[Senate Hearing 111-965]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-965
TOYOTA'S RECALLS
AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Acting Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 2, 2010.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 5
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 6
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 8
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 9
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 10
Statement of Senator Isakson..................................... 10
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 11
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 12
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 13
Article, entitled ``Piling On'' Toyota is Underserved........ 14
Article, dated February 24, 2010, from the Washington Post,
entitled ``U.S. Owes Toyota Fair, Careful Treatment on
Safety Issues''............................................ 15
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 16
Statement of Senator Johanns..................................... 17
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 18
Statement of Senator Ensign...................................... 54
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 59
Witnesses
Hon. Ray LaHood, Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation.... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety... 57
C O N T E N T S
Toyota's Recalls and the Government's Response--Afternoon Session
----------
Hearing held on March 2, 2010.................................... 61
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 61
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 86
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 87
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 104
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 107
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 109
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 112
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 116
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 118
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 120
Witnesses
Takeshi Uchiyamada, Executive Vice President, Toyota Motor
Corporation.................................................... 88
Prepared statement........................................... 90
Shinichi Sasaki, Executive Vice President, Toyota Motor
Corporation.................................................... 91
Prepared statement........................................... 92
Yoshimi Inaba, President and COO, Toyota Motor North America
(TMA); and Chairman/CEO, Toyota Motor Sales.................... 93
Prepared statement........................................... 94
Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety... 95
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Appendix
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from Texas, prepared
statement...................................................... 129
Letter, dated February 15, 2010, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
from
Thomas M. Kowalick, Professor of Holocaust Studies, Sandhills
Community College.............................................. 130
Thomas M. Kowalick, prepared statement........................... 130
Letter, dated February 25, 2008, to Hon. Nicole R. Nason,
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
from Thomas M. Kowalick........................................ 137
Letter, dated November 17, 2009 to Stephen R. Kratzke, Esq.,
Associate Administrator of Rulemaking, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration from William Rosenbluth, Automotive
Systems Analysis, Inc.......................................... 140
Letter, dated March 18, 2010 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, from
Theodore M. Hester, King & Spalding LLP........................ 143
Letter, dated April 13, 2010 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, from
Theodore M. Hester, King & Spalding LLP........................ 149
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Ray LaHood by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 166
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 168
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 169
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 169
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Strickland
by:
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 171
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 173
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Ray LaHood and
Hon. David Strickland by:
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 176
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 179
Response to written questions submitted to Clarence M. Ditlow by:
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 180
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 180
Memorandum, dated April 30, 2008, from Michael W. Monk, Director,
Vehicle Research and Test Center, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration to Kathleen DeMeter, Director, Office of
Defects Investigation, entitled ``Final Report--2007 Lexus ES-
350 Unintended Acceleration''.................................. 181
TOYOTA'S RECALLS
AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SR 253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. All right, this hearing will come to order,
please.
I'll make my morning statement, and then, in order of
seniority, others, as they come, will make their opening
statements, and then we will proceed to our witnesses.
Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
At its core, today's hearing is about the millions of
Americans who drive to work, drive to the grocery store, or
carpool their kids to school and other activities, in every day
in every way. It's about their safety and their security, and
nothing is more important than that.
We're all here today because we know that something has
gone terribly wrong. The system meant to safeguard against
faulty vehicles has failed, and it needs to be fixed, and needs
to be fixed right away.
This is an important hearing. We have dedicated an entire
day--we've never done that before that I can remember--to one
subject, so that we can examine the problems and get to the
solutions. It is most immediately about the Toyota recalls,
but, more broadly--and just as urgently--about the safety
oversight system and how to fix it.
It's not just for some future problem, but right now, in
order to get to the bottom of the dangers of sudden
acceleration, which are not addressed in the recalls. I believe
the way we respond to this serious situation will, and must,
have a lasting impact on the carmaker and its employees, on the
Federal agency charged with overseeing safety, and on the
confidence of the public for years to come. This morning's
hearing will focus on the government's role, and this afternoon
we will focus on the company's role in this very serious
situation.
It is no secret that Toyota is an important company in
America, not only to my home State of West Virginia, but to our
national economy. The carmaker operates 10 plants across the
country, employing 35,000 workers, and dealerships in all 50
States. I worked very hard to bring a Toyota engine and
transmission plant to Buffalo, West Virginia, because I knew
Toyota was a company built on the philosophy of quality first,
that if they designed and built the safest and most reliable
car possible, then sales and profits, and jobs, would follow.
Now it's clear that, somewhere along the way, public safety
took a back seat and corporate profits drove the company's
decisions. If Toyota wants to remain successful, and regain
consumer confidence and trust, it needs to find this balance
once again.
Toyota's consumers and its incredible employees, who've won
all kinds of awards in our State of West Virginia, deserve
nothing less than this. They drive Toyotas, too.
It also is apparent that the government--NHTSA--did not
fulfill its responsibility in the past, and has more to do in
the present, and needs greater resources and authority in the
future. NHTSA's actions and inactions in the years leading up
to today are deeply troubling. The American people count on
NHTSA to protect them and to provide them with clear and
reliable safety information. And even today, that picture is
not clear.
And what's more, the American people do not yet clearly
understand how this happened and how it will be solved; which
defects have been addressed and what dangers remain; and what
the recalls are fixing, and what they are not fixing. So, we
need to look back and focus forward.
We will hear, from Toyota executives, how these problems
occurred and why the company did not respond more quickly, but
I also want to know what Toyota's plans are to fix the ongoing
problems with sudden acceleration and set itself on a new
course to identifying needed recalls in the future, and prevent
new defects. Big company, serious problems, very important this
be fixed for the future. And right away.
We will hear, from NHTSA and DOT officials, why they did
not adequately connect the dots about the safety situation, and
why they did not move aggressively to investigate. But, I also
want to know NHTSA's plan to get to the bottom of sudden
acceleration, industrywide, and to make sure that it has the
resources and the authority, if it does not, to fulfill that
mission. And last, but not least, we will hear from the--in a
panel following this one this morning--the Center from--Auto
Safety, Clarence Ditlow, about the best and most effective plan
to success for all involved.
I do intend to work on comprehensive legislation--let that
be known--to get at all of these issues in a real way. I will
discuss that at the end of the day.
We need to look at current law and ask if it is strong
enough to prevent something like this from happening again. I
know my colleagues have much to contribute to this effort; and,
of course, as always, I welcome that.
The American people deserve a top-to-bottom review, not
just on past errors, but of the road ahead. They deserve more
than reassurances; they deserve full disclosures,
accountability, and solutions.
Thank you for all of our witnesses participating, not just
this morning, but also during the course of the day, for
working with our committee, which has been at this for a long
time. I look forward to hearing from all of you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr.----
The Chairman. Senator Inouye----
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman.--who is really the Chairman of this
committee.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inouye. The past few weeks have been extraordinary
ones. Whenever you turn on the television set or listen to the
radio, watch the printed pages, just about every article is on
Toyota, the front-page articles. The Toyota problem. We've had
interviews of attorneys who are bringing class suits. We have
talk shows determining how long it will take this company to
restore its credibility. And I suppose that it would be
justified for Americans to get the impression that this is a
Toyota problem.
And, Mr. Chairman, I decided to do a little research before
coming over this morning, and I'd like to share some of these
numbers with you. These numbers were prepared by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA, prepared
yesterday, March 1, 2010. So it's very current, sir. And it
runs from the calendar year 2000 to and including yesterday.
In the year 2000, a total of 7,827,164 vehicles were
recalled. Of that number: Ford Motor Company, 7,485,466; Toyota
8,379; Hyundai, 333,319.
In the year 2001, a total of 11,466,361 vehicles were
recalled: General Motors, 2,496,900; Chrysler, 2,609,345; Ford
Motor Company, 5,630,054; Mitsubishi, 379,919; Toyota, 158,259;
Hyundai, 183,884.
In 2002, 15,186,221 cars were recalled. During that year:
General Motors, 4,554,046; Ford, 2,322,932; Chrysler,
6,413,130; Toyota, 496,000.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to put the rest of these numbers in
the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Significant Vehicle Recalls 2000-2009
(Based on National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
Statistics) *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Manufacturer Number of Vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Ford Motor Company 7,485,466
Toyota Motors NA, Inc. 8,379
Hyundai Motor Company 333,319
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 24,636,743
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 General Motors Corp. 2,496,900
DaimlerChrysler Corp. 2,609,345
Ford Motor Company 5,638,054
Mitsubishi America 379,919
Toyota Motors NA, Inc. 158,259
Hyundai Motor Company 183,884
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 13,639,625
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 General Motors Corp. 4,554,046
Mitsubishi America 22,263
Ford Motor Company 2,322,932
DaimlerChrysler Corp 6,413,130
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 496,213
American Honda Motor Co. 1,066,171
Hyundai Motor Company 311,466
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 18,427,866
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Nissan North America, Inc. 1,995,524
General Motors Corp. 7,158,299
Mitsubishi America 74,649
Mitsubishi Motors NA 17,481
DaimlerChrysler Corp. 2,070,975
Ford Motor Company 3,405,403
American Honda Motor Co. 910,732
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 212,252
Hyundai Motor Company 595,683
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 18,858,930
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Nissan North America, Inc. 723,891
General Motors Corp. 10,734,505
Mitsubishi Motors NA, Inc. 219,533
DaimlerChrysler Corp. 5,819,380
Daimler Chrysler Manufacturing 23,108
International
Ford Motor Company 5,035,095
Volkswagen of America, Inc. 1,082,477
American Honda Motor Co. 2,135,070
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 1,132,334
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 30,822,164
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Nissan North America, Inc. 709,838
General Motors Corp. 4,997,923
Mitsubishi Motors NA, Inc. 74,427
DaimlerChrysler Corp. 765,777
Ford Motor Company 6,705,309
American Honda Motor Co. 714,527
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 2,374,162
Hyundai Motor Company 318,111
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 19,178,356
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Nissan North America, Inc. 1,267,021
General Motors Corp. 1,369,916
DaimlerChrysler 2,397,247
Ford Motor Company 1,737,420
Volkswagen of America, Inc. 949,973
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 657,308
American Honda Motor Co. 1,190,774
Hyundai Motor Company 172,993
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 11,276,291
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Nissan North America, Inc. 1,225,057
General Motors Corp. 545,972
DaimlerChrysler Corp. 1,478,288
Ford Motor Company 5,533,853
American Honda Motor Co. 794,277
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 583,191
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 14,860,416
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Nissan North America, Inc. 824,382
General Motors Corp. 1,758,629
Mitsubishi Motors NA, Inc. 269,821
Ford Motor Company 1,604,819
Volkswagen of America, Inc. 579,075
American Honda Motor Co. 796,843
Toyota Motor Corporation 196,222
Hyundai Motor Company 293,910
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 10,539,188
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Ford Motor Company 4,521,993
General Motors Corp. 2,239,394
American Honda Motor Co. 454,003
Hyundai Motor Company 532,633
Mitsubishi Motors NA, Inc. 76,498
Toyota Motor NA, Inc. 4,872,583
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Vehicles Recalled 16,403,426
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Report prepared 3/1/2010 and is retained in Committee files.
Senator Inouye. I decided to read these numbers, and
they're very interesting, because, Mr. Chairman, it is not a
Toyota problem; it is an industry problem. Looking at these
numbers, one would get the impression that maybe it's Ford
Motor or Chrysler or General Motors. And I think we should be
honest with ourselves. If it is an industry problem, we should
hear from the industry, not just from Toyota.
And I'd like to commend NHTSA for compiling these
statistics. They're very helpful. It gives a clear picture. And
if I may respectfully suggest, the investigation and inquiry by
this committee should be based upon the industry, instead of
just Toyota.
Thank you very much, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
Following both this morning's statements and this
afternoon's statements, for the first time, we'll go by
seniority, because we have to divide them up, morning and
afternoon. That's why I decided to do that.
Senator Dorgan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
This issue of the automobile is an interesting issue. You
know, we traveled only as fast as a horse could carry us, from
the Roman legions until Lewis and Clark. And then for the next
200 years we got the train, the airplane, and the car, and now
almost everybody has a car. They are now made bigger and faster
and safer.
Except this issue of ``safer''--not all cars have been made
to the same standards. And, as Senator Inouye indicated, we've
had a lot of recalls. At first, early on, the manufacturers
weren't enthralled with recalls. You will recall the Pinto and
the fires, and the industry was forced, actually, to understand
the need to recall and to own up to defects.
This particular day and hearing is devoted to Toyota. It is
the world's largest manufacturer of automobiles. There is now
evidence of sudden acceleration of Toyota cars, certain Toyota
models. People died, and then their relatives and others, loved
ones, complained, then more people died and more complained.
And the question for this hearing is, this morning, What about
the government agencies that are engaged in worrying about
safety issues? Did they take these things seriously? Did they
seriously investigate? Were they fierce advocates for the
public good, here, or have they become paper tigers and did not
pursue these things the way they should have? I think this
hearing will give us a lot of information about that.
And this afternoon, it is, with respect to the automobile
company--in this case. Toyota--what did they know, and what did
they do with what they knew? What kind of information did they
describe to the Federal agencies that inquired, if they did?
All of these things are very, very important. It's about a
matter of trust--number one, the American people being able to
trust a company that they believe is going to sell them an
automobile that is safe; and number two, the American people
having trust and confidence in a Federal agency that is
designed, and whose purpose is, to address safety issues.
I'm not an expert in this area, but I've read as much as I
could, recently, about the hearings that have been held and the
background information that has been provided to us. I think
there are very serious questions, all the way around. I think
this is a case where people experienced tragic consequences on
the highways because of sudden acceleration, and a company
pushed that off, saying, ``Well, that's not really something
that--that's a floor mat issue,'' or something like that. And
there's also some evidence that, I think, the Federal agency
did not take it as seriously as I wish a Federal agency would.
So we'll have a chance, I think, to ask some difficult and
tough questions today, and try to understand what has happened
here, what are the consequences of that, and what should
happen, going forward, to make certain that this doesn't happen
again?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
In order of seniority, Senator Boxer, to be followed by
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Last August, California Highway Patrol Officer Mark Saylor,
his wife, 13-year-old daughter, and brother-in-law were killed
in a tragic car accident that shocked the community of San
Diego and the Nation. A heart-wrenching 9-1-1 call, placed just
seconds before the crash, described a horrific scene in which
their rental Lexus reached speeds of 120 miles per hour, with
no way of stopping. In the end, all the Saylor family could do
was pray.
This tragedy should never have happened, and we're here
today to ensure it never happens again.
The recalls, accidents, injuries, and tragic deaths
associated with several Toyota-produced models have raised
serious questions as to what Toyota knew, when they knew it,
and whether their current strategy of recalls is sufficient.
NHTSA conducted eight investigations. But, Mr. Secretary,
my friend, I want to ask you if you think they took appropriate
action after those investigations.
In addition, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask your opinion,
because I have so much respect for you; you are a very
straight-from-the-shoulder person. I am deeply concerned about
reports that former NHTSA employees, who were later employed by
Toyota, may have played a role in influencing the result of
NHTSA's safety investigations.
And I ask unanimous consent to place in the record a CBS
News story on this issue.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Did Toyota Pull Strings to Stifle Probes?
CBS News Investigates Questionable Ties between Toyota and NHTSA, the
Federal Agency Charged with Regulating It--Washington, Feb. 25, 2010
(CBS) Critics in Congress say Toyota pulled strings at NHTSA--with
help from two former insiders, reports CBS News correspondent Sharyl
Attkisson.
Christopher Santucci's job at NHTSA was to conduct defects
investigations of automakers and some of his probes were into Toyota.
At some point, while working at NHTSA, Santucci negotiated himself
a job at Toyota--the very company he'd investigated. Santucci testified
two months ago in a lawsuit against Toyota.
``Were there any procedures within NHTSA that would govern your
negotiating a job with an entity that you were supposed to be
regulating?'' he was asked
``Not that I'm aware,'' Santucci said.
In 2003, Santucci gave his two weeks' notice and joined Toyota's
team, working under the very man who'd been his Toyota contact:
Christopher Tinto. Tinto also used to work for NHTSA.
Once together at Toyota, records show the two helped negotiate with
their former NHTSA colleagues to limit probes into Toyotas surging out
of control. They convinced NHTSA to focus only on the ``brief burst''
accelerations, ruling out so-called ``long duration'' events that have
allegedly led to accidents and deaths.
``You use the word `negotiated' . . . We discussed the scope,''
Santucci said.
But ``negotiated'' is exactly the word used in Toyota internal
documents obtained by CBS News. One in 2006 says NHTSA requested
information on ``a broad testing and analysis question'' regarding
Camry and Solara engine surge. It says Toyota ``negotiated to reduce
the response'' to provide much less data.
Consumer watchdog Joan Claybrook headed up NHTSA way before
Toyota's problems--and says NHTSA ex-employees are key.
``They maneuvered and manipulated and I think bamboozled the
agency,'' Claybrook said.
Yesterday, Congress asked Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood if
there's a conflict.
``Absolutely not,'' LaHood said.
Other automakers say--unlike Toyota--they do not use ex-NHTSA
people to deal with NHTSA on defect cases.
Toyota says its employees' only interest is ``the safety of every
single owner of one of our vehicles.''
At Christopher Santucci's deposition, we found a third ex-NHTSA
figure helping out Toyota off-camera: former NHTSA attorney Kenneth
Weinstein.
For his part in limiting the investigations, Santucci said NHTSA
got exactly what it was looking for.
``You say it worked out well for Toyota,'' Santucci said. ``I think
it worked out well for both the agency and Toyota.''
Maybe not so well, in the end. NHTSA is now investigating whether
Toyota provided all the materials it should have over the years. And
the inspector general is investigating NHTSA's role.
Senator Boxer. And I want to tell you--I'll just quote from
this--``Christopher Santucci's job at NHTSA was to conduct
defects investigations of automakers, and some of his probes
were into Toyota. In 2003, Santucci gave his 2 weeks' notice,
joined Toyota's team, working under the very man who'd been his
Toyota contact, Christopher Tinto. Once at Toyota, records
show, the two helped negotiate with their former NHTSA
colleagues to limit probes into Toyotas surging out of control.
They convinced NHTSA to focus only on the brief-burst
accelerations, ruling out so-called long-duration events that
have allegedly led to accidents and death.''
Mr. Chairman, as a long-time Toyota Prius owner myself, I
understand the unease that you feel getting in that car,
especially when carrying my children and my grandchildren. So,
Mr. Chairman, I believe that every Toyota model should be
analyzed by an objective party. Every fix should be analyzed by
an objective party. Every car owner should have the ability to
have their car fixed at the earliest possible time. And I trust
that, under your leadership, this committee's work will move us
toward those three steps.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
convening this critical hearing, because we're here, obviously,
because we have an obligation to determine precisely where
these massive breakdowns occurred that obviously with both the
company and the Federal agency that failed to do their own due
diligence that led to perpetuation of defects that resulted in
the loss of life.
Key questions remain unanswered. Over this past decade,
NHTSA, you know, for example, had 2600-percent increase in
complaints regarding Toyota acceleration--a 400-percent
increase over the last 3 years--and yet, they failed to
properly, independently investigate this issue. So,
regrettably, it points to NHTSA's enforcement program that's
lethargic, it's outdated, not to mention that it lacks the
software expertise and the experts necessary to conduct such an
investigation, particularly in this age, you know, that's
dominated by computer systems. Also, we have a company that
exploited NHTSA's weaknesses in avoiding compulsory reporting
of information that's so integral to exhaustive and an
independent investigation.
Now, many of us here on the Committee were--this is
reminding us of the time in which we held the Firestone tire
recall, a session just about 10 years ago. At that time,
Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater appeared before this
committee, and he asked us to move expeditiously to grant NHTSA
expansive investigative authority so that they could get the
data that they required. And so, we, within months, passed the
TREAD Act that created an early warning reporting system
requiring manufacturers to report at--you know, defects that
resulted in injuries or economic damages.
What's amazing is that, in the direct aftermath of the
Firestone, there was an acceleration--there were a number of
reports regarding Toyota's acceleration. The Department of
Transportation's inspector general issued two reports--2002, as
well as 2004--criticizing NHTSA for failing to act on its own
reports within its system and then, in 2004, failing to set up
a system to do this investigation. Those of us who were here at
the hearing well remember.
It's obviously a disturbing pattern that's all too
familiar, frankly, that has emerged. Back in 2000, State Farm
notified NHTSA of the Firestone tire problems that were
occurring years earlier. Well, in 2004, State Farm notified
NHTSA that there was a trend occurring with respect to Toyota
acceleration. And NHTSA had an investigation for about 4
months, and then closed that investigation and said that the
agency's resources were not warranted in using--in further
examining this issue.
In 2004, State Farm again notified NHTSA. NHTSA opened up
an investigation narrowly targeted to the floor mats, did not
expand it into an independent investigation.
We know that Toyota had a recall in Europe, did not alert
American officials, regrettably, with respect to that. And it
was only after the crash that Senator Boxer is referring to,
that horrific crash, another one, that resulted in significant
recall by Toyota.
Mixed messages from the company. Last week you had the
Toyota USA President saying that he wasn't sure he could rule
out the electronic systems being the actual cause of these
crashes. And then, the very next day, Toyota's President saying
he was absolutely confident that there were no flaws in the
design system with these controls.
The bottom line is, we've got a huge problem, because NHTSA
cannot independently verify or corroborate this information and
the contradictory assertions that are occurring, either because
they lack the expertise, or they haven't contracted it out,
they haven't asked for the resources as to whether they needed
to do an independent investigation. And they allowed a company
to hide behind proprietary data and a corporate bureaucracy.
If you think about it, you know, NHTSA's mission, primary
mission, is to save lives and to prevent injuries. And if this
is an example how they police a fundamental design flaw in a
major automaker, then how can we have confidence that they can
live up to the one important word in their mission statement
and their name, and that, of course, is ``safety.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, profits should never trump
safety. And I must admit that I am highly skeptical, almost
bordering on cynical, when it comes to the automobile industry.
And now we have another example--dragging its feet on something
that's safety.
I remember, Mr. Chairman, when I was a young Congressman,
we in Congress had been able to put in, on a trial basis,
airbags. And a grandmother and a granddaughter, going down a
two-lane highway--A1A, in Satellite Beach, Florida--had a head-
on collision. And that grandmother and granddaughter walked
away from that head-on collision. And yet, over and over, the
automobile industry prohibited us from having airbags until
enough people died. And now, of course, it's standard issue.
And here we come with a similar issue. So, what is it going to
take for us to wake up?
Now, the sad thing is that we're in the middle of a
recession, and guess who's being hurt? It's the Toyota dealers.
You ask anybody whether or not they think a Toyota is safe
today, and you'd be shocked at the percentage of people that
will say no. And they're voting with their feet, because
they're not walking into the Toyota dealers. And it's hurting
them and their suppliers and all of those small businesses, in
the middle of a recession.
So, thank you for getting to the bottom of this, Mr.
Chairman.
I want to thank the Secretary. He has been straightforward
on this. Very clear. Keep at it, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ensign.
Senator Pryor.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
you for having this hearing.
And one of the things that you made clear to me is that
this is not a witch hunt. We're really trying to look at what's
going on out there in the field, and whether DOT and NHTSA are
doing what they need to do, and what Toyota's been doing, and,
you know, how this has been handled. So, really doing our
oversight here today, and I want to thank you for that.
I have seen some documents that I'd like to pass out to the
Committee when it is the appropriate time to do that, to let
people look at some documents that, actually, I think NHTSA
provided to the Committee.
And may have some questions for our NHTSA witness there.
And it's good to see both our witnesses today. Thank you all
for being here.
And this is just a very important matter. I mean, there are
Toyota owners all over the country who are concerned about
this. And, you know, we need to make sure that NHTSA and DOT
are functioning properly, we need to make sure Toyota's doing
what it needs to do, and we just need to do everything we can
to keep our roads safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Pryor. You're the head of
our Safety and Consumer Subcommittee, so your words count.
Senator Isakson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't
take much of my time at all, except to thank you for holding
this hearing today.
And thanks, to my friend and former colleague, Ray LaHood.
He's doing a great job at DOT.
You know, I talked to my Toyota dealers in Georgia. I
called them to see how my constituents in Georgia were being
treated, in terms of repair. And the report I got was that the
company had given carte blanche to the dealers and the service
entities to fix these cars as fast as possible. And I received
some flow numbers, in terms of the numbers that were being
repaired, that were very impressive, which I appreciate. But,
it caused me to think, if we had been just as quick to respond
at the first death that took place on the highway, in terms of
making sure we were doing everything to keep the cars safe, we
may have saved some of those lives.
So, I think, the most important thing today for us to hear
is, What is that threshold? We need to err on the side of
caution. And we ought to be conservative. The first hint of a
life-threatening safety defect, in terms of vehicles, should
immediately cause actions to take place that hopefully save
lives in the future.
I thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
I have Senator Thune and then Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for holding today's hearing, and thank our witnesses, as well,
from the government--Secretary LaHood, nice to have you back in
the Congress--and witnesses from the Toyota Motor Company,
other consumer safety arena, who are going to join us
throughout the day.
The necessity of today's hearing, Mr. Chairman, is
unfortunate. And it's a manifestation of an oversight process
that has failed the American consumer and a major car company
whose practices have put lives in danger over the past several
years. Clearly, the recent recalls have not been handled well
by either the government officials in charge of overseeing the
recall or the Toyota Motor Company's voluntary response to
fixing the issue of unintended acceleration experienced by
drivers of various Toyota models.
And after the several tragic accidents and the recalls, the
investigations have intensified; and throughout that process,
we've heard a changing story from the Toyota Motor Company on
the root cause of the problem.
So, I'm hoping that today will shed some light on that
subject. To date, as we all know, we've had unintended
acceleration problems that have been linked to 39 deaths in the
United States. Many of those were preventable. And I think the
questions that need to be answered are, When was the problem
first identified? Was Toyota too slow to react? Are the ongoing
government investigations adequate? Does either Toyota or the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration know the true
cause of the unintended acceleration?
As thousands of families bring their cars into dealerships
hoping the problem will be fixed, these are the questions that
deserve timely and honest answers.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing working with
the Department of Transportation and my colleagues on this
committee as we dig deeper in search of the answers to those
questions.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Klobuchar, to be followed by Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary LaHood, and thank you, Administrator
Strickland.
I first wish just to say that I believe that a full
investigation of the Toyota Motor Corporation's conduct or
misconduct in response to these complaints must be conducted.
But I'm mostly interested, today, in how our government
responded.
This is a basic matter of public safety and public trust.
And I know very well the two of you were not in charge in the
years leading up to this tragic situation that we find
ourselves in now. But now, regardless of what happened before,
you are in charge of cleaning it up within your own agency.
I believe there might be a problem of culture here.
Industry executives can roam the hallways of government, unlike
consumers. They are not on an equal playing field. Some of the
auto dealers and some of the small businesses that rely on good
products also don't have that same kind of access.
It was recently disclosed that, last summer, officials in
Toyota's Washington office prepared an internal presentation
boasting that they saved the company over $100 million by
successfully negotiating with NHTSA to have only a limited
equipment recall of floor mats in some Toyota and Lexus
vehicles. They also claimed millions of dollars in savings for
the company by delaying safety regulations, avoiding defect
investigations, and slowing down the other industry
requirements.
This internal Toyota presentation was entitled, ``Wins for
Toyota,'' but it could just as well be entitled ``Losses for
Consumers.'' Among the consumers who lost out were some of my
constituents; for example, Jeff Pepski, of Plymouth, Minnesota.
On February 3 of last year, he was driving home from work when
his Lexus dramatically accelerated to 80 miles per hour. After
almost 2 miles of high-speed driving, he was finally able to
stop the car by putting it into neutral. He says the floor mat
had nothing to do with it. I have talked to him over the phone.
A few weeks after the incident, he submitted a detailed
complaint to NHTSA and specifically asked the agency to look
beyond the floor mats. This guy was obsessed with this. And
almost 8 months later, at the end of October 2009, he received
a response from NHTSA. The agency denied his complaint. At that
time, it was still accepting Toyota's explanation.
We've had several instances like this in Minnesota, and it
always makes a citizen wonder what's going on and what happened
between the industry and NHTSA. It was like a hockey puck going
back and forth on the ice. The drivers would file complaints by
the dozens; Federal regulators would open official reviews;
Toyota would promise to answer; the regulators would complain
about not receiving the information they needed; and in the
end, almost nothing was done. The puck never got in the net.
Nothing was resolved, and people died. Again, I have faith, in
both of you, that you will get to the bottom of this and figure
out how we fix this.
The questions I'm most interested in: Did the agency lack
sufficient resources to do prompt, thorough investigations? Did
the agency suffer because of leadership turnover? Was the
agency too reluctant to use all its investigating powers in
order to get cooperation? Did NHTSA have all the tools it
needed? Was the relationship too cozy between Toyota and the
rest of the industry and NHTSA--the revolving-door issue that
Senator Boxer raised? Is it all these things? Those are the
questions that the American people deserve answers for, as they
believe, and they have a right to believe, that NHTSA is there
to protect them.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Wicker, to be followed by Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
important hearing to look at the recent recalls by Toyota, as
well as the response and involvement of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
This is an issue that has grabbed the attention of all
Americans and many others worldwide, and certainly warrants a
thorough investigation. One of the most important roles of this
committee, and even this Congress, is ensuring the safety of
American motorists.
The tragic accident, last August outside San Diego, that
took the life of a California Highway patrolman and his family,
brought national attention to the problem of sudden unintended
acceleration in certain Toyota and Lexus vehicles. Toyota has
recalled millions of potentially affected vehicles. Media
coverage has expanded, and the public is understandably
concerned and confused about the problem and what is being done
to correct it.
Since that time, Toyota has undertaken extensive outreach
to owners and the public in general, and even taken the unusual
steps of halting sales and production of certain affected
models. Employees in dealerships around the country have been
working tirelessly to fix affected vehicles. They are to be
commended for this effort.
However, there are lingering questions that need to be
examined, such as the timeliness of Toyota's response to these
complaints and whether a definitive answer to the problem has
been found. We're going to continue to ask the tough questions
that need to be asked.
I also want to express that it is important, not only to be
tough, but to be fair, and to keep the facts in perspective. We
must not use a different set of standards for one company over
the other.
NHTSA and the Department of Transportation have, likewise,
become very active on the issue. Secretary LaHood, my friend
and colleague, has stated publicly that he is committed to
examining more deeply the possibility that the causes of
unintended acceleration extend beyond floor mats and sticky
pedals, and examining the potential for electronic defects and
throttle control. Also, we have an obligation to review what
NHTSA has been doing over the last several years as these
accidents were being reported, and why they seemed to limit the
scope of their review.
I believe there are still several outstanding issues we
have an obligation to examine and ultimately answer. The most
important is, has the problem of unintended acceleration in
these vehicles been correctly identified?
Next, as with any safety concern, I believe consumer
education is an important component to ensure safety. Toyota
has undertaken a massive outreach campaign to get necessary
information to customers, and I applaud Toyota for this effort.
However, questions remain: Do vehicle owners know where to find
out if they are affected, how to get their vehicle repaired,
and how to ensure that they can safely continue to drive until
they get it fixed?
Finally, we need to thoroughly review the processes that
are in place, both within Toyota and in NHTSA, to see if
changes need to be made to help ensure owners and those on the
road with them are safe.
There's a lot at stake here, and we need to get it right.
Ultimately, all Americans should be able to feel confident that
they are traveling in safe vehicles. It is also in the best
interests of Toyota to continue cooperating and working hard on
these problems.
Toyota has been a good partner to communities and States
across the country, including my home State of Mississippi. Let
the record show that Toyota is investing $1.3 billion to build
a new plant in northern Mississippi, and although the economic
downturn has delayed the plant's opening, the company has
continued to honor its commitments to our State.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to point out, and ask
that we enter into the record, one op-ed written by a Democrat
from Mississippi, Vernon R. ``Randy'' Kelley, the Executive
Director of the Three Rivers Planning and Development District;
and another op-ed from the Washington Post penned by
Mississippi's Governor, Haley Barbour. Governor Barbour says,
``On February 24, the U.S. owes Toyota fair, careful treatment
on safety issues,'' and he says, among other things, ``I worry
that there has been a rush to judgment. The way that Congress
and the Obama Administration respond to this controversy will
have real economic consequences.''
Mr. Kelley hopes that those involved will, quote, ``give
the Toyota company the same opportunity to deal with their
issues that they afford other automobile manufacturers that
experience recalls.''
I ask that these two op-eds be placed into the record at
this point.
The Chairman. Senator Wicker, they both will be included in
the----
[The information referred to follows:]
``Piling On'' Toyota is Underserved
by Randy Kelly
Back in my football playing days when a player had been tackled and
was down on the ground and another player from the opposing team came
along and jumped on the player that was already down then a penalty for
``piling on'' was assessed.
In today's football terminology the penalty is called ``personal
foul--unnecessary roughness.'' Regardless of what you call it, there is
a penalty.
I find myself in one of those situations now with the publicity
Toyota is receiving about some of their models. I believe there is some
``piling on'' taking place by some media and others while Toyota is
``down'' so to speak and I don't believe it is deserved. Intentionally
trying to hurt someone on a football field or anywhere else is wrong
and consequently deserves a penalty or punishment. Surely none of the
Toyota critics believe a company like Toyota would ever do anything to
intentionally hurt anyone. Additionally, I would hope that no one, be
it media, companies or competitors, would intentionally ``pile on''
another company to hurt them for gain of market share. Then again,
perhaps I am too naive.
The Toyota Company that I have had the opportunity to work with
very closely is unquestionably a premier automobile manufacturer with
an enviable customer satisfaction record. I don't pretend to believe,
and I am not trying to imply, that in any manmade product there is
always perfection. Toyota is experiencing some imperfection with parts
of some of their models, and they are going the extra mile to assure
customer safety and satisfaction with their product.
There have been about 2,000 complaints of unintentional sticking
accelerators out of about 20 million Toyota vehicles sold worldwide. Do
the math and that is less than 0.1 percent. Certainly I would never
make light of any unfortunate accident that one of these unintentional
malfunctions caused or played a part in. I value every human life as I
am sure Toyota does. Toyota dealers across this great nation are
repairing those potential problems as quickly as possible.
I'm sure Toyota understands that the trust of the consumer is of
utmost importance to the company's future. Toyota directly employs more
than 30,000 people in the United States, and when you add in suppliers
and dealerships that swells to more than 170,000. With its response to
the issue at hand, it is evident to me that this is a company that is
serious about the satisfaction and well being of its customers.
It is my hope that the ones doing the ``piling on'' in these Toyota
events will give the Toyota Company the same opportunity to deal with
their issues that they afford other automobile manufacturers that
experience recalls. I sincerely trust Toyota to work through these
issues just as I sincerely trust Toyota will soon be giving many
Mississippians the opportunity to build vehicles at Blue Springs with
true ``Mississippi Pride.''
Vernon R. ``Randy'' Kelley III, is Executive Director of Three
Rivers Planning and Development District, headquartered in Pontotoc.
______
The Washington Post--February 24, 2010
U.S. Owes Toyota Fair, Careful Treatment on Safety Issues
by Haley Barbour
When I announced 3 years ago that Toyota would open a U.S. vehicle
assembly plant in Blue Springs, Miss., I said Toyota was the world's
premier automobile manufacturer. I still believe that.
Make no mistake, the safety and reliability concerns identified in
some Toyota automobiles--although they occur very infrequently--are
serious. It seems to me, however, that the company is doing everything
it should as quickly as possible to make things right. This includes
not just a full recall but also temporarily halting production in five
plants to focus on the problem and repairing recalled vehicles. The
company has taken significant steps to improve quality and reliability
worldwide, and to increase the transparency of its communications with
government officials and customers.
But as two House committees and one in the Senate prepare for
hearings on Toyota's safety issues, I worry that there has been a rush
to judgment. The way that Congress and the Obama Administration respond
to this controversy will have real economic consequences.
We cannot lose sight of the company's importance to America's
economy--and should not ignore its continued commitment to doing things
the right way. Although Toyota was founded in Japan more than 70 years
ago, after five decades of doing business in the United States it is as
much an ``American'' car company as any other.
In Mississippi, the automaker is investing $1.3 billion to build a
Prius assembly plant that will provide good jobs to more than 2,000 new
Toyota team workers plus some 2,500 supplier jobs. Though the economic
downturn has delayed the start of production, Toyota is honoring its
financial commitments to the state--including a promised annual
donation of $5 million for the next 10 years to help fund local
education programs. That's the kind of company Toyota is.
Across America, Toyota--together with its 1,500 dealers and 500
suppliers--has helped create more than 200,000 jobs. It operates major
design, research and manufacturing operations in 10 states. Nearly half
of the vehicles it sells in the States are built here. And over the
past 22 years, 16 million Toyota vehicles have been made in America.
The company's direct investment in the United States exceeds $18
billion, but it's not just American workers who profit. Eighty percent
of Toyota vehicles sold in this country over the past 20 years are
still on the road.
That's why I hope Congress will resist the temptation to attack
Toyota simply to advance the interests of its American competitors.
Toyota should not be blamed implicitly for the problems of Detroit's
automakers. Moreover, the decision to bail out bankrupt General Motors
and Chrysler with $60 billion from U.S. taxpayers has put Washington in
an uncomfortable position. I know Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood
to be an honorable man, but can these hearings be seen as impartial,
focused on enforcing the rules and policing corporate behavior, when
the Federal Government has stakes in two major car companies?
Lawmakers must tread carefully lest they give Chrysler, in which
the government has a 10 percent stake, or General Motors, in which the
government now owns a majority stake, an unfair advantage.
Washington's primary role should be to work with Toyota to protect
consumers and assist in getting problems fixed as quickly as possible.
Its other responsibility is to be vigilant in pursuing fairness--Toyota
cannot be unjustly punished or have its business recovery impeded by
attempts to gain advantages for companies owned by the government.
America's openness and its reputation for fairness are what have
made our economy so attractive to foreign investment--investment that
will surely aid in our recovery. If Congress and the media treat Toyota
differently, foreign businesses might think again before investing in
Mississippi or any other state. During these hearings, excessive
bashing of Toyota is likely to be interpreted as a signal that the
United States is turning protectionist during these tough economic
times. That would not be good for the American economy, companies
located here or their workers.--The writer, a Republican, is Governor
of Mississippi.
Senator Wicker. And in conclusion, then, let me say, Mr.
Chairman, to ensure that this partnership continues to
flourish, we must work together now to prevent these kinds of
safety issues in the future. We must work diligently to ensure
that vehicles are safe and that the public is protected. At the
same time, we need to be mindful that there are thousands of
American jobs at stake.
I believe this hearing is only a first step in a process
that must involve careful analysis from all parties and a
collective commitment to work together to find an appropriate
solution.
So, thank you, to our witnesses; thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I look forward to a productive hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Udall, to be followed by Senator Johanns.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Once again, Chairman Rockefeller, you are
focusing this committee on consumer protection, and I thank you
for that. It's absolutely critical.
This hearing's about helping ensure the safety of American
drivers. It's about uncovering why hundreds of instances of
sudden acceleration occurred for so long, and killed, injured,
or inconvenienced so many, without an adequate response from
Toyota or government safety officials.
For years, Toyota has enjoyed a stellar reputation here in
America and around the world. I own a Toyota Prius, and have
driven it for years, and with pleasure and no safety problems.
But, the reality is, too many Toyota vehicles driven over the
past 10 years haven't been safe. As a result, dozens of people
have died; hundreds have been hurt; thousands have been
inconvenienced; and hard-working employees at Toyota
dealerships in my home State of New Mexico and across the
country now face an uncertain future in an already uncertain
economy.
And while all of this was happening, Toyota continued to
put company profits above the safety of the American people,
the American people who bought their vehicles, who depended on
their product, and who expected Toyota to inform them
immediately if something had gone wrong. Toyota didn't just
fail in this regard, they did it knowingly and without remorse.
Just last summer, they were bragging about over $255 million in
savings through recalls avoided.
But, Toyota isn't only to blame. The Federal regulating
agency, NHTSA, is also to blame. Since 2003, they have
conducted more than 10 investigations into issues related to
sudden uncontrolled acceleration. These investigations resulted
in a less-than-adequate floor-mat recall in 2007. Only after
the release of the terrifying 9-1-1 call of August 2009, that
Senator Boxer mentioned, and that crash with the California
Highway Patrol officer, did it seem that NHTSA stepped up and
required action by Toyota. That crash finally resulted in a
complete recall of vehicles, and development of a comprehensive
solution to the pedal entrapment issue.
Although the Toyota safety issues have been in the
headlines for months and hearings were held in the House last
week, many questions remain, and I, for one, would like to know
why the safety issues with Toyota endured, unchecked, for so
long, what steps Toyota is taking to ensure the safety of those
that rely on their vehicles for their livelihood, and finally,
what steps NHTSA is going to take to ensure this never happens
again.
It's wonderful to see you here, Secretary LaHood and
Administrator Strickland, and I know that you will both work
very hard to stay on top of this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Johanns, to be followed by Senator Begich.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Johanns. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Probably everything that I wanted to say has been said, so
I will be brief and avoid being repetitious.
But, I do want to reflect on something, if I could. It
wasn't all that long ago that, Mr. Secretary, I was in your
position as a member of the Cabinet. And during those years one
of my responsibilities as Secretary of Agriculture was food
safety, in the areas of meat and poultry. And food safety
issues arose from time to time. And I always considered those
to be the greatest risk and greatest challenge that we faced--
and the greatest responsibility. Each time that I dealt with a
food safety issue over those 3 years, I have to tell you that
what I wondered about was, What else is out there? You can't
know what you don't know.
Now, as we conduct this hearing, I suspect it's going to be
very easy for us to dig into the documents, look back at the
history of what has happened here. It'll be relatively easy to
connect the dots, in hindsight. But, what that is not going to
tell us is what else is out there, what other companies, maybe,
have done--just as Senator Udall mentioned--have bragged about
how they somehow evaded being caught up in a recall or
something of that nature.
So, as you testify, I hope you will spend some time talking
to us about what you are doing to assure us that there isn't
anything else out there, that our vehicles are safe, and that,
when it is brought to the attention of this Department that
there is a problem, that there is good follow up on that
problem.
I also want to just mention something else, and I will be
just very, very blunt about this. This really irritated me, all
the time I was the Secretary of Agriculture. And there is a
connection. I firmly believe that there is a role for the
Japanese government, here, to step up and to make sure that
what they are sending to our borders is safe. They have a
responsibility.
And here's what I would say about that. I worked with the
Japanese for years on BSE issues related to livestock. We found
one animal. There's never been a case of BSE in the United
States. And yet, to this day, their border is largely closed to
our product.
As I was preparing for this hearing, I wondered what the
response would be in Japan if I suggested that--because people
have died because of the way they have conducted themselves--
until the Japanese government can assure us that all of the
defects are out of these vehicles, we're just not going to
accept any vehicles from Japan. And yet, that's what they did
with one of our industries.
So, I start this hearing very, very frustrated with
everything that has happened. I don't think our consumers have
been treated right, not only by what has happened here
regarding the U.S. Government, but what has happened regarding
a government that has been an ally through the years, but,
quite honestly, has not treated us fairly in trade issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much.
Senator Begich.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding the hearing.
Let me first say, Secretary LaHood and Administrator
Strickland--I know, Secretary, you're very blunt and you're
always to the point----
It is on. Is that better?
Well, that's what I get. Maybe there's a defect in this.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. Let me just say that--thank you--and I know
you're always very direct, so I'm looking forward to your
question--or, your answers to the questions, and what's going
to happen.
To Administrator Strickland, being on the job in a short
time, you now have a big task ahead of you. And I think, for
me, my big issue--not to echo what everyone said here--is going
to be, What systematic changes are necessary for us to ensure
that the car safety and other safety efforts you move forward
on are there, and that you have the resources to do it. It's a
systematic issue that I'm going to be looking for. What do we
do to improve the system? Because we can always look back, make
the list. You know, we're--you'll have the investigation,
they'll be responsible for their actions, in whatever form it
takes. But, what's forward, and how we change the system, or
improve it, or maybe there are just tweaks here--I'm not sure.
That's what I'm looking for. Systematic changes.
In that context, I will say that, in Alaska it's a little
unique, because when folks in rural Alaska buy a vehicle for
use in their community, they barge it up. So, now, if they own
a Toyota--I own a Toyota Highlander, hybrid; very proud of the
fact. I drove from Alaska to Washington, D.C., in that vehicle,
for 19 days, 5,000 miles, and I'm here in one piece, and that's
great. It's a good car. I'm very happy about it.
But, folks in rural Alaska, when they ship that up in a
barge, now they get a recall notice, how do they get that
fixed? And I don't know the answer to that, to be honest with
you. And there will be some in our State. Probably very few--
but, still, the point is, there'll be other States where the
dealer may be miles and miles away. How do they make that
connection? At least in most States they can drive to that
location. In our State, they will have to literally figure out
how to get it taken care of, and I don't know what the answer
is to that. So, I'll be looking to that, and, you know,
specifically today may not be the appropriate place to answer
that, but maybe looking into how we make that logistical
opportunity happen.
But, again, I wish you the best with the testimony today.
But, I do look for the systematic things that we need to do,
and where, maybe, there was a problem in delivery of the
information to the public, as well as to the company, to make
sure they're upholding the best quality vehicle possible when
they sell it here in this country.
So, let me end there. And again, thank you both for being
here, and I'll look forward to your testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Begich.
Secretary LaHood, Administrator Strickland, thank you for
your patience. You got all the statements this morning, and
that means, by definition, in the afternoon there'll be fewer
statements. So they set the tone for what we want to ask, and
now I look forward to hearing you, sir. And you're accompanied
by David Strickland, who's the Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND LaHOOD, SECRETARY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Secretary LaHood. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for
your leadership on safety. And also, thank you for the courtesy
that you have extended to us in arranging this meeting today
that's convenient for both your committee and those of us at
DOT.
Ever since I was sworn in as the Secretary of
Transportation 13 months ago, I have said that safety is the
Department's number-one priority. I believe that we've
demonstrated that commitment, time and time and time again.
When the terrible crash of Washington Metro system claimed nine
lives and injured dozens of others last summer, we quickly
introduced legislation to give us Federal safety oversight of
the transit system, something we currently don't have. When the
Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed in Buffalo, we learned right
away what many of the problems were, and we did not wait a year
for the NTSB to conclude its investigation before we acted. We
began working with the aviation industry immediately to enhance
airline safety and pilot training, holding 12 safety summits
around the country. This spring, the FAA will issue a new rule
to combat pilot fatigue, and it has already begun to overhaul
pilot certification qualification.
One of the hallmarks of my time as Transportation Secretary
has been our work on distracted driving. For all of you with
cell phones and BlackBerrys and other electronic devices, I'm
on a rampage about people talking and texting while driving a
car, bus, train, or plane. It's a menace to society, and we
certainly have exercised our authority to ban truck drivers
from texting while driving.
Now for Toyota. The Toyota recall situation is very
serious, and we are treating it seriously. The three recalls
involving Toyota are among the largest in automobile history,
affecting more than 6 million people in this country.
And I'd like to say a word directly to consumers. First, if
you notice that your gas pedal or your brake is not responding
as it normally would, contact your Toyota dealer right away.
The recent recalls involve three issues:
One, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can
lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds. It's
important to take your floor mats out of the driver's side of
the vehicle until your car has been repaired for this problem
by a Toyota dealer.
Second, accelerator sticking or returning slowly after
being depressed. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to
return after releasing, this could be the precursor to what is
known as ``sticky pedal.'' If your pedal has these symptoms,
contact your Toyota dealer immediately. If your gas pedal
becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the
car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place, and call
your dealer.
Finally, the Toyota Prius for model year 2010, and the
Lexus HS250, if you experience a change in your car's braking
performance, contact your Toyota dealer.
Now, I want everyone to know that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration has the most active defect
investigation program in the world. Known as NHTSA, its job is
to investigate complaints and to look for defects. It receives
more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year, and
reviews every one of those complaints quickly. We don't ignore
any of them. We examine them all, we look at all of them very
carefully.
Over the last 3 years, NHTSA defect and compliance
investigations have resulted in 524 recalls involving 23.5
million vehicles. Twenty percent of those involve foreign
vehicles, while 80 percent were domestic.
Of the 100 investigations NHTSA opens in an average year,
there are currently 44 open defect investigations, five of
which involve Toyota. Every step of the way, NHTSA officials
have pushed Toyota to take corrective action so that consumers
would be safe.
Unhappy with Toyota's responsiveness to our safety
concerns, the Acting Deputy Administrator of NHTSA, Ron
Medford, and two associates flew to Japan in December 2009 to
clarify for Toyota management that the company's legal
obligations are to find and remedy safety defects in vehicles
sold here.
In January, our new Administrator, David Strickland, who is
with me today, and Ron Medford, now our Deputy Administrator,
told the President of Toyota North America in no uncertain
terms that we expect prompt action. Following the disclosure of
the sticky pedal problem, Toyota publicly announced that
recall. Two days later, I personally talked to Mr. Toyoda,
prior to him coming to the United States, and emphasized this
is very serious. Potentially fatal defects are on the road, and
NHTSA has pressed hard to expedite these safety fixes.
If NHTSA had opened a formal investigation and Toyota had
resisted a recall, this would have consumed an enormous amount
of time and resources, in effect extending the period in which
owners of affected vehicles were at risk. By engaging Toyota
directly, and persuading the company to take action, the agency
avoided a lengthy investigation that would have delayed fixes
for a year or more.
Last year, I announced that we are investigating whether
Toyota acted quickly enough in reporting these safety defects
to NHTSA, as well as whether they took all the appropriate
actions to protect consumers.
We have asked Toyota to turn over a wide range of
documents. This will be one of the most comprehensive reviews
of documents, one that will show us when and how they learned
about these safety problems. NHTSA will continue to make sure
Toyota's doing all it has promised to make its vehicles safe,
and we will continue to investigate all possible causes of
unintended acceleration.
While the recalls are important steps in that direction, we
don't maintain that they answer every question about that
issue. Some people believe that electromagnetic interference
has a dangerous effect on these vehicles, and although we're
not aware of any incidents proven to be caused by such
interference, NHTSA is now doing a thorough review of that
subject to ensure safety, because we've heard from enough
Members of Congress that they think that this is a problem. So,
we're going to look into and review the electronics on these
cars. If NHTSA finds a problem, we'll make sure that it's
resolved.
Recently I met with the President of Toyota. I told him
that safety is our top priority at DOT, and it must be for
Toyota, as well. He assured me that Toyota takes U.S. safety
concerns very seriously and they're working hard to address all
safety issues.
Finally, want to remind everyone there is a reason we
investigate safety defects, and there's a reason we push
automakers to do the right thing. I listened to the 9-1-1 tape
of the Saylor family's harrowing last moments. I actually met
with the family last week, when they were here in Washington,
and offered the sympathy of our administration to them, and our
commitment that this will not happen to another family. It was
a terrible tragedy, and I hope that no other family has to
endure this.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear. And now we are happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary LaHood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ray LaHood, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Minority Member Hutchison, and
members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the important issue of Toyota's recent safety recalls and the broader
issue of sudden unintended acceleration. With me today is David
Strickland, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA).
Transportation safety is the Department's highest priority. We
understand the level of concern about the safety of Toyota vehicles,
particularly with regard to unintended acceleration. I would like to
explain the recent recalls, the role that NHTSA played in ensuring the
recalls occurred, and the actions NHTSA is taking to identify any
additional safety defects that might cause unintended acceleration.
The recent Toyota recalls related to unintended acceleration
involve two issues: first, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats,
which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds; and
second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being
depressed, which occurs at a variety of throttle positions but, to the
best of our knowledge, is more likely to occur at low throttle
positions more readily controlled by the vehicle's brakes.
Before I discuss the details of these two recalls and NHTSA's
investigations, I want to clarify what owners of vehicles affected by
these recalls should do. To avoid pedal entrapment, remove all floor
mats from the driver's side of your vehicle until you receive the
repair for this problem from a Toyota dealer. If you do not remove the
mat, make sure that it is always securely anchored in place on the
retaining hooks and that no other mats are ever stacked on top of it.
If your vehicle is covered by the ``sticky pedal'' recall, pay special
attention to your gas pedal. If the pedal is harder to depress or
slower to return after releasing it, this could be a precursor to a
sticky pedal. If your pedal shows those symptoms you should contact a
Toyota dealer immediately. If your accelerator becomes stuck for any
reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a
stop in a safe place, and call your dealer.
Pedal Entrapment
Of the two big recalls, the far more serious problem, in our view,
is pedal entrapment by floor mats. We are aware of five deaths that
have occurred due to this problem, including a tragedy near San Diego
last August that claimed four lives. We have the greatest sympathy for
the loved ones of those members of the Saylor and Lastrella families
who died in that crash.
Pedal entrapment involves a situation in which the driver intends
to accelerate quickly (such as when passing another car or entering a
freeway) and depresses the accelerator pedal toward the floor of the
vehicle. When pushed far enough the pedal becomes entrapped by the
floor mat in full open throttle position. Once the pedal is entrapped,
the vehicle will continue to accelerate well in excess of the driver's
intent unless the driver can overcome that situation. Given the very
high speeds involved and the firmness with which the mat is holding the
pedal at full throttle, these are the most dangerous situations we are
aware of that come under the broad heading of unintended acceleration.
It is very important to note that, even on the recalled vehicles,
entrapment by the mat can occur only if the floor mat is out of
position because it is not secured, one floor mat is stacked on top of
another floor mat, or a floor mat is used that is not intended for use
on the vehicle and is inappropriate due to its shape or dimensions.
NHTSA first became aware of this phenomenon in Toyota's Lexus ES350
in 2007 and quickly opened an investigation in March of that year.
NHTSA acted based on five complaints from vehicle owners. No related
fatalities had been reported at the time the investigation began, but
there had been three crashes allegedly related to pedal entrapment by
the floor mat. At the time, the problem seemed most likely to occur in
Lexus ES350 vehicles where a thick, all-weather floor mat offered as an
option by Toyota was used. The shape of these floor mats and a raised
portion forming a ridge made them particularly likely to entrap the
pedal if not properly secured. So far as NHTSA knew at that time, the
accelerator pedals themselves were functioning as designed and the
problem centered on the way the pedal could be entrapped by these floor
mats under certain conditions.
NHTSA escalated the investigation to an engineering analysis 5
months later, in August 2007. Shortly before that, a fatal crash
involving a Camry occurred that was apparently caused by entrapment. In
September 2007, Toyota announced a recall of the all-weather mats in
Lexus and Camry vehicles. The remedy was to have the dealers remove the
mats and provide a re-designed mat that was shaped in a way that
addressed the entrapment risk even if the re-designed mat was
improperly anchored.
At the time of the 2007 recall, NHTSA also issued a safety
advisory, directed especially to owners of the recalled vehicles but
also to all drivers, warning of the serious dangers of not properly
anchoring mats or stacking mats on top of each other. At that time
NHTSA believed that the recall and removal of the most problematic
mats, the improved design of the replacement mats, and education of the
public and dealers about the proper use of mats would substantially
eliminate the known risk related to pedal entrapment.
NHTSA continued to monitor the situation and became aware of a
post-recall crash involving one of the recalled mats that the owner had
not removed. Fortunately, that was not a fatal crash but did result in
serious injury. In light of that crash and indications that consumer
response to this recall was too low, NHTSA urged Toyota to re-notify
vehicle owners, which Toyota did in January 2009.
Eight months later, when the San Diego fatal crash occurred on
August 28, 2009, NHTSA immediately began to investigate the
circumstances of the crash. NHTSA investigators and the San Diego
County Sheriff's Department examined the wreckage of the vehicle and
concluded that the likely cause was excessive speed due to entrapment
of the accelerator pedal by the floor mat. The vehicle was a Toyota
Lexus ES350 on loan from a Toyota dealer for the day. The floor mat in
the vehicle was designed for a Toyota Lexus RX SUV and was much longer
than the mat that would have been proper for the Lexus ES350. At the
time NHTSA investigators viewed the wreckage, the accelerator pedal was
still fused to the floor mat, apparently melted in that position by the
heat of the fire that followed the crash. Combining that observation
with the circumstances known to have occurred immediately prior to the
crash, including extremely high speeds and the driver's inability to
control the speed, NHTSA concluded that the excessive speed was caused
by pedal entrapment. Supporting this conclusion was the fact that
another customer of the dealership had used the same vehicle just 3
days earlier and complained of unintended, high-speed acceleration
caused by the pedal having been trapped by the mat until he was able to
stop the vehicle and free the pedal.
The San Diego tragedy made clear that the entrapment problem could
occur in unexpected ways and that recalling the worst performing mats
and educating drivers and dealers about not using unsecured, improper,
or stacked mats was not going to adequately address the risk.
Apparently not even all Toyota dealers were mindful of the need to
ensure proper mats and mat anchorage to avoid entrapment.
As a consequence, NHTSA began to explore additional remedial
options. The agency continued to review all relevant data to identify
any reports that might be linked to similar entrapment in other Toyota
vehicles. NHTSA became focused on the pedal design of a number of
Toyota vehicles, not because of any known malfunction in their
operation but because their shape tended to make entrapment more likely
when floor mats are out of position or stacked. NHTSA prepared to open
an investigation on the pedal design. At the same time, the agency
informed Toyota that the company needed to address this risk promptly
as a vehicle defect issue, and requested that Toyota conduct a recall.
Toyota responded to NHTSA by announcing a recall to replace or re-shape
the pedals in 3.8 million vehicles and sent its official notice of the
recall to NHTSA on October 5, 2009.
NHTSA pressed the company to include as part of its recall the
addition of a feature called brake override (which some call ``smart
pedal'') technology on models that have keyless ignition systems. With
brake override, the vehicle control system gives priority to the signal
from the brake pedal and returns the engine to idle when it detects the
brake being applied while the accelerator is applied. NHTSA discovered
in its investigation of pedal entrapment incidents that in some
situations drivers of vehicles with keyless ignition systems did not
know that, in Toyota vehicles, they could shut off their engines when
in motion only by depressing the dashboard ignition button and holding
it for 3 seconds. The owners were familiar with shutting off the
vehicle when it was stopped, which requires holding the button for just
1 second or less. NHTSA thought it was especially important to ensure
that in those vehicles with keyless ignition the driver had the benefit
of brake override. Many other manufacturers use this technology and
Toyota uses it in newly produced vehicles. The recall Toyota announced
in October adhered to NHTSA's request.
NHTSA continued to monitor incoming reports involving relevant
incidents. In January, NHTSA told Toyota that its review of other
Toyota vehicles indicated that they needed to be included in the pedal
entrapment recall. Toyota responded by adding 1.1 million vehicles to
the pedal entrapment recall on January 27, 2010.
Under the law, manufacturers have an obligation to notify NHTSA
within 5 days of determining that a defect or noncompliance exists.
When manufacturers voluntarily initiate recalls without waiting for
NHTSA to order a recall, the process protects the public most quickly.
NHTSA can order manufacturers to do recalls but only after initiating a
formal investigation, completing its investigation, and following
administrative procedures that include a public hearing and
opportunities for the manufacturer to file detailed responses. Even
after the NHTSA Administrator issues an order directing a recall, the
manufacturer can avoid doing the recall until NHTSA proves its case in
court. In such a case, the agency has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a vehicle defect exists and that it
creates an unreasonable risk to safety. As a result, recalls occur most
quickly when a manufacturer announces the recall without waiting for
NHTSA to open and complete an investigation. That is what happened
here--because of the pressure NHTSA applied.
On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query, which is a
detailed request for information about when Toyota learned about the
defect addressed by this recall. The information Toyota will provide in
response to this request will help NHTSA determine whether Toyota's
initiation of the recall met its obligation to notify NHTSA quickly. If
NHTSA determines that Toyota did not meet that obligation, NHTSA may
seek civil penalties from Toyota for that failure. Those penalties
could be as high as $16,375,000 for a related series of violations.
CTS Pedals Sticking
I want to turn now to the ``sticky pedal'' recall that was
initiated in January of this year. NHTSA is not currently aware of any
injuries or deaths definitively linked to this problem. Unlike the
pedal entrapment recall, which concerns the shape of the pedal that
makes it more susceptible to entrapment by an external object (the
floor mat), this recall involves the internal working of the pedal
assembly. Another distinguishing factor is that the pedal entrapment
situations involve instances of full acceleration that are initially
intended by the driver, while this problem, to the best of our
knowledge, generally involves occurrences at lower power levels where
the car continues to accelerate because the pedal does not return
upward, or returns slowly, when the driver lessens pressure on the
pedal.
The affected pedals are manufactured by CTS Corporation, which is
based in Elkhart, Indiana. Some Toyota vehicle owners have complained
of certain symptoms in vehicles equipped with those pedals. Those
symptoms include a feeling that it is harder than normal to depress the
pedal or that, when depressed, it is slower to return. In some
circumstances, the situation can involve the pedal not returning at all
from the position to which it was depressed. At this time, we
understand that this problem is mechanical in nature and does not
involve a flaw in the electronic signal being sent from the pedal
sensor to the throttle.
In November 2009, NHTSA received several Toyota field reports
concerning incidents in which pedals were slow to return or sticking in
a number of different Toyota models from various model years. The
reports did not indicate a root cause of the symptoms drivers were
experiencing. NHTSA reviewed those reports as part of its screening for
possible defect trends. Before NHTSA had decided whether or not to open
an investigation, Toyota contacted the agency on January 16 about the
specific problem it had identified with the CTS pedal. NHTSA told the
company it needed a full explanation immediately. Toyota met with NHTSA
on January 19 and demonstrated what it thought to be the mechanical
problem with the CTS pedals. Based on the information presented by
Toyota about the nature of the problem and Toyota's experience with it,
NHTSA told the company it expected very prompt action. Two days later,
on January 21, Toyota announced the recall, covering some 2.3 million
vehicles (many of which are also covered by the pedal entrapment recall
and will receive both remedies). Toyota has had the supplier produce a
new pedal with a different design that the company believes addresses
the issue of excessive friction. The company has also devised an
interim remedy to eliminate the safety risk by altering the pedal while
new ones are being manufactured. Toyota informed NHTSA that it ceased
production of new vehicles in the models affected by this recall so
that it could begin to supply the new pedals being produced for the
assembly line to dealers for installation in existing vehicles.
On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query about this
recall. NHTSA has also begun an investigation to determine whether
these particular CTS pedals have been installed in vehicles other than
those recalled by Toyota, including those made by other manufacturers.
NHTSA will soon receive relevant information from CTS and evaluate it.
Other Instances of Unintended or Excessive Acceleration
NHTSA receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every
year concerning perceived safety problems with their vehicles. NHTSA
reviews every complaint promptly and, if it appears to contain any
evidence related to a safety defect trend, the reviewers begin to track
that trend for possible investigation. Among those complaints in recent
years have been many allegations of unintended or excessive
acceleration on vehicles made by Toyota. Of course, during that same
period NHTSA has received thousands of complaints containing such
allegations concerning the vehicles made by most major vehicle
manufacturers.
The agency has also received several petitions requesting that
NHTSA investigate unintended acceleration in various Toyota vehicles.
When a member of the public petitions NHTSA to investigate a possible
defect, NHTSA examines all information submitted by the petitioner as
well as all other information relevant to the particular problem cited
by the petitioner. Even where NHTSA denies a defect petition, it does
so only after conducting so thorough an examination of the issue that
it has effectively done a preliminary investigation. Generally, NHTSA
will visit the petitioners, interview them about their experiences,
examine their vehicles and vehicle history, drive the vehicles, and
search the NHTSA databases for complaints similar to the experiences
petitioners had. In some situations NHTSA will conduct more extensive
testing of a vehicle of the same make and model as that of the
petitioner.
The information NHTSA has received from consumers concerning
unintended or excessive acceleration in vehicles can be divided into
general categories that include: engine surging that lasts only a
second or two; unintended acceleration from a stopped position or very
low speed that results in quick movement over a short distance and
sometimes results in crashing into an object; and events that begin at
high speeds because the driver intended to accelerate quickly and
continue for a sustained period of many seconds or minutes beyond what
the driver intended. The possible causes of these events that NHTSA has
been able to identify include mechanical problems with the accelerator;
obstruction of the accelerator by another object; or human error
(pressing the wrong pedal).
NHTSA has carefully reviewed all of the information provided by
Toyota consumers in complaints filed with the agency to try to find
causes for what they were experiencing. NHTSA also reviews Early
Warning Reporting information submitted by the manufacturer and other
sources of information, including insurance company submissions. For
the high-speed events that last for many seconds or minutes, the only
cause NHTSA has been able to establish thus far is entrapment of the
pedal by a floor mat. The only exception to this has may have been a
recent event in New Jersey that apparently did not involve floor mat
entrapment but apparently did involve a stuck CTS pedal. Fortunately,
the driver was able to bring the vehicle under control and drive it to
a dealership. As discussed, the pedal entrapment issue in the recalled
vehicles will presumably be resolved by the recall announced in
October. The problem experienced in New Jersey will presumably be
addressed by the recall of the CTS pedals announced in January.
NHTSA does not contend that the two recalls will fully resolve all
concerns about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. However,
with one exception, NHTSA has not been able to establish a vehicle-
based cause for unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles not
covered by those two recalls. The exception was a recall of the model
year 2004 Sienna vans in 2009 due to a defective trim panel that could,
if loosened during servicing, entrap the accelerator at full throttle.
That recall also arose from a NHTSA investigation.
NHTSA initiated a Recall Query on February 16 to ascertain whether
Toyota has been completely forthcoming with the agency concerning all
possible defects in its vehicles that may be causing unintended
acceleration. NHTSA will closely review the documents Toyota submits to
determine whether the company has additional information not yet shared
with the agency that may cast light on possible defects that cause the
problem.
Some consumers and others believe that Toyota's electronic throttle
control (ETC) systems, and perhaps such systems in other manufacturers*
vehicles, are susceptible to inherent design flaws or electro-magnetic
interference (EMI) that can theoretically cause unintended acceleration
by resulting in incorrect signals to the engine. These types of
electronic systems are commonly used by all major vehicle
manufacturers. To date, we have not identified any particular crash or
unsafe occurrence that can clearly be attributed to such a flaw or the
EMI phenomenon in Toyota's vehicles. NHTSA opened an investigation on
Toyota's ETC system in 2004, focused on short duration events, and
could not find any safety defects in that system at the time. NHTSA
looked at short duration events where no brake application was alleged
in this investigation so as to screen out events that could have been
caused by driver error, to ensure the agency could find a vehicle-based
defect if it existed. In 2008, in wrapping up the floor mat
investigation, NHTSA went on to look for additional possible causes of
unintended acceleration in the Lexus ES350. That work included some
limited electronic and magnetic testing but did not reveal a flaw in
the ETC system. Since 1980, NHTSA has conducted 141 investigations on
throttle control issues in vehicles made by various manufacturers, some
of which involved electronic throttles and some the more traditional
mechanical throttle systems.
However, to be absolutely sure that the agency is aware of all
potential defects, NHTSA is conducting a review of the general subject
of possible design flaws in ETC systems and the possible effects of EMI
effects on those systems. We have begun by talking to Toyota and other
major manufacturers about the design of their systems and how, through
failure modes and effects analysis and other standard techniques, they
have taken the possible effects of EMI into account in designing those
systems. We have just recently received information about another
theory concerning a possible design flaw in the Toyota ETC system. We
will explore all relevant information in this examination. To be clear,
this is a review of the technological issues, not a defect
investigation. However, if any of this activity gives us any reason to
believe that a defect may exist in Toyota or other vehicles related to
design flaws in or EMI effects on ETC systems, we will open a defect
investigation. When we have completed these discussions we will decide
whether to conduct any additional research projects that might shed
further light on the effectiveness of manufacturers* safety control
strategies concerning their ETC systems, including the possible role of
EMI effects on various electronic.
Other Pending Toyota Investigations
NHTSA has a total of 44 pending defect investigations concerning
various manufacturers and a wide range of issues. Of those, five
concern Toyota. One of the Toyota investigations is the Recall Query on
sudden acceleration discussed above. Two others have gained wide
attention and are summarized here.
NHTSA opened an investigation on February 4, 2010, concerning a
braking problem on the model year 2010 Prius. The problem involves a
momentary loss of braking when the vehicle hits a pothole, bump, or
other uneven surface. NHTSA had received more than 100 complaints about
the problem, including four alleged crashes involving two injuries.
Five days after NHTSA opened its investigation, on February 9, Toyota
announced a recall designed to address this problem. NHTSA will closely
monitor its implementation. The recall involves over 148,000 vehicles
sold in this country, including the model year 2010 Prius and the 2010
Lexus HS250H. While awaiting an appointment to have their vehicles
remedied, owners who experience any braking problems should immediately
contact their dealers, and all drivers of these cars should allow extra
stopping distance until the problem is fixed.
On February 18, NHTSA opened an investigation concerning
approximately 487,000 model year 2009 and 2010 Toyota Corolla and
Matrix vehicles. The issue concerns the steering becoming unresponsive
or loose at highway speeds. NHTSA had received 168 complaints alleging
eight crashes (none fatal) at the time this investigation was opened.
As a final note, I would like to make clear that NHTSA has a very
aggressive enforcement program that searches constantly for safety
defects and noncompliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards. In just the last 3 years, NHTSA investigations have resulted
in 524 recalls in which 23.5 million vehicles were recalled so that
safety problems could be fixed. In addition, several million items of
motor vehicle equipment (including imported tires, child seats, and
motorcycle helmets) were recalled to correct safety problems.
In summary, NHTSA has acted to ensure Toyota recalls on the issues
related to unintended acceleration on which we have had evidence
indicating the presence of a vehicle defect, i.e., pedal entrapment and
sticky accelerators. We stand ready to ensure prompt action on any
additional defects that we have reason to believe are present.
Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
When the American consumers and regulators bring up a
serious issue, like this sudden acceleration issue, Toyota
executives in America don't seem to have any authority to take
any action on their own. It all has to go back to Japan. Now,
that may be a matter of corporate culture, Japanese culture,
I'm not sure, but it's the fact. And it was pretty obvious in
the House hearing last week, where the president and CEO of
Toyota North America, Mr. Jim Lentz, said he didn't have the
power to order recalls in the United States, only Japan did. In
fact, he told the Committee that, inside Toyota, information--
quote, ``Information only goes one way.''
This seems to have been a problem in NHTSA's safety
investigations, too. Toyota has not been responsive to their
inquiries, and it doesn't seem to take consumer protection, as
a mission for NHTSA, seriously. That is our impression in
talking with your people. In fact, Secretary LaHood, last week
you yourself testified that Toyota was safety deaf and didn't
respond to your concerns until you personally called Mr. Toyoda
in Japan. And that, I assume, is correct.
Secretary LaHood. Yes, that is correct.
The Chairman. And it's also true that Mr. Ronald Medford,
as you said, was Acting Administrator at the time, had to get
on an airplane and fly all the way to Japan, with some others,
to try to get Toyota to take these issues seriously. To get
them to take it seriously. In my opinion, there needs to be
someone here in the United States who can be held responsible
when American consumers are injured or killed due to safety
problems in Toyota vehicles. Do you agree with that?
Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I understand that Toyota is now saying
they're going to review their corporate structure and make
changes that give their divisions more authority. Do you think
this type of change will be helpful and will cause what we just
talked about to happen?
Secretary LaHood. I think it's an absolute imperative that
they do that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. NHTSA officials recently described to me how
another Japanese automobile company, Nissan, authorizes
recalls. And I'm wondering if this is a model.
Nissan has a three-person group that makes the final
decision about recalls in the United States, and one of the
three persons is always a U.S.-based safety executive.
Secretary LaHood, I think this type of decisionmaking structure
might help a foreign company be more responsive to safety
issues in the United States. What do you think, sir?
Secretary LaHood. I agree with you.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, more than 2,000 American
consumers have told your agency, NHTSA, that they are
experiencing sudden unintended accelerations in their Toyota
and Lexus vehicles, a terrifying experience. And they have
reported property damage, inquiries, at least 34 deaths caused
by sudden acceleration. That's correct, is it?
Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And if we're being honest here today, we
still don't totally understand why this is happening. Over the
last few years, Toyota has offered several different
explanations. First they said it was the floor mats. And more
recently they have blamed it on sticky accelerator pedals. And
it seems to me that, until very recently, NHTSA basically
accepted these explanations. But, here's the problem. There are
still many cases where Toyotas have suddenly discovered an
acceleration--drivers have accelerated very rapidly, and the
recalled mats and pedals were not involved. So, we know there's
a problem, and we still don't know what's causing the problem.
But, there does seem to be a fairly easy way to give
drivers the ability to regain control of the vehicles during a
sudden acceleration episode, and that's called ``brake override
system.'' It trumps. It means the brake always beats the
accelerator. You can have the accelerator on, you could be
driving forward, but the brake stops it cold.
Secretary LaHood, this brake override safety feature would
help Toyota driver controllers--control their vehicles during a
sudden acceleration episode, would it not?
Secretary LaHood. Yes, it would.
The Chairman. And my understanding is that, while Toyota
has just decided to add this feature to its new vehicles, other
cars and other car manufacturers adopted this safety feature
years ago. Isn't that correct?
Secretary LaHood. Yes.
The Chairman. And it's also my understanding that there are
a lot of older Toyotas, where the computer design might have
been a little bit more simple, or harder, from Toyota's point
of view, that are not being given this brake override system.
Is that correct?
Secretary LaHood. Well, Mr. Lentz testified that they were
going to try and install this brake override system in as many
cars as they can. I don't know if it reflects the ones that
you're mentioning here, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, it would have to reflect the early
ones. I mean, they said that--during the Olympics----
Secretary LaHood. It sounded like it was going be in as
many cars as they possibly could do.
The Chairman. Well, then the question is, Does it need to
be all of them? And I think it is.
And my understanding is, that brake override feature is not
a costly mechanical fix. It's instructions that you program
into a car's computer. Is that not correct?
Secretary LaHood. Yes.
The Chairman. So, why doesn't the government make Toyota
install this feature in vehicles? And why didn't it do it years
ago? Couldn't it have prevented some of the crashes and
injuries that Toyota drivers have been reporting to NHTSA over
the past few years? And why don't we require every manufacturer
selling cars in the United States to install this safety
features, in that it doesn't only affect Toyota cars?
Secretary LaHood. As a part of our investigation and
review, we are looking at the possibility of recommending the
brake override system in all manufactured automobiles.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, my time has run out. And I
call now upon the Ranking Member of Mark Udall's committee,
Senator Wicker.
Oh, he's gone. All right, then, order of questions will be
by arrival, so Senator Udall?
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller.
I'm wondering, with the chart that was published today in
the New York Times--here you have--and I know you all can't see
this, but I'm just going to describe it here for a second. In
2004, you have this huge spike in what are being reported as
crashes and complaints; 126 Toyota drivers experienced a crash
and later filed a complaint. All other auto companies are on
this chart, and they were either flat or going down, in terms
of the same kinds of complaint. So, you had this spike in 2004.
It took us 5 years to actually do something significant in this
case. And you had another spike in 2007, and then here you can
see this very, very dramatic spike in 2009.
So, my question to both Secretary LaHood and to
Administrator Strickland is, When you look at this problem--
and, Secretary LaHood, you have some independence from this,
because you've come in, and you're new to this, and you--when
you look at this, and you mentioned, in your testimony, all of
these complaints that come in--it seems to me you should have
something in your database that, when you get a big spike like
this--I mean, this just stands out--that it alerts people
there's something wrong here, there's something going on, and
immediately an activity is started that would have gotten to
the bottom of this a lot sooner.
And, Mr. Strickland, let me ask you--there's one big
watchdog out there, and that's NHTSA, and you're the
Administrator. The other watchdog is this committee, the
Commerce Committee. And you served many years in the Commerce
Committee. So, all of your experience, going back, what do you
see? What was the thing that happened here that we need to get
to the bottom of to make sure that this doesn't ever happen
again?
Please.
Secretary LaHood. Well, Senator, first of all, let me just
say, we've contacted the New York Times. That article is
inaccurate. The story did not mention that NHTSA opened two
investigations into pre-2007 Camry models and found no safety
defects; pre-2007 Camrys also had different floor pans and
pedal design. My point is that they claim, now, they're going
to post on their website the accurate information, which they
left out of the story, which is very unfortunate, because, you
know, people read these things and then they believe what they
read.
But, we did take seriously and did extensive reviews on the
complaints. We interviewed owners and we looked at these model
vehicles, and----
Senator Udall. Secretary LaHood, do you dispute, in the New
York Times article, that--they do the analysis of complaints.
They say, ``Reveals that Toyota had more complaints involving
crashes than any other carmaker.'' I mean, that's----
Secretary LaHood. Well, I'll let our Administrator comment.
But, I want you to know, the story was not accurate when it
reflected that we didn't have investigations. We opened two
investigations, as a matter of fact, and the reporter claims
he's going to post it on his Website. What good that does, I'm
not sure. But----
Senator Udall. I look forward to seeing that----
[Laughter.]
Senator Udall.--because this chart is pretty doggone
revealing, in terms of the spikes and then how long it took to
get actual action. Please, go ahead, Mr. Administrator.
Mr. Strickland. No, Mr. Udall, I think, actually, that
article actually reflects the experiences that NHTSA
investigators had during that time. Since 2000, there have been
10 open investigations dealing with Toyota issues of sudden
acceleration. Our early warning data and our complaint database
actually triggered the right reaction from our investigators,
and we took a look into these things.
The question is whether or not Toyota had an atypical
experience during this period. My understanding, as well, while
there was a marked increase, I think if you look at the entire
market size and fleet size of Toyota, they have the largest
fleet during that time period, as well. If you look at it on a
per-capita basis, I think our investigations and the data show
that, while they had more sudden acceleration incidents, their
actual comparison to the rest of the fleet was actually
unremarkable. They had the same percentage of sudden
acceleration issues as other manufacturers. They just had more
of them because they have more cars.
But, in terms of NHTSA's reaction, it was absolutely
appropriate during that period. We saw a difference in the data
coming in. The early warning data came in differently, the
complaints came up, and we opened investigations.
Senator Udall. My time's up, or, almost up.
Chairman Rockefeller, I just want to say to you, you have
taken this committee in the consumer protection area a number
of times in your short tenure as our chairman. And so, I
applaud you doing this, and I hope that you continue to do
this, because I think the American public knows, when they see
these kinds of articles, that there are big consumer protection
issues out there. And I look forward to staying involved with
you in the oversight of those issues.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Udall, very
much.
Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
This afternoon, we're going to hear from Toyota, but this
morning is about the agency.
And, Mr. Secretary, you and all of us on this dais are
temporary occupants of these seats, and others will take these
seats at some point in the future. And I want to ask about the
agency--not who's sitting in the seat at the moment--the
agency, and the credibility of the agency, because I think it's
important.
My understanding is that NHTSA has a budget of about $145
million, compared to $875 million for security for the embassy
in Iraq. The security for one embassy in one country exceeds,
by multiples, the amount of money we spend in NHTSA evaluating
safety and related issues.
Now, I have a sheet here. And I want to refer to something
that Senator Boxer said, because I want to ask whether you have
investigated this. You just responded to Senator Udall by
saying that investigations had been made and no evidence was
found. And I have that list. July 2003, an investigation
opened, no data to support; 2004, no data to support further
investigation; 2005 no data to support further investigation;
2006, no data to support further investigation.
Senator Boxer, in her opening statement, described
something that made me wonder about this ``no data'' and
further investigation on this issue. CBS did an investigation,
and said that the person at NHTSA--Mr. Santucci--whose job was
to conduct defects investigation, he negotiated a job with
Toyota, and then went to work with Toyota--apparently
negotiated while he was at NHTSA, went to work with Toyota
immediately thereafter. And it says, ``Toyota records show the
two helped negotiated with their former NHTSA colleagues to
limit probes in Toyotas surging out of control.'' He, when
asked about it by CBS, says he didn't agree that he negotiated,
but apparently the internal documents at Toyota obtained by CBS
used the term ``negotiated.''
So, here's the question. If someone left NHTSA to go to
work for the company, and they are limited, then, the
investigations, which then results in looking at these
investigations, and it says, ``no data to support further
investigation,'' have you gone back and investigated inside the
agency what has happened here? And is this a case where, for
several years, the agency was confronted with information
suggesting--I mean, knowing that fatalities were occurring, and
they did investigate, and then, ``no data to support,'' the
investigation is closed--one, two, three, four times? Have you
done an internal investigation to find out whether this agency
has done what it should have done on behalf of the American
people?
Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. We went back and looked at
those two employees. And the law says that they can go to work
for a company, but they cannot represent themselves back to the
Department on issues that they were responsible for. And
everything that we can tell at this point is, they did work for
Toyota, and they did talk to people at DOT, but not in an area
where they were responsible. So, we've looked at that. And some
people believe that, you know, it's not accurate, and so----
Senator Dorgan. You're saying it's just appearance?
Secretary LaHood. I'm saying that from our review of it, it
does not appear that they were engaged in activities that they
were prohibited by law from engaging in.
Now, I also said to another committee, Senator Dorgan, that
I think this law needs to be tightened up. I do. Look, I work
for an administration that has set the highest ethical
standards for its people, and I think this needs to be
tightened up. But, we found no violation for these two
employees.
Senator Dorgan. All right. Aside from this issue that
Senator Boxer raised in her opening statement, aside from this,
if you take a look at the question of when information was
given to NHTSA and then investigations begun, no data, no data,
no data; finally, down the road here, it says, ``recall of
55,000 vehicles because of floor mats.'' And then, you come
down further, again and again and again and again. Meanwhile,
some people are dying. And it seems to me, as Senator Udall
just seemed to suggest, I'm not sure anybody understands yet
what is the problem. It's just----
Secretary LaHood. Well, we know there are----
Senator Dorgan. Do you understand what the problem is with
the----
Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. I mean, we know, from our
investigations, that the floor mat is a problem, and that's why
these cars are up for recall. We know that the sticky pedal is
a problem. We also believe, based on what people have told us,
that perhaps the electronics could be the problem, too, and
we're going to do a review of that.
Senator Dorgan. But, isn't it evident that, if the floor
mats are in the trunk because the manufacturer said you ought
to put the floor mats in the trunk, and you have sudden
acceleration surges with the floor mats in the trunk, there's
something else going on?
Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. That's why we're looking into
the electronics. But, the floor mats are a problem, Senator.
And the sticky pedal is a problem. Could there be another
problem? Some people believe there is, and it's our obligation
to check it out.
Senator Dorgan. But, Senator Rockefeller asked the
important question, as well. If the brakes won't override the
accelerator, and you've moved the accelerator to an electronic
accelerator, and the brakes don't override, why is the recall
not requiring to have that fixed on the vehicles? Because it
seems to me that's the only way you're going to prevent future
fatalities.
Secretary LaHood. Well, we agree with the idea that there
are enough people who believe that the electronics are a
problem, and that we are going to do a complete review of that.
Senator Dorgan. All right.
Well, Mr. Chairman----
Again, this didn't happen on your watch, I understand that.
You're having to respond to it in an aggressive way. But, I
think there are real credibility problems. Senator Udall asked
those questions about the New York Times, CBS and others. I
think they've raised questions that raise questions of
credibility of NHTSA, going back. And I know that what you want
to do is fix all of that and run an agency that people can be
proud of and in which people can have some trust.
Secretary LaHood. Senator, on my watch, when people think
there's a problem, we're going to address it. We're not going
to take a back seat to anybody when it comes to safety. You
look at my 13 months in office. Everything that I've talked
about, lived, and breathed at DOT has to do with safety. It's
just what we have to do. It's what people expect of us. And
when people say there's an electronics problem, I'm going to
pay attention to that.
And we are paying attention to it now.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
Senator Snowe, to be followed by Senator Wicker, because
you're ranking to Senator Pryor.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I know you are looking at it now. But, the
point is, we set in place legislation, that became law years
ago--as a result of the Firestone tire recall issue--putting in
place the investigative authority that's so essential for NHTSA
to do its job.
And I don't know on what basis you could rule out
electronics. I know that we're all urging it to be looked at.
It's not about us urging it. It's the fact that you can't rule
it out, because you don't know. That's the point here. I mean,
even Toyota doesn't know, at least based on their public
statements last week that were, as I said earlier, conflicting,
both with Mr. Lentz and Mr. Toyoda. One said he couldn't rule
it out, and one said they're absolutely confident. So, how do
we know?
And if you look back at prior investigations, I'd be
interested to know--because you have to look at those
investigations to find out exactly what went wrong. State Farm
said there was a trend in acceleration. Six people died that
year, in 2004. So, did NHTSA look at it as a trend? What did
they do? Did they base it on the information they got from
Toyota? Did we subscribe to Toyota's explanation of what went
wrong in 2004 and in 2007?
Secretary LaHood. Well, Senator, our Administrator had sent
a letter asking for all of the possible information that we can
gather from Toyota to make sure that they gave us everything
they were supposed to give us to begin with. And so, that
request has been made.
I agree with you, we need to look back and make sure we had
everything. Based on what we had at the time, we felt that the
remedies that we were recommending were the right remedies.
But, when we look back and find that there's additional
information, we may--obviously have reached a different
conclusion.
Senator Snowe. Well, as I understand it, NHTSA never used
its subpoena authority. So, did----
Secretary LaHood. We----
Senator Snowe.--they get all the proprietary data from
Toyota to make a decision, in terms of what the problem was?
The point is, we don't know. You can't conclude, one way or the
other.
Secretary LaHood. I can----
Senator Snowe. That's the point.
Secretary LaHood. I can't conclude that we received
everything--until we receive the request that we just sent to
Toyota.
Senator Snowe. But, these previous investigations, in 2004
and 2007, were they reliant on Toyota's explanation and the
partial information they submitted----
Secretary LaHood. What we have to rely on, Senator, are
complaints we get from people, what information we get from the
industry, what information we get from the car manufacturer.
Senator Snowe. Well, but an independent investigation
didn't occur--is that correct?--with respect to----
Secretary LaHood. Well, our people do these investigations,
we have----
Senator Snowe. You have an independent----
Secretary LaHood.--experts on our staff that do that.
Senator Snowe. We have been told that you don't have
computer software experts. The question is, on the issue, and
looking at it in totality, was it independently verified?
That's the issue here. You know, State Farm, the Nation's
largest auto insurer, comes to NHTSA, as they had already done
that with Firestone--this wasn't, you know, many years later;
it was on the heels of Firestone. So, we've got to find out
what went wrong. We don't want to be sitting here with a future
Secretary saying, ``Well, you know, we're going to look at it
now.'' We have got to know. NHTSA didn't----
Secretary LaHood. We agree with you.
Senator Snowe.--come forward with resources. They've got
unobligated appropriations, funds that were never used. Isn't
there a way of solving this? We have got to know. It's got to
be independently verified. Yes, you want the information from
Toyota, and I'm not clear that we got all the information from
Toyota.
Secretary LaHood. I'm not clear we did, either. That's why
we've made a huge, huge voluminous request for a lot of
information from----
Senator Snowe. So, on what basis did NHTSA make the
decisions, back in 2004, when it concluded its investigation
after 4 months, and then after 7 months, in 2007? Whose
information did they use to make that decision?
Secretary LaHood. The information that we received from the
car manufacturer, from complaints that we had from consumers,
and our expert people looked at all of that.
Senator Snowe. Well, was it a pre-negotiated recall, in
2007? I mean, on the floor mats.
Secretary LaHood. The way it works, Senator, is, we look at
all the information, we make a judgment call if a recall needs
to be made, and then the manufacturer decides if they want to
do it. If they don't, then we require them to do it.
Senator Snowe. Well, how does NHTSA regard the information
that comes from insurance companies like State Farm? I mean, so
how do they look at that----
Secretary LaHood. We work closely with all insurance
companies, and we regard their information as very valuable.
Senator Snowe. Well, it's just amazing to me that there's
no continuity. This is a matter of life and death. That's what
I don't understand. I mean, this came on the heels of
Firestone. And obviously that memory was not ensconced in NHTSA
at the time. This tire recall issue. And then you have these
deaths. I mean, if you look at the years in which these deaths
occurred, at least in the--submitted to NHTSA--they occurred--
in 2004 there were 6 deaths, and in 2007 there were 7 deaths
attributed to unintended acceleration. And I don't see that
NHTSA did any of the work necessary to have satisfied an
independent analysis, doing everything--moving heaven and
earth--to get to the bottom of this. That's what's
disconcerting here. Yes, we're looking at it now, but where
were you then? And we'd better learn exactly what happened then
to understand how this doesn't repeat itself.
Secretary LaHood. Well----
Senator Snowe. Because NHTSA didn't come forward and ask
for all these resources to do a very aggressive investigation.
Secretary LaHood. Well, Senator, on my watch, I guarantee
you, it'll be done thoroughly, it'll be done as independently
as possible, with every piece of information we can get. We
will not rest until these cars are safe.
Senator Snowe. May I ask one other question? Is it unusual
for NHTSA officials to go to Japan? Is this----
Secretary LaHood. Yes.
Senator Snowe. Was this the first time? So----
Secretary LaHood. Yes.
Senator Snowe.--it was unusual.
Secretary LaHood. Absolutely. I have said, to two other
committees, I believe the Toyota business model is broken. I
told Mr. Toyoda that. When they have good, expert people,
professional people in North America making recommendations,
and then they don't listen to them, their business model is
broken. I think Mr. Toyoda got that message, not only from me,
but from others. And I think you'll see some changes in the way
they do business.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
The Chairman. I'm also told that Mr. Medford and his team
that went over there were treated rather dismissively, and
actually they used stronger language than that. So, these are
not common occurrences.
Senator Wicker, I call on you because you have been chosen
by your----
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you----
The Chairman.--party to--because Kay Bailey Hutchison isn't
here. I need to explain that to keep my Democrats from killing
me.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, and I'm mindful that
Senator Boxer is under a tight schedule, and I promise to be
brief.
Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, about these two studies: the
Exponent study, commissioned in 2009 by Toyota, and the study
done by Professor Gilbert of Southern Illinois University.
As I understand it, Exponent is an organization that is
widely known in this field, concerning analyses of defects, and
that, as a matter of fact, NHTSA has used them in the past.
They conducted an analysis of the electronic throttle system.
These tests are ongoing, but Toyota received an interim report
confirming Toyota's contention that the unintended acceleration
events cannot be caused by the ETC system, because there are
fail-safes that would prevent it.
I want to ask your opinion about that study as compared to
the Gilbert study. This study was commissioned by persons who
are interested in bringing a lawsuit with regard to these
accidents. And Professor Gilbert determined that the system did
not properly detect electronic malfunctions. He was able to
induce unintended acceleration in a Toyota that did not trigger
the fail-safe mode.
Toyota, on the other hand, has contended that, in his test,
he manipulated the system in a way that cannot ever occur under
driving conditions.
So, I'd just like to ask, at this point, realizing that
there are analyses ongoing, if you have some advice to the
Committee or an opinion for us about these contrasting studies.
Secretary LaHood. What we have said, Senator Wicker, is
that we're going to look at the studies that were done by the
professor at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale, and by
the organization that was hired by Toyota. There was a woman,
who testified at the Commerce Committee in the House, whose
Toyota experienced acceleration--unexplained acceleration. We
have purchased that vehicle, and we're going to examine it.
What we're going to do is a thorough review of studies that
have been done by the professor at SIU, by other groups. We're
going to do our own study. We're going to do a review. We're
going to look at the automobile that had unexplained
acceleration, and try and figure out if electronics were a part
of this.
Senator Wicker. So, at this point, you don't feel
comfortable giving us a preliminary criticism or opinion as to
either one of these----
Secretary LaHood. No sir, not at all.
Senator Wicker. And the study done by your Department will
be a completely separate and exhaustive----
Secretary LaHood. Absolutely. Looking at data and the
studies that have been done, looking at the car that had
acceleration which was unexplained, and trying to figure out if
the electronics are a problem.
Senator Wicker. Can you tell us, at this point, what you
know about this firm, Exponent, and their----
Secretary LaHood. All I know about it, Senator Wicker, is
what I heard at the hearing. We're going to get a copy of their
reports and look at them.
Senator Wicker. I would appreciate it if you would get back
to the Committee, on the record, and tell us whether, in fact,
the Department and NHTSA have used Exponent----
Mr. Strickland. Yes. On different occasions throughout the
years, actually, Exponent had a different name, but NHTSA has
used it before.
In terms of this particular report, sir, we are reviewing
that report ongoing, and Dr. Gilbert's. It will be involved in
our work, but there's also going to be a significant piece of
work that's going to be independent, where we're going to
basically pool experts from around the country, from various
aspects, from academia and manufacturing, for, sort of like, a
National Academy of Sciences panel.
Senator Wicker. I understand.
Mr. Strickland. But, in terms of that work--Exponent's work
or Dr. Gilbert's work, we're examining it right now.
Senator Wicker. If you could supply, on the record, the
number of times that your agency has actually used and relied
upon Exponent or its predecessor.
[The information referred to follows:]
On September 26, 2001, NHTSA awarded a delivery order type contract
to Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent's predecessor) for
``Compliance Tests for FMVSS No. 201, Occupant Protection Interior
Impact.'' NHTSA placed four orders during the period of performance of
this contract (September 26, 2001 to September 27, 2007).
Senator Wicker. And then, just briefly, Mr. Secretary, you
stated last week that it would be beneficial for NHTSA to
receive additional information from manufacturers in foreign
countries. Specifically, what types of information do you not
currently receive that would be beneficial?
Secretary LaHood. Well, we receive information, and
certainly we receive information on complaints. But, why don't
I, for the record, tell you specifically what we receive, and
the areas where I think we're deficient?
[The information referred to follows:]
The Early Warning Reporting (EWR) regulation established pursuant
to the TREAD Act requires all vehicle manufacturers and equipment
manufacturers (including tires and child restraints) to report
information based on notices and claims of deaths occurring in a
foreign country if the vehicle involved is identical or substantially
similar to a vehicle sold or offered for sale in the U.S.
Manufacturers must also report information on safety recalls and
other safety campaigns in a foreign country on a motor vehicle or item
of equipment that is identical or substantially similar to a vehicle or
item of equipment sold or offered for sale in the U.S. The following
are exceptions for reporting foreign recall or safety campaigns:
The manufacturer is conducting a safety recall or safety
campaign on a vehicle for which an identical or substantially
similar vehicle is not sold in the U.S.;
The component or system that gave rise to the foreign recall
or other campaign does not perform the same function as the
substantially similar component or system in the U.S.;
The subject of the foreign recall or other campaign is a
label affixed to the vehicle, item of equipment or a tire.
Manufacturers are required to submit a list of identical or
substantially similar vehicles annually so that the agency can use this
information to identify potential defects in vehicles sold or offered
for sale in the U.S. Currently, manufacturers are not required to
submit this list electronically. The agency is reviewing whether
manufacturers should submit this list electronically to provide quicker
access and review of the substantially similar vehicle lists.
At this time, the agency believes the information reported by
manufacturers for foreign deaths and foreign safety campaigns along
with the consumer complaints and other EWR information reported to
NHTSA is adequate to identify potential safety defects in the affected
vehicles in the U.S. However, the agency continues to review the
reporting requirements to determine whether additional requirements or
improvements are necessary to identify potential safety concerns more
effectively and efficiently and intends to implement those changes as
necessary.
Senator Wicker. OK. I appreciate that. Because I know that,
in past instances, previous leadership in NHTSA has said,
``Don't inundate us with a huge mountain of raw data. It has to
be distilled before it reaches us, or it's going to actually be
counterproductive and bog down the system.''
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I'm trying to connect some of the
dots here, in this puzzle that we're trying to put together, as
to who knew what, what happened, why did it happen. And I know
you're very involved in this, in helping. And I don't, frankly,
hold you responsible for what happened in 2004 or 2007. I'm
going to talk to you about going forward.
Now, when we look at an ethics rule, or any law, there's a
letter of the law, and there's the spirit of the law. And you
may be totally right that this fellow, Santucci, who left
NHTSA, went right to work for Toyota, and he--according to the
CBS News story--convinced NHTSA--he was part of the team who
convinced NHTSA to focus only on the brief-burst acceleration,
ruling out the long-duration events that have allegedly led to
accidents and deaths. And he, himself, admitted--Mr. Santucci--
``You used the word 'negotiate,' we discussed the scope.'' So,
he was involved.
Now, if you looked at the letter of the law, maybe he never
worked on sudden-burst acceleration, maybe he worked on
something else. Maybe he worked on safety belts or airbags. The
fact is, the spirit of the law, in my view, was broken. And I
agree with Joan Claybrook's comments to CBS, where she points
this out as a critical moment in time. It's cozy, cozy, cozy.
And it doesn't just happen here. It happens in a lot of places.
So, I want to ask you, because--I really applaud Senators
Rockefeller and Pryor; they have written a letter to the
Inspector General, and I ask unanimous consent to put that
letter in the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Hon. Calvin L. Scovell III,
Inspector General,
Office of the Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Inspector General Scovell:
It is our understanding that the Office of Inspector General for
the Department of Transportation has initiated an audit of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and its role in the
recent wave of recalls issued by Toyota Motor Company. The Commerce
Committee has undertaken its own inquiry into this matter, including a
review of documents provided by NHTSA and Toyota, and plans to hold a
hearing on the recalls. We appreciate your office starting a separate
audit. To make sure your review is comprehensive, we ask that the
investigation be expanded to encompass the points raised in this
letter. We further request that your office keep us apprised of the
progress of this investigation.
NHTSA is charged by law with the mission to save lives, prevent
injuries and reduce economic costs due to road traffic crashes, through
education, research, safety standards and enforcement activity. We are
concerned by recent news reports that may lead the public to believe
that NHTSA employees and leadership in recent years have not lived up
to this mission. These recent reports indicate that NHTSA may have
internal deficiencies in investigating certain safety defects, and even
worse, the potential to be excessively influenced by the industry they
are supposed to oversee on the public's behalf. We expect your
investigation to expose such systemic and leadership deficiencies,
should they exist, past or present.
In this regard, we ask that your investigation include a full
review of NHTSA's ongoing and past actions related to the recent
recalls announced by Toyota Motor Company. We also ask that you review
NHTSA's actions related to the issue of sudden unintended acceleration
and brake failure in all automobiles containing electronic throttle and
braking control systems. This review should determine whether NHTSA
carried a bias against regulating non-mechanical vehicle components,
had been excessively influenced by automobile manufacturers in
regulating electronic control mechanisms, and/or lacked the resources
to adequately investigate electronic control mechanisms.
As part of this review, we believe the American public should know
when the agency received related consumer complaint data, what
information was contained in the data, how NHTSA processed the
collected data, whether NHTSA followed established consumer protection
procedures and requirements of the agency under law, and what more
could have been done or can be done to protect consumers. The public
also deserves answers to news reports that have raised concerns about
the so-called revolving door of employees between the agency and the
industry it is supposed to oversee.
Therefore, as part of your investigation, we ask that you review
the following specific matters related to NHTSA:
Industry-wide complaints regarding sudden unintended acceleration and
brake failure in automobiles containing electronic throttle and
braking control systems:
The nature and number of complaints or reports collected
by NHSTA
When such complaints or reports were received (number by
year)
How such complaints were registered in NHTSA's database
NHTSA's collection of similar reports from foreign
countries
Compliance with the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act and other NHTSA
reporting requirements:
The process by which manufacturers reported data related
to unintended acceleration and brake failure
How NHTSA categorized, processed, and investigated
reported data and defect petitions related to unintended
acceleration and brake failure
Actions taken by NHTSA related to received reports of
unintended acceleration and brake failure
Actions taken by manufacturers to address recommendations
from NHTSA
Government Ethics at NHTSA:
Whether NHTSA officials excluded relevant data from its
investigations and reports
Whether NHTSA officials ignored internal data in favor of
data provided by automobile manufacturers
Whether NHTSA inaccurately categorized reported data in
its database
Whether former NHTSA officials employed or under contract
by automobile manufacturers are in positions to exert
influence on NHTSA decisions regarding investigations
We realize that completing this review may take a number of months,
and as such, request that your office provide us with regular updates.
Furthermore, please be advised that the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, may further request testimony and
preliminary reports from you in the coming weeks.
Sincerely,
John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Mark L. Pryor,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance.
Senator Boxer. And one of the issues they raise is this
issue. Going forward, without waiting for the IG--because it
just seems to me, on its face--remember, the outcome of this
was applauded by Toyota, who put, in their own document--and I
have--I ask unanimous consent to place it in the record; I have
it here somewhere--their own document that bragged about the
fact that they saved so much money on this.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Boxer. And this is the car that killed my
constituent. This is the car that spun out of control, and that
highway patrolman, Mark Saylor, and his wife, died, because, I
believe there was pressure put on NHTSA from people who had a
too cozy relationship. I think it's part of the problem.
Now, could I prove it? Maybe, if I had a lot of time, I
could. But, it doesn't look good. It smells bad, and it's not
right, and they applauded their victories.
Here it is, ``Wins for Toyota.'' Look at this. This is
their presentation. It says, ``Wins for Toyota Safety Group.''
EM--FMVSS 110, NCIR, labeled--labeling recall. No civil
penalties, saved $20 million in buybacks.''
And here's the one, ``Negotiated equipment recall on Lexus
ES''--that's the car that killed Officer Saylor and his
family--``Saved $100 million, with no defect found.''
This is an outrage. And so, would you work with us now on
tightening up this law. Will you work with us----
Secretary LaHood. Absolutely.
Senator Boxer. I think that's very, very key.
Now, as I understand it, Toyota is now installing a brake
override technology. Imagine all of us--probably almost all of
us here drive. You're driving your car, and you step on the
brake, and nothing happens. The car goes faster and faster and
faster. So, Toyota is installing a brake override technology as
a fix for seven existing vehicles. Do you think we should
mandate the use of brake override technology in all new
vehicles? Should the brake override technology be installed on
more vehicles, not just those seven models?
Secretary LaHood. We are looking at that, Senator, and
particularly given the fact that Mr. Lentz has said that they
will put those in all of the Toyota cars that they can in
America. We're looking at it. We think it is a good safety
device, and we're trying to figure out if we should be
recommending that.
Senator Boxer. OK. My last question.
The 2006 Camry model is not on Toyota's current recall
list. Why are there models, such as the 2006 Camry, which have
been involved in deadly sudden-acceleration accidents, not
included on their current list of recalls?
Secretary LaHood. Yes. I'll get back to you, on the record,
if I can, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Toyota is conducting three recalls to address unintended
acceleration in its vehicles. Two of these (09V-388 and 10V-023)
correct problems with the accelerator pedal and floor pan designs that
can increase the risk of the accelerator pedal becoming trapped by an
improperly installed or inappropriate floor mat. The third recall (10V-
017) addresses a defect condition in an internal friction lever of an
accelerator pedal assembly supplied by CTS Corporation. The 2006 Camry
vehicles are not included in these recalls because they do not contain
the defect conditions identified in these recalls. We are currently
reexamining unintended acceleration incidents involving the 2006 Camry
and other Toyota vehicles to determine if there are other defects
causing unintended acceleration.
Senator Boxer. OK. Because I don't think their recall list
is comprehensive enough, just from what I'm reading. But, I'm
going to turn to you, because I do trust your judgment on this.
Thank you----
Secretary LaHood. Thank you.
Senator Boxer.--very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
I'm just going to go through a series of potential
solutions here, because I also don't want to go back over the
past. The way I look at it, six times investigations were
opened, six times closed without action. Thirty-four people
died. I think we can do better.
So, the first would be this resource issue. In 1980, there
were 119 people who worked for NHTSA in enforcement. Today
there are 57. Yet, in 30 years since 1980, we've seen nearly
double the amount of cars on the road, from 146 million
vehicles in 1980 to 256 million vehicles today. Has this
diminished staffing level made a difference? Do you think we
should improve it?
Secretary LaHood. The President recommended 66 new
positions for NHTSA in the 2011 budget. We applaud the
President for recognizing we need more resources.
Senator Klobuchar. So, do you think that would be helpful
here? Because----
Secretary LaHood. Absolutely.
Senator Klobuchar.--I know we're going to hear from----
Secretary LaHood. More resources----
Senator Klobuchar.--someone this afternoon----
Secretary LaHood. Absolutely.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Second, regulatory or statutory reform. As I understand it,
manufacturers can voluntarily initiate recalls without waiting
for NHTSA to order a recall, or NHTSA can order manufacturers
to initiate a recall; but, to do that, you have to go through a
bunch of hoops, public hearings, completing the investigation,
giving the manufacturer time, defending a recall in Federal
court, it goes on and on. What, if anything, could be done to
speed up the process? Is there something that we can do to make
it easier?
Secretary LaHood. Well, we do have to do these
investigations before we can require a recall. But, the
manufacturers have been pretty cooperative. GM just announced a
recall today on some automobiles, but, I guess what I would
say, Senator, is, we'll look at that. For now, what I'm saying
is, for the most part the manufacturers are cooperative on
this.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. But, we have an issue here where,
you know, they were basically showing off for saving $100
million by winning this victory by just saying it was the floor
mats. And one of the things that I've learned is, you can
assess fines for this kind of behavior, but those penalties
could be as high as, like, $16 million for a related series of
violations. It sounds like a lot of money, but when Toyota is
bragging about saving $100 million by basically negotiating a
resolution to a safety defect that isn't a recall, is that
enough money? Should there be more of ability to assess fines?
And would this be a useful tool?
Secretary LaHood. I think it would be a useful tool. And I
would also say that, because of our insistence in going to
Japan, my talking to Mr. Toyoda, we cut short their ability to
stall this out by them recognizing they had a safety problem,
and they decided to recall.
Senator Klobuchar. Right. And I do appreciate that you have
gotten involved in this and you're taking responsibility. But,
remember, there is this long time period----
Secretary LaHood. Understood.
Senator Klobuchar.--that I don't want to go through again--
--
Secretary LaHood. Understood.
Senator Klobuchar.--where clearly there with an issue. As
the New York Times has noted, you know, complaints get filed,
they promise answers, regulators complain, and you just don't
get that answer. I likened it to a hockey puck going back and
forth on the ice.
The issue about the revolving door, I wrote a letter to Mr.
Strickland about this, and I know you just pursued this with
Senator Boxer. Do you have any statistics or information on the
number of former NHTSA staff who now work for other car
manufacturers? Will you get that? Is that a----
Secretary LaHood. Yes, you know, I'll get back to you on
the record for that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The following former NHTSA employees are currently employees of the
indicated automobile manufacturers:
Sam Campbell--formerly engineer in Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, departed NHTSA May 15, 2009; currently--engineer
with BMW;
Theresa Lacuesta--formerly engineer in Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, departed NHTSA November 9, 2007; currently--
engineer with Toyota North America Inc.;
Amanda Prescott--formerly engineer in Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, departed NHTSA June 27, 2006; currently--engineer
with Ford Motor Company;
George Feygin--formerly attorney-advisor in Office of the Chief
Counsel, departed NHTSA May 27, 2006; currently--attorney with
Nissan North America Inc.;
Christopher Santucci--formerly safety engineer in Office of
Defects Investigation, departed NHTSA September 12, 2003;
currently--safety manager with Toyota North America Inc.;
Ralph Hitchcock--formerly Office Director in Office of Applied
Vehicles, departed NHTSA August 3, 1997; currently--engineer
with American Honda Motor Company;
Christopher Tinto--formerly safety defects engineer in Office
of Defects Investigation, departed NHTSA October 14, 1994;
currently Vice President of Regulatory Affairs with Toyota
North America Inc.
Senator Klobuchar. And you've suggested there might be some
ways to tighten the rules, to bring back that public trust. So,
what are those ideas, Secretary LaHood?
Secretary LaHood. I think we should have the highest
standard possible, which I think would be--prohibit NHTSA
employees from going to work for automobile manufacturers for a
period of time. That's the same standard that's set for Members
of Congress to go out and, you know, earn money in Washington,
or whatever. For this administration, it's 2 years for a
Cabinet Secretary. I think it probably should be longer.
Senator Klobuchar. So, you're saying it's not just that
they wouldn't be working and interacting with the agency on a
specific issue, they just wouldn't go work for the----
Secretary LaHood. That's correct.
Senator Klobuchar.--people they were regulating. That
sounds like a good idea.
You know, the other thing I'm trying to figure out is this
interaction between the agency--there has to be one--and the
industry, as you go back and forth. And I know, when you get
these complaints, you scan your own data bases to figure out if
there's a match or if you've seen a number of complaints.
Clearly we were seeing some spike. I don't want to get into the
fight about what the New York Times said, or not. But, there
was some spike in these in 2004, 2005 onward.
NHTSA scans its own data bases. Who scans the corporation's
databases to check if there are potentially matching
complaints? Do you have----
Secretary LaHood. We work with them on that, and, you know,
we try and review all of the possible research and data that we
possibly can.
Mr. Strickland. And, Senator Klobuchar, just to add on,
that Toyota has a statutory requirement, under the TREAD Act,
to report to our early warning system. So, we actually receive
their field reports, their technical service bulletins. All
that information comes in, on a quarterly basis, to NHTSA, so
we have that information to match up with the complaint data
base, as well.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And again, I've got the guy I
mentioned, Joe Pepski. I talked to him directly. I mean, he
felt like he was basically being told he wasn't telling the
truth. He knew what happened. He's never driven that car since.
He's afraid to drive it.
Then we had another woman, a nurse named Mary Pries, of
Morrison, Minnesota. Same thing happened. She barely survived.
She had the presence of mind to take her car and drive it on a
county road where there was no traffic, and she was able to
finally put it in neutral, or something, and stop it from
accelerating. And the problem, from a trust standpoint, with
government, is, these people came forward, and they went to the
agency, and they filed these complaints. And all these other
complaints were going on, and they would read it on the
Internet, but they didn't know all the details. But, those
details were somehow in the computer system.
So, what I'm trying to do--because I truly believe the
employees at NHTSA are trying to do the right thing--is to
figure out what tools we can give you to make it so this
doesn't happen again and so that when my constituents file
these complaints, at least there's some feeling that they
weren't going nuts when this happened to them, that this really
did happen to them, and that they did the right thing in
reporting it, and that they're part of the solution.
Secretary LaHood. Thank you for your leadership, Senator,
we----
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Secretary LaHood.--appreciate it.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Secretary LaHood. Thank you,
Administrator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman,
I have a packet of documents I'd like to hand out to the
Committee, and I also have two charts there, that are also in
the packet of documents, if that's OK.
Administrator Strickland, I hate to see the Secretary have
all the fun.
[Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. So, I'm going to ask you a few questions, if
you don't mind.
And, first, I want to ask, just, about the resource issue.
We've had a few Senators today suggest that you need more
resources, and I know that's in the President's budget, but
have you made a decision on what--how you're going to fill
those slots? In other words, it sounds like you may need some
more expertise in some of these, say, software/electronics-type
area. Do you know what you're going to do?
Mr. Strickland. We have 66 positions provided for in the
President's budget, if it is approved.
In terms of our expertise, we have several pipelines for
that. We have five electrical engineers on staff at NHTSA. We
have 125 engineers, total. We also have resources that we
leverage at the Vehicle Research and Test Center in East
Liberty, Ohio, where we have an electronics engineer, which is
a software engineer, in addition to an electrics engineer, as
well. We are in the process of hiring another electrical
engineer.
But, in terms of the 66, I'm definitely having my staff go
through, do a full assessment of the ODI department, and we're
definitely going to deploy those resources, as needed, to make
sure we buttress a stronger NHTSA.
Senator Pryor. Great.
On this first chart, it's the Camry, Solara, and the ES300.
And that ``UIA'' stands for unintended acceleration. Vehicle
owner questionnaire, vehicles for the model year. I know it's
kind of code, up top.
But, basically, what you see is, in model year 2002, they
add this electronic throttle control, the ETC. They add the
electronic throttle control. You can see what the numbers do.
And, you know, there may be other factors in that, but I'm glad
you're looking at it. And as you all look at it, I would just
hope that you would focus on the electronic throttle control. I
know there are other parts of the electronic system that make
sense, and software and all that. But, I certainly hope you'll
detail some of your people to look at that ETC, the electronic
throttle control.
Mr. Strickland. Senator Pryor, it is a priority. The
Secretary's already laid out the plan for NHTSA, in terms of
how we're going to do an incredibly--we're probably going to
have the most comprehensive review of electronic throttle
control/EMI reviews in the automotive industry. We're going to
not only look at Toyota, we'll be looking at every
manufacturer, because this is a system that's gone through the
entire United States fleet.
Senator Pryor. Yes. I'm glad to hear you say that.
On the second chart, these are State Farm numbers, and
again it's unintended acceleration claims. And you see the--the
numbers are different. You see a spike each time they add the
electronic throttle control. And that's two different models.
One's a Camry, and one's a Corolla. You see a spike. But, also
when you look at these charts together, it raises the question,
Does NHTSA have comprehensive data from Toyota on everything
that's going on with this unintended acceleration? In other
words, you know, some of these numbers are from State Farm,
some are from customer questionnaires. Do you have the sort of
universal data that you need, or has that been requested?
Mr. Strickland. About 3 weeks ago, NHTSA issued three
queries to Toyota for everything regarding what it knew about
the floor mats, what it knew about sticky pedal, and what it
knew about the brakes. And part of it is an overall query for
all sudden-acceleration incidents in Toyotas, which will be an
incredibly large and rich amount of data for the agency to go
through to figure this out.
But, in addition to that, we took a look at the data when
we saw the design changes back in 2002 and 2004, when we saw
the complaint data coming in, when we got the early warning
data come in. NHTSA opened investigations. The standard that we
have to follow in order for us to maintain our case in court
is, we have to find a vehicle defect that creates an
unreasonable risk to safety. If we cannot find that defect, we
cannot go forward. We will lose the case in court.
So, the investigations that opened and closed, as
everyone's been talking about at this hearing, those incidents
of where the investigators did a full investigation, top to
bottom, regardless of any types of rationale or cause for
sudden acceleration, and they were not able to find a defect.
We took a look at the electronic throttle control system in
2004, did a larger inquiry in 2007, and weren't able to find a
defect. We never stopped looking, but--because we recognize the
data and the trends, that's the reason why we're going to do
the broader inquiry.
Senator Pryor. Right. And the last question I have for you
is that some of the Senators have alluded to press reports,
whether it be New York Times, CBS, ABC, whoever. You know, I
don't remember who else reported on this. But, there's an
allegation, or at least, maybe, an inference, that there's a
relationship between NHTSA and the manufacturers that's too
cozy. Now, I don't know if that's true or not. But the question
I would have for you is--you're the new administrator there; I
mean, obviously, most of this stuff happened long before you
got there, even in a previous administration. Do you have
concerns that the relationship between NHTSA and the
manufacturers is too cozy? And I understand you need a close
working relationship, and I understand that; that's very
important to do your job. And to keep, you know, the roads
safer and keep our vehicles safer. But, do you have that
concern, that the relationship is too close?
Mr. Strickland. My responsibility as the Administrator is
to run the agency with the highest level of ethics possible. I
don't want to have anybody roaming my halls at NHTSA, other
than my employees or designated appointments where they provide
us information that we need.
I want to respond to this Toyota document, the report to
Mr. Inaba. There is a lot of things. I will happily respond in
more detail on the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
We do not think that NHTSA's relationship with the manufacturers is
cozy, but rather it is professional. NHTSA makes decisions about
vehicle safety based on an independent analysis of all available data.
During the past 3 years, NHTSA's investigations have resulted in 524
recalls in which 23.5 million vehicles were recalled. We believe that
the number of recalled vehicles is indicative of NHTSA's aggressive and
professional approach to vehicle safety, regardless of the manufacturer
being investigated.
With regard to Toyota's internal document dated July 6, 2009,
Toyota claimed defect, rulemaking and NCAP ``wins.'' NHTSA disagrees
with statements in this document. For example:
Contrary to its claim, Toyota did conduct a safety recall of
over 196,000 Siennas. In Toyota's letter to vehicle owners, it
states that ``this notice is being sent to you in voluntary
accordance with the requirement of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Toyota has decided to conduct a
safety recall. . . .''
With regard to the Camry/ES floor mat problems, Toyota
conducted a recall of floor mats. After a thorough
investigation that began and ended as an equipment
investigation, ODI believed that a recall of the floor mats was
the appropriate resolution because the elimination of these
floor mats and their replacement with floor mats that were not
likely to be entrapped even if not properly secured seemed very
likely to address the most serious risks of entrapment.
In 2008, NHTSA decided to postpone the implementation of the
new Government 5-Star safety ratings program to provide
manufacturers and consumers an additional year to become
familiar with the new ratings system, which contains the most
significant changes to ratings program since the program began
in 1979. We note that NHTSA did not meet with Toyota regarding
the new ratings system.
Although the delayed compliance date for FMVSS 206 door
locks accommodated the manufacturers' design and production
cycle, the delay also allowed the agency more time to analyze
the petitions for reconsideration regarding other technical
issues. We note that Toyota did not submit a petition for
reconsideration requesting delay of this rule.
We also note that the internal Toyota document noted more
aggressive NHTSA management and ``more investigation and more forced
recalls'' as key safety issues for Toyota.
Mr. Strickland. But, the claims that Toyota made about
their negotiations or influences are false. I--that document--
the things that they're claiming in that document is like me
claiming that I was responsible for the sun rising this
morning. Absolutely false. And NHTSA's people did independent
work, independent investigations, and that document absolutely
has no foundation.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
And Senator Johanns?
Senator Johanns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, let me ask you some specific questions
about the vehicles that you investigated. And again, I think
you said, quote, ``full investigation, top to bottom,''
unquote.
So, where did these--where were these vehicles
manufactured? Were they manufactured here in the United States
or in some other location?
Mr. Strickland. In terms of Toyota, or any manufacturer
that we investigate for a defect?
Senator Johanns. No, these specific vehicles. These
specific Toyota vehicles.
Mr. Strickland. I don't know specifically where--I mean,
there are a significant number of Camrys that are manufactured
here in the United States--I think actually most of them--but I
need to get back to you on the record on the actual country of
manufacture or assemblage.
[The information referred to follows:]
The investigations have included Toyota vehicles manufactured in
the United States, Canada, Mexico and Japan (see below).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Make Model Model Years ODI Inv Country
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GS400 1997-2000 DP03-003 Japan
----------------------------------------------------------
LS400 1997-2000 DP03-003 Japan
----------------------------------------------------------
DPO4-003
ES300 2002-2003 PE04-021 Japan
Lexus DP09-001
----------------------------------------------------------
ES330 2004-2005 DP05-002 Japan
----------------------------------------------------------
PE07-016
ES350 2007 EA07-010 Japan
DP09-001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PE04-021 Japan
--------------
2002-2003 DP05-002
DPO6-003 United States
-------------------------------------------
DP05-002 Japan
--------------
Camry 2004-2005 DP06-003 United States
-------------------------------------------
2007 EA07-010 Japan
--------------
United States
----------------------------------------------------------
Toyota PE04-021
2002-2003 DP05-002 Canada
Camry Solara DP06-003
-------------------------------------------
DP05-002
2004-2005 DP06-003 United States
----------------------------------------------------------
PE08-025
Sienna 2004 EA08-014 United States
----------------------------------------------------------
Mexico
--------------
Tacoma 2006-2007 DPO8-001 United States
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Johanns. OK. Would you do that for me?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Senator Johanns. OK. And make sure you supply it to the
other members of the Committee.
Is that important in your investigation? I mean, if you see
a pattern, that all the vehicles are coming from one location,
wouldn't you go, ``Whoa, the light bulb just went on''?
Mr. Strickland. This actually is the same issue, I think
you're alluding to, as what was happening in Ford Firestone,
where there was one particular plant in Ohio that was producing
the defective Bridgestone tires, which had the treadwear
separation issue. We take all data into account, not only the
systems that are used, but where the place of manufacture was.
If there is a trend line, we'll find it. For example, the
sticky pedal recall was a CTS that has been linked to a CTS
pedal that is made in Indiana. They used two manufacturers for
pedals. The other is Denso, in Japan. My understanding was, we
did not see the same type of issues in the Denso pedal as in
the CTS pedal.
So, NHTSA absolutely positively takes into account all
possible manufacturing inputs and quarterly stats, whatever the
problem is.
Senator Johanns. OK.
Now, tell me--this full investigation, top to bottom--tell
me what that would entail. Walk me through what you're--what
you mean by that kind of investigation. Do you look at the car
itself?
Mr. Strickland. In some situations, there are several steps
in the investigative process, opening with a preliminary
evaluation, all the way through an engineering analysis
element. So, it's several steps.
But, in a typical investigatory process, we will send an
investigator to the complainant to actually review their car.
We'll go through the typical list of systems which may
influence, say, for sudden acceleration. If it's electronic,
we'll take a look at those particular assemblages. We'll take a
look at the mats; we'll take a look at whether there's an
engine surge because of other systems, like the compressor
system or the air conditioner. And then go through to eliminate
any and all possible causes. And if we find a defect, that's
where we take action at that point and find out if it's an
unreasonable risk. And then we go further, with a recall
request.
Senator Johanns. OK. But, when you send them to look at
these things, do they fly out there with their computers and
whatever else? I mean, what are you saying, when they look at
it? Are they----
Mr. Strickland. It depends on the type of car and the
complaint and the year whether--how we're going to take a look
at these particular things. In 2004 and in 2007, there was a
comprehensive--the 2004 was a smaller look. 2007 was a larger
look, on electronic throttle control systems.
But, in any other case, if the investigator goes through
the tick list and finds a defect that the investigators either
already been made aware of, from a prior recall, or finds a new
defect, that's what they will flag. At the end of the day, in
terms of how the investigator goes through this process, the
process is to find the defect. And we go through that. If we
don't find a defect, that's when we have a closing resume.
Senator Johanns. Mr. Administrator, here's my concern. And
I think you know what I'm getting to here. There's an
investigation, and then there's an investigation. And when you
say ``full investigation, top to bottom,'' the image you create
for me is that there are computers hooked up to this car, and
they're testing this, that, and the next thing, the car's taken
apart. I could go to the shop floor and there are parts on
the--that's not happening, is it?
Mr. Strickland. I think the consumer probably wouldn't be
very happy if my investigator took apart their car. But I would
state this. In situations where there is a need to take a look
at the onboard diagnostics, I believe that our investigators
bring those tools with them. They also take a look at the
actual assemblages. They also drive the car to see if they can
replicate the fault. That's what I mean by a top-to-bottom
investigation.
If there's something that warrants something broader, NHTSA
will do that, as we did in 2004 and in 2007, and what NHTSA
will be doing in undertaking the full review for EMI in the
days going forward.
Senator Johanns. Well, let's just confine ourselves to the
instances where something tragic happens, somebody died, and--
I'd like to know what the investigation was. I'm not asking you
to tear open all of the files of your agency, but what I am
trying to get to--because we could add 50 more people, we could
add 500 more people, but if the investigation isn't getting us
there, to what's going on here, it won't make any difference.
The second thing, because I'm out of time already, that I'd
ask you to focus on is this. I do want to know where this all
comes from. I'm as free trade as anybody here. But, I will tell
you, the American consumer is getting tired of this kind of
thing, if, in fact, the problem is that we are getting
substandard products from some other part of the world.
What I'm also extremely tired of is the treatment we get
versus how we handle these things. Our borders get shut, their
cars keep coming.
And I just want to dig a little deeper here. Maybe there's
nothing to what I'm saying. And I'm not going to be bothered at
all to acknowledge that. But, I'll tell you, I've worked with
this country before, and I think they have some responsibility
here. So----
Secretary LaHood. Senator, let me just say, the comments
that you made in your opening statement struck me. I'm going to
Japan. I've talked to the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States on a couple occasions about this. I wish I would have
had the insight that you--what you've said has struck a chord
with me, and I think it's something that we need to raise--I'm
going to raise it with the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States, and I'm going to raise it when I go to Japan. I think
it's a point well made, and one that we should be making when
it comes to automobiles.
Senator Johanns. I--Mr. Secretary, we're out of time here,
and I appreciate it--but, I hope you do, because what they have
done to us, in an area that I'm concerned about, in my personal
opinion, outrageous. And yet, they want us to continue to buy
their products, which, again, I'm a free trade sort of guy.
Fair trade. And I hope you will bring it up.
Secretary LaHood. I will.
Senator Johanns. Thank you.
Secretary LaHood. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ensign.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Ensign. Thank you.
Mr. Administrator, I have a few questions for you. One is
that--because I talked to some of the dealers in Southern
Nevada and--about these particular issues. One of the things
they did is, they offered a particular service--the Toyota
dealers there, just voluntarily--a free car wash to anybody who
has a Toyota. And as they were bringing cars in for a wash,
they were doing some inspections. And one of the things they
found was that cars had four floor mats stacked on top of each
other.
The one real tragic accident, that we've heard a lot about
today, was a car that didn't have its own floor mat in it, it
had a different car's floor mat. I have a Toyota product, and
its floor mats have hooks on it. From what I understand, that
mat in the accident was not installed properly. Is that really
the car manufacturer's fault, or is that the dealer's fault? It
would seem to me that the dealer has some culpability there.
The reason I'm bringing this up is, having that Toyota
product--I have a light-colored carpet. I got tired of it
getting dirty within a couple of weeks, so I went down to a
local parts manufacturer and bought some rubber mats. Well,
when I was talking to the dealer the other day, the dealer
said, ``You'd better check that to make sure, you know, that it
is safe.''
Does NHTSA look at things like that? In other words, when
you go to buy something like that, it says on there that it is
good for certain cars. The reason you buy extra market products
like that is because it's a lot cheaper than going down and
spending several hundred dollars for floor mats from Toyota.
That's the reason I did it. And I'm sure that there are a lot
of other people out there that do that. Does NHTSA look at
things like that?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, we do. Not only do we have the
responsibility for motor vehicles, but motor vehicle equipment,
as well, which would include things like aftermarket products,
such as the mats.
Senator Ensign. So, in this case, aftermarkets don't have
those hooks on it. And yet, it's still OK for Toyotas?
Mr. Strickland. The mat that was recalled was an
aftermarket mat, the Weathertech mat, if I'm not mistaken, in
2007. The issue that we always have to look at, at NHTSA, is
not only from a manufacturing standpoint; we also have to look
at it in terms of the use and abuse, and the foreseeability of
use and abuse. And in terms of the mat, originally the thought
was that if we replaced those mats, that was a complete
solution for this particular issue of floor mat entrapment.
The 2009 accident, as tragic as it was, illustrated to
NHTSA at the time was that it is clearly foreseeable that, not
only would a consumer make a mistake like that, but the car
dealer itself could make a mistake like that.
I think the Saylor car actually did not have the right mat.
It was a mat that belonged to a Lexus truck that was placed in
the car, which caused the problem. So, it isn't even an issue
of a manufacturing defect for a particular mat. It's the fact
that you needed a vehicle-based solution to recognize the fact
that the pedal can't be so long. So, even if you have a human
error come in, that the consumer will be safe, even if that
error was made.
Senator Ensign. From what I understand, almost all car
manufacturers have had accelerator problems reported to you. I
think that a lot of Americans feel that if there is one death,
you all should do a recall. But, that's not how it's done. You
have to make sure that there really is a problem with the
manufacturer. Is that correct?
Mr. Strickland. There isn't a threshold numerical component
to this. If there is a defect that creates an unreasonable risk
to safety, even if it's in a small percentage of a certain
production of car----
Senator Ensign. Right.
Mr. Strickland.--we will do the recall. In terms of how we
execute it, you know, NHTSA's mission is saving lives and
preventing accidents and injuries, and not only from the--as
you said, Senator Ensign, issue on the numbers of people who
are involved in accidents because of vehicle defect; NHTSA's
vision is for all 37,261 deaths that happened last year. And on
that point, I'm incredibly proud of this agency. In 2005, there
was 43,510 deaths. In 2008, that went down to 37,261. That is a
quantum change in lives saved. And this is an agency that is on
its mission every day to make sure we get that number lower,
whether it's on the behavioral side or if it's on the vehicle
defect side.
Senator Ensign. One last point to make is that I hope you
look at some of the independent studies that were done and who
funds them. From what I understand, the study that was done at
Southern Illinois was funded by trial lawyers. There may be an
ax to grind there, that they may be trying to do something
there. I would just hope that, regardless who has funded the
study, that you would look at it with a skeptical eye, and you
would look at the good science, and whether that could be
replicated by other folks, and not just take them at their word
that the study was done right.
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Ensign, we'll look at all data points,
and we'll evaluate it independently.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Klobuchar has a clarification to make.
Senator Klobuchar. I do, thank you.
I wanted to clarify, the woman--the nurse I talked about--
her name is Mary Pries Morrison. She's not of Morrison,
Minnesota, although it is a town. She's of Lindstrom,
Minnesota. And it matters, because she's been working very hard
to get her money back for the car. She's the one that--the 9-1-
1 operator told her, as she was desperately calling, after
going 80 miles an hour for 6 miles, told her to shift into park
and take the key out, and it worked. And when the sheriff got
there, she had actually--her brakes were smoking so hard that
she had melted her hubcaps.
So, that is an example of a case that we have in Minnesota.
Thank you for allowing me to clarify it.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And could I ask one question? Senator McCaskill may be on
her way. Let me just sort of put something forward. Let me just
talk it, and then you can answer it.
You had your first complaint into NHTSA--and it's in your
data base--back in--about unexpected acceleration--- back in
2003. Now, some people have said you can't be responsible for
the past, and it's true. But, we're looking at a history here,
a characterization, both past and forward. And it's very clear
that, the sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles,
that NHTSA's database worked. It was clear. There were a lot of
people that complained, and they're all in the database. What
didn't work, to this observer, is what NHTSA failed to do,
because it failed to determine the cause of sudden unintended
acceleration in Toyota vehicles. So, I think its investigations
have failed.
Now, why do I say this? What reason could there be? We've--
our committee staff have reviewed thousands and thousands of
pages of NHTSA documentation, other documentation, and I think
it fairly clearly shows that NHTSA employees are reluctant to
do investigations of the vehicle electronics because it's much
more difficult to detect.
You had one investigation, which was limited to floor mats,
even though there were clearly incidents unrelated to floor
mats. And so, I just make this point, and then I ask that you'd
react to it. I think that NHTSA investigators, taking the whole
period of time, would rather focus on floor mats than
microchips because they understand floor mats. They're more
comfortable with floor mats. They don't understand microchips.
You're going to change that, but this is what the situation has
been.
So, I feel that very strongly, and I feel that has been
sort of a major letdown on NHTSA's part, looking back and up to
the present.
So, how do you react? When are you going--to make sure that
the microchip solution to unintended acceleration works?
Secretary LaHood. Well, my response, Mr. Chairman, is that
we are going to do a complete review. I'll be happy to share
the copy of the letter that we have sent to Toyota, asking for
every possible piece of information that we can get, to make
sure we haven't missed anything, or that they didn't disclose
some things that we should have looked at. And----
The Chairman. But, you don't disagree with me about my so-
called stipulation?
Secretary LaHood. What I would say is that I don't know if
NHTSA turned a blind eye because they didn't understand chips
or the electronics. I know this. We're going to get to the
bottom of the electronics. That's what I commit to you.
The Chairman. And that's what I want to hear, but I'm just
telling you that you got your first complaints about this in
2003, and the record clearly shows that your folks stayed
away--not your folks, but the prior person's folks--stayed away
from micro-
chips----
Secretary LaHood. And if the information from Toyota that
we get--information that we haven't received--no, we're going
to be pretty darn mad about that. But, it will help us in the
future.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary and Mr. Administrator, I
totally thank you for being here.
We have one more witness, for the next 12 minutes, but then
that witness will be back again this afternoon.
I thank you for taking the time----
Secretary LaHood. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I appreciate your----
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman.--strong attitude.
Now I'd ask Clarence Ditlow to come forward, please.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Clarence Ditlow. Now, we have to sort of
hustle here, because we have a vote coming up pretty quickly.
If we could have silence in the hearing room, please, people
could take their seats.
Mr. Clarence Ditlow is Executive Director of the Center for
Auto Safety, has been observing auto safety for, what, 25, 30
years? Longer than that. All right.
Let me ask the first question.
And before I do that, incidentally, any folks, including
Senator Hutchison, who had a statement, and any other folks who
didn't have a chance to give that statement this morning, that
will be included in the record.
Mr. Ditlow, I am very troubled that NHTSA and the public
must rely so heavily on manufacturers for data that,
ultimately, will probably hurt, if they shared all of it, the
company's reputation and profits. Manufacturers have an
incentive to only give the minimum amount of information to
NHTSA. That would be my strong conclusion.
In other contexts, companies are required--not asked to,
but required--to certify that the information they provided the
government is accurate and complete, or face criminal and civil
penalties. Am I right?
STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. DITLOW,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY
Mr. Ditlow. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would it make sense to ask--no, scratch
that--to require manufacturers to make a similar certification
when they provide information to NHTSA?
Mr. Ditlow. Senator Rockefeller, that's one of our first--
--
The Chairman. Is your thing on?
Mr. Ditlow. Sorry.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Ditlow. OK, now it's on. OK.
Senator Rockefeller, that's one of our first
recommendations. Every single response by an automobile
manufacturer ought to be submitted with an affidavit that is
sworn under penalty of perjury. The only--that's the only way
that you're going to be sure that, when they're submitting
information, that they don't err on the side of the
manufacturer, but they err on the side of full disclosure.
The Chairman. All right. I'm compelled to turn to Senator
McCaskill.
Mr. Ditlow. Senator Rockefeller, may I give a few points in
response to----
The Chairman. You can talk.
Mr. Ditlow. OK. Thank you.
The Chairman. But, I've got to get her in. And
incidentally, you're going to be here this afternoon, on the
Toyota panel.
Mr. Ditlow. Yes.
The Chairman. The members should know that.
Mr. Ditlow. OK.
The--all I wanted to do now was to address a few of the
points that were raised by Secretary LaHood and Administrator
Strickland.
First of all, I want to say that I have the utmost respect
for both the Secretary and the Administrator, but they are
behind the eight ball. They came in, essentially, after the
October recall, and they've been doing everything they can to
catch up. But, they have a lot of work to do.
And just looking at some of the things, we talked about--
you talked about the agency getting complaints on its own, and
from the manufacturer. But, in those early investigations,
which did not lead to a single vehicle recall, there were
complaints that were excluded on long- duration events, where
consumers said the brakes did not override the full
acceleration. So, you narrowed it down. You didn't get the full
picture.
And we saw the submissions, today, on the number of
complaints when electronic throttle controls were introduced.
The Center took a look at the Toyota Camry. There have been
twice as many fatal crashes and deaths in the 2002 to 2006
Camry, which has not been recalled, as in the recalled 2007 to
2010 Camry. So if you can't answer questions like that, you
haven't done your job.
The fundamental issue in the complaints comes out of the
1989 study that DOT did, where they said that, ``If we can't
find a mechanical failure, something that causes the throttle
to open, or the cruise control, then it must be driver error.''
They've excluded out complaints. But that study was done on
1983 to 1986 vehicles, a quarter of a century ago. Technology
today, in today's car, is far beyond that. We didn't have
electronic throttle controls. We didn't have 20 to 30
microprocessors in vehicles. You can't use the 1989 study to
measure 2010 vehicles. So, I would just toss it out the door.
And the other thing I want to point out, in terms of the
agency's examination, is, they did one modern test on a 2007
Lexus ES 350 to determine, quote, ``whether it was floor mats
or electronic controls that caused unintended acceleration.''
They said it was floor mats. We filed a FOIA and asked them for
all their test data, all their test procedure, on
electromagnetic interference or any computer malfunctions that
they did during this test of that Lexus. They came back and
said, ``We have no data, we have no test procedure.'' So, it
wasn't a valid test. This is what we're up against in moving
forward, an agency that really hasn't done a thorough
examination.
And then we have the issue of the former employees coming
in. And I will add one more. Erica Jones, the former chief
counsel, when they came in and negotiated the safety
improvement campaign, she was there, as part of the Team
Toyota, lobbying the former agency that she worked for.
So, they know the system, they know how to beat it, and we
need to get a lot more resources for the agency.
And I pose a question for Secretary LaHood. Where are those
66 positions going? How many are going into enforcement, where
we really need it?
Thank you.
The Chairman. I would just say that, in the panel this
afternoon, I think that Toyota's going to get some very tough
questioning from members here. But, the purpose of that, one,
is to solve the problem--that's by far, the most important
purpose; but also, they need that to reestablish the level of
trust they once had, and then suddenly lost when some of these
figures came out. That's what oversight is for. That's what our
job is. And that's what NHTSA's job is. And, you know, so far
the difference is not startling.
I call on Senator McCaskill because she didn't have a
chance to ask a question.
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ditlow, does your organization make any attempt to
track lawsuits that are filed against automakers, and make note
of the results of those lawsuits?
Mr. Ditlow. It's very difficult for us to track the
lawsuits, because there's no central filing mechanism. We have
to rely on filings with the government. But, we certainly come
across some individual lawsuits, like the Alberto case in
Michigan, where there was no floor mat in the vehicle. And we
called that to the agency's attention. And--so, that's part of
the agency's files.
Senator McCaskill. Well, part of the issue here--and I hope
I have a chance to, this afternoon, question the Toyota
officials about it--is a culture about secrets, a culture about
making sure that no one knows anything bad. And, frankly, in
this instance, maybe that culture is more to blame for this
problem than anyone heretofore has actually acknowledged. I
want to first say that I think there are fine cars this company
has built, and our, obviously, hardworking people in America
that are selling them and buying them. But, I look at some of
the cases out there, and what I'm really concerned about now is
that we have some homicides, and vehicular homicide cases,
where people have gone to jail when they have said, ``I put on
the brake, it didn't work. I--it just kept going.'' And I'm
interested on a case where there was a driver of a runaway
Camry that signed a confidentiality agreement, and received a
settlement from Toyota, following accelerating out of control
for 20 miles before killing the driver of another car in San
Jose, California. He was initially charged with manslaughter
for causing the crash, but charges were then dropped. It seems
to me that the lawyers of this country, in many instances, are
doing the work that the regulatory agencies refuse to do, or
won't do, or bureaucracies somehow keep them from doing, and
that is, they are pounding on the doors of justice and saying,
``Let us in. We've got evidence.''
And it seems to me your organization, now, with Internet
technology, a lot of these lawsuits are very easy to find. It
might be a way that consumer groups such as yours--I know other
consumer groups have certainly utilized this--can begin to
track some of these lawsuits and get a leg up, in terms of
bringing evidence to the regulators that could help prevent
this in the future.
Mr. Ditlow. Senator McCaskill, you're absolutely right. And
these confidentiality agreements that are signed should be
prohibited in areas of public health and safety, because they
would cover up a defect that could lead to a recall that could
prevent hundreds of deaths and injuries.
And I must add that the secrecy at the Department of
Transportation is as bad as the secrecy in some of the
lawsuits, because there are hundreds of early warning inquiries
that have been done by NHTSA since 2003. Yet, none of those are
made public. When you look at early warning, NHTSA spent $20
million. Now, when it comes to Toyota's sudden acceleration,
either early warning found it early on and NHTSA didn't act on
it, or early warning itself is flop because it should have
detected it.
But, we can't tell you, as a public watchdog, which way it
is, because the government won't give us access to the
investigations done under early warning. But, they're there.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I think the transparency part's
important, and I know that economic considerations go into the
secrecy culture, because they want to protect their product
from their competitors until the appropriate moment, because of
the competitive market of automobiles, and--in the world. But,
in this instance, I think we need to take a hard look at all
the cases where there have been sealed and private agreements,
particularly after litigation has begun.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And before we all rush off to vote, I just want to make a
point. Comes out of what you said. During the hearing this
afternoon with Toyota, we have two people from Japan that we've
brought over. One is in charge of safety, one is in charge of
another--they're both on the board of directors, so they're top
people. They can give their testimony in English, but they
can't answer questions, necessarily, so they will have a
translator. Because we take these matters seriously in this
committee, we will have a Japanese--or, a person who can speak
Japanese--translator--sitting right here, to listen to how the
translation is given in respect to how the questions are asked.
And I think that's a little bit what you're talking about.
Having so said, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was recessed.]
TOYOTA'S RECALLS
AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE--
AFTERNOON SESSION
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order. People will
be seated.
I welcome our panelists.
And what happens here is that I usually make an opening
statement. There were three--two members, two Senators, who
didn't make opening statements this morning, so they will,
then, make their statements, and then we will go to the panel.
I want to welcome our panel and thank my colleagues for
dedicating so much of their day to this extraordinarily
important issue.
As I said this morning, we have two goals today: first, to
figure out exactly what happened, so those who made the wrong
decisions can be held accountable; and second, to determine
what actions need to be taken, both to fix ongoing safety
issues, and to make sure this never happens again.
We learned a lot this morning from Secretary LaHood--
Secretary of Transportation--and Administrator Strickland and
Clarence Ditlow about the government's role in Toyota's recent
recalls, and why these problems were not identified sooner.
We have an obligation on this committee to make sure that
the American people know the full story. That's what we do; we
do oversight so the American people can understand what goes on
and what is the root of the problem and what is being done to
solve the problem. And both Federal regulators and Toyota must
learn the lessons of these failures, and make sure they are
never repeated.
This afternoon we will hear from Toyota executives about
how these problems occurred and why the company did not respond
more quickly.
I want to say again, in the presence of the second panel,
what I said this morning at the first panel. Toyota is an
extraordinarily important company to America, as well as to my
home State of West Virginia, and to our national economy, as
well.
I worked very hard to bring a Toyota engine and
transmission plant to Buffalo, West Virginia, because I knew
Toyota was a company that believed in perfection and
reliability, a company that believed a winning business plan
was one where growth and profit came from only putting the
quality of its products and the safety of its consumers first.
It saddens me deeply that, it seems somewhere along the way,
public safety decreased in value as profit margins soared.
The Commerce Committee has been examining the recent Toyota
recalls and asking whether the company was losing its focus on
quality and safety; indeed, the president of the company
indicated that. What we have found is that Toyota had plenty of
warning signs that something was changing.
In September 2006, for example, the President of Toyota
North America, Jim Press, expressed concern, in a presentation
to Toyota's top executives in Japan, that Toyota quality was
slipping and that the company, he said, was facing growing
problems with NHTSA, the U.S. safety regulator.
But, it doesn't seem like the message was heard in Japan. A
year-and-a-half later, Chris Tinto, Toyota's top safety
official in Washington, tried to warn his superiors in Japan
that quality problems were growing, and his--in his words, ``We
have a less defensible product.'' It's not typical of the
Toyota that I know.
I ask unanimous consent to insert Mr. Press's and Mr.
Tinto's PowerPoint presentations in the hearing record, and it
is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Chairman. If Toyota wants to remain successful and
regain consumer confidence--and I believe that will happen--it
can happen; I believe it will happen--it needs to find this
balance between quality and profits once again.
Toyota's consumers and its incredible employees deserve,
themselves, nothing less. They drive Toyota cars, they're proud
to work for the company, and they are, in this case, American
citizens, and they deserve the full safety of the car.
And, again, the American people deserve a top-to-bottom
review; the honest picture of what happened and what we are
going to do moving forward.
This morning, we began an important conversation about the
kind of legislation we may need to strengthen our system and
prevent something like this from happening again. That
legislative work will continue, as will our review of documents
and oversight in the weeks to come.
The public's trust has been compromised, and the system has
broken down. For the safety of millions of Americans on the
road, and for the security of thousands of Toyota workers in
America, let's get this right.
Thank you, to all of our witnesses, for participating and
for working with our committee. I look forward to hearing from
each and every one of you.
Let me just add this: We have a system in this country,
where we--where our committees have oversight. We take that
very, very seriously, and we need to take it even more
seriously, because not all administrations are doing what--you
know, Presidential administrations--are doing all that they
could. NHTSA is not doing all that it should. So, we step in to
try to hold a measure of clarity to all of this.
Now, with your permission, I want to call on Senator
Cantwell. And I don't see Senator Lautenberg, so Senator
Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this important hearing today.
Toyota has built a reputation in America for its quality,
safety, and reliability. Toyota introduced into our
manufacturing lexicon, ``lean manufacturing, kaizen, muda,
root-cause analysis,'' and the ability of each line worker to
pull on the andon cord and stop the assembly line, if they see
problems.
When Toyota became aware of the 2004 NHTSA data that
indicated a possible problem with sudden unintended
acceleration of some of its vehicles, someone in the management
should have pulled the andon cord.
Part of our collective disappointment with Toyota's
response to date is that we expected more from them, given the
principles under which they operate.
No doubt, entrapped floor mats do explain a percentage of
the reports of unintended acceleration, but I do believe we
need to explore other causes, such as electronic throttle
control and electronic--and the engine control model software.
A recent article in Discovery.com sums it up: It takes dozens
of microprocessors running 100 million lines of code to get a
premium car out of a driveway. And this software is only going
to get more complex. Small errors in how software performs can
lead to big system problems. I think of these unexplained
occurrences of unintended acceleration as being part of an
extreme tail of a bell-curve. It's an occurrence--a rare
occurrence, but when it does happen, it can have catastrophic
consequences.
I'm glad that Secretary LaHood is looking at electronic
throttle controls and engine control models across the
industry. I am concerned that unless all of these critical
variables associated with one of these reports of unintended
consequences can be identified and then reproduced, there may
not be definitive answers.
Toyota's solution is to have a brake override. It is not
really a solution as much it is a fail-safe strategy.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can come up with answers
today to these important questions. Beyond these concerns, I am
going to be questioning our witnesses about the electronic data
records, because one of the issues here is having people who've
been involved in these incidents be able to have the
information that gives them certainty about what's happened in
these incidents.
I thank the Chairman for allowing opening statements.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Now Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, when Congress and the President stepped in to
help the American auto industry, there were many who said that
GM, Chrysler, Ford deserved to fail. We heard cries that the
Big Three were bloated, they didn't understand the American
consumer, and they didn't know how to innovate. And we
especially heard that they needed to be more like their foreign
counterpart, Toyota. We're not hearing that anymore. And
questions are raised that have a sinister appearance. Did
Toyota gain market share by shortcuts on safety, by trying to
minimize expenses that were to be made to make sure that
everything was operating appropriately?
Toyota became the number one car company in the world
because of its relentless, marketed reputation for safety. We
hadn't seen that. And I'm deeply concerned that this reputation
was built on a house of cards. If we learned anything from the
crisis that's gripping Toyota, it is this: that if a company
puts profits above all else, especially safety, consumers are
the one who pay the price.
We saw in Toyota that single-minded drive for profit, when
last year it bragged about internal documents that gave it a
regulatory win. Toyota bragged of a win when it saved $100
million by avoiding a full recall of the 2007 Camrys and other
car models. It bragged of a win when it saved millions of
dollars by avoiding an investigation into the Tacoma pickup
while delaying safety changes to other models. And it bragged
of a win when it avoided another investigation into the Sierra
minivan. With every one of these Toyota wins, Americans have
been the ones who've lost.
And I come from the business world, and I know the
importance of revenues to a company, and I understand what it
means to work hard to make a corporate profit. I also know that
striving for profits should never be so critical that it
eliminates corporate responsibility. Toyota's quest for profit
hasn't just placed the black cloud over this car company, it's
led to death, injury, and fear among drivers all across the
United States.
Matter of fact, I had someone walk up to me last night--a
woman who had just ordered a Toyota--and she asked me if I
thought it was safe. Well, I couldn't really answer the
question. I assume that that's--that this was an aberration; I
certainly hope so.
Toyota drivers, and all Americans, are owed a complete and
candid explanation about what is wrong with these vehicles. And
it's clear we're still not close to getting these answers. In
fact, a few days ago, a Toyota executive used language that
sounded like it came right out of a crisis management playbook,
explaining the company's problem. It said it had grown too big,
too fast. It had misplaced its priorities, and now it will put
consumers first. Nothing more than words, and they ring hollow.
We need to see action and a real response, not just slick
excuses created by public relations strategies.
Just as Toyota has to get to the bottom of this crisis, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has to do
everything in its power to protect Toyota buyers and every
single driver on American roads. In recent months, the agency
has taken responsible steps to untangle this mess, but it's
critical that NHTSA be given the resources it needs to keep our
roads safe and hold our car companies accountable.
Mr. Chairman, I'm running--one page longer, if I might, or
otherwise, I'll just cutoff.
The Chairman. Please go ahead.
Senator Lautenberg. At the same time, NHTSA must continue
to stay on top of Toyota, make sure that consumer complaints
are taken seriously, responded to swiftly. And I know that
NHTSA and Toyota are in talks to confront the problem. But,
let's get one thing straight: When it comes to safety, there's
no room for negotiation.
It's my hope that Toyota, the company that has a lot of
good things to say--to be said about it--there is--my hope that
Toyota will start to address this crisis fully and forthrightly
so that Americans will have the confidence that they're safe
when they get behind the wheel of a Toyota.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
I want to introduce our panel. The first speaker will be
Mr. Takeshi Uchiyamada, who is the Executive Vice President of
Toyota Motor Corporation; second, Mr. Shinichi Sasaki, who is
Executive Vice President, also, of the Toyota Motor
Corporation; and the third person from Toyota is Mr. Yoshimi
Inaba, who is President and Chief Executive Officer, Toyota
Motor North America; and then, also, Mr. Clarence Ditlow,
Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety.
Mr. Uchiyamada, we would like to start with you, sir.
STATEMENT OF TAKESHI UCHIYAMADA, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
Mr. Uchiyamada. Chairman Rockefeller and members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to address you today.
My name is Takeshi Uchiyamada, an Executive Vice President
of Toyota Motor Corporation, and I am the Chief Engineer of the
growth of our company.
I was fortunate to be the Chief Engineer of the first-
generation Prius. I helped run and develop the first mass-
produced hybrid in the world. And this hybrid led other
automakers to realize the importance of environmentally-
friendly technology.
As Toyota's president, Akio Toyoda, testified to Congress
last week, Toyota's priority has traditionally been the
following: first, safety; second, quality; third, volume. Our
goal in developing safety-related technology isn't only to
comply with regulations and standards and to strive for good
safety ratings, but also to improve consumer safety in the real
world. While concerns have been raised about our electronic
throttle control system, this system, used by all major
automakers, actually represents a great safety advancement,
enabling superior traction control and electronic stability
control, among other things. Because the ETCS controls the
engine's throttle system, Toyota places the greatest importance
on ensuring that the reliability of the system is absolute, by
undertaking rigorous design and testing processes.
Three things ensure this absolute reliability. The first is
the fail-safe mechanisms we built into the design; second, is
its tolerance to extreme environmental conditions; and third is
its resistance to software problems.
The fail-safe systems in Toyota's ETCS are robust. Our
design includes two separate central processors. The main, or
control, CPU calculates and executes the operating command for
all engine systems. The sub-CPU monitors throttle control
input, throttle control output, and main CPU processes. A
watchdog signal passed between the two CPUs many times per
second to confirm that the processors are working correctly. If
the two CPUs are not in agreement, or either the main or sub-
CPU doesn't receive the watchdog signal, the engine management
system will alert the driver and go into a fail-safe mode
operation. The ETCS is also designed and tested to make sure it
withstands all of the foreseeable environments, in terms on
temperature, moisture, vibration, and electromagnetic
interference, or EMI.
We have testing data that confirms its reliability from all
the markets in which we operate worldwide. OEMI--there is no
regulation in the U.S., but we test the ETCS to withstand
double the European regulation OEMI. In none of these cases has
the ETCS failed.
In addition, we test the software in the system
extensively, both in the design phase and after it is
developed, to ensure that there is no possibility of sudden
unintended acceleration.
I want to be absolutely clear. As a result of our extensive
testing, we do not believe sudden unintended acceleration,
because of defect in our ETCS, has ever happened. However, we
will continue to search for any event in which such a failure
could occur.
In order to further validate the safety of our ETCS, we
have asked Exponent, a world-class engineering and scientific
consulting firm, to conduct its own independent, comprehensive
evaluation. We are also addressing the issue of unintended
acceleration through new technologies, including event-data
recorders and brake-override systems.
In conclusion, our Prius has changed the global auto
industry with its environmental performance. Now we will strive
to continue to be the leader in the area of safety. I'll help
drive our team's effort to meet this challenge, ensure our
drivers' safety, regain--and regain their trust and confidence.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Uchiyamada follows:]
Prepared Statement of Takeshi Uchiyamada, Executive Vice President,
Toyota Motor Corporation
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to address you today. My name is
Takeshi Uchiyamada. I am an Executive Vice President of the Toyota
Motor Corporation, and I am the Chief Engineer for the global company.
Since I was a child, I have been interested in technology and
science. Stories about great inventors such as Edison, Bell and Ford
fascinated me, and I dreamed of developing a car that everyone around
the world would love. From the time I joined Toyota, I have been
engaged in developing vehicles and engineering technology with my
wonderful and experienced colleagues.
I was fortunate to be the chief engineer of the first generation
Prius. I helped plan and develop the first mass-produced hybrid in the
world, and this hybrid led other automakers to realize the importance
of environmentally friendly technology. What impressed me most is the
fact that consumers had greater environmental awareness than we did as
automakers. Our customers helped make hybrid cars popular and used
widely around the world today.
Today, I would like to focus my comments on Toyota's approach to
safety, our views on engine throttle control systems--or ETCS--and how
we are applying advanced technology to further address the issue of
unintended acceleration.
As Toyota's President Akio Toyoda testified to Congress last week,
Toyota's priority has traditionally been the following: First; Safety,
Second; Quality, Third; Volume. Our goal in developing safety-related
technology is not only to comply with regulations and standards, and to
strive for good safety ratings, but also to improve consumer safety in
the real world. While concerns have been raised about our electronic
throttle control system, this system--used by all major automakers--
actually represents a great safety advancement, enabling superior
traction control and electronic stability control, among other things.
Because the ETCS controls the engine throttle system, Toyota places
the greatest importance on ensuring that the reliability of this system
is absolute by undertaking rigorous design and testing processes. Three
things ensure this absolute reliability. The first is the fail-safe
mechanisms we build into the design. Second is its tolerance to extreme
environmental conditions. And third is its resistance to software
problems.
The fail-safe systems in Toyota's ETCS are robust. Our design
includes two separate central processors--a main central processing
unit, or ``CPU'', and a sub CPU. The two CPUs are both inside the
engine control module and they both get the same throttle-related
inputs in parallel from the engine sensor network.
The main, or ``control'' CPU calculates and executes the operating
commands for all engine systems. The sub CPU monitors throttle control
inputs, throttle control outputs, and main CPU processes. A ``watchdog
signal'' passes between the two CPUs many times per second to confirm
that the processors are working correctly. If the two CPUs are not in
agreement, or either the main or sub CPU does not receive the ``watch
dog signal'', the engine management system will alert the driver and go
into a fail-safe mode operation.
The ETCS is also designed and tested to make sure it withstands all
of the foreseeable environments in terms of temperature, moisture,
vibration, and electromagnetic interference (EMI). We have testing data
that confirms its reliability from all the markets in which we operate
worldwide. On EMI, there is no regulation in the U.S., but we test the
ETCS to withstand double the European regulation for EMI. In none of
these cases has the ETCS failed.
In addition, we test the software in this system extensively both
in the design phase and after it is developed to ensure that there is
no possibility of ``sudden unintended acceleration.''
I want to be absolutely clear: As a result of our extensive
testing, we do not believe sudden unintended acceleration because of a
defect in our ETCS has ever happened. However, will continue to search
for any event in which such a failure could occur.
In order to further validate the safety of our ETCS, we have asked
Exponent, a world-class engineering and scientific consulting firm, to
conduct its own independent, comprehensive evaluation.
We are also addressing the issue of unintended acceleration through
new technologies, including event data recorders and brake override
systems.
In conclusion, our Prius has changed the global auto industry with
its environmental performance. Now, we will strive to continue to be
the leader in the area of safety. I will help drive our team's efforts
to meet this challenge, ensure our drivers' safety and regain their
trust and confidence.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Uchiyamada.
And now I'd like to turn to Mr. Sasaki.
STATEMENT OF SHINICHI SASAKI, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, TOYOTA
MOTOR CORPORATION
Mr. Sasaki. Chairman Rockefeller and members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to address you today.
My name is Shinichi Sasaki, and I am an Executive Vice
President of Toyota Motor Corporation, where I am responsible
for quality assurance and customer service.
In my testimony, I will outline the significant ways in
which Toyota is changing its approach to customer safety in
light of the lessons we have learned from our recent recalls.
As we look to the future, we need to ensure that we listen more
closely to our customers' voices and address them more quickly
and aggressively. To accomplish this, we are fundamentally
overhauling Toyota's quality-assurance process, under the
personal direction of our President, Akio Toyoda. This overhaul
would cover the entire quality assurance process, from vehicle
planning and design to manufacturing, sales, and service.
In the design stage, we previously had been focused on
technical and regulatory considerations. However, we need do
more consider customer expectations and real-world usage of our
vehicles, even the regular use. We also will reduce the number
of things we ask our customers to do correctly. While quick and
accurate recall decisions are important, so, too, are the steps
we can take to prevent such events during our quality assurance
process. Therefore, we will intensify our focus on safety
design and the principle of preventing any harm during the full
vehicle life.
With regard to customer service, we will build a better
network to collect customer information in a more timely manner
at the site. In the tradition of Genchi Genbutsu, or ``go and
see,'' in the United States we will establish additional
technical branches in several cities. This will reinforce our
local customer service and allow us to deploy SWAT teams of
technicians to make onsite inspections of reported instance of
unintended acceleration as quickly as possible. To make this
activity more useful, we will not only use EDR data, but
improve our vehicle diagnostic tools.
With regard to recalls, in order to help us make timely and
appropriate decisions, we will share global field information
by allowing each regional staff to access to our quality
network globally.
For the future, our U.S. staff will have a clear
decisionmaking role. Ultimately, our goal is for the United
States to have an even greater voice in decisions on vehicles
and other safety and satisfaction issues.
The quality and safety of our vehicle are Toyota's
lifeline. I will do my utmost to make sure that our vehicles
remain among the safest and most reliable in the world, by
leading and training all Toyota quality and safety personnel in
United States and all other areas.
Chairman Rockefeller, members of the Committee, these
important actions reflect Toyota's unwavering commitment to
restoring the reputation for quality that our company has built
in the United States over more than half a century. We look
forward to working with NHTSA and with Congress to advance our
shared goal of improved road safety for the drivers and the
general public.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sasaki follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shinichi Sasaki, Executive Vice President,
Toyota Motor Corporation
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to address you today. My name is
Shinichi Sasaki and I am an Executive Vice President of Toyota Motor
Corporation, where I am responsible for quality assurance and customer
service.
In my testimony, I will outline the significant ways in which
Toyota is changing its approach to customer safety in light of the
lessons we have learned from our recent recalls.
We are redoubling our commitment to always put our customers--and
their safety--first. We are also giving our people in North America a
greater role in the quality assurance process, including recalls. And
we are communicating more openly and more transparently with U.S.
safety regulators and consumers.
Toyota has rigorously tested the solutions for our recent recalls
and we are confident that with the repairs our dealerships are making,
Toyota vehicles are among the safest on the road today. However, as we
look to the future, we need to ensure that we listen more closely to
our customers' voices, consider their concerns seriously and sincerely,
and address them more quickly and aggressively.
To accomplish this, we are fundamentally overhauling Toyota's
quality assurance process, under the personal direction of our
President, Akio Toyoda. This overhaul will cover the entire quality
assurance process--from vehicle planning and design to manufacturing,
sales and service.
In the design stage, we previously had been focused on technical
and regulatory considerations. However, we need to do more to consider
customer expectations and real world usage of our vehicles, even
irregular use. We need to focus even more on customer behavior, and
reduce the number of things we ask our customers to do correctly. While
quick and accurate recall decisions are important, so too are the steps
we can take to prevent such events during our quality assurance
process. Therefore, we will intensify our focus on ``safety design''
and the principle of ``preventing any harm during the full vehicle
life.''
With regard to customer service, we will build a better network to
collect consumer information in a more timely manner at the site, in
the tradition of Genchi Genbutsu--or ``go and see.'' In the United
States, we will establish additional technical branches in several
cities. This will reinforce our local customer service and allow us to
deploy ``SWAT teams'' of technicians to make on-site inspections of
reported incidents of unintended acceleration as quickly as possible.
To make this activity more useful, we will not only use EDR data but
improve our vehicle diagnostic tools. All of this will put us in a
better position to address quality issues more promptly and accurately.
With regard to recalls, in order to help us make timely and
appropriate decisions, we will share global field information by
allowing each regional staff to access to our quality network globally.
Although each country's staff was previously well involved in field
data collection and analysis, as well as the process for considering
possible action, their authority for decisionmaking was neither clear
nor formalized. For the future, our U.S. staff will have a clear
decision-making role. Ultimately, our goal is for the United States to
have an even greater voice in decisions on recalls and other safety and
satisfaction issues.
The quality and safety of our vehicles are Toyota's lifeline. I
will do my utmost to make sure that our vehicles remain among the
safest and most reliable in the world by leading and training all
Toyota quality and safety personnel in the United States and all other
areas.
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of the
Committee, these important actions reflect Toyota's unwavering
commitment to restoring the reputation for quality that our company has
built in the United States over more than half a century.
We look forward to working with NHTSA, and with Congress, to
advance our shared goal of improved road safety for drivers and the
general public.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Sasaki.
And now I'd like to call on Mr. Inaba, President and Chief
Executive Officer of Toyota Motor Company of North America.
Please.
STATEMENT OF YOSHIMI INABA, PRESIDENT AND COO,
TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA (TMA); AND CHAIRMAN/CEO, TOYOTA
MOTOR SALES
Mr. Inaba. Chairman Rockefeller, members of the Committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is Yoshimi
Inaba. I am the President of--and COO of Toyota Motor North
America.
In my testimony, I'll address the decisive steps Toyota is
taking to restore the trust of the tens of millions of American
who purchase and drive our vehicles.
For 50 years, Toyota has provided Americans with cars and
trucks that are safe and reliable. For the past 25 years, we
have built many of those vehicles here in the United States.
Our 200,000 Toyota team members at plants, dealerships, and
suppliers in this country are united in their determination to
provide even safer high-quality vehicles in the future.
I am honored to be joined here today by several members of
the Toyota family in the United States. Their dedication to our
values has helped establish Toyota's record for quality and
dependability.
In recent months, we have not lived up to the high standard
our customers and the public have come to expect from Toyota,
despite all of our good-faith efforts. As our president, Akio
Toyoda, told Members of Congress last week, we sincerely regret
our shortcomings have resulted in the issues associated with
our recent recalls.
I can assure you that we have learned from this experience.
Here are the actions that we are taking:
First, Toyota engineers have developed effective and
durable solutions for the vehicles we have recalled. Our U.S.
dealers have repaired more than 1 million vehicles to date and
continue to make extraordinary efforts to complete these
recalls quickly and conveniently. They are literally working
round the clock.
Second, we are making fundamental changes in the way our
company operates, in order to ensure that Toyota sets an even
higher standard for vehicle safety and reliability,
responsiveness to customers, and transparency with regulators.
At a global level, we have established a special committee for
global quality, led by Toyota's president, to thoroughly review
our operations.
In addition, we are assembling a blue-ribbon panel of
distinguished independent experts to confirm that the enhanced
quality controls we are putting into place conform to best
industry practice. I am pleased to say that former
Transportation Secretary Robert--Rodney Slater will help lead
this panel.
We are also putting a system in place to better share
important quality and safety information across our global
operations and to work more closely with the government
agencies, including NHTSA in the United States.
At the regional level, we will ensure that our customers'
voices will be heard and acted upon in a timely manner. In the
United States, we will deploy SWAT teams of technicians to make
onsite inspections of unintended acceleration reports as
quickly as possible. Our North American operations will have
more autonomy and decisionmaking power with regard to recall
and other safety issues.
In addition, we will establish a new automotive center for
quality excellence in the U.S., where a team of our top
engineers will focus on strengthening our quality control
throughout the region.
At the customer level, we are taking significant steps to
bolster confidence in the safety and reliability of our
vehicles. Toyota will be one of the first full-line automakers
to make brake override systems standard on all our new models
sold in North America, including hybrids, which have a system
that achieves a similar result. We also are installing brake
override on seven existing models.
In addition, we have commissioned a comprehensive,
independent evaluation of our electric throttle control system
by a world-class engineering and scientific consulting firm. We
are confident that the system is safe, but we recognize that
the public seeks additional reassurance, and we will make the
findings of this independent analysis public.
Chairman Rockefeller and members of the Committee, Toyota
continues to produce many of the best vehicles in the world. We
are proud of our heritage, and deeply appreciate the loyalty of
Toyota drivers, so many of whom continue to tell us how much
they love our cars.
For the future, we will revitalize the simple principle
that has guided Toyota since 1937: to build the highest
quality, safest, and most reliable automobiles in the world.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inaba follows:]
Prepared Statement of Yoshimi Inaba, President and COO, Toyota Motor
North America (TMA); and Chairman/CEO, Toyota Motor Sales
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is
Yoshimi Inaba, and I am the President and COO of Toyota Motor North
America and Chairman and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
In my testimony, I will address the decisive steps Toyota is
taking--now and for the future--to restore the trust of the tens of
millions of Americans who purchase and drive our vehicles. For 50
years, Toyota has provided Americans with cars and trucks that are safe
and reliable. For the past 25 years, we have built many of those
vehicles here in the United States. Our 200,000 Toyota team members at
plants, dealerships and suppliers in this country are united in their
determination to provide even safer, high quality vehicles in the
future. I am honored to be joined here today by several members of the
Toyota family in the United States. Their dedication to our values has
helped establish Toyota's record for quality and dependability. And, we
are redoubling our commitment to always put our customers--and their
safety--first.
In recent months, we have not lived up to the high standards our
customers and the public have come to expect from Toyota, despite all
of our good faith efforts. It is clear to us that we did not listen as
carefully as we should--or respond as quickly as we must--to our
customers' concerns. As our President Akio Toyoda told members of
Congress last week, we sincerely regret that our shortcomings have
resulted in the issues associated with our recent recalls.
I can assure you that we have learned from this experience. Here
are the actions that we are taking:
First, Toyota engineers have developed effective and durable
solutions for the vehicles we have recalled. Our U.S. dealers have
repaired more than one million vehicles to date and continue to make
extraordinary efforts to complete these recalls quickly and
conveniently. They are literally working around the clock. To make the
process as trouble-free as possible for customers, Toyota last week
extended additional, complimentary services to owners concerned about
driving their vehicle before the repair is completed.
Second, we are making fundamental changes in the way our company
operates in order to ensure that Toyota sets an even higher standard
for vehicle safety and reliability, responsiveness to customers and
transparency with regulators.
At a global level, we have established a Special Committee for
Global Quality, led by Toyota's President. It will thoroughly review
our operations and make changes to ensure problems of this magnitude do
not happen again. In the interest of openness, we are assembling a blue
ribbon panel of distinguished, independent experts to confirm that the
enhanced quality controls we are putting into place conform to best
industry practices. I am pleased to say that former Transportation
Secretary Rodney Slater will help lead this panel . We are also putting
a system in place to better share important quality and safety
information across our global operations and to work more closely and
transparently with government agencies, including NHTSA in the United
States.
At a regional level, we will ensure that our customers' voices will
be heard and acted upon in a timely manner. In the United States, we
will investigate consumer complaints more aggressively by deploying
``SWAT teams'' of technicians to make on-site inspections of unintended
acceleration reports as quickly as possible. We are establishing the
new position of Regional Product Safety Executive, and our North
American operations will have more autonomy and decision-making power
with regard to recall and other safety issues. In addition, we will
establish a new Automotive Center of Quality Excellence in the U.S.,
where a team of our top engineers will focus on strengthening our
quality control throughout the region.
At the customer level, we are taking significant steps to bolster
confidence in the safety and reliability of our vehicles. Toyota will
be one of the first full-line automakers to make brake-override systems
standard on all our new models sold in North America, including hybrids
which have a system that achieves a similar result. We also are
installing brake override on seven existing models. This advanced
system automatically cuts engine power when the accelerator and brake
pedals are both depressed. In addition, we have commissioned a
comprehensive, independent evaluation of our electronic throttle
control system by a world-class engineering and scientific consulting
firm. In our own extensive testing, we have never found a defect that
has caused unintended acceleration. We are confident in the system but
we recognize that the public seeks additional reassurance and we will
make the findings of this independent analysis public.
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of the
Committee, Toyota continues to produce many of the best vehicles in the
world. We are proud of our heritage and deeply appreciate the loyalty
of Toyota drivers, so many of whom continue to tell us how much they
love our cars.
In renewing our commitment to customer safety as our top priority,
we will revitalize the simple principle that has guided Toyota since
1937--to build the highest quality, safest and most reliable
automobiles in the world.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Inaba.
And now, Mr. Ditlow.
STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. DITLOW,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY
Mr. Ditlow. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller, members of the
Committee.
I won't go over my earlier points from this morning----
The Chairman. Can't hear you very well.
Mr. Ditlow. Sorry.
Thank you, Senator Rockefeller and members of the
Committee.
I won't go over my earlier points from this morning. I'll
focus--I want to go to some policy issues.
First of all, strong regulations and effective enforcement
protect not only the consumer from death and injuries in
crashes, but they also protect the manufacturer's reputation by
ensuring the safety and reliability of the vehicles that they
sell. No one wins by cutting corners on safety, whether it's
the consumer, the manufacturer, or the Department of
Transportation.
Unfortunately, the Department of Transportation has not
kept up with modern automobiles. The standard should lead
technology, not lag behind technology. Toyota itself, during
the last 10 years, has lost sight of where it was. In the
1980s, when the Camry was first introduced as one of the best
vehicles in America, it had problems, but Toyota stepped up
within a year, found the problems, fixed the problems, notified
the consumer, and took care of the consumer. Toyota needs to go
back to what it does best, which is building safe, reliable
vehicles, and responding to the consumer.
But, out of all of this, Toyota and NHTSA need to move
forward. First and foremost for Toyota, it needs to install the
brake override on all vehicles with the electronic throttle
control. To restore consumer faith in the openness of Toyota,
it needs to release all the information that it submits to the
government in the acceleration investigations. It needs to
conduct a public engineering study into electronic controls
that has experts with no ties to the automobile industry.
NHTSA itself needs to immediately set a standard for
accelerators, and not the old mechanical standard that dates
from 1973. It needs the brake--it needs to set a standard for
electronic brake overrides for all manufacturers. It needs to
upgrade the event data recorder rule. We have to have event
data recorders on all vehicles. They need to be standardized,
and there need to be readouts.
Finally, one of the things to come out of this is, we don't
do adequate crash investigations in this country to protect--to
find out what the problem is, to predict defects, to catch them
before they become major crises like Toyota acceleration and
Ford Explorer.
If we had a national accident sampling system at the full
original design level of 19,000 crash investigations per year,
we could have predicted defects like this. We would have found
them earlier. We wouldn't have them buildup over 10 years
before we get a recall and before manufacturers like Toyota
suffer in their reputation.
Let's build a system that works, as we move forward,
because it gets back to that final thing: cutting corners on
safety is no bargain for anyone--the consumer, the
manufacturer, or the government.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ditlow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive Director,
Center for Auto Safety
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee thank you for the
opportunity to testify on sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota
vehicles and the regulatory response of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) is a
consumer group founded by Consumers Union and Ralph Nader in 1970 to be
a voice for consumers on auto safety.
The Toyota Unintended acceleration crisis which has claimed at
least 56 lives was a long time building. Draconian cuts in NHTSA's
enforcement budget and staffing, failure to follow up on early research
into electronic controls and adopting safety standards based on the
research, lax enforcement, flawed research on electronic controls,
manufacturers exploiting weaknesses in NHTSA's regulatory programs,
inadequate crash data collection programs and failures to implement the
Early Warning Reporting System mandated in the TREAD Act all played
significant roles. Even worse for consumers is that more Toyota's
remain to be recalled.
Unrecalled Camrys Lead Deaths: The only Toyota Camrys being
recalled are the 2007-10 model years. The Toyota that leads the known
death list in unintended acceleration is the 2005 Camry--there are 5
known crashes with 7 deaths. There are 7 other crashes with 8 deaths in
2002-04 and 06 Camrys not subject to the recall according to public
records obtained by the Los Angeles Times. Unrecalled 2002-06 Camrys
with electronic throttle control total 12 crashes with 15 deaths
compared to 6 crashes with 7 deaths for 2007-10 Camrys. The unrecalled
2002-06 Camrys have twice as many fatal crashes and deaths as the
recalled 2007-10 Camrys based on public records of know 2002-10 Camrys
linked to unintended acceleration.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model
Name Date State Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barbara Schwarz September 20, 2007 Yukon OK 2005
Anne Ezal February 25, 2007 Pismo Beach CA 2005
Guadalupe Alberto April 19, 2008 Flint MI 2005
Ella Mae & Lon Braswell June 5, 2005 Athens GA 2005
Adegoke & Adeolu March 1, 2009 Marietta GA 2005
Aladegbemi
Noriko Uno August 28, 2009 Upland CA 2006
NHTSA Withheld Name March 14, 2004 HI 2002
Juanita Grossman March 16, 2004 Evansville IN 2003
Blossom Malick March 15, 2004 Delray Beach FL 2003
Ethyl Marlene Foster March 14, 2004 Phoenix OR 2004
George & Maureen Yago January 22, 2004 Las Vegas NV 2002
Maria Cafua September 4, 2003 Wilmington MA 2002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA Investigations: Beginning in 2001 with the introduction of
electronic throttle control (ETC) in 2002 Camry and Lexus ES300,
consumer complaints increased by 4-fold in Toyota and Lexus models. In
response NHTSA received five defect petitions of which it denied four
and granted one. It opened three Preliminary Evaluation (PE)
investigations, two of which became Engineering Evaluations. None of
these investigations was concluded with a vehicle safety recall. The
investigations as a whole show significant weakness in the NHTSA
enforcement program which:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investigation Year/Make/Model Outcome
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DP04-003 2002-03 Camry, Camry Solara, PE04-021
Lexus ES300
DP05-002 2002-05 Camry, Solara, Lexus Denied
ES
DP06-003 2002-06 Camry, Solara Denied
DP08-001 2004-08 Tacoma Denied
DP09-001 2007 Lexus ES350, 2002-03 Denied
Lexus ES300
PE07-016/EA07-010 2007-08 Camry, Lexus ES350 07E-082
PE08-025/EA08-014 2004 Sienna Safety Improvement
Campaign
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toyota exploited to avoid recalls until the tragic crash in San
Diego in August 2009 that resulted in 4 deaths in a Lexus driven by an
experienced highway patrol officer who was unable to bring the vehicle
to a stop. But for the crash being caught on a 911 tape, the recent
recalls would not have occurred because the crash would have gone
unnoticed like so many before it.
Early Warning Reporting System Failure: When the TREAD Act was
passed in 2000, Congress required NHTSA to set up an Early Warning
Reporting System (EWR, named ARTREMIS by NHTSA) to prevent another
Ford-Firestone crisis that led to TREAD. Obviously, it didn't work
because we now have a Toyota unintended acceleration crisis. The DOT
Inspector General has twice criticized EWR which costs $9.4 million to
set up through 2004 and an estimated $11.5 million in operating and
maintenance costs from 2005 through 2009. According to the IG:
Although ARTEMIS became fully operational in July 2004, it does
not have the advanced analytical capabilities originally
envisioned to help point analysts to potential safety defects.
For example, the system cannot automatically notify analysts if
consumer-reported complaints and manufacturer-reported warranty
claims are both increasing due to vehicle steering problems.
According to NHTSA officials, delays in acquiring these
capabilities will prevent NHTSA from obtaining full value from
the EWR information manufacturers report. While ARTEMIS will
automatically point analysts to deaths that manufacturers
report so that trends in small numbers of fatalities can be
detected, ARTEMIS will not, as currently developed, link deaths
to an alleged defect or identify relationships between the
categories of EWR information. In short, ARTEMIS cannot perform
more advanced trend and predictive analyses that were
originally envisioned as being needed to identify defects
warranting investigation. . . .
[T]he public will have access to only a portion of the EWR
information being reported by manufacturers prior to NHTSA
formally opening a defect investigation. Since only NHTSA will
have access to the majority of the EWR information, it is
critical that it establish procedures to ensure Congressional
concerns expressed in September 2000 about NHTSA's ability to
use the data it possessed to spot trends related to failures in
Firestone tires have been addressed. Consequently, much will be
riding on the ability of NHTSA's eight analysts, who are
responsible for reviewing the large volume of EWR information
and drawing conclusions about potential safety defects. This
will be especially true until such time as more advanced
analytical capabilities are acquired to complement ARTEMIS.
We don't know whether there are data in EWR on Toyota unintended
acceleration and what use NHTSA made of it. Unless a defect
investigation in the form of a PE or an EA is opened, the public does
not have access to NHTSA's analysis of EWR data. One thing is clear--
NHTSA has opened hundreds of investigations under EWR which are not
made public like other defect investigations. We have gotten access to
only one EWR investigation so far--Ford Explorer deaths labeled as
DI06-Explorer. While NHTSA may refer to these as inquiries, CAS applies
the duck test--if they look like a duck, waddle like a duck and quack
like a duck, they are a duck. NHTSA's secretiveness in concealing EWR
investigations is unreal but for the fact it used to conceal PE
investigations. The agency just doesn't like the public to see what
it's doing behind closed doors.
The Center filed a FOIA for all EWR investigatory files and lists
of EWR investigations but NHTSA responded by asking us to pay $55,000
in advance. We limited our requests to just lists of EWR investigations
to see if any inquiries were made to Toyota that would have given an
early inquiry into Toyota acceleration but no response yet. There are
only two answers to the EWR Toyota unintended acceleration defect--
either (1) EWR worked and gave NHTSA a heads up which NHTSA failed to
act on or (2) EWR is a $20 million flop in failing to detect the
biggest defect that came down the pike since Firestone tires on Ford
Explorers. In order to assess NHTSA performance, EWR investigations
must be made public.
NHTSA Electronics Capability: Sudden unintended acceleration has
always been recognized as a serious safety hazard. Early unintended
acceleration recalls involved mechanical failures that were easy to
detect and remedy. With the advent of electronic ignition systems and
cruise control systems in the late 1970s and early 1980s unintended
acceleration complaints without clear mechanical failures began to
appear. NHTSA opened more and more unintended acceleration
investigation. Some resulted in recalls for electronic control
failures. The first two Toyota unintended acceleration recalls were for
replacement of the cruise control computer which could cause unintended
acceleration on startup.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (86V-132, 90V-040). CAS filed a defect petition (DP86-08) on
vehicles recalled in 1990 which was denied as there wasn't a
``reasonable possibility'' of a recall. More complaints led to PE90-021
and a recall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 1989 Sudden Acceleration Study Led to Invalid Rejection of
Toyota Complaints: As investigations mounted into unintended
acceleration in a wide range of vehicles, in January 1989 DOT's
Transportation System Center (TSC) conducted a review of unintended
acceleration in which it concluded that absent evidence of throttle
sticking or cruise control malfunction, driver error must have caused
the unintended acceleration.\2\ The studies by the Institute for
Telecommunications Sciences in 1975 and 1976 and their detailed
analytical methods were neither cited nor used. TSC also did not look
at electronic throttle control or computer software malfunctions. The
vehicles examined in the study were 1983-86 models, none of which had
electronic throttle controls or advanced microprocessors systems found
in 2002-10 Toyota vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``An Examination of Unintended acceleration,'' HS-807-367, Jan.
1989--Main Report, App. A-D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on TSC's finding that brakes could stop a vehicle suddenly
accelerating from startup, NHTSA ruled out complaints that the brakes
failed or could not stop a unintended acceleration from startup as
driver error. A classic example of NHTSA's use of the TSC study is its
denial of a defect petition (DP03-003) into unintended acceleration in
1997-00 Lexus LS and GS model which had mechanical accelerator cables:
\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Defect Petition DP03-003 Denial.
``At the conclusion of TSC's effort, comprising thousands of
person-hours gathering data, comprehensively testing vehicles
including their systems and equipment, interviewing owners and
drivers, and inspecting crash scenes and the vehicles involved,
a report was released with the following conclusion: ``For a
unintended acceleration incident in which there is no evidence
of throttle sticking or cruise control malfunction, the
inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the
driver inadvertently pressing the accelerator instead of, or in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
addition to, the brake pedal.''
In the defect petitions, most consumer complaints were excluded
because they were long duration events or where the driver said the
brakes could not bring the vehicle to a stop. Not a single defect
petition resulted in a recall. The one that was granted (DP04-003) and
became an investigation (PE04-021) was closed without a recall after
NHTSA excluded most complaints.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ NHTSA Memo to File by S Yon Restricting Scope of PE04-021
Investigation, March 23, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Phantom VRTC EMI Interference Test on 2007 Lexus ES350: In the
most crucial investigation, PE07-016/EA07-010, the agency conducted a
test of a 2007 Lexus ES350 to: ``Determine whether reported incidents
of unintended acceleration were caused by a vehicle system malfunction
[electronic controls] or mechanical interference [floor mats].'' Later
during DP09-001 which the petitioner asked the agency to look at causes
of unintended acceleration other than mechanical interference such as
electronic controls, the agency used the test report from EA07-010 to
deny the petition without even sending a single information request to
Toyota.
This should have been the definitive test of whether it's floor
mats or electronic controls. In DP09-001, NHTSA said: ``ODI and VRTC
also conducted design reviews and testing to evaluate the possibility
of other potential causes of unintended acceleration in the subject
vehicles.'' Some of this work is summarized in the following excerpt
from the VRTC test report:
The Vehicle Research and Test Center obtained a Lexus ES350 for
testing. The vehicle was fully instrumented to monitor and
acquire data relating to yaw rate, speed, acceleration,
deceleration, brake pedal effort, brake line hydraulic
pressure, brake pad temperature, engine vacuum, brake booster
vacuum, throttle plate position, and accelerator pedal
position. Multiple electrical signals were introduced into the
electrical system to test the robustness of the electronics
against single point failures due to electrical interference.
The system proved to have multiple redundancies and showed no
vulnerabilities to electrical signal activities. Magnetic
fields were introduced in proximity to the throttle body and
accelerator pedal potentiometers and did result in an increase
in engine revolutions per minute (RPM) of up to approximately
1,000 RPM, similar to a cold-idle engine RPM level. Mechanical
interferences at the throttle body caused the engine to shut
down.
Yet when CAS filed a FOIA for the test results and test procedure,
NHTSA said it had no test data or any records of test procedure. NHTSA
couldn't say what it did, how it did it or what the results were.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ CAS Letter to NHTSA Administrator David Strickland--2/2/10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Improvement Campaigns & Equipment Recalls: To make matters
worse, in EA07-010, Toyota agreed to only do an equipment recall of
55,000 all weather floor mats, 07E-082. That was a recall destined to
fail. The notification letters to owners did not even require the
vehicles be brought in for inspection to see what mats were in the
vehicles or how they were secured. The equipment recall saved Toyota
$100 million in recall costs according to Toyota's own estimate.
The only other investigation that resulted in an action was PE08-
025/EA08-014 which resulted in a Safety Improvement Campaign which is
not even recognized under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. After a private
meeting between NHTSA and Toyota including three former NHTSA employees
representing Toyota (Erica Jones, Chris Tinto and Chris Santucci),\6\
Toyota Vice President Chris Tinto agreed to only a Safety Improvement
Campaign as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ S. McHenry Memo to EA08-014 File, October 15, 2008.
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me and my staff on
October 14. Toyota has taken your message seriously and is
extending this offer to conduct a field action in order to
address the concern raised in EA08-014, an investigation into
the Toyota Sienna. . . . Toyota has not determined that the
condition at issue in EA08-014 is a ``safety-related defect''
within the meaning of the Federal vehicle safety laws, and--a
summarized below--it continues to believe that no such defect
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
exists.
How anyone can say unintended acceleration is not a safety defect.
The first Safety Improvement Campaign came in 1995 when Chrysler
balked at recalling minivans for tailgates that spring open in low
impact crashes and killed over 40 people. They are not subject to any
sanctions under the Safety Act if they are not carried out. They are
not safety recalls and they are not as effective as safety recalls in
getting defects remedied. NHTSA defends Safety Improvement Campaigns as
the only thing they can get the manufacturer to do because the
manufacturers otherwise just say no. This is a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
The latest manufacturer to join the ``just say no'' group is Honda
on February 26 which refused to do a safety recall on 2005 Honda
Odyssey minvans for tailgate lift struts that fail because NHTSA had
let Toyota get away with Safety Improvement Campaign on its minivan.
The Honda refusal is all the more troubling because NHTSA had conveyed
a rare Safety Panel that approved sending a letter to Honda requesting
the company to do a voluntary recall. When Honda just said no, the
agency blinked and agreed to the non-statutory recall.
Toyota Knew and Exploited NHTSA's Regulatory Weaknesses: From 2001
to the October 2009 floor mat recall (09V-388) generated by the August
2009 San Diego crash, all NHTSA's enforcement effort got was an
ineffective equipment recall that saved Toyota $100 million and a
Safety Campaign that's not enforceable under the law. Why? First,
Toyota knew the investigatory system and exploited it. Only some
acceleration complaints were submitted. It knew the agency had limited
resources and would agreed to do remedies less than a full vehicle
recall because the agency needed to move on to other investigations.
Toyota didn't tell the agency about foreign recalls for floor mat
interference with the gas pedal that would have caused more emphasis on
an earlier vehicle floor mat recall. Toyota requested confidentiality
for a wide range of materials that prevented full public scrutiny of
the record.
1. Lax Enforcement Program: Toyota was well aware of the fact that
from 2004 to 2008, the agency stopped imposing civil penalties for
failing to do timely recalls and only imposed $150,000 in penalties
since then even though Congress increased the maximum penalty from
$800,000 to $15 million inflation adjusted to $16.4 million in the 2000
TREAD Act. In August 2004, NHTSA imposed a $1 million fine, about 7
percent of the maximum against GM in a W/S wiper recall. In the 1970s
NHTSA used to routinely obtain fines from $100,000 to $400,000 which
represented up to 50 percent of the maximum fine instead of 7 percent.
2. Inflated Influenced Recall Statistics: NHTSA tries to make its
recall record look good by referring to 524 recalls involving 23.5
million vehicles obtained as a result of its investigations. These
numbers are not what they seem to be. First, 9.3 million came from Ford
Cruise Control Deactivation Switch Fire recalls where the agency first
launched an investigation in 1998 and got a small recall in 1999. After
parked Fords starting catching on fire in garages and burning houses
down, NHTSA belatedly opened more investigation and obtained more
recalls. But not until October 2009 did NHTSA obtain the last of the
Ford Cruise Control Deactivation Switch Fire recalls, some 11 years
after its first investigation. Rather than being a regulatory success,
this is a regulatory failure.
The number of recalls is unduly inflated by very small vehicle
recalls influenced by a single equipment recall. For example, Dometic
made defective refrigerators for recreational vehicles and trailers
which resulted in a single equipment recall but 77 vehicle recalls in
2008. Similarly, Ricon made defective wheelchair lifts that resulted in
two equipment recalls but nearly 100 vehicle recalls of just a few
vehicles each. In each case, the real influenced recall was the
equipment recall and the vehicle recall inflated the numbers cited by
NHTSA. The 524 recalls should be more less than 300 recalls when the
incidental small vehicle recalls are excluded..
3. Reduced Budget and Programs: In 1980, there were 146 million
vehicles on the road. Today there are 256 million. In 1980, there 119
people in enforcement, today there are only 57. In 1980, NHTSA had 2
cents per vehicle for enforcement, today it has less than a penny. The
agency doesn't have its own test facility and must rent space from
Honda in East Liberty OH. Any way one looks at it, the agency is
underfunded. In terms of safety, the best way to look at it is motor
vehicles are responsible for 95 percent of the Nation's transportation
deaths but only 1 percent of the Transportation budget.
4. Crash Investigations: The National Accident Sampling System
(NASS) is another system that could have helped detect Toyota
unintended acceleration earlier. The current budget is just over $12
million and investigates only 4,000 crashes per year. This compares
with a budget of around $10 million per year in the early 1980s
providing about 10,000 cases. The original design would have produced
nearly 19,000 cases per year which, at current costs, would require a
budget of around $60 million.
Had NASS been operating at its original design size, the agency
could have spotted the problem with Firestone tires on Ford Explorers
much earlier. The savings in life and limb from that discovery, even a
few months earlier, alone would have been sufficient to cover the extra
cost of NASS at its full design size. Explorers were introduced in 1990
and the defective Firestone tires were on some of the earliest models.
If the excessive Explorer rollovers resulting from failures of
Firestone tires could have been spotted by the mid-1990s, it could have
saved hundreds of lives and at least one billion dollars for Ford &
Firestone.
Conclusion: Toyota and NHTSA need to move forward. First and
foremost, Toyota needs to install electronic brake override systems in
all vehicles with electronic throttle control. Toyota must also agree
to releasing all information submitted to NHTSA during the
investigations and agreed to conduct a fully public engineering
investigation of its electronic controls with independent scientists
and engineers with no ties to the auto industry.
NHTSA needs to issue safety standards that:
A new accelerator standard requiring fail-safe protection
that updates the existing 1973 standard, which was written
before the advent of electronically controlled accelerators.
A standard requiring electronic brake override in all
automobiles.
A standard providing electronic magnetic interference
protection.
A standard mandating installation of Event Data Recorders,
standard read outs for them and the collection of more
information including on rollover crashes.
NHTSA needs to make public all its EWR investigations. Full minutes
of all meetings with auto industry officials must be made public to
prevent secret deals in all types of investigations. All submissions by
manufacturers in investigations must be sworn under penalty of perjury.
Elimination of non-statutory recalls such as Safety Improvement
Campaigns and regional recalls where only some vehicles in some states
get recalled. The whole enforcement program needs to be reinvigorated
beginning with assessment of penalties at the top of the scale rather
than the bottom. When people are killed by vehicle defects, fines
should not be measured in a few dollars, if not a few cents per
vehicle.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ditlow.
I will ask the first question. And then Senator Wicker,
from Mississippi, who said he'll back in time, is acting today
as the Ranking Member, and he will ask the second question. We
will go on from there.
Mr. Sasaki, last week, Mr. Lentz, the President of Toyota
Motor Sales USA, testified that he had no authority to recall
Toyota vehicles sold in the United States when those vehicles
have safety problems. Now I believe either Mr. Inaba or Mr.
Uchiyamada indicated that that's going to change, but I want to
probe that. Is that an accurate statement, as of now?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Let me answer. It is true that
North American member was not officially included in our recall
decisionmaking process. And we believe that we were taken into
consideration the opinions of those members in North America
sufficiently. However, we realize that, as you pointed out, our
old system may have caused some concern or suspicion on the
part of the United States or North American marketplace.
Therefore, in order to improve this, we have decided to include
someone who is very well familiar with the North American
market situation to become a panel member, a very important
panel member that would be involved in the recall
decisionmaking process. And this inclusion is an official one.
The Chairman. And will--when will that system start?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Our North American entity has
already selected candidates for this particular position. So,
although I hope that we wouldn't have to come to that in near
future, however, should we have to come to this, then this new
system will be deployed immediately.
The Chairman. Let me ask--we have two members--Mr. Sasaki,
you and Mr. Uchiyamada, who are full board members--and
actually, special board members of the Toyota Motor
Corporation. So, I just--I can't help but wonder when this
shift began to take place. It came as a surprise to me, but it
evidently has taken place for some time now, enough to affect
quality, and your president has so indicated. Was that a board
decision? Was that just something that evolved? How did that
come to pass, that there was the--a little bit less adherence
to quality and safety, which is what I always associate Toyota
with, and the desire to become the largest company in the
country? That's a--that is a shift that was caused by
something, some decision to take place, and I'm curious.
Mr. Inaba. May I step in?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Allow me to answer. As our
President indicated in the House hearing last week, we really
did not keep pace with our business expansion, our
reinforcement of the human resources of the quality assurance.
How this issue came about is because there were many
vehicle--excuse me--many voices were sent to us from the
customers, but we really did not listen to every one of them
very carefully, one by one. We should have really listened to
them carefully and rendered some technical analysis so that it
would be connected to our following product improvement.
However, the quality of this work or the efficiency of our work
or speed with which we worked had become sluggish, or sort
failed gradually, and this has come to a much larger issue. And
we have taken this very seriously and reflected upon it very
seriously. And then, as we said earlier, we have changed our
system, and we are to improve our system very drastically and
very greatly, and we are working on it very hard right now.
The Chairman. Mr. Uchiyamada, we have a rule here that each
questioner can only ask 5 minutes of questions, and my time has
run out. I will come back.
Mr. Wicker--Senator Wicker is not here now, so I'll call on
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I'll direct my questions to Mr. Inaba, but if
someone else knows the answer, that's great, as well.
But, Mr. Inaba, under what circumstances does Toyota make
available the contents of its electronic data recorder?
Mr. Inaba. I'll be glad to answer it, but Mr. Uchiyamada is
a specialist or----
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. At this time, all the Toyota
vehicles have the electronic data recorder, or it is set in
such a way that the event electronic data will remain. And it
is not the case whether this is disclosed or not disclosed;
however, because there is a special interface that we use, it
is--it just turns out in such a way that only Toyota read it
out.
Senator Cantwell. I----
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. May I continue?
Senator Cantwell. Yes, go ahead.
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. We believe that such data
should become more public, and therefore, we are trying to make
this data available to other entities than ourselves. And
indeed, we are trying to provide 100 such data recorders by
early April, and 150 units of such recorders by the end of
April in North America.
Senator Cantwell. Can I----
Mr. Uchiyamada. Ah, sorry.
Senator Cantwell. If I could, because we only have 5
minutes. So----
I'm asking this because one of my constituents' son died in
a single-vehicle crash, driving one of the recalled 2007 Toyota
Tundras. His parents have the truck's EDR, and have requested
the company to give them access to the software to read its
contents. Toyota has turned them down. In my State, there is a
law pending, in the Washington legislature, as a result of
Toyota's refusal.
So, I want to know, is it possible that you will provide--
can you provide that information to Mr. Eves' family, so that
they can have this data and information?
Mr. Inaba. We'll be glad to do so. And this is our also
desire to find out what has happened. I'm very, very sorry
about what has happened to that family, but we will be--as Mr.
Uchiyamada said, that, you know, 100 units are going to be made
available by 1st of January, or beginning of January.
And also, just for your information, that we are delivering
first three units to NHTSA tomorrow. And also, at the same
time, we are dispatching our engineers to train how to use it.
So, we are doing this just tomorrow.
Senator Cantwell. Does Toyota collect and store all the
information?
I should say thank you for that. We will look forward to
getting that information as soon as possible.
Does Toyota collect and store all the information from EDRs
it decodes? And what does the company do with the information?
Translator for Mr. Inaba. I am not 100 percent sure.
However, so far in the United States, when the data or
information was requested by entities such as NHTSA, police, or
courts, we would submit that data to them. And I would assume
that they are the one who is keeping them.
Senator Cantwell. But, isn't all this valuable information
in preventing accidents in the future and collecting it and
seeing trends and seeing information?
Translator for Mr. Inaba. I think you're completely right.
I think we should utilize those data more actively to elucidate
the cause of accidents in other matters.
Senator Cantwell. And is there some reason that it is not
standardized, as it is among U.S. manufacturers, why that data
device isn't an open interface that is readable by other
individuals? Is there some reason why U.S. manufacturers do
that, and Toyota doesn't?
Translator for Mr. Inaba. I understand that, at this time,
some makers make it open and there are others who don't make
them open, so it is not really a uniform state.
Senator Cantwell. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman,
but I think this is an issue for us to continue on and look at
and investigate.
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell, I have decided that,
because of translation, each member will have 7 minutes, rather
than 5.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
The Chairman. So, you have another 2.
Senator Cantwell. OK. OK.
Well, if I could, then, along that line of questioning.
Obviously, this is a big contention among the victims of people
of these accidents, that they can't get access to this
information. There's only one electronic data recorder. And so,
I know you think maybe making a move to 100 is a big step, but
when other manufacturers have this as information--and then I
would assume that that data and information, analyzed by lots
of different people, could yield important information. So,
besides the 100 devices, when will you try to make it an open
interface?
Mr. Inaba. Let me address that. I think, by middle of 2011,
we're working with vendors, and therefore, it is going to be
commercially available ahead of regulation--ahead of time of
regulation.
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. As Mr. Inaba mentioned, we
would like to make this interface open, or public, so that it
can contribute to the--finding out the cause of the accidents.
And not just waiting for that to happen; as I said, we would
like to bring more data readers to the United States so that
this will also help to make this information available.
Senator Cantwell. And NHTSA has--would also have this
information, and make it available, if necessary? And NHTSA
would have this information and could make it available, if
necessary?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. That is correct. We will be
handing over our recorders--readers, rather, to NHTSA.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
And let me say--I was out of the room when this hearing
began, this afternoon--it's just--it's wonderful to see Senator
Lautenberg back and looking so good. He's had his first
treatment, and he tells us that it's good for weight loss. But,
Frank, you're looking----
Senator Lautenberg. You should try it.
Senator Wicker. I don't want to try it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. But, it's--well, I think I speak for
everyone, it's wonderful to see you back and looking so great.
Let me ask my question about three analyses of the
electronics. You have the December 2009--and I'll ask this of
Mr. Ditlow and whichever representative from Toyota would like
to volunteer to answer this question--you've got the one in
2009, commissioned by Toyota to an outside firm, Exponent. And
it's my understanding that there has been an interim report
confirming Toyota's contention that the unintended acceleration
events could not be caused by the ETC system because the fail-
safes are successful in preventing it.
Now, you have another study called the Gilbert study. This
is a study paid for by, basically, plaintiffs' lawyers and
people interested in bringing a lawsuit against Toyota, which
they have a perfect right to do. Professor Gilbert is a
professor at Southern Illinois University, and he did a study
that determined that the system did not properly detect
electronic malfunctions. And, of course, we understand that
Toyota disputes these results, saying that Professor Gilbert's
tests required a manipulation of the system that cannot
actually happen on the road during driving conditions.
And then, let me ask about the 2007 study, done by NHTSA on
the Lexus, where, basically, they concluded that there was no
defect in the electronics system. And I understand, Mr. Ditlow,
that you have been critical of that 2007 study. I'll let you
speak for yourself.
But, I'd like to ask Toyota and Mr. Ditlow about those
three analyses, and ask, When this sort of thing is done, are
they peer-reviewed? Who takes an outside, objective look at it?
The people who have a claim against Toyota have a perfect right
to hire an attorney and hire someone to make an assessment.
Toyota has a perfect right to pay Exponent to do an assessment.
And the NHTSA assessment, I guess that was done internally,
perhaps. They contracted that out.
But, is there an accepted peer-review process to look at
the methodology and tell us whether it was skewed one way or
the other, whether the table was tilted in one direction or
another, or whether it was absolutely called by the numbers?
So, I'll let Mr. Ditlow go first, and then Toyota----
Mr. Ditlow. Senator----
Senator Wicker.--can volunteer.
Mr. Ditlow.--there certainly is a known peer-review process
to review any scientific test and study. None of the three
studies that you cite have yet been peer-reviewed. And our--
taking the early----
Senator Wicker. Even the 2007----
Mr. Ditlow. No. As a----
Senator Wicker.--study?
Mr. Ditlow.--matter of fact, there's nothing to peer-
review, because the government has no data from that test on
the electronics. It has no test procedure that it did. So, if
you called in a panel of scientists to look at the information
on the testing, there is no information to look at.
I know that this is difficult to fathom, but I called up
the--we filed a Freedom of Information Act request, didn't get
any data, didn't get any procedure. I called up the government,
and I said, ``Are you sure? You know, speaking as an engineer,
you have to have data, you have to have a procedure.'' And they
said, ``No, we have nothing other than the conclusions. It is
what it is.'' So, you can't peer-review something that you
don't have.
But, certainly, as to the Southern Illinois University
study, certainly as to whatever Exponent is going to do, it
could and should be peer-reviewed.
Senator Wicker. I see. OK. And who will speak for Toyota?
Mr. Inaba. Let me start first, and then my colleague will
supplement that.
Senator Wicker. That will be fine.
Mr. Inaba. First of all, to that question that--I have said
in my testimony that we have asked The Honorable Rodney Slater,
who is the ex-Secretary of Transportation, as our outside
adviser, who set up a panel. And we will also ask him,
specifically, that he can set up a different--from Exponent--
laboratory or whatever he chooses appropriate, so that they can
test again our ETS system. Of course, as far as Exponent is
concerned, it is also very well reputated, you know, consulting
firm, and when the final report is available, we will certainly
make it public.
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. I would like to talk about
the Exponent case, and also Dr. Gilbert's report.
We have asked Exponent to conduct this investigation and
evaluate this. We have really asked them to do it completely
independently; we have not interfered with them at all with
regards to the method they might apply.
So--I'm sorry--so, I think we can call it a pure third-
party evaluation.
With regards to Dr. Gilbert's experimentation, we have
tried to recreate that, based on our, sort of, estimate, and we
were able to reproduce his result; however, this we could do
only in the laboratory, and we believe it is extremely unlikely
or very difficult to reproduce in the real world.
We also used other car manufacturers' vehicles to do this
experiment, and we were able to create the same result, using
other vehicle makes.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it's
just amazing how quickly 7 minutes rolls past. Let me just
suggest to you----
The Chairman. Seven minutes and 40 seconds.
Senator Wicker. That's right.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. 43.
Senator Wicker. Let me suggest, in the next 10 seconds,
that there is an entity called the National Academy of Sciences
that does independent peer reviews. And I've found, in my
experience, 14 years in the House and Senate, that they can be
relied upon to call it by the numbers. And I would simply
suggest, to this panel and to colleagues, that it might be
worthwhile to ask NAS if they're interested in performing an
outside, independent, peer review of all three of these
analyses so that the Committee can benefit from it.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
I've been sitting here thinking about--I--about 4 months
ago, I responded to a want ad and purchased a 2003 Camry for my
daughter, who's an upperclassman in college. And I did that
because the want ad seemed appealing to me, and I knew that
Toyota was a car with quality and reliability. And I have to
tell you that, as I've read and studied what has gone on in
this issue, I am enormously troubled by Toyota's response,
going back some 7 or 8 years, to this issue of acceleration--
unintended acceleration. I just think the customer, and
certainly, the Federal agencies, would expect more of, and
expect better of, your company.
Now, I want to ask several questions.
First, Mr. Ditlow, you said, in your testimony, that of the
2002 to 2010 Camrys linked to unintended acceleration, the
unrecalled Camrys have twice as many fatal crashes and deaths
as those who have been recalled.
Mr. Ditlow. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Dorgan. Are you confident with those numbers?
Mr. Ditlow. Yes, I am. I expect that the numbers will
increase as more investigation is done. We have two other cases
right now that we're looking into.
Senator Dorgan. All right.
And, Mr. Inaba, let me ask you, then--if Mr. Ditlow is
correct, that of the fatal crashes of Camrys between 2002 and
2010 linked to unintended acceleration, if there are twice as
many that are not recalled as there are that have been
recalled, doesn't that raise real questions about whether the
recall is extensive--or as extensive as it should have been?
Mr. Inaba. Senator, I am not personally aware of that
information, and therefore, I would ask Mr. Ditlow to give us
some information and look into it, and maybe get back to you
later on.
Senator Dorgan. If the information is accurate, as Mr.
Ditlow presents it, would you reach the same conclusion I have
reached, that recalling a body of automobiles that has only
half the rate of fatalities of unintended acceleration is
hardly the answer? You would want to recall particularly those
that have twice the rate.
Mr. Inaba. I should not speculate, but that shouldn't be
the case.
Senator Dorgan. All right.
Let me ask you, Mr. Inaba, and whomever else wishes. And
then I ask about this accelerator, so I want to have the time.
You have indicated in your testimony--Mr. Uchiyamada, you
said, ``As a result of our extensive testing, we do not believe
sudden unintended acceleration results because of a defect in
our ETCS. In fact, we don't believe it's ever happened.''
And then, Mr. Inaba, you have said, ``We are taking
significant steps to bolster confidence,'' and then, down later
in that paragraph, ``We have never found a defect that has
caused unintended acceleration.''
I think what I hear you saying is that you're doing things
here to bolster confidence, but you don't believe there was a
defect that caused the unintended acceleration. Is that what
you are saying to us?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. It also depends on the
result of the tests. However, we have sold, so far, over 40
million vehicles that has ETC on them, and there was not a
single case where we could identify that an ETC defect was the
cause of unwanted or unintended acceleration.
Senator Dorgan. So, your position is, you don't, at this
point, think there's a defect in the accelerator or the
throttle sensors that has caused sudden acceleration, if that's
the case. I just want to try to understand what you're saying
to us.
And then I want to ask this question, finally. Mr. Wicker
mentioned the study by Professor Gilbert of Southern Illinois
University. I don't know the veracity of that study; I mean,
it's very technical, I'm sure. But, I want to show a chart that
I believe--this is a chart--a photograph that is on your own
website, and it shows some technical data with respect to
sensors.
The first image shows how the sensors in the accelerator
pedal send signals to the engine computer. And Professor
Gilbert apparently wrote that this model has the potential for
the engine computer not to recognize a short circuit in the
pedal sensor. And I think you've indicated that you're not--you
don't necessarily agree with that conclusion.
But, then there's another sensor on the throttle valve,
inside the engine, and that is the second chart. And Toyota
uses--and by the way, this is a different sensor--Toyota uses
sensors that correspond to the second picture. Most automotive
users--most automakers, rather, use the type of sensors on the
second. Both--for both the accelerator pedal and the engine
throttle, Toyota, alone, I believe, uses the better sensor on
the engine throttle control, but the less reliable sensor on
the accelerator pedal.
And so, I guess my question is, Why does Toyota use a
different and, at least concluded by some, a less reliable
sensor on the pedal assembly than most other manufacturers use?
Is it a cost issue, or what has pushed Toyota into that
judgment? Who could answer that question?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. We do not--we never use a
sensor less reliable because of the cost.
We put together a system under which the two sensors do not
really give out the same values at the same time. By so doing,
we could examine the validity of the signaling system.
Senator Dorgan. All right. I'd like to inquire, with a
written question, a bit more about that subject.
And let me, again, just make this point, if I can. I think
what you are saying to the Committee is, you are doing a lot to
try to establish reliability once again. I don't think there's
any question that everybody in this room has read the ratings,
over many, many years. Toyota has been a brand that has
inspired confidence and reliability and dependability and
quality and so on. But, I do think that even those of us who
have purchased that vehicle have some great concern about what
we have learned in the recent months about the company's
response to the questions of sudden acceleration. And I am
especially interested and also concerned that you're saying to
us that the sudden acceleration issue is not, in your judgment,
resulting from a defect in the electronic system of a throttle
or an accelerator pedal. I mean, it seems to me to be at odds
with what many others believe to be the case.
And so, you're doing a lot of things with respect to
recall. You've got--I know you've got good men and women who
are working 24 hours a day, trying to call vehicles into
dealerships and so on. But, is it because you think there is no
defect, just because you're trying to instill some greater
notion of reliability?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. As I said, there is not a
single case that ETC's failure lead to unwanted, unintended
acceleration at this point. However, we would like to do the
following to ensure the safety of our product:
First point is, it could be possibly National Academy of
Sciences utilizing a third-party organization to do another
evaluation.
For example, right now when you look at the notations the
vehicle speed control of a NHTSA database--of course, this is
something that we should probably work with a third party--but,
as far as we could see it, more than half of those complaints
related to non-acceleration.
Mr. Uchiyamada. [Japanese.]
The Chairman. After your translation, we have to go on to
the next question.
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. So, we would like to
continue our effort to elucidate these things one by one.
Another thing we might be asking is asking NHTSA to give us the
VIN number of a certain event. We are deploying our SWAT team
and sending a SWAT team to the site of the UA. When that is
reported, we would like to utilize the event data recorder
data. We want to, you know, do various things, and we really
want to work on this.
Mr. Inaba. We are very eager to find out.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dorgan.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you can imagine, you have a lot of loyal customers in
Minnesota, and a group that hasn't been mentioned today, a lot
of loyal auto dealers who have been, of course, hurt by this,
as well, and are doing everything to meet the requirements of
the recalls, and want to do that.
Do you know, Mr. Inaba, how many vehicles have been
recalled so far and how many remain to be fixed?
Mr. Inaba. Well, talking about two recalls that--related to
this unintended acceleration, we have about--in total, 5.3
million customers, and we have them--more than 1 million. We
are rigorously doing as quickly and as conveniently as
possible, with the dealers really fully backing us up. And I
really respect that--you know, the effort they are doing.
Senator Klobuchar. And do you know how many remain to be
done?
Mr. Inaba. Oh. So, obviously, there are about 4 million.
And we'd like to do it as quickly as possible.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
And then I--my major focus this morning was--as worthy as a
discussion is about what you're going to do to fix these cars,
which incredibly important, how you're going to deal, legally,
with some of the victims and their families and things like
that--but, my focus is on our own government and their
relationship with Toyota and other industry players, and how we
do a better job of regulating, so that when we go forward,
we're going to be able to do a better job.
And so, I was obviously concerned by this PowerPoint
presentation that was--came out in the last week. And I just--
where it talks about ``wins'' for Toyota. And I understand
businesses have to do well and get wins and move ahead. But, to
me it seems like these were wins for Toyota but, arguably,
losses for American customers. And this was the document that
was presented to you by Toyota's Washington, D.C., office? Is
that correct?
Mr. Inaba. That is correct.
Senator Klobuchar. And what does it mean when they talk
about ``wins for Toyota,'' here?
Mr. Inaba. Well, first of all, this is only after few days
after my arrival to the United States, and then this is the
very first orientation material by our Washington office. And
to be honest, I do not recall the meeting or the data in any
depth. And I reread it again, and I'm very embarrassed. First
of all, this--tone of this information is so inconsistent with
our company guiding principles and also my beliefs. And, of
course, you can, you know, expect that, you know, first time,
president coming to the office and they try to impress me.
Senator Klobuchar. And----
Mr. Inaba. And, let me--may I?
And I think this is somewhere--you know, a small sample, a
big universe. I want to believe that. But, at the same time,
this is my job. If there's any element of this thinking around
any organization somewhere, my job is to really rectify it and
make sure that this not going to happen anymore.
Senator Klobuchar. And I don't know if you've talked to
anyone since, but you know what they mean when they say,
``negotiated equipment recall on Camry, yes, regarding SA,''
which is, of course, the sudden acceleration, ``which saved
$100 million-plus, with no defect found.'' What do you think
they meant, when they said, ``no defect found''? Was that note
that the--NHTSA hadn't found a defect?
Mr. Inaba. I don't know. I mean, I don't know the basis of
calculation of $100 million or so. Or I--using the word
``negotiation'' is the wrong one, in my opinion. It should be a
discussion. And therefore, I think there is an element that I
have to really go into and then rectify it.
Senator Klobuchar. And do you know if the people involved,
with whom Toyota was negotiating--one of my concerns is, right
now there are some NHTSA employees that are in Toyota's
Washington office. Were any of those employees involved in
this--former employees involved in this negotiation?
Mr. Inaba. Well, they are the--I must say, a window person
to day-to-day basis and discuss issues with NHTSA; that's
correct. And two of them came from NHTSA--one fifteen years
ago, and second one is 6 years ago. I know them personally by
now, and they are of very high integrity. I really respect
their expertise, and we value them--not their influence, but
their expertise. And I think also they came from a very union
staff. And it's hard to sort of imagine that they can exercise
any strong influence rather than expert. And I really value
their work they're doing.
Senator Klobuchar. And I understand that under the current
rules, this wasn't, arguably, a violation--it was, like, a 1-
year ban--but they were involved in these negotiations, then.
Mr. Inaba. Discussion.
Senator Klobuchar. Discussions. OK.
Mr. Ditlow, I went through with--earlier, with Secretary
LaHood and Administrator Strickland, some ideas for how we can
fix this, going forward. And I just want to throw them out
there again, because that's what I'm most interested in. When
I'm talking about ``fixing,'' it is fixing the relationship
between the government regulators, who are--our public, and my
two customers, and many more in Minnesota, who had these
acceleration events, and one was so bad for 6 miles that it
burned her hubcaps--the brakes did. And fortunately, both of
them survived. The things I threw out there was the resource
issue, the procedural tools for NHTSA, so that they, maybe, can
move things quicker when they want to do their own recalls. The
fines which are, in this case, maybe as much as--the cap may be
something like $16 million, compared to the $100 million
saved--that's right up here on the chart--seems to be not a
good balance. And the fourth thing I raised was this--doing
something differently with the rules so that people won't be
negotiating that used to work at NHTSA.
Could you talk about what's your favorite of those choices,
and if you think they all would be helpful?
Mr. Ditlow. We have a--in terms of favorite, could you
repeat----
Senator Klobuchar. I'm just asking what you----
Mr. Ditlow. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar.--think should be our highest priority,
as we go forward, to try to change the situation.
Mr. Ditlow. Well, in the near term, the highest priority
has to be to get electronic brake overrides in not only the
recalled Toyota vehicles, but----
Senator Klobuchar. I totally understand that that's our----
Mr. Ditlow. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar.--first priority. I am talking about the
government agencies----
Mr. Ditlow. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar.--who to--seems to me, need to do their
job differently so that people who file complaints feel like
they're going to get an answer, and feel like they're going to
get an answer when there's a rash of complaints that's
consistent with what's going on here.
Mr. Ditlow. Well, the government has to totally revamp its
investigatory system. It has to recognize that it is, in fact,
the cop on the beat; it's not Mr. Nice Guy. They need to go
back and look at what the agency was doing in the 1970s, where
the only thing that we had were safety recalls. We didn't have
safety improvement campaigns. We didn't have regional recalls
which excluded some parts of the country. The agency needs to,
when it does an investigation, look to obtaining a full recall
of the vehicles, not something that will save the manufacturer
some money and get a quick out.
But, the other thing is, the agency doesn't have the
resources to do it. They simply move on from one investigation
to another. There's always another one that's in the back of
their mind. But, they need to do a good job on the one that's
before them before they move on to the next one.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you----
The Chairman. Thank you----
Senator Klobuchar.--very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And Senator LeMieux.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing.
I want to thank Mr. Uchiyamada, Mr. Inaba, Mr. Sasaki, and
Mr. Ditlow for being here today.
It occurs to me, in listening to the testimony, that when
we're talking, as my colleague did, about pedal sensors and
engine computers and microprocessors, that these cars are very
complicated. And gone are the days when we, as consumers, could
understand how these vehicles operate. And as these cars become
more complicated, I believe the burden is more on the
manufacturer to make sure that things operate properly. This is
not my old 1966 Mustang that I could work on under the hood and
maybe figure something out; these are extremely complicated
vehicles.
My wife and I have one of your cars. She drives an SUV and
puts our three small kids in the back. So, when I learned of
this, I did probably what most families do, and I went home and
had a conversation with my wife about what she should do if her
car accelerated out of control, whether it was a floor mat or
some other problem. That's not a good conversation for us to be
having, in terms of your company. And I want to echo what my
colleague, Senator Cantwell, said, part of our disappointment
is because of the reputation you have for being such an
excellent purveyor of quality cars.
Many of these issues have already been discussed. I
understand what you're doing now, and I applaud you for doing
it, with the independent evaluation, and I applaud you for the
efforts that you're taking. My concern is how long you've known
about this problem, and the efforts that you took in the past.
We have been given--and I believe that the Chairman has
entered this into the record--a PowerPoint presentation that
was given, on September 20, 2006, by Mr. Jim Press, who was the
President of Toyota Motor North America. I guess that was your
predecessor, Mr. Inaba. Is that correct?
Mr. Inaba. Yes, correct.
Senator LeMieux. And this document looks like it was a
slideshow presentation. Could someone from Toyota provide
information to us as to where this presentation was given and
to whom it was given?
Mr. Inaba. I do not personally know that document. But, we
will certainly get back to you with more information about
that.
[The information referred to is in the appendix.]
Senator LeMieux. Is there anybody from Toyota who's
familiar with this document who's here today?
Mr. Inaba. Not from the three of us.
Senator LeMieux. OK. Well, let me read to you--because I'm
reviewing these documents, Mr. Chairman, as they've been
presented to us. This is a slideshow presentation about a new
era for Toyota and TMA in North America. And it goes through
several issues, including safety issues. And there are
notations, in back here, which are notes to this slide
presentation. And on the document that has as its ending Bates
number 25, there is reference to slide number 25, and it says
the following: ``Our ability to manage the tide of safety
investigations rests largely on our ability to work well with
NHTSA. Over the last few years, we have seen our relationship
begin to slip slightly with NHTSA. The reasons are complex.
They include a combination of increased recalls, more
investigation, and tougher negotiations between Toyota and the
agency. Not all of the recall increase can be blamed on
slipping Toyota quality.'' And it goes on from there.
None of you have--I guess, have seen this document, but
this is from the former President of Toyota Motors North
America, or at least it contains information that he, I guess,
presented or had presented to him. And I'm worried about some
of these phrases, about ``managing the tide of safety
investigations.'' I'm concerned about ``not all of the recall
increase can be blamed on slipping Toyota quality.''
And to the point that was made before, this looks like more
of an effort to get in front of, in a public-relations way, a
problem, in order to instill confidence in the consumer, and to
deal with the government regulatory agency, than it does trying
to solve a problem.
And from the documents that I've reviewed, you've known
about an acceleration problem, whether it's been caused by
electronics, which you don't believe it has been, or whether
it's been caused by floor mats, which, I guess, you believe it
does, and you've taken measures on that--you've known about
this problem for some time. And I have a concern that the
efforts that you took in the past were not appropriate and you
did not go far enough in the years prior to what you are doing
today.
Do you care to comment on that statement?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Around 2006, the number of
recalls in North America increased. And with regards to this, I
do not have any data on me, personally, right now. So, I would
like to submit to the Committee, later, more accurate numbers.
[The information referred to is in the appendix.]
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. It is certainly an embarrassing
thing for a automotive manufacturer to create a--or produce a
vehicle that had--have to be recalled later. However, when we
realized that recall is needed, then that--the work of recall
should be done properly. So, this may sound a little bit
contradictory or complex or a bit strange, but the number of
recalls were increasing, and that meant that, on the one hand,
we were doing our job properly.
With regards to our relationship with NHTSA, it is really
unfortunate that some of you may have a concern, or some people
might suspect it is--it was unhealthy. I would like to
clarify--clear that, going forward, and build a healthy
relationship with NHTSA.
In the past 10 years, Toyota has conducted, in total, 66
vehicle recalls in North America, of which 57 were on a
voluntary basis. In other words, we were not given any
instruction from NHTSA to do these recalls, however we did do
that. Unfortunately, the remaining nine cases, our response was
not good enough, and it ended up in the instructed recall by
NHTSA. But, we are not trying to work on the relationship with
NHTSA so that if we can persuade them, we can avoid recalls or
anything like that, and our past record testifies to that. And
this is a piece of information I would like you to understand.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. I wanted to ask Mr. Inaba a question.
There was an internal document that was dated July 2009, and it
described what the author considered to be a win for Toyota.
One of these wins for Toyota's self-described safety group was
$100-million saving from avoiding a safety recall in 2007.
Mr. Inaba, your name is on the cover page of the document,
and you have stated that it is a presentation that was made to
you, thus the--you're endorsing--you're endorsing.
Mr. Inaba. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Did this presentation raise a red flag
that your company was prioritizing profit over safety?
Mr. Inaba. It has never been the case, and it will never be
the case. I think----
Senator Lautenberg. But, it was described as a ``win.''
Mr. Inaba.--safety----
Senator Lautenberg. So, I think a win is a victory,
obviously.
Mr. Inaba. Well, let me address--safety is an utmost
importance of our company, which is a guiding principle. And
that is why I found--I reread that only recently, and then
found a little embarrassing. And it is so inconsistent with our
guiding principle and personal belief. Therefore, although they
tried to impress me with the bigger numbers of money that they
said they saved, but I would like to really--in my position, to
rectify if there is any element of that thought in our
organization.
Senator Lautenberg. Is anyone at Toyota responsible--been
made responsible for this presentation or related safety lapses
at Toyota--been reprimanded for their lapse?
Mr. Inaba. May I----
[Pause.]
Mr. Inaba. OK. Sorry, I just wanted to understand your
English correctly.
I have told the Washington office, since I found it later
on, that this is not our, you know, company, sort of, policy,
that cost comes first, you know, than the safety. And I
reaffirmed them that safety comes first. And this is, you know,
the top priority of our company. That's all, and there's no----
Senator Lautenberg. But, there--that--there--it was not
suggested that anybody was--in the company was responsible
for--you're an engineer, as I remember, or one of you is an
engineer. Is it possible that there is no assignment of
responsibility for this lapse? Does it--didn't it fall on some
department, some unit in the company that permitted this to
happen?
Mr. Inaba. May I ask--permitted this kind of presentation
happen? Is that what you----
Senator Lautenberg. No, that the acceleration happened. The
sudden acceleration happened, that the accidents happened, that
the injuries happened. Does it say, ``Look, you, so-and-so,
your department, your responsibility--and that we're deadly
serious about this at Toyota, and if you make that kind of
mistake, your career is essentially over,'' or whatever,
however----
Mr. Inaba. Oh, OK.
Senator Lautenberg.--you manage.
Mr. Inaba. Now--and let me just address this first. Of
course, you know, we take any accident, or especially a fatal
accident, very seriously. But, the same time, I don't believe
there is a--any sort of rule or system that we would punish any
individuals when it happens and we know--even if we know root
cause of that.
Senator Lautenberg. Toyota's progress was remarkable; they
went from 10-percent market share in 1999 to 13 percent of the
market share in 2008. GM fell from 17 percent to 12 percent in
the same period of time. Ford fell from 13 percent to 8 percent
in the same period of time.
Now, what I'm trying to understand is what was--why was
Toyota able to move so deftly, so quickly into the marketplace
and overcome the established auto industry that existed in this
country?
Mr. Inaba. I'm from sales and marketing, so I have to
respond to your question.
We believe that the quality of the vehicles are the one
that, over years--we have been in this country 50 years, and it
is not so much one incident or anything, but sort of continuous
sort of reassurance to the customer that our product is
reliable and safe and durable, is the one that really brought
us up to here.
Of course, we are very embarrassed, we are very troubled by
this recent incidents, so that we would have to go back to
basics, to really reaffirm our customers that our product is
one of the safest and most reliable. And this is the only way.
I mean, we have not spent any more incentives than the industry
average or anything. So, I think, really, this--building a
trust among the customers is the key to our past success. We
would like to continue doing so into the future.
Senator Lautenberg. You know, there's an insinuation here,
because you describe a $100-million savings--that's earnings,
basically--from avoiding a safety recall in 2007. Now, that
doesn't sound like Toyota was satisfied with its identification
as reliable, safe--your word--there. Because it looked like
there was a move to make profits by, maybe, taking shortcuts. I
mentioned this earlier. It's a little inconsistent, with all
due respect, Mr. Inaba, that when you talk about market share
growing as it was--and I believe in a competitive marketplace,
but when it's that drastic, and included in there is 100
million bucks we made by not paying a fine or not doing what we
should have.
Mr. Inaba. First of all, again, cost is not the issue in--
when it comes to recall or safety issues. And in Japan, we
deliberately separated from a recall decision to a management
decision, and therefore, it is decided on the fairly lower
level of the management structure. And we have been doing it,
and we are still doing it. And therefore, to make sure that
cost is not the issue when it comes to recalls.
This is a really strong point that we have been making, and
therefore, as you pointed out, this expression is so
inconsistent from our past and current and the future guiding
principle of our company, and I'd like to correct that.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg----
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. And we appreciate the witnesses coming
here. But, I'm not sure that we're always talking about the
same thing.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. It is a possibility.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller.
I want to follow up, also, on what Senator Lautenberg was
asking about, and specifically about the internal company
document, dated July 9th, which you've been discussing with
him. And the term that's used in there, ``saving the company
$100 million''--and I know you don't like that term--did the
company, as a result of not doing a vehicle recall--did you, in
fact, save $100 million? What was the amount of money that was
saved, as you went down one path. We know that the path you
went down--the entrapment problems with the pedal and the
fatalities continued. So, you went down that path. If you'd
gone down the other path of a vehicle recall, that obviously
would have been much more costly. So, what actually did you
save, in terms of your course that you took?
Mr. Inaba. With all my honesty, that--I do not even know
what the basis of that calculation. I am not interested in
going in there. The only problem is that saving out of recall
is inconsistent with our principle. So, that's what I want to
say.
Senator Udall. But, sir, this is your document. This is a
Toyota document, and it used the terms that you ``saved'' that
amount of money. So, clearly, they at least got some of the
statistics and the dollar amount from Toyota information that
was given to them. Is that correct?
Mr. Inaba. No. We don't have any systems or rules or
traditions of collecting those saving amount in the United
States or even in Japan.
Senator Udall. Do any of the other executives want to
comment on this?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. I might be just repeating what
Inaba said. We, at the Toyota Motor Company, the recall
decisionmaking process is the following: It is really purely
the decision on the part of the individuals who are very
familiar with the market situation, and also someone who is
very familiar with the technical content of this matter. And
this would be reported to the managing officer, and he or she
would approve of it, and then it would it be implemented.
In other words, this whole process will complete within
this function of quality assurance and customer services.
Therefore, there is never a discussion that would include the
money amount--how much we would save or not save--if we have
done this or not have done that.
And so, it is really--the discussion takes place outside of
the earnings or savings or whatsoever. And I really would like
you to understand our process.
Senator Udall. So, all of you, do you dispute and reject
the $100-million figure? Do you deny that the $100-million
figure even exists, and it's something that is just out there
and being discussed in the press, but it isn't--doesn't have
anything to do with Toyota? Is that what you're saying today?
Mr. Inaba. Senator, I can only say that I don't know the
basis of that $100 million, so I cannot comment any further
than that.
Senator Udall. Well, you--well, give me a figure, then. If
you--so you're saying you don't know where the $100 million
came from, correct? And so, you're disputing that $100 million.
That's just--it's not your--it's not the way you would approach
it. OK? So, tell me if--what the company did is, you had a
floor mat recall, OK? A floor mat recall. That recall did not
result in safer vehicles. And indeed, it--you had pedal
entrapment, and you had additional fatalities, OK? That's what
you did. If you had had a full vehicle recall, how much would
that have cost your company?
Mr. Inaba. I am not able to answer that question.
Senator Udall. Could you answer that for the record----
Mr. Inaba. Yes.
Senator Udall.--after you----
Mr. Inaba. Yes.
Senator Udall.--at some point?
Mr. Inaba. Also, you know--prior, you know, questions, I
would like to get back to you.
Senator Udall. OK.
Mr. Inaba. The basis of that calculation.
Senator Udall. OK. Now, in following up a little bit, my
staff and I met, and we very much appreciated meeting, with the
Toyota people that came to our office and discussed with us the
matter before the hearing. And they indicated, in addition to
the floor mats being replaced and the accelerator being
reshaped, the dealerships are also upgrading the software on
the recalled vehicles to include a brake override, which Mr.
Ditlow mentioned, when the accelerator and brake are applied at
the same time. And this override is considered, by most vehicle
manufacturers, as an essential safety device. My question, to
whoever has the expertise here, is this software upgrade being
provided, automatically at the next service appointment, to all
existing Toyota vehicles whose computers can support the
upgrade, even those not subject to the recall?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. There may be a slight
miscommunication, so I would like to correct that. Brake
override system is not quite that general yet. I believe,
currently, about 20 percent of the vehicles in North America
are equipped with a brake override system.
We--at Toyota, this brake override system is a very
effective manner to address a certain portion of the sudden
acceleration, so we would like to implement this system to the
vehicles produced in North America, one by one.
And this is scheduled to complete toward the end of year
2010.
With regards to the existing vehicle, the customers who are
particularly concerned about this floor mat issue, we have
selected seven models that has a very high level of complaints
to be the subject of this software upgrade. So, if the customer
brings their vehicle to the dealership, we will provide the
software upgrade.
Once we complete all these upgrade work, Toyota vehicle
would become just as safe, or safer, than other vehicles, and
I'm very convinced of that.
Senator Udall. Thank you--I see my time's exhausted--thank
you very much. I appreciate very much the witnesses being here
today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Begich.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this.
And ``keneechiwa.'' Thank you very much for being here
today.
I'll be parochial for my first question, and then I have
some broader questions to follow up on many questions that
folks have here.
I represent the State of Alaska, and many of our residents
live in very rural parts of the state, where there are no
roads, except when they get there in their community.
How will you address the servicing that they will need when
they have to barge these vehicles to their home, where they
purchase them from a dealer hundreds of miles away. How will
you deal with those folks?
Mr. Inaba. Well, first of all, we will ask our dealers to
take care of the customers as much as they can. So, it is--in
principle, that--how they treat the customers, and I hope they
will treat the proper way.
And also that if there's any sort of situation where
customer cannot bring the cars to the dealership or the--or, at
the same time, he has any concerns, I think we allow the
dealers--pay the cost, if necessary----
Senator Begich. Very----
Mr. Inaba.--and then we will reimburse it.
Senator Begich. Very good. That's important. We are--and
I'm a driver of a Toyota. I own a Highlander hybrid. I drove it
from Alaska to here--19 days, 5,000 miles, and it did a good
job.
Now, to the broader questions that some have asked here,
the--I had not seen the presentation that Senator LeMieux had
talked about. Will you respond to him, in detail on the record
at a later time, his concerns about that document that he
presented in the slide show?
Mr. Inaba. Yes.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Mr. Inaba. Yes.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you, if I can, a couple--so I
understand the process. I understand you have a team, lower
than senior management, that makes a decision on recalls. When
that is brought to that team for decision, is there anyone that
can overrule that team, outside of that group?
Mr. Inaba. Mr. Sasaki will be a better----
Senator Begich. Very good, thank you.
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. The process in which the recall
decision is made is--as I said earlier, it's purely--reflects
the market conditions and technical cause of that problem.
However, this process is very strictly prescribed within our
company. So, if a decision was made outside of that very strict
rules, then that could be reviewed by the officers who is in
charge of looking at that operation.
Also, we do have auditors. And so, given a certain period
of time, there will be a number of audits conducted. And so,
the auditors would be also looking over it.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Can I have, maybe--again, at a later time--for the record,
you probably have a written policy on this. Can you submit that
to the Committee for review?
Mr. Inaba. Yes.
[The information referred to is in the appendix.]
Senator Begich. Also, can you submit maybe--and I'll use
it--a period of time since 2006, because that's some of the
discussion here--of recalls that have been brought through the
chain, and then, at any point, where they might have been
stopped or not moved forward? Could you provide that to the
Committee, based on this process that I now understand?
Mr. Inaba. We'll try to do so, yes.
[The information referred to is in the appendix.]
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Let me also ask--a question I asked earlier today, in the
early session was--as you can see, the Federal Government here
is very interested in safety and security of vehicles and how
they operate. What on the--what in the Japanese government is
going on in regards to what they see we're doing here? Is there
a corresponding action?
Who would like to answer that? I'll leave it to you to
decide who will answer these.
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. The recall system in Japan was
actually put together after learning from the U.S. system.
Therefore, the system in Japan is very similar to that in this
country.
Senator Begich. But, is the Government of Japan taking any
action in regards to this, what we're doing here? Of is there
any action they're doing to follow up on the products that are
being exported?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Actually, it is the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry that has that jurisdiction or
authority to make sure those exported vehicles would be taken
care of or looked after well.
Senator Begich. OK. I'll do this one more time, and it just
may not be able to be answered at this point.
Are they doing anything, based on what's happening right
now in this country, with these recalls? In other words, are
they adding extra scrutiny to your company?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Yes, we have received a number
of hearings from the government, and they are watching the--how
this recalls in the United States came about, and how this
actual implementation of the recall--or execution of the recall
is being carried out. They are following this very closely.
Senator Begich. Very good.
I know I have--I'm out of time, I think, but let me ask
just one last question. And it's kind of a statement with a
question.
You understand that the reputation of the company and the
trust of the company by the consumer has been damaged, and that
the way that's regained is by the work you do, especially now,
in the recall, but also into the future. That's a clear
understanding.
At what point does the senior management involve themselves
or see reports on a regular basis on the amount of recalls or
incidences that are being driven from the lower ranks of the
employee group, indicating there are problems? Does the senior
management see that all the way to the bottom and up, and how
often do you see that?
Mr. Inaba. Well, personal experience is that I have been
involved since the end of September, and I will do--pay very
close attention about what's going on with any technical issues
that arises. And therefore, it will be a lot more attention
paid from now on, because this loss of trust is more costly
than anything else to Toyota. And so, that--we do utmost to
restore it. That's my commitment, and also other members of----
Senator Begich. Very good.
Thank you very much, for your testimony.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you Senator Begich.
And now Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Ditlow.
Mr. Ditlow. Yes, Senator.
Senator Nelson. There's a deadline coming for mandatory use
of electronic data recorders, is that right?
Mr. Ditlow. There's a deadline coming on the
standardization. There's no requirement that it be installed.
Senator Nelson. If there's a deadline for standardization,
why does--what is your opinion that Toyota still uses
proprietary software to read out the contents, if it's going to
be standardized?
Mr. Ditlow. The data that are going to be recorded will be
standardized. There is no standardization on the readout, in
making it commercially available. So, it's a failing in the
rule that's about to be issued, or that has been issued and is
about to be made final.
Senator Nelson. And you think that needs to be corrected.
Mr. Ditlow. Oh, yes. I mean, we need two things: We need to
mandate them in all vehicles, and we need that the readout be
standardized so that anyone can read it.
Senator Nelson. Is an EDR part of the airbag assembly?
Mr. Ditlow. There is, in fact, a data recorder that's
associated with the airbag. The EDR is a more advanced version
and is capable of measuring and recording more features than
the airbag recorder.
Senator Nelson. Well, then I would like to ask Toyota, Does
Toyota's EDR record--and for how long does the EDR record
record--how long does the electronic data recorder record the
data, before and after a crash, for an airbag?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. The current EDR records the
5 minutes prior to the crash and 2 minutes--I'm sorry--5
seconds prior to the crash and 2 seconds after the crash. In
other words, the current system is to record the data related
to the deployment of the airbag. And so, whether the airbag is
deployed or the brake is pressed very hardly, over the
secondary level or above. So that's 5----
Voice. 2G
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. 2G--more than 2G. So, it's 5
seconds prior and 2 seconds afterwards.
Senator Nelson. Who made the decision in Toyota to have
only one laptop in the U.S. with the required software to read
out an electronic data recorder?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. I do not know, at this time,
who has decided--who rendered that decision. However, if that
is needed, I would look into it and then submit the name later.
Currently, we are using just one laptop to do that, because
we have been able to submit all the required data by using this
one piece of laptop. So, I think that's how we have been doing
it.
Senator Nelson. Does Toyota collect and store all the
information from the electronic data recorders it decodes?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. Right now, the event data
readout will be done when the customer requests it or a police
or a court or agencies like NHTSA--those public entities issues
us a warrant to do that, then we would do so. I mean, these are
under several State laws.
And then we are trying to do our utmost so that these work
can be carried out more speedy manner. We will have 100 units
available at the early April, and by the end of April we will
have 150 such units available in North America. Indeed, we are
going to hand over three such readers to NHTSA tomorrow.
Senator Nelson. OK. That's valuable information, but that's
not the answer to the question. The question was, Does Toyota
collect and store all the information from the electronic data
recorders it decodes?
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. It is true that the Toyota
reads them out, but I am not sure, as I said here today,
whether Toyota keeps such records. And I will look into it,
Senator, and I will get back to the Committee.
[The information referred to is in the appendix.]
Senator Nelson. OK. Tell me, why did Toyota officials in
Japan not take seriously the messages about safety concerns
that Toyota's North American officials had conveyed to Japan?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. It is quite unfortunate that you
have come to form that notion, and I wonder if that was--that
happened because in the past, with regards to the field-action
decisionmaking that relates to the safety, a member of our
North American team was not formally involved. And therefore,
we have rectified this immediately, and now we would include
someone who is most knowledgeable of the North American market
situation to become one of the very important panel member that
would render the decision regarding the field action.
Senator Nelson. So, you think that headquarters in Japan
took seriously the messages of safety concerns from North
America, is that correct?
Translator for Mr. Sasaki. Yes, that is correct. But,
although you say the Japanese headquarters, in actuality that
when the decision was rendered, the person in charge of that
was sent to United States and look at the situation under our
``go and see'' principle, and that's how our decisions had been
rendered. Therefore, it is not the case, in the past, that,
without knowing the situation in North American marketplace,
that the decisions were made in Japan.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
It's sad, for the loss of life, but it's also sad, as I
said in my opening comments, about all these Toyota dealers who
now, in the middle of an economic recession, are getting hit
with a double whammy because people have lost confidence in
Toyota. And now, all of these small businesses are getting hurt
all the more because people are not coming in to buy cars in
their Toyota dealerships.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the generosity of your time.
The Chairman. As always. Thank you very much, Senator
Nelson.
I will ask a final question and then will make a closing
statement.
I have here a sheet, from Toyota, called the ``Toyota
management team.'' And it's interesting, because the President
and Member of the Board is obviously Akio Toyoda. There are
five executive vice presidents, there are innumerable senior
managing directors, and there are directors--members of the
board, just two. And of the five executive vice presidents--
members of the board--directly under the president, Akio
Toyoda, two of them are on our panel today--Mr. Sasaki and Mr.
Uchiyamada. And that's why I think there is some--you feel--or
we feel--we both feel some frustration in trying to communicate
our effort to get to the bottom of some of our questions. It's
the question of accountability. Who is accountable? Who makes
decisions? Many questions have come back that, ``We are doing
recalls,'' as if that were a problem-solver. And it is not
necessarily a problem-solver. ``We will get back to you on
that.'' That is not a direct answer. I think there is more
knowledge at the table than has disclosed itself. I don't say
that rudely, I just say that in, perhaps, a typical American-
Japanese inability to communicate as effectively as we should
on a particularly important issue, both to us, in terms of
safety, and you, in terms of safety and some loss of confidence
in your product.
But, you know, all the way since--Senator Nelson said
this--since at least 2002--it was a long time ago--thousands of
Toyota and Lexus owners in the United States have complained to
Toyota that they experienced sudden unintended acceleration.
So, they have been doing that ever since. Thousands and
thousands of them. These Toyota owners told Toyota the brakes
would not overpower the surging vehicle. A number of them have
even had smoking brakes and melted hubcaps to prove it. I
believe Senator Klobuchar made that point.
However, Toyota, in this person's judgment, did not listen
to its customers, and it sent out letters like this, which,
obviously, nobody can read, but I can, and I'll quote from it.
It's rather cold. It's rather cold. The key paragraph says,
``In order for this accident to have occurred as a result of
unintended acceleration, there would have to be a simultaneous
failure of two totally independent systems, namely the brake
and throttle systems. Our inspections confirm that these
systems were purely functional.'' And therefore, it simply sort
of tossed off the agony of this owner.
Now, the evidence, that everyone has now seen, points to
the exact opposite conclusion, and we've been trying to get at
that, which is that brakes could not control the surging
vehicle. So, now we're talking about electronic systems, brake
overrides.
You've mentioned the outside consultant called Exponent,
but this report tested only six vehicles. That's not good
enough. Not good enough.
So, let me give you an example of one person who I think
makes the point. Last August, a Bill Shephard, of Monrovia,
California--I do not know the man, but my staff has talked to
both him and the master mechanic that I'm about to explain--
this person experienced an instant of sudden unintended
acceleration in his 2004 Camry. That was a long time ago. He
was pulling into his garage at the time, and then just, I
guess, pulled back into the living room or something.
At first, the master mechanic at Mr. Shephard's local
repair shop told him, as, in a sense, you have indicated to us,
that it was impossible--his words--that the Camry's electronic
system caused the problem. He said it was impossible. But, Mr.
Shephard was a stubborn man, and he insisted that this mechanic
keep running tests, because he felt that there was some other
reason for his surge, which he did not like and which was
threatening. And about a week later, it turns out, the mechanic
ran a test, after running tests a lot--not just once, not just
twice, but for a period of about a week--he ran a test, after a
week, in which the accelerator pedal position sensor indeed
failed. And so, lo and behold, it was not--it just changed--it
changed everything. It changed everything. In other words,
there was a problem in the electronic throttle system.
Now, Mr. Shephard reported this finding to both Toyota--
this is back in 2004--to both Toyota and to NHTSA. And to my
tremendous sorrow, I have to tell you that neither NHTSA nor
Toyota has ever given a response to Mr. Shephard.
So, symbolically and really, I ask you today--we have
talked to both him and to his master mechanic at length--I ask
you today, will you be in touch with this man? We will give you
his address. Because we didn't have a chance today to get into
how you've handled complaints. That's so key. To what level do
they rise? What does the board know about them? Does the board
meet as all the people I suggested, or is there an executive
committee, which is hinted at, in the organizational table? How
do these things come to the attention? That was my frustration
in my first round of questions, when I tried to found out,
``When were these decisions changed, if they were changed?''
which they were, because your president has admitted to that.
Safety took a second seat to profits.
In Japanese culture, in Japanese corporations, things do
not happen by chance; they happen by decision. And I failed to
get an answer about that, and I regret that. But, you made the
statement, in a sense, that recalls equal doing the job
properly, taking care of the situation, that it would suggest--
is suggested--is that a public relations effort, or is that
really solving the problem? There was no answer forthcoming.
One of you indicated that 20 percent of the outstanding
Toyotas in America have brake override systems now. But, then
you mentioned that, by the year 2010, perhaps the end of it,
you will have--it will be completed. What will be completed?
And I ask you this question: Obviously, the brake override
system is the solution. So, you have a problem. You have the
Toyotas that you make from this point forward in your ten
plants here, and you have the Toyotas that have already been
made, going back to the 2002, or before. If you solve, by
putting in a brake override system, the Toyotas that are made
from this point forward, or starting, let's say, a year ago,
that's good. But, why is a new Toyota and a new Toyota owner
less important than an older Toyota and a previous--or older-
Toyota owner? Their lives are the same, their value is the
same, the human being--are equal in their capacity to be
protected.
And so, I will just ask this question: Is it not fair to
suggest that Toyota should make an override system for all
Toyotas? The older ones, where the electronics were less
complicated and the computer system was less complicated, as
well as the new ones, where things are more complicated. And
then you might say to me, ``Well, that is very expensive.'' And
then I might say to you that, spread out over the entire fleet,
the expense will be less, substantially. And I also might say
that maybe the expense doesn't matter, because these are human
beings and they are loyal customers, as shown by the fact they
still have the Toyotas they bought years ago.
And further, I might ask you this question: Supposing I
was--I bought a Toyota back in--a Camry back in 2004, and it
was an older system, and I had a surge problem--an unexpected
surge problem. I was deeply distressed by it; I was afraid to
drive the car, because of my children, because of myself,
because of whoever. And so, I traded that automobile. I sold
that automobile to somebody else. Well, that brings up a whole
new question. Is it proper to say that--once the car is out of
the hands of the original purchaser, but now in the hands of
another American owner, it still has this defect, or potential
defect in it. Why would one trade or sell a defective--
potentially defective--and I go back to the Shephard case,
where he worked at and worked at it and worked at it and he
found out, yes, there was a defect--why would somebody be
traded or sold a defective car? Is that moral? Is that ethical?
Is that proper? Is that good business practice for Toyota?
Now, I've asked you many questions, and I apologize for
that, but I've said what I wanted to say, that what I think we
wanted to get, and that we've gotten some hint of that, but not
explicitly, real answers to real problems, not just, ``We're
doing a recall,'' and therefore, will solve the problem. But,
we're going to make sure that every Toyota car on the road in
the United States of America is safe and has a brake override.
Now, I'll just stop there, and you can answer in any way
that you wish.
Translator for Mr. Uchiyamada. Allow me to speak first.
Well, thank you very much, Chairman, for giving us many
pieces of comments.
We understand fully that there is a big room for
improvement upon ourselves in the way in which we have dealt
with, so far, in the past, in--as a global Toyota Corporation.
Allow me to repeat this. When we manufacture our vehicles,
our priorities are, number one, safety; number two, quality;
and then, number three, delivery. This importance order has
never been changed.
Having said that, we are fully aware of the fact that
perhaps we haven't lived up to the expectations on the part of
our customers, vis-a-vis our product, when we consider the
amount of recalls that we had to execute, and we are feeling
that we have to do something about it right away.
In the development side, I will be standing on the front
line and working very hard so that people will once again have
the image of Toyota that we were able to instill into people in
the past.
The Chairman. I would respond to that--and I will close
here shortly--by saying that the complaints began to come in,
in 2002, by the thousands. So, to say that you will respond
immediately and that you are--you regret, for your customers--I
understand that. What I do not understand is the lack of
response earlier. It seems to me that it would have been so
much in the custom of the Toyota company that I have known over
the years. But, you talk about, ``We will do something
immediately.''
Let me just say this. Will you contact Mr. Shephard? We'll
give you his address and number.
Mr. Inaba. Yes, sir. I will do so.
The Chairman. And the mechanic.
Mr. Inaba. Yes.
The Chairman. The Japanese transport minister, Seiji
Maehara, appearing at a nationwide broadcast news show on
Sunday, complained that Toyota's, quote, ``corporate culture,''
close quote, reflected a reluctance to be forthright on
recalls. ``The company is not taking the problem as serious as
it should,'' he said, saying the company quality chief,
Shinichi Sasaki, came to explain the problems to the ministry
only after being asked to do so.
I do not require a response on that.
And I will go to my closing statement, if that is all
right.
This has been useful, but not as useful as it should have
been. And I regret that, because I know what kind of company
you are, and can be again. And maybe it's simply a--as when I
was a student in Japan, Japanese and Americans sometimes have
different ways of talking to each other, and what appear to be
clear questions on the part of Americans are--may not be seen
that way by the Japanese. But, on the other hand, we're now
talking about a professional problem--a professional problem
which has affected Toyota in tens of billions of dollars of
lost net worth, and affected a lot of people in this country in
ways which they have experienced, or they have yet to
experience, unless the brake control is made universal.
So, let me just do my closing statement.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today for your
cooperation in making sure the Committee got all the
information it was looking for. I would have to do a little
caveat to that, I guess.
We have had a very full and long day, and with the ongoing
work of this Committee, which will take place, two things are
already very clear to me:
First, Toyota needs to restore its customers' confidence
and trust, and seriously recommit itself to quality and to open
communication. And carmakers should be required to provide the
hardware that dealers need to read electronic data recorders.
My second point was that the U.S. Government has to do a
much better job of keeping the American people safe. Please
understand. We had an all-morning hearing with NHTSA, and it
was not one that was pleasant for them. Mr. Ditlow is here, and
can testify to that.
And I thank you, sir, for all that you would have said,
could have said, and did say.
I--in my case, I firmly believe that this is going to
require strong legislative action. To name just a few examples
I have in mind, it is clear that we need to revisit the TREAD
Act. We must seriously consider a rulemaking mandating brake
override. And carmakers should be required to provide the
hardware that dealers need to read electronic data recorders.
And fourth, we should also require senior executives to
certify the information their companies provide to NHTSA, that
it is 100 percent correct and accurate. That is usual and
customary, and it must take place.
I have other ideas. Those are just mine. I know my
colleagues do, too. If we are really serious about making sure
this does not happen again, we need to work aggressively and
together on this effort, and that is what I intend to do with
my colleagues.
As I said earlier, I have over 1,000 workers in my State
who depend on--who work at Toyota, who have won the highest
awards, in most years--I think, 5 consecutive years, maybe 6
consecutive years--for being the most productive. I want them
to be protected as they drive their Toyota cars, and I want
them to be employed, because people have confidence in you and,
therefore, are buying your product. We have to get back to
that--not, obviously, just for West Virginia's sake, but for
the--your sake and the country's sake.
I have every confidence that you can earn back the trust of
your consumers, and that you can earn back the trust of the
American people. Every single Toyota owner deserves a full
accounting of what happened, and why, and a clear indication of
what we, here today, are going to do to make sure that safety
is never second place.
Having said that, I, again, thank you. We tried to make the
questioning not histrionic, but professional, fact-based, and
we've each tried to communicate with each other as well as we
could. And I do appreciate the fact that at least two of you
have flown all the way from Japan for this hearing.
So, I'm grateful. I'm looking forward to a strong and
complicated future, but I'm always an optimist.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing to address many
important questions surrounding Toyota's recent recalls and related
safety issues, along with the Federal Government's role in ensuring the
safety of the cars on America's roads.
Transportation safety is one of this committee's most important
responsibilities, and I hope today we will begin to understand why it
took so long for Toyota and NHTSA to take decisive action to address
the serious safety problems associated with sudden, unintended
acceleration. We are just beginning to understand the complicated
series of events that has led to the recall of more than 8 million
vehicles in the United States and Europe.
We owe it to the 39 individuals who have lost their lives, and the
thousands who have experienced unintended acceleration, to get to the
bottom of this issue. We also owe it to Toyota and its thousands of
American employees to conduct a thorough and fair inquiry.
To date, Toyota has identified certain all-weather floor mats,
which may entrap a depressed accelerator pedal, as well as so-called
``sticky'' accelerator pedals, as sources of unintended or unwanted
acceleration. But because Toyota and NHTSA were slow to react to
consumer complaints, many remain concerned about the safety of Toyota
vehicles.
Among the many questions the Committee and the American public have
are whether the true cause of unintended acceleration has been
identified and whether the corrective actions underway are sufficient.
There are concerns about whether NHTSA has the appropriate expertise to
diagnose complex problems with today's sophisticated vehicles. Also, is
the information NHTSA receives through Early Warning Reports,
specifically mandated by the TREAD Act to give NHTSA more information
with which to quickly identify potential safety hazards, sufficiently
robust?
Most importantly, we need to know how to prevent this situation
from recurring, and how Congress can assist. Only then will drivers
feel confident about buying and driving Toyota products and only then
will Toyota recover its good name.
I have been encouraged, Mr. Chairman, by the recent statements of
Toyota's President, acknowledging that the company must reaffirm its
commitment to safety and quality. I am confident the roughly 1,700
employees at Toyota's production facility in San Antonio, Texas, and
the more than 9,000 employees of Toyota's dealers in Texas would echo
that commitment. I hope today's hearing will be another step in the
process of making those commitments a reality.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this important hearing. I
look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
______
February 15, 2010
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia,
Chairman, Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Rockefeller:
I applaud the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation forthcoming hearings on Toyota's recently announced
safety recalls.
Thus, today I write to you as a seasoned thirty-year college
professor and widely-recognized automotive and highway safety expert.
(For example, I'm cited on page 69 of GAO-09-56, a report to the
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate, which is directly relevant to the issue before the
Subcommittee, http://gao.gov/new.items/d0956.pdf.)
This GAO Highway Safety report is titled ``Foresight Issues
Challenge DOT's Efforts to Access and Respond to New-Technology-Based
Trends.''
Please review my attached testimony.
I am willing to testify before your committee. My contribution
would be an asset.
Sincerely
Thomas M. Kowalick,
Professor of Holocaust Studies,
Sandhills Community College.
______
Prepared Statement of Thomas M. Kowalick
49 CFR 563: Event Data Recorders
Petition for Reconsideration NHTSA-2008-0004-0007
Providing Consumer Protection
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to submit a
statement and/or testify before your committee. My name is Thomas M.
Kowalick and I am a Professor of Holocaust Studies at Sandhills
Community College, Pinehurst, North Carolina since 1982.\1\ I am also
President of Click Incorporated--Transportation Safety Technologies of
Southern Pines, North Carolina since 1997. Besides that, I serve as
Chairman of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Standards
Association (IEEE/SA) project IEEE 1616 which created the world's first
and only motor vehicle event data recorder standard, commonly termed
``automotive black boxes'' by the general public.\2\ I have published
extensively on the topic of motor vehicle event data recorders as the
author of Fatal Exit: the Automotive Black Box Debate and five
additional books in print to date and I'm working on number 6.\3\ These
books cover the history, research, development, standardization,
legislation, regulation, legal, and privacy and consumer protection
issues connected with implementing motor vehicle event data recorders.
Most recently I contributed to the 2009 McGraw Hill Encyclopedia of
Science and Technology.\4\ I also served on a National Academies of
Science study about EDRs \5\ and I'm cited on page 69 of GAO-09-56, a
report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate which is directly relevant to the issues
before the Committee. This GAO Highway Safety report is titled
``Foresight Issues Challenge DDT's Efforts to Access and Respond to
New-Technology-Based Trends.'' Thus, in summary, I am widely recognized
as an expert regarding Event Data Recorders (EDRs) since 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ www.sandhills.edu.
\2\ http://standards.ieee.org/announcements/pr_1616.html.
\3\ http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-
0471698075.html.
\4\ http://www.accessscience.com/
abstractaspx?id=YB090097&referURL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.
accessscience.com%2fcontent.aspx%3fsearchStr%3dkowalick%26id%3dYB090097.
\5\ http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_w75.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To start, motor vehicle safety is a shared responsibility among
government, consumers and vehicle manufacturers. ``Safety'' is an area
in which manufacturers compete and seek competitive advantage. Then
automakers leverage their safety performance and equipment in efforts
to distinguish their products from competitors. Consumers purchase
these products and only hope that they work as marketed for themselves
and their families. Consumers should trust the automakers to
manufacture vehicles correctly and fix them it they malfunction.
Consumers should trust the Agency charged with enhancing vehicle and
highway safety to intervene when the problem is so severe that injuries
and fatalities are commonplace. Consumers should trust government to
provide consumer protection and assurances that it will never happen
again. At this point in time public opinion polls indicate ``trust'' is
lacking. People want more--they want a better understanding of
automotive electronics that affect safety and they want protection from
misuse of in-vehicle electronic technologies. For the truth is that the
average consumer understands that it is difficult, if not impossible to
prevail in any dispute with an automaker other than by costly
litigation. Consumers also understand that automakers spend plenty of
money to influence legislation. Last year, auto industry lobbying was
65.5 million dollars, according to the nonpartisan Washington-based
Center for Responsive Politics.\6\ Millions of consumers are following
these hearings. They may be wondering who speaks for them? Today I will
do my best to explain the consumer protection urgency of getting the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to respond
positively to my Petition for Reconsideration of 49 CFR 563: Event Data
Recorders. The right to petition is one of the fundamental freedoms of
all Americans, and is documented in the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ http://detnews.com/article/20100213/131Z/2130352/Automakers-
cut-spending-on-lobbying.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some background: The past four decades witnessed an exponential
increase in the number and sophistication of electronic systems in
vehicles.
A vast increase in automotive electronic systems, coupled with
related memory storage technologies, has created an array of new safety
engineering opportunities and subsequent consumer acceptance
challenges.
Consumers continue to be interested in safety advancements but
remain concerned about issues of privacy, tampering and misuse of
vehicle crash data.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_w75.pdf. See
6.3.5
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Virtually every passenger car and light truck manufactured in or
imported to the North American market since model year 1996 includes an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandated diagnostic link
connector to allow access to engine and emissions diagnostic data.
This onboard diagnostic link connector (OBDII) is regulated by the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (40 CFR 86.094-17(h) and revisions
for subsequent model years. It is standardized by the Society of
Automotive Engineers Vehicle Electrical Engineering Systems Diagnostic
Standards Committee. The physical configuration of the output plug is
specified under SAE J1962 and through the International Standards
Organization under ISO 15031-3 and is increasingly used as an access
point to other in-vehicle electronics systems, sub-systems, computers,
sensors, actuators and an array of control modules including the air
bag control module.
The onboard diagnostic link connector is also used as a serial port
to retrieve data elements from on-board systems, sub-systems, modules,
devices and functions that collect and store data elements related to a
vehicle crash such as a Restraint Control Module (RCM) and Event Data
Recorder (EDR). This connector used to download crash data is wide
open--not physically protected from misuse.
The EPA communications protocol utilizes a Controller Area Network
(CAN) to provide a standardized interface between the diagnostic link
connector and the tools used by service technicians and vehicle
emission stations.
CAN uses a serial bus for networking computer modules as well as
sensors. The standardized interface allows technicians to use a single
communications protocol to download data to pinpoint problems and
potential problems related to vehicle emissions. Full implementation of
the CAN protocol is required by 2008. Because it is a universal system,
the use of the diagnostic link connector and the CAN serial bus
alleviates the problem that the data would only be accessible through
the use of multiple interfaces and different kinds of software, if at
all.
While standardizing the means and protocols for data extraction is
generally considered a positive advancement in surface transportation
by helping to assure that systems perform properly over the useful life
of vehicles, it has also created the possibility of extracting data
from motor vehicles that can be used in civil and criminal legal
proceedings.
As example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) cites an Event Data Recorder (EDR) as a device voluntarily
installed in a motor vehicle to record technical vehicle and occupant
information for a brief period of time (seconds, not minutes) before,
during and after a crash. EDRs collect vehicle crash information. These
devices are common in most recent vehicles and in 15 percent of all
vehicles (est. 60 million vehicles have EDRs).\8\ Some systems collect
only vehicle acceleration/deceleration data, while others collect these
data plus a host of complementary data, such as driver inputs (e.g.,
braking and steering) and vehicle systems status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ USDOT/NHTSA Final Regulatory Evaluation, Office of Regulatory
Analysis and Evaluation, National Center for Statistics and Analysis,
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The way in which this is accomplished may be described in the
following simplified manner. The EDR monitors several of the vehicle's
systems, such as speed, brakes, and several safety systems. It
continuously records and erases information on these systems so that a
record of the most recent 8-second period is always available. If an
`event'' occurs, i.e., if a crash pre-determined threshold of severity
occurs, then the EDR moves the last 8 seconds of pre-crash information
into its long-term memory. In addition, it and puts into its long-term
memory up to 6 seconds of data relating after the start of the crash,
such as the timing and manner of the air bags.
Thus, In general, EDRs are devices that record safety information
about motor vehicles involved in crashes. For instance, EDRs may
record: (1) pre-crash vehicle dynamics and system status, (2) driver
inputs, (3) vehicle crash signature, (4) restraint usage/deployment
status, and (5) post-crash data such the activation of an automatic
collision notification (ACN) system.
EDRs can be simple or complex in design, scope, and reach.
They can make a major impact on highway safety, assisting in real-
world data collection to better define the auto safety problem, aiding
in law enforcement, and understanding the specific aspects of a crash.
It is generally agreed that the more we know about motor vehicle
crashes--the better opportunity to enhance vehicle and highway safety.
Manufacturers have been voluntarily installing EDRs as standard
equipment in increasingly larger numbers of light vehicles in recent
years. They are now being installed in the vast majority of new
vehicles.
The information collected by EDRs aids investigations of the causes
of crashes and injuries, and makes it possible to better define and
address safety problems. The information can be used to improve motor
vehicle safety systems and standards.
As the use and capabilities of EDRs increase, opportunities for
additional safety benefits, especially with regard to emergency medical
treatment, may become available. EDRs installed in light vehicles
record a minimum set of specified data elements useful for crash
investigations, analysis of the performance of safety equipment, e.g.,
advanced restraint systems, and automatic collision notification
systems.
Vehicle manufacturers have made EDR capability an additional
function of the vehicle's air bag control systems. The air bag control
systems were necessarily processing a great deal of vehicle
information, and EDR capability were added to the vehicle by designing
the air bag control system to capture, in the event of a crash,
relevant data in memory.
EDRs have become increasingly more advanced with respect to the
amount and type of data recorded. Since 1998, the EDR function in light
vehicles (under GVWR 10,000 lbs) is typically housed in a control
module, such as the sensing and diagnostic module (SDM), the engine
control module (ECU) or the stability control or 4-wheel steering
modules. These modules are located in various places in the vehicle,
such as under a front seat, in the center console or under the dash.
Current EDR designs were developed independently by each automaker to
meet their own vehicle-specific needs.
In current EDRs, there is no common format for EDR data. Both the
data elements and the definition of these data elements vary from EDR
to EDR. Both GM and Ford, for example, record vehicle impact response
vs. time--i.e., a crash pulse. GM however stores the crash response as
a velocity-time history recorded every 10 milliseconds while Ford
stores the crash response as an acceleration-time history recorded
every 0.8 millisecond, e.g., stored in the Ford Windstar RCM. Even for
a given automaker, there may not be standardized format. The GM SDM,
for example, has evolved through several generations.
Until recently, there has been no industry-standard or recommended
practice governing EDR format, method of retrieval, or procedures for
archival. The preferred method is to connect to the onboard diagnostic
connector located in the occupant compartment under the instrument
panel.
Despite the obvious safety benefits that might accrue, however, the
use of EDRs has not been without controversy. EDRs were designed to
help automakers build safer vehicles. But manufacturers have used the
data to defend against product liability, police investigators have
also increasingly been using the data to charge drivers with speeding
violations and serious crimes. And insurance companies want the data to
dispute unwarranted claims and tie policy rates to driving behavior.
Privacy advocates and consumer groups oppose allowing data
collected for safety purposes to be used for other purposes, especially
when most drivers are unaware that their cars have boxes or mechanisms
that can be used as evidence against them. They also question whether
the data is accurate, since few tests have been conducted to establish
its reliability.
A number of research studies have concluded that although the EDR
data (and the recorder itself) may be ``owned'' by the automobile's
owner or lessee, that data may almost certainly be used as evidence
against the owner (or other driver) in either a civil or criminal case.
Furthermore, nothing within the Federal rules of evidence or the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination would exclude the use
of data recorded by EDRs. Similarly, owners might be prohibited from
tampering with the data via Federal or state legislation.
While the statutory authority to require EDRs may exist, the public
may not want open, unrestricted access to a device installed in their
automobiles that may appear to impede their personal privacy interests,
thus public acceptability of EDRs is an important issue paralleling the
legal issues of EDRs. For example, a class action suit, filed in New
Jersey, alleged that General Motors never told owners of their vehicles
that EDRs were installed.\9\
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\9\ ``GM sued over automobile `black boxes' '' USA Today, 12/01/
2000. http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti865.htm.
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The public is largely unaware of EDR systems, how they operate, and
who has access to the driving information they read.
At present, vehicle crash data is controlled by law enforcement,
automakers, state and Federal Government agencies, automotive repair
facilities and automotive insurance companies.
Thirteen states have enacted laws since 2004. These states followed
the example taken by California lawmakers in 2003, and have enacted
laws that specify how motor vehicle event data recorders (``EDRs'' or
auto ``black boxes'') are to be regulated in their respective
jurisdictions. No states have passed legislation preventing tampering.
The states may begin initiatives in the absence of sufficient Federal
regulation or legislation.\10\
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\10\ http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13461.
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NHTSA's EDR research website lists the following potential users
and consumers of EDR data: insurance companies, vehicle manufacturers,
government, law enforcement, plaintiffs, defense attorneys, judges,
juries, courts, prosecutors, human factors research, state insurance
commissioners, parents' groups, fleets and drivers, medical injury
guideline data usage, vehicle owner and transportation researchers and
academics, with the auto industry as one of the major future consumers
of EDR data.
This large, broad and unregulated list of people and entities with
the potential ability to get access to private information from an EDR
without the driver's consent is alarming and disturbing to many
consumers.
The data an EDR records can be decisive in a criminal or civil
case.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ http://www.4dca.org/Mar percent202005/03-30-05/4D03-2043.pdf.
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Further, a driver's insurance coverage might someday depend on
information collected from an EDR. Important rights could be at stake.
Since vehicles have a universal serial bus diagnostic link
connector port to accommodate connecting peripheral devices such as
electronic scan tools capable of re-engineering and altering odometers
this has given rise to vehicle tampering.
Under current practice, anyone with access to a vehicle may plug a
portable san tool device with a flash memory card (via an interface)
into the diagnostic link connector port and copy (or tamper with)
information in the vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) and download
data to a portable flash card or similar type memory devices.
Since portable flash memory cards are usually very small, removing
the flash memory card from the diagnostic link connector port and
taking information out of the vehicle is relatively easy.
The loss of proprietary and confidential information such as
proprietary product information, trade secrets and vehicle crash data
can be very costly with regard to lost revenue and corporate liability,
thus most automakers take significant security precautions to protect
against the theft of corporate information. Some companies take extreme
and costly measures to keep vehicle information from being downloaded
without proper authorization. Rental car companies and automotive lease
dealers are at great risk of suffering economically via widespread
vehicle tampering.
A simple search on the Internet provides alarming results. On one
site http://www.ec21.com/ a search for ``crash data'' found 29 products
from 23 companies advertised with capabilities to alter or omit crash
data or by plugging an inexpensive software/hardware device in the OBD
port.
Other after-market products are currently available such as the Uif
Technology Co., Ltd., (Shenzhen, China) ``Mileage Correction Kit''
which is marketed as ``a compact interface that will allow you to
easily read/write/modify the mileage/km of your car without the need to
remove the dash. It connects to the on-board diagnostics port located
in your car.''
This is not simply an American problem. It is estimated that every
year, more than 89,000 vehicles with tampered odometers reach the
Canadian marketplace at a cost to Canadians of more than $3.56 million
according to estimates by a United States of America based company
called CarFax.
A 2002 U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration study
shows that each year more than 450,000 Americans will inadvertently buy
a used vehicle with the mileage gauges rolled back. That makes
tampering with odometers a $1.1-billion-a-year industry in the United
States of America alone.
The final EDR rulemaking (8/26/06) states (in part) the following:
We have considered the comments recommending that we address
potential tampering of EDRs. We currently do not have
information that leads us to believe that tampering with EDRs
is a problem that necessitates us to develop requirements in
this area. We may revisit this issue if we find that tampering
becomes a problem.
Tampering means to modify, remove, render inoperative, and cause to
be removed, or make less operative any device or element design
installed on a motor vehicle or motor vehicle power-train, chassis or
body components which results in altering Federal motor vehicle safety
standards (FMVSS).
Once it gets data, I believe that the Agency has taken adequate
steps to ensure individual privacy vis-a-vis its use of EDR data.
However, the Agency can do more to assure that the data collected is
not tampered with and is thus scientifically valid. To end up with
``Garbage In--Garbage Out'' scenario after a decade of R&D would negate
the mission of NHTSA.
The Agency states in the final rulemaking that ``We understand that
EDRs can generate concerns related to how EDR data are currently used
or will be used by entities other than NHTSA.''
Unless the Agency moves quickly to protect EDR crash data it may
become virtually useless. Once crash data is primarily used in civil
and criminal cases a strong public response would motivate automakers
to remove the technologies--thus increasing the possibilities of
injuries and fatalities and negating the primary mission of NHTSA--to
serve the greater good.
Automotive insurance companies must also assure that the real-time
crash data has not be tampered or altered.
Therefore, a more practical and convenient means of preventing
casual and unauthorized downloading of information is needed to protect
the privacy of vehicle owners and motorists.
A consumer revolt against the installation of EDRs could negatively
impact sales and/or lead many manufacturers to offer owners the option
to turn off their EDRs or even to stop installation of them altogether.
EDRs as defined by 49 CFR 563 are not designed to resist tampering
and if such tampering occurs there is no penalty. Thus, a giant privacy
void exists as a central element of consumer protection and consumer
acceptance.
IEEE 1616: Standard for Motor Vehicle Event Data Recorder (MVEDR)
section 1.3 Data Privacy and Security Recommendations cite (in part)
the following:
In recent years, advances in technology have made possible the
detailed information about individuals to be compiled and
shared. This has produced many benefits for society as whole
and individual consumers. At the same time, as personal
information becomes more accessible precautions must be taken
to protect against the misuse of information. MVEDR data
aggregated across many events has significant scientific value.
Occasional errors in data recording, communication, or
retrieval will undoubtedly occur. However, uncontrolled release
of any data, especially erroneous data for any specific event,
has the potential to compromise that directly affected
individual's need for confidentiality. Moreover, aggregate
MVEDR data may contain an occasional statistical anomaly. While
scientifically undesirable, minor errors are not catastrophic
to the overall value of the data. However, individual or
personal data containing statistically insignificant errors or
omissions may wrongly attribute, falsely indicate fraud, or
erroneously convict/exonerate a particular person.''
Thus, there is a recognized need to provide both a means of
consumer protection for permitting EPA mandated OBD data related to
engine and emissions diagnostic data to be downloaded by service
technicians and vehicle inspection stations and automobile inspection
stations while at the same securing crash data for vehicle owners,
thereby protecting privacy and avoiding tampering in an inexpensive and
useful manner.
Vehicle owners are any individual, business, institution,
government agency, organization, or corporation that holds the title to
a motor vehicle.
The Agency received sufficient evident to understand that EDR crash
data can be tampered with via the vehicle diagnostic link connector.
See NHTSA-2008-0004-0013 at www.regulations.gov for an expert witness
evaluation of 49 CFR 563.
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)/
Transportation Research Board/National Academies Project 17-24 Final
report: Use of Event Data Recorder (EDR) Technology for Highway Crash
Data Analysis notes (in part) :
Although no cases have yet addressed the issue of EDR
tampering, court rulings in cases involving similar devices in
trains and trucks indicate that deliberate erasure or tampering
with EDR data will move courts to invoke so-called evidence
spoliation remedies. In other words, the deliberate destruction
of such evidence may lead to sanctions against the despoiling
party and judges may permit juries to draw certain negative
inferences from such behavior.
While the Agency may not have ``anti-tampering'' provisions written
into the EDR final rulemaking, the Safety Act does include a provision
known as the ``rendering inoperative'' provision which is set forth in
section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That
section prohibits manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair
shops from knowingly ``rendering inoperative,'' in whole or in part,
any device or element of design installed on or in a vehicle in
compliance with an applicable safety standard.
To overcome the shortcomings my pending Petition for
Reconsideration of 49 CFR 563: Event Data Recorders recommending a
simple mechanical lockout for a diagnostic link connector port would
mitigate or obviate the aforementioned problems. Specifically, NHTSA-
2008-0004-0007 seeks to: (1) maintain data privacy, (2) prevent data
tampering, (3) avoid odometer fraud, (4) limit access to sensitive
data, (5) stop in-vehicle systems engineering, (6) secure in-vehicle
networks, (7) enhance overall safety and (8) encourage consumer
acceptance.
Several Letters of Support are available for review at
www.regulations.gov search NHTSA-2008-0004. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See NHTSA-2008-0004-0011 and NHTSA-2008-0004-0012 at
www.regulations.gov.
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The Change Required in 49 CFR 563: Event Data Recorders \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See NHTSA-2008-0001 at www.regulations.gov.
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Congress Shall Require That NHTSA Add the Following
563.13 Motor Vehicle Event Data Recorder Connector Lockout Apparatus
(MVEDRCLA).
Each manufacturer of a motor vehicle equipped with an EDR shall
ensure by licensing agreement or other means that a motor vehicle event
data recorder connector lockout apparatus (MVEDRCLA) as standardized by
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards
Association (IEEE 1616) is commercially available for securing access
to the data stored in the EDR that are required by this part. The
MVEDRCLA shall be commercially available not later than 90 days after
the first sale of the motor vehicle for purposes other than resale.\14\
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\14\ See NHTSA-2008-0014.1 at www.regulations.gov.
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The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard:
IEEE 1616aTM Standard for Motor Vehicle Event Data
Recorders (MVEDRS)--Amendment 1: Motor Vehicle Event Data
Recorder Connector Lockout Apparatus (MVEDRCLA).
Scope: Motor Vehicle Event Data Recorders (MVEDRs) collect, record,
store and export data related to pre-defined events in usage history.
This amendment defines a lockout protocol for MVEDR output data
accessibility by securing the vehicle output diagnostic link connector
(DLC). This standard does not prescribe data security within the
vehicle electronic control units (ECUs) or within the intra-vehicle
communication and/or diagnostic networks but instead defines ways and
means to permit uniform, but controlled access of electronic scan tools
to the DLC for legitimate vehicle emissions status, maintenance and/or
repair. This standard also defines a means of maintaining data security
on the vehicle via a motor vehicle DLC connector lockout apparatus
(MVEDRCLA). The MVEDRCLA is applicable to vehicles and their respective
event data recorders for all types of motor vehicles licensed to
operate on public highways.
Purpose: Many light-duty vehicles, and increasing numbers of heavy
commercial vehicles, are equipped with some form of a MVEDR. These
systems are diverse in function, and proprietary in nature, however,
the SAE J1962 (ISO/DIS 15031-3) vehicle diagnostic link connector (DLC)
has a common design and pinout, and is thus universally used to access
event data recorder information. Data access via the DLC can be
accomplished by using scan tools or microcomputers and network
interfaces. This same DLC and network interface is also used for re-
calibrating electronic control units on a vehicle. Such ECU
applications can include restraint controls, engine controls, stability
controls, braking controls, etc. This amendment defines a protocol to
protect against misuse of electronic tools which use the DLC to erase,
modify or tamper with electronic controller or odometer readings, or to
improperly download data. Implementation of MVEDRCLA provides an
opportunity to voluntarily achieve DLC security by standardizing a
MVEDRCLA which will act to prevent vehicle tampering, which can include
odometer fraud, illegal calibrations leading to emissions violations
and theft of personal data. Adoption of this standard will therefore
make the common MVEDR/DLC data more secure and credible while still
permitting accessibility to legitimate end users.
Bottom Line: If vehicle and highway safety is to be advanced in our
Nation then crash data available from EDRs must be tamper-proof.
Respectfully Submitted,
Thomas M. Kowalick.
Attachments
1. Petition for Reconsideration submitted 25 February 2008
2. Letter of Support dated 17 November 2009
Online Resources
Press release IEEE p1616 at http://standards.ieee.org/
announcements/pr_
1616.html
Press release IEEE 1616 at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1616a/
PR.html
Fatal Exit: The Automotive Black Box Debate at http://
books.google.com/books
?id=VkooLFWnUmYC&dq=fatal+exit&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=Cd
1pS8zwllaWtgftiZHSBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CBA
Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=appeal&f=true
GAO-09-056 at http://gao.gov/new.items/d0956.pdf
NHTSA Dockets at www.regulations.gov see NHTSA-2008-0004-0007 for
Kowalick Petition.
49 CFR 563: Event Data Recorders at www.regulations.gov See NHTSA-
2008-0004-0001
CC: Chairman, The Honorable Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, West
Virginia
Ranking Member, The Honorable Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Texas
The Honorable Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii
The Honorable Senator John F. Kerry, Massachusetts
The Honorable Senator Byron L. Dorgan, North Dakota
The Honorable Senator Barbara Boxer, California
The Honorable Senator Bill Nelson, Florida
The Honorable Senator Maria Cantwell, Washington
The Honorable Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, New Jersey
The Honorable Senator Mark Pryor, Arkansas
The Honorable Senator Claire McCaskill, Missouri
The Honorable Senator Amy Klobuchar, Minnesota
The Honorable Senator Tom Udall, New Mexico
The Honorable Senator Mark Warner, Virginia
The Honorable Senator Mark Begich, Alaska
The Honorable Senator Olympia Snowe, Maine
The Honorable Senator John Ensign, Nevada
The Honorable Senator Jim DeMint, South Carolina
The Honorable Senator John Thune, South Dakota
The Honorable Senator Roger Wicker, Mississippi
______
February 25, 2008
Hon. Nicole R. Nason,
Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Washington, DC.
Dear Nicole R. Nason:
[Docket No. NHTSA-2008-00041 RIN 21'27-AK 12 or subsequently NHTSA-
2006-25666.
RE: Petition for Reconsideration to 49 CFR Part 563 Event Data
Recorders--Response to Petitions for Reconsideration as published in
the Federal Register/Vol. 73, No. 9/Monday, January 14, 2008/Rules and
Regulations.
Specifically, I Petition for Remand due to factual errors in the
Agency response to the following section:
H. Public Privacy and Consumer
Notification of EDRs
1. Whether NHTSA Should Require a Mechanical Lockout on EDRs.
Mr. Thomas Kowalick petitioned NHTSA to require a mechanical
lockout on the on-board diagnostic (OBD2) port \28\ for the
sole use/control of the owner or operator of the vehicle
equipped with an EDR. Mr. Kowalick argued that it is possible
to protect consumer privacy rights by use of a mechanical
lockout system on this port, which is used to download EDR
data. In a March 1, 2007 meeting with NHTSA, Mr. Kowalick
expressed an additional concern that aftermarket devices are
being developed to erase or tamper with EDR data.\29\ He noted
that the preamble to the final rule stated that if tampering
became apparent, NHTSA would reconsider its position on this
issue.
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\28\ See 61 FR 40940. Thc OBD2 port standard specifies the type of
diagnostic connector and its output pin locations used for monitoring
vehicle parameters measured by the on-board computer(s) such as
emissions controls. It is typically located on the driver's side of the
passenger compartment near the center console.
\29\ Docket No. NHTSA-2006-25666-457.
Agency response: We are denying this petition. Mr. Kowalick
provided information that devices may exist to erase or tamper
with EDR data, but he did not provide information that they
were actually being used. There are several other ways that EDR
tampering will be prevented. First, the EDR download port is
installed inside the vehicle, on which the door locks act as a
first line of defense to prevent access to the data port.
Second, if the vehicle glazing is missing, either due to an
accident or forceful entry (assuming a person wants to tamper
with someone else's EDR data), the vehicle key is needed to
power the vehicle to access the EDR data through the diagnostic
port. And third, the final rule requires that event data from
crashes in which an air bag has been deployed must be locked
and cannot be overwritten. As stated in the final rule, the
agency may revisit the issue if EDR tampering indeed becomes a
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problem.
I petition NHTSA for remand based on evidence of tampering. Thus, I
am providing information to persuade NHTSA that conditions have changed
meaningfully since the Agency's original determination--specifically
with current tampering of EDR data and odometer readings.
Definition of Tampering
``Tampering'' means to modify, remove, render inoperative, cause to
be removed, or make less operative any device or element design
installed on a motor vehicle or motor vehicle power-train, chassis or
body components which results in altering Federal motor vehicle safety
standards (FMVSS).
Providing the Agency Evidence of Tampering Devices
Docket NHTSA-2006-25666-457 clearly establishes that numerous
devices exist to reset air bags, erase crash data and/or modify
odometer readings. In that docket I cited 29 products from 23 companies
advertised with capabilities to alter or omit crash data by plugging an
inexpensive software/hardware device into the vehicle OBD port.
Providing the Agency Evidence of Tampering Services
Here are four (4) examples as advertised online (last visited 2/27/
08):
http://www.talktomycar.co.uk/index.htm
http://www.airbagcrash.com/
http://www.tachosoft.com/_airbag.htm
http://www.autodiag.ru/airbagaudivwen.html
NHTSA Initiatives Call for Increased Measures but Fail to Provide an
Effective Counter-Measure
The Agency maintains an Office of Odometer Fraud Investigation with
a website at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/
menuitem.893c19c9fb974f825c42008
7dba046a0/
This site provides the following assessment:
Odometer tampering continues to be a serious crime and consumer
fraud issue. In 2002, NHTSA determined this crime allows more
than 450,000 vehicles to be sold each year with false odometer
readings, milking American car buyers out of more than $1
billion annually. From 2002 to 2005, we have seen a definite
escalation of odometer fraud. New car prices, coupled with the
increased demand for late-model, low-mileage used cars, has
made odometer fraud more profitable than ever. Strong
enforcement of the Federal and state odometer laws, i.e.,
prosecutions with stiff sentences, appears to be the most
effective deterrent.
The Nature of Odometer Fraud According to the U.S. Department of
Justice (USDOJ)
Odometer fraud is a pernicious crime that robs thousands of dollars
from each victim it touches. See, e.g., United States v. Whitlow, 979
F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1992) (under sentencing guidelines, court
affirmed estimate that consumers lost $4,000 per vehicle). The
television news magazine 60 Minutes once characterized it as the
largest consumer fraud in America. Victims of this fraud are commonly
the least able to afford it, since buyers of used cars include large
numbers of low income people. In addition, consumers generally arc
unaware of being victimized.
Odometer-tampering involves several interrelated activities. Late-
model, high-mileage vehicles are purchased at a low price. The vehicles
are ``reconditioned'' or ``detailed'' to remove many outward
appearances of long use. Finally, odometers are reset, typically
removing more than 40,000 miles.
In addition to the cosmetic ``reconditioning'' of the car, the
odometer tamperer ``reconditions'' paperwork. Automobile titles include
a declaration of mileage statement to be completed when ownership is
transferred. To hide the actual mileage that is declared on the title
when the car is sold to an odometer tamperer, the tamperer must take
steps to conceal this information. These steps vary from simple
alteration of mileage figures, to creating transfers to fictitious
``straw'' dealerships to make it unclear who was responsible for the
odometer rollback and title alteration. Alternatively, the odometer
tamperers frequently destroy original title documents indicating high-
mileage, and obtain duplicate certificates of title from state motor
vehicle departments, upon which the false, lower mileage figures are
entered.
Whatever method is used, the result is the same. The odometer
tamperer possesses an altered, forged, or replacement title document
(which is a security under Federal law) containing a false low-mileage
reading. This title is used to sell the car, for several thousand
dollars above its actual value, to a purchaser who is deceived
regarding the vehicle's remaining useful life by the altered odometer,
by the vehicle's outward appearance, and by the counterfeit, low-
mileage title and odometer statement.\1\
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\1\ See http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/ocl/monograph/odom.htm (Last
visited 2/25/2008)
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Rationale for this Petition for Reconsideration stressing that the
Agency has the authority and responsibility to act in a timely manner
to correct clearly erroneous errors:
1. The Agency already acknowledges tampering devices exist to
erase crash data and alter odometers, and promises if tampering
became apparent it would reconsider its position on this issue.
This petition provides evidence of tampering.
2. The Agency's EDR rulemaking is inadequate to protect owner/
operators of an estimated sixty (60) million vehicles that
currently utilize event data recorder (EDR) technologies as
proven by the fact that EDR data is widely used in civil and
criminal cases.\2\ Even though the majority of vehicle owners
are unaware of the presence of these ``black boxes'' in their
vehicle, criminal prosecutors and personal injury attorneys are
obtaining the data contained in these ``black boxes'' from
owners' vehicles and using the data contained within to charge
drivers with crimes or hold them liable for damages in personal
injury lawsuits. Numerous unsuspecting vehicle operators have
been convicted, sentenced and jailed based, in part, on the
black box data extracted from their vehicles.\3\
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\2\ EDR case law online at http://www.collisionsafety.net/
cdrcaselaw.htm (Last visited 2/25/2008).
\3\ See http://lemonfax.com/industry_secrets.html (Last visited 2/
25/2008).
3. Door locks do not serve as an adequate defense to prevent
access to the diagnostic link connector (DLC) data port.
Following a crash numerous personnel including first
responders, law enforcement and other third parties such as
vehicle towing and insurance adjusters have access to the
interior of the vehicle and thus to the diagnostic link
connector (DLC) port. Therefore, an open port is always subject
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to tampering. (see figure 1).
4. Furthermore, a vehicle key is NOT NEEDED to access the EDR
data since the Agency is fully aware that there arc alternative
methods to provide power via the fuse box.\4\ The Agency also
understands future vehicles will include keyless ignitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Agency participated in a National Academies of Science/
Transportation Research Board (NSA/TRB) National Cooperative Highway
Research Project 17-24 Use of Event Data Recorder (EDR) Technology for
Highway Crash Analysis study in which a section (4) was devoted to EDR
Data Retrieval Methods and Issues: Section 4.2.2 specifically outlines
NHTSA experience with EDR Data Retrieval; and Section 4.2.3
specifically details Interviews with NASS Field Accident Investigators.
Thus, the Agency is well versed on alternative methods of accessing
data without a vehicle key. The full report is available online at:
www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/edr-site/uploads/TRB_NCHRP_Project_17-24.pdf--
Other EDR Downloading Concerns. Assuming that the accident
investigation teams are able to download the EDR from the OBD-II port,
they need to obtain the vehicles keys to operate the ignition. Contrary
to overall NHTSA findings, the Ocean County team reported that
obtaining the vehicles keys was not a problem, making this method of
download a simple process when OBD-II download functions correctly. GM
Experience with EDR Data Retrieval: The research team followed up these
interviews with a phone interview with a subject EDR expert at GM
(Floyd, 2003). GM reports significantly higher success rates at
downloading their EDRs through the OBD-II connector. GM uses a
technique of externally powering the airbag control module through the
fuse box when the car has lost power or no key is available. GM reports
that this technique works unless there is significant intrusion or
unless the ODD-II connection has been grounded. It should be noted that
this technique is not however part of the currently recommended
practice when using the Vetronix CDR tool. Using techniques such as
these, however, GM estimates that their EDRs can be downloaded through
the OBD-II connector 80 percent of the time. Only an estimated 20
percent of the attempted downloads require direct connection with
cables. In an estimated 5 percent of all cases, no data can be
recovered for reasons including water immersion, fire, or severe crash
damage.
5. Finally, although the Agency cites that event data from
crashes in which an air bag has been deployed must be locked
and cannot be overwritten the Agency failed to define the term
``lock.'' \5\ which permits a high likelihood of confusion and
misunderstanding.
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\5\ During this same EDR rulemaking in response to a petition from
AORC the Agency stated ``If we allowed the EDR to be erased by external
means, it could encourage development of tools to erase EDR data
potentially beneficial to our programs, and would make it difficult to
ensure that this feature was not being misused. Although the final rule
did not define the term ``locked.'' we consider it to mean to protect
EDR data from changes or deletion. This would include by external
means.'' (note--these tools are being used!)
In conclusion, although NASS investigation teams may be properly
collecting EDR crash data the Agency cannot determine--one way or the
other--if or when motor vehicle event data recorders or odometers are
tampered with by other parties, therefore, calling into question the
validity of the data gathered or a rationale for lack of data (once
erased). To remedy this situation the Agency should quickly correct
clearly erroneous factual errors and mandate a mechanical lockout on
the diagnostic link connector (DLC) for vehicles that include EDRs or
provide access to odometer settings via the DLC. This is an immediate
and urgent issue. A simple OEM or aftermarket lockout product is
readily feasible. Vehicle OEMs would welcome this means of protecting
data and preventing re-engineering. The estimated cost per vehicle
would be approximately two dollars. This would be a small price for
providing consumer protection toward assuring consumer acceptance of
these emerging life saving technologies. I welcome the opportunity to
provide additional information to the Agency on this issue. I also
volunteer to provide a demonstration of how to secure the ODB DLC port
without interfering with scheduled maintenance, inspection or repair of
the vehicle as required. Thus, based on the evidence presented to the
Agency there are no substantive reasons for denial of this timely
petition.
Sincerely,
Thomas M. Kowalick.
______
Automotive Systems Analysis, Inc.
Reston, VA, 17 November 2009
Mr. Stephen R. Kratzke, Esq.,
Associate Administrator of Rulemaking,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Washington, DC.
Subject: Letter of support for Professor Thomas M. Kowalick's Petition
for Reconsideration of 49 CFR 563.
Dear Mr. Kratzke:
I, William Rosenbluth, wish to submit a letter of support of Mr.
Thomas M. Kowalick's Petition for Reconsideration regarding 49 CFR 563;
Event Data Recorders.
I have been performing retrieval and analysis of passenger vehicle
EDR data for approximately 15 years. I am the author of two books
published on that subject, Investigation and Interpretation of Black
Box Data in Automobiles, jointly published by the American Society of
Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) in June 2001 and Black Box Data from Accident Vehicles, Methods
of Retrieval, Translation and Interpretation, published by ASTM in
November 2009.
I support Mr. Kowalick's Petition for Reconsideration because I
perceive that the Agency has published ambiguous security criteria for
``locked data,'' while Mr Kowalick's anti-tampering device
unambiguously accomplishes security for ``locked data''. My perception
of the Agency's security criteria for ``locked data'' is discussed
below:
1. The definition of ``locked data'' in the Final Rule, published
in the Federal Register: August 28, 2006 contains the notice that:
We have considered the comments recommending that we address
potential tampering with EDRs. We currently do not have
information that leads us to believe that tampering with EDRs
is a problem that necessitates us to develop requirements in
this area. We may revisit this issue if we find that EDR
tampering becomes a problem. However, we do believe one aspect
of EDR design will discourage tampering. We are requiring that
the captured file be locked for crashes that involve air bags.
The locked file will be preserved and the file cannot be
overwritten. (SOURCE: FR Vol 71, No. 166/Monday, August 28,
2006/ Rules and Regulations, Page 51023.).
The exact definition of ``locked file'' or ``locked data'' was
not further specified. Current usage defines ``locked data'' as
specific event-data, once written, that cannot be overwritten
by a next event. The current means of indicating that data is
locked is a byte flag in non-volatile memory indicating that a
portion of non-volatile memory is ``locked'' and cannot be
overwritten by a next event.
2. In current designs, such data is normally resident in
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), which is
actually a re-writable media. Current and understood technology allows
external access to read that EEPROM data via an external data port
(typically, the SAE J 1962 port). Data port access to post crash-event
EEPROM data is typically protected via SAE J 2190 mode 27 security
measures. Data in EEPROM is retained even when battery power is
removed.
3. However, as with any software protection, if there are ways to
read EEPROM ``locked data'' from an external port, there are ways to
write, alter or overwrite that ``locked data'' from an external port
(as long as the media in question (EEPROM) is re-writable).
Additionally, there are ways to write, alter or overwrite data in
EEPROM media via direct internal EEPROM umbilical connections, thus
avoiding data port security measures.
4. It thus appears that, based on the FR Vol 71, No. 166/Monday,
August 28, 2006/Rules and Regulations, Page 51023 criteria, traditional
EEPROM technology, as used in current day EDRs, satisfies this
criteria. However, data saved in traditional EEPROM technology is
actually quite changeable with appropriate external software commands.
5. The Agency appears to have disallowed Mr. Kowalick's original
petition, as documented in the Federal Register: January 14, 2008
(Volume 73, Number 9)], [Rules and Regulations], [Page 2168-2184],
based on its perception that ``locked data'' was not changeable.
Specifically, in its determination, the Agency considered on page 2178:
1. Whether NHTSA Should Require a Mechanical Lockout on EDRs
Mr. Thomas Kowalick petitioned NHTSA to require a mechanical
lockout on the on-board diagnostic (OBD2) port for the sole use
control of the owner or operator of the vehicle equipped with
an EDR. Mr. Kowalick argued that it is possible to protect
consumer privacy rights by use of a mechanical lockout system
on this port, which is used to download EDR data. In a March 1,
2007 meeting with NHTSA, Mr. Kowalick expressed an additional
concern that aftermarket devices are being developed to erase
or tamper with EDR data. He noted that the preamble to the
final rule stated that if tampering became apparent, NHTSA
would reconsider its position on this issue.''
The Agency responded that: We are denying this petition. Mr.
Kowalick provided information that devices may exist to erase
or tamper with EDR data, but he did not provide information
that they were actually being used. There are several other
ways that EDR tampering will be prevented. First, the EDR
download port is installed inside the vehicle, on which the
door locks act as a first line of defense to prevent access to
the data port. Second, if the vehicle glazing is missing,
either due to an accident or forceful entry (assuming a person
wants to tamper with someone else's EDR data), the vehicle key
is needed to power the vehicle to access the EDR data through
the diagnostic port. And third, the final rule requires that
event data from crashes in which an air bag has been deployed
must be locked and cannot be overwritten. As stated in the
final rule, the agency may revisit the issue if EDR tampering
indeed becomes a problem.
6. The Agency, in its answer to Mr. Kowalick, apparently feels that
``locked data'' cannot be overwritten. However, current technology and
current designs only prevent ``locked data'' from being overwritten by
a successive crash event.
7. Conversely, in the same Federal Register: January 14, 2008,
Volume 73, Number 9, Page 2172, in response to an AORC petition, the
Agency additionally defined (clarified) its perception of ``locked
data'' as defined below.
Agency response: We are denying this petition. We do not
believe that reuse of the EDR is a sufficient reason to allow
its erasure by external means. If we allowed the EDR to be
erased by external means, it could encourage development of
tools to erase EDR data potentially beneficial to our programs,
and would make it difficult to ensure that this feature was not
being misused. Although the final rule did not define the term
``locked,'' we consider it to mean to protect EDR data from
changes or deletion. This would include by external means.
This is the first Agency definition (clarification) that
``locked data'' should be immune from alteration by any
external means. However it does not specify the ``locked data''
has to be saved in non-rewritable media, nor does it specify
the degree of security needed to assert that the ``locked
data'' is immune from alteration by any external means.
8. The current reality is that such event-data (as is chosen to be
saved) is typically saved in EEPROM. EEPROM is a rewritable media. At
this time, notwithstanding data port security measures, there are many
publicly advertised tools that have the ability to clear ``locked
data'' from crash records in Event Data Recorders (typically SRS ECUs),
using only the external data port. Representative publicly advertised
tools arc shown in Appendix A.
9. One alternative method of achieving absolute ``locked data''
security, using current technology, is to use Electrically Programmable
Read Only Memory (EPROM), versus EEPROM, as the media in which to store
``locked data''. EPROM is written once, and is not electrically
changeable thereafter. That change would absolutely comply with the
Agency's later definition (clarification) in response to AORC, however,
that change would preclude the storage of multiple below-threshold
(i.e., near-deploy ) events in a common media. Thus, to save event-data
for both non-deploy and deploy level events (as is done today) , it
would require multiple event-data buffer memory types (e.g., EPROM and
EEPROM). That would require programming design innovation and hardware
design innovation above and beyond current EDR design practices. Such
design innovations would add to the cost, complexity and design lead
time for future EDRs.
10. Conversely, if the Agency wishes to avoid such design
innovation, the Agency must revisit the method of preventing
unauthorized and possibly nefarious tools from accessing and possibly
altering the supposedly ``locked data.''
The most practical way to do that is to use a device that
physically assures diagnostic port integrity. That was the nub of Mr.
Kowalick's original Petition and his Petition for Reconsideration.
11. For the above reasons, I believe that the Agency must state its
unambiguous intent regarding ``locked data'' and its direction to
achieve ``locked data'' by either via incorporation of design and
technology innovation in the EDR ECU itself or by a mechanical security
device as would be achieved by allowing Mr. Kowalick's Petition for
Reconsideration of 49 CFR 563: Event Data Recorders.
Respectfully submitted,
William Rosenbluth.
______
Appendix A
Publicly advertised tools that have the ability to clear ``locked
data'' from crash records in Event Data Recorders (typically SRS ECUs),
1. http://www.uuctech.com/Products/VW-AUDI-Airbag-Reset.html
2. http://www.tradekey.com/product_view/id/811757.htm
3. http://www.codecard.lt/carprog/carprog-airbag-with-all-software-
39-s-and-ada
pters-needed-for-airbag-repair-and-programming/prod_345.html
4. http://www.adkautoscan.com/Production/R101.htm
5. http://autocheery.en.made-in-china.com/product/reOQqGocbJiB/
China-Honda
-SRS-OBD2-Airbag-Resetter-for-Honda-with-TMS320-.html
6. http://www.mtaplus.cz/navody/vwgroup_airbagreseter.pdf
7. http://www.codecard.lt/ford-airbag-reset-tool-please-find-it-as-
carprog-software-/prod
8. http://www.codecard.lt/carprog/software/carprog-airbag/s5-5-gm-
airbag-reset
-tool-by-obdii/prod_88.html
Author Information: Thomas M. Kowalick, is widely recognized as a
leading researcher on EDR technologies. He is president of Click,
Inc.--Transportation Safety Technologies, a member of the Author's
Guild, and is a professor in Pinehurst, North Carolina. Kowalick served
as Co-Chair of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) global project 16160 to create the world's first automotive
black box standard, contributed to the development of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) website for EDR research,
and as a panel member on the National Academies of Sciences project
studying EDRs. He is the author of FATAL EXIT: The Automotive Black Box
Debate (John Wiley) and five other books specifically covering EDR
history, standardization, legislation, regulation, legal issues and
consumer protection. Kowalick is also author of the EDR segment in the
forthcoming McGraw Hill 2009 Yearbook of Science & Technology. He holds
three foundation patents for EDR technologies and his company
manufactures CRASH-GUARD an new automotive aftermarket product to help
prevent EDR tampering and odometer fraud.
Further information please contact [email protected] or
[email protected]
______
King & Spalding LLP
Washington, DC, March 18, 2010
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller:
I am writing on behalf of Toyota Motor North America, Inc. (``TMA''
or ``Toyota'') to you as Chairman of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation (``the Committee''). The hearing addressed
a number of issues related to unintended acceleration in various Toyota
models. Toyota welcomes the opportunity to clarify the matters you and
other Senators of the Committee have raised, and has asked me to
provide the following responses.
Question 1. Please describe all technical and substantive
differences between the electronic sensors Toyota places on its pedals
versus the electronic sensors on its engine throttle control.
Answer. Features of electronic sensors are different between the
pedal and the engine throttle control. For those on the pedals, voltage
sensors in which both sensors increase at the same rate are used; while
for those on the engine throttle control, voltage sensors in which both
sensors increase at different rates are used.
Question 2. In accordance with the charts shown during the bearing
in which Toyota on its website describes the different voltage levels
for the pedal versus the engine throttle assembly, please answer the
following questions:
a. Why does Toyota use different sensors with different voltage
level increases for its pedals versus engine throttle control?
i. Is one technology safer than the other?
Answer. There is no difference in safety between the two sensors.
They are an integral part of the overall system strategy that provides
a reliable operation with a robust fault detection and fail-safe
features.
b. Why does Toyota use voltage sensors on its pedals in which both
sensors increase at the same rate?
i. Why did Toyota make that decision when the rest of the auto
industry on its pedals uses voltage sensors that increase at different
rates?
Answer. Toyota is not the only manufacturer that uses sensors that
increase at the same rate. The strategy used by Toyota provides a
better angle resolution.
c. Why does Toyota use voltage sensors on its engine throttle
assembly that increase at different rates?
Answer. Toyota has used voltage sensors on its engine throttle
assembly that increase at different rates since the initial
implementation of the ETCS system. Toyota is not aware of any problems
with these sensors in the market.
d. How much does the sensor on the pedal assembly cost for 2004-
2008 Camrys? (Please give an answer for each year).
Answer. Sensors are not purchased as separate items. They are part
of the pedal assembly.
e. How much would it have cost to place on the pedal assembly
sensors that increase at different voltage rates for 2004-2008 Camrys?
(Please give an answer for each year).
Answer. Sensors are not purchased as separate items. They are part
of the pedal assembly.
Question 3. In the beginning of the last decade, many automobile
manufacturers transitioned from ``drive by cable'' throttle control
systems to ``drive by wire'' electronic throttle control system driven
by software with electronic sensors and mechanisms. Like many
electronic devices, they moved quickly to the marketplace without much
testing and did not come without their flaws and glitches. Toyota
introduced their first system in 2002 in their popular Camry model.
Since 2002, NHTSA has conducted eight investigations regarding SUA in
Toyota and Lexus Vehicles. Software has undergone many upgrades and
revisions in recent years, and today's software is easy to update with
added programs.
a. Can you please explain the role of computers and software in the
control systems for your vehicles?
Answer. Computers and software are used in the modem vehicles to
provide a safe, reliable, fuel efficient operation with minimal
pollution. They help the vehicle operate at its most efficient
performance. They also provide advanced safety features like stability
and traction control, and help provide a fault detection and fail-safe
strategy to the vehicles. With these systems, in the event of a fault
detection, the driver is notified; vehicle acceleration is curtailed at
the same time, allowing the driver to move the vehicle to a safe
location away from the traffic.
b. Has Toyota identified any flaws with ETC systems in the research
and development stage or the current marketplace?
Answer. Toyota has not identified any flaws in its ETCS-i system in
the development stage or in the market.
c. Does Toyota believe this software or electronic throttle control
systems to be a cause of unintended acceleration in Toyotas?
Answer. Toyota's design process is exhaustive and robust. Toyota
does not believe there are any problems with the electronics of its
vehicles. Toyota has built-in redundancies to the system and fail safe
modes that allow Toyota to say with confidence that the ETCS-i is not
the cause of unintended or unwanted acceleration. The ETCS-i system is
designed to cause the engine power to shut off or operate at reduced
power in the event of a system failure.
Toyota recently commissioned Exponent, a well-respected engineering
and scientific consulting firm, to study Toyota and Lexus vehicles and
components for concerns related to unwanted acceleration. Exponent was
not restricted by scope or by budget considerations in this review.
Although its work is still ongoing, to date Exponent has found that the
ETCS-i systems have performed as designed, and have not exhibited any
acceleration or precursor to acceleration, despite concerted efforts to
induce unwanted acceleration. In all cases tested by Exponent so far,
the vehicle either behaved normally or entered the fail-safe mode
described above.
d. What will Toyota do if either Toyota or NHTSA discover that
there is a defect with the Electronic Throttle Control System (ETCS)?
Answer. Toyota is confident that no problems exist with the ETCS in
Toyota's vehicles. Toyota does not believe unintended acceleration is
caused by a defect in the ETCS-i system. Toyota will be vigilant in
addressing consumer complaints, and if it finds any additional problems
with its vehicles, it will address them promptly, in full cooperation
with NHTSA and in full compliance with related laws and regulations.
Question 4. Many other manufacturers of other high-tech systems,
such as those making products for NASA and the DOD, conduct strenuous
verification and validation tests on their equipment by engineers
completely independent from software developers and hardware
manufacturers with the assumption that there will be faults and
failures in the system. They even test these systems under high stress
conditions. The purpose is to correct any fixable flaws and to create
fail-safe corrective systems in the event of a malfunction.
a. What fail-safe mechanisms does Toyota employ to combat the
potential for sudden unintended acceleration?
Answer. Toyota implemented a robust fault detection and fail-safe
strategy. The enclosed document lists some of the important fail-safe
features. (See Attachment A).
It is important to use the right term in discussing the ETCS-i
fail-safes. The correct term is ``fail-safe,'' which means literally
that if there is a system error or failure, the system will revert to a
safe mode. This is distinct from a ``back-up system'' or ``multiple
redundancies.'' Those terms have meanings that, in the event of an
error, preserve safety.
The ETCS-i constantly compares the target at CPUs in the Electronic
Control Module (``ECM'') and the throttle valve's opening angle many
times per second. If there is any discrepancy between the two,
electrical power is cut to the throttle control motor and a powerful
spring closes the throttle valve within 1 second to what is basically
idle position (or what is referred to as ``limp home'' mode).
The accelerator pedal position is monitored by two separate
Accelerator Pedal Position Sensors (``APPS''). These sensors read
differently from each other but are designed to maintain a different
value between them. If by chance or error some outside source-voltage
was to contaminate the sensor signal, the Electronic Control Module
(``ECM'') would recognize the incorrect signal due to a change in the
value between the two sensors. If the system recognizes that only one
of the sensors is reading correctly (by comparing signals, checking
voltages and differences in voltages between the two sensors), the
ETCS-i system will go into a fail-safe that only allows the throttle to
open a small fraction of the normal range. The driver will notice a
distinct loss in power, with a reduced maximum speed. If the ECM finds
that both sensors are inconsistent and out of range, electrical power
is cut to the throttle control motor and a powerful spring closes the
throttle within one second to what is basically the idle position. The
driver would not be able to accelerate; the vehicle will run allowing
the vehicle to ``limp home''--like driving without pressing on the
accelerator pedal.
The throttle valve is monitored by two separate sensors. Any
failure of either sensor causes the ECM to turn off the throttle
control motor, and the throttle value is then held in a fixed (near
idle) position by the return spring. In this mode engine speed is
regulated by controlling fuel injection and ignition timing according
to the APPS signals. The driver will notice a distinct loss in power,
with a reduced maximum speed.
The throttle control motor itself is covered by yet another fail-
safe system. If there is a malfunction in the system, the ECM shuts the
power to the motor off and the return springs move the throttle to the
default position. The ECM will turn the motor off if there is excessive
amperage or not enough amperage in the motor circuit.
If the driver is experiencing what he or she believes is an
unwanted acceleration event, in addition to the fail-safes above, the
driver should be able to control the vehicle with firm and steady
application of the brakes. In addition, the vehicle can be put into
neutral, and turning off the ignition using the push button operation
is explained in the Owner's Manual. There also will be a code stored in
the ECM, and a warning light will illuminate on the dashboard if the
vehicle goes into a fail-safe mode.
b. Does Toyota's electronic throttle control system (software/
hardware) receive analysis and stress testing from independent
engineers to verify and validate the safety of the system?
Answer. Toyota's internal testing standards are based on the
standards of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and those of the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and cover such
circumstances under which electronic interference by any extraneous
broadcasting radio wave, wireless appliances installed or brought into
the vehicles, and/or mobile phones might be anticipated.
On all of the electronic parts and components including the
electronic throttle, Toyota always requests its suppliers to test those
parts and components on the basis of their internal testing standards
and secure the durability of those parts and components, and then
Toyota installs those parts and components into its vehicles and
evaluates the effects of electronic interference on the functioning of
those parts and components. The results of these tests indicate all of
the electronic parts and components meet the standards before vehicle
production.
Furthermore, in order to address the current concerns on Toyota's
ETCS-i system, Toyota has recently commissioned Exponent to conduct
independent tests. Exponent is now systematically evaluating the
performance of the ETCS-i system in Toyota and Lexus vehicles when
subjected to abnormal and fault conditions. In its interim report,
previously provided to you, Exponent concluded: ``[D]uring extensive
testing on multiple vehicles, where different electrical and mechanical
[changes] were imposed on the components comprising the ETCS-i system,
Exponent did not observe any instances of unintended acceleration or
any circumstances that might lead to unintended acceleration. To the
contrary, imposing these [changes] resulted in a significant drop in
power rather than an increase, In all cases, when a fault was imposed,
the vehicle entered a fail-safe mode consistent with descriptions
provided in the technical manuals for Toyota and Lexus vehicles.''
The testing discussed above confirms that the ETCS-i system is not
susceptible to electromagnetic interference. All those tests show there
is no problem with the electronic throttle control or other electronic
components.
c. What companies does Toyota depend on for such testing? Where do
these tests take place?
Answer. Exponent, a leading engineering and scientific consulting
firm, is continuing its examination of the ETCS-i system in Toyota and
Lexus vehicles. In addition, the newly established North American
Quality Advisory Panel will examine the ETCS-i system and have the
authority to consult with any expert it chooses.
Question 5. In an internal company document dated July 2009, Toyota
boasted about convincing NHTSA that an equipment recall was sufficient
to address the pedal entrapment issue instead of a vehicle recall. This
resulted in saving the company $100 million. Unfortunately, pedal
entrapment problems persisted and more people died as a result. You
pledged during the hearing that you would confirm the actual amount of
savings to Toyota from avoiding a full recall in 2007 in favor of a
more limited equipment recall for the floormats.
a. How much did Toyota save as a result of that decision?
b. What will Toyota do to make sure that this does not happen again
and that consumer safety is always put first before corporate profits?
Answer. Toyota is actively investigating the basis for the $100
million figure in the July 2009 presentation, and will respond to the
Committee as soon as possible.
Question 6. New Mexico is a rural state and it may not be
convenient or safe for all Toyota owners to drive in for their recall
service.
a. What is Toyota doing to facilitate recalls in states where the
drive to the dealership is long and potentially dangerous due to the
items subject to the safety recall?
Answer. Toyota has several dealerships situated throughout the
state that are in close proximity to the majority of its customers and
is unaware of any widespread issues in getting to the dealership.
Consistent with Toyota's customer-first values, Toyota's dealers are
working diligently to take care of Toyota's customers and facilitate
the recall process, in many cases working extended hours to complete
repairs as quickly as possible. Toyota will support its dealers in
their efforts to ensure customers are able to get to the dealership and
have their vehicles fixed. If a consumer does not feel comfortable
driving to the dealership, Toyota, its dealers, and the customer will
coordinate a plan to get the vehicle fixed, that could mean the dealer
drives the car to the dealership, a technician visits the home, or a
tow truck brings the car to the dealership. Toyota will reimburse its
dealers for any action they take to conduct the recall efficiently and
conveniently for the customers.
Question 7. The corporate structure of Toyota has all safety
decisions being made in Japan. In fact documents requested of local
units were sent to Japan before they were sent to NHTSA as requested.
This resulted in unnecessary delays in investigations as well as
concerns that the information provided was filtered before being
delivered to NHTSA for their use.
a. What steps is Toyota taking to improve their ability to respond
completely and in a timely manner to NHTSA's requests?
Answer. Toyota is committed to increasing the frequency and
transparency of its communications with NHTSA as well as regulators in
its other markets. Toyota has proposed quarterly meetings with NHTSA,
regardless of whether there are specific issues of concern, to
facilitate the flow of communication. In addition, Toyota will be
available to NHTSA at any time additional meetings are needed.
b. What steps is Toyota taking to be more proactive in identifying
potential issues, notifying NHTSA of the issue in advance of their
request, and developing solutions to the safety concern?
Answer. Toyota is conducting a top-to-bottom review of all of its
quality control processes worldwide, with the assistance of outside,
independent safety experts.
Toyota is improving its ability to investigate complaints in
several ways. First, it has created SMART teams that will investigate
each unintended acceleration complaint in the U.S. Second, it is
increasing the use of onboard event data recorders and producing more
EDR read out tools to NHTSA and Toyota's investigators. Third, Toyota
is requesting that going forward NHTSA provide Toyota with more
information from its complaint data base, such as VIN numbers, which
are necessary for investigation.
Toyota has established new processes and organizations within
Toyota to improve quality, responsiveness, and communication. The
Special Committee for Global Quality will focus on improving quality
processes and procedures at Toyota worldwide. It will have a North
American representative who is also represented on the North American
Quality Taskforce. This taskforce will be advised by an outside
organization, the North American Quality Advisory Panel, headed by The
Honorable Rodney Slater. The Automotive Center of Quality Excellence is
being established in the U.S. where a team of Toyota's quality
engineers will study quality and safety issues in the United States. It
will report to the Chief Quality Officer of North America.
Toyota plans to dramatically improve the flow of safety and defect
information within the company, between regions, and between the U.S.
and Japan. It will do this by posting complaint information and other
trend information on its internal website--the Toyota Quality Network
(TQNet). In addition, a North American quality chief will be
represented at the global quality problem review meeting. There will be
an appeal process from decisions made at these meetings that did not
previously exist.
Question 8. Toyota representatives indicated to my staff that, in
addition to the floormats being replaced and the accelerator being
reshaped, Toyota dealerships are also upgrading the software on
recalled vehicles to include a brake override when the accelerator and
brake are both applied. This override is considered by most vehicle
manufacturers as an essential safety device.
a. Is this brake override software upgrade provided automatically
at the next service appointment for all existing Toyota vehicles whose
computers can support it?
Answer. Toyota plans to make the brake override system (BOS)
standard on all of its non-hybrid North American Toyota and Lexus
models on a going-forward basis. The hybrid vehicles, including the
Prius, already have a function that is designed to reduce engine power,
and, as a result, has a similar effect to BOS. This would make Toyota
one of the first full-line manufacturers to have BOS standard on all
its models. According to Edmunds.com, 18 major car manufacturers do not
have standard BOS on their existing models.
Toyota is retrofitting seven existing models with BUS: 2007-2010 MY
Lexus ES, 2006-2010 MY Lexus IS, 2007-2010 MY Camry, 2005-2010 MY
Tacoma, 2005-2010 MY Avalon, 2008-2010 MY Sequoia and 2009-2010 MY
Venza. The retrofitting is being performed along with the other vehicle
repairs as part of the current recalls, and thus has already begun. To
date, Toyota has repaired approximately 1.64 million vehicles, and will
continue until completion.
b. Will Toyota install this upgrade automatically even for those
vehicles not subject to current recalls?
Answer. Toyota has no current plans to retrofit the brake override
system to any other older vehicle models than the above-mentioned 7
vehicle models.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, or need additional
information, please call me at 202-626-2901.
Sincerely,
Theodore M. Hester
cc: The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
______
King & Spalding LLP
Washington, DC, April 13, 2010
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller:
I am writing on behalf of Toyota Motor North America, Inc. (``TMA''
or ``Toyota'') to you as Chairman of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation (``the Committee''). Toyota welcomes the
opportunity to respond to a number of matters raised by members of the
Committee during the hearing on March 2, 2010. Toyota has asked me to
submit the following information.
First, Senator Cantwell asked that Toyota follow up with the
Senator's constituent, Mr. Eves, regarding his requests for access to
EDR data. My partner, Dan Donovan, has been updating Senator Cantwell's
staff regarding the status of Mr. Eve's requests regarding the EDR data
and will continue to provide updates as necessary.
Second, Senator Begich requested a written policy related to
recalls. Enclosed please find the Toyota Quality Control Standard--Rule
for Implementation of Recall (``Exhibit A''). In addition, Senator
Begich asked how many recalls there have been since 2006 and whether
any have been stopped or not moved forward. Toyota has issued twenty-
eight (28) safety recalls in the United States from 2006 through the
end of February 2010. The general process is that when the Customer
Quality Engineering (CQE) division determined that there was an
``investigated quality problem,'' it was reported to the department and
division general managers. In addition, the group manager of the
relevant CQE department proposed an ``Investigated Quality Problem
Review Meeting'' (hereinafter referred to as a ``review meeting''). At
the review meeting the general manager of the CQE division and the
general managers of the related divisions met to discuss and determine
whether a recall or any other field action was necessary. If at the
review meeting, it was determined that a recall or improvement campaign
was necessary, after review by the general manager of the Quality
Division, the general manager of CQE reported the results of the
meeting to the Managing Officer in charge of quality and sought
approval to conduct a recall or improvement campaign. In the past, the
Managing Officer approved every request for a recall. Since this
standard was designed to insulate a recall judgment from any
unnecessary intervention, no one within Toyota could overrule the
decision on recalls outside of the group that made the decision.
Third, Senator Nelson asked who decided that Toyota would only have
one EDR read-out tool in the United States. The decision to have only
one EDR read-out tool in the U.S. was not made by any one person and
was not the result of any particular meeting or decision; rather, it is
because the EDR read-out tool was still in its prototype stage. The
software used to ``read out'' the EDR data was still in a testing phase
and was not yet compatible with all electronic control units (ECUs) in
use in Toyota and Lexus vehicles. Because the technology was still in
the process of being validated, it was Toyota's policy not to use EDR
data in its investigations in the regular course of business unless
requested by law enforcement, NHTSA or a court order. In addition,
Senator Nelson inquired as to whether Toyota collects and stores the
data from the EDRs it decodes. The TMS Legal Department maintains the
data that is downloaded from EDRs in paper form and in electronic form
on the read-out tool itself as well as on a network drive. These data
are maintained indefinitely.
Fourth, Senator LeMieux asked where and to whom a certain
presentation by James Press was given. This presentation was made by
Mr. James Press, former President and COO of TMA, at a briefing session
for TMC's top executives at Toyota Motor Corporation on September 20,
2006. In response to Senator LeMieux's comments about the presentation,
Mr. Sasaki promised to provide information regarding the number of
safety recalls in the United States. Exhibit B provides the number of
safety recalls for Toyota, Lexus and Scion vehicles from the beginning
of 2001 through February 2010.
Fifth, Toyota is also submitting additional information to clarify
a few points in the record relating to EDR data. Event Data Recorders
(EDRs) installed in Toyota vehicles are classified into two different
types. As the attached chart shows (Exhibit C), a few Toyota vehicles
contain EDRs that record post-crash data only,\1\ whereas the majority
of Toyota and Lexus vehicles, contain EDRs that record pre- and post-
crash data.\2\ The amount and types of data recorded have evolved over
time, and there may be slight variations from vehicle model to vehicle
model depending on, for example, what types of airbags the model is
equipped with. In general, for vehicles equipped with EDRs that record
pre-crash data, the following pre-crash data is recorded by the most-
recent EDR model for up to 5 seconds before the crash: vehicle speed
(mph), engine rotation speed (rpm), accelerator pedal position (off/
middle/full), and brake switch status (off/on). When a collision is
triggered that meets certain criteria, other vehicle status information
is generally recorded by the most-recent EDR model, including shift
position (which is not recorded in the case of post-crash only EDRs),
seatbelt information, driver's seat position, passenger seat occupant
detection status., and airbag diagnostic information. Post-crash, the
type and amount of data recorded depends on the type of collision. In
general, the following types and amounts of data are recorded by the
most-recent EDR model: longitudinal change in velocity is recorded
every 10 milliseconds for frontal or rear collision from an interval of
approximately .15 to .20 seconds post-collision; lateral change in
velocity is recorded every 4 milliseconds for a side collision for
approximately .07 seconds post-collision; and roll angle and lateral G
force every 128 milliseconds for a rollover collision for about 2
seconds following collision. Post-crash airbag deployment information
is also recorded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Toyota is planning to install the capability to record pre-
crash data on these models by the end of 2010.
\2\ In general, the EDRs only record data for collisions that meet
certain criteria that are tied to the severity of the collision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the past, given that the EDR read-out tool was only a prototype,
Toyota prioritized requests from NHTSA, law enforcement, and court
orders. However, going forward, once the additional and commercially
ready EDR read-out tools are available in North America and appropriate
procedures are put in place, Toyota will provide vehicle owners and
their authorized representatives with access to this data. Further,
Toyota plans to have a commercially available read-out tool in the
future, that will enable vehicle owners and their representative to
access this data. Toyota has already provided NHTSA with ten EDR read-
out tools.
Finally, Senator Udall asked Toyota to answer the following
questions:
``In an internal company document dated July 2009, Toyota boasted
about convincing NHTSA that an equipment recall was sufficient to
address the pedal entrapment issue instead of a vehicle recall. This
resulted in saving the company $100 million. Unfortunately, pedal
entrapment problems persisted and more people died as a result. You
[Inaba] pledged during the hearing that you would confirm the actual
amount of savings to Toyota from avoiding a full recall in 2007 in
favor of a more limited equipment recall for the floormats.
(a) How much did Toyota save as a result of that decision?
In the course of the 2007 NHTSA investigation, Toyota articulated
its good faith belief that there was no vehicle-based defect in the
subject vehicles that would have required a safety recall of the
vehicles themselves, so there was no ``savings.'' If the issue that was
addressed in 2007 by Toyota's recall of all-weather floormats had
instead required a vehicle-based solution for the subject vehicles, one
logical response would have been to recall the affected vehicles in
order to either replace or alter the throttle pedal assembly, and
possibly alter the floor pan configuration in some vehicles, similar to
the remedy later implemented in 2009. If generous rounding were used
estimating the cost of replacing the throttle pedal assembly at $100
per vehicle, and the number of affected vehicles at 1,000,000, one
would derive the $100 million number. In fact, however, the cost of
replacing the throttle pedal assembly would have been less, and the
number of affected vehicles in the floor mat campaign was closer to
820,000.
(b) What will Toyota do to make sure that this does not happen
again and that consumer safety is always put first before corporate
profits?
The safety of its customers is Toyota's highest priority. Recall
decisions are made based on safety and quality and not on sales or
profits. At Toyota, engineers and the quality management team have the
final say on whether to initiate a recall. TMC has committed itself to
seeking additional input from its various markets regarding product
quality issues in the future.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, or need additional
information, please call me at 202-626-2901.
Sincerely,
Theodore M. Hester
cc: The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
______
Exhibit A
Photocopying prohibited
Toyota Quality Control Standards QRF 001
Issued: September 1, 1975
19th Revision: August 22, 2006
Kazuhiro Sato, General Manager Quality Division
Approved
Rule for implementation of Recall etc.
1. Outline of Revision
Under orders of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport to
improve the operation related to defective vehicles, the following
items were reviewed and revised.
(1) 4. Understand a quality problem in need of investigation
(2) 5.3 Field monitor after the judgment in the ``review
meeting'' (added item)
(3) 11.(3) Period of record retention for documents for
Investigated Quality Problem Review Meeting
2. Drafting
Deliberation group: Expert Commission for quality information and
related departments
Responsible person: Mr. Hajime Kitamura, General Manager
Vehicle Dep. No. 1, Customer Quality Engineering Division
Considering Leaders: Mr. Tetsuya Ito, Group Manager and Mr.
Shouichi Uchikura, Project Manager External Affairs Group
Vehicle Dep. No. 1, Customer Quality Engineering Division
3. Effective Date
This standard shall be effective as of August 22, 2006.
______
Exhibit A
Confidential Do Not Reproduce
Toyota Quality Control Standard QRF 001
Rule for Implementation of Recall etc.
Issued: September 1, 1975
19th Revision: August 22, 2006
1. Objective
The objective of this rule is to define specific operations and
procedures to secure smooth implementation of a recall and an
improvement campaign.
2. Scope
This rule shall apply to a recall and an improvement campaign on
vehicles (including after market parts) produced and sold by Toyota
Motor Corporation (including such vehicles and parts produced by makers
to which Toyota Motor Corporation has entrusted the production).
3. Definitions
Terms in these rules are defined as follows:
(1) Safety related quality problem
A problem which occurred in the vehicles/units or parts
under proper maintenance and normal operation and is
caused by the design or production, and which results
in noncompliance with safety or environmental
protection provisions in applicable domestic or foreign
laws and regulations, or which may cause a personal
injury due to a fire, inoperative or other factors.
(2) Investigated Quality Problem
A quality problem which is suspected to be a safety
related quality problem.
(3) Recall
Inspection/remedy action for the vehicles which contain
safety related quality problem along with the
notification of the problem to Ministry of Land
Infrastructure and Transportation or other relevant
authorities and to the owners. In addition, a report of
the implementation status of an inspection/remedy to
the relevant authorities. In case of the domestic
market, the safety related quality problem which
results or may result in noncompliance with the Safety
Regulation for Road Vehicle is subject to a recall.
(4) Improvement Campaign
In the domestic market, inspection/remedy action for
the vehicles which contain a safety related quality
problem but does comply with the Safety Regulation for
Road Vehicle along with the notification of the problem
so Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and
to the owners.
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NOTE: The above standard and/or specification are confidential and
proprietary information of Toyota Motor Corporation. They shall be used
only for the quality control of parts manufactured according to the
order of Toyota Motor Corporation or its affiliated car and parts
manufactures. They shall not be reproduced in whole or in part, nor
shall they be disclosed to a third party for any purpose without prior
written consent by Toyota Motor Corporation.
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4. Understand an investigated quality problem
Based upon a result of the investigation and analysis on the
obtained quality information, the group manager of each department in
Customer Quality Engineering Division shall report to the department
and the division general managers an investigated quality problem,
which is categorized as ``S'' or ``A'' rank prescribed in QRF401 ``Rule
for Handling of Field Quality Information'', of which trend is
anticipated and to which a countermeasure has been taken or is planed
in the design or the production. In addition, the group manager shall
propose holding an ``investigated Quality Problem Review Meeting''
(hereinafter referred lo as a ``review meeting'').
5. Review of an investigated quality problem
5.1 Holding the ``review meeting''
The general manager of Customer Quality Engineering Division
shall convene the general managers of related divisions or
their representatives and, if necessary, the speciality
divisions to the ``review meeting'' to discuss the following
matters and judge whether a recall or any other field action is
necessary:
(1) Confirmation results of the fact of the problem
(2) Analysis results of factors of the problem
(3) Judgment of necessity of a recall or an improvement
campaign
(4) Other matters
5.2 Approval of Managing Officer in charge of quality
In all cases where it has been judged in the ``review meeting''
that it is necessary to conduct a recall or an improvement
campaign. after the review by the general manager of Quality
Division, the general manager of Customer Quality Engineering
Division shall report a result of the ``review meeting'' to
Managing Officer in charge of quality and receive the approval
to conduct a recall or an improvement campaign.
A field action other than a recall and an improvement campaign
which has been judged in the ``review meeting'' to be important
shall be reported to Managing Office in charge of quality and
the general manager shall receive the approval to conduct such
field action after the review the general manager of Quality
Division.
5.3 Field monitor after the judgment in the ``review meeting''
In case that it has been judged in the ``review meeting'' that
a recall, an improvement campaign or any other field action is
not necessary, the group manager of each department in Customer
Quality Engineering Division shall periodically monitor the
occurrence status of the problem and report it to the
department and the division general managers. If necessary, the
group manager shall propose holding the ``review meeting'' to
discuss again.
6. Preparation for implementation of a recall or an improvement
campaign
6.1 Hold a ``Recall or Improvement Campaign Preparation Meeting''
Promptly after receiving the approval of Managing Officer in
charge of quality, the general manager of Customer Quality
Engineering Division shall convene general managers of related
divisions or their representatives to a ``Recall or Improvement
Campaign Preparation Meeting'' (hereinafter referred to as the
``preparation meeting'') to discuss the following matters. In
addition, based of a result of the discussion in the meeting,
the general manager shall prepare a ``Request for field action
on sold vehicles'' (Form 1) and issue it after receiving the
approval of the general manager of Quality Division.
(1) Range of affected vehicles (including vehicles
which parts etc. was investigated in the past.)
(2) Method of a remedy
(3) Method of a remedy work operation
(4) Preparation and control of parts for a remedy
(5) Calculation of costs
(6) Request to dealers (and overseas distributors) and
local repair and maintenance shops
(7) Notification to owners
(8) Recovery of the affected service parts in the field
(9) Preparation and submission of a notification of a
recall or an improvement campaign.
(10) Publicity
(11) Others
If it is decided that the parts for a remedy need to be
prepared in advance, the ``preparation meeting'' can be held
before the approval of Managing Officer
6.2. Preparation for a remedy
Related divisions shall prepare the following items to
implement a remedy based on the decision made in the
``preparation meeting''.
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Preparation items Main divisions in charge
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(1) Identification of affected vehicles Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(2) Identification of owners of affected vehicles Domestic Service Field Operations Div.
Overseas Service Field Operations Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(3) Procedures for work operation and completion Technical Service Div.
inspection Domestic Service Field Operations Div.
Overseas Service Field Operations Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(4) Method of parts supply for a remedy Service Parts Administration Div.
Service Parts Logistics Div.
Domestic Parts and Accessories Div.
Overseas Parts and Accessories Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
Quality Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(5) Preparation of parts for a remedy Domestic Parts and Accessories Div.
Overseas Parts and Accessories Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
Service Parts Logistics Div.
Production Control Div., Purchasing Div.
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(6) Delivery and control of parts for a remedy Customer Quality Engineering Div.
Domestic Parts and Accessories Div.
Overseas Parts and Accessories Div.
Service Parts Logistics Div.
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(7) Calculation of costs Quality Div.
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(8) Request to dealers (and overseas distributors) and Domestic Service Field Operations Div.
local repair and maintenance shops Overseas Service Field Operations Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(9) Notification to owners Domestic Service Field Operations Div.
Overseas Service Field Operations Div.
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(10) Publicity Public Affairs Div., Customer Relations Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(11) Identification of vehicles which have been Technical Service Div.
remedied Domestic Service Field Operations Div.
Overseas Service Field Operations Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(12) Report on the completion status of a recall Domestic Service Field Operations Div.
Overseas Service Field Operations Div.
Customer Quality Engineering Div.
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(13) Others ----------
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7. Notification of a recall or an improvement campaign
7.1 Preparation of notification documents of a recall
7.1.1 Notification documents for domestic competent authorities
(1) In case of vehicles sold in the domestic market or
domestic/overseas markets
The general manager of Customer Quality Engineering
Division shall prepare the ``Notification of Recall
(Form 2) and the following documents which need to be
filed with Minister of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport and receive the approval of the president for
the ``Notification of Recall''.
a. ``Notification of Recall'' (Form 2)
(including a diagram showing a remedy part/main
specifications of vehicles subject to a recall)
b. ``Table of Notification of Recall'' (Form 3)
(including a diagram showing a remedy part/main
specifications of vehicles subject to a recall)
c. Other documents to be filed
(a) Exterior photograph of the
representative model
(b) English version of ``Notification
of Recall''
(c) Notification letter to owners
(only in case of a recall related to a
foreseeable problem)
(d) Others
d. Explanation documents for reference
(a) Chronology until notification of a
recall
(b) Occurrence status of problem in the
field
(c) Investigation on the cause of the
problem
(d) Result of confirmation whether a
remedy complies with applicable
regulations.
(e) Verification result of a method of
knowing the symptom of the problem and
how long the vehicle can be operated
after the symptom appears.
(f) Range of affected vehicles and its
reason
(g) Situation of export of affected
vehicles and method of a remedy on
those vehicles
(h) Recurrence prevention method
(including future quality control
method)
(i) Estimated labor time for a remedy
per unit
Note: (e) is needed only in case of a recall related io
a foreseeable problem.
(2) In case of vehicles sold only in overseas market
The general manager of Customer Quality Engineering
Division shall prepare the ``Foreign Recall Report''
(Form 4) and reference documents which shows a diagram
of a remedy part etc. which need to be filed with the
chief of Vehicle and Component Approvals Division,
Engineering and Safety Department of Road Transport
Bureau, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.
7.1.2 Notification documents for competent authorities in
foreign countries
The general manager of Customer Quality Engineering
Division shall have the general manager of Overseas
Service Field Operations Division request the overseas
distributors to prepare notification documents required
under the laws and regulations effective in each
country. In case of the United States, Customer Quality
Engineering Division shall request the local
administration company to prepare the documents.
7.2 Preparation of notification documents of an improvement
campaign
The general manager of Customer Quality Engineering Division
shall prepare the ``Notification of Improvement Campaign''
(Form 5) and following documents which need to be filed with
the director of Road Transport Bureau, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport. Details of a. through d. below
shall be referred to 7.1.1(1)b, interpreting a recall as an
improvement campaign.
a. ``Notification of Improvement Campaign'' (Form 5)
b. ``Table of Notification of Improvement Campaign''
(Form 6)
c. Other documents
Note: English version specified in (b) is not necessary
d. Explanation documents for reference
7.3 Notification to competent authorities
7.3.1 Notification to domestic competent authorities
(1) In case of vehicles sold in the domestic market or
domestic/overseas markets
In case of a recall, Customer Quality Engineering
Division shall file notification documents prepared in
accordance with 7.1.1(1) with Minister of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport. In case of an improvement
campaign, Customer Quality Engineering Division shall
file notification documents prepared in accordance with
7.2 with the director of Road Transport Bureau,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.
(2) In case of vehicles sold only in overseas market
Customer Quality Engineering Division shall submit a
report and other documents prepared in accordance with
7.1.1(2) with the chief of Vehicle and Component
Approvals Division, Engineering and Safety Department
or Rood Transport Bureau, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport through Tokyo Engineering
Division.
7.3.2 Notification to competent authorities in foreign
documents
Overseas distributors shall file the notification
documents prepared in accordance with 7.1.2 with the
local competent authorities in compliance with the laws
and regulations effective in each countries. In case of
the United States, the local administration company
shall file the documents.
8. Implementation of a recall or an improvement campaign
8.1 Request to dealers, etc.
Based on the request of the general manager of Customer
Quality Engineering Division, the general manager of
Domestic Service Field Operations Division or Overseas
Service Field Operations Division shall request dealers
etc. to implement a recall or an improvement campaign.
(1) In case of domestic market
(a) The general manager of Domestic Service
Field Operations Division shall request
dealers:
(i) to notify owners, either by mail or
visit, of the implementation of a
recall or an improvement campaign.
Dealer shall make effort to complete
notification to owners within 1 month
after commencing a remedy.
(ii) to carry out a remedy on the
affected vehicles brought to the
dealers and attach an identification
sticker to each vehicle on which a
recall is completed.
(b) The general manager of Domestic Service
Field Operations Division shall seek to make a
recall or an improvement campaign known to
local repair and maintenance shops through
Federation of Japan Automobile Maintenance
Promotion Societies.
(c) Customer Quality Engineering Division shall
request a relevant division to post a summary
of a recall or an improvement campaign on the
corporate website.
(d) In case that it is difficult to identify
specific owners, the general manager of
Domestic Service Field Operations Division
shall request Japan Advertising & Marketing
Division to take appropriate actions to
thoroughly inform owners through newspapers and
other publicity.
(e) The general manager of Overseas Service
Field Operations Division provides the
information on the domestic recall for overseas
distributors as needed.
(2) In case of overseas market
(a) The general manager of Overseas Service
Field Operations Division shall request
overseas distributors:
(i) to notify owners of a recall in
compliance with the laws and
regulations effective in each country.
(ii) to implement a recall in
compliance with the laws and
regulations effective in each country.
(b) The general manager of Domestic Service
Field Operations Division provides the
information on the overseas recall for domestic
dealers as needed.
9. Monitoring and promoting the implementation status of a recall
9.1 Monitoring the implementation status of a recall
(1) In case of domestic market
(a) Domestic Service Field Orperations Division
shall count up all vehicles by 8th of January,
April, July and October, which have had a
recall remedy at dealers by the end of last
month, and then, report it to Customer Quality
Engineering Division.
(b) Based on this report, Customer Quality
Engineering Division shall prepare the ``Recall
Implementation Status Report'' (Form 7)
(2) In case of overseas market
Overseas Service Field Operations Division
shall obtain a report on the total of the
number of remedied vehicles from overseas
distributors as needed and then report it to
Customer Quality Engineering Division.
9.2 Promoting the implementation
Customer Quality Engineering Division, Domestic Service
Field Operations Division and Overseas Service Field
Operations Division shall confirm the implementation
status and request dealers (overseas distributors) to
take appropriate measures to improve the completion
rate, such as a renotification to the owners whose
vehicles have not been brought to the dealer and have
not been remedied.
9.3 Survey after the implementation of a remedy
Customer Quality Engineering Division shall conduct a
survey on conditions in the market as needed after the
implementation of a remedy through Domestic Service
Field Operations Division and Overseas Service Field
Operations Division.
10. Report on the implementation status of a recall to competent
authorities
10.1 Report to domestic competent authorities
Customer Quality Engineering Division shall submit a
``Recall Implementation Status Report'', which is
prepared to be reported to Minister of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport in accordance with
9.1.1(1), to Japan Automobile Manufacturers'
Association through Tokyo Engineering Division by 15th
of the month. Consequently, Japan Automobile
Manufacturers' Association submits such report to
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport by 20th
of the month.
10.2 Report to competent authorities in foreign countries
The general manager of Customer Quality Engineering
Division shall request overseas distributors through
the general manager of Overseas Service Field
Operations Division to report the implementation status
of a recall to the local competent authorities in
compliance with the laws and regulations effective in
each countries.
11. Record retention of documents which reline to the notification
of a recall etc.
The following documents shall be retained as a written
document or an electronic file.
(1) Notification documents of a mean etc.--20 years:
Customer Quality Engineering Division
(2) Recall implementation Status Report--10 years:
Customer Quality Engineering Division
(3) Documents for Investigated Quality Problem Review
Meeting--20 years: Customer Quality Engineering
Division
(4) Request for field action on sold vehicles--10 years
: Quality Division
12. Operation flow chart
The operation flowchart for the implementation of a recall and
an improvement campaign is shown in the ``Appendix Diagram''.
[Appendix Diagram] The operation flowchart for the implementation
of a recall and an improvement campaign.
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Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Ray LaHood
Question 1. Given the number of safety issues now revealed by the
Toyota investigation, will you now revise your definition of Sudden
Unintended Acceleration?
Answer. Rather than trying to force investigations into
predetermined definitions or categorizations, NHTSA evaluates each
safety issue based on the allegations and the vehicles involved, and
then develops an appropriate alleged defect statement for the specific
issue at hand. Alleged defect statements are found in the Information
request letters NHTSA sends to the manufacturer of the products under
investigation. Examples can be found under defect investigations at
www.safercar.gov. Since defect statements are developed on a case-by-
case basis, NHTSA has no formal definition for ``Sudden Unintended
Acceleration'' or any other type of defect allegation, nor do we
believe that we have a need for such. By developing defect statements
on a case-by-case basis, NHTSA ensures the correct scope for each
investigation, neither overly broad (which could make the inquiry
overreaching and weaken the agency's ability to compel a recall) nor
too narrow.
We believe that the question refers to a definition used by a
Toyota employee relates to a March 23, 2004 memo where NHTSA discussed
its analysis and removal of certain reports. The 2004 investigation,
which involved MY 2002 and 2003 Camry and ES vehicles, was focused on
whether the newly introduced electronic throttle control system was the
cause of consumer reports that the vehicle self accelerated in close
quarter driving situations (e.g., when parking the vehicle) and caused
a crash. These were very short duration incidents (1 to 3 seconds)
where the driver may not have had time to apply the brake.
After interviews were conducted, NHTSA eliminated from that
investigation reports where consumers stated that the vehicle self
accelerated (at full throttle level acceleration) and that they had
forcefully applied the brake pedal but the vehicle continued to
accelerate for a longer period (e.g., 5 seconds or more) or distance
(e.g., 50 feet or more), as discussed in the March 23, 2004 memo. Such
allegations can only be explained by a simultaneous failure of the
throttle and brake systems. When no post-incident evidence of failure
is found in either system, the likely explanation is driver error
(pedal misapplication). Since the reports did not indicate a vehicle-
based defect, they were eliminated from the scope of that
investigation. This decision was made solely at the discretion of the
NHTSA staff conducting the investigation (and approved at the time by a
supervisor) and was in no way influenced by discussion with Toyota
staff or anyone outside of NHTSA.
One important point, the term ``longer duration'' when used in the
2004 investigation did not refer to the types of incidents occurring in
the MY 2007 and later Camry and ES350, which was the focus of a 2007
investigation (i.e., those that were related to floor mat/pedal
entrapment and lasted for several minutes and miles). NHTSA had not
received reports of this type for the MY 2002 to 2006 Camry and ES
vehicles so they were not excluded from consideration--rather they did
not exist during the 2004 investigations.
Question 2. Toyota was able to mislead NHTSA by labeling a defect
on one of its cars as just a ``drivability issue.'' Does NHTSA have a
standard definition of what's considered a ``drivability issue'' versus
a ``safety issue''? Do other car companies use the term ``drivability
issue''?
Answer. A safety issue results when there is a potential safety
consequence, such as a vehicle crash or loss of control that could
potentially cause an injury or death to an occupant or to another
person. The term drivability is commonly used in the automotive
industry and by the automotive press to refer to the smoothness and
evenness a vehicle displays during typical driving and acceleration
maneuvers. Many of the reports NHTSA received on the 2002 to 2006 Camry
and ES vehicles clearly expressed dissatisfaction with the vehicle's
drivability. This is readily apparent from reading the reports. When
investigating defects, NHTSA makes an independent assessment of each
report, and does not rely on the manufacturer's characterization of the
problem or choice of descriptive terms.
Question 3. Now that we know that the safety issues affecting
Toyota vehicles are more severe than initially realized, will the
agency revisit with Toyota all of the issues that it labeled as just a
``drivability issue''?
Answer. NHTSA has committed to taking a new look at the Toyota
products, including assessing whether the electronics or software, or
some other influence such as electro-magnetic interference, could be
the cause of reports of unwanted and uncontrollable acceleration. To
the extent that the study we will pursue or the investigation NHTSA
opened on February 16, 2010 reveals any safety-related defects linked
to the drivability issue, we will take prompt and appropriate action.
The initial results of the study are anticipated to be available later
this year. Progress on NHTSA's investigation (RQ10-003) can be
monitored at www.safercar.gov.
Question 4. The President's recent budget request only calls for a
$5 million increase to the NHTSA budget. Given the enormous task of
investigating safety defects of over 245 million cars and trucks on the
Nation's roads, does NHTSA have the resources it needs to carry out its
mission?
Answer. With its existing resources, NHTSA's Office of Defects
Investigation (ODI) runs the most active defects investigation program
in the world. Since its inception, ODI has influenced more than 2,800
vehicle recalls involving more than 278 million vehicles. The agency
does not hesitate to reallocate resources within the agency's current
budget to meet the needs of defects investigations. Also, the agency
obtains resources from outside the agency in specialized fields of
expertise to ensure that its analyses are thorough and comprehensive,
when such a course of action is necessary.
The President's FY 2011 budget requests 66 additional personnel to
help strengthen our ability to address safety issues on the Nation's
roadways. If approved and funded by the Congress, the agency plans to
use those positions where they are needed to ensure that the agency is
meeting its various safety responsibilities, including additional
resources to defects investigations.
Question 5. Now that we know of the efforts that Toyota made in
concealing the safety defects of its vehicles, what actions will the
Department take to determine if other car companies are doing something
similar to what Toyota has been doing?
Answer. At this time, NHTSA is not aware of Toyota concealing
safety defects. However, NHTSA is addressing three queries to Toyota
that may provide information responsive to this question. NHTSA has
opened two Timeliness Query investigations (one for the pedal
entrapment recall and one for the sticky pedal recall). These
investigations are aimed at uncovering what Toyota knew about these two
problems that led to the recalls and when Toyota knew it. If we
determine that Toyota knew, or should have known, of the existence of a
defect that posed an unreasonable risk to safety, the agency will
pursue civil penalties against Toyota. Additionally, NHTSA has opened a
Recall Query investigation into both recalls that is aimed at
uncovering whether the scope of each recall was appropriate or whether
the recalls should have been expanded to additional vehicles. The
Recall Query investigation is also examining whether the remedies
developed by Toyota for both of these recalls are effective.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Hon. Ray LaHood
Question 1. Can you describe how Toyota has been safety deaf?
Answer. Over the past few years, Toyota developed a pattern of
behavior of pushing back harder and taking longer than other companies
to conduct a recall, including in situations where the consequences of
inaction could result in harm to the public. For example, on March 29,
2007, NHTSA opened an investigation on all-weather floor mat
interference with and entrapment of accelerator pedals resulting in
vehicles traveling at very high speeds for long distances (PE07-016).
Throughout the investigation, Toyota's position was that there was
nothing wrong with its vehicle or floor mat, and that consumers were to
blame. It was difficult to engage in productive discussions with Toyota
because the Washington Office of Toyota, with whom the agency
communicated, had no authority to make decisions and we believe that
the decision-makers in Japan gave little weight to any recommendations
or information that the Washington Office passed on to Toyota in Japan.
It was not until September 26, 2007 that Toyota sent a letter to NHTSA
stating that it would conduct a safety recall. However, despite
agreeing to comply with all of the requirements for conducting a safety
recall of the floor mats, Toyota continued to insist in its September
2007 letter that the floor mats were not defective.
Question 2. Are there any examples of [Toyota] not complying with
safety laws in the United States?
Answer. At this time, NHTSA has not made a determination that
Toyota has not complied with safety laws in the United States. However,
NHTSA is addressing three queries to Toyota that may provide
information responsive to this question. NHTSA has opened two
Timeliness Query investigations (one for the pedal entrapment recall
and one for the sticky pedal recall). These investigations are aimed at
uncovering what Toyota knew about these two problems that led to the
recalls and when Toyota knew it. If NHTSA determines that Toyota knew,
or should have known, of the existence of a defect that posed an
unreasonable risk to safety, the agency will pursue civil penalties
against Toyota. Additionally, NHTSA has opened a Recall Query
investigation into both recalls that is aimed at uncovering whether the
scope of each recall was appropriate or whether the recalls should have
been expanded to additional vehicles.
Question 3. Does NHTSA have a bias against non-mechanical control
systems in vehicles?
Answer. NHTSA conducts investigations based on the frequency and
severity levels of complaints. NHTSA's investigations are data-driven,
and do not exclude any type of control system or potential problem area
from careful scrutiny. The record shows that since 1989, NHTSA has
conducted 80 distinct investigations (of which 11 involved Toyota
vehicles) into alleged safety defects that affected the vehicle's
throttle control system including but not limited to sudden,
unintended, and/or unwanted acceleration. These investigations fall
into the categories of sudden acceleration, unintended acceleration,
stuck throttle, idle surge, cruise control malfunction, accelerator
pedal interference, floor mat interference, linkage problems, throttle
binding and loss of throttle control. This problem description covers
the vast majority of related issues examined but is not all
encompassing. The types of vehicles involved are: passenger cars,
SUV's, pick-up trucks, vans, motorcycles, transit buses, school buses,
and medium/heavy trucks. The investigations included mechanical/cable
(64) throttle, electronic throttle (14), and one floor mat
manufacturer. 22 of the 64 mechanical throttle investigations and five
of the 14 electronic throttle control investigations resulted in
recalls of approximately 6.7 million vehicles.
Question 4. Does NHTSA have adequate expertise in-house to fully
understand and regulate electronic control systems?
Answer. NHTSA has a diverse and experienced work force. The
President has included an additional 66 positions in his 2011 budget.
If these positions are approved and funded by the Congress, the agency
will use them in those parts of the organization that most need staff
to ensure that we continue to effectively carry out all of our safety
responsibilities, including those related to safety defects. In
addition to our staff, we hire contractors to support our work when
there are areas where we need specialized expertise.
Question 5. Does NHTSA need additional tools and resources?
Answer. If the Congress funds the increased staffing levels called
for under the President's budget for FY 2011, we believe the agency
will have the tools and resources it needs to carry out its safety
responsibilities.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. Ray LaHood
Question. Who within DOT should be held accountable and apologize
to the American public for the recent failures [related to Toyota
sudden acceleration problems]?
Answer. In the last 3 years, NHTSA's defects and compliance
investigations have led to more than 500 recalls involving the recall
of 23.5 million vehicles. Where NHTSA has evidence of a defect and can
make a case that the defect poses an unreasonable safety risk (which is
a required showing under the agency's statute), it does not hesitate to
push for a recall.
We cannot speak to the contents of internal Toyota documents, but
we can state that NHTSA did not permit Toyota to influence its
decisions. The recalls that have occurred concerning unintended
acceleration in Toyota vehicles are the result of NHTSA's pressure on
Toyota to fulfill its responsibilities. NHTSA initiated investigations
when specific problems were beginning to appear. When the agency was
able to identify a safety defect, the agency pushed for a recall.
NHTSA is now undertaking a full-scale review of unintended
acceleration problems in Toyota vehicles. If that review provides
information that would warrant additional defect investigations, NHTSA
will conduct them immediately.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Ray LaHood
Question 1. If the Murkowski resolution of disapproval is enacted,
does that prevent the Department of Transportation from enacting the
CAFE standards as established in the 2007 Energy Bill?
Answer. The model year 2102-2016 CAFE standards were issued by
NHTSA on April 1, 2010 as part of a joint final rule with EPA, lithe
Murkowski resolution were to be enacted, that rule would likely be
challenged. If the rule were then to be overturned, there might not be
any car or light truck CAFE standard for at least one model year, model
year 2012. NHTSA anticipates there would be legal challenges if it
attempted to issue a new final rule re-establishing the CAFE standards
for model year 2012, given the statutory requirement to set the CAFE
standards for a model year at least 18 months in advance of that model
year. The 18-month period for model year 2012 began approximately April
1, 2010. However, depending of the timing of a court challenge, NHTSA
might still have time to promulgate a new rule re-establishing
standards for model year 2013 and future years.
Question 1a. From this point, how long would it take NHTSA to
decouple the CAFE standards from the joint rulemaking complete
regulations for Model Year 2012, as directed by the 2007 Energy Bill?
Answer. As already noted, the CAFE standards for model years 2012-
2016 were issued by NHTSA as a joint rulemaking on April 1, 2010. At
this point, it is impossible to decouple the CAFE standards from the
joint rule.
Question 1b. Is EPA's 250-gram per mile standard partially or even
mostly redundant to the fuel economy increases that NHTSA will require?
Answer. No. While the two sets of standards overlap, they are not
redundant. The EPA standards would provide additional greenhouse gas
benefits.
Question 1c. Given DOT's long-standing authority over vehicular
efficiency standards, and Congress' explicit decision to give NHTSA--
not EPA--authority to set fuel economy in 1975, should members of this
Committee be concerned that your agency is ceding a significant part of
its authority to EPA?
Answer. No, NHTSA is not ceding its authority; rather it is closely
coordinating efforts with EPA to ensure that the goals of both agencies
(energy security and climate change) are met while providing regulatory
consistency and certainty for auto manufacturers.
Question 1d. If the joint tailpipe rule is finalized, and EPA is
afforded a role in the fuel economy of light-duty vehicles, does that
decrease DOT's role in decisions related to CAFE standards going
forward?
Answer. No, both agencies have important and independent roles to
play carrying out our statutory responsibilities.
Question 2. Under authorities that existed before the Massachusetts
vs. EPA litigation, and still exist to this day, NHTSA was perfectly
capable of increasing CAFE standards. In fact, even in the context of
the tailpipe rule, NHTSA involvement accounts for 34.1 of the 35.5
miles per gallon mandate. Furthermore, it appears to be the case that
EPA could make their 1.4 miles per gallon contribution to these
environmental improvements under the separate authority of Title VI of
the Clean Air Act. Would you agree with this statement?
Answer. Yes, although that approach would lead to multiple and
possibly conflicting regulations (one issued by NHTSA addressing fuel
efficiency, another issued by EPA addressing the contributions of
automobile air conditioning to greenhouse gas emissions and additional
regulations issued by the states).
Question 2a. Instead of implementing ``one clear and consistent set
of standards''--as the letter from NHTSA's Chief Counsel proposes--
would it not be better to just have one, national standard for
automakers to follow?
Answer. No, that would require preemption of the legitimate
interests of states as part of our Federal system of government to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions. It would also forego regulation of
the contributions of automobile air conditioning to greenhouse gas
emissions.
Question 2b. How are we supposed to reconcile the claims of your
Chief Counsel about the impact of the bipartisan disapproval resolution
in the face of countless letters from actual stakeholders that convey
identical concerns about what happens if Congress fails to stop EPA?
Answer. DOT and EPA received more than 130,000 public comments on
the September 2009 proposed rules, with overwhelming support for the
strong national policy.
Question 2c. Is it not true that NHTSA could realize its
contribution to the economic and environmental benefits listed in your
Chief Counsel's letter--related to fuel savings, greenhouse gas
reductions, and lower oil consumption--under existing statutory
authorities that pre-date the Massachusetts vs. EPA litigation?
Answer. Yes, in part because any reduction in fuel consumption
necessarily reduces tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide. However,
NHTSA's standards alone could not address the need to reduce the
greenhouse gas emissions associated with air conditioning systems.
Question 3. Are you aware of the total economic cost that could
result from mobile source and stationary source regulation of
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act? Could you please describe, in
detail, any cost projections you are aware of?
Answer. We do not have authority to regulate stationary sources or
means of transportation other than motor vehicles and thus do not have
cost estimates for regulating them. The agencies project that the
industry compliance costs of the National Program for regulating light
vehicles in model years 2012-2016 will be slightly less than $52
billion.
For a complete description of the impacts, please see the final
rule and its supporting documents issued April 1. They can be found by
going to http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/fueleconomy.jsp and clicking
on ``Final rule'' under ``Joint Rulemaking to Establish CAFE and GHG
Emissions Standards for MY 2012-2016.''
Question 3a. Can you describe the impact that the tailpipe rule
will have on domestic greenhouse gas emissions? Accounting for new
drivers on the road, and a possible increase in miles driven, can you
estimate how the tailpipe rule would reduce U.S. emissions? Can you
estimate the impact that reduction will have on global greenhouse gas
emission levels?
Answer. The NHTSA and EPA rules will conserve about 1.8 billion
barrels of oil and reduce nearly a billion tons of greenhouse gas
emissions over the lives of the vehicles covered. For a complete
description of the impacts and the estimates you are requesting, please
see the final rule and its supporting documents issued April 1.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Hon. David Strickland
Question 1. If there is a malfunction problem in the Electronic
Throttle Control (ETC) system, what are potential solutions to
correcting or managing this problem?
Answer. The potential solutions to correcting a malfunction in the
ETC will depend on the problem that has been identified. In general, if
there is a hardware problem in a vehicle component, that component
could be replaced with a redesigned part or modified. If there is a
software problem, it might be possible to reprogram the affected
control unit. We are evaluating the Toyota ETC system to look for
potential electronic causes of unintended acceleration.
Question 2. How promising are ``brake-override'' systems in
allowing a driver to regain control of a vehicle in the event of a Full
Open Throttle event?
Answer. We believe that brake override technology is promising and
could help drivers regain control of their vehicles in the event of a
full open throttle event.
Question 3. How easily can manufacturers equip vehicles already on
the road with ``brake-override'' systems?
Answer. We believe the degree of difficulty varies among vehicle
manufacturers as well as among different vehicle models by the same
manufacturer. Some vehicle models may not have the necessary electronic
components to install a brake override system. In other cases, the
control algorithms needed for a brake override system may not have been
developed for a vehicle already on the road.
Question 4. Are there needed improvements to the Early Warning
Reporting database?
Answer. ODI is continually making improvements to the EWR data and
to our analytical methods used to identify vehicles, tires or child
safety seats for further screening for potential defects. Within the
past few years, the agency issued revised final rules in May 2007 and
September 2009 to make EWR reporting more efficient and focused.
Currently, the agency is considering adding a requirement that
manufacturers submit information on new and emerging technologies in
vehicles. This would help ensure that the component codes in EWR are
current so that the agency can easily identify potential safety
concerns with these new and emerging technologies.
ODI continually evaluates its analytical methods and improves them
to help identify outliers and trends that are potentially related to
safety defects. One of the methods `improves itself' each quarter; the
Bayesian Filter evaluates field reports using a computer program with
probability formulas that considers how similar each field report is to
ones that were previously identified as likely or not likely to
indicate a safety-related defect. Each quarter, new field reports are
added to help continuously train this filter.
Given the level of interest in the EWR data as a result of the
Toyota issue, the agency is considering again what, if any, additional
improvements in the EWR system might be helpful to the agency in
identifying defect trends.
Question 5. Does NHTSA have adequate authority to investigate and
subpoena foreign manufacturers such as Toyota, which designs and tests
most of their vehicles in Japan?
Answer. NHTSA has adequate authority to investigate foreign
manufacturers such as Toyota, which has a substantial presence in the
United States. We note that Toyota has responded to our inquiries,
including providing information from Japan.
Question 6. Are the penalties under the TREAD Act adequate?
Answer. We are currently reviewing all of our statutory
authorities, including the adequacy of our civil penalty authority. We
would we pleased to discuss this issue as well as others related to our
statutory authority once we have completed our review.
Question 7. Has Toyota fully complied with the TREAD Act reporting
requirements for accidents that may be related to defects, safety
campaigns, and recalls in foreign countries?
Answer. The Early Warning Reporting (EWR) regulation established
pursuant the TREAD Act does not require manufacturers to report
accidents. Rather, the EWR regulations require manufacturers to report
information based on claims and notices of deaths and injuries. Toyota
has reported 271 deaths and 3,197 injuries in EWR through the fourth
quarter of 2009.
The TREAD Act and subsequent NHTSA regulations also require
manufacturers to submit information on safety recalls and other safety
campaigns in a foreign country on a motor vehicle or item of equipment
that is identical or substantially similar to a vehicle or item of
equipment sold or offered for sale in the U.S. Toyota has reported 89
foreign campaigns, of which 2 are related to sudden unintended
acceleration. In January 2003, Toyota notified the agency that it was
recalling 2002 Toyota Celica vehicles in Canada because the floor mat
may entrap the accelerator pedal. In December 2009, Toyota notified the
agency that it was recalling Toyota all-weather floor mats sold as
optional accessory mats for 2009-2010 Toyota Venza vehicles in Canada
because the floor mat may entrap the accelerator pedal.
The following are exceptions to reporting foreign recall or safety
campaigns:
1. the manufacturer is conducting a safety recall or safety
campaign on an identical or substantially similar vehicle in
the U.S.;
2. the component or system that gave rise to the foreign recall
or other campaign does not perform the same function as the
substantially similar component or system in the U.S.; or
3. the subject of the foreign recall or other campaign is a
label affixed to the vehicle, item of equipment or a tire.
At this time, we are unaware of any violations by Toyota of the
TREAD Act requirements on reporting of incidents involving deaths or
injuries or on reporting foreign safety recalls and other safety
campaigns.
Question 8. Do consumers know enough about this opportunity [to
submit complaints through the DOT Vehicle Safety Hotline and to submit
``Vehicle Owner Questionnaires'' (VOQs)]?
Answer. NHTSA currently receives between 30,000 and 40,000 consumer
complaints a year on a population of approximately 240,000,000
registered vehicles. NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
currently collects consumer complaints in four primary ways. Consumers
can contact NHTSA via the NHTSA Safety Hotline at 888-327-4236, the
Internet at www.safercar.gov, by sending the agency a hard copy of a
Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ), or by sending a letter to the
agency. NHTSA believes that receiving as many consumer complaints as
possible makes identifying and investigating potential safety defects
happen much earlier in time and helps build a stronger case when a
safety defect exists. NHTSA plans to increase public awareness of the
NHTSA Auto Safety Hotline and the agency's website at www.safercar.gov.
NHTSA is developing partnerships to increase the agency's online
presence, attending trade shows, increasing media purchases, and taking
advantage of earned media opportunities. By increasing public awareness
of NHTSA's role as the government agency overseeing motor vehicle
safety, NHTSA expects to increase significantly the number of consumer
complaints it receives.
Question 9. Have SUA complaints related to Toyota vehicles
increased significantly in recent weeks?
Answer. Consumer complaints alleging SUA (as identified by a
keyword search designed to identify these incidents) jumped in November
2009 to ten times normal monthly volume. The number of these complaints
received in February 2010 jumped by an additional factor of eight to
over 1,500. March traffic, while lower, is still heavy. Non-Toyota SUA
complaints also jumped in February but remain well below the Toyota
figures.
Question 10. Has NHTSA adequately investigated VOQs and Petition
Requests for investigation into alleged safety defects related to SUA?
Answer. NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation has carefully
examined VOQs and reviewed Defect Petitions for evidence of vehicle
defects causing, or contributing to, incidents of unintended
acceleration, and pursued significant safety recalls where warranted.
While we believe our investigations have addressed the complaints and
petitions we received, we are taking extra steps to further examine the
issue.
Question 11. Are these penalties sufficient?
Answer. As a part of its review of changes to its statutes that may
be helpful, the agency is also reviewing the adequacy of the maximum
fines manufacturers are subject to for violations of the TREAD Act.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. David Strickland
Question 1. Does NHTSA have adequate resources and technical
capacity to fully investigate safety concerns related to the complex
electronic systems in today's vehicles? Does NHTSA require more
computer scientists, electrical engineers, and other technical experts
in new areas to ensure that NHTSA can protect the public from unsafe
vehicles? With the FY2011 budget requested staff increases, will NHTSA
have adequate resources to fully investigate safety concerns related to
the complex electronic systems in today's vehicles? What other
resources or authority does NHTSA need to investigate complaints and
protect public safety?
Answer. With its existing resources, NHTSA's Office of Defects
Investigation (ODI) runs the most active defects investigation program
in the world. Since its inception, ODI has influenced more than 2,800
vehicle recalls involving more than 278 million vehicles. During six of
the past 7 years, ODI's investigations have resulted in over 100
vehicle recalls per year.
The agency has a diverse and experienced workforce with extensive
experience in automobile safety, including experts conducting defects
investigations and experts researching and testing vehicle safety at
NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center. ODI currently has two
electrical engineers on staff, and NHTSA has a total of five electrical
engineers. NHTSA is assessing ODI's needs to determine what additional
staff with expertise in electronics, computer science, or other areas
of specialization are needed. If necessary to support ODI, NHTSA will
not hesitate to reallocate resources within the agency's current
staffing ceiling. In addition, ODI also obtains resources from outside
the agency in specialized fields of expertise to ensure that its
analyses are thorough and comprehensive, when such a course of action
is necessary.
The President's FY 2011 budget requests 66 additional personnel to
help strengthen our ability to address safety issues on the Nation's
roadways. If approved and funded by the Congress, the agency will use
those positions where they are needed to ensure that the agency is
meeting its various safety responsibilities, including additional
resources to ODI.
NHTSA's legal and program staffs are reviewing our current
statutory authority and will be making recommendations on whether and
how it can be improved. We look forward to working with the Committee
in evaluating how NHTSA's ability to perform its mission might be
strengthened through legislation.
Question 2. How does NHTSA establish thresholds for determining a
``safety related defect''?
Answer. NHTSA looks at the following factors for determining a
``safety-related defect'': (1) the frequency of occurrence and (2) the
severity of the consequence when assessing whether a particular defect
should be considered a safety-related defect. This is a technique
commonly applied in risk analysis methods. Two examples, described
below, illustrate how this method is applied in practice.
In 2007, NHTSA investigated reports of unwanted acceleration in
2007 Lexus ES350 vehicles, causing the vehicle to attain high speeds.
The circumstances led to potentially high severity incidents, sometimes
lasting several minutes and distances measured in miles, where the risk
of a crash with injury or fatality was high. Accordingly, NHTSA opened
the investigation with only five complaints because of the severity of
the incidents being reported. Although an internal Toyota document
claimed that Toyota saved $100 million in this investigation, shortly
after the date of the document, NHTSA's actions caused Toyota to
conduct a recall of 5.3 million vehicles because of this defect, at a
cost to Toyota that is presumably well in excess of $100 million.
With regard to the defective Sienna liftgates, Toyota agreed to
conduct a recall campaign to repair the liftgate struts in over 195,000
vehicles and sent letters to all vehicle owners stating that ``Toyota
has decided to conduct a safety recall.'' NHTSA's investigation of the
defective liftgates indicated that the majority of the injuries
attributed to this defect involved soft tissue injuries, such as bumps
and bruises. However, NHTSA aggressively pursued the issue with Toyota
because of the relatively high number of the reports and the potential
for serious injury, even though the risk of serious injury was low.
Question 2a. Just how many people must suffer injuries or death
under similar circumstances for NHTSA to require a recall?
Answer. NHTSA has no requirement that an injury or a death must
occur before a recall or an investigation is required or initiated. In
fact, the majority of defect investigations that NHTSA undertakes are
opened without an allegation of injury or fatality, but only the
potential for such. Many of the safety recalls that result from these
investigations are initiated before injuries or fatalities occur, which
is the ideal outcome.
Question 2b. In the future, how will NHTSA ensure that its
investigations are sufficiently broad enough to include relevant
incidents related to a particular safety issue in the future?
Answer. NHTSA takes great care in determining the proper scope of
an investigation. The background statement to this question suggests
that NHTSA limited the scope of a prior investigation. We assume the
intended reference was to the 2004 investigation involving the throttle
control system on 2002--2003 Camry and ES300 vehicles. That
investigation was focused on whether the newly introduced electronic
throttle control system was the cause of consumer reports that the
vehicle self-accelerated in close quarter driving situations (e.g.,
parking the vehicle) and caused a crash. These were very short duration
incidents (1 to 3 seconds) where the driver may not have had time to
apply the brake, and after which the vehicle returned to a normal
state.
After interviews were conducted, NHTSA eliminated from that
investigation reports where consumers stated they had forcefully
applied the brake pedal but the vehicle continued to accelerate for a
longer period (e.g., 5 seconds or more) or distance (e.g., 50 feet or
more). Such allegations can only be explained by a simultaneous failure
of the throttle and brake systems. When no post-incident evidence of
failure is found in either system, the likely explanation is driver
error (pedal misapplication). Since the reports did not indicate a
vehicle-based defect, they were eliminated from the scope of that
investigation.
One important point, the term ``longer duration'' when used in the
2004 investigation did not refer to the types of incidents occurring in
the MY 2007 and later Camry and ES350, which was the focus of a 2007
investigation (i.e., those that were related to floor mat/pedal
entrapment, and that lasted for several minutes and miles). NHTSA had
not received reports of this type for the MY 2002 to 2006 Camry and ES
vehicles so they were not excluded from consideration--rather they did
not exist during the 2004 investigation.
NHTSA will continue to carefully evaluate reports and other factual
information relevant to its investigations to ensure that the proper
scope is identified.
Question 3. Why did NHTSA not subpoena the information the agency
required earlier in its investigation?
Answer. NHTSA's issue with Toyota was not an inability to get
documents or responses to questions, but rather Toyota's slow response
in conducting recalls. NHTSA has adequate authority to get information
from manufacturers through its process of issuing requests for document
production and responses to questions. We have found that these formal
requests are a better way to obtain the information we ask for rather
than using subpoenas.
Question 4. What steps is NHTSA taking to make customer reporting
more uniform and thereby improve pattern identification for emerging
safety concerns?
Answer. NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) currently
collects consumer complaints via four routes: Consumers can contact us
via the Auto Safety Hotline (888-327-4236), via the Internet (by far
the majority) at www.safercar.gov, via a hardcopy Vehicle Owners
Questionnaire (VOQ), or via consumer letter. The first three of these
use the same form and collect the same data in the same way. Letters
are manually coded into our database using a similar form. Once coded
into our database, this data is instantaneously available for
investigators to review and use in safety defect investigations.
To date, NHTSA has taken a number of steps to improve data quality
by reducing the number of fields on its web-based input form, by
simplifying component code options on the form, and by improving the
naming tools for child restraint and tire complaints. Decreasing the
number of fields has reduced the risks of erroneous inputs.
Consolidating the component code list has reduced the number of choices
to a more manageable level, improving the certainty behind the
component code that was chosen. Improved naming for child restraint and
tire complaints has reduced ambiguity in those areas.
Concerns have been raised about the consistency between consumer
narratives in the complaints and the component codes that were
selected. A majority of consumer complaints are filed directly by the
consumer, and the data provided by the consumer reflects the consumer's
best judgment. Only the complaints received via the Hotline
(approximately 17 percent of the current traffic) receive a secondary
review for consistency between the narrative and the component code.
While component codes are helpful, the agency also uses other
methods that include a manual review and keyword searches of the
complaint narratives to identify patterns for emerging safety concerns.
The agency is taking additional steps to improve component coding by
replacing the text list with a graphical representation of the vehicle
and an associated glossary to facilitate better choices by consumers.
Question 5. What [steps] can be taken to ensure that cars are
designed with intuitive controls in case of a panic or emergency
situation?
Answer. Under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101
``Controls and Displays,'' NHTSA regulates the location,
identification, color, and illumination of certain vehicle controls for
both normal operation of a vehicle and in panic situations. Currently,
we do not have performance requirements for push button start controls.
We are aware of a lack of standardization of this feature among
automobile manufacturers, and we are evaluating whether the agency
should consider taking steps to require standardization of this
feature.
We note that SAE International has been working to develop test
procedures and guidelines for these controls, and they anticipate
completion of this work in June 2011. NHTSA is also participating in
this important work.
Question 6. Based on its Toyota investigations, will NHTSA update
existing safety standards to prevent ``sudden unintended acceleration''
and pedal entrapment? Should NHTSA require ``smart pedal'' technology
in new vehicles? Should NHTSA further develop a performance standard
for stopping the vehicle when the throttle is wide open?
Answer. We are currently evaluating potential regulatory actions in
this area. We believe that brake override technology could be promising
We are evaluating that technology to determine if it will have a
significant positive impact and to understand its performance
characteristics and how they differ among manufacturers using this
technology. The development of a performance standard for stopping a
vehicle experiencing full throttle requires further discussion and
research.
Question 7. When did NHTSA last review current FMVSS and SAE
standards to ensure that pedal entrapment hazards are fully addressed
in the agency's safety rules?
Answer. NHTSA's last comprehensive review of pedal placement and
design was published in September 1989 (DOT H.S. 807 512). We actively
follow the activities of SAE International as well as other standard
setting organizations. SAE International has a standard related to
pedal placement, SAE J1100 (Motor Vehicle Dimensions), that was last
updated in November 2009. While SAE J1100 contains recommendations for
the placement of pedals, we understand that manufacturers have internal
proprietary guidelines that contain additional specifications. NHTSA
does not have a FMVSS standard that specifically addresses the pedal
entrapment hazard. However, the agency is currently reviewing SAE
International's updated standard and the recent pedal entrapment
incidents to determine whether regulatory action is necessary.
Question 7a. Should NHTSA or Congress mandate new safety standards
for floor mats and pedal entrapment to reduce the likelihood of crashes
from pedal entrapment and uncontrolled acceleration?
Answer. NHTSA is currently developing a plan to review this issue
and will determine if such a safety standard is needed. This will
require some research to ensure that, if a standard is needed, it will
be effective and be expressed in performance terms.
Question 8. Should NHTSA require electronic data recorders in all
new vehicles to improve safety?
Answer. NHTSA currently does not require EDRs. However, we estimate
that more than 90 percent of the 2010 model year vehicles have some EDR
functions available. NHTSA's current regulation on event data recorders
(EDRs) applies to those voluntarily-installed on light vehicles
(vehicles under 10,000 pounds GVWR). The regulation serves to
standardize the accuracy, collection, storage, survivability and
retrieval of crash-related data for vehicles produced after September
1, 2012 (or the 2013 model year). EDRs have the potential to improve
safety by providing a better understanding of the crash environment.
Indirectly, they may lead to safer vehicle designs, improved crash
reconstruction, and better assessments of safety equipment and
automatic crash notification systems. None of these benefits of EDRs
have been quantified at this time, but NHTSA is considering possible
next steps.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Ray LaHood and Hon. David Strickland
Question 1. It appears that as many as 70 percent of the complaints
in Toyota's customer call database about unintended acceleration are
not addressed by Toyota's recent recalls to replace floor mats and fix
"sticky" pedals, and their cause remains unexplained. In its numerous
investigations about unintended acceleration, NHTSA itself raised
concerns in 2004 that the problem could be related to the electronic
throttle control (ETC) system, but the question was never answered. Why
didn't NHTSA independently test the Camry and ES-300 ETC system to
determine whether the ETC may be responsible for unintended
acceleration?
Answer. In 2004, NHTSA independently conducted the investigation of
the Camry/ES electronic throttle control (ETC) system consistent with
its approach in other preliminary evaluations. Specifically, a NHTSA
investigator reviewed and evaluated the relevant consumer reports
(VOQ), issued an information request to Toyota, reviewed and evaluated
the information provided by Toyota (including documentation of the ETC
design and its safety-related features). NHTSA looked for common
objective identifiers of vehicle defects--replacement of vehicle
components, report of warning lights, and presence of trouble codes.
One or more of such factors often is present in the event of an ETC
system failure. NHTSA also looked at Toyota's warranty claim experience
on the ETC system, which if substantial often is an indication of a
defect.
As part of our investigation, NHTSA also interviewed numerous
vehicle owners. Based on these consumer interviews, many of the reports
could not be explained solely by an ETC system failure. Specifically,
some consumers' statements implied that while the vehicle was
accelerating, the brakes simultaneously failed (i.e., they had no
effect on the vehicle after they were allegedly fully applied). Also,
NHTSA did not find evidence to support the occurrence of brake system
or ETC system failure--a fact pattern generally associated with pedal
misapplication. After reviewing the information provided by consumers
and Toyota, NHTSA did not pursue further investigation because the
information gathered at that time did not indicate that further
investigation was warranted.
By contrast, in the 2007 ES350 (floor mat) and 2008 Sienna (trim
panel) investigations. NHTSA was able to identify and establish a
condition that resulted in unwanted acceleration. In both cases NHTSA
pursued the issues until Toyota took a remedy action.
Question 1a. What is the Agency doing now?
Answer. As announced by Secretary Ray LaHood, the agency has
initiated two major studies designed to answer questions surrounding
the issue of unintended vehicle acceleration.
First, NHTSA will conduct a short-term review of electronic
throttle controls in Toyota vehicles by the end of the summer. In this
effort, NHTSA has enlisted NASA scientists with expertise in areas such
as computer controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic
interference, and software integrity to help tackle the issue of
unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. NHTSA chose NASA because of
its extensive expertise in electronic controls, as well as its
unmatched expertise in forensic analysis and fail-safe design,
verification, and testing strategies. NASA's expertise in electronics,
hardware, software, hazard analysis and complex problem solving will
help ensure that this review will be comprehensive.
Second, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)--an independent body
using top scientific experts--will also examine the broad subject of
unintended acceleration and electronic vehicle controls across the
entire automotive industry over the course of 15 months. A panel of
experts will review possible sources of unintended acceleration,
including electronic vehicle controls, human error, mechanical failure
and interference with accelerator systems. The experts will look at
software, computer hardware design, electromagnetic compatibility and
electromagnetic interference. The panel will make recommendations to
NHTSA on how its rulemaking, research, and defects investigation
activities may help ensure the safety of electronic control systems in
motor vehicles.
In addition, NHTSA is concurrently evaluating the need for safety
standards related to brake override systems, as well as other possible
safety standards.
Question 2. What is the Department's assessment of the preliminary
report by Southern Illinois University Associate Professor David
Gilbert, indicating that a failure of the circuitry, sensors or wiring
in the electronic throttle control system could cause a runaway engine?
Answer. We first learned of Professor Gilbert's preliminary report
in a meeting with Sean Kane on February 22, 2010, and we received a
copy of the report the next day. While we immediately began evaluating
the information contained in the report, the agency has not completed
its assessment of Professor Gilbert's preliminary report. As noted
above, NHTSA is conducting two important studies on unintended
acceleration--a NHTSA/NASA study and a NAS study. Both studies will
examine Professor Gilbert's report more closely.
Question 3. What needs to be done to prevent a situation like the
Toyota situation from happening again? How does NHTSA plan to change
its processes and priorities to ensure that no serious vehicle safety
problem is overlooked?
Answer. NHTSA's objective in conducting investigations is to
determine if there is a defect that poses an unreasonable risk to motor
vehicle safety in a particular vehicle or series of vehicles. When
NHTSA is unable to identify such a defect, it closes the investigation
but continues to monitor field data for information that may show that
the issue needs to be revisited.
We believe that our safety defect screening and investigation
process works well in identifying, investigating, and remedying safety
defects in the field. NHTSA's process is data-driven, and decisions are
based on input from around the agency. In addition, NHTSA's process is
largely open to public oversight. We believe that the 524 recalls
involving 23.5 million vehicles within the last 3 years supports the
success of NHTSA's approach.
With respect to the Toyota situation, NHTSA's defect screening
activity identified early concerns about electronic throttle control in
late 2003 (prior to any external warnings). This work and a defect
petition led to the opening of the first defect investigation in mid-
2004. This investigation and several subsequent defect petition reviews
focused on the various causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota
vehicles. The agency closed the investigation and petition requests
because the agency did not find evidence of a vehicle-based defect.
During this time, NHTSA's screening process separately identified
instances of pedal entrapment in other Toyota vehicles such as the
Lexus ES350 (via all weather floor mat interaction with the pedal) and
the Sienna (via trim panel movement). This work led to investigations
which ultimately influenced Toyota to conduct safety recalls in the
affected vehicles.
NHTSA continually seeks ways to improve its defects investigation
process. For example, we are looking for ways to make our Vehicle Owner
Questionnaire easier to use so that we can improve the amount and
quality of information consumers provide in complaints. We are also
adding more experts to our staff in the areas of electronics and
software, which will help us to address issues of this nature more
readily.
As noted above, the agency has also commissioned two new studies to
identify vulnerabilities in the electronics systems that could lead to
unintended acceleration not only in Toyota vehicles, but in all
vehicles. These studies are not defects investigations, but rather are
research initiatives. Any potential safety defect identified by this
work will be referred to the defects screening process for further
consideration. The agency will review the results and any
recommendations from both studies to determine whether additional
measures may assist the agency to improve its process.
Question 4. NHTSA has indicated that, on average, it conducts about
100 vehicle defect investigations annually. Two primary sources of
vehicle information are consumer complaints filed directly with NHTSA,
and Early Warning Report data submitted to NHTSA by the auto
manufacturers as required by the TREAD Act. Yet NHTSA personnel have
indicated that most investigations are opened on the basis of
complaints submitted to NHTSA, and that only a few investigations each
year are initiated based on Early Warning Reports. What needs to be
done to make Early Warning Reports more useful? Early Warning
information was intended to give NHTSA more information with which to
determine potential safety hazards, but the reports do not seem to be
as helpful as they should be.
Answer. At this time, the agency believes the information reported
by manufacturers to NHTSA is useful for identifying potential safety
defects in the affected vehicles in the U.S. Since 2004, the first full
year in which NHTSA received EWR data, the Office of Defects
Investigation (ODI) has used the EWR data to assist in our safety-
defect identification investigation process. NHTSA has utilized EWR
data to assist in opening 110 defect investigations, which resulted in
over 11 million recalled vehicles and equipment. Specifically, EWR data
has prompted the opening of 28 defect investigations, accelerated the
opening of 30 defect investigations, and supported the opening of 52
other defect investigations.
The agency is reviewing the reporting requirements and our
analytical methods to determine whether additional requirements or
improvements are necessary to identify potential safety concerns more
effectively and efficiently and intends to implement those changes as
necessary.
Question 5. Event data recorders (EDR) are used to collect vehicle
information to improve performance and safety. Their installation is
not mandatory, though NHTSA has estimated that more than 60 percent of
new vehicles contain them. It promulgated a rule in 2006 to standardize
the data collected and the format for such information beginning in MY
2013 vehicles. How did NHTSA determine the data elements that should be
recorded by an EDR?
Answer. Currently, NHTSA estimates that more than 90 percent of the
MY 2010 vehicles have some EDR functionality.
The agency has been collecting EDR data since the 1990s when EDRs
were developed as a secondary function of the air bag control module.
This electronic module samples data from various vehicle sensors to
determine if a crash is imminent and if an air bag should be deployed.
Vehicle manufacturers use the data to assess air bag performance in the
vehicle and aid in the development of new vehicle safety features.
NHTSA uses the data to assess not only air bag performance, but also to
assist crash reconstruction efforts and pave the way for the
introduction of new safety systems such as Advanced Collision
Notification (ACN), which forwards crash information to emergency
responders for appropriate response.
In 1998, NHTSA began an effort called the Event Data Recorder
Working Group (EDR WG) that utilized the collective resources of
industry, academia, and other government organizations (e.g., National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and National Transportation Safety
Board) to study EDRs. The EDR WG developed a list of 29 key data
elements that would facilitate the collection and utilization of crash
avoidance and crashworthiness data from on-board EDRs. The list of data
elements was guided by recommendations developed by the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). In addition, the EDR WG attempted to
prioritize the data elements, assess their feasibility, and study EDR
survivability. Consistent with the agency obligation to consider
safety, cost and practicability, NHTSA then chose the required and
optional data elements that would help the agency better understand the
vehicle dynamics and performance of safety systems shortly before and
during a crash.
Question 5a. Do you believe the data elements identified in this
rule will be sufficient? Are there other elements you now believe
should be collected that could prove useful to improving safety?
Answer. NHTSA currently does not require EDRs to be installed on
vehicles. The agency's regulation on EDRs applies to those voluntarily-
installed on most light vehicles. As noted above, the agency identified
those data elements that it believed would help the agency better
understand the vehicle dynamics and performance of safety systems.
However, the agency's EDR rule is designed to grow with the increasing
number and types of safety systems equipped in passenger vehicles. For
example, as more manufacturers begin to install side curtain air bags,
the rule standardizes any data an EDR collects relating to the
deployment of these safety systems.
While other potential data elements may be available for recording
if a vehicle is equipped with certain technology, such as steering
input, electronic stability control status, or lane departure warning,
the EDR technology installed on vehicles varies among the manufacturers
and models. Recording these and other data elements may provide
supplemental information that allows for a better understanding of
driver actions, crash causation and vehicle performance. At this time,
the agency is evaluating what additional elements should be added and
how current data elements might be modified to provide more useful
information.
Question 5b. How did NHTSA determine the appropriate length of time
for which the EDR will record in the event of a crash?
Answer. EDRs were only intended to capture the short time period of
data immediately preceding and during a crash. The EDR WG carefully
considered the length of time needed to characterize a crash based on
the collective experience of industry, academia, NHTSA's own crash
investigations, and other government agencies. The agency selected the
time intervals for collected data based on the recommendations of the
EDR WG, crash testing (including air bag deployment times), and EDR
research conducted in the 1990s. In the 2004 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, NHTSA proposed that EDRs capture up to 8 seconds of pre-
crash data and 500 milliseconds of data during the crash. In response
to comments on the NPRM, additional agency EDR data collection and
research, and the estimated costs associated with the recording
capabilities of EDRs, the agency concluded in the final rule that EDRs
would be required to capture 5 seconds of pre-crash data and 300
milliseconds of data during the crash.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. Ray LaHood and Hon. David Strickland
Question 1. How often and when has the Department of Transportation
utilized Exponent to test for safety/defect related information?
Answer. On September 26, 2001, NHTSA awarded a delivery order type
contract to Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent's predecessor) for
``Compliance Tests for FMVSS No. 201, Occupant Protection Interior
Impact.'' NHTSA placed four orders during the period of performance of
this contract (September 26, 2001 to September 27, 2007).
Question 2. What information regarding occurrences/complaints and
manufacturers in foreign countries do you currently receive? What types
of information do you not currently receive regarding occurrences/
complaints and manufacturers in foreign countries that you think would
be beneficial? How would this information benefit your safety efforts
in the United States?
Answer. The Early Warning Reporting (EWR) regulation established
pursuant to the TREAD Act requires all vehicle manufacturers and
equipment manufacturers (including tires and child restraints) to
report information based on notices and claims of deaths occurring in a
foreign country if the vehicle involved is identical or substantially
similar to a vehicle sold or offered for sale in the U.S. Manufacturers
must also report information on safety recalls and other safety
campaigns in a foreign country on a motor vehicle or item of equipment
that is identical or substantially similar to a vehicle or item of
equipment sold or offered for sale in the U.S. The following are
exceptions for reporting foreign recall or safety campaigns:
The manufacturer is conducting a safety recall or safety
campaign on a vehicle for which an identical or substantially
similar vehicle is not sold in the U.S.;
The component or system that gave rise to the foreign recall
or other campaign does not perform the same function as the
substantially similar component or system in the U.S.,
The subject of the foreign recall or other campaign is a
label affixed to the vehicle, item of equipment or a tire.
Manufacturers are required to submit a list of identical or
substantially similar vehicles annually so that the agency can use this
information to identify potential defects in vehicles sold or offered
for sale in the U.S. Currently, manufacturers are not required to
submit this list electronically. The agency is reviewing whether
manufacturers should submit this list electronically to provide quicker
access and review of the substantially similar vehicle lists.
At this time, the agency believes the information reported by
manufacturers for foreign deaths and foreign safety campaigns along
with the consumer complaints and other EWR information reported to
NHTSA is adequate to identify potential safety defects in the affected
vehicles in the U.S. However, the agency continues to review the
reporting requirements to determine whether additional requirements or
improvements are necessary to identify potential safety concerns more
effectively and efficiently and intends to implement those changes as
necessary.
Question 3. During the 2007 NHTSA investigation into the MY07
Lexus, the VRTC at NHTSA conducted a study of the electronics system.
Please provide all information available related to this study,
including testing procedures used, data collected, analysis of data,
and results and conclusions from the testing. Should any of the
requested information not be available, explain why it is not available
and if that lack of availability is consistent with typical VRTC and
overall NHTSA studies.
Answer. NHTSA's 2007 investigation of MY07 Lexus vehicles was
focused on floor mat interference as the possible cause of unwanted
acceleration. NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center conducted a
variety of tests, surveys and field investigations to support that
investigation. Because they had access to a vehicle with an Electronic
Throttle Control system, they decided to conduct a limited examination
of how that vehicle responded to simulated faults in the accelerator
pedal position sensors, the throttle position sensors, the mass air
flow sensor and the coolant temperature sensor. In order to preserve
the data collected, they were summarized in the final test report for
that investigation (see attached).
Question 4. Have the various studies done on the Toyota and Lexus
ETC systems (including but not limited to the 2007 NHTSA study, 2009
Exponent Study, and the study done by Professor Gilbert) been subjected
to peer review? Do you think it would be beneficial to have them peer
reviewed? Do you think it would be beneficial to have the National
Academy of Sciences conduct a peer review of the various tests? If not
the NAS, who would you suggest as an appropriate entity to conduct an
objective peer review of these tests?
Answer. As noted above, NHTSA's 2007 investigation focused on floor
mat interference as the possible cause of unwanted acceleration.
Although NHTSA engineers performed a limited examination of the ETC
response to a few simulated single point faults, the testing was not
intended to be a comprehensive study of the electronic system.
Therefore, a peer review of NHTSA's 2007 report would not be
appropriate or beneficial.
As announced on March 30, NHTSA is conducting two important studies
on unintended acceleration. In one study, NHTSA with NASA will focus on
the ETC system in Toyota vehicles. The two agencies will examine the
range of studies that have been done that are relevant to this subject,
including those of Professor Gilbert and Exponent. In the second study,
the National Academy of Sciences will examine electronic control
systems and safeguards across the automotive industry. That study will
also examine previous work relevant to the subject. These two
comprehensive studies will include an examination of the work by
Exponent and Professor Gilbert and will therefore serve as a type of
peer review.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Clarence M. Ditlow
Question 1. Mr. Ditlow, Toyota responded to problems with
accelerator pedals becoming stuck by making its pedals smaller,
lowering the floor beneath the pedal, and installing ``smart pedal
technology'' to ensure that the brake pedal overrides the gas pedal.
However, the recalled Toyota vehicles met all NHTSA safety
standards when they were sold. These repairs to prevent sudden
unintended acceleration seem to highlight the need to update Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Should NHTSA or Congress
mandate new safety standards for ``smart pedal'' technology, floor
mats, and pedal entrapment to reduce the likelihood of crashes from
uncontrolled acceleration?
Answer. Congress should require NHTSA to issue a range of new
safety standards for electronic controls, accelerators, and brake-
accelerator pedal configurations. First, NHTSA needs to be directed to
revise its existing standard for mechanical accelerator controls
systems, FMVSS 124, to take into consideration electronic throttle
controls. Second, NHTSA needs to be directed to issue standards that
apply to all electronic controls in vehicles to require failsafe
systems, testing for flaws in computer software, electromagnetic
compatibility to prevent electromagnetic interference failures. Third,
NHTSA needs to be directed to revise its existing standard for controls
and displays, FMVSS 101, to not only address brake-accelerator pedal
separation but also engine off controls such as the 3-second push
button kill switch in Toyota's.
Question 2. What existing FMVSS, SAE, and other standards should
guide efforts to ensure that uncontrolled acceleration and pedal
entrapment hazards are fully addressed in future safety rules?
Answer. In addition to the above changes to existing Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards, NHTSA should be required to take into
consideration IEEE standards as well as standards in other industries
with electronic controls such as aerospace.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Clarence M. Ditlow
Question. Have the various studies done on the Toyota and Lexus ETC
systems (including but not limited to the 2007 NHTSA study, 2009
Exponent Study, and the study done by Professor Gilbert) been subjected
to peer review? Do you think it would be beneficial to have them peer
reviewed? Do you think it would be beneficial to have the National
Academy of Sciences conduct a peer review of the various tests? If not
the NAS, who would you suggest as an appropriate entity to conduct an
objective peer review of these tests?
Answer. None of the three studies have been peer reviewed. The 2007
NHTSA study cannot be peer reviewed because the agency has no records
of its data or procedure. The Exponent and Gilbert studies should be
peer reviewed when they are completed. The NAS is certainly capable of
doing a peer review and would be an appropriate entity to do so.
______
Memorandum
U.S. Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Vehicle Research and Test Center
East Liberty, OH
Date: Apr 30, 2008
Subject: Final Report: ``2007 Lexus ES-350 Unintended Acceleration''
From: Michael W. Monk
Director, Vehicle Research and Test Center
To: Kathleen DeMeter
Director, Office of Defects Investigation
Attached are four (4) copies of the subject report. This completes
the requirements for this program.
Attachment: Final Report
______
VRTC Memorandum Report EA07-010
VRTC-DCD-7113
2007 Lexus ES-350 Unintended Acceleration
1.0 Introduction
This program was performed at the Vehicle Research and Test Center
(VRTC) at the request of the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. ODI opened an
Engineering Analysis (EA07-010) on 2007 Lexus ES-350 vehicles to
investigate reports of unintended acceleration.
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Determine whether reported incidents of unintended acceleration
were caused by a vehicle system malfunction or mechanical interference;
2.2 Understand and document the effects of unintended acceleration
as they impact controllability of the vehicle;
2.3 Document potential difficulties experienced by the operator
while attempting to regain control of the vehicle.
3.0 Project Tasks
3.1 Dynamic Instrumented Vehicle Testing
The Vehicle Research and Test Center obtained a Lexus ES-350 for
testing (see Figure 1). The vehicle was fully instrumented to monitor
and acquire data relating to yaw rate, speed, acceleration,
deceleration, brake pedal effort, brake line hydraulic pressure, brake
pad temperature, engine vacuum, brake booster vacuum, throttle plate
position, and accelerator pedal position. Multiple electrical signals
were introduced into the electrical system to test the robustness of
the electronics against single point failures due to electrical
interference. The system proved to have multiple redundancies and
showed no vulnerabilities to electrical signal activities. Magnetic
fields were introduced in proximity to the throttle body and
accelerator pedal potentiometers and did result in an increase in
engine revolutions per minute (RPM) of up to approximately 1,000 RPM,
similar to a cold-idle engine RPM level. Mechanical interferences at
the throttle body caused the engine to shut down. Mechanical
interferences at the accelerator pedal revealed that the one-piece,
non-articulating accelerator pedal assembly was easily entrapped in the
groove of the rubber all-weather floor mat (Figures 2 and 3) if the
rubber mat was not properly secured with at least one of the two
retaining hooks (Figure 4). In many observed ES-350s, the rubber mats
were stacked on top of the existing carpeted floor mats, which
prevented attachment of the rubber mats and facilitated the
interference failure mode. A warning is embossed on the front of the
floor mat that reads ``Do not place on top of existing floor mats''.
Very few owners interviewed were able to find or read this warning (see
Figure 5).
3.2 Owner Surveys
To comprehend the statistical significance of the probability for
this event to occur, a survey was sent to a sample size of 1986
registered owners of a 2007 Lexus ES-350 requesting information
regarding episodes of unintended acceleration. NHTSA received 600
responses for an overall response rate of 30.2 percent. Fifty-nine
owners stated they experienced unintended acceleration. Thirty-five of
those responding also reported that their vehicles were equipped with
rubber Lexus all-weather floor mats and several commented that the
incident occurred when the accelerator had become trapped in a groove
in the floor mat. Interviews with owners revealed that many had
unsecured rubber floor mats in place at the time of the unintended
acceleration event, which included in some cases unsecured rubber floor
mats placed over existing Lexus carpeted mats.
3.3 Analysis of the Effects of Unintended Acceleration on Vehicle
Control
The safety consequences of an unsecured rubber floor mat trapping
the accelerator pedal with the vehicle in gear can be severe. With the
engine throttle plate open, the vacuum power assist of the braking
system cannot be replenished and the effectiveness of the brakes is
reduced significantly. During trapped throttle acceleration testing,
several methods to defeat acceleration proved effective but not
necessarily intuitive. These methods included:
3.3.1 Application of the brake - Significant brake pedal force
in excess of 150 pounds was required to stop the vehicle,
compared to 30 pounds required when the vehicle is operating
normally. Stopping distances increased from less than 200 feet
to more than 1,000 feet.
3.3.2 Turning off the ignition - In place of an ignition key,
the ES-350 uses an ignition button that removes the ability to
instantaneously shut off the engine in the event of an
emergency while the vehicle is in motion (see Figure 6). It was
found that depressing and holding the button will eventually
turn off the engine after 3 seconds. Through the survey it was
learned that the button delay operation is not widely known by
owners and because of this, drivers found themselves unable to
turn off the engine when the vehicle was in motion. The owner's
manual makes general mention of the operation, but there is no
indication of the 3-second hold requirement.
3.3.3 Placing the vehicle in Neutral - Many owners complained
that the neutral gear position in the gated shift pattern was
not immediately obvious, leading to unsuccessful attempts to
disengage the engine from the drive wheels. On the labeled
shift diagram located on the console, the Neutral ``N'' marking
is in closest proximity to the ``Sport'' mode upshift gate (see
Figure 7).
3.3.4 Activation of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) - It was
discovered that if an emergency maneuver is executed that
activates the Electronic Stability Control, such as steering
around a sharp curve while traveling at an excessive speed, the
electronic throttle is temporarily electronically closed by the
vehicle control module regardless of the accelerator pedal
position. With the throttle plate closed, vacuum quickly
returns to the brake booster and provides a significant
increase in braking capability (see Figure 8). Additionally,
ESC has the capability to automatically apply hydraulic
pressure to the service brakes to aid in slowing the vehicle.
When the emergency maneuver is concluded however, the ESC
system returns to a passive state, and the throttle again
returns to an open condition leading to further unwanted
acceleration.
4.0 Summary
Mechanical interferences at the accelerator pedal revealed
that the accelerator pedal assembly was easily entrapped in the
groove of the rubber all-weather floor mat if the rubber mat
was not properly secured with at least one of the two retaining
hooks.
A survey was sent to 1986 registered owners of a 2007 Lexus
ES-350 requesting information regarding episodes of unintended
acceleration. Of the 600 people that responded, 59 stated that
they experienced unintended acceleration and 35 complained of
pedal interference with the Lexus rubber all-weather floor
mats.
With the engine throttle plate open, the vacuum power assist
of the braking system cannot be replenished and the
effectiveness of the brakes is reduced significantly.
Brake pedal force in excess of 150 pounds was required
to stop the vehicle, compared to 30 pounds required when
the vehicle is operating normally.
ESC activation may restore vacuum to the brake
booster, providing a significant increase in braking
capability, but only until ESC activity ceases.
The owner survey indicated the 3 second delay in the
operation of the ignition button is not widely known by owners
and because of this, drivers found themselves unable to turn
off the engine when the vehicle was in motion.
Many owners complained that the neutral gear position in the
gated shift pattern was not immediately obvious, leading to
unsuccessful attempts to disengage the engine from the drive
wheels.
Figure 1--2007 Lexus ES-350
Figure 2--Lexus All-weather Floor Mat with Retaining Hook Holes at the
Bottom
Figure 3--Accelerator Pedal Trapped at Full Throttle by Unsecured
Rubber Floor Mat
Figure 4 -Floor Mat Retaining Clip and Carpet Receiving Eyelet
Figure 5--Embossed Warning On Floor Mat States ``Do Not Place On Top of
Existing Floor Mats''
Figure 6--Push Button Ignition Replaces Conventional Key
Figure 7--Shift Gate with Diagram
Figure 8--Data Acquired from Lexus During Testing Indicates Engine
Throttle is Overridden During ESC