[Senate Hearing 111-710]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-710
CHALLENGES TO WATER AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
JIM WEBB, Virginia Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Chungyalpa, Dekila, director for the Greater Mekong Program,
World Wildlife Fund, Washington, DC............................ 35
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Cronin, Dr. Richard, senior associate, Stimson Center,
Washington, DC................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Imhof, Aviva, campaigns director, International Rivers, Berkeley,
CA............................................................. 25
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement.... 1
Yun, Joseph, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
(iii)
CHALLENGES TO WATER AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:28 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Webb.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Webb. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
order.
And let me begin by apologizing for the delay in the start
of the hearing. We had a series of votes, the last one having
just been called, about 2:20. So, we will move with some
dispatch here to hear the witnesses and have the dialogue that
the hearing is anticipated to bring.
Today's hearing will explore the critical intersection of
the environment, foreign policy, and security in Southeast
Asia, a nexus that occurs along the Mekong River. Often called
``the mother of all rivers,'' the Mekong originates on the
Tibetan Plateau, flows nearly 3,000 miles down through Burma,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam before emptying through
the Mekong Delta into the South China Sea. It is the world's
12th longest river and the center of a nearly 500,000-square-
mile watershed across the region.
The Lower Mekong River, in mainland Southeast Asia, is a
source of water, food, and economic opportunity for more than
60 million people. In this area, freshwater fisheries provide
at least $2 billion, and up to $9 billion, annually in income,
and approximately 80 percent of the animal protein consumed by
the population.
Given the vital role of the river in this region,
scientists, environmentalists, and policymakers have great
concerns that current designs to construct hydropower dams
along the Mekong may disrupt the region's balance. This hearing
will examine the risks of this development, the environmental,
economic, sovereignty, and security challenges these dams pose
for the Mekong River, the challenge of managing transboundary
water resources through multilateral cooperation, and the role
that the United States can play in promoting this approach.
Currently, China plans to construct more than 15 dams on
the main stem of the Upper Mekong River, in Tibet and Yunnan
provinces. In Yunnan, Chinese authorities are planning a
cascade of eight large-to-mega-size dams, four of which have
been completed. The largest of these four, the Xiaowan Dam, is
the world's highest compound concrete arch dam, taller than the
Hoover Dam. Its reservoir will hold 15 billion cubic meters of
water. For comparison, the Three Gorges Dam in China holds 20
billion cubic meters of water.
Future dams in the Yunnan cascade will have even larger
reservoirs, enabling China to regulate the waterflow to suit
its needs. For their part, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and
Vietnam are planning to construct or finance the construction
of up to 13 dams on the lower half of the river's main stem.
Compared to China's Xiaowan Dam, most of these dams will be a
quarter of the size, in terms of height and hydroelectric
capacity.
Additional dams have been planned or constructed along the
Mekong's tributaries. These dams are intended to generate
electricity in support of growing regional energy demand. Some
of the electricity will even be exported, particularly from
Laos, which has voiced its goal to become the battery of
Southeast Asia.
These dams may also be used to store water, increase
irrigation, and contribute to flood control. However, these
dams will also affect the river's waterflow, its fish
population, and wildlife. Low environmental standards, and weak
enforcement of those standards, may allow these dams to bring
catastrophic damage to the river's ecosystem. Moreover, the
uncoordinated construction of these dams may threaten the
entire region's stability if, as projected, food production
decreases and countries begin to compete for access to water.
The economic benefits derived from electricity production
could be short-lived in this case if tensions over access to
transboundary water resources flash into greater political
instability.
Over the past year, I've traveled to all of the countries
in mainland Southeast Asia. And during these visits, as well as
here at home, I've examined water-use practices and plans for
the river's development. I've engaged numerous American and
regional diplomats, policymakers, environmental engineers, and
academics, all of whom convey the importance of the Mekong
River to Southeast Asia's economic sustainability and to its
human security.
In particular, the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia, the largest
body of freshwater in Southeast Asia, plays a critical role in
the region's food production system. During the wet season,
when the Mekong's water levels are highest, water flows from
the river into the lake, filling it up. When water levels drop
with the dry season, water flows reverse and the lake empties
back into the river. Nowhere else in the world is the flow
reversal or river pulse so large.
The region's fish species and migration patterns depend
upon this river pulse, with fish migrating upriver as far as
Yunnan province in China. The volume of fish migration in the
Mekong is estimated to be 100 times larger than the volume of
fish migration in the Pacific Northwest.
Annual floods also naturally restore soil nutrients and
purge pollutants, facilitating agricultural productivity.
Consequently, Thailand and Vietnam have become the world's
leading exporters of rice.
The Tonle Sap River pulse, the extent of fish migration,
and the flow of sediments into the delta are all at risk from
the unchecked construction of hydropower dams along the Mekong
River mainstream.
With mounting evidence, experts estimate that existing and
planned hydropower dams may block the migration of 70 percent
of the most commercially important fish. Decreasing water
flows, particularly in the dry season, may contribute to
saltwater intrusion into the Mekong Delta and threaten
freshwater rice production.
In June, I traveled to the delta, to Can Tho, in Vietnam,
where environmental scientists reported that, over the past 20
years, seawater has crept 20 kilometers further up into the
Delta. They expect that this intrusion will worsen as upstream
hydropower dams further restrict waterflow.
Given the severity of these risks and their transboundary
consequences, it's vital to consider ways to address water
resources management and the development of hydropower dams
through multilateral cooperation. The Mekong River Commission,
established in 1995 by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam,
is one regional organization attempting this approach.
In August 2009, I met with the Mekong River Commission in
Laos and observed the valuable role that it plays in collecting
data on the river, forecasting the impact of hydropower
development, and catalyzing a regional approach to water
management.
I'm concerned, however, that the effectiveness of this
organization is limited by two major factors. First is the lack
of membership by two Upper Mekong countries, China and Burma.
In fact, China is one of the few countries in the world that
does not recognize riparian water rights of downstream nations.
Yet, it is the gatekeeper for the Mekong River and all of the
water that flows downstream from the Tibetan Plateau.
Without China's meaningful participation in regional river
management and consideration of downstream nations, the Lower
Mekong countries are vulnerable to China's control over water
flows. This concern should include China's potential ability to
hold back the river at its source.
Second, the commission lacks the power to prevent
environmental and economic harms that may occur when parties
fail to account for regional impacts in the development of
hydropower. It also lacks the power to hold nations liable for
environmental or economic damage resulting from these
developments.
Southeast Asia is in need of a methodology, either
political or economic, or both, that can raise environmental
standards, mitigate the negative impacts of water use and
development, and ultimately hold countries responsible for
their actions.
With U.S. participation, the Asian Development Bank's
financing of infrastructure projects presents one opportunity
to influence regional environmental practices. The ADB is the
only regional organization to which all Mekong countries
belong. And it has played a significant role in funding the
development of hydropower and electricity transmission systems
throughout the region.
Presently, this committee is developing legislation to
authorize the U.S. capital contribution to the Asian
Development Bank. This bill also provides an opportunity to
revisit the role that the ADB plays in Southeast Asia,
particularly in financing infrastructure projects and in
improving environmental standards. To this end, I've been
working, with input from several organizations, including the
World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy, International
Rivers, and the Stimson Center, to develop language that would
raise the environmental standards for hydropower dam or
electricity transmission projects financed by the ADB.
This language, if adopted, would instruct the U.S.
executive director at the Bank to vote against financing a
project if the Treasury decides not to certify to Congress that
the process adheres to internationally recognized environmental
standards, and that it protects the rights of individuals
affected by the project, and reflects a multilateral approach
to development along the Mekong River.
I've shared the language under consideration with our
nongovernment witnesses, and I would be interested in hearing
any thoughts that they might have on that, and any other policy
suggestions, as the hearing goes forward today. And I will look
forward to working with Chairman Kerry and the committee to
include some form of this language in the ADB authorization.
United States attention to the health and well-being of the
Mekong River in Southeast Asia can be a vital factor in
facilitating a positive multilateral solution to the risks
facing the region. Additionally, we can encourage other
countries to adopt long-term approaches toward developing the
Mekong River that would balance each nation's economic
development with the protection of the environment and the
overall security of more than 60 million people.
I'm pleased to welcome two panels today to help us examine
the challenges facing Southeast Asia's environment, economy,
and security, and how the United States can facilitate better
multilateral management of the Mekong River and the region's
environment.
Our first panel, I would like to welcome Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Joseph Yun. This is the first occasion that
Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun has had to appear formally
before the subcommittee, but we've had several meetings, and I
have enjoyed, very much, working with Secretary Yun to this
point.
And I'd like, again, to congratulate you on your recent
promotion.
Previously, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun served as the
Director of the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia in the State
Department. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service
class of minister counselor. His overseas assignments have been
in South Korea, Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong.
So, welcome, Secretary Yun. And please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH YUN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Yun. Thank you very much, Chairman. And thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss the importance of the Mekong
River to the sustainable development and security of the Mekong
Basin and key aspects of our engagement strategy on these
issues with the Southeast Asia region.
With your permission, I would like to make brief remarks
and submit a longer statement for the record.
Senator Webb. Your longer statement will be entered into
the record at this time. And please proceed with any other
comments you'd like to make.
Mr. Yun. In her remarks on World Water Day this year,
Secretary Clinton stated that, ``Water represents one of the
great diplomatic and development opportunities of our time.''
By 2025, nearly two-thirds of the world population will be
living under water-stressed conditions. Water scarcity and poor
water quality will increase disease risks, undermine economic
growth, limit food production, and become an increasing threat
to peace and security.
The Lower Mekong region of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam is one of Asia's most vulnerable areas to the impacts
of climate change because of large numbers of people living in
flood plains and low-lying coastal areas and because the people
and economies of the region depend strongly on agriculture and
ecosystem services. The region's extraordinary biodiversity is
also at risk from human activities and both the direct and
indirect impacts of climate change.
The Mekong is one of the most complex river systems in the
world. It is the longest river in Southeast Asia, stretching
over 2,700 miles, through six countries, nearly twice the
length of the Colorado. Its watershed supports millions of
people, providing over $2 billion in revenue from wild
fisheries alone.
Within the lower basin are ecologically unique features
that play crucial roles in regulating the flows of the Mekong.
The Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia's most important fishery, and,
below that, the wide reach of the Vietnam Delta, which produces
about 52 percent of Vietnam's rice and most of its aquaculture,
fish, and shrimp exports.
The people of the Mekong River Basin depend heavily on the
river. Irrigated agriculture and fishing engage 85 percent of
the workforce within the basin. And for most farmers, the river
is critical to their survival.
Poverty is still an enormous challenge in the region, and
those who are dependent on the natural base of the Mekong are,
of course, the first to suffer from any environmental damages
and changes.
It is also important to note that the region holds great
capacity for growth and economic opportunity. For example,
United States exports to Vietnam have tripled in the last 3
years, with two-way trade reaching nearly $16 billion in 2009.
And the region has proved to be very resilient during the
recent economic downturn.
Economic growth results in growing energy needs, and the
countries of the Mekong are increasingly turning to hydropower
as a solution. Construction of dams on the Mekong River,
however, may pose immediate and long-term threats to the food
security and livelihood of the millions of people in the Lower
Mekong Basin.
The impetus behind the Mekong dam projects is the creation
of a regional electrical grid which will facilitate the
development of the Mekong Basin. In the future, the Mekong and
its tributaries could support an elaborate interlocking
electric power generation, supplying Laos, northern Thailand,
parts of Cambodia, and much of Yunnan province in China. The
economic stakes for dam construction are high, and the states
of the Mekong Basin are eager for developmental benefits they
can obtain.
On the upper stem of the Mekong, China's eight-dam cascade
in Yunnan province, four of which are completed, will most
certainly disrupt some of the river's natural function, as well
as give China some degree of control over the timing and amount
of water flows. During the dry season, the flows from China
account for 40 percent of water supply in the Mekong system.
During the wet months, the share is about 16 percent.
In the Lower Mekong, hydropower development plans have been
plagued by weak oversight of required environmental and social
impact assessments. The greatest downstream ecological impact
of regional infrastructure development will be felt at
Cambodia's Tonle Sap Great Lake and Vietnam's Mekong River
Delta.
Upstream mainstem dams may degrade the Tonle Sap, affecting
fish migration and population. The Mekong Delta of Vietnam may
also suffer major consequences, including the loss of vital
silt replenishment, resulting in increased saltwater intrusion
and decreased rice production.
The Mekong River system is already beginning to show signs
of strain brought about by its multiple competing uses.
Although much attention is focused on the impact of future
dams, immediate environmental threats also exist through
overuse and pollution from industry, wastewater, and
agriculture. Effectively managing transboundary water is an
enormous challenge, particularly for the regions--for the
nations in the region with different levels of economic
development and past animosities.
Facing these difficulties, the Mekong River Commission has
provided a framework for addressing transboundary water
resources in the region. It has steered regional and watershed
development since 1995, emphasizing avenues for cooperation,
strategic planning, and continued dialogue. Although not a
regulatory agency, the Mekong River Commission builds knowledge
and technical capacity for member states of Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam through providing assistance and
recommendations.
These problems are not easy, but cooperative solutions are
possible. While the United States has a long history of
engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia on a bilateral
basis, there is an increasing awareness of the growing number
of issues that transcend national boundaries. The countries of
the Lower Mekong region share a variety of common interests and
concerns. With those concerns in mind, Secretary Clinton
launched the Lower Mekong Initiative in 2009 to help facilitate
regional cooperation on the issues of environment, education,
health, and infrastructure. This initiative seeks to coordinate
effective responses to challenges, that are inherently regional
in nature, through working-level visits, training workshops,
conferences, and scientific and technological exchanges.
In concert with other technical agencies of the U.S.
Government, USAID, and the State Department are making
significant investments in order to further improve our
regional programming. USAID programs incorporate U.S. expertise
into a regional plan to address some of the key water and
development challenges these countries face. They also foster
cooperation among the countries in the region to work together
for a common purpose. U.S. leadership and increased attention
may have had an impact on other regional players. Recently,
China agreed to share more of its operational data with the
Mekong River Commission and has allowed the visit by the
Commission officials to China's Yunnan province to look at two
of its four dams. Japan has also increased its involvement in
the region, pledging $5 billion in assistance at the Japan
Mekong summit in October 2009.
The administration recognizes the critical need to work
closely with the countries in Southeast Asia to foster the
rational use and sustainable development of the river resources
before lasting environmental harm has been done and before the
security of the region is jeopardized by improper planning on
this important waterway. We hope to advance cooperation and
expertise by continuing to expand the Lower Mekong Initiative
by developing technical assistance programs mobilizing a whole-
of-government approach. We are encouraged by the progress that
has been achieved in such a short time and, with our Mekong
partners, are pursuing activities that can bring the greatest
gain for the region.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify today.
And I'm very happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss the importance of the Mekong River to
the sustainable development and security of the Mekong Basin and key
aspects of our engagement strategy on these issues with the Southeast
Asia region.
the global water and sanitation challenge
In her March 22, 2010, World Water Day Speech, Secretary Clinton
stated that ``water represents one of the great diplomatic and
development opportunities of our time.'' She noted that, ``It's not
every day you find an issue where effective diplomacy and development
will allow you to save millions of lives, feed the hungry, empower
women, advance our national security interests, protect the
environment, and demonstrate to billions of people that the United
States cares, cares about you and your welfare. Water is that issue.''
By 2025, nearly two-thirds of the world's population will be living
under water-stressed conditions, including roughly 1.8 billion people
who will face absolute water scarcity (a level that threatens economic
development as well as human health and well-being). Water scarcity and
poor water quality will increase disease risks, undermine economic
growth, limit food production, and become an increasing threat to peace
and security.
More than 260 watersheds worldwide are shared by two or more
countries. As water becomes scarce, tensions over shared resources are
likely to rise--both within countries and among countries. Promoting
joint management and using water to build trust and cooperation in
conflict-prone regions are important tools in reducing the risks of
future conflicts.
The effects of climate change will only exacerbate these
challenges. Perhaps the most profound effects of climate change will be
the shrinking of glaciers and rivers. Water availability will change as
will the likelihood of extreme floods and droughts. These extreme
events can affect more people than all other natural disasters
combined.
The Greater Mekong subregion is one of Asia's areas most vulnerable
to the impacts of climate change because of the large numbers of people
living in floodplains and low-lying coastal areas and because the
people and economies of the region depend strongly on agriculture and
ecosystem services. The region's extraordinary biodiversity is also at
risk from both the direct and indirect impacts of climate change.
As we know from our own experiences with the wetlands and marshes
of large river systems such as the Mississippi, the management of these
systems can have far-ranging societal and ecological impacts.
Sustainable river management in the face of climate change is of great
concern to us, as well as for those living in large watersheds around
the world.
To help strengthen U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia, Secretary
Clinton announced the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in July 2009 on the
margins of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting. The LMI aims to engage
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam by helping build regional
capacity in the areas of environment, health, education, and
infrastructure in order to facilitate multilateral cooperation among
the four countries on issues of mutual concern, such as the common
challenge of effective water resource management
Also in response to this challenge, Secretary Clinton has asked
Under Secretary for Global Affairs Maria Otero and U.S. Agency for
International Development Administrator, Rajiv Shah, to identify
specific steps we can take to strengthen the United States capacity to
respond to watershed management and climate change. We are also
establishing a joint steering group under the leadership of Bureau of
Oceans, Environment, and Science Assistant Secretary Kerri-Ann Jones.
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MEKONG SYSTEM
Hydrologically, the Mekong River is one of the most complex river
systems in the world. It is the longest river in Southeast Asia,
stretching 2,703 miles through six countries, nearly twice the length
of the Colorado River. Its watershed supports between 65 and 80 million
people, providing over $2 billion in revenue from wild fisheries alone.
The large flows of the Mekong--nearly as large as those of the
Mississippi--vary widely according to available precipitation. The
basin has a wet season and a dry season. During the wet season, only
about 16 percent of the flows come from China. During the dry season
months, this share rises to 40 percent. Due to the complexity and
extent of the Mekong system, drought and flood events rarely affect the
entire reach equally.
Within the Lower Basin are ecologically unique features that play
crucial roles in regulating the flows of the Mekong: the Tonle Sap
Lake, Cambodia's most important fishery, and, below that, the wide
reach of the Delta, which produces about 52 percent of Vietnam's rice
and most of its aquaculture fish and shrimp exports.
Located in the Cambodian floodplain, the Tonle Sap Lake is filled
by the monsoon rains. When it overflows, it can temporarily reverse the
flow of the Mekong. The surge in water storage in the lake is enormous,
increasing from 1-2 million acrefeet in the dry season, to 40-60
million acre-feet in the wet season, enough to cover the State of New
Jersey in 10 feet of water.
The injection of nutrient-rich sediments also creates one of the
world's most productive ecosystems and the world's largest freshwater
fishery. Through this natural action of seasonal storage, the Tonle Sap
Lake regulates the flows of the Mekong, moderates flood events,
provides crucial flows during dry months, and prevents the incursion of
seawater within the Delta.
The Mekong Delta supports about half of Vietnam's total production
of rice and provides food security for its population. Vietnam is one
of the world's richest agricultural regions, the second-largest
exporter of rice worldwide, and the world's seventh-largest consumer of
rice. The Mekong River and its tributaries are crucial to rice
production in Vietnam. A total of 12 provinces constitute the Mekong
Delta, containing 17 million people, 80 percent of whom are engaged in
rice cultivation. According to the United Nations Development Program
in Vietnam and Vietnam's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development,
the rice industry is under serious threat due to the 2010 heat wave,
climate change, and upstream Mekong River development.
STRONG RIPARIAN DEPENDENCE ON THE MEKONG
The inhabitants of the Mekong River Basin depend heavily on the
river. Irrigated agriculture and fishing engage 85 percent of the
workforce within the Basin, and for most farmers the river is critical
to their survival. Many farmers rely on fishing to supplement their
incomes and provide nourishment. In every Mekong country fish are the
most important source of animal protein; for many, the principal source
of protein in their diet. Poverty still challenges the region, and
those who are heavily dependent on the natural resource of the Mekong
are the first to suffer from any environmental changes.
It is important to note that, while the region is still home to
over 20 million people living in poverty, it also holds great capacity
for growth and economic opportunity. For example, U.S. exports to
Vietnam have tripled in the last 3 years, with two-way trade reaching
nearly $16 billion in 2009. Regional economic growth in 2009 was 6
percent; proving the region's economy to be very resilient during the
recent economic downturn.
HYDROPOWER PLANS
One result of increased development is that the countries of the
Mekong Basin are increasingly turning to hydropower as a solution to
their growing energy needs. Construction of dams on the Mekong River
may pose immediate and long-term threats to the food security and
livelihoods of tens of millions of people in the Lower Mekong Basin.
However, awareness of these threats is rising rapidly due to the
confluence of an extended drought this year and a concerted push by
interested parties, including the United States through the Lower
Mekong Initiative, to highlight the possible adverse affects of dam
construction.
The impetus behind the Mekong dam projects is the creation of a
regional electrical grid that will facilitate the development of the
Mekong Basin. In the future, the Mekong and its tributaries could
support an elaborate, interlocking electric power generation grid
supplying Laos, northern Thailand, parts of Cambodia, and much of
Yunnan province in China. The economic stakes for dam construction are
high, and the states of the Mekong Basin are eager for the
developmental benefits they can obtain.
All dams have an impact on the flow and natural ecology of rivers
and streams, but in certain cases the developmental and environmental
tradeoffs in terms of electric power and navigation can be justified.
In the case of the 11 mainstream dams planned by Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand on the lower half of the river, disruption of the food
security of 60 million people who depend on the river could be among
the serious consequences resulting from damming the Mekong River. A
single misplaced dam on the lower Mekong could block the path of
migratory fish species that supply up to 80 percent of animal protein
in the local diet. A reduction in freshwater flows caused by poorly
designed dams could also increase the salinity of the river water, thus
adversely affecting the rice crop.
The ambitious plans for investment in infrastructure should be
grounded in a comprehensive analysis of where these investments would
provide the highest return and what their hydrological impact would be.
In the Lower Mekong region there is generally little analysis of soil
and water quality, or other constraints to food production, when river
modification is being considered. Often hydropower development plans
have been plagued by weak oversight of required environmental and
social impact assessments.
On the upper stem of the Mekong, China's eight-dam cascade in
Yunnan province, four of which are completed, will certainly disrupt
some of the river's natural functions as well as give China some degree
of control over the timing and amount of river flows. But the greatest
downstream ecological impact may be caused by downstream infrastructure
development and would be felt in Cambodia's Tonle Sap Great Lake and
Vietnam's Mekong River Delta. Mainstem dams, including two planned by
Cambodia itself, may degrade the Tonle Sap, and the Delta may also
suffer major consequences due to the loss of vital silt replenishment.
Hydropower remains a valuable energy resource, so long as the cost-
benefit tradeoffs are fully understood and responsibly addressed. Many
development projects must weigh the tradeoffs between the opportunities
presented by new economic infrastructure--such as roads, bridges, and
dams--and the full impacts to ecology and local livelihoods. The sale
of electricity generated by dams provides a source of foreign revenue
for countries with few existing alternative options for economic
growth, but this may be unsustainable and comes with potentially
significant environmental and social costs.
SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
The Mekong River system is already beginning to show signs of
strain brought about by multiple competing uses. Although much
attention has focused on the impact of future dams, more immediate
environmental threats exist through overuse and pollution from
industry, wastewater, and agriculture.
Maintaining water quality in the Mekong is key to sustaining the
health and productivity of the populations dependent on it. High
salinity levels are prevalent in the Delta, mostly during the dry
months as diminished flows of the Mekong are unable to push back
against seawater incursions. Moreover, agricultural runoff, municipal
wastewater, industrial effluent, and sulphate-rich soils have resulted
in elevated levels of acidity and eutrophication of the Lower Mekong
watershed.
The Lower Mekong countries have recently started to address the
issue of water pollution, but the region is plagued by lagging
enforcement and monitoring. Upstream sources of water pollution, as
well as domestic wastewater continue to degrade the health of the
river. Certain municipalities, for example, discharge the majority of
their untreated sewage directly into the river.
While the state of the Mekong environmental system is threatened by
existing pollution and future development, the few completed monitoring
studies have found that the effect of pollution on Mekong fisheries has
been limited thus far. While the current impact of development along
the Mekong is also limited, future threats to fisheries, water quality,
and human health are most likely to come from human interference in the
form of dams, increased transportation, additional habitat destruction
from land-use changes, and continued water pollution.
The State Department has provided some small grants to a network of
universities in the region to study the levels of pollution in the
river. This effort has enhanced collaboration among research
institutions within the four nations in the Mekong Basin. More studies
are needed to fully understand development's effects on the Mekong's
fragile biodiversity and to strengthen nascent research partnerships.
Beyond the impact of human activities in the watershed affecting
the Mekong River Basin, climate change will undoubtedly add to the list
of challenges. Changing rainfall patterns, glacial melting, and greater
hydrological variability may increase the likelihood of floods and
droughts. Given an average elevation of around five feet, sea-level
rise poses a grave threat to the Vietnam Delta.
LOCAL POLITICS AND WATER POLITICS
Shared water issues among the Mekong countries are managed through
a series of overlapping legal and institutional arrangements, such as
navigation agreements. Effectively managing transboundary water is a
significant challenge, particularly for riparian nations with different
levels of economic development and past animosities. Facing these
difficulties, the Mekong River Commission has steered regional
watershed development since 1995, emphasizing avenues for cooperation,
strategic planning, and continued dialogue.
Under the 1995 Mekong Agreement signed by the Governments of
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, the Mekong River Commission
(MRC) has provided a framework for addressing transboundary water
resources in the region. Its structure has allowed for needed
flexibility and resiliency as hydrologic and economic realities shift.
Major foreign donors to the MRC include Germany, Australia, Sweden, and
Denmark.
Since 1995, the MRC has widened its scope. While remaining a forum
for cooperative discussions, it has moved from large-scale basin
planning to include small-scale resource development and the
establishment of a knowledge base in lower basin hydrology. Although
not a regulatory agency, the Mekong River Commission builds knowledge
and technical capacity for member states through providing assistance
and recommendations.
In the future, the MRC will be forced to address difficult issues
of water allocation and basin management. Hydropower development and
analysis of water flows during the dry season must be discussed to
craft adequate cooperative solutions. Responses to floods or droughts
require strengthened communication between riparian countries. These
problems are not easy, but cooperative solutions are possible.
In response to these challenges, Secretary Clinton launched the
Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2009 to help address regional issues,
with a particular focus on the environment, health, education, and
infrastructure. The LMI seeks to facilitate effective, coordinated
responses to challenges that are inherently regional in nature through
working level visits, training workshops, conferences, and scientific
and technological exchanges.
U.S. leadership and increased attention on the LMI has had an
impact on how other regional players view these issues. Recently, China
agreed to share more of its operational data with the Mekong River
Commission and has allowed a visit by Mekong River Commission officials
to China's Yunnan province to look at two of the four dams. Japan has
also increased its involvement in the region, pledging $5 billion in
assistance at the Japan-Mekong summit last October.
U.S. POLICY REGARDING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SECURITY ISSUES
The unfortunate reality is that there will always be disputes over
water. Our involvement includes emphasis on building solutions that
consider the environment and climate change, health, education,
infrastructure, and economic growth. Through our support of
multinational solutions, we hope to foster an environment that will
preempt instability and minimize the potential for violent conflict. In
analyzing the potential for conflict, we look at factors that are
driving tensions, as well as factors that can defuse tensions.
In the Mekong region we see only a few factors with the potential
to contribute to conflict. Those factors are unilateral development of
upstream infrastructure, bilateral development of downstream
infrastructure, changing environmental conditions, and historical
tensions in relations between Mekong countries. These instigating
factors are to a large extent countered by some important mitigating
factors. First, the Mekong countries recognize that they need to act in
concert in the stewardship of the Basin. The Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and other donors are helping to foster this collaboration. In
addition, the MRC is a regional institution which has recently made
significant strides and includes representation and support from each
of the Basin countries. While much needs to be done to ensure the
institution can effectively advance sound water resources management
across the Basin, it provides a solid foundation for regional
assessment, planning, and discussion. In our view, the MRC's existence
greatly minimizes the likelihood of violent conflict among the Mekong
states.
While the United States has a long history of engagement with the
countries of Southeast Asia on a bilateral basis, there is an
increasing awareness of the growing number of issues that transcend
national boundaries. The countries of the Lower Mekong region share a
variety of common concerns, including transboundary water management,
infectious diseases, and vulnerability to climate change. Our Lower
Mekong Initiative seeks to support a common regional understanding of
these issues and to facilitate an effective, coordinated response.
In order to build regional capacity and cooperation, the State
Department is working with other U.S. Government partners to develop
innovative programs under the auspices of the LMI. ``Forecast Mekong,''
a computerized decisionmaking tool the U.S. Geological Survey is
developing with State Department support, will provide policymakers in
the Mekong countries with the information they need to make good
decisions on managing the Mekong waterways, including predicted effects
of hydropower dams on water flow. This information will be made
available on the Internet so that scientists and researchers, based in
the region and around the world, can also access the data and the
analysis capability. Also created under the auspices of the LMI is a
``sister-river partnership'' between the Mekong River Commission and
the Mississippi River Commission that will help to build the capacity
of the Mekong River Commission and to support its efforts to
incorporate water-related concerns into regional decisionmaking.
USAID is also working to strengthen the capacity of the Lower
Mekong countries to assess the environmental impacts of hydropower
development at both the project and basin levels. Through the Asia
Development Bank (ADB) and Greater Mekong Sub-Region Initiative, USAID
will support partnerships between the countries to conduct Strategic
Environmental Assessments for hydropower projects. In addition, USAID,
in partnership with ADB, MRC, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature, has
developed a sustainable hydropower development assessment tool, which
will soon be piloted in various sub-basins within the watershed.
The United States has an important role to play here. We can inform
regional policy and decisionmaking, build local capacity, and promote
sustainable development by sharing advanced science and technology
capabilities. Our goal in this area is not to determine the outcome of
these discussions, but to give policymakers the tools they need to make
informed decisions about development of the river.
Finally, in concert with other technical agencies of the U.S.
Government, USAID, and the State Department are making significant
investments in the health, environment, and education sectors. In
addition to existing bilateral activities, we are further developing
our regional programming as well. I would like to highlight the
Secretary's announcement of $3 million from USAID for the study of
climate change impacts on the Mekong Basin. Let me share a rough sketch
of what we hope to accomplish with this money.
USAID will support the development of a regional adaptation
strategy across the Lower Mekong. It will engage local institutions and
conduct studies to assess vulnerabilities of the ecosystem as well as
hold dialogues with a variety of stakeholders to gain support for a
regional approach. Further into the program, we look to implement pilot
projects and build platforms for sharing of information. Through an
integrated and regional approach we will be able to build local and
national government capacity for long-term planning founded on sound
science and advanced technology.
These programs incorporate U.S. expertise into a regional plan to
address some of the key water and development challenges these
countries face. They also foster cooperation among the countries in the
region to work together for a common purpose.
Conclusion
The administration recognizes the critical need to work closely
with the countries in Southeast Asia to foster the rational use and
sustainable development of Mekong River resources before irreparable
environmental harm has been done and before the security of the region
is jeopardized by improper planning and exploitation of this important
waterway. Mekong countries, including to some extent China, have
realized the importance of united action by establishing the Mekong
River Commission. We hope to advance cooperation and expertise by
creating the Lower Mekong Initiative and developing technical
assistance programs.
Building upon existing programs, we have mobilized a whole-of-
government approach to our engagement in the Lower Mekong Initiative.
We are sensitive to the needs and priorities of our Mekong partners and
are pursuing activities that can bring the greatest gains for the
region. We are encouraged by the progress that has been achieved in
such a short time and look forward to planning the Third Lower Mekong
Ministerial Meeting to continue the discussion to protect the Mekong
River.
Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on
this pressing and vitally important issue. I am happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Secretary Yun.
I would like to ask you a few questions here. First of all,
speaking of the Lower Mekong Initiative, you mentioned that the
United States is contributing $3 million to a program examining
the impact of climate change on water resources and food
security. In fact, I was reminded of this contribution several
times when I was in Vietnam in July. I am, at the same time,
kind of curious about how much is being invested in areas where
we can get a more immediate improvement.
In page 5 of your testimony, you mention a number of items
that are similar to the areas that I have been attempting to
get some attention to: the notion of the difficulty of upriver
dams, which is a main purpose of this hearing, which affect
riverflow downstream, much among other issues; the impact of
growing population on pollution in the rivers; the lack of
pollution standards--in fact, during my Vietnam trip, I was
told that only 30 percent of the wastewater being put back into
the river has been treated; and also, the increasing
industrialization along the river, and the emissions that come
from those facilities. What are we doing, in terms of the Lower
Mekong Initiative, to assist in resolving those problems?
Mr. Yun. Thank you. We have, this year, in FY 2010--we will
spend--this is our assistance to four Lower Mekong region--$219
million in assistance. I mean, that includes every assistance
we have. A large part of that is--the biggest share of that
goes to Vietnam. And I think that comes--to Vietnam--comes to
about $90 million. And then next we have Cambodia, at about $72
million. And then, of course, smaller sums for Laos and
Thailand.
Within that amount, the biggest amount is spent on public
health programs. And I would emphasize two types of public
health programs. One, we've done a lot in terms of PEPFAR, the
HIV/AIDS program. And second one is the emerging and infectious
diseases. And I think that's the area we'll be looking, in the
future, to expand on. That's the area--we've recently had a
conference among Lower Mekong countries, and that's the area
we'll be looking to expand.
Let me just say a word about Lower Mekong Initiative.
This----
Senator Webb. Mr. Secretary, if I may.
Mr. Yun. Yes.
Senator Webb. How much of that money is being spent on the
Mekong River?
Mr. Yun. It is very small. It is a program that has just
gotten underway last year. And as you know, our budget cycle
typically takes 2 years. And we are now making the budget for
FY12. In the meantime, we want to get whatever resources we
can. And right now, as you mentioned, $2 to $3 million is
devoted. And mostly, that will be for technical exchanges--
doing conferences, bring experts over, and so on.
Senator Webb. But, that money--let's get our facts straight
here--that money, according to testimony, is principally being
spent to examine the impact of climate change. Is that correct?
Mr. Yun. It's not only for climate change. We have also
some money which will do--I don't know whether we've briefed
you on Forecast Mekong, for example. That's a program, with the
U.S. Geological Survey, in which we are trying to do a
simulation model of water levels in Mekong. And so, some of
that money was spent on that. And so, at the moment, I would
say the budget for LMI is pretty much ad hoc. And we need
devoted money. And this is what we are trying to work at.
We've had two LMI ministerials over the past 12 months, and
we're going to have another one at the end of October. And
before committing money to it, we would like to have some
structure. And let me just describe to you the kind of
structure we want to have.
We want to have full working groups within LMI: education,
public health, environment and climate change, and, last, on
infrastructure. Within this working group, we would have
projects. And so, the simple answer to your question is, money
issues, we believe, should come after there has been some
serious work done--what kind of project is necessary. So,
that's where we are.
Senator Webb. So, if we're defining the objectives that
could best be met with the relatively small amount of money
that we have, in addressing the issues of the Mekong River
itself, and you had $3 million, would you put it in climate
change, or would you put it in wastewater treatment, or--what
would you do?
Mr. Yun. It's kind of too small to put it any ways, but we
want to use that money to get the working groups going, to have
good degree of consultations and studies done so that we know,
when the bigger money that we will be asking for--we'll know
what to do with that.
Senator Webb. Let me just----
Mr. Yun. We think of this as a long-term commitment, and we
want to come back to--you know, to Congress, over and over
again, and seek devoted funding. That's what we aim to do.
Senator Webb. But, at the same time, my observation is
that, having visited Can Tho and discussed these issues with
people down there, when they're getting a certain amount of
money for climate change, which is rather hard to get your arms
around, and they have issues of pollution standards, effluence
into the river, those sorts of things, let me encourage you to
include those in your objectives.
Mr. Yun. Thank you. We will.
Senator Webb. And, if I may, I have just another question
on the Lower Mekong Initiative. Are you planning discussions to
engage countries, bilaterally and multilaterally, on the risks
that are associated with these hydropower projects?
Mr. Yun. Most of our engagement on Mekong sites, so far,
has happened with the Mekong River Commission. We, again, do
give a little bit of assistance to Mekong River Commission. And
we also work with a couple of large donor countries--Australia
and Denmark, principally. And most of our engagement has been
on that front.
We also have talked with Chinese, on occasions, on water
usage in general, and also on Southeast Asia. So, we do engage
China as well as Mekong River Commission.
Senator Webb. As you know, China, which has about 20
percent of the Mekong River's water resources, is not a member
of the Mekong River Commission. It also, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, does not recognize downstream riparian water
rights. And I was really gratified to see, recently, just over
the past month or so, after we, in our country, began
discussing this issue a little more openly, that China has been
willing to share some data on the construction in Yunnan. And
the dam projects in Tibet still remain a mystery. But, what do
you think they need to do in order to demonstrate that they're
acting responsibly, in terms of their obligations in the
region?
Mr. Yun. I think they need to have a serious dialogue with
downstream countries regarding, especially, the effects of the
dams they're building, on waterflow. And so far, that has not
taken place. We welcome, of course, China recently sharing some
data, but it's not the whole set. And, you know, essentially,
we want them to share not only part of the current--I think
they're only sharing data--daily waterflow during wet season.
We want them to share, during dry season, what happens. We also
want them to share historical data. And it's really only
looking through historical data you're going to get the trend.
It's not--it's no good--I wouldn't say it's no good; it's some
help. But, having the current data only is just a slice of the
picture.
But, more than that, we would want them to be part of any
kind of organization that takes place in that region, in terms
of discussing overall effects, in terms of fisheries, in terms
of the environment, and what this true cost and benefits are,
so that people in the region can make the decision, based on
true cost-benefit analysis.
Senator Webb. China is very reluctant, particularly in this
region, to engage in multilateral dialogue. Do you see any
movement on that front with respect to these issues?
Mr. Yun. I think we have to encourage them. Mr. Chairman,
you and I have recently discussed the issues of South China
Sea, for example. And I think this is another example in which
United States interests may not be directly involved, or we
have no real presence there, in terms of sharing borders, but,
at the same time, regional stability requires we look a little
bit beyond and engage China and the neighboring states into a
sustainable dialogue. It can be in a multilateral forum. I
mean, there are lots of existing mechanisms.
We have, for example, there is the ASEAN mechanism, there
is the Mekong River Commission mechanism. As you mentioned,
there is also the Asian Development Bank mechanism. But, beyond
that, I think we need to, you know, be more engaged in the
region with China and the neighboring states.
Senator Webb. I would agree with that comment, and I
appreciate your saying it. As I've said many times, the United
States is a vital ingredient in maintaining regional balance.
And, even as you point out, we do not have geographical
boundaries in this area. We certainly can provide, sort of,
facilitation in order to encourage multilateral cooperation.
And, quite frankly, if American dollars are going into these
projects, we can decline to invest in projects that are clearly
harmful to environmental concerns.
Thank you very much, Secretary Yun. I know we'll be seeing
you many times more in this subcommittee, and we appreciate
your testimony.
Mr. Yun. Thank you very much.
Senator Webb. The second panel today, I'd like to welcome
three experts who've made notable efforts to document the risks
facing the Mekong River and consider solutions to these
challenges.
Dr. Richard Cronin is a senior associate at the Stimson
Center, where he has directed the Southeast Asia Program since
2006. Dr. Cronin joined the Stimson Center after a long career
with the Congressional Research Service. He received his Ph.D.
from Syracuse University, his master's and bachelor's degree
from the University of Houston. He is a veteran of the Vietnam
war. Earlier this year, Dr. Cronin published a report entitled
``Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams, Human Security, and
Regional Stability,'' in which he analyzed the development of
hydropower dams along the Mekong River, and the regional
impacts of this activity.
Welcome again to this subcommittee, Dr. Cronin.
Ms. Aviva Imhof directs the Southeast Asia and Latin
American programs at International Rivers. In her position, Ms.
Imhof works with regional international partners to investigate
hydropower projects, disseminate information, and provide
technical, legal, and campaign assistance. Prior to this, Ms.
Imhof directed the International River's Mekong program for 7
years. She was the lead organizer of Rivers for Life, the
second international meeting of Dam-Affected People and their
Allies, a conference in 2003 that brought together 300 people
from 62 countries in Thailand. She has also written extensively
on the efforts to halt destructive river development projects
in Southeast Asia.
And welcome, Ms. Imhof.
Our third witness is Ms. Dekila Chungyalpa, from the World
Wildlife Federation. She is the U.S. director for the Greater
Mekong Program and has led WWF's efforts on the Mekong region
since 2005.
In July, WWF released a study, entitled ``River of Giants:
Giant Fish of the Mekong,'' which profiles four giant fish
species living in the Mekong that rank among the world's
largest freshwater fish. Ms. Chungyalpa also leads WWF's
activities on the river basin climate change adaptation and
sustainable solutions for hydropower. Previously, she worked
for 5 years with the WWF in the eastern Himalayas and has
extensive experience working with local communities. Ms.
Chungyalpa speaks five languages: Sikkimese, Tibetan, Hindi,
Nepali, and English.
I thank all of you for being here today. And we will begin
with Dr. Cronin.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
THE STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cronin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate this opportunity to offer my perspectives on
these urgent issues regarding water insecurity in Southeast
Asia.
I've organized my written statement so as to respond
specifically to the five questions that you posed. But, in this
few minutes' time I have, I would like to----
Senator Webb. Let me say, by the way, because I should have
said it before, that your full statements will be entered into
the record----
Dr. Cronin. I thank you.
Senator Webb [continuing]. At the beginning of each of your
testimony. And you're welcome to take whatever time you like to
make your points orally.
Dr. Cronin. Thanks very much. I appreciate that.
My colleagues, in their statements, have already provided
really eloquent and well-informed coverage of the human
environmental tragedy that is unfolding. I will use my few
minutes here to address two things. First--two points--one is
the risks of both Chinese and proposed Lower Mekong projects
the region's hard-won peace, stability, and the longer term
prospects for sustainable development. Second, I will also
address the Lower Mekong Initiative, which you've already been
discussing with Mr. Yun.
The character and the impact of the 8 or more large-to-mega
dams that China is building on the upper half of the river, and
the dams--now 11 dams and one other water project--proposed for
the lower river--lower half of the river in Southeast Asia by--
primarily by Cambodia and Laos, are different but of equally
negative impact. And again, in the written statement--and I'm
sure you'll hear from my colleagues--China's dam cascade in
Yunnan will have different impacts, as opposed to those of the
Lower Mekong dams. China, basically, is going to change the
hydrology of the river in a very serious way, and hold back
silt in its dams, that is necessary to replenish fields and
rebuild the Mekong Delta every year after the dry season. And
the Lower Mekong dams, to put it briefly, will block the
migration of wild fisheries--and we're talking fish--we're
talking about fish worth about $9 billion as they work to--
their way through the economy, and which constitute anywhere
from 40 to 80 percent of the protein in diets of some 60
million people as you've already mentioned in your remarks.
From a regional peace and security perspective, the worst
aspect of China's Yunnan cascades is capability of the two
biggest reservoirs, one of which is already filling--the
Xiaowan dam--to regulate flow of water from Yunnan to the Lower
Mekong. China plans to use this storage to put as much as 40
percent or more water into the river during the dry season in
order to keep its smaller, but still large, dams running year-
round--that is, its three dams below Xiaowan--and to support
navigation of large cargo boats between southern Yunnan and
Luang Prabang, Laos.
Augmenting the dry-season flow can be--in years of
drought--can be a positive benefit, but the amount of water
that China plans to release in the dry season will reduce the
normal extremes of wet and dry in the river that give it its
great productivity, and particularly of aquatic life and
agriculture. So, some water in the dry season, if it's
unusually dry, will help, but that's not what China has in
mind. China wants to put more water in the river every dry
season. And during the dry season, China is the most important
source of water in the river.
Even more troubling are the political and geopolitical
ramifications. If Laos and Cambodia go ahead with their plans
for damming the middle and lower reaches of the river, they
will make themselves dependent on China to release water, from
the Xiaowan Dam and this other even larger dam it's building,
in the right quantity and at the right time to keep the dams
operating downstream for several months of the year during the
dry season. So, they're--Laos and Cambodia--setting themselves
up, if they build these dams, to be totally dependent on China
during the dry season, for most of those dams to keep
operating.
Equally or more troubling, China has, thus far, refused to
countenance making cooperative water management part of the
agenda of the Asian Development Bank-led Greater Mekong
subregion, known as GMS. The GMS originally started with 11
``flagship programs,'' they called them, but most of the money
is going to build roads and bridges in the regional power grid
that you referenced earlier. And China will not allow the river
to be part of that discussion. So, we already have the MRC with
the four Lower Mekong countries, and China is not a part of
that. And then we have the GMS, where China is a part, as well
as Burma--or Myanmar, as you wish--but won't let the water
issue be discussed.
So, you made some comments in your statement about what we
should be doing at the ADB. And I think that's one of the areas
that the--where the United States should be using its
influence.
Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration has made the Mekong
Basin the focal point of its professed engagement with
Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and not a moment too soon.
All of the Lower Mekong countries understand the
geopolitical nature of the U.S. initiative; and, to varying
degrees, they all welcome it. Because of the wider context of
enhanced United States engagement with ASEAN, the LMI has been
welcomed by most other Southeast Asian countries, due to
concern about China's hegemonic potential, both in mainland
Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.
One serious weakness of the LMI, at present, and one that
you've already addressed in your questions to Deputy Secretary
Yun, is that the initiative originated in the Bureau of Asian
Pacific Affairs. It's a foreign policy initiative not backed by
much in the way of coordination or funding. Its programmatic
pillars of health, education, climate change, and
infrastructure were developed--were really developed on an ad
hoc basis. And one of the problems right now--and you raised
this issue is that the infrastructure pillar is empty. And the
reason it's empty, I think, is that there are no programs to be
rebranded under the LMI. So, the infrastructure side is where,
if we're going to put more money into this initiative, it ought
to be--on the river itself, on the hydrological issues, and
the, you know, the future of fisheries and food security and
human security and the Mekong Delta.
This, however--infrastructure actually is an area where the
United States should be providing, and could be providing,
technology and capacity-building, especially in modeling, river
monitoring, and full-scope cost-benefit analysis of proposed
dams and other infrastructure programs. I think, again, Deputy
Secretary Yun alluded to us moving in this direction. But, I
don't think--I don't sense that that's going to come fast
enough to have an impact on a river which really is at a
tipping point.
Thus, the most urgent need is planning and coordination,
especially for getting adequate funding in place for fiscal
year 2012. I agree entirely with your legislative initiative on
the ADB authorization. The United States should be leveraging
its influence and voting power on the boards of directors of
not only the ADB, but also to the World Bank, to get them to
partner with the United States in supporting specific LMI
programs or program objectives. In other words, it doesn't have
to be the LMI, exactly, but if we can get--leverage our
influence to get them involved in this issue, that would be a
great benefit.
Neither the ADB nor the World Bank can get directly
involved in construction--constructing mainstream dams on the
Mekong, because their extreme environmental and socioeconomic
impacts are too severe to pass muster with the Bank's own
criteria. The risk, though, is that, as in the case of Laos'
recently completed and controversial Nam Theun 2 Dam on a major
tributary, the Bank should not participate in funding the
project. Let me clarify what I'm saying here. There's a risk
that the banks will jump in, to be relevant, and put money into
environmental mitigation--if it's possible--relocation and
alternate livelihoods for dams that it cannot otherwise support
under its own principles. This is a slippery slope. They
started on this slope at Nam Theun 2. And I think a big mistake
for the banks to--in the interest of, perhaps, being relevant
to the countries in the region--to get involved in these
secondary aspects to mitigate or environmental damage or
relocate people and give them--help them get new livelihoods.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States should not,
cannot, and does not, seek to compete with China for
infrastructure assistance or obstruct the growing economic
integration of ASEAN countries into China's production chain.
We haven't been involved in that business for a long time; that
is, infrastructure--heavy infrastructure. That said, however,
provided that infrastructure projects, excluding these
mainstream dams, and activities are not exploitative or
environmentally destructive, the expansion of trade investment
ties between China, its Mekong and ASEAN neighbors can be a
win-win situation for all. Unfortunately, at present, this is
far from the case. What we can do, and have already
accomplished to a surprising extent, is to use our expanded
engagement in the region, as I would put it, to ``keep China
honest.'' You alluded already to the--and as did Deputy
Secretary Yun--to the fact that China has become a bit more
responsive to its neighbors' concerns; for instance, about
what's going on in Yunnan, how much water was being released--
whether it was filling or spilling--the Xiaowan Dam, during the
last drought. But, there's no transparency there. And that
needs to change.
And more broadly, American reengagement with Southeast
Asia, and our firmer stance regarding China's growing
assertiveness in the South China Sea, have predictably been
criticized by Beijing, sometimes in angry language. But, the
main observable effect, to date, has not been an increase in
regional tensions, but, rather, to cause Beijing to pay
noticeably more attention to the concerns, fears, and interests
of its neighbors. U.S. friends and allies in Southeast Asia
welcome this trend, and they want more of it. This is a major
achievement, and one that needs a strong and constructive
followup by the administration and by the Congress.
In conclusion, rather than creating regional nervousness,
the initial impact of American reengagement in the Mekong, and
the wider Southeast Asia region, has been working to the
benefit of peace and stability, as intended. Now is not the
time to rest on these still tentative laurels.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cronin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard P. Cronin, Director, Southeast Asia
Program, Stimson Center, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer my
perspectives on the urgent issues regarding Water and Security in
Southeast Asia. I have organized my statement so as to respond
specifically to the five broad questions you posed as well as offering
some additional observations that I think are relevant to your
objectives in organizing this hearing.
Comparatively speaking, 30 percent of the world's fresh water is in
Asia but it is very unevenly distributed. The South of China is well-
watered but the north and west are extremely dry, as is Central Asia.
Southeast Asia generally has ample water resources but with two
important caveats: First, most of the region's rainfall occurs during
the monsoon or wet season, which can be unreliable. Second, in the
Mekong Basin a large portion of water available during the dry season
comes from the spring and summer melting of the winter snowcap in
Tibet. Nonetheless, the adaptation of flora and fauna to the extremes
of wet and dry are the main reasons for the river's rich bounty and
they are gravely threatened by hydropower dams, especially on the main
stream and major tributaries. The conditions have made the Greater
Mekong Region Subregion (GMS) a major wet rice growing region, with
Thailand and Vietnam the world's first and second rice exporters.
Government policies and standards in Southeast Asia that address
population growth, pollution, and industrial activity, and the impact
on the region's water use and management.
To answer the first question you posed, most but not all Southeast
Asian governments have generally done a better job of reducing
population growth rates than protecting their forests from rampant
destruction and rivers, estuaries, and other water resources from
pollution and the unsustainable use of ground water. Most large coastal
cities in Southeast Asia are sinking from the depletion of their
aquifers, even as the threat of rising sea levels and exceptionally
severe storms caused by climate change are beginning to be felt.
Jakarta, Bangkok, Manila, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are frequently
flooded even by storms of common and predictable strength.
Unsustainable population growth remains an underlying cause of
environmental degradation as well as political instability in some
parts of the Mekong Basin, especially in upland areas which already are
suffering from excessive exploitation. The comparatively youthfulness
of most of the Mekong country populations ensures considerable growth
momentum for some time after fertility rates decline to replacement
level.
In Mekong Southeast Asia the population of Laos was growing at an
estimated 2.73 percent per year as of 2007, with a very young age
structure--41.2 percent of the population aged 14 years and under.
Cambodia is growing more slowly at 1.73 percent per year, but
Cambodians 14 and under still account for 34 percent of the population.
The relevant figures for Vietnam are 1.04 percent growth and 26.3
percent of the population at 14 or under. The Thai population is
growing at well under 1 percent per year and only 21 percent of the
population is 14 years or younger. Myanmar's growth rate has fallen
from 2.5 percent in the mid-1970s to below 1.0 percent in 2008, no
doubt due in part to the dim economic prospects for a population with a
comparatively high level of literacy but forced to live under the
misrule of the military junta.
Because of the still largely young populations of the Lower Mekong
countries--besides Thailand--demographers estimate that the population
of the Mekong Basin will increase from 73 million at present to about
120 million by 2025, an increase of 65 percent. Moreover, some areas
are growing far more rapidly and unsustainably. For instance, the
population around Cambodia's Tonle Sap Great Lake is growing three
times faster than the rest of the Cambodian population. Incomes of
people living around and even on the Tonle Sap not surprisingly are
one-third of those of Phnom Penh and poverty is four times as high.
Certainly rapid population growth is a major factor in poverty but so
are development policies that unsustainable exploit the resources of
the poorest citizens for the benefit of more politically important
urbanites.
As often pointed by Southeast Asians, the United States, Europe,
and other parts of the more developed world equally abused their
resources until they were almost gone. The problem is that this
historically factual argument glosses over some important differences
between the industrial states of the northern hemisphere with
developing Asia and Africa that are critically important. Europe long
ago dammed all of its major rivers but the process took place over a
couple of hundred years and occurred simultaneously with
industrialization. The United States took a century to exploit the
resources of a rich but comparatively lightly populated continent. The
Native Americans paid a terrible price, of course, but until the
closing of the frontier in the late 19th century Americans could always
move on to somewhere else after local resources were exhausted. Today
New England is more forested than in the early 19th century, but mainly
because the whole basis of the economy has changed.
In contrast, the Greater Mekong River Basin (GMS), which some call
``Asia's Last Frontier,'' offers no new rich western lands and some
important natural resources such as timber that once seemed
inexhaustible have been rapidly depleted, mainly by illegal cutting.
Nor do many of the poorest Southeast Asian countries have the realistic
potential for the kind of rapid industrialization that took place in
Europe, North America and Northeast Asia to absorb people who lose
their lands, fisheries, and livelihoods. In other words, the relentless
expropriation of shared community water resources is not likely to have
the same kind of positive outcome for the 60 million or so Lao,
Cambodians, and Vietnamese (in the Mekong Delta) who will loose their
livelihoods and food sources. These days, forests are destroyed as much
to make way for rubber and palm oil plantations as for the timber. For
maximum efficiency, these operations seek to minimize employment, and
in the case of Chinese investments, labor is imported directly from
China and the workers live in self-contained camps.
Hydropower development is even more detached from future employment
opportunities and higher living standards. For a variety of reasons,
starting with geography and inappropriate economic policies,
industrialization and services industries are not likely to spring up
to create new livelihoods for most of those displaced by the dams. The
record thus far of relocating, compensating, and providing new lands
and occupations of those displaced by hydropower dam projects gives no
cause for optimism. Especially because of the particularly devastating
impact of mainstream dams on fisheries and existing agriculture, the
most likely consequence will be the spontaneous migration to cities, in
some cases across borders, with the attendant social ills of increased
squalor, crime and trafficking in drugs and human beings.
The political, environmental, sovereignty and regional security impact
of China's water use and hydropower development along the upper Mekong
River, and China's in regional water resources management.
The most important aspect of the Mekong in terms of water and
security--both national and human--is that the river is a transboundary
resource shared by six countries: China which controls the source and
upper half of the river, and five downstream Southeast Asian
countries--Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Thailand Cambodia, and Vietnam.
China's ongoing construction of a massive cascade of eight or more
dams on the Upper Mekong in Yunnan and plans by Laos and Cambodia for
11 dams on the lower half of the River's mainstream epitomize the
skewed nature of what passes for ``development'' in Chinese minds as
well as in some quarters of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World
Bank and the African Development Bank. Of course large to mega-sized
dams generate much-needed electricity for cities and industries and
which tends to boost overall GDP growth, but at a huge cost to those
who lose their forests, fisheries, and farms.
Dams on the main stem of any river are highly destructive of its
core hydrology and the existing ``environmental services'' such as
aquatic life and clean water for agriculture and drinking. The case of
the Mekong River Basin is at the extreme end of the
developmentenvironment dilemma. The Mekong is one of the most
productive river basins in the world in terms of fish and agriculture,
second only to the Amazon, which is 12 times its size.
Both upstream and downstream dam proposals have different impacts
on the River's hydrology, ecology, morphology, and human security. I
will begin by discussing China's hydropower development program in
Yunnan Province, in the far southwest of the country.
CHINA'S YUNNAN CASCADE
The character and impact of the eight or more large to mega dams
that China is building on the upper half of the river, which China
calls the Lancang Jiang (``Turbulent River'') and the dams proposed for
the lower half of the river in Southeast Asia are different in
important respects.
The main environmental impact of China's dams will be to capture
much of the silt that flows down from the Tibetan Plateau with the
spring snowmelt and late summer monsoon rains, thereby depriving
downstream farmers of the annual nutrient renewal of their fields and
denying the Mekong Delta that replenishment of silt necessary to keep
the South China Sea at bay. China's Yunnan Cascade will also shift the
timing of the seasonal monsoon ``flood pulse'' that triggers the
spawning migration of many fish species.
Worst of all, the reservoirs of China's two biggest dams in the
Yunnan cascade, the Xiaowan Dam that began filling last fall or winter
and the Naozhadu Dam, now under construction, can hold 15 and 22
billion cubic meters of water respectively. This is more than one
season's annual flow of the upper half of the river and it will give
China the ability to regulate the river from Yunnan to the South China
Sea. China plans to use this storage to put as much as 40 percent or
more water into the river during the dry season in order to keep the
smaller (but still quite large) dams running year-round and support
navigation for large cargo boats between southern Yunnan and Luang
Prabang, Laos, and for yet unrevealed plans for irrigation and possibly
other water diversion schemes.
These plans to regulate the river to support navigation and
changing power demands are extremely destructive environmentally and
ecologically. Ever since construction was begun on the first dam at
Manwan, which came on line in 2003, very erratic river flows have
scoured river banks and destroyed dry season vegetable gardens, and
even drowned villagers on river banks in northern Laos who were caught
unawares by fast rising water from dam operations. Manwan, it should be
pointed out, has only \1/15\th the storage capacity of the Xiaowan Dam
upstream. To be clear no more water can come down the river than can
pass through the Manwan Dam's flood gates at a given time, but the
whole point of building Xiaowan as a giant cistern is to keep Manwan
and two other smaller dams operating year round.
Even more troubling, are the potential political and geopolitical
ramifications of China's Yunnan cascade. Many citizens and even
officials in the downstream countries blamed China for the last dry
season extreme drought, the worst in 50 years. The drought was only
broken when the monsoon rains returned this summer. China protested
that it was also suffering from the same drought, but because it
provided no data about the operation of its dam it was never certain
whether the Chinese dams were spilling, filling, or passing along as
much water as entered the reservoirs upstream.
TROUBLING DEPENDENCY
Even in ``normal'' years the dry-season flow of the Lower Mekong is
too meager to generate hydropower. In many places you could walk most
of the way from Vientiane, Laos to the Thai side of the river. If Laos
and Cambodia in particular go ahead with their plans for damming the
middle and lower reaches of the river they will make themselves
dependent on China to release water from the Xiaowan Dam in the right
quantity and at the right time to keep the turbines running for several
months of the year.
Some officials from those countries have expressed confidence that
China would never withhold water for any prolonged period for the
practical reason that it needs to keep enough water flowing to keep its
own southernmost dams generating power during the dry season. There are
at least a couple of flaws with this theory. First, at times of
prolonged drought China may not have enough water in the reservoir to
keep its own dams operating. This appears to have been what happened in
the recent dry season, though in this case China had only begun to fill
the Xiaowan Dam during the preceding rainy season.
In addition, in view of predictions that climate change will
continue to cause the retreat of glaciers and the shrinking of the
winter snowcap in Tibet, China may give higher priority in the future
to storing water than producing power. Moreover, China is already
considering the diversion of some Mekong water to the Yangtze River to
make up for water it plans to redistribute from that river to the
Yellow River in the bone dry North. The risk that China will engage in
``water nationalism'' is a real one, and a strong reason for not
building Lower Mekong dams.
The challenges of proposed dam construction along the Lower Mekong
River, and the impact on the region's environment, food security,
sovereignty, and economic development.
The Lower Mekong is very different than most other important rivers
of the world in that some 60 million people depend directly on, or
indirectly, on its almost unparalleled bounty of fish and annual load
of silt that replenishes otherwise nutrient-deficient soil. This food
resource is not only of vital importance to local livelihoods, but the
rice produced with the Mekong's waters in Thailand, Cambodia, and
Vietnam's Mekong Delta is important to the global rice market. The
people who depend on the river badly need to improve their standards of
living and nutrition, but destroying the natural functions of the river
is not the way to do this. Rather, the river and its bounty of fish and
agricultural production have to remain the base of the Mekong counties'
economic pyramid. Already hundreds of dams are operating, under
construction, or planned for tributaries in the mountains of Laos,
Vietnam's Central Highlands, and the higher elevations of Thailand and
Cambodia.
The true cost-benefit ratio of many of these projects have been
questionable, but they are of a different order altogether than dams on
the mainstream that, if carried out as planned, would turn 90 percent
of the lower half of the river into a series of nine or more slow
moving lakes, connected by stretches of fast moving but highly variable
channels and cascades that cannot support life.
The effectiveness of existing regional mechanisms for managing water
resources in Southeast Asia and options for improving regional water
resources management.
The current incarnation of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was
created in 1995 when four of the lower Mekong countries signed The
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong River Basin. This agreement established norms for water use,
flow maintenance, environmental protection, and areas of cooperation,
to name a few. It eventually led to the establishment of four
institutional goals for the MRC: To promote and support coordinated,
sustainable, and propoor development; to enhance effective regional
cooperation; to strengthen basinwide environmental monitoring and
impact assessment; to strengthen the Integrated Water Resources
Management capacity and knowledge base of the MRC bodies, National
Mekong Committees, Line Agencies, and other stakeholders.
The Mekong River Commission provides a valuable scientific research
resource and an institutional structure for cooperative water
management for the four Lower Mekong countries. Unfortunately, the MRC
mechanism has made little real progress toward the goal of fostering
cooperation. There still are no enforceable rules and MRC countries
seem unlikely to adopt them under current circumstances. Moreover, the
MRC is ultimately an advisory body, with no independent legal authority
to coordinate, plan, or oversee projects--under the current situation,
these remain sovereign prerogatives.
Because of a long term lack of trust among the Lower Mekong
countries, concerns about sovereignty and the high priority given to
the exploitation of ``national'' resources for development, one
country's interests often are almost inevitably in conflict with those
of its neighbors or the region as a whole. Moreover, the goal of truly
cooperative, equitable, and sustainable use of the Mekong is largely
moot as long as China, along with Burma/Myanmar, has declined to join
the MRC. Beijing refuses to share either significant information about
its dams or the data that it used in or derived from its own
environmental and hydrological studies. Even more troubling, China thus
has refused to countenance making cooperative water management of the
ADB-led Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) cooperative development program.
Instead the GMS has focused on crisscrossing the Mekong Basin with
roads, bridges, and even a regional electric power grid, without
including the river that gives the region its name.
The United States policy toward water resources management in Southeast
Asia, particularly along the Mekong River, existing U.S. Government
efforts to promote improved water resources management; and options for
the United States to play a more constructive role in addressing these
challenges.
Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration has made the Mekong Basin
the focal point of its professed reengagement with Southeast Asia and
ASEAN, and not a moment too soon. Of course the United States never
really left the region, especially in regard to our military
capabilities and engagement in East Asia and the Pacific, but it has
been widely accepted that especially after 9/11 the United States was
distracted, and tended to make antiterrorism cooperation the focal
point of its regional engagement. An effort to rebalance U.S.
engagement was begun late in the second George W. Bush administration,
but the Obama administration has greatly expanded the policy
qualitatively, and has begun to mobilize additional budget resources to
expand our involvement more substantively. We have a long way to go and
need to mobilize the resources, expertise, and capabilities of a wide
variety of departments and agencies as well as leverage our important
positions on the boards of the ADB and World Bank.
LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE (LMI)
With the approval of the four MRC countries Secretary of State
signaled U.S. reengagement with the region by signing a Letter of
Intent (LOI) for cooperation with the CEO of the Mekong River
Commission, Jeremy Bird, at the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting
which was hosted by Thailand at Phuket in July 2009. Initially the
concept involved a sister river partnership between the MRC and the
U.S. Mississippi River Commission. What the State Department now calls
the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) has great potential but some
important ongoing limitations.
All of the Lower Mekong countries understand the geopolitical
nature of the U.S. initiative, most especially China, and to varying
degrees and the exception of China, they all welcome it in varying
degrees. Because of the wider context of enhanced U.S. engagement with
ASEAN, the LMI has also been welcomed by most Southeast Asian
countries, all of whom worry about China's hegemonic potential both in
mainland Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.
For the same reasons the administration's decision to approve the
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and apply for membership in
the East Asian Summit (EAS) have also been widely applauded, as has
Secretary of State Clinton's declaration at this years ASEAN Foreign
Ministers' meeting in Hanoi that we have important interests in the
South China Sea and that our position on the maritime territorial
disputes is that boundaries of 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ's) should be anchored on the shore. Effectively, the Obama
administration has aligned itself with the principles of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and against China's claim to most of
the South China Sea on the basis of a historical presence.
One important limitation of the LMI at present is that the
initiative originated in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
This was a foreign policy initiative not backed by much in the way of
programs or funding. Though it was intended to cover the areas of
health, education, climate change, and infrastructure, the main agency
involved besides the State Department was the U.S. Geological Survey,
which had already initiated the Mississippi-Mekong Partnership with
Vietnam's Can Tho University.
The substance of the LMI shows the strengths and weaknesses of the
American governmental structure. On the one hand, many departments and
agencies have already been involved in activities that support the LMI
objectives, especially much-needed human capacity-building and
education. On the other hand, these activities still are not
coordinated in any meaningful way. Moreover, in the absence of strong
coordination, too much depends on the individual enthusiasm and
leadership of government officials to generate ad hoc cooperation.
Officials come and go, and senior bureaucrats have strong influence
over department and agency priorities and often legislative mandates
for much of their budgets.
Mainly by rebranding existing USG efforts the State Department
identified by the latest count about $200 million for FY 2010, mainly
in the form of environment-climate change, health, and education and
training. Some other activities already underway show the wide array of
support the administration and Congress could generate through a
concerted approach. For instance, the Corps of Engineers, presumably
under its own international agenda, has brought senior officials from
the Lower Mekong countries and possibly China to visit Columbia River
dams, where they had the opportunity to learn first hand about the high
cost and limited success of fish ladders and other means to move salmon
around dams that block their spawning runs. Corps representatives have
even participated in MRC ``stakeholder consultation'' meetings to
explain that fish ladders and ``fish ways'' are not practical on the
Mekong River.
USAID has ongoing programs on climate change adaptation. The
Education Department and the Center for Disease Control have long had
programs in the LMI countries.
Recently a colleague and I have even participated in programs on
mainstream hydropower issues for Mekong country officials and NGOs
under the State Department's International Visitor Program.
Infrastructure remains a blank space in the four LMI pillars,
probably because there were no existing programs that could be
rebranded. This is an area where the United States could be providing
technology and capacity-building, especially in the modeling, river
monitoring, and full scope cost-benefit analysis of proposed dam and
other infrastructure programs. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Clinton
has repeatedly emphasized her concern about Mekong fisheries, food and
human security and the future of the Mekong Delta.
On the technology side, the Commercial Service of the U.S. Commerce
Department and the EX-IM Bank can help promote relevant U.S.
technology, including sensing technology for river flows, changes in
silt loads, and pollutants, as well as alternative energy like
efficient gas-fired thermal power plants.
Both Thailand and Vietnam are already exploring the possibility of
acquiring U.S.-designed third generation nuclear power plants, namely
Westinghouse's Passive Core Cooling Systems (PCCS) which are not
dependent on large amounts of river water. The technology is licensed
to a South Korean company but Westinghouse still supplies important
reactor and control components. Obviously there are a host of issues
about nuclear power, starting with proliferation risks and safe spent
fuel disposal, but increasingly even environmentalists are coming
around to the view that modern nuclear power could be preferable to
coal and other thermal power. Solar and wind power also have
considerable potential in Southeast Asia but China is likely to emerge
more competitive than the United States in these areas of applied
technology.
URGENT NEED FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATION
The most urgent need is planning and coordination, especially for
getting adequate funding in place for FY 2012. I'm not sure where these
functions should be located, whether in the State Department or
elsewhere. At present the EAP Bureau has neither the staff nor the
funding to accomplish this task. USAID would be a possibility, but only
with a designated program and adequate staff and funding. Putting the
coordination responsibility might--and I emphasize might--also make
sense because USAID operates under the general policy direction of the
State Department.
Many departments and agencies could give more substance to the LMI,
and in fact many of them are already involved in some way with the
Mekong River Commission and individual governments. An inclusive list
could include, in alphabetical order: The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), Army Corps of Engineers, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), the USDA and its National Institute of
Food and Agriculture and Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS),
Departments of Commerce, Education, and Energy, Export-Import Bank (EX-
IM), U.S. Geological Survey, Health and Human Services (HHS), and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The United States should also be leveraging its influence and
voting power on the boards of directors of the ADB and World Bank to
jointly support specific LMI programs or program objectives. Both banks
have been putting the mantle of poverty reduction over projects that
may ultimately impoverish more people than they help. In my view and
that of many other observers, it's past time for the United States to
push harder for projects that aim to raise the incomes and improve the
lives and health of the poorest and the most natural resource-dependent
populations where they live.
At the same time, the United States Executive Directors to the
Banks should be instructed to oppose egregious hydropower projects,
especially mainstream dams which do not meet World Bank and World
Commission on Dams criteria. Neither the ADB nor the World Bank can get
directly involved in constructing mainstream dams on the Mekong because
their extremely environmental and socioeconomic impacts are too severe
to pass muster with the Banks' own criteria.
``KEEP CHINA HONEST''
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States should not, cannot and
does not seek to compete with China for infrastructure assistance or
obstruct the growing economic integration of the ASEAN countries into
China's production chain. We haven't been involved in infrastructure
development assistance for decades and are not likely to become so in
the future. For better or worse--mainly for the worse--most of these
dam projects are being carried out by commercial developers and
commercial or state-owned banks. That said, however, provided that
infrastructure projects and activities are not exploitative or
environmentally destructive, the expansion of trade and investment ties
between China and its Mekong and ASEAN neighbors can be a ``win-win''
situation for all. Unfortunately, at present this is far from the case.
What we can do--and have already accomplished to a surprising
extent--is to use our expanded engagement with the region to ``keep
China honest.'' U.S. naval and other military power combined with our
still potent ``soft power''--political, economic, and cultural--still
counts for enough to influence our friends and worry China.
Interestingly, while a few observers from Southeast Asia have
worried that the region could be caught in the middle of a growing
United States-China rivalry, most regional leaders and observers
welcome the asymmetrical balancing role that the U.S. provides. While
American reengagement with Southeast Asia and our firmer stance
regarding China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea have
predictably been criticized by Beijing, some times in angry language,
the main observable effect to date has not been an increase in regional
tension. Rather, the most important effect has been to cause Beijing to
pay noticeably more attention to the concerns, fears and interests of
its neighbors. This is a major achievement and one that needs a strong
and constructive followup by the administration and Congress.
In conclusion, rather than creating regional nervousness, the
initial impact of American reengagement in the Mekong and the wider
Southeast Asia region has been working to the benefit of peace and
stability, as intended. Now is not the time to rest on these still
tentative laurels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for giving me this opportunity to share my
views with the committee. I will be glad to answer as best I can any
questions you may have, either orally now or in writing later.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Dr. Cronin. I fully agree with the
final statement that you made. I was very gratified to see
China beginning to move forward with some cooperation here,
although it has, as I mentioned earlier, been extremely
hesitant to deal with sovereignty issues; and this is a
sovereignty issue----
Dr. Cronin. Yes.
Senator Webb [continuing]. It's a water sovereignty issue
on--other than on a bilateral basis. So, there is some room for
hope there.
And, Ms. Imhof, welcome.
STATEMENT OF AVIVA IMHOF, CAMPAIGNS DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS, BERKELEY, CA
Ms. Imhof. Thank you, and good afternoon.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today on the risks to the Mekong River Basin.
My organization, International Rivers, and I, personally,
have been involved in monitoring hydropower developments along
the Mekong River for the past 15 years. We've documented the
impacts of existing dams and advocated for the rights of the 60
million people who depend on the Lower Mekong River for their
livelihoods. And in a region, as you can imagine, that is
riddled with nondemocratic governments, it's not an easy task.
As we've already heard, the Mekong River is one of the
world's great river basins. And we've heard about the
importance of fisheries to people's livelihoods, and the
importance of fish migrations, and the fact that dams block the
migration fish, and the enormous impacts that that will have on
the ecosystem and livelihoods.
We've also heard about China's plans to build a cascade--
or, they're currently building the cascade of eight dams on the
Upper Mekong. So, I won't talk about that.
What I will talk about is that--you know, I want to go
through a little bit about the dam plans for the region, first,
and then the impacts that that will have.
Laos, which contributes about a third of the Mekong's flow,
is undergoing a dam-building boom. The government's signed
deals with foreign investors to build more than 50 dams on
Mekong tributaries, mostly for sale of power to Thailand and
Vietnam. Laos is also considering 10 projects on the Mekong
mainstream. Right now, it sells power from eight projects to
Thailand. And we've spent a long time documenting the impact of
these projects--they're all on Mekong tributaries--the impacts
to people's livelihoods. And over 100,000 people right now are
suffering the impacts from existing dams on Mekong tributaries
in Laos and have not been adequately compensated for their
losses. Sometimes, it's been 10 years that people have been
suffering impacts and haven't been compensated. And a number of
these projects have been funded by the Asian Development Bank.
So, it's very timely that you're introducing legislation to
deal with the issue of Asian Development Bank-funded dams.
And one of the big concerns, of course, is that, with all
these tributary projects that are already having an impact on
people's livelihoods--these are smaller projects than the
mainstream dams--if Laos can't even ensure that these projects
have adequate mitigation and compensation mechanisms for
affected communities, then how on earth are we going to deal
with this--these massive mainstream dam projects that will have
even greater impacts?
Vietnam also has plans to build up to 48 new dams by 2025,
many of which are already under construction. And, here again,
we find that dam cascades are being built on two major Mekong
tributaries, the Se San and the Srepok, the impacts of which
are being experienced by more than 55,000 villages living
downstream in Cambodia who, today, have not received
compensation for their losses.
Cambodia has also committed to an extensive domestic
hydropower development program, mostly financed with the
support of the Chinese Government, and they're considering two
dams, also on the Mekong mainstream in Cambodia.
And meanwhile, in Thailand, where there is more political
space, Thailand has faced such huge opposition to dam
construction in the past that it's basically looking to import
electricity from neighboring countries, rather than to build
more dams in its own territory, because it knows it would face
too much opposition.
So, I want to now discuss the regional planning and policy
context and how this affects water resources development in the
Mekong Basin. As this committee would be aware, and as you are
aware, the Mekong region's political context is challenging,
with a number unaccountable and undemocratic regimes. While, on
paper, some of the national laws regarding water resources
development in the region are progressive, there is a great gap
between policy and practice. And I believe you also noted this
in your opening statement.
In Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, hydroconcessions, including
those on the Mekong mainstream, seem to be given out to any
interested developer on a first-come-first-served basis without
any attention paid to basin development planning processes or
the reputation of the company involved. Even where laws are
strong--even where strong laws are in place on paper, they're
often not followed in practice. Like environmental impact
assessments are often not released before a dam is given an
approval for construction in violation of domestic laws. And
weaknesses in government capacity in Laos and Cambodia
particularly exacerbate the problems with regulation and
enforcement.
And this week, institutional and regulatory framework has
been compounded by changes to the regional investment
environment for hydropower development. Today, energy
construction companies from China, Vietnam, Thailand, and
Malaysia are developing, funding, and building large dams. Thai
and Chinese companies and financial institutions, such as Thai
EXIM and China Eximbank, are becoming particularly prominent in
developing and funding hydropower projects in the region, as
are Thai and Chinese private banks. And these new actors are
yet to adopt any international social and environmental
standards in their operations, which leads to poor planning
processes and even poorer project outcomes.
I want to focus now specifically on plans for the Lower
Mekong mainstream. As we've heard, there are plans for a
cascade of 12 large dams on the Mekong River's mainstream, and
most of the power would be sent to Thailand and Vietnam. In
total, the dams would transform two-thirds of the length of the
Lower Mekong River into a series of reservoirs that would
require the resettlement of at least 88,000 people. And in
order to assess the implications that this cascade would have
on the Mekong River's ecology and economy, the Mekong River
Commission commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment of
the proposed mainstream dams. Conducted over a period of 15
months, the SEA team has just delivered its final report to the
Mekong Secretariat. And this really is the first-ever
comprehensive, cumulative impact assessment of dam construction
on the Mekong mainstream, so it's a very significant report.
And what the SEA does is, it highlights the significant
environmental, social, and economic impacts that the dams are
expected to have, while also warning of the skewed cost-benefit
distribution likely to occur.
The SEA warns that the decision to move forward with just
one dam alone would result in permanent and irreversible
changes to the Mekong River ecosystem. The projects, as a
whole, would impact more than 40 million people, an incredible
number of people, who rely on the Mekong River for their
livelihoods and food security.
Just a few of the impacts mentioned in the SEA's impact
assessment report: Through blocking fish migration routes and
changing the water quality and quantity of water, the dams
would cause fishery losses of between 700,000 and 1.4 million
tons each year, which is estimated to be worth between around
$500 million and $1 billion. In turn, the livelihoods and food
security of millions of people would be impacted, and there's a
consensus amongst fisheries scientists in the region that these
impacts cannot be mitigated. There's no technology available to
mitigate these impacts to fisheries.
The dams would also impact the immense biodiversity of the
Mekong River. Important critically endangered species, such as
the Irrawaddy dolphin and the giant Mekong catfish, would
likely be driven to extinction. The dams would flood key
biodiversity zones, national protected areas, and Ramsar
wetlands sites, impacting terrestrial and aquatic habitat for
fauna and flora. And more than half of the Mekong's riverbank
gardens would be inundated by
the dams and damaged by daily water fluctuations. This would
result in lost income generation of between $18 and $57
million, while also affecting food security by reducing
household vegetable consumption.
And finally, as we've heard a little bit, today the
reduction of sediment flow in the Mekong River would have
serious consequences for Cambodia's flood plains and great
lakes system, along with the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. And, of
course, these impacts would be compounded by climate change, as
well.
The SEA team also finds that the economic benefits of the
projects would accrue mostly to the private developers and
contractors building the projects, and that the projects would
actually have relatively little impact on power supply for
Thailand and Vietnam, the two major consumers of electricity.
So, basically, as we can see, the projects would have a massive
impact and then wouldn't actually even add much, in terms of
meeting regional energy needs.
These findings have led the SEA team to recommend that all
decisions on Mekong mainstream dams be deferred for a period of
10 years, and that this period of time be used to examine
alternative nondam options for generating electricity from the
Mekong mainstream, as well as to improve the understanding of
the river basin's ecology and potential impacts of the
projects.
So, the question now facing the region's governments and
the Mekong River Commission is whether they will adopt the
recommendations of the SEA. And unfortunately, Mr. Chairman,
the writing on the wall is not good. We've heard, from some
sources, that the MRC, because it doesn't like the conclusions
of the SEA, is attempting to distance itself from the SEA
recommendations and to move forward with some of the dams.
And, very significantly, just yesterday it was announced
that the Government of Laos has submitted official notification
to the MRC for the Xayaburi Dam on the Mekong mainstream, which
would be the first dam that's being proposed to be built on the
Mekong mainstream. And this will trigger the MRC's consultation
process with regional governments. And they're expecting a
decision to be made within 6 months. The MRC is likely to allow
this consultation process to go forward, despite the fact that
the SEA report hasn't yet been released publicly, hasn't been
translated into regional languages or considered by regional
governments, nor has its finding been incorporated into the
Xayaburi EIA.
So, to allow the Xayaburi consultation to go forward
without considering the findings of the SEA would be like
getting a diagnosis of cancer and then ignoring it. Mr.
Chairman, this must not be allowed to happen.
Which brings me to the final part of my presentation, which
is, What can the United States do to avert disaster on the
Mekong? As a first step, the U.S. State Department, in its role
as a donor to the Mekong River Commission and to regional
governments, should push for the SEA report to be publicly
released and endorsed by the MRC and member countries before
any consultation process on an individual dam, like Xayaburi,
be initiated. The United States should help push for the SEA's
recommendations to be followed, which means deferring decisions
on mainstream dams for at least 10 years. The United States
could offer the assistance of the U.S. Geological Survey in
generating more comprehensive data sets on the river's
hydrology, ecology, sediment flows and water quality, and
ensuring that this information is released in the public
domain. The U.S. State Department should continue to voice its
concerns over the security risks these dams pose, and continue
its work in highlighting the importance of regional food
security and the role that fisheries plays in the region.
Finally, we believe that, through providing support and
training for better energy planning processes, such as
integrated resources planning, which is a technique used by a
lot of U.S. utilities, coupled with technical assistance and
startup funds for investment and energy efficiency and clean,
renewable energy sources, the United States could play an
instrumental role in pushing for a clean energy future for the
Mekong region, allowing the Mekong River Basin to be preserved
for future generations.
Chairman Webb, thank you again for the opportunity to
contribute to this important debate.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Imhof follows:]
Prepared Statement of Aviva Imhof Campaigns Director, International
Rivers, Berkeley, CA
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe and members of the committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the risks to the
Mekong River Basin and its inhabitants from the construction of large
dams.
My organization, International Rivers, and I personally, have been
involved in monitoring hydropower developments along the Mekong River
for the past 15 years, documenting the impacts of existing dams built
in the Basin and advocating for the rights of the 60 million people who
depend on the lower Mekong River Basin for their livelihoods. In a
region that is riddled with nondemocratic governments, this is no easy
task.
The Mekong River is one of the world's great river basins. The
river still flows freely for most of its length; until recently the
region's years of war and instability had protected the river from
massive dam construction.
Seventy different ethnic groups live in the Mekong Basin and their
livelihoods and cultures are intimately connected with the river's
natural cycles. The river boasts one of the world's most diverse and
productive inland fisheries, in some areas supplying the people of the
region with up to 80 percent of their protein needs. Whether it's the
Tonle Sap or Great Lake of Cambodia--the country's fish basket--or the
tropical wetlands of the Mekong Delta--the rice bowl of Vietnam--the
river sustains the people and ecosystems of the region.
The Mekong River is second in biodiversity only to the Amazon, home
to up to an estimated 1,500 different species of fish. By comparison,
the Mississippi River in the United States--also recognized for its
high biodiversity--has only 241 fish species. Included amongst the
Mekong's aquatic biodiversity are such emblematic and threatened
species as the Mekong Giant Catfish--a species that grows up to 9 feet
in length and weighs up to 600 lbs--the endangered Irrawaddy freshwater
dolphin, and the world's largest freshwater fish, the giant freshwater
stingray. The Mekong's fisheries are highly migratory--at least a third
of Mekong fish species migrate between the mainstream and its
tributaries, including 70 percent of the commercial fish catch.
Migrations are timed to coincide with the Mekong's annual monsoon
pulse.
The Mekong supports the world's largest inland fishery, with
approximately 2.6 million tonnes harvested annually from the Lower
Mekong Basin. By some estimates, this amounts to close to 20 percent of
the world's freshwater fish yield. At first catch, the Mekong's wild-
capture fisheries have an estimated value of US$2-3 billion. By the
time fish-based products have been transported, processed, and marketed
to the final consumer, the fish are estimated to be worth between
US$5.6 and $9.4 billion. In comparison, although the Mississippi River
is nearly as long as the Mekong, its commercial fishing generates only
0.1 percent of the Mekong's first-catch fish value. The revenues
generated from wild-capture fisheries and fish trade make a significant
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each Mekong
country. Eight percent of Lao's GDP and 16 percent of Cambodia's GDP
can be traced to fisheries.
FOOD SECURITY
Fish are extremely important to food security in the Mekong Basin.
Fish consumption in mainland Southeast Asia far exceeds most other
places in the world. Per year, the average person in the Lower Mekong
Basin eats 56.6 kilograms of freshwater fish products. This is over two
times the average total fish consumption in Europe and America. In
every Mekong country fish are the most important source of animal
protein. Although the amount of animal protein from fish varies--from
an average of 60 percent in Vietnam to as high as 79 percent in some
Cambodian villages and 78 percent in the Khong district of Lao--it is
well-established that fish protein is important to food security
throughout the region. Fish are also an essential source of vitamins
and minerals, helping to ward off the nutritional deficiencies that are
sadly still too common.
Fisheries are not the only important food source provided for by
the Mekong. The Mekong River also supports a productive agricultural
sector. The deposition of rich alluvial silt on the floodplains during
the wet season allows for highly productive floodplain agriculture. The
Mekong Delta in Vietnam--one of the most densely populated areas on
Earth, and one of the most productive, is known as the rice bowl of
Vietnam. The Delta produces upward of 16 million metric tonnes of rice
annually, enough to feed about 77 million Vietnamese for a year. The
Delta also supports highly productive shrimp farms, orchards and market
gardens. Floodplains throughout the Mekong Basin allow for highly
productive wet season rice farming with a minimum of artificial
fertilizer or pesticides. In addition, many Mekong residents grow
vegetables on the riverbanks in the dry season, which are an important
source of income and food.
MEKONG UNDER THREAT
Yet this beautiful, dynamic and thriving river system is under
threat. China is building a cascade of eight dams on the Upper Mekong
in Yunnan province. Four of these projects have already been completed,
and at least two more are under construction. The projects are being
developed without any consultation with downstream countries and
without any publicly available studies on their potential downstream
impacts. Limited environmental impact assessments have only recently
been made available within China for some of these projects, although
only after the dams have now been built, and there has been no
comprehensive assessment of the cumulative impacts of these projects on
the ecology and hydrology of the Mekong River in downstream countries.
Academics have linked changes to the Mekong River's daily hydrology
and sediment load since the early 1990s to the operation of the Upper
Mekong dam cascade. Since the mid-1990s, communities downstream in
Northern Thailand, Burma, and Laos have suffered from a loss of fish
and aquatic plant resources, which have impacted local economies and
livelihoods; and since the second project, Dachaoshan, was completed in
2003, local people have been reporting a 50-percent decline in fish
catch. They also report serious erosion downstream and significant
fluctuations in river levels caused by dam operation. These impacts
will be magnified greatly as the larger projects in the cascade are
completed and their reservoirs filled. The upper Mekong dams will store
water in the wet season for release in the dry season, causing
significant changes to the lower Mekong's flow regime, and impounding
crucial sediment that will no longer flow downstream to fertilize the
floodplains.
But China is not the only country with massive dam plans. Laos,
which contributes about a third of the Mekong's flow, is undergoing a
dam-building boom. In its bid to become ``the battery of Southeast
Asia,'' the government has signed deals with foreign investors to build
more than 50 dams on Mekong tributaries, and is considering 10 projects
on the Mekong mainstream. Power from these projects would be sold to
neighboring Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Laos already sells power
to Thailand from eight hydropower projects. While not all of the
proposed projects for Laos will move forward, those that do will have
serious impacts on the health of the river ecosystem and the
livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Laotians who depend on rivers
for fish, agriculture, water supply, transportation and other aspects
of their lives.
Vietnam also has plans to build up to 48 new dams by 2025, many of
which are already under construction. Dam cascades are being built on
two major Mekong tributaries, the Se San and Srepok Rivers, the impacts
of which are being experienced by ethnic minorities living in Vietnam
and by Cambodian villagers living downstream. Vietnam has paid no
compensation to the tens of thousands of Cambodians living downstream
who have been affected by the Yali Falls Dam and four other projects on
the Se San River. Approximately 55,000 people have suffered from daily
erratic water fluctuations, widespread flooding, illness due to poor
water quality, loss of riverbank gardens, and diminished fish stocks.
Dam-induced flooding has killed at least 39 people. While the
downstream impacts were acknowledged by the Vietnamese Government in
2000, there has been little progress in addressing these impacts.
Cambodia has also committed to an extensive domestic hydropower
development program, financed with the support of the Chinese
Government and facilitated through the technical expertise of Chinese
construction companies. To date, deals have been reached on five major
hydroelectric projects outside of the Mekong basin, and at least 9 dams
in the Mekong Basin are being studied. In justifying its hydropower
program, the Cambodian Government claims it is trying to balance the
need for environmental and social protections against the need for
electricity to support its economic development. Civil society groups
in Cambodia, however, have expressed concern over the loss of
Cambodia's natural heritage and questioned the approval process, which
has been conducted behind closed doors without the participation of
local communities and other concerned stakeholders.
Thailand, meanwhile, has faced such huge opposition to dam
construction within its borders that it is looking to import
electricity from neighboring countries rather than face the inevitable
battles that would occur were it to propose additional dams in Thai
territory.
THE REGIONAL PLANNING AND POLICY CONTEXT
I want to now discuss the regional planning and policy context and
how this affects water resources development in the Mekong Basin. As
this committee would be aware, the Mekong region's political context is
rather challenging. Laos and Vietnam are still ruled by one-party
Communist regimes. Thailand's democracy has been under repeated attack
the past few years, and Cambodia, while theoretically a democracy, has
been ruled by Hun Sen for the past 25 years. Burma, meanwhile,
continues to suffer under the rule of a military dictatorship.
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is a river basin management
organization directed by the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand,
and Vietnam. Significantly, China is not a member of the MRC. Today the
agency survives on international donor aid from the World Bank,
Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Sweden, and the United
States, amongst others. The MRC has struggled over the years to define
its role in managing the Mekong Basin since it has no real
decisionmaking authority over government development plans, and since
the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which acts as the organization's
Constitution, does not allow any government or entity to veto another
government's plans for development on its portion of the river.
Therefore, the MRC's role has been relegated to one of coordination
amongst member countries, as well as conducting important research and
data management activities. In recent years, the member governments
have been pushing for the MRC to take on more of a role as a river
basin development organization, rather than a river basin management
organization, with serious consequences for how the organization is
responding to plans for regional developments. I will come back to the
MRC below.
While on paper some of the national laws regarding water resources
development in the region are somewhat progressive, influenced by donor
agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, there is a
great gap between policy and practice.
In Laos, where the lion's share of dams are being planned, laws and
policies surrounding hydropower development have improved over the past
few years, but the country still lacks an overall planning process for
hydropower development. Hydro concessions, including those on the
Mekong mainstream, seem to be given out to any interested developer on
a first-come, first-served basis, with little apparent concern for
basin planning processes or the reputation of the company involved.
Many Lao laws, regulations and policies contain important
provisions to ensure participation, consultation, information
disclosure, compensation and resettlement with livelihood restoration
for affected communities. However, in practice, these provisions are
often not followed, or are implemented on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis
depending on the will, expertise and resources of the environmental and
social consultants and the dam developer. The government's
environmental regulator, the Water Resources and Environment Agency,
lacks the authority, staff and resources to comprehensively review the
significant number of proposed hydro projects and monitor them during
construction and operation to ensure compliance with Lao laws and
regulations. Decisions about whether or not to proceed with a project
appear to be made exclusively the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the
Ministry of Planning and Investment.
The situation is similar for Cambodia. While Cambodia on paper has
a number of strong laws that should safeguard the environment and
ensure adequate protection for affected communities, in practice their
effectiveness is limited due to inadequate resources and, on occasion,
institutional disincentive. Enforcement of Cambodia's laws is very
weak. For example, even though Cambodian law requires an EIA to be
completed for a dam project before approval, in reality a few dams have
recently been approved apparently without an EIA. Cambodia still lacks
any law governing resettlement of populations. And the endorsement by
senior Cambodian politicians of extensive hydropower development plans
has signaled to the government's bureaucracy that these projects should
be pushed through.
A similar situation exists in Vietnam, where the Ministry of
Industry and Trade makes decisions on projects before the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) has appraised their
environmental and social impacts and mitigation plans. The Vice
Minister of MONRE, Nguyen Thai Lai, was recently quoted in the Saigon
Times as stating that ``In reality, our current appraisal procedures
face many obstacles, because investors only send their project
documents to MONRE for appraisal after they were already approved by
the Ministry of Industry and Trade. . . . Mitigation plans may either
be neglected or poorly presented.'' For example, in the case of the
massive Son La Hydropower Project being built in the North of the
country, which is displacing more than 91,000 people, the final
approval of the project's EIA occurred in 2007 while formal
construction started in 2005.
Civil society groups and energy analysts have also questioned
Thailand and Vietnam's power development plans, which heavily promote
the development of new large-scale electricity generation plants, such
as fossil-fuel fired power stations and hydropower dams, and that are
increasingly locking the region into a centralized electricity supply
model. They claim that future electricity demands are overestimated,
and that the potential that investment in energy efficiency measures,
renewable energy, and decentralized energy options could play are
downplayed, especially in the more industrialized cities of Thailand
and Vietnam. They argue that existing plans mostly serve the interests
of the state-owned electricity utilities, energy companies, and the
construction industry, rather than the needs of the regions'
electricity consumers.
The weak institutional and regulatory framework in the region has
been compounded by changes to the regional financial investment
environment for hydropower development. Traditional actors in
supporting energy development in the region such as the World Bank and
Asian Development Bank are becoming increasingly marginalized and
instead, energy and construction companies from Vietnam, China,
Thailand, and Malaysia are developing, funding, and building large
dams. Armed with the support of private banks from their own countries
and the promise of government guarantees through their export-import
banks, these dambuilders are fast displacing the western corporations
and multilateral banks that previously dominated the region's hydro
scene.
Thai and Chinese companies and financial institutions are becoming
particularly prominent in developing hydropower projects in the region.
While the Thai Exim Bank is an increasingly keen supporter of
hydropower projects in the region, it does not have an environmental
policy and its activities are generally unaccountable to civil society.
Thai Exim Bank has not yet adopted the Common Approaches on Environment
and Officially Supported Export Credits, agreed upon by OECD countries,
which outlines environmental and social standards for export credit
agencies. Thai commercial banks are also willing financiers of major
energy projects, but none have yet signed up to the Equator Principles,
a set of voluntary environmental and social standards that have been
adopted by more than 60 private banks around the world.
The China Export-Import Bank, China's official export credit
agency, is also becoming an important player in the Mekong region, as
are a number of China's major State Owned Enterprises, often with the
Bank's financial backing. China Exim is closely aligned with the
strategic overseas interests of China's Government, on whose behalf it
may offer concessional loans and export credits, especially in
implementing China's ``Going Out'' policy. For example, Chinese
companies are involved in developing four of the proposed Mekong
Mainstream Dams: three in Laos and one in Cambodia, and Chinese
companies are developing a series of hydropower projects on tributaries
in Cambodia and Laos.
Most of these new actors are yet to adopt international social and
environmental standards in their operations, leading to poor planning
processes and project outcomes.
MEKONG MAINSTREAM DAMS
I now want to focus specifically on the plans for dams on the Lower
Mekong Mainstream. Until now, the lower Mekong mainstream has remained
free-flowing, one of the last great river basins of the world to be
relatively unaffected by massive dams and diversions. Yet since mid-
2006, Thai, Malaysian, Vietnamese, Russian, and Chinese companies have
been preparing detailed studies for a cascade of 12 large hydropower
dams on the Mekong River's mainstream. Eight of the dam sites are in
Laos, two are in Cambodia, and two are on the Thai-Lao border. Most of
the power generated would be sent to energy-hungry cities in Thailand
and Vietnam.
In total, the dams would turn about half of the river between
Northern Laos and Central Cambodia into reservoirs that, according to
official estimates, would require the resettlement of at least 88,000
people.
In order to assess the implications that this cascade of dams would
have on the Mekong River's ecology and economy, the Mekong River
Commission (MRC) commissioned a Strategic Environmental Assessment
(SEA) of the proposed mainstream dams. Conducted over a period of 15
months, the SEA team has just delivered its final report to the MRC
Secretariat. The Assessment was carried out by an Australian consulting
company, the International Centre for Environmental Management, and
comprised a series of studies, intensive program of consultations, and
detailed expert analysis of the issues associated with developing
hydropower on the Mekong mainstream. As such, the Strategic
Environmental Assessment represents the first ever comprehensive
cumulative impact assessment of dam construction on the Mekong
mainstream, helping to provide a broader understanding of the costs and
benefits involved with building mainstream dams.
The SEA highlights the significant environmental, economic and
social impacts the dams are expected to have, while also warning of
skewed cost benefit distribution likely to occur. The SEA warns that
the decision to move forward with just one dam alone would result in
permanent and irreversible changes to the sustainability of the river
system's productivity, which in turn would impact millions of people
who rely on a healthy river for their livelihood and food security.
The following are some of the key impacts mentioned in the SEA's
Impact Assessment:
Altering the Flow and Nature of the River: The dams would transform
66 percent percent of the length of the Lower Mekong into a series of
stagnant reservoirs and sections of rapidly fluctuating water flows
downstream of the dams. These changes would irreversibly change the
natural flow of the river.
Impacts to Fisheries and Food Security: The dams would block vital
fish migration routes, disrupt flood pulses, reduce wetlands, and
change habitat necessary for the Mekong fisheries. These changes would
result in significant fishery losses of between 700,000 to 1.4 million
tonnes, which is estimated to be worth between US$476 million and
US$956 million. In turn, the livelihoods and food security of millions
of people would be impacted, with Cambodia expected to suffer the most.
No mitigation technology currently exists which could effectively
mitigate the impacts to the Mekong fisheries. Reservoir fisheries would
also not be able to compensate for the loss of capture fisheries and
would produce at best one-tenth of the lost capture fisheries
production.
Threats to Aquatic Biodiversity: Through changes to the river's
morphology, flow and aquatic habitat, the immense biodiversity of the
Mekong River would be at risk. More than half of the recorded fish
species in some zones would be lost. In addition, important iconic and
critically endangered species, such as the Irrawaddy dolphin and the
giant Mekong catfish, would likely be driven to extinction.
Terrestrial System Changes: The Mekong dams would have a major
impact on terrestrial ecosystems and agriculture due to areas of
inundation. Nearly half of the Lower Mekong River's land and forested
areas is located in recognized Key Biodiversity Zones, as well as in
National Protected Area and Ramsar sites. The dams will inundate
important wetlands and river channel areas and impact terrestrial
habitat for fauna and flora. Transmission lines and access roads would
further alter the landscape.
Lost Riverbank Gardening: More than half of the Mekong's riverbank
gardens would be inundated by the Mekong dams and damaged by daily
water fluctuations. This would result in lost income generation of
between US$18 million to US$57 million, while also reducing household
vegetable consumption. The households that would be hardest hit are
those located in Northern Laos.
Mekong Delta Instability: The reduction of sediment flow in the
Mekong River would have serious consequences on the transport of
important nutrients which help to fertilize Cambodia's floodplains and
Tonle Sap or Great Lake system, along with the Mekong Delta in Vietnam.
These impacts in turn would affect the stability of the Mekong Delta
through impacts to inland and coastal fisheries, increased saline
intrusion, reduced agricultural productivity, and destabilizing the
river channels and coastline of the Mekong Delta.
Livelihood, Culture and People: The livelihoods and food security
of more than 40 million people who depend on the Mekong River's rich
fisheries would be undermined through the construction of the Mekong
Mainstream Dams. Furthermore, impacts to agricultural land, compounded
with climate change impacts, could further reduce food security in the
region. By changing traditional ways of living, the dams could lead to
increased poverty and difficulty in meeting the Millennium Development
Goals.
What is of even greater surprise is the findings of the SEA team
that the economic benefits of the projects would accrue mostly to the
private developers and contractors building the projects, and that the
projects would have relatively little impact on power supply for
Thailand and Vietnam, the two major consumers of the electricity from
these projects. They would have only a minor impact on electricity
prices for Thailand and Vietnam and would generate the equivalent 1
year's demand growth for the lower Mekong Basin. Taken in this context,
the tradeoffs are enormous in the proposition to dam the mainstream,
since the impacts would be massive, and yet the projects themselves
would not contribute significantly to the region's energy security.
The SEA concludes that the mainstream dams have the potential to
create international tensions within the lower Mekong Basin due to the
extensive impacts from the scheme, that many of the risks from the dams
cannot be mitigated at this time, that there still remain critical gaps
in understanding about the river ecosystem, that there are many
substantial gaps in governance in the region, and that the governments
lack capacities in personnel and skills to manage the projects. These
findings lead the SEA team to recommend that decisions on mainstream
dams be deferred for 10 years, and that this period of time be used to
examine alternative nondam options for generating electricity from the
Mekong Mainstream, as well as to improve the understanding of the river
basin's ecology and potential impacts of the projects in order to make
a decision about whether the tradeoffs are manageable or not.
The question now facing the region's governments and the Mekong
River Commission Secretariat is whether they will adopt the
recommendations of the SEA. Unfortunately, the writing on the wall is
not good. While the SEA final report was delivered to the Commission in
August, it has yet to be released to the public. We have heard from
some sources that the MRC--because it does not like its conclusions--is
attempting to distance itself from the SEA recommendations and to move
forward with some of the dams.
Indicative of the lukewarm response of the MRC to the report is
that the latest draft of the Basin Development Plan, the main planning
instrument developed by the MRC to coordinate river basin developments.
The plan's latest draft makes little mention of the Strategic
Environmental Assessment, and instead recommends that the six dams
planned for the cascade north of Vientiane go forward. This strategy
(along with the other options) is now being discussed among the four
Mekong governments and an agreement should be made by the end of the
year. The MRC is also pushing for the regional approval process to
begin on the planned Xayaburi dam on the Mekong mainstream in northern
Laos, which is the project at the most advanced stage of planning. The
Xayaburi dam would displace thousands of people in Laos, disrupt an
important fish migration route and cause the extinction of the
critically endangered Mekong giant catfish by destroying one of their
last natural spawning habitats. The MRC is pushing for the
decisionmaking process on this first dam to start soon, despite the
fact that the SEA report hasn't yet been released, considered by
regional governments, nor incorporated into the Xayaburi EIA.
Mr. Chairman, and Senators, this must not be allowed to happen.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
This brings me to the final part of my presentation: what can the
United States do to avert disaster on the Mekong?
As a first step, the U.S. State Department, in its role as a donor
to the Mekong River Commission and to the regional governments, should
push for the SEA report to be publicly released and endorsed by the MRC
and member countries. The U.S. should help push for wide dissemination
and public consultations to take place within the region around the
SEA, ensuring that the needs and views of riparian communities are
considered. The U.S. should also push for the SEA's recommendations to
be followed, which means deferring decisions on mainstream dams for at
least 10 years until the findings and recommendations provided by the
SEA are adequately considered and implemented and informed
decisionmaking can be guaranteed.
The United States could contribute to this informed decisionmaking
through offering the assistance of the U.S. Geological Survey in
generating more comprehensive datasets on the river's hydrology,
ecology, sediment flows and water quality, and ensuring that this
information is released in the public domain.
The U.S. State Department should also continue to voice its
concerns over the security risks these dams pose, and continue its work
in highlighting the importance of regional food security and the
important role fisheries plays in the region.
We understand that through the Lower Mekong Initiative, the U.S.
plans to spend around $22 million in 2010 on environment programs in
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Some of this money will be
allocated for the new ``sister-river'' partnership which was
established between the Mekong River Commission and the Mississippi
River Commission on May 12, 2010. This partnership aims to improve the
management of transboundary water resources, learning from experiences
in the Mississippi River Basin. Money will also be allocated for the
initiative's work on climate change, which is looking at developing
regional strategies to address the impact of climate change on water
resources, food security, and livelihood. Yet beyond this, very little
is known about what the State Department is planning to do with its
Lower Mekong Initiative and Mississippi-Mekong River Partnerhsip. We
would appreciate the Foreign Relations Committee's help in pushing the
State Department to be more transparent about their engagement with the
Lower Mekong countries and consult with NGOs in the U.S. and the
region.
Finally, we believe that the U.S. Government could play an
instrumental role in providing technical assistance and support for the
development of sustainable energy options for the region. Through
providing support and training for better energy planning processes
such as integrated resources planning and strengthening electricity
regulators, coupled with technical assistance and startup funds for
investment in energy efficiency and clean renewable energy sources, the
United States could play an important role in pushing for a clean
energy future for the Mekong region, allowing the Mekong River Basin to
be preserved to allow for the security and continuity of future
generations.
Chairmen Webb, thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to
this important debate.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, for your testimony, Ms.
Imhof.
And welcome, Ms. Chungyalpa.
STATEMENT OF DEKILA CHUNGYALPA, DIRECTOR FOR THE GREATER MEKONG
PROGRAM, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Chungyalpa. Thank you, Chairman Webb, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and members of the subcommittee, for having me testify
today.
My name is Dekila Chungyalpa, and I'm the director of the
Greater Mekong Program for the World Wildlife Fund.
For almost 50 years, WWF has been working to protect nature
all over the world. Today, we are the largest international
conservation organization, with presence in over 100 countries.
WWF has been working in the Mekong for almost three
decades. The region is a treasure trove of biodiversity. Over
1,000 new species were discovered between 1997 and 2007--one
decade alone. The Mekong River is the second most biodiverse
river in the world, with over 1,300 species of fish. It is home
to four of the top giant freshwater species; among them, the
giant Mekong catfish, known to be as long as 9 feet.
The Mekong is the world's largest inland fisheries,
accounting for up to 25 percent of global freshwater catch,
worth up to $7 billion annually. It provides livelihoods for at
least 60 million people, and is the main source of protein for
the majority of people living in this basin. This river is not
simply a waterway. Its unique combination of waterflow,
sediment, nutrients, fish species, and connectivity are what
make it so spectacular. It is a living ecosystem, and it is
still healthy and intact, compared to most of the large rivers
in the world.
However, this may not be the case for long. A combination
of large-scale hydropower in the Mekong mainstem, climate
change impacts, especially in the delta, and watershed
degradation, are all making the region much more vulnerable to
environmental, economic, and, ultimately, political insecurity.
The most urgent threat, as you've heard, that the Mekong River
faces is that of large-scale hydropower in its lower mainstem.
As you noted, yourself, Senator, in the Upper Mekong, China
has completed building the Xiaowan Dam, which has 10 times the
reservoir capacity than its three existing dams--that is, 10
cubic kilometers, one--if you can just imagine it, 10 cubic
kilometers--and is in the process of building an even larger
reservoir. This, of course, gives China significant leverage
over the Lower Mekong countries.
In the Lower Mekong, there are currently 11 dams in
different planning stages of development on the mainstem, with
one in Sayabouly, as my colleague just mentioned, in northern
Laos, which, just yesterday, was notified to the Mekong River
Commission by the Lao Government. This is the first time the
process
of notification will actually be enacted by the Mekong River
Commission.
Almost 50 percent of the fish species in the Mekong are
migratory and travel long distances to spawn. Dams on the
mainstem would prevent them from doing so. One dam alone on the
mainstem, such as Sayabouly, would cause the extinction of many
wild populations, including the Mekong giant catfish.
The Vietnam portion of the Mekong Delta is home to 17
million people and contributes more than 50 percent of
Vietnam's staple food crops. Reduction of sediment trapped by
dams upstream would mean the delta's nutrients are no longer
able to be replenished, threatening the very source of the
country's wealth and security.
WWF is not antidam. We recognize the aspiration of greater
Mekong subregion governments to follow the growth strategies
that were also followed by the United States and other
developed nations. We advocate for energy from sustainable
hydropower plants placed on suitable tributaries of the Mekong
River. In collaboration with the Asian Development Bank and the
Mekong River Commission, and with support from USAID's own ECO-
Asia program, we are currently developing a basinwide
sustainability assessment tool that identifies tributaries that
are most important, in terms of fish migration routes in the
Mekong.
WWF has also identified 70 financial institutions that have
invested in Mekong hydropower projects. These include five
major U.S. institutions: JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, State
Street, Dimensional Fund Advisors, and Fidelity Group.
Coincidentally, tomorrow in Bangkok, WWF, along with--Oxfam,
Proparco, and the World Bank, are hosting a Hydropower
Financing summit. It will explore the risks of hydropower
financing on the Mekong mainstem. We have 30 confirmed
participants from the banking sector, including Morgan Stanley.
WWF hopes the summit will initiate a basinwide dialogue on
sustainable hydropower planning and placement on the Mekong
mainstem.
I'd like to talk about two other related challenges. The
Mekong Delta is one of the world's three most vulnerable deltas
to climate change. Current projections state that the most
likely outcome is a 1-meter rise in sea level by the end of
this century. That would submerge one-third of the Mekong
Delta. Adding dams to this equation limits the Delta from
replenishing itself, just as sea-level rise begins to eat away
at the coast and saline intrusion destroys productive lands.
Already we are witnessing erratic changes in flood
patterns. Without significant steps to alter the course we are
on, cross-border migration, breakdowns of roads and
infrastructure, and the resulting humanitarian challenges,
could create major security issues in the region.
The governments are fully aware of the potential for
conflict caused by climate change. It is not uncommon for them
to send military representatives to regional workshops on
climate change.
I was in New York City yesterday to meet with the Thai
Minister of the Environment, His Excellency Suwit Khunkitti. He
asked us to meet with him to discuss new solutions for
environmental problems in the region. He said ``If we lose the
forests, our water source is broken. If we lose our water, our
lifecycle is broken. If our life cycle is broken, our economies
and our communities are broken. If we lose our forests, we lose
everything.''
The foundation of the Mekong River is its watersheds. It is
the forests that regulate the supply of waters to rivers, that
absorb carbon, that buffer the region from climate change, and
that harbor important biodiversity. Deforestation continues
unabated in many parts of the region. Without a regional
mandate and shared vision of sustainable development for the
Mekong region, these combined challenges will undermine the
well-being of the people and the development aspirations of the
Mekong countries.
His Excellency has raised a new idea. He would like the
region to consider a Mekong Forest Commission, an agreement
among the Lower Mekong countries to protect, conserve, and use
commonly identified forests and critical watersheds in a
sustainable manner, and is willing to champion this idea among
his peers.
Recent U.S. engagement has had a very positive impact on
the Mekong region, not least of which is a renewed will to work
on freshwater issues on a regional scale. A significant
inspiration for this has been the two visits made by Secretary
Clinton. Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated its
long-term commitment to the region's stability through the
State Department's Lower Mekong Initiative. The U.S. Government
can continue to create long-term security in the Mekong region
and call for a moratorium on the approval of mainstem dams to
carry out a full assessment of the risks from such development,
including the Sayabouly Dam in Laos.
The U.S. Government should advocate the Mekong River
Commission procedure that includes notification, prior
consultation, and agreement, and, most importantly, monitor the
procedure to ensure that a rigorous and transparent assessment
is made, using all available scientific and expert analysis of
the impacts of this particular dam.
The U.S. Government can support the full recognition and
endorsement of the 1995 agreement of the Mekong River
Commission and bolster its authority to better manage and
preserve the Mekong's water resources. We ask that the U.S.
Government encourage a fair and meaningful dialogue with China.
The Prime Ministers of the Lower Mekong countries have
recently formally invited China and Myanmar to join the MRC. We
are given to understand that Myanmar will actually accept the
invitation. However, China has yet to respond. However, if the
freshwater biodiversity fisheries and future of the Mekong
River are to be sustained, a whole-of-basin approach must be
attempted. As one of the largest global donors to multilateral
development banks, the U.S. Government can demand that they
take a whole-of-basin approach on hydropower, especially given
their own mandate for poverty reduction and the importance of a
free-flowing Mekong to millions of people.
The U.S. Government can also promote green science-based
solutions. The Lower Mekong Initiative has developed a modeling
system for climate change, called ``Forecast Mekong.'' It helps
the Vietnamese Government analyze adaptation to sea-level rise,
and emphasizes sustainable solutions rather than stopgap
measures, such as building more dikes and walls. The U.S.
Government should continue to do so, but, more importantly,
invest in and provide incentives for environmentally sound
infrastructure development.
And finally, we ask that the U.S. Government call for a
regional agreement on sustainable use and development of
natural resources in the Mekong region. Harnessing the
political will demonstrated by His Excellency Khun Suwit
through a Mekong Forestry Commission may be just the right
place to begin.
Chairman Webb, thank you once again for having me testify
today.
For more details on any of these points, please refer to my
written testimony.
WWF strongly urges the U.S. Government to continue to play
an empowering role in the region and to support ecosystem-based
approaches for a climate-resilient and free-flowing Mekong
River.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chungyalpa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dekila Chungyalpa, Director, Greater Mekong
Program, World Wildlife Fund, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for having me testify today on the challenges
to water resources and security in Southeast Asia. My name is Dekila
Chungyalpa, and I am Director of the Greater Mekong Program of the
World Wildlife Fund.
For nearly 50 years, WWF has been protecting the future of nature.
Today we are the largest international conservation organization in the
world. Our unique way of working combines a global reach with a
foundation in science, involves action at every level from local to
global, and ensures the delivery of innovative solutions that meet the
needs of both people and nature. We currently sponsor conservation
programs in more than 100 countries, thanks to the support of 1.2
million members in the Unites States and more than 5 million members
worldwide.
Using the best available scientific knowledge and advancing that
knowledge where we can, WWF works to preserve the diversity and
abundance of life on Earth and the health of ecological systems. We do
this by protecting natural areas and wild populations of plants and
animals, promoting sustainable approaches to the use of renewable
natural resources, and promoting more efficient use of resources and
energy while maximizing the reduction of pollution. WWF is committed to
reversing the degradation of our planet's natural environment and to
building a future in which human needs are met in harmony with nature.
The six countries flanking the Mekong River are often grouped
together and are collectively known as the Greater Mekong Subregion \1\
(GMS). WWF has been present in the GMS countries (with the exception of
Myanmar) for 30 years, working closely with all levels of government,
as well as communities, development agencies and the private sector.
This work has included not only traditional conservation issues, but
has broadened the organisation's scope of work to include sustainable
development. Given the significance of hydropower development to the
region's ecosystems and natural resources, WWF is also an active member
of the International Hydropower Association and the Hydropower
Sustainability Assessment Forum. The Forum is developing a
Sustainability Assessment Protocol, a tool to measure and guide
performance in the hydropower sector. Its membership includes, among
others, bilateral and multilateral development agencies and the Equator
Principles \2\ Financial Institutions Group.
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\1\ The GMS comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam,
and Yunnan province in China.
\2\ The Equator Principles refer to a financial industry benchmark
for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk
in project financing.
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THE MEKONG AND ITS RESOURCES
WWF-US has identified the Greater Mekong Subregion as one of 19
global priority places where we have chosen to focus our conservation
efforts. This vast region contains irreplaceable treasures ranging from
communities with rich cultural heritages to unique wildlife in
spectacular natural landscapes. The region is home to almost 100
distinct ethnic groups that are heavily dependent on the river and its
natural resources for protein as well as livelihoods. It is also
habitat to extraordinary biodiversity, including large mammals such as
the Indochinese tiger, the Asian elephant, and the last remaining
populations of the Irrawaddy dolphin.
The region is defined by the Mekong River--the longest river in
Southeast Asia. It unites 320 million people as it flows over 4,000
kilometres starting in the Tibetan-Qinghai plateau, through China,
Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam into the South China
Sea. It also nurtures and sustains an extraordinary level of freshwater
biodiversity and endemism. The Mekong River basin provides habitat for
at least 1,300 species of fish, including four of the top 10 giant
freshwater species of the world: Mekong giant catfish (Pangasianodon
gigas), giant pangasius (dog-eating catfish) (Pangasius sanitwongsei),
giant barb (Catlocarpio siamensis), and the giant freshwater stingray
(Himantura chaophraya). By length, the Mekong is the world's richest
waterway for freshwater biodiversity, fostering far more species per
unit area than even the Amazon.
The geomorphology of the Mekong is varied; from reservoirs of
frozen water in its source area, to low depths and stretches marked
with rocks and boulders, to enormous rapids and deep pools toward the
end. At least 170 deepwater pools can be found in Cambodia and Laos
alone, with the deepest measuring 80m in depth. In the dry season, when
the Mekong often recedes and fish habitats on the floodplain disappear,
deep pools play a crucial role, providing refuges for many of the
Greater Mekong's fish species to feed and grow in. Moreover, the
river's annual floods and flow patterns carry much needed sediments to
sustain the agricultural productivity downstream.
At least 150 of the river's fish species are migratory, and 50 of
these are commercially important in the Mekong, particularly in the
Tonle Sap, which provides up to 75 percent of Cambodia's inland
fisheries. The Lower Mekong basin provides food security and
livelihoods to over 60 million people, and fish is the main source of
protein for these inhabitants, ranging from 42-51 kg per person per
year \3\. It is estimated that approximately 2.8 million tons of fish
and other aquatic animals are consumed each year, and an estimated 1.1
million tonnes of aquaculture products are exported, making the Mekong
the largest inland fishery in the world. Mekong fisheries yield 3.9
million tonnes per year, accounting for 19-25 percent of inland catches
worldwide and worth between $3.9 billion and $7.0 billion.\4\ The
fisheries are heavily dependent on wild capture: aquaculture accounts
for only 10-12 percent of production and it, too, depends on wild fish
for feed. Preserving natural variations in river hydrology is important
for sustaining high fish diversity; natural flood pulses are often what
trigger fish to migrate to spawning habitats, migrating between distant
habitats.
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\3\ Mekong River Commission. 2010 ``State of the Basin Report:
2010.'' Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
\4\ Mekong River Commission. 2010 ``State of the Basin Report:
2010.'' Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
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A REGION ON THE MOVE
Of the six countries that comprise the GMS, three of these--China,
Vietnam, and Thailand--are rapidly growing economies, while Cambodia,
Laos, and Myanmar lag far behind in relative economic terms. The GMS is
one of the fastest growing regions in the world, and the demand for
energy, particularly in China, Thailand, and Vietnam is expanding.
Rapid industrialization is pushing the development of hydropower in the
Mekong Basin, including the proposed main-stem dams. In addition to
fueling the fastest growing countries, hydropower development is seen
as an avenue for poverty alleviation for Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.
The challenge facing the GMS governments is clear: they must sustain
economic growth while simultaneously ensuring that the Mekong and its
ecosystems remain healthy.
The GMS initially was designed as a trade agreement facilitated by
the Asian Development Bank, in order to strengthen connectivity and
cross-border trade, and to integrate national markets. As such, it is
really a grid of transport networks, often referred to as ``economic
corridors.''
The GMS Strategic Plan as it was originally conceived consists of
305 planned projects worth $31 billion, broken down as follows:
Roads and bridges--$7.6 billion
Railways--$13.2 billion
Ports and navigation--$2.6 billion
Airports--$84 million
Electricity grid--$338 million
Gas pipelines--$1.3 billion
Power stations--$4.8 billion
Telecommunications--$29 million
Tourism--$446 million
Livelihood projects--$44 million
Industrial estates--$1.0 billion
While not directly mentioning hydropower, GMS clearly prioritizes
development of a regional electricity grid and infrastructure that will
move this forward. Given that the GMS is one of the fastest growing
regions in the world, there is a correlating increase in the demand for
energy. This demand for energy should be met with clean energy that
does not aggravate climate change nor threaten the unique ecosystems
and livelihoods of the GMS. Potential alternatives to mainstream dams
should be explored, including carefully considered tributary dams, or
other forms of renewable energy such as wind power or solar power.
Currently, in the Upper Mekong, China has just completed building
the Xiawan dam, which has a larger reservoir capacity (10 km\3\) 10
times more than its three existing dams--Manwan, Dashwan, and Jinghong,
(which add up to less than 1 km\3\) and is in the process of building
an even larger reservoir (12 km\3\). This gives China significant
leverage over the Lower Mekong countries. For example, China will be
able to increase the mean monthly flow to Laos by 20 percent in March,
the driest month of the year. However, these reservoirs are being built
to produce cheap and reliable electricity for the Chinese market, and
not to help agriculture, navigation or floods in the lower Mekong.
GROWING THREATS TO THE MEKONG
Hydropower
While hydropower development has potential economic and greenhouse
gas reduction benefits, it also brings about enormous costs. Hydropower
dams fundamentally alter the river ecosystem, often with negative
impacts to livelihoods and biodiversity. Each subsequent hydropower dam
further diminishes the river's ability to naturally adapt to ecosystem
impacts. The clock is ticking; there are currently 11 dams in different
planning stages of development on the Lower Mekong main stem, with one
in Sayabouly, northern Laos, on the verge of being notified to the MRC
Joint Committee by the Government of Laos. Hydropower threatens to
impact the Mekong and its ecosystems in three main ways:
(i) Delta stability: The Vietnam portion of the Mekong delta is
home to 17 million people, contributes more than 50 percent of
Vietnam's staple food crops and is the source for 60 percent of fish
production in Vietnam. This region provides food for 40 million people
and contributes 27 percent of Vietnam's GDP. Given that more than 22
percent of Vietnam's population is located in the Mekong Delta, the
spillover effects of hydropower development will be even larger.
Reduction of sediment trapped by dams would mean that the delta's
nutrients are no longer being replenished, threatening the very source
of the country's wealth and security. Furthermore, this would increase
the vulnerability of the delta, limiting its ability to replenish
itself and making it more susceptible to sea-level rise and saline
intrusion.
(ii) Fish diversity: In September 2008, a team of fish migration
experts organized by the Mekong River Commission concluded that there
is no evidence that fish passage facilities currently used on dams in
other large tropical rivers can cope with the massive fish migrations
and high species biodiversity found in the Mekong. The technologies
used on high dams in North America and Europe were developed for a very
limited number of species (5 to 8). In contrast, there are 150 migrant
fish species in the Mekong, and biomasses are 100 times greater.
(iii) Livelihoods: There are at least 50 commercially important
migratory fish species in the Mekong River, representing 70 percent of
the total catch. Over 75 percent of rural households in the Lower
Mekong Basin are involved in fisheries, both for their own consumption
and for sale. Any impact on the ecological balance of the river also
threatens the sustainability of these aquatic resources that millions
of people depend on. Dams in the main stem would impede migration of
fish and other aquatic animals, potentially reducing productivity of
the fishery by as much as 60 percent and compromising the livelihoods
of millions of people.
Climate Change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has identified the
Mekong Delta as one of the three most vulnerable deltas on the planet
to climate change impacts. These impacts include sea-level rise, saline
intrusion and more severe storms, which erode the coastline and
undermine coastal ecosystems. Main-stem dams will block the sediment
that builds the delta and with it the nutrients that feed the delta's
immense. As sediment is trapped by dams, the reduction in the amount
reaching the river mouth will decrease the capacity of the delta to
replenish itself, making it even more vulnerable to sea-level rise,
saline intrusion and erosion. With nearly a quarter of Vietnam's
population located in the Mekong Delta, the combined impacts of the
proposed main-stem dams and climate change will pose significant social
and economic challenges to that country in coming years.
The Mekong River is first and foremost an ecosystem. Anything done
to impede its natural flow will also prevent it and the surrounding
basin from adapting naturally to expected climate change impacts,
including changes to average temperatures, water availability from
precipitation and runoff, and sea level. Changes in temperature can
affect rates of growth and reproduction for individual species and can
also change species distribution and ecosystem processes such as
nutrient cycling. WWF holds that climate change impacts will accelerate
the extinction of some species given the high rate of endemism and
habitat fragmentation found in the Mekong basin.
Changes in the seasonal flow pattern in the Mekong River basin will
strongly influence future species composition and ecosystem
productivity. Changes in temperature and precipitation in the basin may
also affect the very nature of the region's wetlands--vital aquatic
systems that are used for rice cultivation and freshwater fisheries and
help to mitigate floods and erosion. Sea-level rise will have
significant negative impacts in the Mekong Delta region because of the
delta's high population density, which is supported by productive
wetlands and estuaries that are in turn maintained by naturally
fluctuating water levels and input of fresh water from the river. These
upstream inputs of freshwater deliver much-needed nutrients and
sediments, which are critical for wetland soils to accumulate and
prevent plants from being inundated.\5\ Sea-level rise and saltwater
intrusion threaten to upset this natural balance and undermine the
Delta ecosystem.
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\5\ Mekong River Commission. 2010 ``State of the Basin Report:
2010.'' Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
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The anticipated human consequences of unmitigated climate change on
the Mekong are hard to imagine. Projections across the Mekong basin
show an array of climate change effects, including a potential sea-
level rise of a meter by the end of the century. If unaddressed, a 1-
meter rise in sea level could submerge more than a third of the Mekong
delta, home for 17 million people and source of nearly half of Viet
Nam's rice.\6\ Already, we are witnessing erratic changes in flood
patterns in the Mekong Delta. Combined with sea-level rise, we can
anticipate further breakdowns of roads and other infrastructure,
leading to the increasing likelihood of economic and social
instability. Even the more modest predictions of how the region and its
communities, ecosystems and economies may be altered suggest that,
without significant steps to reverse course, the humanitarian impacts
of accelerating climate change in the Mekong are likely to present new
security challenges for both GMS countries and the international
community in the 21st century.
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\6\ Institute of Strategy and Policy on Natural Resources and
Environment (Viet Nam) 2009 ``Vietnam Assessment Report on Climate
Change (VARCC).''
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GEOPOLITICS IN THE GMS
The Mekong countries are often seen as a cohesive bloc, largely due
to the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). In realpolitik terms however,
the GMS consists of nations that are very diverse culturally and that
navigate strong bilateral tensions, as in the case of Thailand and
Cambodia. The droughts experienced in 2010, and the subsequent
assertions by Thailand that these may have been caused by dams on the
Upper Mekong, have made it clear that lower Mekong countries are waking
up to the decisions made by their Chinese neighbours to the north and
are increasingly willing to take them to task. At the same time,
Thailand and Vietnam have not acknowledged their own power development
plans, which substantially rely on centralized hydropower development.
In the context of this kind of political gridlock, it is not surprising
that while the GMS has a designated Working Group on the Environment,
it has so far not been successful in mainstreaming regional-level
environmental planning and design into GMS's core business of economic
growth and trade.
Other regional forums exist, such as the Mekong River Commission,
but it is handicapped by the fact that despite being an
intergovernmental body created to promote sustainable management of the
Mekong River, it is effectively limited to decisions made by the four
lower Mekong governments through the Joint Committee and Council. China
is so far only a dialogue partner and Myanmar is not included, thus
leaving no constructive platform for dialogue on regionwide water use
and management issues.
In the past year, Vietnam and Cambodia have grown increasingly
aware of the disproportionate burden that they will face as downstream
nations if any of the Lower Mekong dams go forward. Not coincidentally,
both countries share a history marked with famine, mass migration, and
food insecurity. Add in the potential for political conflicts due to
climate change impact scenarios in the regions, and it becomes clear
why lower military departments from the lower Mekong governments have
been known to attend WWF meetings and consult with us on water resource
management and climate change.
RECOMMENDATIONS: A SUSTAINABLE COURSE FOR THE MEKONG BASIN
The decision to construct a dam on the main stem of the Mekong
River will have permanent consequences and should be very carefully
considered. In 1995, the four Lower Mekong countries signed an
agreement that committed them to the sustainable development of the
Mekong River. The proposed mainstream dams challenge this commitment.
Prior to hydropower development, a comprehensive assessment of the full
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits in the Mekong
Basin should be conducted. Approval of any of the main stem dams should
be delayed until completion of this study. In addition, WWF offers the
following specific recommendations for a way forward:
(1) A 10-year delay in the approval of the mainstream dams would
allow for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of their construction
and operation.
(2) The 1995 agreement of the Mekong River Commission should be
fully recognized and endorsed, in particular the procedures for
notification, prior consultation and agreement.
(3) In collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the
Mekong River Commission (MRC), WWF is testing Environmental
Considerations for Sustainable Hydropower Development (ECSHD) in Sesan,
Sekong, and Srepok tributary rivers in Cambodia. The project objective
is to build a set of interventions into existing planning processes
that will help move the Mekong countries towards adopting an agreed
framework for sustainable hydropower development. The most recent
advancement includes a river-basin-wide sustainability tool (R-SAT)
developed in collaboration between ADB, MRC, WWF and support from USAID
via EcoAsia. Merely developing the tool however does not mean it will
be implemented. Therefore, promoting and financing similar approaches
and the application of such tools is crucial.
(4) One alternative to mainstream dams is tributary dams. These
need to be considered as more feasible alternatives based on careful
selection criteria and methodology. To ensure the overall ecological
integrity of the Mekong Basin, some tributaries will need to remain
free flowing to preserve the values of connectivity of the river from
headwaters to the sea and to allow for migrant fish to continue to
breed and support the livelihoods of local communities. WWF's Greater
Mekong Program is using GIS-based tools to select free-flowing
tributary candidates, and we promote the concept of free-flowing rivers
to decision makers in these specific sub-basins.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS PROMOTED BY WWF
WWF offers the following general recommendations for sustainable
development in the GMS:
Take an ecosystem-based approach
Confronting climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our
time. How do we address such an overwhelming issue and where do we
start? There has been much analysis and discussion, but few practical
solutions are being proposed at the local level to help communities,
the private sector, policymakers and planners to provide ecosystems the
opportunity to adapt to a changing climate.
A resilient ecosystem has the ability to withstand threats and
systemic shocks and can renew and restore itself even if degraded. The
best example is that of mangrove forests and coastal wetlands in India,
which were able to absorb the floodwaters during the 2004 Asian
tsunami. Unfortunately, restoration and preservation of coastal
wetlands is one of the few established and well-known adaptation
strategies. In the case of freshwater ecosystems, there is an urgent
need to understand how to build both ecosystem and social resiliency
and to identify adaptation strategies at a site level.
WWF is learning in our various project sites that ecosystems will
not react in a gradual manner to climate change impacts but will
instead react rapidly and at multiple scales. To complicate this
further, the speed at which these impacts are taking place is
outstripping most public sector thinking, which consists of reflexive
and short-sighted reactions, such as the call for sea walls and other
inappropriate structural investments that are already appearing in the
Mekong Delta. The challenge therefore lies in convincing existing
national and regional institutions to adopt environmental and social
resilience-building strategies across all economic sectors and
political boundaries.
Engage the Finance Sector
In 2009, WWF Greater Mekong Programme commissioned a report to
investigate sources of funding that would allow the proposed dams to be
constructed on the main stem. This study identified 12 project
companies set to construct dams on the lower Mekong main stem and 70
financial institutions that invested in the different stages of the
feasibility study of these projects. For practical purposes, this list
of financial institutions was then narrowed down to 28 banks:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equator Signatory Specific
Financial institution Country of origin CSR policy principles to UNEPFI policy on
adopted and/or PRI dams
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agricultural Bank of China........... China.................. No No No No
Bank of Ayudhya...................... Thailand............... No No No No
Bank of China........................ China.................. Yes No No No
Bank of Communications............... China.................. Yes No No No
Barclays............................. United Kingdom......... Yes Yes Yes No
China Galaxy Securities.............. China.................. No No No No
CIMB Bank............................ Malaysia............... No No No No
Guotai Junan Securities.............. China.................. No No No No
HSBC................................. United Kingdom......... Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China China.................. Yes No No No
JPMorgan............................. United States.......... Yes Yes Yes No
Morgan Stanley....................... United States.......... Yes Yes No No
State Street......................... United States.......... Yes No Yes No
Dimensional Fund Advisors............ United States.......... No No No No
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ......... Japan.................. Yes Yes Yes No
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking.............. Japan.................. Yes Yes Yes No
Calyon (part of Credit Agricole)..... France................. Yes Yes No No
KBC Bank............................. Belgium................ Yes Yes No No
OCBC Bank............................ Singapore.............. Yes No No No
UBS.................................. Switzerland............ Yes Yes Yes No
Standard Chartered................... United Kingdom......... Yes Yes Yes Yes
ANZ.................................. Australia-New Zealand.. Yes Yes Yes No
ADB.................................. ....................... ........... .......... .......... ...........
EXIM................................. China.................. Yes No No No
CRBC................................. China.................. Not Known No No Not Known
AmBank............................... Malaysia............... Not Known No No No
Fidelity Group....................... United States.......... Yes No No No
RHB Bank............................. Malaysia............... Not Known No No No
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WWF is currently hosting a Sustainable Hydropower Financing
Conference, taking place on the 23rd and 24th of September 2010 in
Bangkok, in order to facilitate open discussion of sustainable
investment practices on the Mekong main stem. We have 30 confirmed
participants from the banking sector involved in funding, insuring, or
supporting the Mekong main stem dams, including Morgan Stanley.
The conference has three objectives:
1. To convince banks to finance sustainable hydropower projects in
the Mekong. The summit incorporates a long-term approach by providing a
solution--Sustainability Assessment Protocol, and the Environmental
Considerations in Sustainable Hydropower Development--that financial
institutions can use only to finance sustainable projects that are
beneficial to the economy and people with minimal impacts on the
environment.
2. To build partnerships with key institutions in the financing
sector, an essential and integral part of any investment project. WWF
offers the summit as a solution-oriented event instead of what has
usually been a charged dialogue between banks and NGOs. WWF hopes that
financing institutions will continue to work with WWF in other
infrastructure or investment project. There is an opportunity to create
synergies between WWF and the financial institutions with respect to
expertise, strength, and experience with sustainable development.
3. To identify a bank to lead the charge in sustainable investing
in the region. Often tokened as a ``lead arranger,'' such an
institution could help WWF to reach its peers, and provide a good
example of the benefits of sustainable investments. While some banks
invited to the summit have had long histories of commitment to
environmentally responsible financing, there are others who have not
traditionally stood up for these types of issues. The summit is an
opportunity to promote this practice and help those institutions
interested in leading investment in sustainable hydropower development
to become the champions.
Engage the Private Sector
WWF is working across the Mekong region with key industry water
users, led by the Coca Cola Company, to help develop a task force to
explore water stewardship issues and the role of the private sector in
wise water use, particular given the impacts of climate change in the
delta where many of these industries are based. This will consist of a
multi-sector network that can jointly share the latest science and
information, apply appropriate adaptation strategies within their
markets, and invest in sustainable resilience building for local
communities, businesses and ecosystems In addition this group will also
explore innovative financial mechanisms for adaptation and water
conservation to safeguard future water supply for biodiversity and
livelihoods.
Engage the Public Sector
There is an urgent need for an integrated regional approach to
natural resource management at policy and operational levels. The
ongoing GEF 5 reforms offer an opportunity and could provide the
resources required to make this happen. The countries of the region are
willing take the bold step to commit a percentage of their GEF national
allocations to a regional ecosystem based adaptation approach. We hope
that such a strong regional signal demonstrates the lower Mekong
governments' commitment to maintain the region's resilience for the
benefit of its people, economies and biodiversity. Program components
would include:
Regionally integrated spatial planning that incorporates
biodiversity conservation and climate change, applied for the
sustainable management of priority landscapes in the GMS;
Maintenance and restoration of critical ecosystems and the
services they provide in selected test sites in priority
landscapes by;
Incentives to effectively manage biodiversity and carbon
values to strengthen adaptation capacity in priority landscapes
developed and tested;
National and regional capacities improved for cooperation
and coordination for ecosystems management and sustainable
development;
A discussion at the administrative level of the lower Mekong
governments on sustainable hydropower and the need for a free
flowing Mekong main stem.
AN IDEAL ROLE FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
The last 2 years have shown tremendous changes in the GMS, not
least of which is a renewed will to work on a regional scale. A
significant inspiration for this has been the two visits made by
Secretary Clinton to the region. Furthermore, the U.S. Administration
has substantiated its long-term commitment to the region's stability
through The Lower Mekong Initiative; a partnership between the U.S.
State Department and the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam to enhance cooperation on environment, health, education, and
infrastructure development. In particular, two science-based approaches
that are beneficial are:
--The sister river partnership between the Mekong River Commission and
the Mississippi River Commission allows the sharing of expertise
and best practices in areas such as climate change adaptation;
flood and drought management; hydropower and impact assessment,
water demand and food security; and water resource management.
--The establishment of the Delta Research and Global Observation
Network (DRAGON), and a new interactive, modeling system called
Forecast Mekong.
This initiative creates the possibility of a strengthened lower
Mekong bloc that is invested in regional win-win strategies rather than
short term national interests that are unsustainable in the long run.
Advancing similar relationships, as the United States has done with
Vietnam, in the other lower Mekong countries will help make this a
reality.
Other ways that the U.S. Government could continue to strengthen
these governments and to create long-term security in the Mekong region
include:
Call for regional cooperation on data gathering, analysis,
and sharing: Hydropower is a regional issue. Regional measures
must be put in place to ensure that the ecological products and
services upon which the development of this region depends are
not degraded or irreversibly lost, which requires a regional
approach to cost-benefit analyses. There are still large gaps
in knowledge in the region. For example, what is the value of
environmental flows and ecosystem services provided by the
Mekong River in monetary terms? Encouraging this kind of data
analysis and sharing among all the six countries is crucial.
This would also invite a stronger influence from academic
institutions and civil society on policy and decision making
processes.
Promote green science-based solutions: The U.S. State
Department led Lower Mekong Initiative has developed a new
interactive modeling system for climate change impacts called
Forecast Mekong. It will help the Vietnamese Government better
understand and adapt to sea-level rise, emphasizing sustainable
solutions rather than stop-gap measures such as building more
dykes and walls. By promoting these types of science-based
approaches, the US Government can further the development of
green technological solutions in the Mekong region.
Support strengthened governance and accountability with the
Mekong River Commission: The U.S. Government can support the
full recognition and endorsement of the 1995 agreement of the
Mekong River Commission; in particular the procedures for
notification, prior consultation and agreement for hydropower
dam development. More specifically, a moratorium on the
approval of mainstream dams should be established to allow the
full assessment of the risks from this development.
Encourage a meaningful dialogue with China: Recently, the
four Prime Ministers of the Lower Mekong countries took part in
the Mekong River Commission Summit to celebrate its 15th
anniversary, giving the MRC a much higher profile than in the
past. China was formally asked to join the MRC by the Cambodia
government. It remains to be seen if they will. However, if the
freshwater biodiversity, fisheries, and future of the Mekong
River are to be sustained, a whole-of-basin and even-handed
approach on hydropower must be attempted.
Call on multilateral development banks to take a whole-of-
basin approach on hydropower: While the multilateral banks
wield less influence than they did in the past, they are still
very important to less powerful governments in the region. It
behooves them to take cumulative impacts of hydropower
development into consideration, particularly for the Mekong
River basin, where poverty reduction strategies must begin with
the well-being of the river. A critical place to start is with
the mainstreaming of sustainable development planning in all
subdivisions and in particular, the promotion of alternative
green energy over that of main-stem hydropower development.
As one of the largest global donors to multilateral development
banks, the U.S. Government can call on them to mainstream what
their ``environmental arms'' develop and recommend. Often
times, conflicting mandates within different subdivisions of
the same institution are the bottlenecks to implementing
innovative environmental solutions and integrating a whole-of-
basin approach to development.
Call for a regional agreement on climate change resiliency:
Climate change will profoundly affect the Mekong River's
biodiversity, water resources, and economy, all of which in
turn will impact its people. National governments can only
respond to climate change at a local level. Given that the
impacts of climate change will be transboundary and has
significant implications for security, a regionally coordinated
response to climate change will be most effective. Guiding a
regional climate adaptation agreement that builds resiliency
for ecosystems, natural resources, biodiversity and most
importantly, local communities, would bring a more peaceful and
sustainable future for the Mekong region. One possible
opportunity is the current Global Environment Facility (known
as GEF V), which allows for a transboundary approach on
protecting the Mekong region's most unique ability to provide
for its people; the environmental services provided by the
Mekong River and its watersheds.
CONCLUSION
Chairman Webb, thank you once more for the opportunity to offer my
comments on the importance of recognizing the Mekong River as one
ecosystem. Taking this whole-of-basin approach emphasizes the critical
need to protect the Mekong River's ecological functions, of which the
free-flowing nature of its main stem is most important, for a peaceful
sustainable future of the Mekong region. WWF strongly urges the U.S.
Government to continue to play an empowering role in the region and to
support ecosystem based approaches for improving climate change
resilience for the entire Mekong River basin.
Senator Webb. Well, thank you.
And thank all of you for your testimony today, both written
and oral, and that will be considered by our staff in great
detail after this hearing is over. We appreciate the time that
you've taken to come here and be with us today.
The first thing I would just say, after listening to you,
is that it is profoundly disturbing in its implications that--
on a lot of different levels--environmentally, politically,
culturally, strategically--in terms of this region, that we are
not paying enough attention to this issue.
And actually, Ms. Chungyalpa, when I was listening to you,
one of the thoughts that went through my mind when you were
talking about the enthusiasm on the climate change issue is,
it's easy to get people to talk about climate change in the
region, because there's no sovereignty dispute. You don't have
to think about encroachment by another country, or the sorts of
issues that are involved when we have to address the hydropower
situation. The immediate reality of what could be happening
with these--the construction of these dams, however, is
extremely dangerous to the continuity of the region as it's
existed for thousands of years. And it takes a little bit more
of a push to get people in the region to discuss this issue.
I know when I was in Vietnam in July, I found a real
hesitation among even government officials to discuss this part
of the problem, because it does go into the need for
governments and the business sector to truly engage in coming
up with some sort of a potential structure in which to address
the problem.
And it's one of our real challenges. One of the reasons I
wanted to hold this hearing was to look at how do we help
create an awareness of the immediacy, in terms of the
seriousness of this problem? Quite frankly, the responsibility
of the players, government, and business alike, who are more
shortsighted and need to be addressing this is a way they
perhaps don't want to.
Let me start with this. And I'd like to hear all three of
your thoughts. We have been working on this amendment, which we
shared with you, that would go to ADB funding and, at the same
time, as all of you have mentioned, in one form or another,
there are other formulas that are taking place right now in
order to finance these projects. There were several mentions of
that. And China, particularly, is starting to finance its own
construction. We saw, just a couple of days ago, China offered
a $4.2-billion interest-free loan to Burma for mass hydropower
projects: road construction, infrastructure, et cetera. So, how
much good can we do with this amendment? How much can we affect
the process? And what are your thoughts for, perhaps, other
ways that we could go about it?
And, Dr. Cronin, if you would?
Dr. Cronin. Thank you, Senator.
Well, I think the first thing is to raise the issue. And
frankly, it won't be well--your amendment won't be that well
received in Manila, at least by a lot of people in the Bank.
But, it's essential to get a dialogue started on this. And
there is an immediacy that needs to be addressed.
One of the issues that concerns me is that if we--if the
countries go ahead with these dams, you're talking about a 10-
or 15-, even 20-year period when the river will be disturbed as
the dams are built. And there is no one, you know, organizing
or coordinating, or even strategizing, that I can see, about
how to deal with the gap between when livelihoods are destroyed
and food supplies are destroyed and when the benefits of
electricity start to kick in. And so, that's an issue.
And I mentioned--with regard to the ADB, I mentioned that
there is a slippery slope of them getting involved in sort of
being the little guy behind the elephants in the parade with a
scooper--pooper-scooper--to clean up, if you will, after the
damage is being done. And so, I would like to see us
particularly weigh in on that issue and make sure--you know,
that the dam--the Bank not go down that path.
But, how to change the minds of the countries, and how to
actually influence the Bank, is difficult. And in addition, as
you just mentioned, the Banks are no longer central to this. I
mean, this is all so-called ``public/private'' financing.
Essentially, they're all commercial opportunities. And there's
plenty of money around, apparently, to carry these projects
out.
But--so, the urgent issue remains, I think, to find ways to
help the governments understand the consequences of what
they're starting--what they're trying to--planning to do. And I
think the ADB has a role--has an important role in that.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin. Thank you.
Senator Webb. Ms. Imhof.
Ms. Imhof. Thank you. Very good questions, of course, that
you're raising.
You know, China is now actually the world's largest dam-
builder and funder. We have been collecting data on how many
projects it's funding and building globally. And I've actually
lost count, but it's probably--at the last count, I believe it
was over 140 dam projects, around the world, that China was
involved in. So, it is a very significant challenge.
I think--with the amendment that you've proposed, I think
it's a very good amendment, in very strong language, and I
think it's very important, because the ADB has been kind of the
main supporter of hydropower development in the region until
recently. And one thing that we are concerned about is, with a
lot of the focus on the Mekong mainstream dams, that there will
be a greater push for dam projects on tributaries of the
Mekong. And we even, here at WWF, you know, advocating for some
tributary development. And our experience with tributary
projects, as I mentioned before, that they are also extremely
damaging and should definitely be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.
So, I think that the amendment is an important signal. I
would recommend that it apply to the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank.
And the other thing that's important about it is, it refers
to transmission infrastructure. And actually, the ADB is
proposing to finance a transmission line in southern Laos that
would enable a whole slew of tributary projects in southern
Laos to go forward that currently aren't going forward because
they don't have transmission infrastructure. So, I think it's
an important signal that the U.S. Government is concerned about
the transmission infrastructure that allows these projects to
go forward.
I think it would be really important for yourself and the
committee to also push Treasury to actually implement the--
sorry--to actually pressure the ADB and World Bank to implement
and adopt the kind of policy reforms that you refer to in the
amendment--so, things like implementation of the World
Commission on Dam Standards--because what we do know from
experience--I mean, as you know, Treasury hates these sorts of
mandated votes, because they say that it reduces their
authority. I think that where it can be important is if
Congress is really pushing Treasury to push for meaningful
reform--policy reform at the institution, along the lines of
what is in the U.S. legislation. So, I would really encourage
you to press for that.
In terms of what can be done about China, I think there has
to be ongoing dialogue about Chinese financing overseas and
China Export-Import Bank. I don't know if the U.S. Ex-Im Bank
could play some kind of role in encouraging the China Eximbank
to sign up to the common approaches adopted by the OECD on
environmental and social impact assessment, lending in their
operations. That might be one other role that the United States
could play in encouraging China Exim to adopt international
standards in its operations, and the same for Thai EXIM Bank,
as well. And Thai EXIM, until now, has been very much neglected
and kind of out of the loop, in terms of, you know, the
international export credit agency community and looking at its
standards of the projects it's financing.
Senator Webb. Great insights. Thank you.
Ms. Chungyalpa.
Ms. Chungyalpa. Chairman, first, I'd like to respond by
talking about climate change in the context of hydropower.
Hydropower is often used as an example what green energy means.
And we're really concerned, especially because it is posited in
the Mekong as a solution rather than a big threat, in the
context of climate change. So, climate change cannot be kept
out of that dialogue, precisely for that reason.
The other thing that we're very aware of is that climate
change, in some sense, gives us an opportunity to talk about
issues that most governments are unwilling to talk about
publicly, and that includes hydropower. It actually allows us
to indirectly bring up hydropower in--at very high levels, to
make the point that if you actually dam the river, you are
going to be basically creating maladaptation on the river, in
the long term.
Finally, as the U.S. Government has invested in the long
term in sustainable development for this region, and if we are
to save the river from hydropower, but then lose it to climate
change, it is going to be a wasted investment. And I think that
might be the broader context for climate change, and WWF's
position on it.
In terms of the ADB in particular, we applaud the language
on the Asian Development Bank that was shared with us. The
reality of the situation is, it's always about the economy. And
in the case of the ADB, it's the economic arms that always win
the battle over the environmental arms. What we have learned,
sometimes in difficult situations, is that the Asian
Development Bank might have arms that are willing to work on
environmental sustainable solutions, might actually develop
very innovative technological solutions, but, at the end of the
day, they are going to be ignored by the other subdivisions of
the Asian Development Bank. And maybe the most important role
that the U.S. Government can play is to actually ask for
mainstreaming of environmental sustainability, not just so it's
side language in the Asian Development Bank's mandate, but
actually mainstreamed within the mandate, especially when you
consider that the mandate is about poverty reduction, not just
in terms of large economic wins, but also at a household level.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Ms. Imhof, you stated, in your testimony, that studies have
shown that the planned dams would not contribute greatly to the
region's energy security; they would have little impact on
regional energy prices, and only generate the equivalent of 1
year's demand for growth. What other energy alternatives would
you suggest?
Ms. Imhof. Thank you. I mean, the first thing is to look at
the potential for expanding investment in energy efficiency,
because there's huge potential. I mean, Thailand already has an
energy efficiency program, but there is still huge potential
for energy savings. And California is a great model of an
entity. The State of California has managed to keep its power
demand growth stagnant over the past 30 years, because of
investments in energy efficiency. And the same goes for
Vietnam, which doesn't have a strong energy efficiency program
right now. And this is an area where I think there could be
very good technology transfer between the United States and the
regional countries.
One of the other issues is that Thailand--energy analysts
have shown that Thailand--the Electricity Generating Authority
of Thailand, the main electric utility, has consistently
overestimated power demand, so there is consistently a surplus
of power in the Thai system. And this has been documented over,
I believe, 10 or 15 years. So, there's an issue of where EGAT
consistently says, ``We need more power. We need more power.''
And we sign--EGAT signs these agreements and then ends up--you
know, the demand growth doesn't meet it. There's also been
studies showing that there's significant potential for
repowering of existing plants, so generating more electricity
from existing plants. There's biomass potential from rice
husks. And then there's, you know, renewable technologies.
There's not a lot of wind potential in Thailand, but there's
certainly solar potential, as well. So, there is definitely
potential there.
The biggest issue is really the kind of political and
economic interests that are driving these sorts of projects.
And there's very strong--for example, the developer of the
Xayaburi Dam project, a Thai company called CH. Karnchang, has
very strong political interconnections with the Thai Government
and is a very large Thai construction company. So, there's more
political interests that are driving--and economic interests--
that are driving the development of these projects, rather than
actually the demand for power. I mean, there's still no study
out there that actually says that this power is necessary to
meet the region's energy needs.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin, in your written statement, you mentioned that
China is already considering the diversion of some Mekong water
to the Yangtze River to replenish water sent north----
Dr. Cronin. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb [continuing]. As part of the south-to-north
diversion project. Where are they on this? And do we see that
this is a serious plan? Because it certainly does go into what
you would call water sovereignty----
Dr. Cronin. Right.
Senator Webb [continuing]. If they're taking water that
historically would be going downstream, and diverting it to
another place inside their own country.
Dr. Cronin. Yes. Well, thank you. As in all things
regarding Chinese decisionmaking on these kinds of sensitive
political--geopolitical issues, they don't show their hand.
These are rumors--and there's substance to them--that they are
considering these projects. How far along they are is a big
question. But, I think, in the longer term, the stark reality
is that China does not have enough water. And, of course,
China's going to try to transport--they're building canals to
transport water over 1,700 kilometers, from the Yangtze River
to the Yellow River, which is now running dry at the mouth
during unusually dry seasons. And there's no way that China can
keep growing the way it's growing and using water the way it's
using it without resorting, ultimately, to some kind of water
sovereignty--``water nationalism'' I would call it.
So, the Indians are also very worried about projects--the
plans that China has at least discussed or as--there is
information about plans that China wants to dam the upper
reaches of the Brahmaputra River in--I think it's in Tibet,
actually. And the same kind of story, that if they bleed water
away from the Brahmaputra River for their own use, then you've
got the whole Bay of Bengal issue, for both India and
Bangladesh.
Senator Webb. The question occurred to me--Is there an
international forum in which downstream riparian water rights
could be considered with sort of decisional authority?
Dr. Cronin. Unfortunately, no. And one of the problems with
water rights is that, traditionally, countries that agree to
negotiate over water rights and to--and countries that respect
upstream/downstream rights, are talking about dividing shares
of water: How much do you get, how much do we get? A good
example is the Indus River Agreement between India and
Pakistan. Essentially, they took five rivers and said to
Pakistan, ``You get two, and India, you get three.'' And that's
been a rather lasting agreement.
But, the key issue with the Mekong is what we call the
``flood pulse.'' That is the flood pulse is necessary for the
aquatic life of the Mekong, as we know it now, and these
extremes of wet and dry. And so, if the monsoon flood pulse is
broken or, for instance, if the river is contained and the
pulse effect is lessened, then you don't have the same amount
of water going into the Tonle Sap Great Lake. When the--you
know, the water comes roaring down the Mekong, and when it gets
to about Phnom Penh, the river divides, and there's
obstructions--the river can't take all the water, and so it
backs up into the Tonle Sap Great Lake. And so, that's almost
like a lung, you know, the expansion and contraction of that
great lake is the--as they say, the nursery of Mekong fish. And
so, you can't--if you interrupt the flood pulse that's a huge
problem.
But, there's no international law, that I know of, no
regime that would, in fact, address an issue like the flood
pulse. In other words, you have six countries sharing the same
river, and any one country disrupts the river, there's an
impact on everybody. And it's like the--almost like the
prisoner's dilemma, you know--problem, where one person--if
they all cooperate, they all benefit. If they don't cooperate,
everyone loses.
Senator Webb. Well, I thank all of you for your
information, and analysis and advice. As I said, the
implications of this are profound and have an immediacy to
them. I think this hearing will help bring greater awareness,
here and in other places, of the immediate seriousness of this
problem. Hopefully we can move forward to some sort of a
structure in which we can start having an impact on these
issues. And I have to say, Ms. Chungyalpa, when I tell my
brother that there's a 9-foot catfish in the Mekong River,
he'll be on the next plane with his rod and reel. [Laughter.]
Ms. Chungyalpa. It is on the verge of extinction. He must
hurry.
Senator Webb. Do this before the next couple of years,
right?
But, thanks again for taking the time to come and help
educate us. We will continue to see if we can't help raise the
awareness of this issue.
Thank you.
This hearing's closed.
[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]