[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND
LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND
ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 9 AND 10, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-32
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Part 1, February 9, 2011......................................... 1
Part 2, February 10, 2011........................................ 67
WITNESSES
February 9
The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern
studies, Council on Foreign Relations.......................... 10
The Honorable Lorne Craner, president, International Republican
Institute (former assistant secretary of state for democracy,
human rights, and labor)....................................... 17
Robert Satloff, Ph.D., executive director, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 26
February 10
The Honorable James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 77
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
February 9
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statements
February 9..................................................... 4
February 10.................................................... 70
The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement................. 12
The Honorable Lorne Craner: Prepared statement................... 19
Robert Satloff, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 28
February 10
The Honorable James B. Steinberg: Prepared statement............. 79
APPENDIX
February 9
Hearing notice................................................... 120
Hearing minutes.................................................. 121
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 123
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: IFES Briefing Paper entitled
``Elections in Egypt: Key Challenges for Credible and
Competitive Elections''........................................ 124
February 10
Hearing notice................................................... 132
Hearing minutes.................................................. 133
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri: Prepared statement...................... 135
The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina: Prepared statement.................... 136
Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen....................................................... 137
Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ
Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 155
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
AND ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST, PART 1
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
Having been duly organized, this committee will now proceed to
our first official hearing of the 112th Congress. After
recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7
minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the
chairman and ranking member of our Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia for 3\1/2\ minutes each for their
statements. We will then proceed directly to hear testimony
from our distinguished witnesses, and I would respectfully
remind them to keep their statements to no longer than 5
minutes. I am rather ruthless with this gavel. After we hear
from our witnesses, individual members will be recognized for 5
minutes each to question our witnesses. The Chair now
recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
Recent developments in Egypt and Lebanon pose great
challenges to U.S. policy, to our interest and to our allies in
the Middle East. In Lebanon we have witnessed the takeover of
the country by the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. In Egypt we see
destabilization of a government which has been a key U.S. ally
and partner for over 3 decades. In both instances, successive
U.S. administrations failed to develop and implement a longer
term strategy to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the
future.
In both Egypt and Lebanon we have failed to effectively
leverage U.S. assistance in support of peaceful, pro-democracy
forces, and to help build strong, accountable, independent,
democratic institutions as a bulwark against the instability
that is now spreading throughout much of the region. Instead of
being proactive, we have been obsessed with maintaining short-
term, personality-based stability, stability that was never
really all that stable, as the events of recent weeks
demonstrate. Successive administrations have repeatedly opposed
and obstructed efforts by Members of Congress to require
accountability and ensuring Egypt met conditions for its
economic assistance.
The Mubarak government has been a reliable and valuable
ally of the United States on security matters, but the
relationship must extend well beyond Mubarak. It would be
short-sighted and potentially dangerous for the United States
to base its entire approach to another nation on the survival
of one individual.
In the early days of the current unrest the administration
failed to seize the opportunity to press for reform, to address
the demonstrators' frustrations and prevent chaos and violence.
On January 25th, the first day of the demonstrations,
Secretary Clinton stated, ``Our assessment is that the Egyptian
Government is stable.'' Vice President Joe Biden, in an
interview on January 27th, said, ``I would not refer to Mubarak
as a dictator.''
According to the Wall Street Journal, National Security
Council officials admitted in a meeting on January 31 that they
did not have a contingency plan in place should the Egyptian
Government collapse. Now the White House is reportedly making
matters worse by not only reexamining its position on dealing
with the Muslim Brotherhood, but also stated that a new
Egyptian Government should ``include a whole host of important
non-secular actors.'' The Muslim Brotherhood had nothing to do
with driving the protests, and they and other extremists must
not be allowed to hijack the movement toward democracy and
freedom in Egypt.
Turning to Lebanon, we are again confronted by the absence
of a long-term U.S. strategy. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have
acted relentlessly to undermine Lebanon's sovereignty and the
United States has largely adopted a reactive posture seeking to
contain the advance of these hostile forces. Washington has
also persisted in continuing to provide assistance to a
Lebanese Government in which Hezbollah essentially had veto
power. This included security assistance to the Lebanese Armed
Forces, LAF, despite longstanding concerns over whether such
aid could directly or indirectly benefit Hezbollah.
Even now when the Lebanese Government has been overthrown,
the United States has still failed to indicate that it will cut
off assistance to a proxy government for Iran, Syria, and
Hezbollah.
There are lessons from the Lebanon debacle which are
applicable to Egypt. In Lebanon, following the Hariri
assassination, elections were immediately held under Syrian-
inspired electoral law, laying the foundation for the political
empowerment of Hezbollah. Therefore, shouldn't the United
States insist that constitutional and administrative
requirements concerning the electoral process in Egypt be
revised to ensure that only responsible actors who meet certain
basic standards participate in Egypt's future? Such criteria
should include renouncing violent extremism, upholding the rule
of law, recognizing and enforcing Egypt's international
commitments, including its nonproliferation obligation and its
peace agreement with the Jewish State of Israel.
I would greatly appreciate if our witnesses this morning
would address the following questions in their testimony: Can
there be stability in Egypt if Mubarak remains in power? Do
conditions enable a military control transition process? Would
this buy time for legitimate opposition forces to organize and
for constitutional modifications to take place? There are some
who have suggested that Egypt could follow a Turkey model. How
viable is that comparison? Given that patterns have recently
developed in Turkey, could Egypt's adoption of this model lead
to possible threats to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle
East? Can the legitimate opposition assume a leadership role?
Can the military transition to the civil arena? What changes in
the Egyptian Constitution would be necessary to ensure that
candidates for public office for political leaders are going to
act and govern democratically? What criteria are necessary to
ensure that radical Islamists are not empowered?
And beyond Egypt and Lebanon the United States must have
broader strategic plan for the region so that our interests and
our allies are protected and destructive regimes in Tehran and
Damascus and other extremists are unable to exert their
influence over people yearning for democracy.
These questions are particularly relevant as we commemorate
the centennial of the birth of President Ronald Reagan. During
his Westminster address Reagan stated, ``Any system is
inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize
its leaders. While we must be cautious about forcing the pace
of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate
objective and to take concrete actions to move toward them. The
objective I propose,'' according to Ronald Reagan, ``is quite
simple to state: To foster the infrastructure of democracy.''
We face an emergency in Lebanon and Egypt that could spread
to the broader Middle East. With cautious determination, we
thank our esteemed witnesses for appearing before our committee
today and look forward to their testimony.
With that, I am pleased to yield to our ranking member, Mr.
Berman.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This hearing could
not be more important or timely. The events of the past month
across the Middle East have come at a head spinning pace. They
are both exciting and daunting. A new dawn is breaking for the
people of Egypt. The promise of a democratic transition brings
with it new opportunities and freedoms. However, with this
change comes uncertainty for our security and the security of
our close ally, Israel. We must both ensure that the transition
proceeds and seek to ensure that our shared interests are not
compromised.
When strongman Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14th, few
guessed that the next country to be intoxicated by the Arab
world's growing embrace of freedom would be Egypt, the long-
time cornerstone of U.S. strategy and peacemaking in the Middle
East. We had worried about Egypt's income gap, its illiteracy,
its poverty, its denial of fundamental human rights. We had
debated leadership succession issues as President Mubarak's
health faltered, and we knew Egyptians, who often seemed to
endure the unbearable and do so with good humor, have a history
of rising up every other generation or so. But we never guessed
that the next Egyptian revolution would begin in Tunis.
The mass demonstrations in Cairo have already produced
stunning results: The decision that neither Hosni Mubarak nor
his son Gamal nor Omar Suleiman will run for President in
September. They have also instigated talks on the future of
Egypt between the government and various parties, including the
Muslim Brotherhood, a moment which has formally been banned
from politics in Egypt since its founding in 1928.
Hosni Mubarak has been a friend of the United States,
however flawed. We didn't put the Mubarak government in power,
but we supported it because it pursued regional policies we
generally supported. And with our large foreign assistance we
incentivized it to pursue those policies.
While we can't determine Egypt's future leader, we should
use our influence to encourage a process of change that is
orderly and a government whose foreign and security policies
support our interests. As this change takes hold, we must keep
firmly in mind that our goals include an Egypt that supports
close relations with the United States, supports the welfare of
the Egyptian people, democracy, universal human rights, is
secular in orientation, and of course adheres to the peace
treaty with Israel.
In any transition the military will play a critical role,
as it is already doing. That is why I think it is important
that our military assistance program continue, so as long as,
and only if, the military is playing a constructive role in
bringing about a democratic transition. Based on their
writings, I know there is disagreement among the panelists on
this issue, and I look forward to the discussion.
Egypt has long needed a more inclusive government,
responsive to the desires of its citizens. If a stable
democracy is to emerge, there must be participation by a wide
array of political forces that are fully committed to
democratic principles. Like many, however, I am skeptical about
the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to democracy. The
Brotherhood wants Egypt to be governed by religious law rather
than man-made law, a problematic position for a democrat. It
has a bloody history and even after it renounced violence and
endorsed democracy in the 1970s, some of its alumni joined the
ranks of the world's most notorious murderers. Included in
those ranks are Sadat's assassins and al-Qaeda's Ayman al-
Zawahiri.
Some Egyptians of impeccable democratic credentials say the
Brotherhood has changed and that it is now truly democratic in
its approach. But even if that is true, we shouldn't fool
ourselves. Even in the best case scenario where the Brotherhood
proves itself fully committed to democracy, there is every
reason to believe it will try to influence the Egyptian
Government in ways that undermine U.S. interests and it will
make Egypt a regressive and less tolerant place.
Mubarak has already made clear that his presidency will end
in September and that his son Gamal will not succeed him. It is
critical that Egyptians agree as soon as possible on relevant
constitutional amendments and laws and a clear and certain
timetable for their implementation if free and fair elections
are to be held in September. The less time that the opposition
has to prepare for elections, the more likely it is that the
next President will be determined either by Mubarak's National
Democratic Party or by the Muslim Brotherhood, by far the two
most organized political forces as of now.
I would like to say a few words about Lebanon, where a
handpicked Hezbollah candidate is on the verge of becoming
Prime Minister. It is a very troubling example of how
democratic development can go off the tracks when a party
doesn't respect democratic ground rules. Hezbollah's
parliamentary faction is but a political front for a cut-throat
militia. And more than anything else that has put the terrorist
group in the political driver's seat. If you don't believe me,
ask Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who left Saad Hariri's
March 14th Movement and threw his support to Hezbollah. It is
an all but open secret that he did so in physical fear of
Hezbollah.
As Hezbollah gradually assumes control over more of the
levers of power in Lebanon, we must be both wise and firm in
our response. I will be introducing legislation called the
Hezbollah Anti-Terrorism Act. Following on the Palestinian
Anti-Terrorist Act, which passed Congress following Hamas'
election to leadership in the PA in 2006, my bill will set
rigorous requirements for the provision of foreign assistance
to Lebanon during periods where Hezbollah is part of the
Lebanese Government. The goal will be to ensure that none of
our assistance to Lebanon benefits Hezbollah in any way. We
certainly want to assist our friends in Lebanon, and we will.
But we also want to make sure that we don't inadvertently help
our enemies at the same time. My legislation leaves ample scope
for both.
I look forward to the testimony of our three witnesses and
particularly their views on how the United States can encourage
a responsible democratic transition in Egypt on the goals I
previously laid out, what the chances are that such a
transition will occur, and what they foresee is the role of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during that transition and beyond.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank my good friend for his
remarks, and now I will recognize Mr. Chabot for 3\1/2\
minutes. He is the chairman on the Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman. So we can get to the
witnesses sooner I will not take the full 3 minutes. I will be
very brief. I want to thank you for holding these very timely
hearings this morning, and I know we all look forward to
hearing from this very distinguished panel of witnesses.
When I was recently appointed chairman of the Middle East
and South Asia Subcommittee, having served on the subcommittee
for a number of years, I knew we would be dealing with a host
of important issues in a critical part of the world. I don't
know that anyone, however, anticipated that we would be
confronted with so many developments in the region quite so
quickly, not just in Egypt and Lebanon, which we will be
focusing on in the next 2 days, but in Tunisia and throughout
the broader region. Clearly in the case of Egypt we have come
to a crossroads. And while we do not yet know how the current
volatile situation in that nation will play out, I think we all
realize that we are going to have to reassess our bilateral
relationship not only in terms of diplomacy but in the area of
economic assistance as well.
The current situation, however, is not limited, as I
mentioned before, to Egypt. The widespread protests throughout
numerous countries in the region raise broader concerns
regarding U.S. foreign policy more generally as well as how we
administer foreign aid.
I look forward to being involved in these important
discussions as we move ahead both here and in the full
committee with you, Madam Chair, and in the subcommittee, both
of which I am sure will be quite busy.
So we can get to the witnesses, as I mentioned before, I am
going to yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Now I would
now like to recognize Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, for 3\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you and congratulations, Madam Chair.
In Egypt I fear we are snatching failure from the jaws of
success. After progressively escalating pressure on President
Mubarak, after rejecting regime-backed violence against
peaceful protests, after denouncing the regime's assault on
journalists, after carefully positioning the United States on
the side of the protesters, the Obama administration now
appears to be wavering on whether America really backs the
demands of the Egyptian people or just wants to return to
stability with a facade of change.
The contradiction that is forming between the
administration's rhetoric and its policy concerns the so-called
national dialogue initiated by Egypt's new Vice President,
General Omar Suleiman. General Suleiman is a strong, serious,
and capable man, but it is still unclear whether his job is to
lead Egypt's transition on behalf of the Egyptian people or to
delay it, sidetrack it, flim-flam it into irrelevance on the
part of President Mubarak.
The major items on the Egyptian reform agenda are well-
known: An end to restrictions on free speech and free press, an
end to restrictions on the formation and operation of political
parties, an end to the constantly abused emergency law, and an
end to structural impediments to free and fair elections.
What have the Egyptian people seen so far? A dialogue with
the opposition that excludes major opposition leaders but does
include regime allies, a proposed committee to report on the
reforms that the government has no obligation to adopt or even
consider, a promise to lift the state of emergency when the
government considers that it is appropriate, a pledge to
liberalize media and communication without any definition of
what constitutes liberalization.
The Secretary of State, to her credit, insists that with
regard to the General Suleiman-led dialogue ``the people
themselves and the leaders of various groups within Egyptian
society will ultimately determine whether it is or is not
meeting their needs,'' she warns. ``We are going to wait and
see,'' she says, ``how this develops but we have been very
clear about what we expect.'' I wish we were that clear.
Respecting Egyptian sovereignty is one thing, maintaining a
level of ambiguity so thick that ordinary Egyptians cannot
discern whether or not we are on their side is something else
altogether. Our national security interests require much
greater clarity. The people yearn to be free.
How refreshing is it to see people who are not trampling
our flag in the streets as they raise theirs? How inspiring is
it to see people in that part of the world ready to die for
their children's future instead of sending their children off
to die? The people yearn to be free. We must plant ourselves
firmly on their side.
Until there is evidence that a real transition is underway,
with the exception of aid for humanitarian needs or with the
transition, we need to suspend our aid to Egypt. We simply
cannot afford to be viewed in Egypt as the bank-rollers of
repression. The people yearn to be free.
I cannot help but muse if Charlton Heston were to be
appointed the Special Envoy to Egypt, he would stand there
speaking softly with a big stick in hand and say to President
Mubarak, ``Your people have let you go.''
Thank you, Madam chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
In the interest of time and since our witnesses are well-
known in their field, I will refrain from the lengthier bios
and will proceed immediately to recognize Elliott Abrams,
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former
deputy national security adviser, for his remarks.
Elliot will be following by Lorne Craner, president of the
International Republican Institute and former assistant
secretary of state for democracy human Rights and labor. And
rounding off our distinguished panel is Dr. Robert Satloff, who
is the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.
Mr. Abrams, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the
committee. It is a privilege and an honor to testify at this
first Foreign Affairs Committee hearing of the new Congress,
and it is a pleasure to return to this room where I first
testified to this committee 30 years ago under, if I remember
right, Chairman Zablocki's chairmanship, your predecessor here.
There is enough ground here for about a dozen hearings, but
I want to try to make six points this morning, and I would ask
that my full statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, they all will.
Thank you.
Mr. Abrams. First, the uprisings we have seen in Tunisia
and Egypt are exciting proof that the thirst for freedom is
indeed universal. The Middle East has lagged behind the rest of
the world in moving toward democracy. There has been a freedom
deficit.
President Bush was right when he adopted a freedom agenda
for the Middle East. He asked in 2003, ``Are the peoples of the
Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions
of men and women and children condemned by history or culture
to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom,
never even to have a choice in the matter?'' And he gave the
answer, ``Sixty years of Western nations excusing and
accommodating lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to
make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be
purchased at the expense of liberty.''
Supporting freedom is our best policy in the Middle East as
it is in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and everywhere else.
Dictators, Presidents for life, stolen elections, government-
controlled press are all a formula for instability. And we can
just see in Egypt, after 30 years of Hosni Mubarak, in fact
there is great instability and the Muslim Brotherhood is
stronger than ever.
Second point, American policy in the region should
accordingly favor democracy and countries that are moving
toward reform. This means one building block for us should be
our alliance with Israel, the region's only established
democracy. We should value and enhance our relations with
countries such as Jordan and Morocco where reform efforts are
underway.
It means that warming up to Syria sends exactly the wrong
message, that we don't care about human rights and democracy.
We don't even care when a country is very hostile to the United
States. That we sent an ambassador to Syria at exactly the
moment when Hezbollah is taking over the Government of Lebanon
sends the wrong message. We must actively press for democracy,
not only in Tunisia and Egypt, but in Iran and Syria as well.
Democracy promotion cannot be a policy applied to American
allies while America's enemies are forgotten.
Third, the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and
several other countries should persuade us once and for all
that the linkage argument, that every problem in the Middle
East is really tied to the Israeli-Palestinian, is false. None
of those events had to do anything with Israel and the
Palestinians.
Fourth, we should use our assistance program, as you said,
Madam Chairman, to promote democracy. There is often a
disconnect. I think we should make clear to Egypt's military
right now that the $1 billion a year they get is not owed to
them. Their conduct will determine how much aid they get.
The late Tom Lantos used to ask, ``What do you think Egypt
actually needs, more tanks or more schools?'' And I think it is
a question we need to ask today. If the Egyptian military
blocks reform and democracy in Egypt, those aid dollars can be
better spent in countries where the military in supporting
progress.
Fifth point, this aid question applies to Lebanon as well,
and I would make the same point about our aid to the Lebanese
military. If they are in fact fighting terrorism and guarding
the border with Syria, then they should get our help, but if
they are not, then that aid it seems to me should be suspended.
It should be conditional, as in Egypt, on the actual
performance of the military.
Finally, how do we support democracy? I urge the committee
to take a look at the National Endowment for Democracy, for the
State Department and USAID programs, to the broadcasting that
we do to see if we can do better and leverage the money that we
spend more effectively.
I will stop there, Madam Chairman. We have a number of
speakers, and I look forward to your questions, and thank you
again for inviting me here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Abrams. Now
we are pleased to recognize Mr. Craner for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LORNE CRANER, PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR)
Mr. Craner. Chairman, Congressman Berman, members of the
committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify today,
especially at your first hearing.
As has occurred all too often in the past, the United
States today stands surprised by foreign revolutions. These
events will have consequences for the region and, as I will
argue later, further afield. Although a single wave of reform
is unlikely, the spread of technology means citizens in Arab
countries are no longer isolated. Most importantly, especially
after events in Egypt, the historic center of the Middle East,
any popular belief that the Arab regimes are too powerful to be
overthrown should be ending.
In the region subtle national differences means events will
take on uniquely local flavors in each country. That said, we
can categorize the region's nations helps in a way that helps
us determine which may be the most problematic.
Counterintuitively, problematic consequences are less likely in
most of the regions monarchies than in the republics. Beginning
about 15 years ago almost all the regions monarchies, mostly
young kings who had been educated abroad, to one degree or
another began to modernize their countries economically and
politically.
A second reason we are less likely to see consequences in
monarchies is that they all project greater legitimacy by
virtue of their hereditary, often tribal lineage. In
combination with the nascent liberalization, this enables them
to deflect economic and political complaints to new governing
institutions. This is what we are seeing today in Jordan and
Kuwait, where the object of protestors' ire is the Prime
Minister and the government.
It will be important for the region's monarchies to be able
to show continued progress in opening up their political and
economic systems. It is worrisome, for example, that some of
the Gulf countries has slowed reforms or even backtracked the
last few years, and of course reforms in Saudi Arabia have been
so glacial as to make an exception to this rule.
It is the region's republics that will be most affected by
recent events. They are run by men who at best have rigged
elections and now have decreasingly credible claims to
leadership. The fate of these leaders is more directly
dependent on their performance, which for most has been sorely
lacking. The leaders have stalled economic and political
reforms for decades, and we have already seen demonstrations in
Yemen, a country run not unlike Egypt but with less stability
and a serious al-Qaeda element.
Clearly Israel, which had regarded its security threatened
more by Iran than by countries with which it shared borders,
will have to recalculate, and our closest ally in the region
will require much reassurance and support from Washington.
When I testified last June before this committee, I noted
that the administration had not yet begun to implement a
strategy to advance democracy abroad because it had to
strategy. Since that time the beginnings of a strategy have
been rolled out by Secretary Clinton in Krakow and by President
Obama at the UNGA meeting. The administration is focusing
democracy work on supportive civil society organizations
working to achieve change from the bottom up, and Secretary
Clinton deserves great credit for conceiving and then
enunciating this policy.
Despite these pronouncements, however, implementation lags.
In Egypt, for example, the administration had responded to
building pressure, not with increased support to civil society.
Instead, it agreed to the Mubarak government demands for
signoff on all USAID funded democracy assistance, which
obviously precluded programmatic support to many of the NGOs
that represent moderate secular interests committed to reform.
This played into a decades-long dynamic that made the United
States choose between Mubarak and the Brotherhood.
U.S. democracy assistance to Jordan and Lebanon exhibits
many of the same failings. IRI and our sister organization,
NDI, constantly struggle to convince USAID of the value of
assisting Jordan's fledgling political parties resulting in
minimal assistance. In Lebanon, even as the United States
pulled closer to Syria, our political party programming for
March 14th coalition parties, the only counterweight to
Hezbollah, was cut short.
Now this failure to cultivate the generation of democratic
leaders is not new. It was not until the Musharraf regime began
to crumble in 2007 that the Bush administration scrambled to
determine who might succeed him and establish relations with
Pakistani figures they thought would help advance American
interests. But this case was notable more as an exception. In
places like Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan the U.S.
Government had acidulously cultivated democratic successors.
The Obama administration has already faced this issue in
Kyrgyzstan last April. As the increasingly authoritarian
government crumbled, dissidents outside complained that our
Embassy had refused to meet them for months or years, and we
feared the loss of our base at Manas. Realism valuing stability
in our relations abroad gained currency after Iraq, but being
so closely tied to authoritarians does not serve U.S. interests
when a repressive government fails. As we are learning yet
again, when we necessarily have relations with authoritarian
governments we must plan for the day when they are no longer in
power.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Craner. Thank you.
Pleased to yield to Mr. Satloff. For 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT SATLOFF, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Satloff. Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
today. Yours has been a principled voice in support of
democracy in Egypt and abroad, and I know that the people in
Egypt and American interests are better for it. Also, Mr.
Berman, I would like to congratulate you for your stalwart
support for change and reform. I had the privilege of escorting
Mr. Berman to the home of a prominent dissident in Cairo
several years ago, and I know that had tremors throughout the
regime. And if I may, would like to congratulate my hometown
neighbor, Mr. Cicilline, on his election on joining this
committee.
To note the obvious, the events in Egypt have enormous
implications for America's interests and role in the Middle
East. For now a sober assessment for the Egyptian situation
leads one to conclude that it is neither the disaster some fear
nor the dawn of a new day that some hope. That story is not yet
written. We can affect it only on the margins; it is of course
the Egyptian people's decision to affect it most of all.
In its handling of specifics of the Egypt crisis, my
assessment is that President Obama and his advisers have
generally adopted a sound approach. This is of course an
evolving situation. Still the administration recognized early
on that it was neither wise nor possible for the United States
to back regime suppression of democracy protestors and that it
did not serve U.S. interests to have its relationship with
Egypt personalized by identification with an unflagging support
for President Mubarak. Instead the administration correctly
supported the idea of change and the democratic spirit at the
heart of the protests while operating on the basis of the not
unreasonable assessment that the Egyptian military was and
perhaps remains the key to resolving a national crisis that pit
millions of protesters against an increasingly isolated and
stubborn President. Hence, the administration's belief, a
rational belief but still unproven on the ground, that the
military could be the agent of positive change. As I said, that
change has not yet happened.
For all the drama of the past 2 weeks, the regime has so
far acceded to no major substantive or irrevocable change.
Indeed, in some areas, the appointment of military men as Vice
President and Prime Minister without clear and irrevocable
decisions on the emergency law or other major changes in the
Egyptian political system, there has been regression.
Every day that passes in which the military does not
definitively break from President Mubarak implicates them with
the regime, which is bad for our interests, and every day that
passes without that break further erodes an already weakened
U.S. regional image. If the new leadership does show itself to
be serious about lifting the emergency law, releasing prisoners
and implementing constitutional, legal and administrative
changes, this may suffice to launch Egypt on the path of
orderly, peaceful, democratic reform. In this context I support
the maintenance of U.S. aid and align myself with Mr. Berman's
comment earlier.
However, in my view United States needs to avoid being in
the worst of possible situations; namely, a situation in which
it is perceived to have broken with President Mubarak, which is
what most of our allies fear is the case. But then to have
President Mubarak still survive in the face of this only erodes
the image of U.S. influence. Neither feared nor respected nor
loved is not a healthy situation for American interests.
As we approach the transitional period, I do believe deep
concern should be expressed about the Muslim Brotherhood. The
Brotherhood is not, as some suggest, simply an Egyptian version
of the March of Dimes--that is, a social welfare organization
whose goals are fundamentally humanitarian; it is a political
organization that seeks to reorder Egyptian society in larger
Muslim societies in an Islamist fashion. The Brotherhood will
exploit whatever opportunities it is presented with. It has
renounced its most ambiguous goals only as a result of regime
compulsion, not by free choice.
Therefore, we should express extreme caution in advocating
for specific reforms that could advantage the Brotherhood at
the expense of non-Islamist political parties. It would run
counter to U.S. interests for the United States to advocate,
for example, in favor of constitutional amendments to lift the
prohibition of parties based on religion. Should Egyptians opt
for such a change, that is their choice, but it is not in our
interest to advance those parties at the expense of liberal or
anti-Islamist parties.
Two very specific ideas in the meantime: I urge you to
discuss with the administration the idea of redirecting an
appropriate sum to humanitarian and medical assistance to
assist the thousands of Egyptians that have been hurt, injured,
or suffered as a result of this oppression of the protests. And
second, I hope that the administration is working closely with
NDI and IRI on planning for massive engagement during the
transition process.
Madam Chairman, I have a series of telegraphic
prescriptions on regional issues that are in my written
testimony about strengthening partnerships, about promoting
sustained efforts of reform, about directing the winds of
change elsewhere, and they are in the testimony for your
review.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We will read those. Thank
you, Dr. Satloff. And thank you to all of our witnesses for
excellent testimony.
I would like to yield my 5 minutes of questioning to
freshman Congresswoman Renee Ellmers of North Carolina. She is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Dr. Satloff, in your writing today, one of your issues that
you wrote about is that our U.S. policy toward Iran has only
been a tactical success as there so far seems to have been
little strategic progress in convincing Iran to change its
behavior in the nuclear file.
How have these recent events in Egypt, Lebanon, and
elsewhere throughout the region altered Tehran's strategic
calculus and cost-benefit analysis? Please elaborate because we
have got to be watching everything, and this is a big concern.
Mr. Satloff. Congresswoman, I couldn't agree with you more.
I fear that the leaders of Iran are misreading our distraction
on Egypt and are taking this as a moment of opportunity. I fear
that they are seeing change in Lebanon, the events in Gaza, a
serious emergence from isolation, and now the events in Egypt,
I fear they are reading this as a series of body blows to U.S.
interests and that they may be feeling that they are on a roll.
I think we should be very careful to keep our eyes vigilant
about efforts by Iranians to use fifth columnists against other
American allies in the gulf and elsewhere, and maybe a
reconsideration by Iran of the pace of its nuclear program,
believing that perhaps we are distracted elsewhere.
Now, on our side we do have assets. The administration, in
my view, lost a great opportunity with the popular protests in
Iran in the summer of 2009. And if you compare the Obama
administration approach the summer of 2009 in Iran and January,
2011, in Egypt, there is a stark contrast. I concur with my
colleague, Mr. Abrams, that we should do our best to blow the
winds of change to Tehran and Damascus. Far be it from us that
we should be more supportive of democracy in countries that
have historically been partners with us than historically that
have been adversaries. And I think there is much we can do to
advance that prospect.
Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you very much, and I yield back my
time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr.
Berman of California.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I would like, most particularly, because you addressed one
issue that Congress is appropriately and directly involved in,
is this whole issue of assistance to Egypt and how to handle it
and what we should be calling for and what we should be doing
and what the administration should be doing. My instinctive
reaction because of wanting to incentivize the military using
their authority to make this transition happen--and I agree, it
is not clear to me that they have made that decision--was to be
careful about messing around with the military assistance right
now. Mr. Satloff, you sort of came down on that side, Dr.
Satloff.
Elliott, you think we should cut off both military and
economic assistance--or at least the working group statement
that you are part of said that. Did you include democracy
promotion activities in that? But I would like to hear the two
of you just develop that. You generally see this much the same
way and disagree on this specific issue. I would like to hear
more.
Mr. Abrams. My view is that we need to tell the Egyptian
military very clearly, Congress needs to tell them very clearly
we are not going to pay for this suppression of democracy in
Egypt. I agree, I think the army may not have made up its mind
yet, so now is the time to signal them, this aid is
conditional.
I would agree with Rob Satloff, I wouldn't cut it off
today. First I would send that message that we are watching,
and it could be cut off any day if you guys do a Tiananmen
Square in Cairo, or even much less than that, if you make it
clear that your goal is to maintain Mubarakism without Mubarak.
Mr. Satloff. I would say we are in violent agreement now.
The United States doesn't have so many levers. It would
seem to me a mistake to preemptively deny us leverage at a
moment when perhaps that leverage could be determinative. I
don't want to exaggerate the potential for this to be the case,
but why we would throw away an arrow before it is absolutely
apparent that the Egyptian Army has made a choice to suppress
and refuse change seems to be unwise.
Mr. Berman. And speak to the issue of how directly the
administration should address Mubarak leaving office
immediately, or how would you suggest they handle that issue?
Any of you? All of you.
Mr. Satloff. I will offer my view. Once the President, last
Tuesday, offered the imagery of him appearing on television 2
hours after President Mubarak had said he was going to stay 8
months, and the President got on television saying the words
``now,'' even though there was some ambiguity in that
statement, the ambiguity did not translate into Arabic. And
everyone in the Middle East saw that Mubarak said 8 months, the
President said ``now,'' and every day since then has been a
victory for Mubarak.
It is not as though he needs to resign or leave the
country. There are alternative constitutional arrangements that
President Mubarak could take advantage of.
Mr. Berman. He could delegate his authority.
Mr. Satloff. According to the Egyptian Constitution, he
could delegate his executive authority to his Vice President,
which is a major constitutional decision that would send us off
on a new path. That is what I would hope would be the direction
in which we head.
Mr. Craner. I think on all these issues, whether it is
Mubarak leaving, what do we need to do with the aid? We need to
think about what we want to see in the end, what is our goal?
And the goal is decent elections with, hopefully, moderates
coming out very well in those elections. Then we need to work
our way back and say, What is the best way to accomplish that?
So on the issue of aid, I think that is our largest trump
card. I don't think it is time to play it yet. On the issue of
military, I would agree with Elliott that we need to be very,
very clear on what we are expecting.
On the issue of Mubarak, I think it is fair to ask if
somebody who has led the kind of fraudulent elections that we
have seen repeatedly over the last 30 years in Egypt is now
capable of leading an effort for a fair and free election.
Mr. Berman. My time is expired.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Excellent
questions, Mr. Berman.
I am pleased to yield to the chair of the Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Smith of New
Jersey, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair. And congratulations
again on your chairmanship. I look forward to serving with you
and Ranking Member Berman.
Let me just begin by saying thank you to the three of you.
I have known you; you are great leaders on behalf of human
rights for decades.
The administration seems to find its voice on human rights
and democracy, it seems to me, only when events portend radical
change. A few weeks ago President Obama rolled out the red
carpet for Chinese President Hu Jintao, a brutal dictator whose
rise to power was initially enabled or advanced by the murder
of hundreds of people in Tibet in 1989. Many of us were
frustrated and profoundly disappointed. Even the Washington
Post editorial said ``President Obama makes Hu Jintao look good
on rights'' in their January 19 editorial. It was a scathing
editorial.
Now that Mubarak is in trouble, this administration is
making human rights demands--better late than never, but they
are making them. Yet in its first year, the Obama
administration cut democracy funding for Egypt by more than
half. The democracy in governance total was $54.8 million in
2008; it dropped to $23.5 million in 2009; and the request for
2011 is $25 million. And the NGOs that are not registered,
obviously don't even apply--a break with the Bush
administration policy. As we all know, human rights groups that
are not registered are usually the cutting edge in the avant-
garde in terms of promoting human rights.
My question is--a day late and a dollar short, I am glad
they are making statements--but will this lead to a
matriculation from bad to worse, as we saw with the Shah of
Iran? We all know that SAVAK was not a good group, his secret
police, during the Iranian crisis. But now we have something
that potentially could be profoundly worse than the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Your thoughts on the Muslim Brotherhood. Are people being
naive, somehow thinking that the Muslim Brotherhood will be
benign and will have a nonviolent approach to politics?
Secondly, last month, Frank Wolf chaired a hearing on the
Coptic Church in response to the violence which killed about
23, we think, Coptic Christians; 100 were wounded. My question
is, how will the Coptic Church, about 10 percent of Egypt's
population, fare going forward, especially with the potential
ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood?
And finally, Israel's profound concerns about the rise of
the Muslim Brotherhood. I remember when President Bush kept
saying we want free and fair elections, which brought in Hamas.
Fattah was certainly a corrupt organization and had terrorists
in its ranks, but it went from bad to worse when there was an
election.
Our fear is, I think on both sides of the aisle, that the
Muslim Brotherhood's animosity toward Israel is well
documented. Your views on that.
Mr. Abrams. Thank you.
A word on the Copts, I would just say I worry a lot about
that, because as we look through the whole region, the
situation of Christian communities throughout the region is
very bad and worsening. On Copts, we should not glamorize how
great the situation has been in Egypt. As you know, it has been
impossible to build churches, to repair churches under Hosni
Mubarak. There has been a lot of discrimination against Copts
in his Egypt. But I think we do have to worry, in the context
of the Muslim Brotherhood, about a more Islamic Egypt being
even more discriminatory against them.
On the Muslim Brotherhood takeover, that is something that
has to worry all of us. And I agree with Rob Satloff that I
think conditions that, for example, forbid religious parties
are actually potentially quite useful. But I would just say the
bulwark that keeps this from being Iran is the army, and that
is why I worry, as he does. Every day that the army is
associated with Hosni Mubarak today in suppressing these
demonstrations diminishes the legitimacy and popularity of the
army. Every day they are complicit with the police and the
thugs, it makes it a lot harder for them to keep the revered
position they have had in Egypt, and that is a great worry.
Mr. Craner. You talked about the elections in the
Palestinian territories. Some of us would argue it was because
elections didn't occur for so long--and they were repeatedly
delayed--that the Palestinian Authority had ample opportunity
to demonstrate how corrupt and useless it was in terms of
delivering services. And that only strengthened Hamas. You have
to ask yourself if over time, if change is delayed in Egypt, if
that only makes the Muslim Brotherhood stronger over time. I
think that is a fair question to ask.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired.
I am pleased to yield for 5 minutes of questioning to the
ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
Asia, Mr. Ackerman of New York.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I think it is more frustrating to see you guys in so much
agreement than if you were disagreeing. At least we would be
able to figure out where to push or not push our own
administration. It is frustrating to see that they are not
moving in the same direction. That, to me, makes great common
sense with what the entire panel seems to be saying.
We are not going to have a second chance to make a great
impression on the people in the street who are at their most
vulnerable point right now and probably a lot more malleable as
to what the United States interests are and what our real
intentions are here.
While I am not sure I wholly agree with what Mr. Abrams
said about sending an ambassador to Syria, not sending an
ambassador I guess is a message in and of itself, but when you
don't send a messenger, how do you send a second message is the
question?
We have messengers in Egypt, and one of the messengers that
we should be using is the military. We have paid a lot of money
to help in the formation of the virtues that the military seems
to possess and the restraint that they have apparently been
demonstrating in the streets. Should we not be more closely
using that tie to have a Nixon moment to deliver a message via
the military to Mr. Mubarak? Should not they be the ones that
help impact? Because the longer this thing takes, the worse the
position is for the United States to influence the opinions in
the street.
My second question is about the Muslim Brotherhood, which I
think is critical here; how we deal with that and how we help
the leadership deal with that and the military. It is my view
that if you over-pesticide your garden, only the weeds are
going to survive. And that is what we have here as far as
looking at who the leaders of the opposition are. We have
killed all the flowers--he has killed all the flowers, I should
say, Mubarak--and the Brotherhood is left. They are not the
March of Dimes--Mr. Satloff is right--neither are they the
``march of the benign,'' but are they the ``march of demons''?
How concerned should we be and how do we get the military to
keep up the bulwark of the opposition to him in the formation
of any new government?
Dr. Satloff.
Mr. Satloff. In terms of the military, I think the thrust
of your comment is correct. The President, and just yesterday
Secretary Gates, had very laudatory words for the military.
What is unclear is whether in private our political and
military leadership--Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, et
cetera--are being as tough in private as they are being
complimentary in public. In private, the Egyptian military
should know very clearly what actions or inactions it takes or
doesn't take would trigger the end of aid that you spoke about
earlier. I don't know if that is happening. That is essential.
In terms of the Muslim Brotherhood, I think we should
recognize and be vigilant about the danger, not exaggerate the
danger. There is no inevitability that the Muslim Brotherhood
is going to come to power in Egypt, and we can't have a self-
fulfilling prophesy here; that would be a mistake. There is a
huge range of non-Islamist political forces that deserve our
assistance and support. And indeed, one of the things that we
should be pressing for urgently is a change in the Egyptian law
that prevents our direct assistance to so many important
nongovernmental organizations in that country. Don't
exaggerate, but also don't be naive. I think that is the right
approach.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Craner.
Mr. Craner. Egypt would not be the first military that was
starting to lose, as Rob noted, is starting to lose its good
reputation in a country because it was sticking too close to a
dictator. This happened in Pakistan where the military, which
was the most revered institution in the country, started
descending in people's opinions. I think that is something we
ought to remind them of. I think certainly American assistance
is something we ought to remind them of. I am sure the Chinese
would be happy to supply tanks and aircraft, but they are not
American tanks and aircraft and tactics.
In terms of the Brotherhood, I would agree with Rob, I am
afraid to say. I would agree with Rob. We need to stop
presenting ourselves with the choice that Mubarak gave us and
understand that there are people in the middle. This is why I
personally do not favor quick elections; I think some time is
needed to be able to work with those folks. But we shouldn't
repeat to ourselves Mubarak's choice.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Burton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and
Eurasia, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burton. Elliott, it is good seeing you again. You and I
go back all the way to Central America and the problems back
there in the early eighties during Reagan's administration, so
it is good seeing you.
I would like to broaden the discussion just a little bit.
The problems in Egypt seem to be manifesting itself in some of
the other states, not to the degree that you see in Egypt, but
there is concern about the Persian Gulf area, the Straits of
Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and what that means for the United
States of America. And I am very concerned about that. We are
not moving toward energy independence. Our dependency on
Venezuela and the Middle East is even greater now than it has
been in the past. We get about 30 percent of our energy from
the Middle East and about 20 percent, or thereabouts, from
Venezuela. We have got some people that don't like us very much
that we are getting our oil from.
So my concern is what is likely to happen in these other
countries, and whether or not there is a possibility that we
could see a bottling up of the Suez Canal, the Straits of
Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf, what that means to the United
States. If we don't drill here in the ANWR and drill off the
Continental Shelf and in the Gulf of Mexico and use some of the
300 or 400 years of natural gas and coal shale that we have
while we are transitioning to these other new technologies,
windmills and solar and nuclear and so forth, what is going to
happen in the United States? What is your prognostication on
whether or not this sort of thing could happen over there and
how can we deal with that?
Right now I am sure you all know that there are some
rumblings going on in the Persian Gulf States, there are some
minor rumblings going on in Syria; we have already heard some
minor rumblings in Jordan, as well as Egypt. And also we have
our good friend, Israel, that is right in the middle of all
this. And if that thing blows up, they are certainly going to
defend themselves, which could be a catalyst for a major
problem.
So I know this is a very broad question, but I would like
to know how this affects the United States and our security,
both economically and militarily.
Elliott, why don't we start with you?
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Thank you for the kind
words. It is great to see you again.
So far, the Suez Canal is open for business, and it is
certainly in the interests of the Egyptian military to keep it
open. I think if we see any sign of Iranian reactions to this,
taking advantage of this, it would be timely for America's
military leaders to stop talking about how catastrophic it
would be if there were ever a strike on Iran, and to start
saying that if Iran closes the Straits of Hormuz, we will open
them; we will open them fast, and they will pay the price. I
think we should make that very, very plain to the Iranians.
I also would just say I agree with you that we have an
incredible development in shale gas that gives us an
opportunity to be independent of Middle Eastern oil, not
tomorrow morning, but not 50 years from now either. To me it
seems that we ought to be moving as fast as we can to develop
that resource and make ourselves energy independent.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Craner.
Mr. Craner. The one allied country in the Persian Gulf that
I think ought to be of some concern is Bahrain, where they have
rolled back a lot of the openings that they had made, where you
have got a heavy Shiite population. Obviously, once you get
beyond that--Qatar, Oman, et cetera, I think are going to be
pretty stable. And again, it is Iran that I would worry about.
I would worry a lot about Iran trying to take advantage of all
these events far afield from where they are. They have got to
be happy watching some of these newscasts.
Mr. Satloff. Just very briefly, not all rumblings are the
same, not all rumblings are bad news. I would hope that we
would see more rumblings in Syria and Iran. It advantages our
interests. And if we could help propel the winds of change to
Damascus and Tehran, that would be good.
Secondly, I do think that the situation in Jordan is
different than what we have seen in Egypt and Tunisia. The
Jordanians--it is a serious situation, but I don't think that
it is by any means approaching the crisis point that we saw in
Egypt and Tunisia. I think in general we have to caution
against the concept of dominoes falling from one country to
another. It is a very different situation in some of these
countries.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Burton.
I am pleased to yield to our friend from American Samoa,
Mr. Faleomavaega, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair. Congratulations
on your attainment of the chairmanship of this committee. I am
looking forward to working with you and your colleagues on the
other side of the aisle.
I do want to thank the gentlemen for their testimonies this
morning.
It is quite obvious that there are so many undercurrents
and crosscurrents now developing as far as the crisis that we
are facing in Egypt at this time. Some 350 million Arabs live
in this part of the world. I wanted to know how difficult the
problem is now that we are confronted with it.
Would you agree that our general policy toward Egypt has
been never mind about democracy as long as there is stability?
And is there a sense of resentment among the Egyptians that
say, Oh, now the United States wants to look for another
Mubarak to continue the policy of stability, more importantly,
than that of democracy--as I think our good friend, my
colleague from New York, has given concern as to whether or not
our Government is going to allow the Egyptian people ultimately
to make that decision for themselves and to their future. I
would like your comments on that.
Mr. Abrams. Thank you. I think you are right. I think that
except for some brief periods--2004, 2005, especially--we have
basically been uninterested as a country in democracy in Egypt.
We have taken--and we have exaggerated, I would also say--the
benefits we get from President Mubarak, and there are a lot of
Egyptians who I think do resent it. I think we could overcome
that resentment if we make it clear right now that we really do
hope their revolution succeeds. And I think the administration
has not been clear about that. I think it has been straddling
the fence. It is time for the United States to make it very
clear that we think what is going on is really terrific and
that we hope for nothing more than democracy in Egypt.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Craner.
Mr. Craner. I have no question that what you just said is
absolutely true. I think we do have a chance to redeem
ourselves. I think if we look back at our experiences in Chile
and in the Philippines under President Reagan, they provide
good guides about how to move.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Satloff.
Mr. Satloff. Sir, over just the last week, my organization
funded a poll in Egypt through the Pechter Middle East polling
firm, which is the first polling data to come out of Egypt
since the crisis. One of the findings is this crisis is not
anti-American. It is anti-Mubarak, but it is not anti-American.
That is a good sign, and that gives us a good foundation on
which to move forward. I don't know if it will last, and we do
have to make important decisions to ensure that it doesn't fall
backward, but we have a surprisingly strong foundation on which
to move forward in Egypt.
Mr. Faleomavaega. For the past 30 years we have given Egypt
well over $65 billion in assistance, and $36 billion of that
went to the military to prop up Egypt's military defense
forces.
Would you agree that if this crisis really comes to a
boiling point where there is going to be riots and all of that,
that the military definitely will have to step in and take
control of the government?
Mr. Satloff. Sir, I think the military has already stepped
in to take control of the government. We have two military Vice
Presidents and a military Prime Minister and still a military
President. What we hope for is a military to chart the
transition and to take irrevocable decisions toward change.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And even if we make threats toward the
military, saying that we are going to cut off your funding, I
am quite sure that there are going to be other sources out
there that are more than willing to compensate for whatever
restrictions or whatever decisions that we make, and say we are
not going to fund you, they are going to find other sources.
So isn't it ultimately that this is going to be one of the
most critical points where the military definitely is going to
be the real power behind whatever is going to happen in the
coming weeks and even months as far as Egypt's future is
concerned?
Mr. Abrams. It will. And I think they are in charge right
now. And even if we grant that they could find the money
someplace else--I am not sure, $1 billion is still a lot of
money--but even if we grant that, the question is about us more
than about them: Where do we stand? What do we want our money
going for? What record will be compiled in this crisis created
in Egypt? I think that is even more important in a sense.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I think my time is up.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Faleomavaega.
I now would like to yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Mr. Rohrabacher of
California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. These witnesses have
been excellent witnesses today. I thank each one of you for
sharing your expertise and also for your service to our country
in the past years and the service to the cause of democracy.
I would like to identify myself with this commitment to
democracy as articulated by our witnesses. I do think that we
could have been giving advice to the regime and to the military
and perhaps forcing more democratic reform over the years. That
certainly is important, not just looking forward but looking
back.
However, let me just note where we are today. I find it
very disturbing that there is such a contrast between the
administration's muffled and restrained response to the brutal
repression of demonstrators against the anti-American Mullah
regime in Tehran as compared--and that is in stark contrast to
the embracing of the demonstrators against a less than
democratic friendly government in Egypt. I think that sends
exactly the wrong message to many people in power.
This administration's response to events in Egypt has
basically been responding to these events with a confused and
unreliable voice that will have, I believe, serious
consequences, long-term consequences for the cause of freedom
and stability in this volatile region. And it does a
disservice, I might add, to American security interests as
well.
President Mubarak has been a force for stability, even
though his rule has been very imperfect and less than
democratic. Improving that does not mean making decisions that
could well result in the empowerment of radical Islamic forces
like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Specifically, President Mubarak reached out to his people
and to democratic countries throughout the world with an
announcement that neither he nor his son would run for
President and that he would work with those to try to ensure
free and fair elections. Well, giving the moderates and the
democratic forces in Egypt 8 months, until September, to
organize and to participate in a democratic process seems to be
a responsible strategy and something that we should have
embraced and worked to make sure that it was indeed ensuring
free and fair elections. Instead, the Obama administration
began calling for immediate change, the alternative to
President Mubarak must be put in place now.
Well, what would that result in? By immediately installing
a new government could well mean that we are installing a
government that has not been elected to anything. And while
Mubarak is imperfect, the people that we are saying should be
installed now wouldn't have any legitimacy in terms of
democratic base work for their power, especially if those
people who end up--because we are demanding immediate leaving
power of Mubarak now--end up to be anti-democratic in their
very nature, or so radically Islamic that they wouldn't permit
real freedom in their country.
I would argue that the administration's actions have been
contrary to the long-term interests of democracy and stability
in Egypt. So I would hope that we would work with the
administration, all of us would try to do our part. And I would
hope that the United States does not in any way compromise our
long-term commitment to the Egyptian people that we side with
democracy, but we need to do this in a responsible way that
will not in the long term result in less democracy and less
freedom.
You wonder about some of these young women who are marching
down the streets complaining about Mubarak, whether or not they
are going to end up with a regime that forces them to wear
burqas and cover their face and shut up and not be involved in
national politics, like we have seen in other radical Islamic
countries.
We have been doing more than just throwing Mubarak under
the bus, we have been throwing him to the wolves. And perhaps
the future of democracy and freedom in that part of the world
will be eaten up as well.
I just went on a rambling rave myself. You have 40 seconds
to make your comments.
Mr. Abrams. Just a very quick one. I think it is important
to distinguish what can be done tomorrow and what can't. There
can't be elections tomorrow, not anything that we would regard
as free and fair and reasonable ones. They could lift the
emergency law tomorrow. After 30 years, it is time. Omar
Suleiman said, yes, it should be lifted as soon as security
conditions permit. He has been saying that for 30 years. It is
time.
Mr. Craner. I think the best judge is whether they are
moving forward with the kind of conditions that could lead to
free and fair elections. When the Vice President says his
people aren't ready for democracy, that answers the question.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. The gentleman's
time has expired.
I am pleased to yield to Mr. Payne of New Jersey, the
ranking member on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
As you know, we have a history of supporting dictators.
Usually our foreign policy has very little to do with the
manner that they treat their people--the Mobutus in Zaire to
the Savimbis in Angola, the F.W. Botha in South Africa. We can
go on and on--the Shah of Iran; Marcos in the Philippines.
How do you see us moving in the future? Are we going to, in
your opinions, still back bad guys that we know they are bad
but they are okay to us, or are we going to sort of have
democracy to try to have a process going in those countries
where you can have the will of the people expressed? How do you
see us going in the future? Because this Egypt thing is not
over. It is not the Obama administration that fouled up
somewhere. This thing, as you know, goes way back to Britain
wanting to block up the Suez Canal back in the fifties. So what
do you think about our relationship to dictators in the future?
Mr. Craner. Obviously, it is important right now to spend a
lot of time on Egypt. What happens in Egypt is going to have
huge consequences for the region. But I hope that this
experience with Egypt, where the conventional wisdom was it was
going to be stable--certainly the conventional wisdom was that
Tunisia was going to be stable--will lead to us look around the
world at other countries that we think are important to the
United States where we are currently muting ourselves on
democracy and human rights. It doesn't mean you have to push
one or the other; you can have a relationship, if you need to,
with an authoritarian government. But you can't believe the
dissidents and the democrats who we have learned time and again
will one day inevitably come to power on their own, and when
they do come to power they are looking around and saying,
``America did nothing for us.''
So whether it is in Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan or China, we
need to be looking at these countries and thinking about what
we are doing whenever change may come to those places.
Mr. Satloff. Just to add a specific word about where we
might ensure our focus in the broader Middle East, events in
Egypt have obscured our attention from Tunisia, and I think we
need to make sure that the Tunisian example actually leads to a
good outcome. It is on a positive path, but it is by no means
assured that Tunisia will lead to the right endgame. I think we
can't lose focus on that.
And secondly, sir, I would suggest that in the Palestinian
Authority, certainly in the West Bank, it is important that our
partner have greater popular legitimacy, in talking about the
leadership for the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abass. And
there is no better way to have popular legitimacy than through
the popular support of elections.
And so I think we should consider talking with our friends
there about ways to enhance their popular legitimacy through
elections. We don't want the type of change that we have seen
in Egypt and Tunisia to be the norm of how change happens in
our friendly countries.
Mr. Abrams. Yes, I agree with both my friends here, Mr.
Payne.
I think one of the things we have learned is that the so-
called ``realism'' that led us to support these dictators is
not so realistic in the end after all, and a policy of
supporting democracy may actually turn out to be more
realistic.
Mr. Payne. Well, there is a situation going on in Cote
d'Ivoire, which not much attention of course is being paid to
right now, but the current President was defeated, everyone
agrees he has been defeated, but he is refusing to leave. With
16 elections coming up and after this year, if this person who
lost the election, Gbagbo, remains to stay in, that simply
sends a bad message for these 16 elections coming, and also, it
might even have impact on the police in the Middle East,
Let me just ask one last question. Both you, Mr. Abrams,
and you, Dr. Satloff, have different opinions on the support
from your Egypt group about military support and assistance
continuing. You both have opposite positions. Could you, in
about 15 seconds each, tell your position and why?
Mr. Satloff. My position is that we should use whatever
leverage we have to try to convince the Egyptian Army to make
the right decision. Positive conditionality. There is always a
time in the future that we can cut off aid when it is apparent
that the Egyptian military has taken the path solely of
repression and suppression of popular protests.
Mr. Abrams. I think we actually do agree on that. I
wouldn't cut it off today, but I would send a very strong
message today to the Egyptian military that it is in jeopardy.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. The gentleman's
time has expired.
If I could ask Mr. Royce, before I recognize you, if you
could take over as chair for me. I have to meet some
constituents. And I will recognize Mr. Royce, the chair of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade for 5
minutes of questioning. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce [presiding]. Mr. Craner, I had an opportunity
over the weekend to meet with seven Egyptians from Cairo and
Alexandria, who recently traveled here from Egypt. Here is what
they shared with me. Their observation was that the Muslim
Brotherhood did not start this uprising, as they called it. It
came from young professionals. But they said that if the
Brotherhood gets the upper hand, eventually it would be a
bloody terror for those who did not subscribe to the
fundamentalist approach of the Brotherhood. They said if you
want to see how this will play out, think of what happened to
the Baha'i in Iran; think of what happened to the students and
to the young democratic enthusiasts that went to the streets
against the Shah and then ultimately found themselves in prison
or shot when the fundamentalist regime came to power. They said
it is the fate of the guillotine if the revolution goes the
wrong way afterwards.
Here was their point: They said the Brotherhood is a group
that does not believe in pluralism. There is no equality for
women; there is no equality under their conception of Islam for
non-Muslims or for Muslims who deviate from their viewpoint. So
they say they have embraced elections as a means to power,
basically. And given their past history, in their view, why
shouldn't there be qualifications on candidates that don't
support pluralism? Because otherwise it is going to be a
situation where you are going to have one free election one
time, because they view this group as hell bent on this path.
So I was going to ask you about that.
I was going to ask you, should they not be allowed to
participate? And maybe you could tell us a little bit about the
Brotherhood's lack of democratic bona fides.
Now the other thing that I wanted to ask you about is the
effort that the United States made some years ago with Hernando
de Soto. This is the other issue they wanted to share with me,
the utter corruption in that society. Hernando de Soto, the
Peruvian economist, went to Egypt in 2004, did a massive study,
and found that gaining the legal title to a vacant piece of
land takes 10 years; to open a bakery takes about 500 days. You
have 56 government agencies you have to go through. They were
telling me about this process in Egypt, you know, 20 bribes to
open a small company.
So they said, ``Look at the consequences of that.''
Hernando de Soto brought that plan forward to the Egyptian
Cabinet to unlock an amount of capital in Egypt 100 times
more--more than that of what we give Egypt in support, right?
And they have a Minister in Egypt that supports a reform to
bring transparency to the legal system, and this guy was
sacked. And as a consequence, as de Soto said, hidden forces of
the status quo blocked crucial elements of the reform. You
cannot get reform under the current system.
And this is something else I wanted to ask you to respond
to. In the United States, here we have a U.S.-funded study that
helps institute crucial legal and institutional reforms that is
blocked by the government. Do we object, do we protest, do we
register a complaint, do we threaten to cut off aid? Do
situations like this even get the Ambassador's attention? What
do we do about this level of corruption in the regime? If you
can respond.
Mr. Craner. In a place that is so corrupt as Egypt, I don't
think a plan like Hernando de Soto's could move forward. I
think it would take a different kind of system. Here I would
point to Georgia, which under Shevardnadze was one of the most
corrupt countries in the former Soviet Union, which is quite a
claim. They have moved forward dramatically under their new
government to end corruption. I think when Saakashvili came
into power, over 90 percent of the people reported they had had
to pay a bribe within the previous 3 months. Now it is exactly
the opposite. But I don't think in a system like Egypt that on
corruption is rotten to the core you are going to see any kind
of change. There are too many people that have their hand in
the till under this system. It is changeable, as Georgia has
shown, but not under this regime.
I think on the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, you and I
faced this issue in South Africa almost 20 years ago, about
whether certain parties were going to be allowed to run. At
that time, the issue was whether or not they were committed to
nonviolence. I think those kind of conditions are very, very
fair. It shouldn't be that people who are against pluralism or
are pro-violence are allowed to be violent on a Tuesday and
stand for election on a Thursday.
Mr. Royce. Well, I thank you, Mr. Craner. I am going to go
to Mr. Satloff for any observations on that as well.
Mr. Satloff. Two brief observations about the political
system and its potential evolution vis-a-vis the Muslim
Brotherhood. There is currently a constitutional clause in
Egypt that no party based on religion is allowed. It will be
for the Egyptians to determine whether that gets amended.
Should they ask the United States or the U.S. Embassy for its
advice, I would urge that we should not advocate for changing
that fundamental principle.
Secondly, there is some discussion about the order of
elections, Presidential, parliamentary, et cetera. It makes
much sense that there be a Presidential election before there
is a new parliamentary election. Under the Egyptian
Constitution, the chances of a moderate, liberal-minded
Presidential victor are far greater than a parliamentary
outcome that would lead similarly to that end.
Mr. Royce. I would like to yield to Mr. Berman for a point.
Mr. Berman. I would very much agree, except for one issue.
Will this Parliament that is in place as a result of a
manipulated election make the changes that we think are
necessary to ensure the legalized parties create a process?
Mr. Satloff. I think the short answer is this Parliament
will do what the political leadership of the country tells it
to do. So I would not make changing the composition of this
Parliament the be-all and end-all of Egyptian political reform.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Satloff.
I would like to go now to Mr. Engle of New York for your
questioning.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. I would like to ask a question about
Egypt and also do Lebanon as well, because I wrote the Syria
Accountability Act. And one of the things that we used in that
act--I did it with the current chair, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen--we
wanted Syria to get out of Lebanon. And we know that there has
been a lot of change and uproar in Lebanon. First of all, the
pro-Western government fell, there is a new Prime Minister
Designate Mikati.
I would like to ask anyone who would care to answer, what
is your assessment of him? Is he qualified for the position? He
was obviously nominated by Hezbollah, so that makes me worried.
So I would just like you to answer that.
I would also like to speak about the Special Tribunal in
Lebanon. Hezbollah bitterly opposes the Special Tribunal
because that is the international body investigating the 2005
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. It is
widely expected that the Special Tribunal will indict some
members of Hezbollah.
And what should the administration do if that happens and
the Lebanese Government decides to withdraw its material and
verbal support from the STL? Should we at that point attempt to
pick up the financial slack? So let me ask that Lebanese
question first.
And then my question on Egypt is: What are the similarities
that you see between the uprising in Iran and the revolution of
1979 and this? Many people have said it is very similar, many
people have said no because of differences. I would like to
hear your analyses on it. Anybody who would care to answer
either question, I would be grateful.
Mr. Abrams. Mr. Engel, I will just start.
I think that Mr. Mikati is, in the technical sense,
qualified to be Prime Minister of Lebanon, but as you said, he
was put there by Hezbollah. This is supposed to be, under their
Constitution, a Sunni seat, but the Sunni community did not
choose him. He is a cat's-paw for Hezbollah. This is, in a
sense, a soft coup by Hezbollah. And I would argue that if
Prime Minister Mikati does not support this Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, I hope our relations with him reflect that. I
would, for example, suggest he not be invited to the United
States to meet the President, to go to the White House, to come
up here on the Hill, if that is the position that he is taking.
Just very quickly, I would draw two distinctions between
the Iran situation and that of Egypt. One, there is no
Khomeini. There is no great opposition leader that we have to
fear, let's say, on the Muslim Brotherhood side; nor is there,
unfortunately, a Walesa, a Havel, on the democratic side.
The second difference is the army collapsed in Iran, and of
course it hasn't collapsed in Egypt. And one of the things that
we are all saying here today is we don't want it to collapse.
We want it, however, not to try to maintain the old regime
forever or people will lose faith in it.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Craner. I think that was an important point, that there
is no central religious figure to fear in Egypt. And I think
that things have not gotten so rotten and so bad in Egypt that
you really have people accruing to that religious leader or
religious party and leaving almost no room for what we used to
call moderates in Iran.
Mr. Satloff. First, I think we should remember how fresh
and new the Egyptian situation is. Less time has passed in
Egypt than what took Ben Ali to leave in Tunisia, and that was
so fast. We should not rule out the idea that leaders will
emerge, whether it is this Google executive, or someone else
may emerge to be the face of the faceless revolution, and that
would be important.
I do concur with the sentiments that were expressed by
Elliott on Lebanon, Congressman. I would just add that there
are Security Council requirements, both regarding the Special
Tribunal on Lebanon and regarding security in the south, that
the Government of Lebanon is required to maintain. And it would
be appropriate for the United States not to have to act alone,
but to act in concert with its Security Council partners to see
that either this government in Lebanon fulfills its
requirements or is censured. And that would be a great
embarrassment to Lebanon, to the Hezbollah-backed government.
Mr. Engel. I just think, and let me conclude, that the
violation in Lebanon of the cease-fire in the war with Israel,
with all these missiles and weapons which were supposed to be
not allowed to come back in the country, is really alarming and
it is something we really need to take very seriously.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel.
I am pleased to yield to the chairman of our Subcommittee
on the Middle East, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Crane, you stated in your testimony that as a
democratic form of government slowly begins to take shape in
Iraq, having similar political developments in Cairo could have
great consequences for the region. Conversely, given the
violent birth of and halting steps toward democracy in Iraq,
chaos or a more repressive government in Egypt will discourage
and further delay much needed reform in the region.
Could you elaborate on the implications for our efforts in
Iraq of the events currently unfolding in Egypt and how will it
affect U.S. leverage?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And Mr. Craner, if you could put the
microphone a little closer to your mouth. Thank you.
Mr. Craner. I said that, because if you look historically
over the last 5,000 years, the two centers of learning and
intellect in the region have been principally Cairo, but also
Baghdad. And so if you are a Syrian or an Algerian or a Yemeni,
you have traditionally looked to or you may have gone to school
in the old days in one of those two places. Today, you may also
have gone to the American University in Beirut. But those are
the kind of two traditional intellectual leader cities and
countries in the region. So if you had democracy in those two
principle pillars for Arab culture, then it would be difficult,
if you are in another Arab country, to say democracy is not
going to work here.
Alternatively, if things were to go badly in Egypt, you
would then be in a position in another country to say, is that
what they mean by democracy? You had all that violence in Iraq
and look what happened in Egypt. So the stakes are very, very
high in Egypt, I think.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Abrams, over the past decades, the United States has
given the Mubarak regime billions of dollars in nonsecurity
assistance, and such assistance has, unfortunately, not led to
significant political or economic reforms, as we all know. How
should the executive branch and Congress going forward leverage
our economic assistance to encourage real reforms?
Mr. Abrams. Mr. Chabot, I think there have been changes in
the Egyptian economy, and the rich have gotten a lot richer.
There are now Egyptian billionaires on the Forbes list, but
there has not been much trickle down and the poor remain
desperately poor.
I would hope that what we would try to do in our economic
assistance is, first of all, help those who are poorest. And
secondly, see if we can encourage the new government that is
going to be coming in to adopt economic reforms that are not
simply about increasing foreign direct investment or getting
the stock market to rise, but about helping people in the lower
middle class, working class, and the poorest people.
One of the problems we have with our aid program in Egypt
is Egyptians don't know it exists. Some other countries have
built stadiums and things like that that are very visible, but
an awful lot of Egyptians don't know that we have given
billions of dollars in aid to Egypt.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
Dr. Satloff, I was struck by your comment that you made
that basically the worst of all worlds for the United States to
be in was to be neither feared, nor respected, nor loved. I
would invite yours, and if there is any time left, the other
members--how can we avoid that hereon?
Mr. Satloff. Generally, the rule in the Middle East is
reward your friends and punish your adversaries, and it is
usually a smart policy to follow. The Egyptian case cuts
through the middle of it because we have a partner who is both
friend to us and adversary to us in different respects. Clarity
here is important. I think, as I said earlier, that the longer
that there is no visible change at the top, the more our
influence wanes.
If I could add just one brief comment, sir, about the
economic question, I suspect that the leaders of Egypt view it
a bit differently. They probably see that all these protestors
have cell phones, Facebook pages, access to computers; they
can't be so poor. And they are probably saying to themselves,
my gosh, all that work that we did to advance the Egyptian
economy only led to popular protests, only led to more
opposition. I think we should be wary elsewhere that leaders
will find ways to limit the sort of growth that led to the
popular protest. Egypt has had 5 percent growth for years, and
this is an outcome that authoritarians will be fearful of in
the future.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I have 15 seconds, if either one of
the other gentlemen would like to--okay. I yield back, Madam
Chair. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to Mr. Meeks of New York,
the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And congratulations
to you, also.
Let me just say this and throw out a question. I, too, over
the weekend have had the opportunity to sit down with some
young people, some who just came back from Egypt who reside in
my district, et cetera. And I have got to tell you, I have come
away tremendously impressed in all of the conversation that we
have been having today.
I have confidence in the Egyptian people. They have gone to
the streets and said what they want and what they don't want.
They clearly want to move into a more free society, something
that I don't think anybody could have ever done for them. They
did it for themselves. And as a result of that, I know we can
talk and we have our interests, of course, but ultimately they
are going to decide their own Constitution. And I think that to
the degree that we try to say, well, this should be in there or
this should not be in there, then--it is not anti-American now,
but if we try to tell them what should or should not happen,
just as they are revolting against Mubarak, that then I think
becomes the danger that we have because they are clear.
Now, one of the things that they were not as clear on when
I asked them, is who could rise from among them to be a leader,
who could be the candidate; because clearly there is no clear
leader within the opposition. And my question to them was then,
in all of this, in doing a new Constitution, et cetera, it
takes individuals to sit down, to talk, to negotiate. I
referenced our Constitution, our men at that time, and
hopefully now men and women will be sitting down and talking.
Have you any idea who is in that group that will be talking
to help rewrite the Constitution so that whoever comes up, we
will then have an entree to try to continue the kind of
relationship that we have had in the past but in a democratic
forum?
Mr. Satloff. Congressman, yesterday the Egyptian Government
appointed a panel of constitutional experts--judges, lawyers,
et cetera--many of whom are very loyal to President Mubarak,
some have been vocal opponents of the President over the last
number of years. It is not clear that this group will have
popular legitimacy.
There are other groups that are out there as well. There is
a group called the Wise Men, public figures, both businessmen
and civic leaders. There are the leaders of the youth. They
have tried to organize themselves into an important coalition
of leaders. There are the traditional parties that the regime
has tolerated; they are small, they have been around for many
years. They don't have much popular support. But they do
understand the Constitution and they do understand Egyptian
law.
There is no coalescing yet, they don't all agree, except
almost all of them seem to agree on the idea that the
President, either in his person or in his authorities, must go.
That important, visible, irrevocable change seems to be a
common feature of the opposition.
Mr. Craner. I think there are leaders out there. You have
El Baradei, you have Ayman Nour, you have others. There are
many people whose names are not household words in the United
States or maybe even in Egypt because of the repression all
these years. I think what will be important is to note, number
one, if you have an election soon nobody is going to know those
leaders' names. And number two, if the good people in the
middle are not able to come together to form a coalition and
perhaps to come up with a common candidate, then you could have
things going badly.
Mr. Meeks. What--go ahead.
Mr. Abrams. I agree with that, and I think there are people
who will come to the fore, because like Ayman Nour, who ran
against Mubarak in 2005, they are known to be opponents of the
old regime.
Mr. Meeks. And within those groups what are you hearing in
regards because when we do talk about U.S. interests I am also
concerned about our ally, Israel. Is there any kind of
consensus because at least there have been a peace, might have
been a cold peace, and you talk about the Suez Canal, you talk
about--and I know that President Netanyahu is concerned. Is
there any conversation that you have heard on the ground in
regards to Israel?
Mr. Satloff. There is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood
has gone on record as seeking the cancelation of the peace
treaty. They have opposed it from the beginning, and they will
oppose it to the very end. Other organizations have publicly
said this isn't about Israel. Thankfully this is not about
Israel. This is what Elliott said earlier; this is not about
America even giving our support. This is about their desire for
change.
We have to be vigilant that a situation doesn't come, that
it becomes about Israel and America. And I think we should all
be quite worried that elements of the regime just last week
tried to play the Israel card and the Jewish card, putting on
Egyptian national television so-called Israeli spies, that
evidently were provocateurs in the protest, or protestors that
admitted to being trained by American Jewish organizations to
overthrow Mubarak. This is all obviously poppycock, but it
plays to the conspiratorial mindset, which many may have, and
it is a sign of desperation on the part of the regime.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. The gentleman's
time has expired. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to Mr.
Fortenberry, the vice chair of Africa, Global Health, and Human
Rights Subcommittee.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you
gentlemen for coming today. I believe it is very important that
we stand by any people who are pursuing their highest
aspirations. Now with that said, the doorway to a vibrant and
sustainable democracy rests really on two pillars
fundamentally. First is an inculturated understanding of the
dignity and therefore rights of every person and secondly an
understanding of the nature of responsible citizenship as it
seeks to uphold the rule of law. Then from there flow the
institutions of society that give rise to civil capacity and
can sustain things like freedom of speech and freedom of
religion and freedom of assembly and a vibrant democracy with
free and fair elections.
The delicate question that is before us is, where is Egypt
on that spectrum? Because without sufficiently developed
institutions the danger or probability increases that this
situation is exploitable by those who would use democracy to
undermine it to pursue other ends. We had a discussion earlier
as to what happened in Gaza. I heard your point, Mr. Craner,
but at the same time, if you are allowing democracy to be used
by those who are going to act antithetically to it, you may end
up in a situation which is much worse off.
With that said, again we want to stand by people as they
are pursuing their highest aspirations, but I think that is the
narrow issue here. Where is Egypt in terms of civil capacity so
that we increase the probability that this type of hopeful and
good outcome can occur.
Mr. Abrams. Just one brief comment, Mr. Fortenberry, this
is the measure of a terrible legacy of Hosni Mubarak, who had
30 years to slowly, steadily build this civic culture and
instead built a culture of suspicion and suppression and leaves
soon, even on his own timetable, with having done none of it.
Clearly Tunisia is in a better situation. Tunisia, with
$8,500 per capita income and roughly 85-80 percent literacy.
But I guess I would say we are who we are. I mean the people of
Egypt are rising up and demanding this. And what perhaps we can
help advise with is the kind of institutional protections that
after all our own founders put in because they wondered whether
we had the civic culture to do this yet and they were very
mistrustful of majorities. So maybe we can help as they think
through what a new Constitution would look like.
Mr. Craner. In terms of civil capacity, there are many
countries less developed that have become democratic. And I
always use the example of Mongolia, quite an isolated place,
with not a lot of civil capacity, Mali in Africa. The list--I
could cite you a long list, but in terms of civil capacity----
Mr. Fortenberry. Are a comparable in terms of----
Mr. Craner. Much less, much less, what would you call civil
capacity in terms of the understanding of the issues you were
talking about that have been able to come to the fore and
become democratic. I think one of the issues in Egypt is from
where we sit it is going to be hard to slow what is going on in
Egypt. I think we can help shape it as it moves forward. We can
even hasten it moving forward. But at the least we can do is
shape it. But I think it will be very, very hard for us to slow
it.
Mr. Fortenberry. One of the problems with analogies and
this is clear is that perhaps you didn't have entities as well
organized as the Muslim Brotherhood is going to reject
fundamental aspects of what are going to provide the foundation
for vibrant democracy as we project on it. I think that is
where it falls short, but I understand your point.
Mr. Craner. I would also point you, however, to some of
the--Muslim Brotherhood is unique certainly in Egypt, but there
have been other countries where there have been well organized
entities that went into elections and were defeated. And I
think here of the former communist parties.
Mr. Fortenberry. I just picked up your language when you
said hopefully moderates will come out well. Again that points
to this delicate situation that we are now in and we don't
exactly know where we are.
Mr. Craner. But we need to get in and shape it and not just
be passive spectators, which is essentially what we are doing
right now.
Mr. Satloff. Just one brief analytical distinction.
Egyptians are generally religiously conservative, but we should
not equate that with membership in the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is an ideological party with political goals. We
shouldn't believe that all Egyptians if they are not liberals
they are necessarily Brotherhood members. We would fall into
their trap.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
expired. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to my Florida
colleague, Mr. Deutch, for his questions.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr. Satloff, you said
just a couple minutes ago that this is not about Israel or
America, this is about what is happening in Egypt. But I would
like to focus on what is happening in Egypt as it relates to
the two, particularly for people, for Egyptian citizens. If you
could discuss the implications on the ground, not just with
regard to the border with Egypt, but the broader implications
should the next government choose to abrogate that peace treaty
with Israel. What does it means in terms of trade, what does it
mean in terms of exports and qualifying industrial zones? If
you could speak to that so that we have a better sense of what
the thinking is and how it might play out.
Mr. Satloff. Thank you, Congressman. I think we have gotten
quite used to the idea of Egypt and Israel linked in peace,
even if it is a cold peace, and the world in which we live is
shaped by that. But to take that out and change that is huge.
Israel for the last 30 years has operated on the assumption it
didn't need to deploy a single soldier on the Egyptian border.
That has opened up huge opportunities for Israel. It has
enabled them to lower their defense spending, enabled them to
move elsewhere, take other risks for peace. A change such as
this, if it convinces the Israelis they have to rethink border
security with Egypt, if they have to worry that the Egyptians
are goings to militarize the Sinai, if they have to worry that
the Gaza border is now going to become free flow for weapons
with the Egyptian connivance instead of against Egypt's
efforts, this changes everything that is possible for peace and
security in this region.
Egypt obviously will lose its American support if it severs
its relationship. It will look for other partners, probably
more nefarious partners than the United States. The Suez Canal
becomes subject to possible closure or selective opening to
various partners. The Egyptians, for example, have permitted
the Israelis to transit their own submarines through the Suez
Canal. The idea that in an era beyond peace that this would be
possible is difficult to imagine.
So there is a longer list, I could go on.
Mr. Deutch. Well, if could you speak first to the nefarious
partners that might be out there should this decision be made
and secondly to the specific statement by the Muslim
Brotherhood over the weekend that they recognize why it is in
Egypt's interest to continue the peace treaty. Do we take them
at their word as well? If not, again speak to who else might be
out there that would be looking for this opportunity?
Mr. Satloff. The statements I have seen by representatives
of the Muslim Brotherhood are not supportive of the peace
treaty. Actually I think the official position is they want the
peace treaty to be up for a new vote by a new Parliament and a
national referendum on whether it should be sustained.
In terms of more nefarious possible partners for Egypt,
well, there are plenty of candidates of countries that wouldn't
have our conditionality, wouldn't have our desire for popular,
for civic rights. Whether they are--they may be friends of ours
even, like the Saudis and others, but they are not going to
have democracy as part of their portfolio. And then there are
more nefarious characters, whether it is the Chinese, the
Venezuelans or other, that would come up with $1 billion to
pluck the prize of Egypt from us, and I think it would be a
price for them well spent.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Craner, you are nodding. Other thoughts, if
you could broaden that discussion.
Mr. Craner. I think Rob was very, very comprehensive in his
answer to you. I think the other thing Egyptians would have to
think about as they move that is their own economy. Nobody is
going to want to invest in an area that looks like a war zone,
which that may if that happens.
The second thing the Egyptian military has to think about
is whatever else you can say about the United States economy
versus China and all this stuff, we continue to have the
world's best military, and they would have to decide if they
wanted to take Iranian weapons, Russian weapons, Chinese
weapons, and Chinese-Russian training and then try to go to war
with Israel.
Mr. Deutch. And then finally, Mr. Abrams, if you could just
speak again to the Muslim Brotherhood and the relationship with
Hamas, funding for Hamas, those direct ties and our concerns as
this goes forward.
Mr. Abrams. Hamas is part of the Muslim Brotherhood
internationally and the Mubarak regime has always been quite
afraid of the link between the two. The question would really
be about the Hamas border with Egypt, which is the Sinai-Gaza
border. The Egyptian Government has done a mixed job. I mean,
if you ask Israelis, there are tons of weapons that float in
through those tunnels. It is hard to say the Egyptian
Government couldn't have stopped more of them had it really
been trying to. So it isn't as if we go from a golden age now
to an age of trouble. But there is no question that one of the
questions that the Muslim Brotherhood is going to have to
answer is what do you want the relationship between the new
Government of Egypt and Hamas to be?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Thank
you, Mr. Abrams.
Mr. Rivera, my Florida colleague, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. One of my
concerns or one of my main concerns in this crisis is the
impact on U.S. interests vis-a-vis Israel. I have one question
first for Dr. Satloff and Secretary Abrams. Obviously the
situation in Egypt is very much in flux, but regardless of what
emerges American interests remain constant. It is imperative
that Egypt today and throughout any political transition
continues to honor its international obligations and play a
positive role in the region. Specifically, Egypt must honor its
commitment to peace with Israel as enshrined in the Camp David
Accords and ensure the integrity of the Egyptian-Israel and
Egyptian-Gaza borders.
So for Dr. Satloff, my question, what message should the
United States be delivering to the parties regarding Egypt's
peace with Israel?
Mr. Satloff. Very simply, Congressman, the United States
should be public and private in saying the type of Egypt that
we can support is only the type of Egypt that fulfills its
international commitments, that we cannot support an Egypt that
flouts or violates its fundamental international commitments.
That applies to the military, it applies to economic. This is
the foundation of our relationship.
With the Israelis, we need to begin serious security
conversations now about upgrading the United States-Israel
strategic partnership. There are many things that we can do in
concert in terms of border security, in terms of intelligence,
and in terms of other items, and it should be seen that we are
doing this so that the region understands that we recognize the
shock to the Israeli security system and that we can do what we
can to help cushion and assist the Israelis through the shock.
Mr. Rivera. And for Secretary Abrams, over the years the
United States has sold a great deal of military equipment to
Egypt. At the same time we are deeply committed to Israel's
qualitative military edge, essentially Israel's ability to
defend itself against any combination of conventional threats.
Part of the calculus in providing weapons to Egypt was that it
was committed to peace with Israel.
If Egypt's commitment toward peace with Israel changes, how
should that affect future decisions about the sale and
maintenance of weapon systems to the Egyptians?
Mr. Abrams. Mr. Rivera, I think we should be very clear
with the new Government of Egypt that the building block for us
is their international obligation, their support of peace in
the region, and if they move away from that, our aid program is
impossible. I think that we can do that privately at first,
rather than browbeating them, but I think we need to make it
very, very clear and make sure that the Egyptian army
understands that it has been obligation to tell the civilians,
to persuade the civilians, to talk to the new Parliament so
that the national debate shows that it is in Egypt's interest,
they are not doing this as a favor to us, not doing this as a
favor to Israel. It is in Egypt's interest to keep those
commitments.
Mr. Rivera. Mr. Craner, anything to add on either front?
Mr. Craner. Just that this large assistance package began
with the Camp David Accords. If the Camp David Accords are no
longer going to be operative, there is no need for the
assistance.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. I yield back
the remainder of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. Mr.
Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and
congratulations to you and thank you to the panel for a great
presentation. A special welcome to Dr. Satloff; it is wonderful
to see you.
I have really two issues that I would ask the panel to
address. The first is just yesterday in the Providence Journal
there was a headline, Egypt's Unrest Raises Oil Prices. And
this seems to be another example of where our national security
interests and our ability to wean ourselves from dependence on
foreign oil intersect. And so my first question is really is
there any reason to believe in the short term that there will
be consequences to the oil supply here in this country, knowing
that Egypt is not a big producer, but that lots of oil is
transported.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline, can I interrupt you
for 1 second?
Mr. Cicilline. Certainly.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and we won't take away
from your time. Mr. Berman and I have to go to the floor to
handle the debate. And I will ask Mr. McCaul of Texas to take
over the chair. And if we could start Mr. Cicilline's time
again. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cicilline. So in light of this uncertainty in the
region in the short term, is there likely to be any impact, and
then add to that that 40 percent of natural gas consumed by
Israel comes from Egypt, which I know the Muslim Brotherhood
has already spoken out against, what are the implications in
terms of energy? And I hope there will be a call to action on
behalf of our country to develop a comprehensive energy policy
that is serious about investing in clean energy and the
development and production of renewable energy.
The second area I would like to hear your thoughts on is
the issue of leadership of the revolution. It seems as if it is
really organic and it is really the people of Egypt that are
leading this revolution. And I think we have to be careful that
even if we could identify the emerging leaders we have to walk
this tightrope where we want to be sure that this is a decision
of the Egyptian people, and so we can't be seen to have
selected or endorsed new leadership.
On the other hand, it sounds like investments in democracy
promotion would be a useful tool to help fuel that kind of
development. The question really is, is it too late for this
country in terms of our playing in that area because they are
now in the midst of the revolution, or are there some
strategies that can support the emerging democratic leadership,
whoever that is?
Mr. Abrams. To say a word about energy, Mr. Cicilline, so
far no, obviously the prices have risen because of uncertainty.
But so far the Canal is intact and the Egyptian army seems to
want to keep it that way.
There was a terrorist attack on the gas pipeline to Israel,
and it is not working right now. It will take several more days
to get it back online. The Israelis I think need to worry that
Egyptian domestic politics may interfere in the medium term
with their supplies. They do have supplies offshore and one of
the things that has happened is it has changed a little bit the
debate within Israel about the importance of those supplies and
the need to get them online a lot faster.
I yield to my colleagues on the question of how we can help
this democratic transition.
Mr. Satloff. Just a word about energy before that,
Congressman, I think that now is the moment when we need to be
talking very clearly with the Saudis and our Gulf partners
about their excess capacity, which is significant and would be
quite helpful right now to help ensure that oil prices, which
is really speculation on the sense of fear and uncertainty,
that oil prices don't take a dynamic of their own. Those
governments are very angry at the United States for their
perception that we threw Mubarak under the bus, which I think
is incorrect, but so be it. We need to have a real serious
strategic conversation with the Saudis and their partners about
their use of excess capacity.
Mr. Craner. On the question----
Mr. Cicilline. And Dr. Satloff, on the balance of the
question is it too late for us to implement some strategies to
support emerging democratic leadership in Egypt?
Mr. Satloff. I will let my colleague Lorne comment in just
a moment. I don't think it is ever too late for us to do what
we can. And we have great institutions, such as the one Lorne
directs and others, that have people on the ground that have
been working quietly for years. Now is the moment really where
we should be more active and do what we can to help liberals,
moderates, anti-Islamists capture the political space which is
beginning to open for them.
Mr. Craner. I wish we had more time on this before
elections occur. The one good thing is that we and other
groups, the National Democratic Institute included, have been
able to have contact with folks there for a couple of years,
less lately because our budgets were cut. So I don't think it
is too late. One of the things I always tell folks to address
the delicacy issue you are talking about is we have to
understand it is their country and it is their fight. We cannot
be leading them.
What we can do when we do this kind of work is to talk
about how coalitions are formed without saying and here is your
leader or what issues do you need to address without saying
these are the issues and here are the solutions. One of the
interesting things that has happened in the last 10 years is
that many new democracies are interested in doing this kind of
work. So, for example, the Tunisians are very interested in
having people from Portugal, which began its democracy in 1975,
and Serbia, which began its democracy in 1998. So it is not so
much regarded as an American thing anymore when you are
bringing in people from all over the world. It can be done. We
can't do it passively, we need to get in there and start doing
it.
The final thing I would say is for the opposition to
understand what issues it is that the Egyptian people want
addressed. I think if you go out there and say let's be more
aggressive toward Israel or you go out there and say let's fix
this economy, you are going to get different reactions.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. McCaul [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes himself
for 5 minutes. We all support democracy. I think the concern a
lot of us have is a power vacuum and who is going to fill that
void in that power vacuum. There is also a great concern I know
from other nations in the Middle East of what is going to
happen to them and what ripple effect could potentially take
place across the Middle East. Certainly countries like Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen.
When you look at the history of who is to fill this void I
think obviously the young intellectual, secular model is what
we want, but then there is, as we have discussed the Muslim
Brotherhood. When you look at the history, Mr. Qutb, the
literary scholar, trained in the United States but then
advocating violence. Mr. Zawahiri, the number two man to bin
Ladin. Those are the elements that we are talking about. That
raises great concern to me in terms of--I think we know the
answer to this question, how it is going to play out, but that
is a great cautionary concern I think that all of us have.
Dr. Satloff, you talked about Iran as well with the vacuum.
So I have got a couple more questions. I just want to throw
that out and see what response or commentaries you had on that.
Mr. Satloff. Congressman, in the current environment no one
is suggesting that any other institution but the army fill that
void. Actually our hope is that the army separates itself from
the President and then fills the void and then opened up a
transition, an irrevocable transition. But no responsible
person is suggesting to hand over the keys of the country to a
leaderless, amorphous group. Everyone hopes for an
institutional change, and that is why if this does happen, if
the army makes the choice, which it so far has been reluctant
to do, then we may be on the right path.
Mr. McCaul. Any other comments? Mr. Abrams.
Mr. Abrams. You asked about the ripple effects. I would say
about that is there have been some good ones in the sense that
the Governor of Algeria announced that after 19 years the
emergency law would be ended. The Government of Jordan, the
King, announced that he has appointed a new Prime Minister with
a mandate for reform. In Yemen the President announces he won't
run again. So they are not going have a President for life,
which is what they feared.
So to the extent that people can get ahead of the curve
this will prove to be positive.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Craner.
Mr. Craner. I think you are not yet seeing negative effects
in any of the countries. I noted earlier if you are going to
see effects it will probably be in the republics, not the
monarchies for a variety of reasons. But I think these events
drive home the point that President Bush made and that
Secretary Clinton made in a speech in UAE and another one in
Munich, that not only do they need to get ahead of the events,
but we need to get ahead of these events.
Mr. McCaul. I agree with that. Is there something to learn
from that? When we look the Turkey they have a secular model of
government. Do we have--is there any benefit to examine that
model in terms of applying it to Egypt?
Mr. Abrams. I would say it is a mixed model in the sense
that for years and years it looked like the right model, the AK
Party, democratic, moderate, but we have seen in the last year
real steps by the Prime Minister against freedom of the press
in Turkey. And so I think Turkey now becomes a worrying model
for the direction of Egypt.
Mr. McCaul. And last question, El Baradei has been, and I
was at a meeting with him in Vienna. He is a very impressive
man and he seems to be the type that could be a consensus
builder. What are your thoughts in terms of him emerging as a
potential leader in Egypt?
Mr. Satloff. In the polling that we did just last week in
Cairo, El Baradei came up quite negligible in public opinion
support. The top ranked person was for better or for worse the
current Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, who
supports peace but isn't always such a friend of American
interests in the broader Middle East.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Craner.
Mr. Craner. Mr. El Baradei would be a transitional figure
at best.
Mr. McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. And welcome. I know it has
been a long morning, and thank you all for being patient.
I have two questions. First, Mr. Abrams, to you. You quoted
Tom Lantos: ``Does Egypt need more tanks or more schools?''
Obviously a rhetorical question. You sound like a liberal
Democrat. Thank you, in raising the question. But you also
bemoaned a little bit the fact that other donors have visible
projects they can point to, and the people can see the
assistance is helping and we don't have so much of that.
The administration in which you served and the Senate in
which I served actually consciously moved a lot of project-tied
aid in Egypt to cash transfer because it made the client
happier, but we paid a political price. I wonder if you want to
comment on that in terms of in retrospect, did we make a
mistake? And moving forward do we need to resist the temptation
even though it takes long and it is clunky and it requires more
people at USAID, but we pay a political price every time
someone doesn't see the tangible benefit, in this case of the
peace dividend.
Mr. Abrams. I agree and I think it was a mistake to do
this. And we almost made an even larger mistake. The Mubarak
regime has been pushing for probably 3 or 4 years now for
some--sort of an endowment where the aid would be put into a
giant pot where you and the Congress would lose all control
going forward and for a while that was a popular proposal. I
think it was blocked here on the Hill.
But I think what we see now is the error of having been so
supportive of the Mubarak government. I would only add the
usual statement is they were such great allies. Yes and no, you
know there are Emirati forces fighting alongside us in
Afghanistan. There are no Egyptian forces. There are others in
the Arab world who have been much more helpful about bringing
peace and democracy to Iraq after the war. President Mubarak
was not helpful, and of course it is a very cold peace with
Israel, under a regime, his regime, that propagated, not just
anti-Israel, but terrible anti-Semitic feelings in Egypt.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Mr. Craner, you talked about the
consequences of in a sense the vacuum. When you have an
autocratic regime and you don't allow political space to be
created for legitimate opposition that is capable of governing,
this is what happens. And we aided and abetted that, maybe
through circumstances, whatever. I would argue clearly it is
also a legacy of the Cold War where we saw the world in such
stark bipolar terms, we kind of lost a lot of stuff in the
antithesis.
But moving forward, it is easier said than done, isn't it?
I mean, you have got a friendly allied government, it may be
autocratic, and here you are, whether it is the Republican
Institute or the Democratic Institute or the U.S. State
Department, mucking around with the opposition that they don't
want you mucking around with. How do we forge a coherent policy
that allows us to help create political space, especially when
the governing regime does not want us to?
Mr. Craner. Because with every country, with every
government there is what I would call an equation of relations
with the United States. You have an X, Y, Z quotients. If X is
the trade relationship, if Y the military relationship, you
want to insert another quotient called democracy and human
rights. And we shouldn't underestimate the power and how much
attention people pay to us. And when they understand that the
President and the Secretary of State highly value a particular
quotient in the equation then they will pay attention to it.
And skilled diplomats are able to use that. This is something I
saw repeatedly in both the Bush-Baker and the Bush-Powell State
Departments. Skilled diplomats can do both quite easily.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Satloff, did you want to comment?
Mr. Satloff. No, I defer.
Mr. Connolly. Oh my gosh, I have 50 seconds left.
Elliot, I hope I see you at the synagogue. Thank you very
much. You go to the synagogue in my neighborhood. Thank you all
very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the Egyptian experience of the past several weeks
raises a number of questions, a lot of contradictions. But also
I don't know that enough has been made out of the generational
influence, not only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East and
North Africa, and I think in Egypt 25 or 50 percent of the
population is under the age of 25. What is different today is
that these regimes have been very good at repression. And there
are now tools of collaboration, of organization that have are
available to everybody in the world in this Web enabled world,
and it is interesting that the Egyptian Government shut down
the Internet, but so much information was out there before they
did it, it essentially drove people into the streets, because
that level of curiosity had been raised to a point where it was
uncontrollable. I supposed that is both a good thing and a bad
thing.
Mr. Satloff, you had indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood,
you talk about contradictions, is an ideological party with
very specific goals. Could you elaborate a little bit?
Mr. Satloff. Yes, Congressman. The Muslim Brotherhood was
founded and retains its intention to Islamize society, to make
Egyptian society first and other Muslim majority countries
second, governed under Sharia law, Sharia law being the
codified Muslim legal code. Now in some places the Muslim
Brotherhood has spread. It started out in Egypt, it has spread
in countries around the world. It takes different names in
different places, like Hamas in the Palestinian arena, but it
retains that ultimate goal. It has a variety of means toward
that goal. At times it has used direct violence trying to
assassinate Presidents and Prime Ministers. At other times it
uses electoral politics, at other times is uses social welfare
efforts to promote popularity, but it has never given up the
goal. And the goal has only been compromised because of actions
of the state. Namely, the state has repressed, thrown in jail
its leaders, and it has been forced to give up certain aspects
of its goal publicly and certain aspects of its means publicly.
But I would argue that there is no fundamental change in the
objective of the Muslim Brotherhood and we should be quite
clear eyed about what that goal is, and it is very antithetical
to our strategic interests and to our human rights and
democracy interests.
Mr. Higgins. Is it possible to gauge the support for the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt itself amongst the population? Is
there a percentage that could be accurately applied relative to
support amongst the popular----
Mr. Satloff. There is a common view among experts that it
is somewhere about 20 or 30 percent. But none of us really know
because the government has set up an electoral system which
deprives all options other than supporting the brotherhood or
supporting the regime. So we don't really know what the
Brotherhood support is. I suspect it is in that ballpark, but
it is certainly not a majority support among the Egyptian
population. Here I just want to reaffirm the point I made
earlier, we need to make a distinction between religiosity,
people who pray and people who ascribe to a political ideology
of compelling their compatriots to live under Islamic law. That
is a very different approach.
Mr. Higgins. It seems like one of the reasons Egypt has
historically supported the blockade of Gaza is because they
wanted to ensure that Hamas remains Israel's problem and not
their problem, which is indicative of a history of fearing, I
presume, the Muslim Brotherhood which makes up Hamas.
This power vacuum, where do we suspect this thing is going
to--how is this going to be filled? Anybody?
Mr. Abrams. The power vacuum in Cairo of course none of us
know, and this is a key question as to whether the army can
lead a steady but real transition to a new democratic system or
not.
I do think one thing about Gaza: Initially the Egyptians
wanted to have a lot more influence in Gaza and prevent a Hamas
takeover. Once Hamas took over, they were very much afraid of a
kind of infection between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, Hamas. And they then began to
enforce somewhat, haphazardly, they began to enforce a border.
And there were some incidents where they arrested Hamas people
and pushed them back over the border. But Mubarak I think was
quite afraid of what the Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood cooperation
could do.
Mr. Higgins. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Arkansas, Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Abrams, my
understanding is that the movement in Egypt is an organic one
for the most part and there is potentially a power vacuum there
and that Egypt historically has done a good job in dealing with
some of the extreme groups, fringe groups. With all of that in
mind, looking forward to the intermediate term, 5 years or so
down the road, what do you see al-Qaeda trying to do, if
anything? And I mention this, I know there hasn't been a lot of
discussion of al-Qaeda, but clearly some critical people in the
al-Qaeda organization have ties to Egypt. And then I see this
Wall Street Journal editorial, could al-Qaeda hijack Egypt's
revolution? And I know it is all sort of speculation, but I
would like for you to comment on how credible that speculation
is. It seems to me if we did have incomplete knowledge, looking
in hindsight, that this was coming and it did sort of
organically bubble up, if you will, looking forward, what do we
know about al-Qaeda and their interests? And I would assume
that there is no question they would have a desire to
capitalize and exploit this, but there may be structural
resource limitations on their ability to do that. Do you want
to comment on that? I don't know if you've seen this article
but just on the general premise.
Mr. Abrams. Mr. Griffin, I think it is something we should
be worrying about because al-Qaeda tends to thrive when there
is an ungoverned space, Somalia, Yemen, or when the hand that
suppresses it is lifted. I am sure they are looking at Egypt
and wondering whether the security forces that have been
fighting them will start being--will start pulling back, and
that could happen now. It can happen in the medium term if you
get new governments of Egypt where it is not so popular to
suppress al-Qaeda, where the people who are running the country
are telling the security forces don't be so tough or make
trouble, I don't want any incidents. Because if they move back
and I am thinking about things like guarding their borders or
airports and seaports, if they lessen or lower their guard
against al-Qaeda, we know enough of al-Qaeda to know that they
are constantly looking around and they will move into Egypt.
So I think it is something to worry about. It is one of the
reasons that I think it is so important the army not sacrifice
its position in Egypt to save Hosni Mubarak and get him a few
more months, because we will need them to prevent exactly what
you are I think rightly worried about.
Mr. Griffin. What I would also be interested in is to hear
your comment on if al-Qaeda is looking at northern Africa as a
whole and not just Egypt as a potential opportunity. Are they
looking to recruit there for their fights elsewhere or do you
believe they would be looking to infiltrate there and establish
themselves? It seems to me we have done such a good job, the
United States has, in fighting them, particularly in terms of
depleting their operational resources that they may not have
the ability to do everything that they might like to do. Would
they be recruiting there for fights in Afghanistan and Iraq or
would they be trying to move into these countries?
Mr. Abrams. I think the answer is both. There is now a
thing called al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and I think we have seen
or we have seen arrests in Morocco or arrests in Algeria. And
they are both trying to recruit there and clearly have tried
and succeeded in some cases in doing terrorist attacks in North
Africa. So this is very much on their radar screen.
Mr. Griffin. I see that I am about out of time. I have
about 30 seconds, if there is anything you would like to add.
Mr. Satloff. A couple of quick points. One, al-Qaeda has
proved quite opportunistic. I am sure they are seeing the
situation in Tunisia and Egypt as the fall of their enemies,
not so much a rise of democracy, and this will invite their
activity in these countries.
Secondly, we should note that even such people as the
assassin of Sadat up at Zamur escaped from jail in Egypt over
the last 2 weeks, and I think we should be quite concerned
about the potential for these fringe movements taking hold
again.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. I want to thank the witnesses for their
excellent testimony here today. Our members may have additional
questions, and we ask that our witnesses consider follow-up
answers to any questions that may be forwarded. Without
objection, by unanimous consent members will have 5 days to
submit questions in writing, which the committee will then
forward to our witnesses.
Again, thank you, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
AND ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST, PART 2
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We thank the folks in the audience
with the yellow T-shirts. They have loved ones or relatives or
interested folks about what is going on in Camp Ashraf and the
many violations against the freedom-loving Iranians there. And
we certainly will keep working so that they get the protection
they deserve from the Iraqi Government and from our U.S.
Government as well. So we welcome you today.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
recognize the chairman and the ranking member of our
Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia for 3\1/2\ minutes
each for their statements.
We will then hear from our witness Deputy Secretary
Steinberg. Thank you, sir, for joining us.
Following Mr. Steinberg's testimony, we will move to
questions and answers from members under the 5-minute rule.
Without objection, the witness' prepared statement will be
made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to
insert statements and questions for the record subject to
length limitations of the rules. Thank you very much. So if we
could have the clock begin now.
Yesterday, as you know, we heard from a distinguished panel
of experts and former administration officials on the dramatic
transformation that is currently taking place in Cairo, in
Beirut, and beyond. There was general agreement on the need for
the United States to send a clear signal of support to those
freedom-loving Egyptians who renounce violence, who are
committed to democratic governance, who respect the security
and the sovereignty of all Egypt's neighbors. There were echoes
of statements by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from
this past weekend that the U.S. relationship is not just with
one person, but rather with all of the Egyptian people as a
whole.
Former Deputy National Secretary Advisor Elliot Abrams
reiterated that Mubarak created the very situation that Israel
and the United States now fear, and that Mubarak's statements
that he will not run in Egypt's scheduled elections is too late
to enable a smooth transition.
America's role should be to facilitate a post-Mubarak
transition in order to avert future violence, and restore calm,
and guard against the use of the transition process by
nefarious elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood to directly
or indirectly undermine Egypt's evolution to a democratic
republic.
There is no evidence that a well-thought-out contingency
plan existed in the event that Mubarak's government became
unstable or collapsed. The Wall Street Journal reported that
Middle East experts at a January 31 meeting asked National
Security Council officials, ``Please tell me that you have
contingencies in case Mubarak's regime collapses.'' The
National Security Council reportedly admitted there were no
such plans.
A February 2 report by foreignpolicy.com cites a senior
administration official telling ABC that the administration was
being compelled to change its strategy ``every 12 hours. First
it was negotiate with the opposition. Then events overtook
that. Then it was orderly transition. Then it was, you,
Mubarak, and your son can't run, and now it is the process has
to begin now.''
Turning to the Muslim Brotherhood, the New York Times
reported on February 2 that ``White House staff members made
clear that they did not rule out engagement with the Muslim
Brotherhood as part of an orderly process according to one
attendee.''
Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood must not be on the table.
This also has implications for U.S. policy toward Lebanon,
given statements last year by John Brennan, assistant to the
secretary for homeland security and counterterrorism,
describing Hezbollah's evolution from ``purely a terrorist
organization'' to a militia, to what Mr. Brennan refers to as
an organization that now has members within the Parliament and
the Cabinet.
Has the State Department evaluated whether Lebanon now
meets the statutory definition of a state sponsor of terrorism
or a terrorist strength sanctuary, given Hezbollah control of
that government? And what is the administration's stance on
continuing to provide assistance to such a Lebanese Government?
From Lebanon to Egypt, what is the administration's stance on
the Muslim Brotherhood? Beyond the general parameters
referenced in Deputy Secretary Steinberg's written statement
that is in our packet, what are the specific components and
contingencies of the U.S. strategy toward Egypt and for aiding
in the transitional process? If a key U.S. goal is to prevent
the Muslim Brotherhood from taking over, and the Muslim
Brotherhood is well funded, then shouldn't U.S. policy seek to
shift economic aid away from the Mubarak government and focus
it on strengthening responsible, peaceful democratic voices?
The administration's initial approach to Egypt was clearly
not keeping up with the priorities in its first years. While
driving increases in the international affairs budget, the
administration made significant cuts to total bilateral funding
for democracy and governance programming. USAID even reportedly
adopted a policy of only funding those organizations officially
approved as NGOs by the Mubarak government. Repeated U.S.
failure to enforce its own conditions and requirements on
nonsecurity assistance to Egypt has compounded the problem.
So, Mr. Steinberg, what tangible economic or democratic
reforms has the Government of Egypt undertaken as a result of
the billions of dollars that we have provided in nonsecurity
assistance throughout the last decades? What have we received
in exchange?
This brings to mind two lessons on the Lebanese debacle
that we are currently facing. The first is that the elections
themselves are meaningless unless they are supplemented with
democratic institutions. Hezbollah's ascendance in Lebanon was
facilitated by the failure of responsible nations to insist on
changing a Syrian-dictated electoral law and subsequent
regulation prior to holding elections in the aftermath of the
2005 Cedar Revolution. Clearer standards for participation in
elections and institutions must be both articulated and
implemented to ensure that destructive actors are not afforded
the opportunity to hijack an incipient democratic process.
The second lesson is we cannot afford to continue to pursue
a myopic, personality-based policy that relies on stability
over institutional reform. In Lebanon, we had a short-term
policy based on maintaining stability, and we vested
significant political capital with both Rafiq Hariri and, in
the wake of his assassination and ascendance of the pro-Western
March 14 bloc, his son Saad Hariri. Basing the next round of
elections on existing Egyptian law and regulations without
clear standards for participation and a democratic
institutional framework is a recipe for disaster.
And turning lastly to the role of the Egyptian Army, it has
been reported that the United States is working behind the
scenes to impress upon the Egyptian military the need to
protect protestors and support a peaceful government
transition. And I will be asking you questions on the
administration's view on the security assistance to Egypt.
So thank you very much for being here.
And I am so proud and pleased to turn to my ranking member,
Mr. Berman of California.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I am just getting word that probably a lot of people are
getting that--except possibly the Deputy Secretary of State--
that according to NBC News and a number of other sources,
including quotes from the new Prime Minister of Egypt, that
Hosni Mubarak is to step down following an all-day meeting of
the country's Supreme Military Council. The army said all of
the protestors demands would be met and a further statement was
expected to be made later Thursday clarifying the situation.
Mubarak was also due to address the nation.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. If I can interrupt. We will start
your time again.
The Chair would like to remind the audience members that no
disturbance of the committee proceedings are allowed, and if
there is no order, we will ask for you to be removed from the
room according to House rules.
Mr. Berman's time will now begin.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Yesterday I made a fairly detailed opening statement on the
rapidly evolving events in Egypt as well as developments in
Lebanon. Today I would like to focus on just one aspect, the
most immediately relevant aspect of the democratic transition
in Egypt, and that is the issue of when that transition will
actually begin. We may have just had an answer on that.
But on February 1, President Obama said that a transition
in Egypt must be meaningful, peaceful and begin now. At this
point, however, prior to my reading about this, I felt that we
were still waiting for that beginning. There have been some
important announcements, the decision that neither Hosni
Mubarak, Gamal Mubarak, nor Omar Suleiman would run for the
Presidency in September, but nothing meaningful up until now
has actually happened, nothing that could be considered a break
with business as usual as seen by the Egyptian regime.
Madam Chairman, the transition needs substance. If current
Egyptian leaders are reluctant to give it that substance, then
the administration needs to give it a major push by setting out
its own timetables and targets. The transition needs to be
orderly, to be sure, but foremost it actually needs to happen.
Both the regime and the opposition need to see defining
actions so that each begins to make what President Obama called
the psychological break from the past. Any number of tangible
actions would serve that purpose, whether it be ending the
emergency law, the decision by President Mubarak to hand over
effective power to his Vice President, a decision by the regime
to bring credible opposition members into a transition
government, clear indications that a new Constitution will be
written and implemented and will ensure the provision of free
and fair elections, the ability of secular parties to organize,
the presence of monitors, the presence of international
observers, and the kind of both print and television freedom
that allows all parties and all voices to be heard during that
kind of a campaign.
This type of concrete action needs to happen for many
reasons, but primarily for the benefit of the Egyptian people.
The Egyptian regime needs to know that it cannot dawdle or
simply go through the motions of democratic change without any
intention of genuinely transitioning to democracy. If delay is
its tactic, it will reap a whirlwind at home, and it will leave
Congress little choice but to take action. In other words, no
slow walking.
When this crisis broke out, I emphasized that I favored
continuing our security assistance program, but the duration of
that program depended on whether the military played a
constructive role in the democratic transition. That is still
my position. But our patience, mine, that of my colleagues, has
limits. Given the military's influence over the regime, a
regime that was born in the military and whose entire
leadership is composed of military men, the democratic
transition will happen if and only if the military plays that
constructive role.
So, Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to see you here. We
have great respect for what you have been doing in a number of
areas, but I am hoping when we finish this hearing, we will
have a sense from you of when you think the democratic
transition in Egypt will begin--it may have been helped by some
of this news--and how we know it has begun, and what our
administration intends to do to make sure that it begins if not
now, then very, very soon.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
And I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the chairman of
our Middle East Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
holding these timely and important hearings again today.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished guest
Secretary Steinberg about the situation in the Middle East,
which continues to unfold even as we speak, as the ranking
member indicated, with the news on Mubarak today.
I think it is safe to say that the developments that
continue to sweep across the Middle East and North Africa
really did surprise many, but for years analysts had called
attention to the ills of the region--a lack of respect for even
the most basic human rights in many instances, like freedom of
speech, freedom of assembly, and fair and free elections--as a
potentially dangerous source of discontent, but it was ignored.
They pointed to the widespread poverty and the aggressive
economic policies instituted by dictators who were out of touch
with the plights of their respective populations.
They did not, however, predict that one 26-year-old street
vendor's desperate act of defiance would initiate a wave of
antiregime protests that are shaking the very foundations of
the political order in the Middle East. Even those countries in
which protests have not yet erupted look at countries like
Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, nervously wondering if they
themselves will be next.
For years we have also been told something else. We have
been told that the Middle East is a region that is not ready
for democracy. Indeed, save a handful of exceptions, the
democracy deficit in the region had all become but a permanent
assumption upon which far too much U.S. policy was based. I say
``had'' because over the past weeks, the people of the Middle
East by taking to the streets, have proclaimed loudly to the
leaders and to the world that they share the same principles
that we cherish. They have told us that the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness does not stop at the
water's edge.
While these developments are very exciting, there is a dark
side, which is a cause for concern. The specter of radical
Islamist groups which exploit every opportunity to seize power
is lost on no one. In Egypt, for over 30 years President
Mubarak has crushed every moderate secular political party that
could pose a challenge to his party, the National Democratic
Party. The only movement which managed to survive is the Muslim
Brotherhood, which, among other aspirations, has declared its
desire to reconsider Egypt's peace treaty with Israel as well
as its desire to impose Sharia law on the Egyptian population.
President Mubarak, however repressive he may have been, was
a close ally to the United States in the region and was
especially helpful to us in fighting the global war on terror.
In his absence, and as Egypt enters a period of transition, we
must do all that we can to ensure that Egypt emerges from its
current crisis with strong and democratic institutions of
government, institutions that will respect the rights of women,
uphold past treaties and agreements like those with our ally
Israel, and not exploit the pillars of democratic governments
like elections to assume the power only to abolish those very
pillars. We must do all we can to help support the development
of these institutions and to avoid one man, one vote, one time.
Preventing the Muslim Brotherhood from coming to power must
be a leading priority as we revisit our policy toward Egypt.
The quiet diplomacy that the United States has been engaging in
so far may be helpful in dealing with the Mubarak regime, but
it does nothing to assure the people of Egypt that we
sympathize with their cause. As one of our witnesses yesterday
pointed out, many Egyptians are totally unaware of the
nonmilitary aid that we have given them.
So again, I commend you, Madam Chair, for holding this
hearing. We obviously want to avoid a situation in which the
Egyptian population looks at us as having bankrolled President
Mubarak while completely ignoring them.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
And the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman, for 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Until recently, and unlike its Arab neighbors, Lebanon had
a democratically elected government that should have had a
mandate to govern, but like all of its regional neighbors
except Israel, Lebanon has suffered from a powerful and
unaccountable element of its society acting above and beyond
the law.
What was different in the Lebanese case was that this
unaccountable few didn't occupy or use the institutions of the
state in order to coerce, in order to repress, in order to
dominate their political opponents. Instead, they just
threatened them and then killed them.
No one should forget that before the current crisis, before
the insurrection of May 2008, before the Presidential
succession crisis and the lockout of Parliament, Hezbollah and
its Iranian and Syrian allies engaged in a campaign of
assassinations against Lebanese parliamentarians and
journalists that began in 2005 with the murder of former Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri.
Long before the recent backroom coup, Hezbollah set itself
above the law and outside the reach of the government.
Hezbollah has for years systematically weakened Lebanon's
Government and continually undermined Lebanon's sovereignty. It
has made Lebanon a regional time bomb by deploying more than
40,000 Syrian and Iranian artillery rockets and advanced
surface-to-surface missiles all aimed at Israel and all in
order to shield Iran's illicit nuclear weapons program.
Tragically, the people of Lebanon are now hostages. Like
the captive nations of Eastern Europe during the Cold War,
their hearts are free, but their government has colluded with a
foreign power to put them in chains.
The United States must continue to advocate for Lebanon's
sovereignty and for the restoration of a legitimate government.
We must continue to support and sustain the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon and keep faith with all of the Lebanese people who
want justice for their murdered countrymen and their former
Prime Minister. America must continue to insist on the
implementation of all relevant U.N. Security Council
resolutions, and we must speak out clearly against the flood of
illegal and destabilizing Syrian and Iranian arms going into
Lebanon.
And finally, we need to be clear with the Government of
Lebanon that it bears the burden of demonstrating that it truly
serves the people of Lebanon, and that it will keep peace
inside Lebanon and on Lebanon's borders, and that it is not and
will not either be a flunky for the ayatollahs in Tehran or for
the dictator in Damascus. Until there is clear evidence that
Beirut has made these choices, I believe we have no other
alternative but to suspend all of our assistance programs to
Lebanon. We have many urgent priorities in the Middle East.
Helping Iran, helping Syria, and helping Hezbollah maintain a
facade of Lebanese independence is not one of them.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the balance.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
The Chair is now pleased to welcome our witness. James B.
Steinberg is the Deputy Secretary of State, serving as the
principal deputy to Secretary Clinton. Appointed by President
Obama, he was confirmed by the Senate on January 28, 2009, and
sworn in by the Secretary the next day.
Prior to his appointment in the Obama administration, Mr.
Steinberg served as the dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of
Public Affairs and the vice president and director of the
foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute.
From December 1996 to August 2000, Mr. Steinberg served as
Deputy National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton. Mr.
Steinberg also has held numerous other posts in the State
Department and on Capitol Hill.
Deputy Secretary Steinberg, thank you for attending, and I
would kindly remind you to keep your oral testimony to no more
than 5 minutes. And without objection, your written statement
will be inserted into the record.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. STEINBERG, DEPUTY
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And let me begin
on behalf of Secretary Clinton to congratulate you on taking
the gavel here and to express how much we look forward to
working with you and Ranking Member Berman and all of the
members of the committee, and express appreciation for holding
this timely hearing.
Last month in Doha, Secretary Clinton challenged the
leaders of the Middle East to give greater voice to their
people. As the region confronts a potent combination of
demographic and technological changes, rampant unemployment,
and in too many cases the denial of universal rights and
freedoms, she warned the status quo was unsustainable.
In recent weeks this dynamic has given rise to
demonstrations across the region and changes in Tunisia,
Jordan, and Yemen, and, of course, sparked the dramatic
developments in Egypt that, along with the events in Lebanon,
are the focus of today's hearing.
In such an environment, it is more important than ever that
America works both with the people and the governments to
democratize and open up political systems, economies, and
societies. As the Secretary said just a few days ago in Munich,
these are her words, ``This is not simply a matter of idealism.
This is strategic necessity.''
Change will emerge differently in response to different
circumstances across the region, but our policies and our
partnerships are guided by a few consistent principles. We
stand for universal values, including freedom of association,
assembly, and speech. We oppose violence as a tool for
political coercion, and we have spoken out on the need for
meaningful change in response to the demands of the people.
American administrations of both parties have been
conveying this message to Arab leaders publicly and privately
for many years, and have also sought cooperation on crucial
priorities such as counterterrorism, Iran's nuclear program,
and the peace process. But these are not mutually exclusive or
even contradictory. Recent events have reinforced the fact that
absent freedom and democratic progress, the public support
needed to sustain progress on common goals cannot be achieved.
Changes must come, but we must be mindful the transitions can
lead to chaos and new forms of intolerance or backslide into
authoritarianism.
We are working wherever we can to ensure that political
transitions are deliberate, inclusive and transparent, and we
expect all who take part to honor certain basic commitments,
because, as President Obama said in his Cairo speech, elections
alone do not make true democracy.
One constant in a changing region is unwavering support for
Israel's security. We continue to believe that the best path to
long-term security for Israel and the region is the committed
pursuit of comprehensive peace. By working for orderly
transitions, we believe we can help ensure Israel's long-term
security, and we will be vigilant against attempts to hijack
the legitimate impetus for domestic reform to advance
extremism.
Egypt today is undergoing a remarkable transition, and
given Egypt's leadership and influence, its peace with Israel,
and our long-standing partnership, the stakes are high. We have
all been transfixed by the heroic images from Tahrir Square of
young and old, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, gathering
to lay claim to universal rights enjoyed in democratic
societies around the world. And as the President has said,
Egypt is not going back to the way it was.
We have declared publicly and privately that a peaceful,
orderly, and prompt transition must begin without delay, and it
must make immediate, irreversible progress toward free and fair
elections.
We set out key principles to ensure that the transition
remains peaceful. We made clear our support for human rights,
including expression, association and assembly, freedom of the
press. We have condemned violence against peaceful protestors,
reporters and human rights activists, and we have underlined
the need for Egypt's military to remain a force for stability.
We are urging Egypt's Government and opposition to engage in
serious, inclusive negotiations to arrive at a timetable, game
plan, and path to constitutional political reforms. And as they
do, we will support principles, processes, and institutions,
not personalities. The desire for an orderly transition may not
be a pretext for backsliding and stalling.
Another vital message we are sending to all who take part
in Egypt's political future is the fundamental need to honor
Egypt's historic peace treaty with Israel. As Egypt builds
democratic institutions after the recent unrest and also
contends with the economic challenges that helped to cause it,
we will continue to extend a hand in partnership and friendship
to the American people, and we will act now, as we have done in
the past, to support civil society, nongovernmental
organizations, democracy groups, and economic recovery. As the
transition unfolds, we will tailor our support to engage and
nurture it.
In Lebanon, a very different situation is unfolding. Last
month Hezbollah, backed by Syria, used threats of violence to
undermine the collapse of the Lebanese Government. We have
worked with the international community with one voice to urge
the next Lebanese Government to support the Special Tribunal,
to honor its international obligations, and refrain from
retribution against former officials.
We intend to judge the next Lebanese Government by its
deeds, mindful of the circumstances that brought it about. We
will be watching Prime Minister Mikati to see whether he makes
good on his public pledge to build a broad-based government
that represents all sections of Lebanese society. The Lebanese
people deserve better than a false choice between justice for
the murder of their Prime Minister and stability for their
country.
If I could just conclude, Madam Chairman, by observing,
without commenting specifically on the recent reports that you
have referenced, that what is critical as we see this unfolding
dynamic is that we remain consistent in our principles and the
values of interest that we bring forward, while remaining
nimble to adapt to emerging circumstances. It is a little bit
like having a good game plan for the game, but also knowing
when to call an audible. And I think that is what we are seeing
as we go forward here, a consistent approach that identifies
U.S. interests and values, but adapts to the circumstances and
preserves our long-term interests.
And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much, sir.
And before yielding my time to Congresswoman Buerkle, I
wanted to bring to your attention, sir, a problem that we had
regarding the YouCut debate on the floor yesterday not related
to the subject of this morning's hearing.
But yesterday morning, less than 2 hours before floor
consideration, we received a letter from the State Department
opposing the YouCut proposal to instruct the U.N. to return
$179 million to the United States because of overpayments we
had made to the U.N. Tax Equalization Fund, a surplus that the
U.N. itself admitted that was payable to the United States.
Your Department's letter stated for the first time ever
that the current TEF surplus is now approximately 80 million,
so there is a discrepancy there. So if it is true, that means
the Department of State had already given away $100 million
owed back to the U.S. taxpayers. And we have been asking for
this information for the past 3 months and have been
stonewalled by the State Department. The U.N. cannot redirect
this surplus fund without instructions from the United States.
So I have some questions that I would like to get written
responses from you by Thursday, February 17, about how this was
handled, because the way that this matter was handled raises
serious concerns in my mind about the management and the candor
of the Department of State. So I would appreciate it when my
staff hands you that letter, if we could get that written
response.
Mr. Steinberg. I would be happy to provide that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
I am so pleased to yield to Congresswoman Buerkle of New
York, who serves on the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade as the vice chair.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
the opportunity this morning to address Mr. Steinberg.
Mr. Steinberg, thank you for being here this morning.
Throughout the course of the opening statements, we have
heard from many of the members talking about the concern that
the Muslim Brotherhood will step in if and when President
Mubarak steps down. And really the key being is this something
that the administration is making a priority of, preventing the
Muslim Brotherhood from stepping in when that void occurs? And
then beyond that, if it is a priority, what is the strategy of
this administration to prevent that from happening?
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you very much for the question.
I think that what we have focused on is some set of
principles that we apply to what we expect to happen during
this transition, because as I said, we recognize that these
transitions can be difficult, and they can lead to
unpredictable results. And so by focusing on those expectations
and conditions, the need for an inclusive process that respects
not only the need for elections, but also the institutions that
protects the rights of minorities, that makes sure that, as
things move forward, that individuals of different religions,
of different perspectives are allowed to be part of the process
is quite critical. And we want to make sure that the process is
not hijacked by extremists or those who do not deeply believe
in the open and tolerant and democratic process that we want.
The process itself is one for the Egyptians to decide, but
as we engage with whatever government emerges there, we will be
guided by those principles.
Ms. Buerkle. If you could, Mr. Steinberg, can you elaborate
a little bit on this inclusive process, some of the specifics,
the strategy that the administration will put forward?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think what is important is that
this be a process that is driven by the Egyptians themselves.
But what we made clear to the Government of Egypt is that we
expect that the full range of voices, not ones that are simply
friendly to the government itself, are allowed to participate,
and particularly the voices of the individuals who have been
protesting peacefully on the street and are asking for
democratic change are brought in and that different voices are
heard, that legitimate perspectives from civil society
participate in these discussions. The format is one that the
Egyptian people themselves have to develop. But that is the
kind of approach that we support.
Ms. Buerkle. And if I may just follow up with that. How do
you anticipate the United States of America being engaged in
that process? How do you see that unfolding? Where will you be
involved in the process?
Mr. Steinberg. I think our first role has been to support
those voices, and we have done that through our assistance
programs. I think that it is important to recognize, as a
number of others have raised this question, that we have a
variety of ways of being involved in supporting civil society
voices, and that while there has been a focus on some of our
assistance programs under the ESF, there are other programs
through our democracy programs and through our Middle East
Peace Initiative and metric programs that we have other ways of
supporting these democratic voices, which we have done.
So we want to support them and give them the capacity to
participate effectively, and then we want to make clear in our
advocacy with the Egyptian Government that these are voices
that need to be heard. But I think it is not for the United
States to be in the meetings themselves. We want this to be a
process that is driven by the Egyptian people, by the
legitimate forces in Egyptian society.
Ms. Buerkle. One last question. Do you believe if you
follow this process that you just outlined for us that that
will be sufficient for the United States--or to keep the Muslim
Brotherhood from stepping in? Is that going to be a sufficient
strategy to prevent that from happening?
Mr. Steinberg. I think the key here, as I said in my
opening remarks, is to have a clear set of principles which
says what we expect and what, from our perspective, is an
acceptable outcome for a new government moving forward, not
just for our interests, although our interests are critical
here, but also for the interests of the Egyptian people, and
then to judge that as events emerge. And I think we need to,
rather than trying to anticipate potential outcomes, be
adaptive enough and responsive enough so we recognize, as we
say, so we can identify concerns as they emerge, be vigilant,
and make sure there we flag potentially dangerous emerging
trends.
And I think that is what we have tried to do here, which is
part of the reason why we focused on the need for an orderly
process, to make sure that it is not hijacked by voices which
in the name of democracy are going to set up an intolerant
regime.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg.
I yield back, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Congressman.
I am pleased to yield to my friend, the ranking member, Mr.
Berman of California.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Steinberg, for your testimony and
your leadership here.
I would like to follow up on Ms. Buerkle's initial
question: What is the administration's position regarding the
participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the transition and
then subsequent governance? I certainly agree that in the end
the Egyptian people are going to decide this question.
There is an article in the current Egyptian Constitution
requiring that religion be kept out of politics. Turkey has had
a similar provision in its Constitution.
Does the administration have a view as to whether Egypt
should retain that principle in the next phase of its
governance?
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Berman, I think what is important is
that the next government respect the kind of democratic
principles that we talked about, which is a commitment to
democracy, but not just for one election, but for all of the
fabric of democracy. Open institutions. Open debate. Tolerance
of diversity and religious minorities. An ability of people to
pursue different paths free of harassment. A recognition that
you have to have a vibrant civil society.
There are different ways the Constitutions can embody that,
different ways in which countries allow religion to play a role
in our lives. We know, for example, even in our friends and
allies in Europe, some have roles for religion in societies.
So I think you can't have an absolute rule about exactly
how that applies, but it is very clear that we need to have--
and we will be clear in our own mind that allowing this to
become a state or a government that is intolerant, that does
not provide an opportunity for the free, full expression of
religious rights, of minority rights, or freedom for all of the
different voices in Egyptian society is very important.
And what is encouraging is if you look at the people who
are out in Tahrir Square, what you are seeing is exactly that,
Christians and Muslims, people from different religions and
backgrounds and different viewpoints on the role of Islam in
society. And that is what needs to be preserved, and that is
something that we feel would be important in any Constitution
that would be adopted by a future government.
Mr. Berman. I have supported the administration's decision
not to suspend the assistance program up until now, but I
noticed that White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs back on
January 28 said the United States will be reviewing our Egypt
assistance posture based on events that take place in the
coming days.
Is that review ongoing, and what is the nature of that
review? Under what circumstances would the administration
consider suspending aid to Egypt?
And then just an observation that I would recommend that
the administration look toward the whole issue of export
controls on things like tear gas canisters, items that are
mostly relevant to the suppression of peaceful protestors. I
think there would be some value in reviewing and perhaps
eliminating licenses on those kinds of items for the interim
period.
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Berman, I think you would expect and we
do always keep under constant review our assistance programs
not just for Egypt, but elsewhere. Congressman Ackerman raised
concerns about Lebanon, and I want to assure him that we do the
same there because we have to be able to be responsive to
ongoing events. And I won't suggest that there aren't some
circumstances where events may arrive where we would have to
change our approach, but what we have focused on here as events
have been emerging in Egypt is how to encourage this
transition, how to use our influence to try to move the process
in a direction that we would like to see it go and it meets the
needs and wishes of the Egyptian people. And I think we have to
be prepared to deal with events as they emerge, but we don't
want to try to anticipate bad outcomes in a way that would make
it less likely to achieve.
Mr. Berman. I agree with that. I just in the end don't want
the notion of the ensurance of that assistance become a basis
for the slow walking of the orderly transition.
One last question. With all of the focus on Egypt, I just
want--I would like you to take one moment to sort of discuss
how the situation may be affecting situations outside of Egypt,
such as Iran. And my specific question is whether the State
Department is on track to make determinations on their
investigations for those violating CISADA, our Iran sanctions
legislation, next month.
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, as you know, this is an issue
that I spent a lot of time on. And the Secretary has asked me
to put a lot of specific attention to make sure that we have a
very vigorous implementation of CISADA. We think it has been an
enormously helpful tool, and it has had enormous impact in
helping us to galvanize the international community to take
steps to put additional pressure on Iran, and I think we have
had enormous success. This continues in a comprehensive way to
affect Iran, the Iranian economy, and also keep in the sense of
isolation.
So we understand the importance of making sure we have full
enforcement on that. We have an ongoing effort that is looking
at activities as they emerge, and I continue to pledge to you
that we will do everything that we need to do both to enforce
it, but also to use the statute in a broader way to engage with
other countries to make clear that we need to remain vigilant
not only about the letter of the law, but also the broader
desire to make sure that we don't have companies trying to
skirt those provisions.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Now for the next round of questions. Mr. Smith, the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and
Human Rights.
Mr. Smith. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
Mr. Steinberg, welcome to the committee.
You know, he is the administration dictator until his
utility and usefulness erodes or evaporates or diminishes, and
then the administration finds its public voice on human rights
and democracy and calls on the former friend to get out of
town.
You mentioned, Mr. Steinberg, a moment ago about the
consistency of principles, and I frankly have some concerns
about that.
A few weeks ago, President Obama rolled out the red carpet
as President Hu Jintao came into Washington, a brutal dictator
who has murdered, tortured, and repressed countless Chinese,
Tibetans, and Uighurs. The press conference with Hu Jintao was
so disturbing--I watched it, and I couldn't believe my ears--
and even the Washington Post wrote an editorial on January 19.
It said, ``President Obama makes Hu Jintao look good on
rights.''
The President defended his friend, his dictator friend, and
said the Chinese had a ``different culture,'' which I found to
be an absolute insult to the Chinese people, especially those
who are suffering in Lao Gai, who are being tortured for
demanding their fundamental human rights.
He also said he had a different political system, as if
that was a defense, and that is what the Washington Post picked
up on. Yeah. It is a different system. It is a dictatorship.
My question is--you know, so I think we need to be very
cautious, and I would respectfully submit to you be cautious
when you talk about consistency and principles. Even Liu Xiaobo
is languishing in prison, as we all know, right now. And then
something was said behind the scenes. But we need public
statements, not when it is--when that dictatorship is in its
final hour, but consistently, and in a very transparent
fashion, to let them know that we know.
I read all of the Chinese press after the fact on the
People's Daily, at least what was carried there. They called Hu
Jintao's trip to Washington a tour de force, that he just took
over Washington, and we were sitting there enfeebled by the
effort that we showed. So I am very concerned when you talk
about consistency.
I do have a question about freedom of press and reporters
in particular. Reporters Without Borders suggests that as many
as 79 journalists have been attacked in Egypt, 76 detained, 1
has been killed. Do we know how high up in the command, whether
or not the Army, whether or not the military, whether or not
Mubarak, ordered that, or did it come from the Muslim
Brotherhood, or was it just an outgrowth of the chaos of the
day each day?
And secondly, I would like to ask about a very disturbing
report that an American company, Narus, has sold the Egyptian
Government what is called deep packet inspection technology,
highly advanced technology that allows the purchaser to search
the content of e-mails as they pass through the Internet
routers. The report is from an NGO called Free Press, and it is
based on information Narus itself has revealed about its
business.
Now, there is no way of knowing whether the information the
Egyptian Government gleaned from its Narus technology enabled
it to identify, track down, and harass or detain some of the
journalists or anybody else in Egypt.
I would like to know what we know about this company. And
it is part of Boeing. It was recently bought. And what can you
tell us about Narus and this invasion of privacy on the
Internet?
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Congressman.
Obviously we had an extended conversation about China,
which I would welcome the chance to discuss with you. But I
just would make one point that in addition to the very public
remarks that President Obama made, my boss, Secretary Clinton,
made an extensive speech the week before President Hu came here
in which she specifically identified our concerns about Liu
Xiaobo and other specific dissidents and, I think, gave a very
clear and very unequivocal statement about the importance that
we attach to human rights in China.
So I certainly appreciate the importance of consistency,
and I think it is something that we have made a part of our
engagement with China.
With respect to the journalists, we have made clear we have
many priorities that we are focusing on as this transition goes
forward. But we have been explicitly very clear about the
unacceptability about the way the journalists have been
treated, the harassment, the imprisonment and the like.
I think it is difficult to know--to answer fully your
question about who is behind it. What is encouraging, though,
is that because of the intervention of us and others, the
journalists have been released, and it is important that we
keep a focus on that because it has been the critical voice
that has kept public eyes and ears on that.
On your second question, obviously I am unfamiliar with the
company that you identified, but I will be happy to see what we
know about that.
Mr. Smith. Could you dig into that and get back to the
committee, because it is very important. It goes to the whole
issue of increasingly that U.S. corporations are enabling
dictatorships. We saw it in Iran with a German corporation. We
have seen it in China. We have seen it in Belarus where the
Internet was used and is used to track down dissidents, to
invade their e-mails, find out who they are talking to. It is
an awful tool of repression, and Narus, according to these
reports, has been enabling that kind of invasion of privacy.
So thank you very much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We would appreciate
answers to that.
Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the Middle East
Subcommittee.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much.
Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
Consistency is important, especially in foreign policy. A
foolish consistency is something much to be avoided.
There is a question that keeps asking itself, and some of
us are asking it, and it demands a real answer. We can agree on
the principle of freedom of speech and freedom of
communication, and we can agree how important it is to
democratic and civil societies. But when you pose a question,
that there is information out there that is in a virus, would
you say that that would be welcome in your computer if the
purpose of the virus was to bring down the system?
My question is about the Muslim Brotherhood. They are an
element of society for sure, and we have principles that all
elements of societies are welcome, and everybody has a right to
freedom of religion, and et cetera.
Now, I believe in treating my neighbor as myself, but that
doesn't tell me that I should invite Jeffrey Dahmer to my house
for dinner. Nothing good will come of that.
How do you form a government and welcome in as an element
of it a party that would destroy the government itself and
expect stability? This is a tough question, and we really have
to think about it. In being civil and democratic and welcoming,
we also have to avoid being foolish.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
Obviously, this is an important question, and I will just
make two observations. Which is, one, some of you know I am a
lapsed lawyer, but I do remember from my constitutional law
that even for free speech, there are limits to free speech. And
we know we can't cry ``fire'' in a crowded theater and the
like. Even in our own system, we recognize that speech has to
support civil society and be part of that.
Mr. Ackerman. Are you saying that the Muslim Brotherhood is
an exception?
Mr. Steinberg. No. What I am saying is that if there were
actual acts that were threatening to people, that that would
not be acceptable. I want to make clear that we don't think
that threatening acts of violence would be an acceptable form
of speech. And I think that is why we made an important
statement about the need for lack of violence.
But even more important, I think what we are focused on and
you have raised the question is not so much the dialogue that
is going on now, but what kind of government emerges once this
transition takes place. And I think we have had a consistent
record in saying that there are circumstances in which parties
fail to respect democracy, fail to be an acceptable participant
in government, that we could not be supportive of that
happening. Obviously a very clear case of that is the Hamas and
the Palestinian Authority. We made our position very clear on
that.
I don't want to try to anticipate what is going to be the
outcome of this process of democratization in Egypt, but I do
think we will bring those same sets of principles together,
which is that a government that will have our support is one
that respects open society.
Mr. Ackerman. My concern is that we be as wise as we could
be considering the alternatives.
Lebanon. What happens if the new Government of Lebanon
rejects whatever the results of the tribunal might indicate?
Mr. Steinberg. I think two points about this, which is,
one, we attach enormous importance to the continuation of the
tribunal, and we will do what we can to sustain that effort
irrespective of what the decisions are of the Lebanese
Government. It is our clear expectation that whatever
government is formed, it meet its international obligations
with respect to the tribunal, and that is what we will expect
to hold them to. I think we----
Mr. Ackerman. If Lebanon pulls its financial support for
the tribunals, some think it would collapse. Are we considering
withholding aid from Lebanon?
Mr. Steinberg. As I mentioned earlier in response to Mr.
Berman's question, I think we obviously keep questions of
assistance under review. Right now we are focusing on trying to
encourage all of the parties, including the Prime Minister
designate, to make sure we have an inclusive government that
meets its obligations. So long as that continues, and at least
up until now the tribunal has not been undermined, we are
continuing our assistance. But obviously we will have to keep
that under review and look at the circumstances as they emerge.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chair for the extension of time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ackerman.
Great questions.
So pleased to yield 5 minutes to the chair of the
Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, Mr. Chabot, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary, I have a number of questions. Some of them have
already been talked about to some degree. But clearly we all
want democracy. We want the people of Egypt to improve their
conditions and their freedoms. Our overriding concern is that
what we all want is going to end up with the folks that we--and
I don't think the Egyptians themselves, the vast majority, want
to be in control--and that is the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic
Jihadists or whatever terminology one wants to use.
They said a lot of things, and they are, I think, trying to
portray themselves to some degree as being, well, we are more
moderate now. And could you talk a little bit about Sharia law
and what they said and what you really think their position is
on that with respect to Egypt if they would gain control?
Mr. Steinberg. I think there is a lot of speculation as to
what their goals or objectives are, and I think I would prefer
to leave that to the analysts.
What I would say from the perspective of the policymakers'
point of view is that we have to be clear about what anybody
joining the government would be expected to be committed to,
and that commitment is to an open, tolerant society that allows
for religious diversity, for differences of opinion; that
doesn't undermine civil society; that supports an open
discourse among all elements of society; and, rather than
trying to anticipate what any particular member organization
is, that we hold to those principles, and we certainly make
clear to anybody who is joining a future government must commit
themselves to those principles, and if they do not, then we
would be clear about what our position is.
Mr. Chabot. Do you know what they are saying about Sharia
law at this point in time?
Mr. Steinberg. I am familiar with their writings, and I
think what we know is that there are different instances in
which Sharia law has been used in different societies. Some
have been tolerant; some have been very intolerant. And what we
need to focus on is what will protect basic civil liberties,
and will this next government, and if this organization cannot
support and subscribe to those things, we believe that it would
be inconsistent with the very efforts that are going on right
now.
Mr. Chabot. You said some of them tolerant and some of them
intolerant. Can you give me an example of tolerant Sharia law?
Mr. Steinberg. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that
there are examples of where in domestic law like Sharia law has
been a part of societies. But what we are focusing on is what
political law is and what are the political circumstances under
which a government should govern. And that government has to
meet these basic principles that we are identifying.
So I think that is what we want to focus on: What are the
political rights? What are the opportunities for the society?
What are the opportunities for citizens to exercise their
rights? What are the opportunities for religious minorities?
One of the strengths of Egyptian society is the fact that
Christians play such an important role, and that there is a
small Jewish community there and other religious minorities. So
if Sharia law means no tolerance for that, then that would not
be something that we support.
Mr. Chabot. Let me ask you this on a different topic.
Relative to the Turkish model, there are obviously some
parallels and some differences between Turkey and Egypt,
obviously, but in Turkey the military plays a particularly
important stabilizing historic role there. What are the
comparisons with that in Egypt, and are there differences?
Mr. Steinberg. I think what has been encouraging, and I
think it has been a positive aspect of our engagement, is that
thus far as events have unfolded in Egypt, that the military
has respected the right for peaceful assembly, and it has not
tried to suppress the legitimate rights of people to express
their views, to assemble and the like. And we would hope that
in any society, any government that emerges in Egypt, that we
would have the same commitment from the role of the military,
which is to support legitimate constitutional human rights. And
that is something that we would look to in any society to see
that as the role of the military.
Mr. Chabot. I have only got a short period of time. Let me
comment on something that is kind of frustrating to the
policymakers here in Washington, I am sure to the American
people to some degree, and that is with the considerable
resources that we have invested in those two countries, Egypt
and Turkey, when you do public opinion polls of the people of
those countries, the United States isn't particularly well
thought of or popular. I don't know if you want to comment on
that. I have been told that is because we are so close, that
they expect more, et cetera, et cetera. Do you have any comment
on that?
Mr. Steinberg. I think it is a challenge to us, and I think
it is an important challenge to us, because I think that it is
critical as we go forward that we find ways to understand why
that is and, to the extent that we can be consistent with our
own principles and values, that we try to do that.
Now, obviously there may be circumstances in which we are
unpopular for things that we believe in, and we will stand up
for them. But I think if we can do a better job of
communicating and indicating that we do share the aspirations
of people all around the world for a better life and better
opportunity, that that is important, and it has been a major
purpose of what Secretary Clinton has tried to do with the
State Department.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
And I would like to recognize Mr. Gregory Meeks of New York
for the next round of 5 minutes.
Thank you, Gregory.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me ask this question. One of the things that I do get
concerned about, and I know a lot of my colleagues, et cetera,
and I talk about the Muslim Brotherhood, et cetera. However,
if, in fact, we seem too heavy-handed, sometimes it is like the
kid, the child; you tell them don't date this person, don't
date that person, and they date the person just to spite you at
times. I want to make sure that we don't get into that
scenario. And I have tremendous faith in the Egyptian people
from what I have seen thus far. They want freedom. They want to
make sure that they have democracy, which they have been denied
for 30 years.
That being said, what you don't want to happen is there to
be a vacuum so that someone like the Brotherhood steps up. And
what concerns me is with the opposition, and I don't know what
leaders can evolve or will evolve because it seems as though
they are leaderless. And when you begin these negotiations and
conversations, you know, there has to be someone that is
talking.
So I was just wondering, and I had asked this question
yesterday, who are the leaders that we can expect to emerge,
and is there anything that you can tell us about them, and can
the protesters achieve their goals basically without a leader?
And so and I want to tie that in as quickly as I could to
the fact that there was a lack of a clear leadership in the
Tunisia revolution also. And how that is going because I am
concerned about this--going to Tunisia real quickly about the
assessments of a security situation there. There was some more
violence this weekend, a protest, and in your view, what course
of action toward holding the formal regimes internal security
services accountable for past abuses would be conducive to a
greater political openness without contributing to greater
destabilization.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Congressman. I think there are--
and we shouldn't underestimate a lot of important and we well-
respected civil society voices in Egypt from the NGOs, from
legal professionals and the like who may well form a part of
the future Egyptian Government. I think it is both difficult to
prevent and not on a roll to sort of anoint individuals to be
the ones. But I do think that that is why we so much have
focused on urging Egyptian Government to create a process to
allow these voices to come together, the wise men's group that
is meeting and others, which do include a variety of well
respected voices in the society, but also to make sure that the
younger people who are on the streets also have a chance to
express their views and to have those perspectives heard.
I think the nature of democratic process is not to try to
preselect the leaders, but to establish some institutions and
processes that then will allow for good, free and fair
competition elections where individuals will stand for
election, and the Egyptian people will pick. And I think we
have a real belief that that process can take place. And that
what needs to happen now is to take the institutional decisions
to repeal the emergency law, to take the steps to allow for
parties to register, for there to be a full debate, and to have
an election, and to have those very important voices that are
being heard throughout Egyptian society now, have a chance to
put their views forward in their candidacy.
On Tunisia, I would just say that we do think
accountability is very important. Different societies have
different ways of doing it, and different conflict situations,
that has been done. But I think it is something that the
interim government is focusing on is to establish an approach
to accountability and understanding both of what happened
during the past regime and during the transition, and we would
certainly support that.
Mr. Meeks. Are we dealing with, Tunisia again, is the
administration reviewing Tunisia's aid package which is
currently focused on military assistance. And is it more
assistance needed by Tunisia for democratic institutional
building as Tunisia's new government requested technical
assistance from the United States for the purpose of supporting
the reform agenda? And will the continuation of military
assistance programs be contingent upon human rights benchmarks
or other benchmarks?
Mr. Steinberg. Well, clearly on the last, we are under a
mandate from you to make sure that it does. And so that would
be an important part of what we do. More broadly, we have been
engaged in conversations with the interim government in terms
of how we can support and help that transition. And I think
that is, as I say, part of the flexibility and adaptability
that we are trying to show now is to look for opportunities to
support that process going forward.
Mr. Meeks. And finally, let me just ask, what level of
electoral success would you anticipate from the Tunisian
Islamic groups, if they are allowed to compete in the national
elections that they had promised within the next 6 months?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, Congressman, we have basic a
principle that guides us, which is that we will support and
encourage governments that meet the basic tests of tolerance,
inclusiveness and openness. And rather than trying to prejudge
what these groups will do, we will judge them by their deeds.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And before
yielding 5 minutes to my Florida colleague, Mr. Rivera, I would
like, without objection, the ranking member to be recognized
for an announcement.
Mr. Berman. We have just learned that, and I think on
behalf of the chair and the entire committee wants to extend
our condolences and the condolences of the entire committee to
the loved ones and friends of Khairy Ramadan Aly. This is a
fellow who was a U.S. Embassy Cairo staff employee for 18
years. He went missing from his home on January 28th and just
today has been confirmed as dead. And so on behalf of all of
us----
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Mr. Berman. It is obviously a
tribute to the dedicated, locally employed staff and the risks
that they take, and I appreciate that. And on behalf of all of
us, we appreciate that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. Mr.
Rivera.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, thank
you so much for being here. I am heartened by your testimony
regarding the impact of the crisis in Egypt, vis-a-vis Israel.
I am glad you agree that irrespective of whatever emerges out
of the uncertain circumstances in Egypt that U.S. interests
remain constant. And specifically that Egypt continue to honor
its commitment to peace with Israel.
So I am wondering if you can elaborate, and please be as
specific as possible, as to what exact message the United
States is delivering, has been delivering, will be delivering
to all the parties regarding Egypt's commitment to peace with
Israel?
Mr. Steinberg. I thank you, Congressman. The message has
been very clear, which is the peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt is not just in the interest of Israel, it is in the
interest of Egypt and the region as a whole. And therefore, we
would expect any government to honor its international
commitments, and to honor a treaty that was signed by that
government, and to remain committed to it not just in letter
but in spirit.
This is a foundation for Egypt's future success. The
prospect of the conflict with Israel would serve no interest of
Egypt's, and it would certainly not be consistent with our
interests. So I think we are very unequivocal about both our
own position but also making fair that this is not a favor to
anybody else. That if Egypt should continue it and the reason
we would expect Egypt to continue it is because it is in
Egypt's interest.
Mr. Rivera. Over the years, Mr. Secretary, the United
States has sold a great deal of military equipment to Egypt,
and at the same time, we have been deeply committed to Israel's
qualitative military edge, and essentially, Israel's ability to
defend it. And part of that calculus in providing weapons to
Egypt was that it was committed to peace with Israel. If
Egypt's commitment toward peace with Israel changes, how will
that effect future decisions about the sale and maintenance of
weapon systems to the Egyptians?
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, any time there would be a
dramatic change in circumstances, we would have to take that
into account in making our decisions, but I think our focus now
on the positive message, which is the benefits of engagement
that we have had with Egypt and the Egyptian military, and
therefore would expect them to see the benefits of continuing
this and continuing that basic process, which has led to this
long period of peace between Israel and Egypt.
Mr. Rivera. Based on your experience and developments that
you are seeing occurring right now, do you see Egypt continuing
to play a positive role on issues in general regional
stability, for example, opposition to Iran's nuclear program,
standing up to Islamic radicalism, et cetera?
Mr. Steinberg. I would have every reason to expect that a
more democratic Egypt would be at least as much committed to
those principles, because in a democratic society, all the
things that you have talked about are inimical to a democratic
society. And some of the kind of intolerance, the support for
terrorism and the things that we would be concerned about are
something that a strong and vibrant democratic government in
Egypt would also share. I think that has been our experience.
If you look around the world, who are our strong partners
on all of these global challenges? Not just the shared values,
but the shared interest. When we are dealing with Iran, who are
our strong partners? Our strong partners in Europe, the
democratic societies there. We are working with Japan, we are
working with Korea. So I think we believe very strongly that in
terms of the interests, whether it is sustaining peace in the
Middle East, dealing with terrorism, dealing with Iran's
nuclear program. That an open vibrant Egyptian Government would
be very much in sync with those views and those perspectives.
Mr. Rivera. And up to this moment here today, you see no
indications whether that be from any elements of Egyptian
society, the military or otherwise, civil society, other
elements of the government that any of these prospects could
change in the negative fashion?
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, we have to be vigilant.
Obviously, we have seen events sometimes not fully predictable.
But I think what we need to do is encourage and support those
forces to reduce the chances of those things happening. And our
whole strategy is to try to do that by engaging in supporting
this process to reduce the risks that these dangers which you
rightfully identify, and which we do have to be alert to, don't
emerge.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I yield back the
remainder of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And now I would
like to yield to another Florida colleague, Congressman Deutch
for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to pick up
where my colleague from Florida left off and broaden from
there. Starting with the issue of aid, not just to Egypt but
aid to Israel as well. It gives us a good jumping off point for
a broader debate that is taking place right now on Capitol
Hill, and that has to do with foreign aid more generally.
There are proposals that have been floating around that
have suggested that State Department and foreign aid requests
should be lumped in with non security spending and as such,
should be subject to cuts, reductions anywhere between 10 and
30 percent. Given the State Department's role in Pakistan, and
in Afghanistan, and in the war on terror, given the national
security concerns that we have, and further, given the role
that foreign aid plays not just in the Middle East, not just in
helping Israel to ensure that Israel has a qualitative military
edge, but in the role that foreign aid plays in global health
and maternal care, children's health, the role that foreign aid
plays fighting global hunger. The role of foreign aid in
fighting narcotraffickers in Latin America and in continuing
President Bush's signature achievement in combating AIDS in
Africa.
Reconstruction, counterterrorism. And finally, given some
of the suggestions that have been made on the Hill to eliminate
foreign aid altogether, and suggestions from some outside, some
prominent outside groups that all foreign aid should be on the
table, is it appropriate, do you believe, Mr. Secretary, for us
to look to what is 1 percent or less of the Federal budget in
finding ways to balance the budget by eliminating foreign
assistance altogether? And wouldn't the elimination of foreign
aid put our Nation at greater risk?
Mr. Steinberg. Well, thank you, Congressman. As you can
well imagine the Secretary and all of us feel very strongly,
and the President that this is a critical part of assuring our
national interest. Our ability to engage in the world, to
support democratic institutions, to build economic opportunity,
to deal with the problems of health and hunger are all critical
questions we asked earlier about how the world looks at
America. This is part of the positive engagement of American
that allows us to build friends and to have support on our
interests and they touch our national interests ourselves. If
we don't deal with the problem of global public health, those
things could come home to us.
It is having a strong, balanced strategy of smart power of
engagement in the world, that has a strong defense, but also
supports development and diplomacy that allows the United
States to pursue its interests over the long term, and to have
the kind of partners that we need to move forward.
We have had important successes in Iraq, we need to sustain
that. It would be a tragedy right now with all that has been
achieved and the sacrifice that has taken place not to be able
to continue the progress they are creating, a good example of a
democratic tolerant society in Iraq, which is a very powerful
signal throughout this region, including to Egypt, to continue
to make sure that the extremists don't come back in
Afghanistan.
We know what had happened before and we have a critical
issue that, again, echoes so much of what you all have been
discussing this morning about how do we assure that extremism
doesn't come back? It is by supporting tolerant, more open
political societies and good governance and the rule of law.
These are the things we do with our assistance programs, with
our engagement with civil society. They are critically
important to our national interests and this is, as we think
about our long-term future and the role of the United States in
the world, this is an absolutely indispensable part.
And so, we do hope that as we understand the fiscal
challenges, but this is a very small part of the budget, but it
is a critically important one for fundamental national security
interests of United States.
Mr. Deutch. And just again, Mr. Secretary, am I correct
that the foreign assistance budget is about 1 percent of the
overall budget?
Mr. Steinberg. That is about right.
Mr. Deutch. And if you could speak to what a cut of 10 to
30 percent across the board might mean? How would that impact
American foreign policy?
Mr. Steinberg. I think it would affect us across the board.
It would mean that we would not be able to sustain our
engagement on the civilian side in Iraq because it's so
important that we make sure that this transition moves forward,
that the reconciliation that is taking place through these two
elections continues.
It would affect our ability to support civil society and
democracy. It would affect our ability to deal with the
problems of hunger and creating sustainable agriculture. It
would affect our ability to deal with the problem of global
public health. It would affect our ability to support the kind
of work that we need to do around the world to build strong
institutions.
And we are, right now, having good opportunities where we
are engaged. But the opportunities are even greater if we see
and smartly apply those resources.
We have an obligation to you to make sure that they are
well-targeted, that they are well-conceived, and that they are
well-managed. But in return, we think we deliver a benefit, and
I think no one more articulate than Secretary Gates has made
clear about how important that is to our national security.
Mr. Deutch. And finally, Mr. Secretary, to those who
suggest that we ought to eliminate foreign aid all together, I
suggest to them that they would be putting our Nation at risk.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Steinberg. I think, as I say, it is a critical part of
our smart power engagement of the world. The three legs of that
stool that all the present survivors recognized are critical to
our national security. And over our history, we go back to the
Marshall Plan and so many other examples of how we sustained
our long-term influence and protected our interest by the wise
use of our resources in this area.
Our military cannot protect our national interest alone. We
have seen that in Iraq, and we see it in Afghanistan. It has to
be a balanced effort. And our contribution, the part that goes
to the State Department and assistance is very small compared
to Defense. But has a huge multiplier effect, it has a huge
positive impact on the well-being of the American people.
Also on the economic side it helps open up economic
opportunities. It creates opportunities for American jobs and
American exports. That is what our diplomats do every day,
advocating for American interests, opening markets and the
like. So there are many ways in which U.S. interests are being
protected by this rather modest investment.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I yield back,
Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now following up on my last colleague's
line of questioning, putting America in jeopardy, let me just
note putting us at a risk at a much greater level than what we
are talking about is $1.5 trillion worth of deficit spending a
year that we have to borrow from China. And we cannot maintain
that. And if we continue to do that, our economy will collapse
under a burden of debt that we have never experienced before.
So this is not, Oh boy, we would love to do this, we would
love to do that. No, there are certain things that we are going
have to come to grips with and be serious about. And I will
tell you, borrowing more money from China in order to give it
to other people in different countries is not something that I
consider to be a positive option. It is crazy, it is insane.
We have been providing aid to Egypt over all of these
years. And now we have people who seem to be high and mighty
about how bad Mr. Mubarak is, but have supported this aid
program to Egypt all of these years.
It seems to me that American foreign policy is not based on
principle, as you have suggested today, it should be or has
been, but instead it is based on juggling. What can we do for
the moment not to create a crisis, rather than have a long-term
principled policy and a policy aimed not at what we can do for
the world but what is best for the people of the United States
of America? And let me get to----
Mr. Ackerman. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, I won't. I have got a line of
questioning I would like to ask. I have got a very fine
diplomat. Let me just note, we have so much juggling going on,
that we can't have someone like yourself answer a straight
question about the nature of Sharia law. Now, if we can't do
that, how do we expect to have the American people and the
people of the world understand where we draw the line?
Yeah. We can have people jump up and applaud that Mr.
Mubarak is gone, yeah. But what is going to happen 2 years down
the road when we have an administration in Egypt that puts
women in jail, much less permitting them to participate in the
system, if they try to go on the street without wearing a veil?
Is that what we are going to end up with Mubarak gone? We are
trying not to end up with that.
Let me just note that I have been dismayed that for all of
these years, we have taken an administration in Egypt, which is
less than democratic, less than honest, we have known that, but
we have treated them well, and then as soon as--but they have
been basically a pro-stability and a pro-Western government.
And as soon as they are vulnerable, we turn on them with a
vengeance, as compared to an anti democratic regime in Iran
when there are demonstrators in the streets against them, we
have sort of a muffled response. Well, we can't really go in
and side with the demonstrators against this anti-American
Mullah regime dictatorship in Iran.
We can't do that because that would be just too intrusive.
But in Egypt where you have a friendly regime--as I say, we
don't just toss Mubarak, a guy who has tried to be a force for
stability, we don't just toss him under the boss, we toss him
to the wolves, and then we are surprised when the wolves end up
eating our lunch.
Let's get to some basics here. The administration Mubarak--
President Mubarak offered to say that he would not be a
candidate, and his son would not be a candidate and he would
oversee a basically a caretaker regime until the September
elections were held, and the people of Egypt were permitted to
make their decision as to what direction their country should
go. What was wrong with that?
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, let me just briefly comment on
your first point first, and then I'll----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. You have 30 seconds.
Mr. Steinberg. I understand.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Pardon me.
Mr. Steinberg. But having had it raised, I think our
position on Sharia law is very clear. And it was illustrated
very dramatically in the case of a proposal for the institution
of Sharia law in Afghanistan, which would have deprived women
of their rights and which would have been unacceptable to the
United States. And we made clear to President Karzai in the
Afghan Parliament that that was unacceptable to us.
So I don't think there was any lack of clarity or lack of
understanding on our part about where the red lines are and our
principals are. So I understand your question, but I want to
make clear from our perspective that we do understand that
point. And we do understand----
Mr. Rohrabacher. It did seem that you were dodging the
question earlier.
Mr. Steinberg. I apologize if I appeared to be dodging, but
I hope----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. That was a good
exchange. Thank you for those excellent questions.
Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
being here, Secretary Steinberg. During the Iranian protest 2
years ago, Americans saw how the Iranian people used the social
media, it is no longer in dispute, the effect of the Internet
on the Egyptian uprising. And they use Twitter, Facebook,
texting, YouTube, to gain a following in the country. And
exacting admiration in much of the world process.
However, many American people were shocked to know years
ago that the Iranians were using the social media, you know, to
monitor protests and to down opposition leaders and even worse,
we discovered that companies, as was mentioned by Congressman
Smith, with the presence in the United States were helping the
Iranian regime exploit technology and turn innovation into
violence.
So when the Egyptian Government commenced its cyber
crackdown, frankly no one was surprised. I don't think they
followed that. But it seems that American company is involved
in this instance as well. A company in California sold the
Egyptian state-run Internet provider the technology to monitor
the Internet, allowing the Egyptian Government to crack down in
dissent. And I also understand that the Pakistani Government, a
telecom company and the Saudi Government's telecom company have
this technology. It is no secret, I think, to anyone, that
neither has a glowing record on human rights.
I would like to know what the Department is doing to work
with American companies that are selling their technology and
these products around the world to ensure that these products
are not an obstacle to human rights at best or a tool of
violence at worst. When we sell weapons to other countries, we
require an end-use monitoring agreement. Do you think that such
an agreement to make sure that U.S. technology is not abused is
in order at all? Is that being considered, thank you.
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, as I mentioned to Congressman
Smith, I am not familiar with the specific case, but we will
get back to you on that. I think, more generally, one of the
things that we have tried to do as we work with civil society
is both to promote openness and to support their access to
alternative media when it has been deprived. But frankly, also,
to help them understand the dangers and the risk to them too.
And I think it is two sides to the coin, and that we have to be
alert to the dangers that will be used by people for the wrong
reasons.
So part of our educational effort in our work with them is
to help groups in civil society protect themselves and to take
measures to be sensitive to these things.
In terms of the specific technologies, again, without
knowing the specifics, it is hard to make a general
observation, but I think it is something we should take under
advisement.
Mr. Keating. I would ask if there is any discussion along
those lines, I would like to know myself, and I am sure that
many members of the committee would like to know that because,
indeed, people are losing their lives based on this technology.
And it is not a stretch to say it is being used as a weapons by
some of these other countries, and as such, should be treated
that way in end-use monitoring agreements so it would be
curious to know anything on that. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, do get back to us on
that.
Mr. Keating. I yield the rest of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, I would just like
to yield myself 30 seconds of time to welcome back and
congratulate and say thank you to a member of our Foreign
Affairs family, a member of our majority staff, Matt Zweig, who
has just returned from a year of military service in Kandahar,
Afghanistan. So thank you, Matt. Good to have you back.
And with that, I would like to yield 5 minutes of
questioning to our subcommittee chairman on Europe and Eurasia,
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. I thank the gentlelady for yielding, and I
appreciate you being here, Mr. Steinberg. My big concern is the
United States first, and our very close ally, Israel in the
Middle East, and toward that end, it appears to me there is
still a great deal of uncertainty right now. We are getting all
kinds of reports on what is going on and nobody knows for sure
what is happening. But we do know there has been upheaval, not
only in Egypt, but in other countries over there. And we get
about 30 percent of our energy from that part of the world.
And although the decision on exploring for energy here in
the United States will not rest with the State Department, the
State Department does have a role to play in deciding where our
national security interests lie.
And right now if we have problems over there in the Suez
Canal, and Egypt is the Suez Canal, or if things get bad over
in the Persian Gulf states, or if, and we see some people
concerned about things in Iraq. If things go awry in Iraq
because of Iran, we can see our supply of energy diminished
dramatically. And I think the State Department's obligation is
that they need to start expressing that to the administration.
The administration has--and we get about 30 percent of our
energy from the Persian Gulf region. We get about 20 percent
from Venezuela who is in league with Tehran right now.
So there is half of our energy. And we can't get permits to
drill in the Gulf now. We can't drill off the Continental
Shelf, we can drill in the ANWR. We can't drill for natural
gas. We had T. Boone Pickens here the last couple of days
talking about that.
And we have the ability to be energy independent within a
decade. There is no question about it. We have more energy in
this country collectively, including gas and oil, coal shale
that can be converted into oil, that any place in the world,
there is no question about it. But we are not moving in that
direction, so we are still dependent on the Middle East and
they have a life and death grip on us if everything goes awry.
And so I would like for you to answer the question, why is
it there is not more attention being paid by this
administration and the State Department to the security of this
Nation, both economically and militarily, because we are not
moving toward energy independence? Not only that, but if you
talk to the average person who is paying $3.50 a gallon for
gasoline knowing it is going to go to $5 or $6 if things get
out of control in a little bit, they are saying, you know, if
we have that ability, why don't we do something about it?
So where is the State Department on this issue? And why
isn't the State Department and Secretary Clinton talking to the
President about the long-term issue of what happens if things
go in the wrong direction in that part of the world?
And make no mistake about it, if you look at history and
there is a book from 1776 to now, which I hope you read and the
people at the State Department, you will see upheaval in that
part of the world is a constant, and our security depends on
it. So while we are concerned about that area and democracy and
everything else, why in the world isn't State and
administration talking about moving toward energy independence.
Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Chairman, it is a complex issue for the
whole administration.
Mr. Burton. It is not that complex.
Mr. Steinberg. In terms of the other parts of the
administration that are engaged. And I am not the spokesman
from that respect, but I can talk about some other things.
Mr. Burton. Before you go to other things. What I would
really like for you to do is go back to the State Department
and tell them to talk to the administration about our national
security. We are supposed to work with other nations in the
world, to bring about stability and we use foreign policy and
foreign aid to do all that. But the number 1 responsibility of
government, according to the Constitution of the United States,
is to protect this country, economically and, militarily. And
we are risking that right now, all you have to do is look at
what is going on not only in Egypt, but in other countries in
the Middle East.
Mr. Steinberg. I think if you look at our energy strategy,
one, the President has indicated the importance of developing
domestic sources. Two, we have talked about, in addition to oil
and gas, there are other energy sources like the efforts we are
doing to revive nuclear energy. We also are working to
diversify so that we are not dependent on these dangerous
areas. For example, a new agreement that we are negotiating
with Mexico to have access to activities on the boundary in the
Gulf. I was just in Africa and looking at opportunities to have
access with Ghana, a democracy in Africa which has----
Mr. Burton. I am talking about energy we have here in the
United States.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. Your time
has run out. Mr. Burton, I think you have made your point clear
and we would appreciate it if you would get back to Mr. Burton
about energy independence and the administration's plan.
Mr. Steinberg. Certainly.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I too want to
welcome our guest and thank you for being here. And thank you
Mr. Secretary for being here. The first question I have is a
follow up on Mr. Berman's question, is it the administration's
position that with respect to the constitutional provision in
the Egyptian Constitution with respect to religious parties
that it is possible to repeal that provision, but have a
sufficiently--a government which is sufficiently tolerant to
satisfy you or satisfy the Department that it will protect the
interest of the Egyptian people and our international
interests, or is it the administration's position that that
prohibition ought to remain as part of the Egyptian
Constitution? It sounded as if you weren't committed or the
administration was not committed--at least to advocating for
the preservation of that.
Mr. Steinberg. I think we are committed to advocating for
the principle. I think it would be a bit perilous for us to try
to write the Constitution in the context they are doing it.
There may be other formulations that are consistent with that
principle, but I don't want to have any ambiguity about the
importance of the principle.
Again, that is why, in our conversation earlier, I
mentioned some cases where we have advocated very vigorously
where that principle was inconsistent with basic values. And so
that is what we will focus on going forward, is it consistent,
that would be a way we would judge.
Mr. Cicilline. Also, would you tell me, it seems as if
there is tremendous concern from everyone that has spoken
really to us about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in a
future Egyptian Government. And I am just wondering what your
impression is with respect to the likelihood of that happening.
Interestingly, of course, when President Mubarak met, he had
met first with them really in response to the protest which
suggested to those of us from the outside that they may have a
more significant role in a future government in Egypt than we
might have first thought. So what do you think is a likely role
they would play? And then second, do we have strategies or an
approach which would help to ensure that funding doesn't go
from the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas moving forward?
Mr. Steinberg. Well, we are very focused and we are very
vigilant because of the risk that this process become hijacked
by extremists, by individualist groups that don't reflect or
respect the very principles that we think people are
demonstrating for. And we are obviously going to have to judge
that by what emerges. There are an infinite number of
possibilities that might come forward. But what we have to be
clear on is that we expect the next Egyptian Government to have
and advance the values of openness, tolerance, allowing people
to pursue an open life with their human rights respected, with
diversity respected, particularly on issues like religious
freedom, on women's rights, on a right to have freedom of
expression, of the press, of assembly. And we will apply those
criteria with a real recognition from the history that we have
seen in this region of the dangers that a process which might
begin with good impulse might not end up that way.
So I think our challenge right now is rather than trying to
say specifically now what will happen if it goes wrong, is to
focus on what we can do to help it go right, and to support
that process, and to be prepared to deal with it, and be clear
that there would be consequences if the outcome is one that is
not consistent with our values and our interest.
But right now, I think what it is critical is for us to
talk about what we are for. And I think by articulating those
principles and by identifying what we expect and what we
believe is in the interest of the Egyptian people and what we
think they are out there on the streets for. I think that
creates a positive engagement for us, not one of--again being
vigilant, but not based on the fear of the worst, but also an
opportunity to achieve this good result.
Again, we must remain vigilant and have seen this go awry.
And we will be prepared to both make clear what we are going to
do and to deal with those circumstances.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And I wanted to say finally,
thank you for your very articulate testimony with respect to
our responsibility to really approach our foreign policy in a
very balanced way. It is clear to me that it is in the national
security interest of our country to make the kind of
investments that we are making around the world, both to avoid
greater costs for our failure to become fully engaged. But also
to retain our moral authority so that we can do the work on
behalf of the American people, both in supporting our economy
and supporting our security.
And so I think this question about foreign aid is an
important one, but it is not simply done to help other nations,
but it is really done principally to help the United States
maintain its position internationally and to protect our
economy and to protect our national security and I thank you
particularly for those comments as well. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And now we
would like to hear from Chairman Ed Royce, the chair of the
Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Steinberg, I met with a group of seven
Egyptians from Cairo and Alexandria who had recently came to
the United States, many of them young professionals, and I
asked them to give me their opinions on what needs to be done.
I would like to share with you sort of their list from the
front lines.
The first observation they made is they shared with me that
we need strict implementation of international human rights
laws in this country and that there should be some discussion
of this in the United States. A guarantee of basic freedoms by
holding accountable those who violate international human
rights laws.
The second thing they see missing from the discussion is an
end to all discriminatory acts that are based on ethnicity and
sex and religion throughout all sectors of society. And most
important, some kind of discipline for those who violate that
prohibition.
They asked for eradication of all ideologies in the
education system because those installed discrimination and
hatred among students starting at the preschool level and all
the way up to the university level. This is partly because they
say the Muslim Brotherhood has gotten control in the
educational system and it is using it for that purpose.
The fourth thing, these are the young students that were in
the streets--they want awareness of the imminent danger of
radical religious groups in Egypt, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, which, to some extent, they say is funded by Iran.
And one of the things they report is there is walking around
money, and food, that has been provided by the Iranians, and it
is annoying to those that are leading the charge to have on the
streets a foreign influence, and they would like that known.
They say that this group has already infiltrated the
backbone of some Egyptian society. They also ask for a
reformation to the judicial system, a reformation to a system
which currently supports a corrupt regime and does not provide
justice to the citizens through the implementation of the laws.
They say bribery and corruption are the norm within most of
the judicial branch and report--the young professionals told me
they pay as much as 25 bribes in order get a little business
going or in order to be professionals. We heard it from
Hernando de Soto's report, right? The Finance Minister or
former Finance Minister, I think it was of Egypt, supported
Hernando's work. Hernando does his study, shows how you can
unleash all of this potential growth in Egypt because you only
know who owns 10 percent of the property. Nobody can start a
business without doing payoffs.
So he lays out the reforms and the first thing the
government does is sack their Minister who supported these
reforms. That shows us how much has to be done here. So I would
just add to your talking points when you talk about this, a
government that respects its people, that is what we want from
Egypt. A government that respects its people and isn't corrupt;
let's add that to our talking points about what we want done. I
just wanted your opinion about what the students and the young
professionals had told me.
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I think that is an enormously
constructive agenda. I think it is an important one that should
be a shared agenda of all of us. I think the issues that you
have raised are issues that should be of concern and that are
important to the long-term success of Egypt. So if we haven't
been clear enough that that is what we hope to see, we will do
a better job. But it is one of the things. Especially, I want
to agree especially with you on the point of rule of law and
corruption, which is a big concern and it is really critical to
the future. So thank you for those suggestions.
Mr. Royce. Well, there is one other point that they wanted
to make. They said there are a lot of good voices such as the
Council of the Wise, which was formed after January 25th
revolution, as well as many other voices in Egyptian society
that are well-known, that are admired by the people and are not
part of the Muslim Brotherhood. And every one of them was
absolutely in terror of what might happen if we end up
negotiating and help putting the Muslim Brotherhood in
positions of responsibility because, as they shared with me,
that is an organization that only exists to take power, put in
place an Islamic society and then carry out of the rest of the
agenda, which, as one of them told me, the next thing you know
we will be at war with Israel if they get control of the
government. If you talk to young people in the Muslim
Brotherhood, that is where they are driving the cadres on the
street, that is the ideology.
So can you keep them out of the equation? I know we
discussed this earlier, but can you do something to help those
voices in Egypt that are so frightened of that consequence?
Mr. Steinberg. I think that should be our objective and
that is what we are trying to do.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Steinberg. As I said, we have a program to address this
and we can and will do more.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. My colleague from New York. It is
good to see you, Elliot, recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to first of
all welcome the Secretary. I was here for his remarks and I
have known him for many years and we are lucky to have him. He
does a great job. Thank you for the job you are doing.
As you know, for the past 4 years, I chaired the Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee on this committee, and now I am the
ranking member. And one of the things that has been irking me,
and I am sure irking you and a lot of us, is that a lot of the
South American governments are recognizing Palestine. And why
it especially irks me is that the Palestinians are refusing to
sit down with the Israelis and negotiate without all these
ridiculous preconditions which actually shouldn't be
preconditions at all. That is what you negotiate about.
And I look at it, it is rewarding the Palestinians for
their intransigence. And I think that is the wrong thing to do,
because rather than tell them they should go to the negotiating
table, it sort of rewards them for not going to the negotiating
table. Now we have this resolution before the Security Council
which condemns Israel for the settlements, and makes it seem
that the settlements are the reason why there is no peace,
which I think is a bunch of nonsense. I think that if the
Palestinians would negotiate with the Israelis that the
settlement issue, along with other issues would be taken care
of.
I would hope that if that happens, the administration would
strongly and forcefully veto such a resolution as we have in
the past. And I believe that the administration so far has not
yet unequivocally indicated that it would do so. So I would
like to ask you is that a fact, and if it is, I would strongly
urge the administration to veto this resolution of the Security
Council if it comes up.
Mr. Steinberg. I thank you, Congressman Engel. First just,
if I comment on your first point about your recognitions we
have made very clear to a lot of countries, including in the
region that you talked about that you have had and continue to
have responsibility for that we think this is
counterproductive. I am disappointed frankly that we haven't
had more success, but it has been in our engagement at the
highest levels with each those governments. I, myself, have had
several of those conversations. And so our position is well-
known on that.
With respect to the Security Council, we have made very
clear we do not think the Security Council is the right place
to engage on these issues. I have had some success, at least
for the moment, in not having that arise there. We will
continue to employ the tools that we have to make sure that
that continues to not happen. And we made clear both to the
Palestinians and our key partners that there are other venues
to discuss these issues, but the most important one of which is
the one that you identified, which is the only way that this is
going to be resolved is through engagement between the two
parties, and that is our clear consistent position.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Yesterday I asked the two questions
to our panelists and I want to ask you the same two questions
and so what your answer is vis-a-vis what they said to me. And
I know some of this has been discussed in the past hour or so.
But what are the differences you see between 1979 Iran
revolution and 2011 Egypt? What are some of the differences
that make us hopeful that perhaps the results that we saw in
Iran wouldn't happen in Egypt?
And then, I know that another question I asked yesterday
which I understand Mr. Ackerman touched upon is what do we do
if Lebanon rejects the special tribunal? Mikati--the answer
from the panelists yesterday from that question of mine is that
Mikati should be shunned. He should not be invited to the
United States, he should be told that this is unacceptable, and
we should shun him.
As you know, I wrote the Syria Accountability Act, passed
in 2004, and with our now chairman, she and I were on a crusade
for many years to do this. And now Syria is still doing the
same kind of nasty things it has always been doing in the
region. We now have an ambassador there, but I don't see any
positive things from their side. I would like to you comment on
those three things if you could.
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you. Both obviously complicated
questions, especially the first. I got my start in government
working on the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. And so I
reflected a lot on that. I would simply say, first no two
circumstances are identical. But also our engagement in Iran
prior to the revolution was very different. The revolution of
Iran was much more associated with our engagement with the
prior regime.
Here I think we are seen as a positive force on the
Egyptian side, so I think we can have a positive influence and
I would be happy to go into more detail with you in less than 5
seconds.
With respect to Lebanon, let me just say that we believe
the continuation of the tribunal is essential, we made clear to
Mikati in direct conversations that we had through the Embassy
that that is our expectation. Again, I don't want to assume the
worst now and say the precise consequences of it not going
forward. But we have made clear that is what our expectation
is, it is the international obligation of any government in
Lebanon to meet those obligations. And we have made clear to
Mr. Mikati that we expect him to do so as well.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel.
I am pleased to recognize Mr. Manzullo, the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chair. In the summer of
2009, many of us in this country were very dismayed over the
fact that when the demonstrations broke out in Iran in the
streets on day 1, our President said nothing. On day 2, our
President said nothing. Finally, on day 3 he said something to
the effect that we need a continued dialogue with the clerics.
That was extraordinarily disappointing.
When the people started marching in Egypt, it didn't take
the President that long to undermine President Mubarak and say
he has got to go. I would like to know what the basis of the
President's decision making was. At that time, you were Deputy
Secretary of State and doing nothing in Iran 1\1/2\ years ago.
Why didn't he do something?
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I obviously have a different
view on what took place both in terms of the statements that we
made in support of the people in the streets in Iran, and the
support that we have continued to give for that, as well as our
continued focus on the problem of the depravation of human
rights in Iran.
Mr. Manzullo. No, I am talking about the response, not the
focus. Don't tell me that the people in the streets were
supported by the U.S. Government because they were not.
Mr. Steinberg. We made clear our strong support for them,
but at the same time----
Mr. Manzullo. But you didn't, that is not correct. They
were not supported.
Mr. Steinberg. I think we gave the support that the
President articulated and the Secretary articulated about our
strong commitment to their rights to peacefully demonstrate and
to assemble, the need for the government there to engage with
them.
Mr. Manzullo. Nothing on the order that was given to the
people in Egypt specifically saying that Mubarak has got to go.
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I also do not--on that side, we
have not used that expression.
Mr. Manzullo. Wait a second, wait a second. You are telling
me that President Obama has not said in one way or the other
that Mubarak must go? Is that what you are telling this
committee?
Mr. Steinberg. What the President has said and what the
Secretary has said is that change has to come, that a
transition has to come.
Mr. Manzullo. Can you give me a yes or no answer to my
question?
Mr. Steinberg. We have not used the expression that you
identified, sir.
Mr. Manzullo. So you said events must go into action and--
--
Mr. Steinberg. Correct.
Mr. Manzullo. Everybody in the world understands that
President Obama's position is to push Mubarak out of office.
And I am just really astonished that you think that that is an
amazing statement. So, why didn't we do anything more in Iran?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think our position has been clearly
to support of the rights of the people to demonstrate. We have
made clear that we thought that the election was not conducted
fairly, openly, that we spoke out against the oppression, we
spoke out against the violence.
Mr. Manzullo. It was clearly not enough. I mean, I don't
think anybody in this country was interested in Iran turning
around, was satisfied with the statement of the President of
the United States. So, what are you going to do now in light of
the President's involvement in Egypt? What happens if
demonstrations break out in Tehran? What are you going to do
now?
Mr. Steinberg. We will do as we have done. We have said
about demonstrations whether they are in Syria or in Iran.
Mr. Manzullo. You see, that is the problem, the answer that
you gave, that you are giving, I know it is well-intended and
it is obviously factual, but it is weak. And it is the message
of weakness that gets sent abroad as to what the United States
is doing. President Obama and the Secretary of State have been
very clear about what is going on in Egypt, granted the
demonstrations there have lasted longer than in Tehran. And
either they said directly or inferentially that Mubarak has to
leave. And apparently that is going on right now. But it was so
weak in Iran. Don't you think that the President's statements
go a lot toward formulating public policy when people take to
the streets such as they did in Tehran?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think the President spoke clearly
to this. But I also think there are other things that we did,
and partially using tools that you give us, we have identified
members of the Iranian Government who are human rights abusers
and imposed sanctions on them. We have taken measures to work
to appoint a special human rights rapporteur in Iran.
Mr. Manzullo. Well, they put three hikers on trial for
treason.
Mr. Steinberg. As we have made very clear and worked very
hard, including----
Mr. Manzullo. Well, nothing is working, so are you going to
change something in Iran?
Mr. Steinberg. We have a very comprehensive strategy in
Iran which not only deals with the human rights abuses there
which are substantial, but also the Iranian nuclear program,
which has led us with the leadership of the Congress working
together with us to impose the most comprehensive sanctions on
Iran that have ever been imposed. And have led us to help
mobilize the international community. And I think the two have
gone together because the fact of the democratic repression----
Mr. Manzullo. Well, in my remaining time, I just want to
let you know how disappointed we were with the President and
the very weak response to the people demonstrating for
democracy in the streets of Tehran back in the summer of 2009.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank, you Mr. Manzullo. And I very
much agree with you. Mr. Murphy of Connecticut is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank
you, Mr. Steinberg, for sticking around with us. I know we are
jumping all over the map a bit here, but I want to bring us
back to one of the subjects at hand today. We are obviously
continuing to monitor the events as they play out today in
Egypt. But if what we believe is happening is happening today,
as you hint at in your testimony, one of the stories of success
will be the potentially very positive role that a secular,
independent, well-respected military has played in this ongoing
transitional process in Egypt.
And I mention that as a segue to talk about Lebanon. The
LAF is at a very different point in its military developmental
history. We still have members of the Armed Forces there
communicating via cell phones with each other across the
Nation. And I want to ask you about how the United States
continues to play a constructive role in what is really the
nascent developmental stages of the LAF, and how we make sure
that our assistance to the Lebanese army continues in the
tradition of achieving both our goals and the Lebanese
military's goal going forward in that nation?
Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Congressman. I think you have
identified obviously an enormously important issue because we
have seen the possibility and the prospect of development of a
professional LAF that is responsive to a constitutional
democratic government as critical to the success of Lebanon and
particularly to deal with the challenge of Hezbollah and armed
groups in that society.
We want to see a professional civilianly controlled
military that can exert control over the country on the behalf
of a democratic government. And we have been encouraged by some
of the progress that the LAF has made. So we would like to
sustain with that, and yet we recognize the situation is fluid
in Lebanon. And we are very vigilant to the possibility that a
change in the political circumstances might undermine that
objective.
So we focused on two things, which is one, a very vigorous
commitment to end use monitoring to make sure that none of our
assistance to the LAF falls into inappropriate hands other than
the LAF itself. And the record is very strong on that in terms
of the LAF's ability to monitor and implement that.
Also, as we see the political developments move forward, to
make sure that the independence and the role of the LAF is not
compromised and that any implication that that might have for
our assistance.
We would hope that we would see a continuation of the
strong support for the LAF. It is a critical component of the
sovereignty and the integrity of the country as long as it is
associated with a democratic transparent open, a government
that is not the products of outside interference.
Mr. Murphy. Can you talk a little bit more about benchmarks
and milestones? How do we moving forward--I understand that our
military aid there is obviously interdependent with the
political developments in Lebanon. You talk a little bit about
how we make sure that the military and the LAF are hitting
benchmarks and milestones that assure that we are making a wise
investment?
Mr. Steinberg. Well, we have a very robust engagement with
the leadership. I believe it was just 2 or 3 weeks ago that
General Mattis of CENTCOM was out there meeting with the
Lebanese leadership. And I think that is that engagement. The
training that we do with them, the professional development
that we do with them that allows us to watch their progress, to
identify programs that continue to help develop their
professionalization. And clearly, it is linked to the political
developments because their ability to do this requires the
strong support of the political institutions that allow them to
not only develop their professional capabilities and to use
this equipment but also to have the mandate to extend their
authority throughout the country.
Mr. Murphy. And just finally, to the Prime Minister
designate, you talk about, in your testimony, making sure that
he makes good on his pledge to build an inclusive government.
How do we judge that inclusiveness? What do we look to as the
keys to know whether we have an inclusive government that
continues to be a recipient of U.S. economic and military aid?
Mr. Steinberg. I think we look both to the
representativeness of that government to make sure that no
important constituency in the Lebanese society is cut out,
particularly obviously a concern with the evolution that the
Sunni population is appropriately represented. But also to make
sure across the political spectrum, that we have an inclusive
government that includes the March 14th coalition, and it
includes the voices that have been the progressive voices in
Lebanon, and which, I think, it will be something that we
supported strongly. So we believe that those voices need to be
included in any government going forward.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
So pleased to yield 5 minutes to the vice chair on the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Mr. Pence of
Indiana.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank you
for calling this, what turns out to be extraordinarily timely
hearing. I always want to make a point, I want to thank the
Secretary for his service to the country, for his distinguished
career, it is an honor to you have back before the committee.
For some reason, this feels a little bit like deja vu all
over again, I am sure it does to you, Mr. Secretary, with your
long career in these matters. And frankly, with word of the
potential eminent and historic change that could take place in
Egypt before the turn of the clock today, on that part of the
world, this conversation is extremely important.
I must say, as the ranking member knows, as we partnered
together in the summer of 2009 to author a resolution that
passed this Chamber nearly unanimously and passed the Senate
unanimously, my first inclination is to stand with the people,
to stand with those who are clamoring for basic human rights,
for freedoms, for more access to the democratic process. And I
carry that bias into this conversation.
I support those who continue to call for democratic
reforms, I am grateful for the State Department and for the
administration broadly, expressions of support for an orderly
transition and the recognition of universal human rights.
Let me, though, by way of raising an issue to you, let me,
though, express a word of caution. One of the first things that
I learned as a member of this committee traveling into that
part of the world was the enormous importance of Egypt, and to
the history of the region, not just at this time, but obviously
through the millennium. The developments in Egypt are of
enormous consequence to U.S. strategic interest, and I would
say, most especially, to the interest of what I like to refer
to fondly as our most cherished ally, Israel.
And so while I know the folks at the administration has
largely been and your remarks have largely been on insuring an
orderly transition, I am concerned about an orderly transition
to what, or an orderly transition to whom? And specifically, I
find my mind drifting back to history, and to lessons of
history. Edmund Burke, famously a member of Parliament, one of
the strongest supporters of the revolution that took place in
the colonies, here in the United States, but also one of the
harshest critics of what happened in France. Edmund Burke
warned that different from the American Revolution, which was
largely born on a reach for democracy and a foundation of
respect for the rule of law, the French Revolution was
something different. And he warned of nefarious factions which
could have opportunity, his words now, ``to become master of
your assembly and the master of your whole republic.''
And with the news the CIA Director, I am told just moments
ago told a public meeting of the House Intelligence Committee
that he expects President Hosni Mubarak to step down this
evening.
I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, very sincerely
is where is that leading us? Who is that leading us to? I know
that the new Vice President has expressed and demonstrating a
willingness to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in a dialogue, an
organization that has largely outlawed in Egypt for decades.
But I guess my first question is, do you expect President
Mubarak to step down, does the State Department anticipate
that?
And secondly, what is the effect of that? Where is that
leading us? And thirdly, can you speak to are we sending a
message sufficiently to this transition authority dominated as
it is by the military in Egypt, that we expect not only an
orderly transition, but we expect order at the end of it. We
expect, if we are to continue that nearly a minimum of $1
billion a year in foreign aid that goes directly to Egypt, the
military coordination support that we provide, that we expect a
successor government to respect the treaties and the alliances
and the allies and the interests of the United States if we are
to continue to go forward with that foreign aid and with the
nature of the alliance that we have had with Egypt.
So I would love your responses in whatever time the
chairman will allow.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. 7 seconds. Plenty of time.
Mr. Steinberg. ``Yes'' is probably a good answer. But to
the last question, the answer is yes. We made clear what we do
expect--and I think that is the way we tried to engage
throughout this process is to set down a set of principles that
we expect the process to embody and the outcome to embody, and
that that is what we will judge it by.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Pence.
Mr. Faleomavaega, our colleague from American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, Mr. Secretary, I do personally want to welcome you
before the committee. And I also want to express my deepest
appreciation to the service that you have given to our country.
And I want to offer my personal welcome to one of our
committee staffers who have just returned from his tour in the
military. I wish I had the same reception when I came back from
Vietnam, Madam Chair. That wasn't my experience, for those of
us who had the unfortunate experience of having served in
Vietnam.
Mr. Secretary, I have often heard people say how important
the Golden Rule is; the Golden Rule, meaning that treat your
fellow men as you would like to be treated. I have also heard
another interpretation of the Golden Rule, and that is, he who
has the gold makes the rule.
What I am getting at, Mr. Secretary, for some 30 years
now--and it has been one way of keeping the peace especially
and what took place historically between Israel and Egypt, and
for the 30-year period we have given well over $65 billion in
financial assistance to Egypt, and $36 billion of that went to
Egypt's military defense system.
I am curious if--and I suspected from what my friend from
Indiana has just given his concerns for which I share that same
concern with Mr. Pence, but it seems that more and more that it
is coming out in the current crisis in Egypt is that the
military and the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be the two main
factions that are going to have a lot of influence and impact
on the future of where Egypt is going as far as its future is
concerned.
Now, I have noticed that you have given in your statement
that has been part of the administration's policy we want the
people of Egypt to determine their own future. But would it be
correct for me to say that in that mix, the military and the
Muslim Brotherhood definitely are going to be very important
factors in determining Egypt's future.
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I think what is important is
that the military play the kind of role we expect the military
to play in a democratic society, which is to support democratic
governance and to respect the rights of the people. And I think
we have been encouraged over the past several weeks that the
military has played a constructive role. But it is not for the
military to make the government, it is for the people to make
the government, and that is what we would expect. And we would
expect as we move forward with the democratic, inclusive
government that the military would be in service of that.
We have obviously talked a lot today about the Muslim
Brotherhood. I can only reiterate the critical view that we
have, which is that we will look to what government is formed,
and we will hold it to a set of principles, and we will expect
the members of the government to uphold those principles, and
we will expect that they are responsive to what we believe is
the yearnings of the people on the street. And that is the way
we will judge our relationship going forward.
I don't think we want to be naive, but I think we are
hopeful that what we have seen is a strong sense that there is
elements of civil society of the people, the Council of Wise
Men and others, the people that Congressman Royce talked about,
that can form a strong, stable, democratic government there,
and we need to do everything we can to support them.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I know my time is running, but I just
wanted to share another irksome situation as I want with my
friend from New York. The fact that 350 million people in the
Arab community's future rests on the fact that these two
countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt--that if these two countries
falter, there is definitely going to be some very serious
problems coming out of that.
I say irksome to the fact that one of the main issues that
always seems to come into the equation when we talk about the
Middle East is oil. My sense of irksome is the fact that we
have spent almost $1 trillion in getting rid of Saddam Hussein,
and expenditures of lives of our own soldiers, and the amount
of energy and resources, and yet when it came time to divvy up
the fortunes, some 30 major oil companies that conducted
biddings of the contracting and the oil to be extracted from
Iraq, to my surprise China was the winner of the bidding
process.
Now, correct me if I am wrong on this, but the fact that it
was our blood, our money, our resources, and supposedly having
some sense of benefit as well for our country, but as it turned
out, China was the beneficiary. Am I correct on this?
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, there are a number of American
firms who are there. Exxon for sure, and Shell probably. We
have worked with them to encourage them to participate. We have
worked with the Iraqi Government to create the conditions that
would make this attractive to American firms.
One of the problems, and it is an ongoing problem with the
Iraqi Government, is that they haven't really opened this up to
the kind of investment that we would like to see. It is a big
priority of the engagement, and as the new government is formed
there, we will continue to push this to make it because we
think American firms have a lot to contribute to the economic
and energy future of Iraq.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
I am pleased to yield to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina for 5
minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I hope that I have
more than 30 seconds than you gave me the other day.
Thank you so much, Mr. Steinberg, for being here. A lot of
great questions have been asked today, and you all have really
delved into a lot of the subjects that are concerning for me.
So I am just going to piggyback on Mr. Burton's comments
earlier about energy independence.
Instability in the Middle East. When I was a young boy, I
remember the gas shortages. I remember the crisis that we had
in Iran. I remember countries around the world where you had
revolutionary factions, and you had groups that weren't
friendly to the United States step into the void. So it is very
concerning to me and the folks that I represent back in the
State of South Carolina that we have stability in the Middle
East.
We have a port in Charleston that receives shipments that
come through the Suez and the Panama, so it is important that
for trade and economic prosperity in this country that
stability in the Suez region is maintained, stability in not
only the North Africa and Middle East, but also East Africa. So
there are a lot of different things that are concerning here.
So who steps into the void in this process is interesting.
And you stated that the administration would adhere to
consistent principles regardless of who was in power. And the
question I have for you, and taken in the light of stability,
and taken in the light of what our energy independence needs
are--and let me just segue to that for just a second because
you mentioned other sources of energy.
I think it is imperative that the United States and the
administration's policies look at American emergency
independence and use American resources that lessen our
dependence on foreign sources, because we are seeing rising gas
prices which affect input costs, which affect commodity prices.
So it is a huge trickle-down effect.
So let me segue back into is the administration actively
working to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from being involved
in this process of new governance in Egypt.
Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I would say that we are
actively working to make sure that the government that emerges
is an inclusive, tolerant, democratic one that respects the
rights of women, minorities, religious minorities and the like.
It is not focused on one particular group; it is on all groups.
We want the principle of anybody participating in a future
Egyptian Government to sustain those values. And anybody and
any group that isn't consistent with that, we would not support
their being a part of the government.
Mr. Duncan. So along those lines, what specific steps is
the State Department or this administration taking along those
lines?
Mr. Steinberg. That is precisely why we have been so active
in pushing the Egyptian Government to engage in a prompt,
orderly transition, because we believe the best chance of
getting that tolerant outcome that we want with the kinds of
people that Congressman Royce talked about is to move forward
with the process and to engage with those forces, because those
are the forces that can come together and create both democracy
and stability in Egypt.
Mr. Duncan. Has the administration, in your support for
clear and consistent principles, stated to Egypt that you would
not support the Muslim Brotherhood in any shape, form, or
fashion?
Mr. Steinberg. Again, Congressman, I don't think we single
out any individual group. We say what we would support, and we
would not support those who are not consistent with those
principles.
Mr. Duncan. I would hope that the State Department policy
would be to support factions that are friendly to the United
States, friendly to the United States' economic interests, and
friendly to the United States as far as national security
interests.
Mr. Steinberg. I think we feel comfortable, if you look at
history, that democratic governments where people really have a
voice, and they get to choose, and they are not intimidated,
and there is diversity are friendly to the United States. If
you look at the democracies around the world, almost to a
country those are our friends.
So I think that is why we are so committed to moving
forward with this process, because we do think it achieves
exactly what you have identified.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
And to round out the question-and-answer period, I am so
pleased to yield as our last interviewer Mr. Griffin for the
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, the vice chair of that
subcommittee.
Thank you, Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
We had some testimony yesterday regarding the potential for
al-Qaeda to exploit some of the instability in northern Africa,
particularly in Egypt, and I just wanted to get your comments
on that. There was a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Kenneth
Pollack on this yesterday, and understanding that this may be
down the road a bit, sort of intermediate term and not
immediate, and also understanding that Egypt has a history of
doing a pretty good job of keeping some of the more extreme
elements under control, could you comment on whether al-Qaeda
is looking to recruit or take advantage of the power vacuum in
the region?
Mr. Steinberg. Without making a specific reference to that,
because I don't know specifically that they are, but I would
have to--I think we have to be alert to the possibility that
they would. I think that we know that they are looking for any
opportunities to advance their agenda in any place that they
can find it. And certainly places where there are real vacuums,
like we see in Somalia, are very dangerous places, which is
precisely why we do believe it is so important to have this
orderly, sustained process, because we think it is the best
antidote about giving extremists and terrorist groups the
opportunity to make inroads.
Mr. Griffin. Well, the article that I was looking at
yesterday tends to say that this may not be the most likely
course, particularly in the short term. But as we know, al-
Qaeda has roots even at the highest echelons in Egypt. So you
don't know of any specific, identifiable antidotes or
information that you can share with regard to al-Qaeda in that
region? You just identify it as a possibility.
Mr. Steinberg. I think it is something we have to be alert
to. Obviously to get into a little more detail, we would
probably have to do this in a closed session. But I would say
the most important thing is to be vigilant to it and to take
the steps now to not to let the circumstances arise, because I
feel very confident that the voices in the streets in Tahrir
Square are not voices that are--voices that are looking to al-
Qaeda as their salvation. So we need to make sure that they are
the ones that prevail in this situation.
Mr. Griffin. Thank you for that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for your excellent
testimony. We look forward to getting some of those questions
in writing from you. And I would especially appreciate your
responses and the Department of State's responses to the U.N.
overpayment issue and the refund.
Thank you so much. And this committee is now adjourned.
Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearings Record
__________
IFES Briefing Paper, ``Elections in Egypt: Key Challenes for Credible
and Competitive Elections,'' submitted for the record by the Honorable
Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California