, we are
working to integrate cyberspace into permanent doctrine
development, accession and advanced training,
professional military education, exercises, wargames,
recruitment, and day-to-day operations.

The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
appropriately funds and resources Air Force priorities in this
domain and places us on the correct path to increase the
Nation's capacity and capability in cyber.

8. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, it is my
understanding that China is investing heavily in fourth-generation
fighters and advanced surface-to-air missiles. F-22s are being phased
into U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). F-22s are in Alaska and are
scheduled to be at Hickam Air Force Base (AFB) in Hawaii in the future.
Can you discuss the importance of having these assets in the Pacific
given recent developments in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR)?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As the threats in the
Pacific theater continue to mature, our F-22s in Alaska already provide
essential fifth generation capability to PACOM. Additionally, those
soon to be delivered to Hawaii will add to this capability. Future F-35
procurement is vitally important to ensure sufficient Joint air
dominance in the event of a contingency. Finally, forward basing of F-
22s in the Pacific AOR provides the PACOM commander rapid access to
critical fifth generation capability.

9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, please
provide an update on the Hickam AFB schedule for F-22s.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The transition to the F-22
Raptor at Hickam AFB is on track. Hawaii's F-15 mission is drawing down
this year to support the F-22 build up starting this fall. The Hawaii
Air National Guard (ANG) will receive 20 F-22s from Langley AFB, VA,
with the first 2 aircraft arriving in July 2010. The remaining aircraft
will arrive throughout calendar year 2011.

active duty and guard cooperation
10. Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, the current mission of the
Active Duty 15th Airlift Wing is to partner with the ANG in Hawaii to
provide strategic and tactical airlift capability to support local and
worldwide missions of combat support and humanitarian or disaster
relief. How has this partnership effort between Active Duty and the ANG
worked?
General Schwartz. The Total Force partnership between the 15th
Airlift Wing and the 154th Wing is working effectively. These airmen's
collaborative efforts have supported strategic and tactical airlift in
response to recent short-notice humanitarian relief efforts, flying
Operation Pacific Wave missions to aid tsunami-stricken American Samoa
and Operation Unified Response missions supporting earthquake-ravaged
Haiti. These missions delivered key personnel and 1.7 million pounds of
vital relief supplies and equipment. The association was also able to
provide airlift for the recent Pacific Angel humanitarian deployment,
further developing Pacific Air Forces and PACOM building partnership
capacity programs. Additionally, the wings teamed to support critical
combat missions sustaining Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, and
support Theater Security Cooperation exercises Cope Tiger in Thailand,
Talisman Saber in Australia, and Cope India. With the current surge
operation in Afghanistan, the partnership between the two wings has
enabled Pacific Air Forces to fully support increased future
requirements from U.S. Transportation Command. The success of this
partnership was further evidenced during the preparations for and
execution of the 2009 joint 15th Airlift Wing and 154th Wing
Operational Readiness Inspection, where both wings received
``Excellent'' ratings, validating their wartime readiness.

11. Senator Akaka. General Schwartz, what are some of the
challenges that remain in partnering Active Duty and ANG forces?
General Schwartz. The partnership between the Air Force's Active
and Reserve components has made good progress in the recent past;
however, partnering challenges still exist. Within the fiscally
constrained budget, prioritization and reallocation of scarce manpower
and equipment resources is difficult. The Air Force is carefully
analyzing a number of factors with respect to future partnering
opportunities, with the goal of optimizing our delivery of combat
capability to the joint team.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
c-135 sustainability
12. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
next generation tanker program aims to recapitalize nearly half of your
aging tanker fleet by 2020. What effects will significantly reducing
the size of the KC-135 fleet have on the long-term sustainment and
affordability of the remaining KC-135 tankers, as well as your other
remaining C-135 class aircraft?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Based on the fiscal year
2011 President's budget, we expect the delivery of 79 KC-X aircraft
between 2015 and 2020. We have not programmed the retirement of any KC-
135s as we receive KC-X aircraft. The Aerospace Maintenance and
Regeneration Group and Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center are in the
process of conducting a 6-year tear-down study on three retired KC-135
aircraft to identify future sustainment and modification costs for the
remaining KC-135s in the inventory. The study focuses on identification
of structural integrity and corrosion issues. Upon completion of this
study in fiscal year 2015, we will have a more complete picture of
future sustainment costs and a stronger basis for programming future
KC-135 retirements as KC-X enters the inventory.

13. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as
you field next generation tankers, do you have an estimated timeline
and strategy for how the ANG units that have KC-135s will be rolled
into the fielding plan?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Basing locations for the
next generation tanker are dependent upon results of the Air Force
strategic basing process. The Air Force is accomplishing an
``Enterprise-Wide Look'' for the basing of the new Tanker aircraft to
ensure an objective review of all potential operational and training
basing options. Air Mobility Command (AMC), as the lead major command,
is developing operational and training criteria that, upon approval by
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
will be used to evaluate all Air Force installations. The first phase
of the tanker operational and training basing criteria should be
completed and released in the coming months. Based on the results of
these initial efforts, the Air Force plans to announce the preferred
alternative locations by late summer of 2011 with a final basing
decision expected in fall 2012.

human capital
14. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, from a human capital
perspective, one of the biggest challenges facing the Services will be
managing expanding and new missions while maintaining a fixed end-
strength. The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
mission is an area that is seeing a great deal of growth across all of
the Services due in large part to the significant expansion of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) or remotely piloted aircraft. What is the current
state of your training pipeline for operators and analysts?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to use all available
resources to meet training requirements as we surge to meet the 65 MQ-
1/9 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) goal by the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2013. In addition to continuing to crossflow experienced aviators from
other airframes into the MQ-1 and MQ-9, we have begun providing
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) assignments to our new Specialized
Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) graduates.
Last year, the Air Force also initiated a test program to train
non-SUPT graduates in RPA employment. This program is geared towards
taking officers without aviation experience and training them to employ
an RPA, and will reduce the need to use experienced aviators as RPA
pilots by developing a core group of officers dedicated to this career
field. Our first group of graduates has successfully completed the
required training to become RPA pilots and some have begun flying
operational sorties. The Air Force is currently reviewing the first
group's performance.
Our analyst training is also at surge capacity and is supported by
active duty and ANG trainers. Training occurs at Goodfellow AFB, TX
with crypto linguists attending the Defense Language Institute in
Monterey, CA, prior to arriving at Goodfellow. After qualification from
the basic course, Initial Mission Qualification training will occur
either at Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Formal
Training Units (FTU), Goodfellow AFB, and/or at their first duty
location.

15. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, how are you expanding ISR
and UAV training to meet demand?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to use all available
resources to meet training requirements as we surge to meet the 65 MQ-
1/9 CAP goal by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. In 2005, the
FTU at Creech AFB trained 40 crews. In recent years, the Air Force has
opened FTUs at both March AFB and Holloman AFB to increase the
throughput to 400 crews a year starting in fiscal year 2011.

16. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, what kind of retention
rates are you seeing in UAV pilot and sensor operators and intelligence
analyst specialties?
General Schwartz. The UAV [now classified as the Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA)] pilots do not yet have a core ID with which to track
retention because this career field is very new. Historically, 68
percent of all rated officers at the 8-year point will stay through
their 14th year of service. We will closely follow the RPA force as
these operators progress through their careers.
The RPA Sensor Operator career field was created at the end of
April 2009, and the first class of non-prior service airmen graduated
in December 2009. Retention data for the career field will not be
available until late 2010 or early 2011. The sensor operator career
field is being manned as quickly as possible given its vital nature to
the Air Force's ISR mission.
The career field most heavily involved in RPA intelligence analysis
currently is the Geospatial Intelligence Analyst career field; it is
currently at 108 percent of its retention goal.

unmanned aircraft
17. Senator Ben Nelson. General Schwartz, with regard to mission
effectiveness, how are you coordinating efforts with the Army to
integrate your unmanned and manned aircraft with their growing fleet of
medium altitude UAVs into concept of operations that will ensure safe
and effective mission execution?
General Schwartz. All aviation operations--manned and unmanned; Air
Force, Army, Navy, Marine or Coalition--are coordinated with the
Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) using Joint doctrine
procedures to ensure safe mission execution. Joint Doctrine also
addresses effective mission execution, and the processes to provide and
prioritize the CFACC allocated assets. With regard to unmanned assets,
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Air Force Air Combat
Command (ACC) signed the Army-Air Force Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
Enabling Concept document that describes how the Services will
integrate theater-capable, multi-role unmanned aircraft. This document
will be added to the existing Joint Concept of Operations for UASs
which was published by Joint Forces Command. To further increase the
Air Force's direct contribution to ground forces, we have deployed
additional ISR liaison officers with our Expeditionary Air Support
Operations Squadrons--the units we assign to provide tactical command
and control of air power and liaison between the CFACC and directly
supported Army field units. These individuals provide greater expertise
in ISR operations to assist Army commanders with the planning and
execution of their missions.

18. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Donley, what process does the DOD
have to produce a comprehensive plan to integrate policy and
requirements across the Services for unmanned aircraft programs?
Secretary Donley. The responsible organization for DOD policy and
requirements integration for unmanned programs is the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition (USD [AT&L]). USD (AT&L) established the UAS
Task Force (and subordinate Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)) to focus
on policy and requirements in the areas of airspace integration,
interoperability, frequency and bandwidth, payloads and sensors, and
research and engineering. The Air Force participates in the working
groups (and leads several IPTs).
Additionally, we developed an Air Force UAS Flight Plan to harness
the increasing automation, modularity, and sustainability of unmanned
systems to maximize combat capabilities for the Joint Force. Our Flight
Plan vision is to collaborate with the other Services, our Allies,
academia, and industry to capitalize on the unique unmanned aircraft
attributes of persistence, connectivity, flexibility, autonomy, and
efficiency, and work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
to chart a course to address the future requirements of combatant
commanders.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
readiness and maintenance
19. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in the
fiscal year 2011 budget request unfunded priorities list (UPL), you
have included $337.2 million for depot maintenance activities such as
service life extension programs (SLEPs), special structural
inspections, and engine overhauls. I commend you for placing an
emphasis on improving readiness and vital depot maintenance
requirements across the Active Duty, Air Force Reserve (AFR), and ANG
forces. However, even if the Air Force's unfunded maintenance
priorities and weapon system sustainment programs were fully funded,
the result would still be well below 100 percent of needed funding.
Even with baseline, overseas contingency operations (OCO), and UPL
funding, Air Force depots would still only be funded at 84 percent for
the Active component, 89 percent for the ANG, and 90 percent for the
AFR component. How much risk are we accepting by not fully funding our
maintenance requirements and do the depots have the capacity to accept
and execute 100 percent of the Air Force's maintenance requirements?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. With the requested UPL and
OCO funds, 85 percent of the Air Force Weapon System Sustainment
requirement is funded. The remaining 15 percent equates to $2.0 billion
in unfunded requirements, which represents a manageable level of risk
in the form of materiel readiness. This $2.0 billion includes a mix of
Depot Purchase Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Contract Logistics
Support, Sustaining Engineering, and Technical Order requirements. This
risk is mitigated through enterprise-wide prioritization to fund the
highest priority platforms/systems in year of execution.
Between contract and organic capabilities, Air Force can execute
100 percent of the required funding; however, depots would need time to
ramp up to address manpower, infrastructure, and parts constraints. In
addition, the Air Force would not be able to complete all funded work
in fiscal year 2011 (causing a temporary increase in carryover), and
this effort would require careful balancing to maintain compliance with
legislation (50/50 + DPEM floor).

20. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
the risks in terms of long-term sustainment, reduction of the expected
service life, and the burden of increased flying hours related to
combat operations in Afghanistan?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. There is manageable risk in
terms of long-term sustainment, reduction of the expected service life,
and the burden of increased flying hours related to combat operations
in Afghanistan. With few exceptions (e.g. sand damage/foreign object
damage and increased engine overhauls), the Air Force does not have a
precise means of attributing increased maintenance due to contingency
operations. We are, however, seeing depot-level workload increases
above planned work packages.

21. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Navy
has issues with deferred maintenance and currently has a backlog of
depot maintenance. Does the Air Force have a similar backlog?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force does not
currently have an issue with deferred depot-level maintenance, as
defined as maintenance that was: not performed when it should have been
or when it was scheduled, and which therefore, is put off or delayed.
We currently have a manageable backlog of maintenance work at our three
Air Logistics Centers. Backlog is a different management category than
deferred maintenance.
The Air Force made decisions not to perform some depot-level
maintenance on aircraft targeted for retirement and defer depot-level
maintenance on aircraft required to support on-going contingency
operations. These decisions are made in accordance with applicable
guidance and technical data. Additionally, aircraft waived from depot
maintenance due to operations are reinserted into the Programmed Depot
Maintenance schedule as soon as possible.

22. Senator Bayh. General Schwartz, why is depot maintenance
funding critical to the Air Force's mission and what are the specific
impacts of not receiving the fiscal year 2011 unfunded depot
maintenance requirements?
General Schwartz. Depot maintenance funding is a critical component
of the Air Force Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) strategy. Underfunding
creates potential aircraft/engine deferrals and backlogs, and impacts
aircraft availability required by warfighters. Funds to support OCOs
and funds to support UPL requirements help mitigate this risk. The Air
Force requested $337.2 million in UPL funding to fund additional
aircraft Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDMs) and engine overhauls.
Specifically, the UPL is programmed to fund 16 aircraft PDMs, 6 engine
overhauls, and Air Force Space Command software maintenance
requirements.

23. Senator Bayh. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
the impacts to Air Force readiness if you do not receive unfunded
aircraft depot maintenance requirements in fiscal year 2011?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Depot maintenance funding is
a critical component of the Air Force WSS strategy. Underfunding
creates potential for aircraft and engine deferrals, and thereby a
potential decrease in aircraft availability for the warfighter.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
initial operating capability
24. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, when
Secretary Gates testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
February 2010, he said that the JSF program is holding schedule in
terms of when the Services can expect to take delivery of fighters with
``initial operating capability'' (IOC). However, just a couple of days
ago, you announced that the Air Force would be extending that IOC date
from 2013 to 2015. To me, that suggests that even over the last few
weeks the amount of risk associated with the program was probably not
fully appreciated. Please explain what the current expected IOC date is
and why the Air Force is extending that IOC date from what was
announced just weeks ago.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The IOC date for the Air
Force is still being evaluated in light of the program restructure, but
is currently estimated to be in 2016. The Air Force is extending the
expected IOC date because it is closely associated with Block 3
capability that will not complete operational testing until early 2016.
The Air Force still expects to receive its first operational F-35 in
2013.

25. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how many
fighters with IOC will be delivered to the Air Force at the new IOC
date and exactly what kind of capability will they have?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. If the President's budget is
supported by Congress, the Air Force will have approximately 102 F-35
Block 3 aircraft by the end of 2015, including 12 aircraft that will be
used for operational test.

26. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
effect, if any, will this decision have on the unit cost of buying the
Air Force's version of the JSF?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. None. IOC is not a factor in
the unit cost of the aircraft.

27. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
effect, if any, will this decision have on the Air Force's anticipated
fighter shortfall?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The delayed F-35 IOC will
minimally impact the Air Force's anticipated fighter shortfall. As
reported in the Air Force's Report to the Congressional Defense
Committees, House Report 2647 (Public Law 111-84) Sec 1075 (Fighter
Force Structure Shortfalls), the Air Force is investigating actions to
increase the service lives of our A-10 and F-16 fleets which are the
legacy aircraft the F-35 is intended to replace. The Air Force has
already taken the required steps, to include full scale fatigue testing
and ``thick skin'' wing replacement to ensure our A-10 fleet will
remain viable until the year 2030. The Air Force is also conducting
full scale fatigue testing to determine the feasibility and cost-
benefit of extending our F-16 Block 40s and 50s beyond their current
estimated service life.

28. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, looking
ahead, exactly what milestones do you believe the Joint Program Office
and prime contractor must complete on time and on budget to achieve the
Air Force's IOC date?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In order to achieve the Air
Force's IOC date, the Joint Program Office and prime contractor must,
first and foremost, deliver the test and production aircraft as
currently planned. In addition, they must successfully complete
developmental test for the program, releasing and testing each
increment of capability (i.e. Block 1, Block 2, or Block 3) on time.
This on time delivery will allow the Air Force to successfully complete
operational test.

cost growth
29. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
expect that additional cost growth in the JSF program arising from
Secretary Gates' decision to restructure the program in December 2009
will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach? Please explain your answer.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The restructure was
accomplished under the premise that the program was already going to
experience a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. The restructure was designed
to baseline the program to a higher confidence cost and schedule and
mitigate future cost and schedule increases by properly resourcing the
program. As noted in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report the program
added development and procurement risk funding consistent with the
Joint Estimate Team assessment, including less airframe commonality
than originally envisioned. Also, the planned Multi-Year Procurement
was delayed to 2016, and the production quantities were updated to
reflect DOD and International Partner procurements. We believe these
actions should result in an executable cost and schedule and thus an
executable program.

30. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, after
the breach, how much will it cost per unit to buy the Air Force's
variant of the JSF?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As reported in the 2009
Selected Acquisition Report, the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC)
for a Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) is $71 million in Base
Year 2002 dollars. However, consistent with Nunn-McCurdy statutory
requirements, a complete Independent Cost Estimate is in process. The
Department expects this analysis will result in increases to the stated
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) and APUC estimates. The projected
range of estimates for all variants are $97-$115 million PAUC and $79-
95 million APUC in Base Year 2002 dollars.

testing and engineering issues
31. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) effectively determined a few weeks ago that the Marine Corps
and the Navy's version of JSF might end up being too expensive to
operate, with each flight hour ultimately costing about $31,000,
compared with about $19,000 per flight hour for current F/A-18 Hornets
and AV-8B Harriers. Have you independently reviewed and validated
NAVAIR's analysis, and if so, do you agree with its finding on expected
operating costs?
General Schwartz. The Naval Air Systems Command cost team brief on
total ownership costs was developed to inform leadership of ongoing
technical analyses, and provide options and consequences as we work to
deliver affordable programs. In a program such as the JSF, these
analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is an internal pre-
decisional document and provides points for discussion in support of
achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the
JSF.
As the CTOL variant of the F-35 transitions to developmental
testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure
readiness to affordably support introduction of this critical
capability, including reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its implications
for the CTOL. Deployment and sustainment plans are being reviewed to
identify cost drivers and develop mitigation strategies. All elements
of operating and support cost are under thorough review, including
those driven by program requirements as well as the effects of changes
in the global aerospace industry.

32. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what does the NAVAIR analysis
mean for the Air Force's JSF program?
General Schwartz. The Naval Air Systems Command cost team brief on
total ownership costs was developed to inform leadership of ongoing
technical analyses and provide options and consequences as we work to
deliver affordable programs. In a program such as the JSF, these
analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is an internal pre-
decisional document, and provides points for discussion in support of
achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the
JSF.
As the CTOL variant of the F-35 transitions to developmental
testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure
readiness to affordably support introduction of this critical
capability. This includes reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its
implications for the CTOL. Deployment and sustainment plans are being
reviewed to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation strategies.
Additionally, all elements of operating and support cost are under
thorough review, including those driven by program requirements as well
as the effects of changes in the global aerospace industry.

33. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what is being done to
mitigate the potential JSF flight hour costs going forward?
General Schwartz. As the CTOL variant of the F-35 transitions to
developmental testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary
assessments to ensure readiness to affordably support introduction of
this critical capability, including reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its
implications for the CTOL. Additionally, we are reviewing deployment
and sustainment plans to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation
strategies. All elements of operating and support cost are under
thorough review, including those driven by program requirements, as
well as the effects of changes in the global aerospace industry.

air force requirement for tactical fighters
34. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, with the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) now complete, what is the Air Force's current total
requirement for tactical fighters?
General Schwartz. The Air Force reviewed its force structure
requirements following the QDR. The Air Force requires approximately
1,200 Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory/2,000 Total Active Inventory
to meet the National Defense Strategy objectives at a moderate level of
risk.

35. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what is the Air Force's total
requirement for JSF?
General Schwartz. The Air Force's total requirement for JSF remains
unchanged with a planned buy of 1,763 CTOL F-35As. This inventory was
determined during the 1997 QDR, and reconfirmed during the 2006 and
2010 QDRs. These F-35As will replace our aging fleets of F-16s and A-
10s, which are approaching the end of their Economic Service Life
(ESL). In addition, the Air Force has included sufficient numbers of
aircraft for homeland defense missions, initial aircrew and maintenance
training, United States Air Force Weapons School and advanced tactics
training, follow-on capability testing and validation, and program life
cycle attrition.

military construction
36. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2011 contains three military construction
projects for the Air Force totaling over $76 million that will support
the stationing of JSF squadrons in 2013. Does the potential slippage of
JSF IOC dates affect the timing that these projects will need? Please
explain your answer.
Secretary Donley. The three fiscal year 2011 JSF Military
Construction (MILCON) projects will not be early to need. Aircraft
delivery schedule slippage affects aircraft delivered to the second
operations and third training location and beyond. The three fiscal
year 2011 projects are needed to stand up the first operations and
second training locations, which will have their first F-35s delivered
in calendar year 2013.

37. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, does the slippage affect the
date for which the Air Force has targeted for the completion of the
environmental impact study (EIS) and records of decision regarding
bases for training and operations of Active and ANG personnel? Please
explain your answer.
Secretary Donley. The IOC slippage does not affect the EIS and
Record of Decision (ROD) timeline because they are required to support
the MILCON timeline necessary for receipt and beddown of the first
operational and training F-35 aircraft. The first operational aircraft
will be delivered to the first operational location in the summer of
2013. The 25 Air Force training aircraft for Eglin AFB or the first
aircraft for the second training location will be delivered fall 2013.
fiscal year 2011 MILCON is required to support beddown at these to-be-
determined locations. This requires the operations and training
locations be announced by operations and training EIS RODs in January/
February 2011.

earned value management
38. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
indicated, the earned value management (EVM) system is the best way of
managing cost and schedule on major weapon systems. I understand that
DOD has had major problems with the JSF prime contractor's EVM system
and has held out the possibility of decertifying that system (thereby
disabling the contractor from being able to obtain new defense
contracts) if it does not demonstrate progress that it was fixing
documented deficiencies. What is your assessment of the prime
contractor's EVM system and how close is DOD to formally allowing the
Defense Contract Management Agency to decertify the system pending a
demonstration of progress in fixing documented deficiencies?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed
to obtaining and using quality earned value information as the best way
for the Government and Contractors to manage cost and schedule on major
weapons systems. We support OSD as they determine if the concerns
warrant de-certification.

overseas contingency operations budget request
39. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, among
the items in the fiscal year 2011 OCOs Supplemental Budget Request is a
request for one JSF aircraft. I understand that this aircraft is
intended to replace an F-15E fighter plane from the 336th Fighter
Squadron that crashed while conducting combat operations in eastern
Afghanistan in July 2009. I also understand that the existing ground
rules for determining what projects can be funded with the supplemental
allow for the replacement of combat equipment because of loss during
combat operations. Nevertheless, I have been told that because the Air
Force can no longer procure F-15E aircraft from the prime contractor,
you elected to procure a fighter aircraft currently in production.
I am troubled by this request. This JSF request in the supplemental
should be included in the base budget--not the supplemental. The JSF
aircraft you are proposing to buy here will cost $205 million. That is
about double what I understand the unit cost of a JSF to be (about $100
million) and considerably more expensive than how much it costs to buy
one F-15E. More importantly, the very earliest that the Air Force can
accept delivery of a JSF with IOC will be 2013, with development not
expected to be completed until a few years later. Exactly why is the
Air Force asking $205 million for that one JSF aircraft in the
supplemental?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In early summer 2009 we were
asked to provide an estimate for a fiscal year 2011 OCO F-35 aircraft.
At that time, the estimate was $204.9 million. This cost control was
subsequently used to develop the detailed cost breakout that appeared
in DOD's fiscal year 2011 PB Justification. If Congress approves the
additional OCO aircraft, the unit cost for 23 aircraft (fiscal year
2011 22 aircraft plus 1 OCO aircraft) would be approximately $182.5
million. OCO funds appropriated above this amount will be used for
initial spares associated with the OCO F-35. The table below reflects
the numbers which were submitted in the fiscal year 2011 PB
documentation for the base and OCO request, and what the OCO numbers
should have been in the documentation for the same weapon system unit
cost ($182.5 million).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Docs (As
Submitted) Fiscal Year 2011
-------------------------------------- OCO Should Read

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proc Quantity.......................................... 22 (base) 1 (OCO) 1 (OCO)
Cost (in millions of dollars).......................... 3729.2 204.9 170.8
Advance Proc Cost...................................... 257.0 11.7
Weapon System Cost..................................... 3986.2 204.9 182.5
Initial Spares......................................... 263.6 22.4
Total Proc Cost........................................ 4249.8 204.9 204.9
Weapon Sys Unit Cost................................... 182.5 204.9 182.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

40. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, would
you agree that the ground rules for determining what projects can be
funded with the supplemental were never intended for the DOD to replace
combat loss with a system that will not--for at least another 6 years--
be fully integrated and capable with all the weapons systems and
sensors needed to serve in a combat role?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. OSD/Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) policy is that DOD may request replacements for combat
losses. If the original item is currently in production it should be
used as the replacement. If not, an upgraded capability may be
requested if it provides replacement capability for the combat loss.

41. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, will
supplemental funds be used in the future to fund JSF requests?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. If future OMB and OSD
direction remains consistent with the fiscal years 2011-2015 OSD
Integrated Program and Budget Submission Guidance, and additional
aircraft are lost in combat, we will request supplemental funds for
future JSF procurements that meet these combat loss replacement
criteria.

42. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as a
cost effective alternative to buying a JSF aircraft here and to ensure
timely fielding of needed strike fighter capability in the combat
theater, did you explore the possibility of ``refixing'' a legacy F-15E
intended for retirement, or one that has actually been retired--under,
for example, the Air Force's Combat Air Forces Restructure Plan?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The F-15Es are some of the
newest fighters in the Air Force active inventory. We have not retired
nor do we plan to retire any for the foreseeable future. Additionally,
the Air Force is making investments in F-15E modernization to ensure
its combat capability well into the future.

air force 2010 force structure announcement
43. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, on June 26, 2009, the Air
Force formally announced force structure realignments for fiscal year
2010, which outlined increases and decreases to manpower at units
around the country. It contained the following announcement for the
Arizona ANG at Davis-Monthan AFB: ``The 214th Reconnaissance Group has
an increase of 217 drill positions to meet validated [Predator UAV] MQ-
1 shortfalls. Total impact is an increase of 217 drill positions.''
From this statement, the Air Force clearly identified a need to meet
validated MQ-1 mission shortfalls. Can you describe the nature and
details of the validated MQ-1 shortfall that was described in the
announcement?
General Schwartz. The Air Force fiscal year 2010 Force Structure
Announcement (fiscal year 2010 FSA) released in June of 2009 included
information on MQ-1 manpower changes at the 214th Reconnaissance Group.
The impact to ANG units as a result of the Combat Air Force restructure
was minimal and did not require a manpower adjustment to the 214th RG.
The unit is currently manned to their program of record, which is to
support one steady-state CAP and zero surge CAPs (``1+0''); they have
sufficient manning for that requirement. For the past 2 years, the
214th RG has volunteered to ``surge'' to a second MQ-1 CAP, and have
done an extraordinary job in doing so. As additional ANG units
transition to MQ-1 operations, the 214th RG will return to normal
operations.

44. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, given the extremely high
demand placed on personnel in MQ-1 squadrons, are these units
adequately and uniformly manned across the Air Force?
General Schwartz. The Air Force is working to fill every available
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilot and sensor operator training slot
to meet mission requirements. Unit manning (as of 4 Mar 10) is provided
below. Low numbers in some units are due to recent unit activations,
increased manpower requirements, and/or limited training availability.
These numbers will steadily increase as requirements stabilize, and
more pilots and sensor operators complete training. In addition to the
units listed below, six ANG and Air Force Reserve units are in the
process of activation.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location Unit Position Authorized Assigned Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Creech AFB...................... 11 Recon Sq........ Pilot............. 44 36 82
Sensor Operator... 59 68 115
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 Recon Sq........ Pilot............. 86 57 66
Sensor Operator... 126 131 104
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 Recon Sq........ Pilot............. 92 72 78
Sensor Operator... 110 110 100
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Recon Sq........ Pilot............. 29 17 59
Sensor Operator... 54 31 57
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42 Attack Sq....... Pilot............. 89 47 53
Sensor Operator... 133 102 77
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cannon AFB...................... 3 Spec Ops Sq...... Pilot............. 103 118 115
Sensor Operator... 128 136 106
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 Spec Ops Sq..... Pilot............. 37 27 73
Sensor Operator... 51 34 67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holloman AFB.................... 6 Recon Sq......... Pilot............. 41 13 32
Sensor Operator... 53 23 43
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Attack Sq....... Pilot............. 41 22 54
Sensor Operator... 54 36 67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

45. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, other than adding manpower to
the 214th, what is the Air Force doing to address this issue of high
demand on MQ-1 squadron personnel?
General Schwartz. The MQ-1 personnel are in high demand and will
continue to be so as we expand to 65 MQ-1/9 CAPs. The Air Force has
planned ahead to mitigate this increased demand in three ways. First,
we have increased our MQ-1 combat capability by increasing the size and
numbers of units. In addition to manning increases at the 214th at
Davis-Monthan, five other ANG and Air Force Reserve MQ-1/9 units have
been or are being stood up. Second, we have increased the MQ-1 training
pipeline with the start of the new FTU at Holloman in October 2009,
which graduated its first class in December. Third, while ANG and AFRC
MQ-1 individuals were mobilized through December 2009, we will continue
to support surge CAPs through volunteerism and active duty augmentation
through December 2010 to minimize involuntary mobilizations.

46. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what is the status of the
action for the 214th and when will the positions be filled?
General Schwartz. The reference to an increase of 217 drill
positions for the 214th Reconnaissance Group in the fiscal year 2010
Force Structure Announcement (fiscal year 2010 FSA) was an error--those
positions were not placed on the unit's manning document and were a
direct result of attempting to mitigate the loss of manpower due to a
fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces restructure proposal affecting
Arizona that was not enacted. The unit is currently manned to their
program of record, which is to support one steady-state CAP and zero
surge CAPs (``1+0''); current manning is sufficient for that
requirement.

47. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, what process does the Air
Force undertake to ensure that Force Structure Announcements are
accurate and definitive?
General Schwartz. The Air Force goes through a very detailed and
deliberate process to ensure Force Structure Announcements are
accurate. The major commands submit manpower and aircraft moves for
every Air Force installation to Headquarters Air Force. The major
commands' inputs are compiled into a single draft document, checked for
consistency, and then briefed to the Strategic Basing Executive
Steering Group and Air Force Board. The proposed final Force Structure
Announcement is then staffed through every major headquarters staff
directorate and the major commands to ensure accuracy and completeness.
Finally, the Force Structure Announcement is approved by both the
Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force prior to
public release.

international pilot training
48. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, many of our allies choose to
conduct fighter pilot training here in the United States for various
reasons ranging from the availability of adequate ranges to cost and
the quality of training. This obviously affords the Air Force an
outstanding opportunity to partner and train with NATO and other allied
pilots. I am proud to note that most of this training is conducted by
the Arizona ANG at the 162nd Fighter Wing operating out of Tucson
International Airport, AZ. How is the process supposed to work for a
partner nation's selection of the best location among candidate bases?
Secretary Donley. The US Air Force provides tuition-based pilot
training at 14 locations, and each location, with the exception of
undergraduate pilot training, is the sole provider of tuition-based
training for a particular aircraft. For example, all F-16 tuition-based
training is done at Tucson ANGB, AZ, through the 162nd Fighter Wing and
their assigned F-16 aircraft and instructor pilots.
When a partner nation desires to beddown its own aircraft at a
CONUS AFB, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International
Affairs (SAF/IA) provides options based on the country's requested
training needs and budgetary requirements. When presented with
available locations, training capabilities, and pricing information, we
expect the partner nation to choose the training venue that best meets
their needs. The U.S. Air Force is committed to providing the most
effective training venue available for our international partners
consistent with their training needs and budget by dispassionately
providing the facts and costs for the available training.

49. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, does the White House or OSD
normally guide or influence decisions for where to train?
Secretary Donley. No.

50. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, would OSD have any reason to
provide guidance to the Air Force to encourage an allied nation to
remain at a certain location, regardless of the cost or quality of
training? Please provide specific circumstances, if applicable.
Secretary Donley. There are occasions when discussions take place
between the appropriate DOD offices and a partner nation concerning
their choice of a bed down training location, usually when information
is requested by the partner nation. Cost and quality of training are
always considered in these discussions and are provided on all
available training locations. Once the data is provided, we expect the
partner nation to make a decision that best meets their training needs
and budgetary requirements.

51. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, has the Air Force received
direction or guidance in 2010 to influence an allied partner to select
a certain base, regardless of the cost or other benefits? If this has
occurred, what was the intent of the guidance?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force provides cost and other benefit-
related information to partner nations supporting base selection for
beddown and tuition-based training. There are occasions when
discussions take place between the appropriate DOD offices and a
partner nation concerning their choice of a beddown location, but once
DOD provides available options to the partner, we expect the partner
nation to make an appropriate decision that best meets their training
needs and budgetary requirements.

increased maintenance requirements for the f-22 raptor
52. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, the President's budget
submission for fiscal year 2011 contains a request of $8.8 million to
add a hangar bay at Langley AFB for additional requirements related to
the maintenance and restoration of F-22 low observable (LO) aircraft
surfaces. The budget justification states, ``the existing LO repair
facility has two bays that operate at a 97 percent usage rate and
cannot handle an increased LO repair load as the aircraft matures and
packaged maintenance plans become more extensive.'' I note that Langley
AFB currently is home to about half the number of F-22s as was
originally planned and yet the existing facilities need to be expanded.
What trends are emerging concerning the time, manpower, and resources
required to maintain the F-22?
General Schwartz. The requested funds are for facilities within the
current F-22 Facilities Requirement Plan (FRP). Reference F-22 FRP pg
6-44 (dated December 2008), F-22 bases with one 18-24 Primary Aircraft
Inventory (PAI) squadron of aircraft require two aircraft-size booth
inserts/bays, while bases with more than one squadron of aircraft
assigned will need one additional bay per 18-24 PAI squadron to support
increased LO restoration and on-equipment composite repairs. By this
criteria, Langley requires three LO Bays. While LO materials initially
imposed a greater workload than anticipated, improved materials have
increased their durability and sub-system reliability enhancements have
decreased the frequency of LO panel removal, resulting in reductions to
the initially unforeseen LO maintenance requirements.

53. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, can you estimate how these
trends translate into increased operating and maintenance costs for the
F-22 over what was originally planned when the aircraft first entered
the Air Force inventory?
General Schwartz. F-22 Program estimates for life cycle mission
personnel costs in 2004 were $5.7 billion dollars and currently are
estimated at $9.0 billion dollars. The majority of the increase in
mission personnel costs was due to LO manpower increases, greater than
forecasted military pay increases, and the addition of ANG and Air
Force Reserve units, which were not part of the 2004 Program Office
Estimate.
In addition to manpower, the rise in O&M costs can be attributed to
subsystem reliability and the corresponding increase in LO maintenance
recovery time. The Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program
modifications will alleviate many of the issues but will take time.
Furthermore, the use of contract field teams (CFT) to augment the units
has also driven up the cost of the program. The CFT is being used as a
LO manning stop gap and will be required until the active duty manning
authorizations are filled and experience levels have matured in the
field. The F-22 Program Office is working diligently with Lockheed
Martin and the Air Force manpower community to accelerate the effort as
much as possible.

54. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, are you satisfied with the
mission capable rates of the F-22 and the maintenance hours compared to
flying hours?
General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2009 F-22 fleet average mission
capable rate was 65 percent and the current rate is 67 percent. Direct
Maintenance Man Hours (DMMH) per flight hour are also heading in the
right direction. The current goal for DMMH is 12.4 or less, and we are
exceeding the goal and holding steady at 11.0. We are satisfied with
the trends and the current improvement efforts (Reliability and
Maintainability Maturation Program) will continue the upward trends.

military construction in the air force
55. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, you mention in your opening
statement and in your comments at today's hearing that the Air Force is
assuming risk in the proposed investment levels for facilities and
infrastructure. The President's budget for fiscal year 2011 for Air
Force MILCON totals almost $1.5 billion, but barely 12 percent of that
amount addresses the recapitalization of existing facilities, while the
rest goes to other new mission priorities. As a result, the AFR, which
accounts for 71,263 members of the Total Force, 3 numbered Air Forces,
and over 2,890 facilities supporting 348 aircraft, will benefit from
exactly one project totaling $3.4 million at Patrick AFB in Florida. At
that pace, it would take about 1,000 years to replace each existing
facility in the AFR. The lack of investment in existing facilities and
infrastructure has a direct impact on military readiness and is a
substantial risk. How long can the Air Force sustain the acceptance of
this risk before it becomes a threat to military operations and
readiness?
General Schwartz. The Air Force has taken increased risk in
infrastructure across the entire Active and Reserve component, without
significant impacts to readiness. We will not allow risk taken in our
facilities and infrastructure to jeopardize our ability to conduct
critical operations from our installation weapon systems. This year, as
in past years, we have had to make hard decisions in order to fund our
most critical mission requirements. We have done our best to balance
shortfalls fairly between Active, ANG, and AFR forces. We continue to
mitigate this risk by funding facility sustainment to the 90 percent
level to ensure that we preserve the quality of our facilities. We will
closely examine the requirements of the Active and Reserve components
as part of this mitigation strategy as we build the fiscal year 2012
Program Objective Memorandum.

56. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, how do you plan to address
this risk of underinvestment in existing facilities in the future?
General Schwartz. The Air Force will continue to carefully balance
risk in infrastructure against other pressing requirements. Each budget
cycle, we carefully evaluate facility requirements to ensure that those
most critical to operations and readiness are funded. We remain
committed to ensuring a minimum level of investment in our facilities
and will minimize any impacts to readiness. We continue to mitigate
risk by funding facility sustainment to the 90 percent level to ensure
that we ``keep our good facilities good.''

military space
57. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, is the Air Force committed to
its space acquisition mission?
Secretary Donley. Yes, the Air Force is committed to space. We
currently manage 35 space programs, and 7 of those are in the top 20 of
largest Air Force acquisition programs with $8 billion total space
investment in fiscal year 2011. The cornerstone to effectively managing
the Air Force Space portfolio is the AIP, published in May 2009, which
serves as the strategic framework for re-instilling excellence in space
systems acquisition. The Air Force AIP focuses on five major
initiatives: workforce, requirements generation, budget discipline,
source selection, and lines of authority. We will complete these 5
initiatives and the 33 associated tasks this spring with the intent to
have the Air Force Audit Agency inspect our efforts after 1 and 2 years
to verify that they have taken hold. This plan has postured the Air
Force for success in Space Acquisition.

58. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, I understand that the roles
and responsibilities for the Air Force in space policy are currently
under review by OSD and the Air Force. When do you plan to define these
roles and responsibilities and do you intend to designate an executive
agent (EA) for space?
Secretary Donley. Last fall, I directed a review of Headquarters
Air Force Management of Space Responsibilities. In December 2009, I
asked Rich McKinney, an experienced Space acquisition expert (prior
Director for Air Force Space Acquisition and a retired Air Force
Colonel), to examine how the Air Force headquarters should be organized
in light of the multiple changes within the Department in this area
since 2001. In preparing his analysis, Mr. McKinney has interviewed
many members of the space community--both inside and outside the Air
Force. Upon review of this report and in coordination with OSD, I will
select the best option to manage Air Force space responsibilities to
include planning and programming, acquisition oversight, and
coordination with other DOD components and agencies.

59. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, I understand the Space
Posture Review, originally due to Congress last December, is going to
be considerably delayed, perhaps up to a year late. Please explain in
detail the cause or causes for this delay and what steps are being
taken to remedy the problem.
Secretary Donley. DOD and DNI submitted an Interim Space Posture
Review to Congress on March 15, 2010. The Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy (USD(P)) is the lead for DOD on this effort, but we
understand the final report will be submitted in mid-summer 2010.

60. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, how informed can the fiscal
year 2011 budget be without any strategy for our short- and long-term
space needs?
Secretary Donley. Over the past year, the Air Force has been
intimately involved in multi-agency strategic discussions regarding the
development of a new National Space Policy and the Space Posture
Review. This experience informed Air Force funding decisions for fiscal
year 2011 with regard to national security space priorities. In
addition, we routinely engage the combatant commanders, OSD, and the
Joint Staff to provide a clear understanding of the threat environment
and any associated capability shortfalls.

air force next generation bomber program
61. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, at an April 6, 2009, news
conference on recommendations he was making for the proposed fiscal
year 2010 defense budget, Secretary Gates announced, among other
things, that he would recommend deferring the start of a Next
Generation Bomber (NGB) program, since much of today's inventory will
remain relevant through 2040. As the Air Force modernizes the existing
bomber fleet to provide long-range strike capability, simultaneous
investments in Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) for a
follow-on bomber will be required. In your view, does Secretary Gates'
decision last year on NGB require upgrading the current B-52, B-l, and
B-2 fleets?
Secretary Donley. Yes, and the Air Force is programming for
upgrades to these fleets to ensure they remain capable.

62. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, how are NGB and EMD decisions
reflected in your budget request for fiscal year 2011?
Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget reflects
the Department's plan to invest $1.7 billion of Research Development
Testing and Evaluation funding across the FYDP to support a future Long
Range Strike (LRS) program. Funding requested in fiscal years 2011 and
2012 would provide approximately $200 million each year to keep the
technology industrial base active and viable in the near-term. This
funding would provide capability improvements in the areas of strike
responsiveness, survivability, lethality, connectivity, and
affordability. Investment areas of interest include advanced sensors,
electronic warfare and countermeasures, survivability, manufacturing
readiness, net-ready communications, open systems and multi-level
security architectures, mission management, weapon effectiveness and
survivability, and combat identification.
The Air Force would invest fiscal year 2011 funds using a three-
tiered approach:

Tier 1: Reduce risk for enabling technologies with LRS
application.
Tier 2: Enable at-risk critical industry skills while reducing
program and technical risk through integration and demonstration
efforts applicable to LRS capabilities.
Tier 3: Refine LRS requirements and develop concepts with
engineered, cost-driven capability options.

63. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, are there sufficient
resources in the fiscal year 2011 budget to sustain the long-range
strike aircraft fleet?
Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget (PB)
contains sufficient resources to maintain current operations and
maintain capabilities of the legacy bomber fleet. In addition, the
legacy bombers (B-1 and B-2) are included as part of the Weapon System
Sustainment Unfunded Priority List to increase aircraft availability.
The following modernization programs for each legacy bomber are
funded throughout the FYDP:
B-52:
CONECT (Combat Network Communications Technology)
SR2 (Strategic Radar Replacement)
EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade
B-2:
RMP (Radar Modernization Program)
DMS (Defensive Management System)
EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
B-1:
IBS (Integrated Battle Station)
RMIP (Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program)
INS & GSS (Inertial Navigation System & Gyro Stabilization System)

64. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, please describe where the Air
Force is going to make these investments in long-range strike
capability this fiscal year and in the coming years.
Secretary Donley. The fiscal year 2011 funds complement and further
expand the Air Force's fiscal year 2010 technology investment plan, and
supports the 2010 QDR directed studies and vision as the DOD defines
future LRS requirements. This coordinated plan maximizes use of
previous work and best positions the Air Force for future LRS program
efforts.
Fiscal year 2011 investments would be used to reduce technology
risk, preserve critical industrial base skills, and refine requirements
for a future LRS ``family of systems'' (FoS). Investment areas of
interest include: advanced sensors, electronic warfare, survivability,
manufacturing readiness, net-ready communications, open systems and
multi-level security architectures, mission management, weapon
effectiveness and survivability, and combat identification.
The Air Force would invest fiscal year 2011 funds using a three-
tiered approach:

The fiscal year 2011 and beyond investments will be tailored as a
result of the DOD directed studies that define LRS requirements and the
Air Force will program appropriately in future budget submissions.

65. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, please describe what sort of
characteristics and requirements the Air Force and the combatant
commanders are considering in a replacement aircraft for long-range
strike.
General Schwartz. ACC and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC),
assisted by Headquarters Air Force, have led the effort within the Air
Force to develop and document LRS platform requirements and attributes
based on the appropriate threat scenarios and target sets. Specific
attributes of interest include: survivability, range, payload, manned
or unmanned configuration, and nuclear capability requirements.
Additionally, in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget, OSD directed
OSD/Policy to lead a post-2010 QDR study to further refine the LRS
platform requirements and attributes, as part of an LRS Family of
Systems that includes a penetrating aircraft, standoff cruise missiles,
and conventional prompt global strike capabilities. The results of this
follow-up QDR study are expected in September 2010.

66. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, given the decision on NGB,
what concerns, if any, do you have about increasingly relying on the
old B-52 platform to satisfy our long-range strike capability beyond
the 2018 threshold?
General Schwartz. While the B-52 is the oldest Air Force bomber,
robust design and structural upgrades have extended the B-52's service
life (currently projected beyond 2040) and will allow it to remain in
flyable condition well beyond 2018. The Air Force has a rigorous
maintenance program to keep the B-52 flying, including a thorough
Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) refurbishment program during which
each jet is inspected (and defects corrected) every 5 years. Despite
its age, the B-52 maintains the highest mission capable (aircraft
availability) rate and has the lowest operating cost of any Air Force
bomber.
In addition to the focused aircraft maintenance program, the Air
Force ensures mission relevance through modernization and sustainment
modification initiatives. The B-52 has programs to address issues with
communications, navigation, electronic attack, and weapons delivery
systems, as well as programs for integrating new weapons. While the B-
52 is not survivable against advanced air defenses, it continues to
provide standoff weapons capability in the advanced threat environment,
as well as direct attack capability in lower threat environments. These
modifications enable the B-52 to continue as a responsive, flexible,
adaptive, and lethal platform to support a share of the Nation's long-
range strike requirements.

c-5 galaxy cargo aircraft
67. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, do you anticipate that the
new Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS) will call for
additional strategic airlift or do we have enough capability to meet
National Military Strategy?
General Schwartz. We have adequate capability to meet the National
Military Strategy and do not need additional strategic airlift. The
latest study, MCRS-16, stated that the current National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Program of Record of 223 C-17s,
52 C-5Ms, and 59 C-5As exceeded the demand required in the 3 scenarios
it examined. Accordingly, C-5 retirements requested in the fiscal year
2011 PB are based on this excess capacity and the strategic airlift
fleet should not grow based on MCRS-16. Since this result is consistent
with guidance in the recently released QDR, we also do not see a need
for a new study of strategic lift in this quadrennial cycle.

68. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, it is my understanding that
there have been several recent studies done by DOD, Air Force, and even
one directed by Congress that have looked at the strategic airlift
question and whether the Nation has sufficient strategic airlift
capability currently available. Can you comment on whether any of these
studies establish a requirement for additional new strategic airlift
aircraft this year?
General Schwartz. In 2009, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
released the ``Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.'' Results of
this study indicated the existing Program of Record (POR) (fiscal year
2009 PB enacted) was both sufficient and cost effective. More recently,
DOD released the ``Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016''
(MCRS-16). This study was aligned with the QDR and examined QDR
relevant cases. MCRS-16 highlighted an excess in strategic airlift and
influenced recommended fiscal year 2011 strategic airlift force
reductions.

69. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, do any recent studies
conclude that we need additional C-17s?
General Schwartz. None of the current studies indicate that we need
additional C-17s. The current strategic airlift program of record (POR)
exceeds the most demanding scenarios/cases found in all recent mobility
studies. The Air Force is aware of two recent studies that looked at
strategic lift. In 2009, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
released the ``Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.'' Results of
this study indicated the existing POR was both sufficient and cost
effective. More recently, DOD released the ``Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016'' (MCRS-16). This study was aligned with the
QDR, and examined QDR relevant cases. MCRS-16 validated the current
strategic airlift POR exceeds all examined cases.

70. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I have
heard that the C-5M Galaxy Cargo modernization program is progressing
well and that the Air Force is pleased with its performance. I
understand the C-5Ms also have demonstrated some very impressive
operational capabilities, including setting 42 world records as part of
their operational test and evaluation. Can you share your impression on
whether the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program is
meeting Air Force's expectations?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The C-5M modernization
program is progressing well and is tracking to the AT&L-directed cost
and schedule. Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) was completed in
January 2010, and included a 30-day ``surge.'' During OT&E, 175
missions and 1,336 hours were flown, including 23 days of maintenance
demonstrations. This OT&E also included cold weather testing at Eielson
AFB, AK. The C-5M did set 42 records--these assessments were sponsored
by the vendor and conducted on a non-interference basis during
operational testing.

71. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is the
Air Force satisfied with the C-5M's operational performance?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is satisfied
with the C-5M's performance. Three development C-5Ms have demonstrated
the capability to move a wartime cargo load 5,000 statute miles
unrefueled while decreasing closure time via reduced en route stops.
They also have improved take-off performance, resulting in
approximately 20 percent more cargo per mission and 27 percent
improvement in range. These enhancements translate into fewer landings,
less aerial refueling, and more rapid delivery of cargo.

72. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is
the estimated reduction in total ownership costs for the C-5M Galaxy
Cargo aircraft?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) projected
reduction in total ownership costs for 52 C-5Ms and 59 C-5As (111 C-5
aircraft) is $10.7 Billion in Base Year 08.

73. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, I am concerned that the Air
Force has not properly addressed the future of the C-5A aircraft. What
action is the Air Force taking to address modernization of the ANG and
AFR C-5As?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force has fully funded the Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) for all ANG and AFRC C-5As not projected
for retirement in the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget. The AMP
program implements communications, navigation, surveillance and air
traffic management (CNS/ATM) upgrades, and mandated safety
modifications.

74. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, over the last 4 years,
Congress has added 44 C-17s, at a cost of over $14 billion. It is my
understanding that these earmarks have now created a potential excess
of Air Force strategic airlift capability and, because of this, the Air
Force is being forced to consider retiring perfectly capable C-5
aircraft that, according to the Air Force Fleet Viability Board, could
serve this Nation or our allies for another 30-40 years. Is my analysis
correct?
Secretary Donley. The current strategic fleet exceeds all
requirements from the newly released Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16). The increase of 15 C-17s in fiscal
year 2008 influenced the decision to upgrade only 52 of the 111 C-5s
with the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). Since
that time, 18 more C-17s have been added. By retiring some of the
older, less capable C-5As, we are able to fund the permanent bed down
of 16 C-17s within the Air Reserve component and appropriately size our
strategic airlift fleet to meet the Nation's requirements.

75. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, to what extent is the Air
Force looking at alternatives to simply getting rid of perfectly good
cargo aircraft, such as storing them in a backup inventory status, or
giving them to trusted allies who desperately need out-sized lift, or
selling them to a U.S.-flagged Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet provider?
Secretary Donley. The C-5A aircraft requested to retire in the
fiscal year 2011 PB exceed capability requirements validated by the
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16).
Maintaining them as Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) incurs unnecessary
sustainment and avionics modernization costs plus stresses limited ramp
space. The Air Force will use these retired aircraft to support the
actively flying C-5 fleet as a ready source for aircraft parts. Further
analysis of BAI conversion will be provided in the C-5 retirement
report required by Section 137 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
For aircraft to be made available for security assistance purposes,
they must be declared Excess Defense Articles (i.e., they must be
excess to the requirements of the DOD). Retiring C-5 aircraft will
continue to support the actively flying fleet as a ready source for
aircraft parts and will not be excess to Department requirements.
Finally, CRAF capacity exceeds all MCRS-16 scenarios. Currently,
DOD regulations prohibit the transfer or sale of C-5 aircraft for
commercial purposes.

kc-x tanker replacement program
76. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, as the Air Force's fleet of
tanker aircraft ages, new tankers will be needed to provide in-flight
refueling support for U.S. military aircraft and for aviation forces of
coalition partners. Under the current draft request for proposal, the
Air Force plans to procure 109 new KC-X tankers by 2020. Is the current
tanker fleet of KC-135 and KC-10 tankers robust and stable to last
until 2040, as has been reported in the Air Force's report, Tanker
Replacement Study 2005, and other recent studies?
General Schwartz. The current fleet of KC-135 and KC-10 tankers
have been robust and stable to date due to the impact of regularly
scheduled maintenance. Maintaining the KC-135 and KC-10 fleet until
year 2040 has been, and will continue to be, a multi-faceted and
aggressive approach involving KC-135 Programmed Depot Maintenance
(PDM), KC-10 Contracted Logistics Support, and select investment/
modernization programs that will ensure safety of flight and access to
the global airspace system.

77. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley, do you anticipate that
additional resources will be necessary to fill seams or gaps in the
tanker replacement plan?
Secretary Donley. No additional resource needs are anticipated at
this time, and investment and sustainment funding is programmed for the
tanker fleet through the FYDP.

across-the-board pay raise and incentive bonuses
78. Senator McCain. General Schwartz, the Air Force intends to add
500 Active-Duty airmen and 1,700 reservists in fiscal year 2011. You
note in your written statement for today's hearing that the Air Force
budget includes a 1.4 percent across-the-board pay raise, but you
request $645 million for recruiting and retention bonuses targeted at
critical wartime skills. Please explain where the personnel shortfalls
are in the Air Force and how the combination of these approaches (a pay
raise and bonuses) will work to shape the Air Force to its best
advantage.
General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force Recruiting and
Retention budget for the Total Force is $644.8 million. This budget
focuses on targeted, critical career fields that are difficult to
recruit and retain, or are new and emerging missions requiring urgent,
immediate increases. The annual across-the-board pay raises help
tremendously as individuals calculate their service and retirement
benefits. This twofold strategy addresses both our targeted, critical
personnel and the force as a whole.
Active Duty: $480.1 million
Although the Air Force is experiencing high retention in broad
areas of the force, the Air Force has focused needs within the combat
and critical skills (both officer and enlisted) and in the health
professions. For non-medical officers, the Air Force has a Critical
Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) budget of $20.2 million which will
continue bonuses for special operations forces and contracting
officers, and will start bonuses for 6 stressed career fields:
Intelligence, Civil Engineer, Public Affairs, OSI (Cyber), Airfield
Operations, and Logistics Readiness. Additionally, the Air Force has
budgeted $97.1 million in Aviation Continuation Pay to shape its rated
force by retaining aviators in specified year groups and at critical
career decision points. Included in this effort are critical bonuses
used to move personnel from traditional aviation specialties to new
mission areas in remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), special operations,
and ISR, which are increasing rapidly without additional manpower
authorizations. For the enlisted force, the Air Force manages a
Selective Reenlistment Bonus budget of $248.2 million, targeting
critical skills in 91 air force specialty codes, ranging from: sensor
operators, intelligence analyst specialists, combat controllers,
pararescue personnel, vehicle maintainers, civil engineering
specialists, security forces personnel, and contracting specialists.
Recruiting and retention of the health professions specialties are
particularly difficult. For accession bonuses, we are using over $14
million to attract surgeons, nurses, mental health specialists, and
other health professions to the Air Force Medical Service. The
retention bonuses are critical to the career longevity of those skilled
practitioners with years of military and medical expertise. It often
takes years of intensive training to create a skilled health care
provider or surgeon that can provide life and limb-saving care under
austere, battlefield conditions, in tent operating theaters, and state-
of-the-art medical centers. Once trained, it is imperative we keep
these experts. Therefore, we have programmed $65 million in multiyear
contractual retention bonuses at selectively targeted health care
fields such as our physician and dental surgeons, operating room
nurses, mental health providers, and other skilled healthcare
professions. The health professions career fields have some of the
lowest retention rates in the Services, and often leave at their first
opportunity after their educational obligations are fulfilled.
Reserves: $47.7 million
The Air Force will recruit and retain personnel in combat related
and medical career fields, specifically survival, evasion, resistance
and escape (SERE), pararescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aerial
gunners, logistics, and a number of other career fields deemed vital to
mission success.
Air National Guard: $117.0 million
The Air Force will recruit and retain personnel in critical skills,
combat related and medical career fields, specifically aircraft
maintenance/systems, civil engineering, air battle managers, remotely
operated aircraft, physicians, pharmacists, nurses and surgeons.

combat search and rescue helicopter replacement program
79. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I am
concerned by recent press reports and testimony from Air Force
officials indicating that the Air Force is considering a multi-billion
dollar sole-source procurement to replace its aging fleet of HH-60G
Pave Hawk search and rescue helicopters with newer models of the same
aircraft. If true, this may raise serious questions regarding the Air
Force acquisition process. Is the Air Force considering a sole-source
procurement to recapitalize its fleet of HH-60G helicopters? Please
explain why.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. No decisions on an
acquisition strategy for HH-60 recapitalization have been made at this
time. The Air Force is currently working with OSD and the Joint Staff
to finalize requirements and acquisition strategy for this needed
capability.

80. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how did
the Air Force arrive at its decision to purchase newer models of the
same aircraft when better alternatives for combat search and rescue
(CSAR) are available?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force will procure
newer HH-60 models to replace aircraft lost in combat (Operational Loss
Replacement). No decisions have been made on aircraft types for the HH-
60 recapitalization program, which will replace the entire HH-60 fleet.
The Air Force is currently finalizing the requirements and acquisition
strategy for this program through close coordination with OSD and Joint
Staff.

81. Senator McCain. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, has the
Air Force abandoned plans for a modern CSAR helicopter fleet?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. No, the Air Force has a need
to recapitalize the existing HH-60G fleet. The fiscal year 2011
President's budget begins the program as a new start in fiscal year
2011, and begins procurement funding in fiscal year 2012.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
risk assessment of fighter aircraft inventories
82. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as
stated in your opening remarks, the Air Force has been engaged in
continuous combat and expeditionary operations since August 1990, which
means we are coming up on 20 years of persistent operations over places
like Southwest Asia, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, as
well as the air bridge between the United States and every location we
have U.S. forces. The mass retirement of so many legacy fighters
concerns me because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force fighter gaps
are only growing more quickly each year with no fix in sight. Can you
give me an overall risk assessment of the Air Force?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. In April 2008 congressional
testimony, the Air Force projected a fighter gap of over 800 aircraft.
Since that time, three key assumptions unpinning the 2008 analysis have
changed. First, the Air Force elected to accept increased warfighting
risk. Second, the planned F-35 procurement rate was increased from 48
to 80 aircraft per year in fiscal year 2016. Third, the Air Force
refined its approach to fighter service life computations. The
combination of these changes significantly reduced the projected
fighter force structure shortfall. Actual risk level and an expanded
discussion are available in a study the Air Force submitted in response
to House Report 2647 (Public Law 111-84) Section 1075.

83. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, are
there any missions you feel are at high risk?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The greatest challenge
continues to be performance across all core missions in the high end of
the Range of Military Operations against a near-peer competitor. As we
continue to rebalance the force structure, we must guard against over-
optimization of the force for today's fight at the expense of
capability against this near-peer threat. These risks are exacerbated
in anti-access, area denial and electronic attack environments. In this
environment some of our current weapons are losing ground in both
capability and sufficiency to rapidly improving near-peer capabilities.
Underpinning this challenge is the growing risk to our airborne ISR
mission. This is due primarily to the increasing vulnerabilities of the
satellite communication architecture. As the Air Force transitions to a
greater reliance on remotely-piloted aircraft for the preponderance of
its airborne ISR capability, the security of our satellite
communications has become increasingly critical to the enterprise. This
includes not only the maintenance of robust and secure satellite
communication links, but the protection of space assets themselves
against a growing array of potential adversary threats.

84. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is the
Air Force still predicting shortfalls in its fighter and attack
aircraft inventory?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, given current
requirements, the Air Force is predicting a modest shortfall in its
fighter inventory. In April 2008, the Air Force informed the Congress
of a projected fighter force structure gap of over 800 aircraft in
2024. Since that testimony, 3 key force structure assumptions have
changed significantly, reducing the fighter shortfall in 2024 from 800
aircraft to 182 aircraft. First, the Air Force elected to accept
increased warfighting risk, going from ``low-to-moderate'' to
``moderate.'' Second, the planned F-35 procurement rate was increased
from 48 to 80 aircraft per year. Third, the Air Force refined its
approach to computing fighter service life. The Air Force is closely
monitoring fighter force structure, and will review the potential need
for SLEPs as part of the fiscal year 2012 budget process.

85. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, can the
ANG continue to support the current 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sights
with proposed inventory and budget cuts?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes. ANG can cover the 18
sites with the fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces (CAF) Restructure.
Operation Noble Eagle Ground Alert is not affected by the fiscal year
2010 CAF Restructure.

fighter aircraft
86. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Air
Force will not have its first unit of combat-ready JSF until at least
2015. F-22 production will end at 187 aircraft, leaving approximately
120 combat-coded aircraft to ``prevail in a broad range of operations
that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes . . .
[including] the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state
aggressors'' as stated in the 2010 QDR. Moreover, foreign surface-to-
air missiles and integrated air defense systems continue to improve and
proliferate; Russia and China continue their military build-up and
modernization to include development of the J-12 fighter aircraft in
China and flight testing of the PAK-FA fighter in Russia; and, Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin said Russia will start building a new strategic
bomber and announced that the Russian military will commission 1,500
new military aircraft and helicopters so that the air force will have
80 percent modern aircraft by 2020. What is the status of our fighter
fleet and its ability to respond to these threats?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The fiscal year 2011 budget
includes $12.5 billion over the FYDP to sustain America's air
superiority advantage. Building on the multi-role nature of our most
advanced aircraft, we are also adding precision attack capabilities
such as the Small Diameter Bomb. The Air Force will also continue the
development and procurement of air-to-air munitions and defenses for
the F-22 such as the AIM-9X, AIM-120D, and electronic warfare
capabilities. We assess that by the time these aircraft are fielded,
our investment in fifth generation aircraft, associated weapons and
defensive architectures will allow us to maintain an acceptable level
of risk.

87. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
plans does the Air Force have in place if the JSF continues to slip to
later dates in the future?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force believes the
restructured F-35 program provides a realistic schedule, however, the
Air Force has postured the A-10 and F-16 fleets to accept potential
delays in the F-35 program which is designed and being fielded as their
replacement. Legacy aircraft SLEPs and modernization are significantly
more cost effective means to mitigate any risks from potential gaps in
fighter force structure capacity. The Air Force has also refined our
ability to quantify aircraft service life. The most accurate depiction
of the Combat Air Force status is achieved using ESL, which is based on
MIL STD 1530C and captures both the capability and structural integrity
of an aircraft constrained by economic reality.
In 2006, the Air Force conducted a fleet viability review of the A-
10 because of a requirement to fly the aircraft until approximately
2028. The Fleet Viability Board (FVB) concluded that with proper care,
investment, and fleet management, the Air Force can keep the fleet
viable. Structural fatigue testing for the wings was conducted in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Air Force has recently completed
component structural tests on the fuselage and empennage to 16,000
hours. The Air Force is drafting the final report, which will recommend
future inspection and repair processes. The Air Force is also
conducting Scheduled Structural Inspections (SSIs) every 2,000 flight
hours after the initial SLEP inspection conducted at approximately
8,000 flight hours. In addition, A-10s manufactured with ``thin-skin''
center wing panels will be modified with new wings that have ``thick-
skin'' center wing panels as part of the fully funded A-10 wing
replacement program. These inspections and modifications will ensure
the A-10 fleet is viable to the ESL of 14,000 equivalent flight hours
(EFH) which equates to approximately 2030.
More information regarding F-16 service life is in development and
the Air Force is currently conducting fleet viability assessments for
the F-16C/D fleet. The first FVB for Block 25, 30, and 32 aircraft will
conclude by the end of fiscal year 2010. Immediately following the
initial FVB, the Air Force will conduct FVBs for the Block 50/52 and
then Block 40/42 aircraft, and they are scheduled to conclude by the
end of fiscal year 2011. The Air Force is also requesting funds in the
fiscal year 2011 President's budget to initiate a full-scale fatigue
test (FSFT) on an F-16 Block 50 airframe specimen, which will be
stressed to 24,000 hours. This test is expected to complete by the end
of fiscal year 2013. Analysis of structural components and failure
modes relevant to the Block 40-52 fleet will determine the exact
structural modifications necessary to extend the service life beyond
8,000 hours. The FVBs and FSFT will provide the Air Force with
information and data pertinent to extend the service life of the F-16
fleet beyond the ESL of 9,000 EFH for the Block 25-32s and 8,000 EFH
for Block 40-52s.

88. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
will be the impact on legacy aircraft if JSF production slips further
than currently planned?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Further slips to JSF
production are expected to have minimal impact to legacy aircraft. The
Air Force has believes the restructured F-35 program provides a
realistic schedule, however the Air Force has postured the A-10 and F-
16 fleets (aircraft the F-35 is designed to replace), as well as the F-
15E Strike Eagle, to be able to accept delays in the F-35 program. The
A-10 ESL is 14,000 EFHs and, at current usage rates, it has planned
viability until approximately 2030. A majority of the A-10 fleet is
already receiving new wing replacements with ``thick skin'' center wing
panels, and all aircraft are undergoing regular Scheduled Structural
Inspections (SSIs) every 2,000 flight hours after the initial SLEP
inspection conducted at 8,000 flight hours.
Further delays to F-35 production may impact the Air Force's
ability to retire additional older model F-16s (Block 30/32s), however,
more information regarding F-16 service life is in development. The Air
Force is currently conducting Fleet Viability Boards (FVBs) on the F-16
fleet that will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2011. The F-16
ESL is 9,000 EFH for Block 25-32s and 8,000 EFH for Block 40-52s. The
Air Force has requested funds in the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget to initiate a Full-Scale Fatigue Test on an F-16 Block 50 test
article to determine structural modifications necessary to extend the
F-16 Block 40-52 service life beyond 8,000 hours. This testing starts
in fiscal year 2011 and is estimated to be complete by fiscal year
2013. These aircraft are expected to remain in service until at least
2025. The FVB and FSFT will prepare the Air Force to extend the life of
the F-16 fleet, and the Air Force will continue to evaluate options
each budget cycle to mitigate the impacts from potential F-35 program
slips on the aging F-16 fleet.
The F-15E Strike Eagles are some of the newest fighters in the Air
Force active inventory. The F-15E has an ESL of 13,500 EFH, and as of
today, none of them have been retired or are planned to be retired.
Further, the Air Force is making steady investments in F-15E
modernization to ensure its combat capability well into the future.

89. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is
the current cost estimate of the JSF overall and per aircraft?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As of 26 April 2010, the
total cost of the program is $328.3 billion (Then Year Dollars) and the
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) for all variants of the JSF is $79
million (Base Year 2002 Dollars)/$113.6 million (Then Year Dollars) as
reflected in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). However,
Consistent with Nunn-McCurdy statutory requirements, a complete
Independent Cost Estimate is in process. The Department expects this
analysis will result in increases to the stated Program Acquisition
Unit Cost (PAUC) and APUC estimates. The projected range of estimates
for all variants is $97-$115 million PAUC and $79-95 million APUC in
Base Year 2002 dollars.

90. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
expect cost estimates to change based on cost increases or decreases in
the number to be procured? Please explain why.
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Production profile changes
did impact the unit cost estimates as reported in the F-35 December
2009 SAR. However, these changes were necessary to institute an
optimized ramp rate commensurate with the Independent Manufacturing
Review Team recommendation.
Any further reduction of fiscal year 2011 Low Rate Initial
Production 5 jets would:

Increase unit costs of remaining fiscal year 2011 DOD
and Partner jets;
Increase FYDP costs due to learning curve effects;
Delay Services' fielding of critical capability;
Exacerbate Tactical Air Force structure shortfalls;
Increase F-35 FYDP unit costs; and
Likely cause further delays in some partner
procurements, which in turn would further increase DOD unit
costs

Executing the optimized F-35 procurement ramp is key to: (1)
lowering F-35 unit cost by capitalizing on learning, manufacturing
efficiencies and economies of scale; and (2) addressing the Services'
force structure shortfalls.

combat search and rescue helicopter replacement
91. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the
fiscal year 2010 budget terminated the Combat Search and Rescue
Helicopter Replacement (CSAR-X) program. In announcing the termination,
Secretary Gates questioned the need for a single service, single
purpose program. Until CSAR-X was terminated, it was the Air Force's
number-two acquisition priority right behind KC-X. It now appears that
the Air Force is moving away from platforms that are more capable to
lower end platforms as more of a budget decision than what provides our
forces the best capabilities. Joint Forces Command directed study
validated the need for a new CSAR helicopter in even greater numbers
than previously planned. In addition, the Air Force has performed
thousands of joint and coalition recoveries in Central Command's AOR.
Is CSAR still a core competency for the Air Force?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, CSAR is an important
mission for the Air Force. In accordance with guidance set forth by
Secretary Gates, CSAR now falls under the Service Core Functions of
Personnel Recovery (PR). The Air Force released the Operational Concept
for PR in September 2009 as part of a continuing effort to adapt to the
current irregular warfare environment and to meet all the Joint force
requirements for personnel recovery. In these challenging fiscal times,
the Air Force is working to provide our forces with the best
capabilities possible. The current HH-60 Operations Loss Replacement
and subsequent recapitalization program will allow the Air Force to
continue to support Joint MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, CSAR, and other PR
missions. The Air Force will continue to work with OSD to ensure that
the right numbers of aircraft with all the required equipment are
getting to our warfighters.

92. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what was
the result of the Air Force's 2002 study for a new CSAR platform?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force Combat Rescue
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was conducted to provide DOD acquisition
decision makers one or more affordable upgrade or replacement options
for the HH-60G recovery vehicle. After careful consideration among five
concepts and over 25 alternatives, the AoA study team recommended a new
medium-lift helicopter as the best concept for a replacement of the HH-
60G.

93. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are
the current plans for replacing the aging fleet of HH-60G Pave Hawks?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The current plans for
replacing the HH-60G fleet involve two efforts, HH-60G Operational Loss
Replacement (OLR) and HH-60 Recapitalization. HH-60G OLR is the Air
Force's plan to replace HH-60G Pave Hawks lost in combat and other
operational missions to sustain the current HH-60 fleet strength. HH-60
Recapitalization will be a long-term recapitalization effort to replace
the entire fleet.

94. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, will
this Nation be getting the most capable CSAR platform for our airmen or
are we compromising based on available budget?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is working
with OSD and Joint Staff to finalize requirements and an acquisition
strategy that supports an HH-60 recapitalization program to replace the
fleet of aging HH-60Gs. Initial program funding is contained in the
fiscal year 2011 President's budget. A Request for Information has been
released to obtain industry's ability to provide the Air Force with a
CSAR platform. The Air Force will procure a CSAR platform that meets
warfighter requirements.

joint cargo aircraft
95. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the DOD
plan in 2008 was to acquire 75 C-27s for military transport. That
number was dropped in 2009 to 38 aircraft and eight were funded in the
fiscal year 2010 budget. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests another
eight aircraft. From my understanding, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) validated the requirement for the Joint Cargo Aircraft
(JCA) and a minimum number of 75 JCA. What is the current requirement
for C-27s?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. A June 2007 Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Acquisition
Decision Memorandum concerning this issue stated, ``The Acquisition
Program Baseline shall reflect an initial procurement quantity of 78
aircraft (54 Army, 24 Air Force).'' This quantity matches the aircraft
procurement through 2013, as presented to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Committee and the Defense Acquisition Board. Resource
Management Decision 802 assigned the Direct Support Time Sensitive/
Mission Critical (TS/MC) mission to the Air Force and revised the total
number of C-27s to 38. The transfer of the TS/MC airlift mission is
intended to capitalize on efficiencies gained by operating the tactical
airlift fleet under a single Service, thereby maximizing the robust
capabilities resident in the existing intra-theater airlift fleet to
ensure all requirements are met.

96. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
mission or missions are driving the required number of C-27s?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Resource Management Decision
802 assigned the Army's time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) mission
to the Air Force, and revised the total number of C-27s to 38. The Air
Force will use the C-27 primarily for TS/MC missions supporting the
U.S. Army. As an Air Force asset, the C-27s can also be operated and
managed through the Global Force Management process to answer all
intra-theater airlift requirements (general support in addition to
direct support).

97. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how will
JCAs support homeland security missions such as natural and manmade
disasters?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The C-27 will be an ANG
asset and will be incorporated into the Global Force Management process
to support the needs of states (Title 32) and geographic combatant
commanders (Title 10). Airlift requirements in support of homeland
security and disaster assistance will be met utilizing the Global Force
Management process to ensure the combatant commander receives the most
effective airlift platform. The C-27 will operate similar to ANG C-130
units in response to preparation and recovery efforts.

nuclear modernization
98. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, your
posture statement highlights Air Force actions over the past 2 years to
reinvigorate Air Force stewardship over the ground and air legs of the
nuclear triad. The fiscal year 2011 budget request shows a planned
investment of $295 million over the FYDP to keep the aging Minuteman
III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) operational. How long do
you expect this missile type to stay in the operational force?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force is committed
to sustaining and modernizing the current Minuteman III ICBM through
2030, per congressional direction.

99. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, at what
point must we make a decision to begin development of a follow-on ICBM
to the Minuteman?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As long as the Nation
requires an ICBM, the Air Force will steward that capability to ensure
we always have safe, secure, and reliable systems. An analysis of
alternatives will be performed during this FYDP to assess alternatives
for 2030 and beyond.

100. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is
there funding in the fiscal year 2011 request for a follow-on ICBM?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. There is no funding in the
fiscal year 2011 budget. The Air Force is working to define attributes
and characteristics for a follow-on capability beyond 2030.

101. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you
believe it is necessary to continue to maintain the ICBM leg of the
Strategic Nuclear Triad?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes. ICBMs remain an
important part of the Nation's nuclear deterrent with attributes that
ensure the TRIAD is balanced, responsive, and adaptable. The foundation
of America's strategic and nuclear deterrence effectiveness depends on
the balance of overall TRIAD capabilities. As such, specific ICBM
attributes include: high readiness, responsiveness, survivability,
positive control, rapid retargeting, and day-to-day stability.

102. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, $800
million is requested over the FYDP to modernize the B-52 and B-2
bombers to ensure survivability against increasingly capable air
defense systems. $200 million is requested for research and development
for the next-generation bomber. You state, ``the proliferation of area
denial and anti-access capabilities will challenge the ability of . . .
legacy bombers to penetrate contested airspace.'' Will our current U.S.
strategic bombers be able to fulfill their nuclear deterrent missions
given the antiaccess threat?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. We are actively sustaining
and modernizing all strategic Air Force bomber and fighter platforms to
fulfill the demands of strategic deterrence and conventional warfare
missions into the future.
The ongoing B-2 radar, defensive management, and strategic
communications system upgrades will ensure penetrating capability into
the mid-term, while B-52 computer system architecture, strategic radar,
and strategic communication improvements will keep our legacy long-
range strike force operationally relevant through at least 2035. We are
also in the early stages of examining a follow-on air-launched cruise
missile which will permit our legacy platforms to fulfill their nuclear
deterrent mission in future threat environments.

103. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, there
does not appear to be funding in the fiscal year 2011 request to make
JSF dual-capable. Are there plans to request such funding in the
future?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, the Air Force remains
committed to our strategic deterrent mission and will ensure the JSF
will be dual capable in time to meet strategic requirements. Dual
capable aircraft (DCA) capability for the F-35 were not funded in the
fiscal year 2011 President's budget due to weapon maturity and
availability issues. The Air Force has multiple options within our
legacy fighter fleet to ensure seamless DCA mission capability while
transitioning to the F-35. This includes monitoring the legacy fighter
force structure closely for any potential need for service life
extensions. The Air Force continues to evaluate the necessary
programmatic initiatives to include integrating DCA capability on the
JSF in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

104. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how
will the United States be able to deliver tactical nuclear weapons
without a dual-capable JSF?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Air Force will maintain
the ability to employ tactical nuclear weapons through proper
management of the F-16 and F-15E fleets. The ability of these aircraft
to penetrate sophisticated adversary air defenses, however, will
continue to be challenged as anti-aircraft radar and missile systems
technology proliferates. Therefore, the Air Force continues to pursue
dual-capable aircraft (DCA) capability on the JSF. F-35 integration
will maintain this mission capability, enabling the United States to
seamlessly provide extended deterrence and meet its treaty and alliance
commitments.

105. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what
implications will a non-dual capable JSF have for U.S. security
guarantees to our European allies?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The 2010 NPR affirmed the
United States' commitment to strengthening regional deterrence and
reassuring U.S. allies and partners. The Air Force remains committed to
replacing the current inventory of F-16s with a dual capable JSF,
ensuring there is no gap in the dual capable mission as the JSF becomes
operational in this mission area.

next generation bomber
106. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in
February 2006, DOD called for a new long-range bomber to be fielded by
2018. Prior to release of the fiscal year 2010 budget request,
Secretary Gates announced on April 6, 2009, that DOD ``will not pursue
a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a
better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the
technology.'' From my understanding, the Air Force conducted numerous
studies and analyses with the assistance of the Institute for Defense
Analyses and the Defense Science Board to determine ``if'' and ``what
type'' of new bomber platform was required to meet future threats. I
also believe the JROC approved an Initial Capabilities Document and an
acquisition strategy was formulated and approved by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in late 2008.
Finally, I believe efforts were underway to seek approval by the JROC
of the Capabilities Development Document in 2009. If all these reviews
have been done, why is more time needed to study the bomber platform
again to determine what type is needed?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. As stated, the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) delayed the development of an Air Force follow-on
bomber until the DOD could better understand the need, requirement, and
technology associated with the weapon system. To satisfy his concerns
about developing a new LRS platform, the SECDEF directed the formation
of a Tiger Team. This team, part of the High End Asymmetric Team
(HEAT), took an in-depth look at long-range strike--including the LRS
need, requirement, and technology--all within the larger 2010 QDR
process. The team's conclusions were supportive of pursuing a new LRS
platform, but identified the need for additional analysis to explore
options for reducing costs and accelerating fielding timelines. Based
upon the need for additional analysis, the SECDEF chartered a
subsequent study to examine a broader array of long-range strike issues
and options including: the appropriate mix of long-range strike
capabilities; upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned force
structure numbers; stand-off and penetrating platform ratio; stand-off
cruise missile requirements; ISR demands; and conventional prompt
global strike needs.
The DOD's rationale for the study is that expanded analysis is
needed to fully understand how all potential LRS options could
contribute the country's national defense and national military
strategies and objectives before large amounts of funding are committed
to the program. The results of the study are expected in fall 2010.

107. Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz, General Corley, Commander of
ACC, has said that the fleet of B-2 bombers is too small for persistent
attacks in heavily defended airspace, and the B-1s and B-52s are not
survivable in heavily defended airspace. Lieutenant General Klotz, Air
Force Global Strike Command, said there will continue to be a need for
long-range strike capabilities. You said to expect major work to start
on a new LRS platform in 2013 but the timing was not definitive. What
do you mean by expect major work to start by 2013?
General Schwartz. Work beginning in 2013 is dependent on finalizing
requirements and establishing and funding a program of record that
would lead to further design, development, and production. Work prior
to that would be focused on technology maturation, risk reduction,
concept development, and requirements definition.

108. Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz, if work started in 2013,
when will we see a new bomber?
General Schwartz. If focused system level design work begins in
2013, a new bomber could be in flight test in the 2021-2025 timeframe
with operational capability coming on-line in the 2025-2030 timeframe.

109. Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz, will we be able to sustain
the current fleet of bombers to meet national security requirements
until the next generation bomber is operational?
General Schwartz. Yes, the current fleet of bombers will be
maintained to continue to meet national security requirements until a
future LRS capability is operational. Current modernization efforts
focus on lethality, responsiveness, survivability, and sustainment.
Very little can be done to make the B-1 or the B-52 survivable against
today's modern air defenses; however, the B-1 and B-52 will be equipped
with extended range munitions to mitigate risk from advanced integrated
air defense systems in the future. Some efforts like Defensive
Management System (DMS) Modernization can improve the B-2's
survivability, but the B-2 will still face survivability challenges in
the mid-term against emerging advanced air defenses. The ongoing OSD-
led ``Analysis of LRS Options'' study directed by the 2010 QDR will
inform senior leadership on future LRS investments to address these
survivability concerns. The following modernization programs are
currently programmed throughout the FYDP:
B-52:
CONECT (Combat Network Communications Technology)
SR2 (Strategic Radar Replacement)
EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade
B-2:
RMP (Radar Modernization Program)
DMS (Defensive Management System)
EHF (Extremely High Frequency)
B-1:
IBS (Integrated Battle Station)
RMIP (Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program)
INS & GSS (Inertial Navigation System & Gyro Stabilization System)
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
kc-135 depot maintenance
110. Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley, 2 years ago, Boeing was
awarded the KC-135 Programmed Depot Level Maintenance contract over
Alabama Aircraft Industries Incorporated (AAII). AAII is awaiting a
ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals concerning this contract, and we
will let the legal process run its course. My concern is with the
Birmingham, AL, aerospace industrial base should Boeing retain the
contract. This industrial base has a skilled workforce of 800 employees
who have a reputation for on-time completion with the fewest faults.
What is the Air Force doing to preserve this military industrial base?
Secretary Donley. Throughout our dealings with the industrial base,
the Air Force must rely on the free and open competition afforded to
all companies.

roles and missions with unmanned aerial systems
111. Senator Sessions. General Schwartz, 2 years ago when General
Moseley was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, he tried unsuccessfully to
make the Air Force the EA for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as well as
placing operational control of these assets under the regional Air
Component Commander. Instead, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon
England stood up a DOD UAS Task Force. Last time we talked about this
issue, you assured me that there was no intent to move from the status
quo. Unfortunately, I am hearing rumblings that this contentious issue
may yet again surface. Please provide me an update regarding UAS roles
and missions in the Air Force and how you are coordinating these
functions with the Army.
General Schwartz. The Air Force strongly believes in the tenets of
Joint doctrine that establishes the Joint Force Commander as the
authority for the use and prioritization of UAS or Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA). The Joint Force Air Component Commander executes the
Joint Force Commander's operational objectives using assigned Joint air
assets. The intent of the 2007 proposal to establish an Executive Agent
(EA) for UAS was to establish a Joint organization to specifically
address the myriad outstanding UAS/RPA issues to include Joint concepts
of operation to integrate all Service component UAS/RPA systems,
airspace control, air defense, and acquisition, standardization, and
interoperability. Since September 2007, the Air Force has been, along
with the other Services, an active participant on the OSD AT&L UAS Task
Force that was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in lieu
of an EA for UAS. I believe it is essential for the Air Force and other
services to continue working together to collectively determine the
optimal way ahead for UAS/RPA.
The Air Force is actively engaged with OSD, the Joint Staff, and
the other Services in determining how to maximize the capabilities that
various RPA provide. Service responsibilities are to organize, train,
and equip combat forces for use by Joint force commanders. Combat
operations are guided by established Joint Doctrine that stipulates
that priorities for use of Service component forces are determined by
the JFC-Services do not direct or establish Joint force employment
priorities. The role of the Combined or Joint Force Air Component
Commander is to execute air operations in accordance with the
priorities of the Combined or Joint Force Commander to meet his
specified mission objectives.
More specifically dealing with RPAs, last year the Army's Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Air Force's ACC signed the Army-
Air Force UAS Enabling Concept that describes a concept for how
theater-capable, multi-role UAS should be integrated. This document
will be added to Joint Forces Command's Joint Concept of Operations for
UAS.

joint strike fighter basing
112. Senator Sessions. General Schwartz, the Air Force published
the Notice of Intent concerning JSF basing on December 30, 2009. I
understand that the decision on which ANG units will receive the first
JSFs was very difficult. I am concerned with the fact that the aging F-
16 fleet will begin reaching the end of their service life at the end
of this decade. Can you give me some indication as to when the next
round of JSF ANG basing assignments will be announced and how many
additional units will be on this list?
General Schwartz. Yes. The first basing decisions will identify the
training and operational basing for delivery of F-35 aircraft between
2013 and 2017. Formal environmental impact surveys will be completed
for the preferred locations and reasonable alternatives, with records
of decision issued in 2011. The Air Force has currently programmed to
purchase up to a total of 1,763 aircraft between 2013 and 2035.
Consequently, the basing process will be repeated every 2 years for
future bases, and will consider both the Active and Reserve
installations.

active association units
113. Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, last
time we spoke, you strongly supported the active Association Program
where ANG and AFR serve alongside Active Duty personnel. I am hearing
that while Active Duty billets currently exist at ANG and AFR units, no
personnel have been assigned to these positions. In light of this, can
you tell me whether the Air Force is still committed to this concept
and process?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Yes, the Air Force remains
committed to the Total Force integration process. Active duty personnel
have been serving in active associations in the ANG/AFR units since
2007. Our desired end state is a leaner, more capable, and more
efficient Air Force that leverages the strengths of our Active and
Reserve components. We fully expect to create more associations, both
active and classic, as we continue to transform our Air Force for the
future.

114. Senator Sessions. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, when
should these units expect to see their first Active Duty personnel
arrive?
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. The Active Duty Air Force is
committed to Total Force Integration Initiatives and has been manning
positions in the ANG/AFR units since 2007. The table below shows two
examples of active duty personnel who are already in place, one unit
from the Mobility Air Forces (KC-135) and the other unit from the
Combat Air Forces (F-16). The 99th Air Refueling Squadron at Birmingham
ANG, AL, is currently manned at 100 percent for officers (7 authorized/
7 assigned) with another 8 inbound as the unit gains more billets;
enlisted manning for the same unit is currently 50 percent (60
authorized/30 assigned) with an additional 33 inbound. Similarly, the
157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, SC, is
manned at 100 percent for officers and 87 percent for enlisted.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Platform Location Unit Position Authorized Assigned Percent Comments
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KC-135........................... Birmingham ANG, AL.. 99th Air Refueling Officer............. 7 7 100 8 add'l inbound
Recon Sq.
Enlisted............ 60 30 50 33 add'l inbound
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-16............................. McEntire Joint 157th Fighter Officer............. 9 9 100
National Guard Squadron.
Base, SC.
Enlisted............ 8 7 87 1 add'l inbound
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
barksdale air force base
115. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, I want to again express my
deep appreciation that the Air Force chose to locate Global Strike
Command (AFGSC) at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana. How important do you
view AFGSC in the Air Force's long-term plans?
Secretary Donley. ``Continuing to Strengthen the Nuclear
Enterprise'' is the Air Force's top priority. Establishing a new
command dedicated to this effort was essential to strengthening the
Nuclear Enterprise.
The fundamental mission of Air Force Global Strike Command is to
provide safe, secure, and effective forces for strategic deterrence and
for global strike capabilities both to deter aggression against the
United States and to provide assurance to our allies.
AFGSC is critical to the Air Force's contribution to strategic
deterrence. Over the past year, we transferred 8th Air Force and 20th
Air Force to AFGSC along with their associated nuclear-capable bombers
and ICBMs. These forces represent two-thirds of our strategic nuclear
Triad and are vital to the day-to-day deterrence operations for our
Nation.

116. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, is there consideration by
the Air Force to make AFGSC a four-star command?
Secretary Donley. There is no consideration at this time to make
AFGSC a four-star command.

117. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, I understand that the Air
Force has decided to wait until the conclusion of a Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on and the Nuclear Posture Review to
make a final decision on whether or not to execute the recertification
of the Weapons Storage Area (WSA) at Barksdale AFB, despite Congress
appropriating $77 million for the project to fulfill the Air Force's
fiscal year 2010 budget request. Can you give me some insight as to
what scenarios and outcomes might preclude the Air Force from moving
forward with the re-certification of the Barksdale WSA?
Secretary Donley. The New START treaty reduces U.S. nuclear force
structure. The Air Force has elected to delay a final decision on the
Barksdale WSA until the New START treaty force structure is decided.
Once a final force structure is determined, we will work closely with
the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to determine the
requirements and operational considerations required to support the
revised force structure.

space and cyberspace vulnerabilities
118. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, last month you stated that
our space and cyberspace missions are at risk. We are increasingly
reliant on our technology that helps make our military the best in the
world, and we clearly need to address potential vulnerabilities. Please
describe the most prominent space and cyberspace vulnerabilities that
concern you.
General Schwartz. The details of adversary threats to our space
systems are classified at numerous different levels. At an unclassified
level, we've seen a demonstrated anti-satellite kill capability and a
historic well-developed counter-space program threatening our strategic
communications, navigation/timing, and overhead collection satellite
missions. On a broader scale, due to the widespread proliferation of
satellite communication and Global Positioning System jammers among
multiple other nations, U.S. tactical military advantage on the
battlefield in local conflicts can be degraded.
Conceptually, just as effective is a cyber attack on the satellite
system ground infrastructure that serves command and control, and data
links. Cyber attack on the ground networks could potentially degrade an
individual satellite or an entire constellation. DOD depends on a
robust command and control, and information sharing network. Our
adversaries know this and undoubtedly seek to deny us this capability.
The Air Force has a significant program underway to evolve to one
Air Force network. Additionally, with the establishment of 24th Air
Force under Air Force Space Command, the Air Force is refining its
command and control relationships for network operations, not only
within the Air Force, but with the Joint Information Enterprise as
well. This single network, reporting to one Air Force Network
Operations Commander, reduces our vulnerabilities, and leads to a more
efficient and effective command and control, and information sharing
construct.

119. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, are you confident that the
President's budget request fully addresses potential vulnerabilities
that concern you?
General Schwartz. The President's budget request addresses these
vulnerabilities and is based on inputs from the combatant commanders,
and guidance from OSD and the Joint Staff to prioritize our
capabilities and warfighting dependencies. Armed with a clear
understanding of the threat environment and associated capability
shortfalls, we developed an optimized investment strategy aimed at
reducing risk in our highest priority programs.

120. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, do you think the budget
request is ambitious and forward-looking to address vulnerabilities in
space and cyberspace?
General Schwartz. In building the fiscal year 2011 President's
budget request, we conducted rigorous enterprise-wide assessments that
considered the threats of a future operating environment, capability
shortfalls, space and cyberspace system solutions, and reasonable
fiscal projections, with the goal of maximizing Air Force contributions
to national defense in these increasingly contested domains. The budget
request is designed to reduce risk in our highest priority programs,
while accepting more risk where feasible.

121. Senator Vitter. General Schwartz, are there other space or
cyberspace investments or initiatives that should be funded that were
not included in the President's budget?
General Schwartz. Consistent with national imperatives and space
and cyber policy objectives, we have put forward a budget request that
reflects our strategy of sustaining current capabilities while also
delivering new capabilities to combatant commanders and national
agencies.

air force personnel recruiting
122. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, military recruiting picked
up last year as Services met and exceeded goals. To what do you
attribute this success?
Secretary Donley. Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) continued
success with enlisted accessions goals can be credited to the numerous
opportunities we provide, as well as the Air Force reputation and
lifestyle. Additionally, our highly-motivated, trained, all-volunteer
recruiting force enthusiastically gets the word out to the young men
and women in the Nation to be a part of the Air Force team. For some of
our harder to fill specialties, a vital element for successful
recruiting is the ability to offer bonuses and incentives where we have
traditionally experienced shortfalls.

123. Senator Vitter. Secretary Donley, do you believe that the Air
Force can meet or exceed recruiting goals this year?
Secretary Donley. The Air Force is on track to meet its enlisted
goal and is currently at 100 percent (12,950 of 12,950) of the October
through February goal. Officer accession is projected at 92.4 percent
(4,604 of 4,979) for the yearly goal. Of the 4,979 goal, USAFA, AFROTC,
AECP, and other programs account for 3,276 accessions (66 percent). The
remaining 1,703 is the Air Force Recruiting Service's share, which
accounts for health professions, chaplains, and OTS candidates. Of that
group, recruiting fully qualified health professionals continues to be
a challenge. As of 28 Feb, we have accessed 16.4 percent (130 of 794).
The Health Professional Scholarship Program allows us to ``grow our
own,'' and continued funding is critical to the success of this program
because Health Professional Scholarship Program accessions are
historically better than recruiting fully qualified health
professionals. The program received more bonus dollars this year, but
still not enough to match bonuses to accession requirements. For
example: 65 Pharmacist requirements and only 45 bonuses; 43 Public
Health requirements and 10 bonuses; 60 Psychologist requirements and 15
bonuses.
The Air Force Reserve is on track to meet its enlisted and officer
goals; it is currently at 100.4 percent (4,265 of 4,250) and 96.5
percent (410 of 425) respectively, of the October through February
goals.
The ANG is on track to meet its enlisted goal and is currently at
111.7 percent (3,041 of 2,722) of the October through February goal.
Officer accessions, currently at 45.4 percent (470 of 1,036) of the
October through February goal, remain a challenge. The Guard has issued
a national incentive-eligible list of critically manned skills, and has
provided the Retention Office Managers real-time capability to review
data and make national updates.

[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES
COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, and LeMieux.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff
member; Gerard J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel;
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional
staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member;
Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
Lloyd, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed;
Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; John Richards, assistant to Senator
Begich; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason
Lawrence, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to
Senator Wicker; and Victor Cervino and Brian Walsh, assistants
to Senator LeMieux.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today's hearing is
the first in a series of hearings that our committee will hold
over the coming weeks with our combatant commanders to receive
their testimony on the U.S. military strategy and operational
requirements in their areas of responsibility (AORs). This is
part of the committee's review of the National Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2011.
This morning, the committee receives testimony from Admiral
James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Supreme Allied
Commander Europe; General William Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM); and General James Mattis, Commander, U.S.
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
First let me take this opportunity on behalf of the
committee to request that you pass along our gratitude to the
men and women in your command and to their families for their
commitment and their sacrifice in carrying out the missions of
our commands.
While Admiral Stavridis is not new to appearing before this
committee, this is his first time testifying as EUCOM Commander
and Supreme Allied Commander Europe. EUCOM's engagement with
our allies and partners in Europe is an essential component of
the trans-Atlantic relationship. Nowhere are the benefits of
this relationship more clearly demonstrated than in
Afghanistan, where 43 countries and nearly 40,000 non-U.S.
troops, the vast majority of which come from countries in the
EUCOM AOR, are participating in the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). EUCOM's efforts to build the
capacity and interoperability of our allies and partners in
Europe are an important contribution to ISAF's mission to bring
security and stability to Afghanistan.
We welcome the increased commitment of forces by our ISAF
coalition partners since President Obama announced the
commitment of additional U.S. forces in December. In addition,
ISAF soldiers from Britain, Denmark, Estonia, and Canada joined
U.S. soldiers and marines and Afghan troops in the recent
combat operations in Helmand Province, and more than a dozen
ISAF troops have died in that operation. We honor their
sacrifice and the sacrifice of their families.
At the same time, an issue that I want to get into further
this morning is the continuing shortfall by our NATO allies to
provide the additional trainers the NATO training mission in
Afghanistan needs to build up the Afghan National Army and
Police. It's apparent that growing the Afghan security forces
so that they can take responsibility for ensuring their
country's security is essential for the success of our
counterinsurgency strategy and for meeting the July 2011 date
that President Obama has set for the start of the reduction of
U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There is no shortage of recruits
for the Afghan Army, thanks in part to that July 2011 date,
which has energized Afghanistan's leaders to bring in more
recruits.
According to General Bill Caldwell, the head of our
training mission in Afghanistan, a major problem is the
continuing shortage of trainers to provide the initial basic
training. Training the Afghan Army is a mission that our NATO
allies should embrace, regardless of their ability or their
willingness to be on the front line of the fight. Yet, at a
recent conference to generate forces NATO members pledged fewer
than half of the approximately 1,200 additional NATO trainers
sought by General Caldwell. That is more than disappointing; it
is unacceptable.
EUCOM faces a number of other security challenges within
its AOR. President Obama's new plan for missile defense in
Europe, the Phased Adaptive Approach, is supported by our NATO
allies. In addition, later this year NATO plans to complete a
revised strategic concept for how the alliance should adapt to
today's security challenges, the first major revision of NATO's
strategic concept since the events of September 11.
General Ward, the challenges in the AFRICOM AOR are
staggering, from the conflicts that rage across borders to
fragile governments, to nations where peacekeeping or peace-
enforcing forces are the best and sometimes only hope for
security and stability, and to the spread of violent extremism.
While confronting some of these issues falls squarely in
the lap of a military command, many do not. Your command is
being directed to assist in nontraditional ways where the
jurisdictional lines between the Departments of State and
Defense are blurred at best. The committee looks forward to
your testimony on these issues and AFRICOM's activities
designed to confront and to counter them.
The threat of terrorism from Africa, and particularly the
potential for havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists in
ungoverned or undergoverned areas, are cause for deep concern.
The attempted Christmas Day bombing of an airliner reminds
everybody that al Qaeda and violent extremists who share their
ideology are not just located in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region, but in places like Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger.
The committee is eager to hear how AFRICOM is working to
confront those very real threats.
Turning to JFCOM, General Mattis is responsible for the
training, certification, and mission readiness of our Armed
Forces as the joint force provider for present and future
operational needs. I hope that General Mattis will discuss how
JFCOM has changed and promoted Department of Defense (DOD)
practices that result in more efficient and effective policies
and coordination with respect to joint operations, as well as
meeting the anticipated threats of the future.
We're also interested in hearing about the role of JFCOM
with respect to the drawdown of forces in Iraq. Specifically of
interest would be your views on: how the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Iraq will have an impact on JFCOM's ability to
source the combatant commander's requirements in the future;
how the Services and other Government agencies are preparing to
execute the drawdown, and how well the Services are meeting
their expected dwell times to restore readiness rates.
In addition, as persistent conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq continue to stress our Armed Forces, our committee is
interested in hearing your assessment, General, of the
readiness of deploying forces.
Again, we thank our witnesses for their dedicated and
continued service and we look forward to your testimony.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all
the witnesses for being here today. I'm grateful for your
service and that of all the brave men and women under your
commands.
Many of my colleagues and I have been strong supporters of
our trans-Atlantic partnerships in the NATO alliance. During
the Cold War, NATO succeeded, as we all know, in promoting and
protecting freedom and democracy in Europe and we won. But
today the alliance is facing a number of very significant
challenges. Secretary Gates rightly said in his speech at the
NATO strategic concept seminar last month, ``Unless the
strategic concept spurs operational and institutional changes,
it will not be worth the paper it's printed on.''
Right now the alliance has serious budgetary problems and
is facing a budget shortfall of some $900 million. The problem
is not just the current underfunding of NATO. Over the years,
NATO and the national defense budgets consistently have
declined to where only 5 of its 28 member states are obligating
the required defense spending of 2 percent of gross domestic
product.
While the war in Afghanistan has shown a light on NATO's
diminished capacity, these shortcomings are not new. For years
before Afghanistan NATO, due to its limited budgets, has let
its capabilities decline. For example, NATO lacks the cargo
airlift, the helicopters, aerial refueling tankers, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms
needed to be effective in Afghanistan or in any other future
conflict.
Member states should be explaining to their parliaments and
to their citizens that NATO faces common threats and shares
common goals. I am concerned that they continue to allow the
idea to build up among their publics that NATO is fighting wars
because the Americans are making them do it. The alliance must
be about more than fulfilling our obligations under Article 5,
as essential as that is. It must also serve to deter potential
adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance and
beyond. Only then can we begin to collectively transform our
alliance from one of common defense to one of common security.
Admiral Stavridis, I look forward to hearing your thoughts
on the future of defense spending among our NATO allies and
your prescription for developing and better leveraging NATO's
capabilities to meet future threats.
I strongly believe it's important to nurture and scrutinize
old friendships. It's equally important to develop and foster
new ones. Africa is a continent full of potential friends and
allies. We often grow too complacent and lack the foresight to
prepare for the things we don't expect, and that's why I'm glad
we have AFRICOM. Africa, as we know, has always been vulnerable
to illicit trafficking due to widespread corruption, poor
governance, and abject poverty.
Somalis continue to flow into Yemen and train with al Qaeda
and its affiliates, and we don't have to look any further than
the Christmas Day bomber, a Nigerian, as proof that violent
extremists exist in many places we're not thinking about or
fighting a war.
But we have partners in the region. Malian troops have
launched an offensive against al Qaeda along its northern
border with Algieria and lost as many as 13 troops last summer.
African nations are vulnerable to a variety of threats,
narcotrafficking, piracy, and terrorism, any of which would
further weaken an already fragile region.
So, General Ward, I look forward to hearing your testimony
and your command's need for trainers, forces, and resources.
General Mattis, your leadership of JFCOM comes at a time
when our troops are engaged more than ever in joint operations.
The branches of our Armed Forces are expected not only to team
with one another, but with allies and host nation troops, as we
have seen most recently in the offensive in Marjah. The
committee is interested in understanding how JFCOM is preparing
our troops to operate jointly and what steps you believe the
Services should be taking in this regard. I'm also curious
about how the rapidly changing feedback from the field in Iraq
and Afghanistan will be incorporated in JFCOM's future
doctrinal development.
You're all highly decorated and highly respected members of
the military. I appreciate your service and weigh your
opinions, requests, and predictions heavily, so I look forward
to hearing all of your testimonies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the witnesses. I am
grateful for your service, and that of all of the brave men and women
under your command.
Many of my colleagues and I have been strong supporters of our
trans-Atlantic partnerships and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) alliance. During the Cold War, NATO succeeded in promoting and
protecting freedom and democracy in Europe--and we won. But today, the
alliance is facing a number of problems.
Secretary Gates rightly said in his speech at the NATO Strategic
Concept Seminar last month, `` . . . unless, the Strategic Concept
spurs operational and institutional changes . . . it will not be worth
the paper it is printed on.' ''
Right now, the alliance has serious budgetary problems and is
facing a budget shortfall of some $900 million. The problem is not just
the current underfunding of NATO. Over the years, NATO and national
defense budgets consistently have declined to where only 5 of its 28
member states are paying the required defense spending of 2 percent of
gross domestic product.
While the war in Afghanistan has shined a light on NATO's
diminished capacity, these shortcomings are not new. For years before
Afghanistan, NATO--due to limited budgets--has let its capabilities
decline. For example, NATO lacks the cargo airlift, the helicopters,
aerial refueling tankers and the ISR platforms needed to be effective
in Afghanistan or any other future conflict.
Member states must explain to their parliaments and to their
citizens that NATO faces common threats and shares common goals. They
cannot continue to allow the idea to build up among their publics that
NATO is fighting wars because the Americans are making them do it. The
alliance must be about more than fulfilling our obligations under
Article 5, as essential as that is. It must also serve to deter
potential adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance
and beyond. Only then can we begin to collectively transform our
alliance from one of common defense to one of common security.
Admiral Stavridis, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on the
future of defense spending among our NATO allies and your prescription
for developing and better leveraging NATO's capabilities to meet future
threats.
While I strongly believe it is important to nurture and scrutinize
old friendships, it is equally important to develop and foster new
ones. Africa is a continent full of potential friends and allies. We
often grow too complacent and lack the foresight to prepare for the
things we don't expect. That is why I am glad we have Africa Command.
Africa has always been vulnerable to illicit trafficking due to
widespread corruption, poor governance and abject poverty. Somalis
continue to flow into Yemen and train with al Qaeda and its affiliates
and we don't have to look any further than the Christmas Day bomber, a
Nigerian, as proof that violent extremists exist in many places we're
not thinking about or fighting a war.
But we have partners in the region. Malian troops have launched
offensives against al Qaeda along its northern border with Algiers and
lost as many as 33 troops last summer. African nations are vulnerable
to a variety of threats: narco-trafficking, piracy and terrorism. Any
of which could further weaken an already fragile region. So, General
Ward, I look forward to hearing your testimony and your command's need
for trainers, forces and resources.
General Mattis, your leadership of Joint Forces Command comes at a
time when our troops are engaged more than ever in `joint' operations.
The branches of our armed services are expected not only to team with
one another but with allies and host-nation troops, as we have seen
most recently in the offensive in Marjah. The Committee is interested
in understanding how Joint Forces Command is preparing our troops to
operate `jointly' and what steps you believe the Services should be
taking in this regard. I am also curious about how the rapidly changing
feedback from the field in Iraq and Afghanistan will be incorporated in
Joint Command's future doctrinal development.
You are all highly decorated officers, and I appreciate your
service and weigh your opinions, requests and predictions heavily. So,
I look forward to hearing all of your testimonies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
We'll start with you, Admiral Stavridis.

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND

Admiral Stavridis. Thank you very much, Senator Levin,
Senator McCain, and all the members of the committee who are
taking the time to hear from my two very good friends and
wingmen this morning, General Kip Ward and General Jim Mattis.
I feel as a Navy Admiral very safe between these two
distinguished combat veterans.
I want to thank Congress, I want to thank this committee,
for the support you give us in all of our operations. It's
vital and it translates directly to our men and women, and we
thank you for it.
I'll be glad to talk about all of the things that were
raised by the chairman and the ranking member. In Afghanistan,
I would say that I am cautiously optimistic. I think Secretary
Gates yesterday in Afghanistan put it very well: We have some
challenges ahead, but we are seeing some bits and pieces of
good news. I'll be glad to talk about some of those.
Senator Levin, I agree completely that we need to focus
like a laser on trainers for the NATO forces. I'm committed to
doing that and I'll talk about it as we go along.
I did want to mention also we're very engaged from a EUCOM
perspective in the Balkans. We don't talk a lot about that
these days, but I think we see a real success story emerging in
the Balkans. If we look back 10 years ago when we had almost
30,000 U.S. troops in the Balkans, today we're down to about
1,200, and our allies are working very hard in the Balkans as
we move toward a safer and more secure area there.
I'd also like to touch on cyber and some of my concerns
there, talk a little about Iran and potential threats to
Europe, touch on our relations with Russia, and then talk a bit
about some of the initiatives we're undertaking at EUCOM which
focus on interagency, international, private-public partnering,
and the use of effective strategic communications.
Sir, I'll close by saying I represent here 80,000 brave men
and women from EUCOM. They're all proud to serve. They're all
volunteers. They thank you for your support.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM James G. Stavridis, USN
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to share with you the challenges and successes
achieved by the men and women of both European Command and Allied
Command Operations. Although I have only been at the helm of these
Commands for less than a year, I am happy to report we are making great
progress and we are moving assertively toward stronger partnerships for
our shared security. Truly, the most important activities we have
undertaken in the past year have been those in which we worked together
with our Allies and partners to build their capacity, as well as our
own, to ensure security in the European theater and defend our homeland
forward. These kinds of activities demonstrate the three essential
pillars I believe are necessary for success.
First, we must understand the military is but one link in the chain
anchoring our national security. Those of us in uniform are well
trained and capable of performing a wide range of duties, but many of
the dangers posed to our national security elicit more than just a
military response. Instead, they call for a ``whole-of-government''
approach that requires partnering with other agencies such as the
Department of State (DOS) leading diplomacy, U.S. Agency for
International Development leading development, Department of the
Treasury, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and
other departments and agencies of our Government to ensure we use all
the means available to ensure our national security. Several U.S.
Departments and Agencies either have representatives at our
headquarters in Stuttgart or will have them in place this fiscal year.
More than a tool or a method, ``Interagency Partnering'' is an
expanding paradigm at EUCOM and we are intent on serving as a model of
interagency cooperation.
Second, not only must we work with our interagency partners, we
must also cooperate closely with our international partners as well.
Our aim is to undertake international security cooperation in a way
that recognizes and leverages the histories, cultures, and languages of
our allies and partners, and enhances our collective capability.
Finally, it is important that we employ effective strategic
communication in everything we do. Our deeds and words should
communicate clearly and credibly our values and priorities to allies,
partners, friends, and even enemies.
Our partnerships in Europe are strong. We share a great deal of
history and culture based on democratic values. Our own democracy was
born of the great European thinkers from Plato to Voltaire, and great
works that shaped our own Constitution, like the Magna Carta. Waves of
immigrants from Europe have helped build our country, and many of the
families of those immigrants still have strong ties to societies on the
European continent. These strong personal transatlantic ties unite us
in common goals and enduring partnerships.

During the past year, European Command's 80,000 soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians have executed many programs, side-by-
side with our allies and partners, which have truly made us ``Stronger
Together.'' Let me summarize some key European Command accomplishments
and initiatives:

Provided predeployment training to thousands of Europe-
based U.S. forces and over 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams slated for deployment in
Afghanistan
Provided forces and critical support for the movement of
equipment and personnel between the Continental United States and the
Central Command Region in support of overseas contingency operations
Provided a world class medical center, Landstuhl Regional
Medical Center, used as the primary trauma facility supporting U.S.
forces in Europe and the Middle East
Executed 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S.,
allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations
Conducted 151 security assistance projects in 19
countries
Reorganized to better engage and collaborate with NATO,
the interagency, academia, the private sector, think tanks, and
international and nongovernmental organizations

progress
Think of U.S. European Command as part of a bridge: one that spans
the broad North Atlantic. Our fundamental purpose is to defend the
United States of America. To do so, we must keep that trans-Atlantic
bridge strong.
In a dynamic region, European Command continues achieving success
by partnering with allies to increase their capacity and ours to
contribute to international security-enhancing solutions. Below are
some examples highlighting this approach:
Joint Multi-National Readiness Center
The Joint Multi-National Readiness Center supports European Command
and Central Command operations by providing predeployment training to
Europe-based U.S. forces and NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison
Teams slated for deployment to Afghanistan. Currently, the Center
provides enduring Observer/Controller support to the United States
Security Coordinator (USSC) Israel to train the Palestinian National
Security Forces. Joint Multi-National Readiness Center observer/
controllers were also instrumental in the successful predeployment
training of the Jordanian 2nd Ranger Battalion for operations in
support of Afghanistan's national elections. We have trained almost
4,000 soldiers thus far. Through these training efforts, EUCOM enabled
partner nations in making contributions to the effort in Afghanistan.
However, we require expanded long-term authorities and funding to
enhance and continue these efforts.

Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force
Marine Forces Europe directly supports the Republic of Georgia's 2-
year program to deploy Georgian forces alongside Marine Forces to
Afghanistan. The Georgia Deployment Program-International Security
Assistance Force will deploy four rotations of a Georgian battalion
with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Afghanistan. As
capabilities improve, Georgian forces are expected to be able to
operate independently. By using Georgian shadow instructors Marine
Forces Europe will create a Georgian training group that will largely
take over the Partnership Training Program by their fourth rotation.
The National Guard State Partnership Program
The National Guard State Partnership Program links individual State
National Guard organizations with a particular European nation. The
National Guard of Illinois, for example, partners with Poland. The
State Partnership Program makes large multi-faceted contributions to
security both within and outside Europe. The 21 European State
Partnerships undertake a broad range of projects, including a capacity-
building program generating 4 enduring European Command State
Partnership Program Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams conducting
combat operations in Afghanistan. This program has the additional
benefit of building critical long-term personal and professional
relationships between the States and European nations because many of
the same personnel return year after year to train with their
counterparts.

Support to NATO Response Force
We are providing personnel to support multiple 2009 training and
certification events through U.S. European Command. This effort
enhanced the training and certification of the Land Component Command
and assisted the NATO Response Force's Joint Logistics Support Group in
reaching advanced operational capability. This high level of
operational acumen is key to ensuring the Force maintains the
deployment capability required to execute its core mission.
Support to Operation Joint Guardian, Kosovo
The United States' continuing support to NATO's Kosovo Force
Operation Joint Guardian helps maintain stability in Kosovo and
advances security progress alongside our NATO and European Union
partners. European Command supports Kosovo Force through our land
component, U.S. Army Europe, and leverages National Guard Bureau forces
to source Task Force Falcon (Multi-national Task Force-East), Regional
Mentoring and Liaison Teams, NATO Training Teams, elements of the
Kosovo Force Headquarters, as well as augmenting the Kosovo Force
Military-Civilian Advisory Division by providing mentors and advisors.
In June of last year, the North Atlantic Council approved the plan to
begin a drawdown from Focused Engagement (current force structure) to a
Deterrent Presence. Accomplishment of Deterrent Presence, which will
reduce NATO force presence from approximately 14,000 to 2,500, began in
January 2010 and, based on a coordinated review of political and
security conditions on the ground may occur in three phases. Today
Kosovo remains stable and secure--a real allied success, but NATO's
North Atlantic Council will continue to evaluate further drawdown.
Reduction of U.S. presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina
European Command has played a significant role in Bosnia's progress
since the 1995 implementation of the Dayton Accords. At the height of
Operation Joint Endeavor in 1996, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemembers
served in Bosnia. The September 2009 deactivation of Task Force Dayton,
the last U.S. entity operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked a
significant milestone for U.S. European Command. Less than 20 U.S.
personnel now remain in Bosnia assigned to the NATO Headquarters-
Sarajevo and the U.S. Balkans National Support Element. European
Command continues building partnership capacity with Bosnia through
focused security cooperation initiatives to include International
Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, Joint
Contact Team Program familiarizations, and the State Partnership
Program with Maryland's Army National Guard. In a show of its
increasing capacity, Bosnia assumed a key leadership role during
European Command's 2009 Combined Endeavor exercise involving 39
countries and 1,200 personnel. European Command is also developing a
bilateral exercise program to further focus on defense reform, Euro-
Atlantic integration, support to Overseas Contingency Operations, and
capacity building. Because of the progress in Bosnia, the Nation
contributed consistently to the coalition effort in Iraq between 2005
and 2008 and will deploy personnel to Afghanistan in the near future.
Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises
The most intensive form of peacetime interaction with our allies
and partners occurs in the conduct of joint exercises. European Command
maintained a robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program last
year, executing 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S.,
allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations. The
exercises focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition
operations to include International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan, NATO interoperability, and improving our military
capability and interoperability with Israel.
In support of NATO, European Command provided forces for 12 NATO
and NATO Partnership for Peace events in the Baltics. U.S. Naval Forces
Europe also executed Exercise Baltic Operations, a longstanding
multinational maritime exercise including 14 nations focused on
maritime and amphibious interoperability. In the Balkans, two major
exercises, Medical Central and Eastern Europe Exercise 2009 and
Combined Endeavor, discussed above, bolstered partner capabilities and
eased regional tensions. Medical Central and Eastern Europe Exercise
2009, U.S. European Command's first large scale exercise in Serbia,
included 14 nations and focused on medical readiness and disaster
response. This exercise also supported the U.S. Agency for
International Development's Preparedness, Planning and Economic
Security program that has been making Serbian municipalities more
resilient to crises and disasters.
Of particular note, European Command conducted a theater-wide
Exercise, Jackal Stone, a Special Operations Headquarters and Field
Training Exercise executed in Croatia and distributed locations
throughout the theater involving more than 10 nations and 1,500 partner
nation Special Operation Forces personnel. This event, along with other
special operations exercises and Joint Combined Exchange Training
events in over 30 countries, directly supported U.S. and partner
Special Operations Forces readiness and contributions to International
Security Assistance Force and other endeavors.
European Command continues a high level of engagement with Israel,
conducting 500+ theater security cooperation events annually and
chairing four bi-lateral, biennial conferences spanning planning,
logistics, exercises, and interoperability. The U.S.-Israel exercise
portfolio also includes eight major reoccurring exercises. European
Command leadership and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring,
personal and direct interactions with counterparts on the Israel
Defense Force. These regular and direct relationships have paid
dividends as the placement of the AN/TPY-2 radar in Israel resulted in
a dramatic uptick in both senior level and operator level interaction.
European Command Headquarters executed Austere Challenge 2009, the
premier joint force headquarters exercise in the European Command
Theater, with a crisis action planning phase in January 2009 and an
operations phase in May 2009.
Building on the success from Southern Command's exercise Blue
Advance 2008, European Command benefitted from the participation of an
Integration Planning Cell with representatives from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. The Department of State's Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization led the Integration
Planning Cell, which also featured the first-time participation of the
newly formed Advance Civilian Team, which was colocated with EUCOM's
Joint Task Force headquarters. Together, the Integration Planning Cell
and Advance Civilian Team comprised the largest interagency involvement
to date in any Combatant Command exercise. The benefits of this
structure are clear: most real-world challenges require an interagency
approach to solve and our robust exercise program reflects this
understanding.
Austere Challenge 2010 will feature multiple event-driven scenarios
requiring multiple joint task forces and will involve a Combined Joint
Air Coordination Center led for the first time by the French Air Force.
On a smaller scale, Flexible Leader is a Command Post Exercise,
focusing on Foreign Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief planning and operations, and strengthening our ``whole-
of-government'' approach through engagement with various U.S. agencies
as well as partner nations and nongovernmental organizations.
None of these events would be possible without Commander Exercise
Engagement and Training Transformation Funding. The support from Joint
Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center is also a keystone to this
command's capability to plan, manage, and execute these challenging
joint exercises. In addition to the extensive engagement European
Command has with partner nations, there are additional major projects.
Logistical Support to Contingency Operations from Spain
In support of ongoing overseas contingency operations, European
Command continues providing critical coordination and support for the
movement of key U.S. equipment and personnel between the Continental
United States and the Central Command region.
Exercising Nuclear Command and Control
In May 2009, the Joint Staff conducted a Staff Assessment Visit on
the European Command Joint Operations Center and Joint Nuclear
Operations Center, and the Joint Staff inspectors rated both centers'
performance as ``excellent,'' a repeat from last year's positive
assessment.
Assistance to Turkey
Increased intelligence sharing with the Turkish General Staff has
increased the effectiveness of Turkish cross-border counterterrorism
operations in Northern Iraq, leading to more precise Turkish action
that reduces potential collateral damage and increases stability in the
region.

Humanitarian Assistance Programs
European Command's Humanitarian Assistance programs directly
benefit the Nations where they are executed and consist of the
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Assistance-
Other Program, and Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property.
Projects funded through these resources complement U.S. Agency for
International Development efforts, enhance regional security
cooperation, and advance U.S. interests throughout the region. They
also bolster a country's own capability to respond to disasters,
thereby diminishing the need for future U.S. involvement, and provide
an example of the value of a military during times of peace. While the
European Command Humanitarian Assistance budget is relatively small, it
has a disproportionately high and positive impact. Last year, the
command executed over $9 million in Humanitarian Assistance Project
funding for 151 security assistance related projects in 19 countries.
Whole-of-Government/Whole-of-Society Approach
Our Nation's success in developing conventional combat power
has driven our adversaries to other forms of warfare, necessitating
a whole-of-government/whole-of-society approach. Interagency and
international military partnering is the ``heart of the enterprise''
for this command.
Embassy Country Teams, a perfect example of interagency partnering
themselves, are our primary engagement entities for the 51 countries in
our region. At the theater or regional level, however, the Geographic
Combatant Commands can serve as a platform for hosting interagency
partners wishing to coordinate their activities with the U.S. military.
European Command presently hosts interagency representatives from the
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Agency for
International Development, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and the Global Center for Security
Cooperation; we will soon add representatives from Department of
Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Energy,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This cooperation helps us
interact with allied and partner militaries who perform many
nontraditional military activities: patrolling borders; responding to
natural disasters; providing coastal security; and performing civilian
air traffic control.
We recently changed the organizational structure of European
Command to better facilitate integration of our interagency partners.
Starting at the top, we established a civilian deputy, an office now
filled by Ambassador Kate Canavan, who in addition serves as European
Command's Political Advisor. Additionally, European Command's newly
formed J9 Interagency Directorate engages and collaborates with
international and nongovernmental organizations, academia, the private
sector, think tanks, and military organizations. We gain many
advantages by leveraging the knowledge and fresh thinking of academics
and business professionals, and international organizations and
nongovernmental organizations have capabilities, access, and
credibility in areas where the military does not.
For example, we are in the very early stages of pursuing a whole-
of-government/whole-of-society approach in addressing regional
narcotics and terrorism threats in Europe and Eurasia, similar to the
interagency effort led by Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key
West. This would synchronize multiple combatant commands (European
Command, Central Command, Africa Command) and the multitude of agencies
working border control, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and
trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, creating synergies that
would add considerable capability and trust for our international
partners while defending our Homeland forward.
european command service components
U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe, U.S. Naval
Forces Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, as well as European Command's
functional subordinate unified command for special operations, Special
Operations Command Europe, are responsible for supporting our Theater
Campaign Plan and implementing our Theater Security Cooperation
programs across the region. The Service components provide the
capabilities necessary to build military capacity among our partners
and allies, conduct military operations, and promote vital national
security interests. Reductions in their forces imposed by budget
constraints necessarily diminish what they can accomplish.

With over 69,000 Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees
operating in 10 main Army communities, U.S. Army Europe leads and
supports 11 brigades postured in geographically-separated locations
throughout Central Europe, from Mons, Belgium to Livorno, Italy. U.S.
Army Europe provides key tactical and operational forces to include
full spectrum combat units and strategic enablers for European Command,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the
International Security Assistance Force. The command currently has 25
percent of its soldiers operationally deployed but still continues to
lead daily to build partner capacity and execute Theater Security
Cooperation in support of USEUCOM's strategy of active security and
global requirements. U.S. Army Europe directly participates in
cooperative efforts with over 80 percent of the countries that have
forces actively serving in partnership with the United States in
Overseas Contingency Operations.
Activities with Allies and Partners
U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany
is pivotal to the Building Partner Capacity mission. Joint
Multinational Training Command builds expeditionary competencies and
increased interoperability between partner nations' militaries through
collective multinational training and through certifying U.S. and
coalition forces for deployments to International Security Assistance
Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Kosovo Force missions.
Additionally, Joint Multinational Training Command has qualified over
500 soldiers from 21 nations in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
training and conducted mission rehearsal exercises for International
Security Assistance Force North, South, and Central Regional Commands.

U.S. Army Europe leads Task Force-East as a European Command
vehicle for fulfillment of the Theater Security Cooperation mission
requirements set forth by the Defense Department and to reaffirm the
U.S. commitment to our Black Sea allies. The command continuously
maintains Task Force-East facilities and support services, and can
quickly transition the facilities to support an increased posture for
all European Command components and partners. Task Force-East provides
important training opportunities not only for the U.S. military, but
also to new Allies close to their forces' home station. U.S. Army
Europe's forward presence in Romania and Bulgaria continues to
facilitate NATO efforts to build and maintain an Alliance for the 21st
century.
This year, U.S. Army Europe participated in 26 major exercises in
22 different countries with 34 participating nations, of which 6 were
in direct support to U.S. Africa Command. These exercises enabled U.S.
Army Europe to meet European Command's priority of sustaining the
relevance of, and U.S. leadership within, NATO; assisting NATO
countries with the capability to conduct out-of-area operations and
ensuring a successful transition of U.S. Africa Command into a fully
operational combatant command. U.S. Army Europe also acted as the lead
organization in Austere Challenge 2009, a comprehensive command post
exercise involving over 3,400 European Command forces, which certified
European Command's Combined Joint Task Force.
U.S. Army Europe continues supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom. In 2009, over half of U.S. Army Europe's units
trained and deployed to or returned from these operations. Currently,
the 1st Armored Division Headquarters, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat
Team, and 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment are deployed in support of
Overseas Contingency Operations. V Corps inactivation was delayed in
order to deploy to Afghanistan, where it currently forms the core of
International Security Assistance Force's 3-star level command and
control headquarters.

U.S. Army Europe also continues contributing significant
operational support and sustainment forces in support of Overseas
Contingency Operations in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa
Command region. Additionally, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment provided
rotational forces for Task Force East in Romania and Bulgaria while at
the same time supporting Denmark in their train-up for NATO Response
Force-14. The 172nd Brigade Combat Team and 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored
Division, which recently reflagged as the 170th Brigade Combat Team,
redeployed from Iraq and are preparing for possible future rotations
while completing their reset and dwell.
Activities Conducted Unilaterally
U.S. Army Europe continues executing its title 10 responsibilities
through transformation planning initiatives in support of modernization
and efficient basing. This past year, U.S. Army Europe transformed into
a Theater Army functional staff configuration. This restructuring will
result in European Command losing one of its Full Spectrum Joint Task
Force/Joint Forces Land Component Command capable headquarters. This
loss, combined with significant force requirements in support of
Overseas Contingency Operations outside the European Command region,
makes retaining one Tactical Intermediate Headquarters and four Brigade
Combat Teams critical to U.S. Army Europe's and European Command's
mission. Without the four Brigade Combat Teams and one tactical
intermediate headquarters capability, European Command assumes risk in
its capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping,
and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased
risk.
While U.S. Army Europe is transforming, it is also optimizing its
footprint and gaining basing efficiencies by consolidating across six
Main Operating Bases in Germany and Italy by 2015. In support of this
initiative, this past year U.S. Army Europe returned eight sites to
host nation control. U.S. Army Europe projects a decrease in 1,400
soldiers this year as it continues to consolidate forces.

With only a small service component headquarters, Marine Forces
Europe very effectively leverages the capabilities of the Marine Corps
in support of European Command objectives. Marine Forces Europe's
engagement in the region follows three lines of operation: (1) building
partner capacity, particularly through combined exercises; (2)
utilizing expeditionary forces to contribute to conventional
deterrence; and (3) supporting operations in Afghanistan. The primary
focus of Marine Forces Europe Theater Security Cooperation activities
is defense sector reform and professionalization of partner nations'
militaries in the Caucasus. The primary focus of Marine Forces Europe
Theater Security Cooperation activities is defense sector reform and
professionalization of partner nations' militaries in the Caucasus.
Collective Training Programs
Engagements in Task Force East, Bulgaria and Volos, Greece
Marine Forces Europe, in coordination with U.S. Naval Forces
Europe, employed over 2,000 marines and sailors of the 22d Marine
Expeditionary Unit between May and June 2009 on a scale not seen since
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise, Loyal Midas
Loyal Midas improved prepositioning equipment in support of
expeditionary operations; a core competency. Loyal Midas experimented
with procedures for tracking offloaded cargo from a prepositioning ship
using new wireless technologies, and significantly improved European
Command's ability to rapidly deploy and assemble expeditionary forces
in the region.
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway
Using this program, the Marine Corps worked with the Norwegian
Defense Staff and Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, and the European
Command staff to develop a plan that enhances access to prepositioned
equipment ashore. Participants analyzed joint U.S.-Norwegian
agreements, and initiated a long-range plan for instituting an
operating concept for the prepositioning facility.
Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force
This program supports the sustained deployment of a Georgian
infantry battalion to Afghanistan to operate as part of the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade for 2 years. The initial deployment occurs this
coming spring.
Coalition Embarkation Support
Personnel from the Marine Forces Europe Strategic Mobility section
used this European Command-led International Security Assistance Force
effort to familiarize partner nations with U.S. embarkation procedures.
Partner nation self-deployment to Afghanistan or other regional
contingencies is the overall goal of the program.
Marine Forces Europe is planning for a company-sized rotational
force to deploy to Task Force East this summer. This force, which is a
proof of concept for the Marine Corps' Security Cooperation Marine Air
Ground Task Force, plans to accomplish in only 90 days what previously
required a full year of Theater Security Cooperation activity by
forward-deploying and utilizing the forward operating site in Romania.
Force Posture
Despite these successes, the lack of a sustained Amphibious Ready
Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit in the European Command region curtails
engagement opportunity with Allies and partners and detracts from
active deterrence. Resuming a sustained presence in the European
Command region would deter adversaries and assure allies and partners
of our commitment to stability in Europe.

With more than 8,000 Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees
operating from 5 main installations supporting rotational surface, air,
submarine and expeditionary forces, U.S. Naval Forces Europe conducts
the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security Cooperation
in concert with coalition, joint, interagency and other partners to
advance security and stability in Europe. NAVEUR continues to
strengthen relationships with enduring Allies and emerging partners
while maintaining naval leadership and combat readiness. U.S. Naval
Forces Europe leverages its maritime expertise to support and improve
regional maritime safety and security. Through ballistic missile
defense, anti-submarine warfare, expeditionary force engagement, a
continuing surface presence, and other activities, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe enhanced maritime safety, security and cooperation throughout
the European Command region in 2009.
Theater Security Cooperation and other Activities with Allies and
Partners
Through military-to-military activities demonstrating our naval
commitment, U.S. Naval Forces Europe promotes maritime domain
awareness, maritime security operations, security assistance, NATO
interoperability, and information sharing.
Taken together, U.S. Naval Forces Europe's anti-submarine warfare
program, Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives, and partner capacity
building efforts are improving maritime stability and ensuring U.S. and
partner access to the maritime domain. Theater Security Cooperation
highlights include:

Afloat Ballistic Missile Defense
A survivable sea-based ballistic missile defense system is an
important component of the phased adaptive approach to defend the
Homeland, as well as allies and partners in Europe and Eurasia. U.S.
Naval Forces Europe is developing the necessary ballistic missile
defense command and control architecture while mitigating
vulnerabilities to the sea-based ballistic missile defense network with
air and undersea capabilities. A U.S. Naval Forces Europe Flag Officer
commanded Juniper Cobra 2010, a joint missile defense exercise with
Israel, incorporating all aspects of both land and sea-based missile
defense and stands as a hallmark of the future of our ballistic missile
defense program.

Enhanced Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability
In partnership with our allies, U.S. Naval Forces Europe continues
upgrading procedures, training and qualifications to enhance theater
anti-submarine warfare capability through Commander, Task Force 69.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Naval Forces Europe's Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Eight
provides extensive military-to-military training programs with the
partner nations' expeditionary forces and provides explosive ordnance
disposal support to International Security Assistance Force
contributors. In addition to supporting U.S. and NATO exercises
throughout the region, the unit provided real-world explosive ordnance
disposal to several European nations.
Response to Piracy
Maritime Expeditionary Security Detachment provides shipboard
security teams to U.S. military support vessels, participates in
exercises and contributes to theater security cooperation engagements.
Construction Support
Naval Construction Forces (Seabees) completed a diverse array of
construction projects emphasizing humanitarian civil assistance and
military-to-military engagements as well as construction support to
exercises Baltic Operations, Medical Training Exercise in Central and
Eastern Europe, Seabreeze, and Jackal Stone. The Seabees completed
construction of operation centers, training infrastructure, and quality
of life projects, including a Military Operation Urban Terrain facility
used for Close Quarters Combat training in Zadar, Croatia, and
renovation of the Padarevo Kindergarten facility in Padarevo, Bulgaria.
Maritime Domain Awareness
U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet continues actively developing
and validating advanced maritime domain awareness procedures. Several
maritime domain awareness exercises, including Autumn Blitz 2009, were
conducted with NATO's Maritime Component Command-Naples to advance the
interoperability and information processing necessary for effective
planning and conduct of maritime operations, such as NATO's Operation
Active Endeavour, between NATO and U.S. commands.

Eurasia Partnership Capstone
In 2009, U.S. Naval Forces Europe's primary Black Sea-Eurasia
region engagement vehicle took place at Souda Bay, Crete. Personnel
from 11 nations participated.
Port Visits
Ship visits demonstrate U.S. Naval Forces Europe's commitment to
improving maritime safety and security and strengthen partner
relationships through training activities with host nation militaries.
For example, following Joint Warrior 2009, the three participating U.S.
ships conducted Theater Security Cooperation port visits in six
countries.
Exercises with Allies and Partners
U.S. Naval Forces Europe participated in 19 exercises with 25
allies and partners covering the full range of maritime activity.
Highlights include:

Exercise Baltic Operations 2009: U.S. Naval Forces
Europe-Sixth Fleet sponsored and executed the 37th annual
Baltic Operations with 43 ships from 12 participating nations.
This European Command-directed multinational exercise enhanced
maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea by increasing
interoperability and cooperation among regional allies.
Phoenix Express 2009: Members of the U.S. Naval Forces
Europe-Sixth Fleet Staff, USS Mount Whitney and USS Robert G.
Bradley along with several European and North African navies
conducted the 2-week Exercise Phoenix Express 2009, leveraging
the capability of European and African partnerships in order to
enhance stability in the Mediterranean region through increased
interoperability and cooperation.
Exercise Frukus 2009: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth
Fleet staff and USS Klakring participated in Exercise Frukus
2009 (France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). This
confidence-building exercise focused on resuming the maritime
partnership between NATO's major Navies and the Russian
Federation Navy.
Reliant Mermaid 2009: USS Stout and members of the
U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet staff participated in the
trilateral maritime search and rescue exercise Reliant Mermaid
2009 with maritime forces from Turkey and Israel. This annual
exercise contributed to overall joint readiness in response to
possible humanitarian assistance efforts or maritime search and
rescue operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and helped
improve engagement between Turkey and Israel, key U.S. allies
and partners in the region.
Way ahead: Our efforts will remain focused on the
Black Sea-Eurasia and eastern Mediterranean regions and follow
European Command Country Campaign Plans. U.S. Naval Forces
Europe is also embarking on an effort to establish a
Mediterranean Sea Fleet Commanders Forum to enhance
interoperability among capable allies and partners and increase
efficiencies in the international military partnership realm.

With more than 42,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian
employees operating from 7 main installations supporting 8 wings and 80
geographically separated locations, U.S. Air Forces, Europe is a key
force provider of tactical combat air forces, tanker, and airlift
assets for European Command, Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Enduring
Freedom (OEF), and the International Security Assistance Force.
Crucially, it also provides a large number of forces for building
partnership capacity on a daily basis, with approximately 740 annual
events that promote enduring relationships and increase security within
and beyond Europe.
Additionally, U.S. Air Forces in Europe provides full-spectrum air,
space, and cyberspace capabilities promoting regional stability through
focused theater engagement and supporting combat operations,
humanitarian assistance, and Ballistic Missile Defense. U.S. Air Forces
in Europe is also European Command's lead agent for personnel recovery,
theater air mobility, and aeromedical evacuation. They execute the
EUCOM mission with forward-based air power to provide forces for global
operations, ensure strategic access, assure allies, deter aggression,
and, key to our approach overall, build partnerships.
Provide Forces for Global Operations
U.S. Air Forces in Europe's top priority to partner with the joint
and combined team to win today's fight. They do this by providing
expeditionary forces as well as a warfighting headquarters that can
plan, deploy, command, control, and coordinate air, space, and
cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military operations.
Ensure Strategic Access
Forward basing of air assets and the establishment of mobility hubs
in the European theater ensure strategic access for operations in
Europe as well as to the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command
regions. U.S. Air Forces in Europe maintains robust support for U.S.
Transportation Command's enroute locations, enabling global operations
by permitting the full spectrum of passenger and cargo movement through
bases throughout Europe. In addition, the command has enhanced
strategic flexibility by opening up new access points through
engagement with new NATO partners.

The activation of the Strategic Airlift Consortium at Papa Air
Base, Hungary exemplified this, with NATO members Bulgaria, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia
and the U.S., as well as Partnership for Peace nations Finland and
Sweden. The result was the creation of a 12-member Heavy Airlift Wing
consisting of 3 C-17 Globemaster IIIs. The Strategic Airlift Consortium
is a watershed event in international military cooperation.
Assure Allies and Deter Aggression
U.S. Air Forces in Europe continues building and sustaining a
credible capability to dissuade aggressors. Its interoperability with
alliance partners through exercises and operations remains crucial for
ensuring primacy of the Alliance and the U.S. leadership role.
U.S. Air Forces in Europe is EUCOM's lead agent for Integrated Air
and Missile Defense. It operates a Command, Control, Battle Management,
and Communication suite to provide the commander with Ballistic Missile
Defense situational awareness, early warning, and possible defensive
countermeasures. The suite is designed to be interoperable with NATO
systems in order to support the Presidential decision to employ a
Phased Adaptive Approach to the Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe.
NATO remains the primary security institution in Europe. Forward
U.S. presence and interoperability with Alliance partners is crucial
for ensuring primacy of the Alliance and a U.S. leadership role. The
planned basing of new systems such as Global Hawk, 5th generation
fighter capabilities on schedule with our allies, and the potential for
a future Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance aircraft capability in
theater will provide opportunities for the United States to display its
commitment and resolve, provide critical tools for engagement, and
enhance allied and partner contributions to global operations. In
accordance with NATO's strategic concept, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe
fulfills the U.S. commitment to allied extended nuclear deterrence with
Dual Capable Aircraft, and personnel who ensure the custody, safety,
and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
Build Partnerships
In a program with long-term benefit, U.S. Air Forces in Europe's
efforts build partner capabilities, increase their ability to
counterterrorism, protect homelands and common interests, and counter
emerging threats. Their ``Building Partnerships'' program contributes
to the building of key relationships, promoting U.S. strategic
interests, providing for essential peacetime and contingency access and
enroute infrastructure, and improving information exchange and
intelligence sharing. Within the past 12 months, the command conducted
approximately 740 building partnership events with 51 partners and
allies, including theater security cooperation events, exercises,
aerial events, and military-to-military engagements. In addition to
partner engagement, they actively engage, in accordance with European
Command direction, to advance regional stability.

Exercises with Allies and Partners
U.S. Air Forces, Europe develops increased Alliance capability to
support Overseas Contingency Operations through participation and
leadership in 20 combined exercises and operations, including Unified
Engagement, Medical Training Exercise in Central and Eastern Europe,
Combined Endeavor, Austere Challenge, Juniper Cobra, and the Baltic
Region Training Exercises, as well as the Tactical Leadership Program.
Key cross-border programs include:

Baltic States Air Capability Development. U.S. Air
Forces, Europe led a series of four-nation symposia with
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to develop the basis for
establishing fundamental air combat capabilities leading to
ministerial-level buy-in of a concept of operations and a long-
term strategy for aviation excellence and eventual self-
reliance.
Enhancing Nordic States interoperability with NATO. In
2009, U.S. Air Forces in Europe led and fostered efforts to
enable the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces to participate in
NATO and coalition air operations.
Developing capability of ``near-4th generation
fighter'' nations. U.S. Air Forces, Europe placed strong
emphasis on helping these partner nations transition smoothly
to 4th-generation operations. To support Poland's new force of
48 F-16s, a very successful sister-wing relationship between
the 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany and the Polish
AF was established. It is now instrumental in spreading
lessons-learned and best practices, as the Polish AF strives
toward its goal of expeditionary F-16 operations. Additionally,
deployments to Bulgaria and Romania fostered those countries'
efforts to adopt NATO-interoperable tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
Build/Sustain Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
capability. Working to increase the number of Joint Terminal
Attack Controllers available to deploy to International
Security Assistance Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe trained 25
new partner nation Controllers in 2009 and estimates training
30 more in 2010. Work with Poland will provide an organic
regional Air Ground Operations School training capability.
Continuing training relationships with French pilots enable
them to train with native English speakers prior to deploying
into Afghanistan.

U.S. Air Forces in Europe's forward-based forces provide the Nation
a 3-for-1 efficiency by providing forces for global operations,
promoting regional stability (with capabilities to deter aggressors and
assure allies), and building partnerships. Unfortunately, the reduction
of 24 fighter aircraft will significantly limit the resources available
for these activities. As we move forward, we must ensure that our
forward-based posture is adequate to support our Nation's strategic
objectives.

Special Operations Command, Europe, comprised of more than 1,600
Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees operating from two main
locations, remains the preeminent U.S. Special Operations Force
provider to the International Security Assistance Force; provides such
forces for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom; contributes
significantly to the development of allied and partner special
operations forces; and stands, prepared and ready, to defend against
transnational threats and rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies
within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility.
Special Operations Command, Europe's capacity building efforts
relies on three elements: the Partner Development Program, support to
the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center--now evolving
into the NATO Special Operations Headquarters--and deployments in
support of NATO International Security Assistance Force operations.
Special Operations Command, Europe remained heavily engaged throughout
2009, conducting 29 Joint Combined Exchange Training events, 8
bilateral training activities, 9 military-to-military engagements, and
6 counternarcoterrorism missions in 18 countries. Along with these
activities, the Command conducted numerous staff and key leader
engagements. These events focused on developing more capable and
professional American and Allied Special Operations Forces, while
building the relationships required to increase the support and
commitment of European political and military leadership.
Activities and Exercises with Allies and Partners:
Partner Development Program
Partner Development Program allows Special Operations Command,
Europe to link disparate programs and training venues to build partner
Special Operations Forces capacity. It focuses on those allies and
partners that demonstrate willingness to deploy Special Operations
Forces in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan and the capability
over time to sustain their increased Special Operations Forces
capacity. Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Lithuania are a few of the
countries that have participated in this program and have deployed
Special Operations Forces for the benefit of the alliance.
The Command's exercise program exemplifies Partner Development
Program's utility. The annual Special Operations Command, Europe
capstone exercise, Jackal Stone 2009, brought together approximately
1,500 Special Operations Forces servicemembers from 10 countries--9 out
of 10 currently contribute Special Operations Forces to International
Security Assistance Force operations, or have indicated a willingness
to do so in the future.
Special Operations Command, Europe Support to the NATO Special
Operations Headquarters
The second critical element of American Special Operations Forces
capacity building objectives in Europe is Special Operations Command,
Europe support to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NATO
Special Operations Headquarters, now being established from the NATO
Special Operations Forces Coordination Center, is already making
significant contributions to Special Operations Command, Europe and
Allied efforts by developing common NATO Special Operations Forces
standards and encouraging allied integration.
Special Operations Command, Europe Support to International
Security Assistance Force
Since 2007, Special Operations Command, Europe has maintained a
Special Operations Task Group (one U.S. Special Operations Company and
associated staff officers) under NATO command in Afghanistan, separate
from Operation Enduring Freedom. Special Operations Command, Europe
deployments to International Security Assistance Force also showcase
``best practices'' to our Special Operations Forces partners and
encourage equally capable Special Operations Forces allies to mentor
other developing partners.

As a direct result of Partner Development Program and NATO Special
Operations Headquarters initiatives, European national Special
Operations Forces contributions to International Security Assistance
Force have steadily increased providing strategic relief for already
committed U.S. and allied Special Operations Forces. Special Operations
Command, Europe, through European Command, Special Operations Command,
and the Department of Defense, continues to work with the Department of
State and Congress to develop the mechanisms necessary to advance to
the next stage of partnership cooperation.
Defense Against Transnational Threats
Special Operations Command, Europe contributes to American, Allied,
and partner nation efforts to defend against transnational threats
through sharing information, building capacity, reinforcing strategic
communications messages, and, if required, conducting or supporting
kinetic special operations. For example, throughout 2009, Special
Operations Command, Europe sponsored a weekly video teleconference,
allowing Department of Defense and other Government agencies from
around the globe to share intelligence and evidentiary information that
closed intergovernmental and international seams and synergized law
enforcement and military operations against complex non-state global
networks.
Preparation for Contingency Operations
Though the European continent is relatively stable, it has numerous
potential flashpoints from the Balkans to the Caucasus. In 2010, the
Command plans to increase regional security through 36 different
engagement events with 30 countries. The Partner Development Program
will begin to focus on filling collective rotary wing aviation gaps,
combining efforts with Department of State to take a lead role in the
development of interoperable Special Operations Forces aviation
capacity.
challenges
Afghanistan
Of the 43 nations contributing forces to the International Security
Assistance Force besides the United States, 80 percent of them (36
nations) come from the European Theater and those 36 nations represent
approximately 42 percent of the coalition's personnel. Many nations are
making particularly large contributions of forces and have suffered
high casualty rates relative to their populations. Our partners
understand the importance of this mission and they are willing to send
their sons and daughters in harm's way alongside our own to bring
peace, security, and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Many of
these nations wish to contribute more capability and other nations have
the will to join the International Security Assistance Force but lack
the capacity to do so. Within the European Theater itself, European
Command's primary focus is to lend whatever support it can to these
other nations as they seek to contribute to security and stability
efforts in Afghanistan. Within the framework of contributing to
international efforts in Afghanistan, and within the boundaries and
authorities set by law and regulation and by international agreements,
this support involves providing training, equipment, logistical
assistance, and personnel augmentation to nations that desire to
contribute to the International Security Assistance Force.
Terrorism in Europe
Our role in the fight against transnational terrorism in the region
is primarily one of engagement and intelligence sharing. Terrorist
networks use Europe principally to recruit fighters, garner financial
and logistic support, and provide sanctuary. They cooperate closely
with criminal networks and engage in numerous illegal activities as
fund raising mechanisms. Well-established and commendable European
civil liberties and the loosening of border controls provide
opportunities for terrorist support and logistic activities.
Nonetheless, Europe is not immune to al Qaeda affiliated terror attacks
or the threat of them. Al Qaeda has consistently and recently stated a
desire to strike directly against our European allies. The reverse flow
of foreign fighters out of Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the bona
fides and experience these fighters will have gained there may increase
the terror threat in Europe in the future.

The possibility of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass
destruction adds another dimension. Al Qaeda has consistently striven
to incorporate weapons of mass destruction into their attacks and the
majority of the world's nuclear weapons are within the European
Command's area of responsibility. The security of these weapons and
weapons material is a significant aspect of European Command's efforts
to counter weapons of mass destruction.

The biggest impact we can have on terror networks in Europe is
through enabling and partnering with our friends and allies. A good
example of this is our intelligence sharing with Turkey regarding
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists. In addition to partnering
with other nations in Europe, we are also closely partnering with other
arms of the U.S. Government, where appropriate, to ensure all the
levers of our national power are applied against these networks in a
coordinated fashion.
Potential Regional Conflicts
In spite of European integration, European Command continues to
face an environment in fluid transition, and we are coping with the
insecurity associated with 21st century challenges and unsolved 20th
century security problems. The outbreak of conflict between Georgia and
Russia served as a reminder that war has not disappeared from the
European Command Theater.
Secessionist pressures, unresolved or suspended conflicts, and
ethnic and religious tensions make European Command's Black Sea and
Eurasia regions the most conflict-plagued area along the Euro-Atlantic
perimeter. Russia's North Caucasus remains an area of persistent
conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan are at a stalemate over Nagorno-
Karabakh. The South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia are a
continuing source of tension between Georgia and Russia, the more so
given the Russian military presence in those regions and Russian
recognition of their independence from Georgia. Little progress has
been made toward a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, which
divides Moldova and hinders solely needed economic development.
Conflict persists between Israel and Palestinian groups. The sources,
complexities, and significant tertiary effects of these regional
conflicts require an integrated interagency approach in concert with
our European partners and security organizations.
Russia
The complexities of managing a military-to-military relationship
with Russia are high. On one hand, there are many areas of potential
cooperation and partnership, including Afghanistan, arms control,
counterterrorism, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and eventually
missile defense. On the other hand, many of our allies and friends in
the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the
conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008, exercises on their borders
like the Zapad series in 2009, and Russia's continuing suspension of
implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.
Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the
potential for cooperation, while maintaining an honest and open
dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we
disagree. While a great deal of engagement with Russia is handled
either by State Department in the diplomatic realm or directly by the
Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European
Command are ready to pursue military-to-military communication,
engagement, and even training and operations with Russia where and when
appropriate.
Energy Security
A massive amount of energy is produced in or transits through
European Command's region. Russia, Azerbaijan, Norway, and other
countries produce large amounts of hydrocarbons. Approximately 3
million barrels of oil transit the Bosporus and the Dardanelles each
day.
European Command is and must be a major participant in the
interagency efforts to ensure the security of energy flows to, from,
and through our region. The Command already has several interagency
representatives on staff to better synchronize our efforts. We are
already working to promote integrated planning and exercises and build
up the capabilities of our European partners through technical
assistance, the Partnership for Peace program, and other train and
equip efforts. The Command is also collaborating with other U.S.
Government partners and like-minded NATO allies to develop a framework
to develop common solutions for major energy security issues. Finally,
we view Russia as a key partner in these efforts and will work with
Moscow in areas of common interest. However, where our interests do not
intersect, we will work with other European partners to develop
solutions for all of Europe.
The Arctic
Changes in the Arctic create both challenges and opportunities.
Climate changes may result in open shipping routes, which link Asia to
Europe, cutting the distance on these routes by up to 40 percent and
transit time by 10 days.
The Arctic is emerging as a complex but potentially productive
region for oil, gas and new industrial activity. Unresolved issues will
become more pressing as economic activities expand. For example, there
are eight bilateral boundary issues involving all states in the region,
and the northernmost extension of the continental shelves in the Arctic
is unresolved.

States, particularly the traditional great powers, will play a key
role in determining patterns of cooperation and tension within the
Arctic. Russia's activities in the Arctic include producing and
modernizing icebreakers, resuming submarine and long-range aviation
patrols, stationing more researchers throughout the region, and
asserting extensive territorial claims. Russia's latest Arctic policy
paper states that the Arctic must become Russia's top strategic
resource base by 2020. It further states that they must complete
geological studies to prove their claim to Arctic resources and create
a new group of forces to ensure military security under various
political-military circumstances.

As the Arctic emerges as a region of economic significance and we
develop our relationship with Russia, there may be opportunities for
increased military activities with Russia to directly support U.S.
policy initiatives. We see the Arctic as not an area of confrontational
challenges but one of shared opportunities for cooperation and
partnership that will benefit all states of the region. Early
investment in an open and meaningful interagency dialog with Russia in
the very near future, could avoid potential conflict in the more
distant future.
Force Posture
The interrelationship of U.S. forces, their footprint, and our
relationships with other nations, is key to achieving national
objectives in the European Command Theater. The presence of U.S.
forces--air, land, and sea--in Europe fosters relationships and deepens
partnerships in multiple ways, including the shared use of training
facilities and other building partner capacity and international
military partnering events.
The nations within the European Command region are of significant
importance to U.S. global strategic interests as evidenced by the
overwhelming number of ISAF troop contributing nations from the EUCOM
AOR. Our ability to develop coalitions and the capabilities of European
coalition partners are central to advancing our national security
priorities. Building partnerships and building partnership capacity is
therefore job number one for European Command.
The forces stationed in Europe today are a key element of America's
strength and they promote our values, protect our interests, and are
tangible reminders to friends and foes alike of our dedicated
commitment to a strong trans-Atlantic relationship based on cooperation
and adherence to fundamental ideals. As the post-Cold War security
environment changed, the size of our forces required to maintain our
leadership role also changed. The number of U.S. personnel in Europe
has gone from 300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today.
European Command forces assure our Allies and deter and dissuade our
adversaries, and are the most visible indication of the ongoing U.S.
commitment to the NATO Alliance.

European Command's footprint is pivotal to U.S. global operations.
Sites and installations in Europe provide superb power projection
facilities for the support of coalition operations and overseas
contingency operations. Installations in the European Command region
coupled with longstanding and emerging relationships contribute to
assured access and strategic reach to and from Europe.
Force posture initiatives for European Command support building the
capability and capacity of partner nations in Europe, increased
expeditionary capability from Europe, and achieve basing efficiencies.
Our posture initiatives support two major categories: operational
capability development and improvements for basing efficiencies in
sustainment and Quality of Life. Operational capability development
initiatives include assessments for stationing of forces anticipated to
deploy to the European theater and a new prepositioning strategy that
transforms portions of European Command prepositioning equipment to
support soft power employment for missions such as Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Response.
Other force posture initiatives focus on achieving basing
efficiencies through coordinated review of infrastructure capacity as
well as supporting service component efforts to optimize resources
supporting of European Command forces. Sustainment initiatives include
the continuous review of Quality of Life requirements such as education
and housing services for European Command personnel and their families.

European Command has aligned its posture planning processes to
support the Department's efforts in addressing global force posture.
The European Command staff coordinates strategic assessment,
implementation feasibility, and theater prioritization of force posture
issues through a posture forum that maximizes outreach and integration
in posture development among Combatant Commands, our European Command
Service Component Commands, and our interagency partners. Our posture
planning necessarily involves coordination across the whole of
government, as we integrate Defense Department posture overseas with
State Department representatives and ultimately our relationships with
European hosts.
opportunities
Many of our challenges also present opportunities for international
military partnering that bring benefit to today's issues such as
Afghanistan but also for those that we will face tomorrow.
Afghanistan
Supporting the International Security Assistance Force has given
European Command the opportunity to deepen its relationship with our
Allies and partners using our expertise and experience to inculcate an
expeditionary mindset and train deploying partnered-country forces in
irregular warfare. The contributions and sacrifice of Eurasian and
European nations in Afghanistan have demonstrated the credibility,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of international military cooperation.
The scale of Allied and partner force contributions to the
International Security Assistance Force has allowed the hand-over of
significant responsibility for regional operations to coalition
partners. NATO's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program
directly supports the development of the Afghanistan National Army and
the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program supports the
expansion of the Afghan National Police. Under these programs, European
Allies and partners are currently providing approximately 50 percent of
the number of teams required to train Afghanistan's security forces.
Right now, U.S. Forces assigned to European Command are deployed to
Afghanistan and make vital contributions on a daily basis. However,
within the European theater itself, European Command's primary focus is
to lend whatever support it can to other nations as they seek to
contribute to the security and stability efforts in Afghanistan.

Engagement with Russia
In 2009, European Command authored a framework document to resume
military-to-military cooperation with Russia in an equal, pragmatic,
transparent, and mutually beneficial manner. This framework not only
addresses crisis response operations, but also seeks to promote
interaction and ensure mutual support in conducting counterterrorism
and counterpiracy operations; peacekeeping; missile, space, and
ballistic missile-defense; as well as search and rescue. This framework
document was signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Russian Chief of Defense during the July 2009 Presidential Summit
in Moscow. This framework begins to rebuild a structure for our
bilateral defense relationship with Russia that allows wide-ranging and
candid engagement on all issues of concern.
In rebuilding the bilateral relationship with Russia, however,
European Command will work with NATO and partners to develop an
integrated and inclusive security cooperation architecture beneficial
to all participants that does not come at the expense of Allies and
partners.
European Missile Defense
European Command looks forward to operationalizing the recently
announced Phased Adaptive Approach, a complete revision of how the U.S.
manages ballistic missile defense of Europe. The phased implementation
of the proposed network of sensors, interceptors and associated Command
and Control structures will provide a regional capability that is
flexible, scalable, and responsive. The architecture aims to provide
the right level of capability, at the right time, in the right location
based on the emerging threat. The new approach provides increased
opportunity for interagency and international military partnering.
European Command is actively cooperating with the Department of State,
Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, and others as the United
States builds the plan for international engagement in the region. The
capabilities delivered with the new phased, adaptive approach will
serve as a catalyst to develop a cooperative solution with our allies
and partners in the region.
Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
Today, almost 15 years after the Dayton Peace Accords and 10 years
after the NATO military campaign to end atrocities in Kosovo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo still evince the problems present throughout
this volatile region: endemic corruption, organized crime, deep-rooted
ethnic divisions, decrepit infrastructures, and weak economies with
little foreign direct investment. Such an environment invites organized
criminals and limits the capabilities of governments to effectively
provide essential services. Despite these challenges, the United States
remains committed to bringing lasting stability to the Balkans, and we
have been making steady progress in the region, as exemplified by the
April 2009 admission of Croatia and Albania into NATO and recent
democratic elections in Kosovo.
In this region, European Command focuses on enhancing transatlantic
security through defense modernization and reform efforts; defense
institution building activities to improve the organic capacity of
countries to recruit, train, and sustain their own military forces;
humanitarian assistance operations; and demilitarization of unexploded
ordnance to eliminate the threat to lives, property, and government
stability.
Significant political and cultural divisions remain in both Bosnia
and Kosovo. In Bosnia, uncompromising, ethnic-based rhetoric continues
to stall reform efforts. While the ``Butmir Talks'' last fall were a
step in the right direction, Bosnia will need to progress politically
toward stability. Although many problems in Kosovo are simply growing
pains of a new state, the institutions in Kosovo face stark challenges
to strengthen weak government institutions, combat corruption and
illicit trafficking, and improve provision of essential services. Most
of our military-to-military engagement is at a basic level, such as
training the Kosovo Security Force and the provision of personal
equipment like boots and uniforms. The programmed reduction of NATO and
European Union forces in the Balkans may induce additional risk and
requires continued monitoring to guard against others in the region
from exploiting weaknesses.
Despite these challenges, there are solid prospects for success
given that we are prepared to devote the necessary attention and
resources to the region. Bosnia and Kosovo, like their Balkan
neighbors, generally hold the United States in high regard. To be
effective, we must continue to coordinate our efforts with our European
Allies and partners. We must expand our efforts to persuade NATO and
European Union partners to persevere in these efforts. Maintaining
stability at the southeastern corner of Europe remains an important
transatlantic interest.
Cyberspace
Cyberspace enables and supports all of the efforts, challenges, and
opportunities above. The cyberspace domain and the ability to operate
freely in Cyberspace are of great importance to European Command. The
21st century and many events of the 20th century will be defined or
redefined by the development, movement, and consumption of information
in a holistic and collaborative environment. Our ability to freely
operate and shape that environment has significant implications on both
our leadership and partnerships in Europe.

European Command is already building that advantage and defining
that success. Access to reliable cyberspace has become imperative to
our national security, economics, and way of life. We must gain greater
visibility of disruptive activities, determine how and to what extent
these actions increase the risk to security and stability, and build
the ability to maintain freedom of maneuver in the cyber domain for
ourselves, our friends, and the voices of truth. We have established a
Network Warfare Center to provide a fused cyber operations,
intelligence and defense capability. We have also reached out to NATO
and other partners to establish cyber information sharing agreements.
These agreements provide great value by enhancing awareness, building
common understanding and developing operational trust. Finally,
European Command continues to see the need for continued investment and
development of both joint and multi-national cyber capabilities. These
capabilities must be integrated, layered, responsive, and assured. U.S.
European Command sees great promise in the continued development and
use of cyberspace in Europe both as a mission enabler and as a common
interest area with European allies and partners.
Innovation Cell
Because innovation is so important to maintaining effectiveness, we
have established a small, dedicated innovation cell. In the first 6
months, this team closed a gap in U.S.-foreign partner security
cooperation. As a result, it uncovered an interesting human detection
technology in the Slovak Republic, accelerated a project with the
French Armaments Agency to put a wireless internet router in space, and
connected over a dozen different organizations together to demonstrate
innovative ways to build partner nation and public-private partnerships
to counter piracy.
Building Partner Capacity Center
Building Partner Capacity is at the heart of EUCOM's mission and
the key to strengthening stability in our region and the regions to
which we project military forces. It requires, however, complex and
astute interactions with our allies and partners, and the application
of lessons learned in many different regions. For those reasons, we are
investigating the establishment of a Building Partner Capacity Center
that will bring together subject matter experts in a way that makes
their knowledge accessible to all and facilitates an in-depth
examination of the issues.
Counternarcotics Task Force
In another very critical area, EUCOM and its naval component have
conducted a full mission analysis for a Counternarcotics Task Force and
have begun establishing one. U.S. Naval Forces Europe is initially
staffing the Task Force from its intelligence directorate. The Task
Force has initiated preliminary outreach to the Maritime Analysis and
Operations Center-Narcotics in Lisbon and with the Center for Combating
Smuggling in the Mediterranean (CeCLAD) in Toulon. To accelerate
establishment, Naval Forces Europe will resource the task force with
its own personnel and funding and has set aside additional funding for
fiscal year 2010 as start-up money.
Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction
In the last decade, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine
have experienced accidental explosions of their aging conventional
munitions, destroying infrastructure and causing military and civilian
casualties. The amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO), excess, and
unstable munitions in our theater is great and of serious concern. We
are working with the Department of State, the Federal lead for weapons
removal and abatement, to enhance their recent stockpile reduction
initiative and address with a greater sense of urgency these stockpiles
that are aging, destabilizing, and exploding unintentionally. Together
we want to preclude another incident that would threaten lives and
decrease stability.
taking care of european command personnel
Quality of Life
European Command is committed to support and maintain a quality of
life for our assigned personnel commensurate to the Nation we serve and
defend. We also recognize that forward deployed forces are better able
to focus on the mission when their families are properly cared for
through quality living quarters, educational opportunities for their
children, and medical care.
Deployment, Behavioral Health and Compassion Fatigue Support
Protracted combat operations, multiple deployments, insufficient
dwell time and casualties have critically increased the immediate and
future demand for Behavioral Health Specialists for our servicemembers
and their families. Multiple studies, for example the Department of
Defense Mental Health Task Force, have identified the need for
increased behavioral health support to military and family members.
Component commanders have identified the need for additional behavioral
health providers and technicians for European Command military and
family members.
As we continue to maintain mission readiness, our warriors and
families require access to these vital programs and services without
stovepipes in a stigma-free environment. A 360-degree review of
programs and the connection between at-risk indicators and catalysts is
needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is alignment of focused
care-giver teams with corresponding indicator data systems to ensure
the health of our force and family.
European Command community caregivers providing warfighter and
family support continue to show signs of stress, burnout and compassion
fatigue. European Command, with funding from European Regional Medical
Command, contracted to develop and deliver a comprehensive compassion
fatigue program titled Providing Outreach While Enhancing Readiness--
Caring for the Caregiver, which focuses on providing caregivers with
tools and strategies to prevent the risk of burnout, stress and
compassion fatigue.
Dependent Education
The quality of the President's school system, managed by the
Department of Defense Education Activity, is a major contributor to the
Quality of Life of European Command members. European Command's system
is a benchmark for other school systems and we need your continued
support and funding to ensure we maintain high educational standards.
We continue to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense
Education Activity to ensure funding for programs such as The Virtual
School for our approximately 2,000 students in the European Command
region located in areas with no school. Because funding for educational
support in remote areas has not kept pace with new mission
requirements, we need your support for this leading edge educational
system for our youth. We are now just beginning to see the effect of
nearly $100 million to replace our schools, many of which are 1950s
barracks. We must continue funding this endeavor in future years.
We look forward to sustaining the recent accomplishments in Quality
of Life and base infrastructure. Taking care of people enhances
readiness. In the short term, this includes ensuring the capability of
the community support base to deploy servicemembers and support their
families. In the long term, it enables the military services to attract
and retain the high quality force our mission demands.

european command infrastructure and logistics
As a large organization with responsibilities spanning Europe,
European Command has major infrastructure and logistics
responsibilities.
Theater Infrastructure
At enduring locations, we must continue to sustain and recapitalize
our infrastructure through responsible use of both the Sustainment,
Restoration, and Modernization program and the Military Construction
program. At non-enduring locations, we must optimize use of all
available resources to ensure these installations remain fully mission
effective until the installations are removed from the inventory.
Thanks to strong congressional support, previous annual Military
Construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled European
Command to address a balanced mix of our most pressing mission, mission
support, quality of life, and housing requirements. The Kaiserslautern
Military Community Housing project is nearing completion and is one of
several showcase examples of the impact that Military Construction
program support has for our community. Continued support of these
investments will enable us to eliminate inadequate housing and this
will pay dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our
forces into more efficient communities. European Command's future
requirements will appear in our Theater Posture Plan and military
construction requests.
Strategic Mobility and Maneuver
Because facilities and forces must be effectively linked,
dependable and available sealift, strategic and tactical airlift, and
ground transportation systems are essential elements of European
Command's strategy. The fielding of the Joint High Speed Vessel and its
assignment to the region will significantly enhance our capability to
deploy and transport forces along sea lines of communication. The
ability of the Joint High Speed Vessel rapidly to transport large
volumes of material will provide a critical engagement platform to
support Military Partnership activities and improve our ability to
respond to potential contingencies such as non-combatant evacuation
operations.
European Command's fleet of C-130s is currently undergoing an
important upgrade from 17 older C-130E aircraft to 14 new, more capable
C-130Js. The payload, capacity, and range constraints of even these
aircraft limit European Command's ability rapidly to deliver forces or
materiel across our theater.

Strategic airlift is also an important force enabled in the region.
We applaud the stand-up of the Strategic Airlift Consortium-Heavy
Airlift Wing that commenced operations July of 2009 at Papa Air Base,
Hungary. The wing operates 3 C-17 aircraft, shared by a consortium of
10 NATO and 2 Partnership for Peace nations, and is the product of a
groundbreaking building partner capacity initiative that provides
European Command with access to robust theater-based strategic lift
capability. European Command will continue to pursue increased organic
lift capability to enable the full range of engagement and contingency
activities.
European Command's principal contribution to global logistics
throughput in support of ongoing operations is to the Central Command
region. For example, lines of communication and distribution routing
for logistics support through the European region should be able to
support all of the International Security Assistance Force logistics
requirements in the event other routes are unable to maintain the
required capacity. European Command continually coordinates logistics
planning with Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency
as well as Central Command to ensure global air, sea, and land lines of
communication are identified and maintained to support global
operations.
Prepositioned Equipment
Prepositioned equipment reduces demands on the transportation
system and appreciably shortens crisis response time by providing a
scalable capability and enabling the assembly of deploying forces with
equipment already staged in the European Command's region. Continued
support of the Services' Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel programs
also demonstrates commitment through presence and preserves a broad
spectrum of response options, from that of traditional crisis response
through support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. As we
transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need
for Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel equipment configured to support
both kinetic and nonkinetic operations, positioned in strategically
flexible locations, and enablers such as the Joint High Speed Vessel.
Exercising prepositioned stocks also builds military partner capacity
with allies and provides ready assets for units arriving in theater for
training/engagement and security cooperation missions.
All four Services maintain Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel in
the European Command's region, either on land or afloat. U.S. Air
Forces, Europe maintains Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel at main
operating bases within the theater, with centrally managed storage
sites in Norway and Luxembourg. U.S. Marine Forces Europe maintains
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway and assets afloat in the
Mediterranean via Maritime Prepositioned Force ships. U.S. Army Europe
maintains propositioned stocks via the Department of the Army's Heavy
Brigade Combat Team prepositioned set at Camp Darby near Livorno,
Italy.
Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel currently requires upgrade. Over
two-thirds of the Marine Corps's Prepositioning Program-Norway stocks
were withdrawn in direct support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom. Army preposition stocks at Camp Darby have also been
reduced to support these operations as well as the International
Security Assistance Force. We do not expect this equipment to reset
until at least 2015.
European Command is actively involved in Defense Department-led
studies examining the global disposition of Prepositioned War Reserve
Materiel and is working to ensure that these studies incorporate our
strategic direction and operational requirements.

NATO has been the anchor of Trans-Atlantic security for more than
60 years ensuring the security of its members, enhancing peace and
stability throughout Europe, and countering threats across the globe.
It is inescapable in any alliance that differences will emerge,
consensus becomes difficult, and perpetual challenge makes members
weary; thus making NATO's success that much more impressive, though not
surprising. The Alliance endures because the principles it defends are
timeless and the determination to safeguard freedom is boundless.
In the relative comfort of this success, set against an
extraordinary amount of post-Cold War challenges, it would be tempting
to address European security as a less pressing matter. U.S.
commitment, distinguished by force levels in Europe and leadership
positions throughout the NATO command structure, will remain a critical
piece in Trans-Atlantic security in the 21st century.

The NATO Secretary General began a multi-faceted review of NATO's
Strategic Concept with an eye to the future--the results of which will
ensure NATO continues being relevant and responsive to future security
needs and clearly acknowledges that its most significant contributions
still lie ahead. Thanks to the efforts of former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and the 12-member Group of Experts, who at the
request of the Secretary General are leading an exercise of reflection
and consultation among allies, partner nations, NGOs and others
interested in the future of NATO, careful examination of threat
perceptions, future challenges to our security, and NATO's role in
meeting them is underway.
Whatever the Alliance's level of ambition, we need to align policy
and resourcing in the same timeframe. NATO does not maintain a
permanent set of forces; as such, our ability to carry out operations
is defined by the armed forces the member nations develop and maintain.
Regardless of the willingness of members to contribute, the burden of
deployed operations is, and will be, borne by those nations whose armed
forces are structured for expeditionary warfare.
NATO needs to be capable of making decisions that may defuse a
crisis. There are an infinite number of challenges we may face in the
next decade and we must be ready to respond with appropriate capability
across the full spectrum. This does not mean we should be looking first
for military solutions; instead, we will require creative work,
unparalleled cooperation and active partnerships. Whatever the final
solutions, there is no substitute for clear objectives and an honest
commitment to achieve them.

Comprehensive Approach
Since the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO has become increasingly
committed to implementing a Comprehensive Approach towards crisis
management. The mission in Afghanistan, in particular, has emphasised
the necessity to align security, governance and development activities
to achieve holistic benefit. Governance, development and security are
inextricably linked and cannot succeed without complementing each other
through the collaboration between military and civilian agencies and
organisations. However, while the aspiration for a Comprehensive
Approach is noteworthy and the principle agreed universally, it is
somewhat more difficult to realize.
The principle of cooperation is universally accepted, however,
without enlightened and firm leadership, will not be realized and
optimal progress enjoyed. As the most accepted and legitimate
organization, the United Nations must be encouraged to take a greater
and more robust lead in a truly Comprehensive Approach. While there is
cooperation on the ground between NATO, Security, Governance and
Development organizations and agencies at national, regional and global
levels, senior United Nations leadership must act with determined
resolve. I would encourage our Government to advocate for a High
Commissioner who is willing to embrace the leadership necessary to see
this critical mission through.

NATO-EU Relations
The European Union is another potential partner for NATO in its
Comprehensive Approach. However, political differences continue to
hamper greater collaboration. There is a genuine need to enhance NATO-
EU cooperation, whether within or beyond the 2003 `Berlin Plus'
framework. Currently, NATO and the European Union may conduct parallel
military and civilian operations with no established or formalized
mechanisms for coordination and cooperation. Field commanders then
resort to informal but pragmatic ad hoc arrangements to harmonize their
missions. Although these arrangements are a means to an end, they
cannot fully harness the true potential effects of NATO-European Union
collaboration during all phases of crisis management. NATO and the
European Union may offer capabilities that are complementary for
addressing a given situation. The challenge is to find an appropriate
mechanism for achieving unity of effort without unnecessary
duplication.

From a military perspective, we do our very best to collaborate
both in terms of planning and execution. However, we will not be able
to deliver a complementary, holistic effect without high level
political agreement between NATO and the European Union. While I am
confident that NATO's Secretary General and his European Union
counterpart are doing their utmost to resolve the matter, it will take
time and patience before we reach a meaningful and efficient level of
cooperation.
While paving the way to the future, NATO must balance the urgent
with the important and commanding forces is my highest priority. Since
its first military intervention in 1995, NATO has been engaged in an
increasingly diverse array of operations. Today roughly 100,000
military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world,
successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all
types of environments.
Kosovo
Today, approximately 10,000 troops from NATO's Kosovo Force are
deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment,
preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier.
Following Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the
Alliance reaffirmed that Kosovo Force shall remain in Kosovo on the
basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO and Kosovo Force
will continue to work with the authorities and will cooperate with and
assist the UN, the EU, in particular Eulex, the EU Rule of Law mission
in Kosovo, and other international actors, as appropriate, to support
the further development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and
peaceful Kosovo.

NATO and Iraq
At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to be part
of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and
accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO
Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), which to date has trained over 14,000
Iraqi security sector personnel. NTM-I is involved in police training,
establishing and mentoring Iraq's military academies, and facilitating
substantial equipment donations and regular out-of-country training
hosted by NATO Allies. All NATO Allies contribute to the training
effort through deployment of trainers, provision of equipment, or
NATO's financial contribution. The Government of Iraq regularly praises
NTM-I, and continues to request its continuation and expansion.

Active Endeavor
Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the
Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect
against terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO's
immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States
of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is continuing. As the
Alliance has refined its counterterrorism role in the intervening
years, the experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has
given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime
terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO forces have hailed
over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded 155 suspect ships.
By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity,
NATO's presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling
through the Straits. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to
strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those
participating in the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue.

Supporting the African Union
Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to
support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the
African continent. Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for African
Union peacekeepers. Following renewed African Union requests, the North
Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of 6
months on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the
African Union in identifying further areas where NATO could support the
African Standby Force. NATO's continuing support to the African Union
is a testament to the Alliance's commitment to building partnerships
and supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts beyond the Euro-
Atlantic region.
Operation Ocean Shield
Building on previous counterpiracy missions conducted by NATO
beginning in 2008 to protect World Food Program deliveries, Operation
Ocean Shield is focusing on at-sea counterpiracy operations off the
Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 2009 by the North Atlantic
Council, the current operation continues to contribute to international
efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional
states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to
combat piracy activities.
NATO Special Operations Forces
The U.S.-led NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre has
continued to serve as a dynamic engine of transformation within the
Alliance. As a result, in September 2009, the North Atlantic Council
approved its reorganization into the NATO Special Operations
Headquarters. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, projected to be
fully operational in 2012, will continue to provide coordination,
support, training, and enabling functions for NATO SOF, but will also
fill a void in the Alliance's crisis response options, establishing an
assured, rapidly deployable SOF command and control capability, by
providing the core elements of a deployed special operations
headquarters. Evolving to a headquarters will better enable the
synchronization of SOF across the Alliance, enhance NATO SOF unity of
effort, and provide Allied SOF with a multinational out of area command
and control capability.
The NSHQ's SOF Communications Network underpins Allied and Partner
SOF collaboration by providing an unprecedented vehicle for command,
control, communications, and intelligence sharing for networked
operations. The NSHQ's Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) in
Kabul, Afghanistan is demonstrative of the operational impact among
Allied and Partner SOF. This stakeholder run enterprise, manned by some
40 personnel from 11 nations and several agencies, focuses on garnering
information from a multitude of Allied and Partner sources, fusing that
information with operational requirements to produce and disseminate
actionable intelligence to ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups
(SOTGs) and our Afghan partners.
The NSHQ is building enduring operational capabilities,
collaborative policies and procedures, and networked command, control,
and communications mechanisms among NATO SOF. Collaborative training
and exercises reinforce this framework to ensure Allied and Partner SOF
are interoperable in order to operate more effectively in designated
combined operations well into the future.
Afghanistan
NATO's operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the
Alliance's most significant operational commitment to date. America's
Allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs and burdens of this mission
from the beginning. They have contributed to International Security
Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as
significant non-military contributions.
The situation in Afghanistan today is complicated and challenging.
As the President has stated, Afghanistan is the epicenter of the
violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. For this reason, I strongly
support the President's new strategy for Afghanistan and I will
continue to work with our allies as we all contribute to this
challenge. Our allies have already contributed a great deal to this
war, fighting, bleeding, and dying side-by-side with our own troops.
Many have committed further contributions following President Obama's
announcement, strengthening their resolve and partnership.

I believe there are four areas in which we must succeed in order to
win in Afghanistan. First, we must strike the right balance between our
civilian and military efforts. Success cannot be achieved solely by the
military. In addition to strong military and police forces to ensure
security, Afghanistan needs a credible government taking active,
visible steps to show that it is stamping out corruption, improving
efficiency and delivering necessary services to its people effectively.
This is where concentrated civilian efforts are needed the most, for it
is they who have the expertise and credibility on topics such as rule
of law, economics, and agriculture--three areas that are critical to
Afghanistan's reconstruction and development.
Second, if Afghanistan is to become a secure and stable nation, the
Afghans themselves must be at the center of this effort. Our allies
must partner with Afghan security forces and civilian personnel to
mentor and develop their own capabilities to conduct these critical
activities on their own. The Afghan people must assume responsibility
for the well-being of their country and they must feel confident in
their own government's ability to provide basic security and services
absent of corruption and tribal favoritism.
Third, strategic communication will be a key method of ensuring
that the Afghans, as well as our enemies, understand the United States
and our allies are committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan.
Finally, the most important role that the military can play in this
strategy is to increase the size and capability of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), through training and mentoring, to be able to
take the lead responsibility for securing their country.
Again, the challenges facing Afghanistan today are serious and
complex. However, I am confident that the Afghan people will prevail.
We have the right strategy and resources in place to partner
successfully with the Afghans to develop their capacity to self-secure.
A recent survey conducted in Afghanistan by the Afghan Center for
Socio-Economic and Opinion Research underscores how our strategy is
indeed bringing us closer to our goals in Afghanistan. That survey
revealed that nearly three out of four Afghans interviewed expect
things to be either somewhat better or much better in a year. That
sentiment reflected a 51 percent improvement over the year prior and is
indicative of a spreading feeling of hope, not hopelessness.
The survey also revealed that 85 percent of Afghans interviewed
rate the work of Afghanistan present government as either fair, good,
or excellent, and nearly 90 percent also rated their provincial
governments as fair, good or excellent. Both the Afghan National Police
and the Afghan National Army received an 89 percent approval rating,
indicative that our investments in training these security forces are
paying off. 90 percent of Afghans interviewed also said they would
rather have Afghanistan's current government in place than the Taliban
or another government and 69 percent said they considered the Taliban
the biggest danger to Afghanistan.

These are all good news indicators that validate our effort to put
the Afghan people at the center of the equation in Afghanistan. We need
to continue giving the Afghan people hope that they are not destined to
live under the yoke of tyranny and offering them every opportunity to
live in an Afghanistan with a future worthy of their sacrifices.

conclusion
The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians at European
Command and Allied Command Operations contribute to our national
security everyday with their professional engagements with our allies
and partners in the European theater. As we look forward to continued
success, I ask for your continued support of these men and women and
their families to ensure they receive the care and benefits they
deserve.
Operationally, we must continuously strive to find flexible
authorities and funding mechanisms to build the capacity of those
partner nations willing to fight side-by-side with us. This has become
increasingly important because of the recent surge in activities in
Afghanistan and the need to get our allies and partners more involved.
Your continued support and expansion of authorities like the National
Defense Authorization Act, section 1206, particularly allowing their
use for partner nation forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, has
been absolutely pivotal in enabling our strategic efforts in the
European theater. With these programs, we are able to provide our
allies and partners with the training and equipment necessary to
achieve interoperability with our own forces engaged in ongoing
overseas contingency operations. They will be able to arrive in theater
better prepared to assume the responsibilities they have committed
their forces to undertake, further reducing the risk of injury and loss
of life.

Furthermore, our efforts to fulfill this short-term task of
building enduring capability are vital to ensuring the long-term
stability and security of Europe. In addition to increasing the
contributions of our allies and partners to operations outside Europe,
building partner capacity allows us to make significant progress toward
achieving strategic objectives within the AOR. For example, we have
been able to conduct security sector reform assessments in Albania, an
interagency effort critical to integrating Balkan countries in the
European community. We also have numerous programs targeted at
countering the proliferation of WMD throughout the theater such as the
Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot stop there. With greater flexibility,
these authorities can achieve greater strategic goals in support of our
theater and national objectives.
European Command and Allied Command Operations serve as important
links between the United States and our friends in Europe, effectively
``bridging'' the Atlantic. We are building and strengthening relations
with our European partners that will help us ensure the security of the
United States at home and abroad.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Ward.

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND

General Ward. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
and distinguished members of the committee. It's great for me
to be here this morning as well alongside my two great friends,
the Admiral and the General, who we've come to partner with
over time, and I think our collaboration has been good for our
men and women who serve with us as well as for our Nation.
I am very happy to be here to address the points that
you've raised as well as others, and I'd like to start off by
just thanking this committee for the great support that has
been provided to my command and its men and women as we have
carried forth our mission on behalf of our Nation.
We do what we do in AFRICOM to protect American lives and
to promote American interests, and we do it by supporting
security and stability programs in Africa and its island
nations. We concentrate our efforts on helping African states
build capable and professional militaries that respect human
rights, adhere to the rule of law, and more effectively
contribute to stability in Africa.
We are assisting our African partners in building
capacities to counter transnational threats from violent
extremist organizations, to stem illicit trafficking, to
support peacekeeping operations, and to address the
consequences of natural disasters.
Supporting the development of professional and capable
militaries contributes to increased security and stability in
Africa, and allows African nations and regional organizations
to promote good governance, expand development, provide for
their common defense, and better serve their people.
The Africa Partnership Station, which includes our European
and African partners as members of the staff, is now on its
fifth deployment and has expanded from the initial focus in the
Gulf of Guinea to other African coastal nations. Africa
Endeavor, a continental-wide command and control (C2) exercise,
has been seeing a steady increase in participation and will
amount to 30 nations participating this year. Exercise Natural
Fire, conducted by the Nations in East Africa, is a
tremendously successful program that looks at how these nations
respond collectively to a natural disaster.
These programs reflect the willingness of our partners to
work with us and with each other against common threats and
reflect that our programs and activities are indeed producing
tangible results. My focus is on activities, programs, and
communications that support our national interests and also
reinforce success in ways that assure progress toward the long-
term goals our African partners have established for themselves
as they align with our national security objectives.
We closely harmonize our activities with our colleagues at
the Department of State (DOS), USAID, and other agencies. Our
service components are in fact maturing. Our Office of Security
Cooperation, defense attaches, the network of forward operating
sites and cooperative security locations, including Camp
Lemonnier in Djibouti, are tremendously valuable as we pursue
our U.S. security interests.
It's my honor to serve with the very distinguished
uniformed and civilian members of DOD and our command who work
every day alongside our interagency partners making a
difference in this vitally important part of the world as we
look to cause their work to lead to more effective global
stability.
Their dedicated efforts exemplify the spirit and
determination of the American people, and they do contribute to
the strength of our Nation and the security and stability on
the African continent, directly supporting our interests there.
I'm pleased to also say that, representing those men and
women, I brought along today our Command Sergeant Major, the
command's senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major Mark
Ripka as someone who just exemplifies the goodness of that
great, great team.
So again I thank you for your support. I thank you for what
you do to cause our mission to be successful, and I stand ready
to add any additional information that I can. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of General Ward follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN William E. Ward, USA
introduction
It is my privilege as Commander of U.S. Africa Command to present
to Congress our Posture Statement for 2010. U.S. Africa Command's
operations and programs protect American lives and interests, in Africa
and in the homeland, by supporting security and stability in Africa and
its island states. We concentrate our strategy and efforts on helping
African states build capable and professional militaries that are
subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, and adhere to
the rule of law. We are assisting our African partners in building
capacities to counter transnational threats from violent extremist
organizations; to stem illicit trafficking in humans, narcotics, and
weapons; to support peacekeeping operations; and to address the
consequences of humanitarian disasters--whether man-made or natural--
that cause loss of life and displace populations.
Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries
contributes to increasing security and stability in Africa--allowing
African states and regional organizations to promote democracy, to
expand development, to provide for their common defense, and to better
serve their people. In his address in Ghana last July, President Obama
reaffirmed Africa's strategic importance to the United States and our
national interests. He identified four priorities for the U.S.
Government's (USG) engagement efforts:

Supporting strong and sustainable democracies and good
governance
Fostering sustained economic growth and development
Increasing access to quality health and education
Helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict

Through sustained security engagement with African militaries, U.S.
Africa Command is supporting U.S. national interests and both the
President's priorities and our African partners' objectives--now and in
the long-term.
In this report, I provide an overview of the strategic environment
in Africa, explain our strategic approach, and show how our security
cooperation efforts, designed and executed in close coordination with
our interagency partners, are promoting stability in Africa in support
of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
strategic environment
The challenges and opportunities in U.S. Africa Command's Area of
Responsibility (AOR) are complex and dynamic. The application of only
military means is insufficient to help our partners address them. U.S.
Africa Command seeks to be part of a coordinated effort that integrates
all tools available to our international and interagency partners.
Our discussion of the strategic environment in Africa begins with
the key Defense Department concerns noted by the President: the
potential for conflict, transnational threats, and other threats to
peace and security. It is followed by an overview of the important
issues faced by our African partner militaries as they seek to confront
these threats.
Nature of the Environment
Africa is a large and diverse continent whose land mass is about
three and a half times the size of the continental United States. The
distance from Africa's northernmost tip to its southernmost tip is
roughly equal to the distance from New York to Moscow. Its 53 countries
each have unique histories.
Africa is home to 1 billion people, divided among 800 ethnicities
and speaking about 1,000 different languages. Ethnic ties are strong,
and ethnic dynamics often influence national politics. Africa's
population growth rate is the highest in the world. Of the 40 countries
worldwide with the highest rates of growth, 34 are African.
While an increasing number of African states are conducting
elections, many of the requirements of enduring liberal democracies,
such as the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and a vibrant
civil society, are nascent or non-existent. Additionally, in some
countries previously demonstrating liberalization and democratization,
increasing examples of authoritarianism are emerging.
Areas of Potential Conflict and Impacts on Peace and Security
Africa is still dealing with the effects of widespread conflict
that engulfed the continent following the independence movements of the
last half of the last century, with some still ongoing today. The
effects of armed conflict in Africa are severe. The African Union (AU)
estimates that Africa has the world's largest number of forcibly
displaced individuals, with close to 3 million refugees and
approximately 11.6 million internally displaced persons in 19 countries
across the continent. According to a 2007 study by Oxfam International
on the economic impact of armed conflict, 23 African countries lost an
estimated $284 billion in revenue between 1990 and 2005 as a result of
armed conflict. Oxfam estimated that an armed conflict in Africa
contracts a country's economy on average by 15 percent. Conflict is a
major obstacle to development and the delivery of basic services, such
as health and education.
Today, 8 of the 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations or political
missions administered by the United Nations (UN) are on the African
continent. The eight missions in Africa account for approximately 75
percent of the UNs' military, police, and civilian peacekeepers
deployed worldwide. The number and scale of peacekeeping missions
increasingly strain donor states and regional organizations. Therefore,
it is in our interests to help our African partners improve their
capabilities and broaden their capacities. While the number of violent
conflicts in Africa has decreased over the past 10 years, significant
potential for new and continued conflict remains.

In Sudan, Darfur remains insecure, violence has increased
in Southern Sudan, and tensions continue in border areas.
Somalia remains a country in armed conflict, as its
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) battles violent Islamic
extremists.
Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF), scattered elements of the Lord's Resistance Army continue to
operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the
Central African Republic, northern Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), and Southern Sudan.
In the DRC, independent local militias, the insurgent
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and some ill-
disciplined Congolese armed forces remain destabilizing forces in the
country's eastern region.
Transnational Challenges
Threats to stability do not necessarily manifest themselves in
conflict, but can nevertheless have a corrosive influence on the
development of good governance, viable market economies, and effective
security sectors. Weakly governed spaces provide favorable operating
environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking of humans,
weapons, and drugs, posing direct threats to the U.S. homeland and our
interests abroad.
Violent Extremism
Violent extremism by transnational terrorist organizations is a
major source of regional instability. In the last year, al Qaeda and
terrorist groups in Africa appear to have strengthened their
collaboration. Al Qaeda operatives are active in East Africa, while al
Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates across the
trans-Sahara region of Northern and Western Africa. The leaders of
Somalia-based Al-Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al
Qaeda, having issued public statements praising Osama Bin Ladin and
linking Somalia to al Qaeda's global operations. Al-Shabaab also
announced its support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at
the same time that AQAP activities increased in Yemen, separated from
Somalia by the 20-mile wide Bab-el-Mandab Strait. Al-Shabaab continues
to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al Qaeda
participation.
Al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates also target the United States and
our European and African partners across North Africa and the Sahel.
Terrorist activities, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of all types
(humans, weapons, drugs), and the existence of undergoverned spaces in
the Sahel contribute to the region's vulnerability and make it
susceptible to extremist influences.
Countries of the Maghreb, like Algeria and Morocco, partner with
the United States to respond to terrorism and check the western
extension of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Yet, enhancing security
depends upon regional cooperation and the development of stable and
growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of violent
extremist organizations.
Illicit Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking is a growing concern in Africa. West Africa
is a node for Latin American drugs transiting to their primary
destination in European markets. In addition, drugs originating in Asia
are transported through South and East Africa on their way to Europe.
The destabilizing and corrupting influence of narcotics trafficking
threatens to turn Guinea-Bissau into a narco-state and helps to expand
the Latin American cartel's network and influence throughout the
region. Many African countries lack the capability to interdict the
flow of narcotics--on land, air, or sea. While not as directly impacted
by narcotics flows through Africa as our European allies, the United
States has a vested interest in countering the destabilizing impacts of
drug trafficking on security, stability, and development in Africa.
Many Africans also remain vulnerable to human trafficking in the
forms of forced labor, child labor, child soldiers, and slavery. While
some countries are making strides to counter trafficking in persons,
many lack the law enforcement capacity to address this problem.
Piracy
Incidents of piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden have
continued to receive international attention. In 2009, pirate attacks
continued to escalate in frequency and expanded their geographic range
in the western Indian Ocean out to 1,000 nautical miles from the
African coast. U.S. Africa Command continues to support counterpiracy
operations through the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
Maritime Patrol Aircraft temporarily based in the Seychelles.
Public Health, Economic Development, and Democratization
Public health, economic development, and democratization challenges
continue to significantly impact the security environment in Africa.
Public Health Sector
African populations remain at great risk to a host of infectious
diseases, including 2009 H1N1 Influenza. The Human Immunodeficiency
Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis, and
malaria are the leading causes of adult mortality in Africa. Most
African countries lack adequate capacity and capability to contain or
mitigate the threat of pandemic diseases.
Pandemic disease is not only a human security issue, but also a
military readiness challenge. For example, some of our African partners
have professional and capable militaries that contribute thousands of
soldiers to UN and AU missions in Somalia, Sudan, DRC, and elsewhere.
However, they would have even greater peacekeeping capacities if it
were not for the high rates of HIV/AIDS incidence found in their
military forces.
Economic Development
Until the global economic crisis of late 2008, Africa as a whole
experienced a 10-year trend of sustained economic growth, averaging
over 5 percent growth in gross domestic product per year. High oil
prices enabled some African oil-producing countries to achieve economic
growth that rivaled the world's highest rates. However, countries
solely dependent on oil and extractive commodities revenue were
vulnerable to falling prices. In many cases, undiversified economies,
high unemployment, and corruption, have prevented the wealth generated
by Africa's natural resources from finding its way to the neediest
segments of African societies. The UN identified Africa as the world's
most impoverished continent, containing 25 of the world's poorest
countries.
Democratization
Over the past 20 years, many African countries have moved toward
democratic processes, good governance, and the rule of law. In January
2009, Ghanaian voters conducted their fourth free and fair presidential
election in 15 years. For the second time, the ruling party was
peacefully replaced by the opposition. In April 2009, over 13 million
South Africans went to the polls and elected Jacob Zuma, the country's
fourth president since the end of apartheid, and Botswana, in October
2009, held its 10th democratic presidential election since
independence--the most of any post-colonial sub-Saharan African
country. Since the 1990s, many African states have also moved from
dictatorship toward democracy.
The African Security Sector
Although African countries have consistently expressed a strong
desire to provide for their security and address these various
challenges themselves, many lack sufficient means to do so without
foreign assistance. The challenges they face can be broadly described
as:

Militaries have frequently been used as tools of
authoritarian regimes to protect their leaders and suppress the
opposition. This has led to corruption and distrust by the
populace.
Increased professionalization of many African
militaries remains a work in progress. Traditionally, the
development of maritime and air components has lagged that of
land components in most African militaries.
The legacy of Cold War politics flooded Africa with
competing streams of military equipment, tactics, and doctrine.
Much of what remains is poorly functioning and ill-suited for
confronting today's challenges.
Although regional cooperation has improved
tremendously, combined efforts to confront transnational
challenges are limited. Domestic politics can inhibit a
government's willingness to take strong action against a
violent extremist organization or other direct threats.
The AU's African Standby Force and its five Brigades
have shown continued development, but are not yet fully mission
capable. They lack sufficient enablers to become self-
sustaining as a peacekeeping and crisis response force.
National peacekeeping capabilities are similarly lacking,
although some countries have made regular and substantial
contributions to international peacekeeping missions.
u.s. africa command's approach
Our approach is founded in our overall national security interests
on the continent as outlined by the President and Secretaries of State
and Defense. The United States and our African partners have strong
mutual interests in promoting security and stability on the continent
of Africa, its island states, and maritime zones. Advancing these
interests requires a unified approach that integrates our efforts with
those of other USG departments, agencies, and our African and other
international partners.
Our programs and activities support U.S. national interests as well
as pursue four defense-oriented goals expressed by our African
partners:
First, that they have capable and accountable military forces that
perform professionally and with integrity;
Second, that their forces are supported and sustained by effective,
legitimate, and professional security institutions;
Third, that they have the capability to exercise the means
nationally and regionally to dissuade, deter, and defeat transnational
threats;
Fourth, that they have the capacity to increase their support to
international peacekeeping efforts.
Fostering stability supports the pursuit of these goals, and allows
further opportunities to reinforce success.
Our approach is subordinate to overall USG policy goals. We work in
concert with our interagency partners, such as the U.S. Department of
State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), to
ensure our plans and activities directly support U.S. foreign policy
objectives.
Africa's challenges require a holistic view of security that
includes defense, law enforcement, and customs and border security.
Addressing defense-related challenges must be pursued in concert with
other USG and partner security-related endeavors to sustain unity of
effort.
Our activities must provide immediate benefits and help our
partners progress toward their long-term goals. Our mission is
``sustained security engagement''; providing programs and activities
that build for the future and reinforce success.
Regional cooperation is critical, whether it be neighboring
countries working together against mutual threats, or region-wide
efforts to establish common security networks, such as the AU's
cooperative security architecture. Our approach focuses on mutual
interests, fostering interoperability and common situational awareness,
regionally-oriented capacity building, and enhancing relationships
built on trust and cooperation. The more the countries of Africa work
together, the greater the likelihood that the continent will achieve
lasting stability.
These goals support our national security interests. Increasing
African partner capability to identify and interdict threats emanating
from the continent enhances the security of the U.S. homeland.
Enhancing the capacity of African forces to respond to threats to peace
and stability on the continent allows the United States to use its
forces for other operations. The development of capable and
professional military forces can support efforts to consolidate
democratic principles and good governance by fostering transparency and
accountability in the military, which historically has been one of the
most important institutions in modern African societies.
u.s. africa command programs and activities
U.S. Africa Command's programs and activities support the
development of capable, professional partner military forces, and are
integrated and coordinated with the DOS, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, and
our international partners. Africa Command conducts several categories
of activities to support our four primary goals and address current
security challenges that threaten stability. The primary purposes of
our activities can be categorized as follows:

Building the capacity of partner conventional forces
Supporting capacity building of partner security
forces
Building the capacity of partner enabling forces
Fostering strong strategic relationships
Conducting defense sector reform
Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness,
and interoperability
Countering transnational and extremist threats
Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict
Addressing conditions that contribute to instability
Building Capacity of Partner Conventional Forces
U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are terrific trainers
and exemplary examples of military professionalism and our core
national values. The training and exercises they conduct encourage the
development of partner security capabilities and the instilling of
professional ethos among African military elements. Moreover, most of
these activities can be performed with small numbers of U.S. forces.
Some examples of our recent activities include:
Natural Fire, Uganda
In October 2009, U.S. Africa Command, with U.S. Army Africa
(USARAF) as the lead component, brought together more than 1,200
soldiers and civilians from 6 countries for Exercise Natural Fire 10 in
Uganda. The exercise improved interoperability and helped build African
partner capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. The
region jointly exercised contingency plans designed to address a global
health threat of pandemic influenza. Approximately 550 U.S. personnel
and 650 soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
participated.
Africa Partnership Station
Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Africa Command's primary
maritime security engagement initiative and is now a program of record.
In cooperation with partner states and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), APS builds maritime security capabilities in our Africa
partners using sea-based training platforms to provide predictable
regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore. Our training and
assistance focuses on strengthening four pillars of maritime sector
development: a competent and professional maritime security force;
secure infrastructure to sustain maritime operations; maritime domain
awareness; and maritime response capability. Our African partners view
APS as a successful maritime initiative and are enthusiastic
participants.
From January through May 2009, the Command employed the USS
NASHVILLE to support APS. With representatives from 9 European allies,
10 African countries, and Brazil, APS doubled the number of partners
participating in the planning and execution compared to previous
engagements. APS conducted 10 engagements in 7 countries--Senegal,
Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, and Gabon.
U.S. Marines and their counterparts from Spain and Portugal conducted
security cooperation events with over 800 African military
professionals in Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon.
Over 1,750 African professionals were engaged in 64 workshops and
seminars.
The success and effectiveness of our engagements was demonstrated
when the Benin Navy boarded and freed a pirated tanker without loss of
life. APS in Benin was a principal enabler for that mission. Benin's
Navy participated in APS instruction focused on Visit, Board, Search
and Seizure, small boat operations, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection,
and use of the Automated Information System (AIS), which was installed
during their training. The Benin Navy used maritime domain awareness
tools provided by APS to guide one of its ships to assist the tanker,
allowing its Navy to take action against a threat affecting the
interests of Benin, the United States, and the international community.
U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), is building on the success of
the APS in West Africa by conducting similar activities in East Africa.
APS-East will work to build our African partners' capabilities in small
boat operations. Our partners include Kenya, Mozambique, the
Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tanzania. The activities of the USS Bradley
and the USS Arleigh Burke in 2009 served as a pilot deployment for APS-
East and made great inroads in South and East Africa. In addition, the
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) established a
maritime center of excellence in Mombasa, Kenya, to provide maritime
training to African states. Both DOS and DOD approved a section 1206
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended)
program to provide small boats, AIS, and surface search radars to
Djibouti, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and
Comoros. The latter effort will establish a basic surveillance
capability along the entire East African coast. We plan to sustain and
supplement this project through Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
African Lion, Morocco
African Lion is an annual exercise with Morocco, a key regional
ally and active contributor to international peacekeeping operations.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) is U.S. Africa Command's
lead component for the exercise, which focuses on U.S.-Morocco
interoperability, air and ground combined arms training, staff
training, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) training, medical and disaster
response training, public affairs training, and humanitarian civic
assistance operations. Last year, during African Lion 09, medical teams
conducted humanitarian civic assistance in 5 villages, treating over
17,000 Moroccans and over 9,500 livestock. Numerous fiscal year 2010-
2011 Exercise Related Construction projects are scheduled to improve
training ranges, strategic access, and delivery of logistics support in
support of African Lion. U.S Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) will
spearhead its participation in African Lion through the State
Partnership Program, with the Utah Air National Guard providing KC-135
tankers and personnel.
Building effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps
Several African countries have underdeveloped NCO corps, which in
some cases are vulnerable to corruptive influences. Our African
partners recognize that effective NCO corps as essential to developing
capable and sustainable units, which will contribute to overall
stability and security. They have turned to us for assistance. By
helping partners develop their NCO corps, we have an opportunity to
instill the qualities and character that will allow them to train and
guide their own development in this area.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
A particular challenge many of our partners face is the lack of
serviceable equipment--from individual military gear to vehicles to
other major systems. FMF and FMS are two programs we are leveraging to
help address these shortfalls. U.S. Africa Command is working with U.S.
country teams to develop and implement FMF programs to procure systems
that increase interoperability among African partners, international
allies, and the United States. U.S. Africa Command is employing the
Excess Defense Articles program under FMS to supply trucks, personal
soldier equipment, and uniforms to support the deployment of
peacekeeping battalions to Darfur, Somalia, and Liberia.
Supporting Capacity Building of Partner Security Forces
Achieving security and stability in Africa requires more than the
contributions of the military alone. Security is a holistic function
that includes nonmilitary elements such as law enforcement, border
patrol, customs, and judiciary. U.S. Africa Command works closely with
USG departments and agencies to ensure that we plan and conduct our
efforts as seamlessly as possible.
African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)
AMLEP is a cooperative maritime law enforcement program with the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Coast Guard and host nation
Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) embark on U.S. and host nation
ships and law enforcement vessels to provide the vessel with the
necessary authorities and capabilities to conduct boardings, search,
seizure, and arrests within the participating African country's
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
AMLEP operations were conducted with Senegal, Morocco, Sierra
Leone, and Cape Verde, with the support of DOS, French Maritime Air
Forces, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Collectively, our operations
accomplished the following: Maritime Law Enforcement and small boat
training for LEDET personnel; the integration of French Maritime Patrol
Aircraft capability; and vessel boardings led by the respective
country's LEDET team.
The highlight of our engagements occurred in August when the
Republic of Sierra Leone's Armed Forces Maritime Wing detained the 750-
ton Taiwan F/V YU FENG 102 for fishing illegally in the Sierra Leone
EEZ. The YU FENG's 11 crewmembers were deported to Taiwan and the Feng
was impounded by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone
forces again demonstrated their resolve and capability by seizing four
vessels for violation of Sierra Leonean law during December AMLEP
operations.
Security Sector Assessments
An integrated and harmonized assessment of a partner nations'
requirements is helpful in developing effective and coordinated
activities. This past year, U.S. Africa Command participated in DOS-led
Security Sector Assessments in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Togo,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. The resulting
interagency plans will ensure our military engagements with these
countries are consistent with policy objectives and mutually reinforce
the activities of other USG departments and agencies.
Building Capacity of Partner Enabling Forces
Enablers such as logistics, intelligence, communications, and de-
mining capabilities play vital roles in the U.S. military, and
facilitate our ability to sustain operations independently. Developing
similar enablers or enabling capabilities among African countries can
help reduce their dependence on foreign assistance when conducting
military operations. Many of our capacity building activities in this
area add tremendous value while requiring only a minimal commitment of
U.S. personnel.
Logistics Capacity Building
Our African partners recognize the importance of logistics and have
benefitted from several U.S. Africa Command training events and
symposia in this area. For example, experts from U.S. MARFORAF provided
vital logistics support and guidance to assist the Republic of Sierra
Leone Armed Forces in packaging and loading a UN ship in preparation
for their first United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
deployment.
The Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) develops
African military logistics capacities to enable them to manage and
support peacekeeping operations. ADAPT training provided by U.S. Africa
Command's Army and Air Force components enabled the Rwandan Defense
Force to load and deploy vehicles, equipment, and supplies to support
UNAMID. ADAPT also allowed the Ugandan People's Defense Force to
certify Ugandan soldiers to load equipment on U.S. military aircraft
(C-130 and C-17), strengthening their ability to support peacekeeping
operations and disaster response operations employing U.S. or UN cargo
aircraft. These soldiers will also serve as co-trainers for future
ADAPT activities. ADAPT activities are planned in Nigeria and Tanzania
in 2010.
In 2009, U.S. Africa Command conducted the first Partnership for
Integrated Logistics, Operations, and Tactics (PILOT) symposium with 25
African participants. PILOT is an operational-level seminar jointly
designed and funded through partnership with the Canadian Ministry of
Defense, Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center. PILOT focuses on
familiarization with the legal and ethical aspects of peacekeeping; the
roles, missions, and functions of the AU and the UN in peacekeeping;
planning logistics staff estimates for PKO; planning Reception,
Staging, Onward Movement and Integration operations; planning Force
Deployment Planning and Execution; and an overview of the Joint
Operational Planning Process.
Intelligence Capacity Building
Military intelligence is an essential capability for all
professional militaries. The ability to collect, analyze, and
synthesize information is key to developing effective military plans.
U.S. Africa Command's Intelligence Security Cooperation and Engagement
(ISCE) Program seeks to build sustainable military intelligence
capacity in designated partner nations and regional organizations. ISCE
develops and implements common military intelligence doctrine and
procedures. It emphasizes the rule of law, respect for human rights,
and civil authority in order to reverse the historical stigma
associated with many African intelligence and security services.
Program activities include familiarization seminars; senior
intelligence officer visits; Director of Military Intelligence
conferences; intelligence exchanges and analyst roundtables; and a
series of officer and noncommissioned officer intelligence training
courses.
The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC-A) is
a course offered to junior military intelligence officers, primarily
from north and west Africa. In addition to teaching professional
intelligence skills, it promotes relationships among the intelligence
communities that encourage greater cooperation in the future. U.S.
Africa Command conducted two MIBOC-A courses in fiscal year 2009 and
one so far in fiscal year 2010.
Communications Systems Development
One way to foster regional cooperation is to establish means by
which partner militaries can reliably and effectively communicate with
each other. However, because African communications infrastructure is
underdeveloped, U.S. Africa Command is developing programs that improve
the communications architecture among African military leaders.
The AU Command, Control, Communications, and Information Systems
initiative is an effort to enable the AU's command and control of its
Standby Force. This initiative achieved its first milestone with the
recent ribbon-cutting of the new AU Peace Support Operations Center,
and will continue by establishing similar command and control nodes at
the regional Standby Brigade Headquarters, planning cells, and
logistics cells. This initiative is also pursuing connectivity with the
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
We are also supporting two other regional initiatives. The Economic
Community of Western African States' (ECOWAS) Regional Information
Exchange System provides workstations, internet access, and telephone
services to senior defense leaders in 11 ECOWAS countries, and this
will soon expand to 13. Meanwhile, the Multinational Information
Sharing Initiative has just begun, and it will provide similar mobile
capabilities to the Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)
countries over the next 3 years.
De-Mining Capacity Building
U.S. Africa Command conducts ``Train-the-Trainer'' Humanitarian
Mine Action missions to build our partners' anti-mine capacities and
support broader U.S. and international efforts to eliminate landmines
and other explosive remnants of war. We initiated programs in Kenya,
Burundi, Mozambique, and Namibia in 2009, and will expand mine action
programs to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Chad in
2010. We are also working with Uganda to develop anti-mine capabilities
in support of Ugandan peacekeeping deployments to AMISOM.
Special Staff Programs
Efforts to establish capable and accountable forces involve
mechanisms that allow the partner military leadership to establish and
enforce standards of conduct and readiness. These mechanisms should be
transparent to ensure equal treatment, fairness, and common
expectations. Through mentoring and information exchanges, our
inspector general, chaplain, legal counsel, surgeon, public affairs,
and other special staff elements work closely with partner countries to
build capacity in these areas in support of improving the military's
standing with its government and people.
Fostering Strong Strategic Relationships
Strong strategic relationships are important enablers for
sustaining the positive gains of our capacity building activities. They
encourage our partners to assume greater ownership of their newfound
capabilities. They provide ready opportunities to reinforce success
through follow-on activities and open communication links that
facilitate new or evolving requirements. They also encourage dialogue
with other partners.
The National Guard State Partnership Program
The State Partnership Program is a superb tool that fosters a
variety of military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-
civilian engagements using National Guard and U.S. States'
capabilities. Eight African countries currently partner with U.S.
states through this program: Tunisia-Wyoming; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North
Dakota; South Africa-New York; Nigeria-California; Senegal-Vermont;
Liberia-Michigan; and Botswana-North Carolina.
The benefits of this program from the past year are many and
impressive. For example, in Tunisia, the Wyoming Guard is helping the
Tunisian Government integrate Ground Surveillance Radar into border
patrol operations. In West Africa, U.S. Africa Command's Air Force
Component, U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), partnered with the Deputy
Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, the
Tennessee Air National Guard, and the Warner-Robins Air Logistics
Center to coordinate military-to-military efforts to rebuild the first
of four Nigerian C-130s. In Botswana, the North Carolina Air Guard
demonstrated its Modular Airborne Firefighting System capability; an
event of key importance to Botswana due to the annual range fires that
destroy grazing land and the habitat for one of Botswana's most
important national resources--its wildlife.
The State Partnership Program delivers programs and activities that
build broad capabilities with our African partners. The habitual
relationships this builds adds tremendous value to our efforts. This
program is very valuable to U.S. Africa Command, and we look forward to
expanding it as our African partners request greater participation. I
urge your continued support.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded
IMET (E-IMET)
Professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the democratic value
of elected civilian authority are among the benefits of the DOS-led
IMET and E-IMET programs. These comprise the most widely-used military
assistance programs in U.S. Africa Command's AOR. Approximately 900
military and civilian students from 44 African countries received
education and training in the United States or their own countries
valued at $19.8 million. Many officers and enlisted IMET graduates go
on to fill key positions in our African partners' militaries and
governments, and the relationships built in the academic environment
directly contribute to stronger bi-lateral military relationships
between the United States and partner countries.
IMET funded regional seminars with a Defense Institute for
International Legal Studies Military Education Teams (MET) for Chad,
Cameroon, DRC, Mauritius and Sierra Leone, and also supported a Center
for Civil Military Relations MET for Cameroon, Comoros, DRC, Mauritius,
and Guinea Bissau. Sustained support for robust IMET and E-IMET
programs is an investment in our future, and directly supports long-
term U.S. interests and relationships in Africa. It is one of our most
desired and productive programs.
Military-to-Military Engagement Programs
U.S. Africa Command uses military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs
to strengthen key relationships and familiarize partners with U.S.
military techniques, tactics, and procedures they can employ to address
a broad range of security challenges, including conducting peacekeeping
operations and countering terrorism. Mil-to-mil also assists partners
in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems, maintenance
operations, force protection, and the conduct of their own training. In
fiscal year 2004, the initial year of the program, less than $500,000
was spent in Africa for mil-to-mil programs. Today the mil-to-mil
program is the cornerstone of U.S. Africa Command's engagement
activities, with $6.3 million allocated and 431 events planned in 40
countries in fiscal year 2010. This is a relatively small investment
with substantial dividends.
Conducting Defense Sector Reform
U.S. Africa Command is a key contributor to the long-term
development of professional defense forces as part of broader security
sector reform efforts led by the Department of State.
Liberia
To solidify gains made under the DOS' Security Sector Reform
program, U.S. Africa Command commenced a 5-year mentorship program with
the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) Headquarters Staff and Liberia's 23rd
Brigade. We have 56 military mentors in Liberia to continue the
professional development of the AFL. Onward Liberty is one of three
lines of effort in our overarching Defense Sector Reform program in
Liberia. We are also working with the U.S. Coast Guard to help the AFL
re-establish a Coast Guard-like capability, and with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to mentor the Liberian Ministry of Defense.
Democratic Republic of Congo
At the request of the Department of State and DRC, U.S. Africa
Command is training and equipping a battalion of the Armed Forces of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in support of USG
objectives and priorities established by Secretary of State Clinton
during her visit to the DRC in August 2009. We will help the FARDC to:
(1) improve its capacity to lead, manage, and sustain its force; (2)
enhance its ability to investigate and prosecute its personnel accused
of human rights violations and other crimes; and (3) reduce sexual and
gender-based violence (SGBV) by the military.
The third objective, mitigating SGBV, is important to helping heal
the wounds of past conflicts in DRC. We are working closely with the
country team and USAID to identify opportunities to provide support to
survivors of SGBV. We are pursuing funding for the completion of a
maternity hospital in the capital city of Kinshasa that will also
provide counseling for SGBV survivors and perform fistula repairs. In
South Kivu Province, we are seeking to secure funding for two projects:
the construction of a primary school, whose pupils will consist of HIV
orphans or survivors and children of SGBV; and a Reference Hospital in
Wolungu serving a large, rural population that includes SGBV survivors.
Fostering Regional Cooperation, Situational Awareness, and
Interoperability
The spirit of cooperation is growing very strong among African
states. Over the past 2 years, participation by African countries has
increased steadily in many of our regional activities. All of our
activities seek to capitalize on this spirit by bringing partners
together to develop collaborative solutions to shared security
challenges. The following activities are noteworthy in their emphasis
on interoperability.
Exercise Africa Endeavor
Africa Endeavor is our premier communications interoperability
exercise that involves the greatest number of partner countries, and it
continues to grow. Exercise Africa Endeavor 09 in Gabon brought
together 25 countries and 3 regional organizations (the AU, ECOWAS, and
the Economic Community of Central African States). Focusing on
information sharing among African states via communication networks,
the exercise developed communications links with the United States,
NATO, and other countries with common stability, security, and
sustainment goals for the region. Participation in this summer's Africa
Endeavor 10 exercise in Ghana is expected to expand to 30 African
states.
Exercise Phoenix Express, North Africa
Phoenix Express is a multinational maritime security exercise led
by U.S. NAVAF and focused on maritime interdiction, communications, and
information sharing. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia increased
their participation in the exercise this past year.
Working With Partners to Counter Transnational and Extremist
Threats
Transnational challenges in Africa are a threat to the United
States, our partners, and our allies. Transnational threats exacerbate
difficult circumstances for local populations and complicate efforts to
create a secure and stable environment conducive to development. We
conduct operations and capacity building programs and activities to
address the threat of terrorism, piracy, narcotics, and other illicit
trafficking.
Counter-terrorism Efforts in North Africa and the Sahel--Operation
Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)
Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) conducts OEF-TS to
counter the terrorism threat in North and West Africa. OEF-TS supports
the DOS-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by
increasing our partners' capabilities to deny safe havens to
terrorists, improving border security, promoting democratic governance,
and reinforcing regional as well as bilateral military ties. OEF-TS
activities are designed to defeat violent extremist organizations
throughout the region.
U.S. Africa Command works closely with the DOS and U.S. embassies
to ensure we provide the military support needed to meet the objectives
of TSCTP, including the following major elements: information
operations; train, advise and assist activities; intelligence capacity
building; coalition development; military exercise programs; and
development and establishment of a regional computer-based information
network. All OEF-TS activities are closely coordinated with the State
Department and our U.S. embassy country teams.
SOCAFRICA remained very active last year with OEF-TS. Military
Information Support Teams assisted DOS public diplomacy efforts in
countering extremist ideology in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and
Nigeria. OEF-TS created High Frequency-Radio Tactical Communications
Interoperability between Algeria and Niger, and Mobile Training Teams
(MTTs) trained new Counter-Terrorism (CT) light infantry companies in
Mali. The MTTs also trained existing CT units in Tunisia, Morocco,
Nigeria, and Senegal. OEF-TS Military Intelligence courses trained
students from 7 OEF-TS countries, and the Trans-Sahara Security
Symposium civil-military course trained nearly 100 students from 4 OEF-
TS partner countries. Additionally, OEF-TS Civil-Military Support
Elements have completed or are planning 79 humanitarian assistance
projects.
In the last year, political conditions have allowed us to resume
engagement with Mauritania, to include our efforts to build a CT
company. Mauritanian security forces lack the capability to
logistically sustain themselves during operations. Helping Mauritania
develop a logistics capacity will provide Mauritanian security forces
with the capability to push supplies and personnel to its forward-
deployed CT companies, which operate hundreds of miles away in
extremely austere territory. Through U.S. assistance, Mauritania will
be able to sustain CT operations within its borders and in partnership
with other regional forces.
In West Africa, we are building on efforts in Mali, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Our activities range from training and
equipping specialized CT units to increasing intelligence capabilities
and information sharing to supporting efforts that counter extremist
ideology in the region. We are working with Mali to develop an
intermediate level maintenance and vehicle repair capability, and to
improve its air mobility, intelligence, and reconnaissance
capabilities. These two programs will bolster the ability of Malian
security forces to take direct action against AQIM.
Counterterrorism Efforts in East Africa
In East Africa, U.S. Africa Command's CJTF-HOA conducts operations
to counter violent extremists throughout the region to protect U.S. and
coalition interests. In cooperation with other USG departments and
agencies, CJTF-HOA focuses its operations on building regional security
capacity to combat terrorism, deny safe havens, and reduce support to
violent extremist organizations. It accomplishes these objectives
through the use of Civil Affairs Teams, Seabee construction teams,
military advisors, and by importing security courses of instruction.
U.S. Africa Command has focused the majority of its CT capacity
building activities in East Africa on Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
Uganda, which--aside from Somalia--are the countries directly
threatened by terrorists. For example, in Kenya, the Command is
assisting in establishing a Ranger Strike Force and a Special Boat
Unit, which will become the country's primary CT and border security
forces. SOCAFRICA completed training two companies of the Kenyan Ranger
Strike Force, and our Special Operations Forces (SOF) maritime efforts
have created a nascent Kenyan Special Boat Unit capability to enhance
Kenyan maritime security. When completed, Kenya will have a
significantly improved capacity to counter the terrorist threat
emanating from Somalia.
In Djibouti, U.S. Africa Command is assisting with training of the
Djiboutian counter-terrorism unit, the Groupe d'Intervention de la
Gendarmerie Nationale. We are helping with the repair and transfer of
12 vehicles from the AU to Djibouti. The vehicles are specifically for
counter-terrorism and border security operations. The Uganda People's
Defense Forces (UPDF) is one of the region's most professional
militaries. It is a reliable partner in combating terrorism and, in
collaboration with regional partners, is leading operations against the
Lord's Resistance Army. Uganda's peacekeeping force in Somalia has
played a critical role in providing the TFG an opportunity to establish
itself. U.S. Africa Command and CJTF-HOA continue to work with the UPDF
to enhance peacekeeping and CT capabilities through Africa Contingency
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), IMET, and PKO funded training.
Counter-Narcotics Programs
Our counternarcotics programs train, equip, and support partner
nation law enforcement, paramilitary, and military units that have a
counternarcotics and narcoterrorism mission. They build partner
capacity to conduct the full range of counter-drug activities, such as
sharing information, detecting threats, and interdicting and seizing
vessels.
One success from the past year was the construction of a multi-
national and interagency fusion center in Cape Verde, funded by our
Counternarcotics Division. The center incorporates U.S. law
enforcement, International Police, and Cape Verde law enforcement
agencies and maritime forces, and U.S. FMS projects will provide
vessels. Our naval component, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, is
providing maritime interdiction training and familiarization. The U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice, and Department of State
are also significant contributors. The goal is to develop a Cape Verde
maritime force capable of detecting and interdicting illicit
traffickers, and sharing critical law enforcement information with the
United States and the international community.
Operation Objective Voice (OOV)
OOV is U.S. Africa Command's information operations effort to
counter violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in ways that
encourage the public to repudiate extremist ideologies. OOV is closely
coordinated with U.S. embassies, DOS, and USAID, and employs a variety
of messaging platforms, such as the African Web Initiative, to
challenge the views of terrorist groups and provide a forum for the
expression of alternative points of view. OOV also supports local
outreach efforts to foster peace, tolerance, and understanding.
Examples included a `youth peace games' in Mali and a film project in
northern Nigeria. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the enhanced
dialogue has had a positive impact. We are currently collecting
baseline data and developing assessments to quantify the overall
effects.
Contributing to Stability in Current Zones of Conflict
Long-term efforts to build security capacity can only succeed in an
environment of sufficient stability. The United States is supporting
African efforts to stabilize current and potential zones of conflict
through peacekeeping missions and the growth of robust peacekeeping
capacity that includes the AU's African Standby Force.
Sudan
U.S. Africa Command is closely working with USG stakeholders to
support implementation of the comprehensive U.S. Strategy for Sudan. In
Southern Sudan, the Command supports professional military education
and non-commissioned officer development programs, HIV/AIDS courses and
seminars, as well as familiarization events across professional
military skills and functional areas. Additionally, we are examining
ways in which our assets and resources can strengthen the UN missions
operating in the country, and how we can continue to provide support to
DOS-led Security Sector Reform efforts.
Somalia
The lack of an effective central governing authority in Somalia for
nearly two decades has created a multitude of de-stabilizing
conditions. It has left the country vulnerable to terrorist
exploitation, and fosters a permissive environment for piracy and other
illicit activities. It also exacerbates a severe humanitarian crisis.
AMISOM, the multilateral AU Mission in Somalia, is severely under-
resourced, but is essential to securing key TFG locations. The USG's
support to AMISOM includes training, equipping, and logistical support
for Ugandan and Burundian forces. Additionally, U.S. Africa Command
provides military mentors to ACOTA pre-deployment training for AMISOM
forces. Before deploying, each battalion receives staff training and
soldier skills training tailored to PKO and the operational environment
in Somalia.
We also provide support to U.S. Central Command operations to
address the increase of piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Counter-
piracy training is also a part of our maritime capacity building
efforts in east and southern Africa, such as Africa Partnership
Station-East.
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
GPOI is a DOS program that builds peacekeeping capacity in targeted
partners and organizations. The GPOI-funded ACOTA program is regularly
supported by U.S. Africa Command with officers and non-commissioned
officers that serve as trainers and mentors. ACOTA has trained and
provided equipment for Ugandan and Burundian forces for AMISOM, and
trained Rwandan, South African, Zambian, and Tanzanian Forces for
UNAMID.
For fiscal year 2010, U.S. Africa Command has requested GPOI
funding to support training programs to enhance the capabilities of the
AU peacekeeping staff, the Economic Community of West African States,
the Economic Community of Central African States, and the Southern
African Development Community Standby Brigade Headquarters. We have
also sought funding for designated member states' tactical units
pledged to the respective Regional Standby Brigades.
Addressing Conditions that Contribute to Instability
The U.S. military has a number of civil-military programs that
promote good civil-military relations, provide military training
benefits, and help develop the humanitarian capacity of African
countries. They complement civilian development efforts and are closely
coordinated with U.S. embassy country teams.
Exercise MEDFLAG
In August 2009, MEDFLAG 09 was conducted with the Umbutfo Swaziland
Defense Force as a joint Medical/Dental/Veterinary Capabilities
Exercise. U.S. Army Africa and U.S. Air Forces Africa designed a mass
casualty scenario that exercised the Defense Force's response
capabilities and its interoperability with civilian first-responders.
The exercise assisted the Swazi ministries of Health and Defense in
jointly examining their emergency response plans and procedures.
MEDFLAG 09 helped improve Swaziland's capacity to support future
regional AU or UN PKO missions, while highlighting our support for this
region of the continent.
Pandemic Response Program
Because infectious disease outbreaks have the potential to rapidly
become global crises, U.S. Africa Command works with African partner
countries, the interagency, international organizations, and NGOs to
build partner military capacity to mitigate the effects of a pandemic.
Our efforts are reinforced with 3 years of funding from USAID, which
cooperates with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies and other partner organizations in African
countries.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(HIV/AIDS) Program
U.S. Africa Command's military HIV/AIDS program is aimed at
mitigating the impacts of the disease on African military readiness.
The program includes activities that help prevent the escalation of
HIV/AIDS infection rates within African security forces, and provide
care and treatment for the servicemembers and families infected or
affected by the disease. DOD activities that support African
militaries' fight against HIV/AIDS now reach 39 African countries.
During the first half of fiscal year 2009, U.S. Africa Command's
programs reached over 117,000 African troops and family members with
prevention messages, and provided counseling and testing services for
114,430 servicemembers and their families. In addition, 111 senior
military leaders have been trained on HIV/AIDS policies, and 2,396 peer
educators and 517 health care workers have received HIV/AIDs training.
Over 19,000 individuals are on antiretroviral treatment as a result of
these collaborative efforts. The fight against HIV/AIDs in Africa is
having an impact. Recently, a leader of a southern African country
remarked that, 3 years ago, he was conducting burials everyday for an
HIV related death; however, today he conducts one burial every 8 to 10
days.
Shared Accord, Benin
When possible, we integrate civil-military operations into our
exercises. Shared Accord is one example. Conducted by U.S. MARFORAF,
Shared Accord's primary purpose is to train for peacekeeping and peace
support operations, and the exercise successfully integrated two
Beninese Infantry Companies with two Marine Corps Infantry Companies.
An additional component of the exercise was a Medical/Dental Civic
Action Program, which treated 7,370 patients during visits to three
villages over an 8 day period. A separate Veterinary Civic Action
Program treated 92,410 animals while visiting 7 villages over the same
period. An exercise-related construction project to increase the
Beninese capacity to conduct peacekeeper training at the Bembereke
Peace Keeping Training Center was also completed.
u.s africa command component and subordinate commands
U.S. Africa Command has four component commands, one sub-unified
command, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Our
components are newly established and have inherited legacy efforts that
they must mold to fit the Command's strategy. U.S. Africa Command's
components and subordinate commands are the primary implementers of our
programs and activities on the continent. Since our components have no
assigned forces, we rely on the DOD Request for Forces process for the
resources necessary to support our engagements in Africa.
U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)
On 1 October 2009, the Secretary of the Army designated U.S. Army
Africa as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to U.S. Africa
Command. USARAF will be fully operational capable (FOC) as an ASCC in
fiscal year 2012, and has doubled in size during the last 15 months.
USARAF is heavily involved in the professional development of African
land forces, which remain the dominant military force in most African
states. USARAF's goal is to help transform our partners' land forces
into contributors to peace and stability, with the capabilities and
capacities required to accomplish their missions in support of
legitimate authority.
USARAF continues to forge cooperative relationships and enduring
partnerships that contribute to self-sustaining African security
capacity. Key to USARAF's success is collaborating with both military
and non-military partners. USARAF is fostering new partnerships and
enhancing existing ones, to include partnerships with other USG
agencies.
USARAF sponsored NATURAL FIRE, the largest exercise on the
continent last year. It brought together U.S. forces from Europe and
the United States to join with forces from five African states in a
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercise in Uganda.
U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF)
NAVAF's primary mission is to improve the maritime security
capability and capacity of our African partners. Beyond APS, law
enforcement operations, and Theater Security Cooperation activities,
NAVAF is working to enhance maritime security by focusing on the
development of maritime domain awareness, trained professionals,
maritime infrastructure, response capabilities, regional integration,
and a comprehensive approach for planning and execution. These
capabilities will improve maritime security and contribute to
development and stability by allowing our partners to take advantage of
the resources in their exclusive economic zones.
NAVAF, located in Naples, Italy, supports the creation of an
environment where all African countries take a proactive interest in
their own maritime security and in the overall security of the region.
NAVAF utilizes maritime engagement activities to build trust, mutual
cooperation, and respect in order to protect U.S. interests, reduce
demand for U.S. resources, and ensure reliable and open access to
ports, territorial waters, and other resources required for conducting
sustained maritime operations.
U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA/17AF)
The 17th Air Force is the Air Force component to U.S. Africa
Command. AFAFRICA continues its growth in capacity to command and
control air forces in Africa for the purpose of conducting security
engagement and operations, and to promote development, air safety, and
security.
AFAFRICA is organized into an Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff and
the 617th Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). AFAFRICA's AFFOR staff
reached FOC on 1 October 2009. The 617th AOC is expected to achieve FOC
on 1 June 2010. The AOC provides continuous air command and control
capability for all theater security cooperation exercise and engagement
activities and crisis response operations such as foreign humanitarian
assistance and non-combatant evacuation operations. Eventually, the AOC
will provide a common operating picture of all air and space missions
over the continent. Located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the 300-
person command is administratively assigned to the U.S. Air Forces
Europe for DOD funding support. AFAFRICA answers directly to U.S.
Africa Command for operational assignments and joint support.
One of AFAFRICA's key programs is the Air Domain Safety and
Security (ADSS) program, which is a long-term Air Force program of
record with fiscal year 2010 funding of $2.6 million. Funding is
projected to grow to $3.1 million in fiscal year 2011. AFAFRICA will
expand ADSS significantly in 2010, by utilizing general purpose air
forces and working together with USG departments and agencies and other
partners to develop African capacity to provide regional air safety and
security solutions to the civil and military air domains. Discussions
with Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana are underway, and will lay the
foundation for a common regional air picture.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF)
MARFORAF, located in Stuttgart, Germany, conducts operations,
exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the
AOR. In 2009, MARFORAF participated in 15 ACOTA missions aimed at
improving partners' capabilities to provide logistical support, employ
military police, and exercise command and control over deployed forces.
As the executive agent for the Non-Lethal Weapons program, MARFORAF
conducted a very successful capabilities exercise attended by 11
African countries. This exercise highlighted a wide range of weapons
that can limit the escalation of force and increase a tactical
commander's ability to control a situation short of lethal force.
MARFORAF conducted mil-to-mil events in 2009 designed to
familiarize our African partners with nearly every facet of military
operations and procedures, including use of unmanned aerial vehicles,
tactics, and medical skills. MARFORAF, as the lead component, continues
to conduct Exercise African Lion in Morocco--the largest annual
Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercise on the African
continent--as well as Exercise Shared Accord 10, which will be the
first CJCS exercise conducted in Mozambique.
U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA)
On 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA was formed as a Special Operations
Forces (SOF) Functional Sub-Unified Command for U.S. Africa Command.
SOCAFRICA is colocated with U.S. Africa Command at Kelley Barracks,
Stuttgart, Germany.
Also on 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for the
Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn of Africa, and on
15 May 2009, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special
Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS)--the SOF component of
Operation Enduring Freedom--Trans-Sahara.
SOCAFRICA's objectives are to build operational capacity,
strengthen regional security and capacity initiatives, implement
effective communication strategies in support of strategic objectives,
and eradicate violent extremist organizations and their supporting
networks. SOCAFRICA forces work closely with both U.S. Embassy country
teams and African partners, maintaining a small but sustained presence
throughout Africa, predominantly in the OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA regions.
SOCAFRICA's persistent SOF presence provides an invaluable resource
that furthers USG efforts to combat violent extremist groups and builds
partner nation CT capacity.
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
In East and Central Africa, CJTF-HOA is critical to U.S. Africa
Command's efforts to build partner capacity to counter violent
extremists and address other regional security challenges. Its mission
to counter violent extremism and its location at Camp Lemonnier remain
of utmost importance given the rising regional threat from al Qaeda and
al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in Yemen. To counter extremist
influences, CJTF-HOA works along several lines of effort:
Fostering Regional Security Cooperation: CJTF-HOA works in close
coordination with coalition members, African partners, other USG
departments and agencies, and NGOs operating in the Joint Operations
Area. CJTF-HOA fosters regional security cooperation through support to
the East African Standby Force, the International Peace Support
Training Center, the Humanitarian Peace Support School, ACOTA, the East
African Community, and the East African regional disaster preparedness
exercises Natural Fire and Golden Spear.
Strengthening Partner Nation Security Capacity: Civil-military
Operations, activities, and development programs offer U.S Africa
Command various pathways to strengthen partner security capacity. Civil
Affairs (CA) teams help our partners promote the legitimacy of their
governments and military forces. Coordinated with USAID and DOS, civil
affairs activities help mitigate the underlying stresses that can
contribute to regional instability. CJTF-HOA also strengthens partner
security capacity by supporting APS; providing opportunities for our
African partners' militaries to work closely with our CA Teams;
developing Maritime Safety and Security/Counter-Piracy capability and
capacity; and by providing opportunities for African military liaison
officers to serve on the CJTF-HOA staff.
CJTF-HOA's support for Djibouti's efforts to train Somali TFG
soldiers and support to the East African Standby Force Field Training
Exercise has improved Djibouti's capacity to assume a larger role in
promoting peace in the Horn of Africa.
command enablers: challenges and opportunities
The breadth and scope of U.S. Africa Command's programs and
activities in Africa are significant and growing. Our ability to
sustain forward progress toward our long-term goals in Africa is
dependent on several factors that enable our efforts. Some, such as
limits on authorities, present us with challenges where we seek
assistance. Others, such as interagency integration, present
opportunities for growth and development of new or improved programs
and activities that we wish to sustain.
Authorities
Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and
activities in Africa requires flexible, multi-year authorities.
Existing authorities are designed to support the conduct of individual
short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not support the
transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently
responsive to changing conditions, such as when train and equip efforts
initiated in response to emergent threats highlight the need for long-
term capacity building.
The authorities and programs we currently use for building partner
capacity are essential, and I ask for your continued support in the
following areas:

Full support of the President's budget request for the
global train and equip program.
Support of the Department of State's request for
programs in Africa.
Support of the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund,
with increased flexibility for foreign military education and
training activities.

We encourage dialogue on ways to streamline or modify legislative
authorities to enable sustained security engagement with our African
partners, ranging from train and equip programs that respond quickly to
changing conditions to long-term partner capacity-building, especially
in countering violent extremism.
Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements
U.S. Africa Command's theater posture was inherited from the three
previous commands that formerly had DOD responsibility for Africa. U.S.
Africa Command, in close cooperation with DOS, is evaluating and
refining its access needs based on our theater-wide requirements. This
centers primarily on gaining and maintaining the access and freedom of
movement necessary to conduct both day-to-day security cooperation
activities and, if required, crisis response operations. We are working
with our components, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and DOS to
identify the network of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and
supporting agreements required to enable the Command to carry out these
activities. Currently, 10 CSLs have been identified, 8 of which were
previously established by U.S. European Command and U.S. Central
Command. The Command's posture plan and facilities master plan are
designed to address our emerging support requirements.
Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations
(CSLs) in U.S. Africa Command's AOR
Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is an enduring location essential
to U.S. security interests in East Africa and the greater Indian Ocean
basin. This facility supports efforts in the Gulf of Aden as well as
U.S. Central Command's objectives for Yemen. Colocation with Djibouti
Airport and proximity to Djibouti's seaport make CLDJ an ideal site for
supporting U.S. Africa Command operations throughout the region, and of
equal importance is the Camp's ability to support DOD's global
transportation infrastructure network as a key node. Camp Lemonnier
also supports our international partners as we work together to counter
piracy in the region.
We are transitioning CLDJ from its previous contingency footing to
an enduring presence through the construction of permanent facilities
funded through a military construction program of record. The first
series of projects will improve security and safety. Subsequent
projects will improve the capacity to sustain operations.
The second of our two FOSs, Ascension Island, is also critical to
the strategic transportation network supporting U.S. Africa Command--
extending our operational reach to the west and south Africa. U.S.
Africa Command is working with U.S. Transportation Command to develop
the infrastructure of this FOS so that it can provide broader support
to the Command's mission.
Enroute Infrastructure outside U.S. Africa Command's AOR
In addition to the transportation infrastructure inside our AOR,
U.S. Africa Command continues to depend on adjacent command
infrastructure and main operating bases in Rota (Spain), Sigonella
(Italy), Aruba (Lesser Antilles), Souda Bay (Greece), and Ramstein
(Germany) for logistical support. Although these sites are located in
other geographic combatant command AOR, they are critical intermediate
nodes that support operations in Africa.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System (C4S)
Infrastructure
All the above leads to a requirement for significant investment in
the development of its C4S capabilities for our enduring locations--
Camp Lemonnier, FOSs, CSLs, and enroute locations. The expanse of the
African Continent and U.S. Africa Command's limited forces necessitate
a steady-state C4S requirement met by limited commercial capability or
deployed tactical networks. The migration and improvement of legacy
C4S, as well as tactical networks, to a robust and sustainable
infrastructure will continue to be an investment priority for U.S.
Africa Command.
Resources
The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that
are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa
Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue
the defense aspects of the President's stated priorities. The countries
in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries
are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary
missions--the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping
operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and
equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building
activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S.
military air and sealift.
Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners
in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them
transform their security sectors. The greatest needs include the
following.
Funding for the FMF Program
Fiscal year 2011 FMF request totals for Africa are approximately
$38 million, of which $14 million is allocated to Tunisia and Morocco.
If we are to achieve our strategic objectives and avoid undesirable
long-term consequences, we must fully fund our requested FMF commitment
to the African continent. FMF is critical to accomplishing the U.S.
mission in Africa and constitutes a long-term investment in critical
relationships. Inadequate funding of our FMF request or inconsistent
year-to-year distribution can compromise our efforts, turn our partners
towards other sources, and inhibit peacekeeping operations. FMF is
fundamental to our strategy of preventative rather than reactive
response.
Funding for Exercises
A key component of our capacity building is our Joint and Combined
Exercise program. This program is conducted under the auspices of the
CJCS exercise program, and is dependent upon funding from the Combatant
Commander's Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2)
Program. As the command continues to mature and our exercise program
expands to meet the readiness needs of U.S. forces and partner
militaries, U.S. Africa Command will place increasing demands for
limited CE2T2 funds. We ask for your continued support of the
Department's request for the Combatant Commander's Exercise and
Engagement and Training Transformation Program.
Funding for Counternarcotics Efforts
Revenue from the sale of illegal narcotics trans-shipped through
Africa directly benefits the same drug cartels who resolutely
distribute narcotics on the streets of the United States. The influence
of drug money in developing states breeds corruption and instability,
which may threaten the availability of African natural resources
critical to the U.S. and global economy. Countering the flow of
narcotics through Africa has direct relevance to U.S. national
security, and we urge you to consider giving this program your full
support.
Interagency Integration and Contribution
The construct of U.S. Africa Command is based on the premise that
interagency partner integration leads to better planning and greater
unity of effort by all USG stakeholders. As mentioned in this
statement, our national interests have benefited from U.S. Africa
Command's interagency collaboration. Our collective efforts have
produced significant positive results in the areas of security sector
reform, military professionalization, peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, disaster preparedness, pandemic response programs,
counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
U.S. Africa Command is working to improve and expand its
interagency partner integration. Currently U.S. Africa Command has
memoranda of agreement with 11 departments and agencies. Opportunities
are expanding with the recent addition of the U.S. Geological Survey,
the Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the
Department of the Interior, and the Transportation Security
Administration.
Challenges of successfully embedding interagency personnel in the
Command have been identified recently through a comprehensive internal
survey. As a result, initiatives are being implemented to address
training issues, collaborative exercise planning, and the education of
DOD personnel concerning interagency capabilities. We understand that
other USG agencies have different obligations and objectives, and that
interagency cooperation is a two-way street. In all we do, we seek to
ensure that the programs and actions of this Command support overall
U.S. policy in Africa. We continue to work diligently to ensure that
interagency participation with U.S. Africa Command is beneficial to all
participants and, particularly, to our national interests.
Increases in funding for defense-related programs must be
accompanied by adequate resourcing of parallel efforts in diplomacy and
development programs. Adequate TSCTP funding enables civilian agency
efforts to help our partners develop and sustain conditions to counter
violent extremism. We encourage Congress to support USG efforts in
their entirety when it comes to diplomacy, development, and defense.
Well-Being Programs
Our Quality of Life (QoL) Office promotes accessibility, equity,
and an increased quality of life through services and programs for the
U.S. Africa Command family. To help us identify QoL focus areas, Africa
Command Families on the African Continent conferences are held to
address challenges faced by families living in Africa. To assist our
team members and their families in solving problems resulting from
deployments and other family changes, we have implemented the Military
and Family Life Consultant Program. Concerning education, our
partnership with the Department of Defense Education Activity and the
Department of Defense Dependent Schools, Europe, ensures educational
support to all U.S. Africa Command members. U.S. Africa Command will
continue to support and expand these initiatives in fiscal year 2011.
The Command will continuously assess the theater-wide environment
in order to identify emerging and unusually sensitive QoL challenges.
We will strengthen our strategic partnerships to leverage best business
practices and collaborate on solutions to mitigate or resolve quality
of life issues. We continue to focus our efforts on our members and
their families, both on and off the African continent, to ensure their
quality of life remains a priority and is funded properly.
conclusion
U.S. Africa Command's priority is to conduct effective and
sustained security cooperation programs and military operations to
advance and protect U.S. interests in Africa. Our programs are helping
our African partners assume an ever-increasing role in addressing the
security concerns of the continent and its island states. By focusing
on long-term capacity building, we are implementing a preventative
strategy that serves the interests of the United States, our African
partners, and our allies.
The United States achieves its greatest effect when all U.S.
Government agencies work collaboratively in applying the tools of
diplomacy, development, and defense to meet our national security
objectives. Congress can modernize our Nation's approach to emergent
challenges made evident in the first decade of this new century by
supporting funding and further development of the other USG departments
and agencies with whom we partner and support. Revising security
assistance authorities will allow all agencies that contribute to our
foreign policy and national security effort to improve our unity of
effort, and thus ensure we outpace transnational threats that know no
lawful limits.
I am grateful for the outstanding congressional support to U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM). Your continued devotion to the men and women
from DOD and other U.S. Government departments and agencies assigned to
the Command will allow their good work to protect and advance the
interests of the United States. I am proud to serve on the U.S. AFRICOM
team with these dedicated Americans.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
General Mattis.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND

General Mattis. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I
request my written statement be placed in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Mattis. Over the course of this past year, JFCOM
has continued to provide combat-ready forces to combatant
commanders to support the military operations and continue to
prepare for future conflicts while looking ahead. After an
historic change of command in NATO, which got handed over to
the Supreme Commander, Allied Command Transformation, we
continue to ensure JFCOM remains closely linked with our allies
and partners in NATO.
The character of this current conflict remains different
or, better said, irregular. We have continued to adapt our
forces in stride and become increasingly confident in irregular
warfare. Across the board, JFCOM has significantly adapted to
this new environment. Our watchword is balance. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense have stated that
we must not lose our conventional superiority in the process of
adapting. Even as we continue to prepare and deploy forces in
the irregular fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot permit
dormancy of our conventional ability.
Our forces are achieving balance and will continue to do so
as dwell times build with the Iraqi drawdown. Through effective
training and education across the force, we can strike the
appropriate balance while ensuring our current and future
combat readiness.
I returned a week ago from Afghanistan and our field
commanders there confirm that our troops are superbly trained
for the fight, even as we use lessons learned to further
improve our readiness and not fall back on complacency. Based
on the reality of current active operations and future trends
outlined in our work on the future, JFCOM's top priority
continues to reflect this balance between support for the
current fight and our constant assessment of the future to
ensure we remain the most capable military in the world.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
introduction
Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on Joint Forces
Command. Joint Forces Command is comprised of 1.16 million Active Duty,
National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Our
command provides combat-ready forces to our Nation's geographic
combatant commanders around the globe in support of today's fight,
while we simultaneously prepare the joint force for future conflicts.
Successful accomplishment of our mission ensures we field the most
capable and ready joint force the world has ever known. At the same
time we keep a weather eye on the future to ensure our Nation has the
fewest regrets when future surprises occur, as they surely will if
history is a guide.
joint operating environment and capstone concept for joint operations
Our thinking about how to prepare our forces for the future must be
informed by the past. No one has a crystal ball to accurately predict
the threats and challenges we could face. But if we're to reduce the
potential for being caught flat-footed, we must explore the strategic
and operational depths of the future to provide the most reasoned
mental framework within which will come the challenges that our
political and military leaders will confront in the future. Developed
at Joint Forces Command for defense planners and decisionmakers, The
Joint Operating Environment (JOE) provides a framework of trends,
contexts, and strategic implications as a basis for thinking about the
world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not to predict, but
to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.
First published in 2008, the JOE was updated and will be re-
released later this month. This new edition of the JOE continues to be
historically informed and forward looking, and this year the JOE
includes a new section that looks at the world's tenuous financial
stability, a growing U.S. national debt, and what this all might mean
for future national security and defense planning. By considering how
global trends will drive change, we draw general conclusions about the
military implications. Those implications set the framework for our
concept development.
If the JOE is the ``problem statement'' for the future joint force,
then the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the
``solution.'' The CCJO is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
statement for how the joint force will operate in the future threat
environment described in the JOE. As the Capstone Concept, it was
drafted with active engagement of the Joint Chiefs and combatant
commanders under the guidance of the Chairman. This past summer a
series of war games tested the CCJO and found it conceptually
sufficient. The games also highlighted several key areas that require
focus and improvement for the joint force and informed the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR).
Throughout history every military organization that has
successfully adapted has done so by clearly articulating the problem as
we have in the JOE, and then resolving the problem as the Chairman has
outlined in the CCJO. With the QDR, JOE and the CCJO providing our
backdrop, Joint Forces Command remains focused this year on prevailing
in the current conflict, preparing for a wide range of future
contingencies, and preserving and enhancing the joint force, including
its ability to work harmoniously with other elements of the U.S.
Government and allies.
prevail in today's conflicts
Supporting the current active operations overseas commands much of
our effort. We are engaged in training and deploying forces, analyzing
and applying lessons learned, and overseeing the development of joint
capabilities in response to our warfighting commanders needs. These
activities demand a sense of urgency. It is imperative that we adapt
and evolve the force to confound our enemies, keeping our forces at
their top effectiveness.
As the joint force provider, Joint Forces Command is responsible
for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in
support of current operations and global contingencies. This mission
area has the most immediate and visible impact on current joint
operations. During the past year, we responded to more than 390
rotational and emergent requests for forces from combatant commanders
resulting in the sourcing of more than 398,000 personnel supporting
numerous global missions. Key among these is the troop increase in
Afghanistan, while continuing to satisfy requirements in Iraq and other
regions.
In reserve, as a shock absorber for unpredictable events like the
surprises outlined in the JOE, Joint Forces Command maintains the
Global Response Force ready to respond to unforeseen crises at home or
abroad. This force, most recently deployed in support of Haiti,
provides the Commander in Chief with flexible options to respond to a
variety of crises while we simultaneously fulfill our commitments in
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world.
The character of ongoing operations has resulted in unusual stress
on ``high-demand, low density'' assets and requires accelerated force
structure changes. In some cases the demand requires new capabilities
be developed. The work associated with the QDR resulted in considerable
gains in identifying shortfalls and validating the need to balance the
force. Although the Services are continuing to increase these
capabilities, persistent shortfalls exist in electronic warfare, civil
affairs, engineering, military intelligence, military police, and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
While we cannot accurately predict the type warfare in which we
must be ready to engage in the future, we recognize that we cannot
adopt a single, preclusive view of war. Balance is key. Our forces must
be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide
range of conflicts and contingencies, because today's strategic and
operational environment is characterized by the constants of rapid
change and complexity. Today, we recognize that the force must be
balanced to effectively meet various challenges to U.S. interests and
an irregular threat, without compromising our nuclear deterrent or
conventional capabilities and at a time when the distinctions between
types of warfare are blurring. Our military leaders and our forces will
need to be the most versatile in our Nation's history.
In support of this line of thinking, in March of 2009 Joint Forces
Command published a vision for Irregular Warfare (IW) and established a
set of goals and objectives to advance counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and stability operations capabilities as a core
competency within the General Purpose Forces (GPF). Our Joint Irregular
Warfare Center is the command's catalyst and driving force behind
establishing IW as a core competency for the joint force. This team is
building bridges across the Services, Service labs, industry, academia,
civilian partners, and with allies to harvest the best ideas on how to
address this challenging form of warfare and steal a march on our
enemy.
The non-state, insurgent and terrorist adversaries we face today in
the Middle East and elsewhere have chosen approaches to warfare that
avoids our conventional strengths. We have adapted to these changing
approaches to war and will continue to do so across the joint force.
The asymmetric approach of our enemy has in some cases negated our
technologically superior, iconic weapon systems, putting the
preponderance of enemy engagements in the hands of our ground troops in
close quarters combat. In this unforgiving environment, our ground
units are employed every day, and this is where over 80 percent of our
casualties occur, often in the initial firefights.
Across all warfighting communities, training advances have been
significant, yet the use of advanced simulation technology has not yet
achieved for infantry training what we take as routine for aviation,
armor or maritime simulation training. While there are a host of
reasons, and the different combat training regimes pose notably
different simulation challenges, dramatic advances in immersive
simulation, artificial intelligence, and gaming technology must now be
harnessed to bring state-of-the-art simulation to small infantry units.
Though the rudimentary simulation designed for close combat currently
affords units some level of challenge, it does not yet approach the
level of sophistication deemed essential in other disciplines.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed funding to the
Services and Joint Forces Command to support the urgent development of
infantry immersive training simulators as part of a broader national
effort for small unit excellence. As our troops are engaged around the
world and assigned a variety of missions confronting insurgents on the
ground, the development of a close combat/infantry immersive training
simulator is a national priority in terms of creating top-performing
small units able to take advantage of joint surveillance and fire
support. Our immediate task is to create prototype immersive training
simulators as a means to enhance warfighter survivability, amplify
exposure to joint and combined assets, improve the employment of our
joint-asymmetric capabilities, and increase the overall effectiveness
of our close combat/infantry small unit performance to defeat the enemy
while protecting the innocent intentionally jeopardized by our enemies'
tactics.
Focusing efforts to enable small units to combine initiative,
critical thinking, and joint warfighting experience will allow for
brilliance in combat skill basics and agile responses to the enemies we
face. Casualty reduction, fewer ethical missteps, psychological
resilience and enhanced mission success rates are the goals. We will
remain responsive and innovative to confront the challenges our close
combat and small infantry units encounter today and tomorrow. Other
communities have demonstrated that simulator training is an effective
tool to increase operational effectiveness. America's close combat/
infantry forces will get our best effort to provide them every
advantage and prepare them fully to achieve success in battle.
In addition to improved simulation training capabilities, Joint
Forces Command continues its efforts to enhance small unit
effectiveness. We have brought together the trainers, coaches,
educators, social and human scientists, academia, and technical and
cognitive assessment experts to form a community of interest that will
improve the combat effectiveness of our small units. Paramount to this
effort is the development of leaders who are capable of operating
against a broad spectrum of threats, while retaining and enhancing
their ability to lead in a more conventional environment. The complex
and dynamic security environment demands that we have small units and
leaders that are able to take advantage of fleeting opportunities on
the battlefield. These small units and leaders must be able to operate
independently, possessing the full knowledge and ability to employ
joint and combined capabilities, and subsequently be empowered to make
critical decisions under stressful conditions--the same attributes we
anticipate will be required on future battlefields, conventional or
otherwise.
Working with the Services, Joint Forces Command has developed a
Concept for Joint Distributed Operations in support of experimentation
to be conducted this summer. This concept describes how joint enabling
capabilities can be made more effectively and efficiently available to
smaller distributed units and that these joint capabilities can be
pushed to lower echelons. Current operations demonstrate that
distributed operations are becoming more the norm, and this experiment
will draw on lessons learned and best practices from recent experience
to determine what solutions should be incorporated into future joint
force capabilities.
In Afghanistan, U.S. airpower represents one of our joint force's
greatest asymmetric advantages over the enemy. The employment of air-
based joint fires, used properly, will wreak havoc on enemy forces. In
the fluid environment of a counter-insurgency fight, the decision to
employ these joint air-based fires will come from leaders who
understand that to be effective these fires must be employed rapidly
and precisely against the enemy while avoiding civilian casualties.
Effective employment often requires persistent observation, integrated
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and shortened approval
procedures. Our airpower is unmatched in the world, however today's
approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system-
of-systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not
the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight. A
Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the
potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a
more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with
immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance
throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation
support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can
provide a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air
support. This year Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project
called Imminent Fury where the Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR
capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy.
Presently, one of the enemy's most effective weapons is the
Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Joint Forces Command is
collaborating closely with the Joint IED Defeat Organization to defeat
this enemy capability, sharing lessons learned and adapting our
operating concept and training efforts. Joint Forces Command continues
to prepare the joint force to conduct operations in urban environments
to defeat adversaries who are embedded and diffused within a population
without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning society. In
collaboration with the Services and international partners, we will
strive to leverage relevant efforts that address gaps in our ability to
effectively operate within cities and complex terrain.
The joint force has learned and adapted to counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and required stability operations conducted in a
complex environment. Recently, the Services and Joint Forces Command
completed an initial assessment of U.S. GPF readiness and proficiency
for irregular warfare. This first effort provides a primarily
qualitative assessment of proficiency and readiness, and will serve as
a baseline for future work. As we incorporate IW--relevant tasks,
skills, and experiences into our tracking mechanisms and further
institutionalize the enduring lessons learned from Iraq and
Afghanistan, subsequent assessments will provide a more quantitative
and focused picture of the GPF's proficiency and readiness for IW.
The complex series of coincident challenges continues to demand
highly educated warriors and leaders. Joint Forces Command continues to
provide a robust Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) program to support
the training of deploying headquarters elements to Afghanistan. These
have included the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force Forward. These exercises are continually improved
to stress cultural awareness and the decisionmaking skills required in
the irregular warfare environment, including interagency, coalition and
Afghan Security Force representatives in attendance. During 2009, the
exercise support to Central Command's Combined Transition Command-
Afghanistan helped prepare that staff to assist the Afghan National
Army to assume national responsibilities. The exercises remained
tightly linked to our joint and NATO lessons learned processes, and
feedback from the field continues to shape the scenarios and
operational problems within which we train and evaluate deploying
commanders and their staffs.
Through Joint Knowledge Development and Delivery Capability (JKDDC)
and Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), Joint Forces Command continues to
provide virtual classroom training to cover a wide array of training
topics. The JKO Portal hosts more than 330 courses, including many
developed by coalition partner nations to build partner capacity
through sharing information and security related training. The portal
also offers basic language training and tailored pre-deployment
training for Individual Augmentees (IAs) and coalition partners
participating in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many resources
found on the JKO Portal also are available to interagency,
international and nongovernmental organizations. To date, JKO reports
over 100,000 registered users and 230,000 course completions. In 2009
JKDDC invested in research and development for advanced technology
capabilities that targeted specific training gaps. These fielded and
available applications include the Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer
and the Small Group Scenario Trainer, specifically addressing
operations, tailored cultural awareness training, and small group
training capability needs. These applications provide some rudimentary
capabilities to satisfy basic warfighter training needs.
coalition efforts
The United States will seldom choose to go it alone. Allies and
coalition partners play a key role across the full range of military
operations today and those anticipated in the future. The presence of
allies and partners will likely exert a major influence on the military
balance in future operations. Our friends can and do provide critical
support. We must continue to broaden and deepen relationships with
capable security partners. Joint Forces Command continues to strengthen
partnerships through engagement with DOD and NATO, via Allied Command
Transformation (ACT), and representatives from other nations assigned
to the command. The command remains actively linked to ACT, not only
because of its proximity, but also because of the productive working
relationships fostered between the headquarters' staffs. As of December
2009, Joint Forces Command routinely collaborates bilaterally with
representatives from 48 nations. These relationships are critical to
building the trust and interoperability necessary to build and sustain
strong alliances and coalitions.
The Joint Forces Command led Multi-National Experiment (MNE) 6 is a
2-year, multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition
capabilities against enemies employing a mix of irregular operational
methods, adaptive technologies, and hybrid approaches to warfare
through a whole-of-government approach. Participants include military
and civilian sectors of 18 NATO and non-NATO nations, NATO's ACT, and
U.S. Special Operations Command. MNE 6 produced draft products on the
assessment of operational progress and cross-cultural awareness in the
first year. The remainder of the experiment is focused on developing
and implementing at national and international levels solutions for
coordination of partner efforts to solve a crisis, assess campaign
progress with valid metrics, and develop a strategy for information
sharing and situational understanding.
A common, often daunting, task for the geographic combatant
commander is strengthening indigenous security forces. As articulated
in the QDR report, Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a cornerstone for
establishing regional security. Effective indigenous security forces
can preclude or minimize conflict and thereby strengthen the collective
security against threats and security challenges, reducing the
potential demand for U.S forces. While Security Force Assistance
expertise traditionally resides within Special Operations Forces (SOF),
some aspects of SFA are well suited to GPF. Transitioning portions of
these responsibilities will relieve pressure on our over-extended SOF.
The GPF possesses robust capability that can be used more effectively
to provide full spectrum SFA support. For example, a maritime SFA
possesses the expertise to support everything from low-end
opportunities such as small boat engine maintenance, to ballistic
missile defense, one of the most complex aspects of modern warfare.
Presently, the joint force is not optimally trained and organized
to advise and assist with building partnerships, although real progress
has been demonstrated. As the provider of the majority of the GPF to
the combatant commanders, we remain fully engaged with Special
Operations Command to expand these capabilities, particularly the
emerging role of SFA. We envision selected SFA executed by GPF in small
units, task organized for the mission, operating in a distributed
manner and building partner security capability in support of theater
campaign plans. This vision includes SFA support within the ground, air
and maritime domains. Our maritime forces are uniquely positioned to
support this mission, by providing SFA from the sea, thereby sustaining
U.S. influence while minimizing the U.S. footprint ashore, and
maintaining the security of the global commons. To support this vision
of an expanded GPF role, we have adapted the global force management
process to account for SFA, and are addressing this capability in joint
concept development and experimentation like the Joint Distributed
Operations experiment, ensuring the Services have a model for these
operations and highlighting Service strengths, such as our asymmetric
naval capabilities.
prepare
Where deterrence fails and enemies threaten our national interests,
the joint force must have the capacity and capability to apply force.
It must be prepared to operate with success in a wide range of
contingencies. Preparing the joint force for these future contingencies
is the focus of Joint Forces Command's effort supporting the
development of fully interoperable joint warfighting capabilities and
concepts.
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is the means to
develop our future leaders for the complexity of the threat environment
in which those leaders will find themselves. Viewed broadly, JPME is a
strategic asset for our Nation that shapes the understanding of not
just American officers, but also for preparing and building personal
relationships and trust with our allied or partner nations whose
officers also attend our schools. Today, JPME is essential to
understanding the multiplicity of state and non-state actors, the
nature of warfare, and building partner capacity to operate in an era
of persistent engagement. The complexities of today's complex security
environment demand the most innovative and versatile leaders to execute
a strategy that demands melding military, civil and cultural factors. A
trained warfighter must perform acceptably against a range of threats
and in dynamic security environments, which demand highly-educated
warriors who can adapt opportunistically in order to prevail. A
critical thinker/warrior will know how to acquire knowledge, process
information from multiple sources, and make timely, accurate decisions
in complex, ethically challenging and ever-changing environments. We
now place greater emphasis on the study of history, culture and
language beyond their broad incorporation into training and exercise
scenarios, including efforts employing the latest modeling and
simulation technology.
We are taking concrete steps to translate battlefield adaptations
into rapid institutional change. Our maturing relationship with the
National Defense University (NDU) is one effort to improve JPME and
ensure it is aligned properly with the current realities and future
challenges that we pick up in lessons learned, mission rehearsal
exercises, and concept development. Results from the ongoing House
Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
National Defense University, and Service school evaluations of the
entire JPME program can provide insights to transform JPME, making it
more effective and relevant to meet the demands of both the present and
future operating environments. In conjunction with Special Operations
Command and NDU, we will stand-up an Irregular Warfare Academic Center
of Excellence to provide a capability which harnesses the work of the
many academic institutions studying counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, stability operations, unconventional operational
methods, and hybrid approaches to warfare and to make their lessons
relevant and available to the joint force. I strongly urge your
continued support of our efforts to expand allied and partner access to
our educational institutions to further build trust and
interoperability among our forces, while broadly sharing our ethical
grounding. We are also swiftly incorporating battlefield lessons
learned into rehearsal exercises and senior leader education programs
like the Pinnacle, Capstone and Keystone courses. Participants' surveys
consistently note the relevance of both lessons learned and interaction
with senior level warfighters who bring a wealth of experience to bear.
As a means to promote the necessary cognitive approaches, the
application of `operational design' will help leaders understand the
problem, understand the environment, design an approach to solve the
problem, and reframe the problem when circumstances change. Joint
Forces Command has initiated a program to move operational design
forward at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; focused on a
cognitive approach vice procedural approach; built with the best of
breed; developed in a joint context; and in collaboration with all the
Services, while leveraging the Army's mature work along these lines.
During the past year, Joint Forces Command examined the adequacy of
the joint force to execute the precepts outlined in the Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations. Through wargaming activity, and drawing
on the extensive experience and broad perspective of participants who
included seven ambassadors; four former combatant commanders; active
flag and general officers from the United States, United Kingdom, and
Australia; subject matter experts from all services and combatant
commands; and representatives from relevant U.S. Government departments
and the National Security Council, this examination identified risk
areas where the joint force's ability to achieve its mission are most
vulnerable, and evaluated potential mitigating actions.
The CCJO wargame identified force development implications in order
to address the changing nuclear landscape, gaining and maintaining
access around the globe, interagency integration, situational
understanding, and overcoming digital dependence. Detailed insights and
recommendations from the experiment were provided to joint and Service
policy and decisionmakers and helped inform the QDR. The CCJO and
related experimentation are also shaping the development of supporting
concepts focused on combat, security, engagement, and relief and
reconstruction, which in turn will update our guiding doctrine.
We have no sense of complacency. The enemy doesn't rest, nor will
we as we move to check his capabilities. With the proliferation of
inexpensive and capable technology, our enemies are gaining precision
capability, and this is no longer an exclusive advantage of U.S./NATO
forces. This precision capability will allow modestly funded states or
non-state actors to acquire long-range precision munitions, project
power from farther out, and with greater accuracy. We are just now
scratching the surface on how best to defend against and defeat this
threat and overcome the anti-access threat they constitute.
During the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Hezbollah employed
unmanned aerial vehicles on several occasions. This use of low cost,
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles demonstrated that sophistication is
not the sole realm of developed states. Again, the proliferation of
relatively cheap and capable technology is creating threats we must be
prepared to reckon with. Presently, our Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Center of Excellence, in conjunction with the Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Office, is developing a concept of operations to
address challenges and evaluate capabilities associated with countering
adversary unmanned aerial systems.
With almost a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is
inevitable that some currently unused capabilities may atrophy. In many
cases, there are now joint warfighters who have never assaulted a beach
or hit a drop-zone by parachute. Because of this, we are seeing a
decline in our ability to conduct forcible entry operations, operations
that can reassure our friends and temper our adversaries' designs.
Additionally, the continued development and proliferation of longer
range, precision guided munitions challenge our ability to perform
these operations in the contested littorals around the globe. The
battle for access may prove not only the most important, but the most
difficult, requiring forcible entry capabilities and sustainment
capabilities. Couple this readiness issue with aging ships, aerial
tankers and strategic bombers, and our ability to gain access and
influence actions over strategic distances needs to receive increased
attention. Seabasing is a highly relevant supporting effort as we look
toward our asymmetric strengths to create cost-imposing dilemmas on
future enemies.
Joint Force Commanders require robust command and control (C2)
capabilities that enable agile decisionmaking and information flow from
the operational to tactical level across today's global domain. This
domain encompasses cyberspace, all wired and wireless communications,
and fixed and mobile warfighting customers, to include the networks
that support them down to the tactical edge. Robust C2 implies a degree
of reliability, redundancy, and agility necessary to effectively
operate, both independently and with our coalition partners and allies,
in degraded and/or austere conditions. Developing enhanced, robust C2
capabilities in the near-term requires adoption of an integrated C2
triad network approach; specifically the blending of surface (including
maritime), air and space systems into a resilient network. We are
working to develop an operational context for objective joint analysis,
assessment and training, and common standards to verify operational
effectiveness of information exchanges and interoperability.
As the C2 capability portfolio manager, Joint Forces Command is
responsible for leading a number of efforts across the C2 Joint
Capability Area which directly supports the establishment of an
integrated C2 triad network. These integration efforts will enhance our
wired and wireless cyberspace capabilities, while leveraging and
creating cyberspace opportunities. To better enable our small units
operating at the wireless tactical edge in austere and/or hostile
environments, we are working in coordination with Special Operations
Command, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration to
develop C2 On-the-Move and Joint Aerial Layer Network capabilities.
Central to this effort is the stand-up of the Joint Systems Integration
and Interoperability Lab to conduct full-spectrum C2 capability
analyses and up-front Joint Systems Engineering to improve joint
interoperability and integration. Finally, we continue to advocate on
behalf of the warfighter ensuring the sustainment and synchronization
of our C2 legacy systems as we migrate to objective joint C2
capabilities, including an Adaptive Planning and Execution capability
that strives to reduce the time required for warfighter plan
development to under a year, and accelerate plan execution to near real
time.
In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have displayed considerable
capacity to learn and adapt in both the political and tactical arenas.
We anticipate we will see more of this in the future; more
sophisticated opponents of U.S. military forces will certainly attack
perceived American vulnerabilities. It is highly likely that attacks on
our computers, space and communications systems will severely degrade
command and control of U.S. forces. Thus, those forces must possess the
ability to operate effectively against denial operations and in
degraded conditions.
For this reason our leaders must understand that, first and
foremost, C2 is a human endeavor. C2 must be leader-centric and
network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decisionmaking at the
lowest level possible. While materiel solutions, processes, and
engineering can enable decisionmaking, command and control is not
synonymous with network operations nor the employment of advanced
technology. The joint force must have the flexibility to exploit both.
Commanders must be skilled at crafting and articulating their intent,
enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative and take advantage of
fleeting opportunities in the decentralized operations we anticipate,
vice centralizing decisionmaking at high levels. This is vital in both
conventional force-on-force warfare and decentralized operations that
we observe in the combat zone.
preserve /conclusion
We must continue to seek ways to ensure the vitality and the
quality of the All-Volunteer Force. As the joint force provider, I have
a vested interest in the vitality and quality of the force. Our number
one priority remains supporting the warfighters around the globe to
prevail in today's wars. Essential to this effort is sustaining the
All-Volunteer Force to maintain the combat effectiveness of our
warfighting formations.
Our guiding principle is balance as we craft our approach to
countering any specific threat or scenario while protecting against the
surprises that are sure to come. Our force must be designed with the
aim of having the fewest regrets when surprises strike. From applying
lessons learned to our current efforts, to guiding sound concept
development and experimentation to build future combat power, with your
support, Joint Forces Command will continue to press ahead in our
efforts.
On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I
thank you for the opportunity to report. I look forward to working with
you to ensure the continued security of America.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Let's try an 8-minute first round of questioning.
Admiral, there have been a number of reports about the
performance of the Afghan Army during the recent operation to
clear the Taliban from Central Helmand Valley. Marine Brigadier
General Larry Nicholson said that Afghan forces are not
cosmetic; they are in the fight. But at the same time, there
have been anecdotal accounts of Afghan soldiers looting the
bazaar in Marjah, smoking hashish, and failing to help our
marines in fortifying their positions.
Admiral, give us your assessment of the performance of
Afghan soldiers that are partnered with coalition forces in the
fighting in Helmand?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, as you can imagine, I discuss this
frequently with General Stan McChrystal, my NATO subordinate,
who is directing operations. I also receive reports on a daily
basis. I am satisfied with the progress of the Afghan National
Army and overall its performance I think has been effective in
Marjah.
As you recall, Senator, when we went south about a year ago
the ratio of ISAF troops to Afghan troops was 10 of the ISAF
for every 1 of the Afghan. In this particular operation, we are
at one ISAF troop and about just less than one Afghan. So we're
approaching that 1 to 1 ratio. The quantity piece has improved
dramatically.
As for the quality piece, I think General Nicholson is spot
on. We're seeing them actually in the fight. We're also seeing
instances where the Afghan troops are stepping ahead of the
coalition forces and saying, let me go through that door first,
let me go up that road first. We're seeing that kind of
shoulder-to-shoulder effective combat fight out of our Afghan
partners.
In terms of individual instances or anecdotes, we follow up
on every one of those. We report them. Action is taken by the
Afghan chain of command. But overall, Senator, I am satisfied
with the progress we've seen over the course of the year and I
think the operation in Marjah shows that.
Chairman Levin. Well, that's important news. I want to just
focus for a minute on that ratio. When we were there the first
time, maybe a year ago now, and got into this issue, it was a
five to one ratio, five of our marines for one Afghan. We heard
that in Marjah, for that effort it was about two of ours to one
of theirs.
Now you're telling us that it was actually a lot better
than that, closer to 1 to 1, which is very significant and
important news, because that's critically important, not just
in terms of the turning over of responsibility for Afghan
security to the Afghans, which is surely a major part of our
mission, but also in terms of the credibility of what we're
doing there to the people who live there, but also to the
training of Afghan troops, so that we can have that close
training relationship. The closer that ratio is, not just 1 to
1, but two of theirs to one of ours, the closer we are to our
own standard and our own goal.
We read in the paper this morning that, however, when that
effort was undertaken that Afghan troops, or perhaps it was
some marines, left a nearby area without adequate protection at
all and a number of the Taliban just simply moved next door.
Can you tell us anything about that and, if that was happening,
why was there not a plan, particularly given the size of the
Afghan Army, to have Afghan forces secure places where other
combat troops were leaving in order to succeed in the fight in
Marjah?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I'll have to take that one for
the record and get back to you on that particular incident. I'm
not familiar with it.
Chairman Levin. You'll see a report in this morning's
paper.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

General McChrystal has implemented a population centric counter-
insurgency strategy that calls for focusing coalition and Afghan
security forces in and around population centers; specifically those
population centers most threatened by insurgents. Despite the build-up
of U.S. and coalition forces and the increasing size and capability of
the Afghan Army, we cannot focus our forces everywhere. I can assure
you that Zabul Province has not been abandoned to the Taliban as the
article suggests; however, our focus is on protecting the people of
Afghanistan and not on attempting to track down individual Taliban
members moving around the countryside.

Chairman Levin. As I mentioned in the opening statement,
NATO members are falling short once again. At the most recent
force generation conference, they fell short in meeting the
NATO mission requirements, in particular the 1,200 trainers
that Lieutenant General Caldwell needs and NATO has committed
to provide.
Can you give us any kind of assurance as to whether the
NATO countries that have fallen short of their commitments and
obligations are going to be forthcoming?
Admiral Stavridis. First of all, let me give you the exact
numbers. We're looking for an additional 1,278 and we have
pledges at this point for 541. So it is absolutely correct to
say that NATO has fallen short in providing these vital
trainers.
What we are doing about it is taking further steps in terms
of contacting each of the Nations individually and going one by
one through the precise requirement for each of the Nations in
terms of where they could most effectively fill in the trainer
mix. That effort is going on in real time both from my
headquarters and up in Brussels, where the Secretary General is
very engaged at the political level. So we will continue to
hammer away at this until we fulfil that commitment, and I will
continue to place it, as I told you, Senator Levin, at the top
of my priority list.
Chairman Levin. We appreciate that. General Caldwell, at a
press conference last week, said that Afghan Army recruitment
is very, very strong. I think he said there was an 800 percent
increase in army recruitment over the last 4 or 5 months. But
they can't put them into basic training right away because of
the shortage of trainers, and that is totally unacceptable.
It's almost unbelievable to me that we can't get NATO allies to
carry out that kind of commitment, which is not the most
dangerous of the positions that they need to fill. It's
training. There's obviously danger anywhere, but compared to
being in combat, it falls well short of that. We need to do
everything we can, and I'm not sure what more we can do, but if
there is anything more we can do, Admiral, please let us know.
In your judgment, can the recruiting trend, which is to a
great extent due, according to General Caldwell, to the efforts
of the Afghan leadership to stimulate recruiting, as well as an
increase in pay, but he attributes the large increase more to
the leadership of the Afghans than to the pay increase when we
met with him. But will that recruiting trend in your judgment
be maintained or is it maintainable right into the spring?
Admiral Stavridis. I believe it will be maintained,
Senator. I am also very focused on the other end of that
equation, which is the retention piece, which is not going as
well. We have to continue to focus on retaining, just as we do
here in the United States, it's so important to have the
retention along with the recruitment piece.
I'm confident we will continue to be strong on the
recruiting side. I'm working very hard with Stan McChrystal and
Bill Caldwell to focus on the retention side as well.
Chairman Levin. There's a new missile defense plan in
Europe called Phased Adaptive Approach that the Obama
administration has announced and begun to implement. Does NATO
support that new missile defense plan?
Admiral Stavridis. NATO is beginning that conversation. At
the moment what we have is a ballistic missile defense C2
nascent structure, which is being explored to decide where,
when, and how NATO could connect into this if the alliance
decides to do so. I anticipate there will be a significant
discussion about that at the defense ministerial, which will be
in the May timeframe, and I'm hoping to see a decision taken
toward the time of the summit, which is in Lisbon in November.
So it's very much an active conversation.
I don't want to prejudge the political decisions of the
Nations, but it's certainly on the agenda.
Chairman Levin. From what you know, can you say that there
seems to be a positive response to it?
Admiral Stavridis. I think overall that would be fair to
say.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, as I understand, the President's proposal was that
we would be adding approximately 30,000 troops and our allies,
including in and out of NATO, would be adding an additional
10,000.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. How are we on track for that 10,000?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, we're in pretty good shape. We're
at 9,500 troops. If I can get the additional 700 trainers that
I just talked to the chairman about, then that would put us
over the 10,000 mark overall.
Senator McCain. Does that include the 2,000 Dutch troops
that are scheduled to leave?
Admiral Stavridis. No, sir, it does not.
Senator McCain. So you're really talking about 7,500
troops. You don't have any illusion about the Dutch troops
remaining, do you?
Admiral Stavridis. My sense is, listening to the political
dialogue out of The Netherlands, that they will be leaving.
Senator McCain. So we're really not on track, then. It's
nice to say, but if you're going to lose 2,000 Dutch troops,
who are, by the way, great fighters from my visits, it's not
9,500; it's closer to 7,500. There are others of our allies
whose commitments have certainly not been firmed up yet.
The Afghan Army, as I understand, needs to be around
300,000 troops and 100,000 police; is that the right numbers
that we would like to see over time?
Admiral Stavridis. I think over time, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. How do we expect over time to pay for the
Afghan Army?
Admiral Stavridis. I think the international community will
have to be in a position to continue to support it for a great
deal of time to come.
Senator McCain. Roughly how much would that cost be on an
annual basis?
Admiral Stavridis. I don't have that number at my
fingertips, but it would certainly be in the billions, probably
in the low billions.
Senator McCain. We would expect our allies to foot the bill
for that?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is fair to say that it's an
international effort and we would hope that all in the
international community would continue to support it moving
forward.
Senator McCain. Overall, the operation in Marjah was
successful?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is going very successfully,
certainly through the clearing phase. We're now in the build
and hold phase, which I think will be challenging. But I am
confident that the plans that we have in place will give us a
very good chance at overall success as we go through clear,
build, hold, and ultimately transition.
Senator McCain. What presence did our NATO allies have in
the Marjah operation?
Admiral Stavridis. The Marjah operation, of the ISAF
forces, was around 25 to 30 percent.
Senator McCain. That was in direct combat roles?
Admiral Stavridis. Largely, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. So some of our allies are fighting very
well. Some of them have very restrictive rules of engagement,
right?
Admiral Stavridis. We have 22 nations that have no caveats
and we have about 20 nations that have caveats, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Some of these caveats are very disturbing.
Admiral Stavridis. Some of them are very restrictive and we
work very hard to try and reduce those wherever we can.
Senator McCain. I thank you. There's a lot going on in NATO
and in Europe and we appreciate the great work you're doing.
General Ward, this sounds like perhaps a question that need
not be asked, but should we be looking as part of AFRICOM at
some headquarters located in Africa?
General Ward. Senator, the work of the command is in its
programs, its activities, and its exercises. The things that we
do across the continent to help the nations of Africa increase
their capacity. The headquarters location, quite candidly,
doesn't affect that work, where we plan those activities, where
we look to resource those activities. It's not something that
the leaders in Africa are asking me about and at this time it
is my estimation that any great efforts to locate an American-
size headquarters of that nature would probably be more
counterproductive than productive.
Senator McCain. Because?
General Ward. Because of perceptions, because of the
reactions to neighbors, and to parts of the continent where the
headquarters might not be located. Many unintended consequences
I think would fall out from that type of a move.
Senator McCain. Could you tell us a couple of countries
that are of your greatest concern, General Ward?
General Ward. Senator, as we look at the continent, clearly
the challenges are there. There are also opportunities. But
when we talk about what's going on----
Senator McCain. What countries are of your greatest
concern, General?
General Ward. There is what's going on in Somalia, what's
going on in Sudan, what's going on in Nigeria, the
extrajudicial means of changes of government that we saw in
Niger, and in Guinea. Those activities are concerning.
Senator McCain. Since it's not in the news, perhaps it's
obvious we are making some progress on the piracy issue.
General Ward. We are making progress from the standpoint of
addressing the threat at sea. The weather lately also helped
because of the high sea state and the inability of those small
skiffs to go out and operate freely. The coalition that occurs
at sea is an effective coalition. It is a big ocean, however,
as you are aware, and so these skiffs do in fact go around and
get through.
That piracy threat is not just in the Gulf of Aden and the
East Indian Ocean. It's also in the west coast of Africa. Our
work to help these African nations increase their capacity to
deal with their territorial waters is certainly making a
difference. In addition to that, I would offer that the work
that would need to occur on land, especially pertaining to good
governance or governments that are more than less able to
control their territories, will also contribute to increased
stability and reducing the effects of piracy.
Senator McCain. The main area of piracy operations is
where?
General Ward. Predominantly the Gulf of Aden.
Senator McCain. What country?
General Ward. Somalia.
Senator McCain. Somalia, an incredibly unstable country.
General Ward. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Very little prospect for stability in the
future.
General Ward. It's a work in progress, to be sure. Small
things are happening now, but much work needs to be done.
Senator McCain. Could you just make a comment about
Ethiopia and the situation there?
General Ward. Ethiopia remains a friend and a partner in
our efforts to help produce stability there in the region. The
work that the Ethiopians do in the counterterror business, as
well as in the work of their participation in peacekeeping
operations, is important work, and I think our partnering with
the Ethiopians as well as other East African nations is
something that we would continue to look at in ways of helping
to produce stability in that part of the world.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General.
Thank you, Admiral. Thank you very much, General Mattis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the three of you for your extraordinary service.
General Ward, let me just pick up where Senator McCain was,
particularly in Somalia. We know from experience that where
there's no government, trouble grows, either as piracy or the
provision of space for terrorists, Islamist terrorists
particularly, to operate.
I gather that there is an attempt by the provisional
government to retake the capital city of Mogadishu, and I
wonder if you could give us both your estimate of how that's
going and to what extent we're able to be supportive of that
effort?
General Ward. Senator, Somalia has been an ungoverned space
for almost 20 years.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Ward. What we're facing today is clearly not new.
What I will say is the current Transition Federal Government
(TFG), being supported by the African Union's (AU) Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), and being supported by others of the
international community, including the United States, is an
effort that I would continue to endorse and think that it has
for now our best potential for helping to turn around some of
the instability and lack of governance that we've experienced
there.
What's going on in Mogadishu with respect to the desires of
the transition government to reclaim parts of Mogadishu is a
work in progress. I'm not aware of the specifics. I'll have to
come back to you, sir, with the specifics on what that current
operation looks like.
[The information referred to follows:]

Operations intended to relieve pressure on the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in
Mogadishu are planned. The intent of these operations is to clear
extremist-held areas.

On 10 and 11 March 2010, TFG and AMISOM forces clashed
with al-Shabaab militia in eastern Mogadishu. The TFG,
supported by AMISOM, ultimately lost that skirmish-probably due
to poor command and control, and insufficient logistics.
TFG operations, under constant Islamic insurgent
assault, remain hamstrung by weak command and control, supply,
and administrative systems, and clan and personality-based
governance dysfunction.

General Ward. To the degree the TFG can, in fact, reexert
control over Mogadishu with the help of AMISOM and others I
think is something that we would look to do and support, as
well as the other provisions of the Djibouti process that look
to instilling governance, instilling developmental things that
will serve the benefit of the Somali people to cause that
situation to reverse itself.
We look to participate with those who also support them,
the other nations and the neighbors who contribute to the
AMISOM mission, in particular Uganda and Burundi. We support
their work and try to lend the hand that they lend to the TFG
to increase stability. So those efforts are ongoing. It's an
effort that I think we would certainly support and we would
look to do it in ways that add to stability in that part of the
continent.
Senator Lieberman. Let me go to the Sudan. There's a lot of
continuing concern here about the situation in Sudan. We're in
a critical period in the coming year with national elections
next month, which are the first in more than 2 decades. Then
there's a referendum in the south in January 2011.
I'd like to hear first what your command is doing to
support the United Nations (U.N.)-AU force in Darfur, where
unfortunately the human rights abuses are continuing; and then
second, what AFRICOM can and is doing to support implementation
of the comprehensive peace agreement of January 2005?
General Ward. Senator, our support to the UN-AU Mission in
Darfur (UNAMID) is in the form of training assistance,
logistics assistance, and support to those forces who have been
declared a part of that UNAMID mission. We provide logistics,
lift support, as I've mentioned, and we continue to do that in
support of the peacekeeping effort there in Darfur.
We have no direct, on-the-ground involvement there. Those
processes as a part of the comprehensive peace agreement are
essentially political processes that we certainly support. We
do support the formation of the Southern Liberation Army in
southern Sudan, some of their professional development
initiatives, some of their training initiatives, and we do that
through and in conjunction with DOS, working with the Special
Envoy and doing those things that help increase the
professionalism of that southern Sudanese force.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you how you would suggest
that we interpret the statements that President Bashir has made
that essentially the war is over? How should we interpret
those?
General Ward. Senator, the cooperation that we see emerging
between Chad and Sudan, between President Debi and Bashir, I
think we would look to that as an encouraging sign.
Senator Lieberman. So it's real? Something is changing
there?
General Ward. Something is changing.
Senator Lieberman. For the better?
General Ward. It's for the better. It's still fragile. It's
not irreversible, to be sure. But I think we should be
encouraged by those signs and we look forward to more of that
as this political dialogue continues.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral Stavridis, let me ask you about
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Senator McCain and I and a couple of
colleagues visited there last month. I think we feel a sense of
pride about what the United States was able to do in the 1990s
to stop the aggression and genocide there. But as you indicate
in your posture statement, the problems continue, particularly
the ethnic divisions. It's not what it was in the 1990s, of
course, but you have some really explosive situations and
people there, particularly Mr. Dodek in the Republika Srpska.
I will tell you that the one most encouraging experience
that we had was visiting with the military of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and I think EUCOM has had a lot to do with that.
You have all the ethnic groups in there. They're functioning
together. They're at a higher level.
I want to quote from something which you said in your
statement because it's really the question I want to ask after
your evaluation. You warn that ``the programmed reduction of
NATO and European Union forces in the Balkans may induce
additional risk of instability in the region.'' I'd like to ask
you to evaluate the situation, but then specifically would you
counsel now that the programmed reduction of NATO and European
Union forces in the Balkans should not go forward, that it
involves too much risk?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Senator. The context of the
reduction of U.S. troops in the Balkans is really quite
remarkable; 20,000 in Bosnia alone. We're down to 20 there now.
In Kosovo we had as many as almost 10,000. We're down to about
1,200 troops there now.
In Bosnia, you correctly hit on I believe a central
element, which is the security force there, the armed forces.
Moving them in a direction that is integrated I think will be
very encouraging to the body politic in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In terms of Kosovo, we had 15,000 NATO troops there as
recently as December. We've been able to draw down to about
10,000 NATO troops there now, again about 1,200 U.S. troops.
The next step in that process is for me to provide military
advice to the Secretary General about whether to take the step
to go from 10,000 down to 5,000. I'm evaluating that very
carefully. There is still tension, understandably, between
Serbia and what they perceive as a breakaway province of
Serbia, but what the United States and 62 other nations have
recognized as the independent country of Kosovo.
So I think we need to move carefully in the Balkans so that
we don't fall back. The progress has been extraordinary. We
don't want to let it unravel. I will be looking very carefully
in Kosovo. We'll continue our encouraging efforts in Bosnia.
Overall, I'm confident we'll continue to move in a good
direction, but it requires watchful approaches.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. I'm encouraged by it.
I guess I'd encourage you to err on the side of caution.
Admiral Stavridis. I agree.
Senator Lieberman. I understand the pressure to reduce, but
we may look back and really regret it.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Just to end on a bright note, I remember
one of the stories we were told by the commander of the
military in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that at one point Dodek from
Srpska called on all the Serbian members of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina armed forces to return home and no one came. That's
a great comment and a tribute also, I think, to EUCOM's role in
training that force.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since Senator Lieberman ended on a bright note, I'll start
on a bright note. Some of the things that are working--and
we've talked about this before, in fact every time we have a
hearing or a meeting in private, like the train and equip
program, 1206, 1207, 1208, the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program, the Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP), and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
(CCIF), those programs are working well.
Admiral Stavridis, I would ask you, with some of these
things that have been changed recently, like in the 1207, the
whole reason for structuring these programs the way they're
structured with DOD is so that they can be activated quickly
and get an immediate response. Now we're kind of going the
other direction with the 1207. Do you want to comment on that?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, first of all, I completely
agree that the 1206 and the IMET programs have been superb. I
think each of the combatant commanders has testified to that
over the last couple years, and I've benefited from them
greatly in 3 years at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
continue to be a strong advocate here at EUCOM.
The 1207 money is kind of dual-keyed between DOS and DOD. I
think that any time there's a dual key it's going to take a
little bit longer to work through the challenges. So some of
that immediacy that is so valuable in the 1206 funding is not
as readily available in the 1207. But we're committed to work
with our partners in DOS to make it go as rapidly as possible.
Senator Inhofe. Of course, I understand that's civilian-to-
civilian.
Are you satisfied with the funding level of the CCIF
program?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. All right. General Mattis, with all the
great things that are happening in simulation and modeling now,
yesterday we broke ground on the new building for the Joint
Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) program. By the way, I
appreciate very much your personal attention, going down and
watching that. We have people from all over the world there
under our IMET program. I think some 250 coalition members are
being trained by this JFETS program.
So that's just another example of how IMET is working, and
also an example of how the JFETS program is working. Why don't
you just give us an update as to what you think is happening in
terms of things with the JFETS program?
General Mattis. Thanks, Senator. This is an issue near and
dear to my heart. In preparing our troops, which is ultimately
my responsibility, we cannot do it as efficiently or as
effectively or as cheaply as we can in the real world as we
could using simulation. One of the biggest challenges we face
is breaking the old paradigm that somehow simulators are good
for Navy submarines, good for aviation, good for ship drivers,
good for ballistic missile defense preparations, but somehow we
leave the people who take 80 percent of our casualties off the
ledger.
So we are going forward very strongly with this from the
small unit level, to how we integrate joint intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) and more importantly
joint fires, because as we distribute our forces more broadly
on the battlefield we need to reduce the risk to them. That
means they can access joint ISR and know what's over the next
hill. That means they can access and use joint fires.
The installation out in your district I'll just tell you,
sir, is absolutely critical to the maturation of this.
Senator Inhofe. I think the best way to break that paradigm
is to get the people out there to see it.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Because it's one of these things that you
can't explain to someone, the actual conditions that they
experience out there. It's mind-boggling.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. We have a couple of programs to
do that right now, and we're getting a lot of interest. We've
actually had significant support from this committee.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
General Ward, as you well know, I've been very interested
in Africa. In fact, I've been criticized for the amount of time
that I spend in Africa. Back when we had it, it was hard for me
to understand why we would have Africa under three commands as
we did. Now things I think are working.
As I've told you before, I would have preferred to have the
headquarters in Africa someplace down there. I know the
political problems that come with that. I was recently in
Djibouti. I talked to Admiral Fitzgerald and to Rear Admiral
Kurta. It's heavy lifting over there. But everything is
happening there. Briefly tell us what is happening in Djibouti
and what are some of the successes there?
General Ward. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
support to the command and also to our security efforts on the
continent. We feel that and we appreciate it.
In Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA), we assumed responsibility for C2 when we became a
fully endorsed unified command a little over a year ago.
Djibouti's programs, or the CJTF-HOA programs, that we
undertake in the eastern part of the continent, but also in
other places as I determine a skill set that they possess
that's required, provide the type of training support, the type
of mentoring, coaching, the type of programs that we are using,
along with our civil affairs activities, to help the Nations in
Africa concentrate their efforts in causing a degree of
harmonization of the training, the professionalism, as well as
the regionalization of security assistance and cooperation
programs that I think are proving very, very beneficial insofar
as moving to the next level the capacity of many of these
African nations to increase their military and security
capacity. Because of our long-term approach to doing business,
doing it in ways that fully integrate the elements of
diplomacy, development, as well as defense. Not that we do
those things, Senator, but because we understand the importance
of those activities being a part of this dynamic, the
comprehensive approach, it is working.
Senator Inhofe. I want to expand on that a little bit. But
first, on the cuts that were there on your information
operations program, are they going to hurt you? Is that
serious?
General Ward. It is serious. The information programs that
we look to do, where we were cut by $3 million, that was about
a third of what we wanted to do. The focus for those additional
programs would have been in the East Africa region, to
complement what we're doing in the Sahel and in North Africa.
Senator Inhofe. It's a huge area. I think people just don't
really comprehend that.
How about in the other equipment? At first there were some
problems there. Do you feel fairly comfortable with the
resources that you have?
General Ward. We are always looking for resources, Senator.
What they have are sufficient to do the work that we want to
do. We could enhance that with additional resources, but the
work that we are able to do working with those nations, to
include assisting them through the various programs, the 1206
program, are very important and beneficial, as we have worked
with the nations on their territorial security as well as their
maritime security and capacity-building.
Senator Inhofe. I'm running out of time here. But do this
for me. The reason that our activity in Djibouti is acceptable
with the rest of the continent is because we were already
there. It's more difficult if you were to start anew. I have
felt that, as large as that continent is, we ought to have
something probably in Ghana. The Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) is there now.
Lastly, I've been heartened a little bit by some of the new
faces in Zimbabwe that have been on the other side of Mugabe. I
feel for the first time in many years somewhat optimistic that
these new faces that want to bring that country hopefully back
to where it was at one time, the breadbasket of sub-Saharan
Africa. Do you share that there is room for optimism now in
Zimbabwe?
General Ward. I do. I had a conversation with our new
ambassador who's been posted there and he is going there,
Senator, with that same sense of optimism to look to take
advantage of what might be a changing political environment.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished service.
Admiral Stavridis, not to be overly simplistic, but the last
several years have forced us operationally, in our budgets and
in acquisition, to become expeditionary. Has that same fever
caught on in the NATO countries? Can you describe their budget
acquisition and military policy?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I think a little bit would be
the answer. There's more of a sense of expeditionary, and this
is part of what General Mattis tried to work so hard, and I
think he successfully moved the Europeans somewhat in this
direction when he was the Supreme Allied Commander for
Transformation, and I think that work continues in that side of
the NATO organization. It's had some salutary effect.
Just the thought that we today have 100,000 NATO troops
engaged on 3 continents speaks to a certain level of
expeditionary, including counter-piracy, including the Balkans,
which is enormously expeditionary, but somewhat of course in
Afghanistan.
So I think there's movement in that direction, and I really
commend the work of JFCOM and Allied Command Transformation. We
need to continue to encourage that and move it forward, because
the nature of threats in this 21st century is going to demand
more than just sitting behind our borders.
Senator Reed. Has the military and political leadership got
the idea and now is it a question of implementation? Or is it
still something that's unresolved and under debate?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is under debate, but I think
increasingly the forces of security, the demands of these non-
traditional threats, these trans-border threats, are moving the
Europeans in this direction. I'm confident as the NATO
strategic concept is unveiled in Lisbon in the fall we'll see
further movement in that direction, sir.
Senator Reed. General Mattis, if you want to comment on
that.
General Mattis. Yes, Senator, and I completely agree with
where Admiral Stavridis assessed this effort. In an explanation
to the Nations, I made the point that Italian troops going to
Afghanistan or Italian troops going to the Baltics would have
to deploy about the same distance, when you look at what the
alliance is trying to do under Article 5. So it's not an
either-or. If you want the alliance to defend more than its own
home turf, each army in its own country, they must be
expeditionary.
I think that is becoming politically more acceptable, where
at one time it was seen more along the lines of what Senator
McCain brought up, that it was the Americans trying to get the
Europeans to fight an American war. I don't think the
expeditionary argument is any longer characterized like that.
So I am optimistic, like Admiral Stavridis.
Senator Reed. Let me turn to one aspect of the way forward
in Iraq, and that's the advise and assist brigades. I wonder if
JFCOM has had a chance to evaluate these brigades. They've been
configured to retain combat power, but also, as the name
implies, to essentially be a trainer, mentor, and integrator
with Iraqi forces. Our success in drawing down our forces and
stabilizing Iraq rests on their performance. I wonder if you at
JFCOM have done any work?
General Mattis. Senator, we leave that tactical training,
of course, to the Chief of Staff of the Army. However, we have
looked closely at it and it is the behavior of the troops as
much as any significant shift in their capabilities that is
important. What I mean to say is that when those troops go in
they will focus on the train and assist, but it would be ill-
advised for the enemy to mess with them. They will still have
their capability to fight and, should the Iraqis ask for it or
should force protection demand it, these forces are quite
capable of rocking the enemy back on their heels.
But they are going in with the mission and the troops are
trained and adjusted to a train, advise, and assist mission to
the Iraqis. Right now, from our perspective these troops are
exactly the right thing at the right time, and their
preparation looks sound.
Senator Reed. Just a follow-up question, because part of
this is sustaining this effort with the best, highest quality
forces we can. Is it your impression that within DOD,
particularly the Department of the Army, that this mission is
highest priority and they will organize these brigades in a way
that we have the best possible component elements?
General Mattis. Sir, obviously we're having to juggle a
number of very high priorities. We also send combat troops in
that can partner in Afghanistan. But the theme that we're
seeing more and more now is that all of our troops going in
must have this ability to fight in a coalition atmosphere and
be able to partner, whether it be with Estonians, Afghans, or
Iraqis. This is part of the shift that Secretary Gates and
Chairman Mullen have directed, where the entire military force
is becoming more attuned to this advise and assist effort,
whether it be in Africa, Afghanistan, or Iraq.
I believe because of that there will be no lowered priority
on something that is now considered an inherent part of the
primary mission.
Senator Reed. Can we assume that this model will be adapted
into Afghanistan also, that as we make progress in terms of
reducing the capabilities of the Taliban that we'll be able to
put more of these type of units on the ground?
General Mattis. Sir, I'd go so far to say that the units
we're sending over there now into the area that Admiral
Stavridis spoke about in Marjah are completely capable on their
own as combat units of partnering with the Afghans. We are
learning. As a British prime minister put it, once we've
exhausted all the alternatives we'll do the right thing. We
have it right this time and we are using these lessons learned
to change the very makeup of the unit training.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
General Ward, can you describe the nature of the
partnership between AFRICOM and the AU Standby Force of five
brigades?
General Ward. The command, Senator, has a relationship
where we have a presidential determination being put in place
that allows us to work with these five standby brigades.
Currently that determination is in place for the Southern
African Standby Force and the West African Standby Force. We're
working on one for the East African Standby Force.
We see that these regional alignments for peace are very
critical, and where they don't exist we still work on a
bilateral basis with the nations who would send forces to these
standby brigades to increase their capacity as well. So it's a
training relationship, in some instances it is an equipping
relationship. In some instances it is a doctrinal relationship
where we provide that type of assistance to these standby
forces that are part of these regional economic communities.
Senator Reed. Do we have an ongoing liaison with them in
terms of personnel on the ground on a day-to-day basis?
General Ward. We have a liaison officer with the AU, which
is obviously the continental organization. We have a liaison
with ECOWAS and their standby force. We do not have a permanent
liaison with the Southern African Developmental, or with the
East African. But we do have a day-to-day relationship in East
Africa with those East African forces as well. We have
supported each of them as they conducted training, exercises,
and other things to help increase their capacity to bring these
brigades together, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. I want to thank you, General Ward. I also
want to thank you for your service, because it's a long time
since we taught together at West Point and I'm awfully proud of
what you've accomplished for the military and for the Army.
Thank you, sir.
General Ward. Thank you for the support, Senator. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Ward. Admiral Stavridis, nice to see you
again. General Mattis, thank you for your service to the
country. Thank you for being here to answer our questions
today.
Admiral Stavridis, I want to talk to you about a report
that came out, I guess it was last week, where a Spanish judge
accused the Government of Venezuela of maintaining illicit ties
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and ETA
terrorists planning to kill senior government officials in
Spain, including President Uribe. The reason I'm asking you,
not only because of the Spanish connection, but your previous
work at SOUTHCOM.
Is there good cooperation between your command and SOUTHCOM
to make sure that we're staying in front of these issues?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, very much so. I'm in quite a
bit of dialogue with General Fraser. Another example would be
since the earthquake in Haiti, he and I have been in close
coordination in terms of support from the many European nations
who have pitched in and helped. There is a very strong
relationship there, and also a strong relationship with
AFRICOM. Those three combatant commands--EUCOM, AFRICOM, and
SOUTHCOM--tend to work together very closely. It's partially
the propinquity of geography, partially the personal
friendships, and partially the geopolitical issues that you
correctly highlight.
Senator LeMieux. I have a concern that touches this issue
that I just raised, with potentially an assassination plot
against President Uribe running through Spain. It is also
geopolitical, as you said, with the concern that Iran, with
projecting its influence through Spain and also through Latin
America, is becoming a destabilizing force. Certainly Europe is
tremendously important for our security interests, and if we
have a nuclear-armed Iran that's going to impact your AOR.
Can you speak to that issue?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I find Iran alarming in any
number of dimensions, not the least of which is, as you
mentioned, increasing Iranian influence throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean, drawing on my previous experience,
their very active sponsorship of terrorism, and their pursuit,
not only of a nuclear weapon, but also of ballistic missiles
which can deliver such weapons. It's one of the reasons I think
missile defense is particularly important, and I think a
concerned international effort to focus on the dangers of Iran
is well warranted.
Senator LeMieux. The administration recently made a
decision about ground-based interceptors and not pursuing that
in the Czech Republic and in Poland. Do you feel that the plan
going forward to make sure that we have an adequate missile
defense to protect Europe and the United States is adequate?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, I do. I think the Phased
Adaptive Approach is timely and flexible. It will provide the
capability and be able to step up, hence the phased and
adaptive aspects of the title, as the Iranian ability to use
ballistic missiles goes forward.
It is being well received in Europe. We're in dialogue with
a variety of the potential partners for emplacement of it.
Secretary Ellen Tauscher is in charge of that particular
effort. She's doing a very good job working with the allies to
move forward on it. So overall, yes, I am a supporter of it and
I believe that it will be very effective in defending Europe
over time, as well as the United States, of course.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Admiral.
General, can you give us an update of the status of al
Qaeda in Africa?
General Ward. We look at al Qaeda in Africa, Senator, in
two locations essentially, although it is likely that they're
in more, but predominantly East Africa al Qaeda and al Qaeda
Islamic Maghreb. We see in the northern part of the continent
al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb. They are operating, conducting
kidnappings, and other sorts of activities that certainly
threaten our interests and the interests of our partners in the
region.
In the eastern part of the continent, we see East Africa al
Qaeda. Recently the claims of a merging between the Al Shabab
in Somalia with East Africa al Qaeda are there, and linkages
between East Africa al Qaeda and al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. I would say that we certainly see indications of the
presence of al Qaeda in Africa, predominantly in the East
Africa region, as well as in the Sahel in the greater Sahara
part of the continent as well, sir.
Senator LeMieux. Is it a growing influence? Are they
becoming more organized?
General Ward. I would not characterize it there. I would
like to come back with something for the record with more
specific detail. But I would also offer that, based on what
they are saying, they are seeking to expand their influence in
the East Africa region as well as in the North Africa region.
[The information referred to follows:]

Al Qaeda's influence in Africa has grown in recent years, as
demonstrated by its increased ties with extremist groups in both East
and North Africa. As al Qaeda becomes less focused on operations in
Iraq, the group's influence on the continent of Africa is likely to
expand.

On 11 September 2006, the Algeria-based Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) officially merged with al
Qaeda, becoming al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). Since the merger, AQIM has developed into al Qaeda's
regional arm, increasingly adopting al Qaeda-style tactics,
ideology, and propaganda. While primarily focused on North
Africa and the Sahel, AQIM is attempting to increase its reach
into West Africa and Europe, expanding al Qaeda's presence.
A limited number of al Qaeda operatives, notably Harun
Fazul, likely remain active in East Africa.
Over the past 18 months, al Qaeda leaders in
Afghanistan/Pakistan and al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia have
exchanged messages of mutual support.
A growing number of foreign fighters are entering
Somalia to train and fight with al-Shabaab against the African
Union Mission to Somalia and Somali Transitional Federal
Government forces. Al Shabaab and the foreign fighters
increasingly use tactics and methods typically associated with
al Qaeda.

Senator LeMieux. General, this weekend we learned that 500
people, including women and babies, were massacred in Nigeria.
What's our current strategy to curtail human rights abuses in
Africa?
General Ward. As we conduct our military-to-military
relations with the various nations of Africa, we encourage the
promotion of human rights. We encourage the conduct of
militaries in professional ways. Obviously, those activities
that you described, I've seen nothing to point that they were
committed by the military of Nigeria. Clearly the role that's
been taken by the Nigerians to go in and stop that action is
something that we applaud. We certainly, like all others,
deplore that type of activity, the killing of any innocent
people. We would certainly encourage the work that's being done
by the Government of Nigeria to address those atrocities, those
who are responsible, to arrest them, and do their very best to
prevent that. But we clearly see that as something that is
deplorable and we certainly regret the loss of innocent life to
those means.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, General.
General Mattis, there was a London Times article earlier
this week which talked about our European allies and their
vulnerability to a cyber attack and the rise of China as a
hostile cyber combatant. What are we doing to strengthen our
allies' defenses and safeguard the sensitive information that
we share with them?
General Mattis. Senator, I'd have to take that for the
record to give you more data. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
is our main effort on the cyber effort, and we're in constant
contact with them. We also work on the concepts. Frankly, we're
scrambling to find a concept that takes into account how best
to protect our networks, and obviously we must maintain an
exploitation capability against the enemy. It is hard to come
up with a theory that also includes the constitutional issues
within our own country as far as how we do this protection.
Our first step is to protect our DOD networks. We work
closely with our NATO allies, but also some other allies in the
world, who work with us on putting these concepts together.
We're drawing a fair amount of traction with STRATCOM now that
they've been assigned this and they're maturing it. I'd have to
get back to you with more detail, which I can do. But I will do
so by going to STRATCOM to make sure I'm current.
[The information referred to follows:]

Cyber defense is a critical warfighter challenge in today's joint
and coalition operational environment. The recent Quadrennial Defense
Review identified cyber as a priority area for the Department of
Defense and we are working with our partners to mitigate cyber
vulnerabilities, increase the resilience of key U.S. and coalition
command and control infrastructures, and develop a shared cyber
doctrine to facilitate the sharing of information and technology. In
coordination with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), we have incorporated cyber operations into the wargaming,
limited objective experiments and training events that we conduct with
our allies. Future interactions will take advantage of NATO's
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to advance cyber defense
capabilities of U.S and other NATO nations and enhance our
interoperability in the field of cooperative cyber defense.

Admiral Stavridis. Senator, may I just add that in Europe
NATO has established a center for cyber. It's in Estonia, which
is appropriate since they suffered a severe cyber attack 2
years ago. I think, as General Mattis says, it's indicative
that all of these organizations are reaching to build the first
nascent structures that can focus on this problem. But I
believe it's vital, and it is something we think about a lot in
EUCOM. I know all the combatant commanders do.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you. I think it's vital, too, and I
appreciate getting a follow-up on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, you recently discussed your concerns
with me on cyber security and in the broader context how you
view the vastness of this realm as a cyber sea. In a recent
paper that you authored, I want to give a quote that really
paints a picture of this sea for me. You wrote: ``The seas I
refer to, however, are not of water and waves, but of zeros and
ones, optic fibers and photons, routers and browsers, and
satellites and servers. The cyber sea is the new global commons
and it is untamed.''
Two recent examples that I can think of for cyber security
attacks is when the Iraqi insurgents recently intercepted video
feeds from a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle using off-the-
shelf software, and then a second one concerning Google
claiming that Chinese hackers stole some of its computer coding
and attempted to break into Chinese dissidents' emails.
Will you describe your principal concerns with cyber
security and how you think we can best mitigate our exposure?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Senator. I completely agree
with the thrust of Senator LeMieux's questions, as well as
General Mattis's response. I think that today we have a billion
devices that are accessing the Internet. Our economies are
fundamentally intertwined in this cyber sea, and it is an
outlaw sea. We do not have the norms, the buoy systems, the
navigation, or the satellites. Nothing really exists to develop
norms of behavior in the cyber world.
So I think that there's a military component to this, but
it's actually a much larger problem. This is a classic example
of whole of society approach must really be taken into account
here. It's not even whole of government. As you point out,
Google and many other private companies are very engaged in
this.
From the military perspective, what we're trying to do in
EUCOM and in NATO is to highlight the challenges ahead, put in
place initial structures, do the kind of damage control that
General Mattis is talking about to initially at least protect
ourselves, and then I think what's necessary is to think our
way forward through a process that can create these kind of
global norms.
That may be a process that brings a lot of nations together
to have this conversation. Just as we gather to talk about the
climate and have a global summit on the climate, I think at
some point there needs to be a very global conversation on this
challenge.
Senator Hagan. Well, I understand that in the summer of
2009 EUCOM held an exercise called the Combined Endeavor, which
included a mix of international, interagency, and public-
private entities focused on computer network defense. I also
understand that NATO recently established a cooperative cyber
defense center of excellence in Estonia to enhance the
capability, cooperation, and information-sharing among NATO
nations and our partners in cyber defense.
How can this endeavor serve as a model for the development
of multi-national policies to ensure continued unimpeded and
lawful access to cyber space?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for highlighting those
activities of EUCOM. I hasten to say that each of the combatant
commanders is taking this on. I know General Ward is doing
this. I know obviously STRATCOM is at the very heart of it, as
General Mattis said. We're all grappling with this. I think
that the more we cross-communicate and cross-level our efforts
at this stage, the more effective we'll be in dealing with
this.
So I believe that exercises that bring international,
inter-agency, and private-public actors together as we try to
do a combined endeavor need to be elevated and taken to a
higher level by the nations that want to connect on this. We're
working that very hard, as you mentioned, on the NATO side
through the center in Estonia.
Senator Hagan. I'm very concerned about this because I see
numerous examples going forward of where we will be subject to
much more attack on the cyber sea.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagan. General Ward, the U.N. peacekeeping mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest
and most expensive, and reportedly the U.N. could begin
withdrawing its troops from the western portion of the country
as early as June 2010. Additionally, the U.N. peacekeeping
mission reportedly plans to begin withdrawing from the unstable
eastern portion of the country in June 2011.
Studies estimate that up to 1,200 people die each day from
conflict-related causes as well as diseases and malnutrition.
Rampant corruption and pervasive weak government allows members
of the national army and members of armed groups alike to abuse
civilians.
Can you please describe the effects that a U.N.
peacekeeping mission withdrawal from the DRC would have on the
stability of the country and region, and what plans are in
place to counter the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) that's focused on destabilizing the eastern
portion of the DRC? I'll be happy to repeat any of that.
General Ward. Well, thank you, Senator. I am sure if I
don't get to everything you'll remind me.
First, as President Kabila talks to the U.N. on the
withdrawal of those forces from the DRC, I too think it would
not be a good idea for that to occur too quickly. The
conditions that you described with respect to the corruption,
the professionalism of the armed forces of the DRC, their
activity, the lawlessness in the eastern part of the country to
be sure, all contribute to abuses to the population and to
instability.
The U.N. force that's there has clearly been a force for
good in addressing those conditions. Large as that contingent
is, given the size of the DRC, it is still not covering that
entire country. But any place where those forces are reduced
would have I believe a negative effect. Right now the western
part of the country is in fact the most stable, so it would
probably be least affected with the withdrawal of U.N. forces.
But clearly in the eastern part of the country, where the
majority of the things occur against the people, either being
committed by rebel groups who operate in that region or in some
cases by the armed forces of the DRC itself, I think the
removal of U.N. forces would have a detrimental effect on those
overall conditions.
As we work with DOS and others with the Congolese as they
address in a comprehensive way the plethora of conditions that
contribute to the instability and the lawlessness, our focus
now is moving ahead with training of a battalion that hopefully
can serve as a model for what professional behavior is and what
it could lead to for other parts of the armed forces of the
DRC.
We have begun that program in earnest about 2 weeks ago. It
will run about another 6 or 7 months, and should it prove
successful there's potential that it could be expanded to other
battalions as well to help a process of increasing
professionalism and ability of the armed forces of the DRC to
move ahead.
The work being done by the FDLR in the east, the Congolese
are addressing that through some of their activities, supported
by the U.N., and I think that too is important work as a part
of the overall comprehensive way that those rebel groups have
to be addressed. As we've also seen, I might add, with the
cooperation that has existed between Uganda, the Congo, Rwanda,
as well as the Central African Republic in a regional way to
address these common threats is something that we also will
continue to encourage.
Senator Hagan. Well, I'm extremely concerned about the
number of people that are dying every day and certainly the
abuse of their men and women is just reprehensible. But thank
you for your testimony.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to add
my thanks to these three distinguished Americans who've
dedicated their lives to protecting us. So from me to you,
thank you, gentlemen.
I will submit, Mr. Chairman, some questions for the record,
because I have a whole list of them here, and I'm going to
start with General Ward. General, your command was designed to
employ the whole-of-government approach to executing theater
security cooperation and to facilitate counterterrorism efforts
within the African nations. General, what is the future role of
the JTF-HOA and the military base in Djibouti?
General Ward. Sir, Camp Lemonnier is I believe a very
critical part of our national structure in that part of the
continent. It serves four combatant commands, not just mine. It
also serves U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Special
Operations Command, as well as U.S. Transportation Command as a
logistics hub, as an infrastructure point, as well as a
training platform.
I think it is in the long-term interest of the United
States to maintain that facility to the degree that we have and
continue to improve upon it, that will allow our activities in
support of our missions in that part of the world to be
facilitated. It is very important to us. I think it has great
long-term meaning for us and I will clearly endorse it over the
long term.
JTF-HOA, which is my force that's there right now,
continues to do work in the region insofar as helping build the
capacity of those nations in East Africa to counter the terror
threat, as well as to be able to deal with the threat of terror
by increasing their capacity. We are providing training
assistance, equipping assistance, mentoring assistance,
professionalization of their militaries, as well as helping to
bring them together in a regional way as they continue to work
together to address that common thread.
So both activities and the platform itself, being Camp
Lemonnier, are important. The work being done by the JTF-HOA as
it executes its programs, fully aligned with the goals and
objectives of AFRICOM are also very, very instrumental in
promoting that degree of professionalism in East Africa and in
other parts of the continent where we see those unique
capabilities that could be applied, in particular the civil
affairs work.
Senator Burris. General, do you feel, since you're the last
command to be stood up here, that you are fully operative and
fully personnel-staffed correctly? Or do you really need
additional staff personnel?
General Ward. Senator, we always look for more. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense has written to all of his colleagues
asking for additional interagency support. Not that we would do
the work of the interagency, but so that the interagency input
to our work could be further assuring that what we do in fact
is in keeping with supporting the overall comprehensive work
being done by other parts of our Government.
We don't have all that we would like to have, but there is
a recognition on the part of our interagency partners that they
should be and want to be a part of this command, and as we
continue to move forward we see that occurring. That's why I
endorse all that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman says
about increasing the capacities of our interagency partners as
well, so that they can in fact participate.
Senator Burris. Are you going to get Egypt into your
AFRICOM? When do you anticipate that taking place?
General Ward. Egypt, as you pointed out, Senator, is
aligned with CENTCOM. But for matters of the continent of
Africa, currently we can work with Egypt. In fact, I will be in
Egypt in a matter of a couple weeks working with them on
matters of the continent.
Senator Burris. Also, General, the reason why we have not
been able to locate AFRICOM in an African country is because of
the politics of these countries and locating the right country
would be a major undertaking. Is that the reason why we have
not located it there and it's still in Stuttgart, or can we
find a very friendly African country to headquarter AFRICOM on
the continent of Africa?
General Ward. Senator, that is very complex. The reasons
that you cite are part of it. But it's more than that. At this
point in time, I think if our work is to be about increasing
the capacity of African nations, it's our programs and our
activities that we do in about 38 different countries right
now. That's the important part, and the effort to find a
location with all the other associated issues would be
distracting to the real work of the command, that is through
our programs.
Senator Burris. Admiral, theater engagement seems to be a
major tool used by the command when partnering with the nations
within your AOR. How is the National Guard's State partnership
program integrated into your theater engagement strategy?
Admiral Stavridis. Deeply, deeply engaged. This State
partnership program, which brings the State Guard into
individual nations to partner with their militaries, is
fundamental to what we're doing. We have 26 of them around
EUCOM, and I'd highlight just one among many, which is the
Georgia Guard, which is partnered with the military of the
Republic of Georgia. The two of them are working hand in hand
to prepare a deployment of the Republic of Georgia's brave
soldiers. They're going to send 750 to Afghanistan.
So multiply that by 26 programs around the theater and you
get a sense of how important this is, sir.
Senator Burris. Thank you.
General Mattis, you have a completed draft document,
``Education and Employment Principles for Interagency
Operations and Integration.'' One of your working concepts is
to stand up an exploratory civilian force. What is the mission
and employment of the expeditionary civilian force?
General Mattis. Sir, there are two expeditionary civilian
forces that we're looking at. One is inside DOD, and this is
where you actually take DOD civilians who can fill certain jobs
overseas on these joint coalition interagency staffs in these
irregular wars.
I think the one you're referring to there is the one where
we work with Ambassador Herbst in Secretary Clinton's DOS, and
that is where we are putting together, with their help,
concepts that would integrate better the civilian-military
interface when we enter into these kinds of wars that cannot be
won by military means alone. There will be an immediate
response force that's being built. These will be people who
have been trained. It's their primary job. Their packs are
packed. They have their shots. They've been through various
exercises with the military, and are ready to go on short
notice.
Then there will be a response force of members of various
agencies, and they will be ones who are basically trained.
They're like the reserves. They go to some training every year.
They're maintained as far as health records and deployment
records, and they know what to do. But it would take us
anywhere from 30 to 90 days to get them deployed.
Then there's a larger force of people that we would
endeavor to train as well, and that would be the sustainment
force that would replace these others.
Senator Burris. We are using contractors for some of this
service, are we not, for these forces? The private contractors
that you see in the theater.
General Mattis. The ones we're looking at, that I just
described, are under DOS, Ambassador Herbst's effort, and those
are all Government employees. Contractors would be a separate
issue, and we do that when we have to fill the gaps when we
don't have the Active Duty or active government civilians that
we can put in.
Senator Burris. My time has expired, so I will yield, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Tomorrow in
our Emerging Threats Subcommittee we're going to look at the
comprehensive way that the military, integrating with the
civilian agencies, can best project U.S. power and interests.
This is particularly applicable to General Ward and Admiral
Stavridis, not only with regard to your present interests in
Afghanistan, Admiral, but also your previous command of
SOUTHCOM. General Ward, clearly AFRICOM is taking this
comprehensive approach.
Mr. Chairman, I was not very satisfied when we had the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ms. Flournoy, come to talk to
us about the policy. It didn't seem to me that DOD had its act
together on integrating, and it was like there were the same
old answers about stovepipes that we're trying to break down.
You give your commanders on the ground the opportunity that
they have a certain amount of CERP funds that they can go out
and dig a well or build a school. But above that, an integrated
approach, which is key to Afghanistan, which is key to Africa,
which is key to Latin America, things like wells, education,
training for jobs, the position of women, medical, all of these
things that for us to be successful in third world areas like
we are projected, there has to be a holistic approach.
The military has been so good as the one who leads it, and
that of course is what is the thrust of AFRICOM and, Admiral
Stavridis, your former command. I'd like to have you reflect,
because I'm worried about Afghanistan that once we get beyond
those CERP funds that these courageous young officers can go in
and utilize, that then we get right back into the old
stovepipes.
I have the head of USAID coming in in the morning and I
want to talk to that person about this. So can the two of you
give me some advice, and also advice for our Emerging Threats
Subcommittee, which it's the subject of our hearing tomorrow,
Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I fully share your
prescription, which is that we have to put together a
comprehensive approach. It's a whole of society approach. It
really is interagency, international, private-public, and it
all has to be connected in a way that we have not been
terrifically effective at in any of these theaters.
We will never deliver security in Afghanistan from the
barrel of a gun. It has to be some as a result of all of these
mechanisms working together. To that end, I just met with Dr.
Shah, the Administrator of USAID. He's extremely impressive,
highly energized and energetic, and he's coming out of the
Gates Foundation, which gives him a very significant grounding
in this private-public kind of connection.
We're exploring with him how we can better partner. State
Department, as General Mattis is talking about, is working very
hard at this with Ambassador Herbst and his team. We have a
long way to go, but I believe that this precise issue is the
most important security issue for the United States moving
forward in this 21st century.
Back to the cyber piece, if you look at cyber as one of
these emerging threats, it's a classic example of why this
comprehensive approach is needed. It is fully validated. I
believe all of the departments should continue to be pushed
very hard to integrate their efforts at all levels, and that
getting that balance of civilian, military, private, public,
and interagency is crucial to our security going forward.
Kip?
General Ward. Senator, I clearly concur with what Admiral
Stavridis just indicated. We know that it's something that's
important to do. We have not broken the code on how to do it at
each echelon. We do it fairly well on the ground. The country
teams in the countries where DOS, USAID, and other members of
the interagency who are there working with the military
component, do a fairly good job of harmonizing the activities
that occur on the ground. We need to do better at how we plan
those endeavors. In my command, as we bring in members of the
interagency to help us with our planning, it's a two-way street
because through their understanding of us, their input back to
their parent organization can help ensure a harmonization of
the planning that occurs.
As the Secretary has pointed out, we think that the
capacity of some of the interagency partners to do that needs
to be more robust. So we support those efforts that would in
fact increase their capacity to participate in the planning as
well as in the execution of these programs that bring the
comprehensive effects to stability that you address.
So we recognize it's an issue. It works more, better than
not, at the lower echelon. We need to expand that through every
echelon so that at the inception of our work we have done a
better job of combining what we call this 3D approach, the
issues of development--obviously, a public-private
partnership--the issues of diplomacy, which includes obviously
good governance and those things that address how a society is
governed; and defense, those security aspects that need to be
there so that those other things can in fact work.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what advice should I give to the
head of USAID tomorrow? What questions should I ask in our
hearing tomorrow that would get around USAID, they go out and
they contract with somebody to do this, let's say it's digging
wells, but there's clearly need for education over here--let's
take Afghanistan--and a medical clinic and training for jobs.
How do we get the comprehensive approach? You have each of
these nongovernmental organizations and they want to do their
thing. How do we get it all combined in an approach?
Admiral Stavridis. Two thoughts. One is the Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which is what USAID
and DOS are working together now; this is happening in real
time. So I think that that's an opportunity to work on the
integration, the alignment, and the partnering between USAID
and DOS and how that marries up with the QDR, the DOD document,
is a place where you could get the three main actors in this
security mix coordinating their plans at the very highest
level.
If you click down one, General Ward has it exactly right,
which is it's the planning. It's the planning that we ought to
go after, because that's where our other agencies are off doing
their plans and we're doing our plans, and then we meet in
Afghanistan and the plans aren't particularly aligned.
I think bringing together a layer of planning below that
strategic layer represented by the QDR and the QDDR, I think in
terms of how we can encourage the agencies to do plans
together, to have transparency in planning, to show across the
board what the big muscle movements are country by country, and
integrate those plans, so there is not duplication.
So as General Ward says, one level down, now we're at the
tactical level, it's seamless. It proceeds from the strategic
through the operational planning down to the tactical
execution. I'd focus in on that planning piece, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Admiral, General, thank you very much for being
here and thank you for your outstanding service to our country.
General Mattis, I wanted to get your views on the
development of the air-sea battle concept. The new QDR directs
the Navy and the Air Force to develop a joint air-sea battle
concept for defeating adversaries with sophisticated anti-
access and area denial capabilities, which in turn will help
guide the development of future capabilities needed for
effective power projection operations.
Could you provide your views on the development of this new
air-sea battle concept so far and where does JFCOM fit into the
development, evaluation, and implementation of this concept?
General Mattis. Yes, Senator. Thank you. The air-sea battle
concept grew out of identification of a military problem, and
that problem is how do we work together jointly in order to
maintain control of one of the commons, the sea lanes. The
situation is changing. It's always changing security-wise and
adapting to that problem has brought these two Services
together.
JFCOM is part of this effort. We're monitoring it right
now, but we're monitoring it to make sure that what we've done
in past experiments and concept development guides this forward
and also that we harvest from them the lessons that they're
learning as they come to grips with this problem broken down
into bite-sized pieces.
What we're seeing is more and more this integration at
every level of war. At one time we basically integrated at the
strategic level and that was good. Then we got into the
operational level of integration. You saw that in Operation
Desert Storm and certainly in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-1.
We're now integrating down at the tactical level. No longer can
any service go into even one of its primary domains--the Army
on the land, the Navy at sea, the Air Force in the air--and not
integrate with others.
It's the nature of warfare today, it's the nature of a lot
of things, that you have to integrate more than ever in this
age. So it's going forward well. I think the identification of
the problems is maturing well. I would say we're in very good
shape on that. The solutions are not completely clarified yet,
and we will also uncover additional problems as we go forward.
Ultimately we will see an increased reliance on naval
forces as we look toward the future security situation. It must
be that way for matters of limited access in certain areas for
political or military reasons, and to bring the Air Force and
the Navy together I think is a very healthy thing at this
point, even though we have not completely got all the problems
outlined. But we're getting there.
Senator Thune. In your opinion how will long-range strike
capabilities fit into this new air-sea battle concept?
General Mattis. Sir, we look at these issues in phases.
Certainly during phase zero, when we're engaging along the
lines of what AFRICOM has been testifying to here today, what
we're doing is we're trying to deter enemies and potential
adversaries from ever doing something that we don't want them
to do that would be disadvantageous to international stability.
When you put together a strong capability like this, you
temper our potential adversaries' designs. Should it go into a
combat phase, the planning for this comes under something
called campaign design. In that area, the strike capability
that would be built would be fundamental to ensuring that we
deter our enemies and reassure our friends that we can get
through to them and support them.
Senator Thune. Do you foresee in any future budget requests
changes based on this new concept? For example, equipment
requests with regard to this new concept?
General Mattis. Sir, I'd like to take a pause on that one,
because I think first we need to get the concept right before
we come to you asking for money. Certainly the strike
capabilities will have to be maintained at the cutting edge.
But I can't really forecast until we get the concept right,
which is based on a very clear problem statement of what we're
trying to solve, whether or not that will mean new programs.
Senator Thune. Admiral, advanced weapons systems designed
for anti-access and area denial are being proliferated
throughout the world, including in the EUCOM AOR. Russia's
developing advanced surface-to-air missile systems, advanced
fifth generation type fighter aircraft, and even hinting at
plans to develop a new long-range bomber.
While the likelihood of conflict with Russia is low, it
seems more likely that we will be involved in a future conflict
against adversaries who possess advanced anti-aircraft and area
denial weapons systems sold to them by the Russians. What are
your views on these activities by the Russians to develop and
proliferate anti-access and area denial systems?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, we continuously evaluate
globally all of the threat systems that are emerging, and
indeed Russia is developing some very sophisticated ones that
you mentioned, along with some, I would add, subsurface,
submarine kinds of capabilities. So clearly we have to pace
that. Clearly we have to maintain our superiority at all levels
as we go forward, and I think that applies not solely to
Russia, but really looking globally at all the threats that's a
fundamental responsibility of the Department.
Senator Thune. Do you view Russia's development of a fifth
generation fighter aircraft as a cause for concern?
Admiral Stavridis. I do.
Senator Thune. How about their planned development of a new
long-range bomber?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, I would put that again in the
category of a wide variety of emerging global threats. But
those would be among them.
Senator Thune. I have one other question I wanted to ask.
The Russians are seeking to link missile defense to a follow-on
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and negotiations, as we
understand, have stalled over the Russian demand for the option
to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if they determine that
our missile defenses would threaten its nuclear missile force.
To the best of your knowledge, is there any effort to
negotiate a side agreement with the Russians on this issue?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I have no idea. That would be
squarely in the purview of DOS.
Senator Thune. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
We expect votes just about now. There's four votes coming.
So let's try to have a second round for everybody. Do you have
additional questions, Senator Burris?
Senator Burris. No, Mr. Chairman. I'm just trying to listen
to these distinguished gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Okay, great. I just have a few and then we
can turn it over to Senator Inhofe.
You've spoken about your support, Admiral, of the new
Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense. One of the
possibilities being considered is to ask Russia to cooperate in
the European missile defense effort with their radar
information as a way to enhance security against shared missile
threats. Do you support that idea?
Admiral Stavridis. I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. If we were able to achieve it, what would
it be?
Admiral Stavridis. First, it would create a zone of
cooperation with Russia, which I think is an important good as
I look at the military-to-military responsibilities I have in
EUCOM.
Second, I think it could technically add to the early
warning time because of the location of the system.
Then third, I think it creates confidence-building measures
between ourselves and the Russians.
Chairman Levin. Does the Polish Government now support the
missile defense approach?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it's fair to say in general
terms they do, yes, sir. I would not speak for the Polish
Government.
Chairman Levin. All right. Have they spoken on it yet?
Admiral Stavridis. They have not. That's my intuition based
on my conversations, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is there discussions or agreements with the
Polish Government relative to the deployment of a Patriot
training battery in Poland?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, there is.
Chairman Levin. Has that been completed yet, those
discussions?
Admiral Stavridis. I think we are literally signing the
final memorandum of understanding this week, and I anticipate
that deployment going forward in the next 30 days.
Chairman Levin. The AFRICOM manning issue has been raised,
General, as to whether or not you have enough personnel. You've
indicated you'd like some more if you can get them. But my
question has to do with this. Apparently your Service
components are not assigned to you as assigned forces; is that
correct?
General Ward. The Service components are assigned, sir.
They have no assigned forces under them, but my components are
assigned to me.
Chairman Levin. Okay. But underneath them there are no
forces; do I have that right now?
General Ward. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Those forces are generally provided through
a global force management and request for forces system. Have
you applied for forces? Have you made that request through that
system?
General Ward. I have. I use the global force management
process, as do the other combatant commands as well, for
satisfying my requirements for forces to do our missions that
we have to undertake on the continent.
Chairman Levin. Finally, the Department is currently in the
process of updating the guidance for employment of the force
(GEF) which establishes the Department's strategic objectives
for campaign planning and security cooperation and the
priorities to be established. There's an ongoing rewrite of the
GEF. It's the first, I think, since AFRICOM was established. Is
AFRICOM receiving a fair hearing under that revision process?
General Ward. Yes, Senator. I've been a part of that
process and I'm fully aware that DOD, as it looks at its
revision of the GEF, is looking at ensuring that the
requirement that we have for resources to conduct the very
essential building partner capacity is being treated at a level
of priority different than the past, so that those forces that
are required to do that mission will enjoy a higher priority
than has been the case in the past. We are participating in
that process.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
General Mattis. Can I just associate myself with General
Ward on that particular issue. I think it is a bit of a sea
change in the Department and it's a good one.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, there's only one area where I disagree
with you, and I've told you this before. But I'd like to have
you tell me where I'm wrong on this. Our intelligence tells us
that Iran would have the long-range ballistic capability
somewhere between 2015 and 2020. I'd say 2015 then, as serious
as that is. The SM-31B, which is short- and medium-range, that
would be 2015, but it doesn't matter. That doesn't have the
capability, nor does the 2A variety, which would get into
intermediate, and that's supposed to be somewhere around 2018.
The SM-32B, which is supposed to be comparable to what we
would have had--at least I think this is the case--if we had
had and kept the ground-based system or the ground-based
interceptor in Poland, there is no date on that.
I objected to that first budget of the President just for
the terminating of all these programs, such as the F-22, the C-
17, and the Future Combat System. But the thing I found most
objectionable was when he pulled the rug out from under Poland
and the Czech Republic. I was with Vaclav Klaus this last
Friday.
I understand the argument that we have the ground-based
system in Alaska and California. I don't have the confidence
that that would have that coverage that far for the eastern
United States. I guess I would just say, just briefly, what am
I overlooking?
Admiral Stavridis. Senator, I'm going to ask to take that
one for the record and come back to you. I think it's a
technical issue that I would like to provide you a little more
data on. I will say that, as a naval officer who has commanded
multiple Aegis ships at sea, I am extremely impressed,
naturally given my background, with the Aegis system and its
ability to adapt. So part of my confidence comes out of my
grounding in my many years at sea operating with that system
and my belief that it can be successfully transitioned ashore.
Having said that, I want to provide you the hard data on
this and I'd like to take that for the record to do that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Inhofe. That's all right, and I don't disagree with
you. I've been a strong supporter of the Aegis system. But
we're talking about long-range intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). Okay, fine, we'll get that for the record.
General Ward, I was appreciative of the fact that you said
some good things about Ethiopia in the response to, I believe
it was, the chairman's question. Specifically, I know that the
one who has been under attack in Ethiopia more than anyone else
is Prime Minister Meles. My personal feeling is he has a tough
job, but he's a tough guy and he's been able to do it.
Would you make the same comments about his leadership as
you would just Ethiopia in general?
General Ward. Senator, I meet with Prime Minister Meles
quite regularly and I have a huge respect for his leadership
and the work that he does, especially as it pertains to
addressing the threat of terror and cooperating with those who
also address that threat of terror in East Africa.
Senator Inhofe. The fact that he was there with us when the
Somalia thing happened--I think he's taking a bum rap is my
position.
You talked, when you were talking to Senator Hagan, about
the cooperation between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC. I
personally have talked to Museveni and Kagame and Kabila on
their cooperation with each other, but in another area, and
that is the area of the LRA in northern Uganda, or wherever
they are right now. We made a point to go over to East Africa
to Goma thinking that was about where he was last seen, and
he's had another reign of terror since that time.
We have legislation right now that is going to try to give
more assistance to those presidents and those countries to try
to end what I call one of the worst reigns of terror I've ever
personally observed, and I've been there and have observed it.
Do you think we should be helping with more resources to end
that particular LRA problem? Would you support me on that?
General Ward. Yes, sir. The work being done by that group
of countries to combat the atrocities that the LRA has
committed for over 25 years is work that's important and I
think our support to those ongoing efforts is important
support.
Senator Inhofe. I think most of the members on this
committee are actually co-sponsors of the legislation that we
have that would be helpful to resolve that. One of the problems
we have is that all three of these presidents came from a
military background and there's always a little bit of a
concern over, is this reflecting that I can't do it myself? But
I think we're finally in a position to jointly work on this
thing.
Let's see. Is there anything else in terms of what is
taking place right now in Africa? Maybe you can give us a
couple of examples of the improvements you've made working with
the African militaries, some of the successes there.
General Ward. Thank you, Senator. There are several. As an
example, as we work with the littoral nations on their maritime
safety and security, our various programs, one we call the
AFRICOM Maritime Law Enforcement Program, it's an interagency
construct. We bring in members of Homeland Security and the
Coast Guard working with African nations and their legal
systems such that they have a better ability to provide for the
territorial integrity of their waters. That is working.
We conducted an exercise in East Africa whereby we had five
participating nations, the first time ever. They came together
jointly working to help address a natural disaster or
humanitarian assistance scenario. But as was pointed out to me
by a chief of defense of one of these nations, as convoys moved
through that part of the continent 10 years ago you would not
have thought that they would have come together to link up and
then move to a common objective that was conducted in the north
of Uganda, where the LRA had just 3 short years ago been
running with abandon and devastating the populations there.
Those are happening all over the place. We had a training
operation in Mali. In the chairman's opening statement he
mentioned what went on in Mali last summer. A member who
received training this past January said had he had that
training prior to that last July situation where the Malians
encountered al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb forces, he said
that would not have happened.
So our work to train and assist these countries so that
they can be in a better position to address these threats
themselves is paying off.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I applaud all three of you for the great work you're doing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I'm going to have to leave now, so I'll turn the gavel over
to Senator Lieberman.
Thank you all very much for your service.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Ward, I just wanted to say to you first how
impressed I am as I hear you answer the questions about what's
happening within the African continent and your involvement in
it, your knowledge of it, and how important it is, that we
created AFRICOM, because I think we were paying too little
attention to this critically important continent.
I think you're bringing to it the same kind of critical
relationship with the leaders there. In some of the regions of
the world, the most important person in the region really is
our regional commander. Now, as you said to me when I began
this conversation before the hearing, it's only in a sense the
door in and it hopefully leads to other relationships,
diplomatic, political, economic, etcetera.
Anyway, I wanted to thank you for the way in which you've
done your job, and it's been very important.
Admiral Stavridis, I know you've been asked already about
missile defense. In your role, you are going to be responsible
for operating the early stages of the Phased Adaptive Missile
Defense System for Europe. I thought I'd ask you first for an
analysis, if you will, or a report on what the state of
European public opinion is about missile defense? In other
words, do the Europeans feel vulnerable now? There have been
times in the not so distant history where I think they haven't.
Do they feel vulnerable, and if so who are they worried about
firing missiles at them?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think there's a growing
appreciation in Europe for the danger specifically from Iran. I
think they look at the nature of that regime, clearly a state
sponsor of terrorism, working hard to develop a nuclear device.
Additionally, I think there's a great deal of understanding
that the ballistic missile technology that the Iranians possess
is moving apace. So that is having a salutary effect on the
European proclivity to be engaged with us in missile defense.
It varies from country to country, and there are a number
of factors that range from geography to relationships with the
United States to general world outlook that shape it. But I
think in my opinion it's fair to say that we are seeing a
growing appreciation of it. Again, I have to applaud assistant
Secretary Ellen Tauscher, who is moving forward on the
diplomatic side of this thing. She's an expert in all of this
and she's doing, I think, a very credible job of forging the
practical partnerships which I believe over time will grow into
a fully integrated missile defense.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the
work that Ellen Tauscher has done, as you do.
There was some concern here on Capitol Hill when the
decision was made to pull back from the Polish-Czech plan. How
are we doing? I know you've answered this in part, but how are
we doing on the development of the alternative system? Are you
confident that it will meet the target dates we've set so it
will provide adequate defense?
Admiral Stavridis. I'm certainly confident that the first
stage will. It'll be sea-based and, as you heard me say to
Senator Inhofe, I have a great deal of confidence in that part
of it. Given the track record of that system and the technology
embedded in it, I am reasonably confident that it will be
adapted and will transition to a shore-based system within the
targets that are set for it.
Nobody can predict the delivery of defense technology.
We've all been surprised on that occasionally. But given the
track record of the system and given my understanding of where
we are, I think it's very reasonable to expect that we will hit
those bells as we move forward.
Senator Lieberman. That's good to hear.
There was a related article in the Washington Post this
morning about the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).
It says, ``After several failed attempts, the Army is trying
again to cancel the $19 billion missile defense system that the
United States is developing in partnership with Italy and
Germany. Known as MEADS, it has been in the works for more than
a decade and is designed to replace in part the Army's aging
Patriot system.''
I wanted to ask you whether you've been involved in
discussions with your Army colleagues about this program and
what your opinion of it is, and ultimately the unique feature
of this is that we have a couple of our European allies, not
only involved, but picking up a big chunk of the bill--whether
you see the MEADS as part of the phased adaptive missile
defense system that you're now helping to implement?
Admiral Stavridis. I have not gone into detail on MEADS
with my Army brethren who are developing that here in the
United States. I will tell you in Europe there is a sense that
the system can be a functioning part of a missile defense
system. I recently spoke with several chiefs of defense from
the participating nations who mentioned that.
I think, Senator Lieberman, it's also indicative of the
relationship between the United States and Israel, where we are
working and looking at some of the Israeli capabilities that
you're aware of, the Iron Dome System and the Arrow System. I
think we in the United States do not have the market cornered
on all the smart technology. We would be well served by
reaching out to our allies and finding what can be integrated.
I think MEADS potentially is in fact a player in that.
So I will continue to follow the MEADS story as it unfolds.
But I think it's more important as an example of how additional
technologies can be adapted to the Phased Adaptive Approach,
which is one reason it's an attractive system.
Senator Lieberman. So at this point you're inclined to
favor the continuation of the MEADS program?
Admiral Stavridis. I don't know enough about MEADS to make
that statement, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Right, okay. But I agree with you.
There's a growing appreciation among allies in Europe, in the
Middle East, and in Asia of the missile threat, particularly
from Iran and North Korea. It just makes a lot of sense for us
to operate, as we have been, cooperatively.
You're right, the last time I was in Israel I saw some
video of testing of the Iron Dome System, which is a defense
against short-range missiles or rockets. It was quite
impressive. We're partners in that with the Israelis and we'll
have full benefit, I think, from its technologies in terms, for
instance, of protecting American personnel and bases in places
like Europe or the Middle East from potential short-range
missile rocket attack.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. That's it for me. I have to go over to
vote. It's been a very informational and encouraging hearing.
I'm sure the committee, as it normally does, will try our best
to authorize to a level that will continue to allow the three
of you and the many men and women in uniform who serve under
you to do the job that we ask you to do in defense of our
security and our freedom.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
u.s. army posture in europe
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, pending the review of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Strategic Concept and an
accompanying U.S. assessment of our European defense posture network,
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended maintaining four
brigade combat teams (BCTs) and an Army Corps headquarters forward
stationed on the European continent. In your written statement, you
stated ``without the four BCTs and one tactical intermediate
headquarters capability, European Command (EUCOM) assumes risk in its
capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and
contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased
risk.'' How important for your priority initiatives is it to retain
four BCTs forward stationed on the European continent?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM's forward stationed forces and bases are
critical elements of U.S. national security and diplomatic strategy.
They are important symbols of continued U.S. support for and leadership
of NATO. Our forces provide essential elements of U.S. assurance,
dissuasion, and deterrence across the entire European and Eurasian
theater. They also provide superb power projection facilities for the
support of coalition operations and contingencies in Europe, Eurasia
and Africa.
Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security
environment; directed tasks associated with U.S. defense strategy;
requirements to sustain robust levels of engagement with allies and
friends; the need for forces, bases, and access and treaty agreements
to support global operations; and a recognition that posture decisions
are more often than not, irreversible, it is my opinion that the four
BCTs and a Corps Headquarters is the minimal forward stationed Army
force requirements for the theater.

2. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, what would be the impact of
redeploying two BCTs out of Europe on EUCOM's ability to engage with
our European allies and maintain the transatlantic relationship?
Admiral Stavridis. Should the two heavy brigades return to the
continental United States (CONUS), the impact on EUCOM's ability to
engage with our European allies and maintain the transatlantic
relationship would be significant. Their physical presence in Europe
serves to further assure our allies of the longstanding U.S. commitment
to NATO and the region in general. U.S. Army forces located in Europe,
in between their out-of-area deployments, are available for training
and security cooperation events with our NATO allies and aspiring NATO
members. These activities are part of the Building Partnership Capacity
priority for EUCOM and encourage the development of partners to
increase capability and capacity for expeditionary operations in
support of global security strategies.
Furthermore, in-theater forces can respond to short-fused
opportunities that could not be performed by rotational forces. EUCOM
realizes that both brigades have not yet converted to the modular BCT
formation. Ideally, these two brigades can be converted such that EUCOM
would have assigned each of the four types of Army BCTs to maximize our
capability with respect to interoperability training with our allies
and friends. These two BCTs do everything stateside forces do . . .
plus they build relationships; assure, deter, and dissuade, provide
operational flexibility, ensure global access, provide our forces
multinational training opportunities, and build partner capacity at a
marginal cost.
Additionally, with Army force generation requirements and rotation
goals, maintaining these additional BCTs in Europe reduces deployment
stress on the Army's BCTs. Maintaining the four BCTs in theater ensures
a BCT in ready status for contingency operations and security
cooperation activities while another is in reset and the remaining two
are deploying, redeploying and/or conducting out-of-area operations.

3. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, if these units remain on the
continent, what is your assessment of the condition of the facilities
that will house them and whether you have adequate facilities to
conduct the necessary training to maintain these units?
Admiral Stavridis. If retained, the 170th Infantry Brigade and
172nd Infantry Brigade will remain stationed at their current
locations. The 170th Infantry Brigade is at Baumholder, Germany, and
the 172nd Infantry Brigade will complete consolidation at Grafenwohr,
Germany, by the end of 2010. Facilities at both locations are generally
in very good condition and suitable to meet unit requirements; however,
a significant portion of the Military Family Housing at Baumholder is
in need of recapitalization. Accordingly, U.S. Army Installation
Management Command Europe began execution of a multi-year housing
recapitalization program in fiscal year 2010. It is important to note
that Baumholder will remain an enduring location even if the 170th
Infantry Brigade returns to the CONUS.
Training areas currently available to these units are world class.
Both Baumholder and Grafenwohr have their own maneuver and training
areas where the BCTs can conduct all required training. In addition,
the Joint Maneuver Training Center (JMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany,
provides the same fully instrumented training capability as the
National Training Center in Fort Irwin. The Grafenwohr/JMTC training
facilities were originally designed for a much larger number of forces
than there will be with just four BCTs. Those four BCTs will have far
more opportunity to conduct combined and collective training than CONUS
units waiting their turn for National Training Center or Joint
Readiness Training Center. Additionally, our European based U.S. forces
train with their European partners utilizing both U.S. controlled and
host nation facilities.

nuclear posture in europe
4. Senator Levin. Admiral Stavridis, as NATO continues its work on
a new Strategic Concept, do you see any consensus developing on the
future role, if there is one, for nuclear weapons in NATO?
Admiral Stavridis. The future role of nuclear weapons in NATO is
being discussed as part of the Strategic Concept deliberations. We
expect the new Strategic Concept to be released this Fall. Until its
release, I cannot speculate on what the final document will state.

al qaeda in the land of the islamic maghreb
5. Senator Levin. General Ward, the failed Christmas Day airline
bombing reminded the counterterrorism community that al Qaeda is not an
organization limited to the rugged terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
but is a global terrorist organization with an insatiable desire to
strike targets anywhere they can. In northwest Africa, U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) is dealing with one of al Qaeda's affiliate
organizations, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Governments in northwest Africa have not demonstrated a consistent
commitment to work on a regional basis to combat this threat. This
provides AQIM with a broader operational space. Would you say the
ambitions of AQIM are different from those of al Qaeda in Pakistan or
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
General Ward. There is no fundamental difference in the ambitions
of AQIM and al Qaeda elements in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula.
Both groups devote significant energy towards attempting to overthrow
apostate governments in their respective regions. The distinction
between the organizations is a difference in operational capability,
focus, and tactics.

Since merging with al Qaeda on 11 September 2006, AQIM
has emerged as al Qaeda's regional arm in North Africa and the
Sahel. This transformation has been reflected in AQIM's
tactics, ideology, and propaganda, which now more closely align
with those of al Qaeda. Although AQIM remains intent on
targeting the Algerian Government and other regional
governments--especially Mauritania-AQIM is increasingly
targeting Western interests, as evidenced by recent kidnappings
in Mali.
AQIM aspires to conduct operations outside of Africa
but has yet to demonstrate a significant capacity to project
force beyond its traditional operating areas in North Africa
and the Sahel.
Over the next year, AQIM will likely concentrate on
expanding the group's operational reach in North Africa, the
Sahel, and West Africa.
AQIM has limited influence in Europe and no known
capability in the United States. However, AQIM is willing to
support operational planning in Europe and may be willing to
support operational planning in the United States if the
opportunity arises.

6. Senator Levin. General Ward, what is your assessment of the
prospects for regional counterterrorism cooperation in northwest
Africa?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

7. Senator Levin. General Ward, what programs has AFRICOM initiated
to address this burgeoning threat, and are they adequately resourced?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

somalia
8. Senator Levin. General Ward, much of the training assistance
provided today is through the African Union Mission to the Transitional
Federal Government in Somalia. Very little, if any, assistance is
provided to Somaliland and Puntland forces. Do you see a role for
AFRICOM in providing train-and-equip assistance either directly or via
contractors to Somaliland or Puntland?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

program for small unit excellence
9. Senator Levin. General Mattis, last year U.S. Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) began the Program for Small Unit Excellence which
focuses on specialized training for squad- and fire team-sized elements
as well as developing better concepts and researching small unit
training. How does the Program for Small Unit Excellence differ from
what is already being conducted by the Services and to what extent are
the Services already conducting squad- and fire-team level training?
General Mattis. JFCOM did not institute a Small Unit Excellence
program in 2010 because the programmed funding was not appropriated in
the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations Bill. JFCOM acknowledges the
outstanding work the Services are doing in preparing small units for
ground combat, but also recognizes the Irregular Warfare (IW)
environment places unique demands on the tactical, behavioral, and
ethical decisionmaking capabilities of small units. While the Services
continue to perform squad and fire-team level training, JFCOM seeks to
complement Service training by providing a joint context, amplifying
the exposure of small units and their leaders to joint command and
control; joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and
joint fires. The goal is to develop small units who are knowledgeable
of employment of the full array of joint capabilities to defeat the
enemy, while also improving small unit cognitive competencies,
increasing individual survivability, decreasing ethical missteps in
combat, and bolstering psychological resilience.

10. Senator Levin. General Mattis, how has JFCOM been able to
rapidly field immersive infantry trainers and simulators with realistic
environments and how can such trainers and simulators improve small-
team close combat effectiveness?
General Mattis. Presently, JFCOM is working closely with the
Services to support their efforts to field immersive infantry trainers
and simulators that possess realistic environments that are fully
integrated with joint enablers such as joint ISR and joint fires
platforms. JFCOM has partnered with the USMC to integrate real-world
Afghan terrain data into an immersive simulator, the USMC-developed
Virtual Battlespace version 2 (VBS2). In turn JFCOM also fielded the
terrain data capability to a Fort Bragg-based Army unit in preparation
for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan.
As the combatant command sponsor for the Future Immersive Training
Environment (FITE) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD),
JFCOM has initiated a program to holistically integrate technological
advances across the DOD to create capabilities focused on immersive
infantry trainers and close-combat simulators. These capabilities will
enable resource efficient solutions that replicate the effects and
conditions of the operational environment.
On March 8, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed out a letter
directing the Department to immediately develop a state-of-the-art
simulation capability for training of ground forces to meet the urgent
requirements demanded by the current fight. This letter specifically
directs JFCOM to contribute to the integration efforts in the
development of this capability, while also providing the joint context
(joint C2, joint ISR, joint fires) to the creation of the virtual
environments. JFCOM will also work with the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to focus on incorporation of the
counter IED challenge.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
supplemental request
11. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, there is a $20 billion
supplemental request for fiscal year 2010 in addition to $102.2 billion
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for fiscal year 2011. If
the supplemental is being replaced by the OCO request, then why is
there such a large disparity?
Admiral Stavridis. The answer to this question is more
appropriately answered by the Department of the Army or Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller.

theater engagement strategy
12. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis and General Ward, theater
engagement seems to be a major tool used by combatant commands when
partnering with the Nations within each of your areas of responsibility
(AORs). What assets do you have and where are they located?
Admiral Stavridis and General Ward. U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and U.S.
Army Europe, as well as EUCOMs' functional subordinate unified command
for special operations, Special Operations Command Europe, are
responsible for supporting our Theater Campaign Plan and implementing
our Theater Security Cooperation programs across the region. The
Service Components provide the capabilities necessary to engage with
and build military capacity among our partners and Allies. These forces
are located on nineteen Main Operating Bases, twelve Forward Operating
Sites and seven Cooperative Security Locations across the European
continent. EUCOM's ability to operate from locations in Germany, Italy,
England, Benelux, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Greenland, Turkey, Portugal,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland creates openings for the United States to
work together with allies and partners on shared regional and global
security opportunities and challenges.

13. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, how is the National Guard's
State Partnership Program integrated into your theater engagement
strategy?
Admiral Stavridis. The National Guard State Partnership Program is
completely integrated into EUCOM's theater engagement strategy. The
National Guard is the force provider for the State Partnership Program
and is critical for supporting and strengthening regional security and
stability in 21 partner nations in EUCOM's area of focus. The State
Partnership Program accounts for over 35 percent of all military-to-
military engagements in EUCOM's area of focus and is mightily engaged
in civil security cooperation.

nato's role in afghanistan
14. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, in your predecessor's 2009
posture statement, building partner capacity is a means for providing
flexible response to this broad spectrum of threats. NATO continues to
work with EUCOM to support partnership efforts with its member nations
and former Warsaw pact nations. Will NATO play a greater role in the
ongoing efforts in Afghanistan?
Admiral Stavridis. NATO already plays a huge role in Afghanistan
and our Allies continue to make additional contributions. Right now,
there are almost 40,000 non-U.S. troops in AFG as part of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). We have also had a
recent surge of commitments from our Allies following the President's
announcement of the new strategy for Afghanistan. So far, the non-U.S.
additional pledges total 9,500.
NATO has also provided over a thousand trainers, which are critical
to increasing Afghan capacity to lead their own efforts. European
Allies and partners provide approximately 50 percent of the Operational
Mentor and Liaison Teams required to train the Afghan National Army.
Also, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland have already
deployed Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to train Afghan
National Police.
Our Allies also hold key leadership positions and carry significant
regional authority throughout ISAF. For example, Germany leads RC-
North, Italy leads RC-West, and Turkey leads RC-Capital. The
Netherlands, Canada, and the United Kingdom have rotational
responsibility for RC-South.
In addition to this direct support to combat and training, our
Allies are also contributing to stability and development efforts in
Afghanistan through participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams
and other civilian and private ventures throughout the country.

15. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, will NATO lessen their
national level caveats for forces they deploy to Afghanistan to allow
them to take a more active role in combat operations?
Admiral Stavridis. Caveats are imposed and controlled by individual
NATO member countries in response to their internal political
situation. Overall, the trend is positive. We have 22 of 43 nations
completely caveat-free. There are 56 total caveats, down from 83 since
April 2008. The caveats are not a significant impediment to operations
in AFG. That said, I am committed to engaging NATO members and partners
to reduce or remove caveats on their forces. It is my expectation that
the positive trends concerning caveats will continue and provide
COMISAF with greater operational flexibility.

providing services to africom personnel
16. Senator Burris. Admiral Stavridis, are there any significant
impacts of providing various military and family services to AFRICOM
personnel by the various military communities that are currently under
your control?
Admiral Stavridis. U.S. EUCOM partners with our Stuttgart neighbor,
U.S. AFRICOM, in a tenant support relationship which extends services
to staff and families who call Germany their home away from home.
We also collaborate with U.S. AFRICOM on an Executive Agency level
through our naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, who oversees
previously brokered longstanding cross service agreements which support
the infrastructure needs of Camp Lemonier in Djibouti from which
Commander, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) operates.

personnel
17. Senator Burris. General Ward, AFRICOM is the newest unified
command and has been fully operational capable since October 2008. As
of October 2009, you also have approximately 1,200 personnel in your
headquarters. Do you have enough personnel in your headquarters to
provide adequate staff and command oversight over the missions within
your AOR?
General Ward. U.S. AFRICOM is an economy of force operation. We
have a relatively small staff in Stuttgart compared to the amount of
activity the command is tasked to oversee on a daily basis. The
personnel assigned to our headquarters on manpower documents include
the sub-Unified Command Special Operations Command-Africa as well as
all military assigned to support our ambassadors in our African
embassies. As we build our programs and capabilities in support of
engagement on the continent, we continue to assess our needs for
manpower, anticipating additional personnel requirements.

18. Senator Burris. General Ward, what personnel from other
Government agencies are part of your permanent staff?
General Ward.

There are 27 interagency personnel integrated across
the command in long-term assignments.
Five members are Senior Executive, or Senior Foreign
Service personnel with strategic decisionmaking roles.
The remaining 22 personnel are GS-15 equivalent or
junior personnel, and are embedded within the headquarters
planning staff.
They provide subject-matter expertise to the planning
process.
Currently, there are 15 interagency personnel
temporarily assigned to the command to support specific
planning events.
U.S. AFRICOM, through the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
has requested an additional 33 personnel from other U.S.
Government departments and agencies to support the command.

egypt
19. Senator Burris. General Ward, will Egypt eventually transition
from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to your AOR?
General Ward. There are no immediate plans to transfer Egypt from
CENTCOM to U.S. AFRICOM. The Unified Command Plan (UCP), which
addresses the boundaries of Combatant Commands, is reviewed every 2
years. This formal UCP review process affords us ample opportunity to
review and modify the existing arrangement with regard to Egypt should
we believe a change is necessary. Currently AFRICOM has a standing
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with CENTCOM whereby AFRICOM goals
and objectives on the continent vis-a-vis Egypt are addressed directly
with Egypt in close coordination with the Office of Military
Cooperation-Egypt. We have conducted senior leader visits, participated
in the US-Egypt Military Cooperation Council, and have held action
officer-level planning meetings to continue to develop our engagement
with the Egyptians.

risk involved in accomplishing mission sets
20. Senator Burris. General Ward, AFRICOM's AOR encompasses 53
countries and water space that equates to the over four times the size
of the CONUS. How would you describe the risk involved in accomplishing
your various mission sets?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

partnership with african nations
21. Senator Burris. General Ward, AFRICOM was designed to employ a
whole-of-government approach to executing theater security cooperation,
and to facilitate counterterrorism efforts with the African nations.
How has the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
program assisted in this effort?
General Ward. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) is an extremely important engagement tool for building military
capacity and professionalism-both of which are essential ingredients
for executing theater security cooperation and in developing forces
capable of successful counterterrorism efforts. Focused on developing
self-sustaining peacekeeping training programs with African partner
nations, ACOTA enables African partners to support UN and AU
peacekeeping missions and, as a by-product, directly supports
USAFRICOM's theater security cooperation goals and objectives.
Through the development of peacekeeping units and partner capacity
to train their own peacekeepers, ACOTA training directly supports DOD's
Guidance for Employment of the Force theater strategic end states for
Africa:

To enable African countries to provide their own
security and contribute to security on the continent;
To assist African countries maintain professional
militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the
rule of law and abide by international human rights norms.

In addition to training with partners throughout Africa, ACOTA is
being used to develop National Peace Mission Training Centers (PMTCs).
This investment in training centers will allow our partners to develop
the capacity to generate their own peacekeeping units, and eventually
develop the ability to sustain those forces when deployed.
AFRICOM coordinates closely with the Department of State (DOS) as
ACOTA partners are identified and looks for ways to supplement ACOTA
training with uniformed U.S. military servicemembers. Much of ACOTA's
equipping programs are coordinated through AFRICOM's Offices of
Security Cooperation.

22. Senator Burris. General Ward, what countries are prime
candidates for a successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) program?
General Ward. DOS has the lead for SSR. A successful SSR requires a
comprehensive analysis and approach. U.S. AFRICOM, in cooperation with
the DOS, examines countries for the attributes that may lead to
successful SSR and Defense Sector Reform (DSR) efforts.
Those attributes include, but are not limited to: (1) the country
is of strategic importance to the United States; (2) the country in
question is committed to reform and is ready to take ownership of
reform programs with which the U.S. and other partners will assist; (3)
the level of resources required to conduct SSR/DSR can be met by the
recipient and donor nations; (4) the recipient is also making
improvements in other sectors of the government necessary for
successful SSR/DSR such as the justice sector and interior ministry;
(5) the potential recipient has the ability to sustain reforms in the
future.
We are pleased with the progress in Armed Forces of Liberia given
the level of U.S. Government investment there, but remained concerned
about other elements of the Liberia's security sector such as its
police forces and its inability to secure its maritime domain. Our
collaborative efforts, with the State Department may well be a model
for SSR efforts of similar scale elsewhere on the continent. AFRICOM's
Defense Sector Reform effort with Liberia, Operation Onward Liberty,
provides experienced military mentors to the nascent Armed Forces of
Liberia. We're also working to help develop a Liberian Coast Guard that
will enhance maritime domain awareness to address illicit trafficking
while providing maritime security and safety. The Secretary's Defense
Institution Reform Initiative is assessing the requirement for
ministerial-level reform efforts and is equipped to provide skilled
mentors if necessary. Taken as a whole, the successes we've realized in
Liberia is a result of a whole-of-government approach with a willing
partner.
However, in some cases we may be directed to initiate limited SSR
activities in environments where our prospects of success may be less
certain, such as Southern Sudan and Somalia. AFRICOM will continue to
provide our best military advice and support to all SSR efforts in
which we participate.

23. Senator Burris. General Ward, what are some examples where the
military-to-military engagement has led to enhancing the
professionalism of any of the African partner nations?
General Ward. Support to the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff
College (EDCSC) has been one of the U.S. Government's most successful
security engagement programs in Ethiopia, allowing U.S. military daily
access to and influence over future ENDF leaders. The U.S. provides
three O-5 instructors to the EDCSC via the Foreign Military Financing
program. In an attempt to increase Ethiopian ownership, these U.S.
officers are assuming an advisory role to Ethiopian instructors and our
presence will scale back to two senior assistants to the Commandant in
fiscal year 2011 and one senior assistant to the Commandant in fiscal
year 2012.
U.S. AFRICOM supports efforts to improve the capabilities of the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in accordance with the U.S.
Strategy for Sudan. Through AFRICOM's Military Advisor to the SPLA and
Security Assistance Program Manager in Juba, the Command conducts mil-
to-mil events, Counterterrorism Fellowship-funded seminars,
International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses and
mentor/advisor training. Cross-functional military familiarization
events with the SPLA have been conducted on a variety of topics to
include: border/riverine security; military intelligence; HIV/AIDS
programs and stockpile management. Additionally, Noncommissioned
Officer (NCO) development is one area of focus for the Command. CJTF-
HOA currently has eight NCOs deployed to the NCO Academy in Mapel,
Southern Sudan for 1 year to assist in training and mentoring the SPLA
instructors.
In fiscal year 2009, U.S. AFRICOM engaged over 800 African military
intelligence partners in a variety of seminars, familiarizations, and
conferences designed to instill military intelligence professionalism
and further enhance bilateral relationships. This investment in
training and capacity building will pay dividends as these graduates
begin to assume key positions in partner country military units. In
fiscal year 2010, U.S. AFRICOM expects to reach approximately 1,500
military intelligence participants in these events.

U.S. AFRICOM has trained 106 African partners in the
Military Intelligence Basic Officers Course and 42 in the
Military Intelligence Professionals Course.

24. Senator Burris. General Ward, what is the future role of Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) and the military base in Djibouti?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

25. Senator Burris. General Ward, are there any plans to have a
greater presence in your AOR, beyond JTF-HOA?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

role as joint force provider
26. Senator Burris. General Mattis, your role as the Joint Force
Provider makes you responsible for providing forces to all commands and
agencies in the Department of Defense (DOD) and other Government
agencies throughout the world. What are the challenges you face meeting
the requests in a timely fashion?
General Mattis. During fiscal year 2010, JFCOM identified and
assigned over 480,000 personnel to fulfill Combatant Commander (CCDR)
requirements. These 480,000 personnel represent over 90 percent of the
overall CCDR requests. The main challenge is fulfilling the final 10
percent of CCDR requirements.
Shortfalls fall into one of four general areas: lack of capability,
lack of inventory, policy restriction, or lack of process architecture.
When JFCOM receives a request for a capability that does not exist,
units may be temporarily converted from one core mission to fill
another. An example might be tasking an artillery unit to fill a CCDR
requirement for a security forces unit. Units temporarily converted
along these lines are designated ``In-Lieu-Of ``(ILO) sourcing
solutions. In some situations, JFCOM builds new units from the ground
up by moving individual personnel from several standing units to form a
new `unit' to meet CCDR requirements. These are designated ``Ad Hoc''
units. Sourcing CCDR requirements using either ILO or Ad Hoc units
requires time and training to ensure the unit has the ability to
accomplish the desired mission. JFCOM also participates in a force
sufficiency process to address requirements for cases where a
capability exists, but in insufficient numbers to satisfy overall CCDR
demand.
Department and personnel policy sometimes constrains force
providing. DOD and Service personnel deployment policies exist to
maintain the long-term morale, health, and welfare of the force, while
others exist to ensure undue hardship is not placed on the force or
that personnel or equipment are not unnecessarily placed at risk.
Examples of policies impacting force-providing include: Boots on the
Ground (BOG) limits (limitations on deployment duration) and dwell
requirements (minimum time at home between deployments). These policies
can constrain the force supply to meet CCDR demand for forces, but
these policy restrictions also ensure that short term requirements do
not supersede the maintenance and long term health of the force
requirements.
Though improvements have been made, the processes and technical
capabilities required for force management continue to challenge the
force providing mission. Since being assigned the mission, JFCOM has
established a Force Management Integration Project (FMIP) Team to
develop and execute a plan to integrate and synchronize policy,
processes, authoritative databases and technology affecting Joint Force
sourcing and Global Force Management (GFM). While challenges will
inevitably continue to arise, the improving processes, policies and
technical capabilities working together are producing a robust global
force management capability for the Department.

27. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what other Government agencies,
other than the military, do you provide forces to?
General Mattis. While JFCOM provides forces to Geographic Combatant
Commanders, many of those forces support other Government agencies
while under the operational control of a CCDR. As an example, JFCOM
provides forces to USNORTHCOM for their use in direct support of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). JFCOM provided forces to USSOUTHCOM for their
use in direct support of USAID in Haiti following the earthquake. JFCOM
does not provide forces directly to other Government agencies, but
forces provided to CCDRs do perform missions in direct support of other
agency missions.

joint qualified services
28. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what percentage of the Military
Services are joint qualified?
General Mattis. USD P&R is responsible for the policy of Joint
Officer Management and the Joint Staff J1 is involved in tracking joint
qualified officers. JFCOM does not track the numbers of joint qualified
members across the Services. I have passed your question to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. A copy of my letter
to him is next under.

29. Senator Burris. General Mattis, if there are disparities in the
joint education opportunities between Active and Reserve component
forces, what are they?
General Mattis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Services can probably provide a more thorough response as they control
all phases of Joint Professional Military Education. Steps have been
taken to increase the opportunities for members of the Reserve
Component (RC) to receive joint education. Advanced Joint Professional
Military Education (AJPME) is a RC course taught at Joint Forces Staff
College (JFSC) that is similar in content to the in-residence JFSC JPME
Phase II course. It is only offered to RC officers. As a pre-requisite
AJPME students must have completed JPME Phase I. The subsequent AJPME
course then builds upon the foundation established in JPME Phase I. It
prepares RC officers (O-4 to O-6) for joint duty assignments. RC
officers may complete AJPME in lieu of JPME Phase II. In addition to
AJPME, RC officers are still provided quotas in the JPME Phase II
course.

mission readiness exercises
30. Senator Burris. General Mattis, how are mission readiness
exercises value-added to deploying commanders and staffs?
General Mattis. JFCOM's mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) program
addresses the mission-essential training requirements for commanders
and staffs deploying to Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. JFCOM
is partnered with ISAF, USF-I and AFRICOM in designing, planning, and
executing each MRX event to ensure MRX training reinforces existing
theater policies and guidance. The formal and informal feedback from
training audiences indicates a high level of satisfaction with the
MRXs.
JFCOM's forward deployed support elements, Joint Center for
Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, Joint Enabling Capability Command
elements, and Deployable Training Teams all undergird the MRX program
with timely training requirement feedback. When enemy tactics and
techniques shift, or theater Commander policies or command and staff
processes and procedures change, JFCOM captures these insights and
lessons learned through persistent interfaces. For example, during the
recent MRX at Fort Campbell for the 101st ABN (AASLT) Division, MRX
planners dynamically introduced vignettes that drove the commander and
staff to work through ISAF Commander's most recent night raid
directive, which was published 2 days prior to start of the MRX.
The Afghanistan training community of interest (COI) meets biweekly
and is comprised of participants from across the Joint Training
Enterprise. The COI provides the latest updates and training
recommendations for troops deploying into theater during these
sessions. COI issues such as reduction of civilian casualties,
escalation/de-escalation of force and rules of engagement have been
incorporated into the MRX program. JFCOM is currently working with ISAF
planners to ensure the latest guidance regarding development and
leverage of the Afghanistan Mission Network is being built into the MRX
program. This will ensure commanders and staffs, and subordinate units
and their equipment are properly set and aligned during pre-deployment
training for theater specific C\4\I interoperability requirements.
MRXs are conducted in partnership with DOD, U.S. Government, and
multi-national partners to continuously exchange and incorporate
theater lessons learned and training requirements. During the most
recent MRX for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the commander
and staff were able to work with the actual French and Polish Brigades
who will be joining them in theater, and also with the Afghanistan Army
Brigade Commanders and staffs who will operate in their sector. Also
personnel from over 30 different agencies participated in the mission
rehearsal.

multi-national collaboration
31. Senator Burris. General Mattis, what is your role in providing
multi-national collaboration to NATO and non-NATO nations?
General Mattis. The multi-national program at JFCOM fulfills the
command's Unified Command Plan responsibility to support multi-national
integration of joint training, concept development and experimentation,
and capability development. JFCOM provides a joint context for multi-
national collaboration. JFCOM's geographic co-location with NATO's
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, VA, continues to
facilitate opportunities for JFCOM to be actively engaged with NATO's
training, experimentation, and capability development efforts.
In addition to NATO, JFCOM's current multi-national program
consists of bilateral agreements with 19 partner nations represented by
29 liaison and exchange officers. Another 14 nations have requested
partnership with JFCOM. Their agreements are in various stages of
review. These agreements forge military-to-military relationships that
create greater opportunities for training, concept development and
experimentation, and capability development, all within a joint context
provided by JFCOM. These agreements also build operational
interoperability with foreign militaries and trust.

joint training
32. Senator Burris. General Mattis, I understand that in order to
train a joint warrior, joint education and training has to be a core
competency for the command. What technology and tools are you employing
to better facilitate joint training?
General Mattis. Primarily, communications technology enables JFCOM
to conduct training in a distributed manner by moving data instead of
people, thus saving cost and time. The Joint Training and
Experimentation Network (JTEN) is a communications technology tool that
provides persistent long-haul network connectivity for the following
types of joint training information: scenario data, live-range data,
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance data, exercise control information,
voice communications (operational and exercise control), video
teleconferencing (VTC), e-mail, and after-action reporting data.
Opposing force technology ensures enemy forces are accurately
replicated and portrayed in training. Modeling and Simulation (M&S)
technology enables JFCOM to integrate joint enablers into joint
training to overcome constraints of time, distance, and resource
availability. JFCOM also relies on M&S to support the joint warfighter
in the areas of testing, training, and experimentation.
JFCOM fields, maintains and continuously enhances the Joint
Knowledge Online (JKO) distance learning capability to provide online
training for U.S. and multi-national command, interagency, and
intergovernmental partner personnel preparing for joint operations.
Online training courses and curriculums are tailored to areas of
deployment including Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. The
combatant commands and other stakeholders are also actively engaged in
shaping JKO to meet their ongoing operational training needs. Recently,
JFCOM introduced a targeted culture awareness training application
utilizing immersive, media-rich training technologies. Also in
development is a cultural trainer for Afghanistan. This web-based,
game-based system trains language translation in the context of
specific mission scenarios, each of which were identified by subject
matter experts with direct experience in the respective region.

33. Senator Burris. General Mattis, is there a timeline for getting
military personnel joint trained? If so, what is that timeline?
General Mattis. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, the Services, and Joint Staff J1 maintain and monitor the
Joint Officer Management Program. This program provides guidance on the
timing of officers meeting gates and criteria to attain different
levels of joint qualification, which includes training and education.
For the past decade, JFCOM has supported senior leader education in
the form of Operations Modules for the NDU-sponsored Capstone,
Keystone, and Pinnacle programs. While these programs and other forms
of Joint Professional Military Education address officer development,
JFCOM sees a growing requirement for joint skills and competencies at
ever lower tactical echelons, requiring Service personnel to receive
joint training earlier in their careers and at lower ranks.
There is no single, all encompassing timeline for getting joint
training to all levels of military personnel, nor is there a mechanism
to displace critical Service training requirements with joint training
requirements. Any timelines for training are driven by deployment
schedules as well as the throughput capacity of training centers and
schools. JFCOM is working to identify that specific joint knowledge,
and those skills and abilities that are required at lower Service
echelons and are developing tailored methods to ensure that the
appropriate personnel receive required joint training. Depending on the
nature of the required skills and the specific audience that requires
training, this individual training may be accomplished through
distributed training employing our Joint Knowledge Online (JKO)
courses, through support to Service training programs leveraging the
Joint National Training capability, or through the mission rehearsal
exercise program and support to the Combatant Command exercise program.

expeditionary civilian force
34. Senator Burris. General Mattis, you have completed draft
doctrine, education, and employment principles for interagency
operations and integration. One of your working concepts is to stand up
an Expeditionary Civilian Force. What is the mission and employment of
the Expeditionary Civilian Force?
General Mattis. The DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) is a
program implemented and administered by the OSD. The purpose/mission of
the program is to establish a DOD civilian workforce that is organized,
trained, and equipped to ensure their readiness to deploy in support of
Department of Defense contingency operations including emergency
operations, humanitarian missions, disaster relief, restoration of
order, drug interdiction and stability operations. CEW has provided a
useful pool of willing professionals to JFCOM force providers to
satisfy some CCDR requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
building partnership capacity
35. Senator McCain. General Ward, with respect to the interagency
or legislation, what is the greatest obstacle your command faces in
building partnership capacity on the continent?
General Ward. Our greatest obstacle is, in a word, responsiveness.
When our African partners request training, assistance or material from
AFRICOM, with the exception of natural disaster and/or humanitarian
crises, we are unable to respond in a timely manner.
In many cases, our African partners' governmental institutions have
not developed to the point where planning for an exercise or engagement
at a relatively distant point in the future is a simple matter. Often,
when we receive assistance requests from our partners, they desire to
engage with us in the near term-in a matter of weeks, or only as far
out as several months from the request. Planning a year or more in
advance is generally not possible for many of our partners due to
financial instability or other reasons. The U.S. Government mechanisms
currently in place to provide funding and/or authority for security
cooperation activities are not responsive or flexible enough to meet
partner nation's time-lines. In addition, AFRICOM does not yet have
immediate access to assigned or rotationally allocated forces, and is
required to use DOD's global force management/request for forces
system, which requires long lead times. As global demand for forces
eases in the coming years, we believe the Command will see improvement
in its ability to access responsive forces. For example, the U.S.
Marine Corps is working to provide the command a special purpose task
force to carry out the command's steady state activities on the
continent. The U.S. Army is likewise seeking to identify BCTs to
routinely make available for security force assistance.
The Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund is our most responsive
funding source; however, it is extremely limited in funding and overall
flexibility. Other frequently used options are Section 1206 funding,
which may require a full year from request to execution, and Title 22
programs, such as Foreign Military Finance and International Military
Education and Training (IMET), which may require 2 or more years from
request to execution.
AFRICOM's inability to respond quickly to partner needs may
increase risk to enhance the capacity of our partner nations and
organizations in Africa. We are working closely with the Joint Staff,
OSD, and our partners in DOS to develop solutions to these challenges.

36. Senator McCain. General Ward, over the past decade, the African
Union has taken on several difficult missions (e.g. Sudan, Somalia, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Given the demands on U.S.
troops, how will AFRICOM enhance its partnerships and build greater
professionalism among the continent's militaries?
General Ward. AFRICOM has several title 10- and 22-funded tools at
its disposal to build professionalism and enhance partnerships.

The DOS funded Africa Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance (ACOTA) is an extremely important engagement
tool for building military capacity and professionalism and for
developing forces capable of conducting successful peacekeeping
efforts. We partner with DOS to the extent possible in
implementing ACOTA.
We will build partner capacity through the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program,
which trains foreign military personnel at U.S. facilities.
Approximately 900 military and civilian students from 44
African countries received education and training in the United
States or their own countries valued at $19.8 million. It
remains the premier program in building professionalism over
the long term.
Additionally, we will select carefully and assist
African partners to train and mentor other African militaries.
We provide partner nations with the opportunity to
participate in the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and the
Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)-key
programs aimed at developing the capabilities of coastal
forces.
We have expanded the National Guard State Partnership
Program to eight African countries, a program that builds
habitual relationships over a sustained period while delivering
broad capacity building programs.
We also conduct a vigorous series of exercises that
have continued to grow in magnitude. These programs build the
capacity of the participants, improve our partnerships, and
enhance partner activities between participating African states
as well.
Additionally, our military-to-military engagement
program was funded at less than $500,000 in fiscal year 2004,
but has now expanded to $6.3 million for fiscal year 2010 with
431 events planned in 40 countries. This program assists
partners in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems,
maintenance operations, force protection, and the conduct of
their own training.
U.S. AFRICOM addresses African intelligence capability
challenges through bilateral and regional training, emphasizing
respect for the rule of law and civilian authority.

resources and forces
37. Senator McCain. General Ward, with personnel primarily located
in Germany and Djibouti, are you comfortable with AFRICOM's ability to
execute a noncombatant evacuation operation anywhere on the continent?
General Ward. A successful noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)
requires a well-trained combatant command staff, defined and rehearsed
procedures that have been coordinated with U.S. embassies, and the
forces necessary to carry out the actual operation on the ground. The
Command has developed the staff skills required, and has developed a
NEO plan. Two of the Command's Service components--Naval Forces Africa
and U.S. Army Africa--are capable, with some augmentation, of
successfully directing Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in our AOR.
Finally, while U.S. AFRICOM has not been assigned dedicated forces, in
the event of a NEO the Department of Defense would make the required
forces immediately available to the Command.

38. Senator McCain. General Ward, are your component commands
adequately staffed and resourced to execute AFRICOM's mission?
General Ward. The Services' efforts to staff our Service components
appropriately continues. For example, the U.S. Army has designated U.S.
Army Africa as an Army Service component and is working to round out
the manning. Both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army are seeking
to have security force capacity building assets routinely identified in
support of AFRICOM. The U.S. Navy's commitment in support of the Africa
Partnership Station program remains firm. The U.S. Air Force has
methodically supported U.S. Air Forces Africa requirements in
resourcing the 17th Air Force and associated air operations
requirements. Given global demands for forces, the Services are also
doing their best to support requests for forces required to carry out
our theater security cooperation activities and our named operations.
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa is adequately staffed to
conduct its assigned missions.

u.s. army posture in europe
39. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, the 2009 QDR recommends
keeping four U.S. Army BCTs in Europe, pending the review of NATO's
Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S. assessment of our European
defense posture. This recommendation is a change from the 2003
Integrated Global Posture Review, which called for most Europe-based
BCTs return to the United States, leaving two BCTS in Europe--one in
Germany and one in Italy. If a decision is made to keep two additional
BCTs in Europe, where will they be stationed?
Admiral Stavridis. The two brigades in question are the 170th
Infantry Brigade, currently home stationed in Baumholder, Germany, and
the 172nd Infantry Brigade which will be consolidated in Grafenwoehr,
Germany, by the end of this year. If they are permanently retained,
they will remain stationed at these locations. Both of these
installations contain excellent training ranges and maneuver areas.

40. Senator McCain. Admiral Stavridis, regarding the review of
NATO's Strategic Concept, to what degree will Army BCTs in Europe
support NATO missions and qualify for funding support under the NATO
Security Investment Program?
Admiral Stavridis. Ground forces in Europe will continue to support
NATO as part of any Article V action. Additionally, forces assigned to
EUCOM are part of the global force pool and will deploy as ordered to
support any global requirement as determined by the department's global
force management process, which includes such operations as those under
the ISAF. Furthermore, U.S. Army Europe forces located in Europe in
between their out-of-area deployments are available for training and
security cooperation events with our NATO allies and aspiring NATO
members; these activities are part of the Building Partner Capacity
priority for EUCOM, and encourage the development of NATO partners to
increase capability and capacity for expeditionary operations in
support of global security strategies.
To be eligible for funding support under the NATO Security
Investment Program, requirements must be linked to an approved NATO
capability package. Requirements supporting Army BCTs in Europe cannot
be readily linked to any existing capability packages. NATO's evolving
role in out of area operations and the ongoing review of the NATO
Strategic Concept may present an opportunity for development of new or
revised capability packages that open the door to NATO funding of Army
BCT requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
european missile defense
41. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, the Phased Adaptive
Approach to missile defense in Europe calls for fielding land-based SM-
3 Block IB missiles in Europe starting in 2015. Is the IB missile on
schedule, and have you identified the two countries that will host its
deployment in 2015?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. The SM-3 Blk IB development and testing
remain on schedule. The first flight test, Flight Test Maritime-16, is
scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
EUCOM is in full support of DOS-led efforts to conclude the
negotiations and appropriate basing agreements with Host Nations.
Romania and Poland are the initial intended host countries for European
Aegis Ashore with land-based SM-3 capability.

42. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, last year Secretary Gates
testified that the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) will
continue development as a hedge against technical difficulties with the
SM-3 Block IIA and IIB missiles. Is this still the plan?
Admiral Stavridis. Any decision to shift from or change the Phased
Adaptive Approach strategy to include elements of the previous European
missile defense strategy would be done through close consultation and
coordination between the NSC, DOD, DOS, and DNI and executed by the
Missile Defense Agency.
EUCOM recommends that questions pertaining to two-stage GBI
capabilities and the associated development schedule milestones be
forwarded to the Missile Defense Agency.

43. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, how and when would we know
that it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the SM-3 Block
II missile?
Admiral Stavridis. Any decision to shift from or change the Phased
Adaptive Approach strategy to include elements from the previous
European missile defense strategy would be done through close
consultation and coordination between the NSC, DOD, DOS, and DNI and
executed by the Missile Defense Agency. Such a decision would only be
precipitated due to a revised assessment of Iranian ICBM missile
capability and development timeline.

44. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, what has been Russia's
reaction to the new missile defense plans for Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. While initially somewhat better than the
reactions to the previous plan, the current reaction from the Russian
Government has been one of suspicion.
Russian representatives have stated that in their view the threat
that a rogue may attack is largely theoretical. In their analysis,
therefore, the United States and Europe must have ulterior motives.
This view, taken in conjunction with Russia's heavy reliance on its
aging nuclear missile force, casts some light on their negative
reactions.
As an example, in Russia's new military doctrine, strategic missile
defense will ``undermine global stability and destroy the balance of
power in the nuclear missile sphere.''

45. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, I've seen press reports
that Russia may now be concerned that the SM-3 Block II missile may be
a threat to their strategic forces and that Russia will seek to limit
its deployment in the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
follow-on negotiations. What can you tell me?
Admiral Stavridis. Boris Gryzlov, Speaker of Russia's Lower House
of Parliament, has said that the new treaty would have to contain tough
language linking the need to limit defensive weapons with any
reductions of offensive missiles. ``Without that, there is no chance
the treaty will be ratified in the Duma.''
Keeping that in mind, EUCOM will act in accordance with President
Obama's Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) (www.defense.gov/bmdr)
which states the United States will:

``Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with Russia on
all dimensions of the missile defense issue. However, the
United States will not negotiate restraints on U.S. BMD
capabilities.''

The BMDR also states that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system
does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian missile
attacks and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with
Russia.

46. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, the administration's new
approach to missile defense in Europe hopes to solicit allied
participation. We are hearing, however, that NATO is facing a funding
crisis due to the operational demands related to Afghanistan. How
likely is it that we can expect European contributions to the defense
of their territory against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles?
Admiral Stavridis. The Alliance recognizes that ballistic missile
proliferation poses a significant threat to the Allies. NATO believes
that Missile Defense plays an important role for the Alliance as part
of a broader response to counter this threat. NATO has welcomed the new
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) introduced by the United States and is
exploring the potential for linking its systems to those of the United
States.
EUCOM is cautiously optimistic that NATO will accept territorial
BMD as a valid mission during the November NATO Summit in Lisbon,
Portugal. Such a decision would represent the political will required
by NATO militaries and the first step in gaining traction for NATO
commitment. It should be noted however, that European contributions are
already taking place outside of NATO. Poland and Romania have offered
to host land-based SM-3 capabilities. EUCOM is in full support of the
DOS-led efforts to negotiate the necessary agreements with these
important allies.

missile defense and freedom of navigation
47. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, it was reported by the
Information Telegraph Agency of Russia on February 15 that Under
Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher told journalists that the United
States has no plans to deploy missile defense elements in the Black
Sea, to include Aegis ships and sea-based missile defense components.
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability is currently
installed on 4 cruisers and 16 destroyers. All Arleigh Burke class
destroyers and nine of the Ticonderoga Class cruisers are planned to
receive BMD capability--a significant portion of our cruiser and
destroyer fleet.
Aegis class ships have sailed into the Black Sea seven times over
the past 5 years--the last such deployment occurring in July 2009. Ms.
Tauscher's comments are disturbing because it would seem to indicate a
new policy to restrict U.S. Aegis ship deployments into the Black Sea--
presumably in response to Russian missile defense concerns. Are there
any restrictions in deploying U.S. Aegis class destroyers and cruisers
into the Black Sea?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey are
unaware of any policy decision to `prevent' the deployment of Aegis
equipped vessels from deploying to the Black Sea.

48. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, are you aware of any plans
to change this policy?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM is not aware of any policy changes as to
restricting Aegis BMD ships from the Black Sea in response to Russian
missile defense concerns.

49. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, is it important that the
United States maintains the right to transit ships, including Aegis
class ships, into the Black Sea?
Admiral Stavridis. Freedom of Navigation is one of the pillars of
U.S. maritime policy.
The only statutory or policy limit on the deployment of U.S. naval
forces to the Black Sea is the Montreux Convention, which has been in
force since 1936. This Convention has played an essential role in
maintaining stability in the Black Sea, particularly throughout the
period of the Cold War. It is the policy of the United States to
support the Montreux Convention. The Convention, while it assures the
free transit of safe commercial shipping, sets some limits on the
ability of non-Black Sea states to deploy naval forces in the Black
Sea. These limits do not prevent the transit of Aegis-equipped vessels
to the Black Sea, but they limit the maximum tonnage of warships which
are part of the fleets of non-Black Sea states. None of the U.S. Navy
ships equipped with Aegis exceed this tonnage limit.

afghanistan-local defense initiatives
50. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, I think we would all agree
that the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq war was a great success and
signaled the beginning of stabilization in that troubled theater. A
Washington Post article that appeared on January 22 highlights
CENTCOM's use of local defense initiatives (LDIs) to similarly train
local militias as security forces to bridge the gap until more Afghan
army and police forces can be trained. Recent estimates imply that
32,000 soldiers need to be added over the next 10 months in order to
meet the stated goal of 134,000 troops by the end of the year. While
not all lessons from the Iraq war can be applied to Afghanistan, former
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf recently wrote, ``Afghanistan for
centuries has been governed loosely through a social covenant between
all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is needed
again to bring peace and harmony.'' Would you agree that this program
will spread coalition influence into remote regions and bridge the gap
until we can recruit and train adequate Afghan army and police forces?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

51. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, do you think the Afghani
Government can be persuaded to support this program or is this
something that will have to be implemented independently?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

52. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, what is your opinion on
our ability to adequately screen militia candidates for this program to
ensure that we are not training the wrong folks?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

53. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, the Post article addressed
differences between DOD and DOS concerning implementation timeline.
General McChrystal has already implemented this program on a small
scale using existing funding. In order to fully implement, Ambassador
Eikenberry must release additional funds. How are existing Commander's
Emergency Response Program funds being used to support this program and
are these funds adequate to fully implement LDIs?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

54. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, what support is needed
from DOS and what is DOD doing to resolve these differences in a timely
manner?
Admiral Stavridis. [Deleted.]

afghanistan-close air support
55. Senator Sessions. Admiral Stavridis, an article in the Atlanta
Journal from last weekend talked about a change in policy concerning
limiting night raids by coalition forces. This follows on the heels of
a decision to also limit airstrikes in the Afghan theater. While I
understand the sensitivities over collateral damage resulting from
airstrikes and local population concerns over the use of night raids, I
am concerned that policies that limit the use of force prevent us from
supporting our troops in contact with the enemy. Will either of these
policies prevent us from responding when our troops are in direct
contact with the enemy?
Admiral Stavridis. The new policies described above in no way
prevent us from responding when our troops are in direct combat with
the enemy. Under the rules of engagement troops retain their inherent
right of self-defense at all times and may defend themselves against
hostile acts and they may defend themselves from individuals or groups
demonstrating hostile intent.
The Tactical Directive does not completely prohibit the use of
combined arms support for our troops. The restrictions on combined arms
support only apply against residential compounds inhabited by civilians
and only then under limited circumstances. The Night Raids Tactical
Directive has no practical effect of limiting force in self-defense.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
angola
56. Senator Wicker. General Ward, Angola's oil exports have been
growing at a fast pace. The exports have grown so large that Angola has
even overtaken Saudi Arabia and Iran to become China's biggest oil
supplier. How is Angola's sporadic economic growth affecting the
politics in sub-Sahara Africa?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

57. Senator Wicker. General Ward, with this growth tied so closely
with Angola's debt to China, what are the political and security
implications of China in Africa?
General Ward. [Deleted.]

france and nato
58. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, last year, France made the
historic motion to rejoin NATO. France also has one of the largest
military budgets in the world. In July 2008, France embarked on an in-
depth overhaul of its security and defense strategy. This strategy has
it building up the force, with a more expeditionary strategy, and
integrating more with Europe. Some advocate for the European Union to
become an organization that is a major player in international security
and is an organization not led by the United States. As France grows as
a security leader in Europe, urging countries to be more involved in
European security, does this come at the detriment to NATO's strength?
Admiral Stavridis. No, European countries generally depend on the
primacy of NATO for their security. Resources committed to European
defense institutions do not necessarily have to come at a cost to NATO.
A complementary capability on the part of the Europeans generally
and the French specifically may allow for greater geopolitical burden-
sharing that does not cost the U.S. taxpayer although it benefits U.S.
security. While NATO can offer high level force projection capability,
the EU can fill gaps in areas of policy where the NATO and the U.S. may
not be interested or willing to operate.
As an example, France participates in European defense institutions
that provide stability in areas of interest to NATO and the U.S.
(Balkans) as well as in areas that may be less accessible to NATO or
the U.S. (Democratic Republic of Congo). Operation Althea in Bosnia
Herzegovina, launched December 2004, has seen the EU deploy 7,000
personnel and still acts within its peace enforcement mandate
supporting the Dayton/Paris Peace agreement today. When Europeans are
able to provide their own security in their own backyard on their own
terms, we all benefit. In Kosovo today, allies provide 8,800 of the
10,000 troops there. A second large military operation, the first EU
military mission outside of Europe, was Operation Artemis in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, involving about 1,500 personnel and led
by France. Certainly, the U.S. and NATO cannot provide coverage for all
of Africa, but where Europeans are able to operate and provide
coverage, the United States can benefit.

59. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, will France's efforts to
increase their own national defense challenge NATO's relevance?
Admiral Stavridis. No. France is a full and active member of NATO.
If France is successful in restructuring its national defense posture
and increasing its expeditionary capabilities, it becomes a more
effective and valuable member of the alliance. The United States should
welcome all efforts of any member to meet the NATO national defense
expenditure goals. A capable NATO is a relevant NATO.

60. Senator Wicker. Admiral Stavridis, in your professional
opinion, does France want to create a European Union-centric security
force?
Admiral Stavridis. France has been a driving force behind EUROCORPS
and supports the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU. It
currently hosts the EUROCORPS headquarters in Strasbourg, France.
EUROCORPS is not an EU Defense organization, but is the closest thing
to it composed of five framework nations of France, Belgium, Germany,
Spain, and Luxembourg.
The important takeaway, though, is that an EU-centric security
force can support U.S. and NATO security goals. EUROCORPS will deploy
in 2012 to Afghanistan in support of ISAF. There have been no
indications that France is forming military units and capabilities that
can only support EUROCORPS and not NATO missions. In the future,
EUROCORPS may be deployed to out-of-area operations where the United
States might not have an abiding interest to contribute forces through
a NATO mission, but where the United States would nonetheless benefit
from and welcome security and stability.
______

Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
61. Senator Vitter. General Ward, please provide me with an update
on AFRICOM integration with non-defense U.S. actors such as DOS and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In this update,
please provide an assessment of DOS and USAID capabilities in regards
to their stability operations role in Africa.
General Ward. Interagency personnel, DOS and USAID in particular,
are integrated into U.S. AFRICOM's staff through multiple mechanisms--
in particular through having interagency personnel on the Command and
their regular communication and coordination with their home agencies.
We have developed strong relationships with these agencies, and we
continue to seek ways to improve them. We coordinate our activities
with DOS to ensure our actions are complementary to broader U.S.
Government efforts. Our assigned interagency experts play a vital role
in informing our activities and plans, and as a result, our planning
efforts are better advised and more effective.

As of 15 January 2010, there were 27 interagency
personnel integrated across the command in long-term
assignments. Currently, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
requested an additional 33 personnel from other U.S. Government
departments and agencies be assigned to the command.
Five members are Senior Executive, or Senior Foreign
Service personnel with strategic decisionmaking roles.
The remaining 22 personnel are GS15 equivalent or
junior personnel, and are embedded within the headquarters
planning staff.
Currently, there are 15 interagency personnel assigned
to the command for temporary assignments related to specific
planning events.
Additionally, we have had a significant number of
personnel on temporary duty from other agencies over the last 2
years. These personnel come by invitation or voluntarily to
determine how they can best work in the command.

Concerning operations, our interagency partnerships have made
significant contributions that otherwise would have not been possible:

The AMLEP Operation, employing a U.S. Coast Guard
cutter with members of Sierra Leone's armed forces, conducted
the first successful seizure by Sierra Leone of a vessel
operating illegally in the country's waters.
The command's U.S. Treasury Department Advisor from
the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence coordinated
and developed counter-terrorist and illicit financing
collaborative initiatives between Treasury and USAFRICOM.
Through the efforts of our humanitarian assistance
team (led by a USAID employee,) USAFRICOM's humanitarian
efforts complement and support USAID's lead on development
initiatives.

DOS and USAID capabilities and their partnership, advice,
significantly contribute to everything that USAFRICOM does in support
of our primary DOD mission, as well as our supporting role to U.S.
Government activities where they are the lead agency. However, I will
echo the Secretary of Defense's call for continued congressional
support for DOS and USAID efforts to increase their capacity to carry
out their missions, including conducting stability operations.

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe,
Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
Lang, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
Reed; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Michael
Harney, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to
Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Matthew R.
Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator
LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; and Chip
Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets today for two hearings. The first
hearing will be to receive testimony from the combatant
commanders of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Then, at the conclusion of that
hearing, we'll take a very brief break and start a second
hearing, with four senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials
and a witness from the Government Accountability Office, to
consider the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft program.
Before we start this hearing, I just want to remind DOD
that formal statements of witnesses before the committee are
due 48 hours before the hearing. Now, we make this requirement
very clear in our formal communications with the Department,
and it's important that that rule be met. We understand that
there are circumstances beyond the control of individual
witnesses, that are the cause frequently, so we're not using
this hearing to target or single out this panel, or any member
of this panel. We've had this problem in a number of recent
hearings, and I would just simply ask our witnesses and
representatives of DOD to take this message back to the
Department.
We welcome General Gene Renuart, the Commander of NORTHCOM,
and also of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD); and General Doug Fraser, the Commander of SOUTHCOM.
General Renuart is nearing the completion of his tour of
duty as commander, and he's planning to retire later this year.
We understand that this could be his last appearance before
this committee. We give him, therefore, a special welcome and a
special thank you for his long service.
General Fraser is appearing before us for the first time as
the SOUTHCOM commander. We thank you, General, for your many
years of dedicated service to the Nation.
We, again, want to just offer you our best wishes, General
Renuart, as you conclude your long and outstanding career.
We also would ask both of you to convey our gratitude to
the men and women who serve in your commands, and to their
families for their commitment and their sacrifice in carrying
out the missions of the commands, and the commands in which
they now serve and have previously served.
NORTHCOM was created following the terrorist attacks of
September 11. It is charged with two primary missions: defense
of the United States and providing defense support to civil
authorities in circumstances where the U.S. military is needed
to respond to natural or manmade disasters.
The commander of NORTHCOM is also dual-hatted as the
commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada that
provides aerospace warning and control, and maritime warning
for North America. As indicated in our letter of invitation, we
hope that General Renuart will describe the synergies between
these two interrelated commands. In addition to Canada, Mexico
is also in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR); and given
the continuing high level of drug-related violence in Mexico
and the attendant risks to our southern border region, we hope
that General Renuart will update us on his view of the current
situation, relative to Mexico.
Finally, General Renuart is the combatant commander
responsible for the operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system that has interceptors deployed in Alaska
and California to defend our Nation from long-range missile
attack. That system has been of considerable interest to this
committee, and we look forward to discussing it today.
Turning to SOUTHCOM's AOR, General Fraser and Lieutenant
General Keene, his deputy commander, and commander of the Joint
Task Force (JTF) in Haiti, have spent much of the last 2 months
responding to the devastating human tragedies in Haiti, and,
more recently, to a lesser extent, in Chile. The scope and
scale of these tragedies remains difficult to imagine, but the
stories that have emerged have captured all of our hearts, have
called our people to action, and have put the Haitian and the
Chilean people in our thoughts and our prayers. We applaud the
work of tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines who responded quickly and provided much-needed
emergency relief to the people of Haiti.
Beyond Haiti and Chile, General Fraser, the other
challenges that we face in our hemisphere remain complex and
interwoven. The drug trade in South and Central America
continues to boom, and the illicit southward flow of guns and
money continues to foster violence, corruption, and political
instability. The region is not without its bad political
actors, as well. President Chavez continues to work to
undermine U.S. interests in the region, to do everything
possible to maintain his own power and align himself more
closely with countries of concern, like Iran. President
Chavez's activities, coupled with the money, corruption, guns,
and violence in the drug trade, are cause for great concern.
The SOUTHCOM AOR does, however, have a good news story, as
well. The Colombian Government continues to consolidate the
gains of Plan Colombia by expanding security in government
services to the farthest reaches of Colombia. Later this year,
the Colombians will head to the polls to elect a new president,
following a Constitutional Court decision that prevented
President Uribe from running for a third term.
So, gentlemen, again, we thank you. We look forward to your
testimony.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you
in welcoming our witnesses today.
I know that executing two wars in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) AOR has robbed other combatant commands of the
sustained attention of Congress and the American people.
However, I want to make it clear that the success of your
commands' daily operations, and the fact that we don't hear
about you every day in the news, is a credit to you. It means
that Americans are safe along our northern and southern
approaches. So, I thank you both for your long years of service
and for the service of all the courageous soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines under your command.
General Renuart, as was mentioned, this is your last
appearance before the committee. We thank you for your years of
dedicated service to this Nation.
There's no doubt that NORTHCOM and NORAD play a vital role
in the defense of our Homeland. Whether it's dispatching jets
to respond to unidentified intrusions into our airspace or
providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a
chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack, the
resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the table
are invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced
growing pains common to a new combatant command.
I'm interested, General, in hearing what steps you're
taking to better operate in today's security environment,
particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). I also look forward to hearing how the command is
improving coordination and reliable communication
interoperability between local, State, and Federal authorities
so that we avoid the confusion of September 11th.
Not only as ranking member of this committee, and a member
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
but as representing the State of Arizona, I'm also particularly
concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Government of Mexico to
confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern
border and the growing threat of the drug cartels to the very
existence of the Government of Mexico.
The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels threaten
not only our border States, like Arizona, but the entire
country. I believe there's no more important mission than
protection of the homeland, and I look forward to your
testimony.
General Fraser, it's been a trial by fire for you. The
Senate confirmed you less than a year ago, and your AOR has
experienced two of the worst earthquakes on record in the
region, little more than a month apart. So, I want to
congratulate you and your team for the exceptional work you
have all done supporting the international relief effort in
Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift
support to the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the
aftermath of its 8.8-magnitude earthquake last month.
We have a number of interests in the Caribbean and Central
and South America, but none so important than helping a
neighbor in need. I'm proud of SOUTHCOM's efforts, and proud of
the men and women serving on the USNS Comfort, whom I am sure
take for granted how critical they are to the lives of not only
our wounded warriors, but to the innocent victims of natural
calamity around world.
So, I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping
with the unexpected costs associated with these efforts, a
status report on our military-to-military relations in the
region. I've long believed that consistent engagement is the
key to enhancing security. By improving partner capacity, we
can help the region decrease gang violence, drug trafficking,
and human trafficking, all of which threatens both regional and
global stability.
I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
today. I know that executing two wars in the Central Command area of
responsibility (AOR) has robbed other combatant commands of the
sustained attention of Congress and the American people. However, I
want to make clear that the success of your commands' daily operations
and the fact that we don't hear about you every day in the news is a
credit to you, because it means that Americans are safe from the air,
the sea, and from our northern and southern approaches. So, I thank you
both for your long years of service and for the service of all the
courageous soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your command.
General Renaurt, there is no doubt that Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
and NORAD play a vital role in the defense of our homeland. Whether it
is dispatching jets to respond to unidentified intrusions into U.S.
airspace, or providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of
a catastrophic chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological attack,
the resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the table are
invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced the growing
pains common to any new combatant command. I am interested in hearing
what steps the command is taking to better operate in today's security
environment, particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial
Defense Review.
I also look forward to hearing how the command is improving
coordination and ensuring reliable communication interoperability
between local, State, and Federal authorities so that we prevent
similar mistakes of September 11. Not only as ranking member of this
committee and as member of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, but as the Senator from Arizona, I am also
particularly concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Government of Mexico to
confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern border.
The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels operating to our
south threaten not only Border States, like Arizona, but the entire
country. There is no more important mission than the protection of the
homeland and I look forward to your testimony.
General Fraser, it's been trial by fire for you. The Senate
confirmed you less than a year ago and your AOR has experienced two of
the worse earthquakes on record in the region--little more than a month
apart. So, I want to congratulate you and your team for the exceptional
work you all have done supporting the international relief effort in
Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift support to
the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the aftermath of its 8.8
magnitude earthquake last month.
We have a number of interests in the Caribbean, and Central and
South America, but none so important than helping a neighbor in need. I
am proud of SOUTHCOM's efforts, proud of the men and women serving on
the USNS Comfort, whom I am sure take for granted how critical they are
to the lives of not only our wounded warriors but to the innocent
victims of natural calamity around the world.
I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping with the
unexpected costs associated with these efforts as well as get a status
report on our ongoing engagements in the region. I've long believed
that continuing engagement in the region is the key to enhancing
security. By improving partner capacity, we can help the region
decrease gang violence, drug-trafficking, and human trafficking all of
which threatens both regional and global stability. I look forward to
your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much Senator McCain.
Let me start with General Renuart.

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND

General Renuart. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of
the committee----
You'd think I'd have learned that by now.
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee,
good morning. As you are so kind to mention, this may be my
last appearance before the committee, and I want to thank all
of the members of the committee for the sustained support that
you've provided to not only our commands, but, of course, the
men and women serving in our military today.
It is good to be back with you today and represent the men
and women of both of our commands, and to talk about some of
the developments that we've had over the last year, and to
mention some areas where I think we can continue to grow and
improve.
Of course, we have to thank the men and women who serve,
each day, who wear the uniform, the cloth of our Nation, as
they defend our homeland, both here and abroad. It's also
important that we recognize the contributions of our senior
enlisted leaders. I'm pleased to have with me today my
command's senior enlisted leader, Chief Master Sergeant Allen
Usry, seated here behind me. Chief Usry is the first National
Guard senior enlisted leader selected for NORTHCOM. I would say
that was a competitive selection across Active, Reserve, and
Guard, senior noncommissioned officers, and we're pleased to
have Chief Usry as part of the team.
I'm also very pleased to sit next to my good friend Doug
Fraser. As you both mentioned, during the past months our
commands have partnered substantially across a broad variety of
areas. First, to fight the narcoterrorism in our region, the
movement of drugs, to support law enforcement to ensure that
illicit trade and trafficking is reduced in our region. But,
we've also partnered together to support SOUTHCOM in their
efforts to provide the military support to humanitarian relief
efforts in the wake of the devastating earthquake in Haiti.
We're pleased to be part of Doug's team.
As Commander of both NORAD and NORTHCOM, I really have two
principal missions. Chairman Levin, you mentioned those, so I
won't repeat them. But, it's important to ensure that, across a
broad spectrum of missions--from air sovereignty, to maritime
homeland defense, to ballistic missile defense, to support the
law enforcement along our borders, and to support Federal
agencies, both in natural and manmade disasters, as well as
large-scale events, like the Vancouver Olympics--our two
commands have created a synergy between each other that is now
inseparable. From warning to consequence management, that
spectrum of activity is really the symbol of what these two
commands have grown to be. I'm pleased to talk about those both
today.
It's important also to note that we're members of a
combined national response in many of these areas. We don't do
it alone. DOD should not be the lead in many of these areas,
but is an integral and important partner. We've worked very
hard with our teammates in both Federal and State agencies.
We've spent a great deal of time on the ground talking to
adjutants general in the States, to the Governors, and to their
senior emergency managers to ensure that we create an
integrated team for success.
It's also important to note that we have excellent
relations with our international partners. Both the chairman
and Senator McCain mentioned Mexico; certainly Mexico is in a
difficult struggle, continuing to work hard on countering the
drug-trafficking organizations in their country. We work very
closely with our Mexican military and their interagency
partners to ensure that the lessons we've learned in other
places around the world are shared so that we can create strong
capacity within the Mexican military and within their
governmental agencies to allow them to succeed. They face
significant challenges. We'll continue to work with them
aggressively. I look forward to discussing that with you here
today.
As for our Canadian teammates, they stand shoulder by
shoulder with us on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but also
here in this hemisphere. We work very closely with them in air
sovereignty. They partner with us in the Joint Interagency Task
Force (JIATF)-South to counter drug-trafficking. We've worked
very closely to provide support to them in special events in
their country. I mention the Vancouver Olympics one more time.
Finally, I want to thank the committee for the support
you've provided for the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC is an important element
to both of our commands. It allows us to establish
relationships with senior military and civilian leaders from
other countries, and it has allowed us, then, to bridge into
some of these tough topics that we'll talk about maybe a little
later in the hearing. So, we both feel that WHINSEC is critical
to our ability to interoperate in our region.
Thanks for your support also to keep the personal security,
the individuals attending these schools, confidential. It
allows them to speak openly, to understand and maintain that
academic freedom that we value in our institutions.
Our commands train hard to ensure our operational readiness
and our mission effectiveness are always the best they can be.
Protecting our families, our Nation, and our communities is the
most important mission we have, and we take that very
seriously.
Mr. Chairman, as I complete my service to the Nation, I
want to tell you that this past 3 years in these two commands
has been an extraordinary experience, much more complex than I
would have imagined, and it created challenges that we are
meeting and successfully achieving every day.
I have to close by saying thank you to my family. For 39
plus years, my wife has quietly endured the moves, the changes,
the challenges, from Operation Desert Storm to Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to here today in
the homeland. So, I want to go on the record to say thank you
to her for her support, and our two sons, who are both serving
in their own way.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions
here today. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Renuart follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report on the posture,
challenges, and future direction of North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Every day, the
Commands' soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, National
Guardsmen, reservists, and civilians defend the United States and
Canada from external threats and aggression-protecting our citizens,
national power, and freedom of action. Due to their efforts, North
America enjoys continued security and freedom.
homeland defense is our highest priority
NORAD and NORTHCOM are inextricably linked Commands that have
complementary missions and work closely together to protect our
homelands. Incorporating an integrated headquarters staff, our Commands
have forged an indispensible partnership operating within a common
security environment, and together are dedicated to defending the
United States and Canada. The synergies that exist between these two
Commands enable us to conduct our missions with a sense of urgency in
the face of very real threats.
NORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense, sustaining continuous
situational awareness and readiness to protect the United States
against a range of symmetric and asymmetric threats in all domains.
NORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes air, land, and sea
approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska,
Canada, Mexico, Saint Pierre and Miquelon (French Territory off the
northeast coast of Canada), The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and three British Overseas Territories: Bermuda, Turks and
Caicos Islands, and British Virgin Islands, as well as the surrounding
water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico and
the Straits of Florida. NORTHCOM is also responsible for leading the
Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts for theater security cooperation
with Canada, Mexico, and Caribbean nations within the NORTHCOM AOR.
Day to day, we are focused on deterring, preventing, and defeating
attacks against the United States. We also stand ready to support
primary agencies, when directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, in responding quickly to natural and man-made disasters. To
accomplish our civil support mission, we stay close to our Federal
partners to anticipate and plan for how and when the DOD can assist in
preventing and minimizing loss of life, suffering, and property damage.
We continually assess threats to our security, improve our homeland
defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and strengthen
relationships with our mission partners. We work diligently to ensure
our Nation's military is ready and immediately accessible to support
our fellow citizens when called upon.
NORAD is the binational U.S. and Canadian command charged with the
missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning
for North America. Aerospace warning includes the detection,
validation, and warning of attack against North America--by aircraft,
missiles, or space vehicles--through mutual support arrangements with
other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and
air defense of the airspace of the United States and Canada. The
renewal of the NORAD Agreement in May 2006 added the maritime warning
mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the
activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime
areas, and internal waterways.
intelligence activities
To perform our missions, we rely on the sharing of intelligence
among Federal, State, and local agencies. NORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence
Operations Center (JIOC-North) coordinates the acquisition, analysis,
and fusion of intelligence, counterintelligence, and appropriate DOD-
related law enforcement information for the NORTHCOM AOR, and shares
that information with organizations at the national, State, and local
levels. JIOC-North maintains a dual focus on monitoring both non-state
and nation-state threats to North America.
In countering transnational terrorism, we continue to rely on our
established connections within the intelligence and Federal law
enforcement communities, seeking as much legally appropriate
information as possible. NORTHCOM maintains liaison officers with the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Beginning in 2009, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis placed a
liaison officer with JIOC-North. In the wake of the Fort Hood shootings
in November 2009, we established a daily terrorism and force protection
information sharing group to improve the manner in which potential
threats are identified, assessed, and acted upon. We perform our
intelligence activities with a focus on safeguarding the civil rights
and civil liberties of U.S. citizens and adhering to appropriate
statutes and DOD regulations.
homeland defense operations--protecting what americans value most
NORTHCOM may be known best for leading the DOD response to
disasters in our AOR; however, we remain vigilant in our number one
responsibility, homeland defense, as we monitor an average of 12-20
potentially dangerous events each day. Through our operational missile
defense program and our maritime and air defense activities, NORTHCOM
maintains a high state of readiness to respond as necessary against
manmade threats.
Ballistic Missile Defense
NORTHCOM is responsible for ballistic missile defense operations
within our AOR and other areas as directed to protect the homeland,
allies, friends, and other national interests from potentially hostile
acts. Our ability to carry out this mission continues to mature. The
Ballistic Missile Defense System has been in nearly continuous
operations since 2006 against potential threats to the defended area.
Although it is a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) asset, the Sea-Based X-
Band radar capability has also been included in our operational
baseline during heightened threat periods since 2008.
Our missile defense crews are trained and our procedures are
continuously validated and exercised, so that we can meet the high
standards required to defend the Nation. Furthermore, NORTHCOM is
active in the ground and flight testing programs to ensure the tests
are more operationally realistic. Our immediate challenge is balancing
a real-time defensive capability with requirements of MDA's Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.
NORTHCOM is working closely with the other Combatant Commands to
develop a Global Force Management Plan to address the Phased Adaptive
Approach and improved capabilities to defend the homeland. This effort
will assess operational planning, force structure, and budgetary
implications to better meet global ballistic missile defense
requirements. We are working with MDA to ensure that the Phased
Adaptive Approach includes upgraded sensor systems with real-time
discrimination capability; improved deployable and fixed-site
interceptors; enhanced command and control systems that provide a
common operating picture across the strategic, operational and tactical
levels; and an additional Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK. MDA's
Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and Simultaneous Test and
Operations, with the additional Fort Greely equipment, will bridge the
gap between operational capability and Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation activities.
Operation Noble Eagle
Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the September 11
attacks and continues today to protect and defend the United States and
Canada with airspace surveillance, ready alert forces, and the U.S.
National Capital Region (NCR) Integrated Air Defense System. Air
National Guardsmen and Air Force reservists have flown more than 80
percent of the more than 55,000 Operation Noble Eagle missions.
The security and defense of the NCR against terrorist air threats
is one of our highest priorities. NORAD works closely with DHS, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
to ensure the skies over the NCR are protected. We are prepared to
provide a rapid, reliable response as incidents unfold. As part of the
NCR Integrated Air Defense System, NORAD and the USCG provide air
patrol and alert aircraft to counter fast- and slow-moving air threats
that may penetrate the NCR Air Defense Identification Zone.
NORAD also provides tailored air defense for National Special
Security Events (NSSE) in the United States and similar events in
Canada.
We are implementing a ``risk assessment'' model as recommended in
the GAO-09-184 report ``Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air
Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace.'' This risk
assessment will enhance NORAD's ability to determine and apply
appropriate requested levels and types of units, personnel, and
aircraft.
Northern Sovereignty Operations
During 2009, NORAD launched fighter aircraft on 14 occasions in
response to TU-95 Bear and TU-160 Blackjack aircraft not on
international flight plans that penetrated North America's Air Defense
Identification Zone. Because these flights did not violate U.S. or
Canadian airspace, they were not considered threats to national
sovereignty. The response was a means of identifying unknown aircraft
operating in relative proximity to U.S. and Canadian sovereign
airspace. In 2009, for the first time, a NORAD representative was
included at the annual U.S.-Russia Prevention of Incidents over the
High Seas staff talks. We anticipate continued NORAD and Russian Long
Range Aviation dialog in 2010 to reduce the ambiguity of Russian
military flights near our borders and promote safe flight operations
within international airspace. NORAD operations in Alaska will remain a
key avenue for positive interaction with Russian military counterparts
during the reset of relationships between our Nations; continued
support for military-to-military engagement opportunities is essential
to maintain this professional dialog.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Maritime Domain Awareness is the comprehensive understanding of the
global maritime domain as it relates to the security, safety, economy,
and environment of the homeland.
In the fall of 2008, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by a KIROV
class cruiser, transited the NORTHCOM AOR en route to participate in a
naval exercise with Venezuela and a port visit in Cuba. Additionally,
in the summer of 2009, we were involved with monitoring the activity of
a Russian support ship and a pair of nuclear-powered Russian submarines
patrolling covertly off our Eastern seaboard. Although these vessels
were not considered a threat to our homeland, their presence off the
coast of the United States cannot be ignored and requires naval assets
to be in a readiness posture to respond in any way necessary to defend
the homeland, if required.
NORTHCOM has aggressively pursued interagency and partner-nation
cooperation for Maritime Domain Awareness. NORTHCOM has partnered with
Mexico to better integrate regional efforts by initiating the
development of an automated identification system architecture, which
will contribute to increased information exchange and Maritime Domain
Awareness. This will have a positive impact on our combined capability
to combat illicit traffic.
NORTHCOM is the Operational Manager for two Joint Capability
Technology Demonstrations, which transitioned to Programs of Record in
2009. These complementary programs--Maritime Automated Super Track
Enhanced Reporting and Comprehensive Maritime Awareness--automatically
fuse maritime-related intelligence to allow joint and interagency
analysts to provide decisionmakers, planners, and operators the
capability to rapidly evaluate and respond to potential maritime
threats. These programs are fully operational and are employed in the
NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Center, as well as the Navy's maritime
operations centers.
As the Arctic emerges as an area of increased activity, NORTHCOM
has taken steps to evaluate DOD's ability to maintain Maritime Domain
Awareness in the region. To establish this foundation, NORTHCOM has
commissioned a surveillance study with the intent of identifying
current capabilities to determine where gaps exist. The study will be
completed in the fall of 2010.
NORAD Maritime Warning
The NORAD maritime warning mission continues to evolve as NORAD
planners work in close coordination with Canadian and interagency
partners. Collaboration on several planning documents with these many
organizations established and reaffirmed formal and informal
relationships required for binational and bilateral maritime
operations.
The past year's accomplishments and ongoing efforts have resulted
in enhanced bi-national information sharing and comprehensive
understanding of the maritime domain among our mission partners. We
worked aggressively to address gaps and seams documented in an internal
Information Sharing Architecture study that identified barriers to
achieving full mission capability status. The study further identified
critical steps and processes necessary to close these gaps within the
NORAD maritime warning mission. We have also moved forward in the
development of a shared binational common operating picture of the
maritime domain. We continue to be challenged in a constrained
environment to match the Canadian manpower commitment to this important
mission area.
Maritime Homeland Defense
Commander, NORTHCOM (CDRNORTHCOM) is the operational commander
responsible for Maritime Homeland Defense within the AOR. Commander,
U.S. Fleet Forces Command is under the operational control of
CDRNORTHCOM for Maritime Homeland Defense. Maritime threats,
particularly asymmetric maritime threats in close proximity to the
homeland, require defensive capabilities ready to respond on extremely
short notice. NORTHCOM is developing a short-notice maritime response
concept of operations that will provide an anti-ship defeat capability
for short-range emergent threats leveraging U.S. interagency and
partner-nation capabilities.
NORTHCOM faces a wide spectrum of maritime vulnerabilities that
warrant a comprehensive analytic study of ``Short-Notice Maritime
Response'' to identify Maritime Homeland Defense capability gaps from a
whole-of-government perspective. The nation's ability to respond to a
maritime threat in the NORTHCOM AOR requires the full integration of
DOD maritime operations with those of interagency partners and, where
appropriate, international partners, anchored on the principle of unity
of effort. To respond to a maritime threat within the NORTHCOM AOR, the
Nation depends on synchronized security efforts at the operational
level along the approaches to and within the United States. The
capability to intercept vessels of interest beyond their ability to
impact population centers, critical infrastructure, and key resources,
and the ability to respond quickly to maritime indications and warning
are essential to protecting the United States from external threats and
aggression. In sum, a whole-of-government approach is required to
leverage NORTHCOM maritime partner capabilities and resources.
Mine Countermeasure Contingency Operations
The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan outlines roles
and responsibilities that enable the U.S. Government to respond quickly
and decisively to threats against the United States and its interests
in the maritime domain. In accordance with the MOTR Plan, NORTHCOM is
responsible for Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations in U.S. waters. In
2009, in order to consolidate logistics and maintenance infrastructure,
the Navy completed the homeport shift of all surface MCM forces
(minesweeping vessels) to San Diego, CA, and all Aviation MCM forces
(mine sweeping helicopter squadrons) to Norfolk, VA. In May 2009, an
experiment conducted in the port of Corpus Christi, TX confirmed that
surveys and port folders completed prior to a mining incident can
significantly reduce the time required to mitigate the mining threat
and restore port operations.
Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP)
NORTHCOM protects DOD assets in our AOR by executing a
comprehensive all-hazards approach to the AT/FP mission that provides
DOD personnel (active duty, reservists, civilians, and family members),
assets, facilities, installations and infrastructure protection from
the full spectrum of threats in order to ensure mission accomplishment.
NORTHCOM has established theater policy, standards, and training, and
verifies program execution and compliance through an exercise program
and AT Program Reviews. We also integrate operational protection
efforts with DHS to create a synchronized defense strategy for the AOR.
NORTHCOM supports new processes and technologies that sustain the
force protection mission. During the past year, we participated in a
pilot program, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, to identify a
suspicious activity reporting and sharing capability for the DOD. The
unclassified FBI eGuardian system is anticipated to be the DOD
suspicious activity reporting system when designated by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. The eGuardian system will share potential
terrorist threats, terrorist events, and suspicious activity
information with State, Local, Tribal, Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies, State Fusion Centers, and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. The eGuardian system will provide a continuous law enforcement
force protection threat information sharing environment to identify
emerging threats to DOD.
Critical Infrastructure Protection/Critical Resource Protection
The Secretary of the DHS is responsible for coordinating the
national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure
and key resources (CI/KR) in the United States. The DHS Secretary
serves as the Principal Federal Official to lead, integrate, and
coordinate implementation of CI/KR protection efforts among Federal
departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private
sector. NORTHCOM continues outreach with DHS and infrastructure sector
partners to ensure effective critical infrastructure information
sharing for the execution of its missions.
As assigned by the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands act to
prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical
assets within their AOR. For non-DOD owned critical assets, combatant
commands act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation only at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, with the exception of responding
to a time-critical event that requires specific actions by military
forces to prevent significant damage to mission-critical
infrastructure.
NORTHCOM retains DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) focus
in three areas: (1) AOR or those DOD assets that are owned, leased, or
managed by DOD; (2) Area of Influence to include the Defense Industrial
Base; and (3) Area of Interest that is non-DOD assets that are critical
to sustaining U.S. military operations.
civil support--helping those in need
When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM
supports the primary agency, typically DHS, in responding to natural
and manmade disasters by conducting operations to save lives, reduce
suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our Homeland. The
Department of State may request DOD support in response to requests
from other countries within and outside the NORTHCOM AOR. DOD is
prepared to support primary agencies with military-unique capabilities
such as fixed- and rotary-wing airlift, search and rescue teams, mobile
medical facilities, communications infrastructure, and catastrophic
planning expertise.
A key component of NORTHCOM's support is Incident Awareness and
Assessment to provided critical imagery for local responders. Military
aircraft over disaster sites provide Full Motion Video and still
imagery to give responders on the ground their first look at affected
areas. At the request of the primary agency, NORTHCOM is prepared to
provide a variety of aircraft and satellites to gather photos and video
that allow Federal, State, and local response assets to quickly respond
to situations. We conduct these Incident Awareness and Assessment
activities while simultaneously safeguarding the civil liberties of
American citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD
regulations.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
Consequence Management.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosives (CBRNE) incidents pose a great and foreseeable challenge to
the security of the American people. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil or
an accidental CBRNE incident could create catastrophic results that
would likely exceed the response capabilities of civil authorities. As
a result, DOD established a requirement for CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Forces (CCMRF) to be trained and ready to respond
to requests from civil authorities to save lives, help mitigate pain
and suffering, and reduce property damage.
A CCMRF is a brigade-sized task force that operates under the
authority of Title 10 of the United States Code. CCMRFs are self-
sustaining and may be tailored to any CBRNE event. A CCMRF is composed
of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy units with unique CBRNE training
and equipment, as well as general purpose units trained to operate in a
CBRNE environment. CCMRF capabilities include event assessment, robust
command and control, comprehensive decontamination of personnel and
equipment, hazardous material handling and disposal, medical support,
air and land transportation, aerial evacuation, mortuary affairs, and
general logistical support for extended operations. The CCMRF augments
the consequence management efforts of State and local first responders,
National Guard forces, and Federal agencies by providing complementary
and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their
capabilities.
In November 2009, NORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH), NORTHCOM's
Army Component Command, conducted the Vibrant Response 10.1 Field
Training Exercise (VR 10.1 FTX), the first full-scale, full-deployment
exercise for a CCMRF, confirming the CCMRF's capability to deploy to
and support a catastrophic CBRNE Consequence Management event from a
standing alert status. VR 10.1 FTX involved a simulated Improvised
Nuclear Device detonation at Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations
near Camp Atterbury, IN. This challenging scenario is one of the 15
National Planning Scenarios established as a common interagency
baseline, and the exercise set the stage for CCMRF 10.1 to fulfill its
assignment through the remainder of fiscal year 2010.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), a NORTHCOM subordinate
command, plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary
agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations. When
approved by the Secretary of Defense and directed by CDRNORTHCOM, JTF-
CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective
command and control of designated DOD forces, providing support to
civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary
critical life support. Some typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site
support, casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace
support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air
operations.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008,
section 1082, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, section
1034, directed DOD to establish an advisory panel to carry out an
assessment of the capabilities of DOD to provide support to U.S. civil
authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident. This advisory panel was
sworn in on 15 September 2009 and will submit their report with
recommendations to Congress within 12 months. NORTHCOM hosted the
Advisory Panel's second meeting at our Headquarters on 23 November 2009
in closed session for classified command mission briefings and
discussions. The Command will continue to engage with the Advisory
Panel throughout its efforts and we look forward to assisting them in
additional research and insight into the Department's CBRNE consequence
management mission sets.
Response to Haiti Earthquake
NORTHCOM is supporting U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) response
and support for Haiti Earthquake relief efforts. NORTHCOM and our
components contributed more than 170 people. Air operations experts
from Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), assisted SOUTHCOM by transforming
the 601st Air Mobility Division's Regional Air Movement Control Center
into the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center to control the
smooth flow of aircraft into Port-au-Prince Airport. AFNORTH's
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, Air Force Reserve officers
assigned to respond to natural and man-made disasters in the United
States, were onsite at facilities set up in the Southeast Region to
support Haitian earthquake relief efforts. ARNORTH's Defense
Coordinating Officer/Element worked closely with Federal, State,
tribal, and local officials to determine which DOD capabilities can
assist in mitigating the effects of the Haiti disaster.
Cyber Operations
NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to rely on data systems, the Internet,
and networked commercial and military infrastructure to accomplish our
missions. Cyber threats to these infrastructures include nation-state
actors, terrorists, and criminal organizations, and are increasing in
sophistication and occurrence. These cyber threats pose potentially
grave damage to the ability of NORAD and NORTHCOM to conduct aerospace,
maritime, and homeland defense, as well as DSCA missions. Our
dependence on critical information systems leaves us vulnerable to
potentially pervasive and sustained cyber attacks from global actors.
The Commands partner with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the
Military Services, DOD agencies, DHS, and other Federal agencies to
share cyber threat and related information, reduce cyberspace
vulnerabilities, and defend against information infrastructure attacks.
Efforts such as the U.S. Government's plans to increase information
sharing with the private sector, and its migration to trusted Internet
connections for the government and military networks, will help promote
situational awareness and reduce vulnerabilities.
In 2009, NORTHCOM, along with DHS, STRATCOM, and other mission
partners, developed a plan tailored to provide rapid assistance to DHS
and other Federal agencies for cyber-related events. This DOD cyber
support would fall under our DSCA mission area and be provided in a
similar fashion as hurricane relief, wildfire support, and responses to
other national disasters. NORTHCOM is also conducting an analysis of
providing a cyber response under our homeland defense responsibilities.
H1N1 Operations
NORTHCOM is executing Phase 1 of our Pandemic Influenza response
plan. As part of our response, we identified five Regional Joint Task
Force (RJTF) Headquarters. The RJTFs, along with NORTHCOM subordinate
commands, continue to prepare to assist the primary agency. To date,
NORTHCOM has not received any requests from the primary agency for DOD
capabilities.
In addition, NORTHCOM is the DOD lead for globally synchronizing
military efforts to minimize contamination and prevent further spread
of pandemic influenza. The DOD Global Synchronization Plan for Pandemic
Influenza provides guidance to all the Geographic Combatant Commands,
Functional Combatant Commands, Services, and DOD Agencies to assist in
development of regional plans addressing operations in a pandemic
influenza environment. Our efforts are focused on ensuring our military
remains combat ready while taking care of interagency actions to keep
military families safe at home.
Support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics
The 2010 Winter Olympics began on 12 February 2010 in Vancouver,
British Columbia. The Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness was charged with overall security for the Games and
delegated the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as the lead agency
for this task. At the same time, the Minister formally requested
Canadian Department of National Defence assistance for the RCMP. As a
result of this request, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General
Walter Natynczyk, tasked CDRNORAD with the aerospace warning, aerospace
control, and maritime warning for this event.
Inland Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordinator
In addition to defending our freedom, our lives, and our territory,
SAR is a priority mission for NORTHCOM. On 4 November 2009, the
Secretary of Defense designated CDRNORTHCOM as the U.S. Inland SAR
Coordinator, which made NORTHCOM responsible for civil SAR involving
the inland portion of the 48 contiguous States. NORTHCOM stands ready
to coordinate the full spectrum of SAR, from normal SAR, such as
searching for a lost hiker, to responding to catastrophic incidents,
such as a large-scale earthquake, through our Rescue Coordination
Center (RCC). The RCC is our key node for inland SAR and is under the
purview of NORTHCOM's Service Component Command, AFNORTH. In addition,
our Joint Personnel Recovery Center at Tyndall AFB, FL, allows us to
have experts in place for routine SAR missions and to have those same
experts at AFNORTH lead the way for a catastrophic incident SAR
mission. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for
recapitalization of the Air Force's current rotary-wing SAR capability
supports the continued viability of our SAR mission. Full funding of
this fiscal year 2011 request keeps us on a path to continue providing
SAR support to American citizens in those critical early hours of a
crisis when aerial life support is a no-fail mission.
support to law enforcement agencies
Joint Task Force-North Operations
Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), a NORTHCOM subordinate command,
provides military support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist
in the identification and interdiction of transnational threats within
and along the approaches to the United States. During fiscal year 2009,
JTF-North coordinated 61 missions in support of Federal law enforcement
agencies. In accordance with DOD policy for supporting law enforcement
counterdrug efforts, JTF-North employed joint air, ground, and maritime
sensors along the Nation's Southern and Northern borders and coasts;
conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats;
provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement
agencies; supported Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) request for
enhanced tactical infrastructure along the Southwest border; assisted
with building planning capability within CBP; and provided Federal law
enforcement with other support such as transportation, tunnel detection
capabilities, and basic military skills training.
At the request of DHS Assistant Secretary Alan Bersin, JTF-North
provided support to the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, a
multi-agency operation, in the State of Arizona. JTF-North facilitated
intelligence and operational planning, and provided sensor capabilities
during execution of this intelligence-driven operation.
Through JTF-North's missions and activities, NORTHCOM continues to
sustain important relationships with Federal law enforcement agencies
in securing our Nation's borders against drug traffickers and their
associated activities. Robust collaboration exists today between JTF-
North and operational-level leaders in CBP, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the FBI.
Counternarcotics (CN) Programs
NORTHCOM's CN Program is an integral part of the defense and
security of our Nation. We continue to build NORTHCOM's capabilities
and establish coordinated efforts supporting our partner agencies and
partner nations to address the illicit narcotics trafficking threat to
the homeland.
NORTHCOM's CN efforts support Law Enforcement Agencies through
information collection, analysis, fusion, and sharing, as well as
theater security cooperation and partnership programs. These efforts
are closely coordinated among the NORTHCOM staff and subordinate
commands.
In addition to our southwest border, there are ongoing efforts with
our Canadian partners along our 5,000 mile long northern border. This
U.S.-Canadian cooperation has uncovered and is addressing widespread
illicit narcotics trafficking in our shared land, air, and sea domains
that does not currently exhibit the level of violence as on our border
with Mexico, but nevertheless remains a serious transnational threat to
the United States. Illicit trafficking also poses a threat to The
Bahamas, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, which are now in the NORTHCOM
AOR. Accordingly, we are exploring how to better coordinate CN efforts
with SOUTHCOM in this region.
NORTHCOM has also made tremendous strides in supporting national CN
efforts by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the
Interdiction Committee (TIC) as part of their coordination with DOD.
TIC membership consists of 17 agencies and commands led by a chairman
appointed by the ONDCP Director. TIC provides advice to ONDCP on
activities and threats posed by all illicit drug trafficking that
threatens the United States and its interests in the Western
Hemisphere. NORTHCOM is now represented quarterly as a TIC participant
with JTF-North.
Counter-Tunnel Initiative
NORTHCOM is working with DHS, other combatant commands, and
coalition partners to explore, map, and characterize illicit
subterranean structures. Among these enhanced capabilities are seismic-
acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, robotics, and other
technologies. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and
Development Center, is the technical lead for this initiative and
continues to work in support of multiple combatant commands to solve
this difficult problem. Within the past year, DOD support has resulted
in the preemptive interdiction of two unfinished tunnels on the
Southwest border. The Southwest border is a perfect test-bed for this
capability. Results of this initiative benefit all combatant commands
and help our interagency partners in their border security mission.
the national guard and reserves--our partners
National Guard and Reserve Forces are critical to NORTHCOM's
ability to carry out our assigned homeland defense and civil support
missions. As such, NORTHCOM advocates for National Guard and Reserve
capabilities in support of the Command's mission. In each of our annual
Integrated Priority List and Program Objective Memorandum submissions
to the DOD, we advocate for and support resolution of National Guard
and Reserve capability concerns. We further advocate for changes to DOD
policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper
resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units' equipment, personnel
and training for civil support operations. We also advocate for and
support key issues such as equipment modernization in the Weapons of
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.
We recognize the National Guard as a fundamental partner in the
Total Force and essential to the security and defense of our Nation.
The Air National Guard provides the bulk of NORAD's operational force
for Air Sovereignty Alert missions, and is developing additional
capabilities in support of domestic requirements. The Army National
Guard provides all of the manning at our Ground-Based Interceptor sites
in support of missile defense requirements. Additionally, the Army
National Guard provides the bulk of personnel for ground-based air
defense capabilities protecting the National Capital Region.
The National Guard has made a significant investment in personnel
assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration
of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of
the National Guard Bureau. There are over 50 full-time National Guard
authorizations in NORTHCOM HQ; however, only 39 of those positions are
filled. In addition, Guard general officers serve in nominative
positions as my NORTHCOM Deputy Commander, Director of Operations, and
one Deputy Director of Plans and Policy. Our ongoing partnerships with
the National Guard have increased our ability to coordinate and
integrate joint and interagency operations. While we still have work to
do, I am pleased to report our collaboration with the National Guard
has never been better, and the experience gained by Guard members
serving throughout NORTHCOM ensures we have a strong foundation for
enhancing this relationship as these servicemembers progress through
their careers.
plans--the cornerstone of our success
NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to
our Nation's ability to deter, detect and defeat threats to our
security, and assist civil authorities when called upon by the
President or Secretary of Defense. Our plans are modified as threats,
observations, and lessons learned from exercises and real-world
operations dictate.
On 2 November 2009, the Secretary of Defense established a Civil
Support Plan category of DOD plans that may be shared with State,
local, tribal, and other Federal authorities that play a mission-
critical role in the development, review or execution of the plans.
This Civil Support plan category of DOD plans contains seven NORTHCOM
plans.
The NORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan provides the framework for all
of our planning efforts and is the primary means by which we
synchronize day-to-day operations for homeland defense, civil support,
and theater security cooperation activities. The operations and
activities outlined in the campaign plan place strong emphasis on
anticipating threats, improving our homeland defense and civil support
capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission
partners, at home and in the North American region. We continually
assess the campaign plan to evaluate our progress toward achieving the
long-term goals and objectives outlined in national and DOD strategies.
theater security cooperation
Our top theater security cooperation priority is to build the
capacity of allies and partners to help create an environment in North
America that is inhospitable to terrorism. NORTHCOM's long-range vision
focuses on establishing a comprehensive defense architecture where the
United States works with its international partners to deter, prevent,
and if necessary, defeat mutual threats. To achieve this, we plan,
execute, and assess theater security cooperation programs, events, and
activities with The Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico to support national and
Command goals and objectives. This requires us to direct theater
security cooperation activities toward improving partner-nation defense
capacities, using a capacities-based planning approach, to promote
regional cooperation and enhanced interoperability.
The focus for our efforts is on building partner capacities with
The Bahamas and Mexico and on enhancing coordination and
interoperability with Canada. Our goal is to strengthen homeland
defense through mutually beneficial partnerships in the AOR that
counter terrorism, trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and
illicit narcotics and other transnational and irregular threats and
their consequences, while contributing to national security objectives.
We have worked over the past year with the Department of State,
U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Geological Survey,
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental
Protection Agency to strengthen those relationships to further North
American security and prosperity. Recent, ongoing, and planned
initiatives include building relationships and capabilities and
creating enduring partnerships that result in enhanced safety and
security along our common borders and within the region. Activities
have focused on developing and improving procedures to prepare for and
respond to potentially catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza
outbreak, mass exposure to dangerous chemicals and/or materials, and
natural and/or manmade disasters.
Canada
The relationship among NORAD, NORTHCOM and Canada Command is a
tremendous example of the strong and mutually beneficial military-to-
military ties between our Nations. I reported last year that we had
signed the Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan, which is the
framework for forces from one nation providing support to forces of the
other nation for timely, effective, and efficient support to their
respective civil authorities. We used the Civil Assistance Plan in our
deliberate planning process, as the U.S. Government responded to
requests from the Government of Canada for NORTHCOM support to Canada
Command when they supported Royal Canadian Mounted Police security
efforts for the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver.
NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to develop our relationships with
Canada Command. This past year, we concluded a comprehensive Tri
Command Study that examined future roles, missions and relationships to
increase North American defense and security while enhancing the valued
relationship between Canada and the United States. The Tri Command
Study identified several initiatives to further integrate and
synchronize our operations and created a Framework for Enhanced
Military Cooperation among NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command that
highlights fundamental relationships and underscores individual command
responsibilities for mutual support and cooperation.
Mexico
NORTHCOM leads Theater Security Cooperation and Building
Partnership activities with Mexico to promote specific U.S. security
interests and support the development of Mexican military capabilities
for self-defense and coordinated operations. Our military-to-military
relationship with Mexico is growing stronger, with full respect for
Mexican sovereignty and a shared responsibility for countering the
transnational illicit trafficking activity affecting our Nations.
As one essential element of the U.S. whole-of-government approach,
NORTHCOM's most significant contribution is in strengthening the
operational capacity of the Mexican Army, Air Force, and Navy. Our
engagement goes beyond providing hardware and the associated training;
it also focuses on developing the ability to analyze and share the
information that will allow the Mexican military to conduct operations
against the drug trafficking organizations to systematically dismantle
them. We are committed to a long-term military partnership with Mexico
that is beneficial to both nations.
NORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military to support
its efforts to increase capacities and execute its current strategy to
counter Mexico's security threats. The level of communication,
interchange, cooperation, and training exchanges between U.S. and
Mexican armed forces has increased dramatically over the last 2 years
and represents a historic opportunity for long-term strategic
improvement of the U.S.-Mexico security partnership.
Through our Theater Security Cooperation Plan and activities,
NORTHCOM plays a significant role in supporting the Mexican military
and improving the security situation in Mexico through the execution of
the following programs:

The Merida Initiative: $415.5 million appropriated in
fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 Foreign Military
Financing funds to purchase aircraft (up to eight Bell 412
helicopters, up to five Sikorsky UH-60M helicopters and up to
four CASA aircraft) to improve the Mexican military's ability
to deploy rapid-reaction forces quickly in support of police
operations against drug cartels, and to conduct maritime
surveillance in an effort to deny the use of the eastern
Pacific and western Caribbean to transnational criminal
organizations, including drug traffickers and potential
terrorists. In addition, funding will procure ion scanners to
help detect illicit drugs. NORTHCOM's actions are in
coordination with efforts to build up the capabilities of
Mexico's civilian law enforcement entities by the U.S.
Department of State and other agencies.
Section 1206 assistance: $14.0 million for equipment
such as Night Vision Goggles, Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats,
personal protective equipment, digital media forensics,
tactical communications equipment, and specialized training.
Section 1004 counterdrug support: $18.0 million for
pilot training, specialized skills training, and intelligence
training.
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic
Aid: $3.0 million in fiscal years 2008-2010 for hazardous
materials response, flood early warning and emergency
management training.
Facilitated training support in the areas of Night
Vision Goggle maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/
Hazardous Material team training, and Aviation Training.
Additionally, our Service components are actively engaged with
their Mexican counterparts in subject matter exchanges and
sharing lessons learned from our experiences in the areas of
civil-military relations and urban operations.

I have engaged with senior officers in the Mexican armed forces
over the past few months who have expressed an interest in more
detailed discussion and training in the areas of military justice and
operational law (and inherent human rights issues) and administrative
law. As a result, we are developing Subject Matter Expert Exchange and
Mobile Training Team events (in conjunction with the Defense Institute
for International Legal Studies) in order to enhance respect for the
rule of law and human rights within the Mexican armed forces. For
example, NORTHCOM attorneys and attorneys from the Mexican armed forces
have already participated in conferences designed to develop curricula
for the professional development of military attorneys. Additionally,
senior attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have visited various
U.S. military entities to get a first-hand view of how the U.S.
military is organized and trained for the administration of military
justice and for conducting operations in compliance with domestic and
international law.
NORTHCOM continues to support the Department of State's ``Beyond
Merida Initiative.'' NORTHCOM has partnered with the Mexican military
in support of disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate and
institutionalizing capacity to sustain the rule of law, thus helping to
build strong and resilient communities on both sides of the border.
We will continue to work proactively with our mission partners and
with the Mexican military to achieve the joint goals of the United
States and the Government of Mexico. It is important to recognize that
while we are currently working with Mexico to develop and strengthen
its military's capability to defeat the drug trafficking organizations,
our long-term goal is to establish an enduring relationship--built upon
trust and confidence--so that we can cooperate in the future on other
mutual security issues.
The Bahamas
On 17 December 2008, Theater Security Cooperation responsibility
for The Bahamas was transferred from SOUTHCOM to NORTHCOM. This Unified
Command Plan transfer enhances our homeland defense mission through our
partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), and
strengthens our civil support missions with Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. This past year, my staff coordinated closely with
SOUTHCOM and RBDF staffs to ensure smooth planning and execution of
this shift in mission and responsibilities. We have developed a
comprehensive Bahamas engagement plan as part of our Theater Campaign
Plan that will enhance the U.S.-Bahamian relationship and integrate The
Bahamas as a participant in the President's Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative.
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
NORTHCOM representatives participated in the WHINSEC Board of
Visitors in June and December 2009. We worked closely with the WHINSEC
staff to ensure their curriculum is fully compliant with U.S. Code and
supportive of human rights. I have tasked WHINSEC to provide human
rights training to the Mexican armed forces in the upcoming months;
however, I continue to believe that open disclosure of the names of all
WHINSEC graduates intrudes upon students' privacy and, more
importantly, would assist drug trafficking organizations or terrorist
groups to target the best and the brightest graduates from Latin
America.
interoperable communications
For mission success, our communications activities are focused on
ensuring DOD interoperability with our DHS, State, and local partners
to rapidly and effectively share information to ensure a prompt,
coordinated response in the aftermath of a disaster.
In partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency, each
year we sponsor the VITAL CONNECTION Communications Exercise (VCCE),
which provides a realistic, controlled environment for DOD and its
partners to train and collaborate on communications systems and
capabilities that facilitate effective and efficient interoperability.
In 2009, there were four venues where DOD, State, and local first
responders developed and refined their techniques and procedures to
improve interoperability in the event of a natural disaster or national
emergency.
NORTHCOM continues to partner with FEMA and the National Guard in
the employment of Deployable Cellular-Based Suites, which include
cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile
Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices to improve interoperability and
service to emergency responders. NORTHCOM procured four additional
Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video communications
suites through the Combatant Commander Initiative Program that are
positioned within AFNORTH Headquarters and Air Combat Command
Communication Squadrons to provide enhanced Incident Awareness and
Assessment/Full Motion Video capabilities to incident commanders. These
suites provide additional capability to enhance situational awareness
during disasters and emergency events for both incident on-scene
commanders and our national leadership.
exercises, training, and education
NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to derive exceptional training value
from our participation in the National Exercise Program (NEP). In 2009,
we participated in each of the Tier I and Tier II NEP exercises,
including the National Level Exercise in July that represented the
capstone event for the first-ever New Administration Transition
Training program.
Our own two major exercises, Ardent Sentry 09 (AS 09) in June 2009
and Vigilant Shield 10 (VS 10) in November 2009, represented
extraordinary training opportunities with scores of Federal, State,
local, tribal, non-government organizations, private sector, and multi-
national partners.
In AS 09, we ran agro-terror and other asymmetric exercise
incidents in Iowa and three surrounding States, a Deployable Homeland
Air and Cruise Missile Defense scenario off the coast of Oregon, and a
nuclear weapon accident/incident vignette in Wyoming, all while
simulating loss of the use of our primary operations facility and
having to move to an alternate location.
In VS 10, we linked to the main Canadian exercises supporting
preparation for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (including how we
would provide civil support if requested), and simultaneously conducted
an earthquake exercise in up-State New York. Each of these major
exercises was linked to a Vigilant Guard exercise, the series we
conduct in support of State National Guard Headquarters and Joint Task
Forces.
In 2010, we will again participate in the National Level Exercise,
and Ardent Sentry 10 will further exercise our civil support mission.
We will also practice our homeland defense missions in Vigilant Shield
11, linked to STRATCOM's exercise Global Thunder 11. We are also
continuing a series of Pandemic Influenza exercises in preparation for
future DOD-wide and U.S. Government-wide Pandemic Influenza exercises.
All in all, we annually conduct or participate in approximately 50
exercises of varying type, length, and complexity, to maintain our
readiness across diverse NORAD and NORTHCOM mission sets detailed in
over 10 Concept Plans. We engage our training partners at every level
of Federal, State, tribal, and local government to employ the most
comprehensive and realistic scenarios.
The newest complement of our civil support series of training
courses is our DSCA Senior Executive Seminar. Hosted in our
Headquarters, this 2-day seminar provides a great opportunity for me to
meet with State Governors and The Adjutants General (TAGs) (ranging
from one to five at a time), for them to receive capabilities briefs
from various staff Directorates regarding DSCA operations, and orient
themselves to NORTHCOM's missions.
partnerships
Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the
American people receive assistance during times of need, whether at the
international, interagency, or State and local level. Our Nation's
Governors take very seriously their role as Commanders in Chief of
their State and we respect that authority. Our job is to support our
Nation's Governors in responding to emergency situations and threats in
their States.
States and Territories
In an effort to understand each State's risks and capabilities and
in order to anticipate the best response for DOD requested assets, I
participated in the initial meeting of the congressionally-directed
Council of Governors and have also separately engaged with Governors,
Lieutenant Governors, various State Directors of Emergency Management
and the TAGs. Since taking command, I have met with a total of 27 State
Governors and/or Lieutenant Governors. I have also met individually
with 37 different States' TAGs and have addressed all 54 TAGs at
various National Guard senior leader conferences. The most recent
conference was the 2010 National Guard Bureau/NORTHCOM Hurricane
Planning Workshop, 18-22 January 2010, in Tampa, FL, where several
hundred representatives from 30 States and for the first time senior
officials from DHS and FEMA addressed hurricane emergency response
preparedness. Next year, we plan to expand the scope of the planning
conference to include all hazards. These engagements strengthen the
relationships between the State and DOD, improve mutual understanding
of the critical balance each State must maintain between its
requirements and resources to ensure support of the State's civil
authorities during a major disaster, crisis, or NSSE; enhance sharing
of information and lessons learned from previous responses to disasters
and events; and support the State's understanding of NORAD and NORTHCOM
and our missions.
NORAD and NORTHCOM provide a training and exercise program that
actively engages the States and Territories. The Vigilant Guard Joint
Regional Exercise Program is sponsored by NORTHCOM and executed in
conjunction with the NGB. Four Vigilant Guard (VG) exercises are
conducted each year, and when feasible, two are linked to NORAD and
NORTHCOM-sponsored exercises (VG Iowa with Ardent Sentry 09 and VG New
York with Vigilant Shield 10). All VG exercises include some degree of
local/county government participation.
Interagency Community
NORAD and NORTHCOM have strong relationships with many non-DOD
Federal Agencies and Departments. Agency representatives and NORTHCOM
liaison officers provide an established reach-back capability to their
parent organizations. These relationships provide the essential
interagency context during operations planning and execution, while
also providing the DOD's perspective to external agencies.
Private Sector
Our Private Sector Engagement Team has worked closely with DHS,
particularly FEMA, to support a comprehensive outreach program to non-
profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), businesses, academia,
faith-based organizations, and public-private partnerships throughout
the country. The tremendous capabilities, resources, and willingness of
the private sector and NGOs community are essential to successful
disaster response. Achieving unity of effort is our goal.
challenges
We are aggressively tackling impediments to our efforts to improve
air and maritime domain awareness, interagency information sharing, and
consequence management operations. As we move forward with these
efforts and others this year, we solicit and appreciate your continued
support.
Aircraft Recapitalization
Legacy fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft in
use today adequately meet all aspects of the Air Sovereignty Alert
mission; however, recapitalization of these legacy aircraft is critical
to the future success of the NORAD mission set.
Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain
reliability and capability as we move into the 2015-2030 timeframe.
Recapitalizing the fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft
will remain a challenge, given the DOD's post-September 11 long-term
mission requirements. NORAD's mission readiness will be affected if Air
Sovereignty Alert aircraft are not recapitalized in accordance with the
fiscal year 2011 President's budget request.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace
NORTHCOM is fully engaged with the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
community through our membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence
Advisory Council; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics-led UAS Task Force; and our participation on the
Policy Board for the Federal Aviation UAS Subgroup. NORTHCOM is also an
advisory member to the newly formed UAS Executive Committee, co-chaired
by the FAA and DOD, which is addressing the numerous national airspace
access issues for public users. We are eager to team with our partners
in the interagency community as they expand their UAS operations to
achieve synergy in our homeland defense and civil support efforts. We
continue to work with the FAA on finding the best way forward on
employing UAS in the National Airspace outside restricted airspace.
Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System
One of the greatest challenges facing the Commands is the lack of
an integrated air and cruise missile defense capability to counter
threats from low-flying aircraft, UAS, and cruise missiles. As these
threats grow, it becomes increasingly important to develop an
integrated air and cruise missile defense system-of-systems to defend
the homeland. In the past year, NORAD and NORTHCOM worked closely with
the Joint Air Defense Operations-Homeland Joint Test Team as the
operational sponsor in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures
for a Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System capability, which could
be employed to protect a particular venue or city which may be
threatened or at risk.
National Security Implications of Arctic Change. The 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea is a seminal agreement of the
extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic
Ocean. Global interest in the Arctic region shows no hint of ebbing,
evidenced by the summer 2009 transit of two German-owned cargo vessels
through the Northern Sea Route, westbound from the Atlantic to the
Pacific Ocean. Increased activity necessitates that the United States
become party to the Convention in order to protect and advance national
interests in the Arctic by enhancing our national security (including
the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces), securing U.S. sovereignty
rights over extensive marine areas (including the valuable natural
resources they contain), and giving the United States a seat at the
table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.
To bolster our efforts for the Arctic region, I support the stated
desires of our respective U.S. and Canadian civilian defense leadership
to reinvigorate the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as highlighted by
Secretary of Defense Gates' and Minister McKay's November 2009 Halifax
Security Talks.
future capabilities
As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for
innovative uses, we are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet
our requirements. We urge Congress to support the following
initiatives.
Air Domain Awareness
In March 2007, the National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS)
was published to enhance public safety and economic growth by promoting
global aviation security through reducing vulnerabilities. The NSAS
states: ``Together, the Strategy and seven supporting plans present a
comprehensive national effort to prevent hostile or illegal acts within
the air domain, promote global economic stability, and protect
legitimate aviation activities.''
To achieve the objectives of the NSAS, the whole-of-government must
be committed to the guidance provided within the NSAS and supporting
plans to achieve global air domain awareness (ADA). ADA crosses many
Departments and Agencies within the government, thus requiring a
coordinated approach. Historically, the operational synergism and cost
efficiencies associated with the principle of unity of effort have not
been completely realized for ADA because neither an interagency
governance mechanism nor an information sharing infrastructure has yet
been established.
To meet this challenge, NORAD and NORTHCOM have teamed with DHS and
other organizations across the U.S. Government to collaboratively
develop solutions and lay the foundation for ADA. The desired end-state
is development and implementation of a work plan leading to a joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational ADA governance
mechanism, interdepartmental capabilities and resourcing roadmap, and
information sharing infrastructure to synchronize the disparate efforts
of ADA mission partners.
DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM hosted an Interagency ADA Summit on 13-14
January 2010 bringing together senior leaders from numerous Federal
agencies. The summit leadership provided guidance to three working
groups facilitating development of processes for governance,
information sharing, and capabilities and resources. Additional summits
are planned at 6-month intervals and will bring in participation from
industry, State, local, tribal, and international partners.
NORAD and NORTHCOM Defense Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy
Wide-area surveillance is a key component of Air Domain Awareness
and is critical to air and missile defense of the homeland; however,
NORAD and NORTHCOM lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-domain
surveillance. The NORAD and NORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy
proposes to rectify this problem by providing the Commands with a
foundation to develop a family of systems permitting persistent wide-
area air and maritime surveillance to enhance defense against threats
in the interior of and in the approaches to North America.
The C2 Gap Filler Joint Capability Technology Demonstration will
demonstrate a capability that enables efficient, secure, timely and
trusted exchange of information resulting in enhanced C2 capabilities
for NORAD and NORTHCOM.
A second effort is the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar
(OTHR) Technical Risk Reduction Initiative (TRRI) Phase 1 project. TRRI
was developed to minimize the technical risks of building a next
generation OTHR prototype while simultaneously raising technical
readiness levels of advanced radar technologies. Over-the-horizon
radars are proven, wide-area surveillance systems with the ability to
detect and track thousands of air and maritime targets at ranges
exceeding 1,500 miles from the radar site. When completed, these
initiatives will improve wide-area surveillance around North America.
Radar Interference
Comprehensive Air Domain Awareness will not be attained unless we
can resolve the growing issue of radar interference. As such, NORAD and
NORTHCOM support the establishment of an interagency process to allow
the accurate assessment of existing and future plans for obstructions
that potentially disrupt various radars within our area of operations.
A formal vetting process is required with the necessary authorities to
prevent projects from interfering with the defense of North America,
while supporting the expansion of alternative energy sources, such as
wind farms. To that end, NORAD has taken the initiative to form a radar
obstruction evaluation team to quantify the impacts of proposed wind
energy projects in close proximity to our radars.
Long-Range Radar Sustainment and Future Plans
DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM use long-range radars to detect and
monitor non-cooperative targets. Many of these radars are 1950s vintage
technology and in some cases are well beyond their life expectancy. To
help with the maintenance of these radars, the Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP) was approved, has been funded since fiscal year 2006,
and again requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget.
Upgrades to the radars are currently being completed. The goal is to
sustain the existing systems another 15-20 years and use modern
technology to play an integral part in the SLEP.
final thoughts
NORAD and NORTHCOM have demonstrated our ability to meet emerging
threats to the homeland and support civil authorities in times of
crisis. We are committed to remaining strong and reliable partners,
working together to protect and defend our Nations, people, and way of
life.
Our Commands' success depends on the dedication, professionalism
and sacrifice of our service men and women. We appreciate what the
members of this committee have done to ensure the men and women of
NORAD and NORTHCOM have the best possible resources to maintain world-
class capabilities.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General, for your testimony.
Thank you for bringing Chief Master Sergeant Usry with you, as
a matter of fact. We welcome him, as well.
General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND

General Fraser. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, distinguished members of the committee. I'm honored to
have this opportunity to appear before you today and provide my
assessment of SOUTHCOM and our assigned area of responsibility.
I'm joined this morning by my wife, Rena. I just want to
echo what General Renuart has said. Her dedication, her support
has been immense throughout, so I just appreciate that
continued support.
It's also my privilege to share this table with my good
friend and mentor, General Renuart, because our appearance
together represents the close coordination, alignment, and
relationship between our two combatant commands. I also want to
thank the members of this committee for your continued strong
support of SOUTHCOM and your outstanding soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen, and the civilian
personnel, whom I'm privilege to lead.
I've personally seen what these outstanding men and women
are capable of doing during the response to the earthquake that
struck Haiti on January 12, 2010. The devastation was
tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate that over 222,000
people were killed, 300,000 people injured, and 1.2 million
people displaced by the earthquake. The U.S. response was
swift, coordinated, and aggressive and comprised Federal,
State, military and civilian agencies and units, exemplifying
joint and interagency teamwork, all under the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) as the lead
Federal agent.
Fortunately, several DOD and U.S. Government assets were in
the vicinity of Haiti when the earthquake happened. As you
mentioned, Chairman Levin, Lieutenant General Keen, the Deputy
Commander of SOUTHCOM, was visiting Haiti when the earthquake
happened. He remains in place, commanding JTF-Haiti, providing
superb leadership to the JTF-Haiti.
Within the 24 hours of the earthquake, a U.S. Coast Guard
cutter was off the coast of Port-au-Prince, and a U.S. Coast
Guard C-130 was on the ground supporting relief efforts. Air
Force elements began surveying the international airport. U.S.
Navy P-3 aircraft, from our cooperative security location at
Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first U.S. aerial
reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. Members
of SOUTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters landed and
began the initial assessments. The first U.S. Urban Search and
Rescue (US&R) Team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA,
arrived. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air
Mobility Command had established an air bridge. Additionally,
the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and the USS Bataan
Amphibious Ready Group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) embarked were ordered to make best possible speed to
Haiti. Joint, interagency, Federal, and State responders, all
these agencies were working to support the people and
Government of Haiti before the first 24 hours had elapsed.
Over the span of the next 3 weeks, the size and scope of
the military response grew to a peak of just over 22,000
personnel involved in the relief effort, including an Airborne
Brigade Combat Team, the hospital ship USNS Comfort, a second
MEU, as well as engineer, planning, communications, and medical
experts. They coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the
United Nations, and other international organizations to
determine where the capabilities of the military could rapidly
be brought to bear to support the Government of Haiti.
Supported by TRANSCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and every
branch of our Armed Forces, our forces dramatically expanded
the airport's capacity and opened the seaport to enable the
vital flow of supplies. JTF-Haiti forces distributed 2.6
million liters of water, 2.2 million meals, and 149,000 pounds
of medical supplies, performing 1,025 surgeries, and assisting
the World Food Programme in distributing 17 million pounds of
bulk food.
As the capabilities of the Government of Haiti, USAID,
U.N., and nongovernmental organizations have increased, and as
the relief needs have been met, we are transitioning many of
our functions to capable partners, and are conducting a
deliberate, conditions-based drawdown of our forces.
The men and women who deployed to Haiti have performed
magnificently and are the very embodiment of the teamwork and
the jointness across DOD. They have been outstanding
representatives of our military with their professionalism,
sense of urgency, focus, and compassion. They continue to make
us all extremely proud.
I would not have been able to perform this mission to the
level of success we achieved without the support of the other
geographic commanders, and unified combatant commanders, the
Services, Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense.
General Gene Renuart and NORTHCOM provided invaluable
assistance. We could not have accomplished so much so quickly
without the personnel his command and others sent to augment
our staff, both in Miami and on the ground in Haiti.
Less than 2 months after the catastrophe in Haiti, tragedy
once again struck in the region, when an 8.8 magnitude
earthquake shook Chile. Working through military liaison
personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy, SOUTHCOM offered to
assist in whatever manner the Government of Chile needed.
Within a day of the earthquake, we distributed imagery of the
affected areas to the Chileans, and sent satellite phones.
Additionally, we are supporting Chile with transport aircraft,
a field hospital, and a port survey team. As the U.S. Embassy
coordinates with the Government of Chile to determine what
additional support is needed, we stand by to assist whenever
possible.
While the majority of our attention and resources recently
has been focused on responding to natural disasters in Haiti
and Chile, we continue to address other challenges in our
region. Illicit trafficking, narcoterrorism, gangs, and
potential for the spread of weapons of mass destruction pose
the principal security threats in the region. The region
remains very dynamic. Brazil continues its rapid emergence as a
regional leader with global influence. Globalization of
information, markets, resources, and financial transactions
remain a force for change in the region, both positive and
negative. Competing ideologies within the region are stressing
democratic and human rights advances. The increasing engagement
of international players from outside the region, such as
China, Iran, and Russia, continues to broaden the regional
outlooks and positions.
Addressing the challenges of our region requires the truly
whole-of-government approach in which DOD normally plays a
supporting role. To that end, SOUTHCOM works not only to
strengthen partner capability and capacity, but also to build
important cooperative security relationships throughout the
region with our partners, foreign and domestic, military and
civilian, in the public and private sector. For the most part,
our military-to-military relations throughout the region remain
strong.
Finally, I'd like to thank this committee for your
continued strong support for the WHINSEC and for the hard work
of my fellow board members who sit on this committee. As a
customer of WHINSEC, I can attest to its critical role in our
security cooperation, especially in its focus on human rights.
Let me close by saying that the tragedy in Haiti is a stark
reminder of the nature and potential severity of challenges we
face in the region. The culture of cooperation, openness, and
transparency we have developed, the relationships we have built
through our enduring and consistent engagement throughout the
region, and the emphasis SOUTHCOM has placed on partnering in
the past few years have all paid a particularly high return on
the investment in Operation Unified Response (OUR), the largest
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission ever
conducted in the region.
I think also, Mr. Chairman, it's important to recognize
that General Keen attended the Brazilian Staff College. One of
his classmates was the commander of the Brazilian United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)--or the U.N.-
led MINUSTA force on Haiti, so the relationship had started a
long time ago, and paid huge dividends during OUR.
Once again, thank you for your interest in our vital
region, and your support of SOUTHCOM. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, USAF
introduction
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the U.S. Southern Command and our area of responsibility in
Latin America and the Caribbean. It is my privilege to report to you on
the successes and accomplishments of our men and women over the past
year, and to share our appreciation for the outstanding support
Congress has shown us. The devastating earthquake in Haiti has shown
how suddenly the strategic environment can change; but it has also
shown how your investments in U.S. Southern Command through the years
enable us to respond to such challenges. With your continued support,
we will build upon this foundation and strengthen the bonds of security
cooperation throughout this region.
The nations of the Americas are strongly linked together in ways
beyond physical and sociological proximity: our hemisphere is linked
demographically, economically, socially, politically, culturally,
linguistically and militarily. These shared qualities and beliefs
connect us and provide the basis for addressing the common challenges
that affect the security and stability of all nations in the region,
today. These common traits also enable strong partnerships and serve as
the foundation for the enduring relationships we will need as we face
the future together.
As globalization trends continue, our security will depend upon
expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multiagency and
public-private partners in our hemisphere. We will be better able to
meet complex challenges of the 21st century security environment by
building robust, enduring partnerships now. Together we are stronger
and more effective than working as a single organization or nation
operating individually. Our vision embodies this belief.
the region--enduring and evolving
U.S. Southern Command is responsible for conducting military
operations and promoting security cooperation in Central America, the
Caribbean and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic
objectives. Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the
security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the
forward defense of the United States.
The Americas, a home we share, is a strategically vital, culturally
rich, and widely diverse and vibrant region. Since taking command 9
months ago, I have traveled extensively throughout the region and have
witnessed the challenges facing regional leaders and their people. I
have also learned that many of these challenges are shared by all of
us. Although our Nations may at times disagree on political and
economic matters, we are united by a common view that we can settle our
problems through negotiated agreements. This view provides the key for
security for our citizens and requires a steadfast dedication to
protecting our fundamental liberties and defending our common
commitment to maintaining democracy and the rule of law.
International commerce and trade between the United States and
Latin American and Caribbean countries is strong, and experts forecast
this growth to continue. The Western Hemisphere is the United States'
largest market with nearly 38 percent of U.S. trade travelling north
and south, equating to $1.5 trillion.\1\ We obtain more crude oil
imports--52 percent--from this region than from the Persian Gulf, which
only provides 13 percent.\2\ The Panama Canal is paramount in strategic
and economic importance as nearly two-thirds of ships transiting the
Canal are going to or coming from a U.S. port, carrying 16 percent of
U.S. trade; expansion of the Canal is expected to almost double the
capacity to approximately 600 million tons a year.\3\ The Commerce
Department reports the overall sum of U.S. foreign direct investment in
the hemisphere (minus Canada) is 17.8 percent of our total foreign
direct investment worldwide. Further, 10 of the 17 U.S. Free Trade
Agreements are with countries in the Americas. In terms of percentage,
our total foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (including
Canada) equals our direct investment in Asia, the Middle East and
Africa, combined. Additionally, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
studies estimate $42.3 billion in remittances flowed from the U.S. to
the region in 2009, slightly more than two-thirds of the IADB's
estimated worldwide total of remittances.\4\ Economic partnerships are
strong today, and according to Commerce Department and World Trade
Organization data, by 2011, U.S. trade with Latin America is expected
to exceed trade with Europe and Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Economic Interdependence 2008 Trade Figures (www.census.gov/
foreign-trade). 38 percent to Western Hemisphere versus 31 percent to
PACRIM and 21 percent to Europe.
\2\ Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov) Aug 2009
Figures: More than 52 percent from Western Hemisphere (incl CAN and
MEX), 30 percent from LATAM (incl MEX), 19 percent from AOR, versus 13
percent from Persian Gulf.
\3\ Panama Canal Authority (www.pancanal.com) 5 percent of world
trade transits the canal/16 percent of U.S. trade transits the canal,
two thirds ships transiting Panama Canal are going to/from U.S. ports.
\4\ Inter-American Development Bank, Press Release, Migrant
Remittances, October 18, 2009, December 7, 2009, http://www.iadb.org/
NEWS/articledetail.cfm?Language=En2&artType+ PR&artid=3348.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to demographic and economic ties with Latin America and
the Caribbean, we share social and political views rooted in a common
commitment to democracy, freedom, justice and respect for human rights.
Compared to three decades ago when the form of government in the
majority of these countries was nondemocratic, most nations in the
region now subscribe to democracy and agree that free governments
should be accountable to their people in order to govern effectively.
We are fortunate to share similar main languages and interwoven
cultures. Although there are many different dialects, people of the
region use four primary languages: English, Spanish, Portuguese and
French. While the United States is thought of as a primarily English-
speaking nation, we are also the fifth largest Spanish speaking country
in the world. Our significant cultural ties will grow stronger in the
decades ahead, as by 2050, the number of people in the United States
citing Hispanic heritage will comprise approximately 30 percent of the
total U.S. population.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Source: Pew Research Center, U.S. Population Projections: 2005-
2050: February 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the constant ebb and flow of political tides in this
hemisphere, U.S. Southern Command has been fortunate to maintain strong
professional relationships with our military and security force
counterparts in almost every nation in the region. We engage with these
nations continuously during peacetime through numerous bilateral and
multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements
designed to prepare for the host of challenges that may confront us.
Regional partnerships with and among our partner forces directly
enhance hemispheric security and stability, as evidenced by the
outstanding professional teamwork and unity of effort displayed by the
region's militaries as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Operation Unified Response.
In addition to our more than 20 large-scale joint and combined
exercises annually, we host and sponsor hundreds of unit and individual
exchanges, and assist with arrangements for approximately 5,000
students from Latin America and the Caribbean who attend U.S. military
schools and training sessions throughout the region. Future senior
military leaders interact with U.S. military personnel at the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Inter-
American Air Forces Academy. The camaraderie developed and the school's
strong emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights
contribute to the professionalization of military establishments who
are subordinate to civilian control and capable of effective combined
operations.
Despite the number of enduring linkages we share with our neighbors
in the region, we are also in a period of profound strategic change.
Globalization has enabled nations, non-state actors, multilateral
institutions and nongovernmental organizations to affect--both
positively and negatively--the condition of millions throughout our
region and across the globe. Our world is shrinking. The Atlantic and
Pacific oceans are not the borders or barriers they once were. There
are multiple approaches in several domains--including, increasingly,
cyberspace--by which adversaries can enter the United States. At U.S.
Southern Command, we remain committed to helping achieve hemispheric
security by developing and maintaining strong partnerships to meet the
dynamic and uncertain future.
challenges
The nations within our area of responsibility are largely at peace
with one another and have formally foresworn the development of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Military spending on a per capita basis
remains lower in Latin America and the Caribbean than anywhere else in
the world. The likelihood of conventional 20th century military threats
also remains low for the foreseeable future. However, we do face
nontraditional challenges that threaten security and stability
throughout the hemisphere.
These challenges are multiple and complex and include a broad and
growing spectrum of public security threats, the possibility of natural
and manmade disasters, and an emerging class of issues, such as those
relating to the environment. More specifically, illicit trafficking,
transnational terrorism, crime, gangs and the potential spread of WMD
pose the principal security challenges within the region, none of which
fall to DOD to take the lead in confronting. Most of these issues, in
turn, are fueled by the endemic and underlying conditions of poverty,
income inequality and corruption. Thus, our primary focus is on doing
what we can to support other agencies of our government and our partner
nations as they confront these problems and try to prevent them from
becoming issues that require the military to address.
Poverty and Income Inequality
Perhaps the single factor contributing most to unrest, insecurity
and instability in our region is the pervasive nature of poverty.
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2009, the number of people living in
poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean--defined as living on less
than $2 a day--rose for the first time in 6 years, increasing by 1.1
percent over the previous year, from 180 million to 189 million people,
or just over 34 percent of the population. The number of truly
destitute--those living in extreme poverty, defined as living on less
than $1 a day--increased from 71 to 76 million. That is an additional 9
million people living in poverty and 5 million living in extreme
poverty. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous
challenges faced by our partner nations and neighbors in the region.
Coupled with this poverty is a disparity in income levels that is,
according to the World Bank, the most unequal subregion in the world.
The richest 10 percent of the Latin American population earns 48
percent of the region's income, 30 times the percentage of the poorest
10 percent, which earns 1.6 percent.
Areas with lower levels of economic investment, development, and
growth can provide a breeding ground for illicit trafficking, other
related criminal activities, and the full range of terrorism.
Impoverished citizens, with little trust in their governments or hope
for a better life, are easy prey for illicit traffickers, terrorist
organizations and political demagogues. They provide fertile soil in
which international criminals and terrorists can recruit, take root,
and flourish, thus directly undermining State sovereignty, threatening
public safety, and contributing to rising regional instability.
Illicit trafficking
The confluence of money, power, and the ability to breach the
integrity of national borders makes the illicit trafficking problem a
significant security challenge for nations throughout the Americas.
Border insecurity, increased violence, public fear, corruption,
weakening support for democratic institutions, and heavily burdened
local, county, and State agencies are the by-products of this
illegitimate and criminal activity, which is estimated to cost
legitimate economies more than $245 billion annually. Furthermore, the
same routes and networks by which illicit traffickers smuggle 1,250-
1,500 metric tons of cocaine per year around the region, could be used
wittingly or unwittingly to smuggle weapons, cash, fissile material or
terrorists. As a threat to our homeland and the long-term stability of
the region, illicit trafficking is of critical concern as it provides a
possible nexus for transnational terrorism and the potential
proliferation of WMD.
Internal and cross-border--via air, land and/or sea--trafficking in
drugs, weapons, human beings, money and terrorists poses a threat to
every nation's security and stability. Revenue from illicit trafficking
has weakened state structures throughout the region, subverted the rule
of law, and ripped apart the fabric of social order. I am particularly
troubled by the progressively negative impact of these activities on
the Caribbean and Central America regions. As progress in Colombia
continues, air and maritime interdiction efforts are increasingly
effective, and the Government of Mexico continues to apply pressure to
drug trafficking organizations, these traffickers are being
progressively squeezed out of their previous operating locations. This
resultant ``balloon effect'' causes the trafficking organizations to
seek safe havens in ``undergoverned spaces'' like the Peten in
Guatemala, the Miskito Coast in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Darien
regions in Panama. Similarly, our Caribbean neighbors are also seeing
an increase and return of illicit trafficking organization presence in
their territories, particularly the island of Hispaniola. The
governments and institutions in these countries contend with the
onslaught of violence, instability and insecurity associated with
illicit trafficking as best they can, but they do not yet possess the
capability or capacity to do so without help.
Underlying all this is the illegal narcotics industry. According to
the Drug Enforcement Administration, 31,000 deaths in the United States
each year are attributed directly to drug-induced causes. The demand
for drugs in the United States remains strong and creates incentives
for illegal activities. The Andean Ridge produces nearly all of the
world's cocaine and it and Central America are increasingly providers
of heroin consumed in the United States. Of the approximately 1200
metric tons of export quality cocaine that shipped from source
countries in South America in 2009, approximately 60 percent of that
was headed north, destined for the United States; in addition, we are
seeing a growing amount (approximately 30 percent) heading to new and
expanding markets in Europe and the Middle East, as evidenced by Spain
becoming the world's largest per capita drug user.
This is not simply an issue of supply and demand for illegal
narcotics, however. Traffic is bidirectional and equally congested in
both lanes with contraband. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and
services in the transit zones, transit nations become drug consumers as
well. Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can
occur, as it is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world
behind the U.S. While drugs and people tend to go out from the region,
increasingly, we are seeing money, arms and technology/know-how (from
communications gear to gangland tactics) flowing back into the region.
This cycle has expanded to become more than a localized or even
regional issue--it has become a global enterprise and thus requires a
global strategy to countermand it. While partner nations are willing to
work with us to develop regional approaches to counter the production
and trafficking of illegal narcotics, effective and sustainable counter
illicit trafficking operations severely test the capabilities and
capacity of their thinly stretched forces. I see the illicit
trafficking threat as a multi-faceted equation--demand, production,
transit and finances--all supporting micro-markets of instability and
violence.
The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates the illegal worldwide
trafficking industry to be a $394 billion per year industry. In
addition to illegal narcotics, illicit human trafficking nets
approximately $32 billion per year; illegal arms smuggling nets roughly
$10 billion per year, and the exotic wildlife industry nets a
surprising $80 billion a year. Traffickers are constantly developing
new means of preventing interference with their illegal activities. As
we modify our tactics, drug producers and traffickers find innovative
methods to develop the drugs as well as alternative trafficking routes
to transport them. The traffickers of yesterday have become much more
lethal today, and this trend is expected to continue.
Terrorism
The blurring of the lines that used to separate terrorists from
narcotics traffickers can be seen in groups like the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in
Peru. These entities define a category of ``narco-terrorists'' and they
derive a majority of their funding and power from their involvement in
the illicit drugs industry. These organizations and a number of
extremely violent gangs have driven up the rates of homicide and
kidnappings throughout the region and do not operate within traditional
nation-state boundaries--they live among and terrorize the populace,
and take advantage of ungoverned and undergoverned spaces without any
regard or respect for national sovereignty.
As these two threat vectors merge into one new hybrid, so must our
efforts to counter it. We thank Congress for providing the dedicated
resources necessary for this mission and for working with us in the
specific case of Colombia to authorize flexible funding sources that
allow us to adapt and stay ahead with a blending of counterterrorism
(CT) and counternarcotics (CN). This expanded authority and flexibility
is essential to helping us rapidly address emerging capability gaps
with our partners as the strategic situation continues to evolve. We
now need to ensure that we have this authority in other areas as
appropriate where we see this nexus potentially occurring, such as
Peru.
Crime and gangs
A close corollary of the spread of illegal trafficking is the
alarming growth of criminal violence in the region. Rising crime,
coupled with corruption, exacerbates the conditions of poverty and
inequality, hampering development efforts and reducing an already
fragile economic growth environment. One out of every three homicides
in the world takes place in our region, as does one out of every two
kidnappings. According to United Nations data, Latin America and the
Caribbean's annual homicide rate is one of the highest in the world,
with more than 27 homicides per 100,000 people--murder now ranks as one
of the five main causes of death in several Central American countries.
Central America is the region with the highest levels of non-political
crime worldwide, with an average murder rate of 33 per 100,000
inhabitants last year, three times greater than the global average,
according to the UN Development Program (UNDP) Report on Human
Development in Central America 2009-2010. These reports all emphasize
the toll--both human and economic--of insecurity, violence and crime on
the day-to-day decisions of the population, making insecurity a clear
impediment to development and a destabilizing element for many nations
in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in recent surveys of the
region, delinquency and lack of personal security rank as the top
social ill for the majority of countries.\6\
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\6\ Latinobarometro.
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The growing presence and influence of gangs contributes to rising
crime rates and severely challenges personal security in many areas. In
Central America, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil, gangs are
infecting society's ability to provide basic functions and necessities,
and are thus becoming a significant security priority. The overall gang
population is estimated to reach into the hundreds of thousands,
primarily filling their ranks with disenfranchised youth. According to
a comprehensive study conducted by the National Public Security Council
in El Salvador in 2008, violent crime cost the five countries examined
a combined $6.5 billion, equivalent to 7.7 percent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).\7\ The GDP losses to crime came at the expense of
government investment in social services like spending on development,
infrastructure, public safety and education. Increasingly, the threat
posed by gangs reaches beyond Latin America and the Caribbean--the more
sophisticated groups operate regionally and even globally with deep
reach back into the United States from California to Washington, DC,
and increasingly into Europe.
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\7\ Los Costos Economicos de la Violencia en Centroamerica (The
Economic Cost of Violence in Central America), El Salvador, 2008, pp.
13-14. In 2008, the National Public Security Council of the Salvadoran
presidency's office commissioned a study compiling the excess direct
spending and losses caused by violence in five Central American
countries in four areas, namely: increased health care; increased
government spending for crime prevention, law enforcement and justice;
spending on private security; and, material losses from crime. This
landmark analysis found that in 2006, violent crime cost the combined
States $6.5 billion--equivalent to 7.7 percent of GDP. Though all
nations suffered significant losses, the total cost of violence varied
between countries: $2.9 billion in Guatemala (7.7 percent GDP); $2.01
billion in El Salvador (10.8 percent GDP); $885 million in Honduras
(9.6 percent GDP); $790 million in Costa Rica (3.6 percent GDP); and,
$529 million in Nicaragua (10.0 percent GDP).
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The compounded effects of urban violence and transnational gangs
are an undeniable threat to our national security and to the larger
long-term security and stability of the region. The Departments of
State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) each have programs that fit together
to augment the efforts of the Nations most affected by youth violence.
In each case, U.S. Southern Command closely coordinates with and
supports the lead Federal agency and the U.S. Ambassador; at the same
time, we continue working arm-in-arm with partner nation military and
security forces in the region to build the necessary capabilities to
enable them to provide their own national security and be able to
provide responsible support to civilian authorities when required.
Competitive Marketplace
Because of globalization and its inherent empowerment of new
actors, the United States can no longer take for granted that our way
of life is the sole ideology of choice in this region. We must now
actively compete to ensure our message is accurately transmitted and
received by the appropriate audience. Populism, socialism and democracy
are all now prevalent ideas within the region. Money, trade, and other
interaction from expanding players like China, Russia and Iran exist in
Latin America and the Caribbean. We are also beginning to see a renewed
polarization in the region. All of these factors combine to form a
competitive marketplace of ideas, within which nontraditional actors
have become very adept at operating.
To compete in this venue, we engage proactively and counter anti-
U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill,
competence and professionalism. We convey the strength of our ideas in
both words and deeds by training and working with our regional partners
to improve security, provide humanitarian assistance, and respond to
disasters. We remain engaged in this marketplace through dialogue and
open discussion with partners within the region as well as players
external to our AOR.
China's evolving relationship with Latin America through a growing
number of linkages and longer-term investments is impacting the
strategic landscape in the region and further emphasizes the
interconnectedness of the 21st century. According to the International
Monetary Fund, total bilateral trade between China (excluding Hong
Kong) and Latin America has risen from $39.3 billion in 2004 to almost
$147 billion in 2008. China is already the second largest user of the
Panama Canal. The rapid growth of China's trade with Latin America and
the Caribbean shows the likelihood China could become an enduring part
of the economic landscape of the Americas.
We have also noticed a marked increase in military-to-military and
technology-based relations between China, Russia, Iran, and the region.
China is conducting more military training and educational exchanges,
entering into a larger number of technology transfers agreements, and
selling sophisticated defensive military items such as air surveillance
radars and military aircraft. China is also finding new areas for
cooperation in the commercial space sector as seen in the China-Brazil
Earth Research Satellite program. Russia has followed suit, with arms
sales and a naval tour of the Caribbean. Russia has publicly stated
that improving relations with Latin America is a top priority, focused
primarily on Cuba and then Venezuela. They have also increased their
outreach to other countries in the region as evidenced by signing a
military and scientific bilateral agreement with Peru, offering
increased support to Bolivia's counter-narcotics operations, and
seeking a Free Trade Agreement with Chile.
Iran, too, is strengthening its ties to the region, focusing
primarily on Venezuela, while developing relationships with other
nations, as evidenced by opening 11 new embassies with a 12th expected
to open in the Caribbean later this year. Iran's trade activities have
thus far focused on infrastructure development, medical exchanges,
agriculture, mining and the oil industry. Finally, a Trade Memoranda of
Understanding between Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela since 2005 has now
surpassed $7 billion.
As we face this complex, dynamic and continually evolving security
environment at Southern Command, we are constantly reminded that
achieving our desired end state of secure stable, democratic and
prosperous States throughout the Americas requires a wide variety of
tool sets beyond pure military activity. We continue to look for
creative ways to approach partnerships throughout the region. We seek
innovative ways to organize, plan, train, and operate; to adapt new
technology to ever-changing challenges; and to communicate, including
how we describe and frame our challenges both with our partners and
with the public in general.
strategic framework: initiatives, exercises and operations
Our strategic approach is balanced and prioritized--confronting the
most pressing and probable threats to the Nation today, while at the
same time, posturing the joint, combined and multinational force to
prevent, and if necessary, defeat the most consequential threats to
tomorrow. We take a regional, global, and long-term view of our
strategic environment, our objectives, and the implications for
strategic risk. It is imperative we remain capable of executing our
plans, while still engaging throughout the region at the appropriate
levels: building, complementing or enhancing, as appropriate, partner
capability and capacity; improving international and interagency
cooperation; and, fostering both security and stability.
As we confront the considerable range of challenges before us in
our AOR, we continually ensure coordination across multiple levels in
more than one agency and in more than one nation. This is a
prerequisite for any project, exercise, initiative or operation within
our region: each issue needs to be assessed as part of an
interconnected and unified strategy. For example, the illicit
trafficking issue cannot be adequately addressed in isolation from
issues of illegal narcotics, migration, arms trafficking, money-
laundering, and radical ideological terrorists. Furthermore, our
strategic approach is based on the affirmation of common values held
throughout the hemisphere: democracy, liberty, and human rights.
In terms of military-to-military contact, Latin America and the
Caribbean represent many opportunities of U.S. engagement. We have
witnessed numerous positive results from nontraditional approaches to
partnering that integrate talents and capabilities from foreign and
domestic, military and civilian, public and private sector entities.
These efforts may be relatively low visibility, but they have a huge
impact on U.S. military and partner nation military and security force
readiness, particularly when they are accomplished in a consistent and
enduring manner. We pursue a host of programs in support of other lead
agencies and government entities to include numerous training
exercises, educational programs, technology sharing, intelligence
sharing, security procurement assistance, humanitarian aid, among
others. Our evolving engagement strategy commits us to build or enhance
the security capability of our military counterparts and to expand the
capacity for all of us to work together. Joint, international,
interagency, and public-private is the essence of everything we do.
Joint Interagency Task Force-South
At the tactical and operational level within U.S. Southern Command,
a model for this regional engagement and international and interagency
coordination is Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South)
located in Key West, FL. JIATF-South exists to spearhead the effort to
fight one of the most pressing challenges facing the region--illicit
trafficking--with an acknowledged potential nexus with narco-terrorism.
This interagency task force, which celebrated 20 years of excellence
last year, is led by a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and is comprised
of truly amazing individuals from all 4 branches of the military, 14
different agencies, and 13 partner nations. This group, beyond doubt,
is a team: a joint, interagency, international, combined and allied
team--a creative and innovative body that defines ``synergy'', the
blending of experience, professionalism and knowledge being greater
than the sum of its individual parts.
JIATF-South continues to make incredible headway, producing
extraordinary results every year. For example: JIATF-South's joint
operating area (JOA) covers nearly 42 million square miles, almost 21
percent of the Earth's surface; in the 20 years it has been conducting
operations in this region, 2,500 metric tons of cocaine have been
seized, 705,000 pounds of marijuana interdicted, 4,600 traffickers
arrested, 1,100 vessels captured, and a grand total of approximately
$195 billion taken out of the pockets of the drug cartels. They have
accomplished these results while possessing zero assets of their own--
every aircraft and vessel involved with detection, monitoring,
interdiction and apprehension is allocated through the Department of
Defense Global Force Management process, Department of Homeland
Security Statement of Intent, and International contributions that
place the assets under tactical control (TACON) of JIATF-South, which
can be recalled by their service provider or operational control
(OPCON) authority if unexpected circumstances warrant, such as Haiti
relief efforts, search and rescue (SAR), or other national interests.
In 2009, JIATF-South had TACON of USCG, USN, and international ships
for a total of 2,915 on-station days, equating to an approximately 8.0
surface asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA.
Similarly, JIATF-South had TACON of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP),
USCG, DOD and international long range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)
for a total of 9,446 on-station hours, equating to an approximately 3.0
air asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA. Based on
JIATF-South's analysis, a 14.0 surface asset laydown and a 5.0 air
asset laydown are required to meet the National Interdiction goal of 40
percent.
In addition to the need for organic surface and air assets,
additional challenges that restrict JIATF-South from realizing their
full effectiveness include: policy limitations on the amount and degree
of intelligence and other data that can be shared with partner agencies
and nations; structural and technological hurdles in situational
awareness, particularly Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and, an
unequal level of ``end game'' capabilities present in the military and
security forces in the AOR. Still, in 2009, JIATF-South was responsible
for greater than 61 percent of all global transit zone seizures and
disruptions, and 45 percent of all cocaine seizures in the world;
additionally, they were responsible for the interdiction of 226 metric
tons of cocaine, equivalent to a net $4.5 billion loss for the cartels
and traffickers. While doing all this, JIATF-South set the benchmark
for workplace quality in a recent organizational study.\8\ This kind of
success demands total commitment from the entire organization--
inspirational leadership, complete integration, collaboration and
partnership which exists at every level throughout the command. JIATF-
South is the standard for integrating and synchronizing ``whole of
government'', ``whole of nation'', and ``whole of many nations''
solutions in confronting challenges to our national and shared regional
security.
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\8\ 2009 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)
Organizational Climate Survey: JIATF-South surpassed the national
average in every category (13 of 13).
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Exercises
Southern Command is committed to being a good partner--more to the
point, we want to be the enduring partner of choice throughout the
region. Day in and day out, year after year, we dedicate the majority
of our resources toward strengthening the security capabilities of our
partners, while working to encourage an environment of cooperation
among all the Nations in the region. We conduct frequent and wide-
ranging multinational exercises and international exchanges with our
partners, send thousands of partner military and civilian experts to
various leading academic institutions, and provide other critical
security assistance to our friends in the region. All these activities
focus on strengthening regional bonds and enhancing collective
capabilities we believe are integral to U.S. national security and
stability in the Western Hemisphere as a whole. These exercises focus
on confronting regional threats such as maritime insecurity, terrorism,
illicit trafficking, and illegal migration, while also increasing
partner nation ability to support peacekeeping, disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance operations. The fruit of these labors can be
seen in the overwhelmingly positive and unified response in Haiti.
Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Commando
Building confidence, capability, and cooperation within our AOR is
essential to confronting today's security challenges. Our exercise
Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) Panamax has matured over the last 7
years and has become one of our flagship programs as well as the
world's largest multinational and multi-agency training exercise.
Panamax focuses on improving the hemisphere's ability to provide air,
sea and land forces to assist the government of Panama in its excellent
work of securing the Panama Canal and defending it from traditional and
non-traditional threats. The exercise began in 2003 as a limited naval
exercise with just three participating nations: Panama, Chile, and the
United States. Due to past successes and efforts to expand
partnerships, the exercise has grown to include a roster of more than
20 nations, several U.S. Government departments and agencies,
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
multiple military branches of Service.
Another large-scale exercise we support that emphasizes such
cooperation and integration is Unitas, which trains participating
forces to ensure maximum interoperability in future coalition
operations. We hosted the 50th iteration and celebration in
Jacksonville in May 2009. Seven thousand international sailors and
mariners participated, including personnel from Canada and Germany,
making it the longest running multinational maritime training exercise
in the world.
Shortly afterward, U.S. Southern Command hosted Counter Terrorism
Exercise Fuerzas Commando in Brazil in 2009. This unique exercise
consisting of 21 partner nations involved a competition in
counterterrorism (CT) skills by the elite CT units in the region as
well as bringing together civilian counterterrorism leadership from
each of the countries to exchange ideas on training and complementary
evolutions. Exercises like Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Comando provide
excellent forums for military-to-military relationship building and I
thank Congress for providing the flexibility in my Combatant Commander
Exercise Engagement funds that allow us to execute these kinds of
exercises, as well as the funds designed to assist the participation of
the developing countries within our AOR.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
While our programs and initiatives focus primarily on security,
increasingly our approach has broadened to support stability efforts as
part of a larger national path to true partnering and engagement in the
Western Hemisphere. A key element of these efforts is a variety of
humanitarian goodwill activities that directly help those in need while
providing needed training to our team. These engagement missions range
from planned events such as the construction and/or refurbishment of
wells, schools, community centers and medical facilities to rapid
response missions in the wake of disasters.
In 2009, as part of our annual operation Continuing Promise, USNS
Comfort returned to our waters with the mission to bring short-term
modern medical care, provide preventive medicine engagement, and
conduct long-term medical training and education. With over 100,000
patient encounters, 1,600 surgeries performed, 135,000 pharmacies
dispensed, 13,000 animals treated and 37,000 students trained, we were
able to engage on a scale previously unimaginable just 4 years ago. In
2010, through Continuing Promise in combination with our Medical
Readiness and Dental Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs and
DENTRETEs, respectively), we hope to surpass the `1 million patient
treatments' mark since the inception of this program.
The impact of Continuing Promise on the Host Nations has been
greater than just numbers, however; the types of procedures performed
and training conducted speak to the long-term positive effects on
society and citizen security as our joint, combined and integrated
crews focused on hysterectomies, thyroids, cataract removals, and
education on disease prevention. The impact has been more than just the
USNS Comfort, as well. On the engineering side for example,
Construction Battalions (SeaBees) personnel repaired and improved five
hospitals and clinics; provided refurbishments to seven schools; and
renovated one baseball field. Additionally, in direct support of
existing USAID projects, USNS Comfort personnel assisted in a
laboratory completion in the Dominican Republic and assisted in dock
repairs in Panama that buttressed a USAID eco-tourism project.
Access to health care is a critical component of security and
stability and the Comfort's mission is only one of many medical
outreach efforts. As mentioned previously, U.S. Southern Command also
sponsors MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, consisting of military medical teams
that treat over a quarter of a million patients annually in the region,
focusing primarily on needy rural, isolated populations. These unique
training exercises have had tremendous impact inland throughout the AOR
over 75 separate locations--changing lives, providing alternative
perceptions, and spreading goodwill through quality donated medical
assistance. In 2009, 89 MEDRETEs were conducted in 18 countries,
treating over 220,000 patients, performing almost 1,200 surgeries and
inoculating and treating more than 31,000 animals. More than just a
medical deployment, these humanitarian assistance missions have also
provided dental care to approximately 50,000 patients, conducted
medical training for almost 60,000 host nation students and medical
providers, and sponsored over 40 construction and restoration projects
at local schools and health care facilities. These visits also extended
veterinarian services throughout their journeys, treating and
vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of
many families.
Throughout the year, U.S. Southern Command's Humanitarian
Assistance Program augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement
activities in order to increase our partner nations' ability to respond
independently to natural and man-made disasters. New Horizons (Andean
Ridge) and Beyond the Horizons (Caribbean and Central Americas) are a
series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance exercises that
U.S. Southern Command conducts with Latin American and Caribbean
nations to provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and
Combat Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the
host nation. Each exercise lasts several months and usually takes place
in remote areas. We strive to combine these efforts with those of host
nation doctors and civic personnel. Our programs help local populations
who can benefit from completed projects such as schools, clinics,
community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster
response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. In 2009, we
conducted these exercises in 6 countries in the AOR, supporting the
renovation, construction, and repair on 12 schools, 2 community
centers, 4 health clinics, 3 water wells, 2 sports complexes, 2 road
repairs, and 1 pedestrian bridge, in addition to providing critical
training programs for first responders, disaster managers,
firefighters, and disaster warehouse managers.
These examples of our consistent and enduring engagement throughout
the region further advance our strategic messaging and help build
confidence, capability, and goodwill in numerous countries in the
region, bring renewed hope to those enduring hardship and challenging
conditions, and serve as a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-
U.S. messaging. The cumulative effects of our humanitarian assistance
missions have directly and indirectly touched and bettered the lives of
several hundred thousand throughout our shared home, as well as laying
the foundation for relationships and experience that pays large
dividends when the United States responds to a humanitarian crisis in
the region . . . as we did and are still doing in Haiti.
haiti--operation unified response
On January 12, the nation of Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude
earthquake with an epicenter located approximately 10 miles WSW of its
capital city, Port au Prince. The size and destructive capability of
this temblor was made even worse by several contributing factors,
namely: the earthquake was relatively shallow, making the shockwaves
much more pronounced; the capital city was overcrowded and over-
developed with construction standards inconsistently applied and
loosely enforced; and, much of Haiti was still recovering from a string
of three hurricanes and one tropical storm that struck during a 23-day
period in the summer of 2008. It had been almost 150 years since an
earthquake of this magnitude had struck Haiti and the devastation was
tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate over 222,517 people were
killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.2 million displaced by the earthquake
and the 59 subsequent aftershocks. Thirteen of the 15 government
ministry buildings were completely destroyed. Between 40-50 percent of
all buildings sustained significant damage in Port au Prince and
surrounding villages, with some suffering as much as 80 percent damage
as in Leogane. The airport control tower was rendered inoperable and
more than half the seaport was left in ruins. Later that night, the
President of Haiti declared a national state of emergency and in doing
so, requested the United States assist in providing humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief aid. The U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
responded by issuing a disaster declaration, confirming the situation
warranted U.S. Government assistance.
The U.S. response was swift and comprised of Federal, State,
military, and civilian agencies and units. There were several DOD and
U.S. Government assets already in the vicinity of Haiti. Just before
dawn the next morning, 13 January, the USCG Cutter Forward arrived off
the coast of Haiti, established a liaison with the Haitian Coast Guard
facility at Killick to conduct damage assessments, set up critical
command and control procedures, and began providing humanitarian
assistance, helping the most seriously wounded, and evacuating injured
American citizens. Shortly thereafter, two USCG C-130 aircraft also
arrived to support U.S. relief efforts.
At 10:20 that morning, President Obama expressed ``the deep
condolences and declared the unwavering support of the American
people'' and ordered a ``swift, coordinated and aggressive effort to
save lives'' with USAID designated as the Lead Federal Agency. During
the course of the day, an Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) assessment team
landed in Port au Prince to survey the airport while elements of the
First Special Operations Wing arrived to reopen Port au Prince
International Airport. A U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft from the Cooperative
Security Location of Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first U.S.
aerial reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. DOD
officials ordered the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and USS Bataan
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary
Unit (22nd MEU) embarked to make best speed to Haiti. The first U.S.
urban search and rescue team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA,
arrived in Haiti before even 24 hours had elapsed.
Later that day U.S. Southern Command deployed two planeloads of
personnel from our Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) element,
an organic, free-standing, deployable joint military headquarters,
which included experts in the field of engineering, operational
planners, communications specialists, medicine, interagency
coordination, and a command and control group. They arrived and began
coordinating with the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince, as well as United
Nations and other international personnel who were leading the initial
recovery efforts. In addition, this core team began conducting
assessments of damage and determining areas where the unique
capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear in
support of the Government of Haiti.
On 14 January, the size and scope of DOD's response grew as more
forces flowed to the assistance and relief effort. Four more USCG
Cutters and the USS Higgins arrived off shore. Throughout the day, P-3s
continued aerial reconnaissance. An engineering assessment team arrived
and determined the pier and wharf at Port au Prince port were
inoperable for movement of bulk stores. Later that night, the Secretary
of Defense ordered the USS Nassau ARG with the 24th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (24th MEU) embarked, the XVIII Airborne Corps, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team 82nd Airborne Division, and the hospital ship USNS
Comfort to deploy to Haiti. As elements of these assets and others
arrived over the course of the next 4 days, they formed the core of
DOD's overall contribution to the massive humanitarian assistance
mission--providing unique capabilities and an initial surge capacity in
what became our primary lines of operation: security, critical
engineering, medical and logistics. To organize the response of the
military forces, we established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) under
the command of my Deputy, Lieutenant General Keen, who was already on
the ground in Haiti for previously scheduled meetings.
The mission of JTF-H was to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in
Haiti, in order to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate
recovery. We would not have been able to perform this mission to the
level of success we have achieved if not for the more than 500
augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic
combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation
Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian
personnel we received were immediately value-added and were
instrumental in helping us develop well-coordinated planning efforts
that translated into unity of effort on the ground. These personnel
were also distributed to JTF-H in the form of planning staffs, the
Joint Information Center (JIC), assessment teams, Joint Center
Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, and many other teams. The men and
women of these contributing units have performed magnificently and been
the very embodiment of teamwork and jointness across the Department of
Defense. They have been outstanding representatives of your military
with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus and compassion.
They continue to make all of us extremely proud.
Security
Apart from isolated looting incidents, small-scale crime and
demonstrations which parallel the security environment prior to the
earthquake, the situation in Haiti remains relatively calm. U.S.
military personnel are engaged primarily with safeguarding humanitarian
supplies and distribution networks in support of MINUSTAH, who has
maintained a peacekeeping presence since 2004, comprised of primarily
Latin American military forces under Brazilian leadership. They have
been working with the Haitian government to provide security and build
the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Our JTF Commander
and the Brazilian MINUSTAH Commander have had an outstanding personal
and professional relationship. This has permeated all levels of
interaction and engagement between the two forces, alleviating many of
the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military
command structures operating in the same vicinity. A division of labor
was established whereby JTF-H military forces would provide local
security for humanitarian assistance missions, while MINUSTAH and the
HNP maintained overall responsibility for security in the country. To
underscore the scope of responsibility, on 19 January, the U.N.
Security Council authorized the expansion of MINUSTAH's force size by
2,000 military and 1,500 police personnel.
Critical Engineering
Initial assessment teams determined that although there was no
physical damage to the airport runway, taxiway and field operations,
the field was unusable because of no power and structural damage to the
control tower. Similarly, a team of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
assessed the entire sea port at Port au Prince was unusable for large
vessels, with buildings, cranes and piers damaged, and debris and
containers in the water. The roads remained largely impassable except
by motorcycle and foot traffic. Communication services in Haiti were
severely degraded, with the power grid, radio, landline, and cellular
telephone services working sporadically in pockets.
Assessments and emergency repairs continued throughout Haiti, but
the primary focus of initial effort was the seaport in Port Au Prince.
Haiti has other port facilities throughout the country, but due to
proximity to the most affected areas and the depth of water, Port au
Prince was critical to the relief efforts. The North pier was
completely destroyed and the South pier, missing 700 feet, was
determined to be non-operational. To address this requirement, U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) immediately deployed Joint Task
Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO), a unit capable of port command and control
and operations, followed closely by service contributions in the form
of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS). The JLOTS capability
consisted of boats, literage, cranes and crane ships allowing for rapid
cargo offload at other locations within the harbor, thus overcoming the
logistical hurdles caused by damage. TRANSCOM also contracted with
marine engineering experts from Crowley Marine to begin installation of
a combination of barges and cranes that would eventually restore
operational capability to the port. Utilizing this combination of JLOTS
and commercial capability, the seaport capacity exceeded pre-quake
offload capacity by 22 January and steadily increased as additional
over-the-shore assets arrived.
The current container per day capacity, based only on the in-place
commercial capability, exceeds demand, thus enabling the GOH, the U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and USAID to
manage flow based on the requirements on the ground while also enabling
Haitian commercial capabilities to resume. Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA) funded repairs to the
South Pier are underway, as are contracted removal of a gantry crane
and other debris which had fouled the port during the earthquake. In
addition, U.S. military engineer teams continue to assess critical
infrastructure, including port facilities and piers, airfields, roads,
bridges, water wells, and electrical grids to determine how best to
assist repair and restore these essential needs. Future U.S. Southern
Command-sponsored MEDRETEs, New Horizons and Beyond the Horizons
medical, construction and engineering exercises will provide a
consistent and continuing assistance to the Haitian people as part of
our larger Theater Security Cooperation program.
Medical
The magnitude of the catastrophe necessitated the rapid deployment
of military assets with sufficient medical capability to help alleviate
suffering and save lives in the wake of the disaster. U.S. Southern
Command responded by requesting the deployment of needed medical
capability to Haiti. The USS Carl Vinson arrived on 15 January; the USS
Bataan and JTF-B Forward Surgical Team (FST) on 18 January; the USNS
Comfort on 20 January; and, the 24th Medical Group Expeditionary
Medical Support (EMEDS) on 24 January. USNS Comfort arrived on station
just 6 days after the initial mobilization order; she and her nearly
1000 medical personnel--including medical and surgical teams from
Project Hope, Operation Smile, Red Cross translators and support
personnel, and medical schools around the U.S.--joined other DOD assets
already on station to provide an immediate surge triage capability and
1400-plus bed capacity to help cope with the enormity of the task. We
are fortunate to have worked with many of these professionals
previously; they had come together to provide humanitarian assistance
and preventative medical treatment and training as part of our annual
Continuing Promise which visited Haiti in the summer of 2009 and will
return to the many countries of the AOR during the summer of 2010. As
of 28 February, DOD personnel were directly responsible for performing
964 total surgeries and treating 9,985 patients.
The GOH Ministry of Health initial priorities outlined to JTF-H
were medical supplies and emergency/trauma medical care. Numerous field
hospitals were established by international partners including
Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Israel, Jordan, Mexico,
Russia, Spain, and Turkey, in addition to the six Haitian hospitals
that remained operational and another nine that were partially
operational. Combined afloat and ashore medical professionals provided
medical evacuation and care to thousands of injured Haitians daily and
conducted hundreds of complex surgical procedures as part of the
concerted international effort. The Program on Essential Medicine and
Supplies (PROMESS) warehouse continues to be a key institution in post-
earthquake Haiti. U.S. military medical logistics experts assisted in
the initial setup and organization of PROMESS, which has now become a
nerve center for distribution of supplies to healthcare facilities
throughout Port au prince.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supported USAID
in its coordination of the U.S. medical and public health response and
later activated the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to
facilitate the transfer of non-U.S. citizens to medical facilities in
the United States. As of 28 February, 189 Haitian citizens in need of
higher levels of care have been transferred via U.S. military aircraft
to healthcare facilities within the United States. Despite initial
fears, there was no indication of widespread communicable diseases and
no report to indicate an imminent epidemic. Public health experts from
the HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention continue to monitor
health conditions related to water safety, food supply, shelter
conditions and other health threats in order to prioritize immediate
interventions aimed at preventing major health-related crises. The
capability of off-shore medical treatment by our surface assets has
largely been assumed by the GoH, U.N. and nongovernmental organization
expertise on the ground and we anticipate being able to release these
assets in the near future.
Logistics
Joint Task Force-Haiti, in support of the lead Federal agency,
USAID, focused on expanding and securing aid distribution networks to
speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people. With the port
damaged, the only means of initially flowing relief supplies in--and
evacuating U.S. citizens and eligible family members, orphans, and
medical patients out--was through the Port au Prince airport. Although
the control tower was destroyed, the runway was intact. We therefore
immediately requested specialized capabilities to rapidly open the
airport to receive relief supplies, equipment, personnel, and forces.
This included the combat controllers of the 720th Special Operations
Group who were on the ground within 26 hours of the earthquake,
providing critical Air Traffic Control capabilities as well as
directing ramp operations. From zero inbound traffic hours after the
quake, these battlefield Airmen had the airport back operating at 60
flights per day within 72 hours, approximately triple the normal
capacity before the earthquake. These specialists worked all-day, all-
night, and in all weather conditions . . . and they did all this
without any radar. The special operators were followed closely by
aviation elements from TRANSCOM as part of their JTF-PO deployment. To
meet the tremendous demand, we also worked with the government of the
Dominican Republic and opened additional air and sea ports of entry
within their territory and contracted commercial carriers to move
supplies and equipment overland from these airfields into Haiti.
Working with Haitian aviation administration officials, JTF-H
personnel established the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center
which constructed a phone, then web-based, system for flight slot
allocation scheduling. This greatly increased our scheduling efficiency
and tracking effectiveness, quickly bringing the airfield to a 120-140
flights per day average. The total number of flights eventually began a
steady decline at the airport as demand decreased and efforts to reopen
the seaport steadily progressed to eventually exceeding pre-quake
delivery capacity. Today the majority of flights are being controlled
by Haitian air traffic controllers. On 18 February, we safely and
successfully evacuated the last of 16,412 U.S. citizens and eligible
family members, perhaps the largest ever peacetime single evacuation of
U.S. citizens. Beginning 19 February, commercial air service from
American Airlines resumed with 3 daily flights between Haiti and the
United States and twice a week Air France flights between Paris and
Haiti. The return of service is a positive indicator of stability and
signals to the international community that the situation is
normalizing.
In addition to airlift assistance, elements of JTF-Haiti continue
delivering supplies, equipment, and personnel. As of 26 February, DOD
has distributed 2,292,431 meals and 2,615,888 bottles of water, in
addition to assisting in expanding and securing aid distribution
networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people.
The demand for JTF assistance in the distribution of supplies has
dropped significantly as the capacity of the U.N., USAID, and
nongovernmental organizations has increased. Our personnel continue to
coordinate with USAID and OCHA to define areas in which U.S. military
support is required.
Under the leadership of the GoH, the WFP began a targeted and
systematic food distribution effort using predetermined distribution
locations. In consultation with the GoH and interested stakeholders, 16
different sites around the capital were identified to serve as fixed
distribution points, instead of attempting to deliver to different
settlements throughout the city. U.S. military forces from the 82nd
Airborne Division and the 22nd and 24th MEUs worked closely with
MINUSTAH forces and Haitian National Police personnel to ensure
locations, routes and distribution of aid was calm, orderly and without
incident. In total, the program provided humanitarian assistance (in
quantities of 15-day rations) to approximately 9,000 families per site,
per day. The initial 14-day operation was a large success in
establishing a sustainable and predictable food distribution program
that reached over 2.9 million Haitians, exceeding their original goal
by almost 1 million people. WFP's Food Surge 7-day Phase 1B concluded
on 20 February with an estimated 19,000 families reached. The WFP
estimates that the Port-au-Prince area consumes 16-20 metric tons of
rice per month. Through the combined efforts of the U.N., USAID, eight
nongovernmental organizations, and U.S. forces, the surge was able to
provide approximately two-thirds of the rice needed in the Port-au-
Prince area for the past 30 days. The WFP began their current phase of
operations on 6 March and has stated no U.S. military presence or other
support was needed, as MINUSTAH and HNP personnel would be utilized
exclusively.
Overall Assessment
It has been 2 months since the earthquake and signs of recovery are
emerging. The massive outpouring of international relief efforts, with
strong support from Latin America and Caribbean countries, has not only
sped up the recovery but also enabled the building of a better Haiti.
The overall security situation remains stable and continues to improve,
with only sporadic incidents of small-scale violence occurring.
MINUSTAH forces, in conjunction with a revitalized Haitian National
Police force, have a presence throughout the country with specific
emphasis on historical hot spots like Cite Soleil and other areas in
and around Port au Prince.
Consistent and predictive aid distribution remains the single-most
important factor in maintaining the relatively calm security situation.
The immediate needs of food and water have been replaced by the more
enduring stability requirements of adequate shelter and proper
sanitation, particularly as the rainy season approaches. Infrastructure
repairs have begun and are primarily being carried out by civilian
engineering experts under contract, like the arrangement between
Crowley Marine and the National Port Authority (APN). Beginning 25
February, Crowley brought their own temporary barge, placed it in the
inner harbor, and then the following day the M/V Crowley Shipper
delivered 50 foot sections to be used as ramps. On 27 February, APN
Blue--the Crowley temporary next to the north pier of Port au Prince
achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for the first time since
the earthquake. As a result of such relief efforts, airport and seaport
commerce are returning to pre-earthquake or higher levels of business.
From all sources, there are no indications an external mass migration
is imminent.
Our original mission assigned to us was conduct Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S.
Government efforts in Haiti, in order to mitigate near term human
suffering and accelerate recovery. As we near achievement of that
mission, I am taking a broader look at how we will support the larger
U.S. Government and U.N. through more traditional security cooperation
means to sustain security and stability. Although we have made great
strides, coordinated planning and on-going communications toward unity
of effort remains a challenging task; these are critical enablers to
ensuring the conditions are right for our transition. The Armed Forces
will continue to execute the mission in support of USAID and the
international community in providing humanitarian aid and disaster
relief. We do not intend to leave a large military footprint, but we
will continue to plan for and remain prepared to respond with a range
of options to contingency situations, such as another natural disaster,
which may necessitate a return to Haiti in the future.
When the appropriate conditions are met, we will effectively
transition our relief efforts to other U.S. Government agencies, the
U.N., and nongovernmental organizations, thereby demonstrating the
ability to conduct an effective transfer of responsibility to civilian
authority. The culture of cooperation, openness and transparency we
have developed; the relationships we have built; and, the emphasis U.S.
Southern Command has placed on partnering in the past few years have
all paid a particularly high return on investment in Operation Unified
Response, the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
mission ever conducted in this region. Haiti may serve as a rare
unifying event, not only for the agencies and departments of the U.S.
Government, but also for the Nations of this region--at the end of the
day, we are all here for one reason: the people of Haiti.
Finally, I offer one personal observation: I have now made five
different trips to Haiti--one before the earthquake and four since--and
on each occasion, I continue to be amazed by the strength, courage and
resiliency of the Haitian people. Their collective character is evident
throughout this tragedy. This is a powerful display of stoic
determination--accepting and enduring the reality of the present, while
foreseeing, believing in and taking the first basic steps to ensure,
the promise of a better future. The citizens of Haiti have shown
themselves to be a proud, strong, and persevering people.
requirements
Illegal trafficking, associated criminal activity, gangs, terrorist
financing and recruitment, natural disasters--none of these recognize
national sovereignty or stop at a nation's border. These challenges to
collective security, stability and prosperity cannot be overcome by any
one nation alone; they require transnational solutions. They cannot be
overcome by the military alone; they require a truly integrated
interagency, non-governmental organization and even private sector
approach.
To that end, U.S. Southern Command works not only to build partner
capability and capacity, but also to build strategically important
cooperative security relationships throughout the region. Among the
military and security forces in the region, we focus on helping to
build greater capability and capacity, as well as striving to improve
our collective ability to plan, direct, and operate. Within the
interagency community, we endeavor to enhance cooperation while
advocating for our partner's greater capability and capacity at every
opportunity. Finally, with the private sector, business community, and
non-governmental organizations, we seek to leverage their skills and
expertise to greatly improve our combined impact and effect.
Supporting Interagency Partners
While remaining fully ready for combat operations, diplomacy
dominates so much of what we do, and development is a mandatory
requisite feature of true, long-term stability and prosperity. We
support our interagency partners who have the lead in addressing the
significant illicit trafficking and crime challenges in the region. To
that end, we support initiatives to increase the pool of resources
available to our partner agencies who are the leads and experts in
these arenas. As we engage and support the lead efforts of the State
Department, USAID, DHS, Justice, and others in the field, we also lend
our advocacy for increased resources for these agencies to more
effectively deal with the endemic problems in the region, improve the
capabilities of partner nations' police and law enforcement agencies,
and strengthen judicial systems and institutions.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
U.S. Southern Command has a continuous requirement for persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), defined as having
the right asset able to observe and understand what is going on,
especially in denied areas. Whether conducting CN/CT operations or
large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
missions, we need fast, flexible and properly vetted information that
then becomes actionable intelligence and we pinpoint the locations
where our forces and resources can do the most good--with sufficient
time to get them there. However, this requires improved imagery
intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals
intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and
management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence and human collectors.
The combined products create a common operating picture that can and
needs to be shared with our partners and allies whenever possible. This
requires, then, all-source synthesis-node sensor resource management.
We continue to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
and industry for innovative solutions to address additional ISR sources
to gain improved situational awareness.
Throughout Operation Unified Response, ISR assets have been an
invaluable resource. UAVs and other assets have provided outstanding
situational awareness and early warning indicators in areas of
potential violence, determining status of critical infrastructure,
assessing gathering crowds, analyzing internally displaced person
camps, determining traffic ability of lines of communication, and
security at WFP distribution points. ISR assets have had a positive
impact on decisionmaking by enabling the efficient use of scarce
resources.
In particular, the information provided has assisted in placing
only the necessary number of USAID and nongovernmental organization
workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and
personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy
security forces.
We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring operations
that require a high state of readiness and a joint effort to link
multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic, operational
and tactical requirements. Expanding the melding of organic and
national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill the
ongoing requirement for continuous and persistent intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This effort requires the
appropriate awareness systems, namely: unmanned aerial craft with rapid
response and good transit and loiter capability; remote light detection
and ranging for foliage penetration; high-speed, unmanned surface
vessels for detection and identification to support maritime domain
awareness; commercial satellite sensors with the ability to detect `go-
fast' boats; next generation `over the horizon' radars; non-electro-
optical imagery that enables change detection; and, novel applications
of existing technology to facilitate cross-domain awareness.
Continued Commitment to Colombia
One of the most dramatic examples of U.S. Southern Command working
to build partner nation capability and capacity in our AOR can be found
in our enduring engagement through providing training, logistical, and
technical support to the military and security forces of Colombia.
Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a crucial anchor
for security and stability in the region. Unfortunately, they are also
the world's predominant source of cocaine and home to the narco-
terrorist group the FARC.
Over the last 8 years, the Colombians have done a magnificent job
of reclaiming their nation from both right-wing and left-wing illegal
armed groups. Through its own military and whole-of-government efforts,
and a steady stream of resources and support from the U.S., Colombia
has made great strides towards building security and stability. Today,
the approval rating of the democratically elected government led by
President Uribe is just under 70 percent. The approval rating of the
FARC, on the other hand, is less than 2 percent. Despite this dwindling
public support, the FARC still maintains approximately 8,500 fighters
in the field, down from approximately 18,000. They remain kidnappers,
torturers, murderers, and drug dealers. This is essentially their
`business model' and they are unfortunately and definitively still in
business.
The government's and military's efforts against the FARC have also
significantly impacted drug cartels, as Colombia has extradited more
than 900 drug traffickers to the United States. Although cocaine
production is still a critical concern, interdiction and seizures of
cocaine headed to the United States and to other destinations in the
region and abroad, have more than doubled in the last 10 years. This
increase indicates improved state control, successful government
strategies, and overall better interagency and international
coordination and collaboration. These efforts have helped contribute to
the fastest sustained economic growth in a decade--greater than 5
percent annually from 2006-2008, providing a sense of positive momentum
for the entire country.
We must now capitalize on the successes achieved thus far to ensure
Colombia remains a long-term strategic regional and global partner.
Continued U.S. commitment and support for the Colombian Armed Forces'
campaign to defeat the FARC, as well as for Colombian interagency
efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas
recaptured from the FARC, is essential. This support can come in many
forms but should entail continued training and development of key
capabilities we are seeing showcased in their cooperation with Mexico
and deployment to Haiti, and human rights programs to continue the
significant improvements in human rights by the Armed Forces in recent
years. With U.S. help, a stable and secure Colombia is achievable in
the near term as they emerge as a strategic partner, positive exporter
of security and democratic model for the region, directly increasing
the security of all citizens of the Americas.
Countering Illicit Trafficking
The November 2009 Central American and Caribbean Chiefs of Mission
Conference held at our headquarters in Miami highlighted the need for a
regional, synergistic whole-of-many-governments approach to counter
illicit trafficking. Just as the successes of the Governments of Peru
and Bolivia in reducing coca cultivation in their countries during the
1980s and early 1990s caused a shift in cultivation and production to
Colombia, we are concerned that current eradication and interdiction
successes in Colombia are causing a corresponding increase in Peruvian
and Bolivian cultivation. For example, according to the most recent
crop estimate from the U.S. Government, potential cocaine production in
Columbia dropped 39 percent between 2007 and 2008. The potential
production of pure cocaine fell from an estimated 485 metric tons in
2007 to 295 metric tons in 2008. Further, the area under cultivation
dropped 29 percent during the same timeframe while Peruvian cultivation
increased by 14 percent and Bolivian cultivation by 8 percent in the
same time period. Furthermore, from 2000-2008, Peru's total area under
illicit coca cultivation increased by 30 percent, while Bolivia's has
nearly doubled.
Similarly, as President Calderon takes the fight to illicit
trafficking organizations in Mexico, Central America is experiencing an
increase in activity as traffickers are squeezed between Colombia and
Mexico. This movement is exacerbated by successes of aerial and
maritime interdiction efforts, which are pushing traffickers to favor
land routes through the Central American isthmus. As traffickers and
their support networks relocate to Central America, they also bring
with them the associated ills of government corruption, crime, and gang
activity which undermine good governance and threaten public security.
As a result of the discussions during the Chiefs of Mission
Conference, we are working with the Intelligence Community to produce
an analysis of the larger, regional and global illicit trafficking
enterprise, looking at networks, routes and organizations throughout
the entire region, as opposed to just one or two countries. The
construct we are using encompasses the production, acquisition, storage
and/or transfer of illicit drugs; illegal arms trafficking; money
laundering; human trafficking and smuggling of special interest aliens;
WMD and WMD precursors; and, all of their supporting activities.
This analysis will help the Department of State and the interagency
community to coordinate an integrated approach to counter illicit
trafficking and associated activities in the Western Hemisphere. The
Department of State already has several excellent sub-regional
strategies to address this challenge such as Beyond Merida, the Central
American Regional Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative. U.S.
Southern Command performs Theater Security Cooperation activities that
are in support of Merida Initiative and Caribbean security initiative
efforts, and help to build partner nation military capability and
capacity in Central America and the Caribbean. Lessons learned from
U.S. support to Colombia show the importance of an integrated and
unified overarching strategy to address insecurity and instability
caused by the combined ills of illicit trafficking.
conclusion
During my 9 months of leading the outstanding men and women of U.S.
Southern Command, I have been fortunate to work closely with our
civilian and military leaders, as well as with our partners to the
south, to improve the security and stability of our region. Together we
are continuing the great work of those who have gone before us and
building upon the foundation of their efforts in seeking multinational,
``whole of government'' and in some cases ``whole of society''
approaches to create a secure and stable environment that set the
conditions for long-term prosperity for the Americas.
This region plays a critical role in the security and prosperity of
the United States. Despite some challenges, I believe that through the
sharing of ideas, economic interdependence, cultural understanding and
harnessing innovation, we can strengthen existing ties of friendship to
build an integrated approach to partnering that will ensure U.S.
Southern Command is a welcomed military partner of choice in this
hemisphere. There are many opportunities ahead to improve hemispheric
security cooperation. We will continue to pursue multinational, multi-
agency and public-private partnerships to confront the challenges and
embrace the opportunities of the Americas. We will continue to dedicate
the majority of our resources to building and complementing the
security capabilities of our partners while encouraging an environment
of cooperation among the Nations in the region. We will continue to
defend the United States, foster regional security, and be an enduring
partner to help enhance regional hemispheric security and stability.
The mutual benefits of these partnering efforts are profound.
Ultimately, our success in pursuit of these objectives depends upon
our military and civilian personnel and their families, as well as
those men and women serving with us from our partner agencies. I thank
you again for your continued interest in, dedication to and support of
the men and women of U.S. Southern Command and their families--they are
volunteers and patriots, and I am humbled to lead them and serve with
them every day.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Fraser.
We welcome, also, your wife here, but she must be a little
bit jealous when she hears General Renuart's wife is going to
have her hubby back full-time.
Let me ask you some questions, General Renuart. First, one
of the major objectives in the creation of NORTHCOM was to
create a dedicated command to support civil authorities. DOD is
now standing up a subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), under
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), that--it appears that that
command is going to provide direct support to civil authorities
in cyberspace, both in defense of the government and in defense
of commercial networks. Is there a role for NORTHCOM in
cybersecurity? If so, what is it?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, there absolutely is a role,
and I think we have developed a very strong relationship with
STRATCOM. As CYBERCOM fully stands up, we'll continue that
relationship with them.
Our role is, if you will, a consumer of the cybersecurity
that STRATCOM and CYBERCOM have been designed to provide. We
have a unique circumstance, in that many of our mission
partners operate outside of the traditional so-called dot-mil
[.mil] environment. So our partnership with DHS, as they
provide protection to the dot-gov [.gov] domains, and then with
the commercial private-sector partners, like Google and
Microsoft and others, we are building a close relationship. We
then determine the requirements that STRATCOM must meet in
order to provide that security.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I forgot to mention, let's have an 8-minute first round of
questioning.
General Renuart, the administration has a policy of
requiring operationally-realistic testing of missile defense
systems, and there is a new Missile Defense Master Test Plan,
that's designed to collect the data necessary to provide
confidence in the operational effectiveness of all of our
missile defense systems, including the GMD system. First, do
you agree it is necessary to have operationally realistic
testing? Do you agree with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
that the new test plan will provide operationally realistic
data and will provide the basis for having confidence in the
capability and the reliability of the GMD system over its
service life?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I do support that, and I do
believe it will give us good data to support the systems, and
we work closely with the MDA on this.
Chairman Levin. Last year, Secretary Gates decided to cap
deployment of the GMD system in Alaska and California at 30
operational ground-based interceptors (GBIs), and to make
significant improvements in their reliability. This committee
and Congress approved that plan. Do you agree with Defense
Secretary Gates that deploying 30 operationally effective and
reliable GBIs would provide an effective defense against the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat from North Korea and
Iran?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman I do believe it provides us
that capability. I'm confident in the capabilities of the
systems. I think the phased adaptive approach identified by the
Secretary will allow us to grow a broader system of capability
against potential growing Iranian threats.
Chairman Levin. As you just mentioned, the President
announced a new missile defense plan for Europe that had been
unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. That plan includes a number of elements that are
intended to enhance defense of the United States against
potential future long-range Iranian missiles: a forward-
deployed radar in southeastern Europe, and development of an
improved version of the Standard Missile-3 Block II for
deployment in Europe. Do you agree that this phased adaptive
approach that's being planned for Europe will improve our
capability to defend the homeland against potential future
long-range missiles from Iran?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do agree. I
think there is, and we'll continue to see the testing and
development of the systems as they mature, but initial
information looks very promising.
Chairman Levin. All right. Finally, on this subject, there
was a recent GMD flight test--it was at the end of January, I
believe--where the system failed to achieve an intercept. Can
you tell us why it failed?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I'm not a true expert at
this, but my understanding, as the operational commander, is
that the integration between the sea-based X-band radar and the
missile--the test intercept vehicle itself--had a software
glitch in there which prevent information from reaching the
interceptor in an important phase of that flight test. I know
that General O'Reilly is working very carefully to correct the
software issues there, and we look forward to the FTG-07, which
will be the next test, coming up in the not too distant future.
Chairman Levin. We understand there were two issues there,
and if you would submit, for the record, whether that's
accurate; and if so, what the second problem was.
General Renuart. Chairman, if I could, can I take that
for----
Chairman Levin. Yes, for the record.
General Renuart. Please, and we'll get that specific detail
back to the committee.
[The information referred to follows:]

The recent Ground-Based Midcourse Defense flight test number -06,
conducted on 31 January 2010, did not result in an intercept. There
were two issues and early indications are that either issue could have
led to a failed intercept. The two issues appear unrelated at this
time.
The first issue observed in the test was the Sea-based X-Band Radar
stopped operating prior to providing adequate information needed by the
interceptor in an important phase of the flight. The second issue
observed in the test was the interceptor did not successfully complete
the final phases of flight required for an intercept.
The Missile Defense Agency has an extensive investigation ongoing
to determine the causes of the failure to intercept.

Chairman Levin. That would be fine.
General Fraser, last month the Colombian Constitutional
Court ruled that President Uribe would not be permitted to run
for a third term. Has there been a fallout from that? Is there
enough time to have an appropriate election? It's a fairly
short period, apparently, before that election takes place. Are
things calm? Are there any concerns?
General Fraser. Chairman Levin, I do not have any concerns.
I think there is adequate time to hold the election. The
election process has been going on while their Supreme Court
was deliberating on its decision, so I think there's adequate
time. There's a number of candidates who are actively running,
and so, I'm confident that Colombia will be able to run a fair
and equitable election.
Chairman Levin. General Fraser, the--relative to Cuba--as I
understand it, we have almost no military contact with Cuba.
The only ongoing contact is apparently this low-level, kind of,
monthly fence talks, I guess they're called. But, there's also
a case-by-case cooperation in the antidrug efforts,
particularly at sea. Apparently, there's notice if there's fast
boats going through Cuban waters. I'm wondering, assuming that
there is no prohibition in law--and we don't think Helms-Burton
does have a prohibition of that kind of contact with the
Cubans--is there any value in increased U.S. military contact
with the Cuban military?
General Fraser. Chairman Levin, there is, as you mentioned,
tactical-level interaction--fence-line talks--and the U.S.
Coast Guard has a liaison in the U.S.-interest mission there in
Havana. Our understanding--and I'll go back and check this--is
that military-to-military relations are prohibited until the
Government of Cuba elects a democratically-elected government,
and does not include either Fidel Castro or President Raul
Castro in as part of that government. So that's our
understanding of it, from an engagement with militaries, we
look to engage with every military organization within the
region. We continue to do that with all our partners. So if the
opportunity is presented for us to do that, we would welcome
that opportunity.
Chairman Levin. All right. Well, doublecheck Helms-Burton,
if you would, because----
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin.--we don't read it that way. We welcome your
testimony.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, our understanding is Helms-Burton does not prohibit
military-to-military contact with the Government of Cuba. Certainly,
placing a U.S. servicemember at the Interest Section in Havana, could
conceivably offer an opportunity to build rapport and trust. However,
current Department of State and U.S. Government policy is that such
military-to-military meetings and contact with the Government of Cuba
are restricted as part of a U.S. Government effort to ensure
consistency of message and to deny the Cuban regime the opportunity to
mischaracterize contacts between U.S. and Cuban officials.

General Fraser, there's a--in terms of the situation in
Haiti, I believe you--you've mentioned that there's some
redeployments now that are going on, and that will continue,
but there's some enablers that SOUTHCOM apparently will leave,
some capabilities that you're going to leave in Haiti. Can you
just describe that briefly?
General Fraser. Mr. Chairman, we're still early in the
discussion and planning of that. It's an evolving situation.
The focus right now on the ground is helping make sure shelter,
sanitation, and security needs are met, especially for the
numbers of displaced people. That is the evolving situation
right now. So, we're looking to support USAID, the other
international efforts, with the right types of capability. So,
I don't have good definition for you right now of what that
will be.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Let me ask both of you, on a subject which we've spent some
time on, and obviously will be considering, and that's the
possible repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' Let me just ask
you your personal views, essentially.
General Renuart, let me start with you. What are your
personal views as to whether we should continue that policy or
whether we ought to repeal it?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I think--my personal view, I
think, probably is very close to what you heard with General
Petraeus, his testimony a short time ago. I believe that we
have all served, through the course of our tenure, with
individuals who were gay or lesbian, and who were not allowed
to talk about that. I think those individuals served honorably.
I think the importance of maintaining the standards of
discipline is critical to our military. But, I believe that we
should not hold, if you will, those individuals ``hostage''
because of the policy we have.
So, I think it's appropriate that we conduct the detailed
study the Secretary has asked us to conduct and--so that we
understand the implications, and then we move forward.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General Fraser, do you have a personal view?
General Fraser. Chairman Levin, my views very much
correspond to that of General Renuart, and that is that I think
it's really appropriate that we do a very deliberate
understanding of what the President's intent is in relation to
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell.'' So I support what General Renuart
said.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman.
Obviously all of us have served with people who are of that
sexual orientation. They have served honorably. That's not the
question. It's the question, which I think you have answered,
and I guess I'd ask you to repeat, is that we have to
understand the implications of repeal before we make a decision
on repeal. Would that be an accurate reflection of your views?
General Renuart. Senator McCain, it would be.
Senator McCain. General Fraser?
General Fraser. Senator McCain, I agree.
Senator McCain. So, a moratorium would obviously be a de
facto repeal of the policy before we have understood the
implications for battle effectiveness on the men and women in
the military. So, I'd--I appreciate your views, and I share
them. For the Congress of the United States to take action
before we have had a thorough review of the policy, not of the
way to repeal the policy would be the best way to proceed,
would you agree?
General Renuart. Senator McCain, just to be clear, I guess.
Is it my view that we should have a moratorium?
Senator McCain. Yes.
General Renuart. I think we ought not to have a moratorium
while we conduct this. I think, as the Secretary and the
Chairman and the Service Chiefs have all indicated, that would
cause, I think, some confusion in that process. So I think,
better to let the study go, and then make a decision.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, there
are efforts to impose a moratorium, which would be tantamount
to repeal. But, I'd like to move on.
General Renuart, could you describe to me, in--as short as
possible, but terms that perhaps Americans can understand, how
dangerous the situation is on our southern border vis-a-vis the
drug cartels, the existential threat to the Government of
Mexico--I'm asking you to make it short, but speak to the
problems of corruption, and the possibility that that violence
can spill over onto our side of the border. This is an issue
that I--I don't know why we haven't--Americans haven't had the
visibility of how great a threat and danger this is to the very
existence of the Government of Mexico, and the effect that it's
having on public opinion in Mexico.
General Renuart. Senator McCain, thanks for that question.
This is, as you mentioned, really the principal struggle that
the Government of Mexico is undergoing. President Calderon has
courageously put his military in the field to take this on,
where local law enforcement officials have been corrupted or
intimidated. That's not the traditional role of the Mexican
military, and it does put some strain on them, but we are
working very closely to share the lessons we've learned, in
places like Afghanistan and others, to do that.
The violence in places like Juarez has been substantial. I
think we are close to 7,000 murders that occurred in 2009.
Senator McCain. At 7,000 murders.
General Renuart.--7,000, and I must say, drug-related
murders that generally were cartel-on-cartel, but that spills
over into the population. The Mexicans----
Senator McCain. Murders of individuals who are part of the
Mexican drug enforcement and military and others; they've
singled them out for assassination, including those that have
been trained by the United States.
Is that true?
General Renuart. Senator, I'm not sure about the last
statement, ``including those trained.'' I know we've had some
people that we have trained in the past that were involved and
corrupted--
Senator McCain. No, I meant who were assassinated.
General Renuart. Senator, I believe there are a small
number that were U.S.-trained Mexicans. But, certainly your
other statement is absolutely correct. These are individuals
who are competing for, if you will, market share in the drug
business. Cartels are very aggressively taking each other on
to, if you will, build the distribution process, the market
share.
So, that continues, and we are working aggressively with
our Mexican partners to help build an interagency capacity for
Mexico to deal with this. I'm cautious, when we talk about the
level of threat to the Mexican Government, because I think
President Calderon is strong, I think he enjoys support, and I
think he's aggressively working this, and growing an
interagency team that can be effective.
Senator McCain. I don't mean to interrupt you, but isn't it
also true, though, that Mexican public opinion, because of this
level of violence, is beginning to turn, frankly, in the wrong
direction? Is that----
General Renuart. Yes.
Senator McCain. Do you have----
General Renuart. We have----
Senator McCain.--indications of that?
General Renuart.--seen that the public opinion polls have
come down, on this regard. Although, I will say, in recent--in
just the recent month, I've seen some numbers where the Mexican
people have continued to express their support in Calderon's
efforts. So, it's a little bit of a balance in that regard.
Finally, Senator, just very quickly with respect to the
border area, here----
Senator McCain. Would you also mention the problem of
corruption?
General Renuart. Absolutely. Across--especially in the
local police areas, the local governing officials, that element
of corruption has become significant. It is the means by which
the cartels, if you will, create their influence on government,
essentially to leave them alone, to not interfere with the
drug-trade business. There has been a substantial effort placed
by the Mexican government to replace corrupt officials in the
towns and communities; but it takes time to build those
credible leaders back up, and that's still a work in progress.
Senator McCain. Would you, for the record, provide the
committee with recommendations of what more you think we need
to do, including the success or failures of Plan Merida? I'd
appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, I believe the way ahead for Plan Merida is to focus a
greater part of our effort on Central America via the Central American
Region Security Initiative in an overall strategic framework to enhance
our Central American partners' territorial control capabilities in the
maritime, land, and air corridors. The end state would be to maximize
our effectiveness to fight criminal organizations by assisting our
regional partners in the disruption of illicit activities such as drug,
weapons, and human trafficking that adversely impact the sovereign
control of their territories and threaten the southern approaches to
the United States. We have been successful by accelerating the
expansion of the maritime interdiction capabilities of five of our
Central American partners.

Senator McCain. I understand we're spending about $400
million in a year cooperating with the Mexican Government on
this issue.
General Renuart. Yes, sir. That's correct. Senator McCain,
if I could, for the record, give you a much more detailed look,
both in that area and our cooperation with law enforcement
along the border, because I think there's a good news story
there.
[The information referred to follows:]

Through the Merida Initiative, $415.5 million in Foreign Military
Financing funds was appropriated in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the
purchase of the following military equipment for Mexico:

$200 million for four CASA maritime surveillance
aircraft
$110 million for three UH-60M helicopters
$105 million for eight Bell 412 helicopters, seven of
which are funded.
Congress is withholding 15 percent of the fiscal year
2009 Omnibus appropriation ($5.85 million) due to their
concerns over the Mexican military's human rights record
$500,000 for 13 handheld ion scanners

These deliverables will provide the Mexican military with urgently-
needed capabilities in the areas of tactical rapid troop transport,
overwater surveillance, and drug detection to support Mexican law
enforcement. I believe they will be valuable additions to the Mexican
military's capabilities that will immediately be used to help tackle
illicit narcotics trafficking operations. As long as the Mexican
military has a leading role in Mexico's national campaign to disrupt
the capacity of organized crime to operate and manage their land and
maritime borders, my belief is that they will continue to need these
kinds of assets. This is a national-level campaign that requires
national-level capabilities.
The Mexican Government has embarked on a long-term effort to
rebuild their security institutions. Training is a major component of
this initiative and focused equipment is necessary to building security
capacity. Along these lines, they will need a large infusion of
additional support to build the kinds of capacities needed to defend
Mexican territorial sovereignty and counter transnational threats like
illicit trafficking. Their most urgent needs are troop and equipment
airlift; secure communications; information collection, analysis,
sharing, and fusion with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement communities;
riverine and littoral operations; border surveillance; and military
justice reform (for dealing with an internal security situation for
which they are not designed to handle). The Merida Initiative thus far
has been an excellent injection of needed support under a shared U.S.-
Mexican agreement. But, it's not the final solution to Mexico's
security requirements.
The Mexican military is a transitional security force, working now
in the cities and communities to make gains in combating the cartels
until the Mexican law enforcement agencies are retooled and ready to
rejoin the fight. When that happens, the deliverables provided by the
Merida Initiative and related support should well position the Mexican
military to focus their emphasis on defending Mexico's territorial
sovereignty, their air and maritime approaches, having the all-domain
awareness to detect threats at a distance and interdict them before
they reach Mexican land. This creates a layered defense for the United
States and enables a more effective security partnership. For that
mission, assets such as those from the Merida Initiative will assist in
developing national-level capacities for all domain awareness, command
and control, interdiction of threats such as weapons of mass
destruction and other illicit materials.
[Deleted.]

Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
General Fraser, could I turn to Cuba, a second? They, just
in the last week or so, a young man named Orlando Zapata died
on a hunger strike, as a political prisoner in Cuba. After a
brief experimentation with a small amount of free enterprise,
the Cuban Government has cracked down. They have even been more
brutal in their repression of human rights, and their prisons
have a large number of political dissidents who have simply
sought to exercise their rights as human beings. Is that true?
General Fraser. Yes, Senator, that's true.
Senator McCain. Isn't there also evidence that, from time
to time, there has been the Cuban government and military
facilitating the drug trade?
General Fraser. Senator, I can't confirm that. I'll have to
take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

I have no evidence that the Cuban Government or military facilitate
the drug trade.

Senator McCain. Has there been any cooperation that you
know of on the part of the Cuban government in trying to
restrain the drug trade?
General Fraser. Senator, we have had cooperation, as I
mentioned--and I'm not the expert on this, because it's really
within the U.S. Coast Guard--as we look at migration as well as
the drug trade there within the straits around Cuba.
Senator McCain. Is there any doubt that the--that Raul
Castro and Fidel have been more repressive in the last year or
2 than they were in the past?
General Fraser. Senator, I think they have continued to
remain fairly strict on the populace, but I can't quantify
whether that has been more restrictive over the last couple of
years than before. So, I need to also get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Since Raul Castro replaced his brother Fidel Castro as chief of
state, the government's human rights record has been essentially
unchanged. When comparing the last two to three years of each Castro's
rule, the frequency of government crackdowns under Fidel (2003 and
2005) are consistent with Raul's directed crackdowns (2006, 2008,
2010), averaging one government crackdown on dissent every 2 years.
More than 200 political prisoners are currently detained in Cuba; most
began their sentences under Fidel's reign. For example, in the ``Black
Spring'' of March 2003, the government arrested 75 human rights
activists on various charges, ranging from aiding a foreign power to
violating national security laws. As of March 2010, 54 of the original
75 prisoners remained incarcerated.

Senator McCain. Well, then let me commend, for your
reading, various human rights organizations who have written
and testified that the Cuban Government is even more
repressive. I strongly suggest you read that, General. It might
be illuminating for you.
Finally, how do you assess the threat of the cooperation
between Iran and Venezuela? Last week Spain's high court said
the Venezuelan Government facilitated contacts between the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and ETA to plan
the assassination of Colombian officials visiting Spain,
including President Uribe. Do you have any information on that
and other activities on the part of the Venezuelan Government?
General Fraser. Senator, I do not have any direct
information on that. We have continued to watch very closely
for any connections between illicit and terrorist organization
activity within the region. We have not seen any connections,
specifically, that I can verify that there has been a direct
government-to-terrorist connection. We are concerned about it.
I'm skeptical. I continue to watch for it.
Senator McCain. You have seen evidence of the relationship
between FARC and the Venezuelan Government. I mean, that's been
published many times.
General Fraser. Senator, I know that there's evidence of
FARC.
Senator McCain. I mean, they have the hard drives. When
they raided the FARC camp on the Venezuelan side of the border.
General Fraser. Sir, the raid where that happened----
Senator McCain. Excuse me. On the other side of the border.
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Yes.
General Fraser. So, there has been some old evidence, but I
don't see that evidence. I can't tell you, specifically,
whether that continues or not.
Senator McCain. My time is expired.
I thank the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to both of you, for your service and leadership.
General Renuart, let me add my personal thank you to you
for four decades of service to our country. You've done it with
real honor and excellence, and personally, it's been a pleasure
to get to know you. I wish you the best in your next chapter. I
know your wife, as you said, will be happy with your
retirement, but having watched others retire, I would say, on
her behalf, that I hope you at least get a part-time job.
General Renuart. Senator I'm going to work on that.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I wish you the best.
Let me begin with you, General. I am, of course, as chair
of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
very interested and appreciative of the way in which NORTHCOM
has organized and consolidated the U.S. military's involvement
in homeland defense. You bring unique and critically important
skills together with DHS.
DOD has been standing up three brigade-size Consequence
Management Response Forces (CMRFs) to respond to a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by terrorists or
others on our Homeland. I've been very impressed by that, and
appreciative of it.
I was unsettled a bit when the recent QDR said that it
would basically scrap the second and third of those, and
replace them with 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces to be put
in each of the 10, basically, Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions around the country, under DHS. I mean,
the regional forces have some appeal, but I'm troubled by the
loss of those two brigade-sized Response Management Forces
because of the tremendous skills and specialties that they
would have brought wherever an attack on our country, of this
serious nature, might occur. So, I wanted to ask you as you
depart this command, how you feel about that change and whether
you feel it--these regional forces can do a--as good a job of
homeland defense as the three brigade-sized CMRFs.
General Renuart. Senator, thanks. This is an issue that
obviously went through a lot of discussion within the QDR.
We've worked very hard to create those brigade-sized forces,
over the last few years, and, with both the support of the
committee and the Secretary, have crafted two of those. The
third was to be made operational this year.
The concern within the discussions of the QDR is that these
forces may not be as responsive as a force that is, if you
will, deployed and lives out in each of these FEMA regions.
After much discussion, the Secretaries made a decision to
adjust this format a bit.
I think our role in this has been certainly involved in the
discussions, but--to take the concept that was developed
through the QDR discussions and turn it into an operational
construct that is effective and executable. That work is
ongoing today, Senator Lieberman. I think that there is some
work to do, still, to ensure that, not only do you have trained
and equipped forces in these regional areas, but they are
accessible and agile and deployable enough to meet the
expectations and the assumptions that were central to the QDR
discussions.
We still have a little work to do on that. Is it possible
that they will be as effective? Yes, sir, I think it is. It
really depends on the fact that we will make a commitment to
train and fund and make these integratable, if you will, into a
capable force when a large-scale event occurs. That's our role
in NORTHCOM. We're working hard on that. We still have work to
do before I can give you a definitive answer.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Well, we're going to keep in touch
on that, because--and you phrased it exactly in terms of my
concerns, which is whether these 10 regional forces will be
able to quickly deploy with the range of skills to the site of
an attack where we'll need something as large as a brigade, or
two or three, to protect the people and stand up the region
again.
I want to understand--make, just, clear for the record--
will the one brigade-sized force remain in effect?
General Renuart. Yes, Senator, it will. In fact, it will
grow----
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Renuart.--by about 700 individuals of--with those
same critical lifesaving skill sets.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Renuart. So, that will remain. It will be focused
on an Active Duty brigade, so it gives you the most rapid
access to that----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Renuart.--to that force. In addition, then, we will
have two smaller forces that will be predominantly the command
and control, the logistics, the joint reception, and some
immediate lifesaving capability in those two smaller forces.
But, they're really designed to receive so-called general-
purpose forces in a large-scale event.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Let me move on to the GMD system that has been mentioned.
In the move to the phased adaptive system that we're going to
now, the--there's some question about the future of the two-
stage GBI. I know there's supposed to still be some testing of
it going on.
I wanted to ask you, as you sort of prepare to retire,
whether you believe we should continue to develop and test the
two-stage GBI, for instance, as a hedge against a possible
Iranian breakout, and whether--particularly in regard to the
homeland defense, whether NORTHCOM has studied options for
deploying a two-stage GBI in the United States to give another
layer of defense to our homeland.
General Renuart. Senator, the operational test program does
continue to include both the two- and the three-stage test. We
are fully supportive of that. As we have had discussions with
both DOD and with the MDA, our support for the phased adaptive
approach is strong. We're confident that it has real potential,
but we've also asked the Secretary and received, I think,
budgetary support to not foreclose the capabilities that might
be resident in a two- or a three-stage interceptor. So, we do
support that continued testing; and my information is, that
continues to stay on track.
With respect to the phased adaptive approach, I think that
the--certainly the information, so far, looks very positive, a
very capable system. So, we're supportive of that. We think it
gives us great added depth to our homeland defense capability.
Again, we don't want to foreclose any possibilities in the
future, so continuing that testing is important to us.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Good to hear. I agree with that
totally.
General Fraser, let me ask you a big-picture question,
because I think we often find that the regional commanders have
some of the best views of the regions in which they lead,
because of the comprehensiveness of their context with the
region. So, as you step back and look at SOUTHCOM, Latin
America generally, plus, there seems to be, here, as in other
parts of the world, an ongoing, sort of, conflict or
competition between the forces of freedom, generally speaking,
and the forces of dictatorship; the forces of socialist
economies, and free economies; friends of the United States,
and enemies of the United States. So, at this moment, where
would you say the momentum is? Who's winning? How are we--and,
in a more direct sense, how are we doing in the area of your
responsibility?
General Fraser. Senator, I think, overall, we are doing
well. We continue to have positive relations with most of the
Nations within the region, especially from military-to-military
standpoint; we see that very directly. There's only a couple of
instances where that has really been reduced. Our relations
with the military in Venezuela is one of those; also, with the
military in Bolivia, is another. But, overall, those relations
remain good.
I see a real competition, as you mentioned, within the
region, for various ideologies, and they're coming from various
different directions. That competition continues today.
Really, I see the view of the United States growing.
There's a 71-percent approval rating of the U.S. image within
the general populace within Latin America. So, I see a positive
trend from our relations within the region growing.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that. That 71-percent
appreciation of the United States in Latin America may be
higher than the appreciation of the United States in America
today. I hope we can catch up with them.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me echo the comments everyone's made
about your great service, and how much I appreciate both of
you, your great wives, and all that stuff.
General Fraser, let me tell you what I'm not going to ask
you. I'm not going to ask you if we ought to close Gantanamo
Bay (GTMO). But, I do want to get something in the record here,
of my personal feelings. I've had a chance to really get into
it. I've studied it. There's never been a case of water-
boarding, and the conditions, the treatment of the people, are
good down there. It's a secure location. There are
approximately 200 terrorists left. The low-hanging fruit is
gone. Of that low-hanging fruit, about 20 percent have the--
have been back in the fight, according to reports that I have.
Once the terrorists are physically in the United States, there
should be no doubt to anyone in this room that these terrorists
will gain additional constitutional rights and fall within the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts.
The attacks leading up to September 11 were not the result
of holding detainees in GTMO. The attacks of September 11 were
not the result of holding detainees. The repeated attempts to
attack this country were not a result of holding detainees.
Moving detainees held in GTMO to the United States would
not stop future terrorist attacks to this country. Those guys
hate us. They want to kill everyone in this room.
The Americans across the country, they understand this. The
polling is showing that 2-to-1 say that it shouldn't be closed.
All these people who are coming up with these great ideas on
what we can do to bring the terrorists to the United States for
either incarceration or for trial go to all elaborate detail as
to how we can do this, what it's going to cost, how we're going
to build the courts. There's a simpler answer, just leave it
open.
Now, again, I'm not going to ask you that question. But, I
would ask you this. You have had opportunity to go there,
General Fraser. Just very briefly, in terms of your impression
of the operations and of the treatment of detainees, do you
have any comment to make?
General Fraser. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Our responsibility in SOUTHCOM is for the safe, legal,
transparent, and humane treatment of the detainees at the
facility in GTMO.
Senator Inhofe. Are they being treated that way?
General Fraser. Yes, sir, they are very much being treated
that way. I'm very proud of the men and women from the military
who come and provide that----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, you don't need to elaborate. There's
a Sergeant Major Carter from Fort Sill who had been stationed
there several times. Her comment to me--she's in charge of the
prison system we have at Fort Sill, and she said, ``I don't
know what's wrong with those people in Washington. Go back and
tell them, that is a jewel that's been run properly.'' She's
the one who has actually been there. I don't want to belabor
that, because that's a decision that was made by your Commander
in Chief, and I don't want to put you in an awkward position.
But, following up on something that has been said by
Senator Lieberman, General Renuart, I--you and I talked about
this in my office. It is true that I was very strongly in
support of the third site in Poland. That's a site that would
have given us the capability of knocking something down. At the
time, by 2012--with slippage, maybe 2015--ironically, that's
when we think that the Iranians are going to have the
capability of sending something over. Now, I know, in response
to the Chairman's question, that we have a lot of ground-based
stuff out there. It's in California and Alaska. I'm not
comfortable, when I look at these maps. So, I won't ask you how
you would stand on going back to that position with the--with
Poland and the Czech Republic, but I would say that, since
we're looking at the SM-3 2B, out there someplace, to be
determined--we don't have a date on that yet; we do have a date
on the SM-3 2A, but that's for short and medium range--of 2018.
I still believe that we should reconsider that. I would only
ask you this question. Are you at all concerned that we're
going to have the--well, it would have to be the 3M--SM-3 2B
capability soon enough?
General Renuart. Senator, the intelligence estimates on
when the Iranians will field a real capability obviously have
moved around a bunch. So, we want to make sure that we are
providing sufficient capability to defend our own country. I
believe, with the current Alaska-based and Vandenberg-based
systems, we can meet that need. If we see proliferation of
capabilities from Iran, we certainly need to consider expanding
that capability.
Senator Inhofe. All right, that's good enough. Now, since
you're going to be bailing out of this--and we have talked
about that. I certainly wish you luck. It's been 39 years, is
that how long?
General Renuart. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Goodness. Well, that's great. It's been a
great service. I would ask you, just in the remainder of the
time that I have, now that you're going out and you can reflect
back, and General Fraser knows, how strongly I feel about our
partnership programs, our train-and-equip programs, my concern
that I had, that perhaps the--some of these programs were not--
like the 1207, the civilian-to-civilian, maybe should have been
left where it was. That's my own personal opinion.
But, in terms of one-size-fits-all, we're talking about the
train-and-equip programs, International Military Education
Training (IMET), the Combatant Commander's Intiative Fund
programs, the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), and all of that. What's your thought
about, between countries, the tailor-making of these things?
Any thoughts you'd like to leave with us on that subject?
General Renuart. Senator Inhofe----
Senator Inhofe. It's a good program. We all agree with
that, I think. But, can it be better if we could figure out a
way to tailor it better?
General Renuart. Yes, sir. This is key and essential to all
of our operations around the world. I spent 13 years in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I've spent 5\1/2\
years in southeast--southwest Asia as part of the CENTCOM AOR,
and, of course, in the Pacific, as well. In every case, those
combatant commanders would tell you that the 1206, 1207, 1208,
FMF, FMS, all of those building-partnership-capacity programs
are critical to allow us to do just what General Fraser said,
where Ken Keen and the Brazilian counterpart know each other
because they've worked together, they've been to school
together, we've created training relationships together. We
have to absolutely keep those programs intact, and support
them, and work through the department-to-department challenges
between, primarily, State and Defense, on making them easier to
take advantage of. They are critical to a combatant commander's
success.
Senator Inhofe. I've spent a disordinate amount of time in
some of the African nations, and I've left--not just there, but
in the Balkans, and everyplace else--with the idea that we made
a mistake, at one time, on our IMET program. We had a--we're
kind of treating it as if we're doing them a favor by allowing
them to come here to our country to train, and train with our
people. I became pretty convinced, after a period of time, that
we should have lifted, which we did, the article of response--
requirement that we had before allowing them to come in, that
it was really to our benefit more than it is to their benefit,
that once these people come in, they train--whether it's a--it
doesn't matter what facility it is, but train with our people,
get that quality training--an allegiance is formed that never
leaves. Do you think that's right?
General Renuart. Senator, very shortly, absolutely. I--my
youngest son spent 27 months in Senegal in the Peace Corps, and
he will tell you, firsthand, that the relationships of American
outreach to these countries are incredible.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, my time's expired, but, General
Fraser, do you generally agree with our conversation here, and
our opinions?
General Fraser. Yes, Senator, I completely agree.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very--thank you Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your dedication
to not only the American military but to the Nation. So, thank
you very much.
General Renuart, a disturbing phenomena seems to be the
increasing sophistication in armaments of the Mexican drug
cartels--assault weapons, antitank weapons, sophisticated
night-vision devices, sophisticated communication devices.
Where are all these coming from?
General Renuart. Senator, thanks. On the very first meeting
that I had in Mexico, their senior military leadership outlined
their concern over what they called ``U.S. trafficking of
weapons into Mexico.'' Clearly, there is no doubt that there
are weapons moving north to south into Mexico, and we partner
very closely with our law enforcement friends to help provide
information from the Mexican military, as they've collected the
forensics of these, so that we can, in fact, prosecute. There
have been over 40 prosecutions, over the last 2 years, of--I'll
call them ``weapons dealers.'' But, certainly we see an
involvement from here in this country with respect to illicit
weapons trade. We're also seeing that move from other nations
around the world, as well.
So, I think this is a hemispheric problem--both General
Fraser and I have talked about this--and something we need to
continue to work.
Senator Reed. But, do you think we're taking effective
steps? Again, what seems to be very ironic is that, in some of
these recorded incidents, the drug cartels outgun the military
and the police. That's unfortunate.
General Renuart. Yes, sir. In fact, we see 50-caliber
weapons, we see rocket-propelled grenades, we see a variety of
those things being used. That is increasingly of concern to the
Mexican military. It has resulted, by the way, in them being
much more forthcoming with serial numbers and that sort of
thing, so it allows our law enforcement to really take some
action.
Senator Reed. Do we have to do much more on our side of the
border to control?
General Renuart. Yes sir, I believe we do. I think our law
enforcement partners are very eager to do that. It's continuing
that information-sharing between the two nations that will
assist.
Senator Reed. On the other side--we're supplying both
sides, essentially, in this battle. Under the Department of
State's Merida Initiative, we provided the helicopters and
light attack aircraft, inflatable boats, et cetera. Can you
tell us if that's being used effectively?
General Renuart. Senator, I can, and it is. The Mexicans
were very appreciative that we accelerated that process to help
meet the Merida objectives. We delivered the first five of the
Bell helicopters this past December. We'll deliver two or three
more this year. Patrol aircraft, computer systems that will
allow them to fuse information to do border security, to
communicate better--all have been put in place--night-vision
goggles. The Mexicans are also reaching out to us for the
training associated with integrating these to be effective, and
we've made great progress in that regard. We need to continue
that effort. Merida shouldn't just be a 1- or 2-year event, but
it's a relationship over time.
Senator Reed. Is there a danger of some of the border
States of Mexico becoming ungoverned spaces that would invite
not just narco-gangs, but more sophisticated international
terrorists to set up shop?
General Renuart. Senator, I think there's--I would not
characterize ``ungoverned spaces,'' because I think there's--
Senator Reed. I don't want to--I don't want to suggest that
the Government of Mexico isn't competent, capable down to every
level, but it's just the turmoil there, I guess, which--
General Renuart. There is significant turmoil, and
certainly local governance is corrupted in some places, but
that's very much on the focus of President Calderon and his
senior--both attorney general, as well has his senior military
leaders. That's allowed him to push--or it's enabled him to
push forces out to try to help reduce that. We have a very good
relationship with the Mexican border-state commanders, as well.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Fraser, your comments on, sort of, the flow of
weapons and other items, not from the United States, but from
other areas in the hemisphere.
General Fraser. Senator, thank you.
We find that there is a flow. A lot of the flow is headed
towards Colombia right now, but it also is into Central
America. A lot of the weapons that are flowing originating--are
originating in Central America from weapons that were sold
there in the 1980s, but we also see a flow that's coming out of
the United States in that direction, also.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Just--let me switch back to General Renuart, to the
chemical, biological, radiological, high-yield explosive
(CBRNE) teams that you've put together, and the CMRF. Can you
give us an update of their deployment. There's two, I believe.
General Renuart. There are, sir. Just very quickly, we
actually exercised one of those forces this year from a
standing start; we mobilized them, deployed them, and put them
into action in a very realistic scenario in Indiana, earlier--
at the end of last year. Comments from the US&R Association,
the professionals in this business, were that it was as good as
any they've seen--the Fairfax unit, for example, that we've
talked about--any they've seen in the world. So, I'm very happy
with the quality and capability of these forces.
As I mentioned to Senator Lieberman, as we continue to grow
this concept that has come from the QDR, we want to maintain
that standard of capability for the people of this country, and
we'll work hard at that.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you a general question, General
Renuart, and that is the status of the equipment for National
Guard. Since they're a major partner in your efforts in
NORTHCOM, can you give just a general view of----
General Renuart. Yes. Very quickly--and what I'll do is, if
I may, provide some more data for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

For the Army National Guard, dual-use equipment (items identified
as critical to domestic missions) is currently at 83 percent.
Approximately, 65 percent of the dual-use equipment is available to the
Governors after accounting for items that are deployed in support of
Federal missions.

General Renuart. But, the National Guard, on the average
across the country now, is up from 40- or 50-percent equipage,
now, to 70, 70-plus. That's new equipment. The training quality
is up. We're especially pleased that the equipment related to
these homeland support missions is close to 100 percent in most
of the States.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Fraser, you have many roles, both air, sea, and
land, but, can you kind of brief us about SOUTHCOM's Naval
Force's Southern Commmand, the naval forces and
counternarcotics operations?
General Fraser. Senator, the DOD mission within
counternarcotics is to support the detection and monitoring of
the transit of illicit goods, if you will, primarily through
the maritime environments, the Caribbean and the Eastern
Pacific. So, working through JIATF-South, an interagency group,
we support the detection and monitoring in those areas. The
U.S. Navy ships do that, as well as U.S. Coast Guard ships, as
well as aircraft. Then, once those are detected, then hand them
off for intercept and detention to the law enforcement
organization.
Senator Reed. Just a quick followup. We all read recently
about the growing use of submersible vehicles and submarines to
move drugs around. Is that a continuing upward trend?
General Fraser. Actually, Senator, it's decreased. We saw
68 movements primarily in the Eastern Pacific in 2008. Last
year, we saw 46. So, we've seen a decline. Now, that's just a
1-year sample size.
Senator Reed. Right.
General Fraser. But, that's the most recent data, and
that's the first decline we've seen.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
General, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for your opening comments that discussed the
connections between Iran and Venezuela. I know Senator McCain
spoke about that, too.
General Fraser, you and I have had an opportunity to speak
a lot about that. So, that's a topic that I want to explore
today.
Start off by saying, thank you both for your service.
General Renuart thank you--39 years, that's incredible.
Thank you, to both of your spouses. We put our spouses through
a lot. So, I'm appreciative of them, as well.
In speaking about the growing projection of influence of
Iran in the region, I recently had an opportunity to visit
Colombia and to visit with our military folks there who are
assisting with the military leaders in Colombia in the fight
against the FARC. There is this concern. Senator McCain spoke
about the recent revelations of the judge in Spain, about the
assassination attempt on President Uribe. We know that the
drug-trafficking flights are flying over Venezuela to get to
Central America to bring those drugs into the United States. Do
you consider Venezuela to be the biggest stabilizing--
destabilizing factor in the region, in terms of our national
security interests?
General Fraser. Senator, I don't know if I would take it as
far as the ``biggest destabilizing factor.'' They are
continuing on a pursuit of reducing U.S. influence in the
region. They are working with various countries and entities to
try and enable that.
Senator LeMieux. Let me try it this way. Is there a country
in Latin America that is working against our interests as much
as Venezuela?
General Fraser. Senator, I would argue that, as we look at
Cuba, they're also in that same vein.
Senator LeMieux. We've seen some recent articles even
calling it ``Venecuba,'' that there are Cuban military
officials working within the Venezuelan Government. The concern
I have--and I think this touches on both of your focuses, with
you, General Renuart, having the focus on Mexico, as well--is
that we have this whole Central American region that runs--we
have Colombia, obviously, on the tip of South America, and then
it runs up through the region into Mexico. We have these drug
trafficking chains. Some have described it to me as, ``We
squeeze the balloon in one place, they find another way to
go.'' If we shut down the semisubmersibles, or we work against
that, they take more air flights. If we stop them at sea--
which, you just had a recent success, General--then they come
over land. I know our Ambassador in Panama is concerned about
the increased traffic through the isthmus there.
So what's your focus--and I assume that there's
coordination between the two of you--what's the focus, and
what's the plan, going forward, to combat this narco-drug
trafficking? Do you have any concerns that, with the projection
of influence of Iran in the region--the idea that we know that
Hezbollah and Hamas are--have set up shop in the region--that
there could be a combination between those groups and the
narcotraffickers?
General Fraser. Senator, if I could start with that. From a
destabilizing standpoint, the biggest concern I have in the
region is illicit trafficking. I think it's growing as a
regional issue throughout, and spreading to other parts of the
region. Brazil is now the second largest cocaine user in the
world. So, it is--the criminal elements of that is the illicit
trafficking that really is my biggest concern. What we are
looking to do is the--our national Intelligence Community is
taking an opportunity to look at illicit trafficking as a
regional enterprise, not just what's affecting individual
countries, so that we have the opportunity to understand that
enterprise, as an enterprise, to try and push on all sides of
the balloon, if you will, rather than just on one part of that
balloon, to see if we can start squeezing that balloon effect
down. So, that's really the efforts that were ongoing. That's
in direct correlation and coordination with NORTHCOM, JIATF-
South, JTF-North. Everybody is working this--in addition, with
law enforcement--to try to get a better understanding.
Senator LeMieux. General Renuart?
General Renuart. Senator, I'd first agree that--with
General Fraser's comment, that this is an enterprise. We have
to approach it as an enterprise. I'd add, that starts in our
own cities; 230 cities in our country have seen increases in
drug-related gang violence. We need to work that internally.
But, in addition, coordination from the supply through the
demand is critical if you're going to really make a difference.
Our two commands work very closely, and have partnered with
Mexico from the south and the north, for example, to try to
arrest some of that flow. The Mexicans have been increasingly
eager for that coordinated support from both of us.
So, I think there's a real opportunity, and we're going
to--we're both committed to continue working that. More
importantly, we have support from our friends in Customs and
Border and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the other
Federal agencies.
Senator LeMieux. Well, I appreciate that. I appreciate your
good work on that. I know, in traveling to Colombia, that now
the Colombian military's going to be training some folks from
Mexico on helicopter operations, so I think that's a good step.
I want to just--and I--General Fraser, you and I have
discussed this, in private--is that--I want you to stay
focused, if you will, on Iran's projection of influence in the
region, because I'm worried that those trafficking chains could
be used for other purposes. We had an Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee hearing yesterday, chaired by my
colleague Senator Nelson, and, to a person, everyone
acknowledged that Iran is the world's number one State sponsor
of terror. When I see Ahmadinejad traveling the world,
including spending several stops in Latin America, whether it's
Venezuela or even some of friendly nations down there, I'm
concerned about it. So, I want you--if you would, please keep a
focus on that.
General Fraser. Senator, we're focused on that.
Senator LeMieux. Right.
Let me ask you a question, General Fraser, about Colombia,
specifically. We've been trying to pass this Colombia Free
Trade Agreement. I think it's an agreement that has
implications beyond trade. I think it has implications to our
alliances and our friendship with Colombia. Do you see that, in
terms of our national security interests, as being a positive
step forward, if we could get that agreement ratified?
General Fraser. Senator, I think it would be a very
positive step forward. One of the things that supports security
within the region is the opportunity to have stable economies,
and vibrant economies. Colombia has that. I think a Free Trade
Agreement would enhance that capability and give an alternative
to the illicit traffickers.
Senator LeMieux. I would assume you would agree that a Free
Trade Agreement with Panama would also be productive.
General Fraser. Yes, Senator, I would.
Senator LeMieux. Right.
General Renuart, just to switch gears a little, you--in
your opening statement that I reviewed, you refer to Russian
Bear Tu-95 flights probing American and Canadian airspace. Can
you comment on the activities of the--those Russian airplanes?
I know they weren't--they were probing our airspace, maybe not
specifically in it. You sent up some fighters, I guess, in
response. Can you talk to that a little bit?
General Renuart. Senator, just very quickly, we've seen an
increase, in the last few years, of Russian--their words,
``long-range training flights'' approaching our sovereign
airspace. In our NORAD role, we have been conducting this
surveillance and response mission for over 52 years. We have
trained, well-equipped capabilities to monitor our airspace.
Really, we attempt to identify any aircraft that is not on a
flight plan, unidentified, not talking to people on the radio,
so that we understand their intentions. We continue to do that.
We've had a couple instances this year where the Russians have
flown close to our airspace in the Aleutian Chain. Nothing is
threatening us, their aviators act professionally. But, again,
we want to make sure that we don't allow any aircraft from any
source to enter our airspace without being identified.
Senator LeMieux. Do you have an assessment of their
intentions?
General Renuart. I think the Russians have neglected their
bomber force for many years. I think, because of financial
concerns, they are--the influx of energy money has allowed them
to refocus some of that, and we're seeing more of the training
that they used to conduct, not at the levels of the Cold War
days, but certainly enough to keep pilots proficient. That--I
think it characterizes the most--the bulk of what they're
doing.
Senator LeMieux. Okay. Thank you both.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Let me just quickly mention, since we've talked about
Chile, that there's a report that, right in the middle,
apparently, of President Pinera's inauguration ceremonies,
there was a magnitude-7.2 quake reported in Chile. So, it's not
as bad as the earlier one, obviously, but it's still a
significant-size earthquake.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually, I thought I wouldn't have time, and I snuck
around. I broke some rule, I'm sure. Doug, I gave your wife a
hug. I hope--behind your back, I want you to know that, in all
full disclosure. But, it's good to see you again, and Rena.
General Renuart, I have a couple questions first, and then
I'm going to have a couple for General Fraser.
But, first with the Arctic and some of the work that's now
going on, especially--on two fronts, one is the climate change
that's occurring, and the Arctic ice melting, and that you have
three commands, really, that kind of manage the Arctic. Is
there discussion, or is there an opinion you have in regards to
this, that--my personal view--and I leave it to the military to
figure this out--that we probably have to unify this in--at
some point, like we did--I think it was with--Africa Command
was a similar situation, two or three commands.
Is there discussions now about trying to figure this out,
as we move more and more into understanding what opportunities,
but also, really, challenges--and I think Senator LeMieux just
mentioned one of those, but that's in the Aleutian. Some would
think that's close to Alaska. It is, but it's hundreds of miles
from the north. But, are you now, as an organization, starting
to think about this, or can you give me some thoughts on that?
General Renuart. Senator Begich, you bet. I was a former
vice commander of Pacific Air Forces, in fact. Doug Fraser was
the commander of 11th Air Force, and he wore four hats.
Senator Begich. I know.
General Renuart. I always felt that it was important for
NORTHCOM and NORAD to try to help reduce the number of hats
that we asked him to wear.
We continue that effort. We will have some discussions this
year with the Chairman and the Service Chiefs in the unified
command plan discussion, to help streamline that process.
Certainly, there is concern that we provide for an active
defense capability for Alaska. During World War II, the
Aleutian Chain were invaded and held by the Japanese. That's
something we don't want to repeat. The missions of that
homeland defense falls in NORTHCOM. So, we want to partner with
Pacific Command and with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, to
try to better streamline that process. So, maybe we can take
one hat or two hats off, and get down to just a manageable
amount.
Senator Begich. Do you agree, as the Arctic continues its
process--as we know, problem in 30 years, is the estimate, that
all summer will be ice-free, that there's going to be a lot of
other activity, civilian and military, by other countries,
within that region, and thinking now about it is probably to
our advantage, rather than thinking 10 years or 15 years down
the line. Is that a fair statement?
General Renuart. Senator, absolutely. The Arctic--none of
us are expert enough to know how much open water, for how long.
But, certainly we're going to see more navigable water in the
Arctic. It's an area where we had not focused our attention--
national attention for quite a period of time. Before the last
administration left, they published a paper indicating strategy
for the Arctic. I think that's a great start. We need to
continue that effort and, I think, partner with the Arctic
Council nations on a common strategy for research and for
development, to settle disputes.
Then, finally--and I know the Senate will continue to
consider this--the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty is something that
is critical to give us a seat at the table to be involved in
these discussions.
Senator Begich. The Law of the Sea.
General Renuart. We very much support ratification of that
treaty as soon as we can.
Senator Begich. You have my next question, which was Law of
the Sea. I guess one question that comes up--and tell me, if
you can--very short answer--some are concerned that--by the
United States being a part of that--the Law of the Sea--that we
will give up some of our sovereignty. Do you believe that
statement?
General Renuart. No, sir, I don't. I think U.S. sovereignty
is something we hold and protect very dearly, and I don't
believe we would give that up.
Senator Begich. Very good. Let me ask you, if I can, on the
missile defense system in Alaska. Great debate last year,
``Should it be 40-plus, or should it be 30?'' The decision was,
through mutual discussions--and I think this committee did a
lot of work to get to the agreement of 30--and do you still
agree with that statement, that it should be 30 operational
GBIs there?
General Renuart. Yes, Senator, I think 30 is the right
number. I would point out that the additional missiles that
will be constructed are not restricted from being used, if we
were to need them.
Senator Begich. Correct.
General Renuart. I think that gives us some capacity----
Senator Begich. Right.
General Renuart.--to plus, if that would be required.
Senator Begich. Right, and I had wanted to comment on that.
I want to thank you for that, because I think one of the things
you have done, especially in the last 4 or 5 months, maybe 6
months, is create that flexibility that, depending on the
situation, you could plus-up and have a situation available, or
infrastructure available, to handle that, is part of the plan.
Is that a fair statement?
General Renuart. That's a fair statement. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. In that regard, one of the things that I
want to make sure--I know, in the 2010 budget, there's
probably, I--I want to say--this might be close number--$13-,
$14 million to continue to deal with Field 2 up there, to get
it completed. We know, through our work and through your
agencies--or agency of DOD, that it needs closer to about $100
million to finish out all the work that's necessary to keep
that flexibility as they close down Field 1, which is just--was
kind of a test site of six. How do you think you'll be able to
go about making sure those revenues, those resource are there
to continue to make sure the base infrastructure is available
to take care of the Field 1, which is in deplorable condition?
Give me your----
General Renuart. Senator----
Senator Begich.--those are my words. I know those aren't
the technical words, but--
General Renuart. If I could--let me provide you some more
detail for the record.
Senator Begich. Okay.
General Renuart. But, we work very closely with General
O'Reilly. I believe his view is that he has sufficient
flexibility to be able to ensure that we can keep Field 2 on
track, and--but let us get back to you with some more specifics
on that.
Senator Begich. That'd be great. I just want to echo that,
please, whatever he could do to keep that moving along, because
the mobilization of the equipment and the people are working.
When you demobe, it just is more costly, and this is a huge
opportunity. So, I--I know he has a lot of flexibility, because
the way we wrote that last year was to give him the
flexibility, as he saw fit. So, if you could get us that that'd
be great, and I'd encourage him to move forward.
General Renuart. Yes, sir, will do.
[The information referred to follows:]

The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requested the funding
needed to continue the operations, sustainment, and maintenance of
Missile Field 1 and to complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo
configuration. The request reflects funds required in addition to
fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work on Missile
Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend
work on Missile Field 2. On February 17 2010, the Missile Defense
Agency submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's
Comptroller for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds and $16
million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the Ballistic Missile
Defense System Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation
of Missile Field 2.

Senator Begich. Last question then. Doug--I don't want to
leave you out--General Fraser. But, one--as more and more
alternative renewable energy is being debated in Alaska, one of
the big issues is wind turbines. General Renuart, this is the
last question for you. Are you dealing with that and
understanding--and I know it's a very small--but, I know we're
starting to hear some concerns that it may interfere with the
mission and airspace. Are you working with the civilian
population to make sure we manage this correctly? Are there
things we need to be looking out for as we deal, for example,
with an energy bill and making sure that the military is not
forgotten in this equation?
General Renuart. Senator, that's a great question. Very
quickly, there is a challenge, as we develop, particularly,
wind farms, but we also see with new building construction,
where those--that development has--interferes with the send/
receive capability of our ground-based radars. I sent a letter
to Secretary Gates asking for a formal body to be formed,
allowing us to review these, so that a developer has a place to
come to ask these questions.
Senator Begich. Oh, great.
General Renuart. Secretary's committed--Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul Stockton--to lead that
effort for that Department. We're partnering with the Federal
Aviation Administration and others. But, we are--we need to
continue to make this process mature. We've had questions from
Senator Webb and others on similar issues, and we know that's a
real concern, and we're committed to work that aggressively.
Senator Begich. Great. Please keep us informed on that.
That'd be--that's great to hear that.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. General Fraser, I feel like I have to ask
you a question, because I don't want to leave you there. You
are a great addition to our Alaska team up there, and I know
you're doing a great job in SOUTHCOM. We've had some great
discussion in regards to that.
One of the things I want to just ask--you and I have had a
conversation about a special unit within your organization that
deals with, kind of, the humanitarian component and the work
you do. Do you--and we talked briefly about--about how it's
appropriate for your command, it may not be as appropriate for
other commands--but, have you found that component, that unit,
of high value for your command, in assisting you with some of
the unique situations you have in Central America in the
SOUTHCOM section? Maybe you could just expand a little bit on
that.
General Fraser. Yes, Senator----
Senator Begich. I found it very intriguing that you had
this underneath your----
General Fraser. You're talking human rights or----
Senator Begich. Yes.
General Fraser. Yes. We have a human rights office that
was--has been in existence for quite a number of years now, has
a human rights initiative in which 34 countries from around the
region have all signed up to. A very active program. Has made
and helped enable a lot of significant progress throughout the
region. Colombia has come up fairly dramatically in their
efforts and their focus on this. Guatemala has the same.
They're very much connected within this. So, it's a very
vibrant office, and is out actively pursuing and enabling and
enriching human rights discussions throughout the region.
Senator Begich. It's unique to SOUTHCOM, is that correct?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant command that
has one of these, and it's a resource that's available to any
of the combatant commanders.
Senator Begich. Very good. I, again, want to thank you for
our conversation, especially during the earthquake, and the
work you have done there, and your troops have done, and all
the affiliated services that, kind of, came to the call
immediately. As--I had heard great descriptions of your
capacity to stay up many long nights, and sleep on whatever's
available, in order to continue to keep the command working. I
just wanted to thank you and the troops for doing such a good
job under a very unique situation, and how fast you mobilized.
General Fraser. Senator, it's a great team effort. Thank
you.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Good to see you both. General, thank you very much.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Let me just announce that, when we begin the second
hearing, we will follow the same order of recognition that
we've been following for the first hearing. We're not going to
start a new or changed order, in terms of recognition of
Senators, so that everybody can know where they stand.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
General, let me thank you for your 39 years of
extraordinary service. I assume that, now that you're retiring,
you will be able to get to Maine's Franco-American Festivals,
that we've talked about before, to celebrate your heritage. I
look forward to being your personal guide in any of those
festivals.
I want to bring up an issue that is an increasing problem
in my State, and that is the problem of drug trafficking across
the northern border. There's been a great deal of focus, and
indeed discussion this morning, about the problem with the
Mexican drug cartels. Fortunately, the violence level at the
northern border isn't anything close to what we're seeing at
the southern border, but that doesn't mean that drug
trafficking is not a problem. Indeed, it's such a problem that,
last December, Maine's Federal judges met with me to express
their alarm about the enormous increase in drug trafficking,
particularly of methamphetamine, across the Canadian border.
They told me that Canada is now one of the world's top
producers of meth, and that this dangerous drug is increasingly
being smuggled across the border in Maine.
I understand that the violence associated with the Mexican
drug cartels demands that the majority of the resources be
focused on that. But, I'm concerned about whether there is a
sufficient focus on the smuggling of meth and other dangerous
drugs into the State of Maine.
Could you give me more information on what you're doing to
counter what you call, in your testimony, ``a serious
transnational threat to our country''?
General Renuart. Senator, first, I look forward to having
you host me at a great event in Maine in the coming days. That
would be wonderful.
I think you hit on a very important element. We do tend to
focus on drug trafficking south to north, and if--as I talk to
my Canadian counterparts, both in the military and in the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), they also indicate an alarming
increase in drug activity, drug-related violence, in Canada. We
have our JTF-North, who is focused on DOD support along the
borders, both north and south, as well as in the maritime. This
year, we actually are increasing the number of small but
effective operations that we will conduct along the northern
border, in partnership with both our Federal law enforcement--
DEA and others--and our RCMP friends.
Let me get that data with more specifics, and I'll take
that question, if I may, for the record and get that back to
you specifically as it looks to Maine.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Collins. Thank you. I also noted that, in your
testimony, you indicated that you had taken steps to identify
threats similar to the threat posed by Major Hasan at Fort
Hood. Have you specifically directed your personnel to do more
training on the signs of violent radicalization, particularly
Islamist radicalization within the ranks?
General Renuart. Senator, Secretary Gates directed a fairly
detailed study of the Hasan case. Out of that, there are a
number of recommendations. They're primarily pushed to the
Services, because they have the responsibility for organize,
train, and equip.
Our role is to ensure that, if you will, facilities are
then provided the right kinds of information so that their
local officials can focus on--focus their attention on specific
events. To that degree, we have worked very closely with our
friends in the law--in the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) on information-sharing of a nature that would be
important to our military facilities. We've increased that kind
of activity over the last, really, couple years and certainly
accelerated some of the programs after the Hasan case.
So, I--our role is to look at how these Services all view
these. We're comfortable that the recommendations out of the
Secretary's investigation committee make a lot of sense, and
we're continuing to support those.
Senator Collins. General Fraser, do you have anything to
add on that issue?
General Fraser. No, ma'am. We're very much in the same
position as General Renuart. So, it's really focused--the only
other piece I would put in--those people who are assigned to
our organizations, especially the headquarters, then we do have
a specific focus on supporting their needs.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Finally, I want to associate myself with the comments that
Senator Lieberman made about the change and the new teams that
are going to take the place of two of the three CBRNE CMRFs.
I'm very concerned about whether adequate resources are going
to be invested so that we can respond effectively to a weapon
of mass destruction. My specific question is how the new
Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) would coordinate, plan, train,
and exercise with the regional FEMA offices. I worked very hard
to create a regional FEMA response team that would be across
agency lines in response to the failed response to Hurricane
Katrina. So, that kind of coordination is very important if
we're going in a different direction.
General Renuart. Senator, again, just very quickly, we have
been asked to create the concept of operations that ensures
just that kind of coordination is done. I think there will be a
resourcing element of that, that we have to focus on very
clearly, because these HRFs are hosted by--under the command of
a Governor. So on a day-to-day basis, we have to ensure that,
across the enterprise of consequence management, all of those
are talking. By the way, they are also connected to the Federal
agencies, like FEMA. So, this is a bit of work in progress. We
owe the Secretary back a concept brief at the end of this
month, and I think we'll have identified some of those very
issues that you mentioned.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Generals.
General Renuart, thank you for taking the time to visit
with me yesterday. As I thought more about your plans to retire
in Colorado, I was struck by the old adage that a--at least for
us elected officials, a statesman is a dead politician. We--
some wag said, ``We need more statesmen,'' but I'll leave that
for another conversation. I don't know your long-term plans
are, I don't know what the equivalent in the military is, but
we're looking forward to the benefit of your advice and your
senior retired status. Although you don't look senior to me;
you're fit. I know we welcome you as a permanent resident in
Colorado.
General Renuart. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Udall. I'm going to lean on you for further
insights and advice.
Would you talk about the National Guard commission
recommendations, and specifically how you've increased
guardsmen at the headquarters, and how they've been
incorporated? I think you and I have talked about what a great
opportunity this is to further enhance the role of the Guard,
to better understand how we utilize and deploy the Guard. I
want to tip my hat to you, in the Northern Command, for what
you've done in that regard, but please elaborate.
General Renuart. Senator, we've--we have 50 full-time
National Guard positions in our headquarters; 45 of those are
filled. We've grown that number over time. That's very
effective. But, across my headquarters, a substantial
percentage of the military--Active military have served in a
position where they've been associated with either the Reserves
or the Guard. A substantial percentage of my civilians have--
are former members of the National Guard or the Reserve. So, we
have a very good flavor and footprint in that regard.
In fact, the State of Colorado has been particularly
supportive, as we have 25 Colorado guardsmen who are a part of
that full-time support. I just hired a new military assistant
for NORAD, and he will come from the Colorado Air National
Guard. So, we've built a close relationship, and I'm very
pleased with that.
I think we need to continue to look for opportunities to
bring our Reserve component in as active participants in our
headquarters. We have over 130 positions that could be filled,
and we're working closely with both the Reserves of our
Services, as well as National Guard Bureau, to try to keep
those all as full as is possible.
So, we're very proud of our relationship. I think we've
built a closer relationship with the National Guard Bureau
itself than we've ever had before.
Senator Udall. Kudos to you. I think you and I share a
philosophy, and I think General Fraser does, as well, that the
Reserves and the Guard in this era of the All-Volunteer Force,
and as powerful and as sophisticated as it is, there's a
tendency for it to become isolated from society. The Reserves
and the Guard provide that pipeline, if you will, and that
connection between civilians and those who serve us so ably in
the military.
Let me turn to educational opportunities. General Fraser, I
want to ask you to comment, as well. I know General Renuart's
really been interested in this, particularly in the area of
homeland security. Do you think the Joint Command educational
opportunities should be expanded, maybe to include Ph.D.
programs? In your experience, are those advanced degrees truly
effective at bringing back a level of expertise to the force?
If so, could they be enhanced? Maybe, General Renuart, start
with you, and then----
General Renuart. Senator, I think----
Senator Udall.--General Fraser, if you'd like to----
General Renuart.--the--in our traditional paradigm, the
Services, each of them, direct the education programs for their
individual people. As we've seen the growth of joint commands,
I think that there is an opportunity for joint combatant
commands to focus educational opportunities on skill sets that
are unique to them. In our case, with homeland defense,
homeland security, civil support, many of those skills don't
traditionally reside in our service-focused education programs.
So I think there is an opportunity for us to relook this
paradigm and look for opportunities to allow combatant
commanders to target, a small number potentially, but a number
of unique education programs that will then benefit their
commands. Then, I think we have to work the personnel system to
allow us to take advantage of that. We do that, currently, with
Chairman Mullen's initiative on the AfPakans, where we're
developing, if you will, area experts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Senator Udall. General Fraser, do you care to comment?
General Fraser. Yes, Senator, thank you.
I agree with General Renuart, and I would probably add on
another part to that, especially as we've just--working through
our experience in Haiti--and that is to also include an
interagency part to that. Because it's not only the joint
piece, but it is understanding the other parts of our
interagency, our counterparts there, that will have great
benefit as we apply a whole-of-government approach in many of
the situations that we face in the future.
Senator Udall. Yes, that's helpful. General Renuart and I
talked yesterday about DHS and the Mexican border situation and
what's unfolding there.
Final question, General Renuart--and I think, in a sense,
this is--strikes right at your legacy. Talk just a little about
the relationship between the two commands that you oversee,
NORAD and NORTHCOM. Why is it important to have a common
commander and staff, in the future?
General Renuart. Well, I think, when the two commands were
formed, there was clearly an opportunity there to create a
transparent--or a transition from warning of threats, that
NORAD has traditionally provided, to the real operational
defense of the homeland, whether its missile or maritime
homeland defense, into consequence management of a natural
disaster or manmade event. Over the years, the relationships
between those two commands have become truly interdependent.
Today, you can't separate the functions of warning from the
functions of defense actions from the functions of consequence
management. The structure that it takes to operate in that
spectrum is consistently tied at every level. While there is
certainly a difference between the binational command, NORAD,
and our--the operations there, and the U.S. national
authorities for NORTHCOM, the opportunity to keep them
connected, almost at every level, provides great synergy for
the Nation.
In terms of the commander, I believe that it would be
difficult not to have the same person in command of both of
those headquarters because it--because of that synergy. I think
we've seen, in the last 3 years, a real move to operationalize
that. I think the results speak for themselves. We are
increasingly effective in that regard, and very proud of that.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that--insights. Again, thank
you for your service.
Thank you, to both of you, for taking care of our
hemisphere--the American Hemisphere and all the opportunities
we have here, and in maintaining our leadership role.
Finally, a shout out to the Canadians, who've been such
great partners of ours, and we're so fortunate to have them on
our northern border, and to share a common culture and values
and outlook. General, you've maintained, enhanced, and nurtured
that relationship. I know they're--I've talked to some of the
Canadian general officers, and they are sorry to see you go,
because you've had such a great relationship with them.
General Renuart. Well, it's in my family blood, so I have
to. Thank you.
Senator Udall. That's right. That's right. Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to both of you for your great leadership, your
service to our country.
General Renuart, as you wind down these 37 years--I know
it's been a long time since your commissioning in 1972, but
what great leadership, what great selfless service you have
provided to our country. You're certainly a model to that next
generation of leaders in every branch of our Service. So,
thanks for your commitment. Thanks for your service.
Personally, thanks for your friendship over the years. You've
been a great asset to me as we've traversed through any number
of issues. So, we appreciate you very much.
We're not going to let you retire yet, General Fraser.
We're going to keep you around a while, so----[Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, in highlighting the
importance of partnering in partnership with nations in
SOUTHCOM area of operations, currently one of the best ways
that we have to build and sustain those partnerships is through
WHINSEC. I was pleased to see both of you comment on that in
your opening statements, as well as your written statement.
Senator Levin and I are pleased to serve on the board for
WHINSEC, and I've seen, firsthand, the value of the training
that WHINSEC conducts and the partnerships with our southern
allies that it helps to create. What are your thoughts
regarding WHINSEC? How does it help you carry out your mission?
What does it provide to nations that choose to send personnel
to WHINSEC?
General Fraser. Senator, thank you for that question. It's
a very important institution for us. It provides a lot of
capability-building. It has a real focus on democratic values,
on human rights instruction. In fact, 10 percent of the course
load is specifically focused on human rights. But, as you
mentioned, it's really that partnership-building. It's not only
partnership-building with members of the U.S. military, but
it's across all the militaries who attend those courses.
So, much like we've experienced in Haiti, where I've had at
least a couple of instances where the U.S. officers had gone to
school and--with, one case, a Canadian counterpart, in another
case, a Brazilian counterpart, and they understood one another
right away, and it really facilitated the operations in the
future. So, no matter where we go, in a partnership-building
capacity throughout the region, or specifically in working
each--in working together on crises, it makes a huge difference
for us.
Senator Chambliss. The current Defense authorization bill
contains a provision requiring public disclosure of names and--
of students and instructors who attend WHINSEC, as well as
their countries of origin. In your opinion, what effect will
this provision have on foreign countries' willingness to send
students, as well as instructors, to WHINSEC? What effect will
it have on WHINSEC's ability to help SOUTHCOM carry out its
mission?
General Fraser. Senator, I'm concerned that it will have a
negative impact on it, that we have gone out and at least
looked, and discussed with some of our partners there; they
would be concerned if those names were released. I'm concerned,
even for the U.S. military personnel and their families who
support WHINSEC, with the release of that. So, I personally do
not support the release of names.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
General Renuart, as you complete your third year as the
commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, as we look forward, what do
you think are the biggest challenges out there for these
respective commands?
General Renuart. Senator, I think, as we see in many of the
Services, recapitalization of our infrastructure is important
to us. The age of our Air Sovereignty Fighter Force obviously
is growing, and we want to continue to monitor very closely the
development, the fielding of new systems that can allow us to
maintain the air sovereignty of our two nations. The radar
sites also are aging, and we have initiatives in place. So
continuing to support the modernization of those are the things
that I think are very important for the NORAD role.
For NORTHCOM, I think continuing to work more closely with
our border security partners, our interagency partners,
continue to work closely with Mexico, especially in this area
of countering illicit trade and traffic, I think are some of
the future challenges. As Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman
mentioned, making sure that the CMRF is well-organized,
trained, and equipped, and executable for the Nation. Because
we don't know when one of those events will occur, we have to
be ready at any moment.
Senator Chambliss. In November 2007, over 450 F-15s were
grounded due to structural concerns, a number of them under
your command. As a result of that, in NORTHCOM we had to call
on the Canadians, who flew CF-18s, to fill in for F-15s for a
period of about 3 weeks. As our F-15 platforms continue to
age--and they're a part of that aging fleet that you alluded
to--and they make their way towards retirement, are you
concerned about available assets and the level of acceptable
risk in the conduct of your air sovereign mission?
General Renuart. Senator, I'm very concerned that we
maintain an acceptable force level so that we can keep that
mission intact. The Air Force is conducting a--if you will, a
fighter force review that will target, not only the assignment
of its aircraft in places, but where we invest money, from the
Air Force's perspective, in maintaining that fighter force, as
new systems come aboard. I think you're going to have a hearing
about one of those in just a few minutes. I do monitor that
very carefully. I've said, often publicly, on the record, that
the baseline force that we have has to be maintained. I'm very
comfortable, so far, that DOD--and certainly Department of the
Air Force--are committed to maintaining that. But, it's
something we monitor as you see adjustments in delivery rates
or in aging rates of each of our systems.
Senator Chambliss. Well, you're right, we're going to be
talking about the F-35 here a little later on this morning. You
and I have had opportunity to visit, relative to the
performance of the F-22. I'd like for you to comment on that,
as you have seen it firsthand. Second, what effect or impact
will a slippage in the initial operational capability on the F-
35 have on NORTHCOM?
General Renuart. Senator, first, on the F-22, it has proven
itself to be an excellent weapon system. We've used it in our
air defense missions in Alaska and have found it to be a very
capable system. I think the Department is committed to continue
its spiral development into the modern versions of the airplane
that were planned. So, I'm very comfortable that it give us a
capability that's much needed in our Air Force.
With respect to the F-35 timing, again, if we see that
program delay, then it's--of--it will be of interest to me to
ensure that we maintain the quality and capability of our
existing F-16, F-15 fleet--again, to maintain that air defense.
For right now, I am not--I don't feel there's an unacceptable
level of risk, because I think the two match pretty well. But,
obviously if something changes, we'll monitor that very
carefully.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
We're ready to proceed, I believe, now, to our second
hearing.
Senator Collins, if you don't have an additional question.
We thank you both. We are, again, very appreciative of the
service that you have always provided this Nation; your
families' great support, we thank them for that.
Again, General Renuart, all the best to you on your
upcoming retirement.
General Renuart. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We're going to take a 3-minute recess.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
haiti reconstruction relief
1. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, it is my understanding that
the USNS Comfort has departed Haiti and we are in the process of
drawing down our forces to approximately 8,000 over the next couple of
days. What will be the biggest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces in
Haiti and turn over responsibilities to the United Nations (U.N.)
Peacekeeping Force?
General Fraser. Our greatest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces
in Haiti is to ensure, together with our U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), U.N., and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
partners, sufficient engineering improvement in Internally Displaced
Person (IDP) camps to weather the upcoming rainy season. We also may
need to assist in the movement of as many as 9,000 at-risk people prior
to the rainy season in order to prevent potential loss of life due to
flash flooding and mud slides. For this reason, our drawdown will be
somewhat slower than originally contemplated and we intend to maintain
some capacity in Haiti through the hurricane season.

2. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, what are your greatest
security concerns in Haiti post-earthquake i.e. drug trafficking,
gangs, general instability?
General Fraser. First let me say that the security situation in
Haiti remains stable; however, challenges persist.
The most immediate security issue is the overcrowded camps due to
the thousands of internally displaced Haitians living there, and in
many cases, lacking adequate sanitation and internal camp security.
Anecdotal reporting indicates crime within these camps, most prevalent
after dark, ranges from petty theft to rape. I would note that the
U.S., Government of Haiti, and the international community are taking
steps to improve camp security, including additional police patrolling
and physical improvement such as lighting.
Finally, I would like to say the Haitian populace has demonstrated
a remarkable level of patience since the January 12th earthquake. While
it is possible that general instability could result from the rainy
season or hurricane season, we believe this is unlikely.

3. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, a recent New York Times
article on Haiti reports that, ``according to a U.N. map of greater
Port-au-Prince circulating among recovery teams, 21 out of the 500
makeshift settlements are considered high risk for flooding,
landslides, or overcrowding. Seven--home to 150,000 to 200,000 people--
are deemed life-threatening.'' With the rainy season officially
beginning on April 15, what are we doing to help internally displaced
Haitians in and around Port-au-Prince with shelter and sanitation?
General Fraser. Shelter and sanitation continue to be the top
priorities for the Government of Haiti. Operation Unified Response
personnel qualified in building damage assessment recently trained
Haitian responders in damage assessment, enabling them to continue
assessments of buildings and homes across Port au Prince with an eye
towards urging Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) to return to those
homes deemed structurally safe. The distribution of shelter material
continues to be a high percentage of total relief supplies
distribution.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is working
closely with the Haitian Government, U.N., and NGO partners, and camp
populations to establish a real-time sanitation monitoring system. The
system will track the sanitary situation in displacement sites and
detect immediate and structural challenges. Over the coming weeks,
IOM's environmental health and sanitation unit will train residents in
several camps to report on crucial health issues such as water,
sanitation and hygiene issues. The teams will also focus on fighting
mosquitoes in order to prevent malaria and dengue fever, as well as
environmental hazards, especially flood and mud-slide risks.
Over the last several weeks, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
others have undertaken engineering projects at the most vulnerable
camps to reduce the risk of flooding. At this point we believe that
perhaps 9,000 IDP residents will need to be moved to safer sites.

4. Senator Bill Nelson. General Fraser, are you satisfied that our
civilian agencies will pick up the slack on the humanitarian
operations--including the security of food distribution--when the U.S.
military departs?
General Fraser. Yes, I am satisfied that the Government of Haiti
assisted by the U.N., USAID, and NGOs can and will successfully conduct
the full range of needed humanitarian assistance as U.S. military
forces continue to depart. I would stress that we have always linked
any reduction of DOD forces to the clear capacity on the ground of
other organizations to assume our activities.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
defense support to civil authorities
5. Senator Burris. General Renuart, I understand that you provide
command and control for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) as
part of your mission to conduct civil support operations. How do you
integrate the forces of the National Guard and the Reserves of all
Services into DSCA operations?
General Renuart. National Guard forces will normally respond to a
catastrophic event in State Active Duty or Title 32 Status, under the
command of a Governor. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) coordinates
with the National Guard to synchronize and integrate Federal and State
military operations to avoid duplication and achieve unity of effort.
NORTHCOM integrates Title 10 Reserve units and individuals into
DSCA operations when they are mobilized or activated. For example, the
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program consists of more
than 400 Reserve officers who belong to the Services (Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps) and have volunteered to support DSCA
operations. As reservists, EPLOs possess unique knowledge about their
regions and States, including: capabilities, key infrastructure,
transportation systems, and local geography. NORTHCOM will normally
request EPLO activation before, during, or after an incident or event
to assist the Defense Coordinating Officer and our components in
coordinating DOD's response. Additionally, NORTHCOM sponsors an annual
workshop to train and educate EPLOs on DOD and NORTHCOM policies,
plans, and procedures.

6. Senator Burris. General Renuart, are there any restrictions?
General Renuart. Yes, in accordance with Title 10, Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Federal reservists are only available for civil
emergencies while in voluntary inactive duty for training status. To
eliminate this restriction, we support a statutory change to allow the
Secretary of Defense to order Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
reservists to active duty to provide assistance in large-scale,
manmade, natural, and accidental disasters or catastrophes when the
response capabilities of Federal, State, and local civilian agencies
have been, or will be, exceeded. This authority will enable the nearest
unit, which is often Reserve, to respond--saving time, money, and
American lives.

7. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what specific roles does the
Coast Guard play in DSCA?
General Renuart. DSCA is conducted by the Department of Defense
(DOD). Though a military service, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is a part
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and therefore does not
conduct DSCA. However, NORTHCOM and the USCG are mission partners in
responding to domestic contingency operations. Additionally, the USCG,
due to its statutory responsibilities, is engaged daily in civil
support well before DOD assistance is requested.
NORTHCOM and the USCG coordinate routinely to ensure unity of
effort in the area of civil support operations. Regular missions
performed by the Coast Guard include maritime Search and Rescue, Port
Waterways and Coastal Security, and waterways management, including
prevention and response to natural and man-made disasters in the U.S.
marine transportation system.
There are 20 full-time USCG positions, including one flag officer
(Deputy Director of Operations), within the NORTHCOM headquarters.

8. Senator Burris. General Renuart, how many personnel from other
government agencies are permanently assigned to your command?
General Renuart. Thirty-one people from non-DOD government agencies
are permanently assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) and NORTHCOM. In addition, there are 20 agency representatives,
who reside with their parent agency, but are permanently assigned as
the primary liaison between NORAD and NORTHCOM and their agency.

9. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what are the advantages of
having these agencies assigned versus detailed to your command?
General Renuart. Having agency representatives permanently assigned
to NORTHCOM allows for a truly ``collaborative'' environment in which
agencies jointly develop and execute integrated plans and operations,
and processes which fuse our cultures together in a common purpose.
Permanently assigned agency representatives throughout NORAD and
NORTHCOM provide interagency synchronization. They assist and
facilitate coordination of interagency issues, initiatives and
operations between the NORAD and NORTHCOM Battle Staff, components,
deployed assets and external agencies. Resident agency representatives
also facilitate interagency information sharing.
Interorganizational representatives are the primary enablers in
coordinating additional or refined connectivity as required with key
external partners to ensure NORTHCOM is connected correctly to support
day-to-day exercise and contingency operations. These representatives
are essential for providing interagency context to our decisionmaking
process, providing the interagency perspective to the NORTHCOM staff
and providing the DOD perspective back to their parent organizations.
This level of action and insight is only realized when an agency is
fully integrated into the Command.

10. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what role does Joint Task
Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) play in DSCA?
General Renuart. JTF-CS plans and integrates DOD support to the
designated primary agency for domestic chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence
management operations. When approved by the Secretary of Defense and
directed by the Commander of NORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys to the incident
site and executes timely and effective command and control of
designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save
lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support.
JTF-CS focuses on responding to the effects of a CBRNE incident
after civilian resources have been utilized first and fully. Some
typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site support, casualty medical
assistance and treatment, displaced populace support, mortuary affairs
support, logistics support, and air operations.
JTF-CS accomplishes its consequence management mission in strict
adherence to existing Federal law, which carefully balances the support
capabilities within the U.S. military with the needs of civil
authorities during emergencies. In most instances, JTF-CS and its
designated forces are deployed only after a State or territorial
Governor requests Federal assistance from the president. In any
domestic setting, JTF-CS remains in support of the primary agency
throughout the CBRNE consequence management operation.
JTF-CS can also conduct non-CBRNE DSCA missions at the direction of
NORTHCOM. However, due to the unique capabilities that JTF-CS affords
the national-level CBRNE response, considerations will be made at all
levels to select alternative capabilities to meet non-CBRNE mission
requirements.

11. Senator Burris. General Renuart, is there a plan to give the
civil support teams the ability to provide mission support and advice
to the combatant commanders, in addition to their role to support the
governors?
General Renuart. There is no plan to have Weapons of Mass
Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) provide direct mission
support to combatant commanders. However, WMD-CST situation reports do
currently flow from the States to NORTHCOM through the National Guard
Bureau.

laboratory personnel demonstration programs
12. Senator Burris. General Renuart, the command has permanently
assigned members of the National Guard and the Reserves. Do you feel
the mix of Active and full-time Reserve component personnel is
sufficient to carry out the mission of the command?
General Renuart. There are over 50 full-time Reserve component
authorizations in NORTHCOM headquarters; however, only 45 of those
positions are filled. More work is needed to fund and fill these
important positions. Our mix of Active Duty and Reserve component is
about right, if we can get the current positions filled. We have a
Reserve component presence in every staff directorate in my
headquarters working alongside their Active Duty brethren with the
heaviest concentration in the Operations Directorate. I'm confident the
Reserve component is represented in everything we do in the
headquarters. I would submit that any change would be driven by funding
and availability. I need either Active Duty manpower to fill valid
positions or the Reserve Component funding to compensate for active
duty shortages. The mission will not suffer depending on the type of
manpower, but a lack of manpower could increase risk. The National
Guard has made a significant investment in personnel assigned to
NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10
National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the National
Guard Bureau.

13. Senator Burris. General Renuart, how do you interface with the
DHS and are you in support of their efforts?
General Renuart. NORTHCOM routinely works with the DHS on
operational planning, training and execution of homeland defense and
civil support missions. For defense support of civil authorities
missions, NORTHCOM supports requests from the DHS in accordance with
direction from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

14. Senator Burris. General Renuart, illegal drugs continue to be
problematic in the Southwest Border (SWB) States. You have a role to
play in providing support to that effort. How long do you anticipate
that the SWB mission using National Guard troops will be required?
General Renuart. In order to effectively counter the threat of
transnational criminal organizations in the SWB region, the U.S.
Government needs to leverage the potential synergies among many
agencies with homeland security, law enforcement, and defense missions
while deepening the U.S. strategic alliance with the Government of
Mexico.
The Joint Staff advised NORTHCOM in 2009 of a request for forces
from the DHS for military support along the SWB. The request was in
anticipation of potential spill over violence by Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations attempting to solidify control of territorial
smuggling corridors. The request for DOD support was patterned after
Operation Jump Start (2005-2007) to bridge capabilities until U.S.
Customs and Border Protection could train new personnel to cover the
expansion of requirements along the northern and southern borders of
the United States. NORTHCOM has not been tasked by the Secretary of
Defense to fill those positions with Title 10 forces. The National
Guard Bureau, through the Joint Staff, has been tasked with planning
how to support DHS with Title 32 forces.

15. Senator Burris. General Renuart, how effective is your joint
intelligence fusion cell in providing actionable intelligence/
information to various law enforcement agencies?
General Renuart. [Deleted].

16. Senator Burris. General Renuart, within the mission to provide
theater security cooperation, what specific training programs do you
provide Mexico?
General Renuart. NORTHCOM coordinates the following kinds of
training for the Mexican military:

Professional development
Professional military education in U.S. War Colleges
and Staff Colleges
English language training
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection
Combat medical training
Port Security training
Logistics, supply, and warehouse training
Combat strategic intelligence training
Human rights training
Military justice/Rule of Law training
Tactical intelligence training
Public Affairs training
Information Systems training
Naval operations training
Patrol craft operations training
Ship repair training
Initial helicopter pilot training
Helicopter maintenance training
Aircraft pilot upgrade training
Aircraft maintenance training (hydraulics,
electronics, pneumatics, corrosion control)
Maintenance supervisor training
Operational law training
Anti-corruption workshop/training
Aviation safety training
Joint training
Ship inspection and container security training
Ship power plant--maintenance training
Civil-Military operations training
Urban operations training
Riverine training
Counter Terrorism fellowship training
International Dynamics of Terrorism courses
Senior executive level courses on global security
threats
Aircrew weapons director training
Aircrew simulator training
Counter Narcotics Operations training
Aviation survival training
Pilot instrument procedures training
Army Ranger training
Jumpmaster training
Dive training
Search and rescue training
Hemispheric security and defense training
Psychological operations training

17. Senator Burris. General Renuart, what specific programs and
DSCA support do you cooperate with Canada along our northern border?
General Renuart. Defense Support of Civil Authorities is not
conducted outside of the United States and its territories. However,
NORTHCOM has signed the Canada-U.S. Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS CAP)
with Canada Command (CANADACOM) establishing the framework for the
military of one nation to support the military of the other nation
pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes. If support is provided to
civil authorities, it is still under military-to-military support, that
is, the military forces of one nation supports the military forces of
the other nation that are providing military support of civil
authorities. The CANUS CAP was used during crisis action planning in
the 2008 hurricane season, and for deliberate planning in response to
requests from the Government of Canada for support during the Vancouver
2010 Winter Olympic Games. During the 2010 Olympic Games, NORTHCOM was
prepared to provide support to CANADACOM as they supported Public
Safety Canada.

disaster relief in haiti and chile
18. Senator Burris. General Fraser, I want to commend your command
for providing the initial support to the relief efforts in Haiti and
your potential support to Chile. What impact will these operations have
on your other efforts within your Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
General Fraser. Due to the increased operational tempo required of
the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) staff and its components as a result of
the Haitian and Chilean crisis, we canceled two of our Foreign Military
Interaction exercises this year, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias and the
command post exercise portion of Peacekeeping Operations-Americas (PKO-
A). Although these training opportunities were lost for this year, we
anticipate executing them as planned next year, so there will not be
any long term impact to the region. Other exercises will require some
modification.
In order to support the U.S. effort in Haiti, 12 of the SOUTHCOM's
Medical Readiness and Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) were refocused on
Haiti (6 previously programmed in Haiti, 4 reprogrammed from other
countries, and 2 were created). Although redirecting four MEDRETEs from
their original countries impacted our original theater security
cooperation priorities, the high level of need in Haiti demanded the
change. More significantly, with the tremendous support of the
Louisiana National Guard, we created an additional New Horizons
exercise for Haiti. This Humanitarian Civic Assistance exercise
includes engineering, construction, and medical projects, selected in
consultation with USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Haiti that will
complement the U.S. relief effort while providing U.S. troops realistic
training.
With regard to SOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance Program, our
ability to engage with other partner nations in the region and to fund
potential disaster response operations throughout the AOR has been
diminished until the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
baseline is restored by the pending Haiti supplemental request.

joint capability technology demonstrations
19. Senator Burris. General Fraser, I understand that you have been
approved to conduct Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD)
to address a permanent solution for responding to foreign disasters.
What are the objectives and expected outcomes of the JCTD?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM is the operational lead or co-lead for
three Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) pertaining to
military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
DR) activities. While it is not possible to field a permanent solution
to the multitude of HA/DR challenges, we expect each of these JCTDs to
improve our ability to support interagency and international efforts
when disasters strike.
Transnational Information Sharing and Cooperation (TISC) JCTD has
an objective of adapting best-of-breed information sharing capabilities
to facilitate collaboration with traditional and non-traditional
partners in complex environments. It leverages Internet Web 2.0
technologies, such as interactive forums, chats, blogs, wikis, etc., to
facilitate timely information sharing among U.S. and partner nation
militaries, government agencies, non-governmental and international
organizations, and other interested stakeholders. Central to TISC is a
customized implementation of the All Partners Access Network (APAN),
based on the Asia-Pacific Area Network hosted by the U.S. Pacific
Command. TISC is in operational use today and has already yielded great
dividends in Haiti. Within hours of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, a
dedicated Haiti HA/DR community of 1,900+ registered members began
sharing situational information, and quickly transitioned to using
TISCs tools to coordinate actions.
The Cooperative Security (CS) JCTD goes beyond TISC/APAN
information sharing, with an objective of providing harmonized activity
planning, execution monitoring, and feedback between DOD and the many
U.S. Government interagency organizations and cultures; and eventually
provide interfaces to support other national and international
stakeholders. Currently under development, the CS design is projected
to incorporate further refinements to APAN, and integrate advanced
knowledge management and decision support capabilities.
The Pre-positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kits (PEAK) JCTD
recently kicked off with an objective of developing a modular, easy to
transport kit that provides deployable water purification, renewable
energy, basic situational awareness, and essential communications
capabilities. PEAK will support a full spectrum of operations, to
include HA/DR, bare-base deployments, peacekeeping operations, and
support to law enforcement and civil authorities. The first six
prototype units are projected to be available on or about June 30,
2010, less than 4 months from idea to fielded capability.

reserve component forces
20. Senator Burris. General Fraser, are you taking advantage of the
civilian acquired skill sets that the Reserve component forces have to
offer?
General Fraser. Yes, the Reserve components brings a wealth of
experience and knowledge that SOUTHCOM uses every day. In Haiti, we
leveraged this extensive pool of experience by filling critical hard-
to-fill positions with reservists trained as surgeons, pilots,
logisticians, and, search and rescue experts.
In addition, Reserve component civilian acquired skill sets are key
to ensuring successful State Partnership Programs (SPPs) projects. For
example this year events have been executed focusing on the following
civilian skills:

Full time civilian teachers who are soldiers at the
New Hampshire National Guard and the Ministry of Education from
El Salvador conducted a training project focused on improving
the techniques of teachers of special education.
Soldiers who work as divers for the New Hampshire
police conducted exchanges on underwater search and rescue
operations with El Salvador Police department.

Many projects are conducted in Latin America that are focused on
developing the civilian capabilities of our partner nations in managing
disaster response utilizing our National Guard members who work as
civilians in U.S. government disaster management agencies.
Throughout the years, Reserve Component forces have also
participated in projects focused on agricultural development, city
planning, well digging and many more civilian acquired skill sets that
have been key for engaging with our partner nations throughout
SOUTHCOM.

security sector reform program
21. Senator Burris. General Fraser, what countries are prime
candidates for a successful security sector reform program?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM participates in broader U.S. Government
security sector reform (SSR) efforts through interagency review of U.S.
Embassy requests for Section 1207 funds to support host nation SSR
programs. Haiti, Colombia, Panama, and Paraguay received 1207 funding,
and remain viable candidates for further security sector reform
programs. In addition, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Honduras, and Jamaica are prime candidates for security sector reform
programs. The security challenges posed by illicit trafficking in Peru,
Central America, and Jamaica adversely affect the security of these
States and their people. In addition, gangs in Central America and
Jamaica contribute to serious security challenges. Integrating defense
and police against illicit trafficking organizations and gangs,
including measures to increase their effectiveness of their joint
operations, is critical to the security of these countries and
ultimately, the United States.
As one aspect of security sector reform, SOUTHCOM has worked with
the defense establishments of various partners in the region, including
Colombia and Panama, at their request, to realize more efficient and
streamlined structures to manage their defense efforts. Professional
militaries are a touchstone of stable and secure societies and
professionalization begins at the individual level. To that end, DOD
hosts a number of foreign defense establishment students at educational
facilities such as the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security
Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, where DOD
provides its best practices on a range of issues, including strategic
planning, resource management, and human rights.

counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts
22. Senator Burris. General Fraser, can you identify some examples
where the military-to-military engagement has led to enhancing the U.S.
counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts?
General Fraser. SOUTHCOM continues to coordinate and implement a
focused Counter Narcotics (CN) program, a basic element of which
supports the development of a more robust Partner Nation air/maritime
interdiction capability. The intent of this effort is to enable Partner
Nations to respond independently or in concert with other Partner
Nations against the CN threat. When integrated into Joint Interagency
Task Force-South's (JIATF-S) overarching CN architecture this
capability provides needed synergy to a diminishing number of US air/
maritime interdiction assets. Examples where this effort is proving its
worth include the following:
Through the Enduring Friendship (EF) Program, SOUTHCOM has assisted
Partner Nations in the Caribbean and Central America to enhance their
maritime intercept and C2 capability to conduct counter illicit
trafficking operations. In fiscal year 2009, SOUTHCOM delivered
interceptor boats to the Bahamas (2), Belize (2), Dominican Republic
(4), Honduras (4), Nicaragua (4), and Jamaica (2). Additionally,
SOUTHCOM provided C2 capability: Harris HF/VHF radios (land based and
shipboard), Over the Horizon Tactical Tracking System and Cooperating
Nations Information Exchange System, a maintenance and spare parts
package for boats and radios, and a training package consisting of
command, control and communications (C3), tactical boat operations and
equipment maintenance. Nicaragua is an excellent example of how this
maritime interdiction capability is being used, as security forces from
that nation consistently respond to JIATF-S cued intelligence to
support Law Enforcement Agencies in the interdiction and apprehension
of illicit traffickers.
Colombia Maritime Interdiction Capability--DOD purchased Midnight
Express interdiction boats were delivered beginning in 2006 concurrent
with the development of multiple supporting infrastructure projects on
both the Pacific and north coast of Colombia. The initial 12 DOD
purchased boats all actively engaged in CN maritime interdiction
missions responding to Colombian/JIATF-S cued intelligence. Colombian
Navy has purchased an additional 14 boats with their own funds with
delivery of the first 6 scheduled in July of this fiscal year. Long-
term sustainment for the capability has shifted to the Colombian Navy
with minimal additional support from the Department of State Narcotics
Affairs Section in Colombia. The boats have been active against the
Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles threat particularly on the Pacific
Coast in/around Buenaventura. JIATF-S and the Colombian Navy work
closely in coordinating operations that employ the Midnight Express
boats as a force multiplier in the maritime interdiction environment.
SOUTHCOM maintains military-to-military relationships and enhances
Host Nation Military Counter Narcotics/Counterterrorism abilities with
countries throughout the AOR by conducting a series of recurring
engagements which include: Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, Combined
Multinational Exercises, Counternarcotics Assistance Missions,
Humanitarian Assistance Programs, Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence
Cooperation, and Security Assistance Programs. These engagements serve
as the foundation to the SOUTHCOM Commander's Theater Campaign Plan and
directly enhance and assist these countries' Counter Terrorist Forces
and Counternarcotics Forces' effectiveness while enhancing the U.S.'s
own counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts.

state partnership program
23. Senator Burris. General Fraser, how is the National Guard's SPP
integrated into your theater engagement strategy?
General Fraser. The National Guard's SPP is integrated in the
SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy through a balanced
approach of military to military, military to civil, and civil to
military activities that sustain positive trends, reinforce successes,
and cooperatively meet shared transnational challenges. It creates
opportunities to develop capabilities within partner countries that
support conditions to advance democracy, promote regional security,
support hemispheric cooperation, foster future economic opportunities,
and build partner nation capacity.
In addition through the office of the Governor, institutional and
people-to-people relationships are developed that can be sustained over
the long term. The State facilitates local government, academic, and
economic contacts, as well as National Guard and civilian community
involvement in people-to-people contacts with the Partner Nation. This
involves linking the right people, with the right skills and
qualifications, at the right time to accomplish the mission and support
my SOUTHCOM Strategy 2020.
At this time 20 nations in the region are partnering with the
National Guard from 17 States. Over the past year Guard units have
participated in engagement opportunities such as engineering and
medical exercises. Most recently, I am pleased to note Louisiana and
Haiti are about to finalize the details of an SPP relationship.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
ground-based midcourse defense
24. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, although the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) has established a Stockpile Reliability Program to ensure
ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) reliability over its service life,
there appears to be very little emphasis on actual flight testing.
Instead, MDA believes it can utilize ground-tests and inspections,
coupled with modeling and simulation, to assess the reliability of the
ground-based interceptor (GBI). This obviates the need for flight
testing, reducing the number of required GBIs, which in turn reduces
costs. The GMD program manager and the MDA Executive Director have
briefed staff that MDA plans to acquire only 52 GBIs: 30 will be
deployed, while the remaining 22 will be used for testing. By fiscal
year 2019, MDA assumes developmental testing will be complete and that
three GBIs will remain for stockpile reliability testing through 2032.
In other words, MDA concludes that only three GBI flight tests over 12
years will be sufficient to maintain system reliability. As the
combatant commander responsible for defending the Homeland against
ballistic missile attack, have you been asked to concur on MDA's
stockpile reliability plan for the GMD system?
General Renuart. No, we are aware of the Missile Defense Agency's
Stockpile Reliability Program, but have not been asked to formally
review the plan.

25. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, do you agree with MDA's
position that only three GBIs are required between 2019 and 2032 to
conduct flight testing to assure the reliability of the GBI and the GMD
system as a whole?
General Renuart. We believe that a reliability program does need to
be based on a representative sample of empirical missile tests at the
full up round and component level. In order for MDA to be able to do an
increased number of tests, additional funding is required to procure an
adequate number of new missiles. This empirical testing, coupled with a
comprehensive modeling and simulation approach to assess system
reliability, can be combined with the lessons we learn through the
Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). The IMTP is not a replacement for a
continued reliability assessment program. However, it is a useful tool
for the warfighter, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (as the
Functional Manager and Synchronizer), and the combatant commands to
work with MDA to develop a comprehensive long-term testing and
reliability program.

26. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, if three to four flight
tests are required for intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles every year to assure the
Commander of STRATCOM and the Secretary of Defense that our nuclear
deterrent remains reliable, why are only three GBI flight tests
necessary over the course of a dozen years?
General Renuart. We believe that an effective stockpile reliability
program is contingent on a sufficient number of items for testing as
demonstrated by the reliability programs used by the individual
Services for missiles like our ICBMs, Patriot, or current fleet of
Standard Missiles. If further evaluation indicates a need for
additional quantities, my understanding is that MDA can make that buy
as late as fiscal year 2013 without incurring a production line break.

27. Senator Sessions. General Renuart, will you personally examine
the MDA's plan for GMD stockpile reliability to ensure sufficient
flight testing is built into the program to maintain system reliability
over the life of the GMD system?
General Renuart. Yes, I look forward to reviewing and provide
comments to the GMD stockpile reliability plan. Additionally, in
coordination with MDA, I will work with STRATCOM and Joint Forces
Component Command, Integrated Missile Defense as the functional manager
and synchronizer to ensure our homeland defense requirements continue
to be addressed throughout the life of the GMD program.

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall,
Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Brown, Burr, Vitter,
and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Howard H. Hoege III,
counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member, and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G.
Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Greta Lundeberg, assistant
to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer
Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to
Senator Hagan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Burris; Halie
Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Anthony J. Lazarski,
assistant to Senator Inhofe, Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
Sessions, Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells
III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to
Senator LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; Kyle
Ruckert, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Chip Kennett,
assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Before we begin the hearing, I want to take this
opportunity to welcome one of our three new members to the
Armed Services Committee. Senator Kaufman is the first Senator
from the First State, which is Delaware's famous name; he's the
first one to serve on this committee, according to our Senate
historian. We know Senator Kaufman for his long, valuable
service to the Senate, both as a Senator and before that as a
member of the Senate staff.
A special welcome to you, Senator Kaufman. We'll welcome
the others when they get here, but a special welcome to you.
Delighted to have you.
The committee receives testimony this morning from General
David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and
Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM). Today's hearing continues the committee's review of
the missions and operational requirements of our combatant
commanders, in light of the priorities that are set out in the
President's fiscal year 20ll budget request.
Nowhere will the President's budget priorities have a
greater impact than with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), including
a significant portion of our Special Operations Forces (SOF).
The men and women of CENTCOM and SOCOM have been engaged in
major military operations for nearly 8\1/2\ years, most having
served multiple deployments. Our SOF are facing the highest
operational tempo in their history. Yet, in Afghanistan and
Iraq, our troops' morale is very high, they are dedicated to
their mission, and they are serving with courage and
distinction.
General Petraeus and Admiral Olson, thank you for your
leadership, and, on behalf of this committee, please pass along
our gratitude to the troops that serve under your command.
The next 12 months will be critical in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. The challenges are significant. In Afghanistan, the
military operations in the central Helmand River valley are
just the opening salvo, as General Petraeus has said, of a long
campaign, under General McChrystal's command, to implement the
President's counterinsurgency strategy. As General Gates told
Afghan soldiers in Kabul last week, this conflict is their
fight to win, and Afghanistan's future is in their hands.
Key to this effort is the partnering of Afghan soldiers
with U.S. and coalition forces living and operating together in
the planning and conduct of military operations. Last week, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, said that the
partnering ratio in Helmand Province had improved to nearly 1
to 1; close to one Afghan soldier for each coalition soldier in
the fight.
General Petraeus, I hope you're going to update us this
morning on the progress of our partnering efforts in
Afghanistan.
I have been deeply concerned, however, that the effort to
grow the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police is being slowed
by a lack of trainers. Earlier this month, Lieutenant General
Bill Caldwell, the head of the NATO Training Mission in
Afghanistan, reported an almost 900 percent increase in Afghan
Army recruits in training, from 830 in September to 7,400 in
January of this year. But, at the same time, he reported that
the NATO Training Command remains at just over half of the
number of instructors and advisers required. At a recent
conference to generate forces, NATO members pledged fewer than
half the approximately 1,200 additional NATO trainers that are
needed. As a result of this shortfall, Afghan Army recruits are
having to wait to receive their basic training course.
General Petraeus, the committee would be interested in any
recommendations that you might have for addressing these
resource shortfalls.
Our SOF in Afghanistan are also faced with resource
challenges, particularly due to the lack of enabling
capabilities, such as rotary wing aircraft support. We'd be
interested in hearing from our witnesses as to what is being
done to address this issue for our SOF in theater today.
I believe there are reasons for cautious optimism. An ABC/
BBC public opinion survey in Afghanistan in January found that
70 percent of the Afghans polled believed their country was
headed in the right direction. In terms of governance, the
Afghan Government is apparently now working better with local
leaders in Helmand to deliver services, which surely improves
the chances of building support in the country for the Afghan
Government.
With regard to Afghanistan's long-term economic future,
President Karzai recently announced that a soon-to-be-released
U.S. Geological survey report will show that Afghanistan has
nearly a trillion dollars in petroleum reserves and mineral
deposits, which are in great demand.
The coming months will also be important for the
President's strategy in Iraq. By September 1, the U.S. combat
mission in Iraq will end and U.S. forces will transition to the
role of advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
According to General Odierno, our commander in Iraq, the ISF
performed well during the recent parliamentary elections, and
that only a catastrophic event, in his words, would prevent the
drawdown of U.S. forces from 96,000, currently, to 50,000 by
the end of August. The drawdown of those forces will be an
important milestone on the way to withdrawing all U.S. forces
from Iraq by the end of 2011, redefining the U.S.-Iraq
strategic relationship, and transferring responsibility for
Iraq's security to Iraqis, while keeping the pressure on Iraqi
leaders to reach the political settlements and decisions so
essential to achieving security in Iraq.
While our conventional forces reduce their footprint in
Iraq, the requirement for SOF and the unique skills they bring
to the effort will continue. Special operators will have a
continuing requirement for support from their general-purpose
force counterparts, including for airlift, medical evacuation,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as
those SOF continue throughout the U.S. drawdown to provide
support to the ISF.
The attempted Christmas Day airline bombing near Detroit
reminded every American that al Qaeda is a global organization
that continues to threaten harm to anyone that does not share
its radical views. That nearly catastrophic incident also
focused attention on Yemen, a country with an uneven record on
counterterrorism and large ungoverned spaces that serve as
attractive sanctuaries for al Qaeda and its recruits.
General Petraeus, I hope that you will let us know this
morning what, in your opinion, our Government is doing to
support Yemen's capacity to respond to the al Qaeda threat and
to stabilize its territory, and your recommendations for what
more can be done.
Because the threat of violent extremism is not confined to
Yemen or the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, SOCOM
maintains a global focus. SOCOM personnel are deployed to
dozens of countries around the world, working to address the
underlying causes of violent extremism and helping to build the
capacity of other nations to address the mutual threats that we
face. Working with U.S. ambassadors in priority countries,
these special operators engage in a variety of training, civil
affairs, and information operations (IO) intended to counter
the spread of violent ideology.
Admiral Olson, we hope that you'll update the committee on
the progress of those efforts to address violent extremism
globally.
Finally, Iran remains a major security challenge. Iran
continues to work to undermine stability in the Middle East and
to stoke fears across the region. The brutal tactics and human
rights abuses of the Government of Iran in its efforts to
silence the voices of the people of Iran are of deep concern.
As the administration continues its push for more significant
sanctions against Iran, it will be critical to continue to work
with our partners in the CENTCOM AOR on robust sanctions
enforcement. This is going to require intense coordination and
collaboration with other nations in the region.
General Petraeus, we look forward to hearing your
assessment of the willingness of other nations in the region to
cooperate in the robust enforcement of current sanctions
against Iran and support even stronger sanctions against Iran
until they comply with United Nations (U.N.) resolutions
relative to the Iranian nuclear program. Nuclear arms in
possession of Iran, in violation of those U.N. resolutions,
will threaten the stability of the region and cannot be
accepted by the world community.
I understand, now, that another new member of our committee
has joined us. We welcome Senator Brown; he's the newest member
of the Senate. He brings a very valuable perspective of having
served for more than 30 years in the Massachusetts Army
National Guard, and that is a very, very important contribution
to us. We all welcome you to a committee which is famous for
working on a bipartisan basis. We all enjoy working here, for
many reasons; obviously, the security of this country being our
common mission, but it's also because we work so well together
across party lines. So, we welcome you.
We've already welcomed Senator Kaufman, and there's just
one other Senator. If Senator Bingaman is not here yet, we will
welcome him when he arrives.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming an old and dear friend, Senator
Kaufman of Delaware, who I've known for many, many years.
I would also like to welcome Senator Brown, a member of the
Massachusetts Guard for 30 years, and all of that is very good
news. Unfortunately, he joins Senator Graham as a lawyer.
[Laughter.]
But, we welcome him to the committee. He brings knowledge
and expertise of the challenges that our men and women serving
in the military face on a day-to-day basis as we are engaged in
two wars.
I thank our witnesses today, Admiral Olson and General
Petraeus, for joining us. Let me extend my thanks to the men
and women serving under your command, especially the families,
who endure so much for the security and betterment of our
country.
Amid the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ongoing fight
against violent Islamic extremism, the focus of the U.S.
military, especially our lead forces, is the Middle East and
South and Central Asia. Obviously, this is the responsibility
of CENTCOM and the chief priority of SOCOM. So, it's fitting
and important that both combatant commanders are here today
together.
I'll keep my remarks brief and to the point. I'm concerned
at what appear to be dangerous and growing doubts about U.S.
power and commitment on the part of both our friends and our
enemies in the broader Middle East today. On the one hand, this
perception is profoundly unjustified. America enjoys a position
of extraordinary power and influence in this region. The United
States did not abandon Iraq when the going got tough. Instead,
we succeeded in turning it around, in large part, thanks to
your leadership, General Petraeus.
A moderate majority was empowered in Iraq to turn the tide
against violent extremists, and today the emergence of a
democratic Iraq that can defend and sustain itself is becoming
a hopeful new presence in an unstable region. I might add, Iraq
is the only country in the Middle East, outside of Israel, that
has a contested election.
In Afghanistan, thanks to President Obama's decision to
increase our civil-military commitment, the United States and
our allies are now in a position to break the momentum of the
insurgency and help our Afghan friends to secure their own
country.
As you've noted before to this committee, Admiral Olson,
our SOF are making major strides in targeting the Taliban's
leadership and keeping the pressure on al Qaeda; not just in
Afghanistan, but also in places like Pakistan and Yemen.
At the same time, as you have noted before, General
Petraeus, the United States is building an elaborate and robust
security architecture in the broader Middle East, including
shared early-warning systems, ballistic missile defenses (BMD),
and major sales of defensive weapons that enhance the
capabilities of our friends to defend themselves and to deter
our enemies. Though we admittedly face many difficult
challenges in the broader Middle East, the fact is, the U.S.
capability and lead in this region is strong and enduring.
Yet, military capability is not the only measure of
leadership. There's also the perception of our political
resolve, and this is what concerns me. I'm concerned that the
Government of Iran has spurned the President's offer of
engagement. Not only has it experienced no real consequences
for doing so, our deadlines for actions have slipped from
September of last year to the beginning of this year, and now
it's mid-March, and still there have been no consequences.
So, too, with the Syrian Government. There's been plenty of
U.S. engagement since the beginning of last year, but seemingly
few changes to Syria's destabilizing behavior in the region as
a result. Instead, the Syrian President is openly mocking U.S.
leaders while meeting with the President of Iran and the head
of Hezbollah. Meanwhile, despite constant refrains about
cutting off the supply of arms to Hezbollah, the fact remains
that Hezbollah is better armed today than ever before. When our
allies and friends in the Levant and the Gulf look at these
events, I worry that it feeds a lack of confidence in America's
commitment to regional security.
In South Asia, meanwhile, the pledge to begin withdrawing
our forces by July 2011 has injected unnecessary doubts about
U.S. commitment in the minds of friends and foes alike, from
Afghan fence-sitters to Pakistan's leaders to our strategic
partners in India. Reports over the weekend that reconciliation
with Taliban leaders is now being explored before the vast
majority of the 30,000-troop surge has even arrived in the
country only feed the perception in the region that the U.S.
Government is more eager to leave Afghanistan than to succeed
there.
In short, I'm concerned that we are heading toward a
situation in the broader Middle East where our friends don't
trust us and our enemies don't fear us, because both doubt our
staying power, our determination, and our resolve. We may be
heading there, but we aren't there yet. Though this perceived
lack of U.S. commitment may take a lot of time and effort to
reverse, I'm confident that it can be reversed. As I said, the
U.S. capacity to lead remains strong; what's more, our country
is blessed with some truly first-rate civilian and military
leaders, individuals like our two distinguished witnesses today
and the brave men and women under their command. It's our job,
here in Washington, to support their needs, including the
resources they require to succeed in their missions on our
behalf. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how we
will all work together to address the serious challenges we
face, especially in this vital part of the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
We now have a quorum of our committee; and so, I would ask
the committee to consider three civilian nominations and a list
of 802 pending military nominations.
First, the civilian nominations: I ask the committee to
consider the nominations of Jessie Hill Roberson, Joseph F.
Bader, and Peter Stanley Winokur to be members of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Is there a motion to favorably
report these nominees?
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay? [No response.]
The ayes have it.
Next, I ask the committee to consider a list of 802 pending
military nominations. They've been before the committee the
required length of time. Is there a motion to report these
nominations?
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. There's a second.
All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay? [No response.]
The motion carries.
Admiral, I think we'll start with you this morning.
Admiral Olson.

STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral Olson. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear again before this body to
highlight the posture of SOCOM.
It's a pleasure to join General Petraeus here this morning.
Your continued support and oversight of SOCOM and its
assigned forces has ensured that our Nation has the broad
special operations capabilities that it needs and expects.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'll submit my written
posture statement for the record, and open with a briefer set
of remarks.
Chairman Levin. That'll be fine.
Admiral Olson. SOCOM's Service Component Commands--those
being the Army SOCOM, the Air Force SOCOM, the Naval Special
Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces SOCOM--through
them, SOCOM organizes, equips, trains, and provides fully-
capable SOF to serve under the operational control of regional
combatant commanders around the world, and, as you noted, by a
wide margin, our forces are most heavily committed to
supporting operations in the CENTCOM AOR under the operational
command of General Petraeus.
On an average day, though, over 12,000 members of the SOF
are present in about 75 countries. They conduct a wide variety
of activities. You listed several, Mr. Chairman. They range
from civil-military operations, like local infrastructure
development in relatively benign environments, to
counterterrorist operations under extremely demanding
conditions. These indirect and direct actions conducted by SOF
are intended to support each other in contributing to
environments where security and stability can be further
developed and sustained by local organizations and forces. In
fact, nearly every mission performed by SOF is in support of an
indigenous partner force.
SOF do what other military forces are not doctrinally
organized, trained, or equipped to do. The powerful effects of
SOF in the areas where they are properly employed are often
recognized as game-changers. Our force operates very
effectively in small numbers, in remote regions, often with a
low profile, under austere conditions.
The deployment rate of SOF is high. Although the demand is
outpacing the supply, I remain firm in limiting our request for
manpower growth to the range of 3 to 5 percent per year.
If approved, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget would
grow SOF personnel by 4.5 percent. The overall baseline budget
for SOCOM would grow by about 5.7 percent, to just over $6.3
billion, with most of that increase in the operations and
maintenance (O&M) account.
Significantly, the overseas contingency operations funds
would increase by $464 million, compared to 2010, bringing that
account to about $3.5 billion, for a total 2011 SOCOM budget of
$9.8 billion. This is sufficient to support our current level
of special operations-peculiar activities around the world, as
long as we are able to depend on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps for service-common items and support.
The budget and acquisition authorities held by the
Commander of SOCOM are similar to the military departments,
although not on the same scale. They are essential to meeting
the emergent needs of an innovative force with a unique mission
set, and this applies equally to SOCOM's research and
development authorities, which enable rapid application of
science and technology to meet urgent operational needs.
In my role as the commander responsible for the readiness
of the SOF, I give high priority to training and education
programs and to influencing, where I can, the career
development of special operations personnel. Along with the
pure operational skills that enable success in very complex and
demanding operational environments, language skills and
subregional expertise remain primary focus areas.
The special operations community, of course, includes the
families of our service men and women, and caring for our
injured and wounded, and for the families of those killed in
action, is among our most solemn responsibilities. We are proud
of our many successes in returning wounded warriors to their
teams and of our lifelong commitment to those who are unable to
do so.
You, on this committee, and all Americans, can be fiercely
proud of your SOF. They are fit, focused, supremely capable,
and incredibly courageous. They have impact well beyond their
relatively small numbers, and I'm deeply honored by this
opportunity to represent them to you today.
I stand ready for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to update you on the U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM). It is an honor to do so for the third time as
Commander.
Over 2 decades ago, Congress directed the establishment of a
headquarters dedicated to prepare Special Operations Forces (SOFs) to
carry out assigned missions. in support of Geographic Combatant
Commanders. Since then, the forces and the missions have expanded and
changed in response to very dynamic global conditions and threats.
In this `new normal` in which our forces operate, emerging security
challenges to our Nation come evermore from agile and elusive adversary
networks versus traditional, uniformed military formations. Therefore,
the value of adaptive SOFs is at least as much in their mindset as in
their skill set.
U.S. SOF respond to the sound of guns with a combination of speed,
discipline, and tenacity. They also apply their knowledge and
experience well ahead of the sound of the guns to prevent violence from
erupting whenever and wherever possible. These are warriors who can act
swiftly with precision and lethality, yet remain simultaneously capable
of building long-term relationships and trust with international
partners.
resourcing: force and mission
On an average day, in excess of 12,000 SOF and SOF support
personnel are deployed in more than 75 countries across the globe. An
invaluable ingredient is our Reserve element, about 14 percent of SOF`s
total manpower.
Currently, 86 percent of deployed SOF are in U.S. Central Command's
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility under the operational control of
General Petraeus. The rest of the deployed force--along with over 3,000
members permanently stationed in Europe and the Pacific--are serving
the other Geographic Combatant Commanders.
To support special operators and their capabilities, the
President`s proposed budget request for fiscal year 2011 is about $6.3
billion in baseline and $3.5 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations
funding. Managing these funds is my responsibility.
Along with SOCOM`s Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding--one
intended to fund SOF-peculiar requirements--the Command is heavily
dependent on each of the Military Services for key enablers to special
operations. Within our organic structure--both to provide sufficient
speed of response and a degree of reliable sustainability--SOCOM is
growing organic combat service and service support assets for SOFs, to
include: communications, information support specialists, forensic
analysts, military working dog teams, intelligence experts, and more.
The fiscal year 2011 budget proposes a total manpower increase of 2,700
people across the Force, a 4.6 percent growth from the previous fiscal
year.
Working closely with Joint Force Commanders, senior Department of
Defense (DOD) leaders, and Congress, SOCOM also develops SOF-specific
doctrine, and advises on policy and legislation supporting these
activities.
SOCOM is tasked to synchronize planning for global operations
against terrorist networks. The 7500 series of Concept Plans
(CONPLANs), crafted at SOCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense,
continue to function as both the framework for planning within DOD and
a supporting mechanism within the interagency environment for combating
global terror networks. The plans are supported by regional plans
formulated by each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders specific to
threats within their areas of responsibility.
In our role, SOCOM receives, analyzes, and prioritizes these
regional plans, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on force and resource
allocations. We also serve as an extension of the Joint Staff in
coordinating SOF programs and operations with our interagency partners.
The authority most often referred to as `Section 1208'--unique to
SOCOM since 2005--is a key tool for our widely dispersed and often
isolated SOFs around the world. This authority enables SOF to train and
equip indigenous forces, both regular and irregular, and to enable them
to support ongoing counterterrorism operations. Indigenous forces--
while serving a leading role and supported by SOF--provide essential
access to locations, populations, and information otherwise
inaccessible. Support to indigenous forces through section 1208
reprioritization of funding has resulted in many successful
counterterrorist operations.
strategy: direct and indirect approaches
CONPLAN 7500 calls for the use of both a direct and indirect
approach to fighting terrorist networks. The direct approach to violent
extremists consists of SOF efforts that disrupt terrorist organizations
by capturing, killing, and interdicting extremist networks and
resources, thereby preventing them from harming us in the near term.
These actions include denial of access and use of weapons of mass
destruction.
The direct approach is urgent, necessary, and largely kinetic. In
the last year, SOF--deployed in support of geographic combatant
commanders--inflicted substantial losses against the leadership and
operational capacity of al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates.
These effects--while significant in the short term--are not by
themselves decisive.
The enduring results come from indirect approaches--those in which
we enable partners to combat extremist organizations themselves by
contributing to their capabilities through advising, training, and--
when authorized and funded--equipping. This includes efforts to deter
active and tacit support for violent extremist organizations in areas
where the existing government is either unwilling or unable to remove
terrorist sanctuaries.
Central to SOCOM`s contribution are our career, multi-dimensional
operators, individuals adept in defense, diplomacy, and development.
SOF operators are often locally grounded in their areas of
responsibility, diplomatically astute, and experts in specialized
tactical skills. It is demanding work.
The number of individuals both eager and qualified to serve as SOF
operators is limited. Overall, SOF personnel growth continues to be
managed at about 3 percent annually, a strategy intended to retain the
best while adding additional manpower only as it can be recruited,
trained, absorbed and deployed.
Still, direct and indirect approaches must be carefully balanced.
While the direct approach is often necessary and has immediate impact,
it essentially creates time for the indirect approach to achieve
lasting outcomes through other means.
Security Force Assistance (SFA) remains a highlight of SOF indirect
action. SFA is a collaboration engine for the Command to include:
security cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense,
internal defense and development, and security sector reform.
SFA enhances the military capabilities and capacities of our allies
and partners via training, advising, assistance, and--as authorized--
equipping and supporting foreign military and security forces.
``Build[ing] the security capacity of partner states'' is directly
referenced within the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as one of
six key missions.
The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of
crime, migration, extremism, and the competition for resources which
drive populations and provoke conflict. Recognizing this, the Command`s
engagement efforts through the `Sovereign Challenge` Program continue
as a unique method of establishing relationships with senior military
leaders from around the world. The program--in collaboration with the
U.S. Department of State--aims to provide venues in which robust dialog
about threats to sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and
mutually beneficial approach to military relationships, long-term
success is measured by other countries' actions in their own and the
region`s security interests.
global synchronization
As previously stated, SOCOM is designated as the command
responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against
terrorist networks. In this ongoing Global Synchronization Process,
SOCOM coordinates with other combatant commanders, the Services, and--
as directed--appropriate U.S. Government agencies and international
partners to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorism across the globe.
Regular meetings, video teleconferences, and `community of interest`
forums facilitate planning, promote situational awareness, and enhance
synergy within the overall war on terror effort. The Command`s Global
Synchronization Workshops--now 5 years old--unite hundreds of planners
from across the Global Synchronization Process Community.
enablers: mobility
While attention is first given to operators conducting missions
around the globe, these individuals are supported by a set of essential
mobility capabilities that allow SOF to move, influence the
environment, share information, and strike when necessary. In
challenging settings and situations, success can depend upon these
capabilities. For example, in Haiti`s Operation Unified Response this
mobility allowed SOF to open a closed and damaged airfield to enable
relief efforts. This was accomplished within 26 hours of the
earthquake, and 28 minutes of being on the ground. SOF personnel
subsequently assisted with medical and humanitarian assistance to
include rescue of trapped citizens, injury treatment, and continuous
broadcasting of relief locations and protocols.
I`ve paid particular attention to mobility enabling capabilities,
making them a focal point of the SOCOM Strategic Plan. This importance
is echoed by the Secretary of Defense in the 2010 QDR, calling to
``increase key enabling assets for SOFs.''
For the Special Operator, mobility enhancements mean a variety of
improved strategic and tactical capabilities. These provide, for
example, quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. In
cooperation with the Army, we will grow SOCOM`s helicopter fleet by
eight MH-47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015. We are also nearing fielding
completion of upgraded MH-47G and new MH-60M helicopters, improvements
that provide SOF with modernized helicopters specifically adapted to
SOF-peculiar requirements like aerial refueling, advanced night
operations, and terrain-hugging flight profiles.
Growth is also evident in the Tilt/Hybrid Wing Aircraft Programs.
The CV-22 Osprey offers high-speed, long-range insertion and extraction
of SOF. SOCOM currently has 12 CV-22s, growing to 50 by fiscal year
2016.
In their first combat deployment, 6 CV-22s logged over 600 flight
hours, performing 45 direct action assault force missions and 100+
combat service support missions in the process. A recent national
contingency mission used three of these aircraft for combat search and
rescue, personnel recovery, and quick reaction force support.
Our goal is to accelerate delivery of CV-22s to better support the
forces requiring them. We are looking to add five more CV-22s in the
coming year.
The C-130--in several variants--remains the workhorse of the SOF,
fixed-wing mobility fleet. C-130s provide SOF with important tactical
lift and precision fire for our ground and maritime forces. Ongoing
efforts to recapitalize the oldest of these airframes are a current top
priority for Air Force SOCOM, our air component.
Finally, the Non-Standard Aviation Program supports Theater SOCOM
mobility requirements worldwide. This program includes short takeoff
and landing, light and medium, intra-theater aircraft. The fiscal year
2011 budget request includes funds to procure nine additional light and
medium aircraft plus associated spares and repair parts.
On land, a new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle
will increase ground mobility for SOF. The new model--funded through
the Joint Program Office--provides improved safety, visibility,
control, and storage.
In the maritime environment, SOCOM remains committed to developing
undersea submersible platforms that will provide assured, clandestine
access to denied and politically sensitive areas while enabling
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in
support of high-priority SOF requirements. The Advanced SEAL Delivery
System Program (ASDS)--one well-supported by Congress--delivered these
operational capabilities until it suffered a significant lithium-ion
battery fire.
As noted in last year's National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is
coordinating with the Director of National Intelligence to assess the
feasibility of establishing a cost-sharing agreement for ASDS follow-on
capabilities. If approved, these capabilities are expected to
capitalize on improved battery technologies, ones recommended to the
Navy by the investigation panel reviewing the ASDS lithium-ion battery
fire. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes funds to conduct
research and development on the Joint Multimission Submersible which
will provide these capabilities.
enablers: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
These efforts are complemented by planned upgrades to SOF`s
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) portfolio. ISR
remains an invaluable asset, most notably in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility. The ISR program is not about platforms; it is about
complete systems including the people who operate them.
Proposed plans--contained within a Joint Staff-approved
capabilities document and seconded by the Secretary of Defense within
the 2010 QDR (``expanding manned and unmanned systems for intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance'') entail expansion of the Program`s
inventory to include both manned and unmanned systems. These systems
will be supported by Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination
capabilities, and robust communication architecture. Airborne ISR
remains complemented by maritime capabilities.
enablers: information sharing
Effective use of ISR, however, can only occur on communications
systems and networks designed to handle the large amounts of
information developed. Our evolving mission sets form a difficult and
increasingly expensive information sharing reality, with data residing
on, and transiting through, a variety of systems under varying security
criteria.
Recognizing this problem, SOCOM is moving toward a globally
responsive network capable of cross-domain data sharing. SOCOM`s SOF
Information Environment (SIE) is our portion of DOD`s Global
Information Grid. The SIE is a SOF information technology enterprise
that will offer permissions-based, single sign-on access to SOF
resources from anywhere on the globe.
enablers: science and technology
SOCOM`s modernization, research and development and acquisition
enabling processes are interconnected to ensure needed technological
agility. The Command`s Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technology
(REITS) Program provides SOCOM with the ability to identify, assess and
exploit emerging technologies for SOF-peculiar applications.
REITS funds are assisting in the development of next generation
software and antenna design for ``on-the-move,'' mounted and dismounted
geo-location technology. This new capability will conform to both
current tactical vehicles and radio frequency systems, while providing
organic, small unit find, fix, and finish capabilities within a single
tactical ground asset.
enablers: agile acquisition processes
Rapid fielding of the Dragon Spear Precision Strike Platform (PSP)
is an example of the benefits of an acquisition process designed for
flexibility and agility. This system benefits from the Combat Missions
Needs Statement (C-MNS) process which quickly addresses critical
capability gaps that put missions or lives at risk. Funding execution
responsibilities for C-MNS reside with the Joint Acquisition Task
Force, meaning faster operational implementation.
By design, PSP is a modular, scalable weapons system, one flexible
enough for many platforms and configurations. Four Dragon Spear systems
are currently being fielded. Ongoing MC-130W Dragon Spear improvements
include upgrades to its sensors, a Standoff Precision Guided Munitions
system and supporting 30mm gun, a sensor operator console, and
communication equipment and flight deck hardware.
SOF MC-130 console reconfigurations enable aircrews to operate more
efficiently and effectively. Improved infrared warning systems result
in better threat detection. Updated line-of-sight antennae produce more
communications capacity with improved reliability. All are
modernization initiatives designed to cost-effectively optimize current
SOF aircraft.
enablers: education
The unique nature of special operations enables us to focus people
on specific regions more so than other forces can. This ensures we are
doing the best we can with what we have.
SOCOM--partnered with the Services--is intensifying its efforts in
training and personnel management to create opportunities for our
personnel to truly build productive and enduring relationships with our
partners. DOD Directive 5100.1 aims to address many of these issues by
enhancing SOCOM`s ability to influence management of our assigned
manpower.
Our culture and language programs are supplemented with increased
attention to interagency collaboration and information sharing, with
specific emphasis on subregional and microregional knowledge.
I`ve directed SOF schools to pay more attention to curricula
dedicated to advanced language skills and regional expertise.
Specifically, we will ensure better alignment of language skills,
career management, and incentives within our force.
To prepare SOF for the challenges ahead, we`re prioritizing career
development toward areas best suited for irregular environments with
emphasis on specialized versus generalized operator performance. This
entails building creative, adaptive and flexible leaders at every level
of the enlisted and officer ranks.
SOCOM`s Lessons Learned Program supplements these efforts with
vital, in the field knowledge. This program emphasizes analysis and
information sharing relevant to the SOF Community, one that now
includes research, development, technology and experimentation
activities.
care coalition
We cannot sustain combat effectiveness without the enduring support
of our families. Our operators are asked to do a great many things to
protect our Nation, and all of them place additional demands on those
who are closest to us. Continuing care for our wounded or injured
operators--and for the families of those who have been seriously
injured or killed--is among our most solemn responsibilities. The 2010
QDR highlights the importance of such programs: ``caring for our
wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will work to provide
them top-quality care that reflects their service and sacrifice.''
SOCOM`s Care Coalition currently supports over 2,800 wounded SOF
operators by matching medical needs with available providers. The goal
of this clearinghouse - via advocacy, education, treatment, recovery,
and rehabilitation - is to increase the likelihood of returning to duty
and/or succeeding in post-military service. Additional efforts include
proactive programs by SOCOM to identify, treat and prevent mental
health care problems before they arise.
Along with its SOCOM headquarters-based staff, eleven hospital
liaisons help extend Care Coalition`s reach across the country and
globe. These efforts are also supplemented by support from over 70
partner organizations.
When supporting our wounded, ill and/or injured and their families,
our job is never done. We still need to improve synchronization among
the various government agencies supporting these individuals, also
refine legislation to fund them.
Your support is essential. Over the past couple of years alone, SOF
operators benefited from legislation that introduced a cognitive
rehabilitation pilot program, pay and allowance continuation for
wounded operators, care giver training and compensation, expansion of
invitational travel orders for families of wounded, traumatic
serviceman group life insurance, and memorial service support to our
surviving families.
looking forward
The three priorities on which SOFs need to focus--mission, people,
and equipment--are enduring. Through direct action, we deter, disrupt
and defeat terrorist threats across the globe. In tandem, indirect
action creates and sustains environments to empower longer-term
success.
As we remain prepared for urgent, bold and decisive action, we
recognize that it is high-quality, low-profile, long-term engagement
that fosters trust and enables essential partnerships. In this regard,
we should measure success by how well we have prepared others to face
their security challenges, not by what we do for them.
We also recognize that as we look forward, success increasingly
depends upon the larger combination of defense, diplomacy, and
development activities. In relaying his sentiments on the Afghanistan
conflict, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mullen indicated
that ``winning is not solely the responsibility of the U.S. Military.''
``Success,'' he said, ``will come by and only through a concerted
effort by other agencies and partners.'' We applaud policy and funding
that provide other agencies the capabilities to contribute to this
effort.
As always, SOCOM and SOF--with your continued support--will answer
the needs of operational commanders. Technology areas seen as vital to
short- and long-term intervention will continue as focus areas for
SOCOM research and development. Key enabling mechanisms across all
terrains will yield the most effective, strategic, and tactical
implementation of our forces.
SOCOM will emphasize even more precise methods for gathering,
analyzing, processing and sharing of information and intelligence about
these domains. We will continue to engender existing relationships with
interagency partners while exploring opportunities to further improve
them. Our technology investments will permit us to better locate, tag
and track threats before they strike.
Sufficient infrastructure is essential to supporting our operators,
and many of our existing facilities are in need of expansion or
upgrade. The military construction program proposed for fiscal year
2011 will help to improve this situation. Much-needed construction and
modernization on 19 different projects at 9 different installations
will sustain SOF operations support, operational communications,
aircraft maintenance and capabilities, and intelligence functions.
The contributions of this force amaze me every day. While
relatively small in number, their dramatic, positive impact is of the
greatest magnitude. They remain the world`s most precise and lethal
counterterrorism force, and the most effective special operations
trainers, advisors and combat partners. It is a profound honor to be
associated with this extraordinarily capable and uniquely innovative
force and to represent them before this committee.
Our successes are only possible because of this committee`s active
advocacy for the Command and its mission. Speaking on behalf of the
entire community, your visits to the theater and to troops in recovery
are deeply appreciated. Your support of the President`s budget will
enable special operations to continue to meet our great Nation`s
highest expectations. Again, thank you.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
General Petraeus, welcome.

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND

General Petraeus. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide an update on the situation in the CENTCOM AOR, and an
opportunity to discuss CENTCOM's strategy and priorities for
the year ahead.
It is a pleasure to be here with my colleague and good
friend, Admiral Olson.
I, too, have submitted a written statement for the record,
and will summarize it here.
CENTCOM is now in its ninth consecutive year of combat
operations. It oversees the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq and the assistance to Pakistan, as well as a theaterwide
campaign against al Qaeda. We are also, of course, working on
numerous contingency plans, and we continue the effort to build
partnerships throughout the AOR, working in concert with our
diplomatic colleagues as part of whole-of-government approaches
to help increase the capabilities of partner-nation security
forces.
Meanwhile, the conditions and dynamics that shape the
security environment continue to evolve. Today, I'll briefly
discuss these developments and our ongoing missions, as well as
some of the dynamics that shape activities in the CENTCOM AOR.
First, Afghanistan. As President Obama observed in
announcing his new policy, ``It is in our vital national
interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to
Afghanistan.'' As he noted, these forces will provide the
resources that we need to seize the initiative while building
the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition
of our forces out of Afghanistan.
Clearly, the challenges there are considerable, but success
there is, as General McChrystal has observed, both important
and achievable. Our goals in Afghanistan and in that region are
clear. They are to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and
its extremist allies, and to set conditions in Afghanistan to
prevent reestablishment of transnational extremist sanctuaries,
like the ones al Qaeda enjoyed there prior to September 11.
To accomplish this task, we are working with our
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan
partners to improve security for the Afghan people, to wrest
the initiative from the Taliban and other insurgent elements,
to develop the Afghan security forces, and to support
establishment of Afghan governance that is seen as legitimate
in the eyes of the people.
We spent much of the past year working to get the inputs
right in Afghanistan; establishing the structures and
organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-
military campaign plan; putting our best leaders in charge of
those organizations; developing the right concepts to guide our
operations--the comprehensive campaign plan, the ISAF
counterinsurgency guidance, and the tactical directive issues
by General McChrystal; and providing the authorities and
deploying the resources needed to achieve unity of effort and
to implement the concepts developed.
These resources include the forces deployed in 2009 and the
30,000 additional U.S. forces currently deploying, some 9,000
more forces from partner nations, additional civilian experts,
and funding to enable our operations in the training and
equipping of 100,000 additional Afghan security force members
over the next year and a half. I should note that the flow of
additional forces and associated equipment would not have been
possible without your continued support, in general, and your
support of our expeditionary military construction program, in
particular.
With the inputs largely in place now in Afghanistan, we are
starting to see the first of the outputs. Indeed, the recent
offensive in central Helmand Province represented the first
operation of the overall civil-military campaign plan developed
by ISAF and its civilian partners, together with Afghan
civilian and security force leaders.
Central to progress in Afghanistan will be developing the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), an effort made possible
by your sustained support of the Afghan Security Forces Fund.
Expansion of Afghanistan's security forces is now underway in
earnest in the wake of the Afghan and international community
decision to authorize an additional 100,000 security force
members between now and the fall of 2011.
This effort is facilitated considerably by the recent
establishment of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, led by
Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell. ISAF-member nations are now
working hard to field the additional trainers, mentors, partner
elements, and transition teams to enable the considerably
augmented partnering, training, and recruiting that are
essential to the way ahead in this important area.
The civil-military campaign on which we have embarked in
Afghanistan will unfold over the next 18 months, and as many of
us have observed, the going is likely to get harder before it
gets easier. As we seek to expand security for the people and
to take from the Taliban control of key areas, the enemy will
fight back. Moreover, we are not likely to see the kind of
dramatic reduction in violence that we saw about 6 months into
the surge in Iraq; in part, because the levels of violence in
Afghanistan are nowhere near those of Iraq at the height of the
sectarian violence, though they clearly are at levels that make
progress in certain areas very difficult.
In any event, 2010 will be a difficult year, a year that
will see progress in a reversal of Taliban momentum in
important areas, but also a year in which there will be tough
fighting and periodic setbacks.
We have seen important change in Pakistan over the past
year. During that time, the Pakistani people, political
leaders, and clerics united in recognizing that the most
pressing threat to their country's very existence was that
posed by certain internal extremist groups; in particular, the
Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani citizens saw the Taliban's
barbaric activities, indiscriminate violence, and repressive
practices in the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), and even in some of
Pakistan's so-called settled areas, and they realized that the
Taliban wanted to take Pakistan backwards several centuries,
not forward.
With the support of Pakistan's people and leaders, the
Pakistani military has carried out impressive counterinsurgency
operations over the past 10 months. The Army and the Frontier
Corps have, during that time, cleared the Taliban from Swat
District, which I visited 3 weeks ago, and from other areas of
the Northwest Frontier Province, as well. Now, they are
holding, building, and beginning to transition in those areas.
They have also carried out impressive operations in South
Waziristan, home to the former Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of
the extremist elements that assassinated Benazir Bhutto and
blew up thousands of innocent Pakistanis and security force
members in recent years. They have carried out good operations
in some other areas of the FATA as well, including in Baijaur
Agency most recently.
These latter operations have been carefully coordinated
with ISAF and Regional Command (RC)-East, and that coordination
enabled RC-East elements to engage extremists who fled
Pakistani operations and crossed the Durand Line into
Afghanistan. In short, Pakistani forces have been carrying out
an impressive campaign, and the Pakistani forces and people
have suffered tough losses during the course of it.
We recognize the need for considerable assistance to
Pakistan as they continue their operations, and we will
continue to work with Congress in seeking ways to support
Pakistan's military.
Our focus has been on supporting the Pakistani forces. They
are doing the fighting. We are providing various forms of
assistance. Our task, as Secretary Gates has observed, has to
be to show that we are going to be a steadfast partner, that we
are not going to do to Pakistan what we've done before, such as
after Charlie Wilson's War, when we provided a substantial
amount of assistance and then left precipitously, leaving
Pakistan to deal with a situation we'd helped create.
It is, therefore, important that we provide a sustained,
substantial commitment, and that is what we are endeavoring to
do, with your support. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill does that by
providing $1.5 billion in economic assistance per year for 5
years. The provision of coalition support funding, foreign
military financing, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Fund, and
other forms of security assistance provide further critical
assistance for Pakistan's security forces. Together, this
funding and our assistance demonstrate America's desire to
strengthen this important strategic partnership and help our
Pakistani colleagues.
In the 3 years since the conduct of the surge, security in
Iraq has improved significantly. Numbers of attacks, violent
civilian deaths, and high-profile attacks are all down by well
over 90 percent from their highs in 2006 and 2007. With the
improvements in security has also come progress in a variety of
other areas: in the repair of infrastructure damaged during the
violence; in the provision of basic services; in attracting
international investment; and even in various social and
political areas.
The conduct of the elections on March 7, during which an
impressive turnout of Iraqi voters defied al Qaeda attempts to
intimidate them, provided the latest example of Iraq's progress
since the sectarian violence of 2006 and 2007 ripped apart the
very fabric of Iraqi society. As always, however, the progress
in Iraq is still fragile, and it could still be reversed. Iraq
still faces innumerable challenges, and they will be evident
during what will likely be a difficult process as the newly-
elected Council of Representatives selects the next prime
minister, president, and speaker of the council, and seeks
agreement on other key decisions, as well.
Our task in Iraq is to continue to help the ISF--in part,
through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund--as we continue to draw
down our forces in a responsible manner. This task has been
guided by the policy announced by President Obama about a year
ago. Since that announcement, we have reduced our forces in
Iraq by well over 30,000, to some 97,000, and we are on track
to reduce that number to 50,000 by the end of August, at which
time we will also complete a change in mission that marks the
transition of our forces from a combat role to one of advising
and assisting Iraq Security Forces.
As we draw down our forces in Iraq and increase our efforts
in Afghanistan, we must not lose sight of other developments in
the CENTCOM AOR. I want to highlight the developments in two
countries in particular: Yemen and Iran.
In Yemen, we have seen an increase in the prominence of al
Qaeda as it exploits the country's security, economic, and
social challenges. The threat to Yemen, to the region, and
indeed to the U.S. Homeland, posed by what is now called al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has been demonstrated by
suicide bombers trying to carry out operations in Yemen's
capital, by the attempt to assassinate the assistant Minister
of Interior in Saudi Arabia, and by the attempted bombing of a
U.S. airliner on Christmas Day.
In fact, a number of us have been increasingly concerned
over the past 2\1/2\ years by the developments we have observed
in Yemen. Last April, I approved a plan, developed in concert
with our ambassador in Yemen, U.S. intelligence agencies, and
the State Department, to expand our assistance to key security
elements in Yemen. With Yemeni President Saleh's approval, we
began executing that plan last summer, and this helped
strengthen the capabilities demonstrated by the Yemeni
operations that were carried out against al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula in mid-December, and that have been executed
periodically since then, as well. With your support, we are
working toward expanded, sustained levels of assistance in
Yemen.
In fact, our efforts in Yemen should not just be seen as
part of our overall counterterrorist campaign, but also as part
of what might be termed preventive counterinsurgency
operations, for our efforts not only help develop key security
forces in Yemen, they also contribute to the overall effort to
help Yemen deal with challenges that could become much more
significant if not dealt with early on.
Iran poses the major state-level threat to regional
stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Despite numerous U.N. Security
Council resolutions and extensive diplomatic efforts by the P5-
plus-1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Iranian
regime continues its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran is assessed
by many analysts to be engaged in pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability, the advent of which would destabilize the region
and likely spur a regional arms race.
The Iranian regime also continues to arm, fund, train,
equip, and direct proxy extremist elements in Iraq, Lebanon,
Gaza, and, to a lesser degree, Afghanistan. It continues
significant intervention in the domestic politics in each of
those locations, as well.
The Iranian regime's internal activities are also
troubling, as its violent suppression of opposition groups and
demonstrations in the wake of last years' highjacked elections
has made a mockery of the human rights of the Iranian people
and fomented further unrest. Those internal developments have
also resulted in greater reliance than ever on Iran's security
services to sustain the regime's grip on power.
Having discussed the developments in these countries, I'd
now like to explain the importance of two key enablers in our
ongoing missions, and to raise one additional issue. The
Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) continues to be a
vital tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small
CERP projects are often the most responsive and effective means
to address a local community's needs. Where security is
challenged, CERP often provides the only tool to address
pressing requirements.
In the past year, we have taken a number of actions to
ensure that we observe the original intent for CERP, and also
to ensure adequate oversight for use of this important tool. I
have, for example, withheld approval for projects over $1
million, at my level, and there has only been one such project
since late last September. In the past year we've asked the
Army Audit Agency to conduct audits of the CERPs in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We've established guidelines for the number of
projects each CERP team should oversee, and we have coordinated
with the military Services to ensure adequate training and
preparation of those who will perform functions connected with
CERP in theater, while we have also established procedures to
take cash off the battlefield.
Beyond that, the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently
performing an internal assessment and undertaking additional
initiatives. With the force increases in Afghanistan, CERP
funding priority has understandably shifted from Iraq to
Afghanistan. We pledge to continue aggressive oversight of the
CERP as this shift takes place. In addition, we will continue
to seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to allow for
greater cost-sharing and to spur the development of similar
counterinsurgency tools by coalition and host-nation partners.
In the past year, CENTCOM has pursued several initiatives
to improve our capabilities in the information domain, and we
have coordinated these actions closely with the State
Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Judith
McHale. This past year, we made significant headway in
improving our ability to counter adversary IO, including
establishing a full-fledged Joint IO Task Force in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, we still have a long way to go, and we desperately
need to build the capabilities of a regional IO task force to
complement the operations of the task force that has done such
impressive work in Iraq, and the one that is now beginning to
do the same in Afghanistan.
In the broader CENTCOM AOR, Operation Earnest Voice (OEV)
is the critical program of record that resources our efforts to
synchronize our IO activities, to counter extremist ideology
and propaganda, and to ensure that credible voices in the
region are heard. OEV provides CENTCOM with direct
communication capabilities to reach regional audiences through
traditional media, as well as via Web sites and regional public
affairs blogging. In each of these efforts, we follow
admonition we practiced in Iraq, that of being first with the
truth. Full and enduring funding of OEV and other DOD IO
efforts will, in coordination with State Department
initiatives, enable us to do just that, and, in so doing, to
communicate critical messages and to counter the propaganda of
our adversaries.
Cyberspace is becoming an extension of the battlefield, and
we cannot allow it to be uncontested enemy territory. Indeed,
in the years ahead, extremist activities in cyberspace will
undoubtedly pose increasing threats to our military, and our
Nation as a whole. DOD and other elements of our Government are
working to come to grips with this emerging threat. Clearly,
this is an area in which we need to develop additional
policies, build capabilities, and ensure adequate resources. I
suspect that legislation will be required over time, as well.
Within DOD, the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command,
proposed by Secretary Gates, represents an essential step in
the right direction. This initiative is very important, because
extremist elements are very active in cyberspace. They recruit
there, they prosthelytize there, they coordinate attacks there,
and they share tactics and techniques there. We have to ask
ourselves if this is something that we should allow to
continue; and, if not, then we have to determine how to prevent
or disrupt it without infringing on free speech.
In conclusion, there are currently some 210,000 soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen serving in the
CENTCOM AOR. Day after day, on the ground, in the air, and at
sea, these courageous and committed troopers perform difficult
missions against tough enemies under the most challenging of
conditions. Together with our many civilian and coalition
partners, they have constituted the central element in our
effort to promote security, stability, and prosperity in the
region. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers
stationed around the world constitute the most experienced,
most capable military in our Nation's history. They and their
families have made tremendous sacrifices, and nothing means
more to these great Americans than the sense that those back
home appreciate their service to our country.
In view of that, and on behalf of all those serving in the
CENTCOM AOR, I want to take this opportunity to thank the
American people for their extraordinary support of our men and
women in uniform. I also want to take this opportunity to thank
the members of this committee and of Congress overall for their
unwavering support and abiding concern for our troops and their
families.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN David H. Petraeus, USA
i. introduction
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) is now in its ninth consecutive year of major
combat operations in an area of the world critical to the interests of
the United States and our allies. With our national and international
partners, CENTCOM promotes security cooperation among nations; responds
to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression; and
supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to
establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and
prosperity. Typically, executing this mission and achieving U.S.
national goals and objectives in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility
(AOR) involves more than just the traditional application of military
power. In many cases, a whole-of-government approach is required, one
that integrates all the tools available to international and
interagency partners to defeat transnational groups that pose a threat
to the United States or our partners; to secure host-nation
populations; to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency and security
operations; to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD); to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental and
institutional capacity; and to promote economic development.
These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics
shaping the region's security environment are constantly evolving. In
the past year, there have been several important developments in the
AOR--some representing progress, others presenting challenges. These
changes include increased operations by the Pakistani military against
groups that threaten the writ of governance in Pakistan, as well as
continued improvements in the capabilities and self-reliance of the
Iraqi Security Forces coupled with the degradation of the capabilities
of militant groups in Iraq. We have also seen increased insurgent
violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a general diminution of al Qaeda
in the region despite an increase in the prominence of al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula in Yemen (AQAP), the emergence of significant
domestic unrest and opposition in Iran accompanied by the regime's
continued intransigence over its nuclear program and its support to
militant proxies, an increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the
coast of Somalia, and the continuing fallout from the global financial
crisis.
The progress we have seen has not simply happened of its own
accord. It is, to a great extent, the result of the work of U.S.,
partner, and coalition forces operating in the AOR over the past year.
Since the delivery of last year's Posture Statement, CENTCOM has worked
to implement national policies as well as the recommendations of the
comprehensive strategic review we conducted last winter. We have begun
the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq, working to sustain the
hard-won security gains achieved since the summer of 2007 and placing
us on track to have 50,000 troops in Iraq after this August. We are
implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to
include an increase in forces and non-military resources. Having put
into place the proper organizations, people, and concepts for the
civil-military campaign in Afghanistan, we are currently deploying
additional resources to halt the downward spiral in security and expand
the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. We have placed
great pressure against al Qaeda's networks and senior leadership, and
we have also made good strides in developing a Regional Security
Architecture to address common security threats in the region. All the
while, CENTCOM forces have continued to provide military support to
major diplomatic initiatives in the region and to maintain a ready
posture to respond to unforeseen crises.
Building on our past successes and achievements and responding to
the region's dynamics, CENTCOM will focus on the following priority
tasks in the coming year:

Reversing the momentum of the insurgency in
Afghanistan and training Afghan security forces to regain the
initiative against militants and to increase public confidence
in the government;
Helping our Iraqi partners build on their progress
while sustaining hard-won security gains, reducing U.S. forces
in the country, and transitioning to a new mission of advising
and assisting the Iraqi security forces;
Maintaining persistent kinetic and non-kinetic
pressure to degrade and counter transnational terrorist and
militant organizations that threaten the security of the United
States and our allies;
Expanding our partnership with the Pakistani military,
supporting its operations against militant groups, and
assisting in the development of its counterinsurgency
capabilities;
Countering destabilizing Iranian activities and
policies;
Countering the proliferation of WMD and related
material, technology, and expertise, while building the
capacity and interoperability of our partners to prevent and,
if necessary, respond to the use of WMD;
Bolstering the military and security capabilities of
our partner nations' security forces;
Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal
narcotics trafficking, and arms smuggling;
Bolstering oversight and ensuring responsible
expenditure of U.S. funding; and
Working with the U.S. military services to reduce the
strain on our forces and the cost of our operations.

The intent of the remainder of this Posture Statement is to address
these priorities and the broader, long term solutions they support by
providing a more detailed overview of the AOR, a description of our
strategic approach to defending and advancing our interests,
assessments of the situation in each of the AOR's major sub-regions,
and comments on the programs and systems that enable our operations.
ii. overview of the centcom aor
A. Nature of the AOR
The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and
distinct regions. It stretches across more than 4.6 million square
miles and 20 countries in the Middle East and South and Central Asia
and contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red
Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as
strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb,
and the Strait of Hormuz. The AOR encompasses the world's most energy-
rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together
accounting for at least 64 percent of the world's known petroleum
reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil production, and 46 percent of its
known natural gas reserves.
Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout
the region. The region is home to some of the world's wealthiest and
poorest states, with annual per capita incomes ranging from $800 to
over $100,000. Despite important pockets of affluence, many of the more
than 530 million people living in the AOR suffer from inadequate
governance, underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption,
and high unemployment.
As a result of these contrasts and the proliferation of global
communications and mass media, many people in the AOR are struggling to
balance modern influences with traditional social and cultural
authorities and to manage change at a pace that reinforces stability
rather than erodes it. For the past century, the sub-regions of the AOR
have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have
struggled to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of
traditional empires. These conflicts have intensified in the past three
decades with the emergence of al Qaeda and its Associated Movements,
the specter of nuclear weapons, and enormous wealth derived from
petroleum and illegal narcotics. Today we see stability in the AOR
threatened by interstate tensions, the proliferation of ballistic
missile and nuclear weapons technology and expertise, ethno-sectarian
violence, insurgencies and sub-state militias, as well as horrific acts
of terrorism.
B. U.S. Interests and the Most Significant Threats to Them
Because of the CENTCOM AOR's geography, control of much of the
world's energy reserves, and propensity for instability, the United
States has substantial strategic interests in, and related to, the
region. Chief among these are:

the security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. Homeland;
regional stability;
international access to strategic resources, critical
infrastructure, and markets; and
the promotion of human rights, the rule of law,
responsible and effective governance, and broad-based economic
growth and opportunity.

The most serious threats to these interests lie at the nexus of
militant groups, hostile states, and WMD. Across the AOR, al Qaeda and
its Associated Movements are fueling insurgencies to reduce U.S.
influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and
economic order. Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a dangerous
game of allowing or accepting terrorist networks and facilitators to
operate from or through their territory, believing that their own
people and governments will be immune to their threat. Efforts to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems magnify the
potential dangers of the marriage between some states and their
militant proxies. Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear arms by hostile
states or terrorist organizations would constitute a grave threat to
the United States, our allies, and the countries of the region and
would likely spark a destabilizing arms race.
In the near term, the greatest potential for such a threat to arise
is found in the instability in South Asia, the activities and policies
of the Iranian regime, the situation in Iraq, and the growth of AQAP in
Yemen.

Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan constitute the most
urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. Al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and the syndicate of militant groups operating in the border
region between Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaging in an
increasingly violent campaign against the people and
Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both states face a
serious threat from these groups, and though some of these
organizations perpetrate acts of terrorism against local
targets and others operate internationally, these groups have
increasingly cooperative, even symbiotic, relationships. As a
result, the control by any of these groups of major population
centers or significant economic or financial resources would
present an enormous challenge to security in the region and
across the globe.
Iran's Destabilizing Activities and Policies. The
activities and policies of the Iranian regime constitute the
major state-level threats to regional stability. Despite
repeated International Atomic Energy Agency findings of Iranian
violations of non-proliferation obligations, five United
Nations Security Council
Situation in Iraq. Security in Iraq has improved
significantly since the peak of the sectarian violence in mid-
2007, but the gains there remain fragile and reversible, though
increasingly less so. In Iraq, a number of factors continue to
pose serious risks to U.S. interests and have the potential to
undermine regional stability, disrupt international access to
strategic resources, and frustrate efforts to deny terrorist
safe havens and support bases. Internally, fundamental issues
such as the distribution of political power and resources
remain to be settled. The Iraqi state is still developing, and
numerous challenges confront its leaders and people,
Instability in Yemen. The inability of the Yemeni
Government to effectively secure and exercise control over all
its territory offers AQAP a safe haven in which to plan,
organize, and support terrorist operations. This network poses
a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland, as evidenced by recent
plots, including the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on
Christmas Day 2009. At the same time, the Yemeni state faces
challenges from separatist movements in the South and a 6-year
conflict with Houthi rebels, which despite the cease-fire in
February could reignite and again spill over into Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, the influx of refugees from Africa, pervasive arms
smuggling, a deteriorating economic situation, and piracy
continue to challenge the capabilities of the Yemeni
Government.
C. Cross-cutting Challenges to Security and Stability
While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics
and challenges in the sub-regions of the AOR, there are a number of
cross-cutting issues that serve as major drivers of instability, inter-
state tensions, and conflict. These factors can serve as root causes of
instability or as obstacles to security.

Insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle
East peace. The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of
its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to
advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions
often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations.
The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a
perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the
Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S.
partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and
weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that
anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran
influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese
Hizballah and Hamas.
Militant Islamist movements. The CENTCOM AOR is home
to militant Islamist movements that threaten states in the
region, exploit local conflicts, and foster instability through
acts of terrorism. The most significant of these is al Qaeda,
which, along with its Associated Movements, seeks to impose its
Proliferation of WMD. The AOR contains states and
terrorist organizations that actively seek WMD capabilities and
have previously proliferated WMD-related material, technology,
and expertise outside established international monitoring
regimes. In addition, regional states are increasingly
interested in the development of nuclear programs, which, if
not properly managed, could lead to the proliferation of
illicit nuclear material or a regional arms race.
Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively
governed spaces. Weak civil and security institutions and the
inability of certain governments in the region to exert full
control over their territories are conditions that insurgent
groups can exploit to create physical safe havens in which they
can plan, train for, and launch operations or pursue narco-
criminal activities. We have seen these groups develop, or
attempt to develop, what might be termed sub-states,
particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen,
and the Palestinian territories.
Significant sources of terrorist financing and
facilitation. The AOR remains a primary source of illicit
funding and facilitation for global terrorist organizations and
other militant groups. All this financing is transmitted
through a variety of formal and informal networks, which
include financial operatives and front companies throughout the
region.
Piracy. The lack of governance in Somalia has allowed
piracy to grow off the coast and in the Horn of Africa
threatening the flow of commerce through the region. Since the
spike in piracy in 2008, we have worked in close cooperation
with the international community to counter this trend by
focusing on increasing international presence, encouraging the
shipping industry to adopt best practices to defend against
piracy, and establishing a sound international legal framework
for resolving piracy cases. Despite some reduction in the
number of successful pirate attacks in the region, piracy
remains lucrative--increasingly so, as the ransom rates have
nearly doubled over the previous year's--and pirates continue
to modify their area of operations and techniques to avoid
coalition presence.
Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries. Within
certain countries, the politicization of ethnicity, tribal
affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the
development of national civil institutions and social cohesion,
at times to the point of violence. Between countries in the
region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve
as catalysts for conflict and insurgency.
Disputed territories and access to vital resources.
Unresolved issues of disputed territorial boundaries and
disagreements over the sharing of vital resources, such as
water, oil, and natural gas, serve as sources of tension and
conflict between and within states in the region.
Criminal activities, such as weapons, narcotics, and
human trafficking. Weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking,
and associated criminal activities undermine security, spur
corruption, and inhibit legitimate economic activity and good
governance throughout the AOR. In particular, state-sponsored
weapons trafficking in support of groups like Lebanese
Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad undermines
regional security and the Middle East Peace Process.
Uneven economic development and lack of employment
opportunities. Despite substantial economic growth rates
throughout much of the region over the past few years,
significant segments of the population in the region remain
economically disenfranchised, under-educated, and without
sufficient opportunity. In addition many countries in the
region face growing ``youth bulges'' that will strain their
economies' abilities to produce sufficient employment
opportunities. The recent global economic downturn has
heightened these problems. Without sustained, broad-based
economic development, increased employment opportunities are
unlikely given the growing proportions of young people relative
to overall populations.
Lack of regional and global economic integration. The
AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce among
countries, which diminish prospects for long term economic
growth, as well as opportunities to deepen interdependence
through increased political, commercial, social, and cultural
ties.
iii. regional strategy
To help defend and advance our national interests, CENTCOM executes
a strategy that promotes security and stability in our AOR. In
cooperation with our partners and in concert with national policy, we
work to deter aggression as well as eliminate the conditions that
foment conflict. Given the complexities of the AOR and its many
security challenges, we have adopted a strategy that consists of active
engagement in the region as well as prudent preparation for
contingencies. The following sections describe the highlights of this
strategy by outlining the strategic vision we seek to achieve and the
guiding principles and major activities that characterize our approach.
A. Strategic Vision.
The conditions needed for security, stability, and prosperity in
the region constitute the strategic vision we are working toward and
the ultimate goals of our activities. They reflect our desire to
strengthen the international system, while promoting effective and
responsible governance and broad-based economic development throughout
the region. Specifically, we seek a region

that is at peace with itself and its neighbors;
that is focused on common security and cooperation;
with stable governments that are responsive to the
needs of their people;
with patterns of economic development that advance
people's well-being;
where nuclear proliferation is not a threat and where
nuclear energy use is verifiable and for peaceful purposes;
with unhindered international access to strategic
resources, critical infrastructure, and markets; and
from which, and within which, groups such as al Qaeda
do not threaten the United States or our allies.

Working towards these objectives, in concert with the Department of
State, is the most feasible and acceptable strategy for addressing the
threats to our interests. To be sure, these objectives are broad and
far-reaching, but they are nonetheless attainable.
B. Strategic Approach.
Achieving this vision and establishing these conditions necessarily
requires changing--in some respects significantly changing--the
security environment in the region, and as a result, our activities
must be guided by the principle that our security solutions be
comprehensive, cooperative, and enduring. This guidance recognizes that
we must simultaneously address security, political, and economic
challenges in the region; that we cannot do this through military means
alone or without the cooperation of our partners in the region and the
broader international community; and that these changes must be
longlasting and, eventually, self-sustaining.

Comprehensive Solutions. Because instability and
insecurity in the AOR stem from a complex mix of security,
political, and economic challenges, we must pursue
comprehensive solutions to problems in the region. This
requires us to apply whole-of-government approaches that fully
integrate our military and non-military efforts and those of
our partners. For example, to address the threat posed by
insurgent groups we are dismantling their networks and
leadership, often through the use of security forces, while
also working to eliminate their sources of support by
protecting populations from these groups, disrupting their
financial networks and sources of financing, delegitimizing
their methods and ideologies, and addressing legitimate
grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population.
We constantly strive to understand the complexities of these
challenges and tailor our approaches to the unique
circumstances on the ground.
Cooperative Solutions. Because the challenges in the
region are often transnational ones and because no nation can
protect itself from these threats without cooperation from
others, we must pursue cooperative, multilateral solutions. We
seek collective action and an atmosphere of broad inclusivity
and partnership to attract the needed pool of resources and to
leverage each country's
Enduring Solutions. Finally, because we want lasting
conditions of security and prosperity, we must seek long term,
enduring solutions to the challenges in the region. To this
end, we work to address the root causes of instability rather
than apply quick fixes to their symptoms. Also, to achieve the
cooperation described above, we pursue strategic partnerships
with the Nations of the region rather than short-term
transactional relationships. Lastly, we strive to increase
integration and interdependence in the region in many different
areas--diplomatic, commercial, social, and cultural--under the
belief that increased interaction is a positive-sum game that
benefits all parties and reduces the incentives for conflict.
All of our efforts require sustained commitments of our
attention, energy, and, in some cases, resources.

Adhering to these principles in our strategic approach and in the
execution of our operations places a premium on unity of effort at all
levels and with all participants. At the combatant command level, this
means working with our interagency and international partners to
develop joint action or campaign plans that establish appropriate
missions and objectives for our subordinate elements, from major
commands such as U.S. Forces-Iraq and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
to our country-based offices of military cooperation. To effectively
carry out these plans, we work carefully to coordinate our military
elements with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador as
well as our international and host nation partners.
C. Major Activities
In addition to our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our
forces are engaged in numerous, wide-ranging endeavors designed to
establish the conditions described above for security, stability, and
prosperity in the region. Chief among these major activities are our
efforts designed to do the following:

Defeat al Qaeda and its Associated Movements
Deny sanctuaries and disrupt support for insurgent
groups
Counterproliferation of WMD and associated technology
Deter and counter state-based aggression and proxy
activities
Support the peaceful resolution of longstanding
interstate conflicts
Build bilateral and multilateral security partnerships
Develop partner nation security capacity
Help nations protect their critical infrastructure and
support infrastructure development
Bolster at-risk states
Respond to humanitarian crises, when called upon by
our Ambassadors
Counter arms smuggling
Protect freedom of navigation
iv. critical subregions of the centcom aor
The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM
AOR defy attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation
that can address, with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent
issues. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges in the AOR is
through a disaggregation of the problem set into six sub-regions,
described as follows:

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India does
not lie within the boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR)
Iran
Iraq
The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
Yemen
Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan (as well as Israel and the Palestinian territories,
which do not lie within the CENTCOM AOR)
Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
A. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India
Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent
problem set in the CENTCOM AOR and requires complementary and
integrated civil-military, whole-of-government approaches. The two
countries are linked by tribal affiliations and a porous border that
permits terrorists, insurgents, and criminals to move relatively freely
to and from their safe havens. Indeed, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
insurgent groups operating from the border region are engaged in an
increasingly violent campaign against Afghan and coalition Forces and
the developing Afghan state. However, while it is important to note
that the problem sets are related, the United States must forge a
unique partnership with each country.
Afghanistan
The past year was marked by a shift in strategic focus in
Afghanistan. Over the course of the conflict, the Afghan insurgency had
expanded its strength and influence--particularly in the South and
East--and 2009 levels of violence were significantly higher than those
of 2008. The Taliban have been resilient, with their activities fueled
by revenues from outside the region as well as from narcotics-
trafficking, the freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, ineffective governance and services
in parts of the country, as well as by contributions from other
militant groups outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. To reverse this
momentum and the downward spiral in security, we have embarked on a new
12-to-18-month civil-military campaign plan, and coalition forces and
their Afghan partners are fighting to retake the initiative from the
insurgency. The main goals of our strategy, announced by President
Obama last December, include the following:

reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military
action,
denying the Taliban access to and control of key
population and production centers and lines of communication,
disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and
preventing al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan,
degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF),
increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and
employing other local forces selectively to begin a conditions-
based transition of security responsibility to the Afghan
Government by July 2011, and
supporting U.S. Government efforts to build the
capacity of the Afghan Government, particularly in key
ministries.

To implement this strategy, we and our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) partners have spent a great deal of effort putting
into place the right organizations and command and control structures
needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-military campaign. This
includes the capabilities for targeting of insurgents' resources and
finances, detention operations, ministerial capacity building, border
coordination, strategic communications, and the conduct of
reconciliation efforts. This began by ensuring the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander was dual-hatted as both a
NATO Commander and the commander of U.S. forces, which helped to reduce
many of the organizational firewalls between ISAF and Operation
Enduring Freedom elements. We created the ISAF Intermediate Joint
Command (IJC), a three-star headquarters to oversee operational
execution of the counterinsurgency campaign. We established a Joint
Task Force to address detainee operations and help develop rule of law
capacity within the Afghan Government, from policing and incarceration
to trials and convictions. We developed a Force Reintegration Cell
within the ISAF headquarters to support the reintegration and
reconciliation process at the national level. We established an
interagency threat finance cell, an intelligence fusion cell, and a
full-fledged Joint Information Operations Task Force to conduct
strategic communications. We formed the NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan and made several other command and control adjustments,
such as the integration of mentoring teams under the IJC and its battle
space commanders and the restructuring of Army brigades, to improve our
ability to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Lastly, we
formed the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell on the Joint Staff
and inaugurated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Intelligence Center of
Excellence at CENTCOM to better organize our resources here at home.
All of these organizations tie together and support the numerous
activities taking place at the unit level across the country as our
operations move forward over time, and to run them we have hand-
selected some of nation's best civilian and military leaders, all of
whom have been involved with counterinsurgency operations for quite
some time.
Just as critical, we have strengthened our counterinsurgency
approach and established a wide-spread understanding of the critical
concepts guiding and governing our operations. First and foremost in
this approach is a commitment to protecting and serving the people.
This focus is captured in Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and General
Stanley McChrystal's Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan, which
directs our military and civilian components to take a residential
approach and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people,
understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. General
McChrystal has also published counterinsurgency guidance, has pushed to
achieve greater unity of effort, has aggressively pursued the mission
of partnering with the Afghan security forces, and has issued
appropriate guidance on detention, reintegration, joint night raids,
and tactical driving. All of these concepts are designed to secure the
Afghan people, to reduce civilian casualties, and to build their trust
in ISAF forces and the national government.
Critical to the organizations, leaders, and strategies we have put
in place in Afghanistan are the resources needed to support them, in
this case, 30,000 additional U.S. forces, additional civilians experts,
and appropriate funding, each of which was announced by the President
in December at West Point. Just as important are the additional
commitments from other NATO and coalition partners totaling more than
9,000 troops. These resources are starting to flow into the country,
and they will allow us to better expand the security presence in
population centers and along major lines of communication, to better
hold areas cleared of insurgent groups, and to build a new level of
Afghan governmental control.
As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to
develop the capabilities of the ANSF, including the Afghan National
Army, the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan Gendarmerie Force, the
Afghan Border Police, specialized counternarcotics units, and other
security forces. We recognize the fact that international forces must
eventually transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces.
In January 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000; today, there are over
206,000 assigned, but significant work remains in improving the quality
of the Afghan force through enhanced partnering, training, and
recruiting. General McChrystal has placed a premium on comprehensive
partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is being demonstrated in the
ongoing Operation Moshtarak, in which ISAF and ANSF operate at close to
a 1-to-1 ratio. Of equal importance, ISAF and ANSF leaders worked
together in partnership to plan all aspects of the operation, a signal
of ANSF development that goes beyond the number of ANSF boots on the
ground. A properly sized, trained, and equipped ANSF is a prerequisite
for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan, and
through our support and the assistance of the Afghan Security Forces
Fund, the ANSF will continue to expand so that they will be more able
to meet their country's security needs.
In addition, we, along with our civilian colleagues, will bolster
the capabilities and the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan
Government--an effort in which, in much of Afghanistan, we will be
building, not rebuilding. We will do this through our support to local
government at the provincial and district levels, utilizing the new
structure of civilian representatives at each level of our deployed
military. These, along with the efforts of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and national level civil-military and ministerial capacity
building teams are empowering Afghans to solve Afghan problems and
promoting local reintegration where possible. Most recently, we are
supporting governance and development efforts as part of ongoing
operations in Helmand Province.
Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics
trafficking, which provides significant funding to the Taliban
insurgency. This drug money has been the ``oxygen'' in the air that
allows these groups to operate. With the extension of authority granted
to U.S. forces to conduct counter-narcotics operations, we are able to
more closely work with the Afghan Government to disrupt the illicit
narcotics industry though interdiction of the narco-trafficking
network. To complement this effort, we support and promote viable
agricultural and economic alternatives and the requisite infrastructure
to help Afghans bring licit products to market for sale and
distribution.
Executing this strategy requires clear unity of effort at all
levels and with all participants. Our senior commanders (and I) have
worked with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Ambassador Eikenberry, the
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; Stefan di Mistura, the United Nations
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan;
Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATO's new Senior Civilian Representative in
Afghanistan; and the Afghan leadership to improve and synchronize the
whole-of-government approach. Our security efforts have been integrated
into the broader plan to promote political and economic development. We
have urged partner nations to continue the invaluable support they are
providing and to seek additional support as required for mission
accomplishment.
The changes in approach launched in 2009 and 2010 (e.g., greater
military and civilian resources, enhanced unity of effort and
partnering) can help turn the tide over time, but we must manage
expectations as we continue the buildup in our forces. Progress will be
incremental and difficult. In 2010, the Taliban and other insurgent
groups will attempt to build on their previous momentum and create
further instability in the Afghan provinces, particularly in the South
and East. We will endeavor not only to prevent that but to wrest the
initiative from the Taliban.
Pakistan
The possibility of significant instability in Pakistan poses a
serious threat to regional and global security, in large part, because
Pakistan remains a critical strategic foothold for al Qaeda and is
important to the organization's efforts to rally supporters worldwide.
Although al Qaeda senior leaders are under considerably more pressure
in Pakistan than in previous years, the Federally Administered Tribal
Area (FATA) still serves as al Qaeda's principal sanctuary. More
important, these leaders continue to plan and inspire regional and
transnational operations from the FATA, while maintaining the ability
to function as a structured organization, and foreign fighters continue
to travel to Pakistan for training and to join al Qaeda. Additionally,
Pakistan continues to face a serious insurgency fueled by militants
operating from the country's tribal areas with casualties from violent
incidents in Pakistan, particularly bombings and suicide attacks having
increased dramatically over the past year.
However, the people and leaders of Pakistan have increasingly grown
to see these groups as serious threats, and the Pakistani security
forces have stepped up operations against insurgents, showing
impressive determination and skill. They have conducted operations in
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA on an unprecedented
scale, successfully re-taking territory from the insurgent groups.
Pakistan has sustained very tough losses in this effort, and it is
clear that the country's leaders are keenly aware of the severity of
the threat posed by these groups to the people and government.
We are working to forge a stronger partnership with Pakistan and to
support its efforts in two ways. First, we aim to strengthen the
military's capacity to target insurgent groups through the development
of Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities. Second, we support
Pakistan's governmental and economic development. Our efforts have
helped as the Pakistani military has made progress in its
counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps
have cleared many areas of militant groups. However, the hold and build
phases of these operations and the subsequent transition to civil
authority challenge the army and Pakistan's civil institutions. In
fact, these institutions will be pressed by militant efforts to
reassert control over the territory gained in 2009, risking a reversal
of the past year's gains. The passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill,
the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, the $11.3 billion
International Monetary Fund grant, and other key initiatives
temporarily pulled Pakistan back from the brink of an impending
economic collapse a year ago and helped increase Pakistan's capacity
for counterinsurgency operations. Continued support for these
initiatives is critical to enabling the Pakistan to continue its fight
and to expand the writ of governance.
Finally, we are working to reduce regional tensions to enable
adequate focus on the existential threat of militant Islamist movements
in Pakistan. Though Indo-Pakistani tensions have eased since 2008, they
could easily reignite in 2010, particularly in the event of another
significant terrorist attack in India. A major escalation in these
tensions would almost certainly result in the immediate redeployment to
the east of Pakistani forces currently deployed to confront militants
in the West, risking forfeiture of gains in FATA and the NWFP. This
suggests a need for India and Pakistan to continue discussions begun on
February 25 in order to reduce the strategic tension and the risk of
miscalculation between these nuclear states.
B. Iran
The Iranian regime is the primary state-level threat to stability
in the region. Throughout much of the region, the regime pursues a
dual-track foreign policy. Overtly, the Iranian Government cooperates
with regional states through bilateral arrangements to promote Iran as
an economic, political, and military power. In parallel, the regime
entrusts the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force to
execute covert aspects of its foreign policy using political influence,
covert businesses, lethal and non-lethal aid, and training to militants
supportive of the regime's agenda. The Qods Force is active throughout
the region, and, in fact, controls Iranian foreign policy in Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and influences heavily in Afghanistan and the
Gulf Region. Through Qods Force soft power initiatives and
destabilizing activities, such as coercion and direct attacks, Iran is
subverting democratic processes and intimidating the nascent
governments of our partners. The regime continues to intervene in the
Israeli-Palestinian situation through its support to Hamas and Lebanese
Hizballah, and it remains in violation of six United Nations Security
Council Resolutions regarding its nuclear program and arms transfers.
Iran's nuclear program is a serious, destabilizing factor in the
region and is widely believed to be a part of the regime's broader
effort to expand its influence. Although the regime has stated the
purpose of its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful, civilian
use, Iranian officials have consistently failed to provide the
assurances and transparency necessary for full international
confidence. This includes failure to provide verification as required
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory,
and failure to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would allow for more comprehensive
inspections. The regime's obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran's
neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst about
the regime's intentions, as confirmed by the recent IAEA Board of
Governors' near unanimous censure of Iran's recent disclosure of a
secret nuclear facility near Qom. It appears that, at a minimum, Tehran
is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran continues
to develop and improve its uranium enrichment infrastructure and is
likely to use its gas centrifuges to produce fissile material for a
weapon, should it make the political decision to do so. This pattern of
conduct coupled with its rejection of international responsibilities is
troubling, especially when viewed in the context that other regional
states have recently announced their intentions to develop nuclear
power programs. This behavior poses a clear challenge to international
nonproliferation goals due to the possibility of such technologies
being transferred to terrorist groups and the potential for a regional
arms race, as other regional states may seek nuclear parity.
Domestically, the regime is taking dramatic steps to maintain power
in reaction to the persistent civil unrest sparked by the apparent
election manipulation leading to President Ahmadinejad's re-election in
June 2009. The aftermath of the presidential election created a
political rift among regime elites and further hardened certain
leaders' views toward the U.S. and the West over alleged involvement in
supporting a ``soft revolution'' in Iran. Tehran has deployed
significant numbers of security forces, mainly comprised of Basij
militia, to crack down on street protests and conduct mass arrests of
protestors. The regime has also taken sweeping steps to control the
information environment by slowing or shutting down the internet,
telephone networks, and other forms of social media used by protestors
to organize, execute, and publicize their efforts. The opposition
movement, led by former regime insiders, poses the most serious
political challenge to the regime since the advent of the Islamic
Republic.
The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and
international efforts to bring stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
broader region. In Afghanistan, the Iranian regime appears to have
hedged its longstanding public support for the Karzai Government by
providing opportunistic support to the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the
Iranian regime has embarked on a broad campaign led by the IRGC-Qods
Force to influence Iraqi politics and support, through various means,
parties loyal to Iran. The Qods Force also maintains its lethal support
to Shia Iraqi militia groups, providing them with weapons, funding, and
training. Additionally, al Qaeda continues to use Iran as a key
facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al Qaeda's senior
leadership to regional affiliates. Although Iranian authorities do
periodically disrupt this network by detaining select al Qaeda
facilitators and operational planners, Tehran's policy in this regard
is often unpredictable.
Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key
relationships within and outside the AOR help to limit the negative
impact of Iran's policies. A credible U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli
issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to
achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut
Iran's policy of militant ``resistance,'' which the Iranian regime and
insurgent groups have been free to exploit. Additionally, progress on
the Israel-Syria peace track could disrupt Iran's lines of support to
Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our development of a cooperative
Regional Security Architecture, which includes a regional network of
air and missile defense systems as well as hardening and protecting our
partners' critical infrastructure, can help dissuade aggressive Iranian
behavior. In all of these initiatives, our military activities will
continue to support our diplomatic efforts, and we will remain vigilant
across a wide range of contingencies.
C. Iraq
Iraq made steady progress throughout 2009, a year that brought
significant change in the security situation and in Iraqi politics. A
broad backlash against the Islamist parties that have dominated the
Iraqi Government since 2005, along with the Iraqi people's increasing
preference for emerging secular, nationalist parties and leaders,
yielded a stunning result in January 2009's largely violence-free
provincial elections and a peaceful transfer of power in every province
that held an election. Various internal dynamics, however, have
exacerbated the Arab-Kurd dispute over Kirkuk and other territories,
and this issue now looms as the greatest potential Iraqi flashpoint.
The security situation in Iraq remained stable during the
implementation of the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, the handover of
lead responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces, and the drawdown of
U.S. forces from some 130,000 in March 2009 to 96,000 today. The level
of violence generally remained at record lows following the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities in June, demonstrating the Iraqi
Security Forces' growing capability to handle security responsibilities
independently. November witnessed the lowest number of civilian deaths
since spring 2003, and December was the first month since the March
2003 invasion in which no U.S. forces died in combat in Iraq. A number
of high-profile attacks in the second half of 2009 showed, nonetheless,
that the Iraqis still have much work to do in developing
counterterrorism capabilities. While al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) attempt
to discredit and destabilize the government through massive bombings
did not succeed, it did demonstrate AQI's resilience. At the same time,
the Arab-Kurd dispute has lent new life to Ba'athist-related insurgent
groups in northern Iraq, which have attempted to ignite a conflict
along the Green Line. As we continue to draw down our forces in a
responsible manner and comply with our commitments under the U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement, key to further improving the security situation and
mitigating remaining risks will be continuing to help the Iraqi
Security Forces and developing their capabilities through our advisory
and security assistance programs and the Iraq Security Forces Fund.
This year will bring far-reaching developments in Iraqi politics
and the U.S.-Iraq relationship. Just this month, Iraqis took to the
polls and expressed their political will in parliamentary elections
made possible by the security provided by the ISF. The significance of
the elections was clearly evidenced by the strong voter turnout across
the country and the political maneuvering--including the campaign by
some Shia Islamists officials to ban a number of former Baathists and
secularists from running--leading up to election day. The formation of
the new national government following the election will shape the
resolution of outstanding fundamental issues about the nature of the
Iraqi state, including the Arab-Kurd question and the balance between
central and provincial authority. As such, we expect Iraq's internal
political landscape to continue to face evolutionary challenges. We
will continue to work with the new Iraqi Government to implement the
Strategic Framework Agreement and strengthen our bilateral
relationship.
D. The Arabian Peninsula
The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus
because of its importance to our interests and its potential for
insecurity. These Arab states on the Peninsula are the Nations of the
AOR most politically and commercially connected to the United States
and Europe. They are more developed economically than any of their
neighbors, collectively wield substantial defense forces, and are major
providers of the world's energy resources. However, the Peninsula has,
in the past, been a significant source of funding and manpower for
terrorist groups and foreign fighters. Where governments face internal
challenges, the situation is often aggravated and intensified by
external factors, such as the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior,
instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon,
political and security troubles in Iraq, and weapons proliferation.
Over the past few years, we have worked with the countries of the
Arabian Peninsula, as well as other partners in the region, to develop
a Regional Security Architecture to address common security challenges.
This architecture is made up of an array of major components including
a Shared Early Warning system; an increasingly integrated air and
missile defense network; and an extensive array of ground, maritime,
aviation, and special operations exercises each designed to respond to
different types of threats. All of these cooperative efforts are
facilitated by the critical base, port, and training facilities
provided by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and others throughout the
AOR.
This emerging but, nonetheless, significantly developed collection
of partnerships improves our interoperability and our overall
effectiveness in ongoing multi-lateral operations and security
initiatives. The mechanisms and capabilities put in place to coordinate
efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, and littoral security,
can often be employed to respond rapidly to crises in other areas.
Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation on one set of issues
can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby
promoting greater interdependence in the region. Contributions of
funding and forces by regional partners to our operations in
Afghanistan evidence some of these positive spillover effects. Now that
our Gulf partners have begun working closely to address common threats,
the logical next step is to expand the model and encourage the
integration of Iraq with our Gulf partners. Such a step would benefit
the entire region.
Yemen stands out from its neighbors because of its underdeveloped
governmental institutions and weak economy and because of its numerous
security challenges, which include the Southern secessionist movement,
the Houthi tribal rebellion, and the presence of AQAP. Yemen's
strategic location facilitates AQAP's freedom of movement and allows it
to threaten not only Yemen's neighbors but also the United States and
Europe. In recent months we have seen several terrorist attacks
attempted within and emanating from Yemen, the spillover of the Houthi
rebellion into Saudi Arabia, the resurgence of Yemen's Southern
secessionists, and the negative influence of al-Shabaab in Somalia. In
view of these developments, we are working toward expanded, sustained,
and predictable efforts to help build Yemen's security,
counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist capabilities, and we seek to
nearly double U.S. security assistance to the country in the coming
year.
E. Egypt and the Levant
The Levant and Egypt subregion is the traditional political,
social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and is vital to
security and stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Because of its history as a
primary battleground between rival ideologies, the dynamics of this
sub-region, particularly with regard to Israel, influence the internal
and external politics of states outside the region as well. In
addition, U.S. policy and actions in the Levant affect the strength of
our relationships with partners in the AOR. As such, progress toward
resolving the political disputes in the Levant, particularly the Arab-
Israeli conflict, is a major concern for CENTCOM. Through a significant
expansion of our engagement program, capacity building efforts,
training exercises, deployment of Navy vessels to the Red Sea, and
information sharing, we are working with our partners in Egypt and the
Levant to build the capabilities of legitimate security forces, defeat
transnational and sub-state militant groups, combat the spread of WMD
and related materials, and disrupt illegal arms smuggling. In addition,
we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and confidence
building to support efforts to achieve a comprehensive Middle East
peace.
Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a staunch U.S. ally, and a key
actor in the Middle East Peace Process. In recent years, however, the
Egyptian Government has had to deal with serious economic challenges
and an internal militant Islamist threat; as such, U.S. foreign aid has
been a critical reinforcement to the Egyptian Government. At the same
time, concern over the possibility of the spillover of instability in
Gaza has led Egypt to play a pivotal role in international efforts to
address the situation there, to improve border security, and to
interdict illicit arms shipments to Palestinian militants. In
partnership with U.S. Africa Command, we are working with Egypt to
combat militancy and smuggling across the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Nile
basin, and northern Africa.
Jordan continues to be a key partner in the region. The Kingdom's
forces participate in many regional security initiatives and are at the
forefront of police and military training for regional security forces.
In addition to its regular participation in multilateral training
exercises, Jordan promotes regional cooperation and builds our partner
nations' security capacity through its recently opened King Abdullah
Special Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training Center,
International Police Training Center, and Cooperative Management
Center. We support these efforts, as they are critical to the continued
development of legitimate security forces throughout the region,
especially in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and, as a
consequence, will be important to the long term viability of the Middle
East Peace Process.
In Lebanon, Hizballah's rearmament following its conflict with
Israel in 2006, particularly its rocket and missile stocks, portends
continued instability in the region. Hizballah continues to undermine
the authority of the legitimate Lebanese security forces, threaten
Israel, and provide training and support to militant groups outside the
country. Stabilizing Lebanon ultimately requires strengthening the
capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, fully implementing United
Nations Security Council Resolutions, including 1559 and 1701, ending
Iran's illegal support to Hizballah, and assisting the Lebanese
Government in developing a comprehensive national defense strategy
through which the government can exercise its sovereignty, free of
external intervention.
Last, despite continued support to Hizballah, interference in
Lebanese internal politics, and accommodation of foreign fighter
networks and facilitators operating from and through its territory, the
Asad regime in Syria appears to be slowly seeking rapprochement with
its neighbors and the United States.
F. Central Asia
Central Asia is a pivotal region on the Eurasian continent between
Russia, China, Iran, and South Asia, has extensive national resources,
particularly hydrocarbons, and serves as a major transit route for
regional and international commerce and for supplies supporting
coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring stability in Central Asia
requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum paradigms of international
politics associated with the so-called ``Great Game,'' replacing them
with broad partnerships to address common challenges such as terrorism,
WMD proliferation, and illegal narcotics trafficking. There are
numerous opportunities in Central Asia for cooperation that can
simultaneously advance the interests of the Central Asian States and
their neighbors.
However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still
developing in the aftermath of decades of Soviet rule, and they present
challenges to our efforts to promote security, development, and
cooperation. Although there is interdependence across a broad range of
social, economic, and security matters, these nations have not yet
fully established a productive regional modus vivendi. Overcoming these
challenges requires incremental approaches that focus on the
alleviation of near term needs, the establishment of better governance,
the integration of markets for energy and other commercial activity,
and grass-roots economic development.
Over the past 2 years, a primary focus of our engagement with the
Central Asian States has been the development and expansion of our
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which supports coalition forces in
Afghanistan. Through diligent work by the State Department and U.S.
Transportation Command, we have improved the flexibility, efficiency,
and reliability of our logistical support to our operations in
Afghanistan by diversifying the routes, approaches, and contracts that
comprise the logistical network. In 2010, we anticipate expanding our
use of the NDN as additional routes and methods of delivery become
available. In addition to improving our regional access and logistics
capabilities, work on the NDN has significantly increased our contact
with our regional partners and provided opportunities to engage on
numerous common causes and to increase our commercial ties.
In addition to increasing our engagement with the Central Asian
States through the NDN, we continue to help build the capabilities of
indigenous security forces, as well as the mechanisms for regional
cooperation. We provide training, equipment, and facilities for various
army, national guard, and border security forces through our Building
Partnership Capacity programs. In addition, we continue to work with
national level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and
emergency response issues through numerous bilateral training exercises
and initiatives such as our annual Chiefs of Defense Conferences and
the multilateral Exercise Regional Cooperation.
v. critical mission enablers
Success in our ongoing missions and achieving comprehensive,
cooperative, and enduring solutions to our challenges in the AOR, all
the while maintaining a credible, responsive contingency capacity,
requires the support of several key mission enablers. The effects of
these capabilities range from the tactical to the strategic, and
CENTCOM fully supports their continuation, expansion, and improvement.
In requesting and employing these enablers, we recognize the
critical importance of proper oversight to ensure their proper usage,
particularly for funding authorities. In many cases, we have
established control mechanisms that exceed those mandated by Congress,
including numerous additional outside audits and command reviews. This
oversight helps us know whether these programs are being properly
implemented and, equally important, whether these programs are
effective.
A. Building Partnership Capacity
Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are
critical to improving security and stability in the region. They help
strengthen our relationships and build the security and response
capabilities of our partners in the AOR. Continued strong support for
global train and equip resources; Coalition Support Funds; and the
State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military
Sales (FMS), and counter-narcotics security assistance and
reimbursement programs are essential to generating comprehensive and
cooperative solutions to defeat insurgent groups. FMF and FMS remain
our mainstay security assistance tools, but the International Military
Education and Training program is also an important contributor to
developing partner nation capabilities and enduring ties, particularly
for the officers of nascent security forces and from Pakistan, with
whom we must reestablish personal bonds and trust after years without
substantive interaction. While these programs are reasonably successful
in meeting needs in a peacetime environment, we support the reformation
of the security assistance programs and processes described in this
year's Quadrennial Defense Review to create new, more responsive, long
term mechanisms for developing our partner nations' security capacity.
Additionally, in the face of enduring conflict in the region, we
look to expanded special authorities and multi-year appropriations to
quickly meet the emerging needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
and Foreign Internal Defense/Security Force Assistance activities.
Multi-year programs-of-record that provide training, equipment, and
infrastructure for our partner nations' security forces enabled our
successes in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve
comparable progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These critical
programs include the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and the
Cooperative Defense Program.
B. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our
commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most
efficient and effective means to address a local community's emergent
needs, and where security is a challenge, it is often the only
immediate means for addressing those needs. CERP spending is not
intended to replace longer term development assistance administered by
agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
but rather to complement and potentially serve as a catalyst for these
projects. In Iraq as the security situation has improved and allowed
USAID full access, CERP funding has been reduced commensurately.
However, we fully support ongoing efforts to enhance U.S. humanitarian
assistance programs in other parts of the CENTCOM AOR, particularly in
Pakistan. In concert with the State Department, we also seek innovative
mechanisms and authorities to allow for greater cost-sharing and to
create similar counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host
nation partners. These tools should allow for a variety of funding
sources, to include contributions from nongovernmental organizations,
international governmental organizations, and partner governments.
Critical to CERP is its proper oversight. We support the ongoing
Department of Defense internal assessment of the program and its
consideration of establishing a Department-wide CERP coordinator. We
will continue to sponsor outside audits and to work with the Services
to ensure proper pre-deployment training for CERP managers and
contracting personnel.
C. Information Operations
Operation Earnest Voice (OEV) is the critical program of record we
use to synchronize and oversee our Information Operations activities,
to counter our adversaries' ideology and propaganda in the AOR, and to
amplify credible voices in the region, all in close coordination with
the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. OEV provides CENTCOM
direct communication capabilities to a regional audience through
traditional media as well as trans-regional websites and public affairs
regional blogging. Strategic, long term effects are achieved through
our supporting Building Partnership Capacity programs, humanitarian
relief efforts, demining activities, Cooperative Defense Initiatives,
and counterterrorist operations. The audience analysis and assessment
component of OEV provides critical cultural understanding required to
connect with the region's population, tell us which techniques are
effective over time and which are not, and gives us the long term
ability to assess our success or failure in the war of ideas. Full and
enduring funding of OEV and other Defense Department information
operations efforts will best enable us to communicate our strategic
messages and to counter those of our adversaries.
D. Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs)
Initiatives focused on countering the threat of IEDs are of
paramount importance to our operations in the AOR. IEDs continue to be
the primary threat to our ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
efforts to expedite the acquisition and fielding of personal protective
equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles and equipment, and the
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, which
includes the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle, have saved countless lives. An
urgent priority for us is the rapid fielding of MRAPs to support the
increase in U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Because we expect
IEDs to remain a key weapon in the arsenals of militants and insurgents
for years to come, we urge continued support for the Joint IED Defeat
Organization; the Services' baseline sustainment for the MRAP family of
vehicles, base defense initiatives, and Counter-IED efforts; and
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funding and procurement of
equipment to counter IED tactics and networks.
E. Intelligence
Detailed and timely tactical, operational, and strategic level
intelligence collection and analysis remain vital to all aspects of our
operations. While we continue to balance the allocation of our
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and to
refine and optimize our procedures and existing architecture, changes
in the operating environment and the expiration of old systems will
require new, improved, or increased intelligence capabilities. We
support the Department of Defense's planned growth in human
intelligence and counterintelligence specialists, interrogators, and
intelligence analysts, but we also have come to recognize the
importance of non-traditional specialists such as threat finance
analysts, human terrain teams, and document exploitation specialists.
In addition, our requirements for signals intelligence geo-location
capabilities, Ground Moving Target Indicator information, and aerial
imagery from remotely piloted systems, including sea-based ISR,
continue to grow. We also look to Operationally Responsive Space to
temporarily fill the space-based reconnaissance gap to be created as
several current systems reach the end of their operational lives.
Finally, managing these capabilities and fully harvesting the
information they provide requires innovative databases (such as the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange system), applications, and
communication systems.
F. Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems
Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust,
interoperable, high-volume theater C4 infrastructure. We are working to
meet C4 requirements for current operations and to posture enduring
theater C4 capabilities to meet post-conflict requirements as well as
prepare for contingencies. Concurrently, we are working to expand our
information sharing and to improve our partners' commercial and
military C4 capabilities.
We aggressively seek greater bandwidth capacity to improve the
reliability and diversity of our C4 networks. CENTCOM currently
utilizes all available bandwidth to full capacity, but theater fiber
networks are vulnerable to single points of failure in the global
information grid. Military Satellite Communications capabilities are
critical to theater operations, and the acceleration of
transformational upgrades to these systems would reduce our reliance on
commercial providers.
We are also pursuing the means to extend Joint Theater
Expeditionary Command, Control, and Communications support and services
to disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these means include
our sponsorship of Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs).
Under the JCTD Tactical Service Provider (TSP) program, we developed
the capability to more effectively manage available bandwidth and
provide coverage to frontline units. We continue to field and further
develop the Distributed Tactical Communications System, which leverages
new technologies to deliver reliable, critical communications
capabilities to the most remote users. Additional fielding and
technology efforts include the Radio over Internet Protocol Routed
Network and the Joint Airborne Communications System. Despite
tremendous actions by the Department of Defense to help us overcome our
communication and network challenges, to be more effective and
efficient, we require a fully integrated space and terrestrial
communications infrastructure that supports all joint and potential
partner nation users.
G. Cyberspace Capabilities and Authorities
The openness of the global cyber commons exposes us to low risk,
low cost threats from our adversaries. Our networks are constantly
threatened by a range of actors from hackers to criminal organizations
to state-sponsored saboteurs. This activity is aimed at retrieving
sensitive information, exploiting our public domain information to gain
an operational advantage, and disrupting our networks. In addition, our
adversaries use the internet for command and control, recruiting, and
fund raising.
To help address these challenges, we welcome the development and
institutionalization of cyberspace capabilities to help us protect and
operate within these critical systems. The formation of U.S. Cyber
Command and other Defense Department-wide cyberspace activities will
facilitate the fusion of intelligence, operations, and communications
essential to our computer network operations. At the combatant command
level, we have created our own Cyberspace Warfare Cell composed of
intelligence, operations, and communications personnel to synchronize
our cyberspace activities and to integrate with national level efforts.
H. Joint and Multinational Logistics
The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely
deployment, equipping, and sustainment of units engaged in combat
operations. With our multinational and strategic national logistics
partners, we continue to work toward an efficient and effective
logistics architecture that supports our forces and operations and
minimizes costs. Our logistics posture consists of pre-positioned
inventories, air and sealift capabilities, and access to bases with
critical infrastructure, all of which are key logistics components that
support operational flexibility. To maintain this posture and our
readiness, we must quickly reconstitute our Army and Marine Corps pre-
positioned stocks and properly reset returning forces. Moreover, this
logistics posture enables the increase in forces in Afghanistan while
simultaneously supporting the drawdown of forces from Iraq, both of
which remain on track to meet the President's timelines.
The Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan continues to
support CENTCOM, USF-I, and USFOR-A by providing responsive contracting
of supplies, services, and construction, and lays the groundwork for
the capacity building efforts within Iraqi and Afghan ministries. As a
result, in fiscal year 2009, the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and
Afghanistan executed over 33,000 contract actions and obligated a total
of $5.4 billion. Over 36 percent of this funding went to Iraqi and
Afghan firms. CENTCOM is transitioning the Joint Contracting Command to
a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, an initiative that will
enhance management and synchronize contracting across a greater portion
of the AOR. We continue to improve contractor oversight through other
initiatives such as increasing the in-theater presence of Contracting
Officer Representatives and Quality Assurance Representatives, early
identification and training of these representatives for deploying
units, and mandating the use of automated Letters of Authorization for
contractors.
In an effort to lessen our reliance on the ground supply lines
through Pakistan, we are moving an increasing amount of non-military
supplies into Afghanistan via an air and surface intermodal NDN, which
transits through the Central Asian States. We have also established
routes to transport military equipment from Iraq through Turkey merging
with the NDN for onward movement to Afghanistan. Continued expansion of
the NDN and additional host nation access remain logistics priorities
as we shift more sustainment from the routes through Pakistan to the
NDN and optimize the Pakistan routes for units and equipment supporting
the increase in forces in Afghanistan. Our relationships with the
Central Asian States continue to improve as a result of our NDN
efforts, and this is supported by legislation that allows us to expand
our partnerships by locally purchasing supplies for forces in
Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.
I. Overseas Basing and Theater Posture
CENTCOM's overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas
Military Construction projects are developing the infrastructure
necessary for the conduct of ongoing operations, as well as supporting
global access, projection, sustainment, and protection of our combined
forces in the AOR. Fully functional Forward Operating Sites and
Cooperative Security Locations are essential to our ability to conduct
the full spectrum of military operations, engage with and enable
partner nations, and act promptly and decisively. Prepositioned stocks
and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy but
require reconstitution and modernization after having been partially
expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even with generous Overseas Contingency Operations budgets,
military construction timelines are too slow to respond to changes in a
combat environment. Major events such as the approval of the Strategic
Partnership Agreement with Iraq and the recent decision to send
additional forces to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing requirements
can change. Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made
available across the entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim
solutions because they push construction decisionmaking authority to
our engaged commanders in the field. Also, increasing the Operations
and Maintenance construction threshold for minor construction in
support of combat operations across the AOR would increase the ability
of our commanders to quickly meet mission requirements and fully
support and protect our deployed forces.
J. Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes
The technical community writ-large has responded exceptionally well
over the past few years to the needs of our warfighters in the CENTCOM
AOR. While the Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) have responded to our calls for assistance, the Joint IED
Defeat Organization, the Rapid Equipping Force, and Army Material
Command's Fielded Assistance in Science and Technology programs have
been particularly helpful in ensuring that our troopers receive the
best, most advanced equipment and tools to make them effective and to
keep them safe during the execution of their missions. In addition,
several organizations under OSD-Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
and OSD-Defense Research and Engineering, in cooperation with the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have been instrumental in
the discovery, rapid development, and early fielding of critical
operational capabilities, such as more capable ISR systems, human
terrain mapping and analytical tools, and improved ballistic protection
for MRAPs. Last, the Quick Reaction Test Program has helped us use
existing technologies in new and more efficient ways.
The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to
addressing non-counter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations,
and we will continue to use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON)
process to support our warfighters. However, because the JUON process
requires execution year reprogramming by the Services, we found in the
past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful JRAC tool for
supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC used
the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for
Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured
in less than 4 months from the initial identification of the need. The
JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical
biometrics equipment until the JUON process could further source the
program, significantly reducing the time required to deploy the
technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the
JUON process would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter
needs.
K. Personnel
Having appropriately trained personnel in sufficient quantities for
our commands and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) is critical to accomplishing
our assigned missions and achieving our theater objectives. The CENTCOM
headquarters has been satisfactorily manned through temporary
augmentation but may require additional permanent manpower for enduring
mission sets as well as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary
manpower for contingency operations. Within our JTFs and deployed
units, there continue to be shortfalls in many low-density, high-demand
occupational specialties and enabling force structures. Most notably,
critical shortages of intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and
human intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation
specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military
police continue to degrade mission effectiveness. As operations
continue in Afghanistan, we see a critical need for increased public
affairs and information operations personnel to improve our strategic
communications capabilities. Moreover, as we complete our combat
mission in Iraq, we will require non-traditional enabling capabilities
such as leaders to augment newly formed advisory assistance units,
personnel to follow money trails in support of our threat finance
cells, and an increased number of multi-functional logisticians to man
critical logistics units. At the same time, we support a significant
expansion of the U.S. Government's vital, deployable civilian capacity,
particularly in the State Department and USAID.
Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain
important to our operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation
program continues to be a success, having served over 875,000 since its
inception in September 2003. We also continue to depend heavily on
entitlement programs such as Combat Zone Tax Relief, Imminent Danger
Pay, and Special Leave Accrual to support our deployed servicemembers.
vi. conclusion
There are currently over 220,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and coast guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR and soldiering
magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations in
punishing terrain and extreme weather. Together with our many civilian
and coalition partners, they have been the central element to the
security, stability, and prosperity we have increasingly promoted
throughout the region. They will be the key to achieving further
progress in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan and other locations where
serious work is being done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow
troopers around the world constitute the most experienced, most capable
military in our Nation's history. They and their families have made
great sacrifices since September 11, and nothing means more to these
great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their
service and sacrifice.
All those in CENTCOM thank the American people for their
extraordinary support of our military men and women and their families.
We thank the Members of Congress for their unwavering support and
abiding concern for our troopers and their families as well.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Petraeus.
We're going to try a 6-minute round of questions, given the
large turnout this morning.
General Petraeus, Iran's actions and lack of willingness to
comply with U.N. resolutions regarding their nuclear program
continues to undermine security in the region. I believe that
stronger U.N. sanctions against Iran are not only essential,
it's critically important that they be enforced.
The President has--rightly, in my judgment--kept a military
option to take against nuclear facilities in Iran on the table,
should they be used for production of nuclear weapons in
violation of U.N. resolutions. I also believe that the
possibility of a blockade or quarantine of Iran's oil exports
and refined petroleum product imports should also be on a list
of possible options for action. Can you comment on what actions
you think might be successful in terms of sanctions against
Iran, should they continue to violate U.N. resolutions relative
to their nuclear program, but also as to whether we ought to
keep those other options on the table?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, as you noted, the
President has explicitly stated that he has not taken the
military option off the table. As you noted in your statement
earlier, we have worked hard in the region to build the so-
called regional security architecture, to build a network of
shared early warning, of BMD, and of other security
relationships and partnerships that have been brought about in
large measure because of concern by those states with whom we
are carrying out these activities, about the developments in
Iran that I spoke of in my opening statement.
With regard to specific contingency plans or activities,
that would obviously be something that we would want to do in a
closed session. But, clearly now, having given Iran every
opportunity--not just the United States, but all of the
countries engaged in this effort--the focus is shifting to what
is termed the pressure track, and there is a variety of
sanctions included that are now being discussed in the
administration. I don't want to get ahead of them in discussing
those particular items.
Chairman Levin. We are going to have a full hearing on
Iran, and we'll have both an open hearing, as I've mentioned to
you in my office, as well as a closed hearing on that subject.
General Caldwell, who's the head of our NATO training
mission in Afghanistan, has reported a very large increase in
the number of Afghan Army recruits that are awaiting training.
There's a shortage of trainers. We've gone into that, and I
think you would agree that, one way or another, we have to get
those trainers present to increase the speed with which the
size of that army is increased.
What General Caldwell told us when we visited him is that
there were a number of reasons for that significant increase in
the number of recruits, that one of them was the increase in
pay, but he also said that a very significant cause of that
increase in the number of Afghan recruits was that the Afghan
leaders are reaching out to the people in the provinces to
increase, significantly, the number of recruits that are coming
in. One of the things that focused the mind of the Afghan
leaders to do that was the decision of the President to set
that July 2011 date to begin to reduce the presence of American
forces; not to pull our forces out, not to have a total exit in
any sense, but simply to begin reductions as a way of focusing
the minds of the Afghan leaders on their responsibility to
provide for their own security and to transition more of that
responsibility to them.
Do you both support the 30,000 troop surge, and do you also
support the setting of that July 2011 date by the President?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. There is a
shortage of trainers. Admiral Stavridis and the NATO Secretary
General did a force-generation effort. They got about half of
those pledged. As you noted, we have to figure out how to get
the rest of those, and we are looking at various options for
doing that, on the U.S. side, while still urging NATO to
generate the remainder.
The surge in recruits, I think, was a result of two
factors: One, the increased pay, without question, but also a
sense by Afghan leaders that they do have to get on with it. In
the speech at West Point, the President sent two messages. One
was additional commitment, the other was urgency. The urgency
component of that was connected to the July 2011 date. It has
concentrated the minds of Afghan leaders, to a degree, while we
have also sought to reassure leaders in the region that that is
not a date when we bolt for the exits, but it is, rather, a
date on which we begin a conditions-based process of
transitioning some tasks to Afghan forces and begin a
responsible reduction of our forces.
Chairman Levin. Do you personally support that?
General Petraeus. I did. Yes, I have stated that on the
record, many times.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
General Petraeus, I want to talk about the issue with you
that has dominated the news in the last few days, and that is
the increased tensions between the United States and Israel
over the settlements issue, the timing of it, and the
implications of it. I note there's been increased Palestinian
demonstrations and violence in the last day or 2 in Gaza and
West Bank. First of all, I understand that you have the
greatest confidence in Senator Mitchell and his work to try to
bring about progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
Is that true?
General Petraeus. That is absolutely true, Senator.
Senator McCain. I just wanted to get that on the record.
General Petraeus. That's why we've invited him to every
single conference that we have hosted with CENTCOM, with
ambassadors, with commanders, and so forth.
Senator McCain. The present issue is over some increased
construction of settlements in Jerusalem, which Israelis view
within the State of Israel when the peace process is concluded;
Palestinians view it as part of a new Palestinian state. Isn't
the issue not the issue of settlements as much as it is the
existence of the State of Israel? Its neighbors, with
exceptions, have dedicated themselves to the extermination of
the State of Israel. Ahmadinejad has said, time after time,
they want to wipe Israel off the map. Isn't it true that the
Israelis left Gaza on the presumption that then there would be
progress, and instead they got rocket attacks? So, maybe you
could put this in a larger context for us of what needs to be
done to reduce the tensions between the United States and
Israel, our closest ally and friend, in many respects. We'd
like to hear a little bit about your views on that situation
and what needs to be done to defuse it.
General Petraeus. Thanks, Senator.
First of all, just a reminder for all, neither Israel nor
the Palestinian territories are in the CENTCOM AOR.
Having said that, we keep a very close eye on what goes on
there, because of the impact that it has on that part of
CENTCOM that is the Arab world. In fact, we've urged, at
various times, that this is a critical component. It's one
reason we invite Senator Mitchell to brief all of the different
conferences that we host, and seek to support him in any way
that we can when he's in the CENTCOM part of the region, just
as we support Lieutenant General Dayton, who is supporting the
training of the Palestinian security forces from a location
that is in the CENTCOM AOR, as well.
Asking for the Palestinian territories to be added to the
CENTCOM AOR, I have never made that a formal recommendation for
the Unified Command Plan, and that was not in what I submitted
this year, nor have I sent a memo to the White House on any of
this. Some of this was in the press, so I welcome the
opportunity to point that out.
Clearly the tensions, the issues, and so forth, have an
enormous effect. They set the strategic context within which we
operate in the CENTCOM AOR. My thrust has generally been to
encourage that process that can indeed get that recognition
that you talked about, and indeed get a sense of progress in
the overall peace process because of the effect that it has on
what I think we would term the moderate governments in our
area. That really is about the extent of our involvement in
that, Senator.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that a policy of containment
would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear-armed
Iran?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that is a big policy
hypothetical that I would like to go around, rather than into.
I think the policy right now is very clear. The President has
said that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons.
Senator McCain. Are you concerned about the fact that the
President's plan was 30,000 American troops, with 10,000
additional ally contributions. We now have the Dutch obviously
going to remove 2,000 troops. As Senator Levin pointed out, we
don't have a sufficient number of trainers. Do we have any
plans for the additional troops that are necessary? Can we
accommodate for what is clearly a shortfall of the number of
troops that was, in my view, a minimum of what was recommended
by General McChrystal?
General Petraeus. Senator, part of that is why we sought
the additional 100,000 authorization for the ANSF, which came
in the wake of the policy announcement.
It is also why Secretary Gates asked for and received some
flex factor that he has discussed. That is in the background
there; if there came to be an emergent emergency need that is
available, as well.
Senator McCain. Finally, General and Admiral Olson, do you
believe that Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) needs a thorough
review before action is taken?
General Petraeus. Senator, can I give my statement on that?
Senator McCain. We're short of time, but please, go ahead.
Chairman Levin. How long is that statement?
General Petraeus. About 8 minutes, sir.
Chairman Levin. No, no.
General Petraeus. Sir, this is not a sound-bite issue.
Chairman Levin. I understand.
Senator McCain. It's a pretty straightforward question,
though.
Chairman Levin. We respect, believe me, the thoughtfulness
that you are applying to it. We've read your public statements.
But, an 8-minute answer, unless someone else wants to use all
of their time for it, I'm afraid would violate the spirit of
our rules.
I would suggest, however, that if nobody asks you that
question and their time is used for that purpose, that you make
that part of the record. But, someone may very well ask you. I
just don't think it would be right, because of our time limit,
to take 8 minutes out of someone else's time.
General Petraeus. I understand.
Senator McCain. I think you've just made it very unlikely
that you'll be asked, if it's 8 minutes. [Laughter.]
Admiral, do you want to make a comment? My question is
pretty straightforward, to be honest with you. Do you believe
that a thorough review of the policy and the legislation needs
to be conducted before repeal?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Senator, let me just answer that. I
believe the time has come to consider a change to DADT, but I
think it should be done in a thoughtful and deliberative manner
that should include the conduct of the review that Secretary
Gates has directed; that would consider the views in the force
on a change in the policy; that would include an assessment of
the likely effects on recruiting, retention, morale, and
cohesion; and would include an identification of what policies
might be needed in the event of a change, and recommend those
policies, as well.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
As you've said, I believe, in my office, the likely effects
could go in either direction, either negative or positive, the
study could show.
General Petraeus. It could, it could.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to both of you, for your leadership.
General Petraeus, I just want to ask you a couple of quick
questions about Iran, first. I thought your prepared testimony
was very strong and clear, here. You describe Iran as ``the
primary state-level threat to stability in the region,'' add
that its nuclear program is, to use your words, ``serious,''
and ``part of the regime's broader effort to expand its
influence.'' I agree, of course.
You also mentioned, just in response to questions, that
President Obama has said that the military option remains on
the table. It's not our first choice, obviously; that's why
we're pursuing economic sanctions.
I just want to reinforce the fact that previously you've
said that in the exercise of your responsibility at CENTCOM,
you are working on actual military plans with regard to Iran,
which, we all hope, you never have to use, but as the military
works on contingency plans for a host of scenarios around the
world. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, probably best for a closed session,
but we get paid to prepare for contingencies; it would be
irresponsible if we didn't do that.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Petraeus. We try not to be irresponsible.
Senator Lieberman. Because I know how responsible you are,
I assume you're working on plans. So, I'll leave it at that for
now.
Let me go to Iraq. We've watched the election that's going
on there now with great satisfaction. It's not a perfect
situation, but when you think about the fact that, a little
more than 3 years ago, it looked like Iraq was going to descend
into chaos, and now we have a government operating, an economy
coming together, and increasing self-defense by ISF. I was
struck by the success of the united parties, as it were, the
nonsectarian parties, and I look forward to continued progress
there.
There was a time when we'd say gains in Iraq were fragile
and reversible. Today, I note in your statement, you say,
``Gains in Iraq remain fragile and reversible, but increasingly
less so.'' I appreciate those four additional words.
I wanted to ask you, in light of all that, but
understanding that our gains in Iraq remain fragile and
reversible, whether it is still going to be possible to draw
down to 50,000 American troops in Iraq by September 1 of this
year. It's a drawdown required by the Status-of-Forces
Agreement with Iraq. It's a good goal, but I'm sure you'd be
the first to say that we don't want to arbitrarily go to it if
we think there's significant risk of reversal as a result. Give
me your sense, at this moment, of whether we're going to be
able to get down to the 50,000 by September 1.
General Petraeus. I think we will be able to do that,
Senator. I think that we may reconfigure the force a bit over
what we originally were thinking it would look like 4 months
ago or so. We're constantly tinkering with it. There's a
possibility that we may want to keep an additional brigade
headquarters, as an example, but then slim out some of its
organic forces and some of the other organic forces elsewhere.
Headquarters really matter because they're the element of
engagement. If we think that there's a particularly fragile
situation in a certain area in the north, then we might do
that. That's something that we are looking at. But, we still
believe that we will be able to stay on track to get down to
that 50,000 figure.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, that's encouraging. That would
mean, I assume, that there'd potentially be a 7th Brigade
headquarters.
General Petraeus. That's correct. That is one option that
we are looking at, but still within the broad 50,000.
Senator Lieberman. I take it, from what you've said, that
that probably would be in the areas of Kurdish-Arab conflict
around Kirkuk, where I know that our forces, working with other
forces there, have really helped to maintain stability.
General Petraeus. That's correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Let me go to Afghanistan with this question. There's been a
lot of public discussion recently about reconciliation with
senior Taliban leaders. Some senior officials in our coalition
seem to be pushing really aggressively on the idea that we
should try to cut some sort of deal with the Taliban, perhaps
with the help of historic allies of theirs in Pakistan.
Personally, I worry that these ideas are ill-advised, although
I'm sure we all look forward to the time when there can be
reconciliation, particularly beginning with lower-level
Taliban, or probably not zealots. In that regard, I agree with
Secretary Gates, that we need to first make the Taliban
understand that they are destined to lose this fight, before
any serious consideration of reconciliation at the higher
levels can take place. Therefore, I worry that the current
public talk about reconciliation is counterproductive. I want
to ask you what your view is on that.
General Petraeus. I agree with Secretary Gates on that,
Senator. Certainly, thinking ahead to that moment when perhaps
senior-level Taliban can be integrated, because there has been
what's called reintegration at low- and mid-levels. In fact,
yesterday there were open reports about a couple of Taliban
leaders coming in with their hands up. It is not an uncommon
event over there; but there are many low- and mid-level
leaders. That's part of the strategy, is reintegration with our
Afghan partners to try to break off from the greater-Taliban
movement, those who might become part of the solution instead
of a continuing part of the problem.
On the other hand, reconciliation at the senior levels, as
Secretary Gates has observed, is probably a bit unlikely, at
the conditions that the Afghan Government has established for
it if they are not feeling a considerably greater amount of
pressure than they probably are right now. That's what's behind
Secretary Gates' view, and that happens to be my view, as well.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that, and that's
reassuring. Thank you very, very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wasn't going to ask this question, but General Petraeus,
you spent quite a bit of time talking about the CERP, and my
favorite program is the partner programs that train and equip--
1206, 1207, 1208 and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
(CCIF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET)
and all that.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Inhofe. The whole reason for this, initially, was
to get more authority to the commanders in the field to be able
to do things, to respond. We've had some testimony that talks
about how much more effective it is if you're able to do this
without going through a lot of the bureaucratic time delays
that would come otherwise. I'd like to know, since they're
talking about 1207, which is the civilian-to-civilian portion
of this, now kind of reverting more back to the way it was
before, or at least having a greater State Department influence
in it, do you see this creating any kind of a problem, number
one? Number two, do you think, starting with this, that it may
spread to some of the other elements of train-and-equip?
General Petraeus. CERP is hugely important. We want to
continue it. We want to make sure we have the oversight that
can guarantee to you and to the other committees that we're
responsibly overseeing the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. We
are trying to work very closely with our partners in the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian
elements, to make sure that we do coordinate what we are doing
in the field. One of the achievements in RC-East, in
particular, of ISAF, has been to build a civilian chain that
parallels the military chain all the way back to Kabul, and
allows them to coordinate much more closely in their thresholds
for various levels as you go up. I think that's working well. I
think we have to continue it. We also want to make sure that it
can be the responsive tool that it is; so, we're sensitive to a
sense, if there's too much bureaucracy building up, then that
would defeat the purpose of it in the first place. We're trying
to find that balance between a sufficient amount of
coordination and oversight and still allowing the free use of
it in the way that it was intended.
Senator Inhofe. If you see that the effectiveness is
impaired at all, if you'd let us know, that would be very
helpful.
Would you agree with his comments, Admiral Olson, first of
all, on all of these programs; and second, his comments about
what changes might be coming, and what to look for?
Admiral Olson. Absolutely, sir. I agree 100 percent. I
think the 1206, 1207, 1208, and, as you mentioned, but which is
often neglected in the conversation, the IMET funding, are
absolutely key to success. I applaud the initiative for CERP. I
think that combatant commanders responsible for military
success in the region ought to have the kind of responsiveness
that CERP funds provide.
Senator Inhofe. You also agree, then, because you have a
broader responsibility, that the CCIF in other areas is a good
program.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Olson, I've always been very
sensitive to the training process in Afghanistan, and one
reason is that, way back, probably 5 or 6 years ago, our
Oklahoma Guard over there was very active in the training of
the trainers. Right now you have Special Forces and
conventional forces that are involved in the training. How is
that broken up?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the cleanest way to divide it is that
the Special Forces trainers are training their Afghan
counterparts. They're in a program that originated as a
commando training program, selecting battalions, kandaks, from
the ANA and putting them through a 12-week training course that
then created a commando program within the ANA. That's now been
expanded recently to include a special forces counterpart
within the ANA. Most of the training of the ANA--the raising of
the army, if you will--is being done by our general-purpose
force trainers.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
In terms of your responsibility in the special operations,
the fact that you're not only dealing with an asymmetric
threat, but also with the more conventional threats posed by
North Korea and Iran; do you have the resources to be able to
confront those threats, in your opinion?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. Depending on Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps for service com and support, we are in
the tracking and planning business. To go beyond that, I think
we should go into closed session.
Senator Inhofe. What's the ratio right now of special
operations to conventional forces that are deployed in numbers
of personnel?
Admiral Olson. SOF number about plus or minus 10 percent.
Senator Inhofe. Roughly 10 to 1.
Admiral Olson. Roughly 6,000 troops each in Iraq and
Afghanistan, relative to just about 100,000 conventional forces
in Iraq now, as that draws down and as Afghanistan moves up
again.
Senator Inhofe. So, when the drawdown occurs, would you see
somewhat of a proportional drawdown? Do you have any thoughts
on that?
Admiral Olson. No, sir. We don't expect to see that. In all
my conversations with General Odierno and General Petraeus,
it's my expectation that the level of Special Operations Forces
will remain about constant in Iraq.
Senator Inhofe. As we continue to fund Pakistan's efforts,
a concern has resonated, at least with me, that we might be
inadvertently getting those fundings to the wrong places, like
the Pakistan-based jihadists, either through the madrassas or
the Federal funds going to Pakistan. What kind of precautions
are we taking to make sure they don't get to the wrong people?
General Petraeus. The security force funding elements are
going directly to the security forces. Any of the different
categories of funding that we have for them--whether it's
foreign military financing, IMET, Pakistani Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund, 1206, whatever--these all buy either
equipment, training, or education for members of the Pakistani
military.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Petraeus. I'm confident that money is going where
it should.
Senator Inhofe. That's good. There have been a few articles
that have been written that have drawn some question to that,
and I felt that was the case.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
General Petraeus, can you give us your initial evaluation
of the election in Iraq? It appears that in terms of the
sectarian lines, there has been a lot of discussion of these
nonsectarian alliances, but the results of the votes appear to
strengthen some of the sectarian positions.
General Petraeus. Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law
coalition is the leader, overall, and it will certainly not get
a majority; it will get a plurality. Second, interestingly,
although it's very close, is former Prime Minister Allawi's
coalition. He is a Shia leader of a coalition that has
substantial Sunni backing. His was the leading coalition in
many of the Sunni-majority provinces. Very close to him is the
coalition of the Supreme Council and Sadrists and Prime
Minister Jaafari's party, Chalabi's party, so that is in there,
as well. Then the overall number of Kurdish votes is in there,
also.
At the end of the day, clearly there will have to be, at
the very least, cross-ethnic coalitions. There will certainly
have to be Arab and Kurd, without question. I think what
remains to be seen is how much cross-sectarian coalition-
building will take place. That will be the dynamic, I think.
Senator Reed. You expect this process of selecting a new
government to stretch for several months?
General Petraeus. Yes, we do.
Senator Reed. One of the interesting results is the
apparent success of Sadr and his party, or at least his
grouping.
General Petraeus. I don't know if it would be a surprise,
candidly. I think those who watch it would have predicted that.
I think the fact that Maliki's coalition is higher, actually,
is quite significant.
The parties don't have to stay with their coalition. They
can join other coalitions. That's going to be the interesting
dynamic that plays out.
Senator Reed. One final question about the elections. The
Iranians were involved, at least in the sense of supporting,
financially, some of the parties. What influence do you think
they'll have, given what we know preliminarily?
General Petraeus. I think Iran, in the past, has had
influence when it comes to deal brokering. They're not alone in
influencing those, certainly. Other actors in the region will
have some degree of influence, as well. I'm sure that they will
continue to try to exercise that. The fact, however, that they
were not able to succeed in getting all of the Shi'a major
parties to run as one coalition was quite significant, as that
was a goal of theirs. The fact that, in the January 2009
elections, the parties most associated with them did not do all
that well, was significant. Frankly, the fact that there was a
strategic agreement is quite significant in that regard, as
well.
You still have this dynamic that Ambassador Ryan Crocker
used to talk about, that there is a certain degree of self-
limiting aspect to some of Iran's influence, given that Iraq
does not want to be the 51st state, if you will, of Iran, in
that it is very conscious of its Arab identity, versus the
Persian identity.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Olson, can you comment about Yemen? I know it's an
area that you're concerned with. Then I'll ask General Petraeus
afterwards. It is a country beset with huge problems. They're
depleting their oil resources; they're depleting their water
resources; they have demographic challenges; a youthful
population; and they have a civil war, despite al Qaeda. With
that good news, besides saving money on your car insurance,
what can you tell us? [Laughter.]
Admiral Olson. Sir, Yemen is clearly a place that's being
challenged. I second what General Petraeus said about the
rising presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and their
focus on Yemen as a place where they are seeking some
sanctuary.
Our involvement, from the special operations community, is
relatively low-level. We have a relatively small training
engagement with certain Yemeni forces. But, beyond that, I
think we'd have to go into closed discussion.
Senator Reed. General Petraeus, you want to comment
further?
General Petraeus. I'd just second the motion.
Senator Reed. Very good.
Let me switch to Pakistan. The Quetta Shura appears to be
dispersing to Karachi and elsewhere. Is that a result of what
you talked about, the different orientation of the Pakistani
Armed Forces and Security Services? Are they putting real
pressure on the Quetta Shura?
General Petraeus. I think there's a number of factors in
play. That may be one of them. Certainly, pressure--just in
Afghanistan--is yet another factor, and just perceptions or
fears that have resulted from the campaign by the Pakistani
Army and Frontier Corps targeted at the Pakistani Taliban, as
distinguished from the Quetta Shura or Afghan Taliban. But
several Afghan Taliban shadow governors, Mullah Baradar and
others, are detained in Pakistan, just as there have been some
also in Afghanistan. I think just feeling a bit more pressure,
worried about what might be out there in the future, has
resulted in some of this dispersal.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as we continue down this road of trying to make
sure that we recruit and retain the finest men and women that
America has to offer, it's the two of you guys that our junior
officers, mid-level career folks continue to look to; you're
providing the right kind of leadership that's going to allow us
to retain those folks. So, thank you for the great work you do.
General Petraeus, I want to go back to what Senator
Lieberman was talking about, relative to meeting this goal of
50,000 troops in Iraq by the end of August. General Odierno, as
well as General Cucolo, has recently expressed some concern
about the fact that we're going to need some probably buffer-
zone-type troops, maybe a brigade combat team, in the northern
end, because of the Iraqi National Forces and the Kurdish
Regional Forces issue up there. Is that going to be a part of
this plan that you're talking about, from a disbursement
standpoint, is this going to be additional troops we're going
to need?
General Petraeus. No. Our goal right now, and we think
we're on track to achieve it, is to reach the 50,000 possibly
with some rescoping. With possibly a 7th Brigade headquarters,
not necessarily all of the brigade's elements; we don't need
all of those. What we need are headquarters. Headquarters
matter enormously when you're coming down, because they are the
engagement element that is there, and particularly in an area
where our contributions, as honest brokers and so forth, are
important. That is seen as an option that we're looking at. No
decision has been made on that yet. The intent would be to do
that within the 50,000, so it would be a rescoping of the
force, rather than an increase.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
General, two of the issues that we've had ongoing in
Afghanistan are the rule of law, or lack thereof, as well as a
corruption issue in the government. Can you bring us up-to-date
on both those issues, please?
General Petraeus. For the rule of law, there are three
elements of that. As always, much more emphasis on not only
training police, but also on partnering with them and insisting
that before they actually put the uniform on, they receive
training. This is all part of getting the inputs right and the
concepts right. Those are among those.
The detention side of that, the corrections side, we're
working hard to help them. The Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) does it with the
Afghans directly. We're doing it with an element that will
eventually be able to take over the detention facility that we
have at Bagram, a goal that we have for early next year; and
that is on track so far.
Then, the judicial leg of the three-legged stool of rule of
law is an area that I think everyone agrees there needs to be
greater effort. There have been additional resources and
partnering activities carried out, with a special element in
Kabul that has been productive; supported by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), as
well. We think that is an effort, overall, that is going to
need to expand over time, just as we had to do in Iraq.
With respect to corruption, President Karzai announced his
anticorruption campaign. There have been some actions taken to
remove corrupt individuals, and there is no question that there
need to be more.
Senator Chambliss. With respect to prisoners that we have
arrested and are being detained at Bagram, the President looks
like he's committed to moving down a path of closing
Guantanamo. What are we going to do with all those battlefield
combatants that we have picked up and are now being housed at
Bagram?
General Petraeus. What we're doing with respect to those
that are at Bagram is preparing a plan to transition control of
that to an Afghan corrections force that we are training,
equipping, and will mentor and partner with. We won't just hand
it to them and leave; we will provide continuing partnering
with them for some period of time. That's the plan for what we
want to do in Bagram.
Senator Chambliss. At this point in time, are you confident
that we're going to be able to take those prisoners who are
comparable to the remaining prisoners that we have at
Guantanamo, and that the Afghans are going to be able to deal
with them a way that doesn't put them back on the battlefield,
either in Afghanistan or potentially in some other country
around the world, including maybe the United States?
General Petraeus. That is certainly what we're endeavoring
to do. That also includes rehabilitation efforts; it includes
engaging tribal leaders and mullahs and families as we did in
Iraq. I might note that, in Iraq yesterday, we transitioned the
Taji detainee facility. We're now down somewhere in the 2,000
to 2,500 number of detainees from some 27,000 that we had there
during the height of the surge. That is quite an accomplishment
for those of our elements that have been engaged in that,
including at various times, Colonel Lindsey Graham, U.S. Air
Force, but also very much the Iraqi security force elements
that are in charge of that now. We don't just hand off to them;
we train, we equip, we mentor, we monitor, and so forth.
Senator Chambliss. I'm always concerned about the security
of our country when Colonel Graham is in theater over there.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Let me give Senator Graham an extra minute
on his time. [Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. He needs more than that to defend
himself. [Laughter.]
The glide path for troop strength in Afghanistan and the
collateral issue of training the security forces in Iraq, are
we on the right glide path? Are we going to be able to meet
that goal of next year?
General Petraeus. You're talking about Afghanistan?
Senator Chambliss. Yes, Afghanistan.
General Petraeus. Not in terms of the deployment of the
additional forces, we made the commitment to the President to
have them all there by the end of August, with the exception of
a division headquarters that's not needed by that time, so it's
about 99 percent of the 30,000. We are on track to do that. I
can tell you that Transportation Command, the logisticians of
the world, and others, have done absolutely magnificent work to
enable that, and to also get their equipment into theater so
that they have what they need shortly after they get there or
beforehand. That's on track.
We're somewhere close to the 10,000 mark of the 30,000.
It's increased a good bit recently. That's on track.
With respect to the ANSF, we are behind a bit on the ANA
side, somewhere around 1,300 or so below the glide path that we
need to be on to take us to that additional figure that we've
talked about out in the future for them. As I mentioned, the
combination of additional army and police will be somewhere
around 100,000 over the next 18 months or so.
Clearly there's going to have to be greater recruiting and
better retention on the part of the ANA. That's the goal. It is
an important reason that Afghan leaders have to grip this, and
that's exactly what they have done, as I think Senator Levin
mentioned. We also have to expand the training capacity there,
and that's linked to the need for the additional trainers;
there's no question about that. That is part of General
Caldwell's plan with NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my welcome to Admiral Olson and General
Petraeus and thank you very much for your leadership and your
distinguished service to our country. Also, thank you, the men
and women that you lead, and also their families, for the
support that they give our troops. We're really grateful.
General Petraeus, Afghan forces are taking an important
part in operations. Many times, leading and even making up the
bulk of forces involved, Afghan soldiers and police forces must
not only expand greatly in a short amount of time, but they
must be trained to a higher standard in order for them to gain
the trust and confidence of the people. I believe a well-
trained and properly-sized ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP)
forces are a prerequisite to America leaving Afghanistan.
My question to you, General, is, what are the most
difficult obstacles to successfully building the ANA and ANP?
How are we coping with these obstacles?
General Petraeus. Senator, you're exactly right, this is a
critical component of the overall strategy. Among the
challenges is insufficient training capacity. Right now, with
this authorization of the additional forces, we need to ramp up
the capacity to train them. That's not just basic recruit
training, but it's also branch training for the different
elements of the military and the police, it is leader training,
it's development of institutions, as well as just basic
trainees.
A challenge there, beyond needing more trainers and, in
some cases, more facilities, is also the challenge of
illiteracy. Illiteracy runs somewhere in the 70-or-so-percent
range in Afghanistan, a bit less in the cities, a bit more in
the rural areas; and obviously that's a challenge if you want
the police to be able to read the laws that they should be
enforcing. So, there is actually going to be a modest component
of literacy training made part of the training plans. It will
be brought in a bit at a time, and we'll work with this, but to
see if that can help with the effort as we go forward, as well.
I think that the facilities, the equipping, and the other
components are generally surmountable. I think it comes back to
the issues of having the numbers of trainers and then partner
elements over time. Then dealing with a culture in which there
is an acceptance of a degree of corruption in which tribal
norms, and so forth, intrude as well.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, since
you mentioned the culture, I believe we must grow our foreign
language capability. There seems to be an emphasis within DOD
to improve these capabilities so that our servicemembers can
better perform counterinsurgency and stability operations.
Admiral and General, what are your impressions regarding DOD's
efforts to develop servicemembers' cultural knowledge and
foreign-language skills to better perform traditional and
nontraditional warfighting activities?
Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I applaud the efforts of the Department
and the Services to increase language skills, and regional and
subregional and microregional expertise along with it. I think
that they are progressing in that regard. I think that they are
demonstrating much more effectiveness in projecting a
relatively shallow level of language and regional skills across
a very broad force. We're still challenged to steep people in
the environments, develop true expertise, native-level language
and native-born regional skills, if you will. But, the
discussions are taking place, and I think the latest
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the latest budget
submission highlight those requirements.
Senator Akaka. General Petraeus?
General Petraeus. Senator, I also agree with the need. It's
not just language, it's cultural awareness and appreciation, as
well. There have been a number of initiatives pursued, some of
them at a fairly shallow level but that is very, very helpful
for our forces. Beyond that, there are other initiatives,
including targeted recruiting, reenlistment bonuses,
proficiency pays, and others, to try to demonstrate the
Department's recognition of the importance of language
proficiency.
With respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, there's a program
called the Af-Pak Hands Program, led out of the Joint Staff,
but with both of our headquarters involved in it, and the
Services, as well, to develop individuals who have a real
understanding of the culture, language, history, and so on of
Afghanistan and Pakistan and then do repetitive tours, either
out in the region or in assignments back in the States, that
keep them working in that particular arena.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The 96-hour rule, I understand that's under review, and
we're getting some relief from that rule. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. There is, Senator. The Secretary of
Defense has approved, in a sense, a U.S. caveat that goes along
with our transitioning of authority of U.S. Forces to NATO
control, and it includes up to 14 days for interrogation, for
analysis, and then, in some cases, for those who need longer
detention, that is also available, as well.
Senator Graham. I want to thank you for leading that
charge, because I think our warfighters will appreciate that,
particularly the marines down south. Has that been well-
received by the force?
General Petraeus. It has, sir. If you want to live your
values, you have to set conditions in which our troopers can do
just that.
Senator Graham. Thank you. Yes, I'm glad you've been given
some relief, because the old rule just didn't make a whole lot
of sense. I think the new way forward does make sense.
We've talked a little bit about Iran. From your point of
view, how much time is available to the world before Iran gets
a nuclear weapon, given what they're doing today?
General Petraeus. Again, probably best for a closed
session.
Senator Graham. Gotcha.
General Petraeus. But it has, thankfully, slid to the right
a bit, and it is not this calendar year, I don't think.
Senator Graham. Okay. But, it's not forever, either.
General Petraeus. It is not infinite.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Now, my favorite topic: detainees. I just want to let the
committee know that you and Doug Stone and others involved with
Camp Bucca is probably one of the great, great success stories
of Iraq, maybe military history, really, turning a prison
around that was a recruiting center for the enemy and becoming
part of the counterinsurgency operations. I just want to put on
the record how much I appreciate what you all were able to do
with Camp Bucca, to turn it into a model military prison that
would rehabilitate people. Those that were irreconcilable were
segregated out, and it is a great success story.
But, that takes us now to Afghanistan. Detention operations
over there are part of this surge, I would think. Is that
correct?
General Petraeus. They are, Senator. In fact, your former
wingman, Brigadier General Mark Martins, is a full-time
resident of the area of Bagram at the detention facility there,
now called the Parwan detention facility. He is spearheading
the effort to ensure absolutely the same kinds of initiatives
are pursued there that you saw firsthand in Iraq, and then to
help develop the concepts, and then implement the concepts, for
Afghan Forces to be trained, equipped, and then take on the
tasks there, increasingly, so that we can step back in a number
of areas in which over time we'll need to step back. That's the
plan for there.
His boss, Vice Admiral Harward, out of the SEAL community,
is the overall Task Force 435 commander. General Martins is the
deputy. Vice Admiral Harward is overseeing the overall effort,
also working more with our State Department colleagues, INL and
others, to ensure that the Afghan facilities outside Kabul and
Kandahar and other places are also conducting their business
appropriately. There are also partnerships of the future in
some of the other rule-of-law areas, as well.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Do we have people in the Bagram confinement facility that
are non-Afghan foreign fighters?
General Petraeus. We do. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say, we need a closed
session, eventually, about this, Mr. Chairman, but just put out
for public consumption, the best I can, that we have a dilemma
in this war; we're running out of jail space for certain
people, and we need to find confinement facilities that work.
Would you support sending Guantanamo Bay detainees to
Afghanistan, to Bagram? Is that a good idea? Some have
suggested that.
General Petraeus. I think that, at the very least, over
time, that's an idea that we need to go sit under a tree until
it passes, I think.
Senator Graham. I'll take that to be, ``That's not a good
idea.''
General Petraeus. If we transition this to Afghan control,
as we should----
Senator Graham. But, I'm talking about taking Guantanamo
people here, and sending them to Afghanistan. Wouldn't that
create great problems for the Afghan Government if you did
that?
General Petraeus. This is why I think that we need to think
pretty hard about that. We're going to transition this facility
to Afghan control.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Petraeus. We're going to do it in the relatively
near term, in the course of a year.
Senator Graham. These foreign fighters that we're talking
about, are the Afghans willing to take them?
General Petraeus. Sir, I'd defer to DOJ or others, because
this is a big policy issue.
Senator Graham. Isn't it fair to say, General, there are
some prisoners in Afghanistan, that are non-Afghan, held by the
American military, that it may be very difficult to convince
the Afghans to take them, or it may not be wise to send them to
the Afghans. Is that a fair summary?
General Petraeus. Sir, you're the lawyer.
Senator Graham. Just say yes, then. [Laughter.]
General Petraeus. The fact is that those individuals broke
the laws in Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. Yes.
General Petraeus. So, as we're transitioning to
Afghanistan, that's an Afghan legal issue. But, I'll be happy
to defer to the legal community.
Senator Graham. Okay. Admiral Olson, we catch somebody in
Yemen. Where do we send them?
Admiral Olson. Sir, that's a question that, on so many
levels, we would have to go into a closed session.
Senator Graham. Okay, fair enough.
Last question. General Petraeus, you've indicated in the
past--and, I think, very eloquently--that Guantanamo is
counterproductive to the war effort and, if possible, should be
closed. Could you tell me why you believe that?
General Petraeus. Rightly or wrongly, and probably wrongly,
because I think that facility--and many of you have visited
it--actually is conducted in an appropriate manner, but, at the
very least, it has a symbol attached to it that is one that is
used in our AOR against us. It, in some cases, is even lumped
in with Abu Ghraib. Completely different case, there's no
reason to do that, but again, it has become iconic in certain
respects, and those are not helpful respects in the CENTCOM
AOR.
Senator Graham. One last, very simple question. Isn't it
true that some of our allies refuse to turn prisoners over to
us if they believe they could work their way to Guantanamo?
General Petraeus. Sir, I don't know the answer to that
question.
Senator Graham. You've never had an ally tell you that,
``We can't turn a prisoner over to the Americans if they're
going to go to Guantanamo?''
General Petraeus. I'm not sure we've sent anybody to
Guantanamo on my watch as the CENTCOM Commander.
Senator Graham. We haven't sent anybody to Guantanamo on
your watch?
General Petraeus. I don't think so.
Senator Graham. I think you're right. I think you're right.
Okay, thanks.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here
with us today.
General Petraeus, we've heard from all of the Services that
combatant commanders have difficulty getting enough ISR. This
budget starts to address that by adding more unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), but the focus has primarily been on the number
of aircraft and not on the personnel required to operate the
aircraft and analyze the intelligence collected. In some
respects, it seems to me that the easier part may be getting
the UAVs, the tougher part may be in manning the UAV mission,
in terms of staffing as well as intelligence. Can you give us
your opinion on this overall picture of ISR personnel versus
equipment?
General Petraeus. I'd be happy to, sir. There's something
called the F3EAD process; that is find, fix, finish, exploit,
analyze--or assess--and disseminate (F3EAD). Of that, the
hardware you've just talked about, what might be on a UAV, is a
subset of that. It's a very, very critical subset.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
General Petraeus. But without all the people that do the
tasks associated with the F3EAD process, it is not fully
exploited to the extent that we need to. We have actually spent
quite a bit of time pulling back up to strategic level, when
folks start talking procurement issues, and talking about the
overall intelligence process that involves these various
platforms, and a whole host of other platforms and
capabilities. I think that the Air Force is to be commended for
the enormous shifts that it has made, in particular, to man all
of these different elements, and the same for the other
Services, and the Intelligence Community (IC) more broadly.
Senator Ben Nelson. Between the Army and the Air Force the
fiscal year 2011 budget request includes about $1.6 billion to
buy 77 Predator-class UAVs. By 2016, both Services project to
have spent $10.2 billion on 499 of these UAVs. In looking at
the unmanned platforms and the requirements for staffing to fit
all of those requirements, is there adequate coordination
between the Services to get that done so that we don't end up
with a stovepiping of each branch having its own approach to
dealing with this?
General Petraeus. There is, sir. In the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), there's an ISR task force that
looks at this very broadly and analyzes it, together with the
Services, all the way down to the tactical level and up to the
strategic level. It is a hugely important element of what we
need out there. Hardware without the people is not sufficient,
and they're addressing that.
Senator Ben Nelson. In achieving the goals, sometimes
referred to as benchmarks, can you take two of the major
benchmarks and give us your impression of how we're doing on
achieving those goals--two of the most important ones?
General Petraeus. I hate to go back to hardware, but
hardware is one of them, because I think we've literally maxed
out the production capacity. There's been intense scrutiny on
where every one of these platforms are. Then there's been equal
scrutiny on what is termed the back end. It's everything that
allows it to stay in the sky, a line, as we call it, to stay in
the sky for 24 hours a day, to provide the unblinking eye.
In each of those areas, I think we've pushed industry about
as far as it can go, is my understanding. The personnel
pipeline has been expanded dramatically, not just in terms of
those who pilot these unmanned systems, but also in terms of
all of the others who are doing the exploit, analyze,
disseminate piece.
Fusion. Because the real breakthrough in intelligence in
recent years has been fusion of imagery, human intelligence,
signals intelligence, and measurement intelligence. It's been
pulling all of that together. That's the real key.
Senator Ben Nelson. We're in the midst of implementing a
new missile defense plan in Europe, called Phased Adaptive
Approach. One of the benefits of this is it allows for an
immediate missile defense system against Iran. What impact does
the approach have affecting regional stability in the AOR?
General Petraeus. We're looking at the BMD in the AOR
itself. We have made our requirements known to the Department,
and also there's an effort to tie in what we do, because now
it's all about shared early warning, and sharing across
combatant commands. So, as the deployment sequences are sorted
out, we will then tie in with our European Command brethren in
making sure that what we see, they see, and vice versa.
Senator Ben Nelson. An area that has more intrigue perhaps
than others is piracy in the vicinity. How much of our time and
our financial resources and personnel and equipment would be
assigned to dealing with piracy in the vicinity that is within
the AOR?
General Petraeus. It's not a substantial portion of Naval
Forces CENTCOM, but it is an important mission that the naval
component of CENTCOM performs. But, it does so, together with a
coalition maritime force, and also with European Union (EU),
NATO, and even independent elements, including China; and
Russia has been out there, as well. Ultimately, Senator, the
key there is going to be maritime shipping companies taking
more defensive measures, including up to, we think, at some
point armed security elements.
We have changed our tactics and so forth, as well. We've
learned a lot about the networks that carry out the pirate
attacks, which are really quite extraordinary; in some cases up
to 600 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, in very open
boats with big, huge, 55-gallon drums of fuel throughout them,
and their other paraphernalia.
But, it's a very challenging mission, because we have the
authorities relative to pirates only that police have relative
to an alleged criminal. This is not the declared hostile enemy
for a military force; it is a reduced set of authorities that
we have in this arena. So, if you then detain a pirate, you are
right back to the question of, who do you turn them over to?
There are not authorities in Somalia that will deal with them.
We've made arrangements with some neighboring countries in the
region, but some of their facilities are starting to get fairly
full.
Senator Ben Nelson. With respect to those authorities--and
my time is up--is that something we should be looking at, in
terms of rules of engagement, if we're going to be patrolling
and protecting those arenas? I realize it's very sensitive.
General Petraeus. It is a sensitive one, sir. We've offered
this to the policy arena. It becomes an international legal
issue and so forth. I think the U.N. has given about the
authorities that, generally, the international community is
willing to provide.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thanks to both of you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and General, thank you very much for your
extraordinary service to our country during some very
interesting and dangerous times.
General Petraeus, the advanced weapons systems designed for
anti-access and area-denial are being proliferated through the
world, including in the CENTCOM AOR. Iran, for example, is
seeking to purchase one of the latest, most advanced surface-
to-air-missile systems, the Russian S-300. I'm interested in
what your views are with regard to the activities by the
Iranians to pursue some of these anti-access and area-denial
strategies.
General Petraeus. With respect to the S-300, I think you
know that has not been delivered. There's quite a bit of focus
on that, whether it will be delivered, because it would
represent a significant increase in the air and missile defense
capability of the Iranian forces.
There's no question that they are trying to increase their
anti-access capabilities against maritime as well as air
threats. It's something that we watch, and that regional
partners and others in that area watch very closely, as well.
Senator Thune. What's your view on this strategy by Iran,
and how it would affect our ability to project power in the
Middle East; specifically, in the Gulf of Iran and the Strait
of Hormuz?
General Petraeus. We have the most capable military in the
world. We can deal with the threats that are there, but they
make it more difficult. That's basically the short answer to
that, without getting into the specifics of each type of system
and what we have in return.
We think, for example, that we could keep the Strait of
Hormuz open, in the event of a crisis, if we are properly
positioned, and so forth. But, that would be a challenging
task. These are the kind of tasks that we have to be prepared
to perform.
Senator Thune. General, I wanted to get your views, too, on
the development of the air-sea battle concept that's currently
underway in the Pentagon. The new QDR directs the Navy and the
Air Force to develop a joint air-sea battle concept for
defeating adversaries with some of these anti-access and area-
denial capabilities that I just mentioned, which, in turn, will
help guide the development of future capabilities that will be
needed for effective power-projection operations. Some of these
anti-access and area-denial weapons can be low-tech weapons,
such as mines or small boats using swarm tactics, and sometimes
can be just as effective in creating these denied areas. Could
you give us your views on the development of this new air-sea
battle concept so far? Where does CENTCOM fit into the overall
concept and development and evaluation, and ultimately, the
implementation of that concept?
General Petraeus. We are being consulted on that, but I
can't really give you all that much, because it is very much in
the early conceptual stages at this point in time. The truth
is, our focus, as a combatant command, is on dealing with what
we know exists right now, and could exist in the near-term with
what we have right now, and know we'll have in the near-term.
That really is our focus, although we do get the opportunity to
contribute to the Services developing these concepts.
Senator Thune. Okay. I assume they're consulting and there
are discussions that are occurring.
General Petraeus. Absolutely.
Senator Thune. Do you have a view about how long-range
strike capabilities would fit into an air-sea battle concept?
General Petraeus. Unless we get into real specifics, I'm
not sure where I would head with that.
Senator Thune. Okay.
General Petraeus. We have a variety of long-range strike
capabilities.
Senator Thune. Right.
General Petraeus. Some, quite impressive. We've used some
of those in recent years, certainly.
Senator Thune. Okay.
Let me ask one other question, if I might, having to deal
with Afghanistan. It has to do with the military intelligence
operations there. I'd direct this both to you, General, and to
you, Admiral. Major General Michael Flynn, who's the top
military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, published what he
titled, ``A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in
Afghanistan.'' The report notes that, ``Our intelligence
apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental
questions about the environment in which we operate and the
people we're trying to protect and persuade.'' I would pose
this question to both of you, do you agree with General Flynn's
overall assessment in this report? What actions are you taking
in response to that report, and have any of the initiatives
that he directs in the report been carried out?
General Petraeus. When we conducted the strategic
assessment that's customary with a new commander coming in to a
position like that of CENTCOM, one of the biggest of the big
ideas was that our capacity and capability for Afghanistan and
Pakistan was not adequate. I went to Admiral Blair early on and
asked if he would appoint a mission manager for Af-Pak; he did
one better, he appointed an associate deputy director of
national intelligence for that. We then set about beefing up
the capability and capacity there, including sending General
Flynn there, among others to help build that. We formed a
Center of Excellence for Af-Pak in the Joint Intelligence
Center at CENTCOM. The Af-Pak cell has also done the same. So,
what we've tried to do, as part of the overall effort, is just
to build the capability that we had. This is not unlike what we
did in Iraq, as well. In early 2007, one of the first requests
I made, before even going to take command of Multi-National
Force-Iraq was a substantial augmentation of our intelligence
capability. We got that, and we've been working on providing
that kind of augmentation in Afghanistan, as well.
Senator Thune. Okay.
Anything to add, Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I think it's natural for the early
energy of the IC to be focused on identifying the immediate
threats to our force, but as the battlefield has evolved, the
transition into using intelligence capabilities to better
develop our understanding of the environment, and to seek
opportunities for engagement, is a transition that I applaud.
Senator Thune. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your continued service to our
country. I'm especially proud that both of you reside in my
State, in the wonderful area of Tampa.
Gentlemen, last week I did a hearing for the chairman in
our Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the
increased radicalization of young men and the extremist
elements that are so bedeviling the civilized world. The
conclusion that came out of a lot of the testimony in this
hearing was that we could continue to do everything that the
military is doing, just exceptionally well, particularly in the
responsibility that you give to these young officers with the
CERP funds, that they can go in and help a village, a
community, and it helps us, ultimately, from our military
objectives. We talked about how all the other agencies of
government, working with the military in a place like
Afghanistan--agriculture, health, digging wells, education--all
of these things are so important, but that if you don't get
right to it, about the radicalization of young men by
presenting Islam as something that is not taught in the Koran,
you're still going to have these extremists that'll go out and
blow themselves up and threaten stability. I'd love to have
your comments on that conclusion.
General Petraeus. Senator, I think this really gets at the
heart of one of the big ideas out there, which is that it takes
much more than just military security activities, it takes
whole-of-government approaches. Not just our Government, but
host-nation governments and all other partners. You have to get
at the conditions that give rise to extremism, to the kind of
discontent and unfulfilled expectations and all of the rest of
that, that can give rise to extremism, and you have to get at
the issues of actual education, which in some cases creates
fertile ground for the planting of extremist seeds. That takes
a very comprehensive approach; it is one that some of our
partners in the region have actually done quite well in recent
years, if you look at some of the countries in the Arabian
Peninsula, in particular; some others have not. But, that is
the kind of approach that is necessary to this overall
challenge.
Admiral Olson. Senator, I agree with that completely. I'd
just add that the DOD plan for addressing a violent extremist
threat does include actions led by the military, as you laid it
out, to conduct the traditional military kinds of actions, but
it also lends strong military support to the whole-of-
government, whole-of-nations approach to dealing with the
environment.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you are as successful as you have
been, certainly in Iraq and, we hope, in Afghanistan, and now
in our relations through the Pakistani Government, that they
are successful, too--but if young men are led astray as to what
the Koran teaches, and they're willing to go and commit
suicide, that is going to continue to be a great hindrance to
us. I think we have to look at this through our Northern
Command as well, the radicalization of young men here, inside
the United States. But, that means we have to be able to find
clerics who know what true Islam is and are willing to go out
and educate the ones that are being radicalized. How do we do
that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think the answer has to lie,
needless to say, in the Islamic world. It has to start there.
It has to be Islamic leaders who identify the issue that you
have just raised about the importance of religious leaders who
have the courage to deny extremism as an aspect of Islam. Those
leaders are out there; they are carrying out some of these
initiatives. Some of their countries were threatened enormously
by this extremism, correctly diagnosed the threat, and have
then taken appropriate actions in the wake of that. That has to
continue to spread to address this threat of extremism as
you've laid it out.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, you take a country like
Saudi Arabia, they can deal with the radicalization problems by
going to the tribes, which is the family of the young fellow
that's been radicalized, and work at it that way. They've had
some measure of success in doing that. But, in other countries
you can't do that, you can't work through the tribes.
I want to lay the problem out. I want to continue to work
with both of you and with the overall problem that's in this
country, as well.
General Petraeus. Senator, just a follow up. Saudi Arabia
has not just worked it through the tribes. That's been an
important component, but they've done a very whole-of-
government approach to this overall issue. It has been quite
impressive for a country that, 5 years ago, was seriously
threatened by extremists who blew up their Ministry of Interior
building, so threatened foreign-oil workers that thousands of
them departed, took over our consulate in Jeddah, and so forth.
What they have done has been quite impressive.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Thanks to both of you for your service to our country. The
more, I think, the American people see our men and women in
uniform perform, the prouder they are of them. I continue to
talk to them in airports and places like that, and they're just
an inspiration to me. But, good leadership is important, it
does make a difference, and you're providing that. Thank you so
much.
With regard to the training of the Afghan military and
police, General Petraeus, your second tour in Iraq was to come
back and train there, and you spent a year or so training a
force. I'm sure you developed some ideas about how that ought
to be done. It seems to me that, if you have a local defense
force that's willing to defend their community against Taliban
or al Qaeda, perfect training, if it's going to delay
dramatically the ability of those people to be effective is a
danger. I recall the al Anbar model, where we quickly got Sunni
tribal leaders to empower their local young men to turn on al
Qaeda, and that was an effective part of that effort.
My question to you is, I see there's some tension in the
State Department, or other people within the military, about
how much training by the central government they need before
they can be allowed to defend their home territories, and with
a little salary and support of a good tribal leader or mayor or
a community leader, much good can be done. Do you understand?
Where are we? Are we demanding too much centralized training
before we join with friendly local leaders?
General Petraeus. We are trying to take advantage of that
in cases where that's appropriate, Senator, and to empower, in
some cases, with good oversight and partnering some local
elements. It's called the Community Defense Initiative. Now I
think there's eight or nine or so that are ongoing, these great
Special Forces elements that are typically the ones partnering
with them, tied into the Afghan Ministry of Interior, because
it's very important that we not just empower warlords to stand
up their forces, given the effort that it took to disperse and
disarm a number of those elements.
Really, it is the same dynamic that we had in Iraq;
different terrain, different culture, different social makeup
and so forth. It's every valley, as opposed to larger tribal
areas, say, in Anbar. But in Anbar over time--and we knew this
in the beginning--the situation in Iraq was so desperate that
we were willing to just take individuals who were willing to
oppose al Qaeda, and then we would figure out afterwards how we
were going to mesh them into the greater Iraqi structure. It
has taken us quite some time to do that, but it has happened;
and Iraq now pays the salaries of all of the remaining so-
called Sons of Iraq who still have not been provided jobs in
various ministries, or what have you. A number of them have
already transitioned in that form.
So, that's what we have to be sensitive to here, as well;
and recognizing that Afghanistan is a country that doesn't have
the financial means that Iraq has. That's yet another dynamic
that we're wrestling with.
But, we are taking advantage of some of these opportunities
in very careful ways in partnership with our Iraqi colleagues.
Senator Sessions. This is a large country--25, 23 million
people--we'll soon be drawing down our troop levels, many of
them now are going to have to be concentrated in some of the
more dangerous areas, and that leaves a lot of areas that we
don't have any presence in, or very little presence, so it
seems to me that we may be desperate enough, we may have to
take some chances with leaders we believe are pretty good local
leaders, and see if we can't support them. Do you agree?
General Petraeus. Some of this is going on naturally. There
are areas in which Afghans are the security forces, and have
been for some time. These are areas in the north, for example,
where we have virtually no other presence than perhaps the
force protection elements that work with the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. So, there's a variety, as always; these
endeavors are somewhat of a patchwork quilt. What you're trying
to find is the right answer for that particular location, and
then to try to figure out how to make it an enduring answer.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, with regard to the
shortage of trainers, perhaps our trainers can be a little less
skilled as trainers or something? It seems to me that would be
one area you really don't want to be short on. How long will it
be before we can get to sufficient number of trainers there?
General Petraeus. What we would like to see right now is
for our NATO partners to generate the additional trainers that
have been requested. In the theory of always having contingency
plans, there are thoughts about how to fill that, if we have
to, in other ways.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson, with regard to the CERP
and how you train our SOF, isn't it true that we believe the
best policy of our Government is to have a seamless
relationship between government aid and our SOF and that we use
all of those factors--political, financial, as well as
military--to achieve maximum progress toward our goals?
Admiral Olson. Senator, I'd say it's certainly true that
the more interagency cooperation there is, the better the
outcome typically is.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the aid that's going
through USAID and State Department and other things, it seems
to me that when you have a skilled SOF team in an area, and
they really have little or no other U.S. Government presence
there, aren't they sort of the representative of the United
States? Do you feel like they're empowered sufficiently,
financially, to make commitments with those leaders to say,
``If you will do this, we'll do this''? If they're empowered
greater, could they be more effective in reducing violence and
protecting the lives of our own people?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I'd leave the answer regarding
sufficiency to General Petraeus, because the money flows
through him, for the most part.
It is true that SOF often are somewhat more remote and do
become, if not diplomats, at least representatives of the U.S.
presence. It is important that they be able to apply benefits
in the regions where they live. So, within the special
operations community resides the Active component of the civil
affairs capability of the Army and strengthening a relationship
between USAID and the special operations community in many of
those regions.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, do you feel like we've
made progress in that area, and can we make more?
General Petraeus. I think we've made progress, but I think
we can make more. One of the important elements of General
McChrystal's overall approach is to achieve greater unity of
effort. That means conventional forces, special forces,
civilian elements, and so forth, all working together to a
common aim, trying not to duplicate efforts, and trying to do
it in a way that is as little bureaucracy as necessary, but
recognizing that some of that is necessary. There is a need to
do more in this area, and that is one of General McChrystal's
thrusts in his effort.
Senator Sessions. I strongly support that.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, as other members of the
committee have already said, I thank you for your service to
our country and for your testimony today.
I am proud that North Carolina is home to the Joint Special
Operations Medical Training Center at Fort Bragg. All special
joint operations combat medics are trained at this facility to
obtain the skills they need on the battlefield. Just several
months ago, I had the opportunity to visit this facility and
witness the great training that's taking place there. But, I
understand that combat medics need to have the capability to
perform complicated procedures, often in the dark, in the
middle of the night, and under hostile live-fire conditions in
remote locations. I also understand that DOD sees tremendous
value in live-tissue training, especially since they're faced
with the task of taking these young men and women, with no
prior medical schooling, and transforming them into combat
trauma specialists in 26 weeks.
While simulators may hold promise, according to OSD,
simulators currently lack the realism and the ability to
replicate combat wounds and the emotional stress found on the
battlefield. Also, moreover, all patients don't bleed the same
or react to medical procedures in the same fashion.
Admiral Olson, can you describe the operational and the
institutional impact we would see if live-tissue training was
stopped?
Admiral Olson. Senator, there are many compelling examples
of how live-tissue training has directly contributed to the
preservation of human life on the battlefield. I have not been
exposed to any simulation, any technology that adequately
substitutes for live-tissue training.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I'm also pleased that the U.S. Army SOCOM and the Marine
Corps SOCOM have developed a close relationship with the
University of North Carolina (UNC). UNC recently signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with both Special Operations
Commands. This MOU includes, but is not limited to, cultural
awareness and linguistic training, business practices, degree-
completion opportunities, and a senior service college
fellowship program.
My question is, Admiral Olson, can you provide your view on
the educational needs of our special forces and how public and
private universities can assist, and are you interested in
creating a fellowship in counterterrorism and public policy for
members of the U.S. Special Operations community?
Admiral Olson. The way you've highlighted it really is a
good example of how the military and the academic communities
are interacting. The kind of relationship that we've developed
enables us in areas where we simply don't have the capacity
within the military forces to perform that kind of training,
that kind of education. I certainly would support an effort to
create similar kinds of fellowships for specialized kinds of
education, as you've described.
Senator Hagan. Around the Fort Bragg area, the UNC system
has 16 public universities, with Fayetteville State, NC State,
and Chapel Hill all very close, and then we have some excellent
private universities, too, such as Duke University and Wake
Forest, that do excellent work. So, I think this MOU will go a
long way to helping, from educational needs, especially from
the linguistics and cultural, for our men and women in the
special operations in these special forces.
I also wanted to talk about the Iranian influence in Iraq.
Despite the fact that the Iraqis are increasingly expressing
their discontent with Iranian influence in Iraq, we need to
keep in mind that Iran has people in Iraq that it uses to drive
a wedge between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites in Iraq, and these
actions ignite the ethnosectarian tensions. These Iranian
actions can undermine Iraqi security in the delicate political
situation. How do you foresee DOD using its future relationship
with the ISF to steer Iraq's defense strategy and acquisition
of weapon systems in order to avoid Iranian meddling that could
jeopardize Iraq's stability?
General Petraeus. Senator, I don't think we'll have to
steer at all. Iraq's leaders and its security force leaders
share a concern about neighbors who arm, train, fund, equip,
and direct proxy elements on their soil. They have continued to
carry out operations against these illegal elements, and I'm
confident that they will continue to do that in the future,
even as we draw down. They've conducted a number of unilateral
operations against these elements, as well.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, Chairman Levin began early on asking
about Iran. He mentioned the U.N. resolutions and asked about
being more explicit about the possibility of a blockade or
quarantine. You said that the President was explicit not to
take the military option off the table. You recently talked
about combining engagement with Iranian leaders, backed up by
the threat of further sanctions. I think this is a quote of
yours: ``That puts us in a solid foundation now to go on what
is termed the pressure track. That's the course on which we're
embarked now.'' You alluded to that, but if you could explain a
little more about what the pressure track will involve, and if
you could tell us, has anything the international community
done so far yielded positive results? Do we have any success
stories at all, with regard to all of these sanctions and
options and all of the talk that we've done about Iran? Then,
after that, I want to ask you about the dissidents in Tehran.
But, if you'd answer the first part of it, I would appreciate
it.
General Petraeus. Senator, first of all, over the course of
last year, the effort has focused on the diplomatic track. All
the countries of the world have given Iran ample opportunity to
discuss the issues that are out there, and to try to resolve
them. Of course, that has not happened.
Senator Wicker. Then it's totally unsuccessful.
General Petraeus. That has led to what the President and
others have termed the pressure track. That is the effort now,
with the U.N. Security Council, other countries, and other
organizations, as well. The EU is involved in this, countries
do it as single actors in a variety of different ways,
everything from on the U.S. side, Treasury designations and a
host of financial and trade restrictions, and so forth. That is
now about to ramp up, needless to say; that's what the
increased pressure will result from.
With respect to what this has done in the past, indeed some
of these actions have resulted in the interdiction of money,
weapons, technology, and so forth. It has limited even the
travel of some of the leaders of the key security elements. So,
there have been.
Now, has it dissuaded them from the path that some analysts
believe they're on, in terms of developing the components of a
nuclear weapon? There may have been some initiatives that have
made that more difficult; a good bit more difficult perhaps;
but, I think the assessment of all that continues to march on.
Senator Wicker. Have we squandered precious time?
General Petraeus. I don't think so. In fact, I think that
this has given us a very firm foundation from which to work as
we transition to the pressure track. No one can say that Iran
has not had every opportunity made possible to them, including
the reaching out of the open hand, and they have not grasped
that. The response has been the opposite. Again, that provides
that now no one can say that the United States and the other
countries of the world have not given that every opportunity.
Therefore, I think, that translates into the greater
possibility that the pressure track could come up with
meaningful actions.
Senator Wicker. The actions on the pressure track will have
to be agreed to by the United States and a number of our allies
or would it be solely American action?
General Petraeus. It depends which action you are talking
about. If you're talking about U.N. Security Council
resolutions, it obviously has to be the Perm-5 and then there
have to be nine total members. So, either abstention or for, in
the case of the Perm-5, and then nine total votes in the
affirmative, as I understand it. But, I'd be happy to defer to
the State Department on that.
Senator Wicker. How public have we been about what form
these actions might take?
General Petraeus. Again, I'd defer to the State Department
on that. A lot of this is understandably, I think, going on
behind closed doors; that's how that is generally best pursued.
Senator Wicker. Okay, well, you may want to defer to the
State Department on this next question.
General Petraeus. Okay.
Senator Wicker. But, I do want to ask it. It's been said in
this committee, and it's been said on the floor, we should be
showing our moral support for the reformers in Iran, for the
people who are willing to take to the street and stand up and
risk their lives and safeties. If you were a reformer in
Tehran, what you would be hoping the United States would do? Do
we need to send some signals as to the limits of what can be
expected of us, as we try to give some sort of moral support,
but we also try to be realistic about what we can do to help
these people who are striving for freedom and democracy?
General Petraeus. As you suggested, Senator, with respect,
I think that's one for the State Department and the folks who
pull together all the different strands of this policy, because
I think just talking about one element of this without talking
about the others in a comprehensive approach could be
misleading.
Senator Wicker. All right.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on some of the sanction stuff on Iran, the
Iran Sanctions Act was passed 14 years ago, and we've never
enforced it. Recently there has been some attention given to
this. One example, of many examples, is a very large South
Korean engineering firm that entered into a contract with Iran
to upgrade oil fields in Iran, in 2007. It was a $700 million
contract. In 2009, the U.S. Army gave the same company a
contract for $100 million to build housing for our Army in
South Korea. Then, just a few months after that, they entered
into another contract with Iran.
I understand that we have not enforced this law because our
European allies squawked about it when it was first passed.
Then, when we tried to enforce it with a company in Japan,
Japan squawked and said, ``you didn't enforce it against the
European countries.'' Brazil, we just gave a huge export/import
loan to, in an effort to try to get some oil out of Brazil, as
opposed to all of it being in the Middle East. Then, what do
they do? They turn around and have Ahmadinejad come to town and
kiss and hug.
I'm a little worried that our talk of sanctions has been
too much talk, and that we haven't even followed up within our
military contracts to make sure we're not contracting with
people who are doing business with Iran, especially in the oil
and gas and the petroleum sector.
Do you have any take on that, General Petraeus, and whether
or not this is something that is being driven through the State
Department, as opposed to whether or not the military is taking
a look at their contractors and whether or not we're doing
business with the wrong people?
General Petraeus. I honestly don't. I'm not in the
contracting business. I don't know what it takes to get someone
on a blacklist, where they can't compete for a contract, and
what that process is, and why, for example, a particular
country that has done something in Iran is not on that list.
It's not my area of expertise. My apologies.
Senator McCaskill. I'll continue to follow up on it, but I
think it's maybe one of the reasons Iran is not taking us as
seriously as they should. Because we talk about the carrot and
stick, and using the stick, and frankly, I don't think we've
used the stick very effectively in a law that's been on our
books for 14 years.
Let me talk also a bit about the size of the military. You
and I had a chance to talk after I got back from Afghanistan,
but I want to put this on the record, Mr. Chairman, because I
think it's important that this be talked about, the size of the
army we're building and Afghanistan's ability to sustain that
military. If you're over there, the Afghans say that they want
400,000 troops. I think we're at the number 300,000 troops, and
there has been no indication that we're going to build an army
above 300,000. But, even if we keep it at 300,000, General
Caldwell briefed me that that's going to be somewhere around
$5.5 billion to sustain that level of military in Afghanistan.
Their gross domestic product, depending on which number you
look at, is somewhere between $10 and $12 billion. I'd like to
put on the record your response to that problem and whether or
not we have signed up for the American people to do the heavy
lifting, in terms of sustaining the Afghanistan military for
decades to come?
General Petraeus. I'm not aware of anyone signing up to do
that for decades to come, but clearly we are helping
Afghanistan build a military force to which we can transition
tasks so that our forces can go home. It's a lot more expensive
to maintain our forces in Afghanistan than it is to maintain
even the comparable number of Afghan forces that might be able
to replace our forces in that country. In a business sense, I
think there is some logic to continuing to support--although
obviously no commitments have been made in that regard--but
continuing to support, over time, a substantial ANSF, and
indeed, one that they will not be able to pay all the expenses
for over that time.
Senator McCaskill. I did notice much more of an
international presence there than I did in Iraq, and I guess we
can continue to hope that our friends in NATO will step up,
although so far while they're there and they're making a bigger
commitment, in terms of monetary support, we are still
shouldering the vast majority of that. Isn't that correct?
General Petraeus. It is. You should note that there are
some very important non-NATO nations, as well. Japan, I think,
I would single out as providing quite substantial resources
also.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the radical terrorist group in
Pakistan--I know this is more of a priority for the Pacific
Command than your command--but all indications are that one of
the very destructive bombs that went off recently in Kabul was
LeT. As we've made great progress against the Taliban in
Afghanistan and the Taliban in Pakistan and the al Qaeda that
we have successfully targeted and gone after, I'm worrying that
this organization is growing in strength. I know it's tricky
because of the historical connection between LeT and the
Pakistani military and their government, because of the Kashmir
area, but I do want to sound an alarm that I'm concerned about
LeT and whether or not it is high enough on our priority list.
Are we putting enough pressure on Pakistan? They've responded,
I think, well in terms of their military going after terrorism
in their country now, but I wonder if we're pushing hard enough
on that front.
General Petraeus. It certainly has been a source of
dialogue. The real issue in this regard was the bombing in
Mumbai, which by all accounts was carried out by LeT. I think
different elements of our Government have had quite a bit of
interaction with the Government of Pakistan over this.
Obviously, India has expressed its concerns, as well.
There's no question that there are elements in Pakistan
that have not yet been the focus of the Pakistani
counterinsurgency efforts, but there's also no disputing the
fact that the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps have a lot of
short sticks and a lot of hornet nests right now in the
Northwest Frontier Province and the FATA. They are continuing
those campaigns. They are not just holding what they have; they
do continue their efforts. I know what the plan is, and it is
impressive. They've taken very tough losses in the course of
this, as has their civilian population.
Senator McCaskill. I know I'm out of time. Let me briefly
say there's some good news. Premature to say how effective it's
going to be. But, compared to when I went to Iraq on contract
oversight, the systems that are in place in Afghanistan are
much better. I want to compliment you and General McChrystal
and everyone for realizing that we had the wild west of
contracting in Iraq, in terms of logistical support and a lot
of other contracting issues. I think we have the structures in
place now. Now, it remains to be seen whether those structures
are going to provide the oversight that we need, but at least
we have the right people gathered in the right rooms.
I have some significant questions about CERP, big projects
and continuity, but I'm out of time. So, what I will do, Mr.
Chairman, is I will make those questions for the record. I know
67 percent of the CERP money is going to projects over
$500,000.
General Petraeus. Actually, Senator, I need to give you
numbers on that, because the average project in fiscal year
2010 is somewhere around $20,000 per project in Iraq, and
$40,000 in the other country. Or is it vice versa? I'm looking
at my J8. Anyway, the average is somewhere around $30,000 this
year.
Senator McCaskill. So we're pulling back down from----
General Petraeus. We have pulled way down.
Senator McCaskill. That's great.
General Petraeus. I think I mentioned that in my opening
statement, that I retain approval authority for the $1 million
projects and above. I've only approved one of those in quite
some time. That's right.
Senator McCaskill. I knew that there was a bunch of them
because some of the folks I talked to over there talked about
the continuity and the problem as units would rotate out, the
big CERP projects that started before, they didn't want to
finish those, because they weren't going to get credit for
them, they wanted to start ones that they thought they could
finish on their watch and some stuff was sitting on the shelf,
and so forth.
General Petraeus. I think we have good oversight and a
rational approach. We're trying to find that right balance
between not too much bureaucracy, but enough, and not such high
level that they're doing USAID's work instead of USAID. I'll
pass on your comments to those who are in the contracting
business. We do try to be a learning organization, and we've
learned a great deal about contracting over the course of the
last decade or so.
Senator McCaskill. Over the course of the last 3 years.
General Petraeus. That, too.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, General. I'll get my
questions to the record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Petraeus, for that
continuing effort at oversight. It's very important to this
committee.
We want to especially thank Senator McCaskill for her
special efforts in this regard. They're very, very important to
the citizenry of our country.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first thank you for your warm welcome. I
appreciate your recognition of my service.
Just to correct the record a little bit, General and
Admiral, I started out as an enlisted man and was branch-
qualified as an infantry officer at Benning and then quarter
master, now I'm a Judge Advocate General (JAG) and a head trial
defense attorney in Massachusetts, so I have some knowledge
that I don't think the average attorney understands, just being
a traditional JAG.
One of the things that Senator Graham was commenting on
that I have great concern about, because when I hear about the
guardsmen serving from Massachusetts and throughout New
England, they are confused a little bit as to how they treat
folks when they are captured. I also want to go on the same
vein. I'm concerned about how we treat the detainees and where
we send them. What rights are they actually given? Then, do we
send them to Afghanistan, do we keep them where they're
captured, do we bring them to U.S. soil, do we get them to
Guantanamo? I know I'm new here, but, being in the military,
these are the questions that my troops are passing on to me
when I'm representing them. If there's any insight you can give
as to where we're heading with that, or if it's an offline
conversation, I'm all ears, because I think it's creating
indecision with our soldiers as to what to do with the folks
when they're captured.
General Petraeus. Senator, let me talk about that, because
I don't think there's indecision in Iraq or Afghanistan, and
I'm not aware of us detaining people anywhere else in quite
some time. When someone's detained in Iraq or Afghanistan,
there are quite clear procedures that are done. By the way, we
don't detain virtually any at all in any significant number in
Iraq at this point. The operations are generally led by ISF,
and they are now warrant-based there. We believe in the rule of
law, and we are helping the Iraqis. They have taken the lead in
terms of making arrests based on warrants, except in the cases
where obviously someone has threatened our soldiers directly or
you have a case of self-defense or an immediate threat
response.
In Afghanistan, as I explained to Senator Graham, we have
clear rules. Now, they have recently been implemented for all
of our forces that have transitioned to NATO, and we are able
to hold them for 14 days, if necessary, and can send them to
Bagram if they hit a certain category after that. Then, we're
working hard at Bagram over time to transition that facility
and the tasks of running it to our Afghan partners so that over
time that transition can take place.
But, we've worked very hard, because of the idea that you
have to create conditions in which your soldiers can live our
values. One of those values has to be, if someone puts his
hands in the air, you detain him instead of shoot him. But, if
you think he's going to be back on the street within 96 hours,
or something like that, because of a catch-and-release policy,
then it becomes much more difficult to live your values. We
take that very seriously. We've worked this very hard. As
Senator Graham highlighted, this policy has gone into place.
Senator Brown. There's more in Afghanistan than Iraq. I
know in Iraq that that's been settled somewhat. But,
Afghanistan, I know there was a transition period, and there
had been some concerns. I'll speak to Senator Graham about some
additional questions that he and I were discussing, and maybe
we can, offline, touch base.
But, I am chairing a hearing on Afghan police training next
week, and I'm concerned and wondering if the mission has lagged
as it's been divided between the State Department and DOD.
General Petraeus. I think, candidly, that there's a reason
that we have, over time, transitioned tasks from traditional
executive branch elements to the military, and that is because
we have more capacity and capability. I stood up the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and, over time, we
took on more and more responsibility because the capacity of
our partners in some of these areas. There's a bunch of heroes
in INL, but they are armies of one, in many cases.
Now, we are going to transition the police task back to the
State Department in Iraq, and we believe that that process can
work. But, with respect to Afghanistan, we have taken on more
and more of that, and we are now going to oversee the training
aspect of that, as you probably know.
Senator Brown. Great. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
We thank you both. We will have a hearing on Iran. With
whoever our witnesses will be, and they're not yet determined,
we will have an executive session at that time, taking up some
of the questions that you left for the executive session. It's
possible that some of our questions for the record to you may
relate to Iran, that you could perhaps answer, even though you
won't be there, in a classified way for that executive session.
General Petraeus, you have spent a lot of time on the DADT
issue, thinking about it, and we would welcome your statement
for the record, but we leave it up to you. Usually we don't do
that, we just simply ask people for a statement for the record,
but in this case, I think I'll just simply say we would welcome
that statement for the record, leaving it up to you as to
whether you would prefer to do it that way, which means it
would be immediately made public or whether you'd prefer to
give your thoughts in a different form at a different time. We
didn't give you that opportunity, because of our schedule here,
to do that. So, that's something we would just leave up to your
good judgment. But, we would very much welcome that statement,
and if so, then it would be made public at that time.
General Petraeus. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Just again, Admiral, thank you so much for
your service. All of us feel very deeply about the men and
women that you command and that you work with. We thank them
through you.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
contracting in iraq and afghanistan
1. Senator Webb. General Petraeus, I have long been concerned with
the systemic problems related to wartime-support contracting in Iraq
and Afghanistan, including continued instances of waste, fraud, and
abuse revealed by inspector general investigations and the Commission
on Wartime Contracting. A March 13, 2010, New York Times article
reported that investigators have opened more than 50 new reconstruction
fraud cases in Iraq in the last 6 months. A March 17, 2010, Defense
News article stated contractors still lack sufficient oversight by
trained personnel.
The Commission on Wartime Contracting's June 2009 report stated the
effectiveness of contractor support of expanded U.S. operations in
Afghanistan is compromised by the failure to apply lessons learned in
Iraq. The Commission later reported in its September 2009 special
report that weak control systems must be strengthened and defense
agencies must improve their oversight of contractor business systems to
reduce waste, fraud, and abuse.
What specific actions has U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) taken to
address the Commission on Wartime Contracting's issues of immediate
concern and other time-sensitive recommendations contained in its June
2009 report?
General Petraeus. CENTCOM has taken several actions to address the
Commission's findings and recommendations from the June 2009 report.
CENTCOM has transferred several lessons learned from Iraq to
Afghanistan aimed at reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. We've formed the
Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD), which implements the
Department of Defense's (DOD) ACOD policies and procedures, and
oversees Private Security Contractors (PSCs). We're transitioning Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) to a Joint Theater
Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) for better synchronization and
efficiency of contracting in the theater. We're applying acquisition
strategies that have increased firm fixed-price competitive contract
awards with reduced reliance on the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP). JCC-I/A continues to refine its processes by
leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are complex, resource
intense, and require a detailed Source Selection process.
CENTCOM and DOD have improved Contracting Officer Representative
(COR) resourcing and training. Defense Acquisition University (DAU)
initiated online and resident courses to train our CORs, and the
Department of Army directed deploying units to identify and train their
CORs prior to deployment. The number of CORs in Afghanistan has
dramatically increased with fill rates now of over 90 percent. The CORs
are better trained not only in general contract management, but are
specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee
contractors performing services such as food preparation, water
purification, and fuels distribution.
We are teaming with the Procurement Fraud Task Force to combat
corruption, and we are consulting with Contracting/Procurement and
Financial Management experts to strengthen the business environment
within the area of responsibility (AOR) and enhance resource control.

2. Senator Webb. General Petraeus, what assurances and examples of
strengthened contracting oversight can you provide that demonstrate the
lessons learned in contracting in Iraq are being applied in Afghanistan
to reduce the incidence of waste, fraud, and abuse?
General Petraeus. CENTCOM transferred lessons learned from Iraq to
Afghanistan specifically aimed at reducing fraud, waste, and abuse.
We've formed the ACOD, which implements DOD's ACOD policies and
procedures and oversees PSCs. We're transitioning JCC-I/A to a JTSCC
for better synchronization and efficiency of contracting in theater.
We're applying acquisition strategies that have increased firm fixed-
price competitive contract awards with reduced reliance on LOGCAP. JCC-
I/A continues to refine its processes by leveraging Rock Island Arsenal
on contracts that are complex, resource intense, and require a detailed
Source Selection process. This allows the contracting officer on the
ground to pay attention to more tactical contractor oversight.
CENTCOM and DOD have improved COR resourcing and training. DAU
initiated online and resident courses to better train our CORs, and the
Department of Army directed deploying units to identify and train their
CORs prior to deployment. The number of CORs in Afghanistan has
dramatically increased with fill rates now over 90 percent. The CORs
are trained not only in general contract management, but are
specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee
contractors performing services such as food preparation, water
purification, and fuels distribution. Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) have also
increased the number of personnel in Afghanistan to improve contract
oversight.
CENTCOM has ordered the use of the Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) reporting for contractors performing valid
work in the CENTCOM AOR. This system will increase the quality and
reliability of contractor data thereby avoiding instances such as
fraudulent duplication of numbers on task order contracts and over-
provisioning of DOD food and supplies based on ineligible contracting
personnel.
To facilitate the integration of contractors when defining the
strategic plan for future CENTCOM operations, documents such as the
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) will feature a greater emphasis on contractor requirements. Other
Field Manuals, DOD Instructions, and new Joint Doctrine support the
growing importance of integrating contract support into operational
planning.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
commanders' emergency response program
3. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, while the Commanders'
Emergency Response Program (CERP) is considered an essential tool for
General McChrystal and other senior commanders on the ground in
Afghanistan, there have been problems with the program. Since 2004,
Congress has provided $1.6 billion to DOD for CERP in Afghanistan for
programs primarily designed to fund small-scale projects to meet urgent
humanitarian and reconstruction needs at the community and provincial
levels. For fiscal year 2011, DOD has requested $1.3 billion in CERP
funds DOD-wide, but about $1 billion of that money will go to
Afghanistan. A May 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct CENTCOM to evaluate
workforce requirements and ensure adequate staff to administer CERP and
establish training requirements for CERP personnel administering the
program. GAO further recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
collaborate to create a centralized project-development database for
use by U.S. Government agencies in Afghanistan, including establishing
specific milestones for its development and implementation. What is
CENTCOM doing to train CERP managers in the types and scale of projects
that they will handle in Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. The entire CERP community has worked diligently
to strengthen the oversight and training of personnel who administer
CERP in theater. Commanders in theater, working with Army CENTCOM, have
improved in-theater training. In September 2009, I wrote to the Chief
of Staff of the Army and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and
requested that they develop and implement pre-deployment training for
all who will have CERP responsibilities. General Casey directed that
units must identify and train all key CERP personnel prior to
deployment. The Army and Marine Corps have coordinated on training
materials and they have made the CERP curriculum available for
individuals to access world wide.

4. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, which of GAO's
recommendations from the May 2009 report have been implemented?
General Petraeus. The May 2009 GAO Audit of CERP in Afghanistan
contained three broad recommendations for the Department to consider.
Two of the recommendations address sufficient staffing and training for
administering CERP. The Army and CENTCOM have worked to implement both
recommendations and will continue to evaluate progress. The third
recommendation requested the Department and Administrator of USAID
collaborate on a centralized project development CERP database. DOD's
Business Transformation Agency is working to develop an unclassified
interface that will allow USAID to access CERP data via the World Wide
Web.

5. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, what is the status of the
creation of the common USAID/DOD database to track projects?
General Petraeus. DOD's Business Transformation Agency is working
to develop an unclassified interface that will allow USAID to access
CERP data via the World Wide Web. The most recent process improvements
can be obtained from the Business Transformation Agency.

6. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how will DOD's current
review of CERP affect the timeline of the implementation of the GAO
recommendations?
General Petraeus. I do not see the current DOD review of CERP
affecting the implementation timeline for recommendations contained in
the May 2009 GAO audit report. The Department has focused on
strengthening the oversight and management of CERP. All recognize a
need for continued program assessment and the potential of additional
process improvements.

7. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how many CERP projects does
CENTCOM currently have that are over $500,000 and how many are under
$5,000?
General Petraeus. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, Iraq
and Afghanistan reported a total of 13 projects over $500,000 and 1,432
projects under $5,000.

8. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how are those figures
affected by micro-loans and what is the average project size when the
micro-loans are subtracted?
General Petraeus. USAID oversees the micro-loans program. DOD CERP
does not allow micro-loans, but it does allow micro-grants. The desired
goal of micro-grants is to stimulate economic activity that supports
stability operations with a focus on areas underserved by other micro-
credit and assistance programs. The average project size, after
subtracting micro-grants, in fiscal year 2010 (first quarter) CERP
Report from Iraq and Afghanistan is $47,200. During the same timeframe,
there were 280 micro-grants issued out of 1,445 CERP projects.

9. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, how are large-scale CERP
projects vetted within the greater framework of reconstruction in
Afghanistan to ensure their utility and prevent duplication or unneeded
projects?
General Petraeus. CERP projects greater than $1 million are vetted
through review boards at several levels within the chain of command
before a recommendation for approval is forwarded to CENTCOM. The
review board includes members from interagency groups (USAID,
Department of Agriculture) and U.S. Embassy personnel to prevent
duplication and to ensure projects are inline with the strategic goals
for Afghanistan. Sustainment of projects is coordinated through
Memoranda of Agreement with donor nations, nongovernmental
organizations, or Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA) officials.

10. Senator McCaskill. General Petraeus, what is the largest CERP
project being conducted in Afghanistan, who is overseeing it, and how
long will it take to implement?
General Petraeus. As of 16 Mar 10, the largest fiscal year 2010
CERP project being conducted in Afghanistan is the $9.5 million Spin
Boldak road project. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan
Engineering District is providing the program management and oversight
for this project. It is estimated the project will take 8 months to
complete.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
afghanistan
11. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, some experts have suggested
increasing the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to as large as
250,000 and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to 150,000, respectively.
What is the planned number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
and is it sufficient for a country the size of Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. The planned numbers for the ANSF are listed in
the following table:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 FEB 10 31 OCT 10 JUL 11 OCT 11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghan National Army........................................ 104,296 134,000 159,000 171,600
Afghan National Police...................................... 98,256 109,000 123,000 134,000
---------------------------------------------------
Total Afghan National Security Forces..................... 202,561 243,000 282,000 305,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We will conduct an assessment in 2011 to determine if these planned
numbers are sufficient to protect the population, which is essential in
conducting counterinsurgency operations.

12. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, Afghanistan cannot
financially support its security forces. Raising additional security
forces or increasing the pay of the security forces will require the
United States or other international donors to absorb this cost. What
are your best estimates on the cost and for how long the ANSF will have
to be financially supported by the United States, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), or other international partners?
General Petraeus. The annual programmed cost to maintain the ANSF
at 305,600 personnel is projected to cost $6.2 billion. Our ultimate
goal of the ANSF at a combined strength (ANA/ANP) of 400,000 personnel
has an estimated annual cost of $10.3 billion. The need for the ANSF to
be supported by the international community will continue into the
foreseeable future. The growth of Afghanistan's economy is the key to
self-sustainment of the ANSF.

13. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what attempts are being made
to enable the government in Afghanistan to bring in revenue?
General Petraeus. This question is best answered by my colleagues
within the State Department. I respectfully refer you to the
``Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy'' which is a
comprehensive and collaborative document updated in late February 2010,
authored by the State Department. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other authorities, internally-
derived revenues from Afghanistan have steadily increased since 2005.
Looking only at 2008 and 2009, revenues from taxes increased from $317
million to $414 million; customs revenues from $270 million to $347
million; and non-tax revenues $199 million to $227 million.

14. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, helping to rebuild the Afghan
Government, economy, and security forces, while helping the Pakistan
people improve their economy, government, and security, is likely to be
a significant effort over many years. How long do you expect the United
States to have significant levels of troops in Afghanistan and be
providing significant amounts of funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and how much do you expect this to cost?
General Petraeus. I expect the United States to have significant
troop levels in Afghanistan for the next few years. Beginning in July
2011, as the President stated in his 1 December 2009 speech, we will
begin a withdrawal of our forces. This will be a conditions-based
withdrawal, and the rate at which we will withdraw will be determined
by the readiness of the ANSF to protect their population, and by the
level of governance established by the Afghan Government. While we have
significant troop levels, we must continue to provide funding to enable
our allies and partners to support our efforts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Due to our conditions-based withdrawal, we are unable to
estimate the cost because there are too many unknowns.

15. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what should we expect in
terms of NATO's and international partners' contributions and length of
commitment to the region?
General Petraeus. NATO and our international partners are currently
providing significant levels of support for the war in Afghanistan,
with total troop strength totaling approximately 44,500. Almost all of
the troop contributing nations have expressed their commitment to stay
in Afghanistan until our objectives have been attained. Of the 43 troop
contributing nations, each sets its own timeline for troop rotations,
and force increases or decreases. The Netherlands has announced the
withdrawal of combat forces no later than the end of 2010, and Canada
has announced its withdrawal in 2011. All of the other nations remain
committed for the foreseeable future.

16. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, initially, there was a 400
civilian personnel requirement to assist with efforts in Afghanistan.
What is the requirement now?
General Petraeus. This might be more appropriately addressed by the
Department of State (DOS), but as far as the reports I have seen, the
requirement, currently in staffing now, is over 1,000 U.S. Government
civilians.

17. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, please provide an update on
the status of civilians supporting the efforts in Afghanistan.
General Petraeus. While I respectfully defer to our partners at DOS
and USAID as the leads, let me share what I know from reports I see
from the department and agency. As of 1 April, approximately 1,000 U.S.
Government civilians are in Afghanistan, more than triple the level
from a year ago. They are assigned both at the U.S. Embassy and out in
the field and are integrated at every level with the International
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan (USFOR-
A) to include at the Regional Commands, Brigade Task Forces, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Agricultural Development Teams (ADT),
District Support Teams (DST), and numerous interagency organizations
such as the Border Management Task Force. Within that overall figure,
we count some 350 civilians in the field, up from 67 a year ago. They
live and work along side their military counterparts in the same field
conditions and level of danger. I would expect civilians to deploy in
growing numbers to Afghanistan in the coming year as a critical
component of the President's Afghanistan strategy. According to the
requests we have seen from Embassy Kabul, staffing would increase by an
additional 20 to 30 percent by the end of 2010 and 40 to 50 percent by
the end of 2011.

18. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what are the plans to enhance
coordination of civilian, military, and international efforts in
Afghanistan?
General Petraeus. The strategy for enhanced coordination in
Afghanistan is detailed in the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-
Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (August 2009). The
Plan represents the collaborative efforts of all the U.S. Government
departments and agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of
different equities, resources, and approaches. It is based on close
collaboration with the ISAF as well as the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective
civilian and military mechanisms for integrated assistance. The Plan's
most important component is a strong partnership with the GIRoA to
build the capacity needed to provide Afghanistan with a stable future.
In April 2010, we completed a civilian-military coordination
conference in Kabul, Afghanistan. Participants came from across the
interagency and the international communities including USFOR-A, ISAF,
the U.S. and partner nation embassies, and key GIRoA ministries. The
primary objectives of the civilian-military coordination conference
were program integration between US Embassy and USFOR-A/ISAF, and
improved coordination between GIRoA, U.S. Embassy, ISAF, UNAMA, and the
rest of the international community. The interagency civilan-military
working groups established to support the civilan-military coordination
conference will endure to ensure continuing coordination and
integration of our civilan-military efforts.

19. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, to your knowledge, have there
been any civilian assistance requests made to other allied nations?
General Petraeus. I do not know of any civilian assistance requests
made to other allied nations. These requests would normally be handled
by NATO and submitted to allied nations. Since U.S. forces are
operating in support of ISAF, these requests are not usually routed
through CENTCOM.

iraq
20. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) are not yet fully capable of protecting themselves from external
threats. What steps are you taking to enable Iraq to defend itself from
external threats?
General Petraeus. Our U.S. forces in Iraq continue work on
improving the ISF capabilities through increased training and
equipping. The ISF continue to make progress towards attaining the
Minimum Essential Capability (MEC) necessary to defend Iraq's
sovereignty on land, at sea, and in the air.
The Iraqi Army continues progress toward MEC but will not achieve a
foundation for defense against external threats before December 2011
due to equipment procurement timelines and subsequent training
requirements. Specifically, equipping, training, and combined arms
integration of the M1A1 fleet, artillery units, and key mechanized
enablers will not be complete prior to December 2011.
The Iraqi Navy is on track to achieve MEC by December 2011,
although there are risks if shortfalls in manning, C4ISR, maintenance,
and infrastructure are not adequately addressed in coming months. The
Iraqi Navy will assume responsibility for protection of the oil
platforms in 2011; however, the importance of these oil terminals to
the Iraqi economy requires an even higher level of capability. A
requirement for a regional presence that can respond to emergencies in
support of the Iraqi Navy as it matures from MEC to a fully capable
force is anticipated.
The Iraqi Air Force is on the path to achieving MEC by the end of
2011 in all mission categories except airspace control and fixed-wing
airlift. Specifically, multi-role fighter, long-range radar, and C-130J
delivery and fielding will not be complete prior to December 2011. The
Iraqi Air Force's December 2011 goal is the development of a capability
to support ISF counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and have an initial
air sovereignty capability in place. Delayed execution of the Iraqi Air
Force Service Plan and lack of funding for acquisitions, accessions,
contract logistics support, and sustainment of current fleet all
present obstacles to achieving the capability to conduct minimal air
sovereignty operations by December 2011.
Although the ISF are not on track to achieve full MEC for external
security by the end of 2011, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
will continue to support Iraqi efforts toward achieving that goal
through training and equipping.

21. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, will there be additional
military cooperation after January 1, 2012, to support the ISF?
General Petraeus. We anticipate additional military cooperation
will continue after January 1, 2012, through an Office of Security
Cooperation-Iraq under Title 22 authorities. Support provided to the
ISF will continue with training and equipping programs that contribute
to a mutually beneficial bilateral security relationship with the
Government of Iraq from 2012 and beyond.

22. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, how are those efforts to
support the ISF reflected?
General Petraeus. Efforts to support the ISF after January 1, 2012,
will be provided through an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq under
Title 22 authorities. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq will
directly support DOS efforts with continued security training and
equipping programs for the ISF. Planning efforts are still ongoing to
adequately define the size and composition necessary to fully accept
the responsibilities essential to continued ISF development.

23. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, what type of equipment is the
United States transferring to the Iraqis and what impact will the
transfer of that equipment have on the availability of equipment for
our forces?
General Petraeus. Equipment being transferred is generally
categorized as either excess or non-excess. Excess equipment is that
which has been determined to have no required use by U.S. forces, as
such, its transfer has no impact on equipping U.S. forces. Excess
equipment comprises a wide range from office equipment to machinery.
Non-excess equipment comprises major end items which have been
identified as essential to Iraq's MEC. The Services have determined
that transferring the non-excess equipment identified in Iraq's MEC
presents no adverse impact to equipping U.S. forces.

24. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, how much revenue does oil
bring to Iraq?
General Petraeus. The Government of Iraq relies on oil exports for
approximately 91 percent of its revenue. Of the total revenues planned
for fiscal year 2010, approximately $49 billion is attributed to oil
exports. This is based on 2.1 million barrels/day at an average market
price of $62.50/barrel. Additional revenue of approximately $4.9
billion in revenue is expected to come from a combination of public
service fees, personal and corporate taxes, customs duties, interest,
and profit from state-owned enterprises.

25. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, with billions of dollars in
oil revenue, how much longer will the United States provide financial
assistance to Iraq?
General Petraeus. The length of time the United States will provide
financial support to Iraq is uncertain because it depends on numerous
factors such as, but not limited to, oil production, oil prices, and
budgetary outlays. Iraq is dependent on oil revenue for 85 percent of
government funding and annual budgets are vulnerable to significant oil
price fluctuations. In 2009, Iraq's budget contained a 34 percent
deficit and relied on bond financing, World Bank loans, and an IMF
Stand-By Loan Arrangement. Iraq's Ministry of Defense requested $8
billion in the Government of Iraq 2009 budget request, but only
received $4.1 billion (50 percent) of funding requested. Budget
shortfalls left critical budget gaps in logistic support units and
sustainment areas of Iraqi Army and Air Force fleets. In an effort to
close existing gaps, DOD requested $1 billion in the fiscal year 2010
supplemental and $2 billion in fiscal year 2011. DOS controlled Foreign
Military Financing should address fiscal requirements beyond 2011.

26. Senator Begich. General Petraeus, has the distribution of
revenues issue been addressed and has progress been made?
General Petraeus. Iraq's Council of Representatives has yet to
approve the Iraq Hydrocarbon Law. Nevertheless, progress has been made
in the absence of new legislation to address distribution of revenues
through interim sharing mechanisms and agreements established between
the central government and the regions. Additionally, new interim
measures are routinely offered. For example, we are aware of a proposal
submitted to the parliament to approve a $1/barrel return to each local
region for the oil exported. These types of provisional arrangements
demonstrate the practical aspects to address revenue sharing while the
final laws are codified and adopted.
However, in the absence of new hydrocarbons legislation, both the
Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government of Iraq have
separately pursued development contracts with international oil
companies. Fundamental differences remain in Iraq over Federal and
regional authority to contract and manage the oil and gas sector.
Therefore, in the long term, it is essential that the Government of
Iraq enact laws governing hydrocarbons and revenue sharing to
permanently codify future control of resources and allocation of
revenues.
For further revenue questions, I respectfully recommend you refer
to DOS which follows Iraq's economy closely.

terrorism
27. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what additional authorities
might you need to combat terrorism and manage your command?
Admiral Olson. I have a need for greater involvement in the
preparedness, promotions, assignments, retention, training, and
professional military education of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
personnel; the Department is currently taking actions to provide me
with such authorities.
Title 10 assigns the responsibility for the combat readiness of SOF
to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the 2009
National Defense Authorization Act (section 901) directed me to develop
a SOF personnel management plan to improve SOF readiness. In response
to this requirement, I submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense
on 09 May 2009, wherein, I proposed that Title 10 language be modified
to give Commander, SOCOM ``coordinating'' rather than ``monitoring''
responsibilities for the readiness of SOF. There is a subtle yet
important difference between these two terms. The former term implies
my active involvement in significant SOF personnel decisions; whereas
the later term implies that I am merely an observer to the process.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff proposed, rather than modifying legislation, that the same effect
would be achieved by modifying DOD Policy. The Service Chiefs concurred
with this proposal, as have I.
A revised DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of DOD and its
components, is currently in staffing and includes a requirement for the
Services to ``coordinate'' with SOCOM on issues affecting the personnel
readiness of SOF. Once approved, it will be sufficient to implement
much of the substance of the SOCOM plan for the personnel management of
SOF.

afghanistan-pakistan border
28. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what can you tell me about the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and the cooperation of the
respective Pakistani defense and intelligence communities?
Admiral Olson. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains as a
sanctuary for Taliban, local militants, and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda
senior leaders likely remain in the region despite operations being
conducted against numerous militant compounds. Having said that,
however, credit must be given to Pakistan for aggressively moving
against extremist elements on the Pakistan side of the border. Pakistan
has conducted military operations on an unprecedented scale within its
tribal region over the past 2 years disrupting critical strongholds of
the Pakistani Taliban and foreign terrorist elements. U.S. military
cooperation with Pakistan has expanded and the Pakistani military have
embraced training efforts by the U.S. SOF community. Recent attention
has been placed on the arrests of senior Afghan Taliban officials
within Pakistan. While the full impact of this is yet to be determined,
it does indicate a more flexible response from Pakistan, its military,
and its intelligence service to work in cooperation with the United
States. This border region will remain problematic for the foreseeable
future with regard to efforts to expand good governance on both sides
of the Durand line.

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
29. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what are SOCOM's intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needs for prosecuting its
mission?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM requires the support of a robust mix of
persistent ISR capabilities: air, ground and maritime-based collection,
accompanying processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED)
capabilities, and supporting integrated ISR architecture.
SOF requires the ability to sense and exploit, to detect/identify/
track through cover and weather in high-clutter environments, and the
ability to track high value individuals (HVIs) over global distances.
SOF requires collection platforms which have long on-station loiter
times, support multiple sensors, have sufficient room for expansion for
future sensors, have suppressed visual and acoustic signatures, and are
all-weather/day/night capable.
SOF at all echelons, from JSOTF down to team level, has a high
demand for readily exploitable data, from numerous data sources to
include finished products, partially exploited data, and raw feeds. SOF
requires the support of a highly scalable, worldwide integrated ISR
architecture, interoperable with service, Intelligence Community (IC)
and coalition/partner systems. This ISR architecture must enable
seamless dataflow, efficient workflow and effective decisionmaking,
starting from collection at each individual sensor, through all phases
of PED and mission execution. SOF partner nation/host nation train,
equip, and advise activities increase the requirement for ISR
architecture (collection, PED and communications) which seamlessly
enables information sharing.

30. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, what is the SOCOM ISR
requirement beyond the CENTCOM AOR?
Admiral Olson. The CENTCOM AOR is ideally suited to Full Motion
Video (FMV) collection and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operations--
more diverse operational environments outside the CENTCOM AOR, i.e.
weather and heavy foliage will drive sensor and PED requirements beyond
FMV. Basing, airspace, and host-nation limitations will also drive an
increased reliance on both manned and maritime-based ISR platforms.
SOCOM requires the support of a robust mix of persistent ISR
capabilities: air, ground and maritime based collection, accompanying
PED capabilities, and supporting integrated ISR architecture.
SOF requires the ability to sense and exploit, to detect/identify/
track through cover and weather in high-clutter environments, and the
ability to track HVIs over global distances. SOF requires collection
platforms which have long on-station loiter times, support multiple
sensors, have sufficient room for expansion for future sensors, have
suppressed visual and acoustic signatures, and are all weather/day/
night capable.
SOF at all echelons, from JSOTF down to team level, has a high
demand for readily-exploitable data, from numerous data sources to
include finished products, partially exploited data, and raw feeds. SOF
requires the support of a highly scalable, worldwide integrated ISR
architecture, interoperable with service, IC and coalition/partner
systems. This ISR architecture must enable seamless dataflow, efficient
workflow and effective decisionmaking, starting from collection at each
individual sensor, through all phases of PED and mission execution. SOF
partner nation/host nation train, equip, and advise activities increase
the requirement for ISR architecture (collection, PED and
communications) which seamlessly enables information sharing.

iraq, afghanistan, and the horn of africa
31. Senator Begich. Admiral Olson, please discuss the nature of the
conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. How are they
similar, how are they different, and what challenges are unique to each
location?
Admiral Olson. The ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
Horn of Africa are difficult problems that will continue to challenge
the United States and our regional allies for some time to come. In
each case, there is a confluence of challenges including limited or
non-existence governance combined with the introduction of a largely
foreign ideology of Islamic extremism. In each case, we face a
challenge from local extremists with their own grievances, and in each
case, this challenge is exacerbated by Islamic extremists inspired by,
and with varying connections to, the al Qaeda network. The greatest
difference we face in each area is the ability and commitment of our
local partners to address these challenges. The Iraqi Government
continues to expand and improve its ability to address its security
challenges, and as that happens, it is requiring less assistance from
U.S. forces. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, army, and police
force have not progressed as far as their Iraqi counterparts, but they
are improving and enhancing their ability to address Afghanistan's
problems is an instrumental element of our role there. We face the
greatest challenge in this area in the Horn of Africa. The Transitional
Federal Government in Somalia only controls a very limited section of
territory inside Somalia and they are heavily dependent on assistance
from other African nations to achieve that. In the long run, enhancing
the ability of our local allies to address their unique challenges will
be the most important element to address the challenges in each of
these areas.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
piracy
32. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM integrated in the
anti-piracy strategy?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM is a force provider, responsible for
organizing, training, and equipping personnel who may be called upon by
the geographic combatant commands to conduct anti-piracy operations.
This would most likely be done in conjunction with geographically-
oriented naval forces under NAVCENT control in the CENTCOM AOR.
Otherwise, SOCOM has no direct involvement with these operations unless
the line between piracy and terrorism begins to blur.

33. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what is the current policy
for captured pirates with regard to detention and prosecution?
General Petraeus. Once a U.S. Navy vessel captures a suspected
pirate, the individual is held onboard and given due care. To ensure
safe and humane treatment is provided to suspects temporarily held
aboard U.S. Navy vessels, crews undertake training such as in-depth
guidance on use-of-force and responding to the religious needs of
suspects.
In terms of due process, while a suspected pirate is held onboard,
evidence is compiled and the case examined for validity. Concurrently,
the State Department determines where to send the individual for
prosecution should the evidence support a likely conviction. In
determining location, the State Department looks to an affected state
to both favorably consider and make appropriate effort to prosecute a
suspect. Affected states include the following: the state whose flag is
flown by the attacked ship; the state(s) from which the ship's owners
originate; and the state(s) from which the crew or passengers
originate. In certain cases, where all affected states are unable or
unwilling to prosecute, the case could be prosecuted in a national
court in the region where the act of piracy occurred, with appropriate
enabling support.
If there is subsequently no interest by any of the affected states,
the U.S. Government has the option to use the Memorandum of
Understanding with the Government of Kenya (signed 16 January 2009)
concerning the transfer of suspected pirates. Upon reasonable request
by the United States, the Republic of Kenya will accept custody of any
person suspected of committing (or attempting to commit) an act of
piracy or armed robbery against ships.
Under these circumstances, Kenya will review the case and indeed
may opt not to prosecute based on the evidence provided and the
strength of possible conviction. If Kenya chooses not to prosecute, the
suspect will then be released by the warship in which he or she is
being held.

illegal trafficking
34. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, what are the concerns with
regard to the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in your
AOR?
General Petraeus. State-sponsored WMD programs and extremists
seeking to acquire such weapons pose a grave threat to our allies and
interests in the U.S. CENTCOM AOR. We must understand the motivations
of those who pursue or stockpile these weapons and team with our
partners to stop such activity. Where appropriate, we must implement
incentives to encourage states to change their attitudes toward WMD and
offer other security alternatives. Several regional countries maintain
WMD stockpiles. When coupled with advanced delivery means, such as
long-range rockets or ballistic missiles, these weapons pose
significant offensive threats and serve as strategic deterrents. Such
programs affect current and future behavior of regional leaders, create
tensions, and undermine regional stability. Countries such as Iran and
Syria continue to import dual-use, WMD-related technologies to remain
relevant and exert influence in the region, while non-state actors
desire these weapons to inflict mass casualties. We remain at a cross-
road with Iran and Syria regarding their WMD programs and their
relationship with surrogates. To counter the increasing threat of WMD
proliferation and related technology, we must leverage all-domain
interdiction processes and capabilities to identify proliferation
networks and then track and interdict suspected shipments. To aid in
these efforts, we must seek regional support or participate in counter-
proliferation agreements, activities, and exercises. We recognize that
U.S. counter-proliferation efforts will be significantly enhanced by
the increased awareness of partner nations and their willingness to
take action with respect to interdiction and border security. To this
end, CENTCOM, through its Cooperative Defense Program, continues to
conduct numerous engagement activities with select partner nations
along the lines of interdiction, border security, consequence
management, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense
to assist in increasing their counter-proliferation capabilities.

35. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM supporting the
combatant commands in their counter-trafficking efforts?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM supports the combatant commands in their
counter-trafficking efforts with the allocation of resources and SOF.
These forces routinely train partner nation personnel or enhance
combatant commands capabilities to address the unique challenges of
trafficking networks operating in their AOR. Specially trained and
equipped to deal with irregular warfare, SOF brings unique expertise
and operational know-how to properly train or support efforts against
the shadowy elements involved in illegal trafficking.
Because the trafficking of weapons, drugs, or people routinely
follows a path that crosses multiple international borders or combatant
commands' boundaries, SOCOM studies these networks from a global
perspective. SOCOM looks at gaps and seams between the commands and
makes combatant commands aware of opportunities and trafficking
networks' vulnerabilities. Major trafficking networks could not be
significantly dismantled or destroyed if addressed only with isolated
regional actions.

special operations command
36. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, how have things developed or
changed since you took command of SOCOM?
Admiral Olson. During my tenure as its commander, arguably the most
significant evolution for our command and force was a strategic one,
reorienting approaches to address more fluid environments and
adversaries. We have referred to this shift as the reality of a new
normal, where the greatest security challenges to our Nation reside in
agile and elusive enemy networks versus traditional, uniformed military
formations of the past.
In this shift, however, we did not forget our origins. To be
successful in this ``new normal'' requires consistent pressure to kill
and capture our adversaries with even greater precision and potency
while simultaneously addressing indirect approaches and building
capacity in our partners. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan currently
necessitate an increased manpower commitment to this region to
accomplish assigned tasks and missions. This commitment has placed
unprecedented demands on SOF, where maintaining an enduring presence
and global footprint across the remaining combatant commands is a
constant challenge.
More than ever, the command has maximized Security Force Assistance
(SFA) as a vital element to enhance the military capabilities and
capacities of our allies and partners via training, advising,
assistance, and--as authorized--equipping and supporting foreign
military and security forces. As we move forward, we should measure our
success by how well we have prepared others to face their security
challenges, not by what we do for them.
In this environment of increasing partnership, we have emphasized
the command's role in synchronization, improving the sharing of
information across various government, DOD, intelligence, and partner
nation organizations to increase expediency and effectiveness. This
includes the direct embedding of SOF personnel in these organizations
to provide subject matter expertise and planning support.
Fiscally, we have carefully maximized our unique funding
authorities, such as Section 1208 and Combat Mission Needs Statements
(CMNS), to produce enabling SOF-specific capabilities required by the
combatant commanders--we've recently upgraded and/or replaced critical
mobility, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision
strike platform capabilities.
Last and perhaps most importantly, the command continues to improve
in the execution of one of its most solemn duties: the care of our
wounded warriors and their families. With the reality of nearly a
decade of continuous combat, the increases in strain and debilitating
injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain
injuries have required increased emphasis in both policy and practice
to ensure the mental and physical well-being of our operators.

37. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, what are the biggest challenges
facing the command in the near future?
Admiral Olson. The challenges that we foresee over the short- to
mid-term are presented in three areas: the enemy in our current wars,
how SOF are employed, and how we will prepare the force for future
operations. These challenges manifest themselves in our
responsibilities as a force provider, our traditional Title 10
responsibilities (Organize, Train, and Equip Special Operations
Forces), and as the synchronizer of plans and planning in the war
against al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
Enemy challenges--countering the adaptive, asymmetric, and increasingly
networked enemy.
We must ensure we have a comprehensive strategy
addressing the root causes of the irregular threat, while fully
developing indirect approaches that mobilize friendly networks
to counter the enemy's network. We must diligently work to
integrate all elements of national power while continuing to
apply direct lines of operations to ensure disruptive pressure
is brought to bear.
The scope of the enemy challenge dictates partnering
with others that have shared interests against violent
extremists. We must also act to build the capacity of nation
states so they are capable of containing the violence while
long-term actions have time to show effect.
Force Employment
``Prevail in today's wars'' using the correct
application of conventional forces and SOF skills is the
county's highest priority. This priority cannot be separated
from another priority of ``prevent and deter future conflict''
(both detailed in the Chairman's Risk Assessment)--we must work
to reemphasize the unique nature of SOF in preventing future
conflict in fragile regions that are currently under-resourced.
In SOF terms, this means persistent engagement to the places
where we can influence or have effect on the upstream factors
that lead to violent extremism. Building of these enduring
relationships is the key to our success in building partner
capacity to minimize the threats to U.S. interests and
protecting our Homeland.
SOCOM must work with the geographic combatant
commanders, the Joint Staff, DOS, and other U.S. governmental
agencies to identify, synchronize, and properly resource united
efforts against both current and future challenges. This is
particularly important in the areas of interagency cooperation,
planning, authorities, and strategies.
Force Development and Preparation
We must enhance our understanding of the strategic
environment and develop sound human capital, force development,
and agile acquisition strategy that get ahead of resourcing
issues in an environment likely to include increasing budget
pressures. We must anticipate the activities, mission areas,
and geographic regions most likely to present problems, and
strive for the agility to respond effectively.
We must provide for the proper enabling of SOF to
assure mission success. SOF must be enabled by inherent organic
enablers, but we cannot succeed without service partner support
and enablers as well.
We must remain committed to caring for our wounded
warriors and their families. As casualties rise through the
years of combat so too must our funding of programs that help
our operators restore their lives or assist family members to
cope and endure with loss.

To meet these challenges SOCOM must present the force to the
geographic combatant commanders with the proper structure and skills to
fulfill an array of strategic options against a variety of missions.
Organize:
While meeting today's enemy and employment challenges
we are aware of the increasing appetite for the use of SOF in
an irregular environment. Our special skills often make us the
force of choice. We must ensure rapid growth does not dilute
the very skills that are required to accomplish our mission. As
stated in my testimony, we must manage our growth, ``only as it
can be recruited, trained, absorbed, and deployed.''
A potential retention challenge for the near future
may arise as we move from many of the kinetic activities to the
more commonplace skills of presence, engagement, and capacity
building. We must also be mindful of the ``SOF for life''
skills our operators possess and can be used after they remove
the uniform.
Train:
The Chairman indicated, ``winning is not solely the
responsibility of the U.S. Military.'' With this in mind, SOF
must be prepared to operate in a synchronized ``Diplomacy,
Development, Defense'' environment, possessing the advanced
education and maturity to deal with complexity and ambiguity.
We must train our operators in this multi-dimensional
application of national power to have greatest effect.
The infrastructure and institutional requirements are
essential to supporting the operators who must meet the
challenging demands. My testimony points to many construction
and modernization programs focused on sustaining SOF operations
support.
Equip:
I spent considerable time in my testimony discussing
the essential enabling aspects to SOF. Many of these are my
responsibility in the allocated MFP-11 budget process. As SOF
is not a separate service, we also rely on service provided
enablers that are just as essential for mission success.
Increasingly, my expenditures are beginning to cover shortfalls
in enablers that the Services have difficulty funding. This
equipping issue may become more acute if overseas contingency
operations funding falls short of helping the military meet its
commitments.
Our enemies, as I stated at the outset, are adaptive
and increasingly use available technologies against us. Our
acquisition processes must become more agile to meet the enemy,
force employment, and force development challenges. Our ability
to field, adapt, and out maneuver the enemy can be hamstrung by
the acquisition process.
Synchronizer:
Addressing the enemy challenges from a DOD perspective
is difficult enough. To fully realize a synchronized whole-of-
government effort against our enemies requires continued
emphasis on understanding and cooperation from all elements of
our national power structure. From strategies, through the
operational art to the tactical level our strategic messaging
must have a more consistent voice/deed alignment. Along with
budgeting issues this is where Congress and our national
leadership can have the greatest effect.

Certainly, these are not the only challenges facing SOCOM and SOF
for the near future. These issues identified will give us the agility
and unity of effort to help confront these challenges and respond to
unexpected challenges as well.

africa
38. Senator Burris. Admiral Olson, please describe how SOCOM is
supporting U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) efforts in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) Trans Sahara and the Joint Task Force Horn of
Africa?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM provides forces to execute activities as
directed by Commander, AFRICOM. SOF elements support OEF Trans Sahara,
JTF Horn of Africa, and other efforts totaling 55 activities in 16
countries across the African continent; this equates to approximately 4
percent of the globally deployed SOF. The focus of SOF operations in
AFRICOM is to build partner nation capacity and regional stability
through both persistent engagement and episodic training; we provide
persistent elements such as Civil Military Support Teams and Military
Information Support Teams in nine countries while Army Special Forces,
Marine Special Operations teams, and Naval Special Warfare elements
provide training to build the capacity of partner nations in the
region.

contractor oversight
39. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, private contractor support
continues to receive increased scrutiny in light of recent abuses in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractor fraud, waste, and abuse are not
only financially damaging, but our strategic efforts are undermined as
well. How will CENTCOM provide better oversight of private contractors'
efforts?
General Petraeus. CENTCOM has taken several actions to provide
better oversight of private contractor efforts. We've formed the ACOD,
which implements DOD's Armed Contractor policies and procedures and
oversees PSCs. We're transitioning JCC-I/A to a JTSCC for better
synchronization and efficiency of contracting in the theater. We're
leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are complex, resource
intense, and require a detailed Source Selection process. This allows
the contracting officer on the ground to pay attention to more
tactical, day-to-day issues affecting the warfighter.
CENTCOM and DOD have improved COR resource and training. DAU
initiated online resident courses to train our CORs, and the Department
of Army directed deploying units to identify and train their CORs prior
to deployment. The number of CORs in Afghanistan has dramatically
increased with fill rates now over 90 percent. The CORs are trained not
only in general contract management, but are specifically selected for
their technical expertise to oversee contractors performing services
such as food preparation, water purification, and fuels distribution.
DCMA and DCAA have also increased the number of personnel in
Afghanistan to improve contract oversight.
CENTCOM has ordered the use of the SPOT reporting for contractors
performing valid work in the CENTCOM AOR. This system will increase the
quality and reliability of contractor data thereby avoiding fraudulent
duplication of numbers on task order contracts and over-provisioning of
DOD food and supplies based on ineligible contracting personnel.
To facilitate the integration of contractors when defining the
strategic plan for future CENTCOM operations, documents such as the NDS
and QDR will feature a greater emphasis on contractor requirements.
Other Field Manuals, DOD Instructions, and new Joint Doctrine support
the growing importance of integrating contractors.

40. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, could the missions being
fulfilled by private contractors be better handled by military
personnel?
General Petraeus. While our military forces are exceptionally well-
trained and capable, a contract work force allows us to increase and
decrease capacity very quickly. It takes years to build military
personnel capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors
bring to the table the required experience at the required time without
the commitment to growing end strength.

41. Senator Burris. General Petraeus, could reservists and
guardsmen provide this type of support?
General Petraeus. Reservists and guardsmen are already contributing
essential skill sets to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While
our Guard and Reserve forces are exceptionally well-trained and
capable, a contract work force allows us to increase and decrease
capacity very quickly. It takes years to build military personnel
capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors bring to the
table the required experience at the required time without the
commitment to growing end strength.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
air force special operations command
42. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, your testimony describes the
rapid prototyping that took place to convert the Air Force Special
Operations Command's (AFSOC) C-130W aircraft to gunships. Does SOCOM
need any additional authorities to help its rapid prototyping efforts?
Admiral Olson. The Dragon Spear project was successful due, in
part, to strong congressional support and authorities afforded SOCOM to
rapidly field technology to the SOF warfighter. The specific
authorities that benefitted the Dragon Spear project included the
ability to execute a CMNS and congressional support for Above-Threshold
Reprogramming (ATR) requests to fund pulling available technology into
the Precision Strike Package (PSP) and to fund modification of the
entire MC-130W fleet. SOCOM appreciates the continued congressional
support through authorities such as CMNS, ATR support, and capital
leasing to rapidly acquire new technology and field capability to
respond to emergent mission requirements.
A slight modification to the existing Below Threshold Reprogramming
(BTR) language would further help SOCOM rapidly acquire and field
innovative technology. Reverting back to the (pre-2004) BTR language
which provided the command the authority to reprogram funds to the RDTE
threshold of $10 million, the procurement threshold of $20 million, or
20 percent of the item, whichever is greater will allow SOCOM to
reprogram MFP-11 funds to support emergent SOF requirements and quickly
react to meet Secretary of Defense priorities. The 2004 change in
language to read ``whichever is less'' is restrictive as the SOCOM
budget is smaller than traditional service budgets.
The command continues to succeed in rapidly fielding capability in
support of SOF emergent requirements. The support provided by Congress
has been a critical enabler to SOCOM's mission success. The enhanced
reprogramming authority described in this response would provide SOCOM
the flexibility to redirect already approved MFP-11 funding to rapidly
acquire new technology to adjust to changing mission requirements.

43. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, your testimony describes
SOCOM's efforts in the area of ISR. I am particularly interested in
AFSOC's use of the MQ-1 Reaper aircraft given that it will eventually
be phased out of the inventory--are there plans to replace it?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM continues to monitor USAF MQ-1 Predator to the
MQ-9 Reaper transition plans. SOCOM currently has 26 MQ-1 Predators and
four MQ-9 Reapers. We expect to receive three additional MQ-9 aircraft
in 2010, nine in 2011, four in 2012, two in 2013, and three in 2016.
SOCOM's inventory end state is 26 MQ-1s and 25 MQ-9s by fourth quarter
2016.

44. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, in your testimony you describe
the acquisition of nonstandard aircraft so that SOF can be inserted
without attention. Does AFSOC plan to acquire or lease these aircraft
and can you tell me the trade-offs in each case?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM's Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV) inventory
comprises both light and medium category mobility platforms for intra-
theater cargo airlift. Since the beginning of SOCOM's NSAV program in
fiscal year 2008, nine NSAV Lights (eight PC-12s and one M-28) were
procured and delivered to the AFSOC. NSAV Medium procurement funding
did not begin until fiscal year 2010; as such, SOCOM leased four
Bombardier Q200s to meet the interim medium mobility mission
requirement. Although the Q200s do not fully meet the NSAV Medium
requirements, this specific lease allows SOCOM to partially meet the
capability gap until the procured NSAV Mediums are delivered beginning
in fiscal year 2011.
Regarding the acquire versus lease trade-off, SOCOM has an enduring
requirement for intra-theater mobility to remote locations that makes
procurement of aircraft more cost effective and advantageous over
leasing.

45. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, my understanding is that
General Stanley McChrystal is emphasizing daylight operations as part
of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. What do you need to
better equip and train your SOF for daylight operations given that
night time operations have been a hallmark of SOF and AFSOC, in
particular?
Admiral Olson. Irregular warfare activities such as Key Leader
Engagement, SFA, and Foreign Internal Defense are typically conducted
during daylight hours and should not be significantly affected by an
emphasis on daylight operations.
Some SOF operations, however, such as direct action missions to
capture key enemy leadership and disrupt enemy networks, are normally
conducted at night; this allows SOF to take advantage of the natural
concealment of darkness and optimize circadian rhythm relative to the
enemy. Through the use of specialized equipment, SOF is able to
overcome low/no-light situations which provide a further advantage.
Daylight operations offset these tactical advantages, placing SOF at
increased risk.
Changes to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed
in such missions are being implemented to mitigate the risks associated
with daylight execution. With appropriate changes to TTPs, the overall
operational risk is manageable in most cases and daylight execution
does not appear to have a significant impact.
SOCOM has efforts underway to expand ISR capabilities and increase
human intelligence capacity; such efforts will provide deployed SOF
with increased situational awareness of geographic objectives, enemy
capabilities, and intentions, and further mitigate operational risk in
daylight operations. Additionally, the command is exploring equipment
that can reduce the warning time at the point of action, and turn
``day'' into ``night'' for the other senses; examples of such equipment
include: advanced phone/radio/noise jammers, directed energy (sound)
equipment, and low-signature (noise) packages for air or ground
mobility assets.
SOF aviation has engaged in limited operations during daylight
hours. SOF aviation typically flies during darkness due to the risk to
the aircraft at the objective during daylight. Current programs to
field Hostile Fire Indication Systems, Lightweight Ballistic Protection
Systems, fire and forget missiles, missile warning receiver and
countermeasures, digital-aided close air support technologies and laser
designation systems will help mitigate the riskier daylight operations.

weapons of mass destruction
46. Senator Bingaman. Admiral Olson, a critical area of SOCOM
pertains to countering WMD. Do you feel with the demands of the ongoing
operations overseas that this area could use more support?
Admiral Olson. Yes. The Nation must prepare for the evolving WMD
threats of tomorrow. The continuing progress of science and technology
can be expected to present opportunities to develop new and even more
troublesome means of perpetrating mass destruction. The Nation will
need to invest in anticipating and preparing to preempt or counter such
developments as it strives to ensure that our worst fears about the
proliferation and use of WMD remain unfulfilled.
Counterproliferation is one of SOCOM's core mission areas. Due to
the high tempo of ongoing overseas operations, SOCOM has had to balance
counterproliferation training and equipping with the more immediate
demands of the current fight. SOCOM continues to evolve to meet these
emerging threats and strives to achieve the appropriate balance between
the current fight and the ability to get out in front of future
threats.
Currently, SOCOM has the capability to conduct counterproliferation
activities but the capacity is limited. Ongoing global contingency
operations have SOCOM counterproliferation forces conducting
counterterrorism missions. The result is a reduction in the number of
forces available for counterproliferation and reduced
counterproliferation expertise due to decreased level of training.
The threat of proliferation and use of WMD by an extremist
organization is greater now than at any other time in history. As U.S.
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, SOCOM's role with regard to
counterproliferation needs to be redoubled. In order to do this, we
need to redeploy, reconstitute, and retrain forces returning from
overseas. In the interim, SOCOM needs to train and equip additional
forces to accomplish some portions of the counterproliferation mission
in order to increase capacity.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
afghanistan/pakistan---taliban reconciliation
47. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, last week while in
Afghanistan, Secretary Gates said this about the prospects of
reconciliation with Taliban leaders: ``I do believe that the senior
Taliban are only going to be interested in reconciling in terms that
are acceptable to the Afghan Government, and those of us supporting it,
when they see that the likelihood of their being successful has been
cast into serious doubt. My guess is they're not at that point yet.''
Do you believe we are now at a point where the Taliban doubt their
likelihood of success and would be willing to reconcile on acceptable
terms?
General Petraeus. [Deleted.]

48. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what would be the minimally
required changes to the security conditions on the ground in
Afghanistan before the United States would enter into or support
substantive reconciliation talks with senior Taliban leaders?
General Petraeus. [Deleted.]

49. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, how do you interpret
Pakistan's recent successes in capturing senior Afghan Taliban leaders
in Pakistan?
General Petraeus. The arrests of Afghan Taliban Senior Leadership
(TBSL) figures most likely represent an effort to capitalize on the
positive developments following the London Conference. Islamabad seeks
to minimize Indian influence in Afghanistan, establish Pakistan's role
in shaping Afghan Reintegration and Reconciliation (R2), and enhance
their strategic relationship with the United States. Pakistan has used
the arrests to demonstrate its unique capability to influence
reconciliation (due to proximity and access to TBSL), something India
cannot offer Afghanistan. Further, Islamabad has demonstrated to TBSL
that Pakistan at present plays reluctant host, not a strategic partner
or sponsor to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's concerns--as expressed in
their recent visit to Washington, DC, for strategic dialogue--remain
firmly centered on countering Indian regional ambitions. Although the
United States and Pakistan have agreed to a framework of working group
discussions to mitigate a number of lesser concerns, Pakistan
ultimately seeks a lasting strategic partnership with the United
States. With respect to Afghanistan and the eventual U.S. withdrawal,
Pakistan's desired end-state remains unchanged: a friendly Afghanistan
Government independent of Indian influence--fully integrated with
ethnic Pashtun representation--and recognizing the Durand line as the
national border.

afghanistan/pakistan--kandahar
50. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, in the aftermath of the
recent operation in Marjah, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently
said: ``Kandahar will be next.'' Other senior leaders have said the
same. Can you tell me what to expect in the coming months in Kandahar?
General Petraeus. Operations in Kandahar will build on the momentum
created in Central Helmand. Unlike Central Helmand, Kandahar is urban,
densely populated and has some, albeit weak, Afghan Government ANSF
structures. One of the requirements for securing the population and
delivering governance is the correct force density, both ANSF and
coalition, in order to secure the population. The key to this will be
to ensure that the U.S. Marine Corps, together with Afghan and United
Kingdom forces, continue comprehensive COIN operations in Marjah and
Nad `Ali in order to strengthen the authority of the Afghan Government
in Central Helmand. In parallel, we have started deliberate COIN
operations to set conditions in Kandahar province during the coming
months.
Our intention is to expand the security zones in Kandahar and the
surrounding districts, thereby bringing a significant portion of
southern Afghanistan's population under Afghan Government control, as
well as denying the insurgents vital terrain, limiting their freedom of
movement and access to key population centers.
Progress in Kandahar is the next step in convincing Afghans of
their government's capacity and resolve to succeed. The insurgents
recognize the threat of a more credible Afghan Government and the
ISAF's COIN approach and will likely react aggressively to prevent
coalition success in Kandahar. Kandahar underpins the Taliban power
base and holds significant importance as the Taliban's former capital;
they still have a disproportionate effect on the population and
continue to exert control through intimidation and shadow governance
structures.

51. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, how would you describe the
objective and the strategy to achieve that objective?
General Petraeus. The objective of Hamkari Baraye Kandahar
(Cooperation for Kandahar) is to provide credible, transparent,
inclusive, and representative governance connected to the population,
enabled by steady, incremental improvements to overall security,
providing space for governance to develop. To achieve this objective,
the ISAF strategy is focused on improving governance and political
engagement, addressing inequality and corruption, facilitating
stabilization and reconstruction, and providing security. To improve
governance and political engagement, ISAF is conducting multi-layered
political engagement and outreach to obtain Government of Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) commitment, to strengthen government
capacity, to reduce parallel influences, and to build representative
structures. ISAF is also working with GIRoA to visibly demonstrate the
government's intent to distribute wealth more evenly, to regulate
parallel governance structures, and to counter corruption.

52. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you believe the current
Marine Corps operations in Helmand are constraining our forces from
conducting the necessary operations in Kandahar?
General Petraeus. Operations in Helmand are not constraining the
effort in Kandahar but, in fact, will provide necessary momentum upon
which to build. Unlike Central Helmand, Kandahar is urban, densely
populated and has some, albeit weak, Afghan Government structures. One
of the requirements for securing the population and delivering
governance is the correct force density, both ANSF and coalition, in
order to secure the population. The key to this will be to ensure that
the U.S. Marine Corps, together with Afghan and United Kingdom forces,
continue comprehensive COIN operations in Marjah and Nad `Ali in order
to strengthen the authority of the Afghan Government in Central
Helmand. In parallel, we have started deliberate COIN operations to set
conditions in Kandahar province during the coming months. Far from
constraining operations in Kandahar, Marine Corps operations in Helmand
are a critical precursor and enabler to success there.

53. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you believe we can be
successful in Kandahar without committing significant numbers of U.S.
and NATO troops into Kandahar City?
General Petraeus. A significant portion of the anticipated U.S. and
NATO force uplift will be allocated to Kandahar. Currently, there are
6,900 ISAF personnel and 5,300 ANSF personnel in Kandahar. By August,
there will be 11,850 ISAF personnel and 8,500 ANSF in the region.
Kandahar is a very different situation than the GIRoA and ISAF faced in
Marjah. While there are clearly security challenges, Kandahar is not a
city that must be ``taken back'' with major clearing operations, but
rather an area where a thickening of existing forces and more robust
partnering with ISAF forces will contribute to security gains over
time. However, more important than the number of forces flowing into
the area is what they will be doing. The campaign for Kandahar is
designed to leverage existing security structures, incoming ISAF
forces, and ANSF to improve security to bring stability and improved
governance. Over the next 9 months, ISAF will continue to partner with
GIRoA and the international community to assist in improving governance
and political engagement; addressing inequality and corruption;
facilitating stabilization and reconstruction; and providing security.
To develop governance and political engagement, ISAF is conducting
multi-layered political engagement and outreach to obtain GIRoA
commitment, strengthen government capacity, reduce parallel influences,
and build representative structures.
ISAF is also working with GIRoA to visibly demonstrate the
government's intent to distribute wealth more evenly, regulate parallel
governance structures, and counter corruption. Security within Kandahar
City will be layered to control movement in and around the city. The
core and inner layers are being built upon the existing police
substation structure that delivers security through community policing,
supported through more effective surveillance and information sharing
among ISAF, National Directorate of Security, ANP, and ANA. The outer
ring is composed of an increased ANSF footprint on the periphery of
Kandahar City, partnered with ISAF elements, that controls movement
into and out of the city, establishing quick reaction forces to address
more significant threats inside the city. There are some police
districts inside Kandahar City contested by either insurgents or a mix
of insurgents and criminal elements; Provincial Governor Wesa's plan is
to clear these areas of insurgents and, over time, remove criminal
elements through ANP-led security operations.

military construction in afghanistan
54. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, why is over $1.2 billion
requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget for military construction
projects to support current operations in Afghanistan when many of
these projects won't be completed until the summer of 2012, a full year
beyond the date set by the President to initiate a drawdown of forces?
General Petraeus. The military construction projects are needed to
support deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces
throughout the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The projects
will also enhance our transition of forward operating bases from U.S.
forces to Afghan forces.

iran
55. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what effect would a nuclear-
armed Iran have on the broader Middle East?
General Petraeus. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically shift the
balance of power between Iran and key regional nations. A nuclear-armed
Iran would likely spark a regional arms race as Iran's neighbors seek
to redress the imbalance.

56. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you believe that a policy
of containment would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear-
armed Iran? Please explain why or why not.
General Petraeus. As Secretary Clinton has said, U.S. interests are
inextricably linked to the future of the Middle East. Preserving
stability, human rights, preventing proliferation of WMD, maintaining
security and availability of energy and energy transport routes,
protecting critical infrastructure, supporting democratic ideals, and
the rule of law are key U.S. interests in the Middle East. In agreement
with international non-proliferation goals, the President clearly has
said he is committed to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. A containment
policy is currently outside the framework of the stated U.S. policy
toward Iran's nuclear intentions and makes the very idea of a
containment policy hypothetical. In support of ongoing U.S. Government
efforts, CENTCOM's military activities will continue to support the
diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran. We will
also remain vigilant across a wide range of contingencies to support
U.S. and regional security objectives.

57. General Petraeus, how do you assess the stability of the
Iranian Government in the aftermath of the June 12, 2009, election and
the popular uprising that followed?
General Petraeus. The Iranian Government remains stable despite
ongoing political rifts among regime elites, namely the conservatives
and ultraconservatives, and regime legitimacy issues created by the
June 2009 presidential elections and the opposition movement. Although
public dissent centered on the reelection of President Mahmud Ahmadi-
Nejad, the behind-the-scenes wrangling was believed to have also
focused on the political and religious legitimacy of Supreme Leader
Khamenei for openly supporting Ahmadi-Nejad. Reformists could not
muster enough support among regime elites to challenge the Supreme
Leader, eventually causing reformist leaders, such as Ayatollah
Rafsanjani, to back down and at least publicly reconcile with the
regime. Concurrently, Supreme Leader Khamenei appears to have
consolidated his circle of advisors, consulting only with those
conservatives who share his views of clerical rule. Despite having
fewer people involved in decisionmaking, the process remains divided,
as ideological differences and personality conflicts arise more
frequently. Following the initially large protests, Iranian security
forces, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), prevented
the opposition from coalescing into a viable near-term threat to the
regime and inhibited the opposition's ability to communicate and
organize anti-regime protests. Supreme Leader Khamenei used the post-
election political dynamics and the IRGC to consolidate his power and
suppress what he believed was a Western-backed ``soft-power
revolution'' against the Islamic Republic. Khamenei's handling of
election unrest demonstrated his dominance over the security apparatus
and his dependence on the IRGC to maintain regime survivability and his
own political position. The regime realized lessons from the 1979
Islamic Revolution and prevented the IRGC from overreacting to
opposition protests and creating a continual cycle of violence, as
occurred between the Iranian population and the Shah's security
services in 1978 to 1979.

58. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, the focus of U.S. policy
toward Iran is now shifting to sanctions. Should we be preparing to
deploy every sanction at our disposal against the Iranian regime or
should we be holding back some in reserve for the future?
General Petraeus. Although Iran is in our AOR, questions concerning
our national policy toward Iran and how we use the various tools
available are better posed to the administration and the State
Department. Regarding security concerns, Iran continues to present a
profound and complicated challenge. I would note that Ambassador Burns
eloquently addressed our efforts regarding Iran in his April 14, 2010,
Senate Armed Services Committee testimony. President Obama has sought
to strengthen our diplomatic options for dealing with the challenges
posed by Iran, and has made it clear the United States is prepared to
deal with the Islamic Republic on the basis of mutual respect and
interest. As Iran remains recalcitrant, we now see a broader
international consensus about the urgency of the Iranian threat and new
frustration among even some of Iran's friends and trade partners. As
the President said in Prague recently, we must insist that Iran face
consequences because it has continually failed to meet its obligations.
Ambassador Burns recounted that the United States is moving with a
sense of urgency toward a new U.N. Security Council Resolution.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to work with our regional
partners as they develop mechanisms to better manage the political,
diplomatic, and security challenges Iran poses. We have launched
intensive diplomatic outreach efforts to other key states to discuss
the need for additional pressure to bring Iran back to the negotiating
table. Equally important to Iran are the informal expressions of
international censure, including the voluntary departure of
longstanding foreign investors and trade partners, and growing
isolation. Neither formal penalties nor increasing international
ostracism will alter Iran's agenda overnight, but the mounting weight
of political and financial pressures can persuade Iran's leadership to
reassess their approach to the world.

iraq
59. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, in a recent interview, your
former partner in Baghdad, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, voiced concern with
the President's plan to have U.S. forces down to 50,000 by August of
this year. He said this: ``The [Status of Forces Agreement] I helped
negotiate had an intermediate timeline to have forces out of cities and
towns by mid-2009, which was accomplished, and full withdrawal by 2011.
The August 2010 date was not part of that agreement. I would have
preferred to see us keep maximum flexibility with the Iraqis between
now and 2011.'' Are you confident that we are on track to meet this
50,000-troop benchmark in light of the recent election? If so, please
explain why.
General Petraeus. I am confident we are on track to meet this
50,000-troop benchmark. The Iraqis are increasingly providing for their
own security and are achieving the security and governance goals that
were established. This will allow the United States to continue to
decrease troop levels to 50,000 in August 2010. Although the overall
troop strength goal is 50,000, the mix of forces in that number is
still capable of performing missions throughout Iraq. This provides the
flexibility needed to adjust to any new developments or unexpected
circumstances.

60. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, when I was in Baghdad in
January, General Raymond Odierno said he had drawn up a contingency
plan to keep an extra brigade in Iraq, which would leave more than
50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the President's August 2010 deadline.
Has this request been made? If not, do you expect it to be?
General Petraeus. We are on target to meet the 50,000 forces
requirement in Iraq by August 31, 2010. The USF-I request has been made
to retain an Advise and Assist Task Force (AATF). This force will be
comprised of 962 personnel, much smaller than a brigade, but with
inherent force protection and engagement elements. The AATF provides
the essential capabilities we need and keeps us on track to meet the
50,000-troop benchmark.

iraq counterterrorism law
61. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what is the status of the
counterterrorism law pending in the Iraqi parliament?
General Petraeus. A counterterrorism law was read once in the
Council of Representatives but was not voted upon. At the end of last
year, we observed some Iraqi politicians pushing for a more
comprehensive national security law in which a counterterrorism law was
merely one subcomponent. However, until the newly-elected Council of
Representatives is seated, it is unlikely there will be any progress in
this area.

62. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, do you expect any action to
be taken on this legislation in the near term?
General Petraeus. Until the newly elected Council of
Representatives is seated, it is unlikely there will be any progress in
this area.

63. Senator McCain. General Petraeus, what are the implications of
this legislation not being enacted?
General Petraeus. Without passage of a counterterrorism law, there
remains the possibility that Iraq's population will perceive the
Counterterrorism Service as overly aggressive, or worse, a ``secret
police'' under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Further, this
could heighten sectarian tensions within Iraq. Additionally, the lack
of clear organizational structures and specific legal guidelines for
decisionmaking may negatively impact the budgetary and administrative
processes necessary for an effective, transparent, and legally-
compliant force. Notwithstanding Iraqi's historical sensitivities to
human rights abuses by previous regimes, the Counterterrorism Service
appears to act upon internal threats based on fact and impartiality.
This is evidenced by operations in heavily-populated Shia provinces as
well as targeting Shia extremist networks. Fortunately, the Government
of Iraq, as a whole, recognizes the need for an effective
Counterterrorism Service and supports the agency's requirements.

lashkar-e-taiba
64. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has
demonstrated its ability to plan and execute large-scale attacks with
the potential to upset the already tenuous balance between Pakistan and
India. During a recent visit to New Delhi, Secretary of Defense Gates
assessed the threat posed by such groups as one that could
``destabilize not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially
the whole region.'' What is your assessment of LeT's capability and
intent?
Admiral Olson. LeT remains the most capable and dangerous terrorist
organization in South Asia and retains the capability to conduct
attacks against targets across India with little to no notice. LeT
remains focused on its goals to liberate Kashmir, and establish Islamic
states in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India. LeT has demonstrated
their ability by conducting numerous attacks against Indian Government,
military, commercial, and transportation infrastructure targets through
bombings and small unit assaults in Kashmir and major cities across
India. LeT has demonstrated their ability to infiltrate by both ground
and sea. LeT utilizes criminal smuggling networks and legitimate
businesses to move funds, supplies, and personnel. Although several
high-value members have been detained since the 2008 Mumbai attacks,
including LeT's operations chief, LeT remains capable of destabilizing
the region in order to attain their goals.

65. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what level of support does LeT
receive from the Pakistani Government?
Admiral Olson. There is no evidence that LeT receives active overt
organizational support from the Government of Pakistan. Although the
Government of Pakistan has detained several members in the wake of the
2008 Mumbai attacks and temporarily closed some businesses and
facilities associated with LeT, LeT continues to operate. LeT is a
large and adaptive organization that has the capability to operate
independently due to its public service and commercial enterprises,
such as Jamaat ud-Dawa (JUD), LeT's Humanitarian Service Organization
and its public face. JUD operates schools, reading rooms, mosques,
medical clinics, and ambulance services across Pakistan. JUD, through
their humanitarian efforts, have become an integral part of Pakistani
society and they operate openly throughout Pakistan. LeT also receives
donations from foreign donors and income from businesses, public and
private, criminal and legitimate, that its members and sympathizers
operate throughout South Asia, South East Asia, the Arabian Peninsula,
the Far East, Europe, and North and South America. LeT also receives
donations from members of the Pakistani Diaspora from all over the
world. This has apparently made the Government of Pakistan reluctant
and unable to eliminate support to LeT and has allowed LeT to survive.
Although the Pakistani Government may not actively support LeT, it
passively supports it by not being able to control it.

66. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, have we, in coordination with
partners in the region such as Bangladesh, been effective in
constraining LeT's freedom of movement and sphere of influence in the
region?
Admiral Olson. Yes, cooperation between regional partners, in
particular India and Bangladesh, have been instrumental in constraining
LeT's ability to plan and conduct attacks. Building the capacity to
counter threats posed by groups like LeT promotes regional stability
and builds trust. We must continue to build the capacity of all nations
in South Asia to enable them to counter the threats posed by groups
like LeT. Building the counterterrorism capabilities in our regional
partners is a long term effort and requires long-term commitment. We
must continue this effort to build and develop capacity in other
partners in the region such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. SOF
continue to lead this effort through recurring training events and
persistent engagement. However, building military capabilities is only
one aspect in building regional stability. Law enforcement and
information sharing are also crucial issues that will enable our
regional partners to mitigate the threats posed by terrorist
organizations like LeT.

force enablers
67. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, concerns have been raised about
the availability of enabling forces to support SOF in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, such as transportation, ISR, and logistics. You have
stated, `` . . . the non-availability of these force enablers has
become our most vexing issue in the operational environment.'' What
steps are you taking to mitigate the lack of these force enablers in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) commanders have stated that
they will continue to provide existing enabler support to SOF without
degradation. Logistics support, ISR, and mobility assets will continue
to be backfilled to support SOF remaining in Iraq. Other enabling
support will be mitigated through the use of ISF or additional local
contracting.

68. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, are you confident that there
will be sufficient support forces remaining in Iraq to support
essential SOF following the drawdown of conventional forces later this
year?
Admiral Olson. Yes, we continue to work very closely with CENTCOM
to ensure sufficient support remains in Iraq to support those SOF who
will continue to train, advise, and assist ISF units. USF-I plans to
provide existing enabler support to SOF without degradation. USF-I will
provide logistical, medical, and basing support as well as sustainment
to any remote areas which SOF may operate in. Drawdown planning is
fluid based on Iraqi elections and we will continue to monitor its
impacts to ensure adequate support for SOF exists as it is currently
planned.

69. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, where do you envision the
largest strain on enabling forces?
Admiral Olson. Our greatest strain on enabling forces continues to
be ISR platform support, and enhanced mobility capability. ISR remains
an invaluable asset in low or limited-access battle spaces, most
notably in the CENTCOM AOR. Enhanced mobility, for instance, results in
quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. Significant
enhancements are underway for SOCOM's helicopter, CV-22 Tilt Rotor
aircraft, and light/medium nonstandard aviation fleets. Additional
enhancements are also needed in mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP)
vehicles. These assets are in high demand and are rarely available in
sufficient numbers. SOCOM will continue to rely on support by
conventional forces which possess the majority of these assets.

70. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, do you plan to use contractors
to provide any enabling support to SOF in Iraq once the bulk of
conventional forces depart?
Admiral Olson. Yes, some enabling support is already contracted.
For example, interpreters and security forces are currently provided
through a combination of contracted support and military forces. Any
further reduction in U.S. military forces will require enabling support
from Iraqi military forces or local contracting.

capability of indigenous security forces
71. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, SOF plays a large role in the
training of indigenous security forces, particularly elite
counterterrorism units. What is your assessment of the capabilities and
professionalism of Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF)?
Admiral Olson. The ISOF have shown remarkable progress in a
relatively short period of time. Since ISOF have trained with both U.S.
and coalition forces to acquire the needed skill sets to provide
security, their learning curve has been tremendously steep. Undaunted,
ISOF have overcome many obstacles and surpassed expectations. They have
shown great potential and have demonstrated a high degree of
professionalism while supporting combat operations. These results are
directly attributable to the confidence they have in their mission,
their men, and their country.

72. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, how is ISOF affected by the
counterterrorism law not being enacted?
Admiral Olson. The effect on ISOF of the counterterrorism law not
being enacted is detrimental. Without clear guidance from legislation,
ISOF's ability to support the government will undoubtedly turn into an
ebb and flow scenario with many fits and starts. Unfortunately, the
real casualty will be the Iraqi people, and their security, as ISOF
employment becomes more of a political issue for debate rather than a
dedicated security force.

73. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the
capabilities and professionalism of the Afghan Kandak commando units?
Admiral Olson. Since the conception of the Afghan Kandak Commandos,
enormous strides have been made to build operationally effective units.
Afghan Commandos are now typically in the lead in the operations that
they conduct with U.S. support, compared to years past where U.S.
forces led all operations with Afghan Commando support. Afghan
Commandos play a critical role in capturing or killing insurgent
leaders and bomb makers. There have been operations in which civilian
deaths have been blamed on Afghan Commandos, but these cases are
typically unfounded. The Afghan Commandos are a very professional
fighting force that receives recurring and extensive training from U.S.
instructors who encourage discipline and attention to detail.

74. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, how are the Afghan Kandak
Commando units perceived by the Afghan population?
Admiral Olson. The Afghan Kandak Commando units are perceived by
the locals as elite fighters compared to the ANA and the ANP. While a
majority of the Afghan population believes that the ANA are not a fully
professionalized force and the ANP are corrupt and provide little in
the way of protection to the population, the Afghan Commandos are seen
as incorruptible and as a source of pride for the Afghan population.
Additionally, the population views the Commandos as a more cohesive
force, uniting members from different ethnic groups.

requested increase in combat mission needs statement authority
75. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, SOCOM is requesting an increase
in its Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) authority to $50 million,
a $30 million, or 150 percent, increase over its currently authorized
level. In what ways is the currently authorized level of $20 million
inadequate to address the needs of SOCOM to meet emerging requirements
in theater?
Admiral Olson. The $50 million request is based on the command's
historical experience with CMNS requirements, as well as projected
requirements based on recent Request for Forces to support ongoing and
surge operations.

a. Historically, SOCOM has received and approved CMNS over and
above the $20 million appropriated in the baseline for use in overseas
contingencies. In fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, this line item
was substantially increased by reprogrammings and supplemental
appropriations--an increase of $66 million and $158 million,
respectively. The majority of the CMNS were submitted on behalf of
Joint Special Operations Task Forces working in the CENTCOM AOR.
Examples include sensors and tracking devices, signals intelligence
equipment, MRAP vehicles, nonstandard commercial vehicles, vehicle and
body armor, weapons and munitions, aircraft, and jammers.
b. In fiscal year 2009, I approved the MC-130W PSP modification
CMNS (Dragon Spear). The estimated cost to modify the MC-130W fleet (12
aircraft) was $415 million. Because the PSP requirement was urgently
needed for current operations, I used the fiscal year 2009 Combat
Mission Requirements funds ($20 million) and $1 million of other
baseline procurement to immediately initiate this urgent combat
capability. The Department provided the sources for the remaining
aircraft modifications, to include over $63 million of fiscal year 2007
supplemental funds for ammunition.
c. In the past year, SOCOM has received several short-notice
requests for additional forces and equipment to support surge
operations in the CENTCOM AOR. The command reprogrammed over $8 million
of procurement funds from other baseline priorities in fiscal year 2009
to ensure deploying forces were properly equipped with items identified
through the CMNS process.

The additional $30 million in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request will
provide the command with the resourcing flexibility needed to quickly
address future surge requirements approved via the CMNS process, which
will result in providing deploying forces with equipment needed to
prevent loss of life or mission failure. If appropriated, the command
will provide Congress the specific equipment purchased with these funds
in the Quarterly CMNS Report.

76. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what circumstances have arisen
to necessitate a 150 percent increase in CMNS authority?
Admiral Olson. See answer to question #75.

countering violent extremism efforts
77. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, following the attacks on
September 11, 2001, SOCOM was designated as the lead synchronizer for
countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts for DOD. These efforts
encompass both kinetic and nonkinetic efforts. Concerns have been
raised about the ineffective coordination internally and between the
relevant interagency stakeholders. What is SOCOM doing to ensure that
our efforts both on the ground and in the strategic communication arena
are synchronized?
Admiral Olson. I see SOCOM's role in CVE as two-fold: as a force
provider, we leverage SOF's persistent presence in over 75 countries to
conduct high quality, low profile, long-term engagements in SFA. These
actions foster trust, and enable partners to directly combat extremist
organizations through advising, training, and--when authorized and
funded--equipping of forces. Functionally, this is executed by
providing SOF to GCCs, and in some cases, authorized via a funding
mechanism commonly referred to as section 1208. This mechanism affords
the training and equipping of indigenous forces, both regular and
irregular, in support of ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations.
Second, we work as a synchronizer for DOD for the global campaign
against terrorist networks, and so we look across the spectrum of what
our partners do in CVE. SOCOM plays a large role in synchronization
through the crafting of DOD strategy that ensures all GCCs are
executing regional/country plans within the architecture of the larger
global plan, and that are applying similar and consistent metrics
across regions to determine the best application of SOF resources. The
current version of DOD CONPLAN 7500 recognizes that to achieve success
requires a broader focus, one which addresses the underlying causes of
extremism. The strategy reflects the primacy of indirect approaches,
both to deter active and tacit support for VEOs and to erode extremist
support for VEO ideology. Specifically, the focus must include indirect
and ideologically-based activities CVE, while building organic
capacities toward this end among our allies and partners. This plan in
turn supports the National Implementation Plan for the War and Terror
(NIP), sponsored by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The
NIP is comprised of four pillars, one of which CVE underpins the other
three: protection and defense of the homeland, preventing terrorist
acquisition of WMD, and attacking terrorists and their capacity to
operate.
In our role as synchronizer, we conduct semi-annual forums where we
bring together our partners in DOD, in the interagency, and our
partners in certain international countries to begin to work together
to apply the strategy and translate that into operational actions. From
these work groups come specific tasks that various communities of
interest accept, and strive through a variety of venues to provide an
acceptable resolution for all involved.
The command believes in cultivating credible influence to build the
foundation for change, one which promotes ideologies that reject
extremist affiliation and action. In tandem, we undercut the resources
and recruitment efforts of VEOs to limit both their sustainment and
freedom of action.
The Expanded Trans-Regional Psychological Operations Program (ETRP)
is the mortar in this ideological foundation, one providing a uniform
set of objectives available to all GCCs to conduct CVE-centric,
psychological operations (PSYOP) activities in support of CONPLAN 7500.
Within ETRP is a system of checks and balances, an approval process to
ensure DOD-conducted PSYOP activities are executed with full awareness
and approval of the appropriate DOS representative. This includes U.S.
ambassadors within countries where these capabilities are employed.
SOCOM's program of record, ETRP-MIST (Military Information Support
Team), provides the resourcing and deployment mechanism for the forces
executing these operations. ETRP-MIST is currently supporting 25 SOCOM
MISTs, units deployed at the specific request of U.S. ambassadors
around the globe. Working closely with and authorized by embassy public
affairs and diplomacy staffs, MISTs--usually small in number--conduct
local information programs via local media in service to ETRP and DOS
Mission Strategic Plan CVE goals.
SOCOM's Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) provides
operational planning, analytic research and production support for all
of the GCCs. JMISC produces six military-to-military journals, one for
each GCC, with particular topical emphasis on CVE and regional
security. In tandem, the JMISC's four regional influence web sites
counter Internet-based misinformation supporting extremism, while
synchronizing DOD's web-based messages on CVE topics.
As a point of distinction, SOCOM remains steadfast in
distinguishing between DOS diplomacy efforts and DOD-led influence
campaigns. While both directly address CVE, our efforts are
specifically designed to deter, prevent, and disrupt violent
extremists. Still, we recognize and appreciate the logic of
coordinating and synchronizing these endeavors toward a common
objective of reducing the appeal of violent extremism.
While the military is not the lead in this effort, SOF Civil
Affairs teams conduct a diverse set of activities promoting development
and goodwill through building of infrastructure, job skill training,
and the provision of medical, dental, and veterinary care in areas
where existing governance structures are unable or unwilling to provide
these services. Again, as with SFA, the focus of SOF Civil Affairs is
on long-term capacity building within local and national structures.
The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of
crime, migration, and extremism, and the competition of resources which
drive populations and provoke conflict. Recognizing this, SOCOM's
engagement efforts through the Sovereign Challenge Program continue as
a unique method of establishing relationships with senior military
leaders from around the world. The program, in collaboration with the
DOS, aims to provide venues in which robust dialogue about threats to
sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and mutually beneficial
approach to military relationships, long-term success is measured by
other countries' actions in their own and the region's security
interests.
Finally, the command simultaneously strikes at the financial center
of VEOs, serving as the DOD lead in Counter Threat Finance. In close
partnership with other combatant commanders, the Services, and--as
directed--appropriate U.S. Government agencies and international
partners, we spearhead DOD efforts to identify, track, and dry up this
flow of capital in the interest of national security.

78. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the
effectiveness of current U.S. efforts to CVE?
Admiral Olson. Current U.S. efforts to CVE have had some successes
but they still have a way to go in combating the multi-pronged
ideological appeal of our enemies. By highlighting the violence against
Muslim civilians and the oppression associated with violent extremist
in Iraq and Afghanistan, our efforts have helped undercut the appeal of
VEOs and al Qaeda. Despite these successes, our enemies have
demonstrated a great deal of effectiveness by appealing to regional
frustration over the continued delays in the Middle East peace process,
and by raising questions over the legitimacy of other regional
governments. Those issues have been endemic to the region for decades,
and will continue to pose a challenge to U.S. efforts to undermine the
appeal of VEOs.

79. Senator McCain. Admiral Olson, where can DOD and its civilian
counterparts improve coordination and eliminate redundant efforts?
Admiral Olson. I can only speak to this issue from my perspective
as Commander, SOCOM; however, our working arrangement with most of DOD
provides me with some unique insight on this central question.
We have a number of activities at HQ SOCOM that address this matter
daily to include our Interagency Task Force (IATF). Interagency
coordination is one of the responsibilities assigned to SOCOM in DOD's
CONPLAN 7500. This CONPLAN outlines the Department's campaign to deter,
disrupt, and defeat al Qaeda and transnational terrorist organizations
and it directs SOCOM to serve as the global synchronizer for such
efforts within the U.S. Government.
Our interagency relationships are further enhanced by the Special
Operations Support Teams, a network of IATF-managed liaison and
advisory experts with deep Special Operations backgrounds, posted at
the headquarters and activities of key interagency organizations and
command partners across the whole of government.
We believe the coordination mechanisms and processes are robust and
working well, and that we can typically collaborate across the
interagency spectrum in a timely and effective manner. SOCOM has an
excellent track record over the past 5 years of coordinating and
resolving contentious issues and new requirements by leveraging senior
leader-to-action officer engagements such as: combatant command and
interagency planning conferences, working groups, the SOCOM Global
Synchronization Conference for counterterrorism, strategic planning
forums, and JCS OSD plans reviews. What we have less ability to do is
influence matters of redundancy in policy, planning, and implementation
matters beyond our statutory and post-September 11 policy authorities.
There are routine issues involving SOF that are clearly both functional
(our job for force preparation, posturing, delivery/replacement, and
support) and geographic (the primary purview of the GCCs). Here, where
these domains intersect at the operational level, we collaborate with
the GCCs and with the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs);
examples of this collaboration include reviews of the theater
operational plans, analytical and assessment support to theater and
TSOC activities employing SOF, and SOF support to the Provisional
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). We see much less redundancy in these areas
than in more macro-level, national policy generated initiatives.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
cerp funds
80. Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, when you
compare the effectiveness of DOD in implementing CERP funds versus DOS/
USAID in implementing the same type of funding, which agency is the
most effective?
Admiral Olson. I am not in a position to provide you with an
informed answer as SOCOM does not manage CERP funds. CENTCOM is better
positioned to compare the effectiveness of the DOD and DOS/USAID
programs.
General Petraeus. CERP and DOS/USAID programs are complementary in
nature and we work together to ensure the most effective application of
resources. Metrics to determine which agency is more effective in
implementing the same type of funding do not exist.

81. Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, compared
to CERP funding, does DOS/USAID get a disproportional percentage of DOD
Section 1207-type funds than they should based on value added in the
field?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM does not execute funding provided under the
1207 program. Additionally, beginning with the fiscal year 2011
President's budget request, all funding for the 1207 program was
transferred to DOS.
General Petraeus. Given a lack of formal metrics for a comparison
basis, it would be difficult to determine if DOS/USAID receives a
disproportionate percentage of DOD Section 1207 type funds. Any formal
assessment as to the sufficiency of 1207 type funds for DOS/USAID
should be provided by that agency.

82. Senator Sessions. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, are the
policy objectives of DOS and DOD tied closely enough when executing
foreign and security assistance programs?
Admiral Olson. At the strategic level, the policy objectives of DOD
and DOS are nested in support of the National Security Strategy. We
have achieved good results in the building of ISF and are moving toward
a sustainable program in Afghanistan. The difficulty is between policy
goals and program execution. While policy objectives are aligned in
areas outside of Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF, the execution of
foreign and security assistance programs are not achieving enduring
results. Geographic combatant commands and U.S. embassies are
challenged with Cold War-era security assistance programs that, while
sufficient for the threat at that time, are not responsive or broad
enough to adequately address current threats.
General Petraeus. Yes, DOD and DOS policies on foreign and security
assistance programs are closely integrated at every level. The DOD
personnel within the country team assist in the development of the
Mission Strategic Resources Plan and DOS personnel assist DOD in
security cooperation planning. For grant recipient countries, DOS and
DOD personnel jointly develop the foreign military financing budget.
Both departments closely coordinate on Foreign Military Sales and
International Military Education and Training Programs. DOS and DOD
cooperate on the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative programs to
improve partner capacity in responding to U.N.-brokered peacekeeping
missions and additionally, programs planned for partner nations under
the Global Train and Equip authority are developed in synchronization
with, and are approved only after, concurrence from DOS. A particularly
notable example of the strong cooperation between DOS and DOD is the
execution of section 1206 projects which receive dual Departments of
Defense and State vetting with the country teams, then continued dual
vetting from the action officers to the Secretary level within the
departments.
During the Theater Strategy and Campaign plan development, CENTCOM
uses DOS policy guidance and Mission Strategic Resources Plans in order
to synchronize our efforts with DOS elements within our AOR. Finally,
we routinely invite leaders in the State Regional Bureaus and Chiefs of
Mission to participate in conferences and strategic discussions in
order to integrate our efforts and benefit from the full range of
political-military perspectives and insight.

afghanistan
83. Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, is there enough emphasis on
stabilization progress in remote locations as compared to heavy
population areas?
General Petraeus. The stabilization/reconstruction efforts of the
coalition and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan
consist of building physical infrastructure, fostering economic
development, and promoting good governance. Showcasing CENTCOM's
involvement are the 27 U.S. and Coalition PRTs and 9 U.S. Agribusiness
Development Teams (ADT) operating in 31 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
While it is true that these are headquartered in the most populated
areas, that is by design. As General McChrystal, Commander of the ISAF
stated in his Initial Assessment of August 2009, our COIN efforts are
concentrated in high-population areas because they're the most highly
contested with the insurgency. Similarly, stabilization activities are
focused in those locations because their existing infrastructure can be
leveraged for maximum gains.
We would always like to do more; and, as opportunities arise, we're
expanding our efforts. In March, a 13th U.S. PRT began operation in
Kapisa province. In July, the Republic of South Korea is establishing a
PRT in Parwan. Turkey is working to assume PRT duties in Jowzjan and
Sar-I Pul, freeing Sweden to concentrate its focus on Balkh and
Samangan. In March a ninth ADT moved into Zabul. In addition, a
concerted civilian uplift effort has tripled the number of governance
and development experts in theater from roughly 300 to 1,000 since
January 2009, with an additional 20 to 30 percent increase anticipated
by the end of this year.
In order to ensure we have a balanced perspective on apportioning
efforts between rural and developed areas, the coalition is
increasingly relying on the Government of Afghanistan to decide where
those activities are focused. Across the board, implementing partners
are working with 26,000 Afghans to institute stabilization activities,
including the USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, which is
establishing links with 264 local representatives at districts/village
level. In addition, DOS's Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
Stabilization Strategy has set goals of: authorizing six Afghanistan
ministries to receive direct U.S. assistance by December 2010;
channeling at least 40 percent of U.S. Government development
assistance through the Afghanistan Government and local Afghanistan
NGOs by December 2010; increasing local procurement of supplies to 20
percent by July 2011; ensuring 200,000 farmers and entrepreneurs have
access to credit; establishing District Development Working Groups in 6
pilot districts in Regional Commands East and South; providing block
grants to mayors in 42 municipalities to improve delivery of services;
expanding the ability of Afghanistan's core ministries to oversee and
implement programs; implementing and monitoring new flexible funding
strategies, such as the Performance Based Governors Fund, in 2010; and
developing a plan to mitigate indirect effects of corruption resulting
from increased military and civilian presence.
Partnering between national, provincial, district, and community
officials will best address each level's needs. This won't maximize
achievements at any given level, but it will optimize gains across the
whole of Afghanistan.

84. Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, to what degree does success
in the remote locations affect our overall objectives?
General Petraeus. In line with the COIN doctrine, the main effort
will be directed to the centers of population and expanding the
security zones in these areas and the surrounding districts. This will
bring a significant portion of the population under the GIRoA control,
as well as denying insurgents vital terrain, limiting their freedom of
movement and access to key population centers. However, as a result,
insurgents are likely to move to the less populated and more remote
areas. In doing so, they are separated from the population and have
less ability to negatively influence them. Moreover, in remote areas,
the insurgent is easier to identify, he is separated from the majority
of his arms caches, and he can be tracked as he moves into the
populated areas to undertake his attacks.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
rights of women in afghanistan
85. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, I recently traveled to
Afghanistan, and during that travel I visited Garmsir, the Helmand
provincial capital just weeks before the start of the recent Helmand
offensive. One particular thing that struck me as I walked freely
around, without a flak jacket, was the absence of women. I was in an
open marketplace, yet there were no women to be found. Knowing that a
key component of the COIN model is the reintegrating of the Taliban
into Afghanistan society, do you see the future rights of women as a
cause for concern?
General Petraeus. CENTCOM supports the current efforts of the DOS
as they work with the GIRoA to develop effective governance that
includes and respects the rights of women. This is consistent within
the greater COIN context focused on protecting the entire population.
The Women's Action Plan which Secretary Clinton announced at the
London Conference is comprehensive and signals our sustained commitment
to improving women's rights. This is a key component of our efforts to
strengthen Afghan communities against the effects of extremist
ideologies. The ISAF is working with Embassy Kabul to ensure
reintegration efforts incorporate elements of these programs and
continue to advance women's rights. More broadly, as the President
emphasized in his State of the Union Address, our policies in
Afghanistan will also reflect our national values, including support
for universally recognized human rights.
The prevailing imperative remains to provide security so
development can occur. Violence against women and girls is endemic and
much remains to be done including increased access for women to
institutions of justice, civic education, and prosecution of crimes.
Further, we must work with DOS and USAID to implement programs as soon
as the security situation will allow in all regions. The women of
Afghanistan are critical to progress and stability in their war torn
country.
Of important note, we have seen some success toward Afghan women's
rights over the last 8 years. These gains include businesses'
ownership, voting, positions in government and professions such as
medicine, law, and academia, but are mostly limited to the urban areas.
Embassy Kabul is intensifying their efforts to help women. One example
is a new $27 million fund of small, flexible, rapid response grants
targeted to empower Afghan women-led NGOs at the local level to serve
their fellow citizens. The grants provide technical assistance and
support for programs ranging from economic development, literacy,
training, and health care.

syria
86. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, recently Ambassador Robert
Ford was nominated to be the next Ambassador to Syria. We withdrew the
U.S. Ambassador from Damascus in 2005 because of terrorism issues. As
early as last year you discussed that Syria was allowing or accepting
terrorism facilitators to operate from and through Syrian territory. In
your opinion, is this the right time to send an ambassador to Syria?
General Petraeus. I believe it is the right time. The U.S.
Government seeks to improve engagement with Syria in the international
arena and the essential element to restarting a relationship is an in-
country ambassador to coordinating U.S. Government policy. We need to
reestablish our ambassadorial presence to permit access and recurring
state-to-state engagement between Syria and the United States.

87. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, how does engagement with a
nation aiding terrorists help your position in the region?
General Petraeus. Engagement with Syria demonstrates to our Arab
partners in the region that we are committed to regional stability and
our engagement enables increased opportunities to explore mutual
interests with Syria. Only through direct engagement can we build the
foundation for a stable partnership that challenges violent extremism,
contributes to stability in the Middle East, and encourages Syria to
broaden its national objectives and become a cooperative nation that
pursues policies to enhance stability and economic opportunity in the
region.

yemen
88. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, despite internal challenges
that include a rebellion in the north and a secessionist movement in
the south, you have mentioned in the past that Yemen has made security
improvements with regard to combating terrorism. However, as is well
known, Yemen has long been a refuge for terrorists. Despite U.S.
funding for counterterrorism, I see little progress in that country to
fight terrorism. Just last month you mentioned that Saudi Arabia and
the other Middle East peninsula countries have continued to make gains
with the obvious exception of Yemen. What is really needed to help
Yemen make substantial security gains?
General Petraeus. Yemen faces internal threats with a rebellion in
the north and a secessionist movement in the south. The conditions in
Yemen must improve to deny al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
access to sanctuary and training camps--like the one used by the
Christmas bomber. Since December 2009, Yemen has had some success in
counter-terrorist operations against AQAP. Currently, the Republic of
Yemen, under President Saleh, is maintaining a cease-fire with the
rebels in the north who are adhering to the conditions set forth by the
government. This cease-fire brings some stability and now permits the
Government of Yemen to increase its focus on combating terrorism.
In the past year, U.S. counterterrorism funding for Yemen has more
than doubled from $67.2 million in fiscal year 2009 to $137.2 million
in fiscal year 2010. This increase aligns with CENTCOM's plan to
enhance the capability and capacity of the Yemeni security and
counterterrorism forces. However, the challenges associated with
Yemen's counterterror operations capability and capacity require a
long-term, sustained commitment to a whole-of-government approach that
addresses governance, security, and economic development. This program
must include persistent U.S. Government engagement and security
assistance to address these challenges. We must also continue to
encourage other nations, both regionally and around the world, to
assist Yemen with its security challenges and provide increased
economic opportunities which address the conditions necessary for
improved security.

tajikistan
89. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, Tajikistan recently held
parliamentary elections in which the ruling party won almost 72 percent
of the vote. Most outside observers, including the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, described the election as
``failing on many basic democratic standards.'' The results also reveal
some of the problems within this country. From what I have read, over
70 percent of the population in Tajikistan live in abject poverty and
over half of the labor force actually works in Russia or Kazakhstan.
Some have predicted it is on its way to becoming a failed state. Since
it shares over 800 miles of border with Northern Afghanistan, what
occurs in Tajikistan is important to our efforts in Afghanistan. What
is your assessment of the situation in Tajikistan?
General Petraeus. Tajikistan is considered the poorest country from
the former Soviet Union. Economic growth is limited due to extremely
harsh environmental conditions, extremely limited sources of income,
and rampant corruption. It is the second-most mountainous country in
the world, and is routinely plagued by earthquakes, blizzards, floods,
droughts, locust infestations, and extreme weather. Parts of the
country are frequently cut off by snow, landslides, and avalanches.
Floods in May 2009 caused an estimated $100 million in damage and
required large amounts of immediate international assistance.
Tajikistan remains heavily reliant on the Tajik Aluminum Company plant
as its major source of foreign income, despite a one-third reduction in
aluminum prices world wide. Its second-most important income source,
remittances from citizens working in Russia, Kazakhstan, and other
countries, has also been affected by the worldwide economic slowdown,
which had some effect on the Russian and Kazakhstani economies.
Furthermore, policies in Russia are forcing some Tajikistanis to return
to Tajikistan or pay more in costs to live in Russia. Corruption at all
levels causes international investors to view Tajikistan as a
remarkably difficult place to do business. Tajikistan is also a major
processing and transportation hub for narcotics emanating from
Afghanistan. Tajikistan requires international assistance to meet its
development and humanitarian needs.
In addition to its economic and environmental plight, Tajikistan's
government struggles to advance political reforms or improve governance
to a level acceptable by western standards. There is little in the way
of an organized opposition in the country. The upper military
leadership is hand-picked and loyal to President Rahmon. Although the
Tajiks are the best news is that Tajikistan remains mindful of the
damage caused to its society by the civil war in the 1990s and there is
a broad consensus that all want to avoid a relapse into such violence.
The power-sharing arrangement that ended the civil war has gradually
eroded over time.
Tajik elections routinely fail to meet basic democratic standards,
situation in Central Asia. Tajikistan does have a government-authorized
political party formed specifically around an Islamic identity, the
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan led by Muhiddin Kabiri.
Recently, the government appeared to be increasing pressure on foreign
religious organizations. Political parties in Tajikistan will require
international assistance to reach effective political mobilization, and
Tajikistan's laws have made rendering this assistance problematic.
Internationally, the Government of Tajikistan is most enthusiastic
about cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, border
security, and counternarcotics. Tajikistan joined the Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, and is committed to fielding a
peacekeeping company by 2010. Tajikistan agreed to our request to allow
transit of non-lethal supplies to our forces in Afghanistan. Continued
security cooperation and improved economic assistance to Tajikistan not
only contributes to regional stability by helping one of Afghanistan's
neighbors, but also builds opportunity for other international
assistance to address socio-economic and political freedom issues in
Tajikistan.

90. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, are you concerned that
Tajikistan could be a possible refuge for Taliban fighters and possibly
other terrorist elements?
General Petraeus. Tajikistan is an unlikely refuge for Taliban
fighters and would not provide a sanctuary similar to the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Although historical precedent
indicates some Central Asian terrorist groups, such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, have used Tajikistan for refuge, current
terrorist elements in Tajikistan are limited and small in number. The
primary concern regarding Tajikistan is its use as a trafficking route
for narcotics, weapons, and other illicit items that can be used to
support and facilitate the insurgency in Afghanistan. Tajikistan has
become a key route for smugglers due to a lack of resources to apply to
border security; however, the Government of Tajikistan actively combats
concentrations of suspected militants within its borders as evidenced
by several operations against alleged extremists in the past year.

israel
91. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is obviously a central issue in the Middle East. Yet, Israel
is the one Middle Eastern country not within your AOR. In some cases,
like India and Pakistan, it can be very helpful to divide the AORs
along political lines. Why should Israel be a part of U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) and not CENTCOM?
General Petraeus. Historically, Israel has been part of EUCOM. They
have an established relationship that goes back many years that
includes a long period of continuous contact enabling effective
engagement with Israel on military-to-military activities. While some
could argue the value of moving Israel into the CENTCOM AOR based on
geography and the important role Israel plays in Middle Eastern
events--I believe that the present arrangement best serves U.S.
interests. The current theater boundaries allow CENTCOM to interact
effectively with the current countries in our AOR. Any adjustments in
the boundary now could have significant consequences and might
negatively impact our access to key areas that support military
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the effort to counter piracy.

92. Senator Wicker. General Petraeus, do you support moving Israel
into CENTCOM?
General Petraeus. I support the current COCOM boundary with Israel
remaining assigned to EUCOM. CENTCOM has developed new relationships
and strengthened partnerships across our region without the inclusion
of Israel and believe there is no compelling reason to change the
current arrangement. We coordinate very closely with EUCOM on
significant events and issues that affect both our AORs, including
those issues that center on Israel.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator George S. LeMieux
venezuela
93. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, President Chavez has
considerably deepened his country's cooperation with state sponsors of
terror. Since 2007, there have been weekly Tehran-Damascus-Caracas
flights that are not subject to appropriate checks. In January 2009 he
called for, and the Venezuelan National Assembly obediently approved, a
resolution calling for international recognition of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army as
belligerent forces, rather than terrorist groups. In July 2009, the
Colombian Government seized several sophisticated Swedish-made antitank
rockets that had been originally sold to the Venezuelan army. The
Venezuelan Government has yet to fully explain how these sophisticated
weapons ended up in the hands of a terrorist organization for which
President Chavez has ideological sympathies. On March 1, 2010, a
Spanish judge accused the Basque separatist group ETA and Colombia's
FARC of plotting to kill Colombian politicians in Spain with Venezuelan
Government cooperation. Is Venezuela behaving like a state sponsor of
terrorism?
Admiral Olson. Since 1999, Venezuela, under President Hugo Chavez,
has increasingly demonstrated domestic and international behavior
patterns which mirror similar past behavior patterns of the four
current state sponsors of terrorism which include Iran, Syria, Sudan,
and Cuba. President Chavez's main international mission is to challenge
U.S. interests in the Americas and around the globe. This mission is
accomplished through the provisions of ``passive'' support to regional
terrorist groups and paramilitary forces which presents an attractive
safe haven or way-station for terrorists due to Venezuela's
unwillingness to deny terrorists use of its territory. Corruption
within the Venezuelan Government and military, ideological ties with
the FARC and ELN, maturing relationships with the other state sponsors
of terrorism, easily obtainable travel documents, and weak
international counternarcotics cooperation are all factors that have
helped to fuel a permissive operating environment for terrorists and
drug traffickers. These factors may also lead to the potential increase
in transit to the United States and Europe of illicit goods and
activities.
Under President Chavez's direction, Venezuela has provided
political and logistical support to the FARC. Specifically, he has
permitted senior FARC officials, such as Rodrigo Granda, Marin Arango
(aka Ivan Marquez), and Rodrigo London Echeverry (aka Timochenko or
Timoleon Jiminez) to move freely within Venezuela and across its
international borders. Arango/Marquez currently plays an important role
as an intermediary in developing international connections and support
for FARC.
On March 1, 2008, after a Colombian military strike against a FARC
camp on Ecuador's side of the shared border resulted in the death of
FARC's chief of staff, Luis Edgar Devia Silva (aka Raul Reyes) and 24
FARC members and sympathizers, computers belonging to the FARC
commander were retrieved. These computers yielded an intelligence
bonanza for Colombia, including evidence from Reyes' computers that
Chavez and his lieutenants were in frequent contact with FARC leaders
and regularly discussing ways to assist the group with money, arms,
logistical support, and strategic advice. Particularly worrisome was
the readiness of Chavez's agents to propose up to $300 million in aid
to FARC and to act as facilitators for FARC to acquire sophisticated
weaponry, particularly surface-to-air missiles or manportable air
defense systems.
In September 2008, after a review of the intelligence collected
from the Reyes laptops, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) identified two senior Venezuelan
officials--General Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, Director of
Venezuela's Military Intelligence (DGIM); and Henry de Jesus Rangel
Silva, Head of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Service
(DISIP), Venezuela's FBI; as well as former Justice and Interior
Minister Ramon Rodriguez Chacin--as materially assisting FARC narcotics
trafficking under the Kingpin Act. Carvajal, in particular, has long
figured as a primary intermediary between the FARC and the Chavez
Government.
In July 2009, Colombian officials disclosed that their Army had
recovered three anti-tank weapons from FARC. These weapons, AT-4 anti-
tank rockets, were swiftly traced back to their Swedish manufacturer,
which reported the weapons were sold to the Venezuelan army in the
1980s. President Chavez at first called the entire report false. Later
he reversed this position, claiming the weapons were stolen in 1995
during a FARC raid into Venezuela. Chavez could not explain why
communications exchanges between FARC leaders in early 2007 that are
documented in the Reyes laptops spoke of a recent transfer of ``85mm
antitank rockets'' from Venezuela to FARC, precisely the weapons
recovered by the Colombians.

94. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, in your opinion, should the
United States designate Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism?
Admiral Olson. According to the DOS, there are currently four
countries officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Iran,
Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. Venezuela is not on the official list but their
cooperation in the international campaign against terrorism has
steadily declined over the past several years. President Chavez has
been vocal in his public criticism of U.S. counterterrorism efforts,
championing Iraqi terrorists, and deepening ties with state sponsors of
terrorism such as Iran, Syria, and Cuba through increased military,
and/or commercial cooperation.
In addition, President Chavez's ideological sympathy for the FARC
and the National Liberation Army (ELN) limits Venezuelan cooperation
with the United States and Colombia in combating regional terrorism.
The FARC, ELN, and other paramilitary groups often use the Venezuelan
border region to secure logistical supplies, as well as support the
transshipment of arms and drugs.
At this time, Venezuela does not represent a direct military or
terrorist threat to the United States, but Venezuela's ``passive''
support to regional terrorist groups and paramilitary forces, maturing
relationship with state sponsors of terrorism and permissive operating
environment for terrorists and drug traffickers suggest increased
scrutiny by the United States is warranted.

95. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, do you believe Iran is a
growing threat to stability in our hemisphere based on their increased
cooperation with Venezuela and other states hostile to the United
States?
General Petraeus. This assessment would be better answered by our
intelligence agencies in conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM).

information operations
96. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, the insurgents seem to have
a better network to get their messages out after an attack. To win the
hearts and minds of the populace, we need to have a robust information
environment that provides an accurate account of military operations;
additionally, we need to be the first to admit to mistakes that lead to
civilian casualties. What are we doing to counter the inaccurate and
negative accounts of military operations in your AOR?
General Petraeus. Unlike our adversaries, our mission is to be
``first with the truth.'' Often times, getting to the truth takes time,
but we're working hard to decrease the time it takes us to get our word
out. We are currently adding a team of communicators, including
language specialists, to the ISAF Joint Headquarters Joint Operations
Center in Afghanistan to provide a rapid response capability, similar
to the capability we had in Baghdad. By positioning professional
communicators in the Joint Operations Center, they can monitor
operations unfolding and plan in advance for events that require
messaging and responses. These personnel also monitor media reporting,
and work to correct factual errors as appropriate, while also providing
accurate information quickly to news organizations in the language of
the medium.
A major investment is also being made in our information operations
capability in Afghanistan with the recent stand up of the Information
Operations Task Force, or IOTF, operating in the realms of PSYOPS,
electronic warfare, computer network operations, operations security,
and military deception. We formed this Task Force based on the lessons
we learned in Iraq with the IOTF we had there, but the Afghanistan
version has been considerably adapted to better operate in the vastly
different information environment of that country, where literacy is a
significant challenge and traditional communication and radio dominate
as means of dissemination.
Since the establishment of USFOR-A's IOTF, that organization is
combating the insurgency's narrative daily, attacking not only the
adversary's message but also attacking, both kinetically and
nonkinetically, the adversary's messengers and their networks. Since
achieving full operational capacity shortly after the turn of this
year, the IOTF has established three major efforts with seven
subordinate operations that serve to counter the adversary's
propaganda, encourage the reintegration of low- to mid-level fighters
back into Afghan society, target individual bad actors, and amplify the
growing capacity and will of our uniformed partners in the ANA, the
ANP, and Afghan Border Police as they assume more of the fight from
U.S. and coalition forces.
At CENTCOM headquarters, there are several communication activities
we are currently engaged in to counter inaccuracies and negative
reporting. We have implemented a headquarter-led Communication
Integration Working Group that helps synchronize communication efforts
across the AOR. This weekly collaboration and cross-purpose command
function is a cornerstone activity that helps us effectively address
communication issues and ensure more accurate reporting in the media
and in social networks. We also have media watch personnel in the
CENTCOM headquarters who monitor the press constantly while assessing
press reporting. These analysts work hand-in-hand with senior military
public affairs officers. A 24/7 operation, these media monitors also
help to develop time sensitive press guidance and analysis on various
issues. With all our communication activities, we continually strive to
align our words, actions, and images to achieve desired outcomes.

97. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, one of the tenets of SOF is
the use of leverage to get results disproportionate to level of effort.
Radio-in-a-box (RIAB) devices are currently being used to put out news
and information including messages from U.S. forces. The last update I
had on this program was over 1,500 of these sets had been distributed
throughout Afghanistan. Has this been an effective strategy?
General Petraeus. Use of RIAB is an effective strategy. Radio
programming is the most common method of mass media in Afghanistan and
reaches the largest audiences. This is due to high illiteracy rates (72
percent of the population), lack of infrastructure in rural areas to
provide terrestrial TV, cost of TVs, low satellite TV installation and
reception, and very low internet penetration.
The estimate of 1,500 RIAB systems distributed across Afghanistan
appears to be too high. According to ISAF Joint Command (IJC) there are
currently 123 RIAB systems operating in Afghanistan. There are an
additional 50 RIABs in various states of repair.
The majority of the RIAB systems belong to battle space owners and
are operated by their information operations personnel. Most systems
are run by contracted local nationals who provide information in the
local dialect making the content more acceptable to the local
population.
The RIAB is an effective tool used to disseminate news, public
service announcements, and command information to the local population.
Improvements are planned in training, maintenance, and message
synchronization to improve RIABs' usefulness to battle space
commanders.

98. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, have we put enough out or do
we need more and are there other information operations (IO) we should
be exploiting, but are not?
General Petraeus. We must expand our capability to contest
extremist groups and adversaries in the IO battle space, in particular,
fourth generation communications (4G) will play a critical role in the
years to come. 4G provides a secure and comprehensive all-IP-based
solution where services (gaming, multi-media, ultra broad band
internet, and IP telephony) can be streamlined instantly to the end
user. Many countries within our area of operations skip a generation of
communication infrastructure and move towards faster, real-time
information platforms. Our ability to stay competitive with our
enemies' dissemination of information is crucial to long-term success
in the fight. Our adversaries understand the nature of this fight, and
they use every method of influence available to them. The information
space in which this war is fought has become increasingly complex with
violent extremist groups displaying the ability to use emerging media
conduits, including the expanded use of the Internet and Web 2.0
technologies (mobile communications devices, blogs, social networking
sites, et cetera) to recruit forces, solicit funding, share tradecraft,
and spread their ideology. Extremist groups realize they cannot
effectively defeat us or overthrow governments in the region through
conventional military operations. Thus, they use the information
environment as a key line of effort for their campaigns, and they use
kinetic attacks to enable their IO and to kill and injure our forces,
our partners, and innocent civilians.

99. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, what is the training
pipeline for soldiers who conduct IO?
General Petraeus. The Services have the mission of providing
trained IO personnel to the combatant commanders. Each Service has a
different method of accomplishing this task, based on its institutional
history, mission, and organization.
The Army has several Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)
involved in IO for both officers and enlisted. Functional Areas (FA)
within the IO construct include FA 30 Information Operations Officer,
FA 29 Electronic Warfare, FA 37A PSYOP Officer, and FA 59 Strategic
Planner. There are school houses at various installations, such as Fort
Leavenworth's Combined Arms Center, that function as educational
establishments and functional proponents.
The Air Force, in contrast, does not have a dedicated IO Specialty
Code. The Air Force IO Career Field is managed via Special Experience
Identifiers (SEIs) and an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). These
identifiers and codes are awarded for attending training, on the job
experience, and based on a commander's recommendation.
The Navy has established the Information Dominance Corps to lead
and manage a cadre of officers, enlisted and civilian IO professionals.
IO personnel are given functional training, and acquire advanced
education and significant experience. Officers are given an IO
designation and enlisted personnel get Navy Enlisted Codes (NECs) upon
accomplishing established prerequisites.
The Marine Corps IO Force does not have a primary MOS, but does
have four additional MOSs to designate IO specialists. Like the Air
Force and Navy, the Marine Corps requires their IO specialists to meet
educational goals, on the job training, and successful completion of
Active Duty tours to be awarded specific MOSs.
The combatant command has the responsibility to provide correct
demand signals to the Services so they provide the right numbers of
people, with the right skills, at the right time. This is done through
the Joint Manning Document and Joint Lessons Learned.

100. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, how is the private sector
being utilized to help the military adopt the best practices for IO?
General Petraeus. We place heavy emphasis on the best commercial
solutions to achieve our military information objectives. Specifically,
we have sought the largest and most successful global firms, and the
most cutting edge technologies to provide the scope, breadth, and reach
needed to effectively counter our adversaries.
Some areas to which we have applied commercial best practices
include a true `integrated,' open source Web 2.0 (applications that
facilitate interactive information sharing, interoperability, and
collaboration, such as Facebook) multimedia platform and accompanying
social networking platform with Consumer Generated Content Monitors to
engage online social networks. This effort has provided the capability
to counter rapid dissemination of extremist influence, reduce support
for extremist ideology, methodology, and leadership.
We continue to apply best industry practices and seek out
commercial off-the-shelf solutions in the marketing realm to bridge the
technological gap, and we will continue to invest in research and
development capacity to seek out and exploit emerging technology to
stay ahead of our adversaries.

101. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, how are we empowering the
Afghans to spread news more rapidly to local populations?
General Petraeus. There are three current IO programs that are
designed to enhance communication throughout Afghan local populations.
One program is conducted by Task Force 41 (TF41). Two programs are
conducted by the Military Information Support Team (MIST), which is a
seven-man team assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan to provide
military support to public diplomacy for the country team.
Within the MIST, a program called ``The Voices of a Nation'' has
been established to empower the Afghan population to spread news more
rapidly. This program educates the Afghan population on principles of
democracy, and provides students with the means to develop and
disseminate moderate messages throughout Afghanistan. Voices of a
Nation trains and equips Afghanistan university students to provide a
native message to counter extremists and insurgent messaging.
Another MIST initiative includes University Media Infrastructure
Upgrades. These upgrades at Kabul University, Jalalabad University,
Mazar-e Sharif University, Herat University, Kandahar University, and
Khost University include structural construction and renovation,
digital equipment upgrade, radio production and broadcast capability,
television production capability, print production, and publication
capability. Like Voices of a Nation, this initiative supports
university students' ability to counter insurgent messaging. DOD is
providing only technical support to this effort which is led by DOS.

102. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, I thought DOS was the
agency in charge of public diplomacy; however, it seems like DOD is
encroaching into public diplomacy through IO. Please explain how IO is
not another form of the public diplomacy role that has always been
associated with DOS.
General Petraeus. It would not be accurate to characterize Military
Information Operations as another form of Public Diplomacy, primarily
because they have clearly different objectives. DOD, and particularly
CENTCOM, focus our Military Information Operations toward fighting the
enemy in the information domain. We see Public Diplomacy efforts
focused primarily toward promoting U.S. polices and values abroad.
Frankly, DOS has been under-resourced in this area. Clearly, there is
overlap of domains, but not overlap of purpose.
Our extremist adversaries are engaged in an information war for the
hearts and minds of men and women throughout the CENTCOM AOR. To
counter this threat, we must use IO to attack the enemy along four
critical lines of operation: command and control, funding, recruiting,
and training. We must also counter the violent extremist ideology that
permeates and enables these four areas.
To do this, IO exploit as many information conduits as possible to
achieve desired effects against our enemy.

103. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, I understand that you are
requesting funding for IO--what is this funding for?
General Petraeus. The funding is for Operation Earnest Voice (OEV),
which is CENTCOM's primary nonkinetic information operation tool to
degrade enemy recruiting and fund raising support. Our adversaries are
adept at exploiting misinformation and cultural differences to recruit
and raise funds for their operations. OEV provides us the ability to
degrade the enemy's recruiting and funding efforts by directly
countering their narrative and by amplifying the message of those who
stand against violent extremist ideologies.
Currently, we have two major ongoing operations: the Regional Web
Interaction Program (RWIP) and Credible Voices Program (CVP). RWIP
requires an additional $6.1 million for continued capability and
expansion. RWIP focuses on informing and influencing foreign target
audiences to counter violent extremist ideology and enemy propaganda,
and amplify messages of credible voices to reduce VEO effectiveness in
soliciting recruits and financial support for their operations.
CVP line of operation requires an additional $38.5 million to
effectively use web-based operations to link disparate credible
networks and organizations to counter our adversaries' messages of
violence. The program's objective is to expand and amplify moderate
messages within the contested information space to reduce extremists'
effectiveness in soliciting recruits and gaining financial support.
IO requires robust recurring funding in order to stop the enemies'
recruiting, training, and their financial support. Full funding for
RWIP and CVP will put us a step ahead of our enemies' efforts and allow
us many opportunities to stop terrorist activities before they happen.

104. Senator LeMieux. General Petraeus, in fiscal year 2010, the
Appropriations Committees of Congress cut your IO budget approximately
in half. What operations were affected by a budget cut of this
magnitude?
General Petraeus. The areas affected by the budget cut are the two
critical operational activities conducted at CENTCOM to interdict VEO
recruiting and funding raising efforts. These activities are the RWIP
and CVP.
RWIP focuses on informing and influencing foreign target audiences
to reduce VEO effectiveness in soliciting recruits and funding by
countering violent extremist ideology and enemy propaganda, and amplify
messages of CVP.
To date, monthly assessments of the RWIP show the positive effects
the program has on the tone of discussion threads by shifting sentiment
away from support of VEO. We strongly believe this leads to decreases
in recruits, funding support, and save havens, all of which are
critical enablers to the enemy's fighting capability.
The budget decrement has impeded our ability to reach full
operational capacity, and has delayed our ability to counter the
violent extremist ideology that sustains their ability to fight,
recruit, train, and gain funding.
The CVP uses web-based operations to link disparate credible
networks and organizations to counter our adversaries' messages of
violence. The program's objective is to expand and amplify moderate
messages within the contested information space to reduce extremists'
effectiveness in soliciting recruits and funding.
The themes of CVP products directly counter VEO narratives to
interdict their ability to seek recruits, funding, and additional
support for their military objectives.
PSYOPS doctrine requires long-term and repetitive messaging to
change attitudes, perceptions, and ultimately behaviors. However, the
current budget allocation prevents our ability to deliver a persistent
capability to amplify CVP throughout our area of operation.

new headquarters for special operations command south at homestead air
force base
105. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, I understand the President's
budget includes $41 million in the Army military construction account
to construct a new headquarters for Special Operations Command South
(SOCSOUTH) at Homestead Air Force Base (AFB). Could you please explain
the need for this new facility?
Admiral Olson. SOCSOUTH requires permanent facilities. They have
been occupying temporary, hurricane-susceptible modular facilities on
Homestead Air Reserve Base (ARB) ever since their relocation from
Puerto Rico in 2004.

106. Senator LeMieux. Admiral Olson, would you please explain why
Homestead AFB was chosen as the preferred site?
Admiral Olson. It is ultimately the GCC's decision where their TSOC
headquarters will be located. Operationally and logistically, it makes
the most sense for TSOCs to be located as close as possible to the
GCC's headquarters in order to facilitate command and control. SOCSOUTH
has been occupying temporary modular facilities on Homestead ARB ever
since its relocation from Puerto Rico in 2004. Homestead ARB provides
SOCSOUTH the benefit of close proximity to the SOUTHCOM headquarters,
while also effecting rapid and efficient access to the SOUTHCOM region.
The proximity to the military airfield on Homestead ARB provides ample
staging capability to facilitate rapid deployment of SOF into the
SOUTHCOM AOR, as was demonstrated by the recent Haiti earthquake
disaster response.
______

Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
non-military stakeholders
107. Senator Vitter. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, as CENTCOM
and SOCOM commanders, please provide your assessment of the evolving
and growing relationship between DOD and non-military stakeholders such
as the DOS and USAID. The efforts of these non-military entities are
crucial to the overall success of virtually every major military effort
we are engaged in today. In your assessment, please include an
evaluation of the ability of DOS to execute its role as lead agency in
stability operations.
Admiral Olson. The relationship between SOCOM and non-military
stakeholders, such as DOS and USAID, has been evolving and deepening
over the past years. The level of success we have achieved thus far is
a result of three main efforts: developing long-term relationships,
creating and participating in predictable collaborative events, and
education. Specific examples of success to date include the high level
of coordination that was achieved between SOCOM and USAID during the
recent Haiti earthquake disaster. Due to the fact that SOCOM and USAID
had a developed and mature partnership program prior to the crisis, the
two organizations were able to quickly and effectively respond. Other
examples include SOCOM's ongoing collaboration with Ambassador
Benjamin's office (DOS S/CT), NCTC, and other agencies in the
development of deradicalization programs to counter violent extremists.
Regardless of which organization has lead, operations--to include
stability operations--are best executed when all organizations involved
establish transparent collaborative events that seek to develop a
common understanding of the problem-set, inform leadership of issues
and impediments, and develop synchronized actions that leverage the
full capabilities and authorities of the whole-of-government.
General Petraeus. The interagency, whole-of-government approach has
greatly improved since the start of OEF. In fact, it is now nearly
impossible to believe that only one government agency has the ability
to conduct successful stability operations by itself. Success requires
the full strength and capabilities that only a whole-of-government
approach can provide. DOS has made significant progress in improving
their expertise available on the ground in Afghanistan. As of April 1,
2010, there are over 1,000 civilians in country. U.S. civilians have
established DSTs in 32 of ISAF's focus districts with an additional 8
DSTs scheduled for activation in 2010.
CENTCOM is in constant contact with Ambassador Holbrooke and we
hold weekly meetings to address critical civilian-military
effectiveness issues. In fact, I believe that the partnership between
the government agencies and departments working in Afghanistan is the
strongest seen to date. To enhance our ability to work as a strong
reliable partner, CENTCOM has embedded members of other U.S. Government
agencies in our headquarters. These interagency experts provide key
links into their parent organizations and are full members of the
command that work closely to shape strategic-level planning on
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and humanitarian assistance.
DOS is more than capable of taking over the lead role for stability
operations in Afghanistan. As was proven after clearing operations for
Operation Moshtarak, DOS along with USAID deployed several staff
members, contractors, and coalition partners to initiate stability
operations that included infrastructure repairs, agricultural
initiatives, emergency humanitarian assistance, civil administration
development, and political outreach.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
afghanistan
108. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, last August when I traveled
to Afghanistan with Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Graham, we received
a bleak report from General McChrystal. In essence, he told us that the
Taliban had the momentum and that the situation was serious and
deteriorating. What is your current assessment of the situation in
Afghanistan compared to the August assessment of General McChrystal?
General Petraeus. The security situation in Afghanistan remains
serious but is no longer deteriorating. We have made progress in
Afghanistan since last August 2009 in strategy, manning, and the
overall situation on the ground. We have the right strategy that
addresses building the ANSF and creates the security structure needed
for good governance and development to take place. We have the troops
ready to take the initiative and momentum away from the insurgency as
we get close to having most of the 30,000 additional troops in place.
The organizational, leadership, strategy, and resource initiatives we
have worked this past year have already begun to change the dynamics in
important ways. The loss of innocent life, for example, has been
dramatically reduced in the past year.
No doubt, 2010 will be a tough year and I expect that the endeavor
in Afghanistan will, as was the case when we conducted the surge in
Iraq, become harder before it gets easier. However, I believe we will
soon begin to see the positive results of our planning and operational
efforts.

iraq
109. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, following last week's Iraqi
election, General Odierno said that the United States is sticking with
its plan to draw down troops to 50,000 by the summer and that the ISF
will be ready by the end of next year to take complete responsibility
for security in Iraq. However, there have been some recent reports that
the Iraqis are hedging as to their commitment to ending U.S. military
involvement in 2011 and Prime Minister Maliki raised the possibility of
asking U.S. forces to remain beyond the 2011 deadline. In your opinion,
will the Iraqis be ready to assume control when U.S. forces draw down
to 50,000 troops?
General Petraeus. The ISF are on track to achieve the MEC to assume
full control of internal security on December 31, 2011; however, the
ISF will require continued assistance as they progress towards the MEC
necessary for external security. Through General Odierno and our U.S.
forces in Iraq, we continue to work on improving their external
security capabilities with increased training and equipping.
The Iraqi Army continues to make steady progress toward MEC but
will not achieve the necessary foundation for defense against external
threats before December 2011 due to equipment procurement timelines and
subsequent training requirements. Specifically, equipping, training,
and combined arms integration of the M1A1 fleet, artillery units, and
key mechanized enablers will not be complete prior to December 2011.
The Iraqi Navy is on track to achieve MEC by December 2011,
although there are risks if shortfalls in manning, C4ISR, maintenance,
and infrastructure are not adequately addressed. The Iraqi Navy will
assume responsibility for protection of the oil platforms in 2011. Due
to the importance of these oil terminals to the Iraqi economy, a higher
level of capability is required.
The Iraqi Air Force is on the path to achieving MEC by the end of
2011 in all mission categories except airspace control and fixed-wing
airlift. Specifically, multi-role fighter, long-range radar, and C-130J
delivery and fielding will not be complete prior to December 2011. The
Iraqi Air Force's December 2011 goal is the development of a capability
to support ISF COIN operations and have an initial air sovereignty
capability in place. Delayed execution of the Iraqi Air Force Service
Plan and lack of funding for acquisitions, accessions, contract
logistics support, and sustainment of current fleet all present
obstacles to achieving the capability to conduct minimal air
sovereignty operations by December 2011.
Although the ISF are not on track to achieve MEC for external
security by the end of 2011, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
will continue the training and equipping process post December 2011 to
attain MEC for external security.

110. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, according to the Pentagon's
most recent quarterly report to Congress on Iraq, ``Iran continues to
fund, train, equip, and give some direction to residual Shia militias
and extremist elements in Iraq.'' How much influence does Iran have in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Iran still has a significant amount of influence
in Iraq which it exerts via the primary Shia militias it supports, such
as Asa'ib al Haqq (AAH) and Kata'ib Hizballah (KH), as well as
political influence through a variety of different Iraqi interlocutors
within the Government of Iraq. However, Iran has experienced setbacks
to its influence campaign, such as Prime Minister Maliki's March 2008
``Operation Charge of the Knights'' where Iranian-backed Shia militias
were forced out of key terrain in Iraq, and the passage of the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement, which Iran vehemently opposed.
The Iraqi election is a more recent case study on Iranian influence
in Iraq and may illustrate Iran's current ability to exert influence.
Iran desires a weak Shia-dominated central government in Iraq, amenable
to Iranian influence. Iran would like the two rival Shia parties, Iraqi
National Alliance (INA) and Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law (SoL),
to unite following the 7 March 2010 elections. Though it is still too
early to tell whether Iran will be able to successfully mediate the
disputes between INA and SoL, Iran's ability to do so may produce an
Iraqi Government willing to seek counsel and support from Iran.
Regardless of whether such a union emerges, Iran will retain some
degree of influence over the Iraqi Government through individual Iraqis
with longstanding cultural, religious, political, and financial ties to
Iran.
There continues to be evidence of Iran's support to multiple Shia
militias in Iraq via the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF). The Government of Iraq's willingness to confront Tehran,
coupled with an aggressive U.S. force protection posture, did have an
impact on IRGC-QF's support to these militias. It appears the impact
was temporary as both AAH and KH continue to receive training, funding,
safe-haven, and guidance from the IRGC-QF. While we assess the quantity
of IRGC-QF's provision of lethal aid has decreased, the sophistication
of the weaponry IRGC-QF provides has increased over the same period.

111. Senator Collins. General Petraeus, you testified that no
captured terrorists in your AOR have been sent for detention in
Guantanamo during the last 18 months. Where are captured terrorists
being held?
General Petraeus. Captured enemy combatants who are not released or
turned over to the host nation are held by U.S. forces in one of two
theater internment facilities (TIFs). The U.S. TIF in Iraq, Camp
Cropper, is located in Baghdad. The U.S. TIF in Afghanistan, also known
as the Detention Facility in Parwan, is located on Bagram Air Field.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, Ben Nelson, Kaufman, LeMieux, and Burr.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and
Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Brian F.
Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin and Vance
Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant
to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Victor Cervino and Brian Walsh, assistants
to Senator LeMieux; and Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, we're going to be hearing from three of our
combatant commanders to receive testimony regarding the issues
and the challenges that they face in their respective mission
areas.
On behalf of the committee, let me welcome back General
Chilton, Commander of our U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM);
Admiral Willard, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM);
and General Sharp, Commander of the United Nations Command
(UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK).
This committee appreciates your many years of faithful
service to this country and the many sacrifices that you and
your families make in that cause. We would appreciate your
thanking, on behalf of our committee, the men and women that
you lead, both military and civilian, for their service, their
patriotism, and their dedication.
We also want to thank you for rearranging your schedules to
be here this morning. We know these hours that you have here
are precious, and we thought it would be better to go ahead
today, even though our attendance is going to be less, rather
than to bring you back at some future time, which would really
disrupt your schedules. The rather arcane rule of the Senate
that was used to prevent us from meeting on Wednesday is still
a rule of the Senate, and as long as it's there, somebody can
exercise that right. It was exercised, and, as a result,
inconvenienced you and many members of this committee, as well.
But, that's where we are, so thank you for your flexibility in
this matter.
Today's hearing, we're going to hear the views and
assessments of senior U.S. Commanders in the Asia Pacific
region, together with the global perspectives of STRATCOM for
those issues that pertain across the combatant commands.
First, on PACOM: U.S. PACOM's geographic area of
responsibility (AOR) is home to over half of the world's
population and to five of the world's six largest militaries.
Stability and security in this vast region is vital to our
interests, as well as to the interests of our allies and our
partners. While the region as a whole remains relatively
stable, we cannot afford to take this stability for granted. We
must remain vigilant in the region and reassure our allies that
we will continue to work with them to further our mutual
interests.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense,
although relatively quiet compared to a year ago, when North
Korea's aggressive rhetoric, multiple ballistic missile test
launches, and nuclear detonation heightened regional concerns
and resulted in a tightening of U.N. sanctions.
In recent months, the United States and North Korea have
had modest bilateral discussions in a effort to regain traction
in the Six-Party process, but there's been no meaningful
progress so far.
Since nuclear inspectors left North Korea last year, the
status of North Korea's nuclear program has been largely
unknown. While the nuclear issue garners much of the
international attention, also of concern is the apparent
unstable nature of the North Korean regime, coupled with a
conventional military capability that represents a significant
threat to security on the peninsula.
China's influence continues to grow regionally and
globally, and, at the same time, China continues to grow its
military. It is important to anticipate and understand the
intended and unintended consequences of these developments on
the region at large. As China's influence and military grow,
traditional alliances and partnerships in the region may come
under pressure from a perception that the balance of power is
shifting, and other countries in the region may deem it
necessary to grow their militaries, as well. Such developments
need to be understood and inform our decisionmaking.
China's growing involvement with Iran, including investment
in the Iranian energy sector, is an example of China's global
influence expansion efforts. China is the primary obstacle to
more stringent United Nations Security Council sanctions
against Iran.
In Japan, the installation of a new government last summer
represented new challenges and opportunities in the
longstanding defense relationship between our countries. For
instance, the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI),
negotiated between our two countries over a number of years,
and agreed to in 2006, has been the subject of renewed
consideration by the Japanese, particularly as it relates to
the movement of U.S. marines on Okinawa and the relocation of
some of those marines to Guam. This matter needs to be
resolved, as does the impact of the associated military buildup
on Guam, and the details of the plan to ensure that the influx
of military personnel and their families is done with due
regard to the effects on the Island of Guam and their
population.
The committee is also interested in U.S. efforts in the
Asia Pacific region to provide humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, to expand the already strong partnerships with
friends like Australia and India and others, and to combat
violent extremism, particularly in Southeast Asia.
STRATCOM has global responsibilities that require it to
work with all the combatant and regional commands. STRATCOM's
broad mission includes both operational and coordinating
responsibilities. The Command has operational responsibility
for strategic deterrence in space and cyberspace operations. It
coordinates actions across the Commands in areas of missile
defense, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
allocation of high-demand/low-density intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles, and helps integrate information operations.
Also, with the growing threat to cyberoperations, the new Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM) is being established as a subunified command
of STRATCOM.
Very shortly, we expect to have a new treaty, which will be
the successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
and a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Both of these are
expected to bring about new and carefully considered changes to
the role of nuclear weapons and national strategy, and the size
of the stockpile to support that role. We hope to hold hearings
on the NPR when both are submitted to Congress. General
Chilton, as Commander of STRATCOM, will play an important role
in the ratification process, and we look forward to working
closely together in that process.
A second domain over which STRATCOM has responsibility is
space. As the leading spacefaring nation, the United States
must sustain and protect its space assets. On the other hand,
how these space assets actually contribute to military
operations is not always well understood. Today we have an
opportunity, with Admiral Willard and General Sharp here, to
explore the importance of space systems and what would happen
to our military capabilities if these assets were lost or
degraded.
Finally, the role of the military and combating WMD, and
how these capabilities are integrated with other elements of
the U.S. Government and the international community, is an
additional challenge confronting both STRATCOM and PACOM.
The Asia Pacific region continues to be one of the hotbeds
of proliferation for both nuclear and missile technologies.
There is continuing evidence of nuclear smuggling in the region
and around the world that each regional commander must address
in a coordinated fashion. We look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about that.
It's a pleasure to have each of you with us this morning.
We look forward to your testimony and to the questions. I
don't--I know that General--that Senator McCain was unable to
make it here this morning.
Senator Burr.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR

Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the recognition.
Before I ask that Senator McCain's remarks be put in the
record, since I feel somewhat personally responsible for this
Friday hearing, I would like to say to the Chair and to my
colleagues what I have said to our panel of witnesses
privately, that I certainly do apologize for the delay in the
hearing and causing this Friday hearing. Sometimes things are
out of our control as it relates to the functions of the
Senate.
I would ask, at this time, that Senator McCain's entire
opening statement be included in the record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be included in the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
today. I am grateful to each of you for your long and distinguished
service to our country, and I hope that you will convey my sincere
appreciation to all the courageous men and women under your command.
Our Nation faces significant challenges around the world--and in
few places are those challenges more complicated than in the Asia-
Pacific region. Asia's economies and militaries are growing in strength
and influence. Our Nation has long relied on our strong alliances with
Japan, South Korea and Australia to promote security in the region--and
increasingly, beyond it as well. Today, more than 2,000 troops from the
Asia-Pacific region are serving and sacrificing alongside our men and
women in uniform in Afghanistan.
In addition, allies like the Philippines and partner nations like
Indonesia are working with us to counter violent extremists in their
own countries. The Filipino military has made great strides in
combating Abu Sayyaf, an al Qaeda affiliate, in the southern
Philippines. Despite a hiatus in our military relationship with
Indonesia, the U.S.-Indonesia partnership has proven to be invaluable
in the fight against violent extremists in the region. We should work
to build our relationship with Indonesia into a genuine strategic
partnership to tackle today's global threats.
Beyond combating terrorism, the United States must forge deeper and
more comprehensive partnerships with other emerging powers in Asia--
with Vietnam, Malaysia, and especially India, among others. Our
relationship with New Delhi has never been simple, and it never will
be, but the fact is, we are now expanding our strategic partnership
with India to address issues not only of regional, but of global,
importance: from nonproliferation and cyber security, to humanitarian
assistance and the promotion of freedom. Our Nation has vital interests
in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is imperative that we expand the
circle of capable friends and allies who can help us share the burden
of long-term security.
General Sharp: I am encouraged by the progress that U.S. Forces-
Korea has made in transitioning the U.S. Headquarters Command into a
Combined Forces Command. I am also pleased to hear that South Korea
will deploy 350 troops to support a Provincial Readiness Team in
Afghanistan in July. I look forward to hearing your assessment of the
current readiness of South Korean forces and your thoughts about the
recent claim that North Korea has increased its missile arsenal by 25
percent in the last 2 years, a total of some 1,000 missiles, including
intermediate range missiles that can hit all of Japan and threaten
Guam.
Admiral Willard, our relationship with China is complicated. I
believe that a U.S. partnership with a strong and successful China--a
China that shares the responsibilities, not just the benefits, open
regional and international order--can be an important force for
stability in the 21st century. But many of China's actions at present
are very worrisome.
I am concerned by Beijing's ongoing and largely opaque military
build-up, including anti-satellite and anti-access capabilities, as
well as other new and significant tools of power projection. I am
concerned about China's irregular engagement with U.S. vessels and
their aggressive sovereign aspirations in international waters--further
exacerbating existing regional maritime disputes. I am deeply concerned
by China's increasing willingness to use its rising power to shield and
support some of the worst behavior by some of the world's most
destabilizing actors, especially the Government of Iran. Admiral
Willard, I look forward to your assessment of China's growing
capabilities, its strategic intentions, and its conduct in common
global spaces--air, sea, land, and space.
Finally, General Chilton, as Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
you are responsible for the health and readiness of our strategic
deterrent. While we have yet to see the President's delayed Nuclear
Posture Review, the current condition of the nuclear complex is not
sustainable. In order to responsibly reduce the size of our arsenal, we
must provide the resources necessary to recapitalize and modernize the
long-neglected infrastructure responsible for ensuring the safety,
security, reliability, and credibility of our national deterrent. While
the fiscal year 2011 budget request is a step forward in making the
necessary investments for modernization, a sustained long-term
commitment is essential. I look forward to hearing from you how well
the proposed fiscal year 2011 funding addresses the vital needs of our
stockpile.
While our troops face many formidable challenges in the world,
especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot lose sight of the need to
enhance our global capacity to deter threats, defend friends, defeat
enemies, and provide needed humanitarian assistance. All three of you
are a credit to your service and to our Nation. I thank you all, and I
look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Senator, it is very clear that the delay
here was not your doing whatsoever. You had nothing to do with
it, except you happened to be on the floor at the moment when
someone else wanted to raise an objection, and you did what you
are, I think, dutybound to do as a member of your caucus, which
is to reflect that objection. But, it's clear that you had
nothing to do with it, except being at the wrong place at the
wrong time, basically.
So, we will now--I think we're going to be calling on our
witnesses in the order--going from our left to your right, I
believe.
So, General Chilton, we're going to start with you and then
we're going to move down the table.

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND

General Chilton. Very good. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I assure you,
sir, it's no burden for us to reschedule and appear before this
committee.
It's a great honor to represent the extraordinary men and
women of STRATCOM. I'm privileged to showcase this joint team's
achievements, discuss our requirements, and highlight future
national security challenges across our diverse and global
mission areas.
STRATCOM's Active Duty, Reserve military members,
civilians, and contractors form a superb joint team, whose
dedicated planning, advocacy, and operational execution efforts
advance our warfighting priorities. We continue to strengthen
and sharpen our focus on deterrence, while at the same time
focusing on preserving our freedom of action in space and
cyberspace.
In all of these efforts, we greatly appreciate the support
of Members of Congress, and particularly this committee and
your staff, whose legislative investments across our mission
areas enable us to deliver global security for America.
Over the past year, we have actively supported the
administration's four major defense policy reviews, which
uniquely impacted STRATCOM: the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
NPR, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the Space
Posture Review, which is still in work. We also provided
analytical and intellectual capital to the New START treaty
negotiations. While not all yet completed, these reviews will
shape the role of our strategic capabilities and define the
investments necessary to recapitalize and sustain them.
Their focus areas also highlight STRATCOM's place at the
nexus of today's national security challenges. Global security
in general, and the United States specifically, face a myriad
of challenges today, from economic and political turmoil,
nontraditional threats, terrorism, and continuing oversea
contingency operations. Actors continue to seek ways to
challenge the United States and our allies and the conventional
and asymmetric means by which to do so.
STRATCOM remains committed to conducting deterrence, space,
and cyberspace operations, and advocating for the capabilities
our national leadership and geographic commanders need each and
every day in the areas of missile defense, information
operations, ISR, and combating WMD.
In the deterrence arena, our energetic exercise program
conducted Exercise Global Lightning 2009 this past year, the
most extensive nuclear command and control and communications
field exercise in over a decade. Our forces' success proved
America's well-placed confidence in our Nation's strategic
deterrent and our--and demonstrated the success of this
Command's effort to reemphasize a culture of excellence across
the nuclear enterprise.
In space, our acceptance of the Space Situational Awareness
Sharing Mission expanded the Command's relationships with
international and commercial partners toward ensuring a safe
and responsibly managed space domain. Future space surveillance
and situational awareness efforts and space investments must
continue to build on recent advances, including greater
collision avoidance analysis to ensure the availability of
essential space-based capabilities for, not only the United
States, but for our warfighters.
Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) sustained its
progress in defending DOD information networks by unifying
STRATCOM's components for network warfare and global network
operations, by increasing the training of cyberprofessionals,
and by welcoming the standup of service cybercomponents. We
carefully planned for the standup of CYBERCOM and look forward
to the confirmation of its first commander. Additionally, in
the past year, we dramatically expanded our military-to-
military outreach program to promote open dialogue and examine
the possibility of new partnerships in space and cyberspace.
Although not contained within the DOD budget, I would like
to mention my support for the administration's fiscal year 2011
request for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). The budget seeks nearly a 13-percent increase for NNSA
to provide much-needed infrastructure, human capital, and
stockpile management investments. I have long advocated for
such critical investments, which help keep our stockpile safe,
secure, and effective. Our deterrence credibility rests on such
confidence, and I appreciate this committee's support for the
request.
In the year ahead, STRATCOM will address the challenges I
have mentioned above as we focus on further developing our
workforce, sustaining a culture of excellence in the nuclear
enterprise, and integrating our global missions. STRATCOM's
uniquely global missions support national objectives, whole-of-
government solutions, and enhanced international cooperation.
Our future success requires investments in deterrence, the
standup of CYBERCOM, and expanding our awareness of, and
sustaining our capability investments within, the space domain.
As we move forward, I look forward to continuing to partner
with this committee and your staff. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify before this committee today. I look
forward to your questions. I would ask that my posture
statement be accepted for the record.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General. Your entire
statement will be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the
Committee on Armed Services, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, representing the extraordinary men and women of U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM). I'm privileged to showcase this joint team's
achievements, discuss our requirements, and highlight future national
security challenges across our mission areas. STRATCOM's Active Duty
and Reserve military members, civilians, and contractors form a superb
joint team, whose dedicated planning, advocacy, and operational
execution efforts advance our warfighting priorities. We continue to
strengthen and sharpen our focus on deterrence while at the same time
preserving our freedom of action in space and cyberspace. Before
continuing, I must say that we appreciate your support, because
legislative investments across our mission areas are essential to our
providing global security for America.
Admiral Mullen's memorandum Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Guidance for 2009-2010 detailed the Joint Force's strategic objectives
through 2010. These objectives include defending our national interests
in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, considering ways and
means to improve the force's health, and balancing global strategic
risks through deterrence. The uninformed observer might expect STRATCOM
to aid the Joint Force only with deterrence, but this globally
operational command does much more. In fact, the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) identified six key missions for the Department of Defense
(DOD),\1\ and STRATCOM plays a role in each of these missions, whether
by conducting operations, supporting and advocating for global
warfighter needs, closing gaps in geographic seams, or building
relationships across a growing range of partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The six mission areas are: (1) defend the United States and
support civil authorities at home, (2) succeed in counterinsurgency,
stability, and counterterrorism operations, (3) build the security
capacity of partner states, (4) deter and defeat aggression in anti-
access environments, (5) prevent proliferation and counter weapons of
mass destruction, and (6) operate effectively in cyberspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATCOM continues to support actively the DOD work on the QDR,
Space Posture Review, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR), and the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) negotiations. These reviews and START will shape the role of
our strategic capabilities and define the investments necessary to
recapitalize and sustain them, while highlighting STRATCOM's place at
the nexus of today's primary national security challenges. We are now
helping to translate these reports into the strategy and plans that our
components and the joint force need. This year we will continue to
focus on further developing our workforce, sustaining the highest
possible standards in the nuclear enterprise, and integrating our
global capabilities to support national and theater objectives. These
efforts will require investing in the deterrent enterprise, identifying
mechanisms to better integrate operations, plans, requirements, and
activities among our components, standing up U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM) to better execute our cyber mission, and sustaining the
critical national security capabilities provided by on-orbit satellite
constellations.
u.s. strategic command
As we address today's challenges, STRATCOM has already devoted
significant effort to align our priorities, plans, and investments
across our components while simultaneously executing deterrence, space,
and cyberspace operations. We have initiated and sustained several
successful engagement efforts. STRATCOM's reinvigorated military-to-
military outreach programs, which included senior-leader discussions
with key friends and allies, including the United Kingdom, France,
Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Israel on such topics as deterrence,
space, cyberspace, and missile defense. STRATCOM was honored to host
the United Kingdom's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope;
Australia's Vice Chief of Defence Force, Lieutenant General David
Hurley; France's Chief of the Defense Staff, General Jean-Louis
Georgelin; and China's Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission, Gen Xu Caihou. Gen Xu's request to visit STRATCOM during
his U.S. tour highlighted China's recognition of STRATCOM's global
role, and our very positive exchange showcased the tremendous potential
of military-to-military relationships to build confidence and
understanding between our countries. These dialogues are important and
must continue.
Over the past year, we welcomed the stand-up of Air Force Global
Strike Command and our components' increased focus on the deterrence
mission. In addition to maturing the adjustments we made in our
headquarters staff, STRATCOM's Global Thunder 2009 deterrence exercise
constituted the most extensive nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) field exercise in over a decade. It demonstrated
the full range of nuclear deterrence capabilities by integrating
submarine strategic deterrent patrols, more than 90 aircraft sorties,
an ICBM test launch, and 5 days of continuous airborne command-and-
control operations. Global Thunder's success demonstrated the readiness
of America's strategic forces. Continued support for the joint training
requirements and the established Combatant Commander Exercise
Engagement (CE2) Defense-wide account is essential to ensuring future
STRATCOM mission readiness.
Today's strategic mission requirements also demand the finest in
command, control, and communications capabilities. Our 1950s-era
headquarters falls short of providing the capabilities we need. We
appreciate congressional support for the planning and design funds
appropriated in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and requested for 2011.
These investments move us closer to a 21st century headquarters and
command center for deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations.
In the cyber domain, the Secretary of Defense directed STRATCOM to
establish CYBERCOM as a sub-unified command. This effort continued the
reorganization of cyber forces that began with the Secretary's
direction in October 2008 to place STRATCOM's Joint Task Force for
Global Network Operations (JTF GNO) under the operational control of
Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW). From
their inception, JFCC NW and JTF GNO had segregated offensive and
defensive military cyber operations. This segregation detracts from
natural synergies and ignores our experience in organizing to operate
in the air, land, sea, and space domains. The establishment of CYBERCOM
will remedy this problem in the cyber domain and create a robust sub-
unified command to address the growing importance of the cyber domain
to national security. We have already begun consolidating JTF GNO and
JFCC NW in preparation for the formal establishment of CYBERCOM, which
awaits confirmation of the nominated commander. We look forward to
continuing to work with Congress and our Agency partners as we move
forward to establish CYBERCOM.
The Services are also reorganizing their cyber forces in order to
present trained and equipped cyber operators to the Joint Force. Over
the past year, each Service reshaped the alignment of its cyber forces
into a more unified organization, and we welcome the stand-up of Army
Forces CYBERCOM, Marine Corps Forces CYBERCOM, Fleet CYBERCOM, and the
24th Air Force. These forces will enhance our ability to operate and
defend DOD information networks and provide the President with response
options in cyberspace.
To enhance the level of global strategic dialogue and STRATCOM's
support to other combatant commands, we are more broadly engaging our
military and non-military partners. In 2009, STRATCOM launched new or
renewed annual symposia for each of our three lines of operation. More
than 5,000 attendees, representing multiple commands, universities,
industry, and at least 10 other countries (including His Excellency
Sergey Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United
States) held substantive discussions on challenges facing our
deterrence, space, and cyberspace professionals. STRATCOM teams also
deployed across the globe to provide in-theater subject-matter
expertise. Our teams facilitated more effective employment of our
capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
space, operational security, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber. These
accomplishments, along with development of integrated missile defense
(IMD) capabilities and increases in space situational awareness (SSA),
represent just a small part of STRATCOM's accomplishments.
strategic context
Last spring, President Obama stated that as the world ``has become
more interconnected . . . we've seen events move faster than our
ability to control them.'' Global economic and political turmoil,
rapidly evolving information technology, nontraditional threats,
continuing overseas contingency operations, and terrorism represent
just some of the factors influencing global and regional security
challenges. Moreover, state and non-state actors pursue traditional and
asymmetric means to challenge the United States and our allies. With
the exception of the United States, all nuclear weapon states continue
to modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles and in some cases grow
them further. Although the United States and Russia are reducing their
strategic arsenals, North Korea and Iran remain on a dangerous nuclear
path. Additionally, we find increasing threats to our freedom of action
in the global commons of space and cyberspace, even as the importance
of these domains to our national security continues to grow. For
example, Iran's successful February 2009 satellite launch and North
Korea's attempt a few months later illustrate the spread of space
launch technology. However, successful space-launch vehicles can also
represent progress toward an effective intercontinental ballistic
missile capability. If perfected, such long-range ballistic missiles
would place a larger area of the world at risk.
Cyber networks weave through every facet of our lives and enable
extraordinary communication, intelligence, and command and control
capabilities. However, an adversary acting in cyberspace can steal
critical information, thwart vital data transmissions, or create
devastating effects beyond the cyber domain. Governments, militaries,
corporations, universities, and the individual computer user must guard
against vulnerabilities that are open to criminals, organized
hacktivists, state actors, and insider threats. Addressing these
challenges while capitalizing on the dramatic enabling capabilities of
cyberspace requires an unwavering watchfulness, a dynamic defense-in-
depth construct, a workforce that is carefully recruited, trained, and
properly retained, strong partnerships, an infrastructure that supports
global employment of DOD forces, and a realization that DOD's cyber
culture, conduct, and capabilities must change.
strategic deterrence
In an environment of such rapid economic, political, military, and
technological changes, many wonder if ``deterrence'' is still possible.
Today's multi-polar and increasingly complex strategic environment,
which includes threats posed by proliferation and terrorism, requires
that we increase our focus on deterrence because effectively deterring
threats to our Nation and our allies is not only possible, it is
essential.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the serious study of
deterrence theory and strategy has been inadequate. Much like our
changing global context, modern deterrence challenges necessitate more
complex approaches. The modern era of smart power requires a commitment
to a whole-of-government deterrence effort that capitalizes on the full
range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities.
Despite this complex environment, we have skipped an entire generation
of future policy makers, strategists, academics, and military
professionals in terms of training and developing them in the field of
deterrence. Preliminary work on the NPR and New START treaty revealed
this shortage of human capital. STRATCOM's first annual Deterrence
Symposium, held this past summer in Omaha, was our initial public
effort to revitalize attention to deterrence theory, thought, and
practice.
Speaking in Prague last year, President Obama articulated his goal
of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons, including a desire to
reduce global nuclear dangers and the role of nuclear weapons in our
national security strategy, while urging other nations to do the same.
The President also asserted that ``as long as these weapons exist, the
United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to
deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.'' Just
days before the President's remarks, the Strategic Posture Commission
concluded that ``nuclear weapons are both the greatest potential threat
to our way of life and important guarantors of U.S. security.'' The
commissioners agreed on two parallel paths forward: ``one path which
reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other
which reduces nuclear dangers through arms control and international
programs to prevent proliferation.'' As the command uniquely
responsible for our nuclear deterrent and for synchronizing DOD
combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning, STRATCOM finds
itself actively engaged in all of these endeavors.
Throughout the 65-year history of nuclear weapons, no nuclear power
has been conquered or even put at risk of conquest, nor has the world
witnessed the globe-consuming conflicts of earlier history. More than
180 state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) have either foresworn the pursuit of nuclear weapons (in
many cases because of the promise of America's extended deterrent
umbrella) or pledged in good faith to move toward eventual disarmament.
The United States and Russia have made steep reductions in their
nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War (a seldom recognized but
important demonstration of U.S. commitment) while joining together to
pursue the goals of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We have
invested considerable intellectual effort toward a stable world order,
where nuclear weapons seem at once dangerous, undesirable, expensive, a
tempting source of power and prestige, and yet also essential to
continued peace and stability.
Today, our nuclear weapons and triad of delivery systems remain
essential to our national security. Nonetheless, in light of the global
security environment, we should continually consider to what degree
nuclear weapons remain relevant, whether ours measurably encourage or
discourage proliferation, and to what extent reductions and/or force
size and posture changes enhance peace and strategic stability. At the
end of the day, all of our actions must enhance the security of the
United States, our most solemn responsibility.
The role of our Nation's nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and
stability, and therefore the security of the United States, is
deterrence. Our deterrence strategy is predicated on the effectiveness
of six distinct facets that in the aggregate make our strategy
credible. These six facets are weapons, delivery systems, threat
warning, nuclear command and control (NC2), weapon production, and
industrial base. I will briefly discuss each of these.
Weapons
Nuclear weapons remain fundamental to our deterrent capability.
Increasing the safety, security, and long-term confidence in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal remains a top priority. However, the weapons we rely on
today for deterrence were designed for short operating lives in a
different era with different safety and security requirements. While
individual components may last for years, combining the components in a
radioactive environment has effects that we cannot fully predict. As
recently noted in government review of the stockpile assessment, our
current approaches to delivery system sustainment are not tenable over
the long term and, for the weapons themselves, they are also not
tenable if we desire to implement improvements to safety and security
features.
As we ramp up to full-rate W76-1 production, we must also address
promptly the B61 warhead life extension. By doing the B61 nuclear life
extension now along with the funded non-nuclear life extension, we have
an opportunity to save cost by avoiding a second life extension in the
2020s while increasing confidence in the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile consistent with the President's vision.
We must act now to fit the life extension within the narrow window of
opportunity in the production complex.
We must also begin exploring sustainment options for the W78
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and W88 SLBM warheads. The
Strategic Posture Commission noted that any options would require some
combination of refurbishment, reuse, and replacement, with decisions
best made on a case-by-case basis. The Nuclear Posture Review is
examining the appropriate policy guidance for considering future
choices between refurbishment, reuse, and replacement. A recent study
by the JASON Defense Advisory Group concluded that only reuse or
replacement options allow for the inclusion of intrinsic surety
features that would be the last line of defense against unauthorized
use. I urge you to support life extension studies requested this year
to best inform the administration and Congress for future decisions.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 created
the Stockpile Management Program to increase safety, security, and
long-term effectiveness of the U.S. stockpile without nuclear testing.
I believe we can meet the goals of this program without seeking new
military capabilities or resorting to nuclear testing. Reductions in
the number of warhead types and in the size of the hedge stockpile are
also possible.
Delivery Systems
The triad of diverse and complementary strategic delivery systems
has supported our national security objectives in the past and will
continue to do so well into the future. STRATCOM is actively working
with the Services to validate proposals to recapitalize and modernize
our forces. Our ICBM force celebrated its 50th birthday in 2009 and
remains the most responsive and cost-effective leg of the triad. The
Air Force is concluding a decade-long modernization effort to sustain
the Minuteman III through 2020 and is continuing the necessary steps to
meet the congressional mandate to sustain the system through 2030.
STRATCOM actively supports current life-extension programs and is
working closely with the Air Force to determine the requirements of our
next land-based strategic deterrent system. The Navy's SLBMs constitute
the triad's most survivable and assured response element. A stealthy
delivery platform and a highly reliable weapon system have proven an
effective strategic deterrent combination, and STRATCOM supports the
Navy's efforts to design a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarine and sustain the Trident II D5 ballistic missile to
meet future deterrent requirements. Finally, our Nation will continue
to require a nuclear-capable bomber's inherent flexibility to address a
variety of possible adversaries and contingencies. STRATCOM supports
the Air Force's efforts to sustain and modernize mission-critical B-2
and B-52 systems. We are also working with the Air Force to identify
requirements for the next manned, nuclear-capable, long-range strike
platform and air-delivered standoff weapon.
Threat Warning
Another key element of credible deterrence is threat warning that
provides attribution. For decades, the Defense Support Program (DSP)
and our early warning radars have provided the essential data necessary
to ensure timely and informed decisions. They provide prompt and
accurate data to the President and combatant commanders for detection,
identification, and predicted impact point of ballistic missiles.
Sustainment of our early warning radars and fielding of the Space Based
Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) geosynchronous constellation are essential
to maintaining timely threat warning and attribution. However, though
SBIRS was originally programmed to launch in 2002 as a replacement for
DSP, we have not yet launched a single SBIRS satellite, and current
schedules forecast that the first will not be ready before December
2010. I encourage your continued support to ensure the successful
deployment of this system.
NC2
For deterrence to be effective, potential adversaries must know
that the President can direct our nuclear forces under all
circumstances. This requires a reliable and secure NC2 architecture.
Our NC2 systems deliver warning and attribution information, provide
for positive control of nuclear forces, and ensure our ability to
employ nuclear weapons per Presidential direction. To remain effective
in the most hostile nuclear environment, our NC2 relies on resilient
satellite communication constellations (MILSTAR and its replacement,
the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)), cryptographic
protection, and hardening. Many of our current NC2 systems were built
during the Cold War and therefore require new investment for upgrades
or replacement. Additionally, continued delays in procurement of AEHF-
related equipment are a concern. The vital task of fielding modern and
survivable NC2 systems is worthy of your full support.
Weapons Production
The Strategic Posture Commission and JASON noted that regardless of
which life-extension options we choose for existing warheads, success
relies on maintaining and renewing expertise and capabilities in
science, technology, engineering, and production techniques unique to
the nuclear weapons program. The National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) aging infrastructure limits its sustainment
capacity, forcing all life extension activities into a tight,
sequential, and delicately balanced timeline that incurs undue risk.
Moreover, our nuclear weapons design and manufacturing workforce is
both aging and shrinking due to a lack of meaningful work, unstable
funding, and the perception that nuclear weapons work is not important.
The custodians of America's nuclear deterrent--NNSA and its National
Laboratories--have long labored in deteriorating plutonium and uranium
facilities that date to the Manhattan Project and that the Strategic
Posture Commission termed ``decrepit.'' Decrepit is unacceptable. We
owe our people at NNSA and the National Laboratories better. We owe our
Nation better.
To sustain the nuclear deterrent and successfully execute the
Stockpile Management and Stewardship Programs, we must invest in new
plutonium and uranium facilities, strengthen the science, technology,
and engineering base needed to sustain and certify the stockpile, and
seek out and develop our very best scientists and engineers. The
President's 13 percent increase in requested NNSA funding represents a
long-overdue investment in the nuclear complex and its people. I
strongly urge you to support this request.
Industrial Base
Industrial base challenges complicate the sustainment of current
and the development of future delivery systems. An inability to produce
items such as solid rocket motors and advanced navigation and control
systems would threaten our ability to maintain strategic platforms.
Perishable skills and technologies are required to sustain current
systems beyond their expected life span and to develop the systems
required for the future. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requirement to
develop a SRM industrial base plan is an important step toward ensuring
essential skills and capabilities in that portion of the deterrent
industrial base, and we look forward to the results of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense led task force chartered to fulfill this
direction. Sufficient funding to sustain a responsive industrial base
is a critical element of maintaining the credibility of deterrence, and
we ask for continued congressional support.
global strike
A limited, credible conventional prompt global strike capability
would provide the President a broader range of non-nuclear options to
address emerging threats rapidly. However, we continue to lack the
ability to promptly deliver conventional effects against targets in
denied or geographically isolated areas. As we continue to make
progress through research, development, test, and evaluation
subprojects, I ask for your continued support for a PGS capability that
will be carefully sized to avoid perturbing our strategic relationships
with Russia and China.
space
Operations in the space domain continue to enable an increasing
number of capabilities that are essential to military operations, as
well as the U.S. and global economy. At the same time, events during
the past few years have reminded the world that space is no longer a
pristine or unchallenged domain, but one that is subject to
consequential mishaps, whether malicious or unintended. This was
apparent in the aftermath of last year's Iridium/Cosmos satellite
collision, which removed any uncertainty about the destructive threat
of space objects. We need sustained investment to provide comprehensive
SSA, actionable collision avoidance (conjunction) analysis, robust on-
orbit space constellations, and modeling and simulation capabilities.
The importance of SSA to effective and sustained space operations
grows each day. Trackable space debris grows each time existing debris
collides or breaks apart, new objects enter orbit, or our sensors
improve to reveal increasingly smaller objects. Despite significant SSA
investments and advances to ensure our freedom of action in space,
debris growth (4,600 objects in 1980; more than 21,000 today) continues
to outpace SSA upgrades. This places a new urgency on improving SSA
sensors and the technical and human capital resources performing
collision avoidance analysis. In addition to maintaining critical
legacy capabilities, new investments must focus on sensors, data
fusion, network linkages, and our human capital base.
Most of today's sensors reside on legacy missile-warning platforms
in the northern hemisphere. This coverage remains important but is
inadequate for today. We must continue to work with international
partners to expand the few sensors that make up our current capability.
Further, we must provide space operators the same situational awareness
we expect in every other domain, along with the tools and information
to operate and protect national assets. The next generation of SSA
sensors will provide coverage from space itself--a new vantage point.
The Space Based Surveillance System will provide such coverage, and we
continue to support this important step forward.
A noteworthy SSA advancement began when Congress authorized the Air
Force's pilot program on the desirability and feasibility of providing
collision avoidance data to commercial and non-U.S. Government
partners. After the successful development of the Commercial and
Foreign Entities (CFE) program, DOD transitioned operational
responsibility for CFE from the Air Force to STRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) in 2009. JFCC
Space's Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base now
provides important data to prevent collisions between satellites,
manned space craft, and debris. In this effort, cooperative
relationships between DOD and owner-operators are essential to
developing behavioral norms for responsible space-faring nations.
STRATCOM will continue to refine collision-avoidance measures, sponsor
agreements with space-faring nations and commercial entities, and
foster greater mutual support through allied and partner engagements.
Another consequential area of space interest lies in how we manage
the sustainment of our current constellations. The past decade's strong
focus on improving efficiency and cost effectiveness now threatens the
uninterrupted delivery of several essential capabilities, as
requirements for increasingly complex and efficient systems push
delivery timelines to the future, exhaust our stock of replacement
vehicles, increase costs, and leave capabilities at risk. We worked
closely in the last year with a variety of independent commissions,
studies mandated by Congress, and DOD examinations that revealed
shortfalls in capacity and capabilities in the next 5 to 7 years.
Program schedule delays, cost overruns, dwindling inventories, and over
confidence derived from our highly successful launch record could
create the circumstance where just a single launch failure creates a
capability gap.
Lastly, effective 21st century space operations will depend on our
ability to accurately model the environment and employ simulators for
training our operators. Modeling and simulation capabilities provide
operators the ability to experiment, fail, adjust, and try again with a
mere fraction of the resources. Once a robust simulation capability
exists, new and increasingly complex exercises can demonstrate
successes and vulnerabilities, facilitate new tactics, techniques, and
procedures, and dramatically expand our understanding of, and ability
to operate within, the space domain. The ability to experiment with new
platforms and capabilities will enhance U.S. freedom of action and
further improve U.S. space operations in a way that further aligns
space and space-based capability requirements with those in every other
domain.
cyberspace
Interest in the cyber domain grows daily. Most of this is positive,
as technology connects the world and enables commerce, communication,
transit, and research in ways never before imagined. The practical
reality of Moore's Law \2\ is a world where many technological
platforms seem obsolete just as they are widely fielded. Unfortunately,
as Secretary of State Clinton noted in January, ``these technologies
are not an unmitigated blessing.'' We can anticipate that adversarial
actors will make cyberspace a battle front in future warfare. Even
today, intrusions and espionage into our networks, as well as cyber
incidents abroad, highlight the unprecedented and diverse challenges we
face in the battle for information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Moore's Law, named for Intel co-founder Gordon E. Moore, is the
observation that processing speed and memory capacity for commercially
available computers tend to double about every 2 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2009, the administration finished a detailed Cyberspace
Policy Review. It concluded that ``the architecture of the Nation's
digital infrastructure . . . is not secure or resilient'' and ``without
major advances in the security of these systems or significant change
in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the United
States can protect itself.'' Both the White House's Cyberspace Policy
Review and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency concluded that
national cyber security requires dramatically enhanced policy and
operational coordination. These reports highlighted the need for a
uniform, rapid, dynamic, and machine-speed approach. Such an approach
demands a culture of responsibility and an ``always-on'' enterprise
infrastructure to support global employment of our military forces.
STRATCOM is responsible for operating DOD information networks,
planning against cyber threats, advocating for new capabilities, and
coordinating with other commands and Agencies. I noted last year that
cyberspace is our least mature line of operation, and it is likely to
remain so for some time, as cyberspace presents new and unique
challenges and opportunities. Cyber operations revolutionize the way we
move information, conduct commerce, and fight wars. We have had
technological revolutions before, most notably a century ago when
people first took to the skies. Some wondered why we would ever need to
fly, but no one today can imagine life without air travel or national
security without air forces. In the 1970s, few people felt they would
ever need a personal computer, but a network outage today is a serious
concern for the largest corporations, the smallest businesses, and most
American households. Just as the United States mastered the air domain,
we will continue to strive to preserve our freedom of action in
cyberspace.
Significant change seldom comes without a seminal event. In the
strategic and space arenas, we have experienced nuclear procedure
issues, the Iridium-Cosmos satellite collision, and China's Anti-
Satellite weapon tests. Last year, the cyberspace domain had just such
an event as DOD information networks experienced a serious intrusion,
resulting in a ban on removable media and other corrective actions. The
event identified best practices and shortcomings in network security
procedures and hardware accountability, causing us to ask not just what
we knew about network health but how we knew it--and whether that
information was reliable. Our forces developed new network monitoring
and evaluation systems and grappled with the security needs of
sprawling networks where low cost and efficiency have often taken
priority over security. Cyberspace weaves through our lives in ways
that make network problems a concern for everyone. Each and every
individual user is a critical element of cyber defense.
Our national defense capabilities are now underpinned by the
assured availability of the enterprise IT infrastructure and our
command-and-control and information-sharing systems. These constitute
the DOD information networks. STRATCOM must continue to defend while
actively improving DOD information networks--interdependent
imperatives--with new and expanded cyber capabilities. The networks
requires improved defense-in-depth measures from the perimeter down to
individual users, like the Host-Based Security System (HBSS), and a
shareable, common operating picture that allows for the free flow of
information among the combatant commanders, Services, and Agencies.
Additionally, we require continued congressional support for
critical DOD programs and initiatives through which we build, operate,
harden, and assure robust and resilient command-and-control and
information-sharing systems. These programs and initiatives include
globally diverse terrestrial and satellite communications networks,
emerging commercial satellite communication capabilities, and the
globally available enterprise IT services that reside on them.
global synergy--joint enabling missions
Integrated Missile Defense
Many rogue actors consider terror, blackmail, and weapons of mass
destruction to be increasingly attractive capabilities. The recently
completed BMDR notes the growing threat of ballistic missiles as they
become more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate from
greater ranges. Countering the growing desire among many states for
such cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power requires
sustained and carefully designed missile defense investments.
As the lead combatant command for missile-defense advocacy,
STRATCOM continues to work closely with the Services, Missile Defense
Agency, and the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to shape
investments. Improvements in sensor and shooter platforms, including
upgrades to the Aegis weapon system and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3),
production of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and
fielding of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based X-band radar provide more
effective capabilities for our geographic combatant commanders.
However, these advances have required an increased focus at STRATCOM
and within the MDEB and Global Force Management processes on how best
to satisfy the requirements of multiple geographic combatant commanders
while appropriately balancing theater and homeland defense efforts.
Strong congressional support is enabling the rapid fielding of regional
systems.
One of the most significant recent missile defense developments is
the administration's Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense.
Given necessary funding and timely fielding, PAA offers an effective
and flexible way to address the growing Iranian threat. PAA also
addresses the most urgent threats first with proven, cost-effective
platforms as we continue to defend our forward-deployed forces and
allies. It also requires that missile defense becomes an increasing
part of our international cooperation efforts. The total effect of PAA
will provide significantly more capability to counter today's regional
threats and improve our ability to defend the United States against any
future Iranian ICBM.
A defensive system, however, will be ineffective if not supported
by accurate and timely warning and intelligence. Ballistic missiles and
space launch vehicles share significant similarities, making launch
characterization--the ability to rapidly determine a vehicle's
ballistic or orbital trajectory and therefore its intent--essential to
recommending appropriate pre-launch postures and post-launch actions.
STRATCOM's ongoing efforts to refine this capability include sensor and
communications upgrades and analytical expansion. As noted above, we
face ongoing challenges to sustaining our missile warning
constellation's long-term health. The SBIRS geostationary orbit
satellite constellation is critical to any missile defense
architecture. Additionally, the two Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) demonstrator satellites launched in late 2009 will
validate key concepts for a future missile defense satellite
constellation. The STSS has the potential to greatly improve our
ability to detect, track, and defeat ballistic missiles.
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
The specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of
terrorists poses a threat to the United States, our allies, and global
security at large. STRATCOM is responsible to synchronize DOD-wide
planning for counter-WMD (CWMD). Our CWMD campaign plan framework,
detailing linkages between military strategic objectives and desired
effects, has become the CWMD planning standard for geographic combatant
commands.
To further enhance regional combatant commander and interagency
planning, STRATCOM has developed a Joint Elimination Coordination
Element in order to support WMD elimination efforts. This unit will
also support DOD efforts to establish a Joint Task Force-Elimination
headquarters to provide specialized command and control for WMD
elimination operations. Additionally, STRATCOM has advanced the
development of the Interagency CWMD Database of Responsibilities,
Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) system to inform planning,
training, advocacy, and other partnerships across the government.
Further, we lead semiannual Global Synchronization Conferences to
enhance CWMD planning across other commands, the broader whole of
government, and our key allies and partners.
To improve the Nation's existing capabilities for nuclear forensics
and attribution, we are sponsoring a Joint Capabilities Technology
Demonstration for National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF). It is
designed to improve existing air- and ground-sample collection
capabilities. In coordination with U.S. Joint Forces Command, we have
conducted a series of experiments to determine the best uses of active
interrogation technology to extend the detection ranges of our nuclear
and radiological passive detectors. DOD has proposed additional CWMD
funding in its fiscal year 2011 budget for DOD nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, and consequence management programs to accelerate
the closure of capability gaps. This additional funding would be
applied to nuclear and biological threat reduction; combating nuclear
terrorism; nuclear search, detection, and forensics; technical
reachback and planning support for the combatant commanders; and
integration of CWMD technical, operational, and intelligence expertise
for improved WMD threat anticipation and response. We fully support
these investments and the efforts of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA).
Finally, the STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC WMD) plays a
key role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a proven
counterproliferation architecture. This past year SCC WMD supported the
embedding of PSI activities into a number of combatant commands'
exercise programs, developed international PSI training scenarios, and
published the first PSI exercise planning handbook. We look forward to
accelerating exercise engagements and increasing our focus on potential
sources of proliferation.
information operations
With the exception of psychological operations (PSYOP), STRATCOM
plans, coordinates, supports, and advocates for information operations
(IO) across geographic combatant commands' areas of responsibility. We
execute these responsibilities through our joint components: JFCC NW
and JTF GNO for cyber operations; and the Joint Information Operations
Warfare Center (JIOWC) for electronic warfare (EW), military deception
(MILDEC), and operational security (OPSEC).
This year, we will participate in reviews of joint and Service
doctrine to evaluate and assess how we conduct warfare in the
information environment. Additionally, we are conducting a Strategic
Communication Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), as tasked by the
JROC. This CBA will identify requirements and capability gaps among the
combatant commands and Joint Staff, including perspectives from the
intelligence community, in order to standardize terminology and to
resource appropriate DOD strategic communication capabilities.
A wide range of military operations depend on unfettered access to
the electromagnetic spectrum. For several decades, forces have taken
advantage of relatively uncontested access to the electromagnetic
spectrum, but spectrum requirements are growing not only for DOD
missions but across Federal agencies, state, and local governments and
commercial industry. Further, rapidly expanding spectrum usage and
technology evolution now threaten to impede our ability to conduct
successful military operations. As regions of the spectrum continue to
be crowded by commercial and scientific entities and other nations, the
warfighter's electromagnetic maneuver space will become more
restricted. Future spectrum policy and use must carefully consider and
balance national and economic security interests to enable commercial
growth while protecting the equities of DOD and Federal agencies.
To address these accessibility concerns and to preserve essential
information transfer capabilities, the JROC approved the STRATCOM EW
CBA. STRATCOM also produced a follow-on Initial Capabilities Document
(ICD) that identified capability gaps and potential solutions. The ICD
also emphasized the need for focused leadership in the EW area and a
comprehensive joint investment strategy. In the coming year, and in
conjunction with federally funded research and development centers,
STRATCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command will study approaches to
responding to emerging electromagnetic threats. This review is intended
to identify organizational and management approaches that will enable
timely, prioritized, and effective EW resourcing decisions.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Over the past decade, geographic combatant commanders' requirements
have increased ISR demand, as highlighted in Iraq and Afghanistan. New
and irregular threats reshaped the battlefield and the information
required to operate successfully. Today, rapidly increasing
capabilities to support the warfighter remain a key geographic
combatant commander priority. Determining the appropriate ISR force
size is important, given limited resources and dynamic theater needs.
STRATCOM is leading efforts to develop an ISR force-sizing construct
for the Department. This initiative will develop a sound analytical
foundation for future ISR allocation and procurement decisions.
To date, DOD has rapidly expanded ISR platform acquisition and
fielding, thereby broadening theater access to intelligence. To
complement this initiative and as a key facet to meeting the rising
demand for ISR products, DOD is also expanding our processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities. Rapid collection-
capability growth challenges our ability to transform raw data into
information of intelligence value and to disseminate it to combat
forces in a timely fashion. STRATCOM continues to advocate for needed
PED capabilities with the Services and combat-support agencies and is
also developing methods to align ISR allocation with PED capacity to
ensure collection effectiveness and to better integrate existing
resources. Finally, new assets and new challenges require bases from
which to access many regions, such as USAFRICOM's Camp Lemonnier,
Djibouti. This important facility deserves sustained support because it
provides access to multiple countries and the Horn of Africa while
enabling the employment of air and naval assets supporting DOD
operations in the region.
As new ISR capabilities come on line, we must transition legacy
capabilities to new systems. The Air Force has fielded the first Global
Hawk in theater, but challenges remain before it could replace today's
U-2 capability. Chief among these is sufficient wideband satellite
communications to permit necessary throughput in the Global Hawk
communications architecture. STRATCOM is working to make sure that a
comprehensive communications capability is capable of providing
worldwide support prior to the U-2 retirement.
Whether making carefully nuanced deterrence recommendations,
evaluating space capabilities, understanding the new and dynamic
cyberspace domain, or sustaining our superior strategic capability
knowledge base, intelligence provides operational context fundamental
to every commander's decision calculus. Since I assumed command of
STRATCOM in the fall of 2007, my intelligence directorate has done
tremendous work using limited resources to support our three lines of
operations and our enabling missions. Recently, we received a modest
but essential increase in intelligence billet authorizations to
establish the STRATCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center. This
important investment will increase our headquarters capabilities to
provide the level of strategic intelligence we require and to
distribute appropriate capabilities to several of our components. We
are also working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence to establish a second Joint Intelligence Operations Center
to support CYBERCOM. We appreciate continued congressional support for
these initiatives.
conclusion
STRATCOM continues to enhance our ability to deliver global
security for America each and every day. We have re-emphasized the
importance of our nuclear deterrence mission and proven America's long
held confidence in our nuclear forces, while also expanding
capabilities crucial to operating in the space and cyberspace domain.
We enable many space-based and cyberspace capabilities essential to
military operations and daily life by sustaining our freedom of action
in these domains. STRATCOM's uniquely global missions support national
objectives, whole-of-government solutions, regional requirements, and
enhanced cooperation with our international partners. While many
challenges remain in our increasingly interconnected and rapidly
changing world, STRATCOM is fully engaged to address them. We greatly
appreciate the support of Congress.

Chairman Levin. Before I call on Admiral Willard, let me
just say a word to my colleagues about a situation which has
existed for far too long, which I'm going to do my best to
correct this morning. I go to the floor at about 10:30, and if
we're still in session here at that time, Senator Lieberman was
kind enough to say that he would be able to take over.
We've had a general, who's been nominated for a second
star, who's been on the Senate calendar since October. His name
is General Michael J. Walsh. He was unanimously approved by
this committee. But, there's been a hold on his nomination, for
a totally unrelated issue. Senator Vitter has been the one--he
admitted--he acknowledges it, so I'm not disclosing anything
which isn't out there. But, it's unconscionable. This is a
military officer whose nomination--excuse me--whose approval of
a second star is being held up by one Senator, for unrelated
purposes. In about an hour, I'm going to go down and try and
get unanimous consent that that nomination come off the
calendar--that approval come off the calendar and be approved
by the Senate.
So, any of you who have some feelings on that subject, you
may want to say something to Senator Vitter, or to his office.
It would be appreciated.
But, I believe that the committee should be, and I think
is, united on this, by the way. I've talked to Senator McCain.
Senator McCain agrees with me. He will be joining me in my
unanimous consent request. But, I would ask any other members
of the committee who feel strongly enough about this to get
hold of Senator Vitter's office, please do so. Because, again,
I think that this committee's jurisdiction and our obligation
and responsibility to our men and women in uniform is really at
issue here if we can't get approval of a second star for a
fully qualified brigadier general to be a major general.
Admiral Willard.

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman.
So, that we can get to the committee's questions, I'll keep
my remarks brief, but I also ask that my full statement be
included for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Admiral Willard. Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and to discuss PACOM and
the Asia Pacific region.
Seated behind me is my wife, Donna, who's been at my side
for 36 years. She's an outstanding ambassador of our Nation,
and a tireless advocate for the men and women of our military
and their families.
Chairman Levin. Special welcome to her.
Admiral Willard. Thank you.
I also would like to thank you for your interest in our
AOR. I've either met many of you en route to the region or
followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and
interest sends a strong message throughout the Asia Pacific,
and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way
into the region, so my staff and I may brief you on the
security situation, or on your return trip, in order that I may
gain from your insights from your engagements.
Additionally, when in Hawaii, I'd be honored to entertain
you in the quarters of a former Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Command, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.
Today is my first posture hearing as the Commander of
PACOM. Since taking command last October, I've had the chance
to meet with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the
region, and exercise a few of our contingency plans.
When combined with my previous years of service in the Asia
Pacific, these experiences have led me to the following
conclusions, which I would hope we can expand on during today's
hearing.
The Asia Pacific region is vital to our Nation, and it's
quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe, due to its
economic expansion and great potential. Key to our commitment
in the region is our forward-deployed and postured forces. We
face challenges in building partner capacity under the current
patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our
security assistance efforts. The United States remains the
preeminent power in the Asia Pacific. Modernizing and expanding
our relationships with our allies and security partners is also
vital to maintaining stability and enhancing security in the
region.
China's growing presence and influence in the region create
both challenges and opportunities for the United States and for
the regional countries. China's rapid and comprehensive
transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional
military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia
Pacific region. Of particular concern is that elements of
China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our
freedom of action in the region.
Finally, India's strategic location, shared democratic
values, growing economy, and evolution as a regional partner
and power combine to make them the partner with whom we need to
work much more closely.
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, the Asia
Pacific is a region of great potential and is vital to the
interests of the United States. Every day, the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of PACOM are working
with our allies, partners, and friends to maintain this
region's security. Our success has been enabled by this
committee's longstanding support. You've provided us with the
most technically advanced systems in the world and with a
military quality of life worthy of the contributions of our
All-Volunteer Force. On behalf of more than 300,000 men and
women of PACOM, thank you for your support and for this
opportunity to testify on the defense posture of this Command.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Robert F. Willard, USN
introduction
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee,
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the United States Pacific Command and our area of responsibility (AOR)
in the Asia-Pacific. I am pleased to report that 2009 was a very
productive year for us and, through your continued support, we
anticipate 2010 to be the same. I also would like to thank you for your
interest in the AOR. I have either met many of you en route to the
region or followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and
interest send a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by
Hawaii either on your way into the region so my staff and I may brief
you on the security environment or on the return trip to share your
impressions from your engagements.
Today is my first posture hearing as the Pacific Command Commander.
Since taking command last October, I have had the chance to meet with
many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region and exercise a
few of our contingency plans. Based on that experience, I would hope
that we could expand our discussion on the following areas during my
testimony:

The Asia-Pacific region is vital to our Nation; it is
quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe due to its
economic expansion and potential.
Key to our commitment to the region is our forward-
deployed/postured forces.
We face challenges in building partner capacity under
the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to
support our Security assistant efforts.
The United States remains the preeminent power in the
Asia-Pacific. Modernizing and expanding our relationships with
our allies and security partners is vital to maintaining
stability and enhancing security in the region.
China's growing presence and influence in the region
create both challenges and opportunities for the United States
and regional countries.
China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of its
armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds
implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular
concern is that elements of China's military modernization
appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the
region.
India's strategic location, shared democratic values,
growing economy and evolution as a regional power combine to
make them a partner with whom we need to work much more
closely.

For over 60 years U.S. Pacific Command has helped provide a secure
environment within the AOR that has allowed the regional countries to
focus on developing their economies and building strong government
institutions. Today we see the benefits of these efforts as the global
economic center of gravity shifts into the region in alignment with our
own nation's interests. Consider the following achievements over the
past year:

On a combined basis, the Nations in the AOR had an
estimated GDP (on an exchange rate basis) of $15.1 trillion;
compared to total U.S. GDP of $14.3 trillion.
U.S. two-way trade in goods and services with
countries in the AOR totaled nearly $1.3 trillion.
In 2009, China surpassed Germany as the world's third
largest economy behind the United States and Japan.
Five of our ``Top Ten'' trading partners are now Asia-
Pacific countries.
The Strait of Malacca remains one of the world's most
strategic waterways with over 60,000 ships transiting annually,
carrying half of the world's oil and 90 percent of the oil
imported by China, Japan and South Korea--our second, fourth
and seventh largest trading partners, respectively. Due to the
cooperative efforts of the Nations bordering this waterway,
piracy has dropped from a high of 38 incidents a year in 2004
to just 2 in 2009.

In my travels and discussions with leaders in the region both as
the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and now as the Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command, I have found that our continuous regional presence is
not only welcomed, but strongly desired. Maintaining such a posture is
not a simple task given size and diversity of our AOR. For example,
sitting in my headquarters in Honolulu, I am closer to New York City
than Sydney, Australia. A soldier at Fort Lewis in Washington State is
closer to Kuwait City than he is to Bangkok, Thailand. These vast
distances make our forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces all
the more important if we desire to remain a highly effective influence
in the region. The abilities of the more than 140,000 men and women--
who represent our forward-stationed/deployed joint forces--to project
credible combat power serves as an effective deterrent to those who
would disrupt the Asia-Pacific security environment or threaten our
friends and allies. In no other region of the world is the requirement
for a properly postured, ready force with dominant high-end
capabilities more vital than in the Asia-Pacific. The forward forces
are the strongest statement of U.S. commitment to the region and any
reduction in their posture, readiness or capability is regarded as
waning interest and diminished U.S. influence.
The military and government leaders that I have spoken with have
also made it clear that we should not take our level of influence
within the region for granted. Many countries, most notably China, see
the same strategic opportunities that we do and are seeking to increase
their level of access and influence throughout the Asia-Pacific by
building and expanding economic, diplomatic and security relationships.
While we remain the current ``partner of choice,'' leaders consistently
tell me it's growing more difficult to be a U.S. partner given the
``constraints,'' such as limitations of our security assistance
programs that often accompany that partnership.
Among our most powerful programs for the region are the security
assistance programs that focus on building partner capacity in
security-related areas. These programs expose future leaders of other
countries to our values and culture through education and training;
present opportunities for nations to purchase U.S. military equipment
that enables greater interoperability in our combined operations; and
provide engagement opportunities for our best ambassadors, our young
servicemen and women, to develop relationships with the region's
military personnel and general populations. Unfortunately, these
programs have not evolved much since the end of the Cold War. As
reported by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), these security
assistance programs are constrained by a ``patchwork of authorities,
persistent shortfalls in the resources, unwieldy processes and a
limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period of
time.'' I agree with this description and fully support the
administration's efforts to reform and enhance these important programs
as essential to maintaining, and, in some cases, regaining our
competitive edge. I hope you will support the administration efforts in
this regard.
I would like to discuss in detail some of my priorities for the
region which include: allies and partners, China, India, North Korea,
and transnational threats.
allies and partners
Five of our Nation's seven mutual defense treaties are with nations
in the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to work closely with these
regional treaty allies--Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic
of the Philippines and Thailand--to strengthen and leverage our
relationships to enhance security within the region.
Australia
Australia remains a steadfast ally that is firmly committed to
enhancing global and regional security and to providing institutional
assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is particularly active
leading the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions
to global security are evident by their recently increased force
presence in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider,
Australia has committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize
Afghanistan.
Australia highly values advancing interoperability and enhanced
defense cooperation with the United States, particularly through
training events and acquisition programs. Last year, Talisman Saber
2009, a large scale biennial, bilateral combined arms exercise that
focuses on strengthening the U.S.-Australian military-to-military
relationship, enjoyed unprecedented participation (of 24,000 U.S. and
Australian military personnel). The exercise enhanced interoperability
and our collective ability to provide security in the region by
focusing heavily on combined command and control, amphibious
operations, close combat and combined arms, and joint and coalition
logistics. The U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate
extensively in many other areas including Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief (HA/DR).
Japan
Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy
in Northeast Asia. Despite some recent challenges related to U.S.
basing in Japan, the military relationship, as well as the overall
alliance, remain strong, as evidenced by Prime Minister Hatoyama's
recent pledge of support. That being said, we must make every effort--
particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance--to
remind the citizens of both the United States and Japan of the
importance of our alliance to enduring regional security and
prosperity.
U.S. Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Initiated by the U.S.
Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in
2002, progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the
execution of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment are critical next steps.
Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with Japan include:
relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier
airwing from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese
command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense
capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments;
improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces;
and adjusting the burden-sharing arrangement through the relocation of
ground forces.
The rebasing of 8,000 marines and their dependents from Okinawa to
Guam remains a key element of the Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based
marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa,
will sustain the advantages of having forward-based ground forces in
the Pacific Command AOR. Currently the Government of Japan (GOJ) is
reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the Futenma
Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marine Corps
aviation assets in Okinawa; an action which is directly linked to the
relocation of marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land
area to Japan. The GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review
by May of this year. The United States remains committed to the 2006
DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries.
The Japan Self Defense Force is advancing its regional and global
influence. In the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two
JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for
counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based refueling
mission recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by
providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and
humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable
future.
Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since
2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue their regular bilateral
interactions with the United States, and in some multi-lateral
engagements with the United States and our other allies, such as the
Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed the completion of
several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including
the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and control
relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to
maintain over $4 billion in annual Host Nation Support (HNS) to our
Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic
pillar of respective U.S. and Japanese alliance commitments.
Republic of Korea (ROK)
The U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional
strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our
efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this
alliance undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General
Sharp's testimony to provide the details of our relationship on the
Peninsula, but note that General Sharp's progress in handling the
transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military
has been exceptional as has his leadership of U.S. Forces Korea.
The transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance will ultimately assist
the ROK to better meet security challenges both on and off the
peninsula. The ROK currently maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in
support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has
provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, including
demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial
Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the
evolving trilateral security cooperation between the United States,
ROK, and Japan. Although there are still policy issues to be addressed
in realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial
resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address
complex contingencies throughout the region make this tri-lateral
partnership a goal worth pursuing.
Republic of the Philippines
The Republic of the Philippines (RP) is simultaneously conducting a
force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations,
and developing a maritime security capability. These efforts in turn
support important U.S. regional initiatives and contribute to a
stronger Philippine Government capable of assuming a greater role in
providing for its own regional security.
In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), U.S. Pacific Command continues to support Philippine Defense
Reform (PDR). Most significantly, the Philippines is actively working
to transition their forces from a focus on internal security operations
to territorial defense by 2016.
Lastly, USPACOM continues to support the AFP in their counter-
insurgency and counter-terror efforts in the south. 2009 marked some
notable AFP successes and we have seen that its momentum has carried
over to 2010.
Thailand
Thailand remains a critical Southeast Asian ally and engagement
partner. In addition, we appreciate Thailand's important global
security contributions to overseas contingency operations, counter-
narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations
(such as their upcoming deployment to Darfur).
In Thailand, U.S. PACOM forces enjoy unmatched access and support.
We recently completed the 29th Exercise Cobra Gold which we co-host
with/and in Thailand. Cobra Gold remains the premier U.S. Pacific
Command multilateral exercise which this year had 6 participants and
observers from more than 15 nations.
The United States and Thailand share important mutual goals on
democracy, regional stability, counterterrorism, and
counterproliferation. Thailand is a positive contributor to the
regional security environment and I am committed to strengthening and
broadening our alliance even further.
partnerships
Successfully managing the many security challenges in the region
depends upon a collaborative approach between like-minded nations who
appreciate the fundamental relationship between security and enduring
prosperity. U.S. Pacific Command expends significant time and resources
developing relationships with non-ally nations who understand the role
common cause partnerships play in the establishment of regional
security. While these relationships often begin or focus on narrow or
specific areas of shared interest, as trust grows and common values are
realigned, broader regional security contributions often result. U.S.
Pacific Command appreciates that strong bilateral relationships advance
in complexity and effectiveness on the basis of individual engagements
and according to capacities, capabilities, and a partner-nation's
desire and national interest. That being said, there is regional
security benefit provided by all of the partnerships we enjoy among the
36 Asia-Pacific nations.
An example of such a partnership--one that has matured
significantly in the past several years and one that contributes in
many ways to enhanced regional security--is the one we share with
Singapore. Initially a relationship focused on trade, maritime
security, and a modest U.S. logistics presence, it has since expanded
into other areas. In 2005, the relationship was formalized with the
signing of a security agreement which identified Singapore and the
United States as ``Major Security Cooperation Partners.'' Today
Singapore is one of our strongest security partners in the region,
hosting many of our transiting ships and deploying personnel, working
with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and commanding the multi-national,
counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden.
Our rapidly developing relationship with Indonesia--the largest
Muslim-majority democracy in the world--provides another excellent
example of a partnership of great importance to enduring regional
security. After years of limited engagement with the Indonesian armed
forces (TNI), the significant level of transparency and extent of
institutional reforms initiated by President Yudhoyono has provided
impetus to renew and advance our military relationship. Based on a
desire to contribute more to the regional security effort, the TNI now
plays a larger leading role in multilateral events and exercises that
focus on capabilities such as HA/DR and peace keeping. We are looking
forward to supporting Indonesia's developing security role in the
region, particularly as the administration builds towards a new
``comprehensive partnership.''
china
One cannot engage within the region without having a discussion
about the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's national strategy
remains primarily focused on economic development which emphasizes
domestic stability and maintaining an international security
environment conducive to continued economic growth. This new found
economic wealth is funding a military modernization program that has
raised concerns in the region over the lack of transparency into
Beijing's emerging military capabilities and the intentions that
motivate them--a concern shared by the United States. China's interest
in a peaceful and stable environment that will support the country's
developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving
military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of
action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its
neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners. Reconciling the
apparent gap between the PRC's statements and its observed military
capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining open
channels of communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue
with China's armed forces based on open and substantive discussion of
strategic issues. However, that type of frank and candid discussion
requires a stable and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military
relationship--a relationship that does not yet exist with the Peoples'
Liberation Army (PLA).
People's Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization
China has continued a rapid, comprehensive program of military
modernization with supporting doctrine and a professionalization of the
officer and enlisted ranks. This program of modernization has been
supported by a military budget that has grown annually by double digits
over the last decade. Beijing publicly asserts that China's military
modernization is ``purely defensive in nature,'' and aimed solely at
protecting China's security and interests. Over the past several years,
China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to
articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China's
immediate territorial concerns, but has left unclear to the
international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA's
evolving doctrine and capabilities.
The PLA has placed increasing emphasis on attracting and retaining
a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers.
Incentives include advanced training and education, as well as housing
and post-service employment preferences that should lead to a more
motivated, better trained and professional military capable of a
broader range of combined arms missions.
China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and
concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial
strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at
risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline. The PLA Navy is
continuing to develop a ``Blue Water'' capability that includes the
ability to surge surface combatants and submarines at extended
distances from the PRC mainland. Modernization programs have included
development of sophisticated shipboard air defense systems as well as
supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles.
China's leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In
1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet Kuznetsov class
aircraft carrier, which began renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in
Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and
likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.
China continues to field the largest conventional submarine force
in the world totaling more than 60 boats; while the quality of China's
submarine fleet is mixed the percentage of modern, quiet submarines in
the fleet is growing. This fleet also includes a number of nuclear
powered fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. China is also
developing a new submarine launched nuclear ballistic missile, the JL-
2, capable of ranging the western United States.
China fields a growing number of sophisticated multi-role fighter
aircraft, including the SU-27 and SU-30 purchased from Russia and
indigenously produced 4th generation aircraft. The PLA Air Force and
naval air forces have continued to focus on improving pilot and
controller proficiencies in complex, multi-plane combat scenarios,
including operations over water. The PLA has focused considerable
effort on building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has
deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 long
range surface-to-air missile systems along the Taiwan Strait. China is
also developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile
based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft
carriers.
Until recently, ``jointness'' in the PLA meant that different
services operated toward a common goal in a joint or combined campaign
with operations separated by time and distance. However, years of
observing U.S. military operations and modern warfare campaigns have
convinced PLA leadership of the need for greater integration between
services to include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level.
The PLA has adopted the concept of ``Integrated Joint Operations'' as a
goal for the Chinese military to allow it to conduct integrated
operations on a campaign level. Additionally, the PLA has placed
increased emphasis on training in more demanding conditions, such as
complex electromagnetic environments.
China's Strategic Capabilities
China maintains a nuclear force capable of ranging most of the
world, including the continental United States. This capability has
been enhanced through the development of increasingly sophisticated
road mobile delivery systems as well as the development of the Type 094
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (JIN-class SSBN). Despite
assertions that China opposes the ``weaponization'' of space, the PLA
is developing a multi-dimensional program to deny potential adversaries
the use of space, an element of which was demonstrated in January 2007
when China intentionally destroyed one of its own weather satellites
with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon.
U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue
to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated from
within the PRC. Although most intrusions focus on exfiltrating data,
the skills being demonstrated would also apply to network attacks.
China's Ongoing ``Sovereignty'' Campaigns
Beijing remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan, and
has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that goal. The PLA's
continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-
Strait military balance in Beijing's favor. The Taiwan Relations Act
provides that it is U.S. policy ``to provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States
to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the
people on Taiwan.'' At the U.S. Pacific Command, we fulfill these
obligations on a daily basis.
Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and
consolidation of self-proclaimed sovereignty limits, the PRC has re-
asserted its claims to most of the South China Sea and reinforced its
position in the region, including the contested Spratly and Paracel
Islands. The PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughout the region
and has shown an increased willingness to confront regional nations on
the high seas and within the contested island chains. Additionally,
China lays claim to the Senkakus, administered by Japan, and contests
areas on its border with India.
As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted
certain international laws in ways contrary to international norms,
such as the U.N. Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has passed
domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims.
U.S./China Military Relationship and Security Cooperation
U.S. Pacific Command is committed to the development of a stable
and reliable military-to-military relationship with the PRC, which is
critical to avoiding misperception and miscalculation and, ultimately,
building the type of partnership that leaders in both countries aspire
to. Although we are currently in a period of reduced engagement
activity due to the PRC's reaction to the notification of arms sales to
Taiwan, last year's military-to-military activities were highlighted by
exchange visits by senior leaders from both sides. During his visit to
Washington, DC in November 2009, General XU Caihou, Vice Chairman of
the Central Military Commission, agreed with Defense Secretary Gates to
further develop the military aspect of the U.S.-People's Republic of
China (PRC) relationship. U.S. Pacific Command looks forward to working
with the PLA on concrete and practical measures to strengthen our
military relationship in order to improve the security interests of
both the United States and China. These measures include senior leader
visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise observer
exchanges, a naval passing exercise, and a military medical exchange.
The PLA leadership has also shown a willingness to expand military
engagement to areas such as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, maritime
safety, and non-proliferation.
As the Executive Agent for the U.S.-PRC Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA), U.S. Pacific Command co-led senior
leader bilateral MMCA discussions last summer in Beijing. The MMCA
forum was initiated in 1998 and is intended to improve safety for
airmen and sailors when our Nations' vessels and aircraft operate in
proximity to one another. During the December 2009 Defense Policy
Coordination Talks held in Honolulu, both sides agreed to reinvigorate
the MMCA as a viable diplomatic mechanism through which we can manage
issues related to maritime and air safety.
india
The complexity, unique significance, and growing importance of the
U.S.-India Strategic Partnership warrant considering this nation apart
from the broader Allies and Partners focus previously discussed. Our
Nation's partnership with India is especially important to long term
South and Central Asia regional security and to U.S. national interests
in this vital sub-region. India's leadership as the largest democracy,
its rising economic power, and its influence across South Asia as well
as its global influence attest to its pivotal role in shaping the
regional security environment. We must continue to strengthen this
relationship and, while our near-term challenges in Central Command are
of great strategic importance, we must ensure the U.S.-India
relationship remains rooted in our extensive common interests of which
the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is only one. U.S. Pacific Command is
working hard to develop bonds that are trust-based, leverage our shared
values, and endure beyond current conflicts. Such an approach is
critical to taking advantage of the full potential of our relationship;
and to effectively collaborating on the wide range opportunities
available in an area of the world that is not only home to some of the
most contentious geo-political and transnational challenges, but also
to some of the most vital sea, air, and land lines of communication.
Our relationship has grown significantly over the past 5 years as
both countries work to overcome apprehensions formed during the Cold
War era, particularly with respect to defense cooperation. Resolution
of the long-standing End User Monitoring (EUM) issue removed a major
obstacle to a more robust and sophisticated defense sales program. To
date, for example, the Government of India has purchased Lockheed
Martin C-130Js and Boeing P-8I aircraft; expressed their interest to
acquire C-17s; and conducted flight tests of F-16s and F/A-18s (under
consideration in the medium multi-mission role combat aircraft
competition). The recent increase in defense sales, which exceeded $2
billion in 2009, not only enhances U.S. access to one of the largest
defense markets in the world, but more importantly enables greater
cooperation between our armed forces.
The complexity of our exercises and training events is increasing
and we are expanding our cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. We
currently engage together combating piracy in Gulf of Aden, countering
terrorism, enhancing maritime security, expanding POW/MIA recovery
missions, and conducting HA/DR events. One of our most notable
accomplishments was last year's bi-lateral Exercise Yudh Abhyas.
Located in India, it included the largest deployment of U.S. Stryker
vehicles outside of the Middle East. Such events offer unique training
opportunities, allow for increased personal and professional
interaction and relationship building, and improve our ability to work
together across a sophisticated range of operations.
We continue to search for new areas to cooperate as our
relationship develops. One area that has been prominently mentioned in
the QDR is managing the global commons. Threats in the maritime, air,
space, and cyberspace domains will be of increasing concern to both our
Nations; and we see many opportunities for U.S.-India cooperation to
address broad threats to the region's and the world's common areas.
As our relationship develops, U.S. Pacific Command remains mindful
of the significance of India-Pakistan tensions, particularly as they
relate to the broader security discussion and the management of geo-
political challenges that span Combatant Commands (Pakistan resides
within Central Command's AOR and India resides in the Pacific AOR). We
are keenly aware of the importance of a peaceful co-existence between
these two nuclear-armed nations and stand ready to assist with this
goal in conjunction with interagency partners.
north korea
As President Obama has said, ``the path for North Korea to realize
its future is clear: a return to the Six-Party Talks; upholding
previous commitments, including a return to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; and the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'' We remain convinced that
our strong bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, as well as our
growing trilateral cooperation, are critical to deterring the DPRK and
to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We continue
to work with our interagency partners to ensure military involvement in
relevant areas such as PSI, operations to enforce UNSC resolutions, and
multilateral non-proliferation exercises are synchronized with
diplomatic approaches and that they contribute to the transmission of a
clear and consistent message to the DPRK.
transnational threats
CounterTerrorism
U.S. Pacific Command has long employed a strategy of working ``by,
with, and through'' regional partners to combat terrorism in the
region. Our main effort, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Philippines (JSOTF-P), operates in support of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region.
The work of U.S. forces--advising, training, exercising, and
informing--in conjunction with the resolute commitment and impressive
abilities of AFP personnel, has resulted in great success. Over the
past year the AFP has captured or killed more than a dozen Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leaders. Perhaps more importantly,
the effort has resulted in enhanced quality of life and denial of safe
haven to extremists in the area.
Leveraging the lessons learned in Southeast Asia, and in concert
with our interagency and regional partners, we are developing plans to
combat extremism in South Asia. Our efforts there will undoubtedly
require a whole-of-government approach and a coordinated multi-national
effort given the extent of the problem and the variety of regional CT
organizations, responsibilities, authorities, and policies.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Our main effort to counter the spread of WMD is through support for
the State Department's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Fifteen
nations in the AOR have endorsed the PSI. Of particular note is the
success by Thailand to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874
last December when they intercepted 35 tons of illicit weaponry that
had originated from North Korea.
In October 2009, Singapore hosted the 38th PSI Exercise, Deep Sabre
II, in which U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel participated--with the
armed forces of 18 other nations--in maritime interdiction exercises
designed to enhance the capabilities and improve the coordination of
participating nations. We are looking forward to supporting future
regional PSI Exercises. Additionally, and in support of the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, we conducted Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defense and Consequence
Management bilateral working groups with Japan and the Republic of
Korea with the intent of improving interoperability and growing
regional capability and capacity.
northeast asia
Mongolia
A strong partner, Mongolia continues to demonstrate support for
U.S. regional and global policy objectives, while managing positive
relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia. The Mongolia
Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian Armed Forces with their
transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force
capable of contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions.
In support of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which
serves as the Executive Agent for MDR, U.S. Pacific Command implements
bilaterally agreed-to initiatives and priorities further the defense
relationship between the United States and Mongolia.
Members of the Mongolia Armed Forces regularly participate in
bilateral and multilateral for a such as the Pacific Army Management
Seminar, Pacific Rim Air Chiefs Conference, Chief of Defense
Conference, and NCO subject matter expert exchanges.
Mongolia continues to support peacekeeping and coalition operations
and, with assistance from the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI), continues to develop the Five Hills Training Center into a
national, and eventually, a regional peacekeeping training center which
hosts U.N.-certified training and component-level peacekeeping
exercises for regional participants. Every year, the Mongolian Armed
Forces partner with either U.S. Army Pacific or U.S. Marine Forces
Pacific to host KHAAN QUEST. Following 2 years as the GPOI capstone
peacekeeping exercise in 2006 and 2007, KHAAN QUEST remains an
important multi-lateral peacekeeping exercise.
Finally, I would like to add that Mongolia committed to deploying
800 personnel to Chad in late-2009 in support of the U.N., while
continuing to support the U.N. in Sierra Leone and other UN missions in
Africa. A strong supporter in U.S. overseas contingency operations, in
the fall of 2009, Mongolia deployed 200 troops in Afghanistan, with a
security company and a mobile training team under Operation Enduring
Freedom and a 40 soldier security detachment under the Germans as part
of the International Security Assistance Force.
Russia
U.S. Pacific Command coordinates all Russian security cooperation
activities with U.S. European Command to ensure the efforts of both
geographic combatant commands are mutually supportive. We seek
engagement with Russia in areas of mutual interest such as counter-
terrorism, peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue operations. U.S. Pacific
Command contacts were re-established in 2009 when the USS Cowpens and
USS Stethem conducted port visits to Vladivostok. These port visits
were symbolic of the historic and positive relationship that has
existed in recent years between U.S. Pacific Command and Russia's Far
East Command, particularly between our two navies. We plan to build on
the success of these port visits by continuing to engage Russia in
areas of mutual interest in accordance with the Military Cooperation
Work Plan.
southeast asia
Malaysia
Our military-to-military ties with Malaysia remain solid amidst a
warming bilateral political relationship and enhanced ties between the
U.S. and ASEAN nations. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command developed closer
ties to the Malaysian Joint Forces Command by participating in major
command post exercises and by supporting their forces to enhance their
capacity in maritime security operations. Malaysia maintains a strong
leadership role in the region by being tough on terrorism, serious
about maritime security, and committed to global peace and stability.
We will continue to expand our cooperation with Malaysia and address
our common security challenges.
Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the
region. The Cambodia Ministry of National Defense and Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces are seeking U.S. engagement opportunities. In 2009, U.S.
Pacific Command supported Cambodia's major initiatives of counter-
terrorism, maritime security, defense reform, HA/DR, and peacekeeping
operations. In 2010, we will continue to assist Cambodia on its Defense
Reform initiative; augment its counter-terrorism efforts with 1206
funding; and, together with Australia and Japan, work with their
defense establishment and interagency to achieve their maritime
security goals.
Laos
With the U.S. Defense Attache now in place, U.S.-Laos military-to-
military engagement is expanding. The Joint Task Force Full Accounting
recovery mission, led by the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC),
continues to be an important focus in developing U.S.-Laos military
relations. Laos has placed a priority on English language training to
enable greater training opportunities and participation in bilateral or
multilateral operations. In our bilateral defense discussions with the
Ministry of National Defense, both sides agreed to explore greater
engagement opportunities associated with military medical cooperation,
civil military operations, training and education, and counter-
narcotics cooperation.
Vietnam
As we prepare to mark the 15th anniversary of the normalization of
U.S.-Vietnam relations, our military-to-military relationship with
Vietnam continues to improve. Vietnam hosted several ship visits this
year including the Seventh Fleet Flag Ship, the USS Blue Ridge, and its
escort, the USS Lassen, whose commanding officer was born in Vietnam.
In support of JPAC, USNS Bruce Heezen, with embarked Vietnamese
scientists and personnel, conducted the first combined hydrographic
survey in Vietnamese waters, successfully identifying potential crash
sites. During his visit to Pacific Command last December, Vietnam's
Minister of Defense indicated a desire for activities that foster
greater understanding and cooperation in various areas such as disaster
management, conflict resolution, trafficking in persons, and improving
relations with its neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam's chairmanship
of ASEAN this year and its desire to take a more responsible role in
promoting peace and security in the region.
Timor-Leste
U.S. Pacific Command remains optimistic about the future of this
young democracy. The Government of Timor-Leste managed to maintain
control of the country and return home more than 10 percent of its
population who were living in IDP camps. Timor-Leste is working with
several other countries to begin critical institutional development
which includes the Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL). Although its
soldiers lack many basic capabilities, the F-FDTL leadership is
developing a recruiting and training program to establish a legitimate,
professional military.
U.S. Pacific Command's interaction with Timor-Leste increased
significantly in 2009, highlighted by our first military-to-military
bilateral discussions. The F-FDTL participated in the Marine Exercise
Marex 09, a multilateral exercise with Timorese and Australian Defense
Forces that concentrated on basic infantry skills and medical and
dental readiness. Although current engagement with Timor-Leste is
mostly in the form of medical and dental readiness exercises and
engineer assistance by U.S. Navy Seabees, we are hopeful that
engagements such as Marex 09 will form the basis of our relationship as
the F-FDTL develops into a professional military.
Burma
Beyond the significant issues associated with their human rights
record, Burma presents challenges to regional stability in a number of
other areas, including a maritime border dispute with Bangladesh,
narcotics trafficking, trafficking-in-persons, and potential for rapid
spread of pandemic disease. The recently completed U.S. Government
policy review and subsequent high level visits to Burma by senior-level
members of the U.S. Government have not altered our military engagement
with Burma. It remains essentially non-existent as a matter of policy
and public law. That said, U.S. Pacific Command is prepared to re-
engage in a military-to-military dialogue with the Burmese whenever
U.S. policy allows.
south asia
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
The conclusion of the Government of Sri Lanka's war against the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist group in May 2009
brought about an uneasy peace to Sri Lanka. Concerns over the welfare
of nearly 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) initially caused
the international community to pressure the Government of Sri Lanka to
better provide for the IDPs while expediting the return to their homes.
To its credit, the Government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to lower the
number of IDPs in camps to a current estimate of around 100,000.
As a consequence of allegations of human rights violations, all
U.S. military-to-military engagement with Sri Lanka was halted in
August 2009, with the exception of humanitarian assistance. In the
meantime, we await development of a U.S. Government strategy that may
include enhanced military-to-military.
Republic of Maldives
Since President Nasheed took office in November 2008, we have seen
a marked increase with Maldives' desire to interact with U.S. Pacific
Command. Maldives strategic location astride key shipping lanes in
addition to its archipelagic geography make it a key region for
maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Maldives requested U.S.
assistance in helping the Maldives National Defense Force transform
itself into a force more capable of defending against the threats of
terrorism, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking. In response to the
Government of Maldives' concerns that international terrorist
organizations were actively recruiting Maldivian citizens, we provided
assistance in development of a national intelligence capability
enabling quicker responses across various agencies of their government.
Nepal
The resignation by the Maoist Government in May 2009 resulted in a
political stalemate that continues to cast serious doubts as to whether
Nepal's Constituent Assembly can ratify a constitution by the May 2010
deadline. The Maoists, who still control a plurality of seats in the
Assembly, have staged numerous walkouts and demonstrations, effectively
impeding the Constituent Assembly and the constitution drafting
process.
Due to the potential for the current peace to unravel, U.S. Pacific
Command's focus is on humanitarian assistance and efforts to support
the peaceful integration of members of the Maoist People's Liberation
Army into the Nepalese security forces. Senior level dialogue and
defense sector reform events are the primary means to assist this
change. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command continues to assist Nepal in
the development of its peacekeeping operations and training
capabilities through GPOI. While PACOM is focused on humanitarian
assistance and peacekeeping activities, we are also noting an increase
in violence in the southern Terai region. These poorly governed areas
are susceptible to exploitation by terrorist groups in South Asia.
PACOM will continue to closely monitor this issue and stands ready to
assist Nepal in building its CT capacity.
People's Republic of Bangladesh
The return to democracy in Bangladesh, while a positive step, has
also resulted in occasional civilian-military tension that could
potentially destabilize this moderate nation of 150 million people.
U.S. Pacific Command has initiated several programs and events to
assist in promoting civilian-military trust, transparency and
cooperation.
Despite their political issues, Bangladesh continues to be a strong
partner who works closely with the United States to enhance regional
security. The establishment of a naval counter-terrorism force and
their hosting of a regional forum to counter violent extremist
organizations are examples of Bangladesh's commitment to improve their
counter-terrorism capacity. We also continue to work closely with
Bangladesh to expand and improve their peacekeeping, HA/DR and maritime
security capabilities.
oceania
New Zealand
New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns such as terrorism,
maritime security, transnational crime, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand is supportive of our overseas
contingency operations, deployed for the fourth round its Special Air
Service (SAS) special operations troops to Afghanistan and has extended
their commitment to lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan
Province, Afghanistan until September 2010.
While the New Zealand nuclear-free zone legislation and resultant
U.S. defense policy guidelines constrain some bilateral military-to-
military engagement, the New Zealand Defense Force participates in many
multilateral events that advance our common security interests. In
2010, New Zealand will be an observer in ``Rim of the Pacific''
(RIMPAC)--the Pacific AOR premier multinational naval exercise. Our
Marines continue to assist in New Zealand's efforts to integrate their
multi-role maritime patrol vessel into regional HA/DR operations.
New Zealand remains active in global security initiatives, from
stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to
operations in Korea, Sudan, and throughout the Middle East.
Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports our National
Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary
staging area for the multinational Operation Deep Freeze.
Compact Nations
U.S. Pacific Command values our partnership with the three Compact
Nations--the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. We meet our defense
obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association
through implementation of our Homeland Defense planning and
preparation. Additionally, we commend the professional Pacific Patrol
Boat crews and fully support each nation's initiatives to expand
operations to protect their valuable EEZ resources. We also recognize
the significant contributions of the proud citizens of these nations as
they serve in the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast Guard in Operations such
as Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
Guam
As a U.S. territory in a strategically important location, Guam is
host to a variety of U.S. Joint Forces, critically important Navy and
Air Force installations and the headquarters for Commander U.S. Forces
Marianas. Efforts are ongoing to simultaneously prepare for increased
Marine Corps presence on Guam, improve Navy and Air Force
infrastructure, and improve the quality of life for servicemembers and
their families stationed there.
u.s. pacific command organizations
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
While Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is not
subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command, it is a Department of Defense
academic institute that supports U.S. Pacific Command by developing
professional and personal ties among national security establishments
throughout the region. The Center's focus is on multilateral approaches
to security cooperation and capacity-building through its three
academic components: executive education, conferences, and research and
publications. In fiscal year 2009, 628 students joined the more than
4,000 fellows from nations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The
success of APCSS programs is regularly demonstrated through the courses
and seminars that the center offers, and its extensive networking
efforts (there are currently 45 alumni associations in as many
nations). APCSS builds its programs to address areas of mutual interest
and concern held by the United States and the countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) has the important mission
of achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from
our Nation's conflicts. Last year, JPAC successfully completed 69
missions globally and, in cooperation with 16 nations on 4 continents,
identified 93 Americans missing from the Vietnam War, Korean War, and
World Wars I and II. We expect another successful year in 2010 and are
projected to execute 75 missions. Of note, engagement with North Korea
remains suspended, but we are prepared to resume discussions and
operations as soon as conditions permit.
Joint Interagency Task Force West
Joint Interagency Task Force West's (JIATF-West) mission is to
conduct activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related
transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific by providing interagency
intelligence fusion, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing
partner nation capacity. The command was essential to several
significant victories this past year that included JIATF-West Tactical
Analysis Team support to law enforcement operations which dismantled
several transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-West also worked
directly with the Drug Enforcement Agency in the multi-ton seizure
operation of Asian precursor chemicals destined to methamphetamine
laboratories in Mexico and Guatemala.
With respect to capacity building successes in 2009, JIATF-West
supported the establishment of Vehicle Control Checkpoint (VCC)
facilities in Sikhiu and Chumphon, Thailand. These VCCs were
specifically set up to enhance border security and interdiction
capacity in a region known for illicit trafficking. Also this year,
JIATF-West executed 17 counter-narco-terrorism training missions which
trained 1,578 partner nation law enforcement officials from Malaysia,
Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam in ground and maritime
interdiction skills.
Although JIATF-West's authorities allow us to act against
transnational criminal organizations, inclusion of Indonesia and the
Republic of the Philippines under 1033 authority would allow us to
better support U.S. and partner-nation Law Enforcement Agencies. This
authority would allow JIATF-West to provide tools and training to
maintain operational maritime assets, and automated data processing and
information technology networking equipment for JIATF-West--constructed
interagency fusion centers.
programs
Security Assistance
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military
Education and Training (IMET), executed in partnership with the
Department of State and our embassy country teams, are powerful
engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing
countries. FMF--the program for financing the acquisition of U.S.
military articles, service, and training that support U.S. regional
stability goals--continues to demonstrate its worth. It has been
particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating
violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. The IMET
program--which provides education and training to students from allied
and friendly nations--also continued to provide lasting value to all
participants. The program is a modest but highly effective investment
that yields the professional and personal relationships that are so
important to regional security.
Science and Technology
The U.S. Pacific Command Science and Technology (S&T) Advisor
actively engages with Service and Defense S&T organizations to identify
potential solutions to operational problems that have a critical impact
on combat readiness. This advisor is also responsible for executing the
S&T Strategy in support of the lines of operation in our Theater
Campaign Plan. That strategy focuses on improving partnership
opportunities throughout the AOR and encourages cooperative S&T efforts
through the extensive use of OSD's Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) and Coalition Warfare Program (CWP).
Pacific Partnership
One of the U.S. Navy's newest cargo ships, USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-
AKE 4), successfully deployed to Oceania on a five-country, 3-month
humanitarian and civic assistance mission from June to September 2009.
The mission travelled, for the first time to Samoa, Tonga, and Kiribati
and returned for a second visit to Solomon Islands and the Republic of
the Marshall Islands. This annual deployment is designed to build
partner capacity and multilateral capability in medical, dental,
veterinary and engineering disciplines to enhance regional security and
better prepare participating organizations to respond to regional
crises. It is a remarkable multinational and multi-organizational
evolution that, this year, involved personnel from 14 nations and
countless international and host-nation Nongovernmental Organizations
(NGOs). In all, the mission treated more than 22,000 medical and dental
patients, conducted 116 community relations projects, and completed 17
engineering and infrastructure projects. This summer Pacific
Partnership will return to the region aboard USNS Mercy, the Navy's
West Coast hospital ship, to deliver help and hope to the people of
Indonesia, Timor Leste, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Pacific Angel
Pacific Angel employs the exceptional capabilities of the Pacific
Air Forces International Health Services to conduct humanitarian
assistance and public diplomacy in less accessible areas of South East
Asia. This unique C-17, C-130, and KC-135-based operation is designed
to increase public health capacity as well as cooperation and
understanding among the armed forces, NGOs, regional partners, and
peoples of Vietnam, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and the United States.
Assisted by partner-nation and NGO medical personnel, Pacific Angel
conducted six Medical Civic Action programs, cared for 14,978 medical
and 1,010 dental patients, and completed 6 engineering civic-actions
projects.
NDAA Section 1206
Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/
capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs
in the region. Last year U.S. Pacific Command contributed more than $31
million to the maritime security capabilities of Bangladesh and the
Philippines. In fiscal year 2010, we intend to build upon the
initiatives funded in 2009 and to expand counterterrorism capability/
capacity in South and Southeast Asia. Given the success of these
efforts to date, we very much support the President's request.
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60
days. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds
enable Pacific Command forces to respond quickly to those in need when
these inevitable disasters occur. Additionally, OHDACA-supported
activities promote interoperability and coalition-building with foreign
military and civilian counterparts, and improve basic living conditions
for populations in countries and regions that are particularly
susceptible to violent extremism. OHDACA projects offer a significant
and sometimes unique opportunity in the region; and have been
particularly helpful to decreasing the operating space of terrorists
and violent extremists. OHDACA is a critical element in PACOM's
comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in South Asia; specifically
in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Global Peace Operations Initiative
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is rooted in a G-8
commitment to address major gaps in peace operations around the world.
The global initiative aims to build and maintain the capability,
capacity, effectiveness of professional peacekeeping forces. Within the
Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Pacific Command's GPOI program leverages
existing host-nation programs, institutions, policies, and exercises.
We encourage long-term sustainment of qualified forces through a
``train-the-trainer'' approach, which enables standardization and
interoperability, and works within the framework of United Nations
guidelines. The GPOI program has been fully implemented by U.S. Pacific
Command in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal,
Thailand, and Tonga; and this year we will begin implementation in the
Philippines. Also in 2010, U.S. Pacific Command will co-host with
Cambodia the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone exercise
conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. We expect participation in this
exercise, Angkor Sentinel, more than 20 of our regional GPOI partners.
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is a
cooperative, multi-national effort to facilitate the rapid and
effective establishment of a multinational headquarters in response to
an HA/DR event in the Asia-Pacific region. The vision of the program is
to develop a cadre of multinational military planners from regional
nations. The MPAT effort--which currently involves more than 30
nations--works to provide coalition and combined expertise in crisis
action planning and seeks to develop procedures that promote
multinational partnerships and cooperation in response to military
operations other than war and small scale contingencies. Recent MPAT
events have focused on building capacity for response to humanitarian
crises and on developing standardized operating procedures.
challenges
Multi-National Information Sharing
The ability to exchange information among DOD components, all
levels of U.S. Government, coalition partners, and the private sector
is becoming increasingly important to regional operations; and
increasingly dependent on Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS)
efforts such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Informational Exchange
Cross Enclave Requirement Program and the Improved Connectivity
Initiative.
Joint Information Environment
Within DOD, Services IT architectures are often redundant or
incompatible. In an attempt to address this issue, U.S. Pacific Command
is partnering with the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Joint Staff,
all Services, and Industry to develop a Joint Information Environment
(JIE) that moves to a unified and integrated net-centric environment.
When realized, this environment will eliminate the need for Joint Force
Commanders to integrate networks; further, it will enable personnel
access to the information with a single log-on from anywhere on a DOD
network.
Cyberspace
U.S. Pacific Command faces increasingly active and sophisticated
threats to our information and computer infrastructure. These threats
challenge our ability to operate freely in the cyber commons, which in
turn challenges our ability to conduct operations during peacetime and
in times of crisis. U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with the newly
established U.S. Cyber Command and other Service and Agencies, is
working on solutions to detecting these attacks on our networks and to
responding to them in near real-time.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Given the size and nature of the Asia-Pacific region, effective
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is essential to
obtaining critical insights into the plans, capabilities, and intent of
our current and potential adversaries. We continue to work with the
National Intelligence Community, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and the Joint Staff to effectively address our
intelligence collection priorities, capability gaps, deployments of
assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information
to maximize situational awareness and warning.
Missile Defense
To defend U.S. forces, interests, allies and friends from short-,
medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, U.S. Pacific
Command seeks a forward-deployed, layered, and integrated air and
missile defense system capable of intercepting threat missiles
throughout their entire time of flight. Additionally, we are
coordinating with the Government of Japan to leverage the newest
Japanese systems--such as PATRIOT PAC-3, AEGIS SM-3 capable ships and
their associated radars.
Piracy
The U.S. Pacific Command continues to facilitate multilateral
efforts to improve regional and global maritime security, especially in
the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic regions of South East Asia, and
in the Gulf of Aden. In Southeast Asia, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted
the annual Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism exercise, which
is designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-
national coordination (participants included Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; Indonesia participated this past
year as an observer). Also of note is the cooperation between
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and most recently, Thailand, to patrol
the Malacca Straits, an effort which has contributed significantly to
reduced incidents of piracy in that vital choke point. Lastly, in the
tri-border area where Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia share
common maritime boundaries, terrorist freedom of action has been
curtailed as a consequence of improved maritime surveillance and
response capabilities procured using 1206 authorities.
Pandemic Influenza
U.S. Pacific Command maintains a robust pandemic influenza (PI)
response plan that supports force health protection, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Advise, and
Assess teams are available to provide assistance and to coordinate
additional support for U.S. States and Territories. Additionally, we
are postured to deploy teams to advise U.S. Country Teams and partner
nations on PI response and to assess infectious disease control and
surveillance programs, laboratories and response team capabilities.
This past year, we conducted more than a dozen PI-related events
that included bi-and multi-lateral exercises and subject matter
exchanges within our AOR. Highlights from the past year include the
Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense exercise Lightning Rescue 2009, which
tested the State of Hawaii's PI response and validated domestic
relationships and linkages to the U.S. Pacific Command PI plan.
closing
U.S. Pacific Command must be recognized as both an extension of
U.S. military power as well as a committed and trusted partner in the
Asia-Pacific. Our every endeavor must promote a region whose nations
are secure and prosperous. Throughout the AOR, we are fortunate to have
allies, partners and friends who willingly and effectively contribute
to regional security and who seek to advance their partnerships with
the United States on behalf of the 36 nations and 3.4 billion people
who reside in the Asia-Pacific region.
In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to the
Committee for the long-standing support you have provided our military.
Your efforts have provided our members with the most technically
advanced systems and with a quality of life that recognizes the
contributions our young men and women make to our Nation every day. On
behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the Pacific Command,
thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify on the
defense posture in the U.S. Pacific Command.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, we thank you so much. Thank you
for those comments, as well, about the work of this committee.
General Sharp.

STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, U.S. FORCES-KOREA

General Sharp. Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and
distinguished members of this committee, I really appreciate
the opportunity to report to you today on the state of the UNC,
CFC, and USFK.
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean war.
Since 1950, Congress and the American people have made an
enormous investment in blood and treasure to first defeat and
then deter North Korean aggression. The alliance continues to
reap the returns of that investment. The Republic of Korea
(ROK) bears the majority of the burden of defending itself, and
in 2012, wartime operational control (OPCON) transitions from
CFC to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
Beyond its borders, the ROK has become an important part of
the international efforts to keep peace and respond to
disasters. With significant forces deployed to Lebanon, Haiti,
the Horn of Africa, and on other missions, the ROK is fast
becoming a global strategic ally envisioned by the 2009 Joint
Vision Statement signed by Presidents Lee and Obama. With our
long-term commitment of 28,500 troops, we will continue to
deter aggression and maintain peace, not only on the Korean
Peninsula, but throughout Northeast Asia.
Last year, I spoke about my three command priorities.
Thanks to your support and funding, I am able to share with you
the progress that we have made since then.
First, the U.S. forces in the ROK-U.S. Alliance are
prepared to fight and win. I flew here directly from our annual
Key Resolve/Foal Eagle combined exercise. This exercise
demonstrated that the U.S. and ROK forces and staffs are
trained and ready to fight, tonight, on the Korean Peninsula.
Second, the ROK-U.S. Alliance continues to grow and
strengthen. Militarily, we will be prepared to transition
wartime OPCON to the ROK JCS on 17 April 2012. In last year's
Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, we successfully stood up and
tested many post-OPCON transition command-and-control
structures. Through our Strategic Transition Plan, future Ulchi
Freedom Guardian exercises, and the final certification
exercise, we will ensure the readiness of the ROK JCS to accept
wartime OPCON in 2012 and the ability for the U.S. Korea
Command to become the supporting command.
My third priority is improving quality of life for the
command personnel. We are making substantial progress here,
and, with Congress's support, we will be able to achieve all of
our goals. We are improving the quality of life through two
main key initiatives. The first is the relocation of U.S.
forces. By consolidating U.S. forces from 105 facilities that
we maintained in 2002 to 48 sites in 2 hubs, we will make
better use of limited resources and be better positioned to
support our servicemembers and families.
The second initiative toward normalization goes hand-in-
hand with the relocation. As we consolidate bases, we are
building the world-class facilities and housing that are
transforming USFK from a command where 1-year tours are the
norm to one where single servicemembers serve for 2 years and
those with families stay for 3. In the last 2 years, the number
of families in the Korean Peninsula has increased from
approximately 1,600 to 3,900. By keeping trained personnel in
Korea for normal lengths, we retain institutional knowledge,
create a more capable force, and are better able to support the
Alliance and deter aggression, and we demonstrate our
commitment to Northeast Asia. At the same time, we are
eliminating an unneeded unaccompanied tour and building the
strong families that are key to retention and effectiveness in
this time of ongoing conflict.
To close, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has never been stronger.
The Alliance has successfully deterred aggression on the Korean
Peninsula for 57 years. In doing so, it has helped make
Northeast Asia a remarkable--remarkably peaceful and prosperous
place. With the ROK contributing a substantial portion of the
Alliance's cost, we are maintaining the combat readiness and
improving the quality of life of our military personnel.
I thank you for supporting our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and DOD civilians, and their families, serving in the
great nation of Korea.
This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to the
committee's questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Sharp follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Walter L. Sharp, USA
i. introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United
Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined
Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK),
it is a privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and their families who serve our
great Nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these
outstanding men and women, thank you for your support of American
forces stationed in the ROK and your commitment to improving the
quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Your
sustained support allows us to deter aggression against the ROK and
promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which in turn
promotes peace and stability in the region of Northeast Asia and helps
protect the national interests we share with regional partners. I
appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of affairs on the
Korean Peninsula, my Command priorities, the plans in place for
organizational transformation of the commands I lead, and how this
change will strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.
This year we mark the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean
War, a 3-year conflict that resulted in millions of military and
civilian casualties and has yet to be concluded by a formal peace
agreement. This year my commands will support a host of ROK led events
to honor those who played a role in repelling North Korea's aggression
of six decades ago. Also this year we recognize the 57th anniversary of
signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Serving as a cornerstone
for the broader ROK-U.S. Alliance, mutual commitments under the treaty
have allowed the Alliance to deter aggression against the ROK and
promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast
Asia.
The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia--a
dynamic region that has significant national interests for the United
States. \1\ Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest
militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and
Russia).\2\ The region contains 25 percent of the world's population
and is an economic powerhouse.\3\ In 2009, Northeast Asia housed 5 of
the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8
percent of global gross domestic product during that year.\4\ Countries
in the region also accounted for 25.8 percent of U.S. trade in goods
during 2009.\5\ At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position
in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion.\6\
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\1\ The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the
following countries and special administrative regions: China, North
Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan.
\2\ In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the
world's six largest militaries during 2009 were: China (2.1 million
personnel); United States (1.54 million); India (1.28 million); North
Korea (1.2 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (687,000).
Personnel data obtained from The Military Balance 2009, produced by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
\3\ Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. Percentage is as of
July 2009.
\4\ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at purchasing power parity in 2009
for the economies of Northeast Asia were: China-$8.7 trillion; Japan-
$4.1 trillion; Russia-$2.1 trillion; ROK-$1.3 trillion; Taiwan-$693
billion; Hong Kong-$301 billion; North Korea-$40 billion (2008); Macau-
$18 billion; and Mongolia-$10 billion. GDP data obtained from the CIA
World Factbook.
\5\ U.S. trade in goods during 2009 was valued at $366 billion with
China, $147 billion with Japan, $67 billion with the ROK, $46 billion
with Taiwan, $23 billion with Russia, $55 million with Mongolia, $24
billion with Hong Kong, $446 million with Macau, and $900,000 with
North Korea. Trade data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.
\6\ The direct investment figure is on a historical cost basis and
was obtained from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Countries/special administrative region included in the
valuation are China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and the ROK.
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While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is
also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change.
Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access
to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose
difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional
states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in
the ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and
both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the
Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors
throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps
set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and
eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong
ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean
Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the
dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed
in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of
American armed forces requires strong security relationships with
allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-
term presence and sustained interaction.
ii. state of affairs in korea
Assessment of the ROK
Last month ROK President Lee Myung-bak marked the start of the
third year of his 5-year term in office.\7\ President Lee Myung-bak has
committed the ROK to taking on a more global orientation in its
policies and to assume a greater role in the international community.
Indeed, President Lee has made the development of a ``Global Korea''
one of five national goals for the ROK.\8\ Later this year the city of
Seoul will host a Group of 20 (G20) summit and at the end of 2009 the
ROK officially joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's Development Assistance Committee, pledging to nearly
triple its current level of official development assistance to a value
that will equal 0.25 percent of gross national income in 2015. The
ROK's commitment to assume a greater role in the international
community is evidenced by its participation in about a dozen
peacekeeping operations around the world, its plans to form a 3,000
person military unit that can be rapidly deployed in support of such
operations, and a general willingness to support international
stability and reconstruction operations such as in Haiti and
Afghanistan (where in Afghanistan the ROK will deploy a Provincial
Reconstruction Team later this year).\9\
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\7\ In the ROK, Presidents serve a single, 5-year term of office
without the possibility of re-election.
\8\ The other four national goals are to develop a government
serving the people, a lively market economy, active welfare, and a
country rich in talent. See the ROK Office of the President (Blue
House) Web site.
\9\ Peacekeeping operations include UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOMIL
(Liberia), UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIN
(Nepal), UNOCI (Ivory Coast), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMOGIP (India/
Pakistan), Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.
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In June 2009 the ROK Government released a revision to its National
Defense Reform 2020 plan. First written in 2005, the defense reform
plan aims to modernize and restructure the ROK military through 2020 so
that it is ready to address the future security environment and
challenges. The revised plan focuses on developing capabilities to
address North Korea's asymmetric threats (identified as its nuclear and
missile programs), successful transition of wartime operational control
(OPCON) to the ROK military, enhancing jointness, developing network
centric warfare capabilities, increasing managerial efficiencies to
include the extensive use of civil resources, enhancing the ability to
participate in operations sponsored by the international community, and
contributing to development of the national economy. The objective is
to develop an information and technology-intensive military force that
can cope well with a comprehensive set of security threats. As stated
by President Lee during his 1 October 2009 Armed Forces Day speech, the
ROK military must transform into a highly efficient multi-purpose
professional elite force that can support Korea's bid to carry out
roles commensurate with its growing international stature. Through 2020
the ROK plans on spending an accumulative 599.3 trillion won ($466
billion) on defense to include expenditures on this reform initiative.
I fully support the ROK's Defense Reform 2020 initiative and hope the
plan is fully resourced throughout the life of the program.
Assessment of North Korea
North Korea continues to be a threat to regional as well as global
security and prosperity. Over the past year, Pyongyang's foreign policy
alternated from provocative actions to a willingness to engage in some
forms of dialogue. North Korea tested its nuclear and missile
capabilities and continued attempts to proliferate conventional arms
and other materials in violation of United Nations Security Council
resolutions. Pyongyang has also maintained its aging but massive
forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea will remain a
serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the
U.S and the international community for the foreseeable future.
Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics
Kim Jong-il's strategic goal is the survival and continuance of his
regime. North Korea's efforts to build a nuclear arms program have
become the key component of its strategy to guarantee regime survival.
This program is now assessed to have enough plutonium for several
nuclear weapons. Nearly 16 years after the signing of the 1994 Agreed
Framework, Pyongyang continues to try to develop nuclear capabilities.
In 2009, it announced a second nuclear test, made public statements
about its plutonium reprocessing and weaponization activities, and
announced progress in uranium enrichment. These efforts, along with the
sustained development of a complementary missile delivery system, will
likely continue into the foreseeable future. North Korea appears to
desire international recognition as a nuclear weapons state, which the
United States, the ROK, and many members of the international community
(including five members of the Six-Party Talks) have made clear is
unacceptable.
On the domestic front, Kim Jong-il appears to have recovered from
an apparent stroke in the summer of 2008 and remains in full control of
North Korea. Over the past year Kim has systematically introduced his
third and youngest son--Kim Jong-eun--as the heir apparent. Meanwhile,
North Korea's ruling elite, whose privileged position apparently rests
upon continuance of the status quo, appears unwavering in its loyalty
to Kim Jong-il. The role of the military in Pyongyang's decisionmaking
apparatus appears to be more prominent, as highlighted by last year's
expansion of the National Defense Commission authorities. North Korea's
conventional and asymmetric military forces remain the guarantor of
Kim's power. The regime manufactures the perception of an external
threat--primarily from the United States--to maintain internal control
and justify its ``military first'' policy.
A Year of Pyongyang Provocations and Posturing
Last year, North Korea initiated a series of provocative actions
against the ROK, including announcing its unilateral nullification of
the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement, restrictions of ROK activity at
the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and threats against ROK naval
forces off the western coast of the Peninsula. Pyongyang in April
launched a Taepo Dong-2 and in May announced that it conducted a second
nuclear test in defiance of United Nations Security Council
resolutions. North Korea also launched multiple shorter range missiles
off its eastern coast, reversed disablement procedures at its Yongbyon
nuclear facility, announced the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to
obtain additional fissile material, announced its withdrawal from the
Six-Party Talks, and stated its intent not to abide by the 1953
Armistice Agreement.
In August, Pyongyang released two detained American journalists, a
detained South Korean KIC employee, and four detained ROK fisherman.
Pyongyang also lifted its earlier imposed KIC border restrictions and
allowed inter-Korean family reunions at Mount Kumgang. But in October,
North Korea launched more missiles, announced that its uranium
enrichment development program was in its final stages and that all
plutonium had been harvested and would be weaponized, and provoked an
inter-Korean naval skirmish.
North Korea's provocations during the first half of 2009 may have
been intended to test the resolve of the new administration in
Washington, create tension in ROK domestic politics, or set conditions
internally for the introduction of a regime successor. Of North Korea's
true intentions, we know little. But what is clear is that these
actions resulted in the North's further isolation--highlighted by
unanimous passage of additional United Nations Security Council
sanctions--and pressure to return to denuclearization talks from all
five parties, including China and Russia. After these events, North
Korea launched a ``charm offensive'' in the second half of 2009,
inviting foreign visitors and business interests to visit the country.
This has not yet led to any measurable progress towards the complete
and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.
Last year, North Korea's annual domestic food production remained
dismal, with the country dependent upon international assistance to
meet its basic subsistence requirements. Despite its serious economic
problems, Pyongyang reportedly continued to divert precious national
resources to its conventional and asymmetric military forces. At year's
end, North Korea announced a currency redenomination which appears to
have confiscated what little wealth might have been accumulated by
private farmers and traders and which many now regard as a failure.
Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive
army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial
threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that
could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in
damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by
attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple
theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus
resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite
food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile
capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat.
North Korea Threat Outlook
My number one concern will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts
to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of
these capabilities would threaten the United States, our regional
allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the
potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's
disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector,
insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and
developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership
change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable.
In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically
heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility
that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch
an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must
maintain the highest level of readiness.
iii. command priorities
I have established three priorities for the commands. These
priorities have remained constant and serve as the guiding principles
for all key initiatives pursued. The three priorities are: (1) be
prepared to fight and win; (2) strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance; and
(3) improve the quality of life for all servicemembers, DOD civilians,
and their families. I will address each of these priorities and the key
initiatives within each below.
Prepared to Fight and Win
My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain
trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are
prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces
stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was
established in 1978. Maintaining ``fight tonight'' readiness is the
primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the
alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK.
The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that
could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum
of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of
general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing
conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and
even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied
potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces
maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.
In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge
on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly
refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression
should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions
that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and
maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to
include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities
and ranges located in the ROK.
The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle
and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise
focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will
fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes
command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a large-
scale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic
deployment of American forces from bases in the United States as well
as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal
Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any
aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual
exercise--Ulchi Freedom Guardian--is a computer-simulated warfighting
exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and
control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime
OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012.
Maintaining ``fight tonight'' readiness can only occur when
training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum
of operations that characterizes today's complex operational
environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events
support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in
the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training
resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the
rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces
challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the
ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and
maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient
training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in
electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on
precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be
addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside
the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure
the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air
forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution,
however, and I continue to work with the ROK Government to find a
solution to this key training and readiness issue.
Strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance
My second priority is to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. This
supports the June 2009 ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement that commits
both nations to build an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and
prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region,
and the world as a whole.
The most significant Alliance strengthening initiative is the
transition to ROK-led defense on the Korean Peninsula. That is, the
transition of wartime OPCON. Following the transition of peacetime
OPCON in 1994, this initiative to transition wartime OPCON resumed in
October 2005, when the ROK President stated that the time had come for
Seoul to be responsible for its own defense. In early 2007, it was
determined that the ROK would assume wartime OPCON of its forces by
April 2012. Under OPCON transition, the ROK and United States will
disestablish CFC and stand up separate, but complementary, national
commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined
defense of the ROK. After OPCON transition the ROK Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) will become the supported--or lead--command and the newly
created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command.
OPCON transition will not result in independent OPCON nor require
independent, self-reliant ROK forces. It also will not lead to a
reduction in USFK forces or weaken the U.S. commitment to provide
reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the Alliance will
continue close strategic coordination and consultation to ensure the
appropriate capabilities are in place to meet future threats. The
United States will have the same commitment to the Alliance after OPCON
transition that it does now--to include the provision of extended
deterrence using the full range of military capabilities.
The combined roadmap toward OPCON transition is laid out in the
Strategic Transition Plan (STP). The STP summarizes 20 high level tasks
and associated sub-tasks and milestones needed to develop appropriate
ROK and U.S. organizations, plans, processes, and systems for the
future Alliance military structure. It is a methodical approach that
ensures the new command and control relationship between ROK and U.S.
forces will be even more effective than the current CFC construct. To
ensure that all tasks are completed to standard, a detailed
certification process has been established. Both American and Korean
external senior observers are being used to help evaluate the new
commands. These advisors use a detailed checklist to report to the ROK
JCS Chairman and U.S. KORCOM commander as well as to the U.S. Secretary
of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense during the annual
Security Consultative Meeting.
Additional evaluation and further development is conducted through
the Command theater exercise program. The Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG)
computer simulated warfighting exercise is the Command's preeminent
combined exercise to test, develop, and refine post-OPCON transition
command and control arrangements. Two UFG exercises have already been
conducted and two more will be held prior to a final OPCON transition
certification exercise in 2012. These exercises help ensure that the
new combined command structure will be trained and ready to fight and
win on the day of OPCON transition. The STP is on track as planned and
we are working hard to ensure that all conditions will be met for a
smooth OPCON transition on 17 April 2012.
The rationale for OPCON transition emanates from the tremendous
changes that have occurred in the ROK since the Mutual Defense Treaty
was signed in 1953. The ROK today is a secure democracy and a global
economic leader. By assuming the lead for its own defense, the ROK will
send a strong message not only to North Korea but to the rest of the
world that it has a strong, competent, and capable military that can
take the lead role in securing peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula. South Korean leaders have proven their ability to lead
forces in a changing regional and global environment. They are members
of a combined task force and are participating in United Nations
peacekeeping operations. Officers of the ROK military, who have grown
up in the Korean culture and are well versed with relevant operations
plans while also being familiar with the Korean Peninsula's terrain,
are best equipped to protect the Korean people. After OPCON transition
occurs, the ROK military will be fully capable of leading the combined
warfight in defense of its people and the United States will remain
committed to ROK defense through its supporting role.
Another key Alliance strengthening initiative was the conclusion of
a 5-year (2009-2013) cost sharing agreement in January 2009. Known as
the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), this cost sharing arrangement has
the ROK provide USFK with valuable labor and logistics services as well
as the design (paid for in cash) and in-kind construction of facilities
and infrastructure needed for daily operation of the Command. Under the
SMA, ROK support for the maintenance of USFK ensures that the Command
maintains its ``fight tonight'' readiness, a factor that helps deter
aggression against the ROK and preserves peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula. SMA contributions also help build the infrastructure
needed for a long-term U.S. force presence in the ROK. SMA funds help
stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of Korean national
employee wages, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction
contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that
host USFK facilities. During calendar year 2010 the ROK will provide
USFK with 790.4 billion won ($664 million) in cost sharing support.\10\
Future increases in the ROK cost sharing contribution through 2013 are
tied to changes in the ROK consumer price index.
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\10\ U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average
2010 won-$U.S. exchange rate of 1,191. This forecasted exchange rate
was obtained from the U.S. DOD.
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Finally, the Command's Good Neighbor Program continues to make
great progress in strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The purpose of
the program is to conduct community outreach events that engage and
connect the Command with the Korean community. Good Neighbor Program
events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the mission and
purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to
develop mutual understanding of one another's cultures, customs, and
lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships
between members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by
the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking
engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security
Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes
two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of our host country.
The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation
between members of my Command and the Korean communities that exist
alongside USFK facilities. In 2009 alone, 2,043 events were conducted
with the participation of over 139,000 local nationals. The ROK
Ministry of National Defense operates similar programs called Friends
Forever and the Experience Korean Culture Program. Under these two
programs, USFK personnel are given the opportunity to experience Korean
culture by participating in various host-nation sponsored events and
tours. These programs strengthen the Alliance at both the professional
and personal levels.
Improve Quality of Life for Command Personnel
Improving the quality of life for servicemembers, DOD civilians,
and their families is my third priority. My overall objective is to
establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea
the assignment of choice for DOD personnel. In order to achieve this
objective and support this priority, the Command is currently
implementing two key initiatives: the relocation of U.S. forces
stationed in the ROK and tour normalization.
Relocation of U.S. Forces in the ROK
The Command is implementing two separate relocation plans. Once
completed, American forces will be stationed in the ROK on two primary
``hubs'' of five enduring sites.\11\ The first plan--named the Yongsan
Relocation Plan (YRP)--will move forces currently stationed in and
around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG)
Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40 miles
south of Seoul. The majority of costs associated with this relocation
plan will be paid by the ROK. The second plan, called the Land
Partnership Plan (LPP), moves the 2nd Infantry Division from locations
north of Seoul to areas south of the Han River and expands
infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk. Costs associated with
the LPP will be shared between the ROK and United States. While the YRP
and LPP programs are being executed, actions will be taken to maintain
our current facilities at an acceptable standard in order to support
current operations.
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\11\ The two primary hubs are centered on Osan Air Base/United
States Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys and USAG Daegu. The five enduring
sites are Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, USAG Daegu, Chinhae Naval
Base, and Kunsan Air Base.
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The relocation of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct
phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I--consolidation--is
currently underway. The current U.S. troop level of 28,500 personnel
will remain on the Peninsula. The Command has returned 37 installations
to the ROK so far, in the process giving thousands of acres of land
back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has purchased land that is
needed to accommodate USFK relocation. The ROK government has granted
land at USAG Humphreys, an action that has enabled the ROK-U.S.
Alliance to begin designing, planning, and construction of what will
become one of the best Army installations in the world. The major
facilities that will be constructed include medical facilities,
headquarters buildings, family housing, schools, a communications
center, and other operational and support infrastructure needed to
accommodate the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division.
Phase II of USFK relocation will involve the movement of Army
forces to one of the two enduring hubs that will be located south of
Seoul. Once this phase is completed, USFK forces will utilize 48
separate sites, well below the 104 facilities USFK maintained in 2002.
The success of the relocation initiative will sustain USFK's ``fight
tonight'' readiness. Unit moves in the relocation plan will be packaged
and executed in manageable components, which will allow units to
maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities.
Completion of the relocation initiative will be a great boon for the
ROK-U.S. Alliance because it improves readiness and soldier quality of
life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued U.S.
commitment to the region, improves the combined capability to deter and
defend against aggression directed at the ROK, and optimizes use of
Korean land by creating a less intrusive military footprint, thus
enhancing force protection for USFK.
Tour Normalization
DOD approved plans to normalize the tours of all servicemembers in
the ROK on December 1, 2008.\12\ As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, DOD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied
tours in Korea. This goal will mean all servicemembers stationed in the
ROK will be on 36-month accompanied or 24-month unaccompanied tours.
Single troops will serve 24-months. Prior to this policy change, the
majority of U.S. military personnel serving in the ROK were on 1-year
unaccompanied assignments. For military personnel with dependents, tour
normalization means that they can be accompanied by their family
members while serving our Nation in the ROK, something that has been
done in Europe for decades. Once complete, there will be approximately
14,500 families in Korea.
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\12\ It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of
tour for USFK civilian personnel was increased from 24-months to 36-
months.
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Phase I is currently underway and will run through fiscal year
2011. During this phase, the number of command sponsored families in
the ROK will almost triple from the start of this phase, to 4,932. The
length of accompanied tours offered in five locations--Seoul, Osan,
Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae--are now 36 months and for areas north
of Seoul (Dongducheon and Uijeongbu, referred to as Area I) are 24
months. Single soldiers serve a 12-month tour.
The tour normalization process will synchronize increases in the
number of command sponsored (accompanied tour) servicemembers and their
families with the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as
housing, schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure needed
to accommodate this growth. Throughout the phased tour normalization
process, the funding for needed infrastructure could come from three
key sources: public and private ventures, appropriated military
construction funds, and ROK cost sharing contributions where
appropriate.
The tour normalization initiative benefits the Command, DOD
personnel serving in the ROK, military families, the ROK-U.S. Alliance,
and U.S. national interests. Full implementation of this initiative
improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained
military personnel in place for longer periods of time, thus enhancing
continuity, stability, and the retention of institutional, regional,
and cultural knowledge. It will also reduce the stress placed on troops
and units by frequent rotations and supports the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review's ``preserve and enhance'' objective by establishing a
sustainable rotation rate that helps protect the force's long-term
health. Quality of life for our servicemembers will be greatly improved
through the elimination of needless separation from their families and
the use of modern DOD standard design facilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance
will be enhanced by the more meaningful and deeper interaction between
Americans and Koreans that can occur during a tour of longer duration.
Finally, U.S. national interests are supported through the signal tour
normalization sends on U.S. commitment to the long-term security and
stability of the ROK as well as Northeast Asia as a whole.
iv. future of the rok-u.s. alliance
A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a
comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June
2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will
be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common
values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture
backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security
interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will
remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The United States will maintain its
commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of
capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly,
the United States welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role
in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its
growing international stature. The United States will continue to
provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of
military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional
strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROK-U.S. Alliance
evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging set of
global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include
peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance
will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual
Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the
transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the
ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These
transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its
stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of
Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by
implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the
Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a
coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK
as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the
Military Armistice Commission.
Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future
for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful
reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and
United States will work together toward achieving complete and
verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile
programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly
with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain
peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in
the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S. Governments will advocate for--
and take part in--effective cooperative regional efforts to promote
mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security
issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work
closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The
ROK and United States will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping
operations and post-conflict stabilization and development assistance.
In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals
through strategic cooperation at every level.
v. summary
This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean
War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number
of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's
aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of
signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and
stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this
mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic
industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role
in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions
for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but
also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast
Asia--a region of key national interest to the United States.
The ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement of June 2009 looks to the
future and sets out a path for taking the next step in Alliance
development--building a comprehensive strategic alliance. My three
command priorities of being prepared to fight and win, strengthening
the Alliance, and improving the quality of life for Command personnel
support this next step in Alliance evolution. In particular, the
transition of wartime OPCON recognizes the substantial growth and
development that has occurred in the ROK over the last 60 years, and
rightly places the ROK in the lead position for its own defense. The
relocation of U.S. forces in the ROK improves readiness and soldier
quality of life. Finally, tour normalization greatly increases our
capability and demonstrates long-term U.S. commitment to the Alliance,
an Alliance that has served the Korean and American people so well for
over half a century.
I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, DOD
civilians, and their families serving our great Nation in the ROK.
Their selfless service promotes peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula as well as in the broader region of Northeast Asia. Your
support for them and the ROK-U.S. Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am
certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the
very best working, living, and training environment that can be
provided, and that we should do everything in our power to provide it.
Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Sharp.
We'll have an 8-minute first round of questioning.
General Chilton, let me start with you. STRATCOM is going
to play an important role in the Senate's consideration of a
new START follow-on, the successor to START. Have you been
involved in developing the force-structure positions in support
of the force structure and the warhead discussions?
General Chilton. Senator, STRATCOM has been involved in
supporting DOD in developing their positions with regard to the
negotiating positions on START from the perspective of--we
looked at what it would take to support the current strategy
that's in existence today, and then, from that, what force
structure and weapons would be required to support that
strategy, and then provided analysis for options that were
being considered throughout the process. So, we were always
consulted as those negotiations were going forward, and I think
that was a healthy relationship we had through the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Chairman Levin. Are you satisfied with the extent of those
consultations?
General Chilton. Certainly with the extent of them,
Senator, I'm satisfied with those. We don't ever want to say we
agreed on everything.
Chairman Levin. Of course.
General Chilton. That's, of course, appropriate, that we
have areas of disagreement and discussions on those. But, I
couldn't be more satisfied with the level of participation that
was offered to STRATCOM throughout the negotiating period.
Chairman Levin. When the treaty is finally entered into and
presented to the Senate, I presume, then, that you will be
asked for your reaction; we can get into it at that time.
General Chilton. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. On the CYBERCOM issue, what is the plan for
managing and dealing with the lines of authority and command
between the intelligence operations and military operations?
How's that going to be handled?
General Chilton. I would see them as no different than
today, Senator, for intelligence operations and military
operations in any regional combatant command or any military
area. Those monies that are appropriated for intelligence need
to stay and be accounted for, and spent in the intelligence
area; the same with those that are appropriated for other force
structure and mission areas.
We will rely, in the cyberspace domain, on intelligence;
not just, I should say, from all-source intelligence, so from
human intelligence to reconnaissance to signals intelligence to
support, our--the development of our plans and operations for
operating the networks, defending the networks, and, in crisis,
utilizing them as part of the platform to support other
operations.
Chairman Levin. Are there going to be two separate approval
and review processes through the two different chains of
command? Will that remain? For approval of action from higher
up----
General Chilton. Right.
Chairman Levin.--or for review and oversight of action from
either higher-up or from Congress. Is that going to remain the
same for those two chains of command, intelligence--
General Chilton. I see no change in that, Senator. I mean,
what I will be asked to do, as the combatant commander, will
stay in the typical Title 10 lanes and under the Title 50
authorities that are normally afforded to combatant commanders,
and flow down through the subunified command for that mission
area. Those intelligence-area investments and decisions that
are made would still flow down through the intelligence chain
to the various intelligence committees and communities.
Chairman Levin. You think those lanes are going to be
clearly defined.
General Chilton. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. General Chilton, there's a new approach,
called phase adaptive approach (PAA), relative to the missile
defense plan for Europe. I think your prepared testimony, and
maybe your oral testimony, covered this; but, if so, I missed
it. In your judgment, does the PAA give us an effective way to
address the Iranian missile threat, which is a growing threat?
General Chilton. I do believe it does, Senator. I think it
shifted our focus more toward addressing the shorter- and mid-
range threats first, and last year, when we looked at the JCM-2
study, it recommended that we increase our investments in
addressing those threats, with increased investments in Theatre
High Altitude Area Defense and Standard Missile-3, which have
been brought forward in this budget. But taking a look at the
Iranian threat, it puts us in a position to address what is a
growing short- and medium-range palpable threat--that's
measurable--sooner, and yet preserves the opportunity to
address the longer-range threat, which we do have some
capability against today, already.
Chairman Levin. All right. I believe, in your written
statement, you conclude by saying, ``The total effect of the
PAA will provide significantly more capability to counter
today's regional threats''--I emphasize the word ``today's
regional threats''--``and to improve our ability''--and I'm
quoting you, here--``to defend the United States against any
future Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).'' Is
that a capsule----
General Chilton. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin.--of your----
General Chilton. I think so. As you look to the future,
we'll have, I believe, more capability, in this plan, in the
2020 timeframe than we otherwise would have had with this
approach, for both of those threats, both to the region and to
the United States.
Chairman Levin. So, is it fair to say that this plan, then,
in your judgment, will provide a better defense of Europe,
especially against those short- and medium-range missiles than
the previous missile defense plan?
General Chilton. I think it will, Senator, because there
will be more capability deployed, and also, I think it gives us
an opportunity to do some further burden-sharing with our
allies in the region, which--of course, they're eminently
interested in the defense of that region, as well.
Chairman Levin. A possible spinoff--still only
``possible''--of the plan might be the inclusion of information
from radars--from Russian radars as part of a missile defense
capability. That's not yet a fact, but it, I gather, is still a
possibility. My question to you is then, that if that occurred,
if that cooperation with Russia took place, would that be in
our interest? Do you think that it could send a powerful
message to Iran that we are united, the world is united, in
opposition to Iran's threats to the region?
General Chilton. Senator, sensors are a key element of any
missile defense system, and having additional sensor capability
that would augment the defense of Europe from any potential
aggression by Iran, I think, would be welcome.
Chairman Levin. Is that additional sensor capability that
you're referring to the possible Russian additional sensor?
General Chilton. I think there's opportunity to examine
that.
Chairman Levin. But, the sensors that you were referring to
are the Russian sensors that we--that I referred to in my
question?
General Chilton. Yes, and so, I would say that
opportunities for additional sensors, to include Russians',
could be beneficial. But, I would also emphasize that the
sensors that we provide are an essential element of this. Too
often we get focused on just counting missiles. The sensors are
very key.
Chairman Levin. That's an important----
General Chilton. Part of the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA)
architecture.
Chairman Levin.--an important point. Thank you.
General Sharp----
Okay, my time's up.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman.
Again, welcome, to all three of our panelists today.
General Chilton, as you continue your preparation for
standing up CYBERCOM, to the degree that you can elaborate,
what are some of the steps that are being taken in the short
term to ensure the safety and security of our Nation's computer
networks?
General Chilton. Senator, we've done a lot of work to
prepare for the standup of CYBERCOM, to include completing an
implementation plan. Also, as part of our normal plan,
independent of the standup of CYBERCOM, we took steps, this
past year, to combine the Global Network Operations Team with
the Network Warfare Team into a single entity so that we could
bring together closer sharing of information and teamwork
between those two entities that are responsible for operating
and defending the networks, as well as preparing for
contingency operations.
I would remind this committee that what we are chartered to
do at STRATCOM is to operate and defend military networks only.
So, we do not have the responsibility for defending other U.S.
networks that--those fall under the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security.
But, it will be essential, in any contingency in the
future, that we preserve our military network so that we can
conduct operations, should this--military operations--should
our Nation come under attack. So, we have a laser-beam focus on
doing that. I think we've made significant strides in three
areas:
One, changing the culture of the military with regard to
how we look at our systems. They are no longer systems used for
convenience; they are systems that we require and are a
necessity in warfare. So, changing that mindset, making it a
commander's business, not just the technicians' business, to
assure that our networks are ready and available to the
warfighter, is absolute an important change.
The way we conduct ourselves on the networks, improve
training for our people, to make sure we tighten security for
them, and teach them how to behave properly on the networks to
minimize vulnerabilities, is the conduct part, as well as
inspecting our units, globally, to make sure that they're
following instructions and directions put out to ensure Web
security.
Finally, increased investments in capabilities, which we
greatly appreciate the support of this committee on, and
technologies that allows us to get out in front of threats
coming into the military networks, are absolutely essential.
Senator Burr. Just very quickly, do you see the threat,
specifically to the military infrastructure, from
cybercapabilities as great as other threats that are more
physical?
General Chilton. I do--
Senator Burr. Specifically as it relates to our
capabilities.
General Chilton. Well, I look at it just like I do the
space domain. I don't think we can imagine operations today--
and I'll defer to my colleagues to the left on this--but, I
don't think we can imagine military operations today without
the advantages we have obtained from missile warning in space,
global communications, GPS position navigation and tracking--
or, timing. The same thing in cyberspace. The way we conduct
our planning today, the way we issue orders, the way we assess
our operations, so much rely on our military networks. So that
is a capability that we depend on, and we must anticipate we
will be challenged in these domains of space and cyberspace, in
any military operation in the future.
Senator Burr. Thank you, General.
Admiral, we have approximately 49,000 military personnel,
mostly marines, at Futenma Airbase in Japan, with an
uncertainty about their future. According to a Reuters article
posted yesterday, the Prime Minister has not made a final
decision on his commitment to the 2006 Accord, in providing a
location for the airbase at Okinawa to move. What's the latest
information that you can share on the matter? If you can,
what's the road ahead for us?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. The first point I
think I'd make is just to reaffirm the importance of the U.S.-
Japan alliance as it exists today. It remains a cornerstone for
security in Northeast Asia, and I think both nations recognize
that. Prime Minster Hatoyama has come out reaffirming the
importance in--that he places on the alliance, and certainly we
do; and I state that frequently.
With regard to this relatively tactical-level issue in
Okinawa, which is the replacement of the Futenma Airbase, as
you suggest, the Japanese have been deliberating on this now
for several months. We have a commitment from the Japanese
Government that they'll disclose their options and decision
regarding the review of whether the existing Futenma
replacement facility (FRF) is agreeable to them, by May of this
year. We don't know whether we'll have disclosures of various
options to consider before that, so I'm awaiting, with some
interest, what the Japanese have to say.
I would offer that we've been discussing Futenma
replacement on Okinawa now for the better part of 17 years with
the Japanese, so this is not a new issue for us. The agreement
that was discussed and come to in 2006 on the FRF was very much
an agreement where the Japanese had a majority vote--the people
of Okinawa and the Government of Japan, both--and we continue
to believe that the FRF in the current plan is the best
locating option for that airfield in Okinawa.
Senator Burr. But, you are confident that, in the next
several months, there'll be additional direction on how we move
forward.
Admiral Willard. Yes, I'm confident that the Government of
Japan will meet their commitment to come forward with their
assessment of this particular item and their options, or
agreement, that the existing FRF is what they will advocate
for.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Admiral.
General Sharp, I think I understand your goal of increasing
the number of command-sponsored families and the tour-length
increase of up to 3 years. I also understand that there are
considerable limitations in funds and resources to support
families; specifically, healthcare, schools, jobs for spouses,
all of the things that we all look at to try to accommodate the
service of our servicemembers.
You talked a little bit about the process and how we've
moved forward. Anything more you want to elaborate on that
process? But, also, can you share with us any projected
shortfalls that we're going to have?
General Sharp. Thank you, Senator. The process is--that is
now ongoing is--as I've said, we have gone from about 1,600
families in the June 2008 time period to about 3,900 now. By
this time--by next summer, by the end of next summer, we'll be
up to 4,900 families. Those are the families that I can handle
with the infrastructure I have in place right now on the
peninsula; infrastructure, meaning housing, schools, and
hospital, primarily.
What--the goal--to be able to go from that 4,900 to when
all servicemembers can bring their families for 3 years, which
will get us up to about 14,000 families, is really the process
that's going on right now in the deliberations in DOD for the
program objective memorandum (POM) 12-17 submission.
I tell my people, ``I can't get ahead of my own
headlights.'' I want to make sure that we have the proper
infrastructure in place in order to be able to handle those
families. That's what you will see when the Department comes
forward with the budget in January as we look out over the POM
years.
But, tour normalization is really making a huge difference
in Korea, not only for the families, in eliminating another
unaccompanied tour, but--and it greatly increases our
capability there, and I think it really shows our long-term
commitment to, not only the ROK, but all to--to all of
Northeast Asia, which I think is important, not just looking at
the Korean Peninsula, but how we are viewed for our long-term
commitment in that very important part of the world.
Senator Burr. Great. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to the three of you, for your service.
I must say that Chairman Levin and I were just agreeing
that the three of you, and the combatant commanders we see in
this series of hearings, are really most impressive, and we
thank you for your service.
Now I'll go on to ask critical questions, of course.
[Laughter.]
But no really Admiral, I thank you--Admiral Willard, I
thank you for your overview, a quick overview of the region. I
thought your prepared statement was really excellent, that you
entered into the record. It reminds us, even though we're
focused, because of combat going on in Afghanistan and Iraq, on
other parts of the world in Central Command (CENTCOM), that the
Asia Pacific is really critical to us. You have some numbers in
here that--it's very important to remember that 5 of our top 10
trading partners are now Asia Pacific countries. China, Japan,
and South Korea are the second-, fourth-, and seventh-largest
trading partners. Obviously, an enormous number of people. We
have, really, an excellent group of allies in the region.
Japan, as you mentioned, foundation for a long time. South
Korea, very important. Australia. Now, India really rising as a
critically important ally. I want to thank you for your
statement, and I repeat it, ``India's strategic location,
shared democratic values, growing economy, and evolution as a
regional power combine to make them a partner with whom we need
to work much more closely.'' I think the military-to-military
relationship that--there can be critical.
I wanted to focus, first, in questioning, on another of our
great allies there, which is South Korea. Continuing--though
we've been, as you say in your prepared statement, General
Sharp, ``North Korea undertook a charm offensive''--``charm,''
of course, like most other human activities, is a relative
concept, relatively--``charming during the second half of
2009,'' although, as you say, ``it's not yet led to any
measurable progress towards the complete and verifiable
denuclearization of North Korea,'' end of quote. So, the North
Korean threat remains.
Here's what I want to focus on. As you all know, in 2007,
President Roh, of South Korea, and President Bush entered into
an agreement, whereby transfer of wartime OPCON in the U.S.-ROK
CFC will go to South Korea in 2012. I want to express to you my
concern about that. I share what you've expressed, which is
your faith, both Admiral Willard and General Sharp, in the
professionalism skill of our South Korean allies, but I worry
about the timing, because 2012 is a year in which both the
United States and South Korea will hold presidential elections.
We know, in our last presidential year, North Korea acted up.
May have been coincidental; I don't think so. I was struck--and
North Korea has already said that they intend to make 2012 a
special year. I believe it's the 100th birthday--100th
anniversary of the birth of the previous great leader. Then I
saw, recently, Minister of Defense Tae-young Kim, of South
Korea, said, and I quote, late February, ``The military must
always prepare for the worst, and the worst scenario is the
transfer of wartime OPCON in 2012,'' end quote.
I wanted to ask both Admiral Willard and General Sharp
whether this is inevitably going to happen, this OPCON
transfer, whether we're reviewing it. I worry about it, both in
terms of the Korean Peninsula, but, frankly, also its impact on
other areas of the world, including, particularly, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, where they worry about whether we're going to
leave before the job is done, as it were.
So, Admiral Willard, would you take a first stab at that?
Admiral Willard. I will, Senator Lieberman.
First, this alliance between the ROK and United States, as
General Sharp indicated in his remarks, is as strong as I've
ever witnessed it----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Willard.--bar none. We've been continually
impressed by the ROK armed forces capabilities in the field and
capabilities in leadership throughout the exercise series that
General Sharp oversees. So, we're convinced that operational
transition--OPCON transition could clearly occur in 2012.
As you suggest, this is a Government of Korea decision, or
certainly OPCON transition will be considered by the Government
of Korea for its import and its impact on the region. We think
that it strengthens the ROK's armed forces position on the
peninsula to take overall OPCON of their own defense; and we
think they're ready for it.
To the extent that the government would question that, I
think, then, it becomes a government-to-government decision
between the United States and the ROK. Our role in this--and
General Sharp can be very specific regarding the many actions
that he's taken to help prepare for this transition to occur--
has been to conduct a series of exercises and take all of the
actions necessary to bring the moving parts together to make
OPCON transition a reality, April 12, 2012.
Senator Lieberman. Right. So, the transfer is not of OPCON
to the South Korean military--is not inevitable. In other
words, it--that is, for the 2012 timeframe. I appreciate what
you've said, that if the Government of Korea has second
thoughts about it--and, incidentally, I appreciate what you've
said. Our relations with South Korea are probably better than
they've ever been, today. This agreement, in 2007, was signed
at a time when the relations weren't as good as they are today.
But, anyway, I hear you say that if the Government of the
ROK has second thoughts about assuming OPCON in 2012, then that
essentially gets bounced up to the political leadership of both
countries. Is that correct?
Admiral Willard. I think so, yes.
Senator Lieberman. General Sharp, do you want to add to
that?
General Sharp. Senator, a couple of things. First off, from
a military perspective, I'm absolutely confident we will be
ready to do OPCON transition on 17 April 2012. We are on the
second version of the plan, the bilateral plan that both
countries will agree to, that will determine what is the
supporting/supported relationship that mission and forces of
ours in the ROK would do in the defense of the ROK. We are
already starting to stand up the organizations that need to be
in place in order for that to happen, both on the ROK side and
on the U.S. side.
We have exercised this several times in our Ulchi Freedom
Guardian exercises. We have people that are working on this--
the plans, organizations, processes, and systems--literally on
a daily basis. I am confident in the ROK military leadership in
the processes that need to be in place for an effective
command-and-control relationship for us to be able to defend
the ROK.
Having said that, I also believe that it is the right thing
to do. The number-one responsibility of any nation is to defend
their own country. In a country that is advanced as Korea is,
the 13th richest country in the world, a country that has a
military that's as strong as it is, it's their responsibility
to take the lead role in defending the ROK.
I think it also sends a very strong message to North Korea
and to other people in the region that the Korean military is
so strong that the United States is willing to go in a
supported-to-supported relationship, and willing to do it in
2012. To delay that time, I think, sends exactly the opposite
signal, which I think is not the right thing to do, against
North Korea or other parts of the--parts of Northeast Asia.
Again, as Admiral Willard said, if North--if the ROK comes
and asks for a delay, I'm sure that will be a discussion at the
highest levels of both governments, because both governments
agree to this timeline of 17 April 2012. To change that
timeline, both governments will have to agree to change that.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. Look, I agree
that the transfer of OPCON is the right thing to do. The
question I'm raising is whether 2012 is the right time to do
it, and also, of course, to make clear, as I think you have,
that if OPCON occurs then, or a year later or 2 years later, it
doesn't mean that the United States is exiting South Korea, or
that part of the world.
General Sharp. Exactly, sir. The commitment of 28,500
troops to the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future--the
words Secretary Gates and the President have used--and I think
it's a great investment, and it has been for the last 60 years,
to be able to maintain peace and security there. As we move
forward in OPCON transition--one of the things that I think is
misunderstood, especially on the Korean Peninsula, is, there is
a belief that, after OPCON transition, the total responsibility
for defending the ROK lies with the Korean military. That can't
be further from the truth. I've heard words of ``independent,
self-reliant forces'' in South Korea. The fight--and the
commitment--that we have to the ROK does not change. It will be
a combined warfight, just like it is today, after OPCON
transition.
As Admiral Willard said, I'm very confident it will make
the ROK military even stronger, just as it has been since 1994,
when they took armistice OPCON of their military, and all the
progress that has been made along those lines.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you both.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
I just want to let you know, General Sharp, how much I
welcome your comments about the importance of that transition
date being sustained, and the reasons that you give for it.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your service. Thank
you for being here this morning.
The first question I have is to Admiral Willard, but,
General Chilton, you may also want to respond to this.
Last week, the Washington Times cited a 2009 Central
Intelligence Agency report to Congress stating that assistance
from Chinese and Russian entities had helped Iran move toward
self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. What
is your assessment of China's support to Iran's ballistic
missile program?
Admiral?
Admiral Willard. I would probably defer to General Chilton
to get his assessment of this. I would offer that, in the
military-to-military relations that China has across the
region, there are always oversight by us and concerns with
regard to proliferation that might occur to accompany that. So,
this is the issue of who is selling ballistic missile
capability to whom. In the case of North Korea, that we've been
discussing over the past few minutes, who might proliferate,
worse than that.
So, proliferation concerns, I would offer, certainly exist.
In terms of specifics between China and Iran, I'm not prepared
to discuss it.
Senator LeMieux. General?
General Chilton. Senator, nor am I prepared to discuss
specifics--and this would be out of ignorance--between China,
specifically, and Iran. I share--agree completely with Admiral
Willard's comments, that proliferation, in general, is a
concern. Certainly we have seen North Korea proliferating
missile technology, and that has been a focus and an area of
concern for us all.
Senator LeMieux. Just as a followup to that, have you seen
any evidence of Iran trying to project influence into your
region?
Admiral?
Admiral Willard. Iran has military partnerships within our
region. In that sense, yes. Iran's influence in the region, by
and large, has to do with Iran's energy resources and the
dependence by Asia Pacific countries on those resources. So, to
a great extent, the economic relationship of a great many
countries in the Asia Pacific with Iran has to do with oil. At
the same time, there are, yes, military-to-military
relationships that we monitor between Iran and some Asia
Pacific countries.
Senator LeMieux. Admiral, in terms of Islamic extremist
groups, what gives you the most concern within your region?
Admiral Willard. For the past half a dozen years, we've
been working with the armed forces of the Philippines--in the
Southern Philippines, against a variety of groups--Abu Sayyef
group being predominant.
With Indonesia, we work with the Indonesians with regard to
their Jemaah Islamiyah concerns. In both these countries, we
have been successful in our work with their respective armed
forces and police forces in the conduct of counterterrorism.
Right now our concern is the movement of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
the terrorist group that emanates from Pakistan that was
responsible for the Mumbai attacks in India, and specifically
their positioning in Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri
Lanka. We're working very closely with the Indians, and we're
working within our own community to develop the necessary plans
to counter that particular terror group as they migrate into
the Asia Pacific region.
Senator LeMieux. Are they a regional threat, or just a
threat to India?
Admiral Willard. We're attempting to develop a further
understanding of the extent to which they're a regional threat.
If you'll recall, LeT was evidenced in Chicago, with the arrest
of Headley, and we have, certainly, knowledge of their
influence within the region, beyond the countries that I just
mentioned. The extent of that influence is what we're taking
under study. They are predominantly a threat to India.
Senator LeMieux. General Chilton, I want to talk to you
about the importance of manned spaceflight and the work of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and how
it impacts STRATCOM, and the relationship thereto. I know this
is something you're uniquely capable to speak about.
The administration has proposed to abandon the
Constellation program and abandon our short-term lower Earth
orbit capabilities, rely instead upon the Russians to get us to
the International Space Station. Does this have any concern to
you as the combatant commander for STRATCOM?
General Chilton. There's just one second-order effect of
that, that I think we need to study, but, I'll speak about it
in a more broad sense, and that has to do with industrial-base
issues. So, NASA was, in their plan for Constellation, going to
use a large solid rocket motor as part of that architecture.
Now I have to take that into context with--moving away from
that--in the context of requirements for sustainment of the D-5
for our submarine-launched ballistic missiles and for the
Minuteman III, for the ICBM. So, I think it warrants us to then
evaluate the impacts on the industrial base. I can't say that
there are clear impacts that would affect STRATCOM, but it
warrants us to take a look at industrial--potential industrial-
base issues with regard to that critical industrial base, which
allows us to build large solid rocket motors for the strategic
deterrent.
Senator LeMieux. Beyond the industrial-base capabilities
and the requirements that you need for your missiles, is
there--it would occur to me that NASA's innovation and the way
that they bring new innovations to--not just space exploration,
but to missile technology and other aerospace technologies,
that that would have some impact upon what you do if they were
no longer pushing the envelope in that regard.
General Chilton. Well, sir, I guess I can't comment on
whether NASA will continue to push the envelope or not. I
suspect they will. They certainly--as we look through our
history, we have benefited, not only in space, but in
aeronautics, from the great research and development and
technology that has been developed by NASA over the years. I
look forward to them continuing to push the envelope in both
domains, because we have benefited from that in the past.
Senator LeMieux. Admiral Willard, there was some discussion
earlier about our relationships with China. We have China
reacting to our military exchange with Taiwan, and they reacted
previously, in 2008, when there was a similar exchange. Do you
think there's--this is business as usual for them, or are there
any additional long-term ramifications to their response to our
agreements with Taiwan?
Admiral Willard. Well, certainly the suspension of
military-to-military relationships is consistent with what
we've seen in the past from China when they've had a
disagreement with our Nation; in this case, with regard to an
announcement of Taiwan arms sales. We've been in dialogue with
China, prior to this particular suspension taking place,
offering that the military-to-military relationship is worth
continuing, worth sustaining, regardless of disagreements
between our two nations. We believe that strongly. We think
that across all of the engagement with China that's currently
occurring with the Departments of the United States, that the
military-to-military relationship tends to lag behind the other
forms of engagement, and that that shouldn't be the case, so
that we can, number one, find areas of common interest, where
we can begin to advance our relationship into the future, and,
second, so that we can have frank discussions about areas of
disagreement, which, clearly, when we suspend military-to-
military relationships, that dialogue stops. So, we think that
it's certainly in both countries' interest. They get a vote,
and they must see the value in it, as we do, I think, to see
anything other than this predictable behavior occurring in the
future.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time is up, but I would like to
submit some questions for the record that I would have asked
concerning cybersecurity. We know, recently, that Google has
experienced attacks, and I was at a China Commission--bicameral
commission meeting this week. It was not articulated directly
by the folks from Google, but there certainly seems to be the
indication that those attacks came from the--sponsored by the
Chinese Government.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux, for
those questions, which I think will be important--the answers
will be important to all the members of this committee and
Congress, because you've pointed to an extremely important
issue that is ongoing.
Now, I understand that Senator Akaka has been happy to
yield to Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Senator Akaka, for your courtesies, extending me
this opportunity to ask a question, because I have an airplane
to catch here shortly.
General Chilton, it's a military construction question. For
some time, you and I and others have talked about the need for
a new STRATCOM headquarters building. So I've been very pleased
with the progress that we've made towards addressing this vital
need. The facility's shortcomings and problems are well known.
They've put STRATCOM's mission and its personnel at some risk.
The existing headquarters was built in 1957; it's weathered the
five decades with little renovation. In recent years, the
building's experienced failures in electrical service, as well
as some fires and flooding. The Air Force and the President
have addressed these shortcomings so that, in fiscal year 2011,
there'll be money to complete the plan and design of the
headquarters facility, with construction beginning in fiscal
year 2012. When we talked last, I think you probably said it
the best I've ever heard it, that STRATCOM headquarters is the
nuclear command-and-control node for the United States, and we
must make the appropriate investments.
Can you speak to why this facility has been a priority for
you, as combatant commander, and what you foresee as the value
of a new headquarters, in terms of our capabilities?
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator. I'm happy to talk to
it.
When I got to the Command, of course, you first reviewed
the working conditions and--for your people. I've walked the
halls and the tunnels of the headquarters extensively. I think
the context is, this headquarters was built with a large
underground facility that extends seven floors below the
surface, to our Global Operations Center, in a time--at the
height of the cold war, when it was felt necessary to bury
things as such.
Since then, technology has evolved and we started using
computers, bringing a lot of computer capability into this
infrastructure that was absolutely not designed to handle that,
so heat loads, working-space conditions are intolerable in some
areas, for some of our people; and we are actually constrained
in the capabilities that we would like to deploy in the
building, both on how we would organize and implement the
critical functions that we have, to include nuclear command and
control, and add on to that the new mission sets that we've
had. So, we've had mission growth in space and cyberspace,
which also demands better support and integration.
So, this is about not only the fact that we live in a
building that was designed to--and occupied early on--over 50
years ago, for a different era and a different sole mission
set, with different technologies. It's about mission growth and
it's about doing what we need to do for the country, both as a
nuclear command-and-control node, but as a cyberspace node and
a space node for this Nation.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, would you--would it be safe to say
that it's a fairly large multistory bomb shelter?
General Chilton. There's quite a bit underground, Senator.
I don't believe we need that anymore today.
Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
General Chilton. I don't believe we need the deep
underground capability. We do need protections for our people
in our command centers to withstand weather phenomenon in the
area, and to ensure that it's always there for America. So I
think we have a--we've worked very hard on the design of a new
infrastructure and facility to take us into the 21st century
and what this command needs to do its missions in the future.
I'm satisfied we're on track. We appreciate your support and
the support of this committee.
Senator Ben Nelson. I want to thank you and the many
personnel, both civilian and military, who make STRATCOM such
an important part of our national security and help keep us as
safe as possible.
I thank you, Admiral and General, for your commitment and
your very diligent and impressive work, as well.
Thank you, Senator Akaka. I appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say aloha and welcome to Admiral Willard and
General Chilton and General Sharp. I want to thank you very
much for your distinguished service to our country, and also
all the military personnel that serve under you to assure that
the security is there.
The posture of PACOM and also USFK is of particular
interest to me because of the strategic location of Hawaii in
the Pacific. The growing economies, also, of the Pacific
region, and particularly China, India, and South Korea, present
both opportunities and challenges. But, I continue to be
interested in the readiness of our forces in the Pacific as
challenges in other parts of the world continue to compete for
military resources. Of course, we're always looking at
resources for our military and to be certain that we have it
ready for our forces.
Admiral Willard, India is becoming a growing economic and
military power in the region. Last year, the United States and
India reached agreements in military cooperation, space issues,
and peaceful nuclear energy generation, during the visit of
Secretary Clinton. Admiral, can you tell us how we are working
with India's military and about any future developments? Of
course, I ask this for information that you can reveal in this
forum.
Admiral Willard. Aloha, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Aloha.
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much for the question.
Senator Akaka. Also let me say welcome to Donna.
Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, Senator, and happy to
answer the question.
The military-to-military relationship with India has been
evolving now for most of the last decade, and really started at
the tactical level, service-to-service-type interaction, some
of which I experienced while I was the Seventh Fleet Commander
in hosting executive steering groups with my counterparts in
the Indian Navy. At the same time, we've had, in the past,
modest exercise series with the Indians that have grown over
the years to become, now, complex exercise series with the
Indians.
And as our military-to-military relationship has advanced,
it's also elevated itself such that we're now holding
strategic-level discussions with the Indians, and very complex
military discussions regarding our respective advancements and
our future, in terms of exercising together. Then there is a
growing foreign military sales relationship with the Indians as
they've expressed interest in acquiring United States-produced
military hardware. So, in my engagement with India--and I just
returned, about 3 weeks ago, from a military-to-military
exchange with them--we discuss in great detail their interest
in acquiring U.S. systems.
So, I would offer that not only is India now an economic
and regional power, certainly in the Indian Ocean region, but
it has global implications, as well, in the relationship
between the United States and India has been evolving, through
my experience, to a point where it's very strong, at the
moment.
Senator Akaka. Admiral, I want to commend you and our
military for continuing to keep, as you were mentioning, the
relationships between the military and our friendly countries,
and also to try to continue to work with them in their
exercises, as well.
General Chilton, the establishment of U.S. CYBERCOM
recognizes the growing importance of the cyberdomain to
national security. This growing importance will require forces
that are able to operate and defend DOD information networks
and provide the President with response options in cyberspace.
General, can you tell us how your organization is giving
your personnel the knowledge and tools they require to operate
effectively in this environment?
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator. You've hit on a very
key point, and that is growing and sustaining cyber-expertise
in the military. We have a couple of things that have happened
over the past year, that have been very encouraging. One, all
of the Services are now organizing in such a fashion as to
present cyberforces to STRATCOM to do those critical missions
of operating and defending the networks and responding, when
required. I would point out the Navy's new fleet organization,
as well as the Air Force's new Numbered Air Force, as two
examples of this. What that means is, the individual Services
who are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping
forces for the combatant commanders are organizing in such a
fashion to put focus on the training of those personnel. So, we
will see the Services increase the tension on accessions and
training and growing the expertise of individuals in the
various Services, and making them available to STRATCOM to
conduct our operations.
Internal to the headquarters and STRATCOM, we are taking
seriously educational opportunities and growth opportunities
for the people, particularly our civil servants that work in
the headquarters, who will be there for the long haul, for
these very critical mission areas of space, cyberspace, and
deterrence. So we're paying attention to that.
Lastly, Senator, I would say DOD, under the leadership of
Secretary Gates, has increased the capacity of the joint
school, down in Pensacola, that is run by the U.S. Navy, to
provide increased educational opportunities for the personnel
we will need, from all the Services, in CYBERCOM to execute our
mission.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that information. If
I have time, I'll come back with further questions on
cyberspace.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Willard, it is my understanding that
China is investing heavily in fourth-generation fighters and
advanced surface-to-air missiles. Admiral, F-22s are being
phased into PACOM. They are in Alaska, and are scheduled to be
in Hawaii in the near future. Can you discuss the importance of
having these assets in the Pacific, and provide an update of
the Hickam basing schedule?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Senator. I think the statement
that you made regarding China's advancements in capability and
capacities in some very high-tech areas, and their--
particularly their investment in the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) air force assets, fourth-generation fighter capabilities,
combined with their integrated air defense systems, which are,
as well, very sophisticated, are illustrative of why the F-22
is particularly well suited to the Pacific, given its very
unique capabilities.
So, as the PACOM commander--and I know that General North,
my Pacific Air Force commander, would attest, as well--we're
very pleased that the F-22 forces in Alaska, and eventually in
Hawaii, will be made available to us. Again, a very unique
capability that is particularly well suited to some of the
potential contingencies in our AOR; and, as well, contributing
to extended deterrence throughout the Pacific. So, we look
forward to those assets. They have served in the Pacific, often
a squadron in Guam, at Anderson Air Force Base, and they will
play a key role, I'm sure, in our various Air Force operations
in the Pacific.
In terms of the timing for the Hawaii Air National Guard to
acquire F-22s, without being definitive about a very specific
date, I would offer that both in the Alaskan Command, as well
as at Hickam Air Force Base, as you're well aware, we're
currently expending the military construction funds, over the
next several years, to equip both of these sites to accommodate
the F-22. Provided those military construction funds are timely
and we're able to complete the advancements in ramp space,
hangar space, and the necessary support facilities for that
unique aircraft, then I'm hopeful that their laydown, both in
Alaska, as well as Hawaii, will occur on time.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Akaka.
Senator Burr, it's my inclination to go a couple of more
questions, if that's okay. Obviously, give you the opportunity,
as well.
Senator Burr. That's fine, Mr. Chairman. I have no
additional questions at this time.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Admiral, I wanted to go back to China, and I appreciate the
statements that you made in your opening statement, I quote
again here, ``China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of
its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and
holds implications beyond the Asia Pacific region. Of
particular concern is that elements of China's military
modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of
action in the region,'' end of quote from your opening
statement.
So, it's certainly my impression that, over the last year
or so, there seems to have been a move up in the assertiveness
of China, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. I take
it, from that statement that I read from your opening
statement, that you agree. If I'm right, why do you think this
is happening now?
Admiral Willard. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
think that we have seen a change in tenor from the People's
Republic of China (PRC) in the last year or so, such that the
exchanges that occur--in my instance, military-to-military, and
often in other fora with our Government and with regional
partners--is a changed tone that, as you suggest, demonstrates
more assertiveness on the part of the Chinese.
It would be hard to speculate as to why that has occurred
at this particular time. But, when you consider the very rapid
growth of capability in the PLA armed forces over the past
decade, combined with the economic growth of China and its
growing global influence, there is a level of confidence, I
believe, that comes with that pronounced assertiveness, that
we're all experiencing.
I think it will be very important for the PRC to regard
that level of influence and their responsibilities now as a
very influential global partner, to dialogue with the
international community and with the United States in a very
responsible manner, and take their place at the table, to
ensure that, rather than shrill exchanges, that we're on common
ground with regard to meeting our global responsibilities. I
think they certainly have them.
Senator Lieberman. Well, I agree with what you said, all
parts of your statement, including, obviously, the fact that we
acknowledge and respect the growth in China's economy, its
importance in the world. We seek a constructive, obviously a
peaceful, relationship with them, but we also have both
historic presence in the Asia Pacific region, and we have
national security interests in the region, and very important
allies that depend on us in the region. So, we have to both
maintain the peacefulness of the relationship, but a clarity
and an honesty in our relations with the Chinese.
Tell me what you meant when you said that elements of
China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our
freedom of action in the region.
Admiral Willard. China has made a number of investments in
a variety of anti-access-capability areas; area denial, perhaps
another way to think about it. This ranges from integrated air
defense systems off their coastline which stand off well beyond
their territorial waters and airspace, to their investments in
submarines, which is pretty profound, and that particular
capability, now, that is ranging throughout the South China
Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea, and beyond, and other
capabilities that, together, provide sizable area-denial
capability.
Over time, they have very much appeared to zero in on U.S.
capabilities and the potential ability to counter those, as a
framework for these investments. But, I would offer that they
not only concern the United States, but our regional allies as
well.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Willard. As you suggest, Japan, the ROK, our allies
in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and our
partners in Vietnam and elsewhere in the region, all have to
deal, now, with capabilities that could potentially infringe on
their freedom of action throughout this very important part of
the world.
I would just remind that we've been present in these
waters, and in this airspace, for the past 150 years.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Willard. We've been providing security for sea
lines of communication that are moving over a trillion dollars
of commerce per year, both back and forth to the United States
and to our important allies and partners in the region, which
has also provided for the economic growth of China.
Senator Lieberman. Correct.
Admiral Willard. We don't intend to cede any of that space,
but, rather, continue to protect those sea lines of
communication that are so vital to the United States and the
Asia Pacific region as a whole.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that statement very much,
and also the fact that China's growth and assertiveness is not
just a concern of ours, parochially, it is very much a concern
of most of the rest of the countries in the region who are
allies. I gather, unfortunately, that the kind of military-to-
military relationships that have otherwise been quite useful in
diminishing tension between countries has actually not done
very well, yet, with the PRC. Now, if I'm not mistaken, the
military-to-military contacts are suspended as a result of
Chinese reaction to our recent arms sales to Taiwan. I wonder
if you have anything to say about the state of our military-to-
military relationship with China.
Admiral Willard. You describe it accurately, Senator
Lieberman, when you refer to the suspension and also the fact
that our military-to-military relationship tends to lag behind
the other engagements that we enjoy with the PRC. We believed
that we were making progress last year, when General Xu, one of
the very high-ranking members of the Central Military
Commission, visited Washington, to include Secretary Gates, and
agreed upon a method to advance our military-to-military
relationship, and mature it. He stopped in Hawaii on his way
back to Beijing, and he and I spent a day or so together, again
revisiting the areas of common interest that we thought we
could advance discussions and relations with, and also the
opportunity that military-to-military dialogue provides, in
terms of dealing with our differences.
Regretfully, those engagements that had been agreed upon
with the PRC are part of this suspension, to include the high-
level visits--invitations extended to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Secretary Gates, and, lastly, myself--were part of this
demarche. So, we believe strongly that China needs to revisit
the value of a continuum of military-to-military relationship
and dialogue with the United States and determine its value in
their self-interest, which we believe strongly in, and we--
we're hopeful that they'll have that internal discussion and
ultimately we'll be able to depart on a more continuous
relationship.
Senator Lieberman. Well said, thanks.
General Chilton, one quick question. This morning, as I'm
sure you know, President Obama and, I presume, President
Medvedev will be announcing the successful conclusion of START
negotiations, and that they'll be submitting, in this case, the
treaty to the Senate for consideration. Many of us here have
been concerned that the Russians might try to bring into the
treaty some limitations on our freedom of action with regard to
defensive systems, missile defense systems, particularly. I
gather that there's a reference to defensive systems in the
preamble, but nothing in the heart of the treaty, that the
Russians are apparently going to say, publicly, in a separate
statement, that they reserve the right to leave the treaty if
they think our defensive missile systems are, in some sense,
threatening them.
Do you agree that START should be a separate matter for
consideration, which is basically the reduction of our nuclear
weapons inventories, on both great powers, and leave the
question of defenses separate from that?
General Chilton. Senator, I do. That's the short answer.
Senator Lieberman. It's a good one.
General Chilton. Missile defense--in spite of our--all our
efforts--and we need to continue these efforts--the U.S.
Missile Defense System has been fielded for two purposes; one,
to counter a Korean capability----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Chilton.--that, in some future date, should we not
have a missile defense, might put them in a position to deter
the United States from meeting our responsibilities and our
commitments to the people of South Korea.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Chilton. Likewise, to prevent Iran from fielding a
system that they could blindly blackmail, or use to blackmail
or threaten, our friends and allies, both in the CENTCOM
region, but also in the European Command region.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Chilton. That is our focus. If you put on a pair of
Russian shoes and look at it from their perspective, their
concern is that there's more to this than that, perhaps. So we
need to continue dialogue with the Russians to assure them that
is not the case, not only through dialogue, but through our
actions. I think our actions to date have shown that we're
fielding a limited system, with focused capabilities, to
address those two focused threats--those two specific threat
areas.
Again, this kind of circles back to the point on military-
to-military discussions. Military-to-military discussions with
Russia, as well as China, are important.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Chilton. Russia, on this particular topic, China,
on this particular topic, as well as, certainly, others when we
start talking about strategic deterrence and posturing for
strategic deterrence between those three countries--the United
States, China, and Russia.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Burr.
Senator Akaka, do you want to ask another question?
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, may I?
Senator Lieberman. Please, go ahead.
Senator Akaka. Yes.
Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I believe we must expand
our foreign language capability, and also our cultural
knowledge. There seems to be an emphasis within DOD to improve
these capabilities within our forces. Admiral and General, what
are your thinking of the Department's efforts to develop
servicemembers' cultural knowledge and foreign language skills
in order to better perform their roles in counterinsurgency and
stability operations?
Admiral Willard. Yes, thank you, Senator Akaka. It's an
important question. In my previous assignment as the Vice Chief
of Navy, I was a party to many of the discussions inside the
Pentagon regarding the need to increase our investments in
foreign language skills and cultural awareness, which was
fundamentally an increase in the number of foreign area trained
officers for very specific areas of the world, that each of the
Services were making. We have made sizable investments within
DOD to support those increases in language training and the
increases in foreign area officers. As a PACOM commander, I'm
enjoying the benefits of that, such that now a sizable number
of my headquarters' staff members--I know it's true in the
components, as well, having previously served as the Pacific
Fleet commander--we're enjoying greater language skills among
our junior officers and senior enlisted personnel, such that,
when they conduct their engagements and capacity-building
around the Asia Pacific region, they're much better able to
converse across the wide number of languages and dialects that
you're more than familiar with exist in our part of the world.
So, this has been a great investment, and I am assured the
Services all will continue to make this investment, as I think
we've learned some lessons regarding its importance to the work
that we do out there.
Senator Akaka. General Sharp?
General Sharp. I agree completely with Admiral Willard. I
think the initiative that the Department has undertaken toward
normalization of longer tours in Korea also greatly contributes
to the cultural understanding and the capabilities that we
have, specifically in the ROK. I was in the building at the
same time as Admiral Willard, working on this same initiative,
and agree with him that it is critically important for our
Services to step up to this and make more language and cultural
awareness among all of our forces. I think they're doing very
well at that. It's critically important.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much for those
responses. I'm happy to hear that.
Mr. Chairman, I asked the question because it goes back to
World War II, when the Military Intelligence Services (MIS)--
Japanese from our country--made a huge difference with General
MacArthur in Japan and believed that they helped to build a
base that has become what Japan has succeeded to be through
their efforts and through the language and cultural skills that
our military had at that time, and was able to deal with Japan.
I look upon that as an important part of our future strategies
as we work with other countries.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
General Chilton, Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thanks for
your service, thanks for your testimony today, thanks for your
patience with Senate procedure during the week. It's been a
really helpful and informative discussion this morning. I know
I can say, on behalf of Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, Senator
Burr, and everybody else here on this committee, that we
appreciate very much what you're doing for us in very important
aspects of our security around the world, and we'll try our
best, in our authorization responsibility, to give you the
support that you, and all those men and women in uniform
serving under you, deserve.
So, thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
1. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, Secretary Gates testified
that the combatant commanders have an insatiable appetite for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This year's
budget request seems to address that need. Collectively, the Services
are planning on spending $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 for new
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities.
From my vantage point, it seems the focus has been on how many UAVs
are in the field and how quickly we can get more, and, in doing so, we
overlook critical aspects of expanding ISR- like how the Services plan
to train the analysts that will be required to process the expanding
volumes of data, and what infrastructure will be required to move data
and share it with those that need it. The easy part is buying the next
Predator--the hard part is exploiting and using the intelligence.
A Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report issued last week
states that within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), less than half of
the electronic signals collected by Predator are exploited. The report
identifies a shortage in analytical staff to process ISR data and
limited bandwidth to disseminate intelligence as principle challenges.
At the Air Force posture hearing this month, I asked General Schwartz
about manning the ISR mission and he stated that the current manning
structure to support UAV operations was unsustainable in light of
projected growth. It doesn't appear that the Department's capacity to
process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence has kept pace with its
ability to collect it.
Last week I addressed ISR shortfalls with General Petraeus, and he
testified that the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) ISR Task Force
is coordinating the activities among the Services to support operations
in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Could you comment on your
role in these coordinating activities with the OSD ISR Task Force?
General Chilton. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the DOD Joint
Functional Manager (JFM) for ISR and associated processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED). STRATCOM executes its command
responsibilities through its Joint Functional Component Command for ISR
(JFCC-ISR). As a point of reference, STRATCOM personnel were primary
sources of information for the GAO report, ISR: Overarching Guidance is
Needed to Advance Information Sharing, noted by Senator Nelson. As the
JFM for ISR, STRATCOM works closely with the OSD ISR Task Force to
identify current PED gaps and shortfalls, as well as forecast future
PED issues with the acquisition of new platforms and sensors. This
coordination helps to ensure any additional capabilities fielded look
beyond the platform and take into account all aspects of collection,
PED.
To address the PED adequacy concerns raised by Senator Nelson,
STRATCOM is developing a comprehensive plan to align PED with the
allocation of ISR platforms to the combatant commands, ensuring PED
capacity with an ultimate goal of better aligning with ISR collection.
To this end, STRATCOM is working to formalize PED relationships with
the Military Services and Combat Support Agencies in an attempt to
maximize and target use of PED capacity as a DOD Intelligence
Enterprise.
STRATCOM is also conducting a assessment to determine overall PED
capability and capacity across the DOD based upon a detailed analysis
of the ISR/PED architecture. This assessment will help STRATCOM
highlight gaps, shortfalls, or possible redundancies within the current
system to the Services and Combat Support Agencies. The desired outcome
is the ability to specifically identify bottlenecks and logjams to
include any aspect from lack of bandwidth to types of linguist to
proficiency of imagery analysts.

2. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, beyond the needs of
CENTCOM, can you further speak to any shortfalls that you are seeing
generally in ISR personnel and bandwidth?
General Chilton. Recognizing that the preponderance of available
ISR capability and capacity are engaged in the CENTCOM AOR, the recent
earthquake in Haiti highlighted challenges the Department faces in
satisfying ISR and PED requirements in other geographic combatant
commands. During the Department's initial response to the humanitarian
crisis in Haiti, Operation Unified Response (OUR), STRATCOM noted
shortfalls related to processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
Following the initial ISR deployments to support OUR, analysis
revealed some limitations in our ability to establish an expeditionary
ISR architecture during the early stages of the operation. Specific
bandwidth and equipment issues prevented direct communication between
ground-based personnel and airborne platforms, hampering the JTF-
Haiti's ability to respond to problem areas. STRATCOM in coordination
with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) developed an in-theater and
beyond line of sight dissemination architecture for the full motion
video capability, ensuring all collection was available to forward
commanders. The challenges noted during this experience are not unique
to SOUTHCOM and are applicable across multiple combatant commands.
Airborne ISR requests for forces submitted by geographic combatant
commands also show shortages in intelligence personnel with requisite
language skills. As new collection systems are brought on line,
fielding of the PED expertise to support their full employment lags
behind. STRATCOM is partnered with the Defense Intelligence Operations
Coordination Center to identify and where feasible mitigate
intelligence personnel shortfalls and identify efficiencies within the
DOD Intelligence Enterprise. STRATCOM is also working with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to help the combatant commands
identify their key signals intelligence language requirements and help
the military departments source the required manpower.

3. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, are these issues being
addressed and do you have any recommendations as to how they should be
addressed?
General Chilton. STRATCOM and its ISR component JFCC-ISR, continues
to take a leading role within the Department in advocating for ISR
capabilities to address current and future warfighting requirements. As
the military co-lead for the Battlespace Awareness Portfolio, the
Command conducts an annual ISR-related Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF)
to develop and prioritize needed ISR and PED attributes along with
combatant command shortfalls and gaps for all ISR to include overhead
systems. As an example, STRATCOM recently conducted a SWarF to develop
a combatant command statement of urgent need for space-based ISR
capabilities. The Command takes a global perspective and coordinates
with the military departments, the combat support agencies, and the
combatant commands in developing courses of action to address these
issues. In essence, STRATCOM is the combatant commands ``voice'' to
ensure the warfighters ISR shortfalls and gaps are addressed.
To help to address the gap between growth in ISR requirements and
projected ISR capabilities, STRATCOM is developing an ISR Force Sizing
Construct to inform future ISR allocation and procurement. The
combatant command focused ISR assessments construct and resulting ISR
Measure of Merit is intended to give decisionmakers an analytical basis
for a relative comparison of force mixes. The Force Sizing Construct
will provide a scalable, tailorable, and repeatable process to
determine regional combatant commander demands and expectations in
order to better inform future acquisition decisions.

4. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, with
regard to ISR personnel, can you discuss whether you are seeing
shortfalls in ISR personnel and what is being done to address personnel
shortfalls for analysts to process, exploit and disseminate
intelligence?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
General Sharp. [Deleted.]

5. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, what are
your recommendations?
Admiral Willard. Numbers are only part of the solution. Realizing
the potential of our ability to process information requires changes in
culture, policy, procedure, governance, and information technology. We
continue to actively engage with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) and other Intelligence Community leaders to
ensure they understand our requirements, capabilities and shortfalls.
Additionally, we continue to work with the Services and the broader
Intelligence Community to provide the right-sized, right-qualified,
right-equipped ISR force.
General Sharp. In order to compensate for military department
intelligence billet shortfalls, United States Forces Korea is
considering converting many more of these positions to Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) civilian billets. If DIA is unable to hire
and fill civilian billets for the Combatant Command, that payroll
should become available to the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to
pay for contractors or temporary duty assistance. Increase the priority
fill for intelligence personnel working the North Korea problem at the
operational, theater and strategic level. We ask for the committee's
support in this effort.
Another challenge we face is the short tour lengths for both
civilian and military personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea
(ROK). One and 2 year tours have a negative effect on the continuity of
our workforce. Standard tour normalization of 3 years for personnel
assigned to Korea will help to mitigate this problem. We ask that the
committee support this effort as well.

interagency coordination cyber/intelligence
6. Senator Ben Nelson. General Chilton, one thing that I commonly
look for are stovepipes and whether the Services are duplicating
efforts or truly enhancing overall mission effectiveness. Last year at
the STRATCOM hearing, you highlighted the importance of sharing
information among agencies, including the Department of Homeland
Security, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Defense
(DOD), in addressing security risks in cyberspace. I want to ensure
proper coordination is taking place between agencies to ensure that
each agency is not creating its own unique defenses. If each agency
builds their own protective walls, they will ultimately stifle
collaboration and the ability to disseminate intelligence information
among agencies, which has been our Achilles heel--an inability to share
intelligence, connect the dots, and prevent future attacks. How are we
doing at interagency coordination of cyber security and information
exchange protocols?
General Chilton. I believe we are making progress in improving
interagency coordination of cyber security and information exchange
protocols.
Efforts to improve our interagency coordination begin with our
continued participation in Joint Interagency Task Force-Cyber (JIATF-
Cyber). Current member organizations of the JIATF-Cyber include the
National Security Agency/Central Security Service, DIA, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Joint
Warfare Analysis Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint
Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Joint Functional Component
Command-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), Joint Task Force-Global Network
Operations (JTF-GNO), Joint Functional Component Command for Global
Strike, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC),
Departments of Treasury (DOT), State (DOS), and Homeland Security and
the combatant commands.
As U.S. Cyber Command stands up, it will look to improve our
coordination by transitioning JIATF-Cyber to a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group--Cyber, a multi-functional, advisory element that
represents civilian departments and agencies at U.S. Cyber Command and
facilitates information sharing across the interagency and key partner
nations.
We intend to further coordination with the placement of liaison
officers with the following organizations in coming year: FBI, CIA,
DoT, DoS, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the
combatant commands. Additionally, plans are developing to place LNOs
with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.
U.S. Cyber Command will also leverage JTF-GNO's full-time Law
Enforcement/Counter-intelligence (LE/CI) Center for coordinating LE/CI
activities in support of defensive cyberspace operations. Today, DOD
LE/CI agencies have assigned agents that support our efforts to improve
cyber security, including Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Defense
Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, Army Criminal Investigations Command, and Army
Intelligence and Security Command.
Finally, we continue to work hard at sharing information on cyber
threats among a variety of DOD and interagency partners everyday.
Establishing the connective tissue among our partners is a significant
challenge, but one we see as essential to deter our adversaries and
prevent future attacks.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
active and reserve duty components
7. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, General Chilton, and General
Sharp, do you believe you have the right mix of Active Duty and Reserve
component presence within your command? If not, what are your
shortfalls in capabilities or skill sets?
Admiral Willard. Yes, we have the right mix of Active Duty and
Reserve component presence within the PACOM command. However, as an
Active-Duty Force we see shortfalls in Foreign Area Officers,
intelligence professionals and those with skills sets in the areas of
Security Cooperation, POW/MIA identification and accounting, and cyber
active and passive defense.
General Chilton. U.S. Strategic Command's global, operational
missions demand several unique (often high-demand, low-density) skill
sets. The Command continually balances mission and workforce
requirement growth across our team through a robust and carefully
managed total force approach. We are also dedicated to pursuing and
advocating for expanded deterrence, space, and cyberspace professional
development opportunities, to ensure we remain as fully capable of
executing our missions as we are today.
There always exists unsatisfied demands which stretch the limits of
active duty resources, and reservists can provide the ability to
quickly respond to address expertise or manning shortfalls until the
operational requirement has passed. Our reserve utilization is aligned
to STRATCOM's global mission set that draws on highly specialized
skills encompassing subsurface, land/sea, nuclear, space, and cyber
warfare areas.
Since the end of the Cold War and particularly since September 11,
2001, we have increasingly relied on the Reserve component as an
``operational reserve.'' In fact, STRATCOM's reserve utilization rate
has increased substantially in the last 3 years from 48,000 man days
per year in 2008 to a projected 85,000 in 2010. The level of Active/
Reserve integration within this command is such that there is no
discernable difference operationally in the workplace.
General Sharp. National Guard and Reserve component forces provide
greater than 60 percent of the Combat Support/Combat Service Support
units in support of our operations plan. Successful accomplishment of
our objectives is not possible without them. Tour normalization for our
Active component forces should reduce ramp-up time for maneuver and
fires units while reducing risk to training and proficiency. At the
same time, tour normalization provides continuity, ensures theater-
specific experience, and enhances interoperability with forces from the
ROK.
In spite of the steps we have taken, Combined Forces Command
struggles with a number of personnel-related capability gaps. For
example, the Korean Theater of Operations has endured a chronic
shortage of trained Tactical Air Control Party and Joint Terminal
Attack Controller (JTAC) personnel. The intense, complex training
requirements, language skill requirements, and deployment operations
tempo for that career field result in a capability void which we labor
to bridge. The impact to the operations plan is a reduced ability to
direct close air support for our forces on the forward line of our own
troops and our forces in the rear area countering the threat posed by
North Korean special operations forces.

pacific command disaster relief efforts
8. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, Pacific Command (PACOM) played
a tremendous role in the humanitarian operations following the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami. How are you working with the other combatant
commands, such as U.S. SOUTHCOM following the earthquakes in Haiti and
Chile, to better prepare for natural disaster response efforts?
Admiral Willard. It is important to note that PACOM forces respond
to a natural disaster on the average of every 60 days. That said, PACOM
sent a five man planning team to assist SOUTHCOM for Operation Unified
Response within days of the event. The team became the core planning
element and assisted in the preparation of SOUTHCOMs Strategic
Framework and Transition Strategy, as well as performing as the conduit
for United Nations and interagency planning. The augmentation support
mission also provided an opportunity for PACOM and SOUTHCOM to share
their HA/DR response plans which further prompted a greater level of
collaboration with European Command and Africa Command.

illegal narcotics and human trafficking
9. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, the trafficking of illegal
narcotics, humans, and arms continues to be a priority for your
command. What is your current strategy for countering these threats?
Admiral Willard. These kinds of transnational threats are indeed a
priority for the PACOM. Our strategy is to work through the Interagency
to develop ``whole-of-government'' approaches to build in the capacity
of our regional allies and partners to counter these threats.
The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) is the PACOM
Executive Agent (EA) for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the
PACOM AOR. As EA, JIATF-W uses delegated authorities and funding to
combat drug-related transnational organized crime in the Asia-Pacific
region. JIATF-W sources capabilities from all five U.S. Military
Services as well as the entire U.S. Intelligence Community.
Strategic Goals:

Support ongoing and developing LE operations to
disrupt and dismantle drug-related transnational criminal
organizations.
Build partner nation capacity to combat drug-related
transnational crime.
Enhance and support a cooperative network of
partnerships across Asia-Pacific to combat transnational crime.

10. Senator Burris. Admiral Willard, how are you working with other
combatant commands to address this concern?
Admiral Willard. The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W)
participates in planning conferences hosted by other combatant commands
counterdrug (CD) executive agents (EA). Each year we participate in the
counterdrug and border security planning efforts of Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF-S), the CD EA for Southern Command, and Joint
Task Force North (JTF-N), the CD EA for Northern Command.
JIATF-W attends the DOD Combatant Command Counter-Narcoterrorism
Conference hosted by OSD SO/LIC&IC&CN>. This is a Director level
conference to discuss regional and national CD policy, strategy and
programs.
JIATF-W also coordinates and exchanges intelligence on a regular
basis CD EA in Northern Command and Southern Command on the global
movement of illegal drugs and drug precursors.

private contractors
11. Senator Burris. General Chilton, private contractor support
continues to receive increased scrutiny due to abuses in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. Most recently, there were allegations of unauthorized
intelligence gathering operations by contractors. Abuses by contractors
continue to undermine our strategic efforts and bilk the taxpayers out
of millions of dollars. How will STRATCOM provide better oversight of
private contractors?
General Chilton. STRATCOM/J8 has a contracts branch within its
headquarters which monitors STRATCOM contracts and will provide better
oversight of private contracting as outlined below. They will ensure
contract personnel are trained to oversee their respective contracts.
As a result of recent allegations pertaining to contracts in
Afghanistan, J8 has implemented a process in which all intelligence
related requirements for new contracts and modifications to existing
contracts must be reviewed by J8 and STRATCOM's legal office. J8 has
also implemented a second level of control by requiring a division
chief or deputy division chief as an additional level of contract
oversight above the trained personnel. A rigorous funding review
process is also conducted before STRATCOM funding is approved.
Organizations must submit a spend plan based upon an approved financial
review by the STRATCOM Deputy Commander. Once the spend plan is
approved by J8, funding documents are prepared and reviewed within the
user's office and by at least two other personnel within J8. The
contracting and funding processes work hand in hand to ensure no
``abuses'' occur.
Presently, there are three ongoing investigations looking into
allegations relating to unauthorized intelligence gathering by
contractors. None of these investigations are complete, so it would be
premature to form conclusions as to the facts or findings these
investigations will reveal. However, none of these are funded with
STRATCOM funding.

12. Senator Burris. General Chilton, could the missions being
fulfilled by private contractors be better handled by military
personnel?
General Chilton. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has implemented
guidelines for managing functional and geographic combatant command's
manpower baselines. He has also established business rules to govern
the management of manpower resource relationships among the Services,
combatant commanders, and the combatant command support agents. These
guidelines state that once the baseline is established, permanent
military billets will only be adjusted based on approved programmed
changes. In light of this STRATCOM is working hard with DOD to convert
contractor positions into civilian billets based on in-sourcing
guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Wherever possible, we
are converting contractor positions to civilian billets based on cost
effectiveness and whether the work is inherently governmental. However,
there are certain functions that should continue to be contracted
because of specialized expertise which are not reasonably available
within the military or civilian communities and which are not an
inherently governmental function.

cyber command
13. Senator Burris. General Chilton, the President has stated that
cyber security is ``one of the most serious economic and national
security challenges we face as a Nation.'' As the new U.S. Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM) continues to take form, what is your strategy for
addressing the threat?
General Chilton. As CYBERCOM stands up it will need to continue to
change our DOD cyber culture, build capacity; increase capability; and
strengthen partnerships to effectively address the growing threats we
face within cyberspace.
With respect to changing culture, CYBERCOM will work with the
combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies to refine the way in
which we execute our responsibilities and grow our cyber expertise.
Through education and training, CYBERCOM will improve understanding
among all DOD personnel that every networked computer is on the front
line. Everyone who logs on is a cyber defender first. There are no
`protected zones' or `rear areas'; all are equally vulnerable.
CYBERCOM will work with the Services and their designated cyber
components to ensure we are able to build capacity through the
recruitment and retention of a world-class cadre of military cyber
forces. The skills required include operators, planners, analysts and
engineers. These cyber forces will require focused training, just like
other forces required to operate our most sophisticated and complex
weapons systems. Fundamental to this effort will be an ability to
manage this diverse but vital talent, and also to promote a culture of
creativity and innovation that will allow us to maintain our
technological edge in the cyberspace domain.
CYBERCOM will also increase our capability to deliver integrated
effects in cyberspace. These effects include building a shared
situational awareness of DOD networks; developing faster and more
comprehensive early warning; and improving our ability to plan and
execute dynamic defense operations. These effects will enable a
paradigm shift in the way we defend our networks--a move from a
reactive and passive posture to a proactive, prepared one.
Finally, CYBERCOM will focus on strengthening critical
partnerships. While the primary mission of U.S. Cyber Command will be
to secure our military's classified and unclassified networks, the
interconnected nature of these networks and the free flow of
information across them will necessitate an active partnership between
CYBERCOM and the other combatant commands, the Intelligence Community,
departments and agencies across the U.S. Government, and our allies, to
ensure that we work together to eliminate our collective
vulnerabilities. In addition, given that the private sector controls
the vast majority of our Nation's cyber infrastructure, a strong and
transparent partnership between U.S. Cyber Command and private industry
will be critical to allow for the exchange and development of new
technologies.

14. Senator Burris. General Chilton, how will CYBERCOM work with
other Federal and State agencies?
General Chilton. CYBERCOM Implementation Plan guidance directs the
establishment of two interagency coordination bodies. One body will be
focused on day-to-day operational planning, deconfliction and
execution. The second body, comprised of senior leadership from the
participating agencies, will meet periodically and review interagency
posture, operations and plans, and offer a forum for issue resolution,
communication facilitation, and the elevation of issues to senior U.S.
Government leadership.
CYBERCOM will also provide liaison officers (LNOs) to key
interagency partners in order to facilitate information sharing and
improve CYBERCOM's understanding of their partners' missions,
operations, and staffs. While at their host organization, these LNOs
will maintain routine contact with the CYBERCOM staff. Upon
establishment, CYBERCOM will maintain the existing LNO relationships
that are held by JFCC NW and JTF-GNO and will establish LNOs at other
key organizations as additional resources become available.
A Reserve component (RC) Joint Reserve Unit including elements from
each Service component, the Army National Guard, and the Air National
Guard, will be created at CYBERCOM. These elements will provide
CYBERCOM staff support, coordinate and provide situational awareness,
and ensure an understanding of unique roles and capabilities of the RC.

15. Senator Burris. General Chilton, how will you integrate the
National Guard and Reserve Forces into CYBERCOM?
General Chilton. CYBERCOM will communicate and coordinate through
the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Coordination Center (JoCC)
to leverage National Guard Title 32/State Active Duty cyber forces of
the States and territories. The Army National Guard and Air National
Guard maintain units that provide full spectrum information operations
and cyberspace operations capabilities, including computer network
defense, computer network exploitation, and computer network attack.
These capabilities meet Service and combatant commander requirements
and can be leveraged under state authorities to assist civil
authorities in the National Guard's Homeland Security and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities role.
A Reserve Component Joint Reserve Unit including elements from each
Service component, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard,
will be created at CYBERCOM. These elements will provide CYBERCOM staff
support, coordinate and provide situational awareness, and ensure an
understanding of unique roles and capabilities of the Reserve
component. The need for additional CYBERCOM Reserve requirements and
structure will continue to be analyzed as the Department's
understanding of the domain matures.

the strategic arms reduction treaty
16. Senator Burris. General Chilton, Secretary of State Clinton
said last week that the United States and Russia are on the brink of
completing a new nonproliferation treaty. What are your biggest
concerns with regard to nuclear security and the adoption of a new
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement?
General Chilton. My biggest concern is the modernization of our
nuclear weapons infrastructure, and approval of the administration's
request for funding that modernization. The proposed investment in the
infrastructure will enable improved security and reliability of our
nuclear weapons while at the same time enabling further reductions in
our hedge requirements, once the infrastructure improvements are
achieved.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
missile defense
17. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, while I am most concerned
about Iran and North Korea and generally wary of China and Russia,
rogue nation states and non-state actors continue to pursue nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. It is
critical that the Nuclear Triad, as well as Missile Defense, remain a
viable and effective mechanism for preventing those that mean this
country harm from doing so. Our Trident submarines have an average age
of 20 years old, with replacement build not starting until 2019 and
tentatively completed by 2028. The associated D5 missiles will undergo
modernization as well. Our nuclear stockpile will undergo life
extension programs for the W-76 warhead and the B-61 bomb. Both pre-
date the 1960s with variants as late as the mid-1990s. Our strategic
bomber fleet of B52s, B1s and B2s vary in age from 10-30 years. The
Secretary of Defense recently stated that 2020 may be the first time we
see a new bomber. $200 million has been requested for research and
development (R&D) of a new strategic bomber, but it is unclear what the
administration intends to do about a replacement for the 30 year-old
nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), a follow-on to the
Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and the F-35
``dual-capable'' aircraft. Are we assuming too much risk by only
modernizing our fleets and limiting the R&D necessary to keep our
qualitative edge over current and future adversaries?
General Chilton. Efforts are underway with participation by
STRATCOM to modernize the SSBN, Bomber, Cruise Missile, ICBM, and
nuclear weapons. As part of our support to the NPR we developed and
laid out our recommended capabilities in the triad. Specifically, our
recommendations included to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030
and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to
replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships' end of life; and to
study future long-range bomber capabilities and also support moving
forward with full-rate production for the W76-1 warhead for our
submarine leg of the triad; full-scope (nuclear and non-nuclear) life
extension of the B-61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and
extended deterrence role; and initiating studies to develop life
extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead. In this latter effort, we
should include the possibility of adapting the resulting warhead for
sea launched ballistic missiles and thereby reducing the number of
warhead types. This blueprint would allow us to be adequately postured
to deter strategic threats throughout the next 20-30 years.

18. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, do you believe that the fiscal
year 2011 budget request adequately funds what is needed to maintain
our deterrent and global strike capabilities?
General Chilton. Yes, the President's budget provides adequate
funding to address our Nation's most critical needs to maintain our
deterrent and global strike capabilities. Specific significant budget
decisions included $561 million transferred from DOD to the Department
of Energy ($160 million addition for B-61 life-extension) to ensure we
maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile, $493 million
for the Ohio-class replacement SSBN, $130 million for ICBM mods and
upgrades and a UH-1 helicopter replacement start, $240 million for
required bomber upgrades and industrial base sustainment, and $33
million for joint ballistic missile advanced fuze technologies.

19. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what impacts will the START
follow-on agreement have on our deterrent and global strike
capabilities?
General Chilton. We were involved and consulted in the development
of the central limits of the New START treaty. I assess this Nation and
our allies will continue to be safe and our forces sufficiently robust.
New START retains U.S. global strike capabilities-necessary to meet our
strategic deterrence requirements.

20. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what is the plan for our
stockpile of ALCM?
General Chilton. The current plan is to sustain our ALCM fleet
(warhead and missile) until 2030 or until a replacement capability can
be fielded. The Future Strategic Standoff Weapon Initial Capabilities
Document is scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2010. Starting in
fiscal year 2011, the Air Force will determine the need and
capabilities for a follow-on cruise missile through an Analysis of
Alternatives.

republic of korea missile defense
21. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, North Korea is a threat and
their pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities should not
be misinterpreted. Not only is North Korea pursuing their own
capabilities but they are also selling missiles, material, and
technology to other countries to include Iran. From the information I
have been provided, I understand that North Korea can produce up to
five nuclear bombs and are working on a two-stage missile that can
range Alaska and Hawaii and a three-stage missile that could range the
continental United States. As General Sharp outlined in his comments, a
transition to a ROK-led defense on the Korean Peninsula, relocation and
consolidation of U.S. forces into two areas, and the normalization of
servicemember tours, will strengthen U.S.-ROK relations while still
providing a strong deterrence against North Korean threats.
With the changes you highlighted, as well as the U.S. military
personnel cap of 28,500, is the ROK adequately supported and/or
prepared to defend itself against a North Korean ground, air, or
missile attack?
General Sharp. The short answer is ``yes,'' with our ROK allies,
our prepared defenses, and considering the U.S. forces planned to flow
into theater, Combined Forces Command is ready to repel a North Korean
ground, air, or maritime incursion into ROK territory. However, there
are notable capability gaps for which we either accept or must attempt
to further mitigate risk.
Specifically, North Korean ballistic missiles with chemical
warheads remain the single greatest threat to our bases and the ROK
civilian population in general. As you pointed out, the North Korean
missile threat continues to grow in number and capability. It demands a
combined and joint effort to provide a robust, active, layered theater
missile defense.
We need the capability to engage North Korean missiles at various
stages of flight. Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) could
provide the Korean Theater of Operations with a midcourse interceptor
for SCUD and NoDong threats. As an area defense weapon, THAAD is
capable of providing a layered defense as well as coverage to assets
currently on the CAL but not the CAL. PATRIOTS contribute a terminal
low-altitude layer of defense against short and medium range ballistic
missiles.
Currently, the Korean Theater of Operations only has PATRIOT for
on-peninsula TBM threats and AEGIS/SM-3s for shots against targets
outside the theater (Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska). North Korea has
more missiles than we have counter-measures. We have the technology to
counter the threat; we need to take the steps to field a layered
ballistic missile defense in Korea which mitigates the risk to our
assets and personnel.

defense policy review initiative
22. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, what, if any, response will we
see from the North Koreans with the potential realignment of U.S.
Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam and the deployment of U.S. missile
defense capabilities to Japan, as part of the Defense Policy Review
Initiative?
General Sharp. North Korea likely has already begun to respond to
the potential realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to
Guam primarily by editorials denouncing the United States.
The Korean People's Army (KPA) likely will not perceive a
realignment of U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces from Okinawa to Guam as
a significant change to the U.S. posture or threats facing it. The
added distance will somewhat increase USMC response times to a
potential Korean Peninsula crisis, but added response time is of little
benefit to the KPA since ROK forces are already responsible for and
capable of halting an initial North Korean attack. The USMC realignment
removes some U.S. forces from North Korean TBM range--thereby reducing
the number of strategic targets available for Pyongyang to threaten.
Guam likely remains within range of North Korea's new long range
theater ballistic missile. Additionally, North Korean intelligence
operations will likely shift from Okinawa to Guam.
North Korea has already attempted to score propaganda points about
the USMC move from Okinawa to Guam although it has been unable to
attract much attention to the issue. A recent Pyongyang editorial
alleged that the U.S. is using global realignment to gain hegemony, and
``respond rapidly to a `contingency' on the Korean peninsula . . . ''
\1\ North Korea will continue to protest U.S. forces' maneuvering and
expansion of overseas bases as proof of hostile and malignant
imperialistic intent. We expect to see editorials and pronouncements
denouncing realignment that are read mostly by Pyongyang elites and
international analysts--and believed by no one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nam CH`o'n-ung: ``What is the U.S. Forces Relocation Aimed
At?'' DPRK Cabinet Paper on U.S. Strategy Behind Planned Relocation of
U.S. Marines to Guam (U). Open Source Center. KPP20090324045005
Pyongyang Minju Joson (Electronic Edition) in Korean 24 Mar 09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korea will likely also portray the USMC as an unwelcome
`Occupying Force' that was finally expelled from Asia by the indigenous
population (Pyongyang will likely avoid congratulating Japan or the
Japanese directly). North Korea will attempt to use the USMC
`expulsion' as an example to encourage `Anti-Colonialist' forces to
expel Westerners and imperialist influence throughout Asia and
worldwide. Pyongyang will also likely declare that the United States
and USMC were cowed by the resolute KPA deterrence--thereby claiming
the realignment as a North Korean victory to bolster its internal
popular legitimacy. This particular line of propaganda reinforces North
Korea's self-portrayal as the defender of the true ethnic/cultural
Korean Nation from imperialist Westerners. Pyongyang will attempt to
rebut all U.S. military statements about force posture; U.S. statements
that it remains ready to defend allies and interests will be portrayed
as belligerence against North Korea; and U.S. statements that it is not
threatening the North will be dismissed as lies intended to deceive the
KPA.

22a. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, what, if any, response will we
see from the North Koreans with the deployment of U.S. Missile Defense
to Japan?
General Sharp. North Korea will likely respond to further
development of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Japan (which
significantly impacts Pyongyang's strategic capabilities) by attempting
to negate missile defense capabilities and by vociferously complaining
about the U.S. military buildup.
North Korea will correctly perceive regional missile defense
capabilities as negating hard-won North Korean strategic deterrence
(TBM, IRBM) and rendering it vulnerable to strategic coercion without
significant recourse. Most critically, North Korea might fear the U.S.-
ROK-Japan alliance will be emboldened to attempt a 'Regime Change'
offensive campaign if Pyongyang loses its strategic deterrence,\2\
particularly since the KPA conventional capabilities have atrophied
relative to the ROK.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ri Hyo'n-to; ``Missile Madness that Brings Fiery Clouds of
War'' DPRK Party Organ: U.S. Missile Defense in Asia, ROK Aims at
'Preemptive' Attack (U). Open Source Center. KPP20091007106001
Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (Electronic Edition) in Korean 07 Oct 09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korea will likely strive to develop countermeasures such as
increasing numbers of missiles, changing strategic theater targets,
developing missile defense countermeasures and asymmetric means, in
order to circumvent, overwhelm, or defeat any missile defense system.
Pyongyang has poured massive resources into developing its strategic
strike capability to guarantee the regime and cannot allow that
capability to be neutralized without adequate replacement. It is also
likely that further development of strategic strike capability will add
significant additional stress to the North Korean economy. Conversely,
North Korea might view its TBMs as minimally sufficient to deter
`Regime Change' despite a Japanese-based missile defense and continue
to rely on its developing a nuclear ICBM rather than expend resources
on increasing its TBM capability. In the same manner, North Korea has
declined to modernize the aging KPA and instead shifted its defense
responsibility to a strategic nuclear deterrent.
North Korea will criticize the U.S. and Japan for developing/
fielding missile defense systems that threaten the `peace' of Northeast
Asia. Pyongyang will protest the expansion of regional U.S.
capabilities and influence as further evidence of imperialism, and
might attempt to mis-characterize U.S. defensive missile systems as
having offensive strike capabilities. North Korea will likely criticize
Japan for increasing its perceived offensive capabilities and for its
complicity in U.S. efforts to expand its imperial influence in Asia.

pacific regional influencers
23. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, are there any other viable
influencers within the region besides China? If so, what level of
influence do they have?
General Sharp. As the U.S. Forces Korea Commander, I will focus on
the part of this question as it applies to the area of Northeast Asia.
The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following
countries and special administrative regions: China, Hong Kong, Japan,
Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan. As noted in my
Posture Statement, Northeast Asia is home to 4 of the world's 6 largest
militaries in terms of personnel, 25 percent of the world's population,
and 5 of the world's 19 largest economies (that collectively accounted
for 24.8 percent of global gross domestic product in 2009). Thus, when
viewed collectively, the military, demographic, and economic power of
the entities in Northeast Asia makes this area a major influencer in
the Pacific region as a whole. This influence in the Pacific region is
expected to grow over time as the countries in Northeast expand their
economies, military power, and presence in regional diplomatic and
political affairs as well as assume a growing role in regional
multilateral organizations such as the Asia Development Bank.
Within Northeast Asia, the ability of individual states--excluding
China and its special administrative regions as specified in your
question--to influence the Pacific region varies. As the world's third
largest economy in 2009 when gross domestic product is measured on a
purchasing power parity basis, Japan exerts influence in the Pacific
region due to its trade and foreign direct investment relationships
with nations of the area. Tokyo's political influence is moderated by
20th century historical issues that have yet to be resolved with many
Pacific area states. Russia has the ability to exert influence in the
Pacific through military sales and its large stock of natural resources
which the growing economies of Asia are eager to purchase. Due to its
relatively small economy and military, Mongolia's ability to influence
affairs in the Pacific is limited, although it has provided support to
international peacekeeping operations.
I expect that the ROK's influence in Pacific affairs will grow over
time. The current ROK President, Lee Myung-bak, has committed his
country to taking on a more regional and global orientation in its
policies and actions. Indeed, creating a ``Global Korea'' is now a
national goal. Later this year the city of Seoul will host a Group of
20 (G20) Summit and the ROK has pledged to triple its level of official
development assistance to a value that will equal 0.25 percent of gross
national income in 2015. Additionally, the country has increased its
participation in international peacekeeping operations and plans to
form a 3,000 person military unit that can be rapidly deployed in
support of such operations. The ROK is also a major trading partner for
many countries in the Pacific area and a source of foreign direct
investment as well as a provider of developmental assistance/advice for
regional states. Seoul has also increased its role and activity in
regional multilateral organizations and groupings. Thus, in terms of
diplomacy, security, and the economy, I believe that the ROK is already
exerting a degree of influence in the Pacific region and this influence
will grow over time.
On the flip side, North Korea exerts a negative influence in the
Pacific region through its provocations, nuclear, missile, and
proliferation activities. These activities inject instability and
uncertainty into the Pacific area and create a security concern for
regional states. Additionally, threats to security caused by North
Korea's behavior have a dampening effect on regional economic
development.

china's defense spending
24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, Taiwan, along with Japan and
South Korea, continues to be one of the strongest democratic partners
of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and serves as a model
of freedom and democracy. I continue to be concerned about the friction
over Taiwan's status as a sovereign nation in the context of the
People's Republic of China (PRC). The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review highlight of the continued concern over China's missile buildup
and increasingly advanced capabilities in the Pacific region, in
particular the Taiwan Strait, reinforces my concerns. You have stated,
``it is difficult to reconcile China's developmental goals with its
evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S.
freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of
its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners.'' I fully
support the recent decision to sell U.S. military weapon systems to
Taiwan, even with the concerns voiced by China. However, I do not agree
with the decision to not sell F-16s as part of this package. What
effects are China's significant increases in defense spending, foreign
military sales (FMS), and use of soft power having in the PACOM region?
Admiral Willard. China's significant increases in defense spending,
FMS, and use of soft power have challenged parts of the status quo and
have the potential to challenge the relative stability at a time when
the economic locus is shifting east. China's rapid increases in defense
spending have focused in large measure on developing China's
capabilities to deter Taiwan independence and eventually compel
unification of Taiwan and mainland China. This increase in Chinese
military capability vis-a-vis Taiwan poses a continued military threat
to Taiwan and remains a significant obstacle to improved cross-Strait
relations.
China's increasing military budget and capabilities have also
focused on power projection and area denial, both of which are of some
concern to me at the U.S. Pacific Command. China is pursuing a variety
of air, sea, space, and counter-space, and information warfare systems
and operational concepts to deny other countries' military forces--most
notably those of the U.S. access to the air and sea space near China's
periphery. This capability could pose an increasing challenge to the
U.S. military's ability to operate in the Western Pacific during a
crisis. The Chinese military's focus on operating at greater distances
from China is allowing Beijing to focus greater attention on perceived
security issues in the East and South China Seas, and potentially in
the Indian Ocean as well. This creates both opportunities for
cooperation--as in the Gulf of Aden--and potential emerging challenges
to the United States and its allies and partners as the Chinese
military--the navy in particular--expands its area of operations.
China's military modernization is occurring alongside a broader
Chinese effort to build its global influence and soft power, with a
particular focus on countries within the PACOM AOR. China's deepening
economic relationships within the region remain its most potent levers
of influence with its regional neighbors. One recent and salient
example is the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which went into
effect in January 2010. This FTA will allow China to further deepen
economic ties to Southeast Asia--a region of considerable and growing
importance to PACOM. This expansion of Southeast Asia trade
relationships is occurring alongside increasing Chinese trade ties with
the region's other major economic powers. China's economic influence is
not limited to trade ties; China regularly uses grants, low-interest
loans, and Chinese-financed infrastructure projects as influence-
building tools--particularly among the developing nations of Oceania,
Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
China's military is a growing part of China's influence-building
effort. China conducted several first-ever bilateral exercises in
region over the past 3 years--including exercises with India, Mongolia,
Thailand, and Singapore. China continues to use FMS to developing
countries of South and Southeast Asia as means to build influence.
While China's FMS in the PACOM AOR has been modest when compared to its
sales to Pakistan, parts of the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan
Africa, they nevertheless are significant to developing countries with
modest defense budgets.
China's expanding military power and growing influence in the
region are having important effects on how countries in the region are
viewing their own security situations as well as their relationships
with the United States and their regional neighbors. China's neighbors
are uneasy about China's military rise. Many have openly questioned
China's long-term strategic intentions and called on Beijing to be more
transparent in explaining to the region for what purpose is China so
rapidly developing its military capabilities. Some regional countries
are rethinking their defense strategies and procurements to hedge
against a more assertive China. While China's neighbors are seeking
greater diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with Beijing,
these same countries are also continuing--for the most part--to call
for a strong U.S. military presence in the region as a stabilizing
force.

1979 taiwan relations act
25. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, do you have any concerns
regarding our ability to comply with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and
how it impacts relations with China and stability in the region?
Admiral Willard. No. For more than 30 years the United States has
fulfilled its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. By doing so,
we are helping to ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait, and throughout
the region.
General Sharp. Issues such as this related to Taiwan fall outside
my AOR and under the purview of PACOM. Thus, I will defer to Admiral
Willard on this question.

26. Senator Inhofe. General Sharp, where do we stand with respect
to selling more advanced F-16 fighters to Taiwan?
Admiral Willard. [Deleted.]
General Sharp. Issues such as this related to Taiwan fall outside
my AOR and under the purview of PACOM. Thus, I will defer to Admiral
Willard on this question.

u.s. foreign engagement programs
27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, your comments that ``we cannot
take our influence in the region for granted and that our status as the
partner of choice is difficult to maintain given the constraints such
as limitation of our security assistance programs'' is quite telling
and cannot be disregarded. Our military-to-military (1206), civilian-
to-civilian (1207), small-scale special forces (1208), Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant Commander's Initiative
Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in aiding developing
nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency
situations. I was pleased to see an increase in 1206 funding in the
fiscal year 2011 budget . . . increasing funding from $350 million to
$500 million. I have voiced my concern about the level of funding of
CCIF and movement of 1207 funds to the Department of State in the
fiscal year 2011 DOD request. It is evident in your comments that you
believe these programs are truly beneficial, yet suffer from being Cold
War era programs subjected to a multitude of influencers; what
constraints or concerns would you like to emphasize to ensure we do not
lose our influence in the region?
Admiral Willard. I would refer you to Secretary Gates' speech to
the Nixon Center in February where he laid out the following key
principles that should be included in any security assistance reform
effort:

The programs must be flexible, and able to respond to
emergent crisis
There must be provisions for appropriate congressional
oversight
Security Assistance programs must take the long view
toward the political crisis of the day
The State Department's leading role in crafting U.S.
foreign policy must be reinforced
Capacity building programs must acknowledge that
partnerships will always mean relinquishing some degree of
control.

28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard, do you have concerns over the
fiscal year 2011 funding breakout for your engagement programs?
Admiral Willard. Although we could always use more, I am generally
pleased with the breakout of funding allocated to the Pacific Command
in fiscal year 2010, and that projected for 2011. These are very
important programs that provide an incredible return on our investment.

29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, can each of
you give me an update on how these programs are doing in PACOM and in
the ROK?
Admiral Willard. Foreign engagement programs are the backbone of
PACOM's success in the region. Together with other U.S. Government
agencies, PACOM has successfully protected our territory and interests.
Showing countries their relevance to the AOR and building their
capacity to protect their own interests, essentially helps the United
States in solidifying trust and protecting shared interests with
partner nations. Additionally, utilizing the whole-of-government
approach, in concert with the interagency, gives us the ability to
affect all sides of the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
(DIME) construct. The result is that the Asia Pacific region is stable
and secure.
General Sharp. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs are
powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with
nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Since purview over these programs
in Northeast Asia lies with United States Pacific Command, I will defer
to Admiral Willard for an update on how these programs are progressing.
I can, however, provide a brief update on the status of FMS to the ROK.
Administered through the Joint United States Military Affairs Group
Korea, the ROK has been a major purchaser of U.S. defense articles.
During the years 2002 thru 2008 the ROK spent over $5.6 billion on FMS
defense articles and another $9.6 billion on direct commercial sales of
U.S. defense products. From 2005-2008, the ROK spent over $47 million
on military training in the United States via the FMS program. In 2009,
the ROK sent 648 personnel to the United States for training in 987
different courses. Currently, the ROK has an active FMS program of
nearly 600 active cases valued at over $12 billion. Some of the major
items purchased through the FMS program include the F-4, F-5, F-15, and
F-16 fighters, AWACS, P-3 patrol planes, MLRS, Patriot, SM-2, and AEGIS
combat system. The robust FMS program with the ROK as described above
maintains a high degree of interoperability between U.S. and ROK
military forces and in turn enhances the deterrent and warfighting
capabilities of Combined Forces Command.
Separate from the programs discussed above, my Command is
conducting a wide array of engagement events with the ROK. Contained
within our Good Neighbor Program, a host of activities are conducted
that engage and connect the Command with the Korean community. Good
Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with
the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows
Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another's
cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of
lifelong friendships between members of the two communities. Examples
of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-
language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and
tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK
installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK
personnel and people of our host nation. The program helps foster
exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of my Command
and the Korean communities that exist along USFK facilities. In 2009
alone, 2,043 events were conducted with the participation of over
139,000 local nationals. All of these events strengthen the ROK-U.S.
Alliance at both the professional and personal levels.

30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, with the
movement of 1207 funding to State, do you have concerns that the State
Department will not be able to execute 1207 as rapidly as DOD has and
how will you ensure all these programs continue to be synchronized
between Defense and State?
Admiral Willard. Turning over 1207 to State should not impact the
speed of execution. State already had the lead on the 1207 process,
with Defense coordinating at the Country Team level. Defense
representatives at each Embassy will continue coordination with State
at the local level and provide feedback to the Pacific Command to
ensure overall synchronization with broader security assistance
engagement activities.
General Sharp. In the Department of Defense, offices that play a
role in management and execution of the section 1207 program are the
Office of the Secretary Defense, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands.
Thus, as a sub-unified commander, I do not participate in the operation
of this program. Additionally, to date no projects have been conducted
with the ROK nor do I know of any 1207 project proposals that involve
the ROK. Thus, I will defer to Admiral Willard of U.S. Pacific Command
on this question, where several 1207 projects have been conducted with
countries in his AOR.

cyber command
31. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, you have made significant
gains since our last discussion over cyberspace. I am specifically
pleased to see that you have consolidated both the JTF-GNO and the
Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare, which I know
was an issue. I understand that Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the
current Director of the National Security Agency, is still pending
nomination approval for Commander, CYBERCOM. What issues are you facing
with the stand up of CYBERCOM?
General Chilton. Our primary concern is hiring the skilled
workforce required for the cyberspace mission. The Department has
placed a very high emphasis on training programs and we are working
with the Services to ensure that standardized curriculums are in place.
These programs are intense and require some of the greatest time
commitments of any in the Department. We have increased the throughput
of students at the school house to help solve this problem, but it will
take some time to generate the capacity required. We continue to work
on technical solutions to take advantage of the speed of maneuver
required for cyberspace operations. Additionally, we need to improve
the defensibility of our military networks as they exist today, to
include building a shared situational awareness of DOD networks;
developing faster and more comprehensive early warning on impending
intrusions into our networks; and improving our ability to implement,
plan and execute dynamic network defense operations.
Moreover, we will need to focus on increasing our capability to
deliver integrated cyber effects in support of combatant commander, to
include developing an agile, transparent, and responsive cyberspace
requirements process.
Simultaneously, we must mature the command, building the staff,
while working closely with the military departments and their
designated cyber components to ensure that we are able to retain a
world-class cadre of military cyber forces that we have trained and
developed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
chinese military modernization
32. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, you comment in your written
statement that ``China continues to develop weapons systems,
technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and
area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and
maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline.''
From a tactical air and long-range bomber perspective, how confident
are you that, if required, you will have the assets you need as a
combatant commander to prevail in the event of a conflict?
Admiral Willard. In the short term, I believe that U.S. forces have
the ability to prevail in the event of a conflict in the PACOM AOR.
However, we need to monitor carefully China's developing ability to
execute anti-access and area denial strategies and develop mitigating
approaches. The developing Air-Sea Battle Concept is one such
mitigation, and will need to be evaluated and, when mature,
implemented. In the longer run, other mitigations for such strategies
may need to be developed and acquired, including a new generation of
aerial refueling aircraft and long-range strike systems.

33. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, where do you see risks for
the United States in this area?
Admiral Willard. I think we see some risk in the development of
anti-access and area denial capabilities that may come from China's
military modernization. Additionally, there may be some risk for the
United States in the potential shift in the regional balance of power
and increased competition over energy resources that could result from
a rapid increase in Chinese military strength. I also think that the
development of mitigating strategies and capabilities along with
continued cooperation with regional allies and partners and engagement
with China are vital to approaching these risks.

34. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, thinking 5 to 10 years down
the road and based on the trajectories of currently planned U.S. force
development and projected Chinese force development, what is your
assessment of the risks for the United States in that timeframe.
Admiral Willard. Given the current rate of China's military
modernization in the areas of naval, air, missile, and space, China
will develop a substantial power projection capability out to 300
nautical miles from its shores by 2015. They will have the ability to
rival U.S. military force presence in the Western Pacific. By 2020,
Chinese capabilities will likely expand to directly challenge U.S.
military force presence in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea.
U.S. military forces have been in the Western Pacific since the end of
the Second World War. Through the decades those forces have acted as a
guarantor of security not only for U.S. interests, but for the entire
region. A shift in the balance of power in East Asia due to the growth
of Chinese military strength could risk a loss of confidence in U.S.
security from regional U.S. partners and allies. This could result in
regional powers hedging against China by building their own domestic
military capabilities, making compromises with China over a range of
issues, and potentially engaging in regional conflicts over vital
energy resources.

pacific regional relationships
35. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, your AOR is huge both in
terms of area and population. As you look 20 and 30 years down the
road, are there places within the PACOM AOR where the U.S. needs to be
thinking about establishing closer relationships, perhaps to include
basing rights, to ensure we can provide the kind of security and
stability in the coming decades as we provide today?
Admiral Willard. As you look out 20-30 years in the future, U.S.
interests in South Asia will only increase. In fact, the importance of
the Indian Ocean Region to global stability and economic revitalization
has increased considerably over the past decade. India is crucial to
maintaining stability and growth in the region. Our relationship with
India continues to mature and it is important we work to sustain this.
Working with India, there is an opportunity for the U.S. to play a
vital role in establishing more robust and proactive regional
cooperation with other South Asia partners, like Bangladesh, Nepal, the
Maldives, and Sri Lanka, to root out violent extremism and their safe
havens and to establish the infrastructure that provides the capability
and capacity for these partners to respond effectively to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in response to the many
natural disasters that plague this region. In concert with CENTCOM,
this regional cooperation needs to extend to Pakistan in order to
foster the economic stability and then growth that will benefit all the
countries in the region. The situation in each country is unique and
pursuing basing rights will not necessarily facilitate closer
relationships. But it will be necessary to assess what infrastructure
and support is necessary for the capabilities and cooperation required
to achieve true regional cooperation in which the U.S. is viewed as a
viable partner.
Southeast Asia is another critical region. Leaders in Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have expressed a general
agreement that a U.S. forward presence is essential to regional
stability in view of a myriad of transnational security threats and the
rise of China. In this context major Southeast Asia states--Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam--are seeking
opportunities to expand bilateral, as well as multilateral engagement
with the U.S. in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, maritime security and countering violent extremism. Long-term
stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be directly dependent on the
near-term success of the United States in building the needed
relationships with major ASEAN states to become the enduring partner-
of-choice.

36. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Willard, what do we need to be doing
as a Nation now to lay the ground work for those relationships?
Admiral Willard. The situation in each country is unique, but
utilizing consistent messaging across the spectrum of civilian and
military leadership, the media, and think tanks, we want to emphasize
direct benefits to the individual country, vice stressing mutual
benefits. This approach, along with continued patient and persistent
engagement, will help the Nation lay the ground work for expanding and
strengthening relationships.
Vital tools for U.S. efforts in building allied and partner nation
capacity include Exercise Related Construction, the Asia-Pacific
Regional Initiative, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, IMET,
and the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) 1206 and 1207.
Increasing the funding and reliability of these programs will
facilitate whole-of-government and multilateral relationships for U.S.
access for needed training and operations. As a Nation,
institutionalizing these key programs, and others like it, will be
viewed as a commitment to U.S. presence in the region.

u.s. missile defense
37. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, in your written statement
you comment that ``with the exception of the U.S., all nuclear weapon
states continue to modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles and in
some cases grow them further.'' In your view, what risks is the United
States accepting by not modernizing our nuclear weapon stockpiles and
what specific actions do you recommend in this regard?
General Chilton. The Nuclear Posture Review calls for sustained
interagency and bipartisan efforts to address the risks associated with
an aging stockpile and changes in the international security
environment. PB11 begins the process to reduce these risks, as it
supports: (1) Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons enterprise
infrastructure--physical and human capital, (2) Timely warhead life
extension programs that explore the full range of life extension
options, and (3) Robust stockpile assessment and surveillance programs.
These actions will ensure the United States sustains a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal.

38. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, regarding prompt global
strike, what are the specific barriers to pursuing this non-nuclear
strike capability and, in your view, what is a feasible timeline for
developing this capability that will--as you say--``provide the
President a broader range of non-nuclear options to address emerging
threats rapidly''?
General Chilton. There are no specific barriers in the pursuit of
this capability; however the Department is utilizing an event based
acquisitions approach that focuses on maturing critical technologies
before executing Service-led Conventional Prompt Global Strike
acquisition programs. Under USD AT&L leadership, the Department is
making progress in efforts to mature important hypersonic strike
technologies, which include: thermal protection structures, advanced
materials, communications, flight controls, navigation and guidance and
autonomous flight safety system.
Planned flight experiments in fiscal year 2011 will provide the
Department quantitative data regarding the maturity of technologies
which will inform future potential timelines.

39. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, in your written statement
you refer to the Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense which seeks to address what are judged to be the most urgent
threats first with proven, cost-effective platforms. There has not been
universal acceptance in Congress of this approach. Any approach accepts
a certain amount of risk. Could you offer your assessment of what risks
the current Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense may accept and
the extent to which you believe accepting risk in these areas is wise
and warranted?
General Chilton. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review,
it is inherently difficult to predict the nature of the threat our
Nation will face in the years to come; however, it is a fact that the
threat from ballistic missiles--of all ranges--will continue to grow.
The Phased Adaptive Approach should allow us to tailor our capabilities
and associated architectures in response to the threat, and as such,
allow us to manage technological challenges we may encounter during
development, deployment or in operations. The National Intelligence
Estimate has characterized short-range ballistic missiles as the most
immediate threat to our deployed forces, Allies and friends. To
adequately equip our missile defense forces to meet this threat, Joint
Staff J8 has initiated a Joint Capability Mix (JCM) study to examine
sufficiency needed to counter the threat. Additionally, STRATCOM and
MDA conduct an annual review of capabilities being fielded versus the
assessed threats. These reviews ensure the warfighter view of the
threat and missile defense capabilities are presented to the OSD staff
and OSD leadership. As the Phased Adaptive Approach is fielded missile
defense will be flexible to meet the threat. To enhance regional
defense of our deployed forces, Allies and friends, PB11 requests
funding for MDA and Navy to add 10 AEGIS BMD ships between fiscal year
2010-2012 and funds the purchase of 436 SM-3 interceptors by fiscal
year 2015. Additionally, PB11 funds 9 THAAD batteries and 431 THAAD
interceptors by fiscal year 2015.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
long-range strike capabilities
40. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, you note in your prepared
testimony that ``elements of China's military modernization appear
designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region'' and that
``China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts
of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the
Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended
distances from the PRC coastline.'' As the combatant commander
responsible for the Pacific theater, how important is it to you that
the Air Force develops a new long-range bomber that is capable of
penetrating these anti-access and area denial systems and technologies?
Admiral Willard. My primary interest is ensuring that U.S. forces
in PACOM have adequate freedom of action to ensure their ability to
accomplish assigned missions, including in anti-access and area denial
environments. Long-range strike capabilities are an important part of
ensuring U.S. freedom of action. In addition to penetrating bombers,
there are several other approaches to conducting long-range strike. A
family-of-systems approach may be the most cost-effective to attaining
the capabilities that are needed.

41. Senator Thune. General Chilton, how important is it to you as
the head of STRATCOM that the Air Force develops a new long range
bomber that is capable of penetrating these anti-access and area denial
systems and technologies?
General Chilton. As we sustain and modernize the nuclear triad, our
Nation will continue to require a nuclear-capable bomber leg's inherent
flexibility to address a variety of possible adversaries and
threatening contingencies. We are working with the Office of Secretary
of Defense's Long-Range Strike study to identify requirements for the
next long-range bomber that will meet combatant commander's needs and
ensure no gap in capabilities.

42. Senator Thune. General Chilton, you note in your prepared
testimony that you are working with the Air Force to ``identify
requirements for the next manned, nuclear-capable long range strike
platform.'' My understanding had been that no decision had been made
yet as to whether the next long range strike platform would be manned
and whether it would be nuclear capable. Is it now set in stone that
the new bomber will be manned and nuclear capable?
General Chilton. No decision on the platform characteristics has
been made. STRATCOM is participating in the Secretary of Defense's Long
Range Strike Study, to identify and assess necessary capabilities and
attributes for the new bomber. We anticipate the new study will be
completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012
budget submission.

43. Senator Thune. General Chilton, when was that decision made?
General Chilton. No decision on the platform characteristics has
been made. STRATCOM is participating in the Secretary of Defense's Long
Range Strike Study, to identify and assess necessary capabilities and
attributes for the new bomber. We anticipate the new study will be
completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012
budget submission.

44. Senator Thune. General Chilton, the new Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) report states that Secretary Gates has ordered a follow-on
study with regard to expanding long range strike capabilities. Have you
been involved at all with this new study, and if so, can you provide an
update on the progress of this study to date?
General Chilton. STRATCOM has been involved from the very beginning
of this study. I am a member of the Senior Working Group providing
oversight and my staff is directly integrated into the study effort. We
are working to fully understand how potential long-range strike options
and supporting capabilities contribute to our Nation's security goals.
We anticipate the new study will be completed in time to inform
decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

45. Senator Thune. General Chilton, when do you expect this study
to be completed?
General Chilton. We anticipate the new study will be completed in
time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget
submission

46. Senator Thune. General Chilton, to the best of your knowledge,
how many studies have been conducted by the Pentagon with regard to
developing a follow-on long range strike platform?
General Chilton. During my tenure at STRATCOM since the fall of
2007, there have been a number of Service and OSD(AT&L)-led studies of
required capabilities for long-range air-delivered strike. Significant
studies include: The Air Force Bomber Force Structure study (May 2008),
QDR Tiger Team (November 2009), and the ongoing Secretary of Defense
directed Long Range Strike study.

air-sea battle concept
47. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, I wanted to get your views on
the development of an Air-Sea Battle concept that is currently under
way in the Pentagon. The new QDR directs the Navy and the Air Force to
develop a new joint Air-Sea Battle concept for defeating adversaries
with anti-access and area denial capabilities, which in turn will help
guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power
projection operations. As you know, anti-access and area denial systems
are being aggressively pursued by nations in your AOR. Could you
provide your views on how this new concept will affect the way you
currently operate and the way you will operate in the future?
Admiral Willard. I am very interested in any concept that helps
preserve and extend freedom of action in the PACOM AOR, especially in a
contested environment, should that occur. The Air-Sea Battle concept is
one of those. My staff continues to monitor the work of the joint Navy-
Air Force Air-Sea Battle study group. This work will help the PACOM
staff identify where unaddressed capability gaps exist, especially in
countering anti-access/area denial strategies. These gaps may require
development and acquisition of additional capabilities.

48. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, where does PACOM fit into the
overall development, evaluation, and implementation of this concept?
Admiral Willard. Development of the Air-Sea battle concept is being
performed by a joint Navy-Air Force study team. The PACOM Staff is
monitoring its development with great interest, and we look forward to
the study team's report. Along with the other combatant commands, we
expect to be active in evaluation of the study team's recommendations
and in its implementation when it achieves an appropriate level of
maturity.

49. Senator Thune. Admiral Willard, in your view, how will long-
range strike capabilities fit into this new Air-Sea battle concept?
Admiral Willard. Long-range strike capabilities contribute to the
Air-Sea battle concept by helping to eliminate or limit the
effectiveness of adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities,
whether they are land- or sea-based.

50. Senator Thune. General Chilton, have you been involved at all
with the development of this new Air-Sea battle concept? If so, could
you provide your views and activities in developing this new concept?
General Chilton. I and my staff are aware of this effort but to
date have not materially participated.

follow-on start
51. Senator Thune. General Chilton, the START follow-on agreement
will include a ceiling on operationally deployed nuclear delivery
vehicles of 700. What are the implications for each leg of the nuclear
triad under these limitations?
General Chilton. While decisions on the planned force have yet to
be finalized, the force structure flexibility within New START ensures
the continued viability of all legs of the triad to meet strategic
deterrent requirements. We are progressing as quickly as possible to
provide the New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure
Plans as directed by Section 1251 of the NDAA of 2010 to Congress.

52. Senator Thune. General Chilton, according to the testimony of
Admiral Mullen before this committee earlier this year, there is
currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall
bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. I assume this means
that the START follow-on treaty is likely to result in a reduction of
deployed strategic bombers. How do you believe these reductions would
be apportioned between the B-52 and B-2, and at what level of reduction
do you become nervous about the viability of the bomber leg of the
triad?
General Chilton. The START follow-on treaty did not require a
specific reduction to either the B-2 or B-52. NPR guidance was to
retain both bombers and convert some B-52H, to a conventional only
role. The conversion of a portion of the B-52 force to conventional
only will allow the Air Force to retain sufficient dual-capable B-52s
to support conventional requirements, and provide extended deterrence
to our allies, deter our adversaries, and maintain a hedge against
future uncertainty. Force structure flexibility within New START
enables the enduring viability of all legs of the triad and will
preserve our current global strike capabilities. We are progressing as
quickly as possible to provide the New START Treaty Framework and
Nuclear Force Structure Plans as directed by section 1251 of the NDAA
of 2010 to Congress.

airborne laser
53. Senator Thune. General Chilton, on February 11 of this year,
the MDA completed a successful destruction of a threat representative
missile in its boost phase using a high energy laser beam from the
Airborne Laser aircraft. This is a remarkable accomplishment. What are
your views of this successful test of the Airborne Laser program, and
do you think it marks the beginning of a revolution in military
affairs?
General Chilton. The recent feasibility tests of the Airborne Laser
Test Bed--that being, successful detection, tracking, and engagement of
boosting threat-representative missiles--highlight the important work
accomplished by MDA in the directed energy arena to this point. These
tests are also illustrative of potential new capabilities that further
development of this technology could provide to combatant commanders.
Directed energy technology holds promise for boost-phase intercept
and handling increasing raid sizes, and could contribute to an
offsetting strategy for missile vs. missile which is cost imposing on
adversaries. STRATCOM supports the continued research and development
of directed energy projects, although the actual technology development
is not a combatant command responsibility.
U.S. Strategic Command fully supports the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and Director of Defense Research and Engineering as they begin
over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to build on Airborne Laser
Test Bed lessons and research and test operationally viable and
affordable directed energy concepts and platforms.

54. Senator Thune. General Chilton, what are your views about how
this program should move forward?
General Chilton. STRATCOM supports the continued research and
development of directed energy projects, although the actual technology
development is not a combatant command responsibility.
STRATCOM fully supports the MDA and Director of Defense Research
and Engineering as they begin over the FYDP to build on Airborne Laser
Test Bed lessons and research and test operationally viable and
affordable directed energy concepts and platforms.

55. Senator Thune. General Chilton, should we be aggressively
leveraging this new technology?
General Chilton. Yes. The recent feasibility tests of the Airborne
Laser Test Bed--that being, successful detection, tracking, and
engagement of boosting threat-representative missiles--highlight the
incredible work accomplished in the directed energy arena to this
point, and portend the revolutionary capabilities further development
of this technology could provide.
Directed energy technology holds promise for boost-phase intercept
and for handling of increased raid size, and offers an offsetting
strategy for missile vs. missile which is cost imposing. STRATCOM
supports the continued research and development of directed energy
projects, although the actual technology development is not a combatant
command responsibility.

56. Senator Thune. General Sharp, in light of the successful test
of the Airborne Laser in shooting down a boosting missile, do you view
its continued development as important to our future ability to defend
the Korean theater?
General Sharp. I believe key technological advances such as the
Airborne Laser's ability to defeat Theater Ballistic Missiles are
uniquely suited for our Area of Operation. With the tremendous
accomplishments the Airborne Laser has enjoyed in the last year, I feel
that we need to continue to build upon this capability so that it is
more reliable, less operationally constrictive and more responsive in
nature based on conditions of limited warning.

[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, McCain,
Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, and LeMieux.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff member present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member;
and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jennifer R.
Knowles, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed;
Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Marta McLellan Ross and Gordon I. Peterson, assistants to
Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
Senator Begich; Anthony J. Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants
to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants
to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine
Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant
to Senator LeMieux; and Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the ballistic missile defense (BMD)
policies and programs accompanying the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2011. We're pleased to have four
distinguished witnesses with us today to consider these
matters. Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, has been deeply involved in all facets of
the administration's missile defense policy consideration and
their efforts. This includes the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)
to missile defense in Europe announced by the President last
September, as well as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and the recently
released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Dr. Michael Gilmore is the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) at the Department of Defense (DOD). His
office plays a crucial role in the Nation's ability to have
confidence that our weapons systems work as intended, and this
committee has sponsored many improvements in the DOT&E ability
to assess the capabilities and testing of our missile defense
systems. He has recently submitted to Congress a number of
reports related to missile defense and his organization has
been instrumental in the development of the new missile defense
integrated master test plan (IMTP).
Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly is the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which is charged with designing,
developing, and producing all the elements of the BMD system
and ensuring that they work together effectively in an
integrated fashion to defend our Homeland and our forward-
deployed forces, our allies, and our partners. We will be
interested to hear how the $8.4 billion budget request for the
MDA supports the policies and strategies presented in the BMDR.
Rear Admiral Archer Macy is the Director of the Joint
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) of the
Joint Staff. His organization works with the combatant
commanders to ensure that our missile defense programs are
meeting their needs and to consider future needs for our
missile defense capabilities. For example, several years ago
his organization conducted an important analysis of our
combatant commanders' upper tier missile defense needs as
compared to the threats facing them. This study, called the
Joint Capabilities Mix Study, concluded that we needed to buy
at least twice as many Standard Missile 3 and Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as planned to meet
the warfighters' needs and that is what this administration
plans on doing.
We thank our witnesses for their service, their numerous
contributions to the security of our Nation, including
improving our missile defense policy and programs.
The past year has been a busy one for missile defense. Last
April, Secretary Gates announced a number of significant
changes to our missile defense approach and programs, including
the termination of a number of troubled programs and an
increased focus on our regional missile defense. In September
President Obama announced a new PAA to missile defense in
Europe, which was unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This February, along with the budget request, the
administration submitted the QDR and the BMDR. The latter was
born in this committee. Just a few weeks ago, the
administration submitted the NPR, which was also initiated by
this committee.
I want to commend the administration and our witnesses
today for their thoughtful and thorough approach to these
missile defense matters. I think there are a number of
significant improvements in missile defense that are consistent
with this committee's recommendations and they deserve strong
bipartisan support. First, much greater emphasis on meeting the
needs of the combatant commanders and in providing the
capabilities to defend our forward-deployed forces, our allies,
and partners against existing short- and medium-range missile
threats from nations like North Korea and Iran. This focus is
embodied in the PAA that is being used for Europe and other
regions. In this regard, the good news, which sometimes seems
overlooked, is that we are ahead of the threat in defending our
Homeland. We already have a missile defense system in place for
the United States, whereas those nations have not deployed
long-range missiles that could reach our shores, and our system
is being improved and will be supplemented by elements of the
PAA in Europe.
Second, the administration has adopted a policy of
requiring realistic testing and operational testing to
demonstrate that our missile defense systems work before we
deploy them. This ``fly-before-you-buy'' approach is long
overdue and brings missile defense into line with all of our
other major defense acquisition programs. The new missile
defense test plan reflects and supports this new policy and is
a significant improvement.
Third, the management and oversight of the MDA's programs
has been strengthened through the Missile Defense Executive
Board and by making the MDA programs consistent with the
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. The
administration's focus on fiscally sustainable missile defense
is both realistic and essential.
Fourth, the emphasis on international efforts and
cooperation should help strengthen regional security against
missile threats from nations like Iran and North Korea. This
includes our work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) on missile defense in Europe and with regional allies
and partners in the Middle East and East Asia. In this context,
I would highlight the possibility of missile defense
cooperation with Russia. U.S.-Russia cooperation against Iran
would send a powerful signal to Iran of the unity of the world
against their threatening policies and programs. We have an
important opportunity to improve our security through
cooperation and I look forward to hearing about that potential
from our witnesses.
On a final note concerning the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START), the administration said from the beginning of
the negotiations that the treaty does not limit missile
defenses, the treaty is about reductions of strategic nuclear
arms, and I hope our witnesses will comment on that.
Before recognizing our witnesses, let me call on Senator
McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses.
Over the past year our national policy on missile defense
has been substantially revised. I believed, and said so at the
time, that this administration got off on the wrong foot with
its plans for missile defense, undermining two NATO allies who
had much at stake in our previous deployment of these
capabilities in Europe. But with the BMDR and with an increased
level of funding for missile defense in the fiscal year 2011
budget request, the administration appears to have embraced
missile defense. Their proposal to establish a layered global
missile defense architecture seems to be scaleable and flexible
enough to address the threats of today and prepare for those of
tomorrow. By rapidly pursuing the PAA, while also providing
much-needed modernization, sustainment, and development funding
for legacy systems, such as our Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) System, this budget represents a seriousness on missile
defense from this administration.
Nonetheless, given their abrupt actions in the past, the
administration must make a long-term commitment to missile
defense and honor all of the long-term goals established within
their BMDR, especially the development of the SM-3 Block II-B
interceptor, which will provide additional defense to the
Homeland.
In the event that the proposed development and deployment
of later generations of the SM-3 interceptor are not achieved
within the planned 2018-to-2020 timeframe, it's imperative that
the administration fully support and fund the development of
the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI) as a technological
hedge.
The management of the MDA appears to be turning a corner,
as recently highlighted by the Government Accountability
Office. Still, there's more to be done, including the
establishment of key baselines across all programs and
addressing both inadequate quality control and substandard
contractor performance. Poor contractor performance has long
plagued many of the Department's multi-billion dollar
acquisition programs, and I'm encouraged by the steps the MDA
is undertaking to withhold profits from contractors responsible
for unacceptable, poor, or substandard performance.
To illustrate this point, the failed THAAD test in December
is indicative of the financial and operational consequences
that can result from one contractor's carelessness. This
critical test, one of the last necessary to certify the
operational capability of this important missile defense
system, required hundreds of hours to coordinate and over $50
million to field. However, the test was rendered useless when
the air-launched target, as a result of blatant contractor
error, failed to ignite, fell from the back of a C-17, and sank
to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.
For far too long, contractors have attempted to cut corners
on quality control at an increased cost to the taxpayer. This
is simply unacceptable, and I look forward to hearing what more
you are doing to ensure that all future contracts are
structured to demand both accountability and performance.
Missile defense is a key national security priority and its
importance will only grow as we take responsible steps to
reduce our nuclear arsenal. While the New START has not
officially been transmitted to the Senate, Secretary Gates has
affirmed that this treaty will not ``limit plans to protect the
United States and our allies by improving and deploying missile
defense systems.'' Nonetheless, I'm concerned that the treaty
may establish a low threshold for Russia to withdraw, citing
future U.S. missile defense deployments as the rationale.
Unilateral Russian statements to this effect are troubling.
Missile defense is not and should not be viewed in Moscow as
some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It is, rather, a
reasonable and prudent response to the very real threats that
the Iranian and North Korean regimes pose to the United States,
our friends, and our allies.
In the coming months we will have the opportunity to assess
the treaty and confirm that nothing inhibits our ability to
deploy defensive weapons to counter the missile threats of
rogue states. Russia must not have veto power over U.S.
decisions on our missile defense architecture and I will reject
any attempts by this administration, or any future
administration, to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for
their hard work.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Let us start with Secretary Miller.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Dr. Miller. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. It is a pleasure to join my colleagues here on
the panel.
In February, as the chairman noted, DOD published the
report of the first-ever BMDR. In requiring that DOD conduct
this review, Congress stipulated that we started with an
updated threat assessment. The ballistic missile threat today
is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and is
likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Several
states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and-or biological
warheads for their missiles.
The threat to the U.S. Homeland from states like North
Korea and Iran continues to develop. Neither has yet acquired
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the
United States, but both are working to acquire and/or develop
long-range ballistic missile capabilities, including space
launch vehicles which include many of the necessary
technologies.
The threat from short- and medium-range missiles has
developed rapidly over the past decade. Both Iran and North
Korea present a significant regional missile threat. These
conclusions of the BMDR have been reinforced by a report
submitted recently by DOD on the military power of Iran. This
report notes that Iran is continuing to improve its missile
capabilities and it is also ``at a minimum, keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so.''
Based on this threat assessment, the BMDR set six policy
priorities for U.S. missile defense: First, the United States
will continue to defend the Homeland against the threat of
limited ballistic missile attack. The top priority for U.S.
missile defense efforts is to defend the United States from the
threat of missile attack by regional actors such as North Korea
or Iran. The United States does not intend for missile defenses
to affect the strategic balance with Russia or China. Through
our missile defense programs, the United States seeks to
dissuade states such as North Korea or Iran from developing an
ICBM and, failing this, to deter them from using it or, if
necessary, to defeat their attacks.
The second policy priority is that the United States will
defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces while
protecting our allies and partners and helping to enable them
to protect themselves. As was noted in September 2009, based on
the unanimous advice of the civilian and military leadership of
DOD, the President endorsed a new PAA for missile defense in
Europe. Since then we have concluded agreements with Romania
and Poland to host the two planned land-based sites for BMD
interceptors in 2015 and 2018 respectively and, more broadly,
we have worked closely with our NATO allies on the way ahead
for the alliance on missile defense.
The BMDR concluded that the United States should pursue a
PAA not only in Europe, but also in other regions, particularly
Northeast Asia and the Middle East, and that this approach will
be tailored to the threats appropriate to those regions.
The third policy priority stipulated by the BMDR was that
before new capabilities are developed they must undergo testing
that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.
As the chairman noted, we believe in ``fly before you buy.''
Flight testing under realistic operational conditions is needed
to provide proven capabilities for the defense of the Nation
and of our warfighters, and our other witnesses, including Dr.
Gilmore, will have more to say about that.
The fourth policy priority was that the commitment to new
capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
Our investments in BMD, as in other areas, must be managed to
ensure that there are sound capability improvements at
reasonable cost and in overall balance with other defense
priorities.
The fifth policy priority is that the U.S. BMD capabilities
must be flexible enough to adapt as the threat changes. Our BMD
program is building systems that are mobile and modular to
ensure that we can quickly reinforce capabilities in a given
region and also so that we can successfully adapt capabilities
as the threat evolves. We're also taking a number of steps to
hedge against potential increases in the threat, including, for
example, completing Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK. This
will provide the ability to rapidly deploy eight additional
GBIs if needed.
Sixth and finally, the United States will lead expanded
international efforts for missile defense. We are working with
allies and partners to strengthen deterrence and build regional
security architectures through improved missile defenses and
through other measures, and my full statement includes many
relevant details. These cooperative efforts are essential to
the credibility of extended deterrence and reassurance of our
allies and partners.
In sum, the BMDR comprehensively considered U.S. missile
defense policies, strategies, plans, and programs in the
context of current and emerging ballistic missile threats to
the U.S. Homeland, to our deployed forces, and to our allies
and partners. It resulted in a $700 million increase in our BMD
funding request for fiscal year 2011 over 2010, and we believe
that it provides a clear and sensible path forward for U.S.
missile defenses.
Before closing, I'd like to offer brief comments on the New
START and U.S. missile defenses. As General O'Reilly's
statement makes clear, the New START does not constrain the
United States from deploying the most effective missile
defenses possible, nor does it increase cost or add
inconvenience. Senator McCain commented on the Russian
unilateral statement on missile defense associated with the New
START and I ask to submit it for the record along with the
related U.S. unilateral statement.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Dr. Miller. Thank you.
I want to note here that these statements are not part of
the treaty, obviously. That's why they're called ``unilateral
statements.'' They're not unilaterally binding. But they do
provide some insight into Russian and U.S. thinking. I'll take
just a moment to speak to that.
The Russian unilateral statement suggests that Russia would
consider withdrawing from the New START if there is ``a buildup
in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States
of America such that it would give rise to a threat to the
strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.''
That is not the case today, nor do we expect it to be the case
in the future.
In fact, both sides would have the right to withdraw from a
New START if they deemed it necessary for their supreme
national interest. The previous START and most other arms
control agreements have similar provisions.
The U.S. unilateral statement notes that, as we stated in
the BMDR, U.S. missile defenses are not intended to affect the
strategic balance with Russia. It then says quite directly and
quite accurately that ``the United States intends to continue
improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to
defend itself against limited attack and as part of our
collaborative approach to strengthen stability in key
regions.''
As this U.S. unilateral statement, the BMDR, and our budget
proposals all make clear, this administration is committed to
continuing to improve our missile defenses as needed to defend
the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners.
I ask that my full written statement be entered into the
record and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record, as will
all of the statements. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James N. Miller
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the
Department's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. BMD is a key
strategic issue for the United States and I look forward to testifying
and answering your questions about our policies and plans.
In February, the Department of Defense published the report of the
first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review
comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and
programs in the context of current and emerging ballistic missile
threats to the Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners. It provides a clear and sensible path forward for U.S.
missile defenses.
We are here today to testify on the President's fiscal year 2011
request for BMD and how it is aligned with the policies and strategies
reported in the BMDR. We have taken many steps to ensure a close
alignment of budgets with the Defense Department's strategic reviews--
not just BMDR but also the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear
Posture Review, as it was being developed.
I will first review the key recommendations of the BMDR, and then
describe our actions to implement it. The committee has also asked that
I address the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in some detail.
ballistic missile threat
In charging the Defense Department with the responsibility to
conduct a BMDR, last year's legislation clearly specified the starting
point: an updated threat assessment. Accordingly, the review began with
a review of the ballistic missile threat and key trends.
The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and
qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade.
Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are
becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate,
while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to
increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch
attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile
defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or
biological warheads for their missiles.
The threat to the Homeland from states like North Korea and Iran
continues to develop. Although neither has yet acquired or deployed
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), both are working to
acquire and/or develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities, a
threat that has proven to be inherently difficult to predict.
Of particular concern, North Korea has demonstrated its nuclear
ambitions, and it appears that Iran is determined to continue its
longstanding defiance of its international obligations on its nuclear
program.
The threat from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles has
developed rapidly over the past decade. Both Iran and North Korea
present a significant regional missile threat.
Iran has developed and acquired ballistic missiles capable of
striking deployed forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and
Southern Europe. It is fielding increased numbers of mobile regional
ballistic missiles and has claimed that it has incorporated anti-
missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile
forces. Iran has flight-tested a new solid-propellant medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM) with a claimed range of 2,000 kilometers. Iran
is also likely working to improve the accuracy of its short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
North Korea has developed a solid-propellant SRBM, and is
developing a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). It has
also conducted test launches of multiple theater ballistic missiles,
demonstrating a capability to threaten U.S. and allied forces.
strategy and policy framework
The BMDR set the following policy priorities based on Presidential
guidance:

1. The United States will continue to defend the Homeland against
the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.

This remains the top priority for U.S. missile defenses, with a
focus on the threat from limited ballistic missile attack by regional
actors such as North Korea or Iran. The United States does not intend
to affect the strategic balance with Russia or to undermine strategic
stability with China. The United States seeks to dissuade states such
as North Korea and Iran from developing an ICBM and, failing this, to
deter them from using it or to defeat their attacks should deterrence
fail.

2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats
to U.S. forces, while protecting our allies and partners and enabling
them to defend themselves.

This policy has guided the development of U.S. capabilities since
the emergence of the missile proliferation problem in the 1980s. The
security of our deployed troops, and our allies and partners, requires
this.

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing
that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.

We believe in ``fly before you buy.'' Flight testing under
realistic operational conditions is needed and cannot be conducted from
facilities not equipped or properly located for this purpose. This will
result in a posture based on proven technology with improved
reliability, confidence, and cost control.

4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable
over the long term.

Our investments in this area must be managed to ensure that there
are sound capability improvements at reasonable cost and in overall
balance with other defense priorities.

5. U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as
threats change.

Building capabilities that are mobile and modular ensures we can
successfully adapt as the threat evolves, and our own technology
advances. Hedging against potential changes in the threat is essential
given the uncertainty associated with the ballistic missile
capabilities of potential adversaries.

6. The United States will lead expanded international efforts for
missile defense.

We will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional
security architectures. This theme cuts across all of the Department's
policy and posture reviews. Cooperative efforts are essential to the
credibility of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and
partners. Our commitment to seeking strategic stability with Russia and
China means that engagement with them is also needed.
defending the homeland
The U.S. Homeland is currently protected against the threat of
limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments made over the past
decade in the system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). By
the end of this fiscal year, the United States will deploy a total of
30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg
Air Force Base, CA, along with a global architecture of sensors and
command and control systems. The United States now possesses a capacity
to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the
foreseeable future.
At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, the United
States must be well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat
developments. The focus now must be on maintaining the current level of
capability while developing future capabilities that will enhance
Homeland defense if and as new threats emerge. We are taking the
following steps to strengthen our hedging posture:

1. Continue the development and assessment of a two-stage GBI. The
two-stage GBI is only a development program and no decision has been
made to acquire or deploy operational interceptors at this time.
2. Complete construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, to
the originally planned configuration of 14 operationally-capable silos.
Finishing Missile Field 2 will allow us to replace older, inadequate
silos from Missile Field 1, provide the most reliable and effective
silo configurations to the warfighter, and establish a Reserve
capability to rapidly deploy up to 8 additional interceptors if needed.
3. Pursue advanced sensors to strengthen existing networks. MDA is
currently developing air- and space-based sensors that will bring new
capabilities to the fight by allowing us to detect enemy launches,
handle larger raid sizes, and track them earlier and longer through all
phases of their flight.
4. Invest in advanced technologies such as directed energy and its
potential use for missile defense, early-intercept capabilities that
allow us to engage threats earlier in their flight, and the ability to
launch interceptors and engage ballistic missiles based on information
from external, forward-deployed sensors.
5. Implement Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe
which will provide supplemental capabilities for the protection of
Europe and the Homeland from Middle East threats.
defending against regional threats
Over the past decade, significant progress has been made in
developing capabilities for protection against attack from short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles. Critical new systems have begun to be
deployed. But these deployments remain modest in number in comparison
to the rapidly expanding regional threat. The BMDR reflects the
commitment to significantly accelerate the acquisition and deployment
of these mature systems and to invest in follow-on capabilities.
The benefits of improving capabilities are best ensured by
tailoring regional deterrence and defense architectures to the unique
requirements of each region. The effort to develop tailored approaches
will be guided by the following key principles:

1. Regional deterrence must be built on a solid foundation of
strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing between
the United States and our allies. While missile defenses play an
important role in regional deterrence, other components will also be
significant. As the Nuclear Posture Review has made clear, the U.S.
nuclear umbrella will remain in place so long as nuclear threats to our
allies remain.
2. The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within
each region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region,
including their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the
capabilities available and most suited for deployment.
3. Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets
over the next decade may exceed supply, the United States will develop
capabilities that are mobile and re-locatable.

Let me further explain what we mean by ``phased'' and ``adaptive.''
The phases are designed to implement the best available technology to
meet existing and potential threats. As more capable interceptor
technology is tested, proven, and available, we will phase that
technology in to counter the increasing range and complexity of missile
threats we face.
The approach is adaptive in that it relies largely on sea-based and
other mobile capabilities that can be surged into troubled regions in
times of political-military crisis. We must plan to surge for the
simple reason that the potential demand for regional missile defense
assets will exceed supply for years to come. Although the missile
threat is developing at different rates in different regions, overall
it is developing rapidly--both in quality and quantity. Today there are
thousands of ballistic missiles and hundreds of launchers; roughly 90
percent of those missiles have ranges less than 1,000 kilometers.
Against this threat, the United States currently has only a few hundred
defensive interceptors deployed in multiple regions. To manage the
supply/demand challenge, the military utilizes the Global Force
Management process. This will help to ensure that our missile defenses
can face the most pressing regional threats, and that we have
capabilities that are responsive to changes in the threat environment.
the bmdr and the budget
The Department's budget request aligns with the policies identified
in the BMDR and reflects an increased emphasis on strengthening our
Homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. The fiscal year
2011 President's budget requests approximately $500 million more than
was appropriated in fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, our plan for fiscal
years 2011-2015 is $3.2 billion above what was planned for last year.
MDA Director O'Reilly will provide a more detailed overview of the
programmatic investments in fiscal year 2011 and beyond.
The legislation mandating the BMDR specifically posed a question
about the needed balance between investments in Homeland and regional
defenses. Clearly, we need strong investments in both areas. We also
need to be well hedged in both against potential developments in the
threat. We also need to accelerate the fielding and further development
of capabilities to deal with regional threats because of the dramatic
growth in that dimension.
We have emphasized the following key investment priorities for
fiscal year 2011 and the 5 year defense plan:

To increase the inventory of near-term, mature
systems, including interceptors, sensor networks, and command
and control capabilities, in order to provide our military
forces with what they need now.
To rigorously test our missile defense systems as they
are developed to ensure we are investing in operationally-
effective and reliable sensors and shooters.
To invest in advanced technologies and follow-on
capabilities so that we continue to outpace new developments in
our adversaries' ballistic missile capabilities.
To maintain and improve existing capabilities.

We believe these increased investments are essential, and
consistent with a key principle of the BMDR, fiscally sustainable.
missile defense in europe
In conducting the BMDR, we were also specifically directed to
assess the pathway forward for missile defense in Europe. Having
reviewed the threat and set out our policy priorities, that pathway
forward emerged clearly.

The accelerating threat from short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East
pointed to the need to accelerate missile defense protection of
U.S. forces and allies in Europe.
The inherently unpredictable nature of the threat
pointed to the need for a missile defense approach with
flexibility to adapt to developments in the threat.
The need to hedge against future threats, whether to
U.S. deployed forces, allies, or the Homeland, pointed to the
need for an approach in Europe that could be adaptive to this
purpose as required.
The commitment to lead expanded international efforts
pointed to the value of a broader alliance approach that would
enable effective sharing of burdens and risks.

The previous ``Third Site'' approach scored poorly against these
objectives. The small number (10) of interceptors meant that the system
could be overwhelmed by the launch of as few as five missiles. The high
expense of the interceptors limited future capability growth. The Third
Site approach did not include any specific components for defending our
allies and forces from the threat posed by short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles.
The BMDR developed a more adaptive approach, which utilizes proven
technologies that are flexible and responsive to current and future
threat developments. Based on the unanimous advice of the civilian and
military leadership in the Department of Defense, the President
endorsed the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe.
It is useful to recall here the four phases described in the BMDR:

In Phase 1, out through the 2011 timeframe, existing
missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles will be deployed. Phase 1 will be
accomplished by deploying a forward-based sensor and utilizing
BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM-3 Block IA interceptors.
In Phase 2, in the 2015 timeframe, improved
interceptors and sensors to defend against SRBMs and MRBMs will
be deployed. The architecture will be expanded with a land-
based SM-3 site in Southern Europe and the deployment of SM-3
Block IB interceptors.
In Phase 3, in the 2018 timeframe, to improve coverage
against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a
second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed in Northern
Europe. This will include use of the more capable SM-3 Block
IIA interceptors on land and at sea to cover all NATO Europe
countries.
In Phase 4, a decade from now, to address the threat
of potential ICBM attack from the Middle East, the next
generation SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIB, will be available
for land-based sites. This interceptor, with its higher
velocity, is intended to provide the ability to engage longer-
range ballistic missiles and to intercept threats in their
ascent phase.
implementing paa in europe
Since the announcement of the new approach to missile defense in
Europe in September 2009, the administration has worked to engage
allies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to begin to bring together
the needed building blocks for this approach. Key milestones in this
process to implement the EPAA are summarized below:

In September 2009, the Czech Republic expressed its
continued strong support for missile defenses and stated its
interest in being involved with the EPAA. As we consider ways
to cooperate on areas related to the PAA over the longer term,
including through research and development activities, we are
already in the process of working with the Czechs to establish
a near-term arrangement for sharing information on ballistic
missile launches.
In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a land-based
SM-3 interceptor site on its territory, as called for in the
Phase 3 of the EPAA (2018 timeframe). This site will be located
at the same former military installation in northwestern Poland
that would have housed the GBIs under the ``Third Site'' plan.
The U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Basing Agreement was
signed in August 2008. In February 2010, the U.S. and Poland
concluded negotiations on an amendment to that agreement to
allow the deployment of a land-based SM-3 site in Poland.
Additionally, in 2010, the Polish parliament ratified the U.S.-
Poland supplemental Status of Forces Agreement required for the
deployment of U.S. forces in Poland, including personnel
associated with missile defense.
In February 2010, Romania agreed in principle to host
the Phase 2 Southern Europe land-based SM-3 interceptor site in
the 2015 timeframe. The U.S. is preparing for negotiations with
the Romanian Government concerning the details of hosting the
site.
We are currently in discussions regarding the
potential location of the forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar, which
we would like to deploy in Southern Europe in the 2011
timeframe. As these discussions mature, we will be able to
provide more information.
We are also working to coordinate our EPAA missile
defense efforts with those of our NATO Allies that are seeking
to counter shorter-range ballistic missile threats to deployed
forces. Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring
such missile defense capabilities. For example, several have
Patriot systems (Netherlands, Germany, and Greece). Some are
working cooperatively with the United States to develop the
MEADS system (i.e., Italy and Germany). Others have expressed
interest in acquiring systems like Patriot, SM-3, and sensor
technology.

These bilateral efforts have been paralleled by multilateral
efforts within NATO. The administration is working to ensure the EPAA
is implemented in a strong NATO context--meaning it has NATO's
political support, complements current and future NATO efforts, and
offers enhanced opportunities for cooperation.

The EPAA closely aligns with NATO political guidance
on missile defense, issued unanimously in April 2009 by allied
heads of State and Government, which states that ``missile
threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that
includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat
and the level of acceptable risk.'' Accordingly, our NATO
allies have responded positively to EPAA. NATO unanimously
welcomed the PAA at its December 2009 Foreign Ministerial, a
key first step in cooperation with NATO on European missile
defense.
NATO is also developing a command and control network
that will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets
together, called the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (ALTBMD) program, creating a more efficient
architecture. The United States is working to ensure U.S.
assets will be interoperable with NATO's ALTBMD program. NATO
is also examining the implications and costs of potentially
expanding ALTBMD to include command and control for territorial
missile defense. ALTBMD and potential expansions for it would
facilitate greater interoperability and shared situational
awareness among Allied missile defense assets.

In combination, these efforts have helped to generate a significant
new level of alliance commitment to missile defense. As a result, there
is greater potential for cooperation with NATO on a potential Alliance-
wide initiative to protect NATO territory from ballistic missiles.
It is important to understand that working to ensure protection of
all NATO Allies does not give NATO a ``veto'' over the protection of
the United States and our deployed forces. Interoperability with NATO
command and control systems will not diminish our ability to defend
U.S. deployed forces, our allies, and our partners.
All of these efforts represent significant progress towards
implementing the BMDR and PAA in Europe--in just over 6 months since
the announcement of the new approach.
the paa in asia and the middle east
The European PAA is representative of our new approach to regional
missile defense. It shows how we plan to apply in practice those policy
priorities that we established in the BMDR.
However, it is important to note that the regions differ in the
range, scale, and technical sophistication of the existing and
potential threat. This variation has important implications for how
phased adaptive approaches to missile defense are applied in each
regional context. The regions also differ in terms of the U.S. role. In
Europe, the United States engages as a party to a multilateral
alliance; in East Asia, the United States cooperates through bilateral
alliances and with key partners; in the Middle East, the United States
has a number of key partners. The United States has deployed forces
across the globe. Regional differences have important implications for
the authorities under which the United States is able to operationally
employ defenses in protection of local partners.
We are also working in East Asia and the Middle East to implement
the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in these regions. As I
mentioned earlier, these approaches must be tailored to the specific
threat and geopolitical characteristics of each region.

The United States and Japan have made considerable
strides in BMD cooperation and interoperability in support of
bilateral missile defense operations. Japan has acquired a
layered integrated missile defense system that includes Aegis
BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot
Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars,
and a command and control system. The United States and Japan
regularly train together, and our forces have successfully
executed cooperative BMD operations. One of our most
significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a
next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This
codevelopment program represents not only an area of
significant technical cooperation but also the basis for
enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional
security. The U.S.-Japan partnership is an outstanding example
of the kind of cooperation the United States seeks in order to
tailor a phased adaptive approach to the unique threats and
capabilities in a region.
The United States also has ongoing discussions with
South Korea and Australia related to missile defense and we
look forward to further cooperation should either country make
the decision to acquire missile defense capabilities.
In the Middle East, we have a longstanding
relationship with Israel on BMD. In addition to conducting a
major missile defense exercise with Israel in November 2009,
the United States and Israel continue to meet regularly and
coordinate extensively on a wide range of missile defense
issues. During a recent bilateral discussion in Tel Aviv in
March 2010, ways in which elements of the BMDR would help our
cooperative efforts to defend Israel were analyzed. This set of
bilateral discussions on missile defense will be continued
later this year in the United States. In addition to
cooperating on plans and operations, our extensive support for
Israeli missile defense programs continues to include the
existing Arrow Weapons System and a new program for defeating
short range ballistic missiles known as David's Sling.
Improvements in the U.S. missile defense posture as a result of
the BMDR benefits regional stability and benefits Israel's
security.
The United States currently has a robust mix of BMD
assets forward deployed to provide BMD for our troops and
facilities in the Persian Gulf Region. This includes the
command and control equipment, and personnel necessary to
direct BMD engagements. Currently, a series of bilateral MD
agreements between the United States and host GCC nations
exist. Central Command continues to work on establishing a
Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture for
the GCC nations.
cooperation with russia
As noted in the BMDR, the administration has given a special
emphasis to renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense. From
discussions at the most senior levels, when Presidents Obama and
Medvedev met at the July 2009 Moscow Summit, to technical discussions,
we are making a concerted effort to identify areas where the United
States and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation. We are open to a
wide-range of cooperative activities.
Some examples of cooperation that we have recently examined with
the Russians include sharing data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian
radar installations; conducting collaborative missile defense flight-
tests; and undertaking experiments that would combine data from U.S.
ground- and space-based sensors with data from Russian sensors such as
the radars at Qabala, Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern Russia.
Pursuant to President Obama's and President Medvedev's agreement at
their July 2009 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia are
conducting a joint assessment of ballistic missile threats and
challenges. Also, we are attempting to work with Russia to implement
the 2000 Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) agreement. The JDEC
agreement would establish a joint ballistic missile early warning
center in Moscow.
conclusion
In the BMDR we have a new policy document outlining the
administration's approach to missile defense. We have accordingly
shifted budgetary requests, increasing investments in missile defenses
in the fiscal year 2011 budget. We have already begun to execute those
policies as demonstrated by our progress on the implementation of the
PAA in Europe, and we are working closely with other allies and
partners.
The threat posed by ballistic missiles is real, and it is growing.
After years of development, our missile defenses today are also very
real, and vital to coping with this growing threat. We look forward to
working with Congress in ensuring continued progress.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Dr. Gilmore.

STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
committee, I'll very briefly summarize my written statement.
First, my characterization of demonstrated performance in
BMD is contained in the report that I submitted to Congress
this past February, which is required by law as part of the
oversight regime that Congress and particularly this committee
has created and the role that my office plays in overseeing
testing progress in BMD.
In that report I characterize the demonstrated performance
of the elements of the BMD system using a one to six rating
scale, with one being the lowest demonstrated capability and
six being the highest. Generally, Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot--
against short-range ballistic missiles--are rated at the
highest levels, from four to six. There has been relatively
extensive testing against short-range threats. Aegis, ground-
based missile defense and THAAD against medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles generally have
demonstrated less capability, and the less capability is
demonstrated as the range of the missiles increases.
With regard to major events over the last year, of course,
there was the successful shootdown of a threat-representative
missile by the Airborne Laser. With regard to developments in
test planning, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, there was the
development of the IMTP, an exercise in which my office played
a substantial role. The IMTP is, in my view, a rigorous plan
for conducting the tests and collecting the information that
will be needed to verify, validate, and accredit all of the
models that will be absolutely essential to demonstrating
confidence in the performance of the missile defense system,
because we will never be able to test in live flight tests, the
system throughout the entire battle space that will be
relevant.
With regard to challenges in the future, missile defense
testing is some of the most complex testing that DOD conducts.
It's very difficult to execute these tests successfully. There
have been failures in the past, both with regard to
interceptors and to targets, and targets in particular are a
real challenge, as I'm sure General O'Reilly will discuss. The
realism and reliability of the targets is something that needs
work and General O'Reilly has a plan to work on that and to
procure a new family of targets that we hope will be more
reliable than the ones in the past.
Thank you and I'll be happy to respond to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Gilmore.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. J. Michael Gilmore
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Ballistic
Missile Defense System, or BMDS, its test program, recent results, and
challenges. I will focus my remarks in three areas:
First, my assessment of current missile defense programs, the
details of which are in my annual report submitted to you on February
12;
Second, the major events from last year that will shape the course
of future BMDS testing; and
Finally, the challenges to BMDS test and evaluation.
current missile defense programs
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) has not yet attempted an
intercept of an intercontinental ballistic missile target. The
intercept flight tests it has conducted on intermediate range missiles
have been conducted under a limited set of operationally-realistic
engagement parameters.
GMD flight test FTG-05, conducted in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2009, was the third successful intercept using the currently
fielded operational capability. It was the first flight test requiring
the GMD fire control to correlate multiple sensor inputs and supply a
weapons task plan to the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. FTG-06 was
conducted in January 2010; it was the first flight test of an
interceptor equipped with the Capability Enhancement II Exo-atmospheric
Kill Vehicle and was meant to demonstrate the use of the sea-based X-
band radar to perform tracking and discrimination. The intercept
attempt failed for reasons that the MDA continues to investigate.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, or Aegis BMD, has demonstrated
that it can detect, track, and engage simple non-separating and
separating short-range ballistic missiles (those with ranges below
about 1,000 kilometers). Using Aegis BMD 3.6 hardware and software and
SM-3 Block IA hit-to-kill interceptors, Aegis BMD has demonstrated it
is operationally effective for performing midcourse intercept of short-
range ballistic missiles. Additionally, follow-on operational testing
of Aegis BMD 3.6.1 hardware and software demonstrated Aegis BMD's
capability to engage simple short range ballistic missiles in the
terminal phase with modified SM-2 Block IV warhead interceptors.
During 2009, Aegis BMD completed two U.S. flight tests, Stellar
Daggers and FTM-17. The two tests addressed midcourse-phase and
terminal-phase engagement capabilities for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. Stellar
Daggers performed a simultaneous engagement of a short range ballistic
missile in the terminal phase of flight with a modified SM-2 Block IV
interceptor, and a cruise missile target with a SM-2 Block IIIA
interceptor. FTM-17 completed the planned follow-on operational test
and evaluation flight testing phase for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. It also
provided a venue for regression testing of midcourse-phase engagement
capability following the upgrade from Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis BMD 3.6.1.
The latter introduced the capability for terminal intercepts and merged
anti-submarine warfare functionality into the system software.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has demonstrated
the ability to detect, track, and engage unitary and simple separating
short-range ballistic missiles. In six flight tests, THAAD intercepted
four of four unitary short-range ballistic missiles, and two of two
simple separating short range ballistic missiles. One flight test
demonstrated a salvo engagement of two THAAD interceptors against a
single threat, consistent with plans for actual tactical operations.
THAAD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept threat missiles
both inside and outside the atmosphere, the only BMDS element
specifically designed with this capability. Although THAAD has
demonstrated the ability to detect, track, and successfully engage a
target exhibiting medium-range, ballistic missile characteristics, it
has not yet been tested against a true medium-range ballistic missile.
During 2009, THAAD conducted flight tests FTT-10a and FTT-11. In
March, THAAD successfully completed FTT-10a, a salvo of two THAAD
interceptors against a single separating short-range ballistic missile.
The MDA ``cold conditioned'' the first THAAD interceptor before the
test to simulate operations in a cold environment. The test was a
combined developmental and operational test, with minimal contractor
involvement. FTT-10a was also a BMDS-level test, with Aegis BMD
providing a cue to THAAD as part of the engagement. In December, THAAD
attempted FTT-11, an exo-atmospheric intercept of a complex separating
short-range ballistic missile. The target, planned as an air launch
from a C-17 cargo aircraft, had a relatively low infrared signature and
radar cross section. This was the first flight test to include all
major tactical software builds planned for initial deployment,
including radar advanced discrimination algorithms. Unfortunately,
after the target was released from the C-17, it failed to deploy
properly and was lost. DOT&E is assessing the extent to which the data
that would have been collected during this test can be collected during
subsequent testing.
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) has
demonstrated the ability to command and control the AN/TPY-2 X-band
radar in its forward-based mode, and provide track data to other BMDS
elements for engagement support (GMD) and simulated launch-on
engagements (Aegis BMD). C2BMC has provided situational awareness
information to military command authorities during all three GMD flight
tests. During the past 2 years, C2BMC has demonstrated Aegis BMD launch
on Aegis BMD cueing in three ground tests, and simulated Aegis BMD
launch on AN/TPY-2 cueing in four ground tests and two flight tests.
THAAD does not currently have a launch-on-remote capability which will
require modifications to the THAAD fire control software to achieve.
major events
In the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, the MDA implemented an
evaluation-based strategy for testing the BMDS, an approach that DOT&E
has been advocating for the past several years. This approach
emphasizes testing under so-called Critical Engagement Conditions
(CECs), and collecting the data on system performance under those
conditions necessary to verify, validate, and accredit (VV&A), the BMDS
models and simulations to be used to assess overall BMDS capability.
The MDA codified this approach in an Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP)
that documents their planned testing through the period spanning the
Future Years Defense Program. The MDA staff, staff from the combatant
commands and the BMDS Operational Test Agency participated in
developing the IMTP, as did staff from DOT&E.
DOT&E has been involved in the evolution of the evaluation-based
strategy and the revised IMTP since General O'Reilly initiated its
development in December 2008. For example, DOT&E provided the MDA with
critical operational issues the new test program must resolve. Over the
next 6 months, the DOT&E staff reviewed with MDA staff the details
underpinning all the CECs associated with resolving the critical
operational issues, the ground and flight testing needed to collect the
associated data, and the development of the final integrated test
schedule. This effort culminated in an IMTP approved jointly by MDA and
DOT&E in July 2009.
In August 2009, when the President announced the phased, adaptive
approach (PAA) for the defense of Europe, MDA initiated a revision of
the IMTP to incorporate the testing needed to support the PAA. DOT&E
participated in this effort in a manner analogous to its participation
in the development of the previous IMTP. My office provided the MDA
with a detailed test concept for Phase 1 of the PAA as well as a test
concept outline for the remaining phases. That concept included the
need for a test of Aegis Block 3.6.1 and SM-3 Block IA against longer-
range threats than had previously been tested, as well as the need to
test the use of launch-on-remote capability.
In particular, when the President announced the PAA for the defense
of Europe, a revision of the new IMTP became necessary. The PAA uses
Aegis BMD and forward-based sensors to defend Europe and the
United States from short-, medium-, intermediate-, and
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles as Aegis BMD evolves with
increasing capability. While the MDA has adequately demonstrated
current Aegis BMD capability to defeat short range ballistic missiles,
the MDA test program has not yet demonstrated current Aegis BMD
capability to defeat medium or intermediate range ballistic missiles.
The MDA must successfully complete flight tests against these longer-
range threats to demonstrate ballistic missile defense of Europe.
The revised IMTP, approved jointly by DOT&E and the MDA this past
February, incorporates such tests. Phase 1 of the IMTP is the most
detailed, as it concentrates on testing and fielding near term defenses
by the end of 2011. Both Aegis BMD and THAAD will conduct flight tests
to demonstrate capability against intermediate and medium range
ballistic missiles respectively. The MDA will also conduct ground
testing of the command, control, and communications required to support
Phase 1 implementation. U.S. European Command is working to develop the
operations concept and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that
will be used during these ground tests.
One other noteworthy event occurred recently. The Airborne Laser,
now designated the Airborne Laser Test Bed, successfully engaged a
boosting, threat-representative short range ballistic missile. This
accomplishment demonstrates that it is technologically possible to
``shoot down'' a boosting, ballistic missile using a laser carried on a
large aircraft. The program had to overcome difficult technological
challenges, such as the effects of the atmosphere on the laser beam and
the difficulty of holding the laser on the desired aim-point
sufficiently long to cause the threat missile to fail. However, the
engagement was not an operational test conducted under operationally-
realistic conditions using an aircraft that is fully ready to conduct
combat operations. For example, the Active Ranging System (ARS), a
precision laser ranging system that is a key component of the detection
and tracking system, was not available for the test. To compensate, the
aircrew utilized the aircraft's Wide Area Surveillance System as well
as a priori knowledge of the threat missile launch location, timing,
and aim point; this approach generally could not be used during combat.
The incorporation of the ARS and numerous other capabilities would be
necessary before the Airborne Laser (ABL) could be evaluated for
operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and survivability
when performing missile defense. The ABL would need to incorporate a
laser with sufficient power to successfully engage, at operationally
realistic standoff ranges and without a priori knowledge, a variety of
threat missile types using countermeasures designed to defeat laser
effectiveness. It must demonstrate reliability, availability, and
maintainability, particularly during missions performed from deployed
locations. It must also implement basic survivability features,
including self-protection systems and airframe modifications to reduce
the effects of damage caused by anti-aircraft weapons. If the
Department should determine at a future time that it is appropriate to
develop and field an Airborne Laser system, an extensive program of
additional developmental testing culminating in realistic operational
testing would be needed.
challenges to future bmds testing.
Targets
THAAD flight testing has experienced target failures. The one
flight test completed in 2009 was a successful repeat of a flight test
first attempted in September 2008 that suffered a target failure. The
second flight test attempted in 2009 also ended with a target failure.
When the targets have flown successfully, THAAD has successfully
intercepted and destroyed them. These target failures have prevented
THAAD from progressing to flight testing against threat-representative
medium range ballistic missiles.
GMD also has experienced target failures. Flight test FTG-03a was a
repeat of FTG-03 that suffered a target failure. The target used for
flight test FTG-05 did not deploy the associated objects needed to
accomplish important test objectives. The MDA delayed flight test FTG-
06 due primarily to readiness issues associated with the first-time
flight of a new longer-range target. This new target flew nominally and
correctly deployed its associated objects when FTG-06 was flown this
past January.
The MDA recognizes that its targets are very complex. This
complexity is a key factor contributing to the failures that have
occurred. Such failures may well be a fact of life for several more
years until the MDA can transition from using its legacy targets and
field a new set of more reliable targets.
Executing the IMTP
The IMTP is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test information
needed to assess BMDS performance quantitatively. However, I am
concerned that it is success-oriented with limited schedule flexibility
and no incorporation of repeat, or backup, tests to compensate for test
failures. The ripple effects of a test failure, such as the recent GMD
flight test FTG-06, can be significant. An Aegis BMD test failure in
the next year could affect the full implementation and assessment of
Phase 1 of the phased, adaptive approach for the defense of Europe, as
Aegis BMD would not have demonstrated capability against the longer-
range threats that might need to be countered in that timeframe.
Test Complexity
Realistic BMDS testing is difficult. Assessing the capability of
each phase of the PAA will require some of the most complex testing
ever attempted by the Department of Defense. The majority of the
testing is planned to be conducted on the Pacific test ranges. The MDA
will be challenged to replicate realistic radar acquisition and
intercept geometries in the Pacific. In addition, testing of the
command and control linkages and systems to be used for the first phase
of European missile defense will have to be conducted using ground
testing in the theater and surrogate testing elsewhere concurrent with
development and implementation. Executing the first operationally-
realistic combined test of Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Patriot in 2012 will
tax MDA's capabilities for test planning and execution. In particular,
performing the planning and marshalling the resources necessary to
handle the safety requirements associated with what could be as many as
10 missiles--both targets and interceptors--in flight nearly
simultaneously will be a substantial challenge, as will executing the
actual test.
conclusion
The ability to conduct comprehensive and objective assessments of
BMDS capability is still a number of years away. If the MDA can execute
the revised IMTP, the data needed to validate models and perform
quantitative assessments of BMDS performance will become available.
However, it will take as many as 5 to 7 years to collect those data.
This concludes my remarks and I welcome your questions.

Chairman Levin. General O'Reilly.

STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY

General O'Reilly. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. It is
an honor to testify before you today on the MDA's activities to
continue developing and fielding an integrated layered BMD
system to defend the United States, its deployed forces,
allies, and friends.
Under the oversight and direction of the DOD Missile
Defense Executive Board, MDA proposes an $8.4 billion fiscal
year 2011 program that is balanced to achieve six policy goals
of the BMDR's report and the combatant commanders' and the
Services' missile defense needs stated in the latest U.S.
Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) prioritized missile defense
capabilities list.
First, defense of the Homeland against limited attack. We
continue to upgrade the GMD system to increase reliability,
survivability, ability to leverage a new generation of missile
defense sensors and testing to accredit our simulations.
Missile fields in Alaska are in an optimum location to
intercept missiles from either North Korea or Iran. The
purchase of five additional GBIs and the production of
components to support extensive reliability testing and missile
refurbishment will sustain our production capability until 2016
and critical component manufacturing beyond 2020.
Second, defense against regional threats. By 2015, we plan
to buy 436 SM-3 I-A and I-B interceptors, 431 THAAD
interceptors, 14 AN-TPY-2 radars, 9 THAAD batteries, and have
38 BMD-capable ships available. Our regional missile defenses
are adaptable to the unique circumstances of each combatant
command. For example, we determined, based on updated
intelligence estimates, that our previous plan for the defense
of Europe could be rapidly overwhelmed and thus made
ineffective by the large number of Iranian medium-range
ballistic missiles today. Additionally, the previous program
did not cover most of Southeastern Europe exposed to the
ballistic missile threats today, would not have been available
until 2017, and was not adaptable to changes in future threats
to Europe. Therefore we plan to deploy a larger number of
interceptors in Europe in four phases as missile threats from
the Middle East evolve.
Two phases in 2011 and 2015, respectively, provide
protection against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
The third phase in 2018 provides protection against
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the fourth phase in
2020 provides capability to intercept ICBMs from the region in
which they are launched.
Third, prove the BMD system works. We have submitted a
comprehensive IMTP signed by Dr. Gilmore, the Services'
operational test agencies, and the Commander of STRATCOM, to
ensure we fly our missiles before we buy them.
However, the two greatest challenges that we face in
developing missile defense are acquiring cost-effective,
reliable targets and improving quality control of all products.
Over the past year, we have initiated a new target acquisition
strategy to increase competition, improve quality control,
reduce costs, and provide backup targets starting in 2012.
However, the precision of missile defense systems requires
stringent manufacturing standards. Until we complete planned
competitions including the greater use of firm fixed-price
contracts and defect clauses, we will have to motivate some
senior industry management through intensive inspections, low
award fees, issuing cure notices, stopping the funding of new
contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control
performance to influence future contract awards.
Fourth, hedging against uncertainty. In accordance with
warfighter priorities, we are focusing our future technologies
to develop more accurate and faster tracking sensors on
platforms to enable early intercepts, enhanced command and
control networks to rapidly fuse sensor data to handle large
raid sizes, a more agile version of our SM-3 interceptor to
destroy long-range missiles, reentry vehicles discrimination,
and the development of high-energy lasers.
Fifth, deploy new fiscally sustainable capabilities over
the long term. MDA is complying with the WSARA of 2009 by
establishing and managing six baselines, cost, schedule,
technical, test, contract, and operational baselines,
increasing service and combatant commander participation, and
increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a program's
acquisition life cycle. We are reviewing over $37 billion in
new contracts for competition over the next 2 years.
Sixth, expand international missile cooperation. We are
currently engaged in missile defense projects, studies, and
analysis with many countries, including Japan, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Israel, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany,
South Korea, NATO, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait. Additionally, Poland and Romania have
agreed to host our Aegis Ashore sites and we are cooperatively
developing the SM-3 II-A interceptor with Japan, in which they
are investing over $1 billion.
We also continue to support expert dialogue on cooperative
efforts with the Russian Federation, whose location of
surveillance radars would significantly enhance our ability to
monitor ballistic missile development and flight testing in
Southwest Asia.
Relative to the recently expired START, the New START
actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile
defense program. Unless they have New START-accountable first
stages, which we do not plan to use, our targets will no longer
be subject to START constraints, which previously limited our
use of air-to-surface and waterborne launches of targets, which
are essential for the cost-effective testing of missile defense
interceptors against medium and intermediate-range ballistic
missile targets in the Pacific area. In addition, under New
START we no longer will be limited to five space launch
facilities for launching targets.
The New START also has no constraints on BMD system
deployment. Article 5, section 3, of the treaty prohibits the
conversion of ICBM or sea-launched ballistic missile launchers
to missile defense launchers, and vice versa, while
grandfathering five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force
Base already converted for GBIs. MDA never had a plan to
convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg. Moreover, we've
determined that if more interceptors are added to Vandenberg
Air Force Base it would be less expensive to build a new GBI
missile field, which is not prohibited by the treaty.
Regarding sea-launched ballistic missile launchers, some
time ago we examined the concept of launching BMD interceptors
from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely
expensive option. As the committee knows, we have a very good
and significantly growing capability for sea-based missile
defense on Aegis-capable ships.
In conclusion, MDA is teamed with the combatant commanders,
services, other DOD agencies, academia, industry, and
international partners to address the challenges of managing,
developing, testing, and fielding capabilities to deter the use
of ballistic missiles and effectively destroy them once
launched.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, other distinguished
members of the committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on
the Missile Defense Agency's support to the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR) and our $8.4 billion fiscal year 2011 budget request to
continue our mission to develop and field an integrated, layered,
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to defend the United States,
its deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missiles of
all ranges and in all phases of flight. This budget request reflects
the strategy and policy stated in the BMDR report and the prioritized
missile defense needs of our combatant commanders and the Services as
stated in the latest U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) Prioritized
Capabilities List (PCL).
The Missile Defense Agency has been operating in accordance with
the principles outlined in last year's Weapons System Acquisition
Reform Act. This includes establishment of formal baselines for the
system component managers, Service participation through the STRATCOM-
led Warfighter Involvement Process, and increased emphasis on
competition at all phases of a program's acquisition life cycle. All of
these steps, I believe, will maximize the return on the taxpayer's
investment dollar.
Under the oversight and direction of the Missile Defense Executive
Board (MDEB), chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), MDA proposes a
fiscal year 2011 program that is balanced to achieve the six strategy
and policy goals documented in the BMDR report:

Defend the Homeland against a limited ballistic
missile attack
Defend U.S. forces, allies, and partners against
regional threats
Deploy new systems only after effectiveness and
reliability have been determined through testing under
realistic conditions
Develop new capabilities that are fiscally sustainable
over the long term
Develop flexible capabilities that can be adapted as
threats change
Expand international cooperation

defense of the homeland against limited attack
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system forms the
foundation of our Homeland missile defense against limited ICBM attack
today. We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and
survivability and expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors as
well as test GMD to accredit our simulations. Since the beginning of
fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire
Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction
of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new
silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
Terminal at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), CA. Additionally, we are
completing the missile defense upgrades to the Upgraded Early Warning
Radar (UEWR) in Thule, Greenland, and we have transferred operation of
the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs
to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and design work to upgrade
the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar.
We are requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to
continue our GBI refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to:
help sustain the fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension
decision around 2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile
Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency
deployment of 8 additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system
software to ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and
tracking capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management
network matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command
and control node at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue
operations and sustainment of the Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX) platform
to prepare for transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.
Finally, we will continue development of technologies to enhance
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) variants to protect our Homeland in the
future by having the capability to intercept long-range ballistic
missiles early in flight in the regions from which they were launched.
To validate this concept, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
requested the Defense Science Board independently assess the viability
of developing capability for early intercept of ICBMs. Our GMD
sustainment, refurbishment, and test strategy gives us the flexibility
to adjust to the uncertainty in the future ICBM threat. Although, we
experienced a GBI vendor production break after the last procurement of
GBIs in 2006, the purchase of five additional GBIs, and supplying
``limited life'' GBI components for refurbishments will sustain our
production capacity until 2016 and beyond. We will conduct stockpile
surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are
refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests,
results from the aging surveillance program, and future intelligence
estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform decisions on
the need to procure additional GBIs.
defense against regional threats
Our fiscal year 2011 budget request balances the warfighter's needs
to develop new capabilities and grow our missile defense capacity. An
integrated deployment of Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) forms an effective, layered, regional missile defense.
The Aegis BMD is a mobile system, designed to defeat short- to
intermediate-range missiles above the earth's atmosphere, and the THAAD
is a rapidly deployable system, designed to engage short- to medium-
range missiles both above and within the Earth's atmosphere. Aegis has
more than twice the engagement range of THAAD. Additionally, Patriot
Advanced Capability 3 can add an additional layer and point defense
against Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs).
We are developing regional missile defense elements that can be
adapted to the unique circumstances of each Combatant Command region.
For example, we plan to deploy missile defenses in Europe in four
phases as missile threats from the Middle East evolve over time. The
Phase 1 capability (planned to begin deployment in 2011) will provide
initial protection for southern Europe from existing short- and medium-
range threats using sea-based interceptors and forward-based sensors.
Phase 2 (2015) deploys the SM-3 IB interceptor at sea and at an Aegis
Ashore/land-based SM-3 site. In collaboration with OSD Policy,
STRATCOM, the Department of State, and U.S. European Command (EUCOM),
we are preparing to begin negotiations with Romania to locate an Aegis
Ashore/land-based SM-3 site on its territory in 2015. Phase 3 (2018)
employs SM-3 IIA on land and at sea to protect NATO from SRBM, MRBM,
and IRBM threats. Poland has agreed to host this Aegis Ashore/land-
based SM-3 site. The Phase 4 architecture (2020 timeframe) features
the higher velocity land-based SM-3 IIB, a persistent sensor network,
and enhanced command and control system to intercept large raids of
medium- to long-range missiles from the Middle East early in flight.
Since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered 27 SM-3
Block IA interceptors and upgraded 3 additional ships (for a total
today of 20 Aegis BMD ships); upgraded the USS Lake Erie with the next
generation BMD fire control software that increases the number of
threat missiles that can be simultaneously engaged and more effectively
uses data from missile defense sensors external to the ship. We have
also delivered two THAAD batteries (the first unit is planned to be
operationally accepted by the Army by the end of this year). We have
separately deployed one U.S.-operated X-band AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel
on a contingency basis. We have also installed C2BMC hardware and
software upgrades at command and control nodes at U.S. Pacific Command,
STRATCOM, U.S. Northern Command, and EUCOM and began C2BMC installation
in the U.S. Central Command.
We are requesting $1.6 billion for Aegis in fiscal year 2011. We
will continue the design, qualification, and testing of the SM-3 IB
interceptor; manufacture 30 SM-3 IB test and production verification
interceptors (we plan to procure a total of 436 Aegis SM-3 IA and IB
interceptors by 2015), and upgrade 3 additional Aegis BMD engagement
ships (2 Aegis BMD 3.6.1 destroyers and 1 4.0.1 destroyer) for a total
of 23 BMD capable ships by the end of fiscal year 2011 and 38 BMD
capable ships by 2015. We will continue development and testing of the
Aegis BMD 4.0.1 and 5.0 fire control system to launch SM-3 IB and IA
interceptors against threat missiles when they are beyond the range of
the ship's own radar. We also will continue the co-development of the
SM-3 IIA interceptor with the Government of Japan to increase
significantly the area defended by the Aegis BMD system with its 21-
inch diameter rocket motors, two-color seeker, and increased kinetic
warhead divert capability. We also will continue to design the first
Aegis Ashore battery that will be installed for testing at the Pacific
Missile Range Facility in 2012.
We are requesting $1.3 billion for THAAD in fiscal year 2011. We
plan to deliver the second THAAD battery (we plan to procure 6
batteries by 2015), add a second launcher platoon to each battery to
double the firepower to 48 interceptors, procure 67 interceptors (we
plan to procure a total of 431 interceptors by 2015), and complete
hardware and software upgrades to the communications suite to enable
THAAD to use fused data from all BMDS sensors.
We are requesting $455 million for sensors in fiscal year 2011. We
plan to upgrade the AN/TPY-2 radar software to facilitate its use as a
surveillance radar or as a THAAD battery fire-control radar, optimize
the radar's ability to leverage assistance by external sensors, and
support the contingency operations of AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan
and Israel. We will continue to develop a Concurrent Test, Training and
Operations capability to provide operational BMDS sensors (including
the UEWRs, Cobra Dane and Sea-Based X-band radars) the capability to
conduct training and testing while continuing to provide on-line
missile defense, upgrade AN/TPY-2 and Sea-Based X-band radar
discrimination and dense track management software, and conduct ground
and flight testing to support accreditation of sensor models and
simulations.
We are requesting $343 million for Command and Control, Battle
Management and Communications (C2BMC) in fiscal year 2011. We plan to
provide automated planners to aid a Combatant Command's deployment of
BMD assets according to its concept of operations and conduct ballistic
missile defense battles according to its tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Furthermore, we will develop and deploy an upgraded version
of our C2BMC hardware and software to provide new battle management
functions that enable shoot-look-shoot tactics between layers of U.S.
and international partners' missile defense assets, control multiple
BMDS radars, correlate and combine sensor data from multiple sensors
tracking the same threat into one system track, provide real-time
awareness of the battle as it develops in accordance with a Combatant
Command's concept of operations, and enable engagement coordination
among BMDS elements in accordance with regional Area Air Defense Plans.
Additionally, C2BMC will participate in and analyze results of ground
and flight tests to support accreditation of models and simulations and
support war games and exercises.
MDA played a significant role in the conduct of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review. The agency provided technical analysis and data
as required by the leaders of the review to support their effort to
answer the questions posed by Congress. Preliminary analytical results
were then presented to the departmental leaders, including the
Secretary and Chairman, who then made recommendations to the President.
Although MDA provided these architecture assessments, it is important
to recognize the decision to deploy the recommended European PAA
architecture was not based solely on detailed performance predictions.
Rather, the decision to deploy an Aegis SM-3-based architecture to
Europe was based on the need for a flexible defense against an evolving
threat from the Middle East. First, the previously proposed European
missile defense architecture lacked a sufficient number of interceptors
to defend against the current and emerging numbers of medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) being fielded by Iran. Simply put, with a
notional 2 interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI interceptors proposed
for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by a raid size of 6 threat
missiles launched towards European targets. Second, with the European
PAA, we can deploy a missile defense capability to Europe earlier than
the previous Program of Record, with GBIs in Poland and an X-Band Radar
in the Czech Republic. NATO Europe is threatened by a short-range and
medium-range ballistic missile threat now, so this was an important
variable in the decision. Upon the completion of testing in 2011, we
could begin the deployment of proven capabilities to defend against the
MRBM threat. Third, by creating a re-locatable, land-based version of
our most capable regional missile defense system, the Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) system, Combatant Commanders could have the
capability to adjust their missile defense architectures to address the
uncertainty of future missile threats without the need to develop a new
missile defense system. These systems can be deployed in any theater in
a reasonably short period of time. Fourth, the increased defended areas
and larger raid size capacity resulting from planned enhancements to
the Aegis BMD system are expected to increase the cost-effectiveness of
a European missile defense against the growing missile threat over this
decade. Finally, while we currently have a limited defense system
against potential Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats
originating in the Middle East or Northeast Asia, there is no technical
reason to indicate that this system would not be further enhanced by
the deployments envisioned in Phase 4 of the PAA. It is important to
note that the missile defense capability needs identified in the BMDR
are consistent with capability needs listed in the recently approved,
independently developed, classified STRATCOM missile defense
Prioritized Capability List.
proving the ballistic missile defense system works
A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities
and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin
procurement, or we will ``fly before we buy.'' As such, missile defense
projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L).
Additionally, we use the Services' standard material release and
operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and
operational test data prior to formally fielding initial capability.
Both THAAD and AN/TPY-2 have production decisions by USD(AT&L) and Army
Material Review Boards planned for this year. We are requesting $1.1
billion in fiscal year 2011 to provide targets and support to missile
defense projects to test new capabilities under developmental and
operational conditions, including the use of actual threat missiles, to
support accrediting our models and simulations and production decisions
by USD(AT&L). In collaboration with the Services' Operational Test
Agencies, STRATCOM, and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
we submitted a comprehensive Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) in
March that describes our plan through fiscal year 2015 to conduct over
150 test events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our
models and simulations and support operational assessments. The IMTP
also describes our testing to support European PAA deployment
decisions. To support a Phase 1 decision in 2011, we have completed 10
Aegis BMD intercept tests of short range targets. We will conduct an
Aegis BMD test against an intermediate-range ballistic missile target
prior to the Phase 1 deployment. Likewise, there are system level
ground tests, exercises, and simulations to test system effectiveness
and interoperability. The IMTP also describes our testing of the two-
stage GBI and several GMD intercept tests against long-range targets. I
concur with the January 2010 DOT&E January assessment that ``if MDA can
execute the IMTP as planned, successful VV&A of BMDS models and
simulations should result, enabling quantitative and objective rather
than subjective assessments of the BMDS capability in the future.'' I
further agree with the DOT&E conclusion that ``objective assessments of
the BMDS capability are still a number of years in the future.''
Our recent flight test results have been mixed. From October 2008
through today MDA achieved 5 of 7 successful hit-to-kill intercepts and
a number of ``firsts'' in BMDS testing. In December 2008, the GMD
system engaged an IRBM target launched from Kodiak Island, AK, using a
GBI launched from VAFB in the most operationally realistic test to date
that demonstrated our ability to fuse sensor data from five on-line
sensors. Unfortunately, the target in that flight test failed to
release countermeasures. In March 2009, with soldiers operating the
system using tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the U.S.
Army, we conducted THAAD's first dual salvo endo-atmospheric engagement
of a threat-representative separating ballistic target. The Navy
conducted an intercept using an Aegis SM-2 Block IV (terminal defense)
in February 2009, and we conducted an SM-3 IA intercept in July 2009.
In October 2009, we supported Japan's intercept test of an SRBM using
the Japanese destroyer JS MYOKO.
Although we have had three intercepts out of three previous
attempts using the GMD system, our newest variant of the kill vehicle,
relying on data from the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, failed to
intercept a target in January 2010 during a flight test to measure
GMD's performance at its maximum operational intercept range. The GBI
launched successfully from VAFB and the newly designed LV-2 long-range
target successfully flew for the first time out of the Reagan Test Site
in the Kwajalein Atoll 7,500 km away. It was a very valuable test
because we collected extensive data on the performance of the SBX and
GBI, the advanced exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), and the target.
We discovered new failure modes for the SBX, the EKV flew more than
twice the distance it had flown in previous tests, and we collected
significant new data on the EKV's ability to acquire, track, and
discriminate the target. The failure investigation is expected to
continue for several more months before root-cause is determined and
verified. It is my intent to immediately correct any deficiency and
repeat the test as soon as feasible. In contrast, the most recent
attempt to conduct a THAAD test last December was of no value because
of a target missile failure. The THAAD interceptor was not launched and
the system was not exercised. Despite the cost of more than $40 million
for that test and subsequent program delays, we gained no new
information on the performance of the THAAD system.
The two largest challenges to executing the U.S. missile defense
program is acquiring a cost effective set of reliable targets and
improving quality control. Over the past year we have initiated steps
to acquire a new set of targets of all ranges, including Foreign
Material Acquisitions, to verify the performance of the BMDS. Our new
target acquisition strategy, initiated in fiscal year 2009, procures
targets in production lots to increase competition, quality control,
reduce costs, and ensures the availability of backup targets starting
in 2012. For the next 3 years, we must continue to rely on an intensive
inspection and oversight process to motivate mission assurance.
Due to the precise nature of the operation of missile defense
systems, very high standards of quality control and an enduring culture
of disciplined mission assurance by the industry workforce is
essential. We have had many successes in improving our prime contractor
and supplier quality assurance. In each case, companies have been
willing to identify shortfalls, invest in new capital assets and attain
experienced leadership in changing cultures to establish the enduring
discipline required to consistently deliver precision missile defense
products. However, not all companies have sufficiently improved. Until
we complete planned competitions, including the greater use of firm
fixed price contracts, we will have to motivate greater attention by
senior industry management through intensive government inspections,
low award fees, the issuance of cure notices, stopping the funding of
new contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control
performance to influence future contract awards by DOD.
hedging against threat uncertainty
Missile defense technologies must be developed to adapt and upgrade
our systems to counter future changing threats. In accordance with the
PCL, we are focusing our future technologies in four areas: (1)
developing more accurate and faster tracking sensors on platforms to
enable early fire control solutions and intercepts; (2) developing
enhanced command and control networks to link and rapidly fuse sensor
data to handle large raid sizes of missile threats; (3) developing a
faster, more agile version of our SM-3 interceptor to destroy long-
range missiles early in flight; and (4) developing discrimination
techniques to rapidly resolve Reentry Vehicles from other nearby
objects. Additionally, we continue to research technologies for
destroying boosting missiles with directed energy. We are developing
more mature technologies for mid-term deployment decisions around 2015
and conducting science and technology experiments for far-term (around
2020) advanced capability deployment decisions.
One of the highest priority capabilities requested by the
warfighter community is a persistent and precise missile tracking
capability. We are requesting $113 million in fiscal year 2011 for the
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and Near Field Infra-Red
Experiment satellite operations. This space operations work will
demonstrate the utility of remote missile tracking from space and
reduce the risk of integrating the remote tracking data of future
satellites into missile defense fire control systems. MDA launched two
STSS demonstration satellites on 25 September 2009. We continue testing
and operating the two demonstration satellites, including cooperative
tests with other BMDS elements, and demonstrating these satellites
against targets of opportunity and scheduled tests involving targets.
We are also requesting $67 million in fiscal year 2011 for a new
program start, the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), comprised of
a network of remote tracking satellites, communications, and ground
stations. Key attributes of the PTSS are its limited mission,
uncomplicated design, lower costs, use of mature technologies, and
integration with legacy data management and control systems to provide
a persistent remote missile tracking capability of the areas of the
earth that are of most concern for missile defense. Lessons learned
from the two STSS demonstration satellites currently on orbit will
inform decisions on the development of a prototype PTSS capability by
the end of 2014. After validating the prototype design in ground
testing in 2014, we plan to fly the first prototypes while we have
industry teams compete to produce the remaining satellite constellation
for initial constellation operations by 2018.
We are also requesting $112 million for fiscal year 2011 for the
development and testing of a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) based
missile tracking sensor system, or Airborne Infrared (ABIR) sensor
system, to track large raids of ballistic missiles early in flight. We
are completing an analysis of the optimum RPV platform and sensors to
integrate into an effective early missile tracking system.
For fiscal year 2011, we are requesting $52 million for C2BMC
enhancements to develop a net-centric, Service-oriented architecture,
to rapidly fuse sensor data and provide data to distributed fire
control systems to intercept enemy reentry vehicles early, optimize
shoot-look-shoot opportunities, and economize the number of
interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat missiles. We are
pursuing enhanced C2BMC capabilities and experiments to integrate
interceptor fire control systems with ABIR, STSS, and other new sensor
technologies. We work closely with STRATCOM and the COCOMs to develop
and deliver the optimum C2BMC architectures in their regions.
We are requesting $41 million in fiscal year 2011 to develop
components that increase the speed of our SM-3 family of interceptors
with advanced divert capability, faster boosters, and lighter kill
vehicles. We are studying the use of a derivative SM-3 IB kill vehicle
and derivatives of the first and second stages of the SM-3 IIA
interceptor as part of the development of the SM-3 IIB long-range
missile interceptor.
We are requesting $99 million for fiscal year 2011 to conduct
continued research on high energy lasers. This past year we saw the
significant accomplishments of the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) as it
completed preparatory tests which ultimately led to two successful and
historic experimental shoot-downs of a solid rocket on February 3,
2010, and a boosting, liquid-fueled, Foreign Material Acquisition (FMA)
target on February 11, 2010. We are preparing for another test against
an FMA, at nearly twice the distance, later this spring. We will
continue to investigate multiple high energy laser technologies to
characterize their performance while validating the modeling and
simulation of long range directed energy beam propagation and beam
control. Additionally, we are currently supporting the USD(AT&L)/
Director for Development, Research, and Engineering (DDR&E)
comprehensive review of all DOD high energy laser programs to establish
a department wide program for developing and applying high energy laser
capabilities. We anticipate this review will define the ALTB's role in
the future development of high energy lasers.
develop new, fiscally sustainable capabilities over the long term
MDA's preferred approach to developing new missile defense
capabilities is to evolve and upgrade existing capabilities to leverage
the cost-effectiveness of utilizing existing Service training,
personnel and logistics infrastructures. The fiscal sustainability of
missile defense systems is largely determined by the cost of operations
and sustainment. Therefore, MDA executes ``hybrid management'' of
projects with the designated lead Services by embedding ``Service
cells'' in MDA joint project offices to make design and development
decisions associated with Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership,
Personnel, and Facilities to assure MDA products efficiently align with
Service processes and operational concepts.
MDA has established six baselines (cost, schedule, technical, test,
contract, and operational baselines) to plan and manage the execution
of missile defense projects. I approve the baselines of technology
programs, but jointly approve with lead Service Acquisition Executives
the baselines of MDA projects in product development. These baselines
not only assist in our cost-effective management of MDA projects, but
also provide visibility to the MDEB and Congress on the progress of our
execution. The baselines of all of our projects are established in
spring and will be submitted to Congress in a Baseline Acquisition
Report (BAR) in June. Finally, these baselines will form the basis for
USD(AT&L) production decisions.
expand international missile defense cooperation
As stated in the BMDR and Quadrennial Defense Review, a key
strategic goal is to develop the missile defense capacity of our
international partners. We are currently engaged in missile defense
projects, studies and analysis with over 20 countries. Our largest
international partnership is with Japan. We are co-developing the SM-3
IIA missile, studying future architectures, and supporting their SM-3
IA flight test program. In Europe, we are participating in the NATO
Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command and control
program and war games, continuing technology research projects with the
Czech Republic, and planning for the European PAA deployments, which
include the installation of Aegis Ashore sites, one each in Romania and
Poland. Collaboration with Israel has grown to involve the development
and deployment of the Arrow Weapon System, which is interoperable with
the U.S. missile defense system. MDA has completed and the United
States is now in the final negotiation of an Upper Tier Project
Agreement with Israel for cooperative development of an exo-atmospheric
interceptor and amending the U.S.-Israel Arrow Weapon System
Improvement Program agreement to extend the system's battle space and
enhance its ability to defeat long-range ballistic missiles and
countermeasures. MDA and Israel are also jointly developing the David's
Sling Weapon System to defend against shorter-range threats, to include
some ranges that the PAC-3 system cannot engage. Additionally, MDA is
active in supporting the Combatant Commands through international
symposiums, bilateral and multi-lateral dialogs, planning, and analysis
with Allies and international partners to help them understand the
benefits of integrated missile defense in their regions.
conclusion
Missile defense is a key part of our national security strategy
described in the BMDR to counter the growing threat of ballistic
missile proliferation. The New START treaty has no constraints on
current and future components of the BMDS development or deployment.
Article V, Section 3 of the treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launchers to missile
defense launchers, and vice versa, while ``grandfathering'' the five
former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB already converted for Ground Based
Interceptors. MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at
Vandenberg and intends to hedge against increased BMDS requirements by
completing construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely. Moreover, we
determined that if more interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg
AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI missile field (which
is not prohibited by the treaty). Regarding SLBM launchers, some time
ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors
from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive
option. As the committee knows, we have a very good and significantly
growing capability for sea-based missile defense on Aegis-capable
ships.
Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START treaty
actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense
program. Unless they have New-START accountable first stages (which we
do not plan to use), our targets will no longer be subject to START
constraints, which limited our use of air-to-surface and waterborne
launches of targets which are essential for the cost-effective testing
of missile defense interceptors against MRBM and IRBM targets in the
Pacific area. In addition, under New START, we will no longer be
limited to five space launch facilities for target launches.
MDA is working with the combatant commanders, Services, other DOD
agencies, academia, industry and international partners to address the
challenges and difficulties of managing, developing, testing and
fielding new military capabilities to deter use of ballistic missiles
and effectively destroy them once launched. Implementing these
warfighter priorities takes time, since the production time for a
missile and radar is over 2 years and establishing and training a unit
to create and deploy a military capability takes an additional year.
Our fiscal year 2011 budget funds the warfighters' near-term priorities
while building the foundation of a layered defense system with our
partners and friends that can provide an adaptive, cost-effective
strategy to counter ballistic missile proliferation in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral Macy.

STATEMENT OF RADM ARCHER M. MACY, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, JOINT
INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, AND DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FOR FORCE PROTECTION, J-8, THE JOINT STAFF

Admiral Macy. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss missile defense and the roles and
functions of the JIAMDO with you. I have submitted written
testimony for the committee and I would like to take a few
minutes to summarize the key points.
The JIAMDO is a small group of military and government
civilian personnel that supports the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the combatant
commanders. Our mission is to identify and coordinate joint
requirements for air defense, cruise missile defense, and BMD
to support development of solutions for the warfighter.
Key tasks for my organization include: advocating for the
warfighter's desired air and missile defense capabilities;
providing air and missile defense subject matter expertise and
advice to the CJCS, and to the Commander of STRATCOM;
facilitating combatant command and service collaborative
efforts to identify and develop operational concepts, joint
requirements, system interoperability, and operational
architectures; developing and maintaining an air and missile
defense road map; and finally, assessing and validating
integrated air and missile defense capabilities.
Our manning is tailored to provide current operational
expertise in air and missile defense and is drawn from across
the services. Our staff officers include Air Force E-3 AWACS
air battle management specialists, Army Patriot surface-to-air
missile officers, Navy Aegis surface warfare officers, and
Marine Corps fighter pilots. The background and experience of
these military personnel provide them operational credibility
and standing when discussing requirements with the warfighter
and enables them to translate operational needs into
requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and
demonstrations. It also provides a pool of experts to support
the CJCS in the development of policies and programs for the
warfighter.
JIAMDO provides the CJCS with direct input and assessment
on combatant command air and missile defense needs and options
on how to meet those needs. JIAMDO is very focused on ensuring
DOD is delivering capabilities that support combatant command
operational plans and that address their air and missile
defense gaps. We are an important conduit for the combatant
commanders to get their air and missile defense needs into DOD.
We have liaison personnel at Central Command, European Command,
STRATCOM, Joint Forces Command, Pacific Command, Northern
Command, NORAD, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan, and
we support the STRATCOM in their role as the air and missile
defense integrating authority.
JIAMDO applies its extensive air and missile defense
expertise, operational analysis capabilities, and Pentagon
process knowledge to serve as a link between the combatant
commands and the joint and Service staffs.
JIAMDO has been positioned by the CJCS to be at the
intersection of the requirements processes for air defense and
BMD and to act as an integration mechanism for harmonizing both
common and differing needs across multiple services, platforms,
and systems. Some recent and upcoming activities highlight
this. During the BMDR, I was one of the three directors of the
review and two of my senior officers served as co-chairs of the
programmatic, process, and execution working groups, and
requirements teams.
JIAMDO also recently completed a BMD inventory analysis,
the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study, as alluded to by the
chairman. This was a STRATCOM requested study to determine the
warfighter's requirement for upper tier interceptors. Working
with the combatant commands, the Services, and MDA, JIAMDO was
able to quantify how many interceptors were needed and the
effect those numbers had on warfighting capability. It is
important to emphasize that this was not a unilateral effort by
JIAMDO and in fact would not have been possible without the
support, input, and participation of the MDA and the combatant
commands.
With the advent of the PAA for missile defense, we are
embarking on a new round of analysis to understand the
implications of that decision on our needs for sensors,
weapons, and systems. The PAA concept will affect each
combatant commander differently and each will have their own
requirements for accomplishing their BMD responsibilities. In
order to integrate these needs, we are undertaking a new round
of analysis, the JCM-3 study. This is in its initial stages and
we are targeting completion for about this time next year.
Finally, as the Director of JIAMDO, I am the U.S.
representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee and am
responsible for addressing air and missile defense-related
issues in NATO and for drafting and coordinating U.S.
positions. In this role I recently had the privilege of working
with the NATO staff and member countries to discuss the
application of the PAA in Europe and the potential for regional
missile defense capability in the NATO context.
I should also note that I had the opportunity to observe
yesterday when the North Atlantic Council was briefed on the
PAA in Europe by the Vice CJCS, General Cartwright.
In conclusion, developing the right capability for the
warfighter is a challenging task. JIAMDO is a unique
organization positioned and manned to meet this challenge and
to support joint and coalition air and missile defense.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Macy follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Archer M. Macy, USN
Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished
members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. It
is an honor and pleasure to join Dr. Miller, Mr. Gilmore, and
Lieutenant General O'Reilly to discuss missile defense and the roles
and functions of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization.
The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization is a
small group of 30 military and government civilian personnel with
support staff that supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is to
identify and coordinate joint requirements to support efforts to
develop air defense, cruise missile defense, and ballistic missile
defense solutions for the warfighter. Key tasks for the organization
are:
Advocating for warfighter's desired air and missile defense
capabilities within the requirements and budgeting processes.
Providing air and missile defense subject matter expertise and
advice to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
Facilitating combatant command and Service collaborative efforts to
identify and develop operational concepts, joint requirements, system
interoperability, and operational architectures.
Developing and maintaining an air and missile defense roadmap to
correlate capabilities to weapons systems and track progress towards
delivering those capabilities to the warfighter.
Assessing and validating integrated air and missile defense
capabilities by means of simulations, technology demonstrations, and
wargames.
joint integrated air and missile defense organization
These are challenging activities that will be discussed in more
detail, but I want to provide some background on how Joint Integrated
Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) is structured. We are a
Chairman Controlled Activity that functions within the Joint Staff.
Chairman Controlled Activities are specialized organizations designed
to address unique, overarching areas that are of joint interest.
JIAMDO's manning is tailored to provide current operational expertise
in air and missile defense and is drawn from across the Services, and
in our case is primarily from air and missile defense specialties.
Some, examples are: Air Force E-3 AWACS air battle management
specialist, Army Patriot surface-to-air missile officers, Navy Aegis
Surface Warfare Officers, Marine Corps F/A-18 fighter pilot. The
background and experience of these military experts allows them to
relate at an operational level with the warfighter and enables them to
translate operational needs into requirements documents, analysis and
study activities, and demonstrations. It also provides an unequaled
pool of experts to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
development of policies and programs for the warfighter. JIAMDO reports
to the Chairman through the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment (Joint Staff J-8).
Originally the organization was focused on addressing air and
missile defense within a single theater of operations. However, the
theater ballistic missile threat is evolving and one of its principal
characteristics is increasing range, which enables a threat country to
attack targets thousands of miles away. This attack could be crossing
through one or more combatant commanders' area of operations or
Theaters, which has made the term ``Theater'' missile defense obsolete.
Because of this, the decision was made to change the name of the
organization to the Joint ``Integrated'' Air and Missile Defense
Organization. This reflected several factors. First, was the
Department's overall shift to address the emergence of longer range
ballistic missile threats. Second, it recognized the desire to more
closely integrate air defense capabilities with ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Third, it helped align the organization to
support STRATCOM, which as a result of the changing air and missile
defense environment had been assigned the task to synchronize planning
for global missile defense.
joint integrated air and missile defense
Before continuing, I want to take a moment to provide a brief
summary of what we mean by the air and missile defense concept that we
support. Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense is defined as the
integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the
Homeland and U.S. national interests, protect the Joint Force, and
enable freedom of action by negating an adversary's ability to achieve
adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. This
capability provides full spectrum dominance against aerial threats--
space-based, and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; intercontinental
through short-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; manned and
unmanned aircraft; rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM). The
Protection extends from the Homeland, through friendly nations and
coalition partners in a region, and within areas of military
operations.
The key enabling factors for integrated air and missile defense
include the abilities to provide a battle space picture in which the
commander is confident of it's accuracy and completeness; that key
intercept systems and shooters have the same high quality picture; that
we can defend a broader area through mutually supporting, joint,
interoperable forces; that we can increase the commander's confidence
of successful engagement; and, that the commander has the flexibility
to rapidly shift resources to best focus their effects on the
adversary.
jiamdo as part of the joint staff
JIAMDO is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff cadre of experts on
air and missile defense. One of the duties of the Director, JIAMDO is
to serve as the Deputy Director for Force Protection on the Joint
Staff. In this function, the Director is responsible for overseeing the
full scope of force protection activities in the capabilities
development processes including those for air and missile defense.
JIAMDO provides the Chairman direct input and assessments on combatant
command air and missile defense needs that are put forward in their
Integrated Priority Lists. Options on how to address those needs are
developed in conjunction with the Services, and JIAMDO tracks the
recommended courses of action from approval through the budgeting
process to fielding.
Weapon system fielding is another area where JIAMDO works critical
issues in support of the Chairman. The fielding plan for new missile
defense systems developed by MDA identified a need for the department
to develop a process to transition and transfer those systems from MDA
to the Services. JIAMDO worked closely with Service staffs and MDA to
develop business rules and processes to handle this, and was the lead
to take the new process to the JROC for approval.
The most recent example of support to the Chairman was during the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). JIAMDO had four key roles in
the BMDR. The Director, JIAMDO, was one of the directors of the review;
other JIAMDO personnel served as co-chair of the Programmatic Process &
Execution Working Group, led the Requirements issue team, and served in
the directorate of activities. In short, JIAMDO played a central role
in the development of the BMDR.
the air and missile defense integrating authority
In July 2008, STRATCOM was designated the Air and Missile Defense
Integrating Authority (AMD IA) and directed to serve as the combatant
commands' representative for air and missile defense. This was an
outgrowth of STRATCOM's ballistic missile defense role where they are
the warfighter voice to MDA. JIAMDO's role was also expanded at this
time to include support to STRATCOM in the AMD IA capacity. This is a
natural synergy where JIAMDO is able to apply its more extensive air
and missile defense expertise and capabilities process knowledge to
support the AMD IA. In addition to serving as a link between STRATCOM
and the Joint and Service staffs, and facilitating meetings, document
staffing, and briefings, JIAMDO also provides operational expertise and
analytic support. This will be critical as the Department evolves the
Prioritized Capabilities List, currently how ballistic missile
requirements are documented for MDA, to encompass the full scope of air
and missile defense. The expanded Prioritized Capability List will
provide transparency and insight for developers in the Services for air
defense, and in MDA for missile defense. It will also provide a common
requirements view for senior decision makers.
jiamdo and the combatant commands
A key part of our contribution is advocacy for combatant commands.
JIAMDO is very focused on ensuring the Department is delivering
capabilities that support combatant command Operational Plans and that
address their air and missile defense gaps. The principal avenues used
to coordinate the warfighters needs are the capability gap assessments
and through a liaison program.
The capability gap assessment is an annual Department process to
address the combatant commands' critical warfighting capability gaps in
their Integrated Priority Lists or IPLs that identify risk in
accomplishing their specific Unified Command Plan missions. Integration
and assessment of air and missile defense inputs from the IPLs are the
responsibility of JIAMDO. Through direct action officer level
discussions with combatant command staffs we coalesce similar inputs
from multiple combatant commands into what we call synthesized gaps. At
this point JIAMDO begins a detailed cross-walk of gaps to current and
planned programs, assesses the ongoing efforts to close or mitigate
those gaps, and provides a balanced approach to recommend programmatic
and/or non-programmatic solutions to close or mitigate remaining gaps
against available resources.
Again, through discussions with combatant command staffs we query
them as to whether the plan fully meets their needs, partially
satisfies it, or does not meet it at all, and carry that position
forward in Department discussions and reviews. We also use our
relationship with the combatant commands to gain insight into how to
quantify the risk for those gaps that are not fully satisfied. JIAMDO
then prepares a formal briefing for the JROC that addresses how the
gaps are being met, or recommendations on how to address them, which in
some cases means accepting risk. As is true throughout this process,
JIAMDO coordinates directly with the combatant command staffs on all
recommendations.
From this point forward the coordination becomes more formal. The
Director of JIAMDO will accompany members of the Joint Staff, Services,
and OSD on several trips to the combatant command headquarters. The
first trip occurs after the JROC is briefed to ensure combatant
commands understand and agree with the plan to address their gaps. For
this trip JIAMDO will brief the consolidated gaps and recommended
mitigation for the combatant command's gaps from the synthesized group
and specifically match it to planned actions. On a follow-on trip, the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of JIAMDO
will go to individual Combatant Commanders and provide a forum to more
closely examine plans to mitigate that command's gaps and provide an
opportunity to address other pressing concerns. This close coordination
and contact from the action office level up to the Flag level is the
way we meet our advocacy responsibilities and in my opinion the key to
successful capabilities development. This direct and repeated contact
with the combatant commands enables the Department to understand the
full impact of its decisions on the warfighter.
In addition to JIAMDO's role in the joint staff capabilities
processes, we have liaison personnel at CENTCOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM,
JFCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, NORAD, USFK, and USFJ. The liaison provides a
direct link between JIAMDO and the combatant commands. The liaisons are
located within the combatant command headquarters staffs, and work air
and missile defense day-to-day issues for both the hosting command and
JIAMDO. In many cases they serve as both liaison and as the command's
expert on joint air and missile defense. The ability to leverage direct
combatant command input on key issues, as well as analysis and
wargaming inputs, enables all of our activities to maintain a
warfighting focus. This relationship has served both the combatant
commands and JIAMDO well, and provides a responsive and accurate avenue
to gain answers to immediate inquiries within the Department of
Defense.
jiamdo in the requirements process
With that background, I would like to move on to discussing what
JIAMDO's role is in the Department requirements processes. Meeting the
challenges of countering air and missile threats is inherently a joint
activity that requires not just the participation of assets from all
our Services, but coherently integrated employment of those assets.
Similarly, the proper development of requirements and weapon systems
depends on the participation of all our Services, combatant commanders,
and key Agencies. JIAMDO serves at the intersection of the requirements
processes for air defense and for ballistic missile defense, and acts
to integrate and harmonize both their common and differing needs across
multiple services, platforms, and systems.
The Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) is the
Department process used for air defense requirements and JIAMDO is at
the hub of this process. I chair the first level of formal review and
approval in JCIDS, and my deputy runs the joint working group that
directs and vets analysis and requirements. As I mentioned earlier,
JIAMDO also supports STRATCOM as AMD IA in their development of the
Prioritized Capability List, which is MDA's equivalent of JCIDS.
JIAMDO's alignment with the AMD IA positions us to fully examine
employment and development interdependencies between ballistic missile
defense and air defense, and explore the potential for innovative
cross-utilization of technologies. In effect, JIAMDO serves as a bridge
between the Department's capabilities development process and the PCL
process and enables the warfighter's needs to remain as the focus of
both those activities
This is why JIAMDO is manned with air and missile defense
operational personnel and positioned within the joint staff. These
unique attributes, and the growing linkage between JCIDS and the PCL
allows us to understand what is needed for the joint fight, and
recognize opportunities to leverage capabilities across the air and
missile defense mission area.
the integrated air and missile defense roadmap and operational
architecture
One of the techniques central to achieving the vision of integrated
air and missile defense (IAMD), in the practical landscape of budgets,
technology and time, is the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Roadmap,
which supports the IAMD Operational Architecture. JIAMDO works with
STRATCOM, the Combatant Commands, and the Services, to develop the
roadmap as a culmination activity where the hardware needed to meet
operational concepts, architectures, and requirements is brought
together to provide a moving snapshot of progress toward meeting
warfighter needs. Getting to this point requires significant effort in
many areas. It begins by bringing the Services and combatant commands
to agreement at the macro level on what the air and missile defense
problems are, now and in the future, and what the desired end state is.
An Operational Concept does that. Through a process of joint meetings
and discussions, and iterative written drafts, a document is developed
that describes the end state of joint air and missile defense
employment and shortfalls that must be overcome to reach it. That
concept forms the basis for developing an operational architecture
which in essence is a hierarchical listing of mission tasks that must
be accomplished to execute air and missile defense. The Operational
Architecture provides a common lexicon and conceptual structure that
can be used across the Services to delineate what tasks a specific
weapon systems must be capable of based on its role in the air and
missile defense mission. The architecture does not specify what
equipment should be used to conduct a task, only what tasks must be
completed to enable joint employment. It is a necessary first step in
order to develop the systems architecture which does specify the
hardware and software that will be used for each task. This assortment
of documents provides the necessary framework and structure the
Services need to be able to build joint systems that enable the
warfighter to have a plug and fight capability across the Services.
The following example may help explain this process. Today's
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have very long fly-out ranges. In order
to engage a target the SAM needs a radar to detect and track that
target and provide tracking information to the missile. Historically,
SAMs have their own organic radar positioned side by side with it, like
the Patriot and Aegis weapon systems. Unfortunately, that means that in
many cases, and especially for low altitude targets, the SAM's fly-out
range is well beyond where its organic radar can see. To regain that
lost range, another radar that is closer to the target can be used as a
surrogate for the SAM's organic radar. The closer radar, which can be
airborne and from another Service, digitally replaces the SAM's organic
radar track. The SAM is now able to fly-out to its maximum range. One
of the desired end states in the current operational concept is to be
able to have an Army radar provide the target tracking data to a Navy
SAM to engage low altitude cruise missiles beyond the Navy radar's line
of sight. However, before that happens there must be agreement that
there is a need (Requirement) for this capability against low altitude
threats; the idea of jointly engaging needs to be described in
operational terms (Operational Concept); a list of tasks to be executed
must be determined and documented (Operational Architecture); and
identification of what hardware and software is needed must be compiled
(Systems Architecture). The lynchpin in the process is developing it
all jointly so that regardless of which Service the SAM or radar is
from the capability is there to complete the engagement.
We have found that using a roadmap is the best method to bring
these disparate but related pieces of information together. In close
coordination with the Services and combatant commands, we have built an
IAMD Roadmap which identifies a way forward for developing, and
ultimately fielding, joint capabilities described in the operational
concept/architecture. The purpose of IAMD Roadmaps is to enhance senior
leader abilities to make better-informed and timely decisions. The
Roadmap examines capabilities of the Service's individual systems
within a Family-of-Systems context and projects how these systems will
contribute to achieving desired Joint capabilities. Specifically, the
JROC-approved IAMD Roadmap Version 3 defined Air and Cruise Missile
Defense (ACMD) capabilities that will enable the warfighter to employ
Service specific and Joint IAMD capabilities within an integrated Joint
Engagement Zone. Additionally, Version 3 addresses the Wide Area Air
Surveillance (WAAS) challenges for the defense of the Homeland against
air and cruise missile threats and includes a Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) Appendix. Further, IAMD Roadmap Version 3 made recommendations
which influenced Program Review (PR)-11 studies and will inform Program
Objective Memorandum (POM)-12 budget planning. The JROC accepted the
Roadmap recommendations for action and requested that JIAMDO return to
the JROC to provide an update on the status of those recommendations,
an assessment of kill chains that cross Service lines, and Service
implementation of IAMD Roadmap in POM-12. Future IAMD Roadmaps will be
developed in time to support budget decisions and influence guidance
for developing the force.
The Department has documented the operational needs for air defense
in Joint Capability Documents and in the Prioritized Capabilities List
for ballistic missile defense, and JIAMDO has published the Operational
Concept and Operational Architecture. A System Architecture as well as
the next version of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Roadmap is
in development.
assessing operational architectures and operating concepts
A concurrent responsibility for the Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Organization is assessing and validating operational
concepts and architectures, and helping combatant commands and Services
define and refine requirements. This is performed primarily through
studies and analyses and modeling and simulation. Study activities vary
from inventory analysis to examinations of surveillance coverage and
options for various mixes of surveillance sensors. A ballistic missile
defense study is illustrative of this area. JIAMDO recently completed
an inventory analysis, Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study, in support of
STRATCOM. They had requested a study to determine what the warfighter
requirement was for upper tier interceptors for ballistic missile
defense. The information was needed to support production and budget
decisions. Working with the combatant commands, the Services, and the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), JIAMDO was able to quantify how many
interceptors were needed and the affect on warfighter capability. The
results were used to support recent programming decisions on missile
defense. It is important to emphasize that this was not a unilateral
effort by JIAMDO, and in fact would not have been possible without the
support, input, and participation of the MDA and all the combatant
commands.
With the advent of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile
defense, we are embarking on a new round of analysis to understand the
implications of that decision on our needs for sensors, weapons and
systems. The PAA concept will be applied in the different areas of
responsibility of the combatant commanders, and each will have their
own needs for how to accomplish their ballistic missile defense
responsibilities. In order to integrate these needs across the
Department, we are the initial stages of conducting the next round of
analysis in this area with JCM-3, which we are targeting for completion
about this time next year. I have included a graphic on the Senior
Review Group of the study to illustrate the inclusive approach we use
for our analysis.
Modeling, simulation, and wargames are also used for analysis. A
centerpiece of JIAMDO's analysis is the Nimble Fire modeling and
simulation activity. Nimble Fire is a U.S. classified operator-in-the-
loop simulation where Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army
operational personnel come together to execute joint air and missile
defense missions. The events are structured to allow operational
personnel to employ as they deem appropriate and the data we obtain is
used to define and refine capability gaps, requirements, concepts, and
in some instances employment techniques. It is a fully functional joint
architecture capable of executing current and future concepts with
operationally representative positions for Aegis, Patriot, AWACS, E-2,
F/A-18, F-15, F-22, and JLENS among others. The simulation can conduct
distributed operations to U.S. and overseas military locations and
annually executes a combined air, cruise missile, ballistic missile
defense event in conjunction with MDA's Missile Defense Integrated
Operations Center simulation at Colorado Springs. Analysis events are
based on combatant command war plans and routinely have participants
from the commands in the operational positions. Results are out-briefed
to the combatant command as well as the Services and agencies. Nimble
Fire is a one of a kind capability that has proven to be invaluable in
analyzing concepts and requirements.
Two of the premier ballistic missile defense wargames, Nimble
Titan, and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Wargame, are not
conducted by JIAMDO, but JIAMDO provides analytical support and
coordinates combatant command participation and input. Nimble Titan is
sponsored by STRATCOM and led by the Joint Force Component Command,
Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). It is a policy and military
wargame designed to assess and evaluate coalition and allied
participation in missile defense. U.S. and international missile
defense experts from both ministries of foreign affairs and ministries
of defense take part in the events. Eight nations currently participate
with more countries to be added in 2012. Insights from these wargames
allow the U.S. and its partners to identify potential policy and
military issues such as command and control, information sharing, and
coalition decision making.
The BMDS Wargame, sponsored by the MDA, is a U.S. only classified
tactical level simulation that brings together warfighters and
developers to work collaboratively to examine how to fight the future
ballistic missile defense system. This wargame explores areas such as
shot doctrine, sensor control, interceptor inventory management, and
force employment. JIAMDO provides development, planning, execution, and
analytic support for these wargames. We also leverage findings from
these events to support other analyses, and used the shot doctrine
developed during the BMDS wargame in the models for the JCM studies.
jiamdo and the north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
Closely associated with combatant command relationships are the
NATO responsibilities of JIAMDO. The Director, JIAMDO is the U.S.
Representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee. In this role the
Director is responsible for addressing air and missile defense related
issues in NATO. The Director drafts U.S. positions for NATO, and
coordinates them with other U.S. stakeholders. The Director's unique
position allows insight into policy and military issues from both a
U.S. and coalition point of view, and enables JIAMDO to understand and
address tactical level integration of coalition partners in analysis
and studies, and during the development of employment concepts. In this
regard I have had the privilege of working with the NATO staff and
appearing before the North Atlantic Council to discuss the application
of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe and the potential for
regional missile defense capability in a NATO context.
conclusion
In my opinion JIAMDO is uniquely and correctly positioned and
manned to provide the kind of support the Department needs to meet the
President's air and missile defense objectives. The Department has
recognized that air and missile defense is a complex mission area and
has committed to joint warfighting. JIAMDO is part of that commitment
and we are working hard to ensure that warfighter needs are met. Thank
you for your time, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you very much.
Let's have an 8-minute first round for questioning.
Secretary Miller, you outlined the four phases over the
next decade for the PAA, so I'm not going to go into that in
more detail. But I am going to be asking you, General O'Reilly,
to go through some of the reasons why the military uniformly
supported it. I'm going to just tell you what I understand the
advantages of the new system are and then see if you agree. You
outlined some of them, but I don't think it was as
comprehensive as it could be, so let me go through them.
First, does the new plan, the PAA, provide protection 5
years sooner than the old plan? In other words, the old plan
would have been deployed around 2017, I understand, while the
new system will be deployed starting in 2011. Is that true?
Dr. Miller. Yes, Senator. We would estimate 5 to 6 years
earlier.
Chairman Levin. Okay, doctor, you can chime in. If either
of you have a different answer on this let me know.
Second, the new plan protects the most vulnerable areas
first. The old system would not have provided any protection
for Southeastern NATO Europe, the portions that are currently
within range of Iranian missiles. The new plan starts by
protecting the areas that are currently within range of
existing Iranian missiles. Is that true?
Dr. Miller. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Third, the new plan protects all of NATO
Europe by 2018, and will provide additional protection to the
United States with phase four in the 2020 timeframe, unlike the
old system, which never would have covered more than 70 to 75
percent of NATO Europe. Is that true?
Dr. Miller. That's right.
Chairman Levin. General?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Fourth, the old plan, with 10 interceptors
in Poland, could have been overwhelmed with just 5 Iranian
missiles or more. The new system, with many SM-3 interceptors
at sea and on land and the potential for adding more with a
naval surge, could handle many more Iranian missiles of all
ranges.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Chairman Levin. General?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Next, the old system only defended against
longer-range Iranian missile threats, which Iran does not yet
have. The new system starts with capability against existing
threats, but then adds capability against future threats. Is
that true, doctor?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. General?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the old system could be used to
defend against medium-range ballistic missiles, and that was
part of our concern. It was a mismatch of our capability versus
that medium-range threat.
Dr. Miller. Excuse me, just to amplify on the General's
statement. The old system would not have covered the shorter-
range systems of 500 kilometers or 1,000 kilometers or under.
General O'Reilly. Yes.
Chairman Levin. The PAA is a plus in that regard as well?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller, do you agree? You're shaking
your head.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, the old system was a fixed-site
system that could not be moved to adapt to a changing threat.
The new system is inherently flexible and adaptable. The Aegis
BMD ships can move quickly. The land-based SM-3 sites can be
relocated within about 4 months if a changed threat warranted
it. Is that correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, the baselines. General, you talked
about I think six baselines for acquisition, including cost,
schedule, performance, testing. One of the issues here, which
Senator McCain raised, has to do with some of the problems that
we have because of the cost-plus contracts that have been given
in this area and some of the losses that we've suffered as a
result of not being able to go after a contractor for defects.
He listed one of the major defects which has recently been
clear.
You mentioned, General, that you used the figure $37
billion. You're looking through that number of potential
contract awards to see where competition can be used more
often. That, of course, is one way to keep costs down. But
we're going to need to have some kind of warranties against
defects, it seems to me. Right now, we've lost tens of millions
of dollars, more than that, hundreds of millions of dollars,
based on small defects, which means that systems were presented
to us that did not do the job that they were supposed to do.
I'm just wondering whether or not, in addition to looking
for greater opportunities for competition to reduce the cost,
you're also going to be looking for a system which is not as
much based on cost-plus, but is based on warranties and defects
that would have to be paid for by the contractors?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. As I review the acquisition
strategy for the value of $37 billion of contracts in the next
2 years, that is one of the criteria that I review for, is
where can we apply both fixed-price contracts, which puts the
penalty of not delivering a fully operational, functional end
item on the producer, not only that, but also look for defect
clauses.
The problem that I have right now is with a lot of these
contracts on the developmental side. There was an intent for
the government and industry to share risk, but that risk we
were talking about was a developmental risk and risk of
technology and new manufacturing processes. Unfortunately, that
cost-plus coverage to handle those risks limits our ability to
enforce the fact when defects occur and the contractor is still
not liable for those defects because of the way the contracts
were constructed.
So yes, sir, we are reviewing the actual construct of each
one of those contracts.
Chairman Levin. That's very important to us. We just had
the reform acquisition law which this committee initiated and
promoted, and it was signed by the President. I understand
sharing risks in the developmental stage. That is clear. You're
not going to get too many contractors who are going to be
willing to take the risk of a new system which is under
development.
That's very different, however, from producing something
with a defect in it which is not supposed to be there. It's a
manufacturing defect. Something is left out which is supposed
to be there. Something is put in the wrong place. That's not
supposed to be a shared risk. That's a failure of
manufacturing.
I'm glad, and I know that Senator McCain raised this point
very strongly and feels very strongly, and I think all the
members of this committee do because we've been so actively
involved in the reform effort here in terms of acquisition.
Your determination in this area is very important to us.
Dr. Gilmore, you have some skin in that game as well, and
I'm sure that this effort that has been described and was part
of your testimony is also good news for you as well. Is that
accurate?
Dr. Gilmore. That's correct. The pace of testing now is
largely limited by the availability of targets. So the sooner
that we can get reliable targets, the more testing can be done.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller, do you want to add anything to
that issue in terms of cost-plus versus fixed price and getting
guarantees, warranties against defective manufacturing?
Dr. Miller. Senator, I'll just say that I agree with the
statements of both General O'Reilly and Dr. Gilmore.
Chairman Levin. All right, thank you.
My time is up. Senator Inhofe is next.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to cover three things pretty quick here. First of
all, the chairman spent a long time talking about the old
system, the new system. We're talking about the third site in
Poland, which is one that I very strongly supported during that
time. Do you agree that initially we were talking about having
that capability of knocking down an ICBM from Iran in the third
site originally by 2013? That slipped probably to about 2015.
Am I generally right there? Actually, originally I think it was
2012, but then it started slipping.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Then the requirements for
ratification of the treaties before we could begin work--to
build the missile field is 5\1/2\ years, another year and a
half to integrate it and complete the operational certification
by the combatant command in Europe. So it was 2017 we reached
the point before we could have the first operational site.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, I disagree with that, and I will
submit for the record evidence that it would have been 2015.
It's not that big a deal, but that's an opinion that I'm
expressing.
[The information referred to, submitted by Senator Inhofe,
follows:]

The 2007 report by the Department of Defense and the Department of
State, Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets in Europe, stated that, the
proposed European interceptor site would include ``up to 10 silo-based
long-range interceptors located in central Europe (2011-2013).''

[The information referred to, submitted by the Department
of Defense, follows:]

Missile field construction was estimated at 5\1/2\ years plus 1
year operational integration. The starting date slipped due to
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement ratification requirements, which
moved the operational capability from 2014 to 2017.

Senator Inhofe. The second thing I want to get out is how
this treaty affects our ability to protect America, our
national missile defense system. Dr. Miller, I looked in your
written testimony after you made a statement and I couldn't
find it, but you said something to the effect that there is no
restriction by Russia in terms of our ability for a national
missile defense system.
I did find, however, in General O'Reilly's statement it
says that ``the New START has no constraints on current and
future components of the BMD's development or deployment.'' Let
me just suggest to you that there are a lot of people who
disagree with that. How do you respond, very briefly, and just
take one of you--perhaps, General O'Reilly, you'd be the right
one--when you have the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Lavrov,
who stated that linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled
out in the accord and legally binding and the Russians will
have the right to exit the accord if the U.S. is building up a
missile defense strategy.
I also have actually from the unilateral statement by
Russia where they say the same thing, that yes, they do have
that restriction on the United States and it is legally
binding.
Any response to that?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the DOD General Counsel, the State
Department General Counsel, and the National Security Council
General Counsel have all advised me that it is not legally
binding.
Senator Inhofe. So that's us. We're saying it's not legally
binding, although the Russians say it is legally binding. Does
that bother you?
General O'Reilly. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. It bothers me.
Dr. Miller. Sir, it's clear that the Russian unilateral
statement is not unilaterally binding. But it's also clear that
they have the right to withdraw from New START, once ratified
and implemented, should they see it in their national security
interests. We don't expect that to be the case.
I would also note that the Russians made a similar
statement with respect to New START I and concerns about BMD
development.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I know that.
Dr. Miller. The United States then withdrew from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russians stayed in START I at
that time. We can expect them to make decisions that are based
on their national interest.
Senator Inhofe. The third thing that I want to get into the
record--and there's not going to be a lot of time to do all
this--would be the issue that comes out as to when Iran is
going to have the capability, and we spent a long time looking
at this. We know that we have GBIs in California. We know we
have them in Alaska. We've seen the map showing the footprint.
Yes, it does reach the east coast of the United States barely,
and a lot of people have said, well, that's assuming we're
lucky with one shot, and then there's a percentage that's
attached to that.
I think the previous administration, in talking about the
third site, felt the same as I do. That that is not a comfort
level that I feel that I'm enjoying.
Would anyone like to volunteer as to when you think that
the Iranians are going to have the capability of sending an
ICBM to the continental United States?
Dr. Miller. Sir, that's an inherently uncertain question.
The current estimates, as included in a recent unclassified
report submitted by DOD, say that it could potentially be as
soon as 2015.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I agree with that, and that's the
first thing we agree on.
That being 2015 and the capability as I look at this--and
we've been talking about the old system and the new system. I'm
familiar with the SM-3 Block I-A, what its capabilities are.
That's 2010, that's now. The Block 1-B, 2015; Block II-Alpha,
that would be 2018, but really to have the capability of a
ground-based system that would have been in this case in
Poland--at one time we were talking about doing that in Florida
and decided that we wanted to have something that would also be
defensive for Western Europe, and I agreed with that at the
time.
But to get to that you have to have an SM-3 Block II-B,
Bravo. Does anyone want to venture a guess as to when that II-
Bravo would be effective, deployable?
Dr. Miller. Sir, we estimate that for 2020. If I could
briefly add, the current planned deployment for the PAA
includes the placement of a forward-based radar in Europe in
the 2011 timeframe. That radar will not only help the defense
of Europe. It will also help the defense of the United States,
and it was indeed the most important contribution of the
previous architecture. That's a common element from the past
architecture. We moved it forward from what we estimated to be
2017 deployment to a 2011 deployment to provide that capability
for improved national missile defenses earlier.
Senator Inhofe. It's my understanding that this 2020 date
on the phase four is one--do you all stand behind that date?
Because I don't. I've read a lot of things to the contrary,
that there's not any level of certainty to that. Does anyone
feel very confident?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. I've developed four missile
systems. This is very feasible. We used very conservative
timelines. We've looked at the technology. I've had two
independent estimates. I've asked the Defense Science Board and
the Secretary of Defense has supported me in an independent
assessment of that this year to verify----
Senator Inhofe. I want you to send me something that is
convincing that we would have that by 2020. Now, even if that's
true--and I would question that; I do want to see what you have
and I want to give you the benefit of that doubt, General. But
even if that's true, we still have that timeframe between 2015
and 2020 that is very disturbing to me.
[The information referred to follows:]

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) established the
goals and timelines for the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe.
The PAA will build on already fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System
assets to deploy capability in four phases, delivering missile defenses
earlier than prior plans for defense of Europe, and will complement the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense activities. The BMDR
states that, ``under this approach, in Phase 4 (2020 timeframe), an
additional capability against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle
East against the United States will be available. This phase will take
advantage of an upgrade to the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the Block
IIB.''
The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) program and budget documentation
supports and reflects a 2020 deployment of Phase 4. For example, MDA's
fiscal year 2011 budget justification documentation states that, ``in
the 2020 timeframe, we intend to field in Phase 4 more advanced land-
based capabilities in Europe using a more capable SM-3 Block IIB
missile and space sensors to handle large raid sizes.'' MDA requested
$40 million in fiscal year 2011 to initiate this effort.
Additionally, MDA has base-lined the schedule, technical, resource,
and contract plans that will lead up to a 2020 deployment of the SM-3
Block IIB missile and other Phase 4 activities. These plans will be
included in the congressionally-mandated Ballistic Missile Defense
Accountability Report, which will be completed and delivered to the
Congressional Defense Committees in June 2010.

Senator Inhofe. This whole idea on the estimates that we
have had in the past is a great deal of concern. You've heard
me say this before, because I was there in 1998, in August
1998, when we asked the question, when will North Korea have
the multiple-stage capability. At that time the intelligence
estimate, and it came out of the White House also, somewhere
between 5 and 10 years. That was August 24, 1998. Seven days
later, August 31, they fired one.
I'd rather be conservative in our estimates. I have to at
least express the opinion of one member of this panel who's
very much disturbed over what could happen to the United States
with this change in policy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first thank all of you for the extraordinary work
that you've done. I've said this before in previous years, but
it's not so long ago that there were a lot of people around
here and elsewhere who thought that the whole idea of a BMD was
really pie in the sky, no pun intended, I mean that it just was
a ridiculous waste of money. I remember people saying, how are
you ever going to have a bullet that could hit another bullet?
Well, you have done it. It's a remarkable technological and
management breakthrough, and I just don't think we can thank
you enough for it, because it has direct relevance to the
security of the American people.
My God, you've actually even done a successful test of the
Airborne Laser, General O'Reilly. That was thought to be the
biggest mind trip and waste of money, and yet it holds
tremendous potential for giving us a number of capabilities,
including hitting missiles in the launch phase, which is
probably the best time we'd want to hit them.
So the first thing I wanted to do is thank you for the work
you're doing.
Second, last year in this committee we had a really
vigorous debate in light of what many of us thought were
excessive cuts in the MDA's budget. I'm really glad that the
President has proposed in the budget for the coming fiscal year
restoring well over $500 million in funding to the MDA. I think
that's a very constructive step forward.
I want to get into some of the discussion that both Senator
Levin and Senator Inhofe had about the PAA and the two-stage
GBI. If it's possible, I find myself agreeing with what
Chairman Levin has argued are the positive results of the PAA
in terms of the defense of Europe and the Middle East, our NATO
allies, and our allies in the Middle East in terms of short-
and medium-range missiles which Iran has now.
But I also agree with Senator Inhofe and I share his
concerns about what we lost when we stopped the change from so-
called ``old'' to the new approach in terms of the GBI. Last
week, General Burgess, the head of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, was before this committee and echoing or paralleling
what you said, Dr. Miller. He told us that their estimate was
that Iran could have an ICBM that could hit the United States
by 2015 with foreign assistance.
When we pressed him on that, he said he was thinking about
North Korea, and of course it's quite plausible that North
Korea would sell Iran such foreign assistance. The problem here
is that the two-stage GBI was supposed to be done by 2015,
maybe 2017, as time went on. It's pretty clear in the exchange
between Senator Inhofe and yourself that the SM-3 Phase II-B
that will be capable of hitting a missile fired from Iran to
the United States won't be ready until 2020 at best.
There is a gap there. It's not a total vulnerability
because of course we have the missiles in California and Alaska
if, God forbid, the Iranian missile came over. General
O'Reilly, I was pleased that the BMDR describes the
administration's commitment to ``continued development and
assessment of the two-stage GBI'' as a hedge against the risks
that either a threat to the American Homeland will develop
sooner than expected or the SM-3 program will run into
currently unanticipated technical challenges.
I think that's a very important statement to make because I
think, as you would I guess agree, the two-stage GBI was a very
good program, moving in the right direction.
But here's my concern. In your testimony you highlighted
the upcoming two tests for the two-stage GBI as laid out in
MDA's IMTP. But if I'm reading things correctly, I'm concerned
that, although that pair of tests is scheduled through 2012, no
other tests are planned until 2016. So quite directly, I'm
asking how can the two-stage GBI serve as an adequate hedge in
the way that I described for defense of the Homeland, shoot,
look, shoot--shoot from Europe, if we miss look, California,
Alaska, pick it up? How can the two-stage GBI serve as an
adequate hedge if it will not be sufficiently tested until
later in the decade?
General O'Reilly. Sir, first of all, the two-stage GBI has
the same components as the three-stage, except the third stage
is removed and we have an adapter in there. The actual
appearance of them, the length, everything, is identical.
We will test the two-stage GBI in June and that will verify
any differences between the two-stage and the three-stage GBI.
The important part of this interceptor is the kill vehicle
itself, and the kill vehicle is identical between the two- and
three-stage GBI. So our choice of when we were testing the two-
stage GBI was basically driven on what type of environments we
wanted to test the kill vehicle in, because we believe after
this test in June we will have satisfied any differences
between the two and three-stage and literally at that point on
the performance of a two-stage is directly correlated and
identical to the performance of a three-stage, because the
front end after the first few minutes of flight is identical
between the two.
Senator Lieberman. So you're saying that the program to
develop the SM-3 systems will also facilitate or bring about
the realization of the two-stage GBI as a hedge?
General O'Reilly. The two-stage GBI, as we said, in June we
believe will verify any distinctive differences. At that point
it'll be a very mature missile, because of the part that's so
key. The development of the SM-3 II-B is a separate,
independent activity. If we did have a problem with that,
another way of achieving a hedge against a launch from either
North Korea or Iran is to have another shot opportunity from
our current missile fields, and that's what a two-stage GBI
would provide you.
Senator Lieberman. Current missile fields in Alaska.
General O'Reilly. Yes, in Alaska.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, I wanted to get to that.
Let me just come back to the strategy of this. I assume
that you would agree that the sooner we can have the capability
to shoot, look, and shoot--that is, shoot at an Iranian or
North Korean missile, Iranian particularly, from Europe and
then look and see if we hit it, and if we don't, shoot again
from California and Alaska--the sooner we have that capability,
the better?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Dr. Miller. May I briefly----
Senator Lieberman. Yes, go ahead, Dr. Miller. I'd invite
you into the conversation.
Dr. Miller. Thank you very much. I just want to add that if
we were 100 percent sure that a GBI interceptor would work
effectively against this Iranian threat, we wouldn't have been
talking about the possibility of a third site. So you're right
that the idea of multiple shots is an important element.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Miller. What the SM-3 II-B provides is a different
phenomenology, because it would have an ascent phase intercept.
If there's a problem with the sensor of the GBI, which is
common to both the two-stage and three-stage, the SM-3 II-B
will provide a different way to get after that future threat
that's independent and in our view a much greater contribution
to the overall defense of the United States against that
threat.
Senator Lieberman. I think you're going to increasingly be
asked about the potential gap here between when Iran has an
ICBM and when we have the shoot, look, the two opportunities
here. So I urge you to please be as direct as you need to be
with us about what you need financially to really develop the
two-stage GBI as a hedge, including, as you said, General
O'Reilly, the potential for basing some of those two-stage GBIs
in the United States for defense of our Homeland.
I thank you. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for all of your
work on these important subjects.
I want to come back, if I can, briefly to some questions
that Senator Inhofe had asked with regard to New START. I'm
concerned that the administration may not fully implement its
Phased Adaptive plans for missile defense in Europe or that it
may seek to slow down that implementation to avoid Russian
withdrawal from the New START. What types of missile defense
activities will the administration avoid to diminish the
chances that the Russians will withdraw from the New START?
Dr. Miller. Senator Thune, this administration has
attempted to make as clear as possible in the Missile Defense
Review and in other statements that it will do everything
necessary to defend the U.S. Homeland, our troops overseas, and
to work with our allies and partners to defend them as well--
full stop.
Senator Thune. I know your argument has been that these
unilateral agreements, either side can walk away from this
thing. But there's certainly an implication that the Russians I
think believe that there is more to this than what we're being
led to believe. I think it's an important element as we look at
this treaty, because missile defense plays so heavily in the
defense not only of the United States, but our allies.
So that's something my guess is we'll continue to pursue.
Dr. Miller. Sir, could I add just a brief note on the
mathematics here? Currently we have 30 GBIs, by the end of this
fiscal year, that will be deployed. Even with the potential
growth in that, consider the difference in that scale relative
to the 1550 warheads that are allowed under the New START.
Whatever the concerns that the Russian Federation may have
about the future of U.S. missile defense, the scale of the
defensive capabilities that we have is nowhere near the
potential of affecting the stability of the strategic
deterrence relationship.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that. I think sometimes too,
though, that it gives them an out, a convenient out, an excuse
at some point in the future.
But let me ask you, Secretary Miller, if I might. In 2007,
I should say, the Director of National Assessment--I want to
quote for you what they said here: ``The individual Russian
entities continue to provide assistance to Iran's ballistic
missile programs. We judge that Russian entity assistance,
along with assistance from entities in China and North Korea,
has helped Iran move towards self-sufficiency in the production
of ballistic missiles. The Russian Government has taken steps
to improve controls on ballistic missile technology and its
record of enforcement, though still mixed, has improved over
the decade.''
What level of assistance do you see from Russia today in
helping Iran develop its ballistic missile capabilities or
capacities?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I believe that the 2000 assessment still
stands, but I'd like to take that question for the record and
provide a detailed response if I could.
[The information referred to follows:]

Moscow is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to
further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle research and
development efforts. However, Russia's advanced ballistic missile
production infrastructure has technologies that could further current
and future Iranian goals. Russian-based Iranian defense officials and
intermediaries have access to Russian academics, companies, and
research organizations, and some of these individuals and entities
likely assist Iran with technologies that could assist in its ballistic
missile programs. Iran is likely attempting to obtain Russian expertise
in missile guidance systems to improve accuracy, composite structural
materials to save weight and increase range, high temperature materials
for reentry vehicles, and possibly with more energetic propellants.

Senator Thune. This is a follow-up to that one, so I don't
know if you want to maybe take this one for the record, too. On
Thursday, April 15, there was a Washington Times newspaper
article that reported that the Central Intelligence Agency's
Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation Arms Control Center this
year linked Chinese companies to missile programs in Iran. Do
your missile defense plans take into account longstanding and
possible present day cooperation and support by Russia and
China for Iran's ballistic missile program?
Dr. Miller. Sir, yes, they do, and I will provide more
details with respect to the Chinese side of that equation as
well for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Beijing is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to
further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle research and
development efforts, but Chinese individuals and entities provide Iran
with controlled and dual-use technologies needed to advance in these
areas. China-based Iranian defense officials and intermediaries have
access to Chinese academics, companies, and research organizations,
some of which continue to provide support despite being sanctioned.
Iran is receiving materiel and technological assistance with missile
guidance systems, raw materials, production machinery, and propellants.

Senator Thune. Thank you.
This I would direct to you, Secretary Miller, as well as to
General O'Reilly. As part of the PAA to European missile
defense, my understanding is the administration is now seeking
to establish a ground-based SM-3 missile defense site in
Romania by 2015. What countries do you envision will be
protected by that site? How do you envision that the command
and control process will work? What policies and procedures
would likely be at work in the event that a launch would be
detected?
Dr. Miller. The capabilities of the PAA in terms of
coverage of Europe will grow over time. By the time of phase
three, which is 2018, it will have complete coverage of Europe,
and that will be a combined contribution of the site in
Romania, the site in Poland, and any additional sea-based sites
as well.
With respect to command and control, this is a conversation
that we are having now with our NATO allies and we expect that
the command and control for the PAA, which is intended to be
the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense, would be through
the European Command, and then we are having discussions with
our European allies with respect to NATO command and control
arrangements.
There's an important program there called Active-Layered
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALT-BMD), a NATO program
that's currently funded for study and that provides the command
and control architecture to integrate countries' contributions
to missile defense as well. I think General O'Reilly will
probably want to add something, perhaps Admiral Macy as well.
General O'Reilly. Sir, the ALT-BMD program is focused on a
lower tier and, as we've said, the most effective missile
defense has both an upper and a lower tier. So you have
multiple shot opportunities using different systems. They are
reviewing, going through studies, as we speak in order to
determine what their contribution would be from a lower tier
and then how to integrate it with our systems that we're
proposing.
This obviously will need the decision made at the Lisbon
summit later this year with NATO to determine whether or not
territorial defense in Europe is going to be a policy and a
priority for them. If it is, the ALT-BMD system then would
readily be available to integrate with the PAA.
Senator Thune. I want to ask one question that Senator
Lieberman alluded to earlier. On February 11 of this year, MDA
completed a successful destruction of a threat-representative
missile in its boost phase using the high-energy laser beam
from the Airborne Laser aircraft, which I think is a pretty
remarkable accomplishment and in my view could lead to a
revolution in military affairs.
I'm interested in knowing what your views are regarding the
successful test of the Airborne Laser program. Do you think it
marks the beginning of sort of a revolution, and what are your
views about this program as we move forward and how should we
be leveraging the new technology that it represents?
Dr. Miller. I'll speak very briefly, then ask my colleagues
to come in.
The test represented an important milestone in showing that
directed energy technologies can play an important role in the
future in missile defense. As the Secretary of Defense had
noted in the decision to terminate the program just about a
year ago, the concern was not about the technological
capabilities of the system, but about the operational concept
for applying it and the reality that there would have to be
large numbers of aircraft relatively close to the threats and
there are serious concerns about the survivability of that
platform and the lack of a concept of operations that would
make it effective in an actual theater warfighting scenario.
General O'Reilly. Sir, that intercept and destruction of
the missile a few seconds after liftoff on 11 February
demonstrated many scientific breakthroughs. There was a
hierarchy of first-time accomplishments, and it went a long way
with moving us from theory to empirical data that we're
collecting on these systems.
That design was largely designed during the 90s that you
saw on that platform. The platform demonstrated the beam
control and the ability to propagate in the earth's atmosphere.
Since then, we have also been developing other technologies
which produce more power in smaller packages, and our budget
requests continue development of those so that we are readily
available, or we have a platform readily available, in order to
take these newer technologies and gain the standoff distances
that we've been referring to that make them very operationally
capable.
Senator Thune. I appreciate the doubts that have been
expressed by some about the concept of operations in an actual
conflict. But there are others who I think have great
confidence in the aircraft. It seems to me at least that these
directed energy type weapons have great potential to transform
our future deterrence capability. So I hope that we can
continue dialogue about how to use those technologies as we go
forward.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank you, gentlemen, for your service as well. I
want to go a little more into the PAA. In his testimony before
this committee last month, General Chilton, the Commander in
Chief at STRATCOM, talked about STRATCOM being the ``lead
combatant command for missile defense advocacy'' and indicated
he was working to shape missile defense investments that
``provide more effective capabilities for our geographic
combatant commanders.''
This goes to you, Admiral Macy. Have geographic combatant
commanders requested increased regional missile defense
capabilities?
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir, they have, if by ``increased'' you
mean additional assets. Following the generation of the PAA and
the concept of having different abilities which could be
tailored to regional needs, all of the combatant commanders
with current significant issues in missile defense have been
looking specifically at the PAA and how to adapt it to their
region.
I should take the opportunity to say that the PAA is not a
system, but a concept of how you provide a regional missile
defense. The systems, if you will, are the toolkit provided by
General O'Reilly, which includes your interceptors, sensor
packages, and command and control. There are differences in the
regions between the Pacific, the Central region, and the
European region, of politics, of threat, of geography, both
technical and operational issues. So each of the combatant
commanders are looking at that, and have come forward with
their initial estimates, and we are in the process now within
the Joint Staff and with STRATCOM of looking at how to balance
those assets and to meet their needs in the different regions.
Senator Ben Nelson. There are obviously going to be
different needs depending on the location of the combatant
commander. So you're requesting their input to determine how
best to meet those needs, because there may be multiple needs
and there may be some overlay of needs depending on the
geographic location?
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir. We have two primary means in which
we can ascertain and address the COCOMs' needs. The first is,
if you will, through their systemic and technical capabilities
desires, which are expressed in the prioritized capabilities
list for missile defense, which has inputs from all of the
COCOMs and is collated and signed forward by General Chilton to
General O'Reilly as what he sees as the need for General
O'Reilly to provide.
Separately, on the operational end we have, as we do for
all our forces, a global force management process with a series
of steps and boards that meet to figure out how to divvy up, if
you will, all of our assets around the globe. We have, over the
last 6 months, been engaged in an effort to understand how to
put the missile defense issues into that same process, because
the process works. The trick here, if you will, is getting the
business rules for missile defense to provide to the global
force managers. That is coming to a conclusion here in the next
few months, and incorporates those things such as I mentioned
that the combatant commanders have been looking at: What would
be the laydown for PAA in their area?
Senator Ben Nelson. Different warheads, different delivery
systems, different capabilities, different needs, but
coordination of them and the integration of that total arsenal;
is that what we're attempting to do here?
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir, exactly that, if you will, the
toolkit of interceptors is fixed with the different types as
sensors, and how do you apply those in the different regions.
The other is recognizing that right now we don't have enough,
so how do you prioritize and how do you manage the risk between
regions, which is what we do on a daily basis with all of our
forces, whether it's armor or ships or bombers or whatever. But
the same thing applies to missile defense, yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Secretary Miller, do you support the PAA for missile
defense in Europe, and is this a template for a regional
missile defense in, let's say, the Middle East or Asia as well?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, I do, and it is. As Admiral Macy
noted, its instantiation will be different in each region, and
we are working with our partners and allies to define those
various architectures at this time, and also to do our own
internal analysis of what makes most sense.
Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Miller, you heard the
questions regarding the unique unilateral statements regarding
the implications of our missile defense programs on the New
START agreement. Is this a 'tis and 'taint situation, where
they're saying one thing and we're saying another thing?
Because unilateral statements that are contradictory are
problematic in and of themselves. The question is what's the
impact of the differences in understanding or different
agreement about what the treaty says?
If Russia decides to get out in the future at some point,
is that a problem? Will we have achieved sufficient results
being in the treaty for having gotten into the treaty in the
first place? In other words, what is the impact if we end up in
the situation where we part ways on the treaty, either we
decide it's not in our national interests or they decide it's
not in their national interests? What are the implications,
positive and negative?
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, let me say at the outset that I
do not expect that that is a likely outcome at all. This treaty
is in the national security interests of both the United States
and the Russian Federation, and that is true taking account of
the verification provisions in the treaty, of the reduction of
delivery vehicles and warheads, and of the data exchanges and
other steps that will take place to make it so that both sides
have a better understanding of each other's capabilities.
Senator Ben Nelson. So that's the essence of the treaty
from the standpoint of Russia and from the standpoint of the
United States. Are they just stating for their own political
purposes back home about the missile defense system or do they
truly believe that they have some control or some limitation on
what we do with missile defense, recognizing the consequences
if they get out, if they disagree?
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, I think that the history of our
discussions and of the choices of this administration and of
past administrations make it clear that we will continue to
invest in missile defenses and deploy missile defenses in order
to protect the Homeland and to protect our forces overseas and
our allies and partners.
We've also made clear in the Missile Defense Review, and in
the BMDR, that it is not our intention to change the strategic
balance with respect to Russia, and the relatively small
numbers of interceptors that we have today and the relatively
small numbers we would have even if we increased that, compared
to the 1,550 accountable strategic nuclear warheads under the
New START, make it clear to me at least that we are a very long
distance away from our defenses having any impact on strategic
stability.
We would like to continue discussions with Russia on
missile defense cooperation. As Senator Levin noted, we believe
we have a common interest in that area and would like to go
forward from the current work on a common threat assessment to
looking to include their radar, one at Armavir, and potentially
other elements, to help improve our PAA in Europe. We think we
have a lot of common interests, both in moving forward in
missile defense and in reducing our nuclear weapons.
Senator Ben Nelson. I agree with you, and this afternoon
I'll be discussing that area of cooperation between Russia and
the United States with Senator Margelov, who is the chairman of
the Russian Federation Council's equivalent of their Foreign
Relations Committee. There are areas where I think cooperation
is possible. It appears that both sides are posturing to keep
their own position open with respect to national defense and
it's not necessarily the threat of a divorce before the
prenuptual agreement is entered into. Is that fair?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. I'd go further to say I expect
throughout the duration of the treaty--it's a 7-year
implementation period and it would be a 10-year period of
implementation, with the possibility of a 5-year extension.
Within that period, and I believe further, it's in the interest
of the United States and Russia to continue to reduce our
nuclear weapons and to exchange information and to conduct the
type of verification that we will under the New START.
Senator Ben Nelson. So even if one side or the other side
decides to get out, there's still value in getting into the
agreement?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. As I said, I don't expect that that
would be an outcome.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Admiral Macy, let me begin with you and ask you to explore
with us the effect that this PAA will have on Aegis
shipbuilding and deployment. Perhaps others will want to
contribute to this discussion. There are worries that valuable
Aegis ships might be locked into the BMD mission. These ships
carry out a wide range of other warfighting tasks and are very
much in high demand. Was there collaboration between the Navy
and the other agencies represented at the table on the creation
of this plan, and does the Navy's shipbuilding plan take into
account the increased need for BMD-capable ships under this
approach?
Admiral Macy. Senator, thank you. To answer a couple of
different pieces here: Yes, we had participation during the
discussions last year and this year as part of the BMDR, which
engendered the concept of the PAA as part of our analysis, with
the other Services and with the COCOMs.
We are certainly conscious of the impact of that on Aegis
shipbuilding and ship tasking. I can't tell you right now that
there's a plan to increase the shipbuilding as a result
strictly of this tasking, because partly for the reason that
you noted, that these are multi-mission ships, and they will be
doing very many different missions at different times.
As I mentioned earlier in my discussion with Senator
Nelson, that is part of the global force management process,
which is where you send ships and what you use them for. We do
not anticipate at this time, nor have we to date, taken a ship
and permanently assigned it to doing nothing but missile
defense, whether it was part of the efforts that we have in the
Seventh Fleet with potential risks from North Korea or in other
parts of the world.
I will note that in an earlier time in my life I served on
a Tomahawk-capable ship and we performed a number of different
missions. From time to time, depending on the needs of that
combatant commander, we would be assigned to be the Tomahawk
shooter, in which case we were geographically constrained
within a certain area to be prepared to launch on a moment's
notice. That certainly could be a possibility in the future,
depending on a BMD risk.
But that doesn't mean that that is all that ship would ever
do. Part of what you do in global force management on an annual
basis, what you do in operational management, command and
control on a day-to-day and a week-to-week basis, is to move
your assets around.
Now, we do need more Aegis BMD-capability, which is not
necessarily the same thing as more Aegis BMD ships, because we
are looking to convert certain numbers of our current Aegis
ships to BMD capability.
Senator Wicker. How many?
Admiral Macy. I believe it's a total of 38 across the
Future Years Defense Program. I'd have to defer to General
O'Reilly for the specific number.
General O'Reilly. Yes, it will be 38 by 2015.
Senator Wicker. How long ago was that decision made? Did
that decision predate the decision to move toward this phased
approach?
Admiral Macy. I would say it was done in consonance with it
and the discussions over the last year to 2 years as we
developed this idea. The PAA did not spring full-blown on a
day, and there were a lot of discussions looking at that. The
chairman alluded earlier to the Joint Capabilities Mix Study.
Senator Wicker. I hate to interject, but when was the PAA
announced?
Admiral Macy. The PAA was announced on September 17 of last
year.
Senator Wicker. Of 2009?
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. The decision with regard to the number of
ships predated that?
General O'Reilly. Sir, last year's budget request was for
27 ships by the end of this time, and we have increased that,
working with the Navy, 11 more since the PAA has been decided
and announced.
Senator Wicker. Largely as a result of the PAA?
General O'Reilly. Yes--well----
Admiral Macy. No, sir. A combination. The original----
Senator Wicker. General O'Reilly says yes and Admiral Macy
says no.
Admiral Macy. I would submit, sir, that the original
increase up to 27 was as a result partly of the studies we had
done saying that we need more. Then when the PAA came into
being, the General was asked what more will it take, and that
resulted in a further increase in the number of ships.
Senator Wicker. For the two of you at that end of the
table, are you telling the Senate that under the present plan
we're going to have enough Aegis ships to carry out this new
PAA and all the other missions that are going to be required?
Are you comfortable with that number?
Admiral Macy. Based on the information we have now, we
think that is a good number. It is a step in the right
direction. Whether it is the total number will be part of the
analysis I alluded to earlier, that will be conducted over the
next year, the JCM-3 study. The last study just looked at
interceptors. This new study will look at interceptors, launch
systems, and sensors.
Dr. Miller. Senator, could I very briefly? Prior to the PAA
decision, the plan was for 27 Aegis-capable ships. After the
decision, the plan was changed to 38 Aegis-capable ships, and
we will continue to look at that question, I'm sure not just
with the current study but over the years, as we see how the
threat changes and how our capabilities develop. That's a
fundamental element of the adaptive part of that PAA.
Senator Wicker. Let me move on to one other thing. Dr.
Gilmore, in your testimony you talk about the ripple effects of
a test failure, such as the recent GMD flight test FTG-06, and
say that the ripple effect can be significant. I think our
chairman and ranking member alluded to this in their
statements. Can you give us, in a nutshell, why we had this
failure?
Dr. Gilmore. General O'Reilly can talk about it as well as
I can and perhaps better. But the failure investigation is
under way. I'm not sure exactly what we can say about the
failure.
Senator Wicker. Is it classified or is it just premature to
answer that?
General O'Reilly. It's classified, sir. But I can say, sir,
that there were two failure modes. The first was the sea-based
X-band radar stopped transmitting at a certain point in time,
and we understand why now. Second of all, we had a new version
of the GMD kill vehicle. It was the first time being flown, the
longest any kill vehicle's been flown. We also encountered a
problem that we've been able to identify on that design, and
our intent is to make those corrections and test again this
year.
Senator Wicker. Dr. Gilmore, I guess my question is,
according to your testimony the testing is very complex and
fraught with potential for other failures. Can technology
realistically meet the goals of this PAA? What are we to draw
from your testimony that says an Aegis BMD test failure in the
next year could impact the full implementation and assessment
of phase one in the PAA for the defense of Europe?
The test that you spoke of in your testimony, what did it
do to our timeline, and what effect might one of these very
possible failures have on the timeline?
Dr. Gilmore. When there is a test failure, there is less
knowledge gained and it will take longer to gain the amount of
knowledge that we wanted to gain. So in the case of the failure
of FTG-06, I think that General O'Reilly is still assessing
what changes will have to be implemented in the IMTP, and that
will be something that you would decide within the next 6
months or so, I think.
But there's a potential for tests to get bumped down the
road in order to collect in the next test the information that
would have been collected in this test. So the implication is
that there would be less knowledge known in any given point in
time.
With regard to the PAA and whether it's technologically
feasible, yes, in my view it's certainly technologically
feasible. It will take time to test it, just like it takes time
to test all of these complex systems. These are particularly
complex systems, but all defense systems are complex, and we
have a history of learning as we go along and some of the
programs taking longer to test and pan out than we had
originally hoped.
But I have no reason to expect that testing of the PAA
through the various versions of the SM-3 interceptor will be
particularly unique in the testing history of this program or
other programs.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Bill Nelson, with thanks to Senator Hagan.
Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Miller, with the Czech
Republic we're going to have some form of shared missile launch
information. You mentioned this in your prepared statement. You
indicate it's a near-term effort. Do we need to provide for
some funds or authority to conduct such information-sharing?
Dr. Miller. Senator, we've begun discussions with the Czech
Republic on shared early warning. The required funds are
relatively quite small. We are currently assessing whether the
MDA and/or the Army have the authority to expend those funds.
Sir, if we are unable to resolve that in the very near term, we
may come back and ask for specific legislative authority. This
would be in the single digits of millions of dollars.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask Dr. Gilmore. In your
prepared testimony, you stated, talking about the Airborne
Laser: ``The engagement was not an operational test conducted
under operationally realistic conditions.'' Then why don't you
give us more detail why this was not an operationally realistic
test and why it's not a basis for using this aircraft as an
operational weapons system.
Dr. Gilmore. I'd be happy to do that. I can summarize some
of those reasons immediately and then I can also refer you to
the report on the Airborne Laser that I submitted to Congress
this past January, which will spell out in greater detail, a
lot greater detail, what I'm about to say.
The range at which the intercept was conducted is not
operationally realistic because modern air defenses would
preclude the aircraft from penetrating into the air space of
any country, even a small country like North Korea, to a
position such that the range at which this particular foreign
military asset was engaged was realistic. So you would have to
demonstrate the capability to engage threats successfully at
several times the range that was recently demonstrated.
The next test will be at about twice the range of the
initial test, but even that would not be an operationally
realistic range for an engagement. In the case of larger
countries like Korea, unless the power of the laser was
substantially larger than the laser power in the current system
or even the objective power that was originally sought, which
was I think about three times the amount of power that's in the
current system, even with a much larger power laser. In a
larger country like Iran there would probably always be
locations from which a launch could occur that an airborne
laser that had to stand off outside the Iranian borders could
engage.
In addition, there are other things that some people may
regard as more mundane, but which are very important for a
system to be operationally effective in combat. For example,
you have to have a logistics system that will support the
operations of the aircraft when it's deployed. We don't have
that for this aircraft. It could be gotten, but we don't have
it currently.
There would have to be a relatively large fleet of
aircraft. You would probably need one or two orbits of aircraft
even to defend launches against a country like North Korea.
Each orbit would have to have two aircraft in it to assure that
one aircraft at any given time could engage. If you want two
aircraft up, and they would have to be up continuously because
you can't give the enemy an opportunity to shoot when the
aircraft land, then you would have to have another three to
five aircraft to support those two up continuously. That's a
fleet of 10 or more aircraft would be needed in order to have
an operationally effective system.
Those are the highlights, and there are more details in the
report I submitted.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about the difference between
chemical lasers and solid state?
Dr. Gilmore. As General O'Reilly can discuss probably in
greater detail than I can, there are concepts, some of which
are being worked on at some of the national laboratories, for
solid state lasers which would have higher power than the
current sort of hybrid solid state-chemical lasers, but in a
much smaller package. That means that you could put it on an
aircraft that's smaller than the large 747 on which the COIL,
which stands for Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser, is emplaced.
MDA is pursuing those kinds of technologies, so they do
offer promise. General O'Reilly could probably say more about
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to
reflect that several predecessors ago of General O'Reilly,
General Kadish testified to this committee--and this is years
ago--that the chemical Airborne Laser by the time that he
testified was going to be ready within 10 months. Of course,
we've heard the testimony today that it's nowhere near it. I
thought that strange at the time and have made some remarks
since about that kind of information coming to this committee,
which was wildly optimistic, indeed a fantasy, is not the kind
of testimony that this committee should be receiving.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for the recollection. You have
the memory here, institutional memory on this subject, but a
lot of other subjects as well, which is invaluable to us.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your service and for the
important work that you're doing on missile defense. It's
really essential for the emerging threats we have in the world
that we're facing.
I want to go back to something, Dr. Miller, that you talked
about and see if everybody's in agreement with this. I believe
that you testified that you believe that Iran could possibly
have an ICBM by 2015?
Dr. Miller. That's correct. As was noted, that would assume
foreign assistance.
Senator LeMieux. Is that everyone on the panel's opinion as
well? Any differing opinion?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I don't have a differing opinion.
Senator LeMieux. We heard from General Cartwright, I
believe it was, a couple of hearings ago in terms of
development of a nuclear weapon by Iran, that he thought that
that would be, at its earliest, maybe a 3- to 5-year period,
which would also bring us to about 2015. Is that your
understanding as well?
Dr. Miller. Sir, there's a tremendous amount of uncertainty
associated with both of those estimates. With respect to a
nuclear weapon, I think one can have confidence that it's well
beyond a year and it is more likely in that 3-plus time,
timeframe.
Senator LeMieux. I want to focus you on a topic, if I can,
in another potential area of threat that's not talked about a
lot, but it's being talked about more and more in this
committee. The chairman and ranking member and myself have
raised this issue when we've talked to our friends from
SOUTHCOM. I want to set the table for you on this topic because
I think it has an impact on missile defense.
More and more we're seeing Venezuela as an emerging threat,
I believe, to the United States. We have evidence from a
Spanish judge that Venezuela was collaborating with a group in
Spain to potentially assassinate President Uribe. I had the
opportunity this past weekend to go to our joint interagency
task force in Key West, which does tremendous work on
interdicting narcoterrorism, and we know that Venezuela is
allowing for airplanes to fly over its space to bring drugs and
other contraband up Central America towards Mexico to the
United States, and that they're a willing collaborator with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia.
We know that Hezbollah and Hamas now have a presence in
Latin America, and we know that Tehran and Venezuela through
Chavez and Caracas have more and more connections.
I want to pose to you and put on your radar screen for
thought and contemplation that we should not be just concerned
about a threat from Iran from the east, but we should be
concerned about a threat from Iran from the south. I'm worried
that in the next 10 years we're going to be talking about
Venezuela trying to obtain a nuclear weapon. With this
dangerous alliance that's growing between Iraq and Venezuela, I
want to pose to you the question of whether or not our missile
defense system would be capable of intercepting a weapon that
was launched from South America?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the PAA that we're using for missile
defense applies, of course, to other areas other than Europe,
especially in the United States. The PAA applied here to our
territory would provide that defense.
Senator LeMieux. Would that be through Aegis ships or what
would be the mechanism for that defense?
General O'Reilly. For the type of ranges you're referring
to, you would need to use Aegis, either Aegis Ashore or Aegis
on ships, which we can surge into the area.
Senator LeMieux. Right now am I correct, Admiral, that
there are two Aegis ships that are on the east coast of the
United States, or BMD-capable ships?
Admiral Macy. At any given moment, it could be anywhere
from two to five, and there are more as time goes on, because
we are increasing the number of East Coast Aegis ships with BMD
capability, not necessarily for that reason, even though, as
the General pointed out, you would apply it in that direction
should you feel the threat develop, but as a matter of, if you
will, just practical fleet management. It's closer to the
Mediterranean and parts of the Middle East from Norfolk than it
is from San Diego. So the Navy is looking to more evenly
distribute the number of BMD ships they have, if you will, in
the two major fleets, Atlantic and Pacific.
Senator LeMieux. In terms of the Atlantic, that would
obviously provide for those ships to be in the south around
Florida and the Gulf of Mexico?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Again, as you adapt in phases
to what you believe Venezuela may be doing, it would be exactly
that, and do you have ships, would there be Aegis Ashore sites
placed in various locations, and then you would build up the
architecture appropriate to that region.
Senator LeMieux. In terms of a missile, you would not, I
assume, need an ICBM to launch from South America to hit the
United States? It would be a mid-range missile, is that
correct?
General O'Reilly. Mid-range to intermediate-range, and then
we can talk about who thinks how many thousand kilometers is
which. But yes, sir.
Dr. Miller. Sir, if I could interject very briefly, I just
want to clarify that we have no plans to deploy Aegis Ashore
within the United States. One of the advantages of the PAA is
that that option would always be available in the future. But
as was suggested, should the threat you posited arise, a sea-
based capability should be able to cope with it.
Senator LeMieux. Does Iran now possess medium-range
missiles or short-range missiles?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the answer is yes to both of those
questions.
Senator LeMieux. I ask that you, as I have asked our
leaders in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM and others, to put this in your
analysis if you've not already done so, going forward, because
I believe that there is a gathering storm in this alliance
between Iraq and Venezuela. I was also concerned to see that
China has decided to give billions of dollars in aid to
Venezuela. I ask that you focus on this topic because I think
it's something that we're going to be dealing with in the years
to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks for your testimony today. I do support the
administration's PAA to BMD because it incorporates the
relevant technologies in an accelerated time fashion to respond
to the evolving threats that are out there. This approach
augments our current technologies in place to protect the U.S.
Homeland against long-range and ICBM threats. It also provides
an enhanced capability to defend against short- and medium-
range ballistic missile threats to our personnel that are
deployed in the regional forward operating bases and
headquarters, and obviously as well our allies in Europe, the
Middle East, and Southwest Asia.
The Navy's mission of protecting Europe from ballistic
missile attacks has widespread implications for the surface
fleet, potential deployment schedules, crewing arrangements,
and command and control procedures for cruisers and destroyers.
Admiral Macy, what will be the command and control procedures
regarding the use of sea-based SM-3s for the purpose of
intercepting ballistic missiles fired toward Europe from Iran
or some other rogue country in the Middle East or Southwest
Asia, and will the authority to fire the missile rest with the
regional combatant commanders?
Admiral Macy. To answer the last one first, yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Admiral Macy. If I may take a moment, in BMD command and
control can be thought of as encompassing two areas of effort:
the command area, which is where you do your planning, you
determine your preplanned responses, your rules of engagement,
those assets you're most particularly going to focus on
protecting, and so forth. You can think of the control area as
being the execution part.
Once the missiles are flying, the timelines are such that
the interaction and control is very limited, and you find that
in order to be successful the operational commanders down to
the level of the commanding officer of that destroyer needs to
have the authority to carry out the plan that was developed
earlier in order to succeed in the intercept.
So we talk about the arrangements in the control area. It
would follow if we were conducting this in a U.S. context, it
would be in a line of command that comes down from European
Command, through an area air defense commander, notionally
possibly down to a regional defense commander, to the
commanding officer of that ship, but who would be carrying out
the plans he was given until told to stop, because that's where
command interaction in BMD most often comes in, is to tell you
to stop, not to go.
We like to tell people that to be effective the first phone
call you're going to get from that young commander is not what
he wants to do, but what he just did. So the issue is on the
command side. That's where your planning and your
decisionmaking occurs.
In a U.S. context, that would be under, in the case of
Europe, the command of European Command, Admiral Stavrides in
his U.S. hat. General Brady is the U.S. Air Force Europe
Commander, and would also have the responsibility for missile
defense efforts under Admiral Stavrides. So that would be that
organization.
As I mentioned in my opening comments, I did have the
opportunity yesterday to participate with the Vice Chairman on
briefing the North Atlantic Council and that was a part of the
discussion in a NATO context. It is our belief that should NATO
take this as a mission we would then develop the missile
defense command and control within a NATO context, in which you
would have a missile defense adaptation of the military
procedures that we follow now. NATO would be involved in the
command part developing the plans, understanding what the rules
of engagement would be, under what circumstances you would
start to commence active missile defense launching
interceptors. The NATO command and control, once they had the
capability, the physical capability to participate, through
adaptation of the ALT-BMD system or others--we believe the ALT-
BMD system is the proper approach to take that up to an upper
tier and to a territorial capability--would have more and more
hands-on involvement in the command of it and it would fall
under the NATO military procedures, where the Supreme Allied
Command Europe (SACEUR) and Admiral Stavrides in his role as
SACEUR, with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
underneath him.
As it happens, the U.S. air defense command focus is at
Ramstein and that is also where the NATO air defense command
focus, the buildings, are located. So it would be done in that
context.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Admiral Macy. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hagan. As you've indicated, the administration's
PAA for BMD involves building two land-based Aegis BMD systems
in Europe. Some observers suggest that the establishment of two
Aegis Ashore sites would allow a reduction in the number of
BMD-capable Aegis ships needed for European BMD operations.
General O'Reilly, what modifications are needed to make the SM-
3 suitable for use as a land-based missile and what are the
technical risks associated with these modifications?
General O'Reilly. Senator, one of the advantages of the
land-based SM-3 is that we would not change the missile
configuration used at sea or at land. It gives the Navy and the
combatant commanders a greater pool of missiles to manage from,
more operational flexibility. Each site can maintain between 80
to 120 missiles, so there's a tremendous amount of firepower at
each location.
We literally are taking the Aegis system so that it is
duplicated on the land. We have no special logistics
requirements or training requirements or manning or command and
control. So that in fact it is very adaptable to the Navy.
Again, it can be moved within 4 months, if we see the threat
has diminished in one location or moved to another. It is very
readily adaptable to remote sites or large protection.
We don't plan on making any unique changes of the Aegis
system to be adapted to the land.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I know, General O'Reilly, when you were in my office
recently I was asking you the question on where you get the
highly capable, trained individuals who do the technology, the
individuals, the scientists. I do want to thank you for
recruiting also at the universities and schools within North
Carolina, because I know we have a lot of very capable
individuals in our State, too.
Following the official signing of the New START, the
Russian Government announced that it reserves the right to
withdraw from the treaty if its national interests are
threatened. The Russian Government also announced that New
START will only be effective if there's no buildup in
capabilities to the U.S. missile defense system.
Dr. Miller, how is the administration reconciling Russia's
caveats under the New START treaty with Central Europe's
demands for a role in U.S. missile defense plans?
Dr. Miller. Senator, the United States made a unilateral
statement as well with respect to New START, and I'll just give
you the relevant element of it. I had asked earlier that it be
submitted for the record. That is that the statement says very
directly that ``The United States intends to continue improving
and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend
itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative
approach to strengthening stability in key regions.''
What that means is that, both with respect to any necessary
improvements for our Homeland defense and for the PAA in Europe
and in other regions, we intend to make what improvements are
necessary to continue to protect our Homeland, our forces
deployed overseas, and our partners and allies.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General O'Reilly, I'm concerned about whether or not we're
going to adequately continue to complete the deployment of our
missile defense system, the GMD system that we spent decades
perfecting, and it's really exceeded most people's, almost
everybody's expectations in technology, its proven
effectiveness, and that sort of thing.
There are some that have opposed it and as a result it
seems this administration to me is penny wise, pound foolish,
in the sense that once we have done all this let's complete it.
I'm concerned about whether or not we are deploying enough of
these missiles, number one, and number two, whether we have
enough to maintain the kind of testing that we need.
The GMD program manager and the executive director briefed
staff that the MDA, your agency, plans to acquire only 52 GBIs.
Thirty will be deployed and put in the ground, while the
remaining 22 will be used for testing. By fiscal year 2019,
based on the plans that are ongoing, MDA assumes that the
initial developmental testing will be complete, but that will
leave only three GBIs for stockpile reliability testing through
2032.
So from 2019 to 2032 we have only three missiles, according
to our present plans, 12 years, to do testing. By contrast, the
Air Force conducts three flight tests each year on the
Minuteman III ICBM and the Navy conducts four on the Trident
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).
So is this enough? Don't we need to, while the assembly
process is still available to us, produce enough of these
missiles so that we can maintain testing in the years to come?
General O'Reilly. Sir, working with the test community,
represented by Dr. Gilmore and the operational test
communities, we did work together and determine that by 2019 if
the tests are successful, we do believe that we will have the
data necessary to confirm the performance of the GMD system in
all anticipated flight regimes.
We also have designed a missile which has an incredible
capability of maintaining its health and status. Not only do we
constantly maintain the health and status of these missiles, we
also run periodic checks thoroughly to verify its performance
and the proper functioning of all of the systems. We will
conduct 4.3 million checks of these 30 missiles over a 20-year
period, plus 600 other tests where we remove the missiles,
remove components from them, test those components, and
refurbish the missiles with brand new components.
Senator Sessions. I think this idea came from on high
somewhere, to cut the number back. But are you confident that
enough analysis has been done to conclude that through that 12
years there's going to be enough missiles to do actual testing?
Will you let us know if you conclude there's a problem? Don't
we need to do it soon; otherwise we'll have to restart an
entire assembly process?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we do today have to restart an
entire assembly process. I'm faced with that right now. What we
currently are building will take us through 2016 with the full
production line. But yes, sir, I do have monitoring
responsibilities to ensure that we have a production base that
will take our refurbishments all the way to 2026, and we do
need an industrial base to do that.
So yes, sir, and I will report back if I determine that we
need more missiles based on our estimation.
Senator Sessions. I firmly believe that we're cutting the
number too close and I hope that it's not too late to
reevaluate that now. It would be a lot less costly.
General O'Reilly and Dr. Gilmore, the industrial base
supporting the production of solid rocket motors necessary for
the ICBMs, SLBMs, and evolved expendable launch vehicles
(EELVs) is under strain. The recent decision to cancel NASA's
Constellation program will likely reduce the customer base for
solid rocket motors substantially, raising costs and perhaps
leading to a loss of industry proficiency. It's estimated that
costs for solid rocket motors programs could rise as much as
150 to 200 percent for DOD.
This is because, as I understand it, NASA has been
consuming about 70 percent of these solid rocket motors and
keeping the system moving forward. General O'Reilly, I
understand that you or DOD were not consulted about the NASA
decision on cancelling the Constellation program. This is our
manned spaceflight plan for the future. What impact does that
decision have on MDA?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for GMD we were not consulted. Our
solid rocket motor usage for large solid rocket motors was
about 8 percent of the total production done in the United
States every year. So we had a very small part to play. As you
said, it was dominated by NASA's use of the solid rocket
motors.
We have an increase in the small solid rocket motors based
on the proposed budget that we have submitted to Congress,
where we will consume over 550 tons of solid rocket motors in
the next 5 years. So we actually have the reverse process or
challenge of having that production capability for small solid
rocket motors. Yet at the same time, as you said, we have had a
severe reduction in the industrial capacity to produce the
large solid rocket motors.
We are procuring five additional booster sets for our GBIs.
One reason is they are economical to buy now to use them at a
later date if we need to for testing or other purposes.
Senator Sessions. I'm worried about it.
Dr. Gilmore, is the Secretary of Defense concerned about
the shrinking solid rocket motor industrial base and the issues
that General O'Reilly mentioned?
Dr. Gilmore. Senator, with all due respect, I think that
General O'Reilly tracks the industrial base issues more than I
do. I focus on the testing issues, not on the industrial base
issues. So he would be the best one to answer that question.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could interject very quickly, I
do know that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Dr. Carter, is currently undertaking a study of
the industrial base for solid rocket motors.
Senator Sessions. The President has already indicated that
he's rethinking some of the NASA issues, which I appreciate him
doing, and I really think that he should do that, because I
strongly believe we don't need to abandon our leadership in
space; and second, there may be ways in which we can recognize
this symbiotic relationship between NASA and DOD that could be
a basis for being able to continue that program.
Mr. Chairman, I would just say I won't ask the question at
this point, but I may submit for the record my concern over the
fact that we were ready to test the two-stage GBI, which was
going to be deployed in Europe and will be deployed in the
United States, and it's ready to go forward. But our plan to
create an interceptor in Europe capable of knocking down an
ICBM that would hit the United States, appears to be delayed as
late as 2020. I think that's a mistake and we'll want to pursue
that as we go forward.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions. If that's
submitted for the record, the answer will be forthcoming
promptly, we hope.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. General O'Reilly, in your opening
comments you made the point that missile fields in Alaska were
positioned to engage both Korea and Iran. Just a point of
clarification. Does that affect the launchers or the radars and
the launchers? Can the radar as it was configured in Alaska
pick up a target coming from Iran?
General O'Reilly. From a polar projection, the closest
point to the United States from Iran is actually Alaska, and
the same with North Korea. For our radars, we have the
Fylingdales radar in England and coming on line next month will
be the Thule radar in Greenland. They provide our northern
observation and tracking of missiles launched from that part of
the globe.
Senator Reed. So that both in terms of acquisition of the
target and launching to intercept, Alaska is well positioned
vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. As Secretary Miller said
earlier, the contribution of a forward-based radar in Southern
Europe adds tremendously to that capability also because we
could track even sooner.
Senator Reed. One other aspect of this is not only the
forward-based radar, but also space satellite observation and
integration. Does that enhance our ability to acquire the
target and engage it?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We currently have a satellite
system that tracks booster launches. But we have put into space
last year two demonstrator satellites that not only demonstrate
tracking a missile in launch, but the entire flight of the
missile. Yes, sir, we have a proposal for the Precision
Tracking Space System (PTSS), which then would be established
by the middle of this decade, that would also track hundreds of
missiles being launched over their entire flight and would
provide information to both GMD and the Aegis system for
intercepting.
Senator Reed. The plan now would be--or I'll ask you the
question. I don't presume the answer. The Aegis would engage
first, and then the ground-based missile would engage later in
the flight?
General O'Reilly. In the 2020 time, sir, in the timeline,
we believe it's very feasible to have a high acceleration
interceptor in an Aegis system; yes, sir, the plan would be to
have an early intercept soon after boost and destroy the
missiles early in flight; and if not, then we have the GMD
system for the second attempt.
Senator Reed. Relatively speaking, the reconfiguration of
the system, has that advanced our ability to engage Iranian
targets or delayed it?
General O'Reilly. Sir, it has greatly advanced it, because
we now have the capability to utilize sensors, not only on
ships, for example, but they also have the ability to use
sensors at any location, of any frequency, of any bandwidth.
That significantly helps us launch interceptors sooner, so we
don't have to wait for the missile to get close enough to a
ship in order to launch. The ship actually uses all sensors
available to it.
Senator Reed. Let me ask another question about Aegis, and
that is the shore sites. You talked to Senator Hagan about
this, but one of the constraints, obviously, is vessels at sea
and operational. The shore-based Aegis will, in fact, relieve
some of that pressure. Admiral Macy, do you want to respond?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I'll just say yes, sir. That was the
discussion last year and it was highly discussed with the Joint
Staff and the Navy, and I'll defer to Admiral Macy.
Admiral Macy. One other point, sir. I'm in violent
agreement with the General. It is also attractive financially.
In simplistic terms, we're taking the top third of the
destroyer and putting it on a concrete pad. Therefore I don't
have to buy or operate the bottom two-thirds. This is not going
to redo the U.S. budget, but we do expect to see some savings
from being able to station the capability that way without all
the attendant things that come with the ship.
Senator Reed. Are you planning just for the contingency to
scale up, to have multiple further sites?
Admiral Macy. As the need, yes, sir, that would be the
point. Right now the plan is for two. As I mentioned earlier, I
believe in my conversation with Senator Hagan, the other
combatant commanders are also looking at it. None has as yet
expressed the need, but they are certainly looking at it. In a
number of ways it's just as attractive to that commander
because he also has to buy fuel and take care of that ship when
it's in his area of responsibility. So one of the big things
about this is we could put one in other areas, including the
SOUTHCOM region, though, as Dr. Miller said, right now we don't
have a plan.
But yes, sir, we could buy more and do that.
Senator Reed. The launching system is relocatable, so you
could move these. You wouldn't have to buy another set. You
could, if the need arose, just move it to another location.
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir, that is our concept for how this
would go. We have asked the MDA to include as part of their
engineering assessment the ability to move this in 4 months as
a starting point, and then we'll understand from them the costs
and difficulties of doing it. But definitely we would like to
be able to pick it up and move it somewhere else.
Senator Reed. Let me just ask the question and someone can
decide who should answer it. That is that we've cancelled the
cruiser CGX and we're going to essentially replace that with
the Flight 3 DDG-51s. The radar on the Flight 3 is a scaled-
down version of the AMDR which was going to go on the cruiser.
Are you losing anything in that scaling down, any capabilities?
What are the implications, essentially, of cancelling CGX to
the BMD program?
Admiral Macy. We believe that within the BMD program the
implications can be handled by a different architecture. Though
you have notionally a scaled-down radar--and I want to be
careful how I say that. As I'm sure you're aware, sir, if we
get too much farther into that discussion we'll have to have it
in a separate room.
But the other thing I want to go back to is what the
General brought up. We are looking to the future to create an
architecture which takes advantage of all of the sensors that
are available in the particular battle space, such that you are
not limited to the instrumented range of a SPY-1 or a THAAD or
any other sensor, that by using what we call the engage-on-
remote technique you will have one launching system launching
one or more interceptors, which are being guided by data coming
from separate sensors, not necessarily part of their generic
system, and quite likely controlled by a battle management
system in a third area and a third capability, to get beyond
the limitations of such things as the curvature of the earth
that just gets in the way of your radar. So we'd like to get
beyond that.
So the goal here is to not be focusing on an architecture
which is a closed system fire control system, but an expanded
engage-on-remote capability.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One final quick question, Dr. Miller. New START has been
discussed and one of the conditions is that we would not,
except for grandfathered silos, convert silos to be BMD
capable. My understanding is that we have no intention to do
that, that it's actually cheaper to build new silos.
Dr. Miller. Senator Reed, that's absolutely correct. The
existing silos at Vandenberg were grandfathered by the treaty
and we have no plans to do additional conversions. As I believe
General O'Reilly's statement included, in fact, if we were to
go forward with additional silos it would be cheaper to build
new ones than to convert.
Senator Reed. So if that was a key negotiating point, we
gave something away that we weren't going to use anyway. That
would be my comment, not yours. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I want to thank the chairman too
for his patience and for staying here and giving me an
opportunity to ask some questions as well this morning.
Dr. Miller, thank you for your commonsense explanations of
New START. There are certainly voices that I think have in some
cases, whether intentionally or not, muddied the waters. I for
one look forward to the treaty coming to the floor of the
Senate. I can't imagine we wouldn't find the votes to ratify
it, in part because of your incisive and helpful explanations
of what is included.
If I might, I'd like to follow on and talk a little bit
about NATO-izing European missile defense. I know that there
have been some positive statements issued on the PAA, but there
has been no collective endorsement by the NATO heads. I
understand the administration is hoping to secure such an
endorsement at the Lisbon summit later.
Can you discuss any progress that's been made within the
alliance on this subject?
Dr. Miller. Senator Udall, we began conversations with our
NATO allies about the PAA as we were conducting the BMDR, so
they were not surprised as we went forward with this approach,
and in fact very shortly thereafter issued a statement of
support as an alliance for PAA for Europe.
Since then we've continued discussions as we've moved
forward with first agreement by Poland to host a land-based
site, then agreement by Romania to do the same. As we discussed
earlier, we're moving forward with the Czech Republic in
developing a shared early warning capability as well.
With respect to command and control, we will continue to
work within a NATO context. We see the PAA as being the U.S.
contribution to a NATO territorial missile defense. Sir, you're
correct, we hope that at Lisbon the alliance will in fact
approve that as a NATO mission.
Senator Udall. Doctor, I understand part of the focus is on
protecting civilian populations, not that military assets
should not be protected as well, but there is a focus on
civilian populations, is there not?
Dr. Miller. As the system develops through its phases, by
phase three we have the capability for territorial defense of
NATO Europe, which would include defense of populations.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Dr. Miller. Earlier phases would, of course, have the same
capability, but just not over the same breadth of geographic
area.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
General O'Reilly, good to see you. We're proud, in
Colorado, to host the Missile Defense Integration and
Operations Center at Schriever. I always look forward to going
down there and at least understanding a bit of what's going on
down there, because we have such smart people there on the
ground.
I understand you've created a new program this year, the
PTSS and it would enhance the effectiveness of all missile
defense systems and reduce reliance on land- and sea-based
sensors. Given the ongoing challenges in space acquisition,
which we have talked about in other ways this morning, can you
assure the committee that this program can be delivered in a
timely way, at a reasonable cost? As a follow-on, can you
explain why the MDA is planning on acquiring a satellite
capability when the Air Force has primary expertise for space
systems?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the PTSS, the strategy to develop it
was based on many studies in the past of what were the
challenges and problems with previous satellite development
programs. Two of them were the requirements being quite large
on a small package; and second was to use technology that
wasn't mature at the time the program started.
So the PTSS was designed to be a very simple satellite
system, and that's a key hallmark of it, is the size of it. It
is designed to stare at certain parts of the Earth and do just
that and transmit down what it sees for fusing with our battle
management control systems on the ground. So we believe the
strategy that was laid out and the cost estimates--we've had
several independent cost estimates and we've been very
conservative to ensure that this can be developed on the
timeline stated and in fact endure setbacks and still be
developed on the timeline stated, and the costs are very
conservative for this. The approach is very simple and we did
that intentionally in order to ensure we don't have problems in
executing this.
The MDA actually will not manage the satellite aspect of
this program. It is a system, though, that involves the command
and control, the whole fire control system, the information
transmitting and so forth. So the entire network needs to be
integrated into our Aegis system especially and our GMD system.
That's the expertise and the integration that MDA brings.
We are utilizing the Navy research lab and Johns Hopkins
University, which have a history of successful launches of
these size of satellites, in order for us to verify we
understand the requirements, again going back, looking at the
history of satellite programs and where they've had trouble. We
want to assure we know what we're going to ask industry to
build.
At that point we will compete the satellite system for
development. Ultimately, sir, you're correct, the Air Force
will be managing this and therefore they have an Air Force cell
that's embedded in our team, so that we ensure that everything
we're developing follows their data management and their ground
control systems out at Schriever, which will be operating the
system.
We believe we've built a team together, capitalizing on the
core competencies, and then the MDA has to be the one that is
ultimately responsible of delivering a missile defense
capability with all our fire control systems and utilizing the
benefits of those space-based sensors.
Senator Udall. Thank you for walking me through that
process and that construct.
Dr. Miller, Admiral Macy, let me turn to East Asia and the
Middle East, the BMDR. Incidentally, I think the SECDEF put
together a very comprehensive and helpful approach to missile
defense in general. But according to the BMDR, the
administration plans to tailor the PAA to East Asia and the
Middle East. I understand that these regional missile defense
architecture plans are still in development, so the inventory
and resources requirements for Aegis and SM-3 and Patriots and
THAAD are not certain.
The BMDR says the Joint Staff and STRATCOM are developing a
comprehensive force management process, recognizing that the
regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply
for some years to come. The new PAA to missile defense is
likely to have significant force structure implications. Have
these requirements been quantified yet and, given the fact that
regional demand is likely to exceed supply for years to come,
when do you think the comprehensive force management process
will be completed to allocate what seemingly are scarce
resources? Admiral Macy, let's start with you.
Admiral Macy. Senator, we are close to finishing up the
initial estimate on the global force management issues and
processes. We've been doing a study since last fall when it
became apparent that this was going to be an issue when you
apply a PAA to all three major regions with the current missile
defense issues. That effort has been led by STRATCOM and by my
organization, JIAMDO, on the Joint Staff. We are bringing that
to a close in the next few months and we'll be briefing it up
to the Secretary, hopefully by June, if not before, to address
the current near-term needs of allocating the available ships,
interceptors, THAAD units, et cetera.
In the longer term, we will be shortly starting the Joint
Capability Mix-3 (JCM-3) study. This is a follow-on from JCM-2
that was done a couple of years ago, looking at the sufficiency
of interceptors. This one will be, if you will, a repeat where
we look at scenarios across the three regions, compare them
against the COCOMs' warfighting plans, and understand the
implications. We don't expect to be fighting in all three
places at one time, but how much overlap do you assess or
believe? Then this JCM-3 study, as it's going to be called,
will be starting soon, and expects to finish about this time
next year.
The big difference between it and the previous study is it
will look not only at interceptors, but it will also look at
launch systems, such as ships and THAAD batteries, and it will
look at independent sensors such as airborne sensors, TPY-2
radars, and so forth.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Senator Udall, I'd just add very briefly that
DOD has an existing global force management process and over
the last year we've worked to integrate missile defense assets
into that process. I expect that, even with the accelerated
purchases of missile defense assets, including THAAD missiles
and including SM-3 capabilities, that we'll continue to have to
manage that process for some years to come.
Senator Udall. I see my time has expired, but, Dr. Miller,
I assume that in the process of developing these plans we're
also working with the nations in those various theaters that
are inclined to be supportive of our efforts and would like to
be a part of the process of developing further missile defense
capabilities?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, we are.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Let me just summarize some of the points that have been
made on the Phased Adaptive System. There has been a reference
made to a gap and the reference is to the following: that if,
in fact, Iran gets foreign assistance, they could have a long-
range missile by 2015 or 2017. Our second missile defense
system that would be able to defend against a long-range
Iranian missile would not be deployed until about 2020. That is
characterized as a gap of 3 years or so, having one system
instead of two.
Now let's look at the other side of the equation, where the
Phased Adaptive System will have far superior radars. They will
be able to use sensors from many sources, including satellite
sensors and airborne sensors. So on the sensor side and the
radar side, the Phased Adaptive System will be far more
capable.
On the interceptor side, the third site or the old system
would be limited to ten missiles, which means you could maybe
deal with five Iranian missiles, and the new system will have
many, many more interceptors that will be available to it.
You really have a double gap with the old system. You have
a radar gap, the old system having far less capable radars, and
you have a numerical missile or interceptor gap as well with
the old system.
Would you agree with that, Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Senator, yes, I would agree. I would add that
the PAA, because we place the forward-based radar in Europe in
2011, that will improve our national missile defense
capabilities significantly. So, if you will, that's an implicit
gap that was closed by the change in approach. We'll have
greater capability, sooner than we would have, for the defense
of the United States.
Chairman Levin. Greater capability for the ground-based
system?
Dr. Miller. That's right. It will tie into the ground-based
system.
Chairman Levin. So we'll have a greater, more capable
system than we have now in Alaska and California?
Dr. Miller. It will augment that system and improve its
capabilities.
Chairman Levin. The first defense will be more capable, the
second defense will be far more capable than the third site
would have been, although it will not be available for perhaps
3 to 5 years later if Iran gets foreign assistance and comes up
with an ICBM. So from my perspective, you have at least a
double gap if you go to the old system compared to at best a
very short-term, or at worst, a very short-term 3-year gap in
having a second system in place. General, do you agree with
that? Since you're a General, will you generally agree with me
on that?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, I would. On top of that, there
was some discussion about the ability of the GMD system to
intercept one time. When we have the forward-based sensors,
that also gives us the ability for GMD itself to intercept more
than once, have more than one opportunity in the defense from a
launch from the Middle East.
Chairman Levin. In addition, the more capable radars on the
new system are moveable; is that correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The old radar was fixed at the third site.
So there are other advantages as well. But I think if people
want to talk about a gap, the number of gaps are much greater
with the old system than with the new, at least a double gap
with the old system, maybe a triple gap, compared to that very
short-term so-called gap where you just have one system in
place, even though it's more capable than having two systems.
Senator Udall, do you want to ask anything else?
Senator Udall. No, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you all. It's been a very, very
useful morning. We appreciate your being here. We'll stand
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
advantages of phased adaptive approach
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, please list and explain all of the advantages and benefits, as
well as the drawbacks, if any, of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)
for missile defense in Europe, compared to the previously proposed
third Site missile defense system in Europe.
Secretary Miller. A key factor in any comparison between the
European PAA and the former ``Third Site'' plan is the updated U.S.
ballistic missile threat assessment. The threat from short- and medium-
range missiles has developed very quickly. In the face of the growing
regional threat, protection for U.S. forces, allies, and partners is
provided sooner under the PAA than the previous plan. The PAA will
allow us to field capabilities in the 2011 timeframe; the former Third
Site plan would have added capabilities in 2017 or 2018.
The European PAA provides coverage to the area that is most
threatened first, and expands to cover all of our European North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies in the 2018 timeframe. Under
the former approach, we did not provide full protection of our NATO
Allies, and the areas left unprotected were those that were closest to
the threat.
With the PAA, we are able to deploy systems that are capable
against larger numbers of missiles than the previous plan. With a
``shot doctrine'' of two shots per missile, only five threat missiles
would be needed to overwhelm the previous architecture.
The European PAA will improve the capabilities for defense of the
United States in 2011 with the forward-based radar; which will increase
the capabilities of the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) based in the
United States. This improvement in defense of the Homeland will be
available 6 to 7 years earlier than the previous architecture.
The new approach is also more cost-effective. We expect
requirements to increase as the threat grows; thus, it is more cost-
effective to use the PAA's Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), which is less
than one-fifth the price of one GBI.
The new approach also allows for greater cooperation with our
allies. NATO's views of missile defense have evolved in recent years.
We are seeking a NATO decision to take on territorial defense as a NATO
mission. We see positive indicators that NATO is interested in doing
so, including the unanimous Foreign Ministerial statement in December
2009 that the Alliance welcomes the U.S. European PAA.
The European PAA is also much more flexible than the Third Site
approach: The SM-3 and other PAA systems are mobile, while the Third
Site would have required large missiles at fixed locations.
General O'Reilly. The PAA offers several advantages over the
previous approach: increased number of interceptors, lower cost,
increased coverage, earlier availability, increased adaptability,
reduced deployment time and wider applicability.
The previously proposed European missile defense architecture
lacked a sufficient number of sensors and interceptors to defend
against the current and emerging ballistic missile threat from by Iran.
Simply put, with a notional two interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI
interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by a raid
size of 6 long-range threat missiles launched towards European targets.
Furthermore, the GBIs would have been unable to defend against shorter-
range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. deployed forces and allies
in the region.
The Department of Defense (DOD) now plans to deploy missile
defenses in Europe through a PAA that will combine stronger sensor
networks with an Aegis SM-3-based architecture to provide a flexible
defense against an uncertain and growing missile threat. Each of the
four phases that comprise the European PAA (EPAA) will leverage more
capable variants of the SM-3 missiles as they become available. The SM-
3 is more affordable than GBIs and increases the cost-effectiveness of
a European missile defense (you can buy four to seven production
variants of the SM-3s (IA or IB) for the cost of one GBI).
The previous program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe,
which today is exposed to Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
threats. The previous program would not have been available until 2017
and was not adaptable to changes in future threats to Europe. Under the
EPAA, however, we will begin deployment of missile defense capabilities
in 2011 (Phase I). Additionally, by fielding mobile capabilities in
phases, combatant commanders can adapt their missile defense
architectures to address the uncertainty of future missile threats.
These systems can be deployed in any theater in a reasonably short
period of time.
Finally, efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and
procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for
deployment of the EPAA architecture have application in theaters other
than Europe.
Admiral Macy. The PAA offers several advantages over the previous
approach: increased number of interceptors, lower cost, increased
coverage, earlier availability, increased adaptability, reduced
deployment time and wider applicability.
The previously proposed European missile defense architecture
lacked a sufficient number of sensors and interceptors to defend
against the current and emerging ballistic missile threat from by Iran.
Simply put, with a notional 2 interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI
interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by a raid
size of 6 long-range threat missiles launched towards European targets.
Furthermore, the GBIs would have been unable to defend against shorter-
range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. deployed forces and allies
in the region.
DOD now plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe through a PAA
that will combine stronger sensor networks with an Aegis SM-3-based
architecture to provide a flexible defense against an uncertain and
growing missile threat. Each of the four phases that comprise the
European PAA (EPAA) will leverage more capable variants of the SM-3
missiles as they become available. The SM-3 is more affordable than
GBIs and increases the cost-effectiveness of a European missile defense
(you can buy four to seven production variants of the SM-3s (IA or IB)
for the cost of one GBI).
The previous program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe,
which today is exposed to MRBM threats. The previous program would not
have been available until 2017 and was not adaptable to changes in
future threats to Europe. Under the EPAA, however, we will begin
deployment of missile defense capabilities in 2011 (Phase I).
Additionally, by fielding mobile capabilities in phases, combatant
commanders can adapt their missile defense architectures to address the
uncertainty of future missile threats. These systems can be deployed in
any theater in a reasonably short period of time.
Finally, efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and
procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for
deployment of the EPAA architecture have application in theaters other
than Europe.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, Phase 4 of the PAA to missile defense in Europe is planned to
have the capability, using the SM-3, Block IIB variant interceptor, to
defeat potential future long-range Iranian missiles in the 2020
timeframe. There has been a suggestion that, since Iran might, with
sufficient foreign assistance, be able to develop a long-range missile
by 2015, there is a 5-year gap between our missile defense capability
and Iran's potential for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
capability. Please provide your views on whether such a gap would
exist.
Secretary Miller. No, there would not be a gap in our capability.
The United States is currently protected against any attacks from North
Korea or Iran if they were able to develop an effective ICBM capability
today. This protection is a result of investments made over the past
decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD).
Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of
GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-
range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a
capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran
for the foreseeable future.
Given uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate
at which it will mature, it is important that the United States
maintain this advantageous position. In order to maintain this position
we will: continue to develop existing capabilities for our GMD system,
complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely, deploy new
sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the United
States, invest in further development of the SM-3 for future land-based
deployment in Europe, increase investments in sensors and early
intercept kill systems to help defeat missile defense countermeasures,
and advance other hedging strategies including continued development
and assessment of a two-stage GBI and directed energy technologies.
General O'Reilly. There is no ``gap'' in which the United States
would be unprotected from potential Iranian long-range ballistic
missile threats. The United States is already protected against limited
long-range ballistic missile attacks, including against current and
projected future threats from Iran. As part of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS), the GMD element, with missile fields at Fort
Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, provides continuous
operational capability to protect the Homeland against ICBMs. Given the
uncertainties of future ICBM threats, including the rate at which they
will mature, we plan to preserve our position of advantage by
maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense capabilities.
To that end, we will continue development of technologies to
enhance SM-3 variants to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. With
deployments of the SM-3 IIA (2018) and SM-3 IIB (2020) in Europe, we
will augment Homeland defenses by intercepting long-range ballistic
missiles earlier in their flight.
Admiral Macy. There is no ``gap'' in which the United States would
be unprotected from potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile
threats. The United States is already protected against limited long-
range ballistic missile attacks, including against current and
projected future threats from Iran. As part of the BMDS, the GMD
element, with missile fields at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, CA, provides continuous operational capability to protect
the Homeland against ICBMs. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM
threats, including the rate at which they will mature, we plan to
preserve our position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing our
current midcourse defense capabilities.
To that end, we will continue development of technologies to
enhance SM-3 variants to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. With
deployments of the SM-3 IIA (2018) and SM-3 IIB (2020) in Europe, we
will augment Homeland defenses by intercepting long-range ballistic
missiles earlier in their flight.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, isn't it true that the currently deployed GMD system has the
ability to defend the United States from a potential future Iranian
long-range missile threat?
Secretary Miller. Yes, the current GMD system is designed to
protect the United States against limited ICBM attacks. This capability
is a result of investments made over the past decade. Because of
continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of GBIs now
deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range
ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a
capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran
for the foreseeable future.
General O'Reilly. Yes. The United States is already protected
against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including
projected future threats from Iran. By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30
GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. This capability will defend
the Homeland for the foreseeable future from the potential ballistic
missile threats from Iran.
Admiral Macy. Yes. The United States is already protected against
limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including projected
future threats from Iran. By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30 GBIs will
be deployed as part of the BMDS. This capability will defend the
Homeland for the foreseeable future from the potential ballistic
missile threats from Iran.

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, please describe the capability of our current GMD system and the
capability planned with future GMD upgrades.
Secretary Miller. By the end of fiscal year 2010, a total of 30
GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. Given the continuing
improvements planned for the GMD element, 30 operational GBIs will
defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future against the projected
threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight additional empty silos, and
storage of test and spare GBIs, will provide a hedge against any
unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile
surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are
refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests,
results from the age surveillance program, and future intelligence
estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform decisions on
the need to procure additional GBIs. We continue to upgrade GMD to
increase reliability and survivability and expand the ability to
leverage new BMDS sensors as well as test GMD to accredit our
simulations.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a
substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion
across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) intended to ensure the GMD
element remains viable over the long term. We are requesting $1.3
billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI refurbishment
and reliability sustainment programs to: help sustain the fleet to 2032
and support a service life extension decision around 2027; procure an
additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration
to accommodate a contingency deployment of eight additional GBIs;
upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to ensure GMD leverages
BMDS increased discrimination and tracking capability as sensor, data
fusion, and battle management network matures; and complete the
installation of a second GMD command and control node at Fort Greely,
AK. Additionally, we will continue operations and sustainment of the
Sea-Based X-band radar (SBX) platform to prepare for transfer of the
SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.
General O'Reilly. The GMD system forms the foundation of our
Homeland missile defense against limited ICBM attack today. By the end
of fiscal year 2010, a total of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the
BMDS with 26 at Fort Greely, AK and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
Given the continuing improvements planned for the GMD element, 30
operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future
against the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight
additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide
a hedge against unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct
stockpile surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components
as GBIs are refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD
flight tests, results from the aging and surveillance program, and
future intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will
inform decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs.
We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and
survivability, expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors, and
test GMD to accredit our models and simulations. Since the beginning of
fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire
Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction
of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new
silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
Terminal at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Additionally, we are
completing the missile defense upgrades to the Upgraded Early Warning
Radar (UEWR) in Thule, Greenland, and we have transferred operation of
the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs
to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and design work to upgrade
the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a
substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion
across the FYDP ensuring the GMD element remains effective and viable
over the long term by funding element and system improvements. We are
requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI
refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to help sustain the
fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension decision around
2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-
silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of 8
additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to
ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking
capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network
matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and
control node at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue
operations and sustainment of the SBX radar platform to prepare for
transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.
Admiral Macy. The GMD system forms the foundation of our Homeland
missile defense against limited ICBM attack today. By the end of fiscal
year 2010, a total of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS with
26 at Fort Greely, AK, and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Given
the continuing improvements planned for the GMD element, 30 operational
GBIs will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future against the
projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight additional empty
silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide a hedge against
unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile
surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are
refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests,
results from the aging and surveillance program, and future
intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform
decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs.
We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and
survivability, expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors, and
test GMD to accredit our models and simulations. Since the beginning of
fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire
Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction
of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new
silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
Terminal at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Additionally, we are
completing the missile defense upgrades to the UEWR in Thule,
Greenland, and we have transferred operation of the Cobra Dane Early
Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs to the Air Force. We
are continuing planning and design work to upgrade the Clear, AK Early
Warning Radar.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a
substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion
across the FYDP ensuring the GMD element remains effective and viable
over the long term by funding element and system improvements. We are
requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI
refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to help sustain the
fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension decision around
2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-
silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of 8
additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to
ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking
capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network
matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and
control node at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue
operations and sustainment of the SBX radar platform to prepare for
transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy in 2012.

gmd enhancement
5. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, Phase 1 of the European PAA
includes the planned deployment in the 2011 timeframe of a forward-
deployed AN/TPY-2 radar in southeastern Europe. You have indicated that
this deployment will enhance the capability of the GMD system to defend
against a potential future threat from Iran. Please describe the GMD
capability enhancement that will come from such a deployment. For
example, will the deployment of the AN/TPY-2 allow a more efficient use
of GBIs against a potential future Iranian ICBM threat, or even permit
a ``shoot-look-shoot'' firing doctrine?
General O'Reilly. The United States plans to deploy missile
defenses to counter more immediate regional ballistic missile threats
to our forward-deployed troops and to our Allies in Europe. These plans
involve a forward-deployed radar in Europe that will improve Homeland
defense by detecting and tracking threat missiles launched out of the
Middle East much earlier in the threat trajectory and provide high
quality tracking information to the GMD element. This will increase the
U.S. defended area performance and provide increased shoot-look-shoot
capability across a greater portion of the United States.

commitment to fly-before-you-buy
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, one of the key points of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is the policy that missile
defense systems must be tested realistically and successfully to permit
deployment. According to the BMDR, ``Before new capabilities are
deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under
realistic operational conditions.'' Are DOD and the administration
fully committed to operationally realistic testing and demonstrating
capability before deploying new missile defense capabilities?
Secretary Miller. The administration is committed to deploying
capabilities that have been proven under extensive testing and
assessment and are affordable over the long term. To strengthen the
testing program, a number of steps are being taken. Working in close
partnership with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as
requested by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced a new
approach to testing in June 2009.
This program projects necessary test activities over the full
course of each system's development, not just 2 years into the future
as under the former program. These activities include a comprehensive
set of ground and flight tests designed to demonstrate operational
performance and validate models used to support an evaluation of system
effectiveness. The new master plan is to be reviewed and updated
semiannually. This new approach will be evaluated after 1 year of
experience (June 2010), and any necessary adjustments will be made at
that time.

7. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, General O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy,
do you agree that this fly-before-you-buy approach is the right
approach to take?
Dr. Gilmore. Senator Levin's opening statement noted DOD has
adopted a policy of requiring realistic and operational testing to
demonstrate that our missile defense systems work before we deploy
them. I agree that this ``fly-before-you-buy'' approach is correct. The
MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), if successfully executed,
should put into practice this approach and, over time, provide the data
needed to evaluate quantitatively levels of confidence in the system's
performance. My office will continue to work closely with the MDA, the
BMDS Operational Test Agency, and the Combatant Commands to assure that
system capabilities are adequately demonstrated by realistic testing
prior to transitioning those systems to the acquiring services.
General O'Reilly. A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test
the capabilities and limitations of a missile defense system before we
begin procurement, or ``fly before we buy.'' As such, missile defense
projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L).
Additionally, we use the Services' standard material release and
operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and
operational test data prior to formally fielding initial capability.
Admiral Macy. Absolutely. Testing new systems under operationally
realistic conditions before committing to full-scale procurement is a
key factor in ensuring the reliability of fielded assets.

operational testing now planned
8. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, for years I have been asking if the
missile defense test plan included dedicated operational tests, and the
answer has always been: No. This has been a disappointment, especially
since some of the systems were deployed operationally. Does the current
IMTP include plans for dedicated operational tests? If so, how soon
would they begin?
Dr. Gilmore. The current IMTP does include plans for dedicated
operational testing. Operational testing, both ground and flight
testing, is planned for each phase of the PAA. In fiscal year 2012
(post Phase 1), the MDA intends to conduct a system-level operational
test, FTO-1, featuring three ballistic missile targets to be
intercepted by Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) (version
3.6.1), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot. FTO-2
is planned for fiscal year 2015 (Phase 2) and is a BMDS operational
system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets to be
intercepted by GMD, Aegis BMD, THAAD, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot. FTO-3
is planned for fiscal year 2018 (Phase 3) and is a BMDS operational
system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets
employing the same elements as FTO-2 but in their upgraded
configurations. The IMTP does not currently address Phase 4 testing
that would be conducted in fiscal year 2020.
Additionally, Aegis BMD will conduct flight test FTM-15 in third
quarter fiscal year 2011 and THAAD will conduct flight test FTT-13 in
second quarter fiscal year 2011. Both of these operationally realistic
flight tests are planned to demonstrate capability against intermediate
and medium range ballistic missiles, respectively, and to support my
assessment of the PAA Phase 1 capability prior to the planned fiscal
year 2011 deployments of these systems to the European theater. The MDA
also plans to conduct ground testing of the command, control, battle
management, and communications system in fiscal year 2011 to support
the Phase 1 implementation.

9. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, has your organization reviewed and
approved the plans for any such operational tests?
Dr. Gilmore. My staff, along with the MDA, the combatant commands,
and the BMDS Operational Test Agency participated in the development of
the IMTP. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has been
involved in the evaluation-based strategy underpinning the IMTP since
General O'Reilly initiated its development in December 2008. In
addition to detailed and day-to-day staff involvement in the
formulation of the IMTP, I personally participated in a number of
executive-level reviews and provided comments and guidance to the MDA.
I approved the IMTP, which includes plans for operational testing. I
expect that as the IMTP is executed, I will continue to review and
approve the detailed operational test plans that support all
significant BMDS operational testing, and that the realism of the
testing conducted will increase over time.

no icbm tests yet
10. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, in your prepared testimony, you
note that the GMD system ``has not yet attempted an intercept of an
ICBM target.'' Since the purpose of the GMD system is to defend the
United States against ICBMs, and it has not demonstrated such a
capability, does this fact affect your assessment of the operational
capability of GMD to defeat ICBM threats?
Dr. Gilmore. As discussed in my February 2010 report to Congress
assessing ballistic missile defense, GMD Flight tests FTG-02, FTG-03a,
and FTG-05 demonstrated that the GMD has a limited capability to
intercept a simple ballistic missile threat. Although the MDA used
target missiles for these flight tests that did not duplicate the
ranges that define ICBMs, re-entry vehicles that exhibited
characteristics of ICBM re-entry vehicles were used. These tests
provided data for a small portion of the substantial GMD performance
envelope. The MDA is developing an ICBM class target. The current IMTP
includes six GMD flight tests using these ICBM targets beginning in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2015. Data obtained from these flight
tests will inform future assessments.

11. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, if the GMD system demonstrates a
capability to intercept ICBM targets, will that increase your
confidence in the capability of the system?
Dr. Gilmore. Test data from intercepts of ICBM targets are only
some of the data I will need to determine a quantitative assessment of
confidence in the capability provided by GMD. I will also need
verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations that
accurately replicate GMD performance. All the GMD flight tests and
ground tests will be used to accomplish this task. These accredited
models and simulations would then allow evaluation in the areas of the
GMD performance envelope that are necessary for assessment but may be
impossible to test due to safety or environmental reasons. The newly
revised IMTP lays out a plan to obtain the data needed to rigorously
accredit these models.

no objective ballistic missile defense system assessment possible yet
12. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, in your prepared testimony, you
state that ``the ability to conduct comprehensive and objective
assessments of BMDS capability is still a number of years away,'' and
that ``it will take as many as 5 to 7 years'' to collect the test data
needed to validate models for missile defense capability. Does that
mean that the ``comprehensive and objective assessments'' of our
missile defense capability are at least 5 to 7 years away?
Dr. Gilmore. Based upon the testing described in the most recent
IMTP, my assessment is that it will take 5 to 7 years to collect the
data needed to support rigorous, comprehensive, quantitative
assessments of BMDS performance. During this time, however, there will
be opportunities to complete limited verification, validation, and
accreditation (VV&A) of some models and simulations. This should allow
for some similarly limited quantitative assessments of the performance
of selected BMDS elements.

13. Senator Levin. Dr. Gilmore, since you note that there has been
a history of missile defense test failures and delays, what affect
would such delays in the future have on the schedule for collecting the
necessary data and conducting the ``comprehensive and objective
assessments'' you mentioned?
Dr. Gilmore. In the IMTP, each test is designed to collect data for
VV&A of the models and simulations. These data elements are defined as
either Critical Engagement Conditions (CECs) or Empirical Measurement
Events (EMEs). The IMTP is revised every 6 months. When a test failure
occurs, preventing collection of planned CECs/EMEs, the IMTP revision
process, in which my office participates, reviews the current test
program for opportunities to collect the CECs/EMEs using other tests or
to add new tests, as necessary. This is the case with the recent
failure during FTG-06. FTG-06a is being planned and will be
incorporated in a revised IMTP.
No test plan as complex as the IMTP has ever been executed exactly
as planned. There are always unforeseen system responses and failures
that occur and require adjustments to the test plan. If such problems
do not arise, it likely means that the testing being conducted is not
robust. The delays in collecting data caused by test failures could
vary from several months to more than 1 year depending upon many
details including the BMDS element involved in the test and the targets
used in the test.

14. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, do you agree with Dr. Gilmore
that only subjective assessments of the missile defense system
capability are possible to date, and not objective assessments, because
of the lack of test data?
General O'Reilly. I concur with the January 2010 DOT&E assessment
that ``if MDA can execute the IMTP as planned, successful VV&A of BMDS
models and simulations should result, enabling quantitative and
objective rather than subjective assessments of the BMDS capability in
the future.'' I further agree with the DOT&E conclusion that
``objective assessments of the BMDS capability are still a number of
years in the future.''

ftg-06 flight test problem
15. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what went wrong with the most
recent GMD flight test at the end of January, FTG-06?
General O'Reilly. Although we have had three intercepts out of
three previous attempts (FTG-02, FTG-03a, FTG-05) using the GMD system,
our newest variant of the kill vehicle, relying on data from the Sea-
Based X-band (SBX) radar, failed to intercept a target in January 2010
during FTG-06, a flight test to measure GMD's performance closer to its
maximum operational intercept range. The GBI launched successfully from
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) and the newly designed LV-2 long-range
target successfully flew for the first time out of the Reagan Test Site
in the Kwajalein Atoll 7,500 km away.
The target complex was acquired and initially tracked by the SBX in
the Pacific and track data was provided to GMD Fire Control (GFC). A
Weapons Task Plan was generated and transmitted to the Command Launch
Equipment located at VAFB. A GBI was then launched from an
operationally-configured GMD silo, at VAFB. After the GBI launched, the
SBX ceased providing data to the GFC earlier than planned.
Even without target position updates from the SBX, the
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) transitioned to target acquisition
mode, but, due to an on-board failure, the EKV was unable to intercept
the target. The SBX and EKV failures are under investigation by the
FTG-06 Failure Investigation Team.
Despite the failure to intercept, we collected extensive system and
component performance data on the SBX, the GBI, the EKV, and the
target. We discovered new failure modes for the SBX, the EKV flew more
than twice the distance it had flown in previous tests, and we
collected significant new data on its ability to acquire and track the
target.
During FTG-06, we obtained model validation data on CECs related to
long interceptor time-of-flight. We collected EME data on EKV
performance against a complex ballistic missile threat scene and a
medium closing velocity intercept. As a result, current deployed
systems will benefit from FTG-06 because it advanced simulation
development and confirmed BMDS performance metrics.

16. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, when do you expect the Failure
Review Board to complete its assessment?
General O'Reilly. A Failure Investigation Team was chartered on
February 4, 2010 to investigate and determine the precise root cause of
failure. The failure investigation is expected to continue for several
more months before root-cause is determined and verified. The expected
date for completion of a final report including an assessment of the
failure is August 2010.

17. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what do you plan to do about
fixing the problems?
General O'Reilly. I intend to implement corrective actions once the
root cause of the failure is confirmed.

18. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, will you repeat the test after
you think you have fixed the problem?
General O'Reilly. Yes, I intend to repeat the test as soon as
feasible after the root cause of the failure is confirmed and we have
implemented corrective actions.

19. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what implications are there,
if any, for currently deployed systems?
General O'Reilly. After a final report and assessment of the
failure is provided, we will examine any implications to the deployed
BMDS.

new start and missile defense
20. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, there have been some concerns expressed by critics that the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) constrains our BMD program.
Does the treaty constrain U.S. missile defense capabilities or
programs?
Secretary Miller. The New START treaty does not constrain the
United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses
possible, nor does the New START treaty add any additional cost or
inconvenience to our missile defense plans. As the BMDR, our budget
submission and projections, and the U.S. unilateral statement made in
connection with the New START treaty all make clear, the United States
will continue to improve its missile defenses throughout the next
decade.
The New START treaty touches on missile defense in three parts: in
the Preamble, in Article V, and in the unilateral statements made by
both Russia and the United States.
The Preamble of the Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the
interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.
President Obama and President Medvedev recognized in their Joint
Understanding of July 2009 that this relationship will become more
important as strategic offensive arms are reduced; they note current
strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the
effectiveness of the Parties' strategic offensive arms.
Regarding the treaty's ban in Article V, paragraph 3, on the
conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor
launchers and vice versa, MDA Director Lieutenant General O'Reilly has
made clear that this ban does not constrain MDA's plans. Should
additional missile defense launchers be needed, we would build the
smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made GBI silos rather than convert
costly ICBM silos. Moreover, use of SLBM launchers for missile defense
interceptors is an unattractive option and would be unreasonably
expensive.
Russia's unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty
raises the possibility of Russian withdrawal from the treaty if
qualitative and quantitative improvements in U.S. missile defense were
to threaten the viability of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent.
In fact, both sides have the right to withdraw from the treaty under
Article XIV if they deem it necessary due to extraordinary developments
which threaten supreme national interests. Such withdrawal clauses are
common in treaties, especially in the case of arms control agreements.
The U.S. unilateral statement takes note of the Russian statement but
makes clear that U.S. missile defense systems do not threaten Russia
and that the United States intends to continue to deploy improved
missile defense systems to defend the U.S. Homeland from limited
attacks and to defend collaboratively its deployed forces, allies, and
partners against regional threats.
General O'Reilly. The New START treaty does not impede the
development and fielding of U.S. missile defenses, and it eliminates
START constraints on development and testing. The New START treaty does
not contain limitations that impact the U.S. plan to develop and field
missile interceptor systems.
Specifically, missile defense targets will no longer be subject to
START constraints which limited and complicated MDA use of air-launched
and waterborne launches of target missiles. Use of these targets is
essential for the cost-effective testing of missile defense
interceptors against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
in the Pacific region.
Admiral Macy. The New START treaty does not place constraints on
missile defense testing programs as did START, which banned production,
testing, or deployment of ballistic missiles or their launchers on
waterborne vehicles other than submarines. This same ban also applied
to air-to-surface ballistic missiles. New START has done away with
these prohibitions and provides MDA with more flexibility in its
testing capabilities. New START also has no constraints on MDA to
conduct missile launches from any number of space launch facilities as
the previous START had limited.

21. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, there were suggestions that,
rather than negotiating a New START, we should simply extend the
previous START I agreement. You have expressed the view that the
previous START constrained our missile defense testing options. If we
had extended the previous START I agreement, would that have
perpetuated the constraints on our missile defense testing options?
General O'Reilly. Yes. MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target missile
system, used in key tests to demonstrate Homeland defense capabilities
and the first phase of the new PAA to missile defense, was accountable
under the START because it employs the first stage of the now-retired
long-range Trident I SLBM. Due to the LV-2's accountability under START
it was subject to START movement reporting, launch location
restrictions and telemetry collection and sharing requirements. These
constraints limited the value the of LV-2 target system in BMDS testing
by, among other things, restricting the number of locations from which
the LV-2 could be launched.

22. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, from your perspective, is the
New START better than the old START from a missile defense testing and
development standpoint?
General O'Reilly. The New START treaty does not impede the
development and fielding of U.S. missile defenses, and it eliminates
START constraints on development and testing. The New START treaty does
not contain limitations that impact the U.S. plan to develop and field
missile interceptor systems.
Specifically, because the Trident I is not included in the New
START treaty the LV-2 is no longer subject to START constraints. This
will allow MDA to examine alternative LV-2 target launch sites for more
efficient test architectures and geometries by exploring other ways to
make use of this target that is now free from START constraints. The
result is that MDA will be able to improve BMDS performance for defense
of the Homeland and examine efficiencies and enhancements to the BMDS
testing program by taking advantage of new flexibilities, as well as
opportunities to reduce cost.

missile defense cooperation with russia
23. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, in your prepared testimony,
you state that ``the administration has given special emphasis to
renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense,'' and that ``we
are making a concerted effort to identify areas where the United States
and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation'' on missile defense. You
then describe a number of options being considered, including ``sharing
data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian radar installations;
conducting collaborative missile defense flight tests; and undertaking
experiments that would combine data from U.S. ground- and space-based
sensors with data from Russian sensors such as the radars at Qabala,
Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern Russia.'' Do you agree that such
cooperation with Russia would send a powerful signal to Iran that we
are united against their threatening policies and programs?
Secretary Miller. Yes. Cooperation with Russia on missile defense
would send a powerful signal to Iran that Russia and the United States
are working together to counter the threat posed by Iran's
proliferating of ballistic missiles and pursuit of nuclear capability.

24. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly and Admiral Macy, do you
believe such cooperation, particularly sharing radar data on missile
launches, and cooperative flight tests, would be beneficial to our
missile defense capabilities?
General O'Reilly. Yes, we continue to support expert dialogue on
cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation, whose surveillance
radars would enhance our ability to monitor ballistic missile
development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There are
opportunities for us to cooperate in sharing our sensor data, our
future research and development, and our command and control activities
and exercises in order to build confidence between both sides that
we're not threatening each other, but we are building ourselves a
defense against the proliferation of these missiles.
Admiral Macy. Yes, we continue to support expert dialogue on
cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation, whose surveillance
radars would enhance our ability to monitor ballistic missile
development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There are
opportunities for us to cooperate in the areas of shared sensor data,
research and development, and command and control activities and
exercises in order to build confidence between both sides that we're
not threatening each other, but we are building ourselves a defense
against the proliferation of these missiles.

25. Senator Levin. Admiral Macy and General O'Reilly, do you think
it is technically possible that the PAA to missile defense could
provide defensive coverage of parts of western Russia against Iranian
missiles?
Admiral Macy. Yes, it is technically possible.
General O'Reilly. Yes, it is technically possible.

contractor performance
26. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have expressed
disappointment with the poor quality of some contractors' performance,
including the failure of an air-launched target in an important THAAD
flight test. Please describe your quality concerns, using specific
examples.
General O'Reilly. After the failure of a target missile in a THAAD
test last December we convened a Failure Review Board. This board
determined that a contractor had unacceptably low standards of
engineering rigor, quality control and mission assurance which led to
the root cause failure. Subsequently, we suspended the use of air-
launched targets and prohibited the use of ballistic targets contracted
or subcontracted from that contractor. MDA is awaiting evidence of
improvement at the contractor before we continue funding.

27. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what steps are you taking to
rectify the poor performance of the contractors and to ensure sustained
quality improvements in the future?
General O'Reilly. The precision of missile defense systems requires
stringent manufacturing standards and quality control of all products.
We have had many successes in improving our prime contractor and
supplier quality assurance. In each case, companies were willing to
identify shortfalls, invest in new capital assets and attain
experienced leadership in changing cultures to establish the enduring
discipline required to consistently deliver precision missile defense
products. However, not all companies have sufficiently improved.
Until we complete planned competitions with updated contract
incentive types appropriate for the particular phase of development
(e.g., firm fixed price, cost plus award fee, etc.) and defect clauses,
we will continue to motivate senior industry management to improve
through intensive inspections, low award fees, issuance of cure
notices, stopping the funding of new contract scope, and documentation
of inadequate quality control performance to influence future contract
awards. We are increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a
program's acquisition life cycle to ensure the highest performance and
quality standards are sustained throughout development.
Additionally, over the past year, we have initiated a new target
acquisition strategy to increase competition, improve quality control,
and reduce costs.

aegis ashore test facility authorization
28. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, last year Congress
appropriated $68.5 million for construction of an Aegis Ashore Test
Facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii to permit
testing of the planned land-based SM-3 interceptor system for Europe.
However, the request came after the Defense Authorization process was
complete, and there was not enough information available for us to
authorize the project separately. Senator McCain and I filed a separate
bill to authorize the project as soon as the project information was
complete, but we understand that DOD is seeking to have Congress
authorize the project, as an amendment to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Is it correct that DOD needs
this Aegis Ashore Test Facility authorized now, in order to permit the
testing that is needed to maintain the President's schedule for Phase
II of the PAA to missile defense in Europe in the 2015 timeframe?
General O'Reilly. Yes, authorization of the $68.5 million of fiscal
year 2010 Military Construction (MILCON) funding for the Aegis Ashore
Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC) at the Pacific Missile Range
Facility in Hawaii is needed before we can carry out the project. The
funds must be placed on contract in the first half of fiscal year 2011
to meet Aegis Ashore development and test schedules.
In Phase II of the PAA, the first operational Aegis Ashore system
will be installed in Romania in fiscal year 2015. The AAMDTC provides
an operationally realistic environment to prove the effectiveness and
suitability of Aegis Ashore prior to deployment in a host nation and is
consistent with the Department's fly-before-you-buy approach.
If the Department does not receive authorization of the $68.5
million of MILCON in fiscal year 2011, the availability of the land-
based SM-3 Block IB to be fielded in Phase II will be delayed a year,
to the end of 2016. Therefore, fiscal year 2011 authorization of the
fiscal year 2010 MILCON funding of $68.5 million for the AAMDTC is
crucial.

29. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, is DOD still planning to meet
the President's 2015 schedule for Phase II?
Secretary Miller. Yes.

acquisition oversight process
30. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, the MDA has a unique high-
level acquisition oversight process through an organization called the
Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). The BMDR stated that this
process is adequate, and there is no need to place MDA under the
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process. Can you explain why you and
DOD believe the MDEB process is sufficiently rigorous, and why you
believe it is a better mechanism than the DAB would be?
General O'Reilly. The characteristics of the MDEB acquisition
oversight process are uniquely suited to managing the BMDS. For
example:

- MDEB meets more frequently on the BMDS than similar boards
(e.g., Defense Acquisition Board) that govern a broader mission
area across the DOD.
- The MDEB leadership and decisionmakers (USD(AT&L) and VCJCS)
have more BMDS-specific information available to them
concerning the focused BMD mission area.
- The MDEB as well as the Deputy Secretary of Defense-directed
Life Cycle Management Process, enables collaboration between
the acquisition and requirements decision authorities.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported (GAO
10-311) on the MDA acquisition process stating ``importantly, the
Director has begun new initiatives and in accordance with guiding
principles of DOD's acquisition policies, which already embrace
knowledge-based practices and sound management controls.''

establishing acquisition baselines
31. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have stated your plan to
establish acquisition baselines for a number of components of your
program, including cost, schedule, performance, and testing. This is
something that GAO has been recommending for many years, and something
this committee has encouraged also. Previous MDA directors have said
they would establish such baselines, but it did not happen.
Specifically what baselines are you planning to establish, and how will
they be used to help manage and evaluate your acquisition programs?
General O'Reilly. MDA has established six baselines (resource,
schedule, technical, test, contract, and operational baselines) to plan
and manage the execution of missile defense projects. I approve the
baselines of technology development programs, and jointly sign with
lead Service Acquisition Executives the baselines of MDA projects in
product development. These six baselines not only assist in our cost-
effective management of MDA projects, but also provide transparency and
accountability to the MDEB and Congress on the progress of our
execution. The cost (resource), schedule, performance (technical), and
test baselines being established this spring will be submitted to
Congress in a BMDS Accountability Report in June. We will update the
baselines, as required, through the MDA Program Change Board process.
Finally, the baselines for the Product Development projects will form
the basis for USD(AT&L) production decisions.

32. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, are you committed to
establishing these baselines and providing them to Congress, as well as
to the MDEB and to GAO?
General O'Reilly. Yes. The baselines will provide the basis for our
annual report to Congress (BMDS Accountability Report), which is also
provided to USD(AT&L) and GAO.

patriot deployments to poland
33. Senator Levin. Secretary Miller, your prepared testimony
indicates that Poland has ratified the supplemental Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) with the United States, which covers the stationing of
U.S. military personnel in Poland in association with missile defense.
I understood that at some point after that ratification, the United
States would begin rotational deployments of a U.S. Army Patriot
battery for training purposes in Poland. Is that rotational deployment
of a Patriot training battery still on track, and if so, when will it
begin?
Secretary Miller. The rotational deployment of a Patriot training
battery is still on track. The Polish ratification of the Status of
Forces Supplemental Agreement took place on February 26, 2010, and the
deployment will begin within 90 days of Poland's ratification.

34. Senator Levin. Admiral Macy, does this rotational deployment to
Poland have an impact on our planning and force management for possible
contingency deployment of Patriot capabilities elsewhere?
Admiral Macy. There is an impact but it is manageable. Planning and
force management for possible contingencies elsewhere is a normal part
of all deployments and operations. When any unit is engaged in a
mission for a finite amount of time--such as a 30-day rotational
deployment to Poland--the combatant command will assess how it will
meet directed contingency missions elsewhere and plan accordingly.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
nato and the phased adaptive approach
35. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I think everyone in NATO
can agree that Iran is a clear and dangerous threat. But I know our
allies have many questions about the new European PAA. France, for
example, has publicly expressed concerns. Like me, they want to know
about cost, implementation, and effectiveness of this program. In
particular, in these economically strained times, I am wondering how
NATO allies are looking to the future on funding this program. You have
Greece in financial crisis and our smaller allies, such as the Baltic
States, really straining to contribute to missions in Afghanistan,
address their important economic needs, and keep their publics in
support of broader NATO missions. Please explain what kind of cost
implication the new PAA strategy has for NATO allies and whether they
are enthusiastic about participating or not.
Secretary Miller. At the NATO Foreign Ministerial in December 2009,
Allies unanimously stated, ``We welcome the new PAA of the United
States to missile defence, which further reinforces NATO's central role
in missile defence in Europe.'' In addition, Romania and Poland have
agreed to host land-based sites in of the European PAA in 2015 and 2018
respectively. Thus, even amidst financial challenges, NATO members have
embraced the collective importance of missile defense in recognition of
the evolving threat.
The United States will fund the European PAA. This U.S.-funded
European PAA will be the U.S. contribution to NATO's missile defense
efforts. NATO and Allies including the French, Germans, Dutch, Greeks,
Italians, and Spanish have focused their missile defense efforts in
recent years on missile defense systems to protect deployed forces from
shorter-range ballistic missile threats. These NATO countries already
possess, or are acquiring, missile defense capabilities.
NATO is also developing a command and control network called the
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program that
will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets together. ALTBMD
could allow current and future NATO national systems-including those of
the United States-to be able to ``plug-and-play'' with the overall NATO
effort and the PAA assets.
NATO is currently funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide
command and control for defense of deployed forces only. Allies' costs
for territorial missile defense in Europe would come from the potential
expansion of ALTBMD, including command and control linkages for Allies'
territorial missile defense efforts. NATO has funded a study to examine
the implications and costs of expanding ALTBMD's mission to include
command and control (C2) for defense of territory.

36. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, if the United States is
going to burden the lion's share of the cost, which I expect it will,
how are those costs factored into the new cost of the system?
Secretary Miller. The President's budget request for fiscal year
2011 includes $2.7 billion for regional missile defense. If
appropriated, this will begin funding the conversion of additional
Aegis ships to be BMD capable, and the purchase of additional SM-3
interceptors, THAAD batteries, and AN/TPY-2 radars, along with covering
other costs associated with the PAA for Europe. The FYDP will also
reflect the longer-term cost associated with European PAA.

new start
37. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I applaud you all for your
efforts in getting New START signed. That is a great step with Russia
and an important step related to nuclear arms reductions. But in my
experience, there is usually a tradeoff for most advances with the
Russians. Where are you in dissuading Russia from delivering to Iran
the S-300 anti-aircraft system?
Secretary Miller. We have continued to make clear to the Russian
government that we oppose the delivery of the S-300 and believe it
would be a destabilizing and counterproductive step given Iran's
refusal to live up to its international obligations and that Russia and
the United States are currently discussing possible new U.N. sanctions
on Iran. We are pleased that, to date, Russia has not delivered the
system. However, to date Russia has declined to cancel the sale.

38. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, if Iran were to get the
system, would it be a setback to our missile defense deterrent, as Iran
has recently boasted?
Secretary Miller. If Iran were to acquire the S-300 air defense
system, it would not affect the deterrent and defensive value of our
missile defenses. However, we have continued to make clear to the
Russian Government that we oppose the delivery of the S-300 and believe
it would be a destabilizing and counterproductive step given Iran's
refusal to live up to its international obligations.

israeli missile defense
39. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, when Under Secretary
Flournoy discussed missile defense before this committee last
September, she said that Israel had not explicitly consulted on the new
PAA but that the system would be compatible with Israel's ongoing
missile defense programs. Are you confident that our new PAA is able to
be integrated with Israel's missile defense system?
Secretary Miller. Israel was not explicitly consulted about our
change in missile defense approach for Europe. However, the United
States and Israel coordinate extensively on missile defense issues. We
have a long history of cooperative research and development, which has
borne fruit in the deployment of Israel's Arrow missile defense system.
Arrow is interoperable with U.S. systems. The United States and Israel
also cooperate on missile defense operational issues through a program
of joint exercises. The PAA--particularly its emphasis on advanced
mobile BMD systems--is an advantageous framework when applied to
ballistic missile defense cooperation with Israel. The applicability of
this approach was successfully examined at recent exercises, such as
the U.S.-Israel Juniper Cobra exercise.

40. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, please explain what value
added Israel will get from the new PAA in terms of protection and
strategic advantage. Is Israel more protected by the new system?
Secretary Miller. The increase in investments in regional missile
defense assets and flexible capabilities associated with a PAA to
regional missile defense, which can surge into the region in times of a
political-military crisis, would benefit Israel. Our missile defense
cooperation with Israel is already advanced and will continue.
In addition to conducting major missile defense exercises with
Israel, the most recent of which occurred in November 2009, the United
States and Israel continue to meet regularly and coordinate extensively
on a wide range of missile defense plans and operations. Moreover, our
extensive support for Israel includes deployment of a US forward based
AN/TPY-2 X-band radar to Israel, and support for Israeli missile
defense programs such as the existing Arrow Weapons System, Arrow-2
production, Arrow-3 development, and the development of a new program,
David's Sling, for defeating short-range ballistic missiles.

41. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, how will the new PAA
approach provide added protection to our friends in the Gulf?
Secretary Miller. The United States will pursue a PAA within each
region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including
their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the
capabilities available and most suited for deployment.
In the Persian Gulf, the United States has a continuous missile
defense presence and seeks to build on the Bilateral Air Defense
Initiative to strengthen cooperation. The United States is also working
with a number of partners in the region on purchases of missile defense
capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales program.

42. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, is this system integrated
with our efforts in Israel?
Secretary Miller. Israel's missile defense assets are designed to
be interoperable with U.S. systems.

pakistan and india
43. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I'd like to push more on
how the new PAA approach affects countries to the north and east of
Iran, which the Pentagon has not addressed much. Can you explain how,
if at all, Pakistan (which borders Iran) fits into the new PAA
calculus?
Secretary Miller. While Pakistan is an important security partner,
we are not engaged in missile defense cooperation activities at this
time.

44. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, what missile defense
protection do the Pakistanis currently receive from U.S. assets in the
region?
Secretary Miller. While Pakistan is an important security partner,
we are not engaged in missile defense cooperation activities with
Pakistan at this time.

45. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, will the Aegis ship
approach provide them with any additional protection?
Secretary Miller. While Pakistan is an important security partner,
we are not engaged in missile defense cooperation activities with
Pakistan at this time.

46. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I know India has recently
done testing for its own missile defense systems, including its
interceptors. Where are we in terms of integrating our own missile
defense strategy with India, and how is Iran factored into our mutual
calculus, if at all?
Secretary Miller. In the 2005 ``New Framework for the U.S.-India
Defense Relationship,'' the governments of the United States and India
agreed to expand collaboration relating to missile defense. This
resulted in three successful U.S.-India missile defense table-top
exercises and a bilateral meeting in 2008 to discuss ideas for further
cooperation. We look forward to continued cooperation with India.

47. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, how will the new PAA (and
sea-based approach) help India, if at all?
Secretary Miller. India is an important security partner, but we do
not have operational missile defense cooperation activities with India
at this time.

missile defense capability
48. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Macy and General O'Reilly, section
125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit a joint review with the
head of the MDA to set forth requirements for investment in Aegis BMD-
capable cruisers and destroyers. Please provide the status of where
this review is headed with respect to determining the final number of
Aegis ships that will be equipped with missile defense capabilities.
Admiral Macy and General O'Reilly. Navy and the MDA completed the
requested report and forwarded to Congress on April 19, 2010. The
conclusions of the report state:
``Navy and MDA have jointly concluded that the plan for 38 funded
surface combatants with Aegis BMD (by fiscal year 2015) contained in
PB11 reflects an achievable balance of capacity and capability, while
sustaining the requisite number of multi-mission Aegis cruisers and
destroyers deployed worldwide to meet concurrent surface combatant
requirements. The plan is consistent with QDR force-sizing guidance.
Further increases to BMD capacity through additional new construction
Aegis ships beyond those contained in Navy's 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan
are not considered necessary.''

49. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Macy, what percentage of your future
cruisers and destroyers (not the current fleet) are planned to be
missile-defense capable?
Admiral Macy. Under the program of record, 33 of the Navy's 88
Aegis ships will be BMD capable by the end of the FYDP (2015), for a
total of 43 percent. Under the current modernization plan, this
percentage is expected to increase to 75 percent by 2025 and approach
100 percent by 2030.

50. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I recently returned from a
trip to Afghanistan that also included time at NATO headquarters in
Brussels, where I received briefings on missile defense and met with
key NATO allies on the implications of the new PAA to missile defense.
Many of the allies I spoke with were interested in how we plan to
resource and distribute our missile defense--capable Aegis assets and
how they will be included in that calculus. Where are U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command in the planning process for
testing of Aegis systems in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR)?
Secretary Miller. The Department will rely on the Global Force
Management (GFM) process to assist in decisions on the allocation of
missile defense forces among the geographical combatant commands.
The GFM process is designed to adjudicate competing requirements
from the various combatant commands. This approach underscores the
value of developing capabilities that are flexible and adaptive and
also relocatable, so that they can be surged into regions, as
necessary.
The United States will test PAA assets including Aegis systems
prior to their deployment. Most of our operational testing takes place
in the Pacific using our test range and the missile defense test
monitoring equipment there. Our missile defense assets are or will be
tested before they are deployed to the combatant commanders' AORs.

51. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, are we on track for tests
to begin in 2011?
Secretary Miller. Our missile defense assets are or will be tested
before they are deployed to the Combatant Commanders' areas of
responsibility. For example, those Aegis BMD ships that are currently
deployed have already been tested and are fully operational.

52. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, which allies will be
included in that process and to what extent?
Secretary Miller. As part of our Phase 1 architecture, we plan to
deploy a forward-based radar in Southeastern Europe. The other assets
that are to be deployed as part of Phase 1 of the European PAA are sea-
based and will not require any formal bilateral cooperation other than
that which already exists for such activities as port calls, refueling,
etc.
In addition, the United States will continue its cooperative
efforts with NATO Allies. The PAA aligns U.S. missile defense plans in
Europe more closely with Allies' existing missile defense efforts. NATO
missile defense efforts in recent years have focused on missile defense
systems to protect deployed forces from shorter range ballistic missile
threats. Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring
missile defense capabilities. For example, several have PATRIOT systems
(Netherlands, Germany, and Greece). Italy, Germany, and the United
States are cooperatively developing the Medium Extended Air Defense
System (MEADS). Others have expressed interest in acquiring systems
like Patriot and the SM-3. NATO is also developing a command and
control network that will allow Allies to link their missile defense
assets together, called the ALTBMD program. ALTBMD could allow current
and future national systems--including those of the United States--to
``plug-and-play'' with the overall NATO effort and the PAA assets.

53. Senator McCaskill. Secretary Miller, I know that some allies
have a greater comfort level than others with Russian involvement in
building the missile defense ``roof,'' so to speak, over Europe. Are
you considering including Russia in any Aegis-related exercises or
activities, either bilaterally or through the NATO forum?
Secretary Miller. We are continuing bilateral discussions with
Russia on missile defense cooperation focusing on a broad agenda that
includes shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical
cooperation, and even eventual operational cooperation with Russia. We
believe we share common interests in missile defense cooperation, and
are undertaking a common threat assessment as an initial cooperative
step.
We are also exploring NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation. As
Secretary Clinton said in April 2010, ``Following the restart of the
NATO-Russia Council last December and the recent signing of the New
START treaty, there is considerable momentum within the alliance for
moving ahead with Russia on areas of common concern and shared
responsibility. We are exploring how best to work within the NATO-
Russia Council itself and we are committed to obtaining greater
transparency and practical cooperation on issues like missile
defense.''
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
precision tracking space system
54. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, I'd like to follow up on my
questions about MDA's acquisition of the Precision Tracking Space
System (PTSS) program. As I understand this program, it will grow on
the lessons learned in the Space Tracking Space System (STSS) program,
eventually fielding 9 to 12 satellites and associated ground stations.
You indicated that the PTSS program is being managed by Johns Hopkins
University and the Naval Research Lab (NRL), as they have a proven
track record for launching satellites of this size. It is my
understanding that these organizations have a history of providing
experimental satellites, but I am not aware that they have experience
with the acquisition of an operational satellite constellation. What
operational space programs has the NRL or Johns Hopkins fielded?
General O'Reilly. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL) and the NRL have a long history of developing
prototype space systems and transitioning them to Government
operational elements with industry suppliers. The PTSS plan is for APL
and NRL, in collaboration with laboratory partners such as Sandia
National Labs, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Labs, and
Utah State University's Space Dynamics Lab, to conduct a prototyping
effort for PTSS and transition the production effort to industry. MDA
does not intend for APL or NRL to field the operational PTSS.
MDA is implementing Service Cells within the PTSS project office--a
lesson learned from the experience transferring Cobra Dane Upgrade from
MDA to the Air Force in early 2009. Specifically, Service
representatives embedded in BMDS program offices during development
improve MDA-Service interaction, transparency and program efficiency.
In April and May 2010, the Air Force and MDA conducted discussions
for an Air Force Space Command cell in the PTSS project office in
anticipation that the Air Force will be designated as Lead Service of
PTSS. The final arrangements are being worked with the envisioned
objective for the Air Force to have overall authorities for PTSS
doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel
and facilities. In June 2010 the Navy and MDA will discuss a similar,
embedded cell arrangement for the Navy to leverage PTSS capability from
an overall architecture aspect in support of missile defense with the
next generation radar suite aboard Navy surface combatants.

55. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, what operational space
programs of this scale has MDA fielded?
General O'Reilly. None. However, MDA fielded several space programs
of similar scale as the PTSS prototype program. On September 25, 2009,
MDA launched the STSS. While PTSS will be less complex than STSS, we
are similarly pursuing the simultaneous development, test, and launch
of two spacecraft. Another example includes the successful Near Field
Infrared Experiment, launched in April 2007.
A more complex space program undertaken by MDA is the Mid-Course
Space Experiment launched in April 1996. Although not a dual spacecraft
manifest, this system compares similarly to PTSS in several areas, most
notably in the optical telescope and multi-band tracking payload.
MDA has not fielded a constellation of operational spacecraft of
the scale proposed for the PTSS.

56. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, you also mentioned an Air
Force cell within MDA working on the PTSS program. Please respond with
their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.
General O'Reilly. In anticipation of Air Force's designation as
Lead Service for PTSS, MDA and the Air Force have begun preliminary
discussions on an Air Force cell in the PTSS Project Office. We
envision the Air Force will have overall authorities for PTSS doctrine,
organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities. Final roles, responsibilities, and authorities are still
pending.

57. Senator Udall. General O'Reilly, please discuss the planned
interoperability of this satellite system with other Air Force systems.
General O'Reilly. PTSS will be an element within the BMDS and
interface within the broader U.S. National Security Space enterprise.
We plan for PTSS to connect with the Air Force Satellite Control
Network and other U.S. communication system assets, and the system will
interface with Air Force and government overhead persistent infrared
systems (OPIR). That interface will provide real time coordinated
tasking between the PTSS, the BMDS, and the external OPIR systems as
well as real time data dissemination of OPIR data necessary to develop
state vector cues to the PTSS. The MDA is working with the joint OPIR
community to develop a plan for posting PTSS data to the real time data
service to make it accessible to other mission areas such as missile
warning, technical intelligence, and space situational awareness.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
new start and missile defense restrictions
58. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, I appreciate the administration's
persistence against the numerous attempts by Russia to link missile
defense to START. Nonetheless, in a recent interview, Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev stated that he would consider withdrawing from the New
START should the U.S. missile defense program in Europe create an
imbalance. How do you perceive what the Russians mean by imbalance?
Dr. Miller. We view Russia's concern about imbalance as a
hypothetical situation where our missile defense capabilities might be
able to undermine the credibility of Russia's strategic deterrent.
Various American interlocutors repeatedly told their Russian
counterparts that the PAA in Europe will not pose a threat to Russia
because the United States does not view Russia as an adversary and the
capabilities to be deployed during each phase will not pose a threat to
Russian offensive missile forces.
The missile defense interceptors we are planning to deploy as part
of the European PAA will not have the speed necessary to intercept
Russian ICBMs heading to the United States.
In addition, the relatively small numbers of GBIs deployed at Fort
Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, designed to defeat first
generation North Korean and Iranian ICBMs will not have significant
capability against Russia's strategic deterrent, which, under the New
START treaty will include well over 1,000 warheads deployed on several
hundreds of advanced ICBMs and SLBMs.
For these reasons, we do not believe that U.S. missile defenses
will threaten Russia's strategic deterrent, nor that Russia will have a
legitimate missile defense-related reason to withdraw from the New
START treaty.

59. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, can you assure me that Russia will
not have veto power within this administration going forward on the
design, development, and deployment of our missile defenses?
Dr. Miller. Yes. During the course of the New START treaty
negotiations, U.S. officials, including President Obama, repeatedly
told their Russian counterparts that the United States would not accept
any constraints on its ability to develop and deploy ballistic missile
defenses to protect the U.S. Homeland and to defend our deployed
forces, allies, and partners from regional missile threats. And, true
to our declarations, we did not agree to any provision under New START
that would constrain our missile defense programs.
As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding missile defense, the
BMDR, and our budgetary plans all make clear, the United States will
continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S.
Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners.

60. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, are DOD and the administration
fully committed to the development and procurement of the SM-3 block
IIA and block IIB, irrespective of Russian concerns?
Dr. Miller. DOD and administration are committed to developing and
deploying the missile defense assets needed to protect ourselves and
our allies from the threat of ballistic missiles from defiant states,
such as Iran and North Korea. Our plans include the SM-3 Block IIA and
the IIB.
The United States will continue to address stated Russian concerns
over our future BMD capabilities, and we plan to continue to engage
Russia on a broad range of cooperative initiatives, as well as on
transparency and confidence-building measures. However, this will not
limit the U.S. ability to develop and procure the capabilities we need.

61. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, given this administration's
eagerness towards pursuing arms control, why should we not believe the
Russians will hold future missile defense endeavors hostage by
threatening to back out of New START?
Dr. Miller. The United States made clear to Russia that it would
reject any restraints on our ability to provide protection from
ballistic missile threats to the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces,
allies, and partners. As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding
missile defense, the BMDR, and our budgetary plans all make clear, the
United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed,
to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners.

north korean and iranian threat
62. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, according to
an unclassified DOD report on Iran sent to Congress on April 19, 2010,
Iran with ``sufficient foreign assistance . . . could probably develop
and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.'' If
the Iranian or North Korean threat were to evolve faster than
predicted, is the MDA ready and poised to expedite development,
testing, and fielding of the PAA?
Dr. Miller. The United States is currently protected against the
attacks that North Korea or Iran would be able to launch if they were
able to develop an ICBM capability. This protection is a result of
investments made over the past decade in a system based on GMD.
Continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of GBIs now
deployed gives us confidence that we can meet a potential North Korean
and Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat.
In addition to improving the GMD system, the United States is also
pursuing several other hedging strategies for defense of the Homeland
against a ballistic missile attack. For example, the United States will
continue development and assessment of a two-stage GBI. We will also
pursue multiple paths to develop and deploy ballistic missile sensors,
including both airborne and space-based detection and tracking systems.
The Department also plans to complete the construction of Missile
Field 2 in Fort Greely, AK, by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and
making those silos operationally ready. This will both replace older,
inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a Reserve capability
to deploy rapidly up to eight additional GBIs from the pool of
interceptors currently designated for testing. Although the Department
does not currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these
extra operational silos will provide an additional hedge against future
threat uncertainty.
General O'Reilly. The United States is already protected against
limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including projected
future threats from Iran. As part of the BMDS, the GMD element provides
continuous operational capability to protect the Homeland against
ICBMs.
By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30 operational GBIs will be
deployed as part of the BMDS. We plan to preserve our position of
advantage by maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense
capabilities and given continuing improvements planned for the GMD
element, 30 operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for the
foreseeable future against the projected threat from North Korea and
Iran. Eight additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs
will provide a hedge against unanticipated ICBM threat growth.
The United States plans to deploy missile defenses to counter more
immediate regional ballistic missile threats to our forward deployed
troops and to our Allies in Europe. These plans involve a forward-
deployed radar in Europe that will provide data earlier in the
engagement and augment Homeland defense capabilities already in place
at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
Additionally, we will continue development of technologies to
enhance SM-3 variants to add additional protection to our Homeland in
the future. Deployments of the SM-3 IIB (2020) in Europe will augment
the GMD system with a capability to intercept Iranian long-range
ballistic missiles early in flight in the regions from which they were
launched.
The BMDS IMTP, Version 10.1, lays out the current plan for testing
the PAA capabilities. We review and update the IMTP semi-annually to
ensure our test program is consistent with MDA priorities, capability
development schedules, and funding.

63. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, what about the
testing and fielding of the two-stage GBIs?
Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 budget request funds continued
development and testing of the two-stage GBI. The two-stage GBI is
scheduled for one booster verification flight test in fiscal year 2010
and two intercept flight tests, the first in fiscal year 2012 and the
second in fiscal year 2016. Any potential operational use of the two-
stage GBI is yet to be determined.
General O'Reilly. The schedule for testing the two-stage GBI is
part of our overall IMTP objective to collect the data needed to anchor
our models and simulation. The two-stage GBI test dates are driven by
the types of engagements in which we need to test the GBI kill vehicle.
We will test the two-stage GBI for the first time in June 2010 to
verify differences between the performance of two-stage and the three-
stage GBIs. After this test and the subsequent intercept events we
believe we will have characterized differences between the two and will
be able to evaluate the performance of a two-stage GBI using data
collected from three-stage testing.
This is possible because the two-stage GBI builds upon the success
of the three-stage GBI and has many of the same components, except the
third stage is removed. The two-stage reuses existing flight-qualified
components from its three-stage counterpart. Key common components are
the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, BAM electronics, stage 2/3
interstage, and first and second stage motors. As part of the three-
stage development effort, these common components have undergone
ground, flight, and qualification testing. Changes from the three-stage
GBI are limited to the removal of the third stage motor, relocation of
the BAM, and minor modifications to navigation and guidance software
for the two-stage flight.
The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill
vehicle itself and the kill vehicle for both the two- and three-stage
interceptors is identical.

north korean and iranian missile development
64. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, the notion of collaboration
between North Korea and Iran is not new. Earlier this month, press
reports cited that Iran is building a new short-range missile launch
site from an existing complex and appears to be working with North
Korea. Do you currently see any evidence of technology transfer between
Iran and North Korea?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]

65. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, do you agree that estimates
on Iran's timeline for ICBM development should take into account North
Korean space launch and ICBM development?
General O'Reilly. MDA relies on the Intelligence Community
assessments of Iranian long-range missile developments, and defers to
the IC. The current DIA assessment is that Iran could develop and test
an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015 with sufficient,
continued foreign support.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DIA, Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran, April
2010.

quality control
66. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, as I mentioned earlier,
contractor performance and a lack of contractor quality control is
unacceptable and the description of the failed test in December is
indicative of the significant impact just one contractor can have.
While you have ceased to conduct any business with L-3/Coleman, the
company responsible for the target in that test, I get the impression
that L-3/Coleman is just the most recent example, certainly not the
only one. During the press conference for the fiscal year 2011 budget
release, the MDA Executive Director was quoted with the following
statement: ``I'm not going to name names today, but I'm going to tell
you we continue to be disappointed in the quality that we are receiving
from our prime contractors and their subs--very, very disappointed;
quality-design issues, but more in quality of products delivered, which
then results in rework and which reserved--because most of these
contracts are cost contracts, it costs the taxpayer more.'' Given the
cost-plus nature of many of these contracts and the allegation that
reckless failures by contractors are resulting in unnecessary cost
increases, how do you intend to address these concerns, both
proactively within MDA and across the DOD?
General O'Reilly. MDA is committed to improving missile defense
acquisition to overcome significant flight test delays, target and
interceptor failures, cost growth, quality control, and program delays
we have encountered in the past.
Moving forward, MDA is implementing the Weapon Systems Acquisition
Reform Act of 2009, including provisions related to contract
competition, and it is our intent to use greater firm fixed price
contracts and defect clauses as we complete planned competitions. We
are increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a program's
acquisition life cycle to ensure the highest performance and quality
standards are sustained throughout development.
However, until we complete planned competitions we will have to
motivate some senior industry management through intensive inspections,
low award fees, issuing cure notices, consideration of pending quality
concerns during funding decisions for new contract scope, and
documenting inadequate quality control performance to influence future
contract awards by DOD.

67. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, what steps can be taken to
ensure that contractors are held responsible to provide quality
products without unnecessary increases in cost?
General O'Reilly. As the Acquisition Executive Agent responsible
for Missile Defense, I continue to pursue knowledge-based program
performance practices and sound management controls in accordance with
guiding principles of DOD's acquisition policies, to include
competition-based acquisition. Historical experience has demonstrated
that competition-based acquisition results in contractors delivering
reliable, high-quality products that meet performance specification
thresholds within the cost and schedule parameters.
The use of competition-based acquisition is an effective strategy
to ensure quality control and contain costs for programs. As contracted
activities come up for renewal or to adjust the scope of work, vigorous
competition is pursued and knowledge points are established within
contracts so progress can be assessed and alternatives evaluated.
Competition ensures we have viable, multiple sources to motivate high
reliability and quality at the lowest cost. Industry reacts to
incentives from competition and is motivated to sustain and gain
business by providing quality products on time and within cost. Vendors
whose cost controls or products do not meet required metrics are faced
with lost business opportunities. Companies must deliver cost-
effective, high-quality, reliable products and services to be awarded
contracts and win competitions, as well as retain contract performance
history. Contract performance histories re-enforce this approach by
informing future contract awards from MDA.

68. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, what incentives does a cost-
plus contract have to have to prevent unnecessary increases in cost
resulting from carelessness?
General O'Reilly. In order to prevent increases in cost, a cost-
plus contract must have quality and mission assurance incentives. MDA
development and sustainment cost-plus contracts have incentives that
address, at a minimum, a mission success performance element. These
incentives measure the timeliness and effectiveness of contractor
performance on events that are key to successful BMDS performance. This
ensures contractor focus on quality and mission assurance in addition
to strict adherence of their corporate best practices. In order to
prevent or minimize unnecessary cost increases and ensure quality
products, cost-plus contracts reward a contractor for achieving
performance at or below the set limit of the contract cost. A fee
structure is also included that appropriately rewards a contractor for
delivering required products that demonstrate performance.
Should a contractor fail to achieve cost control and/or
performance, award fees are appropriately reduced. Consistently poor
work or a significant failure may result in the contract and/or work
scope being restructured or the contract terminated, impacting the
current work and award level of the contractor and opening the door for
competitors to complete remaining work. The contractor's performance
assessment ratings may also be negatively affected, reducing the
contractor's ability to secure future contracts from MDA. FAR Part 46--
Quality Assurance requires that clause 52.246-3 Inspection of
Supplies--Cost Reimbursement be included in cost reimbursement
contracts to ensure that no additional fee will be paid to the
contractor for the correction of defects.
MDA takes full advantage of cost-plus incentive contracts within a
competition-based acquisition strategy to ensure quality control and
contain costs. As contracted activities come up for renewal or to
adjust the scope of work, vigorous competition is pursued and knowledge
points are established within the contracts so progress can be assessed
and alternatives evaluated. Competition ensures we have viable,
multiple sources to motivate high reliability and quality at the lowest
cost. Industry reacts to incentives from competition and is motivated
to sustain and gain business by providing quality products on time and
within cost. Vendors whose cost controls or products do not meet
required metrics are faced with lost business opportunities. Companies
must deliver cost-effective, high-quality, reliable products and
services to be awarded contracts and win competitions, as well as
retain contract performance history. Contract performance histories re-
enforce this approach by informing future contract awards from MDA.

schedule delays
69. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, in GAO's recently released
Assessment of Major Weapons Programs, they boldly asserted that ``the
Aegis BMD program is putting the SM-3 Block 1B at risk for cost growth
and schedule delays by planning to begin manufacturing in 2010 before
its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment.'' Is it true that technologies will not be fully mature
until after the decision to produce the first 18 SM-3 Block 1Bs?
General O'Reilly. The MDA disagrees with the GAO's assertion that
the program is putting the SM-3 Block IB missile at risk for cost
growth and schedule delays by beginning manufacturing in 2010 before
its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment.
For the SM-3 Block IB technologies to be fully mature, they must
function properly during a flight test in the expected environment.
These 18 SM-3 Block IB Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) rounds are being built to support flight testing that will
demonstrate the maturity of the critical technologies and to prove-out
manufacturing processes.

70. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, as concluded by GAO, do you
agree that such an approach increases the risk of costly design changes
in the event unexpected issues arise during testing?
General O'Reilly. The MDA disagrees with the GAO's assertion that
the program is putting the SM-3 Block IB missile at risk for cost
growth and schedule delays by beginning manufacturing in 2010 before
its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment. The procurement that is mentioned by the GAO in their
report is for SM-3 Block 1B developmental test rounds to conduct flight
testing of the second generation Aegis BMD/SM-3 weapon system. These
rounds will also be used to validate production line processes. During
fiscal year's 2010 and 2011, all critical technologies will have
completed developmental testing, a successful flight test will have
been conducted and the manufacturing readiness review would have been
concluded. Only after the successful testing of these RDT&E missiles
will an initial production decision be made by the USD(AT&L).

71. Senator McCain. General O'Reilly, given the key role the SM-3
Block 1B and future variants will play within our global missile
defense architecture, are you concerned cost growth and schedule delay
could greatly impede our ability to field the 1Bs on schedule and in
the quantities budgeted?
General O'Reilly. The SM-3 Block IB RDT&E rounds purchased in
fiscal year 2010 are necessary to conduct flight test for the second
generation Aegis BMD/SM-3 weapon system. In addition to providing
assets to support test, these rounds will also be used to validate
production line processes prior to a full rate production decision in
2012.

medium extended air defense system
72. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, in their most
recent assessment of the Patriot follow-on, MEADS program, GAO assessed
that while critical technologies are finally becoming mature, the
program will likely face an 18-month delay and require at least an
additional $1 billion to address issues that arose during the program's
preliminary design review (PDR) in 2008. GAO cites progress; however, I
remain concerned especially in light of recent press reports stating
the Army ``MEADS is taking too long to develop and has become too
expensive.'' The Army is rumored to be in preliminary program transfer
discussions with MDA; is this true?
Dr. Miller. The Department of the Army currently has program
support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. Discussions
regarding a possible transfer to the MDA have occurred; however, no
decision has been made to date. We will consult with Congress regarding
any plans to realign this important program.
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. Discussions regarding a
possible transfer to the MDA have occurred; however, no decision has
been made to date.

73. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, is it true
that the program will need an additional $1 billion and are any
additional increases expected?
Dr. Miller. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), along with the Department of the
Army, has responsibility for this program. According to AT&L, cost,
schedule, and performance issues emerged during the MEADS PDR, which
led to a tri-national Independent Review Team (IRT) assessment. The IRT
review found that radar development had been delayed (leading to cost
overruns), the program development and testing were high-risk due to
tight schedules and engineering concurrency leading to the Critical
Design Review (CDR), and the overall management and governance of the
program were inefficient and needed to be improved. The IRT determined
that the planned MEADS Design & Development (D&D) Program of Record
(POR) would likely not produce the required performance within the
original cost and schedule and estimated approximately $1 billion cost
growth and a 12-24 months schedule slip in order to correct the
identified deficiencies and reduce program risk going forward.
In late 2008, the National Armaments Directors of the MEADS partner
nations agreed in principle to proceed with the program to CDR, and
agreed to delay the CDR by 1 year until August 2010 to mitigate program
risks. Concurrently, the partner nations began work on an amendment to
the program Memorandum of Understanding to revise the D&D POR and to
re-evaluate the expected cost and schedule based on the IRT findings.
The DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office is in the final
stages of updating an independent cost estimate that will be available
in time to inform the System Program Review, following the CDR later
this year. At that time, the partner nations will have a full
understanding of the cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the
MEADS program.
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
senior leadership on questions pertaining to the program's cost.

74. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, is 18 months
the full extent of the schedule delay?
Dr. Miller. Please see response to Question #73.
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
senior leadership on questions pertaining to the program's schedule.

75. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, given the
international collaboration associated with MEADS, is it true that this
program is exempt from traditional DOD acquisition regulations? If so,
was or is MEADS in risk of breaching Nunn-McCurdy?
Dr. Miller. The MEADS program, under co-development in a
partnership among the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only
active missile defense development program the United States currently
has with NATO partners. We believe that honoring the U.S. commitments
to cooperative program partners is critical.
According to the USD(AT&L), who along with the Department of the
Army has responsibility for this program; the MEADS program was
designed to adopt many of the DOD 5000-series procedures and program
documentation standards, but the MEADS program is managed by a NATO-
chartered Agency. The NATO MEADS Management Agency administers the
MEADS prime contract and is overseen by a tri-national Board of
Directors who report to their respective acquisition authorities. DOD
evaluates program performance in accordance with traditional
acquisition practices and standards. Although an independent review of
MEADS did identify significant cost and schedule growth, it is our
understanding that MEADS has not breached the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds.
The DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office is in the final
stages of updating an independent cost estimate, and the NATO MEADS
Management Agency is awaiting a restructure proposal from industry that
will better define the actual magnitude of cost and schedule growth.
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
senior leadership and the USD(AT&L) on whether the program is at risk
for breaching Nunn-McCurdy restrictions.

76. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, what steps are
being taken to ensure that the program stays within budget and
schedule?
Dr. Miller. According to the USD(AT&L), who along with the
Department of the Army has responsibility for this program, the
National Armaments Directors of the MEADS partner nations agreed in
principle in late 2008 to proceed with the program to Critical Design
Review (CDR), but agreed to delay the CDR by 1 year until August 2010
to allow time to correct technical issues and mitigate program risks.
The partner nations agreed to revise the government oversight construct
for MEADS and approved structural changes proposed within industry
systems engineering and management. The NATO MEADS Management Agency
and industry implemented a number of management and technical
recommendations provided by an Independent Review Team of the MEADS
program.
The partner nations are working on an amendment to the program
Memorandum of Understanding to revise further the remainder of the
Design and Development program to reduce overall risk. The NATO MEADS
Management Agency and the partner nations involved are re-evaluating
the expected cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the program
through the run-up to the CDR. The DOD Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation office is in the final stages of updating an independent
cost estimate. The Army and OSD are jointly conducting a comprehensive
U.S. System Program Review, which will be complete following the CDR
later this year. At that time, each partner nation will have a full
understanding of the cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the
MEADS program.
General O'Reilly. The Army currently has program support and
budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army's
senior leadership on actions being taken to ensure the program stays
within its budget and remains on schedule.

77. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, is the Army,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or MDA looking at any
alternatives to a Patriot follow-on system in the event it is
determined that MEADS technologies will not materialize on time and
within budget?
Dr. Miller. The MEADS program, under co-development in a
partnership among the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only
active missile defense development program the United States currently
has with NATO partners.
Although there have been numerous schedule delays and cost growth
in the MEADS program, the program is being restructured so that it can
better meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals.
When ready, MEADS will offer a replacement for the Patriot system
that is more capable, more easily sustained, and more mobile. It could
be an important part of a NATO missile defense effort. At this time, we
are not considering alternatives to MEADS.
General O'Reilly. The MDA has not been directed to examine
alternatives to the MEADS program. MDA is also not aware of any Army or
OSD initiatives pertaining to a Patriot follow-on system should MEADS
not be available.

78. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General O'Reilly, how concerned
is DOD with the affordability of this program?
Dr. Miller. Although there have been numerous schedule delays and
cost growth in the MEADS program, the program is being restructured so
that it can better meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals.
General O'Reilly. Army currently has program support and budgetary
responsibility for the MEADS programs. I defer to the Army's senior
leadership and the USD(AT&L) on questions pertaining to the
affordability of the program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
phased adaptive approach
79. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, the central difference
between the previous plan for missile defense in Europe and the PAA is
the substitution of SM-3 missiles in Romania and Poland for the 10
long-range GBIs intended for Poland. Current, if somewhat vague, plans
call for land-based SM-3 Block IB missiles in Romania by 2015 to
address the medium range threat from Iran, and then land-based SM-3
Block IIA missiles in Poland by 2018 to address the intermediate range
threat. By 2020, phase IV of the PAA is supposed to deliver the new SM-
3 Block IIB missile, which will be capable against ICBM-class Iranian
missiles, providing the United States an additional layer of
protection. There are scant details, even in the BMDR, about the PAA.
How many ships, interceptors, and radars are required for each phase of
the PAA and how much this will cost?
General O'Reilly. The PAA is not a defined system or capability,
but rather a policy approach that guides the fielding of ballistic
missile defense architectures tailored to an individual region. The
interceptors, sensors, and command and control system are part of the
tool kit MDA provides to the COCOMs to deploy the right mix of BMD
capabilities in their Areas of Responsibility. For the European region,
the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) must consider
force structure requirements and allocate missile defenses to meet
EUCOM's needs. There is a GFM process to figure out how to allocate
assets around the globe. At this point in time, a determination of how
many ships, interceptors, and sensors are required for each phase of
the PAA has not been made, but will be determined through the GFM
process. While the exact force structure and inventory numbers for each
of the Phases are still being determined, Phase I will leverage
existing and maturing systems to counter the short- and medium-range
ballistic missile (S/MRBM) threat from the Middle East, while improving
Homeland defense. Phase II will build upon Phase I by using existing
and new capabilities to enhance our defense against the SRBM/MRBM
threat from the Middle East. Phases III and IV will employ follow-on
variants of the interceptors used in Phases I and II to expand
defensive coverage of Europe against longer-range ballistic missile
threats.

80. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, does your testing and
procurement plan support your fielding goals that I just laid out?
General O'Reilly. Yes, MDA has developed and documented the test
and procurement plans required to field the PAA. In February 2010, we
finalized version 10.1 of our IMTP that outlines the first three phases
of the PAA test program and have provided it to the four congressional
defense committees. The IMTP is a collaborative effort in which we
partnered with the DOT&E, STRATCOM, and the Service's Operational Test
Agencies to define the test data required to support both procurement
and fielding decisions. The PAA procurement plan for the first three
phases is outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense congressional
oversight documents (R-docs, P-docs) and the details of the phase IV
procurement are still in development.

two-stage gbi development and flight testing
81. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, according to the February
2010 BMDR, the United States ``will continue development and assessment
of a two-stage GBI'' as a hedging strategy for defense of the Homeland.
Yet the testing schedule for the two-stage GBI is such that it may not
be available in time should the SM-3 Block II missile encounter
technical difficulties. Under the current schedule, which appears to be
slipping, the SM-3 Block IIA may be available for deployment in 2018,
while the IIB missile might be available no earlier than 2020. First
flight test (non-intercept) of the two-stage GBI is scheduled for
fiscal year 2010; first intercept is scheduled for end of fiscal year
2012; the next intercept test might occur in fiscal year 2016. What
will be the role of the two-stage GBI in the BMD arsenal?
General O'Reilly. DOD is investing in new missile defense capacity
and capabilities to hedge against future uncertainties in both the
ballistic missile threat and the technical risk inherent to our own
development plans. One such hedge effort is the development and testing
of a two-stage GBI. While there are no plans to field this interceptor
at this time, maintaining a two-stage GBI development and testing
program preserves national policy options to field missile defenses in
a timely and effective manner. Accordingly, we will be flight testing
the two-stage GBI for the first time in June.
A two-stage interceptor has less burn time than the three-stage
version, which allows it to operate within a shorter engagement
timeline. Deployment of two-stage GBIs at Fort Greely, Alaska would
provide additional time and additional opportunities to defend the
United States from threat missiles launched from locations such as
Iran. MDA has conducted studies to support two-stage GBI basing options
for both the United States and Europe. At this time, however, there is
currently no request from the combatant commanders to deploy a two-
stage GBI.

82. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, is the current development
and testing schedule adequate to preserve the two-stage GBI option?
General O'Reilly. Yes. The schedule for testing the two-stage GBI
is part of our overall IMTP objective to collect the data needed to
anchor our models and simulation. The two-stage GBI test dates are
driven by the types of engagements in which we need to test the GBI
kill vehicle. We will test the two-stage GBI for the first time in June
2010 to verify differences between the performance of two-stage and the
three-stage GBIs. After this test and the subsequent intercept events
we believe we will have characterized differences between the two and
will be able to evaluate the performance of a two-stage GBI using data
collected from three-stage testing.
This is possible because the two-stage GBI builds upon the success
of the three-stage GBI and has many of the same components, except the
third stage is removed. The two-stage reuses existing flight-qualified
components from its three-stage counterpart. Key common components are
the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, Booster Avionics Module (BAM)
electronics, stage 2/3 interstage, and 1st and 2nd stage motors. As
part of the three-stage development effort, these common components
have undergone ground, flight, and qualification testing. Changes from
the three-stage GBI are limited to the removal of the 3rd stage motor,
relocation of the BAM, and minor modifications to navigation and
guidance software for the two-stage flight.
The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill
vehicle itself and the kill vehicle for both the 2- and 3- stage
interceptors is identical.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
aegis bmd
83. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller, while I'm confident that
the Aegis/SM-3 system may succeed, I'm concerned about future policy-
related and programmatic challenges. What additional funding and assets
might DOD need to implement the PAA, particularly as it relates to
additional SM-3 interceptors and Aegis ships?
Secretary Miller. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
includes $2.7 billion for regional missile defense. This investment
will be used to convert additional Aegis ships to BMD-capable, adding 8
Aegis BMD ships between fiscal year 2010-2012 and a total of 292 SM-3
interceptors by fiscal year 2015, field additional THAAD batteries and
launchers for a total of 6 batteries and 281 Terminal High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors by fiscal year 2015, and to field
additional AN/TPY-2 radars for a total of 14 by fiscal year 2015.
Continued investments in regional missile defense will be necessary
to meet these production goals, and to field the necessary capabilities
to protect deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners from regional
ballistic missile threats.

84. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller, with regards to the
proposed Aegis-Ashore BMD site in Romania that was announced in
February, have there been any offers of assistance from NATO or our
other European friends in the form of financial support for this
effort?
Secretary Miller. The land-based SM-3 site in Romania will be
deployed based on a bilateral agreement. Our NATO Allies are not
directly involved in funding that or other elements of the European
PAA. The United States will fund the European PAA, and the European PAA
will represent the U.S. contribution to NATO's missile defense efforts.
Regarding NATO and Allied efforts, NATO is also developing a
command and control network called the ALTBMD program that will allow
Allies to link their missile defense assets together, creating a more
efficient architecture. In addition, NATO countries already possess or
are acquiring national missile defense capabilities. Several countries
have Patriot systems (Netherlands, Germany, Greece). Italy, Germany,
and the United States are cooperatively developing the MEADS. Others
have expressed interest in acquiring systems like Patriot and SM-3.
ALTBMD could allow current and future NATO systems--including those of
the United States--to be able to ``plug-and-play'' with the overall
NATO effort and the Europan PAA assets.
Currently NATO is funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide
command and control for defense of deployed forces only, rather than
territorial missile defense. The United States strongly supports
continued funding for ALTBMD and its expansion because it will allow
Allies' missile defense systems to be interoperable and more efficient.

85. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller, will the Aegis-Ashore
system in Romania be able to defend against Iran's Shahab-3 missile?
Secretary Miller. Yes. The SM-3 interceptors and planned follow-on
versions are designed to intercept MRBMs, including the Shahab-3.

86. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller and General O'Reilly, DOD's
BMDR discusses the expansion of countermeasures other nations are using
to confuse and overwhelm BMDs. What can you tell me about how the U.S.
BMD program is or is not responsive to these developments in
countermeasures?
Secretary Miller. We see an increased desire on the part of
potential adversaries to increase the numbers of ballistic missile
systems and their operational performance. Some states aim to defeat
missile defenses through operational countermeasures, such as large
raid sizes and salvo launches, and technical countermeasures to enable
penetration of missile defenses. The MDA has completed several external
``red team'' studies to provide insight into the possible future
changes of the threat in these areas.
Significant technical countermeasures are not expected to be
deployed by potential adversaries within the near to midterm. However,
adversary countermeasure capabilities may mature and deploy more
rapidly than predicted. Ballistic missile defense capabilities and
development must be agile so as to adjust to unexpected evolutions of
the threat.
MDA's budget includes a portfolio of investments in capabilities to
hedge against the possibility of more rapid than projected developments
of the threat, including the use of countermeasures. These hedge
capabilities include improvements in sensors to support our ability to
intercept missiles before they can completely deploy countermeasures
and to counter larger raid sizes. The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB system,
available in the midterm, will have improved on-board discrimination
and greater area coverage. The PAA provides an inherent hedge against
threat uncertainties by deploying scalable, relocatable missile
defenses. Moveable assets enable more rapid increases in capability
against larger threat sizes. Scalable systems allow flexible
integration of new technologies into the existing architecture to deal
with uncertainty in the performance of threat systems. These approaches
provide the United States with flexible responses to new threats and
capabilities as they materialize.
General O'Reilly. We see an increased desire on the part of threat
states to increase the numbers of ballistic missile systems and their
operational performance. Some states aim to defeat missile defenses
through operational countermeasures, such as large raids and salvo
launches, and technical countermeasures to enable penetration of
missile defenses. MDA has completed several external red team studies
to provide insight into the possible future changes of the threat in
these areas.
Capabilities in the area of technical countermeasures are not
expected to be deployed by adversaries of concern within the near to
midterm. However, adversary countermeasure capabilities may mature and
deploy more rapidly than predicted. Ballistic Missile Defense
capabilities and development must be agile so as to adjust to
unexpected evolutions of the threat.
MDA's budget includes a portfolio of investments in capabilities to
hedge against the possibility of more rapid than projected qualitative
developments of the threat, including their use of countermeasures.
These hedge capabilities include improvements in sensors to support our
ability to intercept threat missiles before they can completely deploy
countermeasures and to counter larger raid sizes. The Aegis BMD SM-3
Block IB system, available in the midterm, will have improved on-board
discrimination and greater area coverage. Research into the utility of
directed energy systems for missile defenses is being funded by MDA.
The PAA provides an inherent hedge against threat uncertainties by
deploying scalable, relocatable missile defenses. Moveable assets
enable more rapid increases in capability against larger threat sizes.
Scalable systems allow flexible integration of new technologies into
the existing architecture to deal with uncertainty in the performance
of threat systems. These approaches provide the United States with
flexible responses to new threats and capabilities as they materialize.

87. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, I have some general concerns
about the ability of the Navy to accommodate what appears to be a
significant amount of growth over the next few years in the realm of
missile defense. Given the multi-mission role of our Aegis-equipped
ships, are you confident that the Navy can both refit their cruiser-
destroyer force with Aegis technology while simultaneously meeting the
maritime demands of our regional combatant commanders, all the while
operating with a total of 88 cruisers and destroyers?
Admiral Macy. The anticipated force requirements, as informed by
the decision on the PAA, were taken into consideration in the Navy's
scheduling decisions on Aegis BMD refits. The GFM process is completely
capable of managing our available forces to balance combatant commander
requirements and U.S. commitments.

88. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, as far as equipment and
technology, what modifications are required for the sea-based Aegis
system to be converted to the land-based Aegis Ashore system?
Admiral Macy. With regard to the Aegis weapons system itself,
little to no changes are required to convert it to Aegis Ashore.
Certain mechanical, electrical, and structural modifications will be
required to house the weapons system in the shore based structures.
These details will be worked out during MDA's system development
efforts.

89. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, do you foresee any challenges
to meeting the fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 2018 timeline?
Admiral Macy. While any technology development effort entails a
certain amount of risk, I foresee no significant challenges to meeting
the fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 2018 timeline. The challenges normally
found in a new program are being mitigated through the use of the same
Aegis BMD configuration and functionality found on Aegis BMD ships, as
well as the existing Navy infrastructure to meet training and personnel
requirements.

90. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Macy, considering that a significant
amount of the Navy's resources will be dedicated to refitting its ships
with Aegis BMD capabilities, how will we train, man, and equip the two
planned Aegis Ashore sites (Romania and Poland) in this timeframe?
Admiral Macy. Many of the manning requirements for the Aegis Ashore
sites in Romania and Poland will be determined as we negotiate the
basing agreements with the host-nations, including manning for site
security, support facilities, etc. With respect to the manning required
specifically to operate the weapons system, it will be significantly
less than that of a ship. This is estimated to be 1/4 to 1/3 or less of
an equivalent ship's complement. As part of the duties of lead service,
the Navy will assess the manning requirements for these systems and
incorporate them into the Navy's overall manning plan. The training
requirements for Aegis Ashore will be common to that for Aegis
operators afloat, as will the majority of the system parts support.
Parts support for Aegis Ashore specific components will be addressed
during system development, but will leverage existing Navy logistics
and logistics infrastructures.

91. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Miller and General O'Reilly,
regarding the issue of testing, the administration's policy emphasizes
the need for operationally relevant testing and a fly-before-you-buy
approach to BMD development and fielding. In my view, BMD testing is
qualitatively different from testing for other types of weapon systems.
If 99 percent of the time an airplane took off it was able to land
successfully, but 1 percent of the time it crashed, that would be
unacceptable and we would never tolerate it. However, if 99 percent of
the time we launched a ballistic missile interceptor it hit its target,
but 1 percent of the time it missed, in my view that is a great track
record and is infinitely better than having no missile defense system
at all. I am in favor of operationally realistic testing and flying
before we buy, but I do not think we should demand the same level of
reliability as we do for other systems. We need effective systems, but
we shouldn't require perfect systems. What are your comments on this
issue?
Secretary Miller. We agree that it is important to balance
reliability against availability regarding our missile defense systems.
A key tenet of the BMDR is to test sufficiently the capabilities
and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin
procurement. Missile defense systems are subject to production
decisions by USD(AT&L). Additionally, we use the military departments'
standard material release and operational certification processes that
also rely on developmental and operational test data prior to formally
fielding, initial capability.
A related effort is the execution of the IMTP. In collaboration
with the military departments Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM, and
the DOT&E, the MDA submitted a comprehensive IMTP in March 2010 that
describes the test program through fiscal year 2015 to conduct more
than 150 test events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our
models and simulations and support operational assessments.
General O'Reilly. MDA is enforcing rigorous developmental testing
to mitigate risk prior to operational assessments, consistent with the
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 which directs enhanced focus on solid
developmental testing. There is a clear benefit of early operational
input to the development of missile defense systems. However, premature
entry into operational development and testing (i.e., before the design
and configuration has been stabilized and basic technical concepts have
been validated) risks expensive repetition of non-recurring engineering
and operational development.
A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities
and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin
procurement, or ``fly before we buy.'' As such, missile defense
projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L).
Additionally, we use the Services' standard material release and
operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and
operational test data prior to formally fielding initial capability.
Another critical Department effort is the execution of the IMTP. In
collaboration with the Services' Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM,
and the DOT&E, MDA submitted a comprehensive IMTP in March that
describes our plan through fiscal year 2015 to conduct over 150 test
events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our models and
simulations and support operational assessments.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
russian and chinese support for iran
92. Senator Thune. Secretary Miller, in 2007, the Director of
National Intelligence assessed that ``individual Russian entities
continue to provide assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs. We
judge that Russian-entity assistance, along with assistance from
entities in China and North Korea, has helped Iran move toward self-
sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. The Russian
Government has taken steps to improve controls on ballistic-missile
technology, and its record of enforcement--though still mixed--has
improved over the last decade.'' What level of assistance do you see
from Russia today, in helping Iran develop its ballistic missile
capabilities or capacities?
Secretary Miller. Moscow is not providing state-to-state assistance
to Tehran to further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle
research and development efforts. However, Russia's advanced ballistic
missile production infrastructure has technologies that could further
current and future Iranian goals. Russian-based Iranian defense
officials and intermediaries have access to Russian academics,
companies, and research organizations, and some of these individuals
and entities likely assist Iran with technologies that could assist in
its ballistic missile programs. Iran is likely attempting to obtain
Russian expertise in missile guidance systems to improve accuracy,
composite structural materials to save weight and increase range, in
high temperature materials for reentry vehicles, and possibly in more
energetic propellants.

93. Senator Thune. Secretary Miller, a Thursday, April 15, 2010,
Washington Times newspaper article reported that CIA's Weapons
Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center this year linked
Chinese companies to missile programs in Iran. Do your missile defense
plans take into account longstanding and possibly present day
cooperation and support by Russia and China for Iran's ballistic
missile program?
Secretary Miller. Beijing is not providing state-to-state
assistance to Tehran to further its ballistic missile and space launch
vehicle research and development efforts, but Chinese individuals and
entities provide Iran with controlled and dual-use technologies needed
to advance in these areas. China-based Iranian defense officials and
intermediaries have access to Chinese academics, companies, and
research organizations, some of which continue to provide support
despite being sanctioned. Iran is receiving materiel and technological
assistance with missile guidance systems, raw materials, production
machinery, and propellants.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
long-range threats
94. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General
O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy, do you think that an additional missile
field on the U.S. east coast would provide more protection from long-
range threats to address a coverage gap?
Secretary Miller. [Deleted.]
Dr. Gilmore. The additional area of defense provided by a missile
field on the East Coast of the United States would depend upon the
types of interceptors emplaced, as well as the radars and other sensors
available. Whether such a field is needed is a question that should be
answered by those in the Department responsible for determining
military requirements.
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
Admiral Macy. An additional missile field on the U.S. east coast
would provide some redundant coverage against long-range threats, but
would provide no additional coverage. The west coast missile fields
already provide coverage for 100 percent of the Homeland.

95. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General
O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy, do you think such a site would be
beneficial to further hedge against long-range threats?
Secretary Miller. Given continuing improvements in the GMD system
and the number of GBIs currently deployed, the United States possesses
a capacity to counter the projected threats of North Korea and Iran.
Therefore, based on current threat projections, deployment of
interceptors at an east coast site is not warranted.
Dr. Gilmore. The additional area of defense provided by a missile
field on the east coast of the United States would depend upon the
types of interceptors emplaced, as well as the radars and other sensors
available. Whether such a field is needed is a question that should be
answered by those in the Department responsible for determining
military requirements.
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
Admiral Macy. In the current budget climate, the redundancy
afforded by a U.S. east coast missile field would provide less
additional capability than would be lost as a result of the budget
restructuring required to establish the new field.

96. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General
O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy, how quickly could the United States have an
operational east coast missile field?
Secretary Miller. Establishing a fully operational east coast
missile field would require a minimum of 5 years from receiving funding
and authority to proceed. This estimate factors in considerations such
as site selection, environmental survey/approval, site clearing and
construction, and equipment production.
Dr. Gilmore. I believe the answer to this question is best left to
the MDA and the operational user. If a decision is made to deploy a
missile field to the U.S. East Coast, I will ensure that appropriate
operational testing is accomplished in a timely fashion.
General O'Reilly. From authority to proceed and assuming funding is
provided, fielding of a fully operational East Coast Missile Field (MF)
would require a minimum 5 years of construction and check out plus a
year for operational integration based on the following assumptions:

(1) Located on a military base and within a single contiguous area
similar to the GMD Missile Defense Complex (MDC) located at Fort
Greely, AK.
(2) Consisting of a 10-Silo configuration
(3) Support facilities and equipment would include:

a. Controlled entry point/force protection, security boundary/
fencing, roads, local power and associated facilities support structure
b. Missile Field - Mechanical Electrical Building (MEB)
c. Command Launch Equipment/Readiness and Control Building
d. Two In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data
Terminals
e. Missile Assembly Building (MAB)
f. Satellite Communications
g. Self Sustaining Power Source

(4) Approximately 2 years required for site selection,
preconstruction and design, approval and environmental survey/approval.
(5) Minimum of 3 years required for construction (initial site
clearing to facilities with system equipment installed).
(6) Minimum of 1 year for establishing initial operations and
deployment, training, exercises, and verification of integration into
GMD operational baseline.

The time required to field a fully operational east coast MF could
increase if the requirements for the site and capability exceeded these
basic assumptions.
Admiral Macy. Establishing a fully operational east coast missile
field would require a minimum of 5 years from receiving funding and
authority to proceed. This estimate factors in considerations such as
site selection, environmental survey/approval, site clearing and
construction, and equipment production.

missile defense and new start
97. Senator Vitter. Secretary Miller, there seems to be conflicting
reports and conflicting interpretation on limitations on missile
defense in the START follow-on agreement. I find this troubling because
it seems that Russia is adamant that this concession was provided in
the negotiations, despite promises from the administration that such a
concession would not be made. Was any promise made by the United States
to Russia regarding missile defense during the negotiations or in the
treaty?
Secretary Miller. No ``promise'' to or ``side deal'' with Russia
has been made regarding missile defenses. The legally-binding documents
connected to the New START treaty represent the only U.S. obligations.
Specifically, Article V, section 3 of the treaty prohibits the
conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers and
vice versa; that is, the conversion of missile defense launchers to
launch ICBMs or SLBMs. This section also ``grandfathers'' the five
former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB that were converted for the
placement of GBIs within them over the past several years. If more
interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less
expensive to build a new field of GBI silos, which is not prohibited by
the treaty, than to convert additional ICBM test launchers. Regarding
SLBM launchers, the MDA examined the concept of launching missile
defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and
unreasonably expensive option.
The Preamble of the Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the
interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms
and recognizing that this relationship will become more important as
strategic offensive arms are reduced. This statement also notes that
current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the
effectiveness of either Parties' strategic offensive arms. The Preamble
does not limit the United States.
Both the United States and the Russian Federation made unilateral
statements concerning ballistic missile defense just prior to signing
the New START treaty.
Russia asserted in its unilateral statement that any build-up in
U.S. missile defenses that would ``give rise to a threat to the
strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation'' would
justify Russia's withdrawal from the treaty. This statement is not
legally binding and does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs.
In fact, both sides have the right to withdraw from the treaty under
Article XIV, if they deem it necessary due to a threat to their supreme
national interests. Such withdrawal clauses are common to treaties,
especially in the case of arms control agreements.
The United States also issued a unilateral statement concerning
missile defense in connection with the New START treaty, stating that
``the United States intends to continue improving and deploying its
missile defense systems in order to defend against limited attack and
as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key
regions.'' The statement takes note of Russia's views expressed in its
unilateral statement and makes clear that U.S. missile defenses ``are
not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia,'' but instead
are intended to defend the United States against limited missile
launches and to protect U.S. deployed forces, our allies and partners
from regional threats.
As the U.S. unilateral statement, the BMDR, and our budgetary plans
all make clear, the United States will continue to improve our missile
defenses as needed to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces,
and our allies and partners. Nothing in the New START treaty, or in any
other statements, limits our ability to do this.

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011

----------

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Bill
Nelson, Hagan, Coons, McCain, Sessions, LeMieux, Brown, and
Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative
counsel; and Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Brian F.
Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Neal Higgins, assistant to Senator
Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to
Senator Manchin; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh,
assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Scott Schrage, assistant to
Senator Brown.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. I want to
welcome our witnesses today: from the Navy, Secretary Mabus,
Secretary Stackley, Admiral Roughead, and Rear Admiral
Pandolfe; from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Paul
Francis; from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Dr. Eric
Labs; and from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Ron
O'Rourke.
The Navy continues to be faced with a number of critical
issues as it tries to balance its modernization needs and
procurement needs against the costs of current operations. The
shipbuilding budget remains at a level where it will be
difficult at best to field the Navy that we must have.
Therefore, we need to be looking for ways to make the
shipbuilding program more affordable.
The original Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition plan
would have had the Navy buying both types of LCS vehicles for
some time while the Navy evaluated the capabilities of each
vessel. At some time in the future, the Navy would have had the
option to down-select to building one type of vessel, but in
any case the Navy would have been operating some number of each
type of LCS vessels in the fleet, which means that the Navy
would have been dealing with two shipyards, two supply chains,
two training pipelines, et cetera.
Last year, the Navy decided upon a winner-take-all
acquisition strategy to procure the fiscal year 2010 vessels
under a fixed-price contract, with fixed-price options for two
ships per year for the next 4 years. This revised strategy
included obtaining the data rights for the winning ship design
and competing for a second source for the winning design among
other shipyards, starting in fiscal year 2012. The Navy did
this after determining that the original acquisition strategy,
an approach of buying at least one ship from each shipyard in
fiscal year 2010 under a noncompetitive solicitation, was
unaffordable. Earlier this year, the Navy released the
solicitation under the revised strategy and has been in
discussions with the two contractor teams and evaluating those
proposals since that time.
The Navy has decided, upon reviewing the bids from the two
contractor teams, to modify its strategy for the following
reasons: First, both teams have made offers that are much more
attractive than had been expected and both are priced well
below the original noncompetitive offers; and second,
continuing the winner-take-all down-select would save roughly
$1.9 billion compared with what had been budgeted for the LCS
program in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
But the Navy has also determined that accepting the offers
from both LCS contractor teams, rather than down-selecting to
one design and starting a second source building the winning
design, would save $2.9 billion, or $1 billion more than the
program of record, and would allow the Navy to purchase an
additional LCS vessel during this same period of the FYDP, 20
ships rather than 19 ships.
The Navy has also determined that, using net present value
calculations, additional operation and support costs for
maintaining two separate designs in the fleet for their service
life over 40 to 50 years would be much less than the additional
savings that could be achieved through buying both the ships
during the FYDP period.
The Navy first conveyed to Congress its interest in
modifying the LCS acquisition strategy in early November and
said that they needed to act before the bid prices were set to
expire on December 14, 2010. Since then, the Navy has requested
and the contractors have agreed that the LCS teams extend these
bid prices until the end of this month.
I understand that the Navy has been briefing members and
staffs in the Senate and House of Representatives since
announcing its revised plan.
From a broad policy perspective, I believe the Navy
approach of a competitive dual-source alternative could help
ensure maximum competition throughout the life cycle of the
program, meeting the spirit and intent of the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. Specifically, it calls
for two shipbuilders in continuous competition to build the
ships for the life of the program. The Navy plans to build a
total of 55 of these ships, so that competition would be going
on for a number of years.
The Navy has been prevented from sharing specific bid
information that would violate the competitive source selection
process by revealing proprietary information about the two
contractors' bids. This has led some to ask whether these bids
can be independently verified. We should hear in detail from
the Navy witnesses today about that issue and also why they
believe that these bids are realistic bids.
In that regard, I take some comfort from knowing that these
bids are for fixed-price contracts and not for cost-type
contracts, where a contractor has little to lose from
underbidding a contract.
As far as the capability of the two vessels, we will hear
from Admiral Roughead today on whether each of the two vessels
would meet the Navy's requirements for the LCS program and why
he favors the modified approach.
Reports by CRS and other individuals have raised a number
of questions about the strategy change. This hearing, that was
called at the request of Senator McCain, by the way, will give
us an opportunity to get answers about the Navy's proposal.
The CBO analysis also estimates that continuing competition
between the two teams, as envisioned by the revised Navy
strategy, would cost more than going ahead with the winner-
take-all option. CBO, however, was unable to factor into their
analysis the actual fixed-price bid data to which the
contractors are willing to agree, because of the information-
sharing constraints surrounding an ongoing competition.
The GAO has raised concerns about potential cost growth
from design changes, additional operation and support costs,
and mission package development. We will need to hear from the
Navy witnesses whether design changes are a significant threat
to realizing the price reductions and why the Navy has
confidence in its estimate that the operating and support cost
increases are far less than the expected acquisition savings.
As far as the progress in development of the mission
packages is concerned, I believe the Navy's fundamental
architecture of the LCS program divorces changes in the mission
package from changes that perturb the ship design and ship
construction. In the past when there were problems with
developing the right combat capability on a ship, this almost
inevitably caused problems in the construction program. In the
case of the LCS, I understand that the combat capability
largely resides in the mission packages that connect to either
LCS vessel through defined interfaces. Now, what that means, I
believe, is that changes inside the mission packages should not
translate into changes during the ship construction schedule,
that they're interchangeable, and whatever is happening in the
mission package development program would apparently apply
equally to either the down-select strategy or the dual-source
strategy. We'll need to hear from Navy witnesses today to
describe that relationship in greater detail.
In terms of the proposal's effects on the industrial base
and therefore on the future of competition, I would think that
there would be a net positive. The Navy would have the
opportunity to compete throughout the life of the program and
any erosion in contractor performance could be corrected by
competitive pressures. For the industrial base, there would be
more stability in the shipbuilding program, and a number of
Navy witnesses have previously testified that one of the
important things that we could do for the Navy is to help the
shipbuilders achieve stability in our shipbuilding programs.
To me, the Navy's proposal seems to promote that goal while
effectively continuing competition throughout the program and
at the same time reducing acquisition costs and buying an
additional ship over the FYDP.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you for holding this hearing. This is a very important issue
that is upon us in the final days of a lame duck session.
I want to thank GAO, CRS, and CBO for raising important
questions that should have answers before I believe we should
consider approving this proposal.
Mr. Chairman, we can't consider this LCS in a vacuum. The
story of this ship is one that makes me ashamed and embarrassed
as a former Navy person and as a person who's responsible to
the taxpayers of my State. I'd like to just review with you a
little background and one of the reasons why I remain
incredibly skeptical about this latest rush proposal that we
have to approve in a lame duck session.
The background is that in November 2001, the LCS program
was started. In 2004, the Navy awarded contracts to two teams
led by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. The initial
contract price was $188 million per ship.
In the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
Congress set a cost cap of $220 million per ship. In the 2008
NDAA, Congress increased the cost cap to $460 million per ship.
In the 2009 NDAA, Congress amended the cost cap again by
deferring its implementation by 2 years, as the Navy requested.
In the 2010 NDAA, Congress increased the cost cap to $480
million per ship.
In 2007, the LCS unit procurement cost tripled to over $700
million. Later, outside the congressional budget review
process, the Navy proposed to substantially restructure the LCS
program. So 6 years later, after expenditure of roughly $8
billion, the Navy decided to restructure the program.
Then, of course, we went through the strategy of the down-
select and the competition of 10 LCSs, that one contractor
would build 10 LCSs over a 5-year period, and the Navy decided
to make a down-select decision and award the contract to build
the 10 LCSs some time this summer. It delayed its decision
twice. The award decision would not be made in December 2010.
Then in November they came up with a great idea.
I'd remind the witnesses and the taxpayers, the cost of the
LCS from 2005 to 2010 has been $8 billion of the taxpayers'
dollars. What do we have to show for it? The first LCS was
funded in 2005 and it was commissioned in November 2008 at a
cost of $637 million. The second LCS, funded in 2006, was
commissioned in January 2010 at a cost of $704 million.
Then numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 funded and cancelled by the
Navy; the third one, funded in 2006, cancelled in 2007; the
fourth one, funded in 2006, canceled in 2007. The list goes on.
Then we get to the eighth LCS, funded in 2009, christened
in 2010, and now is about 80 percent complete. The ninth LCS,
funded in 2009, is under construction and is about 40 percent
complete.
So we've spent $8 billion. We have two ships commissioned,
another one 80 percent complete and the other 40 percent
complete. If my figures are wrong, which we got from the Navy,
I will be glad to stand corrected.
So here we are now with a brand-new idea as to how we
should apportion the funding for the LCSs. Somehow,
miraculously, a month or so ago the two shipbuilders came in
with very low estimates. Now, we are told by the Navy those are
very low estimates, but we don't know what those numbers are
because it's proprietary information.
I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have never in the 20-
some years that I've been a member of this committee approved
of a program that I don't know what the cost is. At least I owe
it to the taxpayers of Arizona to know what the cost is. But
with a record like this of $8 billion for four ships and an
estimated cost of about $11 billion from 2010 to 2015, I'm
supposed to say: Hey, this is a good deal.
GAO has said they have concerns that decisionmakers need
more information, cost savings are uncertain, future
performance is an open question, the Navy's assessment of
design stability may be too optimistic, and the proposal is
fundamentally inconsistent with an important GAO
recommendation.
CRS's concerns are: How the proposal was presented raises
issues; potential relative costs and risks of the two
strategies is unclear; the proposal could hinder competition;
the industrial base implications are uncertain; how the mission
packages would be procured is unclear; and CBO's concerns about
costs and savings remain unclear, certainly, and the cost of
operating and maintaining the LCS are probably more than the
Navy's estimate.
The Navy may have overstated the costs of the current plan,
and using two different combat systems for each LCS version may
drive costs up. If you build two different ships, then you have
two different supply lines, you have two different training
regimens for the crew, and you have, obviously, dramatically
increased costs, plus a problem with cross-training and safety
concerns.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that the two very generous
offers have now been extended to December 30. I see no reason
why those offers could not be extended to January or February
or March, so that this committee could at least address the
concerns that GAO, CBO, and CRS have raised. They're important
questions.
When you look at the history of this ship, and now we're
supposed to buy an additional 15 ships based on costs we
haven't been told, with the incredible and disgraceful waste of
the taxpayers' money that has characterized this whole program,
Mr. Chairman, I have greater responsibilities to the taxpayers
of my State.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator McCain.
Let me start with Secretary Mabus.

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of this committee: Thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you to discuss the LCS program. Following my
comments, Admiral Roughead will have a short opening statement.
Our Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, Sean Stackley, is also here and is prepared, with
your permission, to briefly offer some more specifics on the
numbers involved in this proposal.
The LCS brings critically needed capabilities and numbers
to our Nation's fleet which are necessary to give the Navy the
force structure to meet the missions we've been given. For the
future strength of our Navy, it's vitally important that we
succeed in delivering this 55-ship class affordably,
effectively, and quickly, while at the same time exercising
sound judgment and solid oversight.
As Secretary, I take this process extraordinarily seriously
and I would not have made this recommendation if I did not
firmly believe that giving us the authority to move forward
with a dual award of 10 ships to each of 2 shipbuilders, as we
are requesting, is in the best interests of the taxpayers, our
Navy, and our Nation.
This authority, which I emphasize requires no additional
funding, will enable us to purchase more high-quality ships for
less money and get them into service in less time. It will help
preserve jobs in our industrial shipbuilding base and will
create new employment opportunities in an economic sector that
is critical to our Nation's military and economic security.
We recognize that this proposal comes outside the normal
budget process. However, a key focus of this Department for the
last 2 years has been to build as many ships for the Navy as
possible, as affordably as we can. As a result, I believe it
was my duty to present Congress with this opportunity.
The timing of this request is the result of a very thorough
analysis. Once we received the bids, we conducted two rounds of
discussion with industry to assure ourselves that the bids were
realistic and sustainable. That examination demonstrated that
we achieved our goal, one we share with this committee, of
driving down the cost of these ships.
We next needed to examine the proposal from the standpoint
of naval operations, which was done by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and the Navy staff. As the CNO will explain in
a moment, they concluded that a dual award created important
operational flexibility. Finally, we met with Pentagon
leadership for their review and concurrence with this proposal.
This process took some time, but I believe it was critical
to ensuring that we were making an operationally sound and
fiscally responsible proposal that meets congressional
guidelines, as well as the intent and the spirit of the WSARA
of 2009.
As you're aware, both the lead LCSs fully meet performance
requirements. Both the lead ships of each variant are currently
in service and already performing well, while also conducting a
comprehensive test and evaluation program. LCS-1, the Freedom,
demonstrated some of the things we can expect during her maiden
deployment earlier this year, a deployment done 2 years ahead
of schedule. In less than 3 weeks of counternarcotics operation
in the Caribbean, she made three major drug seizures and
recovered more than three tons of cocaine. It was because of
her capabilities that she was able to run down fast drug boats
that otherwise would have escaped.
I recognize that this program has historically had
problems. The program's early shortfalls and initially
unrealistic cost expectations, stretching back nearly a decade,
have been pointed out by members of this committee and
oversight organizations. It was precisely because of this poor
performance record that last year, with the concurrence of
Congress, we made very significant changes to our LCS
procurement strategy. The message from this committee and
Congress was unmistakably clear: The Navy needs more ships, but
they have to be more affordable. We heard that message and
established and enforced a strict policy to limit design
changes and their debilitating impact on cost and schedule. We
worked with industry to ensure the lessons learned building the
lead ships were put in place for efficient construction of
successive ships. We put a talented, highly capable team in
charge of this process.
In 2009, when bids for follow-on ships of both variants
came in unacceptably high, we made the two industry teams
compete against each other to get costs down. In this, we
structured a highly competitive, fixed-price procurement
strategy to award 10 ships of a single design over 5 years to a
single builder, with an additional 5 ships to be built by a
second builder after another round of competition, with the
Navy owning the technical data package for construction of all
ships.
In response to this down-select, industry competitors
restructured their respective teaming agreements to eliminate
excess overhead and unnecessary costs. They leveraged the 10-
ship plan to drive down material costs with their vendors and
they used the long-term nature of the contract to plan facility
improvements to further reduce labor costs.
These bids and the cost reductions we have seen
demonstrated on LCS-3 and -4 will save the taxpayer
approximately $1.9 billion in fiscal years 2011 through 2016.
More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically
reduced presented an opportunity to save an additional $1
billion, for a total of $2.9 billion, through a dual award of a
10-ship contract to each bidder.
Each of the variants included in the two contracts will
fall significantly below the cost cap established by Congress
in 2010. If our request is approved, it would also enable
purchase of an additional ship through the realized savings. In
short, we'll get 20 ships for the price of 19.
It's important to note that these will be block buys and
not multi-year contracts. We will not be contractually required
to buy any ships after the first year and there are no
termination or cancellation costs. Therefore, both Congress and
the Navy will have continuing supervision and the ability to
ensure this program stays on track.
Senator Levin, Senator McCain, members of this committee:
You have worked for years on behalf of our service men and
women to provide them with what they need to protect our
Nation, while also ensuring proper oversight to protect the
interests of taxpayers. The LCS proposal you have before you is
the fruit of those efforts. It delivers better value to the
taxpayer and greater capability to our fleet.
I believe we have arrived at an opportunity to realize
significant real savings within our shipbuilding program, and
we have done so by following congressional guidance. This is
good for the Navy, good for the taxpayers, good for industry,
good for workers, and good for our Nation.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Mabus.
Now, I believe you wished our CNO, Admiral Roughead, to
follow? Okay, Admiral Roughead.

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
McCain, distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the LCS
and the dual-award proposal that I believe is good for the
Navy, for our critical shipbuilding base, and for the taxpayer.
The LCS will bring new and needed capabilities to our fleet. It
fills critical current and future warfighting needs in anti-
submarine warfare, mine warfare, and surface warfare, close to
shore, in areas of strategic interest, areas where we need
shallow draft, speed, onboard capacity, and the flexibility to
reconfigure our ships to optimize those missions. These same
characteristics also allow the LCS to take part in blue water
operations. Having commanded the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, I
know the value of such a ship.
Accordingly, getting LCS into the fleet quickly,
affordably, and in sufficient numbers became one of my highest
priorities as CNO. The first step to get there, ironically and
as was mentioned by Senator McCain, was to cancel LCSs we had
planned for in 2007 because of unacceptable costs. What
followed was extraordinary cooperation among my staff, the
acquisition community, and the fleet. With the support of
Congress, an acquisition strategy was developed and executed
with discipline that gave us the opportunity to acquire LCSs at
great savings.
We have taken firm control of the program. Requirements
have been controlled and we have held the line on changes to
LCSs under construction today. I deployed the LCS earlier than
any other ship class to assure we were on the right path
operationally. It is clear to me that we are.
The dual award will bring important stability to the
industrial base and is a major step in getting to the floor of
313 ships in our fleet. It enables more rapid production by
involving two shipyards with two designs that fulfill LCS
mission requirements and that have complementary features. It
allows us to take advantage of the solid progress and
infrastructure investments made by both builders. It will
sustain competition.
The dual award also allows us to reduce costs by further
locking in a price for 20 ships, enabling us to acquire the LCS
at significant savings to American taxpayers and permitting the
use of shipbuilding funds for other shipbuilding programs.
What we have proposed is outside the normal process, but it
is an opportunity that, when it became apparent, was one that
was to be seized. While it locks the price in, it does not lock
out control by Navy or Congress, as it is not a multi-year
procurement. Our ship construction budget, of which these ships
are a part, will be authorized annually.
These are good ships. The LCS concept is a sound systems
approach and we have brought the program under control.
I respectfully request your support of the Navy's LCS dual-
award proposal. It is good for the Navy, for the Nation's
industrial base, and for our taxpayers. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Secretary Stackley, you will be next, and then we'll call
on Admiral Pandolfe if he has testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION

Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Senator Levin, Senator McCain,
members of the committee: I'd like to provide amplifying
information regarding cost numbers to better inform the
committee members where we are today and why we believe that
the numbers that we're looking at inside the bids are both
credible and are very affordable.
To provide baseline information, as Senator McCain pointed
out, the lead ships' construction costs to the taxpayer, the
Navy, and the government are between $600 million and $700
million each. Those numbers reflect the shipbuilders' costs as
well as government-furnished equipment and any changes that
were brought to bear on those ships. We will refer to that as
the baseline cost when we talk about cost cap information.
The follow ships, which are currently under construction at
both Marinette and Austal, were negotiated ships inside of
fixed-price contracts. Those are negotiated at target prices of
about $500 million each, which includes the shipbuilder's cost
plus government-furnished equipment. Now, we also have budgeted
above those targets change orders at 5 percent, as well as a
share line that runs to a ceiling on the contract. So inside of
the fixed-price construct, we're sitting at targets for ship
construction of about $500 million, with a range that could go
as high as about $585 million for those ships if they don't
perform in accordance with the contract.
Today, LCS-3, which launched at Marinette at about 81
percent complete, is on schedule and on budget. So she is
hitting her numbers in accordance with the target on the
contract.
When we look at change order activity, which crippled the
lead ships, the change order activity on LCS-3 is below 3
percent. So at 80 percent complete, change orders are
performing at below 3 percent, which is also well below the 5
percent budgeted. So we see construction and performance to a
contract that is demonstrating stability and capturing lessons
learned from the lead ship.
For LCS-4 at Austal, she is 9 to 12 months behind LCS-3 by
the natural progression of the contracts, she's about 42
percent complete and on track for her launch at about 80
percent complete. While it's still early in that ship's overall
construction, she is performing in accordance with her target.
Also, change orders on that ship are minimal, less than 1
percent thus far. So we're seeing demonstrated performance on
the first follow ship, lessons learned and change order
activity throttled to the extent necessary to ensure these
ships hit their cost and schedule targets.
Now we move to the solicitation that was cancelled in the
summer of 2009. In 2009 we went out for bids for the 2010
ships. Proposals that came in were going in the wrong
direction. So where we saw progression from the first to the
second ship targets, we were seeing a reversal of that trend in
these proposals, which reflected to a great extent the
introduction of new shipyards inside the teaming agreements
held by industry, and also risk that they viewed since they
were very early on in construction of the follow ships at the
time and had not demonstrated the learning that we are in fact
seeing today.
We cancelled that solicitation, as you're well aware, and
went out with the down-select, the solicitation for 10 ships, 2
ships per year over a 5-year period. So inside of the fiscal
year 2010 through fiscal year 2015 period, where we have a
total of 19 LCSs programmed, 10 of those ships were to be down-
selected and the remaining ships were to be opened up for
competition for a second source, and then between the first and
second source they would be competed in 2015. So there's 19
ships in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, 10 bid in the down-
select.
At the same time, as Senator McCain pointed out, the cost
cap was established at $480 million, with an escalation
provided for the cost cap. So over those ships the cost cap is
averaged to about $538 million. So we have a cost cap of $538
million and then we get bids in hand. We evaluate the bids and,
while we can't provide specific details on individual bids or
individual ships to avoid violating the competition
sensitivity, I'm going to provide averages per the 20-ship bid
numbers.
For 20 ships from the 2 competitors, average, including the
shipbuilder's cost for construction plus the government 5
percent budget for change orders, plus a margin for potential
cost growth for unknowns or other performance considerations,
the Navy is holding in its budget of $440 million per ship--
that's inside of a fixed-price contract--bid numbers, our
government-furnished equipment, our budget for change orders,
plus a management reserve budget for any cost performance or
other issues that would impinge on the contract.
In the worst case, which we do not anticipate and have no
cause to believe, but within the fixed-price contract at
ceiling, plus government-furnished equipment, plus the budget
for change orders, the price to the government is on the order
of $460 million average over the 20 ships. So under all
circumstances, the pricing for these ships fall well below the
cost cap and well below the budgeted amount, which is how we
derive the savings that we've calculated.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Pandolfe.

STATEMENT OF RADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR, SURFACE
WARFARE DIVISION OPNAV N86

Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, very briefly, this program was
founded in validated requirements arising from growing threats
in the littorals from submarines, mines, and surface crafts,
that we have to counter. In response to our request, both
builders have produced highly capable ships that exemplify
speed and maneuverability and adaptability.
As mentioned, due to competition we now have favorable
pricing, which allows us, with your permission, sir, to move
forward with this program.
Senator, we need these ships and we ask for your support.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
I think, Dr. Labs, you're next on our list, so we'll start
with you.
Thank you all for being here, by the way. I think I
mentioned that at the beginning, but this is very short notice.
We very much appreciate your all being here.
Dr. Labs.

STATEMENT OF ERIC J. LABS, Ph.D., SENIOR ANALYST FOR NAVAL
FORCES AND WEAPONS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

Dr. Labs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
McCain, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity
to discuss the Navy's LCS program with you today.
Director Elmendorf sent a letter to Senator McCain on
Friday in response to his request that CBO conduct an
evaluation of the cost implications of the Navy's proposal to
change its LCS acquisition strategy. I ask that the full text
of the CBO's letter to Senator McCain be entered into the
record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The information referred to follows:]

Dr. Labs. CBO's analysis suggests the following five
conclusions: First, under either plan, costs for the first 19
ships are likely to be less than the amounts included in the
Navy's 2011 budget and FYDP;
Second, CBO's estimates show per-ship construction costs
that are about the same for the two plans, but those estimates
do not take into account the bids the Navy received;
Third, adopting the dual-award plan might yield savings in
construction costs, both from the possibility that the bids are
lower than they would be in a subsequent competition when the
economic environment could be different and from avoiding the
need for a new contract to develop the infrastructure and
expertise to build a new kind of ship;
Fourth, operating and maintaining two types of ships would
probably be more expensive than operating just one; and
Fifth, if the Navy later decides to use a common combat
system for all LCSs, the cost for developing, procuring, and
installing that system could be significant.
Let me first address the Navy's estimates. In the 2011
FYDP, the Navy proposed spending almost $12 billion in current
dollars to procure 19 LCSs under the down-select plan. The Navy
now estimates the cost for that plan to be $10.4 billion, or
about $1.5 billion less than its earlier estimate. Now, with
the 2 bids in hand, the Navy proposes to purchase 20 ships, 10
from each contractor, for about $9.8 billion through 2015, or
$600 million less than it currently estimates for the down-
select plan and $2.1 billion less than its 2011 FYDP.
The Navy briefed CBO on those estimates, but did not
provide the detailed contractor data or the Navy's detailed
analysis of those data. If the contractors' proposals for the
10-ship award are robust and do not change, the Navy's
estimates would be plausible. In fact, in today's dollars and
on a per-ton basis the cost of the LCSs under each strategy
align well with the historical costs of the Oliver Perry-class
frigate, the ship in the Navy's inventory that is most similar
to the LCS. But CBO has no independent data to verify the
Navy's savings estimate and total costs could grow by several
hundred million dollars if the shipbuilders experience
overruns.
In contrast, CBO's own estimates of costs are higher and
indicate little difference in the per-ship cost of the two
plans. But CBO's estimates do not incorporate any benefits of
competition that may have arisen as a result of the Navy's
existing down-select strategy. The Navy argues that benefits
would be locked in by the fixed-price plus incentive contracts.
CBO estimates that the down-select plan would cost the Navy
about $583 million per ship, compared with an estimated cost of
$591 million per ship under the dual-award plan. Given the
uncertainties that surround such estimate, that difference,
less than 2 percent, is not significant.
Overall, CBO's estimates of the costs for the down-select
and the dual-award strategies are higher than the Navy's by
$680 million and $2 billion, respectively. However, in light of
the contract bids, it is not clear that CBO's cost estimating
model is a better predictor of LCS costs through 2015 than the
Navy's estimates. Still, changes in design to address technical
problems, changes in the number of ships purchased, inflation,
or other escalation clauses could add to costs.
The Navy decision to buy both types of ships through 2015
would have cost implications after 2015, but whether those
costs will be higher or lower depends on at least three aspects
of the Navy's decision: First, which of the two ship designs
the Navy would have selected under its original down-select
plan; second, whether the Navy will buy one or both types of
ship after 2015; and third, whether the Navy decides to develop
a common combat system for both LCSs or keep the two separate
combat systems under the dual-award approach.
CBO cannot estimate those costs beyond 2015 because it does
not know what the Navy is likely to decide in those areas.
However, I would like to highlight the issue of the common
combat system for the LCS. If the Navy were to decide that it
wanted all LCSs to share the same system, it would be
considerably more expensive to backfit the 12 LCSs under the
dual-award strategy than the 2 orphan LCSs under the down-
select strategy.
The combat system of an LCS today costs about $70 million.
Thus, if future Navy leaders decided that a common combat
system were desirable, developing, purchasing, and installing
new combat systems in 12 LCSs would cost more than the savings
that the Navy is asserting that the dual award offers over the
next 5 years.
Thank you and I'm happy to answer any questions you might
have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Labs.
Mr. O'Rourke.

STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. With your permission, I'd like to submit my
written statement for the record and summarize it here briefly.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. They will all be made part of
the record.
Mr. O'Rourke. The Navy's proposed dual-award strategy is
the third time in the history of the LCS program that the Navy
has presented Congress with an important choice about the
future of the LCS program late in the congressional budget
review cycle, after Congress has completed its spring budget
review hearings and some of its committee markups. The first
instance was in mid-2002 when the Navy submitted an amended
request to Congress for fiscal year 2003 funding to get the LCS
program started using a rapid acquisition strategy. The second
instance was in September 2009 when the Navy announced its
proposed down-select strategy.
The timing of the Navy's new proposal for using a dual-
award strategy provides relatively little time for Congress to
collect cost or other information from the Navy, to solicit
cost and other information from independent sources such as CBO
and GAO, for CBO and GAO to develop such information and
provide it to Congress, and for Congress to then evaluate all
this information.
This situation raises a potential issue for Congress
concerning the possible implications for the LCS program and
for congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs in
general of proceeding with the LCS program in part on the basis
of policies originally presented to Congress late in the
congressional budget review cycle.
There are a number of issues to consider in evaluating the
relative merits of the down-select and dual-award strategies,
including their potential relative costs, and on this key
question the available information is fragmentary and not well
vetted. Although the Navy's statements in recent weeks about
the cost implications of the dual-award strategy have tended to
focus on ship acquisition costs, this is only one of at least
three significant cost elements that can be examined in
comparing potential costs of the down-select and dual-award
strategies.
Regarding ship procurement costs, there's a notable
difference between the Navy's estimate and CBO's estimate. The
Navy estimates that, compared to the down-select strategy, the
dual-award strategy would reduce ship procurement costs by $1
billion through fiscal year 2016. CBO in contrast estimates
that, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-award
strategy would increase ship procurement costs by $740 million
through fiscal year 2015. That's quite a difference in
estimates.
The second cost element to factor in are potential
additional costs under the dual-award strategy for possibly
developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system
for LCSs. Depending on what the Navy now or years from now
decides to do regarding LCS combat system commonality, these
additional costs can either be negligible or significant.
Neither the Navy nor CBO has released estimates of these costs
as of yesterday, but at the potential high end they could be
enough to cancel out or even exceed any savings in ship
procurement costs that might be realized through the dual-award
strategy. The Navy's intentions regarding LCS combat systems
are not clear.
The third cost element to factor in are the potential
additional costs under the dual-award strategy for operating
and supporting significant numbers of two LCS designs over
their live cycles. GAO has reported a Navy estimate of $295
million in net present value terms for this additional cost,
but this figure does not appear to have been vetted yet by an
independent entity outside DOD. Both CBO and GAO have
highlighted uncertainties regarding estimates of relative life
cycle operation and support (O&S) costs under the down-select
and dual-award strategies.
When I put together the information on these three cost
elements that was available as of yesterday, I get a range of
possibilities. At one end of the range, the dual-award strategy
might cost about $700 million less than the down-select
strategy. Toward the other end of the range, the dual-award
strategy might cost hundreds of millions dollars more than the
down-select strategy. The wide degree of uncertainty from one
end of the range to the other can be viewed as an expression of
how imperfectly understood the potential relative costs of the
down-select and dual-award strategies are at this point.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this
concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to
testify and I'll be pleased to respond to any questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ronald O'Rourke
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss acquisition strategies for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
program.
introduction
Down-Select Strategy Proposed In September 2009
On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a proposed LCS
acquisition strategy under which the Navy would hold a competition to
pick a single design to which all LCSs procured in fiscal year 2010 and
subsequent years would be built. (The process of selecting the single
design for all future production is called a down select.) The winner
of the down select would be awarded a contract to build 10 LCSs over
the 5-year period fiscal years 2010-2014, at a rate of two ships per
year. The Navy would then hold a second competition--open to all
bidders other than the shipyard building the 10 LCSs in fiscal years
2010-2014--to select a second shipyard to build up to five additional
LCSs to the same design in fiscal years 2012-2014 (one ship in fiscal
year 2012, and two ships per year in fiscal year 2013-2014). These two
shipyards would then compete for contracts to build LCSs procured in
fiscal year 2015 and subsequent years.
Section 121 (a) and (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) grant
the Navy contracting and other authority needed to implement this LCS
acquisition strategy.
The Navy had planned to make the down-select decision and award the
contract to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the
decision was delayed to as late as December 14. (The final bids
submitted by the two LCS contractors were submitted on about September
15, and were valid for another 90 days, or until December 14.)
dual-award strategy proposed in november 2010
On November 3, 2010, the Navy notified congressional offices that
it was prepared to implement an alternative LCS acquisition strategy
that would involve awarding 10-ship contracts to both LCS bidders. The
Navy would need additional legislative authority from Congress to
implement this dual-award strategy. The Navy stated on November 3 that
if the additional authority were not granted by December 14, the Navy
would proceed to announce its down-select decision under the
acquisition strategy announced on September 16, 2009. On December 13,
it was reported that the two LCS bidders, at the Navy's request, had
extended the prices in their bids to December 30.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Anthony Capaccio, ``Lockheed, Austal Extend Prices on Littoral
Ship Bids,'' Bloomberg.com, December 13, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas,
``Deadline Looms For U.S. Navy's LCS,'' Defense News, December 13,
2010: 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Navy's proposed dual-award strategy poses a near-term issue for
Congress of whether this strategy would be preferable to the down-
select strategy, and whether Congress should grant the Navy, by
December 30, the additional legislative authority the Navy would need
to implement the dual-award strategy.
On December 8, 2010, the House passed H.R. 3082, a full-year
continuing appropriations bill for fiscal year 2011.\2\ Section 2314 of
H.R. 3082 would provide the legislative authority the Navy needs to
implement its proposed dual-award acquisition strategy for the LCS
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ H.R. 3082 was originally the fiscal year 2010 military
construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies
appropriations bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
observations regarding information on potential comparative costs
The potential comparative costs of the down-select and dual-award
strategies are not clear. Observations that might be made about these
costs as of December 13 include but are not limited to the following:

There is a significant difference between the Navy and
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regarding relative LCS
procurement costs under the down-select and dual-award
strategies. The Navy estimates that, compared to the down-
select strategy, the dual-award strategy could reduce LCS
procurement costs by $1 billion through fiscal year 2016. CBO,
in contrast, estimates that compared to the down-select
strategy, the dual-award strategy could increase LCS
procurement costs by $740 million through fiscal year 2015.
As of December 13, there were no available estimates
from the Navy or CBO regarding potential additional costs under
the dual-award strategy for developing and installing a common
combat system on some or all of the first 24 LCSs.\3\ Depending
on what the Navy decides to do regarding LCS combat systems,
these additional costs could be negligible or significant. The
Navy's intentions regarding the LCS combat systems are not
clear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The LCS combat system referred to in this discussion is the
ship's built-in collection of sensors, weapons, displays, and software,
and not the LCS mission modules that can be placed on or taken off the
ship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the Navy estimates that, compared to the down-select
strategy, the dual-award strategy would increase LCS life-cycle
operating and support (O&S) costs by $295 million (net present
value). Both GAO's December 8 report on the LCS program \4\ and
CBO's December 10 letter report on the LCS program \5\ express
uncertainty regarding estimates of relative life-cycle O&S
costs under the down-select and dual-award strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R,
December 8, 2010, 14 pp.
\5\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, 7 pp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBO's letter report included several cautionary
statements about its estimates relating to limits on the
information available to CBO in developing its estimates.
general discussion \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ This section is adapted from the December 13 update of CRS
Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 4 Navy Point Paper on Dual-Award Strategy
A November 4, 2010, Navy point paper on the dual-award strategy
stated the following (this is the full text of the point paper): \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Source: Navy point paper on proposed alternative LCS
acquisition strategy dated November 4, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Littoral Combat Ship Proposed Revised Acquisition--Dual 10 Ship
Awards
In summer 2009 Navy received bids for three fiscal
year 2010 ships from Lockheed Martin/Marinette Marine/Bollinger
and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works/Austal USA industry teams.
These bids did not reflect competitive pricing and well
exceeded the Congressional Cost Cap. In order to reverse cost
trends on the program, the acquisition strategy was revised to
the current down-select strategy.
The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship acquisition strategy
to down select to a single design has resulted in a highly
effective competition between the industry bidders. Navy is on
the path to down select in accordance with the terms of the
current solicitation.
The industry response to the competitive acquisition
strategy has resulted in reduction in cost for the LCSs
relative to the previous bids. These competitive bids, coupled
with Navy's desires to increase ship procurement rates to
support operational requirements, has created an opportunity to
award each bidder a fixed-price 10-ship block buy--a total of
20 ships from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2015. A
comparison between the two strategies of which ships are
included in a down select/second source versus dual 10 ship
block buy appears in the table below.
The current National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
anguage permits the Navy to procure up to 10 ships in a block
buy. In order to execute a dual 10 ship award, Navy believes
congressional authorization is required.
If congressional support for this approach is granted,
Navy will work with industry to revise the ship procurement
schedules within current proposal pricing (fiscals year 2010-
2015 vice fiscal years 2010-2014).
Navy is continuing on the path to down select and
absent authorization, we will proceed to down select by mid-
December 2010.
There are numerous benefits to this approach including
stabilizing the LCS program and the industrial base with award
of 20 ships; increasing ship procurement rate to support
operational requirements; sustaining competition through the
program; and enhancing Foreign Military Sales opportunities.
The Navy intends to procure the Technical Data Package
for both designs and if necessary a second source for either or
both designs could be brought into the program.
Either approach will ensure the Navy procures
affordably priced ships.

Some General Observations About the Dual-Award Strategy
General observations that can be made on the Navy's proposed dual-
award strategy include but are not limited to the following:

The dual-award strategy would avoid, at least for now,
the possibility of a contract protest being filed against a
Navy down-select decision.
Although the dual-award strategy includes the
possibility of the Navy at some point bringing a second source
into the program for either or both LCS designs, the dual-award
strategy does not include the guaranteed opportunity present in
the down-select strategy for shipyards not currently involved
in building LCSs to compete for the right to become the second
LCS builder.
The Navy's November 4, 2010, point paper on the dual-
award strategy does not outline the Navy's intentions regarding
the currently different combat systems on the two LCS designs.
The dual-award strategy would require each LCS
contractor to build 10 ships over a period of 6 years (fiscal
years 2010-2015) rather than 5 years (fiscal years 2010-2014),
but at the same price that was bid for the 5-year schedule. In
addition, LCSs built under the dual-award strategy would
incorporate combat systems that would be built by combat system
manufacturers in smaller annual quantities than would be the
case under the down-select strategy, possibly increasing the
costs of these combat systems. Factors such as these could, at
the margin, alter the profitability for each contractor of
building its respective group of 10 ships.
Potential Oversight Questions for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress in assessing whether the
proposed dual-award strategy would be preferable to the down-select
strategy announced by the Navy on September 16, 2009, and whether to
grant the Navy, by December 30, the additional legislative authority
the Navy would need to implement the dual-award strategy, include but
are not limited to the following:

Does the timing of the Navy's proposal provide
Congress with enough time to adequately assess the relative
merits of the down-select strategy and the dual-award strategy?
Given that the contractors submitted their bids by about
September 15, could the Navy have notified Congress of the
proposed dual-award strategy sooner than November 3, giving
Congress more time to seek information on and evaluate the
proposal? Should the Navy ask the contractors to extend their
bid prices for another, say, 30 or 60 or 90 days beyond the
original December 14 expiration date, so as to provide more
time for congressional review of the Navy's proposal? \8\ (As
mentioned earlier, on December 13, it was reported that the two
LCS bidders, at the Navy's request, had extended the prices in
their bids for 16 days, to December 30.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ A December 6, 2010, press report states: ``Lockheed officials
have indicated that they could extend the pricing in their proposal for
a short while beyond December 14, to allow time for Congress to approve
the change. Lockheed Chief Financial Officer Bruce Tanner told an
investment conference last week that Lockheed could extend the prices
it offered for a day or 2, but not indefinitely . . . . Analysts said
they expected both companies to show some flexibility on the expiration
of their pricing, given that each firm stood to win a contract valued
at around $5 billion.'' (Andrea Shalal-Esa, ``U.S. Navy Hopeful
Congress Will Approve Ship Buys,'' Reuters.com, December 6, 2010.)
Another December 6, 2010, press report that was posted online on
December 3, 2010, stated: ``Theoretically, Lockheed Martin and Austal
could likely agree to extend the price deadline, but the Navy has not
asked them to do so yet, [Navy spokeswoman Captain Cate] Mueller
said.'' (Cid Standifer, ``Stand-Alone Bill May Be Needed To Approve LCS
Dual Block Buy Plan,'' Inside the Navy, December 6, 2010.)
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What role, if any, did a desire by the Navy to avoid a
potential contract protest against the Navy's down-select
decision play in the Navy's decision to propose the alternate
dual-award strategy? For example, how concerned, if at all, was
the Navy that the announcement of an LCS down-select decision
might lead to a contract protest and controversy somewhat like
what has been experienced in the Air Force's KC-X aerial
refueling tanker acquisition program? \9\ A December 13, 2010,
press report on the LCS program stated: ``One high-level Navy
source recently said that without the dual-ship approach,
`there is 100 percent chance of a protest.' '' \10\
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\9\ For more on the KC-X program, see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force
KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Jeremiah Gertler.
\10\ Christopher P. Cavas, ``Deadline Looms For U.S. Navy's LCS,''
Defense News, December 13, 2010: 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What are the potential relative costs of the down-
select and dual-award acquisition strategies, including
development costs, procurement costs, and life-cycle operation
and support (O&S) costs? Has the Navy fully and accurately
estimated these costs--including potential costs for
developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system
for both LCS designs--and reported all these potential costs to
Congress?
What are the potential relative risks of the down-
select and dual-award acquisition strategies, including
development risks, production cost risks, production schedule
risks, and life-cycle O&S risks? Has the Navy fully and
accurately estimated these risks, and reported all these
potential risks to Congress?
What are the Navy's intentions, under the proposed
dual-award acquisition strategy, regarding the currently
different combat systems on the two LCS designs? Does the Navy
intend to leave them unchanged, adopt one of the combat systems
as the common system for both designs, or develop a new combat
system for both designs? If the Navy intends to pursue the
second or third of these paths, what is the Navy's plan
(including schedule) for doing so? If the Navy does not have a
definite plan regarding the combat systems for the ships, how
well can the potential costs and risks of the dual-award
strategy be estimated and compared to those of the down-select
strategy?
What are the potential industrial-base impacts of the
dual-award strategy, including impacts on the two LCS
contractors, on shipyards that could, under the down-select
strategy, bid for the right to become the second LCS builder,
and on combat system manufacturers?
What impact, if any, might the Navy's proposal to
shift from its down-select strategy to the dual-award strategy
have on the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to
implement down-select strategies for other acquisition
programs? For example, will the Navy's proposal to shift to the
dual-award strategy cause contractors bidding for other
acquisition programs to treat with increased skepticism stated
DOD intentions to carry out down selects? If so, could that
reduce the benefits of competition that DOD might hope to
achieve through the use of down-select strategies?
Enough Time for Adequate Congressional Review of Navy Proposal?
Regarding whether the timing of the Navy's proposal provides
Congress with enough time to adequately assess the relative merits of
the down-select strategy and the dual-award strategy, it can be noted
that this is the third time in the history of the LCS program that the
Navy has presented Congress with an important choice about the future
of the LCS program late in the congressional budget-review cycle, after
Congress had completed its spring budget-review hearings and some of
its committee markups. The first instance was in mid-2002, when the
Navy submitted an amended request to Congress for fiscal year 2003
funding to get the LCS program started using a rapid acquisition
strategy.\11\ The second was in September 2009, when the Navy announced
its proposed down-select strategy for the LCS program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Navy's original fiscal year 2003 budget request, submitted
to Congress in February 2002, contained no apparent funding for
development of the LCS. In addition, the Navy in early 2002 had not yet
announced that it intended to employ a rapid acquisition strategy for
the LCS program. As a result, in the early months of 2002, there may
have been little reason within Congress to view the LCS program as a
significant fiscal year 2003 budget-review issue. In the middle of
2002, the Navy submitted an amended request asking for $33 million in
fiscal year 2003 development funding for the LCS program. Navy
officials explained that they did not decide until the middle of 2002
that they wanted to pursue a rapid acquisition strategy for the LCS
program, and consequently did not realize until then that there was a
need to request $33 million in fiscal year 2003 funding for the
program. By the middle of 2002, however, the House and Senate Armed
Services committees had already held their spring fiscal year 2003
budget-review hearings and marked up their respective versions of the
fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill. These two committees thus
did not have an opportunity to use the spring 2002 budget-review season
to review in detail the Navy's accelerated acquisition plan for the LCS
program or the supporting request for $33 million in funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the third instance--the Navy's proposal of November 3,
2010, for using a dual-award strategy rather than a down-select
strategy--a potential issue for Congress are the implications for the
LCS program and congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs
in general of proceeding with the LCS program in part on the basis of
policies originally presented as proposals to Congress late in the
congressional budget-review cycle, after Congress had completed its
spring budget-review hearings and some of its committee markups. The
Navy's November 3, 2010, notification to Congress of the proposed dual-
award strategy, combined with a request by the Navy that Congress act
on that proposal by December 30, provides relatively little time for
Congress to collect cost and other information from the Navy (including
information that Navy might not offer in initial briefings to
individual congressional offices), for Congress to solicit cost and
other information from independent sources such as the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and GAO, for CBO and GAO to develop such
information and provide it to Congress, for Congress to hold hearings
at which all this information might be discussed in a group setting,
with multiple parties present, and for congressional offices to then
form their evaluations of the Navy's proposal.
Potential Relative Ship Procurement Costs
Regarding potential relative costs of the down-select and dual-
award acquisition strategies, the Navy has stated that it estimates
that procuring LCSs under the dual-award strategy would cost $1 billion
less through fiscal year 2016 than procuring them under the down-select
strategy.\12\ According to CBO, the Navy's estimated savings through
fiscal year 2015--the final year covered in the table shown in the
Navy's November 4 point paper--is $600 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Source: DOD letter to GAO dated December 6, 2010, p. 2, as
reprinted in Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual
Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-
11-249R, December 8, 2010, p. 12. The GAO report states on page 2:
``According to the Navy, $1.9 billion in savings resulted from the
competition between the two offerors and is common to both strategies.
However, the Navy estimates that approximately $1.0 billion in
additional cost savings would be realized under the proposed dual award
strategy because of the avoidance of higher start-up costs and risks
associated with the second source planned for fiscal year 2012, among
other factors. According to the Navy, these additional savings would be
offset, in part, by increased total ownership costs.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBO in its December 10 letter report provided its own estimate of
the relative ship procurement costs of the down-select and dual-award
strategies through fiscal year 2015. As shown in Table 1, CBO estimates
that the dual-award strategy would cost $740 million more in ship
procurement costs than the down-select strategy through fiscal year
2015.

CBO's letter report included several cautionary statements about
its estimates relating to limits on the information available to CBO in
developing its estimates.
Under the down-select strategy, shipyards competing to become the
second LCS builder could include yards that currently build other ships
for the Navy, such as, possibly, General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works (GD/
BIW) of Bath, ME, Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula,
MS, or General Dynamics' National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
(NASSCO) of San Diego, CA. If such a yard were to be selected under the
down-select strategy to become the second LCS builder, it could reduce
the cost of other Navy ships being built at that yard by more fully
spreading the fixed overhead costs of that yard. It is not clear
whether the Navy estimate in Table 1 accounts for a possible reduction
in the cost of other Navy ships that might be realized under the down-
select strategy through more full spreading of shipyard fixed overhead
costs. The CBO estimate does not account for this possible
reduction.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Source: Telephone conversation with CBO, December 10, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Combat System-Related Investment Costs
Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the
down-select strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could be
offset by potential additional costs under the dual-award strategy for
developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system for the
two LCS designs. Developing a new common combat system for the two LCS
designs might cost tens of millions of dollars. Procuring replacement
combat systems for LCSs could cost tens of millions or dollars per
ship. Removing an LCS's existing combat system and installing a
replacement system could cost several millions of dollars per ship.
CBO's letter report states that ``if the Navy later decided to use a
common combat system for all LCSs (rather than the different ones that
would initially be installed on the two different types of vessels),
the costs for developing, procuring, and installing that system could
be significant.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If, for example, the Navy decided to develop a new common combat
system for both LCS designs, developed that new system at a one-time
cost of, say, $30 million, procured 24 copies of that system at a
recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them on the
first 24 LCSs (i.e., LCSs 1 through 4, plus the 20 ships to be awarded
under the dual-award strategy's two 10-ship block-buy contracts) at a
recurring installation cost of, say, $5 million per ship, the total
cost would be $1,350 million.
If, as another example, the Navy decided to adopt one of the two
existing LCS combat systems as the common combat system for both
designs, adapted that existing system for the other LCS design at a
one-time cost of, say, $10 million, procured 12 copies of that system
at a recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them
on 12 of the first 24 LCSs (i.e., the LCSs originally built or to be
built with the other combat system ) at a recurring installation cost
of, say, $5 million per ship, the total cost would be $670 million.
CBO's December 10 letter report states that the existing combat
systems on the two LCS designs cost about $70 million per ship.\15\
Using this figure (instead of $50 million) as the basis for estimating
the cost of a replacement combat system, the estimates of $1,350
million and $670 million in the preceding two paragraphs would become
$1,830 million and $910 million, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the Navy's intentions for the combat systems on the two
LCS designs, a November 29, 2010, press report states that ``the Navy
intends to keep separate the combat systems of the Lockheed and Austal
USA versions of the Littoral Combat Ships for its dual buy strategy,
but will `procure the tech data package to allow for consideration of
[a] common combat system in the future,' according to Navy spokeswoman
Capt. Cate Mueller.'' The report also quoted an industry official as
saying that the Navy is likely ``still strategizing as to how they're
going to single up on a combat system.'' \16\ A December 13, 2010,
press report described as an ``analysis'' article stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Andrew Burt, ``Navy Open To Combining Combat Systems On Both
Littoral Combat Ships,'' Inside the Navy, November 29, 2010. Material
in brackets as in original. The Austal USA version of the LCS is the
version developed by the General Dynamics-led LCS industry team.

To speed development [of the LCS], each [LCS industry] design
team was allowed to develop its own system. [For the Lockheed
team's LCS design,] Lockheed came up with COMBATSS-21, in some
ways a lightweight derivative of the Aegis combat system built
by the company and fielded on nearly 80 U.S. Navy cruisers and
destroyers. General Dynamics' Advanced Information Systems
(AIS) developed an entirely new system for [the General
Dynamics team's LCS] design, a system the company claims more
closely embodies the open architecture concept espoused by the
Navy for virtually all its new computer systems.
Each combat system requires its own support pipeline:
maintenance and parts chains, training programs, operational
characteristics. Even if the Navy had simply picked one, it
would still have been unique in a fleet that has striven for
homogeneity and relative simplicity.
Navy officials downplay the impact of fielding separate
systems, and claim competition will hold prices in check. But
sooner or later, whether today's management team supports both
combat systems or not, an official will come into office who
sees the dual-system setup as wasteful and unsupportable. When
that happens, the ships with one of the systems will likely be
taken out of service--years before they're used up--and
probably made available for foreign military sales.
The Navy reportedly has a plan to deal with the dual combat
systems, but it's not saying what it is, possibly because
officials lack the authority to discuss details of a dual-ship
buy. While a number of congressional staffers and analysts have
been briefed on the plan, they've been sworn to secrecy. Even
among those who have been briefed, there are concerns that this
is an issue the Navy needs to address publicly before the buy-
bothdesigns plan can be approved.
What's the Plan?
So what is the Navy's plan for the combat systems? Sean
Stackley, the service's top weapons buyer, gave some clues in
September 2009 when he announced the service would have a
competition to buy only one of the designs. As a key factor in
the strategy to keep a lid on cost growth and perhaps drive
prices down, the Navy would compete multiple elements of each
LCS design, including the combat systems, weapons and engines.
Eventually, the service wants to purchase the technical package
both for the design and for the combat system, thus allowing
other companies to bid for construction.
After sailors have a chance to put each LCS combat system
through its paces, the service will begin to pick and choose
among the various elements of each system. Those elements will
be incorporated into what would become, in essence, a third
combat system. Another competition would then be held for that,
allowing companies such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon or even
Saab to bid as the combat system integrator.
Under this scenario, a third system might be developed in
time to begin incorporating the new, one-size-fits-both combat
system into the later ships of each company's 10-ship buy. Even
if the new system isn't ready by then, it could become a key
element in follow-on LCSs, beginning with the 25th LCS in 2016.

What would become of the earlier ships featuring individual combat
systems is not yet clear.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Christopher P. Cavas, ``Two LCS Designs, One Big Dilemma,''
Defense News, December 13, 2010: 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Relative Life-Cycle Operation and Support (O&S) Costs
Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the
down-select strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could also be
offset by potential additional life-cycle operation and support (O&S)
costs of operating significant numbers of two different LCS designs.
GAO's December 8 report states: ``According to the Navy, [estimated
savings in LCS procurement costs under the dual-award strategy] would
be offset, in part, by an additional $842 million in total ownership
costs, which the Navy equates to a net present value of $295 million.''
\18\ The GAO report also states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship

Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate
supporting the dual award provides details on the costs to
operate and support both designs. However, since little actual
LCS operating and support data are available to date, the
Navy's estimates for these costs are currently based on data
from other ships and could change as actual cost data become
more available. These estimates are also based on new
operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance
that have not been fully developed, tested, and implemented.
For example, the Navy has not yet implemented a comprehensive
training plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost more
or less than the training costs currently accounted for by the
Navy.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R,
December 8, 2010, p. 6.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBO's December 10 letter report stated:

Operating and maintaining two types of ships would probably
be more expensive, however. The Navy has stated that the
differences in costs are small (and more than offset by
procurement savings), but there is considerable uncertainty
about how to estimate those differences because the Navy does
not yet have much experience in operating such ships.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John
McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Resulting Relative Net Costs
Using information available as of December 13, potential relative
costs of the down-select and dual-award strategies might be bounded as
follows:

On the one hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the
dual award strategy might cost a net total of $705 million
less. This net figure includes $1 billion in Navy-estimated
ship procurement cost savings through fiscal year 2016, no
additional combat system-related investment costs (i.e., the
Navy decides not to pursue a common combat system for the two
LCS designs), and $295 million in additional life-cycle O&S
costs (net present value) for operating significant numbers of
both LCS designs.
On the other hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the
dual award strategy might cost a net total of as much as $2,865
million more. This net figure includes $740 million in CBO-
estimated higher ship procurement costs through fiscal year
2015, as much as $1,830 million in additional combat system
related costs (i.e., the Navy decides to develop, procure, and
install on 24 LCSs a new common combat system with a
procurement cost of as much as $70 million per ship), and $295
million in additional life-cycle O&S costs (net present value)
for operating significant numbers of both LCS designs.
potential relative risks
Regarding the potential relative risks of the down-select and dual-
award acquisition strategies, the GAO report states that ``a second
ship design and source provided under the dual award strategy could
provide the Navy an additional hedge against risk, should one design
prove problematic.'' \21\ A converse argument might be that managing
the construction of two very different LCS designs could place
increased demands on overall Navy program management capacities and on
the Program, GAO-11-249R, December 8, 2010, Table 1 on page 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Government Accountability Office, Navy's Proposed Dual Award
Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R,
December 8, 2010, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) capabilities for on-
site monitoring of the construction of Navy ships--factors that might
increase the chances of program-management challenges in the LCS
program or of the Navy not detecting in a timely manner construction-
quality problems that might occur in one or both LCS designs.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Limits on Navy SUPSHIP capacities may have been a factor in
the delayed discovery by the Navy of construction quality problems on
Navy San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships. For a discussion of
LPD-17 class construction quality problems, CRS Report RL34476, Navy
LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this
concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss these issues. I will be pleased to respond to any
questions you might have.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. Francis.

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Francis. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
talk about the LCS today.
We've been involved in the program on or off for about the
past 5 years and I would say I think the Navy's done quite a
bit of work, particularly in the last year, to get the program
on track, but in our view the program is not out of the woods
yet. We see risks in three areas.
First would be the seaframes. The third and fourth
seaframes are undergoing construction right now. There are
design changes. Some design changes are being postponed to post
delivery. I believe the Navy feels that they have adequately
provided for these changes financially and managerially, but
time will tell whether that's sufficient.
The second area is the mission equipment packages. The
mission equipment packages have had difficulty in development
and testing over the years. To illustrate, in 2007 the Navy had
anticipated having delivered 16 mission equipment packages
through fiscal year 2012. Right now the estimate is at about
eight and those mission equipment packages will be less capable
than envisioned.
The third area is integrated testing, that is bringing the
mission equipment packages and the seaframes together. At this
point, no operational testing of either the seaframes or the
mission equipment packages has been done yet. Right now I
believe the schedule is the first operational testing of the
seaframes and two mission equipment packages, will be finished
on the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. The third mission
equipment package will be operationally tested in fiscal year
2015. There's potential for discovery there when those systems
are brought together and operationally tested.
In August 2010, we raised the concern that the ships and
the seaframes may be proceeding too quickly before the
operational testing was done, and we made a recommendation to
the Navy that they reconsider sequencing the mission equipment
packages and the seaframes so that one didn't get ahead of the
other. The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with
that recommendation, but we haven't seen that followed up in
the new dual strategy proposal.
In closing, I'd say the risks that I cite in the programs
are not materially different in either strategy. So for
example, if the dual strategy were not followed and the
existing down-select to 10 ships were followed, we'd have many
of the same risks. I think by the Navy saying they're willing
to back 20 ships it does signal that the Navy is more confident
in the ships and could create some expectations on the part of
industry downstream. On the other hand, I think that having a
second source could provide an additional hedge against risk
should one seaframe develop some problems.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I'd be glad
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Paul L. Francis
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the Department of the Navy's proposed dual ship
acquisition strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. LCS is
envisioned as a vessel able to be reconfigured to meet three different
mission areas: mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine
warfare. Its design concept consists of two distinct parts--the ship
itself (seaframe) and the mission package it carries and deploys. The
Navy is procuring the first four ships in two different designs from
shipbuilding teams led by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, which
currently build their designs at Marinette Marine and Austal USA
shipyards, respectively.
The Navy's strategy for procuring LCS has evolved over the years.
Prior to September 2009, the Navy planned to continue building the
class using both ship designs. This strategy changed following
unsuccessful contract negotiations that same year for fiscal year 2010
funded seaframes--an outcome attributable to industry proposals priced
significantly above Navy expectations. In September 2009, the Navy
announced that in an effort to improve affordability, it was revising
the LCS program's acquisition strategy and would select one seaframe
design before awarding contracts for any additional ships.\1\ Following
approval of this strategy in January 2010, the Navy issued a new
solicitation--intended to lead to a downselect--for fiscal year 2010
seaframes. In support of this strategy, Congress authorized the Navy to
procure up to 10 seaframes and 15 LCS control and weapon systems. The
Navy planned to have a second competition in 2012 and provide five of
the ship control and weapon systems to the winning contractor, who
would construct up to 5 ships of the same design and install the
systems. However, in November 2010, following receipt of new industry
proposals for the fiscal year 2010 seaframes, the Navy proposed to
change its acquisition strategy back to awarding new construction
contracts to both industry teams.\2\
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\1\ The decision to select a single ship design is referred to as
the ``downselect.''
\2\ In response to the Navy's September 2009 LCS acquisition
strategy change, General Dynamics and Austal USA revoked their teaming
arrangement for future seaframes, in turn allowing the General Dynamics
Bath Iron Works shipyard to compete for selection as the planned
potential second source of the winning design. Austal USA and Lockheed
Martin are the prime contractors competing for the current 10-ship
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 2010, we issued a report evaluating LCS planning and
implementation efforts that identified technical, design, and
construction challenges that could impact the Navy's ability to deliver
promised LCS capabilities.\3\ This statement highlights findings from
that report and a subsequent report issued on December 8, 2010, which
assessed risks that could affect the Navy's ability to execute the LCS
program.\4\ As detailed in our most recent report, we found that
regardless of the strategy selected, the Navy continues to face design
and construction risks in executing the LCS program, given its stage of
maturity and its unique mission, design, and operational concept. These
risks threaten the Navy's ability to achieve the cost savings it
estimates under either of its acquisition strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy's Ability to Overcome
Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual
Capabilities, GAO-10-523 (Washington, DC: Aug. 31, 2010).
\4\ See GAO, Navy's Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for
the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R (Washington, DC: Dec. 8,
2010).
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In preparing this testimony, we relied primarily on work supporting
our most recent LCS report. That report contains a detailed overview of
our scope and methodology. All of our work for this report was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
summary
Successful business cases for shipbuilding programs require balance
between the concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the
resources--technologies, design knowledge, funding, time, and
management capacity--needed to transform that concept into a product.
Without a sound business case, program execution will be hampered,
regardless of the contracting strategy. The LCS, given its stage of
maturity and its unique mission, design, and operational concept, still
faces design and construction risks. Most of these risks appear to be
inherent to the program, regardless of which acquisition strategy is
followed. Navy officials believe that experience to date on the
program, coupled with fixed-price contracts and a sufficient budget for
ship changes, mitigates this risk. However, much work and demonstration
remains for LCS, and other shipbuilding programs have had difficulty at
this stage. On the other hand, a second ship design and source provided
under the dual award strategy could provide the Navy an additional
hedge against risk, should one design prove problematic. Mission
equipment packages are common to both ships and would pose the same
execution risks, apart from integration.
key features of the downselect and the dual-award strategies
The Navy estimates that both its existing and proposed acquisition
strategies will generate significant cost savings to the government.
According to the Navy, $1.9 billion in savings resulted from the
competition between the two offerors and is common to both strategies.
However, the Navy estimates that approximately $1.0 billion in
additional cost savings would be realized under the proposed dual award
strategy because of the avoidance of higher start-up costs and risks
associated with the second source planned for fiscal year 2012, among
other factors. According to the Navy, these additional savings would be
offset, in part, by increased total ownership costs. The Navy plans to
use some of the remaining savings, if realized, to fund construction of
an additional LCS seaframe in fiscal year 2012. Table 1 compares the
key tenets of each strategy.

The quantities planned under both of the Navy's strategies are
similar through fiscal year 2015. These similarities are outlined in
table 2, which details the Navy's procurement plans for seaframes under
both the existing downselect strategy and the proposed dual award
strategy.

Under the dual award strategy, the government will be authorized to
contract for up to 20 ships. In contrast, the existing downselect
strategy limits this authorization to up to 10 ships until fiscal year
2012, when the Navy planned to solicit a second source for additional
ships.
design changes could increase near-term costs above current estimates
Under both the existing downselect strategy and the proposed dual
award strategy, the Navy plans to award fixed-price incentive contracts
for new seaframes. This type of contract provides for adjusting profit
and establishing the final contract price by application of a formula
based on the relationship of total final negotiated cost to total
target cost. The final price is subject to a price ceiling, negotiated
at the outset. In the case of LCS, the solicitation stated that the
government would share 50 percent of costs above the target cost, up to
the price ceiling. Navy officials also stated that they have budgeted
management reserve funds to accommodate potential impacts to cost
performance during program execution. In other programs, the Navy has
returned to Congress to request funding for costs exceeding the target
costs. In the near term, cost increases are likely but it is unknown
whether increases will exceed what the Navy has budgeted for fiscal
years 2010 and beyond. The likely source of these cost increases is
design changes, which result in out-of-sequence work, potentially
limiting the shipbuilders' ability to achieve the benefits they
anticipate from construction process improvements and shipyard capital
investments.
Our August 2010 report on LCS discussed issues with the performance
of particular ship systems at the time of lead ship deliveries and as a
result of subsequent operating experience.\5\ In an effort to address
technical issues on the first two ships, the Navy has implemented
design changes for the third and fourth LCS seaframes (LCS-3 and LCS-
4), several of which are not yet complete. These changes are
significant and have affected the configuration of several major ship
systems including propulsion, communications, electrical, and
navigation. In addition, launch, handling, and recovery systems for
both designs are still being refined, although the Navy reports recent
progress related to each of these systems.\6\ To the extent that these
design changes necessitate modifications in the ship specifications on
which the contractors based their proposals for future ships, contract
modifications will need to be negotiated and priced. According to the
Navy, it estimates funding requirements for these change orders to
total 5 percent for all future follow-on ships produced, regardless of
whether it proceeds with a downselect strategy or the proposed dual
award strategy. In addition, Navy officials stated that the seaframe
solicitation includes a provision that agreed to design changes are
``not to exceed'' $12 million--a feature that Navy officials state will
bound government cost risk due to design changes. Pending full
identification and resolution of deficiencies affecting the lead ships,
the Navy's ability to stay within its budgeted limits remains to be
seen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO-10-523.
\6\ According to Navy officials, the most recent progress related
to LCS launch, handling, and recovery systems consists of: (1)
successful operation and movement of an embarked 11-meter rigid-hull
inflatable boat onboard LCS-1 in March 2010; (2) synthetic lift lines
on LCS-2 successfully completing a 200 percent lift test; and (3)
routine usage of a straddle carrier to move an 11-meter rigid-hull
inflatable boat (with stowage cradle) and berthing modules around the
LCS-2 mission bay. In addition, Navy officials state that LCS-1's
system is scheduled to begin testing with the mine countermeasures
mission package in fiscal year 2011 and testing of LCS-2's twin-boom
extensible crane is progressing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported earlier this year, the LCS shipbuilding teams have
implemented process and capacity improvements based on lessons learned
from constructing lead ships and have made capital investments in their
yards in an effort to increase efficiency.\7\ Fully realizing these
improvements may be challenging given the design changes still
occurring in the program. To the extent that addressing technical
issues disrupts the optimal construction sequence for follow-on ships,
additional labor hours could be required beyond current forecasts.
Introducing such inefficiencies could offset initial benefits obtained
from the process improvements and new facilities the shipbuilders have
put into place, increasing the risk of out-of-sequence work and rework.
Some level of design changes can be reasonably expected given the
testing that remains. To date, however, Navy officials report that LCS-
3 and LCS-4 changes are being managed efficiently--citing improved cost
and schedule performance by both shipbuilders. The Navy also believes
that the LCS seaframe may be less affected by mission equipment changes
than other ships given the equipment's modular design. Maintaining a
high level of performance will depend on avoiding significant design
changes to seaframes under construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Guidance Needed on Navy's Use of
Investment Incentives at Private Shipyards, GAO-10-686 (Washington, DC:
July 26, 2010) and GAO-10-523.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
operations and support costs difficult to estimate
Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate
supporting the dual award provides details on the costs to operate and
support both designs. However, since little actual LCS operating and
support data are available to date, the Navy's estimates for these
costs are currently based on data from other ships and could change as
actual cost data become more available. These estimates are also based
on new operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance
that have not been fully developed, tested, and implemented. For
example, the Navy has not yet implemented a comprehensive training
plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost more or less than the
training costs currently accounted for by the Navy.
In addition, the Navy has not studied--within the context of the
downselect strategy--the potential savings associated with early
retirement of the two nonselected design ships. As such, decision
makers do not have a complete picture of the various options available
to them related to choosing between the downselect and dual award
strategies. Under the existing downselect strategy, the Navy's
intention is to keep in service--at least initially--the other two
ships of the design not selected for long-term production. The Navy
acknowledged that operating and supporting two different designs
carries increased costs as compared to the costs of employing only one
design. As we previously reported, these costs include separate
training facilities because each design has unique equipment and
therefore different operating and maintenance requirements.\8\ In
February 2010, we recommended that the Navy conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of options for these two ships, including the possibility of
retiring them from service--a recommendation with which the Department
of Defense agreed. As we point out in the February report, it is
important that estimates of long-term operating and support costs are
available to assess alternatives before a decision is made,
particularly since these costs constitute over 70 percent of a system's
life cycle costs. However, in discussions with Navy officials in
November 2010, they told us that their latest assessment of the long-
term costs of maintaining two ship designs does not consider the option
of retiring the two nonselected ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve
Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New
Concepts, GAO-10-257 (Washington, DC: Feb. 2, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mission package uncertainties and delays
The Navy's request to double its current 10-ship authorization to
20 ships--at a time when the mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and
antisubmarine warfare mission packages continue to face significant
developmental challenges--highlights the Navy's risk of investing in a
fleet of ships that has not yet demonstrated its promised capability.
Absent significant capability within its mission packages, seaframe
functionality is largely constrained to self-defense as opposed to
mission-related tasks.
Navy officials acknowledged that mission package systems have taken
significantly longer to develop and field than anticipated.
Underscoring this situation is the fact that development efforts for
most of these systems predate the LCS program--in some cases by 10
years or more. However, Navy officials expressed confidence that their
latest testing and production plans for mission package systems are
executable.
Recent testing of mission package systems has yielded mixed
results. The Navy reports that two systems within the mine
countermeasures mission package recently completed developmental
testing, but another system is undergoing reliability improvements
following production of several units that did not meet performance
requirements.\9\ Further, test failures contributed to the cancellation
of a key surface warfare mission package system, and the future
composition of the package remains undetermined.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ According to Navy officials, the AN/AQS-20A sonar and Airborne
Laser Mine Detection System recently completed developmental testing in
August and October 2010, respectively. Alternatively, the Remote
Minehunting System--produced since 2005--continues to struggle with
reliability shortfalls. This has prompted the Navy to implement a
series of design changes to the vehicle component and evaluate reducing
the system's performance requirements.
\10\ Development of the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System--an
anticipated key system within the surface warfare package--was canceled
in 2010 following test failures and higher than expected cost
estimates. The Navy continues to evaluate alternatives to replace this
capability onboard LCS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Developmental challenges facing individual systems have led to
procurement delays for all three mission packages and have disrupted
program test schedules. Most notably, the Navy reports the first
operational testing event involving a seaframe and partial mission
package is now scheduled for late second quarter of fiscal year 2012,
and the Navy expects individual mission package systems to remain in
development through 2017.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ According to Navy officials, the planned fiscal year 2012
operational test will employ the first LCS (LCS-1) seaframe and a
(partial) surface warfare mission package. This date represents a
recent update to the program's testing plan as the Navy's fiscal year
2011 budget estimates showed this event occurring in the third quarter
of fiscal year 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To safeguard against excess quantities of ships and mission
packages being purchased before their combined capabilities are
demonstrated, we recommended in our August 2010 report that the
Secretary of Defense update the LCS acquisition strategy to account for
operational testing delays in the program and resequence planned
purchases of ships and mission packages, as appropriate.\12\ The
Department of Defense agreed with this recommendation, stating that an
updated schedule was under development to better align seaframe and
mission module production milestones. However, it is unclear how the
department's concurrence with our recommendation can be reconciled
against the Navy's current request to increase the planned seaframe
commitment, particularly since no operational testing involving mission
packages--or any of their individual systems--has since taken place.
Until mission package and operational testing progresses--and key mine
countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare systems are
proven effective and suitable onboard seaframes--the Navy cannot be
certain that the LCS will deliver the full capability desired. This
risk would increase with a commitment to higher quantities. The Navy
believes this increased commitment is appropriately balanced against
competing risks in the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO-10-523.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions.
contact and staff acknowledgments
For future questions about this statement, please contact me at
(202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Individuals making key
contributions to this report were Belva Martin, Acting Director; Diana
Moldafsky, assistant Director; Christopher R. Durbin; Jeremy Hawk;
Kristine Hassinger; Simon Hirschfeld; and Karen Zuckerstein.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Francis.
Let's try a first round of 8 minutes.
First let me ask you, Secretary Stackley. You've heard now
the testimony of CBO, GAO, and CRS. Do you want to comment or
react to any of the testimony that you've heard, before I ask
specific questions?
Mr. Stackley. Let me make a few comments. First, I believe
Dr. Labs pointed out in his assessment that he basically
estimated what the ships would cost in accordance with his cost
model, but his information is uninformed by the bids. What we
are bringing to the table is information inside of the bids
that would take CBO's cost estimates, which are within I would
say 5 percent of the Navy's budget and the Navy's estimate of a
year plus ago, and then bring against that demonstrated
performance in the course of the past year on the first follow
ships and fixed-price proposals inside the bids we have.
So his estimate balanced against the fixed-price bids that
we have are consistent in terms of the determination of the
savings that we have here. I believe that CBO's estimate and
the Navy's estimate and the Navy's proposal for a dual award to
provide savings are all consistent.
Chairman Levin. The reason that they're uninformed is that
he did not have that information available to him, for
proprietary reasons, is that correct?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Nonetheless, looking at ranges, is that
what you're saying, they are consistent with your estimates?
Mr. Stackley. His estimate is within a few percent of the
Navy's estimate and the Navy's budget in 2011. When you bring
the bids against that and you factor in, as I have described,
the fixed price and the margins that we're including for both
change and any cost excursions, then we have a solid number to
go against an estimate, and the difference is the savings that
we're bringing to the table.
The second comment has to deal with, there's a common theme
between CBO, CRS, and GAO regarding risk; it's risk and
unknowns. I will describe that this program, as I mentioned in
my opening remarks on the numbers has done a complete turn-
around in terms of stabilizing design, stabilizing production
processes, and driving lessons learned on the part of industry
into their processes.
So what that has resulted in is performance far improved,
not just on this program, but also compared to other historical
performance on shipbuilding programs at this stage in their
respective contracts. The key indicators I would tell you are
what we're seeing in terms of cost performance on the first
ships, the first follow ships, and control of changes on the
first follow ships, and then what we're seeing in terms of
remaining risk on the test program.
So we have very much controlled change, controlled the risk
that the program is staring at in the future. Then the mission
package discussion has isolated any risk associated with the
mission packages from the seaframes themselves. So we have a
different view on risk, that yes, there is risk, but it is very
well-controlled and contained within the estimates that we have
on the program, which supports our assessment of the savings
that we're bringing to the table.
Chairman Levin. Let me pick up where you just left off.
Admiral Roughead, one ship of each design has been
delivered. They've gained some operating experience. Do both of
these vessels in their current configuration meet the Navy's
requirements?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator, both ships do.
Chairman Levin. The CRS report lists some cost risks of
pursuing a down-source strategy. As we've heard, the largest of
these appears to be related to replacing the ship's combat
systems. If we were to do that as part of the plan, it would
seem to eliminate some of the additional savings of the dual-
source strategy.
But I would note that the CRS report says that we might
want to replace the combat system on all LCSs bought to date
with a new common combat system. Admiral Roughead or Admiral
Pandolfe, is the current combat system on each type of vessel
adequate to meet your requirements?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, they are.
Chairman Levin. If the combat systems fail in the future to
meet requirements, then we would have to replace or upgrade
those. But would that not be a decision unrelated to current
acquisition strategy? Secretary Stackley, let me ask you that
question.
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. The current acquisition strategy
does not call for the changeout of the combat system.
Let me describe some characteristics of the combat system.
As it was mentioned earlier, the total cost for the combat
system is on the order of about $70 million. When we think of
the combat system, we break it down into a couple key
components, weapons, sensors, and command and control system.
We have, in fact, on the weapons side of the combat system,
commonality. Both ships have 57-millimeter Bofors guns, both
ships we're looking at Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortor
(CRAM) weapons systems. So the weapon system is already common
both between them and also with other ships in the inventory.
On the sensor side, we have contemplated moving towards a
common sensor, and inside of this solicitation the Navy asked
for priced bids for a new sensor to consider for the future. In
total, the cost for bringing a new sensor--that's both common
for LCS and with the rest of the fleet--is about $20 million
nonrecurring and about $2 million a ship difference.
So weapons are common. If the Navy chose to go to a common
system for performance reasons, the cost impact would be about
$20 million nonrecurring and a couple million dollars a ship.
Then on the C and D side, which is largely the software
system and displays and processors, the Navy does not have a
drive right now to go towards common C and D for this class
either in the down-select or dual-award. It is something that
we could consider in the future.
Chairman Levin. Another concern which has been raised by
Mr. Francis is that if the Navy has to make changes in the
mission package that would result in cost growth. As I
understand the LCS architecture specifying how the mission
packages plug into and operate on the ship through defined
interfaces, the LCS program divorces mission package changes
from the ship construction program and ship construction
changes from the mission package program.
Let me ask you, Secretary Stackley: Do I have that right so
far or am I off, and if so, correct me?
Mr. Stackley. No, sir, you have that correct. There is a
strict interface control document that serves both the seaframe
and the mission packages. So the seaframe is designed in
accordance with the interface control document, the mission
packages are designed in accordance with the interface control
document, so that when you bring them together, form, fit,
function, space, weight, power, and cooling support the mission
packages as well as the seaframe design.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses.
Dr. Labs, we've seen this movie before, haven't we? Isn't
this the third time that the Navy has come in late in the game
with proposals for a LCS?
Dr. Labs. This has not been the first time where the Navy
has come in, as you say, to change a major aspect of the
program in a very short period of time. Mr. O'Rourke's report
certainly goes into that history in some detail.
Senator McCain. The third time after the NDAA was done, the
Navy has come in and said, ``Gee, we have it solved now and we
need significant changes.'' Obviously, I read off the results
of those significant changes twice before.
Mr. O'Rourke, you've been following this kind of business
for about 30 years, is that right?
Mr. O'Rourke. Twenty-seven years in January.
Senator McCain. Have you ever seen one quite like this?
Mr. O'Rourke. I cannot think of another shipbuilding
program that has had this many changes proposed over the years
within that program at such a late stage in the congressional
review process.
Senator McCain. Mr. Francis, did you have a chance to look
at one of the concerns that's been raised about the combat
systems, the different combat systems in the different ships?
Mr. Francis. Senator McCain, we have not had a chance to
look at the issue of the combat systems. I have read what Dr.
Labs and Mr. O'Rourke have written, but we have not covered
that ourselves.
Senator McCain. Dr. Labs, do you agree with Secretary
Stackley's remarks about the relative ease on the whole issue
of combat systems on the different ships?
Dr. Labs. Senator McCain, I honestly do not have enough
information to comment intelligently on what Secretary Stackley
offered up in response to those comments.
Senator McCain. Do you agree with Mr. O'Rourke's statement
that the costs of this new proposal could be $700 million less
and in some cases could also be as much as over $2 billion
more?
Dr. Labs. I would say that, since a large part of the $2
billion more is being driven by the CBO estimate of what the
dual-award strategy would be, it would depend very much on
detailed examination of the contract bids, because the CBO
model is just that, it's a model. It takes what the Navy has
been paying for the ship so far, it runs it down a learning
curve, it applies rate factors and things like that.
It did not take into consideration any benefits of
competition, what the actual contract bids might be. If I were
to have more access to that kind of data in a detailed way,
it's possible that the CBO estimate could change in response to
that.
There is certainly a potential range here because there's
still potential for cost growth within the context of those
contracts. There is potential for cost growth even outside of
those contracts if other decisions are made to address
technical problems that arise on the ship, as Mr. Francis has
stated. So there is certainly a possible range there, but
without knowing more detailed information I can't comment on
whether I think the high end of the range is more likely than
the lower end of the range or vice versa.
Senator McCain. But you agree there is a range?
Dr. Labs. There is a range, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Mr. Francis, do you agree that Mr. O'Rourke
states on the one hand, compared with the down-select strategy,
the dual-award might cost a net total of $705 million less. On
the other hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-
award strategy might cost a net total of as much as $2.8
billion more?
Mr. Francis. Senator McCain, I would agree that there is a
range. I'm not sure what the numbers are. As Dr. Labs
explained, his numbers are not based on the current bid
proposals. But we do think there is potential for risk. The
Navy could be exactly right on what it's estimating, but we
will have to see whether they've adequately provided for that
risk.
Senator McCain. But the three witnesses, Dr. Labs, Mr.
O'Rourke, and Mr. Francis, are operating at a certain
disadvantage because you don't, as I don't, know the exact cost
that's bid; is that correct?
Mr. O'Rourke. That's correct.
Dr. Labs. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Rourke. There's one more factor I think that needs to
be considered, which is the unknown of what the bid prices
would be under the second-stage competition that would be held
under the down-select strategy. The Navy is saying in essence
that they were pleasantly surprised by the bid prices they
received on this solicitation, but might not they be also
pleasantly surprised by the bid prices that would be submitted
under the second-stage competition that would be held under the
down-select strategy? What are the Navy's assumptions regarding
the kind of bid prices they might receive under that second-
stage competition and are they as optimistic or as pleasantly
surprising as what they have realized here?
It's also possible that if you were to implement the down-
select strategy and hold the second-stage competition, the bid
prices in that second-stage competition could be even better
than the bid prices under this first one, because the number of
bidders involved and the various talents they would bring to
bear in putting their bids together could be as great or
greater than what was available among the universe of bidders
in this solicitation.
So when the Navy says that they think they will get a
billion dollars savings more under dual-award than under down-
select, they are comparing known bid prices for this down-
select to an unknown bid price for a down-select that would
take place 2 or 3 years from now and one which might also be
pleasantly surprising to the Navy. That is one dimension of how
we cannot be all that certain about what the comparative prices
are if we were to move forward with the down-select versus
dual-award strategies.
Dr. Labs. That's a point, Senator McCain, that I raise in
my report as well.
Senator McCain. Obviously, you would agree with the
obvious. It takes a lot of training and a lot of skill to man
one of these ships efficiently, with the latest technology and
equipment. Yet now we are asking the men and women in the Navy
to be trained in two separate ships, two separate systems, two
separate supply chains, two separate maintenance regimens, and
we have obviously a very large number of questions that remain
unresolved, not because you three aren't doing your job. You
just don't have the information, and those questions are the
difference in costs, deficiencies affecting the lead ships have
not been identified and fully resolved. Has the combined
capability of the LCS seaframes with their mission modules been
sufficiently demonstrated, so that increasing the Navy's
commitment to seaframes at this time would be appropriate? Why
would operating and maintaining two different combat systems,
that is sensors, weapons, and software, that are unique to each
LCS version not offset the Navy's savings estimates or
ultimately prove to be wasteful and unsupportable; and how
consistent is the Navy's plan with GAO's recommendations for
the program?
What is the down side to delaying this decision? The
bidders have already agreed to one extension to December 30.
What's the down side to waiting, say 2 months, while we can get
the complete information and for the people that Congress
relies on for objective opinions and views and information, to
give you a couple of extra months to look at and get the
specifics that you don't have now in order to make the kind of
informed judgment and recommendations to Congress which,
frankly, are your duties?
Could I ask, maybe beginning with you, Dr. Labs? In other
words, what's the rush?
Dr. Labs. It seems to me that the down side that I can
imagine to this would depend very much on the type of
negotiations the Navy has been having with the contractors and
the process by which those contractors are involved in building
LCS-3 and -4. If, for example, delaying the contracts, the
letting of the 10-ship contract under the down-select strategy,
by a few months leads to layoffs at the shipyard, if it leads
to a loss of learning because there isn't work for people to do
because they were expecting the fiscal year 2010 ships, which
have not even been awarded yet. That could lead to increased
costs for that down-select strategy compared to what the Navy
is presenting today.
I have no idea as to what the range of that potential
increased cost could be. It could be very small. It could be
something significant. But that seems to me what would be the
potential down side to it.
On the positive side of the equation are many of the things
that you've mentioned, that we'd have much more time to look at
the details of the proposals and the details of the operating
cost issues, which we have very little information to go on,
and to make a more informed decision. That to me are the two
sides of the equation as I see it.
Senator McCain. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. I think the premise of your question included
if the bids could be extended by another month or 2 or 3, and I
don't know whether that's possible. But if the bids could be
extended, it would provide more time to get at questions of,
for example, the potential investment costs of moving toward
commonality on the combat systems. That's not something you
would do because of any inadequacy of the current combat
systems. It's because you're trying to streamline the number of
combat systems that the Navy would be supporting across its
surface fleet at any one time.
So it would provide more time for that. It would provide
more time to vet the number on life cycle operation and support
costs and what the interaction between that number is, and also
the interaction between that number and investments that you
make in combat system commonality, because the more common you
make the combat system, it could actually bring down whatever
the premium is for life cycle O&S costs.
In general, it's better to get ships under contract sooner
rather than later. I think as a general practice people in most
cases would prefer to get the ships under contract. But if we
were to wait more time and not have these ships under contract
for 1 or 2 or 3 more months, it would not be the only
shipbuilding program that has experienced that kind of a delay
while we were waiting for issues to be sorted out. The contract
award on the DDG-1000 destroyers was held, on the second and
third ships in the program, in abeyance all through this year
while we put the DDG-1000 back through the Nunn-McCurdy
recertification process. The Navy had to do that. More
generally, those two ships, the second and third ship in the
DDG-1000 program, have not been awarded, even though the second
ship was funded in the 2007-2008 timeframe and the third ship
was funded in the 2009 timeframe.
So there are other examples of ships that have waited for
some time after they were funded until the contracts were
awarded. It's not a preferable practice, but if you can get
value out of it in terms of developing firmer information on
which to base a decision, then observers might judge that value
to be worth it.
Mr. Francis. Senator McCain, if the bid prices can be
extended I think a down side would potentially be work in the
yard, particularly for LCS-3, which was recently launched and
is 80 percent complete. There'd be fabrication shops and so
forth earlier in the process that might be looking for work.
But apart from that, I think there are up sides
programmatically to have more time to go through and analyze
what we're getting ourselves into and what the downstream
effects are. I'll give you one example. In the current
estimate, the net present value of O&S costs to operate a
second ship is put at $295 million. But last year when the
strategy was changed to a down-select strategy the Navy cited
substantial O&S cost savings by going down to one design. So a
good analytical question would be, how does that $295 million
cost in this strategy compare with what savings were estimated
in the last strategy?
Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank the witnesses.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's obvious that this
is a rush to judgment on a program that has been plagued with
billions and billions of cost overruns and waste of taxpayers'
dollars. I obviously am deeply concerned about that from the
taxpayers' standpoint.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe Senator McCain has asked the right question and I
think the Navy should respond. So, Secretary Mabus, Secretary
Stackley, and Admiral Roughead, can you respond? What is lost
or what do you gain by waiting?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with the time line
that we've been on. This is a 2010 solicitation for the 2010
ships. We, in fact, received the bids back in May. The
competing industry teams who put together these fixed-price
bids have gone out through their vendor base to secure long-
term vendor agreements, looking for 10-ship buys with their
vendors over a 5-year period. So they have agreements with
their vendor base for that piece of their proposals to lock in
those fixed prices.
The other key components of their bids are their own labor
learning and the overhead rates that come with that. Those were
in the proposals received in May. We went through the
evaluation, two series of discussions, and that brought us to
the fall. The pricing was extended to expire in mid-December,
and we have pushed that back to the end of the month.
When we have discussions with industry about the impacts of
further delay to the award, that's where their proposals start
to come apart. We have both hiring freezes and layoffs in
effect at the competing shipyards, and we have vendor
agreements that have been extended far beyond what was
anticipated when they went out with their first go-arounds with
the vendors.
So their comeback to the Navy has been: We are at the point
where we have to press on. The workforce is leaving, hiring
freezes are in effect, and vendors are stressed in terms of
their ability to keep faith with the fixed-price proposals that
they have put in place. They will need to go back with any
further delay and reprice their proposals.
Today we have very affordable fixed-price proposals in
hand, which is why we are here, and we do not propose to give
those up for further delay.
Senator Reed. If I can follow up with just one question in
this area. In order to make a decision, you would have to at
least implicitly assume the additional cost to the Navy for the
2- or 3-month delay, given what the vendors and the contractors
are saying. I would assume in your comments you assume it would
be a significant increase, not something that could be
acceptable to the Navy; is that correct?
Mr. Stackley. I think that they have gotten very hard
commitments from their vendors. This program has been very
troubled. It started, stopped, started, and stopped. With this
solicitation we are looking for stability. That has been the
forcing function, to get costs under control and to get the
competitive pressure that we've brought to bear.
If we have another start-stop with the vendors, I just
don't have confidence that we'd be seeing the same type of
pricing coming back in a repricing drill.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question. You've
talked about average cost of ships, but we don't do things on
the average. We do things year-by-year, ship-by-ship. Can you
plot out the graph of the year-by-year, ship-by-ship? Is it
going to start off at a point and go up, up, up, and then peak?
Mr. Stackley. No, sir. This is the stability issue and
industry responding to the issues that we have driven in terms
of performance. We are looking at going from ship 1 to ship 2,
in terms of production labor, which is a big component of your
cost. We're seeing on average about a one-third reduction in
labor hours between the first and second ship, which is
phenomenal. This is rooting out the issues that plagued us on
the lead ships.
Then inside of the proposals across the 5 years, what we
are seeing is very steady, aggressive learning proposed based
on what we're seeing for demonstrated performance to date, what
they have locked in in terms of fixed prices with their
vendors, a reasonable expectation of control of overhead rates
based on this business base.
So we continue down a learning curve nominally in the mid-
80s, which is very good but not unreasonable in terms of
comparison with other shipbuilding programs. The 51 program,
for example, experienced learning in the 85 to 90 percent
range. We're seeing the Virginia-class in about the 90 percent
range.
They've made a significant drop in their costs from the
first to the second ship and then they're extending continued
good learning throughout the period of this contract, and then
backing it up with, as I described, locking in the material
costs. Then you have escalation effects. In fact, the learning
that we're seeing dominates over any escalation effects in the
period of this contract.
Senator Reed. Let me turn to another subject that's been
discussed. That is life cycle costs. Points have been raised by
the oversight organizations that suggest that one of the
motivating elements for a single contract was saving on life
cycle costs, the points that Senator McCain made so eloquently
about crew training and standardization. Now we have two ships
and the life cycle costs are very vague, to say the least.
They're influenced by systems--anti-submarine systems, anti-
mine systems--that are still being developed.
Can you give us a notion of how you're estimating life
cycle costs, and how confident you are of that estimate?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with the elements of
the life cycle, the total ownership cost. We have what's
referred to as a program life cycle cost estimate, which was
completed in the June-July timeframe. Independent of the
design, whether it's design A or design B, the program life
cycle cost estimate is on the order of $83 billion. The two
different designs are pretty much on top of each other in that
estimate.
When we look at a dual design versus a single design in the
life cycle, what we focus on are those elements of the life
cycle cost that are affected by the design characteristics. So
when it comes to manpower, for example, manpower is equal for
the two because they're both 40-man crews, and so you can
remove that as a determinant in O&S costs. When you look at
repair parts, whether it's a diesel on the Austal version of
the ship or the diesel on the LCS version of the ship, the
repair part is about the same. So repair part costs get pushed
off to the side in the assessment.
Then you have maintenance and fuel costs. Those are pulled
off to the side in the dual versus single design. The
determining characteristics in placing the premium on dual
design have to do with things like configuration management,
in-service engineering support, software maintenance, and then
nonrecurring associated with modernization. Then there's the
piece associated with training for the crew that Senator McCain
highlighted. When you look at that portion of the life cycle
and you estimate what the premium is for dual design versus
single design, and take into account the fact that we have
already paid for a lot of the nonrecurring cost, so by
delivering two ships we have already absorbed those costs, and
we also are going to continue to support the two ships that we
have for either of the non-selected class in a down-select
mode, that's where you arrive at a fairly manageable premium
associated with O&S for dual design, which in net present value
is about $300 million.
That's the estimate. Today we went back to the 2006
business case analysis that was done at that point in time,
because this same question was being viewed, and on a percent
basis it is consistent with the 2006 assessment, it's
consistent with the program life cycle cost estimate done this
year and then when we looked at it again in the fall.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
My time has expired, but I think these questions should be
posed, and I will follow up, either in writing or if I get back
for a second round, to the oversight, because this is a
critical issue. I think it's such a highly complex and
technical nature that it deserves a discussion from both
perspectives.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for having this hearing. I think it's good to air these
questions. I appreciate Senator McCain's commitment to
containing costs and I think some of his criticisms early on of
this program have been exactly correct. I think all of us
recognize the program had an inauspicious beginning.
I would just ask Admiral Roughead and Admiral Pandolfe, how
many years do you two have working with building ships?
Admiral Roughead. I've been involved with ships for going
on 38 years now, Senator. I've had the opportunity to put the
second ship of a class in commission, and I understand what the
challenges are associated with that. As I said in my statement,
these ships are needed, but what we're seeing as we get on to
building the second ship of the class or the second ship of
each design is some pretty remarkable improvements that in my
experience not only are encouraging, but they give me the
confidence to go forward.
Senator Sessions. The drop in price as the new ships come
on, does that exceed what you have seen normally in your
previous history?
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Stackley can talk more about the
pricing of ships, but what I have seen in the way of the
learning curve as we go forward on these ships I think is
really quite good.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Pandolfe, how many years have you
had?
Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, I've just gone over 30 years of
operating and maintaining war ships. To the CNO's point, I
think the team has worked extraordinarily hard over the last
year to bring this program to where it needs to be, to put
rigor into the requirements and to work with our shipbuilders,
and to get some affordable pricing that can lead to program
stability. That's what this program needs, sir.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Stackley, how many years have
you been working in this area?
Mr. Stackley. About 30 years, sir.
Senator Sessions. I think you have almost 100 years here of
experience. You've been living with this a lot closer than any
of us in the Senate have been living with it. The House has
approved this plan that you've asked them to approve, and I'm
inclined to agree, based on what I know.
I think we ought to examine it, but I think we should have
an open mind. Mr. Stackley, regarding to additional delays,
you've mentioned a number of points. One of our reviewers in
analyzing this talked about uncertainty in programs. We've
already had a lot of uncertainty and a lot of delays in this
program. Could this cause a bad reputation for DOD, in general,
to a bidder thinking, no matter what I do, it's going to be put
off and delayed and costs are going to run up? Is that a
concern we should have?
Mr. Stackley. Sir, I think one of the most critical aspects
of cost control on any major defense program is stability;
stability of requirements, stability of design, stability in
budgeting, stability in scheduling and contracting. Delaying
the program tends to destabilize what we're trying to
accomplish here.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Roughead, you've heard from CBO,
GAO, and CRS. But the Navy has its own plan. It's your ship,
it's your money that's getting spent. Do you believe that your
analysis of these bids and the decision you've reached is based
on intense evaluation that is more in depth than the three that
have been proposed here? Not that they're not valuable, not
that a fresh look at this isn't very valuable. But tell me how
you evaluate your own plan? It's not as if you haven't analyzed
these factors yourself.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think as the other witnesses
mentioned, they're working from models and from estimates.
We're working from known figures. We can get into why it is
that way. I think even a delay may not even solve that problem,
simply because of the restrictions that we have on making that
information available.
So a delay doesn't get us any farther down the road. But
we're working from known figures; they're at the disadvantage
of not having those figures.
The other point that I would make and one of the reasons
why I have confidence in the ships is that we've had these to
sea. There is no other ship class that I'm aware of that 2
years ahead of schedule I directed Admiral Pandolfe and his
team to deploy the ship within a matter of months and the ship
deployed, not only to the Caribbean in real operations, but
then we pushed it out to Hawaii, where it participated in the
largest maritime exercise in the world with other countries and
with our high-end capabilities, an aircraft carrier. The ship
has performed well.
The mission modules are plug-and-play, so the complexity of
the mission capabilities of the ship allows us to change those
as we go along. I think there are so many attributes to this.
I'm confident with the way we've seen both designs work at sea,
and I'm comfortable with where we are.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Mabus, I know that when you
came on board there was a lot of criticism of this program. It
seems to me I have to say you've done what Congress asked.
You've confronted the cost. My criticism to you and Mr.
Stackley was you emphasized cost so much that maybe you weren't
evaluating which ship had the greatest capabilities. But we had
a cost problem. Congress told you to deal with the cost
problem.
I'm actually quite surprised and pleased that you've
brought this under the cost cap and to a point where you can,
as I understand it, add an additional ship and still have money
left over, according to your estimates.
Would you comment on that?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, sir. Thank you. I sat in this room at my
confirmation hearings, listened to the concerns raised,
particularly on acquisition, on cost control of certain
programs. I watched as this committee passed the WSARA of 2009
almost immediately after I was confirmed. In this we set about
to use that Act as almost a checklist to go down, to put
competition in the programs, to do firm fixed-price contracts
whenever possible, to demand improvement as programs went
along, to demand a learning curve, and that prices, time, and
schedule should improve as programs mature, to make sure that
designs did not change to any significant degree during
construction, that designs be mature, and that technology be
mature.
To the CNO's point, because these are modular ships,
because you can remove and replace weapons systems, you have a
very stable hull, a very stable platform for these weapons
systems, so that you don't have to redesign an entire ship as
technology improves or as weapons systems change.
I think, as I said in my statement, that this is a great
example of the WSARA of 2009 working, that we have taken a
program that had problems, particularly in cost, but also in
stability, and have stabilized the program, have driven costs
down by using the intent, the spirit, and the specifications of
that Act.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Stackley, I believe one of our
witnesses testified that the follow-on contract bid if we use
the original proposal, the single source proposal, could be
lower than you've estimated as you evaluated the viability of
this dual award. Isn't it possible that they could also be
higher than you presently estimate?
Mr. Stackley. I read CBO's report and understand the
information that's in their table and the differences in terms
of the way the Naval Sea Systems Command and CBO estimate. In
terms of the baseline for the down-select, we are within 5
percent of each other relative to the estimate. But again, CBO
does not have the insight into the specific bid information
that we have that gives us far greater confidence in terms of
the numbers that we're bringing forward.
Senator Sessions. You're getting a fixed-price contract and
I believe it's CBO's numbers using inflation of 1.0 in 2011,
edging up to 2.3 in 2015. If it goes above that, are the
bidders required to eat that cost?
Mr. Stackley. The proposals that we received are what's
referred to as forward-priced, which means that they have
included escalation inside of their bids.
Senator Sessions. So if it goes higher than that, they eat
that cost?
Mr. Stackley. It's all in accordance with the terms and
conditions of that fixed-price contract, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Even though it's a fixed-price contract,
you're not contractually obligated to even buy them. If
Congress decides not to fund the ship in the future, there will
be no penalty if the government fails to purchase another ship?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. When we award these contracts,
we're funding the first ships on the contract, but the ships
that are in the out-years are subject to the annual
appropriations. So if either the Navy or Congress determine not
to fund the out-year ships, there is no termination liability
or cancellation ceiling.
Senator Sessions. I think it's a pretty tough negotiation,
Mr. Chairman. I think they've done a pretty good job.
Chairman Levin. It's the first bit of daylight in this
program, actually.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I start on my questions, I wanted to take a moment
of personal privilege. I think this will be my last Senate
Armed Services Committee meeting. I'm not sure, but I think so.
Chairman Levin. You never know around here.
Senator LeMieux. You never know. There could be one
tomorrow.
Chairman Levin. It's been our privilege to have you be with
us.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you for the good work that you've
done, thank you to Senator McCain, it is especially important
work as we're fighting two wars. So I just wanted to make a
note of that.
Admiral Roughead, in listening to this it occurs to me that
we've had a competition here with two ships and we're in the
situation now where the proposal is on the table to not pick
one or the other, but to pick both. Why is it in the best
interest of the Navy and why does it serve the requirements of
the Navy to have both of these ships, as opposed to just have
one?
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator. I think there are a
couple of reasons. One, it is clearly going to allow us to
begin introduction of the ships at a more rapid rate, simply
because we'll have two shipyards building, so we'll have two
production lines moving.
There is no question that both of these designs meet the
LCS requirement. That said, there are attributes in each design
that I believe in the future will prove to be operationally
advantageous. Operating the ships in tandem, a particular ship
with another collection of ships, I think will give us
capabilities that we would not have had before.
Then coupled with that are the savings that are realized by
going down this path. So from what I would call the speed to
the fleet, the flexibility that we get, and then the advantage
to the taxpayer in the cost of the program, I think those are
the advantages that are apparent to me.
Senator LeMieux. Operationally, would you potentially
deploy one ship or the other depending upon the mission based
upon the unique capabilities of those ships if you had both in
your arsenal?
Admiral Roughead. I think that each ship has some
attributes that favor one over the other. What is the mission,
what is the environment, what are the other ships that are in
company? I think all those are factors that will allow us to
put together better mixes of capability simply because of the
attributes of each design.
They both fit the bill, and I think it's going to give our
Navy increased flexibility.
Senator LeMieux. I don't have a problem with that and
that's a compelling argument to me. I want the Navy to have all
of the tools it needs to be able to accomplish whatever mission
there is. If they both fit the bill but there's one that has a
unique advantage in a specific situation, I think that makes a
lot of sense, for you to have that.
I am concerned, however, with the point that Senator McCain
brought up, is that it's hard for us to do our oversight
function if we're not able to rely upon CBO to look inside the
numbers. I trust you, but I adhere to the old Reagan
expression, ``trust, but verify.'' Our job is to know.
Maybe the chairman and the ranking member have been privy
to this information. We don't have the privy of this
information. On its face, the idea that we have two ships, we
had a competition and we're supposed to get to one, and now
we're going to take both and that's going to save us money,
doesn't make intuitive sense. It doesn't make sense to have two
ships which require two maintenance programs, which require two
training regimens, which are going to require different
attributes for the Navy to be able to deal with these two ships
over time. That doesn't make intuitive sense.
If it is true that you can save $600 million, or even $1
billion, which is another number I heard, as opposed to the
number that our friends at GAO, CBO, and CRS suggest, which
will cost more, that's fine. But we need to have that
information.
Mr. Chairman, this may not be something that happens when
I'm here, but it seems to me that in the future we need to make
sure that the folks who do this evaluation for us have this
information and then we, whether it's in executive session or
not, can have that information. We can't do our job without it.
I feel a little bit hamstrung without knowing exactly what
the numbers are and what the attributes of the particular ship
are. If we could have a candid conversation about why you like
this ship better than that one, I think we could do a better
job.
It's hard for me to come to a final conclusion. I am
appreciative of your comments and I certainly want you to have
all the tools you need, but I also have to look out for the
taxpayer, and it's hard for me to make that evaluation.
I appreciate what you've done. I appreciate Secretary
Mabus' work on this, because I know cost-cutting, as my
colleague from Alabama said, has been something that you've
been focused on. So I appreciate that.
I don't have any additional questions, Mr. Chairman,
because I feel at a loss if we don't have that information. I
hope going forward that this committee will have the ability to
be able to truly evaluate the pros and the cons with the
information before it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. There's no doubt that there's a
disadvantage in that regard in terms of oversight. I don't know
myself how to get around the proprietary protection.
By the way, we don't have that information, either. We're
relying on the Navy and then our oversight folks to the extent
they're able to do it, and they tell us what they can do and
what they can't do, and give us the range of their limitations.
It is a disadvantage, it seems to me, and we will look into how
we can possibly in the future deal with that. I'm not sure that
they've solved that in the past that we can, but it's an
important point.
Senator LeMieux. If I could just suggest, in the
procurement process going forward, I know that these companies
have proprietary information. There's going to have to be some
ability to have a limited waiver of that, because we can't do
our job under the Constitution if we can't know what the
information is.
Chairman Levin. Yes, it definitely is a problem for us, and
we have to weigh the limitations in our judgment as to what
we're operating under.
In terms of the attributes, though, I don't know that that
is privileged information. The CNO has given us the statement
that each ship has certain attributes. I think that part of it
probably is available to us. Is that right?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I would say it is. A lot of it
is simply in the configurations of the ship, the volume that is
available in one, boat-handling capability that's available in
another. The first time I walked aboard the LCS was back in
2007 as the first two were being built, I was struck at the
potential that was in the ship, the volume, the aviation
capability, the ability to move boats on and off.
Each one is different, as a fleet commander both in the
Atlantic and Pacific and having operated globally, I could
envision each one of those ships bringing great versatility,
agility, and capability to our Navy. One thing our commanders
will do is they'll mix and match this capability for the
mission, for the environment, to get the best effect. I think
it really gives us some incredible capability, not just in what
we've been talking about, in cost and stability to program and
to the industrial base, but I think it gives us great
operational flexibility.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux, and thank you
for your great service to this committee and to our State and
to our country. We really appreciate your being with us. You've
been a very, very active participant in the work of this
committee and we deeply appreciate it.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to join you in
that. Senator LeMieux's been a great member of the Senate and
this committee. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, before Senator LeMieux
leaves, I just want to point out to my colleagues that, who
knows, he may be back on this committee some day.
Chairman Levin. I can't say exactly with a straight face
that I would look forward to that, as much as I look forward to
the service that you've given to us. [Laughter.]
But I think Senator LeMieux understands I'm an honest
person and you put me in a very difficult position.
Senator Collins. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. That's all right.
Senator Collins. I just couldn't quite resist the
opportunity there.
Chairman Levin. I do repeat my strong feeling that you've
been a major contributor to this committee. That is sincere and
I would want to keep that sincerity in my response in reaction
to Senator Collins' comment.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On a more serious note--though that was a serious note--I
want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding
this hearing today on what is a very important issue. I must
say that the Navy's latest decision on this program took me by
surprise. I've had a very helpful opportunity to talk to some
of the members of this panel as well as to other experts. But,
like many of my colleagues, I've not yet reached a final
decision on the Navy's proposal.
Since that decision is upon us, since language is included
in the omnibus, I very much welcome this opportunity today to
better understand the Navy's rationale for this change in its
strategy. Both the Secretary and Admiral Roughead have said
that this plan is good for our shipbuilding industrial base. As
all the members of this panel as well as my colleagues on this
committee know, preserving the industrial base is a major
concern of mine and a major concern of the Navy's.
Let me start by first exploring that issue with you, and
I'll start with you, Admiral Roughead. When the Navy announced
last year that it was going to hold an LCS down-select
competition and cease to build the two different designs, it
stated that the winning shipbuilder would build 10 ships in the
near term and then there would be a second competition that
would be held by the Navy to introduce the second source
shipbuilder.
A number of Navy shipbuilders, including Bath Iron Works
(BIW) in my home State, relied on the Navy's announced plan and
thought that they might well end up competing to be that second
source for the ship that was produced as a result of the down-
select. The reason that this is important to our shipbuilders
is many of them, including BIW, are looking out and seeing gaps
in their workload, and the potential of being able to build
some of the LCSs would help fill in some of those gaps.
Under the Navy's new proposal, however, the Navy will
continue to build both designs with the two current
shipbuilders and there's no longer a definitive plan or
commitment by the Navy to introduce competition by other
shipbuilders in fiscal year 2012, which had been the original
plan.
I understand the case that you're making for the new plan
and I understand the advantages that it could have, including
certain cost advantages. But I'm concerned that you're removing
an opportunity for more volume to help fill in those gaps for
other shipbuilders that had hoped to build LCSs in the future
and now are unlikely to have the opportunity to do so.
I realize that's a long introduction to my concern. But
given your new proposed strategies, what specific actions will
the Navy's leaders take to preserve shipbuilding volume and
stability at critical shipyards like BIW if it now appears that
they're not going to be involved in building the LCS? I ask
this in particular because of my concern that we still don't
have the DDG-1000, the second and third ship, under
construction contracts, even though they've been fully
authorized and appropriated, and in view of my concern about
the low level of procurement on the DDG-51, a concern that I
know you share.
Admiral, if you could address that concern on how you plan
to preserve shipbuilding volume and stability necessary for our
shipyards if you go this new route.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question.
In fact, even if we go with the 20-ship option that we're
talking about here, that's only about half the ship class. So
our commitment is to continue to build the LCS, to get to the
target of 55 that we need. So there is more shipbuilding that
will go on as a result of the LCS.
This is not an operational factor for me, but I also
believe that the designs of the ships, the flexibility in the
ships, and also the cost of these ships open up potential for
foreign military sales that would otherwise not be there. Then
on top of that, is the savings that we derive, because we look
at our shipbuilding account in its entirety. These savings also
enable us to look at how we can shift around other procurements
that we may need because we've realized these savings.
Senator Collins. I guess my concern is if you have the two
current shipbuilders each building 10 ships--and I understand
the advantage if you can get 20 ships for the cost of 19, that
that is powerful--but it seems very unlikely to me that other
shipbuilders are going to be able to come in at that point.
That's very different from a down-select that produced 1 ship
design, the first shipbuilder would build 10, and then it's a
tossup or an open competition. It's very different if you're
going with 20 ships, 10 at each shipyard, and it seems to me
that does make it unlikely for others to bid in the future.
Let me go to your second point about cost and ask the
Secretary and you both this question. The Navy has asserted
that the dual-award strategy not only adds stability to the LCS
program, but will produce savings that could benefit
shipbuilding programs as a whole. Earlier this year, as you're
all aware, both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
House Armed Services Committee expressed concern in our
committee reports that the procurement rate for destroyers is
insufficient.
If the Navy's large surface combatants continue their
historical average service lives of 25 to 30 years, we are
never going to reach the Navy's goal of 88 large surface
combatants. Furthermore, if you look at the independent Perry
and Hadley panel which reviewed the Quadrennial Defense Review,
that panel recommended a fleet of 346 Navy ships. Admiral
Roughead, every time we've talked you've always been careful to
say 313 is the floor, and so I suspect that higher number is
not really a surprise to you. These are actual requirements.
This isn't pie in the sky. These are to meet our military
presence requirements.
Secretary Mabus, we'll start with you: Do you believe that
the change that you're proposing for the LCS program will make
it easier for you to address the budget shortfalls facing the
shipbuilding budget?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Senator. Yes, as Secretary Stackley
said earlier, we would propose taking the savings that we get
from the proposed dual buy and keeping it in shipbuilding, so
that we can procure more ships, for the same amount of money
over the next 5 years.
Admiral Roughead and I share your concern that we keep
these critical skills in our shipyards, because shipbuilding
skills tend to be unique and if you lose those skills they are
very hard, if not impossible, to regain. Second, as this
committee has authorized, the DDG-51 line has been restarted,
because it is one of our crucial platforms. It's one of the
most flexible platforms that we have, and that's particularly
true since the President has given the Navy the mission of
being the first antiballistic missile defense in the Phased
Adaptive Approach. We're the first phase, the Aegis system that
goes on the DDG-51.
So it would certainly be our hope and our recommendation
that any savings we get from the LCS program go back into
building more of other classes of ships.
Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, do you want to add to
that or give me a similar commitment that the savings would be
not diverted for other purposes, but help meet the shortfall
that is so clear in the shipbuilding budget?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. I am committed to the force
structure. I think I've been consistent with that during my
time as CNO. I'm also very focused on the need for
recapitalizing the combatant fleet when we get to the 20s. That
is an issue that I would submit is bigger than the Navy,
because it is about our ability to field that type of force as
part of our national interest. It's also significantly
important to our industrial base and what we will be doing as
the ships that we built in numbers in the 80s age out. Key to
that, one of those large number-drivers, are our combatants,
the DDG-51s, and so that is the strategy that we as a Navy and
we as a Nation have to take forward into the 2020s.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Starting round two, I just have really one additional
question. There's been the question of the additional O&S costs
of operating two different ships here. I think you told us,
Secretary Stackley, that we're going to be operating ships in
each class in any event since we will have at least two in each
class. So the question is how confident are you that you have
adequately estimated the marginal costs of operating a larger
number of the ship class that might have only included two
ships?
Mr. Stackley. Yes, sir. We have broken down the different
categories of costs and to the extent that we can at this stage
in what will be about a 40-year life cycle for the program,
have tried to discretely cost out the research and development
(R&D), the procurement, and the operations and maintenance
(O&M) bills associated with the dual design. We start on the
R&D side on the upfront. We have a good understanding today of
things like training systems required for the two different
ship types, and in fact we have training systems that we've
already procured for the two different ship types, so we have
high fidelity in the remaining costs in that category.
We're sustaining two different design efforts today inside
of the procurement. We look at the premium associated in plans
and engineering in a down select versus the dual-award inside
of the budget, and then we are able to extrapolate that outside
of the FYDP carrying that on into the life cycle for the class.
So we believe we have good fidelity there.
When you get into software maintenance and modernization,
that's subjective and it's subjective by way of there are
future decisions that we're going to make on the class that
will impact that. So while we have what I'll call a plug number
in there in our estimate, throughout the life cycle we're going
to be continually reevaluating what modernization at what
cycle, what point in the program, do we insert new capabilities
or do baseline upgrades. That's a little bit more subjective.
It doesn't have the fidelity as compared to the other
categories that I've described.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
I appreciate all of you. I know that the Navy has worked
hard to bring this program under control. I think earlier when
our independent evaluators were criticizing the program I think
the Navy's defense was not so good. But I do believe you've
gotten this program under control and I thank you for that. I
think that criticism and objective view helped get us to the
position we are today.
But ultimately it is the Navy who handles this weapons
system, who's working with it daily, who's had people in the
shipyards monitoring every step of the construction. I value
your opinion and you've seen both the ships and you say both
would be helpful to you. I think that's something that we
should consider.
It does seem to me, Admiral Roughead, that if a decade from
now a new anti-mine warfare system, a new surveillance system,
a new weapons system, came about and you decided to put it on
15, 20, or 30 of the ships, might not one of those ships be
better able to handle it, and could that be an advantage from
having ships with slightly different capabilities?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I think the two different types
give us a certain amount of flexibility and versatility, as I
talked earlier about this ability to mix the capabilities of a
force that we put in there.
The other thing I would say that the LCS gives us that
other ships do not is that if we are upgrading a mine warfare
capability in the LCS that seaframe can be off doing something
in anti-submarine warfare. Today, if we want to take it in and
upgrade a capability, that ship comes off line. In the case of
the LCS, we can upgrade the mine countermeasure package while
the ship is doing anti-submarine warfare or surface warfare.
The ability to increase capability on these ships on both
designs is really quite extraordinary. That's why the system
that we're putting together is for more than a ship. It really
is a capability that we've not had before.
Senator Sessions. I think you could argue that there could
be a minor extra cost because one ship is presumably slightly
less expensive than the other, but apparently they're pretty
close, from what I understand from your testimony. So I think
that the additional advantage is helpful.
One thing about our industrial capacity, Secretary Mabus.
We often sell ships to our allies and it's both good for our
shipbuilding capacity and for those countries.
Having two ships, might that be somewhat of an advantage
for our ability to export weapons systems to our allies?
Mr. Mabus. I think it would, Senator. I think, like
operationally, in terms of foreign military sales, having both
versions gives us more flexibility. Some countries may want one
version for specific reasons. Others may want the other. I
think it gives us a better opportunity to make those sales and
make more of them than with one version.
Senator Sessions. I just don't think there's any doubt, Mr.
Chairman. If these shipyards are preparing to go forward,
they're at a point where the delays do impact them. I see one
Navy source in a recent article said there's a 100 percent
chance of a contest or a protest. I don't know whether that's
accurate or not. But certainly we would be in a position to
move forward with a lot less potential delays in this
recommendation of the Navy. I'm inclined to think it's well
thought out.
Thank you for having this hearing.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
I'll just close with one request and then one comment. The
request is that the agencies that help us to oversee these kind
of issues--we've run into this proprietary issue before. It's
not the first time. So we would ask you to give some thought as
to how we can in the future address that issue. You have the
same issue. You're unable to be more specific because you don't
have the information. It's proprietary and these contractors
are not going to disclose it.
We have the Navy, on the other hand, that has seen it, and
has given us the assurances. These are fixed-price contracts.
If these weren't fixed-price contracts, let me tell you, I'd
have plenty of problems with these contracts. They're fixed-
price contracts, so we have a pretty fair handle on that. But
still, if we can solve that proprietary information issue in
the future, I think it would be helpful to you and it would be
helpful to us as well.
In terms of my comment, this has been a troubled program,
obviously. The Senate has been deeply involved in trying to get
this back on track. It seems like it is on track. This is the
first daylight in this program that I think we've seen, and
it's very welcome. We are grateful that all of you would come
here today again on short notice; it was important that you be
available to answer these questions. I think you've done a
very, very good job of doing that.
Thank you all. With that very positive comment, we now
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]